Full text of "The SALT II treaty : hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session on EX. Y, 96-1 .."

THE SALT II TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON

EX. Y, 96-1

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO-
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT II
TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18,
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

JULY 25, 26, 31, AUGUST 2, 1979

PART 3

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

THE SALT II TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON

EX. Y, 96-1

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO-
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT
II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18,
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

JULY 25, 26, 31, AUGUST 2, 1979

PART 3

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

V^ F 76 Iz ■ St ^/s/Pi 3

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-250 O WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, B.C. 20402

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

GEORGE McGOVERN, South Dakota CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois

V^: JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee

''^ JOHN GLENN, Ohio JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

\ RICHARD (DICK) STONE, Florida S. I. HAYAKAWA, California

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
— EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska ^5^

WiLUAM B. Bader, Staff Director 2

Albert A. Lakeland, Jr., Minority Staff Director \ I

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Hearing days:

July 25, 1979 ^ 1

July 26, 1979 125

July 31, 1979 151

August 2, 1979 235

Statement of: „ ^ . . . ^ , ,00

Ellis, Gen. Richard H., Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command 128

Haig, Gen. Alexander, Jr., U.S. Army, retired, former Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe, Philadelphia, Pa 277

Hill, Gen. James E., Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense/

Air Defense Command 126

Kissinger, Hon. Henry, former Secretary of State, Washington, D.C 151

Legvold, Robert, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y 72

McCloy, Hon. John J., Coordinator of U.S. Arms Control Activities,

1961-63, and former U.S. Military Governor and High Commissioner for

Germany, New York, N.Y 235

Pipes, Prof. Richard, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 53

Slocombe, Walter, Director, Department of Defense SALT Task Force and

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs,

Department of Defense 131

Sonnenfeldt, Hon. Helmut, Brookings Institution, former counselor,

Department of State 42

Toon, Hon. Malcolm, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R 2

Ulam, Prof. Adam B., Gurney professor of history and political science.

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 69

Zagoria, Prof. Donald S., City University of New York, New York, N.Y 83

Insertions for the record:

Prepared statement of Ambassador Malcolm Toon 5

Prepared statement of Hon. Helmut Sonnenfeldt 46

Prepared statement of Prof. Robert Legvold 79

Prepared statement of Prof. Donald S. Zagoria 87

Prepared statement of Prof. Leopold Labedz 91

Department of Defense responses to additional questions for the record .... 146

Prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Kissinger 160

Prepared statement of Hon. John J. McCloy 247

Letter to Senator Church from Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of CIA,

dated Aug. 1, 1979, with respect to verifiability of SALT II Treaty 276

Additional statement submitted for the record:

Prepared statement of Col. Phelps Jones, USA (Ret.), Director, National

Security and Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United

States, Washington, D.C 318

(III)

SALT II TREATY

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1979

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m., in room
4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sar-
banes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar.

Also present: Senator Boschwitz.

opening statement

The Chairman. Today the committee sits to solve a riddle, pierce
an enigma, and piece together a puzzle, in short, to decipher the
motives, intentions, and capabilities of our principal adversary, and
in SALT II, our counterpart, the Soviet Union.

Our hearing, however, is not a foolish rush to judgment. We do
not have to judge the Soviet Union in order to judge the merits or
demerits of the SALT II Treaty. We must only acquaint ourselves
with the unknowns of the Soviet present and the unknowables of
our common future in order to put the treaty into a context within
which we can assess its contribution to our security and that of the
world.

To do more would require a lifetime. I am always struck by the
fact that experts on any subject — and the Soviet Union is an excel-
lent example of this pattern — are generally the most cautious in
pronouncing final judgment, while those with the least exposure to
a complex matter are often the most certain of their views.

In the case of the Soviet Union, I cannot help repeating what
Marshall Shulman said on our second day of these hearings, quot-
ing Mr. Dooley: "It ain't the things you don't know that hurts you,
it's the things you do know that ain't so."

In eissessing the Soviet Union, I start with more questions than
answers, and candidly, I expect to finish these hearings in just
about the same condition. Our witnesses today are experts, policy-
makers, and scholars, but their views are diverse, and the commit-
tee is obliged and fortunate to hear them out, not to decide among
them. Time and the correctness of the decision we do make on the
SALT Treaty will do that.

For now, we can simply seek information and enlightenment,
information on Soviet policy today, enlightenment on its likely
shape and direction tomorrow. We need to try to understand how
Soviet leaders view the SALT process, how they make their choices

(1)

between guns and butter, between restraint in the arms race and
competition in the Third World.

We need the best advice we can obtain on long-term Soviet goals
and on our ability to direct them to match our own as much as
possible, to counter them effectively when they spell direct conflict
with our own vital interests.

Most of all, I imagine, we need to know the safest path to follow
when we know too little of our adversary to choose our course and
be sure of his with absolute certainty. The testimony we hear today
will not be the last word on this subject. I know, however, that it is
the best available to us, and I very much look forward to hearing
it.

Our first witness, Ambassador Malcolm Toon, is an official one,
but he is also an authoritative expert on the Soviet Union. His
expertise has been acquired during three postings in Moscow,
under Stalin, under Khrushchev, and under Brezhnev, and several
tours of East-West duty in the State Department. As a junior
diplomat, he served in Warsaw and in Budapest. As an Ambassa-
dor, he has represented the United States in Czechloslovakia, Yu-
goslavia, and Israel before returning to the Soviet Union.

As a PT boat commander, he saw duty in World War II. As a
diplomat, he has seen long duty in what another PT boat com-
mander, President Kennedy, called the twilight struggle to avert
world war III.

In his last posting in Moscow, he has seen his Embassy roof on
fire and his basement made a haven for refugees from Soviet
religious intolerance. He has been barred from Soviet television for
seeking to speak frankly about America's commitment to the pur-
suit of human rights, and he has been criticized in his own country
for seeming to bar contact between the Embassy and Soviet human
rights activitists.

In short. Ambassador Toon is no stranger to controversy. Before
this committee testifying on the subject of SALT, he is then on
familiar ground. We are pleased to have you here, Mr. Ambassa-
dor. We look forward to what you have to say.

STATEMENT OF HON. MALCOLM TOON, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO

THE U.S.S.R.

Ambassador Toon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
pleased to be here, as always.

I was interested to note that you referred to experts who are
appearing before you this morning. I assume you had in mind
those that follow me, because I do not regard myself as an expert. I
perhaps know a little bit more than the layman in this country
about the Soviet Union because I speak the language, I have lived
there for a few years, I have negotiated with them, but frankly, I
have never been able to predict Soviet behavior, and that, I think,
is the mark of expertise, and therefore I decline the honor.

Now, Mr. Chairman, you have my statement, and I must assume
that because of the conscientious attitude toward the problem that
confronts you which you have demonstrated — you and your col-
leagues, throughout these hearings — that you have read it in its
entirety. I will try therefore in these few brief remarks not to
duplicate what I have set forth in that statement.

I would like in the time allotted to me before we get to questions
to do three things: First, clarify my attitude toward SALT; second,
give you some thoughts on possible Soviet reactions to courses of
action that have been suggested by some witnesses appearing
before your committee; third, touch on my own approach to the
business of United States-Soviet relations.

As to my attitude toward the SALT process and the SALT agree-
ment itself, you may recall the flurry of articles that appeared in
the press after Vienna, some uninformed, others somewhat tenden-
tious, but all of them leaving the impression that I was becoming
lukewarm in my support for SALT, or worse, was considering
opposing the treaty.

This impression, Mr. Chairman, was completely unfounded. I felt
then as I feel now that the SALT process is central to our search
for strategic stability, that the agreement itself was a good one,
that it constituted in my view a useful, stabilizing element in
United States-Soviet relations, that it represented a useful first
step, though only a first step toward effective strategic arms con-
trol, and that it in no way weakens our security or that of our
friends and allies, but I also felt, Mr. Chairman, and it was on this
point where the press frankly took license, that no agreement with
the Soviet Union can rest on trust. It must be verifiable.

I made clear that I could not support a treaty that I did not
believe was adequately verifiable, and frankly, I could not be sure
of this in Vienna or in Moscow because of the loss of our Iranian
facilities and other developments that had taken place prior to the
meeting in Vienna.

I therefore preferred to withhold judgment on verifiability until I
could be briefed by the experts in Washington. This is the sort of
briefing, as you know, you cannot get in the field, and I had to wait
for my return before I could be assured.

Now, since returning to Washington about 10 days ago, I have
had my briefings. I am told that the briefings I had were the same
that were given to the President, and the Secretary of State, and
other top officials in Government, and I assume that were given to
you, Mr. Chairman, in your executive session, and I now share the
view of our top political and military leaders that no militarily
significant violations of SALT II— by this I mean those that could
affect the strategic balance — can take place without detection by
us.

So, I am satisfied and can in good conscience support the treaty.
I do so here and I shall do so in speeches around the country in
coming days.

Second, with regard to Soviet reactions to courses of action that
have been suggested by some witnesses who have appeared before
you, before your committee in recent days, in all frankness, with
my some 30 years of experience in dealing with the Soviets, I
consider myself somewhat better qualified — although I again say I
am not an expert, but better qualified — to estimate Soviet behavior
than others who have not had the, I might say, dubious privilege of
living cheek by jowl with our Soviet adversaries.

In my view, rejection would not lead to Armageddon, just as
approval of the treaty will not bring in a new era of United States-
Soviet cooperation, but it will in my view put an end to the SALT

process for the foreseeable future— and make political and strategic
competition with the Soviet Union more unstable and possibly
more dangerous.

Amendments to the treaty that would amount to mandated re-
negotiation to resolve issues in our favor, as has been suggested by
some witnesses, are inadvisable, in my view. At best, such a course
would reopen issues of concern to the Soviets which are now re-
solved in our favor, thus unraveling the whole fabric of the treaty
itself and at worst, the Soviets would simply refuse to discuss
changes with us.

This is essentially what Brezhnev said in his toast at Vienna,
and I was there to hear it, and what Gromyko reiterated in his
press conference subsequently in Moscow. There are times when
we should take Soviet statements at face value. This, I feel, is one
of those times.

Now, finally, a word on my personal approach to United States-
Soviet relations. I have long felt, and I have said so publicly many
times, that our relationship with the Soviets is essentially an ad-
versary one. It is not one that can be based on mutual trust,
confidence, friendship, not now, not in the foreseeable future, not
in my view, until there is a basic change in Soviet world outlook, in
Soviet philosophy, in Soviet behavior.

This does not mean that we must regard each other with hostil-
ity and unmitigated suspicion, but it does mean that we must be
hardheaded in our assessment of Soviet objectives, that we must at
all times remain alert to the need to guard our vital interests, and
that we should be frank— not offensive, but frank— in expressing
our disapproval of Soviet behavior.

On the policy level we should, in a word, recognize and operate
on the need to cooperate on some matters, to regulate competition
on others, and to try to defuse around the world tensions which
might possibly lead to a dangerous confrontation between us.

All of this means, it seems to me, that any Ambassador must
approach his job in Moscow with a mixed view, a view comprising
both respect and contempt, or perhaps I should use a milder word
since I must always be mindful of the friendly Soviet press reaction
to what I say, let's say disapproval. Respect for Soviet military
strength, for Soviet persistence in pursuing those basic political
objectives, Soviet determination to take advantage of perceived
weaknesses in their adversaries, coupled with opportunities and
world developments which may open up and may give them the
chance to project their influence abroad, and finally, respect for
Soviet loyalty to their own ideological aims in dealing with their
own people and their so-called friends and allies, respect in the
sense that we must recognize that this is an element of power that
we have to take into account.

Disapproval— disapproval of their ideology and of their contempt
for the principles of individual freedom, the dignity of man, the
religious ethic, which underlie our own philosophy and behavior
and those of our friends and allies in the West.

This, of course, works both ways. The Soviets also have a mixed
view of us, also composed of respect and contempt. In this case it is
contempt, and not just disapproval. Respect for our military
strength, respect for the strength of our economy, and hopefully,

respect for our determination to take all necessary steps to protect
our vital interests.

On the other end of the spectrum, contempt— again I say not just
disapproval — contempt, as they see it, for our tendency to shift
policies from one administration to another, our vacillation in pur-
suing policies once determined, our tolerance of individual freedom,
which they regard as unbridled license, tantamount to anarchy,
our search for a warm and friendly relationship with a power
whose ideology condemns everything we stand for.

There are more elements, of course, to the mix, but these are the
important ones as I see them.

I have felt that the American Ambassador in Moscow, in reflect-
ing this mixed view of Soviet power and in projecting our national
interest, should not be reluctant to speak his mind both to the host
government and to his superiors in Washington as well as, of
course, the American people and the Congress, in his public ap-
pearances back here.

Plain speaking, of course, has its hazards— blasts in the Soviet
press, and the occasional cold shoulder by Soviet officials, and, of
course, on this end, anguish in Washington, in the executive
branch.

Despite some rough periods, I believe that this approach has
commanded the respect, admittedly very grudging respect, of the
Soviet leadership. After all, Soviet leaders themselves are straight-
forward, frank, frequently insensitive to others' concerns, and I
have managed, I think, to develop a dialogue with Brezhnev and
some— not all of his colleagues, but some— in order to project this
point of view.

In any case, I feel strongly that an ambassador does a disservice
to his country if he shades the views of his Government to make
them more palatable to his host, his Soviet host, and if he puts an
unwarranted gloss on his host government's positions in his com-
munications with Washington. Any other course, in my view, can
lead to miscalculation and misunderstanding, neither of which we
can afford in this dangerous and unstable world.

As to the future, I do not believe Moscow is going to be any
easier for us to deal with even with SALT II and even with a new
generation of Soviet leaders in place. Ideology will continue to play
a role in Soviet policy. Soviet values and world views will remain
very different from our own. This means continued repression of
dissent at home and support of radical movements abroad. This
friction and unpleasantness in relations thus will continue between
our two countries. It is incumbent on both sides to regulate the
mutually harmful competition and expand the mutually beneficial
cooperation. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that we will carry our share
of the load. Given my skepticism of Soviet intentions, I cannot be
sure the other side will do the same.

Thank you very much.

[Ambassador Toon's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Ambassador Malcolm Toon

In my statement today, I would like to discuss SALT against the broader back-
ground of U.S.-Soviet relations and in this context, to state my reasons for support-
ing the Treaty.

Since I will be speaking to you in my capacity as a "Soviet expert," perhaps I
should give you my qualifications for doing so.

Our relationship with Moscow has occupied me for over thirty years, from the
onset of the Cold War to the present. I am now on my third assignment in Moscow.
I first served there in 1951-52 as political officer and again in the early 1960's as
political counselor. I have served in Berlin. I directed Soviet Affairs in the State
Department for a number of years. I have served as Ambassador in two Eastern
European capitals, in Prague and in Belgrade. Finally, I have been Ambassador in
Moscow for the past two and a half years. In all, I have served under nine U.S.
Administrations and have dealt with the Soviets under Stalin, Khrushchev and

Brezhnev. , , , x, . 1 1-

I am sometimes called a hard-liner. Personally I don t thmk I m a hard-lmer— nor
am I anti-anybody. But since I made the transition from World War II PT-boat
commander to career diplomat I have found that I served my country most effec-
tively by speaking frankly to the people and governments I was accredited to about
American views and values, and by expressing frankly to my own government and
people my views on how best to advance American interests.

It is from this background that I speak today about U.S.-Soviet relations and the
role of SALT in that relationship. I believe I might usefully begin by talking about
the Soviet regime and how I think we should deal with it.

At the risk of restating the obvious, let me start with some basic truths. The
Soviet system reflects a view of history, a concept of man's relation to the state, a
complex of values and principles totally different from our own. Historians can
argue whether this view is traditionally a Russian one or a basically Soviet view
imposed from above in 1917. I am inclined to think that Lenin and Stalin took an
essentially Western philosophy, Marxism, and shaped it to fit Russian reality so
that from Stalin's time until the present there has been no fundamental conflict
between Soviet ideology and Russian nationalism.

In any case, the considerable resources of the Soviet Union are now, and will
continue to be for the forseeable future, effectively mobilized in support of a distinc-
tive and, in my view, distorted historical world outlook. The Soviet regime does not
accept and will not tolerate ideas of free expression and of free individual choice as
we understand them. It will try to vindicate its ideology by stifling dissent at home
and often by supporting abroad various repressive regimes which proclaim them-
selves Marxist-Leninist. j xu o • *

Beyond ideology, geography and hhstorical experience have also shaped the t»oviet
system and the policies of its leaders in important ways. Centuries of invasions from
both East and West have left their mark on the outlook of the Russian people and
of its rulers. The Soviet leadership has invested massive efforts to achieve security
on Russia's Jaorders, in part by seeking to push those borders outward. This historic
attitude, to which the Communists have added their preoccupation with military
strength as a key element of political power, may explain, though it does not justify,
why the Soviet Union presently maintains a military machine entirely dispropor-
tionate to any objective assessment of its needs. The cost of this quest for absolute
security and for greater political influence by means of military strength has been
enormous It has meant deprivation for the Soviet people and strain and friction in
the Soviet Union's relations with its neighbors, with sometimes dangerous conse-
quences for world stability. Total security such as the Soviets seek can only mean

insecurity for others. , „ . , .• ^^^. u u

The same passion for security extends to the Soviet domestic scene, although here
some striking changes have taken place since my first tour in Moscow in the early
fifties Stalinist terror has ceased. Nonetheless, organized dissent still meets with
official hostility, especially when it poses a direct challenge to the Party s otticial
line Yet I am inclined to believe that domestic repression would be much more
severe if the Soviet Union were to give up its policy of detente because then it
would be even less concerned about world public opinion.

A central question of U.S. foreign policy for the past thirty years— and one which
is still very much with us— has been how we should deal with this complex and
repressive system. I think we must begin by seeing the Soviet Union as it really is.
Not as some see it, 260 million people who want to be like Americans, nor, as
others see it, 260 million Genghis Khans, ready, willing and able to conquer the
world It is a unique nation travelling slowly along a course of its own, exploiting
powerful built-in strengths, yet beset by confounding weaknesses— most importantly
in the economic sector— and pursuing objectives and methods profoundly ditterent

'^ We must aiso look at the Soviet Union and our relations with it in a long term
perspective If we focus on the short term, we cannot be hopeful of changing either
the direction of the Soviet Union's movement or its tendency to override both

individuals and powerless countries that get in its way. If we continually ask
ourselves how much progress we have made in the last 24 hours or in the last week
or even in the last year, we will have to say frankly: not much. But if we take the
longer view, if we look back at the period of the Cold War and the distance we have
travelled since that time, then I believe that despite a succession of pendulum
swings in our relations, we can see gradual forward movement. Over the past
decade Soviet leaders have, out of their own self-interest, modified the way they
deal with their own people. And as I mentioned, they are not indifferent to world
public opinion. Despite fluctuations, there has been a long-term upward trend
towards useful cooperation in those areas where our interests overlap. One of the
most important of these is arms control.

For those who have watched the Soviet Union for thirty years, since the depths of
the Cold War, as I have, there are grounds for cautious optimism that patience,
persistence and hard-headedness on our part can eventually bring Soviet leaders to
see that their interest is served less by a continual military build-up and by military
adventures abroad and more by negotiated limits on arms and by restraint in other
parts of the world.

Clearly, we must not expect too much too soon. As President Carter has said, we
must avoid excessive swings in our public mood, from an exaggerated sense of
compatibility with the Soviet Union to open expressions of hostility. In my view a
troublesome misunderstanding about the real nature of detente developed in the
early 1970's which led to uncritical and heedless euphoria. Detente does not mean
that a millenium of friendship or mutual trust has arrived — which is impossible, in
any case, without a basic change in Soviet philosophy and outlook. At most detente
represents a growing sense in this nuclear age of the need to cooperate on some
matters, to regulate competition on others and to agree on the means of defusing
tensions which could lead to dangerous confrontation. And that is all, nothing more.

Bringing about any basic changes in the Soviet system must be viewed as a very
long-term proposition. But the prospect for change, slight though it may be, is better
served if there is some degree of engagement between our two countries. And in my
view it is equally mistaken to question, as many are doing today, the value of trying
to cooperate with Moscow at all.

We need to keep clearly before us our own objectives in our relationship with the
Soviet Union. We want to minimize the likelihood of direct confrontation that could
escalate into suicidal military hostilities. We want to minimize the chances of
destabilizing superpower conduct in the developing world. We want to maximize
mutual understanding — which is not, let me stress, dependent on mutual trust —
which can contribute to the first two goals and also lead to beneficial cooperation in
those areas where our interests overlap.

Having established what we want out of relations with the Soviet Union, we must
set out methodically, persistently and realistically to achieve it. Needless to say, I do
not hold with the notion that all we have to do is sit down and reason with the
Soviets to achieve our aims. J believe that on any given issue we should start with
the assumption that we and the Soviets are at opposite poles and that they will seek
to take advantage of us wherever possible. But at the same time, we should have
enough confidence in ourselves to welcome a dialogue and to use our ingenuity to
forge solutions which will attract the Soviets by meeting some of their interests,
which at the same time are consistent with our most essential objectives and, most
important, which will not weaken our security or that of our Allies.

Our policies will continue to conflict. In my view, the present Soviet leadership
continues to believe in the traditional Marxist-Leninist goals of "world revolution."
But I also believe that the same leadership is convinced that their global aims will
not be promoted by a nuclear war. While arguing for "peaceful coexistence" be-
tween East and West, the Soviet Union has continued to serve as protector and
supporter of radical, essentially anti-Western currents in the Third World — which
the Soviets have labelled "national liberation movements." Such a view of the world
offers us little comfort. However, it should also not lead us to conclude that mutual-
ly beneficial cooperation is impossible. It is possible — if it is carefully conceived and
executed without any illusions or Utopian perceptions of what is feasible.

In my view, historical circumstances have combined to make real disarmament
measures attractive to the Soviet leadership. Ten years ago, few knowledgeable
Americans would have believed that we and the Soviets could sit down together and
agree to limit strategic nuclear weapons.

Working out good agreements with the Soviets — ones which they will carry out
because it is in their interest to do so, yet which serve our purposes also — can take
years. In some instances it will become clear that there is no mutuality of inter-
ests — and when this happens we must have both the good sense to realize it and the

will to walk away. But we need to keep in mind our long-range goals, to set a course
and to stick to it.

Clear-eyed calculation of our national objectives is a prerequisite for dealing with
the Soviet Union. That has been the approach of this and previous administrations
in arms control matters, and especially in SALT.

I will not dwell on the contents of the SALT agreement. Let me just mention
what I see, from my particular vantage point, as some of its main benefits. I think it
will introduce a substantial element of stability in our relations with the Soviet
Union. In my view, it is important that the Treaty places equal ceilings on the
strategic arsenals of both sides, thereby ending a previous numerical imbalance in
favor of the Soviet Union. It preserves our options to build the forces we need to
maintain the strategic balance. It enhances our ability to monitor Soviet actions and
is adequately verifiable— an essential feature in any agreement with the Soviets
since we cannot rely on goodwill.

Here let me say that I had earlier stated publicly that I would actually oppose a
treaty which could not be adequately verified. In light of the loss of our facilities in
Iran, I reserved my position on the Treaty. Now that I have had a briefing by the
experts here in Washington, the same briefing given the President, I agree with him
and with Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff No militarily significant
violations of SALT II could take place without detection. I would not be here today
to recommend this Treaty if I did not believe that.

Finally, a main benefit of the Treaty is that it leads directly to the next step in
controlling nuclear weapons and establishes a basis for further cooperation with the
Soviet Union in this important field.

I would like in this connection to say a few words about the negotiation of the
Treaty. A view frequently expressed by those critical of the Treaty is that we could
have gotten a better deal if only we had been more persistent, less eager to get an
agreement— in a word, tougher. The corollary to this is that we still can seek a
better deal and can rectify our past mistakes by going back to the Soviets and
renegotiating the Treaty. I am convinced that both assumptions are profoundly
wrong. They rest in my view on a fallacious view both of what actually happened
and of what is possible and feasible in our relations with the Soviets. I think we will
be dangerously deluding ourselves if we believe otherwise.

As regards the negotiation of the Treaty, I am confident that the Agreement is
the best that could have been obtained. We could not have gotten more out of the
Soviets on any specific issue without having to pay an unacceptable price in another
part of the agreement. I say this on the basis both of my own involvement in the
SALT negotiations and of my long experience with the Soviets.

I think we should also be clear-headed about the prospects for renegotiation. If we
go back to the Soviets to demand that certain issues be negotiated in our favor, on
the basis of amendments passed by the Senate, this will at best result in a reopen-
ing of those issues which were resolved in our favor— and there are many. Or they
will turn us down flat. In either case, this would kill the Treaty. I do not think we
should entertain any illusions on this score. The Soviets signed the Treaty because
they believed it was in their national interest to do so, as we believed it was in ours.
They want SALT and they have important reasons for wanting it. But I cannot
imagine any circumstance under which we could persuade them to enter into a
Treaty which they regarded as disadvantageous to them or to accept an agreement
which, at our insistence, was revised in our favor. This simply will not work. From
thirty years' experience dealing with the Soviets, I can tell you that I believe that to
think otherwise would be not a leap of faith, but a leap of folly.

In this connection, I think it is important to understand why the Soviets want the
Treaty In my view they do want it and largely, I would say, for the same reason
that we do. While basically antagonistic toward us, the Soviet leadership has come
to realize that world war, involving nuclear weapons, cannot advance Soviet global
aims The Soviets therefore are interested in the development of a more stable
relationship with us and in decreasing the likelihood of a dangerous confrontation
between us In addition, the Soviet leaders want to place some limits on the
resources which now go into strategic weapons and to have additional resources to
devote to other purposes. While they, as we, understand the need for strategic
parity and second-strike capability, they are not interested in investing in nuclear
weapons systems which they hope never to use— so long as they are convinced they
can forego such sytems without harming their national security(t

At the same time, it is naive to suppose that the Soviet Union is in such a
desperate economic state that the Soviets must swallow a SALT package disadvan-
tageous to them. I think thhs is wrong, and I think the argument is dangerous. It
would be equally naive to suppose that Brezhnev is so anxious for a bALl agree-
ment that he would be prepared to override all opposition from his colleagues and

enter into an agreement disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. No one with genuine
experience of the Soviet Union would credit this for a minute. Under no conditions
would Brezhnev go counter to Soviet interests, and even if he were so inclined, in
the interests of self-aggrandizement, he would not have the power to do so.

And what if the Senate fails to ratify SALT II? In my opinion, this would be a
severe blow to U.S.-Soviet relations generally and to the SALT negotiating process
in particular. I would not go so far as to say that rejection of SALT II would either
put a halt to all disarmament negotiations, or cause a permanent rupture in our
bilateral relations. But the disarmament process as well as our overall bilateral
relationship would be hurt, and at this point no one can say how much time would
be needed to repair the damage.

Moreover, I believe the Soviets see an alternative to a SALT II agreement — a
risky one but one with considerable appeal. If the Senate fails to approve the
agreement or insists on changes unacceptable to the Kremlin, the result will be a
crisis of confidence in U.S. leadership among our Western Allies. Driving a wedge
between the U.S. and its European Allies is a goal of Soviet foreign policy which
long predates arms control. I am persuaded that Moscow would exploit a breakdown
in the SALT process to pursue this goal with a vengeance. And I believe that they
would have some success in doing so. The result could be increased U.S. isolation
and a breakdown in our efforts to stimulate improvement in the conventional and
nuclear defenses of Western Europe.

Let me make clear that I do not expect that ratification of SALT II will produce a
climate in which all will be sweetness and light in our relations with Moscow.
Nothing could be further from reality. Ours is an adversary relationship, and we
will always have a substantial measure of friction, problems, unpleasantness.

Looking ahead, what changes can we expect? Prediction in Soviet affairs is a
notoriously risky business and ordinarily I studiously avoid trying to forecast Soviet
behavior. But we can and should examine domestic Soviet factors that could have
an influence on Soviet foreign policy and Soviet behavior abroad. We need to be
aware of these, if we are not to be surprised at Soviet actions.

Before long we will be dealing with a post-Brezhnev leadership. Here we have a
key variable in the Soviet political equation whose exact weight is impossible to
assess. We do not know when this will be or who will succeed him. The emergence
of Brezhnev's real successor will take time. There will be a period of jockeying for
position within the Politburo. Even if one personality emerges, it may take him
several years to achieve Brezhnev's present preeminence, as was the case with
Brezhnev himself. During part of this period we can expect some degree of turning
inward and a reluctance to take initiatives or make bold moves. This may be
accompanied by some hard-line posturing: Both Brezhnev and Khrushchev took a
hard line in opposing their predecessors only, of course, to espouse "peaceful coexis-
tence" and "detente," respectively, once their positions were secure.

'The Politburo has clearly not been free of disagreement during the past eight
years. But at the same time, Brezhnev has — so far as we can tell — been careful not
to get out too far ahead of his colleagues and to bring them along. His has been and
continues to be essentially a consensus policy. This, I believe, makes a major
repudiation of Brezhnev's policies unlikely, provided those policies are intact and
viable when handed over.

My confidence in this, however, would be significantly reduced if the longstanding
and painfully achieved undertaking to control and reduce strategic arms were to be
in disarray.

There is speculation — mostly, in my view, uninformed — about competing interest
groups within the leadership. There are those who argue that there are hard-liners
and moderates in the Politburo and that we must strengthen the hand of the latter
against the former. I think I know the currrent Soviet leadership as well as any
Westerner, and I would find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify who belongs to
which group.

There are those who are less interested than others in establishing a cooperative
relationship with the United States— for example, the doctrinaire Party functionar-
ies, the KGB, and perhaps the military. And the worst case in terms of American
interests would be a stronger voice in policy making for these groups. The result
would be a higher Soviet tolerance than during the Brezhnev years for temporary
increases in U.S.-Soviet tension.

The best case for American interests probably would involve a stronger voice for
relatively non-ideological technocrats, who perceive a need to increase imports of
Western technology, who understand the economic and national security benefits of
arms limitation, and who are relatively more inclined to defer or de-emphasize
policies which increase U.S.-Soviet tension.

An important — perhaps the most important— preoccupation for any future Soviet
leadership, as it has necessarily been of the present one, will be the performance of
the Soviet economy. Here the prospects are not encouraging: all indicators point to
a continued sluggish performance during the 1980's with increasing competition for
scarce resources, a backward agricultural sector, and powerful vested interests in
the bureaucracy opposing any change in the status quo. A declining rate of popula-
tion growth will decrease the manpower pool available for labor — and incidentally
for military manpower. Nationalism, combining with other frustrations, could
become a prominent consideration for Soviet centralism.

But we should not delude ourselves that economic difficulties will moderate Soviet
behavior abroad or, in themselves, curtail the Soviet defense effort. It would be a
dangerous illusion to base our own policies— in SALT or elsewhere— on the assump-
tion that the Soviets cannot afford to compete with us in an all-out arms race. It is
dangerous, because it would dare Moscow to try to leapfrog us in strategic arms.
Moscow respects our technological ability and certainly would not welcome a no-
holds-barred arms race with us. But history has shown that the Soviet regime will
demand any sacrifice from the Soviet people necessary to assure an adequate
military posture. And the Soviet people, lacking any effective means to object, have
little choice but to comply.

In dealing with the future leadership, as with the present one, I thmk we must
continue to pursue our efforts at cooperation where possible and where consistent
with our national security. SALT II will not produce a harmonious relationship with
the Soviets. But even though it will not eliminate the abrasive elements of competi-
tion between ourselves and the Soviets, it will nonetheless enhance world stability
and set the stage for further negotiations and on arms control and political issues. It
will enable us to move forward to SALT III— to further reductions in our strategic
arsenals and to continued efforts to lower the risk that our competition could erupt
in nuclear war. History will not forgive us if we do not continue to probe— without
in any way harming our own national security— the extent of Soviet sincerity in
this critical field of strategic arms control.

FORWARD MOVEMENT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WEST

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for both
your abbreviated statement and for the lengthier written state-
ment which you have submitted. Taking the long view, as you do,
in your paper, you speak of the belligerent isolationism which
characterized Soviet policy in the early years, certainly through
the Stalin era, and then what you call gradual forward movement
of engagement with the West.

Seldom do we recognize in this country that there was a lengthy
isolationist period in Soviet foreign policy, just as there was such a
period in our own in the 19th century. The process of forward
movement toward an engagement with the West is a subject that I
would like to question you on first. How far can Soviet leaders let
it go? Do they have a need for our markets and our technology? Is
that need sufficient for them to sacrifice anything significant in
order to keep the commercial relationship a healthy one?

Ambassador Toon. Mr. Chairman, I think they do have a need
for our technology and certainly a desire. This has been demon-
strated clearly on many occasions in the past, but I think we are
wrong if we assume that we can use our technology and our trade,
for example, as levers in order to bring about changes in Soviet
behavior and Soviet policies, either foreign or domestic.

I think this has been demonstrated rather clearly, if I may say
so, by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and I think it has been
demonstrated rather clearly by other developments.

The Chairman. Mr. Toon, if I may interrupt there, do you think
we can use the SALT II Treaty as a lever to extract concessions
from the Soviet Union or to shape their behavior in other ways?

Ambassador Toon. Absolutely not, and I would hope we would
not try to do that. The Soviets are a proud and independent people.
They think they are on the right track. They think their policies
are correct, and they are not about to listen to us or to anybody
outside the Soviet Union as to the need for a change in their
policies, nor are they apt to respond to any sort of pressures that
we might want to apply to them.

I think this has been demonstrated clearly down through the
years, and I think we must take this into account.

The Chairman. If you do not attribute the rather substantial
increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union since mid-
1977 to the Jackson amendment, then to what do you attribute it?

Ambassador Toon. This is not an easy question. It is a question
that we have focused on very assiduously over the past year in the
Embassy in Moscow. I can't give you a definitive answer. I can give
you a complex of possible reasons for this very welcome develop-
ment. One is that the Soviet Union — and some may not believe
this — is in my view concerned to a degree with its image in the
world. Therefore, it felt that one way of improving its image would
be to expand Jewish emigration.

Second, I think the Soviets probably felt they might, through this
measure, through this policy action, have some impact on the
Senate, not only with regard to the SALT ratification process, but
also with regard to the possibility of removing what they regard as
a highly offensive amendment, the Jackson- Vanik amendment.

Finally, I think you have to take into consideration the fact — and
this has been pointed out to us by refuseniks in Moscow — that
there has been a vast increase in the number of applications for
emigration, and therefore, according again to the local experts in
Moscow, the increase in emigration is not necessarily a very impor-
tant development in itself. It is simply a function of a vastly
expanded number of applications to leave the country. You take
your choice.

The Chairman. I think they are all plausible reasons. I agree
with you; I always have agreed that those who think we can push
the Soviet Union around by attempting to impose conditions of one
kind or another are wrong. Just as we would not respond to such
pressures or even consider doing so, I think, neither will they.

IDEOLOGICAL COHESION HAS DECREASED

There are some experts on the Soviet Union, Mr. Ambassador, as
you know, who, in comparing internal conditions today with what
they were in Stalin's time, assert that the people are less ideologi-
cally cohesive today than they were then, that they are less collec-
tivist oriented in social behavior, less disciplined, and perhaps less
fearful. Would you agree with that?

Ambassador Toon. I think so, but I think the Soviet population,
which has become naturally cautious in its behavior down through
the years because of the fear of the secret police in the Stalin era,
is not going to behave in a very bold way. I think it is true that the
terror we knew when Stalin was alive is no longer a feature of the
Soviet political scene. Nonetheless, the KGB [Soviet Secret Police]
is still a force to be reckoned with, and most Soviet citizens are

very careful about what they do and what they say, because they
know that they could be cracked down upon very easily indeed.

With regard to the ideological appeal of the Soviet system and
the Soviet doctrine and the Soviet ideology, it is true, I think, that
the Soviet leaders are very disappointed in the attitude of the
youth in particular, the fact that they do not respond with enthusi-
asm, for example, to a lead article in Pravda.

I have the misfortune of reading the language, and I can under-
stand why they don't respond with enthusiasm to a lead article in
Pravda. Nothing could be more boring, but in any case this is a
problem for the regime.

They now can no longer stir the emotions of the people by
referring to the Great October Revolution. They can still do this to
a certain extent by referring to the great and valid exploits of the
Soviet people during World War II, but even this is losing its
appeal, and this is a matter, I think, of genuine concern to the
Soviet leadership, not only to this one, but to the one that may
follow and the one after that. I do not think we should help them
out with this problem.

Senator Church. Neither do I, but I am wondering whether this
change in attitude within the Soviet Union, the problem you have
just described, may be asserting some pressure on the Soviet Gov-
ernment that would affect or tend to moderate its foreign policy
objectives. Do you see any relationship between internal develop-
ments of this character and the external policy of the Soviet
Union?

Ambassador Toon. To a degree, but not a very significant degree,
in my view. Certainly the problems that they face in the economy
have forced them to take a much more forthcoming view toward
the West than they might otherwise have done.

Second, and on the negative side, the problems they face in
controlling their people have made them take a more conservative
view with regard to the exchange program and to exercise very
tight control over ideas that come in and control over the visitors
who come to the Soviet Union on the exchange program.

So, I think to a modest extent some of these internal develop-
ments do have some impact on the Soviet policymaker, but I think
it is important to recognize that while there are forces at work in
Soviet society for change, they are working very slowly and very
gradually. I do not think that they will soon have the result that
all of us hope will ultimately take place— that is, a basic change in
Soviet posture, Soviet behavior, and Soviet world outlook— for a
long, long time to come.

In any case, these changes, it seems to me, can only come to
fruition and can only be productive if they operate from within and
without outside pressures. That is my view.

REASONS SOVIET UNION WANTS SALT

The Chairman. I have one final question in the time left to me,
Mr. Ambassador. It is a question that we have asked many of our
witnesses, and I think you are as well qualified as any to answer it.
Why do you think the Soviet Union wants SALT II?

Ambassador Toon. Put very simply, they regard SALT II as
being in their interest. That is why they want it. They will not

pursue any policy and they will not take any action that they do
not regard as being in their self-interest. I think it is important for
us to recognize that just because it is in the Soviet self-interest does
not mean that it is antagonistic to our own self-interest. I do not
think that is the case at all.

Second, I think the Soviets are interested in trying to put a cap
on the strategic arms race, primarily because they know, just as we
know, that if in fact we should engage in an all out arms race, they
can do nothing but lose, because of the strength of our economy
and the built-in weaknesses and complications of their own econo-
my.

Finally, I think that the Soviet interest in SALT is geared to the
Soviet desire to be seen as an equal with the United States on the
world scene. I think those are the basic reasons, but I would add
one final objective. They have an interest in stability in the world.
They have an interest also in demonstrating to the Chinese that
they can cooperate with us in a very significant way.

I think that basically is the way the Soviets look upon SALT IL

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator Javits?

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being with us. I have had much
experience with you in other capitals, and I value your testimony
here very much. I am sorry to see you leave our service, however.

EFFECT OF SALT REJECTION ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND

RENEGOTIATION

The two things that stand out from your statement to me are
these, one that you have touched on, and the other you have not
yet touched on. What is your judgment as to what will happen if
we reject SALT II in terms of a renegotiation? The second, which I
would like to ask you, first occurs toward the latter part of your
statement; what happens in respect to the change in Soviet leader-
ship? This is a critical matter to us because it is very likely to
occur. In your statement, you undertake to analyze the idea, which
I myself have raised, that there are hawks and doves in the Polit-
buro, or hardliners and moderates, as you call them.

Your own view is that there are operatives and that there are
neither hawks nor doves. There is a group, you say, whose influ-
ence in Communist party policy would be, "the worst case in terms
of American interest. That is the doctrinaire party functionairies,
the KGB, and perhaps the military."

Well, that is a pretty big slice. It almost sounds like the whole
apparatus. Could you refine that for us in your thinking?

Ambassador Toon. Senator Javits, first let me say that I appreci-
ate your warm remarks. I think perhaps I should clarify my own
position, since you have expressed regret that I am leaving the
service. I think everybody should know that I am doing this by
choice, and that I am not a victim of certain developments that
have taken place in Washington in recent weeks. [General laugh-
ter.]

With regard to your questions. Senator Javits, I happen to feel,
as I think I pointed out in my statement, that while it is fascinat-
ing to deal with the question of personalities in considering the

48-250 0-79

succession problem, it frankly is not a very productive pursuit,
primarily because we know very little about the people in the
Politburo except for the top man and Gromyko and perhaps one or
two others. I have tried to overcome this handicap by insisting on
access to all members of the Politburo. I have been singularly
unsuccessful in doing this. This is my biggest regret in my IVi
years as Ambassador in Moscow.

Despite the fact that I speak the language, despite the fact that I
know very well the Soviet scene, and despite the fact that the
President himself asked me to get to know the people in the
Politburo, in the leadership, who might possibly succeed to power
when Brezhnev leaves the scene, I have been unable to do this. I
have been told by Mr. Gromyko in his very glib way, you know,
Mr. Ambassador, we have a different system. I said I understand
that, but I think it is time to change it, because this sort of denial
of access does not do our mutual understanding any good at all.

Senator Javits, I think the important thing for us to do is to
focus not on personalities but on policies. My own view is that no
matter who succeeds Brezhnev, he or his colleagues will have very
little alternative to pursuing basically the same foreign and inter-
nal policies that we have seen Brezhnev pursuing over the past 5
or 6 years.

The reason for that is, conditions in the world are such that the
Soviet Union has very little choice. The Soviets have deep concern
over China, as you know. This means for the most part that they
seek— but not at any price to themselves — a relaxed Western flank.
This means that some form of detente, perhaps not the same as we
know it now, but some form of detente is required in order to meet
Soviet basic interests.

The second thing is, they have a very weak economy. I do not
want anybody to get the impression that I think their economy is
grinding to a halt. I thought so 20 years ago, but I was wrong. I
now feel that the Soviet economy, no matter what its condition
may be, will muddle through. There is something inherent in the
system that makes this inevitable, but the point is, they do have a
weak economy, and they need close relations with the Western
industrial world.

This also means that they have to have some form of detente. So,
I think the important thing for us to focus on is the fact that the
policies will remain more or less the same. There will be some
nuances which may cause us problems, but basically the thrust will
be essentially the same.

Senator Javits. And that is to be connected directly with your
view that, if we reject the treaty, there is no hope for a renegoti-
ation. That would defy all of the instincts and policies of the
Kremlin, and, as a matter of fact, defeat what they want: The
respectability of being the equal of the United States in the world.
Is that it? They just couldn't take amendments. Is that correct?

Ambassador Toon. I agree with that, but I cannot be absolutely
dogmatic about it, because I simply cannot predict Soviet behavior.
Others may want to do this, but I can't do it, but I am convinced
that if you reopen the treaty, if you reopen the negotiating process,
you are going to unleash all kinds of problems. You are going to

unravel certain things that are frankly greatly to our advantage in
the treaty itself.

Senator Javits. That brings me to the main point I wanted to
make; if we do unravel the treaty, don't we have to be prepared to
decide in advance what we are ready to give up?

Ambassador Toon. Precisely.

Senator Javits. Aren't there those who believe that this is going
to be a one-way street, only the Soviets will make concessions: give
up? Aren't they completely deluding themselves?

Ambassador Toon. Absolutely, Senator. I agree with that.

Senator Javits. You do agree. That is a very important issue to

me.

Second, as to the problem of defeating the treaty and its effect, I
noticed with great interest your opinion as to what this will mean
to "a crisis of confidence in U.S. leadership among our Western
Allies, and the fundamental base of American security is its alli-
ance, especially the NATO Alliance." Could you expand on that?

Ambassador Toon. I don't really think I have to expand on it,
Senator Javits. You have done it very eloquently. My own feeling
is that we have to be more concerned about our credibility with our
allies and friends than we do with the Soviets. I feel strongly on
the basis of conversations I have had with our German colleagues,
our French colleagues, and our British colleagues and others in
Europe, that if in fact this treaty is rejected, this will mean to
them that the administration is simply not reflecting the gut feel-
ing of the American people in carrying on important negotiations,
and therefore they will decide that perhaps they should go some
other course. Perhaps they should adapt to this new phenomenon,
and perhaps they may go in a way which would certainly not be in
the collective interests of the Western world. I agree with you.
Senator.

Senator Javits. In one word, this is called the Finlandization of
Western Europe?

Ambassador Toon. Well, that is your term. [General laughter.]

I am still a diplomat.

EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS

Senator Javits. There is one last point which was called to my
mind by your reference to Jewish emigration and the fact that
there are many applications. You know, the Soviets have always
used this as a pretext for why fewer people were emigrating. Isn't
it a fact that under Soviet practice they determine how many
applications there may be just as they determine how many shall
leave because of the penalties that they can exact if you even
apply? You will lose your job, you will lose your home, your friends
will lose their jobs, your family, et. cetera. Isn't that true?

Ambassador Toon. It is true.

Senator Javits. So they can turn it on or off as they please. Isn't
that a fact?

Ambassador Toon. That is true.

Senator Javits. Both in applications and in emigrations?

Ambassador Toon. Yes; therefore, I do not attach too much
importance to the opinion of the refusenik community in Moscow. I
think it was important to cite it as one in a complex of reasons.

Senator Javits. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits.

Senator McGovern?

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I want to join my colleagues in commending
you on your excellent statement this morning. Also, I want to
express my appreciation for your services as Ambassador.

Senator Stone. George, would you just yield to me to ask the
Ambassador to repeat his last answer? The last part of his last
sentence got lost.

Senator McGovern. Surely, I will yield.

Senator Stone. Mr. Ambassador, when your said, therefore, I
don't attach too much importance to — what was it? I didn't hear
you.

Ambassador Toon. I said, I don't attach too much importance to
the views of the refusenik community in Moscow with regard to
the reason for the increase in the emigration rate of the Jewish
community.

Senator Stone. Thank you. Thank you, George.

Senator McGovern. Certainly.

Mr. Ambassador, I just wanted to add that I have only had one
visit to the Soviet Union, and that was in August 1977. You were
my very gracious host at that time, and I thank you for making
that visit as instructive and as profitable as it was. I regret that
the fire which almost destroyed the Embassy occurred the day you
took me on a tour of that building.

Ambassador Toon. I am sure there was no connection between
the two events.

Senator McGovern. I have always contended that. [General
laughter.]

Ambassador Toon. It was a pleasure to have you in Moscow,
Senator.

Senator McGovern. Mr. Ambassador, earlier in the deliberations
of the committee, Mr. Nitze and others have argued that one of the
dangers in the strategic balance between the United States and the
Soviet Union was that the Soviet Union is preparing an elaborate
civil defense plan that might enable them to attack the United
States with impunity knowing that their population could be safely
taken care of in a rather elaborate civil defense plan. He has been
making that point for several years.

As you may or may not recall, I raised that concern with you
when I was in the Soviet Union and you and your experts at the
Embassy told me that you could not find any real evidence of an
elaborate civil defense buildup. I am wondering if I am right in my
understanding of what the Embassy told me and if so whether
there has been any change in the last couple of years since I was
there.

Ambassador Toon. No, Senator McGovern, you are right in your
recollection of what we told you. I think that remains our opinion
today. I think it is important, however, to point out that the Soviet
civil defense program is a good deal more comprehensive and ex-
tensive than our own, but I think it probably is a good deal less
than some people, including Mr. Nitze, think.

It seems to me, as I told you in Moscow, that if in fact the civil
defense program were on the scale indicated by Nitze and others,
then we would see evidence of it in Moscow simply by walking
around the city. I think at the present time their efforts in the civil
defense field are concentrated primarily on protecting their leader-
ship, as we do, and on protecting their major industrial installa-
tions, but in my view they have not gone far enough to warrant an
assumption on our part that they are fully protecting their popula-
tion and therefore preparing themselves for a first-strike capabili-
ty. I do not think that is in the cards at the present time.

Senator McGovern. The answer they give is, they say you people
don't read the civil defense manual that the Soviet Government
puts out, and that if you were to take the time to read the manual,
you would see all the plans there, that they have very careful
preparations for a major effort to cover up their own civilian
population and enable them to survive a nuclear exchange with us.
This is not my argument. I am just trying to make the case which
they made.

Ambassador Toon. This is not the first time they have done us a
disservice. In fact, they are doing us a disservice when they said
that, that we have not read the manual. Of course we have read
the manual, but there is a vast difference between the manual and
the operation of a policy and the implementation of a policy.

I do not think they are doing it on the scale that some people
who have also read the manual feel they are. That is my view, and
I think it is shared by a good many others who have been on the
scene and have tried to examine the traces of the evidence for
these allegations.

Senator McGovern. Mr. Ambassador, in your statement you say
the Soviet Union presently maintains a military machine entirely
disproportionate to any objective assessment of its needs. Then you
~_ga^onio_warn, and I agree with this, that total security such as the
Soviets seek can only mean insecurity for others. I sometimes
wonder, though, if the two superpowers do not create a kind of
mirror image of fears for each other.

Here you have a country which you know better than most of us,
the Soviet Union, which has gone through two incredibly tragic
world wars in which the people have suffered enormous casualties.
They do have an incredible fear of China, justified or not. They
have the memory of the humiliation of being forced to back down
in the showdown over the Cuban missile crisis.

I think many Americans assume that their enormous military
buildup is primarily an offensive threat designed against us. Isn't it
possible that this mirror image scenario could be true, that they
are as much defensively oriented and as much fear ridden about
the possibility of attack from the West or from China as they are
motivated by any aggressive designs on the West or anyone else?

Ambassador Toon. Certainly it is possible. Senator. But I think,
frankly, to arrive at that conclusion would reflect a much more
charitable view of Soviet policies and attitudes than I am prepared
to harbor.

I think my remarks in the paper which I submitted refer primar-
ily to the buildup in central Europe. We have focused on this in
great detail in recent years, and none of us can really come up

with a satisfactory explanation of why they feel they have to have
a 4 to 1 tank ratio, for example, or a vast advantage in personnel
on the ground, and also a vast advantage in the air.

Senator McGovern. If I might just break in here, Mr. Ambassa-
dor, that really is not relevant to the strategic arms balance, is it?

Ambassador Toon. That is true. I think the strategic arms bal-
ance probably does reflect, as you say, a mirror image of what the
other side is trying to do.

Senator McGovern. Do you think it is possible, if not probable,
that both sides have overbuilt in terms of the strategic equation?
Lay aside the matter of conventional weapons, but isn't it possible
that both sides have pushed this race to the point where they have
built strategic systems that go beyond any real defense require-
ment?

Ambassador Toon. I think that is true, and I will go along with
that, but frankly, I think the major fault lies with the other side,
that we were reacting to what they did rather than their reacting
to what we did. Certainly the essence of SALT II is to meet the
problem. We are beginning to reduce the arsenals on both sides,
and of course we look forward to even more drastic reductions in
SALT III.

I frankly am not entirely optimistic that the Soviet Union will go
along with these drastic reductions, but that, at least, is our hope,
and that is our policy decision, but to get back to the matter of
central Europe, this really bothers me. I don't know why they have
done this sort of thing. There is no rational explanation for it. You
can argue that it is in terms of their historical experience, if you

will.

Senator McGovern. Well, I for one do not try to rationalize or
justify their buildup in central Europe. I do not understand it,
either, but it has long seemed to me that each side, each of these
two superpowers, is terrifying the other by needless buildups. I
frankly don't know who started it or whether they are reacting to
us or we to them. It does seem to me that each time one side or the
other gets a new breakthrough on a more terrifying strategic
weapon, it is not very long until the other side attempts to match

it.

This further creates a climate of uncertainty and fear. If I ulti-
mately decide to vote for this treaty, and I may very well so decide,
it will not be because I think it represents a really genuine arms
reduction or even genuine arms limitation, but because I think it
may possibly eliminate some of the fear and uncertainty between
the two superpowers.

Even a bad deal at least means that they are dealmg with each
other and that they are reducing some of the element of terror, of
mutual terror that I think is responsible for this buildup. I am
wondering if perhaps in a different wording, that isn't your conclu-
sion, that the chief value of SALT is to reduce some of the uncer-
tainty and risk of error between these two great powers.

Ambassador Toon. I think that is a principal advantage of SALT.
I would disagree with you to at least this extent, Senator McGov-
ern, that this is a bad treaty. I do not think it is a bad treaty at all.
I think it is probably a bad treaty to those who have a much more
ambitious idea as to what is possible.

Senator McGovern. It is certainly not what we originally
wanted.

Ambassador Toon. That is true.

Senator McGovern. I remember it. At the time I was in the
Soviet Union, we had offered a much greater cut in terms of
nuclear weapons and that had been soundly rejected by the Soviet
Union, so from that standpoint I think it is disappointing.

Ambassador Toon. I think you are referring to our March 1977
comprehensive proposal.

Senator McGovern. Yes.

Ambassador Toon. That was certainly a much more ambitious
proposal than SALT II represents at the present time, but in my
view it was totally unrealistic in terms of its acceptability to the
Soviets. This was demonstrated by the Soviet reaction to it, but
certainly I think all of us look forward to the next round of
negotiations following SALT II, when we hopefully can get Soviet
agreement to much more drastic reductions. You are right, we do
not need the vast arsenals we have today.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Wherever the skilled technicians are in our Gov-
ernment, they are not on Capitol Hill. The lights are not working
again, which seems to be a chronic problem for this system. I just
mention this to members because you will have the time cards
presented by our timekeeper when the Senator's 10 minutes are
up. Senator Percy?

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we are delighted to have you here. We have
long looked forward to your testimony. Though you do not call
yourself a hardliner, you are perceived to be one. I think your
testimony and the logic behind it is powerful and really compell-
ing.

Ambassador Toon. Is it bad to be a hardliner?

Senator Percy. No; I don't think so. I consider myself a hardliner
when it comes to the defense of this country. I do not think we
would have any differences on that issue. All along in these hear-
ings we have talked about the necessity of having behind our
foreign policy a very strong military capability. I feel no hesitancy
in saying that again, as I have said it throughout my public and
private life.

Ambassador Toon. Then I am in good company.

Senator Percy. I look upon that as a note of distinction in your
record, really. I think because of your three decades of experience,
your advice is extraordinarily helpful. I am particularly interested
in the comments which Senator Javits drew from you concerning
your attitude toward Europe. This treaty's effect on NATO is of
deep concern to me.

SCANTY SOVIET COVERAGE OF U.S. SALT DEBATE

It is a matter we must take into account. This committee of all
committees must look into that area. I have a number of questions,
and I will cover as many as I can. I am interested in the New York
Times article today about Soviet press coverage of our considera-
tion of the SALT II debate. The writer says Soviet coverage has

been scanty and attributes it either to a Soviet desire not to inter-
fere in our debate or to a Soviet reluctance to tell its own people
the details of the controversy.

What would be your own analysis as an expert on the Soviet
Government and people as to why very little has been published
about the Senate debate on SALT?

Ambassador Toon. It may be a combination of both, Senator
Percy. I think probably it reflects a decision made by the Soviet
Administration to avoid excessive rhetoric during the ratification
process. This was a commitment made, well, not a commitment,
but an understanding that Senator Byrd thought he had reached
with Brezhnev and Gromyko when he was in Moscow. There is a
practical reason for this, of course. You know the Soviet press as
well as I do, and the Soviet newspapers are very tiny.

There is just no room for the sort of extensive coverage that
would have to be given to these hearings if in fact you were to give
an objective picture, so I think it is a combination of the two.

SOVIET SKEPTICISM IN TRUSTING UNITED STATES

Senator Percy. One Soviet observer was quoted in the article as
saying that there are people writing to government officials asking
why should we trust the Americans and sign this treaty? Now,
obviously, there is widespread distrust in this country and skepti-
cism about the possibility of Soviet cheating. How widespread is
the feeling of skepticism in the Soviet Government as to whether
they can trust the American Government, with respect to this

treatv?

Ambassador Toon. Certainly, in the first place, I would not
attach great importance to a letter to the editor of Pravda or any
other Soviet newspaper because it is simply not a voluntary act. It
is stimulated by people on high. I think probably there is an innate
suspicion of what we are up to.

With all apologies to this administration, this was intensified by
certain things that we did in the early days of this administration.
I think this would be admitted readily by some of my colleagues in
Washington. They weren't quite sure what we were up to. I think
while they have a clearer picture now as to what our objectives
are, there still is a trace of that suspicion which was engendered in
the early days of this administration.

Beyond that, of course, they have always had a suspicion of our
intentions going all the way back to 1918, when we invaded the
Soviet Union, as you know, with our expeditionary force in Siberia.

While I do not want to say there is a justification for the Soviet
feeling, there is a sort of rationale for it. I think it is something
with which we have to reckon. Certainly, there is much less ration-
ale for Soviet suspicion of our objectives than there is for our
suspicion of theirs.

AMBASSADOR TOON's POSITION TOWARD NOMINATION OF TOM

WATSON

Senator Percy. I would like to talk about your successor for just
a moment. You are perceived to be opposing the appointment of
Tom Watson, Jr. As I understand your position, you would prefer

to see careerists go into a post of this kind. We might differ in
principle here. I think a certain number of noncareer appointments
are fully justified, and the distinguished careers of David Bruce,
Averell Harriman, and John Sherman Cooper and others bear out
my point.

It is refreshing to have some new blood go into the Foreign
Service in key posts. Soon after his appointment became known,
Tom Watson was described in several editorials as having no
knowledge of the Soviet Union. Since then the Star for one has put
on the record that his experience goes back over three decades,
that he does speak some Russian, that he was based there for 6
months, that he worked with high military personnel, and that he
has continued from those early days his experience with the Soviet
Union.

I strongly support his candidacy simply because I think the
Soviets have a tremendous regard for toughminded, hardheaded
business people, particularly those in the computer field, where the
Soviets are struggling to catch up with the United States. The
Soviets also have tremendous regard for people who are close to
the President, and close to the Secretary of State and Secretary of
Defense. I think he is uniquely qualified.

Could you clarify for the record what your position is with re-
spect to your successor? You have been quoted in ways that I
thought possibly may have been somewhat unfair to you.

Ambassador Toon. I will be glad to, Senator Percy. In the first
place, I know Tom Watson. I know him well. I have spent a good
many hours with him in recent days. He is a fine fellow. He is a
man of good judgment. I think if he relies on the competence and
advice of the highly professional staff that we have in Moscow, that
he should do well. Obviously, I cannot sit in judgment on his
particular qualifications for that job or his lack of qualifications for
that job. Frankly, that is your business. I do not want to violate the
Constitution by telling you how you should handle it.

On the broader question about the infusion of new blood into the
diplomatic service, certainly I agree that this is a good thing from
time to time, but. Senator Percy, I would caution you and your
colleagues that for every David Bruce and Averell Harriman, we
wind up with 10 clunks, if I may say so. That may not be the right
term, but I have in mind, for example

Senator Biden. It is better than naming them. [General laugh-
ter.]

Ambassador Toon. A number of years ago, a dress manufacturer
from the Midwest was appointed to a post out in the Far East and
came before your committee and did not know the name of the
Prime Minister nor the capital of the country to which he was
being appointed. In fairness to him, he did say that he would learn
these two designations before he arrived. [General laughter.]

I think you can carry this principle too far. Of course, I am
subjective in my attitude. I am a professional and I have been for
30 years. I happen to think that the country would be better served
by having professionals manning all posts, but having said that, I
recognize as a practical person that this is not in the cards. There-
fore, I do welcome the infusion of new blood provided it is very
carefully selected.

AUTHORITY U.S. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW SHOULD HAVE

Senator Percy. There have been discussions in the press about
your own position with respect to SALT II, your position with
respect to the negotiating posture, and the intimacy of your rela-
tionship with the negotiators in this area. Would you care to clari-
fy what authority you feel an American Ambassador in Moscow
should have and what relationship he should have with the host
government and with the U.S. Government?

How close should he be keyed in? Does it undercut the Ambassa-
dor, for instance, if there are end runs around him in such a way
as to prevent his position from being the prestigious position it
should be? Anatoly Dobrynin has that kind of position right here
and has had ever since he arrived in Washington.

Ambassador Toon. Certainly, I think the American Ambassador
in Moscow ought to be completely clued in on anything and every-
thing that has to do with our relations with the Soviet Union,
whether it is a negotiating process, whether it is a policy state-
ment, whatever it is.

Now, in fairness to this administration, I must say that that has
been the case since I have been Ambassador in Moscow once I
became legitimate. I was in limbo, as you know, for a number of
months, but once I became legitimate, I was clued in on everything
that went on with regard to the Soviets.

