Full text of "Russia's agony"

See other formats

Google

This is a digital copy of a book lhal w;ls preserved for general ions on library shelves before il was carefully scanned by Google as pari of a project

to make the world's books discoverable online.

Il has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one thai was never subject

to copy right or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books

are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often dillicull lo discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the

publisher lo a library and linally lo you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud lo partner with libraries lo digili/e public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the
public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order lo keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to
prevent abuse by commercial panics, including placing Icchnical restrictions on automated querying.
We also ask that you:

+ Make n on -commercial use of the files We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request thai you use these files for
personal, non -commercial purposes.

+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort lo Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the
use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ Maintain attribution The Google "watermark" you see on each lile is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find
additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ Keep it legal Whatever your use. remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just
because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other

countries. Whether a book is slill in copyright varies from country lo country, and we can'l offer guidance on whether any specific use of
any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner
anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers
discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through I lie lull lexl of 1 1 us book on I lie web
al |_-.:. :.-.-:: / / books . qooqle . com/|

» V

•^r

HARVARD COLLEGE
LIBRARY

Given by

JAMES N. B. HILL

CLASS OF 191 5

'9'f

RUSSIA'S AGONY

<l VS AGONY

V ■!.- -T WILTON

r "IMA!. M *

j.T»vi(i(:.

e. p.Dvrrorsi * 1:0^1- any

UJil Il,TH A.ViLE

RUSSIA'S AGONY

ROBERT WILTON

COMJCRFONDENT Or TuM TlMMS AT PKntOOMn,

Khight or Saint Gw>bgm, no., m.

NEW YORK

E. P. DDTTON & COMPANY

681 Fifth Avenue

."'..a . - /'/-■ /..■■■• as. -5

j;;iv[:rsity

LIBRARY

otPiola64/

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

All Right* Evened

Printed i* the United State* of America

OP
THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN THKB AIA

FOB
THE GREAT CAUSE

PREFACE

To inr RgAPmtg;

Ik the following pages I speak of Russian affairs with the
experience of an observer who has lived from early boyhood
among the Russian people and has shared with them their
joys and their sorrows.

"Russia's Agony" was written in compliance with a per-
sonal call and with the discharge of a public duty; it com-
bines a human document with a historical treatise. Men,
events and conditions have, I believe, been dealt with in a
spirit of fairness, for although the original edition of this
book was begun and completed a year ago, the storm and
stress of later developments call for no substantial changes.
That a comprehensive account of Russia from the inside
was in demand has been shown by the rapid exhaustion of
several impressions of this work, and indicated by the pub-
lication of an American edition.

Serious study of Russian affairs is more than ever im-
portant, and even necessary, for every thinking man and
woman, not only because of the ignorance that prevails on
the subject — a great handicap to us in the War — but because
of the great social drama that has been staged in that
country. Since her collapse, Russia has become the focus
of social unrest throughout the world. Bolshevism — a foe
more deadly to our civilization than German Militarism —
cannot be effectively combated unless we understand the cir-
cumstances of its origin and working, indissolubly connected
with the so-called Russian Revolution — a Revolution that
has still to justify its name.

The questions that have been put to me so often will rise

to the reader's lips: "What is Bolshevism?" and "Why did

••

viii PREFACE

the Russians succumb to its influences ?" This book answers
them in full. Here I give a few preliminary outlines:

Bolshevism demands an immediate application of Social-
istic ideals. Its protagonists care not by what methods or
with whose help they carry out their experiment. Bolshevism
recognizes no nationality, no society, no family — nothing but
a conglomeration of manual workers governed by "idealists"
with the help of a Red Army. It is essentially un-demo-
cratic; it involves the forcible subversion of all the laws and
covenants upon which human society has been established.

Why then has it obsessed the Russian people? There
were predisposing conditions, some permanent, others acci-
dental. A mystic idealism combined with singular proneness
to mass action have long characterized the Russians; the
sufferings and perplexities of the war have affected with
peculiar intensity an ignorant and illiterate people in an
ill-governed State. Planted in such favorable soil, the seeds
of Bolshevism induced a veritable psychic disorder which
defeated — temporarily at least — the fair promise of the
Revolution and has spread its contagion to other lands.

The Bolshevist experiment has been applied. Russia to-
day is a desolate land; millions of its inhabitants are
unclothed and dying of hunger ; all the sufferings of the war
are as nothing in comparison with the first-fruits of Bol-
shevism; and, naturally, the workers have suffered most, as
they must invariably suffer from any assault upon the social
fabric. In Russia to-day the masses, deprived of remunera-
tive toil, despoiled of their savings and even of their bread
to feed a ravening horde of mercenaries, are closing their
account with Bolshevism. The reaction has already come,
sweeping and intense as was the collapse. The Bolshevist
garrison in and around Moscow feels the mutterings of the
coming storm. Like Ludendorff, it is preparing a final
assault. The plundered billion of Russia's gold reserve, the
co-operation of the "Blond Beast" and the sentimental igno-
rance of cranks or enthusiasts in other lands provide for-

PREFACE ix

midable weapons of offense. Like their friends in Berlin the
Bolshevild dispose of a vast propaganda fund, which even
now makes its insidious power felt in all countries, becloud-
ing the public conscience.

Germany's ruthless attempt to dominate the world will
not have failed until Bolshevism is overthrown. The lists
are still open. Germany, bleeding and distraught, has an
unconquered ally in Bolshevism. By sapping the bases of
our national life, Berlin still hopes to destroy the fruits of
our Victory. Until the evfl has been reached in its present
stronghold, Moscow, and Russia has revived to new nation*
hood the German conspiracy will not have been crushed —
there can be no real peace in the world.

Bolshevism is not Russian — it is essentially non-national ;
its leaders belong almost entirely to the race that lost its
country and its nationhood long ago. In April, 1918, the
Bolshevist "Government," including 384 "Peoples' Commis-
saries," was represented by 2 negroes, IS Russians, 15
Chinamen, 22 Armenians and Georgians, and more than 800
Jews. Of the last 264 had come to Russia from the United
States during the "Revolution."

Let us awaken to the full significance of this phenomenon.
Let us, before all, make reparation to the race that gave us
our religion, the very basis of our civilization ; let us restore
the Jews to their country and to their nationhood. It will
be but an act of sacred Justice; it will also be a means of
social salvation. The liberation of Palestine from Turkish
thralldom and its promised return to the Chosen Race have
been rightly heralded and acclaimed by Jew and Gentile alike.

We have fought in order to assure the unfettered prog-
ress of nations towards universal brotherhood by placing
national life on the sure foundations of peace, ordered liberty
and social justice. At a great price we have won this boon
for ourselves and for other nations, cementing with our blood
a comradeship that eschews class privileges and distinctions.
Is this great step in human progress — with all its inevitable

z PREFACE

sacrifices — to be imperiled by a mere handful of madmen,
seeking to destroy the very existence of nations? The people
of the United Kingdom have given their response in the elec-
toral consultation which has just been concluded. Who can
doubt that France and the United States will be equally
emphatic?

Russia has to voice her sentiment otherwise. The time
for peaceful expression will come when the hostile garrison
of Bolshevism and its German supporters have been driven
out. What form of government may then be adopted by
the free decision of the Russian people concerns only them-
selves. Three centuries ago they elected a Tsar of the
Romanovs. The dements of a true democracy were embodied
in the Zemsky Sobor, or Assembly of the Land. But Russia
then was dominated by Byzantine tradition, and later by Ger-
man influence. The voice of the people was dulled by these
un-Russian forces. Freed of their deadening power, Russia
will assert the principles of justice and true democracy that
are inherent to the Russian character. Her troubles came
not from the Monarchy, but from the alien influences that
the Monarchy imbibed. The German incubus will have been
removed ere Russia can revive.

Of that revival I perceive sure and certain promise. I
believe that the Russian people were destined to play an
exalted part in the advancement of mankind, and that the
day will soon dawn when the peoples of the world will duly
appreciate the sacrifices that the Russians have endured, not
less than the services that they render to the common cause
of humanity. It is with this confidence that I am leaving
the hospitable shores of America to rejoin my Russian com-
rades in the great adventure of this unparalleled war — the
restoration of Russia.

R. W.
Bohemian Club,
San Francisco,

January 4, 1919.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
Introduction ••• 1

PART I— SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

CHAPTER II
Qbkhnb, Bibb, and Decline • ••••• T

CHAPTER m

Bureaucracy and Okkraha • • • • • 15

CHAPTER IV

Thjb National Conscience ..•;••• 82

chapter v
Razputinihm and the Coxtbt • • • • • 80

CHAPTER VI

German Influences . . • . .48

CHAPTER Vn

Thi Jews ••64

CHAPTER Vm

C o ndit io ns of Upheaval . . . . . • 61

xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX

PAOB

Revolution V$rsu$ Evolution 75

CHAPTER X

Revolutionary Parties 93

PART II— u DEMOCRACY; 9 " SOCIALISM,

AND " FREEDOM

CHAPTER XI

The Revolution 101

CHAPTER XII

The Soviet, " Coalition/' and Bolshevism . . 182

CHAPTER Xffl

Abdication and After 151

chapter xiv
Mutiny of the Sailors 185

chapter xv
" No Annexation and No Indemnity " ... 173

CHAPTER XVI

Anarchy 182

PART III— RUSSIA AT WAR

CHAPTER XVn

The Outbreak of Hostilities 107

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER XVm

PAO»

Poob Armaments; Splendid Abmt . 209

chapter xix
Soldau-Tannenberg and After 224

CHAPTER XX

" The Hun within the Gates " 240

chapter xxi
Nationality Problems ........ 247

CHAPTER XXn

Short-lived Victory 262

CHAPTER XXm

The Bolshevist Betrayal 280

PART IV—KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

CHAPTER XXIV

The Fight with Bolshevism 296

CHAPTER XXV

The Hope or Russia 315

CONCLUSION

chapter xxvi
The New Russia 831

xiv CONTENTS

Appendix I— Declaration of the Progressive Bloc . 841

Appendix II— The " Soldiers' Charter " . 844

Appendix DI— Foreign Trade or Russia . . . 847

Index _ • ^ 840

ILLUSTRATIONS

Tn Auvhob Ftomti$pim»

Gbbooby Rasputin and Hb "Dbyotbbs" 98

Nicholas H wish Hb Son ahd Dauohxbbs 40

Thb Tsab and Hn Momma • . 78

Solkbbs* ahd Sailors' "Dblbqasbb" n no Duma .

Thb Gaboon of Captivity .....•••••

Onb or tub "Abmt Commtrbsb" 174

Eablt Ideals of thb Revolution ........

fbbb Jot Bidbs fob Rbvolutionaby Souhbbs • • • • • 190

Thb Grand Dun Nicholas when Gbnbbaubsdio C ohvbbuh o with
ah Abut Chaplain ...

Caucasian Native Hobss Division hi thb Cabpathians . . 814

Thb Sayaxob in thb Cabpaxhiahs 999

Gshbbai* L. G. Kobkilov . . . 998

G— HTML M. V. AlJBlBlSV ••••••••••

Amasohb at Pbatbbs . . .

SfAMPBDSD BT THB BOUWBVUL •*•••••••

Ttpb or Kuban Cossack 818

IffifWAgr. Vt.A wngT^m f ffl g Rw ^ MNF OT • • •• • • • 999

RUSSIA'S AGONY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Inspired by conceptions of government borrowed
bom the adjacent Empire of Byzantium, the Russian
autocracy was destined, like its protagonist, to enjoy
prosperity so long as it avoided direct conflict with
powerful neighbors, and, having exceeded this rule, to
suffer a gradual process of internal decay and of external
disaster. The influences of western civilization ever
acted as a dissolvent upon the eastern system of autoc-
racy.

Weakened and retarded in their development by suc-
cessive waves of Tatar invasion, the Russian people were
long in manifesting any decisive tendency to eschew
Asiatic in preference for western models. Peter the
Great foresaw and prepared his country for the coming
change. His successors, devoid of his genius, interpret-
ing his clear-sighted endeavor to reach the open sea as a
mere lust for conquest, remained oblivious to the inward
teaching of his reign. They introduced reforms tardily,
under the stress of circumstance, never anticipating the
dangers of delay except by specious methods of police
repression which served only to intensify — even if they
concealed — the fires of discontent.

Over a century ago Russian officers, returning from
the Napoleonic wars, organized the first revolutionary
movement in Russia. The disastrous Crimean War half

% RUSSIA'S AGONY

a century later, revealing the internal weakness of Russia*
led to the emancipation of the serfs and great adminis-
trative and judicial reform l in the sixties. In the
intervals the autocracy had reverted towards reaction,
which was enhanced by the successful war against Tur-
key, undertaken for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs
and — as the irony of internal politics demanded — for the
strengthening of despotism in Russia.

Yet another fifty years later a war against Japan,
lightly entered upon from analogous " internal " motives,
led to widespread disorders, which could be repressed
then, and to a marked development of a constitutional
movement, which had to be satisfied. The semi-Consti-
tution of October, 1905, introducing Representative .Gov-
ernment, was followed by another period of reaction and
by the further development of the okhrana or secret
police system, which belittled and discredited the Duma
in the eyes of the masses. Temperance — long urged by
the Duma, and at last ordained by Imperial Edict in
the early part of 1914 — opened the eyes of the peasant
masses, while it enhanced their material prosperity.

The great war with Germany thus found Russia un-
prepared — her ruler and her people devoid of an organic
bond of union. The popularity of the struggle, its humane
and exalted aims, were soon overshadowed by internal
differences and by the maladministration and abuses of
the Old Regime.

Razputinism, symbolizing the superstitions and favor-
itism of a Court severed from vivifying contact with
the People, undermined the prestige of the Throne and
of the Church among the masses.

The blessings of temperance bestowed by the autocrat

1 These included local government by provincial and district Zemstvos
elected by all classes, including a numerous contingent of peasants and municipal
councils (Dumas) elected by a property suffrage, also reform of the Law Courts,
assuring "speedy and merciful justice," and introduction of trial by jury.

INTRODUCTION S

proved a fatal gift for the autocracy. The masses only
realized more clearly the evils of the autocratic rule.
They were many. Disorganization in army supply had
involved unnecessary losses of men and territory during
the war. Corruption in high places and disorder in
railway management had brought about a dearth of
food in the cities. Millions of men were needlessly
called to the colors. These factors, sufficient in them-
selves to shake the loyalty of the troops and the people,
were aggravated by persistent unwillingness or inability
on the part of the autocrat to comply with warnings
that had been repeatedly conveyed to him by the repre-
sentatives of the nation, and even by the Allies, as to the
urgent need of Responsible Government.

When he at last gave way in March, 1917, it was too
late; the Revolutionary movement — prepared long before-
hand — had already acquired too great an impetus to
afford the Moderate parties an opportunity for imme-
diate and effective resistance.

History offers nothing comparable with the events of
1917. An empire covering one-sixth of the world's
territories and numbering upwards of 180,000,000 souls
suddenly cast off its government and remained bereft
of authority, of law, and of order for a prolonged period
in the very midst of a great wax. The human imagi-
nation is overwhelmed by the dimensions of the Russian
Revolution. Other countries felt its influences, good
and bad,- profoundly. Its dramatic incidents and lessons,
the pathetic fall of the autocrat, a promise of revival
followed by disasters that seemed to be irreparable —
all these themes engage our curiosity and arrest our
attention. Good and evil are closely interwoven in the
Revolutionary record. The evil came uppermost, but
the good was bound to survive. One great benefit it
has already conferred upon Russia and her friends is

4 RUSSIA'S AGONY

the awakening of a deeper interest in her affairs and a
desire to know the real truth about her.

An old woman threw a stone at a baker's shop-window
and "started" the Russian Revolution. Some days
later, in March, 1917, I was standing in the vast square
that faces the dull red pile of the Winter Palace, and
saw soldiers and civilians, men and women, pulling down
the black and yellow standard of the autocracy. It
had floated from the high flagstaff surmounting the main
gateway ever since that proud building had replaced
the humble Dutch cottage — still one of the show places
of his metropolis — wherein two centuries ago Peter the
Great had made his abode during the foundation of the
city that was to be his "window into Europe."

Crude withal and unpolished, his genius, like an uncut
diamond of finest water, had shed a new light amid the
shadows of Muscovy. Breaking all resistance, severing
himself from the trammels of semi-Asiatic tradition, he
had boldly, far-sightedly launched and steered the ship
of State towards the West. Was this removal of its
emblems to be prophetic merely of the end of autocracy?
Or was I witnessing the logical sequel to the great work
that Peter had begun — the final passing of Russia into
the communion of western nations?

The yellow folds, emblazoned with the black double-
headed eagle, had been adopted by John the Third, on
his marriage to a Byzantine princess. It symbolized
the union of temporal and spiritual power wielded by
the autocrator over Constantinople and the Roman
Empire of the East. That symbol had been the guiding
motto of Russia's rulers since the days of the Terrible
One. In its place, amid the plaudits of the assembled
crowd, the Red Flag of Revolution was soon afterwards

INTRODUCTION 5

I, brazenly announcing the end of the autocratic
era. Some weeks went by, and, under the mellowing
influence of wind and weather, its sanguinary hue faded
perceptibly, gradually assuming a dull gray tone. The
process of time was to exert a like influence upon the
shortsighted enthusiasm of the multitude. Wild and
dangerous visionaries, acting largely in collusion with
the country's foes, applied Socialistic " ideals." Political
chimera was to lead to disillusion and apathy, interrupted
by sporadic joy and depression as the ephemeral success
of the Revolution alternated with crushing disasters in
the field and a shameful peace.

Other thoughts and reminiscences obtruded them-
selves amidst the turmoil of that eventful day and in that
historical square. It had witnessed the loyal outpourings
of an emancipated people, when the peasant serfs knelt in
gratitude before Alexander II. Here also, when the
Great War began, a hundred thousand people acclaimed
Nicholas II, forgetting the innocent blood that had been
shed within its precincts a decade earlier. Then men,
women, and children had come to seek the countenance
of their Little Father, desiring a larger measure of freedom,
and were received with bullets; now they were avenging
that ghastly blunder, dominated by long pent-up feelings
of revolt.

We had attained at last a closer communion with
Russia, and were bound together by the ties of a common
interest against a common enemy, only to find the great
cause of Country and Freedom, that we had at heart,
tragically weakened by Russia's internal troubles — a
temporary weakening, it was to be hoped. But upon our
comprehension of its causes and of the remedies that
were to be an indispensable condition of recovery would
depend the future of Russia and of her Allies.

PART I

SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

CHAPTER H

ORIGINS. RISE, AND DECLINE

The Conflict b et ween Slavdom and the Tatars— Early Civilisation Over-
whelmed — Republics and Principalities give place to Tsardom— The
Autocracy — Its Greatness — Its Evils.

At the dawn of history the Slav — last-come of the
races that migrated from Asia — gradually colonized the
vast domain familiar to us under the names of Serbia,
Bohemia, Poland, Galicia, and Russia. Originally pagan
tribal communities, they slowly developed into Chris-
tian principalities and republics — an evolutionary process
called forth and stimulated by circumstances of an
economic order.

The great rivers of northern Slavdom — the Vistula,
the Dvina, and the Dnieper, with their tributaries, and
later the Volga — afforded natural avenues for commerce
in the exchange of European commodities — largely domi-
nated by the Hansa cities of the Baltic — with Asiatic
markets: Byzantium, Persia, India, and Siberia. And
the dwellers by these rivers became the sturdiest and
most enterprising representatives of the Northern Slav
peoples. Their descendants have preserved these traits.
Among them are the Cossacks of the Dnieper, the Don,
and the Volga, and the Pomory (literally By-the-sea
dwellers) of the Far North.

8 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

In what is now European Russia we find in the early
Middle Ages flourishing commercial organizations, like
the republics of Pskov and Novgorod, doing much busi-
ness with the Hansa and the principality of Kiev, acting
as an entrepdt for trade with Byzantium. Those enter-
prising sea-rovers, the Vikings, who were keen traders
as well as fighters, gradually imposed themselves upon
the northern Slavs. Hence arose the legend of Rurik,
Sineus, and Truvor, the Variag, or Norse brethren, who
came to " rule over" these communities. The Norman
conquest of northern France and England was attended
by circumstances not less far-reaching.

By and by they acquired a permanent status, and their
descendants figure largely in the early chronicles of
Russia. Among them was Alexander Nevsky, who drove
back the Swedes (his ancestors) and Finns many centur-
ies before the time of Peter the Great. Earlier still,
Vladimir Krasnoe Solnyshko (Little Red Sun) had reigned
in Kiev and converted his people to Christianity. He
was so well beloved that his name still lives in the memory
of simple Russian peasants. Both these Grand Dukes
were canonized by the Church. Descendants of " Rurik "
associated themselves with their people, and largely,
thanks to their spirit of duty and self-sacrifice, the nation
did not " go under " during the sad times of Tatar
domination. In order to obtain investiture from the
Khan they had to travel countless miles — to Mukden, a
whole year on the road through Siberia — and to debase
themselves in sign of homage; and some never returned.

It is said that the name " Rus " was borne by a Norse
tribe, and that the Dnieper warriors coming to Constan-
tinople to vindicate the rights of their merchants were
so styled by the Byzantines. The name "Russian"
would thus appear to be of Norse origin.

The Tatars converted the Dnieper Valley into a wilder-
ness. Kiev lay in ruins for two centuries, until it was

ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE 9

recolonized by Slavs of Russian stock — the Little Rus-
sians of to-day.

Russia's "center' of gravity" was lost for a time.
Many small "dukedoms" had, however, "budded off"
north and eastward, which were later to form a new
"center" in Muscovy. To this new country came
settlers from the Dnieper, the Dvina, and the Volkhov,
bringing the names of their original abodes. Thus Nizhni
(Lower) N6vgorod on the Volga recalled Velfky (Great)
Novgorod, the Northern Dvina recalled the river of the
Baltic; many place-names in Little Russia were dupli-
cated in Great Russia.

A new and larger State thus arose. It had attracted
numerous elements from the disturbed ohrdiny (borders),
where Swedes, Lithuanians, Poles, and German "knights"
alternately made incursions. It developed the concomi-
tants of statehood — a defensive and administrative
apparatus, necessarily crude in its earlier forms, but
essentially Russian. The servants of the State were
called tidglye liudi (burden-bearers). They had to appear
kdnno i zbr&yno (horsed and harnessed) at the summons
of the voyevdda (war leader), as the local official was
called. When the Tatar raids began to molest Muscovy
the people naturally preferred the shelter of strong or
less affected dukedoms or voyevddstva. In order to put
a stop to these migrations and prevent a weakening of
the country's defenses, the settlers or laborers were
" bonded" to the local administrator or pomUshchik
(fief-holder), land tenure being conditional to military
obligations. This measure of State defense afterwards
degenerated into the enslavement of the peasants to the
pomtishchik — a name that came to be applied to land-
owners. Such was the origin of serfdom.

'Without attempting to give more than an outline of
the broad aspects of early Russian history, I think it
is important to note that the Russian people displayed

10 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

in remote times a spirit of enterprise and freedom, and
that extraneous circumstances subsequently dulled the
one and quenched the other. Wave after wave of Asiatic
invasion swept over Russia, effacing the landmarks of
national growth, and preparing the way for the reign
of autocracy, wherein the people saw their only hopes
of salvation. In this view they were confirmed by the
teachings of the Church.

Autocratic Russia, like its Asiatic predecessors, waxed
in might, majesty, and dominion, in the end subjugat-
ing other nations, yet remaining herself nationally unde-
veloped, and, like the Tatar empires of the East, bound
to disclose inherent elements of weakness whensoever
she came into decisive collision with the progressive
nations of the West.

If we carry the parallel farther, we find the subju-
gation of more highly civilized races was in itself a source
of disintegration. The Tatars left a deep and abiding
impression upon Russia, yet, weakened, disrupted, and
subjugated, the Russians in the end destroyed the power
of the Khans. Similarly, by conquest of the Teutonic
and Polish borderlands, the Russian autocracy prepared
the way for its own downfall. Had Peter the Great not
"opened a window," through which western influences
forced themselves headlong into the Asiatic calm of
Muscovy, had his successors not laid violent hands upon
Lithuania and Poland, through which extraneous, dis-
integrating elements gained admission into the heart of
Russian politics, the history of Russia would have been
a very different one.

The autocracy could endure only on one condition:
that, like the despotisms of China or Turkey, it sedu-
lously avoided active intervention in the affairs of other
States. Alexander I having sent his armies into France,
his officers, on returning home, conspired to overthrow
the autocracy. This was the famous Decembrist plot,

ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE 11

which nearly cost his successor the Throne. When
Nicholas I subdued the Magyar revolution in defense
of the Hapsburg Crown, he blindly furthered the cause
of German world-power, the foundation of which had
been laid by former autocrats in starting the Elector
of Brandenburg on a career of Empire. The military,
power of Germany and Austria, with which the Russians
and their Allies have engaged in a battle to the death,
owes its development to the mistakes of the autocracy,
which perished during the war. The Slavophil idea,
which prompted the emancipation of Bulgaria, had directly
and indirectly sapped the foundations of autocracy-
Russia came into the anomalous position of a State that
conferred political freedom upon other nations without
enjoying it herself. Exalted, humane ideals inspired
the autocrats, but were fatal to the autocracy. When
Alexander I pledged his word to the Finns to safeguard
their civic liberties, he intended to gradually extend
the same to his own people, but he found it impossible
to do so without sacrificing the autocracy.

The election of the Romanovs three centuries ago did
not affect the status of the autocracy, as some students
of history would have us believe. Election by the people
did not presume a change of principle: it was merely
an expedient necessitated by default in the succession.
The Tsar Michael Fedorovich and his successors were
autocrats enjoying the mystical, unquestioned, and un-
questionable power wielded by John the Terrible. In
the language of the people they were B&tiushka Tsar
(Little Father); they impersonated the absolute, God-
given authority of the Parent of the State, to whom all
owed blind obedience, whose word alone was law, who
had the power of life and death over all his children.
The besotted German who reigned in Petrograd more
than a century ago under the style of Peter HI, 1 ignor-

1 Strangled by order of his wife, who became Catherine the Great.

12 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

ant of the language of his subjects, reviling their Church,
was none the less an autocrat in the eyes of Russia.
The power of the autocracy was so great, so exalted,
that it retained its hold upon the people till very recent
times. What more striking example can be given than
the effect of the Tsar's edict on temperance. Nicholas II
could boast with reason that only the autocracy had the
power to suddenly convert the Russian nation to total
abstinence.

We cannot understand the causes of the Russian Revo-
lution unless we gain a clear insight into the essence of
autocracy, its grandeur as well as its weakness. Why
has Russian history during the past century been marked
and marred by spasmodic attempts to enlarge the social
framework, followed by periods, more or less prolonged,
of obscure, apparently senseless and hopeless, reaction?
Why were the latter days of Alexander II poisoned by
a seeming repudiation of the bright promise contained
in his emancipation of the Serfs? Old age had not made
him a despot. What idea inspired his successor to insist
upon the repression of all liberal principles? Yet Alex-
ander m was the very soul of honesty and kindliness.
How can we reconcile the enlightened personal goodness
of Nicholas II with his inveterate distaste for the "vain
delusions" of modern statehood? Surely it could not
be greed of power. The explanation must be sought
in the traditional significance of the autocracy. Under
its shadow the nation had waxed in numbers, Russia
had become a great empire, wielding enormous power.
The sacred, mystical attribute of autocracy, its very
essence, had to be maintained at all costs. The mind
of the autocrat, indoctrinated by teachers of the school
of Pobedonostsev, associated the preservation of the
autocracy with the maintenance of the State. In a
sense they were right. The Russia of the autocracy
would naturally cease to be the same Russia without the

ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE 13

autocracy. And so, quite honestly and sincerely, see-
ing the good of their people in the maintenance of their
absolute power, successive autocrats did their utmost
to shield Russia from any change that might imperil
that sacred, limitless power with which the greatness and
prosperity of the State had been identified. Nicholas II
is reputed to have said that he considered it to be his most
solemn duty to hand over to his son that sacred power,
unbdittled, unimpaired. We have no reason to doubt
the sincerity of his purpose or the unselfishness of his
motives, although in the light of its tragic end we may
well dispute the soundness of the autocratic theory in-
voked by him and his predecessors.

Without a Chinese wall of isolation, without inter-
ference in the affairs of other States, without progress in
the western sense, the autocracy might have enjoyed
years of calm, unruffled existence, subject only to occa-
sional "palace revolutions/' But all these conditions of
permanency were lacking, as we have seen. The dead-
liest foe was " western progress." Its worst feature,
industrialism, with its attendant problem of capital and
labor, could not be excluded entirely. Developing, it
profoundly modified the rural, semi-patriarchal life of the
nation, which so easily concorded with the autocratic
principle. Its other aspects — education, with its inevit-
able influx of European thought, the management of their
local affairs by the people, and last, but most fatal of all,
the advent of Representative Government — one after
the other came hammering at the door of autocracy, to
the accompaniment of military disasters in far-off Man-
churia and, later, in the blood-stained fields of Poland.
The war with Japan sounded the first danger-signal to
autocracy. Heeding it, Nicholas II granted a Constitu-
tion; but falling again under the spell of the autocratic
idea, he reasserted the old doctrine. The Great War
brought the second and final summons.

14 SLAVDOM, THE TATABS, AND AUTOCRACY

But how long, how convulsive was the struggle that
came to an end in March of 1917! We have seen the
autocrats repeatedly imperiling the autocracy and some-
times the interests of the State by rash, Hi-considered
or Quixotic adventures in foreign policy; we have noted
them acting upon high-minded, humane impulses in the
conduct of internal affairs, assuring the liberties of the
conquered Finns, abolishing serfdom, curing their people
of Russia's worst evil, drink; and we have found them
halting midway, unable to give full scope to their noblest
efforts. The principle of autocracy reared itself up as
an overmastering obsession; it ever dominated the main
principle of all sound government: compromise and
conciliation.

German influence, all-powerful at the Russian Court,
added a baneful stimulus to the autocratic prejudice.
One of the greatest of modern Russian statesmen, the
late Count Witte, persistently advocated a pro-German
policy as an indispensable safeguard to autocracy and
a bulwark against Revolution.

CHAPTER m

BUREAUCRACY AND OKHRANA

The Autocracy Supplanted— Forty Thousand Clerks— Bureaucracy Subor-
dinated to Police— Fear of Progress— National Ignorance— Agrarian
Reform.

As Russia waxed great in area and in complexity of
population, the autocrat's paternal, all-wise, unlimited
authority could not be exercised by one man; it had
to be delegated to innumerable agents. Nicholas I once
said: "Russia is ruled not by me, but by my forty
thousand clerks." The autocracy implied in name, if
not in deed, an entirely centralized, one-man govern-
ment; in practise, in a huge empire like Russia, it re-
solved itself into government by irresponsible officials,
who ruled according to their caste or individual pro-
pensities, whether for good or for evil. Herein lies the
origin of the bureaucracy.

In becoming the ruling caste in Russia, the bureau-
cracy was, by its very nature, committed to the support
of the autocratic power whence it derived its authority
and privileges. The work of administering the Empire
was not neglected; indeed, it may be said without exag-
geration that, as bureaucrats, the Russian officials were
not a whit less competent or efficient than civil servants
in other lands; and certainly they had a far more formid-
able ta&k to cope with. Profit and honor could be gained
in the official careers more surely than in any other
capacity; it would have been surprising that a gifted
race like the Russians should be poor in bureaucratic

16 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

talents. The Russian bureaucracy suffered, it is true,
from a lack of integrity among the lower grades for
reasons which will be dealt with later, but its besetting
sin was neither of omission nor commission, but one of
origin. Everything that tended to undermine or belittle
the autocracy was per se repugnant to the bureaucratic
caste. Its leaders, with a few distinguished exceptions,
saw danger in the slightest concession to liberal tendencies.
Freedom of speech, of the Press, and of meeting was
tabooed; the enlightenment of the masses was syste-
matically retarded; trade and industry were held under
suspicion and hampered by vexatious regulations. Poli-
tical offenders were relegated to Siberia on a par with
convicts, while emigration of the teeming peasant popu-
lation found no favor. The bureaucracy did not wish
to be troubled with too many colonists, who might become
difficult to control from a distance.

When Russian trade and industry began to develop
by leaps and bounds as a result of the railway and finan-
cial reforms of the last twenty-five years, a new terror
was added to the many cares of the bureaucracy: it
became necessary to keep a firm hand upon the laboring
classes, which began to increase in numbers and to provide
a rich soil for political and revolutionary propaganda.

The emancipated serfs had been tethered by commu-
nal land-holdings to the village, kept in ignorance, de-
prived of an outlet to the fertile plains and valleys of
Siberia, and shorn of their original and rightful share in
the Zemstvo (local government) councils created by the
Tsar Liberator; now these same peasants found employ-
ment in the newly created industries, in the steel and iron
works of the South, in the textile factories of the Center
and the North, and returning periodically to their homes,
sowed the seeds of future revolution.

Above all, the bureaucracy feared war. Plehve, the
all-powerful Minister who was assassinated in July, 1904,

BUREAUCRACY AND OKB RAN A 17

committed the unpardonable blunder of conniving at
the adventure which led to an armed conflict with Japan.
He believed that it would " clear the air/' The experi-
ment was a ghastly failure for the bureaucracy. Every
bureaucratic nerve was strained thereafter to avoid
international complications. For many years after the
Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia neglected her defenses,
starved her army and navy, and, partly as a result of that
neglect, was unable to meet the requirements of the great
struggle with Germany into which she was drawn.

From what has been said it is apparent that the
bureaucracy subordinated its normal activities during
the past century to a police system. The fight with
" privy conspiracy and rebellion," perceived on all sides
by the terrified gaze of the bureaucratic wiseacres, claimed
absorbing consideration. Policemen rose to the highest
places in the land, not as humble guardians of the public
peace or as detectives of crime against the person or
property of citizens — these lowly tasks were relegated to
the humble constabulary — but as wardens over the
autocracy.

It is a sad and characteristic commentary upon the
good intentions of one autocrat to recall the reason
which led him to institute the famous Third Section.
Alexander I wanted to right the wrongs of the fatherless
and widows, to wipe away all tears from the eyes of the
oppressed. The Third Section of His Majesty's Cabinet
was formed to discover these wrongs to tell the Sovereign
abput them, and to act as his medium for reparation.
His most trusted officers and courtiers were placed in
charge of the service. We know what was the result.
The Third Section began by delving into the life-history
of the Tsar's subjects, and found that all was not agree-
able to the safety of the autocratic power. By easy and
rapid stages it became, not an instrument of mercy, but
one of oppression. Its business grew till it embraced

99
99

18 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

every class and calling in the Empire. The odium of
the office led to its transfer to the Ministry of the Interior
under the style of Department of Police, more popularly
known as the okhrana, a word meaning "protection.
And verily this institution was intended to " protect
the autocracy and its agents from internal foes. John
the Terrible, his bright intellect dimmed in old age by a
mania of persecution, treated his subjects as enemies,
and to protect himself instituted the oprichnina, a brother-
hood sworn to defend him, whose members carried at
their saddle-bows a dog's head and a broom, indicating
fidelity and the sweeping out of sedition. The oprich-
niJci could rob and murder whomsoever they chose,
always justified in their acts by the high mission con-
fided to them of safeguarding the autocrat. What was
even in those rough days regarded as an abomination
became under the guise of the okhrana the mainstay of
the Russian bureaucracy. Its agents did not wear the
brutal emblems of their protagonists; they did not openly
rob and murder; but we know that they did not scruple
to provoke crime and to lend a hand in political assassina-
tion. The okhrana was not loved by the bureaucracy,
be it added. It was repugnant to the best men who held
high offices. I include even some of those who in the
course of their official career stood at the head of the
Police Department. They deplored its abuses. Many
would have liked to be rid of it. But the okhrana had
become an indispensable adjunct of government. Bewail
its evils as they might, no one dared to lift a finger against
this institution. To have done so would have been
tantamount to official suicide. How could the autocracy
and the bureaucratic system hope to control and check-
mate their many foes if the okhrana were abolished?
It was a vicious circle, whence escape seemed impossible
— a Gordian knot which had to be severed by the Revo-
lution.

BUREAUCRACY AND OKHRANA 19

With a distorted sense of political perspective, seeing
things through the colored glasses of an irresponsible
police system, their best intentions warped, the autocrats
drew farther and farther away from their people, from
the realities of the situation, captives in mind and deed
of the okhrana. And the people? How did the classes
and masses, the many creeds and races peopling the
Empire, react under this treatment? Crushed in rebel-
lion, the Poles stolidly awaited the end of their trials.
The Cossacks and the Caucasian races, shorn of freedom,
held fast their traditions of independence. The Germans
of the Baltic provinces, spoilt children of the bureau-
cracy, flourished mightily, ruling the local Esthonians
and Letts, and enjoying fat offices. The Mussulmans,
inurdd to autocracy, were docile. The Jews, poor, pro-
lific, and pushful, adapted themselves to oppression,
secretly nurturing plans of revenge. The Finns, long a
privileged race, watched for opportunities to enlarge their
autonomy. All this conglomeration of races was borne
on the broad back of Great Russia, by the might of a
loyal army drawn from a hundred millions of peasants,
led by nobles, and subservient to the police system of
government described above.

When the reservists, who went to fight with Japan
over a quarrel that they did not understand, came back
to the villages, bringing tales of defeat and inefficiency,
the prestige of the old authority dwindled perceptibly.
Political propaganda easily started a jacquerie, recalling
some of the worst features of a similar movement in
Ireland. The Government tried to remedy some of its
past errors. Emigration to Siberia was encouraged.
The accounts brought back by the soldiers of fertile
lands beyond the Urals helped greatly to foster a whole-
sale exodus. It was difficult for the land agents of the
Government to keep pace with the demand for allot-
ments. All approachable regions were quickly colonized.

20 SLAVDOM, THE TATABS, AND AUTOCRACY

New railways were built, and more were required. Siberia
began to accumulate great stores of grain, demanding
outlets to the northern and southern seaboards. There
was a sure promise of a new and Greater Russia, peopled
by the most enterprising and energetic elements from
the Old Country.

But this exodus, great as it was, did not attain the
proportions necessary to keep pace with the growth of
the population, which had reached the enormous figure
of over two and a half millions yearly, and, for technical
causes mentioned above, it tended rather to diminish.
The Great War, with its insatiable demands upon the
manhood of Russia, temporarily stopped the movement.
The millions that should have gone to people Siberia
partly fell in battle or became prisoners of war toiling
in German lands.

Simultaneously with the encouragement of emigra-
tion, the bureaucracy fostered the introduction of indi-
vidual ownership of land and the creation of small farms.
After the emancipation of the serfs, the existing village
communities were retained, and held their lands in com-
mon until they had paid off the redemption dues. Primi-
tive, uneducated, unable to think or act on his own
initiative, the serf, after his emancipation, could not be
expected to become an independent farmer. He clung
to his commune as the only familiar landmark in a new
world full of pitfalls for the unwary. Meanwhile the
village elder continued to draw comfort and guidance
from the pamieshchik squire, his former owner.

The commune (dbshchina) was favored by the bureau-
cracy; in its perpetuation the okhrana saw a good hope of
preserving the peasant from disagreeable influences; but
suddenly the commune lost its popularity. M. Stolypin
opened the eyes of his countrymen to the danger of
communal ownership. It was a negation of the rights
of property, a lure for the socialistic doctrinaire, an

BUREAUCRACY AND OKHRANA 21

impediment to individual effort and enterprise* All
this was very true. The remedy was applied with all
the force that this strong statesman could command.
The redemption dues having been paid up, it was an-
nounced that communal ownership had served its purpose,
that the peasants were free to take up their allotments
as individual owners, and that the State was prepared
to advance them money for the purchase and equipment
of small farms. "We place our stakes on the strong
men/ 9 said M. Stolypin.

Now, as a matter of fact, the communal system was
a natural outcome of the primitive conditions and ignor-
ance under which the peasants lived. The more enter-
prising peasants had already bought up lands, either
individually or in companies, from the squirearchy, and
with the progress of time and education communal
ownership was bound to disappear. The attempt to
suddenly disrupt a system organically bound up with
ignorance may be justified as a political expedient; it
could not fail to bring much friction and disappointment.
The laziest, poorer, and less developed members of- the
commune offered all the resistance of inertia to a scheme
that would compel them to rely upon themselves, and
were secretly encouraged by the political elements which
favored the commune as a profitable soil for socialistic
propaganda.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE

Rdle of the Aristocracy and Middle Class — Absentee Landlordism — Disunited
Elements — The Duma — Its Parties — The Church — National Character*
iatics — Drunkenness — The Temperance Edict — Its Hidden Aspects.

Perhaps the least comprehensible feature of the Old
Regime to a western mind was the absence of guiding
and controlling centers. Propensity for mass action had
been characteristic of the Slavs since their appearance
in Europe. Inhabiting a vast plain, remote from the
open sea, the Russians had not developed the individual-
ism or self-reliance of the Anglo-Saxon. To the present
day, Russian peasants migrate collectively, in whole
villages. Democracy had no equivalent in Russia.

The masses were aristocrats owning huge landed
estates and enjoying all the privileges of the nobility,
such as the right of petition to the Throne and a virtual
monopoly of high offices in the civil and military adminis-
tration, but they had no political power as an aristo-
cracy — only as bureaucrats; and for that reason many
of them were not free agents. They were divided into
two hostile clans: representatives of bureaucracy on the
one side and of the Zemstvos and other local elective
bodies on the other side. In the first case they figured
as absentee landlords, drawing revenues from their estates,
but devoid of direct contact with the peasants; in the
second case they formed the moderate wing of a healthy
but necessarily weak opposition, including within its
ranks the nascent middle class.

THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 23

Similarly, the middle class, as represented in England,
had no corresponding existence. It was not much more
numerous than the nobility, and certainly less influential.
If included the merchants and the better educated
element. But many of the so-called intelligentsia were
peasants or poor Jews who had obtained a university
education, losing their original roots in the process, with*
oit engrafting themselves solidly upon their new station,
from them were recruited most of the revolutionary
leaders. Thus neither in the aristocracy nor in the middle
cass could Russia find a sheet-anchor against the coming
storm.

Many of the nobles and gentry espoused the cause of
Reform, and, making use of their right of petition, sent
remonstrance after remonstrance to the Tsar. But a
Congress of Nobles, instituted under bureaucratic and
autocratic auspices, invariably succeeded in stifling these
isolated voices.

The middle class was split up into constitutional and
socialist factions. Besides, this class was semi-inarticu-
late. It had not the right to appeal directly to the
Monarch. Its voice was heard feebly through the col-
umns of the Press, which was subject to a rigorous cen-
sorship.

Every Russian was ticketed and docketed according
to class or calling: eighty out of every hundred were
peasants, including about ten workmen engaged in
industries, nineteen were burgesses (merchants and
artisans), a fraction represented the nobility from which
the ruling caste was recruited. Sixty per cent were
illiterate, twenty-five per cent could read and write,
ten per cent were educated, five per cent were intelli-
gentsia.

Default of education, the innate conservatism of the
farmer, the natural subserviency of masses new-fledged
from serfdom, rendered them passive, inert. Their half-

24 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

articulate cry during the generations of slavery for
zetnlid i vdlia (land and freedom) was stilled by the
emancipation. Brought into sudden contact with indus-
trialism, they lost their primitive virtues, honesty and
godliness, without acquiring the birthright of free men,
love of honor and of country. Carefully segregated from
enlightening influences, they learnt only what was re-
prehensible. Drunkenness became a great national curse.
The introduction for fiscal purposes of a State Liquor
Monopoly placed drink within easy reach of the peasant,
exhausting him physically and morally, and draining
away the resources of the village into the Exchequer.
The artificial impediments to emigration and settlement
in the boundless, fertile regions of Siberia caused a glut
of the rural population and a renewal of the land hunger.
Of this circumstance political parties, took full advantage.
Land nationalization, expropriation, and the other lures
of socialistic doctrine found many willing listeners among
the ignorant, and especially among the peasants who
had inherited a "starvation" allotment of land. 1

In response to popular clamor and tumult against
the abuses revealed during the war with Japan, and in
compliance with the demands of constitutional parties
supported by the Zemstvo nobles and by a large section
of the middle class, the Tsar signed the Manifesto of
October SO, 1905, a semi-Constitution perpetuating the
autocracy.

The Church had long been perverted by bureaucratic
interference. Since the days of Peter the Great it had
been deprived of its Patriarch, 2 who enjoyed an amount

1 Tfae serfs, on emancipation, could choose a "working" allotment suf-
ficient for their sustenance, by paying for it in instalments (redemption dues),
or they could obtain a smaller ("starvation") allotment without payment.

*The schism of the Starov&y and Staroobriddlsy (Old Believers and Fol-
lowers of the Old Bite) dates back to this period. Schismatics in minor point*
of dogma and ritual, they were Dissenters in the political and some of them also
in the ecclesiastical sense. All were opposed to the violent introduction of

THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 25

of influence and independence that did not please the
masterful reformer, and its affairs had been placed in
commission under a Holy Synod, which in its turn was
subjected to the dictatorial powers of the Grand Pro-
curator, an agent of the bureaucracy.

The clergy were divided into parish priests, who had
to be married, and monks, who alone could hope to
attain the prelacy. The white or parish clergy formed a
caste, their cures descending from father to son. They
were often only a little less ignorant than the peasants,
tilled their own fields, and were given, like their parish-
ioners, to indulgence in strong drink. The villagers
respected the priestly office, but could not always respect
the individuals. They paid them tithes in kind, unwill-
ingly, and bargained with them for the price of their
ministrations.

Among the prelates were men of all classes, peasants
and nobles. They included some very high-minded and
learned divines. But among them were also many
time-servers who subordinated their high calling to
purely selfish dictates. The Holy Synod, as it was in
the days of the autocracy, could not afford much scope
for anything else.

Monastic life in Russia offered certain advantages to
the peasants. They came there in youth to fill menial
offices and casually pick up some rudiments of knowl-
edge. In maturer life they went thither on pilgrimages.

western, chiefly German, dress, customs, and methods of government carried
out by the ruthless Peter. Some adopted their priesthood from the Galician
or Bielokrynitsa eparchy; others became bezpopdvtsy (priestless ones), having
sought refuge in the eastern borderlands, where priests were unavailable. All
sturdily refused to shave their beards, accounting it a sin. All were total
abstainers, unaddicted to the use of tobacco, and hard-working and thrifty.
A "reconciliation" between the Old Faith and the Orthodox Church was
soJemnked in 1907, when the Ukaz on Freedom of Conscience was promulgated.
The altars of the Old Believers were then "unsealed" after a lapse of three cen-
turies. The number of adherents of the Old Faith is reputed to be about
*0 y 000,000.

96 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

Some of the monasteries were homes of idleness and its
usual accompaniments; others, again, became admirable
centers of industry. The Solovetsky monastery, situated
on an island in the White Sea, was an example of this
kind. Its hard-working inmates created a garden amidst
an arctic wilderness. They were excellent husbandmen,
dairy farmers, architects and builders, and fishermen.
Wild birds and animals were sacred at Solovki and at the
Ladoga monastery of Balaam. There I have often
watched the seagulls and wildfowl, hares, foxes, and
badgers enjoying complete impunity amid the pilgrim
and tourist crowds.

The Revolution emancipated the Church from its
police duties. The reaction that followed upon the ex-
cesses of Bolshevism was marked by a great religious
revival, which restored much of the influence wielded by
the Church in olden times.

The real Russian is naturally good-tempered, kindly,
extremely intelligent, and lovable. Qualities of heart
perhaps dominate in him over qualities of mind. He is
gregarious, sociable, and expansive. He is given to bursts
of energy, accomplishing an extraordinary amount of
work in a short time, rather than to steady, prolonged
labor. The long winter has left a permanent imprint
upon him. He is not a hater. He has not even a sense
of retributive justice. The peasants would stone a horse-
thief caught red-handed, but they would feed and care
for him if he recovered. Trial by jury, introduced in the
sixties, invariably led to a verdict of "not guilty." Cor-
poral punishment was not permitted in the schools, and
the death penalty was held in abhorrence. The soldiers
had always been kind to prisoners. Some regiments did
not, it is true, take prisoners, but that was only when
they had seen their comrades tortured by the Germans
or Hungarians, or when they had been exposed too long
to the explosive bullets used by the Austrian Army.

THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 27

But under the influence of drink the Russians, espe-
cially the ignorant masses, were capable to committing
terrible excesses. Drink had an irresistible fascination
for them. The peasant would imbibe as often and as
much as he could afford; and, as he grew more pros-
perous — during the decade preceding the war — he spent
more money on vodka. Births, marriages, and bereave-
ments imposed traditional obligations of hospitality. The
result was an orgy. Village festivals and holidays — they
were all too numerous — involved a general debauch. It
was dangerous to enter a village while the people were
drunk. They frequently murdered each other, and would
not hesitate to assault or murder a stranger. Drink
played an important part in the affairs of the commune.
Any muzhik who had a grievance could be sure of a favor-
able hearing if he put up "drinks all round/ 9 The more
wealthy or fashionable villagers occasionally indulged in
beer, but vodka undiluted (potato spirit of 40 degrees)
was the staple beverage. It brought about the speediest
and pleasantest results. When the ex-Tsar visited the
home of his ancestors in Kostroma on the occasion of
the Romanov Tercentenary (1918), he heard a good deal
about this wretched state of affairs, and probably saw
something of village life.

Had he taken the trouble to study the conditions that
had prevailed, and still, to a certain extent, prevail in
other countries, the ex-Tsar would have understood that
a sudden and miraculous cure could not be permanently
achieved without first spreading education and enlighten-
ment among the rustics. But he would not listen to the
warnings of his able Prime Minister, Count Kokovtsov,
who explained to him that any sudden prohibition measure
would cripple the Treasury, and in the end fail of its
direct purpose. Events subsequently justified the states-
man's arguments. Nicholas II — a typical Russian —
inclined towards the dictates of a kind heart. He was

28 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

probably unconscious of the fact that the temperance
plan was being fostered by the Reactionary gang in order
to get rid of a liberal-minded Prime Minister, and that
they were leading him (the Tsar) into a trap. Every-
thing seemed at first to accord with the Reactionary
scheme. Count Kokovtsov's resignation coincided with
the famous edict on temperance at the commencement
of 1914. The villages became orderly, peaceful, while
deposits in the State savings banks accumulated in un-
precedented proportions.

But I had a conversation with some of my muzhik
acquaintances shortly after the edict had been applied
which somewhat surprised me. It was an old peasant
who spoke. "We old ones rather like it/' he said; "we
have had our day. And the young ones — the boys and
the girls — used to beat us when we had drink in the
villages. But the youngsters are all against total absti-
nence. They think it is unfair. They have not had their
fling yet, and they are rather sulky."

However, we all blessed the Emperor for his temper-
ance edict when the war began, because it enormously
helped the mobilization. Many villages had voluntarily
abjured the Monopoly shops. Had drink been procurable
in the villages, there would have been delay and trouble.
The Government would have closed the liquor shops
around the depots under the old system, but all the
reservists would have been drunk before they left home
and drunk on the way. As it was, only one serious
disturbance occurred. At Barnaul, in Siberia, the reser-
vists wandered about the streets. No arrangements
had been made for them.. In disgust they broke open
a vodka store and then proceeded "to paint the town
red." Half the houses were burned down.

I must say that the enforced absence of liquor was
never complained of by the troops. On every occasion
when I visited the trenches the men appeared fully con-

THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 29

scions of the great benefits of temperance. Moreover,
with the characteristic responsiveness of the Russian,
they had appreciated the good intentions of the Little
Father and never repined, although there were times and
seasons when a vodka ration would have been extremely
welcome and useful.

CHAPTER V

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT

Belief in "Holy Men"— The Advent of Rasputin— Healing the Tsarevich—
The Empress's Infatuation — An Anxious Mother — The Tsar and the
Dalai Lama — Alexandra's Ambitions — The Weakness of Nicholas H —
Rasputin Appoints and Dismisses Ministers — "Remarkable Prophecies"
— Rasputin's Peace Intrigue with Germany— "Removed" by the Army
— The Circumstances of Rasputin's Death — Protopopov's Madness —
The Court at Mogilev.

The Russian was ever a God-seeker (bogoiskdtel).
This trait found its expression in various ways, bad and
good — in the formation of quaint sects, some of which,
like the abominable hhlysty (flagellants), resisted all
attempts at conversion; in the schism known as the Old
Faith; but above all in the popularity of elders (stdrtsy),
to whom multitudes came seeking light and guidance.
It was wonderful how quickly the fame of a "holy man"
traveled over the country. People of all classes got to
hear of him, and traveled enormous distances to see his
face and to receive his blessing. Now, as all sects were
banned by the Church, these ghostly comforters generally
selected their abode under the protection of some monas-
tery. They signalized themselves by their blamelessness
and otherwise. They might be ignorant laymen or
learned clerics; it mattered not so long as they had
the requisite gifts and qualities. We shall see how this
characteristic of Russian life was to affect the whole
course of politics and to produce one of the contributory
causes of the Revolution.

While the semi-skeptical intelligentsia professed dis-

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 81

dainful tolerance for all beliefs, and the educated classes
displayed a widespread laxity of morals — as has been
strikingly illustrated in the works of Russian writers —
they could never attain the profundities of out-and-out
skepticism. The lower orders might, and were often,
misled by false prophets like the mad monk Hiodor in
Tsaritsyn, who converted his cloister into a revolutionary
fortress, or a Father Gapon, who led the workpeople of
Petrograd to revolt in 1905, with the connivance of the
okhrana; the enlightened classes were equally subject
to mistake the false prophet for the true.

Father John of Kronstadt was, for many years, the
leading "holy man" of Russia. He attracted rich and
poor, high and low. Through his hands passed a golden
stream of charity. Yet he died comparatively poor. It
was by his advice that the Emperor and Empress went
on a pilgrimage to disinter the remains of Serafim of
Sarov (near Nizhni Novgorod) and beatify that "holy
man," in recompense whereof they were to be blessed
with the long-awaited Heir to the Throne. The prophecy
came true.

Prior to that, a recourse to occult arts, under the
guidance of a well-known charlatan named Philippe, had
brought about scandalous disappointment. But the
Court did not scruple to revert to these practises. Then
follows the first appearance in Petrograd of the notorious
Razputin. A peasant of Tobolsk, in Siberia, he had
served in a monastery, picking up a smatter of biblical
phrases and laying the foundations of his future trans-
formation into a staretz. A wealthy merchant's wife
from Moscow "discovered" him during her pilgrimages
to the shrines of Siberia, and introduced him to her friends
in the great city.

Razputin's name signified "the vicious one," or "he
of the bad roads." His record in his native village fully
these appellations. A drunken and abnormally

82 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

perverted and lazy peasant and illiterate, he was yet able
to impose upon susceptible people by his monastic
verbiage, and particularly by a forceful, if brutal, per-
sonality.

I saw him once or twice. His face and appearance
reminded me of Repin's celebrated painting of John the
Terrible, where the tyrant is depicted holding to his
breast the bleeding head of the Tsarevich and glaring
upward in a frenzy of despair at having murdered his
only son. Razputin's face was coarser, less intelligent.
But the two men bore a striking resemblance — the mad,
vicious, bloodthirsty genius who, like Louis XI, alter-
nated between orgies of torture and paroxysms of prayer,
exterminated the flower of his aristocracy, yet united his
country under one scepter, and the depraved peasant
who was also destined to exert such a fateful influence
upon his native land. The Terrible One and the Tobolsk
muzhik were cast in the same mold, physical and moral.
This fact must be appreciated. It was one of the causes
of the extraordinary hold which Rasputin obtained upon
a superstitious Court

The lure of occultism ever appealed to Nicholas II.
By nature secretive and mistrustful of all who approached
him, inherently well-intentioned, devoted to his wife and
children, he, like men of weak character, was obstinate,
unable to brook dictation or advice. Above all, he was
permeated by a profound belief in the sanctity of his
mission and office. Any appeal to autocratic prejudice
ever found him a ready listener. The Empress unfortu-
nately encouraged rather than corrected these inclina-
tions. Her semi-English, semi-German upbringing had
yielded an untoward admixture. She could never identify
herself with her adopted people. From the outset of her
long sojourn among the Russians she was never liked by
them, nor seemed capable of understanding them. But
she adopted their superstitions and beliefs. The circum-

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT SS

stances under which Alexis was born appear to have left
an indelible imprint upon her mind. t It was on the
Tsarevich's account that she first made the acquaintance
of Razputin.

The boy suffered from a bodily ailment, inherited from
his mother, transmitted to the male issue, known as
haemophilia, a condition of the blood which might cause
danger from a ruptured vein or from a mere nose-bleeding.
Picture the unceasing anxiety of this mother about her
boy, and remember that in him were centered all the
hopes of a great empire; remember also how many girl
children she had borne before the arrival of the Heir;
take into account the mournful fact that no other children
would ever bless her home — this boy was to be the only
one and the last; then you begin to perceive an incomplete
but faithful image of the Empress. Add to this that she
was a proud, aloof, masterful woman, living in the hot-
house atmosphere of a semi-Byzantine Court, amid people
whom she disliked and distrusted, not over-intelligent,
yet convinced of her own political sagacity, imbued by a
belief instilled into her by courtiers and clerics that the
peasants, whom she did not, could not, know would for
ever remain loyal to the Throne — that they were the
only sound element in the country.

Razputin's fame as a staretz, who, by occult powers,
could save her boy, appealed to her mother instinct;
Razputin's peasant origin enlisted her confidence and
political interest. Because Razputin was able by the
simple and well-known exercise of animal magnetism to
stop nose-bleeding, which the Tsarevich's physicians
could not arrest, the Empress was persuaded of his occult
powers. He was a "holy man," no matter what evil
courses he might pursue or what unkind people might
say of him. The charlatan's boastful announcement that
the boy's life depended upon him was accepted as an
inspired utterance. He became the privileged libertine

84 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

of the Court. Worse still, his word — the artless expression
of a loyal peasant — carried weight in the highest counsels.
As the years went by he became more impudent, more
interfering and more dangerous.

Remonstrances reached the Emperor's ears. Among
his oldest courtiers were men who saw the danger and had
the courage to speak out. Nicholas II always turned
the conversation by saying : " These are my private affairs,
and they are nobody's concern except mine." In vain
it was represented to him that Razputin was interfering
in affairs of State, that he was the tool of alien influences,
that he was discrediting the Monarchy by scandalous
boasts indulged in openly by him during his bouts of
drunkenness and debauch. The Emperor treated, or
affected to treat, all these attempts to oust the charlatan
as an unwarrantable invasion of his domestic life. Pre-
sumably he had tried to remonstrate with his wife about
the man, and had encountered such opposition that he
had decided to tolerate Razputin rather than further
incense the Empress. To one old General of my acquaint-
ance, who had ventured to bring up the sore question,
he said: "I prefer five Razputins to one hysterical

woman."

Occasionally the siarelz went to visit his wife and chil-
dren in Tobolsk. He had built a gorgeous hut for them.
There he flaunted himself in silk shirt, velvet skarovary
(pantaloons), and patent leather boots — the acme of
muzMh dandyism. The peasants could not but feel flat-
tered that one of themselves should have become so rich
and powerful. The local authorities, lay and clerical,
paid court to him. In Fetrograd hope arose each time
that he had gone for good. But he came back more im-
pudent than ever. One of his daughters was placed by
the Empress in a school reserved for nobles, and became
engaged to an officer. His house in Fetrograd was
besieged by callers, high and low, asking for official favor

BAZPCTINISM AND THE COURT S5

and bringing presents. A few words scrawled by Ras-
putin to a Minister would bring immediate results.

Razputin kept a sort of debit and credit account with
high functionaries. If they did what he wanted, he would
return the favor. Ministers always needed a friend at
Court. Some were too squeamish about accepting Raz-
putin's overtures, others dared even to resist. They
invariably suffered. M. Samarin, a distinguished public
man belonging to the Conservative party, had under-
taken to restore the shattered prestige of the Church by
accepting the post of Grand Procurator of the Holy Synod.
He was summarily dismissed for "coldness" towards one
of Razputin's prot6g6s who had been made a bishop-
General Djunkovsky, chief of the all-powerful okhrana,
kicked Razputin out of his office when he came in unbidden
to present some impertinent request. He was immedi-
ately deprived of his post. No Minister's career, no
woman's honor, were safe from the enterprise of the
"holy man."

The newspapers had, of course, been forbidden to
mention Razputin, but in covert ways, using subterfuges
which were understood by their readers, they kept the
initiated public aware of all that went on. If the Emperor
could have heard what was being said by his faithful
and loyal subjects about Razputin's connection with the
Court, he might have risked even an open rupture with
his Consort to save the Monarchy. Officers and Generals
at the Front often discussed the scandal with me in such
a tone that I felt sure had Razputin ever ventured^to
come near the Army he would have been killed. The
Grand Duke Nicholas, when he was Generalissimo, openly
announced his intention of hanging Razputin if he ever
got hold of him. (That was perhaps the main cause of
the Grand Duke's transfer to the Caucasus.)

All this was bad enough, but it was not yet irreparable.
Soon, however, the scandal became known to the common

36 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

people, and the autocracy became discredited. So also
did the Church. Razputinism had belittled the Prelacy.
The late Mr. John Birkbeck, an old friend of Russia and
of the Emperor, was in Moscow in the summer of 1916,
and told me how shocked and surprised he had been by
unmistakable evidences of the widespread unpopularity
of the Empress. During a cinema performance the people
had actually hissed when her picture appeared on the
screen. This was an unprecedented — an almost incredible
— occurrence.

Unfortunately the Emperor did not understand what
was happening. He heard of these manifestations from
the ohhrana and other interested parties, who colored
them to suit their own purposes. The campaign against
Razputin was represented as a malicious intrigue which
could be checked only by further police measures, a
symptom of revolution which could be doctored only
by repression.

The influence of the Empress had for many years
estranged the best Russians from the Court. Naturally
a sociable man, given to conviviality, Nicholas H had
to fall back upon the company of persons who were ap-
proved by his Consort. He had no continuous, healthy
touch with his subjects. 1 During recent years the Sov-
ereigns lived in retirement. Most of the Tsar's huge
revenues were swallowed up for the maintenance of
innumerable palaces and retainers; the residue was
invested in the War Loans. (Hence the Tsar had to be
careful about expenditure. He was poorer than many of
the Grand Dukes, or even his own children.)

Razputin's power grew. The highest appointments
were within his gift. A word from him to the Empress

*Even purely Court functions and entertainments had been given up.
Hie last "function" that the author remembers was given on the occasion of
the young Grand Duchess Marie Favlovna's marriage to a Swedish Prince at
Tsarskoe Selo—a marriage that ended in a divorce.

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 37

and Ministers were dismissed or nominated, probably
without the Emperor knowing whence the recommen-
dation came.

Thus Maklakov (a brother of the deputy) was given
the all-important post of Home Secretary because he had
taken Razputin's fancy, and later the Falstaffian Khvos-
tov, a Deputy of the Right, succeeded him.

Khvostov and his nominal subordinate, Beletsky, then
chief of the okhrana, were engaged in a duel at cross-
purposes for the possession of the Empress's letters to
Razputin, which had been abstracted by a brother " saint."
The Minister sent funds to Norway to secure the docu-
ments, but the emissary with the papers was "inter-
cepted" by Beletsky, who thought he would thereby earn
Razputin's gratitude and oust his superior. Beletsky
overreached himself, however, and was relegated to the
Governor-Generalship of Irkutsk.

This state of affairs grew worse when the Emperor,
acting under his wife's influence, decided in an ill-fated
moment to assume personal command of the armies.
Delighted to be at the Front together with his boy among
his soldiers, away from the hateful worries of Tsarskoe
and Petrograd, Nicholas II thus relinquished the reins of
government to Alexandra, with consequences that might
be foreseen. Razputin and his clique did exactly what
they pleased. The "holy man" had visions which were
interpreted as guides to policy. As a matter of fact they
suited the interests, not of Russia, but of Germany, whence
they in all probability emanated.

Some years before, the late Count Witte, 1 who had
never been a friend of England, was asked for an "inter-
view" by the Cologne Gazette to justify Razputin in the

1 A talented Minister who had played a foremost part in the promotion of
Russian industries, the originator of the spirit monopoly and currency reform,
chief negotiator of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and Prime Minister during
the uprising of 1900.

38 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

eyes of the German public. The staretz himself declared
soon after the war began that had he not been absent
in Tobolsk at the time, he would never have allowed
Russia to fight, and predicted misfortune because he had
not been consulted. The fatherly tone adopted by
Wilhelm to Nicholas in the messages which they ex-
changed on the eve of war argued a degree of assurance
in the power of Germany's influence at the Russian Court,
and subservience thereto on the part of Nicholas, which
reveals consciousness of a very powerful hand being
exerted at Tsarskoe in the interests of Germany and
"peace/' But that influence, or rather the agency
through which it had been working, was too far away
in Siberia. Later we knew that the Emperor had at
the last moment countermanded his own order for a
general mobilization, but the Staff could not stop it.
Berlin, of course, distorted this fact, attempting to attrib-
ute the origin of this war to incompetent and disobedient
Generals. But doubtless the "holy man" had some-
thing to do with the counter-orders.

While the Emperor remained in supreme command of
the armies, some of the most important ministries were
being confided to men who had notoriously acted in the
interests of Germany. Thus M. Sazonov, who had suc-
ceeded M. Izvolsky at the Foreign Office and loyally
developed the Entente policy, was suddenly (July, 1916),
and without any avowable cause, supplanted by M. Stur-
mer, an old bureaucrat of Austrian origin, who, more-
over, wielded the Premiership. His ultra-reactionary
and pro-German antecedents were only too well known.
He had been singled out on the recommendation of Ras-
putin's friends. He took his orders from the Empress.
The British Government showed its disapproval of this
extraordinary procedure by demonstratively bestowing
the Grand Cross of the Bath upon M. Sazonov.

Next came the appointment of M. Protopopov to the

-g 8-B-g | 4

r..r |||
1 1 - j j *
??irll

- 31 j ■ 1 °

IKiii

?i| s: i
j I J f 1 1
e 1 -| 1 1

i i a s |3^

ill ill

■ aPhi
s s '- 1 .■ > i

Iliiili

il J ll-i e

lllfiv

lilji!

ill it

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT SO

Home Office. He was a prominent public man who had
suddenly displayed marked pro-German sympathies.
Returning with a Legislative Delegation from Paris to
Petrograd, he arranged a secret meeting with some Ger-
man emissaries in Stockholm with a view to discussing
peace terms. Soon after his arrival in Russia he was
honored by an Imperial audience. A fortnight spent
with Razputin in a round of restaurant orgies had brought
him his opportunity. Afterwards it transpired that he
was bankrupt and suffering from an incurable disease
which affected his mind. (Later he had to be placed in a
lunatic asylum.) The appointment of this broken-down,
half-crazed adventurer was flaunted by the agents of the
autocracy as a gracious concession to the Duma, of which
he had been vice-president in his sane and prosperous
days. This Protopopov was to play a fateful part in the
Revolution.

All Russia loathed Razputinism, and turned her coun-
tenance from the Emperor, who had not sufficient strength
to put an end to the scandal. The murder of Grishka
(a contemptuous diminutive of his Christian name) 1
was talked of long before it took place. And its occurrence
probably stimulated the revolutionary outburst which
followed two and a half months later. The Army had
more particularly felt the harm and ignominy of Raz-
putinism, and it was the Army that finally "removed"
him. Young Guardsmen, including Prince Felix Yusupov
and his kinsman, the Grand Duke Dmitry Pavlovich, and
a Conservative Deputy named Purishkevich, who had
been in charge of relief work at the Front, were present
at a supper in the Yusupov Palace on the Moika Canal
in Petrograd, to which Razputin was lured by the promise
of meeting some fair guests.

It had been resolved that he should die "like a dog,"
and such indeed was his end. The body, riddled with

1 December *9, 1916.

40 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

bullets, was swiftly removed in a motor-car and flung,
weighted so that it should sink, into an arm of the Neva*
The weights, hurriedly attached with string, came off,
and the corpse floated up, the water at this place being
clear of ice. Marks of blood had been found on the bridge
whence the body had been flung. So the police were on
the lookout. Sure enough, here it was found and con-
veyed to a mortuary. I read the secret report of the
post-mortem examination. It described the body as
that of a man of over forty-five years of age, normally
constituted.

The Empress, maddened by grief and anger, came from
Tsarskoe disguised as a sister of mercy, and together
with Frotopopov visited the mortuary, where she con-
vinced herself that the "saint" was really dead. She
was more than ever convinced that he was a "saint,"
because the arms were crossed. She had ordered the
arrest of her nephew Dmitry, and had summoned the
Emperor. Prince Felix had made his escape to the
Crimea. Purishkevich had returned to the Front. The
Emperor came to Tsarskoe, exiled his nephew to Persia,
himself went back to the Front, and the affair was hushed
up. The body was quietly buried in a secret place in
Tsarskoe Park.

Frotopopov, who had been displaying unmistakable
signs of mental derangement, came often to condole with
the Empress. During his visits he was subject to hallu-
cinations, imagining that the "saint" was holding con-
verse with him. "See, there he is," he would exclaim,
stretching out his arms to empty space. "Our blessed
one beckons. He is talking. He wishes me to tell you
that dire misfortune will befall Russia because he was
martyred. Woe unto us! Woe unto us!" And then,
the vision ended, Frotopopov and the Empress would
talk about their lost one. She would recall the circum-
stances of her first meeting with the "saint." It was

BAZPUTTNISM AND THE COURT 41

eight years earlier. They had been yachting in the Gulf.
Wilhelm had come to visit them at Biorke Sound, near
Vyborg. She grew reminiscent.

She related how Nicholas had signed a secret treaty
with him earlier — in 1905 — that would make war with
France impossible. That funny old Admiral Birilev,
who could crow like a cock — almost as funny as Minister
Maklakov, who could tell such amusing stories, and
General Sukhomlinov, a born actor — well, Birilev coun-
tersigned it without knowing what was inside. But later
the signature of the Minister of Marine had to be endorsed
by the Prime Minister, and that was that horrid Witte. 1
He would have nothing to do with the secret treaty, so
it lapsed, and he frightened Nicholas into signing the
Manifesto and summoning the Duma.

Well, to return to "our beloved saint," it was at Biorke
that five-year-old Alexis, skipping about the yacht, fell
and bruised himself. Chagin, the captain of the Standart,
could never get over that affair. We know he after-
wards shot himself, and people talked so much disgusting
nonsense about it. Alexis kept his hurt to himself. A
tumor formed on the groin, and he was given up for
lost. The "saint" appeared, and since then the boy
had been saved, and she (Alexandra) had daily prayed
for Grisha.

She had kept him with her as much as she could.
Every night when he was not in the Palace she asked for
his blessing by telephone. He could order her to sleep
with a word in that dear commanding voice of his, and
then she was sure of getting some rest. He was so intel-
ligent, magnetic, so full of life. It was such a pity
that he would not remain always in the Palace. But

1 Returning then through Germany, Count Witte was received with Im-
perial honors at Potsdam. The Kaiser presented him with his portrait bearing
a mysterious date. "You will know what it means when you see the Tsar,"
he said. It was the date of the secret treaty— the" Nicky" and "Willi" treaty.

42 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

then so many interests called to him. She could not
expect to have him always by her side. And oh! how
much she had always dreaded those wanderings of his.
He had so many enemies, dear, good soul. She could not
trust the Russian detectives. (Let Protopopov not be
offended!) So she had ordered two private detectives
from London, and one of them was on guard always.
And there was a village girl, very devoted to the saintly
one, who went everywhere with him, dressed as a sister
of mercy. Yes, everywhere. On the fatal night Grisha
had promised to heed her warnings, and not to go out,
for they knew that enemies were plotting to kill him. So
the detectives and the "sister" were absent, and they —
the horrible murderers — had lured him to his doom.
Well, what was written was written!

Protopopov would take up the parable. "Our holy
one" had ever foretold coming events with clear-sighted
perspicacity. He was conscious of his exalted mission.
Did the lady recall his prophecy when an abominable
peasant girl in Siberia had stuck a knife into him? Every-
body was so delighted, and hoped he would not recover.
He was himself that way inclined in those benighted
days. That was a month or so before the war. Grisha
did recover. He said: "My blood has been shed, and,
in retribution for it, rivers of blood will flow." How true,
how wonderful! And then, just before the disaster in
Galicia, in 1915, did she recall another prediction, just
as wonderful and true. The "holy one" was kicked and
beaten by some of those depraved guardsmen in a res-
taurant. (Grishka had been caught dining with one of
their brother officer's wife. But of this Protopopov, of
course, said nothing.) And he had lain two weeks in a
private hospital. He said: "I have been ill-treated;
soon our armies will suffer defeat." And now Grisha
had told him in visions that soon his death would be vis-
ited upon all Russia, that there would be sorrow unspeak-

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 48

able and pandemonium, but they would have to endure
and to make peace.

