Full text of "RUSSIA U.S.U.R. A COMPLETE HANDBOOK"

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(Etig
public ithrarg

This Volume is for
REFERENCE USE ONLY

RUSSTA/U.S.S.R.

RUSSIA
U S. S. R.

A COMPLETE HANDBOOK

Edited by

P. MALEVSKY
MALEVITCH

WILLIAM FARQ.UHAR PAYSON
NEW YORK

BY WILLIAM PAROUUAR PAYKON

NKW YORK

PRINTED IN THK tlNITKI) HTATK ilF AMI-;RH'A

AT THE STRATFORD FRES8, INC., NKW YOUR

PREFACE

THERE Is a steadily growing interest among all intelligent people in that
part of thc^ world which was the Russian Empire and which now appears
as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In no part of this planet
have the changes during the last three decades been greater, the de
velopment of human history and institutions more involved, and the
results so far-reaching on the thoughts and actions of modern times.
There is a great wealth of material available for tracing out the general
course of events in the Soviet Union. The Press is full of information
about it, and every organ for the dissemination of knowledge is almost
choked with the reports, official and unofficial, which are at hand. At
the same time actual statements of accomplishments and failures, of
realities and expectations are profusely diluted with propaganda of
various kinds and of a conflicting nature.

Russia has always been wrapped in a veil of mystery. The stories
which were told before the Revolution gave to the uninitiated reader
a picture which he could not analyse or understand, and the almost
fantastic course of the Revolution only served to confuse still further
the public mind. Moreover, there have been no large scale attempts to
cany out an objective survey of the last phase of the Empire together
with the progress of the Soviet State since the Revolution. The situation
is further complicated by the conflicting reports on the Soviet pro
grammes, estimates and statements of detailed results which are ex
ploited according to the sympathies and desires of the readers and their
secondary sources of information. With the present Government estab
lishing an entirely new system, based on untested and generally little
known principles, the situation is really more than chaotic.

There secm, then, a very real place for this work which aims to
sketch conditions as they existed in various fields of thought and of
activity during the early part of the twentieth century in the Russian
Empire, and then to show how conditions changed into those of the
present day* The serious scholar, and even the average reader, will
secure an appreciation of the tendencies of life in the Empire and the
Soviet Union that will help him to understand much of the present and
of the possibilities of the future*

The authors, who have collaborated in this volume, have been moved
by the one idea of picturing the actual train of events with the greatest
possible degree of objectivity. Practically all their studies of present
conditions have been based on the official documents of the Soviet
Union. These arc araassingly frank, once the reader understands the

KANMAKttltY MOf'tfUJC MHRAMY

D 0001

vi PREFACE

fundamental difference between the principles of this Union and the
other nations of Europe and America, which are founded on dia
metrically opposed conceptions. Conclusions must rest upon knowledge
and understanding. The friendships and hostilities that exist upon an
ambiguous use of unsystematic information and an ignorance of the
oretical bases must disappear. If this work will clear up confusions
which exist in the minds of almost every one about the trend of events
in the U.S.S.R. and will aid in producing a succinct and intelligent
picture of the last thirty years, it will have abundantly served its pur
pose and the wishes of the authors. More than that, it will have clone a
real service to humanity in eliminating controversies and in clearing the
way for a truer understanding of a problem of universal importance.

CLARENCE A, MANN INC;.
Columbia University

EDITOR'S NOTE

THERE is today hardly any other country which arouses so much uni
versal and conflicting interest as Russia. In the post-War world, where
the very foundations of the traditional social order seem often to give
way under the unprecedented burden of responsibilities, commitments
and rapidly succeeding complications the natural results of the mon
strous holocaust of 1914-1918, "the Russian experiment" stands out
as the great controversy of the age. To those who have lost patience and
hope, it has been the incentive for revolutionary enthusiasm and specu
lation; to those who believe that the old order can be saved and is
worth preserving it has been a warning against the use of untested and
Utopian remedies on the suffering body of humanity.

These conflicting opinions and (even more often) emotions have
found their expression in numerous publications which, very naturally,
bear a highly controversial and partisan character, frequently lack ob
jectivity and usually champion either the "White" or the "Red" side.
A student of the Russian question would find it very difficult to discover
in any language a general survey of the past and present conducted on
non-partisan lines.

This is one of the, needs which the authors of the present publica
tion have set themselves to fill

Another equally important principle, which prompted the authors in
their work is the desire to demonstrate that Russia's organic and in
herent weight in international relations has advanced the Russian Revo
lution to the preeminent position it occupies in the mind of the world,
and not the fundamental policies and theories of Communism. Had this
Revolution happened in a less important country its significance would
have been merely local and transitory. Thus, the prominence of Com
munism and of its world-activities depend, to a large degree, on Russia's
importance for the world, regardless of her regime.

Finally, the authors have endeavoured to throw a true light on the
value of Communism, as a cure for the ills of humanity and as an
indisputable promise for the future. This is particularly important in
the present acute crisis which seems to have brought the world into a
blind alley*

The failure of the Five Years Plan, be it even only partial is an
answer to this question* This failure is no longer concealable. It is evi
denced by the proclamation of a second period of industrialization, not
for the purpose of developing the prosperity which was promised after
the first; by the catastrophic food and supply situation which follows

vii

viii EDITOR'S NOTE

on several years of excellent and average harvests, and cannot, in rea
son, be attributed to "Capitalist intervention" or counter-revolutionary
plots; by the growing nervousness of the Communist leaders, demon
strated by the mass of conflicting orders and counter-orders, since the
food crisis was precipitated during the summer of 1932; by the sullen
disaffection of the population, once more reduced to conditions rem
iniscent of the famine of 1920. The Soviet Press itself is full. of recrim
inations and gloomy forebodings, and the few officially-optimistic
pronouncements, which still occasionally appear, sound cheerless and
unconvincing.

The authors have endeavoured to be as objective as humanly possible.
All the information concerning the Soviet regime and its present position
has been derived exclusively from official Soviet statistics,, reports and
Press news. Of course, it has not been always possible to accept; Soviet
estimates at their face value; all estimates were checked but the docu
mentation used was always of strictly official Soviet origin.

If the authors' conclusions arc often unfavourable to the present Gov
ernment, it is not because of counter-revolutionary sympathies, hut be
cause the Communist dictators have not lived up to their promises ami
have not brought peace, social justice and prosperity to the Russian
people. On the contrary, on the evidence of indisputable facts, the
Russian people is forced to bear ever increasing burdens and is not
afforded any kind of constitutional redress against the costly experi
ments of its rulers.

The editor expresses his deepest gratitude to his American and
British friends who have made it possible to accomplish this publication,
as well as his profound appreciation to lieutenant-Commander Rupert
T. Gould, R. N. (ret.), Professor Clarence A* Manning of Columbia
University, and Colonel A, A. JJaitxov, formerly of the Russian, General
Staff for their invaluable assistance in his editorial work,

New York.
November i ? 1932.

Note, Since this publication went into print a number of

changes have taken place in the U,S.8,R, Some of them arc fcvordal iii

the addenda.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Author Subjects

P. MALEVSKY-MALEVITCH History

P, SAVITZKY, M.A. Prof. Econom. Rus
sian Faculty Univ. of Prague Physical Survey

C. TcHEiD7,E ? D.C.L. Univ. Prague. , . Nationalities

J. BROMBKRG, Author The Jewish Question

Structure

N. N, ALEXEYEV, M,A. Former

Civil Law, Unit). of Moscow, Author, , ~. .. ~ i * t ^ t .

I Civil Code and bocial Relations

A. ZAITZOV, Prof. Military Sciences,
Author , , . ,, Armed Forces

IJ, NrKrriNK. Former
Persia, Member International Diplo
matic Academy, Paris ............ Foreign Policy

G. LODVJENSKY, MJ). Secretary of

Entente against the III Interna

tional, Geneva .................. The Communist International

P, MAtKVSKY-MALKViTCH ........... The Five Years Plan

P. SAYITHKY, 1VLA* Prof, of Econom*

Raman Faculty Univ. of Prague, . . Industry

N* SAvmKY. Former d&cted member
Council of Empire Chairman,
Chernigov Zemstvoxpoy-zyw. . , Agriculture

P, FtwfBSov* Engineer * Prof, Russian
Technical Institute, Paris ......... Transport. Part I The Empire

N* JKCUUN* Prof, Slavonic

Prague .,,.,.,.,,,,........ ..... Transport. Part II The U.S.S.R.

M. BRNAi)KY. Former Prof. Eco

nomics Polytechnic Institute, SL Pe
tersburg Former Minister of Fi
nance t Provisional Government , . * . Money

x LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Author Subjects

A. MARKOV. Former Prof. Econom.

Kharkov Univ ................... Finance

W. HOEFFDING. Author ............. A - rp ,

^Russian-American i raclc

R. T. GOULD. Author ............... Anglo-Russian Trade

I. KHRANEVITCH. Prof. Russian Co

operative, Institute Prague ....... Cooperation

LANCELOT LAWTON. Author ......... Labour

N. KLEPININ. Lecturer Greek-CathoL

Theological Academy, Paris ....... Religion

COUNT P. IGNATIEV. Former Minister
of Education ZQX 4-191$ ....... _ . lulucatloii

C. TCHEIDZE, D.C.L. Univ. of Prague > Science

CLARENCE A. MANNING. Prof. Colum
bia Unh. and V. IVANOV. Author and
Critic .................... . ..... The Arts

LANCELOT LAWTON. Author ......... The Press

CONTENTS

PAGE

Preface v

Editor's Note vii

List of Contributors ix

HISTORY

L The Varangian Period 3

II. The Mongolian Period 6

IIL Moscow 9

IV. The First Romanovs 16

V, St. Petersburg 18

VI. Peter's Inheritance 24

VII. Alexander I 26

VIII Nicholas I 31

IX, Alexander II 35

X. Alexander III . . . , 43

XL Nicholas II 47

XII. The Provisional Government * . . . 60

XIII. The Communists in Power 64

PHYSICAL SURVEY

L General Characteristics 70

II. Agricultural Resources 72

IIL Mineral Resources 77

NATIONALITIES

L Racial Elements of the Population 100

IL Cultural and Political State of the Nationalities, 1900-

1917 , . 103

IIL The Revolution * 109

IV, National Structure of the U.S.S.R. , nr

V, Culture . , . , . . m

VL The Communists 1x4

VII. The Five Years Plan 116

THE JEWISH QUESTION

L Historical Past: of the Jews in Russia 120

IL The Nineteenth Century . , . 123

xli CONTENTS

PAG 1C

III. The Legal Status of the Jews Before the Revolution . . 130

IV. Contemporary Position of Russian Jewry ...... 132

V. Jewish Agricultural Colonies .......... U7

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

' I. Special Features of Russian Political Organization . . . 143
II. Political Structure of the Russian Empire in the Nine

teenth Century .............. 147

III. Constitutional Reforms, 1905 .......... 155

IV. The Revolution of 1917 ............ 162

V, Communist Theories ............. rho

VL The Organization of the Soviet; State ........ log

VII. The Constitution of the U.S.S.U ..........

VIII. The Soviet System and Its Organs . ... .....

IX. The Communist Party . . . . ...... ,

X. Soviet Elections ..... , . , .......

JUSTICE

I. Historical Survey ..... * ........

IL Soviet Justice ...... ........,

SOCIAL RELATIONS

I. Social Relations Prior to the Revolution

IL The Revolution .,..,.*,

III. The NEP. ...........

IV. Socialist Construction ....,,

ARMKI) FORCES

L Historical Survey .......... , , 24 f

IL Army Reforms after 1905 ........... 440

III. The Great War . . . ' ...... ...... ap

IV, The 1917 Revolution . ..... , ..... , ^H

V, General Organization of the Armed Forces of the U,8,S.R, j/>n

VL The Command and Political Orfrinr/atum of ilu* Rt?tl

Army ....*..,. ..... , , . 267

VII. Supply . ......... . , ...... 472

FORFJON POLICY

L Politica^ Factors of Foreign Policy on the Kv* of ?Itr

Twentieth Century ...,..,..,.,, y/h

IL Russian Foreign Policy from 1900 to 1914 ,,.,.. 484

III. The War and the Revolution ,.,..,.,. $t$*

IV, The Communists in Power ,..,,,... trf
V, The Civil War, ....,,......,;."

CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

VI. Recognition de jure 309

VII. The International Relations of the U.S.S.R. Since 1929 . 314

THE COMMUNIST OR THIRD INTERNATIONAL

L Historical Survey 328

II. The Essential Lines of the Programme of the Communist

International 328

III. Congresses of the Comintern 334

IV. Auxiliary Organizations of the Comintern 336

V. The Budget 34

VI. The Comintern, The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

and the Soviet Government 341

FIVE YEARS PLAN

An Introduction; General Survey of the Five Years Plan . 343

INDUSTRY

L The Boom of 1893-1900 3S3

II. 1900-1913 354

HI. The War 366

IV. The Revolution of March 1917 369

V. The New Economic Policy 373

VL Slate and Private Industries During the NEP 376

VI L The Five Years Plan ' 380

AGRICULTURE

I. Historical Survey 399

II. Stolypifl's Reforms 4 02

III. The National Income from Agriculture 406

IV. The War .......' 407

V, The Revolution . 4 8

VL Militant Communism 49

VII. TheNKP. . , .... 414

VIII. The Anti-Kulak Campaign ........... 4*

IX. Collectivisation . * 4*9

X. The Sovkhox 43 o

TRANSPORT Part 1

L Highways and Roads ,..*.*...*.. 435

II. Waterways . . . * 43 6

III. Railways . . * 44^

IV, Sea Transport . . . 4S 1

xiv CONTENTS

TRANSPORT Part II

I. Highways

II. Waterways 457

III. Sea Transport 459

IV. Railways 460

V. Air Transport 471

MONEY

I. Witte's Monetary Reform 475

II. The War 480

III. TheNEP 484

IV. The Soviet Monetary Reform 486

V. The Present State of Money Circulation 492

FINANCE

L Pre-War Finance 495

II. Finance During the War and Revolution 500

III. Militant Communism 507

IV. TheNEP 515

V. The Five Years Plan , . , 527

TRADE

L Conditions Before 1917 * 541

II. Domestic Trade under the Soviet Regime 544

III. Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union 551

Russian-American Trade , 560

Anglo-Russian Trade ,

COOPERATION

L Historical Survey , , . ....,, 572

II. The Twentieth Century , . '^.j

III. The War and Revolution ..,....,,. 577

IV. Communism v. Cooperation , * , , ijy^

V. The Five Years Plan ............. i;Hj

LABOUR

L Before the Revolution * . . 586

II. The War and Revolution . . . . jyf>

IIL Wages ...,... 594

IV* Labour Laws and Changes in Labour Policy .,,,., 5^*;

CONTENTS xv

RELIGION

PAGE

I, Introduction 627

II. Religion in Russia before the Revolution 628

III. The Revolution ; 631

IV, The Five Years Plan 642

V. The Present Position of Religion 645

EDUCATION

I. Introduction 651

II. Primary and Secondary Education in the Beginning of the

Twentieth Century 653

III, The Universities 657

IV, School Administration 658

V, The Educational Budget 66 1

VL ' The Revolution 663

VII. The First Period 664

VIIL The Second Period 667

IX. The Third Period 670

X, The Universities 671

XL The Five Years Plan 673

XII. Latest Reforms 675

SCIENCE

L Science and Revolution . * 677

II, Science in the U.S.S.R 678

III- Natural and Technical Sciences 680

IV, Non-Materialistic Sciences 682

V, Scientists in the U.S.S.R 684

VL Science and the Nationalities of the U.S.S.R 685

VI L Soviet Science and the World . 686

THE ARTS

L Literature ... 688

II. The Fine Arts 694

THE PRESS

L Before the Revolution 700

II, Under the Soviet Regime . . . . 701;

Addenda , 7 10

LIST OF MAPS

BETWEEN PAGES

Physical Map Number I 1

[ 70-71
Physical Map Number II J

Administrative Map Number I 1

Administrative Map Number II J

Military Map Number I 1

r 242-243
Military Map Number II J

Communications Map Number I .., 1

> 434-43 S

Communications Map Number II ...... j

RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

PART ONE GENERAL

HISTORY

THE VARANGIAN PERIOD

A STUDY of Russian history clearly brings out the distinctive course of
Russia's growth and development as compared with Europe. Both the
natural conditions of the vast land that is Russia today and the cultural,
spiritual and political influences which determined its position among the
other nations of the World tended to make of it a continent apart, where
East and West met and even blended into one. In fact, it can be said
that Russia is neither European nor Asiatic it is related by ties of
blood and culture to both Europe and Asia.

The Slavs are related by blood and language to the races of Europe.
But until the eighteenth century definitely established political and cul
tural intercourse between Russia and Europe it is only this relation that
can be claimed as a common bond. From the earliest times, the Eastern
Slavs started on a historical path that for centuries separated them from
what can be called the "pax Europaica"; and if until 1700, there existed
a certain contact between them, this bore an incidental character, chiefly
determined by the political "ebb and flow" on Russia's western frontiers.

The two main reasons for this were cultural and religious.

Inaccessible, intemperate in climate, sparsely populated and deficient
in the resources which could attract the conqueror or the trader, Russia
never heard the tramp of the Roman legions. Neither Roman nor Greek
was ever tempted to investigate the enormous forests, swamps and vast
steppes of a region which ancient imagination peopled with curious and
abhorrent monsters (the Hyperboreans of Herodotus) and which they
believed to be the land of eternal darkness. Thus Russia remained "un-
discovered" till almost the last quarter of the first millennium; and
knowledge of it was confined to myths and stray reports; the reports
serving chiefly to render the myths stranger and more uncanny.

At the beginning of our era, the Slavs, moving in the rear of the great
barbaric migration to Europe, reached the upper basins of the Danube
and the Elbe in the West, and the shores of the Adriatic and the south
ern slopes of the Balkans in the South, This westward movement was
arrested by the resistance of earlier settlers (Germans); and this re
sistance deflected eastwards in turn the Slavonic migration. In the sixth

4 RUSSIA/U.S.S,R.

and seventh centuries the Slavs arc to be found firmly established in the
basins of the rivers W. Dvina and Volkhov and the Dnieper.

Here they established a chain of communities, loosely bound to each
other by the common roots of language, social institutions and religion.
Their chief occupations were agriculture and trade with the aborigines
of Turkic and Finnic blood, with whom the Slavs mixed freely.

By the end of the eighth century these communities had founded
several important townships, centres of trade and administration. The
basin of the Volkhov, situated near the shores of the Baltic, was brought
into commercial relations with the Baltic ports; Novgorod, the most; im
portant of its towns, became a centre for trade between the German
littoral, Scandinavia and the Russian hinterland. Its commercial contacts
also spread as far south as Byzantium.

During the ninth century Russia became an arena for the trading and
colonizing activities of the Norsemen, those great rovers of early Euro
pean history.

As already stated, the Slavonic settlements formed a chain in the*
basins of the Volkhov and Dnieper. These rivers running North and
South formed the shortest route from the Baltic to the Black Son. Only
a short distance separatee! the two waters and here a portage* was easily
effected, all the river traffic being conducted on light eanoe> similar to
those of the American Indians. In addition the Kingdom of the Volga
Bulgars (in the middle basins of the Volga and Kama rivers) and the
Khoxar Kingdom (on the lower Volga) maintained a very important
trade with Persia and Arabia* This trade-route could easily tie readied
along the waterways of the Volkhov basin,

It Is probable that at a much earlier date the Norsemen (or
Varangians, as the Slavs called them) had established political ami trade
relations with the Slavs, The absence of poiitieal unity and the frequent
feuds among the Slavonic tribes prompted the Varangiaiw to establish
their own control over the route. This they effected in the second half
of the ninth century. Historical data arc insufficient to reconstruct the,
story of this conquest of the trade-route "from Varnngia to the Greeks"
as early Russian chronicles call it; but the date Hfij A,J>, Is generally
accepted by historians as marking the establishment of Varangian rule
in Novgorod. Thence their military and trading expeditions gradually
worked their way southward, and towards the close of the ninth <x*n<
tury their rule was firmly established along the whole counie of the two
rivers*

This event was of fundamental Importance in Russian history; For It
served to establish a direct and regular contact; between the Slavonic
lands and Byzantium, thus bringing Russia for the first time into con
tact with the civilised nations of Europe.

By this time Rome had ceased to be the secular capital of the world,
the Old Roman, Empire was no more, and a new world wan hdng horn
cm the ruins of the old. On the shores of the Bosphonui there remained,
however, a mighty Empire centred round the capital of Coiiitantine

HISTORY 5

the Christian Constantinople or Byzantium, the seat of Eastern Chris
tianity. But at the end of the first millennium little of the old Roman
traditions survived in its eastern successor. It had become preeminently
Asiatic in almost every feature, reviving the Hellenistic tradition of
Alexander the Great Although endowed with many Western possessions,
its face was definitely turned to the East; and the majority of its popula
tion, while under a nominally Roman rule, was of Asiatic origin. Cen
turies of contact with Persia and other civilizations of the Near and
Middle East had made Byzantium, still calling itself the "Second Rome,"
a truly Europasian state, where European and Asiatic elements had been
blended into a new composite body.

The Greek monks were called by Grand Duke Vladimir to teach the
Christian faith to his subjects in the end of the tenth century and this
fact played a very important part in Russian history. For although in
the tenth century the separation between Constantinople and Rome had
not been formally established, yet their dogmatic and canonical diver
gencies were already so marked that a great deal of hostility existed be
tween them. Russia inherited at the baptismal font the feud between the
two, and centuries later she became the champion and centre of Greek
Christianity.

As to Russia's secular inheritance from Byzantium this made itself
apparent at a later date. The Varangians were too much attached to
their own aristocratic, semi-feudal institutions to copy the highly cen
tralized organization of the Byzantine State and, as rulers of Russia,
never acquired the authority of the Emperors of Constantinople. The
clan disputes among the Varangian princes and a very early cessation of
Norse emigration into Russia always prevented the formation of a cen
tralized State wherein the principles of Byzantine statesmanship could
take root.

The Varangians have left very few indications of their erstwhile do
minion over Russia. Neither the Russian language nor Russian popular
customs show many traces of it. Only in the legends (and, to a very re
stricted degree, in the common law) can one find slight vestiges of
Scandinavian influence.

By the end of the eleventh century the Varangian conquerors had be
come completely absorbed in the Slavonic population, forming the nu
cleus of the upper class to which notable families from the Slavs them
selves had also been co-opted. All ties uniting the Norsemen to their
former country had long been severed and forgotten. They had brought
a new nation into being the Russian nation ^ and spread the name
"Russian" from the Volkhov and Dnieper to the basin of the Volga, the
Caspian^ the Black Sea and the Carpathian mountains*

After two centuries of internecine strife among the conquerors, some
semblance of order was established by the greatest of Russia's early

the ward Rv*t believed to have been the name of the particular Varangian dun or
ftj which had established iticlf in Novgorod.

6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

rulers Yaroslav the Wise. He divided his territory into principalities
governed by members of the house of Rurik. 1 These princes succeeded
to the Grand Duchy of Kiev, the most important of the principalities,
according to seniority in the same generation. The ruler of Kiev bore
the title of Grand Duke and the rest owed him allegiance. At the death
of the Grand Duke, his brother or the next of kin in the same genera
tion "received" Kiev, all the others changing their "seats" one step
higher. Alongside the administration of the princes, who governed with
the assistance of the drmhinas* there existed the popular assemblies or
veche of the towns. The veche elected municipal officers and judges.

Although devised in the interests of peace, this system led to innu
merable feuds and crimes among the members of the reigning house;
and Kiev, the centre of all the strife, suffered greatly, in spite* of the
flourishing trade which it carried on with Byzantium.

About this time the rise of a junior branch of the house of Rurik 3
which had acquired a domain in the North gradually changed the centre
of influence. The aristocratic and semi-feudal South, divided into a ckwn
small principalities continually at war with each other, was losing pres
tige as compared with the North younger and poorer, but more disci
plined. In 1169 Grand Duke Andrew definitely established his capital in
Suzdal, having previously taken and sacked Kiev. At the close of the
period (thirteenth century) the political supremacy of the North over
the South was firmly established.

It is at this time that a new force appeared from the East-- -the Mon
gols -a force that was destined to play a much more important: part in
the making of Russia,

11
THE MONGOLIAN PERIOD

THE first encounter of the Russians with the Mongols occurred in I2ij,

when a Russian army was severely defeated by the Mongol general^
Djebe-Noyon and Kubutai. The Mongols, who Ltd just completed a two
year march through Persia and the Caucasus in pursuit of the defeated
Shah of Khoresm, were returning to their homes. They regarded the
battle as a rearguard action, immediately retiring from the Russian
borders. Almost twenty years passed before they reappeared, under the*
leadership of Khan Batu, grandson of Genghis Khan (the Great Mon
golian Emperor, founder of the vastest Empire known to history),

The Mongolian Empire at; the death of its founder was divided be
tween his 8on~//w/ Kipchak steppes (mnghly nil the territorial in

** Rurik is hrlJfvni to IK* the rider of tlirrv hrothfrti, who took fWfttrwwti of Niv#<*rmi
m 862*

"That of Vladimir M<mom*tch<A*<~'XXt v-

HISTORY 7

the basins of the rivers Ural and Volga and the Caspian Sea) falling to
the lot of Djuchij the eldest. It was the tatter's son, Batu, who fought
westward. In the campaigns of 1237-1243 his armies conquered all of
Russia (the extreme North excepted), took Warsaw, occupied Silesia,
and established themselves for a century as overlords of the territory
now known as Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania.

Russia was laid bare; her armies, fighting stubbornly, perished in the
field; her princes proved unable to unite even in the face of this terrible
menace, and she was reduced to paying a heavy annual tribute (the
yassak) for almost three hundred years to the Great Khan, who built
himself a capital (Saray) on the Volga.

After the conquest the Mongols' attitude towards the conquered
country was tolerant. They regarded it as a part of their Empire, left
its local institutions intact, showed great respect for the Russian church
(a Russian Episcopal See had been established at Saray soon after the
conquest) and in general abstained from interfering with the internal
affairs of the principalities; the Mongol governors (baskaks) were much
more the Great Khan's Residents at the courts of the Russian princes
than active administrators: only in cases of disobedience or revolt did the
Mongol troops reappear to establish "law and order" with characteristic
ruthlessness.

Having no choice the Russian princes courted the Great Khan's pro
tection; and it is chiefly due to this that Moscow, once the insignificant
fief of a junior branch of the House of Rurik, grew in to the new capital
of Russia,

The unquestionable political and administrative ability of the Princes
of Moscow, and their cautious and crafty policy towards their overlords
of the Golden Horde, made Moscow, towards the close of the fourteenth
century, the most important of Russian centres, so much so that Grand
Duke Dmitry in 1380 summoned the other Princes to join him in an
attempt to throw off the Mongolian yoke. In a pitched battle fought on
the shores of the river Don (The "Field of Kulikovo") Khan Mamay
was completely defeated, and the legend of Mongol invincibility de
stroyed forever.

It was, however, only a century later (1480) that the power of the
Mongols over Russia was definitely broken.

The Mongol yoke had a tremendous influence on Russia and Russian
mentality. First of all, it created a spirit of national unity. The levelling
policy of the Golden Horde, which treated the territory regardless of its
feudal divisions^ subjected "Russia to a uniform standard of government.
The Mongols introduced Into Russia a regular postal service as part of a
system covering th<^ whole of their Empire from the Dnieper to the
shores of the Pacific, and a uniform monetary and fiscal system. Further-
more, the Russians learned from their conquerors the art of war; and
they were also brought into closest contact with the great Eastern civili
zations, whose Influence in language, art and craftsmanship became pre
dominant and so continued until the close of the seventeenth century.

8 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Equally important is the Mongol influence on Russian statesmanship
and social order. The Mongol Empire stood even more than Byzantium
for autocracy. Every individual subject of the Great Khan, no matter
how exalted in rank, was his servant, over whom the Khan exercised
unlimited authority. The Khan held all property, of which his subjects
had only the use so long as it pleased him; in matters of peace and war,
policy and administration his decision was final. The Great: Khan, could
say long before Louis XlVth of France, "I'Etat c'est moif* for his rule
was absolute and divine.

This etatism could not but produce a lasting effect on the imagination
of Russian statesmen. On the eve of the Mongolian conquest Russia was
no more than a loose confederation of principalities, held by their rulers
on a basis of semi-private proprietorship. Its incorporation into the Mon
gol Empire made it both a Nation and a State. Russian statesmen, the
Princes of Moscow and their advisers in particular, copied the Mongol
models of administration and policy, The settlement: of numerous Mon
gol communities among the Russians, and the entry of Mongols in thou
sands, at a later period into service with the Russian princes, all tended
to propagate Mongol ideas in Russia.

It is under the Mongol, too, that the Russian Church became a na
tional institution. Its dependence from the see of Constantinople wan
perforce weakened; and, as regards administration, completely severed.

Russia's relations with Europe were also greatly affected by the Mon
gol conquest* The terror which these ruthless warriors had inspired dur
ing the campaigns of 1240-1243 in the West, resulted in a crusade being
preached against them by Pope Alexander VI, As a result,, AuBtria,
Hungary, and Poland were liberatednot so much, however, by force
of arms as by the fact that the Mongols could not find pasture enough
for their innumerable cavalry* Russia, however, remained a Mongol
province with her western neighbours more or less leagued together to
resist any attempt on the part of the Mongols to issue forth from her
borders. They went further, undertaking, with the blessing of Rome,
several invasions into Russian land. Among the more important wc*re
the invasion of the Swedes into Ingria (territory south of the river Neva
and Lake Ladoga) in 1240^ and that of the German Knight H into Pkov
territory in 1242. Both were heavily defeated by the Russians under
Grand Duke Alexander Nevsky.

IE the fourteenth century, Lithuania, an independent principality,,
with strongly Russian characteristics, was united under ow* crown with
Poland, and from this time on till the middle of the seventeenth century
an almost continuous state of war existed between her nnci Russia. UK*
Polish-Lithuanian State rapidly pushed its eastern frontiers to the Dvinn
and far beyond the Dnieper. In the wake of the Poles canu; the Roman
clergy which used the Sword as much as the Cross in an effort in convert
the Orthodox population to Roman Catholicism*

It was only through Mongol help that the Russians were able to ktttf
their ground and even occasionally take the offensive.

HISTORY 9

III
MOSCOW

THE beginning of the sixteenth century finds Moscow dominating all the
Russian North, Novgorod had been annexed with its vast territories,
stretching from Lake Ilmen and the mouth of the Neva to the White
Sea and the basin of the North Dvina. The possessions of Moscow
reached the Volga in the east and southeast; while In the south its
frontiers spread to the basin of the Desna, an affluent of the Dnieper.

The growth of Moscow's power was determined by two factors: it
had freed itself at the close of the fifteenth century from the Mongol
domination and had become the spiritual heir of Byzantium (which
had fallen to the Turks under Osman in 1453).

The first event not only established Russian national and political
independence but added considerably to her territory and population
through the annexation of all the Mongol provinces west of the Volga,

The fall of Byzantium, also, was of the first importance to Moscow,
which became the most powerful and the only independent centre of
Greek Orthodoxy the "Third Rome" as it styled itself. The general
international situation warranted this, for from then on the Eastern
Christian Churches and the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Near
East have regarded Russia as their natural supporter and protector.
Russia accepted this as a religious mission, which later expressed itself in
her advance to the Black Sea and her political interest in the Balkans.

The assumption of the title of Caesar (Tzar) by the Moscow rulers
also implied acceptance of the Byzantine principle that the supreme
secular power was at the same time the ultimate embodiment of ecclesi
astical authority on earth.

Ivan the Terrible
It was in the long reign, of Ivan the Terrible 1 (1533-1584) that the

foundations of the future Russian Empire were kid, Ivan was un
doubtedly one of the greatest and most remarkable of the Russian rulers,
a man of extraordinary political foresight and of pre-eminent military,

administrative and legislative ability.

He succeeded to the throne when three years old; and during his
minority lie was a helpless yet indignant witness of the fierce struggles
conducted behind his throne by the various parties of boyars (the
highest order of nobility) who constituted the council of regency. More
than once their selfish ambitions almost succeeded in wrecking the ship
of state. Throughout Ins reign, Ivan could never divest himself of a
consequent aversion towards their order*

1 "Terrible* 1 if an incorrect translation of the Russian word * c Orony," which really mean
M awc-Inpiring w i thus title ww fivcu to several of Ivan's predecessors and was used m
Sf nifytaf "Great"

io RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

He was sixteen when following a bloody revolt of the townspeople of
Moscow, which overthrew the regency and almost reduced the city to
ashes, he assumed the supreme power (1547). His youth, neglected by
the regents, had been a truly wild one; but on assuming the government
he showed that he possessed enough moral strength to shake off old
habits and devote himself, heart and soul, to the task of administration
and of healing the wounds inflicted on his country by the malpractices
and corruption of the regency.

Ivan's Domestic Reforms

In 1550 Ivan promulgated a political programme which comprised the
enactment of a new Code of Civil and Criminal law, and the reform of

the local self-government (fiscal, judicial and administrative); between
1550 and 1560 he put the finances of the country in order, carried out
the first census of land and population in Russia, reorganized the armed
forces of the State and succeeded in establishing comparative peace and
order throughout his domains. He frequently convocated Ztmsky Sobers
(Land Congresses), comprising representatives of the nobility, the
clergy, the industrial middle class and peasant communes, to learn his
country's opinion on matters of internal and external policy, One^of the
best known among these was the Sober of 1551, with whose atmistam'c
Ivan enacted the New Civil Code and a Code of Canon Law, 1

The Tzar, while unable to abolish all the privileges of the boyars who
assisted him in the government through the Duma of Boyani (a con
sultative and executive Council), yet raised men of humble^ even obaeuro
origin to the highest rank in the administration, selecting his most
trusted councilors from among them and entrusting them with the mont
difficult tasks of government- He instinctively felt that he could better

trust their loyalty and devotion than that of the boyars mot of whom

were descended from royal blood, and who had grown accustomed to
regarding themselves as co-rulers with the Ton

He was assisted in the great task he had undertaken by an Inner
Council, of which the highly educated Metropolitan Makarius, hi* chain
berlain Alexis Adashev'and the learned monk Silvester were the most
prominent members for the first ten yearn of his reign.

Among other activities Ivan strove to develop the natural re#otwcrt
of his country and to encourage industry and trade, 9 He mvittul for
eigners skilled in arts and crafts to take service with him and lie
young men abroad for the purpose of study, as Peter the Great did *i
century and a half later. HU efforts to establish regular intercourKc with
Europe were largely thwarted by the combined efforts of his ridghhmmu
This was the reason for the special trading privileges extended by Ivan

l Tlic autocratic power of th<j Twr of Moscow h4 that pattkiikrity that If w,w rttmhtft<*>i
with the autonomy of thr low! rtimmtiuefl or **iir,** The mir rwjwnwMf et th* trittut
Government* independently suSmmiitem! locul llrwnws itui Junttc? through yr**rly rlnlfif
officers* Tliil i wat regarded at & duty more than a privilfjpc^thfl deeton were rnpemtiUta to
Moscow for their representative*' behaviour*

s An attempt to build a living machine WM inatif wul**r hi* u*puni, M proved i fIhtrc*

HISTORY ii

to England and Denmark, since these were the only two European
countries which pursued a friendly policy towards Russia. 1

The most far-reaching of his internal" reforms was an attempt to
change the system of land-tenure.

Most of the land held, as private property belonged to the princes
(descendants of the House of Rurik), and to the boyars, on a semi-
feudal basis. Such estates were called votchinas and entitled the owners
(votchinniki) to a great number of privileges which made them almost
independent rulers. Their allegiance to Moscow depended chiefly on a
community of interests or on its power and influence in the district. The
Tzar "held" the towns and the communities of free peasants and was
of course the most important of all the votchinniki.

The votchinniki were notorious for the fickleness of their allegiance
and often sidecl with the enemies of Moscow (especially Lithuania).

This situation had gravely troubled Ivan's forebears; and he now
decided to change the system of land-tenure to conform with that estab
lished in the Tzar's own domains.

This consisted in making grants of land on a conditional basis, the
holder being obliged to serve the State in peace and war. The tenure of
these grants was not necessarily hereditary, the Government reserving
the right to dispose of the grant, vacated by death or otherwise. These
grants were called pomesties and the holders pomestchiki who usually
belonged to the so-called dvoriane (second order of nobility) a rank
easily reached by service to the State.

In Ivan's eyes, this system had many advantages of a political, mili
tary, social and fiscal character, all of which combined to increase the
central Government's authority and control

Ivan initiated his land-tenure reform, in 1550 by settling one thousand
selected families and their liegemen on grants of Crown land in the
immediate neighbourhood of Moscow. Simultaneously he invited the
votchinniki throughout the country to surrender to him their estates
and to receive in exchange either equivalent or larger grants of Crown
lands in other parts of the country or the same estates with some Crown
lands added to them, on a Crown lease; thus transforming them into
pomestics.

This, of course, met with a great deal of opposition, Ivan resorted to
acts of coercion against those most prominent in their resistance* At
the slightest pretext the votchinas were confiscated from their owners by
acts of attainder, divided into pomesties, and granted to men devoted to
the Tzar's cause. At the same time Ivan heaped honours and advantages
on all those who accepted his offer.

Ivan's Foreign Policy

Simultaneously with his internal activities Ivan undertook the task
of strengthening Russia's external position. He first turned his attention
to the eastern frontiers, where the situation was far from satisfactory.

11 R, Chancellor cutaUUhed the Muscovy Company in * 554,

12 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

An intermittent state of war with the Khanate of Kazan had existed for
over a century on the Middle Volga and Kama rivers.^The Kazan Tar
tars were a thorn in Moscow's side; interfering with its trade, its
communications with the Russian North and constituting a perpetual
menace to the peaceful population of the adjoining Russian territories.
They also carried on an important slave-trade with the East and their
slaving raids into Russian territory were almost a yearly occurrence.

In 1552, after two years of careful preparation, Ivan besieged Kazan
in person and stormed it. In 1554 the Khanate of Astrakhan on the
Lower Volga was also conquered by the Russian armies. The Volga
basin, stretching to the Ural Mountains, became Russian. The Russians
also gained access to the Caspian Sea and the northeastern Caucasus
(the districts of Kumyk and Terek) acknowledged Russian suzerainty.
Ivan's policy in the annexed territories was a wise one; he tolerated the
local customs and religious institutions 1 and relied on the peaceful
colonization of the vast unoccupied lands by Russian settlers whom he
greatly encouraged. Towards the end of his reign the conquered prov
inces had accepted the new order, the native population retaining its
distinctive character and living in amity with the newcomers.

Towards the end of his campaigns in the east, Ivan's attention was'
drawn to his western borders. Here a powerful league was gradually
forming against him. Poland, Lithuania, the Livonian Order (of German
Knights) and Sweden were anxiously watching the extraordinary growth
and activity of their eastern neighbour-r-the fate of Livonia, then in a
state of disintegration, being their chief concern.

At the beginning of the century the Livonian Order had acknowledged
Russian suzerainty. On this ground, Ivan now required the Order to
pay a (nominal) annual tribute and to abandon its policy of interfering
with the transit of Russian goods to the Baltic ports. Receiving no
satisfactory reply, he opened hostilities against the Order. In 1558 the
Russian armies invaded its territories, speedily captured most of its
fortresses and reached the shores of the Baltic. The Danes, in alliance
with the Russians, invaded Curland and Duke Magnus, their leader,
was invested by the Tzar with the lands formerly belonging to it after
swearing allegiance to Ivan.

The Order realizing that it could not withstand Moscow single-handed
concluded a treaty in 1561 with Poland and Sweden, by which part of
its territories became a vassal State of Poland under the ex-Grand
Master, who assumed the title of Duke of Curland; Estonia was ceded
to the Swedes. Poland, Lithuania and Sweden declared war on Russia .
in 1562. For the first 15 years the Russian armies not only held their
ground victoriously but also reconquered all the provinces lost to
Lithuania during Ivan's minority.

The election to the Polish Crown (1579) of King Stephan Batory,
perhaps the ablest soldier of his time, marked a turn of fortune's wheel.
In the next four years the Russians were driven out of the Baltic Prov-

1 His Ambassador to Turkey claimed for the Tzar the title of a "friend of Islam."

^ HISTORY 13

inces and lost ground in Lithuania. By the peace of 1583 Ivan had to
relinquish the greater part of his conquests, only retaining Smolensk
and the territories on the Upper Dnieper. Thus his dream of a Western
Empire was shattered.

Since 1564 great changes had come about in Russia. The war in the
West was forcing Russia to make great sacrifices and concentrate all her
resources as much as possible. In spite of this the Tzar and his advisers
although sorely embarrassed for men, armaments and supplies were still
pressing on with the scheme of land-tenure reform. The war with
Lithuania gave many a discontented landowner an opportunity for going
over to the side of the enemy.

Defections on the part of those who were unwilling to submit to the
new order only Increased the severity of Ivan's measures of coercion.
Hostility between him and a large number of boyars and their de
pendents was greatly on the increase when, in 1564, the defection of
Prince Kurbsky while in command of a Russian army in Livonia
j.^brought the crisis to a head. Kurbsky was a bosom friend of Ivan, his
tompanion in peace and war for over fifteen years and a member of the
OVInner Council. His treachery not only to his country but to his suzerain
(Hand friend seemed to sap what little faith Ivan still had in men of his
Q order. jSuch was the impression Kurbsky' s treason made upon him that
* he decided to abdicate and left Moscow with his family and bodyguards.
^However, the common people of Moscow, who were always unflinchingly
i! devoted to the Tzar, rose in arms and threatened to do away with the
boyars if the Tzar did not return. Ivan reconsidered his decision; but
he only consented to remain on the throne on condition that a separate
estate Oprichina should be established over which he could exercise
authority independently of the boyars.

The country was divided into two parts the Oprichina and the
Zemstchina the latter being administered as of old by the Tzar and
Duma of Boyars the former governed by the Tzar and the Qprichniki
-a thousand selected guardsmen, mostly of humble and obscure origin.
The Oprichina incidentally embraced most of the territories where the
old system of land-tenure was prevalent.

This regime lasted for seven years, during which time more and more
territories were assigned to the IVaPs "separate estate." Ivan, displaying
ruthless cruelty, set out to eradicate the boyars and "Princelings" in a
way that had neither justification nor excuse.
It was a cruel age and the sufferings inflicted on the "enemies" of the
were great It must la extenuation be said that Ivan had little
jPeaaon to love the old order of boyars and that on most occasions he
^had good ground to suspect their loyalty. He was definitely determined
^to break their power and to replace them by another order based on the
(^principle of service to the State. The good of the State seems to have
been his ideal; but his ruthless methods of achieving this end naturally
aroused fierct 4 opposition, which In turn led him into further excesses
against the old order,

i 4 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Towards the close of Ivan's reign a new and mighty Empire Siberia
was added to his realms, the Tartar Khanates on the Obi and Irtysh
rivers being subjugated by Don Cossacks l under Ataman Yermak.

Ivan died in 1584 with his plans still unfinished and leaving Russia
greatly weakened by twenty-five years of ceaseless wars. He has been
greatly maligned by many historians. That he should commonly be rep
resented as a senseless and cruel tyrant is due to the circumstance that
the class which had the greatest reasons to fear and dislike him has left
the only written documents illustrating his period. His enemies abroad,
goaded on by traitors and ill-wishers, created a picture of Ivan that does
not agree with the lore and veneration which the humble folk bore him*
In the popular songs and legends which still survive he is praised as a
just ruler, the protector of the poor and the terror of Russia's enemies,

Ivan's greatest error was in overtaxing the strength of the country,
which was not prepared for the magnitude of his schemes and reforms*
So far as Russia was concerned, he had come before his time, lie left
it greatly weakened and in a state of unrest; in less than a quarter of it
century it was again in the hands of those same boyars and Princelings
whose power he had attempted to destroy.

Ivan's immediate successors, his son Fcntlor (15^4-1598) and the*
latter's brother-in-law, Boris Oodunov (1598-1605) first as rgeut, then

as Tzar, followed the general lines of Ivan's policy*

One outstanding problem confronted them- the shortage of labour
in the centre of the State. There were several reasons for this: the great
loss of human life occasioned by war; the colonisation of the new terri
tories of the Volga; the emigration of the peasants to the south (the*
semi-independent Cossack communities of Little Russia, Ukraine*) and
the Don; and the great increase on the number of private land holdings
resulting from Ivan's reform of the land-tenure system,

In those days, the Russian peasant class was divided into two distinct
groups: the landed peasants, who formed free peasant communities *uul
held their land directly from the TV&r; and the landless peasant H M who
hired themselves out to the landowners on a system of yearly contracts,
under which they undertook to till the kind, the proceeds being divided
between the contracting parties.

Owing to the above mentioned shortage of labour, ami to the great
demand for it, the peasants, lured by better conditions or promises, often
broke their contracts. Besides leaving the lands of the smaller owners to
waste, the continual migration of a large proportion of the peasants
made it very difficult for the authorities to collect the taxes- Further**
more, the Government viewed with great concern the impoverahtiifm,
of the pomestchiki from whom it drew its military and civil power and
whom it was paying for their services by grant** of land, A steady supply

1 Russian settlers outside the borders of the State* Comsark or Kiw.dk, a word f Turkish
origin) meant a free man*

*Tht were quite distinct frfom the? pe.rn<mal serf* (klmtaps) of the tittHUtty* Tlws Irtttw
were usually persons whw had sold themselves into serfdom* or clif prisoners <rf wtf*

HISTORY 15

of labour had to be maintained and during Ivan's reign the Government
on many occasions automatically prolongated the labour contracts for
an extra year or more and severely punished all infringements, thus
restricting the peasant's choice of his employer. Towards the end of the
century the years which the Government declared "free" became
steadily fewer: and finally a ukaze of Tzar Feodor definitely abolished
the peasant's right to transfer himself from one master to another.

In adopting this policy the Government was merely continuing to
carry out the plan of mobilizing all the State's resources. Having "tied"
the upper classes to its service and the middle classes and free com
munities of peasants to the payments of the head-tax and other State
duties, it now tied the landless peasant to the land. The system, however,
was not devoid of a certain element of equity for although the peasant
became a bondsman to the landowner, yet the latter in his turn was as
much a bondsman to the State. The Government reserved the right to
control the relation between the landowners and the peasants. But in
course of time this relation developed, almost inevitably, into that of
master and slave.

"The Time of Trouble 33

The end of the sixteenth century saw the advent of troubled times
for Russia. Feodor was the last Tzar of the Rurik dynasty and Boris
Godunov ascended the throne as the chosen of the towns and the
pomestchiki, but very much to the displeasure of the higher nobility.

Godunov was undoubtedly a gifted and just ruler, but his seven years
reign was chiefly marked by repeated plots of the boyars to overthrow
him, and by his measures of retaliation. Relying on his undoubted popu
larity with the middle classes, the Tzar met conspiracies by banishments
and executions. The party of the boyars, however, found new allies in
the disaffected peasants; and after Boris' death his young son (Feodor
II) met an untimely death in a boyar plot, organized in favour of a
pretender, Dmitry, who claimed to be a son of Ivan the Terrible. Dmitry,
supported by the boyars and the Poles, took, possession of Moscow, but
was soon murdered (1606).

After this, anarchy reigned supreme in Russia for seven years till
1613, when, a Sober in Moscow elected Michael Romanov Tzar, During
these years called "The Time ol Trouble" pretender followed pre
tender; central authority was powerless: the Poles not only seized
Smolensk, but once occupied Moscow for over two years; King Sigis-
mund of Poland, master de facto of a great part of the country, claimed
the Russian Crown for himself; the Swedes occupied Novgorod and vast
tracts of Russian territories in the North (Ingria); large masses of
rebellious peasants and bands of the riffraff of the towns scoured the
country; towns and estates were laid bare by contending parties or by
marauders; pestilence made its appearance; and, as the old chronicles
have it, "the wrath of God descended on the land like a fleece,"

Gradually, however, the more moderate elements of the population,

16 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

rallied by the encouraging voice of the Church, mustered to the saving
of the State. A great patriotic movement was set on foot at Nizhni-
Novgorod under the merchant Minin and Prince Pozharsky, and 16 u
saw the militia of the nobility and the towns in the field, Moscow re
captured, and the Poles in flight. A Sobor was convened in the beginning
of 1613, Here the boyars made a last bid to secure the throne for one
of their members Prince Galitzine; but a petition signed by 5> oo
representatives of the militia of the nobility and presented to the Sobor
by them all in full armed array, turned the tables in favour of the more
democratic candidate Michael Romanov, who was duly elected and
crowned.

THE: FIRST ROMANOVS

MICHAEL was the son of a most remarkable statesman, I'Vodor
Romanov, Fie had been forced to take holy orders by (Jodunov, on the*
latter' s accession to the throne, and had later been elect eti to the
Patriarchate of Russia, Under his monastic name of Philarctos, he was
associated for over fifteen years with his son in the government of
Russia.

The task was an arduous one the "Time of Trouble 11 had left the
country in a state of chaos and at war with its western neighbours (not
until 1635 ^ ^ 1C Poles definitely abandon their claims to varknin
Russian territories and the Polish King his to the Crown of Mcineow),
It needed true ability to reestablish order and to maintain the yotnig
Tzar on the throne. The boyars, for many years to come ftavt* but a
grudging submission to the "upstart** Tssar's authority; and many ;m*
the plots known to have been fomented by them against him wifh the-
help of the Poles, whose armies more than once ravaged Rtisk\i hordrr?i
and appeared again under the very walls of Mwcow,

Michael with his father as chief adviser, continued the "democratic"
policy of Ivan and Godtmov, During his reign, and those of hi* iun
Alexis and grandson Feoclor, the Government became* amwttmwtl to
lean more and more on the middle chimes (the "dvoriaue* 1 or *t$cmul
order of nobility^ and the trading communities of the town*). Solxir*
were frequently convened and consulted on mattcro of internal ami
external policy. This made the Government popular and utrcngthcnrd
its position.

The first three Romanov rulers, the Patriarch Philaretoa, Txar
Michael (1613-1645) and Tfcar Alexis (1645-1676) proved to be very
capable administrators. During the whole of the seventeenth century
the structure of the Russian nation was being made stronger nwl mwc
secure. Its boundaries were greatly extended; the whole of Siberia be
came a Russian province, and large tracts of KuHftian laud* In die outh

HISTORY 17

and southwest, which had been annexed by the Poles, were returned
to Russia. The latter was the result of a general rising of the Little
Russian (Ukrainian) Cossacks under Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitzky
against the political and religious oppressions of Warsaw. After a Sobor
held in Moscow had decided in favour of annexation, the treaty of
Periaslavl (1658) between the Ambassadors of the Tzar and the rep
resentatives of the Cossack Rada (Supreme Council) admitted Little
Russia (Ukraine) as a part of the Russian State. The Cossacks retained
their self-government and elected their own Hetman as of yore; but
this investiture required the Tzar's sanction and Moscow garrisons
occupied the more important strategic points of the Ukraine, Further
more, the right of deciding all questions of external policy vested in the
Tzar.

Internally great changes were also wrought. The administration,
finance, justice and the government of the Church were all put in order.
Encouragement given to trade and industry restored the prosperity of
the land in a remarkably short time. The reign of Alexis in particular
saw reforms begin to take a somewhat Western turn; many foreigners
established themselves in Russia and intercourse with the Germans,
English, Dutch and French became more regular. This period corre
sponds with a very definite decline in the power of Russia's neighbours.
Poland, weakened by internal dissension lost the power of aggression.
Sweden, Poland's traditional ally, had .parted company with her; and
a new enemy of Poland appeared in the south -the Turks, who occupied
all the Polish territories, south of Kiev, from the Dnieper to the Pruth.
True, Russia was as yet unable to recover the Russian provinces on the
right banks of the Dnieper or on the Neva and the Baltic- the latter
held by the Swedes, But, in the eyes of her Western neighbours, there
waa no longer any doubt that Russia was growing into a great Power
to be reckoned with.