I also had an opportunity for input not only with regard to SALT
II but with regard to other policies that were being formulated
back here toward the Soviet Union or toward areas in which the
Soviets might possibly have an interest, so I have no complaint on
that score. I do feel that we could do more in using the American
Ambassador in Moscow, in using the Embassy, in speaking for our
Government.

After all, when you have a person in Moscow who speaks the
language and who knows something about the Soviet Union, it
would seem to me to be to our advantage to speak directly to the
leadership when you want to get across a new policy, a new deci-
sion on which you want complete understanding on the part of the
Soviets.

My own feeling is that at the very least you ought to double
track everything through the Embassy in Moscow. That we have
done to a significant degree during my tenure in Moscow, but I
think we have a way to go in this respect.

Senator Percy. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Percy.

Senator Biden?

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I would like to compliment you on what I
would characterize as a very realistic view of the limits of our
relationship with the Soviet Union and what we still try to call
detente. From reading your statement and listening to you this
morning, I think you may be asking for what is more than realistic
to expect of the American people and the policymakers toward the
Soviet Union when you call for method, persistence, and realism in
our approach to Moscow.

It seems to me to attain those virtues there has to be some sense
of a consensus among those policjrmakers and among the American
people as to who the Soviets are, what they want, and what they
are up to. It is because of that missing consensus that I find it hard
to buy completely the administration's argument that there should
be no linkage between the SALT agreement and the activities and
relationships we have with the Soviet Union in other parts of the
world and in other matters.

It seems to me that the argument begs the question of the
context in which we judge the merits of the SALT agreement. In
the real political world the issue is not how many heavy missiles
Moscow can build but what Moscow intends to do with those mis-
siles, and why is it building them.

I have a growing sense of frustration after having heard your
testimony, not because I disagree with it, but because I guess I
continue, as do most congressional policymakers, to look for an
expert who somehow is going to codify for me my prejudices with
regard to the Soviet Union. In your honest and candid testimony,
you have acknowledged your inability to do that even for yourself,
and you are not presumptuous enough to suggest you would at-
tempt to do it for anyone else. That creates a certain sense of
frustration.

In a sense, the issue of the Backfire bomber is not whether or not
it has an intercontinental range, or whether or not our F-lU's or
FB-lll's are a match. The question is the interpretations that we
put on the Soviets having these planes at all, or having the SS-20
deployed in Central Europe, or their growing Navy, or their stead-
ily improving air defense system, or their conventional arms build-
up in other areas, and so on.

I would like to go through with you, in the time that I have
remaining, some assumptions that many Americans make in trying
to decipher Soviet intentions and see how you and we might modify
our ideas to fit them and match them to the real world.

First, your statement talks of the history of invasions Russians
have had and their response to them, that is, their search for
security through territorial expansion. To that history, you added
the Communist "preoccupation with military strength as a key
element of political power," and you concluded that these concepts
explain, if not justify the overblown size of the Soviet military
machine.

Now, carrying your thinking a little further for us, if you would,
I would like to ask a few questions. Is this history and drive that
we have witnessed throughout that history insurmountable? Does
it mean that we should expect to deal with a Soviet Union which
will feel itself insecure in the near future, and as a consequence
continue to translate these feelings of insecurity into aggressive
actions or at least actions which appear to be preparation for the
prospect of taking aggressive action? Calculating how much power
is enough, do the Soviets constantly see themselves under the gun
from the United States and China, or in your mind can you see a
plateau being reached in essential equivalence and establishing
that equivalence?

Are we destined to live with this paranoia through the remain-
der of this century? Do you see any change in it or any plateau?

Ambassador Toon. I can give you a very short answer. The
answer is "Yes." We are destined to live with it until the basic
change that I talked about earlier in the session comes about, the
basic change in world outlook, the basic change in the way they
handle their own people, their friends, and so forth and that is a
long way down the road.

Senator Biden. There is no evidence that that basic change is
forthcoming. There is an assumption, is there not, that the present
leadership is much more sensitive to domestic pressures within the
Soviet Union and that there is a more collegial atmosphere in the
Politburo as compared to the days of Stalin, and that these changes
amount to some significant political change in the Soviet Union
and alteration of their structure, and that therefore we can look
forward to a more reasonable response from the Soviets?

Ambassador Toon. I wish I could believe that, but frankly I do
not know of any such evidence. Frankly, Senator, all of us must
look upon this treaty on its own merits. We cannot expect simply
by passing the treaty that we are going to have access to certain
leverage which will bring about certain basic changes in Soviet
behavior and policies. That is not going to happen. I think it will
happen in the long run, as a result of forces at work right now
inside Soviet society, but as I said before, that will not happen for
40, 50, or 60 years from now, if you want to put a finite time limit
on it.

I hate to be so pessimistic, but that is the way I see the situation.

Senator Biden. Let me put it another way. If we do not continue
the process which is referred to as detente, do we impact upon
those forces at work in the Soviet Union and thereby effect the
evolution which might occur 20, 30, or 40 years down the road? By
rejecting the process now, do we in any way fundamentally alter
when that would come about or is whatever we do irrelevant in
terms of when that process will eventually come to fruition?

Ambassador Toon. Senator Biden, I would say it is relevant only
in the sense that passing SALT II will create that atmosphere of
stability in which we can carry on what I think has been a very
useful dialog with the Soviet Union over the past 6 or 7 years in
the strategic arms field. I think rejecting SALT II removes that
element of stability and therefore jeopardizes the whole process,
but I think it is wrong to expect that SALT II is going the have
any impact per se on Soviet behavior or Soviet policy or Soviet
decisions in the immediate future.

Senator Biden. So we should look at SALT II and ask if it
enhances U.S. security and leave it at that?

Ambassador Toon. Precisely.

Senator Biden. I agree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McGovern [presiding]. I guess in the absence of a more
senior member present on the majority side it falls to me to recog-
nize Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, let me start by thanking you very much for
your hospitality to my wife and me and all of us in our party when
we visited Moscow in January of this year. We had a wonderful
time, as good a time as one could possibly expect to have in
Moscow.

Ambassador Toon. It was wonderful to have you there, but
having a good time in Moscow is not saying very much. [General
laughter.]

Senator Hayakawa. You did very well by us, and indeed, we
were very grateful.

Ambassador Toon. We were glad to have you there.

Senator Hayakawa. I must say in January we were not suffering
from a heat wave over there.

STATE OF FALSE SECURITY THROUGH SALT H

At the present time, we are perhaps equal to the Soviets in
strategic weapons, and as I understand it we are far behind as
conventional forces and conventional weapons are concerned, but
whatever the condition, it is argued that signing the treaty will
further relax our vigilance and our commitment to an adequate
defense, so that we are not likely even to live up to the limits that
the treaty allows us in strategic weapons.

Would you care to comment on this argument that we would be
put into a kind of state of relaxation and false security by the
signing of this treaty?

Ambassador Toon. Senator Hayakawa, first of all, let me say
that we were delighted to have you in Moscow, and we were glad
that we gave you at least a taste of some hospitality which you
found acceptable. Frankly, if I thought we were going to go the
route you suggest by passing SALT II, then I would strongly recom-
mend that we reject it. I do not think we are going that way at all.
I think we have to maintain a strong defensive posture. We have to
maintain our arsenal, one which is the equivalent of the Soviet
arsenal, primarily because we cannot trust these people. I am
deeply skeptical of their intentions if in fact they found it possible
to do certain things with impunity.

Therefore, I would think certainly that we, as the American
people, should be willing to pay the price, whatever it may be, in
order to maintain essential equivalence, as we call it, or a strong
defensive posture, as I put it myself. It is absolutely essential to
stability in the world and to our own security.

Senator Hayakawa. Secretary Brown has said that with the
treaty signed and agreed to, we would still have to spend an
additional $2.5 billion a year on defense and stategic equipment, I
suppose, and without the treaty, we would have to spend $5 billion,
so either way, life will be expensive for us for some time to come.

Ambassador Toon. I do not think any of us who have defended
the SALT Treaty or the negotiating process has ever maintained
that the result would be a savings in defense expenditures.

Senator Hayakawa. Of course not.

Ambassador Toon. I think frankly I would respect Secretary
Brown's judgment in this respect.

Senator Hayakawa. But there is enough sentiment against the
increase of expenditures on weaponry that we are likely not to
spend either $2.5 billion if signed or the $5 billion if not signed. Is
that not the case?

Ambassador Toon. Then we are in trouble.

Senator Hayakawa. OK, then, we are in trouble. I think that is
a quite satisfactory answer, sir.

U.S. STRATEGIC INFERIORITY BY THE 1980's

In the early 1980's, I understand that we will be in a strategical-
ly inferior position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as regards strategic
weapons. Would you expect the Soviets to take greater political
risks under those conditions?

Ambassador Toon. Senator Hayakawa, I am not sure that I
agree with your premise. I do not think that we will be in an
inferior strategic position in the 1980's. One thing is clear. One
part of the Triad will be vulnerable in the 1980's, and that, of
course, is the Minuteman missile force. That, of course is why we
have to develop the M-X, in order to shore up and offset the
vulnerability of the Minuteman, but the other two parts of the
Triad are going to remain fairly viable at that point, so I would not
say that we are going to be strategically inferior.

The second part of your question was what, sir? I am sorry. I
didn't quite catch it.

Senator Hayakawa. Would you expect that the Soviets would
undertake greater risks and be more venturesome as a result?

Ambassador Toon. If they felt they had a strategic advantage
over us, then I would think there would be a very good chance
indeed of their taking the sort of political risks backed up by
military power which would cause us deep concern. I think that is
entirely possible.

Senator Hayakawa. Since Vietnam, we have been extremely
unwilling to venture into the outside world, and it seems to me
that the practical consequence of this has been the expansion of
Soviet adventurism in Africa and elsewhere.

In your opinion, have we encouraged that by our very steady
policy of nonintervention an5rwhere?

Ambassador Toon. I think to a certain degree that is true. I
think the Soviets moved in Africa in the first place not in accord-
ance with any grand design, but simply because the opportunities
presented themselves for extension of Soviet political influence,
and second, because they felt they could do so with impunity
because of their assessment of the American domestic political
scene.

Senator, I think it is incumbent upon us — on you as a responsible
legislative official, on me as a responsible official of the executive
branch, and on the American people — to decide just what are our
vital interests, and to make sure that there is no uncertainty on
the other side as to what those are, so that there can be no
miscalculation in the future which might result in a serious con-
frontation between us.

I think we should make absolutely clear what these are.

Senator Hayakawa. This is exactly the reason why to a consider-
able extent I agreed with what Senator Biden was saying about
linkage and nonlinkage. It is hard to maintain a nonlinkage posi-
tion when you consider all the other Soviet activities in the world
as perhaps an index of what the future might hold. I am simply
stating my reservation in this respect.

Ambassador Toon. Senator, as I said before, I think you must
assess this treaty on its own merits. If you think as a result of
passing the treaty that you are going to affect Soviet behavior—
this is simply not in the cards— then I don't think you ought to go

that route. I think you should look at the treaty and decide wheth-
er it is in our national interest to approve it. I happen to think
that it is.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McGovern. Senator Glenn.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon, it is good to see you again. I would like to ask
a question that might appear unrelated, but it is not. I saw one
press report a short time ago that in your tenure in Moscow you
were given an opportunity once a year to go on Moscow television.
Is that correct? Is there any regular program that you are permit-
ted to appear on each year?

Ambassador Toon. Yes; it is on our national day, the Fourth of
July. It is a rare privilege accorded to every Ambassador in
Moscow to speak on Soviet television on his national day. I happen
to have a rather rare talent in Moscow in the ambassadorial corps,
speaking Russian, so I do it in the Russian language, and it is quite
effective.

As one of your colleagues pointed out, I think it was the chair-
man, in my first year in Moscow I was denied the privilege because
they had seen the advance text, and there was a paragraph in
there on human rights which they did not like, and they suggested
that I abbreviate the text, and I said I would be glad to. They said
to take out that paragraph. I said; no, I will abbreviate it in other
respects. The answer was that I did not appear on television, but I
have appeared for the last 2 years.

Senator Glenn. We have had what I view as almost a spectacle
in this country of Georgi Arbatov being on our national television
here on half-hour shows, national programs such as "Issues and
Answers," traveling to various cities in this country, putting forth
the Soviet view of SALT. Do you think they would welcome my
going to Moscow and putting forth some American views on SALT
on national television in Russia?

Ambassador Toon. No.

Senator Glenn. Do you think it would be a futile gesture if I
proposed such a thing formally?

Ambassador Toon. No; I meant to say that they would not wel-
come your appearance on Soviet television, but I think possibly
they might reckon with it, and you might succeed. I would be glad
to look into it when I get back.

Senator Glenn. Well, I had thought of that at first in jest, but
then later on, perhaps seriously, that if we are to be open and have
trust in each other, which this treaty is supposed to engender in
the future, that we should then start communicating with each
other.

It seems to me if we have certain reservations about parts of
SALT in this country, it would be good to spell those out to the
Soviet people and hopefully open up a dialog in that regard that is
not there now. As was already mentioned in the hearings this
morning, they get a spoonfed view of everything regarding SALT.

Obviously, if we are to have some sort of rapprochement or
continuation of meaningful detente with the Soviet people, which I
hope is a people-to-people relationship and not just the hierarchies

of government, then somewhere, somehow, some time we have to
start having people-to-people contact on our differing views, or we
will never work out our difficulties.

Ambassador Toon. I agree. Senator. The next time you see Arba-
tov and he is appearing on "Issues and Answers" or some other
program, just tell him that you understand that Toon does not get
the same privilege in the Soviet Union.

Senator Glenn. I will be glad to point that out. I did see him
only briefly while he was here. I had met him when we were your
guests in Moscow a year or so ago.

SUPPORT FOR SALT HINGES ON VERIFICATION

Before you left Moscow to come back, you indicated that your
support for SALT would perhaps hinge on the monitoring and
verification aspects, which to me indicated that you believe that
the Soviets would cheat if they had a chance to do so. Is that

correct?

Ambassador Toon. I would not want to take that chance, Sena-
tor. I can't say that they would cheat if they felt they would not be
caught, but I think frankly it is up to us to make sure that that is
not the case and that they are not given that sort of temptation. It
is not quite correct to say that I would oppose SALT if I felt it
would not be verifiable.

I said simply that I had to assure myself that the treaty was
verifiable before I could make up my mind as to whether I would
go that route.

Senator Glenn. Well, let me put it in different words, then. I
guess you would not have much confidence that they would always
operate in our best interests within the framework of SALT unless
we could check on it.

Ambassador Toon. None whatsoever.

Senator Glenn. I certainly share that view. I have been through
all of the briefings that I am sure you have been through and
which Senator Biden mentioned here. There are things moving in
this area that cannot be talked about publicly. We know there is a
lot of effort going on to replace the monitoring capability that we
lost in Iran.

Since you have come out very solidly in your statement this
morning that you do feel the treaty is verifiable and is monitorable
now, would you say that it is monitorable now or are you basing
your estimate of this on what you have been briefed that we hope
will take place in the future?

Ambassador Toon. I feel strongly on the basis of my briefings
that we can detect any significant military violation of the treaty
that would have an impact on the strategic balance and we can do
that now.

Senator Glenn. Are you talking about deployments?

Ambassador Toon. Well, I would rather not go into the details.

Senator Glenn. OK, that is what happens all the time in these
open hearings. I am not being critical. It should happen. Sometimes
we get into sensitive areas on such matters that cannot be dis-
cussed publicly. My difficulty with some of the administration wit-
nesses that have appeared before us is, they talk about some of

these things as if ever3^hing is in place and operating right now,
and that we are not giving away any intelligence information to
say some of these things are systems still being put together.

I want to see this be verifiable and monitorable from the day we
agree to this and the day the treaty goes into effect. That may be
possible. I am certainly not ruling that out, but I think we have
perhaps too much talk these days of prospective things which we
are assuming will take place by certain time periods, and I want to
see more guarantees that these will in fact take place.

Ambassador Toon. Senator, I will be frank with you to this
extent. I am perfectly aware that we suffered a rather serious
intelligence loss when we lost the facilities in Iran. It is my under-
standing that we are now studying ways and means of offsetting
that loss. I am confident that that can be done in the fairly near
future. We don't have that offsetting capability at the moment, but
I do not think that has a bearing on our ability to detect the sorts
of violations about which I was speaking earlier in my statement.

Senator Glenn. Assuming we do not have those now, then I
would disagree with your second statement, because I think as far
as monitoring numbers is concerned, and deployed weapons sys-
tems, we have that and can do that with a fine accuracy. I think as
far as monitoring other key elements of the treaty such as launch-
weight, throw-weight, MIRVing, et cetera, I hope some of those
things work out so that we can monitor with absolute reliability.

There is a lot being developed along that line, and I am not
pessimistic about that taking place, but I want to see that be a fact
when this treaty goes into effect.

Ambassador Toon. I agree, Senator.

CONNECTION BETWEEN SALT AND MBFR

Senator Glenn. Do you believe that there is a relationship be-
tween SALT and MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions]?
We have seen a mammoth buildup in Soviet forces of a convention-
al nature on their eastern European front while we have negotiat-
ed SALT, and we perhaps have even gotten behind in conventional
forces and don't really know for sure, but there are 7,000 NATO
tanks and 20,500 Soviet tanks which they claim are defensive.

Now, that is a lot of defense against our 7,000 tanks. Can you
spell out a little bit of the relationship between SALT and MBFR
and why you think we have held up our negotiations or why the
negotiations have been held up while we have negotiated SALT?
Why could they have not gone on along together?

Ambassador Toon. I do not, quite frankly, think that there is a
direct relationship between SALT and MBFR. I think the only
relationship is the one spelled out at Vienna itself when both sides
expressed the hope that successful conclusion of the SALT agree-
ment would provide a desirable impulse to the negotiations in
Vienna. That has not yet happened. We hope it will happen in the

future.

The basic problem in Vienna, as you know. Senator, is the fact
that we cannot agree on the data base. We have a disparity of
something like 180,000 between their estimate as to what they
have in the way of armed forces strength in Central Europe and
ours.

48-250 0-79

Senator Glenn. Well, Mr. Arbatov, when he was here, indicated
that he felt MBFR was being held up pending completion of SALT.

Ambassador Toon. Well, that may be Arbatov's view, but I do
not share it.

EFFECT OF SALT ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Senator Glenn. What about the Sino-Soviet relationship and
how that may be affected by SALT? What considerations of foreign
policy in the Sino-Soviet conflict would influence Soviet behavior
toward us? Could you comment briefly on that?

Ambassador Toon. Well, I think. Senator, that virtually every
foreign policy decision made by the Soviet Union is filtered
through the litmus of their relationship with Peking. They are
deeply concerned about the Chinese and they reach almost every
foreign policy decision in careful consideration of the impact that
this will have on their relations with the Chinese. So, to that
extent I think the SALT agreement has some relationship with the
China picture.

Senator Glenn. We may get into some discussion of that later.
My time is up. Just let me say that when we were in China in
January, in the People's Republic, I met with Deng Xiaoping and
some of the generals and Army chiefs of staff there. I asked them
about their view of SALT and they said they didn't think it did
much. I asked if they would be willing to participate in a broad-
ened SALT since they are a nuclear power. I also asked, would
they be willing to pursue talks with the Soviet Union and the
United States, and they said, well, if we could get a treaty that was
more meaningful, perhaps they would. They did not rule out their
participating in future talks. I thought that was rather interesting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon. I would not hold my breath until that hap-
pens.

Senator Glenn. I would not either, but it was an interesting
comment.

The Chairman [presiding]. Mr. Ambassador, in connection with
your last answer, do considerations of China and Soviet concerns
color their military policy as well as their foreign policy?

Ambassador Toon. Yes; I don't think there is any question about
that. I think, for example, their reluctance to even contemplate
drastic reductions to anything in the military field is related direct-
ly to their concern about China.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Lugar?

Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Toon, you mention that you have been characterized
by some as a hardliner regarding Soviet affairs. You say you do not
accept that specifically but you point out your realism as you take
a look at these affairs in your long service. Now, for this reason I
am disappointed in the conclusion you have reached on the SALT
II Treaty, and let me give the reason for my disappointment.

As you are not a naive onlooker in this situation, you have not
tried to make all sorts of defenses as to why the Soviets might have
been building on and on to defend themselves here and there, I
think you have characterized pretty accurately a long-going build-

up of a toughminded regime which continues even more so in the
conventional realms.

Now, in the proposition that you look at here, couldn't you say
that the Soviets are in fact building for a potential scenario in
which they are going to be dominant and in which they see the
Soviets as No. 1. They would have a possibility for defeating every-
body in sight, including ourselves.

What in SALT deters any of this for a moment? Is it your
suggestion that this will continue because the process is useful and
the need to keep talking about it has some value and that it is best
to keep playing along with the game even if you think it is a
totally dominant strategy and even if we are asleep at the switch?
Isn't there a potential service on your part simply to sound the
alarm bell and to say we had better cut the nonsense of SALT II,
reject this treaty, and get on with either of two courses. One would
be substantial disarmament, in which our ICBM's would not be in
such jeopardy, and in which other legs of the triad might not be in
such jeopardy. We need to proceed to do those things that we need
to do with the American public fully on notice that we are in
trouble because the public is not on that notice.

Knowledgeable people like yourself come back and in a laid-back
style the public is being told, pass SALT, stop nuclear war, you are
safe, and for a small expenditure of money you can sort of buy
peace.

Now, you know better and I know better. Why would it not have
been better for you simply to have sounded the alarm and said,
SALT II is no good and it is time we got our act together and began
building up the things we need in this country.

Ambassador Toon. Senator, the answer to that is very simple. I
have not taken that decision because I simply do not believe that
SALT II is not any good. I think it is a good treaty, primarily
because it does set modest limits on our arsenals, our strategic
arsenals, and it is the beginning, I think, possibly, depending on
the Soviet reaction to SALT III, of an effective arms control pro-
gram.

Certainly I agree basically with your thrust that we cannot
afford to let down our guard. Certainly, signing SALT II and the
fact that the Soviets are prepared to sign SALT II is no indication
at all that they have suddenly overnight taken a much more
benign view of the United States of America. That is simply not
the case.

In that respect, perhaps I am a hardliner. I happen to think that
that is just a realistic assessment of what the Soviets will do if in
fact they thought they could get away with it.

Now, with regard to the need to maintain our defensive posture
in a very good, solid shape, that is something that we have to
decide as a matter of national policy. It has nothing to do with
SALT II. We have to do it an5rway because the Soviets are doing it.
Therefore, we must take the necessary steps in order to cope with
them and to make sure that they do not receive a certain advan-
tage which they could exploit for their own political purposes.

EFFECTIVE UNKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND STRONGER DEFENSE

Senator Lugar. But you keep saying that it really has nothing to
do with SALT II. It has everything to do with SALT II. Do you
really believe as a policymaker that the odds are good that after
SALT II is ratified the President of the United States and the
defense establishment are going to be successful in getting on with
the M-X missile as really a basic item? You know, I am not certain
that I believe that for a moment. I don't think the support has
been engendered by the President of the United States for the M-X
missile. Why, he doesn't even know yet how he would deploy it.

No decision has been made on this. It is a pig in the poke, and
you are saying it is a different item, as if we antiseptically have
SALT II on one hand and a defense posture on the other. How
should we be linking the two? What is the effective way for those
who support SALT II but want to make sure the defense continues
on to make doggone sure that occurs?

Ambassador Toon. I do not think the answer is not to sign SALT
II. I do not think that is the answer at all. I think the answer is, if
in fact this is necessary, and I had not thought that it was, to
convince the American public that we have to go the M-X route,
that we have to do certain other things in order to maintain a
healthy defensive posture and essential equivalence with the Soviet
Union. I happen to think that we are going to go this route.
Perhaps I have more confidence in the American people than you
do, Senator, with all due respect, but I think the American people
will support this thing, and they had better, because if they do not,
we are in trouble.

Senator Lugar. I am sure the American people will support it,
but the question is whether the President of the United States will
do so. It has not been the people who have unilaterally been
making defense decisions and obviating weapons systems while we
were even in the process. This is the dilemma with which we are
faced. How do we wicket in some will on the part of our own
administration to do those things which have to be done?

I don't know the answer to that. That is why I am appealing to
you as somebody who surely must have thought about this. It is
just not manifest that these things are going to occur.

Ambassador Toon. I was under the impression. Senator, that the
President had already made the decision on M-X.

Senator Lugar. Well, the President finally, I would say in the
last 60 days, with the breath of the SALT hearings coming down
upon him heavily, has indicated some disposition in that manner,
but even on this committee, in these hearings, there are people
expressing the viewpoint that things should never be built. You
couldn't get a unanimous feeling on this committee that it ought to
happen. I hope you would be able to get a majority.

Now, I think we are in for some heavy sledding.

Let me follow up with one more question. You say you think this
offers a modest basis for some arms control. Now, on what basis?
Every scenario we have been presented with by the Secretary of
State, Secretary of Defense, shows a piling on of missiles and
launchers, one on top of another. As this thing progresses, we
recognize that it offers some very modest caps, modest caps in the

launchers, but not in the missile production and not in all sorts of
other things that might be brought in.

What is the basis for anticipation that arms control is going to
come from this?

Ambassador Toon. I did not say anticipation, Senator. I said I
had the hope that perhaps this would prove to be a first step
toward effective arms control measures. Now, this depends in large
measure on the Soviet reaction, and I do not frankly know what
the Soviet reaction is going to be. I know what their reaction was
in March 1977, and if in fact that is the precedent on which we
build, then the outlook is very pessimistic.

Senator Lugar. It certainly is. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Toon. I still hope.

Senator Lugar. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Your expression of disappointment that this
committee is not unanimous — well, I can think of few occasions
when this committee has been unanimous on any issue. I suppose
that happens in the Soviet Union, but it is not likely to happen in
the U.S. Senate.

Ambassador Toon. It happens every day in the Supreme Soviet.

The Chairman. Senator Stone?

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

soviet rejection of march 1977 proposal

Mr. Ambassador, why did the Soviets reject the deep cuts that
we offered in March 1977?

Ambassador Toon. I think primarily because the deep cuts
meant a virtual collapse of their SS-18 arsenal, and they were not
about to do that at this particular juncture.

Senator Stone. Why, if it were balanced, did they not prefer, as
we, the relative safety of a lower level of weapons?

Ambassador Toon. Sometimes the Soviets behave in an irra-
tional way, and I think they did at that particular time.

Senator Stone. Was it really irrational, or were they acting in
their perceived best interests? What you said earlier was a lot
more credible, that the Soviets always act in their best interests.

Ambassador Toon. They were acting in their perceived best in-
terests. They were irrational perhaps from the standpoint of sensi-
ble arms control. The second fact. Senator, is, they have a genuine
concern about China and are not about to engage in substantial
drastic cuts in their arsenal until that concern has disappeared.
That is a long way down the road.

Senator Stone. Do you perceive that the main substantive reason
which you think they had in their mind for rejecting the cuts was
their concern about the Chinese situation?

Ambassador Toon. To a large measure; yes.

radiation focused on U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

Senator Stone. Mr. Ambassador, you have been there for 2y2
years. You have been described twice here as a hardliner. Why do
we tolerate the bombardment of our U.S. Embassy in Moscow by

harmful radiation, radiation which is harmful to everyone's
health?

Ambassador Toon. Primarily because we can do nothing about it.

Senator Stone. Why?

Ambassador Toon. We made protests on every appropriate occa-
sion. I myself took it up with Brezhnev twice. They maintain with
a perfectly straight face— and this is one illustration of why it is so
difficult to deal with these people— they maintained with a straight
face that there was no radiation being focused on the Embassy,
that what had happened was a general increase in the level of
radiation in the area because of the number of hospitals that had
been built and laboratories and so forth, and that this is perfectly
normal in any urban environment around the world. That is what
they said. Of course, this argument was totally unacceptable to us,
but in fact since they refused to admit they were bombarding the
Embassy with radiation, how could they go along with a suggestion
that they stop it, but now in fact it has been stopped. I don't know
why, primarily because I really do not know why they did it in the
first place.

We have a number of theories about this.

Senator Stone. Are you sure it has been stopped?

Ambassador Toon. Just recently it was cranked up again, within
the past 2 weeks.

Senator Stone. That is what I read.

Ambassador Toon. Again, I am not excusing Soviet behavior.
They ought to stop this sort of thing. It is an inhuman thing to do,
to irradiate human beings. That is precisely what they are doing.

Senator Stone. Mr. Ambassador, that is the problem. Are we not
excusing that inhuman behavior when we let them do it?

Ambassador Toon. What is your suggestion as to what we should

do? . ^ . X

Senator Stone. I think we should take stronger action than just

making a suggestion or a protest. Many things can be done at the

level of diplomacy, many things, and we have not done anything

but make a suggestion or a protest.

Ambassador Toon. Senator, I can assure you that we have given
this very serious consideration down through the years, primarily
because I am on the spot and it is a problem for me with my
personnel, but we have yet to come up with a satisfactory answer.
If you could come up with one, except in general terms, I would be
happy to listen to you.

Senator Stone. How about withdrawing from there, withdrawing
from that building, and telling the world that the Soviet Union
radiates our building, and it is unhealthful, instead of just suggest-
ing. Mr. Ambassador, the reason I am pursuing this is not this
issue alone. All through these hearings I have been concerned not
with verification so much as what we do when we find them doing
something wrong. What good does it do if all we do is suggest, if all
we do is request, but we never insist or we rarely insist, and when
we do we accept their version? That is the problem. We are about
to enter into a very major agreement, one in which, if we don't
know if the treaty is verifiable, nobody is going to vote for it, but
what good is verification if when we find them doing something

wrong we stop at a suggestion or even worse, accept their version
of their straight-faced He?

Now, you know it is a lie that they were not radiating our
Embassy because you even know that they started up again 2
weeks ago, right?

Ambassador Toon. I agree with most of what you said.

Senator Stone. I thank you for that.

Ambassador Toon. Except that I have yet to detect a solution to
the problem, and certainly, with all respects. Senator, the solution
to the problem is not breaking diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union.

Senator Stone. I did not suggest breaking relations. I suggested
moving out of the building.

The Chairman. Into the street. [General laughter.]

Senator Stone. You know, into the street would focus their
attention on you. They might have to put you on Soviet television
if you did it. [General laughter.]

PROTEST OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

Mr. Ambassador, in your 2V2 years of service in Moscow, did you
protest Soviet activities in Cuba in any respect?

Ambassador Toon. Yes; we have.

Senator Stone. What did you protest, and what was the result?

Ambassador Toon. As I recall, it was with regard to the Mig-23
problem. This was some time ago, and frankly, I think we were
satisfied with the Soviet reaction.

Senator Stone. Was it a reaction in action, or was it an explana-
tion of their version of what has happened?

Ambassador Toon. It was primarily an explanation, but we came
to the conclusion that our concern was perhaps unduly exagger-
ated.

Senator Stone. What about the visit of the Golf II submarines to
Cuba in 1972 and 1974? Did we protest that?

Ambassador Toon. From 1972 to 1974 was before my time in
Moscow.

Senator Stone. Then you were not aware of that situation?

Ambassador Toon. I cannot recall at the moment. I was in

Israel.

Senator Stone. All right. Mr. Ambassador, you were there when
South Yemen invaded North Yemen with support from East Ger-
many, from Cuba, and from the Soviet Union, at least materiel
support. Did we protest that in Moscow?

Ambassador Toon. Yes; we made representations about that in
Moscow.

Senator Stone. Did we get any response?

Ambassador Toon. I think the situation has calmed considerably
since we made representations. Now, I do not say it is necessarily
because we did, but the situation has improved.

DETECTION OF SOVIET RADAR TESTING IN ABM MODE

The Chairman. Were you in Moscow when we detected the test-
ing of Soviet radar in an ABM mode, some more than 30 or as
many as 40 times, according to Mr. Nitze?

Ambassador Toon. I am not sure that I am competent to answer
that question. I just do not have any knowledge at the present time
of that.

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Helms?

Senator Helms. Mr. Ambassador, I want to say at the outset that
I respect you. I mean not to offend you, but I hope you will obtain
a copy of the transcript of your testimony this morning and read
for yourself your own assessment of the backbone of the United
States and its relationship with the Soviet Union. I was going to
ask almost precisely the questions that Senator Stone has just
asked you about the microwave radiation. The American people
are persuaded that this Government, our State Department, rolls
over and plays dead every time it gets into a confrontation with
the Soviet Union, even on the question, as Senator Lugar put it to
you, of arms reduction.

Now, if ever there was an opportunity for the United States to
stand up and say to the world, we are willing, we are anxious to
reduce nuclear arms, that is when we should have done it, but no,
what we did is, we went with our hat in our hands, or so it
appeared, and said, how would you feel about a little bit of arms
reduction, and they said, "nyet," so we backed off and they had
their way.

The same thing is true with respect to the bombardment of the
U.S. Embassy. I hope you will read your testimony about our
reaction to that. I say that not in a critical way.

REUGIOUS PERSECUTION IN SOVIET UNION

Now, let me raise another question. We are all concerned and all
aware of the persecution of religious minorities in the Soviet
Union, particularly the Jewish people, but I want to raise a little
question about some others. I am receiving a lot of mail from
Baptists and people of other denominations concerning their
human rights in the Soviet Union which are being violated.

What efforts have we really made, Mr. Ambassador, to bring an
end to such persecution not only of the Jews but of the Baptists,
the Methodists, and all other denominations represented over
there?

What can you say for our posture in that regard?

Ambassador Toon. Senator Helms, I think we have made our
position perfectly clear in the public domain. We have tried to
focus world public opinion on this problem, not only with regard to
the plight of the Jews, but also with regard to the plight of the
Baptists and other Christian elements there. I think in very practi-
cal terms we have to recognize this is a basically internal problem,
and there is nothing really that we can do to change the situation
with regard to these people who, after all, are Soviet citizens.

The most we can do, and I think we have done it very adequately
in this sense, is to focus world public opinion on the problem, and
to make representations to the Soviets and the Soviet leadership on
appropriate occasions, which we have done many times.

Senator Helms. And the results have been almost nil. The perse-
cution continues. Mr. Ambassador, I raise this line of questioning

again not to be in an adversary position with you. I hope you
understand that.

Ambassador Toon. Of course.

Senator Helms. I was in London early in July, and I met with
about 75 Members of the House of Commons and made a little
speech to them. Then we had a question and answer period, and I
must say to you that they do not understand the U.S. posture in
terms of standing up for things that count in a confrontation with
the Soviet Union.

Now, all of that having been said, and the record of the Soviet
Union in terms of keeping agreements and treaties being what it
is, even if this SALT II Treaty were a good treaty, which I do not
agree that it is, would you not have some apprehension about what
may flow from this treaty in terms of relative nuclear strength?

Ambassador Toon. Senator, I think that is the basic reason why
we feel strongly that the treaty ought to be completely verifiable.
In my view, no treaty with the Soviet Union or frankly with any
major power should rest on trust. We should be able to walk out of
the treaty if in fact that is what the Soviets are doing. So we must
keep a very careful watch on this whole thing.

Senator Helms. Well, we are making a grave mistake in this
committee and in the Armed Services Committee with letting var-
ious witnesses get by with interchanging the words "monitoring"
and "verification." There is a decided difference between the two.
Monitoring is a science. Verification is a political judgment. Again,

I am concerned about the posture of this Nation when there is a
confrontation with the Soviet Union. I agree with the things that
Senator Stone said. I absolutely do. Why, why, why?

Now, some years ago, not many years ago, the Internal Security
Subcommittee of the Senate made a study of 1,000 treaties that
were entered into by the Soviet Union with other nations, includ-
ing with this one. It found that in all but just a handful of them,
the Soviets had violated those treaties. That is the concern that I
have about SALT II, even if it were a fair treaty for this country,
which I do not believe it to be.

Ambassador Toon. Senator, the immediate precedent for SALT

II is SALT I. In terms of compliance, I think the Soviet Union
honored its obligations under SALT I. Now, let me say this in
addition. Certainly the Soviet Union, if it felt that any treaty, no
matter how solemnly entered into, acted against its basic self-
interest, would walk out, would scrap the treaty. I think we should
do the same thing if we found ourselves in that sort of position.

Senator Helms. It is a matter of good faith, too. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The Chairman. I think the diplomatic history would pretty well
demonstrate that all countries adhere to treaties as long as those
treaties are in the self-interest of the countries, and that this is not
exclusively a matter that relates only to the Soviet Union. It is a
matter of national behavior through the years.

One would expect that if the United States were to find at any
time that this treaty impaired our national security interests, we
would then opt to abrogate the treaty, which would be our right.

Ambassador Toon. I would hope so.

The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes?

38
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DEGREE OF RESTRICTIONS SALT PLACES ON UNITED STATES AND

SOVIETS

Mr. Ambassador, first, I want to thank you for your statements
which reflects some very hard thinking. I do not think you are a
hardUner or a softHner, you are a hard thinker. That is what we
ought to have. I particularly welcome this point about the tendency
of this county to swing from one end of the pendulum to the other
in our attitudes, giving too much significance to detente, while in
an earlier period, perhaps going too far the other way, with the
cold war attitude. You need a steady, tough, realistic attitude at all
times.

The Joint Chiefs testified that the treaty would place substantive
restrictions on the Soviets and only nominal restrictions on us.

First of all, do you agree with that?

Ambassador Toon. I think I agree with that judgment.

Senator Sarbanes. We have had the argument that the balance
has been shifting against us over the SALT I period, and even
before that, and that this treaty offers us an opportunity to catch
up.

If that is the case, why would the Soviets agree to such a treaty?

Ambassador Toon. Senator, I think they would agree primarily
because they see other advantages in the treaty which they consid-
er offset some of the disadvantages which have been cited by the
Chiefs. I think the important thing to recognize is that we have not
negotiated a treaty which is completely to our advantage. That is
impossible. I think all you can negotiate with the Soviet Union is
equality. You cannot negotiate superiority. Therefore, they see cer-
tain advantages in this from their point of view, just as we do.

Senator Sarbanes. Do the Soviets think that a treaty will lull
the United States so that it will not do a number of things in the
strategic force area that it is free to do under the treaty? That the
atmosphere created by the treaty will lead us to relax so that,
while the treaty permits us to significantly bolster our strategic
forces, the Soviets calculate that we will not as a practical matter
avail ourselves of the opportunity.

Ambassador Toon. Well, that may enter into their calculations,
but it seems to me the important thing for us to focus on is the will
of the administration backed up by the American people and the
Congress to do the things we feel have to be done in order to
maintain a healthy defense posture, so it really does not depend on
what the Soviet calculations are. It depends on what we are pre-
pared to do, and I am satisfied that we will do the necessary thing.

Senator Sarbanes. But why would they agree to a treaty that
places only nominal restrictions on us unless they sense we will not
avail ourselves of the legal opportunities which the treaty gives us?

Ambassador Toon. I suppose you are talking specifically about
the protocol and whether the limitations of the protocol will be
extended beyond the life of the protocol. Now, this may be the
Soviet intention in the next negotiating round, and I would not
exclude that possibility. In fact, I would think that is probably
what they have in mind, but they cannot succeed in this tactic
unless we are prepared to go along with them.

My own feeling is that we are strongly determined to end the
protocol in 1981, and that is it.

Senator Sarbanes. I was interested in your view that the deep
cut approach and in fact the future as we move toward SALT II is
very much related to the Soviet position on China, which you see
as really blocking further significant arms reduction.

Ambassador Toon. Well, I would use the word "drastic" rather
than "significant." Ijust do not know. I know what the Soviets said
in Vienna, for example. They said we can't go very far down this
road unless other powers, and they never mentioned China specifi-
cally, come on board. I think we have to take this into account in
estimating what the possibilities are.

Senator Sarbanes. How fearful do you think the Soviets are that
they will undertake a major arms commitment without SALT, and
that our technology would allow us to outstrip them and place
them in a very difficult position?

Ambassador Toon. I think they are concerned about that possi-
bility, but I think it is important for us to recognize that despite
the fact that we have a significant economic margin over them,
they would pay the necessary price in terms of depriving the
population of certain things in order to maintain the pace with us.

I think in the long run they would have to lose simply because of
the strength of our economy, and they know that.

EFFECT OF RATIFICATION PROCESS ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR

Senator Sarbanes. Do you see Soviet behavior in the world as
improved or more responsible now because the SALT Treaty is
pending and they would like it ratified?

Ambassador Toon. The world is fairly placid at the moment, but
I do not think we should read that as an indication of Soviet
restraint. I think possibly the reason for this is that the opportuni-
ties are not there at the present time for Soviet exploitation. If
something should happen in the next month or two, I think the
Soviets would be prepared to move in response to their perception
of their own self-interest.

I do not think I would count on restraint in that sense.

SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCE BUILDUP

Senator Sarbanes. What is behind this tremendous buildup of
Soviet conventional forces?

Ambassador Toon. We discussed that earlier in the session. Sen-
ator, and I frankly don't know. Do you mean in central Europe for
the most part?

Senator Sarbanes. Yes.

Ambassador Toon. I do not know why they have done this. It
may be a product of their defensive mentality, or their historical
experience. It may be in fact that they anticipated a much greater
strengthening of the NATO military machine than in fact hap-
pened. It may be, finally, that this is in the nature of some sort of
payoff to the military as a result of Brezhnev's policies. I do not
know. All I know is, this is not justified by the circumstances
objectively seen in central Europe, and there is no excuse for it at
all in my view.

Senator Sarbanes. Do the SALT II terms enhance our abihty to
monitor what the Soviets are doing with their strategic forces?

Ambassador Toon. Yes. To the extent that there are provisions
of the treaty which do provide us with certain monitoring. For
example, the telemetry encryption provision provides us with a
certain ability in this respect.

Senator Sarbanes. Knowing Soviet history as you do, were you
surprised by the extent to which they were opening up certain
things in order to permit monitoring for verification of the treaty?

Ambassador Toon. I have been surprised in general by the
nature of the dialog that we have had with the Soviets since the
beginning of the SALT process.

Senator Sarbanes. Would you please develop that a little bit? I
think it would be helpful.

Ambassador Toon. Well, I think 15 years ago, none of us who
felt we knew something about the Soviet Union anticipated that we
would get into this sort of really extensive dialog involving awfully
sensitive things with the Soviet Union, but this has happened, and
this has been an encouraging aspect of the process.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you. I see that my time is up. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Percy, do you have any further questions?

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one further
question. We would like to draw upon Ambassador Toon's vast
experience in dealing with the Soviets to get his judgment on how
two competing forces can effectively deal with one other.

The President has said that we will be a military power second
to none. The Joint Chiefs have in a sense conditioned their support
of SALT upon our moving ahead to regain our relative military
strength. Many people have said in this debate that you can deal
with the Soviets only with superior force. What sort of superior
force is most effective against Soviet designs? That is, we have
military, political, as well as world public opinion, and economic
power. Do we have to be superior, second to none in every single
area to gain their respect? Would you comment on just how do we
do that? How do we effectively compete without putting them in a
posture and a position where there is deep resentment, hostility,
and a feeling of insecurity such as they had after the Cuban missile
crisis?

Could you just comment on that one area?

Ambassador Toon. I think. Senator, we do not have to get our-
selves in a superior military position necessarily. We have to make
sure that we are not in an inferior position. We must maintain
essential equivalence. Now, with regard to the other elements of
the relationship, the political, economic, social and cultural, and so
forth, I think it is generally perceived in the world that we are
vastly superior to the Soviet Union in our political philosophy, the
strength of our economy, in our moral approach to the problems of
the world.

I think the proof of that, frankly, is that there is no country in
the world today, no people in the world today that wants to emu-
late the Soviet example. On the contrary, they look to us for

leadership and not to the Soviets. That, I think, is a real indication
of the relative strength of our two societies.

Senator Percy. Thank you very kindly.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me announce that we have two more witnesses, but I do
want to accommodate any Senators who wish to have a second
round. Senator Lugar?

Senator Lugar. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I want to
follow up once again the question Senator Sarbanes asked and to
which the Ambassador responded honestly.

Mr. Ambassador, he asked with regard to the theater buildups
and conventional armaments, just how extensive these have been,
and likewise your own mystification as to why, whether it is simply
that the military continues on and must be satisfied.

It appears to me to be important for the record to indicate that
those sorts of buildups do appear to be continuing in the theater
sector, leaving the strategic aside for a moment, and the theory
that I propounded earlier in questioning you generally is that the
Soviets simply wish to be dominant. In other words, one reason
why you continue to build arms beyond those that could ostensibly
be required for any sort of defensive purposes is, that you wish to
intimidate, if not to invade, and at least to make certain that you
are in a position to so totally influence the construct of affairs. I
think that is a very valid reason why a country might want to do
that, though a very frightening reason.

In your judgment is this not the primary reason why they are
doing it, or would you still say simply that you do not know?

Ambassador Toon. It could very well be. I was talking about the
buildup in central Europe. Now, clearly, one of the reasons which I
forgot to mention to Senator Sarbanes for the buildup in central
Europe is that the Soviets look upon this as an instrument of
political control. Everybody knows that if it were not for the Red
Army, why, the Soviet Union would not dominate Eastern Europe
today. But with regard to your broader question, I think frankly
this depends on us.

Clearly, the Soviets can gain all kinds of superiority in conven-
tional forces as they seem to be aiming at right now, but whether
in fact they use these in order to project their political influence, in
order to bring about a confrontation with us which they hope they
might win, really depends on us.

I think frankly I have enough confidence in the American people
and this administration and the Congress to realize that that will
not happen.

Senator Lugar. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, your testimony has been ex-
tremely helpful this morning. I want to thank you for it.

Ambassador Toon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Sarbanes?

Senator Sarbanes. If it is agreeable to our next witnesses, would
it be possible to hear from them at the same time?

The Chairman. In fact, it would be necessary to do that, and I
was going to propose it, because it is now 11:55 and we do have an
afternoon hearing.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you. I think in this way we will at
least have a chance to hear their prepared testimonies.

The Chairman. Yes, Senator. I do think we should proceed in
that way. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for your testi-
mony.

Let me ask our two next witnesses, Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt and
Prof. Richard Pipes, if they would come to the table.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt has been working on East-West relations
almost as long as Ambassador Toon. He has spent 23 years in the
State Department and in the National Security Council. He has
been responsible for analyzing Soviet behavior and advising policy-
makers how to deal with it.

As a participant in three summit sessions between President
Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev, he has seen the Soviet leadership
in close quarters, but he also brings to our hearing the perspective
of a scholar, a title he now holds at the Brookings Institution.
Counselor of the State Department when detente was still a word
Washingtonians could use with equanimity, he remains a valued
contributor to public counsels now that detente is a word to be
whispered or shunned.

Not by his choice, he has been made the author of a doctrine.
This morning he comes to urge a strategy, and we welcome the
chance to hear his views.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt, if you will present your statement, then we will
turn to Professor Pipes, then we will ask questions of you both.

STATEMENT OF HON. HELMUT SONNENFELDT, BROOKINGS IN-
STITUTION, FORMER COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee and Senator Boschwitz.

I think in the interest of time I will be brief in my preliminary
remarks because I have given you a written statement which
should go into the record.

I am pleased and honored to be here to participate in your very
important deliberations on the SALT Treaty. When you invited me
to testify, Mr. Chairman, you asked that I comment on the place
occupied by the SALT process and the particular treaty before you
in the broad context of United States-Soviet relations. It is to that
complex problem which has in some ways already been addressed
in earlier testimony that I have directed the comments in my
paper.

It is often said that SALT should be judged on its own merits.
That is hardly a disputable proposition. The question is how these
merits are to be defined, whether narrowly or broadly, and I am
inclined to want to see them defined broadly.

I believe in a nutshell that SALT negotiations and possible or
actual agreements in that area should be part of a broad range of
policies and actions designed to protect our interests in a world
where Soviet power has been steadily increasing and Soviet ambi-
tions are actively asserted. Our purpose must be to see to it that
the uses of Soviet power are restrained and that at any given
moment and also over time Soviet leaders recognize that the risks
of assertive and aggrandizing uses of power outweigh the benefits.

I believe that this is essential for any positive evolution in our
relations with the Soviet Union. Arms control may have some
useful role to play in structuring our policies along these lines and
for the purposes indicated. Much of American arms control doc-
trine, and particularly the doctrine underlying the SALT negotia-
tions, has gone on the presumption that there is an overriding
mutual interest between ourselves and the Soviet Union in this
area and that is the interest in the prevention of nuclear war.

I think this is a notion, appealing though it may be, whose
validity needs to be questioned and examined more deeply. In any
case, the slow progress in arms control negotiations, including
SALT, and the very marginal accomplishments to date in these
negotiations, suggest that other factors than a mutual interest in
preventing war are at work as well.

I think we need to define our purposes with respect to SALT in
American terms. That clearly includes the prevention of war, and
to that extent it may overlap to a degree with the interests of the
Soviet Union. But we cannot ignore, and we must centrally incor-
porate in our policies, in our defense policies, and in our negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union the protection of our security and well-
being in the face of challenges posed to us and other nations by the
emergence of the Soviet Union as a major military power on the
international scene.

I see no sign that the impulses and ambitions which have carried
the Soviet Union to the position and status that it has reached to
date are subsiding. On the contrary, they remain a central ingredi-
ent in Soviet conduct. Soviet interest in arms control, including
SALT, remains subordinate to them. I should say that ever since
the Bolshevik revolution, ever since the Soviets first raised the
disarmament issue, a term that is still preferred to arms control,
they have sought to pursue through it certain very concrete politi-
cal and military aims.

In the days of their weaknesses, early on, the purpose was to
attempt to inhibit and demobilize their potential enemies as much
as possible through agitation and through mobilizing the so-called
masses against bourgeois governments.

In Stalin's day, when the United States had its nuclear monopoly
and substantial nuclear superiority, Soviet arms control or disarm-
ament policy was heavily directed, again principally through agita-
tion, mass movements and the signing of appeals, such as the
Stockholm Appeal, toward inhibiting the potential American use of
nuclear weapons and the building of the American nuclear arsenal.
These were very concrete aims for the Soviet Union because the
United States had to rely on its nuclear and strategic power in
order to offset the traditional military advantages that the Soviet
Union had on its own periphery, and which after the Second World
War it was continuing to build up with considerable momemtum
and at considerable sacrifice to the population of the Soviet Union.

Consequently, Soviet arms programs and Soviet strategy was
directed at offsetting the principal counterweight which the United
States was marshalling to this massive Soviet power on the Eur-
asian land mass. Thus, even in the days when Soviet disarmament
policy was essentially agitational, it pursued very concrete Soviet
interests.

It is worth bearing in mind at all times that this subordination
of arms control or disarmament to overriding political goals has
never changed in the case of the Soviet Union. Soviet devotion,
Soviet belief in and Soviet adherence to certain abstract principles
like stability has never been anywhere near the same as has been
the case in American arms control doctrine and American strategic
doctrine, and in our political discussions on the matter.

The Soviet system is strongly geared to the accumulation of
military power, and this has been a fact which has not changed,
particularly since World War II. For us, this ineluctably leads to
the conclusion that we cannot in the foreseeable future expect to
avoid maintaining our own strong and diversified military pro-
grams. Arms control arrangements may affect the pace and the
character of some of these military programs, but they are at best
likely to be modest and almost certainly unlikely to contribute
substantially to the balance we require for our security.

In my prepared statement, I have said a number of things about
the relationship of strategic forces and the strategic balance to
regional military situations in various parts of the world, particu-
larly in Europe. In our debates concerning the security situation in
Europe, we frequently ignore that it remains NATO doctrine,
agreed NATO doctrine, that the conventional forces of the alliance,
the theater nuclear forces of the alliance, and the strategic nuclear
forces of the United States constitute a whole.

We tend to forget also that NATO doctrine, and indeed European
security depends upon a strategy that calls for potential first use of
nuclear weapons by the United States. That is an accepted NATO
doctrine which has never been changed.

To point that out by itself demonstrates beyond doubt the inte-
gral relationship between the state of the strategic balance and the
state of regional balances.

I would like to make one further comment, Mr. Chairman, on
the matter of the difference, alleged or real, between the United
States and the Soviet Union on the matter of the possibility of
nuclear war. The Soviets do not make a distinction between deter-
rence and war fighting, indeed, between deterrence, war fighting,
and war winning.

They do believe in deterrence because they do not wish to suffer
the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. But it is clear that
their military programs, particularly in recent decades but really
from the beginning, have always been based on the proposition
that the best deterrent is that capability which also carries the
greatest potential for fighting a war in the event deterrence should
fail.

We are sometimes much less clear about this proposition than
the Soviets, even though we do ourselves procure programs that
have utility, real utility, in the fighting of a war should that prove
to be necessary. But we are less clear about the integral connection
between credible and usable military force and deterrence, deter-
rence not only of strategic attack against the United States but of
military action in other parts of the world, notably in Europe.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is for this reason that I think it
is important that what happens in the context of SALT and the
circumstances in which SALT is implemented do not in any way

derogate from the credibility and the potential usability of Ameri-
can military forces. This SALT agreement places certain modest
limitations on Soviet programs. It is often said that it does not
inhibit any programs of our own. There is, of course, a question
whether these programs have in the first instance already been
tailored to fit SALT prescriptions. But even apart from that, you
have had testimony here that in regard to the M-X, one of the
criteria for its deployment must be its verifiability under SALT.
That is clearly a constraint placed by SALT on an American mili-
tary program.

There has also been some question about the freedom of action
which the United States might have with respect to theater weap-
ons in Europe, particularly the cruise missiles, whose deployment
is now prohibited for 2 years in the protocol, and the possibilities of
cooperation with allies with respect to these particular weapons as
well as others.

Mr. Chairman, it is my view that before the ratification process
on this treaty can be properly completed, the questions that have
been raised, at the very least in these matters — the deployment
mode of the M-X and its compatibility to SALT requirements, the
cruise missile programs and possible potential cooperation with
allies — need to be clearly resolved.

I believe the means for doing so are available, given the sched-
ules that you have set for yourselves in regard to the ratification
process.

Since you asked me to talk about the broader context as well, I
would like to do so very briefly. The military relationship is, of
course, dominant between ourselves and the Soviet Union because
it is so dangerous, because of the pervasive militarization of Soviet
policy, and because of the fact, as has been pointed out, that
military power is the principal asset of the Soviet Union. Its other
attributes turn out to be not nearly so appealing or effective inter-
nationally as was once thought.

I do believe that the Soviet Union has, particularly in recent
years, become more conscious of its needs with respect to the
outside world. This is true in economic matters, in commercial
relations, in financial relations, in technology exchange, and in
other respects.

There are other matters — the environment, nuclear nonprolifera-
tion, the regime of the oceans, various other things — in which the
Soviet Union has found it desirable, perhaps more than some of us
believed some years ago was likely, to participate in the interna-
tional system.

It is my view that on the whole these are desirable trends and
afford us opportunities for conducting policies that increase Soviet
stakes in a more disciplined orderly international system.

I believe we should consciously and deliberately follow policies
that increase the degree to which the Soviet Union needs to rely on
the external world and obeys the disciplines of the international
system from which it seeks benefits. This is not a substitute for
maintaining a balance of usable military forces across the whole
spectrum of military power, because I believe without that we will
find our security constantly in jeopardy, I mean our security broad-
ly construed, because it involves the security of others.

48-250 0-79

It is in that sense that military poHcy and our other poUcies
should form a single whole, and it is therefore that I believe that
SALT as well should be a product of our overall strategy toward
the Soviet Union rather than the other way around.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Sonnenfeldt's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

I am honored to appear before you and to be afforded the opportunity to partici-
pate in the deliberations concerning the Senate's action on the SALT II treaty
completed and signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev at Vienna on June 18,
1979.

When you invited me to testify, Mr. Chairman, you asked that I comment on the
place occupied by the SALT process, and the treaty before you, in the broad context
of U.S.-Soviet relations. This is a complex question, but I welcome the fact that you
have posed it in this way. It is often said that SALT II should be judged on its own
merits. This is hardly a disputable proposition. The issue is how these merits are to
be defined.

In my view, SALT negotiations and possible or actual agreements must be viewed
as part of a broad range of policies and actions designed to protect our interests in a
world where Soviet power has been steadily increasing and Soviet ambitions are
actively asserted. Our purpose must be to see to it that the uses of Soviet power are
restrained and that at any given moment and also over time, Soviet leaders recog-
nize that the risks of assertive and aggrandizing uses of power outweigh the bene-
fits. I believe this to be essential for a positive evolution of our relations with the
Soviet Union.

Arms control, particularly as it may relate to the most destructive weapons, is
frequently seen as having intrinsic value, since the incalculable damage that would
result from nuclear war gives even adversary powers strong mutual incentives to
stabilize military relationships in ways that would make the outbreak of such wars
less likely. Much American arms control theory — and, indeed, of our approach to
the SALT negotiations — has been based on this premise of mutual interest. I believe
this premise to be only partly valid and still to be largely unproven. At any rate,
the slow progress in arms control negotiations, and the modest accomplishments
which they have produced to date, suggest that other factors than a mutual interest
in preventing war are at work as well.

It is for this reason that I have stated what I believe to be our broad purpose in
conducting our policies toward the U.S.S.R. in terms of our own, American, inter-
ests. These interests clearly include the prevention of war and may, in that respect,
overlap to a degree with the interests of the U.S.S.R. But they cannot ignore, and
must centrally incorporate, the protection of our security and well-being in the face
of challenges posed to us and other nations by the emergence of the Soviet Union as
a major military power in the international arena. I see no sign that the impulses
and ambitions which have carried the Soviet Union to the position and status it has
reached to date are subsiding. On the contrary, they remain a central ingredient in
Soviet conduct. Soviet interest in arms control, including SALT, remains subordinat-
ed to them.

It should be observed that since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the subse-
quent establishment of the Soviet state, advocacy of disarmament has been an
important instrument of Soviet policy. In the early years, it was intended as one
means of inhibiting external enemies from acting individually or in concert against
the then still weak and fragile Soviet state. Soviet disarmament policies were
agitational, and designed to mobilize the "masses" against governments. But their
goals were quite concrete in a period when Soviet fears of foreign intervention, even
if objectively exaggerated, were real. It was after all the Bolshevik leadership itself
which had declared the surrounding "bourgeois" world as its enemies and which
had proclaimed itself to be the agent of allegedly inevitable historical processes
which would transform other societies, and the international system as a whole, in
the image of the Bolshevik Revolution. Communist doctrine and the beliefs of its
proponents anticipated that those destined to be superseded would resist by force.
Their preparations and plans, imagined or real, needed to be undermined.

The stress on disarmament remained prominent in Soviet policy after World War
II and continued to serve the quite practical and concrete aim of braking the
defense efforts of nations feeling themselves threatened by Soviet ambition and
pressure. The agitational content and methods of Soviet policy were, if anything,
even greater in the post-War period than in the twenties as countries on the

U.S.S.R.'s periphery reacted to the satellization of Eastern and Southeastern
Europe, Soviet claims to territory elsewhere and the evident commitment of the
Soviet Union to the building of massive military forces.

The decision of the United States to participate in collective security arrange-
ments with nations threatened by potential Soviet expansion, and the reliance of
the United States on atomic weapons as the ultimate sanction against such expan-
sion, made these weapons a special target of Soviet disarmament policy. (In retro-
spect, it is perhaps paradoxical that the United States relying as it did on the
nuclear sanction, also concentrated its disarmament efforts on the control of nucle-
ar weapons. The Soviets, of course, saw these efforts as designed to perpetuate the
United States monopoly.) Meanwhile, the Soviets themselves moved with vigor to
equip themselves with nuclear weaponry and the requisite delivery systems in order
gradually to neutralize the very weapons on which the U.S. and its allies relied to
offset the traditional military power of the U.S.S.R. on the Eurasian landmass.

It was in the Khrushchev era that Soviet leaders began to recognize that agitation
and extravagant disarmament proposals alone would be unlikely to block the de-
fense programs of the West. Consequently, the decade from the mid-fifties to the
mid-sixties saw the beginnings of exchanges at the negotiating table about more
specific measures to limit arms. The Soviets evidently came to see that if binding
limitations on Western programs were to be achieved, they would probably have to
accept some restrictions on their own programs. There developed, too, a hesitant
recognition that in the era of nuclear weapons some kinds of cooperation in reduc-
ing the risks of miscalculation might have merit. Thus, after tortuous negotiations,
agreements such as those on limiting atmospheric testing, on non-proliferation and
on the establishment of the Hot Line proved feasible.