Oh yes, something terrible would soon happen! The
other day an impudent journalist had come to him and
begun to take notes with a red pencil. He (Frotopopov)
had wrenched it from him. Red! red! that awful color!
He saw it all round him. It was the hue of Revolution.
That awful color would be the ruin of Russia. And then
the same impertinent one had looked round at all the
Buddhas and icons which adorned the Minister's study.
Two of the idols were particularly dangerous. He had
told the journalist about them. They had to be placed
together in a niche of honor, lest one, becoming jealous,
might avenge himself. The journalist had suggested they
should be placed apart in separate rooms. "Then, you
see, one will counteract the other." There was a great
deal in that. He must think about it. Oh! if "our
saint" were only with them always! He could help them
out off all these terrible difficulties.

These are not fancied conversations; they are genuine,
reported by unimpeachable witnesses. Is it surprising
that, speaking some months later before the first Great
Congress of the Church at Moscow, Prince Eugene
Trubetsk6y, an eminent Russian savant and public man,
should have declared: "In the latter years of Nicholas H
Russia was like some dark, hellish kingdom"?

The reign had opened with an awful tragedy. On the
Hodynka, a field in the outskirts of Moscow, great crowds
gathered to receive the Tsar's bounty, as customary at
each coronation. By the carelessness of the police, such
a crush of people occurred that hundreds were trampled
to death. Midway in his reign thousands of soldiers
were to die in the wind-swept fields of Manchuria for
a cause that they did not even comprehend, and many
hundreds of workmen were to be shot down at the
doors of his great Palace, craving for freedom. And

44 SLAVDOM, THE TATABS, AND AUTOCRACY

the end of his reign was to come amid still greater
bloodshed.

like the Bourbons, Nicholas II and his Court could
"learn nothing and forget nothing." New ideas could
not displace the old. He inclined towards the archaic.
Soothsayers and occultist charlatans attracted him more
than the stern calls of statesmanship. He sent emissaries
to the Dalai Lama, seeking a revelation. And the Indian
Government imagined he was thirsting for Tibetan terri-
tory. He assembled the nations at a Peace Conference
at The Hague at the bidding of visionaries, and himself
drifted into a senseless war with Japan. At his accession
he told the Tver Zemstvoist Rodichev and a deputation
craving representative rights for the nation to "put
away these vain illusions." Yet when Count Witte
came to him in 1905 and said that the Army could not
be relied upon to suppress a revolution, he granted what
he had previously refused. And then he tried to take
back what he had given. Mistrustful of all and every-
body, yet led captive at the heels of a distracted woman,
bearing upon his shoulders the weight of a gigantic empire,
he was a pathetic figure.

He had his cup of bitterness. The boy he loved, that
bright, sunny lad with the limp which told its tale —
would he live to inherit the great Throne of All the Rus-
sia*? For him he toiled day and night, poring over
reports and papers which gave him knowledge without
understanding. And it was so sad to see the boy already
comprehending many painful things. He did not seem
to like his mother as much as of old ; and he would spit
fiercely whenever he heard the name of RazputJn. Well,
he would see. A fatalist, like his subjects, Nicholas II
never repined, never lost his temper. One night in 1905,
when the mutineers in Kronstadt were shooting and
burning the town, he had calmly watched the perform-
ance from the windows of his Peterhof villa, across the

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 45

bay, and exclaimed to an officer of his suite: "It would
be so interesting to know how it will all end."

To the reader of these lines it will seem strange that
people who casually approached the former Sovereigns
of Russia should have failed to note the slightest taint
of Byzantinism. All were impressed by their apparent
good sense and charmed by their kind ways. All de-
parted absolutely convinced of the absurdity of the
"legends" about Razputin, and of the irremediable
mischief that was being wrought within the Empire.
Almost on the eve of revolution distinguished foreigners
visited Petrograd and saw the ex-Tsar and his Consort
I do not think I exaggerate in saying that they formed
no exception to the rule, and that they carried a way "with
them an all too optimistic impression. Only those who
had lived in the country and had had experience of its
sad realities could appreciate the facts at their true
value.

Only three months before the Revolution I saw the
Imperial family at Mogilev and talked with Alexis. A
winsome lad, bright and full of mischief, he interested and
attracted all who knew him. As he had been thoroughly
spoiled by his doting parents, and did pretty well what he
pleased, this was rather wonderful. On that occasion
I had been invited to lunch at the Palace. The Empress
and the daughters happened to be in Mogilev. Alex-
andra had come to talk about Stunner's resignation.

The Governor's Palace, which was occupied by the
Tsar and his suite, forms a semicircular row of buildings
overlooking the picturesque valley of the Dneiper. In
the large drawing-room twenty-five or thirty guests had
assembled, standing in a long row and waiting for the
hosts to come out of their apartments. Lieutenant-
General Sir John Hanbury Williams and other representa-
tives of the Allied armies, some Grand Dukes, Ministers,
and officials, were among them. General Voydikov, a

46 SLAVDOM, THE ^TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

heavy-faced but energetic-looking functionary, was in
attendance. Although a civilian, I had to wear a sword,
such being the etiquette. One of the British officers lent
me his.

Walking round to greet their guests, the Sovereigns
stopped to say a few words to friends or strangers. The
Grand Duchesses filed past like a bevy of school girls,
holding up their hands to be kissed. In front of them
came Alexis, dressed in soldier's uniform, khaki shirt,
trousers and top-boots, and wearing the medal of St.
George, of which he was very proud. It had been be-
stowed on him for service in the trenches. He gave me a
friendly nod, and glanced admiringly at my ribbons,
which were those of his Order. Everybody then entered
the dining-room, where a long table was spread for lunch-
eon. Another table containing the celebrated zakuska
stood near the windows, from which a glorious snowy view
of Russia's historic river offered itself. Having partaken
of caviare and other delicacies, we sat down to a modest
repast served on silver.

Half an hour later we were again in the drawing-room.
This time the Emperor spoke at greater length with those
of his guests whom he wished to entertain. He chatted
with me about my visits to the Front, displaying a remark-
able acquaintance with regiments and their respective
positions. He knew about my son's service in the Rus-
sian and in the British Guards, remembering even the
smallest thing. We spoke English and Russian. He
had scarcely any trace of foreign accent. I had never
met any one more simple and unaffected. He looked shy
and diffident, with a quiet dignity and an indefinable
charm of manner. The clear, resonant voice betrayed
physical vigor, the mournful eyes an internal dreaminess.
Altogether a typical Russian. I never saw him again.

The Empress wore a plain, but not unbecoming, dress
of grayish material. Hers and the girls' dresses were

fin

I t % * £

i a>62
8 HIS

5 S

i °i

sill"!

thl'i

IJJ"i
111 f "

.i ■ fi I *

a i 1 1 i

sills

I ill

lltll

i'il'i

RAZPUTINISM ANDT.THE COURT 47

evidently home-made. The Grand Duchesses were win-
some lasses, while the third, Marie, was decidedly pretty.
Their mother looked well. No one could have suspected
this rosy-cheeked, somewhat prim matron, with the thin,
rather cruel lips, of being the devotee of a Razputin.
Mme. Vyrubova was also there — a stocky, rather coarse-
featured person, very lame since her leg had been broken
in an accident to the Tsarskoe train, designed, it was said,
to do away with the "saint." (As it happened, Raz-
putin did not travel with her that night.)

That was in November, 1916. Six months later I
visited the same rooms to see General Brusilov, and,
in the following month of August I had tea in the dining-
room with General Kornilov. General Alexeiev had
preferred to remain in his old quarters. An A.D.C.
showed me all over the house. The Tsar's study and the
adjoining bedroom, which he had shared with his son,
had satisfied his modest requirements. In Count Fre-
dericks' room I saw the telephone that formerly connected
the Palace at Mogilev with the villa at Tsarskoe. It
looked a most ingenious and complicated contrivance.
What tragic conversations it had carried!

CHAPTER VI

GERMAN INFLUENCES

All-powerful, All-pervasive — Colonists — Merchants — Barons — Monopoly of
Trade and Office— The Court— Russia's Allies Belittled— An Insidious
Campaign — The Press Dependent on German Advertising — Dalliance
with Reaction — Suspicion of France and Great Britain.

Under the Old Regime German influences had been
all-powerful and all-pervasive. I shall explain how
they operated. They all tended in one direction — to
the subordination of Russia in political and commercial
matters. When the arch-conspirator at Potsdam dis-
covered that Russia meant to liberate herself from the
German yoke, he struck at Russia's ally, France, and then
launched his legions into Russia. But later, when the
Russian people were in the throes of revolution, he sent
into their midst a diabolical firebrand, who, under the
flag of Bolshevism, carried ruin and desolation far more
terrible than any engine or appliance of war, as waged
by the Germans.

During the reign of Nicholas II, and earlier, Reaction
had been undoubtedly exploited by dark influences of
German origin. That does not necessarily imply that
Tsarskoe Selo was in direct collusion with Berlin. The
German influence in Russia derived its sources of strength
at home as well as abroad. There were many millions
of Germans residents in the country. German colonies
had been planted in the choicest parts of European Russia:
on the western border, in Poland, in the fertile south, on
the Volga, and around Petrograd in flagrant disregard of
military considerations. Catherine the Great, a German

GERMAN INFLUENCES 49

princess, started the fashion. It had been her intention
to promote improved methods of farming. Later, the
"peaceful penetration" of Poland and adjacent lands
was encouraged in compliance with the anti-Polish policy
to which Russia had been committed by the partition of
Poland.

As a matter of fact, the German colonists, while thriv-
ing by dint of their better adaptation to rural require-
ments, lived quite apart from the surrounding villagers,
preserving their own language and faith, enjoying educa-
tional privileges which were denied to the Russian peasants
and neither helped the peasants, who were still under the
deadening influence of the commune, nor associated
themselves with the interests and destinies of the Empire
which harbored them. They owed their first allegiance
to the Kaiser. They spoke and thought in German, and
regarded Germany as their home.

German merchants and manufacturers thrived and
multiplied in Russia under the same favorable conditions.
They were numerous and wealthy. Goods and machinery
could be obtained in abundance from the Fatherland,
money also. When the internal prosperity of Russia
began to develop rapidly after the Japanese war, the
Germans reaped a golden harvest. German manu-
factured goods flooded the market, while Russian rye
exported to Germany went to fatten pigs. Custom-house
duties had been suitably arranged in gratitude for German
"friendship" during the war. All the benefit of the
exchange went into German pockets.

British manufacturers had business enough at home
or in the colonies, and were so ignorant of Russian methods
that they never attempted to compete seriously with
the Germans. Germans came to regard Russia as their
lawful domain. The predominance of German capital
in the banks and of German enterprise in trade and
industry naturally led to a large dependence upon them

50 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

of the Russian newspapers. Here came in a potent
factor in the political situation. The Germans had
helped to build up trade and industry, with great advan-
tage to themselves, it is true, but undoubtedly with
benefit to the country, in developing its resources. But
the ultimate result was distinctly unfavorable to Russia.
Public opinion was being subjected to a pro-German
propaganda.

This danger had long ago arisen in another quarter.
The Baltic provinces were ruled by German barons and
German burgesses. The former, descendants of the
Teutonic Knights, who had waged relentless war with
Slavdom in the Middle Ages, found themselves included
under the Russian scepter as a result of Peter the Great's
conquests. But they lost few, if any, of their feudal
privileges. German castles and country seats belonging
to the barons, and German warehouses which dated
back to the days of the Hanseatic League held the prov-
inces in undisputed possession. Thence emanated a
stream of powerful German influence throughout the
country. High offices of State, Court dignities, commands
in the Army and Navy, were monopolized by the numerous
heads or cadets of baronial houses. They were efficient,
honest, and clannish. The Foreign Office was full of
them, so were the Guard regiments.

I do not wish to doubt their loyalty. Far from it.
Officers bearing German names fought well, although
sometimes their kinsmen were fighting against them.
But their German associations and kinship naturally
colored their feelings. They were ever inclined to
magnify the prowess of their country of origin, and
to belittle the power of non-German allies of Russia.
This feeling existed throughout the ministries, and
had numerous and powerful exponents throughout the
country.

Alexander HI had realized all the perils of this situa-

GERMAN INFLUENCES 51

tion. He initiated a veritable anti-German campaign.
German names diminished in number among courtiers and
functionaries during his reign. So wide-awake was he to
the necessity of safeguarding the national spirit from
dangerous encroachments, so clearly did he realize the
aggressiveness of German activity abroad as well as at
home, that he concluded the famous alliance with France.
That agreement deeply shocked the apostles of autocracy,
and was hailed with delight by the Russian people. All
saw in it a hope of riddance from Germanism and a blow
to despotism.

The pro-German orientation of Russia, promoted by
her strong German element, was, indeed, based upon
the prejudices and interests of the autocratic regime and
its supporters. Germany was regarded by the bureau-
cracy and the okhrana as the refuge of absolutism, and
therefore as the natural friend and ally of Russia. The
French alliance had always been a bugbear to them.
The tendency of the powerful German influence and its
bureaucratic adherents was hostile to it. After the
disastrous war with Japan, which had been connived
at both by Germany and by the bureaucracy — the former
desiring to divert Russia's attention to the Far East,
the latter stupidly hoping to introduce a counter-irritant
to internal unrest — the pro-German movement sustained
an unexpected check, which enabled Russia to secure a
necessary rapprochement with Great Britain — a con-
summation above all hateful to the bureaucracy, which
identified English institutions with revolution. Once the
course of foreign policy had been set in the Entente direc-
tion, the pro-German intrigue became more difficult. 1

But in Petrograd, as well as in Berlin, hopes were enter-
tained that Russia would leave her allies in the lurch
rather than risk another war, inasmuch as the bureau-

1 Note WOhelm's negotiation of a secret treaty with Nicholas II and its
failure (1905).

52 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

cracy had been taught by bitter experience that war
might entail a revolt against the autocratic power.

I have often been asked, even by the Russians —
extraordinarily ignoran tabout political affairs — "Who
are the pro-German party?" The answer has been
supplied above. Their name was and is Legion. And
it would be a mistake to suppose that persons bearing
German names — whether Gentiles or Jews — alone nour-
ished covert or open sympathy for Germany. Durnov6
and Voy&kov were just as pro-German as Plehve or
Stunner. Many Russians had received their education
in German schools and universities, imbibing German
science and German ideas. Literature and the Press
were largely inspired from German sources. The art of
Munich, the fashions of Berlin, the news agencies and
the manufactured produce of the Fatherland permeated
everyday life in Russia. The height of one pro-German
editor's ambition was to receive the Red Eagle and the
rank of Komerzienrat

Even the Duma had been adapted to German models.
Its party leaders were grouped in a "Senioren Convent,"
like the Reichstag. And its "Presidium" and rules of
debate were fashioned after the German manner. If
Kaiserdom had openly prevailed on the banks of the
Neva, it could not have colored the organization of
the Russian Empire, its politics, and even its language
more than it had done. German influence assumed pro-
portions that can be compared only with the Norman-
Variag lordship over the early Russian communities or
the Norman-French conquest of Saxon England. Ger-
man words and German titles (Graf and Baron) were
all-pervading. The hierarchy of the Court was eloquent
of its German origin: Hof-Marschal, Hof-Meister, Kam-
mer-Junker, Kammer-Herr, Stahl-Meister, Ober-Schenk,
Jager-Meister — such were the honorific dignities that
appealed to bureaucratic ambition. likewise, for an

GERMAN INFLUENCES 53

officer to become FlGgel-Adjutant meant adoption into
the privileged ranks of Court dignitaries and a brilliant
career. For Court rank carried precedence over the
civilian and military hierarchies. At the commencement
of the war, Nicholas II changed the name of his capital
from St. Petersburg to Petrograd. The German Court
titles remained.

But just because the German hold upon the country
was so all-embracing, the Russians themselves became
alive to its dangers, and a great anti-German rally set
in. The war intensified it. At first the high commands
in the Army were largely in the hands of Generals bearing
German names. Two years later they had been weeded
out. During the Revolution the soldiers drove out many
of their officers simply because their names were German.

One of the causes that led to the downfall of the Old
Regime must be sought in the deep-rooted conviction
of the masses that they had been sold to the Germans,
and that Russia's reverses in the field were part and
parcel of a huge pro-German conspiracy. This feeling
led to serious anti-German riots in Moscow soon after
the outbreak of war. But even here the okhrana disclosed
its vicious hand. The lawless outburst was insidiously
diverted against Russians and Allies, who suffered com-
paratively more than did the German-owned properties.

CHAPTER VH

THE JEWS

Influx of Jews after the Partition of Poland— The Pale as a Barrier — Misery
and Abuses — A Source of Political Poison— Origin of the Pseudo-Jew
Extremist — Cause of Pogroms.

For a fuller comprehension of the situation in Russia
under the Old Regime, and more particularly of the
events that occurred during the Revolution, it becomes
necessary to deal at some length with the position of
the Jews. It had an intimate bearing upon all that
happened in 1917 and 1918.

Something like six millions of Jews inhabited the
Russian Empire at the beginning of the war. They
were twice as numerous as the Germans, with whom
they were largely associated in business. Their numbers
had been enormously increased as the result of an evil
act — the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth
century. By this political blunder Russia strengthened
the Brandenburg-Prussian realm, and saddled herself with
the Polish and Jewish questions. Thereby she was
destined to come, sooner or later, into direct collision
with the Germans and to find herself handicapped in
her struggle.

The ancestors of the Polish Jews had fled from Ger-
many — the Biblical Ashkenaz — to escape persecution. 1
But they brought with them a deep-rooted association
with that country. During centuries of abode in Teu-

1 The Jews of Germany and their descendants are known as Ashkenarim;
those that settled in Spain as Sephardim — a Jewish "aristocracy."

THE JEWS 55

tonic lands they had evolved a specific language known
as Yiddish, a German jargon. They acted as a sort of
advance-guard of German penetration. In Poland they
enjoyed a large measure of freedom. All business was
in their hands. They acted as agents to the great land-
lords. The urban population was — and remains — mostly
Jewish. But Poles and Jews lived peacefully enough
together. The Jews certainly had the best of the bar-
gain; they prospered, and were not ungrateful. They
helped the Poles with money during the insurrections of
1831 and 1863.

Thirty years ago the Poles began to go into business
themselves. Competition arose. The landlords started
agricultural associations to shake off the Jewish monopoly.
A rift betokened itself, and has been growing ever since,
— effectually discrediting Assimilationist theories, largely
based upon the earlier and one-sided adjustment of Polish
and Jewish interests. 1

Old Russia tried vainly to denationalize the Poles,
and, obeying the dictates of self-preservation, to prevent
the Jews from spreading eastward. This was the origin
of the Pale.

No Jew was supposed to enjoy rights of residence,
roughly speaking, east of the Dnieper. The Little
Russians had become more or less inured to Jewish
methods, and were left, to bear the brunt of an ever-
increasing Jewish element. For every Jewish boy and
girl had to marry and produce a numerous progeny.
Such was the Talmudic law. Unpermitted to hold lands
and thus incapacitated for husbandry, the Jewish masses
filled the towns and settlements, managing to eke out a

1 The history of Polish politics during the past three decades does not enter
within the scope of this book. In the author*s opinion, based on long residence
in Poland, it should afford convincing evidence of the utter failure of Assimi-
lation or any other solution of the Jewish problem except Zionism, i.e., the
restoration of Jewish nationhood, the Jewish masses in Russia will follow their
Rabbis, who, on religious grounds, are favorably disposed towards Zionism.

56 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

miserable existence, living under the menace of pogroms,
which exploited Gentiles were ready to perpetrate when-
ever the police gave the signal.

That the enforcement of the Pale system would lead
to abuses was to be expected. Jews could not own land
or reside outside specified settlements, even within the
Pale. The police were able to levy blackmail for all
kinds of real or alleged infractions of this rule. Wealthier
Jews could always evade it by means of bribery. Without
this source of income the police could not, indeed, have
made ends meet. Their pay and allowances were ludi-
crously insufficient. But with the help of the Jewish
revenue they accumulated comfortable fortunes. Thus
the police had an interest in the Jews so long as the Pale
was maintained, and tolerated or prompted pogroms only
when the okhrana judged thbm to be necessary. We
shall see how this system of corruption gradually affected
the whole Empire.

In addition to his propensity for the accumulation
of riches, the Jew living within the Pale was incited
thereto by the degrading position of his impecunious co-
religionary. The poorest peasant lived like a prince in
comparison with the average Jew. A piece of herring,
an onion, and a crust of bread formed the Jew's diet.
Dirt, squalor, and privation were his destined portion.
Besides, the pogroms affected rich and poor alike. Was it
surprising that the Jew strove to escape from the Pale by
fair means or foul, and that to him the lands east of the
Dnieper seemed [like a Canaan, a land flowing with milk
and honey, where he might wax rich and live secure?
But how could the moneyless Jew hope to reach it? The
struggle to gain affluence was naturally intense. Only
the craftiest and least scrupulous could hope to raise
their heads above the seething mass of Jewish pauperdom.
Amongst this suffering multitude the devil of class-
hatred raised a fearsome harvest. The teachings of

THE JEWS 57

Karl Marx were here decocted in their quintessence and
spread by migrants from the Pale into more favored lands
— into the heart of Russia, into England and far America.

The rich and the poor among the Jews were bound
together by ties of religion and charity. The wealthier
Israelites gave of their abundance to the less fortunate
ones of their faith. But this bond was not a compre-
hensive one. Certain important elements repudiated it
by severing all ties with Jewry. For apostasy was one
of the manifold evils arising out of Jewish disabilities.
The poorer Jew could also break open the door of his
prison by passing stringent academic tests. Then he
went into the cities, an isolated, needy adventurer, losing
his faith, dominated by a thirst for vengeance, seeing in
the most violent political creeds and methods an appeal
to redress the wrongs of his people, and ready to implicate
the bourgeois Jew and the Gentile in his feelings of class
and political hatred.

Through the schools the Jew sought to satisfy his
desire for freedom rather than an inclination for learning.
University degrees gave certain rights and privileges,
including the right to travel or reside anywhere in Russia.
Every Jewish boy strove to enter a university. For this
purpose he had to matriculate through a high school.
The proportion of Jews admissible had to be limited, how-
ever, or they would have swamped the "gymnasia"
within the Pale. Only the very cleverest Jewish boys
could gain access to the State schools and eventually
enter the university. And the proportion of Jewish
undergraduates was also restricted. It represented more
than double the ratio of the Jewish to the Gentile popula-
tion, but this did not satisfy Jewish appetites. Handi-
capped, the Jews yet managed to exceed the norm at the
close of their studies, because they were more persistent
and could endure greater privations than the poorest
Russian student. An outcry was raised when the Min-

58 SLAVDOM, THE TATABS, AND AUTOCRACY

istry of Education insisted on refusing further admittance
to Jewish undergraduates until the proportions had been
readjusted.

Attempts to safeguard the Russians from Jewish
encroachment became more pronounced and desperate
as the tide of Hebrew invasion rose higher, and — I may
add — as outcasts from Jewry developed revolutionary
tendencies. The Jews were slowly but surely pervading
all the lucrative professions: the Bar and medicine 1
and to a lesser degree art and literature. They had
small inclination for science or engineering. Commissions
in the Army and Navy were barred to them. Commerce
and industry could not appeal to the impecunious Jew.
These lucrative branches were reserved for wealthy
Hebrews, who, by payment of a certain Guild tax (amount-
ing to about $500 per annum), could reside everywhere.
In banking and industries the Jews became all-pervasive,
as in the Press. They were confidants of Grand Dukes.
The bureaucracy tried to restrain their irresistible sway
by introducing senseless restrictions. For instance, a Jew
could not be freely elected to boards of companies.

Numerous methods of evading the law of residence
arose. Dentists' and chemists' assistants and certain
artificers were granted partial exemptions. These callings
were glutted with Jews. "Colleges" sprung up which
did a profitable trade in "diplomas/' Hie police readily
winked at irregularities for a consideration. Petrograd
was full of Jews who had no legal right of residence.
They lived in suburban districts on payment of a "private
tax" to the police, who watched over their interests
paternally, and were disposed to molest only those Jews
who had a right to reside there.

It becomes clear that the purpose for which the Pale
and all the other anti-Jewish restrictions had been devised
was mistaken and mischievous. It defeated itself. It

1 They had almost monopolised them by the time the Revolution broke out

THE JEWS 59

led to the penetration of Russia by Hebrew elements
of the most aggressive kind which had severed themselves
from Jewry — had become pseudo-Jews — while it left the
Jewish masses to suffer in congestion and misery. The
purpose was one of self-preservation, yet it was mis-
represented in the eyes of the world by the Jews plausibly
enough, for motives that are easily comprehensible.

No instigation was necessary to provoke pogroms.
They would have occurred oftener if the police had not
interfered. The Little Russian, Lithuanian or Polish
peasants wrecked Jewish shops whenever Jewish "ex-
ploitation" assumed intensive forms. A similar phe-
nomenon had been observed in Austria-Hungary, 1 and
its recurrence in Russia since the Revolution puts an
end 'jo the fiction that the police alone were responsible.
Indeed, the frequency of pogroms during 1917 was all
the more remarkable because Revolutionary Russia was
disposed to champion the Jews as a race that had been
oppressed by the Old Regime.

Another point must be explained before I leave the
Jewish question. When the Russian armies entered
Poland at the beginning of the war many regiments
from other parts of the Empire knew little or nothing
about the Jews. The soldiers had a religious prejudice
against them and also a certain contempt, because the
Jews systematically evaded service in the ranks. Here
they found enormous populations of Jews who were
obsequious and omniscient. Jewish " factors" supplied
them with anything for money, even drink. To ingratiate
themselves with officers and men they would tell them
— long anticipating official knowledge — of promotions
and of impending transfers of units. As the Germans
displayed by means of derisive placards hoisted over the
trenches a similar knowledge of military secrets, the idea
gained ground that the Jews were spying in the interests

i H. Wickham Steed "The Hapeburg Monarchy."

t .

60 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

of Germany. "Telephone" wires discovered around
Jewish houses confirmed this suspicion. It is interesting
to note that the Jews had a habit of "wiring" their
compounds in order to evade some of the Talmudic laws
of ritual and other observances. This simple explana-
tion accounts for many of the cruelties to which Jews
were unjustly subjected. Let me add that to my knowl-
edge Jewish soldiers of the right sort performed many
gallant deeds — worthy of their remote ancestors, the
Maccabeans.

•CHAPTER Vm

CONDITIONS OP UPHEAVAL

The Ordeal of War— Dearth in the Cities— Disease and Desertion among the
Troops— -The Government Suspected of Treachery— Silence about the
Allies — No more Volunteers — The Drink Evil Revives — Dearness of
Living-— What had Become of the Food?— M. Guchkov and the Grand
Dukes— Plans for a Palace Revolution— Grand Duke's Letter— Revolt
of the Nobles — Last Warnings — The Zemstvos — M. Rodzianko and the
Duma; — Demands for Responsible Government— Arrest of Labor Members
— In Moscow — ProtopopoVs Confidence.

In Petrograd, early in 1917, everybody felt that a
revolution was impending, and that, sooner or later, it
would break out unless some radical change was intro-
duced in the system of government. The old system
had been thoroughly discredited by the sad experience of
the war — that searching test of a nation's fitness and
efficiency. The Russians were a long-suffering people,
but continuous evidence of blundering and lack of organ-
ization, reverses in the field, corruption and abuse of
power on the part of the Government, which the Duma
pitilessly exposed, lamentable default of co-ordination
between the civilian departments and the Army, the
unnecessary mobilization of many millions of peasant
farmers affecting the production of food, the breakdown
of the transport services provoking scarcity of bread in
the cities — all these disheartening symptoms had slowly
but surely diminished the ardor of the people. Russia
was not so much war-weary as discouraged by the blind
or wilful stupidity of her rulers, who were acting like
tools of German influence and ambitions. Superadded
to this unhappy situation was the tragic discredit in

68 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

which the autocracy had been involved by the Razputin
scandal, coupled with a diminished prestige of the Church.

As the queues at the bakeries and provision shops
lengthened, the prospect of revolution grew nearer. It
was sad for the people to wait in their hundreds and
thousands for a small ration of coarse bread. The rich
had to hire extra servants, who did nothing but stand
in line at various shops to obtain the simple necessaries
of life. For the poor clerk's family it involved great
hardship. The working classes were receiving high wages,
but the women and children had to spend most of their
time in the queues. Waiting the whole day and a good
part of the night was trying enough, but standing outside
in the bitter winter cold caused suffering that would have
tried the temper and exhausted the patience of the
hardiest. Co-operative food stores were started by the
mills, banks, and ministries, by journalists, lawyers,
doctors, and other professional men. * They were quickly
overrun with demands. People tried to obtain food from
the villages, where it was to be had in abundance. But
the Government had enacted that no food should be
transported from one province to another without special
permission. This had been done ostensibly in order to
prevent speculation. It failed entirely of its purpose.
The sack of flour or potatoes consigned to a private
individual was impounded by "zealous" officials and
appropriated to their own use. At the same time huge
transactions were being carried on by the banks in flour
and sugar. With the help of bribery they could defy
all regulations and "buy" railway cars, reducing thereby
the already insufficient supply of rolling-stock.

Meat had become extremely scarce. The countless
herds raised on the steppes of southern and southeastern
Russia had been used up wastefully to supply the needs
of the Army. Two-thirds of the live stock consigned to
the Front died on the way. And larger numbers had

CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 68

to be sent in order to provide copious meat rations for
the men in the trenches. The soldiers were being well
fed — much better than they had ever fared in the villages,
where, indeed, they lived chiefly on bread, cabbage, and
kdsha (a porridge made of buckwheat). The cry was
"All for the Army," and the soldiers were not stinted.
But this soon brought about a meat crisis. The peasants
and farmers naturally took advantage of the situation to
slaughter their calves rather than raise cattle that would
be requisitioned. An interdict was placed upon the
marketing of veal, but it could not be enforced, owing
to the great demand for meat. Then the farmers devoted
all their attention to fattening pigs. It became more
profitable to use cereals as food for pigs. So the supply of
bread grew dearer and more difficult.

Meanwhile the troops could no longer be fed in the
old lavish way. Meat and even bread rations had to be
cut down. Formerly the soldiers received 3 lb. of rye
bread and } lb. of meat daily. They could not eat all
the bread, and used to sell the remainder to peasants,
who fed the pigs with it. On the eve of the Revolution
they were receiving 2 lb. of bread a day and a smaller
ration of meat twice a week; on other days they received
salt herring. 1 This diet induced much tribulation in the
trenches. Men suffered from thirst, and used up the
timbering for fuel to boil tea. (Methylated spirits could
not be served out for this purpose, because the men would
consume them in the liquid or in the solid state.) During
the winter of 1916-17 scurvy was very prevalent at the
Front. Desertion began to occur. Many companies
were reduced by these causes to one-third of their normal
strength.

The huge agglomerations of reserve troops in the towns
and cities were not much better off. Tobacco and sugar

1 In 1917 the Army and the reserve troops required 1,000,000 tons of
meat.

64 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

all had in fair abundance, and the men could eke out
their rations with food purchased outside. But soldiers'
pay amounted to 90 kopeks per month (less than 50 cents
at pre-war rates of exchange). They got a little money
from the villages occasionally. In some respects they
were worse off than the men at the Front, because presents
of food and comforts were sent to the active regiments
by the towns and provinces whose names they bore,
whereas the reserve troops had no territorial designations.

In Petrograd and in the larger cities conditions were
somewhat better, but soldiers who had been in my service
often came to me to complain that they were underfed.
Suspicion prevailed in the minds of all the men, both at
the Front and in the Rear, that their food was being
tampered with by unscrupulous officials. The wildest
stories of profiteering received ready credence. Even the
hardships endured by their civilian fellow-citizens did
not convince them that there was a real shortage of
food in the towns and cities, easily explicable by the
disorganization of railway transport. They heard of
vast speculations by functionaries and merchants, or
bankers; they could see for themselves that money was
being spent extravagantly by civilians and officers,
never had there been so many luxurious motor-cars
about the streets of Petrograd, and they concluded that
the "famine" was being "arranged" by speculators for
selfish purposes, or by pro-Germans in order to provoke
a revolution: they felt that in either case the people were
being betrayed and that Russia was doomed to defeat.

Little or nothing was known about the Allies. The
Staff and the Government had not done much to remove
this ignorance, and, in this respect, the cryptic influence
of the German element in the military and civil adminis-
trations and in a large section of the Press had asserted
itself with persistent disregard of the Allied cause. I
must add that the Press -was long shorn of information

CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL «5

regarding the achievements of its own Army. Narrow-
minded conceptions of the war correspondent's true
mission, prevailing at Headquarters, deprived the public
of an asset of incalculable importance — of a daily, living,
human bond of union between the people and the soldiers.
As General Alexeiev aptly defined it to me in a conver-
sation dating back to the end of 1915: "They have
converted the Army into an anonymous entity, void of
human face or form." I had just then been on a visit to
the Front, and had told thousands of the men what I
knew about the Allies. It was a revelation to them —
and, I may add, to their officers. Generals who were
real Russians, in name and in heart, asked me to visit
the British Army and French Armies. They realized
how important it was that the soldiers should hear more
about their comrades in the West. At the same time,
General Alexeiev urged the Tsar to break down the wall
of silence around his armies. A party of Russian writers
soon afterwards visited England and France under my
charge.

Much good work was subsequently accomplished.
Officers heard enough about the Allies to discount any
too obvious insinuations against them which pro-German
partisans were always ready to produce. (An insidious
campaign had been directed against the Allies after the
Russian retreat in 1915.) But the soldiers in the trenches,
constantly replacing heavy casualties in the ranks, still
remained ignorant of what was really going on. They
still imagined that the bulk of the enemy's forces were in
front of them, and there was no end of the war in sight.
Pro-German agents did their best to perpetuate this belief.

The officers had also become discouraged. It seemed
to them that the Government was deliberately trying to
quench popular enthusiasm from the outset of the war.
All the well-born youth of Russia — and many a poor
peasant— had volunteered in the early days. Then,

66 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

gradually, the spirit of the nation, reflected in its purest
elements, its young men, had been quenched. We all
noticed the change, and we knew the cause. The disas-
trous retreat of 1915 had much to do with it, but it was
mainly due to a consciousness of the incapacity of the
Government and of the prevalence of German influences.
Volunteers diminished, and finally ceased. The young
men had to be conscripted. Enormous numbers evaded
active service; a majority joined their regiments after
a brief preparatory training. But theirs was not a whole-
hearted service. The morale of the Army suffered accord-
ingly.

Discouragement also led to laxity among Staff officers.
To the towns in which various staffs were quartered soon
came wives and families. There they could be sure of
obtaining food. Officers who would not allow their
domestic arrangements to interfere with their duties at
the Front took the alternative course of sending flour
and sugar home. Thus the railways were engaged in
carrying food to the Front and of transporting it back
to the Rear.

In the Navy everything was quite different; the men
suffered very little from the war, either in casualties or
in comforts. Discipline was severe, for the officers as
well as for the men. Seldom was a naval uniform to be
seen in Petrograd. But the long winter anchorage in
the Baltic, and particularly the influence of depot life in
Kronstadt, reacted badly upon the seamen. Later these
conditions were destined to afford a rich soil for revolu-
tionary propaganda, with disastrous consequences to the
Navy and to Russia.

Side by side with the growing dearth of food in Petro-
grad, Moscow, and other cities, the drink evil had been
gradually reasserting its sway. In the cities the sale of
methylated spirit was strictly regulated; vodka, of course,
could not be obtained. But by subterfuges the common

CONDITIONS OP UPHEAVAL 87

people managed to procure intoxicants. Methylated
spirit, varnish, eau-de-cologne, various "knock-out" drops
dispensed by the chemists, were all severally or col-
lectively impressed into the secret drink service- The
first-named method was the cheapest, although the most
deadly. It led to an extraordinary increase in the con-
sumption of cranberry waters. The breweries had had to
close down because beer was also forbidden. Some of
them began to make cranberry fcvass. It was soon dis-
covered that a judicious admixture thereof with methyl-
ated spirits removed the unpleasant odor and partially
neutralized the poison. Small grocers waxed rich on the
sale of hi ass.

Another cause of widespread discontent was the
increasing dearness of all the necessaries of life. On
the eve of the Revolution they had risen fivefold, and
more. Rye bread cost 17 kopeks (8c.) a pound, instead
of 2 kopeks (lc); potatoes 80 kopeks (40c.) instead of
8 kopeks (4c). Tea was at 3 roubles ($1.50), or three
times its usual price; bacon-fat at 3 roubles 50 kopeks
($1.75), or six times higher. Sugar could be obtained in
small quantities at double the former figure, although it
was produced in huge quantities within the country.
The cost of heating had risen tenfold. Wood was almost
unprocurable. The stoppage of imported coal had di-
verted wood fuel to the mills. The working-men drew
four and five times their former wages, and did not feel
the pinch. But the numerous class of employees in
private and Government offices suffered terribly. There
were cases of women smothering their children rather
than see them die of starvation.

To such a pass had the country been brought by an
incompetent Government. For three years no cereals
had been exported, no bacon, no butter, no eggs, no sugar;
yet these staples of life had provided the bulk of Russia's
huge export trade without prejudice to home consump-

66 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL OT

people managed to procure intoxicants. Methylated
spirit, varnish, eau-de-cologne, various "knock-out" drops
dispensed by the chemists, were all severally or col-
lectively impressed into the secret drink service. The
first-named method was the cheapest, although the most
deadly. It led to an extraordinary increase in the con-
sumption of cranberry waters. The breweries had had to
close down because beer was also forbidden. Some of
them began to make cranberry kvass. It was soon dis-
covered that a judicious admixture thereof with methyl-
ated spirits removed the unpleasant odor and partially
neutralized the poison. Small grocers waxed rich on the
sale of Jcva&s.

Another cause of widespread discontent was the
increasing dearness of all the necessaries of life. On
the eve of the Revolution they had risen fivefold, and
more. Rye bread cost 17 kopeks (8c.) a pound, instead
of 2 kopeks (la); potatoes 80 kopeks (40c.) instead of
8 kopeks (4c). Tea was at 3 roubles ($1.50), or three
times its usual price; bacon-fat at 3 roubles 50 kopeks
($1.75), or six times higher. Sugar could be obtained in
small quantities at double the former figure, although it
was produced in huge quantities within the country.
The cost of heating had risen tenfold. Wood was almost
unprocurable. The stoppage of imported coal had di-
verted wood fuel to the mills. The working-men drew
four and five times their former wages, and did not feel
the pinch. But the numerous class of employees in
private and Government offices suffered terribly. There
were cases of women smothering their children rather
than see them die of starvation.

66 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

In the Navy everything was quite different; the men
suffered very little from the war, either in casualties or
in comforts. Discipline was severe, for the officers as
well as for the men. Seldom was a naval uniform to be
seen in Fetrograd. But the long winter anchorage in
the Baltic, and particularly the influence of depot life in
Kronstadt, reacted badly upon the seamen. Later these
conditions were destined to afford a rich soil for revolu-
tionary propaganda, with disastrous consequences to the
Navy and to Russia.

CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 87

people managed to procure intoxicants. Methylated
spirit, varnish, eau-de-cologne, various "knock-out" drops
dispensed by the chemists, were all severally or col-
lectively impressed into the secret drink service. The
first-named method was the cheapest, although the most
deadly. It led to an extraordinary increase in the con-
sumption of cranberry waters. The breweries had had to
close down because beer was also forbidden. Some of
them began to make cranberry kvass. It was soon dis-
covered that a judicious admixture thereof with methyl-
ated spirits removed the unpleasant odor and partially
neutralized the poison. Small grocers waxed rich on the
sale of Jcvass.

Another cause of widespread discontent was the
increasing dearness of all the necessaries of life. On
the eve of the Revolution they had risen fivefold, and
more. Rye bread cost 17 kopeks (8c.) a pound, instead
of 2 kopeks (la); potatoes 80 kopeks (40c.) instead of
8 kopeks (4c). Tea was at 3 roubles ($1.50), or three
times its usual price; bacon-fat at 3 roubles 50 kopeks
($1.75), or six times higher. Sugar could be obtained in
small quantities at double the former figure, although it
was produced in huge quantities within the country.
The cost of heating had risen tenfold. Wood was almost
unprocurable. The stoppage of imported coal had di-
verted wood fuel to the mills. The working-men drew
four and five times their former wages, and did not feel
the pinch. But the numerous class of employees in
private and Government offices suffered terribly. There
were cases of women smothering their children rather
than see them die of starvation.

72 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

bev, who had presided in the Upper House, was summarily
dismissed. Never had such a revolt been anticipated
by the Court clique. Instructions immediately went to
the subsidized "Black Hundred" organizations, and
telegrams denouncing the Nobles and the Council were
promptly forthcoming, which somewhat cheered the
Court. However, a memorandum, signed by seventeen
leading statesmen, came to hand warning the Emperor,
without result.

The British Ambassador saw the Emperor in Decem-
ber for the third time since the summer of 1916, and told
him, without the slightest reserve, that he was gravely
imperiling his Throne. There was only one way out of
the food crisis, he urged, and that was to entrust the
whole business of supply to the Zemstvos (County Coun-
cils) and other public bodies, so that the people should
regain some measure of confidence. Now the Zemstvos
had been doing splendid work at the Front in Red Cross
and other auxiliary relief services. They had shown their
ability, under the able direction of Prince Lvov, to
organize and handle such business. Nicholas H listened
without wincing, and thanked the Ambassador. It was
all quite true, of course, but nothing came of it. The
Empress insisted that no concessions should be made.
To give the Zemstvos such power would convert Russia
into a Constitutional Monarchy before they knew where
they were. And then good-bye to the autocracy. The
"saint" did not approve, so there was an end of it. More-
over, her own lust of power inclined the scales against
any compromise. So the Emperor remained at Head-
quarters. The "saint's" death steeled the opposition of
the Court.

President Rodzianko, acting as spokesman of the
Duma, came to Headquarters at the end of January with
a last despairing appeal. A tried and faithful supporter
of the Throne, he poured out his fears and misgivings.

CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 78

Members had visited their constituencies and returned
with a clear and categorical demand for Responsible
Government. The country would not wait any longer.
Periculum in mora. Vague promises were made to him,
but it was urged that reforms must wait till the war was
over. A few Ministers might be changed. Stunner was
replaced by M. Pokrovsky, a colorless financier. Pro-
topopov remained. And Razputin's influence survived
in the person of Pitirim, the new Metropolitan of Petro-
grad.

In an Imperial Rescript (January 20th) the Tsar
directed his Premier, Prince Golitsyn, to devote special
care to the food and transport questions, and to work in *
harmony with the Duma and the Zemstvos. These gen-
eralities, meaningless in themselves, kept hope alive.

The Duma was to reassemble at the end of February.
On the 12th, Protopopov arrested twelve Labor members
of the Industrial War Committee, an organization which
had long previously been started by M. Guchkov to
promote munition work. As usual in proceedings against
the working class, they were accused of conspiracy to
set up a Social-Democratic Republic. There were prob-
ably excellent grounds for the accusation this time, as
we shall see, but nothing had ostensibly occurred that
could lend color to it, and, in any case, the arrest of
these men was likely to promote the movement that they
were accused of fomenting. The crazy Minister imagined
that by this measure he had precluded further trouble.
Nevertheless, great anxiety was felt at the okhrana head-
quarters. Rumors of trouble when the Duma met cir-
culated everywhere. However, nothing happened. And
people still "hoped/*

Some days later I visited Moscow. Conditions there
were much the same as in Petrograd. Strikes were con-
stantly occurring. The queues extended down every
street People were perishing with cold and hunger.

74 SLAVDOM, THE TATABS, AND AUTOCRACY

Everybody foresaw trouble, but few thought it was so
near. We all hoped, even then, that the Emperor would
give way, and all Russia, even then was ready to "bless
him and to forgive and forget the sad past." On return-
ing to Petrograd I learned that things were again critical.
The Emperor had been to Tsarskoe. Protopopov reas-
sured him. He had reorganized the police in such a
fashion that they would stiffen the wavering loyalty of
the garrison. He had posted machine-guns on" roofs, in
garrets, and near basement windows, so that his men,
knowing little about machine-guns, would nevertheless be
able to sweep all the main squares and thoroughfares.
The Emperor returned to Headquarters, almost tran-
quilized.

As a matter of fact, Protopopov and the Empress
wanted an outburst, fondly believing that they could
nip incipient revolution in the bud by summarily crush-
ing disorders in the capital.

CHAPTER IX

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION

Earlier Revolutionary Movement* — The Deoembrirti — Influence of Literary
Men — The Emancipation — Origin of Socialist Groups — The Assassination
of Alexander II — Reaction — Rdle of the Zemstvoa — Growth of Industries
— Labor Unrest—The First "Soviet" — Workmen and Peasants in the
Duma — The "Cadets" and "Expropriation" — Stolypin and Agrarian
Reform — Kokovtsov's Administration — No more Famines — Unexampled
Prosperity — Spread of Education — P ro g ress of Siberia — The Co-operative
Movement— The "Third Element.'

»t

Revolutionary forces had long been struggling for
expression under the autocratic regime. They manifested
themselves at the dawn of the nineteenth century in the
conspiracy of young officers who had imbibed Liberal
ideas while serving in the Napoleonic wars, and had borne
the brunt of national disaster and humiliation during
the Conqueror's march to Moscow in 1812. Attracted
and inspired by the noble ideals of the French Revolution,
they had been correspondingly incensed by the obscu-
rantism, corruption, and inefficiency of their Government
at home. But the people were too ignorant to understand
them. When Volkonsky and the other Decembrists haled
their men to the Square in front of the Senate and Holy
Synod buildings, under the shadow of St. Isaac's Cathe-
dral, with the rallying cry of " Constitution," these be-
nighted followers imagined they were cheering for their
"New Empress," the wife of the Grand Duke Constantine
(Konstantin — Konstitutsia) . Falconet's equestrian statue
of the Great Peter witnessed a short and decisive combat
between the Decembrists and the supporters of the
autocracy. Unbeknown to the conspirators, Constan-

76 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

tine, the liberal-minded, then Viceroy at Warsaw, had
renounced his right of succeeding Alexander I on marry-
ing a Polish lady, whose name, of course, had nothing
to do with " Constitution. 99 Nicholas I had no difficulty
in asserting his claims to the autocracy. The noble
ringleaders of a premature movement were ruthlessly
executed or deported to Siberia.

For half a century no serious movement against the
ills of autocracy could assume form. The voice of an
enslaved people remained inarticulate. Only Russian
"intellectuals, 99 recruited from the gentry, could make
themselves heard, but they did so at the risk of having
to seek refuge abroad or suffer grievous penalties at home.
Hertzen and Bakunin the forerunners of Russian Social-
ism, Pushkin the Russian Byron, Dostoievsky the novelist
of Despair, Turgeniev the advocate of Emancipation —
all felt the heavy hand of the autocrat and of the okhrana.
But while Hertzen indited abusive epistles to the despot
from London or Paris, while Pushkin satirized the Court
(just as Gogol, the inimitable Little Russian genius,
had castigated the old-fashioned bureaucracy and the
police, and, later, Chekhov in his caustic tales admon-
ished the middle class), while Dostoievsky sensitized the
minds of his readers by tear-stained records of suffering,
insanity, and revolt, Turgeniev prepared and heralded
the great reforms of Alexander ITs reign. In "The
Memoirs of a Sportsman " Turgeniev sounded the
death-knell of serfdom. Count Leo Tolstoy, the author
of many remarkable novels, gave promise of continuing
the traditions of Turgeniev, but in later years devoted
himself to politico-philosophical writings that served,
like those of J. J. Rousseau, to provide a literary inspira-
tion for revolutionaries.

The okhrana had not yet attained the fatal power it
afterwards exercised. Alexander II took to heart the
lessons of the Crimean War and laid the foundations of

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 77

Representative Government. With the enthusiastic sup-
port of the highest and best elements in his country, and
the help of its best brains, he freed the serfs and en-
dowed them with land, preserving the commune until
the land redemption dues should be paid off. He then
created the Zemstvos, admitting the peasants to a large
share in local government thus introduced, so that when
the time came for " crowning the edifice " by the institu-
tion of a Parliament all classes should have had some
experience in public affairs. But he seems to have been
frightened by what he had done under the influence of
Miliutin and other high-minded statesmen, and for a
whole decade reverted to despotism. We know that he
again relented, and that almost on the eve of his assas-
sination (March, 1881) he signed, and his son endorsed,
a Constitution.

Meanwhile, revolutionary ferment was working. The
Government had to deal with a new and, to them, dis-
concerting element. Students of both sexes — the girls
wearing short hair and spectacles — formed the rank and
'file of a dismal revolutionary battalion. They were the
" Nihilists/' For them there was no God, no Tsar, no
law, no country, no family ties. Sprung from the under-
world of poverty and ignorance, uprooted, unclassed, and
unsexed, they gloried in trampling underfoot all that
was sacred to their elders.

Political groups, successively formed under the ban-
ners of " Land and Freedom " and " The People's Will,"
had been trying to stir up the masses. They meant
well, but, like the Socialists in 1917, they were childlike
in their ignorance of political realities and in their hopes
of attaining a social millennium. Finding no encourage-
ment among the peasants or among the workmen — then
few and scattered — they turned to assassination as a
panacea for political ills.

The murder of Alexander II, perpetrated by political

78 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

enthusiasts to "avenge the execution of revolutionary
partisans " — with, perhaps, the tacit connivance of re-
trograde elements that could not forgive him his great
reforms, turned the whole current of Russian political
life. The conscience of the masses, who adored him as
their Liberator, was inexpressibly shocked and outraged.
For many a year to come the emissaries of " The People's
Will" (Narodovdlisy) appealed to deaf ears, and Reaction
enjoyed undisputed sway. One by one the great reforms
were truncated, education and emigration placed under
a ban. The cauldron of discontent seethed ominously.
Terrorism increased.

i Perhaps Alexander II had waited too long before
signing his still-born Constitution. (The advocates of
delay found a plausible argument in the disinclination
of the peasants to take an interest in other than purely
village affairs.) On the other hand, perhaps had he
not signed it his life might have been saved. But cer-
tainly the enlightened minority of his subjects took the
former view. Finding their hopes of internal political
development were not likely to be fulfilled in the near
future, they turned their attention abroad. This attitude
stimulated the Slavophil (miscalled the Pan-Slav) move-
ment. The names of leading public men like Katkov
(the famous editor of the Moscow Gazette) and of literary
celebrities of this epoch — Aksakov, Homiakov, and others
— thus came to be associated with the salvation of the
Balkan Slavs. Soldiers like Kireiev volunteered their
services. Many generous-hearted Russians enrolled them-
selves under the Slav banner. Their heroism and self-
sacrifice aroused popular interest in the ensuing war with
Turkey in 1877-8, undertaken partly with a view to
stilling the impatience of the Russians for constitutional
reform. Successful in its purpose of freeing the Serbs
and Bulgars, the war had, however, failed in its internal
object. Indeed, it had shown so much incompetency

•I

I J

1 is

3 is

2 < a

5 as

8 <3

I 5

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION TO

and bungling on the part of the Government that a
change was felt to be all the more urgent. And two
years later under the famous "Dictatorship of the
Heart," wielded by Loris-Melikov, the Constitution was
signed secretly, only a few days before the Tsar's mangled
body reached the Winter Palace. Russia did not know
till thirty years later of this tragic coincidence. The
ensuing reaction comprised Slavophil as well as consti-
tutional ideals. The administration of a Kaulbars at
Sofia degraded the one, the omnipotence of a Pobed-
nostev scoffed at the other.

While the country was being stunted in its political
development during the reign of Alexander HI, that
sovereign studiously avoided war and foreign complica-
tions. He set his face against pro-German influences,
and pointed to the larger interests of colonizing Siberia.
So he is depicted by a sculptor of genius in the symbolic
statue that faces the Nicholas railway station — a great
burly man astride of a ponderous horse, curbing its
restiveness as he contained his legions, and pointing
eastwards. But the great political act of his reign, the
Franco-Russian Alliance, involved far-reaching economic
changes that were destined to bring new revolutionary
elements into play.

The French money-market had become available for
developing the enormous latent resources of the Empire.
Witte used this credit with a free hand to promote rail-
way-building, to introduce a gold currency, and to
stimulate industry. But he wanted still more money,
and for this purpose he devised the Spirit Monopoly,
which pumped all the cash that the peasant used to spend
in the village "pub" straight into the Treasury. Thus,
while satisfying the peasant's craving for liquor, the
Monopoly impoverished the countryside. However, the
gradual cessation of periodical famines (after 1909),
thanks partly to improved transport, partly to organiza-

80 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

tion of local reserves of grain, and the gradual increase
in industrial prosperity, averted agrarian disturbances.
Moreover, the growth of industries afforded an outlet
for wage-earners. The working class thereby grew vastly
more numerous, and revolutionary schemers devoted
their attention to this favorable soil.

Yet another revolutionary force was to come from the
Zemstvos. These bodies had continued their discouraged
labors under the guidance of public-spirited landowners
belonging almost exclusively to the gentry. All the
provinces of European Russia, excepting those of the
western border, the Caucasus, and the extreme North,
enjoyed the blessings of local government. But they
were constantly encroached upon by the bureaucracy.
The peasants alone dealt with the affairs of their com-
munes (obshchiny) and parishes (volosti), cared less about
provincial or district 1 concerns, and were willing to
leave their management in the hands of the Zemstvo
leaders. But they had a real grievance. The cost of
the parochial and communal administrations had to be
defrayed by the peasants, although other classes (mer-
chants, nobles, etc.) had recourse to it. No remedy was,
however, provided. The Government would not consider
the extension of the Zemstvo system to the volost, which
would have eliminated this injustice, because the Old
Regime sought in every way to restrict the Zemstvos,
not daring, however, to abolish them outright. (The
volosi Zemstvo was introduced in August, 1917, when the
Revolution was in progress.)

The main cause of this attitude arose, as usual, in
police requirements. The Zemstvo schools, hospitals,
statistical and other services, had engendered an unrecog-
nized class, composed of the people there employed,
which came to be styled the " Third Element," because

1 A district (uwaf) averaged 900,000 inhabitant!.

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 81

the Zemstvos were officially composed only of peasants
and other property-owners (nobles, merchants, burgesses,
etc.). These teachers, dressers, surveyors, and other
employees played an important part in Zemstvo work*
They were recruited almost exclusively from the poorer
classes, men and women who had struggled to secure a
secondary-school education, all more or less predisposed
towards radical, and even revolutionary, doctrines. Even
the higher branches of the Zemstvo services, the doctors
for instance, were inclined in the same direction. Was
it surprising that they should be? Their daily work
brought them into constant contact with evidences of
bureaucratic misrule and the oppression exercised by the
okhrana. This Third Element afterwards provided_some
of the cadres of revolutionary organization.

It was to be expected that the okhrana would battle
with the new danger in the old way, and that as the
number of village schools multiplied the efforts to sterilize
the influence of masters and mistresses would become more
intense. Herein we have an explanation of the syste-
matic opposition raised by the police to rural educa-
tion.

The old NarodovdUsy had failed in their attempts to
enlist the peasant mass in a revolutionary movement.
Their Socialist successors did not fare much better in the
abortive revolution of 1905. But the Third Element
went on with the work, less obtrusively, but ultimately
with signal success.

Meanwhile the working-men had become more adapt-
able to revolution. As usual, strike movements had
marked the growth and developments of industries.
But labor organizations were unknown. There were
artels or companies of workmen, bound together under
an elected leader, who undertook contracts, but these
primitive organizations had only an outside connection
with the mills and factories. In the great textile districts

82 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

gravitating around Moscow and Petrograd, and in the
steel and iron works, coal mines, and oil fields of the
South, many millions of men were massed together, and
often suffering unnecessary hardships. Then there were
the railway workers — a large and united force. So long
as these men had tilled their fields the police did not
interfere with them. In fact, the peasant did not feel
the oppressive rule of the okhrana in his daily life. But
as soon as he left the village he became an object of
suspicion, particularly if he entered a mill.

"Labor unrest " was precluded by the okhrana in a
very simple manner — no unions and no strikes were per-
mitted. Factory inspectors, appointed to hear and settle
grievances, were constantly torn between the repressive
dictates of the okhrana and the impatient demands of
the men. Still, as there was no resisting the men's
tendency to "organize," and they were doing so in secret,
the okhrana devised a plan whereby they fondly imagined
the men would be "satisfied" and "the security of the
State" assured. Thus arose the famous "Zubatovsh-
china" (1903). Zubatov, an agent provocateur, was per-
mitted to form workmen's associations in Moscow in
order to keep an eye on the men. In Petrograd a similar
mission was confided to Father Gapon. We know the
tragic sequel of this experiment.

Ninety years after the Decembrist uprising — a Nobles'
movement — came the first semi-popular uprising, the
Socialist revolt of 1905. It dominated and partly upset
a Constitutional movement organized by the Zemstvo
leaders. All the workmen struck, and the railways
stopped running. The peasants indulged in excesses,
but would not side with the strikers. A council of
workmen's Deputies was formed in Petrograd, but no
soldiers joined it. There was, however, a mutiny in the
Black Sea fleet, due largely to the sad memories of
Tsushima and Port Arthur. The repressions then applied

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 8S

were destined to find a terrible echo in the great Revolu-
tion of 1917. Count Witte brought troops back from
Manchuria, quenched the revolt, and at length wrested a
Parliament of sorts from the unwilling hands of the
autocrat (1905).

Subsequent contests between Constitutional Reform
and Reaction have already been dealt with in a previous
chapter. The existence of the Duma disconcerted Revo-
lution for a time. Terrorism had previously been in-
creasing. Three Ministers — Bogolepov, Sipiagin, and
Plehve — were murdered in rapid succession. The okhrana
got "into touch" with Terrorist organizations through
Azev and other provocateurs, and hoped to control their
energies. Many of the assassians were young Jews, who
also figured in hundreds of murders of policemen and
"expropriations" of banks, effected ostensibly to finance
Revolution and to divert public attention from the main
causes of political crime; a series of pogroms followed.

Experience of revolutionary phenomena left its mark
upon the bureaucracy. After the rude lesson of 1905
much was done to alleviate the intolerable position of
Russian Labor and to introduce agrarian reform. Com-
pulsory insurance of workmen, employers' liability,
hospital funds, reduction of hours, restriction of child
labor, boards of conciliation — all received more or less
attention. A separate Ministry of Commerce and Indus-
try was created with a separate department dealing with
"Labor questions." But the okhrana never gave it a
fair chance. M. Litvinov-Falinsky, a young factory
inspector who had been placed in charge of this service,
repeatedly told me of the impediments that were being
daily placed in his way. The workmen were entitled
under the new law to elect delegates to the various boards.
These delegates were always the most moderate and
trustworthy representatives of their class. Yet the
okhrana invariably had them arrested. Employers and

84 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

employed were thus systematically deprived of a proper
and responsible organization of labor.

Among the peasants, revolutionary organization and
propaganda made comparatively little headway. I re-
member in 1905, during one of my frequent visits to
the Zemstvo Congresses then assembling in Moscow to
discuss constitutional reform, I was present at one of
the first attempts to create a Peasant's Union. My
venerable colleague, the late W. T. Stead, had come to
Russia on a special mission. He had interceded success-
fully with Governor-General Trepov for the release of
M. Miliukov from the fortress, 1 and had come to Moscow .
to address the Congress. A lady, who took great interest
in politics, a Countess Borbinskaia, invited us to meet
some peasants whom she was helping to form a party
and union of their own. We went. It was a curious
gathering. The real peasants said nothing, but an officer,
who claimed rustic origin, talked much. His views
became known later in the programs of Radical and
Socialist parties: "All the land for the peasants." Our
host, an old Etonian, apparently enjoyed the conversa-
tion. He was a very large landowner. It amused him
to hear his wife quite seriously endorse the doctrine of
spoliation. Stead was so overcome by the eloquence of
Mazurenko, the quasi-peasant, that he fell asleep. The
heat of the room, the endless and fevered speech in Rus-
sian, which he did not understand, poured forth too rapidly
for interpreting, had been too much even for his iron
constitution. How typical of present-day politics in
Russia! The well-meaning dame, I think, only then
realized that her plans might be misunderstood. But
the "Union " was formed. It held two meetings. The
police closed the second one, and arrested some of Mazu-
renko's friends.

1 M. Miliukov had rashly attempted to address the factory hands in Pe-
trograd.

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 85

Later, in the first and in the second Dumas, elected
on a very wide peasant suffrage, with an enormous con-
tingent of rustics, we witnessed the same spectacle; many
of the peasant Deputies kept aloof from parties, grouping
themselves together, unresponsive to the bids offered
from the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) benches and
from the Socialist camps. Many of these peasants had
bought lands, and were frightened by the Cadet scheme
and still more by the Socialist plan of land nationaliza-
tion. M. Stolypin, the new Premier, aided by an able
and energetic Minister of Agriculture, M. Krivoshein,
introduced and carried out a gigantic measure to pro-
mote small holdings — in other words, individual owner-
ship.

In the first and in the second Dumas good evidence
was afforded to the Government of their, exact position
with the people, and had they listened attentively all
might have been well. The Moderates and the Left
were about equally divided, the Right was nowhere.
Trepov wanted to summon a Cadet Ministry. But the
Constitutional Democrats had, perhaps unadvisedly,
espoused the agrarian program of Hertzenstein, a Jew-
ish Deputy, providing for a restricted measure of com-
pulsory expropriation in order to enlarge the peasants'
holdings. Nobody could explain satisfactorily how the
scheme was to be applied. It " looked attractive"; in
reality it was specious, untimely, and needlessly compro-
mising to its authors. It frightened all the propertied
classes, and thereby indirectly stimulated reaction.
Moreover, Hertzenstein had spoken in an unguarded
moment (June, 1906) of the "illuminations of May,"
alluding to agrarian disorders which had notoriously
been stimulated by Jewish agitators, " mounted on bi-
cycles," and which he thought would frighten the Govern-
ment into compliance. It did frighten them, but into
resistance. Goremykin told the House that "compul-

86 SLAVDOM, THE TATABS, AND AUTOCRACY

sory expropriation " would "under no circumstances be
permitted/' And when the Cadets wanted to issue an
Appeal to the People against the Government, the Duma
was dissolved. M. Miliukov and his followers thereupon
issued the famous Vyborg Manifesto, summoning the
people not to pay taxes. Practically all the best men in
the party signed it, although many disapproved. It led
to their trial, imprisonment, and disqualification. Their
revolutionary acts seriously crippled the Cadets in the
second Duma, although in 1917 they assured to them a
leading part in the Revolutionary Government. Hert-
zenstein was murdered by an emissary of the "Black
Hundred" organization.

The Duma afforded a useful outlet for pent-up griev-
ances, but at the same time it focused and intensified
revolutionary feeling. In drafting the election laws
prominence had been given to the peasant representation,
it being a bureaucratic axiom that the rural vote might
be relied upon. The workmen also had a separate dele-
gation. But the Socialist parties "boycotted" the first
Duma, on the assumption that parliamentary methods
would prejudice the Revolutionary cause. Hence the
Labor Deputies then elected had only a casual connection
with Socialist parties. The Socialists soon discovered
their mistake, and in the second Duma (February, 1907)
were exerting great influence under the guise of "Toilists."
They, of course, had come to the Duma not to legislate,
but to prepare a revolution. What they wanted was a
Constituent Assembly, and eventually a Socialist Re-
public. The okhrana "discovered" the plot, and many of
the conspirators were arrested and imprisoned. Weak-
ened in numbers and influence, the Cadets had lost all
control over the House. Moderate parties like the Octo-
brists — founded by M. Guchkov to support constitutional
reform within the scope of the Tsar's Manifesto of
October SO, 1005 — had been terrified by revolutionary

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 87

accesses, and were inclined to support repressive meas-
uies.

Under these auspices M. Stolypin initiated his Pre-
miership. His policy was based on ruthless repression
of levolutionary and on the strengthening of conservative
elements. In both directions he was handicapped by
the okhrana, of which he was nominally chief. Repres-
sion overran all limits, and in the end was destined to
weary Stolypin's most ardent supporters, the Octobrists.
Conservatism had been discredited by the creation of a
so-called Monarchist party, commonly known as the
"BUck Hundred/' Sycophants and scoundrels like
Dubrovin, Glinka- Yanchevsky, and Bulatzel disgraced
the cause for which they ostensibly worked. Yet the
Tsar supported them with money and favors. The
Blade Hundred ruled the local police and directed pog-
rom*. Cadets and Socialists were included under one
ban of political excommunication, and everything was
done to favor the Reactionary minority* Stolypin knew
the dangers he ran from Reactionary and Revolutionary
sources. But he went on boldly with his scheme of
agrarian reform, hoping to create a strong reliable peasant
farmer class which should provide a safeguard against
revolution.

He did not scruple to change the electoral law in
order to exclude undesirable elements from the Duma.
This meant a coup cT&at. The organic laws, as amended
by the autocrat in 1906, expressly ordained that no change
should be made in the law on elections without the con-
sent of the Duma. But feeling at Court was then run-
ning so high that Stolypin had to choose the lesser of two
evils: either to abolish the Duma, or "amend" it. It
had been assumed that the autocracy was "self -limited"
by its own act. Exponents of the autocratic doctrine
maintained, however, that the Tsar could always reassert
his unlimited power and omnipotent will. Such was the

88 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

explanation vouchsafed to his subjects when he arbitrarily
enacted a new electoral law (June, 1907).

A forceful, fearless man, Stolypin had faced single-
handed a howling mob of agrarian rioters in Saratov
while Governor of that province in 1905. Just as fear-
lessly he entered upon his task of "saving Russia."
Soon the Socialist ranks were dispersed, Revolutionary
organizations disrupted and the leaders executed, de-
ported, or driven to take refuge abroad. The lesser
lights of Revolution adopted "neutral" or even "loyal "
colors, and the work of agrarian reform proceeded without
serious interruption. In the third and fourth Dumas,
winnowed by electoral devices, very few Socialists gained
entrance. Disqualification of "doubtful " persons was
sweepingly applied by the police and local authorities.
A few Socialists, who had not been too openly compro-
mised by their antecedent activities, managed here and
there to elude official watchfulness. Among them was
young Kerensky. He passed as a Toilist from a small
urban constituency. 1 The Church had also exerted itself.
Parish priests returned to previous Dumas had not been
moderate or loyalist enough to please the Holy Synod.
Now, the clerical interest had been alarmed by Socialist
threats of confiscating Church lands. With the help of
the nev electoral law a large company of priests appeared
in the Duma, voting solidly for the Government.

But even with a subservient Duma little progress
could be hoped for in reform legislation. The Lower
House might pass an important Bill, only to encounter
reactionary opposition in the Upper Chamber. Recourse
had to be taken to emergency legislation under a clause
that enabled the Government to enact urgent measures
during a Parliamentary recess. In this manner the
Agrarian Bills were carried into effect, and courts martial

1 He was selected quite casually by the opponents of Count Uvarov, who had
represented the constituency (Volsk in Samara, Kerensky *s birthplace).

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 89

instituted to try revolutionary offenses. It was a two-
edged weapon, however. The Duma did not like it, and
revenged itself by amending or cutting down the measure
when it came up for its subsequent legislative endorse-
ment. In this manner also Stolypin extended the Zemstvo
organization to the south-western provinces. Small-
holdings were in disfavor with Socialists, Cadets, and
Reactionaries alike, though for different reasons. The
Stolypin Zemstvos discriminated against Polish land-
owners in favor of Russian property-owners and Little
Russian peasants. Intending to strengthen the bonds
uniting the Ukraina with the Empire, he indirectly pro-
moted rural unrest and separatism.

Stolypin's life had been constantly in danger. The
Revolutionaries blew up his summer residence on the
Neva to avenge their comrades executed by order of
courts martial, but he escaped, though one of his daughters
was crippled. In Kiev, while attending a performance
at the Grand Theater in September, 1911, he was fatally
wounded by an agent of the okhrana. A monument
erected to him outside the theater Was destroyed by the
Revolutionaries four years later.

The new Premier, M. (afterwards Count) Kokovtsov,
had for eight years presided over the administration of
Finances. He had never pursued a policy of repression,
and he could not associate himself with the methods of
the okhrana. But as revolution had been stamped out
by his predecessor, he did not have to preoccupy himself
with this unsavory task. He set his mind steadfastly
to carry out economic reforms, to develop the agrarian
policy of Stolypin and Krivoshein, and to provide money
for education. His was a safe and statesmanlike admin-
istration, and it should have met with greater support
and encouragement. But the artificial Duma and the
Reactionary Upper House were both dissatisfied. Revo-
lution was secretly fermenting, Reaction had already its

90 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

Razputin. Neither of them could, or would, accept a
policy of gradual evolution. Discontent with the Premier
assumed a concrete form in the Temperance movement.
Peasants in the Duma and bishops (acting on Razputin's
instigation) in the Council led the assault. The Tsar
espoused the quarrel, and Kokovtsov resigned.

Never had Russia enjoyed material prosperity com-
parable with the decade of M. Kokovtsov's administra-
tion. He had well earned his elevation to the dignity of
a Count of the Russian Empire. What is more, he had
enlisted the respect of all parties. Never had the Revolu-
tionaries molested him, and later in the storm and stress
of upheaval he was to be one of the few representatives
of the Old Regime who did not suffer arrest or imprison-
ment.

Reaction had triumphed, and Goremykin succeeded to
the Premiership. With the subsequent record of Raz-
putinism we have become familiar. Under Goremykin
Russia was destined, however, to engage in a world-war.
The call of patriotism stilled all party passions. But
blindness and incompetency in high places, aggravated
by alien intrigue, were afterwards to lead to a foreseen
disaster. The workmen, who had been periodically
striking in protest against the interference of the okhrana
in lawful Labor organization, and who on the eve of war
were engaged in a strike fomented by German agitators
with German money, instantly resumed their labors.
Later they were to succumb to these and other influences.
And the rustics, dismayed by endless drafts upon the man-
hood of the villages without hope or prospect of victory,
allowed themselves to be swept into the movement.

Great changes had occurred in rural life during the
previous decade, partly as a result of the Co-operative
movement and partly because of the spread of education.
The percentage of illiterate youths had fallen appreciably.
In some provinces, notably on the Volga, every boy was

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 91

attending school sufficiently to acquire the rudiments of
learning. 1 I remember as far back as the winter of 1906,
while staying near Yaroslav with a priest whom I had
known when we were boys, learning from him that
the peasants in his parish gave little heed to revolu-
tionary questions, and were concerned only with one
matter: how to introduce compulsory education. By
their own efforts they anticipated the scholastic measures
afterwards taken by the Government with the approval
of the Duma. Moreover, the village youth were par-
ticularly keen for technical instruction. Classes in
farming, opened by the Government in agricultural
districts, were packed to overflowing.

Emigration to Siberia had changed the face of that
vast region. Thousands of miles of the railway, and
sometimes many hundreds of miles on either side, were
dotted with settlements. The emigrants to Siberia had
always been recruited from the most energetic and inde-
pendent forces in the country, political and agricultural.
Among them were peasant millionaires and huge Co-
operatives. When Stolypin and Krivoshein made their
colonial tour (in 1909) they were entertained by some of
these " strong men." Stolypin had launched his famous
challenge to the supporters of the commune in the Duma :
"You want to foster the idleness of the Weak; I mean
to stake my policy on the Strong!" Yet after his expe-
riences in Siberia he said candidly: "The Siberian
democracy requires careful watching: it may prove too
strong."

The Co-operative movement arose and flourished in
Western Siberia. Dairy farmers associated themselves
together, imported Danish experts, set up modern plants

1 They formed the bulk of the Russian Army in 1914, which never wavered
in its loyalty and patriotism. The older men* called to the colon later, were
more ignorant and less reliable. Hence the success of Bolshevist propaganda
in 1917.

02 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

and machinery, and did a roaring business with the
British market. Thence the movement spread westward
into Russia. The Kokovtsov administration encouraged
it; the okhrana, scenting danger from afar and fearing
all organized labor, did its utmost to prevent its growth.
One of the advocates of rural Co-operative Associations,
M. Nicholas Chaikovsky, 1 a well-known Russian revolu-
tionary, was arrested on returning from exile in England
and detained for some time in the Fortress of SS. Peter
and Paul. The Co-operatives took up and developed the
work that had been already initiated by Zemstvos organi-
zations. The Zemstvos had supplied the peasants and
the numerous kustarny, or cottage industries, with raw
material, and helped them to dispose of their produce.