It wan in the reign of Alexis that a great reform of the Russian
Church took place*, accompanied by a crisis in the relations between
the spiritual and secular powers. Since the days of Ivan III the auto
cratic power of the Tzar, inherited from the Mongols, was tempered by
the influence of the Church. This 1 influence was greatly Increased by the
elevation of the Metropolitan of Moscow to the rank of Patriarch

The importance of the Moscow Patriarchate was greatly enhanced
by the fact that Patriarch Philaretos, the father of Tzar Michael, had

actually shared the government of the State with his royal son. From
this clay onwards the Patriarch became, after the Tzar, the most im
portant person in the State, its regent in the Tzar's absence from
Moscow*

In the pewon of Nikon, elected to the Patriarchate in 1652, the Rus
sian Church found an ambitious and forceful head. He started his rule
by instituting, with the approval of the Tzar, a commission empowered
to enquire Into the malpractices of Church administration and also to

18 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

rectify, revise and standardize the Church ritual and Canon Law which
had become greatly corrupted by careless copying and abuses. A Sober
held in 1656 endorsed the revised versions, and this was followed by
ukazes reforming the Church services and enforcing the new order all
over Russia, In his reforms Nikon was backed by the most learned
advice that the Russian and other Greek Catholic churches could pro
duce: but unfortunately the reforms, naturally enough, occasioned a
schism in the Russian Church- the so-called "Old Believers/' refusing
to accept the new books or the alterations of the services,

But Nikon had greater ends in view than a mere reform of the Russian
Church. He wanted to make the Patriarchal Sec of Moscow (the "Third
Rome") the supreme centre of the Eastern Christian Church and to set
the ecclesiastical power above that of the State, He had an immense
influence over the pious Tzar and used it without discrimination. Such
was his authority that at one time it was difficult to decide who was the
actual sovereign Alexis or Nikon.

In 1660 a breach occurred between the Tzar and Nike% who, in a
huff, divested himself of his functions and retired to a monastery, leaving
the Church without leadership. After years of fruitless negotiations an
Ecclesiastical Court presided over by the Patriarchs of Alexandria ami
Antioch and attended by legates from the Patriarchs of Constantinople
and Jerusalem, met in 1666, This deprived Nikon of his functionn ami
titles, reduced him to the state of an ordinary monk, and relegated him
to a monastery.

His church reforms, however, were endorsed by the Court; ami tlu*
Government continued to put them into force rdenlUwaly, and omr
times with a great deal of cruelty, persecuting the "Old Believer^ for
bidding their religious meetings, and confiscating their property.

Nikon was a purist in his orthodoxy, and his services to the Chuivh
were truly great. It was lib inordinate ambition (not for him*u*lf but for
the See which he occupied) that ruined his career, Mciaanv w;u; nut
prepared to accept ecclesiastical leadcrahipfhe old tradition of fin*
Supremacy of the State, and of the divinity of the Sovemgnli powi*t;
was too deeply rooted. However, the struggle between the civil and
ecclesiastical authority lasted for some time longer, till Peter the Grot*
some fifty years later, definitely altered the government of the Church.

V
ST. PKTKRSBURC5

Peter the Great

THE reign of Peter the Great (1686-1725) markH a IK*W qwh in the

history of Russia* From 1700 onwards the world witncnwd tin* brilliant,
almost dazzling transformation of the Tssardom of Moscow into flic?,

mighty Russian Empire; Its evolution from a State "lost in the depths

HISTORY 19

of Asia" into an important and, on some occasions, decisive factor in
Western politics; its advance to the forefront of the civilized nations,
and its participation in the achievements of Western civilization.

The reign also marks an important change in the traditional char
acter of Russia, from a semi-Asiatic country to a Western State; from
an "Orthodox Tzardom," where autocracy was tempered by the influ
ence of the Church and self-government, into a bureaucratic absolutism
on a Western pattern.

The changes wrought by Peter the Great in Russia's everyday life
were tremendous: their only parallel is the transformation of Japan into
a modern power during the second half of the nineteenth century.

Europeanization, however, did not come to Russia entirely as a
blessing; it is responsible for the beginning of a social cleavage that
ultimately brought her to the Revolution of October, 1917. The Western
izing process Europeanizcd the upper classes, but the great masses of
the people (the peasants in particular) remained, almost to the present
day, aloof and distrustful of it.

However, at the moment Peter's reforms, or at least a large propor
tion of them, were long overdue. On the eve of the eighteenth century
Russia found herself technically extremely backward. This was evident
to all onlookers, and many had been the efforts of the Russian rulers
during the seventeenth century to bring her up to date. But none of
them had combined the power and the will to break through age-old
traditions and prejudices. It needed a character of extraordinary force-
fulness and ruthlessness to achieve this. Such a man appeared in the
person of Peter.

Although only the youngest surviving brother of Tzar Feodor II,
Peter, at the age of 6, was proclaimed Tzar in 1686 by a powerful Court
faction.

Tins faction, headed by Artamon Matveycv, the young Tzar's
guardian, united all the men of progressive mind, and may well be
termed the "Progressive Party." Hence the atmosphere in which Peter
grew up served to develop his inborn thirst for progress and knowledge.

In 1692 Peter's eldest half-brother Ivan was proclaimed co-Tzar
through the efforts of the "Conservative Party." Tzar Ivan V never took
any part in affairs of State; he was merely used as a tool by a faction
which fell to pieces after his sister Sophia had made an unsuccessful
attempt, to govern in his name.

From his early childhood Peter showed an extraordinary capacity for
acquiring knowledge. In clays when education, even in the royal palace,
did not "extend beyond the reading of Scripture, the inquisitive boy
managed to discover tutors for himself and to learn things that no
Russian Prince before him had attempted to learn: geometry, astron-
omy, fortification, musketry, tactics, navigation, boat-building, Latin,
German. ... It was characteristic of him to follow theory up by the
practical application of his knowledge. This was a marked trait of his
throughout life; thus during his travels abroad (1697-98) he studied

20 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R,

artillery in Konigsberg, shipbuilding in Holland, sailmaking and navi
gation in England, anatomy in Leyclcn, engraving in Amsterdam,

His other great talent was in the choice of men, whom he promoted
irrespective of class or country. He always managed to make them not
only his devoted followers but also intelligent and capable adminis
trators.

Some playmates (The Amusement Company), with whom as a boy,
and later as a youth, he played at warlike exercises,, formed the germ of
his two famous regiments of guards Prcobraxhcnsky and Semionovsky.
These regiments were at once the nucleus of his victorious army, and
the companions of his labours and reforms.

It is interesting to note that in this Peter remained true to the old
Russian tradition of government through a selected 61itc: the Preo-
brasshensky, in particular, and the Semionovsky were a development, of
the drachma of the early Russian Princes, the Guardsmen of the Mongol
Overlords, the dvoriane and even more the Opriehniki of Ivan tltr
Terrible. These regiments consisting of 52 companies each (ab. 6000)
recruited exclusively from the ranks of the nobility, never had through
out Peter's reign more than 8 to 12 companies in the field. The Tsar
employed the rest in every official capacity: engineers, fleet- town- and
road-builders, administrators, educator^ the Txur's commisione;r.s,
controllers,, leaders of expeditions, etc, tn fact, they were the "eye -anti
arm" of the Tfsar. Peter himself selected certain guardsmen to go abroad
for special training; and these throughout ins reign were to be found
overseas studying every art and craft in Europe, A remarkable collec
tion of letters exchanged between the Tsar, who started him military
career as drummer in the Preobraxhenaky, and the corpora 1 and er*"
geants of the regiment illustrate* both, their devotion to him and hi
implicit faith in their loyalty* The officer** and nu?n of the two regiments
held high rank in the army; thus n Guards corporal ranked with an
army captain and a lieutenant -colonel with *i general

Peter's Foreign Policy

Two problems of external politic** were engaging the Maseow Ciuvem
meat at the end of the seventeenth century: the uiumitHfattory im tuition

on the Baltic, where the Swedes held Ingria* Estonia unit Latvia; and
the unsettled condition in the South, where intermittent war existed with
the Crimean Tartars, supported by the Turin* The latter seemed the
more pressing problem since on its golution depended the consolidation
of Russian rule in the newly acquired territories of Little Ruttsh
(Ukraine)*

The Crimean campaign of 1695 showed Peter that the task wan, as
yet, beyond his power, The Turkish fleet's command of the sea nullified
the victories gained by his armies, This inspired Peter to foreign
help against the Turks, and an Extraordinary Embassy (iftyp-yH) was
dispatched to the West, visiting Curland, Denmark, Brancleribiirg
(Prussia), Holland and England. Peter accompanied' the

HISTORY 21

incognito (as Peter Mikhailov, corporal of the Preobrazhensky). The
Tzar's plan of an anti-Turkish coalition failed.

However, a new plan was born in Peter's mind. During his visit to the
northern capitals he had discovered that great tension existed between
the Swedes on one side, and the Poles and Danes (the latter supported by
England) on the other. War was imminent and Peter saw his chance of
recovering the Russian Baltic littoral. Having concluded peace with Tur
key after a second and successful campaign in the Crimea, he joined the
anti-Swedish coalition. In 1700 war broke out between the contending
parties.

It began disastrously for Peter. His army, when besieging Narva, was
entirely routed by Charles XII of Sweden, only the Preobrazhensky and
Scmionovsky regiments gallantly fighting their way through the encir
cling forces. Charles, however, committed the mistake of underestimat
ing Peter's energy and resources .and, thinking that he had disposed of
the Russians, he turned against the Poles and "stuck in Poland" for
eight years, during which period Peter conquered the whole of Ingria,
firmly occupied the Neva, laid the foundations of his new capital, St.
Petersburg, on its shores (1703), and built a fortress on an island in its
mouth (Kronstadt).

When CharlcSj having vanquished the Poles, turned once more against
Peter it was too late- In 1708, Charles invaded Little Russia but was
completely defeated by Peter at the battle of Poltava (1709). The King,
the traitor Ukrainian Hetman Mazepa, and a few followers alone
escaped to Turkey. Although the war with Sweden continued for another
12 years, Peter could now concentrate his attention on domestic affairs.

From the beginning of tlic Crimean war onwards, Peter had been dili
gently building a fleet, with which he secured command of the Sea of
Azov and the Baltic.

In 1721 Sweden, by the treaty of Nystadt ceded to Russia Ingria,
Estonia (with Reval), Latvia (with Riga) and part of Finland and
Karelia.

The fight for the Baltic, though occupying such an important place in
Russian history, was, in Peter's mind, of merely subsidiary importance
compared with his general plans of internal reforms and his projects of
Eastward expansion. He had joined the league against Sweden merely in
order to establish himself firmly at the gates of Europe and assure his
intercourse with it,

But actually the strain of the war against Sweden, at that time a first
class military power, continued seriously to affect and handicap his
policy, both domestic and foreign throughout the greater part of his
rctga; and the Tzar's plans were in consequence circumvented by the
needs of the war and Its aftermath.

P*ter*s Domestic Reforms

The War with Sweden conclusively proved to Peter the shortcomings
of his country's administrative organization* But it was only in 1708

22 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

that he could start on remodelling his government. In this year he pro
mulgated a wide plan of reforms. First of all local self-government,
where corruption was rampant, was entirely abolished. Crown function
aries were appointed to every post previously held by elected officers.

In 1711 the Central Government itself was reformed. A Senate was
substituted for the Duma of Boyars; the members of this new supreme
governing body being recruited by the Tzar on the principles of bureau
cratic seniority. Administrative Collegia were established in St. Peters
burg, to replace the old governmental departments. The Collegia, gov
erned by boards of bureaucrats had, until much later, very little real
authority. In Peter's time they were mere secretariats which assisted the
Senate in the routine-work of government.

In 1722 Peter promulgated his famous "Table of Ranks, copied from
the Prussian organization of the state services. This table established a
detailed division of all the servants of the Crown (military and civil)
according to their position, functions, wages, and special branch of serv
ice. A time-table was fixed for advancement in each branch, and exami
nations established for functionaries passing to a higher grade.

All these reforms, whatever might have been Peter's ulterior inten
tions, had one primary aim the construction of an efficient administrative
machinery which would enable him to muster all the country's avail
able resources and use them to the limit of their capacity. There is rea
son to believe that the Tzar regarded the bureaucratic regime as a transi
tory form. Notes and memoranda, discovered after his death, show that
Peter had contemplated a more liberal constitution, with representative
government and decentralization. This, however, never came into being.
The fact remains that Peter's administrative, judiciary and fiscal reforms
entirely altered the original character of Russian Government. The tra
ditional paternal autocracy, tempered by religion and by the institutions
of local self-government, gave place to an enlightened absolutism of the
Western pattern.

During Peter's reign moreover an important change took place in the
government of the Russian Church. At the death of Patriarch Adrian in
1700 Peter refused to sanction the convening of a Sobor of the Church
to elect a successor, on the ground that the dualism of Tzar and Patri
arch was detrimental to the State. Till 1721 the Church was governed by
a locum tenens, when a collegiate body of bishops and laymen, the Holy
Synod, was created by ukaze. The appointment of the members rested
with the Crown; and its representative, the Procurator General, became
from this time onward the real administrator of the Church. The Tzar
assumed the title of Head and Protector of the Church.

This reform reduced the Church to a department of the Government;
thus radically altering its position within the State, and initiating a
speedy and progressive decline of its influence upon the life of the Rus
sian people.

In peasant affairs a new marked departure in Peter's reign was a
change in the old Russian conception of bondage. Peter imposed a poll-

HISTORY 23

tax on all serfs. Until then the fiscal obligations of the serfs were limited
to providing labour for the landed estates. This appeared, and was inter
preted as, a public duty. Peter's departure from this principle, dictated
by the necessities of war, and the upkeep of an increasing army of serv
ants of the Crown, brought the peasant's obligation to the landowner
into the category of private or personal dependence. Like any other
citizen, the peasant now paid taxes to the State (these payments, how
ever, were smaller than those made by any other category of citizens);
and, in addition to this, he was under obligation to work for his master
who inevitably began to regard him as a private chattel, similar to the
other assets of his property, such as working implements, cattle, etc.
The Government, which had at first controlled the employment of bond
labour, now became primarily interested in the revenue it produced. It
made all pomcsties hereditary and delegated to the owners the collection
of the peasants' taxes.

This reform must be stigmatized as unfortunate and unjust. The bal
ance that existed in the old Russian State between the obligations of
landowner and peasant was* upset in favour of the former, and very
much to the detriment of the latter. Henceforth the peasants, none too
pleased with their state of bondage before, felt there was no justification
for it. The reform sowed the seed of an unrest, which throughout the fol
lowing centuries, often broke out into open rebellion.

In the chain of his remarkable activities, the agrarian policy of Peter
the Great must figure as the weakest link. The other achievements of
the T /,ar were stupendous. He reorganized the Russian army on a West-
era model, yet on original lines (he was the first to use mounted infantry
(dragoons), and to introduce new tactics in gunnery and new principles
of fortification all of which served as models to the greatest com
manders of Europe in the eighteenth century) ; he was the creator of the
Navy and mercantile marine, both of which became, even in his own
time, important factors in European politics and trade; he laid the
foundations of Russian industry (the metal industry in particular); he
encouraged trade, to which he gave an extraordinary impetus; he laid
the foundations of lay instruction in Russia and made education compul
sory for all the servants of the State; he encouraged knowledge and
science by every means at his disposal, 1 and his foreign policy assured
to Russia a safe western frontier and a regular contact with Europe.

His handling of eastern problems was no less bold and vigorous. His
expeditions to Central Asia and his conquests of the greater part of the
Caucasian littoral of the Caspian Sea were designed to open trade-
communications with India, and his policy in the Black Sea was to lead
during the century to Russian colonisation of the whole of the southern
steppes. This served to create the myth of his "will/ 7 a document which
never existed; still it must be admitted that: the scheme outlined in this
mythical testament, culminating In the seizure of Constantinople, was
one which he might very naturally have contemplated.

1 Tine Imperial Actufomy of Science wai created by him-

24 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

In 1721, at the close of the Swedish War he was proclaimed (by the
Senate, Holy Synod and the troops) Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia,
Father of his Country. He died in 1725 from exposure, overwork, and
excesses, aged 53.

It has been often said of Peter the Great that he was merely a blind
imitator of western patterns. This is not so. From Europe, Peter took
that technical equipment which Russia entirely lacked, but while copying
European models he always endeavoured to adapt: them to Russian con
ditions, and his failures in this respect are largely due to the straits in
which his country was during the war with Sweden. A great patron of
foreigners, he nevertheless put Russians in every responsible post, for
eigners, with few exceptions, bcin^ merely technical advisors. His
admiration for Europe did not blind him to the fact that Russia was not
European: witness a sentence in a letter to the Governor General of
Astrakhan, written a year before his death "We shall need Europe for
another 20 years; then we can turn our back on her,"

As with Ivan the Terrible, the demands of his foreign policy (in his
case, a successful one) thwarted his efforts at internal reconstruction*
Like Ivan, he too overestimated the resources of his people; and Ins un
timely death put an end to the projects that might have corrected, or at
least alleviated, mistakes committed under pressure of events. But, un
like Ivan, in his social reforms he showed no consideration for the tradi
tions of the country,

Russia, at the end of Peter's reign, had become a great Power* Yet in
making tier great, he had unwillingly sown a seed- social discontent
which one day bore a harvest of revolution.

VI
PETER'S INHERITANCE

DURING the eighteenth century Russia continued to expand. In the west
she reached her natural boundaries, uniting under the Russian Crown
most of the Russian people, 1 She annexed large w*w territories lit the
south and consolidated her position on the Black 8c*a; her armic wore
victorious against Turk, Tartar, Pole, German (the Seven Yearn War)
and Swede, Her importance m world politics grew steadily; hc had
developed her way into the family of European nation^ am wig whw
she now occupied a place of honour* The new capital, St. PctmhurK,
became a brilliant centre of arts and elegance.

Below the surface, however, all was not healthy. The chaam t*pa rar
ing the new upper class from the bulk of the people* wan growing The
Europeanization of the former went hand in hand with the
of the peasants to the landowners.

l Thc Gulklim and CarpittMim Ruituni

HISTORY 25

The succession to the throne became a series of palace revolutions.
"Le trone russe n'est pas possessif, il est occupatif" said Frederick II of
Prussia.

Peter was succeeded by his second wife (Catherine I, 1725-1728) who
was merely the figure-head for a powerful faction of high officials, sup
ported by the Guards; then came a minor (Peter II, 1728-1730) his
grandson, then his niece, Anne (1730-1740) daughter of Tzar Ivan V,
called to the throne by another faction; again a minor, Ivan VI of
Brunswick (1740-1741) grandson of Anne's sister. In 1741 Elizabeth,
daughter of Peter, seized the throne, assisted by the Preobrazhensky.
Aided by a succession of able favourites she reigned for twenty years
(1741-1761), a period marked by the creation of the University of Mos
cow (1755) and the abolition of capital punishment except in cases of
high treason.

Elizabeth was succeeded by her nephew Peter III of Holstein (1761-
1762) a weak and dissolute foreigner. With the assistance of the Guards
he was dethroned by his wife Catherine II the Great (1762-1796), a
princess of German blood and a most remarkable woman. Extremely li
centious in her private life, she ruled the country through her favourites,
among whom were such outstanding statesmen as Panin, Potemkin,
Orlov and Bezborodko. During her reign Russia's armies covered her
name with glory; while New Russia (the territories between the Dnieper
and the Dniester) , the Crimea and part of Poland were annexed to the
Russian Crown.

The Empress patronized art, science and learning. Continuing the re
forms initiated by Peter the Great, Catherine pressed forward an in
tensive westernization of Russian institutions. At one time she contem
plated establishing representative institutions, but the influence of
Frederick the Great prevailed on her, and the plans were abandoned.

A law promulgated by her husband but put into force and developed
by her the emancipation of the nobility from compulsory service to the
State destroyed the last vestige of justice in the existing system of peas
ant serfdom. The peasant from now on became a slave, to be used or
sold at his master's discretion. The institution of peasant serfdom was
introduced into Little Russia, where until then it had hardly existed.
When colonizing New Russia, Catherine granted enormous tracts of
land to her favourites (or their prot6g<s) accompanied by quotas of
Crown peasants (until then freemen) whom the State regarded merely
as material to be used at will, and naturally as serfs, During her reign,
and that of her successor, over 4,000,000 peasants thus lost their
freedom,

In these circumstances peasant risings became frequent and violent;
one headed by Pugachev, who claimed to be Tzar Peter III, and wrote
"freedom and land for the peasants" on his banners, was for a time suc
cessful over all the territories between the Urals, Kazan, the basins of
the Volga and the Don. It was only suppressed by the use of consider
able armed forces.

26 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

At the close of the eighteenth century Russia stood like a lonely
giant in a world not a little fearful of her next move. The "Northern
Bear" was becoming a concern to European chancelleries. Her stupen
dously rapid development, her enormous resources, the autocratic power
of her Government and the seemingly blind obedience of her teeming
population, all filled her neighbours with concern.

A definitely hostile tendency had already begun to make itself felt,
when the advent of the French Revolution which destroyed and shook
so many thrones, swept away old institutions, and introduced a new era
with the battle cry, "Libert6, Fraternit6, Egalite 5 ' forced monarchist
Europe to seek an ally in Russia. Both sides the Revolution and the
old ordervied with each other to court Russia's good pleasure. Cathe
rine decided in favour of the old order, even though throughout the cen
tury Russia and the French Monarchy, with the exception of the Seven
Years War, had always been in opposite camps. Her erratic son, Paul I
(1796-1801) at first followed her policy (Field-Marshal Suvomv in
1798-1799 drove the French from Italy), but: afterward** allied himself
with the French (1800). This cost him his throne and his life, as ho was
murdered by an anti-French faction of which Ins son and heir, Alexander
I was the unconscious tool

VII

ALEXANDER 1

Foreign Policy

ALEUCANDKR, who succeeded to his murdered father's throne in tHor, was
a very remarkable man perhaps the most brilliant diplomat of Inn
time. In the struggle against Napoleon^ European policy of civic equal
ity (under French tutelage)? Alexander promulgated a scheme for a lib-
era! federation of national states. In a striking document 'his iusmiC'
lions for his Ambassador to Great Britain (1804) he sketches *su<rh a
federation, the first prototype of the League of Nations. As part of tlu
plan, he envisaged the liberation of the Western ami Southern Klavw
from Austrian, German and Turkish domination, and the creation of a
Slavonic federation with Russia aft their protector. Greece and flu* Da-
nubian principalities were included in the scheme* Representatives of
this federation were to deal in Congress with all questions of interna
tional policy; the plan had as its chief aim, the preservation of peace.

The wars with Napoleon, however, were continually forcing Russia to
ally herself with the AuatrJans and Prussians and naturally ewlmlnl
that part of the scheme which concerned the Slavs under their sway. Su
far as concerned the Balkans, Alexander piinuirtl IUH plmn with rw*r#y;
he succeeded in wresting the Ionian Inlands from the Turks ami m es
tablishing a Russian protectorate over the Republic created thw* ami
also over Montenegro, Further, he succeeded in forcing the Turks to

HISTORY 27

grant the Danubian Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) an auton
omous constitution. But by reason of Russia's life and death struggle
with France, the Balkans naturally became relegated to the background.

Napoleon's victories over the allies which eliminated Austria and
Prussia, brought Russia and France face to face. In East Prussia (1806-
1807) for the first time both parties could appraise each other's resources
and skill. Although the Russians were outnumbered, their stubborn
fighting qualities induced Napoleon to seek an agreement with Alexan
der. The latter, abandoned by his Allies, felt that an agreement with
Napoleon might offer a better opportunity for his scheme. As a result,
by the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) the two Emperors "divided" Europe into
two spheres of influence: Napoleon was to have a free hand westward
of a line which followed the eastern frontiers of Prussia,' of the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw (created from the Prussian provinces of former
Poland under French protectorate) and of Austria. 1 Alexander was to
have a free hand cast of this line in the Balkans, the Black Sea, the
Caucasus and in the eastern Baltic.

In the light of later political developments the Treaty of Tilsit held
many advantages for Russia. Her interests in the East were unaffected
and her prestige in Europe was enhanced. However, it also involved
many disadvantages: e. g. Russia agreed to join Napoleon's Continental
System, directed against Great Britain (which greatly affected Russian
trade), and ceded the Ionian Islands to France (thus closing the south
ern Balkans to herself). But the most subtle offset was Russia's formal
consent to the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under Napoleon's
protectorate. This stole a leaf from Alexander's wreath, since he had to
surrender to Napoleon the kudos of reconstitution of the Polish State, of
which, there is no doubt, the Tzar had always been the champion. The
Poles who until then had looked to him for their liberation, now trans-
ferccl their allegiance to Napoleon. This was a blow to both Alexander's
political scheme and his personal prestige.

The Polish question became a stumbling block which prevented a
really sincere alliance between the two Emperors. The very fact that
Napoleon had insisted on becoming overlord of Poland definitely dis
closed his disbelief in a permanent arrangement with Russia; and by
encouraging the Poles to demand the retrocession of the Lithuanian and
Little Russian Provinces of the Polish Kingdom (annexed to Russia at
the end of the eighteenth century), he threw away every chance of a
lasting understanding with Alexander.

At last (1812), the situation reached a crisis, and war broke out
Russia was confronted by France and her eleven European allies (in
cluding Austria and Prussia the two latter more or less unwillingly
drawn into the struggle on Napoleon's side),

Napoleon invaded Russia at the head of an army of 600,000. After a
series of the most stubborn battles in his career he succeeded in captur-

1 In 1809 Kant Ortlici~~ th district of Tarnopol was ceded to Russia to maintain her

neutrality during the Frauco-Auntriun War of 1809-

HISTORY 29

Domestic Policy

Alexander's liberal inclinations met with no less opposition in his
own domains. At his accession to the throne he contemplated two main
lines of reform: the political reorganization of the State, and the im
provement of peasant conditions.

As a preparatory step towards the former end, the Senate was re
organized as the Supreme Court of the Empire; the old Collegia were
abolished and Ministries created in their place, having at their head
Ministers responsible to the Crown; a Council of Ministers under the
chairmanship of the Sovereign dealt Dvith all interdepartmental matters ;
a Council of Empire (of State) was created in order to improve the
technique of legislation; in Alexander's mind, it was intended to become
the Second Chamber of a representative legislature.

Two plans for the political reorganization of the State were elaborated
under his orders: that of Speransky (later to become the codifier of Rus
sian law), definitely under the influence of the French conception of a
centralized state and that of Novossiltzev, who drew his inspiration
from the Constitution of the United States and offered a plan for a Rus
sian Federation, with one Imperial and several Provincial Legislatures.
The latter plan was favoured by Alexander, and steps were taken to
carry it into effect. Representative constitutions were granted to Poland
and Finland (annexed to Russia in 1809); Russia was divided into
Oovernor-Generalsships intended to become later provinces of the Rus
sian Federation; and councils of bureaucrats and elected nobles were
created in each Province, with the idea that they might ultimately be
come the second chambers of the provincial legislatures. The projected
reforms, however, were never destined to become law; and at Alexan
der's death (1825) they were definitely shelved. They had proved im
practicable,, chiefly because of the several problems mainly connected
with the serf-status of the peasants which they involved.

During the eighteenth century the peasants had literally become the
slaves of the landowners; and with the exemption of the latter from
compulsory service to the State every vestige of justification for serfdom
liacl disappeared. In addition to this the landowners had gradually be
come the financial and police agents of the Government; for the collec
tion of taxes, the providing of recruits for the army and the preservation
of law and order were delegated to them. The landowners received the
right to deport their refractory serfs to Siberia. They had been success
ful in having all limitations on their right of property revoked; e. g. in
1782 Catherine II had ceded to them the sub-soil rights and the right to
fell ship timber (which until then, had been vested in the State).

The Emperor Paul was the first to introduce a measure somewhat
alleviating the condition of the serfslimiting the landowner's right of
serf-labour to three clays a week. Previous to this, Catherine had ordered
a ttumiugli investigation of the whole question but foHear of opposi
tion from the nobility, she had never dared to go further into the matter,

3 o RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Alexander, supported by a small circle of friends imbued with liberal
ideas, had in view a drastic reform of serfdom, although it is doubtful
whether he ever seriously contemplated the complete abolition of that
institution. He soon came to use his peasant-policy as a weapon against
the opposition of the landowners to his general schemes.

In the beginning of Alexander's reign the Senate, the centre of aristo
cratic opposition, made an attempt to transform itself into a House of
Nobility and to force the Government to grant it political privileges
limiting the Imperial power. On one occasion, when a certain decree
affected a privilege of the nobility, the Senate withdrew it from publica
tion and the Government had some difficulty in dealing with the situa
tion. This was a warning, for Alexander's liberalism was anything but
aristocratic, and the general tendency of his policy was to diminish the
privileges of a special class and to establish a better balance of power.
Thus his series of measures issued in favour of the serfs were primarily
intended to intimidate the landowners.

These measures consisted of a law enabling all classes (the serfs ex-
cepted) to own land, a privilege which previously was one confined to
the nobility; of a law establishing the procedure of voluntary liberation
of serfs with land, and of strict regulations to control any illegal prac
tices (cruelty, exploitation, etc.) of the owners towards the serfs. In
1819 the Emperor actually liberated all the serfs in the Baltic provinces
and in Finland. These measures showed the landowners that the Gov
ernment could, if it wished, counterbalance their privileges by granting
privileges to the peasants. The Government was not strong enough to
push the reform further; it depended too much on the cooperation of
the nobility with its administration to risk a definite breach.

The death of Alexander I in 1825 was the occasion of the so-called
Decembrist rebellion, which it is usual to consider as the first act of the
Russian Revolution that culminated in 1917; this point of view, how
ever romantic, must be discarded. Neither in form nor in substance can
one build any connection between the Decembrist plotters and the later
revolutionaries. If it were logical to consider every anti-governmental
movement as part of a single Russian revolutionary process, it would
be necessary to look for the "first act" of the Revolution many centuries
earlier. The history of Russia is peculiarly fecund perhaps more so
than that of any other country, in rebellions. The official Bolshevik his
torians are apt to claim that every rising against the Government, from
mediaeval times onwards, was part of the class-struggle against Capital
ism. In substance, the Decembrist plot was an aristocratic movement,
whose chief actors were army officers and members of the nobility.

The reasons for the rising were manifold and disconnected: the very
definite opposition of part of the nobility to a regime that had success
fully limited their privileges through its peasant policy; the spread
among a section of the officers of liberal and even radical ideas; discon
tent with the Government's apparent subservience to Metternich in
Russia's foreign policy and with its refusal to launch itself into a war

HISTORY 3 i

with Turkey on account of the Greeks *; the fears inspired by Alexan
der's Polonophile policy among the ultra-nationalist section of society,
etc. The plotters formed two societies, the Southern and the Northern;
and they hoped to make use of the discontent among the rank and file
of the army to produce a successful coup d'etat.

The army's discontent was chiefly due to the introduction, after 1815,
of the so^ called Military Settlements (farms worked by soldiers and
their families under military control) with the idea of making the army,
or part of it, self supporting economically and for providing it with re
cruits. Towards the end of Alexander's reign one third of the army
(ab. 200,000) had been settled in these militarized farms, where the
farmer-soldiers were subjected to a detailed and severe discipline.
^ The Southern Society had a republican and the Northern a constitu
tional-monarchist character. Both contemplated the liberation of the
serfs and a land reform. The connection between the two societies were
weak, and no concerted plan of action had been pre-arranged.

What seemed a favourable moment for action offered itself after
Alexander's death, because of the circumstances connected with the suc
cession to the throne.

VIII

NICHOLAS I

The Decembrist Rebellion

ALEXANDER, who was childless, should have been succeeded by his

brother, Grand Duke Constantine, the viceroy of Poland; the latter,
however, was unwilling to assume the responsibilities of imperial power
and renounced his claim with Alexander's consent in favour of his
brother Nicholas, The necessary act was passed in 1823 but, for some
reason kept secret. On Alexander's death, Nicholas did not immediately
assume his rights and the delay occasioned by his correspondence with
the Grand Duke Constantino (who firmly refused to alter his decision)
gave the plotters their opportunity. Rumours of the arrest (and even
murder) of the Grand Duke Constantino by his brother's agents were
spread among the Guards on the days preceding their taking the oath to
the new Tzar; and on December 26th, 1825, part of the garrison of St.
Petersburg mutinied and assembled on the Senate Square calling for
Constantine. However, the older Guards Regiments (famous for their
participation in every coup d*etat in the eighteenth century) remained
loyal and deaf to the appeals of the rebels, who were easily dispersed
without great bloodshed. Of the ringleaders a hundred and twenty were
tried, and fivewho had plotted the death of the Tzar- were executed;
the rest received long terms of imprisonment and were deported to
Siberia,

*The latter was untrue ;s the Government iincc 1823 had been preparing for such a

war,

32 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Russian literature has built a vivid romance around the figures of the
Decembrists some of whom, admittedly, were quite remarkable men.
What struck the popular fancy at the moment was that all the plotters
belonged to the highest class of society, many of them bearing the great
est names of Russia (the Princes Trubetzkoy, Galit/ine, Rostovsky, Vol-
konsky, etc,) ; but it is certain that the rebellion had no popular support
or character. It closely followed the old pattern of the coups d'etat car
ried out by the Guards so successfully and so often in the preceding
century. But the character of the Guards had changed, and the re
sources of the Government had greatly increased.

Domestic Policy

Emperor Nicholas 1 (1825-1855) was a man totally unlike hi
brother. A rigid disciplinarian, a lover of formality and of meticulous
regularity, an admirer of Prussian methods, a firm believer in the divin
ity of the Sovereign's power and an avowed legitimist, he enjoyed
neither his predecessor's popularity nor his international prestige. Un
popular with the army, distrustful of the nobility and with no real
knowledge of affairs of state (for he had not been schooled to a&unw*
supreme authority), he governed Russia burcaucratically, never really
delegating his power, or part of it, to anyone*

He had, however, many striking qualities: a great sense of duty, sin
cerity in his opinions and a love of justice; he also was an untiring
worker.

He realised that affairs in the country were in a critical state and de
manded immediate reforms. However, unlike his liberal brother, who
was seeking for the cooperation of public opinion, Nicholas decided <m a
course of bureaucratic reforms; believing that regulation down to micro
scopic details of the work of the public services was the bet way to dis
cipline the country into order and prosperity*

Having successfully crushed the Decembrist rebellion and having on
the whole shown a great deal of moderation in dealing with the culprit*,
he ordered an account of the projects of the plotters to be presented to
him and carefully studied them.

One of the complaints of the Decembrists was the chaotic suite of
legislation and legal procedure, Nicholas appointed the veteran UUCH^
man Count Speransky to preside over a commission for legal reform,
This published in 1832 the Russian Code of Lawthe first, since* the*
days of Tzar Alexis.

Another of his measures, influenced by the study of the Deranbmt
projects, was the reorganization of the State Bank and a general reform
of financial matters. This was carried out by Finance Minister Count
Kankrin, The Government stabilised the currency by legal tn;ifjure t
the rate of $}4 paper rubles for one gold ruble, and gradually ex
changed the old notes for new paper currency at par with gold.

Towards the peasants Nicholas pursued the same policy an ht brother
and there is no doubt that he never abandoned the project of liberating

HISTORY 33

the serfs. This, however, was dictated not so much by moral or economic
considerations as by his distrust of the landed nobility and by a desire to
weaken their influence in the State.

The measures passed under his reign in favour of the peasants were:
a law 'forbidding the sale of serfs without a sufficient amount of land, an
other prohibiting the separation of families by sale, and a series of new
regulations favourable to the peasants as to the exploitation of serf
labour. A committee was set up by the Tzar to prepare a law liberating
the serfs. The work of this committee, however, was not completed at
his death, and the reform was carried out by his son, Alexander II.

On the other hand, his administration was frankly based on the
principle of a "police state"; and by his creation of the Corps of Gen
darmes he greatly increased the political powers of the administration.
The Gendarmes were empowered to investigate everything and every
body. The administrative powers delegated to the new institution were
immense; and at the slightest indication, or even suspicion of "political
imtrustworthincss," the suspect was imprisoned or banished to Siberia.

The Tzar, who more or less distrusted everybody, had all matters,
even of a very insignificant importance, referred to him in person. This
created incredible complications of red tape, and the country, under his
regime, soon became an immense camp of bureaucrats, chancelleries and
police officers.

As a natural result of the burden of work thus thrust on the Tzar's
shoulders, and the impossibility of dealing with it in any but the most
formal way, there arose what Russia termed "the autocracy of a hun
dred thousand bureaucrats."

With all his love for "law and order" the Tzar did not go below the
surface of things* So long as things looked well and were in accordance
with the existing regulations, he did not bother to investigate therr^any
further* This was applicable both to the army and to the civil services;
arid it led to widespread corruption. A flood of papers concealed the real
state of affairs; and the ruthless suppression of opinion made it impos
sible for Nicholas to judge of matters in any more human way than by
the official reports of his innumerable chancelleries.

The "Iron r IV,ar," as he was often called, saw the edifice which he had
been building for thirty years crumble owing to the collapse of his for
eign policy, in which his principles of legitimism had earned him the
title of the "Gendarme of Europe."

Foreign Policy

In the first years of his reign Nicholas continued his brother's foreign
policy; the war with Turkey (1828-1829), envisaged during the last
years of the preceding reign, terminated by the peace of Adrianople,
which established the independence of Greece and the autonomy of
Serbia, Moldavia and Wallachia. The moderation of Nicholas' terms of
peace greatly astonished Europe. But this astonishment was turned to
apprehension by the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833) when Russia and

34 RUSSIA/U.S,S.R.

Turkey concluded an alliance by which they declared the Black Sea
closed to the navies of all other countries. In addition, Russia guaranteed
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, in exchange for a full recognition
of her exclusive right to protect all Christians under Turkish rule. Tur
key thus became in the eyes of the world a Russian vassal. Russia in
return assisted the Sultan to emerge victorious from his struggle with his
rebel vassal Machmed All, the Pasha of Egypt

The treaty of Unkiar-Skclcssi was an important victory of Russian
diplomacy, but Nicholas' legitimist sympathies soon diverted his atten
tions to European affairs. In 1830 he decided to intervene in favour of
the Bourbons in France and summoned the other members of the Holy
Alliance to assist him in the task The Polish Rebellion which broke out
in the same year prevented the Tzar from sending his armies to France
to crush the revolution.

The Polish Rebellion cannot be attributed to Nicholas* policy. Al
though a declared enemy of representative government he rigidly ad
hered to the letter of the Polish Constitution* The Poles had no real
complaint about the regime; what they resented was the limitation of
the privileges of the Polish minority in the lands annexed by Russia
from Poland in the eighteenth century,

The Rebellion was suppressed (not without difficulty) ami, as a result f
the Polish Constitution was abrogated and the Polish army disbanded,
The local administration still remained in Polish hands but: the Govern
ment at Warsaw was made responsible to that in St. Petersburg awl
Poland was garrisoned with Russian troops Thin unfortunate event,
which clicl not promote either Russian or Polish interests merely com*
plicated the issue between the two countries.

In 1848 Nicholas 1 intervened in the Hungarian Revolt, .which the
Russian troops crushed. The country was given back to the Ilapsburgs,
Russia stipulating that none of the leaders of the revolt, who had sur
rendered to the Russian army, should suffer more than banishment. On
the successful termination of the revolt Austria took up a position far
from favourable to Russia, The Austrian Minister Prince Schwarxen-
berg is known to have said: "Austria will stagger the world by her in
gratitude," This soon proved to be true.

After 1848, Franco-Russian relations, which had never been cordial
since the fall of the Bourbons, reached a stage of crisis, which wan not
improved by Napoleon II Fs proclamation of the Second Krnpire, More
over, In order to consolidate Ins throne Napoleon maintained an aggres
sive foreign policy. He succeeded in getting the Turks to confer on him
the title of Protector of the Christians in the Holy Land, which by the
treaties of 1774 and 1833 belonged to the Russian Crown. Ru?isv
Turkish relations, not over cordial for the last decade, reached n brctak-
ing point and war was declared in fK^j; France and Great Britain de
clared war on Turkey's side and later the weight of Sardinia w;tti
thrown into the same scale.

The Russian plan of campaign was to invade Turkey through the

HISTORY 35

Danubian Principalities. Accordingly, these were occupied by the Rus
sian army. Simultaneously, the Turkish fleet was destroyed by the Rus
sians at the naval battle of Sinopus. The war might have been ended in a
few months, before the Allies could give Turkey their assistance.

It was at this moment that Austria acted. The Government of Vienna
demanded the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Principalities
and threatened war. Prussia's attitude was unfriendly and Nicholas,
thus abandoned by his "allies," saw no way out but to comply. The
bulk of the Russian army was perforce retained on the western frontiers.
This allowed the Turks and their allies to invade the Crimea and, after
a siege, famous for the resistance of its garrison, to storm the fortress of
Scbastopol. Russian victories in the Caucasus could not alter the position
of affairs, as the Russian High Command did not risk moving any large
body of reserves from the Western front to the Crimea.

In this contest with the French and British the Russian army was re
vealed as inferior in equipment, armament and tactics. Only the stoicism
and valour of the troops prevented a disaster of greater magnitude.

Emperor Nicholas I died heart broken in the spring of 1855.

In 1856 the war was ended by the Treaty of Paris, In exchange for
Scbastopol Russia had to abandon her conquests in the Caucasus, and to
surrender the mouth of the Danube to the Turks. She agreed to main
tain no navy and to dismantle her forts in the Black Sea. She was also
compelled to abandon her claim to protect the Sultan's Christian sub
jects, whose rights were henceforth to be guaranteed by all the Great
Powers.

IX
ALEXANDER II

THE death of the Emperor Nicholas I marked the collapse of his regime
and cut out for his successor, Emperor Alexander II (1855-1881), an

enormous task of reconstruction and reform. The structure of the State
had given way everywhere: Nicholas 7 foreign policy, based on the tra
ditions of the Holy Alliance, had proved futile, and those on whose

gratitude Russia had every right to rely Austria and Prussia had
turned against her in her hour of trial; the Russian military organization
entrenched behind a brilliant fajadc of impeccable discipline and meticu
lous regulations, proved unequal to contesting the field against armies
whose command had paid more attention to the progress of armaments,
ancl whose supply and ordnance services were more efficient and hon
est,; the innumerable army of bureaucrats, badly paid but provided with
extensive powers of extortion, had shown itself a corrupt and inefficient
body; the country, although dragooned into apparent blind obedience,
proved apathetic in the crisis; recruiting for the army during the Cri
mean War was accompanied by bloody revolts; and there was a wide-

36 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

spread rejoicing at the difficulties of the day apparently In the hope that
improvement must necessarily follow disaster.

Fortunately, Alexander II, unlike his father, was a man of a kindly
and liberal disposition, moderate In his opinions and inheriting some of
the more attractive qualities of his uncle Alexander Iyet very defi
nitely a man of more character and resolution.

Domestic Reforms

His first reforms were dictated by the financial depression which fol
lowed the Crimean Wan Laws were passed to encourage industrial,
financial and trading companies and to implement an extensive pro
gramme of railway construction. These enabled the country in a very
short time to rectify Its finances.

The most pressing problem which confronted the Government W;JK
that of serfdom. Alexander had decided from the very beginning to
emancipate the serfs. A great deal of preparatory work had been niTom-
plished la the preceding reign, but whereas Nicholas had limited his
efforts to bureaucratic investigation, Alexander appealed for collabora
tion to the nobility and the leading public men of the day. In 18^7 the
Emperor ordered the Governor-General of Vilna to orftantxo Provincial
Committees among the nobility of the Lithuanian provinces with a view
to elaborating a plan of emancipation. The other provinces followed nuit ;
a Central Committee in St. Petersburg and the Council of Kmpm % < -
summing up the labours performed in the provinces- drafted ;i law
which was promulgated by Imperial Manifesto on March j, iKni.

The Act of Emancipation freed all Kerfs unconditionally; tin* bun!
allotted to them was to be bought from the* owners with thr Suit* 1 .**
assistance. The Government issued emancipation bonds to the land-
owners for this purpose and collected corresponding wurns from the
peasants at the rate of $% of the total cost yearly, lite amount of land
allotted to the peasants was roughly equal to that which they had prrvi
ously held for their own use and was about one-half of the total ai'Wtj>r
belonging to the landowners before the reform.

This reform unfortunately fell short of public expectation* in many
respects. In the first place the land allotted to the peasantry w?* not
given to them individually but as common property, Thin waa dow to
ensure payment for the newly granted land- "a tnatrer for whieh flu*
communes were made collectively reaponnible*. The peasant* thug foil ml
themselves again subjected, as a claw, to a *(>eda! regime, "lite law at
that time made no provision to enable individual peaHuwn to leave the
commune and become individual landowners, unles* th?y abandoned
their share of common land* This not only affected their eeonomh'
freedom, but made them socially and legally dependent <m thr ,*4|riai
Institutions of the commune,

In^addition, the peasants aoon felt the pinch of povnrty. While* erfdom
flourished, it was the duty and interest of the landowner* to provide?
them with land or work; now the growing number* of the

HISTORY 37

greatly increased the ranks of the landless or of those whose land-tenures
could not suffice to keep body and soul together. It must be said in ex
planation that, previous to emancipation, the serfs were divided into two
categories : house-serfs and land-serfs. The Emancipation Act granted
land only to the second category, the first were set free with the idea
that they would either provide hired labour for the estates or else be
absorbed into industry. In practice this resulted in creating a class of
landless peasants (the forerunners of the "poorest peasants" of today)
who touched the depths of poverty.

The condition of the newly freed men compared very unfavourably
with that of the State peasants who at the time of the emancipation, were
very numerous indeed (about 50% of the whole peasant population 1 ).
The reform left these in full possession of all the lands which they had
been working and until the Revolution of 1917 there existed a very
marked contrast between villages of former State peasants and former
private peasants,

It would have been much wiser had the reform, instead of creating
thousands of peasant communes created millions of farms, by allotting
the land individually; this being supplemented by the creation of a fund
to assist the peasants to buy more land out of the immense reserve of
Crown lands. All this the Government of Nicholas II introduced, with
remarkable results, some fifty years later after the first Russian Revolu
tion (1905-1906), Unfortunately it was too late. The poverty and dis
content among the peasants grew every year and served to increase the
ranks of the discontented.

Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the reform was a very decided
stop forward. It was the first important item of Alexander's general
scheme and completely changed the order of things in Russia.

Alexander's oilier important measures were the introduction of local
self-government for the rural districts (the Zemstvos) and the towns
(Municipalities) and reform of the judiciary, of the penal code and of
the military service.

The Zemstvos, created by the Imperial ukaze of 1864, reestablished
local 8elf-#overnment, and departed for the first time from the class
basis by providing for the representation of every class on the Boards
of the Zerastvoa on a basis of equality,

The electors were divided into three eurias; private landowners,
peasant communes and townspeople. The Zemstvos had the right of
limited taxation and were put in charge of education, roadbuilding, pub
lic health, and Improvement schemes.

In 1870 the towns were similarly organized. Town Councils represent
ing all classes of society replaced the old burgomasters with their boards
appointed by the Crown.

Alcxander'e judicial reform of 1864 was no less important Juries were
introduced; the proceedings of all courts were greatly improved and

* In 1860 there werc:~private jpeawmti (men)- xo,o$o>zoo State peasants (men)

10,544)09*. Three %uret are taken from the census of 1859.

3 8 RUSSIA/US.S.R.

made public; the judges were rendered independent of administrative
interference and pressure, the new law making them irremovable except;
by process of law; the Russian bar was created, the penal code was re
vised and justice made equal for all classes of society with the excep
tion of the peasants, as special courts were created to deal with ques
tions, other than criminal offences, affecting the last named. This was
due, of course, to their special organization into communes.

The reform of military service (1874) was the last of the principal
measures promulgated in Alexander's reign. The old system of long term
service (25 years) for recruits impressed, by rota, from the communes
was abandoned, as being too heavy a burden on the population and as
providing practically no reserves. This system had obliged Russia to
keep up a standing army which in peace-time had proved a most serious
draw on her exchequer; and yet one which, in the case of a serious con
flict like the Crimean War, had proved entirely insufficient even for
strictly defensive purposes.

The new law introduced a system of conscription which provided for a
short term of active service to be followed by several years in the re
serve* It was drawn on democratic lines, calling to the colours all youn#
men of 21 without distinction of class. Exemption was only granted to
young men who were the only breadwinners of their families. The term
of service was also shortened in the case of young men with a secondary
education.

These reforms were accompanied by a series of minor ones tending to
improve the social services. The censorship, which had HI tiled opinion
under Nicholas, was greatly relaxed, and public opinion found a voice.
This greatly facilitated the Government's effort to eradicate the corrtip-
tiottj red tape and inefficiency so prevalent in the preceding reign,

The Government encouraged education; it was during Alexander* u
reign that the education of the peasant masses started on a vast neiile,

In domestic matters Alexander's reign was undoubtedly an age of
great progress and constructive activity, The serial order which he tw*
tablished endured till the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

Alexander's far-reaching policy, however* diet not bring political pc**w
to Russia, Not only did the Tor have to face strong opposition to lib
views from both the conservative and radical sectors of nanny, but hh
life was constantly in danger; many attempt* on it had bmi fnwtratt*d
before the last proved fatal

Conservative opposition came, of courftct, from the landed nobility- *
who, fearful of the Government 1 ** radicalism* clamoured for politic!
rights that would enable them to control it policy.

The radical and revolutionary" opposition came from the ne*wly-ffrmrd
tiers etat the intelligentsia, a class of intellect wd iwruitttd from rvcry
layer of society but centering chiefly in the Umv*jritic and the Prtm
As early as 1862 groupn of Terrorist* became active, ami propaganda
urging assassination of members of the Government and Atimimfltnttitw
was widely disseminated* The revolutionary movement took very deft-

HISTORY 39

nite shape In the Polish Rebellion of 1863, which had to be crushed by
armed force. As a result Poland lost the last remnants of autonomy, the
very term Kingdom of Poland being changed to the Governor-General
ship of the Vistula. The land-tenure reform which the Russian Govern
ment subsequently carried out in Poland on the lines of the Russian
emancipation, insured the loyalty of the Polish peasants to the Russian
Crown till the World War.

Revolutionary activities took a very sharp turn after the Turkish War
(the War of Liberation, 1877-78) when all the terrorist activities were
concentrated against the person of the Tzar. Previous to that, between
1870 and 1875, their propaganda had been directed without any marked
success towards rousing the masses of the peasantry.

There is no doubt that the revolutionary activities were directed by
two different elements: one was desirous of forcing the Government into
further reforms of a more radical character; the other, fearing that the
Government's liberalism would weaken the revolutionary spirit in the
masses, attempted to force the Government by a succession of outrages
to adopt repressive measures, which would alienate the moderate ele
ments of society. In this they partly succeeded. The Government found
itself between the devil and the deep sea. However, the Tzar remained
faithful to his moderately liberal ideas: on the very day of his assassina
tion (March 13, 1881) he signed a ukaze convening the so-called Repre
sentative Committees (of delegates of the Zemstvos, the Municipalities,
etc.) to advise the Council of Empire. The plan of a Constitution had
been drawn by Count Loris-Melikov, Minister of the Interior; who by
introducing a representative regime and allying the moderate progres
sive elements with the Government, hoped to put a stop to revolutionary
activity.

Foreign Policy

Alexander's foreign policy was inspired by the tragic events attending
his accession. The Treaty of Paris had imposed on Russia obligations
which limited her rights as a sovereign power in the Black Sea; and her

Near Eastern policy of giving protection to the Balkan Slavs had re
ceived a definite check. In her Caucasian dominions the Moslems not
without Turkish assistance and emboldened by the defeat of the Rus
sianswere in open revolt

The Government first directed its attention to the Caucasus and the
Middle East. The former had been nominally under Russian rule since
the beginning of the century, when the last Georgian King voluntarily
surrendered his dominions to Russia in order to protect it from devasta
tion by Turkish and Persian raids. Russia held the lowlands, leaving the
unruly mountain tribes more or less to their own devices, although she
was continually compelled to make war on them* In the middle of the
century the Moslems under Shamil rose en masse, and a Holy War
threatened to reduce the Caucasus to ashes. The Government collected
large reinforcements and decided to subdue the mountaineers. Towards

40 , RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

1860 the Caucasus, under its new viceroy Prince Bariatinsky, was en
tirely pacified and subject to full Russian control.

After 1847 the centre of Russian activities in the Middle East was the
fortresses on the upper Ural river Orenburg-Orsk. From there, Rus
sian punitive expeditions were sent to retaliate against the continual
raids of the Uzbeks of Khokand, the Bokharans and Khivans from the
valleys of the Syr Daria and Amu Daria.