For the Soviets, however, agreements of this kind did not take the place of
military strength. While Khrushchev, like Brezhnev after him, was conscious of the
economic burdens of amassing military power in all its dimensions, the long-term
momentum of Soviet programs did not slacken. Disarmament negotiations — or
"arms control" negotiations as we came increasingly to call them — were an adjunct
of Soviet military policy. This has not changed, even as in subsequent years the
subject matter and scope of negotiations has broadened to include strategic arma-
ments. When limitations have been accepted, the Soviets have generally maintained
vigorous programs within, and up to, the very margins of the limitations. Other
programs not affected by agreements have been pressed to offset restrictions and
prohibitions imposed by agreements.

There has been much debate in the West — and in your hearings — about the
motivations underlying the persistent Soviet commitment to the accumulation of
military power. Stalin's decisions in the mid-forties setting priorities, which in
essence have changed little, might originally well have been due to his determina-
tion to ensure that the Soviet Union would never again suffer the catastrophies of
invasion and occupation and that the Communist regime would never again be
brought to the brink of destruction by external attack. But even if this "defensive"
purpose of Soviet power and expansion was at first dominant in Stalin's time, the
concept of security on which it was based in fact implied that other countries,
particularly those near the Soviet Union, would be under constant pressure from
the weight of Soviet power. As time went on, the Soviet definition of security
became increasingly expansive, in part, no doubt, stimulated by the reactions of
other countries which felt themselves threatened precisely by the broadening Soviet
definition of security.

The Soviets have stressed that what they seek is equality of equal security, that
they are "catching up". But the Soviet view of equality is heavily colored by the
evident conviction that the threats to Soviet security are unending and somehow,
despite its vastly enhanced military strength, always leave the U.S.S.R. in greater
danger than the United States with its surrounding oceans and militarily unthreat-
ening neighbors. The Soviet response is to seek "compensation" through more
military power. Catching up seems to be a permanent process which, in the perspec-
tive of the outside world, looks like a quest for military advantage. Considering
where the momentum of their military programs will carry them in the years to
come, the notion that the Soviets are catching up, even if that is what they
themselves believe, cannot be a source of comfort.

In addition, it has become apparent over the years that the sources of growing
Soviet influence in the world were not to be found in the attractions and achieve-
ments of the Soviet domestic system but largely in the fact that increasingly diverse
and far-ranging military capabilities enabled the U.S.S.R. to become more active in
international politics. Although in the early stages of the decolonization process, the
Soviet Union seemed to offer a source of economic and other support to new nations,
and some of the latter seemed impressed by Communist doctrines and prescriptions,

the Soviet model made little lasting headway. Moreover, the struggles and divisions
within the so-called socialist camp raised serious questions about Moscow's ability to
lead or even shape an international system of diverse nations, peoples and societies.
Whether nearby, in Eastern Europe and Asia, or in remoter regions, it was military
strength that was — and remains — the chief attribute of the Soviet Union's role.

It is hard to know to what extent Soviet leaders and elites acknowledge these
realities to and among themselves. What is clear, however, is that Soviet politics,
especially in periods of maneuver for succession but also in more normal times, are
geared to preserving the priorities that sustain the military underpinnings of Soviet
policies. It is evident also that, in these circumstances, arms control arrangements
can have little intrinsic appeal to the Soviets. Of course, they want to see potential
enemies constrained, particularly the United States with its impressive economic
and technological resources. And they probably wish to have greater certainty in
their economic planning. But they are unlikely to want to see the principal source
of their international influence significantly curtailed.

From the American standpoint, the aspects of the Soviet evolution sketched so far
will seem profoundly pessimistic. They do lead ineluctably to the conclusion that we
cannot in the foreseeable future expect to avoid maintaining strong and diversified
military forces of our own. Arms control arrangements may affect the pace and
character of some military programs, but they are likely to be modest in effect and
are almost certainly unlikely to contribute substantially to the balance we require
for our security. But if we maintain our military strength, and if it is seen and
known to be usable in the numerous contingencies with which we may be confront-
ed, we can still have considerable scope for policies that contribute to restrained and
even constructive relationships with the Soviet Union.

Before turning to this latter aspect of the problem, it is necessary to address,
briefly, the relationship between strategic, or intercontinental, military forces and
those with other roles. For it is by examining this relationship, j)erplexing and
intangible as it may be in some respects, that light can be shed on the oft-repeated
question as to the utility of modern strategic forces.

As already noted, in the early post-War period, the United States relied chiefly on
its monopoly, and then its superiority, in nuclear weapons and their delivery sys-
tems, to deter significant regional Soviet military aggression. Even then, however,
the threat of nuclear retaliation was insufficient to prevent every form of Soviet
pressure against neighboring areas or to contain entirely Soviet instrusions by
means short of direct military actions into various parts of the world.

The Korean War led us to the recognition that we would require conventional
military power to protect our interests in many circumstances; it brought about the
increase in our stationed forces in Europe and the establishment of a number of
military commands within NATO and elsewhere.

In due course, the development of early generations of Soviet long-range nuclear
weapons delivery systems, required our introducing nuclear weapons to buttress our
theater forces in Europe and elsewhere. Questions came to be raised, rightly or
wrongly, whether the United States could be expected to put its own cities in
jeopardy in the event of limited Soviet attacks in central Europe. This, among other
reasons, led the French to develop their own nuclear weapons. The British main-
tained and modernized theirs.

With time, as they acquired more diversified nuclear weapons and means for
their delivery, the Soviets moved to deploy them with their forces in central Europe.
Medium and intermediate range nuclear weapons were targeted in increasing num-
bers against Western Europe. These developments, along with the steady and cumu-
latively impressive improvements in Soviet conventional theater forces, in turn,
obliged our Allies and us to undertake programs to strengthen our own convention-
al forces and to improve reinforcement capabilities. We now also have the urgent
task of modernizing the theater nuclear forces within NATO. And the British and
French are reported weighing modernization options for their respective nuclear
forces in face of improving and increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities for use against
targets in Europe.

NATO has continued to rely on conventional forces, nuclear forces in the theater
and American strategic forces to deter attack. Moreover, it remains NATO doctrine
that the Alliance would, if necessary, initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the
event conventional forces are unable to repel attack. At the same time, whatever
the adequacy of particular conventional, i.e. non-nuclear, capabilities and improve-
ment programs in the European theater, there is widespread agreement that be-
cause of the evolving nuclear balance in all its elements, effective deterrence of non-
nuclear attack requires large and modern non-nuclear forces on our side so that if
deterrence fails we would not be confronted at once with the decision to resort to
nuclear weapons.

Yet, as noted, the security of the Alliance continues to depend on the credibility
of our nuclear posture, both within the European theater and in the form of our
strategic forces. More particularly, it depends on a continued ability of the United
States to control the process of escalation, if that has to be resorted to. It is in this
perhaps esoteric but crucial respect that the most serious questions have been
raised among those concerned with the defense of Europe. They have arisen because
of the concern that at both the theater and intercontinental levels, the ability to
control escalation may be shifting to the Soviet side — that our strategic forces may
be "decoupled" from our and the Allies' other forces.

If NATO's strategy is to continue to have meaning, it is essential that at all levels
of nuclear power we have survivable and flexible forces. And it is for this reason
alone that we must be concerned about the future of each leg of our strategic Triad,
as well as the nuclear forces located in Europe. These concerns have been frequent-
ly voiced in these hearings. They are legitimate concerns.

To be specific: I believe, first, that an effective and credible American commit-
ment to the defense of Europe demands that we act rapidly to equip ourselves with
survivable ICBMs while also proceeding with the modernization of our SLBM and
bomber forces. I believe there should be no shred of doubt not only that the United
States is legally able under SALT to proceed with the MX program, including an
optimal basing mode, but that it is actually doing so. I single out the MX in this
context because questions as to the compatibility of certain of its possible basing
modes with provisions of SALT II have been raised. I believe these doubts need to be
removed by word and deed as promptly as possible. But I wish to stress also the
urgency of proceeding on schedule with the other strategic programs.

A second specific point relates to the European nuclear theater forces. Since
effective deterrence of attack in Europe requires diversified, accurate and modern
nuclear weapons, I believe the United States should at this stage make clear in
word as well as deed, i.e. in the programs Congress authorizes and funds, that it
does not intend to renew the prohibition now contained in the Protocol to SALT II
against deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles beyond 600 km in
range. There are other reasons for taking these actions, e.g. the needs of the navy,
but I consider them especially necessary in the context of European defense and our
Alliance commitments.

Third, I believe that the considerations just mentioned also require us to leave no
doubt whatever that SALT provisions dealing with cruise missiles of whatever type
do not preclude us from undertaking any kind of cooperation, from technology and
other transfers to the coordination of forces, which we and our Allies may judge to
be necessary.

I have dwelled on the relationship between strategic forces and European defense
because it is in that context that the growth of Soviet capabilities has long posed the
most complex problems of strategy and programs for us and our Allies. These
problems will continue and will require constant attention. I see no prospect at the
moment that arms control agreements either on strategic or on theater forces will
alleviate our difficulties. My concern is that they should not make them greater.

But, in addition to the problems of European defense, we must also recognize that
Soviet military deployments and actions can jeopardize our interests elsewhere. The
direct relevance of the strategic force balance to such contingencies is harder to
demonstrate than in the case of European defense. But there can be little doubt
that the strategic balance that exists today and is projected to exist in the years to
come at the very least makes decisions to use American forces more complicated
and hazardous than they were even five or ten years ago. Above all, the changed
and changing strategic balance does require us to give attention to the state of our
naval and long-range intervention forces. It would be a dangerous situation indeed
if the Soviets, under the umbrella of the developing strategic balance, saw increas-
ing opportunities for uncontested uses of their own or proxy military forces.

Soviet arms control propositions bearing on these situations have generally
sought to constrain us more than the U.S.S.R. In some instances, e.g. in connection
with the establishment of facilities for our use on Diego Garcia, the Soviets have
resorted to traditional agitational techniques and political pressures to impede us. It
seems unlikely that arms control arrangements can be looked to for much help in
safeguarding our interests. Not, at least until the Soviets judge the risks of interven-
tion to be sufficiently great to make negotiated restraints that are equitable in their
effects a more attractive alternative for them.

I should like to make some further comments on the Soviet view of the role of
military power because of its bearing on an evaluation of SALT and other arms
control efforts. It is frequently contended that a major difference between the
United States and the Soviet Union is that we tend to see military forces, particu-
larly nuclear forces, as having chiefly a deterrent function whereas the Soviets

intend and actually procure such forces to fight wars. Related to this difference,
there is the further proposition that while we tend on the whole to see nuclear wars
as unwinnable in any meaningful sense, the Soviets regard them as winnable and, if
war were to come, would intend to fight it through to victory. Soviet doctrinal
writings, military exercises and force dispositions suggest that Lenin's adaptations
of Clausewitz remain valid for present Soviet leaders: political goals can still be
pursued in war, indeed must be, even if destruction is unprecedented.

I believe that the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting is not one that
the Soviets make. They, too, wish to deter or avoid war. They give every evidence of
recognizing the catastrophic consequences of nuclear conflict, although they, far
more than we, devote efforts and resources to limiting these consequences. How
confident they are in such efforts, however, is difficult to determine. But the Soviets
do proceed on the premise that war-fighting forces and war-winning doctrines are
the most effective deterrent to attacks against themselves, and the most effective
restraint on an enemy's recourse to military force in a crisis, whatever the origin of
that crisis — precisely because such forces are usable if deterrence fails.

In many crises of the past, the Soviets found themselves deterred from pressing
for major advantages; in some, indeed, they found themselves backing down when
faced with a seemingly credible threat of military action against them. It is this
kind of situation which the Soviets have sought, and continue to seek, to avoid by
their military build-up. One of their purposes in pursuing arms control, including
SALT, is to support this objective, although they place their main reliance on their
own programs rather than on arms control.

While some Americans support what may be called a "deterrence-only" view of
the role of military, particularly nuclear forces, this has not in fact been our
dominant attitude to date. We, too, have sought to procure forces and weapons
systems and to adopt doctrines that enable us to fight if necessary. But we have
continued to have vigorous debates about the wisdom and morality of thinking in
terms of fighting nuclear wars. Ironically perhaps, many of those most critical of
"Strangelovian" war scenarios, have urged us to procure forces which could be used
primarly for the most destructive attacks on population centers. The more vulner-
able our cities (and those of the Soviets), it has in effect been argued, the more
effective the deterrent.

As will be evident from my earlier comments on European defense, I believe that
deterrence increases as the usability of weapons and the credibility of our commit-
ments and doctrines for their use increase. I take this view not because it happens
to be that of the Soviets but because by acting on it we do, in my judgment, have a
more effective deterrent to attacks on our interests and, ultimately, to war, given
the nature and direction of Soviet military programs. I believe that SALT agree-
ments should in their terms and in their effects be compatible with the mainte-
nance of our war-fighting capabilities or else SALT will detract from, rather than
enhance deterrence.

More fundamentally, the time may well have come to review our arms control
doctrines and approaches which now go back more than twenty years and still
dominate our negotiating goals. "Stability", a key concept in arms control, does not
appear to have impressed the Soviets greatly. While many Soviet analysts, especial-
ly in the Institutes with which many of us are familiar, have adopted American
vocabulary, Soviet forces in practice bear no necessary resemblance to stability
criteria.

For example, while the Soviets accepted the ABM treaty, they have continued to
assign major resources to research and development for anti-missile defense. Mos-
cow s ultimate intentions in this field remain unclear. But anti-missile defense,
anathema as it is to stability doctrine, is hardly so to the Soviets. Defense against
aircraft is clearly a high Soviet priority, to the point that the bomber leg of our
Triad must now be drastically modified in order to penetrate to its (second strike)
targets. How long the 25-year old B-52 force will remain an adequate launch
platform in the face of Soviet air defense efforts remains to be seen.

The Soviets have refrained from procuring counter-force weapons. Either the SS-
19 or the SS-18, and certainly portions of both in combination, will threaten the
most reliable and flexible part of our Triad. We are now faced with acquiring less
vulnerable land-based forces and adopting launch-on-warning or launch-under-
attack doctrines. Some analysts believe the time has come to give serious fresh
consideration to defending our land-based forces.

The Soviets have done work on anti-satellite systems which if developed and
deployed could threaten the command, control and communications of our most
numerous and secure retaliatory forces.

Given these developments and some of the responses we plan to make or may yet
have to consider, it seems at least questionable that what should determine our

policy are arms control doctrines (e.g. verifiability in the case of the MX deployment
mode), rather than defense doctrines adapted to the realities of the eighties and
nineties. Whatever the ultimate disposition of the present treaty by the Senate, it is
urgently necessary to ensure that future SALT negotiations, and the purposes and
doctrines that govern them, are the product rather than the determinant of our
defense policy.

Military issues dominate much of our relationship with the Soviet Union but they
are not the only ones involved in it. The Soviets seek influence and associations in
the world to shift the geo-political balance, but in the process they also want to
obtain a variety of other benefits and to meet needs which they cannot fill by
themselves. Indeed, it is one of the characteristics of the present period that the
Soviets have found it necessary and desirable to interact more extensively and
intensively with the outside world than at any time in their history. These interac-
tions remain marked by strong hesitations; the innate autarkic impulses of the
Soviet system remain vigorous and Soviet resistance to external intrusion remains
powerful. Nevertheless, the iron curtain of 30 years ago has become more porous in
both directions. The Soviets are more active, if still reluctant and selective partici-
pants in international institutions, practices and agreements.

Many of these developments result from the shortcomings of the Soviet economy
and its technological backwardness. Some are due to the fact that the Soviet
resource base, while impressive, is no longer fully able, and will become less able, to
meet the growing demands of a maturing economy. With the labor supply tighter
than in the past, increases in production depend heavily on improved productivity.
This, in turn, demands more and better technology. Soviet agriculture continues to
be afflicted by uneven harvests and a seemingly chronic inability to meet the
objective of the leadership to improve the population's diet. The consequent need for
manufactured goods, commodities, technology and capital from the outside world
has increased Soviet hard currency requirements, since exports, though growing,
are inadequate to finance imports. This has led the Soviet Union to engage in more
extensive international financial operations and has made it more sensitive to
foreign fluctuations, interest rates and other commercial and economic trends.

Other concerns which have tended to bring the Soviet Union more actively into
the international arena include such problems as environmental pollution, nuclear
proliferation, exploitation of the resources of the oceans, regulation of airspace, etc.
In all such matters, the Soviet Union is unable to protect its interest unilaterally
and therefore finds it desirable to participate in international arrangements and
institutions.

More closely related to security, the Soviets have viewed the widening contacts
between China and other nations, especially Japan, Western Europe and the U.S.,
with mounting uneasiness. Apart from military measures, calculated to keep China
under threat, Soviet diplomacy also seeks to counteract these developments, which
Moscow interprets as a hostile effort at encirclement. Sometimes, this takes the
form of attractive political and economic overtures; sometimes it involves threats.
Usually, both elements are present. Thus, the Japanese and West Europeans and
the Americans are simultaneously offered the rewards of detente but sternly
warned against military cooperation with China. Elsewhere, the Soviets seek to
offset alleged Chinese-inspired encirclement by efforts of their own to surround
China with Soviet allies. Soviet policies designed to build influence in Third World
areas by military support for and intervention in behalf of, so-called liberation
movements and regimes engaged in "just" wars, are in part intended to pre-empt
China's influence and to acquire allies against it.

The Soviet emergence into the world in search of beneficial economic, political
and security connections makes it important for us to devise and to pursue a
comprehensive strategy aimed at strengthening the incentives for restraint in all
aspects of relations. Put most simply, and perhaps somewhat crudely, we and others
must be clear among ourselves, and make it clear to the Soviets, that assertive uses
of power, and efforts to shift the geo-political balance, are fundamentally incompati-
ble with productive and constructive relations in other respects.

This is not the occasion to discuss in detail how these connections or "linkages"
can and should be established and implemented. What is required in a broad and
conscious attuning of cooperative projects and associations to military relations and
the overall level of tensions and crises.

It is sometimes suggested that in the early seventies, the Administration of that
day somehow deluded itself into believing that economic rewards and agreements on
"rules of conduct", along with SALT I and other arms control agreements, would
ensure moderate Soviet international conduct. This, I believe, is a caricature of
what came to be called "detente".

Among the absolutely essential parts of the comprehensive approach developed in
the early part of this decade were to have been: (1) An effective balance across the
whole range of military power; and (2) the maintenance of high risks, if necessary
by unambiguous demonstration of our readiness and ability to react to militant
behavior. In both these crucial respects, we fell short of what we should have done.
Important defense programs lagged, in part due to Congressional action and, more
recently, also due to curtailments by the Administration. And in several instances
of Soviet intervention, directly and by proxy, we failed to achieve the necessary
consensus at home that our interests were threatened and that this required action
on our part. The element of risk was kept excessively low. (It should be added that
positive incentives for Soviet restraint were not particularly high either. There has,
for example, been little in our trade and other policies to suggest to the Soviets that
a coherent pattern of benefits is to be derived from moderation.)

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we must see our relations with the U.S.S.R. in their
totality. We must recognize that the Soviets are driven by powerful impulses to
amass military strength and, on that basis, to consolidate and expand their status
£is a power with world-wide interests and ambitions. This quest for status is not
limited by a desire to attain "equality" or "parity" but is dynamic and open-handed.
The most effective way for us to deal with this aspect of Soviet reality is to
maintain our own end of the military balance and to make certain that our military
power is known and seen to be usable. Arms control agreements, including the area
of strategic weapons can play a modest role in contributing to military balance; but
they may also make it more difficult to maintain balance. In any event, however,
our own defense programs will remain the principal means by which we maintain
balance and these must, therefore, be our overriding concern.

Military balance and maintaining high risks for predatory actions by the Soviets
provide a basis for pursuing other policies utilizing the Soviet need for, and reluc-
tant but real interest in, beneficial relations with the outside world. We must
establish and pursue in practice more explicit connections between the state of
military and security relations and these other aspects. It is possible that over time
the economic shortcomings of the Soviet system, in part caused by its militarization,
will induce Soviet leaders to practice greater military restraint and to seek more
far-reaching arms control limitations. But this is likely, if at all, only as a result of
sustained policies by us and others which make clear to the Soviets: (1) The futility
of seeking military advantage; (2) the risks of using military power, directly or
indirectly, for aggrandizement; and (3) that there is a direct connection between the
relief and benefits the Soviet Union can expect from the external world on the one
hand, and the manner in which it defines and pursues its interests and uses its
power, on the other.

I believe, in conclusion, that SALT agreements pursued and concluded in isolation
from these considerations, that is, on the basis of narrow technical "merits", are
unhelpful and therefore undesirable. SALT, particularly, because of its at best
marginal effects cannot carry the burden of regulating American-Soviet relations.
The historical record does not bear out the proposition that arms control agree-
ments, SALT included, lead to better, more restrained relations. On the contrary,
the more poorly managed the relationship with the U.S.S.R. the more prolonged and
tortuous the negotiations, and the more likely that whatever results they may
produce will be negated by intensified military programs.

SALT must support what we can fundamentally do only by our unilateral, and
Allied, military programs. This is the military test that must be applied to the
SALT process and the present treaty.

Completion of the ratification process for this treaty, in my view, requires that
there should be precise answers to the questions that have been raised concerning
the impact of particular SALT provisions on needed American programs and on
various existing and future forms of cooperation with Allies. In addition, it is
essential that Congressional action this year — before final disposition of the treaty—
firmly establish these programs in our defense budget and force planning. It is not
too late to act on the premise that SALT is a function of security policy, rather than
the other way around.

Finally, within the context of our defense policies, SALT should be an integral
part of a wider strategy encompassing all pheises of relations with the U.S.S.R. and
designed to constrain the militant and aggrandizing aspects of Soviet conduct while
maximizing stakes in more disciplined and beneficial relationships with us and in
the world at large.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, for an
excellent presentation.

Our final witness this morning is a scholar who has also played
an important role in our public debate over the nature of the
Soviet challenge and the form of America's response to it. Prof.
Richard Pipes of Harvard University is one of many very distin-
guished Cambridge sages who have found willing students on the
banks of the Potomac as well as the Charles. As a researcher, he is
intimately acquainted with Russia under the old regirne. As a
policy advisor, he has been nominated by a New York Times col-
umnist for a high post in Washington's next Republican regime. In
fact, his advice was already sought by the CIA when it looked for
authorities on Soviet affairs to pit against its own analysts, by the
Committee on the Present Danger when its executive committee
sought authoritative academic advocates of its views.

Professor Pipes, I do not know what your prospects are for be-
coming a permanent Washingtonian, but in any case we are happy
to receive you this morning in these hearings, and I invite you now
to make your presentation, and then we will go to questions.

Senator Javits. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. May I just apologize
to both witnesses? I must leave promptly at 12:30, but I hope to
hear all of Mr. Pipe's opening statement.

STATEMENT OF PROF. RICHARD PIPES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. Pipes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the purpose of my
testimony is to explain Soviet attitudes toward nuclear weapons,
toward the prospect of nuclear war, and towards the arms limita-
tion process. I will address myself obliquely to several critical
questions which have loomed behind these hearings from the
outset: for example, why do the Russians insist on the right to the
exclusive possession of modern heavy missiles? Why do they
demand the protocol and the noncircumvention clause? In other
words, why do they make so much of all those things which we are
told by the advocates of SALT II have no military value, and if
conceded will not in the least affect U.S. security? In dealing with
my subject, I shall draw on Soviet military literature and what we
know of Soviet strategic deployments, reinforcing both sources of
information with references to Soviet history and politics. It clearly
is essential to try to understand Soviet behavior in terms of Soviet
traditions, values and aspirations, which unfortunately is not
always done by the treaty's more zealous advocates.

The Soviet regime has from its inception placed great reliance on
military instrumentalities both to insure its internal security and
to pursue its external goals. Russia is an inherently poor country,
and the Communist system, by depriving the population of mean-
ingful incentives, guarantees that it remains poor. At the same
time, however, the Communist system, which places the country's
entire human and economic resources in the hands of a self-perpet-
uating elite of rulers is excellently suited for purposes of military
mobilization. Such power as the Soviet Union enjoys in the world
today is due almost exclusively to its military might.

In a world from which all weapons would be banned, the Soviet
Union would at once become a second-rate power, since it possesses
neither the civilization nor the material wealth that would qualify

it as a superpower. Contrary to some of the sentiments expressed
in the debate over SALT II, there is no contradiction between
Soviet Russia's low-living standards and her willingness to commit
immense funds for armaments. The Soviet military drive is in fact
a natural corollary of endemic poverty. These economic factors
making for militarism are reinforced by an ideology which views
the modern age as a time of a life or death struggle between
capitalism and socialism. Militarism is the very essence of the
Communist mentality. It has aptly been said that Lenin put
Clausewitz on his head by transforming politics into the pursuit of
war by other means.

When nuclear weapons first made their appearance, the Soviet
Government found itself in a quandary. It realized their potential
importance early enough. As we now know, Stalin had a research
program to construct atomic weapons under way at the very out-
break of World War II, but the United States forged ahead and
hence for some time a tendency prevailed in the Soviet Union to
denigrate the effectiveness of these new weapons. Immediately
after Stalin's death, a keen debate developed in Russia on the
subject in which the professional military played a key role. The
conclusion reached some time in the late 1950's and signaled by the
establishment of the Strategic Rocket Forces as a separate, fourth
branch of the armed services, was that nuclear weapons have
indeed become the decisive weapons of modern warfare— the very
opposite conclusion from the one reached more or less concurrently
by America's civilian strategists.

Soviet nuclear strategy as well as the political strategy that
accompanies it is internally consistent and intellectually impres-
sive — at any rate to anyone who is not "a priori" convinced that
the Russian military have nothing to teach us. It rests on several
related propositions.

One, the introduction of nuclear weapons with intercontinental
delivery vehicles has revolutionized warfare in the sense that
henceforth the ultimate objective of all war, which is to incapaci-
tate the enemy's military forces, can be attained directly and im-
mediately rather than gradually by means of many separate oper-
ations.

Two, within that context, the traditional principles of the science
of war remain fully intact. The advantages of preemption, of supe-
rior quantity and quality, of good defenses, et cetera, are as valid
in the age of hydrogen bombs as they had been in that of gunpow-
der.

Three, even under the most auspicious circumstances, however,
nuclear weapons cause such widespread destruction that great
power conflict which may lead to nuclear war ought to be avoided
to the maximum extent possible: In the nuclear age the struggle
with capitalism must of necessity assume indirect forms such as
flanking movements, proxy wars, seizure of energy resources, and
all the other forms which are subsumed under the general title of
detente.

Four, it is nevertheless possible that detente may fail, and an all-
out war with the United States break out, either as the result of a
local crisis getting out of control or the United States, isolated and
driven against the wall, lashing out in a Samson-like act of univer-

sal destruction; this contingency calls for the ability to deliver a
quick surgical preemptive strike designed to eliminate as much of
the enemy's nuclear arsenal as possible and thereby to reduce to
the utmost his ability to inflict damage.

It is sometimes said that the Soviet war-winning strategy is
irrational, and need not be taken seriously in view of the indisput-
able fact that a Soviet first strike against the United States would
surely invite a devastating counterattack on Soviet cities and in-
dustrial centers. To say that, however, is to assume that a Soviet
first strike would come about as the result of a coldblooded calcula-
tion. Such an out of the blue assault is not part of Soviet doctrine,
and no responsible specialist considers it likely. A Soviet decision
to preempt would come under conditions of extreme crisis, after
the Soviet leadership had concluded that general war has become
unavoidable. It would not be an act of bold adventurism, but of
desperation; its aim would be to minimize inevitable casualties and
losses. It must be realized that inasmuch as fractionalization of
nuclear warheads allows one missile to destroy several enemy nu-
clear systems, under conditions of modern war preemption today is
even more attractive militarily than it has been in the past.

The Soviet strategic buildup must be understood in the light of
these premises and expectations. The Soviet Union has never
adopted our doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction; nor has it
ever been content with parity or essential equivalence. These are
concepts of people who do not believe in the military and political
utility of nuclear weapons. Once it has made up its mind on this
issue, the Soviet Union has consistently striven to attain over-
whelming strategic superiority that would make allowance for all
kinds of unforeseen contingencies as well as for the prospect, which
it takes seriously, of a protracted nuclear conflict.

In these calculations, SALT is assigned a role of some promi-
nence, not as a vehicle for general disarmament, as it is with us,
but as a device which inhibits U.S. responses to Soviet long-term
strategic programs.

One, on the most elementary level, SALT fixes the number of
American systems and therefore facilitates the task of estimating
what is required to render them harmless in the event of war
under conditions which I have outlined.

Two, on a higher level, it alleviates in some degree Russia's
recurrent nightmare lest an American technological break-
through — such as the ABM and the cruise missile — suddenly nulli-
fy the rather ponderous and incremental Soviet buildup. In this
sense, the acronym SALT can properly be deciphered to read,
"Stop the American Lead in Technology."

Three, last but not least, SALT creates in the United States a
political atmosphere that is not conducive to defense expenditures.
It persuades much of the public that any improvements in strategic
forces are destabilizing and at the same time inhibits the U.S.
Government from funding weapons programs which may be limited
or even prohibited by future arms limitation treaties.

All these features of SALT are inherently so beneficial to the
Soviet Union that it understandably likes to depict SALT as the
lynchpin of detente, as it depicts detente as the only alternative to
nuclear holocaust. It is not so apparent why an American adminis-

tration would adopt this point of view unless it believes that SALT
can be translated into domestic political benefits at a minimum
military risk.

To conclude, let me address myself to the question of what is
likely to happen should SALT II, for whatever reason, not come
into force.

There is no cause to believe that the Senate's assertion of its
constitutional prerogative to amend or reject this treaty outright
will result in any of the harrowing scenarios with which we are
being regaled. The inability of the great powers to agree on the
terms of a treaty resolving the differences does not in and of itself
cause the relationship to deteriorate. For the latter to occur, there
must be other, more positive reasons driving them towards hostil-
ity. The Soviet leadership has entered into SALT negotiations not
in order to maintain a favorable climate of United States-Soviet
relations, for had it desired the latter it would not have dispatched
military advisors and mercenaries to the four corners of the world
following the signature of SALT I.

It has entered into these negotiations in the hope of securing the
distinct military and political advantages enumerated above.
Should SALT II fail, the Russians would promptly write it off as a
bad investment, and try to secure the same results by other means,
if necessary, by a more equitable SALT. Their military programs,
already operating at peak capacity, are not likely to be accelerated
in any significant way as a result.

There is something very dubious about the proposition, advanced
by both the United States and Soviet administrations that we
either ratify this treaty as written and advance along the royal
road toward peace, or else risk growing enmity and war. Such
doomsday scenarios are not only unrealistic, they place in doubt
the very basis of the proposed accord, and I am speaking here as a
historian.

The viability of international treaties ultimately depends on a
combination of self-interest and good will of the signatories. Either
such self-interest and good will exist in respect to SALT II, in
which case the parties ought to be willing to negotiate and renego-
tiate its terms until they arrive at a generally acceptable agree-
ment; or else these qualities are lacking, in which case the treaty
will not hold in any event and ought to be rejected. Realistically
speaking, no treaty can be said to advance the cause of peace if its
sole alternative is hostility and all-out war. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Professor Pipes.

I will try to keep my questions brief because of the hour.

You make a point in your statement about Soviet activity in the
Third World as proving Russian disinterest in the maintenance of
a favorable climate between the United States and themselves.
That puzzles me. I have not heard any spokesman for the treaty,
for the administration or any advocate outside the administration
who has spoken for the treaty claim that the Soviets were acting or
were likely to act out of an interest in good will.

In other words, that strikes me as falling outside the scope of the
arguments that have been made for or against the treaty.

Mr. Pipes. The argument which is made in favor of the treaty by
most of its advocates runs roughly as follows: "Certainly, this is not
a perfect treaty. There are many things wrong with it, but it is the
lynchpin of detente, and detente is quintessential to gradual im-
provement in American-Soviet relations. Therefore, we ought to
ratify this treaty, which does not inhibit our matching the Soviet
buildup, for the purpose of maintaining the process of arms limita-
tions, or, if you will, the dialog between us and the Soviet Union."
They lay great emphasis on the importance of SALT in the devel-
opment of general American-Soviet relations.

I, on the other hand argue that the Soviet Union does not look at
it in this long-term political way. Rather, it looks at SALT as
essentially a military treaty, inhibiting American military develop-
ment, and it will go on doing what they are doing in the rest of the
world because it is in this sense that they define detente.

Tlfie Chairman. In my experience, I have never attended lengthy
or extensive hearings on this committee having to do with a so-
called arms control agreement that involved such a vigorous pres-
entation for a much larger American arms budget. Nearly every-
body has come here to say yes, SALT, in the context of a bigger
arms budget, yes, SALT, because it helps to improve American
prospects for doing what it should do militarily.

Maybe this is a beginning of an American consensus that links
these two things together, and it will only strengthen our resolve
to make certain that our military is sufficiently strong. You would
at least acknowledge the possibility that your political judgment in
that respect might not be infallible.

Mr. Pipes. In respect to what?

The Chairman. With respect to the fact that the Senate's ratifi-
cation of the treaty would undermine America's resolve to main-
tain an adequate defense budget.

Mr. Pipes. I do not say that. I say that this is a Soviet expecta-
tion.

The Chairman. Do you share that expectation?

Mr. Pipes. I would say if you look at the experience of SALT I,
yes, they have a point. I think these hearings to some extent will
overcome this danger, but the hearings on SALT I, which were to
some extent perfunctory had led to this consequence. It has been
very difficult for U.S. administrations to fund strategic progranis
even psychologically because SALT I created the impression in this
country that we have attained stability and therefore anything we
would do would be destabilizing.

Now, what I say here is: This is how they view the matter. This
expectation is an added bonus for them in the SALT agreement.

The Chairman. Well, I can assure you that none of the testimo-
ny that we have received even by the most spirited proponents of
the treaty have suggested that our ratification of the treaty \yill
place us on the royal road to peace, as you say, or that its rejection
would result in growing enmity and war, as you say.

Now, those may be the ultimate choices for this generation, and
should that happen, should nuclear war happen, I think that those
who survive will look back on the occasion and curse all of us for
having failed to take the necessary steps to prevent it.

I do not regard SALT as a very daring step in the direction of
reduced nuclear arms. The question I would put to you is about the
process itself, whether it is another step in the process that could
lead to some meaningful reductions in the future.

You have heard Ambassador Toon say he thought it would keep
alive the hope. What do you think?

Mr. Pipes. I see no reason to think so. I think you will agree,
Senator Church, that this is not an arms limitation treaty, really. I
listened on television to most of the testimony of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, and it is very clear to us that
upon the expiration of the treaty both parties will have more
warheads and strategic weapons in general than they have right
now.

Now, one can argue that without the treaty there would be even
more of a strategic buildup. That is an argument that I do not
quite buy, but I think one can argue that way. That argument
carried some weight when the Interim Agreement was signed.
Then it was said that by the time we got to SALT II we would have
real cutbacks. Well, they have not occurred. Now we are told these
will happen in SALT III. I worry that this will not be the case
either because when SALT III will be negotiated, we will be in a
position of such vast inferiority in almost all respects except num-
bers of warheads, which I do not think have much meaning, that
we will have to take the best bargain we can — and if SALT II will
produce arms limitation, it will be largely on our side again.

The Chairman. Mr. Sonnenfeldt, let me ask you a question that
occurred to me during your testimony. You said that there was
some connection between SALT and what we might do. You men-
tioned the M-X, and said, the fact that we must build it in a
verifiable mode illustrates the connection. Well, wouldn't we want
to build it in a verifiable mode anyway, because of the element of
instability that would be injected into the nuclear arms balance if
we began to hide weapons?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. Senator Church, I think the irony, even from
an arms control standpoint, is that a mobile missile makes for
stability and it is a matter of relative inconsequence whether we
can see it and count it.

The Chairman. Why?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. Because the missiles, that is, the launchers
themselves by their mobility are invulnerable, and therefore the
capacity that a large mobile missile force might provide for a
disarming counterforce strike against another mobile force is very
limited.

Of course, the problem that we have and will have for a long
time ahead is that there would be a mixed force of mobile and
fixed missiles. But from a purely arms control standpoint we would
both be better off if our missiles were mobile and we would be far
less sensitive to whether our count may be wrong by 10 or 12 or 15
or 20.

The Chairman. Yes; but certainly numbers are the other part of
the equation, and if we had no way of knowing whether the Rus-
sians had 10 mobile missiles or 1,000, we would feel ourselves in a
highly precarious position, would we not?

Mr. SoNNENFELDT. Certainly as long as we rely as much as we do
on our fixed Minuteman force, which, though small in comparison
to Soviet fixed forces, is our most reliable and most flexible force,
this is a problem. But I have another concern. Senator Church. It is
that I think it may prove to be the case that by having to have the
verifiability criterion for the M-X basing mode, we will in fact be
driven to other basing modes that will be open to serious question
in regard to cost, environmental considerations, and so on.

I am therefore not as persuaded as perhaps some others that the
issue of the M-X is a settled issue. The fact that verifiability is one
of the principal criteria to which we must now adhere in regard to
M-X deployment complicates that problem, and is one of the rea-
sons why I have testified to you that it is one of the issues I would
like to see settled before one can— I don't want to give you advice,
but before I personally would want to see any definitive action
taken in disposition of this treaty.

QUESTION OF CRUISE MISSILE AND ALLIED COOPERATION

The Chairman. You also mentioned the cruise missile question
and the question of our cooperation with allies. Do you see these as
preconditions for ratification of the treaty?

Mr. SoNNENFELDT. I would like to see the ground-launched and
sea-launched cruise missiles properly funded to the extent that
authorizations can and must be gotten this year. I would like to see
us firmly committed the procurement of those weapons systems. In
short, I do not believe it is sufficient to contend, which is almost a
tautology under our law, that the protocol cannot be extended
without further action by two-thirds of the Senate.

I would like to know as clearly as one can, barely 2 years before
the lapse of the protocol, that it is not in fact the intention of
anyone to seek the extension of the protocol, that there is not in
fact any intention under foreseeable circumstances to curtail these
programs. I happened to listen to some testimony before this com-
mittee some days ago in which one of the administration witnesses
suggested that of course we ought to retain our options because it
is conceivable that the Soviets may make an offer we cannot resist,
such as offering to throw away all of their land-based ICBM's.

Now, I know this witness acknowledged he was giving an exam-
ple of an absurd proposition, but one man's absurdity may be
another man's intriguing possibility. These programs are essential
to a viable NATO European defense strategy and I would like to
see any question removed regarding the possibility that that part
of the protocol, or restrictions in some other form, would continue
in effect.

Moreover, were the protocol restrictions in some way to continue
in effect, the administration's negotiated statement— of June 29,
1979— with the allies concerning nontransfer would also come into
play, because we would then have a prohibited weapon and the
transfer situation with respect to prohibited weapons is quite dif-
ferent from the transfer situation with respect to limited weapons.

The Chairman. My time is up. Senator Javits has asked me to
put one question to our witnesses on his time. His question is
whether you would vote — if you were a Senator — for or against
ratification on the SALT Treaty.

Mr. SoNNENFELX)T. If I were to vote today, which fortunately you
gentlemen do not have to do, I would have the greatest hesitation
in voting for it. I am hoping that this process — and I am sorry to
use the word "process," which is the most overworked word at both
ends of town these days — but I would hope that this process that
you and the other committees are going through would make this a
ratifiable treaty.

I have raised a couple of issues about which I feel very strongly,
and I may say if to clarify them means having to go back to the
Soviets, although I have an open mind on that, I would be prepared
to see us do so. I would like to be able to support this treaty. I
could not do it today, but I would hope that perhaps by October or
November, when and if the issues have been clarified, and the
budget in all its aspects passed through the Congress, and the
defense programs put on course, I would like then to be able to be
in a position to vote for this treaty were I to be a Senator, which I
am not.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt. I think you can
thank your lucky stars for that. [General laughter.]

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry, I
have no questions to address directly to you. Dr. Sonnenfeldt. I
have to worry about the small farmer, among other things, and
was unable to be here through your presentation and did not have
a chance to hear it.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. He makes the world go around, Senator. I
think you did the right thing.

Senator Hayakawa. However, I am very glad I got here in time
to hear Dr. Pipes, whose testimony I find extraordinarily persua-
sive. Let me see if I understand you correctly. Did you say that on
the whole, we as Americans tend to think that other peoples in the
world, whether in Asia or Europe, are sort of like ourselves, under-
standably so in our terms, human, but you are saying Soviet soci-
ety is essentially profoundly different, and it is run, as you say, in
a country in which the entire human and economic resources are
in the hands of a self-perpetuating elite, and whatever the wish of
the common people, its ultimate aim is military modernization of
the whole society, and the aim of the whole society is warlike.

Is that your statement?

Mr. Pipes. That is correct. We have special difficulty allowing for
the Russians to be different from us. We have not so much difficul-
ty with people who are racially very distinct. Nobody will ap-
proach, say, an African tribesman with the notion that he is just a
backward American.

When we are dealing with the Russians, we have a special prob-
lem, because they are of the same race, they have much of the
same cultural background, a Christian background, and they speak
a language that belongs to the Indo-European family. Therefore, it
is very difficult for us to see the fundamental differences dividing
their history and civilization from our own.

As a Russian historian, I have to battle against the tendency of
people to blur these differences all the time, because that is the
easy thing to do.

Senator Hayakawa. That, I think, is what gives your testimony
its particular force and persuasiveness. Dr. Pipes. I am very, very
glad that I got here in time to hear you. There are some ancillary
questions that were raised in my mind. How do you explain then
our allies and their desire to see us ratify the SALT Treaty?

According to reports we have received, they are unanimous in
wishing us to ratify it. Are they in fact actually that unanimous?

Mr. Pipes. I think this question can be answered in several ways.
I think what they say publicly and what they say privately is not
quite the same thing. What they say publicly, at least those who
are now in office, is, I believe, due to two kinds of considerations.
One is direct pressures from the Carter administration. It is very
difficult for a European leader whose security, after all, ultimately
depends on the American deterrent, to come out and say, no; "the
American administration is making a bad deal." He really would
find that extremely difficult to say even if he believed in it.

Second, I think there is a belief in Europe that SALT — I think it
is a false belief, but nevertheless it exists — that SALT would lead
to a decrease in expenditures on strategic weapons and that the
money saved in this fashion would go for beefing up conventional
forces in Europe.

I think both of these factors play a role, but I also think if you
talk to Europeans privately you will find many more doubts than
they are willing to express publicly.

Senator Hayakawa. Do you think if the treaty were signed we
would beef up our forces in Europe, our conventional forces in
Europe?

Mr. Pipes. First of all, I do not believe that this treaty is going to
lead to a great saving of money. Second, even if it should lead to it,
I don't quite believe that there will be direct transfer of the funds
of beefing up NATO forces.

Senator Hayakawa. One of my concerns with the treaty. Dr.
Pipes, is whether or not it would act as a kind of tranquilizer to
our public, so that we would relax our efforts to maintain our
defense posture.

Mr. Pipes. Yes. Senator Church questioned me on this. I think
the experience of SALT I suggests that the Russian expectation of
it acting as a tranquilizer is to some extent justified. I do feel,
however, that the present debates to the extent that they are
nationally followed, will have a sobering effect, because there are
two messages getting across to the people at large: "It is not a good
treaty. You can't trust these Russians, and maybe there ought to
be amendments, maybe it ought to be rejected. But no matter what
we do, we have to beef up our defense forces." On the second
proposition, I think there is a broad consensus across the country.

From that point of view, these debates are fulfilling a useful
educational function.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very, very much. Dr. Pipes.

Senator Biden [presiding]. Dr. Pipes, I have several questions.

You indicated in a rather bold statement that we will be inferior
in all aspects except warheads. Tell me, will we be inferior in
terms of launchers?

48-250 0-79

Mr. Pipes. We are inferior right now because the figures of
launchers from the Interim Agreement to the present have always
been higher in favor of the Russians.

Senator Biden. But the passage of SALT requires that there be
the same number of launchers. Now, how will we be inferior?

Mr. Pipes. You measure missiles or launchers not only in num-
bers but also in throw-weight.

Senator Biden. No, you don't. I don't know anybody who does
measure it that way. Let's talk about how it is measured. Let's talk
about warheads, launchers, megatonnage, and accuracy. What
other elements of the strategic mix are there that determine
whether or not there is parity? Tell me one other one.

Mr. Pipes. Senator, you know very well there are very many,
including throw-weight.

Senator Biden. I said accuracy, megatonnage, warheads, and
launchers. What else is there?

Mr. Pipes. How will you guarantee equal accuracy? How can you
do that?

Senator Biden. By our verification capability.

Mr. Pipes. But there are no limits placed on accuracy improve-
ments.

Senator Biden. But we know what they have.

Mr. Pipes. That is correct, but you know very well that ICBM's
are far more accurate than SLBM's.

Senator Biden. But we also know very well that the cruise
missile is more accurate than the ICBM.

We also know that our ICBM's are more accurate than their
ICBM's.

Mr. Pipes. I understand this. Senator, but there are very many,
as you know, criteria by which you judge.

Senator Biden. I do not know anyone in the strategic community
who has suggested through weeks of hearings that now, in the near
future, or in the long-term future the Soviets will equal or surpass
our accuracy. Do you know of any?

Mr. Pipes. I am not saying that. Senator.

Senator Biden. What are you saying?

Mr. Pipes. I am saying, if you take throw-weight as your basic
factor, throw-weight which allows you to put on your missiles
larger warheads, with greater yields and if you then catch up in
accuracy, which is not controlled and is uncontrollable, you then
are getting much greater destructive capacity, with the same
number of launchers and warheads.

Senator Biden. But isn't it true that in the treaty, for the first
time we control fractionation? Isn't throw-weight and launch-
weight a future argument? Isn't it only relevant as it relates to the
number of RV's that are placed on the head of that post-boost
vehicle?

Mr. Pipes. We are controlling through this treaty the number of
warheads which either party can put on its missiles. That is cor-
rect, and that is, as far as I can see, the only positive achievement
of this treaty, assuming it can be verified. I see no others, but I
grant that this is a certain plus.

You are questioning my statement that the Soviet Union will be
superior by 1985. It will be superior because it will have an equal

number of missiles with a higher throw-weight and an accuracy
approaching ours. If you know the relationship between accuracy,
yield, and destructiveness, you know what this means.

Senator Biden. But the fact of the matter, though, is, isn't that
countered by the number of warheads?

Mr. Pipes. We shall have equal numbers of warheads of different
jdelds. They shall have larger warheads with equal accuracy or, in
some ways better overall accuracy, because ICBM's — which consti-
tute the bulk of their forces — by their very nature are more accu-
rate than SLBM's — which predominate in our forces.

Senator Biden. But they do not have superior accuracy. There is
no evidence that they do have. They don't even have equal
accuracy.

Mr. Pipes. They are approaching it very rapidly.

Senator Biden. They do not have equal accuracy.

Mr. Pipes. I beg to differ with you. Senator.

Senator Biden. Let me ask you, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, you suggested
that on the protocol we should be more definite about not extend-
ing it. My experience after several weeks of sitting here listening
to the testimony is that the Secretary of Defense of the United
States has indicated that there is no intention to extend the proto-
col, and that we have had in the negotiating documents our asser-
tion that we have no intention of extending the protocol.

Public statements by administration witnesses and others have
declared that we will not extend the protocol, and in fact we are
moving rapidly forward to be able to deploy the very thing that is
precluded in the protocol.

Now, I wonder what else we can do other than never having
agreed to the protocol in the first instance?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. That would have been helpful. I am glad that
you are as certain, Senator, of these matters as you are. I do think,
however, that we need an affirmative and binding commitment.
We need to buttress such a commitment by what we do in appro-
priations and authorizations, and also by what we are doing in
regard to the basing and launching modes, particularly of the
ground-launched cruise missile.

Senator Biden. Now we are talking about something beyond the
protocol.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. We are talking about a commitment to a
program, so that when the date of December 1981 approaches — and
that is just 2 years away, more or less, by the time the treaty is
ratified, if you ratify it — we will have ongoing programs which it
will not be argued are so modest at that point that we are giving
up nothing in exchange for something that may be offered us from
the other side, or in response to some threat that may be made by
the other side, for example, that with the lapse of the protocol, the
Soviets will go into a major and rapid mobile missile program
apart from the SS-16.

In other words, we must be in a position by the time this protocol
ends not to be either tempted or threatened by what the other side
may propose to cut our losses or to curtail programs to which we
are not yet fully committed at that time.

Senator Biden. You mentioned nontransferability of technology.

Mr. Pipes. Senator Biden, may I just add a footnote to this,
please?

Senator Biden. You can after I ask my questions. I have only 2
minutes left. You have all the time in the world, so you can beat
the system by continuing to talk, and I can't.

With regard to your statement, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, about nontrans-
ferability, my understanding was that was the language that the
Soviets sought. We rejected that and put in noncircumvention and
have subsequently defined noncircumvention as not in any way
precluding our transfer of any technology to our allies.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. Excuse me, Senator. The phrase is "not neces-
sarily" on page 2 of the June 29, 1979, statement. That is a little
different from what you have just said.

Now, I do not want to raise questions on the relationship with
the allies in a session such as this.

Senator Biden. Why not?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. Because I happen to have devoted my life in
Government to NATO and the building of our alliance relation-
ships, and I do not want to sit here to question what administra-
tion witnesses have said concerning their intentions in regard to
case-by-case decisions on cooperation with allies. But I do think it
is important that in some way this issue be resolved very clearly.

Senator Biden. How would you suggest?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. I would refer you to the sentence in the
statement at the North Atlantic Council which is in the record
here and which, I take it, some people suggest ought to be part of
the treaty.

With respect to systems numerically limited in the agreement,
which I presume affects these, transfers would not be necessarily
precluded by the agreement.

Senator Biden. Does that not merely mean that we are main-
taining the option as to whether or not we transfer? In a given
case, we may not wish to transfer technology irrespective of what
the Soviet position is.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. I completely agree that we should have a
policy of our own with respect to the issue of transfers, but what I
am concerned about is that there not be a shred of prior commit-
ment to the Soviets on that matter. Incidentally, it is not just
transfer of technology but the whole question of how these forces
are coordinated within the alliance, and the extent of assistance to
or cooperation with the British or an independent British force, be
it of ALCM's or of SLCM's. I think it is absolutely essential that
the whole range of cooperation from technology all the way to close
coordination, joint targeting, and so on, be in no way inhibited by
commitments we may have made to the Soviets.

For other reasons, we, or they on the European side may decide
to go some different way. That is another matter, but I do not
believe that we should have prior commitments or even the possi-
bility of a commitment to the Soviets in regard to these matters.

Senator Biden [presiding]. I fully agree, but my time is up.

Senator Lugar?

Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I suppose one of the frustrations that those of us on
the committee who are less than enthusiastic about the treaty face

is the major suppositions about the Soviet Union and their history,
both recent and past.

It seems to me that both of you have focused on this in a way
that is very important. For example, Mr. Sonnenfeldt has men-
tioned that the Soviets, whatever might be our desire for stabiUty,
have not shared that fear of destabilization. Mr. Sonnenfeldt, you
mentioned as I recall, the continued work on the SS-19 and the
SS-18, clearly large counterforce weapons, and work on anti-satel-
lite systems, the so-called killer satellite project, which are clearly
destabilizing.

The fact is, work continues there, and work on antimissile de-
fense systems continues. I have tried to question witnesses and
point out that I do not think the B-52 is a very certain leg as the
second leg of our Triad, and we keep getting insistence that 75
percent are going to go back and forth in Soviet airspace with
relative impunity, which in my judgment is incredible.

The point you are making is that the Soviets, whatever may be
their general posture, have not been that concerned about destabi-
lization. As a matter of fact, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, you contend that
whereas we take a look at the situation as a force that has deter-
rence, you say that the Soviets in fact are prepared to actually
procure such forces to fight wars, and there is the further proposi-
tion that while we tend on the whole to see nuclear wars as
unwinnable in any meaningful sense, the Soviets regard them as
winnable. If war were to come, they would intend to fight it
through to victory.

Now, this is a critical point. Again and again, various Senators
or various witnesses start out by saying nuclear war is unthink-
able, it is unwinnable. We do not know what the word "advantage"
would mean. All of that sort of testimony has floated through.

Now, do you mean what you say here? Are you saying that the
Soviets regard nuclear war as winnable, and furthermore, that
they are prepared to fight and win? They would prefer not to fight
a war, mind you, but they are prepared to be expansive and domi-
nant, and if anybody finally contests their world view they will
fight wars if certain inconveniences occur.

Would you comment again on that?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt. You have described my view of the matter
accurately; maybe more cogently and consequently slightly more
categorically than I did, but I think in essence I agree with it. But I
think that the answer to that proposition is to prove the invalidity,
to demonstrate the invalidity of these Soviet views. This is why I
harped again and again in this testimony and elsewhere on the
necessity to keep the risks high for Soviet assertive behavior, not
only in the military realm, but in the political realm. Incidentally,
there was an earlier colloquy in response to a question from you,
Senator Lugar, as to whether the Soviets are likely to take greater
risks in the next generation because of their military growth. I
think the danger is not so much that they see themselves taking
greater risks, but rather that a particular course of action strikes
them as not carrying great risks because of the way they calculate
the balance.

Consequently, I think it is essential and absolutely vital to our
well-being, but also vital to any kind of effective policy toward the

Soviet Union, that the risks are kept high and that the Soviets
recognize at all times that the risks are high. I would say one of
the criteria by which an arms control agreement should be
judged — and I think arms control agreements can have some effect
on the pace with which these things develop and their predictabil-
ity, and therefore I think we ought to pursue them, but I think one
of the criteria that has to be used in judging them is, do they help
us keep the risks high?

Senator Lugar. Right.

Now, if we are really antiwar, antinuclear war, indeed, anti any
kind of war, your testimony is that you must keep the risks high so
that our credibility is there. Now, along comes Dr. Pipes, and he
points out three things that this particular SALT Treaty does. On
the elementary level, SALT fixes the number of American systems
and therefore facilitates the task of estimating what is required to
render them harmless; namely, the targets are there, and we are
determined that they be totally verifiable. We are determined even
though it may compromise the security of our system that the
Soviets can count, target, and know precisely what they need to do
to destroy each of our sites.

That is hardly an escalation of the risk for the Soviets.

Second, it alleviates in some manner Russia's recurrent night-
mare lest an American technological breakthrough such as the
ABM or cruise missile suddenly nullifies their gains once again.
This treaty has removed the possibility for such a breakthrough.
Indeed, there are some in this committee and in this Senate that
would say that was destabilizing, to even proceed in such a fashion.

Third, last but not least, SALT creates in the United States a
political atmosphere that is not conducive to defense expenditures,
and persuades much of the public that any improvements in strate-
gic forces are destabilizing, and at the same time inhibits the
United States from funding programs which may be limited or
even prohibited by future arms limitation treaties. In short, I agree
with you.

You have pointed out, both of you, good reasons why we may
never build the M-X, and you are right. Why, in fact, we may
extend the protocol forever, and you are right. This is the dilemma
that I think we are in as we take a look at this.

Mr. SoNNENFELDT. If I may say so. Senator, since it is a dilemma,
there are two horns, and we do not necessarily have to be impaled
on both of them.

First of all, to be able to count a weapon does not necessarily
mean that you can target it. What concerns us, of course, about the
land-based missile force as it is now constituted, is that it is both
countable and targetable and with a high probability in the next
few years of a substantial kill ratio. The submarines can be count-
ed because you can see them come out of the building sheds and so
on, but it is much more difficult to target them at present.

My main concern about the submarines for the time being has to
do with their command, communications and control. Aircraft can
be counted, but you can alert them and you can keep them in the
air and so on, so I think we have to be a little careful not to
exaggerate, at least for the moment, this problem of counting and
targeting.

What I was saying about the M-X is that the need to allow them
to be counted greatly complicates our decisions on basing and may
also make them more expensive. Consequently it may make our
decisions more questionable in terms of their ultimate implementa-
tion than I personally would like. So, I would qualify what you
have said on that score.

Second, in regard to technology, there is, of course, nothing in
SALT that prevents the United States from using its technological
advantage to look at various possible weapons systems to cope with
our problem. That is true of defense. I do not think we should stop
that. I even think that we ought to take a fresh look at air defense,
quite apart from our ongoing programs on ABM point defense.

So, I see no intrinsic reason why we should not let our technol-
ogy continue to provide us with considerable assets. I would only
say these things to add to your presentation, sir, because I do not
believe that the situation is quite as bleak as you say, and I do
believe it is in our capacity to maintain the kinds of risks about
which I was talking earlier.

I believe the most important role of these hearings and this
process of ratification, as Senator Church was alluding to earlier, is
to contribute to public awareness, congressional awareness and
administration awareness that we face serious problems across the
board in military relationships with the Soviet Union over the next
10 or 15 years.

I hope these hearings have already made a contribution which
will be reflected in what we do in our defense budgets.

Senator Lugar. Mr. Pipes, do you have any further comment
about your three points?

Mr. Pipes. I would like to give you perhaps one concrete illustra-
tion of what is meant there. A lot has been made of the utility of
cruise missiles as a counterforce weapon and of the fact that the
protocol will expire in V-k or 3 years, allowing us then to proceed
with the deployments. This is not the Soviet view.

I would like to read to you a passage from Pravda of February
11, 1978. This is what it says — and as you know, nothing appears in
Pravda without expressing the highest political consensus.

[U.S. SALT critics] would like to remove from the limitations sea-launched and
surface-launched cruise missiles. This is in fact a blatant attempt to insure right
now that after the 3 year term of the protocol ends, there is freedom of action to
develop such missiles and increase their agreed range above 600 kilometers, and
ultimately to retain the possibility of deploying them outside of the United States
that is as close as possible to the Soviet borders. Comment, as they say, is superflu-
ous. It is surely quite obvious this is yet another attempt to emasculate the limita-
tions already agreed upon and to wreck the agreement as a whole.

The Russians are putting us on warning here that the attempt to
construct and deploy land-based and sea-based cruise missiles with
ranges above 600 kilometers after the expiration of the protocol
will be viewed by them as a breach of the treaty.

I think very earnest attention ought to be paid to this statement,
because otherwise it may happen that the Senate will agree within
its own walls that there will be no extension of the protocol, but
this may not be the Soviet view.

Senator Lugar. I agree. I will not prolong the agony of you two
gentlemen, who have been very patient witnesses and listeners all
morning here, but I would comment as a member of the Intelli-

gence Committee, having heard the team A, team B controversy,
that it is ironic that so much of the testimony during these hear-
ings has been based, Professor Pipes, on the assumption that you
were right rather than wrong. Your perception of Soviet will ap-
pears to have turned out to be a great deal more valid.

At the time the team A, team B exercise was occurring privately
and then leaked publicly, and then in all of the aftermath of the
restudy, the attempt was made, in my judgment, to prove not only
that you were wrong, but almost injurious to the intelligence proc-
ess of formulating the national estimates. I suspect there has been
a remarkable shift without acknowledgment of that shift and of
really how team A and team B came out. At least I have not seen
any generous acknowledgment throughout the committee, either
Intelligence Committee or Foreign Relations Committee or in the
public in general.

Now, far be it from me to do this individually, but I do acknowl-
edge the fact that I think your initial contribution was very help-
ful. Perhaps as both of you point out, although you have played to
a limited audience of Senators, I am impressed, as is everybody
else, with the fact that your team B episode played to a very
limited and critical audience earlier on, too, and yet forms a basis
for enlightened debate on the subject.

I am indebted to you on behalf of the committee. As I am the
sole survivor, I thank you for appearing, and have been asked to
announce that the committee will resume action in this room at 2
p.m. Senator Biden will chair the European Subcommittee, which
will hear witnesses at that time.

Thank you, gentlemen. This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 2 p.m. in room 4221 Dirksen Senate Office Building.]

Afternoon Session

The Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on
Foreign Relations met at 2:15 p.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate
Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Church, McGovern, Stone, Sarbanes,
Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa.

Also present: Senator Mathias.

The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING session

This afternoon, as part of the Foreign Relations Committee's
consideration of the SALT II agreement, the Subcommittee on
European Affairs will hear from three distinguished academicians
on the subject of SALT and United States-Soviet relations.

Our witnesses, appearing as a panel, are Prof. Adam Ulam, who
will analyze the goals of Soviet foreign policy; Dr. Robert Legvold,
who will assess the doctrines and internal factors shaping that
policy; and Prof. Donald Zagoria, who will discuss Soviet foreign
policy with regard to China and the Third World.