Thanks to the Zemstvo and the Co-operative organi-
zations, Russia was in a position to deal with the huge
problems of supply connected with the war. (It was the
Government's fault that this invaluable machinery did
not render its full measure of usefulness.) In themselves
they were economical forces of the highest value. Placed
in revolutionary hands they might become dangerous,
and that they were so handled is beyond dispute. The
Co-operatives and the Third Element were, indeed, the
main channels through which revolutionary influences
gained access to the peasantry, and afterwards brought
them into temporary alliance with the Soviet.

1 He m at the head of the Local Government in Northern Russia in 1018.

CHAFTEft X

REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES

RiMWian Socialism — Three Groups — Social Democrat* and Socialist-Revolu-
tionaries — Bolshevism and Maximaliam — Terrorist Organisation-— The
Doctrine of Murder — Lenin and Kerensky.

Having surveyed the revolutionary terrain, we may
now proceed to analyze the forces that were destined, by
the logic of Despotism, to override the Moderate elements
in the country and storm the citadel of State. We have
seen how these forces looming in the background had
sent forth skirmishers to capture all the positions that
had been laboriously acquired by the Moderate forces:
the Zemstvos, the Duma, and the Co-operatives. We
have noted the pernicious influence of German intrigue
and of pseudo-Jew vengefulness on the one hand and
of pseudo-Conservatism on the other. Traversing the
dark mazes of Court life, we have paused briefly to take
stock of the progress made by the people. Nowhere
did elements manifest themselves in strength, unity, and
concord, sufficient to save the country from a sudden
internal convulsion.

Socialism, the mainspring of revolution, had assumed
three concrete forms in Russia during the early part of
the twentieth century. They were: the Labor Emanci-
pation group, initiated by Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Vera
Zasulich; the Social-Democratic party, organized with
the help of a Russian, Vladimir Ul&nov, alias Lenin, 1
Dyin, etc.; and the Socialist-Revolutionary party, formed

1 See note at the end of this chapter.

94 SLAVDOM, THE TATABS, AND AUTOCRACY

under the auspices of Gerschuni, a pseudo-Jew, and
E. K. Breshko-Breskovskaia, afterwards nicknamed
grandmother of the Russian Revolution." They were
outlaw" parties. Avowed membership in either of them
entailed punishment. The organizations were secret,
and the leaders directed affairs from the safe vantage of
foreign countries, largely from Switzerland. Flekhanov
also a Russian, had formerly been an associate of Lenin,
but, unlike him, had grown moderate in his views, and
his following was the least numerous. He dealt not in
the excitement of murder, nor in the cupidity of "ex-
propriation." Lenin was an early-Marxist. Himself of
Russian birth, he owed his inspiration to Germany.
Gerschuni was an enthusiast of terrorism. Their parties
appealed respectively to the class prejudices and passions
of the workmen and the peasants.

Parallel with, but independently of the "out-law"
factions, several groups of literary men figured as leaders
of "advanced liberalism." Mikhailovsky was the great-
est of them. His death in 1903 was deplored by all the
intelligentsia of Russia. Korolenko, a lesser light, strove
like him, for the material welfare and happiness of the
rural masses. They were, so to speak, the enlightened
and moderate equivalents of the Socialist-Revolutionary
party. M. Peter Struhwe devoted himself, on the other
hand, to economic questions more closely concerned with
Labor. Using a Russian definition, he was a "literary
Marxist" in his earlier career.

But this "intellectual" Socialism, like the disembodied
anarchism of Kropotkin, did not appeal to university
undergraduates, who had formed the readiest and most
daring supporters of revolution up to and during the
abortive movement of 1905. During that period of
unrest the university and technical colleges in Petrograd
were hotbeds of revolutionary propaganda — a fact which
led to repressive measures against them, the abolition of

REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 95

Students 9 Clubs, and discrimination against Jewish under-
graduates, who had been particularly prominent in
revolutionary agitation.

The moderate Russian Socialism of the Plekhanov
school was side-tracked by the pseudo-Jewish element,
and all the force of revolutionary activity found its out-
let under the respective flags of industrial Social-Democ-
racy and rural Socialist-Revolution, each formed, led, and
developed mainly by pseudo-Jews. But each of these
two revolutionary parties underwent considerable changes,
as we shall see.

Social-Democracy in Russia followed very much in
the footsteps of its German protagonist. The teachings
of Karl Marx formed its Alpha and Omega. It held
forth the purely academic argument that sooner or later
Labor must devour Capitalism. The Russian Social-
Democrats divided on the question of method. Lenin
represented the extreme tendency which insisted on
activist propaganda, immediate and sanguinary conflicts,
without quarter to or compromise with the bourgeoisie.
The matter was broached at a secret congress held abroad
(some dozen years ago in Stockholm). A majority sided
with Lenin, whence the name of Bolshevist, or "major"
group, thenceforth designated his followers. The Men-
shevist or " lesser " group contented itself with the Marxian
theory, 1 leaving the development of class warfare and the
promised division of capitalist spoils to the process of
time. This circumspect strategy was " justified " by
the ruthless methods of the okhrana and by all the force
and energy that Stolypin displayed in his campaign
against the hidden forces of Revolution. The working
classes had been sorely tried by the stern lessons of 1905

1 Lenin adopted the extreme methods advocated by E. Man in his early
days; the Menshevists preferred the later and far more moderate "system"
that Marx himself had found to be necessary. Present-day German Socialism
contains no element corresponding with the BolahevikL

96 SLAVDOM, THE TARTARS, AND AUTOCRACY

and subsequent years; and as a "burnt child fears the
fire," they scented in all appeals to violence the hidden
hand of the agent provocateur.

So for many years the Menshevist program pre-
vailed, and, belying their name, the Bolsheviki were really
in a minority. The Social-Democrats returned by Labor
at ensuing elections were almost invariably Mensheviki.
Their leaders in the Duma, Chkheidze and Tseretelli
(both Georgians), were also the recognized chieftains of
the Menshevist group. Lenin and his chief supporters —
Bronstein-Trotsky, and others, nearly all pseudo-Jews —
hid themselves abroad, biding their time. But they
succeeded in imposing a certain Malinovsky upon the
Moscow workmen, who returned him as their Deputy.
During the Revolution it became known that Malinovsky
had been in the pay of the okhrana.

With the Socialist-Revolutionaries (political suc-
cessors of the Narodovdlisy, or "People's Will party")
matters assumed a somewhat different course. They
were not Marxists. They were " rural " as well as " indus-
trial" Socialists. Their motto read: "Land and freedom
for all the toiling people. By strife shall they attain their
rights." It offered a much broader program than that
of the Social-Democrats. It embraced rustic and mill-
hand within its scope, but it was intended chiefly for the
land-hungry peasant, and appealed more especially to the
increasing contingent of parasitic villagers who, through
idleness and drink, had lost the capacity of bettering
themselves, 1 or of emigrating to the free and fertile lands
of Siberia. But no political party, revolutionary or
constitutional, can hope to endure if it fails to show cause
for its existence — a truism that had disheartened the
Russian Radical party, the Constitutional-Democrats or
Cadets. (Rendered desperate by reaction, they flung

1 This parasitic dement attained the huge proportion of Iff per cent of the
total village population (in 1914).

REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 97

themselves headlong into demagogue appeals to the
populace in 1906, unheeding the very patent argument
that on this slippery path they were bound to be outpaced
by revolutionary parties. They even renamed them*
selves "Party of the People's Freedom/') Constant fail-
ures had affected the Social-Democrats in another man-
ner, as we have seen, and had the Government not been
dominated by okhrana methods, that failure might have
been prolonged. The Socialist-Revolutionaries could not
justify their motto, so, in revenge, they organized political
assassination. For internal and tactical reasons they
had grouped themselves into Minimalists and Maxi-
malists. The former advocated the first half of the
party program: "Land and freedom for all the toiling
people." The Maximalists accepted it in its entirety,
and proceeded to apply the behest contained in the second
half: "By strife shall they attain their rights." The
Socialist-Revolutionary members of the Duma figured as
"Toilists." Their leader was Alexander Fedorovich
Kerensky, a young lawyer, whose hysterical speeches
gave no promise of a great political career. 1

I remember reading a very interesting document
prepared by the okhrana in 1904, setting forth the origin
and growth of what was called "The Fighting Organiza-
tion of the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalist Group."
This was the specially selected volunteer corps that car-
ried out political assassination. The demure and respect-
able intellectuals in the Minimalist camp were not sup-
posed to know how these things were done. Such and
such a Minister was "sentenced" by the Maximalists,
and the "Fighting Organization" had to "execute" him.
Gerschuni was the guiding spirit of this league of murder,

i The Minimalists had an "internationalist" wing that naturally inclined
towards Bolshevism* which is inherently anti-national and based on "inter-
nationalkation" of the masses. Kerensky belonged— prior to the Revolution—
to the internationalist wing of hi* party. In 1915 and 1916 he carried on
revolutionary propaganda with funds sent from Germany.

88 SLAVDOM, THE TARTARS, AND AUTOCRACY

and he prided himself upon the perfection and success
of the "Organization." Minister after Minister fell. But
Gerschuni was himself betrayed by another Jew, the
famous Evno Azev, who had been co-director of assas-
sination in the pay of the okhrana. Plehve was killed
in Petrograd by a bomb thrown at his carriage at the
end of July, 1904; the Grand Duke Sergius was mur-
dered in February, 1905. Then the "Organization" sus-
pended further operations. It had been tracked and its
members dispersed or executed.

Curiously enough, the Revolutionaries had previously
decided to "exempt" the Tsar. They were afraid of
compromising themselves like their predecessors in 1881.
An attempt had been made in 1887, on the anniversary
of Alexander El's death, to assassinate his son and the
whole Imperial family by blowing up their train. For
that attempt, which failed miraculously, several Naro-
dovdltsy were executed, including Lenin's elder brother.

The Socialist-Revolutionaries were unable to practise
assassination after the Grand Duke's murder in Moscow,
being disrupted. But they attributed their reticence to
another cause, viz., to their having succeeded in terri-
fying the Tsar into making concessions and promises.
This theory was unjustifiable and absurd. Never had
assassination evoked "concessions" or "promises." On
the contrary, it had, in every case, only intensified repres-
sion. Moreover, the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves
boycotted the Duma, which shows clearly enough what
they thought about the "concessions."

In nearly every case the horrible work was imposed
upon hapless youths, who fancied they were "saving
their country," while the pseudo-Jewish organizers di-
rected murder from afar. One enthusiast entered the
okhrana office (in 1905) with bombs all over him, so that
none dare approach him. Many "expropriations" were
carried out by mere hooligans under Maximalist colors.

REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 90

Within a few short years the Maximalists had acquired
such a sanguinary reputation that their name was destined
to be misapplied to quite another, although a kindred,
group, the Social-Democrat Bolsheviki, who "came into
their own " during the Revolution of 1917. By that time
the distinction between Maximalist and Minimalist
Socialist-Revolutionaries had ceased to have any prac-
tical significance. All became — if they had not already
become — Maximalists. But the Social-Democrats re-
mained, as hitherto, divided into Bolsheviki and Men-
sheviki, not so much on strictly tactical or Labor policy,
as on the question of continuing the war — for which pur-
pose a coalition with the bourgeoisie was indispensable — or
of concluding a separate peace. Lenin 1 and his followers

1 In experience as a revolutionary, Lenin was greatly superior to Kerensky.
They both came originally from one Volga city, but while Kerensky was still an
undergraduate, Lenin, seventeen years his senior, had already made a name for
himself as a leader in the Socialist world. Each had been influenced by environ-
ment and circumstances. Lenin was a youth when his brother perished on
the scaffold (1887), and while Kerensky passed his early manhood among com-
fortable surroundings at Tashkent — where his stepfather directed the local
high school — Lenin traversed the thorny path of the revolutionary outlaw.
In the nineties he had tasted the "sweets" of Siberia. Then after a spell
"abroad," controverting Plekhanov in Switzerland, he had proclaimed the
doctrine of Bolshevism at Stockholm (1903) and come to Petrograd to act as
the guiding-spirit of the first Soviet (1905). At that time Kerensky was just
beginning to "conspire." For ten weary years Lenin remained abroad, and
when the war broke out was in Austria. He was first "arrested" as a Russian
spy, then on the recommendation of an Austrian Socialist named Adler regained
his liberty and finally entered into relations with the enemy Governments.
Lenin and one of his friends named Ioltuhowski were respectively commis-
sioned by the Germans to foment a revolution in Russia and to start a separatist
movement in Ukraina. Passage in a "sealed" car was provided for Lenin and
his friends through Germany.

The mentality of the two men who were destined to exercise a fateful influ-
ence over the course of the Revolution deserves careful analysis.

Lenin displayed the characteristically Russian proclivity for carrying "ideas"
to the uttermost extreme of ratiocination. Fanatics of this stamp were not
uncommon among the undergraduates in Russian universities. It was during
his early university days that Vladimir Ulianov — his real name — began to
devote himself to the study of Karl Marx, and it is symptomatic of his inborn
predilection for extreme doctrines that he should have espoused the quasi-

100 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY

had espoused the "defeatist" doctrine and "no coalition,
like the other Socialists, they wanted a "new earth,
but sought it in the ruin of society. The autocracy was
to be overthrown by a defeat of Russia's armies. This
was really a confession of their wish and their unaided
inability to force a revolution. At any rate, they per-
petuated this doctrine after the disappearance of the
autocracy under the guise of a "democratic" peace.

Bolshevism of the early-Marxian revelation and steadfastly repudiated the
far more moderate tendency of his master's later teachings. Perhaps in this
choice he was dominated by feelings of bitterness and vengeance rankling
within his mind, since the tragic and violent end of his elder brother. Unlike
the great majority of Russian revolutionary undergraduates, Lenin remained
a revolutionary in his mature years and grew more uncompromising with age.
There is no doubt that he deliberately entered into an arrangement with his
country's foes and used German money to propagate his doctrines. To a fanatic
who repudiates nationality and nationhood, there was nothing derogatory in
such a proceeding. To him all means were good, provided he could achieve his
end.

It was in the application of his ideas that Lenin stood apart from his country-
men. He was un-Russian not so much in the tendency to unconscious paradox
as in the persistency with which he developed and imposed his doctrines. And
we find him constrained to rely on the aid of almost exclusively non-Russian
elements. The majority of his principal associates were of the pseudo-Jew
class — the hate-laden product of the Pale. Without them and without the help
of German agents, like Robert Grimm, and German gold conveyed through
well-known banks in Petrograd, he could never have assured the ephemeral
triumph of Bolshevism; without these adjuncts there would never have been a
separate peace negotiated at Brest-Litovsk by two Jews, Bronstein-Trotsky
and Joffe, in the name of Russia and signed by four other Jews in Berlin.

Kerensky's was a totally different mentality. A highly strung, somewhat
hysterical young man of Jewish descent, he reacted in 1917 to his new surround-
ings, boasted that he would lead the Army into battle, and adopted the ways of
an autocrat. But the greatness that was thrust upon him reached far above
his mental and moral caliber. He was not a statesman by genius or experience.
Well-intentioned enough, he found himself torn by a thousand conflicting cares
and interests. The author recalls a pathetic narrative of Kerensky's conversa-
tion with the ex-Tsar, when, as Minister of Justice, he paid one of his periodical
visits to the captive at Tsarskoe Selo. They had a friendly smoke and chat.
Kerensky began to unbosom himself regarding the burdens of State. He
complained that it was all "so difficult and perplexing." Nicholas U sym-
pathized : " I can assure you, Alexander Fedorovich, that I had the same trouble.
But you will find, as time goes on, that it comes easier."

PART II

"DEMOCRACY," " SOCIALISM," AND

" FREEDOM "

CHAPTER XI

THE REVOLUTION

Alarm Signal*— Kerensky discloses Revolutionary Plana— A weD-organixed
Movement— "Peaceful" Demonstration*—" No Bread" a Pretext— The
Duma "Used" — A Diary of the Crucial Days — Protopopov's Gunners —
Mutiny of the Guards — Preobrashentsy support Rodzianko — Last Appeals
to the Tsar — The Provisional Committee — Socialists show their Hand 1 —
The Soviet— Divided Authority— "Ideals" and "Loot."'

We have now passed in review all the principal ele-
ments of the situation as it presented itself to the initiated
observer of Russian affairs in March, 1917. If the reader
has patiently followed the unraveling of this skein, he
will be able to understand the causes and the conse-
quences of the Revolution. He will be familiar with
the character of the forces that were then let loose, and
note without surprise the form and manner in which
they were exerted. Above all he will bear in mind that
the masses were largely illiterate and politically immature,
that revolution had long been fermenting, that it had
gained a whole army of adherents among soldiers and
civilians, because the country had been engaged for two
and a half years in a mismanaged and unsuccessful war.
In short, revolutionary dreamers and demagogues were
in a position to mislead an ignorant and irresponsible

101

103 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

"democracy," under the banners of miscalled "Social-
ism" to a "freedom" that quickly resolved itself into
anarchy.

Some months before the Revolution I paid a short
visit to the Front and visited the men of a regiment with
whom I had previously been in action. The officers were
as keen as ever, and delighted to see an English friend.
The men appeared to be less cheerful than I had been
accustomed to find them. On returning to Headquarters
I was asked by a friend who held high office: "How
did you find the men?" And when I looked at him
questioningly, he added: "Were they in good spirits?"
I answered that there had seemed to me to be a decline.
"Ah!" was the brief but significant commentary. My
friend had carefully perused the weekly reports sent by
regimental commanders about the feeling among their
troops and the military censor's reviews of soldiers' letters
to their homes; it was important for him to hear the
opinion of a disinterested outsider. The gloomier tone
of these communications — then unknown to me — was
thus confirmed by my impressions. The causes of this
change will be fully explained. I allude to this incident
because it serves to emphasize the significance of a certain
decline in morale among the troops at the Front some
little time before the Revolution broke out.

Only a few days before the outbreak I went to Moscow
to attend the jubilee of a great Russian publisher, Ivan
Dmitrievich Sytin, who began life as a peasant-boy
hawking pictures and tracts in the villages and had built
up one of the greatest printing and publishing houses in
the world, with a million-circulation newspaper, the
Russkoe Slow, and many millions of popular publications
to its credit. "All Moscow" was present at the celebra-
tion. I was struck by the immense cheering that greeted
my reference to British sympathy with Russia's progress
"on the path of freedom," and painfully impressed by

THE REVOLUTION 108

the speeches of the workmen. Responding to M. Sytin's
generous donations to bis employees, amounting to several
hundreds of thousands of roubles, and the foundation of
schools, hospitals, and other institutions for their especial
benefit, the spokesman of the printing staff bluntly said:
"Ivan Dmitrievich, we do not thank you. We accept
your offerings, and we have to say only this, that you
should have made them long ago." It was a brutal
and altogether un-Russian utterance. Everybodyunder-
stood that it had been prearranged "elsewhere," and
that it was delivered "according to plan" for the benefit
of the Socialist gallery in Petrograd. The impending
outbreak of revolution was evidently suspected by, if
not known to, the workmen.

A speech delivered by M. Kerensky in the Duma
explained the tone of the Moscow workmen. In the
smother of subsequent events it was unheeded at the time,
except by the okkrana, which wanted to arrest and im-
peach him. Speaking two weeks before the outbreak in
his usual hysterical and gesticulatory manner, the Social-
ist-Revolutionary chieftain announced the approach of
upheaval. "Its lightnings already illumine the horizon,"
he cried. It was an indiscreet utterance. It hinted
all too clearly that he and his associates were organizing
and fomenting the outbreak.

The rest of his speech contained a precise indication
of the program that had been decided upon by the
Socialists in regard to the war: "We think that the
man-power 1 and material resources of this country are
exhausted, and that the time has come to prepare for
a termination of the European conflict. It must be
settled on a basis of self-definition of all nationalties.

1 This was a misleading statement. Russia's losses in men in the war were
the smallest of any European Ally in proportion to population. See pp. £31 and
284. Kerensky, moreover, betrayed a distinctly internationalistic tendency in
utterance.

104 -DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

All Governments must forego to the same extent their
Imperialistic aims. 9 '

There was no room for misapprehension. The indi-
cation of coming internal strife, the intention of the
Revolutionaries to conclude peace, and the unwholesome
allusion to the Allies afforded an epitome of the revolu-
tionary plan.

Having the workmen well in hand, counting upon
disaffection among the troops in Petrograd and relying
upon their sympathies among the Third Element (to
which must be added the municipal employees) and the
apathy of the villagers, the Socialists had decided to give
battle with much greater forces than in 1005, and, in
view of the discontent and unpreparedness of the Moder-
ate elements, had all the chances of success.

The Socialists waited merely for an opportunity to
launch their attack. On February 27th, while Kerensky
was making his speech in the Duma, "peaceful" Labor
demonstrations began in the streets. The effect of these
parades became apparent some days later. People
waiting for bread and provisions grew more restive. On
Wednesday, March 7th, an old woman indignantly broke
a baker's window. Others followed her example. Some
looting occurred. Cossack patrols appeared in the
streets. But no collisions took place. The people re-
mained quiet. Unrest was, however, visibly growing.

Next day more bakeries were stormed, chiefly in the
Vyborg quarter, where a large number of mills and fac-
tories concentrated an almost exclusively working-class
population. Huge crowds appeared in the streets. The
workmen were invading the city. More Cossacks ap-
peared on the scene. There was sporadic firing, appa-
rently by workmen, but no serious conflicts. The
Government evidently became much alarmed, for during
the day General Habalov, Commander-in-Chief of the
Garrison, explained that flour was arriving regularly and

THE REVOLUTION 105

being supplied to the bakers, and that there should be
enough bread for everybody. Suspicion was thus cast
upon the bakers, who were already in disfavor, and many
of whom promptly closed up their businesses.

Later in the day I read a notice in the newspaper win-
dows in the Nevsky stating that the Government had
decided to take urgent measures, that a conference with
representatives of the Duma, the Zemstvos, and other
public bodies would be convened on March 9th (the follow-
ing day) and that everything would be done to settle the
food crisis. Anything more fatuous could not be conceived.
Here was a patent confession of laxity. Whom was it ex-
pected to satisfy? The Socialists, who had already made
up their minds for revolution, or the dissatisfied "man in
the street," who did not want revolution, but pined for
relief from.an incapable Government. However, "At last
they are going to act Let us hope it will not be too
late! " Such was the tenor of comment in the Nevsky.
I ; On the Friday morning the police tried to confine the
workmen within their quarters, especially on the Vyboig
side of the Neva, but they made long d&ours, crossed
over the ice, and made their way into the Nevsky. A
good deal of shopbreaking occurred in the outlying dis-
tricts. The central portions of the city remained quiet.
Traffic became difficult, owing to the crowded state of
the thoroughfares. Cossacks charged up and down the
Nevsky without using sabers or knouts. The crowds
cheered them. Very few policemen were visible. A few
red flags appeared; on the other hand, loyal songs re-
sounded. Besides the Revolutionaries there were many
people in the streets who had no sympathy or connection
with militant Socialism.

In the Tauris Palace, Deputies talked long about the
food crisis. M. Rittich, the Minister of Agriculture,
argued fervently in defense of his own acts. He had
been saddled with an impossible task. Such measures

106 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

as had been taken were not sufficiently supported by the
people who were chiefly concerned. This was a direct hit
at the Zemstvos and other public organizations. There was
some truth in what he said. A certain amount of "pas-
sive resistance" had been shown, with a view, probably,
to force the Government to capitulate to the Zemstvos.
But this was not the time to raise such questions. Every*
body agreed that the situation had reached a critical point.
And the hope of the Moderate parties lay in the meas-
ures promised at the eleventh hour by the Government,
with the concurrence of the Duma and the Zemstvos.

On Saturday the crowds were more numerous than
ever. Looting of bakeries continued. The workmen
again came into the city, although armed resistance was
shown by the police and the gendarmes. In order to
safeguard the munition works from possible injury by
strikers, the Government ventured to order out troops,
who, up to this time, had been confined to their barracks.
At one of the cartridge factories the strikers shot a young
subaltern. His men did not retaliate. They had rela-
tives amongst the strikers. In other cases the soldiers
fired a few rounds. Most of the troops and the Cossacks
were obviously disinclined to be rough with the people.
It was becoming evident that the workmen acted under
orders from a revolutionary organization. Nearly all of
them were employed in the output of munitions or war
supplies, and as such were in receipt of bread rations.
They were consequently better off than the ordinary
inhabitant, yet they were creating the greatest amount
of disorder. Some policemen and gendarmes were killed
in the mill districts.

The Duma again discussed the food crisis. At the
conference with the Government on the preceding night
the fullest information had been obtained regarding the
situation, and M. Nekrasov, a prominent Cadet Deputy
from Siberia and an authority on railway matters, told

THE REVOLUTION 107

the House, of which he was Vice-President, that in his
opinion there was good hope of solving the difficulty,
which was mainly one of transport. He announced that
the Government had agreed to hand over the whole busi-
ness of food supply to the Zemstvos and municipalities.
Here was a great and undoubted victory. The Govern-
ment had always refused to make this concession, holding
— and rightly so — that it would lead to further and larger
measures of responsible administration.

But nobody outside the Duma knew what had hap-
pened. The papers did not appear on Sundays, and the
effete Golitsyn Ministry took no steps to inform the public.
Protopopov did not wish to trumpet his failure, for he
had been the arch-opponent of the Zemstvo scheme, and
perhaps he recognized the hopelessness of appeasing the
Revolutionaries.

Instead of taking the people into their confidence and
explaining the situation to them, the Government, feeling
satisfied that enormous concessions had been made, de-
cided to take "a strong line." On the Sunday morning,
posters at all the street corners informed the inhabitants
that all gatherings would be dispersed by force of arms.
At once things assumed an ugly look. Up to this point the
great majority of the civilians and soldiers, and even the
workmen, had no idea that a revolution was inevitable,
and actually in process of development. There had been
a few people killed; more police than civilians. But
when the soldiers appeared in the Nevsky with orders
to fire on the crowd, some alarm arose. Nevertheless,
it being a fine day, large numbers of people resorted to
this popular promenade, undeterred by the stoppage of
the tram service.

Protopopov had succumbed to nervous prostration on
the Saturday, and remained hidden in his official residence
on the Fontanka Canal, flanked by the Police Department
and the Gendarmerie. Thence he was in communication

108 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

by telephone with the Empress at her residence in Tsar-
skoe Selo, fifteen miles south of Petrograd, and the
Empress could telephone by means of a special wire
direct to the Tsar's Headquarters at Mogilev, some three
hundred miles further south.

There appears to be no foundation for the report that
the Sovereigns were unable to obtain information about
events in the Capital up to this stage. On the contrary,
both knew what was going on, and they were quite pre-
pared for an outbreak. They knew much more than
the public in Petrograd or even the Duma (excepting the
Socialists) could know about revolutionary plans and
about the unreliability of the garrison, but they trusted
in Protopopov's police, and never imagined that events
would develop too rapidly to enable them to bring "up
reinforcements in time. What is more, they were quite
aware of the use that the Revolutionaries intended to
make of the Duma.

Already the "peaceful" Labor demonstrations on
February 27th, when the Duma opened, had indicated
the revolutionary plan, and Kerensky's speech confirmed
their suspicions. Prince Golitsyn had, therefore, been
furnished with an undated ukaz of prorogation, which
he could publish as soon as matters began to assume a
critical form. Herein lies the explanation of what then
appeared to be an incomprehensible measure. The Gov-
ernment had given way to the Duma on Friday evening,
yet on Sunday it decided to crush resistance and to close
the Duma, realizing somewhat tardily that the Socialists
meant to use the Duma as their rallying point and battle-
cry. Either because "stem measures" had been decided
upon or by some blunder, 1 the bridges had not been closed
that morning. So the crowds were very great.

1 Protopopov and the Empress had agreed that a "local" disturbance should
be encouraged in order that reprisals might be justified, they believed that
immediate repression would "scotch" the revolution.

THE REVOLUTION 10*

Platoons of guardsmen were posted along this thor-
oughfare, extending two miles in a straight line from the
Admiralty to the Nicholas railway station, and shortly
before three o'clock they began to clear the street. But
the crowds did not seem to mind. There was no rough-
ness on either side. People movec* ' . 'y and cheered the
soldiers. A company of the Pavlovsky Guards, drawn
up at the corner of the Sadovaia, then opened fire up
the Nevsky in the direction of the Anichkov Palace and
the Fontanka, beyond which stood the Anglo-Russian
Red Cross Hospital (Dmitri Palace). Some firing came
also from the housetops, and one guardsman fell.

Something like one hundred people were killed or
wounded. Motor ambulances soon afterwards appeared
on the spot and began removing the fallen. I saw hun-
dreds of empty cartridge-cases littering the snow, which
was deluged with blood. But the sharp lesson also failed
to scare people away or even to provoke resentment
against the troops. A woman shouted to them: "We
are sorry for you, Pavlovtsy. You had to do your
duty!"

This company was marched to its barracks on the Field
of Mars, near the British Embassy. The men had not
had any food all day. When they were approaching
their quarters they found another crowd barring the way.
The officer ordered them to fire a volley. They did so.
But the men aimed high, so that only a few people were
wounded. Stopping to care for thpm, the company com-
mander sent his men home, and at this moment was
attacked and severely wounded by two men, apparently
disguised, one as a student, the other as an officer. The
assailants jumped into a sleigh and vanished, and at the
same time shots rang out from the roofs and garrets of
surrounding houses and from the adjoining Church of
St. Saviour, erected on the site where Alexander II had
been assassinated.

^. "DEMOCRACY/* "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

And then followed the unexpected. As soon as the
Pavlovtsy entered their barrack-yard, recriminations
began among them. One of the men had recognized his
own mother amid the slain. Another wanted to know who
had fired from the housetops and killed one of their com-
rades. "It is the police/' was the unanimous verdict.
"They are provoking bloodshed. They have betrayed
us." Revolutionary sympathizers fed the flame. The
whole company decided not to obey orders, but to
side with the people. General Habalov was immediately
informed of what was transpiring, and loyal troops were
sent to surround the mutineers. But the latter had their
rifles and ammunition, and it was decided not to resort
to extreme measures. The company remained within its
quarters. Some of the men ventured out and were
arrested. On the following day this company was to be
joined by others and to play a part in the rapid success
of the Revolution.

That Sunday afternoon Sir G. Buchanan returned from
a few days' sojourn in Finland and heard the first news
of trouble. Later, a number of our submarine reliefs
came in from Archangel. The men could not understand
what was happening in the city.

More blood was spilt some hours later around the
Nicholas station. Enormous crowds debouched from
the Nevsky and Ligovskaia, surging around the great
equestrian statue of Alexander III. The station square
was an important strategical point guarding railway
communications with Moscow, and down the Nevsky,
with all the important Ministries. Here Frotopopov had
installed hundreds of machine guns and policemen on
the surrounding houses. A commissary of police who
was in charge of the men below found himself jostled.
He spoke rudely to an officer who happened to be in the
crowd. An altercation ensued. The officer drew his
sword and cut down the policeman. Immediately the

THE REVOLUTION 111

crowd seized the body and tore it to pieces. Then the
secreted maxims sent forth a stream of bullets. Firing
resounded on all sides. Soldiers directed their rifles at
the housetops. Cossacks joined in. It was a veritable
pandemonium. Scores of people and soldiers were killed,
hundreds wounded. This proved to be the most san-
guinary episode in the Revolution.

I had been an eye-witness of some acts in the Pavlovsky
tragedy. I now tried to make my way to the Nicholas
station. Firing could be heard in the Nevsky. Lines
of soldiers were blazing away at each other, not knowing
who was friend, who enemy. Later, I made another
effort to pass. The street was quiet and deserted. Burly
guardsmen held it from end to end with orders to let
no one pass. The great thoroughfare was lit up by
powerful searchlights from the Admiralty tower, street
lamps having been smashed by the hail of bullets. It
recalled the stormy days of 1905, when the whole city
was plunged in darkness. Neither electric light nor
water supply had been cut off, however. The Revolu-
tionaries had learned a lesson then.

The Government now began to feel some resentment
at the delay in rendering them efficient counsel and
assistance from Tsarskoe or Headquarters. On Sunday
evening they almost decided to resign, but Beliaev l had
received a brief message from the Tsar, ordering him "to
hold on," and informing him that troops were coming
and that General Ivanov had been sent as Dictator.
Later it was rumored that Protopopov had been dis-
missed and that the Tsar himself would arrive on Tuesday.
As a result of the deliberations in the Duma on Saturday
it had been decided to hasten an Emergency Food Bill,
embodying the new scheme of Zemstvo organization
to which the Government had agreed, and a Committee
on this Bill was sitting at the Tauris Palace throughout

1 The War

US "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

Sunday. All the Deputies who could reach the Duma
were also assembled there. They brought lurid accounts
of all that had been happening throughout the day. The
impression in the lobbies was one of intense excitement.
The workmen refused to resume their duties until bread
could be procured in abundance. There was evidence
of a growing conflict between the police and the gar-
rison.

To add to this gloomy outlook, the Government was
obviously indisposed to show confidence in the Duma.
Voicing the feelings and anxieties of the Moderates in
the House, President Rodzianko telegraphed an urgent
and pressing appeal to the Tsar:

Condition serious, anarchy in the Capital. Government paralysed. TVan>
port of food and provisions has entirely broken down. General discontent is
growing. Disorderly firing is proceeding in the streets. Sections of troops
are firing on one another. It is necessary to summon quickly persons enjoying
the confidence of the country to form a new Government. Delay is impossible.
Every delay is fatal. I pray God that a share of the responsibility may not
fall on the crowned head.

Afterwards I learned from a friend at General Head-
quarters that this message did not reach the Emperor.
It was "intercepted" by the Palace Commandant, Gen-
eral Voy£ikov, who decided apparently that it was not
worth while to bother the Tsar with fresh and impertinent
demands for Responsible Government at a time when he
was already much worried by events in Petrograd. To
the courtier's mind Rodzianko, although a personage
holding Court rank, was unconsciously lending himself
to the designs of the Revolutionaries at a time when all
loyal subjects should rally round the Throne. But the
Tsar knew already that the situation was critical, although
he did not realize how desperate it was. Anyhow, he
could not answer the message, as he did not receive it.
But all this was, of course, unknown to the Duma, and
the Tsar's silence placed him in a bad light. Members

THE REVOLUTION

114 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

9»

decided to pass the night in the Tauris Palace against
any emergency. So ended the first day of the Revolu-
tion, properly speaking.

On Monday morning Prince Golitsyn carried out the
Government's decision to prorogue the Duma. It is said
that he made a mistake in filling in the date of the Im-
perial ukaz, and that it was marked March 11th instead of
March 12th. It was placarded on the doors of the Palace,
and there the Deputies found it in the early hours of
Monday. It intimated briefly that the sessions of both
Houses were prorogued for a month, "unless important
circumstances should intervene."

The impression produced thereby was one of stupor
and indignation. How could the Government thus cut
itself adrift from the accredited representatives of the
people at a moment of intense popular crisis? It passed
the wit of man to comprehend. Previous utterances in
the House discrediting the Court confirmed the worse
suspicions. M. Miliukov, the Cadet leader, had openly
accused the Empress of promoting a separate peace
with Germany. The Black Hundreds had urged that
it was "better to compromise with the external foe
rather than lose everything to the Revolutionaries."

The persistent refusal of the Tsar to accede to demands
for the summoning of a "Government enjoying the con-
fidence of the country" — a demand that had been en-
dorsed by the Upper House and even by the Nobles*
Congress — lent color to other suspicions, that the Court
party was seeking to provoke a revolution in order to
have an excuse for concluding a separate peace. This
suspicion had been so prevalent throughout Russia that
repeatedly my Russian friends had asked me: "Is it
true that there is a secret clause in Russia's agreement
with the Entente Powers by which she resumes her free-
dom of action in the event of internal troubles?" M.
Miliukov called attention to the formidable military

THE REVOLUTION 115

preparations made by Protopopov. "We know now
why he asked for $25,000,000 in January. It was to
proclaim war on the people ! " he cried. All these accumu-
lated feelings of distrust, however unwarranted they
might have been by the real facts of the situation, aroused
resentment of the intensest kind and prompted immediate
action.

When the sun rose on these fateful events the Govern-
ment still held most of the trump cards. Not a single
regiment had mutinied yet, and the Old Regime had at
its disposal enormous stores of arms and ammunition.
It had the fortress and the arsenal, and commanded
every important street and bridge with guns and maxims,
and all the telegraphs and railways. The bridges were
closed and the workmen cut off. But as the soldiers
were "doubtful/ 9 Habalov lent himself to a "brilliant
idea," emanating from the half-crazed Minister; to dress
up the police as soldiers. In that way the police would
be safe from the crowd and from the troops. They
would fire all right. And so everybody would be im-
pressed by the "loyalty" of the garrison, and there would
not be any risk of a scandalous refusal on the part of the
soldiers to do their duty. Policemen were hurriedly
supplied with brown-gray instead of black overcoats,
and gray sheepskin headgear, cartridge holsters, and
army rifles. It was difficult to distinguish them from
ordinary infantrymen. They sallied forth in the mill
districts and did much execution, especially on the
Vyborg side. The rattle of musketry and machine guns
resounded thence all through the morning.

But Protopopov's ruse did not save the situation. (It
was soon afterwards detected and led to wholesale exter-
mination of the police.) The revolutionary spirit quickly
spread among the units quartered around the Duma and
on the Vyborg side. Here the 1st and 180th Reserve
Regiments, largely recruited from the local population

116 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

had already shown evidence of disaffection in November,
1916. Some of them now joined their relations among
the strikers. Armed parties captured the arsenal on the
north side of the river, and having distributed rifles to
the crowd, forced the Liteiny Bridge. There they easily
took possession of the Artillery Department, looting it
of stores and arms.

Meanwhile the Guards battalions 1 in the Kirochnaia,
a street leading from the Liteiny Prospect to the Tauris
Gardens behind the Duma, had mutinied, one after
another, amid scenes of the greatest atrocity. Some of
the men in the Litovsky Guards (which with the Vol-
hynsky regiment formed one of the two Guards Brigades
previously stationed in Warsaw) had agreed during the
night to mutiny and to murder their officers. At early
morning parade they turned out as usual and lined up
in the barrack-yard. Men who were not on duty mean-
while took their rifles and ensconced themselves at the
windows overlooking the parade ground. The officers
came out, suspecting nothing. The CO. approached his
company and greeted them with the customary "Good
health, my lads ! " Dead silence in the ranks. According
to disciplinary usage the men should have answered,
"We wish good health to Your Honor!" The CO.
cried sharply, "Why don't you reply?" Then out of
the ranks came several men with their rifles at the charge,
and without a word spitted the CO. on their bayonets,
lifting him high in the air. Instantly the men at the
windows opened fire on the other officers. Those whom
they missed were hunted down and butchered. Very
few escaped. One of the survivors told me this dreadful
story afterwards. He had to hide for days before he
' could leave Petrograd, because the men searched every-

1 All the Guards units in Petrograd were Reserve Battalions numbering
as much as 6000 men each. The regiments* thirteen in all had been at the
front since August. 1914.

THE REVOLUTION 117

where to find and kill the survivors. And this particular
officer had been severely wounded at the Front. (It is
said that the officers of this battalion were particularly
strict with their men.)

After satiating themselves with blood and slaughter,
the Lkovsky poured out into the street. There they
heard that the Duma had been closed. Here was a con-
venient means of justifying their crime. They had slain
their "oppressors." It was all in defense of the people.
Now they would rally round the Duma. "To the Duma!
To the Duma!" they cried. The neighboring Volhyntsy
and some Preobrazhentsy turned out of their barracks
and joined the movement. And so a crazy mob of dis-
banded guardsmen and civilians hurried to the Tauris
Palace to defend the liberties of the people.

Hearing nothing from Mogilev, the Deputies were
somewhat disconcerted by the appearance of these " rein-
forcements." They did not know their precise character
nor the horrible circumstances under which they had
originated, but it seemed quite clear that part of, and
perhaps all, the garrison had gone over to the Revolution.
So the sooner the Duma took action the better. They
could not wait upon the pleasure of Nicholas II. Already,
then, it was proposed to form a Provisional Government,
and the Socialists talked about a Constituent Assembly.
But President Rodzianko would not hear of it. He was
a loyal subject of the Tsar, and he could not reconcile an
act of open revolt with his feelings of loyalty. So he
indited and dispatched a second and last message to
Headquarters, telling Nicholas II: "The situation is
becoming worse. Measures must be taken immediately,
for to-morrow it may be too late. The last hour has
arrived, when the fate of the country and the dynasty
is being decided." (This telegram did reach its destina-
tion, but the Emperor was already "acting" — troops
had been sent from the Front — and was preparing to

118 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

leave for Petrograd, so he did not reply*) As the Duma
stood legally prorogued, no formal sitting could take place.
The party leaders and other members met informally
under the presidency of M. Rodzianko. For convenience'
sake it was agreed that only the party leaders or "Elders"
should deliberate. They represented the Progressive
bloc and the Socialists. The Right would have no dealings
with a Duma that had been prorogued by the Tsar, and
all the members on that side withdrew.

The duties of this Board of Elders were confined to one
object: to get into touch with the Army and with the
Nation. President Rodzianko held — and rightly too —
that whatever happened they would not be justified in
taking any decisions without the knowledge of the Army
at the Front, and, if possible, of the country at large.
But on the latter point the views of the Progressive
element in the Duma were sufficient. He did not wish
to be led astray by the clamor of the multitude outside,
composed of soldiers and civilians who were obviously
under the influence of passion. Generals Alexeiev, the
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, Ruzsky, and Brusilov
were acquainted by telegraph with the messages to the
Tsar, and asked to support them.

All this did not suit the Socialist book. They had
hoped for something much more fiery. The Duma was
to be their stepping-stone to power. They wanted to
get on with the Revolution. So they resigned from the
Board. However, a few hours afterwards they thought
better of it. M. Kerensky urged them to relent for
"tactical reasons."

Events outside were proceeding with dramatic swift-
ness. Army lorries had been requisitioned by the Revo-
lutionaries. Filled with a motley crowd of soldiers, stu-
dents, Red Cross nurses, and youngsters bestrung with
bandoliers improvised out of machine-gun belts, they
careered back and forth along the quays and thorough-

THE REVOLUTION 119

fares bristling with rifles and maxims. They visited out*
lying barracks to stir up tardy units, and attempted to
seize the telephone and telegraph offices. In this they
did not then succeed. Elsewhere the victories of the rev-
olutionary forces were rapid and decisive. Early in the
morning the great Kresty prison on the Vyborg side had
$ been captured and all the inmates, "politicals' 9 and con-

victs alike, set free. Among them were the Labor dele-
gates to the War Industrial Committee, whose arrest a
month previously had constituted one of Protopopov's
measures to prevent a revolution, also Khrustalev-Nosar, 1
President of the Council of Workmen's Delegates in 1905.
The Lav Courts (opposite the Artillery Department)
and the adjoining prison were invaded and sacked.
Among the prisoners here released was Stunner's fac-
totum, Manasevich-Manuilov, whom Miliukov had de-
scribed as one of the Razputin "camarilla." Manuilov
was under trial for extortion. A wild-eyed soldier burst
open his cell, crying out, "Are you for the Revolution?"
"Anything you like," replied Manuilov, and quickly ap-
praising the situation, he fled hatless and coatless into the
cold. Unlike most of his fellow inmates, he was cap-
tured later and exiled. Another captive Razputinite was
the notorious Prince Andronikov, adventurer, informer,
sycophant, who had frequently palmed himself off on
unsuspecting foreigners as a "prominent" Russian.

Escaped convicts set fire to the Courts in order to
remove records of their crime. Former agents of the
okhrana sacked the Police Department to destroy evidence
of their complicity. Enormous quantities of invaluable
documents went to feed bonfires in the streets. All
the notarial archives thus perished. Nobody in Petro-
grad had any title-deeds to their houses or property.

1 Nosar soon became a Commissary (Governor), and proceeded to intro-
duce Bolshevist methods according to the plan of his former chief, Lenin. He
was thought to be insane, and was "removed" by the Provisional Government.

130 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

The Commandant's office was similarly ransacked in
order to destroy the military service registers.

Early in the afternoon the Fortress of SS. Peter and
Paul, situated on an island opposite to the British Em-
bassy, fell into the insurgents' hands after a short fusillade.
The headquarters of the revolutionary forces was estab-
lished here. With the guns of the fortress the insurgents
could command the whole city. Within its walls were
the tombs of the Romanovs, the mint, and the political
prison. None of the edifices suffered. The prisoners
were of course released. 1 This acquisition practically
settled the fate of the Government.

Constant firing was to be heard on all sides. Civilian
insurgents all had, or were procuring, arms, stopping
officers and taking away their swords and revolvers. The
soldiers were, however, fairly respectful to officers.
Everybody was practising with rifles or pistols.

No work was done that day at the munition and other
factories. The men had been warned to report or be
paid off. The Government still held the wires, the
Admiralty, and most of the public offices. The censor-
ship was working, but the newspapers had not appeared,
because all printers and compositiors had struck.

M. Shcheglovitov, the Reactionary President of the
Upper House, had refused permission to the members to
assemble informally after the ukaz of prorogation. He
was apprehended and brought a prisoner to the Tauris
Palace. Successively Archbishop Pitirim (the friend of
Razputin), Stunner, Prefect Balk, General Kurlov (one
of the okhrana chiefs), and a number of lesser lights of
the Old Regime were conveyed thither, also many quite
innocent persons. Everybody who wore a General's

1 Among them were some exceedingly dangerous German spies and a few
mutineers of the Pavlovsky regiment. These had been sentenced to be shot
on the following morning. Soon afterwards Protopopov, Stunner, Goremykin,
etc., took their places and were subjected to all the rigors of their own regime.

THE REVOLUTION 181

uniform was regarded as a "suspect." The crowds
brutally maltreated some unfortunate veterans. All these
persons were indiscriminately subjected to insults by a
jeering populace surrounding the Tauris Palace. Par-
ticular joy burst forth at the appearance of any okhrana
suspects or policemen, derisively nicknamed "Pharaohs"
(Faraony). Regular hunts were proceeding in the gar-
rets. Many policemen had been hurled from the roofs.

At midnight a tired-looking old man struggled into
the Duma. "I have come to give myself up/ 9 he mut-
tered. "I am Protopopov, the ex-Minister of the Interior.
Take me away. I want "to serve my country. You
shall hear all I know." He collapsed on a sofa. It
appeared he had sought refuge outside the city with a
friend, the Tibetan "healer" Badmaiev, who was one
of Razputin's intimates. But he could not rest. Con-
science tormented him. He made his "confession" to
Kerensky. It was an "old story." He had deserted
his post, "resigned " it to Golitsyn, who himself announced
his resignation some hours later to Rodzianko. An
unknown General had been appointed Minister in Proto-
popov's place. And while I was sitting in Rodzianko's
study this "Minister" rang up to ask what he was to do.

Meanwhile replies had come through the Duma tel-
egraph office from several of the Army Chiefs, announcing
that they on their side had remonstrated with the Tsar
and were in sympathy with the Duma. Such was the
tenor of messages from the Northern, Southwestern, and
Caucasian Fronts. As the Tsar still maintained silence,
and as the old Government showed no signs of existence,
there was no longer any motive for further delay. Pres-
ident Rodzianko's scruples and anxieties were overcome
when he heard that a large contingent of the Preobra-
zhensky Guards, with their officers, had come to the
Duma ready to support a new Government. Discus-
sion on this matter was actually in progress when a

122 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

summons came by telephone from the Marie Palace
inviting Rodzianko to attend a meeting of the Council
of Ministers. Guarded by soldiers lying along the mud-
guards of his car with loaded rifles pointed ahead, the
President of the Duma, who had become the idol and hope
of the people, traversed the whole city safely, escaping
the gusts of flying bullets. He had suspended the sitting
of the Board to hear what news the Ministers had to give.
He hoped to learn from them that the Tsar had sum-
moned a Duma Government. He found all the Ministers
assembled, and also the Grand Duke Michael, only
brother of the Tsar. But they had no news. Then M.
Rodzianko apprised them of the Duma's intentions. It
was going to constitute a Provisional Government, as
there seemed to be no other way of re-establishing order
in the Capital, of saving the country from anarchy, and
of enabling Russia to continue the war to a successful end.

The majority of the Ministers signified their willingness
to submit, and proposed that the Grand Duke Michael
should become Regent. But General Beliaev declared
that he could not thus violate his oath as a soldier, and
that he would continue the struggle until he received
contrary orders from the Tsar. M. Rodzianko returned
to the Tauris Palace, and shortly afterwards it was
unanimously resolved to elect a "Provisional Executive
Committee " of twelve members, which should select a
Provisional Government. At the same time orders were
issued to arrest the members of the old Government;
but when the emissaries of the Duma reached the Marie
Palace the birds had flown. One old Minister, who
had remained, hid himself under the table and was not
detected. The others sought refuge in the Prefect's
residence, opposite the Admiralty.

That night the refugees cleared all the archives out
of the Prefecture, transferred them across the Alexander
Gardens to the Admiralty, and there sought sanctuary.

THE REVOLUTION 1*8

Here they were besieged on the following morning (Tues-
day). Some reserve battalions from Novgorod had been
brought in during the night. They formed the garrison.
Beliaev had posted machine-guns, and even some field-
guns in the building, and wanted to "hold out" till
further reinforcements arrived. The freshly imported
troops thought they were fighting the Germans — at least,
so they were told — and were believed to be reliable. But
the Revolutionaries announced that if the Admiralty
did not surrender tiy three o'clock they would open fire
from the fortress. Admiral Grigorovich, the Minister of
Marine, who, with the other Admiralty officials, resided
in the building, was opposed to resistance. He pointed
out that damage to the edifice might involve the loss of
papers, plans, and technical appliances necessary for the
conduct of naval operations. Beliaev reluctantly gave
way, and himself, with Habalov and Balk, the Prefect,
sought shelter in the Winter Palace. This he also wanted
to "fortify," but was dissuaded from doing so on the
ground that it would be easily wrecked by the fortress.
He then disguised himself as a soldier and hid in the
General Staff buildings opposite.

I lived in the house adjoining the Prefecture,*and was
able to follow all the stages of this closing act in the
revolutionary conquest of Petrograd.

Throughout Monday night armored cars, manned by
the Revolutionaries, tried to capture the telephone ex-
change in the Morskaia and the telegraph office in the
Pochtamtskaia. The garret artillery raked them fore and
aft, and when they attempted to cross the St. Isaac's
Square they ran into a hot cross-fire, delivered from the
roofs of the Marie Palace, the Ministry of Agriculture,
and the Cathedral of St. Isaac. The telephone office was
guarded by a company of the Guards Rifles from Tsarskoe,
who also held the Tsarskoe Selo (Vitebsk) and Nicholas
railway stations, saving those buildings from utter destruc-

124 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

tion by fire at the hands of the Revolutionaries, bent that
night on preventing any fresh troops from entering the
city. The Semenovsky and Izmailovsky Guards bat-
talions quartered in this neighborhood remained stanch to
the last. Mixed companies of the Guards had also held
the Winter Palace throughout Monday.

On visiting the telephone office at early dawn, during
a momentary lull, I saw an armored car standing outside.
The crew had carelessly opened the steel doors protecting
the radiator, and a stream of machine-gun bullets had
ripped it clean through; then, the fire becoming still more
accurate, all the crew had been slain through the loopholes.
The inside presented a tangled mass of human remains,
blood, snow, and ammunition, all congealed by the sharp
frost. The soldiers were chatting in the yard. Finally
they went off hungry to Tsarskoe, feeling they had "done
their bit"

Soon afterwards the contagion reached the sailors in
the depot in the Molka. They had been exchanging
salvos during Monday with the men of the Kexholm
Guards, whose barracks were " across the way." Neither
side seemed to know why. Then they decided to join
the Duma. The sailors marched up the Morskaia with
their band playing the "Marseillaise" and red flags
flying. On crossing the Isaac Square they were greeted
with volleys from the irrepressible police. Somebody
shouted that the bullets had come from the Astoria,
or Military Hotel, where many officers, including the
Allied Missions, resided. Immediately the sailors opened
out in skirmishing order and sent a hail of bullets into the
hotel windows. Every young hooligan who had been
cheering the sailors carried a rifle and began to use it.
The police loosed off more cartridge-belts. The fusillade
grew intense. As a matter of fact, not a shot had been
fired from the hotel. Thinking they had vanquished
resistance, the mob — sailors, soldiers, and civilians —

THE REVOLUTION 125

stormed the building, smashed the plate-glass windows,
and rushed in to arrest the inmates. There is every
reason to believe that the attack on the hotel had been
decided beforehand. I was there late the previous
evening and heard that one was expected. Many of the
residents had even left early in the morning, fearing
violence. Nothing could exceed the brutality or ferocity
of the " revolutionary " horde. The coolness and pluck
of British and French officers alone prevented wholesale
murder of Russian Generals, ladies, and children. They
promptly assembled everybody and formed a line of
defense. The Allied uniforms inspired sufficient respect
to contain the violence of the mob. Only one old Gen-
eral was killed. But the building was gutted, the cellars
plundered, and the effects of the British officers stolen.

On the outbreak of war the crowds had wrecked the
German Embassy on the opposite side of the square in
a frenzy of patriotism; now soldiers and sailors were
committing worse excesses against their own officers and
innocent women and children. It did not promise well
for the Revolution, which everybody had hailed at first
with gladness. Finally, the sailors marched off with
scores of unfortunate Generals to the Duma.

Only a few hours later a similar assault was delivered
upon the town residence of Count Freedericks, a few doors
from the telegraph office. Valuable works of art, wines,
and money were plundered, the house set on fire, and
the crippled wife and daughter of the Tsar's Minister of
the Court dragged into the street and brutally beaten.
The Kexholmers perpetrated this outrage. Count Freed-
ericks was with the Emperor.

A little farther down the Moika the Litovsky prison
for women, a historic pile built in the form of a castle,
was stormed and burnt down by the crowd under fierce
machine-gun fire directed from the roofs of the famous
Marie Theater.

126 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

While agreeing ostensibly with the Duma resolution,
the Socialists were preparing their own " Council of Work-
men's and Soldiers' Delegates/ 9 which was to assemble
' next day at the Tauris Palace. This fact alone shows

how well the revolutionary plans had been matured.
They had issued a "manifesto" to the workmen and to
the soldiers, calling upon them to send delegates to the
Soviet (Council), one per thousand workmen and one per
company of troops. This manifesto appeared in the first
number of the Bulletin, published by the Duma journalists
on Monday. The elections were, necessarily, hurried,
and more or less perfunctory. Whoever spoke loudest
considered himself elected. Many "delegates" came
who represented nobody except themselves. All the
jail-deliveries swarmed into the meeting on Tuesday.
The Soviet had so little prestige that, for the time being,
the Revolutionaries had perforce to recognize the authority
of the Duma Committee and to use it for their purposes.
Many of these facts were not fully appreciated or
estimated then. People were so carried away by feelings
of intense joy over the prospective downfall of the Old
Regime— the Revolutionaries by hope of an immediate
Socialistic Millennium, the public at large by relief from
the deadening influences of autocracy — that there was no
recrimination. Many officers came to volunteer their
services to the Duma. They formed the nucleus of the
Military Committee, then organized, which took over
such affairs as came within its purview. But already signs
were not wanting of a coming clash with the rival revolu-
tionary organizations.

The greatest confusion still prevailed among the bulk
of the garrison as to the cause of the fighting. Many
thought quite seriously that the Germans had invaded
Petrograd. I remember, while passing the Winter Palace
that Monday afternoon on my way from the Duma,
witnessing a case of this kind. The Winter Palace and

THE REVOLUTION 1£*

the Admiralty and neighboring Ministries were still in
the hands of the Government troops. They began firing
wildly at the Foreign Office, although only a mere handful
of people were then in the Square. I had just left Sir G.
Buchanan walking to the Foreign Office to pay his daily
visit to M. Pokrovsky, who was still unmolested. By
good fortune neither of us came into the line of fire. On
his walk homeward the people recognized and cheered him.

To most observers it would have seemed hopeless and
futile to continue the struggle under such circumstances.
The ignorant peasant troops were all too ready to change
their allegiance, while the Labor element was dominated
by Socialists. But the bulk of the soldiery still respected
their officers, and there was no sign as yet of widespread
indiscipline. The Soviet was soon able to change all
that. Stubborn resistance was being shown, however,
by the Military Colleges and by the Cyclist Battalions.
These units, composed exclusively of real Russians of the
educated class, showed by their behavior in this and
subsequent conflicts between the forces of order and the
forces of anarchy that the best elements in the country
were stanch and reliable; that they might be swamped
for a time by the tide of Revolution, but sooner or later
would assert themselves. Some months afterwards many
of these brave lads fought and fell, leading the troops at
the Front.

I had seen one or two drunken men during the first
days of the Revolution. Excitement enough was afforded
by the novelty of the thing. Besides, liquor was unpro-
curable. The Monopoly shops, where methylated spirits
had been dispensed, had closed. But after the sack of
the Astoria and the Freedericks mansion drunken soldiers
littered the sidewalks. The guard stationed at the
telegraph office, whither I succeeded in penetrating,
Tuesday night — thanks to a written permit from the
Duma Committee — had imbibed so much that only one

128 "DEMOCRACY, "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

man could stand on his legs. 1 Revolutionary soldiers
entered flats and houses demanding food and drink, and
in many cases helped themselves to valuables. Weapons
of all kinds, ancient and modern, were of course "requisi-
tioned."

Some days later I saw a whole company of guardsmen
marching to the Post Office. Each man carried a heavy
bundle under his arm — loot that they were sending home
to their villages. To their simple minds the "ideals' 9 of
revolution had immediately assumed a "material" form.
Later on the civilian "leaders" of the Revolution dis-
played tendencies of a kindred nature, and the revolu-
tionary movement was marred by acts of robbery and
spoliation. Socialists could be tender only for the foes of
their country: "No indemnity; no annexation" where
the Germans were concerned, but both the one and the
other could be applied towards their own countrymen.

Although the Soviet had partly assembled on Tuesday
night, and could not develop its organization till some
days later, orders were being issued by mysterious persons
in the Socialist camp throughout the incipient stages of
the Revolution. And even while the Duma Elders acted
in all good faith with the Socialists, the latter continued
to "pull the strings" for their own purposes. The forma-
tion of the Duma Committee 2 with two Socialists (Keren-
sky and Chkheidze) produced no change in revolutionary
tactics. Yet it was quite obvious to any except those
who would not see that the institution of the Soviet
was tantamount to preparing beforehand the overthrow
of any Coalition Government. Herein lay the almost

1 Revolutionary leaden invariably discouraged drunkenness for practical
reasons: a drunken follower was both discreditable and dangerous. He lost
sight of the "ideals" of revolution while under the spell of drink. I had noticed
this indignation of Revolutionaries with drunken workmen in 1905.

'The members of the Provisional Executive Committee were MM. Rod-
sianko, Kerensky, Chkheidze, Shulgin, Miliukov, Karaulov, Dmitrinkov,
Rzhevsky, Shidlovsky, Nekrasov, Vladimir Lvov, and Colonel Engdhart.

THE REVOLUTION 129

utter hopelessness of the task that had been undertaken
in all sincerity by the Moderate groups in the Duma.

By Tuesday night the city was entirely in the hands of
the Revolutionaries and, nominally at least, under the
control of the Duma. Moscow had joined the movement.
The police and the representatives of the Old Regime had
been dispossessed with little difficulty and practically
no bloodshed. All the railways were working. Fires
had been extinguished. Everybody was glad to get
some respite and to enjoy the new-found "freedom."
City "militia" (paid constables) had been enrolled. The
Duma Committee issued a proclamation signed by Michael
Rodzianko, President, defining its mission:

The Provisional Committee of members of the State Duma finds itself
compelled, by the onerous circumstances of internal chaos, resulting from the
courses pursued by the old Government, to take in hand the re-establishment
of State and public order.

Fully appreciating the responsibility it has assumed, the Committee feels
confident that the people and the Army will help it in the difficult task of cre-
ating a new Government capable of meeting the wishes of the nation and of
meriting its confidence.

Another proclamation summoned all citizens to safeguard
public property, and the lives and property of individuals.
It had been a beautiful day, bringing the first breath
and fragrance of spring, which is loveliest in these gloomy
northern climes. People were elated and happy. Few
understood or thought about the ominous events that
had occurred, and that were bound to bring untold misery
in the near future. It was an inspiring sight to watch
regiment after regiment marching to present its homage
to the Duma. The men stepped out so boldly, so confi-
dently, as free men should. Their officers looked proud
to lead such a gallant array. Inside the Duma I wit-
nessed a stirring spectacle. Hundreds of Preobrazhentsy
were lined up inside the huge lobby and presented arms to
President Rodzianko, who addressed them:

180 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

"Soldiers of the True Faith! Let me, as an old soldier, greet you according
to our custom. I wish you good health."

"We wish good health to your Excellency/' came the thunderous response.

The President continued:

"I want to thank you for coming here to help the members of the State
Duma to establish order and to safeguard the honor and glory of our country.
Your comrades are fighting in the trenches for the might and majesty of Russia,
and I am proud that my son has been serving since the beginning of the war in
your gallant ranks. But in order that you should be able to advance the cause
and interests which have been espoused by the Duma, you must remain a dis-
ciplined force. You know as well as I do that soldiers are helpless without their
officers. I ask you to remain faithful to your officers and to have confidence in
them, just as we have confidence in them. Return quietly to your barracks,
and come here at the first call when you may be required."

"We are ready," they answered. "Show us the way."

"The old authority is incapable of leading Russia the right way," was the
answer. ''Our first task is to establish a new authority in which we may aD
believe and trust, and which will be able to save and magnify our Mother
Russia."

A group of twenty-two elected members of the Upper
House, including MM. Guchkov, Stakhovich, Vasiliev,
Grimm, Vernadsky, and Prince TVubetskoy, addressed a
telegram to the Tsar:

The maintenance of your old Government in office is tantamount to the
complete overthrow of law and order, involving defeat on the battlefield, the
end of the dynasty, and the greatest misfortunes for Russia.

We consider that the only means of salvation lies in a complete and final
rupture with the past, the immediate convocation of Parliament, and the sum-
moning of a person enjoying the confidence of the nation, who shall form a new
Cabinet capable of governing the country in full accord with the representatives
of the nation.

The partisans of Reform were still hoping to check-
mate the forces of Revolution. But Time was against
them. Already the men who were to direct Russia's
destinies into anarchy had taken steps to shatter the very
foundations of authority and discipline. President Rod-
zianko's words to the Preobrazhentsy reflected the deep
anxiety he felt on this subject. He was not led astray by
the plaudits of the crowd, because he knew what fell
designs were being hatched in the Socialist conclaves.

THE REVOLUTION 1S1

But he left open a door of possible salvation. He would
not form a Revolutionary Government while there was
some hope of reform, but that could be assured only by the
Tsar's summoning a new Government. On Thursday
that hope vanished with the appearance of prikaz No. 1.

CHAPTER XII

THE SOVIET, "COALITION." AND BOLSHEVISM

The Soviet Proclaims Itself — Prihu No. 1 — Determined Opposition to the
Duma — Incitement against Officers — Origin of the Committee System —
Soldiers Mystified and Misled — Pseudo-Jew Extremists — Kerensky and
Coalition — Lvov Cabinet's Program — Surrender to the Soviet — Lenin's
"Mission"— Bolshevists' "Coups" of May 2d and July 16th— Kerensky
in the Toils— Bolshevism "Triumphant"— The Importation of Trotsky.

This chapter opens on events that had their origin
in the long struggle between Autocracy and Reform.
Worsted in the conflict, the Reform leaders had not the
force or the authority requisite for coping with, the advo-
cates of revolution. These had been preparing and organ-
izing the machinery of upheaval. Popular discontent had
supplied them with the requisite motive power. Once
started, no matter under what name or auspices, whether
of a "Cadet" — Prince Lvov, or a Minimalist — Kerensky,
or a Bolshevik — Lenin, the machinery would work unremit-
tently for the disruption of the social and political fabric.
Russia had wanted reform; she did not want revolu-
tion. But national desires and interests had no concern
with the aims and purposes of the Soviet. This body
had been called into existence by professional revolu-
tionaries to carry out their specific plans. To unpreju-
diced observers its real character was clearly visible from
the outset. On Wednesday (March 14th) I wrote to
The Times: 1

What the Emperor may decide to do on his arrival is unknown at the hour
of telegraphing, but one thing is quite certain. Unless his Majesty immediately

1 The Timet, March 16, 1917.
132

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 188

complies with the wishes of the moderate element among his loyal

the influence at present exercised by the Provisional Committee of the Duma

will pass wholesale into the hands of the Socialists, who want to see a Republic

established, but who are unable to institute any kind of orderly government

and would inevitably precipitate the country into anarchy within and disaster

without.

In the same message I referred to the issue by the Soviet
of a seditious proclamation to the troops. That had
prompted M. Rodzianko's warnings to the Preobraz-
hentsy on the need of maintaining obedience to their
officers. The Menshevist and Minimalist Soviet leaders
(Kerensky, Chkheidze, and Tseretelli) repudiated fore-
knowledge of the act. Next day another and much more
insidious appeal was issued, known as prikaz (order)
No. 1, concocted at the instigation of a Bolshevik pseudo-
Jew in the Soviet, Nahamkez by name, and immediately
circulated among the troops of the garrison by "emis-
saries" of that faction. It called upon soldiers to disobey
their officers and to take charge of arms and internal
administration. Another prikaz ordered the formation of
committees. These acts embodied the inward policy
of Extremists in the Soviet, and were never countermanded
by it, although some attempts were made afterwards by
the Menshevist majority to explain that the "orders"
did not apply to the whole Army, but only to the Petro-
grad garrison. But this was a mere quibble, for the sedi-
tious order, printed in official form, but unsigned, began
to be scattered broadcast along the Front. Moreover,
the "emissaries" of the Soviet hastened to Helsingfors to
disseminate the doctrine of undiscipline and mutiny
among the crews of the Baltic Fleet.

To the reader who has familiarized himself with the
history of Russian revolutionary parties related in a
preceding chapter, and is aware of the development of
subsequent events, the appearance of prikaz No. 1 offers,
indeed, no grounds for surprise. That " extremists "
actually wrote, printed, or circulated it might also be

184 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

expected. They invariably "acted" while the other
Socialists "talked." Besides, the summoning of soldier
delegates to join the Soviet was in itself an indication
of Socialist intentions.

The Socialists had agreed to work with the Duma
Committee, which had already established its own mili-
tary organization under Captain Karaulov, a Cossack
Deputy, with the assistance of a large number of officers
who had proclaimed themselves on the side of the Duma
against the autocracy. What justifiable cause had the
"Socialists for doubting the sincerity of these men? Obvi-
ously none, except that the Cossacks would have nothing
to do with the Soviet. Their delegates had attended its
meetings, listened to the doctrines of anarchy and land
spoliation, and had gone to report to their Congress,
shortly afterwards assembled in Petrograd, that "it was
no place for them." But could the Duma leaders be
reasonably suspected of favoring a return to the Old
Regime? Certainly not. Were they not capable of
taking the necessary measures to re-establish order
among the garrison? Most decidedly, yes. Then why
was it necessary to bring the soldiers into the Soviet?
The Socialists explained that their motives were good;
that their plan would "restore confidence " among the
men, and that they were "saving the situation," be-
cause, forsooth, without the "re-establishment" of
"confidence," through the medium of the Soviet, the
soldiers might "get out of hand," with "results too terrible
to imagine." Similar arguments were advanced in justi-
fication of the system of company committees.

There was not, of course, the least atom of truth in
these explanations, unless we deliberately agree to con-
fuse cause with effect, for it was the "active" Socialists
themselves who had taken the initiative in undermining
"confidence" and sowing suspicion among the men
towards their officers. At first the men did not under-

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 185

stand. Excepting a few battalions — a small percentage
of the garrison — in which officers had been overstrict
or revolutionary agitators had managed to exert a mutin-
ous influence, the bulk of the garrison was loyal to its
chiefs. Officers, it was well known, had harbored no
love for the Old Regime. Razputinism had disgusted
them with it forever. In the prolongation of a struggle
for a Government that had discredited itself irrevocably
in the eyes of the Army they foresaw useless effusion of
blood, and, desiring above all to save the Duma and to
avert anarchy, they had led their men to the conquest
of civic freedom.

On the other hand, it might be argued that a Soviet
without the soldiers would not have been possible. After
all, the overthrow of the old Government had been accom-
plished by the garrison. Out of the 460 recorded casual-
ties more than half had been soldiers. The workmen
would never have "risen" had the troops not sided with
them. To revive the 1905 Soviet with its doubtful
memories did not agree with Socialist interests. > To
summon a Soviet without the soldiers would have led
to an immediate estrangement between them and the
workmen. But the swift downfall of the old Government
was due to the co-operation of all classes, especially the
officers. Needless to say, Extremists did not stop to
consider niceties of justice and community of class
feeling and solidarity. On the contrary, they wanted a
war of classes. And, having been carried to victory on
the shoulders of the garrison, they would henceforth
use the soldier as their stalking-horse.

The invitation to send company delegates to the Soviet
naturally flattered the troops. Every soldier who had
fired a shot at a policeman, civilian, or a fellow-soldier
in the wild pandemonium of Monday and Tuesday con-
sidered himself a "hero." All wanted to be delegates.
But only one man per company was invited, and the

186 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

»•

companies were at battalion strength. Even so the
garrison contingent would exceed two hundred, and might
swamp the Labor delegates, who were also to number
one per thousand. 1 Loud complaints immediately arose.
And, paradoxically enough, the men came with their
grievances to M. Rodzianko. It only showed the artless-
ness of the soldiers. They believed in the Duma and in
its President, and came to him for advice, all unconscious
of the irony of their request, unsuspecting the Socialist
snare that was soon to convert them into an armed rabble,
harnessed to the Soviet chariot.

I was present in the Duma on Tuesday evening at a
conversation of this kind between M. Rodzianko and
several Preobrazhentsy, who had been refused admittance
to the Hall of Sessions, where the Soviet first assembled.
M. Rodzianko did his best to pacify the complainants.
Their companies had elected two delegates each, and they
were the extra ones. He promised to intercede for them.
It was an unenviable position for the President of the
Duma. He was waiting upon the unready autocrat to
save the cause of Reform; he was the hope and idol of
Petrograd and the whole Empire, yet betrayed by those
who claimed to lead these people.

When he took a stroll in the crowded Shpalemaia the
people thronged respectfully around him, walking in step
with him, watching his countenance, hungering to hear
the sound of his voice. His huge burly figure, massive
rugged countenance, his homely comprehensible words of
good cheer, his clarion voice — what comfort, what confi-
dence they inspired in those delirious but awesome days!
And this giant was sick — stricken in body and soul.
Under an impassive exterior the pallor of his face betrayed
the pain that gnawed his great heart. He was so weak
that he ought to have been in his bed, not amidst these
crowds. But he was ready to endure any suffering for

1 Later the number of delegate! exceeded 8000.

THE SOVIET, "COALITION;* BOLSHEVISM 137

"Mother Russia." If only the reply that he awaited
with such inexpressible longing did not come too late!
That haunting fear had given him no rest day or night.

In summoning delegates from the men of the garrison,
the Revolutionaries had, perhaps unconsciously, prompted
another departure, viz., the election of officers. Once
the companies had to elect delegates from their own midst,
it was only natural that they should proceed to elect
their C.O.'s and subalterns, just as they elected their
starosta (elder) in the villages. There were always some
unpopular officers. They could thus be eliminated. So,
having chosen their delegates to the Soviet,, the companies
proceeded to " elect " their officers. In most cases this
process affected the situation very slightly.

What happened in one Guard regiment may be taken
as an example. The officers were at dinner in their Mess
on Tuesday, when a N.C.O. came in to report that they
had been " elected." They were not altogether surprised.
The Soviet scheme had prepared them for some such
departure. Going out to the men, they thanked them
for this mark of confidence. Some hours later, an
orderly-clerk having aroused the suspicions of the men
regarding the quantity of food supplied to them, they
resolved to arrest their Colonel — an officer of great
distinction and above all reproach. He was politely
requested to report himself at the Duma and remain
there.

Prikaz No. 1 put an end to " amenities." The dele-
gates had brought back from the Soviet enough of the
spirit of anarchy to destroy all discipline, even had the
prikaz been deferred. The orders contained in that
document were immediately carried into effect. Officers
who resisted the men in " taking possession of the arms"
were arrested or murdered.

It may seem strange to us that such excesses should
be committed, but not if we understand the Russian

138 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

character, which cannot brook injustice, real or fancied,
and is always prone to violence in the assertion of its
rights. For the same reason the Russians will go to the
other extreme and allow themselves to be led by persons,
good or evil, who happen to please them or gain their
confidence.