It soon become clear that only firm Russian occupation of these
valleys would ensure the peaceful development of the, Russian part of
Turkestan, the Kirghiz steppes and Semirechie. The conquest of the
Uzbek Khanate of Khokand was accomplished by 1865. Two years later
the Khan of Bokhara, who had sent armies to assist the Uzbeks, had to
acknowledge Russian suzerainty.

In the same decade Russia acquired large territories in the Far East.
By the Treaty of Aygun (1860) and of Pekin (1861) the Chinese re
linquished to her, in return for Russian mediation with the British and
French, the northern banks of the Amur, the region of the Ussuri, the
Maritime Province with Vladivostok and the Northern half of the
Island of Sakhalin.

The Russian successes in Asia did not fail to arouse great nervousness
in Europe; particularly in Great Britain, where public opinion became
fearful for British interests in India. Russia's policy towards- her new
subjects and vassals on the borders of Afghanistan was very liberal and
broadminded. Local institutions were allowed to continue; Russia played
the part of tribal peace-maker; and Russian money and administration
very rapidly promoted the welfare of the population, which had been
groaning for decades under the despotic rule of its Khans. The fame and
prestige of the 'White Tzar" spread far beyond the borders of the Em
pire at a time when the Indian Mutiny had shown up the defects of
British administration in India,

The British Government viewed with concern the growth of Russian
popularity in Asia; and early in the sixties it entered into negotiations
with the Government of St. Petersburg with a view to agreeing upon a
line of demarcation and a neutral zone: Russia, it was suggested, was to
keep the valley of the Amu Daria, while Afghanistan was to be included
in the British zone of influence, The Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara
were to be declared neutral. Russia, already holding Bokhara, could not
agree to these terms. Besides, British participation in the Crimean War
still rankled in the Russian mind and it was a popular belief that
Russia's foreign difficulties were all due to the "Englishwoman's plots." *
The Russian Government in those circumstances needed allies to
counteract British opposition. The Government's attention was drawn to
the United States, with whom cordial relations had existed since the days
of the American Revolution. During the Crimean War the attitude of
the United States had been friendly to Russia. American public opinion,
concerning itself but little with the complications of the balance of power

X A reference, of course, to Queen Victoria.

HISTORY 41

in Europe, sympathized with Russia's championship of the Christian
population of the Balkans against their Ottoman rulers.

During the American Civil War Russia, in her turn, adopted a friendly
attitude towards the Government of Washington at a moment when
British recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent state was in the
balance. A Russian fleet was sent to New York and another to San
Francisco. Russia intimated that she would resist by force any attempts
to interfere in her commerce with the United States and flatly refused to
consider any scheme of joint European intervention in the war (at that
time Napoleon III and the British Government were negotiating with
other European Cabinets for a peaceful joint intervention in favour of
the Confederates).

Desiring to demonstrate her friendship for the United States Russia
sold to that Power all her American possessions (Alaska) in 1867 for the
nominal sum of $7,200,000.

However, her cordial relations with the United States in those days
could not provide Russia's Eastern policy with a counterbalance to
British and French opposition. Alexander took advantage of the Franco-
Prussian War (1870-1871) to abrogate the Treaty of Paris (with Ger
man sanction, given in return for Russia's assent to the creation of the
German Empire). In the light of later developments, it is to be regretted
that Russian moral support helped to create the German Empire. But a
united Germany was essential for the moment and enabled Russia to
regain her position in the East

With his usual moderation Alexander II, having acquired what he de
sired in the Black Sea, was now prepared to come to an understanding
with Great Britain in the Middle East The two Governments guaran
teed the neutrality of Afghanistan. Russia, in addition, declared her
willingness to respect the independence of Khiva, provided the Khivans
maintained peace. However, the latter continued their raids into Russian
territory and in 1873 a Russian expedition under General Kaufmann
took possession of the Khanate, part of which was annexed to Russia,
while the rest acknowledged Russian suzerainty as a vassal state.

The War of Liberation

After 1870, grave complications arose in the Balkans. Turkish oppres
sion of the Christian population of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina and
Macedonia reached unprecedented dimensions; and the ensuing mas
sacres, of Bulgarians in particular, roused public indignation through
out the world. The same state of things prevailed in Armenia, where
thousands of peaceful inhabitants fell before the fury of Turkish irregu
lars* The Great Powers which, after the Crimean War had undertaken
to protect the Christian subjects of the Sultan, seemed, with the excep
tion of Russia, to be unconcerned, and would not act Gladstone, Brit
ain's great liberal leader, alone urged intervention* Finally, a European
conference was called* The Government of the Sultan, however, em
boldened by an entire absence of concerted action and by the disaccord

42 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

that reigned between the European cabinets, paid no heed to counsels
of moderation.

Events in the Balkans meanwhile took a turn for the worse. Serbia
and Montenegro, where public opinion was clamouring against the mas
sacres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared war on Turkey in 1876.
Such was the popular feeling in Russia that on the outbreak of war
thousands of Russian volunteers enlisted in the Serbian army. The dis
proportion of forces, however, was too great; and after many months of
stubborn fighting the Turks had Serbia at their mercy. The European
Conference again intervened with no success, and Serbia was only saved
from annihilation by Russia declaring war on Turkey early in 1877.
Russia was soon joined by Rumania, a vassal state of Turkey (formed
by the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859)-

No war was ever more popular in Russia. A great feeling for their
Slav brethren in the Balkans, who were also their brothers in faith,
permeated every class of society. The people regarded the war as a cru
sade and called it the War of Liberation* The hardships of the campaign
(undertaken when the Russian army was undergoing reorganisation)
and some severe reverses which the Russians suffered at the outset
could not damp the general enthusiasm.

In the spring of 1878 the victorious Russians were at the gates of Con
stantinople when Great Britain and Austria intervenedin favour of
Turkey. Threatened by new international complications which ml^ht
lead to another war, Russia agreed to suspend her military operations
without occupying Constantinople. A preliminary treaty was Kilned at
San Stefano, which established the following regime for the Balkan?*;

Serbia was to receive Bosnia and Iler/xgovma and bmmie an inde
pendent Kingdom; Turkey agreed to the creation of a Bulgarian primi
pality consisting of Bulgaria proper, Macedonia and KuKtern Rumetta;
she was to return 1 to Russia the mouth of the Danube and that jait of
Bessarabia lost; tinder the Treaty of Paris; in addition Russia received
the Provinces of Batum and Kars in the Caucasus. Armenia WM to he
granted an autonomous regime, and Ruswian troops were to occupy the
country for 10 years to see that reforms were carried through.

In spite of the moderation that RuKwa showed in this agreement (tihr
actually received only the Caucasian Provinces as new additions to lirr
territory), the Treaty of San Hlefano aroused tremendous opposition
from Great Britain and Austria. Russia, to avoid further t*omplir,itions
saw herself forced to accept the Insincere mediation of the CJerinau
Chancellor Prince Bismarck and agreed to revwe the Ban Stefnno pmvi"
sions. A European Conference was called at Berlin ami the* eonmied
efforts of the diplomatic coalition against Ku*t*ia, of winch Disraeli w
the leading spirit, reduced the Russian victory to a diplomatic cfrfrat,

The "sick man of Europe" was once more saved by the* British* thin
time with Austrian and German support. The Treaty of Berlin gave
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria (nominally they remained prwitie**?*
of Turkey) reduced the principality of Bulgaria by half, leaving

HISTORY 43

donia to Turkey and dividing the remainder into two vassal states
Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia the latter receiving merely a form of
autonomy under direct Turkish control; the Russian mandate over
Armenia was cancelled, the Great Powers undertaking to see that the
Armenians were granted the regime stipulated in the Treaty of San
Stefano. This last never materialized, and for over thirty years the
Turks were allowed a free hand in this unfortunate country.

The Treaty of Berlin created in the Balkans a state of affairs which
was primarily responsible for the war of 1914. It created a Serbia
irredenta (Bosnia and Herzegovina), led to estrangement and enmity
between Serbia and Bulgaria over the Macedonian question; gave
Austria (and through her, Germany) an unprecedented position in the
Near East, which naturally led to tension with Russia; and, in general,
created an atmosphere pregnant with hostilities. Russia did not lose
materially, for she received all that was agreed upon by the Treaty of
San Stefano; but the defeat of her truly liberal policy served, without
any doubt., to concentrate the explosive matters which blew Europe up
in 1914. After the Great War, Europe was forced to revert to the prin
ciples of San Stefano. But even now that which could have been a long
established and consolidated order has not been reached: the Mace
donian problem is still an obstacle to complete peace in the Balkans,
and the tragic destinies of the people of Armenia will always be a blot
on European and Christian honour.

ALEXANDER III
(1881-1894)

ALEXANDER III ascended the throne after his father had been tragically

murdered, Ills political ideals resembled those of his grandfather
Nicholas I; like the latter, he put all his belief in enlightened autocracy;
he was an avowed enemy of liberalism for Russia and in his father's
tragic end he saw not only a proof of Its failure but a justification
nay, an Imperative demand for a reversal of policy.

Ilia very first actions showed the young Tzar's Intentions: one by
one his father's moat trusted councillors were honourably retired from
public service, and only those who had definitely proved their con
servative sympathies remained in office*

Alexander III selected his collaborators carefully from men who had
trusted conservative opinions and whose character guaranteed implicit
obedience, for the Tzar meant to rule personally he would be his own
Cabinet, his ministers being mere agents to carry out the Imperial

Alexander III was not popular with society and did not seek for

popularity; he worked and lived within a very restricted circle of friends

44 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

and relations. As a private man he bore an impeccable character:
straightforward, kindly, frank in his likes and dislikes, frugal and
simple in his tastes. As a public man he was masterful but distrustful,
brooking no contradiction, an untiring worker, always honouring his
word and always firm in his decisions.

Domestic Policy

Alexander's domestic policy can easily be outlined; it consisted in
strengthening the powers of the administration, weakening that of all
institutions in which public opinion could be expressed and satisfying
in every possible way the economic needs of his subjects.

With regard to the last item, he put into practice the most rigid
economy, which began by reducing the civil list of the Imperial family;
the Tzar himself saw to it that the members of his family and household
set an example of cutting down expenses.

In a similar way the estimates for the army, navy and civil services
were cut down considerably.

The economies in the Government expenditure enabled the Tzar to
introduce a series of financial reforms which tended to ameliorate the
condition of the peasantry: the poll-tax was abolished (1886); a law
was passed to accelerate the legal transfer of the lands allotted to the
peasants in 1861, and the payments due from them for these lands were
greatly reduced; Crown lands were made available, for leasing or pur
chase, to the peasants on comprehensible and advantageous terms; and
great stretches of Crown lands in Eastern Russia and Siberia were
opened up for peasant emigration and settlement.

Labour legislation was first introduced in 1882 with the creation of
an inspectorate of factories (in charge of health and life saving regula
tions), the regulation of working hours, and the limitation of female
and juvenile labour.

Alexander's financial reforms prepared the way for the introduction
of the gold standard, which was carried out in the first years of his
successor's reign (1897).

He continued his father's policy of intensive railway building. Here
the greatest event was the laying down of the Great Siberian Railway
(1891) an event of world-wide importance.

All these measures gave a great impetus to trade and industry, which
flourished under a regime that hoped to stifle political and social dis
content beneath a wave of prosperity.

The other features of Alexander's domestic policy were much less
fortunate, and were dictated by his intense dislike for everything that
breathed of liberalism.

The Zemstvos' powers were curtailed, and those of the Provincial
Governors strengthened; for instance, the peasant communes were de
prived of the right to elect their representatives to the Zemstvos. A new
law (1890) gave them the right to elect a list of candidates from which
the Governors were to select the members. New officials, the Land

HISTORY 45

Captains, were created; these were in charge of all peasant affairs and
took the place of elected judges in the Peasants' Courts.

The administrative powers of the police were greatly increased in
order to wage war against political "untrustworthiness." All persons
suspected of antigovernmental tendencies were subjected to police
supervision. An emergency s,tate of special ordinance or of siege was
frequently proclaimed in order to give the administration greater free
dom of action.

Censorship, greatly slackened by Alexander II, was reintroduced in
full force. The autonomy of the Universities was suspended, and a law
(1884) subjected them to the direct control and administration of the
Ministry of Education.

Every attempt at political organization was crushed with the utmost
seventy. As usual in such cases the zeal of the police often saw plots
ancl^ worse, ^ where there was merely youthful radical enthusiasm or
justifiable discontent. The abuse to which this gave birth and the harsh
treatment of political convicts and deportees found no redress.

Policy Towards National Minorities

Alexander III was the first ruler to introduce a definite system of
Russiflcation. This chiefly affected such countries as Poland, Finland

and the Baltic provinces.

In the former the Russian language was introduced in all the schools,
Government officials were obliged to use it exclusively and it became
the official language of the courts. As a nation the Poles became "un
trustworthy^; and the Polish middle class saw themselves debarred from
public offices in their own country (no restrictions were applied to them
outside the Polish provinces).

In Finland, although the Tzar respected the Finnish Constitution
and never definitely suspended It, the Finnish Legislature was restricted
in every way which the Government of St. Petersburg could devise.
The Russian language, moreover, was introduced as the third legal
language of the State (in addition to Swedish and Finnish) and
Russians were appointed to all offices in the grant of the Government.

The measures of Rusaification in Finland had chiefly a petty and
annoying character and only served to create a feeling of animosity
between the two countries, without really serving the purpose for which
they were designed. There existed, of course, a great number of
anomaKtiea: for Instance, whereas Russians were required to produce
a Finnish permit to enter Finland, the Finns could enter Russia without
any such formality; Russian goods imported into Finland were dutiable
but not Finnish goods imported into Russia; the Russian Government
was spending a great deal of the taxpayers' money on Finland, yet the
Finns did not participate in any expenditure of the Empire, All this
could have been corrected by measures passed by the Government
through the Legislature at HclsSngfors, but Alexander preferred to pass
them by Imperial ukafte, which aroused a great deal of discontent.

46 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

In the Baltic provinces he pursued a policy antagonistic to the
German minority (the landowners) ; this,, of course, could have gained
him the sympathies of the local Lettish and Estonian population,, had it
not been accompanied by an attempt to Russify the latter also.

During his reign the Jews, who had never possessed the same rights
as other citizens, had fresh disabilities imposed upon them.

The Jewish disabilities had a distinctly religious character; any Jew
who became a Christian acquired every right of Russian citizenship,
The restriction imposed on the Jews by Alexander III produced as a
result, a great number of fictitious conversions to Christianity. At the
same time a large number of Jews joined the revolutionary camp, from
which as a general rule they had previously kept aloof.

Foreign Policy

The principle underlying Alexander's foreign policy was peace in
token of which he earned the surname of "Peacemaker' 1 from his people,

During the thirteen years of Alexander's reign Russia was at peace
with all her neighbours. This enabled the Government, to devote all its
attention to domestic affairs, particularly the finances and industry of
the country,

Alexander avoided every kind of entanglement in foreign affairs, ami
he pursued this end with firmness throughout his reign without allowing
his love of peace to be interpreted as weakness. This wan chiefly re
sponsible for the peaceful adjustment of the Kushka incident, which
had almost brought Russia and Great Britain to loggerheads

The incident occurred as a result of an Afghan raid into Ruian
territory. Subsequently Russian troops seized the strategic 1 : frontier fort,
of Kushka and made a punitive expedition into Afghanistan proper* The
British Government, always nervous at every Russian move in Central
Asia, demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Russian forces,
Alexander's firm assurance that his troops would retire immediately 1
after the payment of an indemnity by the Afghans, and his refusal to
abandon Kuahka, were accepted by the British Government, whose
representations to Kabul served to settle the conflict without IOHS of time.

In a similar way^ the Tzar's firmness in 1885 served to dispel a new
Franco-German crisis* His intimation that Russia would view with cli:;*
favour any aggressive move on Germany's part cooled the belligerent
spirit of Berlin.

A new departure in Russian foreign policy was the Franco-Ruian
rapprochement^ which began, soon after this incident, by a French Kin
for Russian railway-building and for the development of industry, Thin
was soon followed by a political agreement and in tKt;r by a military
imdcrstandinif preparatory stepn towards the Franco -Russian Allf<
anee of 1895,

The entente with the French wa to serve as cowttrrbnlamv to the
Austro-German alliance which isolated Russia in the Near Kit
Alexander's idea was to stabilize the peace of Europe by international

HISTORY 47

political agreements. This explains why he renewed the alliance with
Germany and Austria in 1884 (the last remnants of the Holy Alliance)
for a period of three years. He had hoped to do more for the cause of
European peace; but his death in 1894 left this task to his son, Emperor
Nicholas II, on whose initiative the first Peace Conference at The Hague
was called in 1899.

NICHOLAS II

(1894-1917)

THE reign of the Emperor Nicholas II, last "Autocrat of all the
Rtussias," is fully considered in other chapters of this book. The object
of this one therefore, is merely to give a general sketch of his reign
chiefly in connection with important events such as the Russian-
Japanese War, the first Revolution (1905-1906), the Great War and
the Revolution of 1917.

Nicholas II was a man of great personal charm, a scholar, a model
husband and parent Vastly more refined than his predecessor, he lacked
his forccfulness and resolution and was easily influenced by his
surroundings.

Unlike his father, too, he had no definite policy, either domestic or
foreign. These, however, were determined for him, to some extent, by
extraneous influences such as the international complications of the early
twentieth century, which reacted unfavourably on Russian foreign rela
tions and had very definite repercussions on domestic affairs. But it
must be admitted that Nicholas II never showed himself adequately
equipped to deal with difficulties, scaxxcly, if at all, greater than those
which his father had surmounted*

The first years of the new reign saw little more than a continuation
and development of the policy pursued by Alexander III.

Thus in 1897 the restoration of the gold standard by Witte, Minister
of Finance, completed the series of financial reforms initiated fifteen
years earlier. By 1900, too, the Great Siberian railway was completed/
an achievement which gave a great impetus to Russian trade in the
Far East

In her foreign relations Russia, while strengthening her entente with
France, pursued a policy of general European pacification, which cul
minated in the famous Peace Conference of 1899 at The Hague. This
meeting, suggested and promoted by Nicholas II, was convened with
the view of terminating the race in armaments and setting up machinery
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The results of the
Conference were less important than expected because of the mutual

1 Except for the section around l*kc Baikal

48 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

distrust existing between the Great Powers. Still there is no doubt it

was the first step towards a better order in matters international

During the Conference, if not earlier, it became apparent that ^tho

chief factor militating against Russia's peace enterprise was^ the Triple
Alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy. The Russian Government
was forced to the conclusion that unless a similar understanding were
reached between Russia, France and Germany its efforts would be in
vain. This view was powerfully urged by Wittc, and under his influence
a modus v'w&ndi was elaborated, which provided for Austro -Russian
cooperation in the Balkans (1897-1907),

Russian- Japanese War

Russia now turned her attention to the Far East Here a new factor
had appeared, in the shape of the new remodelled and vigorous Japan.
At Germany's initiative Russia, together with France and Great Britain
intervened in the Sinn-Japanese War (1895), By depriving Japan of
what she had fairly won, this inflamed a national resentment against
Russia which meanwhile had concluded a treaty with China, whereby,
in exchange for a loan, she received railway concrsHtons in Manchuria
and a lease of the Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur; <?ivai Britain
at the same time occupied Wei-Hai-Wei (on the oppugn* side of the
Yellow Sea) and Germany Kiaochao.

As a result of the growing friction between Ruia and Japan, thr
latter opened hostilities against Port Arthur in January 1904, without
any formal declaration of War.

Russia* in spite of the many warnings given her by the twtitn of
recent years, was caught absolutely unprepared. Her military Fnrivn in
Manchuria consisted of only two army corps; the fortifkatkwH of Port
Arthur were not yet completed and its garrison wa not at full ;tf rrrigtlu
The Russian fleet was far inferior to the Japanese, both in numbrf ss and
in technical equipment*

The war lasted for over eighteen months, ami the kimiafin suffered
an unbroken series of reverses. Port Arthur* blockaded by nea and
besieged by land, fell to the Japanese after rtiiit* mouths *[' hrt*H' it*'
sietanee; the Russian armies were heavily defeated in two pm'htni
battles, Laoyang and Mukden her naval forces in Kastctrtt w;tf<<r; w*rc
cither Immobilized or destroyed in detail and the "Armada 11 dipau*lJ
from the Baltic under Admiral Roxhileflivfinnky was $lmt.*Ht entirely
annihilated at the battle of Tsushima (May, 1905),

It must be said that until the very last weeks of the war fltct Rutiaian
army, owing to the difficulties of transport, wa$ inferior to the Jiipiiicat*
in numbers and equipment, When at last, in the summer of 1905, the
Russian Command in the Far East wiw prepared to take the offcnaivt*,
domestic eventsthe beginning of the firm, Revolution"**" forced the
Russian Government to accept American mediation and conclude the
Treaty of Portsmouth*

The Japanese War was highly unpopular in Ruwia* Her people did

HISTORY 49

not understand its aims and saw no reason for the sacrifices demanded
of them. The military disasters added to this feeling of discontent.
Revolution, smouldering under the surface, broke out sporadically in
strikes, mobilization revolts and acts of terrorism.

The First Revolution

At the time of the Japanese war there were three revolutionary
parties: The Workers' Socialist-Democratic Party (Marxian), the
Socialist Revolutionary Party (of agrarian leanings) and the Constitu
tional Democratic Party (Cadets), the latter recruited from the liberal
section of the intellectual classes. All these were then secret societies.
The Workers' Socialist-Democratic Party is of particular interest, since
it produced the present rulers of Russia. In 1903, at a Party congress
in London the W. S. P. broke into two groups : the majority who, led
by Lenin, voted for a guerre & outrance against the Capitalist order in
Russia were subsequently called Bolsheviks (from the Russian bolshe
greater) ; the minority, under Plcchanov, stood out for a programme
of cooperation with the liberal-bourgeois elements of the country and
were called Mensheviks (from the Russian menshe fewer). The pro
grammes of both parties were definitely under Marxian influence and
their propaganda was addressed only to the factory workmen.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party, called itself a peasant party. It
was a descendant of the Populist movement of the eighties and of the
various Russian revolutionary groups which had been active in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. Their programme was chiefly
concerned with laud reform, and their propaganda with the villages.
Both parties had an important sprinkling of Jews In their membership;
this was due to the limitations imposed on that race, which had forced
a large number of them to leave the country. The revolutionaries found
themselves, in consequence, assured of sympathy and financial support
from international Jewish circles.

The Government had long known of the revolutionaries and their
activity, but as the latter was chiefly directed from abroad, it had great
difficulty in suppressing it

In order to counteract the work of the revolutionaries the Govern
ment through its secret agents organized sections of workmen designed
to promoted purely economic programme. This effort, however, cul
minated in disaster. On Jan. 22nd, 1905 (Bloody Sunday) several
thousands of workmen, led by the priest Gapon and carrying Ikons and
national flags, marched to the Winter Palace with a petition^ for the
Emperor. A' good deal of mystery surrounds the whole event. The Tzar
at that time 'was not in residence at the Palace, a fact of which the
leaders of the demonstration could not have possibly been unaware,
The workmen, however, were genuinely persuaded that they were on a
peaceful errand. It is very likely that they were the dupes^ both of the
revolutionary agents, who had penetrated their organisations, and of
the Okhrana (Secret Police) which desired to bring matters to a head

So RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

in order to get a free hand. In any case, the Government used armed
force to disperse the demonstrators, many of whom were killed* Horror
and consternation gripped Russia at the news of this event, unprece
dented in her history. It had a far-reaching effect on the working classes,
who were won over to the revolutionary creed practically en masse.

After this disaster the organized revolutionary movement took a more
decisive turn. A council of Workmen Deputies was formed in St. Peters
burg with Trotzky-Br on stein as its leader. Strikes paralysed industry
and communications, revolts broke out in the army even in the
Guards; and peasant risings, accompanied by the sacking and burning
of private estates, daily increased the difficulties of the Government at
a time when it was making desperate efforts to continue the war with
Japan,

At last the Government saw it had been beaten; almost simul
taneously it issued an Imperial Manifesto (Aug. 19, 1905) granting a
constitution (which provided for a consultative Duma) and accepted
American mediation in the conflict with Japan.

These concessions, however, came too late to satisfy public opinion,
and the Government saw itself compelled to retreat further. On Oct.
30, 1905, an Imperial Manifesto was issued promising:

(1) fundamental public (civic) liberties: inviolability of the person,
liberty of opinion, organisation, speech and assembly.

(2) an electoral law on democratic lines,

(3) the enactment of all laws through the representative, institution**.

In addition to this, a new method of selecting the Cabinet; wan insti
tuted by the creation of a new office: that of the Prime Minister
(President of Council of Ministers), to whom the appointment of his
colleagues was henceforth to be en trusted, subject to Imperial concnt.
Count Witte became the first Prime Minister*

The Manifesto of Oct. 30th, 1905, was a decided step towarcla an
understanding with the liberal elements of society. Unfortunately, Witte
failed in his efforts to gain the confidence of the liberal opposition, The
reason for his failure must be looked for in the history of RttHsmii
political parties. Forced to work underground, they had evolved a type*
of theoretical politician who had no opportunity of becoming a practical
legislator or administrator. These parties, moreover, could not imme
diately forget the persecution to which they had been so recently
subjected; and, in consequence, they distrusted the Government's aiu-
cerity. To that must be added the fact that the two Socblbt parties
were not disposed to abandon their revolutionary activities, which hud
as their aim the complete and sweeping overthrow of the Imperial
regime. The bourgeois parties, too (of which the (ktobnnti l ami the
Cadets were the most important) could not at a moment** noiife ev(*r
their connection with the more radical groups, with whom they lute!
been previously allied in anti-governmental activities.

1 Formed in November 1905, thti Party comprtwd tlur mwr mntifrutt (Mfmur<hit)

liberal!.

HISTORY 5*

The accusations of insincerity levelled at the Government were ill-
founded. The majority of the first Duma was definitely hostile to the
Government, yet the latter showed no intention of going back on its
word. Even Count Witte's dismissal from office and the appointment
of Goremykin (a bureaucrat of the old school), chosen for his reac
tionary sympathies, did not shake the Tzar's decision to seek an under
standing with the Legislature. However, the Duma showed no more
inclination to work with Goremykin than with Witte, and the Tzar saw
himself once more compelled to change his Prime Minister. Accordingly
Stolypin, Minister of the Interior in Goremykin' s Cabinet, became head
of the Government.

Stolypin

Stolypin was, perhaps, the only great Russian statesman since the
days of Alexander II. To firmness of purpose, he joined great adminis
trative ability, a moderately liberal mind, and deep foresight. There
can be no doubt that if he had risen to power earlier, and remained
longer at the head of the Government (he was assassinated in Sep
tember 1911) the Revolution of 1917 might never have occurred.

At first Stolypin sought to cooperate with the Duma, but failed in
particular, over a project of land reform introduced by the Cadets and
designed to expropriate practically all privately-owned estates in favour
of the peasants* The Duma was dissolved. Stolypin, although urged
both by his colleagues and by a considerable section of public opinion
to alter the electoral law, firmly refused to take so drastic a step. He
fell back on the prerogative of the Crown and in this manner initiated
his celebrated land reform. The law abrogating the peasant communes
was promulgated in November 1906. Each peasant was empowered to
assume personal ownership of his share in the communal land. Simul
taneously, the Peasants' Bank was empowered to finance the purchase
of private estates for partitioning among the peasants; a vast scheme
for the colonisation of Siberia and Turkestan was launched and large
areas of Crown lands were made available for purchase and settlements
by peasants. This reform was followed by the abolition of all restrictions
upon the civic status of the peasants; the payments for the communal
lands -and their arrears, if any were remitted; and the Government
put forward a programme for the development and improvement of
agriculture. As the result of this policy, by 1917 there were already over
1,500,000 peasant families settled on their own land.

*Stolypin's experience with the second Duma (1907) was not more
fortunate than with the first and after dissolving it he was reluctantly
forced to alter the electoral law in favour of the more moderate elements
of the electors (landowners, merchants and the middle class). There
was a great deal of justification for this step, as cooperation with the
Duma (as originally constituted) had proved impossible. The first Duma
had even gone the length, after it had been dissolved by Imperial ukaze,
of inciting the country to revolt against the Government Moreover, its

52 RUSS1A/U.S,S.R.

projected legislation could only have proved acceptable to revolution
aries, and entirely disregarded the fundamental principles of the
Constitution of 1905.

Stolypin's amended franchise proved an unfortunate necessity, as it:
still more alienated the liberal elements from the administration. How
ever, the third Duma, with a moderately conservative majority, was
responsible for legislation which greatly advanced the cause of peace
and order in Russia.

Stolypin showed great firmness in suppressing terrorist activities.
The courts-martial instituted to deal with cases of terrorist assassination
passed about 3600 death sentences between 1906 and 1912, There is a
tendency among ignorant or prejudiced historians to compare Stolypin's
"White Terror" with the Bolshevik Terror. There is absolutely no
ground for such a comparison. Stolypin's courts-martial dealt exclu
sively with murderers and their associates; they were never directed
like the Bolshevik "terror" against a particular class, or against every
person who might be in opposition to the existing regime.

His policy gave Russia internal peaee and much improved standards
of living and welfare. His agrarian reforms, which aimed at creating a
prosperous farming community as a bulwark against revolution, at the
same time, were designed to remedy the real grievanees of the peasantry.
Under his regime education, industry, and commerce acquired a new
impetus. His cooperation with the third Duma wan undoubtedly one of
the most prosperous periods which Russia had seen for many decades
past

Curiously enough Stolypin, in spite of all he achieved, was not
popular. The radicals feared and distrusted him; the conservative?** were
afraid of his advanced ideas; the Tsiar, while reposing more trust in
him than in most of his ministers, still tolerated him merely a,s a neces
sity. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, feared him for two main
reasons: lie had shown his unflinching determination to mwh their
terrorist activities, and his policy of reforms wa greatly dimini.shinj.*
the chances of a auccessful revolution, Probably the second reatm was
the mainspring of the many attempts against his lift*. The final tntgrdy t
however, 5s involved in a great deal of mystery for the imdnvr---;i
revolutionary wa proved to have been closely connected with the*
Okhrana.

Russia and the World War
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by Austria, up

ported by Germany, was the first clear indication that n Kurnpcan eriw

was approaching* It really marked the last stage in the race of arma
ments that began with the Treaty of Berlin (1878),

Europe was divided into two armed camps the Triple Ktifitmr
(Ruaaia, France and Great Britain) and the Triple Alliance (Auatria,

Germany and Italy),
The policy of "armed peace/ 1 which could be better called a "policy

HISTORY 53

of menacing gestures" was bearing its fruit. In 1907 a second Peace
Conference, convened at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, met at
The Hague. Here Russia again proposed a general disarmament. This
met the same fate as its predecessor between Germany's uncom
promising hostility, Britain's hesitation in choosing whether to support
Germany or Russia, and, above all, the spirit of mutual distrust which
permeated the conference.

The Agadir incident, the French occupation of Morocco, the Italo-
Turkish War and the Balkan Wars of 1911 and 1912 all following in
quick succession created an atmosphere full of electricity. The assas
sination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914,
was the spark that kindled the pyre.

The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia provoked Russian intervention:
and in consequence the other European Governments saw themselves
also compelled to enter the dispute. The efforts made by St. Petersburg,
London and Paris on the side of peace met with no success.

Following Austria's attack on Serbia (July 28, 1914) Russia had no
choice but to mobilize part of her army on the Austrian border. This
was followed by a German ultimatum calling on Russia to stop her
preparations within 24 hours (July 29, 1914). Immediately after this
Germany and Russia both ordered a general mobilization (July 31,
1914). On August 1st Emperor Nicholas made a last effort to avert war
by addressing himself personally to the Kaiser, but the same evening
the German Ambassador informed Sazonov, the Russian Foreign
Minister, that Germany had declared war on Russia. '

Russia accepted the war with great enthusiasm. The country rallied
unanimously to the Tzar's call; the Legislature in extraordinary session
expressed itself entirely in agreement with the Government; the
Zemstvos passed patriotic resolutions and formed themselves into a
union for assisting the Government in supplying the army's needs;
mobilization was carried out with unprecedented smoothness; and a
general strike in progress in St. Petersburg stopped on the day war was
declared.

Feeling ran high in favour of the Serbs, for whom so much Russian
blood and efforts had been spent in the past There is no doubt that if
the Government had decided not to fight it would have been faced with
a very ugly situation at home.

The Slavophil policy proclaimed by the Government soon after the
opening of hostilities gave a new meaning and impetus to this feeling.
Russia rejoiced at the intention therein declared, of giving extended
autonomy to a united Poland, and of freeing the Slavonic nations under
Hapsburg rale (Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.).

But under the surface,, from the very beginning, there lurked grave
dangers*

Russia's armaments were not complete. It is interesting to note that
the Allies (Russia, France and Great Britain) had all three passed
legislation, shortly before the War, regarding armament programmes

54 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

scheduled for completion by 1917. Of all the belligerents Germany alone
had forestalled the rest, reaching the zenith of her war preparedness In
the summer of 1914. But while this comparative unreadiness for war.
was a matter of the most serious concern for France and Great Britain.,
for Russia it was a tragedy, as her industry, unassisted, was incapable
of supplying the demands of her army, while her geographical position
made it extremely difficult for supplies from abroad to reach her in
sufficient quantities. 1

However, Russia began the war in an optimistic spirit. With Great
Britain and France as her allies it seemed quite likely that it would be
over before the shortage of munitions and equipment could be seriously
felt.

Operations started with an Austrian flank attack on the Russian army
in Poland. At first the Russians, whose mobilization was much glower
than that of their enemies, were forced to retreat; but the arrival of
reinforcements allowed the Commander-in-Chief Grand Duke Nicholas,
to pass to the offensive in the end of August and to inflict on the
Austrians a serious defeat, as the result of which half Galicia was
occupied by the Russian forces.

This first offensive against the Austrians was followed by another in
October (the Ivangorod operation) which drove them out of south
western Poland to take shelter behind the fortifications of Krakow.

Meanwhile, however, the news from the Western front was dis
appointing. The French had been unable to Immobilize the Germans
on their frontiers. The violation of Belgian neutrality, which finally
brought Great Britain into the War, gave Germany the opportunity
of effecting a wide encircling movement with her right wing, ancl so to
threaten Paris. The French counter-offensive In the Vosges miscarried.
In their hour of peril the French urged the Russian High Command
to relieve the pressure on them by a diversion against the Germans.
Owing to the personal intervention of Emperor Nicholas this was done*
He ordered the Commander-in-Chief to send the 1st and 2nd Russian
Armies into East Prussia. Accordingly these two Armies invaded East
Prussia without proper preparations, and with the inevitable result that
even before they could effect a junction the 2nd Army (under General
Samsonov) was defeated in a three-day battle by Field Marshal von
Hindenburg.

However, this Russian sacrifice (some 90,000 men) was not in vain.
Alarmed by the Russian advance, the German High Command not only
dispatched to East Prussia several reserve divisions intended for the
Western front but was forced to withdraw several more from France.
As a result the Germans could not extend their right wing sufficiently
to envelop Paris thus giving Joffre and Gallieni the chance of a new
counter-offensive, which culminated in the German defeat at the Marne,

1 There were only two ports available for the purpose Arkhangelsk, froxcn a great part of
the winter and Vladivostok, with a aingie track railway some 12,000 klm. long linking It
with the front.

HISTORY 55

It is thus apparent in the light of further developments that the Tzar's
decision was ^farsighted and justified. It is to be regretted that Russia
was not destined to profit by it, or even to obtain general recognition
of^ the outstanding service she had rendered to the Allied cause at a
critical moment a service which, actually, decided the outcome of the
War.

In their turn the Germans, immobilized in France but not hard-
pressed by the Allies, decided to reverse their War Plan and to switch
over their offensive to the more active front the Russian.

The victory in East Prussia was followed by a concentration of
German reserves in the East and a strong German offensive in Poland.
The German advance had almost reached Warsaw, when, simultaneously
with his drive against the Austrians further south, the Grand Duke '
counter-attacked (middle of October 1914) and after a week of severe
fighting drove the Germans back to their frontiers. Further north the
Germans were also heavily defeated in the forests of Avgustovo.

It was precisely at this period that the Russian armies began to
experience a shortage of munitions and arms. However, the Allied com
mand in the West, still incapable of active operations on a large scale,
and fearful of a renewed German offensive in France, insisted that
Russia continue her operations against the Germans.

The Russian G. H. Q. very reluctantly agreed, though at that time
the Russian army needed a respite very much more than her Allies.

During the winter of 1914-1915 Germany continuously increased her
armies on the Russian front. Two thirds of the Austro-Hungarian army
were there. It must also be remembered that Turkey declared war on
Russia in October, 1914, and that part of the Russian army had to be
diverted to the Caucasus and later to Kurdistan and Persia.

The continuation of the Russian offensive after the battles of Ivan-
gorod, Warsaw and Avgustovo in November 1914 did not bring any
material success and, as on the Western front., the opposing sides dug
themselves in. Russia's one chance of success lay in a speedy termina
tion of the War, for her industries were inadequate to supply the
necessary munitions, and in the placing of munition orders abroad she
had not received from her more fortunate Allies any special privileges
or even that equal share to which her efforts and losses fully entitled
her.

Severe fighting continued on the Russian front throughout the winter
of 1914-1915. Early in the following spring the Central Powers launched
their offensive on the Eastern front. They had an overwhelming supe
riority in material, and a considerable preponderance in forces.

The entry of Italy into the War on the side of the Allies had not
altered the latter factor appreciably, as the Austrians were able for a
time to hold the passes in the frontier mountains without diverting any
considerable forces from the East. Nor did the abortive Allied attack
on the Dardanelles divert any Austro-German forces from the Russian
front.

S 6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

The attack came at a moment when the Russian munition crisis was
at its most acute stage. In the summer of 1915, about $ 9 percent of the
Russian soldiers were unarmed. Under those conditions the German
advance became almost a contest between high explosive and the
bayonet a contest to which there could only be one outcome. By^the
end of the summer the Russian army had fallen back to the line Riga-
Dvinsk-Pinsk-Tarnopol-Chernovtzy.

The whole brunt of the 1915 campaign, it may be noted, was borne
by Russia almost unsupported, as her allies in the West were unable
to give her any such effective assistance as she had them in 1914.

The Russian retreat of 1915 had grave domestic repercussions.
Popular opinion accused the Government in general and the War Office
in particular of gross inefficiency and held them entirely responsible for
the unprepared state of the Russian army. This, while partly true, was
yet a gross distortion of the facts. However, the Duma constituted itself
the champion of public discontent; and its majority, organized into the
so-called progressive block (Cadets and Octobrists, as well as some
other moderate groups), demanded the appointment of a "responsible
Cabinet" enjoying the confidence of the country by which term was
meant a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature and not to the Crown.

The majority of the higher Army Commanders (including the Grand
Duke Nicholas), the Zemstvos and the greater part of the general public
sided with the Duma. The Tzar, on the other hand, very much under
his wife's influence and of that of the Court and reactionary circles,
would not yield to these demands; the Duma was only assembled for
very short periods, and effectively muzzled. Goremykin, whose antag
onism to the representative bodies was well known, was again appointed
Prime Minister. To block any interference with the conduct of the War,
the Tzar ultimately took the decision to assume the command of his
armies in person.

This step was the greatest mistake of his reign. It was designed to
revive patriotism and confidence and to put an end to the rumours that
certain elements surrounding the Tzar were contemplating a separate
peace with the enemy. 1 In practice, however, the actual conduct of
military operations naturally passed to the Tear's Chicf-of-Staff,
General Alexeyev, one of the most remarkable soldiers of the War, but
much less popular in the Army than the Grand Duke Nicholas; while
the Tzar's nominal command was assumed at a time when the position
of the Russian army was at its worst, so that public opinion made him
responsible for subsequent reverses. The Emperor's long absences at
G. H. Q. from his capital and seat of Government also had a bad effect;
for in his absence affairs of primary importance were referred to the
Empress and her well-known dislike of the Duma (in which she saw
merely an institution limiting her husband's authority) and her oppo
sition to every attempt at conciliating public opinion by concessions, led

1 These rumours were absolutely unfounded} throughout the War and until hh tragic
death Nicholas II was rigidly loyal to the Allies.

HISTORY 57

to a complete lack of confidence in Russia's rulers. The frequent changes
of ministers, the manifest determination not to let the great public
bodies have any share in the conduct of the War, and the Government's
failure to do more to alleviate public suffering created a general atmos
phere of distrust and gloom.

It was in such troubled circumstances that the campaign of 1916
began. During the preceding year Russian industry had done great
things, and it was now able to provide about 50 percent of the material
needed for the Army. Foreign munitions were coming in through
Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok and the newly built port of Murmansk (in
the Arctic Ocean). The Russian army found itself, for the first time
since the beginning of hostilities, almost as well equipped as the enemy.
In 1916, moreover, the Allied operations acquired a more concerted
character than previously, and Russia could expect better cooperation
from the West than she had experienced in the previous eighteen months.

The first Russian operations of 1916 were not successful an offen
sive against the Germans in the centre, timed to coincide with an
offensive in the West, failed owing to the weather, which made it Im
possible to follow up the advance of the troops. It ended by the Russians
seizing and keeping the first lines of the German defenses.

At the same time the Austro-German Command, not counting on
Russia's speedy recovery after the reverses of 1915, had planned to
crush Italy. It was to relieve the latter Power that Brussilov began his
celebrated offensive in May 1916. It was entirely successful; the Rus
sians broke through the Austrian lines in many places and compelled
them to beat a hurried and disorderly retreat. After only a few weeks of
fighting the enemy had lost over half a million prisoners and practically
all their artillery. Eastern Galicia was re-occupied and the enemy was
also expelled from part of the Russian territory.

It was at this time that Rumania, very much against Russian wishes
and chiefly under French pressure, entered the War on the side of the
Allies.

It was well known to the Russian High Command that the Rumanians
were in no way prepared, and it was feared that Rumanian intervention
would merely mean a drain on Russian resources. Unfortunately these
views proved only too well founded. The Rumanians were unable to
resist the Austro-German attack and the Russian High Command found
itself forced to send over ten army corps to their assistance. The 1916
campaign ended by the German occupation of the whole of Rumania.

It must be said that for the Germans the defeat of Rumania proved
a Pyrrhic victory, which drained most of their reserves in men; hence
forth their decline began, and from this point of view the French in
sistence upon Rumania's entry into the War was justified. Nevertheless,
while facilitating the ultimate defeat of Germany, it also precipitated
Russia's collapse.

This ineffective ending of the 1916 campaign produced a bad impres
sion on public opinion. Again, it was felt, Russian lives had been

S 8 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

squandered in an effort to assist the Allies with no adequate efforts on
their part (the Allied offensives in the West had not been successful,
nor had they caused the withdrawal of any German forces from the
Eastern front).

Moreover, Russia's internal difficulties were growing; there was a
shortage of food in the larger cities, and a general shortage of labour
(Russia had mobilized over 15,000,000 men); the relations between the
Government and the Duma were becoming more and more strained;
society was full of rumours, grossly exaggerated or utterly untrue, about
court intrigues. Among these was the persistent rumour of Rasputin's
influence, through the Empress, on affairs of State an influence which,
it was hinted, made him the real ruler of the country. As he was sus
pected of being a German agent, or at least, of holding pro-German
views, the disquieting effect of such rumours can easily be imagined.

Rasputin, an obscure peasant who possessed great hypnotic power,
had undoubtedly gained a considerable ascendency over the Empress,
chiefly through being able to alleviate the sufferings of her son ^the
Tzarevitch Alexis, heir to the throne, who was afflicted with haemophilia.
Through this influence he was able to procure some favours from the
Court, and people in high position often sought his friendship. Moreover
a group, chiefly composed of society women, regarded him as a prophet,
and even a saint; this to the St. Petersburg public who well knew the
Empress's fervently devotional character was additional proof of his
omnipotence. Another section of society accused Rasputin of immoral
relations with female devotees. Rasputin, owing to the high tension of
the time, acquired an exaggerated importance and his murder by a well
known scion of the nobility (with the complicity of a Grand Duke and
a conservative member of the Duma) only served to strengthen the
impression of his importance and to justify the wildest rumours about
the influence he exercised over affairs of State.

At the end of 1916, the Empress's participation In State affairs was
publicly criticized in the Duma which was at once prorogued. At the
same time a plot to depose the Emperor was discovered. Disaffection
had gone so far that some members of the Imperial family were impli
cated in this together with members of society, men in high official
positions and officers of the Guards. So startling was the list of plotters
that the Government did not dare publish it; the persons implicated
were sent to the Front or forbidden to reside in the capital

On March 19, 1917, the Emperor at the G. H. Q. received a telegram
advising him of food disorders in St. Petersburg. At that time no one
imagined that these disorders would take a revolutionary turn and lead
to the overthrow of the Russian throne. Headquarters were busily en
gaged in the preparation of a Russiaa offensive to start early in the
spring in conjunction with a general offensive in the West, which it was
hoped would end the War by the autumn. The equipment and supplies
at the disposal of the Russian army were better than ever before. There
were more men ready to fight.

HISTORY 59

The Revolution of March 1917 dashed all these hopes, Russian and
Allied, to the ground.

Revolution of March igij

The first news of the St. Petersburg food riots received by the Imperial
Headquarters at Moghilev did not alarm anybody. The Tzar left the
authorities in St. Petersburg to deal with the situation. The following
days, however, brought more alarming information; Rodzianko, Presi
dent of the Duma, informed General Alexeyev that anarchy was gaining
ground and that only the appointment of a responsible Cabinet could
pacify the country. The Grand Duke Michael (brother of the Tzar) and
Prince Galitzine, Prime Minister, telegraphed to the same effect. In
fact only one alternative presented itself that of using force to crush
the movement. But the troops in the capital were unreliable. They con
sisted of raw recruits, and a large proportion were mobilized workmen
from the capital's factories; the latter were known to hold revolutionary
sympathies.

The Tzar, although loath to yield to the popular demand for a re
sponsible Cabinet, yet adopted no measures to crush the revolt, then
confined to the capital. Under these conditions the Government, and
the military and civil authorities in St. Petersburg, soon found them
selves unequal to the task of keeping order. The mob was left to its
own devices. Until the evening of the mh, the Duma .hesitated to break
with the falling regime and merely formed an Emergency Committee,
composed of several Liberals and Conservatives, and one Socialist
(Kerensky) to watch over the situation.

Simultaneously with the formation of the Duma's Emergency Com
mittee, a Soviet (Council) of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was
formed. Tcheidze, a Socialist Democrat and a member of the Duma,
was elected its chairman; the Soviet peremptorily demanded the
Emperor's abdication.

On March Ijth, when concessions and wise measures might have still
saved the situation, the Tzar left G. H. Q. for Tzarskoe Selo (a suburban
Imperial residence) thus cutting himself off from contact with events.
No definite instructions were given to General Alexeyev, who tem
porarily assumed command.

The Tzar was unable to reach his destination. On the I4th he arrived
at Pskov, the Headquarters of General Ruzsky (commander of the
Northern Front). Here he was met by two representatives of the Duma
Committee. These explained the situation in the capital, informed him
that the Duma had assumed supreme authority on the i^th and
demanded his abdication. The Tzar, with no one to advise him, and
anxious for the fate of his country, capitulated; he abdicated in favour
of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael, and appointed Prince Lvov
(President of the Union of Zemstvos) Prime Minister and the Grand
Duke Nicholas Commander-in-Chief. He was then taken to Tzarskoe
Selo, virtually a prisoner.

60 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

The Tzar's abdication was the final signal for the complete collapse
of the regime. It is a tragic fact that on the day of his fall Nicholas II
found himself friendless and without supporters. His relatives, ministers,
generals, administrators and courtiers, with very few exceptions, had
yielded to the Revolution even before his abdication. Russia accepted
the event as marking the decadence of the age-old principle of Imperial
Power; the refusal of the Grand Duke Michael to accept the Crown
finally shattered the people's deep-rooted faith in the Monarchy. . . .

This sudden acceptance of the Revolution by Russia should not be
ascribed to any feeling of disloyalty, especially on the part of those who
were closely allied to the regime. Disillusionment ran high as the con
sequence of truly startling mismanagement, which had proved the whole
administration to be hesitating and incapable. Nor would it be fair to
lay the whole blame on Nicholas II personally. Like Louis XVI he
became the scapegoat for wrongs done before his time, and fell as the
result of events which he neither caused nor controlled.

The fate of the Emperor and his family was a tragic one. Removed
by the Provisional Government to Tobolsk, they were transferred by the
Soviet Government to Ekaterinburg in July 1918. There, on instructions
from Moscow, they were foully murdered on the night of July 18.
During their last months of life, the Imperial family set a fine example
of Christian fortitude and humility. The last of Russia's Autocrats went
to his grave a martyr.

XII
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

THE Provisional Government of Prince Lvov was composed of
members of the Duma, of liberal and even conservative (Monarchist)
opinions. It contained only one Socialist Minister Kerensky, destined
to play so prominent and inglorious a part in the next ten months.

From the very first the new Cabinet was forced to compromise with
the power of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, No such
obligation lay with the Council. A characteristic clash happened on the
very first day of the new regime.

The Provisional Government issued a decree announcing an amnesty
to political prisoners (most of whom had been already liberated by the
revolutionary mob, together with criminals of all descriptions); the
restoration of civic liberties (freedom of speech, assemblies etc.); the
abolition of all class distinctions, privileges and limitations; the conven
ing of a Constituent Assembly at the earliest possible opportunity to
decide upon the form of Government and the new constitution of the
country; and the institution of universal suffrage. In addition, under
pressure from the Soviet, it promised not to send the troops that had
part In the overthrow of the old regime to the Front, abolished the

HISTORY 61

old police and instituted a special Committee to prosecute members of
the former Government and administration. 1 It also proclaimed its
determination to honour Russia's obligations to the Allies and to
continue the war to a victorious end.

The same day the Soviet, without even consulting or informing the
Government, issued its celebrated "order No. I," the instrument re
sponsible for the complete subsequent disintegration of the Russian
army. This established Soldiers' Soviets for every military unit;
abolished the commanders' disciplinary prerogatives; ordered the Soviets
to exercise political control over the commanders; warned the rank and
file to obey no orders, even from the Government, unless sanctioned by
the Soviet; and gave the soldiers a right to demand the dismissal of
any commander.

It was apparent from the very beginning, that the Provisional Gov
ernment had no real authority. If the Soviets did not seize power
immediately, it is because they still were not sure of the troops at the
Front, and were apprehensive of disclosing their real aims for fear that
the more moderate elements of society would organize and crush them.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of St. Petersburg,
consisting of some 2,500 members, elected haphazard from the factories
and military units of the capital, was entirely under Socialist control.
The majority consisted of Socialist Revolutionaries; next came the
Socialist Democrats, a divided party: the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks
the former led by Lenin and Trotzky, who had arrived from abroad
with German connivance. The Bolsheviks were in so hopeless a minority
that during the first few months after the Revolution their presence
aroused no uneasiness in official or political circles. But they soon
became, owing to their untiring activity and uncompromising policy,
the champions of Soviet authority against that of the Provisional
Government.

Stimulated by St. Petersburg's example, Soviets arose all over the
country, becoming daily more numerous and more powerful.

The Provisional Government will always occupy a lamentable and
undignified place in Russian history. Consisting, with very few excep
tions, of political theorists, it never succeeded in dominating the
situation. Instead of acting, it talked. The few measures which it enacted
passed unnoticed among the flood of proclamations, speeches, and elo
quent appeals to the people which it poured forth. To a nation
accustomed to an autocratic Government all this spoke eloquently of
weakness and very soon the masses went completely out of hand.

It must be said in extenuation that the difficulties facing the Provi
sional Government were very great, and that the domestic troubles
were intensified by the hardships of war. The Government, yielding to
the revolutionary storm, threw away all chance of cooperation with the
servants of the old administration, the corps of officers in particular, on

1 It is curious to note that of the many people examined by the Commission not one was
found guilty.

62 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

the ground that such were suspected of Monarchist sympathies. This
was a grave mistake. The officers' corps, for example, had greatly
changed and was now recruited from all classes of society, the only
qualification for an Army commission being education the greater
majority of the corps remained unflinchingly loyal to the National cause,
in spite of all the indignities they suffered at the hands of the revolu
tionaries. Much the same can be said about the civil services.