We will proceed by having our witnesses make their presenta-
tions in the order that I named them, and then turn to questions
afterwards. If, however, during the presentation, my colleagues
wish to interject with a thought or question, I hope they will. I
suggest also that we extend this informal approach to the question
period, and that we avoid applying strict time limits.

We have a very distinguished panel and are fortunate to have
you testify. You have all been very incisive and prolific in the
areas on which you are going to speak. I look forward to hearing
your testimony.

Professor Ulam, if you will begin.

STATEMENT OF PROF. ADAM B. ULAM, GURNEY PROFESSOR
OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, HARVARD UNIVER-
SITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. Ulam. The treaty which is before you has been characterized
by some as being essential to the security of the United States, by
others as posing grave dangers to it. There is, I believe, a general
consensus that no strategic arms agreement can by itself guarantee
security. Weapons do not make wars; states do.

NUCLEAR sufficiency OR DETERRENCE IN A CRISIS

What constitutes nuclear sufficiency or deterrence in a crisis lies
not only in the objective data, but also in the eye of the beholder.
And it does not make a difference whether the beholder is a
democratic society like ours, a small group of men making policies
in secret or not subject to many external constraints, or a nervous

' (69)

ally of the United States whose statesmen are aware of how loath
our leaders are, and rightly so, to incur even a slight risk of a
nuclear confrontation.

Hence, it might have been avoidable, and it is regrettable that
this country has allowed the Soviet Union to get ahead of it in
certain categories of nuclear weapons. The current leaders of the
U.S.S.R. are rational and prudent men, but those who come after
them may not always be so. In any case, our policies should be
such as to give them every possible incentive for additional pru-
dence and restraint.

The treaty has been discussed mainly in terms of what it might
do for our security in the most direct sense of the term. Whether
and to what extent it would safeguard the territory of the United
States from a nuclear attack. Yet, even under its most favorable
interpretation, the present treaty does not guarantee the security
of our allies, nor our access to vital raw materials, nor some other
elements which add up to national security in the broader, but
essential, sense.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT

Is the strategic arms agreement as currently framed likely to
lead to more amicable relations with the Soviet Union, place re-
straints on its policies, and be productive of greater national secu-
rity for the United States?

Here the record since SALT I has not been very encouraging. It
was expected at the time that in addition to arms limitation, both
powers would observe in their foreign policy a certain code of
behavior which would inhibit them from encroaching on each
other's vital interests.

Hence, SALT I was accompanied by a number of other agree-
ments, such as the Berlin agreement, and other declarations, the
general purpose of which was expressed in a statement signed by
Messrs. Brezhnev and Nixon, the most salient part of which read:

The U.S.S.R. and the United States attach major importance to preventing the
development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their
relations. . . . Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantages at
the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objec-
tives.

SALT I, it is said, made possible detente. The alternative to
detente, it is added, is a relapse into the cold war. Whatever the
causes of the cold war, and many people have some extraordinarily
muddled ideas on the subject, it is instructive to reflect that at no
period prior to 1972, with the exception of the Berlin crisis and the
Korean war, had Soviet policies been as consistently expansionist,
as purposefully designed to undermine Western interests and influ-
ence as has been the case during the last few years.

Furthermore, Soviet actions on Berlin and Korea could be ration-
alized to some extent by the fact that they affected areas and
issues which the Soviets, by their lights, saw as crucial to their
security. During the last few years, Soviet expansion and their
search for unilateral advantages at the expense of the West, and of
international stability in general, has been directed at areas where
no crucial interests of the Soviet Union are involved.

One can understand, if not justify, Soviet activities in the Near
East — it is a region where historically the Russian state has long
sought to obtain a foothold. But even old fashioned imperialism
cannot explain Soviet intrusion into Africa, South Yemen, and
their support of the replacement of an already friendly regime in
Afghanistan by an out-and-out pro-Soviet one.

Economically such actions involve a not inconsiderable burden to
the Soviet state. And so their only rationale must be that they
undermine Western interests in those areas, and do harm to the
prestige of the United States and its allies.

What must be of even greater concern is the new character of
Soviet intervention in, up to now. Third World areas. For long the
Soviets have assumed the prescriptive right to license any conflict
in a country whose regime is even mildly pro-West or even neutral-
ist as a "war of liberation" and to provide the insurrectionists with
arms and other supplies. Beginning with the midseventies this
approach has been supplemented by large-scale, under local cir-
cumstances, direct and open military intervention by the Soviet
bloc forces, involving Cuban troops and Russian, East German, et
cetera, officers.

SOVIET DESTABILIZING POLICIES AND SALT I LINKAGE

Let me add hastily that there is no direct evidence of a causal
link between the Soviet decision to intensify their anti-Western
and destabilizing policies and SALT L In fact, as Communist
spokesmen have themselves occasionally admitted, their changed
tactics have been influenced mainly by what they perceive to be
the growing political and economic weakness of the West, the
energy crisis and recession, and the debilitating effects of Vietnam
and Watergate on America's society, and hence its ability and
determination to protect its own and its friends' interests abroad.
But what has been happening since SALT I throws some light on
the one argument used in support of the present treaty; without it,
we would not be able to continue our hitherto quite satisfactory
relations with the Soviets.

In making this point to some of my friends in the administration,
I often encountered the counterargument that by its very nature
detente between two such powers must imply a relationship partly
competitive, and partly cooperative in its nature.

The sad fact is that competition, if such it has been, has come
mainly from the U.S.S.R., cooperation from the United States. This
country and other Western industrial nations have undoubtedly
greatly helped the Soviets' economy at a time when its hitherto
spectacular growth has begun to level off, by expanding their trade
with the U.S.S.R., and by providing it with some of their most
sophisticated technology.

By contracting to ship great quantities of grain to the U.S.S.R.,
America has been helping the regime to avoid food shortages occa-
sioned by periodically bad harvests, as well as by the inefficient
organization of Soviet agriculture. When it comes to trade with the
U.S.S.R., the distinction between goods with or without military
significance is not very meaningful. Foreign help, by contributing
to greater efficiency in any sector of its production or consumption,
may enable the regime to divert more resources to military use.

In addition to this direct help we assist the U.S.S.R. indirectly,
but significantly, by credits to and commerce with the Soviet bloc
countries. Without it the Soviet Union would have to shoulder at
least part of the economic burden in shoring up the local Commu-
nist regimes.

BENEFITS TO WEST OF DETENTE

There have been, in all fairness, some benefits to the West.
Expanded exports to the U.S.S.R. bring more jobs at home. In-
creased contracts between Americans and Russians are valuable,
and in the long run they may have beneficial political side effects.
There has been some but rather marginal improvement in the way
the regime has dealt with dissidents. Yet, on balance, most of the
benefits of detente have accrued to the Soviet Union, something I
certainly would not begrudge, if it were not that Soviet policies in
practically every part of the world are directed at undermining the
position and interests of this country and its allies.

The main premise behind those policies of the U.S.S.R. has been
the assumption, alas for the most part correct, that they have
carried with them but little risk. Therefore, what must be of con-
cern to us is not only the substance and verifiability of the treaty,
but also whether through the process of negotiation and ratifica-
tion this country will have been able to convince the Soviet leaders
of the tenacity of its purpose, of its determination and ability to
bar their further "efforts to obtain unilateral advantages" at the
expense of the West.

If the Kremlin becomes convinced of that, then the way indeed
will be open for "the establishment of a more stable and construc-
tive foundation for United States-Soviet relations," as stated in the
preamble to this treaty. If it does not, and the present thrust of
Soviet policies is allowed to continue, then, whether we do or do
not have a strategic arms agreement, there is a high probability of
our relations growing worse, and leading eventually to dangerous
confrontation.

The Chairman. Mr. Legvold?

STATEMENT OF PROF. ROBERT LEGVOLD, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. Legvold. My prepared statement deals with Soviet perspec-
tive on the fundamental questions of nuclear war and strategic
deterrence, nuclear deterrence, and so on. Rather than reading, or
summarizing that, I thought that I would try to go from it to some
specific considerations that bear on the immediate question of
SALT, but that deal primarily with Soviet perspectives.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

In the next few minutes, I would want to comment on those
aspects of this process, the debate within the country and within
the Senate, which the Soviet Union finds confusing, or unconvinc-
ing, or the way in which Soviet perspectives are probably quite
different from those that some anticipate or expect.

I am doing so, not because I think that the Soviet perspective is
right, and not because I think the Soviet perspective is justified. I

am doing so because I think that this is what the Soviet perspec-
tive is, and I think that it is important to have it in mind.

Everything that I am saying does not for a moment gainsay the
serious challenge that Soviet activities, particularly its efforts, its
military forces, present for us, and the extent to which these have
to be answered. But their perspective on basic trends within the
strategic nuclear arms race are important to our considerations
here, as are Soviet perspectives on the SALT debate, and their
sense of what the agreement is, what kind of a bargain it is.

It is those two items that I want to focus on: Soviet perspectives
on strategic trends; and Soviet perspectives on the kind of a bar-
gain that SALT is. I do so for two reasons.

First, because in both respects, Soviet perspectives will signifi-
cantly influence the kind of reaction that you get from them,
depending on Senate action in adjusting or accepting or rejecting
the SALT Treaty. Second, Soviet perspectives bear very much on
what the possibilities are for the process of SALT in some larger
sense, and in the specific sense, what the potential of SALT III may
be.

I start by saying that I don't believe in their heart of hearts and
in their genuine convictions that the Soviet leadership, military
and civilian, sees trends in the strategic balance in the same way
that those who are most critical, or most suspicious, or most con-
cerned about the SALT agreement do within this country. I don't
think that they see, second, in terms of SALT as an agreement,
that the bargain is as unequal or as dangerous from American
perspectives as the critics within this country do.

That is, to put it the other way around, I think the Soviets
believe that it is a genuinely equitable bargain. I will talk to both
points.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC TRENDS

First, in terms of Soviet perspectives on strategic trends, because
it is clear that that is an utterly crucial context for the discussion
of these agreements at the moment, I think that the Soviet leader-
ship recognizes and would agree with those who emphasize the
extent to which it has improved its relative position over the last
decade. There is no disputing that.

The Soviets have made enormous gains in eliminating their strate-
gic nuclear inferiority which was substantial as late as 1967, and
there is no question of that, and the Soviets say so publicly. I think
that they would even, though this is not publicized in their press,
agree that now and in the near future their advantage in static
indicators will be clear, when you are talking about megatonnage
or throw-weight, or any of the others, with the exception of war-
heads in the near term.

I might say that in these terms, from a psychological perspective,
the Soviets would regard that as important, and I suspect they
would not be surprised if the United States, from the point of view
of correcting the psychological impact of this, as opposed to its
substantive or intrinsic military significance, moved to do some-
thing about the discrepancy in static indicators. We are not likely
to because it is not necessarily in our interest for intrinsic reasons.

But the Soviets understand the political/psychological aspects of
this kind of thing.

They would, however, I think disagree over the extent to which
they have improved their relative military position, and the extent
to which they will continue to do so in the near term and where we
will be left, both in the early 1980's and particularly in the late
1980's, which is where the Soviet perspective tends to turn at this
point, because the critical decisions affecting the late 1980's are
now being formed.

I think they would disagree because in a fundamental way their
comparative threat perception is different from our comparative
threat perception. That is, I don't believe that one is the obverse of
the other. I think that we are looking at things in basically differ-
ent ways.

First, because the Soviets have a different notion of the role that
allies and enemies play in defining threat, at this point. The Sovi-
ets have a different sense of the strength of alliances and the
vulnerability of alliances at this point, and understand that not
only are there those essential differences, but they are critical. We
tend to factor them out when we measure the balance, except in
counting strategic vulnerabilities in the case of the theater nuclear
balance.

The same thing is true in terms of enemies. We are reminded
since the war in Indochina this last year, and the considerable
Soviet effort to strengthen its military posture since late March, all
the things that are going on in the Far East now, the extent to
which the China factor is a real one and bears on these consider-
ations of strategic nuclear balance.

Second, not only because they are more inclined to weigh in, in
more significant ways, the issue of alliances and enemies, but also
because they do not see us standing still. Aside from the point of
how much of an improvement in their relative position they have
made, having said that, having recognized that, the Soviets do not
for a moment believe that we have done nothing, as so many critics
of the SALT agreement are implying at this point before the two
committees that are taking testimony.

The Soviets recognize that since the SALT process began in 1969,
in the early stages the United States continued and completed
deployment of a Poseidon missile series, which was the first
MIRVed SLBM, and which increased the number of warheads by a
factor of 3, and that within a year of that, the United States
introduced the MIRV into the strategic balance, which has been
the most destabilizing development of the last decade. This was in
the first stages of the SALT process.

Since SALT II, the United States has gone forward with the
modernization of the Minuteman III, and the development of Min-
uteman III with the new warhead, the MK-12A, and the new
guidance system, the NS-20, together with the software coming on
line at the end of the decade, it transforms that weapon. It is a new
weapon. That becomes effectively a counterforce weapon from the
Soviet Union's point of view.

In 1979, the United States will begin retrofitting the Trident I
missile, the C-4, into Poseidon boats. That is a different level or
category of MIRV weapon. The number of warheads that we have

increased from 1972 to the present is well known because it has
been repeated regularly in the hearings.

In the future, the United States is going forward with the cruise
missile program, and with the Trident II missile, which comes very
close to invulnerable counterforce at sea from the Soviet point of
view, which is another important threshold in this competition.

All of these things are underway before the issue of whether we
go ahead with M-X or not. I am not arguing, and I don't want to
be misunderstood that any of these things are unwise on our part. I
think that they are absolutely essential. I think they are the mini-
mum that is essential in terms of maintaining competition, but I
am talking about the Soviet perspective on the arms race itself,
and the extent to which the United States has supposedly been
standing still while the U.S.S.R. has raced forward.

There are any number of ways in which you can talk about these
things. It is clear that the one issue, in terms of threat perception,
which exercises more people at this point is the impending vulner-
ability of the Minuteman III and all that that spells in terms of our
approach to nuclear deterrence, the window of opportunities in the
1980's as it is often referred to.

But the Soviets could, if I play hard and loose with the figures,
come up with a different calculation by the early 1980's, not in
terms of genuine first-strike capability against the ICBM force,
that is the extent to which you can eliminate 90 percent of the
ICBM force. They know that they will be able to do that to our
ICBM force. They know that the maximum for us, by the mid-
1980's, would be 60 percent by best estimates, talking about that
modernized and transformed Minuteman III.

The Chairman. We would eliminate 60 percent of their ICBM
force?

Mr. Legvold. That is right.

The Chairman. Which is 70 percent of their force.

Mr. Legvold. That is right.

The point that I was about to make is that when you work that
math out, we are talking about a capacity on our part to eliminate
42 percent of their warheads, or force loadings, or whatever that
70-percent measure means, in contrast to their ability to knock out
22 percent of ours.

I say that this is playing fast and loose with the figures, but it is
something that a person who has some concerns within the Soviet
Union would make.

The basic point is that they are not likely to see the speed with
which their relative position has improved is quite what we say it
is, or the extent to which it will be in the near term.

It is furthermore true, in terms of the way we think about basic
issues, that we have a different notion of what it means to make an
ICBM force hostile, and the extent to which that is a basis for
nuclear blackmail, a different notion of what the risks of nuclear
blackmail are within these circumstances.

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON SALT II AS A BARGAIN

The second set of comments bear on SALT as a bargain, and
whether the Soviet Union understands that they really have pulled
one over on us, and that they fully expect us to catch them and

propose a wide range of amendments, and secure the right kind of
renegotiation in order to have an equitable agreement.

I think that the Soviet leadership believes that this is a fair and
an equitable bargain. I think they believe that it does not do much
to constrain the arms competition in a critical respect, but then
very few people in this country or in this Senate believe that it
does an enormous amount to correct or to control the arms race.

I think that the Soviet leadership believes that if the SALT
process is to amount to something, it will soon have to begin
digging in and accomplishing something in the future, even
though, I think, increasingly they are likely to go in the direction
of incrementalism because of the obstacles they see to comprehen-
sive SALT negotiations and attempt to break out pieces of the
problem and negotiate them the next time around.

I think they believe that if the thing is not to become unraveled,
if it is not to finally disintegrate, something has to be done in the
next round. But not that it has been done in this round.

I think they believe it is a genuinely equitable bargain to the
extent that they think they are paying a price for it which is at
least as large as the price that critics in this country say we are
paying for the SALT agreement. I think they feel that it is the
product of a genuine compromise.

I sat down and thought my way through the range of compro-
mises that were made, the critical compromises, in SALT IL From
the Soviet point of view, it seems to me that there are basically five
substantial compromises that mattered, that were a cost for them,
and indeed there is some evidence that they were the subject of
considerable debate.

I think that there are five others that are probably less substan-
tial in terms of the cost, how much it really mattered to offer the
concession or the compromise.

In terms of the concessions that mattered from the Soviet point
of view, the first of them is the issue of counting rules. The Soviet
Union took seriously paying that price in the interest of verifica-
tion of the SALT agreement because it did compel them to alter
force deployments that they would otherwise have made. For in-
stance, they were prepared to go forward with — and indeed are
prepared to go forward — 100 or more single-warhead SS-17's and
SS-19's that are already sitting in the modernized silos in the old
mode, which they now will have to dispose of in one way or
another.

In a way, we have forced them to modernize with this, in the
name of verification. But it was not their preference.

Second, in terms of cruise missiles, it has been plain from the
very beginning that the Soviets take the cruise missile threat
seriously. Given the extent to which we also regard it as an impor-
tant part to the solution to our security problem, indeed, they
should.

They, from the beginning, wanted either to eliminate the thing,
or to count it, if it was more than 300 miles. They gave on every
one of those issues. What we have as a result is 120 new delivery
vehicles that are MIRVed with a minimum of 24 warheads and a
total of up to 4,000 additional warheads that are effective second-

strike counterforce — not merely second-strike, but second-strike
counterforce, potentially, with their accuracy.

There are parts to that that go along with it. The Soviets conced-
ed nontransfer. They wanted to make sure that we could not
transfer to the Europeans, and they know now with the noncircum-
vention provision that we will be able to transfer to the Europeans,
to the extent that we are not bound to develop the weapon our-
selves.

The same is true in terms of the length of the protocol. The
Soviets wanted that to be longer. They wanted the restraint, to the
extent that it existed, for a longer period than they got. Now it
ends in December in a less significant manner.

Third, on the SS-16, the Soviets, it is true, had developed it to a
certain point in the testing in 1975, but now they will not be able
to go forward with the mobile SS-16, which is in many ways the
precursor of their M-X, when they develop their M-X. We are
going forward with M-X in these circumstances.

I am talking now not merely about counterforce. I am talking
about invulnerable counterforce, this next stage in the competition.
The Soviets have prejudiced their ability to go forward with that in
the SS-16. I might say that they have conceded the M-X issue to
us as part of that.

In the summer of 1978, if I am not mistaken, the Soviets made
some attempt to control M-X by suggesting that we do without the
single new missile through 1985. They conceded the issue to us.
Those mattered to them, it seems to me.

Fourth, and fifth, which are really left over from Vladivostok,
but Vladivostok is a part of SALT II, the Soviets conceded equal
aggregates, which is no small matter because it means that in
conceding us the opportunity to build up to equal totals, they are
making the problem of coping with the China factor more difficult.
If we build up the totals, then they have to deal with the China
factor out of equal totals, and indeed with American forces that
equal theirs at the same time.

This is not an insignificant consideration for Soviet leaders that
are looking in that direction.

Fifth, the finessing of FBS [forward-based systems] one more
time. The Soviets are not using FBS. This is simply an issue to seek
compensation in other areas. They take seriously the nuclear
threat based in Europe, whatever portion of the overall threat it is,
and its relationship to national nuclear forces. It is a security
problem from their point of view, and they allowed it to be finessed
one more time.

I think that I will not go through the five concessions that they
made that seem to me to be with lesser cost, but concessions
nonetheless in the course of the negotiations: The reductions total,
the limits on land-based MIRV and combined ICBM-SLBM
MIRVed, the encryption issue, the modernization constraint, the
fractionation, and so on. I will not spell those out.

I think that the Soviets see strategic trends differently from the
way in which the severest SALT critics in this country see them. I
think that they see it genuinely as an equitable bargain between
the two sides in contrast to the way in which many in this country
present the SALT agreement. They do not, I repeat, for a moment

48-250 0-79-6

underestimate the extent to which they have made progress, and
how much happier the military balance is from their point of view
than from what it was in the 1960's, nor am I in presenting my
personal view, for a moment underestimating the extent to which
these trends are issues that need to be corrected. It does have
implications for what the Senate does in these terms, and that is
the question of not merely ratification, but understandings, reser-
vations and amendments.

If the Soviet Union believes, as I think it does, that this is a fair
and an equitable bargain that has been driven with great difficul-
ty, then I think they are prepared to live with understandings and
reservations that clarify the bargain. But if the essential proposi-
tion is to drive another bargain, to change the bargain, I don't
think that they are prepared to accept that.

I cannot say for sure what the line is. I have a strong conviction
that the understandings that are being talked about within this
committee on noncircumvention, for example, or on the termina-
tion of the Protocol, are not problematic. It may even be that the
Soviets would swallow a demand for equal rights to heavy missiles
on our part if that were to be done.

I think the Soviet Union might be willing to accept clarifying
language on encryption, and the extent to which they can do more
than encryption in order to obstruct telemetry, and so on. But,
then, when you cross over into the next category, and that may
already be with the question of the right to heavy missiles, but it
certainly is Backfire counting, and so on, at that point I think that
it is quite clear that we are driving another bargain, and I don't
think that the Soviets are prepared to.

I think people are operating under a delusion if they believe that
the Soviet Union will be an easier negotiating partner the next
time around, having lost this time around and being extremely
concerned about what the traffic will bear, and what you can
negotiate with this country.

I think, for example, that even were they to negotiate the Back-
fire issue, they would negotiate it. They would not simply accept
the amendment. They would negotiate it. If one were looking for
the equivalent for them, in terms of what they are concerned
about, it would be much tighter constraints on cruise missiles,
because from their point of view Backfire is essentially a theater
weapon, whatever potential threat it poses for us, and it is ad-
dressed to their China problem and their European problem.

If we want to negotiate the Backfire in terms of counting because
of the potential problem to us, then I think the Soviets will, as
their counter, raise the essential theater problem, and that, from
our point of view in the SALT context, means tougher constraints
on cruise, and so on. Or else, it does mean nothing because the
Soviets will be extraordinarily skeptical about what kind of a bar-
gain they can drive with us.

Whether that, in some larger sense, forces us back to the days of
cold war or not, it seems to me is largely a false issue. I am
uncomfortable with people who say that the failure of SALT is
going to throw us back into the days of the cold war. I think that
Mr. Ulam's comment about the nature of the cold war in the

recent period of tension, and Soviet ambition and the difficulty of
distinguishing between the two of them is well taken.

For me the critical characteristic of the cold war, which is at the
moment, is not the extent to which we had tension, or competition,
or Soviet ambition, but the extent to which we had direct confron-
tation, the Berlin crisis and Cuba. I don't think that will be re-
stored by a failure of SALT. But I think an enormous range of
opportunity will have been lost, and I think that is important.

[Professor Legvold's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Prof. Robert Legvold

As someone interested in Soviet affairs, I think I can best aid you by focusing on
the attitudes that the Soviet side brings to SALT. These, of course, are not easily
determined, but neither are they so inaccessible as we sometimes assume. Nor are
they so crude as we sometimes imagine for want of knowing. They are a mix of
subtlety, ambivalence, assertiveness, and concern roughly consistent with the com-
plexity of strategic trends and the challenge of SALT, and, in my judgment, they
are important to consider.

the soviet and AMERICAN APPROACHES TO WAR AND ITS AVOIDANCE

No factor more vexes the effort to negotiate arms control with the Soviet Union
than the differences between us. Not the differences in ideology or political order,
though these matter ultimately. The more fateful differences are in the structure of
our military forces, in the nature of the threats we face, and in the strengths and
vulnerabilities of the alliances we rely on and mean to defend.

The United States has built forces stressing diversity, flexibility, and technologi-
cal prowess; the Soviet Union, numbers, firepower, and redundancy. Our means of
nuclear attack comprise a TRIAD, a concept that has come to have considerable
importance to us. The Soviet Union has persisted instead with essentially a DYAD,
one resting heavily on land-based ICBMs. But Soviet ICBMs, in turn, being larger
than ours, will pose a threat to this part of our deterrent sooner than we can
threaten any part of theirs. Should both countries develop the ability to destroy the
others' fixed ICBMs, however, the implications are graver for the Soviet Union
because roughly three and a half times more of its forces are ICBMs. And should
the competition turn toward acquiring invulnerable counterforce weapons, an in-
creasingly likely prospect, the superiority of our next generation of SLBMs and
mobile ICBMs over theirs makes the implications graver still.

Discrepancies like these — the practical consequence of the differences in the
throw-weight of each side's ICBMs, in the levels of their SLBM technology, and in
the versatility of their delivery vehicles — are SALT's great burdens. Add to these
the effects of geography, the China factor, and allies who bring vastly different
resources and concerns to the common defense, and the plight of SALT II or any
other attempt to reach meaningful and negotiable strategic arms limitations
emerges more clearly.

The asymmetries in capabilities, enemies, and alliances deeply influence the
perspectives each side brings to the SALT process. But there is still another impor-
tant asymmetry — this, in the way the two leaderships think about war and its
prevention. The contrast stems not from a more cynical or cavalier attitude on the
part of one leadership toward the risks of war. Nor, as some seem to suggest, from a
Soviet willingness to treat war, even nuclear war, as an acceptable means to their
political ends. No such willingness exists, not as reflected in what they say and
write.

The real contrast is in the way the two nations cope with the theoretical possibil-
ity of nuclear war. Given the suicidal implications of using nucler weapons, Ameri-
can strategists have concentrated on the psychology and framework of deterrence —
that is, on the process of dissuading the Soviet Union from risking nuclear war or, if
war comes, on cutting it short. Strengthening our ability to dissuade has not been
divorced from defense — that is, from developing the ability to fight a war — but the
stress has been on structuring choice and, if you will, "bargaining" in the shadow of
nuclear conflict. By this I mean spinning out scenarios designed to convince the
Soviet leaders in advance that we can and will attach too high a price to any prize
they may wish to capture with military force. In the process, the civilian strategists,
game theorists, and scientists who dominate strategic thinking in this country have
come to worry most about the credibility of our deterrent, the stability of the

nuclear balance in moments of crisis, and the raising or lowering of the nuclear
threshold.

In the Soviet Union, the task of dealing with the specter of nuclear war belongs to
military men. They, by tradition and profession, make it a matter of waging war. By
preparing to prosecute war successfully, they assume, they are both deterring war
and putting their country in the best possible position should deterrence fail.
Nuclear weapons have revolutionized warfare, and this they recognize. But their
inclination is still to approach the problem as traditionally as possible, committing
themselves to victory on the battlefield and, to this end, the destruction of the other
side's war-making potential.* The more abstract notion that the outcome of a
nuclear war can be decisively shaped by launching a limited number of nuclear
weapons at a selected set of (military) targets and then waiting to see whether the
other side will desist remains largely alien to their way of thinking. Thus, where we
tend to start with deterrence, pressing on to defense, ultimately subordinating
defense to deterrence, they skip the issue of deterrence and concentrate on defense,
assuming deterrence will follow.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SALT

Inevitably the different way Soviet and American leaders think about nuclear
war influences the way they judge the strategic balance, the trends altering it, and
the process of regulating it. Inevitably it also shapes their perspectives on the SALT
II accords.

Some say that our original goals in SALT were doomed to failure because, as
events turned out, the Soviet Union did not share them. We envisaged SALT as a
chance to reduce and stabilize the strategic nuclear balance, to turn the competition
from arms building, and to shift these resources in other directions. The Soviet
leaders, in contrast, it is said, viewed the SALT process not so much as a joint
enterprise to manage the arms race as an opportunity to codify their superpower
status and, if possible, to improve their military position by impeding U.S. defense
efforts. We were simply working on different levels.

It seems to me that this misstates the problem. For the Soviet leadership SALT
has been preeminently a political exercise, but in the sense of the contribution that
arms control efforts make to the over-all U.S.-Soviet relationship. From the begin-
ning, the Soviet leaders have been more inclined to focus on the place of arms
control in East- West relations than on the role of arms control in restructuring the
military balance or in imposing a particular discipline on the arms competition.
They have tended to urge SALT as a necessary and integral part of a broader
process of easing tensions between our two countries, arguing the obvious proposi-
tion that not much progress can be made if both are locked in an unyielding arms
competition. The challenge of using SALT to shape the strategic nuclear balance
has concerned them less.

Indeed, by and large, their natural preference has been to define the objectives of
SALT modestly, rather than get bogged down in the complexities and intractable
dimensions of a far-reaching effort to regulate the strategic arms race. In SALT I,
they would have been happy to settle for an ABM agreement, and it required
considerable determination on the part of the Nixon Administration to negotiate
the interim agreement limiting offensive weapons. In SALT II, they have generally
sought the simplest and least arduous route to agreement, meaning inevitably a less
ambitious one. They have not pressed to circumscribe or avoid new technologies,
threatening to make the strategic arms competition more unmanageable, like MIRV
or mobile ICBMs. And, when in March 1977 they were offered the opportunity to
achieve major reductions, they angrily backed away. Their anger had to do with
what they regarded as the one-sided nature of the 1977 proposals, but this did not
fully explain their refusal to respond with counterproposals.^

This preference for unencumbered arms control, I think, in large part traces back
to the Soviet Union's broader political stakes in SALT. True, another powerful
syndrome is at work, a Soviet reluctance to constrain the other side if it means
constraining yourself. But the same can be said of the American approach to SALT,
and that has not prevented us from trying to push SALT in more ambitious

' "Winning" a nuclear war in this sense is scarcely a good in Soviet eyes. It is better than
losing, but no Soviet leader in the last twenty years, military or civilian, has suggested that
nuclear war would be anything other than an unimaginable calamity, leaving victor and
vanquished in virtually the same condition.

' They also resented the way the proposal was sprung on them and objected to an attempt, as
they saw it, to throw over Vladivostok and the laboriously negotiated compromises of the
intervening two and a half years. Still, the Soviet reaction was so swift and sharp that obviously
they had not even paused over the prospect of making more of SALT.

directions. Rather, the further explanation is that the Soviet Union cares more
about the political effect of a successful SALT process, and, for this, small steps,
setting aside the hard choices that generate controversy, may be best.

It is also true that the Soviet Union has looked upon SALT as a mechanism for
controlling American military programs. Preventing the United States from going
forward with an elaborate ABM system was obviously a high priority for the Soviet
Union in 1969. Limiting, even eliminating, the contemporary U.S. cruise missile
program has also been a major Soviet objective in SALT. But, we, too, have sought
to circumscribe through SALT Soviet weapons that are particularly disturbing to us.
The ceiling on SS-9s in SALT I is a case in point and so is our attempt to impede
the development of a fifth generation of Soviet ICBMs in SALT IL The attempt to
use SALT to hamper the other side's defense efforts is not what divides us.

Neither the self-serving aspects of the Soviet approach to SALT nor its political
stake in SALT proves that the Soviet Union has no desire to stabilize the nuclear
balance or to shrink both countries' strategic arsenals. The problem is in defining
what it means to stabilize the balance, a problem that ultimately traces back to our
contrasting way of thinking about nuclear war and its avoidance.

It is not merely that our attempts to give stability to the nuclear balance, that is,
to reduce the incentives to squeeze the trigger first in crisis situations, come across
to Soviet observers as self-seeking. Thus, from the original Option E proposed in the
opening rounds of SAL'T I to the March 1977 scheme for "deep cuts, ' our efforts to
increase crisis stability have seemed distinctly in our favor. Again and again we
have come back to the notion of abandoning potentially vulnerable ICBMs, where so
much of the Soviet effort is focused, and moving the competition to less vulnerable
SLBMs, weapons of a more clearly second-strike character, but in which we hold a
clear technological edge, not the least in the race to turn them into first-strike
weapons. On the other hand, a Soviet might note, when the most "de-stabilizing"
weapon of the last decade was introduced, that is, MIRV, we introduced it and we
did so without giving much thought to SALT and an agreement to banish MIRVed
forces on both sides.

There is, however, a more profound problem than notions of stability that appear
to Soviet leaders as discriminatory and calculated to enhance U.S. advantage. The
problem is that our notions of what is stabilizing and destabilizing in the strategic
arms competition, to a large degree, remain alien to them. This, some would argue,
arises out of the Soviet tendency to equate stability with the growth of Soviet
military power. 'The point is not made derisively: Soviet speakers do suggest that a
stronger Soviet Union is the surest guarantee of nuclear stability; indeed, it is the
way they most commonly discuss the issue. (To say the least, it is not an approach
that will get the two sides very far.)

Still, this does not gainsay the extent to which our own concept of stability is a
function of the way we happen to think about nuclear deterrence. Worrying about a
Soviet ability to destroy 90 percent of our fixed land-based ICBM force, while we can
destroy only 60 percent of theirs, makes sense at a certain level of abstraction. For
us, the abstraction is important, because we have predicated deterrence on ensuring
that the Soviet Union cannot come out ahead in any nuclear exchange. This
proposition has a significance of its own, independent of the question of what
objective could activate a chain of events resulting on this 30 percent margin, what
fortuities would threaten to undo any calculus based on the 30 percent, and what
other dimensions of war might prove more decisive.

For the Soviet leaders, however, given their approach to nuclear deterrence, this
proposition has no significance independent of these other considerations. They are
less sensitive to and, happily, less emboldened by Minuteman vulnerability, because
of the difference in approach. Less sensitive, because they are inclined to view their
ability to destroy a large part of the Minuteman force as simply one component in a
war-fighting strategy — that is, a measure, albeit a critical one, for reducing the
damage a foe can inflict in the course of a war. They are less emboldened, because,
as they judge matters, this ability affords them little leverage as long as they
cannot launch and win a war at a tolerable cost.

By the same token, I think they are baffled by and more than a little mistrusting
of the concern expressed by many in this country over trends in so-called "static
indicators." 'They understand the psychological problem. They understand that
numbers and seeming inferiorities in the tally of weapons — megatonnage, throw-
weight, total warheads, numbers of delivery vehicles, and so on — have an impact on
the public mind. But, when serious defense planners and analysts make the gap in
the throw-weight of the two countries' forces decisive, arguing that by this gift the
Soviet Union can launch a nuclear attack knowing that after each exchange its
remaining forces will be fractionally larger than American forces, Soviet observers
suspect ulterior motives.

Because Soviet defense planners make do with the science of war, abjuring the
development of "strategic doctrine," they look upon our attention to doctrine as
politically inspired. That is, they think the fussing we do with declaratory policy,
replacing the "doctrine of massive retaliation" with "flexible response," modified by
the "doctrine of limited nuclear options," is designed to squeeze the maximum
political-psychological leverage out of a defense posture. Talk about the meaning of
the discrepancy in throw- weight, translated into a concept like "escalation domi-
nance," the language of American strategists, is lumped into the same category.

Soviet and American views of SALT II also derive to an important degree from
their respective views of military trends, a further dimension shaped by our con-
trasting approaches to the challenge of nuclear war. In this country what different
people think about the SALT II accords follows closely from their apprehension over
the comparative momentum of Soviet and American military efforts. The fears
generated by recent trends impinge constantly and heavily on judgments about
SALT II, even where the connection, both for good and ill, is nearly nonexistent.

Not surprisingly, in the Soviet Union, the link between the evolution of the
military balance and SALT matters less. Whatever the defects of the agreements—
and from the Soviet perspective there are a number — these are softened by the
general context. SALT or no SALT, the Soviet Union has made enormous strides in
overcoming its strategic nuclear inferiority. In these circumstances, even the most
equitable agreement looks different to the side losing ground than to the one
gaining ground.

But the contrast has still deeper sources. Because we and our NATO allies place
so much weight on U.S. strategic forces, accepting the abstractions of deterrence
theory and neglecting other dimensions of our common defense, the erosion of our
comfortable advantages in the nuclear competition is particularly disturbing. SALT
may have very little to do with this situation and it may offer little solution — short
of the futility of expecting it to re-establish American strategic superiority— but it
becomes its victim. Suddenly everything, even at the margin, acquires significance:
the chance that the Soviet Union could use its large medium-range BACKFIRE
bombers in a nuclear attack on the United States, the chance that a disputed
interpretation of the SALT protocol might impede our efforts to rectify a deteriorat-
ing theater nuclear balance, and the chance that the Soviet Union would cheat
under the terms of SALT and, escaping detection, produce a larger and more
accurate successor to the SS-19 two or three years earlier than it could if it waits
for the Treaty to expire.

Both in its posture and in its concepts, the Soviet Union is less dependent on
carefully calculated nuclear deterrence. Because the Soviet Union believes the
decisive feature of any general war will be the ability of one side to triumph at all
levels, from conventional to nuclear, and has designed a posture around the integra-
tion of capabilities for fighting at all levels, it worries less about the precise
calibration of the nuclear balance. Or, to put the matter another way, it has a
different sense of what constitutes the basis for "nuclear blackmail." To a Soviet
mind it is not the ability to wipe out one leg of a TRIAD that counts most, and even
less is it a gap in throw-weight, translated into a scenario in which one of two
devastated countries after a series of nuclear exchanges ends up with a fraction
more weapons. Rather, the decisive consideration in the Soviet perspective is the
over-all military balance. Provided one has a sufficient ability to survive a nuclear
attack and strike back with a certain level of viciousness, the key concern is with
prosecuting war, and that involves something much beyond the refinements of
nuclear strategy.

Not that the Soviet Union has ceased to worry about trends in the strategic arms
competition. In a looser fashion, the Soviet leaders do apparently fear the twists and
turns that the competition may yet take. They are concerned with the implications
of cruise missiles and what the introduction into Europe of large numbers of these
weapons, blurring the line between conventional and nuclear, will mean. They are
beginning to stir at the prospect of a race in counterforce weapons. And, in general,
they continue to watch warily for the new directions in which we, with our techno-
logical superiority, will push the nuclear arms competition. But these are concerns
for the future, for SALT III, and the Soviet leaders do not feel them so acutely as
we feel ours. For the moment, the two countries' anxiety over military trends is out
of phase.

I have chosen not to address more directly the concerns that are usually debated,
because I believe the problem runs more deeply. I could have made the case that,
whatever our image of emerging Soviet superiority, the Soviet leadership does not
share the same perception. I could have summarized for you the defects that the
Soviet leaders see in the treaty. I could have reviewed for you the compromising the
Soviet Union did to get this agreement, by way of disproving the impression that we

have let ourselves be slickered. I could have commented on the faithfulness with
which the Soviet Union keeps the contracts it signs or the likelihood that it wants
an inadequately verifiable agreement. The reality in all these cases, I am convinced,
is more reassuring than assumed by many of those who oppose SALT II or who
would substantially rewrite it.

I did not because I think the factors that lead the two countries to view strategic
trends and SALT II so differently— that make these agreements so controversial in
our country and not in the Soviet Union — flow from far deeper considerations.
Much of the trouble SALT II is in stems from our basic outlook, from the way we
choose to define what counts in the nuclear balance, from the way we choose to
define Soviet calculations, and, ultimately, from the way we choose to cope with the
specter of nuclear war. Much of the trouble with SALT— and a challenge that we
must deal with more effectively if the process is to come to really matter— stems
from the fact that the Soviet Union does each of these things another way.

The Chairman. Professor Zagoria.

STATEMENT OF PROF. DONALD S. ZAGORIA, CITY UNIVERSITY
OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. Zagoria. Senator Biden, and distinguished members of the
committee.

As you continue your deliberations on the SALT II Treaty and
the role of that treaty in the United States-Soviet relations, it is a
privilege for me to be invited to present my views.

As a student of Soviet foreign policy for three decades, and as
one who has no illusions whatever about the nature of the Soviet
system, or about Soviet expansionist objectives in the world today,
I have still felt uncomfortable with what I regard as the extrerne
views on the Soviet Union that often dominate our national dis-
course.

On one extreme, Soviet power is frequently exaggerated and
Soviet ideology is frequently confused with that of Nazi Germany.
A Chicken Little school of American foreign policy thinks that the
sky is falling down and that the United States is powerless to
reverse unfavorable trends. This school is nostalgic for the 1950's,
when the United States was the most powerful country in the
world, and it seeks to turn the clock back to the situation that
prevailed then when the United States enjoyed unquestioned mili-
tary superiority over the Soviet Union.

The Chicken Little school, in my opinion, exaggerates the Soviet
menace. It minimizes the strength and vitality of the United States
and the resources of our many friends and allies. I believe it is
incapable of devising a measured and discriminating response to
the Soviet challenge.

Generally opposed to SALT II, this school fails to tell us how the
defeat of SALT and the escalation of the nuclear arms race will
help to contain Soviet advances, or to induce greater Soviet re-
straint.

On the other extreme, the very challenge of growing Soviet
military power and the problems created by the Soviet offensive in
the Third World are frequently minimized by the "so what" school
of American foreign policy. This anti-geopolitical school seems in-
capable of understanding that many of our friends and allies are
adversely affected by changes in regional balances of power.

Seven pro-Soviet Communist parties have taken power or terri-
tory by armed force since the spring of 1975. Between 20,000 and
40,000 Cuban gendarmes are now in Africa with guns for hire. To
the extent that our friends and allies lose confidence in our ability

to contain this offensive, they will be forced to reconsider their own
foreign policy alinements.

But rejecting SALT II is not the answer to this problem either.
The challenge for the United States is to devise a steady, meas-
ured, and broad response to these and other problems with which
the Soviet Union confronts us. But to do this, we must recognize
first of all that many of our problems have been made or aggravat-
ed not by the Russians, but by our own erratic and indecisive
national behavior in recent years, behavior that has led many
countries and many leaders throughout the world to believe that
the United States is engaged in a global retreat.

Many of the most serious problems we face in the global arena
today are the result of a crisis of confidence in American leader-
ship, a crisis that has spread throughout the world since Water-
gate, since our defeat in Vietnam, since our announced withdrawal
from Korea, since our lack of reaction to Soviet-Cuban advances in
Africa, and since our continuing inability to meet some of our most
pressing domestic problems.

Our first and highest priority should be to get our own act
together, to achieve some national consensus on a long-range strat-
egy designed to meet the crisis, a strategy that would be designed
to reassure our friends and to warn our adversaries that the
United States is not engaged in a global retreat.

Second, we must recognize, that the world of the 1980's is differ-
ent from the world of the 1950's and 1960's. We no longer have,
and are unlikely ever to regain, unquestioned nuclear superiority
over the Soviet Union. In many parts of the Third World, the
Soviet Union has cleverly positioned itself on the side of parties
and states that enjoy considerable support. But rejection of SALT
II will not solve any of these problems.

It will not raise the confidence in us among our friends and
allies. Rather, it will lower their confidence in our ability to pursue
a unified foreign policy. It will not help us regain military superior-
ity over the Soviet Union. Rather, it will lead us to a new, even
higher, and more dangerous level of the nuclear arms race.

Rejecting SALT II will not improve our position in the Third
World, on the contrary it will make our competition with the
Russians in these regions fraught with much greater danger.

This is neither the time nor the place for me to spell out in great
detail what I mean by a steady, persistent, broad, and measured
response to the problems we face in our dealings with the Soviet
Union. To put the matter in shorthand, I would say that we need a
policy that combines detente with containment.

To achieve such a detente, the administration must make two
things clear to Moscow. First, that it will be to the Soviet advan-
tage if they exercise greater self-restraint. Second, that it will be
risky if they don't. In the recent past, I believe we have failed to
provide the Russians either with positive or with negative incen-
tives for restraint.

There are three steps in particular that we need to take to
provide Moscow with positive incentives for restraint. First of all.
Congress should make the kinds of amendments in trade legisla-
tion that Senator Stevenson is now proposing. The effect of Senator

Stevenson's amendment would be to increase the President's flexi-
bility to trade with Moscow, and to use such trade for linkage.

Second, I believe we should engage the Russians in preliminary
discussions about regional security problems in various parts of the
Third World. We cannot exclude the Russians from all negotiations
on regional matters and then ask them for restraint in the regions.

Finally, and not least important, we need to sign and to ratify
the SALT II agreement as a symbol both of our desire to slow down
the nuclear arms race, and of our desire to pursue a more coopera-
tive relationship with the Soviet Union.

In sum, passing SALT II should be part of a larger strategic
concept that makes it clear to Moscow that we, for our part, are
anxious for a more comprehensive detente.

But along with the carrots there should also be some sticks. The
Senate, when it ratifies SALT II, as I hope it will, should warn
Moscow in a sense of the Senate resolution that the United States
will no longer accept a narrow and unreciprocal detente, and that
future Soviet conduct in the Third World will influence the future
development of detente, including the prospects for SALT III.

Moscow should understand that if it continues to conduct violent
interventions in the Third World whenever the opportunity beck-
ons, we will eventually be forced into consolidating our new rela-
tionship with China. In a word, the Russians must be forced to face
a basic question. What is more important to them: A steady, stable,
and reasonably cooperative relationship with the United States, or
a license to stir the boiling pot of the Third World, a license that
will no longer be free of charge.

One case for SALT II, then, seems to me to rest on one very
simple proposition. If we expect to make even modest progress in
developing our political relations with the Russians and in getting
them to exercise restraint in the pursuit of their overall foreign
objectives, we must first obtain the needed strategic stability that
only SALT-type agreements can provide. The absence of a SALT II
agreement will make our competition with the Russians much
more dangerous, and even most hopes for improving our political
relations will be doomed.

But there is still another argument for SALT II that I believe
has not yet received sufficient attention. In our continuing competi-
tion with the Russians, competition that will continue as far into
the future as we can now see, our biggest advantages are not in the
military but in the nonmilitary areas.

These advantages are our economic and technological dynamism,
our democracy which can count on genuine popular support, our
ability to count on allies who join us freely, our society's openness,
flexibility and ability to innovate, our commitment to pluralism
and diversity. In all of these respects, we have fundamental advan-
tages over the Russians, who by contrast have only one great
strength, their sheer military might. And that is why, in pursuing
their goals around the world, the Soviets rely primarily on their
military power. They have few other assets.

It follows from this, I believe, that our long-range political objec-
tive should be to lessen the military competition with the Russians
and increasingly to divert that competition into areas in which we
hold the lead, and in which the Russians are behind, and may

never catch up. They can always catch us in military power. They
have demonstrated this during the past 15 years. By diverting
massive resources from their civilian economy, they can match
and, perhaps, if we fell asleep, they can even surpass our military
might.

But the Russians will have greater difficulty in catching up to us
in all other areas. Their economy is in serious trouble. Their tech-
nology lag continues. Their ability to motivate their own people to
work harder and more efficiently is limited. Their ability to attract
genuine allies rather than proxies or satellites will remain small.

Consequently, by putting a cap on the strategic arms race in
SALT II, and by moving SALT III to cut those arms further, we
will be diverting the competition between us into the economic,
technological, and moral arenas in which our advantage is incom-
parably greater. Can there be any doubt over the long run as to
whose system, theirs or ours, is likely to prevail in protracted,
peaceful competition?

There is already a good deal of suspicion in the Kremlin that this
is in fact our policy. Rejecting SALT II while embracing China is
the surest way to confirm these suspicions in the minds of the
Kremlin leaders. If the Soviets do come to the conclusion that we
are forming an anti-Soviet entente, including Europe, Japan, and
China, they will be tempted to react in some way that is bound to
be profoundly destabilizing.

They might even be tempted to take military action against
China before such an entente emerges. They might suspend the
MBFR talks, and increase their forces both in Europe and on the
Chinese border even more.

The best way for us to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict
is to pursue a policy of balance between Moscow and Peking. Yet,
rejecting SALT II at the same time that we are warming up
relations with China will mean taking a giant stride towards an
unbalanced policy.

Finally, with all due respect to the Members of the Senate, and
other distinguished Americans who oppose SALT II, I must say
that none of the arguments I have heard so far against the treaty
seem very convincing. For those who say that SALT does not go far
enough in cutting strategic arms, the answer surely is that this is
an admittedly imperfect but necessary step in the right direction.
To those who say that this agreement will lead to our strategic
inferiority, the answer is that this agreement does not prevent us
from developing any of the weapon systems, such as M-X, Trident
submarines, air-launched cruise missiles, that we may need to
ensure parity.

To those who say that we cannot trust the Russians, the answer
surely is that we could trust them even less if there is an unregu-
lated, and unrestrained nuclear arms race.

Some opponents of the SALT II Treaty seem to believe that
unless the treaty is defeated, the necessary military programs that
we need to deter the Russians will never be mounted. They see the
defeat of the treaty as a kind of shock therapy for the American
public. But the effect of defeating the treaty is more likely to be to
shock the Russians into higher and higher levels of military spend-
ing, while we continue at our more modest pace. Thus, defeating
the treaty may have precisely the opposite effect of the one intend-
ed by those treaty opponents.

Some treaty opponents apparently oppose the treaty because
they do not like the general character of Soviet foreign policy in
Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. As I hope I have made
clear, neither do I. Although we should take this opportunity to
warn the Russians that in the long run detente is incompatible, or
will be incompatible with many of their actions in the Third
World, we cannot reasonably ask them to suspend those actions as
a precondition for accepting SALT II.

After all, the Soviets for their part do not like the new relation-
ship that we are developing with the Chinese. What would be our
response if they sought to link SALT directly to our China policy?

We have a genius in this country for oversimplifying complex
problems. But sometimes that same genius leads to phrases that
cut through all the complexities to the heart of the matter. I do not
know who among your previous witnesses said that SALT II is a
small gift horse which we should not look in the teeth, but he was
certainly right. SALT II is neither a panacea nor a disaster. It is a
step in the right direction and it is a precondition for a
long range response to the Soviet challenge that we desperately
need to develop.

In the words of one White House official, SALT II does not signal
an end to the arms race. It does not mean an end to competition
between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is not a substi-
tute for a strong defense. But it is decidedly better than having no
treaty at all.

Thank you.

[Professor Zagoria's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Prof. Donald S. Zagoria

Senator Church and Distinguished Members of the Committee, as you continue
your deliberations on the SALT II Treaty and the role of that Treaty in U.S.-Soviet
relations, it is a privilege for me to be invited to present my views. As a student of
Soviet foreign policy for three decades, and as one who has no illusions whatever
about the nature of the Soviet system or about Soviet objectives in the world today,
I have still felt uncomfortable with what I regard as the extreme views on the
Soviet Union that often dominate our national discourse. On one extreme, Soviet
power is frequently exaggerated and Soviet ideology is frequently confused with
that of Nazi Germany. A 'Chicken Little" school of American foreign policy thinks
that the sky is falling down and that the United States is powerless to reverse
unfavorable trends. This school is nostalgic for the 1950's when the United States
was the most powerful country in the world, and it seeks to turn the clock back to
the situation that prevailed then when the United States enjoyed unquestionable
military superiority over the Soviet Union. The Chicken Little school exaggerates
the "Soviet menace." It minimizes the strength and vitality of the United States
and the resources of our many friends and allies. It is incapable of devising a
measured and discriminating response to the Soviet challenge. It confuses develop-
ments in Iran, southern Africa, Yemen, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and elsewhere, and
sees only the Soviet hand behind all of the unfavorable trends in the world today.
Instead of helping us to understand that the challenges we face in the Third World
are varied and complex and cannot be met merely with guns and missiles, it

encourages a mindless militarism. Generally opposed to SALT II, this school fails to
to tell us how the defeat of SALT and the escalation of the nuclear arms race will
help to contain Soviet advances.

On the other extreme, the challenge of growing Soviet military power and the
problems created by the Soviet offensive in the Third World are frequently mini-
mized by the "so what" school of American foreign policy. This mindless anti-
geopolitical school seems incapable of understanding that many of our friends and
allies are adversely affected by changes in regional balances of power. Seven pro-
Soviet communist parties have taken power or territory by armed force since the
spring of 1975. Between 20,000 and 40,000 Cuban gendarmes are now in Africa with
"guns for hire." To the extent that our friends and allies lose confidence in our
ability to contain this offensive, they will be forced to reconsider their own foreign
policy alignments. A substantial change in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia,
combined with the recent Islamic revolution in Iran, could, for example, imperil
Western interests in the Middle East.

But rejecting SALT II is not the answer to this problem either. The challenge for
the United States is to devise a steady, measured and broad response to these and
other problems of foreign policy. But to do this, we must recognize first of all that
many of these problems have been made or aggravated by our own erratic and
indecisive national behavior in recent years. Many of the most serious problems we
face in the global arena today are the result of a crisis of confidence in American
leadership, a crisis that has spread throughout the world since Watergate, our
defeat in Vietnam, and our continuing inability to meet some of our most pressing
domestic problems. We can no longer afford the luxury of 102 different foreign
policies, one for each Senator, one for the Department of State, and one for the
National Security Council. Our first and highest priority should be to achieve some
national consensus on a long range strategy.

We must recognize, secondly, that the world of the 1980's is different from the
world of the 1950's. We no longer have, and are unlikely ever to regain, unques-
tioned strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. And, in many parts of the Third
World, the Soviet Union has cleverly positioned itself on the side of parties and
states that enjoy considerable support — in Rhodesia, on the side of the Patriotic
Front; in the Arab world, on the side of the PLO against Israel; in the Persian Gulf,
on the side of the rebels against conservative oligarchies; in Ethiopia, on the side of
a government protecting the existing territorial status quo against internal dissi-
dents supported by Somalia. Rejection of SALT II will not solve any of these
problems. It will not help us to regain military superiority over the Soviet Union.
Rather, it will lead us to a new and even higher level of the nuclear arms race, a
level that will be much more dangerous because it will be out of control. And
rejecting SALT II will not improve our position in the Third World. On the con-
trary, it will make our competition with the Russians in these regions fraught with
much greater danger.

This is neither the time nor the place for me to spell out in great detail what I
mean by a steady, broad and measured response to the problems we face in our
dealing with the Soviet Union. To put the matter in shorthand, however, I would
say that we need a policy that combines detente with containment. To achieve such
a detente, the Administration must make two things clear to Moscow: first, that it
will be to the Soviet advantage if they exercise greater self-restraint; second, that it
will be risky if they don't. In recent past, we have failed to provide the Russians
either with positive or negative incentives for self-restraint. By foolishly imposing
congressional restrictions on trade with the Russians, and by linking those restric-
tions to Soviet emigration policies — rather than to Soviet foreign policy — we have
deprived ourselves of positive leverage on Soviet behavior. At the same time, we
have not been able to demonstrate any kind of military or political response to
Soviet activity in the Third World that might be a negative incentive for further
Soviet advances.

There are three steps in particular that we need to take in providing Moscow
with positive incentives for restraint. First, Congress should make the kinds of
amendments in trade legislation that Senator Adlai Stevenson is now proposing.
The effect of Stevenson's amendment would be to increase the President's flexibility
to trade with Moscow and to use such trade for "linkage." Second, we should engage
the Russians in preliminary discussions about regional security problems in various
parts of the Third World. We cannot exclude the Russians from all negotiations on
regional matters and then ask them for restraint in the regions. Finally, and not
least important, we need to sign and to ratify the SALT II agreement £is a symbol
both of our desire to slow down the nuclear arms race and of our desire to pursue a
more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. In sum, passing SALT II

should be part of a larger strategic concept that makes it clear to Moscow that we,
for our part, are anxious for a more comprehensive detente.

But along with the "carrots" there should also be some "sticks." The Senate,
when it ratifies SALT II, as I hope it will, should warn Moscow in a "sense of the
Senate" resolution that the United States will no longer accept a narrow and
unreciprocal detente, and that future Soviet conduct in the Third World will influ-
ence the future development of detente, including the prospects for SALT III. And
Moscow should understand that if it continues to conduct violent interventions in
the Third World wherever the opportunity beckons, we will eventually be forced
into consolidating our new relationship with China. In a word, the Russians must be
forced to face a basic question. What is more important to them: a steady, stable
and reasonably cooperative relationship with the United States, or a license to stir
the boiling pot of the Third World, a license that will no longer be free of charge?

The case for SALT II, then, seems to me to rest on one very simple proposition. If
we expect to make even modest progress in developing our political relations with
the Russians and in getting them to exercise restraint in the pursuit of their overall
foreign objectives, we must first obtain the needed strategic stability that only
SALT can provide. Passing SALT is, in fact, a necessary precondition for devising a
measured and broad response to the Soviet challenge in the world today. With it, we
may be able to devise such a response. Without it, we have no chance. The absence
of a SALT II agreement will make our competition with the Russians much more
dangerous and even modest hopes for improving our political relations will be
doomed.

But there is still another strong argument for SALT II that has not yet received
sufficient attention. In our continuing competition with the Russians — competition
that will continue as far into the future as we can now see — our biggest advantages
are not in the military but in the non-military areas. These advantages are our
economic and technological dynamism, our democracy which can count on genuine
popular support, our ability to count on allies who join us freely, our society's
openness, flexibility and ability to innovate, and our commitment to pluralism and
diversity. In all of these respects, we have fundamental advantages over the Rus-
sians who, by contrast, have only one great strength — their sheer military might.
And that is why, in pursuing their goals around the world, the Soviets rely primar-
ily on their military power. They have very few other assets.

It follows from this that our long range political objective should be to lessen the
military competiton with the Russians and increasingly to divert that competition
into areas in which we hold the lead and in which the Russians are behind and may
never catch up. They can always match us in military power. They have demon-
strated this during the past 15 years. By diverting massive resources away from
their civilian economy, they can match, and perhaps, if we fell asleep, they can even
surpass our military might.

But the Russians will have much greater difficulty in catching up to us in all
other areas. Their economy is in serious trouble. Their technological lag continues.
Their ability to motivate their own people to work harder and more efficiently is
limited. Their ability to attract genuine allies rather than proxies or satellites will
remain small. Consequently, by putting a cap on the strategic arms race in SALT II,
and by moving in SALT III to cut those arms further, we will be diverting the
competition between us into the economic, technological and moral arenas in which
our advantage is incomparably greater. Can there be any doubt over the long run as
to whose system — theirs or ours — is likely to prevail in protracted, peaceful competi-
tion?

Why, if this is the case, should the Russians be interested in SALT agreements?
The answer, in my opinion, is not that they want to lull us. The answer, I believe, is
that the Russians know even better than us how far behind they are the West in
the economic and technological arena and they are determined to catch up there,
too, just as they have caught up in the military field. But for them to have even the
slightest change of reducing the gap between us in these areas, they must begin to
divert resources away from their massive military industrial complex and back into
their civilian economy. For their great military strength is also their great economic
weakness. They must soon pay much more attention to increasing productivity, to
obtaining capital for investment, to increasing consumption, and so on, or their lag
behind the West will grow even more. But to accomplish this goal, the Russians will
need to change their present priorities. They will need to cut back on their huge
military programs in order to catch up to the West in the non-military areas in
which they are now so seriously behind.

In sum, in addition to our common interests in survival and in safely managing
our competition, both we and the Russians have another reason for wanting to
limit, and eventually to reduce, our strategic nuclear arsenals. We want the Rus-

sians to divert their resources away from the military and back into the civihan
economy in order to divert our competition into areas in which we are superior.
They have a stake in diverting resources back into the civilian economy because, in
the long run, that is their only hope of catching up to us as an economic, as well as
a military, superpower.

Before I turn to some concluding thoughts, there is one other consideration that
deserves to be weighed in the SALT balance. If the Senate refuses to ratify SALT II,
at the same time that Western Europe, with American acquiescence, begins to sell
arms to China, and at the same time that the West begins to trade with China on a
rather large scale, the Soviets will conclude that Washington is forming an anti-
Soviet alliance against it. There is already a good deal of suspicion in the Kremlin
that this is in fact our policy. Rejecting SALT II while embracing China is the
surest way to confirm these suspicions in the minds of the Kremlin leaders. If the
Soviets do come to the conclusion that we are forming an anti-Soviet entente that
includes Europe, Japan and China, they will be forced to react in some way that is
bound to be profoundly destabilizing. They might even be tempted to take military
action against China before such an entente emerges.

The best way for us to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict that has been
developing for two decades is to pursue a policy of equidistance or balance between
Moscow and Peking. Such a policy would exploit our unique position in the triangle
and make it possible for the United States to improve its relations with both the
Soviet Union and China at the same time. Such a policy would be a major contribu-
tion to global stability. It would be a policy dictated by our own national interests.
And it would be a policy warmly endorsed by our allies. A policy that tilts sharply
towards China, on the other hand, would be a major contribution to global instabil-
ity. It would not be in accord with our own interests and it would lead to great
strains within our own alliance system. Yet rejecting SALT II at the same time that
we are warming up relations with China will mean taking a giant stride towards
such an unbalanced policy.