The Soviet had taught the men that resistance on the
part of the officers might be expected, and that it would
argue intent to deprive them of " freedom" — that it was
"counter-revolutionary." Within a few hours a large
number of the officers of the garrison were " eliminated."
Only those who combined the qualities of "general
favorites" with absolute readiness to efface themselves
before the men and avoid appearing too much in the
streets were spared. Thus ensigns found themselves in
"command" of battalions or regiments. But they were
not safe from the men of other units. The "order" to
"take possession of arms" was interpreted to the letter.
It was taken to mean "all arms" — those of officers and
even civilians also.

Here is the true story of a wounded guardsman
who, unluckily for himself, returned that day from the
Front. Driving to his regimental headquarters, he was
stopped by men belonging to his reserve battalion. They
roughly demanded his sword, and threatened him with
their bayonets. "My sword!" he cried. "What do
you mean, scoundrels! I won this sword in battle!"
Before he could draw it in self-defense he was overpowered
and the weapon — a sword of St. George — wrested from
him. Weakened by his wound, the poor lad lost control
over his feelings and burst into tears. He managed to
reach his home, and there shot himself, unable to survive
the shame that had been put upon him. These men
belonged to the Grenadier regiment which afterwards
deserted in face of the enemy.

Thenceforth officers left their sidearms at home, and

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 189

all who could do so hurried back to the armies in the
field. There, at all events, they were safe — till the Soviet
and Committees had extended their fatal influence. *'i
Subversion had been carried out by a handful of
pseudo-Jew Extremists in the Soviet, 1 but the Soviet
was a party to the traitorous business. Most of the
leaders — especially the pseudo-Jews — were a truculent
pack, cowering behind the soldiery, intent upon realizing
their revolutionary "ideals," but terrified by a possibility
of failure and eventual reprisals. A Russian proverb
truly says, "Fear hath big eyes." They egregiously
magnified the danger of a "counter-revolution," and,
just then, were in mortal fright of the Tsar's return to
Fetrograd. The whole garrison was on their side, or
rather with the Duma, but, "Supposing the Tsar enter
the city? Who knows/ he may also proclaim himself
for the Duma, and then the people and many, perhaps
all, of the soldiers may revert to their allegiance under a

1 Afterwards their numbers increased largely, and although they studiously
concealed their identity under assumed Russian or Polish names, it became
known that the principal ones were: Nahamkez-Steklov, Apfelbaum-Zinoviev,
Rosenfeldt-Kamenev, Goldmann-Gorev, Goldberg-Mekowski, Zederbaum-
Martov, Himmer-Sukhanov, Krachman-Zagorski, HoD&nder-Mieshkowski,
Lourier-Larin, Seffer-Bogdanov. Among the leaders of this gang — under Lenin
— were: Trotsky, whose real name was Bronstein, and Feldmann, alias Chernov.
Lenin's previous record has been given. He came to Russia in April, traveling
from Switzerland and through Germany in a "sealed carriage" with Robert
Grimm, Mme. Kolontay, etc., at the time when Austria, with Germany's
approval, proposed "separate terms" to the Provisional Government. He
had been amply provided with funds by a "wealthy lady" in Zurich. He
"requisitioned" a ballet-dancer's villa opposite the fortress and preached the
doctrines of Bolshevism. Having stirred up a revolt in July to defeat Keren-
sky's "offensive," he was permitted to go into seclusion. It is said he went to
Germany. He came back to carry out the final "victory" of Bolshevism with
the aid of Bronstein-Trotsky, who had been a refugee after the troubles of 1905,
Trotsky had then been Vice-President of the Labor Soviet. He had bee*
expelled from France for anti-war agitation and before the Revolution went to
America. His detention at Halifax aroused the greatest fury in the Soviet
against the British Government, and as "Minister for Foreign Affairs" in the
Lenin " Cabinet" he gave full vent to his feelings of revenge for his detention.

140 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

»»

Constitutional Monarchy!" It was too dreadful to
contemplate. Hence the feverish haste they had dis-
played in summoning the soldiers to the Soviet and in
issuing prikaz No. 1. And in these counsels of cowardice
the Socialist leaders were unanimous and united.

The situation had become so critical on the Wednesday
that it was no longer possible to defer the formation of
a Provisional Government. Only one representative of
the Soviet agreed to enter it. That was Kerensky.
The others preferred to wait, or to carry on their revolu-
tionary intrigue outside.

It was too late to pass over the Soviet. The Duma
Committee negotiated through Chkheidze and Kerensky
the terms upon which the Soviet agreed to support the
new Government. But while the negotiations were pro-
ceeding the soldiers had been "stampeded" again by
rumors purposely spread among them that they would
be drafted to the Front. The pseudo-Jews were afraid
of the Army, and mistrusted Chkheidze, their Menshevist
president. He wielded great authority among the work-
men, and was extraordinarily skilful in manipulating
the unwieldy assembly of delegates. Who could tell
what the Provisional Government might do, should a
new garrison come into Petrograd, especially soldiers
from the Front! So the soldiers were "panicked" into
demanding that they, the "heroes" of the Revolution,
should be absolved from fighting for their country, now
that they had won such a victory for freedom. They
required little prompting. To the usual demands of
Constituent Assembly and political amnesty was added
this other preposterous demand.

The Provisional Government was finally constituted
on Thursday, March 15th, as follows:

Prince George Lvov (Cadet) Prime Minister and Interior

M. Miliukov (Cadet) Foreign Affairs

M. Guchkov (Octobrist) War and Marine

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 141

M. Tereschchenko (Progressivist) Finance

M. Manuilov (Cadet) Education

M. Shingarev (Cadet) Agriculture

M. Nekrasov (Cadet) Railways

M. Konovalov (Octobrist) Commerce and Industry

M. Kerensky (Socialist) Justice

Vladimir Lvov (Center) Holy Synod

M. Godney (Cadet) ? . Comptroller-General

There were only three " strong " men among them:
Guchkov, Miliukov, and Kerensky. The new Minister
of War had seen service as a volunteer on the Boer side
in' the South African War and with the Slavs in the
Balkan Campaign!' He had "managed" the Bed Cross
in Manchuria, and had been closely associated with Bed
Cross and munition work dining the present war. He
had been President of the Duma and was leader of the
Octobrist party — essentially a politician and a man of
action. Professor Miliukov had been for twenty years
a leading Liberal, a well-known Bulgarophil, one of the
founders of the Constitutional Democratic party, of
which he was the recognized leader, foreign editor of
the Reck, and a specialist on foreign affairs — essentially
a man of words, and nicknamed by Doroshevich (editor
of the Russkoe Slow) the "god of untactfulness." Keren-
sky was a struggling lawyer, who specialized in political
trials. He had proposed a resolution to the Bar of Petro-
grad denouncing the old Government for the Beyliss
case. For this and for his association with the Socialist-
Revolutionary party he had been "under suspicion,"
and had even been arrested — a bold and fiery orator,
without any experience whatever of affairs of Govern-
ment.

That night Kerensky addressed a mass meeting in the
Duma. "Comrades," he cried, "Regenerated Russia will
not resort to the shameful means utilized by the Old
Regime. Soldiers! I ask your co-operation. Do not
listen to the promptings of the agents of the Old Regime.

142 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

Listen to your officers." So, according to Kerensky it
was the okhrana that had issued prikaz No. 1. And
Chkheidze l was still more emphatic. He attributed
the "launching of vile proclamations inciting the soldiers
to murder their officers" to "provocative efforts of the
secret police."

In the light of subsequent events it reads like a
mockery. The Soviet leaders knew that their hearers
would swallow any dish served up with this sauce. But
it was such concoctions as this that were destined for
many months to go down with the gullible public at home
and the ignorant people abroad. In the gentle art of
prevarication, and still more in the negation and dis-
honor of "Free Russia" — their vaunted watchword —
they far outdistanced the agents of the Old Regime.
Much talk was then dispensed about "dark forces" and
okhrana agents disguised as soldiers trying to encourage
pogroms and desertion in order to "discredit" the Revolu-
tion. But all this talk turned out to be largely nonsense.
Of course, the wretched police, who had been garbed in
military uniforms by Protopopov, made their escape to
the Army whenever that was possible. Naturally enough
they could not feel safe in Petrqgrad. And even if they
tried to instil notions of discipline and duty among the
troops (which, of course, rendered them suspect of
"counter-revolutionary" designs), who shall blame them?
The pogrom theory has been sufficiently accounted for in
a previous chapter. The Jews were all in a state of terror
and dreamt of nothing but pogroms.

On Thursday the Tsar had abdicated and appointed
Prince Lvov Prime Minister. This appointment was

1 Chkheidze was the son of a Georgian peasant — one of the serf-retainers of
the Dadianis, former sovereigns of Mingrelia, a small mediatised State in the
Caucasus. His associate, Tseretelli, was a "noble" retainer of the Dadianis.
Chkheidze was the "bellwether," Tseretelli the "nightingale" of Menshevist
Sovietdom.

Portrait hu been removed fr

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 148

signed some hours before the Provisional Government
was finally constituted, but the fact had not come to the
knowledge of the Duma. Had the abdication taken
place two days earlier, things might have been different.
On the Friday morning the Provisional Government
issued the following appeal to all the inhabitants of
Russia:

Citizens, the Provisional Executive Committee of the Duma, with the aid
and support of the garrison of the capital and its inhabitants, has now triumphed
over the noxious forces of the Old Regime in such a measure as to enable it to
proceed to the more stable organization of the executive power. With this
object the Provisional Committee has appointed as Ministers of the first
National Cabinet men whose past political and public activity assures them the
confidence of the country.

The new Cabinet will adopt the following principles as the bases of its policy:

1. An immediate general amnesty for all political and religious offenses,
including terrorist acts, military revolts, and agrarian crimes.

£. Freedom of speech, of the Press, of association and labor organization,
and the freedom to strike, with an extension of these liberties to civilians and
soldiers in so far as military and technical conditions permit.

8. The abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions.

4. Immediate preparations for the summoning of a Constituent Assembly,
which, with universal suffrage as a basis, shall establish the Governmental
regime and the Constitution of the country.

5. The substitution for the police of a national militia, with elective heads
and subject to the self-government bodies.

0. Elections to be carried out on the basis of universal suffrage.

7. The troops that have taken part in the revolutionary movement shall
not be disarmed, and they are not to leave Petrograd.

8. While severe military discipline must be maintained on active service,
all restrictions upon soldiers in the enjoyment of social rights granted to other
citizens are to be abolished.

9. The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no intention of
taking advantage of the existence of war conditions to delay the realization of
the above-mentioned measures of reform.

Even a casual perusal of these "principles" will satisfy
the reader that the new Cabinet had bound itself hand
and foot to Revolution. But they could no longer help
themselves. They accepted the doctrine that "soldiers"
should have the same right as ordinary working-men
"to go on strike," that the Petrograd troops should not

144 "DEMOCRACY,- "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

»»

leave the city, that no restrictions should be placed upon
soldiers when off duty. What else could they do? Ten
thousand machine-gunners with one thousand maxims
and several millions of cartridges had come in from
Oranienbaum and quartered themselves in the People's
Palace. They had killed or driven away their officers,
and were ready to shoot indiscriminately. The Soviet
knew its own strength and made its own terms. It was
easy to criticize M. Rodzianko "for waiting so long"
and Prince Lvov "for accepting such a program of
government" — as the Moscow wiseacres did afterwards
— it was a very different thing to have acted otherwise,
placed as they had been.

The city had resumed something of its normal appear-
ance — restaurants were opened after three days devoid
of food for those who had no domestic resources. Pro-
vision shops had been open at intervals but were still ill-
provided, and the queues were enormous. Some of the
mills had resumed work. Were they, the Duma Com-
mittee, to run the risk of another and a worse upheaval?
There was danger of this if they refused the Soviet's
terms. And these would become still more sweeping.

The mob in Petrograd went wild on learning of the
abdication. They proceeded to remove and destroy all
the emblems of Tsardom on palaces and private houses.
This spirit of wanton destruction had been Russia's bane.
It caused an infinity of harm during the war, and still
more during the Revolution and its resultant anarchy.
But after a while the mob became calmer. General
Kornilov, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief
of the garrison, managed to restore a semblance of order
among the troops, and life in the Capital became tolerable.
The armies had adhered to the new Government, and it
was hoped that they would not heed the Bolshevist
agitation.

One of the largest cartridge works in Petrograd had

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 145

been the scene of a characteristic episode at this time.
The soldiers employed in the clerical staff decided to
form a committee to run the works. They drove out
the management and "elected" two unknown officers,
friends of the ringleaders. For several days the manage-
ment and the funds were in their hands. Then they
quarreled among themselves and betrayed each other.
The two "officers" turned out to be "liberated" convicts.
They had murdered a couple of officers in the street
and donned their uniforms.

The Russian General Staff had positive information,
which was published later in the Press, 1 that Lenin had
returned to Petrograd with a German mission to propa-
gate pacifism in Russia, to undermine the Provisional
Government, and to use all and any means to drive out
Ministers who were opposed to a separate peace. Two
meetings of Socialists took place in Berne, whereat
Ioltuhowsld, the Ukrainian agitator, and Lenin were
present. Lenin was an intimate of Ioltuhowski, and
often stayed at his house. With Lenin came a Swiss
Socialist, named Robert Grimm, who helped him to prop-
agate the Bolshevist doctrine. Grimm delivered speeches
in Petrograd, in Kronstadt, and other places, not scrupling
to address the people in German. During this time
Grimm was in communication with the Germans through
Federal Councilor Hofmann at Berne, sending and
receiving cable messages in the Swiss cipher through
the Petrograd Legation. 2 With them worked an ex-
society woman named Kolontay, who had left her family
and friends to follow Lenin. She afterwards became
People's Commissary for Education, and one day dis-
appeared with the Crown Jewels in company with a
common sailor who was Minister of Marine under the
the Bolsheviki.

1 Russkoe Slovo, September £, 1917.

' " The Timet History of the War," Part 168: [Swiss Neutrality.

146 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

's first move was undertaken soon after his
arrival. It is described in detail in another chapter. It
had the desired effect of "eliminating" Miliukov, the
"pet bugbear" of Berlin. On July 16th the Bolsheviki
organized a still stronger onslaught upon their opponents.
This time their stroke was directed not only against the
Provisional Government, but also against the Soviet
majority. The reason for this may be easily explained.
In May they had the Soviet with them. The immediate
Bolshevist objective was to get rid of Miliukov and of
war aims based on "decisive victory" over the Germans.
The Soviet and Kerensky were already committed to
doctrines that could not be reconciled with the Miliukov
program of out-and-out loyalty to the Allies. An
"arrangement" with the Bolsheviki was, therefore,
readily accepted on the basis of a "democratic peace,"
with "no annexation and no indemnity."

In July, contrary to German hopes and expectations,
the Russian Army began an offensive. With all its
faults, the Old Regime had managed with the assistance
of the Allies to provide the armies on the field with guns,
munitions, etc., on a lavish scale. There was a super-
abundance of men. The offensive should and would
have brought a decisive victory in Galicia, which was
to have been followed up by an invasion of Turkey.
But the Bolsheviki wanted, not victory, but defeat, and
the Provisional Government had not a clear mind on
the subject.

On July 16th several regiments of the Petrograd
garrison obeyed orders from the Bolshevist "staff,
and came out into the streets armed. The "Red Guard,
a Bolshevist band of armed workmen, also mustered.
The soldiers did not know what they had to do. They
simply "took possession" of the streets. Kerensky being
at the Front, Prince Lvov and the Soviet appealed to the
Cossacks A sotnia went out to restore order. They did

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 147

not use their rifles. The Bolshevist troops ambushed
them and killed several. Then the Cossacks took drastic
measures. Next day Bolshevist reinforcements arrived
from Kronstadt. The Cossacks repulsed them, inflicting
heavy losses. There was as much bloodshed during these
two days as during the two worst days of the Revolution.

The Bolshevist regiments then went over to the
Soviet, and a temporary blight fell upon the Leninite
propaganda in Petrograd, though, as we shall see in
another chapter, it had been disastrously successful in
checking the offensive movement of the Russian armies.
Lenin had served the Germans well.

I was absent from Petrograd, having gone to the Front.
My friends in the Capital afterwards related to me what
had happened. One of them was at the Tauris Palace,
where the Soviet still had its headquarters. 1 He related
that the building was full of Jews — reporters and others
— who were in terror of being captured by the partisans
of the Bolshevist-Jews. Frantic appeals were being sent
over the telephone to "loyal" troops for help. A regular
panic occurred when an armored car rattled up. To
their intense relief, the Jewish "garrison" were told that
the crew of the armored car were on the side of the Pro-
visional Government. Equal dismay was felt when, on
looking out of the windows, the "garrison " saw. the
crew talking to a group of workmen. Some of the bolder
spirits ventured to go out and begged the crew to come
inside the Palace. They feared that the workmen might
seduce them from their allegiance. "Save us!" the
piteous cry resounded upon the ears of the armored-car
warriors. "Don't listen to those workmen!" "Save us

1 Soon afterwards the Soviet transferred its headquarters to the Smolny
Institute, a huge building outside the city, where noblemen's daughters had
received their education. It offered a great advantage. It could be more easily
fortified. The Tauris Palace was plundered by members of the Soviet before
they left it.

148 "DEMOCRACY,- "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

and you save Russia I H " Tovdrishcki, we implore you,
we appeal to your sense of revolutionary solidarity !"
"The fate of free Russia and of the great ideals of the
Revolution, Land and Freedom, are in your hands!"
While these objurgations were being launched at the
astounded soldiers, cigarettes, buns, and glasses of tea
were thrust into their hands, even into their mouths.
They could not utter a word, but as they took the prof-
fered douceurs the anxiety of their hosts quickly subsided.
Then began a tragi-comedy of another sort. The
"guilty" Bolsheviki had to be " punished/ * Writs were
issued against Lenin and the ringleaders — Trotsky, Kolon-
tay, etc. (Grimm had already left). General Polovtsov,
who had succeeded General Kornilov as Commander-in-
Chief, was instructed to take "stern measures." But
the Soviet and Kerensky (the latter in Petrograd by this
time) were not inclined for reprisals. They were bound
by party ties with the Bolsheviki and committed to "free-
dom." It was "dangerous" for the Revolution — and
for themselves — to proclaim open war against these
"misguided" but "well-intentioned" persons. After all,
they were "revolutionaries." It was necessary to "step
warily." So the "stern measures" came to nothing.
Lenin was able to "evade" arrest. When General
Polovtsov came to apprehend two of the Bolshevist
ringleaders, including Trotsky, he found Kerensky at
their quarters, and from him received orders to leave them
alone. When General Polovtsov proceeded to disarm the
Red Guard, he was forbidden to do so by orders from
Prince Lvov, "in compliance with the wishes of the
Soviet." The peaceful majority of the workmen had
themselves come to General Polovtsov offering to disclose
the secret stores of arms, but both they and the Soviet
were in terror of the Bolsheviki. General Polovtsov
sallied forth with Cossacks and armored-cars to repress a
Bolshevist mutiny in one of the rifle factories outside

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 149

Petrograd. The " mutineers " were "sniping*' the loyal
garrison of a neighboring fort. But the Soviet forbade
him to disarm them. He thereupon resigned.

M. Kerensky and the Soviet had been saved from
the Bolsheviki in July by a few Cossack regiments
stationed in Petrograd. But at the Moscow Conference
he assumed the airs of an autocrat. Previously he
had claimed dictatorial powers to suppress an alleged
conspiracy to re-establish the Old Regime, and had
arrested General Gurko without any just cause. (Some
months later he had to release him, and asked the British
Embassy to facilitate General Gurko's journey abroad.)
At Moscow he announced that all attempts to upset the
Revolutionary Government would be suppressed "with
blood and iron." He would brook no dictation from
General Kornilov or General Kaledin, both of whom
demanded instant and energetic measures to put down
anarchy in the Army and in the country. M. Kerensky
remained blind and obdurate. He forgot that he had still
to reckon with the Bolsheviki, who were stronger than
ever in the Soviet.

A crash was bound to come. The Bolsheviki chal-
lenged him once more, and once more he had to appeal to
Kaledin's Cossacks and to General Kornilov. The latter
had been preparing to take drastic measures. He sent
cavalry to the aid of Kerensky, but Kerensky then realized
that the Soviet, now entirely Bolshevist, held him in
its power. So, taking its side, he betrayed Kornilov and
the troops that were coming to aid the Government.

Another conference was summoned, this time exclu-
sively "democratic," another name for "Socialist." On
September 28th Kerensky, in a speech, declared that
"anarchy was growing irresistibly, and spreading in
enormous waves throughout the State." Russian troops
were helping the Finnish Diet to defy the Government.

150 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

The Ukraina had already proclaimed a semi-independence
with Kerensky's own connivance. The German fleet
and Army were advancing.

Coalition had suffered shipwreck because the Cadets
could not agree to the autonomy of Ukraina under
auspices that were notoriously inspired from Vienna and
Berlin. Now the "sham" was again enacted. Consti-
tutional and revolutionary elements once more joined
the Ministry. The earliest promoter of the sham, M.
Kerensky, informed the world that all the trouble had been
caused by General Kornilov, who, it was alleged, had done
incalculable harm to the Army. A semi-Bolshevist War
Minister named Verkhovsky, who had never seen any
fighting, undertook to "cleanse" the Army of Komilo-
vists. Upwards of ten thousand Generals and officers —
the pick of the Army — were dismissed, and one-third of
the reserves were immediately disbanded.

But still the Bolsheviki were not satisfied. How could
they be? They had wanted certain things from the
outset: peace, and the destruction of property and of
the whole social fabric. To these schemes tljp sham
Coalition had unconsciously lent itself, but, knowing that
the country at large would not accept open repudiation
of national interests and obligations, had cloaked its
subserviency to the Extremists with smooth words. Again
the Bolsheviki proceeded to juxtapose oratory with
action. This time there was no Kornilov, no Kaledin
to serve as rescuer or catspaw, and the sham was killed.
Anarchy reigned supreme.

CHAPTER Xm

ABDICATION AND AFTER

Nicholas II goes to Pskov— The Last Hours of the Autocracy— Touching Fare-
wells to the Army—the Manifesto — "I cannot part with My Son" —
General Ivanov's "Forlorn Hope" — Renunciation of the Grand Duke
Michael — Kerensky and Alexis — At Tsarskoe Selo— Light at Last — i
Adopts the Revolutionary Badge — In Exile — The Other Romanoi
Confiscation of Estates— The Tsar a "Poor Man."

We left the Emperor at Mogilev on Monday, March
12th, leisurely preparing for his return to Petrograd.
When he finally departed with the usual precautions and
accessories — two trains proceeding at half-an-hour's in-
terval — he and his suite, including Count Freedericks and
General Voy£ikov, knew that matters were serious, but
they did not know how serious. They did not realize
that the Revolution was to triumph on the morrow. The
telephone wires with Tsarskoe had been cut. As the
Vitebsk line, a single track, had been much shaken by
heavy traffic, the Imperial trains usually went by a cir-
cuitous route to the Moscow line, and thence via Petro-
grad to Tsarskoe Selo. Thus they traveled on this occa-
sion. At Bologoe junction news came warning the Tsar
not to attempt to approach the Capital. The Revolu-
tionaries were in control of the stations. So the trains
were switched on to the Pskov line, with a view to rejoining
the Vitebsk railway at Dno, and thence proceeding to
Tsarskoe direct. Nicholas was very anxious about his
family. The children were ill, and that was why the
Csarevich had been removed from Headquarters. At

151

15* "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

Dno the news became still worse, so it was decided to go
on to Pskov and consult with General Ruzsky . Here they
arrived on Wednesday. Hearing of this, the Duma Com-
mittee decided to send two of its members, MM. Guchkov
and Shulgin, thither. They were instructed to secure a
Writ of Abdication in favor of Alexis, with the Grand
Duke Michael as Regent.

M. Guchkov related to me afterwards the circum-
stances of the journey. The two commissioners were
very nearly intercepted by a telegram from the Soviet to
the railway employees at Liiga, on the Warsaw line, who
had joined the Revolution and deposed the gendarmerie,
but they managed to get through, traveling all night, and
reaching Pskov, weary and unkempt, after four days 9
ceaseless vigil in Petrograd and on the road.

Nicholas II had been fully informed by General Ruzsky
of events in Petrograd. Moreover, it transpired that
General Alexeiev, at Headquarters, had been for three
days (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday) in communi-
cation with the Tsar, urging him to abstain from sending
more troops to Petrograd, 1 and to comply with the wishes
of the Duma and even to abdicate. These facts, hitherto
little known, had prepared the Tsar for his ordeal. The
Tsar received his old enemy (Guchkov) and M. Shulgin,
the Conservative member for Kiev, in the saloon of his
railway carriage. It was a bleak winter's day. In the
dim light Nicholas TL looked pale, as usual, and careworn,
but was perfectly calm and self-possessed.

Addressing Guchkov, he said: "Tell me the whole
truth."

"We come to tell your Majesty that all the troops in

1 Acting on General Voyelkov's advice, the Tsar had ordered a brigade of
cavalry and infantry to leave the Front. It is said that General Alexeiev
implored him with tears, on bended knee, to refrain from weakening the front
even by a few regiments. During the journey there had been some conversa-
tion among the suite about opening the Central front "to save the autocracy."

ABDICATION AND AFTER 158

•

Petrograd are on our side." And, with slow emphasis:
"Even your own Bodyguard!"

This was news to the unhappy Sovereign. He quiv-
ered under the blow* "They also/ 9 he murmured.

"Yes/ 9 went on Guchkov pitilessly. "It is useless
to send more regiments. They will go over as soon as
they reach the station."

"I know it," replied the Tsar. "The order has
already been given to them to return to the Front."
Then, after a slight pause, the Tsar asked : "What do you
want me to do? "

"Your Majesty must abdicate in favor of the Heir-
Apparent, under the Regency of the Grand Duke Michael
Alexandrovich. Such is the will of the new Government
which we are forming under Prince Lvov."

"I had already decided to do so," the Tsar said,
glancing at General Ruzsky, who was a silent participant
in the interview. "But I have changed my mind."
And he added with emotion: "I cannot part with my
boy. I shall hand the Throne to my brother. You
understand my motives." \

This was a surprise to the commissioners. They
had no instructions to agree to such an arrangement, but
they could not but be sensible to the motives invoked by
the Tsar, and after some demur they agreed.

Then began the drafting of the last Imperial Manifesto
to the Russian people. General Alexeiev had already
drawn up and telegraphed a suggested text on the lines
proposed by the Duma. It had to be amended and typed
afresh in two copies. Moreover, the Tsar could not forget
his beloved Army. In a touching farewell he commanded
his faithful soldiers to obey the new Government. When
all these papers had been typewritten, the Tsar sat down
and signed a ukaz appointing Prince Lvov Prime Min-
ister, and another ukaz appointing the Grand Duke
Nicholas generalissimo, and his last Order of the Day to

154 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

the Army. (It was intercepted by the Soviet, and never
reached its destination.) Then, without a trace of emo-
tion, he appended his signature to the Manifesto for the
last time as Tsar of All the Russias. It was couched in
lofty and impressive language:

By the Grace of God, We, Nicholas II, Emperor of All the Russias, Tsar of
Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., to all our faithful subjects be it known:

In the days of great struggle with a foreign foe, who has been endeavoring
for three years to enslave our land, it has pleased God to send Russia another
grievous trial.

Internal troubles threaten to mar the further progress of our obstinate
struggle. The destinies of Russia, the honor of her heroic Army, the happiness
of the people, and the whole future of our beloved country demand that the war
should be conducted at all costs to a victorious end.

The cruel enemy is making his last efforts, and the moment is nigh when our
valiant Army, in concert with our gallant Allies, will finally overthrow him.

In these days of Russia's ordeal we consider ourselves beholden to our
people to assure close union and organization of all their resources for speedy
victory: therefore, in agreement with the State Duma, we have recognized
that it is for the good of the country that we should abdicate the Crown of the
Russian State and lay aside the Supreme Power.

Not wishing to separate ourselves from our beloved son, we bequeath our
heritage to our brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandre vich, with our bless-
ing for the future of the Throne of Russia.

We bequeath it to our brother to govern in full union with the national
representatives sitting in the Legislative Institutions, and to take his inviolable
oath to them in the name of our well-beloved country.

We call upon all faithful sons of our native land to fulfil their sacred and
patriotic duty in obeying the Tsar at this sad hour of national trial and to aid
him, in union with the representatives of the nation, to conduct the Russian
Realm in the path of prosperity and glory.

May God save Russia!

In great distress about his wife and children, the Tsar
had, before leaving Mogilev, ordered one of his oldest
and most trusted soldiers, General N. I. Ivanov, to pro-
ceed with a small force to their rescue. While Comman-
der-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, General Ivanov
had prompted the Council of the Military Order to confer
upon Nicholas II the Order of St. George, and he was
now given command of the St. George's Battalion, com-

ABDICATION AND AFTER 155

posed of men who had won the coveted cross. Having
accomplished this mission, General Ivanov was to act as
Dictator. From my knowledge of General Ivanov, I
should say that he was quite incapable of "counter-
revolutionary" designs. Himself a son of the people,
he had preserved throughout his great military career
a simple, homely demeanor that had earned for him
the affectionate sobriquet diedushka (grandfather). His
men, also, were not inclined to engage in civil war. The
battalion returned to Mogilev without having accom-
plished its mission. General Ivanov fell into the hands
of the Revolutionaries, but was able to prove his entire
innocence and good faith, and was released. He was
killed a year later in Kiev when the Bolshevist troops
stormed the sacred Lavra and slaughtered the Prior and
10,000 of its defenders.

After his abdication, Nicholas H, still without direct
news from Tsarskoe, was advised to return to Head-
quarters. He would be safe there under the watchful
and trusted care of General Alexeiev. He returned to
Mogilev, and took up his residence as usual in the Gov-
ernor's Palace, motored, walked, and saw General Alex-
eiev and the few people with whom he was intimate. He
was treated with every mark of respect and deference,
but he had nothing to do with the business of the Staff.
Some of the Grand Dukes were also there. He received
a visit from his mother. He made plans to go into retire-
ment in the Crimea, to live as "a private gentleman."
Learning that his son and the other children were mending
rapidly, he only waited for them to come and join him
before they all started for the South. His dreams were
not realized. They clashed with the plans of the Soviet.

The Grand Duke Nicholas had been making all expedi-
tion tc reach Mogilev in order to assume the Supreme
Command. Telegrams were sent at the instigation of
the Soviet to stop him at all costs, but they did not reach

166 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

>»

him. On arrival at Headquarters the troops and the
people gave him an enthusiastic reception. He found
a message from the Provisional Government urging him
not to assume charge. It was a bitter humiliation. He
bore it stoically, like a soldier, and hurried back to the
Caucasus. The people and the troops who had cheered
him were respectful in their farewells, and evidently
disappointed at his going.

M. Miliukov, as leader of the Constitutional-Demo-
crats, who held six out of the eleven Ministerial posts in
the Provisional Coalition Government, proceeded imme-
diately after its formation to set forth its views of the
situation in a statement to the Press. He believed that
"recent events would increase popular enthusiasm for the
war and enable Russia to win. ' He went on: "During
the last few days the Duma has attracted the attention of
the whole country and acquired great moral influence.
And now, with the Army at its side, it becomes a great
material force." Like most people outside the Socialist
ranks, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs counted upon
the Army — not the troops in Petrograd so much as those
at the Front, who had not yet been subjected to the
Soviet and Committee influence. He confidently added:

"The new Government considers it to be indispensable
that the abdication of the Emperor should be official,
and that the Regency should be temporarily entrusted
to the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Such is
our decision. We consider it impossible to alter it." On
the following day (March 16th) he modified this state-
ment, declaring that what he had said about the Regency
was his own personal opinion.

The Socialists had been very angry. They did not
like references to "war enthusiasm," though, for the
moment, they thought it best not to say so, but they
were furious at the mention of a Regency. Their aim
was a "Democratic Republic," which to them meant a

ABDICATION AND AFTER 157

Socialist regime, and for this purpose they had insisted
upon a Constituent, intending to inveigle the people in
the meanwhile by methods of agitation that were familiar
to them. M. Kerensky was accused by his colleagues in
the Soviet of having betrayed the revolutionary cause.
A stormy scene followed, as a result of which M. Miliukov
had to retract his words.

When MM. Guchkov and Shulgin returned with the
text of the abdication, the Socialists were still more
aroused. It made no difference to them whether the
Grand Duke Michael was designated as Tsar or as Regent:
they had not wanted the Tsar to abdicate; they had
intended to depose him. The Provisional Government
had been formed with their consent. It was a "revolu-
tionary organization." To them the ukaz appointing
Prince Lvov was equally unpalatable. Altogether it
looked as if the Executive Committee of the Duma had
been juggling with them. Had the extreme wing in
the Soviet been as strong then as it was destined to
become later, an open rupture would have occurred.
M. Kerensky pacified them by inducing the Grand Duke
Michael to renounce his rights, until he should be duly
elected. It would be futile for me to speculate on the
possible advantages of a Regency, but I think perhaps
M. Kerensky would have had a more difficult task had the
original plan proposed to Nicholas II in behalf of the
Duma been followed. To overcome Soviet suspicion,
M. Kerensky dictated a clause in the Grand Duke's
renunciation, stipulating for a Constituent.

His "Declaration from the Throne" was signed by
the Grand Duke Michael late on Friday, March 16th,
after a lengthy consultation at his Palace with the members
of the Provisional Government:

A heavy task has been entrusted to me by the will of my brother* who
has given me the Imperial Throne at a time of unprecedented war and of
domestic strife. Animated by the same feeling as the entire nation — namely,

158 "DEMOCRACY." "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

that the welfare of the country overshadows all other interests — I am firmly
resolved to accept the Supreme Power only if this should be the desire of our ,

great people, who must, by means of a plebiscite, through their representa-
tives in the Constituent Assembly, establish the form of government and the
new fundamental laws of the Russian State.

Invoking God's blessing, I, therefore, request all citizens of Russia to
obey the Provisional Government, set up on the initiative of the Duma and
invested with plenary power , until, within as short a time as possible, the
Constituent Assembly, elected on a basis of universal, equal, secret, and direct
suffrage, shall express the will of the nation regarding the form of government
to be adopted.

M. Kerensky had been the principal spokesman, and
after the document — which he himself inspired — had been
signed, he warmly thanked the Grand Duke. The Soviet
was so pleased with its " revolutionary " clauses that it
quite forgot about the obligations imposed by the Grand
Duke's renunciation — "to obey the Provisional Govern-
ment" until "the Constituent should express the will
of the people." The Soviet never did "obey," and M.
Kerensky himself afterwards violated the "Constituent"
pledge and his oath as a member of the Provisional Gov-
ment by proclaiming a Republic. M. Kerensky deposited
the Acts of Abdication and Renunciation with the Senate
(Supreme Court of Judicature), whence they were after-
wards abstracted by burglarious Revolutionaries, together
with other historical documents and relics.

Six days later (March 22d) the ex-Tsar was conveyed
as plain Colonel Nicholas Alexandrovich Romanov to
Tsarskoe Selo and taken to the Imperial villa, where
his wife and children — the latter recovering from their
attack of measles — had already been placed under arrest.
All remained captives there until August, when Kerensky,
as Prime Minister, ordered them to be transferred to
the bleak Siberian town of Tobolsk, capital of the province
where Razputin had lived. Later they were taken by the
Bblsheviki to Ekaterinburg, where Nicholas II, his son
and others were murdered.

Only two or three faithful followers remained with

On March 20, 1917. Nicholas II waaat

ill the

Abaolui

M M aater of all th.

i Russia*. Oi

ia week li

•a in his own Oa

HTb

nkoe Selo, guarded by am

iple aoldiera wl

.oonlya

lier would 1

■ave fallen dowi

nipcd h

im. had he had tl

le atrength of

bead hi*

ounsela and had

the oa:

mings and appeals

of hit faithful

is much

changed in

He calmly aw

aita his fi

He .till i

•car. his Co

ia Cross of St.

George. He b pli

ilo Nicholas A

leiandrot

Hom.no

v and the aoldien address h

iroar

i " Mr

. Colon

A."

ABDICATION AND AFTER 159

the family after the ex-Tsar's arrest at Mogilev, among
these few being Count Benckendorff, Marshal of the
Court and brother of the late Ambassador in London, and
the Empress's bosom friend, Mme. Vyrubova, Razputin's
firm adherent. Count Freedericks and General Voy6ikov
had both been arrested while traveling from Mogilev.
The latter was on his way to his estates, where he had
a large artificial mineral-water business. The sale of
this beverage had been greatly promoted by the Temper-
ance Edict, and it was alleged that railway transport
was always available for the Voy6kov table-water, even
when there were not sufficient trucks to carry bread
and fuel.

While at Tsarskoe the captives did not suffer from
ill-treatment. A sum of four roubles (about $2) was
allowed for the daily food of each person. The Tsar
was not allowed to see his wife. Several hours each
day all had the right to take exercise in the garden.
They were, however, under constant guard by the troops
of the garrison, and through the garden palings they
could be seen and were stared at by curious sightseers.
The Tsar spent all his time in the garden. As the spring
and summer advanced he seemed to have quite adapted
himself to captivity. He was "so fond of flowers."
Bending over his flower-beds, he forgot his troubles.

Repeatedly the Extremists tried to force Kerensky to
bring the ex-Tsar to the fortress in Petrograd, or send
him to the dungeons of Kronstadt. Kerensky defeated
these schemes — he knew that the Bolsheviki wanted sim-
ply to secure a "hostage" and to use the fallen monarch
for their own purposes.

M. Kerensky had paid occasional visits of inspection
to the Imperial villa. On one occasion young Alexis
approached him, saluted, and gravely asked: "Are you a
lawyer? " "Yes," was the reply. "Can you tell me
me what I want to know?" "I shall try," answered

160 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

>»

the Minister of Justice. "Well, please explain one
thing: had father the right to abdicate for me? Could
he renounce my rights?" It was a ticklish question to
answer offhand. The Minister hesitated a few moments.
The grave, boyish face looked so appealing. "Tell me
the truth/' Alexis urged. "I think that as your father
he had not the right/' answered Kerensky. "But as
the Emperor he had the right." The boy looked puzzled
for a moment, then he seemed to understand the legal
view of the case. He was disappointed, and the tone
of his voice as he said "Thank you 9 ' showed it.
Who had stirred the lad's imagination with these mat-
ters?

His question augured ill for his peace of mind, and
bore out the current gossip that family differences had
cast a deeper gloom upon the fallen household. The boy
had previously shown distaste for his mother's society,
and, since he had lived at Headquarters, he had conceived
a violent hatred and disgust for Razputin. Was the
ex-Empress setting the boy against his father, blaming
him for abdicating, and still more for disinheriting his
boy? The last refuge of parental affection, his renun-
ciation in behalf of his son because he could not bear "to
part with him " — was even this to be denied to the hap-
less autocrat? During the earlier days of his captivity
Nicholas II had attributed the responsibility for all that
had happened to incompetent subordinates. He told a
Staff officer, who had been sent to him by the Provisional
Government: "You were to blame. I always said that
those Petrograd reservists would betray me. Yet the
Staff allowed them to serve in the city." In his solitary
walks in the garden the ex-autocrat had gained a clearer
vision of the past. Later he came to realize that his
wife's influence had been his bane.

While the fallen Sovereigns and their children were
being secretly conveyed to Tobolsk, another quaint thing

ABDICATION AND AFTER 1«1

happened. The boy donned a red ribbon and one of
the little medals that had been struck to commemorate
the Revolution. These badges he wore demonstratively,
as if he wished everybody to know that he had severed
himself from his past. It was suggested, however, that
he had been persuaded to adopt the red color. Marie
Antoinette and the Dauphin had donned the bonnet rouge
when the fish wives came to Versailles. In this, as in
other points of comparison between the French and
Russian Revolutions, there was a difference — a very con-
siderable difference, due to the complete disparity between
national character and temperament. As nobody knew
who the boy was, and as no constraint was exercised
upon him in this matter, he probably acted on the motives
I ascribe. The train conveying the family stopped only
at unfrequented stations, or in the open country, for the
passengers to take some exercise during the long journey
of three thousand miles. And not even the engine-
drivers, who were frequently changed, knew who was
traveling.

After the Revolution all the Romanovs were excluded
from the Army and other services. Many were arrested.
All suffered privations because their properties and for-
tunes were confiscated. Many sustained bad treatment,
though none were actually killed. Whenever it was
possible for them to do so, they migrated to Finland.
The majority had taken refuge in the Crimea and in the
Caucasus. The Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich
received scant recognition for having renounced his rights.
He was allowed to reside at his palace in Gutchina, but
suffered arrest afterwards. The Grand Duke Cyril and
his wife went to Finland. He had brought the Guards'
Naval Brigade, of which he was Commander, to the
Tauris Palace in the early days of upheaval. But this
did not save him from obloquy and distress. The Grand
Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich was a prisoner in the

162 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

Crimea. 1 So was the Grand Duchess Vladimir. For-
tunately for himself, the Grand Duke Dmitry was in
Persia. There he remained. His father, the Grand
Duke Paul, was imprisoned but afterwards released.
The Yusupov family enjoyed complete immunity for
several months. Then the young Prince Felix, who with
the Grand Duke Dmitry had figured in the affair of Raz-
putin's death, fell under suspicion and was arrested.
Some of the Romanovs took advantage of the Revolution
to contract marriages that had formerly been forbidden
by the law of their House. The Grand Duchess Olga,
sister of the fallen monarch, solaced herself by marrying
an officer. The Grand Duke Andrew had married Mile.
Ksheshinskaia, the famous ballerina, whose mansion was
"annexed" by Lenin and afterwards plundered.

The worst sufferer was the unhappy Empress Marie,
who had always been opposed to her son's reactionary
tendencies and to the evil influence exercised upon him by
his wife. Deprived of her revenues and possessions, she
had been permitted to live in one of the Crimean resi-
dences on an allowance of £1200 a year. Here she was
rudely awakened at night by mutinous seamen of the
Black Sea Fleet, who had been incited thereto by Soviet
agitators on the pretext that she was in treasonable corre-
spondence with the "counter-revolution." They pulled
her out of bed in order to search for documents, and
insulted and ill-treated her. Her health was severely
affected by this ill-usage.

But all that has been said in this chapter about the
treatment of the Romanovs pales into insignificance
besides the barbarism of the Lenin regime.

All the property of the Romanov family was confis-

1 The former Generalissimo fell into the hands of the Germans when the
Crimea was occupied by them in the spring of 1918. They took him to Kiev
and tried to persuade him to assume the Crown under their protection. He
refused to have anything to do with the enemies of his country.

ABDICATION AND AFTER 168

cated during the Revolution, and their private fortunes
"sequestered." The Tsar's Civil List, about $7,500,000,
did not suffice for the upkeep of his innumerable palaces
in and around Petrograd, Moscow, and Warsaw, his villas
at Tsarskoe, Peterhof, etc., his shooting seats at Spala
(in Poland) and Bieloviezh * (in Lithuania), and his
stately abode, Livadia, in the Crimea. The huge sums
required for the Court came mostly from "His Majesty's
Cabinet," which owned and exploited vast possessions in
Siberia (the gold mines of the Altai, the quicksilver mines
of Nerchinsk, etc.). The Tsar threw open large tracts of
fertile land in the Altai valleys to colonization during
Stolypin's agrarian reform movement. In spite of all
his wealth he was a poor man.

To provide for the numerous members of the Romanov
family, which at the present time comprises about seventy
'Grand Dukes, Grand Duchesses, etc., a certain portion
of Crown lands (quite distinct from State lands, which
include all the boundless forests of Northern Russia and
most of the land in Siberia) was set apart a century ago
under the name of Imperial Appanages and administered
as a separate department (UdUlnoie viMomstvo) of the
Ministry of the Court. The appanages produced and
dealt in wine, raised in the Crimea and Caucasus, timber,
etc. Each member of the Romanov family received a
certain endowment (averaging about $35,000 per annum)
from the day of birth, which accumulated till his or her
majority. The Emperor, as head of the family, could
dispose of the available appanage funds and revenues
to provide marriage portions or special grants to his
kinsmen.

Many of the wealthiest among his titled subjects owed
their fortunes to the bounty of earlier sovereigns. Cath-

1 The pfUchcka (dense forest) of Bieloviezh was renowned for its herds of
forest bison (ztibry), commonly known as aurochs, and large preserves of elk
and deer, which were mostly destroyed by the German troops during the war.

164 "DEMOCRACY,- "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

erine the Great was particularly liberal in gifts of land
and "souls" (serfs) to her favorites: Potemkin (who
built the Tauris Palace), Zubov, and others. Peter the
Great had "Possessioned" or "fiefed" vast tracts in the
Urals to the Stroganovs, who, like the Sheremetevs,
Demidovs, etc., were slowly developing the incalculable
mineral wealth of that favored region.

Comparatively few of the Romanovs were really well
off. The Constantinovichi were the wealthiest, the
Vladimirovichi the poorest. Enormous fortunes were
locked up in art collections. The Rembrandts in the
Hermitage, and the arms, jewels, and old English plate
in the adjoining Winter Palace — not to speak of the
regalia in the Kremlin — were of priceless value, and the
same may be said of the Constantine Palace at Pavlovsk,
near Tsarskoe Selo. Much of this heritage of art had
been collected during the Revolutions in England and
France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
They were destined to "disappear," destroyed or plun-
dered, during the Russian Revolution.

CHAPTER XIV

MUTINY OP THE SAILORS

Babhevflri at Helsingfors — A Delayed Manifesto — Finnish and Swedish
Socialists — Murder of Officers — How Admirals met their Death — Maz-
imov Elected — Death-blow to Discipline — Committees and British Sub-
marines—A "Watery" Reception — At Kronstadt— Admiral Viren Tor-
tured—The Black Sea Fleet— Admiral Kochak "Dismissed"— Further
Bolshevist Agitation — Admiral Verderevaky and "Admiral" Lebedev
— Shipbuilding Suspended.

An appalling tragedy had been enacted at Helsingfors
and Kronstadt. Soviet agitators went thither on Thurs-
day, March 15th, to subvert the sailors. On the following
day the Manifesto was wirelessed to the Fleet, but the
transmission stopped midway and a service message in-
sisted that the Manifesto must on no account be com-
municated to the crews. We know the reason: the
Soviet had objected to it, and Kerensky had undertaken
to obtain the Grand Duke's renunciation. They were
afraid that the Army and Navy might straightway accept
the new Tsar. At Mogilev the Staff was also nonplused,
but the Army knew nothing, whereas at Kronstadt and
Helsingfors the garrison and crews learned from the wire-
less operators that the Tsar had abdicated and that the
Manifesto had been "recalled/' It was midnight on
Friday when the Grand Duke's renunciation became
available for transmission. M. Kerensky and the Soviet
doubtless had no idea what serious misapprehension was
being caused by delaying the Manifesto.

During those hours of uncertainty the Bolsheviki at
Helsingfors and Kronstadt spread a tale to the effect

165

166 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

that the "counter-revolution had restored Tsarism and
destroyed the new-found liberties." Such is the true
cause and explanation of the atrocities that followed.
The men were deliberately misled into the belief that
they were being betrayed by their officers, and proceeded
to murder them wholesale. When the Acts of Abdication
and Renunciation did come through, the harm had already
been done. From that awful butchery the fleet did not
recover, and Kronstadt remained a Bolshevist plague-spot.
The fleet was at anchor in winter quarters, grouped
in squadrons off Helsingfors. The Gulf of Finland being
icebound, they were in no danger from the enemy. A
few hundred yards of stout ice separated the vessels from
the city. Many thousands of seamen and hundreds of
officers lived on board. About a thousand marines
and some of the officers were quartered in town. There,
also, resided about a thousand artificers employed on
munitions. Trouble broke out first among the men on
shore, they having received the earliest news about events
in Petrograd from the Soviet's emissaries. Discipline was
well maintained in the fleet. The seamen had permission
to visit the town within prescribed hours. Through
them the crews also obtained their information. They
were exhilarated by the news and anxious to enjoy all
the extraordinary " liberties " that had been secured by
the Petrograd garrison.

When the whisper went round that they were to be
"done out" of them by their officers "in league with
the counter-revolution," the shore men mutinied and
sent deputations to the ships' crews inviting them to
join. However, they were not permitted to approach
the battleships, but succeeded in gaining access to some
of the smaller vessels and smuggling themselves among
the crew, unnoticed by the officers on watch duty. It
was late in the night. The officers of one of the gunboats
were in their wardroom, talking about the mysterious

MUTINY OP THE SAILORS 167

"wireless," when a seaman entered without permission,
declaring that he came as a delegate from the crew. For
this breach of discipline he was ordered to be placed under
arrest. Some provocator on deck thereupon fired his
rifle. Immediately from the other gunboats came answer-
ing shots. In a frenzy of rage the crews began shooting
their officers, who defended themselves with desperation.
A regular fusillade ensued. Many unfortunate officers
were dragged out and thrust alive under the ice.

Admiral Nepenin, whose flag of Commander-in-Chief
had been flown on board a gunboat anchored near the
battleships, signaled to ascertain the cause of the firing.
He received no answer. The battleships remained quiet,
but the shooting from the gunboats continued. Officers
sent thither with orders to enforce discipline were shot
before they could cross the gangways leading to the ice.

In this manner Admiral Nebolsin was killed. He had
just arrived from Petrograd. Having reached the Capital
in the very thick of the upheaval, he had made haste to
rejoin his squadron. No trains were leaving the Finland
station because the northern outskirts of the Metropolis
were unsafe. Here the gallant Cyclist Corps was holding
out against the Revolutionaries. So the Admiral walked
along the permanent way, amid a hail of bullets, some
twenty miles to Beloostrov, the frontier station, whence
he managed to get a train to Helsingfors. Beloved by
all the men, he was warned on arrival by some of the
sailors "not to cross the ice." But learning that there
was trouble in the fleet, he hastened all the more to join
his flagship. On his way he heard firing from the gun-
boats and went to ascertain the cause. And as he
ascended the gangway of one small vessel the men shot
him dead.

When the full text of the Manifesto and Act of Renun-
ciation came through, Admiral Nepenin made his arrange-
ments to explain the tragic misunderstanding. But by

168 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM,** "FREEDOM

that time the mutineers were ashore, many of them
drunk, fraternizing with the local Russian and Finnish
workmen and crowding the square in front of the station.
Many carried rifles, but at first there was no shooting.
Here it was decided to elect a new Commander-in-Chief.
Finnish and Swedish Socialists were helping the Soviet
emissaries. At their instigation it was proposed that
Admiral Nepenin should be superseded by Admiral Max-
imov, a junior flag-officer of pro-Finnish sympathies. A
number of officers from the battleships had pluckily come
ashore to try to bring the mutineers back to duty. They
were standing in the square, and had the courage to
address the crowd and to remonstrate against such an act.

One of them said: " Maximo v is not as good a chief
as Nepenin, and you all know it. You are being misled
by traitors." Thereupon the agitators prompted some
of the drunken seamen to threaten the speaker with their
rifles. The meeting cheered uproariously for Maximov.
Some officers were then shot down. One who was present
and escaped told me afterwards that he had seen a Swedish
Socialist go up to a sailor and offer him five marks (about
$1) if he would kill an officer.

A deputation was chosen to proceed to the flagship.
Everybody understood what was going to happen. A
sleigh was brought and left at the quayside. The depu-
tation came with soft words. They requested Admiral
Nepenin and his Staff to come ashore in order to explain
matters. He consented readily enough, but asked that
two of his Staff should remain in charge of secret plans and
papers, which might be abstracted by agents and sym-
pathizers of Germany, who were very numerous in Fin-
land. This was agreed to.

Directly the Commander-in-Chief had ascended the
quay, he saw the sleigh waiting and knew that his end
was nigh. A seaman rushed at him, uttering foul words,
spat in his face, and shot him through the head. The

MUTINY OF THE SAILORS 160

body was flung into the sleigh and taken to the mortuary.
There it remained for three days, an object of derision
and infamous insult, used as a target for bullets and worse.

Admiral Marimov assumed so-called command. He
treated the men like long-suffering martyrs who had been
imposed upon by his predecessor — "anti-revolutionary,"
as he called him. He allowed his sentry the use of an
armchair and invited him to breakfast.

The incident of the Manifesto was forgotten. Com-
mittees had to be elected, and there was no more cause,
real or fancied, for suspecting officers. But drunkenness
and rowdyism ashore continued. The widows and
children of those who had been butchered or drowned
came seeking their lost ones. They were insulted and
illtreated by the mutineers.

Order and discipline had been almost unbroken on
board the larger ships. The "casualties" in the other
thips were heavy. Forty officers had been killed, many
more wounded. It was a serious loss. But the survivors
did not quail. They adapted themselves as best, they
could to the committee system, knowing full well that
the men could not handle the ships without them, but
realizing also that any failure to carry out the wishes
of the Committee would entail instant death.

Admiral Verderevsky came from Petrograd to take up
the duties of Chief of Staff. M. Guchkov had selected
this competent officer with a view to his eventually
assuming chief command. But before the change came
into effect fresh trouble arose. The seamen had been
permeated with "anti-militant" doctrines. They re-
solved to doff shoulder-straps and other badges. In
tetrograd the soldiers had done so, and had torn off
shoulder-straps from officers. To avoid a repetition of
excesses and to preserve appearances of discipline, the
captains mustered their crews, "ordered" them to have
shoulder-straps removed, and then had their own taken

170 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

»»

off, renouncing epaulettes and adopting sleeve-badges
of rank. One of the "reasons" for this outbreak may
be ascribed to the fact that Admirals carried a double-
headed eagle embroidered on their shoulders, which was
held to be a Reactionary badge.

Subsequent events in the Baltic Fleet are too well
known to call for detailed description. Bolshevist ele-
ments obtained a complete mastery in some vessels.
Two Dreadnoughts and a cruiser proceeded to Kronstadt
in July to support the Lenin uprising. 1 M. Kerensky
ordered Admiral Verderevsky to torpedo them, but the
order was read by the Committees, and to avoid another
mutiny he had to promise the men not to take action.
For this he was dismissed and was to be court-martialed,
when suddenly M. Kerensky appointed him Minister of
Marine. Later he again fell into disgrace.

Our submarine crews were constantly interfered with
by the Committees. Russian seamen manned the mother-
ship of the flotilla. They sent emissaries who spoke
English to persuade the British sailors to imitate their
example. I need hardly say that they met with a chilly,
and even a "watery," reception.

The subsequent failure of the Baltic Fleet to repulse
a German landing in the Gulf of Riga was to be expected,
although it was beyond any doubt that the Russian
ships were more numerous than those produced by the
enemy. In modern Dreadnoughts, as well as in lesser
craft, the Russians wielded a substantial superiority.

More fortunately situated, the Black Sea Fleet long

1 ftj- Kerensky. issued the following Order of the Day on this subject (July
21st): "The detachments of Kronstadt and the battleships Petropadovak,
Republic, and Slava, the names of which have been disgraced by the actions of
the counter-revolutionaries, shall arrest within twenty-four hours the ring-
leaders and send them to Petrograd for trial. I hereby notify the Kronstadt
detachments and the crews of these ships that if this order is not carried out
they will be branded as traitors to the country and the Revolution, and the
most rigorous measures will be taken against them."

MUTINY OP THE SAILORS 171

escaped the contagion. But in the end it also came
under Bolshevist influences. Admiral Kolchak, its gallant
commander, was " dismissed * * by the Committees. Under
Lenin, German agents organized a massacre of Admirals
and officers.

In Kronstadt the huge naval depots had been con-
vulsed by revolutionary agitation. Many officers were
following special courses during the winter months, and
had no connection with the depots. How many officers
were killed will perhaps never be known. The bodies
were slipped under the ice. Admiral Viren, the Com-
mander-in-Chief, was butchered in a most atrocious man-
ner. He is said to have been burnt alive, fastened naked
to a stake, in the presence of his distracted daughter.
Scenes of the wildest debauchery continued for many
days. Over two hundred officers had been cast into dun-
geons "so that they should have a taste of incarceration."
Admirals and captains were forcibly compelled to carry
out repulsive menial duties. These unfortunate captives
were detained for many months while the "Revolutionary
Tribunal" was inquiring whether any of them had sat
in courts-martial on the mutineers of 1905. The gar-
rison gunners had kept aloof and preserved the fortress
from harm. But soon, under the influence of agitators,
they partly adhered to the Bolshevist cause. Thence-
forward Kronstadt became a stronghold of Bolshevism,
the headquarters of Lenin and his crew. The sailors and
the ships sallied thence to support every succeeding dis-
turbance in Petrograd, twenty miles up the Neva, and
finally shelled the Winter Palace, thereby putting an
end to Kerensky's rule. (November, 1917.)

As Minister of Marine figured at one time a revolu-
tionary adventurer named Lebedev. He had enlisted
in the French Legion and risen to the rank of lieutenant.
Returning to Russia — with or without leave from his
superiors, I cannot say — he ingratiated himself with

178 "DEMOCRACY/' "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

Kerensky and was promptly raised to this high post.
He, of course, knew nothing about naval affairs, but
could make revolutionary speeches to the sailors. He
always wore his French uniform. Under Bolshevist
rule he was succeeded by a common seaman, named
Dybenko. He claimed to have recognized Kerensky
disguised as a sister of mercy. This was the man who
eloped with the Bolshevist heroine Kolontay and the
Crown Jewels.

Shipbuilding during the Revolution came almost to
a standstill. The dockyard hands were too busy with
politics. Besides, the new "Ministers" had Bolshevist
"ideas," which have no concern with national defense,
and "sailors" were more useful on land for "lynching"
Commanders-in-Chief who wished to fight the Germans.

CHAPTER XV

M N0 ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY"

Early Days of "Fraternization" — Army Displays Tendency to Revive —
New Theory Invented— Credulity of Allies— All Incentive Killed —
Miliiikov Excluded— Tereshchenko the Tool of the Soviet — Alexeiev
and Other Generals Resign.

General Kornilov had given up the hopeless task
of "commanding" the Petrograd garrison, which obeyed
only the Soviet, and had gone to the Eighth Army (in
April). All who understood what was passing behind
the scenes saw clearly that Russia's hope lay in the sol-
diers at the Front. I accompanied M. Guchkov on sev-
eral tours of inspection, visiting the Twelfth, Fifth, and
Second Armies, then stationed along the Dvina and
southward. As the train left Petrograd (March 24th),
I was told by the Minister that probably we should be
stopped by the Soviet. However, it seems the order
came too late. We found the Committee system rapidly
developing, but the men still keen to fight. They were
on good terms with their officers and gave the civilian
Minister a rousing reception. German attacks at Riga
had met a stout resistance. The enemy was concentrating
forces in the sear, making ready to take advantage of the
Revolution. Aeroplanes dropped proclamations explain-
ing, in bad Russian, that "the English were to blame.' 9
They had deposed the "God-given Tsar" because he
would not continue the war "in the interests of England,"
etc.

Soon, however, the Germans altered their tactics,
iizing that military action would only stimulate

173

174 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

the Russian troops, they proceeded to "fraternize/*
Officers came under a flag of truce to General Dragomirov
at Dvinsk offering an armistice, "so that the troops
might exchange ideas/' For this purpose the Germans
hadorganized "kissing commandos/' composed of men
who spoke Russian. "Fraternization" was destined to
succeed for a time. Meanwhile, desertion was taking
place wholesale. The soldiers wanted to go home,
because the Soviet had promised to distribute lands.
The artillery shelled fraternizers, whereupon the infantry
charged them with the bayonet. Then the gunners
proceeded to enclose themselves with barbed wire.
Finally the Germans gave up "fraternization," having
obtained much valuable information about the Russian
defenses and fearing lest their men might become "con-
taminated."

At Headquarters, General Alexeiev watched events
with the deepest misgiving. He had been placed in
supreme command, and refused to take the responsibility
of permitting agitators in the Army. The Soviet insisted
that he should issue the requisite permits to any of its
members. An open rupture was avoided at the time by
M. Kerensky's efforts. We know that the Soviet finally
succeeded. As soon as the field had been opened for the
agitators, they quickly gained control of the Committees
and destroyed the last hopes of discipline and fighting
efficiency.

The abolition of the death penalty (March 20th) by
M. Kerensky had lent an additional impetus to agitation
in the Army. Many hundreds of thousands of deserters,
demoralized by the cry of "land and freedom," were
wandering about the war zone and blocking railway
traffic, seriously aggravating the difficulties of transport.

In conformity with the doctrine enunciated in the
Duma two weeks before the Revolution by M. Kerensky,
the Soviet proceeded to make overtures for peace. On

16
"9

i I*
' -I

: g I

, li

!■

j i

"NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY- 175

March 27th it issued a pacifist Manifesto to the democ-
racies of all countries, and more particularly to the
"German brothers of the proletariat/' whom it called
upon to "cast off a despotic yoke, as the people of Russia
had thrown off the autocracy of Tsardom." War was
to be considered as an outcome of "Imperialistic aspira-
tions" and "capitalistic policy/ 9 inasmuch as the interests
of workers of all nations were "identical." Meanwhile
"democratic Russia" would not "yield to the bayonets
of a conqueror." Chkheidze had introduced this saving
clause. As he explained to the Soviet, "So long as the
German people refuse to overthrow Wilhelm our bayonets
will be turned against Germany" — and therein lay the
difference between Chkheidze and the Extremists — adding,
"Long live the Army, whose discipline is based on the
mutual good understanding of soldiers and officers!"
This last phrase was intended as "eye-wash" for the
bourgeoisie.

That same day I had found in the train which was con-
veying me to Riga a whole cargo of incendiary literature
emanating from the Soviet. The conductors had orders
to drop batches at every station. I took up one paper
at random. It was the Pravda ("Truth"), organ of the
Bolsheviki, wherein soldiers were bidden to lay down
their arms, make peace with the German "brothers," and
return to the villages, where "land and freedom" would
be their portion. "Why do you distribute such stuff?"
I asked the conductor. "Don't you see it helps the
Germans?" "Yes," he replied. "It is bad for us,
I know. But what can I do? I have my orders." And
he showed me the inscription on one of the bundles:
"By order of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Delegates." I told M. Guchkov about it. He shrugged
his shoulders. "We are lucky to be allowed to travel
ourselves," was his mournful comment.

Within a few days of the Soviet's formation we knew

176 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

that the Extremists were doing what they pleased, al-
though in open session Chkheidze was able to impose reso-
lutions that suggested a "favorable complexion," repre-
senting the majority to be imbued with "good intentions."
However, we knew that the Bolsheviki had issued prikaz
No. 1, and that nothing had been done by the Menshevist
majority to counteract their fell designs. Moreover,
the Press, almost entirely in Jewish hands, had gone
over to the Soviet, and Moderate organs that would not
publish the Soviet proclamations glorifying spoliation
and promoting Anarchy had been summarily "expro-
priated" on behalf of newly founded Socialist publica-
tions. The revolutionary pseudo-Jews were thus destroy-
ing Russia's hopes of a national revival &nd dragging
the country into disaster. Young and old, these zealots
intensified revolutionary passions. Through the Press
they already wielded enormous power and were capturing
other channels of control, the Committees and the militia
(police).

I called attention at the time to both these dangers. 1
On April 8th I reported on the Soviet's plans "to bring
about the defeat of the Russian armies and a dishonor-
able peace." Pacifist members of the House of Commons
raised a great outcry, and M. Miliukov, who was attempt-
ing the impossible task of reconciling the Soviet's pro-
gram with sober dictates of Allied policy, indirectly
supported the "Allied" Pacifists. On March 26th I
reported from Riga on the pernicious influence of Jewish
Extremists. But this appeal to moderation was wilfully
distorted by the Jewish Press. Facts cited by me on the
best authority were "proved" to be non-existent, and a
campaign of slander and intimidation followed. Later on
M. Vinaver, the eminent Jewish Deputy, admitted in
conversation with me that Nahamkez and his ilk were
a greater danger to the Jews than to the Russians. I

1 The Times, March 28 and April 11, 1917.

NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 177

felt that I had done my duty in calling attention to the
ominous feature of the situation, and refer to these inci-
dents here simply to show how impossible it was then f
to speak the truth about Russia. The Soviet regime
was far worse than the okhrana. I know that on one
occasion, at least, the okhrana had contemplated my
expulsion for writing too freely about the Old Regime.
Now, I was threatened with nothing less than murder.
Under the dispensation of "freedom" applied by the
Soviet, the truth had become unpalatable and dangerous
in Petrograd and unacceptable in London.

Behind the veil thus dropped by the Soviet and its
pseudo-Jewish supporters, British and French pacifists
worked unremittingly for the success of the Soviet plan.
The respective Governments encouraged Socialist depu-
tations to come and "convert" the Russian Revolution-
aries, who knew infinitely more about revolution than
did these "innocents." It was even rumored in Petro-
grad that Mr. Arthur Henderson would succeed Sir
George Buchanan. The French experiment with M.
Albert Thomas had not, however, proved a success. The
Allies dallied with the proposal to hold an international
Congress in Stockholm, initiated by the Soviet in further-
ance of its schemes. Oceans of ink were expended on this
subject before the real motives of the Soviet were under-
stood. Meanwhile some of the "missionaries" had them-
selves been "converted."

Another lamentable feature of the revolutionary period
was the constant passage of Russian and pseudo-Jew
revolutionaries from Allied countries. Every shipload
that came from America, England, or France gave
trouble. The exiles would go straight from the train
to the Field of Mars and "stir up" the revolutionary
pot. Whether "martyrs of Tsarism" or merely German
spies, they all considered themselves to be entitled to
a share in the spoils, and had to be provided with "fat

178 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM"

places" in the Food, Agrarian, and other Committees.
To these shipments we owed the advent of Bronstein-
Trotsky and other Bolsheviki.

The well-intentioned sophistries of M. Chkheidze
could not long stave off a conflict between M. Miliukov
and the Soviet. On April 10th the Provisional Govern-
ment had issued a proclamation explaining its war policy.
It repudiated aims of " domination " or "conquest,"
enunciated "its object to establish a durable peace on the
basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny,"
called for "the defense, cost what it may, of our national
patrimony and the deliverance of the country from the
enemy who invades our borders" as "the capital and
vital problem before our soldiers, who are defending
the liberty of the people in close union with our Allies."

The Soviet, under the benign influence of MM.
Chkheidze and Tseretelli, accepted this statement of the
case. But M. Slobelev, a Labor demagogue who had
assumed control of the Soviet's news service and "Depart-
ment of International Relations," was acting separately.
So were all the Bolsheviki. Their joint activities had
given rise to rumors that a separate peace was being
secretly negotiated. As a matter of fact, after Russia had
proclaimed her war aims the Austrians made a separate
offer of a "declaration of conformity of aims," without
specifying terms of peace. This offer had been preceded
by a conference of the two Kaisers at Homburg and inter-
views between Russian and German Socialists at Stock-
holm.

M. Miliukov thereupon addressed (May 1st) a Note to
the Allied Governments attributing these "absurd reports"
to "our enemies." He contrasted the "nation's" deter-
mination as "a free democracy" "to bring the World
War to a decisive victory" with the failure of the Old
Regime "to appreciate and share the ideas" of her Allies
"and of the great oversea Republic." He reaffirmed his

"NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 179

statement that "our country will maintain strict regard
for the engagements entered into with the Allies of Rus-
sia/ 9 and was "firmly convinced of a victorious issue to
the present war . . . assuring a firm basis of a lasting
peace," and the establishment "by the Allied democracies
of guarantees and penalties necessary to prevent any
recourse to a sanguinary war in the future." All the
sober and stable elements in the country were thoroughly
in accord with the tenor and substance of this Note.
Moreover, it was substantially in agreement with the
proclamation of April 10th, which had been accepted by
the Soviet.

But the words "decisive victory" could not be glozed
over by the rhetoric of the Georgian orators. The storm
broke as soon as the Note appeared in the papers, some
days after its dispatch. It had not been "previously
submitted." Kerensky denied all knowledge of it.
Miliukov's premature pronouncement about the Regency
was recalled, and the "free democracy" in the Soviet
was particularly incensed that the Note should bear the
date of the annual Labor festival. That was, so to
speak, "the last straw." A grand palaver was arranged
at the Marie Palace. The Bolsheviki sent orders through
their "Chief of Staff," a certain Linde, to "concentrate"
regiments in the square in front of the Palace. They
intended to seize Miliukov and the other Cadet Ministers.
Half a dozen regiments responded to the call, not knowing
in the least what they had to do, but shouting vocifer-
ously "Down with Miliukov!" This looked so much
like treachery on the part of the Soviet that Kerensky
and others for shame's sake persuaded the men to go
to their homes, assuring them that the Soviet had never
issued or countenanced the orders that had been given
to them in its name.

The outcome of this conference was the much-vaunted
doctrine of "no annexation and no indemnity." M.

180 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

Miliukov had to endorse it with the best grace possible
in a further Note, which called upon the Allies to respond
thereto. They did so readily enough, but France had,
of course, to make certain necessary reservations in
regard to Alsace-Lorraine, which had been French terri-
tory. All the same M. Miliukov had to go and the Allies
remained in disfavor. The Cadet leader was succeeded
by young and fascinating M. Tereshchenko, a millionaire
sugar-refiner who had coquetted with the workmen in
Kiev and espoused their cause in the local War Industrial
Committee. Under the Old Regime he had served as an
official in the Imperial ballet. His only qualification for
the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs was an intimate
knowledge of foreign languages and Allied capitals. But
he was ready to please the Soviet, and was willing to ac-
cept as his "assistant" an emissary of that body known as
Avksentiev, who had been an "emigrant" in Paris, a
writer on economics, and an inveterate supporter of the
Socialist-Revolutionary party. (He was afterwards chosen
President of the Peasants' Soviet, and later became Min-
ister of the Interior.) Under these amiable auspices
Russia's relations with her Allies continued till the Bol-
sheviki swept the sham paraphernalia away (in November,
1917).

M. Guchkov had grown tired of constant interference
from the Soviet. He had hoped to "head off" the
Extremists by anticipating their wishes. It was a hope-
less undertaking. M. Kerensky succeeded him, and
tried an equally impossible task: to substitute rhetoric
for discipline.

General Alexeiev was requested by the Soviet to leave
for having spoken slightingly about the "no annexation,
no indemnity" clause. He considered it had been obvi-
ously invented to kill any lingering inclination on the
part of the troops to fight. What, indeed, should they
fight about if the Soviet could drive out the invader

4 "N0 ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 181

with mere words? One regiment on the Central Front
actually concluded peace with the enemy, agreeing to
" surrender " Vilna and Kovno. "Free" Russia had
promised to give freedom to the Poles, but why should
the soldiers fight about it, if all the nations were to have
the right to settle their own destinies? General Ruzsky
was dismissed for "lack of courtesy" to Soviet agitators.
General Lechitsky resigned because he could not stand
the Committee nonsense. Generals Gurko, Dragomirov,
and others followed suit. They saw the Army perishing
under the Committee system, and could not agree to
look on.

CHAPTER XVI

ANARCHY

"Rights" for "Democrat*" and "Duties" only for Bourgeois— Workmen's
"Wages" — Plunder by Soviets— Decline of Morals— -Revelry in Winter
Palace— Soldiers' "Joy Rides" — "Jacqueries" — Cossacks Restore some
Order — Financial Ruin — Revolution "Costs" over $20,000,000 a Day
—Soldiers Require a Thousand Millions Sterling — Filching the Gold
Reserve — Art Treasures Lost.

Two revolutionary lights came in to illuminate the
mournful shadows of Coalition. The fire-eating Skobelev
(nominally a Menshevik), as Minister of Labor, quickly
stirred the workers up to a sense of their "rights." There
was one charming feature about the Russian Revolution
that much simplified all social and political questions:
the partisans of Revolution had rights, the other people
had only duties. M. Skobelev told the workers that all
the profits of the mills should be theirs, and all the working
expenses should be paid by the capitalist owners. The
bland Chernov, alias Feldmann (a hybrid Socialist-Revo-
lutionary with Bolshevist leanings and pro-German
tendencies), as Minister of Agriculture, secretly incited
the peasants to "take possession," while he ostensibly
professed adherence to the recognized understanding that
the land question could be settled only by the Constituent
Assembly. " Meanwhile, why should they wait? All the
same it would be theirs."

Both these "Socialists" were well off, and Feldmann-
Chernov was reputed to hold large estates in the Caucasus,
where they would be safe. Protection was also accorded
to M. Tereshchenko's estates. A neighbor of his told me:

182

IS a

a -til

alii
1 1 II

III

ill

IP
Si

ANARCHY 188

"We have no trouble, I am thankful to say. The Min-
ister had troops sent to guard his property, and the whole
neighborhood is quiet."