In the course of time the Provisional Government underwent a series
of purges, the bourgeois members being gradually replaced by Socialists.
Prince Lvov, a man of no real ability, very soon retired from active
politics and was replaced by Kerensky. Unfortunately, Kerensky,
although posing as a revolutionary leader, was no more than a puppet,
completely at the mercy of events. His plans of a democratic reorganiza
tion of the army, and a general Russian offensive that would establish
the Government's prestige, failed miserably. The lamentable result of
the "Kerensky offensive" in Galicia (July 1917), and the subsequent
rout of the Russian forces on every sector of the Front, exhausted the
hope and courage even of those who had hitherto kept a stout heart in
the thick of the storm.

The ever-increasing power of the Soviets was clearly demonstrated at
their first Congress (July 1917). * This took place in the teeth of the
Government's opposition for the elections for the Constituent Assembly
were impending. The Government rightly feared that the latter's pre
rogatives would be usurped, but it was not strong enough to forbid the
Congress, which as a demonstration was entirely successful The
Soviets in the eyes of the nation became the fountain-head of revolu
tionary activity and inspiration.

It is true that the Government succeeded (August ist) in suppressing
a Bolshevik rising in St. Petersburg, and that after the Galician disaster
it attempted to reinstate discipline into the army and to stem the flood
of Bolshevik propaganda at the Front. The reintroduction, for this
purpose, of capital punishment produced an immense impression, and
the High Command saw its authority, for a few weeks, actually upheld
by the Government A new Commander-in-Chief General Kornilov
was appointed with exceptional powers in military matters and with the
Government's authority to reestablish discipline at all costs.

Unfortunately Kerensky whom Russia had aptly nicknamed the
"Persuader-General" soon became fearful of Kornilov's growing popu
larity, which manifested itself clearly at an all-party conference at
Moscow in August 1917, where the Commander-in-Chief 3 appeal for
measures of greater severity and a firmer regime produced a great
impression. From that day on Kerensky started the complicated game
of playing off the Soviets against Kornilov, and the latter against the
Soviets. Things came to a head, when Kornilov attempted and failed
(September 1917) to suppress the Soviets and set up a military dic-

1 Of some 600 members, 105 were Bolsheviks.

HISTORY 63

tatorship in St. Petersburg. It is said that Kerensky originally agreed
to the plan, but withdrew his consent at the crucial moment. General
Krymov, who was in command of the troops to be used for the seizure
of the capital, committed suicide; Kornilov and his immediate colleagues
were arrested; and Kerensky appointed himself Commander-in-Chief.

Whether Kerensky double-crossed Kornilov or not, his position with
the Soviets was not improved. The Bolsheviks, the real power behind
the Soviets, made capital of the incident, which was the last effort on
the part of the forces of law and order to turn the tide of the approach
ing social upheaval and as a result the Government lost any prestige
it still possessed.

Meanwhile, the disintegration of the army continued with alarming
rapidity (there were over 1,000,000 deserters in September 1917); the
financial position of the country was catastrophic, prices had risen
enormously; supplies were running short; transport was utterly dis
organized; the peasants, forestalling the legal expropriation of private
estates, were dividing land and destroying property; and industry was
becoming paralyzed by the complete collapse of labour discipline.

It was in these conditions that the elections for the Constituent
Assembly took place: and, owing to the intrigues of the Soviets who
had, unbidden, taken charge of proceedings they gave a tremendous
majority to the Socialist parties (the Bolsheviks still being inferior to
any other Socialist group). The first meeting of the Assembly was
appointed for December 12, 1917.

In view of this the Bolsheviks called a second Congress of Soviets for
November 7 and prepared for a coup d'etat on that date. This time
their plans entirely succeeded.

With incomprehensible blindness Kerensky allowed the Bolsheviks to
prepare their blow unmolested. On November 7th 1 pro-Bolshevik troops
in St. Petersburg occupied public buildings and put up posters proclaim
ing immediate negotiations for peace, expropriation of private estates,
control of industry by the workers,, and the establishment of a Soviet
system of Government.

Too late, Kerensky decided to act or rather to speak about the
necessity for action. He then fled from St. Petersburg on the plea of
collecting troops for use against the rebels, leaving his colleagues to
resist as well as they could. As the garrison had gone over to the Bol
sheviks, and the only loyal troops at the disposal of the Government
were feeble detachments from the Military schools, there was practically
no resistance. The members of the Government ran for cover and Lenin,
returned from Finland (where he had been hiding since the abortive
rising of August 1st), became President of the Council of People's
Commissars.

The Soviet era dawned over Russia,

1 October 25th old style.

64 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

XIII
THE COMMUNISTS IN POWER

The Constituent Assembly

DESPITE many portents, the Bolshevik Revolution came on the whole
as a complete surprise to Russia. The country regarded the October *
events as a mere episode. It is safe to say that the Communists them
selves, with the doubtful exception of Lenin, did not imagine their luck
could last.

But everything conspired to favour the new Government and its
allies. The agents of the Provisional Government offered no resistance,
either in the capital or the provinces; the army at the Front, faced by
a foreign foe, could not intervene and was, in fact, being fast disin
tegrated by propaganda; while the workmen, the reserve troops and
the peasantry showed, on the whole, sympathy with the new regime
whose slogan "peace and land" and promises of far-fetching Socialist
reforms did a lot to attract popularity. Moscow alone stood out against
the usurpers; and its streets for over a week resembled battlefields,
However, the Reds triumphed.

But even now the new rulers could not feel secure; it must be noted
that the Constituent Assembly elections had already taken place, and
had given an overwhelming majority to the Social-Revolutionaries and
the Mensheviks. The Communists had no illusions as to their fate in
the event of the Constituent Assembly establishing its authority over
the country; and in this they did no more than share the country's
own conviction.

The Assembly, however, proved a clay-footed idol On January 18,
1918, after a single sitting it was dispersed without resistance at the
order of the Government.

This was a terrible blow to the more moderate parties. The Bolshevik
slogan of "peace and land" exactly met the aspirations of the peasantry;
they had had enough of fighting and deserted in huge numbers, hurrying
home to be in time for the promised division of land. The workers were
openly in sympathy with the Bolsheviks. This left the intelligentsia and
property-owning classes alone in the field against Bolshevism.

The Civil War that broke out in 1918 was not occasioned by any
indignation on the account of the Reds' high-handed action; it was the
result of two factors that had little in common the aversion of the
intellectuals (the officers in particular) to Bolshevism, and the forces of
national separatism. The vacillating policy pursued by the Provisional
Government since March 1917, had greatly loosened the links uniting

1 The Revolution took place on. October 2$, 1917 old style (according to the Greek
calendar) corresponding to November 7th. The term "October Revolution" has become
synonymous with the Bolshevik Revolution, in spite of the change of calendar effected by
the Communists.

HISTORY 65

the country into one body: separatism was making headway in the
Ukraine and the Cossack lands, to say nothing of those parts of the
Empire inhabited by non-Russians such as Estonia, Latvia, Finland,
etc.

Those who were adverse to the new (Communist) regime could thus
be divided into two very different groups: One comprising the property-
owning classes (who had been deprived of their all by the Bolsheviks),
the officers, the civil servants and all those devoted to the ideals of the
Russian State as constituted before the October Revolution; the other,
the national separatist groups, which desired complete separation from
Russia. It is easy to see that, no matter how antagonistic these two
groups might be to Communism, their aims were absolutely dissociated.
The unity of the Russian State could only be reestablished in one of
two ways: either by a restoration of the Monarchy or by federation.
Neither alternative appealed to the anti-Bolshevik groups; and this
circumstance explains the absence of cooperation in the Civil War which
broke out in many parts of the country, in 1918. It must be noted also,
that the majority of the population the peasantry stood entirely aloof
from the activities of both groups, and remained during the initial stages
of the Civil War absolutely neutral.

During the first three months succeeding the October Revolution, the
anti-Bolshevik movement was chiefly confined to the Ukraine and the
Cossack lands (Don, Kuban, Terek and Orenburg). Whereas, the
Ukraine and the Kuban Cossacks desired independence, the remainder
of the Cossack territories pursued a more complicated policy: they
strove for autonomy (federalism) while at the same time proclaiming
their intention of re-creating a United Russia, freed from Bolshevism.
In addition to this, General Alexeyev, the former Commander-in-Chief
of the Russian Armies, formed in December 1917, a Volunteer Army
on the Don. This Volunteer Army took as its slogan the restoration of
a "united and undivided Russia." It did not aim at restoring the
Monarchy; but neither did it sympathize with the federal scheme en
couraged by the Cossacks. Its ranks were soon filled by demobilized
officers and by volunteers from every class of society, who shared its
ideals.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk

Meanwhile, the peace negotiations with the Austro-Germans at Brest-
Litovsk, initiated by the Communists on Dec. 22, 1917, had been broken
off (Feb. 1 8, 1918) owing to the Ukraine (where a separatist Govern
ment had been formed) having concluded peace without consulting the
St. Petersburg Government. One of the conditions of this peace was that
the Central Empires should occupy the Ukraine in order to safeguard
it from Bolshevik aggression. War broke out, in consequence, between
the Ukraine and Russia; the former was completely defeated; her
capital Kiev fell in February 1918.

The Germans, however, in pursuance of the treaty re-captured Kiev

66 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

on March ist; and two days later peace was concluded between the
Communists and the Central Empires. The Germans halted on the line
Narva, Lake Chud and the Dnieper, although continuing to advance
further east in the Ukraine itself, where they soon reached the banks
of the Don. This advance encouraged the Cossacks to revolt against the
Red regime, and an independent Don Cossack state was proclaimed.

At this time the Volunteer Army of some 4,000 men with two former
Commanders-in-Chief at their head 1 was vainly striving, in alliance
with the local Cossacks, to liberate the Kuban region from the Bol
sheviks. It was ultimately compelled (spring 1918) to retire into the
Don region. But here new complications arose.

German Occupation

The Don had accepted help from the Germans, but the Volunteer
Army refused to have any dealings with them. This precluded any
general movement against the Communists, as the Ukraine was entirely
controlled by the Germans and the Don dependent on their benevolent
neutrality. Until the Armistice of November n, 1918 the Volunteer
Army and the Don and Kuban Cossacks limited their activities to
freeing the Northern Caucasus from the Bolsheviks an objective which
they managed to attain towards the end of the year.

During the summer of 1918, the Germans had also occupied the
Baltic provinces (Latvia and Estonia) and Finland. What did Russia's
allies do in the meanwhile?

The Allies

The collapse of the Russian front and the opening of the Russian
"granary" to the Central Empires was of the gravest concern to the
Allies. It became imperatively necessary to counteract German activity
in Russia; and accordingly British forces were landed at Arkhangelsk
and Murmansk. The British Government also recognized the Volunteer
Army as a belligerent and provided General Denikin (who had suc
ceeded to its command after General Kornilov's death) with ammunition
and supplies.

In addition to this, 40,000 Czechoslovaks (former prisoners of war
in Russia and now on their way to France via Vladivostok) were
organized into an army corps and halted on the Volga, which they
occupied from the Kama to Samara.

This force, however, was badly organized and supine. In its rear and
almost in its sight, the Imperial family imprisoned at Ekaterinburg
(now Sverdlovsk) was butchered (July 1918) under orders from
Moscow. 2 Conjointly with the Czechoslovak troops a new White army
was formed, that of the KOMUCH $ on the Volga. During the autumn

1 General Alexeyev and Kornilov,

a The seat of Government was transferred from St. Petersburg to Moscow early m
spring 1 1918.
8 Abbreviated from the Russian "Committee of the Constituent Assembly."

HISTORY 67

of 1918 Siberia was freed from the Communists, while an Allied force
chiefly Japanese landed at Vladivostok. The Siberian Government
joined hands with the KOMUCH and formed a Directory consisting
mostly of Social Revolutionaries.

Position of the Bolsheviks in Autumn igiS

Towards the autumn of 1918 the position of the Bolsheviks had
become desperate; the German troops in the Ukraine, the Allied forces
at Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Vladivostok and the White Armies on
the Don, in the Caucasus, in Siberia and on the Volga hemmed them
in on all sides. To this must also be added various internal troubles:
risings in Yaroslavl and Moscow (organized by the Social Revolu
tionaries), peasant insurrections, etc.

But the lack of concerted action among their opponents, and the
impossibility of reaching any understanding between the Austro-
Germans and the Allies, gave the Soviet Government time to reinforce
the Red Army, and put ultimately about half a million men into the
field. After the armistice of November n, 1918, too, the Austro-Germans
in Russia became in turn, the victims of revolutionary propaganda.
Their armies melted away and were only partially replaced by Ukrai
nians, Poles, Latvians and Estonians the latter supported by the
Russian Volunteer Army of General Yudenitch.

Campaign of 1919

The Soviet Government now took the offensive and attacking the
Ukraine re-occupied Kiev in January, 1919. Incidentally, the Reds
organized a massacre of the bourgeoisie in Kiev, during which some
n,ooo persons perished. Meanwhile, mixed detachments of French and
Greek troops had been landed in Odessa and the Crimea; but these
were soon driven into the sea by the Red forces.

Beyond the Volga, and in Siberia, the Directory had been superseded
by the Government of Admiral Kolchak, who assumed the title of
Supreme Ruler (Regent) of the Russian State, "until such time as a
freely-elected Constituent Assembly, sitting in Moscow, should deter
mine the political structure of the country." His armies, however, were
soon forced to retire from the Volga to the Urals (Spring 1919).

After seizing Kiev and the Ukraine, the Soviet Government launched
an attack against the Don and soon occupied two-thirds of its territory.
At this moment Denikin's Volunteer Army came to the assistance of
the Don Cossacks. Its offensive proved entirely successful. The Bol
shevik forces were expelled from the Don; and towards the end of the
summer the Whites had reached a line running through Tzaritzin (on
the Volga), Voronezh, Orel, Chernigov, Kiev and Proskurov (on the
Galician border).

The situation on the Eastern front (Admiral Kolchak's) was less
favourable , to the Whites; after a successful advance to the Volga,
Kolchak's armies were defeated by the Reds (under Kamenev,

68 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Tukhachevsky and Frunze) and forced to retreat to the Urals once
more. And as a final blow, an attack by General Yudenitch's Volunteer
Army on St. Petersburg failed at the last moment, when his troops
were on the outskirts of the city itself (September 1919).

Risings in the White Rear

The Red successes in the field were chiefly due to the conditions pre
vailing behind the White lines. The peasants were dissatisfied with the
land policy of the Whites; nor were the Whites able to restore law and
order. Attempts to mobilize the population for the White armies led to
peasant revolts, shortage of food and commodities, and a state of general
chaos. The position was no better in the Red camp; but the Red leaders
governed with a ruthless hand and were entirely united. In the White
camp, union was conspicuous by its absence.

The position of Admiral Kolchak's armies was the worst; the whole
zone of the Siberian Railway was in open revolt in the autumn of 1919
and Kolchak was forced to retreat from the Urals towards Irkutsk.

Moreover, the newly-formed border States Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland showed no inclination to come to terms with
the various White armies, which proclaimed, as their leading principle,
the restoration of a "united and undivided Russia." While, for example,
Yudenitch who depended on the Estonians for supplies, etc. under
took to recognize Estonian independence, Dcnildn and Kolchak did
not. On the other hand, the Cossacks and the Ukrainians were at logger
heads with Denikin; matters eventually culminated in an actual battle
on the Dnieper, between the Ukrainians and the Whites. The latter
were victorious in this strange conflict; but their victory banished all
hope of further Ukrainian support.

Retreat of the White Armies

The stage was now set for the final defeat of the White armies.
Yudenitch retired into Estonia, where his army was disarmed and
disbanded (Spring 1920).

On the Arkhangelsk front, where the British had been, replaced
(August 1919) by a White army under General Miller, the Whites
were forced to retreat to the sea and finally compelled (February 1920)
to abandon their last stronghold in the North.

Kolchak's retreat towards the end of 1919 became a rout. He was
finally surrendered by the Czechoslovaks x to the Revolutionary; Com
mittee of the town of Irkutsk and shot (February 7, 1920). The
remnants of his army retired to Eastern Siberia. Large numbers of his
soldiers perished of cold, others were taken prisoners by the Reds, and
only a small fraction reached the borders of China,

Denikin's Volunteer Army held out longer than the rest, since it was
composed, to a great extent, of former officers who, as fighting material,
proved infinitely superior to the Red levies. However, in March 1920,

1 With the consent of Gen. Janin, the High Commissioner of France in Siberia*

HISTORY 69

the Red Generalissimo Tukhachevsky drove it from the Don into North
Caucasus. This also the Whites were soon forced to evacuate for the
Crimea, abandoning most of their material and a large proportion of
the troops. Only the Crimea remained in White hands. (

The Polish War of 1920

At this moment the Poles, who had hitherto remained inactive,
launched an attack on the Reds and occupied Kiev (May 1920).

General Wrangel, who had replaced General Denikin at the head of
the remnants of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea, also successfully
attacked the Red forces massed against him, and reached the lower
Dnieper and the Don.

The Reds, at this juncture had to devote all their attention to the
Poles; after concentration they counter-attacked and drove Pilsudski's
troops helter-skelter to the gates of Lvov and Warsaw (June 1920).
The Red advance was, however, too precipitate; and the armies of
Tukhachevsky and Budenny found themselves out of touch with their
supply and ammunition bases.

The Polish counter-attack near Warsaw broke through an enemy
entirely deprived of ammunition; and as a result the Reds were forced
to retreat to the Dnieper.

On Sept. 14, 1920 the Reds concluded an armistice with Pilsudski.
This sealed Wrangel's fate in the Crimea. The Reds were now free to
concentrate enormous forces against him; and after the most stubborn
fighting seen in the Civil War, they at last overwhelmed the remnants
of the Volunteer Army. All that was left of it, together with some tens
of thousands of the civil population, who had sought refuge in the
Crimea from all parts of Russia, was evacuated in Russian and Allied
shipping to Constantinople, thence to disperse throughout the world as
homeless refugees.

On November 16, 1920 the last White Russian soldier left his native
soil. This day marks quite definitely the end of the Old Russian state.
The Reds were left sole and undisputed masters of the country.

PHYSICAL SURVEY

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

THE territory of Russia (U.S.S.R.) is the largest continuous expanse of
land under one political Power. It is true that the total area of the
British Empire at the present time is almost double that of the U.S:S,R.;
but the British possessions are spread all over the globe, and comprise
numerous discrete units. The largest of the self-contained territories
owned by Britain are her uninterrupted chain of African possessions
(extending from Egypt to South Africa), and Canada, neither of which
exceeds 10 million sq. klm. in area. 1 As against this, the present U.S*S.R.
territory is a single unit, having an area of 21,636,600 sq. klm. The total
area of the United States (with Alaska and other possessions) is about
6,018,415 sq. klm,

Russia (U.S.S.R.) is watered by rivers which are amongst the
largest,, in the world, e. g. the Volga, Obi, Irtysh, Yenissey, Lena and
Amur. The largest lake on the globe, the Caspian Sea, is Russian, 2 and
has an area of 438,000 sq. klm. The fourth and seventh largest lakes on
the planet are also Russian; viz., the Sea of Aral (68,000 sq, klm.) and
Lake Baikal (35,000 sq. klm.), the largest fresh-water lake in Russia.
The three Russian plains the Russian, West Siberian and Turkestan
represent, if taken together, one of the largest plain areas in the world,
and most decidedly the largest under one Power.

Russia, however, is by no means a flat country. Together with the
largest plains, it possesses some of the highest mountains ia the world.
The peak of Beluchi (in the Altai) reaches a height of 4,800 metres
above sea level. Elbruz in the Caucasus, rises to a height of 5,629 metres.
In the Pamirs and in Russian Tian-Shan, the number of peaks above
5,000 metres runs into two figures. 8

Some of them rise to a height of 7,000 metres, for example Khantengri,
(6,997), Kaufman Peak (now renamed Lenin Peak) in the Zaalai Ridge
(7,144) and Garmo Peak in the Pamirs (7,495). This height is only ex
ceeded by the summits of the Karakorum in the Himalayas which attain
almost 9,000 metres. No others of the world's highest mountains can
rival the above-mentioned heights in Russian Turkestan; for example,

1 1 kilometre equals 0.6214 mile (roughly 0.6 mile).

"With the exception of an insignificant part of the south shore which belongs to Fcrsiu,
8 One metre equals 39.37 in. roughly, 3.25 ft.

H
CL

,. \

-j 1 a

i 1 ^ .;

% 1

PHYSIC

DDDD! :

DDDD

PHYSICAL SURVEY 71

the highest peak in the Andes (Aconcagua) only reaches 7,040 metres.

In spite of the absence of natural boundaries on many of the
frontiers of the U.S.S.R., their general character must be regarded as
advantageous to the Soviet Union. The main fact is, that the material
resources of the U.S.S.R.'s neighbours are inferior to those which it itself
possesses. Thus, the population of the U.S.S.R. is 161 millions as against
100 millions for its western and southern neighbours. The latter are di
vided into 8 States (from Finland to Afghanistan).

The position in the Far East is more complicated. The thinly popu
lated Russian Far East is very difficult to defend against possible aggres
sion by the thickly populated states of Eastern Asia. One of the chief
factors of defense here is the severe climate, and in particular the very
rigorous winter; easily borne by the Russian, it would prove an insur
mountable obstacle to colonization by a people more sensitive to cold.

The physical position of Russia with relation to the sea cannot be
considered satisfactory. Some parts of Russia are further from the sea
than any other places in the world: Semirechie (Kazakstan) is more
than 2,400 klm. distant from the sea. No other country contains points
more than 1,600-1,700 klm. away from the sea.

The sea coast of the U.S.S.R. is, in a political and naval sense, divided
into four separate parts. The maritime communication between the
Black Sea and the Baltic ports is very unfavourable (in war time it may
be impossible) ; neither is the journey from the Baltic to the White and
Arctic Seas an easy one. The route by sea between the above mentioned
waters and those of the Far East is exceptionally difficult. All this has
had a fundamental significance in Russian history. It has weakened
Russia's military position considerably, and has hindered the develop
ment of the Russian seafaring trade.

These conditions can only be partly overcome. The most that can be
done in the circumstances is the establishment of safe maritime com
munication between the White Sea and Russian Far Eastern waters. The
route along the northern shores of Siberia (from the borders of Finland
to the borders of Korea), however, exceeds 25,000 klm. and is not prac
ticable the greater part of the year. The development of ice-breaking, a
practice chiefly created by Russian sailors, might greatly improve mat
ters and establish a regular trade route via the Arctic waters.

This matter was alluded to by Mendeleev in 1906: "If even a tenth
part of that which was lost at Tsushima 1 had been expended in attempt
ing to reach the North Pole, our fleet would probably have arrived in
Vladivostok, avoiding the North Sea and Tsushima; but more than this,
we should have had sailors experienced in the mining of obstacles and
submarine navigation, who would be capable of subjugating both nature
and their enemies by bold and cautious foresight. To further the progress
of our navigation and make it secure and successful, it is necessary, in
my opinion, to make the conquest of the Arctic Ocean our chief aim."

Some countries possessing a divided sea coast have been able to
remedy this without too much trouble; thus the United States by build-

?2 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

ing and securing the control of the Panama Canal have united their
Atlantic and Pacific coasts; Germany by building the Kiel Canal united
the Baltic to the North Sea. No such devices avail Russia. The existing
canal-routes between the Baltic and the White Sea, the Baltic and the
Black and Caspian Seas do not permit the passage of seafaring craft. It
would not be Impossible to create direct communication between the
Baltic and the Arctic waters; but this would be an undertaking on a
colossal scale, necessitating enormous funds and a technical development
which the country does not as yet possess. The project has, however,
been proposed on several occasions in the past and the future may see its
execution.

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

Climate

FROM an orographical point of view the area of Russia consists of:

1. Three low-lying plains (Russian, West Siberian and Turkestan) ;

2. Low mountainous regions separating them from one another (the
Urals, and the hilly region of Kazakstan) ;

3. The low mountainous regions between the Yenissey and the Pacific
Ocean; and

4. The high mountainous regions to the south and east (the Crimea,
Caucasus, the northern ridges of the Pamirs, the Altai and Sayan moun
tains and the hilly regions of the Baikal, the Amur and the Pacific
Coast).

This continuous continental area presents certain climatic peculiarities.
The greater part of it enjoys a definitely continental climate, character
ized by a hot and short summer and a very severe and long winter.
Owing to the hot summer, many comparatively southern forms of life
are to be found to the northward. They occur, for instance, in the so-
called "polar zone": a region where the mean temperature in January is
lower than at the geographical Pole, e. g. in northeastern Yakutia, and in
the basins of the rivers lana, Indigirka and Kolyma. Extremely low
January temperatures are here combined with comparatively warm
summers (the mean temperature in July exceeds +15 C).

Since Russia forms a single continental mass, its climate is uniform
over the greater part of its extent and differs considerably from the
typical climate of either Europe or Asia. The annual rainfall (and snow
fall) over the greater part of Russia, exceeds 300 millimetres; while
there are very few Russian districts where this exceeds 600. In Europe
the average rainfall exceeds 600 millimetres., while in Asia there are
many regions having a rainfall of over 600 millimetres and also many
others with considerably less than 300. An even more characteristic
feature of Russia's climate as opposed to those of Europe and Asia, Is
the great difference between the mean temperatures in the hottest and

PHYSICAL SURVEY 73

coldest months of the year. This difference is on the average 25 C.
while in Yakutia it reaches 65 C. In Europe and Asia, it is exceptional
for this difference to amount to as much as 25 C. Only a few districts
in Russia conform to the European or Asiatic standards in this respect.
They are as follows: the climate of the southern shores of the Crimea is
similar to that of the regions bordering the Aegean Sea and the Sea of
Marmora; that of the lower reaches of North Caucasus closely resembles
the climate of Hungary, Rumania and the middle and lower Danube dis
tricts; the climate of the Caspian and Black Sea littoral differs little from
that of Central China and South Japan; the Murmansk coast has a
climate which may be compared with the Scandinavian countries:
Northern Norway, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands.

Effect on Agriculture

Climatic conditions greatly influence the distribution of vegetation and
soils, and thus determine the character of Russian agriculture.

Russian agricultural economy is faced with a relatively (or even abso
lutely) hot summer, a severe winter and a short vegetation period.
These conditions determine the composition of the crops. Winter wheat
for instance only grows south of the line connecting Riga, Rostov-on-
Don, and the northwest coast of the Caspian Sea. In Eastern Siberia no
winter crops are possible.

The area of Russia may be divided, from north to south, into four
horizontal zones; corresponding to the four basic belts of the tundra,
forest, steppe and desert.

These zones are characterized by the following basic conditions:

Zones

Yearly average
relative humidify
at i p.m.

Monthly average
relative humidity
at i p.m. during
the dryest month
of the year

Mean temperature
for July

Tundra

80% & higher

65% & higher

I4.5C & lower

Forest . ..

. . . 68% 70%

<o% 64.%

n.? C-ig.<C

Steppe

<6%~6?%

1 C% 4.0%

ig.<C-24..<C

Desert

55% & lower

34% & lower

24.5 C & higher

The Zones

The progressive change, from north to south, of the types of vegeta
tion in these zones is due to the gradual decrease in humidity and the
increase in average temperature. The general character of their soil and
vegetation is shown in the following table:

Sub-division of Vegetation Sub-division of Soil

A. The Tundra Morasses

B. The ForeSt . Silicious soil, divided into two sub-

zones;

74 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

C. The Steppes i. The northern (or concealed)

silicious soil.

2. The primary silicious soil.
The following sub-zones of the
"Black soil belt/' (humus) :

I. The Wooded Steppe.

1. Northern (degraded humus),

2. Limestone humus,

3. Heavy humus;

II. The Prairie Steppe.

1. Humus proper,

2. Southern humus;

III. The Wormwood Steppe.

D, The Desert Chestnut humus,

Red and grey soils, sand
and saline deposits.

Each of these sub-divisions has its own forms of cultivation. In the
tundra only cattle-breeding (reindeer farming) can be carried on; no
land cultivation or afforestation is possible.

In the northern sub-zone of the silicious zone (forest) only afforesta
tion is possible. Agriculture in the sense of cultivation of land for regu
lar crops becomes possible in the more southerly parts of the silicious
zone. From here the arable area stretches through the steppe zone. In
the desert zone it becomes again impossible, except under special condi
tions.

The two silicious sub-zones, together with the wooded steppes, form
the belt where cattle-breeding, afforestation and agriculture are all car
ried on. The "black soil belt" (humus) because of its fertility is particu
larly adapted for agriculture.

In the treeless steppes, afforestation is generally impossible.

In the desert regions agriculture, unless accompanied by Irrigation, is
impossible. Two sub-divisions of this zone must be noted: the grassy
desert, and the true desert. In the grassy desert (semi-desert pastures)
cattle breeding is still possible. In the true desert, even this is impossible.

The following table shows, approximately the area of the various
zones :

In millions
of hectares *

I. The basic agricultural and grazing areas within the zones of forest and steppe 400
II. Forests within the basic agricultural area loo

III. Forests in the forest zone of the north 600

IV. The tundra and hilly regions of the north $o

V. Semi-desert grazing land 200

VI. The deserts and mountains of the south 150

, Total '- 2,000

i hectare = 2.7 acres.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 75

The first category includes not only land which is actually cultivated,
(of which there is not more than 150-170 million hectares) and grazing
land, but also such waste land as might be brought under cultivation.
There is comparatively, a great deal of such land, both in the steppes of
the northern part of Kazakstan, and in the forest regions of West, Cen
tral and East Siberia and the Far East in plots that could easily be
cultivated.

Agriculture

Each item of the above table presents a series of problems. The area
under the first heading takes the lead in the agricultural life of the
country, as it includes all the most fertile lands. The majority of these
are to be found in Russia proper, as the arable area of Siberia and the
Far East is considerably smaller in comparison.

As already stated, the basic agricultural area forms part of two geo
graphically different zones the forest and the steppe. In consequence,
different methods of cultivation have to be employed. The cultivation of
root-crops and clover can be undertaken in the forest and at places in
the wooded steppe zones. In the treeless steppes, the cultivation of root-
crops and clover presents many difficulties. Many fertilizers used in
Europe are not suitable here. This zone demands special methods of
farming; and Russian agronomy has been studying such for many
decades.

In the treeless steppe natural conditions favour the cultivation of
cereals exclusively. This requires a comparatively small outlay of capi
tal: crops are sown without manure and, in some cases, local conditions
render the use of fertilizers actually harmful to the crops. Here, success
ful farming depends, to a great extent, on the rational employment of
mechanical methods for the preservation of humidity.

Wheat is the staple crop of the treeless steppe. Further north, rye is
the main cereal. The wheat of the steppes is known for its high quality:
in certain districts it contains over 20% of albumen. In fact all the crops
cultivated in the steppes are very much richer in albumen, sugar and
fats than those grown in countries with a less continental climate. The
same holds good for other crops and their richness in albumen,
sugar, and fats gradually increases towards the centre of the continent.
Proportionately however, the total yield of the harvest (calculated per
unit of the sown area) decreases. When taking into account the lower
proportionate yields of the Russian harvests (as compared with Europe)
it must be noted that this is partly due to natural conditions; e. g. re
moteness from the sea.

Forests

The importance of the Russian forest reserves is quite unique in world
economics. The area of the Russian forests exceeds those of the U.S.A.
and Canada combined. Russian timber is rich in lignine and is regarded
as very good building material. The reserves of timber are extremely

76 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

vast and in some parts of the country have not yet been touched. The
export trade of the Communists, however, has depleted those very con
siderable forest areas which were nearest to transport facilities. Timber
was cut down regardless of measures of afforestation, which are only
now being re-introduced. The principal trade timber is pine, fir, cedar,
oak, aspen and birch.

Cattle Breeding

The grass-desert regions of Turkestan have for many centuries been
the pastures of innumerable herds of cattle owned by the local nomads.
New methods of breeding are now being introduced by the Soviet Gov
ernment in the so-called Sovkhoz farms, in these regions. The conditions
here much resemble those of South America and Australia; the Govern
ment is justified in regarding these regions as the "meat and wool base"
of the U.S.S.R. However, owing to the severity of the climate only the
coarser kinds of wool can be produced here.

Any extensive economic utilization of the tundra gives ample scope
for conjecture. Under present economic conditions both the tundra and
the desert are waste lands 1 which, by their mere existence, act as ob
stacles to economic progress. Reindeer breeding, of course is possible
here; but this industry is at present in its infancy.

Cotton

As regards cotton, in the years immediately preceding the War, there
was -not, in spite of the unusually rapid increase in the cultivation of
cotton both in Turkestan and Transcaucasia, sufficient grown to meet
the needs of Russian industry. Of the half million tons required, nearly
50% was imported. At the present time the area under cotton cultivation
has nearly trebled compared with pre-War times, although the actual
yield has decreased. There is ample scope in these regions for a further
extension of cotton cultivation. It has been estimated that the rivers of
Turkestan alone can irrigate an area of at least twenty million hectares.
American species of cotton are mostly cultivated.

Lately, an attempt has been made to introduce Egyptian cotton in
Tadzhikstan; and quite recently steps have been taken to cultivate
cotton further north in North Caucasus and the south of the Ukraine.

Furs and Game

In conclusion, mention must be made of the abundance of fur-bearing
animals and game, principally to be found in sparsely-populated places
T in the tundra, the virgin forests of the North, and in the grass desert.
Hunting in the steppes (practiced mainly by the nomadic tribes) and
hunting and trapping in the North constitute the principal local means
of livelihood. The North is the main hunting ground; but it cannot be

1 Although even now the rationalization of reindeer breeding in the tundra might give good
results.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 77

said, considering the vastness of the country, that either fur-bearing
animals or game are very plentiful. It has been estimated, for instance,
that during the pre-War years there were killed, in the best game areas
of Russia proper (Arkhangelsk, Vologda and Olonetz) :

bear

Per Hectares

IQOjOOO

fox

14,000

stone-marten . .

..... . . 25,000

hazel lien

blackcock

700

squirrel

160

i ermine . .

2,500

I hare

5^0

i partridere

-?<o

However, these insignificant results as compared with the area do not
prevent hunting and trapping from constituting one of the main features
in the economic life of the North. The part which Russia has played,
and is playing, in the world's fur-market is well known. Before the War
there was no noticeable decline in the Russian pelt market as a whole.
At present, owing to the great pressure brought to bear upon the fur
trade by the Communists for export purposes, the natural resources of
this industry are being rapidly exhausted. This branch of national econ
omy, like many others, requires to be systematically rationalized by the
introduction of longer close-seasons for fur-bearing animals, the estab
lishment of rearing farms and sanctuaries, etc.

Ill

MINERAL RESOURCES
INTRODUCTION

RUSSIA proper is not particularly rich in mineral deposits; such are,
according to contemporary standards, of only secondary value (brown
coal, peat, iron ore, brown schist, spheroid siderites, low grade phos
phorites, small deposits of sulphur pyrites, etc.).

As regards the more valuable mineral resources these are mostly to
be found in the regions lying to the south, southeast and east of Russia
proper and, in a few cases, to the north.

In consequence, it is not difficult to distinguish two elements ^in the
problem of Russian industrialization: the question of emancipating
the central regions from imported foreign raw materials and fuel by
means of a rational utilization of their second-rate natural resources;
and that of establishing a new industry based on the first-class indus
trial resources of the outlying regions.

78 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

A. COAL

Soviet statistics previous to 1931 established the figure of 558,000,-
000,000 tons as the general geological reserves of coal of the U.S.S.R. 1
These reserves, however, might be doubled, or trebled or, perhaps, in
creased tenfold if sufficient supplementary grants were made ^ for de
tailed geological prospecting in certain given districts. The difficulty,
however, is that the time has not yet come for such detailed geological
research work in remote regions where coal has recently been discovered.
In this connection mention should be made of the inaccessibility of the
area between the middle and lower Yenissey, and the middle and lower
.Lena. From data to hand, this area promises to be one of the world's
richest coal fields. There are here, possibly, one to two million square
kilometres of coal fields, at present almost uninhabited and unexplored.

Central Siberia

In the seventies the well known Siberian explorer, A. Chekanov, in
vestigated the coal deposits found at intervals along the Lower Tung-
uzka, a tributary of the Yenissey (outcrops of coal are to be found for
about 2,000 klm. along the banks of this river). In 1895 extensive coal
deposits were discovered on the middle Angara. At present no doubt
exists that these deposits, although separated from each other by many
hundreds of kilometres, all belong to the same great coal basin. This
coal field, the Tunguz basin, owing to the enormous extent of its seams,
occupies the first place in the world for size (its area is at least one
million square kilometres). At all points (as yet few in number) where
investigations have been carried out, coal seams of considerable com
mercial value (up to 6 m. in thickness) have been discovered. The total
reserves are estimated, according to the data at present obtained (1931)
at tens of millions of tons. In the earlier estimates of the coal resources
of the U.S.S.R. this coal basin was credited with only 66 million tons.

In the east, and in the basin of the Viluy (a tributary of the Lena)
and the Markha the Tunguz basin approaches the Yakut coal basin.
Outcrops of coal, extending for several hundred kilometres, are to be
found on the banks of both these rivers. The total area of this basin may
be estimated at several hundred thousand square kilometres. The best
known coal fields are at Zhigansk. Here, on the banks of the Lena, south
of Zhigansk, are situated eleven seams about one metre m thickness.
This coal, containing but little sulphur and leaving a comparatively
small residue of ash, is very suitable for furnaces.

At present there is no reliable information as to the extent of these
coal fields further north in the basins of the rivers lana, Kolyma and
Indigirka. But the reserves of the Yenissey and Lena coal-basins (the

1 According to statistics published in 1913, the U.S.A. coal reserves were computed at
3,839,000,000,000 tons, those of Canada at 1,235,000,000,000 and those of China at 997,-
000,000,000.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 79

Tunguz and Yakut basins) make it possible to affirm that the coal re
serves of the U.S.S.R. are second to none in the world.

This coal zone extends further south and is bounded in the east by
Lake Baikal and on the west by the upper Obi. Between Lake Baikal
and Nizhneudinsk, the Siberian railway runs through the coal fields of
the so-called Yakutsk basin. Its area is about 25,000 square kilometres.
The seams lie near the surface; and in some places open workings are
possible.

The quality of the coal varies considerably, from brown coal upwards.
Its thermal capacity is 6,000-6,500 calories. The general reserves of this
coal basin have been variously estimated at from 50 to 150 billion tons.
In any case, the Yakutsk coal basin is one of the largest in the world,
although it cannot pretend to be one of the richest.

To the west of the Yenissey the Siberian railway runs through the
Kansk and Krasnoyarsk-Achinsk coal basins (brown coal). The area of
these basins covers some 750,000 sq. kilometres and the reserves are
estimated at several billion tons.

To the southwest of Achinsk, again quite close to the Siberian railway,
another brown coal basin is situated, called the Chulym-Urup. This
basin occupies an area more than 15,000 klm. Borings executed at one
point of the basin disclosed a 3.6 metre seam of coal at 57 m. below
the surface, and one of 5.7 metres at 93 m. The resources of the region
have not yet been estimated. These three basins, taken together, surpass
any other brown coal field in the world except the North American.

Kuznetzk

Two hundred kilometres west from Achinsk lies the Kuznetzk coal-
basin.

The reserves of the Kuznetzk basin are fairly well known. According
to the most recent information, they amount to about 400,000,000,000
tons. 1 The seams lie some 200 m. below the surface, and some are as
much as 15 m. thick. The average calorific value is approximately 7,500
calories; but some varieties of the coal give 8,000 calories. The basin
possesses coal of every type, from "light" (containing 12% of volatile
substances) to cokesing and "heavy gas" coal (up to 40%). In 1929,
deposits of sapropelitic coal were discovered in the northern part of the
basin. This coal yields up to 65% of coal-tar; this enables it to be very
profitably converted into liquid fuel.

There is no doubt that the region between Irkutsk and Tomsk (sit
uated on the northern fringe of the Kuznetzk basin, the so-called Sud-
zhensk basin) is one of the richest in coal to be found anywhere in the
world. In the varieties of coal present, it surpasses the richest coal fields
of Europe. The extent of its reserves of coal undoubtedly surpass all
others in the U.S.S.R.

The exceptional richness of this area is enhanced by the fact that

* According to some estimates, the reserves of the Kuznetzk coal fields amount to 1,000,-
000,000,000 tons ("JPravda" August 26, 1931).

8o RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

immediately to the north of it (at about 100 klm. distance) is the south
ern fringe of the splendid Tunguz basin (see above), while immediately
southward of it lies the Minussinsk coal field. This is situated on the
Yenissey, several hundred klm. above Krasnoyarsk, and has an area of
650 square kilometres. The total thickness of the working strata is about
50 metres, and the calorific value of the coal is 7,000 calories. Its re
serves were estimated, in 1915, at several tens of millions of tons. In the
early twenties of this century this estimate rose to 6,000,000,000 tons,
and at the present time investigators suggest the figure of 14,000,000,000
tons. (1931.)

Transbaikalia

As compared with such richness the scarcity of coal in the territory
lying to the east and west of this region is striking.

To the east which, at present, plays only a secondary part in the eco
nomic life of the US.S.R. the Transbaikal Railway, runs through coal
.fields; but these are not of any great importance; they have very little
horizontal extension, and consist of small isolated and self-contained
basins. The coal is exclusively brown, and its calorific value varies from
4,500 to 6,000 calories. The total reserves of brown coal in Transbaikalia
were estimated, in the early twenties, at 200,000,000 tons; but they are
now put at 300,000,000. Owing to the lack of mineral fuel in Transbai
kalia, these coal basins have been, and are being, worked fairly
thoroughly.

Amur

The Amur Railway runs through coal fields which are even less im
portant. It touches, however, an extensive brown-coal basin in the region
where the Bureia river falls into the Amur. As early as 1911 the coal
reserves of part of this area were estimated at 187,000,000 tons.

Vladivostok is surrounded by coal fields, producing both black and
brown coal. This coal is, generally, remarkable for its high calorific value
(7,000-8,000 calories). Some of the smaller coal fields are already being
worked. The reserves of these coal fields are estimated at about 50,000,-
ooo tons.

Sakhalin

The coal fields of Sakhalin are more important. In the northern (Rus
sian) half of this island in some parts the coal strata are to be found at
the surface; in others, they lie deep, but coal is to be found all over the
island and a continuous line of coal fields is situated all along the west
ern shore of the Russian portion. All these coal fields can be worked by
galleries straight from the seashore. Its calorific value is from 8,000 to
9,000 calories; the quality varies considerably. The resources of Russian
Sakhalin are at present estimated at several billions of tons. Nature
herself seems to have intended Sakhalin to become a great coaling sta
tion. The export of Sakhalin coal may prove of importance not oaly to

PHYSICAL SURVEY 81

the Russian Far East but also to other parts of the Pacific seaboard
which are poor in coal. Hitherto, however, the absence of natural har
bours on the western shore of the island has impeded the development
of its coal industry.

To the west of the meridian of the Upper Obi stretches the area of the
three plains: Turkestan, West Siberia and Russia proper. This area is
very scantily provided with coal. The contrast between it and the rich
coal fields to the east of the upper Obi and Yenissey is very remarkable.

Russia Proper

In the whole of this wide extent only three coal-basins (and those not
particularly important) have, so far, been located. One of these, the
Don, has long been known; and has for many decades, played an im
portant part in Russian national economy; the second, the Karaganda,
has only been worked since 1930; and the importance of the third, the
Pechora, is at present problematical. The Moscow and Ural coal fields
are of second-rate quality. In other parts of the area, only very small
coal fields are to be found.

Pechora

Prospecting carried out between 1923-1925 discovered in the region
included between the tributaries of the right bank of the upper and
middle Pechora, "an enormous coal basin." In this basin three coal strata
have already been explored. The thickness of the seams is up to 8
metres, and the calorific value (according to samples) from 4,000 to
5,500 calories. These samples were taken from outcrops of the seams;
the coal from the deep seams is expected to be of better quality and
higher in calorific value. The area of these deposits is approximately
40,000 sq. klm. The Pechora basin has not, so far, played a part in the
industrial development of the U.S.S.R., and its reserves have so far not
been estimated. 1

Don

This basin, situated to the north of the Sea of Azov and the lower
Don, occupies an area of 22,760 sq. klm. From 30 to 40 seams are
worked. Production is hindered by the fact that most of the seams are
not very rich; another unfavourable circumstance is that the seams of
coal are separated, in the majority of cases, by considerable strata of
barren soil. The coal of the basin exhibits great variety in its quality
and chemical composition, every conceivable species of coal being repre
sented. Generally speaking, the quality of the Don coal is high, its
calorific value being about. 7,000 calories. The Don basin cannot be re
garded as producing really first-class mineral fuel, in the usual sense of
the term. Don coke, although quite suitable for blast smelting, is in
ferior to that used in England and Germany, for it contains a much

1 See article on Industry.

82 RUSSIA/U-S.S.R.

larger proportion of sulphur and other residue. In order that, during
smelting, the sulphur may not mix with the iron it is necessary to add a
great deal of limestone in the furnace; and, in order to melt this, yet
more coke must be added. Hence, the total expenditure of coke per ton
of iron smelted is abnormally large, and the cost of production corre
spondingly increased. t .

In 1913 the general reserve of coal in the Don basin was estimated at
56 000,000,000 tons. This estimate did not include the coal of the extreme
western part of the basin, the so-called Grishin region. At present, in
the light of supplementary information obtained during the last eighteen
years, the resources of the Don basin may be estimated at some 70,000,-
000,000 tons. In addition, there are also the untapped resources of the
western and northern borders of the basin, where the coal deposits are
covered by various thick strata of chalk and tertiary formations.

Karaganda

During the last two years it has been ascertained that the part of the
steppe zone beyond the Urals also possessed a coal field, the Karaganda
basin, equal, or possibly even superior to that of the Don. Its importance
was only realized after a survey made in 1930 and I93 1 - 1 I* 1 onl 7 a P art
of this basin, reserves of 15,000,000,000 tons have been discovered, and
thirty workable seams located. Their average thickness is about 2.5 m.,
but some range up to 8 m. The calorific value of the coal is more than
7,000 calories.

These discoveries have revolutionized the whole problem of supplying
coal to Turkestan, the plains of West Siberia and the adjoining countries.
So far as is known, both the mountains of Turkestan and the Caucasus
are comparatively poor in hard mineral fuel. Among those of Turkestan
three of some value are situated in Ferghana, the Narin, Shurab and
Kizil-Kiga coal fields, of which the first is situated north, and the second
and third south of the Ferghana valley. Among the Caucasian coal fields
the most important are the Tkvibuli basin near Kutais (western Trans
caucasia) and the Tkvarcheli on the shores of the Black Sea, 30 klm.
from the coast town of Ochemchiri (the estimated reserves of this basin
are 100-150 million tons).

The Mangishlak coal field on the eastern shore of the Caspian, is more
important. Its outcrops cover 400 sq. klm. and there are seams of over
i metre in thickness. The calorific value of the coal is about 5,000 calories.

Moscow

One of the main factors which have hitherto hampered the develop
ment of Russian industry is the very second rate quality of the coal pro
duced in the Moscow district and the Urals.

The majority of Moscow coal is of very low calorific value (from 3,000

1 Previously only one important coal basin the Ekibastus with reserves of coal estimated
at 500,000 tons was known. It ia situated on the left bank of the Irtyah river, in the environs
of Pavlodar,

PHYSICAL SURVEY 83

to 3,300 calories). This coal will not yield coke; furthermore, owing to
the amount of water it contains, it deteriorates rapidly if exposed to the
air, while it is also liable to ignite spontaneously; consequently, It cannot
stand either prolonged transport or exposure to the air. In these circum
stances, it is principally used as fuel for electric power stations or
burned for the sake of the by-products. The character of the coal seams,
too, presents certain obstacles to the economical working of the mines.
The coal of the Moscow district is seldom found in continuous horizontal
seams it occurs chiefly in "pockets." It may be noted also that the
aggregate coal-reserves of this area are now estimated at 6,000,000,000
tons.

The Urals

As regards the coal of the Urals, this is found in two parallel belts,
one on either side of the mountain ridge. On the western slopes the belt
is of comparatively small extent, stretching parallel with, and about 100-
120 klms. east of the Kama river between Solikamsk and Perm (Kis-
selev basin). 1 On the eastern slope coal of various kinds is to be met
with in many places. Many of these coal fields, however, could not be
profitably worked, their extent being both limited and uncertain: but
this does not apply to the brown coal of the Cheliabinsk basin (on the
border of the Urals and Siberia) which is of more importance.

The thickness of the seams is considerable (e.g. in the Cheliabinsk
basin there are some seams 7 metres thick). The anthracite coal of the
eastern slope has a calorific value of about 8,000 calories, whereas that of
the Cheliabinsk brown coal is approximately 6,000.

Within the last few years, the total coal-reserves of the Kisselev and
Cheliabinsk basins have been approximately estimated at 2,000,000,000
tons. This amount, as compared with the other natural and industrial re
sources of the Urals, is insignificant. In addition, some kinds of Kisselev
coal will not yield coke; and for smelting, Kuznetzk coal must be added
to it.

B. IRON

According to returns for 1910, the reserves of iron in Russia proper
were as follows:

Ore

Equivalent of Iron content

Ptg~Iron of the Ore

.,.. , N tg~ron o e

""Mont of tons) ( .^ ^.^ QJ /(w) ^ %)

The Urals .................. 282 135 40^-63%

Central Russia .......... 789 3 l6 *o%

South Russia .............. 536 233 4o%-6i%

Caucasus .................... 14 8 $o%-6o%

1 The Pechora coal field is possibly the continuation of this basin to the north.

84 RTJSSIA/U.S.S.R.

As regards central Russia, however, the reserve of iron ore is of small
industrial value owing to the wide distribution of the ore, the scanty
character of the deposits, and its low iron content.

In the south, the most important iron fields are those of Krivoy Rog
(62% contents of iron) and of Kerch (40%). In 1910 the former was
estimated to have an ore-reserve of 86,000,000 tons, and the latter one
of 450,000,000 tons.

In 1910, the corresponding figures for Asiatic Russia were insignif
icant. They are subjoined.

Ore Smelted Iron

(in millions of tons) {in millions of tons)

The Kirghiz Steppe 7 4-2

Eastern Siberia *4 7

The Far East 6 3

Prospecting between 1910 and 1916 increased the estimated ore re
serves of the Urals by 50% (to approximately 400,000,000^ tons), and
discoveries were made which profoundly affected the Siberian iron in
dustry. In the Telbes iron field, situated directly south of the Kuznetzk
coal basin, prospecting carried out in 1914 and 1915 by the Kuznetzk
Coal Mining Company showed a definite reserve of 1 1,000,000 tons and
a probable further reserve of 16,000,000, totaling some 27,000,000 tons.
Prospecting was continued in 1916 and additional large fields of high
grade iron ore (60 to 63^) discovered.

Recent geological researches (1931 and 1932) have had similar good
results. "New and great horizons have been opened with regard to the
ore-base of the Kuznetzk mining region in connection with the new dis
coveries made by the geological expeditions. According to preliminary
calculations the reserves in the basin of the river Tomi are estimated at
not less than 150,000,000 tons of high-grade ore, containing more than
60% of iron." 1 Further research estimates these reserves at 200,000,000
tons. These investigations have therefore increased eight-fold the figures
given for the reserves of iron ore in the region lying south of the
Kuznetzk basin.

"The importance of these discoveries is enhanced by the fact that dur
ing 1931 enormous deposits of iron ore have also been discovered in
East Siberia. The research work of a single summer sufiiced to show that
the total resources of iron ore in East Siberia were something like
500,000,000 tons. The existence of several great concentrations of iron-
ore deposits was confirmed. One of these, Sosnovy Baetz, (with re
serves amounting to nearly 120,000,000 tons of ore) lies on the south
ern fringe of the Yakutsk coal basin; and another several hundred
kilometres to the north of the first, in the basin of the river Him on the
southern boundary of the Tunguz coal basin. Here the Korshunov ore

1 "Pravda" September 2, 1931.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 85

field holds not less than 111,000,000 tons. The total reserves of the ore
fields of the Him and the neighbouring basin of the Angara river amount
to some 200,000,000 tons or so." 1

The discovery of first-class iron ore reserves in the southern portion
of the Kuznetzk coal field and in the basin of the Angara is of extreme
interest to any student of the natural industrial resources of the U.S.S.R.
It has already been stated how very rich, judging by world standards, is
the coal area between the upper Obi and Lake Baikal It has now been
found that this is equally rich in first class iron ores. Whereas the Krivoy
Rog ores have to be transported 480 kilometres to the Don basin, here,
the corresponding distance is only 60-100 kilometres; and the Kuznetzk
coke Is undoubtedly better than that of the Don.