Finally, with all due respect to the members of the Senate and other distin-
guished Americans who oppose SALT II, I must nonetheless say that none of the
arguments I have heard so far against SALT II seem very convincing.

To those who say that SALT II does not go far enough in cutting strategic arms,
the answer surely is that this is an admittedly imperfect but necessary step in the
right direction. To those who say that this agreement will lead to our strategic
inferiority, the answer is that this agreement does not prevent us from developing
any of the weapons systems such as the MX, Trident submarine, and air-launched
cruise missiles, that we may need to ensure parity. To those who say that this
agreement does not include the Backfire bomber which could reach the United
States, the answer is that it also does not include our bombers based in Britain
which could also be used against the Soviet Union. To those who say we cannot
trust the Russians, the answer surely is that we could trust them even less if there
is an unregulated and unrestrained nuclear arms race.

Some opponents of the SALT II Treaty seem to believe that unless the Treaty is
defeated, the necessary military programs that we need to deter the Russians will '
never be mounted. They see defeat of the Treaty as a kind of shock therapy for the
American public. But the effect of defeating the Treaty is more likely to shock the
Russians into higher and higher levels of military spending while we continue at
our more modest pace. Thus, defeating the Treaty may have precisely the opposite
effect of the one intended by these Treaty opponents.

Some Treaty opponents evidently oppose the Treaty because they do not like the
general character of Soviet foreign policy in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere.
As I hope I have made clear, neither do I. But although we should take this
opportunity to warn the Russians that detente is incompatible with many of their
actions in the Third World, we cannot reasonably ask them to suspend those actions
as a precondition for accepting SALT II. After all, the Soviets, for their part, do not
like the new relationship that we are developing with the Chinese. What would be
our response if they sought to link SALT directly to our China policy? To impose a
direct linkage between SALT and the general character of either Soviet or Ameri-
can foreign policy would mean that each side would have to accommodate each
other on matters of concern as a precondition for agreement on strategic limita-
tions. Such a procedure puts the cart before the horse. We cannot hope to resolve
matters in which our interests are divergent, as they are in various parts of the
world, if we cannot begin by resolving matters in which our interests coincide, as
they do on the need to limit the strategic arms race.

that SALT II is a small gift horse which we should not look in the teeth, but he was
certainly right. SALT II is neither a panacea nor a disaster. It is a step in the right
direction and it is a precondition for a long range response to the Sovient challenge
that we desparately need to develop.

The Chairman. Last week, at the close of the hearings on AUied
attitudes toward SALT, I put into the record testimony that John
Armitage had prepared for an earlier subcommittee hearing on
that subject which had to be canceled.

The other witness who was to have testified at that time was
Prof. Leo Labedz, a respected author on Soviet and East European
affairs. Today, I am happy to be able to put Professor Labedz'
testimony on Allied attitudes into the hearing record as well,
which I will do without objection.

As editor of Survey, the distinguished journal on East- West stud-
ies published in London, Professor Labedz knows whereof he
speaks when he argues in this testimony that SALT II must be
judged on whether or not it reflects and contributes to "the decline
of American power."

He holds that the treaty does intensify the preconception of
eroding American power and will, and that the Europeans support
the agreement only because they are too weak to take on them-
selves the burden that the United States is shedding.

His testimony is a welcome addition to our deliberations on the
treaty.

[Professor Labedz' prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Prof. Leopold Labedz

Mr. Chairman, it is my belief that the advocates of SALT II are confused about
the problem of its significance for Europe and that they systematically neglect the
question of Soviet motives in wanting it.

They argue that the refusal to ratify SALT II by the Senate would, in the words
of George W. Ball, "reinforce European doubts as to [the American] steadiness on
course and thus [the American] reliability as Europe's main defense". In support of
such speculations they often quote official and unofficial pronouncements by Euro-
pean leaders, politicians and journalists.

It seems to me that this is profoundly misleading and that if these propositions
are accepted at face value it would contribute not to the maintenance, but to the
erosion of Atlantic solidarity which is the political basis of Western security.

There is a striking discrepancy between public postures and private anxieties in
European political circles. It is a mistake to take the official endorsements of SALT
II as a sufficient indication of European attitudes on the subject. Neither in Amer-
ica, nor in Europe is there a unanimity on it, yet in the United States there is a
genuine grand debate on it, while in Europe there is nothing comparable, even
though it has profound implications for European security. Such anxieties as exist
are hidden behind the facade of the official endorsements. Therefore, one has to
probe the reasons for them, examine the motives and apprehensions underlying
them, and only then draw conclusions about probable political consequences for
Europe and NATO of the ratification of SALT II, rather than limit the argument to
the formal declarations on the European interest in it.

It is not my contention that the refusal to ratify SALT II will have no disturbing
effect on the European political scene. European leaders and even more the Europe-
an public are still largely thinking in terms of the early premises of "detente" and
are even less inclined to shed their illusions than are the Americans. Nor do they
think that they can influence the outcome. Yet whether SALT II is ratified or not,
Europeans are in for a shock, one way or another, when they more generally realize
the implications of the political and strategic shift in the balance of power. It is not
the SALT treaty itself, but the realization of the decline of the protective American
power which is the basic cause of the future shock in Europe. The question there-
fore is whether the ratification of SALT II will in this context increase or decrease
European efforts to enhance its security and the Atlantic cooperation, or whether it
will only intensify the shock and contribute to neutralist tendencies in Europe by
demonstrating not only a deterioration of American strategic position, but also a

further erosion of American political will. Because Europe is so dependent on the
American military support, while being in the front line, it should be even more
concerned about the preservation of the American strength and the impact of SALT
on it. As yet such concerns manifest themslves only on the unofficial level, but they
are real nevertheless. The ratification of SALT II in its present form will contribute
no less to the European than to the American continued complacency about the
growing threat of Soviet ascendancy. Americans have at least grown skeptical about
"detente". The sooner the Europeans get out of its still lingering anaesthesia, the
better the chances that they would face the reality of the growing peril to Europe.
The cooperation of the ostriches is hardly an answer to it.

George W. Ball argues that the rejection of the SALT II Treaty would undermine
the vitality of the Western Alliance and "give renewed vitality to the movement for
the Federal Republic [of Germany] to undertake independent negotiations with the
Soviet Union".There was a time when he stressed that American weaknesses pro-
vide fuel to neutralist tendencies in Europe, now he disregards his own old reflec-
tion when it became even more relevant in the context of further decline of the
American power. The danger of German "self-Finlandization" represented by the
Wehner-Bahr tendency exists, but it is not the consecration of the American decline
in SALT II, but its refusal that would avoid adding to its chances of growing. The
perception not just of decline, but of its acceptance can only have the opposite effect
and strengthen the neutralist potential in Germany and Europe.

Indeed, the official endorsements of SALT II by the NATO leaders are, paradox-
ical as it may seem, an indication of the undermined European political morale in
the face of growing Soviet threat. The fact that they have meekly accepted the
treaty which separates American and European security interests is an ominous
sign that in the future they may not have the courage to defend them from the
Russians and may choose "self-Finlandization" instead.

The reason why they do not object to SALT II is a measure of European weak-
ness, not of European political wisdom. It produces no protests about sacrificing
European security interests in SALT II, such as for instance the acceptance of
"Backfire" and of SS 20 non-strategic weapons, because of the desperate need to
cling to the American "clinging deterrence". Ironically, European weakness instead
of producing intensified concern about the growing American weakness, only leads
to a growing nervousness about the possible loss of American military protection.
Many Europeans, such as Chancellor Schmidt, feel that a failure to support SALT II
by the Europeans may result not in a resolution by the Americans to reverse the
unfavorable trend in the balance of power between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but
in a growing American isolationism which will totally undermine European secu-
rity. They are ready therefore to support SALT II in spite of its negative features
from the European point of view. They think, on plausible if not necessarily realis-
tic grounds, that the alternative is even more dangerous. Within this framework of
thought, Europeans choose the lesser evil, they do not aspire to be the actors in the
wider political game. It is up to the Americans to face the more profound historical
alternatives and to provide the leadership of the Alliance: Europeans can only
follow suit.

Besides, different European leaders have their own additional political motives to
adopt such attitudes. They stem from internal political pressures. Herr Schmidt
faces the neutralist wing of the SPD, Mr. Ecevit the growing dissatisfaction with
NATO and the Left-wing opposition to it, Mrs. Thatcher seeing the prospect of
internal economic and Trade Union battles does not want to jeopardize their out-
come by foreign policy stands which may appear quixotic and make her more
vulnerable internally. Italian and French communist parties are powerful reasons
not to appear "plus Catholique que Le Pape," more royalist than the king, more
American than Jimmy Carter.

Yet, ultimately, all these reasons can only explain, but they do not justify the
European failure to take a more far-sighted stand on SALT II. When all is said and
done, they are in the same boat as the Americans and if the boat is leaking it is not
just up to the boatswain to take care of it.

There are other voices in Europe. They presage the as yet as muted anxiety that
SALT II may contribute to the dialectic of decline in the relations between Europe
and America. From the European point of view, even the fact that the American
and Soviet strategic armaments may cancel each other out and leave Europe ex-
posed to Soviet conventional military superiority (with no realistic chance to match
it) is bad enough. "The SALT process" undermined European theatre stability from
its inception. But this is water under the bridge: now Europeans face the situation
in which, as the Norwegian General Zeiner Gundersen said to NATO defense
ministers, the Russians are gaining ascendancy "in every category of capability, be
it nuclear, chemical, land, sea, air, or space". They can see as well as anyone the

decline of American power. As the liberal German journal, "Die Zeit" (23 March
1979) put it not long ago:

"The President had to take shameful chiding in Mexico. The U.S. marines were
disgracefully defeated in Tehran. The U.S. ambassador to Kabul died ignominiously
in the exchange of fire between Islamist terrorists and Marxist "Liberators". To
Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia the U.S protective power was no longer worth
being visited."

They can visualize Soviet soldiers conducting operations in Eritrea, the Soviet
navy moving to Aden and Cam Ranh Bay (while the American navy has not enough
strength to establish a permanent presence in the Indian ocean to protect the vital
oil area), Soviet MIGs and submarines in Cuba violating the 1962 agreement with-
out American protest, Nicaragua falling to the Sandinistas with Cuban help, the
"allied" Turkey refusing to grant the United States, after the Iranian debacle, the
substitute facilities for SALT nuclear verification. The Turkish Foreign Minister
said: "We have told the United States not to consider us a spearhead of NATO".

In such context, it requires an effort for Euopeans to believe in the credibilty of
the American deterrent after the ratification of SALT II; therefore it is not surpris-
ing that there may be some skepticism in Europe about the value of Mr. Vance's
assurances (in his speech of May 1, 1979) about the need for "more — not less
American leadership ... to inspire others to work with us towards goals we share
but cannot achieve separately".

One can only say: "Amen . European skepticism was bluntly put in the French
Figaro (11 May 1979). Referring to President Carter's warning that the failure to
ratify the treaty "would play into the hands of the most hardline and intransigent
elements in the Soviet leadership," it wrote:

"This kind of logic is reminiscent of the school playground. . . . The thesis that
refusal by the American Senate to ratify the agreement would play into the hands
of the Moscow 'hardliners' is extremely weak, if only because whether 'hard or soft'
all Soviet leaders share a similar concept of history. You cannot, without risk,
reduce the Kremlin to a kind of aviary in which 'hawks' and 'doves' contest for
power. ... It is time that Mr. Carter realized this and stopped confusing foreign
policy with ornithology."

The argument is indeed boringly familiar. Already during the last war Stalin
used Western mirror-perceptions to get concessions from Roosevelt and Churchill,
warning them that otherwise he may be "overruled" by the hardliners in the
Politburo.

It was in fact difficult for the hard-bitten Europeans to look at the course of
negotiations without skepticism. The cancellation of the B-1, the "postponement" of
neutron bomb production, the unilateral abandonment of weapon projects which
could have at least served as bargaining counters, the naive expectation of recipro-
cal "good-will gestures" from the Russians, "deadline diplomacy" — all this seemed,
as Mr. Paul Nitze described it, "an Alice in Wonderland approach in meeting the
Soviet threat." To many Europeans it looked like a course for teaching vegetarian-
ism to tigers by a correspondence course. They wondered whatever happened to all
the hard-headed Yankee traders. The half-hearted attempts to maintain the strate-
gic balance will not compensate for the negative long-term effect on Europe of the
ratification of SALT II.

Of course, the show counts for more than the billboard pictures. Ultimately, it is
the American defense effort itself, with or without SALT, which counts most. But in
this case the show and the billboard only too obviously are politically linked. The
billboard matters because the European spectators know that the previous shows
were not very good and they fear that they are getting weaker. They can only
wonder what will happen if the "Cuba-in-reverse" situation should occur. The most
prominent European commentator on international affairs, Raymond Aron, noticed
that a decade of SALT negotiations "accompanied and masked" Soviet ascendacy
and he asked (in "Commentaire," No. 5, 1979) the pertinent question— whether
SALT II does not in itself mark the replacement of American by Soviet hegemony.
The implications of this for Europe, America, and the world should be soberly
assessed before the ratification of SALT II significantly adds to the political momen-
tum of this process.

When it comes to the question of the Soviet enthusiasm for SALT II the rationali-
zations of its supporters are inverted. They take the official European declarations
at face value without looking at any other political considerations. But they disre-
gard Soviet political and idelogical pronouncements which explain Soviet purposes
and strategy. The general reasons for both Soviet intensive pressure for the ratifica-
tion of the treaty and for its significance against the background of the history of
Soviet expansionism are thus avoided.

48-250 0-79-7

When attempts are made to face this crucial issue, they are not only reluctant
and infrequent, but also evasive and inconsistent. In particular, the SALT support-
ers find it hard to explain away the Soviet continuous arms drive in the Sixties and
Seventies, when America unilaterally abandoned the "race" and the "SALT proc-
ess" reigned supreme. Thus, for example, George Kistyakovsky first tries to "prove"
in his article, "False Alarm: The Story Behind SALT II" (The New York Review of
Books, 22 March 1979) that "hardliners" have been consistently exaggerating the
Soviet military build-up, only to come up with the lame (even though misleading)
statement that: "since intercontinental missiles were introduced some twenty years
ago, the Soviets have tested thirteen known ICBM designs — and probably several
other models not identified by American intelligence — while the U.S. tested and
deployed only six models. This is an extraordinary waste of Soviet economic and
technical resources. It seems likely that the Soviet leaders have had even more
difficulty controlling their 'military-industrial' bureaucracy than our own govern-
ment has."

"Bureaucratic inertia" is, of course, not the reason for the Soviet arms drive, but
whatever it is, it presents a threat to the West which is not explained away by such
arguments.

The slipperiness of the pro-SALT case can also be seen in the inconsistency of the
reasoning employed by its advocates. Some of them acknowledge the threat, but
ignore the historical roots of Soviet expansionism, others deny its existence and try
to explain Soviet behavior by the tired argument about the legitimate concern with
security. It has been used ever since Stalin gobbled Eastern Europe, but it does not
sound convincing at the time of the Soviet global thrust.

Secretary Brown recognized in his FY 1980 Annual Report "the degree of empha-
sis in Soviet military doctrine on war-winning nuclear capability, and the extent to
which current Soviet programs are related to the doctrine", but he failed to look
into the motives underlying both the programs and the doctrine. The implications of
this for the future can only be gauged if one relates SALT to the fundamental
sources of Soviet conduct and not, as Secretary Brown did in his testimony before
the Senate Committee, to the tactical considerations alone.

While some SALT II advocates do not address themselves to the right historical
questions, others provide the wrong answers to them in their testimonies. Thus
Richard J. Barnet rightly stressed that "the debate over SALT really comes down to
a disagreement about Soviet goals", but reduced them to "the historic concern of the
Russians with territorial security" and asserted that "their weapon programs, mili-
tary doctrines, and political uses of military power have been imitative of and
responsive to U.S. programs, doctrines and operations." All these propositions are
demonstrably false.

Soviet actions in Angola or Ethiopia are hardly concerned with the Russian
territorial security. Nor is it relevant to the development of the Soviet missile
superiority or the Soviet blue water navy. And they were not built in response to
American arms expansion: as noted above, the enormous increase in Soviet military
expenditures coincided with a steady decrease in American military expenditures.
In short, the old chestnut about the Soviet "security" should be finally put to rest
and be replaced by concern about Western security in the face of Soviet expansion-
ism, of which the years of Soviet history provide such ample evidence.

Military technology matters, but it is not everything. Political perspective is even
more important. The problem before the Senate is how the ratification of SALT II
in its present form will affect the situation in which the decline of American power
is acknowledged by everybody except the American President. Inevitably, its accept-
ance without serious amendments will be generally taken as an indication that the
Soviet expansion and drive for ascendance is going to meet with even less resistance
in the future than in the recent past. (Conversely, a modification of the treaty, with
a view for a better balance will have the opposite political effect. As both supporters
and opponents of SALT II realize, its symbolic significance will be enormous. For
the world as a spectator, its ratification may raise the specter of a possible emer-
gency of Soviet hegemony in Europe and adjoining areas, if not yet of a more
general Pax Sovietica.

Seen in this light the attempts to represent the opposition to the ratification as
somehow illegitimate, or as the President put it, "the height of irresponsibility,"
turn against those who became known as "SALT-sellers" (Churchill would undoubt-
edly have called them "the boneless wonders"). Soviet pressures against any amend-
ments give us an early taste of what Soviet intimidation might become if the United
States were to continue down the slippery slope.

A day after he accepted Mr. Brezhnev's non-treaty assurances on the use of the
"Backfire", President Carter said that "SALT II is not based on trust" and added

that the "U.S. means of verification would discover, in time for an effective re-
sponse, any Soviet cheating on the treaty."

Leaving aside the question of verification, one wonders what this "effective re-
sponse" might be, whether the Russians are, or are not, cheating. This one effective-
ly guarded secret has not been detected through the national means of verification
in the SALT II debate. The comparison of the American starting position in March
1977 with the outcome of the Geneva negotiations throws some doubt on how
resolute the will behind such "effective response" would be, especially in the context
of an even more adverse balance of power.

No, the time for such an "effective response", which does not require any dramat-
ics but only a reassertion of national will, is now. In part it requires refusing to
accept SALT II as it stands, having emerged from ill-conducted negotiations which
were based on false political and strategic perceptions. Wrong expectations in the
past cannot inspire confidence in wishful assurances today.

In his Foreign Policy article of Spring 1974, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that:
"Nobody knows what the American policy is," a statement which has acquired an
additional pertinence with the passage of time. At present nobody knows what
American foreign policy is either, but it became clear that at least some of its
premises are incompatable. There is a growing tension between the need to preserve
American alliances (NATO, in particular) and the strategic concepts elaborated in
the sixties (the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, in particular). What hap-
pens to the operational relevance of the theories of "tripwire", of "limited re-
sponse", or of damage limitation" when the credibility of the American deterrence
umbrella itself comes into question? And if, in order to strengthen European de-
fense, a European nuclear deterrent is promoted in spite of Soviet objections in
SALT III, what will happen to the American concern with nuclear non-proliferation
and, indeed, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself? If Europe had to rely on its own
deterrent, can Japan be far behind? What about other nations which are already on
the brink of nuclear capability? And how can NATO, conceived as a regional
alliance limited in its functions to a specific geographic area, be effective against the
growing Soviet threat to the strategic points vital to its survival, but lying outside
its "jurisdiction"? Such and similar questions are increasingly forcing themselves on
the agenda £is a result of the American drift into impotence.

The Soviets were, of course, skillfully exploiting such "contradiction," trying to
aggravate them through their tactics. The divorce between the political and strate-
gic concerns, the "decoupling" of various vital American considerations have been
sharpened by the acceptance of Soviet diplomatic strategy which has separated ab
initio the political and strategic, the nuclear and conventional, the American and
the European interests simply through the assignation of different subjects to
different diplomatic pigeonholes, in Helsinki (only general "security"), Vienna
(MBFR— only NATO conventional arms), Geneva (SALT II — only American strate-
gic arms). This diplomatic arrangement precluded in effect the necessary "linkages"
inconvenient to the Soviets, but it is, of course, not the only reason for the divorce
between different elements in American foreign policy which is now so confused in
its concepts, its perceptions and its responses.

If paradoxically, both the acceptance and the rejection of the ratification of SALT
II create considerable concern among West Europeans, it will be the result of this
confusion. Europe should realize now the relevance of the celebrated question by
Edward Gibbon in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire."

"The savage nations of the globe are the common enemies of civilized society; and
we may inquire with anxious curiosity, whether Europe is still threatened with a
repetition of those calamities which formerly oppressed the arms and institutions of
Rome." Optimistically, Gibbon answered this question in the negative, but two
hundred years later, one cannot help but feel that there is a real possibility that the
answer may after all turn out to be positive.

And if Europe is lost it would not be a calamity just for Europe. It would be a
disaster for America too. Europe does not have to be lost in any dramatic way, it
may simply drift into neutralism or self-Finlandization, just as America may drift
into the isolationist impotence of a "fortress" mentality. The Orwellian "Eurasia"
and "Oceania" would then acquire realistic, rather than horror-fiction characteris-
tics. Considerations of American security apart, this is not a development which
would be conducive to the minimization of the chances of nuclear war after the 1984
elections, with the United States increasingly isolated and with the possibility of a
Sino-Soviet rapprochement or a Sino-Soviet nuclear confrontation looming.

There is no earthly reason why this kind of development should occur. The
potential strength of the antagonists of the Soviet Union is immensely greater than
its own and it is the Soviet menace which brings them together. Besides, the
potential weaknesses of the Soviet Union — in economics, technology, and national

problems — could be very troublesome if the Soviet Union cannot compensate them
with foreign policy successes. Even such successes created new difficulties for the
Soviet Union. It cannot consolidate its imperial realm through the cultural superior-
ity of its institutions. It has only brute force and totalitarian techniques, not Roman
law or British constitutionalism. Its economic base is too weak by itself to sustain
the imperial expansion, it can only count on the weakness of its opponents. Western
strengths and Soviet weaknesses can be politically exploited, the American political
will strengthened, the morale of its allies reinforced, and Soviet expansionism
checked. Given a clear vision of the aim, there is no reason why America and the
West should not pull through the dangerous period of the Eighties. But this cannot
be done by a Wilsonian "guarantee by word" of peace and an unequal treaty
signalling American decline and Soviet ascendancy. However concealed, this kind of
arrangement cannot dispel anxieties in Europe and elsewhere, including America
itself.

The hairsplitting about "adequate" verification, "significant" threat and all the
other weasel words in the SALT II debate (which George F. Will called "the canned
cant") can, of course, confuse the public. But although it is difficult for the public to
find its way through the welter of technical claims and counter-claims, it can sense
the danger. After all, as Pericles said, in a free society "although only a few may
originate a policy, we are all able to judge it."

For this purpose it is essential to realize a few fundamental historical and
political facts.

We all know that SALT I was supposed to be an "interim" agreement to be
followed by a more permanent arrangement providing for increased arms limita-
tions and a real arms control. We also know that after six-and-a-half years of
negotiations nothing came out of it, except another Soviet step en route to the
consolidation of Soviet strategic superiority and a similar promise of increased arms
limitations and control in SALT III. We are therefore bound to ask ourselves the
worrying question, as so many asked in the Thirties, where all the concessions to
the dictators are leading, whether the optimistic anticipations are not equally
illusory this time and whether the SALT II agreement will not prevent the recogni-
tion of the dangers involved. If we do not all remember the still relevant distant
past, we remember the recent past and, as Henry Kissinger put it in his Statement
to a Senate Committee (on 15 April 1975), "to fully understand what has happened
it is necessary to have an appreciation of all that went before."

Those who have not only a sense of responsibility to the present, but also a sense
of history and of responsibility to future generations, to our own children should be
able to see that the ratification of SALT II may be a political calamity.

"Detente" was a victory of false hopes over historical experience. SALT I was a
victory of wrong concepts over strategic experience. SALT II will be a victory of
discredited illusions over both historical and strategic experience. It should not be
ratified in its present form.

We will proceed, at this time, to the questioning of the panel,
and I would yield to Senator Church.

Senator Church. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I confess that because of another engagement, I have been
unable to hear all of the statements, but I can assure you, gentle-
men, that I will read them.

Mr. Zagoria, you say in your statement — and it struck me as I
quickly perused it — "A Chicken Little school of American foreigri
policy thinks that the sky is falling down, and the United States is
powerless to reverse unfavorable trends."

I must say that there is a popular view that this is happening to
us, and one that seems to be so deeply implanted that it may give
rise to another attempt to find scapegoats like we witnessed after
the Second World War.

You define this school as:

Nostalgic for the 1950's, when the United States was the most powerful country in
the world, and it seeks to turn the clock back to the situation that prevailed then,
when the United States enjoyed unquestioned military superiority over the Soviet
Union.

"The Chicken Little school," you go on.

exaggerates the Soviet menace, and minimizes the strength and vitality of the
United States and the resources of our many friends and allies. It is incapable of
devising a measured and discriminating response to the Soviet challenge. It confuses
developments in Iran, Southern Africa, Yemen, Afghanistan, Vietnam and else-
where, and sees only the Soviet hand behind all of the unfavorable trends in the
world today. Instead of helping us to understand that the challenges we face in the
Third World are varied and complex, and cannot be met really with guns and
missiles, it encourages a mindless militarism.

As I said, I see much evidence of this school of thought, not just
among the experts that are down at Foggy Bottom, but out in the
country at large. Politicians are trying to latch on to that, and
make the most that they can of it.

What I would like to ask you is, there really isn't any way to
turn the clock back, is there, Mr. Zagoria?

Mr. Zagoria. I don't think that it is possible for the United
States to achieve for any length of time strategic superiority over
the Soviet Union. I think they would do everything to deny us that,
and I don't think that it is technically possible.

Senator Church. Is it even conceptually sound? When we had a
monopoly on the weapons, or when in the early 1950's we had so
large a number of these weapons as compared to the Soviet Union,
or even during the Cuban missile crisis, when we had such a
preponderant advantage, then there was such a thing as strategic
superiority, and it had some impact upon the Berlin crisis of that
period, and the Cuban missile crisis.

Once both sides have built up their arsenal to the point where
either can pulverize the other several times over, then is it sensible
anymore to talk about achieving a strategic preponderance that
has any meaning?

Mr. Zagoria. I don't think it is sensible. But I think on both
sides there are fears that the other side is trying to get strategic
superiority. I think that there is probably a Soviet counterpart of
our people who fear for ICBM vulnerability. Professor Legvold gave
some very interesting figures that can be used by those Soviet
counterparts.

At the moment, because we have diversified our strategic force,
our ICBM land-based missiles are more vulnerable than the Rus-
sian land-based ICBM's because they have not diversified their
force. But they are going to face the same problem later on.

Senator Church. Yes, they will face the same problem later on,
but the question is, how much of a real problem is it, or how much
is it the result of the nuclear theologians who concoct these scenar-
ios?

When the committee was told by the commission that we wanted
to study what the actual physical effects of a nuclear exchange
would be on the United States and the Soviet Union, they spoke of
a strike against our missile bases, our Minutemen missiles — and
not of the sort of surgical strike that we hear about in this antisep-
tic language of the military experts and the nuclear theologians,
but of a strike that would wipe out between 15 and 20 million
Americans.

Then, the scenario went, an American President would hesitate
to strike back even though he had the power left to destroy the
Soviet Union for fear that the Soviet Union, in the last act of the
last person, would touch the buttons and fire the remaining mis-
siles at us.

All of this seems to me to be unreal. I cannot imagine any Soviet
military leader saying to the Kremlin:

We now have the necessary measure of nuclear preponderance that we can take
out those Minutemen, and when we do so, we will paralyze the American President
who will then refrain from retaliation, or if he does retaliate, at least we have a
sufficient margin of missiles that we can get back at them and decimate what is left
of the United States.

It seems to me that it is unreal, once you get to the point where
the missiles can destroy both countries.

Mr. Zagoria. I agree with you that it would be irrational for
Soviet leadership to launch a first strike against the United States
now or at any time in the foreseeable future. I think that some of
the better critics would respond that they are talking about the
political and psychological consequences of the perception of
American inferiority.

I agree with you that there is a great deal of theology in the
debate as it is taking place in the pages of many of our journals.

Senator Biden. Don't the theologians encourage that perception?
The very people who argue that perceptions of American weakness
are important are the same people who contribute to a perception
of American weakness, by constantly talking about scenarios in
which the United States either loses or gives in to Soviet intimida-
tion. The trouble is that these scenarios are totally implausible.
They exist only in the minds of the nuclear theologians. A first-
strike threat is only significant if a rational Soviet leader would
consider it. If he is irrational, then it doesn't matter in this con-
text. We can have 4 million M-X, if they are irrational, and they
are still going to be able to eliminate somewhere up to 125 million
Americans.

Mr. Ulam. Senator, if I may say something. If we look at one
point where everybody agrees there was some risk of a nuclear
confrontation with the Soviet Union, that was the Cuban missile
crisis. At the time, the Soviets were in a condition of considerable
inferiority to us in nuclear weapons. Still, the situation developed
because of their perception of our weakness, that we would not
react, and a series of events started, the momentum of which could
have led to a nuclear crisis.

Mr. Khrushchev was not irrational. He was harebrained, as his
successors say, and had harebrained ideas occasionally. But one
thing that impressed me at the time was that even at the time of
the decided inferiority in nuclear weapons, the Russians assumed
that the mere prospect of any nuclear conflict with the United
States would act as a deterrent for the United States in defending
its interests.

I remember Mr. Gromyko was in Washington at the time, and at
the time the Berlin crisis was ripening, and President Kennedy
called out 150,000 reservists. Mr. Gromyko in his interview with
the American press said that President Kennedy should realize
that we don't live in the 19th century, and consequently calling out
150,000 reservists makes no difference in the age of modern weap-
ons.

In other words, the Russians were using something of a nuclear
bluff at a time when they were decidedly inferior to us. So the
question is not academic, or theological whether with a much

increased power vis-a-vis us in nuclear weapons, whether this
would not increase their propensity for similar plays.

Senator Church. My belief has always been that the harebrained
idea was that the Russians could achieve something comparable to
nuclear equivalence cheaply, by putting medium range missiles in
Cuba that would strike the United States and would make up for
their inferiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that this
kind of bluff would give them a nuclear equivalence that they
could not otherwise attain, except for the massive expenditure of
resources in the Soviet Union itself.

When the bluff was called, the Russians withdrew the missiles.
They did behave rationally.

Mr. Ulam. They did break down.

Senator Church. The threat was really not credible. When the
President reacted, the Russians recognized that it was not credible,
and that they were not going to suffer the destruction of their own
society. So they backed down. It was a great miscalculation and
humiliation for them.

After that, they apparently made a conscious decision that they
would devote however much of their resources as would be neces-
sary to achieve nuclear equivalence with the United States, to close
the gap so that in the future they would be in a position of parity.
Today they are roughly in that position.

The other factor that has been added to the equation in the
meantime is that our nuclear arsenal has continued to grow mas-
sively — over 10,000 warheads, equivalent to 600,000 Hiroshimas. In
the event of a miscalculation today, the level of danger arising out
of a confrontation between these two arsenals is enormously great-
er. Both sides have each spent $1 trillion just to make the two
countries the two most insecure in the world today. That is, I
think, the central insanity of our times.

I don't know how we crawl down from this precarious position.
But the only hope that I can see is that we take advantage of the
parity which makes negotiation possible. As modest as SALT II is,
the hope that I have is that it is a stepping stone that may lead to
more substantial reductions on both sides in the SALT III talks.

That would sum up my feelings toward the treaty. Do you have
any response to that?

Mr. Ulam. I will just use this as an example that perceptions are
important, and the argument that psychologically numbers are of
some importance. What is even more important is the impression
that the Soviets perceive how eager we are just to concede to their
viewpoint without protecting our own interests, and arriving at a
fair bargain from our point of view. Those things add up to a
situation where they would make another miscalculation. We
cannot preclude it.

Mr. Legvold. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could comment on the
same range of questions.

The issue, if you will, is nuclear blackmail in these circum-
stances. I think it is fair to say it never comes as a proposition or a
shot out of the blue, but out of a crisis situation. The essential
proposition of rationality, or irrationality in actually using the
nuclear weapons is very rarely in dispute.

100

By and large, the question of nuclear blackmail is more a com-
ment on us, that is the potential victim, than it is on the Soviet
Union. That is, the extent to which we would, in the shadow of
nuclear war, given physical, visible, or tangible advantages on the
Soviet Union's part, yield.

That has to be converted into some set of scenarios, and the
nuclear theologians, and so on, who develop this argue it in the
following fashion. It is almost like one of those computerized chess
games in which you can set up four moves, and then press the
button and see what happens. The whole thing plays its way
through, and you see the results. At that moment, we press the
button and we see what the whole set of moves are, and responses
through nuclear war. Since we know that at the end of this proc-
ess, called escalation or dominance, we lose, we yield before we
ever get to that point. That is the real problem.

The Chairman. It is a matter of will, isn't it?

Mr. Legvold. Yes, and that is why, Mr. Chairman, I said that it
really was a comment on us rather than it is on the realism of the
proposition.

There is a second side to this, and it is very important. It brings
us back to Cuba. It is the extent to which at this moment, if we are
not bluffing, if we do not yield, even if we were to perceive the way
in which the calculator plays out the chess game in the right way,
then what does the Soviet Union do in these circumstances, when
the balance no longer looks the way it did in the Cuban missile
crisis.

That raises the question of the link between the state of the
strategic balance and Soviet behavior in various parts of the world,
or specifically the question of Soviet risk taking. I am not satisfied
on two scores yet, and I think that people ought to be satisfied on
this score before they draw hasty conclusions. I am not satisfied,
first of all, that there is a direct correlation between the state of
the nuclear balance and the way in which people behave, by and
large, when there are risks involved at the low end.

The moment of the crunch, when you are eyeball-to-eyeball,
there is a link between the strategic balance and risk taking. But
at the lower level, I am not sure there is.

The second point that I would make, as I look at Soviet behavior
over the 17 years since the Cuban missile crisis, I am not convinced
that the Soviets are more prone to take risks today than then. In a
period of inferiority, I think that they took greater risks.

I think that the Berlin crisis from 1958 to 1961, and I think the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962 far exceed risk taking as such, when
contrasted with Angola, with the Horn, or anything else that you
might cite in the recent period.

There is another way in which you can phrase the problem of
Soviet behavior in risk taking, and that has to do with the way in
which we have been behaving outside the context of the shifting
military balance, although maybe because of it. That is the extent
to which our failure to resist Soviet probing has caused them to
redefine what constitutes a risk. Therefore, they feel they can do
what they want in Angola or the Horn because of our failure of
will. But even that is not necessarily linked to the strategic bal-
ance.

101

I don't know who believes that the American response or failure
of response in Angola was due to the state of the overall military
balance, or the failure to respond in the Horn of Africa was due to
the state of the strategic nuclear balance.

So even here, I don't see evidence that, in fact, the Soviets are
more prone to run risks, or to recalculate or redefine what consti-
tutes a risk at the moment.

Senator Church. In the whole course of the debate in the Senate
about what American policy should be in Angola — I don't remem-
ber anyone talking about the threat of a nuclear war.

There were those who wanted to send in the CIA, and send in
Marines, and start another war in the jungles, and so on. But none
of them talked about the risk of a nuclear war. The nuclear ele-
ment, the strategic nuclear balance did not really enter into the
debate.

Mr. Legvold. That is my point.

Senator Church I was underscoring your point.

Mr. Legvold. If the general statement is frequently made, as it
is, that the Soviets are more inclined today, because of the chang-
ing military power, to run risks, then where is the evidence?

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, during that debate, and we
had closed and open sessions, I don't remember any discussion
about the prospect of a direct head-to-head confrontation with the
Soviets. The issue was not that as it was debated.

I am going to revamp what I said initially. I said that this was to
be an open forum, which I prefer. But all of the gentlemen who
showed up decided that they prefer not to have an open forum, and
the ones who agree with me are not here. We will return to the 10-
minute rule, and I yield to Senator Javits.

Senator Javits. I would just like to thank the witnesses. I am
reading their statements now, and I prefer to wait for any ques-
tions.

The Chairman. Senator McGovern?

Senator McGovern. Thank you.

First of all, I want to commend all four of the witneses for the
very thoughtful statements they have presented here today. I am
particularly pleased to have Mr. Legvold here because, Mr. Chair-
man, he once worked in my office many years ago. I don't take any
credit at all for his brilliance and his perception, but I do feel very
proud that we once worked together.

I would like to ask all of you a general question in whatever time
I have. I think that we are dealing in these hearings not only with
Soviet perceptions of us, but American perceptions of what the
Soviets are up to. It has been repeatedly stated in these hearings,
and implied when it was not stated by other witnesses, that the
Soviet Union is bent upon a course that is aimed at virtually
devouring the West. But I am wondering whether it is not the
emergence of the Soviet Union as a major superpower in the world
today that is really troubling us.

In other words, are their efforts an attempt to emulate what we
are doing as a superpower around the world? I see them doing a
number of things in the Third World and elsewhere that are of
concern to me, but I have been concerned about that pattern of
conduct when we practiced it.

102

Senator Fulbright used to make the observation when he was
here that when he traveled around the world, he saw more Ameri-
can soldiers in airports going hither, dither, and yon, to various
posts of duty, than he saw Soviet forces. Maybe that is an oversim-
plification, but we see the Soviets sending arms and advisors to
South Yemen, and to Africa, and other crucial points, but we have
sent more arms and advisors to the Third World, I think, than they
have.

We see them supporting the Cubans in other countries, but we
have had our share of direct interventions, and no one needs to
tick off that list to this audience. We see them building nuclear
weapons, despite SALT I, and that point has been made by a
number of witnesses. But we have not been standing still either in
the SALT L We have taken the first technological step on such
things as the MIRV, and now the cruise missile.

I would like to raise the question, isn't the basic source of the
tension the fact that we have two major superpowers, each trying
to look after their interests, and extend their influence wherever
they reasonably can, and that that competition is not quite the one-
sided campaign of Soviet aggression that it is sometimes made out
to be?

Aren't some of the same things that worry us in their behavior a
cause for worry to them when they are practiced by us?

I would appreciate comments from any of you who care to com-
ment on it.

Mr. Labedz. I could not agree. Senator, that this is just the
function of two superpowers, and that the Russians in some way
are copying our behavior. I think our whole engagement in the
business of selling arms started very largely with the Soviet posi-
tion after the war, and evaluation by the Soviet Union of its
wartime pledges, extending its sphere of influence over Eastern
Europe, replacing the governments with military force. We may
have acted clumsily, or overreacted at times, but certainly I don't
think that you can make the comparison and say that this is just
the traditional competition, natural competition of two superpow-
ers.

I think that for all our sins of commission and omission, the
record as to which power stands for more peaceful international
relations is very clear. I think that any sense of proportion should
indicate that Russian behavior has been such that it should have
caused us legitimate concern, and should concern noncommunist
and even some Communist countries all over the world.

Mr. Zagoria. I do think that there is a basic validity to the
argument. Senator McGovern, that we are witnessing two great
superpowers in competition, seeking to extend their influence. I
think, in fact, that a good analogy, insofar as analogies are ever
useful, sometimes some of our people refer to Nazi Germany, to
Munich, they evoke the Germany of the 1930's as an analogy of the
Soviet Union of today.

I think that a better analogy would be the analogy that existed
on the eve of World War I between Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany and
Great Britain at that time, in which Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany
was determined to catch up to Great Britain and achieve its place
in the sun.

103

I think that that is the situation today. I think that the Russians
want a place in the sun. Their idea of a place in the sun is to have
as much influence in the world as the United States has.

I think there are a number of things that create the problem.
One is that the Soviet Union is a rising power. We came out of
World War II as the only global power, economically, culturally,
ideologically, militarily, and every other way.

What has now been happening in the past decade or so is that
the Soviet Union, particularly through the growth of its military
might, is challenging that dominance. That, understandably, cre-
ates great fear, alarm, suspicions, as did the rise of German power
on the eve of World War I in Great Britain.

Senator McGovern. The reverse of that, Mr. Zagoria, is that
they must have felt enormous anxiety during that period when
they were so clearly overshadowed by American power.

Mr. Zagoria. That is right.

I think another factor that has to be brought into this equation
is that they benefit more from global disorder, disorder particularly
in the Third World, because they are an anti-status quo power, and
we are, by and large a status quo power. Therefore, if one can bet
on anything it is that there will be more radical transformations in
the Third World, many of them will benefit the Soviets and prob-
ably come at our expense. This will increase our anxieties and our
fears.

A lot of the debate, a lot of the discomfort in the United States is
precisely over their taking advantage of those opportunities created
by that disorder in the Third World.

Having said all that, I would agree with Professor Ulam on one
point. Recognizing this competition, I think that we should all
recognize it, I happen to prefer our system, our values.

Senator McGovern. I think that that goes without saying. I hope
that all of us here are in agreement that we prefer the constitu-
tional democracy of the United States, and our system of free
enterprise, and our respect for spiritual values more than we do
the Soviet system.

The only question I am raising is, is it proper for us to deduce,
when we see the Soviets actively exploiting revolutionary situa-
tions in Africa, that that is necessarily a major threat to the
security of the West?

Mr. Zagoria. It is proper for us to be alarmed, if we want to stay
ahead. I would like us to stay ahead.

Senator McGovern. The irony of this is that one does not have
to go very far back in the history of the two countries when the
tables were reversed, when we were the country that was seen as
the inspiration for revolutionary forces around the globe, and the
Russians were the great status quo power, fearful of these libertar-
ian ideas that had been unleashed in the United States. I think
now those days are gone. We are now at a point where neither
country is going to sit still while the other achieves a clear position
of superiority.

Mr. Legvold. If you would allow me a short comment on the
same question, and if you will allow me the prerogative of disagree-
ing with an old employer.

104

As Don Zagoria said, I think that it is an argument. I think it is
a half-argument. I think it gets to an essential element of the
problem, the dimension of the problem, the competition between
two superpowers. Indeed, the Soviet Union in its own perspective
often is merely attempting to do what we have done along the way,
especially in terms of Angola or Ethiopia.

We have had our share of interventions, and we have used our
military power in foreign policy comparably more often than the
Soviet Union. But, as I said, I think that it is only part of the
problem. I think beyond that, I would argue, by my terms, by my
definitions, the Soviet Union does mean us malice. It does not have
our interests, by almost any definition of those, however they are
to be perceived or defined, as in their interests.

There are certain points at which this becomes complicated. Let
us say, a Western recession which poses problems to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe and so on.

Second, as Mr. Zagoria has said, the Soviet Union is power
seeking, and it is a rising power. It is seeking its place in the sun.

I think that you are right in your formula to the extent to which
you correct those people who believe that the whole thing, the
primary inspiration, the wellspring of Soviet behavior is to, in your
words, devour the West, a campaign of aggression, simple expan-
sionism, or in Mr. Zagoria's terms, the equivalent of Nazi Germany
in the 1930's.

Nonetheless, they are seeking power, and they would use it in
order to influence outcomes that in the long-run are not in our
interest. They want different outcomes from what we want, and
that is why I come to this third instance, which seems to me to be
at the very heart of the matter. We have different values. They
wanted a different outcome in Chile from what we wanted. They
want a different outcome in the Middle East from what we want.
They want a different outcome after Tito in Yugoslavia from what
we want.

That is not in our interest, and to the extent that they are able
to combine power in order to produce influence, in order to affect
those outcomes, it is not in our interest, even if, to a certain extent,
there is the problem of doing what we have done before.

I think that this all comes down to the basic question of how we
cope with the problem, provided we define it properly. It means
that we are really interested in influencing their behavior, and
when it comes to something like Ethiopia, or Angola, it seems to
me, in the future, the problem is not whether the Soviets have a
right to do this because we have arrogated that right in the past,
and have done it in the past. But that neither side, nor the commu-
nities about them, are going to do very well if we both insist on
that right.

We have to figure out some way to work our way through that
problem because that is another way in which we cannot go back.

Senator McGovern. We may disagree on some of the nuances,
but we come out with the same conclusion, that both sides ought to
exercise extreme caution in trying to control events in other peo-
ple's backyard. I think that that doctrine practiced by either side is
going to be self-defeating.

The Chairman. Senator Percy.

105

Senator Percy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I would very much appreciate each of you respond-
ing to a question with respect to the effect on our NATO Allies, if
this treaty is not ratified.

Ambassador Toon said this morning:

I believe the Soviets see an alternative to a SALT II agreement, a risky one, but
one with considerable appeal. If the Senate fails to approve the agreement, or
insists on changes unacceptable to the Kremlin, the result will be a crisis of
confidence in U.S. leadership among our Western allies.

Were all of you here this morning?

[No response.]

Senator Percy. Let me just finish that paragraph.

Driving a wedge between the United States and its European Allies is a goal of
the Soviet foreign policy which long predates arms control. I am persuaded that
Moscow would exploit a breakdown in the SALT process to pursue this goal with a
vengeance. I believe that they would succeed in doing so. The result could be
increased U.S. isolation, and a breakdown in our efforts to stimulate improvement
in the conventional and nuclear defenses of Western Europe.

I happen to believe that if this whole process broke down, there
would be an attempt by the Soviet Union to exploit it worldwide,
as well as in Europe.

Now if we have a bad treaty, we must convince the world that it
is bad for the security and safety of not just the United States but
the world itself. The United States is a protector of many interests
around the world.

Could you comment on the degree of concern you feel there
would be if the treaty were turned down?

What effect would failure to ratify the treaty have?

I have a couple of other questions, so could each of you be as
brief as possible? I ask that the record be left open so that your
remarks can be amplified, if you so wish.

Mr. Labedz. Senator Percy, I believe that the ratification of the
treaty, and the rejection of the ratification of the treaty, will both
cause some sort of disturbance on the European scene. On the
whole, I think that the ratification, in the long run, will produce a
more harmful political effect for the following reasons:

The Europeans are so dependent on the American support and
deterrence that they naturally cling to the support. They feel that
it is not up to them, but up to the Americans to take the leadership
in enhancing western defenses which has been generally recog-
nized as necessary after the experience of the last decade.

They feel, therefore, that they cannot come out and stick out
their neck in opposing the SALT Treaty ratification. But if your
premise of the perception of the balance of power in the world is
that there is a decline in the power of the United States, which
leads to a possible undermining of the American security umbrella
in Europe, then the full impact of the ratification, in terms of
political perception, of the possible legitimation of the Soviet drive
toward superiority may come with a delayed effect on the Europe-
an scene.

There may be then, a shock of recognition, a recognition of the
new position of the Western European scene vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, and at that point the present complacent view in Europe of
SALT may turn into, if not a panicky attitude, at least a much
more nervous attitude toward the Soviet Union.

106

As we see now already, there are tendencies, Mr. Ball referred to
them with respect to Germany, toward some kind of European
neutralism. I believe contrary to what Mr. Ball said that such
neutralist tendencies will be enhanced only at that point, rather
than the failure of ratification may bring them about now.

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Labedz.

Mr. Zagoria?

Mr. Zagoria. I think the basic question is a question of the
confidence that our Allies have in us. I think that their lack of
confidence will grow if we demonstrate that we are incapable of
pursuing a unified policy. The administration wants to do one
thing, and the Congress does not go along.

If we act as if we are paralyzed, and if we act as if we are
unreasonable, I think that the Europeans will draw many of these
conclusions from the act of not ratifying the treaty.

Therefore, I would think that it would have a much worse
impact on our lives. I think that, for example, the Germans, who
are in the forefront of the Ostpolitik of improving relations with
the Soviet Union in Europe, and the Japanese who are in a very
tender strategic situation, and who do not want to provoke a new
cold war with the Russians, both would certainly be very anxious.

The French and the British might very well conclude that their
only alternative was to increase their own nuclear forces, if the
Soviet Union was going to increase theirs. This would create new
tensions in NATO.

So, I think, yes; Ambassador Toon is absolutely correct. There
would be new tensions in NATO along similar lines to pro and
antitreaty forces in the United States. There would be great oppor-
tunities for the Russians to exploit those tensions, play off Europe-
an powers against the United States, and European powers against
each other, and Japan against the United States, to exploit their
fears that this country no longer seems to be able to conduct a
unified, coherent strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. I think that it
would be very dangerous.

Mr. Legvold. I think the basic proposition is correct at a certain
level. But like so much else in this debate, I think that it is vastly
overdrawn. I think that the Soviet Union would try to exploit the
failure of the treaty in two respects.

One, I think we would be engaged in a battle of who destroyed
SALT internationally, with what effect I don't know. Second, I
think that the Soviet Union would make progress on the European
front, and particularly press forward with the MBFR negotiations,
and I think that they would receive some response on the part of
the Europeans, probably with also some greater support on the
part of the American administration, concerned also about the
implications of a lost SALT.

Senator Percy. The failure of SALT would help MBFR?

Mr. Legvold. The failure of SALT may, indeed, in that way.

The Chairman. You just made the strongest argument to vote
against SALT.

Mr. Legvold. If that is the strongest argument to vote against
SALT, then I assume all of you are voting for it.

The larger proposition, though, is would it really explode the
alliance, and would there be the enormous tensions, and the failure

107

of NATO, as some prominent official has said, in these circum-
stances? That, it seems to me, is vastly overdrawn.

The Europeans are concerned, the Germans particularly, they
want to go forward with their own Ostpolitik. But the failure of
SALT is not going to transform the Atlantic relationship in the
dire ways that are predicted.

Finally, in terms of the United States-Soviet relationship, I said
in my opening comments that, again, these things are overdrawn.
It is going to accentuate the tensions. I think that it will make
things at least as bad as they were in the spring of 1978 and that is
as bad as they have been in a very long time, certainly in the last
decade. I am talking now about the context of the Horn, Soviet
intervention in the Horn, the trials in Moscow, and so on.

But I don't think that it would lead us back to that one funda-
mental proposition of the 1950's and the early 1960's, and that is
the risk of direct confrontation. Tension, yes; direct confrontation, I
am not certain. As far as the SALT process itself is concerned,
again, those people who say that failure either to ratify here, or to
attach amendments that cause the Soviet Union to reject, will
mean that we cannot go forward with the SALT process, I think
that that is overdrawn.

I think we probably will be able to continue with the SALT
process, but that is not the central issue. The issue is what kind of
a party will the Soviet Union be the next time around in a SALT
negotiation, and that is of important consequence, and I don't
think they are going to be an easier party with which to negotiate.

Senator Percy. Mr. Ulam?

Mr. Ulam. I think the worst possibility from the European view-
point is if this treaty is ratified unchanged, even if there is a strong
feeling that it confers substantial advantages to the Soviet Union,
and you pass it simply because you feel that this is the way toward
getting better relations with the Soviet Union.

I think, if the treaty is rejected, and I am not saying that I am
for rejection of it as a whole, what you would probably have is a
fierce baying and gnashing of teeth by the Russians, which would
be bad for our nerves for a while, and for the European nerves. But
if it is accompanied by a reasoned case for a different type of
treaty, I think eventually it might have beneficial rather than
detrimental effects on our alliance and our own national security.

Senator Javits. Would the gentleman yield?

Senator Percy. I will be happy to.

Senator Javits. Gentlemen, a sequel to that question is, our
primary problem today is the destabilization that the Soviets are
imposing on the world in various areas by their policy and arms
supply. What is the view of each of you as to the effect upon their
activities in areas, such as the Middle East, and Africa, and other
places, of the Senate's ratifying or not ratifying?

Mr. Labedz. In general, it would have a very negative effect in
the world on the perception of the American political will and of
the American resolve to stop the process which has been going on
for many years of the Soviet political and strategic ascendency in
the international balance of power.

Therefore, I believe that one has to, first of all, concentrate on
the problem of the tendency which exists now in terms of this

108

balance, rather than on the treaty itself. I believe that there is a
connection in terms of political dimension between the ratification
of the treaty and the perception of this balance. But the fundamen-
tal thing is what the Russians themselves see as the relation of
these factors.

To the extent that the S5niibolic significance of the treaty will
contribute to the perception which is, to the Europeans and,
indeed, to many Americans, deeply worrying, to this extent the
Soviet calculation of the correlation of forces; i.e. not only of the
military strategic balance, but of the overall political balance, will
raise the possibility of the Soviet risk taking, the threshold of risk
will be lower for them.

Of course, the fundamental thing is the real thing, namely, the
balance of forces.

Mr. Zagoria. I think that there is a limited payoff that we are
going to get from SALT in terms of trying to get Soviet restraint in
the world. We will remain competitive. However, I think that what
marginal chances there are for inducing greater restraint on the
Russian side for turning what will remain a basically competitive
relationship into a somewhat more civilized competitive relation-
ship, and a somewhat less dangereous competitive relationship, the
chances for that are better over the longer run if we continue
SALT as a process, and not just SALT II, but SALT III and so on,
because I think the Soviets have a stake in that process, and
particularly if we are able to convince the Russians that their
violation of certain rules of the game — their use of Cuban troops in
Africa and in the Middle East— is simply incompatible with our
understanding of detente, and that eventually the SALT process
will be affected by that.

If we can get that message across to them, and continue SALT at
the same time, then I think there is certainly some chance of
inducing greater restraint in their behavior, but it will be very,
very difficult. They are very, very persistent. We have to be also.

Mr. Legvold. I agree with so much of what Mr. Zagoria has just
said. Again, there are two important refinements, it seems to me.

The first is the way in which SALT may fail, and the second is
the content of the relationship in its other aspects, economic coop-
eration, the status of the Jackson- Vanik amendment, or the Ste-
venson amendment, and other forms of cooperation in other areas.

In terms of the way in which it fails, there is a vast difference in
terms of Soviet behavior in other areas, if the failure is because the
Soviets are convinced that this body has decided that they want to
destroy the treaty, and attach killer amendments, and that is it,
and the onus branding it is to be transferred to the Soviet Union.
Or if they perceive that there are people, from their point of view,
who are misguided, but who want to correct an agreement, and
who are also basically committed to the agreement.

The Soviets are not utterly incapable of appreciating that. How
they are going to cope with it is another matter. They may not
respond well.

The third factor is the role of the administration. The ^yorst of
all worlds, and you could never have had the two combined — a
Senate determined to destroy the SALT agreement, and an admin-
istration unwilling to fight for the SALT agreement.

109

I believe, in looking at Soviet responses, that 1 year ago or iy2
years ago, beginning in the fall of 1977 and going through the
spring of 1978, one of the great Soviet concerns was the extent to
which this administration, the Carter administration was really
committed to SALT. Now they are satisfied that this administra-
tion is committed to SALT. Of course, to a large part they respond
to American policy in terms of the administration's policy. So that
is a further factor.

Now, in terms of the direct relationship of Soviet behavior in the
Third World, as I said, I second so much of what Mr. Zagoria has
argued. I believe that the essential proposition is one of restraint
and constraint. That is, securing Soviet restraint by patterns of
mutual restraint in the things that we do, or do not do, and at the
same time constraining them by making it plain that if they inter-
vene there is always the risk, when we choose, of counterinterven-
tion, for example.

Here I would argue that the balance of forces matters, not pre-
cisely as Mr. Labedz states in terms of the larger correlation of
forces, or the overall military balance, but the relevant military
power, and that is force projection and what we need to cope with
circumstances like a crisis in the Persian Gulf, or Angola, or

Ethiopia.

Through this combination of constraint/ restraint, as Mr. Zagoria
pointed out, we begin to lose a part of that balance, we forego the
movement toward patterns of mutual restraint if we defeat SALT.
But basically, and on balance, I think that that is largely marginal
because I think it is going to come out of the complex of the
relationship, and out of the totality of the components of the rela-
tionship, including economic cooperation, and the way we deal with
one another on a range of problems.

Senator Javits. Professor.

Mr. Ulam. I think in the paper I tried to spell out the original
concept behind SALT I, that it was not merely a strategic arms
agreement but was conducted on certain assumptions of mutual
behavior by both parties. By and large the Soviets' behavior has
not been such to meet our expectations.

As I said, the worst thing from every point of view would be if
we conclude SALT II just out of weakness or out of fear of displeas-
ing the Russians and making them quite mad at us. I think that
would be very largely a self-fulfilling prophecy.

On the other hand I think if this discussion leads to amendments
and declaratory statements and so on, it will give enough warning
to the Russians that we are stubborn about our interest, especially
if this is accompanied by our readiness to use other weapons at our
disposal, the economic weapon and the diplomatic weapon.

I do not think it quite fits to say we know you have been
misbehaving and this time we give you SALT II but watch out for
the future, we may not do it again. I think that kind of impression
would probably be the worst impression we could create both for
the Russians and the Third World which would encourage and
strengthen their mischief making all over the world.

Senator Javits. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Hayakawa, you have been very patient.

48-250 0-79-8

110

Senator Hayakawa. I am enjoying this very much and I want to
thank all of you for being here. I have enjoyed your presentations
and have been fascinated by your discussion. I am especially happy
to see Professor Ulam. I think I reviewed a book of yours about 7
or 8 years ago, did I not?

Mr. Ulam. I hope favorably.

Senator Hayakawa. I think so. I think we had some correspond-
ence afterwards. It is a pleasure to see you here, sir.

I have some questions for various individuals to discuss. I would
like to ask Mr. Legvold why it is in March 1977 we made certain
proposals to the U.S.S.R. which entailed a fairly substantial reduc-
tion of strategic weapons and the Kremlin flatly refused to con-
sider such a proposal. Why was that?

Mr. Legvold. I think there were three reasons. I think the first
was, and in ascending order of importance, the way in which it was
sprung on them. It was announced publicly virtually at the same
time they received it. They do not take well to this kind of negotia-
tion. The second reason was, from their point of view, it threw over
an agreement that had been laboriously negotiated since the fall of
1974, and when the Soviets do these things, they proceed incre-
mentally.

I said in order of importance. The third reason was they regard-
ed it as a one-sided proposition. One-sided because it asked them to
make, talking about the three dimensions in terms of the overall
cuts, the major cuts in all the programs including the heavy mis-
siles down to 150, the MIRV program down to 550 when they
probably projected a minimum of 820 as we now know or maybe
even 1,000. We were settled on the 550, and so on.

Second, in terms of cruise missiles, the only limit that we were
offering them was a range limit. There was no indication that we
were prepared to do anything other than build as many as we
cared to build of those within that range limit which in their point
of view was interpreted in the context of European theater.

Third and most important, the essential limit on modernization
was for ICBM's. It said nothing about modernization of the SLBM
force where we had the lead and where the concern from their
point of view at that juncture was Trident II and indeed Trident I
before it and no pledge that we would do anything about that race.
As a modernization limit on ICBM's, it meant it came at a point in
which we were considerably advanced with our MIRV development
and they were essentially 3 years into their MIRV development.

From their point of view it was a one-sided arrangement.

I want to add something that I have often said to them in this
context. I think they were wrong to respond only at those three
levels. I think they were wrong to reject the notion that we might
be able to proceed toward deep cuts in principle and they were
mistaken not to offer a counterproposal and see whether we could
negotiate at that point. They should not have rejected it out of
hand but if I answer your question as a Soviet watcher, then the
third point was they thought, I think, that it generally was one-
sided and whether it was or not is another matter.

Senator Hayakawa. I think you have already answered, you feel
they should have taken us up on the proposal.

Ill

Mr. Legvold. That is right. I think the worst circumstance was
for them to reject it the way they did and force us back to the
consequences in May and so on, but so they did.

Senator Hayakawa. Professor Zagoria, I have a question for you
also. I love your metaphor of the Chicken Little school of foreign
policy. I enjoyed your paper very much.

There is something which bothers me. You said we should take
this opportunity to warn the Russians that detente is incompatible
with many of their actions in the Third World. Of course I believe,
myself, that we have never had a detente as long as they have been
keeping with this kind of action.

We have warned the Soviets. You say we should take this oppor-
tunity to warn the Soviets. It seems to me that we have warned the
Soviets repeatedly and what makes you think a new warning will
be any more effective than the previous warnings?