We have seen that the Cadets failed miserably in their
Coalition venture. Miliukov had been hounded out.
Shingarev, a country doctor who had made a name in
party and later in Duma dialectics, specializing in finan-
cial questions, had tried to tackle the food problem at
the Ministry of Agriculture. Then he had succeeded
M. Tereshchenko at the Ministry of Finance. M.
Nekrasov, a Siberian railway expert, had seceded from the
party in order to remain in the Cabinet with the Socialists.
He went from Communications to Finance. As the
Soviet grew stronger it cast off most of the non-Socialist
Ministers. Later, the Revolution, like Saturn, devoured
many of its children.

Anarchy in the Government was magnified a hundred-
fold in the country. The workmen simply did not know
how much to ask in wages and emoluments. At one
great rubber factory they brought a number of sacks
with a request that they should be filled with money —
"the war profits of three years" — or they would "put the
directors into the sacks and drown them." As nearly
all the products of industry were being purchased by the
Government for war purposes, the State had to pay higher
prices. Private enterprise was completely crippled. All
the smaller establishments had to close. The larger
ones continued, losing money. But things looked so bad
that they would surely have to improve, some time.
They did not, and finally the Bolsheviki proclaimed the
confiscation of all industries for the workmen.

But money could be freely made. Russia was spend-
ing fifty millions of rubles a day. This huge "dole" had
to go into somebody's pockets. The Soviet absorbed
its "share." Its members rolled about in expensive
motor-cars. Kerensky, a humble lawyer, was no excep-

184 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

9»

tion to the rule. He lived in the Winter Palace, used
the Emperor's carriages and motors, drank his cham-
pagne, and fed lusciously out of his gold plate.

The morals of "Free" Russia corresponded with the
general absence of restraint among the Revolutionaries.
"Ideals" had been swamped in the general scramble for
material enjoyment. Kerensky set the example. There
had not been so much rollicking gayety in the Winter
Palace since the day it was built. Who could talk
about Razputin now, while all this merriment was going
on? Revolutionary Ministers were too much occupied
with marrying and giving in marriage. They used the
Imperial Crowns for the nuptial ceremony. They lodged
their mistresses in grand-ducal abodes. Aprte rums le
d&uge.

While the domestic servants in Petrograd were dis-
puting as to the respective merits of the eight- and the
nine-hour day, under the belief that the one began at
eight and the other at nine o'clock, their peasant relations
were trying to live up to the general tone. Mansions
pillaged, farmsteads destroyed, cattle maimed, land-
owners, small and great, murdered or fugitive — such was
the common report. Even the prisoners of war took a
hand in the game.

The whole apparatus of local government had been
swept away. Half the Zemstvos were no more. They
had been "replaced" by "committees" or "republics,"
governed by local hooligans, escaped convicts, and a
sprinkling here and there of the Third Element. But
most of its members were away at the Front.

Few taxes were paid; the local treasuries were empty
and had to obtain funds from Petrograd. The State
Bank could not cope with the demand for notes, and
increased the denominations to two thousand rubles.
Previously the highest note had been five hundred rubles.
Only the luckless manufacturers paid taxes, and they

ANARCHY 185

had been assessed by the Soviet economists at 97 per
cent on the gross profits. Soviet agitators constantly
clamored for a "compulsory expropriation " of the
banks, thinking they could find money there galore.
The soldiers' pay had been increased tenfold. They
gambled, drank, and danced. The barracks resembled
houses of ill-fame. Things were not much worse when
Lenin "governed" in name as well as in deed.

Living had cost fivefold its normal level when the
Revolution broke out. It steadily increased. Every-
body who could go left Petrograd. The Crimea and Cau-
casus were choked up with fugitives. Huge fortunes had
been made. They were squandered in riotous living and
gambling in the cities and in entertainments of unprece-
dented extravagance in the favorite Crimean resorts.
The cities "beyond the pale" were overrun by the Chil-
dren of Israel. At last they had taken possession of the
"promised land." The soldiers in Petrograd traveled
daily to Finland — without tickets, of course — to smuggle
cigarettes, which they sold at a big profit, while their
worthy comrades at Vyborg competed with them in the
business. It would require a whole volume to describe
all the abuses, corruption, and scoundrelism that went on
in Russia during the reign of the Soviet. Never had a
country suffered as much from the most ruthless invader.

Earlier in his career, Kerensky had compared his coun-
trymen with "mutinous slaves." But his own theories
were largely responsible for the degradation, and he himself
succumbed to it. The ideals of the Revolution were fine
enough, if somewhat crude. Everybody became tovarishck
(companion, comrade). The word appealed to the sim-
ple, democratic ideas of the people. Private soldiers
addressed their officers in this way. They called Kerensky
"Tovarishch Minister." It sounded well enough from
the lips of some old peasant-reservist, who in his village
was accustomed to address everybody — his superiors as

186 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIAIISM," "FREEDOM

»»

well as his equals — in the familiar second person singular.
Under the banner of "class warfare" it became a mockery,
a sign of contempt.

Election urns were brought to the bedsides of wounded
soldiers so that all should vote on municipal affairs with
which they had absolutely no concern, simply because the
soldier vote would go to the Socialists, and preferably to
the Bolsheviki. The schools were invaded by Soviet
delegates, who terrorized the pupils and deprived them of
food. Sons of "counter-revolutionaries" were driven out
of the military colleges. Red Cross hospitals were also
"revolutionized." The soldier orderlies formed com-
mittees, which decided what food and what medical or
surgical treatment was to be applied, and forbade any
rations to nurses or doctors other than the "ordinary" of
the peasant-soldier.

Here are some observations that I was able to make in
the course of my travels within and without the war zone.
In Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, and other large cities, the
demoralized and undisciplined soldiery monopolized the
tramcars, brutally flinging off women and children, and
overcrowding them so that fatal accidents were of daily
occurrence. Much worse was the condition of the railway
service. Soldiers invaded every train, occupied all the
carriages and compartments, corridors, lavatories, and
even the footboards and roofs. Suburban traffic was im-
practicable. Summer resort residents had a bad time,
and officers "perched" on the steps while the men reveled
on the cushions of first-class compartments. The revolu-
tionary troops were "visiting" or "prospecting," which
meant expropriation of palaces and villas, private, Im-
perial, or grand-ducal, contraband "trade" in cigarettes,
etc. Others were going home to "grab" land, others
again "toured" the country. One soldier related to me
that his free "joy ride" on the trains had extended to
Archangel and Vladivostock. These "tourists" were

ANARCHY 187

acquiring first-hand knowledge of Greater Russia. Anar-
chy was not altogether an unmixed evil so far as they were
concerned.

Foreigners traveling through Siberia were not molested,
at first, although Russian passengers were unceremoni-
ously bundled out of their compartments. But station-
masters were often compelled to turn back a train because
the soldiers wanted to go in that direction. Refresh-
ment-rooms were plundered and wrecked. Restaurant
cars had to be abandoned because the men invaded them
and ate up all the provisions — without payment, of course.

On the Moscow and Vitebsk lines, and all the railways
leading from the Front, pandemonium reigned. Here
no regard was shown to foreigners or Allied officers. One
unfortunate British subaltern, nearing Petrograd, was
thrown out of his compartment by the troops at Tsarskoe
Selo, beaten, and imprisoned. Allied military repre-
sentatives going to Headquarters met with brutality
equally egregious. One General of my acquaintance had
to sleep on the floor, while the revolutionary "heroes"
crowded into his bed. Even the Commander-in-Chief,
proceeding to visit the armies, had his carriage invaded
and narrowly escaped being "marooned." Fortunately
he had a small armed guard, and when the train was in
the open country it was stopped, and the invaders had
to jump off or t>e shot. I could multiply instances of
this kind without end. The men who climbed on to the
roofs in the cold of winter stamped their feet to keep
themselves warm, and often broke through and fell
on their comrades below. At night-time they frequently
slipped off in their sleep, or were knocked off when the
train passed under bridges or tunnels. Hence they
came to be called Utehiki (flyers).

Whatever they touched they stole or destroyed.
Window-curtains were torn off for all sorts of sumptuary
purposes, for footgear or clothing. All the fittings dis-

188 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

»!

appeared. Benches were demolished for fuel. The in-
side of a railway carriage after being thus "appropriated"
was an appalling sight. Moreover, in their mad rush for
seats, many would try to anticipate those who were
entering by the doors, which in Russian trains are always
at either end of the carriage, by flinging themselves
through the windows, first smashing them with the
heavy sacks wherein they carried "loot." I have hud-
dled in a first-class compartment, the only passenger
with a ticket, pell-mell with soldiers, nurses, and wounded
men, and seen these sacks landing in our midst, preceded
by fragments of glass and followed by the owners. More-
over, fodd and goods trains were being systematically
plundered by the deserters.

For weeks and months this abomination continued.
The so-called "Government" was powerless, the Com-
mittees had no authority, and the railway staff were cowed
and terrorized. Then the Cossacks took charge, and soon
matters improved for a time. For the Cossacks would
stand no nonsense. By that time also the cavalry began
to round up deserters and to guard the main railway
junctions. Everybody had to produce a document of
some sort. But the deserters easily procured them.
Whenever a man had made up his mind to leave his
regiment, he simply notified the Committee and was
furnished with a pass, or he terrorized the surgeon into
issuing a certificate. (Lenin revived railway anarchy.)

Meanwhile the transport crisis had been growing daily
more acute from other causes. Cars and locomotives
were in need of repair. The rolling stock had not been
properly overhauled for several years, owing to pressing
need of transport. It was thoroughly worn out, and
almost every train had to "drop " a car or two on account
of minor breakages. But the men in the railway work-
shops were too busy with politics and committees. Thou-
sands of engines were standing idle because these men had

ANARCHY 189

other matters to occupy their time. And, not satisfied
with idling, they forcibly took over the management of
several lines. At Tsaritsyn, an important food junction,
they even proclaimed a separate Republic.

Financial and administrative anarchy may be charac-
terized by the situation as observed by me in one of the
administrative divisions of the province of Petrograd soon
after the Revolution. 1 This district contains agricultural,
timber, and textile industries. The local assessment
amounted to about $175,000, which covered expenditure
on roads, schools, hospitals, and police. Most of this
money was expended for the people, but only $12,500
came from the peasants and working-men — the rest was
paid by land, forest, and mill-owners. The local admin-
istration had been in the hands of the district Zemstvos,
composed of elected tax-payers, who worked in the public
cause gratuitously. Under the Soviet regime the Zemst-
vos and police were driven out and the district was split
up into seventeen separate republics, each under a com-
mittee composed of workmen or peasants, ruled by a
carpet-bag politician. They enrolled their own militia.
The seventeen committees established a pay-roll for them-
selves and their agents aggregating over $500,000, or three
times the amount of the local revenue. They impounded
and divided whatever money came into the local treasury
office, levying contributions from the land and mill-owners
to make up the difference. Private houses were annexed
whenever they suited the convenience of the committees;
parks and gardens were invaded; land was appropriated,
and trees were felled and stolen by the peasants, but the
owner had no right to dispose of his property. Open
violence was not of frequent occurrence, because no one
ventured to offer any resistance to the committees.

Here are some incidents of rural life during the Rev-
olution. A certain aged landowner who had enough

1 The Times, September 22, 1917.

190 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

»»

money to satisfy modest requirements decided to make
a present of his broad acres to the peasants, rather than
be troubled by agrarian disorders. Summoning the vil-
lagers, he said: "I am leaving after to-morrow to end
my days in town. Take my land; divide it among
you; it is yours." The peasants were grateful. Imme-
diately they began to discuss the momentous question how
to divide the property. It was a difficult matter to adjust.
The argument became so fierce that half a dozen of them
died before nightfall. By the following sundown the
deaths had doubled in number. When the proprietor
reached his town residence he was followed by a deputation
of the peasants. "Take back your land," they implored
him: "if you do not, we shall all be dead." Another
landowner offered one-third of his acreage to the peasants.
Then one village rose against another, each claiming the
preference, and, rather than agree to a compromise or
fight out their quarrel, they each set a watch upon the
other. The property was thus exceedingly well guarded.

Another case is worth citing. The local committee
had, as usual, fixed a minimum wage for farm labor.
Formerly the pay did not exceed fifty cents a day.
The committee decided that nobody must work for less
than $5. Now, the peasants knew quite well that the
landlord could not afford such remuneration. They
were willing to work for much less, but they feared the
bad men on the committee, who would not scruple to
burn their houses and crops if they disobeyed. They
sought a way out of the difficulty, and found it. "We
sign a receipt for ten rubles ($5) a day, and you give
us one ruble and a half (75c.)." A secret compact was
thus concluded between the farmer and his laborers, and
a few thousand acres remained under cultivation that
otherwise would have lain fallow.

In another place the peasants, carried away by M.
Chernov's wild scheme of land spoliation, "grabbed"

;;

■B

I
1
I

ANARCHY 191

a landowner's property, plowed and sowed the fields,
neglecting their own allotments. Then they began to
divide up the stolen acres, and came to blows and murder.
Finally they sent word to the owner: "Take back what
belongs to you. We want nothing for our work, nothing
for our seeds: we want only to remain alive."

These incidents, culled "behind the scenes/ 9 afford
some explanation of the surprising fact that amid the
anarchy and terror spread broadcast over the land by
Soviet agencies the instincts of a national conservatism
had not altogether left the minds of the masses. 1

To deal with the land question, "agrarian committees"
had been established under the auspices of the Chernov
administration. They were filled by revolutionary adven-
turers, and their pay-roll aggregated $70,000,000 per
annum.

At the Moscow Conference, convoked by M. Kerensky
at the end of August, 1917, astonishing figures were given
by Ministers regarding the economic crisis. In the hope
of grappling with the food problem, the Government
had introduced a monopoly on grain stuffs. This method
had been applied in other countries with success. But
it required an efficient machinery of purchase, control,
and distribution. None of these requisites were avail-
able amid the prevailing anarchy. Local "food com-
mittees" were instituted under the direction of a central
board in Petrograd. One may easily picture the result.
All these bodies were filled with adventurers or scoundrels
who had no qualification except the profession of "revo-
lutionary sentiments." Plunder and profiteering became
a thousandfold more prevalent than had ever been known
in pre-revolutionary times. Besides, these new "organ-

1 Tbe Bolshevist "Government," soon after its usurpation of power in
Petrograd (November, 1917), ordained the confiscation of ail lands except those
belonging to peasants, and all industrial property, for the benefit of the workers.

19* "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

izations " involved an outlay of colossal sums, amounting
to $250,000,000.

The peasants were still disinclined to sell their grain,
in spite of high prices, because they could not purchase
necessaries of life with the money. Boots cost ten times
as much as formerly, but even at this price were difficult
to procure. The leather trade had been disorganized.
Textiles were worth their weight in gold and difficult to
obtain. Owing to labor anarchy the mill production
had fallen so tremendously that the total visible supply
of cotton goods amounted in August, 1917, to 29,000,000
yards for a population of over 180,000,000, or less than
seven inches of material per capita. There were large
quantities of food in the country and huge stores of grain
in Siberia, but they were immobilized by lack of trans-
port and inefficient or corrupt organization. And the
Revolution had intensified the difficulties of coping with
the problem.

Measures for increasing transport capacity were pro-
posed by the American Railway Commission, which had
been sent to Russia in order to help the new regime.
These measures would have increased goods traffic by
40 or 50 per cent. But the prevailing anarchy rendered
any improvement impossible.

Within a few months of the outbreak of revolution the
Treasury was completely emptied in order to supply
colossal sums for revolutionary organizations (the Agra-
rian and Food Committees, the Soviet and its affiliations)
and for supplementary pay and allowances to the troops.
Later, under the Kerensky administration and Soviet
rule, this item increased to such an extent that the
"supplementary requirements " of the Army called for
an outlay of $5,500,000,000 (eleven milliards of rubles)
per annum, representing an additional expenditure of
about $450 per man, of which $50 were for pay and $400

ANARCHY 193

for food and other allowances. The "revolutionary"
soldier was to be well cared for.

Russia had spent $24,500,000,000 on the war, 1 and
against this outlay had raised $17,500,000,000 on loans
and notes; 2 the surplus of Ordinary Budgets provided
about $900,000,000, leaving a deficit in unpaid bills
amounting to $6,100,000,000 (figures for July, 1917).
The rate of increase of expenditure before and after the
Revolution may be estimated approximately by the issue
of paper money. During the war months of 1914 the issue
of banknotes averaged $109,500,000 per month; in 1915 it
had risen, very slightly to $111,500,000, and in 1916
to $145,000,000. But during the revolutionary months
(March to August, 1917), the averages leapt to $416,000,*
000. Reckoning the difference between the last two
averages, the Revolution had thus cost Russia, in actual
Treasury disbursements in the form of paper currency,
the colossal sum of $1,890,000,000 in seven months. This,
of course, gives but a faint idea of losses sustained by
industry and agriculture and the wanton destruction of
State and private property, besides art treasures and his-
torical relics of priceless value.

1 According to a statement published in the Petrograd official Trade and
Industrial Gazette (September 26, 1917), the total war expenditure, in actual
disbursements by the Treasury, was given at Bs.41,392,700,000, of which
Rs.30,944,600,000 were for the Army and Bs.2,057,900 for the Navy. Also
included in the general total were immense sums, running altogether into mil-
liards of rubles, assigned for other needs created by the war. Thus, up to
September 14, 1917, were expended Us. 3,264,100,000 on allowances to the
families of soldiers; for the construction of new railways for military purposes,
Rs. 869,300,000, and for developing those already in existence, Bs.1,172,700,000;
on orders for railway engines and rolling-stock, Rs.017,600,000; on constructing
and improving ports, Rs. 115,200,000; further, on roads and waterways*
Bs.79,700,000; on the development of the post and telegraph services, Rs.122,-
400,000; and so on. Finally, a very large sum, amounting to Rs.569,500,000,
was used in giving assistance to refugees. The par value of the ruble was
about fifty cents.

1 The Soviet had constantly impeded the raising of War Loans, and at one
time threatened to boycott the so-called "Liberty" Loan.

194 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM

»»

M. Nekrasov, then Minister of Finance, declared that
never had the Tsar's government been so prodigal as
"revolutionary Russia." What calamitous consequences
had already been brought about by revolutionary excesses
and anarchy? He pointed out that during the first
three months after the Revolution the State revenue
had declined in the following proportions, as compared
with 1916: Land tax by 82 per cent, town real estate
tax by 41 per cent, lodging tax by 48 per cent, war tax
by 29 per cent, industrial tax by 19 per cent, insurance
tax by 27 per cent, and outstanding land redemption
dues by 65 per cent. This decline had been far greater
in the following months. He warned his hearers that
any measures of confiscation or expropriation of capital
or real estate would only lead to a complete disappearance
of the revenue, and would react upon the people at large,
as their savings had been deposited in the State and private
banks. 1 What has been shown above sufficed to render
the continuation of war a financial impossibility. Lenin
had been "behind the scenes"; he did "better" still
when he himself appeared "on the boards."

Having no funds wherewith to carry out the extrava-
gant "bribes" promised to the soldiers, M. Kerensky's
Government was compelled subsequently to disband a
large portion of the Army. But the Committees and
Soviets continued to draw their emoluments so long as
the printing presses at the State Banks could provide

1 On September 1, 1917, the State Bank held 1,207,992,927 rubles in gold
in its vaults and 2,906,006,718 rubles in gold in foreign banks — altogether
about $1,600,000,000 in gold. The issue of notes had then reached the sum of
14,676,172,052 rubles. During the preceding week it had issued 245,000,000
rubles in paper, and the available paper currency at the Bank did not exceed
198,827,948 rubles. The deposits at the State Savings Banks had risen
enormously prior to the Revolution, amounting in October, 1916, to 8,458,-
200,000 rubles in cash and 1,119,900,000 rubles in securities. The Bol-
sheviki in November, 1916, "captured" $900,000,000 in gold at the Moscow
branch of the State Bank.

ANARCHY 195

enough paper money. When Lenin took possession the
state of the Treasury was already hopeless. To carry
on, he sought a loan of $5,000,000 from the State Bank,
and tried to get the money by subterfuge, which failed;
then the banks were "expropriated." The Bolsheviki
repudiated Russia's State loans, ignoring the claims of the
people whose savings they thereby sacrificed.

At the end of 1917 Russia's debts, unsecured by any
assets, exceeded the colossal figure of fifteen milliards
cf rubles ($7,500,000,000). Such were the net results of
the Revolution. It had "cost" over $20,000,000 a day.
Its cost in 1918 cannot be estimated in figures.

PART HI

RUSSIA AT WAR
CHAPTER XVH

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Second Humiliation Repulsed— Pourtales and Sasonov— -A Forgotten Doc-
ument— Wilhelm's Ruse to Gain Time— Fledged his "Word of Honor"
— Sukhomlinov's Boast — Russia "Ready" — Popular Enthusiasm — Suc-
cess of the Mobilization — Hopes of Reform— The Grand Duke and Yan-
uahkevich— Efficient Generals "Shelved."

Russia opened the struggle with Austro-Germany
under the happiest auspices. The people were unanimous.
They had had enough of German influence and domi-
nation. Already, in 1909, when Austria tried to force the
Balkan issue on the backs of the Serbs, all the educated
classes understood that she was merely a skirmisher for
the German hosts, then preparing to hurl themselves at
the Empire of the Tsars; and the humiliation inflicted
upon Russia in the person of M. Sazonov by the German
Ambassador, Count Pourtales, was felt and resented by
them. The masses and the classes, workmen and peas-
ants, nobles and burgesses, rich and poor, without dis-
tinction of race or religion, hailed the call to arms. The
Winter Palace was thronged with hundreds of thousands
of loyal subjects, who acclaimed the Sovereigns on their
appearance on the balcony. The troops inside the
Palace mingled their prayers with those of the autocrat.
Vociferous cheers resounded in honor of the Grand Duke
Nicholas Nikolaievich as he drove away from this memo-

197

198 RUSSIA AT WAR

rable function flying the black and yellow pennant of
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Russia's armies.

Even to the "man in the street," unversed in the
secrets of diplomacy or military plans, it was quite
clear that the Germans were out to fight; that Russia
and her Allies and friends were in for a querelle d'attemand 1
— as the French so adequately express it — a quarrel which
the Teutons were picking simply and solely because they
felt themselves strong enough to win against all possible
odds, and had determined to crush opposition to their
dreams of world-power and oppression.

The Russians had been developing their strength in
industry and commerce during the decade of semi-consti-
tutional existence. They believed that their Army was
well equipped. The Minister of War, in an inspired
article published by the Press, had announced "We are
ready." So they would stand no more humiliations.

1 Germany in 1900 compelled Russia, under threat of war, to exercise
pressure upon the Serbs in a quarrel which had the sympathy and approval of
Russia and other countries. And in 1914 Count Pourtales was confident that
the Russians would also not fight. The author met him in the drawing-room
of the Foreign Office at Petrograd almost daily during the week that preceded
hostilities. The German Ambassador went out of his way to persuade the
author, whom he "knew to be influential among prominent Russians," to
"warn his Russian friends not to be led astray by the clamor of the Press"—
meaning the Novoe Vremya, the leading anti-German organ — "into imagining
that the country would support them in going to war about a trumpery affair
like the Serbian question." He (Pourtales) was "well informed" about the
feeling of the country. The author tried in vain to persuade him that he was
mistaken. Pourtales then oracularly declared that the existing attitude of
certain elements in Petrograd was "extremely dangerous" — clearly indicating
that Germany had made up her mind to fight. When the mobilization of the
Russian armies was publicly announced, Germany sent an ultimatum demand-
ing that Russia should "recall" or "cancel" the mobilization within twelve
hours. Even then Pourtales was confident that the Tsar's Government would
give in. He came to Sazonov with two notes verbals* written on a sheet of paper:
the one to be read in case of Russia's consent, the other in the improbable case
(as Pourtales imagined it) of her refusal. When Sazonov calmly announced
that Russia had already given her answer, Pourtales lost countenance, burst
into tears, and departed, forgetting the telltale document in his hurry and
confusion.

Phalo taken by thi Autkor in Jidg, 1916.

UOHBIAM JTIOHTI

General Irmanov. of the famous Third Caucasian Carp*, showing his d
■word — ths hiibest reward for leadership— to General Abrsm Drmomirov,
Army Corp*. General Irmanov resigned his rank during ths Revolution anc
private soldier. He ni then hsls sad hearty, though over TO years ■
Drmsomirov wis afterwards Commander-in-Chief of um ol ths Fronts, an
protest uainet Bolshevism. Their Chiefs of Huff, General Roeanov and Colt

THE OUTBREAK OP HOSTILITIES 199

Since the Germans wanted a "preventive war," let them
have it. "God is on our side!"

Never had the Tsar been so popular as at that moment.
He had proclaimed war against drunkenness — the great
national evil — and now he had proclaimed war on the
Germans, the nation's foes. People readily overlooked
the appointment of Goremykin as Prime Minister; they
even forgot the absurd notion that had inspired the
Imperial rescript on March 19, 1914, wherein it was set
forth, in blind disregard of the teachings of history and
common sense, that "futile aspirations" — meaning con-
stitutional reform — were irreconcilable with "the welfare
of the people."

In proclaiming war, the Tsar said from the Throne:

At present we have not only to succor a kindred land which has been un-
justly wronged, but to safeguard the honor, dignity, and integrity of Russia
as a Great Power. We firmly believe that in the defense of their country all
our true subjects will rise united in a spirit of self-sacrifice. At this great
hour of trial may all internal differences be forgotten; may the union of the
Tsar and his people become closer and stronger.

Russians believed that the Tsar, in summoning his
people to embark upon a national war, had abjured his
superannuated notions, and in this spirit they understood
the Tsar's Manifesto.

Having lived in Russia during the days of the war
with Turkey (1877-8) and the war with Japan (1904-5),
I can confidently say that nothing like the same enthu-
siasm was observable at the outbreak of either of those
two conflicts; yet the former had been essentially a
popular and a patriotic enterprise.

Anxiety prevailed only on one point: would the
British nation join in the struggle? During the few days
that elapsed between the proclamation of war by Russia
and the announcement that England had become her
Ally, many prominent Russians appealed to me, among
them being MM. Krivoshein and Sazonov. My reply

£00 RUSSIA AT WAR

was: "I stake my head on it. The Germans will force
us to fight, even should we still wish to stand aloof."
Extraordinary scenes of enthusiasm were witnessed by
me in the Duma after the news came that Great Britain
had espoused the cause of injured nations. Allied rep-
resentatives received tremendous ovations, such as the
Duma had never known.

In view of the facts that have been adduced regarding
Germany's scheme of a "preventive war," it is interesting
to cite some interesting revelations made by General
Yanushkevich, the Chief of Staff, and General Sukhom-
linov, the former Minister of War, on his trial before the
Supreme Court in Petrograd last September. They
throw a curious light upon the circumstances of the out-
break of hostilities. Germany, be it noted, had planned
to overwhelm France, and, having soon crushed her, to
launch all her legions upon Russia. It was, therefore, of
the highest importance to the General Staff in Berlin that
the mobilization of the Russian Army should be delayed;
every day gained at the outset of war would be of price-
less value. We shall see how vital was this consideration
when we treat of the first invasion of East Prussia.

The Germans subsequently asserted that their mobili-
zation began "officially" only after Russia had com-
menced mobilization. The argument does not bear crit-
icism. The Germans knew that Russia would require
three weeks to mobilize her Army, whereas they could
place all their war effectives in the field within half that
space of time, thanks principally to their great superiority
in railways. Moreover, the machinery of mobilization
could be started in Germany — and was so started — before
an official announcement was made, whereas in Russia it
could not begin without an Imperial ukaz promulgated
by the Senate.

When, in response to British appeals, Wilhelm osten-
sibly agreed to "restrain" Austria-Hungary and pledged

THE OUTBREAK OP HOSTILITIES 201

his "word of honor" to the Tsar (July SOth) not to
mobilize the German Army if Russia abstained from a
general mobilization, the German troops on the French
border were already being concentrated for their dash
into Belgium, and on this point the Allied Staffs had
precise information. Wilhelm was thus making use of
British peace efforts to hoodwink the Tsar and to gain
time. It was a ruse de guerre of a kind which the Germans
persistently resorted to before and during the war.

General Yanushkevich deposed as follows: "On
July 29th we had decided to mobilize. The Emperor
instructed me to convey assurances to Count Pourtales,
the German Ambassador, that in proclaiming a mobili-
zation Russia intended no hostile act towards Germany.
I informed Sazonov; the Minister for Foreign Affairs
had a poor opinion of Pourtales. He said that Pourtales
would construe my words in his own way, and advised
me to have a talk with the German Military Attach^,

who was more competent in such matters. Major

answered my summons at the General Staff. He had
usually come in uniform, and punctually at the time
appointed, and spoken in Russian. On this occasion he
kept me waiting a whole hour, appeared in plain clothes,
and spoke only in French. I pointed out that Russia
had no aggressive intentions towards Germany. The
Major replied that, unfortunately, Russia had already
begun to mobilize. I assured him that the mobilization
had not begun. He then declared with aplomb that on
this point he had more precise information. I gave him
my word of honor as Chief of the General Staff that,
at that precise moment, 8 p.m., July 29th, the mobili-
zation had not yet been proclaimed. He still remained
incredulous. I then offered to give him a written pledge.
He politely declined it. At that moment the Russian
mobilization had not commenced, although the ukaz
ordering the mobilization was in my pocket.

808 RUSSIA AT WAR

"From the Attache's behavior/* continued the wit-
ness, "I understood that Germany had decided before-
hand to have war with us, and that no power on earth
could avert war. I understood, and afterwards I defi-
nitely ascertained, that at that moment Germany had
already mobilized, but had managed to do so in secret,
although the German Press asserted that at that moment
Germany had not mobilized and that Russia had begun
to mobilize. I categorically affirm that the first day of
mobilization in Russia was the 30th of July."

Proceeding with his account of what transpired on the
29th and 30th July, General Yanushkevich deposed:
"It was first decided to order a partial mobilization,
affecting only the southwestern military districts, in
order to frighten Austria-Hungary. Then this matter
was reconsidered, and on July 30th, after I had made a
report to the Emperor, the ukaz to the Senate, ordering
a general mobilization, was signed. In urging a general
mobilization, I had pointed out to the Tsar the necessity
of defining our attitude quite clearly, not only towards
Austria, but also towards Germany, who stood behind
Austria's back. We knew quite well that Germany
desired war, that, indeed, she was incapable of deferring
a conflict because she was aware that our enlarged pro-
gram would be ready in 1918, and that she must needs
use her opportunities before the program was com-
pleted. From Peterhof I came straight to the Council of
Ministers, then sitting, and read out to them the ukaz
that had been signed by the Emperor.

"But, late that same day (July 30th), about 11 P.M.,
I was summoned to the telephone by the Emperor. He
asked me what was the position of the mobilization. I
answered that it was already in progress. Another
question was then put to me: 'Would it not be possible
to substitute a partial for a general mobilization, so that
only Austria-Hungary should be affected? 9 I replied

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 203

that it would be exceedingly difficult, that such a course
would entail a veritable catastrophe, that mobilization
had already begun, that 400,000 reservists had been
summoned. • . . Then it was explained to me by the
Emperor that he had received a telegram from Wilhelm,
in which Wilhelm pledged his word of honor that if
a general mobilization were not proclaimed by us the
relations between Germany and Russia would remain
'as hitherto/ friendly.

"After the conversation with the Tsar," continued
General Yanushkevich, "I hastened to Sazonov, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and convinced him that it
was not possible at that hour to recall the general mobili-
zation. I implored him to give his support. He prom-
ised me to report to the Emperor in the morning. He did
so, and at half-past four in the afternoon of July 31st a
conference was held at the Palace, at which Sazonov,
Sukhomlinov, and myself were present. In ten minutes
we had decided that it was impossible to withhold a gen-
eral mobilization, as such a course would be fatal to Russia.
Sazonov had reported to the Emperor in this sense. At
5 p.m. the question was definitely settled in favor of
the general mobilization."

But it transpired afterwards that General Yanushke-
vich's telephone conversations during those days with
the Tsar and other personages were immediately reported
to the German General Staff, which knew precisely the
day, the hour, and the substance of every such conver-
sation. General Yanushkevich noticed the ominous click
which betrays the "tapping" of a "through" call, and
immediately gave orders to put up a direct wire to Peter-
hof.

Resuming his account of the earlier conversation with
the Tsar, General Yanushkevich added: "I ventured
to retort that I had no faith in Wilhelm's word of honor,
because I knew definitely that Germany had already

204 RUSSIA AT WAR

mobilized. And, as a matter of fact, I had received
sufficiently reliable information at that time to show that
Germany had mobilized. There is a difference between
Russian and German methods. In Germany the mobili-
zation is carried out by orders from the Minister of War,
but with us it has to be preceded by the promulgation
of a ukaz through the Senate/ 9

This narrative was borne out by the statements of
General Sukhomlinov. He deposed as follows: "On
the night of July 80th I was rung up by the Emperor
and told to cancel the mobilization." (The ex-Minister
of War, in his further deposition, showed — as General
Yanushkevich had explained — that the Tsar wanted to
revert to a partial mobilization.) "It was a direct order,
not admitting rejoinder. I was overcome, knowing that
it was impossible to cancel the mobilization for technical
reasons, and also because it would provoke frightful
confusion in the country. . . . Half an hour later General
Yanushkevich telephoned. The Emperor had told him
to suspend the mobilization. He replied that it was
technically impossible to do so. Then the Tsar had
said: 'All the same, suspend it/ General Yanushkevich
iasked me what was he to do. I replied: "Do nothing/
I heard General Yanushkevich utter a sigh of relief,
saying* Thank God!*

"Next morning I lied to the Emperor — I told him
that the mobilization was proceeding partially, only in
the southwest, although I knew that the mobilization
was a general one and that it was impossible to stop it.
Fortunately the Emperor changed his mind that day,
and I was thanked instead of being censured."

While the mobilization was in progress General Suk-
homlinov obtained the Emperor's permission to set
aside half the Winter Palace for the convenience of
G.O.C/s, who there consulted together before joining
their armies at the Front. But jealousy of the Minister's

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 205

influence led to a peremptory order to stop these consul-
tations. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich had
never forgiven General Sukhomlinov for abolishing the
Supreme Council of State Defense, of which he had been
President. He now suspected the Minister of designing
to take control of strategy during the campaign, as he
had monopolized the direction of Army affairs before
the war. He had all the more grounds for this appre-
hension because Sukhomlinov had been the Tsar's tutor
in strategy. These bickerings led to a complete estrange-
ment between the War Office and Headquarters during
the war, so long as Sukhomlinov and the Grand Duke
remained at their posts.

Some surprise had been felt in military spheres over
the appointment of the Grand Duke to the Supreme
Command. The Emperor had made this choice osten-
sibly because "for general reasons" he did not then "think
fit to assume" these duties himself, and it was to be
inferred that he had substituted one of his kinsmen merely
on account of his kinship. There were good reasons for
selecting a member of the Imperial family. He could
enforce obedience with greater authority. Purely mili-
tary considerations of fitness to command had not played
a decisive part in the matter, for there were many other
Generals in the Tsar's Army who had far greater claims
to leadership, chief among them being Alexeiev. But
he and consummate strategists like Ruzsky were kept
in the background.

The selection of General Yanushkevich to be Chief of
Staff was even less comprehensible. He had terminated
his Army career after commanding a battalion for four
months, without seeing any active service. Later he
had served in the juridical section of the War Office,
and obtained a readership at the Staff College. Thence,
by a series of lucky promotions, he had risen to be Chief
of the College and Chief of the General Staff, by General

206 RUSSIA AT WAR

Sukhomlinov's favor and protection, the all-powerful
Minister not wishing to have a man of strong and inde-
pendent personality in occupation of this high post.
Thence he had passed "automatically" to the highest
military function that had ever been filled by a living
Russian, that of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief, with a host of many millions of men
under his orders. General Yanushkevich had no expe-
rience whatever of war, and, what is still more extraor-
dinary, he had only the vaguest knowledge of the supply
of munitions available. He declared at the Sukhomlinov
trial: "We had no information till November (1914) as to
the quantity of munitions that could be supplied to us."
Yet he had left the General Staff only three or four months
previously, and must, or should, have known what
quantity of munitions had already been used up, what
remained, and also what were the available means of
producing more in the meantime.

Was it surprising under these circumstances that the
Russian Army showed a lamentable deficiency in leader-
ship? Army Group Commanders apparently did what
they thought fit, without co-ordination between muni-
tionment and strategy. The appointment of General
Zhilinsky to command the northern group, apparently
because he had been Chief of the General Staff and
was Governor-General of Warsaw, was on a footing with
the other selections. The disasters in East Prussia and
in Galicia were inevitable.

Meanwhile the nation was working like one man to
carry out the mobilization. General Lukomsky at the
War Office and General Dobrorolsky at the General
Staff directed the complex machinery with great skill
and entire self-abnegation. I saw the latter several
times in the sanctum whence he exchanged telegrams
with all the four corners of the Empire. Unkempt,
unshaven, begrimed by toil, he had rested neither by

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES SOT

night nor by day for a whole week. But he was in high
spirits: "It is going splendidly. I can take a little
sleep now. We are well within our schedule, and I
expect we shall be several days ahead of it." He was
right. The mobilization was complete on the sixteenth
day, or five days earlier than could be foreseen. At
the General Staff in Petrograd we all expected to reach
Berlin before the end of the year.

General Lukomsky was rewarded by the Tsar in a
unique manner. He was given the black and yellow
ribbon of St. George to wear with his order of St. Vladimir.
The statutes of the order of St. George did not admit
of its bestowal except for service in the field. The Em-
peror had invented this device to show how great was his
appreciation of his work.

But no organization, however skilful, could have ac-
complished the task with such amazing rapidity unless
the people themselves had put their heart and soul into it.
And that was precisely what the Russian nation had
done. Reservists flocked to the colors. The village
wives and maidens did not wail, as the Russian peasant
women do on parting with their menfolk — there were
no lamentations such as we heard later in the war, when
disaster had overtaken the armies and the toll of casu-
alties had grown long. The railwaymen were splendid.
They did not have to go to the trenches then or later,
but, throughout the war, and even during the Revolution,
guards and engine-drivers bore themselves like true men.
Whoever saw the mobilization of 1914 can never forget it.
The memory of those early days of the war hovers over
me as I write, and sheds its fragrance over the bitterness
of ensuing years, over the horrors of war, and the still
greater horrors and shame of revolution and anarchy.

On the railway lines leading westward came train-
loads bearing an armed multitude out of the depths of All
the Russias. On the Moscow-Brest-Warsaw line the

206 RUSSIA AT WAR

trains moved all one way on both tracks, day and night,
in endless procession. It was like a double-ribbon of
cheering, exulting humanity stretching out in endless
miles, eagerly hastening to have done once and for all
with the hated Niemtsy (Germans). The cities on the
way hailed them and brought food. The village women
cheered them on. The boys smuggled themselves into
the trucks and went off to fight. Many girls donned
the simple field dress and came disguised. Soon it became
necessary to place a guard at the stations, lest all the
schoolboys in Russia should join the armies.

CHAPTER XVm

POOR ARMAMENTS; SPLENDID ARMY

Credits Unused — Undeveloped Industry — Red-tape in Artillery Department —
Krupp & Co. — Sukhomlinov in Control — Woeful Lack of Shells — Russia's
Armaments and German Plans — Miasoiedov — New Army Formations —
Enormous Effectives — Swarms of Cavalry — Few Guns — The Siberian
Troops — Military Colonisation — The Caucasians and Finland Troops.

People were not aware, however, of the true state of
affairs in the War Ministry, and more particularly in
the Artillery Department. The Army was "ready" to
fight, but not sufficiently equipped for modern war.
The Duma had repeatedly called attention to official
neglect of the country's defenses. In 1907 a Supreme
Council of State Defense had been instituted by the
Tsar, under the Presidency of the Grand Duke Nicholas
Nikolaievich. He summoned Kokovtsov and said: "It
is awful! There are no shells, no rifles, no cartridges."
Kokovtsov replied that he had never been given an oppor-
tunity to consider the question. Together they drafted
the estimates for an immediate expenditure on arma-
ments of $146,500,000. Some months later the "grand
program" was passed by the Duma. They refused,
however, to vote a lump sum because they had "no
confidence" in the War Minister on account of his prox-
imity to the Court. The money was to be voted yearly.
They wanted to maintain a hold upon the Government.
They did not intend to be parsimonious. Far from it.
(But events have proved that they were mistaken. They
had not sufficiently taken into account the industrial
question, and had unconsciously lent themselves to

209

210 RUSSIA AT WAR

bureaucratic dilatoriness and red-tape.) During the
seven years (1908-14) the Treasury assigned a total
of $231,850,000 to the War Departments, but only
$70,000,000 had been expended, leaving $161,850,000
unutilized. 1

The Army programs were to be completed by
1918. The Germans knew this, and, doubtless, the fact
played a leading part in their consideration of a "pre-
ventive" 2 war in 1914. Probably they also knew — but
the Russian nation did not know — that the program
was not being carried out in regard to armaments and
munitions. It had failed almost completely in this vital
point — as shown by the huge amount of unused credits
— for two reasons of unequal importance.

The first and lesser reason was to be sought in purely
departmental technicalities — the red-tape prevailing in
the Artillery Department — and in a prolonged personal
conflict between the Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovich
as Head of the Ordnance and General Sukhomlinov as
Minister of War.

The second and major reason emanated from the still
undeveloped condition of home industries. When Ger-
man Staff plans for a war against France and Russia
assumed concrete form in 1908 — after the conclusion of
the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 — it was decided
not to place any more orders for guns and munitions in
Germany. It seemed to be obvious that the one thing
to do was to manufacture them at home, or, if possible, in
allied or friendly countries. But the Artillery Depart-
ment could not change its routine ideas and methods.

1 Count Kokovtsov. The Sukhomlinov trial.

* France, "degenerate and broken by political strife" — as the Germans
then pictured her — had dared to increase her army by restoring the three years'
service system; England was "England, the unready/' and would not inter-
vene — so the Germans imagined; the Kiel Canal had been widened for the
passage of German Dreadnoughts. Last, but not least, the Archduke Fran*-
Ferdinand's death had to be avenged in the interests of absolutism.

POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 211

They had always gone to Krupp. Krupp's agent in
Fetrograd (M. Wachter) was an important personage who
held the rank of Actual Councillor of State in the Russian
hierarchy (an equivalent of Gewirkliche Staaisrat). They
had always done business with him. He was a courtly
gentleman. No suspicion could ever attach to him, or
to them, of collusion or bribery. Goodness knows what
might be thought if they commenced negotiations with
"strangers." Besides, the available Russian firms were
also mostly German, so it would come to the same thing
in the end. Give the order to Krupp in Germany, or
to Tillmans, 1 or to Siemens & Halske, or to the Russian
branch of the Allgemeine Elektricitats Gesellschaf t — was
it not the same thing? In one way, certainly. Because
the German firms in Russia could not be expected to
refuse information to the General Staff in Berlin any
more than could Krupp. And the Miasoiedov espionage
case subsequently demonstrated the fact that one, at
least, of these firms had free access to fortress plans and
other military "secrets." In another way it did not.
Krupp might hold up or lay an embargo on supplies at
a crucial moment. The German firms in Russia could not.

Admiral Grigorovich, the Minister of Marine, had to
work under the same unpleasant auspices. But he
palliated the danger by inviting representatives of reputa-
ble British firms to superintend the construction of
machinery for the ships under construction. But Ad-
miral Grigorovich was not opposed to the Duma, and his
credits were not doled out.

No proper appeal was made to Russian industries by

1 The notorious Miasoiedov was an intimate friend of the senior partner in
this firm, and through him was invited to attend the Imperial "shoots" at
Rominten. Miasoiedov was then Colonel of Gendarmerie at Vierzhbolowo.
He was discovered to be using a car with a double bottom wherein he smuggled
goods from Germany, and for this cause had been dismissed. During the war
he was reappointed to active service. Before the war Sukhomlinov had em-
ployed him to spy en officers till Suvorin and Guchkov denounced him as a spy.

212 RUSSIA AT WAR

the Artillery Department, and, moreover, it would not
have been successful without guarantees that could not
be given — guarantees of a political as well as of a financial
character. The okhrana would have interfered — as it
did constantly interfere — with any development of labor
problems.

Besides, the Artillery Department was very busy
experimenting with shell-fuses. It wanted to be quite
sure that it had an ideal fuse 1 before proceeding to spend
an urgent grant of $5,000,000 voted for munitions by
the Duma. Moreover, the earlier program had been
based on the experience of the Japanese War, which
appeared to call for a reserve of 350 rounds per gun.
Later this figure was raised to a thousand. The Depart-
ment had two shell factories in the country. In 1914
they were producing fifty thousand shells per month.
The Department expected to accumulate by the middle
of 1915 something like four million shells, which was
considered to be amply sufficient for a war of three or
four months. That was the maximum period that any
war could last, in the opinion of the experts. Heavy
guns — anything above three inches — had been little used
in the Japanese War, and were almost entirely neglected.
The total reserve of shells above three-inch caliber did not
exceed fifteen thousand. The Artillery Department had
not made good the depletion of munition stores on the
western frontier, which had been resorted to for the
requirements of the army in Manchuria; it did not even
know where these stores were situated.

Proportionately speaking, the Russian Army was not
so well prepared for war in 1914 as it had been in 1904. 2
Eleven artillery brigades on mobilization were found to
be without guns.

*A mania for super-excellence has ever been the Russian's bane. In
revolution as well as in fuses they wanted to "improve" on other countries.
1 General Vernander. The Sukhomlinov trial.

POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 213

M. Timashev, Minister of Commerce and Industry,
during the period of increased armament, was kept in
complete ignorance of the munition difficulty. Army
affairs were never discussed before civilian members of
the Cabinet. He and his civilian colleagues knew no
more than did the public up to the very outbreak of war.
They saw the article "We are ready" in the papers,
and that was all the information they had. Even after
the Galician reverses had brought home to people's minds
that there were no shells, he was not approached by the
War Office. He, himself, called a meeting of manufac-
turers, who were treated to a patriotic appeal by the
Minister of War.

In 1910 "we began to do something," as General
Polivanov expressed himself in giving his evidence. The
program was being "realized," but "our industries
could not cope with it, and the Artillery Department
was holding up designs." However, "up to that time
all our military preparations, such as they were, had
provided only for another war with Japan, our struggle
with that country having completely exhausted our
means of defense."

The Germans were not in ignorance of this change in
the venue, as a little incident which occurred on Feb-
ruary 20, 1910, clearly shows. A war game was to be
played in the Winter Palace under the direction of the
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich. Many leading Gen-
erals of the Russian Army had assembled there to undergo
a test of their fitness for high command. They waited
in vain. A telephone message came from Tsarskoe
Selo dismissing the assembly, on the pretext that the
Grand Duke "had not had time to prepare himself,"
but intimating that no more "war games" would be
held "lest umbrage be taken by certain Powers."

Meanwhile the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich,
who was notoriously anti-German, had been relieved of

214 RUSSIA AT WAR

his office by the abolition of the Supreme Council. Pre-
viously he and the Chiefs of War Departments, including
the Chief of the General Staff, reported independently
to the Emperor. General Sukhomlinov urged that this
method only created confusion, and to a certain extent
he was right. 1 But now everything was concentrated
in his hands, and the Tsar saw Army affairs through his
eyes only. This was a fatal mistake, because General
Sukhomlinov, being a courtier, represented matters
invariably in a favorable light for himself. He was
unable, however, to assert his authority over the Artillery
Department, and could not get rid of the Grand Duke
Sergius, whose position at Court was too strong.

Guchkov and a number of Deputies and officers formed
a sort of informal club to discuss matters of State defense.
General Gurko took a leading part in the work. But it
displeased the Court. They were dubbed the "Young
Turk Party " and placed under a ban.

Sukhomlinov was now master of the situation as
regards the personnel, if not so much the materiel, of the
Army, and, without challenging, or in any way reflecting
upon the finding of the Court that tried him in August-
September, 1917, impartial critics will be disposed to

1 On this subject the author recalls a conversation with General Sukhom-
linov which has an anecdotal interest. Relating the arguments he had used, he
said: "I reminded His Majesty that even Napoleon declined to receive mote
than five ministerial reports in the course of a week. And here was the Tsar
having to pass upon the reports of twelve Ministers and of half a dozen sep-
arate heads of departments connected with the War Office. The Tsar replied
that the Kaiser managed to do it, so the Grand Duke had pointed out. To
this I rejoined: 'Yes, your Majesty, that may be so. But you are not the
Kaiser. He is older and more experienced. Just think yourself what will
happen when each of the departmental reports run counter to the other, as
they often do. You will have to make the decision, and it will be beyond your
capacity!'" It must be remembered that Sukhomlinov had been the Tsar's
tutor. What he said about the multiplicity of ministerial and departmental
reports was perfectly true, and experience had shown that the utmost con-
fusion often resulted from conflicting decisions endorsed by the unhappy
autocrat*

. POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 215

admit that he accomplished not a little for the better
organization of Russia's man-power, although he was
found guilty of delinquency in providing armaments.

In 1908 the standing Army was composed of Field and
Reserve formations. The former represented sixty-three
divisions of infantry, twenty-eight divisions of cavalry,
and thirty-one brigades of field artillery, all grouped in
thirty-one army corps, altogether about 528,000 bayonets,
70,000 sabers, and 3700 guns. The Reserve formations
represented equivalents of a little over six corps, com-
prising about 500,000 men. This brought up the total
peace strength in infantry to 1,280,000 men. On mobili-
zation the Reserve battalions expanded into regiments
of three-battalion strength, giving about eighteen addi-
tional Reserve corps, or 540,000 bayonets, while the
two-battalion line regiments (not counting the Guards)
on mobilization expanded to four-battalion strength,
giving 480,000 additional bayonets. Thus, on mobiliza-
tion the Army received over one million additional
effectives, and represented a total fighting strength of
2,800,000 bayonets.

In 1910 the Reserve formations were abolished. They
had not stood the test of war in the Japanese campaign.
They lacked esprit de corps and efficiency. They were
transformed into field units. The Duma had voted in
secret session (J909) an increase of the annual contingent
to nearly 460,000 men. The new organization, based
on a three years' service with the colors, took approxi-
mately the following form: seventy-five guards and line
divisions, each of sixteen battalions (with some minor
exceptions), and as many field batteries, grouped in thirty-
seven army corps, containing altogether 1,200,000 bay-
onets and 6000 guns. So far, the difference in bayonets
was slightly in favor of the old scheme, and the increase in
guns was "on paper." But in quality of fighting material
the new organization gave better promise. On mobiliza-

216 RUSSIA AT WAR

tion this superiority was also to be implied. Every one
of the regiments in the seventy army divisions "budded
off" a second-line regiment, regular cadres of young and
efficient officers and men being provided to form the
second-line units, while the parent-regiment "filled
up" with the pick of the men who had just been released
from active service. By this method Russia had 1,200,-
000 first-class, and over 1,100,000 second-class fighting
men available on mobilization.

At a conference summoned by the Tsar at Tsarskoe
Selo, on March 23, 1913, it was decided to further increase
the peace footing of the Army by 400,000 men, for which
purpose it was proposed to assign $111,500,000 in a lump
sum, or $45,500,000 annually. M. Kokovtsov agreed.
This enlarged program had been necessitated by the
clear and positive information received from the Russian
military representatives in Berlin, and the evidence
afforded by the secret intelligence service of German
designs to seek a decision on the battlefield. This informa-
tion showed that in 1908, as soon as Russia had begun
to think about repairing her armed defenses, the Germans
planned a war for 1909, and then, having humiliated
Russia, they again decided in 1910, as soon as they had
information about the first program, to force a war in
1913. But once more they could find no favorable oppor-
tunity. Then, having learned of the enlarged program
which was to be completed by 1918, they resolved finally
and irrevocably to defeat Russia's plans of independence.

The basis of the seven years* program was not
affected by the enlarged scheme. In fact the mobiliza-
tion of 1914 was carried out according to the plan laid
down in 1910, which was then somewhat superannuated.

It should be added that artillery brigades on mobiliza-
tion contained six-gun instead of eight-gun batteries,
whereby the difficulty of arming the second-line brigades
was partially overcome. Thus the strength of the active

POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 217

Army in field guns at the outbreak of war was nominally
about 5200. An artillery park (40,000 rounds) was
attached to each army corps.

The cavalry was little affected by the new scheme.
Cossack second- and third-line formations provided on
mobilization a total of over twenty divisions. Another
regular cavalry division was raised in the Caucasus,
besides a volunteer Native Horse Division (afterwards
nicknamed "The Savages "), bringing up the total to
fifty cavalry divisions, or 120,000 sabers, the largest
force of trained horsemen that modern warfare had
known. Each regular cavalry division was composed
of a Hussar, a Lancer, a Dragoon, and a Cossack regi-
ment, and was ordinarily attached to an army corps.
Alexander HI had converted all the line cavalry regiments
into dragoons and ordained very unbecoming uniforms.
Sukhomlinov, himself a hussar, restored all the glories
of the olden time. It had cost some money, but looked
decidedly effective on parade and at Court.

In medium and heavy guns the Army was woefully
ill-provided. There were altogether twenty-two mortar
divisions of 4.7 Krupp howitzers attached to army corps,
and twenty-one batteries of heavy artillery. In aero-
planes and wireless there was tremendous deficiency.

Another lamentable defect was the paucity of machine
guns. There were only four per regiment, and even this
number could not be rendered immediately available,
because harness and cartridge-belts had not been pre-
pared in sufficient quantity. Also there was a deficiency
of rifles. The Ordnance Department had "miscalcu-
lated," and besides, 150,000 rifles had been given to
Serbia before the war.

General Sukhomlinov was responsible for another
important change in the Russian defense system. He
abolished the fortresses in Poland, and moved four army
corps eastward to the Volga, constituting a new military

218 RUSSIA AT WAR

district at Kazan. He claimed that the fortress "idea"
was superannuated, that it weakened initiative among
commanders in the field, etc. The General Staff in
Paris was somewhat disconcerted, and an exchange of
views took place, which apparently satisfied the Allies.
Sukhomlinov argued that his scheme of army reorgani-
zation and the distribution of the new corps (one in the
Caucasus, two in Siberia, and three in European Russia)
left the position on the western border unweakened,
while it brought the new formations nearer to their sup-
plies and reserves and more easy of mobilization. But the
question of the fortresses gave rise to much controversy.
When the war broke out the dismantling of the great
strongholds of Novo-Georgievsk, Warsaw, and Ivangorod
had been substantially carried into effect. But the
services rendered by Ivangorod, hastily re-equipped, and
more particularly by Ossowiec, did not bear out Suk-
homlinov's theory.

Never in the history of the world had there been such
an army as the one that assembled on the Austro-German
frontiers by the end of August, 1914. As fighting mate-
rial the Russian infantryman was unrivaled. He could
fight and march, and suffer all the privations of cam-
paigning, on a modicum of food and comfort that only a
primitive rustic population could endure. Moreover, the
first-line regiments were splendidly disciplined and well
led, and they alone represented an army of nigh upon
1,500,000 bayonets. As for the 50,000 Guards, I do not
think they had their equals in any other armies in num-
bers and physique, if not in courage. They were the
pick and flower of a hundred million men of one race,
language, and creed. These giants looked upon Austrian
troops with the supremest contempt, and at first insisted
upon attacking them bolt upright, scorning to take cover.

More particularly interesting had been the history of
the Siberian troops, which deserves some attention as

POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 210

a record of military colonization. At the time when
the Great War began, the Siberian troops consisted of
five army corps, or ten divisions, in all about 160,000
bayonets. Some of the earliest units from which this
splendid force had developed had gone to the Far East
in the middle of the nineteenth century to safeguard the
borders, stretching for thousands of miles eastward from
the Urals to the very shores of the Pacific Ocean, the
Cossacks being too few for this vast zone. For service
in desert and in wild and uninhabited places, the Govern-
ment decided not to send newly conscripted recruits, but
officers and men drafted from active units.

At that time people knew so little about Siberia that
few were desirous of proceeding thither for service. Lots
were drawn by officers, and only the healthiest were
selected, while the men were detailed at the rate of ten
per company, soldiers able to read and write, healthy,
and of irreproachable behavior. 1

Preparations for the long journey were protracted and
complicated. Horses and conveyances had to be pre-
pared, and equipment obtained of a character more suit-
able to the distant region. The officers and some of the
men traveled with their families, taking with them domes-
tic cattle and all their household effects, prepared to sever
their ties with Europe. As far as the Urals the earlier
travelers proceeded by steamers and railways, but from
Ekaterinburg or Cheliabinsk the entire distance to the
Russo-Chinese frontier, six hundred miles, had to be
traversed on foot. To the Trans-Amur region the last
part of the journey was made by water. In front of
the battalions marched two companies in line; then
came the transport wagons with provisions, uniforms,
equipment, cartridges; then another company, and the
transport conveying officers 9 and soldiers 9 families.

In Western Siberia, where the route of the battalions

1 Colonel Smolianinov. The Timet Russian Supplement. Jan. 1915.

320 RUSSIA AT WAR

passed over the Great Siberian track, halts were made
in the villages, prosperous and thrifty, like all villages
in Siberia. Here the tired travelers rested a day or two,
and then continued their journey. But the farther they
proceeded towards the east the more difficult it was
to advance. The "taiga," or Siberian jungle, began,
with its narrow paths winding in and out, obstructed by
the thick-spreading tree-roots which protruded from the
swampy, uneven ground.

Thousands of mosquitoes and horse-flies hovered in
clouds over the column, depriving human beings and
horses of all peace, and when the battalion stopped for
the night a thick cordon of sentries with loaded rifles
was drawn round the sleepers, as no one could be sure
that somewhere near there was not prowling a bear,
quick to detect the scent of abundant fresh meat. Thus
they went on for weeks, passing towns, villages, and
detached zaimki, as the farms of well-to-do peasants
(often exiles originally) are called in Siberia, until they
reached the town of Srietensk, on the Shilka. Here
began loading on shallow-draught barges and rafts, and
the column transformed itself into a huge river transport,
slowly moving eastward, avoiding the inshore shallows.
This voyage was a long-awaited rest. Sitting in the
barges, the soldiers cleaned and dried themselves and
mended their overcoats, uniforms, and boots, which had
been ripped and torn in the forests. At sunset the
entire caravan made fast to the bank, and the passengers
landed and cooked supper.

With the arrival of the travelers at the appointed spot,
their privations were not yet ended. Many battalions, on
getting as far as Khabarovsk and receiving instructions
as to their post, encountered impenetrable forest and
continuous masses of graystone. Here their work began,
and, where till then the foot of man had never trod,
rang out the sound of ax and saw. By tfutumn, when

POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 221

terrible rains and wind from the sea begin, had arisen
a barrack settlement, seething with life. Thus arose and
were created almost all the towns and settlements of
the Far East — Khabarovsk, Novokievsk, Possiet, Iman,
Shkotovo, Barabash, De Castries.

The strategic importance of De Castries was enormous.
The sea at this spot forms a splendid harbor, of sufficient
depth and well protected, which could readily be utilized
for a hostile landing. Troops landed here, by making
use of Lake Kesi, could easily debouch on the Amur,
and without difficulty establish themselves in the middle
of its lower reaches, thus flanking the fortress of Niko-
laevsk, which closes ingress to the Amur from the Tatar
Straits. To-day De Castries is a fortified place. But
about five years ago there was nothing there save a light-
house and barracks for a company of infantry. It is dif-
ficult to imagine the gigantic work accomplished by these
companies engaged in preparing De Castries for conver-
sion into a fortress.

Years passed, and the battalions grew more and more
accustomed to the new conditions, which became easier
for every succeeding contingent of recruits. Every sol-
dier who joined the Siberian Rifles, irrespective of what
he was before conscription, passed through a severe
and laborious military school. During the first four
months of duty, on them devolved all the heavy work of
building, of felling trees, floating them down the rivers,
uprooting stumps. In the following year they entered
the hunting detachments formed from time to time in
every company for stalking bear, tiger, or deer. They
spent whole weeks in the jungle, so among the Siberian
riflemen there were a large number of first-class hunters
and exceptional shots. Work and hunting in the jungle
did not cease even in the winter, although the frosts reach
40 deg. to 49 deg. Fahr. A polusk&bka (short fur coat),
a shaggy black fur cap (papakha), felt boots, and a pair

222 RUSSIA AT WAR

of broad plain skis — these were the only things that
distinguished winter from summer equipment.

Four years of such service so inured the men to the
new regime, unfamiliar to natives of Central European
Russia, that a good fourth of them felt no desire to return
home, and settled in the Far East, working as laborers,
artisans, and farmers, creating there a new vigorous
and prosperous Russia, differing from the poor Russian
peasantry in Europe.
. During the last ten or fifteen years many of the condi-
tions of life had improved. Siberia and the Far East
was being energetically colonized and linked up with
civilization. But in the Siberian units before the war
might still be found a large cadre of officers who had
undergone all that has been described above. Every
day one of the companies of the regiment, in full marching
order, with the necessary transport, tents, and camp
kitchens, left barracks to go into the field or the jungle
for training, winter and summer alike.

Straight from the cars these Siberian columns were
hurled into the fight near Warsaw. And here, under
strange conditions, with an unfamiliar opponent, who had
at his disposal every technical appliance for slaughter
and destruction, they fought in accordance with the rules
of their Siberian school. Taught by experience to rely
upon their own efforts and not to look back for the
approach of reinforcements, one brigade fought two
days with two corps of Germans, sustaining the shock
against the Polish capital. Only on the third day did
reinforcements arrive, when a fierce conflict raged
along the whole line, terminating in the rout of the
Germans. In this struggle only a handful of the sur-
vivors of the Siberian Rifles took part; the remainder had
fallen, honorably vindicating their wonderful traditions.
Later, at Augustovo, the Third Siberian Corps marched
thirty miles and then charged Hindenburg's men with
the bayonet and drove them back to East Prussia.

POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 228

The three army corps from the Caucasus were picked
troops, with traditions older and more glorious than
those of the Siberians. They had long been recruited
from the hardy Russian settlers on the Caucasian border-
land, men of splendid physique, reared in a sunny land
of mountains and plains, inured to hardship, to burning
heat and searching cold, imbued with traditions that
were as inspiring as those of their near relations, the
Cossacks. At Ivangorod the Third Caucasian Corps,
under General Irmanov, performed prodigies of valor.
One division, commanded by General Ivanov, held out
for nine days on the left bank of the Vistula in marsh-
lands, with water up to their waists and necks, till the
Guards came up, and then, together, they drove the
enemy helter-skelter to the very doors of Cracow.

The Finland Rifles represented a younger but not
less seasoned force. They had been raised when, the
Finns declining to serve in the Russian Army, it became
necessary to assure the northern borderlands against
hostile invasion. All the officers and N.C.O.'s were
picked men. Service in Finland was much sought after,
owing to the greater comfort and cheapness of living in
the Grand Duchy, and vacancies were readily filled up.
The Finland Corps (the XXIId) had been brought up
to a high standard of efficiency. Summer and winter
the men were constantly on campaign service. Like
the Siberians and Caucasians they had their hunting
companies, which used to travel on skis hundreds of
miles into the forests around Ladoga and Onega after
bear and elk in winter and lesser game in summer and
autumn. These men fought splendidly at Augustovo.
One company was surrounded by the Germans, held its
trenches for fourteen days, and then, having expended
the last cartridge and biscuit, fought its way back to
the Niemen, losing four-fifths of its strength in killed
and wounded.

CHAPTER XIX

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER

Russian Offensive — Distribution of Armies — Pressure Diverted from Allfc
Hindenburg Intervenes — Strategy Upset — A Decisive Battle — Incom-
petent Generals — Ruzsky'B Recovery — Galician Campaign — No Muni-
tions — Japan's Offer — Ivanov Left in Ignorance — No Boots, no Rifles —
The Great Retreat — Alexeiev — The Tsar as Generalissimo — Excessive
Mobilization — Lack of Unity and Modern Methods — Allies Help —
Sacrifices in Vain — Russia's Losses — The Navy.

It would be a work of supererogation to retrace all the
vicissitudes of the Russian campaign during the two
and a half years of war under the Old Regime. But
some of its outstanding features have still to be more
clearly elucidated. Russia took the offensive at the
outset for two reasons: firstly, because her Army had
been strengthened sufficiently to warrant this course,
and the advantages of offensive strategy were obvious;
secondly, because "Russia had to support her Allies.
According to the plan jointly agreed upon, it fell to her
share to divert the attention of Germany from France." 1

A general offensive against the Austro-German coali-
tion necessitated the clearing of Russia's flanks in Poland,
so that the huge armies assembled behind the Niemen,
the Vistula, and the Dnieper could freely utilize the
Polish salient as a place d'armes whence they could launch
themselves into Silesia, cut off the Austrians, and menace
Berlin. Such was the problem set before the High Com-
mand at the Headquarters near Baranovichi in August,
1914.

On August 16th the mobilization and concentration

1 General Yanushkevich (I.e.).
224

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 235

of the armies was completed. General N. I. Ivanov
commanded the Southern or Kiev group; General Zhil-
insky the Vilna or Northern group. Their forces were
about equal. Each had about 1,200,000 bayonets, over
2000 guns, and huge masses of cavalry. Each launched
his main attack on the same day, August 17th, after
preliminary reconnaissances and skirmishes by the horse-
men. In both cases enemy territory was invaded.

The difference between the respective merits of the
Staff work soon became apparent. General Alexeiev,
directing the operations in the south, never faltered or
made a mistake, and, thanks to his remarkable talents,
the men under the leadership of Generals Ruzsky, Brusilov,
and Radko-Dmitriev scored an almost uninterrupted
series of brilliant victories, successively capturing posi-
tions of great strength at Zaleshchiki, Halich, Tarnopol,
and Bzhezany, "rushing" Lemberg (September 2, 1914),
reducing the great fortress of Pshemysl (March 21, 1915),
and, earlier, crossing the Carpathians, threatened the
plain of Hungary and came within a few miles of Cracow.'

They were superior in numbers to the enemy, but,
on the other hand, they had to overcome tremendous
obstacles and almost throughout these operations they
were short of munitions.

In the north, Zhilinsky had an overwhelming superi-
ority over the Germans. Only five corps had been left
to guard the Prussian frontier while the bulk of Wilhelm's
hosts were hurled against France. In East Prussia the
Germans had two active corps and some reserve forma-
tions and garrison troops equivalent in number to about
two corps. Against this force Generals Rennenkampf
and Samsonov each wielded an army of five army corps
of first-line troops.

1 Many of the Slav soldiers of Austria-Hungary, forming a large portion of
the Army, went over to the Russians, thereby greatly facilitating the Russian
advance. Subsequently, the Csechs and Slovaks entered the Russian service.

226 RUSSIA AT WAR

Rennenkampf *s cavalry, including the Guards (many
of whose officers were of the Baltic-German nobility),
simply romped into East Prussia. Eydtkuhnen was occu-
pied August 6th; two days later, the Chevalier and
Horse Guards rode down German batteries; on August
17th the Prussian forces were smashed at Stalluponen;
Insterburg fell August 24th; the Russian right was near
Konigsberg, their outposts as far west as Bartenstein,
and the whole of the northeastern corner of "Junker-
land " was in their power.

Samsonov's army having concentrated behind the
Narew, he proceeded to direct his main thrust from
Soldau, in the southwest corner of the province, towards
Allenstein, and, having turned the "impregnable" de-
fenses of Mazuria, with its lakes and swamps, to join
hands with Rennenkampf and sweep East Prussia clear
of the enemy. His troops crossed the frontier and took
Soldau, Neudenburg, and Allenstein; then, after a ten
days 9 fierce engagement captured Frankenau (August
24th and 25th).

The position was now (August 24th) as follows:
Rennenkampf held the line Friedland-Gerdauen-Norden-
burg-Angerburg, facing southwest. Samsonov occupied
the triangle Soldau-Allenstein-Frankenau, facing north-
west. And the interval between the armies was being
scoured by Russian cavalry, who had almost met. 1 But
in both armies there was lack of direction and manage-
ment. Neither General used his opportunities for captur-
ing important lines of road and railway, with which the
province had been richly endowed for strategic purposes.

Rennenkampf had wasted his time in amenities with
the Brandenburgers, seeking to impress them by the
humane and kindly disposition of the Russian troops,
which was repaid at every opportunity by the sniping
of Russian soldiers. His Staff appear to have broken

1 A'distance of only sixteen miles separated the armies.

SOIDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 227

down at the crucial moment. Instead of hastening to
join Samsonov, they issued orders and counter-orders,
so that the bewildered commanders did not know what
to do. Meanwhile the Staff had made no arrangements
whatever for a possible retreat.

Samsonov, recently commanding in Turkestan, had
joined his army when its advance had already begun.
He had been detained, it seems, by General ZhUinsky at
Vilna. So he was unable to personally supervise the
initial arrangements of his move into enemy territory.
To this fact must be ascribed the astounding neglect of
assuring the safety of his left flank, which soon gave the
enemy his chance, and of providing food and ammuni-
tion for some of his corps. The food and ammunition
had been "delayed." He had three divisions of cavalry
and should have been able to secure himself from surprise.
But the cavalry had all been sent on in front.

The Germans had been doing their best to hamper
the advance of the invaders, but wisely contented them-
selves with delaying battles. The situation on August
23d was wellnigh desperate. Refugees were flocking
into Berlin, and it looked as if nothing could prevent
the occupation of East Prussia. Heeding the clamor
of Junkerland, the German Headquarters Staff finally
gave orders to send troops from the West. They were
seen entraining in Belgium on Friday night, August 28th.
But on the 23d Hindenburg had assumed charge, and
immediately took advantage of the mistakes committed
by the Russians. 1 Assembling what troops he could,
the remnants of two corps from Konigsberg and the
scrapings from Thorn and other fortress garrisons, he
struck at Samsonov's left, cutting off supplies from the
Russian 1st Army Corps under General Artomonov,
which it seems had no ammunition, and, as a consequence

1 It is said that the Russian wireless messages interchanged by the armies
were not even coded, and this greatly helped the German counter-move.

228 RUSSIA AT WAR

thereof, Artomonov retired, exposing the whole of Sam-
sonov's left flank. He then struck at Soldau, Samsonov's
main line of retreat. Soldau fell on the 26th. Samsonov
tried desperately on the following day to recapture it
He had to fall back upon Neudenburg, whence he had
no way of escape. Meanwhile Hindenburg's scratch
army, skilfully handled, was driving the loosely strung
out Russian forces into the Mazurian swamps. They
fought desperately for six days; then 90,000 surrendered
and the remainder escaped into the woods, leaving 30,000
of their comrades killed, wounded, or drowned, and, finally,
straggled into Poland. Nearly 100,000 men subsequently
rejoined the colors, but the tales they brought back with
them inflicted a tremendous blow upon the prestige of
their commanders.

A British officer had joined Samsonov in the woods
near Neudenburg some hours before the disaster had
become irreparable. Urging him to immediately return
lest the enemy's cavalry should have already closed all
avenues of escape, Samsonov said: "My right flank
(the VTth and Xlllth Corps) is crushed, my left (the
1st Corps) does not exist. I cannot go back. I am going
forward," and pointing northwestward, he shook hands
and resumed his study of the maps spread out by the
roadside. Soon afterwards he and his Staff were fugi-
tives, and, unable to survive the loss of his army, he shot
himself.

Hindenburg lost no time in following up his success.
Again he struck northeastward to intercept Rennen-
kampf 's line of retreat. A disaster of equal magnitude
to that of Samsonov's army was averted solely by
the cavalry. A whole corps under General Khan of
Nakhichevan, including a division commanded by Gen-
eral Gurko, swept across the line of the German advance
and enabled the army to recross the frontier with the loss
of some 30,000 prisoners. The retreat was indeed a

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 2S9

terrible one, several corps retiring simultaneously along
one road, wider the fire of German artillery, who unlim-
bered their guns in the open within a few hundred yards
of the highway. And every window in every town or
village traversed by the Russians was belching missiles,
old guns, horse-pistols, and blunderbusses having been
mobilized to speed the parting "guests."

The whole of Samsonov's artillery and much of Ren-
nenkampf's had been lost. Also some 400,000 rounds
of shell — a terrible sacrifice, for a shortage of munitions
had already begun to make itself felt.

Hindenburg unwarily pursued the Russians to the
Niemen. General Ruzsky, the victor of Lemberg, having
taken command in the north, soon turned the tables
on the invaders at Augustovo, and again punished them
in February, when, aided by Colonel Miasoiedov, their
secret agent on the Staff of General Siever's corps (the
Xth), the Germans turned its flank and nearly crumpled
up the whole of the Niemen front.