The Urals

The reserves of iron ore in the Urals were estimated, in the first half
of 1930 at not less than 1,000,000,000 tons. An estimate of the iron ore
reserves of the Orsk region (In the southern Urals) drawn up within the
last few months, radically modifies the former calculations. The results
of investigations in 1932 have surpassed all expectations. In the area in
vestigated, alone, the reserves of iron ore amount to 400,000,000 tons and
those of Magnitogorsk to 300,000,000. The ore contains, on an aver
age, 40% of iron. Hematite, containing 60% and more of iron, has also
been found in this region. The reserves of the hematite in one district
alone amount to about 30,000,000 tons. Outcrops of magnetic hematite
containing 70% of iron, have also been found.

These discoveries increase the known reserves of Iron ore in the Urals
by about 50%, from 1,000,000,000 to 1,500,000,000 tons.

South Russia

New ore deposits have been discovered in the Khoper area. 2 Investi
gations carried out in 19291930 have confirmed the existence here of
reserves of phosphorite ore totalling some 130,000,000 tons.

During the last few years more has also been learned about the well-
known Kerch and Krivoy Rog ore fields. The reserves of Kerch esti
mated in 1910 to be 450,000,000 tons, are now put at more than 2,000,-
000,000 tons. In the Krivoy Rog, they were estimated at 260,000,000
tons in 1916, and in 1929 at 466,000,000 tons. Further surveys in the dis
trict have now raised the figure to about 800,000,000 tons.

C. WATER-POWER

As with coal and iron, the water-power of the U.S.S.R. is chiefly to
be obtained in places remote from the centre (Russia-proper) in the
northwest, south and east The Leningrad area, which is poorly endowed

1 "Pravda" September 2, 1931.

2 The Khoper is a tributary of the Don.

86 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

with other resources, has been richly provided by nature with facilities
for obtaining hydro-electric power. It is surrounded on all sides by con
siderable concentrations of water-power: the Ivanov rapids on the Neva,
the rivers Svir, Volkhov, Narova, etc.

Total Reserves

The total reserves of water-power in the U.S.S.R. have been estimated
at 41,300,000 h.p., 1 and by another expert at 64,800,000. These estimates
however, cannot be regarded as final. Thus, for instance, the Kuznetzk
and Altai regions were credited, with some 4,000,000 h.p., but more
recent calculations have increased this to 20,600,000.

To the economist, however, the most important fact is that, so far no
attempt has been made to exploit the great majority of these resources.

Principal Sources of Water-Power

The main sources of water-power (16,000,000 h.p.) are in the Cau
casus.

Another noteworthy region is the basin of the Dnieper with 1,100,000
h.p. Of this, 820,000 h.p. will shortly be utilized by means of the great
hydro-electric power station, The Dnieprostroy, planned for completion
in 1932. Reserves of over 2,000,000 h.p. are also available in the Lenin
grad-Arkhangelsk area. 2

According to calculation, the possible efficiency of the hydro-electric
installations, per sq. klm. of surface, in the various areas is as follows:
(in h.p.)

The Lena-Baikal area 6.0

The Kuznetzk-Altai area 6.8

The Turkestan area 7.3

The Caucasian area 35.9

The Dnieper area 5.2

The Northwest area 4.8

Water-Power in the Central Regions

All these areas surround the enormous territory of Central Russia and
the lands bordering upon it, a territory whose water-power is incon
siderable both actually and by comparison. This circumstance may
partly be explained by the flat nature of the Russian plain: but it is
somewhat remarkable that this comparative lack of water-power should
be shared by the neighbouring low hilly regions e. g, the Urals and the
hilly country of Kazakstan. In these areas, the available water-power is
estimated to be as follows:

1 I. Moskovitinov, "The Water-Power of Russia," Leningrad, 1923.

a A part of this is utilized by the Volkkovsfroy, a hydro-electric station on the Volkhov river.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 87

Area

Total available
water-power
{in thousand h.p.)

H.P. ffuaila
per sq. klnt.
surface

lie
of

Northeast

I 4.OO

1.5

Western

i on

I.I

Central

) et

I.I

Viatka-Vetlu,g-a

240

1.2

Central Volga 1

330

1.4

Ural

<OO

O.7

Southwestern.

?2<

I.I

Central Black Soil

270

2.3

Southeastern

370

I.I

West Kirghiz

9OO

1.0

East Kirghiz

I, IOO

i*3

Obi

I, IOO

0.6

1 Here the building of a hydro-electric station has been in progress for several years. Its
completion has been put off several times owing to the deficiency of the original plans.

These data show very clearly the poverty in water-power (especially
per sq. klm. of surface) of the Russian and West Siberian plains, and
the neighbouring regions.

D. OIL

General Reserves

Professor Ramsin of the "engineers' trial" fame, a well known fuel
expert, estimated in the middle twenties, the total reserves of oil in the
U.S.S.R. at 2,874,000,000 tons. In the conditions prevailing at that time
this credited the U.S.S.R. with 37% of the world's total reserves. Pro
fessor Strizhov, another fuel expert, considered that this proportion
should be estimated at at least 45%.

It is interesting to note, that, several years before Ramsin, an eminent
Russian expert on oil-fields, D. Golubiatnikov, estimated the reserves of
Russian oil at a far more modest figure 1,137,000,000 tons. This figure
was obtained by adding the computed reserves of the separate old oil
fields, as follows:

mill, fans

Baku (Apsheron Peninsula and Sviatoy Island) 933

Emba (N. E. Shores of the Caspian) *7

Grozny (N. E. Caucasus) 9$

Maikop (N. W. Caucasus) *

This estimate is by far the most authoritative so far as it concerns the
Baku region, particularly since its author has an intimate knowledge of
that oil field.

New Prospecting

In the Maikop region D. V. Golubiatnikov estimated the reserves of
oil at about 1,000,000 tons; but rich oil-bearing strata have since been
discovered here. It is anticipated that 1,200,000 tons of oil^will have been
obtained during 1932, more than the total reserves listed in the previous

88 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

estimate. By 19333 it is planned to raise the output of Maikop oil to
4,000,000 tons.

It must be noted also that the oil fields which are known to exist in
western Turkmenistan, on the shores of the Caspian, and also in the
plain of Ferghana, do not figure at all in Golubiatnikov's estimates.
Their reserves according to information supplied in 1931 are estimated
at 90,000,000 tons. 1

Broadly speaking, it has been established that the known oil reserves
of the U.S.S.R. vastly exceed (possibly even one hundred-fold) that
country's yearly output of oil (about 25,000,000 tons); and also that
there exist a series of regions known to be oil-bearing, although not yet
thoroughly explored.

The Caucasian Oil-Zone

Along the entire length of the Caucasian range some 1,000 klm. oil
occurs in the form of oil-wells, and frequent gas gushers. The Caucasus
represents only a part of a great oil-bearing zone which continues on the
other side of the Caspian Sea, through the Island Cheleken, Ferghana
and the Salian Steppe to the borders of northern Persia.

The local population has, from time immemorial, obtained oil from
wells sunk in this vast oil bearing zone. During the Russian industrial
"boom" of the late sixties and early seventies of the last century, oil was
obtained, in commercial quantities by means of borings both on the N.
W. slopes of the Caucasian range and on its S. W. slopes, in the Apshe
ron Peninsula. The first of these oil fields has since declined work
ceased there in 1903. The second flourished in the most remarkable
manner becoming, and remaining, the centre of the Russian oil indus
try. During the industrial boom of the nineties the Grozny (now called
the Old Grozny) region in the N. E. Caucasus was worked for the first
time (1893). During the industrial boom of the second decade of the
century, the centre of activity here was spread to the so-called New
Grozny oil fields, lying to the south of the former (1913).

At that epoch also attempts were made to develop the Maikop region
(in N. W. Caucasus), but at the time these attempts were unsuccessful
through lack of capital. There is reason to believe that the Communists
are accomplishing what individual enterprise failed to effect: to found
an important oil industry in the Maikop district. They are also making
efforts to organize oil-production in Georgia, where oil was discovered
in 1869.

Baku's Potentialities

It must, at the same time, be emphasized that the original and existing
oil fields, Baku and Grozny, have not yet, regarding each as a whole,
attained their maximum possible output. It may be pointed out too, that
while the oil fields of the Baku region are being exhausted, the efforts of
geologists discovered, even before the Revolution, that under the whole

'"Pravda" of Nov. 24, 1931,

PHYSICAL SURVEY 89

of the well-known Baku field, and only a little deeper, lies a "new" Baku,
in no way inferior to the other. According to D. V. Golubiatnikov, in
deed, the "new" lower Baku is possibly better than the "old" upper one.
While the lower section is characterized by the more or less continuous
presence of oil, the upper possesses large reserves of oil at three' points
only, at Bibi-Eibat, in the Sabunchin region and at Surakhani. The
lower oil-bearing stratum, with an average thickness of not less than 400
metres, contains 54 oil seams.

Other Oil Fields

The oil fields east of the Caspian and the plain of Ferghana of which
the former was opened up as early as 1870, and the latter at the begin
ning of the twentieth century have, so far, played only a secondary
role in the Russian oil industry. Their extensive reserves, however, make
it quite possible for them to be more fully developed, although they will
scarcely come up to "Baku" standards.

The Caspian-Ural Oil Fields

A very brilliant future, however, is probably in store for the oil-bear
ing region which extends over a vast area (about 80,000 sq. klm.) be
tween the N. E. shore of the Caspian Sea and the southern Urals. The
extreme S. W. oil fields of this zone lie almost on the shores of the Cas
pian, surrounding the estuaries of the Ural and Emba rivers. The one to
the extreme N. E. is situated on the upper reaches of the river Dzhusa
to the north of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway and not far from the
town of Orsk in the southern Urals.

In this area there are more than twenty oil fields, probably of great
commercial value a fact which indeed has already been partly proved
by borings. In three of them, those nearest to the Orenburg-Tashkent
Railway (i. e. the most easterly), deep boring was started during the
last years of the pre-Revolutionary industrial boom. The borings, how
ever, had not yet reached the productive stratum at the outbreak of the
Revolution when the work was discontinued. Further to the S. Whiles
a belt of oil fields (along the middle course of the rivers Uila, Sagizha
and Emba) equidistant from the railway and the Caspian Sea. These
oil fields have as yet not been thoroughly explored although some of
them, judging by borings, are very promising.

Gushers

The number of known oil fields increases towards the Caspian Sea. In
this district is situated (to the south of the lower Emba) the oil fields
where for the first time in this region an oil gush occurred during the
prospecting in 1899. At that time Russian industry was approaching a
crisis, and the discovery was not fully utilized. A second gush occurred
in 1910 at Dos-Sor near Guriev. At 'that time Russian industry was
booming and the event served as the signal for the awakening of the
whole region. The industrial value of this district cannot, however," even

9 o RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

yet be regarded as finally determined notwithstanding that its output
of oil has been maintained for twenty years and has amounted to several
hundred thousand tons annually.

Ural Oil Fields

Surveys carried out during 1931 and 1932 showed that there is another
large oil field lying along the western slopes of the Urals. This oil field
can be divided into three groups: the Ukhta basin, between the rivers
Pechora and Vychegda, the Chussov basin, on the middle Kama, and
the Sterlitamak basin, on the river Belaya. There is no doubt that these
oil fields are very rich in oil and gases, the latter being emitted in
large quantities. Their commercial value, however, cannot be as yet
estimated. The Ukhta basin is very inaccessible and the Chussov only
very superficially explored. The Sterlitamak is undoubtedly the most
promising one, lying close to the northern limits of the Caspian oil fields
(Grozny and Emba). The development of these fields cannot take place
in the near future; they must be regarded as fuel reserves.

Whatever the future results of prospecting, the regions situated along
the southern mountainous borders, from the Caucasus to Ferghana, and
those to the northeast of the Caspian Sea, will, for a long time, continue
to play the principal role in U.S.S.R. oil production. These regions are
well enough equipped for the purpose.

E. LIGHT METALS

Russia Proper and the Urals

Russia proper is extremely poor in light metals; a fact which has had
a marked influence on her history. Some insignificant deposits of copper
and silver in the northern territories were known at an early period; but
these were insufficient to allow of a light metal industry being developed
on a commercial scale.

The situation was radically changed during the eighteenth century,
when great deposits of light metals, particularly copper, were discovered
in the Urals. Mining operations there afforded large quantities of ore
containing from 12% to 20% of copper: and the output of these mines
enabled Russia to assume first place among the world's copper-producing
nations, a position which she held for a very long period.

But by the end of the nineteenth century the old copper mines in the
Urals were almost exhausted; and early in the twentieth they were re
duced to working pyrites containing but 2% to 3% of metal.

The technical success obtained in working this ore stimulated the
search for similar deposits elsewhere; and between 1910 and 1916 such
were discovered, in considerable quantity, between Verkhoturie and
Cheliabinsk (on the eastern slopes of the Urals). In the twenties the
total reserves of copper here were estimated at 1,500,000 tons. Consider
able deposits of silver, lead and, zinc were also discovered in the same

PHYSICAL SURVEY 91

region. Some copper deposits have also been found in the Don basin,
together with others of galena and of zinc-blend.

The Caucasus

The Caucasus is rich in light metals. Silver, lead and zinc abound in
the basin of the river Ardon (N. Caucasus), while large deposits of
copper ore have been located in Transcaucasia.

One of the most important copper-bearing areas here stretches from
Tiflis to the shores of Lake Gokcha. The most important mining centre
is Allaverd, on the railway between Tiflis and Erivan. The ore contains
up to 4% of metal, and its extent is very considerable.

North of Tiflis, on the slopes of Mount Kazbek, another important
copper area has recently been discovered. The reserves of ore here are
estimated at over 500,000 tons, with a metal content of no less than 10%.

There is still another copper area on the southern borders of Trans
caucasia in the environs of the town of Ordubad but this, as yet, has
not been worked.

Turkestan

The results of a recent geological survey of Turkestan (1930-1931)
are of great importance to the U.S.S.R. copper industry. Very consider
able deposits of copper, lead and zinc have been discovered at Kara-
Mazar (Ferghana). This discovery will probably make Turkestan the
light-metal centre for the U.S.S.R.

According to Soviet official data this region will provide -industry with
at least 500,000 tons of metal a year. 1 As a beginning, it is proposed to
erect smelting works here capable of producing 75,000 tons of copper,
150,000 tons of lead, and 125,000 tons of zinc yearly. 2

Kazakstan

Kazakstan, also, is rich in light metals. Before the Revolution the
Spassky works in the Nura basin and the Atbasar works (an English
concern) were obtaining a yield of 10% to 2,0% copper from local ore.
It was considered, at the time, that the reserves in this area were in
significant; but the survey of 1931 discovered very important deposits
of copper ore in the southern part of Kazakstan. Smelting works are
being erected, near Lake Balkash, capable of producing 150,000 tons a
year. Important deposits of silver and lead in the same region are also
being developed. In addition the Atbasar works are being modernized,
and will be rendered capable of producing up to 75,ooo tons of copper
a year.

Altai

The deposits of light metals in the southern Altai are very rich. The
most important light metal centre here is the Ridder area; where, before

lu Pravda." November 13th, 1931.
""Pravda." August 23rd, 1931.

9 2 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

the Revolution, the reserves of metal were estimated at 50,000 tons of
gold, 350,000 tons of silver, 400,000 tons of zinc, 200,000 tons of lead,
and 16,600 tons of copper. A new geological survey is being carried out,
and it is known that, as a result of its work, these estimates will be
greatly increased. However, the precise figures have not yet been
established.

Siberia

The whole of Siberia is very rich in deposits of light metals. Most of
these, however, have scarcely been reconnoitred. The three most im
portant areas here are:

1. The copper ore deposits in the basin of the Yenissey (the Minus-
sinsk and Uriankhay districts);

2. The silver, lead and zinc deposits of Transbaikalia and,

3. The polymetallic region of Sikhota-Alin on the Pacific coast,
(north of Vladivostok).

1. The Minussinsk district is extremely rich in copper pyrites, dis
tributed over a large area between the Siberian Railway (Marinsk)
and the Sayan mountains. The manufacture of copper here dates from
the Bronze Age, the metal being exported eastward to China and^ west
ward as far as Hungary. Before the Revolution, only two insignificant
smelting works existed in this district. At present, the district is being
surveyed with a view to extensive developments.

In 1913 valuable copper deposits were discovered across the Russian-
Chinese border, at Uriankhay. The territory at that time was under a
de facto Russo-Chinese condominium. It is now the Tannu-Tuva
People's Republic, a state completely dominated by Soviet influence.
The copper deposits here are important; but as yet no efforts have been
made to develop them.

2. The silver, lead and zinc deposits of Transbaikalia are located in
the fork between the rivers Shilka and Argun (which join to form the
Amur). These deposits have been worked since the second half of the
eighteenth century, and an important industry was developed here in
the nineteenth. The Soviet Government is surveying the region with a
view to increased production; but as yet no estimates of the reserves
are available.

3. The lead and zinc deposits of Sikhota-Alin differ from those else
where in the U.S.S.R. through their proximity to the sea. Here, before
the Revolution, lead and zinc were exported to Japan and Europe from
the Tetukhe mines it being unprofitable to transport the ore by rail
to Russia, while no smelting works existed locally.

As the result of the 19301931 survey, the U.S.S.R. reserves of light
metals (copper, lead and zinc) have been estimated at some 12,000,000
tons. Further intensive researches are being conducted. In the middle
twenties on the eve of the inauguration of the Five Years Plan the

PHYSICAL SURVEY 93

corresponding estimate was no more than 4,000,000 tons; i. e. 1,000,000
tons of zinc, 1,500,000 tons of lead, and 1,500,000 tons of copper.

F. OTHER MINERALS

The following table gives a general idea of the deposits of other
minerals on the territory of the U.S.S.R. Only those of definite com
mercial value are enumerated.

j. Aluminum

The principal reserves of this metal are located near the town of
Tikhvin to the southward of Leningrad; they are estimated at some
300,000 tons, and the planned yearly production is to be about 20,000
tons.

New deposits have been discovered (1931) in the Khibiny mountains
(Kola Peninsula), believed to be very extensive.

2. Antimony

Deposits of commercial value are located in Transcaucasia, and in
the basin of the Amur (eastern part). Small deposits are also to be
found in the Don basin, and in Ferghana.

j. Arsenic

The most important deposits (those in the province of Kars)^have
been ceded to Turkey by the Soviet Government. Other deposits of
commercial value are to be found in central Caucasus. A certain amount
of arsenic is also produced, as a by-product, in the mercury mines of
Nikitovka (Don basin), and new deposits have been discovered in
northwest Transcaucasia.

4. Asbestos

The reserves of asbestos in the Urals are estimated at several millions
of tons. It is also found in Uriankhay, in the environs of Irkutsk, and
in northern Turkestan.

5. Barium

Almost inexhaustible reserves of this are to be found in western
Transcaucasia; and there are other deposits in the Lake Onega region
and in the Altai mountains.

6. Beryllium

Deposits have been found in Transbaikalia.

7. Bismuth

Deposits of considerable value have been discovered in Transbaikalia.

94 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

8. Graphite

Enormous deposits are to be found in various parts of the country;
the more important are:

In southern Ukraine. (Krivoy Rog) ;

In the northern Urals and the basins of the rivers Ilych and Pechora;

In the Tarbagatai mountains (north of Tianshan) ;

In the Tunguz coal basin;

In Kamchatka; and

In Transbaikalia.

The reserves of this mineral amount to thousands of millions of tons.

p. Boron

Boron is being extracted from the waters of the Kerch, Baku and
Emba oil fields; and from the mineral waters of North Caucasus and
Transcaucasia.

10. Bromine

Bromine occurs in the same localities as those given above for Boron.

jj. Cadmium

Cadmium is to be found in the zinc deposits of the Ridder mining
area (Altai) ; and in very large quantities, in the Tetukhe mines of
Sikhota-Alin.

12. Chromium

The Ural mountains contain the world's largest deposits of ferrous
chromium. They are distributed over the eastern and western slopes of
the central Urals. Deposits have also been discovered lately in Armenia
(Transcaucasia).

zj. Cobalt

Cobalt is to be found in Transcaucasia (in the Tiflis-Gandzha copper
fields) and has also been discovered (1922) in the central Urals.

14. Fluorine

Fluorine is produced chiefly from fluorspar, found in the central Urals
and in Turkestan (near Tashkent). New deposits of this have also been
discovered in Transbaikalia.

15. Glauber's Salt *

The world's largest deposits of Glauber's salt (decahydrated sodium
sulphate) are located in Karabugaz Bay, on the eastern coast of the
Caspian. The reserves here are estimated at 500,000 tons. There are
other deposits in North Caucasus, and near Tiflis; as well as in other
salt-mining areas.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 95

16. Gold

The most important deposits of gold are in the Urals; in the hills of
the middle Yenissey basin (the two Tunguzka rivers) ; the Altai and
Sayan mountains; in Transbaikalia; in the basins of the rivers Vitim,
upper Amur, Zeya, Selendzha, Bureya; in the basin of the Lena; in
the mountains of the Okhotsk littoral; and in the Chukotsk Peninsula.
Some gold is also to be found in Kazakstan. Before the War, gold
mining was only carried on in the Urals and the Altai mountains; but
alluvial gold was obtained in the Yenissey basin, and in Transbaikalia.
Since 1917, large deposits of alluvial gold have been discovered in the
basins of the rivers Tympton and Aldan (Lena basin).

The total annual production of gold in pre-War years amounted to
some 50 tons. The present yield is unknown.

17. Iodine

Iodine js obtainable from the seaweed of the Black, Caspian, Japanese
and White Seas; its production, however, has only been definitely
organized on the Murmansk coast of the White Sea. Efforts are now
being made to organize an iodine manufacture at Baku.

18. Lithium

Lithium is to be found in the central Urals and Transbaikalia. The
reserves in the latter locality are the more extensive.

rp. Magnesium

Magnesium is to be found in the lakes of southern Ukraine (environs
of Odessa) and those of the Crimea and lower Volga region.

20. Manganese

The manganese reserves of the U.S.S.R. are very extensive. The
Chaitur mines in Transcaucasia are the richest in the world, with
reserves of at least 250,000,000 tons. Nikopol, on the lower Dnieper,
is another important manganese centre (50,000,000 tons). Manganese
has also been discovered in the Sikhota-Alin mountains.

21. Mercury

The most important centre for mercury production is Nikitovka, in
the Don basin. The reserves here are estimated at thousands of tons.
Important reserves also exist in Daghestan (North Caucasus); and in
1930 large quantities of mercury bearing ores were discovered in
Ferghana.

22. Mica

Mica is to be found in the White Sea littoral and in the Kola Penin
sula. It also occurs in large quantities in the Sayan and Baikal
mountains, and in the basin of the river Vitim.

96 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

2j. Mineral Wax

Mineral wax is to be found throughout the Caucaso-Ferghana oil-
bearing area.

24. Molybdenite

Molybdenite has been found in Transbaikalia (1916); and, recently,
in the Sikhota-Alm mountains.

25. Nickel

Nickel occurs in the copper-bearing area between Verkhoturie and
Cheliabinsk (central Urals). The centre of production is Sverdlovsk
(formerly Ekaterinburg) where the reserves are estimated at over
50,000 tons of ore, containing from 0.9% to 3% of metal. Other deposits,
in the Urals, contain up to 7%. In the early twenties important nickel
deposits were discovered in the basin of the lower Yenissey. In 1931
new deposits were also discovered in the southern Urals the Khalilov
Mines (near the town of Orsk), estimated at 165,000 tons. Production
was started here at the end of 1931.

26. Phosphates

Between 1909 and 1917 large deposits of phosphates (P 2 5 ) were
discovered throughout Russia proper, the reserves being estimated at
some 5,500,000,000 tons. But their quality, with two exceptions, was
low the primary matter containing not more than 18% of phosphate.
The exceptions were the Podolian deposits (containing up to 55%) and
the Kama deposits (29%).

In 1923 considerable deposits of apatite (phosphate-content 34%)
were discovered in the Khibiny mountains of the Kola Peninsula.
Apatite is an excellent raw material for the manufacture of super
phosphates. Production was started in 1930, and has developed very
rapidly; and a new town, Khibinogorsk, with 50,000 inhabitants has
sprung up. The reserves of apatite here are estimated at 1,000,000 tons.
("Pravda," August I5th, 1931.)

27. Platinum

Platinum is found in the Urals (annual production in pre-War years
about 2.5 tons). New deposits have recently been discovered in the
basin of the lower Yenissey.

28. Potassium

Potassium, in large quantities, was discovered in the basin of the
river Kama in 1916. The reserves here are believed to be the largest
known. Production, however, was only started in 1931 the yearly
manufacture of 220,000 tons being planned. Potassium has also been
discovered in the southern Urals, and in the basin of the Ural river.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 97

2Q. Salt

Salt (cooking) is produced at the salt lakes of the Black and Azov
sea littoral, and in the Crimea and the lower Volga regions, as well as
m Turkestan, the basin of the Yenissey, Transbaikalia, and the basin
of the Lena.

Deposits of rock salt are to be found in the Don basin, in the moun
tains east of the lower Volga; in Transcaucasia, on Cheleken island
(Caspian Sea), and in the central Urals (Solikamsk). Rock salt has also
been discovered recently in the basins of the Yenissey and Lena rivers.

30. Spar

Iceland spar of very high quality .occurs near Bargusin in Trans
baikalia, and in the basin of the Viluy river (a tributary of the Lena).
Various deposits of inferior quality are located in the Crimea, and in
the basin of the Kuban river (N. Caucasus).

Feldspar is to be found on the White Sea littoral; also in the southern
Urals and the Lake Baikal region.

jj. Strontium

Strontium is produced in Ferghana. Important deposits have been
discovered in the region of Karabougaz Bay (Caspian Sea).

32. Sulphur

The most important mines are those of Turkestan (north of
Askhabad). Other mines exist in Daghestan and the Crimea. The
Askhabad deposits are supposed to be the richest in the world.

33-

Talc occurs in large quantities in the central Urals.

34. Thorium

Deposits are found in the basin of the lower Dnieper (Ekaterinoslav,
now Dnepropetrovsk), in the Altai mountains, and south of Lake
Baikal.

35- Tin

Until 1852, tin was mined in Transcaucasia. Since then, work has
been discontinued as unprofitable. The old mines are now being sur
veyed with a view to re-starting production.

3<5. Titanium

Important reserves of titanium ores have been discovered in the
central Urals.

?7. Trass (Puzzolana)
This mineral is the chief constituent of the Karadag Mountain in the

98 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Crimea. The reserves here are estimated at 130,000,000 tons. In quality,
it surpasses the Italian puzzolana.

3#. Uranium and Radium

The only locality of any importance for the production of radium and
uranium is Ferghana (the Tuia-Muiun mine). In 1922 the total radium
content of this mine was estimated at from 15 to 20 gr.

jp. Vanadium

Vanadium has been discovered on the western slopes of the central
Urals and in Ferghana.

40. Tungsten

Small deposits are to be found in the central Urals, in Transbaikalia,
and in the Amur basin.

41. Building Stone

Russia proper is extremely poor in good building stone (the sand
stone of central Russia is not found in large quantities and is of inferior
quality). Hence until the eighteenth century wood was the chief material
used for building. Since then brick has been largely employed. Stone,
granite, and Olonetz marble were used only for Government buildings,
or those of historical importance (churches, museums, galleries, etc.).
It is doubtful whether building stone will be ever found in large
quantities in the U.S.S.R. Of course, such regions as the Caucasus,
the Crimea, the Urals, and other mountainous districts have building
stone in plenty. But the future of building in the U.S.S.R. lies in the
development of the brick and cement industries.

On the other hand, the Urals and the Caucasus abound in decorative
minerals such as labradorite malachite, porphyry, coloured marbles,
lapis-lazuli, etc. These, however, are only useful for decoration.

42. Peat

The reserves of peat in the north are extremely large. In Russia
proper the peat areas occupy some 18,800,000,000 hectares, the best
being those of the Moscow and Leningrad regions, in the development
of which peat may play a very important role. It is proposed to use it
extensively as fuel for the power-stations,

43. Slag

The reserves of combustible slag, in the Leningrad, lower and middle
Volga territories, are very considerable. These reserves are estimated at
10,000,000,000 tons; and their occurrence in these regions, poor in local
fuel, is of great importance. At present, however, owing to the low
calorific qualities of this fuel its manufacture is very limited.

PHYSICAL SURVEY 99

CONCLUSION

The resources of the U.S.S.R. may be stated as unsurpassed by
any other single country, the British Empire excluded. The mineral
resources are located, with the exception of the Urals, on or near her
southern or eastern borders the mountainous ridges of the Caucasus,
of Turkestan and Siberia. In the latter country the basins of the
Yenissey and Lena, where enormous reserves of best quality coal and
iron ores have been recently located, lie in the frigid zone where the
earth is permanently frozen at a depth of from 2 to 4 metres from the
surface. This undoubtedly constitutes a certain obstacle to the commer
cial development of these mineral reserves. The extremely rigorous
climate of these regions must also be remembered. But the time for their
development has not yet come. The most important discoveries of the
last few years are those of the Kuznetzk and Karaganda coal basins, the
light metal deposits of Kazakstan and Turkestan, and the iron ore
deposits located immediately to the south of the Kuznetzk coal basin.

As to rubber, important experiments have been carried out with a
plant, originally discovered in the Kara-Tau mountains of Kazakstan
(east of Alma-Ata), which bears the name TAU-SAGIS meaning mountain-
gum. It is reported to contain up to 4$% of latex, yielding 95% pure
rubber. Experimental plantations have been established in the Tashkent
and Ferghana regions, in Transcaucasia and the Ukraine. The results
so far have been proclaimed satisfactory and it is now proposed to build
a rubber factory near Tashkent to start operations in September 1932.
The planting of 100,000 hectares with tau-sagis has been decided and
great hopes for "rubber-independence" are being nursed in Soviet in
dustrial and political circles. It is as yet early to form a definite opinion
on the possibilities of the tau-sagis rubber to supply the needs of the
U.S.S.R.

NATIONALITIES

NUMBER AND RACIAL ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION

ACCORDING to the census of January 1897, the population of the Russian
Empire totalled 128,924,289 and was divided into the following
nationalities:

Nationality

In
thous.

%of
popula

Nationality

In
thous.

%of
popula

tion

Great Russians

Ukrainians 22,415

White Russians 5,886

Poles 7,931

Jews 5,063

Germans 1 >79o

Lithuanians *>658

Letts 1,436

Estonians 1,003

Georgians *>352

Armenians *>*73

Lesguins 601

Circassians and Chechens 491

Sarts 969

Uzbeks 727

Tadzhiks 350

43.30 Moldavians 1,122 0.67

17.41 Swedes 340 0.29

4.57 Tartars 3,738 2.91

6.17 Kirghiz 4>o84 3.18

3.94 Bashkirs *j439 1.12

1.40 Mordvins 1,024 O-79

1.29 Chuvash 844 0.66

1. 12 Votiaks 421 0.33

0.78 Cheremiss 375 0.26

1.05 Kurds and other Iranian

0.91 tribes 247 0.19

0.47 Turkish tribes in Siberia.... 440 0.33

0.42 Turkomans 281 o.2l

0.75 Buriats 289 0.22

0.57 Yakuts 227 0.17

0.30

By January I, 1914, the population of the Russian Empire had in
creased to 181,182,545.

The census of 1926 established the population of the U.S.S.R. at
146,637,530 and subdivided into one hundred nationalities.

THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. ACCORDING TO THE

1926 CENSUS

Nationality

Number
in
thous.

Nationality

Number
in
thous.

Russians (53%)

77)79*

Bulgarians

ITkl

Ukrainians

31,195

Letts

White Russians

4>739

Lithuanians

A.1

Jews

2,600

Finns

Poles

728

Estonians

*<?5

NATIONALITIES

101

Number

Nationality

thous.

Karelians

248

Svans

Veps

Armenians

1,568

Izhors

Turks

i,7<>7

Moldavians ,

279

Abkhazians ,

Tats

Georgian Jews

Persians

Aysors

Kazaks

3,968

Kurds

Kirghiz

763

Yezids

Gypsies

Talysh

Kazan Tartars ,

2,917

Bulgars

Crimean Tartars ,

180

Karachay

Mishars

243

Circassians

Krishens ,

101

Ossetines

273

Bashkirs

Ingush

Teptiars

Avars

169

Chuvash

1,117

Laks

Man

428

Chechens

319

Votiaks

5o4

Karakalpaks

146

Zyrians

227

Uzbeks

3,905

Permaks

149

Tadzhiks

979

Bessermans

Turkomans ,

764

Mordvins

1,340

Central Asian Jews

Germans

1,239

Arabs

Kalmuks

129

Kipchaks

Nog-ay Tartars

Tarranchas ,

Nogaibeks

Kuramas

Kabardins

140

Uygurs

Khakos

Dungans ,

Buriats

238

Iranians

Yakuts

Baluchis ,

Voguls

Altaians

Ostiaks

Shors ,

Samoyeds

Kainchadals

Tunguz

Chinese

Chukchis

Kumiks

Koraks

Dargins

109

Greeks

214

Lesguins

135

Crimeans

Tabassarans

Georgians

1,821

Caucasian Jews

Mingrelians

243

Koreans

Adzhars

Other nationalities

The Principal Branches

At the end of the nineteenth century the Great Russians numbered
55?637,ooo or 43.30% of the total population of Russia. By 1926 they
had increased to 77,791,124 (53%).

The three principal branches of the Russian race Great Russians,
Ukrainians, and White Russians together number 113,725,023 or 80%
of the total population of the U.S.S.R.

Non-Slavonic Races

The non-Slavonic population of the U.S.S.R. is composed of many
different races. After the Slavonic, the most important group of nation
alities is the Turkic Tartar group often called the "Russian Moham-

102 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

medans" which embraces about 20 millions. These can be divided into
four groups.

1. Northwestern Turks (Volga): Kazan Tartars, Mishars, Besser-
mans, Bashkirs, Teptiars, Kirghiz, Chuvash,

2. Southeastern Turks (Turkestan): Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Tarranchas,
Kipchaks, Uygurs, Kuramas, Dungans, Karakalpaks, Iranians,
Baluchis; the Azerbaijan (Caucasus), Crimean and Nogay (Lower
Volga) Tartars, also belong to this group.

3. Northeastern Turks (Siberia): Yakuts, Altaians, Khakos.

4. Caucasians: Kabardins, Bolkars, Ossetines, Ingush, Karachay,
Circassians, Chechens, Avars, Kumiks, Tabassarans, Lesguins etc.

The common bond uniting these nations is the Moslem faith Kazan
(on the Volga) and Baku (on the Caspian) are their chief religious and
cultural centres; both these cities played an important part in Pan- ,
Islamic movements.

Next come the peoples of the Ugro-Finnic group, numbering about
4,000,000; with the exception of the Western Finns, their cultural level
is very low. They are either Orthodox, Protestants (the Western Finns)
or heathens. The number of Finns has been greatly diminished by the
separation of Finland, Estonia and Latvia from Russia.

These nations can also be divided into four groups.

1. Western Finns (Baltic littoral) Karelians, Estonians, Chud,
Letts, Izhors, and Finns proper.

2. Northern Finns (Kama Region) Lopars, Votiaks, Permiaks,
Zyrians (now called Komi).

3. Eastern Finns (Volga) Mari (previously known as Cheremiss)
and Mordvins.

4. Ugro-Finns Samoyeds (Arctic Region), Voguls, Ostiaks, etc.
(Siberia).

The Mongol group is not very numerous, but at present plays an
important part in the Russian Far East, being closely related to
nationalities across the border of the U.S.S.R. Most of the Mongols
are Buddhists. They number about half a million (this does not include
the Mongols of Red Mongolia, and of the Republic of Tannu-Tuva,
regions not incorporated in the U.S.S.R., although closely allied to
it and practically under its sway), and consist of the Kalmyks (N.
Caspian littoral) the Buriats, Kamchadals and Oirats (E. Siberia).
To these must be added a small number of Chinese, Koreans and
Japanese.

Apart from these groups stand some of the nationalities of Trans
caucasia; the Armenians, Georgians, Mingrelians, Lazians, Svans,
Abkhazians, Aysors, Kurds and Persians. With the exception of the two
latter nationalities, the majority are Christians.

An important part is played in the Union by the Germans (1,200,000)
and Jews (2,500,000).

NATIONALITIES 103

In concluding this survey it is interesting to note the increase of the
U.S.S.R.'s populations since 1926, when it was 146,637,530. By 1929
it had risen to 153,930,800, and by 1932 to about 160,000,000.

THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF THE VARIOUS

NATIONALITIES

(1900-1917)

AT THE end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth,
there was a noticeable development of consciousness among the non-
Russian nationalities. The Revolution of 1905 acted as a stimulant to
nationalist activity among the various peoples of the Empire in par
ticular, the Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and Finns. The
nationalist movement was much less prominent in the Ukraine, White
Russia, Georgia and Armenia, and it was hardly noticeable among the
"backward races" of Turkestan, North Caucasus and Siberia.

After the failure of the 1905 Revolution a Russification reaction set
in, which led to strained relations between the Government and the non-
Russian nationalities. As a result, a great deal of anti-Russian feeling
accumulated; and this led, in 1917-18, to the rapid formation of various
independent States on the borders of the U.S.S.R. Thus the study of
the former citizens of the Empire, today the peoples of Finland, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are beyond the scope of this work.

White Russia

From ancient times, White Russia had been the arena of a conflict
between Polish and Russian cultures. The White Russian upper classes
mostly submitted to Polish culture, and became Roman Catholics;
while the majority of the peasants remained Russians and Orthodox.
This has been a source of continual strife between the Russian and
Polish elements almost to the present day.

White Russia's wealth resided in its timber but the very size of its
vast forests, surrounded by bogs and far from both the sea and the
great trade-routes, had a deterrent effect upon trade and industry. The
country's remoteness from the great cultural centres too, and its limited
population, rendered it unable to keep pace with the general cultural
and economic development of the Russian Empire.

White Russia's tragedy lay in the fact that the bulk of the Russian
population had insufficient land to be economically independent, as the
Polish land-owners possessed over half the total area.

The spiritual needs of the White Russians were ministered to by both
Russians and Poles, while trade was chiefly left in the hands of the
Jews. It is not surprising, therefore, that the White Russian nationalist

104 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

movement began much later than the other similar movements in
Russia; or that it achieved very little either in the political or cultural
spheres.

The Ukraine

Quite another picture is presented by the Ukrainian nationalist move
ment. It had behind it a great historical tradition, and soon spread
beyond the borders of the Empire into Galicia inhabited by Ukrainians
(Ruthenians) while it now influences Poland, Rumania and Czecho
slovakia (Carpathian Russia).

Ukrainian nationality is not based merely upon a political history
it can also point to many achievements in the sphere of culture; and
although the Ukraine, on its own initiative, was united to Russia in the
seventeenth century, many subsequent efforts were made by powerful
factions to establish national independence with the help of the Poles,
Turks and Swedes.

The nineteenth century saw a renaissance of Ukrainian culture, and
many of its representatives became prominent in art, science and politics.
Some of them, such as Gogol, Skovoroda, Gnedich and Kostomarov,
formed part of the general Russian culture. Others such as
Kotliarevsky, a dramatist, and Shevchenko, the national poet were
Ukrainians first and foremost. On the whole the Ukrainian movement,
both in and outside Russia, was not anti-Russian; but it bore a definitely
federalist character.

Dragornanov, a historian and philosopher who died at the beginning
of this century was the most eminent representative of these Ukrainian
tendencies. He unequivocally insisted upon the cultural independence
of the Ukraine and proposed to reconstruct Russia on a federal basis,
without altering her status as a single Power. Many cultured people and
various societies in the Ukraine subscribed to these sentiments; but
they met with opposition from those who either thought there could be
no independent Ukrainian culture or who wanted political independence
as well.

The Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, the first Ukrainian political
party, was founded early in this century. Out of this party came the
Socialist Federalists, who demanded the federation of the peoples of
Russia, with an autonomous Ukraine forming part of the Russian State,
and the Ukrainian Social Democrats, who joined the Russian Social
Democrats as an independent group. In 1905 the activity of the Ukrai
nian Nationalists was renewed; it manifested itself in the Duma elec
tions, in an extensive nationalist propaganda among schools and in the
organization of political unions and artistic societies.

These federalist tendencies, however, did not triumph. For the bulk
of the Ukrainian population their country was an integral part of the
Russian Empire; a part organically connected with it in all depart
ments of life. Russia's economic advance was reflected in the Ukraine
which kept pace with her in railway and port construction, output of

NATIONALITIES 105

coal, and activity in the metal and sugar industries all largely due to
Russian capital. Statistics show, too, that the percentage of literacy was
much the same for the Russian and Ukrainian Provinces.

Over-population in agrarian districts, the most pressing problem of
the Russian Empire, was as prominent in the Ukraine as in Great
Russia. What is more, it was solved in the same way by emigration
to Siberia and Turkestan; a fact demonstrating the close relations of
the Ukraine with other parts of the Empire. During the decade 1896-
1907 emigration from the Ukraine exceeded that from any other region.

The official persecution of the Ukrainian language, literature and art,
which assumed a severe form after the Revolution of 1905, stimulated
a strong protest in those Ukrainian circles which stood for national
independence; separatist tendencies grew rapidly among the educated
middle class. But the upper classes, consisting largely of Russians and
Poles, were merely fighting their own battles : the mass of the popula
tion the peasantry remained unaffected by the struggle.

Georgia

Georgia, small in territory and population, has a very ancient and
interesting history. She first came into touch with Russia by way of
Byzantium in the tenth century; and, during the Mongol Conquest, in
the thirteenth. The common history of Russia and Georgia begins in
the days of Catherine the Great and Alexander I, after Georgia's volun
tary union with Russia. Georgians have since taken a prominent part
in the life of the Empire.

Georgia's nationalist revival began in th nineteenth century, and took
a literary form. The new Georgian literature based itself on classical
examples the golden era of Georgian literature proper was from the
tenth to the thirteenth centuries. The theatre developed side by side
with literature; and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, politics
began to interest the Georgians especially the nobility and the in
telligentsia.

The Social Democrats played a great part in Georgian life. They
attracted both the cultured classes and the representatives of the clergy,
and were very closely connected with the Russian Social Democrats.

The Revolution of 1905 gave a stimulus to Georgian nationalist tend
encies, hitherto rather weak. The Georgian Social Democratic Party
demanded cultural autonomy; but no separation from the Russian State
was contemplated. This was chiefly due to the fact that the more
energetic Georgians sought a wider field for their activities they were
interested in Empire politics, and thought imperially. Local politics
could not satisfy them. It is chiefly due to the vacillations of Russian
policy in Transcaucasia that Georgian nationalist activity was diverted
to the revolutionary camp.

Armenia
Armenia, Georgia's neighbour for 2000 years, has been known to

I0 6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

history from Biblical times. The Armenians trace their origin from
Haika, son of Togarmah (Genesis x, 3) and they call themselves
Haikans. They adopted Christianity in the third century; and from then
onwards religion played a leading part in the history of the nation.
Surrounded by the Mohammedans of Persia, Turkey, Kurdistan and
Azerbaijan, Armenia maintained her religious and national character
through the centuries, being supported in her national struggle by the
Orthodox East, Russia in particular.

Armenia was once a powerful state. Her sons still show great ability
as statesmen. The closest associate of the Russian Emperor Alexander
II was Count Loris-Melikov, an Armenian, and many grand viziers of
the Ottoman Empire were Armenians. But the Armenians' lot was hard.
During the whole of the nineteenth century, and in the first two decades
of the twentieth, there were continual collisions with the Mohammedan
worldespecially with Turkey. The whole world rang with horrible
accounts of Armenian massacres.

Until the end of the last century, the Armenians believed that the
all-powerful Russian Empire would save them from the Turks and
Kurds and give them some prospect of peaceful development. The
failure of Russia (for international reasons) to secure autonomy for
the Turkish Armenians after 1878 led the Armenian nationalists to the
conclusion that extreme measures must be taken to save the Armenian
people. The Armenian revolutionary movement began at the end of the
nineteenth century. At first directed against the Turks, it soon became
involved in the Russian revolutionary movement as well.

The Armenians became convinced that it was not Russia as a country,
but Russia's autocratic Government, that was unwilling to protect
Armenia against the Turks. A strong and energetic Armenian Revolu
tionary Party Dashnaktzutun was formed, and became very popular.
By 1905 this Party had drafted its programme, chiefly following those
of the Russian Socialist parties. Its general tendencies were federalist.

Armenian revolutionaries, however, were not the sole representatives
of Armenian political opinion. The clergy, and numbers of the wealthy
Armenian bourgeoisie were eminently loyal to the Russian Government,
and waited patiently for reforms. The Armenian masses on the whole re
garded Russia as their second fatherland.

Azerbaijan

The third Transcaucasian country, Azerbaijan, is populated by
Tartars. Their religion divides them from both the Georgians and
Armenians, as well as from the Russians; and in the past they did not
regard the Russians as allies and defenders (the Georgian opinion) or
saviours (as did the Armenians) but as enemies and intruders. Their
allegiance to Moslem culture strengthened Russo-Tartar antagonisms
in Transcaucasia. The Azerbaijanians, however, soon realized that the
Russian Empire offered them advantages they could never enjoy under
either Turkey or Persia. Russian, capital developed their country to a

NATIONALITIES 107

wonderful extent. The Baku Tartars greatly profited by the development
of the oil industry: and their economic prosperity enabled them to
assist other Mohammedans in Russia.

The revolutionary movement in Azerbaijan took a definitely economic
trend. When the War broke out, there were two camps; the European,
consisting of the upper urban classes; and the Asiatic, which comprised
the proletarians and peasants who were completely under the influence
of beys, mullahs and revolutionary workers. The revolutionary move
ment in Transcaucasia, however, was not so much under the direction
of Azerbaijan revolutionaries as of Armenian and Georgian.

Other Nationalities

The Northwestern Volga Tartars, came into the closest relations with
the Russians. The close proximity of the two peoples (the Tartar
population is 50% of the present Tartar Republic) strengthened the
relations between Russians and Tartars, but did not lead the Tartars
to abandon their religion or customs; Tartar culture developed under
strong Russian influence, but was always based on Islam. The bulk of
the population the peasants were on the same level as their Russian
neighbours. Tartar trade and industry occupied an important place in
Russian economic life. Kazan x was the centre of Tartar religion and
culture: its influence spread all over the Mohammedan population of
the Empire. The Tartar share in Pan-Islamic movements never out-
weighed the native loyalty to the Russian State. In this region,
nationalist tendencies were very slow to appear.

The Government's policy of Russification, however, assisted this
development. In 1908 a Special Commission to elaborate Measures
against Mohammedan influence in the Volga Region was formed. The
measures adopted were particularly directed against the "Mekteb"
schools (by the substitution of Russian schools) where Tartar children
were taught religion, reading and writing. These Tartar schools not only
influenced the local population but also remote tribes such as the
Chuvash, the Kirghiz, the Tadzhiks and the Turkomans. The Special
Commission took steps to strengthen the position of the Orthodox
Church, to enforce the teaching of Russian, and to influence the Tartar
mind by administrative measures. These measures had their effect upon
other Mohammedan districts also, and aroused a great deal of
opposition.

The Kirghiz

The largest nation amongst the Northwestern Turks were the Kirghiz
(including Kazaks and Karakirghiz) who numbered four millions. The
Kirghiz until recently lived a semi-nomadic tribal life. Previous to the
Revolution there were three Hordes, Great, Middle and Small; their
chief occupation was and still is cattle breeding. A widespread illiteracy

1 Kazan was at the same time an important centre of Russian culture the seat of one of
Russia's oldest Universities.

io8 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

prevents any .speedy cultural advance. Until 1916 there was no registra
tion of Kirghiz marriages, births or deaths and the first Kirghiz news
paper, "Kazak," was only published (at Orenburg) in 1912. Its readers
were Kirghiz of the upper class and clergymen.

The conscription of Kirghiz as army labourers during the War resulted
in a serious rebellion (1916), only put down with difficulty.

The Bashkirs and Chuvash

The Bashkirs are now an agricultural tribe. In 1861 they were settled
as peasants and lost a large proportion of their lands, being transformed,
by Government decree, from nomads into farmers. The agrarian revo
lutionary movement which developed among the Bashkirs in the
twentieth century was led exclusively by Russian revolutionaries.

Closely related to the Bashkirs are the Chuvash. Their language (of
Turkic origin) and their blood are strongly diluted by a Finnic ad
mixture. In manners and customs they are Tartars: they shave their
heads and wear the Tartar cap although they belong to the Orthodox
Church. They do not differ greatly from the Russian peasants among
whom they live.

The Uzbeks Etc.

The Southeastern Turks (Turkestan) are composed of Uzbeks,
Tadzhiks, Tarranchas and other smaller tribes. The Uzbeks are the
descendants of nomads who settled on the irrigated land in Turkestan.
Their principal occupation is agriculture chiefly cotton-growing. They
derive their name from Khan Uzbek, who ruled them in the fourteenth
century. In the fifteenth, a portion of the tribe detached itself from the
Uzbek State and travelled to the northeastward, where they became
known as Kazaks, or Kaizaks (i. <?. freemen). Those who remained loyal
to the Khan retained the name of Uzbeks, and later subjugated the
Tadzhiks, who from ancient times had occupied the territory of which
they were now dispossessed.

In order to secure firm control of the region, the Russian Government
broke up the nomadic life of the tribes and promoted their settlement.
Much was done by the Government to pacify and develop the region,
but the local population saw itself compelled to surrender to Russian
emigrants an important proportion of the territory where it had formerly
wandered nomadically.

The Northeastern Turks form the smallest group, the weakest and
least cultured. It consists of Yakuts, Teleuts, Oirats (Altaians), Shorts,
Khakos and others. The Yakuts call themselves Sakha-Lar, and speak
an old Turkic dialect. The majority are Orthodox, but they retain many
pagan customs. They are agriculturalists, cattle breeders, and traders.
So successful are they in this latter occupation that they are sometimes
called the Jews of East Siberia.

Unlike the Yakuts, the Oirats are backward. They occupy themselves
with agriculture. In this region the Teleuts (nomads), Shorts (agricul-

NATIONALITIES 109

turalists) and many other tribes also led, until the Great War, a very
primitive existence.

The Crimean Tartars, related by blood to the above-mentioned tribes,
are comparatively highly cultured. Many very interesting historical
remains (the town of Bakhchisaray and others, for example) have been
preserved in the Crimea. In the latter pre-War years there was a
renaissance of Tartar culture, stimulated by archeological excavations
and the spread of education.

Caucasian Mohammedans

The group of Caucasian Mohammedans consists of many diverse
tribes inhabiting North Caucasus. The origins and languages of some of
them are still obscure. The most cultured and numerous are the
Kabardins (a handsome and warlike race) who with the Bolkars and
Karachays inhabit the mountain gorges in the region of Kashtan-Tau
and Elbruz. Another cultured tribe are the Ossetines. The Chechens are
a warlike and predatory race,, who composed the bulk of ShamiPs army
the last defender of North Caucasian independence.

Little need be said about the other minor nationalities of the Russian
Empire, as their importance in the State was not great, and their low
cultural level excluded them from any appreciable share in the country's
life.

Ill
THE REVOLUTION

THE Provisional Government proclaimed a policy of toleration towards
national aspirations, and the free cultural development of all the
nationalities of Russia; but, being pre-occupied with disastrous events
at the front and internal discords, it did nothing really constructive^

This hesitating policy resulted in rapidly strengthening the separatist
tendencies to an extreme degree.

The Revolution was hailed by the minor nationalities of the Empire
as the beginning of a new national era. Few among them desired ^to
break away from the Russian State. On the contrary, the majority
considered themselves a component part of one great organism. But the
activity of the separatists, the lethargic policy of the Provisional Govern
ment, war weariness and Communist propaganda soon produced a
marked change in public opinion.