Mr. Zagoria. I am not talking. Senator, just about a warning. I
think we have to, by both word and deed, make it clear to the
Russians that if there is continued Cuban combat troop involve-
ment in the Third World, if there is continued heavy arming of Mr.
Quadaffi in Libya— and there are a whole variety of other actions
of this kind that the Russians categorize as national liberation
movements, which they say are compatible with their understand-
ing of peaceful coexistence and detente— we should make it clear to
them by word and by deed that in our vocabulary these two things
cannot be compartmentalized, that ultimately there will have to be
a reciprocal detente in which they will have to show much greater
restraint in the Third World, particularly than they have shown in
the past.

My proposition is if we say that and act that way at the same
time that we are engaged in the SALT process and at the same
time we are engaged in a growing economic relationship and at the
same time that there is a stake for the Russians in improving
relations with us, that at some point the leaders will have to sit
around with each other and say, well comrades, we have a choice
that we have to make. Who is more important? What is more
important, our relationship with the Americans, technology, trade,
developing Siberia, and so on or Angola and South Yemen?

That is the choice I would like to force the Soviet leadership to
make. You are quite right. So far we have not gotten very far.

Senator Hayakawa. We have had words and no deeds.

As you say, it should have compelled the Soviets to ask them-
selves the question, do we want to improve our relations with the
United States. It seems to me they have never had to ask that
question because we have had a few mild words but no deeds.

Mr. Zagoria. I think we have had the worst of both worlds. We
promised them or seemed to be promising them in the early 1970's
a huge trading relationship and then we withdrew that. At the
same time when they did make their various advances in the Third
World, we were unable to mount any actions, political, military, or
otherwise to stop them from doing that, from thinking that it
might be risky.

We have not offered them a stake in the relationship and at the
same time we have been impotent in meeting their challenge.
What I am proposing is that we reverse that, we offer them a

112

positive stake in the relationship and that we do try to take a
variety of actions that will convince them that their continued
fishing in troubled waters in the Third World will be risky.

Senator Hayakawa. The problem you raise is a crucial one to me
because those who have proposed this SALT II Treaty have insisted
that there be no linkage between this treaty and all the other
Soviet behavior elsewhere in the world. We should try to think of
this treaty by itself in a kind of isolation. I find it difficult to
achieve that level of schizophrenia, to be able to divide myself into
two and look at these things separately.

Mr. Zagoria. I agree with you, Senator. I think in fact that the
SALT debate in the country as a whole and perhaps even in the
Senate is in large part a debate about the nature of the Soviet
Union and the nature of Soviet foreign policy and the nature of
Soviet objectives in the world. I think in a country such as ours
those things cannot be separated from SALT.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Professor Zagoria.

I would like to address a question to Professor Ulam. You say in
your opinion we ought to convince the Soviet leaders of our pur-
pose, the determination and ability to bar further efforts of being
unilaterally advantaged at the expense of the West, in other words,
how can we show the Soviets that kind of finality of purpose
without risking a confrontation or do we want to risk that confron-
tation in order to clarify our purpose?

Mr. Ulam. I tried to point that out in the paper and that is why
I spoke about economics. I am far from being an expert but I
somewhat disagree with my colleague, Professor Zagoria, that the
Soviet Union has not already gotten tremendous advantages from
detente economically and in transfers of technology. Look at the
figures of trade. The original principle of SALT I was the carrot
and stick simile of our relations with the Soviet Union. For the
past 7 years they have been munching the carrots but the stick has
not been very much in evidence. I do not think we can do it. I
think they are very tough customers. We cannot do it simply by
saying next time you will go too far. I think we have to start doing
it now about the whole problem of the Cubans. Scrutinize the
provisions of SALT II with an eye to whether we gave in on some
provisions simply to have a treaty or whether we feel that some
provisions are unfair advantages to the Soviet Union.

I think warnings are not very useful but I would go even so far
as to say that when it comes to verbal warnings, we have not done
enough. There were some people who were unconcerned, believing
that the Soviets would eventually develop sort of indigestion, they
will have their own Vietnams and so on. I have not seen the Soviet
students demonstrating against their policies in Afghanistan and
Angola and they are not likely to.

I think we should pass deeds fairly soon and do it right no\v, and
the process of this detente itself is one yardstick of how seriously
the Soviets take our warnings, if indeed we do issue warnings.

I agree with you that it is impossible to separate SALT II com-
pletely from other aspects of our policy. That was not done with
SALT I. I think I would have been happier if indeed we could have
made it clear during the process and stuck to it that any treaty
eventually to some extent must depend on Soviet behavior in var-

113

ious areas of the world and not just on quantities of this or that
weapon.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, with your leave, I am going to make a statement
which is really only a question in the sense that all these gentle-
men are welcome to comment on it, if they wish. It is triggered off
by Professor Zagoria's statement that we cannot any longer afford
the luxury of 100 foreign policies, one for each Senator, one for the
State Department and another one for the National Security Coun-
cil.

Of course that is the way our country works. I feel myself at a
very serious disadvantage in negotiating or talking about coming to
a treaty agreement with a nation whose representatives are not
elected. They are a self-perpetuating elite. As far as we know they
have no consultative process by which they know what the various
nationalities, the various working class groups, et cetera, want out
of Soviet life. This elite decides foreign policy for itself and even
within that elite there is no visible difference of opinion.

Here we have not only 100 but possibly several million foreign
policies in this country which we have to pull together into one
document, a treaty that we can discuss and negotiate with another
party. On the other side we have a peculiar monolithic system. On
top of that they have full access to our discussion including the
words we are speaking this very afternoon which are all on the
record and which are published freely and they have full access to
our technical journals and our scientific information, all sorts of
information about our weapons which is published and all sorts of
information about our public discussions is published.

We have no such access to what they are thinking. They have
only one monolithic party line. This makes it very difficult to think
of this treaty as being a resolution of differences between two equal
powers confronting each other. They are extraordinarily different
powers.

If we were negotiating this treaty with Japan or Britain, France,
or Italy, or Greece, it would be one thing. We are negotiating this
treaty with a peculiarly monolithic totalitarian state in which as
you say there are no student demonstrators for testing the policies
of their government.

Therefore, whatever treaty we enter into, I must say I am terri-
bly nervous about it. We are not as two nations confronting each
other as peers. We are confronting each other as two entirely
different kinds of political animals. I do not know what historical
meaning such a treaty will have in that situation.

The Chairman. You keep coming back to student demonstrators.
I do not know how you always get to that.

Senator Hayakawa. He brought it up.

The Chairman. I am teasing you. If anybody has experience with
student demonstrators, the two most experienced are you and I
because at the time when the demonstrations were going on I was
one of the ones demonstrating unlike anyone else in the U.S.
Senate and at the time they were going on, you were one of the
ones speaking out. Thank God I was in Syracuse and you were in
San Francisco. You might have flunked me.

Senator Hayakawa. I would have had you arrested.

114

The Chairman. I expect you might have. I am just thankful that
you do not share the viewpoint of some who agree with you on
SALT, which is that I should now be arrested for my position.

I would like to pursue if I may several of the lines of questioning.
I would like to commend me for my patience. I thought by opening
this up, and chairing, that I would get to ask all the questions. Lo
and behold all the senior members showed up.

I forget who made the statement that there tends to be an
oversimplification when we discuss events in other parts of the
world. Angola and Iran were mentioned. I am just wondering
whether the Soviet Union's activities in say, Angola, bore any
relationship to their perception of having achieved strategic parity
with the United States. In other words, did they take the action
they took in Angola as a consequence of their significantly in-
creased strategic capability or did they do it for a totally different
reason having no relationship to the strategic balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union?

I wish you would respond to that specific question. We are talk-
ing about motivation. What was the Soviet motivation? What made
them think they could run the risk they ran in Angola? Was it
because they felt they were so strong strategically or was it for
other reasons?

Let's start with Professor Ulam.

Mr. Ulam. I think you emerge sometimes with a very strange
sort of rationalization of rational behavior. People say before the
late 1960's they acted aggressively because they were unsure of
themselves and we had strategic superiority. Now they act because
they have equivalence or they feel they have some superiority and
consequently they feel more assured.

I feel the main explanation is simply they acted the way they did
in Angola not so much because they counted the relative state of
their strategic weapons but they felt the United States would not
meet their challenge at the other level, that you will not react
economically. We would not do a symbolic thing like recalling an
ambassador or being vigorous. They felt the advantage was to
decrease the U.S. prestige and power in the opinion of the Third
World.

Now of course we should not concentrate on the Third World.
They may feel their strategic gains under this agreement if it does
confirm them or they perceive them as such may allow them to act
more vigorously elsewhere.

The Chairman. I would like to get to that question as a follow-on
question. If I could get just once and for all some specific comment
as you just gave me on the Third World connection if you will. It is
used so much so many times by so many people, pro and con, in
this debate.

Professor Legvold?

Mr. Legvold. Earlier I referred to an important part or core of
this question and that is Soviet risk taking and the correlation
between the state of the military balance and Angola as an in-
stance of risk taking.

I do not think there is anyone at this table who would disagree
that the question really is unanswerable. I do not think any of us
know in a fundamental way.

115

You give us a choice between the two. Was it the change in the
power balance that caused them to do what they did in Angola or
was it simply an opportunity that came along that they would have
seized whatever the state of the overall military balance, particu-
larly the strategic nuclear balance? The problem is that it gets
blurred because somewhere in between the definition of "opportu-
nity" has to do with the obstacles they thought they would meet
which means what we would do and then the problem is what
determined our behavior in these circumstances.

Was it the state of the military balance or was it a so-called
Vietnam syndrome, a kind of immobility and unwillingness to
become involved in other such events along the way?

The Chairman. Is there any place in the literature on Angola
that suggests that overall military force balance was a factor in
what we did?

Mr. Legvold. On our side or their side?

The Chairman. On our side.

Mr. Legvold. In a sense, yes. There are people who argue that
the erosion of the military balance between the two sides, including
the strategic balance, contributed to our sense of will, if you like,
or lack of will in these circumstances, whether it was operational
in the day-to-day sense that influenced it or what.

The Chairman. Maybe that happened in the academic world, but
it did not happen down here. It did not happen in the State
Department. It did not happen in the Defense Department. It did
not happen on the floor of the Senate. It did not happen here in
committee. It did not happen anywhere at any place at any time
under any circumstances at all among the policymakers of this
country.

I would be really interested if you in your future research can
come up with any evidence that any policymaker in the United
States of America even considered the comparability of forces being
a faction in whether or not we responded in Angola. I have never
once heard it even from my strange friends at the Defense Depart-
ment who march in with their death scenarios for us. This is for
the record, as they say.

Mr. Legvold. To try to disentangle some of these elements, first
of all I am not arguing that if the argument was made, and I think
it was made, maybe not by policymakers but I would argue a
version of it was made, as far as I understood their public state-
ments, by people within the Congress, for example, in a very gener-
al way. The policymaker is another matter.

I want to separate another thing, the extent to which I think
that is the case. I am the one who began by saying that I doubt the
correlation between the military balance and Soviet risk taking,
and for that matter our willingness to respond in these instances at
this low level of something like Angola. This is not my perception.

As far as the Soviet side is concerned, I would argue that if there
was any factor that they thought explained our behavior in some
larger sense, that is a continuing factor that impinged on our
decisions in Angola as opposed to the immediate considerations of
Angola, including our South African foreign policy in that case, it
was more Vietnam than it was the military balance, the overall
shift in the military balance.

116

In any case the Soviets never defined the balance between us in
terms of the miUtary balance alone. The military balance is always
a component of what Mr. Labedz referred to as the correlation of
forces and that correlation of forces also includes a Vietnam syn-
drome or it includes the strength of national liberation, revolution
forces, or what have you in the area.

When the Soviets analyzed it, that is the way in which they put
it.

There is a final comment that I would make because my basic
proposition is I do not see a connection between the two, either in
Soviet perception or in fact in determining our reaction and the
kind of opportunity the Soviets had.

The last point I would make is what they did in Angola they did
rather cautiously. Mr. Ulam is absolutely correct in saying that
they pushed against no resistance and it allowed them to go for-
ward. They went through a whole series of stages before the thing
was finally consummated in the spring of 1976. They watched the
insipid escalation of supply to the respective groups in the spring.
They watched the reaction of the OAU [Organization of African
Unity] in the summer. They watched the reaction of Secretary
Kissinger's policy in the fall. They watched it through the Decem-
ber 19 vote within the Congress on further assistance to the parties
and finally they watched it all the way through that critical OAU
vote in January 1976.

They did not rush in but they did push in gradually and met no
resistance and that was decisive.

Mr. Zagoria. Are you asking about their motivation or ours or
both?

The Chairman. I started off by asking about theirs. Did they
move because they felt they now had a strategic advantage or at
least parity? Did that embolden them to do something?

Mr. Zagoria. I would say other factors were much more impor-
tant and some have already been mentioned. There was the Viet-
nam syndrome in the United States, Watergate, the fact that so
many Americans thought we had no good options and therefore
there was a virtual certainty that we would not become involved.

I think also the Soviets thought they had a just cause or a cause
that could be portrayed as just among many Africans. After all,
these were people fighting against the Portuguese, although they
ultimately sided with only one faction in that struggle against the
Portugese.

I think they also felt that since the other African countries were
divided among themselves as to which of these various factions to
support, they could weigh in in support of one of them without
getting an extremely negative reaction from a lot of African coun-
tries.

I think the South African intervention on the side of MPLA's
enemies helped legitimize even more the Soviet-Cuban support for
the MPLA.

I think there are a whole variety of considerations in the Soviet
mind. I think one of the critical factors that the Soviets always
weigh very carefully is, is the United States in or out, is it likely to
get in or out, and therefore is this intervention likely to lead us to
an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with the United States?

117

For example, if you look at their behavior in Korea over the past
decade, even when they have been amassing all this military
power, they have been extraordinarily cautious. They do not supply
advance weapons systems to Kim II Sung although he is desperate-
ly anxious for them. In 1968, when he seized the Pueblo and the
United States sent in a naval task force in response to that, the
Soviets were very cautious then. In 1969, when we sent in another
naval task force to the Sea of Japan after the North Koreans shot
down an EC-121, the Soviets not only were cautious in response
but they helped us pick up the survivors as a clear warning to Kim
II Sung that they did not want him to get them involved with us in
a war in Korea.

Again in 1976, when the North Koreans killed a couple of Ameri-
cans and South Koreans over a poplar tree incident, we sent a
naval task force into the Sea of Japan and this time the Russians
did not do a thing.

I think in places where the United States is present with a
strong commitment or there is a strong likelihood that the United
States would consider it as a challenge to some vital interest and
might get involved or where the United States has some good
options, the Russians would think twice. I think they pick their
targets very carefully and there are many factors involved apart
from the overall balance.

The Chairman. Are they not going to think twice regardless of
whether or not they have strategic parity?

Mr. Zagoria. I think Professor Legvold is correct, that the
burden of proof is on those who say this changed correlation of
forces at the strategic level has greatly increased their risk taking.
One could make the case that they were taking risks in the 1950's.

The Chairman. It did not seem to slow them down in Czechoslo-
vakia.

Mr. Zagoria. At the same time, it is a moot question. We do not
know what is likely to happen in the 1980's. I would say we would
certainly not want to put ourselves into a position where not only
the alarmists regard us as inferior but also many other people both
in the United States and throughout the world who are not alarm-
ists. If such a situation were to develop, I think it would have an
impact on Soviet behavior.

Mr. Labedz. Senator Biden, Professor Ulam mentioned that the
Soviet leaders have acted aggressively when they were weak and
behaved aggressively also when they became stronger. There is no
contradiction between the two because as any poker player can say,
you can sometimes bluff when you have nothing in your cards but
it is better to have a royal flush if you want to win.

Indeed there is a correlation between the Soviet's strength and
their behavior, not in the sense that they cannot try to do a Cuba
but in the sense that if they had to do a Cuba nowadays it would
be a much less risk taking operation from their point of view than
it was in 1962.

I find this is an exercise of unreality when my friend Professor
Zagoria argues that at any given instance, when the Soviets were
facing real risks, they were not taking these risks. He also says
that we have to demonstrate to them by words and deeds that

118

there are risks involved in what he calls "detente after SALT II
ratification."

I would like to hear what such deeds can be and whether such
deeds would not immediately bring from him a charge to a person
proposing them that he is Chicken Little. I see here a certain
schizophrenia, a certain contrast between one part of Professor
Zagoria's reasoning with the premise that the Soviets are not
taking any risks and the argument that in fact all the evidence of
Soviet history points precisely to the opposite conclusion. It is not
only Soviet history but universal history which shows that empires
expand until they find themselves facing some other power.

If there is no possibility of presenting them with it, then the
Soviet Union will expand and that is why I feel the question of the
Soviet sources of conduct, the question which you put to us, is to be
seen in this particular political dimension.

They have of course been taking risks such as Angola. I was in
Peking at that time. The Chinese expected the United States to
react. The Soviets had a better perception because they had taken
the risks on the premise that there would be no reaction.

The Chairman. Part of the same debate that went on when the
Chinese had to make a decision about Vietnam and we had to
make a decision about what the Russians were likely to do as a
consequence of the Chinese decision.

Mr. Labedz. Obviously each power makes a preliminary calcula-
tion of what is the likely behavior or reaction on the part of the
other power. At that time, if you recollect. Secretary Kissinger
actually came with the question of what the consequences of doing
nothing in Angola might be in the long run. I am no friend of
Henry Kissinger's policy but I remember at that time he had
actually brought to the notice of the Senate a possible consequence
of not facing the question and we are discussing now such potential
possibilities after SALT II.

The Chairman. My only point is that the strategic balance
seemed to be an irrelevant consideration.

Is there anyone of you who would suggest that by signing the
SALT Treaty, we would be precluded from moving forward on what
we need to do to have a viable strategic force?

Mr. Zagoria. I would like to say that Mr. Labedz and others are
worried about the United States being in a position of strategic
inferiority and so am I. SALT did not put us into a position of
strategic inferiority.

The Chairman. Will the passage of this agreement?

Mr. Zagoria. I do not think ratifying or rejecting SALT is going
to put us in the position of strategic inferiority. On the contrary, I
think it leaves open for us many options that we should take up
that would lead us militarily to a position where we are not inferi-
or. I think we have to leave open every option. I think it leayes
open a great many.

The Chairman. Do you think it closes any?

When Mr. Nitze testified, I listed the eight things the committee
on Present Danger said we must do. I asked: "Is there anything
here you cannot do?" As usual, he begged the question. I respect-
fully pursued it, and he finally said, no except the M-X. I said the
M-X problem, if there is one, can be cleared up with a reservation,

119

and then he went into perceptions and will, as his fallback argu-
ments.

I asked the same question of Admiral Zumwalt. I asked the same
question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I listed every one of the
things that critics have suggested we need and not one witness to
date has suggested that any one of them is out. They acknowledged
that all of them are in, except for a very strained argument that
M-X is not. But if the reservation were passed, M-X would be in,
even by their definition.

I wonder why we continue to talk about something that no one
has shown is precluded by SALT. Why do we not move beyond
that? If we want to argue about American resolve, let's argue
about it but let's not suggest that this treaty prevents us from
doing what we need to do. If the issue is perceptions, let's talk
about that.

Speaking of perceptions, I went to Europe specifically for the
purpose of trying to find out what our allies think. In Germany,
where perceptions are particularly important, I spoke with all
those folks on the left within the SPD, within the right in the CDU
[Christian Democratic Union]. I sat down with the head of their
parliamentary defense committee, their equivalent of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, their Chancellor, their Defense Minister, their For-
eign Minister. Nobody privately, publicly, directly, indirectly, up-
side down, rightside up or whatever suggested that we not go
forward with SALT.

The only time I ever heard anything negative was when they
would say— and it is the most I ever heard— the only thing that
worries us is you have people in America telling us that SALT
makes you weak. You have Mr. Nitze saying there is a reason to
worry about perceptions, and, Mr. Jackson in the Senate.

Mr. Labedz. If I may. Senator Biden, I will try to answer the
points you make. You try to argue the case that there is no remote
connection between the change in the balance of power and the
Soviet behavior in the Third World.

The Chairman. In certain parts of the Third World.

Mr. Zagoria. Excuse me but that was not your argument. You
were not talking about the change in the balance of power. You
were talking about SALT.

The Chairman. Exactly.

Mr. Zagoria. The change in the balance of power is something
separate from SALT.

Mr. Labedz. You said the change in the balance of power accord-
ing to your perception may not have any remote connection be-
tween the Soviet activities and the strategic mix SALT II "brings
about or changes"

The Chairman. I contend SALT does not change the balance of
! power.

Mr. Labedz. The argument is predicated on the fact of what the
United States can do in international law. The political question is
what the United States will do, particularly in a contingency.
Therefore it is connected via the balance of power with the possibil-
ity of reaction or nonreaction on the part of the Soviets.

The Chairman. I may grant you that but it is not connected to
SALT, is it?

120

Mr. Labedz. In the Soviet perception, the question of the balance
of power is connected with SALT and so it is in fact all over the
world. That is why there is so much interest in the question of the
ratification of SALT. If this were not so, there would have been
little interest in SALT II and there should have been no Senate
hearings. There would have been no press coverage all over the
world, no television coverage and all the rest of it.

There must be some special relevance to this question. If there is,
then we face a puzzling question. The only conceivable logical
inference from this reasoning is that the Soviet Union is totally
irrational in trying to change the balance of nuclear power in its
favor. Why on earth do they do it if they cannot possibly exploit
politically this change? They themselves perceive it as a necessary
precondition of taking risks to this or that degree. The Soviet
Union is a very cautious power as Professor Zagoria and Professor
Legvold said in their description of the Angola situation. Soviet
leaders have not acted precipitously. They have been acting slowly

step by step. o • i j v •

If there is such a perception on the part of the Soviet leadership
and we know this from empirical evidence during the last 15 years
that they were trying to change the balance of the central military
power, nuclear and strategic, what is the premise of their nuclear
build-up? Either they are totally irrational or we are wrong.

Mr. Zagoria. With all due respect, the question is being evaded.
The question is not whether the Soviets are trying to change the
balance of power. Of course they are. The question is whether our
signing SALT will enable the Soviets to change the balance of
power starting from the time we sign SALT. If one agrees that
there are virtually no constraints on our ability to do what we
want to do, then I do not see how one could make that argument.

Mr. Labedz. Let's be clear about it. The argument is not whether
SALT does or does not prevent the American reaction but what is
the political likelihood that such a decision will be taken in the
new situation? We have the whole history of SALT I and you
yourself described all these African adventures and we know there
was no such reaction there or elsewhere.

You say it is up to those who oppose the ratification of SALT to
prove that the Russians are not going to take the kinds of risks
which you say we must try by words and deeds to persuade them

not to take.

My point is they certainly do not go by words and as far as deeds
are concerned, the deeds in the last 10 years are a very emphatic
illustration of the decline in political will on the part of the United
States to take the steps which you yourself seem to envision.

I find it rather ironic that those people who are now supporting
the ratification of SALT in the present form are retrospectively
implying the necessity of action in Angola. I would like to have
this question clarified. Is Professor Legvold retrospectively advocat-
ing or at least acknowledging that the American inactivity in
Angola was a mistake?

The Chairman. I would like to hear your answer. Professor.

Mr. Legvold. To answer Leo's question and also comment on
what you have said because basically what you said. Senator Biden,
I agree with.

121

The Chairman. You do not have to say any more.

Mr. Legvold. I would add another feature which I think is
important and in a moment I will indicate why I do not think it is
an element of complacency.

I do not think the Soviet Union at this point underestimates the
American will to respond even at the level of the Angolas out in
the hinterland, at great distances. I think it is a moment where the
Soviet Union is the last power to underestimate the American will
to act at this juncture.

In 1979 we are a very considerable distance from Angola in the
spring and summer of 1975. We have had the intervening events
and the outcry within this country and we have had the action on
the part of an administration. We have had the intervening events
of the two Yemens and the Southern Arabian Peninsula and the
edginess along the way and in between when we also had the
second Shaba incident with the 82d Airborne. We have planning
within this administration to cope with those kind of things.

I repeat myself: of all the parties in the world that pay attention
to this kind of thing it is the Soviet Union.

I would argue we ought not to count only on that as we have to
make good and we have to continue to act in those terms otherwise
it does become a guide to complacency. To assume today in Moscow
that the Soviets see a declining American will in the case of
Angola is simply inaccurate as far as I can judge the Soviet percep-
tion of the United States at this juncture.

In terms of Angola itself, if your only basis for judging American
policy in Angola was cutting short the Soviet intervention by any
means and you are convinced that the only way that you could
have cut short Soviet Union intervention in Angola was by a firm
response, that is by matching power with power, intervention with
counterintervention, then the answer is yes, American policy was a
mistake. Those are not the only two grounds on which you judge
American policy in Angola or even the basic problem of coping
with Soviet behavior in areas of regional instability. Let me sepa-
rate the two.

First of all there are other dimensions of American policy within
that area that were deeply affected by the way in which we re-
sponded with what parties, with what partners in the area. We had
other portions of American foreign policy at stake than making a
general point by responding forceably to Soviet intervention.

The Chairman. Considerably more.

Mr. Legvold. Second, in terms of how we are effective in control-
ling the Soviet dimension of the problem of regional instability,
even here I am not convinced that Leo is right in assuming the
only way they would have been stopped was by a counteraction,
setting aside the costs and other dimensions of American policy.

I am not convinced at this point that had we in the spring of
1975 before the scenario played itself out come to the Soviets and
said, we are on the road to supporting and sponsoring our various
clients, you, the MPLA. We do not know where this is going to
lead, it looks like a civil war because the cords are not going to
hold in these circumstances and there is going to be intervention,
counterintervention, the prospect of the South Africans involved
and it is going to create an enormous difficulty. Let's both of us

122

cool it and let the chips fall where they may. The Soviets might not
have responded favorably. I think there is a possibility they might
have and there are people within the administration of that day,
people very close to Secretary Kissinger, who had his notion of
what was going right and wrong in Angola, who believed the same

thing.

The Chairman. There are people within this comniittee and you
are looking at one of them who shared that point of view.

Mr. Legvold. The question is why did we not do it at the time
and it was because Vietnam and a lot of other things were coming
down around our shoulders. That is a fair explanation for what
happened then but it is not a justification for not having this in
mind the next time around.

Coming back to the complacency issue, I do not believe that is
sufficient. I do not know whether that would have worked. I do
believe there was a possibility that it could have worked. If it did
not, I do not think the cost to American policy and other parts, our
African policy, were worth it. That does not end the issue.

I think there are occasions where it does make sense to respond
forcibly if that kind of invitation to the Soviets pointing out the
implications of their actions, is not sufficient where we act. The
Yemens are a case in point and I support that kind of thing.

To argue the failure of an appeal to the Soviet Union in the
spring, if that had not brought a response and that we therefore
should not have dealt with them because of the cost to other parts
of policy is not a statement that says we ought not to respond to
them in other circumstances elsewhere.

The Chairman. We should go through that process. I think it is
important to reiterate what you have just said regarding other
foreign policy interests that the United States had, and I think
rightfully considered, in Africa and Southern Africa specifically. I
think it was the Soviet reading of the U.S. real interests that
emboldened them to do what they did. As they measured where ^ve
were and the spot we were in, irrespective of the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union, they properly
read what should have been the reasonable course for us to follow
if pushed to it.

Although we might have succeeded in thwarting the Soviets, we
would have lost a whole lot more in my opinion, and I think they
properly read that.

Without refighting that battle once more and since time is run-
ning short, I would like to honor Senator McGovern's request to me
before he left. He has a written question which he would like me to
ask you. Professor Legvold, and I will read that question. If you
will respond, I will appreciate it. He said:

Your statement touches very directly on my main concern in these hearings. As
you know I seek genuine arms reductions as the best path to mutual security. You
suggest that the Soviets view SALT primarily as a political exercise m terms of
regulating East-West relations rather than as a military exercise to regulate and
reduce the arms race. If as you say the Soviets care more about the political effect
of a successful SALT process and therefore are willing to sidestep some hard
choices, how is it ever going to be possible to get a genuine arms reduction? Will it
ever be possible? Will it come about only if detente improved dramatically or do you
think a sufficient halt in the arms race such as a freeze or a moratorium might
itself create the improved political climate in which detente could progress?

123

Mr. Legvold. First of all, to the basic point Senator McGovern
referred to, to put that in context of my prepared statement, I said
I think the Soviets have several levels at stake or several kinds of
stakes in the SALT process.

I think their primary stake in contrast to what we assumed at
the outset was our primary stake, that is to reshape or stabilize or
effect or restructure the strategic balance in some fashion, is essen-
tially political, the impact that it has on East- West relations, pro-
moting the process of detente and so on.

I hasten to add this does not mean they do not have other stakes
including as I have indicated in my testimony, a desire to regulate
or influence American military programs. I think they do, as we
have a stake in regulating Soviet military programs. That does
raise a basic problem.

I think the extent to which the Soviets feel an urgency about
stabilizing the nuclear arms race particularly according to defini-
tions of stability derived peculiarly from our notion of nuclear
deterrents and what constitutes stability which is a further prob-
lem and that is what the presentation is about, does create real
obstacles to substantial progress in SALT.

I do not think that the way in which we are going to overcome
that in the long run is by taking the heat off and saying we will
not race if you will not race and declare a moratorium for the
moment.

I think that will lead to a kind of open-ended negotiation in
which the Soviets are continually looking for the political fill-ups
or benefits from the process. It will in a sense unleash that even
more so. In any case there is no prospect of that.

I think the realization will come only with the continued devel-
opment of both sides' programs until both sides begin to believe out
of deep convictions that the road to their security, their self-secu-
rity, is going to come out of a combination of arms control and
defense planning. It is out of that we will move toward a more
stable balance according to anyone's definition.

It is never going to be possible to persuade the Soviets they
ought to commit themselves to stabilizing the nuclear balance as
we define it. The thrust of my whole paper is that they do not
operate with the same definitions.

The essential objective is to persuade them as well as many on
our own side that arms control combined with defense planning in
a fairly" ambitious way is the best way to pursue security and
frankly I think that is going to come only out of the continued
competition because they are going to prosecute their end of the
competition and we are not going to gain if we do not maintain our
own end. A moratorium makes no sense in my judgment.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, you have been very helpful. I appre-
ciate your spending so much time with us. You have been with us
for 3 hours.

For my benefit, I could keep you 3 more hours if you would be
willing to stay. We are going to vote in a few minutes and I have
already trespassed on your good will keeping you this long.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to
call of the Chair.]

SALT II TREATY

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1979

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, D.C.
The committee met at 10:50 a.m. in room 4221, Dirksen Senate
Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Biden, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, and
Lugar.

Senator Biden (presiding). The hearing will come to order,
please.

opening statement

Today marks the end of the third week of hearings before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the proposed SALT II
Treaty. This week we continue to explore significant issues raised
by the treaty. On Tuesday, the committee held an executive session
on the critical issue of our ability to monitor and verify Soviet
compliance with the SALT II Treaty. Yesterday, we addressed the
broader question of United States-Soviet relations in the context of
SALT. This morning, the subject is the Soviet Backfire bomber.

We have with us Gen. Richard Ellis, Commander in Chief of the
Air Force Strategic Air Command; Gen. James Hill, Commander in
Chief of the North American Air Defense Command; Mr. Walter
Slocombe, Director of the Department of Defense SALT Task Force;
Dr. James Timbie, Chief, Strategic Affairs Division of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and Ambassador Ralph Earle,
head of the U.S. SALT delegation.

Their appearance here today will permit us to review the treat-
ment of the Backfire bomber within the context of the SALT II
agreement. Earlier this morning, the committee received an intelli-
gence briefing on the technical capabilities of the Backfire. We now
turn our attention to the negotiating history of this issue and the
military significance of the limitations finally agreed upon as they
relate to the Backfire. We will examine how the Backfire was
handled in the earlier SALT proposal, and then compare the Back-
fire with other American and Soviet bombers.

Gentlemen, I understand that three of you. General Hill, Gener-
al Ellis, and Mr. Slocombe have submitted written statements for
the committee; is that correct?

General Hill. Yes, sir.

Senator Biden. General Hill, we will start with you, then we will
hear from General Ellis and Mr. Slocombe.

(125)

48-250 0-79-9

126

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. HILL, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE/AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

General Hill. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the Soviet Backfire
bomber and its effects on the North American Air Defense Com-
mand within the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

First, let me say, I unequivocally support the concept of arms
control and the philosophy of strategic arms limitations. This arms
control agreement with the Soviet Union is a step toward the
establishment of equal aggregates from which balanced and phased
reduction can occur. Adjustments to force structure by the Soviet
Union, as well as by the United States, must be made to achieve
the levels of equality described by the treaty. The United States
must, of necessity, be prepared to defend against those offensive
forces that do and will exist. This, of course, will force a reevalua-
tion of our defensive forces and strategies but a reevaluation which
will be able to be made in the context of agreed upon specifics.

The SALT II Treaty, in the short term, appears neither to im-
prove nor to degrade the ability of the North American Air De-
fense Command [NORAD], to perform its atmospheric defense mis-
sion. The treaty does bring into focus some significant consider-
ations peculiar to NORAD which involve our atmospheric defense
capability, especially as it relates to the Backfire bomber.

At the outset, let me state our basic NORAD atmospheric de-
fense missions. The first is to provide surveillance and control of
the air space of Canada and the United States; second, to provide
warning and assessment of an air attack; and third, to provide
appropriate response against air attack.

I will discuss the capabilities of the Backfire bomber and our
present ability to defend against it, some implications that SALT II
has for the atmospheric defense mission, and finally outline what
we need to do to improve our atmospheric defense capabilities.

For a number of years the Soviet strategic long-range aviation
force has included the four-engine turboprop Bear and the four-
engine jet Bison. This force consists of about 150 aircraft. The LRA
[long range aviation] also has about 30 Bisons that are configured
as tankers. These tankers can refuel the Bear, the Bison, and the
Backfire bombers.

We at NORAD view the Soviet bomber force as a more formida-
ble threat with the introduction of Backfire. I would have preferred
to see the Backfire treated within the formal constraints of SALT
II; but in any case its capability and its availability are factors we
must consider in the formulation of our atmospheric defense strat-
egy. Although there is some disagreement in the intelligence com-
munity about the operational characteristics of the Backfire, even
the most conservative estimates acknowledge its capability to reach
the continental United States and Canada in an operational mode.
Without aerial refueling, it is clearly capable of flying from Soviet
Arctic bases across virtually the entire United States and Canada
on one-way missions with recovery in third countries. With refuel-
ing, the Backfire can achieve similar target coverage and return to
the Soviet land mass. On missions to Canadian and northern U.S.
targets, arctic staging and tanker support would enable the Back-
fire to use supersonic dash or to fly low to avoid radar detection.

127

All Backfire aircraft apparently are either equipped for, or actually
carry, air refueling probes.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified, the
Backfire will be limited to a production rate not to exceed 30
aircraft per year. Over 100 Backfires have been produced to date,
and we believe that the LRA force will eventually include several
hundred Backfires.

In addition to Backfire production, the Soviets may be in the
process of developing a new long-range bomber to replace the Bear
and Bison. Since 1974, Soviet officials have on several occasions
referred to such developments. If such a program is underway, this
new bomber could appear in the early 1980's.

We at NORAD have examined the SALT II Treaty in view of
this trend in Soviet bomber modernization. The treaty specifically
spells out strategic systems limitations. The multiple, independent-
ly targetable reentry vehicle limits of the treaty provide for an
aggregate of 1,320 MIRV, ICBM's, SLBM's, ASBM's and long-range
cruise missile equipped heavy bombers.

Since the treaty restricts the number of MIRV ballistic missiles
to 1,200, an attractive strategic expansion option for the Soviet
planner, and one which is relatively inexpensive, would be the
introduction of a long-range cruise missile equipped bomber force
of at least 120 aircraft. Should the Soviets select this option, it will
complicate significantly our ability to defend against a Soviet air
attack, due to both increased weapons and standoff tactics.

Our national policy does not give major priority to strategic
defense in general. The United States relies on a strong strategic
offensive force and a credible tactical warning system to achieve
deterrence goals. Strategic defense policy has changed since the
1950's and early 1960's when we had numerous fighter interceptor
squadrons. The mid-1960's brought strategic defense resource re-
ductions which were attributed to a shifting emphasis in military
priorities, as well as budget constraints. This change in emphasis
culminated in a policy guidance memorandum from the Secretary
of Defense in March 1972. As a result of this change in policy our
fighter interceptor force today stands at 315 aircraft. These inter-
ceptors are essentially the same aircraft we had in 1958 — that is F-
106's and F-lOl's, now augmented by some TAG F-4's and a few F-
15's; and thus this fighter force is inadequate to stop a determined
attack. We have seen similar reductions in all atmospheric defense
systems. In the past 20 years NORAD has been reduced 70.3 per-
cent in long-range radars; 61.7 percent in distant early warning
line [DEW] radars; 83.3 percent in control centers, and 75.2 percent
in manpower.

Given the dramatic decline of our atmospheric defense forces, the
present Soviet force of 150 Bear and Bison bombers, even without
Backfire augmentation, could pose a real threat to North America.
It also provides greater flexibility for Soviet selection of strategic
options and a usable strategic reserve force.

The continued production of Backfire and development of new
heavy bomber systems demonstrates continuing force moderniza-
tion efforts in Soviet long-range aviation. We need to continue our
conversion to the joint surveillance system to become operational

128

in 1981 for peacetime sovereignty of North America, as well as
proceeding with the upgrading of the Canadian Pinetree system.

However, in view of the Soviet force modernization, it is essential
for our warfighting capability that we rely on the AW ACS [Air-
borne Warning and Control System] and a modernized fighter in-
terceptor task force. In order for our fighter interceptor force and
the AW ACS to be responsive to an incoming threat, it is impera-
tive that we upgrade our long-range tactical warning system with
the planned over-the-horizon-backscatter radar and enhanced DEW
line.

In view of the ongoing developments in the Soviet bomber force,
which includes the continued production of the Backfire, the op-
tions afforded the Soviet planner and our very limited air defense
capability, I believe that a reevaluation of our national policy for
atmospheric defense is now required.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before
the committee.

Senator Biden. Before we get to the next statement, can you
augment your statement slightly and at least set out for the record
what the rationale for the degrading of NORAD was at the time?
You said there were budget constraints, but what were the argu-
ments at the time of the tradeoff?

General Hill. The reduction in atmospheric defense forces has
been continuing over a long period of time, Mr. Chairman. Funda-
mentally our national policy has been to rely on a strong offensive
deterrent force in the United States, rather than provide for de-
fense against ballistic missiles. The Secretary of Defense who initi-
ated this decision as well as those who followed, determined that
since there would be no defense against ballistic missiles it seems
imprudent to spend money on bomber defenses.

Senator Biden. The reason being there is not much that will stop
it, once it breaks out anjrway; is that the rationale?

General Hill. If you mean a massive nuclear exchange, that is
correct, yes, sir.

Senator Biden. I just wanted to be sure I understand it. General?

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD H. ELLIS, COMMANDER IN
CHIEF, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

General Ellis. Mr. Chairman, a considerable amount of study
over a long period of time has been expended at Strategic Air
Command [SAC] in an effort to better understand the Backfire.
Our analysis of its relationship to SALT II was undertaken in the
context of the strategic force portion of the treaty as a whole and
of the entire United States-Soviet strategic force relationship. My
statement was prepared using the same comprehensive approach.

Furthermore, since the security of our country, with or without a
treaty, depends upon U.S. strategic force modernization initiatives,
I have also briefly described in my statement those things SAC
believes must be undertaken. I will read just a summary of my
statement.

SAC's interest in this treaty is straightforward and relates solely
to our mission of nuclear deterrence. We have two very basic
questions.

129

The first question: During the life of the treaty, will it be more
difficult or less difficult to accomplish the objectives of our deter-
rent and emergency war missions with a treaty utilizing the
weapon systems we have and expect to have between now and the
end of 1985?

The second question relates to the post-treaty period, and it is: Is
SAC likely to be more capable or less capable of carrying out the
objectives of its deterrent and emergency war missions during the
post-treaty period by reason of our country having abided by SALT
II?

It is our assessment that during the period of the treaty, SAC
will have less difficulty executing its deterrent and emergency war
missions with a treaty than we would without a treaty. Now, the
reasons for this positive assessment.

First, under the treaty we will have approximately 250 less
Soviet strategic delivery vehicles to contend with in our planning.
Additionally, we undoubtedly would have a much larger number of
Soviet weapons to consider in our planning if there were no treaty.

Second, the treaty places a limit of 10 warheads on each SS-18
missile or a total of 3,080 for the entire SS-18 force until 1985. In
the absence of a treaty, we believe the Soviets have the technology
and production base not only to increase the number of SS-18's
that could be deployed, but also to increase the number of weapons
each SS-18 could carry during the 1980-85 time period. Additional-
ly, such increases in SS-17's and SS-19's could also be achieved.

Third, the Soviets have follow-on modifications underway to ex-
isting fourth generation ICBM's, along with some fifth generation
ICBM's under development; but under the treaty they may test and
deploy only one new system. Additionally, the Soviets undoubtedly
have extra Backfire production capacity but have agreed to limit
production to 30 a year.

Fourth, under the treaty it will be easier to verify Soviet actions
than it would be without a treaty. Our Nation's current capability,
together with programs underway, will preserve an ability to ade-
quately verify Soviet activities. Whether adequate is sufficient for
this treaty could be a shaky judgment if taken in isolation. But
when weighed with treaty imposed restraints that can be verified, I
believe it is acceptable. However, the uncertain aspects of treaty
verification once again bring home the absolute requirement for
more positive cooperative measures, including onsite inspection, if
we are to expand qualitative limitations in SALT III.

Fifth and most important, we are not restricted by the treaty
from doing those things we must in the way of strategic force
modernization.

Now, to the second question regarding the performance of SAC's
mission in the post-treaty period. Our position in the post-treaty
period, from a war planning and execution point of view, should be
better by reason of having complied with SALT II because we will
better understand and be better informed on the Soviet post-treaty
force structure and capabilities; and we will not be restricted from
undertaking our modernization program.

However, there are two areas of concern: the SS-18, the Soviet
heavy, modern ICBM, which we are not permitted to duplicate, and
the Backfire bomber.

130

With regard to the SS-18, during SALT II we can expect the
Soviets to concentrate on identification of methods for exploiting
the enormous throw-weight available in the missile — almost twice
that of the M-X — in the post-treaty period. The technology of
fractionation is well known to the Soviets, and I expect them to
progress in this area during the course of and within the limita-
tions of the treaty. The Soviet planner will also identify other
techniques for utilizing this excessive throw-weight, such as accura-
cy improvements and increases in warhead yield. The question
then becomes whether the United States would prefer the Soviets
to do them with an agreement, or take the chance of them being
done, plus fractionating and additional SS-18 deployments, without
a treaty. I choose the former with the hope that future negotiations
will cancel out this clear Soviet advantage.

With regard to Backfire, I would echo the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This bomber has an intercontinental capability and should have
been considered a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle. The promised
production constraint can be monitored in peacetime, but whether
the Soviets would use the Backfire in a strategic role during a
crisis is a matter for conjecture. The fact remains that in the post-
treaty period the Soviets could have a force of some 300 or more
Backfires with which we will have to contend.

I am led to the conclusion that the SS-18 and Backfire are
central to the Soviet side of SALT II, and efforts to further con-
strain these systems could very likely delay the treaty for an
extended period of time or leave us with an incomplete treaty
during a period when treaty constraints will be helpful — even nec-
essary — to the strategic planner and commander.

Perhaps the most significant point to emerge from this Nation's
debate on SALT II has been the growing consensus on the need for
U.S. strategic force modernization. The best way to outline SAC's
views in this critical area is to first comment on modernization
programs now underway.

The air-launched cruise missile which will be integrated into our
B-52G model force is now scheduled to go into production early
next year. The ALCM promises to be a valuable supplement to our
capability for the rest of this century.

We fully expect the ALCM-equipped B-52G to be employed in a
"shoot and penetrate" role until 1985, at which time we recom-
mend its transition to an all-stand-off ALCM carrier. The B-52H
model will be upgraded to insure it has the ability to penetrate
until the late 1980's. Then, SAC recommends that it, too, be con-
verted to an ALCM standoff carrier role, thereby permitting us to
delay the costly introduction of a new cruise missile carrier until
the 1990's.

President Carter's recent decision to authorize full-scale engi-
neering development of the M-X missile is encouraging. A basing
decision is now required and, further downstream, a timely produc-
tion decision.

Preliminary work on an advanced strategic-manned penetrator
for the 1990's has just started, and we will watch progress with
interest.

At this point in time, the programs I have just described appear
to be an effective hedge against the strategic threat projected for

131

the post-1985 period, when these systems, plus the Trident, will be
entering the force in operational numbers.

I would now like to turn to the period before these new systems
are available in the necessary quantity— 1980-1985— a time frame
when the United States is very likely to lose strategic equivalence
with the Soviet Union.

Several agencies have looked at various alternatives to offset the
serious threat in this period of uncertainty. SAC believes the most
promising solution is the early modification of 155 FB-lll's and F-
lll's into FB-lllBC's with new engines, enlarged weapon capacity,
and sharply increased range capabilities. This option would not
only help in the early 1980's but also replace the B-52's as they are
phased out of the penetration role in the post-1985 period.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the treaty you are considering will be
helpful to the SAC Commander. However, it must be realized that
SALT II, or any reasonable modification thereof, can in no way be
regarded as an alternative to strategic modernization. The modern-
ization requirement matured during the past few years as we
began to understand the full meaning and impact of the Soviet
strategic buildup. Depending on what the Soviets do in the future,
the treaty can perhaps reduce the magnitude of our modernization,
but the necessary minimum strategic modernization requirement
has already been identified and is not coupled to approval or disap-
proval of the treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Biden. Thank you, General. Mr. Slocombe, do you have a
statement?

Mr. Slocombe. I will summarize my statement briefly if I may.

Senator Biden.

STATEMENT OF WALTER SLOCOMBE, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE SALT TASK FORCE AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AF-
FAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Slocombe. The purpose of my statement is to describe the
resolution of the Backfire issue in the SALT II negotiations and to
set it in perspective with some of the other issues which were
considered in the talks.

A definitional issue that has been an element in the negotiations
from the outset and has had a substantial impact on the negotia-
tions concerning the Soviet Backfire bomber, is the definition of a
strategic weapon. The Soviets have used their geographical posi-
tion—that is, they are close to our allies and far from the United
States— to press a simple but totally unacceptable definition of
"strategic." The Soviet definition is that any weapon owned by one
side capable of striking the territory of the other with a nuclear
weapon is a strategic system. This would count all of the central
strategic systems— ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers— on both
sides, but in addition would include all of the United States so-
called forward-based systems. According to the Soviets, this defini-
tion would, however, exclude all of the Soviet noncentral strategic
systems since they could not strike U.S. territory.

Our definition was more empirical and reflected our alliance
interests. In essence, we argued that whatever a strategic system

132

may be in the abstract, SALT should deal with central systems,
and that ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers were the central
systems. Other U.S. systems that were designed or deployed for
theater missions should not be considered in SALT, especially be-
cause they have to counter Soviet theater nuclear systems which
are not limited by SALT.

With the firm support of our allies we adamantly resisted the
Soviet position that our forward-based systems be limited in SALT.
Whatever the theoretical capability of these aircraft, they are de-
ployed for theater missions and thus should not be subject to
bilateral SALT limitations, especially since Soviet theater systems
were not covered.

This fundamental definitional dispute stalemated the SALT I
negotiations on offensive forces for an extended period. The dispute
was never resolved in SALT I, but merely set aside, and it arose
again early in SALT IL

In SALT II the United States pressed for Soviet acceptance of a
concept of equal aggregates covering central systems only, with no
limits on forward-based systems. The Soviets for their part pro-
posed asymmetrical central system limitations — a larger aggregate
for themselves, in part to compensate for our forward-based
system. They also proposed eventual withdrawal of all U.S. for-
ward-based systems from third countries. They further argued that
the Soviet Union should be entitled to compensation for allied
nuclear forces.

These early negotiations did not directly address the issue of the
Soviet Backfire bomber. The United States wished to settle first on
the principle of equal aggregates and exclusion of forward-based
systems with no compensation for allied systems before discussing
the precise systems to be covered.

As you know, these two general principles, equal aggregates and
exclusion of forward-based systems which had been espoused by the
United States, were agreed upon when President Ford and General
Secretary Brezhnev met at Vladivostok in 1974. The Vladivostok
framework provided among other things for an equal aggregate
ceiling of 2,400, and included no limitations on or account taken of
U.S. forward-based systems or allied systems. It was agreed that
the 2,400 aggregate would apply to launchers for ICBM's and
SLBM's and to heavy bombers.

When the two delegations resumed work in Geneva in early 1975
to draft detailed language implementing the general principles
agreed to at Vladivostok, the U.S. Delegation proposed that Back-
fire be included as a heavy bomber because of U.S. concerns about
its inherent intercontinental potential. The Soviet delegation re-
jected that proposal on the basis that Backfire was not a heavy
bomber and thus not subject to SALT. The United States kept the
proposal to include Backfire on the list of heavy bombers formally
on the table until well into 1979, but discussion of the Backfire. for
all practical purposes ceased at the delegation level and was con-
ducted thereafter instead in higher level channels, that is, at the
level of contacts through Foreign Ministers and through the two
Presidents.

During 1975 and 1976, the United States presented to the Soviets
at higher levels a number of SALT proposals addressing Backfire

133

and the cruise missile question which had also arisen after the
Vladivostok meetings. Some of these would not have counted Back-
fire as a heavy bomber. As President Ford notes in his memoirs,
these included a proposal in January 1976 that would have limited
the U.S.S.R. to 275 Backfire bombers by 1981. Another approach
proposed in February 1976 would have put both Backfire and
cruise missiles into separate packages for 3 years while negotia-
tions proceeded. During that time, the Soviets would have agreed
not to increase Backfire production rates, and the United States
would have made various commitments with regard to cruise mis-
siles. Neither of these proposals proved negotiable, and the Back-
fire issue was not resolved.

In part, of course, our inability to agree turned on a factual
dispute over the range capability of the Backfire. But there was
also a difference over whether the standard for inclusion in SALT
should be the physical capability of a weapon delivery vehicle to
strike the homeland of the other side. In our view the Backfire
issue was in an important way different from the FBS problem
because we believed — and continue to believe — the Backfire to have
a capability to attack the United States from the U.S.S.R. Nonethe-
less, there was clearly some tension between efforts to include
Backfire, whose primary current mission we acknowledged to be
other than intercontinental, and our successful insistence that U.S.
forward-based aircraft be excluded despite their physical capability
to strike Soviet targets. They are, of course, in fact assigned to
different missions and have their primary role in different mis-
sions.

The Soviets from time to time used the logic of our argument on
FBS to insist that Backfire be excluded from SALT II. Including
Backfire in the treaty and excluding FBS would not, in their view,
be a compromise with the United States, but a reversal of a posi-
tion they had held since the opening round of SALT I.

When Secretary of State Vance met with the Soviet leaders in
Moscow in March 1977, neither of the two U.S. proposals he pre-
sented — the so-called deferral proposal and the better known com-
prehensive proposal — provided for Backfire to be counted under the
SALT II aggregate ceiling.

After prolonged negotiations, again conducted at the higher
level, the sides subsequently agreed that Backfire would not be
counted in the SALT II aggregate, but that there would be written
commitments on Backfire by President Brezhnev to President
Carter. In the context of the mutual understanding that the Back-
fire issue would be resolved at the summit, the U.S. withdrew our
formal listing of Backfire among the heavy bombers as it appeared
in the treaty.

At the Vienna Summit in June 1979, President Brezhnev handed
President Carter the following written statement after having read
it to him — and it is set out in my statement and in the documents
which have been circulated to the Senate. The statement reads:

The Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet "TU22M" airplane, called
"Backfire" in the U.S.A., is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to
give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this
connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this
aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the U.S.A.
Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-

134

flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the
production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate.

In response to a direct question, President Brezhnev confirmed
that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per
year. President Carter further stated that the United States en-
tered into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments
contained in the Soviet statement with respect to Backfire, and
that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be
essential to the obligations assumed under the treaty. He also
stated that the United States has the right to a comparable
bomber.

The Soviet commitments given at the Vienna summit are con-
sistent with the U.S. objective of constraining the intercontinental
potential of the Backfire force while continuing to exclude our own
European-based and Pacific-based theater aircraft from SALT.

The production rate commitment limits the total number of
Backfires and thus the overall effectiveness of the Backfire force.
In particular, it means that a possible Soviet diversion of Backfire
from its theater and naval mission to an intercontinental role
would substantially reduce Soviet strength in those areas, while
adding only marginally to overall Soviet strategic capability.

With respect to the legal status of the Soviet commitments on
Backfire, the Soviet commitments are clearly binding legal obliga-
tions of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, President Carter's statement at the
Vienna Summit makes clear that the United States enters into the
SALT II agreements on the basis of the obligations undertaken in
the Soviet statement and considers these commitments as essential
to the obligations assumed by the United States under the treaty.
The result is that, even though the Soviet Backfire commitments
are not a part of the formal treaty text, the United States would
view a Soviet violation of these commitments in exactly the same
manner as we would view a Soviet violation of the treaty text
itself, and would act accordingly. The Soviet Union understands
that this is our position.

In sum, while it would of course have been desirable to count
Backfire in the aggregate if we could have done so, the resolution
of the Backfire issue satisfactorily serves our interests. Our ex-
change with the Soviets gives us a firm production rate commit-
ment; it limits increases in its capability of the Backfire; it makes
clear our own right to a comparable bomber, and it definitely links
Soviet fulfillment of its obligations on Backfire to the continued
viability of SALT.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

The Chairman [presiding]. I think we had better go to questions
now. Are there any other prepared statements that other members
of the panel would care to submit to the committee?

Ambassador Earle. I do not have one.

The Chairman. Dr. Timbie?

Mr. Timbie. I do not have one.

The Chairman. Very well. Then, I think, we should go to ques-
tions.

135

STATUS OF ORAL ASSURANCE OF BREZHNEV TO CARTER

My first question is directed to you, Mr. Slocombe. On July 10
Secretary Vance testified before this committee and stated that if
the Russians violated the Backfire agreement, the United States —
and I am quoting the Secretary — "would consider that a basis for
repudiating the treaty."

Now, my question to you is, what is the status of an oral assur-
ance given by Mr. Brezhnev to the President of the United States
under international law?

Mr. Slocombe. Under international law it is a binding, legal
commitment of the Soviet Union. Further, in light of our statement
that we are relying on that commitment in undertaking our own
obligations — assuming the treaty is ratified — with respect to the
SALT Treaty, under international law a violation of the Soviet
commitment with respect to Backfire would give us grounds, as the
Secretary of State said, for abrogating the treaty itself.

The Chairman. Well, all of this could be made very explicit and
could be tied down with a reservation which has the effect of
incorporating these assurances into the treaty, giving them the
same status as the commitments made by the Soviet Union in the
treaty itself. The Senate could make that a condition to its consent.

Mr. Slocombe. The Senate certainly has that power, Mr. Chair-
man. It is our position that such a reservation would be unneces-
sary and not change the legal effect of the posture as it now stands.

The Chairman. Well, it would certainly remove any possibilities
for ambiguity or disagreement in the future; would it not? It is
your position that that is unnecessary?

Mr. Slocombe. It is our position that there is no ground for
ambiguity or uncertainty in the future without such a reservation.

The Chairman. Mr. Warnke said in his testimony before the
committee on July 16 that he had no objection to the Senate
reaffirming the administration's position in an understanding, and
he has been as close to these negotiations as anyone.

Mr. Slocombe. He has indeed, but he does have the luxury of
speaking as a private citizen.

The Chairman. Yes. This committee often turns for its advice to
well-informed private citizens.

Under the present circumstances it is my view that we have to
consider the capability of the Backfire. It may well have been
designed primarily as a theater weapon, and as a naval weapon;
but if it can be used in an extreme case, such as a nuclear war, to
strike the United States, then I think we have to look at it that
way.

Now, it is true that the treaty, or at least the statement made by
Brezhnev, restricts the Soviet Union to its present level of produc-
tion. It is also true that the United States is not inhibited in
building a comparable weapon if it were to choose to do so. I would
like to ask. General Ellis, if in your view the United States has a
need for a weapon comparable to the Backfire, a new plane with
the Backfire's general capabilities.

General Ellis. Mr. Chairman, as indicated in my statement, I
strongly believe that we need additional capability, particularly in
the 1980-85 time period. I would not, however, want it classed as a

136

peripheral bomber. We need it for use against a primary target
area.

The Chairman. Now, does the FB-111 which is based in this
country satisfy our need, in your opinion, if we had added numbers
of that type of aircraft?

General Ellis. Our proposal has been to increase its range, mod-
ernize its engines, and to more than double its bomb-carrying
capability.

The Chairman. And if that were done, you would then be satis-
fied that our bomber force, both that counted within the treaty and
that not counted in the treaty, would be adequate for our needs as
a part of the Triad on which we rely?

General Ellis. That, in conjunction with other programs that are
under way.

The Chairman. Like the cruise missile?

General Ellis. The cruise missile. Our recommendation on the
FB-111 is so strong simply because it is the only thing we can get
in the near term in a timely manner.

negotiating tradeoffs

The Chairman. Now, as the Commander in Chief of SAC, Gener-
al Ellis, can you tell us if our FB-lll's and F-lll's, the aircraft we
have in this country and in Europe with which we could strike the
Soviet Union, were counted in the treaty along with the Backfire,
would you prefer that to the present arrangement where the F-
lll's are not counted and the restriction is imposed on the limited
production of the Soviet Backfire?

I am trying to assess the two situations and have your judgment.

General Ellis. No, I would not, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
want to draw a distinction between the FB-111, which is a strate-
gic bomber, and the F-111, which is a European based and general
purpose fighter aircraft.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Ellis. We have large numbers of those, several hundred.
To throw them into any exchange with the Backfire in my opinion
would be very harmful to our conventional posture as well as to
our tactical nuclear posture.

If you are talking in terms of the FB-lll's alone as a tradeoff for
the Backfire, at this point in time because they are roughly equiva-
lent in terms of the Backfire assigned to the long-range Air Force,
I would say that it could be done because we have headroom within
our total number of SNDV's whereas they would have to make
some sort of accommodation in the way of reduction of other
weapon systems.

Mr. Slocombe. Senator, could I add a comment on that?

The Chairman. Yes; of course.

Mr. Slocombe. Quite apart from the numbers and the impact on
our own capability, the question you put, of including all of the
FBS that are in Europe in exchange for counting the Backfire,
would raise very considerable concerns among our allies. They
would, I think, be very reluctant to see the United States agree to
limit FBS in Europe, even as a matter of principle, without some
limits on Soviet theater nuclear forces such as the SS-20.

137

I think that is another consideration that bears on the FBS
position which we have taken consistently in the negotiations.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Senator
Javits?

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I am a little bit puzzled by the statements of General
Hill and General Ellis.

At the end of General Hill's statement, he discussed his own
responsibilities in NORAD and he says, "I believe that a reevalua-
tion of our national policy for atmospheric defense is now re-
quired," pointing out that this policy would be very materially
changed from the present state of our interceptor force in which
we are now deficient.

Then General Ellis concludes:

It is our assessment that during the period of the treaty, Strategic Air Command
will have less difficulty executing its deterrent and emergency war mission with a
treaty than we would without a treaty.

Now, is there any inconsistency in those statements or are they
entirely reconcilable; and if so, why?

General Hill?

General Hill. May I review General Ellis' portion that you are
referring to?

Senator Javits. Certainly. He goes on to detail his reasons which
are reasons we are very familiar with because we have had a good
deal of testimony. But we are not familiar as far as I know, with
your concerns about the fact that perhaps we have a new situation
respecting Soviet bomber capability which requires a revision of
our national policy for atmospheric defense, involving interceptors.

I would like to see if there is a consistency between your state-
ment or if there is not.

General Hill. Speaking only for the defense forces, my state-
ments. Senator Javits, were made on the basis that over the years
the Soviet bomber force has not been a large force and has not
been considered to be a threatening force to the United States,
certainly not as threatening as SLBM's or ICBM's. Therefore, na-
tional policy has been to reduce our military defensive capabilities
with regard to bomber attacks and bomber forces. Due to this
policy, our systems have declined over the years to the point where
today our capability is one of peacetime air sovereignty with a
limited ability to fight a war.

The introduction of the Backfire to the Soviet bomber force
increases the capability of the Soviet bomber force and therefore in
my view, as the commander of the defensive forces, makes that
force a more threatening one. As I see it, we need to re-evaluate;
the current national policy regarding bomber defense and deter-
mine if that policy is still a valid one. That was my suggestion in
my statement.