Meanwhile, Hindenburg had gone to other and more
important scenes. He had destroyed the Russian plan
of a combined offensive. He now proceeded to deprive
them of their strategical position in Poland, whereby
he hoped at one stroke to drive their northern group
beyond the Vistula and check the advance of the southern
armies on Cracow. Twice he struck and twice he failed.
But on each occasion the Austrians secured a respite,
General Ivanov's troops having to send aid. In these
onslaughts Hindenburg had the help of troops brought
from the West in response to the call of Brandenburg.

Russia had thus fulfilled her appointed task. She
had diverted some of the German legions from sadly
harassed France. But, owing to mismanagement and
inefficiency on the part of her Generals, she had done so
with incalculable prejudice to the future success of her own
and Allied plans. The Battle of Soldau, or Tannenberg,

280 RUSSIA AT WAR

as the Germans quite arbitrarily named it for purposes
of their own, 1 was one of the few great decisive battles
in history. From its effects Russian strategy was not
destined to recover, and for this reason I have described
the East Prussian campaign somewhat in detail, utilizing
the information I had been able to obtain from inde-
pendent — not official — sources, from the lips of officers
and soldiers who had been engaged therein. The whole
subsequent record of the struggle between Russia and
the Central Powers bears the imprint of this disaster.
Not in vain did the Germans idolize Hindenburg, al-
though I have shown that Hindenburg's task was unhap-
pily not a very difficult one.

The final and crowning disaster of the great retreat
was due to causes similar to those that had brought about
Hindenburg's victory — lack of organization and co-ordina-
tion. The scarcity of shells was noticeable in the early
days of the war. As a matter of fact, on August 21, 1914,
the Artillery Department had received a telegram from
the Northern Front asking for "more munitions." Ex-
perience of the first days of war had shattered all the
calculations that had been based upon the lessons of the
Japanese campaign. From that time onward the cry
for munitions never ceased. In February, 1915, the
requirements of all the armies were estimated at 60 parks
(2,400,000 rounds) per month. Instead of that they
received 8 parks (480,000 rounds). 2 Why, it may be
asked, was the Southern Army group thrust forward in
reckless fashion when there was no prospect of supplying it

1 At Tannenberg, a village some distance from Soldau, a great battle was
fought July 15, 1410, between the Teutonic Knights and a Slay army composed
of Poles, Russians, and Lithuanians, in which the Germans were completely
routed. By attributing the same name to the Battle of Soldau, the descend-
ants of the vanquished Teutons flattered their own pride and revenged them-
selves for the historical ignominy which they had sustained at the hands of the
despised Slav races.

8 General G. Danilov, D.M.O. at G.H.Q. The Sukhomlinov trial

e " RuaitBtSloto")

thwttiern Front would a

opened (July 19. 1917) 12 divisi<
although it was known that the
advancing (on Tarnopol). The ]

ropBgsoda purposes. The in

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 281

with shells? The answer is to be found in the complete
estrangement that existed between Headquarters and
the War Departments. General Sukhomlinov was mak-
ing promises which could not be fulfilled and Headquarters
was blaming him for not doing the impossible.

General Ivanov was kept in ignorance of the real
state of affairs, and allowed to do what he pleased. Gen-
eral Ivanov undertook the campaign in the Carpathians
at his own risk and peril, hoping that shells would be
supplied to him. He did not consider it possible to
remain inactive, because inactivity in the field is fatal. 1

General Vernander, Assistant Minister of War, had
summoned representatives of twenty-two firms and asked
them to help. But "they demanded such huge sub-
sidies that we could do nothing." Besides, his depart-
ment was "arranging technical conditions." In the early
days of January, 1915, designs and specifications were
handed to agents of American firms and Sukhomlinov
expected to obtain deliveries in April. These munitions
did begin to arrive in April, but in April, 1916.

The Army also lacked rifles, boots, and clothing.
President Rodzianko related in Court that he had been to
the Stavka (General Headquarters) in October, 1914,
to discuss these matters. The Grand Duke asked him to
intercede with the Emperor. M. Rodzianko recom-
mended wide recourse to the Zemstvos, for which purpose
he proposed to summon a Zemstvo Congress. The Min-
ister of the Interior (M. Maklakov) retorted: "I know
what you want — to prepare a revolution."

In January, 1915, the Duma took up the question.
Sukhomlinov promised his assistance, but nothing was
done. Then, in March, M. Rodzianko again visited the
Stavka. The Grand Duke said: "The Army cannot go
on fighting without rifles or boots." M. Rodzianko
went to Galicia "to see for himself," as the Grand Duke

1 General Yanuahkevkh (La).

282 RUSSIA AT WAR

had suggested. He was with the Third Army (General
Radko-Dmitriev) and witnessed enemy attacks when
the Russian artillery had only three rounds per gun. He
saw soldiers armed with sticks. Radko wept: He said
"I cannot hold out unless I have arms. 1 We shall have
to surrender all that we have won/' M. Rodzianko
saw General Komilov at the place which he managed
to hold till he was wounded and taken prisoner. After
that M. Rodzianko went back to the Stavka. "You
see, I was right/ 9 exclaimed the Grand Duke. Then
M. Rodzianko asked leave to bring the whole matter before
the Tsar and, on behalf of the Duma, to insist upon
energetic measures being taken. The Tsar agreed to
appoint a Special Conference. Evidence of departmental
chaos and intrigue and of personal rivalry between
General Sukhomlinov and the Grand Duke Sergius was
so overwhelming that General Sukhomlinov was dis-
missed. But the Artillery Department still continued
its obstructive methods. Thereupon M. Rodzianko went
to the Grand Duke Sergius and said to him: "Unless
you resign I shall have you exposed in the Duma." The
Grand Duke was then appointed to another post: In-
spector General of Ordnance.

In April, 1915, the Special Conference drew up a com-
prehensive scheme of mobilizing industries for immediate
munition production. This scheme was laid by till
August "to wait for the Duma Committee," as General
Yanushkevich afterwards stated. An offer of 1,000,000
rifles from Japan was declined because they were of a
different caliber from the Russian rifle. Viscount Motono,
the Japanese Ambassador in Petrograd, had suggested
to General Sukhomlinov in the early months of the war

1 The wastage of rifles during the early months of the war had been very
great, as it necessarily must be in field warfare, especially going over enormous
distances, as the Russian Army had done. Moreover, there was no organiza-
tion then to collect the rifles of wounded men or to utilise captured rifles.

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 238

that Japanese industries could supply munitions, and had
pointed out that, during their own war with Russia,
the Japanese had suffered greatly from shortage of muni-
tions till they had mobilized their industries. The offer
and the advice were both disregarded till long afterwards*

On May 2, 1915, General Mackensen, having stiffened
the Austrian ranks with picked German troops, opened
a bombardment such as* the Russian Army had never
known. Something like 700,000 shells burst upon the
shallow Russian trenches. 1 The much-vaunted "pha-
lanx" pierced Radko-Dmitriev's single line; the Rus-
sians had no ammuniton. The enemy mustered twenty-
four army corps against the Russian fourteen, and the
Russians had to retreat. They fought stubbornly, hero-
ically. Who can describe all the tragedy of that retreat!
It will live for many a year in the minds of those who
came through it alive. It left an aftermath of bitter-
ness and disappointment which did much to strengthen
the ferment of revolution.

Warsaw fell August 5, 1915. Novo-Georgievsk capit-
ulated — through treachery, it is said — August 19th,
uncovering the Russian flank. Brest-Litovsk, the great
Lithuanian border stronghold, fell August 25th. Worst
of all, Kovno had fallen a week earlier, also through
treachery, deserted by its Commandant, who fled in-
land and was arrested — a raving lunatic. Kovno was
immensely strong, yet it did not resist more than seven
days. This catastrophe threatened to close the main
avenue of escape for the tortured armies. The road
eastward through the Pripiat marshes was already
overthronged by countless fugitives. 2 Artillery could

1 The Russian troops had not been trained to trench warfare and were con-
stitutionally averse to "digging in." This was noticeable during the first year
of the war, and, to a lesser degree, afterwards.

1 More than 8,000,000 Poles, Lithuanians, Galicians, and Jews fled east-
ward into Russia during the great retreat. The population of Petrograd and
Moscow increased by nearly 1,000,000.

284 RUSSIA AT WAR

not pass through this concourse without throwing carts
with their human freight into the morass on either
side. Many thousands thus perished and many more
thousands died on the way.

At this appalling conjuncture of disasters the Tsar
decided to assume the High Command (September 5,
1915). He alleged a chivalrous motive: he did not
desire to wrest anyone's laurels, so he came in when
things looked gloomiest. But he himself did not realize
that he was acting as a puppet in the hands of Raz-
putin, who had taken this opportunity to settle old
scores with the Grand Duke. He appointed General
Alexeiev his Chief of Staff. The Grand Duke Nicholas
Nikolaievich went to take command in the Caucasus,
where General Yudenich secured for him afterwards a
series of brilliant victories against the Turks, resulting
in the capture of Erzerum, Erzinghian, and Trebizond.
It is interesting to note that before his departure the
Grand Duke said to a friend: "If I had had my choice
I should also have selected General Alexeiev, but I
took the man that was given to me. He was in favor
then. He is in disfavor now. I am not going to de-
sert him when he is down." And General Yanush-
kevich went with him as his assistant, but he never
again had anything to do with armies in the field.

General Alexeiev succeeded in an apparently hopeless
task. He extricated all the northern armies from the
jaws of the trap that was closing upon them. The
Guards had set their back against Vilna and held
open one of the jaws. A daring German cavalry raid
to Molodechno was countered, and finally, when the
order to evacuate Vilna came (September 18th), the
weary, war-stained armies marched across country
along the route that had carried Napoleon's invader's
in 1812.

Modestly, General Alexeiev told me afterwards: "It

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER «35

was our men's endurance on the march that saved us."
He was only partly right.

The armies in the field had been under the undivided
control of their commanders. There had been no inter-
ference from Petrograd or Tsarskoe Selo. The reserve
formations in the rear had, on the other hand, no con-
nection except with the War Office. And here, again
utter chaos and inefficiency had prevailed. The reserves,
hurried up during the retreat, were often raw peasants
who had never handled a rifle, who had not the rudi-
ments of military training or discipline, and were armed
only with sticks. In tens and in hundreds of thousands
they fell prisoners into the hands of the Germans, adding
only to the confusion of the retreat. General Alexeiev
set himself to remedy this evil. He wanted a substantial
support for future operations. The War Office had an
efficient chief in General Polivanov, who, however, did
not long remain there because he was not liked at Court,
and General Shuvaiev, a commissariat expert, took his
place. The War Department now went to the other
extreme, from excess of zeal towards the Tsar, now
Generalissimo. Too many men were called out — mil-
lions and millions in excess of efficient requirements,
needlessly irritating the villagers, reducing agricultural
labor and the production of foodstuffs.

Russia's armies scored many a gallant victory in the
several offensives afterwards undertaken by General
Brusilov, wherein such leaders as Kaledin, Lechitsky,
Sakharov, Shcherbacher, Lesh, Count Keller, and others
distinguished themselves. The Dvinsk and Riga held
their positions stanchly, and even drove back the enemy.
(Platonovka, November, 1915.)

Munitions and heavy guns had increased very largely.
Russia's Allies helped her, but she herself produced
over 80 per cent of all her own requirements. The
wastage of rifles had so diminished in trench warfare

236 RUSSIA AT WAR

that now there was a fair sufficiency. But in
improvements, in modern applications of trench artil-
lery, etc., the War Department still continued its old
methods. While I was at the Southwestern Front
in December, 1915, thousands of soldiers' lives were
wasted because no trench mortars were available. The
Artillery Department had been "experimenting" to
"improve" French and British models. Later, General
Lukomsky, leaving the War Office to take command
of a division, was able with the use of trench mortars
to score easy successes in the Carpathians without
much loss of life.

Under the influence of the Old Regime persistent
unwillingness had always been shown to any direct
contact between the Russian and Allied Armies. Of-
ficers applying for temporary service in France in order
to acquaint themselves with the latest methods were
not encouraged.

Of the Siberian, Caucasian, and Finland, as well
of the first and even the second line regiments that
fought so gallantly in 1914 and 1915 little remained
save the name. They had been filled and refilled.
The losses during the war were heavy, if prisoners be
counted in. Casualties in killed and wounded of course
affected chiefly the fighting units, and more particu-
larly the infantry. By the end of 1915 the fighting
units had lost 200 and even 300 per cent of their effect-
ives. 1 One colonel told me that he had nearly 25,000
men on the strength of the regiment, of whom less than
8000 were then in the ranks; the remainder had been
killed, wounded, or incapacitated for further service.

1 Losses in the artillery averaged about SO per cent; in the cavalry about
£5 per cent. Officers of these arms were not strangers to their men; hence
these men remained disciplined long after the infantry had become "revolu-
tionized." Moreover, the younger infantrymen, who were better educated,
had been replaced by older men, who were mostly illiterate.

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 237

On a rough estimate the total losses at the beginning
of the Revolution may be stated at 4,500,000, including
500,000 killed, nearly 2,000,000 wounded or invalided,
and over 2,000,000 prisoners. At the end of 1915 the
men on service numbered 6,000,000. Something like
16,000,000 men had been "called up" by the end of
1916, or nearly 10 per cent of the population. Approx-
imately 8,000,000 men were then distributed in the
various towns and cities, undergoing instruction, more
or less appropriate, and guarding communications, etc.

It was said soon after the war began that the shortage
of officers had reached an enormous figure — 30,000 to
50,000. Training corps, established in various parts
of the country, provided a contingent of prdporshchiki
(ensigns, or the equivalent of our temporary second-
lieutenants) whose loyalty and patriotism could not
compensate for their lack of efficiency, whence the
prestige of officers was sadly diminished in the eyes
of their men.

The depreciation in the fighting value of old first-
line units owing to losses was counterbalanced by notice-
able improvement in quality of the new second line.
General Alexeiev considered them equal to the new
first line. Russia's Regular Army of over 2,000,000 was
replaced in 1916 by a serviceable host of 4,000,000 com-
batants, resembling a militia rather than a regular
army. But the Germans did not possess material of
a much higher quality, while the Austrians were dis-
tinctly inferior.

Munition supply had increased very largely in 1916.
During the summer of that year I was present at the
operations near Baranovichi. General Ewert made an
effort to break the German line towards Vilna and so
force the enemy back from the Dvinsk and Riga
Fronts. The artillery preparation and the attack pro-
ceeded under my eyes. The Russian guns were su-

238 RUSSIA AT WAR

perior in numbers, in caliber, and in range. There was
no lack of munitions. Three lines of trenches fell be-
fore the attacking waves of infantry, including strong
points which the enemy had been preparing since Sep-
tember of the preceding year. But the operation failed.
And I have no hesitation in saying that the failure was
due to errors of organization, training, and leadership
much more than to other causes. The losses were very
heavy, chiefly because infantry attack and artillery
preparation and support were not properly combined.
I then appealed to Headquarters to send officers to the
Allied Armies and invite instruction. But nothing came
of it; and, I may add — through no fault of General
Alexeiev.

I have not spoken of the Navy in connection with
program or fighting, but in both respects it had
compared very well with the record of the land services.
Admiral Grigorovich had done what he could to bring
ships and men to a high standard of strength and effi-
ciency. Shipbuilding had given the Baltic Fleet two
squadrons of super-Dreadnoughts and two modern units
of the largest type to the Black Sea. The Baltic Fleet
could not, of course, hope to deal with the combined
strength of Germany's battleships. But once Great
Britain was in the war, the Russians could feel more or
less secure. When Admiral Beatty came with his Battle
Cruiser squadron to Reval and Kronstadt in the summer
of 1914, he and his officers and men received an enthu-
siastic welcome from the Russian sailors. That visit
encouraged hopes in Russian breasts that they would
not be left to fight the Germans alone. And, some
weeks later, a French squadron came, bringing M. Poin-
car6 on his last visit to the Russian Government.

The Baltic Fleet was then under the command of
Admiral Essen, an eminently capable leader, who was
succeeded on his untimely decease by Admiral Kanin*

Who ltd bil army to victory and then laved the whole
Southwettern Front from diaaater by stern meuure* ol
diaoipline. He wu betrayed by Keremky and the Bdihe-
riU. Theionofaeimple Siberian Ooesark and a Burial
mother haroee by bi* own unaided exertion*, by sheer
lore* of otniua and valor, to be Rumib'i «reateat military
leader. He waa then >ted only 47.

VABILIEVICH

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 2S9

Admiral (then Captain) Kedrov had greatly improved
gunnery in the fleet. Our submarines entered the
Baltic soon after the war began and rendered very
substantia] assistance, sallying forth even from ice-
locked harbors. The Russian Naval Intelligence was
excellent. little, however, could be done to prevent
the Germans from taking Libau. On the other hand,
all attempts to enter the Gulf of Riga were successfully
defeated till the Revolution had undermined discipline
and enabled the Germans to seize the waters and the
islands of the Gulf.

In the Black Sea, Russian sailors quickly asserted
their mastery over the German raider and submarine
menace, Russian submarines constantly intercepted the
transport of coal from Asia Minor to Constantinople
and maintained a ceaseless and silent vigil on and around
the Bosporus, remaining deeply submerged during the
long hours of daylight to avoid German aeroplane bombs.
These submarines twice torpedoed the Goeben and Breslau,
necessitating prolonged repairs to those scourges.

Under Kerensky the twelve Russian Dreadnoughts
in the Baltic failed to challenge a numerically inferior
German force, and the Fleet Committee sided with Lenin
in demanding a "democratic" peace. In November
they joined Lenin. Two months later some of the
Black Sea units took part in a Bolshevist plot instigated
by German agents, and the sailors murdered four Ad-
mirals and sixty officers. In 1918 the Black Sea war-
ships, cut off from their bases by the German occupa-
tion of the littoral, had to surrender. The Germans
also captured a whole fleet of warships and transports
that had been built at Nikolaiev for an invasion of
Turkey. The Revolution disabled Russia at a time
when combined land and sea operations against Germany
and her allies would have assured a decisive victory.

CHAPTER XX

"TOE HUN WITHIN THE GATES"

Prisoners of War— Dependence on German Goods — Peasants in Bags— Ger-
man ''Capture" of Industries and Coal Supply — Northern Trade Routes
Undeveloped — The Archangel Explosion.

It was not the actual losses in the war that depressed
the Army and the nation, but the apparent hopelessness
of the struggle. The enemy had taken 2,000,000 pris-
oners, mostly untrained reserves, but the Russians had
captured a larger number (nearly 2,000,000 Austrians
and about 200,000 Germans). The Austrian prisoners
were working in the villages. Many of them belonged to
Slav races, Galicians, Czechs, Slovaks, etc., or Rumanes,
who could be trusted. The Germans were sent farther
North and East. They afterwards helped the Bol-
sheviki in Eastern Russia and Siberia.

f Owing to the lack of co-ordination between the War
Departments, skilled labor had been recklessly con-
scribed at the outbreak of war for service in the trenches,
and the mobilization of industries thus became still
more difficult. From the same cause the output of the
Donetz coal mines fell considerably. This affected the
great steel and iron works in the South, and still more
the munition works in Petrograd, 1 which had formerly

1 The Putilov works, with a trebled staff of oyer 50,000 hands, was able in
1016 to produce more munitions in one month than could be received from the
Allies in a whole year. The shortage of coal prevented a further increase of
output. The transfer of these works to the coal and iron regions in the South
was repeatedly urged, but the Government would not take a decision. Many
of the important rubber and munition works at Riga were "evacuated" into
the interior during 1915-16.

240

"THE HUN WITHIN THE GATES"

242 . . . RUSSIA AT WAR

obtained their supplies from Great Britain. Before the
war, Westphalian coal was fast ousting British fuel,
thanks to the monopoly that German exporters (for
secret military reasons) were introducing under the
superintendence of Herr Hugo Stinnes.

The Germans already held a virtual monopoly on
scores of imported goods, from upholsterer's nails to
steam-hammers, practically all chemical and pharma-
ceutical products and electrical fittings and machinery.
The war deprived Russia of most of the appurtenances
of modern life and comfort. British firms had not
sufficiently cultivated the Russian market, and, more-
over, owing to the severance of communications, it
was exceedingly difficult for them to remedy the neglect.
According to the statement made before the Moscow
Conference in August, 1917, by the Minister of Supplies,
Russia was then receiving only 16 per cent of her muni-
tions from abroad, but the proportion of goods obtained
for the open market was too trifling to bear any com-
parison. Imports from Germany had not been for-
bidden during the war: they were penalized by in-
creased customs duties; but all that was imported
through the frontier station at Tornea in the North of
Finland in the form of German, Swedish and Danish,
goods could not even begin to satisfy Russia's require-
ments. Unfortunately, champagne was "smuggled" to
the detriment of necessaries, the price per bottle in
Petrograd having risen to 150 rubles (nominally $75)
during the Revolution.

None of the great Allied or enemy nations were
suffering from the effects of the war to an extent that
could be compared with the privations of the Russian
people, more particularly the middle class and the
peasants. The former were underfed and ill-clad. Boots,
shoes, and goloshes were almost unobtainable. I have
seen thousands of people waiting all night in the hope
of buying a pair of boots, glad to pay any sum ($25

M THE HUN WITHIN THE GATES" 843

and even $50 for footgear that used to be sold for $5).
An ordinary overcoat which formerly cost $10 or $15
was selling for $60 or $100. (Under the Bolshevist regime
these prices rose tenfold.) The earnings of a whole month
went to pay for a pair of shoes, and nothing remained
for food, which had increased in price tenfold. The
peasants had food, but no clothing. How far would
seven inches of cotton goods suffice to cover the naked-
ness of man or woman? They went about in their old
cotton rags. Cloth was, of course, out of the question.
It had all been monopolized for the Army. Already,
at the end of 1916, it was extremely difficult to obtain
common woolen garments in Petrograd. In the villages
they had long ago been unprocurable. The peasants
had only their sheepskin coats and what homespun
material they could still weave. And even this source
of supply had been greatly reduced by the wholesale
slaughter of sheep for the f oodless market.

Li order to strengthen their hold upon the Russian
consumer and to circumvent protective duties the Ger-
mans had opened many large industrial enterprises in
the country, and, more particularly in the chemical,
electrical, and engineering branches. These works were
taken over by the Russian Government after war had
broken out, and helped very much to increase the out-
put 1 of munitions. But the Germans had cunningly

1 Many of the German manufacturers and merchants were exiled to the
northern provinces, to the Urals and to Siberia, as enemy subjects. There
they laid their plans and made their arrangements for the future development
of their economic conquest of Russia. The German prisoners of war, and more
particularly the officers, were studying Russian (books for this purpose were
actually imported from Leipzig during the war), and preparing themselves
to take part in a "peaceful" invasion of the country after the war. Another
instance of German "forethought" may be cited here. During the Revolution
it became known from statements made by German prisoners that many
mobilised industries had been reconverted to peace production in view of immi-
nent separate peace with Russia and the enormous requirements of the Russian
markets. Germany's terms to Lenin provided for duty-free entry of German
goods and fifteen years' monopoly of the Russian grain trade.

£44 RUSSIA AT WAR

contrived their equipment in such a manner that some
essential process had to be carried out in Germany. To
remedy the deficiency in war-time was difficult. How-
ever, jt was done — often with the help of German tools
and machinery supplied through the "disinterested"
medium of Swedish agents.

Much of the burden and stress of war might have
been "obviated by Russia had the Government taken the
most elementary precautions to assure communications
with Allied or friendly countries in the event of a con-
flict with Germany. The General Staff knew positively
in 1908 that Germany meant to fight, yet nothing was
done to repair the deficiency. A railway to the Murman
coast had been talked about twenty-five years ago.
The scheme was revived twenty years later to develop
the fisheries on the newly discovered Kanin banks,
whence British trawlers were drawing a fabulous harvest.
Still nothing was done. It did not suit the watchful
Germans that anything should be done; their agents
in Petrograd knew how to clog the bureaucratic cog-
wheels. When the war-cloud burst, Russia had a
single-track narrow-gage line between Vologda and
Archangel and no other communication with her arctic
seaboard except the fitful waterway of the Northern
Dvina, frozen or shallowed for eight months in the year.

Months and years of war passed before the railway
to the Murman was begun and completed and the Arch-
angel gage widened. By the autumn of 1917 both
were in fairly good working order. Prior to that time
enormous difficulties had been encountered in the trans-
port of armaments and other war material — difficulties
that were due to blundering and red tape, and largely
to German machinations in the Petrograd chanceries,
which were far more harmful than German mines dropped
by innocent-looking "neutrals" in the White Sea.

I shall cite one example. It will help us to under-

"THE HUN^WrrfflN THE GATES" 245

stand how true had been the saying that "Russia had
to fight the German within, as well as the German
without, her gates." By the end of July, 1916, an im-
posing accumulation of stores was spread along the
shore at Archangel awaiting transport to the interior.
The narrow-gage railway had been quite incapable of
handling such traffic. Now things began to look more
hopeful The wide gage was in operation. Train upon
train had been loaded and on the point of being dis-
patched, when, suddenly, orders came from Petrograd
to suspend all southward freight "because large and
urgent consignments were coming north." The traffic
manager remonstrated. He pointed out that war ma-
terial had to take preference, and explained that if
many train-loads of goods were sent to Archangel they
would completely "bottle-up" the sidings and paralyze
all traffic southward. His expostulations were unheeded.
He received fresh and peremptory orders. By this time
the "urgent consignments" were already arriving. They
consisted of huge quantities of "vodka for the American
market/' The traffic manager's warnings had not over-
stated the position; "blockage" was complete and
irreparable. However, "salvation" came in an unex-
pected manner. A terrific explosion occurred, destroy-
ing the "cork" and incidentally much of the war material.
Whatever the cause of the explosion may have been,
whether accident or malicious design on the part of
German or other agents, it enabled the traffic manager
to resume work on the railway.

At Vladivostok matters were not much better. All
travelers who passed that way during the years 1916-17
reported seeing vast quantities of goods lying on shore.
The distance that had to be traversed in order to bring
them to European Russia had involved too great a
strain upon the railway. But much of the delay was
due to bad management and, during the Revolution,

248 RUSSIA AT WAR

to interference from the Committees and Soviets. At
Tomsk the Workmen's Committees passed a resolution
insisting that not more than two trains should be al-
lowed to pass daily, "because the engines also required
a rest"

CHAPTER XXI

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS

Poland as * 'Buffer State"— The Polish Army— German Temptation to Poles
— The little Russians--" Ukraina" Movement— -Austro-German Intrigue
— Ioltuhowski's "Mission" Fails— Blue and Yellow Replaces Red Flag—
Siberia and Caucasia "Separate" from Anarchy—-" Constitutions" in
KhiTa and Bokhara— Russia Deserted by the Finns— Enhstment in
German Army — Bolshevist Aid.

Thb war had entailed national and political prob-
lems that called for the application of tact and states-
manship which often ran counter to the prejudice and
customs of the Old Regime. Foremost among these
problems stood the Polish question. Reference thereto
has already been made in previous chapters, but it will
be useful to summarize certain aspects which more
immediately concerned the war. " United Poland " would
be at once a "buffer" State between Russia and Ger-
many and a powerful antidote to Germanic world-power.
By reiterated pledges Russia bound herself to restore
this unity. The Grand Duke Nicholas, as Commander-
in-Chief of the Tsar's armies, at the commencement of
the Great War solemnly proclaimed this purpose; it
had been reaffirmed and extended by a Declaration of
the Premier before the Duma after the Russian retreat
in 1915, when the words "Polish autonomy" were first
uttered by a Russian Minister; it was still further de-
veloped by the Revolutionary Government in its an-
nouncement to the people and to the Allied nations
that it would "liberate Poland."

But Austro-German policy during the war tended

247

£48 RUSSIA AT WAR

to discount all the possibilities of an Allied vindica-
tion of the Polish cause. The Poles in Galicia had long
been the spoilt children of the Hapsburg Monarchy.
In Posen and Silesia they, on the contrary, had had
to contend with an agrarian and cultural campaign of
Prussification against which they had presented a united
and unbreakable front, comparing well with the resist-
ance offered by their countrymen in the Vistula prov-
inces to Russifying tendencies manifested shortsightedly
by Tsardom. In this respect the administrators deputed
by Nicholas II continued to play the German game.
Almost on the eve of war, General Zhilinsky, on taking
charge of the Warsaw Governor-Generalship, proclaimed
his unconditional adherence to the policy of Russification
that had been followed with varying intensity by his
predecessors. This attitude revealed an utter incapacity
to estimate the causes and consequences of German
aggression. But the Poles themselves, taught in the
school of bitter experience, knew how to differentiate
between the hard, calculating domination of the Germans
and the imitative but comparatively innocuous rule of
the Russian bureaucracy; they also realized that a
genuine solution of their national hopes could be assured
only by the Powers of the Entente. Later they were
to be sorely tempted to make terms with their German
masters, but they — or at least a majority of them —
held out in the face of almost desperate provocation
and distress, remaining stanch in their belief that the
Allies alone were capable of assuring to them a free and
independent existence.

Early in the war the Poles had intimated to the
Russian High Command their desire to form themselves
into units for the defense of their country. A similar
movement had been initiated in Galicia. Pan Pilsudski, 1

1 Afterwards " Dictator" of Poland during the period following the defeat
of Germany (November, 1918).

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 249

a representative of the so-called Austrian Orientation,
had raised a small force of Polish Sokoly to fight against
the Russians, believing that the liberation of Poland
could never be acceptable to the autocracy. Later,
when the Austro-Germans were in possession and a
tame Council of State (Rada Panstwa) had been insti-
tuted at Warsaw to encourage Polish hopes of inde-
pendence, this same Pilsudski gradually lost his belief
in the possibility of salvation under Germanic auspices,
resigned from the Council, and declined to use his legion
on the Russian Front. Meanwhile, the Grand Duke,
domineered by the Court and the bureaucracy, had
had to discourage the Polish volunteer movement.
There were over half a million Poles serving under the
Russian colors, and they, like their countrymen in the
German and Austro-Hungarian units, were unconsciously
shedding each other's blood, not knowing when their
bullets or bayonets were being directed against Polish
breasts.

Had Russia then accepted and encouraged the idea
of a Polish Army, which was to reach the incipient
stage of realization three years later, 1 the course of
the Great War might have been much modified. When
Polish units did finally make their appearance on Russia's
side, they were too small to make the desired impres-
sion. Moreover, the Germanic control over Polish lands
had asserted itself in such a fashion, and the Revolution
had so weakened the Russian army, that the prospects
of Russia being able to exert an influence over the
destinies of Poland had become more remote. On the
other hand, all the provinces conquered by the Austro-

1 A Congress of Polish soldiers, assembled in Petrograd (May, 1917), decided
in favor of the formation of a Polish Army. But the movement encountered
some opposition in their own ranks, and was approved half-heartedly by the
Provisional Government. This Congress elected General Pilsudski honorary
Commander-in-Chief of the new Army, a proceeding which afterwards afforded
the Germans a pretext for ordering his arrest. See Appendix.

250 RUSSIA AT WAR

Germans had been endowed with an appearance of
self-government; and there was much German talk of
a revival of United Poland, of course without Posen and
without a sea-port at Dantzig.

It was notorious, however, that the produce of Polish
lands had been diverted for German use and profit.
As an offset to this system of spoliation, which entailed
famine to the urban population, the conquerors had
everywhere — for selfish purposes — safeguarded and de-
veloped rural property. Farming was carried on with
the aid of improved German implements and machinery .
and half the profits handed over to the owner of the
land or deposited to his credit at the banks if he had
sought refuge in Russia, the other half being taken over
by the Germanic treasuries. While the Russian armies
in their retreat had destroyed Polish farms and estates,
the Germans were taking every care of them and even
paying the owners a share of the revenue. This was a
clever move on their part. It had an undoubted influence
upon the many thousands of Poles who had been driven
from their homes, to flee before the German invasion.

Mistakes on the part of Russian officials, and to a
lesser degree lack of discipline and restraint on the part
of the Russian troops, had also been noticed in Galicia.
When the victorious hosts of Russia swept westward
to Cracow during the first year of the Great War, they
were met with open arms by the natives, who had been
ignorant, or were oblivious, of the treatment that had
been meted out to their co-religionaries in Kohlm and
Lublin. 1 Very soon, however, they were disillusioned.
In the wake of the Russian legions came trainloads of
the Orthodox clergy and administrators, imbued with
the hope of unifying the Galician Ruthenes under the
Russian scepter by means of "spiritual conversion/'

1 The Ruthenes of Kholm and Lublin had been ruthlessly "dragooned
into the Greek Orthodox Church by "Ruaaificators."

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 251

The experiment ended in failure, for the Ruthenes were
an obstinate race, with the proverbial obstinacy of their
Little Russian kinsmen; nothing could shake their alle-
giance to their priests, to the Greek-Catholic Church
and to the Pope. The missionaries went away disap-
pointed.

But the attempt to hustle Galicians into unity with
Russian ways and beliefs left an aftermath of bitter-
ness, which grew during the winter and the spring of
1915 and killed any inclination on the part of the natives
to seek Russia's protection. They hailed with joy the
return of the Austrian and even the German armies.
A short taste of Russian rule had more than sufficed.
Even gratitude for $150,000,000 expended by the Russians
on relief work and seeding their fields was forgotten.

On the southwestern borders separatist designs had
long been brewing. Fostered by Austrian and German
agents, the so-called Ukrainian (Borderland) movement
eventually tended to shake off alien trammels. In
August, 1914, the Austrian Government promoted a
Union for the Liberation of the Uhrainia with the help
of Russian subjects, notably Skoropis-Ioltuhowski, Mele-
newski and V. Doroshenko. Later the Germans took
over this organization. Von Bergen and Trautman, of
the Berlin Foreign Office, were in charge of its operations,
and spent large sums of money on propaganda and on
the dispatch of agents to Russia. The President of
the Union, Ioltuhowski, who was working in conjunction
with Lenin, received large allowances every month for
his expenses. His associates received 1200 marks monthly ;
those who were chosen by the Union to agitate in prison
camps received 600 marks monthly; and those who
were sent into Russia received a lump sum of 1000
rubles. Independently of this, the German Government
also spent a considerable sum of money upon organizing

252 RUSSIA AT WAR

volunteers amongst the "Ukrainian** prisoners of war
in order to fight against Russia.

All these facts are confirmed by documentary evi-
dence in the possession of the Russian military author-
ities. 1 Besides these details the following may be added.
After the occupation of Eholm by the German armies,
the Union sent a telegram of congratulation to Wilhelm.
This telegram was printed in the Viestnik Saiuza and
signed by Doroshenko and Melenewski. In the year
1915 the Union published a pamphlet in Munich calling
upon Germany to liberate the Ukraina from the Russian
yoke. In August, 1914, the Union appealed to Sweden
and Bulgaria, calling upon them to join with the Ukraina
against Muscovite barbarism. The appeal to the Bul-
garian people was printed in the Sofia paper Utro with
the help of the Austrian Legation. At the end of 1914
Melenewski went to Constantinople to the Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talaat Bey, to ask him to
help the Ukraina in its desire to separate from Russia.
The latter promised to give his help. Propaganda was
also carried on by Biberovich and Stephankowski, who
edited newspapers in Vienna and Lausanne.

"Ukrainian" separatism appealed to a small group
of literary men among the Little Russians. They alleged
that in language, in customs, and in character the Little
and Great Russians had drifted somewhat apart during
the centuries since the country had been devastated
by the Tatars. Ukraina had then been recolonized by
Russians under the auspices of Polish, Russian, and
Lithuanian magnates. There existed another incentive
to Ukrainian separatism — the economic and cultural
questions. People of one race and one language (the
Little Russians and the Galician Ruthenes) had naturally
sought a development of commercial and intellectual
relations. These had been, however, much hampered

1 Buuhoe Slow, September % 1917.

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 95S

by Russian and Austrian custom-house duties and police
restrictions. Moreover, on the Russian side the Ukrain-
ians saw with envy their kinsfolk beyond the border
enjoying certain cultural rights which were denied to
them — the right of tuition in their native tongue and
its official status. And, although a closer inspection
would have revealed the hollowness of the Ruthene
liberties, dominated as the people were in their daily
lives by Jewish officials and land-agents and even by
Poles, the poverty of the Ruthene peasants, bedecked
under the gay colors of their national dress, and the
speciousness of their religious freedom under a Church
adopting the Greek rites but recognizing the authority
of Rome and its Hapsburg supporters — although there
was no sound motive for envy, especially after the over-
throw of the autocratic regime — the catchword "Ukraina
for the Ukrainians" was successfully promulgated by
the aforesaid group of literary men, backed by the
Austro-German propaganda.

The errors of the Old Regime had involved needless
harrying of the Ruthenes inhabiting the districts of
Kholm and Lublin and professing the Greek-Catholic
or United faith. Russification had there taken the form
of forcible conversion to Orthodoxy and later to a sep-
aration of these districts from the kingdom of Poland
as defined by international treaty. But Russian Neo-
Slavophilism had dictated a conciliatory attitude towards
the Ruthenes of Galicia. Indeed, its leaders, while
accepting in principle a reconciliation with the Poles,
persistently reproached them for "oppressing the Gali-
cians."

So, while the consolidation of the German occupation
of Courland and the virtual separation of Finland were
undermining the edifice built by Peter the Great on the
shores of the Baltic, and threatening to close his "win-
dow into Europe," a similar movement in the Ukraina

254 RUSSIA AT WAR

threatened the integrity of the dominions acquired to
the south of Muscovy by the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich
and on the Black Sea by Catherine the Great. The blue
and yellow flag of Ukraina had been substituted for
the red flag of Revolution, symbolizing thereby a ten-
dency to break away from Revolutionary Russia. Ger-
many wanted to break up the "Empire" of the Tsars,
but she had more urgent need of food. Hence she took
particular care to confine Bolshevism to other parts of
Russia.

Professor Hrushevsky (formerly of Lemberg Uni-
versity), the leader of the movement, had declared in
written and oral utterances that nothing less than the
whole of Southern Russia, including Siedlce and Voro-
nezh, Kursk and Novorosiysk, with all the Euxine
seaboard and Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, were under
his plan to be evolved into a separate State, with a
population of 87,000,000 souls. Hrushevsky was propa-
gating this idea before the war. The name Ukraina
(Borderland) was to be given to the new State. His
"national 9 ' ideals were utilized by Austria and Germany
in a conspiracy to weaken Russia.

The Ukrainian "leaders" formed a so-called Central
Rada or Council in Kiev soon after the Revolution
broke out in Petrograd. In April the Rada announced
its intention to call a Constituent to decide the future
form of government for Ukraina. Soon a Congress of
Ukrainian "representatives" proclaimed itself for "au-
tonomy in a federal Russian Republic." The movement
was extended to Poltava, Kharkov, and Odessa. A
series of Ukrainian demonstrations began in Kiev, often
developing into street conflicts with the Jews and
the Russian Revolutionaries. Sermons were preached
in the churches for the first time in the native dialect.
The soldiers enrolled themselves into separate
regiments.

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 255

The arrival of Count Szeptycki, the Greek Catholic
Metropolitan of Lemberg, gave rise to fresh manifesta-
tions. He had been imprisoned under the Old Regime
for alleged conspiracy against the Russians in Galicia.
His visit led to a revival of Romish tendencies, buried
since the days of Catherine. At the end of May, M.
Kerensky came to Kiev, visited the Rada, and light-
heartedly promised the fulfilment of their wishes by
the Russian Constituent Assembly. But the Ukrainian
"leaders" were not disposed to wait. Negotiations were
carried to Petrograd, where a special commission reported
in favor of local self-government, not venturing to use
the word "autonomy." Finally, to save the Ukraina
from anarchy, the Rada drew up a Manifesto called the
"Universal/ 9 in which, after censuring the Provisional
Government "for refusing to comply with Ukrainian
demands/' it announced that "the Ukrainian people
would proceed to manage their own affiars." Soldiers
were dispatched to various cities to read and explain
this document, and incidentally to levy a land tax of
a penny per acre for the Rada's expenses. The pro-
mulgation of the Universal in Kiev was attended by a
grand open-air meeting, amid the ringing of church and
cathedral bells (June 26th) . Prince Lvov issued a counter
manifesto on the danger of changing the form of adminis-
tration in the country and in the Army in war-time.
His arguments were two-edged; they fell unheeded upon
the Rada. Within a few days the new Ukrainian Govern-
ment had been formed under the modest name of General
Secretariat.

This body proceeded to address the population of
Ukraina as the responsible Government of an autonomous
State. The writ of the Provisional Government was
no longer recognized in Ukraina. Its administrative
prerogatives were suspended. M. Kerensky and his
associates, MM. Tseretelli (a Georgian) and Tereshchenko

956 RUSSIA AT WAR

(a Little Russian), came to Kiev on July 11th to confer
with the members of the General Secretariat and with
the local Soviet. Hie Military Secretary had ordered
a parade of Ukrainian soldiers in honor of the occasion.
The Commander-in-Chief of the district forbade it.
Nevertheless the parade was held. MM. Hrushevsky,
Petlura, and other Ukrainian "Ministers" went out
to take the salute, while Kerensky and his Ministers
discreetly abstained from appearing. That two rival
authorities — the Russian and the Ukrainian — were in
open conflict became self-evident.

An agreement was concluded with the Rada by
MM. Tseretelli and Tereshchenko (July 14th) without
the previous assent or knowledge of non-Socialist Min-
isters in Fetrograd. This led to a serious Cabinet crisis
on the eve of the Bolshevist uprising in July, 1917.
During the Bolshevist usurpation the Germans occupied
Ukraina and set up their Hetman (the Russian General
Skoropadski) who continued to rule nominally until the
German overthrow (Nov., 1918) when the whole para-
phernalia of mock Ukrainian government disappeared.

Other "autonomies" and "republics" arose within
the confines of the Empire. The Caucasians and the
Siberians each "separated" themselves from Bolshevist
anarchy. The Lithuanians, the Letts (their kinsmen),
and the Esthonian Finns successively displayed similar
tendencies whenever they escaped the heavy hand of
the Teuton invader. Bokhara and Khiva, the semi-
independent Khanates of Central Asia, did not escape
the contagion.

The Revolution had aroused interest in tlie peoples
inhabiting the Caucasus and Turkestan that stood in
the path of German designs and ambitions not less
than did the Ukrainians and the Cossacks. The atrocities
in the Black Sea Fleet (January, 1918) betrayed the
hand of Germany. Through Bolshevist agents she was

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 267

even preparing the way for combined land and sea
operations from Constantinople and Constanza against
the Black Sea littoral, her objectives being Odessa,
Rostov, and Tiflis.

Having turned the Russian flank in the Baltic with
the aid of the Bolsheviki and feeling herself secure there
under the auspices of the Lenin-Trotsky regime and the
new Finnish Republic, Germany planned a vast flanking
operation in the South. If permanently successful, it
would have turned the British position in Mesopotamia,
encompassed the Cossacks, Ukrainians, and Rumanians,
and opened the road for German influence and commerce,
under subservient Ottoman auspices, into the heart
of Asia.

Already she held all the trump cards after her in-
vasion of the Ukraina, the capture of the Black Sea
Fleet, and a foothold on the Caspian; but her own military
collapse and the national rally in Russia have ruined her
dream of Asiatic conquest.

Let us briefly review the elements that held sway
in this field of conflict. The Cossacks and the Ukrai-
nians are dealt with elsewhere.

On the southern slopes of the great Caucasian mountain chain the Geor-
gians* Armenians, and Tatars, each in fairly equal proportions (total popula-
tion about six millions), have not lived in perfect harmony.

The Georgians, numerically the strongest, inhabit a solid strip extending
from the sea-coast eastward beyond Tiflis, which lies within their country.
The Armenians live on the border of Asia Minor, the Tatars along the Caspian.
Baku is their center, but it also contains a large Armenian population.

The Georgians are nearly all Christians. They have proclaimed their
Church autocephalous. They are essentially a fighting race. The Armenians
and the Baku Tatars are wealthy and mercantile. The Trans-Caucasian
Tatars, like their more numerous kinsmen in Kazan, are not warlike. In this
respect they differ entirely from the Moslem hill-tribes in Cis-Caucasia and the
Turcomans.

Extraneous factors lend a still more complex character to the position.
The Baku Tatars are the most enlightened and the wealthiest among the
twenty million followers of Islam that inhabit Russia, and, given certain con-
ditions and incentives originating horn the German-led Committee of Union

258 RUSSIA AT WAR

and Progress, might have been tempted into an Islamic combination. On the
other hand, the natural wealth of Trans-Caucasia— oil and cotton p r edicate
a maintenance of close ties with the industries of Russia. The same may be
said of Turkestan. Nothing short of the permanent conquest of the Caucasus
by the Germans with the aid of Turkish troops could have overcome these con-
siderations.

Central Asia has been the scene of strange events during the Revolution.
"Democratic" Governments have been set up within the palaces of the Emir
of Bokhara and the Khan of Khiva, apparently with the assent of these poten-
tates. Much discussion has been engendered regarding a so-called Turanian
Movement, uniting the Russian Tatars.

The Russian framework embraces a number of separate Moslem groups.
There is "Mawara-en-Nahr," the country "beyond (Le., northeast of) the
River" Oxus, which is an integral part of the civilised Eastern world, with
ancient centers of Islamic culture in its cities, a peasant population in the oases
and irrigated riverine tracts, and nomads in the steppes between. The total
population is about five and a half millions, and about 83 per cent of them
speak the Turkish dialect called Chagatai. Mawara-en-Nahr is as un-European
as India. It is cut off from Russia by deserts as India is from England by the
sea, and under the Tsardom it was divided, on the Indian system, between
protected native States and Russian-admiiiistered provinces.

Between Mawara-en-Nahr and European Russia lies Kirghisistan, a vast
steppe-land which no civilised State before Russia, whether Moslem or Chris-
tian, has ever ruled. The native Kirghiz—from four to 6vt millions in number
— speak the same Chagatai dialect as the Moslems of Mawara-en-Nahr, but
differ from them in their economic life and culture. The yirgfrSy are nomads,
threatened with extinction by the immigration of an agricultural peasantry
from the overcrowded parts of Russia in Europe.

North and west of the steppes lies European Russia, a settled country of
fields and towns; and here, in the Urals and along the Volga, there is another
Moslem population, about four millions strong, entirely surrounded by Russians,
but holding their own against them, and not inferior to them in civilisation.
These Moslems, whose center is Kazan, speak the Tatar l dialect of Turkish,
but are Europeans in spite of their language and creed. They have not only a
peasantry but an urban class— shopkeepers, merchants, an intelligentsia, a Press.

Lastly, there are the Moslems of the Caucasus and Crimea, four and a half
ynilltAM in all, but divided (for the Caucasus is another Balkan Peninsula) by
differences of religion, civilisation and speech. There are £^ias and Sunnis,
townsmen and peasants, and untamed mountaineers. Turkish-speakers and
Persian-speakers and speakers of innumerable indigenous tongues.

Under the Tsardom these various Moslem groups had few links with one
another beyond their common inclusion in the Russian Empire; but since the
Revolution there has been a spontaneous movement among them to make
their aggregate weight of numbers tell by democratic organisation. TWK^ing

*The Tatars are incidentally the "old clothes" dealers and waiters in
restaurants.

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 250

that they are behind most other Russian populations in education and economic
development, they seek to compensate for this weakness by organising on the
largest scale, and they do not shrink from the problems this involves. They
have taken in hand the reconciliation of Sunni and Shia, and they build con-
sistently on the Islamic bads, in preference to the Turanian. In view of the
fact that over 80 per cent of the Russian Moslems are Turkish-speakers, this is a
noteworthy choice of policy; but the Turanian basis is less practicable than
the percentage makes it appear, for Chagatai, Tatar, and Azerbaijani are not
so much dialects as independent languages, and when the first All-Russian
Moslem Congress met at Moscow last May, Russian was adopted as the medium
of discussion, because no other language, whether of the Turkish family or not,
was equally familiar to all the delegates.

During the Revolution the Caucasus and the Crimea
have afforded a refuge to countless numbers of Russians,
and much wealth has accrued thereby to the inhabitants.
But the anarchy of Bolshevism has reacted heavily upon
the industries of these countries as well as of Turkestan,
and has therefore aroused a strong anti-Bolshevist cur-
rent. Therein lies their prospects of revival.

Among Russia's many races the people of the Grand
Duchy of Finland occupied a special place. The Duchy
had been conquered from Sweden a century ago, but
its people had never been enslaved. And the Finns
should have been the first to volunteer for service in the
Great War. But all that they did — and not willingly
either — was to pay a small annual grant to the Imperial
Exchequer. They did not otherwise feel or assume the
burden of war. The Finland rifle regiments were Rus-
sian — as explained elsewhere. The Finns had refused
to serve in the Russian Army, as they wanted to form
an army of their own. For a century they had enjoyed
a privileged position within the Empire, yet in the hour
of its need they did not provide a single soldier. On
the contrary, when the war began, some 3000 Finnish
students deserted to Germany and were trained by
the Germans to form the nucleus of a Finnish army
organization whenever the moment was favorable for

260 RUSSIA AT WAR

an armed uprising of the Grand Duchy. Stories of
oppression by Russia had long formed the theme of
pro-Finnish constitutional quibblers. True, Nicholas II
needlessly irritated his Finnish subjects. But that and
the blundering of incompetent bureaucrats filling high
posts on the borders, where tact and judgment were par-
ticularly requisite, served merely to cloak the latent
disloyalty of the Finns themselves and their hatred
of all things Russian.

Finnish and Swedish Socialists played an ugly part
in the disorganization of the Russian troops in the
Grand Duchy, or, as the Socialists afterwards pro-
claimed it, the " Finnish Republic/ 9 Finnish workmen
employed in the munition factories in Petrograd lent
themselves readily to pro-German propaganda and had
a great deal to do with the excesses committed in the
early days of the Revolution. In return for this co-
operation their people were supported by the Bolshevist
army and navy committees in Helsingfors, which openly
espoused the cause of the Diet in its defiance of the
Provisional Government writ of dissolution. It was
with the aid and support of Bolshevist soldiers and sailors
that Svinhuvwud and his associates in the Senate (Min-
istry) of the Grand Duchy proclaimed a Republic.
And having in this manner declared their "independence,"
they hastened to appeal to the Entente Powers for
official recognition. Later the Finnish "Reds" came
into conflict with the Swedo-Finnish "Whites." During
the spring and summer of 1918 the country was torn
by civil war. Germany sent an army corps and tried
to instal a Monarchy. The Teutonic host endeavored
to seize the Murman railway. Finland was encouraged
to drive out the Allies from the Arctic ports.

The Finns are an honest, thrifty, and hardworking
people, but their ingratitude to Russia and their pro-
German sympathies should not be underestimated.

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS £61

Thence partly arise some of the reasons why they have
suffered from a shortage of food supplies during the
war. Russian wheat used to come to them through
Germany.

CHAPTER XXII

SHORT-LIVED VICTORY

The July Offensive-- Bolshevist Interferenc e Gene ral Gator's Mistakes—
Superiority of Russian Annies — Austro-German Reserves used up —
Korailov's Success—Disaffection.

I had lived through the alternating hopes and
of the war and shared the joys of deliverance from the
long nightmare of intrigue, inefficiency, and corruption
of the Old Regime. With my Russian friends I had
fondly thought that the advent of New Russia might
be saved from the perils of revolution and anarchy, that
the war which had swept away the Old might strengthen
and pacify the New dispensation. And so it would
have been, had the great cause of the nations and of
freedom not been subverted by ruthless hands to serve
interests that were neither Russian nor free.

Mob-rule and mob-law were the inevitable accom-
paniment of the Soviet and its satellites, the Committees.
The masses and the soldiery had grown tired of a struggle
that all had long felt was being misdirected, and ware
easily misled by visionaries or traitors to believe it was
fruitless and unnecessary, while on the other hand they
were seduced by promises of "land and freedom.' 9 Not
step by step, but with the swiftness of an avalanche,
Anarchy was rushing upon the edifice of State and society.
Soon it would crash them into the abyss. In vain
generals and statesmen warned the people: "You are
on the very edge!" In vain Kerensky, in his better
moments, had hurled insulting epithets at the mob:

202

SHORTLIVED VICTORY MS

"You are not free men, but mutinous slaves. The
avalanche, once started by Kerensky's own friends,
rushed on 9 sweeping the "ideals" of the Revolution
before it.

But ere Bolshevism had achieved its ultimate ends
we still had some hope — a very faint one — that the
Army might save the situation. If the soldiers at the
Front, the pick and flower of the nation, could only
detach themselves from its mass, the avalanche might
perhaps be stilled, or, at least, its devasting effects
lessened.

All thinking Russia gladly hearkened to the promise
of an offensive which resounded in June, 1917. That
the spirit of the nation had not entirely succumbed
to the deadening influence of effeteness and the alluring
poison of Anarchy had been shown by the formation
of numerous battalions of volunteers who variously
styled themselves "Battalions of Death," "Kornilovsty
(after the popular General), "Death or Freedom Boys,
etc. Then the women came forward. They must needs
fight if the men would not. And they also formed a
"Battalion of Death/ 9 and fought right well.

The Provisional Government adopted the idea of
a general offensive. But a conference at Mogilev be-
tween Ministers and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
General Brusilov, who had been transferred from the
Southwestern Front to succeed General Alexeiev, did
not yield so much promise. It was ascertained that a
simultaneous offensive on all the fronts would necessitate
indefinite delay. The Northern Front had suffered such
ravages from the proximity of Petrograd and its de-
moralizing influences, that scarcely any hope could be
entertained of its reviving before the season had matured
too much for effective operations. The Western or
Central Front, recently commanded by General Gurko,
was better off, as the Bolshevist strongholds, Petrograd

SM RUSSIA AT WAR

and Kronstadt, were farther away. But it was badly
infected, and nothing could be done much before the
end of July. The Southwestern Front looked more
promising. With careful nursing it might be counted
upon to deliver a blow some time in June.

In Rumania things were less cheerful. The Ru-
manian Army had revived marvelously under French
auspices. It was splendidly led, well disciplined and
equipped. Its officers and men were inspired by patriot-
ism and eager to drive the invaders beyond their borders.
Not so the Russian armies under the King's nominal
command. The fact that Russian troops were serving
under royalty had attracted the fiercest propaganda
of revolutionary agitators. Whatever hope there could
be of success in this theater lay almost entirely with
the Rumanians themselves, but would they be able to
draw the Russian armies with them? No one could
venture to give an assurance on this point.

It was finally decided to deliver the first and most
important blow in Galicia and Bukovina, following up
this offensive with a second one in the direction of Vilna
and a third in Rumania, as soon as the respective fronts
could move. This plan was carried out with some
modifications. General Gutor's attack (Southwestern
Front) was twice postponed, because of delays in the
concentration of reserves and artillery, due to disor-
ganization of the railways, and also largely because
agitators were constantly getting at the troops. Then
the Southwestern offensive had to be delivered in
two phases — Bzhezany-Zlochow and Stanislawow, instead
of simultaneously — a circumstance which greatly added
to the difficulties of the enterprise.

There seems to be no doubt that the Army Committees
and the Commissaries representing the Government tried
to counteract pacifist propaganda. Although the Com-
mittee system was destined to break down utterly as

SHORT J JVED VICTOEY

9M RUSSIA AT WAR

a substitute for discipline based upon the undivided
authority of the officers — just as the Soviet system had
failed to afford a substitute for the undivided authority
of Government — the goodwill and patriotism of indi-
viduals must be recognized and appreciated. Committee-
men, some of whom were officers, some privates, went
about stimulating their comrades before the attack, and
were foremost in the fight, and many of these devoted
men fell at the head of the attacking waves of infantry.
But these bright examples only served to emphasize
the hopeless absurdity of the Committees as a system
of army management.

General Gutor had been an excellent corps commander.
He was not of the caliber that is required from the
leader of a group of armies. The strategy and tactics
adopted by him bear witness to his deficiencies. Had
he borne in mind the peculiar conditions of the case
he would have, above all, avoided frontal attacks against
positions of exceptional strength and difficulty; he
would have shunned forest sectors, wherein a loosely
disciplined force would be easily shaken and dispersed.
Yet this was precisely what he failed to do. In one
respect his dispositions were well taken; he singled out
Austro-Hungarian divisions as the main objects of at-
tention, rightly appreciating their inferior stability. But
he seems to have been guided in the selection of one
of the main points of his offensive by the fact that his
old corps was stationed in the vicinity.

The plan was briefly as follows:

First. The Eleventh Army, General Erdelli (west of
Tarnopol), was to operate along an eleven-mile front —
Presowce (opposite Zborow) to Byshki (opposite Tsen-
iow) — and strike northwestward, attacking the 32nd
and 19th Austro-Hungarian divisions. Objectives: Zlo-
chow and Gliniany, along the railway to Lemberg.
The left flank, on reaching Pomozhany, was to push
towards Bzhezany, around the woods, and make for the

SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 867

other railway leading thence to Lemberg, getting into
immediate touch with the right flank of the Seventh
Army.

Second. The Seventh Army, General Belkovich (south-
west of Tarnopol), was to operate along a ten-mile front
— Kuropatniki (1} miles south of Byshki) to Miechychow
(situated southwestward) — get well astride of the Zlota
Lipa and strike also northwestward, attacking the 54th
and 55th Austro-Hungarian Divisions and part of the
20th Turkish Division. Objectives: Bzhezany-Bobrka-
Lemberg. The right flank was to get into touch with
the corps on Erdelli's left; the left flank was to make
a strong diversion against Ottoman troops and endeavor
to reach Rohatyn, flanking the railway.

Third. The Eighth Army, General Kornilov (east of
Stanislawow), was to operate along a twelve-mile front
— Jezupol-Stanislawow-Lysiec — west and northward, at-
tacking the 15th Austro-Hungarian and the 2nd Austro-
Hungarian cavalry divisions. Objectives: the Stanisla-
wow-Dolina-Bolidow railway. It was to exert strong
pressure northward, to reach the Halich-Lemberg railway.

General. A combined enveloping movement was to
be carried out by the Seventh and Eighth Armies against
the 19th and 20th Turkish, 38th Austro-Hungarian,
24th German, 75th German Reserve, 55th German, and
34th Landwehr Divisions, and two German regiments
(241 and 242), all of which were to be strongly held by
energetic demonstrations of three corps belonging to
the Seventh Army.

General Kornilov carried out his appointed task in
more than the full measure. Had his army been entrusted
with a more important mission, and had suitable reserves
been forthcoming, he might easily have reached Rohatyn
from Halich, turned the strong Bzhezany position, and,
following up his successes at Kalush, reached Dolina,
south of Lemberg, thereby severing the enemy's com-
munications and isolating some of his forces.

268 RUSSIA AT WAR

The topography of the battle region was such that
a succession of ridges and deep river valleys, formed by
some of the northern tributaries of the Dneister, and the
dense forests around Bzhezany rendered the central
section of the Russian thrust (athwart the Zlota Lipa
and its affluents) a particulary difficult one to nego-
tiate; whereas if General Gutor had disposed his group
so as to throw its weight on the flanks (Halich and Zlo-
chow), he would have obviated at once the danger of
frontal attacks (Bzhezany and Koniuchy), which were
bound to suffer delay, if not disaster, before strongly
fortified woods, and have secured the advantage of
operating in fairly open country (the Dneister and its
tributaries, the Gnila Lipa and the Strypas). And al-
though in the light of subsequent information it became
evident that the Russian Army could not be counted
upon for a sustained offensive, it may have been rea-
sonably assumed that a successful and rapid advance,
without too heavy losses, would have so heartened the
men that Bolshevist appeals to desertion might have
been less heeded, and perhaps the shameful opening of
the front, with consequent panic and disaster, would
have been avoided.

Criticism of General Gutor's strategy was freely in-
dulged in by Russian experts at the time. There could
be no motive for passing it over in this review of the
Galician operations of 1917. On the other hand, the
considerations just cited afford a necessary explanation
of the heavy losses that were sustained in the Russian
attacks, notably at Bzhezany, which certainly contrib-
uted to the disastrous success of Bolshevist propaganda.
These criticisms were sanctioned by the dismissal of
General Gutor before the final disaster. 1 It may be

'The immediate cause of General Gutor's removal was ascribed to the
explosion of a huge ammunition dump near Bzhezany by the enemy's shell fire
(see map, p. 878).

SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 960

added that he was a brave and gallant soldier who had
never sought a higher command and accepted his pro-
motion obediently, with much personal misgiving. The
difficulties encountered at Bzhezany were, moreover,
visited upon General Belkovich, commanding the Seventh
Army. He was succeeded on the eve of the retreat by
General Selivachev, whose corps, including a Czecho-
slovak brigade that bore the main brunt of the fighting,
had done well in the offensive on the right flaqk, opposite
Zborow. There appeared to be no sound reason for
this change in the high command. General Belkovich
could not be held responsible either for the defective
strategy of his superior or for the loss of discipline
among his men.

Never had the Russian Army been so well equipped.
Artillery of all calibers, trench mortars, machine guns
had been provided in abundance, with plenty of ammu-
nition. There were armored cars, including British and
Belgian contingents, posted with every active corps.
The roads and railways — a heritage of Austrian dominion
— ensured easy and rapid intercommunication. The
Russians had repaired them, and had laid down field
railways to their heavy batteries. As regards numbers,
the Russians had a superiority of nearly two to one.
Only in aeroplanes were they deficient. A good many
British and French machines had been provided, but
they were not sufficient to cope with the Germans. How-
ever, what they lacked in numbers they made up in
daring. Splendid work was done by the Russian airmen,
and they were exceedingly well supplemented by balloon
observers in large numbers, who ran hourly risk of death
from the constant onslaughts of enemy aircraft. The
positions of hostile batteries were almost invariably
detected and counter-battery work organized in approved
style. But, however well they were equipped and how-
ever well they handled their guns, the Russian artillery

270 RUSSIA AT WAR

could do little with the enemy's strong points in the
wooded areas. This was an additional reason why a
plan of attack in the open should have been adopted.

The enemy lines were thinly held — about one division
per seve miles, not counting reserves. Confronting
the Eleventh and Seventh Armies — a stretch of 100 miles
— stood altogether about SO divisions (14 German, 18}
Austro-Hungarians, and 2 Turkish). Of this total, 14
were in the first line, 16 in reserve. The Russians had
assembled 54 divisions, of which 37 were in the first line
and 17 in reserve. Prince Leopold of Bavaria was in
general command of the enemy forces under the direc-
tions of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, while the northern
group, comprising the Bug Army, 1 IV Austro-Hungarian
(von Krobatin), and II Austro-Hungarian (Boehm-Er-
molli), was under the orders of General von Linsingen.
The ordre de battaile of the enemy's divisions at the time
the Russian offensive began was approximately as follows:

Opposite the XI (General Erdelli's) Army (count-
ing from 'north to south) were the 4th Austro-Hungarian,
27th Austro-Hungarian, 12th German Landwehr, SSrd
Austro-Hungarian, 197th German, 32nd and 19th Austro-
Hungarian, seven divisions in all, with 12} divisions
in reserve. Opposite the VH (General Belkovich's)
Army was the German Southern Army (von Bothmer),
represented by 54th and 55th Austro-Hungarian, 20th
and 19th Ottoman, 24th German, 75th German Reserve,
38th Austro-Hungarian (Honved) Divisions, in all seven
divisions with three in reserve.

From this distribution of their reserves it is evident
that the German Staff had prepared for a movement
directed principally on the northern sector (Zlochow),
and that General Gutor's preference for the Bzhezany
direction was unexpected by them, as indeed it might

1 The Bug Army (von Bernhardt) faced the Russian Special Army, north of
Brody (see map on p. 887).

SHORTLIVED VICTORY 871

have been, for the tactical considerations set forth above.
It is interesting also as an indication that Field-Marshal
von Hindenburg did really believe in the possibility of
a Russian offensive, and that, notwithstanding "fra-
ternization," German propaganda, and the cheap bluster
of the German Press, the enemy's High Command had
not made up its mind to regard Russia as a negligible
quantity. Moreover, with the help of their excellent
railway system the enemy could easily transfer their
reserves from one sector to another.

Opposite the VEH (General Kornilov's) Army, which
included only about eight divisions, stood the 58th
German, a German brigade, S4th German (Grena-
dier), 2nd Austro-Hungarian Cavalry, 15th and 36th
Austro-Hungarian, 42nd Austro-Hungarian (Honved), in
all five infantry and one cavalry divisions, the III
Austro-Hungarian Army (Tersztyansky von Nadas), with
no reserves to speak of. The Archduke Josef, in com-
mand of the group which, farther south, included the
VII (von Kdwess) and the I (von Rohr) Austro-
Hungarian Armies, apparently felt the utmost confidence
in the inability of the Russians to dislodge him from
the Dneister valley.

The tremendous havoc wrought in the enemy's ranks
by the Russian offensive, which promptly led to whole-
sale surrender of Austro-Hungarian regiments, evidently
caused the utmost confusion among the enemy Staffs.
Divisions, hurriedly brought up from reserve, were as
hurriedly flung about from one sector to another. For
instance, the hapless 15th German Reserve Division
was battered at Bzhezany and then smashed by Kornilov's
troops. More than five German and one Austrian divi-
sions (the 53rd Reserve, 24th Reserve, 15th Reserve,
241st New, 4th Ersatz, and a Bavarian Landwehr brigade
and also the 11th Austro-Hungarian) were brought up
to Bzhezany to take the place of German and Austrian

272 RUSSIA AT WAR

divisions that had been wiped out or surrendered. On
the Stanislawow sector, also, five German and one Austrian
divisions (the 83rd, 20th, 15th Reserve, 8th Bavarian
Reserve, Jaeger Guards, and the 16th and 5th Austro-
Hungarian) came into first line. Out of the total of
fifteen divisions known to be in reserve along this front
the enemy had thus used up twelve. They had only
three divisions to draw upon on a front of 100 miles.

These facts and figures are sufficiently eloquent. The
Russian Army had done well. True, it had a superi-
ority in numbers, but this superiority was partly dis-
counted by the above-mentioned errors of strategy and
tactics, and, above all, by the demoralizing influence
of indiscipline and unceasing propaganda. Sufficient
has been said to justify the assumption that, had the
Russian High Command been in a position to take the
necessary measures for enforcing discipline, the Austro-
German hosts would have sustained a signal defeat and
Lemberg would soon have been in Russian hands. A
Russian victory then would have altered the whole sub-
sequent course of events on all the Allied fronts. It
must ever remain a blot upon the Revolutionary Democ-
racy of Russia that it should have deprived the High
Command of the necessary power to put an end to the
activity of Extremists; that it should have espoused
doctrines which enabled traitors to subvert the Army
and have done nothing itself to checkmate their devices.

The Russian offensive began at nine o'clock on the
morning of Sunday, July 1st. After fierce bombardment
and under cover of their barrage, the infantry attacked
according to plan, as above indicated. The Russian
barrage was so well handled that the enemy were quite
helpless to resist the oncoming waves. One Russian
division, taking the offensive at the point where I was
observing the attack, rushed three lines of trenches within
twenty-five minutes, and I counted the battalions and

SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 278

regiments which surrendered to them wholesale — there
were 5000 Austrians with their officers. (General Korni-
lov's movement was started a week later.)

I was an eye-witness of the main events, but most of
my messages to The Times were intercepted by the Soviet
censor in Petrograd, although they had been approved by
the Army censorship. Much heart-burning had been
endured by the Russian Commanders before the ad-
vance. Individual units were constantly developing
sporadic weakness. Several mutinies broke out. The
Bolsheviki were extremely busy. Loyal committeemen
had no rest day or night, scouring the front in motor-
cars to enliven the low-spirited or to talk over the
cowards. The gunners did their utmost during the artil-
lery preparations to inflict visible ravages upon the enemy's
trenches so as to hearten the infantry for the assault.
One of the Corps Commanders prayed silently during the
fateful minutes preceding the appointed time. Would
his men go over the top? He hoped so, but could not
feel sure. When, punctually at 9 a.m., the troops swarmed
over and the attacking waves rolled onward, this General
devoutly crossed himself.

German official communiques had announced the com-
mencement of the attack a day before it began, near
Koniuchy, between the Zlota Lipa and the Strypa, and
had prematurely boasted of its failure. The offensive
was, of course, ascribed to "increasing pressure of the
other Entente Powers." Later the Germans recorded
"a strong destructive Russian fire over our positions
from the Lemberg-Brody railway as far as the heights
south of Bzhezany," and an increase of "firing activity
to the north and northwest of Lutsk," but repeated
the claim that "all attacks had been repulsed." These
versions were so obviously "doctored" that neither
the German nor the Austrian communiques could afford
any idea of what was really happening.

874 RUSSIA AT WAR

Much heavy fighting lay before the Russians before
they could hope to take Bzhesany. This place, situated
fifty mfles from Lemberg — the nearest Russian position
to the Galician coital — was protected by a lake, the deep
defiles of the Zlota Lipa, and the high hills, reaching
an elevation of 1300 feet, on the east and south. When
Count Bothmer fell back there in the summer of 1916,
after his stubborn defense of the Strypa line, he estab-
lished himself on all the higher ground, where he could
command the Russian positions. At Koniuchy the
Russians stQl had many of these higher positions before
them before they could reach the Zlota Lipa, which is
itself a formidable barrier, as the stream is in a deep
cleft of the hills, like most of the tributaries of the
Dniester in this part of Galicia. After the Austrian
breakdown in 1916 the Germans reconstituted their
armies in Galicia, and entrusted these key positions
largely to their own troops and to the Turks, who had
held them since. Almost the last success of General
Brusilov's great offensive was won at this point, before
events in Rumania turned attention to new battles in
another field.

I On July 2nd, about three o'clock in the afternoon,
after a severe and stubborn battle, the Zaraisky Regi-
ment occupied the village of Presowce, while the gallant
troops of the 4th Finland Division and of the Czecho-
slovak Brigade occupied the strongly fortified enemy
positions at Mogila, on the heights to the west and south-
west of the village of Zborow, and the fortified village
of Kozhylow. Three lines of enemy trenches were
penetrated. The enemy then retired across the little
Strypa. The Czecho-Slovak Brigade captured 62 officers
and 3150 soldiers, 15 guns, and many machine guns.
Many of the captured guns were turned against the enemy.
Enemy positions to the west of Josefowka (north of
Koniuchy) were also taken. Altogether in the battle

SHORTLIVED VICTORY £75

of July 2nd, in the neighborhood of Zlochow, the Russians
took 0800 prisoners (officers and soldiers), 21 guns, 16
machine guns, and several bomb-throwers.

To the southeast of Bzhezany the battle continued
with less intensity. In the battle of July 1st in this
region the Russians had taken 58 officers and 2200
soldiers, mostly Germans.

The success at Koniuchy had been compromised by
an untoward incident. In their precipitate flight or
surrender the enemy had left much store of wine and
spirits behind them. The Russian soldiers, disobeying
their officers, plundered these stores. The men of a
whole division which had fought bravely became drunk,
and might have fallen an easy prey had the enemy
counter-attacked. Another division was sent forward,
but was checked by the German machine guns placed
in the trees of the adjacent forest.

Meanwhile the gallant fighting at Bzhezany had been
marred by indiscipline and even mutiny on the part
of some units. The key to this position lay in the
triangle formed by the confluence of the Zlota and the
Tseniow. Its slopes descended precipitously, clothed on
the northern side of Bzhezany and Lysona woods. This
triangle was known as the Flat-Iron (Utv&g). Here
many thousands of Russians fell, and in helping them
with Maxims, Hotchkiss, and armored cars, five British
soldiers were killed. Here also whole regiments of
Austrians and Germans were wiped out. The plan of at-
tack consisted in a flanking movement over the western
slope of the ridge, so as to turn the woods. Unfortunately,
the right flank advanced too rapidly and was caught in
a cross-fire from the heights, and when orders were
given to a division posted in reserve to relieve the pres-
sure on their comrades, they flatly refused to budge,
alleging that they had not agreed to fight on the first
day of the offensive. The advantage that might have

276 RUSSIA AT WAR

been gained on the first day could not be recovered.
Several lines of enemy trenches were taken, literally filled
with their dead. Some of these lines remained in the
hands of the Russians till the day of panic and disaster.

During the fighting of July 1st and 2nd the total
number of prisoners had risen to 300 officers, 18,000 men,
29 guns, 33 machine guns.

Instead of improving, the men were growing daily
less reliable. Divisions refused to remain more than
twenty-four hours in the front line, and that only on
the condition that they would be strictly on the de-
fensive. The Corps of Guards, oblivious of its glorious
traditions, was no exception to this degrading rule.
One of the regiments (the Grenadiers) had elected a
Bolshevist officer named Dzevaltovsky, and would take
no orders. M. Kerensky himself tried to persuade them,
but they threatened violence and he had to leave. Finally
this regiment was surrounded by cavalry, armored cars,
and artillery. It then surrendered Dzevaltovsky, 1 who
was removed for trial — not involving the death penalty.
Half the men were distributed in other units, where
they spread the Bolshevist contagion. Some of the
Guards divisions after that did some fighting. One of
them, on being sent (July 5th) to relieve a line division
near Dzike Lany, which had been the scene of gallant
fighting by a Siberian corps, was misdirected in the
dark into the enemy's trenches — a piece of almost in-
credible treachery. The astonishing part of this adven-
ture was that the guardsmen took the trench and then
went on to capture the next enemy's position. Every-
thing pointed to a coming crisis which the gallantry of
individual units could not forestall.