The revolutionary and national problems entered upon new phases.
The Finnish Seym (Legislature) was the first to raise the question of
the right to secede from Russia. The Provisional Government dissolved
the Seym and strengthened the armed forces in Finland. Some months
later, the Soviet Government saw itself forced to concede Finnish
independence.

IIO RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

The Provisional Government, it is true, proclaimed the independence
of Poland; but as Poland was then occupied by the enemy, who had
already proclaimed Polish independence themselves, this gesture of the
Provisional Government was more or less irrelevant.

The Ukraine underwent many changes, coming under about twenty
different political regimes within two years. In April 1917 the All-
Ukrainian National Congress was summoned. It elected an executive
body called the Central Rada, and resolved to demand the autonomous
organization of the Ukraine. The Provisional Government did not agree
with this resolution. A conflict arose, which ended in the defeat of the
Rada: whereupon the Ukrainian nationalists addressed the people over
the heads of the Central Government. A few days after the fall of the
Provisional Government, the Ukrainian Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian
People's Republic, but still did not envisage a complete severance from
Russia. It was only at the beginning of 1918 that the full independence
of the Ukraine was proclaimed. In turn, the Ukraine had then to submit
to a German invasion, to occupation by Denikin's Volunteer Army; and,
finally, to inclusion within the Soviet Federation as the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic.

White Russia's fate was somewhat similar; but there, in addition^ to
the Germans, the Poles took a hand endeavouring to create a Polish
White Russia. Finally part of it was united to the Soviet State as the
White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic (B.S.S.R.), the rest being
occupied by the Poles.

The fate of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan is very instructive.
Previous to the War and the Revolution, the idea of separation from
Russia was never mooted. Attempts by spies to spread Turkish propa
ganda during the War met with no success. The people looked upon
the Revolution as an all-Russian affair, for which all the nationalities
in the Empire were responsible. When the Provisional Government was
overthrown, regional administrations were established. They were meant
to be merely temporary, pending the convocation of an All-Russian
National Constituent Assembly. These administrations had but a brief
existence. Local politicians, fearing anarchy and Bolshevism, and acting
under external pressure (occupation by Germany and the menace of a
Turkish advance) proclaimed the independence of Georgia, Armenia
and Azerbaijan. These proclamations, in the two former cases, were
not popular, nor did the Azerbaijan Tartars particularly desire inde
pendence. Subsequent events, such as the Armenian-Tartar massacres,
a Georgian-Armenian conflict and a Turkish Invasion, sufficiently
showed the disadvantages of separation. The restoration of State unity,
in the form of the Soviet federative system, was accepted by Trans-
caucasians as a necessity.

NATIONALITIES in

IV
NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE U.S.S.R.

ON NOVEMBER 2, 1918, the Soviet Government issued a declaration of
the Rights of Nationalities in Russia. Its four chief points were as
follows: i) the equality, and sovereignty of all nationalities, 2) the
right of free self-determination up to complete independence, 3) the
abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations, and
4) the free development of minorities and ethnographical groups in
Russia.

The Declaration recognized that the Republic was a free union of
free nations, and that this union was established by treaty (1923)
between the R.S.F.S.R. and the other Soviet Republics.

The mainstays of Soviet federalism are: i) the control of all units
of the Federation through the organs of the Communist Party and 2)
the maintenance of superior strength in population, wealth and resources
of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.)? the
mainstay of the Union. It is interesting to compare the latter, from a
political, cultural and economical point of view, with the three
other more important republics the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic (ULS.S.R.), the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Re
public (Z.S.F.S.R.) and the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic

(B.S.S.R.).

On one hand is the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, with
a territory of 19,648,160 sq. kilometres, and 105,568,800 inhabitants;
and on the other, the Ukraine, with a territory of 45 1,828 sq. kilometres
and a population of 30,350,000, White Russia with a territory of 126,-
792 sq. kilometres and a population of 5,171,000, and Transcaucasia,
with a territory of 185,968 sq. kilometres, and a population of 6,146,000.

In addition to the natural predominance of the R.S.F.S.R. the
centripetal tendencies in other Republics, being stronger than the
centrifugal, render the Union a fairly stable body. Even the Trans
caucasian Republic, notwithstanding the -Georgian revolt of 1926,
regards its union with the Russian Republic as, on the whole, a
guarantee of peace and a protection against external enemies Turkey,
especially. The White Russian Republic is still more closely attached to
the R.S.F.S.R. This leaves only the Ukrainian Republic to be considered.

A section of the Ukrainian, and also of the foreign Press, over
emphasize the state of separatist feeling in the Ukraine, and gives a
misleading impression as to the true state of affairs. There is no doubt
that the separatists are chiefly political refugees abroad, and have no
real influence with the Ukrainian population. In addition, the dispro
portion, in numbers, national resources and economic power, between
the Ukraine and the R.S.F.S.R., does not favour Ukrainian separatism.

ii2 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

TERRITORY AND POPULATION OF THE NATIONAL
REPUBLICS (JANUARY i, 1931)

Territory

Area in
sq. klms.

f P o -pulatio 1
Total

* v
-per sq.
klm.

U.S S R.

... 21,171,521

*53>93o,8oo

7-3

RSF.S.R.

... 19,648,166

105,667,800

5-4

151,840

2,807,300

i8.f

Buriat-Mongol Autonomous Socialist Republic
Daghestan Autonomous Socialist Republic

376,392
56,747

546,600
807,300

i-5
14.2

ICazak Autonomous Republic

.. 2,983,564

6,816,900

2.3

Karelian Autonomous Republic

145,226

278,100

1.9

Kirfrhiz Autonomous Republic

196,740

1,048,900

2.3

Crimean Autonomous Republic

25,880

755,300

29.2

German Volffa Autonomous Republic *"

27,152

610,200

22.5

Tartar Autonomous Republic

67,153

2,646,700

39-4

Chuvash Autonomous Republic

18,309

912,100

49.8

.. 4,023,307

281,000

0.07

UK S S R

451,829

30,350,500

67.2

BSSR

126,792

5,171,100

40.8

ZSFSR

185,968

6,146,700

33-2

Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic

85,896

2,412,000

28.1

Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic

29,964

960,800

32.1

Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic

69,259

2,773,900

40.1

Uzbek SSR

309,843

5,520,300

17.8

Turkoman SSR-

449,000

1,074,400

2.4

Tadzhik SSR

161,300

1,036,000

6.4

(Published by the Central Statistical Department

of the U.S.S.R.)

V
CULTURE

Education

FEDERAL principles are largely embodied in the Soviet educational
system, where the use of the local language is made compulsory. This
is a radical departure from tradition. Before Count Ignatiev's reforms,
tuition in any other language than Russian was hardly countenanced,
save in a few exceptional cases. Even the reform of 1915 only introduced
tuition in the mother tongue for elementary schools and in a limited
degree.

According to the constitution of the U.S.S.R. the responsibility for
all cultural work rests upon the Federal Republics; although the Central
Government lays down the general lines of education and hygiene, on
principles which cannot be altered by local legislation.

The following table shows the literacy of the general population both
in Russian, and in local tongues.

1 This Republic was included in the North Caucasian Territory In November 1931.
3 This Republic Is Included in the Central Volga Territory.
8 This Republic is included in the Nizhni-Novgorod Territory.

NATIONALITIES

113

Nationality

%of

literate

Of these

only in
national
language

Nationality

literate i

Of these
only in
national
angu&ge

Russians

45.0

99-7

Estonians

.. 72.4

77-3

Ukrainians

43-3

51.9

Karelians

4I.A 1

White Russians

37-3

40.2

Veps

35-7 *

Jews
Poles

72-3
53-8

55-5 *
52.3

Izhors
Moldavians

60.9
27-6

23.1
38.7

Bulgarians

39.6

Greeks

50-3

214

Letts

74-5

66.3

Gypsies

-3

Lithuanians

70.5

28.1

Tartars

33-6

92.5

Bashkirs

24.3

40.0

Cauc. Jews

19.7

22.8

Mishars

25.6

83.9

Georgians

39-5

98.3

Krishens

29-2

Armenians

18.2

8o-9
/

Teptiars
Nagays
Nagai-Beks
Kabardins

24-3
6.8

274
28.8

23-7

Turks
Abkhazians
Chuvash
Cheremiss

8.1
11.3
32.2
26.6

9O.2
42.9
89.6
694

Balkars

5-3

15-9

Votiaks

25.6

75-5

Karachays

9-2

Zyrians

38.1

56.2

Circassians
Ossetines
Ingush
Chechens
Avars
Laks

16.9
31-2

2.9
6.8
8.4-

36.6
38.5
13.9
29.8
85.6
87.1

Permiaks
Bessermens
Mordvins
Germans
Kalmuks
Karakalpaks

26. i 1
16.6
22.9
60.2
10.9

54-6
28.9
91.7

38.3
66.3

Kumiks

ii. i

81.3

Tadzhiks

2.2

69.9

Dargins
Lesguins
Tabassarans

4-9
1.6

79.0

Cent. Asian Jews
KIpchaks
Kuramas

24-2
14
2.4

79-6
94.8
13.2

Dungans
Baluchis

8.6
0.3

40.1
58.8

Kirghiz
Uzbeks

4-6
3-8

93.2
98.0

Shorts
Buriats
Voguls
Samoyedes
Chukchis

n-5
23.2
6.2 1

. 2.8 X

0.6 *

444

Turkomans
Arabs
Tarranchas
Uygurs
Iranians

2.3
1.2

8-5

4-6
7-9

91.1
10.8
914
53-7
9.6

Kamchadals

39.6 1

Altaians

40.0

8
5

Georgian Jews
Aysors
Kurds

32.9
25.2
3-7

25.0
44.0
2-3

Khakos
Yakuts
Ostiaks

12.9
5-8
6.9 *

85-7

Yessids

2.1

104

Tunguzes

7.8 1

Talish

3-0

Koriaks

5-9 X

Tats

5-9

Chinese

42.1

85.2

Persians
Kazaks

I4-I

464
96.5

Koreans
Total in the

39.8
U.S.S.R. 50.8

86.6
83.0

These figures cannot be considered apart from the quality of the work
carried out This, it must be confessed, is not very high. At the XVI
Congress of the Communist Party (1930) it was stated that the agri
cultural experts sent to Central Asia could not make themselves under
stood by the people. And in most other minority regions not only
agricultural experts, but even doctors, teachers, and engineers had a
similar experience. Trade union, political, and economic Soviet workers,
moreover, are frequently in the same position.

1 In Russian.

ii 4 RUSSIA/ILS.S.R.

The Press

A great effort has been made to "nationalize" the Press. It is regarded
as a sure weapon of Communist propaganda; and every means of using
it to reach the population is being exploited to the full. In particular,
the publication of newspapers in the various languages of the Union is
important; in 1930 there were published 356 newspapers in Russian
and 249 in other languages.

Anti-Religious Propaganda

All religions Christian, Mohammedan, Jewish etc. are persecuted.
Information derived from the U.S.S.R. reveals an awful condition of
spiritual decadence and moral decline. The Union of the Godless, num
bering over 4,000,000 members, is responsible for active propaganda
among the population. The following table shows the distribution of the
Union by nationalities, according to Soviet data (1930).

THE UNION OF THE GODLESS

Nationality

Number
in thous.

Nationality

Number
in tkous.

Russians

2,000

Moldavians

White Russians

Kazaks

Ukrainians

460

Chuvash

Jews

200

Armenians

Tartars

Karelians

I.OI

Bashkirs

Bolkars

o.i

Mari

Letts

Poles

Lithuanians

o.i

Buriata

Bulgarians

0.5

Germans

Circassians

0.5

Ossetines

Ingush

0-51

Georgians

Finns

0.7

Uzbeks

Arabs

o.oz

Turks

Samoyeds

O.O2

Greeks

0.1

Turkomans

X-5

Mordvins

Kirghiz

1.52

Karaims

0-05

Chechens

0.6

Votiaks

i.i

Tadzhiks

0.3

Oirata

0.5

Estonians

0.5

Zyrians

0.5

Chinese

0.5

Yakuts

O.I

Koreans

0.25

Kalmuks

0.5

Uygurs

0.02

Avars

0.75

(Figures for 1930, as published by the Central Statistical Department of the U.S.S.R.)

THE COMMUNISTS

THE most important element in the Union is the Communist Party. As
the ruling Party, it has manifold duties in the Union, So far as federa
tion goes, they can be reduced to the following: i) maintenance of

NATIONALITIES "5

the Union, 2) the preservation of its Communist character, 3) control
of the administration, and 4) Communist education of the proletariat.

The task is not an easy one. Quite apart from the question of
separatism there is a very definite clash between the principles of
national autonomy and the aims of Communism.

The combination of internationalism and nationalism in Communist
policy is further complicated by the stipulation that all Party members
must be of proletarian origin. This must ultimately result in the pre
dominance of one principle over the other; and experience suggests that
nationalism will prove the victor. Proletarians undergo "a change of
heart" when they attain influential positions in the Party. The local
Communists begin gradually to consider themselves the representatives
of national minorities as a whole, rather than of their proletariat.

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY IN

Nationality

Members
and
Candidates

Nationality

Members
and
Candidates

Total

1,060,860
688,855

Germans
Ossetines

5)2^6

4:43*

122 028

Estonians

3,602

A<7A6

Mordvms

3,653

72.64.6

Lithuanians

2,577

18,088

Bashkirs

2,442

16 1 16

Finns

1,810

T.A. 711

Lesguins ,

i,493

U-k^l-Q

iq.20<

Koreans

1,257

T2IQ8

Tadzhiks

1,359

K"--7fllrc

1 1,950

KLabardins

, 1,1:34

Pn1*

11,158

Persians

1,124

10 841

Bulgarians

759

The majority of the Communist Party is Russian. This corresponds
to the predominance of Russians in the Union. The percentage of Com
munists amongst Russians, however, is not so large as that of
Communists in other nations of the Union. There are only 72 Com
munists to every 10,000 Russians, while the Georgians number 88
per 10,000, the Armenians 116 and the Jews 155. The Ukrainians and
White Russians have lower proportions 39 for the former and 69^ for
the latter. It is interesting to notice the number of women, of various
nationalities, in the Party. One seventh of the members of the Union
Party are Russian women; Ukrainian women comprise a tenth, Jewesses
a fourth, Armenian and Georgian women about one eighteenth, while
(owing to their particular customs and religions) practically no women
figure on the rolls of the Asiatic nationalities, such as the Uzbeks, Bash
kirs and Tadzhiks.

Another peculiar feature is the high percentage of Communists who
belong to nationalities living on the Eastern and Western frontiers of
the Union Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Chinese and Koreans.

1 No later detailed figures have been published.

RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

This is a result of Soviet policy a Communist, of any nationality, may
prove a useful weapon for the Government across the border.

Table No. 8 shows the national composition of the organization known
as the Lenin Union of Communist Youth.

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNION OF COMMUNIST YOUTH

Nationality

Total

Nationality

Total

Russians

1,436,463

Estonians

3,084

Ukrainians

300,965

Letts

2,595

Jews
Georgians

98,323
66,727

Karelians
Kabardins

2,790
2,784

Armenians

Finns

2,520

White Russians

5^,403

Avars

2,507

Turks

57,882

Kumiks

2,555

Uzbeks

50,157

Lesguins

2,416

Tartars

39,o5o

Abkhazians

i,775

Ossetines

12,739

Permiaks

1,261

Kazaks

52,145

Adzhars

2,102

Chuvash

14,928

Greeks

2,527

Kirghiz
Poles

13,447
8,276

Circassians
Molda viand

1,590
897

Bashkirs

9,549

Karakalpaks

Ij256

Koreans

6,028

Ingush

1,074

Turkomans

9,950

Yakuts

1,127

Tadahiks

6,911

Karachays

i, 002

Mordvins

5>66o

Dargins

1,078

Buriata

3,890

Laks

603

Mari

3,937

Bolkars

654

Germans

4,849

Oirats

671

Votiaks

4,35!

Khakos

480

Zyrians

4,044

Others

40,968

Chechens

3,728

Kalmuks

5,oi7

Total in the U.S.S.R.

2,409,864

(Official Soviet Data for I93O. 1 )

VII

THE FIVE YEARS PLAN

IN THEIR endeavour to build up a Socialist country entirely independent
of the Capitalist world, the Communists were obliged to resort to cen
tralization which stands in direct contradiction not only to the general
principle of national autonomy, but to the nationalist policy which they
themselves proclaim. While associating various economic enterprises
with different regions of the Union, they set local authority entirely
aside, in favour of Moscow's. Hence conflicts between Union and local
interests are frequent.

The richest reserves of natural resources are located in the R.S.F.S.R.
The Five Years Plan accordingly devotes the greater proportion
of its capital investments to that Republic, much to the discontent of

1 Thc total in 1932 is estimated by the Soviet Press to have reached 5,000,000.

NATIONALITIES 117

the others, especially as it affects not only possible revenue but also
employment.

Figures published by the Soviet Government in 1929 establish that
the workers (the proletariat proper) were 2.75% of the total population
of the Union. In the R.S.F.S.R. they were 3.570, in the Uk.S.S.R.
2.50%, in the B.S.S.R. 1.25% and in the Z.S.F.S.R. 1.5%. The
proportion was less than i% in all other Republics. Since 1929 condi
tions have changed still more in favour of the R.S.F.S.R.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, let it once more be emphasized that Soviet Federalism
differs greatly from any other kind of federal system in the world. It
is a transitory stage in the evolution towards a purely Communist
society; and the federation of national proletarian minorities is merely
a tactical variation in applying the principle of the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat.

The national aspirations of the many races and nationalities of the
U.S.S.R. forced the Communist leaders to adopt this method as far
back as 1918. Hence the federal structure of the Executive Committee
of the U.S.S.R., as well as many other concessions to federal ideas
in the field of politics, culture and even economics.

But while preserving an appearance of federation, the Communists
persistently strengthen the central authority by every available means.
In the political sphere the authorities of the Federal Republics merely
execute instructions received from Moscow, which alone controls foreign
relations and trade, questions of defense, the financial policy of the
Union and its police force (OGPU). In the cultural sphere (education),
under cover of regional autonomy, Moscow supervises programmes
elaborated by the Central Government; in the economic field, local
interests are everywhere subordinated to those of the Union.

And behind all stand the Communists, the true rulers of the U.S.S.R.
The Communist Party a "formidable guardian in the strictest sense
of the word, of the unity of the U.S.S.R. is the chief force that at
present holds it together. In this task it utilizes the natural bonds that
unite the peoples of the Soviet State no less than it does measures of
administrative and political compulsion.

Yet Communism appears, at the same time, to be the Union's prin
cipal weakness. The proportion of the proletariat (proper) to the
population in general is so small that the only safe method of govern
ment for the rulers of the U.S.S.R. is an absolute dictatorship. The
attitude of the bulk of the population (of all nationalities) remains, if
not openly hostile, at least definitely distrustful of the Communist
regime, and jealous of the vast privileges enjoyed by the proletariat.

In spite of all measures of severity, anti-Communist feeling manifests
itself in every form and shape. In the Federal Republics this, very often,
takes a nationalist character. In certain instances it may even take an

II8 RUSSIA/U.S.S.K

anti-Russian turn; although, quite apart from theoretical Communism,
the perpetual community of political, economical and cultural interests
emphasizes the necessity of union between the nationalities ot the

TT C Q T?

Note:' A few words must be said about the peculiar position of
Bessarabia. This Province of the Empire was ceded to Russia by Turkey
in 1812. Its population at that time consisted of some 240,000 Mol
davians, Bulgars, Greeks and Russians. In 1856, by the Treaty of Pans
Russia was compelled to restore Lower Bessarabia (the estuaries ot
the Danube and Pruth) to Turkey, but recovered it again after the
Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78. ^ .

By the returns of the census of 1897 the population of the Province
was about 2,000,000 and in 1917 it was estimated at 2,700,000 the
Moldavians constituting about half and the Russians about a quarter

Bessarabia had greatly prospered under Russian rule; a century ot
peaceful development with the assistance of^Russian capital had made
of it one of the richest Provinces of the Empire. ^ mm

After the March, 1917 Revolution a Provincial Council Sfatul lam
was established in Kishinev; this body displayed federalist tendencies
but was decidedly hostile to Rumanian pretensions to the Province.

At the end of 1917 the Rumanian Government, profiting by the dis
integration of the Russian army and by the presence of Rumanian
troops in Bessarabia (reorganized in the Russian rear after their defeat
by Mackensen), occupied the Province with the assent of a minority m
the Sfatul Tarii. A Rumanian proclamation to the people gave the
assurance that no annexation of the Province was contemplated. On
March 27, 1918, however, Rumanian soldiers occupied the Council
Chamber and the members of the Sfatul Tarii were coerced into^passmg
a resolution in favour of incorporation with the Rumanian Kingdom,
the vote being taken openly and by name. A few hourc later the whole
administration was taken over by the Rumanian military, while the
few members of the Council who had had the courage to protest against
this action were summarily executed.

The occupation of South Russia by Bolshevik troops in the spring of
1918 forced the Rumanians to agree to return the Province to Russia,
the treaty being signed by General Averescu on behalf of the Rumanian
Government. The Reds were, however, obliged to retreat north of the
Ukraine by the advance of the Germans; the Rumanians, who had
concluded a separate peace with the Central Empires in 1917, abrogated
their agreement with the Reds.

In 1920 (Oct. 28) Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan
recognized the Rumanian annexation of Bessarabia; the United States,
however, refused to be party to this transaction. No Russian Govern
ment has ever recognized the Rumanian claim to Bessarabia and there
is no difference of opinion on the subject among the Russians at home
or abroad.

The anti-Russian policy pursued by the Rumanians in the Province

NATIONALITIES 119

is well known and has led over a hundred thousand people to emigrate
into the U.S.S.R. where they were settled in the so-called Moldavian
Autonomous Republic. Several popular risings occurred in the Province,
the most serious being that of Akkerman in 1924.

Thus Bessarabia remains to this day a sore point of Eastern European
politics. Torn between the Rumanian oppression and the fear of a Red
regime the Province still awaits the decision of its destinies.

THE JEWISH QUESTION

THE HISTORICAL PAST OF THE JEWS IN RUSSIA AND THE
ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN LEGISLATION RESPECTING THE JEWS

THE catastrophic collapse of the Russian Empire, and the formation of
independent States on its Western borders, brought about the dispersal
of the hitherto united six million Russian Jews, and made a sudden
break in the long line of their historical development a break which
reduced this people to a state of unprecedented cultural and economic
decline.

The Jews came into contact with Russia as early as the tenth century,
when Jewish settlers from the Judaic Kingdom of the Khozars (the
Black and Caspian Sea littoral) came to Kiev. However, until the end
of the eighteenth century there was no Jewish problem in the strict
sense of the word. The Jews settled in the Russian and Ukrainian towns
suffered occasional persecutions, owing to religious fanaticism; there
were occasional pogroms in the Ukraine (under Russian rule since the
middle of the seventeenth century) ; but on the whole the relations be
tween the Jews and the Christians were satisfactory and the former
suffered no legal limitations. Jews occasionally rose to important posi
tions in the Russian State, i. e. the Vice-Chancellor under Peter the
Great was a Jew, Shafirov, who was subsequently raised to a barony.

The position changed radically when Russia in the reign of Catherine
the Great, acquired large Polish territories, thickly inhabited by Jews.

The latter had come to settle in Poland in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, flying from persecutions generally meted against them under
the guidance of the Roman Church in the Iberian Peninsula, Germany
and the Holy Roman Empire. The Jews suffered various legal dis
abilities under the Polish regime and it is this that Russia inherited in
the three successive partitions of Poland.

The first took place in 1772 when Russia obtained the ancient Russian
province of Polotzk (White Russia) thus, for the first time, adding to
her possessions a territory which had been inhabited for centuries by a
large, settled Jewish population. Empress Catherine approached the
Jewish question with the tolerant ideas prevalent in that age of en
lightenment; and the only reason which kept her from granting the Jews
full permission to live where they liked in the Empire, and equal rights
with the Christian population, was her wish not to make sensational

120

THE JEWISH QUESTION 121

changes in internal policy. This was very natural in the case of a
monarch who realized that her own legal position was anomalous. In
an Imperial manifesto to the inhabitants of White Russia announcing
the new order, and confirming the old rights of all classes of the popu
lation, special mention was made of the Jews; who, however, were
promised only the same rights which were indeed few as they had
enjoyed under Polish rule. The words of the manifesto, however,
speaking of her Majesty's humanity and the impossibility of excluding
"only them" (L e. the Jews) "from the general act of grace," raised
radiant hopes among many of the Jews.

The Councils of the Elders

The peculiar autonomous organization of the Jews found expression
in the so-called Councils of the Elders (Kahal), constituted in every
town or hamlet possessing a Jewish community. The Council of the
Elders had jurisdiction over its own race in matters of litigation (pro
vided both parties were Jews), as well as in fiscal transactions relating
to the collection and payment of State taxes (e. g. poll-tax, land tax,
etc.). Later, this right of distributing and collecting taxes was much
abused by the local Councils of Elders, and this resulted in the decline
and final abolition of this institution (1844).

When, in 1778, the provincial constitution was introduced into White
Russia, by which the legal position of the urban population was regu
larized and guilds of merchants brought into being, some of the richer
Jews enrolled in these guilds with a view to gradually freeing themselves
from the strict and troublesome authority of the Councils. Many of them
were honoured by being elected to public positions by their fellow citizens;
but this provoked the opposition of their trade rivals and of the Roman
Catholic clergy, leading to appeals in St. Petersburg. In spite of this,
the Empress held firmly to her broad, liberal views with regard to the
Jews and paid no attention to complaints ; thus encouraged, the Councils
of the Elders frequently petitioned the Empress, begging particularly
for the removal of the disabilities which forbade their living in the
villages. In her anxiety to form a strong and solid middle-class in
Russia, Catherine had forbidden (1782) the urban population to settle
in rural districts. The whole Jewish population came automatically under
this edict. By the irony of fate this comparatively innocent decree of
the Government, although at the time not put into effect, was destined
to be the origin of one of the most serious restrictions upon the Jewish
community and lasted until the Revolution of 1917.

The Distilleries

To the same period may be referred the notorious question of the
distilleries. This industry had been in Jewish hands for many genera
tions, since it was customary for the Polish nobility to farm out many
of their seignorial prerogatives to the ubiquitous Jews. One of the most
important, that of distilling and selling spirits, thus fell entirely into

122 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

the hands of the Jews. The latter were apparently attracted to this
business by its quick returns: a very important factor, considering that
the Jew lacked the usual rights of citizenship and was entirely dependent
on the landowner who was quite capable of breaking the contract,
seizing the Jew's earnings, and turning him off the estate. In many cases
the farming-out of distilleries, owing to keen competition, ceased to be
remunerative; but it was difficult for them to obtain release from their
obligations to the landowners. The landowner might oblige his distiller
to sell a minimum quantity of vodka for which he was made liable. The
Government, in order to end this and also the publicans' activities as
money lenders, forbade the Jews to sell spirits in the villages, but
allowed them to do so in the towns. *

The Pale of Settlement

The Jews were not at liberty to settle in every locality of the Empire.
In addition to the Polish provinces and parts of the Ukraine the Pale
of Settlement had at that "time been extended to include the Provinces
of Kiev, Chernigov and the district of Novgorod-Seversk. In 1793 and
1795 it was again extended by the addition of a vast territory, including
Lithuania, Curland, Volhynia and Podolia, ceded to Russia after the
second and third partitions of Poland. The density of the Jewish popu
lation on the western frontiers of the Empire began to be a danger to
itself and a nuisance to the Government which therefore endeavoured
to transfer the surplus population to the empty lands of New Russia,
where new towns were rapidly springing up. In order to exercise indirect
pressure on the Jews, double taxation was imposed upon them in the
western Provinces; those who consented to remove to the south were
immediately released from this burden.

The Jews were given the right of voting in municipal elections; but
in order to placate the Roman Catholic electors, who were dissatisfied
with the political successes of the Jews under the new regime, the Jewish
vote was limited to one-third of the total number of electors. A special
curia was formed from the Jews eligible for election; a measure which,
on the whole, did not satisfy the Jewish population, who in some cases,
would have, preferred a well-meaning Christian deputy to a Jew. In
Lithuania, where the Polish element prevailed in the towns, the dis
abilities of the Jews remained the same as they had been under Polish
rule. A similar situation arose in Curland, where the German burghers
jealously guarded the ancient privileges which had come down to them
from the days of the Livonian Order; a feature of whose statutes was
the complete denial of rights to the Jews. In Poland, the landowners
sided with the Polish burghers in upholding the Jewish disabilities. Thus
the reform did little to lighten the burden of the race.

The Village Jew

The Jews, although they had never actually been serfs, had for cen
turies lived in the villages in a state of oppression and degradation. It

THE JEWISH QUESTION 123

was not to be wondered at, therefore, that the landowners came, in time,
to look upon them as their menials; and the Russian Government's
endeavours to give them the rights of citizenship was as distasteful to
the Polish nobility as the liberation of their Christian serfs would have
been.

On July 28, 1797, a new ukaze was published which had the effect
of removing the Jews, who were ruining the peasants by their question
able business dealings, from the villages. The Councils of Elders,
seriously alarmed, convened a great Jewish congress at Ostrog in
Volhynia, which decided to send representatives to St. Petersburg who
should appeal directly to the Emperor (Paul I). It is not known, how
ever, whether anything resulted from this deputation, or even whether
it was actually sent. However, the Government again refrained from
enforcing the law.

II
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Alexander I

ALEXANDER'S accession to the throne, on which Russia set such high
hopes, seemed also to presage amelioration in the conditions of the Jews.
Alexander I was disposed to regard the Jewish problem as a State ques
tion of the first importance. A Committee for the Welfare of the Jews
was formed, comprising both prominent officials and personal friends of
the Emperor. The well-known statesman, Speransky, was greatly inter
ested in this Committee's work. He recommended that the Jews should
be uplifted by developing their moral and spiritual culture, by encourag
ing education among them, and by reducing their disabilities as much as
possible while promising them speedy and complete equality with the
rest of the population in the event of the success of these measures. The
Committee listened favourably to the representations of the Councils of
Elders (1802). Its opinions were divided, however, some advocating
-complete and immediate equality for the Jews, others recommending a
more gradual transition and qualified reservations, i. e., discriminating
treatment of the various categories of the Jewish population, in accord
ance with their importance in regard to the general interests of the State.

Two tendencies were, therefore, apparent in the Decree for the Regu
lation of Jewish Affairs of December, 1804, which was brought forward
by the Committee and confirmed by the Emperor: and which, for a
short time, constituted the fundamental character of Jewish rights in
Russia.

While maintaining an attitude of disapproval towards the activities
of the Jewish publicans and usurers in the villages, the Decree in every
way encouraged the Jew to undertake agricultural work. The regulations
which prescribed their removal from the villages of the Polish Provinces,

i2 4 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

were confirmed, and the final term for this fixed (according to locality)
as either January 1st, 1807, or January 1st, 1808. On the other hand,
they were invited to settle anywhere in New Russia 1 and were prom
ised that, if their colonization proved successful, the Provinces of Astra
khan and North Caucasus would be included in the Pale of Jewish
Settlement. The assistance and protection of the Government was prom
ised not only to the agriculturists, but also to those engaged in trade and
manufacture, who were all freed from double taxation.

The Decree made the question of the complete equality of the Jews
dependent on their willingness to conform to the general practices of the
Empire, and endeavoured to restrict the functions of the Councils of
Elders to purely religious (and, to a certain extent, fiscal) matters. Great
importance was attached in the Decree to the speedy establishment of
schools for Jews; where, instead of Talmudistic dogmas, they were to
be taught the language of the country, foreign languages and the
sciences. The Jews were also encouraged to depart from many of their
obsolete customs which were founded entirely on superstition and which
gave offense to their neighbours (the wearing of side ringlets, strangely-
cut clothes, etc.) .

The beginning of the nineteenth century was marked by an intensive
emigration of the Jews to New Russia where towns, villages and col
onies sprang up with truly American rapidity. At the same time, how
ever, the Government insisted on enforcing the laws relative to the trans
fer of the Polish Jews from the villages to the towns in the Polish
Provinces. Instructions to this effect were sent to the local authorities;
the Jews were forcibly removed to the towns where they became a bur
den upon the already impoverished Jewish community. The threat of
French invasion after the campaigns of 1805 and 1807, put an end to
these expulsions. Since then there has been no recurrence of such mass
movements in Russia; although the prohibition preventing Jews from
settling in villages remained in force until the Revolution.

Nicholas I

It is interesting to note that the Decembrists, on the whole, adopted an
anti-Semitic attitude. It is difficult to estimate how the revolt of Decem
ber 14, 1825 would have affected the Jews had it been successful; but
Pestel, the author of a draft constitution, proposed 'their entire removal
from Russia to territory in Asia Minor, especially acquired for this pur
pose.

The reign of Nicholas I is by far the most memorable in the history
of the Russian Jews since they first came under the dominion of the
Tzars. This monarch was keenly interested in his Jewish subjects and
wished them well; but the history of Russian Jewry during his reign
proves once more how the best intentions, too drastically carried out,
may become a source of dire calamity to those whom it is sought to bene
fit. The Emperor who was personally inclined, if not to grant the Jews

Sea Littoral,

THE JEWISH QUESTION 125

complete civil equality, at least gradually to give them certain privi
leges made these favours dependent on the rapidity with which the
Jews could a'bandon their seclusion and join in the general social life of
the country. One of the most potent means of bringing the Jews into
closer contact with the native population was the application to them, in
1827, of the recruiting laws. No fault, naturally, was to be found with
the actual measure; but the manner in which it was carried out formed,
in effect, one of the most barbarous persecutions to which the Jewish
race had ever been subjected since its dispersal.

In order the more successfully to attain the object of the measure, the
age of the Jewish recruits was fixed at from 12 to 25 years, instead of
the normal 20 to 35. A mutual guarantee for providing recruits was es
tablished in the communities; and as the parents of young boys naturally
hid them, Jewish boys were rounded up in the streets, no attention being
paid to any plea of their insufficient age.

In 1840 a Committee for the Reorganization of the Jews was formed,
but seems to have served no practical purpose. A new regulation was
issued at this period, by which the quota of Jewish recruits for a given
number of the population, was increased five-fold as compared with
that of the Christians.

In 1844 the civil authority of the Councils of Elders was officially and
finally abolished. About the same time increased activity was shown in
the establishment of Jewish schools. In this work Lilienthal (who died in
the eighties in America, where he was Rabbi at Cincinnati, Ohio) took a
particularly active part, as did the Minister of Public Education,
Count Uvarov. The funds for building such schools came mainly from
the so-called peddling dues, which remained in force until the Revolu
tion, and which were a peculiar form of indirect taxation. They included
a tax on kosher meat and some other articles of consumption; these dues
were usually paid to the Government by private individuals, mostly
Jews, to whom they were farmed out. The wearing of Jewish dress was
also taxed naturally, since the Government made every effort to do
away with it.

Monte fiore in Russia

In 1846 the well-known philanthropist, Sir Moses Montefiore, an
English Jew, visited Russia. He was ceremoniously received by the
authorities; and during his stay in the capital he presented an extensive
report on the subject of the Jewish reforms to the Minister of the In
terior, Count Kisselev. The Government gave him every facility in his
journeys through Russia. Count Kisselev, himself although he con
sidered that there was a great difference, not to the latter's advantage,
between European and Russian Jews held most liberal views with re
gard to the Jewish question. However, Nicholas I considered it necessary
to exercise the utmost caution in gradually granting to the Jews the
rights of citizenship, and still more as regards giving them the right to
enter the services of the State, or to hold official posts.

M 6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

The "Catchers 33

During the last years of Nicholas I's reign a fateful gloom pervaded
the towns within the Pale of Jewish Settlement. The enlistment law held
the Jewish population in a cleft stick. On the one hand, the Jews (and
only they) were obliged, as a fine for the non-payment of taxes, to pro
vide additional recruits over and above their already "normal" five-fold
quota; on the other hand, the forcible recruiting of the best workmen
bled the Jewish population white and made it impossible for thereto pay
their taxes regularly. Special agents went along the streets looking for
boys; these so-called "catchers" (who were mostly Jews) entered the
houses, pulled boys of 8 to 10 years old from their hiding places and tore
them away from their screaming and weeping mothers.

Alexander II

The accession of Alexander II inspired the most radiant hopes
among the Jews. Count Kisselev again brought forward his liberal
schemes. The Minister for the Interior, Count Lanskoy, and^Count A.
G. Stroganov, the Governor-General of New Russia, went still further
by proposing the complete abolition of all Jewish civil disabilities and
all restrictions upon Jewish settlement. The liberation of the serfs in
1861 had also its repercussion upon the Jewish question. The landowners
of Great Russia, who had lost their right to the labour of the serf crafts
men (tailors, bootmakers, carpenters, locksmiths, etc.) tried to attract
Jewish artisans to their estates, and were highly incensed when the police
sent these back to the Pale of Settlement.

Somewhat more guarded and evidently influenced by former sugges
tions with regard to differential treatment and its gradations, were the
opinions given on the Jewish question by Count Bludoy, another well-
known official of the first years of Alexander IFs reign. About this^time,
the idea of differential treatment began to make headway even in the
more well-to-do Jewish circles.

The cultural and habitual aloofness of the Jews gradually began to be
relaxed. An ever-increasing number of Jews adopted the Russian lan
guage and Russian customs; an atmosphere was created which made
^for the spread of education, the desire for a better knowledge of Russia
and the promotion of a better understanding of the Jews by the Rus
sians. An important periodical devoted to Jewish interests, entitled
"Razsvet" (The Dawn), was published in Russian. Some zealous ad
herents of these new tendencies considered it useless, and even mis
chievous, to retain the German-Jewish dialect (Yiddish). An enlightened
Jew (an expert on Jewish doctrine, law and customs and an official cen
sor of Jewish publications) attached to the Governor-General of New
Russia suggested that the printing of Yiddish books be prohibited. This
measure was not carried out in a drastic manner, but provincial gov
ernors in the south sometimes forbade the publication of books, and the
performance of plays in Yiddish. As a matter of fact the authorities

THE JEWISH QUESTION 127

turned a blind eye to most of these restrictions; but many, nevertheless,
were not actually repealed until the Revolution.

All attempts at an immediate improvement of the Jews' legal position
were hindered by the attitude timid rather than unfriendly of the
Emperor Alexander II. For instance he would not allow Jewish soldiers,
who had completed the long-term service of Nicholas' days, to settle
where they liked unless they had been baptized. At the same time, how
ever, Jewish doctors were permitted to enter the Army Medical Service.
In the decree establishing the Zemstvos no limitations were imposed
upon the election of Jews as members of the Zemstvos in Provinces with
in the Pale of Settlement; but the regulations governing municipal elec
tions enacted that not more than one third of any town Council were to
be Jews.

In examining all these vicissitudes of the Jewish question, it may be
noted that a social movement was beginning to make itself felt, among
the Jews themselves, which tended to meet the views of the Govern
ment. From the early seventies onwards the attendance of Jews in the
schools established for them, which had been reorganized and greatly
improved, showed a marked increase. This was largely due to the in
fluence of N. I. Pirogov, the well-known physician and educator. In 1879
all Jews holding the diplomas of higher educational establishments were
granted the right to domicile anywhere in the Empire.

The "Pogroms" *

In 1881 the first wave of pogroms swept over the south of Russia
that at Elizavetgrad being particularly fierce. Those who took part in
these pogroms were not confined to the roughest part of the population
(the rabble of the towns and, on market days the peasants of the neigh
bouring villages), but comprised also the more advanced and from a
revolutionary point of view "reliable" elements, such as railwaymen.
It is an established fact that one of the early classics of pogrom litera
ture in Russia is a proclamation by the Executive Committee of the
Party of People's Freedom (the predecessors of the Social-Revolution
aries), calling upon its members to attack the landowners and Jews.
What was more significant, however, was that at about this time some of
the young men of the Jewish intelligentsia began, to the Government's
great surprise, to join the revolutionary movement.

The 1882 Reforms

The disorders in the south once again recalled the Government's atten
tion to the Jewish question. A conference was convened at the Ministry
of the Interior. The resulting output of regulations, which- subjected the
rights of the Jews to difficult (and sometimes even offensive) restric
tions, consisted of a mass of heterogeneous provisional instructions and
circulars which could be and, in 1915 and 1916, actually were re
scinded by a simple stroke of the Minister's pen.

1 Anti-Semitic riots.

128 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

The Committee drafted regulations with regard to the expulsion of
the Jews from villages on the strength of decisions to be taken by village
meetings; for which decisions unlike the common practice in such cases
a simple majority, however small, was sufficient. The Minister of
Finance, N. K. Bunge, protested against these regulations. A compro
mise was arrived at the Jews were forbidden to settle in the villages or
to acquire property there, with an exception made for those already
possessing such rights. According to established rules these rights de
scended also to their heirs; but as the families increased and the hold
ings became divided and, also, through marriages with unprivileged
persons legal complications arose, the settlement of which caused the
Government a great deal of trouble.

It is of interest to note that the sale of intoxicants by the Jews was
eventually permitted; this regulation remained in force until Witte's
financial reform (1895), which established a State monopoly for the
distilling of spirits and for their sale at a uniform price. This act auto
matically did away with the Jewish public-houses.

The well-known "provisional regulations" of May 3, 1882, definitely
established and confirmed (in principle) the status of the Russian Jews,
which remained practically unaltered until the Revolution. The last
manifestation of liberal tendencies with regard to the Jews on the part
of administrative and official circles were the decisions of the special
commission under the presidency of Count Pahlen (1883-1888) affirm
ing the desirability in principle of granting the Jews full rights of
citizenship; but these decisions were not confirmed in higher quarters,
and remained a dead letter.

The First Revolution

It is a 'singular fact that all this remained unchanged by the Revolu
tion of 1905. The Duma made absolutely no alteration in the legal status
of the Jews. Those orators of the Duma who belonged to the extreme
reactionary parties denounced the Jews from the tribune; while the
deputies of the Left defended them very feebly. There were but few
Jewish deputies in the Dumas (two only in the fourth). Not a single
restrictive decree was rescinded, although from time to time, new ones
were added. In the practical application of the few rights still left to the
Jews and in all disputed questions the authorities in nearly every case
interpreted the law restrictively. Local administrative bodies often
paid little attention to instructions from above, but established in rela
tion to the Jews under their jurisdiction an independent system of op
pression.

Even more distasteful to the wider circles of the Jewish population
than the restrictions with regard to domicile were the disabilities con
nected with education. Whereas formerly the Government had endeav
oured in every way to attract the Jews to the schools in order to teach
them Russian, and even to give them a rudimentary knowledge of the
sciences, from the beginning of the nineties when the desire for edu-

THE JEWISH QUESTION 129

cation was firmly rooted among a considerable portion of the Jews, and
numbers of Jewish scholars flocked to the schools in the Pale of Settle
mentthe Government suddenly changed its tactics and began to limit
the enrollment of Jews in the higher, special, and later, even in the sec
ondary educational establishments. In the last years before the War, the
ratio of Jewish pupils in the secondary schools of the Pale of Settlement
(in towns where^the population was mainly Jewish) was not more than
15% of the Christian pupils a proportion which was reduced to 10%
outside the Pale and to 5% in the capitals, while in the higher educa
tional establishments of the capitals, (many of which were entirely
closed to the Jews), it barely reached 2%-

It was^possible to evade these restrictions upon secondary education
by combining private tuition with examination as an "outside pupil."
Accordingly, within the Pale such outside pupils were almost entirely
young Jews. The examinations were extremely difficult, and were made
more so by discrimination against the Jews. Higher education did not
even offer this alternative while in 1911 the quota limitation of the
secondary schools was made to include outside pupils also. Numbers of
Jewish students flocked to foreign Universities where they lived in
great poverty and squalor, continually worked upon by the propaganda
of revolutionary agents. Having, after untold hardship and privation,
concluded his studies, the young Jew was again faced, on his return to
Russia, with a terrible reminder of his lack of civil rights in such forms
as a quota scheme regulating the State examinations for obtaining dip
lomas, restriction of domicile, etc. In addition to the minority who had
obtained higher education abroad, and those who had been fortunate
enough to be accepted by the Russian Universities under the quota
scheme, there were many who held no school certificates, and who had
been debarred from going to the universities just when they were begin
ning to appreciate the advantages of education. They were readily in
fected by the revolutionary virus and from among them came the half
educated and semi-cultured Jews, who later, in the long-expected cata
clysm, joined the Communist Revolution with irreconcilable rancour and
vindictiveness.

It is from this class of semi-intelligentsia that the Soviet regime draws
its most reliable officials, entirely devoted to the new order, willing to
fill every imaginable post for the supervision of "politically unreliable"
elements, and to enforce Communism with even more devotion than
the old order had enforced limitations against them.

The Beylis Case

The last event which crowned thirty years of State oppression directed
towards restricting the rights of the Jews and debarring them from
participating in the general development of the Empire, was the notori
ous Beylis case at Kiev (1911-1913). In this lawsuit an innocent person
was accused, on very flimsy evidence, and with the help of the criminal
element of the town, of a horrible ritual crime. The mainstay of the ac-

i 3 o RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

cusation was the baleful legend of the ritual murders of Christians by
Jews. The trial ended in an acquittal, in spite of the Government's
efforts to convict Beylis.

Ill

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE JEWS IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE THE WAR AND THE REVOLUTION

THE fundamental restrictions on the Jews in Russia immediately pre
ceding the War were:

a) Restriction of domicile to the Pale of Settlement, embracing but a
small part of the territory of the Empire. The Pale of Settlement in
cluded the Provinces of: Bessarabia, Grodno, Ekaterinoslav, Kovno,
Minsk, Moghilev, Podolia, Poltava, Taurida, (without the southern
coast of the Crimea), Kherson (without the town of Nikolaev), Cherni
gov, Kiev (without the town of Kiev) and Kholm, Vilna, and Vitebsk, as
well as the Polish Provinces. It was greater in area than any one Euro
pean country, but this consideration loses its effect when it is remem
bered that in most Provinces the Jews were not allowed to live outside
the towns.

There existed, nevertheless, certain groups of individuals who per
manently or temporarily enjoyed the advantage of being allowed to live
outside the Pale, and even in the capitals; these were: persons holding
university degrees, specialists (doctors, engineers, lawyers, etc.) while
exercising their profession, students who had successfully overcome the
obstacles of the quota (while at school) ; merchants of the first guild (so
long as they paid guild dues and income-tax); soldiers serving with
the colours; descendants of Crimean War veterans (1854-1855) ; quali
fied artisans, holding trade certificates (only while plying their trades)
and a few others.

b) Complete inability to enter Government service. This with very
few exceptions, was rigorously enforced.

c) Restrictions upon entering the service of the Zemstvos except as
doctors.

d) Restrictions upon entering the profession of the law; the quota
regulating the enrollment of Jews as solicitors' clerks closed this career
to the majority of Jewish aspirants.

e) In the army no Jew could hold officer's rank. A special form of
mutual guarantee was instituted for the Jews in respect of military serv
ice: if any man failed to report at the proper time at the recruiting sta
tion, his place was filled up from among those who had been given ex
emption for family reasons. Failure to report at the proper time, besides
being a legal offence, was punishable by a heavy fine (levied exclusively
on Jews).

THE JEWISH QUESTION 13 1

f) The Jewish quota for the State schools was established at 10%
only (5% in the capitals).

g) Inability to acquire landed property in places outside the Pale of
Settlement or, with some exceptions, in the villages within the Pale. Ex
ceptions were also made for the Jewish Agricultural Colonies scattered
over the whole area these will be more fully dealt with later. 1

The War and the Jews

The Imperial Government during the last years of its existence showed
a definite tendency to remove these restrictions. The Pale ceased to exist
from the very first days of the War, when hundreds of thousands of
refugees from Poland and Lithuania, and among them innumerable
Jews, fled in terror before the enemy invasion, and spread over the In
terior of Russia (about 20 Provinces of the Pale of Settlement were in
the zone of military operations). In these circumstances it was impos
sible to discriminate between the refugees; and the sword of war cut
the Gordian knot of the domicile question. Later in the War about a
quarter of a million Jews were called up for military service, and fought
side by side with their Christian fellow-citizens. Young Jews invalided
out of the army, their relatives and the relatives of Jews killed in action
saw the school quota abolished for them. The removal of educational
restrictions on the Jews proceeded rapidly with the appointment of
Count P. Ignatiev as Minister of Education. He did his utmost to repair
the injustice which, until .then, had been meted out to Jewish students.

Great is the power of national inertia, while the national memory ^is
short. The deeply tragic history of the last decades of the Imperial
regime will always it may be, remain associated in most Jewish minds
with memories of harsh injustice. Very few will remember that Russia
was the first Christian State where, as early as the eighteenth century,
the principle of "equal rights for the Jews" was commended from the
Throne. In the purblind party struggles between the Jews and their
Christian opponents and enemies, it has already been forgotten that
one of the last acts of the dying regime was the removal of most Jewish
disabilities.

In concluding the history of the legal disabilities of the Jews it must
be stated that the generally accepted legend that these were only re
moved by the Soviet Government is entirely misleading. As a matter
of fact the complete and comprehensive removal of restrictions was one
of the first acts of the Provisional Government (March 1917).

Statistics of the Jewish Population
of the Empire (Census of 1897)

In 1897, the total Jewish population of the Empire was returned as
5,189,401 persons of both sexes (4.1396 of the population). Of this total
93.9% lived in the 25 Provinces of the Pale of Settlement. The total pop-

X A11 these restrictions held good as long as a Jew remained faithful to his religion.
Every disability disappeared automatically when a Jew embraced some other religion.

132 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

ulation of the Pale of Settlement amounted to 42,338,367 of these
4,805,354 (11.596) were Jews. At the beginning of the War the number
of Jews in the Empire had grown to about 6,500,000.

IV
THE CONTEMPORARY POSITION OF RUSSIAN JEWRY

THE extensive participation of the Jewish intelligentsia in the Russian
revolutionary movement goes back some 40 years. The rise of revolu
tionary feeling among the Jews should, apparently, be attributed to a
psychological reaction brought about by the anti-Jewish policy of Alex
ander Ill's government. It was, however, only at the beginning of
Nicholas II's reign, and under the influence of the general spirit pervad
ing the country, that the pent-up revolutionary stream began to flow.
Numbers of Jewish youths joined the revolutionary parties, especially
those who had failed, owing to the quota system, to gain the longed-for
admittance to schools. The Jewish revolutionaries were mostly of the
poorest classes on whom the burden of disqualification naturally fell
most harshly; and their sense of racial humiliation became subcon
sciously merged into rancorous hatred of the existing social system.

The Bund

Naturally, the revolutionary-minded intelligentsia were only too ready
to involve the working classes in this movement. In 1897 a Union of the
Jewish workmen of Lithuania, Poland and Russia was formed under the
name of the Bund. Its influence over the Jewish masses was, however,
negligible. During the 1917 Revolution most of the members of the
Bund joined the Communists, and the rest were expelled or exiled.

Many Jews were prominent in the Russian revolutionary parties. Of
the two principal ones the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Demo
crats Jewish sympathies clearly tended towards the right wing of the
latter (the Mensheviks). Both the founders and leaders of the Menshe-
vik section of this Party, Martov and Axelrod, were Jews. The pro
gramme of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, relating to the peasants'
movement and the agrarian question mostly, attracted less attention.
There were also many Jews in the moderate liberal parties.

The Revolution

The Jews, perhaps, more than any other section of the population
maintained the Revolutionary tradition through the years of pacification
that marked the Stolypin regime and hailed the "great and bloodless"
Revolution of March 1917 with enthusiasm. The great bulk of the Jews
were, however, moderate socialists and at first their membership of the
Bolshevik Party was small.

Among the leaders of the Communist Party there were, of course,

THE JEWISH QUESTION 133

Jews, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotzky, loffe and others. But they were
"internationalists," and the Jewish population could not regard them as
champions of their national cause. Most of the Jews put their faith in
the Provisional Government. They were not much affected by the ideo
logical discussions among the various parties in the capitals, and paid
little heed to the ominous signs of an approaching catastrophe.