Senator Javits. You two come to the same conclusion, however,
that everything considered — after all, I cannot match your profes-
sionalism — "It is our assessment that during the period of the
treaty NORAD will have less difficulty executing its mission with
the treaty than without a treaty."

138

You both come to the same conclusion. Would you rather have
the treaty or not have it in order to free you to do what you think
you have to do?

General Hill. I have indicated in my statement, Senator Javits,
that the treaty neither improves nor degrades my ability to per-
form the air defense mission, however, I think the treaty is a
valuable document for the United States. As I have indicated, it
does take the first step toward the establishment of equal aggre-
gates from which balanced and phased reductions can occur. I
think that is good, I think we need that.

At the same time, it does in fact create a situation from a
defensive point of view of an increased potential threat to this
Nation. That is what I am calling attention to. I am suggesting
that it now is time for our Nation to understand that and re-
evaluate our past policies.

Senator Javits. Is the word "it," "it does create a potential
threat," the treaty for SALT II, or is the word "it" the present
ongoing momentum of the Soviet military preparations?

General Hill. I am referring, sir, to the Soviet bomber force, the
ongoing upgrading of the Soviet bomber force and the continuing
modernization of that force.

Senator Javits. So, that notwithstanding, you still think you are
better off with the treaty because whatever limits are placed, at
least there are some limits.

General Hill. Narrowly speaking from the defensive point of
view the treaty does not affect my capability in either regard.

Senator Javits. What about not narrowly speaking?

General Hill. I have already said, sir, that as far as the United
States is concerned, I think the treaty is good. I am in favor of the
treaty.

Senator Javits. Thank you. Is there anything you want to add to
that. General Ellis?

General Ellis. No, I do not want to speak for NORAD, I will
speak for SAC. I think my statement stands. Senator Javits.

Senator Javits. And you do not want to change anything based
on what has just been said.

General Ellis. No, I do not.

Senator Javits. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have a few minutes I would like to yield
to Senator Percy.

The Chairman. Senator Percy.

INCLUDING BACKFIRE IN AGGREGATE

Senator Percy. Thank you very much, Senator Javits, for accom-
modating my schedule. Gentlemen, we very much appreciate your
help in this regard.

General Ellis, Mr. Slocombe says in his statement that it would
have been desirable to count Backfire in the aggregate. If you had
your choice, would you have wanted to have included the Backfire
in the aggregate, and could you give a reason for your position?

General Ellis. Let me understand the proper assumptions here.
Is there an additional tradeoff that we would have to throw into
the total aggregate?

139

Senator Percy. Well, there has been, as I understand it, negotia-
tions to include the Backfire in the aggregate, to count it in the
treaty limits. It has been excluded. Would you have preferred also,
as Mr. Slocombe said, to have included the Backfire in the aggre-
gate?

General Ellis. Very much so.

Senator Percy. Very much so.

The Soviet Union in its statement to the United States said that
it did not intend to give the Backfire the capability of operating at
intercontinental distances. There are estimates that the Backfire
already has some intercontinental strategic capability. Is the Soviet
statement, then, somewhat misleading in this regard?

General Ellis. Is that question directed to me, sir?

Senator Percy. Yes, sir.

General Ellis. On strict terminology, and taking our knowledge
or estimate of its capabilities, it could be misleading. However, I
look at it as a statement, a Soviet statement, indicating the pri-
mary role of that bomber; that is in the peripheral role, and we
will assume that is what they intend to do with it until indications
would direct otherwise.

Senator Percy. Thank you.

SENTIMENT TO INCLUDE BACKFIRE IN TREATY LIMITS

Mr. Slocombe, there is sentiment on some Senators part to in-
clude the Backfire in the treaty limits. If such action were taken,
would the Soviets be over the limit? Would they have to retire
other systems to deploy more Backfires?

Mr. Slocombe. You mean if all the Backfires were counted
against the SNDV aggregate? They are already over the 2,400 and
2,250 limits counting only the things which it has been agreed to
count, so they would be further over the limit to the extent of any
Backfires being counted against the 2,400 and 2,250 total.

Senator Percy. If we for instance decided to include our F-lll's
deployed in Europe in the treaty limits, would we have to retire
other systems to stay within the limits, also?

Mr. Slocombe. I believe that we could stay within the limit if we
counted only the F-lll's that are now deployed in England and not
the FB-lll's in the United States. We would be just under the
limit if you do not count the nonoperational systems. We would
have to dismantle and destroy the nonoperational aircraft, virtual-
ly all of them.

By my calculations, if you kept everything which now counts and
which is operational, and you counted both the F-lll's and the
FB-lll's, we would be, I think, just over the total. Whether that
would have any impact depends on what assumptions you made
about what we do with the 160 Polaris tubes.

U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE TO BACKFIRE

Senator Percy. The final two questions. Does the United States
have any intention of deploying an aircraft similar to the Backfire
during the next decade? If theoretically we did deploy a Backfire,
how would we use it? Would we consider it a strategic weapon?
Perhaps the latter, or both questions, could go to General Ellis.

140

General Ellis. Our proposal as set forth in my statement, Sena-
tor Percy, was directed toward a strategic vehicle.

Senator Percy. I am sorry, I did not hear you.

General Ellis. It was directed toward a strategic vehicle, I was
not thinking of a peripheral bomber in the classic definition of the
Backfire.

Senator Percy. But if, just on a theoretical basis, we did deploy a
weapon similar to the Backfire, how would we use it? Would we
consider it useful as a strategic weapon?

General Ellis. Very much so, that is the whole thrust of my
argument.

Senator Percy. I thank you very much, and thank you. Senator
Javits, very much indeed.

The Chairman. Senator Zorinsky?

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

backfire capabilities with regard to first strike

General Ellis, I would like to welcome you to the hearing, having
known you prior to coming here to Washington. The home State of
SAC is Nebraska and I certainly appreciate your coming here to
lend your expertise and testimony regarding this very serious
treaty.

General, I would like to focus on the scenarios that you conduct
concerning the first-strike capability of the Soviet Union. Given the
fact that the Backfire bomber is capable of in-flight refueling, has
the internal system built into the structure of the aircraft, that is,
it is capable of being a long-range intercontinental bomber even
though there is some question between the Air Force, Defense
Department, and the CIA concerning the exact range of the Back-
fire; given those factual realities, do you or do you not project the
Backfire's capabilities with regard to first-strike potential against
this Nation?

General Ellis. We take them into consideration in our planning.
Senator, but obviously, whether they would use it in that role is
conjecture. It might also be used in postattack, and by that I mean
after the initial strike.

Senator Zorinsky. Well, do you allow for conjecture? I think you
made the comment earlier this morning in our other briefing that
when people are at war panic sometimes evolves or people may do
things with weapons unintentionally.

So, what I am saying is, in the event the Soviets had to use the
Backfire for intercontinental bombers, they certainly could, and I
would assume that you do allow for more than conjecture, the
possibility of the actual use of those Backfire bombers.

General Ellis. Absolutely. If I were a Soviet strategic planner I
would count on it and would insist on using it that way, just as we
can use B-52's in the conventional phase of a European conflict,
and then they revert to the nuclear phase in the event there is a
nuclear phase. That would be the logical way for them to use them.

Senator Zorinsky. The point I am making is, you are counting
them, the treaty does not count them.

General Elus. I look at them as a system that can strike the
United States.

141

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you. Then, let me ask one other ques-
tion. How old are our B-52 bombers versus the development of the
B-1?

General Ellis. We received the last B-52 bomber in 1962, that
was 17 years ago. That was the last B-52 bomber. The first B-52
was accepted in the middle 1950's.

Senator Zorinsky. Would you say objectively that our develop-
ment of air bomber systems has kept pace with that of the Soviet
Union?

General Ellis. Very definitely not. Senator.

Senator Zorinsky. And would I be wrong in saying that you did
support the continued production of the B-1 bomber?

General Ellis. I did.

Senator Zorinsky. And if you were asked that question again
now, would you continue to support the need for the production of
the B-1 bomber?

General Ellis. I would look at two things. I would look at how
long it would take us to get started on the B-1 again. I would look
at the cost that would be imposed on us at this time, and I would
look at alternatives. That is how we came up with the FB-111 B
and C. We can get it sooner at a much cheaper price than we can
get the B-1.

Senator Zorinsky. Would the FB-111 be a suitable replacement
in lieu of the B-1 bomber, in your estimation?

General Ellis. It does not have the overall capability of the B-1,
obviously; but it could be made available faster, in greater num-
bers, at reduced cost. We are looking for the earliest possible
capability to counter the threat that I described in the early 1980's
in my statement.

maintaining parity

Senator Zorinsky. From the first day of this hearing. General
Ellis, I have attempted to portray the issue as not being one of
whether SALT II does or does not resolve our deficiencies concern-
ing parity with the Soviet Union, but as one of the will of the
American people, the administration, the Congress, as to how much
we want to do to catch up in these areas. I have asked for defini-
tive lists. I have admitted you cannot bind one administration to
another administration; neither can you bind one Congress to an-
other Congress.

In your view, do you look at SALT II as a purchaser of time
where the real issue is that we must continue to do those things
that need to be done in order to maintain a parity outside of SALT
II, concerning our strength and weakness as compared to the
Soviet Union?

General Ellis. Senator, I have the scars of the B-70 and the B-1
decisions. So, I share the apprehension that I know has been ex-
pressed to this committee by certain committee members on wheth-
er or not the treaty would be a substitute for modernization.

As I have tried to bring out most strongly in my statement,
modernization is not coupled with the treaty, it is something that
must be done.

Senator Zorinsky. As a military leader, what advice can you give
me as an elected official about locking in, or creating a commit-

142

ment on behalf of the administration and this Congress? To what
extent do you feel we have to make plain, solid and simple our
meaning to the American public?

I keep hearing the word from all those who testified that we
must do what needs to be done. Well, that is a simple statement.
But I am sure that statement was heard many times during SALT
I. I feel one of the reasons we have the disparity now is because we
did not do what we could have done under the parameters of SALT
L Now, as you pointed out, the fear continually exists that we will
not do under SALT II parameters what we are allowed to do.

So, what I am saying is, as a military man you must have had
disillusionments with what we did not do during SALT I, and to
avoid that happening again, what advice can you give us about
what should be done to lock into the focus of the American public
the sacrifices that might have to be made in the area of playing
catchup?

General Ellis. Senator, I cannot give you the legislative mechan-
ics of how to do it. I can tell you, as I think I made clear in my
statement, that it seems to me it is most important that that point
be made, and it be made over and over again; and that it be done
by action on the part of this body. That, to me, is more convincing
than any amount of rhetoric.

Senator Zorinsky. Can you make a definitive statement such as
that neither you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor any other
military leaders, responsible military leaders, could guarantee the
safety of this Nation in the event that we do not make a total
commitment to creating parity with the Soviet Union?

General Ellis. Senator, I cannot speak for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. I can give my advice and they make their own judgment. I
think I made the judgment in my statement on the situation in the
early 1980's. I think the chance of losing essential equivalence is
likely. To me, if you lose essential equivalence, we have always
looked at it as the bottom line in terms of the capability that would
be represented by the strategic forces and strategic capability of
the United States.

Senator Zorinsky. General, you are looked at very highly, and
you know how the people in Nebraska feel about the Strategic Air
Command. I think many times we take it for granted that we can
go to bed and wake up in the safety and sanctity of our own homes,
and that is only due to the fact that we have experts and profes-
sionals guarding the integrity of this Nation militarily.

I think if you unequivocally said that you could no longer guar-
antee the security and safety of the people, many of whom take
that safety for granted, without our commitment to continue to
modernize our military forces, it would bring a meaningful reality
to a lot of people that take this country for granted.

General Ellis. Senator, I do not want to overstate this. I have
never been one that believes the most effective way to make your
point was to hang up your uniform, but the responsibility of the
Commander in Chief of SAC is not only to our people, to the
military, but to the public as you indicated.

I have long held the assumption — and by that I mean from the
very first day that I assumed command at SAC — that if I was ever
unable to execute my mission I would make it known, and I would

143

at that point leave. I will not be in a position of trust such as this
in which the American people are expecting us to do something
and we cannot do it. At that point I will be heard.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you. I hope at that point it is not too
late, General.

General Ellis. I do too.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lugar, please?

Senator Lugar, Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I suspect one way in which the media might cover
the testimony today is to suggest that the NORAD commander and
the SAC commander endorse the SALT Treaty, which would be a
shame because essentially, of course, you have indicated that you
support it for various reasons. At least you have said — and I now
quote General Ellis: "It is our sissessment during the period of the
treaty SAC will have less difficulty executing its deterrent and
emergency war missions with the treaty than we would without
it."

And yet, this precedes a recitation of five situations in which in
various ways, General Ellis, you point out that the Soviets have
either a production capability or a technical capability. For exam-
ple, you cite the treaty limitation on the SS-18, 10 warheads can be
put on each launcher as opposed to 30, and that this is one value in
the treaty. Clearly implicit in that is that they have the capability
to go to 30. The treaty means 250 strategic delivery vehicles that
you will not contend with because they will be destroyed. Clearly,
that implies they are there, the buildup has occurred, the modifica-
tion of the fourth generation ICBM's, the fifth generation ICBM's
are under development; the treaty might hold that down to a dull
roar — but we can only be hopeful that is the case.

In essence, as one analyzes your testimony, and I hope people
will, it underlines again that the Soviets have been going great
guns and we have not really been keeping up. That is what this
SALT debate is finally coming down to. The antiseptic view that
this treaty could be considered on the merits while we ignore the
comparative difficulty. As you in your testimony pointed out, we
are going to have a possibility of strategic inferiority in the early
1980's — and if we do the right thing, somehow we may get through
that period.

But it has not yet sunk in, I think, on this committee, this
Congress, or this Nation that we are in this sort of danger. When it
does, you will get the support you need.

I am encouraged by the testimony that Senator Nunn has report-
ed to have offered yesterday in which he was saying that this
treaty should be examined and may offer some benefits. That is
about what you are saying. Given the fact that they have been
going great guns, it may be wise to contain the threat as best as
possible.

But the critical factor is whether or not there is the will of the
leadership in this country to provide, as I understand Senator
Nunn said, about 1 or 2 percent more increase in real terms in the
defense budget each year. Some staff member interprets that to
mean $7 to $9 billion more each year.

144

What I think would be useful for you to address yourself to if
you could, sir, is: In the event that this position prevails and there
are a growing number of us who say there is indeed linkage in this
treaty and the linkage is that there must be a national commit-
ment to do those things that have to be done before we even
consider this treaty, what sort of things should we do?

You are giving testimony, I am afraid, battered by the rejection
of the B-1; battered by rejection of this and that and you suggest
that finally, given all these constraints, some modification of the
FB-111 is about the best we can do. But if in fact this Congress
says, "We are going to spend the money that we need to, to save
the country, leaving aside the Soviet Union, the SALT Treaty," or
what have you, sort of pick that up as a secondary consideration,
what should we do to enforce your ability to do your mission?

That, I think, is what some of us who would like to do those
things would like to know, what our program ought to be. The
administration has its program, it is the passage of the SALT
Treaty. But our program is something else, and the administration
is going to have to bargain with us. I think in order to have some
expert testimony — and maybe you cannot answer that today — we
need to know what that program ought to be.

In that case, why, eventually we might take a look at SALT and
may hold things to a "dull roar" as you have suggested. It might
not cost us that much because we will be coming out in a different
negotiating posture and SALT III, or SALT Il-and-a-half will be a
different sort of treaty because of that.

Now, with all of that preface, what can you say today, or what
could you say later on if there were other assumptions made about
the defense budget and about what we should do?

General Ellis. Senator, let me address first the force require-
ments. I tried in a general way to describe those requirements
during the period of the 1980's. I can give it in more precise
language, including dollar costs if that is the will of the committee.

But let me say one other thing about coupling it to the treaty.
You remember I said the need to modernize is not coupled with the
treaty. I recognize that is the mechanics that can help us accom-
plish modernization, that is, coupling modernization approval to
SALT ratification. I do not know about that, and I do not want to
overstate this, either.

But we people in the Strategic Air Command consider ourselves
in the nuclear front trenches. We are in the process of "hunkering"
down right now because of the early 1980's, and I will take help
wherever I can get it. The SALT Treaty provides some help simply
because it restrains what we know the Soviets can do, it is that
simple.

I will be most happy to provide you with the precise force struc-
ture recommendation.

Senator Lugar. I appreciate the point you are making, and
obviously one can make a case that we should proceed anyway and,
indeed, I think we should. But the testimony being presented
broadly around this country is, with SALT, why, we only spend x
number of dollars; without SALT we have to do something else. $30
billion has been cast around for the next decade as the difference
in expenditures, and that is a lot of money. Furthermore, one can

145

argue in domestic politics, if we had $30 billion, there are a good
number of social programs that this country might adopt, that we
would not have to spend — to use the words of the opponents — "on
Pentagon-inspired buildups" and this type of thing.

I think your point is well taken; the Joint Chiefs made the same,
but they said that at the time of SALT I they also had a list of
things to do and they recited how one after another was dashed

away.

The question I had for them was, "On what basis of faith do you
anticipate that there will be any other difference?" Now, I think
there will be because we are debating the SALT Treaty in this
format. It is going on for a long time; it may go on for a very long
time, as a matter of fact, until a defense budget is pinned down.
That could be much longer than many proponents have any
thought of it taking. But, it could go on just that long.

I think for those of us who see any leverage or linkage in this
situation and who are concerned about the defense of this country,
why, this means a great deal to us.

I do not mean to put you on the spot today, but I think we will
be coming back to you, the Joint Chiefs and others, in due course
for somewhat of an agenda as to things that need to be done, even
as we are considering SALT. As you say, with the limitations of the
Soviet thrust that are involved in it, it may be somewhat helpful in
this interim period of danger for us in the early 1980's.

Thank you very much.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO RENEGOTIATION

The Chairman. We are just about finished, and I want to ask a
question of Ambassador Earle, who has been left out.

Ambassador Earle. I have not felt left out. Senator.

The Chairman. If I understood General Ellis correctly— and
please listen closely to this, General Ellis, because I want to state
your position accurately— General Ellis has said that if we could
have obtained a deal with the Russians that would have included
the Backfire in the aggregate limitation of the treaty, and the FB-
111 in the aggregate limitation, that that would not have been a
bad deal. But if we could have only agreed upon counting the
Backfire in return for which both the FB-111 and our F-111 were
both counted in the aggregate limits, that would not have been a
good deal.

That is an accurate statement, is it not?

General Ellis. That is an accurate statement.

The Chairman. Now, if the Senate, by reservation, insisted on
counting the Backfire alone, what, in your judgment, would be the
Soviet response?

Ambassador Earle. Mr. Chairman, in my judgment the Soviet
response would be very negative. They have maintained from the
outset that the Backfire is a medium bomber. As Mr. Slocombe's
testimony indicated— and I think the record shows— they essential-
ly refused to discuss the Backfire at the negotiations in Geneva,
taking the position that those negotiations dealt with strategic
arms and the Backfire was not a strategic arm and therefore not
subject to consideration by the Delegations.

146

So far as I know, Backfire was not discussed at Vladivostok but
my own judgment is that we never would have reached agreement
on equal aggregates at Vladivostok had the Soviets contemplated
that we would take the position that the Backfire was indeed a
heavy bomber and should be included.

So, in short, I think the reaction would be totally negative I
think it would reopen, among other things, the whole concept of
equal aggregates.

The Chairman. Well, now, during the negotiations which, after
all, went on for nearly 7 years, did you try to make a deal that
would have counted the Backfire in, along with our F-lll's

Ambassador Earle. No, we did not, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. If not, why not?

Ambassador Earle. Because we did not want to, we did not think
it was a good deal. We did try to include the Backfire simply as a
heavy bomber, but you know the history of that. At no time did we
ever suggest that we would consider inclusion of our F-lll's in
exchange for their Backfire.

The Chairman. What about just the FB-lll's?

Ambassador Earle. That was not considered either, so far as I
know. I was in Geneva; whether it was considered in Washington
or not, I simply do not know.

Mr. Slocombe. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Slocombe.

Mr. Slocombe. While it is certainly true we never proposed to
count the FB-111 explicitly, we did make a number of offers which
would in effect have counted Backfire after a certain number, and
initially those numbers were not unrelated to the number of FB-
lU's. For example, in President Ford's book he points out that the
initial proposal which we made in January 1976, would have count-
ed Backfire after 120, which is of course in excess of the number of
FB-lll's. That proposal was not accepted. Because of our great
desire not to draw the question of FBS into the negotiations we
never proposed to count FB-lll's if Backfire would count. But I
think it is important to understand in the negotiating record we
did make a number of proposals to count Backfire only after a
certain number.

The Chairman. And those were all rejected.

Mr. Slocombe. That is correct.

The Chairman. I think I have no further questions. Senator
Zorinsky, do you have further questions?

Senator Zorinsky. No, thank you.

The Chairman. I want to thank you all for the executive session
this morning in which we pursued these matters in greater speci-
ficity and for your testimony during the public session. Your testi-
mony has been very helpful to us. We thank you very much.

Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Ellis. Thank you, sir.

Department of Defense's Responses to Additional Questions for the Record

Question 1. In the Joint Chiefs' testimony before the Committee on July 11, Gener-
al Jones stated that the United States "needs to keep a penetrating bomber force,
and we need to modernize." Is the Administration currently examining various
options for a new penetrating bomber? Would any of the options envision an
aircraft comparable to the Backfire? Would a new bomber carry cruise missiles of
range greater than 600 km? (If yes) Would the United States plan to count any new

147

bomber, regardless of its capabilities, under the SALT II limits? (If no) Why
wouldn't we plan to deploy our newest air-delivered weapons on a new bomber?

Answer. There are studies in progress examining a wide range of possible strategic
aircraft. These studies are looking at what could be built with today's technology,
what may be needed in the future and how effective the various concepts would be.

We are considering, as one possibility, bombers of the approximate size of Back-
fire. Since, however, effectiveness evaluation studies are a long way from complete,
no design or size has yet been identified as the most desirable bomber of the future.

A number of possible payloads including cruise missiles of range greater than 600
km are under consideration. The question of the best weapon mix for strategic
bombers is a complex issue. In general, however, flexibility in what a bomber may
be equipped with is very desirable and long range cruise missiles are a good candidate
for any new bomber.

As you know, any bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in
excess of 600 km are considered, under the SALT II Treaty, to be heavy bombers
and will be counted in both the 2400/2250 and the 1320 aggregate limits. Whether
or not a new, non-cruise missile-carrying bomber will be counted under SALT II will
be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Question 2. Several Administration witnesses before the Committee have asserted
the United States right to build a bomber comparable to the Backfire, and that it
would not be included in SALT II. If the United States built such a bomber, would it
be subject to any of the same restrictions as the Soviet Backfire, i.e. production rate
no more than 30 per year, and "not capable of operating at intercontinental dis-
tances"? Would we be permitted to deploy such an aircraft in the Strategic Air
Command, provide it with a refueling capability, and target it against the Soviet
Union?

Answer. If the United States built a bomber comparable to its Backfire, there
would be no restrictions on the production rate or capability of such an aircraft. The
United States could deploy such a bomber in any way it saw fit.

Question 3. Do we and the Soviets have any formal or informal understandings
about the interpretation of the restrictions on the Backfire? For example, Mr. Nitze
said in his testimony before this Committee that it isn't clear when the "year"
starts for counting the Backfire production rate. Thirty bombers per year is equiva-
lent to 21/2 per month. Would the Administration regard the production of 4 Back-
fires in any one month a violation of the agreement? For how long a period must
the production rate exceed 2^/2 per month before the Administration would feel a
violation had occurred?

Answer. The Soviets have agreed that Backfire production will not exceed 30 per
year. 'This means a monthly production average of 2y2 aircraft. We do not expect
the Soviets to turn out precisely 2 ¥2 Backfires every month, but any production
significantly in excess of this rate— particularly if carried on for several months —
would be cause for challenge in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Question 4. When Secretaries Vance and Brown appeared before the Committee
on July 9, Senator Glenn asked if the United States had made unilateral statements
that the Soviets have not yet responded to. Secretary Brown responded ". . . in
every case where we have made a statement with respect to their future actions,
that has been resolved satisfactorily." Besides the Backfire statement, what other
such agreements exist?

Answer. During the course of the negotiations, each side made many statements
which are included within the negotiation record. These statements are of varying
degrees of formality. Further, some are obligatory, such as the Soviet Backfire
statement; some are interpretive in nature, usually to clarify a technical aspect of
the Treaty, such as our statement with regard to U.S. terminology for terms in the
throw-weight definition; and some are merely informational in nature, such as our
statement with regard to the status of Hound Dog missiles. A complete list of each
side's statements and responses will be provided to the Chairman of the Committee
by the Secretary of State.

Question 5. The Treaty "defines" heavy bombers by listing all current types of
heavy bombers. Is there any formal agreement or informal understanding between
us and the Soviets that attempts to specify such a definition? What criteria does
the Administration use in judging whether a bomber should count under SALT? By
these criteria, is the Backfire a heavy bomber? Using these criteria, how would the
following United States and Soviet aircraft compare: Bear, Bison, Backfire, Blinder,
Badger, Fencer, B-52, B-1, FB-111, F-111, A-7.

Answer. Paragraph 3 of Article II of the SALT II Treaty establishes the airplanes
to be considered "heavy bombers" in a number of ways. First, it lists existing types.
Second, it includes those aircraft in the future which can carry out the mission of a
heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers.

148

The criteria to be used for determining this are to be agreed upon by the two sides
in the Standing Consultative Commission. No formal or informal understandings
exist as to what such criteria might be. However, it is likely that the United States
will include range and payload capability among such criteria.

The term "heavy bombers" also includes types of bombers equipped for cruise
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or air-to-surface ballistic
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers (ASBM's).

The bombers listed in the question are all existing bombers. Of these, only the
Bear, Bison, B-52, and B-1 are listed as current heavy bombers in the Treaty. The
others, by virtue of their neither being so listed nor being equipped for long-range
cruise missiles or ASBM's, are not considered to be heavy bombers. It is not possible
to evaluate these other bombers based upon the criteria to be used for future heavy
bombers, as these criteria have not yet been developed by the sides.

Question 6. Does the Administration expect the Backiire to become a carrier for
ALCMs, with ranges in excess of 600 km, during the period of the Treaty?

Answer. [Deleted.] Were the Backfire to be deployed with such a missile system,
then all Backfires, except those which were distinguishable on the basis of function-
ally-related observable differences (FROD's), would be accountable as heavy bombers
under SALT, and would count under both the 2400/2250 and 1320 aggregate limits.
The Backfire weapon system currently includes the [deleted] air-to-surface missile.
While replacing this missile with a longer-range one would increase the system's
effective range and consequently its standoff capability, [deleted].

Question 7. What improvements in the Backfire seem reasonable to expect and how
would they affect range and weapons delivery? How confident is the United States
that it can detect such activity? Was a higher production rate than 30 per year
thought to be a likely option for the Soviets?

Answer. With various modifications, the range of the Backfire could be signifi-
cantly increased. Some modifications could be incorporated relatively quickly and
easily — for example, increasing fuel capacity by adding external fuel tanks or in-
stalling fuel tanks in the weapons bay. Other possible modifications— such as ini-
proved engines, aerodynamic improvements, or lengthened fuselages to permit
greater fuel capacity — would be more complex and would probably be built into new
Backfires at the production plant.

[Deleted.] Without SALT there would, of course, be no constraints on improve-
ments to Backfire.

[Deleted.] The Intelligence Community believes that Soviet Backfire production
facilities are capable of producing more than the 30 aircraft per year limit agreed
upon at Vienna.

[Deleted.]

Question 8. What is the evidence that a new tanker for the Backfire may be under
development? It was first suggested in early 1975 in Secretary Schlesinger's Annual
Report. Why haven't we seen this aircraft tested or deployed yet?

Answer. [Deleted.] „ • r-

Question 9. Did the United States consider "collateral constraints on the Backfire
earlier in the negotiations in hopes of constraining the growth potential and intercon-
tinental capability of the Backfire? What were such constraints?

Answer. During the course of SALT II negotiations the United States proposed a
number of assurances other than a production rate limit and constraints on range/
payload capability of Backfire. These included restrictions on refueling, training,
basing, and armament. The Soviets rejected these proposals. In the end, we concluded
that a production rate limit and a more generalized approach to restricting the
capability of the Backfire provided an acceptable resolution of the issue.

Question 10. Is the exclusion of the Backfire from SALT II's aggregate limitations
and allowing up to 30 per year to be produced contrary to the assurances the United
States made to its allies early in SALT II that the United States could not "permit
threats to our allies to develop unchecked because of SALT agreements ? What
positions have our Allies taken with respect to including the Backfire in SALT II?

Answer. No. The exclusion of the Backfire from SALT II's aggregate limitations
and the limitation on Soviet Backfire production are not contrary to the assurances
that the United States made to its allies early in SALT II that the United States
could not "permit threats to our allies to develop unchecked because of SALT
agreements.*^ That assurance is given substance (1) by our efforts jointly with our
NATO allies to modernize and improve NATO conventional and theater nuclear
capabilities in Europe to counter growing Soviet conventional and TNF capabilities
and (2) by our refusal in SALT II to permit limitations on U.S. forward-based
systems in Europe. In the context of our assurance, it also is important to note that
the Soviet commitment to limit Backfire production to 30 per year not only serves to
constrain the intercontinental potential of the Backfire force, but also places a
ceiling on the number of Backfire available for theater and naval missions— a
constraint which otherwise would not exist.

149

Since we consulted with our allies throughout the SALT II negotiations, they are
aware of the history of the Backfire negotiations. Their primary concern was that
U.S. forward-based systems not be constrained. We were successful in resisting
Soviet demands for limits on U.S. forward-based systems.

Question 11. In Mr. Slocombe's prepared statement he states that, "The Vladivostok
framework . . . included no limitations on or account taken of U.S. forward-based
systems or Allied nuclear systems." Hasn't the United States included some future
forward-based systems of high interest to NATO, GLCM and SLCM, in the SALT II
Protocol? Is this an important exception to the U.S. position that FBS be excluded
because they relate to commitments to allies and counter Soviet theater forces not
included in SALT (or MBFR) which threaten our allies?

Answer. Early in SALT II, the Soviets proposed that the Treaty contain a ban on
the testing and deployment of SLCM's with ranges over 600 km and later adopted
the same position for GLCM's. We took the position that consideration of restrictive
long-term limits on these systems should be postponed to future negotiations. How-
ever, the Soviets insisted that SALT II should contain some limits on SLCM's and
GLCM's, and it became clear in the post-Vladivostok negotiations that an agree-
ment could not be concluded without some GLCM and SLCM limits. The compro-
mise between Soviet insistence that GLCM's and SLCM's be limited and our insist-
ence that long-term limits be postponed to future negotiations was to include some
GLCM and SLCM limits in a short-term Protocol, not in the Treaty itself. By this
approach, we accommodated Soviet insistence that the agreement address SLCM's
and GLCM's, while making certain that these limitations would have no impact on
U.S. programs.

The Protocol bans the deplosmient of SLCM's and GLCM's capable to ranges
greater than 600 km until after December 31, 1981, but places no limits on develop-
ment and flight-testing, which can go and are going forward. Since neither the
GLCM or the SLCM would be ready for deployment until 1983, well after the
Protocol will have expired, and development and testing of the systems is permitted
during the time the Protocol is in effect, the Protocol will not constrain these
programs. Further, the limitations in the Protocol expire with the Protocol and set
no precedent for future negotiations.

We have and continue to consult closely with our allies on the potential role of
SLCM's and GLCM's in NATO long-range theater nuclear force modernization and
in arms control. Decisions on the role of SLCM's and GLCM's in NATO's moderniza-
tion should be forthcoming by the end of the year. The Protocol limits will in no
way constrain these decisions. With respect to future limits on these systems, the
United States, after consultation with the allies, declared that any future limits on
U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by
appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to
call of the Chair.]

THE SALT II TREATY

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1979

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman
of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone,
Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, and
Lugar.

Also present: Senators Cranston, Nunn, Moynihan, Mathias, and
Boschwitz.

The Chairman. The committee will please come to order.

OPENING statement

Appearing before the committee this morning is a distinguished
participant of the SALT I and early SALT II negotiations. Dr.
Kissinger was Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and Secretary of State, and as far as I know, the only man
to hold both jobs simultaneously for a time, and he was a leading
figure in developing U.S. positions and negotiating strategy for
SALT I and for the negotiations that led to the Vladivostok under-
standing between President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev in No-
vember 1974.

Dr. Kissinger was also one of the major negotiators of SALT II.
We have been informed that about three-quarters or more of the
SALT II Treaty now before the Senate was actually negotiated by
the time he left office.

Dr. Kissinger, we welcome you. We will appreciate your views
and judgments on the SALT Treaty. Your participation in the
SALT process goes back to the beginning. You have also thought
deeply about the SALT process, the nature of deterrence, and
strategic stability, and the need for a viable international order.
We welcome your testimony.

I understand you have presented the committee with an even
more extended text of your remarks and that you have an abbrevi-
ated text which you would like to deliver at this time.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Secretary Kissinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(151)

152

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is a privilege to appear again
before this committee, with which I spent so many hours when I
was in office.

With your permission, I will read excerpts from the statement
which I have submitted, and then I will answer your questions.

First, I will deal with the general problem presented by this
treaty.

In his essay, "Perpetual Peace," the philosopher Immanuel Kant
wrote that world peace would come about in one of two ways: After
a cycle of wars of ever-increasing violence, or by an act of moral
insight in which the nations of the world renounced the bitter
competition bound to lead to self destruction.

Our age faces precisely that choice. For the first time in history,
two nations have the capacity to inflict on each other and on
mankind a level of destruction tantamount to ending civilized life;
yet they have also before them unprecedented possibilities of coop-
eration, to harness technology to improve the human condition.

Both mankind's hopes and fears are bound up with the relation-
ship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two
countries possess huge nuclear arsenals; they also espouse sharply
opposing concepts of justice and conflicting visions of the future.
Hence, the Soviet Union and America clash in areas that each
considers vital. We have allies whose interests we will not sacrifice.
Soviet allies such as Vietnam and Cuba are quite capable of gener-
ating crises of their own, all too frequently encouraged by Moscow
to do so.

The peace we seek must therefore rest on something more tangi-
ble than a hope or a fear of holocaust. It must also reflect a
military and geopolitical equilibrium. How to strive for both peace
and our moral principles; how to avoid nuclear war without suc-
cumbing to nuclear blackmail — this is the overwhelming problem
of our period.

The new treaty poses a particularly complex problem. I have a
long-standing commitment to the process of limiting strategic nu-
clear arms. As your chairman pointed out, I was involved in the
negotiations of the Vladivostok Accord of 1974, and I played a role
in the negotiations which followed it.

As an historian, I am conscious of the lessons of World War II,
when global war resulted because the democracies disdained to
maintain the balance of power. But equally, we must not forget the
tragedy of World War I, when disaster resulted even with an
equilibrium of power, when technology and rivalry outran the con-
trol of statesmen.

Thus, SALT cannot be considered in isolation. It must be viewed
in the context of the global balance that it reflects or purports to
effect.

Thus, I regret to have to say that the present treaty comes up for
ratification at a time of grave danger to our national security and
to the global equilibrium. The military balance is beginning to tilt
against the United States in too many significant categories of
weaponry. The unprecedented Soviet use of proxy forces in Africa,
the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, and the turmoil caused by
radical forces and terrorist organizations sponsored by Moscow's
friends, mark ours as a time of profound upheaval.

153

In addressing the treaty before you, I respectfully submit, the
Senate has a responsibility to examine the broader conditions of
our national security. Without such an examination, SALT will
become a soporific, a form of escapism. I shall submit specific
proposals to achieve this, later in the statement.

Let me now turn to the shifting strategic balance.

The basic technical facts about the current military balance have
been presented in great detail before this and other committees.
Let me concentrate first on the serious transformation, adverse to
our interests, that has taken place in the overall strategic balance
during the last decade and a half.

For about the first 25 years of the postwar period, the problem of
maintaining the military equilibrium was relatively straightfor-
ward. The Soviet Union was always superior in ground forces on
the Eurasian continent. We were vastly ahead in strategic striking
power as well as in theater nuclear forces. The reach of the Soviet
Union was limited to regions accessible to motorized ground trans-
port, generally adjacent territories in Europe, and to some extent
China. Africa, most of the Middle East, and Southeast Asia were
beyond the capacity of major Soviet military intervention. And the
areas which were hostage to Soviet ground armies were protected
by three factors:

First, by the American preponderance in strategic nuclear strik-
ing power, capable of disarming the Soviet Union or at least reduc-
ing its counterblow to tolerable levels while still retaining large
residual forces for attacks on industrial targets;

Second, by a vast American superiority in so-called theater nu-
clear forces;

And third, in Europe, by substantial American and allied ground
forces that posed at least a major probability that Soviet ground
attack would trigger the nuclear retaliation of the United States.

This state of affairs will soon have ceased to exist. Starting in
the 1960's, the military balance began to change — almost impercep-
tibly at first, so great was our superiority — but with growing mo-
mentum in recent years. It is imperative that we recognize without
illusion the dangerous trends that are emerging. It is crucial that
we begin to rectify them now.

The growth of Soviet strategic nuclear forces has been inexorable
for a decade and a half. In 1965, the Soviet strategic arsenal
comprised about 220 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 100 sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles. By 1968, the number had grown
to 860 ICBM's and over 120 SLBM's. By mid-1970, the Soviets had
caught up with us in numbers of launchers. Instead of stopping
when they reached parity with us, as the Johnson administration
expected, the Soviets continued their missile buildup — until they
were frozen at the levels of the ceilings established by the first
SALT agreement in May 1972. Then, they switched energetically to
qualitative improvements in their missile forces.

Our problem derives not only from the larger number of war-
heads on Soviet ICBM's, but above all from the difference in the
types of weaponry emphasized by the two sides. In the sixties, the
United States unilaterally decided to base its strategic forces on
light but highly accurate ICBM's, the less vulnerable but also less

154

accurate SLBM's, and the more versatile but more vulnerable
manned bombers.

The Soviets made the opposite decision, relying on large land-
based missiles capable of delivering a far heavier pay load. At first,
the crudeness of their technology and the lack of accuracy deprived
these weapons of effectiveness against military targets. But as
Soviet technology improved, its advantage in numbers and missile
payload was bound to tell.

There is now general agreement that their improvements in
missile accuracy and warhead technology will put the Soviets in a
position to destroy our land-based forces of Minuteman ICBM's by
1982. Whether this capability is ever exercised or not — and I con-
sider it improbable — it reverses and hence revolutionizes the stra-
tegic equation on which our security and that of our friends have
depended through most of the postwar period.

The revolution in the strategic balance is aggravated by a compa-
rable buildup of Soviet aircraft and missiles, and theater based
nuclear forces, to a point where Soviet superiority in theater strik-
ing forces is upon us.

All this has been accomplished while the Soviet advantage in
conventional forces has grown, and while the reach of Soviet power
has been extended enormously by the rapid development of the
Soviet Navy, an expanding long-range airlift capability, the acquisi-
tion of Soviet bases in countries like South Yemen and Vietnam,
and the establishment of vast Soviet arms depots in such countries
as Libya and Ethiopia, which will enable the Soviet Union to move
its own or proxy troops rapidly to their prepositioned weapons.

All these actions were unilateral, hence avoidable. They were not
extracted from us by clever Soviet negotiators. We imposed them
on ourselves by our choices, theories, and domestic turmoil. It is
therefore in our power to alter them.

The prevailing American strategic doctrine of the sixties went
under the name of "assured destruction." According to it, deter-
rence was guaranteed so long as we possessed the ability to destroy
a predetermined percentage of Soviet population and industrial
capacity. Strategy thereby turned into an engineering problem, an
economic analysis essentially independent of the size of the oppos-
ing forces.

The emergence of a new strategic nuclear environment should
have forced a reconsideration of this doctrine and a renewed atten-
tion to regional nuclear and conventional balances. Unfortunately,
at the precise moment that such a reexamination became urgently
necessary, all our programs came under systematic attack as a
byproduct of the bitter domestic debate over Vietnam.

On the one hand, the war in Vietnam reduced funds available
for modernization. Even more important, the wholesale assault on

155

defense spending jeopardized even those projects for which funds
were available and budgeted. After the end of our involvement in
Vietnam, new strategic programs could at last be funded: The B-1
manned strategic bomber, to become operational in 1979; the M-X,
to become operational in 1983; the Trident submarine and missile,
expected to become operational in 1978; various kinds of cruise
missiles for the 1980's — all of which would give the United States
greater options, and some of which would bring about a new coun-
terforce capability.

Every one of these programs has been canceled, delayed, or
stretched out by the current administration, so that we are at a
point where only the Trident can be operational during the period
of the projected SALT Treaty. We now face the challenge of the
early eighties with forces designed in the sixties.

Since our modern military doctrine and strategy have depended
much more on strategic forces than those of the Soviets, even
overall equality revolutionizes the postwar security and geopolitical
structure. But in fact the situation is worse. My principal worry is
not only the growing vulnerability of our land-based forces but the
growing invulnerability of Soviet land-based forces. The deterrent
effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies will in these
circumstances continually decline; our strategic forces will surely
lose their ability to offset the Soviet capacity for regional interven-
tion. And this capacity will be reinforced by the growing edge in
Soviet theater nuclear forces.

I want to reiterate that it is not necessary for present purposes
to debate whether the Soviet Union would in fact run a risk of a
global war; it will be grave enough if the willingness to run risks in
regional conflicts is magnified. And that seems to me the minimum
consequence of what is ahead. We cannot possibly continue to
gamble with inferior forces for regional defense, a shifting balance
in theater nuclear forces, vulnerable land-based strategic forces,
and invulnerable Soviet ICBM's, without courting the gravest dan-
gers.

How in such circumstances will we fulfill our commitment to our
allies? How will we protect our vital interests in areas such as the
Middle East? How will we prevent nuclear blackmail?

No responsible leader can want to face the 1980's with the pres-
ent military prospects. This, and not SALT in isolation, is the
principal problem facing us.

We must now ask, how does the SALT 11 agreement affect the
strategic balance? Any fair-minded analysis must recognize the
beneficial aspects of the SALT II agreement. The overall ceilings of
2,250 will force the Soviets to get rid of 250 strategic systems,
including some modern ones, while giving us the right to equalize
the numbers. The permitted number of land-based Soviet MIRV's,
820, is some 100 below the maximum number that they probably
intended to build in the absence of SALT. There are some restric-
tions on missile testing procedures. There are limits on numbers of
missile warheads on ICBM's, and a prohibition on more than one
"new" ICBM. There is for the first time an agreed base line of
information on the Soviet forces.

Regrettably, none of these achievements affects the grave strate-
gic situation which I have described and which must urgently be

156

reversed. The treaty does not reduce the Soviet first strike capabih-
ty against our land-based forces or improve our ability to survive a
first strike. It does not diminish the Soviet residual capability to
destroy civilian targets in the United States. And it does not en-
hance — indeed, it may slightly inhibit — the possibility of the
United States to catch up in the capacity of our strategic forces to
attack military targets.

The reduction in Soviet numbers is irrelevant to our strategic
problems. The danger to our security derives from warheads, not
from launchers, and the Soviet total of ICBM warheads will in-
crease from 3,200 at the time of the signing of SALT to over 6,000.
Even after the reduction in Soviet launchers is supposed to take
place, the total number of Soviet warheads including SLBM's will
approach 12,000 in 1985, as compared to 8,000 at the time of the
SALT signing.

I will not read other numerical analyses which make the same
point, but to sum up: The Vienna Treaty will not diminish the
threat to the strategic balance. During the life of the treaty, the
Soviets will complete their counterforce capability against our
ICBM's. This will coincide exactly with our period of maximum
danger.

At the same time, I must repeat, any SALT Treaty is likely to
ratify existing strategic trends. SALT negotiators cannot produce
what our military programs — for whatever reason — have neglected.
The Soviets will never agree to unilateral reductions. If we want
equality, we must build to equality.

The novel— and to me the most disturbing— feature of the cur-
rent treaty is its impact on the theater nuclear balance. The Soviet
Backfire bomber is limited to production of no more than 30 per
year, through an oral agreement outside the treaty or protocol.
There has been dispute about the utility of the Backfire in carrying
out unrefueled attacks against the United States. There is no doubt
of its ability to threaten all our allies as well as China and the sea
approaches to Eurasia.

The most immediately available American counter to the Back-
fire and the SS-20 missile has been cruise missiles. But the provi-
sions of the protocol restrict exclusively American programs on
cruise missiles. They affect not a single Soviet program. They
amount to a unilateral renunciation of an American capability.

The protocol also for the first time limits American weapons
relevant primarily to the theater nuclear balance, thus affecting
important interests of our allies in return, at best, for restrictions
relevant primarily to the United States.

This is something we have heretofore consistently refused to do
as a matter of principle in the decade that SALT negotiations have
been taking place. It is a dangerous precedent.

To sum up: I have serious reservations about the protocol. As for
the treaty, its terms do not improve our strategic situation, but
neither do they prevent our remedying it during the remaining 6
years of its life.

The crucial question is whether we can unite behind what is
clearly necessary. Ratifying SALT— or rejecting SALT makes-
sense only if it prompts a renewed dedication to our national
defense and security.

157

Let me say a few words about the political context.

First, with respect to the Soviet Union, the awesomeness of
modern weapons and the aspirations of all peoples for peace impose
the imperative of peaceful coexistence. No democratic leader de-
serves the public trust if he fails to make a genuine effort to reduce
the dangers of nuclear holocaust and to free national energies for
dealing with the many urgent problems of mankind.

The temptation is overwhelming to view this common stake in
peace as a common bond between us and the Soviet Union. It
should be, and some day it must be, if a cataclysm is to be avoided.
But we cannot in good conscience say that the current evidence
supports the proposition that the time has yet arrived.

The fact is that since 1975, there has been an unprecedented
Soviet assault on the international equilibrium — 1975 saw the in-
troduction of Cuban combat forces into Angola, eventually reaching
40,000, backed by Soviet financing, airlift, and policy support. By
1977, Soviet planes and pilots were flying air defense missions out
of Cuba, so that the Cuban air force could operate in Africa — 1977
witnessed the spread of Cuban forces to Ethiopia. East German
military and intelligence advisors have now joined the Cubans all
over Africa and the Middle East. There have been two invasions of
Zaire — and there may yet be a third. There have been Communist
coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen, and the occupation of
Cambodia by Vietnam, preceded by a Soviet Friendship Treaty
designed to secure Hanoi's rear during its aggression. Soviet arms
depots in Libya and Ethiopia fuel insurgencies all over Africa.

Nor is this all. Terrorist organizations supported by Communist
funds, armed by Communist weapons, and trained by Communist
instructors are becoming a systematic instrument of anti-Western
policy, threatening countries friendly to us on several continents.
They are not, to be sure, all controlled by Moscow, but someone
who has started a rockslide cannot avoid the responsibility by
claiming that the rock he threw was not the one that ultimately
killed bystanders.

Whatever label we give to recent Soviet conduct — whether "Cold
War" or opportunism — it must be ended if there are to be any
prospects for East- West coexistence or cooperation. Surely, it is not
provocative to ask the Soviet Union to accompany restraint in
arms with restraint in political conduct. Attention to this kind of
linkage insures that no agreement stands alone, vulnerable to the
next crisis, or turns into a soporific to lull the West while adven-
turism runs free.

Let me now turn to the concerns of our allies.

All our allies have expressed support for ratification of the
Vienna Treaty. But their endorsement results from a complex of
factors of which approval of the provisions of the treaty is by far
the least significant. Each has been urged, if not pressed, by the
administration to express support. In some cases, the Soviets have
added their entreaties. Refusal to comply would thus risk relations
with both superpowers over an issue that is of high technical
complexity and has been under negotiation for 7 years.

Some allies are afraid lest their objection endanger their essen-
tial defense cooperation with the United States. All are reluctant
to contribute to a further weakening of American executive author-

48-250 0-79-11

158

ity. There is no doubt that failure to ratify the treaty will shake
European confidence in an American Government that for 7 years
has assured them that it knew what it was doing.

At the same time, allied endorsement should be seen in the
context of a pervasive ambivalence. The thoughtful leaders among
them know that the basis of their security is eroding as our strate-
gic superiority ebbs — but they fear they do not have enough domes-
tic support for a really significant defense effort, especially when
American attitudes on that score are so ambiguous. They do not
want to be perceived as an obstacle to SALT II, but they are highly
uneasy about the inevitable SALT III.

The test of our leadership is American willingness to give a
clearcut signal of what we understand by Western security and
how we intend to maintain it. No other country or group of coun-
tries, however closely associated, can take this burden from our
shoulders. None of our allies will forgive us if we fail.

Thus, we return to our original problem. The Senate, in consider-
ing ratification, needs urgently to address our dangers in a compre-
hensive way:

First, how the Senate can take concrete steps to begin redressing
the military balance.

Second, how to deal with the specific problems in the treaty and
the protocol.

Third, how the Senate can put the Soviet Union on notice that
continued attempts to upset the global equilibrium will not be
tolerated.

After much reflection I have concluded that I can support ratifi-
cation only with the following conditions.

First, if it is coupled with a defense program representing an
obligatory understanding between the Congress and the President
which overcomes on an urgent basis the grave peril posed by the
current military balance.

Second, if it is accompanied by amendments — not requiring re-
negotiation — clearing up ambiguities in the treaty, defining the
status of the protocol, the meaning of noncircumvention, and set-
ting guidelines for follow-on negotiations.

And third, if it is accompanied by a vigorous expression of the
Senate's view of the linkage between SALT and Soviet geopolitical
conduct.

Let me deal first with the military balance. With respect to the
military programs, I respectfully recommend that the Senate give
its advice and consent to ratification of the SALT Treaty only after
the administration has submitted, and the Congress has authorized
and begun appropriating, a supplemental defense budget and a
revised 5-year defense program that will begin rectifying some of
the shortcomings that I have identified.

The congressional recess provides an opportunity to prepare such
a program, on which work should already be far advanced as part
of the normal budgetary process. If the administration is unable to

159

put forward such a program to this session of the Congress, I
recommend that the Senate delay its advice and consent until a
new military program has been submitted to and authorized by the
next session of Congress.

I would be openminded about other methods to achieve this end,
provided they are unambiguous and represent an obligatory com-
mitment by both branches of the Government. Assurances that the
Executive intends to proceed with individual weapons systems like
the M-X after ratification are not enough, either for the reality of
our danger or to reverse the political and psychological trends
which will make the immediate future a period of great peril.

Nor have the percentage figures of projected increases proved
effective because of ambiguities about the baseline and how to
compute rates of inflation. It is not a question of a legislative
compromise, or of what price should be paid for the approval of
SALT. The issue is what our country needs for its long-term secu-
rity.

My support for ratification is entirely conditional on the develop-
ment of a new program and doctrine, given some binding form by
the Congress.

Clarifying the treaty and the protocol. In addition to these mili-
tary programs, I recommend that the Senate add the following
amendments to its advise and consent resolution.

First, as far as cruise missiles are concerned, that the protocol
may not be extended after 1981. The Senate should stipulate that
this particular limitation can be submitted to the Congress only as
part of an equitable arrangement for theater nuclear forces. Spe-
cifically, no limitations may be negotiated for American theater
weapons such as cruise missiles which are not matched by similar
limitations on Soviet weapons performing comparable missions.
This will bring cruise missiles into some equilibrium with the
Backfire and the SS-20.

Second, the Senate should specify that as part of SALT III the
United States be entitled to any weapons system permitted to the
Soviets in the new agreement unless the Soviets agree to some
compensation by giving up a weapons system of equivalent charac-
teristics allowed to us. This should take care of the problem of the
heavy missile within the only framework which will give us a real
option to produce it.

Third, that the noncircumvention clause be interpreted by the
Senate as not interrupting cooperative relationships with allies
with respect to technology needed to modernize their forces.

I also suggest that the Senate reexamine the SALT agreement
every 2 years, specifically to determine its verifiability.

Finally, addressing the geopolitical problem. I respectfully urge
the Senate to use the ratification process to put the Soviet Union
on notice that this country is prepared, indeed eager, for peaceful
coexistence that reflects true stability and equality in arms, but
also that insists on political restraint.

The Senate should attach to its instrument of advice and consent
an expression of the following principles:

That the absence of political restraint will seriously jeopardize
continuation of the SALT process.

160

That the Senate understands this to include Soviet supply or
encouragement of intervention by proxy military forces; the use of
Soviet forces on the territory of its allies, such as Cuba, to free
Cuban forces to fight in Africa; the support, financing, or encour-
agement by any member of the Warsaw Pact of groups and activi-
ties seeking to undermine governments friendly to the United
States; or the exacerbation of regional conflicts.

That the administration be required to submit an annual report
to the Senate on the degree to which the Soviet Union is living up
to these criteria.

That the Senate vote every 2 years its judgment whether the
Soviet Union has lived up to these criteria. If the judgment is
negative, the Senate should then vote whether whatever SALT
negotiations are taking place should be continued.

I recommend the approach outlined here because it gives this
country an opportunity to address its dangers without abandoning
an important negotiation that has already extended over 7 years.
And it gives us an opportunity to proceed as a united people.

To be sure, the course I propose will make SALT II far from the
turn in the arms race many of us hoped for when the negotiations
were inaugurated. But too much time has been lost, too many
weapons systems have been unilaterally abandoned, too many mili-
tary adventures have been encouraged by the Soviet Union, the
geopolitical balance has been too severely strained, for SALT to be
much more than a base from which, one can hope, a new and
serious effort at equitable arms reduction can be made.

Concrete steps to rectify this situation are urgently required. In
this context, SALT II can play a useful role as a signpost to
continuing negotiations, as a beacon illuminating the path to genu-
ine coexistence, and as a means to contain current tensions.

There are deeply concerned people who want SALT but doubt
the need for augmented defense. Others see in SALT an obstacle to
augmented defense. Let there be a serious effort to reconcile these
points of view before we turn to domestic confrontation.

Rarely is an opportunity so clearly presented to determine the
course of national policy in a direction vital to the future of the
democracies. After the 1919 Versailles Treaty, misjudgments by the
Senate and the administration lead to a debacle which undermined
international security and doomed the world to another bloody
holocaust. At this moment, the Senate and the administration can
point us in a different direction — toward the restoration of our
national unity, toward the strengthening of the security of this
Nation and its allies, and toward a more constructive relationship
with our principal adversaries. This is America's responsibility if
we are to remain true to our trust and to the hopes of mankind.

Thank you very much. My apologies for the extended statement.

[Dr. Kissinger's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Henry A. Kissinger

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

In his essay Perpetual Peace the philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote that world
peace would come about in one of two ways: after a cycle of wars of ever increasing
violence, or by an act of moral insight in which the nations of the world renounced
the bitter competition bound to lead to self-destruction.

161

Our age faces precisely that choice. For the first time in history two nations have
the capacity to inflict on each other and on mankind a level of destruction tanta-
mount to ending civilized life; yet they have also before them unprecedented possi-
bilities of cooperation to harness the wonders of technology to improve the human
condition.

Both mankind's hopes and fears are bound up with the relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union. These two countries possess huge nuclear
arsenals; they also espouse sharply opposing concepts of juctice and hold conflicting
visions of the future. The ideology of Soviet leaders does not make them content to
practice their preferred social system at home; they strive for its victory worldwide.
Hence the Soviet Union and America clash in areas that each considers vital. We
have allies whose interests we will not sacrifice. Soviet allies such as Vietnam and
Cuba are quite capable of generating crises of their own, all too frequently encour-
aged by Moscow to do so.

The peace we seek therefore must rest on something more tangible than a hope or
a fear of holocaust. It must also reflect a military and geopolitical equilibrium. The
notion of balance of power has always been unfashionable in America. But it is the
precondition of security, and even of progress. If the mere avoidance of conflict
becomes our overriding objective, and if our own military power is disparaged, the
international system will be at the mercy of the most ruthless. If the desire to
conciliate becomes the sole operational basis of policy, we run the risk that the
threat of war will become a weapon of blackmail; our allies and our moral values
will both be permanently in danger. The desire for peace will be transformed into a
caricature of itself, and become instead the beginning of appeasement. How to strive
for both peace and our moral principles; how to avoid nuclear war without succumb-
ing to nuclear blackmail — this is the overwhelming problem of our period.

The United States must proceed simultaneously on three fronts:

First, we must maintain a military balance that does not tempt aggression
against our friends or allies, against our vital interests, or in the extreme case
against ourselves.

Secondly, beyond resisting naked aggression, we have a stake in the principal that
political or economic pressure, or military or terrorist blackmail, not become the
arbiter of the world's political disputes. The geopolitical equilibrium must be main-
tained lest radical forces hostile to the West gain such momentum that they appear
as the irresistible wave of the future.

And thirdly, on the basis of a balance thus achieved and preserved, we must be
ready to explore routes to genuine peaceful coexistence. The great powers, having
learned that they cannot dominate each other, must practice moderation and ulti-
mately cooperation. The creativity of a world of diversity and peaceful competition
can be the basis of unparalleled human progress. A stable balance is the most
hopeful — perhaps the only — basis for the control and ultimately the reduction of
weapons of mass destruction.

Too often these requirements are posed in the alternative. But the quest for
security and for peace are inseparable; we cannot achieve one without the other. No
democracy can court conflict. Our government will have support in resisting chal-
lenges to our vital interests only if confrontation is seen to have been unavoidable.
Our people have a right to expect of their government that it will explore all
avenues to a genuine peace. And our allies will insist on it.

The new Treaty poses a particularly complex problem for me. When I was a
professor, I participated in the academic discussions of military doctrine and strat-
egy that underlay early initiatives in arms control. I helped design the first SALT
agreements in 1972. I was involved in the negotiations of the Vladivostok accord of
1974 which marked the first breakthrough of SALT II; I played a major role in the
negotiations which came close to completing an agreement in January 1976. I have
a long-standing personal commitment to the process of limiting strategic nuclear
arms. As an historian I am conscious of the lessons of World War II when a global
war resulted because the democracies disdained to maintain the balance of power.
But equally we must not forget the tragedy of World War I: When disaster resulted
even with an equilibrium of power, when technology and rivalry outran the control
of statesmen.

Thus SALT cannot be considered in isolation. It is one element in our overall
national security policy. It must be viewed in the context of the global balance that
it reflects, or purports to affect.

Thus I regret to have to say that the present Treaty comes up for ratification at a
time of grave danger to our national security and to the global equilibrium. The
military balance is beginning to tilt ominously against the United States in too
many significant categories of weaponry. The unprecedented Soviet use of proxy
forces in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, and the turmoil caused by

162

radical forces and terrorist organizations sponsored by Moscow's friends, mark ours
as a time of profound upheaval. We have learned painfully that we alone cannot be
the world's policeman. But neither our moral values nor our safety can tolerate the
Soviet Union's increasing tendency toward global intervention. As the United States
nurses its wounds after Vietnam, radical forces are threatening regional stability
and attempting the violent overthrow of moderate governments friendly to the
West. If present trends continue, we face the chilling prospect of a world sliding
gradually out of control, with our relative military power declining, with our eco-
nomic lifeline vulnerable to blackmail, with hostile forces growing more rapidly
than our ability to deal with them, and with fewer and fewer nations friendly to us
surviving.

In addressing the Treaty before you, I respectfully submit, the Senate has a
responsibility to examine the broader condition of our national security. The Senate
has an opportunity at least to begin to reverse the unfavorable trends in the
military balance and to put the Soviet Union on notice that we consider the
constant probing of every regional equilibrium and the encouragement of subversive
and terrorist groups as incompatible with any definition of coexistence. Without
such an affirmation, SALT will become a soporific, a form of escapism. I shall
submit specific proposals to achieve this, later in the statement.

THE SHIFTING STRATEGIC BALANCE

The basic technical facts about the current military balance have been presented
in great detail before this and other committees. Let me concentrate first on the
serious transformation, adverse to our interests, that has taken place in the overall
strategic balance during the last decade and a half.