On July 7th, General Cheremisovs corps (Kornnov's
army) after a brilliant advance from Stanislawow, crossed
the Lomnica and advanced slightly on its left flank

1 Afterwards "honorably" acquitted by a Bolshevist court

SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 277

(Bohorodczany-Solotwina). On a wide front General
Kornilov's army was now in movement south of the
Dniester. The Russians were retracing their steps taken
in the retreat of 1915, when General von Linsingen's
cavalry swept forward across the country south of the
Dniester to Halich, and thereby turned the main Russian
front north of the river. In three days the Russians
had gone forward fifteen miles west of Stanislawow, they
had at two points crossed the Lomnica, had taken Halich,
to which the enemy had retired, and were pushing on
westward along the road to Dolina and Stry. The
country before them was less adapted to defense than
that north of the Dniester, where the deep-cut channels
of the tributaries flowing south to that river were a for-
midable obstacle to an advancing army.

Halich, by reason of its bridgehead position, was a
place of the first strategic importance, and both com-
batants had made strenuous efforts for its capture since
the war began. General Brusilov reached the river bank
opposite the town in the summer of 1916, and seemed
about to take it, when the Rumanian campaign, which
had just begun, diverted Russian efforts elsewhere.

The remarkable success of General Kornilov's move-
ment had brought a tardy recognition of the value of
the Halich-Dolina direction. A neighboring corps was
added to his right flank and reinforcements hurried up.
But they came too late to do much good. The two
flanking corps on the right and left of General Cheremisov
advanced very slowly owing to the difficulties of the
terrain, but his troops continued their progress, and
during the night of July 11th and 12th they forced their
way into Kalush. Here, as at Koniuchy, scenes of
debauchery were enacted, and the drunken soldiery
committed nameless acts of violence. A Cossack cavalry
regiment came up in time to repulse a German counter-
attack. I was in Kalush on the morning after its cap-

378 RUSSIA AT WAR

turc. On all sides there was evidence of the precipitate
flight of the Headquarters of the Third Austrian Army,
situated in the suburbs on the banks of the Lomnica,

HAP SHOWIHQ THE FSHTOiyAL VLACM MENTTONXD IX IBS ACOOOKT Or OPBKA-
HONB m TBI niEECTIONB Or BSBXIANT ADD ILOCHOW (juli, 1917).

General Tersztyansky had evidently considered himself
safe from attack.

During the day we strengthened and extended our
position on the west bank of the Lomnica in preparation

SHORT-LIVED VICTORY *7»

for the arrival of the enemy's reserves. That evening
heavy rain set in, necessitating the suspension of the
advance. The Lomnica was transformed into a boiling
torrent and all the bridges were swept away. The Ger-
mans brought up six batteries and shelled our communi-
cations, but the following day our guns silenced them
and covered our positions across the river. Rain con-
tinuing, it became necessary to withdraw the bulk of
our forces, a move which was safely carried out on
the night of July 15th.

Meanwhile we had extended our lines in the valley
of the Lomnica, for the eventual resumption of the
offensive.

According to the statements of prisoners the enemy
had transferred hither the Jager Reserve Division from
Vilna, the remnants of the German 75th Reserve Divi-
sion from Bzhezany, and the Austrian 5th Division from
the Carpathians. During our attacks on July 8th, 9th,
and 10th, the Austrian 15th Division lost 80 per cent,
the German S3rd Division 40 per cent, the Austrian
16th Division 50 per cent, and the Austrian 36th Divi-
sion SO per cent, while the Austrian 2nd Cavalry Divi-
sion lost little. The enemy had altogether 44 bat-
talions with 82,000 bayonets, of which they lost over
16,000, including 12,000 prisoners. Our losses were about
one-third. We had taken over 100 guns.

CHAPTER XXIH

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL

Failure of the Committee System — Lenin and German Flans — The Front
Opened — "Military Strategy" — A Narrative of Disaster — Horrors of
the Retreat— Kornilov's "Death to Traitors"— The Armies Saved—
Brave Women — Rumania's Peril — Boastful German Accounts — Our Dead
at Kshywe— Story of the British Armored Can— Valentine's Burial —
Censored Telegrams.

"Our further successes will depend on the measures
that may be taken to restore a proper spirit of subordi-
nation among the men at the front and the reserves.
This question is bound up with the whole political
situation of Russia. The Army has done better than
was expected, but the present Committee system has
failed."

The warning note struck in the concluding paragraph
of this message sent by me to The Times just after the
success of Kornilov's offensive was almost immediately
justified by events. All unknown to the brave "Korni-
lovtsy " (bearing the name of their leader on their sleeves,
inscribed on a blue shield surmounted by a white skull
and cross-bones) and the "shock battalions," who had
won victory west of Stanislawow, a dread catastrophe
was being enacted in General Erdelli's Army. It was
not altogether unexpected. In the following laconic
sentences the Russian Headquarters Staff recorded the
defection of its troops:

After strong artillery preparation, the enemy persistently attacked our
detachments on the Pieniaki-Harbuzow front (on both sides of the headwaters

280

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 281

of the Sereth and twenty miles south of Brody). At first all these attacks were
repelled.

At ten o'clock, July 19th, the 007th Mlynoff Regiment, situated between
Batkow and Manajow (in the same region), left their trenches voluntarily and
retired, 1 with the result that the neighboring units had to retire also. This
gave the enemy the opportunity for developing his success.

Our failure is explained to a considerable degree by the fact that under
the influence of the Extremists (BoUheviki) several detachments, having
received the command to support the attacked detachments, held meetings and
discussed the advisability of obeying the order, whereupon some of the regiments
refused to obey the military command. The efforts of the Commanders and
Committees to arouse the men to the fulfilment of their duty were fruitless.

On July 26th I telegraphed as follows:

From the words of an officer captured near Bzhezany a fortnight ago, we
understood that the Germans were preparing an artful stroke in conjunction
with their agents in Petrograd and in our armies. "You will see that your
troops will run away when the time comes, and we shall have a walk over," he
declared. Events have fully borne out this prophecy. Lenin and his crew
have well earned their pay. The disturbances in Petrograd, organized on the
16th and 17th inst., were obviously directed from Berlin so as to coincide with
the German plan. The thunderbolt fell almost on the day when the High
Command on this front changed hands, and the harvest in Eastern Galicia and
Bukovina had nearly been gathered.

A whole day before the news of the crisis in Petrograd reached us, Lenin's
agents were acquainted with it through traitors in the wireless service. They
spread a report among the troops that the Bolsheoiki were in control of the Gov-
ernment, and that the war was at an end. The execution of the German plan
became ridiculously easy.

The enemy entered at our most sensitive point near Zborow, and advanced
in the direction of Trembowla. The wedge thus driven in would sever the
Tarnopol-Buchach railway and the highways, disuniting the Eleventh and
Seventh Armies and exposing the right flank of the latter to serious peril.

Our line was opened on the morning of the 10th inst. north of Zborow.
On the 18th General Brusilov, who had come to Tarnopol, summoned General
Kornilov and ordered him to take over the command from General Gutor.
The rupture was represented to be a slight affair, as we had eight divisions in
reserve. The Staffs of the neighboring armies were not even informed of it.
General Kornilov, however, realized that the danger was great, and gave the
necessary orders. But he had to go to Stanislawow in order, to transfer his
command of the Eighth Army to General Cheremisov. Much precious time
had to be wasted in journeys.

l The survivors afterwards declared that they had not sufficient artillery
support.

t8£ RUSSIA AT WAR

My gallant colleague Lembich, the war correspondent
of the Russhoe Slovo, wrote simultaneously from another
part of the Front:

The fine had been ruptured on a comparatively small section, and the harm
done might have been easily re tri eved by steadiness and discipline on the part
of the troops. Hie High Command at once gave orders to move perfectly
adequate forces to the place where the breach had been made, with the design
of getting the Germans, who, it appears, were rushing forward, in a vise, and to
cut them off from retreat on two sides. But then it was that took place that
horrible thing that has now been given in the Army the name of "MeeHn§
jfretajp." The majority of the troops ordered to the breach either did not leave
their quarters or began to assemble meetings to decide the question whether
they should go to the positions indicated or not by means of voting. Two reg-
iments, which had been given a more responsible task than others, considered
the question until late at night, and the men, not being able to come to a decision,
separated. During this time the Germans, not encountering any serious
resistance, penetrated eight miles to the rear of our lines, began to capture
batteries and a number of prisoners, and to outflank Jesierna, the Headquarters
of the Staff.

In the evening of this unhappy day panic began to spread in the Army,
deliberately encouraged by certain suspicious characters, Bolsheviki in uniform,
who flooded the Army in the days of the Revolution. The rumor was circu-
lated that the Germans had pierced our front at two points and that the line
of retreat to Tarnopol had been cut off. One after the other the divisions sent
to encounter the Germans refused to attack, or, on the first encounter with the
enemy, began to desert, breaking up in disorder, creating great uproar and con-
fusion. Hie cavalry and artillery alone rose to the height of their duty, and
with the greatest steadfastness supported the few heroic units of infantry who
covered the retreat. Yesterday one valiant Cossack regiment saved the posi-
tion in an exceptional way, and, in horse and foot formation, repelled the
violent attacks of the Germans.

Resuming my own narrative of events, I note that,
being in Stanislawow on the 21st (the Moslem festival
of Bairam), I had gone to sup with my Caucasian friends
of the Ingush Native Horse, who had been fighting con-
tinuously throughout our offensive; and while we were
at table discussing some delicious plof (slices of toasted
mutton with rice) to the sound of native pipes, and
admiring the skill of the tribal dancers, the Colonel
received the startling news that Tarnopol was in dire
and that next morning early the regiment would

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL t88

go with all speed to the rescue. My message to The
Times continues:

Having rejoined the British Armored Car Headquarters an the 17th inst,
I left again for Stanislawow on the afternoon of the 20th inst. Nothing was
then known of the rupture of the front at a point only twenty-five miles distant
on the previous morning* and the first report of it reached Commander Locker-
Lampoon late on the 20th. At Stanislawow "rumors " began to circulate during
the afternoon of the 22nd that Tarnopol was for some mysterious reason "in
danger/' but nothing whatever was known at the Staff.

General Cheremisov assumed command of the Eighth Army that morning.
I saw him at noon. He was disquieted by the defections among his own men,
but said not a word of the rupture in the front of the Eleventh Army. On the
morning of the 23rd the Staff had information that left no doubt as to the mag-
nitude of the catastrophe.

My first thought was to rejoin the British section, whose position I judged
to be an extremely perilous one. Abandoning all impedimenta (which was lost,
together with the photographs I had taken), I jumped into the first car going
to Buchach in the hope of meeting the British contingent as it fell back through
Podhajce.

At Buchach I came across our transport and Colonel Valentine, 1 of the Brit-
ish Air Service. From them I heard the full story of the disaster. The ILF.C.
officers had safely removed the aeroplanes and the aeronautical stores from the
zone of the Eleventh Army under the full blast of the Russian panic and the
German advance.

We were destined to witness some strange scenes on the road from Buchach
eastward, although the enemy was still thirty miles distant. A man on a white
horse dashed through the town yelling: "German cavalry are behind: save
yourselves." He was afterwards arrested, and proved to be a German spy.
Indescribable confusion ensued. A multitude of deserters and transport cars,
lorries, and ambulances headed eastward at top speed. The roadway was
littered with impedimenta. Through this inferno, through burning dust, and
under a scorching sun, we literally fought our way, using our sticks and fists,
and brandishing revolvers at the deserters, who repeatedly tried to storm our
cars, until we had got ahead of the rout. Then, placing our lorries across the
road, we dammed the tide of panic.

Leaving Buchach at 5 rot, we reached Proskurow (in Russia) only at
eight o'clock the following morning.

1 Lieutenant-Colonel James Valentine, R.F.C., D.S.O., died soon afterwards
in Kiev of heart failure, brought on by the hardships he had endured during the
retreat. He was only twenty-nine yeartold. He had been one of the foremost
competitors in aviation contests in England, and had served during the war in
France. For the best part of a year he had been in Russia, in charge of instruc-
tion in British aeroplanes. For his signal gallantry during the retreat he waa
recommended by General Kornilov for the Order of St George.

284 RUSSIA AT WAR

The following telegram appeared in the Russkoe Shoo:

Active Army, July 21. Two regiments were disbanded at night. An
armed force was employed in the work of disbanding. The revolted regiments,
which were in reserve, were surrounded by Cossacks and two batteries. When
it finally became clear that the regiments would not voluntarily give op their
arms and their leaders, they were told to settle the question in the space of
three bugle calls. The first was played, then the second, then the third. After
this Kalinin, Commissary of the Front, gave the order to open artillery fire on
the insubordinate regiments. About a hundred projectiles were fired. The
firing did its work and the regiments laid down their arms.

The Germans and Hungarians were attacking with
insignificant forces. The Russian disaster was the work
of only two German and one Austro-Hungarian divisions.
Twelve divisions were ordered to oppose them, but the
attempt failed through the behavior of the soldiers.
An attempt to attack the enemy's salient from the
flanks was made, but the troops did not choose to obey
orders. Use had to be made of machine-gun fire to
restrain marauders and deserters, who threatened the
houses and shops of peaceful inhabitants. There was
no time for the evacuation of Kozowa, an important
strategical base for supplies of food and ammunition.
It was occupied by the Austrians on July 23rd. The
Russians had left there more than 600 railway wagons, a
sanitary train, railway engines, and an immense quan-
tity of ammunition and other stores. The road to
Tarnopol was crowded with thousands of carriages and
carts and motor-carts, moving eastward in clouds of
dust. Deserters pillaged the shops of the town. Of-
ficers were unable to preserve order among the troops
there, and many killed themselves in despair. Tarnopol
was occupied by the enemy on July 22nd. A Battalion
of Death, composed of cadets, reduced the rioting soldiers
in Tarnopol to order, not hesitating to shoot them when
necessary, superintended the work of evacuation, and
set fire to stores that it was not possible to remove.
After the cadets had left, soldiers began a pogrom, which

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL £85

was stopped by shooting fourteen of the men who were
caught red-handed. Fleeing bands of marauders sacked
houses on their way. There were cases of families being
bayoneted and women and children violated.

Kerensky had abolished the death penalty. General
Kornilov took the law into his own hands, and sent the
following telegram to Army Commanders:

I consider the voluntary retreat of units from their positions as equivalent
to treason and treachery. Therefore I categorically require that all com-
manders in such cases should, without hesitation, turn the fire of m^M™ guns
and artillery against the traitors. I take all responsibility for the victims on
myself. Inaction and hesitation on the part of the commanders I shall count
as neglect of duty, and such officers I shall at once deprive of their command
and commit to trial.

A formal ukaz, signed by Kerensky, by Efremov,
Minister of Justice, and by General Yakubovich, restoring
the death penalty in the Army during the war, was issued
on July 25th. In this ukaz the military crimes involving
the death penalty were set forth, and the composition
of the military-revolutionary courts to deal with the
most serious offenses was laid down. They were to con-
sist of three officers and three soldiers chosen by lot.
The verdict was to be decided by a majority of votes;
if the voting were equal, the verdict was to be in favor
of the prisoner.

Between Krewo and Smorgon the central group of
armies began its offensive on July 20th. They took
some positions and 1000 prisoners; then they declined
to do any more fighting, except the woman's battalion,
which lost heavily but never faltered. Farther north,
at Lake Naroch, the attempt to advance was even less
effective. The troops of the Central and Northern Fronts
were more subject to Bolshevist influences than their
comrades in the South.

In Rumania the forward movement began still later,
and at first, thanks to the ardor and the dash of the

286 RUSSIA AT WAR

Rumanian Army, it yielded substantial results in cap-
tured positions, guns, and prisoners; but soon, owing to
the defection of the Russians, the tide of battle turned
in favor of the enemy, and some of the forces under
the command of the King and of General Shcherbachev
found themselves hemmed in, and were extricated with
great difficulty.

Tarnopol fell July 22nd, Stanislawow was evacuated
on July 25th, Kolomea (recently General Kornilov's
headquarters) on July 27th. Czernowic, the capital of
the Bukovina, had to be abandoned a day or so later.
Kamieniets was prepared for evacuation. But, thanks to
General Kornilov's firmness and skill, the Russian armies
made a stand on the Zbruch. The Germans could not
secure a footing across the river.

The Austro-German accounts of their "victory" in
Galicia and Bukovina afforded cheerful reading for their
unenlightened public at home. Counter-attacks on the
Russian flanks (at Zwyzyn, on the upper reaches of the
Dniester, and at Nowica, southeast of Kalush), which
had prefaced but had not caused the rupture of the
Russian front, were represented in the light of mani-
festations of German skill and superior valor. Thence-
forward, the course of the Russian retreat was persistently
depicted as being a succession of hard-won battles. For
the first time in history an enemy's war bulletins were
magnifying the courage and valor of a panic-stricken
foe. The motive was easy to understand. It was less
flattering to German vanity to appraise the foe at his
just value; moreover, the Germans did not want the
Russians to think that their armies needed re-forming,
and there was also an abiding hope that by impressing
them with the idea that Russian troops had fought well
the covert scheme of a separate peace on "honorable"
terms might be furthered. But while German military
critics indulged in dithyrambics about the invincible

T » QUKU. (tVLT. 1917),

888 RUSSIA AT WAR

prowess of the Austro-German forces in Galicia and
Bukovina and the stanch resistance offered to them
by the Russians, the German General Staff prudently
deferred publishing the usual official summary of the
operations or from stating the number of prisoners taken.
(Later it was given as 40,000.)

General Komilov had proved himself to be a great
leader of men — I may say, one of the greatest military
commanders of his time — as well as a clear-sighted
statesman, capable of' quickly grasping a situation and
of acting upon it. I saw him frequently during the
anxious week when he was marshaling his broken line
to safety, at all hours of the day and of the night, and I
never noticed any hesitating or faltering. One of his
army chiefs, in despair at the wild retreat of his men,
telegraphed: "I cannot hold my line. Only 12,000
troops out of my army remain; the rest have fled. You
are asking impossibilities." But Komilov knew — and
his subordinate did not know — that unless the 12,000
held out, two whole armies would be unable to retire in
safety. He answered: "You have my orders." And
the "impossible" was accomplished. It is true that
the cavalry (including the gallant Polish Lancers), the
heroic cyclist battalion, a handful of "Death or Vic-
tory" volunteers, and last, but not least, the British
armored cars, had flung themselves into the breach.

I had the honor of conveying a message from him
to my countrymen and a number of crosses of St. George
to be bestowed upon those who had more particularly
distinguished themselves. It was all the more pleasing
to me because I had been amongst these men in good
and evil fortune, and knew how well they had deserved
recognition from the Commander-in-Chief.

On the first day of the offensive at Bzhezany they had
gone into action, in cars and in trenches. Five had been
killed. They lay buried near Kzhywe (southeast of

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 289

Bzhezany) in ground that was soon, alas! to fall into
enemy hands. Over the grave where they rested together
a plain wooden cross had been planted with the follow-
ing inscription:

Herb ub Fmo Englishmen

C.P.O. J. MacFarlanb
C.P.O. E. Vianb
C.P.O. W. J. Locu
P.O. W. 6. Pearson
P.O. W. L. Mitchell

Thbt Died Fighting fob Freedom in a Foreign Land.
Fear God and Fear Nought.

I wrote a detailed report of the work done by the
British armored cars during the retreat, and telegraphed
it, August 1st, from the Headquarters of the Seventh
Army to The Times. It was sadly curtailed and muti-
tilated in transmission, and I think it only right to
reproduce it here in full, for in the opinion of the Rus-
sian commanders the Allied co-operation had contrib-
uted greatly towards extricating their armies from a
plight that at first appeared to be hopeless.

Commander Locker-Lampoon, whose headquarters were at Kosowa, near
Bzhezany, learned on the evening of July 20th that Jezierna had fallen. He
was summoned to the Corps Staff and asked to withdraw the whole of his force
from their positions and hold the right flank. The enemy had advanced*
forming a salient, and the Staff hoped to be able to attack along the line Kuro-
patniki-Taurow-Jeaaenia and to use our cars to turn them back.

All our armored cars were collected at Kosowa that night, and none of us
had any sleep, as we were sent early next day to be attached to a Cossack regi-
ment. Three squadrons of our cars, operating together, were spread fanwise
across the front from Kuropatniki to the Tamopol road. Rumors had already
spread that the Russians were deserting their trenches and fleeing, and cer-
tainly their morale was bad on our arrival. We reported ourselves to the head-
quarters of a Cossack division, but nobody there could give any detailed instruc-
tions. The Corps Commander believed that our force might keep the infantry
from running away.

Lieutenant-Commander Smiles took the right-hand sector north of the
Tarnopol road, and dashed ahead through the villages of Halenkow and Olesin

200 RUSSIA AT WAR

(doe north of Kosowa) very successfully. The can outdistanced the
infantry by many handled yard*. The can under hit commend got within
dote range of the advancing Germane and Austrian*. They delayed the
advance for leveral hours, fighting mcessantly, then f efl back as the German
and Austrian artillery came up.

The Russians remained in their trenches as long a* the armored can stayed
with them, but as the Austrian* advanced and the Germans were crying out
"Hurrah!" the Russians of their own accord flung down their rifles and ran for
their lives. Despite this shocking defection we attempted to keep the enemy
back, in order to stem the retreat, but it was impossible. We had to give way,
and the fleeing Russians crowded our can, breaking them down so that we
lost three, which we had to abandon.

An exactly similar state of affairs occ u r r ed with the other squadrons which
checked the Austrian* and managed to keep the advancing infantry back until
their artillery arrived, rendering further resistance impossible. The Russian
retreat became a rout, and though we went into action time and again during
the day, the effect produced was only local. A panic ensued at Kosowa.
Everybody ran away. We did our best to stop the runaways.

All our stores were removed the following night. The enemy began A»llmg
Kosowa; some of our men were wounded by shrapnel, and the Staff ordered
us to retire. Great craters filled the road from Kosowa to Kshywe, impeding
the retreat to Podhajce, where we arrived safely. The only regiment that did
good work that day was one of the Finland Division. The can covered car
retreat. Every car that went into action fired over 8000 rounds.

By the evening of the 88nd our force was transferred to an aerodrome some
miles from Podhajce on the road to Monasteshyska. The doctor and the
English nurses, who had been doing splendid work in the hospital at Podhajce*
left with our column.

The same day the Staff of the corps to which our force was attached had
been transferred to Bialokernka, a few miles east of Podhajce. We were
ordered to reconnoiter and destroy any remaining stores. One heavy car
reached Teliacse without sighting the enemy. It found that the stores had
been destroyed by Russian gunners. Kosowa was burning, but was apparently
unoccupied. The Austrian advance wot incredibly aloto, and both these places,
within a few miles of the enemy's original lines, were still unoccupied on July
tted. Other can went north along the road to Kshywe, also without meeting
the enemy. We had been delayed near Podhajce by a shocking panic among
the troops and transport. On the afternoon of the fcfcnd our transport column
and damaged can proceeded south to Buchach, which was also in a state of
panic.

The next day our can were transferred to another corps belonging to the
same army and ordered to operate along the Buchach-Tsrncpol road. A
section went into action with four can. The situation was desperate. There
were great gaps in the front corps, caused by flight of whole divisions. The
Corps Commander had no information of the tohereabouU of the enemy or of hie
own troops. Our can were able to give him invaluable information, and besides*
they kept the enemy at bay. The hottest fighting occured at the villages of

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 201

Pantalicha and Darachow, about ten miles west of Trembowla. At Darachow
we ambushed the enemy in the houses and courtyards, des troyin g them whole-
sale. During that night, thanks to the respite which we had been able to
afford them, the Russians rallied, entrenched themselves, and even drove out
the enemy from some of their positions.

On the 24th our cars operated on the high road from Darachow to Buchach.
At four o'clock that morning the Corps Commander summoned Commander
Locker-Lampson to the village of Laskowce and told him that two divisions
had bolted, leaving a gap of fifteen miles north of Laskowce as far as Trembowla.
Our cars were entrusted with the task of protecting this huge space.

Working along the road between Chmielow and Darachow, they did great
execution among the advancing infantry, mainly Austrians. Lieutenant-
Commander Smiles came up later with two cars which had been repaired.
Commander Locker-Lampson himself went into action. One of our officers
spotted an Austrian standing on a knoll, drove his car in that direction, and
came plump into a large force of the enemy at a range of fifty yards. Opening
fire, he mowed them down and got out safe. The cars eventually left Chmielow
owing to severe shell fire. The enemy did not venture to make a direct attack
on Chmielow, but, making a d&ow over fields where the ears were unable to
operate, tried to surround the village. The attempt was unsuccessful.

Our cars were invincible on the road, and fought a series of rearguard actions
the whole of the rest of the day, frequently under a fierce fire from the enemy's
field guns. One car had its engine completely blown out by a direct hit and
had to be abandoned. The crew removed the guns and material and withdrew
in safety. Another car was struck by a shell which smashed a plate, wounding
all the crew, including Sub-lieutenant Wallace. Driver Swan, although badly
wounded, drove the car out of action. Another car got on fire, but was safely
removed. A car with Commander Locker-Lampson had its dynamo damaged
by a splinter. All the squadrons re-formed that evening at Buchach.

The whole of the 85th was given to patrol work within the triangle Buchach-
Chortkow-Trembowla.

On the 80th, at the village of Kobylowloki, half-way between Chortkow and
Trembowla, the cars got into action for the first time with German cavalry,
which all immediately decamped.

Some of our men were for twenty hours in tiuw seats in the armored cars.
The Corps Commander said we had given him a respite of twenty-one hours by
filling a gap which otherwise would have offered the enemy's cavalry, motors,
and mounted infantry a chance to cut our line of retreat. The extraordinary
feature about these operations was that the British Armored Car Division
practically held up the Germans on a whole army front. This exploit was
rendered possible by excellent judgment in selecting such a splendid road for
operations as the highway between Buchach and Tarnopol. Our can were
repeatedly under artillery fire at a range not exceeding 8000 yards.

On July 87th, Lieutenant-Commander Smiles, with two light and one heavy
ear, held the German cavalry for a considerable time on the Trembowla road,
north of Husiatyn. The village of Shivkowce had to be evacuated at 4 p.m.,
and rearguard actions were fought by our armored can, permitting the infantry

S92 RUSSIA AT WAR

to retire. An alarm compelled a further retirement during the night, wherein
one car was lost. On the 28th, continuous rearguard actions by Smiles were
fought with the same squadron along the road to Suchadol from early morning
to 2.90 p.m. In Husiatyn the Russian infantry had thrown down their rifles
and machine guns, and a provocateur who had spread panic had been killed and
crucified. By three o'clock all the troops had crossed the River Zbrach, and
our cars were the last things on wheels to cross. Five minutes later the bridge
was blown up, and fifteen minutes later some German cavalry reached the bridge
by another route. Soldiers and villagers on this side of the river at' Husiatyn
cheered the armored cars as they went past.

The 29th was a day of rest for the cars, as the enemy had not crossed the
river. Pillaging went on. Three of our officers attacked with their fists three
hundred pillagers and put them to flight. Some German prisoners who had
been brought to our base got into conversation with one of our men. One of
them spoke English. He stated that the British armored cars seemed to be
everywhere along the front, and one day alone had killed over six hundred.

On the 80th, lieutenant-Commander Wells-Hood and his cars were con-
tinuously in action on the outskirts of Husiatyn. Very good work was done
by Sub-Lieutenant Benson in a heavy armored car with a three-pounder gun.
The enemy had mounted maxims on the church standing on a ridge east of
Husiatyn, and in the absence of Russian artillery these could not be dislodged.
Our car destroyed the emplacements in the belfry after fifteen minutes' firing
at a distance of 2000 yards. Four times consecutively during the morning our
cars went into action. The Russian Divisional Commander was loud in their
praise. The best targets so far secured in the war were obtained against
German infantry on this occasion. In the evening, using a Lewis gun, Petty
Officer Rogers, in one of Lieutenant-Commander Wells-Hood's cars brought
down an enemy aeroplane which was sniping our reserves. On the 31st,
Lieutenant-Commander Ruston and his cars were in action against the enemy
continuously throughout the day. Sub-Lieutenant Southam, who already
had had one car blown up under him, took great risks, as opportunities for
advancing against the enemy were small in view of their heavy artillery, which
had been brought up and was pounding the road. Our casualties in wounded
represented 20 per cent of the fighting force.

Ten days later, at Kiev, on my way north, we buried
Valentine. The city was in an uproar. Ukrainian regi-
ments were exchanging volleys with the Russian cavalry
at the railway station. The garrison was torn by Bol-
shevist factions. An octogenarian professor-colonel who
was in "command" had been trying to apply his theories
of a "democratic republic" among the troops, with the
result that he had twice had to make a hurried escape
from his headquarters. He plaintively informed me that

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 293

he could not count upon his men to bury a "bourgeois
monarchist" Englishman. But a Cossack sotnia effectu-

ally prevented any nonsense. The company of terri-
torials who rendered the last honors was not interfered
with. And we knew that the Russian troops, if left

294 RUSSIA AT WAR

alone, would never display feelings other than those of
affectionate loyalty and respect for a fallen ally. It
was the Cossacks who bore Valentine's coffin from the
cathedral to the gun-carriage, and, after a four hours 9
march in the dust and heat of an August morning, car-
ried him through the military cemetery to his last resting-
place. As we drew nigh to the grave the horsemen
lined the pathway, and we passed under a double row
of drawn Cossack sabers.

There had been some uncertainty about the arrange-
ments for the funeral, so I telegraphed two days before-
hand to our military mission at the Stavka requesting
instructions from General Kornilov. This telegram
reached its destination a week later, when I had already
reached Mogilev. It bore the mark of the Petrograd
telegraph office. Apparently all messages for Head-
quarters were being transmitted for "censorship." It
showed clearly enough that the Soviet regime did not
trust the Army. This incident has its importance, for
at that time the relations between Kornilov and Keren-
sky were not even "strained."

As a commentary on the difference between the spirit of the Russian armies
in 1916 and 1017, this map shows the remarkable achievements of the troops
on the Southwestern Front some months before the Revolution and its attend-
ant breakdown of discipline. It speaks for itself. I may add that these same
troops were better armed and munitioned in 1917 and had a greater superiority
in numbers over the enemy. But they lost all that had been won in 1016V and
thus forever discredited the Revolution.

PART IV

KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

CHAFFER XXIV

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM

Attempts to Restore Discipline— Savinkov Supports Komilov— Kerensky
Vacillates — Failure of the Moscow Conference — A "Socialist Autocrat"
— Collision with Komilov and Kaledin— ^JThe Truth about the Military
Dictatorship — Another Bolshevist Move— Kerensky Parleys— The Dem-
ocratic Conference— Lenin Reappears— The "Bed Guard" — Kerensky's
Overtures to Komilov — Intrigues with Bolsheviki-^ircumstances of the
Cavalry Expedition — Komilov Dismissed — Alexeiev to the Rescue —
Kornflov's Intercepted Orders of the Day — Alexeiev Resigns— The Lvov
"Migunderstanding"— Bolsheviki Turn against Kerensky— The Lenin
Government and Armistice*

Bolshevism had snatched victory from our grasp,
but all hope was not yet lost. The men had rallied
under General KornUov's stern measures of discipline.
Behind them was the nation, largely composed of sound
elements that awaited the signal of some strong man
backed by an organized force to revolt against the
terror of the Soviet. The heart of the nation was still
sound. Its sturdier portions, the inhabitants of the
borderlands — the Cossacks, the Caucasians, and the Si-
berians — had done their best in the offensive and were
ready to unite together and to save the country at
the eleventh hour from anarchy, from collapse, and from
shameful surrender to German intrigue, with its pros-
pect of complete subjection of new-found liberties to the
domination of the Huns.

286

296 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

Here is an evidence of self-sacrificing loyalty shown
by the Russian settlers in Western Siberia. Already in
April they had formed three "death" battalions of
volunteers, which hurried up to take part in the offensive.
One of them, the 2nd Orenburg Battalion, reached the
Front when oiir line had been opened and the disgrace-
ful retreat was in full blast. They had no transport
and no iron rations. Forcing their way through the
fugitives, they rushed forward and engaged the enemy.
Three days and nights they were continuously in action
without receiving any food. Then they were relieved.

I saw them at P , our base, whither they had come

to refit and refill. Out of 1000 men only 500 remained.
Three companies of reserve men were paraded and in-
vited to join the volunteers. Hie reserves had come
from Bolshevist towns. They were a poor lot, untrained
and undisciplined. After conferring with their "Com-
mittees" these "soldiers" declined to join the bat-
talion.

Having restored some semblance of discipline at the
Front by the simple method of reviving the death penalty
for deserters and succeeded thereby in arresting the
further advance of the enemy, General Kornilov boldly
urged upon the Provisional Government the adoption
of similar methods among the troops in the country
and the workmen employed on the railways. He had
forbidden political meetings and had restricted the Com-
mittees to their normal domestic functions. He de-
manded similar measures among the reserve troops.
It was quite obvious that to continue the war with any
prospect of victory necessitated an immediate compli-
ance with his demands. The Chief Commissary of the
Government with the southwestern armies had entirely
endorsed General Kornilov's energetic program. This
commissary was M. Savinkov, a well-known revolutionary
and writer. He was one of the few Russians who had

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 897

played an active part among the Maximalists in 1905
and later. It was said that he had been privy 1 to several
political assassinations. Being clear-sighted and patriotic,
however, he had now subordinated party aims and
ideals to the stern necessities of the hour. Proceeding
to Petrograd, he boldly and energetically canvassed
General Kornilov's plan, and partly as a result of his
intervention General Kornilov was appointed to the
Supreme Command. <

I shall now briefly outline the events that followed.
M. Kerensky himself had been at the Front and knew
how complete was the failure of the Committee system
as a military organization. He had himself been hooted
and jeered at by soldiers who were being "revolutionized "
by Bolshevist agitators behind the backs of their Com-
mittees. His own perfervid oratory had failed to remedy
the evil. He had just scored heavily against the Bol-
sheviki of Petrograd and Kronstadt — thanks to the help
of the Cossacks. What could the country expect of him
at this juncture? He was Minister-President by this
time, it should be mentioned, and claimed to have
absolute powers. I ask, what should he have done at
this critical juncture? And I say unhesitatingly — and
all men of common sense and common patriotism agree
— he should have proclaimed himself openly for General
Kornilov, as his fellow-Socialist M. Savinkov had done.

But this "bold, fearless" orator, who had made
people believe in him and follow him, was at heart only
a revolutionary — a tool of the Soviet, as he had been
from the beginning. He boasted later on that he would
"save Russia" if it cost him his "soul" — in other words,
that he would sacrifice his political "ideals" to the
interests" of his country. And that was precisely

1 While reproving Terrorism, one cannot withhold a certain measure of
respect from men who, like Savinkov, risked their own lives in support of
"ideals," however misguided.

998 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

what he lacked the courage to do. I have related else-
where how he proceeded to play a game of "fast and
loose" with the avowed traitors who had disrupted the
Army — with Lenin, with Trotsky and the other pseudo-
Jews who were acting in the interests of Germany. In
the same way he now played with Komilov and even
with his own successor at the War Office, Savinkov.

General Kornilov's drastic measures had been ap-
plied without previous sanction from Petrograd, but
they could not be upset by the Soviet just then. The
shame inflicted upon Russia by its associates was too
palpable. Besides, the Soviet had not recovered from
the fright inflicted upon it by Lenin and Company.
But even before they could rally themselves Kerensky
had taken his stand against Komilov. Messages to
the Stavka — even those that were addressed to Allied
missions — from any part of the country were passing
"by order" into Kerensky 's hands. He was treating
Komilov as if he were an enemy- General Kornilov's
record precluded suspicion of partiality for the Old
Regime- A son of the people, he had been systematically
"shelved" throughout his previous military career. But
General Komilov was becoming too popular, and might,
if he were allowed to restore discipline among the 8,000,000
reserve troops, become too powerful and turn the country
against the Revolutionaries. Then good-bye to the
sweets of sham government and the delights of the
Winter Palace. Under no circumstances must the
Komilov program be applied without "guarantees,"

Waiting impatiently for an answer, because he had
evidence that the Germans would soon make their move
on Riga, General Komilov at length obtained an in-
vitation from M. Savinkov to come to Petrograd and
make a report to the Council of Ministers. It appears
that M. Kerensky did not know of this invitation.
His astonishment and Hi-suppressed fury quickly found

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 899

vent against the Minister of War. A few hours after-
wards M. Savinkov was curtly requested to resign. But
General Komilov would not be refused a hearing, and
M. Kerensky listened with the best grace possible. The
Generalissimo unfolded his anxieties to the Ministers
and hinted that a "counter-move" might be advisable
in order to check the German advance. Thereupon M.
Savinkov slipped a note into his hand telling him to
beware of discussing plans, because certain persons —
indicating M. Chernov — were not reliable. The Council
agreed "to consider" the Kornilov program.

But M. Kerensky had other views. He hastened
the assembling of a Popular Conference at Moscow,
hoping thereby to strengthen his own position. Repre-
sentatives of all four Dumas, of the Zemstvos and Munici-
palities, of the Co-operatives, the Soviets, the Committees,
military and social organizations, were invited. The
revolutionary element was, of course, to be largely
represented, but there were also to be delegates from
the manufacturers, the landowners, the officers, the
Knights of St. George, and the Cossacks. The Conference
met in August, 1917. Never had the Grand Theater
at Moscow witnessed such a gathering.

Kerensky had signified to Headquarters that General
Kornilov would probably be "too busy." He did not
want him to come, but General Kornilov had made up
his mind to come, in order to have an opportunity of
telling the country that his recommendations were still
in abeyance* although the danger of invasion was more
than ever pressing. On the eve of the great day he
arrived, accompanied by a faithful bodyguard of Turco-
mans. Moscow gave him an enthusiastic welcome, as
he traversed the streets on his way to the Iberian chapel.
Kerensky was coming out of the Imperial apartments
in the Kremlin to go for a drive in one of the Emperor's
motor-cars when he heard the cheers of the multitude.

800 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

He immediately gave orders to drive in the opposite
direction. The great day was to be on the morrow.
That evening I was having tea with some of the gor-
geously attired Turcoman princes in Kornilov's saloon
carriage when Kerensky summoned him to the tele-
phone and "requested" the Generalissimo not to speak
at the Conference. He replied that he did not intend
to discuss politics, but only the affairs of the Army.
Surely he had the right and the duty to do so. Kerensky
could not find a convenient rejoinder. But Kornilov
felt that relations were becoming "strained/' and, for
the first time, showed some signs of nervousness. His
entourage determined to redouble their precautions,
fearing lest some attempt should be made to arrest
him, as Kerensky had arrested Gurko — on a trumped-up
charge.

From the very outset of the proceedings it was appa-
rent that the Conference was a "sham." The Bol-
sheviki were "in command," although they showed few
signs of their presence. As usual, they trusted not to
oratory, except for appealing to the mob and to the
ignorant soldiery* This audience of bourgeois and Men-
sheviki was not in their line. But they gave us all a
taste of their power by calling a general strike of trams
and restaurants. Fortunately a large supply of sand-
wiches and refreshments had been laid in at the Grand
Theater. The Bolsheviki were also too busy organizing
their next " coup " in Petrograd. As usual, they preferred
"to act" rather than "to talk."

I cannot say whether Kerensky was consciously blind,
or whether he had succumbed to mental derangement.
Certainly he acted and spoke like a person who was
afflicted by a mania of grandeurs. He adopted the manner
and tone of an autocrat. Two hapless A.D.C.'s were
left standing "at attention" behind his chair for several
hours. Still wearing the khaki tunic, breeches, and

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM SOI

gaiters which he had affected when he became Minister
of War, he delivered a long and violent harangue, the
sum and substance of which was that he (Kerensky)
was the Supreme Power, that anybody who dared to
wrest the "scepter" — he used the Imperial formula
"our scepter" — from his grasp would be crushed, that
he would ruthlessly suppress all attempts against "our
power" with "blood and iron," At the same time he
announced that the country and the Revolution were
in deadly peril and that everybody must help him; but
that he, and he alone, would save the country and the
Revolution, adding, "even if I lose my own soul in the
attempt." The impression produced upon me by nearly
an hour of hysterical "talk" of this description left no
doubt in my mind that we were on the eve of another
crisis.

Then General Kornilov appeared in the rostrum.
The contrast between the two men was overwhelming.
Here was calm, sober sense. Without a superfluous
word or gesture, without even raising his voice, Kornilov
told the plain, unvarnished tale of Russia's agony, of
the men who had wanted to save their land from thral-
dom, of the sapping of discipline, of the officers who had
been foully murdered or shot in the back, and of the
specter of hunger in the ranks. The foe was even then
beginning to knock at the gates of Riga. By dealing out
death to traitors the Army had saved the southern
provinces. Would they not take the lesson to heart?
Would they wait till the Germans were in Riga and
in Petrograd, before they understood? By leaving a
few traitors alive, countless victims, unspeakable misery
and shame, would be involved.

The audience was divided into two fairly equal por-
tions, one for Kerensky, the other for Kornilov. The
same division was noticeable when General Kaledin
proclaimed the Cossack veto on further delay and Gen-

SOS* KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

end Alexeiev pilloried the doctrinaires of indiscipline.
Kerensky had jumped up in a fury of rebuke to the
Cossack chieftain. "We have invited you to state
your opinions. We do not permit you to proffer advice
or dictation/' he cried.

Speeches, parliamentary or revolutionary, followed
in endless succession. They were not pertinent to the
issue. The Conference had been summoned to declare
itself for or against Kerensky. It did neither, although
it seemed to do both. It should have declared itself
for Kornilov, but its revolutionary taint was too strong.
The events that followed were even then visible to all
who had eyes to see, but even those who were most clear-
sighted did not realize that Kerensky was capable of the
maddest compromise to maintain himself in office, and
would bring his country to the lowest depths of national
humiliation and despair.

General Kornilov had returned to the Stavka immedi-
ately after his speech. General Kaledin hastened back
to his Cossacks. All their friends and supporters made
arrangements to evade Kerensky's spies, who were cease-
lessly shadowing them.

There was no "conspiracy," of course, unless one
could apply that term to the outspoken wish of every
thinking Russian who had not succumbed to revolutionary
dogma or interest. In Kornilov all their hopes were
centered. Kornilov and Kaledin, with the Cossacks be-
hind them, would save the country. Let Kornilov be
Dictator! Such was the unanimous cry outside the
revolutionary camp. A great popular organ like the
Russhoe Slovo was openly supporting him. Was that
a "conspiracy"? No, but it was gall and wormwood
to the man who had arrogated dictatorial power to him-
self and who was far gone in madness. We can under-
stand now all that was soon to happen.

The Kornilovites knew quite well that another Bol-

III
, -1

s |3

S ij

TfiE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM SOS

shevist rising was imminent and that Kerensky would
either have to join Kornilov or be swept away. But
Kerensky was blind and rash. He did everything to
upset the arrangements that were being made with a
view to checking Bolshevist designs. He helped the
Bolshevist game. It was not the first time.

However, Kornilov still did not quite despair of the
acceptance of his program by the Kerensky Govern-
ment. His supporter, M. Savinkov, had been taken
back into favor, with the erratic inconsequence that
characterized many of Kerensky's acts.

On his return to Petrograd, Kerensky was apparently
under the delusion that he had scored a definite triumph
in Moscow, and adopted a somewhat haughty tone
towards the Soviet. Then, suddenly, the Bolshevist
menace assumed concrete form. Positive information
reached the Stavka that another uprising was imminent.
And Kerensky authorized M. Vladimir Lvov, who had
been his associate in the first Coalition Government, to
convey certain proposals to General Kornilov, which
were accepted. Then M. Lvov was suddenly arrested.
Some days earlier, General Kornilov had been asked to
send troops to help the Government. But, as the Bol-
sheviki, evidently informed about it, became aggressive,
M. Kerensky parleyed with them, carefully concealing
the fact that he was already negotiating with General
Kornilov and also that Savinkov had talked him round
to accepting in part the Kornilov program.

An authoritative version of the events that occurred
after the Moscow Conference was given by General
Kornilov in an Order of the Day to the Army (September
10th, No. 897):

Hie Galidan disaster sustained by the armies of the Southwestern Front
clearly showed to what an extent the disintegration of our Army had gone.

As Commander-in-Chief of that front I considered it my duty to present a
demand for the introduction of the death penalty for traitors and cowards.

EOUNH07 AMD THE OOGGAJ

w ^

in the
for all of the

to take

to her destruction, and < Wiring to forestall
decided to

the Bokhevkit uprhmng take place, it might be
and prompt inssmer. It was accessary to flaake i
inal activity of traitors in the rear.

In taking this decision I was not following any plans of
and did not seek to take upon myself all the burden of undivided ifapumSIiililjr
for the Government of the country. My intention was to work in harmony
with persons enjoying the public confi d en ce and with h i i i wu h m pnblie orgaav
aations who were endeavoring to save Bosnia. I hoped, with the help of these
prominent public men, to endow oar comitiy widiestzongGovermnentcspabfe
of saving it from shame and ruin. I merely co ns idere d it necessary thai I. as
the Supreme Gene ra l i ss imo , should be a member of the new Gove r nm ent,

The Bolshevist uprising in Petrograd was intended for September 10th ox
11th. By September nth three cavalry divisions were already conce ntr ated
at Pskov, Veffloe Luki, and Dno station.

On September 6th, M. Savinkov, Director of the Ministry of War. came to
the Stavka and brought me a draft of the propose d measures to be taken by
the Provisional Government, based upon the demands I had presented, and
informed me that ■Mhmis* these measures were to be introduced within a few
days, the Provisional Government strongly apprehended that this might call
forth an uprising in Petrograd and severe opposition on the part of {Responsible
organisations. At the same time M. Savinkov told me that the Provisional
Government, apprehensive of a Bolshevist uprising; did not feel sure about its
own forces, and wanted me to place at its disposal a corps of cavalry, which it

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 300

wished to be moved towards Petrograd. It wy, ha added, the intention of the
Government, a* soon as it was informed of the concentration of such a corps*
immediately to proclaim martial law in Petrograd.

Hie wishes of the Provisional Government as transmitted to me by M.
Savinkov entirety corresponded with the decision I had already taken, and,
therefore, that same day I gave the necessary orders for putting down a possible
rising in Petrograd.

On September 7th came to me at the Stavka M. Vladimir Lvov, member
of the State Duma, former Procurator of the Holy Synod, and, speaking on
behalf and in the name of M. Kerenaky, the Minister-President, asked me to
state my views regarding three various methods of organising a new Govern-
ment, suggested by M. Kerenaky himself: (1) The withdrawal of Kerenaky
from all part in the Government; (ft) the participation of Kerenaky in the Gov-
ernment; and (8) a proposal to me to assume the dictatorship which was to be
proclaimed by the existing Provisional Government.

I replied that I considered the only solution lay in the establishment of a
dictatorship and the proclamation of martial law throughout the country.

Under the dictatorship I understood not a one-man dictatorship, inasmuch
as I had pointed out the n ece s sity of participation in the Government by
Kerenaky and Savinkov.

Let it be known to all that in taking this decision I considered and stfll
consider, any return to the Old Regime to be an utter impossibility, and the
task of the New Government should be exclusively devoted to saving the coun-
try and the civic liberties won by the Revolution of March 12th last

On the evening of September 8th I exchanged telegrams with the Minister-
. President, Kerenaky , who asked me if I would confirm what I had said to Lvov.

As I could not entertain the idea that the emissary sent to me by the Pro-
visional Government could distort the sense of my conversation with him, I
replied that I did confirm my words fully, and again invited Kerenaky and
Savinkov to come to the Stavka, as I could not answer for their safety if they
remained in Petrograd. 1

In reply to this the Minister-Resident stated that he could not leave for
the Stavka on the 8th, but that he was starting on the 9th.

It is evident from the foregoing that up to the evening of the 8th my actions
and decisions were proceeding in full accord with the Provisional Government,
and I had every reason to consider that the Mmister-President and the Director
of the Ministry of War were not playing a double game.

The morning of the 0th showed the contrary. I received a telegram from
the Minister-Resident intimating that I must immediately hand over the office
of Supreme G>mmander-m-Chief to my Chief of Stall and myself immediately
leave for Petrograd.

The Chief of Staff declined to take over the post I likewise considered it
impossible to hand it over until the situation had been fully cleared up. Through-

1 M. Tereshchenko left Petrograd for Mogilev on the evening of September
8th to attend a co nf erenc e of public men summoned by General KornHov. He
was recalled by a telegram from M. Kerenaky when he was half-way .

806 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

out the whole of September 9th I conferred by telegraph with the Director of
the Ministry of War, Savmkov, and from these conversations it appeared that
the Minister-President and Savinkov himself not only repudiated the propos a ls
that had been made to me, but even disavowed the fact of their having made
them.

Considering that under the existing circumstances further hesitation pre-
sented fatal dangers, and that, moreover, the measures already ordered could
no longer be countermanded, I decided, with a full appreciation of the weight
of my responsibility, not to hand over the post of Supreme Commander-in*
Chief, in the hope that thereby I might save my country from imminent disaster
and the Russian people from German slavery.

In this, my decision, I was supported by the Commanders-in-Chief of the
various fronts, and I am convinced that I shall have with me all the honest
defenders of our much-suffering country.

What had happened was simply this, that on the
evening of September 8th Kerensky realized that the
Bolsheviki were very strong. On the other hand, his
prejudice against Kornilov impelled him to go on treating
with them and to represent Kornilov as their enemy.
He thus enlisted their support Trying to palliate this
act, he afterwards explained that circumstances had
compelled him, because the Bolsheviki had assembled
enormous quantities of explosives and threatened to
blow up the Winter Palace and the bridges. Moreover,
he permitted the arming of the Bolshevist workmen
who formed the "Red Guard," and received deputa-
tions from the Kronstadt garrison. Simultaneously he
was consulting M. Miliukov (who advised, as usual, the
formation of another Coalition Cabinet), and later Gen-
eral Alexeiev.

By that time the Kornilov cavalry was approaching
Petrograd. Under joint Kerensky-Bolshevist auspices
the garrison set forth to meet them. The Bolsheviki
had taken up the rails behind the Kornilov contingent
and severed the wires. But all were in deadly fear of
the cavalry. M. Chernov, of agrarian disfame, organized
a novel form of skirmishers. Singly and in groups they
stole up to the Caucasian regiments, bringing procla-

THE BIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 807

mations signed by Kerensky wherein it was stated that
Kornilov was a traitor and that he had been superseded
and arrested. The emissaries further added that Kornilov
had shot himself. Bereft of all means of communication
and completely mystified and misled, the cavalry stayed
their march. Had Kornilov been with them, he could
have taken Fetrograd almost unresisted. But he was
directing very critical operations from Headquarters,
and he had not counted upon treachery. Kerensky
had imposed upon the credulity of Savinkov, who was
also now against Kornilov. Later, Savinkov recanted
and left the Ministry to enlist as a private soldier, vow-
ing that, sooner or later, he would have Kerensky 's
blood.

General Alexeiev now sacrificed himself. None of
the Generals at the Front would take Kornilov's place.
Kerensky pledged himself not to arrest Kornilov or any
of his supporters, and, on that understanding, General
Alexeiev went to Mogilev "to save the situation." The
following hitherto unpublished documents fully describe
the position at that moment:

ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE ARMY.
Mogilev, September lift, No. 900:

I, General Kornilov, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, hereby explain to all
the armies entrusted to me, to their Commanders and to the Commissaries and
elected organisations, the significance of the events which have just occurred.

It was known to me from authentic written data, from the reports of our
Secret Service, from intercepted telegrams and personal observation, that:

1. The explosion at Kazan, where over 1,000,000 shells and 12,000 machine
guns were destroyed, was caused with the undoubted connivance of German
agents;

2. Germany had spent millions of rubles to organise the destruction of
mines and works in the Donets Basin and in the South of Russia;

8. Our Secret Service had reported:

(a) A simultaneous blow is being prepared on our whole front in order
to break and rout our weakened Army.

906 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACES

(I) An i nsur rec ti o n ii being organised in Fmland.
(c) It it intended to blow up bridges over the Dnriper and Volga.
(a*) The organisation of a Bolshevist uprising in Petrograd is being
proceeded with*

4. On August loth, during a sitting of the Council of Mmisters in the Winter
Palace, Kerensky and Savmkov personally requested me to be careful and not
to talk about everything, because among the Ministers there were men who
were unreliable and disloyal.

5. I had grounds for weighty suspicion of treason and treachery among
the ranks of various irresponsible organisations who are in the pay of Germany,
yet exe r ci s e an influence upon the work of the Government.

6. In view partly of what has been said above, and in full agreement with
the Director of the ministry of War, Savinkov, who came to the Stavkn on
September Oth, a whole series of measures were drafted and taken for the sup-
pression of the Bolshevist movement in Petrograd.

7. On September 7th the Minister-President sent to me a member of the
Duma, V. N. Lvov, and there then occurred a historical act of provocation.

Tnere could not be the slightest doubt in my mind that irresponsible influ-
ences had got the upper hand in Petrograd and that our country was being led
to the edge of her grave.

At such moments one cannot discuss, one must act. And I took the decision
which you know of : to save my country, or to die at my post.

You are well acquainted with all my past life, and I declare that neither
before nor at present was I moved by personal desires or personal aims or
ambitions, but that only one purpose, one aim guided my life, and that waa to
serve my country, and to this I summon aD, as I have summoned the whole
nation and the Provisional Government.

No answer has yet come to me.

I did not surrender the office of Supreme CommandeMn-Ghief , nor could
I have done so, because not one of the Generals would take it; and therefore I
give this order to all the personnel of the Army and Navy, from the Gosn-
maaders-in-Chief to the last soldier, to all Commissaries and to aD elected
organisations, to unite together at this fateful hour in the life of our country,
to join their efforts without thwHng of themselves in the cause of our country's
salvation, and for this purpose to remain in all tranquillity at their posts* ready
to repulse the imminent onslaught of the foe.

I pledge my word of honor as an officer and a soldier, and assure you once
more that I, General Kornflov, the son of a simple Cossack peasant, have by
my whole life and not in words only shown my unfailing devotion to my country
and to freedom, that I am alien to any counter-revolutionary schemes whatso-
ever, and remain on guard over the liberties we have won, desiring only that
the great Russian nation should continue to enjoy its independent

GbNEBAL KOBHILOV.

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 809

The following telegrams were sent to M. Kerensky,
to General Kornilov, to the Minister of War, and to
other military officials by the Commanders-in-Chief of
the various Russian fronts:

From Gknbbal Kuuibovhey, C-w-C. Northern Front,

September 10th. No. 574a,

I have received a telegram from Supreme Coaunander-in-Chief notifying
me that I have been appointed in his place. While ready to serve my country
to the last drop of blood* I cannot, without failing in loyalty and love to her,
accept this office, as I do not consider myself sufficiently strong or competent
for such a responsible post during the difficult and troublous times through
which we are now passing. I consider any change in the Supreme Command
to be the most dangerous at a moment when the enemy threatens the integrity
of our country and our freedom, and jrhen measures are urgently needed to
stimulate discipline and efficiency in the Army.

(Signed)

From General Balduv, C.-in-C. Southwestern Front,

September 10th. No. 10,450.

In my telegram as Commander of the Eleventh Army, 12th (80th July)
I stated my views regarding the conditions that were necessary to raise the
fighting efficiency of the armies and thereby to save Russia. As regards the
measures that should be taken, I am entirely in agreement with General Korn-
ilov. 1 have just received a telegram that General Kornilov has been ordered
to hand over the post of Supreme Ommiander*in-Chief . I consider the depart-
ure of General Kornilov would be destructive to the Army and to Russia;
firstly, because General Kornilov has always put his whole heart and soul into
his work for the welfare of the country and that he is the only man in Russia
who is capable by his iron wiD to restore order in the Army; and secondly,
because his dismissal indicates that the measures rejected wiD not be carried
out by the Government although the present situation in Russia insistently
demands the carrying out of extraordinary measures. General KornuWs
retention at the head of the Army is urgently needed, regardless of any political
complications.

(Signed) General Balotev.

From General Shchbrbacrxv, C.-in-C. Rumanian Front,

September 10th. No. 400.

I consider any change in the Supreme Command at the pr e sen t difficult
time through which Russia is passing to be extremely dangerous from a military
point el view. Fully agreeing with the measures proposed by General Kornilov
for restoring dis ci nJnM and efficiency in the Army, I consider it my duty to

310 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

declare that the mptrwwi o n of General KornOov will inevitably
fatal influence upon the Army and upon the defense of Russia. I appeal to
your sense of patriotism, in the name of the salvation of our country, to avoid a
rapture in oar ranks.
Jasbt. (SJf**9 Shcubaacbbv.

Fbom Gkotbal Damn, C.-ni-C. Wnumt Facnrr*

September 9th. No. 145

I am a soldier and unaccustomed to play hide-and-seek. On Jujy 29th,
at a conference with the members of the Provisional Government. I declared
that they had by a whole series of military enactments demoralised and dis-
rupted the Army and trampled our battle-flags in the mire. By my retention
as Coumiander-m-Ghief the Provisional Government had to my mind recog-
nised its weighty transgressions against the c ountr y and a desire to repair
the evil that had been done. To-day I have received the news that General
Koraflov, who had presented the well-known demands which could atiD save
the country and the Army, is to be relieved of the post of Supreme C omman de r -
in-Chief. Taking this to mean the return of the Government to a course of
studied destruction of the Army, and consequently to the ruin of our country, I
consider it my duty to acquaint the Provisional Government that along this
course I shall not travel with them.

(Siffned)

The senders of these telegrams were subsequently
dismissed and arrested, in some cases under circum-
stances of the utmost brutality.

But the Army never received these Orders of the
Day. Bolshevist agents at Mogilev intercepted them.
It had been difficult, for the same reason, to get them
printed. On the other hand, Kerensky's foul and slan-
derous proclamations against Kornilov were scattered
broadcast. The Bolsheviki stirred up the Committees,
and immediately a series of abominable outrages were
perpetrated upon officers who lay under the slightest
suspicion of being pro-Komilov. The Kerensky-Bol-
shevist "Coalition" set the example by arresting Korni-
lov, Lukomsky, (then Chief of Staff), and most of the
officers at Mogilev. Thereupon General Alexeiev, after
protesting in the strongest terms against Kerensky's
violation of his pledges, left the Stavka, and eventually

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 311

General Dukhonin accepted the post of Commander-in-
Chief. Noble-hearted Denikin had been brutally ill-
treated by a Bolshevist rabble. Other high officers
shared Ins fate. Many were murdered. One was
"boiled."

The Kerensky "sham" government shed crocodile's
tears over the dreadful harm that Kornilov had done
to the Army. Things were improving, and he must
needs spoil them, forsooth. When Riga fell and the
Germans overran Oesel, it was, of course, Komilov's
fault. Much had been made of the Lvov "misunder-
standing." He was also a "bad man." He had mis-
construed M. Kerensky's "good intentions" and had
induced General Kornilov "into error." The obvious
discrepancy between these two versions did not worry
such people as Kerensky and his friends.

After a short period of internment at Mogilev, General
Kornilov was transferred to Bykhov, 1 a neighboring
townlet, to be put on his trial for "high treason." A
Committee of Inquiry went down "to investigate."
Of the six members, three were pseudo-Jews of the
Soviet. And yet, after the most searching examination,
even this body could find no case against him except
for "attempting to change the existing form of Govern-
ment," i.e., the Soviet regime. His trial was, however,
postponed, because already some of the General's de-
positions had got into print and enabled the public and
the Army to obtain a glimmering of the truth.

It was damning for Kerensky, and completely spoilt
his hopes of collaboration with the Bolsheviki. The
Soviet also became "obstreperous." Then the madman
lost all sense of realities. He "proclaimed war on the
Soviet" and demonstratively withdrew from it, resigning
his post of Vice-President of the Executive Committee.

1 He escaped thence in December, the day before Dukhonin was murdered.

812 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

His acolytes, Chkheidze and Tseretelli, followed suit*
The complaisant M. Tereshchenko informed the Allied
representatives that all was well. "We shall soon dis-
pose of the Soviet and of the Bolsheviki," he boasted

At a "Democratic" Conference, convened by him in
the early days of October, 1917, Kerensky managed to
secure a half-hearted assent to the formation of another
Coalition Government. The majority of the Socialists
recognized the impossibility of eschewing bourgeois sup-
port; indeed, some of them now recognised the fact
that the Revolution had been the work, not of the
"democracy" alone, but also of the bourgeoisie, and
that the very essence of the social upheaval was bour-
geois, it being mainly concerned with the acquisition of
property. None except blind fanatics could imagine
that the peasants having once come into possession of
lands would give them up.

The Bolsheviki argued from another point of view.
They contended that the Revolution had hitherto been
"usurped" by pseudo-Socialists in alliance with bour-
geois to the detriment of the "democracy." The pacifism
of demoralized soldiers and sailors, and wholesale jac-
queries by the peasants, were, in their eyes, appeals for
the advent of a Bolshevist Government. Such was the
gist of arguments used by Lenin in printed and oral
utterances at this time.

The War Office had been entrusted to a semi-Revolu-
tionary semi-Bolshevist professor — a Colonel named Ver-
khovsky, who had been "commanding" the Moscow
soldier-rabble. He proceeded to settle the food and
the money problems and incidentally pave the way to
a premature peace by wholesale demobilization of the
reserves.

The propertied and non-Socialist classes had offered
their support to Kerensky because, after the Kornilov
affair, they saw no other alternative to a Bolshevist

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM SIS

regime. The new Coalition, including four Constitu-
tional Democrats, was formed October 8th. Meanwhile
Kerensky proclaimed Russia a Republic in order to
pacify the Left. It was, moreover, decided to institute
a sort of provisional parliament, with consultative
powers, in the hope that it would obviate the persistent
interference of Soviets and Committees.

This body was formed out of members of the Demo-
cratic Conference and nominees of the propertied classes,
which were represented in a proportion of about 95 per
cent. The Provisional Council of the Republic — as it
was styled — met October 20th, a few days after the
Germans had consolidated their conquest of the city
and gulf of Riga by the occupation of Dago Island, In
his inaugural address, Kerensky denounced the Bolshe-
viki — his recent allies against Kornilov — as traitors.
Trotsky retorted by branding the Council as a counter-
revolutionary organization.

Trotsky had "captured" the Petrograd Soviet soma-
time earlier, and had been organizing a Military Revo-
lutionary Committee to direct eventual Bolshevist oper-
ations in the Capital. The garrison and the populace
being informed of Kerensky's connection with the Korni-
lov "plot" and of the plan to send Petrograd troops to
the Front, joined Trotsky, obeyed his orders, and turned
their backs on Kerensky. The latter appealed to the
Cossacks in his hour of need, but he had deceived, bullied,
and slandered them and their beloved Ataman, Kaledin.
They refused to act as his police. He then fled, vainly
hoping to find support outside. Konovalov and the
other members of the latest Coalition were left in the
Winter Palace guarded by a handful of loyal officer-
cadets and women. Subjected for hours to a merciless
fusilade and shelled by warships, they could not resist.
Lenin's forces suppressed resistance ruthlessly in Petro-
grad, Moscow, and other cities. The Bolshevist coup

814 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

of November 7th, unlike the two preceding ventures, was
a complete and immediate success.

And as General Komilov had predicted, the Bol-
sheviki began their rule by negotiating an armistice,
without even consulting the Allies. Like the various
Coalitions they were also a "sham — but "made in
Germany."

CHAPTER XXV

THE HOPE OF RUSSIA

of the Cossacks—Three Centuries of Loyal Service— Ermak—Sea-
rovere — Stlnka R&rin — The "SXech" — Conquest of Siberia — Arctic Explor-
ation — The Cossack Lands — Home of Agricultural and Mineral Resources
—The Twelve Armies — Organisation Past and Present — Fighting Record
-—Elective Offices— Conditions of S e r vice The Don "Outlanders"—
Numbers in the Field-— Fighting Peculiarities—General Kaledin— A
Message to King George and the British Nation.

Throughout this narrative of Russia's past and
present history, I have endeavored to speak in terms
that may be comprehensible to those of my readers
who do not know Russia or the Russians or have a
superficial and often misleading acquaintance with Rus-
sian affairs. It is the truth and the whole truth that has
been unfolded in these pages — a record of glorious pos-
sibilities alternately wasted by narrow conceptions of
statehood under the autocracy and wrecked by extrav-
agant dreams 'of Millennium under the Revolution; an
autocracy and a Revolution that were dominated in turn
by the okhrana and the Soviet — institutions that were
"to wipe away all tears/' but, in fact, only constrained
or terrorized the living forces of the nation.

The Russian people had been, so to speak, in swaddling
clothes throughout the ages of Tatardom and autocracy;
their best men had sought sanctuary from oppression
in the border wildernesses, and later were drafted thither
as prisoners or exiles. Like our Pilgrim Fathers, these
early emigrants had gone forth to colonize new lands;
like our bold seamen, they founded new states and em-

315

316 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

pires. While Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher were laying
the foundations of our oversea dominion, Enn&k Timo-
f&evich, a Cossack (in Russian, Kazdk — freebooter) with
a handful of hardy adventurers, overran Western Siberia,
and came to John the Terrible to lay the new realm at
the autocrat's feet.

Our own Robin Hood had his counterpart in the Volga
Ataman "Stgnka" 1 R&zin. The exploits of this bold
spirit live to this day in popular legend. Every peasant
knows of his daring raids across the Caspian in open
boats to the confines of Persia, 3 whence he was reported
to have brought back a lovely princess as his bride.
And still more do they appreciate St£nka*s undying
love of freedom, his "complaint" against oppression,
which is so poetically rendered in one of the beautiful
songs of the Volga — the "Song of St£nka R&zin."

In the dawn of Russian history exploits of equal
audacity had been accomplished by forerunners of the
Volga freebooters. Prince Oleg had "hung his shield"
upon the gates of Byzantium. Legends describe how
Oleg's men fixed wheels to their boats so that "they
sailed oyer land and sea." Long after the Principalities
of Little Russia had been overshadowed by the Duke-
doms of Suzdal, Vladimir, Tver, and Moscow and the
Republics of Novgorod and Pskov, which finally suc-
cumbed to the "ingathering" power of the Terrible One,
the hardy free-rovers of the Dnieper continued to main-
tain their traditions. (The Crescent had triumphed
over the Cross, and the avenues of commerce had been
closed in this direction, wherefore it became necessary

of Stepan (Stephen).
1 Thence, perhaps, originated the name "Cossack," derived from the
Turkic word "robber." (The Persian* later had their own "Cossack" brigade.)
There also, perhaps, the Cossacks acquired their battie-cry"Ur*r which mean*
"Kill!" (Our Hurrah!) But more probably these words, like many others used
by the Cossacks, were introduced into Russia by the Tatar invader*. *

THE HOPE OP RUSSIA 817

to develop an outlet into Asiatic markets through the
Volga. Muscovy owed its rise to this economic cir-
cumstance.)

Cossackdom asserted itself as a barrier against the
infidel. The Free Republic of Zaporozhia (literally,
the lands below the Dnieper Rapids), with its Siech,
or "Slasher" army, survived even the Polish domina-
tion 1 and was dispersed under the Great Catherine.
Who has not read the thrilling pages wherein Senki-
ewicz relates the long-drawn story of the Cossack struggle
against Polish rule? Who has not heard of Tar&s Bulb&,
the Cossack hero of Gogol's immortal epic? Who does
not remember the story of Mazeppa, a Cossack chieftain
who was bound on the back of a wild horse for "treach-
ery" to the "oppressors" of his land?

The "Cossack" name had been more particularly
identified with the Little Russians, but we have seen
that their brethren of Great Russia were not less entitled
to it. All had been equally animated by a love of
freedom and independence, all were fearless and stanch.
And now the Great Russian Cossacks again showed
their marvelous qualities as pioneers of their country
and people. Going ever eastward through Siberia, they
passed mighty rivers, overpowered the resistance of
native tribes, till finally they reached the open sea.
Little is known about the doings of these remarkable men.
They were ignorant and unlearned and left no records.
They simply notified their discoveries of boundless lands
and islands. Thus D6zhnev, a Cossack, sailed the
Arctic Ocean in an open boat (1647-54), rounding what
was afterwards called Behring Strait after a Russian
naval officer who came there a century and a half later.
D&hnev built a fort at Anadyr Bay. A Cossack sotnia
under Volodimir Otl&ov conquered Kamchatka. Later,

1 A well-known picture by the great Russian painter, Dya Repin, represents
the warriors of the Siech writing an egregkraa epistle to the Khan.

318 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

in 1870, two Cossacks, Vaghin and Bermiakov, discovered
the New Siberian Islands. It is asserted by Colonel
Vandam, a well-known Russian writer, that some of
D6zhnev's contemporaries crossed the Straits and skirted
the coast of Alaska and southward to what is now San
Francisco.

Meanwhile their brethren in Great Russia had grown
and multiplied. Their services were in demand. Great
tracts of land were bestowed upon them by successive
sovereigns. The Don Cossacks were the most numerous,
because thither had flocked all the hardy youth of the
Great Russian plain. Here grew up a new nation of
horsemen. The vast prairies of the South afforded ideal
pasturage and the soil was exceedingly fertile. The
Don Cossacks became noted riders and husbandmen,
and in the still waters of their river they gathered a rich
harvest of fish.

From the Volga, Cossacks radiated eastward, forming
two separate hosts — the Orenburg and the Y&Ik or Ural
Armies. The name Yrilk was forbidden after the up-
rising of Pugachev 1 (early in the eighteenth century),
in which the Y&Ik Cossacks had taken part, and they
were afterwards styled the Ural Cossacks, till the Rev-
olution, when the old name was revived. A small
group of St6nka R&zin's followers settled in the estuary
of the Volga and were known as the Astrakhan Cos-
sacks.

When Catherine the Great finally broke the resistance
of the Sieeh, she arranged for the transfer of its warriors
to the Cis-Caucasian border. The advantages of her
plan were twofold. An unsubmissive element was elim-
inated from Little Russia and settled in a region where

1 Hence the Russian word Pugachfrshckina, equivalent of Jacquerie, applied
to agrarian troubles, reminiscent of the wholesale destruction of property that
attended PugacheVs uprising. Pushkin wrote a wonderful novel on the sub-
ject entitled "The Captain's Daughter" (Kafitatukma Dock).

(Droirn iv -V. Kro«A«*o)

THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 319

their inborn fighting spirit would safeguard the Empire
from incursions. For the Caucasian tribes were then
untamed and predatory, and might help the Turks or
the Persians to invade Russia. This was the origin of
the Kub&n and the T6rek Cossacks.

The Cossack organizations had been originally based
on the elective principle. Their Atamans, or head-men,
and minor officers were chosen in common assembly.
The Siech host had been divided into regiments, which
in peace-time were styled K&ren (smoke), as they lived
in one building and foregathered around one hearth.
In time of peace the army obeyed the orders of a Camp
Ataman, who was assisted by a Pisar (clerk). They
fulfilled duties approximating those of a Minister of
War and his Chief of Staff. Discipline was not very
strict. The whole army voted on war or peace. As
soon as war was decided upon, the authority of the
Camp Ataman became subordinate to that of the Field
Ataman, 1 specially elected for the occasion. He was
handed a bulava (mace) of office, and from the moment
he had taken it no man dare to question his authority
under pain of instant death. So long as the campaign
lasted discipline of the sternest, most uncompromising
character was enforced. Any Zaporozhian who imbibed
a drop of strong drink was instantly put to death. Need-
less to say, refusal or delay in complying with orders,
or any discussion thereof, were punished with equal
rigor. Cowardice or treachery was visited with dreadful
punishments. The guilty were impaled or torn to pieces
by their comrades. This penalty was heralded by cries
of "Na pokibeU" (To destruction!).

In their new home the Zaporozhians were "modern-
ized" and placed under appointed officers. The scalp-

1 During the early days of the Cossack revolt against the Soviet (August.
1917), it was proposed to elect General Kaledin "Army Ataman" and General
Karnuov "Field Ataman."

S20 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

locks which they and the Poles affected in imitation
of their Tatar and Turkish foes disappeared. But
some of their old privileges remained. And nothing
could quench their inveterate love of freedom and in-
dependence.