For a time, and until the spirit of those who opposed the Communist
tyrants was broken, the Jewish intelligentsia of the capitals and the
large towns in no way lagged behind the Russians in resisting them.
There were many Jews among those who sought to avenge the dispersal
of the Constituent Assembly and the disgrace of Brest-Litovsk. Thus the
president of the Cheka, Uritzky, himself a Jew, was murdered by a Jew,
Kannegiesser, while Dora Kaplan, who wounded Lenin, was also a
Jewess.

Nor was separatism popular among the Jews. Forcible severance from
Russia was not desired by most of the Jews; still the proclamations of
separatist groups promising every kind of self-determination and all the
blessings of this world sounded sweet in the ears of the radical Jewish
intelligentsia. In the Ukraine in particular the Jewish participation in
the separatist movement was strong. Many Jews even look somewhat
leniently upon the fact that the most terrible pogroms to which the
Jewish race has ever been subjected were organized by Ukrainian So
cialists and separatists fighting against the "Imperialism of Moscow."

In Russia proper, meanwhile, where the Soviet power had been suc
cessful in its struggle on several fronts, the small body of Jewish in
telligentsia living outside the Pale of Settlement quickly lost its animosity
against the Soviets, and adapted itself to the fact of the astounding polit
ical success gained by the Communists over their enemies. The fact that
the leaders of the White anti-Communist movement had at the time of
its greatest success condoned much injustice and oppression with regard
to the Jews (anti-Semite agitation in the White Press, disorderly conduct
towards the Jewish population, etc.) greatly affected the situation.

The Appeal of Communism

All this was, of course, made the subject of increased agitation among
the Jewish population, and especially the intelligentsia, at the time of the
final triumph of the Communists.

It is not to be wondered at that Communist propaganda was so ex
traordinarily successful among the Jewish intelligentsia. The bewilder
ment and uncertainty of judgment to be noticed among them, due to
their sudden break from the century-old religious and intellectual tradi
tions of their race, naturally predisposed them to the acceptance of a
social Utopia. The campaign against purely idealistic science, and the
destruction of the spiritual elite of the population, in some unaccountable
way flattered the morbid self-esteem of the half-cultured provincials
who had been denied education by the old regime. The enormous growth
of Communist bureaucracy absorbed the whole of the available Jewish

134 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

intelligentsia partly by the chances it offered of escaping death from
famine, and partly because it seemed to be a form of actual State service
and participation in power, so dear to these step-sons of the old regime
who had always been bereft of rights. Naturally, the elite of the Jewish
race in Russia declined to have any dealing with Communism; and in
consequence it was either destroyed or compelled to emigrate. The mem
bers of the different opposition parties (Mensheviks and Revolutionary
Socialists, not to mention the bourgeois Zionists), are still persecuted
quite as virulently as their non-Jewish colleagues. It is a remarkable fact
that this procedure, in spite of all protests by those friends of the perse
cuted who live beyond the reach of Communist authority, has not im
pelled the great majority of the Jewish intelligentsia outside the U.S.S.R.
to take any outstanding part in denouncing the Communists,

This may be to a great extent (though not entirely) explained by the
conditions under which the Jews at present live in those parts of the
Pale which have been separated from the U.S.S.R. Hemmed in by the
frontiers of several new States, the Jewish population of a considerable
part of the Pale of Settlement found itself unexpectedly cut off from the
economic and intellectual life of a great Empire. The anti-Jewish chau
vinism of the new nations brought about such conditions of life for the
Jews as made their old pre-Revolution life in Russia appear a lost para
dise.

Jews in the U.S.S.R.

In Soviet territory, on the other hand, the economic position of the
Jewish population is tragic. The Draconian laws of the Soviets offer
hardly any economic independence to artisans, and none whatever to
traders. Masses of the Jewish population are not only deprived of civil
rights (as they were under the old regime) but even of the elementary,
human right to obtain food: 35% of the Jewish population belongs to
the category of the so-called "deprived" (disenfranchised), whereas the
average percentage of disenfranchised in the whole country does not ex
ceed 6%. Whole categories of the Jewish population (<?. g. teachers and
rabbis) are deliberately condemned to die of hunger. Furthermore, the
systematic persecution of the Jewish religion, which is carried out in a
coarse and offensive manner, insulting to racial dignity, deserves special
comment.

One would have thought, in such a terrible situation as this, that
as Jews are scattered all over the globe, the whole world would be ring
ing with Jewish denunciations of Communism. What a short time ago
seemed inevitable (the Beylis case) has now become impossible. The
frontiers of the U.S.S.R. are carefully guarded, and nothing but praise
of Communism may cross them. Far more important is the marked dif
ference in their present position; whereas formerly the authority which
oppressed the Jews was something strange and foreign to them, some
thing in which they were never called upon to take part, now things are
different: the unheard-of despotism which is slowly starving the Jewish

THE JEWISH QUESTION 135

population to death is, in most cases, represented in the towns by full-
blooded Jews, fanatically devoted to the Soviet power. For most Jewish
artisans and tradesmen the existence of this regime means physical de
struction; but on the other hand thousands of the semi-intellectuals and
social failures in the small towns have tasted unlimited, uncensured
power. From the statistics given later, it will be seen that the percentage
of Jews in the Communist Party is not as great as is generally supposed;
but there is no doubt that no other section of the community has con
tributed to it so many whole-hearted and undoubtedly "reliable" fa
natics.

Contemporary Statistics of the Jews

According to the census of 1926, the total number of Jews in the
U.S.S.R., is computed at 2,672,398 of whom 59% live in the Ukraine,
15.2% in White Russia, 2,2% in Great Russia and the remaining 3.8% in
different Federal Republics. The following table shows the social (pro
fessional) composition of the Jewish population at that time:

Social Groups % ^

Workmen * H-8

Peasants 9- 1

Artisans l8 -9

Government clerks 2 3-3

Liberal professions *&

Traders JI - 6

Unemployed 9-3

Persons of indefinite and unproductive professions 114

IOO.O

Investigation has established that some 400,000 families (I e. approxi
mately 1,200,000 persons) stood in need of outside assistance which
they could not obtain.

Unfortunately, more detailed results of the census of 1926, so far as
the Jews are concerned, are not available, and the following particulars
have been taken from the returns of the former (1923) census, as given
in a Soviet publication. 1 According to these particulars, the total number
of Jews in the U.S.S.R. was given, in 1923, as 2454,000; a figure which
indicated a slight increase in the Jewish population between 1923 and
1926. From the following considerations it will appear, however, that
these figures are open to considerable doubt in view of the general
mortality of the Jewish population in the U.S.S.R.

An analysis of the census of 1897 shows, for the present territory of
the U.S.S.R. a total Jewish population of 2,504,000 which gives, for
1923, an absolute decrease of 50,000. The natural increase in the popula
tion for the same period is estimated at 1,140,000; figures which, taken
together indicate a decrease of 1,190,000 Jews. In attempting to explain

1 "The Jewish population of the U.S.S.R.' 1 Moscow, 1927.

i 3 6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

this, the number of Jews who emigrated during the period is given at
600,000, while the victims of the pogroms of 1918-1920 are estimated at
100,000. If to this are added several tens of thousands who fell in the
War, or who were reported missing, there still remains, however, a
deficit of more than 450,000 persons, concerning whom the authors, ow
ing to the Soviet censorship, do not dare give the only true explanation
the rapid dying out of the Jews through the Revolution, the Civil War
and, especially, the present deadly economic policy of the Soviet regime.

In comparing the censuses of 1897 and 1926, the most interesting facts
that emerge concerning the Jewish population are: the sharp decrease
in the numbers of traders, professional workers, industrialists, farmers
and trade employees, and the appalling growth in the number of persons
having no fixed occupation. Another very important fact brought out by
the census of 1923 is the mass flight of the Jews from the villages to the
towns.

Even more illuminating, with respect to the decline of the Jewish
population in the U.S.S.R. are the interesting tables given in Soviet pub
lications, which show the percentage of the Jewish population, for vari
ous towns, in 1897 and 1923. From the particulars of the two republics
the Ukraine and White Russia in which most of the Jewish popula
tion (nearly 7$% of the U.S.S.R.) is to be found, it will be seen that in
the great majority of towns the number of Jews shows a great decrease
in 1923 as compared with 1897.

I*n the Ukraine the greatest decrease of the Jewish population since
i897isfoundatMoghilev-Podolsk (29%) andBerdichev (28%). Almost
the same decrease is to be seen in the large Jewish communities of Tul-
chin, Elizavetgrad, Bela-Tserkov, Nezhin and others. Certain towns
Vinnitza, Proskurov, Uman and Chernigov show a slight increase as
compared with 1897; although this, without doubt, is actually a decrease
as compared with 1913. In a few districts, of the Ukraine only, there
may be noticed an unexpected increase in the Jewish population, mainly
in the large industrial centres (which had formerly been outside the
Pale of Settlement e. g. Kiev) , where the Jewish artisans have gathered
in search of work. Thus in the Artemov (Bakhmut) district the Jewish
population is 3.88 times as great as in 1897, in the Kiev district 2.88
times (in Kiev itself the increase has been from 32,000 to 123,000) in
the Mariupol district 2.88 times, and in the Krivoy Rog district 1.99
times; on the other hand, in other towns the decline of the Jewish popu
lation is breaking all records. Information is available showing that the
Jewish population in Elizavetgrad decreased from 31,812 in 1920 to
18,871 in 1923; and in Odessa from 190,135 in 1920 to 130,041 in
1923. The proportion of the Jewish population to the whole population
of the Ukraine fell from 7.8% in 1897 to 5.3% in 1923. Even the imper
turbable Soviet statisticians were aghast at such, fluctuations of the popu
lation, and could think of no better explanation for it than a (mythical)
repatriation of alien subjects ! . . .

In White Russia the total decrease of the Jewish population of the

THE JEWISH QUESTION 137

towns between 1897 an( i *9 2 3 ' l& %% In the Moghilev district the de
crease amounts to 22%, in the district of Polotzk to 40%, and in that of
Slutzk to 22%. A slight increase (but only in comparison with 1897, i. e.
taking no account of 26 years of natural increase) Is noticeable in the
districts of Vitebsk 15%, and Minsk 2%.

Only in the R.S.F.S.R. is there a marked increase of the Jewish popu
lation from 252,000 in 1897 to 443? in J 9 2 3- This increase is not due
to any gradual improvement in living conditions, but to emigration
from the Pale of Settlement. A great increase of the Jewish population is
particularly noticeable in the capitals: in Moscow, in 1923, there were
87,000 Jews (as against 8,000 in 1897) and in Leningrad 52,000. This
increase may be almost exclusively ascribed to an influx of young Jews
from the Pale adherents to and sympathizers with Communism in
search of administrative and technical posts.

It may be well to give here a few particulars of the part taken by the
Jews in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. In 1922 Jews constituted
5.2% of the Party, in 1927 4.3%, in 1929 3.5%. The percentage of Jews
in the total population of the U.S.S.R. is approximately 1.8%.

Among the urban population the number of Jewish Communists per
1,000 was 20, whereas for the rest of the population it was 32. The spe
cial Jewish section of the Communist Party was dissolved in 1930.

JEWISH AGRICULTURAL COLONIES

a) Jewish Agriculture Before the Revolution

THE decree of 1804 encouraged the Jews to settle on the land, and the
first Jewish colonies soon arose in the Odessa and Kherson districts of
New Russia. The Jewish colonists were given allotments of land, granted
state loans, and allowed to pay diminished taxation for a certain period
of years. By the second decade of the nineteenth century, great distress
was felt among the colonists, owing to maladministration and the venal
ity of local officials; some of the colonists even died of starvation but
were replaced by others. During the reign of Nicholas I the colonists
were given further privileges (amongst others, the exemption of young
boys from military service). From 1830 onwards the colonists were for
bidden to engage in any other work. In 1835 new Crown lands were
allotted to them, and they were permitted to purchase, and lease, pri
vately-owned land. Colonies were also founded, during the forties, in the
western Provinces and that of Ekaterinoslav; and, in the fifties, in Bes
sarabia. In 1847 a special fund was opened for the settlers. The average
allotment of land in New Russia was 30 hectares * per household and 20
hectares per household in other places.

Early in Alexander IPs reign, certain restrictions were enforced upon

1 1 hectare = 2.7 acres.

i 3 8 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

the Jewish colonists. In 1859 the further allotment of land was stopped,
as the colonization of New Russia was nearly completed. In 1865 the
colonists were permitted to follow other occupations. They became sub
ject to the general law of conscription introduced in 1874. From 1872
onwards commissions visited the colonies for the purpose of inspecting
them; many farms were found to have been abandoned by their owners
who had engaged in other professions elsewhere; their land was conse
quently confiscated (sometimes as much as 90% of the whole extent of
land occupied by a colony was thus taken back).

From the seventies onwards, the Jewish community showed renewed in
terest in colonization. In 1880 an organization arose called the Associa
tion for Manual and Agricultural Labour among the Jews which had at
its disposal funds amounting to several hundred thousand rubles.

A great blow was dealt to colonization by the notorious Regulations of
1882. In 1887 the Government Settlement Fund, amounting to Rbles
1,000,000 was abolished by the Treasury; but by 1900 the colonists in
New Russia had succeeded in acquiring additional land, and again be
came more flourishing. From 1908, however, further allotment of land
was stopped.

According to the census of 1897, there were within the Pale of Settle
ment 158,000 colonists of both sexes (approximately 3.3% of the Jewish
population of the Pale) and almost 6,000 outside the Pale. In the prov
inces of Minsk, Bessarabia, Kherson and Taurida the colonists formed
3.5% of the Jewish population and in the Caucasus as much as ig%.

The total number of Jewish colonies in the Russian Empire, according
to data supplied by the Association for Jewish Colonization, founded in
1871 in London by Baron Hirsch, was 296 (of which approximately 250
were outside Poland) possessing 130,000 hectares of land, of which 79%
were allotments, 17.7% private property and 3.3% rented from land
owners. The greater proportion, both of the land and the colonists, was
in the Kherson and Ekaterinoslav Provinces (52.8% land and 35.8% col
onists). In the next half century the population of the colonies had in
creased from 2j4 to 2^2 times, while the individual allotments had di
minished from 30 to about 12 to 14 hectares. Some of the colonists had lost
their lands, and others had no horses; but on the other hand there was a
marked concentration of property, while some of the colonists had be
come labourers or taken up outside trades. The colonies, nevertheless,
did not, in general, lose their purely agricultural character. Side by side
with colonists lived Jewish artisans who worked both for them and for
the neighbouring peasants.

b) Colonization After the Revolution

The War, and still more the Revolution, dealt a hard blow to the
prosperity of the Jewish colonies. During the revolutionary pogroms
several colonies were completely destroyed. Upon the conclusion of the
Civil War, a great tendency to return to the land was noticeable among
the Jews of the small towns: the despotism established by the Com-

THE JEWISH QUESTION 139

munists in economic conditions fell hardest upon the small Jewish mid
dleman and artisan. In White Russia there were no prospects at all; but
in the steppes, on the contrary, there were some possibilities, as after the
expropriation of the landowners many farms remained uncultivated. Be
ginning in the autumn of 1922, many families of the poorest Jews went
to the south in order to escape certain death by famine.

The Soviet Government endeavoured to take this movement under its
control, and even promised its support on condition of financial help
from foreign Jews. In 1924 a Committee for the settlement of the work
ing Jews on the land (Comzet) was organized. In 1925 the Ozet, a
similar non-party Jewish organization, was formed. Jewish colonists
were granted an important privilege by the Soviet Government; they
were allowed to accept as colonists even those Jews who, before the
Revolution, had not belonged to the working classes; a privilege enjoyed
by no other section of the population.

The hotheads among the Comzet proposed to settle 100,000 Jewish
families on the land in the course of ten years. The colonization scheme
of the Communists awakened the interest of the American Joint Distri
bution Committee; which had proffered help to the ruined Jews in the
East of Europe during the first years after the War, and had formed the
so-called Agro- Joint Committee for the Support of colonization in the
U.S.S.R. Lands for settlement were found in the districts of Krivoy Rog,
Kherson, Mariupol (Zaporozhie), Odessa and in the North of the
Crimea. About this time Jews from Bokhara began to settle on the land
(in the territory of the Uzbek Republic, and Jews from the Caucasus in
the Daghestan region). A Utopian scheme was at one time proposed to
found an autonomous Jewish Republic in the Crimea a scheme which
naturally came to nothing. Another plan, even more fantastic, was
started in connection with a place called Biro-Bydzhan in the Far East
(details of which will be given further on). Several village settlements
were also established in Volhynia, mainly for the cultivation of hops.
Furthermore, the Jews were granted several desolate sandy islands in
the estuary of the Dnieper (comprising some 26,000 hectares) for vine
yards and orchards (the land is absolutely unsuitable for cereals).

The following are a few particulars of Jewish colonization from 1925
to 1930:

,_,..._. Number of families

Parts of the Soviet Union settled

Ukraine 6,556

Crimea

White Russia

Caucasus

Uzbekistan

Biro-Bydzhan

Other parts of the U.S.S.R

Total of families settled

i 4 o RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

About 3,000 families per year were thus settled on the land. The allot
ments of land in 1927 amounted (on the average) to 10.2 hectares per
household. Up to January 1st, 1928, there were 113 head of draught and
82 head of domestic cattle for every 100 households; and 65 out of 100
colonists had built themselves houses.

In 1928 the Soviet authorities concluded a treaty with Agro-Joint
according to which both parties undertook to make a grant of $8,000,000
for Jewish colonization. No information is available as to how far the
parties have carried out the treaty. In any case, it will be seen from the
following data that the Soviet Government had no objection to letting
the burden of this plan of colonization be borne by others :

SPENT ON JEWISH COLONIZATION BETWEEN 1925-1928

Rbles.

By the Treasury of the U.S.S.R 4,280,000

From bank credits 1,500,000

By Jewish foreign organizations

Total 20,835,630

The average amount thus spent per household was approximately
Rbles 1,500.

Up to 1928 the land granted to the settler by the Government
amounted to:

Parts of the Soviet Union Hectares

Ukraine 164,334.

Crimea : 131,623

White Russia I7?926

Other parts of the U.S.S.R 22,300

Total 336,183

The Government promised a further 109,000 hectares in the Crimea.
This would have entirely exhausted the land-fund available for Jewish
colonization.

There is no definite information extant concerning the allotment of
settlers' lands according to crops. Among the colonists wine-making and
oil-pressing were apparently the chief occupations, because owing to the
starvation prices which the Government gave the peasants for the corn
they commandeered from them, the growing of corn was a waste of
effort.

On the whole the colonization scheme has not relieved the situation of
the Jews.

c) Biro-Bydzhan Plan

After the failure of the" Crimean Plan, the Comzet still continued to
cherish the idea of founding an autonomous republic for the Jews on

THE JEWISH QUESTION 141

U.S.S.R. territory; and, for some unaccountable reason, fixed upon the
unexplored and somewhat desolate region of Blro-Bydzhan in the Far
East, lying along the Amur river and the Amur Railway, about 200
klm. west of Khabarovsk. In 1927 an expedition under the leadership
of Bruck, a Jewish agricultural expert was sent to the Biro-Bydzhan
region, and made a fairly favourable report on its possibilities for colo
nization. On March 28th, 1928 the Praesidium of the TZIK of the
U.S.S.R. agreed to hand over the region to the Comzet for colonization
by Jews.

In official Comzet circles it was estimated that in the Biro-Bydzhan
region there were more than 87 million hectares of land suitable for cul
tivation, and that within the next ten years it should be possible to open
up 25 million hectares (actually, a population four times as great as the
whole Jewish population of the U.S.S.R. would hardly suffice for this).
Sceptics meanwhile declared that the region comprised only 17.5 million
hectares of arable land but that machinery would have to be extensively
introduced. They therefore estimated the average expenditure for
settling a family at Rbles. 3,500.

The Soviet Government transferred to the Biro-Bydzhan project
nearly all its available settlement funds, but the Agro-Joint did not show
the same amount of confidence in the scheme. It was soon discovered
that the conditions of climate and soil were unsatisfactory (the mean
temperature in winter is round about 21 C.; and as there is very little
snow, the ground freezes to a great depth). Whatever the reason may be
out of the 654 families of settlers who arrived in the Biro-Bydzhan
region in 1928 only 337 had settled down.

The Biro-Bydzhan project still remains a controversial question one
frequently discussed both in the Soviet Press and also in Jewish pub
lications abroad. So far, however, there is no reliable information as to
its practicability.

PART TWO POLITICAL

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

SPECIAL FEATURES OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION

The Powers of the State

THE political structure of the Russian State " exhibits a series of pecu
liarities permeating its whole history: beginning with the Moscow
period, passing through that of the Empire, and ending with the Soviet-
Communist period.

If, with Herbert Spencer, one divides human societies (states) into
two fundamental types military and commercial then the Russian
State undoubtedly belongs to the former category. In this sense there is
a radical difference between the Anglo-Saxon world and the Russian. The
liberal methods of English administration are alien to the political his
tory of Russia, where the State has always exercised a firm, wide-spread,
and "parental" sway over the people. The monarchical form of govern
ment, originally common to most other political societies, was developed
in Russia to the pitch of absolute sovereignty.

The authority of the Throne, in every absolute monarchy, has always
relied for support upon the governing class. In most of the monarchies
known to history this class has either been composed of the great landed
aristocracy or the upper urban middle-classes, the latter being enlisted
by the Throne in its struggle against the power of the great feudal lords.
A characteristic feature of the early Russian monarchy was its pro
longed but successful struggle with the landed aristocracy without rely
ing upon the bourgeoisie of the towns; the crown relied on the dvoriane
and officials, both designated by the generic name of "servants of
the State."

In the opinion of Kliuchevsky (the best-known Russian historian), so
late as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the special privileges of
separate groups and classes were still largely undefined. Legislative
authority in Moscow fully recognized the economic (fiscal) privileges
enjoyed by various classes, but regarded these as serving not so much
the interests of these classes as the aims of the State. In other words,
such were regarded as a definite method of ensuring the performance of
certain duties imposed by the State, and not as a means of safeguarding

143

144 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

class interests. These privileges were obtained by the personal efforts of
individuals, and were conferred upon these individuals by the State.
Simultaneously, the State imposed upon such persons corresponding
responsibilities.

The Origin of Class Legislation

The Russian State, which did not recognize any rights as inherent in
mere citizenship but made such rights dependent on the fulfillment of
various duties, distributed the latter anything but impartially. This dis
tribution became the basis for the class organization of the State. At the
time when the Russian Empire was founded, Russian society was di
vided into various classes, which existed until the Revolution of 1917.
The most privileged class was that of the nobility, which from the middle
of the eighteenth century onwards began gradually to lose its exclusively
official character. Special significance attaches to a ukaze, published in
1785, by which the nobility were freed from compulsory State service.
The nobility received the permanent right of entering and resigning
from the service of the State as they pleased. They were exempt from
some forms of taxation (e. g. the poll-tax). They were entitled to acquire
property, and to enjoy the right of owning serfs. The property of the
nobility was inviolable, while they could dispose of it freely. In a word,
the only "Declaration of Rights" contained In the laws of the Empire
was a declaration of the rights of the nobility.

Other classes enjoyed rights to a lesser extent. The priesthood formed
a separate class, exempt from the poll-tax, immune from corporal pun
ishment, and subject to special jurisdiction; the priests were, however,
restricted as to the acquisition of property. The merchants, also, had
certain class privileges (the right to own serfs, exemption from the poll-
tax, and immunity from corporal punishment). The serfs were almost
devoid of rights. It would appear that the only "privilege" assured to
them by law was freedom to marry.

Another manifestation of this class structure was to be found in the
corporate organization of the upper classes. From the time of Catherine II
onwards, the nobility of each Province constituted a body possessing a
definite legal status. This body held periodical assemblies, and was gov
erned by elected Marshals of the Nobility. Such bodies were not re
stricted to managing the internal affairs of their own class but were also
charged with certain public duties, such as the election of persons to
sundry posts in the administration, and the police.

The merchant class, also, had a special guild organization but took no
official part in State administration. It is very significant that, although
the priesthood was included in the privileged classes, it was debarred
from corporate organization and was almost entirely subject to the
authority of the administration.

Class organization per se was not, of course, peculiar to the Russian
Empire; but its actual form differed appreciably from that of other
western States. As has already been shown, class social standing in

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 145

Russia was much more a return for State service than a hereditary right,
On the other hand a characteristic feature of the Russian State in the
days of the Empire was the enormous difference in the mode of life
between the upper class and the lower the so-called "common" people.
From the time of Peter the Great onwards, the upper classes had lived
the life of educated European society, shared its interests, and followed
its fashions. During the Napoleonic era, they frequently spoke French
better than they did Russian. The Russian masses, on the contrary, were
still living a life entirely free from Western influences, and based on
purely national traditions.

Property Relations

The outstanding feature of Russian political history has been internal
colonization. Russia came into being by the gradual spreading of her
population over the face of a whole continent. To the north, south and
east she was bounded by stretches of sparsely inhabited lands, on
which her ever-increasing population laid hands. The Russian colonist
was accustomed to consider land as belonging to nobody in particular, i
as "God's land." He was devoid of that feeling of attachment to a par
ticular plot of land which is the psychological basis of the idea of owner
ship. Spurred on by economic necessity, he wandered afield and took
possession of steppe or forest, sometimes dispossessing their nomadic
inhabitants, sometimes settling down peaceably among them. When
such territories became over-populated, the surplus population moved
on further.

This peculiar form oi colonization was not conducive to strengthening
the principle of private landownership, as was known to the lex Romana
and to Western Europe. European explorers, on landing in America,
found themselves more or less in the same situation as the Russian col
onists; but the conquerors of America possessed a deeply rooted respect
for private property, whereas the idea that the land belonged to every
one and no one, that it was common or God's land, was inborn in the
Russian people.

Furthermore, the whole trend of State property regulation, even in
its more modern forms, has not been conducive to developing the idea of
private property. In ancient Russia only a certain proportion of the
land, the so-called "patrimonial land," was privately owned by the upper
classes. The rest of the land, the so-called pomesties were a form of
recompense, given by the State to its officials for services rendered. The
State had as much right to resume them as to confer them. The struggles
between the Moscow Tzars and the landed aristocracy broke the power
of the patrimonial landowners, and served to establish the principle
that all the land was owned by the State in the person of the Tzar.
Similarly, the peasantry had no sense of ownership with regard to the
land. As early as the end of the sixteenth century the peasants living
within the boundaries of the State gradually became serfs of the State,
or of those to whom the State had given the land.

J4 6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Properly speaking, the idea of private landownership was only intro
duced in Russia with the rise of the Empire. As soon as the nobility were
freed from compulsory service, the right of dealing as they liked with
their own land became one of their fundamental privileges. But the
peasants still remained serfs, living on land belonging to the landowners
and ignorant of what it meant to have absolute ownership of one's own
plot; so foreign was the principle that they firmly believed the pro
prietors had no real right to the land.

Revolutionary Movements

The economic and social life of the lower orders in Russia could not
be called either easy or attractive. The peasants suffered most before
their emancipation (1861). Russian literature abounds in descriptions
of the harsh oppression suffered by the serfs whose fate, property, lives
even in some cases, depended on the whim of their masters. A deep feel
ing of dissatisfaction was firmly rooted in their hearts and sometimes
manifested itself in fierce peasant revolts.

A characteristic feature of the old Russian revolutionary movements
is that they bore a social and economic, rather than a political, character.
Monarchy was so much an article of faith with the people, that the ris
ings were not directed against the Monarchy itself but against the ad
ministration. Peasant-risings, therefore, were frequently led by a
usurper, or a "false Tzar/' who adopted the name of a dead monarch.
The idea of a republic, which presented itself so naturally to the Bo
hemian peasants in the Hussite wars and to the Puritans of Cromwell's
time, was unknown to the Russian masses. Their revolts were directed
primarily against the landowners and the State officials. The funda
mental points of their programme were a forcible redistribution of the
land, the destruction of the upper classes and the subsequent establish
ment of the dictatorship of the poor over the rich.

Revolutionary tendencies, however, developed among not only the
lower orders but also the aristocracy. This very definitely took an anti-
monarchist character.

It was in the reign of Nicholas I that Russian Radicalism and Social
ism originated. The doings of men like Alexander Hertzen (who went to
London and founded the first periodical denouncing Russian autocracy)
or Michael Bakunin (who began his revolutionary activities in Russia
and took part in many revolutionary outbreaks all over Europe) make it
clear that the relentless warfare waged by the Imperial Government
against the spirit of revolution had not only failed to destroy this, but
had, in a sense, added fuel to the fire.

Unity and Separatism

Russian history exhibits the working of two opposite principles cen
tralization and decentralization. Usually, only the former has attracted
the attention of historians, the latter remaining in the shade as a lost
cause; it was only the Revolution of 1917 which made decentralization

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 147

again a question of practical politics. Disruptive tendencies had, how
ever, always existed, sometimes breaking out and causing extensive
disturbance. The Russian State was founded by colonization and con
quest and it would be futile to imagine that the population of the
colonized territories accepted Russian rale without any friction or put
aside all "separatist" aspirations.

Russian historians were accustomed to regard these tendencies in
the manner of St. Petersburg officialdom, which looked upon them as
"unrest" and "disorders," unworthy of serious attention. Russian unity
was considered a foregone conclusion and separatism as an incompre
hensible anomaly.

Russian dominion over the numerous tribes naturally presupposes
their conquest by physical force; but it would be a mistake to think
that such were the only methods employed to keep all the races of
Russia under a single and undivided authority. The widely diffused
opinion that Russia was nothing but an "agglomeration of stolen
provinces" is not strictly true. Russian civilization evinced immense
power of assimilation, a process which evolved from the multi-racial
elements of Russia a certain uniform type. Even in early days the
conquered Finnic and Turkic races were not destroyed by the Slavs
but became an organic part of Slavdom. The same was the case with
the Tartar element, which was absorbed and assimilated by Moscovy.
Russia not only succeeded in ruling conquered nations but enlisted their
nationals among her administrative class and placed them In positions
of authority. In this fashion the Tartars successfully penetrated into the
ruling class of Muscovite Russia and even that of the Empire. This was
also the case with the Caucasian tribes, which became organically united
to the Empire. It would be an unheard-of thing for an Arab or a Hindu
to hold Cabinet rank in England; but Russia has had, for example,
Georgians as military commanders and Armenians as ministers. The
Russian world was formed by the merging of many races and many
cultural ideas into a single super-national civilization. This explains why,
in spite of the acute separatism shown during the Revolution, unity was
preserved.

THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE
RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Stabilization of the Empire in the First Half of the Nineteenth

Century

THE political history of the Russian Empire may be divided into three
periods:

I. The period of construction from the reign of Peter I to that of
Catherine II (1689-1762).

i 4 8 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

2. The period of stabilization and full development from the reign
of Catherine II to the end of Nicholas I's reign (1762-1855).

3. The period of decline from the death of Nicholas I to the Revo
lution of 1917.

The foundations of the State were laid in the second of these periods;
and it continued to exist, almost without alteration, until the Revolution
of 1905, while it maintained its outward form until the fall^ of the
Empire in 1917. The territorial expansion of the Empire attained its
maximum during this period.

At the same time the internal political structure of the Empire
assumed definite form. The authority of the Throne attained its highest
power, pomp, and dignity; and the fundamental institutions and or
ganizations surrounding it became firm-rooted. In the time of Nicholas
I the fundamental laws of the Empire were first codified by ^ Count
Speransky. The autocracy of the Russian Tzar attained its definite and
ultimate form; the Emperor, indeed, became a potentate who, as Peter
the Great said: "was answerable to none for his actions." According
to the old fundamental laws of the Empire, all authority in the State
was vested in a single person, the Monarch. As the Emperor was,
naturally, unable to perform in person all the multifarious functions of
the Throne, State institutions were formed, which were, however, only
executive organs of the Monarch's will. They were established, and
their authority conferred, by the Emperor, who could, at any moment,
act independently of them. These higher institutions of the State in
cluded the Council of Empire (the Council of State), established by
Alexander I, and the Senate, which was a legacy from Peter the Great.
The actual administration was handed over to the ministries: and the
ministers became the confidential agents of the Emperor's will. At this
time the Empire was divided, for purposes of administration, into
Provinces, districts (Uyezds 1 ) and communes (Volosts), as first estab
lished by Catherine II. The system of administration was several times
modified between the end of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the
nineteenth century. Finally, a system of centralized administration be
came established, according to which the whole state machinery of the
Empire was directed from St. Petersburg. To each ^ Province was
appointed a Governor, responsible to the central administration and
carrying out its instructions. Local autonomy and self-government were,
at this time, very much restricted. Such rights were only enjoyed by the
upper classes especially the nobility, and were limited to purely class
interests.

The Empire retained the character of a military state, the army being
the chief force behind the Throne. The bureaucracy was organized, to
a considerable extent, on military lines: officials wore semi-military
uniforms and were subject to semi-military discipline. The fundamental
peculiarity of this vast organization was the fact that, in spite of its
specifically national character, It had been slavishly copied from

1 The literal translation of "Uyezd" is "Riding."

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 149

Western models. The pattern imitated had been mainly German, or,
rather, Prussian. This tendency towards German ideals had been ap
parent even in the founder of the Empire, Peter the Great; and since
his day German influence had become one of the most powerful single
factors in Russian history. Curiously enough, Western influence was,
if one may so style it, retrospective. Towards the middle of the nine
teenth century Russia was hopelessly behind Europe in almost every
thing administration, economics, education, etc. Russia's defeat in the
Crimea opened the eyes of Russian society and of the Government
itself to the colossal defects of the existing regime.

The Era of Great Reforms, and After

The most important of the reforms introduced during the reign of
Alexander II was the long overdue emancipation of the serfs (March 3,
1861).

The abolition of serfdom shook the position of the nobility as the
leading class ; it deprived them of economic power and emancipated the
peasants from their patriarchal authority. The influence of the nobility
was further reduced by the new Law Statutes of 1864, under which
their right of appointing law officers was repealed. The reform of the
police in 1862 limited the landowners' authority locally; and the reform
of rural and urban self-government (1864 and 1870) did away with
their exclusive influence in the Provinces. The main feature of the new
institutions was the granting to the whole population, through the
Zemstvos, of a large measure of local autonomy strictly limited, how
ever, to economic matters, public health, and education. The functions
of the Zemstvos were definitely separated from those of the local rep
resentatives of the Government.

The representation of the Zemstvos, according to the Act of 1864,
was established on the principle of dividing the whole population into
three categories (curiae) of electors (which did not entirely coincide with
the division into classes of Russian society) ; a curia of landowners, one
of urban electors and a special peasant curia. To the first category
belonged the owners of a specified amount of land (the extent of this
being separately determined for each Province) or the possessors oi
real estate not less In value than Rbles. 15,000. The urban curia con
sisted of owners of industrial and trading concerns having an annual
turnover of not less than Rbles. 6,000, and the owners of real estate in
towns to the value of from Rbles. 500 to Rbles. 3,000. This new enact
ment did away, to a great extent, with the idea of class, substituting
for it the principle of economic qualification. In the peasant curia,
however, representation remained on a class basis.

The membership of the Zemstvos in the beginning of the twentieth
century was, roughly, as follows: 45% were nobles, officials and priests,
38% peasants and 17% all other classes.

In general, class distinctions were levelled. Strictly speaking, only
nobility was hereditary; the other class distinctions were a personal

150 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

rank which could be gamed or lost. 1 This circumstance made it easier
to pass from one class to another. Rights co-extensive with those of the
nobility could be granted to anyone of good educational status and
ability who entered the service of the State: and this substantially
lowered the prestige of the nobility in the eyes of the country. Their
place was gradually occupied by a class known, in Russia, as the edu
cated or intelligentsia. Considerable numbers of them found a place in
Russian society from the beginning of the sixties onwards. Actually,
the intelligentsia soon became the dominating factor in Russian political
life and so continued until the Revolutions of 1917. From this class
came the leaders of the 1917 Revolution.

After the era of the great reforms Russia still remained an autocratic
Monarchy. The extent of the Imperial power was essentially unchanged.
The Monarch continued to be the sole source of law and authority.

Council of Empire

The highest legal and advisory institution, under the Emperor, was
still the Council of Empire. According to its founder, the Council was
established "in order to place the strength and well-being of the Russian
Empire on a steady legal foundation." It was re-modelled more than
once, but its composition and character remained substantially un
altered. The last legislation relating to it, previous to the Revolution
of 1905, was "The Institution of the State Council 1886" (Code Vol. I
part 2). It consisted of persons appointed by the Emperor himself. The
number of members varied at different periods. Upon its establishment
in 1810 there were 35 members; in 1890 there were 60. Ministers were
ex-officio members of the Council. The Emperor either presided in per
son or appointed a deputy from among the members.

The main duty of the Council of Empire was the preliminary investi
gation, in the wide meaning of the term, of laws (their promulgation
and abrogation, etc.). Yet, by its constitution, many questions of
legislation were excluded from its purview. In this sense individual
Ministers, the Committee of Ministers, and the higher military and
naval authorities, had equal rights with the Council.

The endeavour to establish an exclusive monopoly of legal and con
sultative functions by the Council of Empire was a characteristic feature
of moderate Russian liberalism and constitutionalism. By this means it
was hoped to guarantee, in the Empire, the maintenance of the prin
ciple of official legality according to which no act of Imperial authority
could become law until it had been passed by the Council. On the basis
of this, Russian legal literature attempted to differentiate between the
laws of the Empire and mere ukazes, which might indicate merely the
Emperor's will and pleasure. These political aspirations, however, found
no actual fulfillment either in legislation or in practice. The Council,

^"A certain rank in the service of the State conferred hereditary nobility, by letters patent,
on application to the Monarch.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 151

therefore, remained till 1905 a consultative legislative Institution but
not the only one.

The jurisdiction of the Council was not confined to legislative matters.
It was at the same time the highest administrative organization with
which the Monarch could deliberate on most urgent and special State
business, such as the declaration of war, the conclusion of peace, etc.
To it were also submitted the preliminary drafts of the State Budget
and other financial operations of paramount importance. It exercised
judicial iunctions in specially important cases of administrative juris
diction. It was, finally, empowered by special Imperial decree to
deputize for the Emperor in the event of his absence.

The Senate

The Senate, established by Peter the Great and subsequently re
organized more than once, was finally put on a permanent basis by
Alexander I. Although the Senate had no right of direct access to the
person of the Emperor, and (unlike the Council of Empire) was not
composed of official personages of the highest rank, it nevertheless
played a very important part in the life of the Empire. As the law
provided no direct definition of the special functions of the separate
State institutions, the powers of the Senate were somewhat hetero
geneous. Thus, it took part in legislation, inasmuch as it was responsible
for the publication of the laws. It also enjoyed various administrative
rights, such as the investigation of cases concerning class privileges and
the supervision of the proceedings of several subordinate organs.

Its main functions, however, were judicial. According to the legisla
tive code of Alexander II, the Senate was the highest court of the
Empire. As such, it exercised control over all legal institutions and
officials throughout Russia. In this capacity, too, the Senate was largely
concerned with the interpretation of the Code; and its decisions upon
points of Russian law were as authoritative, as the written law itself.
In Russian popular opinion, both liberal and moderately radical, the
Senate was the State institution which possessed the greatest authority.
It was considered "the guardian of the law" and with great dignity
upheld the system of judicial organization introduced in Russia during
the period of reforms.

The Cabinet

Executive authority was vested in the various ministries. Ministers
were appointed at the pleasure of the Emperor and were personally
responsible to him. They had direct recourse to Imperial authority
through possessing the right of "personal report in audience."

Uniformity in the administration of the various ministries was assured
by their being subordinate to the will of the Monarch. Furthermore,
there was a tendency to unite the ministers into one corporate body, and
thereby ensure uniformity.

i S 2 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Local Administration

The local administration of the Empire went through a series^ of
changes in the course of two centuries. The principle of centralization
represented by the Provincial Governors, the sole representatives of the
supreme power, came gradually to be limited by what could be called
departmental decentralization. For in the course of time the various
ministries established local branches in the Provinces which acted
independently of the Governors and were directly responsible to their
superiors in St. Petersburg. The partial introduction of self-government
in the sixties addecf to this the principle of local autonomy. In the
second half of the nineteenth century the Governors really became the
representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and for cermonial pur
poses only represented the Emperor.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Empire was divided
into 49 Provinces in Russia proper; Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan, Bes
sarabia, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav, Estland, Grodno, Kazan, Kaluga,
Kharkov, Kherson, Kiev, Kovno, Kostroma, Kurland, Kursk, Livland,
Minsk, Moghilev, Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod, Novgorod, Olonetz, Oren
burg, Orel, Penza, Perm, Podolia, Poltava, Pskov, Riazan, Samara, St.
Petersburg, Saratov, Simbirsk, Smolensk, Taurida, Tambov, Tver, Tula,
Ufa, Viatka, Vilna, Vitebsk, Vladimir, Vologda, Volhynia, Voronezh
and Yaroslavl. To these must be added the Territory of the Don
Cossacks. Russian Poland was subdivided into 10 Provinces: Kalish,
Keltse, Lomzha, Liublin, Petrokov, Plotzk, Radom, Suvalki, Sedlietz,
Warsaw; Finland into 8 Provinces: Abo-Bierneborg, Kuopio, Neiland,
St. Mikhel, Tavasthust, Uleaborg, Vaza and Vyborg; the Caucasus into
9 Provinces: Baku, Black Sea, Daghestan, Elizavetpol, Erivan, Kars,
Kutais, Stavropol, Tiflis and two Cossack Territories: Kuban ^ and
Terek; Siberia into 4 Provinces: Irkutsk, Tololsk, Tomsk and Yenissey
and 4 Territories: Amur, Maritime, Transbaikal, Yakut and the Island
of Sakhalin, which was an independent administrative unit; finally,
Central Asia was divided into 9 Territories: Akmolinsk, Ferghana,
Samarkand, Sernipalatinsk, Semirechensk, Syr-Daria, Turgaisk, Trans-
caspian and Ural. Total, 97 administrative units.

The Provinces were divided into Uyezds (called Circuits in the Ter
ritories) ; the Uyezds in turn were divided into smaller administrative
units Volosts (called Settlements in the Cossack lands and Ulus in
the Mohammedan.

Since the reforms introducing self-government the administrative
units of the Empire could be divided into two distinct groups: (l) Those
Provinces in which Zemstvos had been introduced. At the beginning of
the twentieth century this was the case with 34 Provinces. As already
stated, the Zemstvos administered local education, medical service, roads
and some other matters. In such a Province, the Governor had the right
of control over local self-government: it was his duty to scrutinize the
decisions of the Zemstvos, not only from the point of view of legality

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 153

but also of policy. Besides this control, the functions of the Governor
included the supervision of the local police, finance and taxation. The
administration of justice, education, ecclesiastical matters, military
affairs, posts and telegraphs, railways and means of communication of
State importance, was not directly subordinate to the Governor. They
were administered from the centre by means of special institutions,
agencies of the corresponding departments in St. Petersburg. (2) Those
Provinces in which Zemstvos had not been introduced. In Siberia,
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Finland and Poland the Governors, in addi
tion to their other functions, had the duty of performing those elsewhere
delegated to the Zemstvos.

In order to deal with matters not directly delegated either to the
Governors or the Zemstvos, the Empire was divided into fifteen Edu
cational Circuits, fourteen Military Districts, twelve Law Circuits and
nine Districts of Communications.

At the head of each division was an official directly responsible to
the ministry concerned (e. g. Curator of the Educational Circuit, Com
mander of the Military District, etc.). By reason of his position, such
an official sometimes ranked higher than a Governor. The administration
of the Empire was not thereby rendered any easier.

Finally, some Provinces and Territories were united under the
authority of a special representative of the Imperial power, who bore
the title of Governor-General. The duties imposed on this high official
by the laws of the Empire were very characteristic survivals of that
patriarchal life which ruled pre-Revolutionary Russia (Code, Vol. II,
part I, par. 408-462). The Governor-General was "the upholder of
the inviolability of the rights of the Autocracy" His duty was to take all
necessary measures to put an end "to luxury, lavishness, dissipation
and prodigality. 33 He had to see that "the nobility lived a decent life
and set a good example to the other classes 33 He had to take care that
the young men received an education in the "rules of religion, the highest
morality and the feelings of loyalty to the Throne and the Fatherland 33 ;
that everyone, to whatever class he belonged, "should earn his living
honestly and usefully. 33 In a sentence, the Governor-General was the
direct local representative of the Emperor's patriarchal authority, and
his appointment was made at the sole discretion of the Crown.

At the beginning of the twentieth century there were ten Governor-
Generalships in Russia: Warsaw (uniting 10 Provinces of Poland),
Vilna, Irkutsk, the Caucasus, Kiev, Moscow (Moscow Province alone),
Amur, Steppes, Turkestan and Finland. As will be seen from the above
list, the Governor-Generalships were established in places of special
political importance (Moscow) or of strategic and political importance
(Poland, Finland, and the Caucasus). The Governor-General's powers
were very wide; he was empowered to supervise and direct every branch
of the administration in his jurisdiction; he had the exclusive right of
declaring localities under martial law, or in a state of siege. The intro
duction of these conditions meant the abrogation of the usual jurisdiction

154 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

and the subjection of the population to emergency laws. On the strength
of this the Governor-General could prohibit any person from living in
any locality, could close down any industrial or trading enterprises,
modify the usual legal procedure (transfer cases from civil to military
courts), and prohibit all meetings either public or private; he possessed
the right of extraordinary arrest, of levying fines, of sequestrating
property and suppressing newspapers.

The administration of the lower units the Uyezds, conformed, on
general lines to that of the Provinces. An essential difference was, how
ever, that in the Uyezd central authority was not personally represented.
In the Uyezd the police, the courts of justice, the Zemstvos, excise
agents, etc., were under the direct jurisdiction of the corresponding
organs in the Province, of which they constituted sections.

The still smaller administrative divisions of the Empire, the Volosts,
possessed institutions of peasant self-government, starting with the
Village Meeting (general meeting of householders) which elected the
Village Elder. The organs of the Volost were the Volost Meeting (com
posed of Village Elders), the Volost Elder (elected), the Volost Office
and the Peasant Law Courts. The non-peasant classes were neither
included in these peasant institutions nor subordinate to them.

In the reign of Alexander III the peasant institutions were put under
the control of special officials the Land-Captains who combined
administrative and legal functions and were directly responsible to the
Governors. The Land-Captains, together with the representatives of
the Uyezd police, were the chief officials through whom the State came
into direct contact with the peasant population of the Empire.

Town Administration

The system of self-government in the towns, introduced during the
era of great reforms and later modified and restricted in scope (1892),
allotted the performance of various local and municipal duties (munici
pal economy, town planning, administration of the poor law, hospitals,
elementary education, etc.), to the elected organs of self-government,
the Town Dumas, and their administrative bodies, the Town Councils.
Municipal self-government, like the Zemstvos, was under the control
of the Governors not only from the standpoint of legality but also of
policy. Other municipal matters, as well as governmental business,
were under the jurisdiction of the Governors. Municipal self-government
had been introduced in all large and medium-sized towns of the Empire
in 1874. In smaller towns a special simplified form of self-government
was introduced in 1892.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 155

III

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

The Revolution of 1905

THE social and political movement antagonistic to Russian autocracy
attained its highest development during the first years of the twentieth
century. Owing to the reverses of the Japanese War, public unrest took
a definitely revolutionary turn in 1905. The Government at first tried
to compromise, and promised the convention of a consultative Duma
(August 1905); but it soon saw Itself forced by continued disturbances
to make further concessions.

On October 3Oth, the Emperor was compelled by the turn of events
to issue a manifesto establishing:

1. The inalienable rights of civic freedom based on the liberty of the
person, conscience, speech, assembly and association.

2. The franchise for all classes of the population.

3. The fundamental principle that no law could come into force
without the approval of the Legislature, and that the representatives of
the people should be given the opportunity of exercising active control
over the legality of the activities of the authorities.

The provisions of the manifesto were gradually legalized by subse
quent enactments. On December nth, 1905, a ukaze extending the
franchise for the Duma was issued. On February 2Oth, 1906, another
ukaze was published ordering the revision of the statutes of the Duma
and of the Council of Empire, which became the Upper Chamber. On
April 23rd, 1906, the new Fundamental Laws regulating the relationship
of the Monarch to the newly established legislative bodies were promul
gated. On April 27th the first Parliament was convened.

The Moscow rising in December, 1905, marks the zenith of the First
Revolution; it was quelled by the timely arrival from St. Petersburg
of some units of the Imperial Guards, after which the wave of revolu
tion began to subside. The principal elements of Russian society rallied
round the Monarchy, which began to feel itself once more on firmer
ground.

The Constitution of the Empire After 1905. The Emperor

The State organization of the Russian Empire after 1905 was char
acterized by the following features. At the head of the State was a
hereditary Monarch. His 'authority, as defined by the law of April 23rd,
1906, was "supreme and autocratic" (article 4). The former term
defines the position of the Monarch among the other organs of the
State, the latter indicates that the power of the Throne is not derivative,
and does not originate in some power superior to it (e. g., that of the
people) .
The power of the Throne in matters of legislation was now exercised

i 5 6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

through two parliamentary chambers, the State Duma and the Council
of Empire (article 7). The person of the Emperor was sacred and un
assailable (article 5): and the Emperor was still, in the ^ legal and
political sense of the term, answerable to no one. As regards his ^financial
position, he was only nominally dependent upon Parliament; since part
of the Budget was permanently fixed.

In the field of legislation, the right of initiating ordinary laws lay
with the Emperor; while the fundamental laws, according to the con
stitution of 1906, could only be changed at his initiative. This meant
that constitutional action was vested exclusively in the^Emperor. He
had the unconditional prerogative of sanctioning laws, while without his
assent no bill could become law (article 9). No conditional restriction
of the Imperial sanction was provided nor were any terms or conditions
placed upon the Imperial veto. Therefore, while sharing his authority
with Parliament the Emperor predominated over Parliament.

In the field of government the Emperor enjoyed exclusive preroga
tives. He was the head of the administration, as may be seen from the
text of article 10 of the Fundamental Laws of 1906: "the exclusive
right of government is, within the confines of the Russian State, vested
in the Emperor." In some branches the Emperor exercised direct con
trol; in others, he deputed his authority to the institutions or individuals
concerned, who acted in the name and under the orders of the Emperor
(articles 80 and 81). In other words, the Emperor bore the whole
responsibility of government. From this resulted, first of all, the im
portant circumstance that the Government was responsible to the
Crown alone (articles 17-19). All higher officials were appointed by
the Crown. According to article 12 of the Fundamental Laws, the
Emperor was the supreme authority in all relations with foreign powers.
He alone could declare war or conclude peace (article 13). He was the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (article 14). The Emperor
could place under martial law or a state of siege any parts of the
Empire, he had the sole right of minting money, of concluding foreign
loans and of ordering military credits in time of war, and he was "the
supreme defender and upholder of the established faith and the guardian
of the Orthodox Qmrch."

Finally, judicial authority in the Empire was administered, in the
name of the Emperor, by the duly constituted law-courts (article 29) .
The Emperor appointed the judges and other law officers; he alone had
the right to bring higher officials to justice. The Emperor, further, had
the right of commuting or revoking sentences, of granting free pardon,
and of stopping legal proceedings.

The Legislative Orders. The Duma

The Russian Parliament consisted of two chambers, the State Duma
and the Council of Empire.

Elections to the parliamentary institutions of the Russian Empire
were not based on the principle that the franchise derives from the

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 157

right of every individual citizen to share in the government of the
State; Russian citizens enjoyed the franchise partly through belonging
to some definite profession, partly through possessing property rights,
which gave them concomitant political rights. Only the peasantry, as a
class, was formed into a special electoral curia.

Besides the peasant curia, the electoral law established the following
categories of electors: I. the landed proprietors, who owned land to an
amount determined for every Province. This amount fluctuated between
55 and 880 hectares. In this curia of landowners were also included
those who possessed other real estate besides land. Finally, the so-called
small landowners belonged to this curia; viz., those who owned land or
other real estate in amounts below the established figures. The latter
took part in the elections in the landowners' curia through their repre
sentatives; each representative being elected by a group of small land
owners whose property amounted, in the aggregate, to the established
standard of value.

The Russian priesthood, as a class, had no electoral franchise; but
they took part in the elections if the Church owned land or other settled
property in the Uyezd.

2. Urban electors of the first category. Among these were included
persons who owned property in towns with a population of over
20,000. The value of such property was fixed at a minimum of Rbles.
3,000, or, in smaller towns, at not less than Rbles. 300. In this
category were also included the owners of large shops and indus
trial undertakings. 3. Urban electors of the second category. To this
category belonged all the small urban landowners, as well as persons
who rented lodgings in their own name, employees in various businesses
and officials. 4. Factory workmen. To obtain a vote, a factory-worker
had to be employed in a factory having at least 50 workmen. Thus the
workmen in all the smaller undertakings were deprived of the right of
voting in the workmen's curia. It will be noticed that this curia was
not so much based on the idea of class or property qualification, as upon
a purely professional foundation.

All persons, other than peasants, without property were deprived of
the franchise. The following categories were also ineligible for it:
women, men under 25 years of age, students, army officers, men serving
with the colours, and the nomadic tribes.

Moreover, the electoral law did not grant the direct vote except in
a few special cases. The elections to the State Duma were indirect and
the number of gradations were determined separately for each electoral
curia. Members of the State Duma were elected by the Provincial
Assemblies. These Assemblies consisted of representatives, elected at
Uyezd Electoral Congresses. Representatives to these were in their
turn elected in lower grades of Electoral Congresses. In the peasant
curia, for instance, the method of election was as follows: each village
elected its representatives at a village meeting, one for each ten house-

IS 8 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

holders. These representatives formed a conference of the Volost, at
which representatives to the Uyezd Electoral Congress were chosen. The
Uyezd Congress elected its representatives to the Provincial Assembly,
and this last elected the deputies to the Duma. Thus the elections in
the peasant curia were in four stages. There were two stages for the
curia of the landowners and urban electors of the first and second
categories, and three for workmen. Direct elections were only held^ in
the large cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and Riga), which
sent separate deputies for each curia of urban electors.

The Provinces did not all return the same number of representatives
to the Duma. The electoral law (1905) according to which the elections
for the first and second Duma took place, gave a disproportionately
large number of seats to the purely Russian Provinces. As amended in
1907, the electoral law reduced the representation of non-Russian terri
tories still further. Poland, for example, was now represented by only
14 deputies instead of 37, and the Caucasus by 10 instead of ^29.
European Russia had one deputy to every 279,000 of its population,
Siberia one to 492,000, Poland one to 795 ? ooo, and the Caucasus one
to 1,065,000. The Central Asiatic territories, with a population of over
9 millions, were left without any representation at all.

The theoretical fairness of the electoral law was further impaired by
the fact that the various curiae did not elect the same number of
electors. The method of election, as laid down in the law of December
nth, 1905, gave preference to the peasants. The law of 1907, brought
about a reduction in the total number of electors, besides causing a
redistribution of electors among the different curiae, preference being
given to the landowners. The following table shows the distribution of
the electors of the different curiae in the 49 provinces of Russia proper.

Actual Profor- Actual Pro-por-

Flgures tion Figures tion

1972

32.7%

2644

Si-3%

Towns

First category
2354

22.5%

f 688

13-2%

Second category
2505

41.4%

I 570
1168

22.4%

Workmen

208

3.4%

114

2.3%

6039 5184

The Council of Empire

The Upper Chamber of the Russian Parliament was the Council of
Empire. This bore a more definitely class and bureaucratic character
than the Duma. It was composed of both elected and appointed mem
bers, in equal proportions. The elected members served for a term of

1 The law of 1905 had only one curia for urban, electors.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 159

9 years, one-third retiring every three years. A candidate for election
must have attained the age of forty, and must hold the certificate of at
least a secondary school. Electors to the Council of Empire were divided
into 5 curiae.

1. The Clergy, represented by sis members, three from the White
and three from the Black (monks). The manner of their election more
resembled an appointment by the highest ecclesiastical authority, viz.
the Holy Synod.

2. The Provincial Zemstvos elected one member per Province. The
property qualifications for election were three times those of the land
owner curia for the Duma. In other words, this class of representatives
in the Council included the largest landowners of the Empire.

3. The Provincial nobility elected two electors per Province; who,
upon assembling in St. Petersburg, elected from among their number
1 8 members of the Council of Empire.

4. The trading and industrial community (exchange committees,
chambers of commerce, etc.) elected deputies, who in their turn elected
from among their number 12 members to the Council of Empire.

5. The Academy of Science, and each of the Universities, elected
three electors, who elected six members to the Council of Empire.

Out of 98 elected members of the State Council, 56 were chosen by
the Provincial Zemstvos from among the large landowners, who be
longed mostly to the nobility; and 18 members were elected directly
by the Assemblies of the Nobility. Consequently the nobility could
count on 74 votes out of 98. This predominance of the nobility was
unjustifiable, for by the time of the first Revolution the nobility had
undoubtedly lost their former preeminent social importance.

The other half of the members of the Council were appointed by the
Crown. Membership of the Council was the highest bureaucratic
honour; a member by appointment ranked among the highest officials
of the Empire. This made the Council of Empire a semi-bureaucratic
institution, sensitive to administrative pressure. A list of the appointed
members of the Council was published every year. The Government
reserved the right, when publishing this list, to omit any names it
wished, and to substitute others. In this way there was formed a special
category of "non-sitting" members of the Council, 1 who bore their rank
as an honourary title but were not entitled to sit or vote. Taking ad
vantage of this rule, the Government more than once transferred
appointed members of the State Council from the active to the
honourary list.

It was sufficient for an appointed member of the Council to express
views opposed to those of the Government for the latter to remove his
name from the Council for the following year. The Government could
also, at the beginning of each year, pack the Council by new appoint
ments at its discretion, to conform with its own views.

lr nie number of "non-sitting" members was not limited.

160 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Administration in the Twentieth Century

There were no essential changes, after the 1905 Revolution, in the
system of local administration. The Empire continued to be governed
by the same Governor-Generals, Governors, Land-Captains, etc. Nor
did the 1 905 . Revolution cause any change in the systern of self-govern
ment of the Empire. Zemstvos and Municipalities remained, as before,
centres round which there gathered the local elements mildly antago
nistic to the Government. During the first Revolution, however, and
afterwards during the years when the new constitutional regime was
being established, there arose within the Zemstvos (and, to some extent,
in the Municipalities) tendencies which were frankly revolutionary.

The physical force of the Empire was concentrated in the army at
the head of which were the Imperial Guards. The officer's corps of the
Guards and some officers of the army regiments were men who belonged
to the privileged and propertied classes. Military service, especially in
the Guards, had become a tradition for many of the noble families.
The first Revolution left the army, especially the officer's corps, very
little affected. The rank and file proved, on the whole, loyal to the
Empire, in spite of several local mutinies, principally in the navy.

The peasantry, little affected by the political side of the first Revo
lution, continued to be the backbone of the Empire; for them the
Russian Tzar was still the "Father," the embodiment of the highest
justice and truth. They were still convinced, at that time, that the social
evils from which they suffered came from the landowners and officials.
They therefore remained monarchists at heart, in spite of taking part
in revolutionary movements. The soldiers of the Guards regiments which
broke up the Revolution of 1905 were the sons of Russian muzhiks. 1

At the same time, however, great changes took place in the life and
psychology of the Russian peasantry. The boom in industry caused great
masses of the peasants to move from the land and settle in urban fac
tories. From the ranks of the peasantry appeared the Russian workman,
who was transformed into a great social power. The Russian industrial
workman did not lose touch with his village. Often he owned land and
a house there and could, if he wished, become a peasant again. Many
peasants migrated to the factories, the towns and the large industrial
centres during the winter and returned to the soil in the spring. Town
life changed their psychology and destroyed their patriarchal outlook.
When they went back to the villages, their urban experience led them
inevitably to become the village intelligentsia. Thus it came about that
the Russian proletariat gradually occupied a leading place among the
intelligentsia of the villages. Town life, revolutionary propaganda, and
the policy of the Government gradually sapped the Russian workman's
primitive virtues and turned him into a revolutionary and a Socialist.

The victory of the Monarchy over the first Revolution was far from
being either decisive or conclusive. The Monarchy continued to lose

1 Russian for peasant (male).

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 161 '

ground. Want of confidence in it spread, in one form or another, among
all classes of Russian society. The peasantry only lost their monarchical
sympathies very slowly, but the new bourgeoisie were not wedded to
the ideal of monarchy, which had not guaranteed to them sufficient
importance or privileges. The landed nobility was divided; and opposi
tion to the Government had been an age-long tradition among them.
There remained the bureaucracy; and even here anti-monarchist, or
even revolutionary, tendencies gradually appeared.

National aspirations did not see their fulfillment in the new parlia
mentary institutions. For the peasants Parliament was an unfamiliar
institution "invented by the upper classes." Owing to the peculiarities
of the electoral system, also, the peasants were too far removed from
it, and were deprived of the possibilities of electing a sufficient number
of their representatives as members. It may even be doubted whether
they made any deliberate effort to do so. The elections of the peasant
curia in its lowest stages were carried out more under administrative
encouragement than by free personal initiative. The few peasant
deputies who secured election to the Duma did not feel at home there,
and laboured under the impression of being unwanted.

The workmen, too, were very inadequately represented in the Duma.
The Party with which they were most in sympathy the Social Demo
crats only existed unofficially, or, at most, semi-legally. The group of
Social Democrats in the Duma numbered only a few members, who
were under police supervision as members of a revolutionary organiza
tion. A considerable section of the Social Democrats boycotted the Duma
altogether and refused on principle to take any part in the elections.
The Social Revolutionaries were in the same position, although their
extreme right wing sat in the Duma as the "Labour and National
Socialists' Party." For the Socialists the Russian Parliament, as repre
sented by the Duma and Council of Empire, was but a caricature of
real constitutional authority.

The more moderate bourgeois Constitutional Democrats regarded the
Russian Parliament only as a stage on the road towards Western
democracy. They aimed at establishing in Russia a fully parliamentary
regime, similar to that of European democracies. They took their seats
in the Duma in order to bring about the fulfillment of their hopes as
soon as possible. Thus among the circles of educated Russian society
the intelligentsia the considered opinion was gradually formed^that^the
new parliamentary institutions were a form of pseudo-constitutionalism.
The new Russian regime existed so to speak as a compromise be
tween the forces of the old and of revolution. How long such a state
of affairs might last, no one could pretend to know.

It is open to question what the final outcome would have been if the
fateful War of 1914, which completely upset all human calculations, had
not come so soon. The political compromise effected in 1906 a compro
mise which had not yet become stabilized, but was only tending to
become so was suddenly tested by an unprecedented war against

162 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

enemies who far surpassed Russia both in their technical and economic
development. It is just as difficult to imagine what would have happened
to the Empire had the War been won; but in any case, the state of
compromise must have been terminated. All the more was it^ found
impossible to maintain this compromise in the face of military disaster,
and the vacillation shown by Imperial authority during the War.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917

THE World War did not affect the legal side of the constitution of the
Empire. The response of the nation to the call to arms was spontaneous
and splendid. The regime had not enjoyed such a measure of popularity
for many decades as it did in 1914.

Even the opposition circles (the Socialists excepted) rallied round the
Throne in Russia's hour of need. It seemed that the political hatchet
was buried for ever; the Imperial regime, after seven years of economic
prosperity and political reforms, had everything at its disposal, during
the first months of the War, to assure for itself a long period of internal
peace. It did not, however, pass the test of the War a test imposed
on it by international events over which it had no decisive control.

The terrible reverses of 1915, the obvious unpreparedness of the army,
the insufficiency of Russian industry and the unprecedented drain on
the nation's blood and resources resulted in war-weariness and general
discontent. The vacillations of the Government did not help to restore
confidence.

In March, 1917, the reserve troops in St. Petersburg joined the work
men of the capital in open revolt The Government, unable to deal with
the situation, abandoned the helm. The food-riots immediately took on
a more serious aspect, for the Socialists assumed control of the masses.
On March I5th, the Tzar abdicated and with him fell the Monarchy
which during the last three hundred years had led Russia to greatness.

The Tzar's abdication took the Duma no less by surprise than the
rest of Russia. The majority in the Duma was formed by the so-called
"progressive" bloc, which consisted of Cadets, Octobrists, and other
moderate (monarchist) parties, excluding both the extreme Right and
Left. Thus in March 1917 the representatives of Russian constitu
tionalism were suddenly called to pilot the country through the stormy
and uncharted waters of Revolution.

It is not without interest to note how the Revolution was received by
Russian constitutionalists. On the evening of March I2th, the President
of the Duma, Rodzianko, sent a telegram to the Tzar, in the name of
the Duma, demanding that he should immediately appoint a responsible
person, enjoying the confidence of the country, to form a new Govern
ment. The Revolution was therefore considered as a stepping-stone from

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 163

"pseudo-constitutionalism" to European parliamentarism, based on the
Monarchy.

One of the leading members of the Cadet Party, P. N. Miliukov ?
very clearly described what was, at the time, not only the attitude of
the Party he represented but the view held by moderate opinion in
general. In a speech he delivered on March I5th to a crowd of people
and soldiers collected in the Duma he said: "The old despot, who has
brought Russia to the verge of ruin, has to abdicate or he will be
deposed. Authority will be transferred to the Grand Duke Michael
Alexandrovitch as Regent. The heir to the Throne is Alexis" (cries and
uproar: "that is the old dynasty"), "yes, gentlemen, it is the old dynasty,
which perhaps neither you nor I like; but it is now not a question of
like or dislike. We must answer the question: How is the State to be
constituted? We see this as a parliamentary and constitutional monarchy.
It is possible that others see it differently; but if we are now to argue
this out, instead of at once deciding the question, the country will be
plunged into civil war, and the regime that has just been destroyed will
be restored. ... As soon as the danger is over, and peace is estab
lished, we shall prepare for a Constituent Assembly based on universal,
direct, equal and secret suffrage. The freely-elected representatives of
the nation will decide who is best fitted to express the general opinion
of Russia ourselves or our opponents."

Meanwhile, the opponents mentioned by the leader of Russian con
stitutionalism were by no means inactive. One of the characteristic
features of the Revolution was that from its inception two separate
directing centres were formed. Side by side with the Committee of the
Duma, the Socialist parties had organized a provisional executive the
"Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" 1 ; in it was crystallized the
spirit of social revolution, as opposed to the bourgeois principles of
constitutionalism, parliamentarism and liberal democracy. The subse
quent course of the 1917 Revolution is the history of the conflict between
constitutionalism on Western lines, which the Provisional Government
endeavoured to set up in Russia, and social revolution, led by the
radicals and Socialists, and backed by the traditional elements of
Russian unrest the peasants in search of land, the nations of the^
Empire in their quest for national self-determination, etc.

The history of the Provisional Government may be divided into four
periods:

i. The period when it existed as originally formed (March I5th to
May 1 5th). During this period it carried through a series of democratic
reforms, among which were the introduction of equal civil rights for all,
preparation for the establishment of new local self-government on
democratic lines, and the abolition of the death penalty. The Govern
ment also issued a proclamation to the Poles, pledging itself to grant
Polish independence, 2 and a similar manifesto promising Finland a new

1 Soviet is Russian for Council.

fl On the basis of a union with Russia of all the Polish lands.

164 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

form of Government. This period is characterized by the growth of
anarchy and the gradual decline of authority. At the same time, at the
seat of the administration the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
gradually became the chief centre of "the nation in revolt." The Soviet
succeeded in placing the Provisional Government^ under its control;
and even, by means of constant organized pressure, in forcing that body
to carry through certain of its demands. A first step in this direction
was the demand that the Provisional Government should reverse its
foreign policy and put an end to the War. Pressure on this point and
agitation among the workmen and soldiers, became so great that the
ministerial offices of the Provisional Government had to be reshuffled.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Miliukov, a champion of "War to
Victory" resigned together with several other members of the cabinet.
Socialists took their places (in the first cabinet there had only been
one Kerensky) .

2. The period of the first Coalition Government (from May I5th to

July i $th).

During this period the Provisional Government merely reflected the
will of the Soviet, where left tendencies (Bolshevism) were steadily
gaining ground. The Government, however, influenced by the "bour
geois" ministers, tried to base itself on the right wing of the Soviet; and
a conflict arose in its midst. The Socialist Ministers, coming under fire
of their left wing Soviet associates, were compelled to pursue a double-
faced policy. This led to further anarchy; an armed revolt in St.
Petersburg in July, 1917, was suppressed with great difficulty.

3. The Second Coalition.

The direct result of the events in July was a new and very protracted
crisis in the Provisional Government. The "bourgeois" ministers, be
longing to the Constitutional Democratic Party, resigned and no
cabinet could be formed till the end of the month. The crisis was com
plicated by the catastrophic disasters at the Front and by the pressure
constantly exerted on the Government by the Soviet of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Deputies. Finally, on July 24th, a new Coalition Cabinet was
formed, composed of eleven Socialist and seven "bourgeois" ministers,
with Kerensky at its head. In connection with the formation of the new
Cabinet the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies demanded from
the Government an undertaking:

I. To take no action against the Soviet;

II. Not to countenance any deviation from the programme of "demo
cratic peace";

III. To take no action against the Bolshevik Party;

IV. To take decisive action against the "counter-revolutionaries";

V. To carry out, as quickly as possible, a political programme,
including the nationalization of the land, and a general plan of organi
zation of national economy and labour on Socialist lines, etc.

4. The fall of the Provisional Government.

The second Coalition Cabinet collapsed in August 1917. After several

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 165

unsuccessful attempts to revive It, Kerensky was compelled (early
September, 1917) to concentrate authority in the hands of a Council
of Five the so-called Directory consisting of himself, Nekrasov,
Tereschenko, Verkhovsky, and Verderevsky. This was done on the
definite understanding that the Council of Five should, at the first
opportunity, be supplemented by representatives of the other parties. On
September I4th, at a meeting of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies, a resolution brought forward by the Bolsheviks was passed
by an overwhelming majority. This resolution included the following
demands: the immediate proclamation of a democratic republic in
Russia; the immediate expropriation of private lands; the immediate
proposal to all belligerent nations that peace should be concluded; the
abolition of the death penalty at the Front; the renewal of full liberty
of political propaganda in the army and navy; the suppression of
bourgeois newspapers; the introduction of the principle of the self-
determination of nationalities; the election by the rank-and-file of all
military commanders; and the dissolution of the Duma. Kerensky
and the Directory of which he was head decided to accede to some of
these demands. On September i5th the Provisional Government,
through the Directory, decreed the new form of government. Later,
the entire high command of the Army was dismissed and the Bolshevik
leaders arrested at the time of the July revolt released. These con
cessions very much enhanced the prestige of the Bolsheviks, and still
further weakened the position of the Provisional Government Finally,
at the end of September, the vacancies in the Cabinet were filled by
new ministers, among whom were included several representatives of
the bourgeois parties (Konovalov, Smirnov and Tretiakov). By this
means the third and last Coalition Government was formed. It began
its work in almost catastrophic circumstances. A wave of disorders and
pogroms swept over all Russia. The Government searched for sup
porters on which it could rely but could not find any. The "Pro-Parlia
ment" (consisting of representatives of all parties) which it convened
was not a success. This institution consisted of 550 members; the
bourgeois political parties had 156 seats; the representatives of the
nationalities numbered 27, and the Socialists 367, all members of the
Soviet. The Bolsheviks held 53 seats, but decided to absent themselves.
The endless meetings of the Pro-Parliament resulted in fruitless dis
cussion and no action whatever. On November 7th (October 25 th, old
style) 1 the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government. The
latter had done nothing of any note during the eight months it had been
in office.

x Hence the term "October Revolution."

l66 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

COMMUNIST THEORIES

THE Bolsheviks, having seized power, actively initiated the programme
which, for decades past, they had been preparing. The most radical
changes were introduced into the legislation governing marriage farm y
life, economic conditions, etc. In a few words, they realized all the wild
dreams of the Russian radicals of the sixties of last century whose
successors had retained, up to the Revolution of 1917, the Marxist
principles unimpaired.

The distinctive ideas of Lenin, the intellectual leader of Communism,
and of his closest followers and successors among Russian and European
Marxists, may be epitomized in the view that World Capitalism has
reached the last stage of its effete Imperialistic development. Capitalist
economy, according to Lenin's doctrine, had reached a point in its
existence when the question of its destruction the so-called break-up
which entered into the social conception of Marx as a necessary element
no longer appeared as a distinct theoretical possibility but as an
inevitable event of the near future. Leninism and Stalinism, which
succeeded it, are essentially based upon the theory of a sudden social
change, consequent upon the full development of World Capitalist
economy which contains already in embryo all the conditions necessary
for a swing-over to Socialism. Under these conditions the working class
must take up an active attitude, seize political power by direct action
and organize a new Society.

Orthodox Marxism considers the State as a historical transitory form
which will have no place in the Socialist world of the future. This prin
ciple should not be mistaken for a condemnation of the discipline every
State imposes on its citizens; the Marxists maintain that Socialists
society will need more discipline and not less, and that compulsion will
be a natural characteristic of its regime. The absorption of the Individual
by the collective body of society and "organized labour discipline" will
demand greater sacrifices and more submission from man than the
"bourgeois organization" of the world has ever demanded. But, of
course, the New World will be chiefly governed by self-imposed^ disci
pline of the conscious masses, and then the necessity for any kind of
instrument of coercion, of which the State is the most powerful, will
disappear. All this, naturally, applies to some remote future. At present
the bourgeois State must give way to the proletarian, and bourgeois
oppression to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

This view of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat has been officially
and clearly explained in the "Introduction" to the "Criminal Code of
the R.S.F.S.R.," published in 1919: "The proletariat, in the October
Revolution, seized power and broke up the bourgeois State, which had

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 167

served for the purpose of oppressing the workmen as a class. . .
Without special regulations, without codes, the armed nation has dealt
and is dealing with its former oppressors. In the progress of the fight
with its enemies the proletariat makes use of one form or another of
oppression, but it does so, at first, without definite method, as the indi
vidual case demands, and not in an organized manner. The experiences
of the struggle, however, leads it to organization, to the establishment
of a system, and gives birth to new legislation. ... In the interests of
the economy of resources, correlation and centralization of separate
actions the proletariat must draw up rules for controlling its class
enemies and evolve a method of fighting its opponents and learning how
to conquer them."

Western jurists very often fail to realize that Soviet law is something
quite different from what is usually understood under the term "law. 53
The accepted standards of Soviet law do not recognize any rights of
the people, they are mainly standards of compulsory discipline, which
establish duties. These duties are purely conditional, and are not based
on any inviolable principles or demands. Therefore, the standards of
Soviet law are those of purely technical feasibility. According to Soviet
theory, these standards governed the life of the people in a state of
primitive Communism. The original form of the standards of a primitive
society was custom, which was nothing more than "technical rules for
the conduct of social life." Communist society, in the future, must live
on the basis of similar technical standards, which lie at the root of the
dictatorship of the working classes. Therefore "rights" and "laws,"
according to Soviet interpretation, have no inherent higher aims and
aspirations; they deny the elements of duty and equity, and all that
is higher and incontrovertible. All these ideas are but an inheritance
from bourgeois "fetishism and hypocrisy," which can find no place in a
proletarian society. In the latter, law is everything that serves to destroy
the old class of exploiters and to build up the new proletarian society.
Therefore it is necessary to submit to this law In the same way as to
any other practical rule or technical requirement. A quotation frequently
made from a Soviet text book on law gives a characteristic view of
this: "Between the standards of Soviet law and the rules for the culti
vation of market gardens, there is no essential difference of principle."

Soviet law is based on collective value, not individual which is a
bourgeois standard of theoretical equity. The "rights of the Individual,"
therefore, form a category far removed from the Communist conception.
In these individual rights Marxist theory inclined to see a veiled class-
interest favouring the bourgeoisie, and a political expression of their
privileges. If the Soviet constitution, shaping itself upon old revolu
tionary models, begins by "asserting the rights of the exploited working
classes," these rights are certainly not an expression of the principle of
the legal rights of the individual. To examine carefully the Soviet
"Declaration of Rights of the Labouring Masses," is enough to convince
anyone that it does not deal with the establishment of rights or the

168 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

maintenance of liberty, but with the formulation of certain definite aims
which Soviet authority has set itself, and which it intends to carry out
inexorably. Reisner, the well-known Soviet jurist, authoritatively defines
the Declaration thus: "As a matter of fact, this is not a question of
rights but of definite problems of Socialist organization."

The Declaration in particular, deprives the bourgeoisie of their rights
of ownership by proclaiming the expropriation of private property as
well as of financial and banking capital (Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.,
Part I, par. 3): it deprives them of their political rights by stating
that "at the time of a decisive conflict between the proletariat^ and
their exploiters, the latter have no place in any official organization."
(Ibid., par. 7.) In addition, the Declaration proclaims universal labour-
conscription which, naturally, is no sort of a right and solemnly de
crees the arming of the working classes, the formation of the Red Army,
and the disarming of the well-to-do classes.

The Soviet State Is, therefore, not so much concerned in limiting its
authority as in extending it. The impulse that marked the first stage in
the growth and development of Soviet power is indeed without parallel.
To take a cursory glance at the extent of the Socialization planned by
the Soviet is enough to obtain a clear idea of the growth and complexity
of its activities. Between 1917 and 1920, the Communists abolished
private ownership of: land, mineral wealth, forests, pedigree stock,
house property in towns, building land, all industrial concerns whether
owned by private individuals or companies, workshops employing more
than five workmen, the whole estate of the Church, all shipping con
cerns, whether owned privately or by companies, all stocks of books and
other printed matter, libraries, all theatrical properties, inventions,
royalties, scientific, literary, musical and artistic productions, etc. Taking
into consideration, in addition to this, that all' banks were nationalized,
decrees issued replacing private trading by State trading, and requisi
tions of all kinds made, the inference may naturally be drawn that
Soviet legislation truly leaves little scope for individual rights.

Such was the Soviet State during the period of Militant Communism;
L e. until 1921, when economic difficulties supervened which brought
about the introduction of the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP),
permitting some freedom to private economic activity. It must be
emphasized that this new freedom was confined to economic matters
only. The regime of State control and pressure did not cease in the
other spheres.

The juridical definition of these rights of freedom granted by the
NEP may now be mentioned. It would be more correct to call them,
not rights, but conditional concessions which made free trading possible
in so far only as it was convenient to Communist policy. Therefore the
regime of "freedom," granted by the NEP ceased as soon as Communist
policy found this expedient. The NEP was abolished in 1927, and the
Soviet State returned to integral Communism. It would be a mistake to
think that the change from the NEP to the policy of Socialist construe-

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 169

tion abolished any rights, or destroyed any constitutional guarantees.
Such rights had never actually existed and, therefore, could not be
abolished.

The introduction of compulsory labour in the U.S.S.R. has been
much discussed. This is regarded, to a certain extent, as an innovation
as a new phase in the history of the Soviet State; regardless of the
fact that the very essence of Soviet law, the "Declaration of the Rights
of the Labouring Masses/' provided for universal labour conscription.
What could this mean but compulsory labour? It may be affirmed that
because of the Inadequacy of Soviet organization the regime of com
pulsory labour was not, during the time of Militant Communism, suffi
ciently established; it may be said that, for reasons of expediency, It
had not been put into practice during the period of the NEP. It cannot,
however, be denied that it is a consistent outcome of thoroughgoing
Socialization. Socialist construction is necessarily bound up with the
systematic distribution of man-power. The juridical standards governing
this method of distribution are a consistent development and corollary
of the Soviet "Declaration of Rights."

In accordance with this the State, when drawing up a plan of distribu
tion of labour, has the right to transfer large bodies of workmen from
one sphere of Industry to another. This was done at the beginning of
1931, when all workmen with railway and shipping experience were
compulsorily mobilized for transport work.

It may be affirmed that the Soviet State does not recognize the
principle of the freedom of labour, and that compulsory labour Is its
main economic basis. This is specially noticeable in agriculture, where
the members of Kolkhoz are actually "adscripti glebae" It may, in fact,
be said that in the Soviet Union certain forms of serfdom have been
revived; the labourer is gradually becoming a serf of the State, and is
used as the raw material of a plan of State economy which could not
be worked in any other way.

From the foregoing, it will be seen that the regime of the U.S.S.R.
is utterly unlike either the democratic or bourgeois conception of govern
ment. The peculiarities of Soviet legal principles and practice also serve
to explain many features of Soviet administration, which will form the
subject of the following chapters.

VI
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET STATE

THROUGHOUT the Civil War the Communists remained the masters of
central Russia, roughly the regions between St. Petersburg., Moscow,
the Volga and the northern borders of the Ukraine.

It is from this centre that the Communists gradually reconquered and
united under their sway most of those portions of the Empire which

170 RUSSIA/ILS.S.R.

had either become isolated or were in the hands of political bodies
inimical to Bolshevism.

The new political entity which had been formed in the centre of
Russia, and which was known as the R.S.F.S.R., 1 was the nucleus of
the present U.S.S.R. At first, it was a Union of States, loosely bound
together. It gradually became a Union State, passing through the
following stages. On June ist, 1919, the Ail-Russian Central Execu
tive Committee (VTZIK) ratified by decree the union of the following
Republics Russian/ Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and White Rus
sian, with a view to combatting World Imperialism. Some States which,
later, fell away from Russia were parties to this treaty. 2 New treaties
were concluded in 1920 and 1921, determining the relations of the
States which had been established on the territory of the Russian
Empire. These treaties included the commercial and military treaty of
September 3Oth, 1920, with Azerbaijan; and that of December 28th,
1920, concluded between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukraine. Thanks
to these treaties, the respective military, economic, trade, financial and
labour authorities, as well as those of communications and posts and
telegraphs, were united in joint administrations. Similar treaties were
concluded by the R.S.F.S.R. with White Russia (January i6th, 1921)
and Georgia (May 2ist, 1921). The separate Republics, in accordance
with these treaties, were subordinated, in all important economic and
military questions, to the All-Russian Executive Committee (VTZIK).
Until the end of 1921 only the Ukraine had a representative in the
VTZIK. The other Republics were not officially represented. Their
delegates, however, took part in the work of the VTZIK from the end
of 1921 onwards under a resolution of the III Ail-Russian Congress
of Soviets. On March I2th, 1922, a treaty of alliance between Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan was concluded, forming the Transcaucasian
Federation. On December ijth, 1922, the Constitution of these Trans-
Caucasian Soviet Socialist Republics was promulgated.

On September 3rd, 1920,, a treaty of alliance was concluded between
the R.S.F.S.R. and Khoresm 3 ; and, on March 4th, 1921, a similar
treaty was made between the R.S.F.S.R. and Bokhara.

On December 30th, 1922, work was begun on the projected treaty for
the creation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. On July 6th,
1923, this treaty came into force; and, on the strength of it, the new
constitution of the Union was promulgated.

Federation and Centralization

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat is the most prominent charac
teristic of this Soviet State; and dictatorship, as a rule, entails
centralization to a much larger degree than in any other form of

1 Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

2 The treaty and decree were largely academic} for, at the time, Latvia, Lithuania, White
Russia and most of the Ukraine were occupied by anti-Soviet forces.

8 Khiva.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 171

government Yet events forced the Communists to select a federal
constitution for the Soviet State. How were the principles of dictatorship
and federation reconciled?

From the first, the Communist Party took up a purely tactical
position on the general question of the federal structure of the State and
on questions of local autonomy. It was for tactical reasons that the
Bolsheviks stood for the principle of the widest local and national
autonomy; for tactical reasons also, the principle of autonomy was
subject, from the very beginning, to considerable restrictions. This
contradiction, however, is easily explained. By supporting national
self-determination, the Communists were encouraging revolutionary
tendencies. By restricting it, the Party endeavoured to unite the inter
national proletariat.

In relation to the problem of federation Lenin, and the Party led by
him, had, in the past, adopted a negative attitude. '^Marxists," wrote
Lenin as far back as 1913, "are naturally opposed to federation and
decentralization; for the simple reason that Capitalism tends, as it
develops, to create large and highly-centralized States. Other conditions
being equal, the proletariat will always consciously uphold the principle
of a centralized State. It will always oppose mediaeval nationalism, will
always welcome the closest possible amalgamation of large territories,
in which the struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie would
best develop." Lenin brought forward the same anti-federal point of
view in his pamphlet "The State and Revolution" (1917). In this he
agreed with Engels, who defined the attitude of the Social Democrats
towards federalism as follows: "In my opinion the proletariat can only
adopt a republican form of a highly centralized type." This point of
view was shared by most Communist leaders.

Events, however, forced Lenin to reconsider his opinion, when
Platakov, President of the First Soviet Government of the Ukraine,
very definitely expressed himself (VIII Congress of Soviets, 1920), as
opposed to "the right of self-determination of nations." Lenin stigma
tized Piatakov's point of view in the following ironical words: "What
need is there for any self-determination when there exists a splendid
TZIK In Moscow." To prevent his being taken seriously, he explained
a number of tactical considerations showing that under certain condi
tions, federalism had its advantages. According to Lenin, "great caution
should be exercised in this matter, as there is nothing worse than a
distrustful nation. . . . The working masses of other nations, for
instance, distrusted the Great Russians, considering them a nation of
kulaks and oppressors. . . . National problems cannot be solved by
enforcing economic unity. Such unity is, of course, necessary, but it
must be attained by means of teaching, propaganda and voluntary
consent. . . . This is why we must say to other nations that we remain
internationalists to the end, and that we are striving for the voluntary
union of the workmen and peasants of all nations."

Centralization must come later. It is stated in the preliminary draft

172 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

of the report on national questions presented to the Second Congress
of the Communist International that: "Federation is only a transi
tional stage on the road to full unity among the workers of the different
nations." But ". . . federation has already shown its practical efficiency;
both in the relations of the R.S.F.S.R. with other Soviet Republics and
also, in the R.S.F.S.R. itself, with regard to nationalities which hitherto
possessed neither national status nor autonomy (e. g. } the Bashkir and
Tartar Autonomous Republics in the R.S.F.S.R., created in 1919 and
1920)."

The above mentioned situation, with regard to federation, was deter
mined by the de facto disintegration of the Russian State. The
separatism evinced in various parts of it imperatively demanded
political recognition; and it may be remarked that the Soviet authorities,
in the circumstances, showed great elasticity and adaptability.

The R.S.F.S.R.

In order to understand the complicated contemporary structure of
the U.S.S.R. as a whole, it is best to begin at its centre, the R.S.F.S.R.
Soviet jurists call this "the basic State"; "the centre of gravity";
"the prototype of the system." It is, indeed, a kind of political micro
cosm, whose features are reflected with very little distortion by the
whole Union. Here the Soviet system developed; and from here it was
transferred, preserving all its essential features, to the other parts of
the Union.

The R.S.F.S.R. at first maintained its former subdivisions into
Provinces, Uyezds and Volosts; but several of its parts became au
tonomous. Later, the Soviet Government undertook the task of dividing
the R.S.F.S.R. into new administrative areas. The Provinces were
merged into larger administrative units, which were termed Territories.
Finally, in recent times, Uyezds have been abolished; Regions composed
of several former Volosts becoming the sole sub-divisions of the Terri
tory.

In addition to this, several parts of the R.S.F.S.R. have become
national, autonomous republics, e. g. the Bashkir, the Buryat-Mongol,
the Kazak, the Tartar, etc.

The political organization of these portions of the R.S.F.S.R. is
different from that of the Territories and Regions. The Republics have
at their head independent Central Executive Committees, Soviets of
People's Commissars, as well as People's Commissariats. They are,
therefore, separate States. Jurists differ greatly with regard to the
question of sovereignty. Some consider it merely "decorative." In their
opinion the status of the autonomous republics differs very little from
that of the pre-revolutionary provincial Zemstvos. V. Durdinevsky, a
prominent Soviet jurist, considers that this is not quite accurate and
that "at least some of these republics are jealous of their national and
sovereign status"; but, even in the opinion of this author, "these Re
publics cannot pretend to exercise complete sovereign rights." Another

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 173

Soviet jurist, Mazherovsky, is of the opinion that the question must
be considered dialectically. "The Russian State/' he says, "has not yet
become a Federation in the full sense of the word, for the nations, in
the process of assuming sovereign powers have not reached, either
economically or culturally, the stage when they can organize inde
pendently or actively exercise their sovereignty. These nations are,
however, growing and developing and are demanding the reconstruction
of their State institutions on national lines; conjointly with their growth
the principle of federation also develops." This last assertion does not
correspond to the actual state of affairs. Throughout the R.S.F.S.R.
(and later the U.S.S.R.) Soviet institutions have been modelled on
a standardized type which disregards national particularities.

It is impossible, therefore, to judge the system of Soviet federalism
from the point of view of established standards. This is proved by the
solutions of the following three problems:

1. The repartition of authority between the component parts and the
centre. Central authority administers foreign affairs, foreign trade,
military and political affairs by means of the so-called Commissariats
(in Moscow). These Commissariats were, until the establishment of
the U.S.S.R. (1923) called All Russian People's Commissariats and
after the Union People's Commissariats. Supplies, finance, national
economy, labour, State control (Workers and Peasants Inspection),
communications, posts and telegraphs in the R.S.F.S.R. were, and
still are, under the joint administration of the local organs and the
corresponding People's Commissars in Moscow. Finally, local adminis
tration, justice, education, health, social welfare and agriculture, were
administered by the local People's Commissars of the Autonomous
Republics. The Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. makes no mention
of the degree of dependence on Moscow of this autonomous administra
tion. Article 49 of the Constitution, however, assigned to the jurisdiction
of the Central Executive Committee (TZIK) of the R.S.F.S.R. the
general direction of home politics, general legislation, organization of
justice, court procedure, civil and criminal legislation, etc. Furthermore,
Article 50 subordinated to its authority "all questions which it recognized
as subject to its decisions"!

2. The combination of legislative and executive authority. The Soviet
system does not acknowledge the separation of legislative and executive
powers. It therefore follows that in entrusting to the local authorities
certain spheres of activity, the Soviet system does not limit them to
any one category of functions legislative or executive. They possess
full powers in the Soviet sense of the word. Possible conflicts of juris
diction are solved by the authority of the Executive Committee of the
R.S.F.S.R. a fact that was not made sufficiently clear in the con
stitutions of the R.S.F.S.R., but which is quite clearly formulated
in the more recent constitution of the U.S.S.R. In practice, possible
discrepancies, or even anarchy, in legislation are abolished by the dic
tatorship of the Communist Party.

i 74 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

3. Finally, there is the question of the constitutional changes in the
relations between the central and local authorities. Article 49 of the con
stitution of the R.S.F.S.R. reads : "The establishment of the boundaries
and powers of the component bodies of the R.S.F.S.R., as well as the
settlement of disputes between them, lie within the competence of the
Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R., as well as the general adminis
trative distribution of the territory, the inclusion in the R.S.F.S.R. of
new members and the right of secession from the Russian Federation."
Taking into consideration that the establishment of the constitutions of
the member States was in itself an act of the central authority, it must
be admitted that the latter alone has the right of determining or modify
ing their jurisdiction. m

Such is the organization of the "basic State" of Russia, m studying
which it is always necessary to distinguish between the slogans and tac
tical methods, the actual state of affairs, and the policy of the Moscow
authorities. Briefly, the main features are these: advertisement of the
widest possibilities of federation in programmes and slogans (adopted in
the face of national "separatism") ; a firm policy of standardized Soviet-
ization, as manifested in the written law; and State institutions which
ensure the supremacy of the Russian element.

VII
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

HISTORICALLY, the greater part of all the Republics which form the
U.S.S.R. arose as a result of the disintegration of the Russian Empire.
They differ from the autonomous republics of the R.S.F.S.R. in that all
went through more or less short periods of complete separation from the
Russian State. Their regimes during these periods were, without excep
tion, anti-Communist. The Reds conquered them by force of arms; and,
partly forcibly and partly by taking advantage of the help of local Com
munists, introduced Soviet organization and thereby united them to
Moscow. Until 1923, the general political position of these Republics
was very similar to that of the autonomous portions of the R.S.F.S.R.
The Federation possessed no special institutions, and no definition of the
respective powers of the Federation and of its component members
existed. The status of the latter varied considerably. The Constitutions
of some of these Republics proclaimed them as entirely independent
of the R.S.F.S.R. Of this type is the Constitution of the White Russian
Socialist Soviet Republic, promulgated on February 4th, 1919, and sup
plemented on December I7th, 1920, at the II- Congress of Soviets of
White Russia. On March I4th, 1919, the Constitution of the Ukraine
also declared it to be a State completely independent of the R.S.F.S.R.
Their relations with Moscow were established partly "de facto/' partly
by special agreements which bore resemblance to international treaties.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 175

In general, there was a tendency to centralize several important branches
of government (e. g. that of defence) in Moscow, and to establish for
others a uniform system of administration, while allowing a certain
amount of self-determination in local and national questions. In this
manner, a series of joint People's Commissariats was created by treaties
with the other member States of the Federation.

Such an order was, of course, far from perfect, or even mutually con
venient. After the Civil War modification became imperatively necessary.
Reconstruction was carried out by the Treaty of Union on December
3Oth, 1922, which served as the basis for the new constitution of the
U.S.S.R., promulgated on July 6th, 1923. The actual conclusion of the
Treaty of Union was very ceremonious, and December 3Oth was declared
a day of rejoicing throughout the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
According to Stalin the new Union was the "precursor of the coming
World Socialist Republic." "We are setting the example of a proletarian
State, which will lay the foundation stone of world-wide unity among
proletarian Republics" declared another well-known Soviet leader,
Frunze.

The Treaty and the subsequent Constitution of the Union were in
tended first of all to coordinate the relations between the member States:
the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., the White Russian S.S.R., the
Georgian S.S.R., the Armenian S.S.R. and the Azerbaijan S.S.R. In addi
tion, Bokhara and Khorezm were also recognized as members of the
Union; although they did not take direct part in signing the Treaty but
were declared to be "States in fraternal relations with the Union." In
1924 took place the complicated process of sub-dividing Central Asia;
as a result of which two new republics the Uzbek S.S.R. and the
Turkoman S.S.R. were established on the territory of Russian Turke
stan (including Bokhara and Khorezm). At the III All-Union Congress
of Soviets (1925), these Republics were recognized as new members of
the Union, and the Treaty of Union correspondingly modified. In 1930,
a seventh Federal Republic the Tadzhik S.S.R. was established.

The provision of the Treaty of December 30th, 1922, as customary with
all similar treaties, established the general political foundations of the
Union. These were more fully developed in the new constitutional law of
July 6th, 1923. From a cursory examination of these acts it will be at once
seen that the prototype of the new Union was the Constitution of the R.S.
F.S.R. The Constitution of the Soviet Union exactly reproduces the gen
eral system of the supreme organs of the R.S.F.S.R.; except that, instead
of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, there is the All-Union Congress of
Soviets, from which is subsequently formed the Union Executive Com
mittee and its Praesidium, and the Union Council of People's Commis
sars. The relations between the People's Commissariats of the Union
and those of the member States are planned on lines identical with those
within the boundaries of the R.S.F.S.R.: there are Union Commissariats,
Joint Commissariats and Independent Commissariats, the whole system
being extensively coordinated and unified. Each member State is ad-

i 7 6 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

ministered by its own Congress of Soviets, Executive Committee, their
Praesidiums and Councils of People's Commissars. Furthermore, the
Constitution established the Supreme Tribunal of the Union and the
United States Political Department of the Union (OGPU) .

To what category of states can the U.S.S.R. be assigned? It has been
termed a Union of States (Staatenbund), a Union State (Bundestaat),
and a Federation. Owing to the peculiar structure of the Soviet, and in
view of its as-yet amorphous political character, one cannot at present
classify it with any existing type.

The U.S.S.R, judged by its formal constitution, belongs to the type
of those federal states which are based on the principle of the delegation
of sovereignty.

Article 3 of the Constitution reads: "The sovereignty of the Federal
Republics is limited only to the extent provided for in the present con
stitution, and only in matters allotted to the competence of the Union.
Beyond these limits, each Republic of the Union exercises its powers in
dependently." At the same time the Union represents a real legal entity
a universitas, not a societas. The new Constitution of the Union, like
that of the R.S.F.S.R. has completely done away with the idea that the
source of sovereignty is vested in the Soviets of the lowest grade; each
Republic per se is a sovereign power. The Constitution invests the su
preme organs of authority of the Union with supreme power. The Union
of Soviet Republics has "direct" authority over the subjects, officials and
the institutions of its member States.

Equally, the Union has the right of "direct" control over the legislative
and administrative activities of the members of the Union. All these
features establish the fact that the U.S.S.R. is a Union State (Bunde-
staat).

As regards the very important question of the repartition of sovereign
rights in the U.S.S.R., it must be acknowledged that the powers of the
Union are very great, and exceed the usual relations between a Union
and its component members. The powers of the supreme organs of the
Union are, in some way,, wider than those of the supreme organs of the
R.S.F.S.R. Comparing Article 49 of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R.
with Article i of the Union Constitution, it will be seen that the latter
includes all but two points (the right to alter the prerogatives of mem
ber States of the Union, and the right to change the general administra
tive division of their territory) of the prerogatives of the Executive Com
mittee of the R.S.F.S.R. In addition, the following points are within
the competence of the Union: I. all general enactments concerning the
principles of land-tenure, as well as of the use of the mineral wealth,
forests and waters of the whole territory of the Union: 2. legislation with
regard to emigration within the Union, and control over internal colo
nization funds: 3. the fundamental labour laws: 4. the general principles
of education: 5. all general measures to promote national health: 6. the
compilation of Union statistics. It may well be asked, what remains in
the competence of the member States? In what sphere of competence.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 177

in the material sense of this word, do they exercise their sovereignty in
dependently? Apparently there is no special, entirely independent sphere
of state activity possessed by the member States.

Taking into consideration that in Soviet legislation the right to pro
mulgate general laws belongs to the Union alone, it must be concluded
that the member States possess the right of legislation only in local mat
ters. Their competence is thus mainly local; and their sovereignty can
mainly be manifested only within the scope of the activities of the Inde
pendent Commissariats. In all other respects they are given general in
structions by the central organs of the Union.

Finally, there remains the question of the right to alter the existing
repartition of sovereignty. It has been shown that the Constitution of the
R.S.F.S.R. assigned this to its supreme organs, whereas the Constitution
of the Union excluded the corresponding enactments from the jurisdic
tion of the supreme organs of the Union. Any change in the repartition
of sovereign rights is made dependent on a change in the Constitution
itself. Alterations in the fundamental principles of the Constitution,
however, are exclusively the prerogative of the All-Union Congress of
Soviets. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the right to change the
system of repartition of sovereign rights belongs to the Union and not to
the member States.

At the same time, the Constitution recognizes the right of every mem
ber State to secede from the Union at its discretion; a right which is
specially emphasized by Soviet jurists who point out that the Union Is
the freest political organization in the world. It is true that the Consti
tution does not define the method of this withdrawal. It might be sup
posed that secession from the Union could be affected by a resolution of
the supreme organs of the member States in particular, of their
Congress of Soviets. But the enactments of these Congresses of Soviets
may be suspended, or even annulled, by the All-Union Congress of
Soviets or by its Executive Committee. It may be asked, wherein lies the
freedom of secession, when it may be either annulled or suspended?
Actually, the freedom of withdrawal as announced in the Constitution is
a pure fiction, preserved for purposes of propaganda.

VIII
THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND ITS ORGANS

General Scheme

Two separate principles underlie the theoretical foundations of the
Soviet State, a dualism which explains many of the contradictions of
Soviet life. These principles are Soviet democracy and proletarian (or
Communist) Dictatorship. The first implies that the State is built up
from below, from the base to the apex, the source of all power being the
people. The second, on the contrary, invests the Communists, acting in

178 RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

the name of the proletariat with supreme authority, and implies the
organization of the State in the reverse order. The Soviet State could not
reconcile these contradictory principles and had recourse to a purely
superficial and mechanical method of adjusting their differences. It set
up two kinds of State organizations those of democracy, and those of
the Dictatorship, the former having a constitutional de jure existence,
the latter merely a de facto one. The organs of the Communist Party
are therefore not mentioned in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

During the first period of the history of the U.S.S.R. until about 1928
the Communist Party strove in every way to give the constitutional
organs of the State full apparent responsibility; the Party remained in
the shade and controlled the official organs "unofficially." Since 1928 a
gradual change of policy occurred; the Party concealed its dictatorial
powers less and less. The constitutional organs appeared now in their
true light a mere screen for the activities of the Communist Party. This
constitutional screen is organized as follows :--

I. The primary organs of the U.S.S.R. the Soviets (Councils) of
Deputies, sub-divided into: Village, Urban, and Factory Soviets.

II. The derivative organs of the Republic or of the Soviets, elected by
them, and sub-divided into:

A) Local organs:

1. Regional Congresses of Soviets and their Executive Com
mittees.

2. Territorial Congresses of Soviets and their Executive Com
mittees.

B) Central organs:

a) Organs of the federal and autonomous parts of the U.S.S.R.

1. The Congresses of the Soviets of the Federal and Auton
omous Republics.

2. The Central Executive Committees and their Praesid-
iums.

3. The Councils of People's Commissars of the federal and
autonomous parts of the Union.

b) Supreme Organs of the U.S.S.R.

1. The Congress of the Soviets of the Union.

2. The Central Executive Committee of the Union with its
two chambers the Council of the Union and the Council
of Nationalities.

3. The Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of
the Union.

4. The Council of the People's Commissars of the Union.

5. The OGPU.

6. The Supreme Court of the Union.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE 179

During the whole history of the Soviet State, this system has never
been essentially modified. Herein, the Russian Revolution differs widely
from the French, which was continually changing its constitution. This is
not due to any special inflexibility inherent in the Russian character but
to the purely secondary part assigned to the constitutional organs of the
Soviet State; the constitution itself, from the beginning, was a blind,
behind which the actual ruling power the Communist Party was con
cealed.

I. SOVIETS

Government by council is not new to Russia although it takes its
origin rather from the popular assemblies of pre-Mongolian times the
Veche than from any democratic doctrine. Councils were organized by
Ivan the Terrible to administer local finances and justice; Peter the
Great's Collegia were bureaucratic councils; the Zemstvos and Munici
palities of the nineteenth century conformed to the council principle; and
the peasant communes were governed by councils the Village Meetings.
The Russian revolutionaries adopted the council or Soviet system not
because it was democratic but because it was familiar to the majority of
the population.

The first revolutionary Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed in
1905, at the time of the first Russian Revolution. The ideology of this
first Soviet was distinctly pragmatic. "The Soviet of Workmen's Depu
ties," wrote Trotzky, "was formed, through stress of circumstance, in
answer to the objective need for an organization which, while not having
any traditions, would be authoritative; which would at once gather to
gether the scattered hundreds of thousands of people almost devoid of
organization; which would unite the revolutionary tendencies of the
proletariat, would show initiative, and automatically exercise control.
The secret of its influence lies in the fact that it arose as a natural organ
ization of the proletariat in the direct struggle for power forced upon it
by stress of circumstances." The pragmatic reasoning of Trotzky, whose
mentality is exceedingly realistic, agrees with the comments of the far
more theoretical Lenin. In his opinion, too, the Soviet during the first
period of the Russian Revolution was not an established form of gov
ernment. "The Soviet of Workers' Deputies was only a means for popu
lar and revolutionary State-construction. This is manifested not only by
its fighting the existing authority, but also by its search for new political
forms." The process, in Lenin's opinion, consisted in:

1. The seizure by the people of political power without any right, law
or restriction.

2. "The spontaneous formation of new revolutionary organizations,
such as Soviets of workers, soldiers, railwaymen, and peasants. In their
social and political composition, they were embryonic organs of the
dictatorship of the revolutionary elements of the nation, because the

i8o RUSSIA/U.S.S.R.

Soviets recognized, no other authority or law and no standards except
their own will"

The Soviets of 1917 arose approximately in the same way, and still on
the lines of the old traditions of 1905. There existed no defined Soviet
system and the part the Soviets played in the State was at first not at all
clear. A few months later, however, the principles of Sovietism became
much more precise. Two kinds of influence were brought to bear on
them. The first was purely Russian and national and hence not easily
understood by foreigners. It took its origin in the well-known anarchical
tendencies of the Russian intelligentsia, and from its often erroneous in
terpretation of some peculiar features of the political life of the masses
of the Russian people. "The Soviet regime," says Mikhailovsky, a Com
munist historian, "did not appear in Russia by chance. In its embryonic
form it had long existed in the traditions and customs of the Russian
people. It suff