Meanwhile the Great Russian Cossacks had also been
subjected to more direct control and to abolition of
many of their rights and privileges. This circumstance
had indirectly fostered Pughachev's movement, which
was also, however, aided by a general feeling of revolt
among the peasant-serfs against their owners. Puga-
chev, an ignorant and drunken ruffian, had impersonated
the dead Tsar and promised a "Golden Charter" (Zclo-
taia Qramota), which he declared had been "withheld"
by his Ministers. The Golden Charter was to bestow
Land and Freedom. (Two centuries later the legend
of the Tsar and the " Golden Charter " was revived
by agitators, during the jacquerie of 1905. And the
fact that similar yarns did not materialize in 1917 shows
that the villagers had become more enlightened.)

The Cossacks had not so much to complain of, after
all. They were still free men. Vast tracts of land and
exclusive rights of fishery were granted to them in per-
petuity. In return for these rights they had to render
military aid to the State whenever they might be called
upon to do so.

In Asia, geographical conditions had led to a gradual
"budding-off." The Siberian Cossacks established in
the region nearest to the Urals had been supplemented
by the Enisey and Trans-Baikal, later by the Trans-
Amur and the Ussuri Cossacks, and an offshoot into
Central Asia had become the Semirechensk (Seven Rivers)
Cossacks.

Platow's Cossacks rendered signal service during the
invasion of 1812, fiercely harrying the retreat of Napo-
leon's broken legions, and, later, entered Paris. The

THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 821

Cossacks figured in every succeeding war: in the Crimea,
in the Caucasus, in Turkestan, in Manchuria. They
were not, however, in particular favor with theOld
Regime, which treated them somewhat contemptuously
as Irregular Cavalry, suitable for repressing internal
troubles rather than for warfare. However, all who
had to travel in the wilds of Siberia appreciated the
inestimable value of the ubiquitous Cossack.

The Cossack organization as it existed under the Old
Regime was briefly as follows: All the above-mentioned
groups (twelve in number) were designated as "armies,"
each under the command of a chief appointed by the
Tsar (who was "Hetman" of all the Cossacks), and
known as Nakazn&y Atamdn. Under him was the civil
and military administration of the "army" (wwfco).
The Cossack settlements, or stanitsas, were adminis-
tered by elected " elders n under a central board, 1 which
had charge of the lands, fisheries, etc., and funds of
fhe^voisko. In some cases the funds were very con-
siderable, notably in the oil regions of the Kub&n, which
came within the Cossack lands. Every Cossack was
entitled to an allotment out of the voisko land reserve,
which the Socialists tried to "confiscate." No one
could become a Cossack except by adoption by a stan-
itea. The settlements sometimes bestowed upon a non-
Cossack the privileges of a pochetny startle (honorable
old man) for distinguished service. Russian Generals
prized this honor exceedingly.

Cossack boys entered the ordinary Military Schools
and, eventually, received commissions in the regular
Army. Such a one was the poor Siberian Cossack lad,

1 The Cossack armies and their headquarters were as follows : Don* Novo-
cherkask; Kuban, Ekaterinodar; Terek, Vladikavkaz, Yalk, Uralsk; Oren-
burg, Orenburg; Astrakhan, Astrakhan; Seknirechenak, Vierny; Siberian,
Omsk; Enisey, Irkutsk; Trans-Baikal, Chita; Trans-Amur, Blagoveshchensk;
Ussuri, Vladivostok (see p. 880).

SB KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

Laur Kornilov, afterwards Generalissimo of the Russian
armies. Or they passed through the Cossack College
in Petrograd and became Cossack officers. To this
category belonged the Don Cossack Kaledin, afterwards
elected Ataman of all the Cossacks. Officers had their
own peculiar designations. Thus, a lieutenant was styled
horunzhy (bannerman), a captain was escrid (Turkic
for chief of an atil or camp), and a colonel was voishw6y
starshind (army elder).

Under the Old Regime non-Cossack officers were,
however, frequently given high command in the Cos-
sack armies. This created irritation and friction. What
is more, they sometimes obtained as a reward for services,
or by Court favor, large grants of land out of the Cos-
sack reserves, and thereby virtually became Cossacks.
Thus a Cossack gentry and nobility arose, owning large
estates.

Every male Cossack was liable for service from the
age of eighteen upwards. According to age he passed
from one dchered (class) to another. He had to appear
for service with his own horse, clothing, equipment,
and side-arms. Rifle and ammunition and food and
fodder were supplied by the State. All carry the lance.
The Cossack infantry had been famous among the
Zaporozhians, and we find its traditions reasserted by
the Kub&n army. When the males of the family were
too numerous, or for other causes the Cossacks were
unable to appear mounted, they formed what were
known as plastun (creeper) battalions, this name having
been used in the Zaporozhian days to designate their
method of attack — they crept up to and then "rushed"
the foe.

The Kub&n and T6rek armies had adopted the "cher-
kesska," or long tunic with ornamental breast cart-
fridge-case, and the bashlyk (hood), papdkha (sheepskin
bonnet), and burka (camel's-hair cloak) of the Caucasians,

THE HOPE OP RUSSIA 328

as being most suitable for their climate. Other Cos-
sacks wore a plain buttonless long coat and trousers
of the blue cavalry color and a broad strip down the
leg, differing in hue in each army — red for the Don,
blue for the Orenburg, yellow for the Ussuri, etc. During
the war they, of course, adopted khaki and in winter the
papdkha. Unlike the Zaporozhians they wore their hair
long on the crown— a mark of distinction which was
emphasized by leaving a long curl to protrude from
beneath their headgear, rakishly set over the ear. The
Caucasian Cossacks shaved their heads in summer like
the native tribesmen, but always retained the papdkha,
which was often stained a reddish hue with henna. This
gave an excellent "protective" coloring.

In type they showed both their origin and their asso-
ciations. Thus the Don Cossacks are blue-eyed, fair-
haired, and rosy-cheeked — the true Great Russian type.
The Kub&n and T6rek armies had little foreign blood,
having bred true to their original Slav ancestors — the
auburn-haired, somewhat dusky Little Russians. Among \
the Orenburg and Y&ik warriors Mongol blood made
itself noticeable, and the admixture of native strains
became more noticeable in the Asiatic armies. General
Komilov, for instance, was half Buriat. A Kalamuk
type was often very pronounced. The faces in a sotnia
made one think of the wild horsemen of Djenghiz Khan.
The Orenburg Cossacks were not so long ago — about
fifty years — engaged in constant warfare with the Khan-
ates of Central Asia, often capturing their brides among
the native tribes. Kub&n and T6rek Cossacks waged a
relentless war with the Chechen, Ingush, and other
warlike tribes of the Caucasus, but jealously avoided
all admixture with them.

The Don Cossacks had in late years to contend with
an invasion of land-hungry rustics from the North. Steel
and iron industries sprang up in the Donetz coal basin,

324 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

which contains some of the finest ore and coal in the
world, and in huge quantities. Moreover, the growth
of Rostov-on-the-Don (almost adjoining the Don Cos-
sack capital, Novocherkask), due to the great develop-
ment of agriculture and the proximity of rich oilfields
at Baku, Grozny, etc., brought a large influx of non-
Cossack inhabitants. All these new-comers were styled
inogorodtsy (other townsmen). 1 Their advent caused
much trouble to the Army Board, because they were
constantly clamoring for a share of the Cossack land.
And this vexed question lay at the root of demands
formulated in the Duma to introduce Zemstvos in the
Don province, the effect of which would have been to
give the inogorodtsy something like a preponderance in
local affairs. Later, the Cossacks came to an amicable
arrangement with them.

In point of numbers the Cossack armies may be
roughly estimated at anything between 100,000 and
150,000. If all the male population were "called up,"
the figure would be several times larger. Ten divisions
of Cossack cavalry, or 24,000 sabers, were with the
colors when war broke out. The second and third
dcheredi gave another twenty divisions, bringing up the
total to 72,000. But other classes were also summoned,
and the strength of the Cossack host mobilized during
the war must have far exceeded 100,000. Two plastun
brigades were . also formed, equal to 12,000 bayonets.
These figures do not include the Cossack artillery, which
was numerous and excellent.

Before the end of 1915 the Cossacks had captured
78,000 prisoners and taken 143 guns and 143 machine
guns. The Don Cossacks alone took 33,000 prisoners
and 59 guns and the Kub&n 15,000 prisoners and 38
guns. The T6rek Cossacks took 11,000 prisoners and

1 "Cossack-land" also attracted many British enterprises connected with
mining and agriculture.

THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 325

23 guns and the Orenburg 6800 prisoners and 19 guns.
Thus they had shown their fitness for warfare under
modern conditions, taking their turn in the trenches —
a distasteful occupation for born horsemen. At the
very beginning of the war many Cossack girls replaced
their brothers in the ranks so that the farm-work should
not suffer. It was nothing to them. They had bestrid-
den horses since early infancy. Later the women had
to bear almost the entire burden of farm-work, and
well they acquitted themselves of the task. Nearly
all the Army funds were exhausted during the war.

I had been with the Cossacks in the field and in the
trenches before the Revolution and admired their adap-
tability and stanchness. In one place the Germans were
on a high ridge beyond a broad, deep river. Every night
the Cossacks would swim their horses across and, leaving
them in the brushwood, steal up and capture German
prisoners. The enemy caught one of the Cossacks, cut
a strip of skin out of the sides of his legs, and crucified
him on a high tree in full view of his comrades. From
that day few Germans were brought in, but the Cossacks
continued their successful nightly excursions.

A special form of mounted attack is peculiar to the
Cossacks, known as the lava. Perhaps the horsemen
of Tatary knew it, but certainly the Cossacks elaborated
and made it their own, and although I have seen "crack"
regulars going through the intricate evolutions, they
never quite come up to the Cossack level. It is essen-
tially a Cossack "trick." The idea is to confuse and
surround the enemy.

Imagine a regiment of six sotnias launched against
an opposing force of horse or foot in the open. When
the signal for the lava has been given the six hundred
gallop wildly without any semblance of order. Their
commander has, however, remained behind, and they
are watching him. With a movement of his saber he

386 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

directs exactly what each #of nta and each man has
to do*

Suddenly the confused mass separates, dashing off
in different directions, some even "bolting" backward.
Then another wave of the sword, and lo! as if by magic
the helter-skelter resolves itself into a combined on-
slaught upon the enemy's flank or rear. As the contest
proceeds innumerable other "combinations" may be
evolved. To use a homely simile, it is something like a
charge of American footballers, with consequences even
more fatal.

The Caucasian tribes are also great adepts at the
lava. I have seen the "savages" — as the Native
Horse Division was dubbed — work wonders in this way.
For the astounding thing is that during the war Cos-
sacks and regular cavalry often charged trenches filled
with Austrians and captured them. They have even
swum rivers to get to the enemy and sabered all before
them — mother-naked.

I had also some experience of the plastun brigade.
These Kub&n infantrymen were the terror of the hapless
Hungarians who sat in the opposing trenches. Barbed
wire could not stop their incursions. And, when the
order came to attack, without artillery preparation, the
plastun companies flung their burkas over the wires and
were on the enemy. Baiko (Daddy) Gulyga, their com-
mander, said that none of his men were ever taken
alive. They died fighting. The man who fell into the
enemy's hands would never find a bride among the
girls of the Kub&n.

The Revolution was hailed by the Cossacks as an
augury of the revival of old and cherished independence
in matters that concerned their internal organization.
Immediately they began to assemble a farug (circle)
first in the Don and later in the other neighboring armies.
M. Guchkov dispatched General Hagondokov, a noted

MICHAEL VLADWIBOVICtl KOazIAN'KO GE.VERAL KALEDIN

President of the Dunn. lletmin of all the Comtek*.

LENIN (RIGHT) AND TROTBKT (LEFT), THE

THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 3*7

Cossack leader, to encourage the men and to prepare a
pan-Cossack Congress. The movement soon embraced
all Cossackdom, and, as stated above, General Kaledin
was elected Ataman of all the Cossacks with headquarters
at Novocherkask.

It was thanks to the Cossacks that Russia did not
go to pieces in the first months of revolution; they
alone restored a semblance of order on the railways
and kept desertion in check; they held the country against
the inroads of Bolshevism. But they were only 100,000
horsemen scattered over a front of over 1500 miles and
many more miles of railway. They were willing and able
to support the Government, but they could not save
Russia single-handed against a coalition of Government
and Soviet, both dallying with Bolshevism. Kerensky
sought their aid when it pleased his fancy or suited
his purpose. Then he turned on them — to "negotiate"
with Lenin.

And many a Cossack had been fighting the enemy
without as well as the enemy within. At Kalush the
3rd Caucasian Cossack Division went into action under
my eyes. Who shall adequately describe that scene!
Here was a garden city rushed at nightfall against a
handful of Germans and shamelessly plundered by the
Committee-led soldiers, who all night had drunken their
fill and perpetrated nameless atrocities on the inhabit-
ants. And there, beyond the hills, a large force of Ger-
mans was rapidly approaching. As I crossed the shell-
swept valley of the Lomnitsa my car broke down and
I got out to watch the Cossacks. Coolly they rode
into the city; then, dashing forward, dismounted and
drove the enemy back.

The Cossack Congress declared its unalterable will
to recognize only the properly constituted Government
of Russia, to continue the war in all loyalty to the
Allies, and to maintain order in the country till the

S28 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

Constituent could meet. I attended its proceedings and
noted some isolated attempts at obstruction on the
part of inogorodnie, who had surreptitiously entered the
hall. There was complete unanimity among the Cos-
sacks. Later a Soyuz (League) of all the Cossacks was
formed, and a Council elected.

When the Soviet Press began to attack General
Kornilov, the Cossack Council passed a resolution de-
nouncing any attempt to displace him from the post of
Generalissimo. M. Kerensky, thereupon, demanded a
written retraction. The Cossacks replied with another
resolution declaring their readiness to support Kornilov
and Kerensky. But this did not satisfy the revolutionary
autocrat. He still insisted on a retraction. They ig-
nored the demand.

At the Moscow Conference, General Kaledin, 1 a great
burly man who looked and spoke as if nothing could
shake him from his purpose, voiced the views of Cos-
sackdom. Amid shouts of rage from the Socialists and
under violent rebuke from Kerensky he declared in the
name of the twelve armies that the Cossacks, "who
had never been slaves, and were not drunken with
freedom," "who had never deserted or shirked their
duty," "would not be false to their traditions"; "they
would serve the country in the field of battle and in the
fight with traitors at home." "They had saved Socialist
Ministers from the Bolsheviki on July 16th, and would
save Russia from anarchy and betrayal." He concluded:
"The time for words has passed. Our patience is ex-
hausted. It remains for us to accomplish the great
work of salvation."

He had already realized the fact that his enemy was
presiding at the Congress, but he did not, perhaps,
anticipate that Kerensky was unconsciously playing into

1 As Commander of the Eleventh Army he had pierced the German front
on the Pripiat A man of excellent parts as a leader.

THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 329

the hands of Russia's most inveterate foes, the Bol-
shevist agents of Germany. Among Kerensky's other
mad acts was an attempt to deprive the Cossacks of
their elected Chiefs. He even tried to arrest Kaledin.
The task before the Cossacks became still more difficult,
but they were not the men to turn back.

When I had written my account of the Moscow con-
ference to The Times, a few of my Cossack friends came
to bid good-bye. Before hurrying off to Novocherkask
they wished to convey certain messages to the Allies.
They anticipated a Bolshevist uprising and wanted the
Allies to be prepared for it.

They hold a compact block of the richest territory l
in Southeastern Russia, backed by Cis-Caucasian tribes
with whom they had fought in the old days. 2 The
Ingush and Chechen horsemen, the Cherkess and Tatar
tribes, the natives of Kabarda and Daghestan rose
during the war to espouse the common cause. Faithful
and loyal to their salt, like all good Moslems, no treachery
could affect them, and it was not their fault any more
than it was the fault of the Cossacks that the cavalry
sent to Petrograd under General Krymov in September
1917 was "nobbled." On learning how he had been
betrayed the hapless Krymov shot himself.

But in Russia there remain other strong and stanch
elements. The Old Believers, to whom most of the
Cossacks belong, count many millions of hardy settlers,
of thriving merchants, and prosperous manufacturers.
Many of the greatest names in Moscow are borne by men
of the Old Faith. Then there are the millions of small

1 AJ1 the principal coal, iron, copper, oil, and gold-fields and the steel,
cotton-growing, wheat-raising, and cattle-breeding industries of Russia in
Europe and in Asia are within range of Cossack-land (see map).

1 During the short-lived invasion of Bolshevism in Gs-Caucasia (early in
1918) these old feuds broke out afresh with dire results to the Cossacks and
to the tribesmen. Much damage was incidentally caused to the oil fields.
It was during these troubles that Gen. Kaledin in despair committed suicide.

330

KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS

landowners — peasants who have bought their hokfcgL
These are elements of stability which cannot be swept
away, no matter what harm revolutionary jaequak
may do. And behind and beneath all the destructive
agencies that have been at work, the old edifice of hai
government still stands. Indeed, by the irony of fste
the volort or parish zemstvos are even now being been.

Tbb Cossack: Population and Lamps.

The numerical composition of the Cossack "armies" and the
belonging to them may be roughly stated as follows:

of fad

Army of:

Population.

1. Don.

ft. Kuban

S. Yflk (Ural).

4. Orenburg. . .

5. Terek

6. Trans-Baikal

7. Siberia

8. Trans-Amur.

9. Semirechensk

10. Astrakhan. .

11. UssurL

lft. Enisey

Total

1,500,000

1.860,000

900,000

590,000

870,000

270,000

100,000

50,000

45,000

40,000

84,000

80,000

5,190,000

88,400

18,000

17,500

80,000

8,400

87,000

14,000

8,700

1,900

4,800

1,000

900

141,000

109

40
54

It should be noted that the Kuban and Te*rek "armies" hold valuable <&
bearing lands, which if properly developed would offer certain countervt&g
advantages making up for the comparative smallness of the areas beloagisj
to them. The Orenburg and Ural armies were never touched by BoUevam

SZffiSS

•»'

• ffeJB'

fa"* CONCLUSION

■kttr

■*"' CHAPTER XXVI

THE NEW RUSSIA

In the history of a great commonwealth like
the events of the past year are bound to leave their
trace, but they cannot remove or even radically modify
the fundamental conditions of Russia's existence. Those
who seek to make us believe in the power of Bolshevism
to undermine and overthrow all that has hitherto existed
should first of all demonstrate the possibility of reversing
social and economic laws. But we know that to be
impossible, for in their operation these laws are fixed
and immutable as the stars.

To superficial observers the "communism" of primi-
tive muzhikdom falsely appeared in the guise of a pre-
paratory stage to "socialism." Into such a confusion
of elementary facts the Russian bureaucracy was misled
by the Revolution of 1905, and its errors have been
adopted by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and by their
Bolshevist rivals. In reality the peasant commune was
a survival of the crude conditions of serfdom. It was
bound to disappear — and was fast vanishing in fact —
before the spread of education and the development of
a higher form of social activity, as exemplified in the
enormous increase of small-holdings. The "communism"
of the peasants was not a negation of the principle of
individual property nor — still less — a conscious self-
restriction of the rights of ownership, which forms the

331

882 CONCLUSION

very essence of modern socialism; it was simply an utter
incomprehension of the idea of property in general.
Hence the muzhik was prone to consider "lands, waters
and all that therein lived or grew" as "nobody's" or
— as he put it — as "God's." But between this primitive
conception and the high-f angled notions of "State so-
cialism" or "land nationalization" lies an ocean of
ignorance, to traverse which is utterly beyond the edu-
cational standard of the average peasant. To him the
idea that the land, etc., is "God's" afforded an argument
for "helping himself" and not in the least for sharing
what he could lay his hands on with "others" except
his own particular friends, for he had and still has no
conception of State or nationhood. To him the "Little
Father" was the "State" and the Orthodox Church is
the "nation." To this day a peasant does not address
his countrymen as "Russians" but as Pravoslavnye ("You
of the orthodox faith").

Unless we understand these essential facts of peasant
psychology we are bound to go astray in our estimation
of the Russian problem. But having grasped them, we
can understand the dishonesty of the peasant, his lack
of "patriotism," the unseemly readiness with which
he repudiated his "Little Father" — once the powers
of the day, i.e., the Bolshevist agitators, could defy
authority — and his tumultuous willingness to accept
the doctrines of spoliation. And because the Russian
peasant had no consciousness of "statehood" or even
of "nationality," except as an expression of lay or ecclesi-
astical lordship, the flouting of all bonds of discipline
found the Russian soldier and sailor — and also the mill-
hand — a ready prey to the wildest excesses. He became
a rudderless craft — the sport of wind and wave.

What has been said above applies with special force
to the mass of ignorant peasants in European Russia
who have lived exclusively by agriculture. They rep-

THE NEW RUSSIA 888

resent something like 60 per cent of the population,
or in round numbers as many millions of souls. Among
this section we find the influences of serfdom still domi-
nant, for here the great landed estates were principally
centered. Here also the population was and remains
densest and the agrarian problem has become most acute,
with the least prospect of a local solution even by an
equal apportionment of all existing lands. Among them
also the peasants had migrated annually seeking em-
ployment and the parasitic element in the commune
attained its most formidable proportions. Under the
influence of "socialistic" teachings — misapplied and mis-
understood — one peasant here proceeded to despoil
another peasant, causing widespread ruin.

Among this benighted element the process of reaction,
which ever waits upon the excesses of revolution, in-
volves perils that may serve the purpose of the dark
forces presently arrayed against Russia's revival and
progress.

But as I have indicated in Chapters II and IV, and
more particularly in Chapter XXV, the Russian people
are not all formed in this primitive mold. The riverine
tradesmen and artificers and the Cossacks and, I may
add, the Mussulman element — which alone numbers
over 20,000,000 — are not of the material that will suit
the Bolshevist book. The descendants of the Siech
warriors, of the Don and Volga freebooters, of the
Novgorodian merchants or the Pomor fishermen each
and all represent traditions of initiative and independence
and have very clear and precise notions regarding the
rights of property.

Such are the outstanding facts of the Russian situ-
ation as accounted for in the preceding chapters. Let
us resume the data therein collected regarding the char-
acter and scope of the Revolution. The nation and the
Army realized quite well when the war broke out that

834 CONCLUSION

the quarrel had been fastened upon them by Germany
and they were unanimous in desiring to shake off Teutonic
domination and aggressiveness* But they grew tired—
with good reason — of seeing the conduct of the war
hopelessly muddled, and the great problems of food and
transport mismanaged, and of finding their offers to mend
matters persistently ignored. The Revolutionaries took
the opportunity to organize an uprising in Petrograd,
and the autocracy, having outlived its day, found no
supporters in the hour of need. It fell like a rotten
pear.

Throughout the tumult of upheaval the Revolution-
aries were marshaled by an old and experienced hand
— an extremist who had formed a temporary alliance
with the German propaganda and who came to Russia
under German auspices, provided with German money.
The whole course of the Revolution was directed by this
man and his allies. They were infinitely superior in
skill and daring to the Socialist doctrinaires or visionaries
who claimed to represent the masses of the people. 1
Behind the backs of sham coalition Governments they
carried out unhesitatingly and unfalteringly their pro-
gram of disruption of Russia's armed forces and of her
material and financial resources with a view to rendering
it impossible for her to continue the struggle. The
various phases of this conspiracy have been traced and
their authorship established in this book. Their desig-

1 On "assuming power/' Lenin made the following characteristic statement
to a representative of the Matin (November 10th): "You may be sure that
whatever may be the variations of the struggle, we must always in the end
prove the stronger, because boldness is on our side, whereas Kerensky" — here
Lenin shrugged his shoulders disdainfully—" is nobody. He has always hes-
itated. He has never done anything and he is always vacillating. He was a
partisan of Kornilov and had him arrested. He was an opponent of Trotsky
and he allowed him his liberty. . . . and, as he has not dared to defend himself ,
I firmly believe he did not dare to attack us." He might have added, had he
been quite truthful, that Kerensky had been of the greatest service to the
Bolshevist cause.

NEW RUSSIA SS5

nations are: prikaz No. 1, the Stockholm Conference,
the doctrine of "no annexation and no indemnity,"
the opening of the Galician front, and the wholesale
plunder of the Treasury. Bolshevism was most dan-
gerous while it worked behind the screen of Democracy.
When it came into the light of day with Lenin's usur-
pation of the Government in Petrograd, its troubles began.
It had to conclude an immediate peace and feed and
enrich the mob ... or perish.

Obviously, Bolshevism is a destructive, not a con-
structive, agency. It has laid waste the country, agri-
culturally and industrially. It offers no practicable
method of feeding and clothing the people. All who
could leave the cities have fled home to their villages.
The northern and central portions of European Russia
are in the throes of famine, and it is unlikely that any
surplus food will be available for export from European
Russia for a long time to come. Thus from an economic
point of view the continuance of the present regime is
an impossibility. From a political standpoint it is
equally absurd.

The only calculable effect of the Revolution upon
Russian economic conditions is a certain hastening of
the process of disintegration of large landed estates,
which has been proceeding with varied degrees of in-
tensity during the past fifty years — since the Emancipa-
tion. It is obviously ridiculous to suppose that the
peasant freeholders of some 100,000,000 acres, whose
numbers run into many millions, will accept confisca-
tion under any guise. 1 It is equally improbable that the
spoliation of the banks and the resultant prejudice to
the savings of the people will be accepted without demur.

1 Leninite usurpation was followed by confiscation of all property, but the
Bolaheviki did not venture to confiscate Peasant and Cossack lands.

336 CONCLUSION

The workers in the mills will soon tire of village
And how are they to return to their looms or lathes if
industries remain the sport of socialistic experiments?

We may take it for granted that European Russia
will lose a great deal of its previous capacity for export-
ing foodstuffs, both in the near and distant future.
Farming has already suffered enormously and great agri-
cultural enterprises, notably the sugar industry, are
likely to sustain serious damage, the successful cultiva-
tion of beetroot requiring large areas. 1 But agriculture
and industries will not disappear — far from it.

Siberia had only begun to figure as a producer of
foodstuffs when the war broke out; she was already,
however, regarded as a formidable rival to European
Russia, so that the through freights on grain were de-
liberately increased west of Cheliabinsk, lest Siberian
wheat should swamp the Russian export market. But her
resources had then been barely tapped. Emigration is
bound to resume in large proportions, for the purely
agricultural surplus population of European Russia has
no alternative outlet. It is, indeed, the only solution of
the Russian agrarian problem. Enormous tracts of the
richest loam lands are still untouched both to the north
and to the south of the great Siberian main railway.
Siberia will unquestionably be the greatest wheat-pro-
ducing country of the near future. And her natural
outlets are Archangel and Rostov-on-the-Don. 2

1 The productivity of Russian agriculture in 1900 was estimated at $2,125,-
000,000. In 1910 it had risen to $4,825,000,000. The total production of
Russian mills and industries in 1910 had reached an estimated value of $2,500,-
000,000. Russia was the greatest cereal producer and exporter in the world.
The quantity of grain harvested averaged 60,000,000 tons* of which one-fourth
(about 16,000,000 tons) was exported. The loss of this huge contribution to
the world's import necessitated food saving and exports on an unprecedented
scale from the United States and Canada and until Russia is restored the food
requirements of Europe must be dependent almost entirely upon America.

* The play of economic forces will compel the various republics and autono-
mies of 1917 Russia to coalesce afresh.

THE NEW RUSSIA 837

I need only mention a few of the other natural products
of the vast Russian Empire — the great forests of the
north and east, the cotton and fruit of Turkestan and
Caucasia, the furs of Siberia, the hides and tallow of
Caspia, the fisheries of the Arctic and Pacific Oceans and
the Caspian Sea — to recall so many items of commerce
that Bolshevism can never control or destroy.

With all her industries going, Russia was unable to
satisfy half the requirements of her market — the re-
mainder had to come from abroad. The Germans were
benefiting enormously by the growth of Russian con-
sumption. It was, indeed, their craze for monopolizing
this great Russian market that prompted them to go
to war. They were afraid of Russia's growing inde-
pendence and armaments and, judging others by them-
selves, concluded that Russia, becoming strong enough
to protect her own interests, would shake off the German
economic yoke. But we have seen from the narrative
of her munition tragedy how sadly behindhand Russia
was in her industrial development. And it is beyond any
question that her industries must, in the future, attain
a much greater extension than before. No combination
of Lenins can stultify this growth for long. The textile
regions of the Volga, Moscow, and Petrograd, the steel
and iron industries of the South and of the Urals, the
copper mines of the Urals and Siberia, the great coal
and oil fields of Cis-Caucasia and Asiatic Russia will
outlive Bolshevism and any other combination of "isms,"
for they are the very heart's blood of the country.

The war and the Revolution have been sad trials for
Russia. Her people have had to suffer more than any
other of the great belligerent nations. The Revolution
has been worse than an invasion of the Tatars. Indeed,
one may regard this latest ordeal as being another service
rendered by the Russian people to humanity. We may
learn from their bitter experience more about the dead-

SS8 CONCLUSION

liest foe of our civilization and more readily detect its
secret workings. We may hope also that the modern
Huns who have launched this visitation will have cause
to regret their foul work as they already have deplored
the application of poison gases. 1 The Russians survived
Tatardom; they are a great multitude and have not
all succumbed to the German Bolshevist poison. Hie
Revolution has stirred up the dregs and muddied the
current of national life. But its effects have not been
altogether unsalutary, nor have its lessons been lost
upon the best elements of the nation.

The war and the Revolution together provide a hard
school for Russia's many millions. The bombardment
of the Kremlin, the desecration of national shrines, the
wholesale murder of officer-cadets, the "lynching" of
General Dukhonin and all the "abomination of desola-
tion" wrought by Bolshevism have forever discredited
its teachings. But even if Bolshevism had not been
stained by such acts, its attempts to conclude an armis-
tice and a separate peace with the nation's enemies can
never be forgiven.

Russia has been resolving itself into its constituent
parts during the Revolution. This tendency is con-
servative rather than centrifugal. It is intrinsically a
revolt against anarchy. It should not excite alarm
but rather be hailed as a first step towards final crys-
tallization of the new State. And whether that State
will be a monarchy or a Republic, a federation or a single
organism, is not pertinent to the main issue that con-
cerns Russia's friends. The deadening and disastrous
hegemony of Fetrograd is coming to an end. A huge
commonwealth like Russia cannot be governed from one
essentially un-Russian center. Even London could not
hope to govern the whole of our Overseas Dominions.

1 This was written in December, 1917. Hie prediction has been realised.

THE NEW RUSSIA 339

Muscovy, Little Russia, Siberia, and the Caucasus are
so many great communities, each having its own peculiar
interests and requirements. Moscow, Kiev, Irkutsk, and
Tiflis — not to speak of Rostov, Orenburg, Archangel,
Omsk, Blagoveshchensk, and Vladivostok — will develop
mightily in the future, and by this strengthening of its
nerve-centers the whole country will be stimulated to
healthy growth.

Local government has attained a full measure of
expression in the establishment of the Volost Zemstvos.
Therein lies an assurance of solidarity between all classes.

The time has come for Russians to cast off old ideas
and old hatreds, to repudiate the doctrines of mate-
rialism, and to reassert their true spiritual leanings, to
purify and refine their Church, which has regained her
freedom and independence under a Patriarch, and to
spread the blessings of education.

A new Russia is springing up amid the ruins of the
old. The day of Lenin and destruction draws to a close.
Do'not believe outward aspects and appearances. Russia
is not dead. Her agony, still upon her, is not the agony
of death, but the agony of a living, breathing organism
struggling to find expression, wrestling against the fiend
of Bolshevism that has gripped her when she was at
her weakest.

And to my readers who are saddened and disheartened
by Russia's collapse, who see in it an evidence of dis-
loyalty, a disinclination to share the common burden
of our Great Cause, I would address an earnest appeal
to read carefully the record of "Russia's Agony" and
then to ask themselves, in all truth, justice, and equity,
if the Russian people are not more sinned against than
sinning. Let them take as their type and exemplar
of true Russian ideals that perfect man and stainless
knight Michael Vasilievich Alexeiev, who stands out
unsullied amidst the intrigues of a pro-German Court

840 CONCLUSION

and the insane vagaries of disloyal demagogues. Let
them pay due regard to the fearless genius of a Komilov
and the stanchness of a Kaledin. These are all men
of the people. These and Rodzianko are the true Rus-
sians. Let them heed the promise of Cossackdom, the
Dtitovs and their kin — the "hope of Russia."
f Three centuries ago Russia was afflicted as she is now
with a "time of confusion." Then, Minin, a tradesman
of Nizhni, aroused the people and Count Pozharsky led
them. In a week they had driven the Polish invader
out of Moscow. History repeats itself.

A few words must be said about ourselves. If Ger-
many captures the Russian market, it will not matter
much to her what she may lose in the West. She could
then recoup herself for any such losses within a few years
and be in a position to resume her campaign for world
mastery with all the odds in her favor. It is by no
means certain that she can succeed in capturing Russia,
since her own overthrow — but she will certainly try to do
so — unless the Russians surrender their birthright — an
improbable event, as I have shown — and their Allies fail
to make use of their opportunities. For this purpose
we must cultivate the Russians — not exploit them as
the Germans do — with a fair policy of give and take,
and must develop a living contact with the people. Prop-
aganda of the right sort is essential, but it will never
be really effective so long as Russian newspapers have
to depend upon German firms for their advertising
revenue. We have too long forgotten and neglected the
sea routes of the North and East.

Let us not underrate the dangers of which I speak,
but on the other hand let us not overrate or misunder-
stand them and jump to wrong conclusions. Bolshevism
is an enemy that we have to deal with not only in
Russia.

APPENDIX I

DECLARATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC

In November, 1915, all the Moderate Parties in the
Two Houses formed a "Progressive Bloc," which drew
up and submitted to the Government an important
"Declaration" embodying a program of policy and
reform which, if it had been accepted, would have staved
off, and perhaps prevented, the Revolution. Here is
the text of the Declaration:

The undersigned representatives of parties and groups of the State Council
and Duma, moved by the conviction that only a strong, firm, and active
authority can lead the country to victory, and that such authority can only
be one based upon popular trust and, as such, capable of organizing the active
co-operation of all citizens, have come to the unanimous conclusion that the
most important and urgent task of establishing such an authority cannot be
realized without compliance with the following conditions:

The creation of a united Government composed of individuals enjoying the
confidence of the country and union with the legislative bodies for carrying out
a definite program at the earliest date.

Decisive change of methods of administration, which have hitherto been
based upon distrust of public independent action, 1 in particular (a) strict intro-
duction of the principle of law in administration; (6) abrogation of dual au-
thority, military and civil, in questions that have no direct relation to the
conduct of military operations; (c) extension of local government; (<J) a wise
and continuous policy directed towards the preservation of domestic peace and
the removal of discord between nationalities and classes.

For the realization of such a policy the following measures must be adopted
both in administrative and in legislative channels:

I. The cessation, by the Imperial prerogative of clemency, of actions raised
in connection with purely political and religious offenses not associated with
crimes of a general penal character; liberation from punishment and restora-
tion to rights, including that of participation in elections for the State Duma,
Zemstvo, and municipal institutions, of persons condemned for such offenses;

1 The Okhrana is here alluded to.
341

342 APPENDIX I

and amelioration of the lot of others convicted for political and religious
with the exception of spies and traitors.

IL The return of those exiled by administrative order for matters of a
political and religious character.

HI. Complete and decisive discontinuation of religious p e rs e cuti on under
whatever pretext and abolition of circulars which have resulted in the limita-
tion and distortion of the meaning of the Ukas of April 80, 1906. 1

IV. Settlement of the Russo-Polish question, vis., abolition of restriction of
rights of Poles * throughout Russia, the immediate drafting and mtroductiaa
into the legislative institution of a Bill for the autonomy of the Kingdom of
Poland, and the simultaneous revision of legislation concerning Polish land-
ownership.

V. Entry upon the path of abolition of restriction of the rights of the Jews,
in particular further steps towards the abrogation of the Pale, facilitation of
access to educational establishments and abolition of hindrances to the
of professions. Restoration of the Jewish Press.

VI. A conciliatory policy in the Finnish question, in particular
the composition of the administration and Senate, cessation of pro sec uti on of
functionaries.*

VII. Restoration of the Little Russian Press, immediate revision of the
affairs of the inhabitants of Galicia who are kept under arrest and of those
exiled, and liberation of those who have been wrongfully subjected to prose-
cution.

VIII. Restoration of the activity of professional unions and cessation of the
persecution of the representatives of workmen on hospital boards on
of belonging to non-legalised parties. Restoration of the labor Press.

IX. Agreement of the Government with the legislative institutions
cerning the speedy introduction of the following:

(a) All Bills having immediate connection with national defense, the
equipment of the army, security for the wounded, settlement of the lot of the
refugees, and other questions indirectly connected with the war.

(6) Of the following program of legislative work directed to the organisa-
tion of the country for co-operation for victory and for the support of dom es ti c
peace: Equalization of the peasants' rights with other classes; introduction of
parish (volod) Zemstvos; amendment of the Zemstvo regulations of 1890;
amendment of the municipal regulations of 1892, introduction of Zemstvo insti-
tutions into the outlying districts, i.e., Siberia, Archangel Province, the Don
Province, the Caucasus, etc., a Bill concerning co-operative societies; rest for
commercial employees, betterment of the situation of post-office and telegraph
employees; ratification of temperance forever; Zemstvo and municipal con-

1 Establishing freedom of conscience.

1 Polish officers were excluded from the General Staff, etc.

> In the majority of cases these prosecutions were due to refusals to recognise
Imperial legislation regarding equality of rights for Russian subjects in Finland,
especially the right to carry on trade, which was restricted by the Finnish law
to citisens of the Grand Duchy.

APPENDIX I 848

grass and unkms; regulations concerning revision, introduction of Courts of
the Peace in those provinces where their introduction had been stopped for
fiuamial considerations; realisation of legislative measures which may be
found necessary in the execution of the above-indicated program.

The foregoing declaration was signed by Count V. A. Bohrinsky for the
progressive group of Nationalists; V. Lvov for the Center; I. I. Dmitriukov
for the Octobrists; S. Shidlovsky for the group of the Union of October 17th;
T. Efrenov for the Progressivists; P. Mflrakov for the party of National free-
dom (Cidets) in the Duma; D. D. Grimm for the Academic group; and V.
Mellor-Zakomelsky for the group of the Center in the State Council.

Half s year later, at the reassembling of the Duma in April, 1916, these
demands were reiterated with the warning "Time will not watt."

The whole record of the Revolution has tragically
demonstrated the appositeness of every item in this
Declaration.

APPENDIX H

THE "SOLDIERS' CHARTER"

The "Soldiers* Charter" was issued by M. Kerensky
as an Army Order. He boasted that he was conferring
privileges on Russian soldiers such as were not enjoyed
by any other armies in the world. It consisted of the
following clauses:

1. AH serving in the Army enjoy all the rights of dtaena. but wk3e on duty
they must strictly conform their conduct to the demands of military service and
military discipline.

8. Every person serving in the Army has the right to belong to any political,
national, religions, economic, or professional organisation or society.

8. Every person serving in the Army has the right, when off duty, to utter
freely and publicly, orally, or in writing, or in print, his political, religions, social,
and other views.

4. All persons serving in the Army enjoy complete liberty of conscience;
and no one can be prosecuted for his faith or be compelled to attend divine
service or religious rites performed according to another religion. Attendance
at common prayer is not obligatory.

5. All persons serving in the Army are subject, in respect of their corre-
spondence, to the rules common to all citisens.

6. All publications, periodical and non-periodical, without exception, must
be delivered, without let or hindrance, to the addresses. 1

7. AU persons serving in the Army have the right to wear civilian dress
when off duty, but military uniform remains obligatory at all times for all
serving in the Army in the military sectors and at the front. The right to
civilian dress in certain large towns within the military aone may be granted to
persons serving in the Army by Commanders of the armies at the Front, or of the
Navy. A mixed form of dress is absolutely prohibited. 1

8. The mutual relations of persons serving in the Army must be based on the
strict observations of military discipline, and also on the sentiment of dignity
of citisens of free Russia and on mutual trust, respect, and courtesy. 1

1 None except Bolshevist organs reached the troops.
1 This rule was constantly violated.

1 As no penalties were implied, this clause had no meaning and no value.
This applies also to Clause It.

344

APPENDIX U 845

9. Such special phraseology which has hitherto been regarded as obligatory
for individual soldiers is to be replaced by the ordinary forms of speech.

10. The appointment of common soldiers as orderlies U abolished, an excep-
tion being made for officers, army surgeons, army officials, and army clergy in
the active Army and Navy, in fortress districts, in camps, on board ships, and
on manoeuvres, as well as in such places as offer no opportunity for hiring ser-
vants. In these cases one orderly is allowed on conditions and at a pay agreed
upon mutually.

11. Orderlies who are used for personal service are not freed from active

12. The obligatory salute, both by individual soldiers and by units, is abol-
ished, and is replaced for all persons serving in the Army by a voluntary and
mutual salute. An exception is made for ceremonial occasions, for funerals,
etc, when military honors are prescribed. The command "Attention" also
remains in all cases provided by the rules.

Id 13. In those military districts which are not included in the zone of military
operations, all persons serving in the Army, when off duty, have the right to
leave the barracks, or the vessel, as the case may be, after previously informing
the competent authority and receiving a proper certificate of identity. In
case of vessels in port, also that part of the crew is allowed to leave for shore
which is not required in case the ship may have urgently to raise anchor.

14. No person serving in the Army may be punished or fined without a
proper trial, but in face of the enemy a commander has the right, on his per-
sonal responsibility, to take all measures, including the use of armed force,
against persons declining to obey his orders, such measures not being regarded
as disciplinary punishments.

Uj 15. All punishments which are offensive to the honor and dignity of a
person serving in the Army, as well as which inflict torture or cause damage
to health, are not allowed.

10. The employment of punishments which are not mentioned in the dis-
ciplinary code is an offense against law, and persons guilty of committing them
are to be placed before a court-martial. A commander striking his subordinate,
whether in the line or outside it, is also to be placed before a court-martial.

17. No person serving in the Army may be subjected to corporal punish-
ment. This exemption also affects those who are undergoing a term of punish-
ment in military prisons.

18. The right of appointing to posts, and, in certain cases defined by law, of
temporarily removing from command, belongs exclusively to the commanders,
who alone have the right to issue orders affecting the fighting activity and
efficiency of any unit, its training, its special work, as well as the work of inspec-
tion and administration. On the other hand, affairs concerning internal self-
government, punishment, and control belong to the elected Army organisa-
tions, committees, and courts.

Parts of Clauses 2, S, 9, 12, IS, 14 and the second
part of 18 — consolidating the Committee system — are

348 APPENDIX II

obviously incompatible with military discipline. The
main delect of this "Charter" lay in the fact that it
conferred "rights" without defining "duties."

Under the Bolshevist regime the rank and pay of
officers were abolished. Commanders of regiments and
lesser units were elected. The Council of the People's
Commissioners under Lenin appointed their nominees to
the higher commands. Thus Krylenko, a demagogue
who addressed students' meetings during the semi-
Revolution of 1905, under the sobriquet of '* Comrade
Abram," became Generalissimo.

ifftCL

Ik
La©

i poeaid

APPENDIX m

FOREIGN TRADE OF RUSSIA

Tea Foreign Trade of Russia in 1012 r epres en ted a value of over $1,880,-
000,000. Of this sum exports r epr e sen ted approximately $790,000,000,
chiefly foodstuffs and raw materials, while the imports (manufactured goods)
exceeded $530,000,000. About 80 per cent of the exports went to Germany
and over 40 per cent of the imports came from that country.

A comparison of the relative positions of German and British trade with
Russia up to the outbreak of war is given in the following returns for the five
half-years ended June, 1014:

Imported from ^t'anil Imported from Germany.

1010 $58,050,000 $106,850,000

1011 86,200,000 1*3,550,000

1012 88,250,000 188,800,000
1018 40^00,000 140,800,000
1014 40,750,000 186^50,000

847

INDEX

JLffonti provocateurs, 82, 83, 96
Agricultural productivity, 886 n.
Alexander I, Tsar, 10, 11
Alexander II, Tsar, 5, 12, 76-8, 98
Alexander III, Tsar, 18» 50-1, 78-9,

217
Alexander Nevaky, 8
Alexandra* Tsaritsa, character of,
82-8; infatuation for Rasputin,
34,40-2,71; unpopularity of, 36;
estrangement from Alexis, 44,
160; description of, 46, 47; dis-
astrous influence of, 160
Alexeiev, Gen., Chief of Staff to the
Tsar, 234-6; disapproves policy
of secrecy, 65; Guchkov's letters
to, 69; efforts of, to maintain
discipline, 174; staff work by,
£25; dismissed by Soviet, 180;
deceived by Kerensky, 307, 810;
estimate of, 339; mentioned, 47,
118, 152 n., 153, 155, 205, 288, 268
Alexis, Tsarevich, birth of, 31; del-
icacy of, 33; accident to, 41;
estrangement from his mother, 45,
160; Tsar's abdication for, 153;
his question regarding, 159-60;
removal to Tobolsk, 160-1; esti-
mate of, 44; suitability for con-
stitutional monarch of Russia,
389; mentioned, 87, 44, 46
Alexis Mikhailovich, Tsar, 254, 389
Allies, Russian ignorance regarding,

64-5,286
Alsace-Lorraine question, 180
Andronikov, Prince, 119
Archangel railway, 244-5
Aristocracy, 22
Army:

* Anarchy gaining upon, 262, 276
Casualties, 108, 236, and n* 240
Caucasian troops, 223

Army (eoittiniMtQ
Committees, 173, 181, 188, 280, 282
Cossacks, strength of, 289, 2*3-4,

323-5 (sat alio Cossacks)
Cyclist battalions, 127, 167
"Death or Victory" Volunteers*

263,284,288,296
Death penalty— abolished, 174; re-
stored, 285, 303
Demoralisation of, 101-4, 185-8
Desertion and panic, 68, 280-1
Disbandment of part of, 194
Discouragement of recruiting, 65
Disease in, 63
Duma supported by, 144
Election of officers, 137
Equipment lacked by, 231-2
Excesses committed by, 284-5
Expenditure on, under the Revo-
lution, 192
Finland Rifles, 223
Fraternization with enemy, 173-4
German names in, 53
Grenadier d ese r te r s , 138, 281
Guards, 218; anti-Tsar, 116
Ignorance in, of Allies* achieve-
ments, 64-5, 236
Mobilisation of, 200 d eeq. 9 206-7
Munitions, tee thai heading
Mutiny — incitements to, 138; out-
break of March, 1917, 116-17
Officers — disarming of, 138; dis-
missal of, 140; shortage of, 237
Fay of, 64

"Peace" negotiations by, 180
Personnel of, 218
Priso ne rs l ost by, 240; taken by,

824-5
Rations of, 68
Raw peasants in, 285
Siberian troops, 219-22
Soldiers' Charter," 344-6

<«i

[349

850

INDEX

Army (oentimutJ)\

Soviet delegates fan, 185-6

Strength of. 816-7

Sqkhofnfmmr'f dung* 614, f 17-8

Unmdinesi of (1014), tit; un-
stispected, 188-8

Volunteer battalions daring the
Revolution, 863
Aajaasination, 96-8
Augustovo, 888* 888, 888

Balkan issue raised by, in 1800, 187
Offer of (1917), 178
Autocrac y es s en ce of, 18-18; iso-
lation the necessary condition of,
1, 10, 18
Avksentiev, 180
Axelrod.93
Awv, 83,98

Bakunm,76

Bal t i c Provinces, 80

Bander, Gen., 800

Barnaul outbreak, 88

Beletsky, 37

Beliaev, Gen., Ill, 188

Benckendorff, Count, 180

"Black Hundreds," 78, 88-7. 114

Biberovich, 858

Bobrinakaia, Countess, 84

Bokhara, 256

Bolsheviki:

Army corrupted by, 881 d seq.

Atrocities by, 811

Defeatist program of, 80

Financial and administrative ex-
cesses of, 180 et Mg.

Finnish intrigues of, 860

Industrial policy of, 188

Rising of September 17th — warn-
ings of, 308-3; rising of Novem-
ber 7th, 818-4
Bolshevism:

Impermanent, 881, 885, 888-8

Kronstadt stronghold of, 166, 171

Nature of , 97 n^ 885
Bolshevist, origin of name, 05
Breshko-Breskovskaia, £. K, 04
Bredau, 880
Brest-Iitovsk:

Fail of (August, 1015), 888

Peace negotiations at, 100

British
British

can, 688 «f
1701

Brusilov, Gen., 118. 886. 863, £77
Buchanan, Sir George, 7t» 118, 187.

Bulgaria:
Rnsaian emancipation of, 11
Ukranian appeal to (1014).

Origin and
Byaantine

of. 81
of. 1*-16
iations.7-8
871.875

Cadets, 06, 141; program. 86
Catherine the Great. 18 *^ 4& 184
818

Caucasians, independence

by. 858
Caucasus:

Fugitives in, 185

Successes in, 884
Chaikovsky, Nicholas, 88
Chekhov, 76

Cheremiaov, Genu 881, 883
Chernov, 130 «., 188, 800, 806
Chhhrid**, 06, 188 *.', 140, 146

ii, 175-6, 178; 318
Church:

Freedom regained by, 880

Government supported by, 88

Old Faith and, 85 *.

Rnthenea dragooned by, 669-1
Clergy, 85

Clothing shortage, 846-8
Coal shortage, 840 and n.
Committees:

Army, 178, 181, 188. 880, 888

Excesses of, 188

Food, 101
Communications, defective, 844
Congress of Nobles, 23, 71. 114
Constantine, Grand Duke, 75
Constituent Assembly, demand for.

148,156-7
Constitution of 1005, 8, IS, 84
Constitution signed by Alexander II,

77-0 «
Constitutional Democrats, see Cadets
Co-operative movement, 00-8

INDEX

SSI

Cossack, origin of name, 816 n.'

Ancient glories of, 316 et eeq.

Appearance of, 922-8

Armies of, 821 and a* 822

Battle-cry of, 816 n.*

Characteristics of, 817

Congress of, 826-8

Don. 818, 328, 324, 880 a.; out-
landers among, 824

Dress of, 822-3

£zplorations by, 817

Fighting strength of, 217, 324-6

Imperial attitude towards, 821

Kuban, 319, 322-6, 830 n.

Lands of, 320, 820 and nj 830 a.

Lava, attack of, 325-6

League of, 328

Military liability of, 822

Nobility and gentry among, 322

Numbers of, 324-5

Officers, 322

Orenburg, S1& 328, 825, 330 n.

Organisation of, 319

Plastwi battalions, 322, 326

Railway anarchy crushed by, 188

Semirechensk, 320, 380 a.

Siberian, 820, 330 a.

Terek, 319, 322-4, 380 a.

Women workers among, 326

Yatk, 318, 328, 880 a.
Council of Empire, 71
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'

Delegates, plans for, 126
Court, the:

German influence at, 50, 52-8

Personnel of, 46-7

Rasputin's power at, 34 et eeq.
Crimea, fugitives in, 185
Czechs, 240
Czeroowic,286

Dadianis, 142 a.
Dago Island, 818
De Castries, 221
Decembrists, 10, 75, 82
Denikin, Gen., 810
Deatructiveness, spirit of, 144
Deshnev, 817

Dmitry Pavlovfch, 89, 40, 162
Dobrovohky, Gen* 206
Donets coal basin, 823

Dostoievsky, 76
Dubrovin»87

Dukhonin. Gen., 311 and a., 338
Duma, the:
Clerical element in, 88
Exposures by, 61
German models in, 52
Labor members of, arrested (Feb.

1907), 78; released, 119
Proclamation of, 129
Prorogation of (March, 1917), 114
Provisional Executive Committee
(March, 1917), 122, 126; list of
members of, 128 a. s ; military
organisation of, 183
Revolutionary center in, 85-6
Socialist-Revolutionary relations
with, 98
Durnovd, 62

Drink prohibition evaded, 66-7
Drunkenness, 24, 27-8, 127-8

East Prussia disasters, 206, 227-9

Education:
Illiterate percentages, 28, 90-1
Jewish emancipation through, 57

Electoral Law (June, 1907), 88

Emigration, restrictions on, 16% 24

Engdhart, Col* 128 a.'

Erdelli, Gen., 266, 280

Ermak,816

Essen, Adm., 288

Esthonian Finns, 256

Ewart, Gen* 287

Feldmann, see Chernov
Financial position, 194 a.
Finland:

Government defied by, 149

Independence proclaimed by, 260

Romanov refugees in, 161

Smuggling from, 185

Students from, deserters, 259

Troops from* 223
Finns:

Alexander Fs pledge to, 11

Esthonian, 256

Mongol origin of, 9 a.
Food shortage, 62-4, 66-8, 73, 192,
248; high cost, 67; in Finland, 261
Foreign trade in Russia, 847
Franco-Russian Alliance, 79

852

INDEX

Fredericks, Count, 151, 15*
French Revolution parallels, 161

Galkia:
Russian offensive in, 264 et seq.;
disasters, 206; German accounts
of, 886
Russian political failure in, 250-1
Gapon, Father, 31, 82
Germans in Russia, 48 et seq.; number
of, 54; merchants and their
schemes, 248 n.
Germany:
Armistice negotiated with, 814
Bolshevist intrigue with, 90 n., 808
Espionage by, 208, 211 and it.
Fraternisation tactics of, 174
Imports from, during the war, 242
Mobilisation in, 200 et seq.
Monopolies of, in Russia, 242
Riga success of, 170
Russia coerced by (1009), 198 n.
War schemes of (1908-1914), 216
Gerschuni, 94, 97-6
Glinka- Yanchevsky, 87
Ooeben, 289
Gogol, 76, 817
"Golden Charter," 820
Golitsyn, Prince, 78b 114, 121
Golubev, 71

Goremykin, 90, 120 n., 109
Great Britain — Russian rapproche-
ment with (1915), 51; Cossack
attitude to, 829
Great Russia, 9
Grigorovich, Adm., 128, 288
Grimm, M., 180, 189 n.
Guchkov, M., relations with the Tsar
and Alexeiev, 68-9; in the Pro-
visional Government, 141; inter-
view with the Tsar, 152-8; Cos-
sack policy of, 826-7; succeeded
by Kerensky, 180; mentioned,
ISO, 178, 175, 211 n., 214
Gurko, Gen* 69, 181, 214, 228, 268,

800
Gutor, Gen., 264, 266, 268, 281

Habalov, Gen., 104, 110, 115, 123

Halich,277

Helsingfors, atrocities at, 165-6 i

Henderson, Arthur, 177

Holy men, 80

Holy Synod, 25

Hospitals "revolutionised/* 186

Hrushevsky, Prof ^ 254, 256

Imperial appanages, 163

Industrial development:
Backwardness of , 887
Donets basin, in, 828
German exploitation of, 40
German schemes for, 243 n.
Political effects of, 16, 80
Value of production (1910),

Industrial War Committee, 73

Ingush horsemen, 282, 329

Intelligentsia* 23, 80

Ioltuhowski, 99 fk, 145, 251

Innanov, Gen., 228

Ivangorod, 218, 223

Ivanov, Gen., Ill, 154-5, 223,
281: estimate of, 155

Japanese offer of munitions A*******

(1915), 282
Japanese war:

Effects of, 2, 18, 213,

Experiences of, 212

Nature of, 199

Fro-German check after, 51-2
Jews:

Assimilationist theory, 55 and sw

Disabilities of, 55-8.

Pale, the, 55

Pogroms of, 56, 59, 88

Poland, position in, 54-5

Press controlled by, 176

Revolutionary, 28, 98-5

Suspicions against, 59-60

Soviet dominated by, 139 and a.

Terrors of, 189-4Q, 142
Joffe,100

John of Kronstadt, Father, 81
John the Terrible, Tsar, 4-5, 18, 316;
Rasputin's likeness to, 32

Kaledin, Gen., 149, 285, 813. 322, 807,
829, 840; at the Moscow Con-
ference, 301, 828

Kanin, Adm., 288

Katkov, 78

INDEX

353

Kaulbara>79
Kazan explosion, 907
Keller, Count, 295

Kerensky, Alexander Fedorovich, fam-
ily of, 141; youth of, 99 n.; leader
of Toilists, 97; internationalism
of, 97 n., 109 n.; speech preced-
ing March outbreak (1917), 109;
the Revolution, 118; the Soldiers'
Charter, 944-6; in the Provincial
Government, 140-1; offends the
Soviet, 167; abolishes death pen-
alty, 174, 285; succeeds Guch-
kov, 180; luxurious living of,
189-4; army disbandments by,
194; plays fast and loose, 297-8;
relations with Lenin, Kornilov,
and Savinkov, 298, 902-9, 927;
at the Moscow Conference, 900-
2; proclaims war on the Soviet,
902; tries to arrest Kaledin, 929;
proposals to Kornilov, 909-5;
betrays Kornilov, 150, 906-10;
visit to Ukraina (May, 1917),
255-6; Order of the Day (Sept.,
1917), 908; proclaims a Repub-
lic, 157, 812; denounces the Bol-
shevists, 919; on Kronstadt mu-
tineers, 170 n.; on mob rule, 262;
relations with Cossacks, 919, 927;
estimate of, 100; Lenin's esti-
mate of, 994 n.; mentioned, 88,
128, and n.*, 140, 179, 185

Khan, Gen., 228

Khiva, 256

Kiel Canal, 210 n.'

Kireiev, 78

Klembovsky, Gen., 909

Kokovstov, Count, 27-8, 89-90, 209,
216

Kolchak, Adm., 171

Kolomea, 286

Kolontay, Mme., 199 n.

Kornilov; Gen., humble origin of,
921-2; Buriat strain -in, 929;
the Galician offensive, 267, 271,
277; ordered to supersede Gutor,
281; orders the death penalty,
285; urges disciplinary measures,
264; Commander-in-Chief, 144,
297; reports to Kerensky, 298;
at the Moscow Conference, 901-2;

Kerensky*s proposals to, 908-4;
betrayed by Kerensky, 150;
Order of the Day, 909-6; ar-
rested, 910; escapes, 91l7n.;
estimate of, 288, 940; mentioned,
47, 179, 292

Komflovtsy, 280

Korolenko, 94

Kovno,299

Koxowa,284

Krivoshein, M„ 85, 91, 199

Kronstadt, Bolshevist atrocities at,
165-6

Krupp, 211

Krymov, Gen., 829

Land and Freedom/* 77

Land grabbing, 186, 190-1

Land tenure:
Aristocrat landlords, 21
Communal, 20, 21, 991
Small-holdings, 89

Law reform, 2 n.

Lebedev, 171

Lechitsky, Gen., 181, 295

Lembich quoted, 282

Lenin, alia* Vladimir Ulianov,

of, 99 n., 199 n.; German mission
of, 99 n., 100; Social Democratic
leader, 9&-6; eliminates Miliukov,
146; a defeatist, 146; financial
coup of, 195; informers of, 281;
Kerensky's relations with, 297-8;
violence of, 819; estimate of,
99 n., 100; quoted, on Kerensky,
994 n.

Leopold, Prince of Bavaria, 270

Letts, 9 ft., 256

Lithuanians, 9 ft., 256

"Little Father," 11

Little Russia, 9 m, 252-9; Jews, 55}

Iivmov-Falinsky, M„ 89

Locker-Lampson, Commander O., 289,
291

Lukomsky, Gen„ 206-7, 286, 910

Lvov, M. Vladimir, 809-5, 908

Lvov, Prince, 72, 142, 144, 159, 157,
255

Mackensen, Gen., 298
Maklakov, M., 97, 291

854

INDEX

MWIpiMiwaly, 06

Manuflov, 119

Maps, 118, 241, 865, 878, 887, 808,
facing Wt

Marie, Empress, 71. 16t

Marie Pavlovna, SO a.

Marxism, 0*-5, 100

Maximalists, 06-0

Maximov, Adm*, 168-0

Masurian swamps, 886* £88

Masurs,0n.

Mensheviki, 00

Menahevist, origin of name, 05

Miaaoiedov, Col., 68, 811 and n* 880

Michael Fedorovich, Tsar, 11

Michael Grand Duke, Tsar's abdi-
cation in favor of, 154; declared
Regent, 156; his renunciation,
157-8; declaration from the
Throne, 157-8; mentioned, 182,
161

Middle classes, 81, 83

Mihailovsky, 04

Miliukov, M., in the Provisional Gov*
eminent, 141; eliminated, 146;
difficulties with the Soviet, 156-7,
176, 178-80; Notes to Allied
Governments, 178-0; mentioned,
84 and it.; 114, 806

Mingrelia, 148 n.

Minimalists, 07-8

Minin,840

Monasteries, 85-6

Moscow, revolutionary, 180

Moscow Conference (Aug., 1017),
140, 101,1200, 888

Motono, Viscount, 898

Munitions:
Credits for, 800-11
Japanese rules declined, 888
Lack of, 806, 818-8, 817, 885, 888-

88; improved supply, 885-8
Output of, rate of, in 1014, 818;
in 1016; 840 n.

Nahamkes-SteUov, 188, 180 «* 176
NarodovdUty. see "People's Will"
Natural products of Russia, 887
Navy:
Baltic Fleet— under Old Regime,
888; under Revolutionary Com-
mittee, 880; mutiny, 189. 185

Navy (ttaaaastf)
Black Sea Fleet; 170; mntimj. 88,

Condition of, in 1016, 86
Strength of, 888

Nebolsm, AdnL, 167

Nepenin, Adm., 167—8

Nekrosov, M„ 188, 104

Nicholas I, Tsar, 11, 76; qootel
15

Nicholas II, Tsar, tragedy at Corona-
tion of, 48; Temperance edict of,
18, 87; Finnish policy of, 908;
popularity of, on outbreak of
war, 5, 107, 100; Speech from the
Throne, 100; vacillations as fat
mobilisation, 801 et sag.; honors
Lukomsky, 807; conflicting re-
ports endorsed by, 814 nui as-
sumes chief command, 37, 884;
warnings to, from various quar-
ters, 68 et seq.i Duma's tfJcgiam
to, 180; abdication of, 142; re-
turn from the front, 151; inter-
view with Guchkov, 158-8; Act
of Abd i ca t ion, 154-6; return to
Mogilev, 155; captive at Tsar-
akoe, 158; Kerenaky*s mUawi e w
with, 100; removed to Tobolsk,
158, 160-1; character of. St,
44,46; attitude to autocracy, IX
88; home life of , 86, 45-7

Nicholas Mikhailovich, Grand Duke,
60-70; letter to the Tsar, 70-1

Nicholas Nicholaievich, Grand Duke,
Resident of Supreme Cound
of State Defense, 800, 818; es-
trangement from Sukhonolinov,
805; OHnmando>m-Chief an
outbreak of war, 107; promises
Polish freedom, 847; hatred of
Rasputin, 85; demands muni-
tions and equipment, 881; rele-
gated to the Caucasus, 161-8; 894;
successes in the East, 60; ap-
pointed Generalissimo, 158; re-
fused by Provisional Government;
156; in the Caucasus, 161-8

"Nicky" and "Willi" Treaty, 41 a,
61a.

Nihilists, 77

None Press**, 188

INDEX

855

Octobrists, 68, 80-7

ffrwrl Til
f^ Okkrana:
\ Co-operative movement oppoied

l German orientation of, 51
i Institution and character of, 18-19
' I Interference of, 212
I Labor provocations by, 88
1 Peasant education and, 81
j Prikaz No. 1 attributed to, 142,
J Soviet worse than, 177
j Stolypin's relations with, 87-9
MHd Believers, 24 n., 329
Orlov, Count, 69

Pan-Slav movement, so-called* 78
Peace terms, 248 a.
Peasants:

Illiteracy, 28; education opposed
by Okkrana, 81; their seal, 91

Psychology, of, 882

Serf influences amongst, 882
Peasants' Union, 84-5
"People's Will, The," 77-8, 97;

program, 96
Peter m, Tsar, 12
Peter the Great, Tsar, 1, 4
Pilsudski, Gen., 248-9 and n.
Pitirim, Metropolitan, 78, 120
Platow's Cossacks, 820
Plehve, 16, 88; smianginsted. 98
Plekhanov, 98-5
Pobednostsev, 79
Pogrom* 59, 83, 142
Poland:

Army of, 249

Autonomy of, promised, 24/7

Fortresses of, abolished, 217-8

German overtures to, 248-50

Jews in, 54-5

Partition of, 54

Russian retreat from, 288-4

Russification of, attempted, 248
Poles, stock of, 9 n.
Police:

Enrollment of, against the Revo-
lution, 110-11, 115, 142

Jewish bribery of, 56, 58
Political assassinations, 77, 88
Polivanov, Gen,. 68, 285
Polovtsov, Gen., 148

Pomieiekekik, 9
Population of Russia:

District averages of, 80 n.

Jewish and German proportions in,
54

Mussulman element in, 888

Peasant proportion of, 882-8

Statistics of , 28
Pourtales, Count; 197, 198 a.
Posharsky, Count, 840
Pravda,l75
Press, the:

Censorship of , 28, 85

German influence in, 49, 52, 64

Jew revolutionaries in control of,
176
Prikaz No. 1, 138, 187, 142, 176
Fripiat marshes, 283, 828 a
Prisoners, enemy: ^

Cossack takings, 324-5
Prisoners, Russian, 240
Progressivists, declaration of, 341-8
Protopopov, arrest of Labor Members
by, 88-49, 78, 119; police dis-
guised by, as troops, 115, 142;
breakdown of, 107; resignation
of, 121; imprisonment of, 120 n.
Provisional Council of the Republic,

813
Provisional Government:

Appeal issued by, 143

Establishment of, 140

Finnish defiance of , 260

Personnel of, 140-1

War policy stated by, 177-8
Prussians, Slav origin of, 9 «.
Pugachev, 318 and n., 820
Purishkevich, 39-40
Pushkin, 76

Radko-Dmitriev, Gen., 225, 232-4

Railway anarchy, 186-9

Rasputin, character of, 81-2; power
of, 88-7; ousts the Grand Duke
Nicholas, 69, 284; hated by the
Tsarevich, 44, 160; murder of,
89-40

Red Guard, the, 146

Rennenkampf , Gen., 225-6, 228

Revolt of 1905, 82

Revolution of 1917:
Effect of, economic, 885

856

INDEX

Revolution of 1017 (oontinvtd)
Industrial conditions under, 183
Moral laxity under, 184
Police against, 110-11, 115
Outbreak of, 104 d seq.
Revolutionaries from abroad, 177
Riga:
German seizure of, 170, 811
Russian defense of, 280
Rodsianko, President of the Duma,
warns the Tsar, 72; recommends
Zemstvo assistance, 281; the
Revolution, 121-2; address to
the soldiers, 120-80; estimate of,
186; mentioned, 112, 117-8, 144,
840
Romanovs:
Election of, 11
Treasures of, 108-4
Treatment of, 161-8
Rumanes,240
Rumania:
Conditions in (1017), 264
Offensive in (July, 1017), 285-6
Queen of, 71
Russian, origin of name, 8
Russian standard, 4-5
Russians, traits of, 10, 26, 187-8
Ruuko Slow, 102, 282, 802
Ruthenes, n., 250 and n., 251,

258
Russky, Gen., 118, 152-3, 205;
success of, 225; dismissed, 181

Sakharov, 235

Samsonov, Gen., 225-0

Savinkov, Gen., 211 n., 206-7, 808-8

Sasonov, M., 88, 100; relations with
Pourtales, 107; 108 n.; action
regarding mobilization, 208

Schools, Soviet's invasion of, 186

Serbia, 107, 108 n.

Serfdom:
Emancipation from 5; land allot-
ments, 24 n. 1 ; communal owner-
ship, 21
Origin of, 10

Sergius Mikhailovicn, Grand Duke,
210, 214, 282; assassinated, 08

Shcherbachev, Gen., 808

Shcheglovitov, M., 120

Shingarev, 183

Siberia:
Co-operative) movement in, 92
Cossack colonization of, 817; of*

shoots of, 920
Development of, future, 336-7
Emigration to, encouraged, 79
Peasant prosperity in, 10-20, £10
Troops from, 218-22
Siever, Gen., 289
Skobelev, 178, 182
Slavophil movement. 78
Slovaks, 240

Smiles, Lt.-Commander, 280, 291
Social-Democratic party, 03
Socialism, three forms ot, 83 el tflf,
Socialist-Revolutionary party, 93-i
08, 831; figHi^g organization d
07
Socialists, Duma activities of, 86
Soldau, 228, 228 and n.
Soviet, first (1005), 90 n.
Soviet (1017):
Army discipline destro y ed by.

174
Bolshevist terrorism of, 147-41
Censorship by, 294
Department of International Bd*

tions, 178
Headquarters of, 147 it.
Influence of, 282
Kerensky's breach with, 311
"No annexation and no indent

nity" formula, 170-80
Peace overtures of, 174
Soldiers included in, 134-6
Terrorism of, 178-7
Spirit monopoly, 70
Stead, W. T., 84
Stenka Raran, 316
Stinnes, Hugo, 242
Stockholm, Russian and Genstf

Socialists at, 178
Stockholm Conference question, 177
Stolypin, M., Premiership of, 87-9;
agrarian policy of, 85, 87-9;
on Siberia, 20, 81-2; anti-rev*
lutionary activities, of 05; quoted,
20,21
Struhwe, Peter, 04
Students' clubs, 05
StOrmer, M., 38, 45, 73; imprison
ment of, 120 and a.

INDEX

891

Sukhomlinov, Gen., estrangement
from Grand Duke Nicholas,
004-5; conflict with Head of
the Ordnance, 009-10, 214, 290;
army changes by, 214, 217; revel-
ations by, 200, 204; mentioned,
211 n., 231

Supreme Council of State Defense,
206, 200, 214

Sytin Ivan Dimitrivich, 100-8

Szeptyclri, Count, 255

Talaat Bey, 252
Tannenberg, 220 and n.
Tarnopol, 282, 284, 286
Temperance edict, 2, 12, 27
Tereshchenko, 180, 182, 255, 805 n.,

812
Teutonic Knights, 50, 280 n.
Third Element, 80-1, 92, 104, 184
Timashev, M., 218
The Times quoted, 182-8, 289-92'
Toiliats, 86, 97
Tolstoy Count Leo, 81, 76
Tomsk workmen's committees, 246
Transport difficulties, 62, 66, 188, 192
Treaty of Portsmouth, 17
Trotsky, 96, 100, 818; career of, 189 n.;

Kerensky's relations with, 298
Tsaritsyn, Republic at, 189
Tseretelli, 96, 142 n., 178, 255, 812
Turgeniev, 76
Turkish war (1877-8) — character of,

199; effects of, 78-9

Ukraina:

Austrian and German designs on,
251

German intrigue in, 99 n.

Independence of, 258-6; the "Uni-
versal," 255

Land policy of, 835 n.

Polish relations with, 252
Unification of Russia, a necessity,
887 n.

Valentine, Col., 288 and it., 292
Vandam, Col., cited, 818
Verderevsky, Adm., 169-70
Verkhovsky, Col., 150
Vernander, Gen., 281; cited, 212 n. 1

Victoria, Grand Duchess, 71

Vinaver, M., cited, 176

Viren, Adm., 171

Vladimir Krasnoe Solnythio, 8

Vladivostok congestion, 245

Von Bernhardi, 270 ft.

Von Hindenburg, Gen., 271; in East

Prussia, 228-80
Voygkov, Gen., 45, 52, 112, 151, 159
Vyborg Manifesto, 86
Vyrubova, Mmc, 47, 159

War enthusiasm, 209

War expenditure, 198 and n. 1

War weariness, 262

Warsaw:
Fall of, 288
Siberian troops at, 220

Wells-Hood, Lt.-Commander, 292

Wilhelm II, Kaiser, action of, on eve
of war, 200-1

White Russians, 9 n.

Williams, Lt.-General Sir John Han-
bury, 45

Witte, Count, 87 and «., 41 and n.,
88

Yakubovich, Gen., 085
Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff, 004-6,

084; revelations by, 000-4; cited,

309 ft. 1
Yiddish, 55
Yudenich, Gen., 084
Yusupov family, 162

Zaporoshians, 817, 819, 820

Zasulien, Vera, 93

Zemstvos:
Committees replacing, 184
Composition of, n.; peasants

formerly excluded from, 16
Establishment of, 77
Extension of system, 89
Food supply organized, 107
Government opposition to, 70, 80
Organizing ability of, 70, 90
Utilization of, demanded, 081
Volost, 80, 830, 889

Zhilinflky, Gen., 005, 007, 048

Zionism, 55 n.

Zubatov, 80

CONSERVED

HARVARD COLLEOE
LIBRARY

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "Russia's agony"

See other formats