For about the first twenty-five years of the postwar period, the problem of main-
taining the military equilibrium was relatively straightforward. The Soviet Union
was always superior in ground forces on the Eurasian continent; we were vastly
ahead in strategic striking power as well as in theater nuclear forces. The reach of
the Soviet Union was limited to regions accessible to motorized ground transport,
generally adjacent territories in Europe and to some extent China. Africa, most of
the Middle East, even Southeast Asia were beyond the capacity of major Soviet
military intervention. And the areas which were hostage to Soviet ground armies
were protected by three factors:

First, by the American preponderance in strategic nuclear striking power capable
of disarming the Soviet Union or at least reducing its counterblow to tolerable
levels while still retaining large residual forces for attacks on industrial targets;

Second, by a vast American Superiority in so-called theater nuclear forces every-
where around the Soviet periphery.

And thirdly, in Europe by substantial American and allied ground forces that
posed at least a major probability that Soviet ground attack would trigger the
nuclear retaliation of the United States.

Not surprisingly, the major crises in the first twenty years of the postwar
period— whether in Berlin, Korea, or Cuba— were ultimately contained, because the
risks of pushing them beyond a certain point always appeared exorbitant to

Moscow. -,nnn>

This state of affairs will soon have ceased to exist. Startmg in the 1960 s, the
military balance began to change— almost imperceptibly at first, so great was our
superiority— but with growing momentum in recent years. It is imperative that we
recognize without illusion the dangerous trends that are emerging. It is crucial that
we begin now to rectify them.

The growth of Soviet strategic nuclear forces has been inexorable for a decade and
a half. In 1965 the Soviet strategic arsenal comprised about 220 Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 100 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).
By 1968 the number had grown to 860 ICBMs and over 120 SLBMs. We had stopped
our build-up at 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs in 1967. By mid-1970 the Soviets had
caught up with us in numbers of launchers. Our intelligence estimates of their
plans invariably turned out to be too low; contrary to popular mythology the Soviets
did build on the scale of the "worst case" hypothesis of our intelligence community
and not to the level that was defined as "most probable." • Instead of stopping when
they reached parity with us, as the Johnson Administration expected, the Soviets
continued their missile build-up— until they were frozen at the levels of the ceilings
established by the first SALT agreement in May 1972. Then they switched
energetically to qualitative improvements in their missile forces.

' See Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy, No. 15 (summer
1974), pp. 3-20; "Rivals, But No 'Race,' " Foreign Policy, No. 16 (fall 1974), pp. 48-81.

163

Our problem derives not only from the larger number of warheads on Soviet
ICBMs but above all from the difference in the types of weaponry emphasized by
the two sides. In the Sixties, the United States unilaterally decided to base its
strategic forces on light but highly accurate ICBMs, the less vulnerable but also less
accurate SLBMs, and the more versatile but more vulnerable manned bombers. The
Soviets made the opposite decision, relying on large land-based missiles capable of
delivering a far heavier payload. At first the crudeness of their technology and the
lack of accuracy deprived these weapons of effectiveness against military targets.
But as Soviet technology improved, its advantage in numbers and missile payload
was bound to tell. For the land-based ICBM is always likely to be the most accurate
and powerful strategic weapon, and the one most capable of a rapid attack against
the military targets of the other side. In short the Soviets have emphasized quick
reaction forces by modernizing their ICBMs; we concentrated on slow-reacting forces
like air-launched cruise missiles. Thus the asymmetry in the capacity of the two
sides to destroy each other's military targets has grown with every passing year.

There is now general agreement that their improvements in missile accuracy and
warhead technology will put the Soviets in a position to wipe out our land-based
forces of Minuteman ICBMs by 1982. Whether this capability is ever exercised or
not — and I consider it improbable — it reverses and hence revolutionizes the strategic
equation on which our security and that of our friends have depended through most
of the postwar period-

The revolution in the strategic balance is aggravated by a comparable build-up of
Soviet aircraft and missiles that threatens to overturn the American advantage in
theater-based nuclear forces. The Soviet Union has deployed scores of new missiles
of 2,000-mile range — the SS-20 — which carries a MIRVed warhead of three reentry
vehicles. Several hundred supersonic Backfire bombers will threaten all peripheral
areas in the Eighties (leaving aside for the moment their utility for inter-continen-
tal missions). A Soviet superiority in theater striking forces is therefore upon us.
The inequality is demonstrated by the fact that we have had to assign part of our
strategic forces — a number of Poseidon boats — to cover targets threatening NATO.
Thus in case of war we are likely to be strained either with respect to our strategic
or with respect to our theater nuclear coverage.

All this has been accomplished while the Soviet advantage in conventional forces
has grown, and while the reach of Soviet power has been extended enormously by
the rapid development of the Soviet Navy, an expanding long-range airlift capabili-
ty, the acquisition of Soviet bases in countries like South Yemen and Vietnam, and
the establishment of vast Soviet arms depots in such countries as Libya and Ethio-
pia, which will enable the Soviet Union to move its own or proxy troops rapidly to
their prepositioned weapons. At the same time our Navy declines and our access to
overseas bases shrinks.

Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted such a radical change in the
military balance. If we are to remedy it, we must first recognize the fact that we
have placed ourselves at a significant disadvantage voluntarily. This is not the
result of SALT: it is the consequence of unilateral decisions extending over a decade
and a half: by a strategic doctrine adopted in the Sixties, by the bitter domestic
divisions growing out of the war in Vietnam, and by choices of the present Adminis-
tration. All these actions were unilateral, hence avoidable. They were not extracted
from us by clever Soviet negotiators; we imposed them on ourselves by our choices,
theories, and domestic turmoil. It is therefore in our power to alter them.

The prevailing American strategic doctrine of the Sixties went under the modest
name of "aissured destruction." According to it, deterrence was guaranteed so long
as we possessed the ability to destroy a predetermined percentage of Soviet popula-
tion and industrial capacity. Strategy thereby turned into an engineering problem,
an economic analysis essentially independent of the size of the opposing forces. So
long as enough of our weapons survived to wreak the theoretically calculated havoc,
deterrence would be maintained; our military effectiveness was essentially inde-
pendent of the threat we faced; the vulnerability of part of our forces — such as our
ICBMs — was irrelevant so long as enough warheads would remain to inflict an
"unacceptable" amount of damage on the Soviet Union.

This doctrine not only took for granted continued Soviet inferiority in technology;
it also ignored the psychological inhibitions in the way of implementing such a
strategy. The targeting scenarios developed from this doctrine left a President with
no other options in a crisis but the mass extermination of civilians, or capitulation.
This strategy was morally questionable even in an era when we had superiority. In
an age of strategic equality it would be a formula for mutual suicide.

The emergence of a new strategic nuclear environment should have forced a
reconsideration of this targeting doctrine and a renewed attention to regional nu-
clear and conventional balances. Unfortunately, at the precise moment that such a

164

reexamination became urgently necessary, all our defense programs came under
systematic attack as a byproduct of the bitter domestic debate over Vietnam. On the
one hand, the Vietnam war reduced funds available for modernization of our
military forces; even more important, the wholesale assault on defense spending and
programs jeopardized even those major projects for which funds were available and
budgeted. New weapons were decried as excessive, as symptoms of a military psy-
chosis, as wasteful and dangerous. "Reordering national priorities" was the slogan
of the day; it weis the euphemism for cutting the defense budget. The ABM passed
by only one vote and was then emasculated in the appropriations process; the C-5A
transport aircraft which later saved an ally in the 1973 Middle East war was
challenged repeatedly on budgetary grounds; MIRV's, the only strategic system
available to us to offset the Soviet numerical superiority in the 1970's, were under
constant attack. In the realm of strategic doctrine, paradoxically it was those most
alarmed at the arms race who clung to the most bloodthirsty targeting strategies, in
the hope that these would obviate the need to strengthen or increase our strategic
forces.

In this atmosphere, maintaining even the strategic forces inherited from the
Sixties absorbed the energies of the Administrations up to the end of the Vietnam
war; obtaining funds for new programs was enormously difficult. The best that
could be accomplished in the early 1970's was to alter the older strategic doctrine
and shift targeting from civilian to military objectives. (Paradoxically, however, the
decline of our capability for a counterforce strategy turned even the more sophisti-
cated targeting into a high-risk tit-for-tat option with no logical stopping place.)

After the end of our involvement in Vietnam, new strategic programs could at
last be funded: the B-1 manned strategic bomber, to become operational in 1979; the
MX ICBM, to become operational in 1983; the Trident submarine and missile,
expected to become operational in 1978; various kinds of cruise missiles for the
1980's— all of which would give the United States greater options and some of which
would bring about a new counterforce capability.

Every one of these programs has been cancelled, delayed, or stretched out by the
current Administration, so that we are at a point where only the Trident (with only
the most limited counterforce capability) can be operational during the period of the
projected SALT Treaty. In addition, even the Minuteman production line was closed
down, leaving us without an emergency hedge for rapid build-up in unexpected
contingencies. We now face the challenge of the early Eighties with forces designed
in the Sixties. We have been able to develop new programs in only four years out of
the last fifteen, and most of them have been held in abeyance since 1977.

Furthermore, a remedy will be more difficult if the Administration intends to
return to the pure "assured destruction" strategic doctrine. In his State of the
Union address last January 23, President Carter proclaimed that "just one of our
relatively invulnerable Poseidon submarines * * * carries enough warheads to de-
stroy every large and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union."

But this truism demonstrates rather than solves our strategic dilemma. Even
under SALT conditions we will have in the early Eighties at best equality in the
capacity of our strategic forces to inflict civilian damage, and a clear inferiority in
the ability to attack and destroy the land-based missiles of the other side. Our
Minuteman missiles do not carry sufficient warheads or possess adequate throw-
weight for a disarming attack against Soviet ICBMs; our present strategic forces can
put at risk less than one-half of Soviet ICBMs. All of our ICBMs will in the Eighties
be vulnerable to an attack by the greater numbers of missiles and warheads, and
improving accuracy, of soviet land-based missiles.

Since our modern military doctrine and strategy have depended much more on
strategic forces than those of the Soviets, even overall equality revolutionizes the
postwar security and geopolitical structure. But in fact the situation is worse. My
principal worry is not only the growing vulnerability of our land-based forces —
though this must be remedied — but the growing invulnerability of Soviet land-based
forces. The deterrent effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies will continual-
ly decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to offset the soviet
capacity for regional intervention. And this capacity will be reinforced by the
growing edge in Soviet theater nuclear forces, a naval and airlift capability which
immeasurably extends the reach and preponderance of Soviet conventional power.

I want to reiterate that it is not necessary for present purposes to debate whether
the Soviet Union would in fact run a risk of war on the global level; it will be grave
enough if the Soviet willingness to run risks in regional conflicts is magnified. And
that seems to me the minimum consequence of what is ahead. The side that can
defend its interests only by threatening to initiate the mutual mass extermination
of civilians will gradually slide towards strategic, and therefore eventually geopoliti-
cal, paralysis. The consequence, to put it bluntly, is that in the 1980's regional

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conflicts — whether deliberately promoted or not — threaten increasingly to grow out
of control unless we drastically reverse the trend. We cannot possibly continue to
gamble with inferior forces for regional defense, a shifting balance in theater
nuclear forces, vulnerable land-based strategic forces, and invulnerable Soviet
ICBMs without courting the gravest dangers. The decline in relative power must be
dramatically reversed.

Even more important is a strategic doctrine which answers the following ques-
tions:

(1) How in the Eighties will we safeguard our national security when we face
adverse trends in every significant military category?

(2) How will we fulfill our commitments to our allies in the absence of a signifi-
cant counterforce capability, when strategic parity is at best tenuous and the
theater nuclear balance is turning against us?

(3) How will we protect our vital interests in areas such as the Middle East with
our present conventional forces, airlift, and declining naval capability?

(4) How will we prevent global blackmail?

Our safety and that of all of those who depend on us depends on the response.
Every day we delay in dealing with the issue magnifies our peril.

The Senate therefore cannot deal with the SALT Treaty in a vacuum; it must
simultaneously seek to restore the military and geopolitical balance. No responsible
leader can want to face the 1980's with the present military prospects. This, and not
SALT in isolation, is the principal problem facing us.

SALT IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN STRATEGY

The idea of arms control developed in the late Fifties and early Sixties. The
underlying rationale derive from the indisputable fact that thermonuclear weapons
and intercontinental missiles have added a new dimension of peril to the historical
problem of military rivalry. In the past it could be argued that weapons were a
symptom rather than a cause of tension. Indeed it is difficult to find an historical
example for the cliche that arms races cause wars. (What caused World War I was
mobilization schedules, not the rate of increase of armaments.) But today, indeed,
the nuclear age combines weapons of unprecedented destructive power, extremely
rapid modes of delivery of intercontinental range, and high vulnerability to a
surprise attack.

In these new and unprecedented circumstances, the conclusion seemed inescap-
able that the side whose capacity for retaliation was vulnerable must react in crises
in ways which would heighten the likelihood of cataclysm; a country whose strategic
forces were not secure could be driven, even against its will, to strike first rather
than await the opponent's attack which it would know it could not survive. In the
late Fifties, one of the most brilliant students of deterrence, Albert Wohlstetter,
correctly perceived that what Churchill called the "balance of terror" was perilously
delicate. Arms control sought to circumscribe and if possible eliminate this danger
by measures that would enhance each side's "second-strike capability," that is, its
secure capacity to retaliate, thereby reducing the incentive and capacity for surprise
attack.

This analysis was essentially correct. At the same time this novel military doc-
trine — according to which an adversary's invulnerability was thought to add to
stability — was combined with "assured destruction" reasoning to produce a kind of
"minimum deterrence" theory by which we allegedly had no need to consider the
threat posed by the level of Soviet forces. Even theorists of arms control who valued
maintaining the strategic balance only dimly perceived that the strategic stability
they sought implied a strategic revolution. For if attained, it would greatly magnify
the danger at levels of violence below that of general nuclear exchange. If crises no
longer produced fear of escalation to all-out war, they would also grow more likely.
Thus even strategic stability (not to speak of a Soviet edge) would require new
major military efforts by us on the regional level or else major political weakness
would result. Above all it was erroneously assumed the Soviets held a similar view.
In fact, there was no evidence that Soviet strategic planners — almost all military
men — subscribed to the academic subtleties of American strategic theory. As Secre-
tary Harold Brown has said, our unilateral restraint does not seem to be reciprocat-
ed by the Soviets: "We have found that when we build weapons, they build; when
we stop, they nevertheless continue to build * * *." ^

As one of the architects of SALT, I am conscience-bound to point out that —
against all previous hopes — the SAL'T process does not seem to have slowed down
Soviet strategic competition, and in some sense may have accelerated it. The Soviets

' Statement of Secretary Brown before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9, 1979.

166

worked hard and successfully to enhance the first-strike capabilities of their land-
based ICBMs despite our restraint and within the framework of SALT. The Admin-
istrations of the early 1970's of which I was a member sought to use SALT to
demonstrate their commitment to easing tensions and thereby restore a public
consensus behind a strong national defense; to some extent we succeeded. But we
will not draw the appropriate conclusion if we do not also admit that SALT may
have had a perverse effect on the willingness of some in the Congress, key opinion
makers, and even Administration officials to face fully the relentless Soviet military
build-up.

New weapons systems have long had to overcome the traditional objection of
advocates of "minimum deterrence" that they were unnecessary (because we al-
ready possessed an "overkill" capability); they were now also attacked by arms
control experts as endangering the prospects of SALT. Indeed, many new progranis
could be put through the Congress less on their merits than as a " bargaining chip";
they were needed, various Administrations argued, so that they could be traded in a
negotiation. Whatever the tactical utility of this argument, it tended to reduce the
energy with which such programs were pursued. The Pentagon found it difficult to
muster enthusiasm — or scarce resources— for programs which were ephemeral by
definition. After a while the Soviet Union began to play the game deliberately: from
ABM to cruise missiles it systematically sought to use SALT to inhibit our military
and technological development; it tried to fuel our domestic debate, adding its own
propaganda pressures to domestic pressures against new weapons systems.

The theory that new American weapons weakened the prospects of arms control
thrived despite all evidence to the contrary. In 1967, before we had an ABM
program, when President Johnson suggested to Soviet Premier Kosygin at Glassboro
that both sides renounce ABMs, Kosygin contemptuously dismissed the idea as one
of the most ridiculous he had ever heard. By 1970, after the Nixon Administration
had narrowly won its Congressional battle for funding of an ABM, Soviet SALT
negotiators refused to discuss any subject except ABM, and it required the most
strenuous negotiating efforts to maintain the crucial linkage between offensive and
defensive limitations. Conversely, neither the abandonment of the B-1 by the cur-
rent Administration, nor its stretch-out of the MX missile, nor the slowdown in the
Trident program, speeded up SALT negotiations or improved the terms.

The SALT negotiations have always proceeded against the background of the
strategic balance as it existed, and must be considered in this context.

The negotiations for SALT I grew out of the ABM debate of the 1960s: whether
the tf.S. should follow the Soviet lead and build a defense against ballistic missiles,
or try to head off such a new competition by negotiating some limits with the
U.S.S.R. After considerable Soviet stalling, to see whether Congress might kill the
ABM without any need for Soviet reciprocity, the SALT negotiations began in
November 1969. Almost from the outset it was apparent that the only system the
Soviets were eager to limit by negotiation was the sole system we were building—
the ABM. In the 1972 ABM treaty both sides agreed in effect to leave themselves
indefinitely vulnerable to missile attacks; ABMs were restricted to a token deploy-
ment at one site (which we then unilaterally abandoned for budgetary reasons). In
effect we traded our superior ABM technology for a halt to the numerical build-up
of Soviet offensive forces.

To restore equality in this critical area— strategic offensive forces — proved to be
enormously difficult, largely due to the unilateral decisions of the Sixties that
stopped both our ICBM and SLBM programs by 1967. As I have said, in pure
numbers of offensive missiles the Soviets passed the United States in 1970; in this
category we had no bargaining chips. Our only active program was adding multiple
warheads (MIRVs) to our land- and sea-based missiles. The Soviet numerical build-
ing program was so considerable, and Congressional opposition to comparable
American programs was so unrelenting, that it was the Defense Department which
in July 1970 and then again in January 1972 urged a five-year mutual freeze on
offensive weapons, primarily to arrest the momentum of the Soviet build-up and to
give us an opportunity to catch up.

The first SALT agreement on offensive weapons was thus a photograph of the
existing balance, not an alteration of it: it froze the numbers of American and
Soviet land- and sea-based missiles for five years. The numerical balance was
favorable to the U.S.S.R. in the same proportion that the previous decade of unre-
stricted arms competition had produced. Because of our MIRV program, the United
States retained a substantial advantage in numbers of warheads for the lifetime of
the Interim Agreement and beyond. The criticism later heard, that SALT I "gave"
the Soviets unequal numbers, missed the central point: what had produced the
Soviet numerical edge was not SALT I but the unilateral American decisions of the
Sixties to stop our strategic building programs, and then the Congressional and

167

public attacks on the defense budget growing out of the Vietnam war. The 1972
SALT agreement curtailed no American offensive program; it did halt the numeri-
cal growth of the Soviet strategic forces. It gave us an opportunity to catch up —
which we sought to do by pushing the development of the B-1 slated to be oper-
ational in 1978, the Trident submarine and missile planned for 1979, the MX missile
for 1983, and a variety of cruise missiles for the early Eighties.

But the simple Interim Agreement of SALT I could not deal with— nor did it
pretend to address — the rapid evolution of technology. Modernization of existing
weapons was allowed, and both sides proceeded apace with new programs. The U.S.
funded its MIRV program, and the Soviets developed a new generation of ICBMs; in
doing so they pushed to its outer limit the SALT I provision restricting conversion
of "light" to "heavy" missiles. It was these larger missiles (the SS-17, 18 and 19),
soon equipped with MIRVs, and with the potential of greatly improved accuracy,
that were bound to give the Soviets for the first time in history a capacity to launch
a first strike against our land-based missiles.

These trends, which would eventually put our force of ICBMs into jeopardy, led us
first to undertake a complex but eventually fruitless negotiation to set a low, long-
term ceiling on Soviet missile capabilities both in numbers and in quality. For a
time these negotiations seemed promising; but they fell victim to the collapse of
executive authority resulting from Watergate. In the wake of President Nixon's
resignation, it seemed prudent to pick up the thread of a simpler agreement that at
least consolidated numerical equality, and then to move as quickly as possible in
SALT III into the more intricate discussion of the qualitative factors (missile accura-
cy, throw-weight, number of warheads, testing limits and so forth). Thus, in Novem-
ber 1974 in Vladivostok, President Ford pressed for an agreement based on equal
aggregate ceilings, and the Soviet Union accepted our proposal. A framework accord
was reached specifying strict equality of 2,400 missiles and strategic bombers for
each side, and an equal limit of 1,320 missiles with MIRVs, in an agreement to run
through 1985.

The Ford Administration had first hoped that a treaty implementing the Vladi-
vostok accord could be completed in 1975. But two new issues intervened to slow
down the talks: first was the Soviet insistence that cruise missiles be entirely
banned if they had a range of more than 600 kilometers (350 miles); second was the
U.S. counterdemand that the Soviet aircraft called the "Backfire" be counted as a
"heavy" bomber and thus be included in the SALT totals. Inevitably the two
systems became linked in the talks. Throughout 1975 and into early 1976, the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. made proposals to resolve the dispute. Basically, the Ford Adminis-
tration was prepared to limit the range and number of some cruise missiles pro-
vided the Soviets would reciprocate by limiting the Backfire bomber in some compa-
rable manner. In January 1976, we were close to a compromise along these lines
which also would have lowered the Vladivostok ceilings of 2,400 to "below 2,300."

Two events prevented the completion of the negotiations. First, the introduction
of 25,000 Cuban proxy troops in Angola raised serious doubts about Soviet motives
and fueled a whole new debate in this country about United States-Soviet relations.
And the imminent American Presidential election convinced President Ford that it
would be best to keep SALT from turning into a partisan issue and so to wait to
conclude an agreement after the election.

The advent of a new Administration brought with it the obligatory new approach.
The first proposal to Moscow in March 1977 abandoned the negotiations as they
then stood. An entirely new proposal was submitted, immediately rejected, and
quickly withdrawn. The parties returned to earlier proposals, and over two more
years were spent refining the agreement. Meanwhile the presuppositions of that
agreement were daily challenged by technological change, the pace of the Soviet
build-up, and the unilateral abandonment or stretching out of major American
weapons systems, all of which further tilted the strategic balance dangerously
against us.

Three conclusions emerge: The imbalances we now face, and which concern so
many, stem in essence from unilateral American decisions rather than from the
SALT negotiating process. This is important when we consider the provisions of the
SALT Treaty. No negotiation can achieve through diplomacy that for which we
have been unwilling to make unilateral efforts.

Second, SALT by itself cannot bring about parity; it can only ratify trends which
exist. SALT cannot be a substitute for defense programs. If we fall behind by our
own actions, SALT runs the risk of perpetuating an inequality. But whether that
comes about is up to us; and to avoid it must be a principal concern of the Senate.

Third, SALiT III cannot simply be an extension of the previous process. It must be
explicitly related to our long-term strategic program. Its principles must be clearly

168

worked out between the Administration and the Congress and settled with our allies
before we launch ourselves into it.

THE VIENNA TREATY: HOW DOES IT AFFECT THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

We must now ask, how does the SALT II agreement affect the strategic balance?
The agreement is composed of three documents:

The Treaty itself, running until the end of 1985, would limit the total numbers of
ICBM and SLBM launchers (though the term is not defined); heavy bombers;
MIRVed missiles; and land-based MIRVed missiles. It also defines counting rules for
MIRVed missiles and for heavy bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles.

Second is a Protocol that restricts cruise missile other than on heavy bombers to a
range of 600 kilometers (or 350 miles) and bans the testing and deployment of
mobile ICBMs. The Protocol is supposed to expire on December 31, 1981.

Third is a set of principles to guide the negotiations for SALT III.

Any fair-minded analysis must recognize the beneficial aspects of the SALT II
agreements. The overall ceiling of 2,250 will force the Soviets to get rid of 250
strategic systems, including some modern ones, while giving us the right to equalize
the numbers. The permitted number of land-based Soviet MIRVs (820) is some 100
below the maximum number that they probably intended to build in the absence of
SALT. There are some restrictions on missile testing procedures. There are limits
on numbers of missile warheads on ICBMs and a prohibition on more than one
"new" ICBM. There is for the first time an agreed baseline of information on the
Soviet forces. The counting rules are a useful way of dealing with the MIRV
problem.

Regrettably none of these very real achievements affects the grave strategic
situation which I have described and which must urgently be reversed. The Treaty
does not reduce the Soviet first-strike capability against our land-based forces, or
improve our ability to survive a first strike. It does not diminish the Soviet residual
capability to destroy civilian targets in the United States. And it does not enhance-
indeed it may slightly inhibit— the possibility for the United States to catch up in
the capacity of our strategic forces to attack military targets.

To be sure, the Soviets will be obligated after 1981 to reduce the total number of
their launchers by about 250. But the new ceiling of 2,250 will not limit the Soviets'
ability to destroy our ICBM force or to inflict devastating damage upon the United
States. The reduction in Soviet numbers is irrelevant to our strategic problem. For
the danger to our security derives from warheads, not from launchers, and the
Soviet total of ICBM warheads will increase from 3,200 at the time of the signing of
SALT II to over 6,000 even after the reduction in Soviet launchers is supposed to
take place; the total number of Soviet warheads (including SLBMs) will approach
12,000 in 1985 as compared to 8,000 at the time of the SALT signing. (In fact, if the
Soviets went all out they could get 8,000 MIRVed warheads in the permitted new
land-based missiles.) Moreover, the total Soviet missile throw-weight will increase
from about 6 million pounds at the time of the signing of SALT I, to 7 million
pounds at the signing of SALT II, to 9 million pounds (compared to our 2.5 million)
in 1985. And improvements in Soviet accuracy will approach ours by 1982; the
practical effect of this will be to reduce the number of warheads that need to be
aimed at our ICBM silos, freeing a larger number of the ever-increasing Soviet
warheads for other targets.

The agreed ceiling, of course, is some 200 above the 2,060 operational systems we
now possess. We thus have some considerable room for expansion of single-warhead
systems. But given the cancellation of the B-1 bomber, the delay in the operational
date for MX, and the slow pace of Trident production, there is almost no chance
that the United States can reach the permitted total of 2,250 except perhaps by
keeping in service ten older Polaris submarines (with 160 missiles); this the Navy is
likely to oppose because of the heavy cost of operation and relatively short range of
its missiles. The result, therefore, is that in practice the overall aggregate numbers
will continue to be unequal.

The limitation of land-based MIRVed launchers to 820, which may be some lOU
below the probable Soviet program, is equally welcome and similarly without signifi-
cance to our fundamental problem. The Soviet Union can destroy our land-based
ICBMs with about half of the land-based MIRVs permitted by the Treaty; this would
leave over 300 Soviet land-based MIRVed launchers, 380 sea-based MIRVed systems,
and some 500 single-warhead systems— or well over 5,000 warheads— aimed at our

169

civilian population and industrial potential. (By contrast, if we expended our entire
land-based force against the Soviet ICBM silos we could destroy less than half.) '

Nor is the threat to our forces and to the overall strategic balance reduced by the
provision limiting new missiles during the time of the Treaty. The provision is
drafted so as to permit the deployment of the MX for the United States, a compara-
ble new missile for the Soviet Union, and the modernization of existing missiles
allowing an increase in their volume of up to five percent in each direction. Except
for setting a precedent for qualitative restraints, these limitations have little oper-
ational effect on the Soviet program — all the less so as there seems to be no
definition of baselines. The testimony of Administration witnesses seems to confirm
that no known Soviet program is affected.

In short, the Vienna Treaty will not diminish the threat to the strategic balance.
During the life of the Treaty the Soviets will complete their counterforce capability
against our ICBMs. This will coincide exactly with our period of maximum danger.
To be sure, a good case can be made for the proposition that in the absence of the
Treaty the relative numbers will be even worse. But the analysis here suggests that
what is allowed to the Soviets will meet all their foreseeable counterforce and
residual needs.

But I must repeat: any SALT treaty is likely to ratify existing strategic trends.
SALT negotiators cannot produce what our military programs — for whatever
reason — have neglected. The Soviets will never agree to unilateral reductions. If we
want equality, we must build to equality. We must reverse the strategic trends if we
are serious about an equitable SALT treaty. Nothing in the Vienna Treaty dimin-
ishes the need for s substantial military build-up by the United States. In fact, the
situation which SALT reflects makes such a build-up imperative.

In fairness, it must be pointed out that the same was true of the SALT II
aggregates worked out in the previous Administration. There are nevertheless three
essential differences: first, the rate of advance of Soviet technology which has been
unexpectedly rapid (the estimate at Vladivostok was that Minuteman would not
become vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce strike until after 1985); second, the
unilateral abandonment or stretch-out of almost every American strategic program
inherited by the Carter Administration, which makes the Soviet threat even more
ominous; and third, the Soviet geopolitical offensive in Africa, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia which has gained momentum since. But to help a bipartisan solution
I am willing to concede that the problem we face has origins going back at least 15
years."

The novel— and to me the most disturbing— feature of the current Treaty is its
negative impact on the theater nuclear balance. The Soviet Backfire bomber is
limited to production of no more than 30 per year, through an oral agreement
outside the Treaty or Protocol. There has been dispute about the utility of the
Backfire in carrying out unrefueled attacks against the United States. There is no
doubt of its ability to threaten all our allies as well as China and the sea approaches
to Eurasia. In addition, the Soviet Union is developing a large number of SS-20
missiles each with a range of 2,000 miles and three MIRV warheads. Like the
Backfire, the SS-20 is convertible to intercontinental range — in the case of the
Backfire by adding fuel tanks, or an aerial refueling capability; in the case of the
SS-20 by adding another stage, thereby converting it into the already tested mobile
SS-16. These actions are prohibited by SALT II but they are not easily verifiable,
and in any event they represent a rapid break-out potential should the Treaty be
broken or lapse.

The most immediately available American counter to these weapons has been
cruise missiles. In the negotiations conducted by the Ford Administration, proposed
restrictions on cruise missiles were made conditional on comparable restrictions on

^ Though the permitted total of land-based MIRV's is some 300 above what we possess, we
cannot expand our land-based MIRVs significantly since the Treaty also contains a subceiling of
1200 permitted MIRVed vehicles. We could thus increase the number of our land-based missiles
only by reducing the number of submarine-based missiles. That sublimit will also force us to
dismantle either one Poseidon boat (or 14 Minuteman III) when the seventh Trident submarine
goes on sea trials, probably by 1983. If the eighth and ninth Trident were to become operational
before December 1985, three more Poseidon boats or 48 Minuteman II or some combination of
the two would have to be dismantled.

' On at least one occasion I contributed to the existing ambivalence. After an exhausting
negotiation in July 1974 I gave an answer to a question at a jjress conference which I have come
to regret: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? ' I asked. "What is the significance
of it • * ' at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" My statement reflected fatigue
and exasperation, not analysis. If both sides maintain the balance, then indeed the race becomes
futile and SALT has its place in strengthening stability. But if we opt out of the race unilateral-
ly, we will probably be faced eventually with a younger group of Soviet leaders who will figure
out what can be done with strategic superiority.

170

the Backfire. The concept was to limit the number of cruise missiles of more than
600-kilometer range in some relationship to limits on the Backfire. The Protocol, on
the other hand, prohibits the deployment of land- and sea-based cruise missiles and
of air-launched cruise missiles of more than 600-kilometer range on other than
heavy bombers altogether — even when they carry conventional warheads. The same
Protocol prohibits the testing and deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, even
though the Soviets have already tested a mobile system (the SS-16) and we have
neither tested nor developed a comparable weapon.

The provisions of the Protocol with respect to cruise missiles, especially, restrict
exclusively American programs; they affect not a single Soviet program. They
amount to a unilateral renunciation of an American capability. The Protocol also
for the first time limits American weapons relevant primarily to the theater nucle-
ar balance— thus affecting important interests of our allies— in return at best for
restrictions relevant primarily to the United States. This is something we have
heretofore consistently refused to do as a matter of principle in the decade that
SALT negotiations have been taking place. It is a dangerous precedent.

Two arguments are advanced on behalf of the Protocol: First, that it was neces-
sary to induce the Soviet Union to go along with limits in the overall Treaty;
second, that since the Protocol will lapse at the end of 1981 and since we will have
no cruise missiles of more than 600-kilometer range before then, no real concession
is involved. These propositions are mutually inconsistent; if the Protocol restrains
nothing we can do before the end of 1981 and will lapse, then why are the Soviets so
insistent on it?

The answer is that the Soviets know the history of moratoria and protocols very
well; they are aware that such "provisional" agreements almost never end on their
expiration date, especially if a negotiation is then taking place. At a minimum the
Protocol's terms will be the point of departure for the next round of negotiations.
The Soviets will have the option of offering a seeming concession— for example,
reducing the SALT totals to 2,150 (which we know they can accept since at one
stage in the current negotiations they suggested it), or even lower. They can con-
versely threaten to abandon whatever negotiation is then taking place. Will we then
insist on pursuing the development of cruise missiles, without which we have done
for nearly three years? And if we do extend the moratorium, we will then have
explicitly traded theater capabilities important to our allies in return for marginal-
ly reducing the threat against ourselves.

This deficiency of the Protocol would not be cured by a proposed Senate amend-
ment or reservation stating that it may not be extended except with the Senate's
approval. Such an amendment, to begin with, implies that the Protocol with its
existing one-sided terms might well be extended, albeit with the Senate's consent.
This will make it more difficult to appropriate significant sums for cruise missile
programs which may at any moment be ended by an extension of the Protocol.^
Moreover, if the Protocol comes up for extension independently of a broader consid-
eration of the strategic balance, the temptation to extend it could easily be over-
whelming.

To sum up: I have serious reservations about the Protocol. As for the Treaty, I
conclude that its terms do not improve our strategic situation but neither do they
prevent our remedying it during the remaining six years of its life. Undoubtedly it
imposes some inhibitions on us— the prohibition against "heavy" missiles for the
United States, for example, as well as the Protocol's ban on mobile missiles through
1981. But I believe that the Senate can deal with these during the ratification
process. (The issue of heavy missiles seems to me most relevant to the period after
the expiration of the Treaty since we could not build any before 1985 and since MX
should take care of immediate needs.)

The crucial question is whether we can unite behind what is clearly necessary.
Ratifying SALT— or rejecting SALT— makes sense only if it prompts a renewed
dedication to our national defense and security. The Senate's judgment of the
Vienna Treaty should hinge, in my view, on what will be done to remedy existing
trends and on the international impact of ratification or rejection.

Let me turn, therefore, to the broader political context of this SALT II agreement.

* Apparently the Navy has virtually abandoned the development of cruise missiles aimed at
land targets— a role still considered important enough in the Ford Administration to cause the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1976 to withhold their consent to an agreement which did not protect
that capability.

171

THE GEOPOUTICAL PROBLEM

A. The Soviet Union

The awesomeness of modern weapons, and the aspirations of all peoples for peace,
impose the imperative of peaceful coexistence. No democratic leader deserves the
public trust if he fails to make a genuine effort to reduce the dangers of nuclear
holocaust, and to free national energies for dealing with the many urgent problems
of mankind. The temptation is overwhelming to view this common stake in peace as
a common bond between us and the Soviet union. It should be and someday it must
be if a cataclysm is to be avoided. But we cannot in good conscience say that current
evidence supports the proposition that the time has yet arrived.

For a too brief period in 1972 and 1973, our insistence on restraint in the conduct
of international relations seemed to bear fruit. SALT I was accompanied by a
declaration of principles signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. It
affirmed the necessity of avoiding confrontation, the imperative of mutual restraint,
the rejection of attempts to exploit tensions to gain unilateral advantage, the
renunciation of claims to special influence in any region of the world. These princi-
ples, of course, reflected an aspiration, not a contract; they defined a yardstick by
which to assess Soviet behavior. The strategy of detente was to encourage observ-
ance of these standards by a combination of positive incentives for constructive
behavior and firm responses to block adventurism. The principles agreed to in
Moscow were a paradigm of conduct which the Soviet Union could violate only to its
political cost.

Whether the Soviet Union ever intended to comply with them, or whether it was
tempted into an adventurous course by the collapse of our executive authority as a
result of Watergate (which deprived us of both incentives and penalties), or whether
a combination of all these factors was responsible, will never be known.

Whatever the cause, the fact is that since 1975 there has been an unprecedented
Soviet assault on the international equilibrium. 1975 saw the introduction of Cuban
combat forces into Angola, eventually reaching 40,000, backed by Soviet financing,
airlift, and policy support. By 1977 Soviet planes and pilots were flying air defense
missions out of Cuba so that the Cuban airforce could operate in Africa. 1977
witnessed the spread of Cuban forces to Ethiopia. East German military and intelli-
gence advisers have now joined the Cubans all over Africa and the Middle East.
There have been two invasions of Zaire— and there may yet be a third; there have
been Communist coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen; and the occupation of
Cambodia by Vietnam, preceded by a Soviet Friendship Treaty designed to secure
Hanoi's rear during its aggression. Soviet arms depots in Libya and Ethiopia fuel
insurgencies all over Africa. While the collapse of the Shah of Iran had many
causes, one contributing factor surely was the demoralization of a pro-Western
leadership group by the gradual and unopposed growth of Soviet power in nearby
areas.

Nor is this all. Terrorist organizations support by Communist funds, armed by
Communist weapons, and trained by Communist instructors are becoming a system-
atic instrument of anti-Western policy threatening countries friendly to us on
several continents. They are not, to be sure, all controlled by Moscow; but someone
who has started a rockslide cannot avoid responsibility by claiming that the rock he
threw was not the one that ultimately killed bystanders. These tactics, reinforced by
a Soviet military build-up clearly threatening the strategic, theater, and convention-
al balances, are incompatible with any notion of detente or coexistence.

Some argue that SALT is necessary lest we risk a return to the Cold War. This is
a curious argument. Whatever label we give to recent Soviet conduct— whether
"Cold War" or opportunism— it must be ended if there are to be any prospects for
East-West coexistence or cooperation. No leader serves his people by pretending
that SALT is needed to perpetutate an acceptable state of affairs. It is not an
acceptable state of affairs, and it cannot be continued.

The Vienna summit recorded no progress toward a clear understanding with the
Soviet Union on the key issue of political restraint. It was not possible, of course, to
settle in the space of three days all the outstanding issues of Africa, the Middle
East, or Southeast Asia. Nor can the Senate responsibly delay SALT until these
vexing matters are settled; they must be dealt with by intelligent and patient
diplomacy and firm resistence to pressure. But it would have been important to give
at least symbolic expression to what is the overwhelming political challenge of our
period: the ultimate test of an improved relationship— the real turning away from
the Cold War— must be restrained Soviet international conduct. The refusal of the
Soviets even to discuss the subject at Vienna, the reiteration by Brezhnev of the
commitment to so-called struggles of liberation, is worrisome indeed.

What is involved here is a profound issue in United States-Soviet relations which
is both philosophical and practical. Can peace be realized exclusively by restraint in

172

the field of arms? Or does the structure of peace require a geopolitical dimension as
well? Is it possible to proceed in separate negotiations on their merits, or must there
be some relationship between all the various interactions of two superpowers in the
field of foreign policy? In the language of recent controversies, should there be
"linkage" or not?

In my view, to seek to separate United States-Soviet relations into discrete com-
partments runs the risk of encouraging Soviet leaders to believe that they can use
East- West cooperation in one area as a safety valve while striving for unilateral
advantage elsewhere. The Administration, imagining that linkage was a personal
idiosyncrasy of previous administrations, decided to ' abolish" it. SALT was pursued
for its own sake, unaffected by Cuban troops in Ethiopia and East German auxil-
iaries in Mozambique; by Communist coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen; or by
Soviet Friendship Treaties such as the one with Vietnam that was a prelude to the
occupation of Cambodia.

This raises several problems. First of all, it is not possible to "abolish" the simple
reality that the two superpowers impinge on each other, on a broad range of issues
and areas Moreover, the attempt to do so produces an almost compulsive commit-
ment to whatever particular subject seems susceptible to solution, such as SALT,
thus permitting the Soviets to dictate the pace of negotiations and to use it to
reduce the risks of aggressiveness. And it simultaneously overloads the issue under
negotiation. If SALT must bear the whole weight of East- West relations, it runs the
risk of turning into escapism; it will eventually crumble under the strain.

No serious person would maintain that nothing should be settled until all issues
are settled; nor should SALT become the hostage of every passing political tension
of a world in flux. What is needed, however, is a bread recognition that in an
interdependent world the actions of the major nuclear powers are inevitably related
and have consequences beyond the issue or region immediately concerned. A demon-
stration of American impotence in one part of the world erodes our credibility and
hence the stability of other regions; pressures against our friends, encouraged by the
Soviet Union or its proxies, cannot be compensated for by other negotiations such as
SALT. If we ignore these facts we paradoxically enhance the attractiveness of such
adventures. It surely is not provocative to ask the Soviet Union to accompany
restraint in arms with restraint in political conduct. Attention to this kind of
linkage ensures that no agreement stands alone vulnerable to the next crisis, or
turixS into a soporific to lull the West while adventurism runs free.

I am inclined to agree that the failure to ratify an agreement negotiated over
seven years by three Administrations would have a disruptive impact on East-West
relationships, creating a crisis atmosphere for which we may have little public or
allied support. This is undoubtedly one of the telling arguments in favor of ratifica-
tion. But the Senate will also wish to consider that to deal with SALT in isolation
runs the risk of seriously misleading the Soviet Union. Moscow cannot have it both
ways: the slogan of detente and the reality of the systematic undermining of the

§eopolitical equilibrium. We should use the SALT debate to force a decision. The
enate will want to make clear that Soviet expansionism threatens the peace and
that coexistence depends above all on restrained international conduct, for which
the Senate should define some criteria.

In the long run this is also in the Soviet interest, for current trends will make a
confrontation inevitable sooner or later. Our country will not be defeated without
noticing it and when it does take notice, it will resist. The course of inadequate
defense preparation, gradual reduction of military capacity, and partial accommoda-
tion to Soviet expansionism must be reversed — on a bipartisan basis and by coopera-
tion between the Administration and the Congress.

B. The concern of allies

All our allies have expressed support for ratification of the Vienna Treaty. But
their endorsement results from a complex of factors of which approval of the
provisions of the Treaty is by far the least significant. Each has been urged, if not
pressed, by the Adm' aistration to express support. In some cases the Soviets have
added their entreaties. Refusal to comply would thus risk relations with both
superpowers over an issue that is of high technical complexity and has been under
negotiation for seven years. If the Treaty failed as a result of their opposition, our
allies might find themselves in the uncomfortable position of taking on both super-
powers. Some governments are loath to expose themselves to domestic criticism as
an "obstacle to detente" — especially over a Treaty which the United States has
already declared compatible with Western security. Some allies want to keep open
their own individual options for detente and increased East-West trade. Some are
afraid lest their objection endanger their essential defense cooperation with the
United States (even while worried about the non-circumvention clauses of the
Treaty). Some sense the changing military balance but, unsure of our direction and

173

unwilling to demand domestic sacrifice, seek to mitigate their perils by accommoda-
tion with the Soviet Union, staying one step ahead of us on the road to Moscow. All
are reluctant to contribute to a further weakening of American executive authority,
reasoning correctly that whatever their views on particulars their ultimate security
depends on the self-assurance and credibility of the American President. There is no
doubt that failure to ratify the Treaty will shake European confidence in an Ameri-
can government that for seven years assured them that it knew what it was doing.

At the same time, allied endorsement should be seen in the context of a pervasive
ambivalence. Our allies, especially in NATO, fear an exacerbation of tensions — but
they are also deeply worried about the military imbalance on the European conti-
nent which the ratification of the present strategic relationship brings to the fore-
front of concern. The thoughtful leaders among them know that the basis of their
security is eroding as our strategic superiority ebbs — but they fear there is not
enough domestic support for a really significant defense effort, especially when
American attitudes on that score are so ambiguous. They do not want to be per-
ceived as an obstacle to SALT II, but they are highly uneasy about the inevitable
SALT III, in which some limitation of theater-based nuclear weapons has already
been placed on the agenda.

The United States thus stands in danger of being blamed by our allies at one and
the same time for risking detente and for paying inadequate attention to security,
for provoking the Soviet colossus and for jeopardizing the defense of the free world.
It has ever been thus in the postwar period. The ultimate test of our leadership
cannot be a poll of our allies, which will always reflect a mixture of incommensura-
ble motives. The test of our leadership is American willingness to give a clearcut
signal of what we understand by Western security and how we intend to maintain
it. No other country or group of countries, however closely associated, can take this
burden from our shoulders. None of our allies will forgive us if we fail.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We thus return to our original problem. The Senate is in the anomalous position
of being asked to ratify a treaty which is essentially peripheral to our basic security
and geopolitical concerns but whose either simple ratification or simple rejection
would have a profound and dangerous symbolic impact. Failure to ratify an agree-
ment negotiated over seven years would compromise international confidence in our
ability to perceive our own interests or to harmonize the various branches of our
government. But it is equally true that if the custodian of free world security
neglects its task, sooner or later panic will become inevitable. The Senate in consid-
ering ratification needs urgently to address our dangers in a comprehensive way:

First, how the Senate can take concrete steps to begin redressing the military
balance;

Second, how to deal with the specific problems in the Treaty and Protocol; and

Third, how the Senate can put the Soviet Union on notice that continued at-
tempts to upset the global equilibrium will not be tolerated.

Some, whose analysis I respect, have urged amendments to the Treaty to accom-
plish these goals. These amendments are of two kinds. The first category would not
require any renegotiation with the Soviet Union. They would either express the
Senate's interpretation of the meaning of ambiguous clauses of the Treaty, or
instruct our negotiator on criteria to be applied in any follow-on negotiations, or
reassure uneasy allies about our intentions in applying SALT provisions, for exam-
ple, on non-circumvention. The second category of amendments would seek changes
in the text. These amendments would require renegotiation of the Vienna agree-
ment and they again fall into two categories: One type would alter the strategic
balance during the term of the Treaty, for example, by forcing a reduction of Soviet
throw-weight or heavy missiles. The second type would represent a claim of equal
"entitlement" — such as an American right to possess 308 heavy missiles — which
cannot be exercised during the life of the Treaty and would therefore represent an
assertion of principle rather than a contribution to the strategic balance.

The only amendments that would make any immediate difference are the kind
which go to the heart of the problem: they would remove the Soviet counterforce
capability against our ICBMs (by mandating a drastic reduction of throw-weight, for
example). Such amendments are almost certain to be rejected by the Soviets; they
would be accepted, if at all, only after an actual build-up of our forces, which in
turn might well be delayed by the very fact that renegotiations were underway. If
we maintained current limits while negotiating, the result would be a continuation
of the existing deterioration of the strategic balanc. We might thus wind up
without either SALT or a strengthened defense.

After much reflection I have concluded that I can support ratification only with
the followmg conditions:

48-250 0-79-12 .

174

First, if it is coupled with a defense program representing an obligatory under-
standing between the Congress and the President which overcomes on an urgent
basis the grave peril posed by the current military balance.

Second, if it is accompanied by amendments — not requiring renegotiation — clear-
ing up ambiguities in the Treaty, defining the status of the Protocol, the meaning of
non-circumvention, and setting guidelines for follow-on negotiations.

And third, if it is accompanied by a vigorous expression of the Senate's view of
the linkage between SALT and Soviet geopolitical conduct.

This approach would avoid the negative consequences of a collapse of SALT. But
ratification must not become an end in itself. In my view it can only be justified if
the Administration is prepared to unite our country by demonstrating its determi-
nation to restore our military strength and the geopolitical equilibrium. This seems
to me the sense of what Senator Nunn among others has proposed, and it points the
way to a bipartisan resolution of the issue.

A. To redress the military balance

With respect to the military programs, I respectfully recommend that the Senate
give its advice and consent to ratification of the Vienna Treaty only after the
Administration has submitted, and the Congress has authorized and begun appro-
priating, a supplemental defense budget and a revised five-year defense program
that will begin rectifying some of the shortcomings I have identified. The Congres-
sional recess provides an opportunity to prepare such a program, on which work
should already be far advanced as part of the normal budgetary process. If the
Administration is unable to put forward such a program to this session of Congress,
I recommend that the Senate delay its advice and consent until a new military
program has been submitted to and authorized by the next session of Congress. I
would be open-minded about other methods to achieve this end, provided they are
unambiguous, and represent an obligatory commitment by both branches of our
government.

Assurances that the Executive Branch intends to proceed with individual weapons
systems like the MX are not enough, either for the reality of our danger or to
reverse the political and psychological trends which will make the immediate future
a period of great peril. Nor have the percentage figures of projected increases— such
as the three-percent increase agreed with NATO— proved effective, because of ambi-
guities about the baseline and how to compute rates of inflation. I am worried that
if the consideration of defense programs takes place after SALT is ratified, the
debate over the proposed defense programs may stifle remedial actions or delay
them beyond all relevance — all the more so as the Administration seems to have a
far from settled view about the need for a strengthened defense. Witness the
cancellation of the B-1, the nuclear carrier, and the neutron bomb; the closing down
of the Minuteman III production line; and the stretch-out of the MX, Trident, and
cruise missile programs. After ratification, Soviet propaganda pressures can be
expected to multiply, particularly against an MX basing system that ensures sur-
vivability. Allied doubts about the security situation— especially with respect to
theater forces — will grow.

It is not a question of balancing the insistence of conservatives for higher defense
with the considerations of liberals for a reduction in our military spending. The
issue is what our country needs for its long-term security. The President and the
Congress must choose. After fifteen years of giving inadequate priority to defense, it
is time for a serious long-term effort to prevent a menacing imbalance against us.
The program must include accelerated development of a counterforce capability
through the MX and Trident II, air defense against Backfire, immediate steps to
restore the theater nuclear balance, and urgent measures to beef up our capacity
for regional defense including accelerated modernization and expansion of our
Navy. Our current five-year program is deficient in all these categories. My support
for ratification is entirely conditional on the development of a new program and
doctrine given some binding form by the Congress.

The Joint Chiefs have testified that the rapid improvements required cannot be
achieved at expenditures representing less than a five percent real increase over
current programs, for at least the next five years. The burden of proof to the
contrary should rest with the Administration.

B. Clarifying the treaty and protocol

In addition to these military programs, I recommend that the Senate add the
following amendments to its advice-and-consent resolution. None of them requires
renegotiation with the Soviet Union:

First, as far as cruise missiles are concerned, that the Protocol may not be
extended after 1981. The Senate should stipulate that its particular limitations can
be submitted to the Congress again only as part of an equitable arrangement for

175

theater nuclear forces. Specifically, no limitations may be negotiated for American
theater weapons — such as cruise missiles — which are not matched by similar limita-
tions on Soviet weapons performing comparable missions. This will bring cruise
missiles into some equilibrium with the Backfire and the SS-20.

Second, the Senate should specify that as part of SALT III, the United States be
entitled to any weapons system permitted to the Soviets in the new agreement
unless the Soviets agree to some compensation by giving up a weapons system of
equivalent characteristics allowed to us. This should take care of the heavy missile
inequity within the only framework — that of SALT III — which will give us a real
option to produce it.

Third, that the non-circumvention clause be interpreted by the Senate as not
interrupting cooperative relationships with allies with respect to technology needed
to modernize their forces. No technology available to us should be barred for
transfer.

I also suggest that the Senate reexamine the SALT Agreement every two years,
specifically to determine its verifiability.

C. To address the geopolitical problem

Finally, I respectfully urge the Senate to use the ratification process to put the
Soviet Union on notice that this country is prepared, nay eager, for peaceful
coexistence that reflects true stability and equality in arms, and also political
restraint. We are ready to pursue the control and reduction of arms with dedication.
But we will brook no subterfuge, nor can we continue a conciliatory policy if
Moscow chooses to exploit that policy as a convenient opening to Soviet predomi-
nance. The Senate should attach to its instrument of advice and consent an expres-
sion of the following principles:

That the absence of political restraint will seriously jeopardize continuation of the
SALT process.

That the Senate understands this to include Soviet supply or encouragement of
intervention by proxy military forces; the use of Soviet forces on the territory of its
allies such as Cuba to free Cuban forces to fight in Africa; the support, financing, or
encouragement by any member of the Warsaw Pact of groups and activities seeking
to undermine governments friendly to the United States; or the exacerbation of
regional conflicts.

That the Administration be required to submit an annual report to the Senate on
the degree to which the Soviet Union is living up to these criteria.

That the Senate vote every two years its judgment whether the Soviet Union has
lived up to these criteria. If the judgment is negative, the Senate should then vote
whether whatever SALT negotiation are taking place should be continued.

Finally, if we thus reassess our strategic position, we must also take another look
at the SALT process. Though the strategic conditions I have described result largely
from unilateral American decisions, they have been reflected in the SALT process
which was essentially a confirmation of them. The fact that I have participated in
the process — and must share some of the responsibility — entitles me to warn against
continuing it by rote. I urge that its long-term implications be carefully considered.
Never in the postwar period has there been more disagreement and intellectual
confusion about the requirements of stategic stability and the implications of arms
control. A thorough reassessment and the fullest consultation with our allies are
crucial before we launch ourselves into SALT III, which will directly affect our
allies and hence may jeopardize our alliances.

CONCLUSION

I recommend the approach outlined here because it gives this country an opportu-
nity to address its dangers without abandoning an important negotiation that has
already extended over seven years. And it gives us an opportunity to proceed as a
united people. If the Administration rejects this approach, the Senate will have no
alternative except to go the route of farther-reaching amendments, either holding
the Treaty in abeyance or forcing a renegotiation. The result will almost certainly
be a diplomatic stalemate until the Soviets are convinced that we are determined to
restore the strategic balance; it would be an indirect — and in my view less produc-
tive — route which, even if successful, would lead to the same result of a major new
effort to meet out imperative security needs.

To be sure, the course I propose will make SALT II far from the turn in the arms
race many of us hoped for when the negotiations were inaugurated. But too much
time has been lost, too many weapons systems have been unilaterally abandoned,
too many mihtary adventures have been encouraged by the Soviet Union, the
geopolitical balance has been too severely strained by Soviet pressures, for SALT to
be much more than a base from which, one can hope, a new and serious effort at

176

equitable arms reduction can be made. C!oncrete steps to rectify the global balance
are urgently required. In this context a ratified SALT II Treaty can play a useful
role as a signpost to continuing negotiations, as a beacon illuminating the path to
genuine coexistence and detente, and as a means to contain current tensions. But
SALT must contribute to the world's security, not insecurity.

At this moment our major obligation is to restore the confidence of all those who
depend on us; to redress the military balance; to reestablish some effective link
between arms control and restrained international conduct. All Americans — of
either party — should share these goals.

There are deeply concerned people who want SALT but doubt the need for
augmented defense. Others see in SALT an obstacle to augmented defense. Let
there be serious effort to reconcile these points of view before we turn to domestic
confrontation. I am prepared to do my best in this effort.

Rarely is an opportunity so clearly presented to a legislative body to determine
the course of national policy in a direction vital to the future of the democracies.
After the 1919 Versailles Treaty, misjudgments by the Senate and the Administra-
tion led to a debacle which undermined international security and doomed the
world to another bloody holocaust. At this moment, the Senate and the Administra-
tion can point us in a different direction — toward a restoration of our national
unity, toward the strengthening of the security of this nation and of its allies, and
toward a more constructive relationship with our principal adversaries. This is
America's responsibility, if we are to remain true to our trust and to the hopes of
mankind.

DARK VISTAS OF LOOMING U.S. INFERIORITY

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for your
statement, which gives us much room for thought.

The committee will operate under the 10-minute rule, as usual,
one with which you are familiar.

Dr. Kissinger, in March 1976, just over 3 years ago, you said, and
I quote your statement

But we must be clear what maintaining the balance means. We must not mesmer-
ize ourselves with fictitious gaps. Our forces were designed according to different
criteria than those of the Soviet Union. Their adequacy must be judged by our
strategic needs, not theirs.

You then went on to say —

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons
ignore these facts, and the real choices facing modern leaders.

What has changed in the last 3y2 years which you could not
foresee when you made this statement in 1976, and which has led
you now to paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority?

Secretary Kissinger. What has changed since 1976 is the follow-
ing: When I made this statement, it was in the context of a mili-
tary program that included the B-1, which was to become oper-
ational 2 or 3 years later; the M-X missile, which was supposed to
become operational in 1983; and a Trident development which has
since slipped by some 3 or 4 years. It was also made before our
intelligence indicated that our missiles would become vulnerable to
the accelerated Soviet technological development about 4 years
before previous estimates. And finally, it was made before the
geopolitical offensive that I have described. But if we confine it to
the military equation, I will put it in relationship to the military
program as was then being contemplated.

DELAY IN U.S. STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

The Chairman. Looking at that military program, you have
mentioned weapons systems which were delayed, which you antici-

177

pated would move ahead on schedule. Now, there have been some
very important programs that have continued on schedule. The
hardening of the missile silos for the Minuteman, the accuracy
improvement for the Minuteman, the substitution of a much larger
MIRVed warhead for the Minuteman, all of which have improved
our counterforce potential and all of which have contributed to the
survivability of the Minuteman, those programs have continued
without delay and on schedule. Would you agree to that?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes. I agree to that. I do not think they
changed the basic situation that I have described.

The Chairman. Right.

Now, with respect to the Trident and the cruise missile, this
committee is informed that delays that have extended that sched-
ule have been caused at least in major part by technical problems
that had to be resolved, the difficulty of building the submarine, as
we had hoped, and technical problems in connection with the mis-
sile, while, as for the M-X, we have, as you know, been attempting
to determine a basing mode that would work best for us and would
not constitute a serious impediment to the continuing SALT proc-
ess in that we want it to be verifiable.

We decided against the B-1 bomber after coming to the conclu-
sion, which I think is based on good military grounds, that the
cruise missile was preferable, mainly because the B-1 could be shot
down by the Russians by 1982, and the cruise missile not only had
great accuracy but greater penetrating power. Therefore, the cruise
missile was substituted in favor of the B-1, each one of which
would have cost over $100 million a copy.

So, my question to you is, given these technical problems that
have arisen, given the decision to substitute a superior missile
system for the B-1, would any prudent planner have proceeded
more rapidly with these programs in your judgment?

Secretary Kissinger. My basic purpose here is not to assess
blame, but to describe a condition. With respect to the B-1, I have
personally never accepted the proposition that our choice was be-
tween the B-1 and the cruise missile, because the original planning
was that we would have both, given the danger to the survivability
of the over-aged B-52's. The theory on which we were operating
was that both systems would be maintained; therefore I think that
the choice between the cruise missile and B-1 was not the only
choice that was before us.

It is undoubtedly true that Trident had technical problems and
that this was not a deliberate decision based on strategic doctrine.
The fact nevertheless remains that in the 1980's we will face a
grave situation in which we will be either even or behind in every
significant strategic and military category. And that in the past
has always had geopolitical consequences.

This is the problem that I am trying to address without assigning
the blame to any one decision.

PAST political CONSEQUENCES

The Chairman. What are those past political consequences to
which you refer? In the earlier postwar period, when, according to
your statement, the United States enjoyed predominant military
advantage in the strategic field and in the conventional field as

178

well, we had such aggressive and adventuresome threats from the
Soviet Union as the Berlin crisis and as the Cuban missile crisis.
Apparently the obvious preponderance of military strength in the
strategic field was not a deterrent to Soviet adventurism in that
period.

Secretary Kissinger. They were not a deterrent to the adven-
tures, but they were a deterrent to their success.

The danger that is foreseeable is threefold. One is that in a world
in turmoil, crises affecting vital interests can arise — not deliberate-
ly sought by either of the major powers — in which then the capac-
ity for intervention as we have seen can play a decisive role.

Second, there can be deliberate encouragement of these crises,
and in the extreme, there can be direct pressures of the kind we
have not yet seen.

CAUTIOUS BEHAVIOR DURING NUCLEAR EQUIVALENCE

The Chairman. I understand the doctrine, but the question I put
to you is this, that if, during a period when we had preponderant
military superiority over the Soviet Union, they were willing to
take the risk of very aggressive moves, what makes you think that
in a period when we have at least an equivalence of nuclear power,
they would not be more cautious in taking such gambles?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I would say two things. One is that if
they were willing to run risks during a period of American prepon-
derance, it would seem to follow that they may be prepared to take
greater risks when there is no American preponderance.

Second, the definition of nuclear equivalence is usually derived
from the capacity to destroy civilian population. I believe that a
country that puts itself into the position where its only military
option is to initiate the mass killing of civilians has written for
itself a prescription for paralysis, because that is a recourse to
which we should not condemn ourselves, and which is out of pro-
portion to almost any objective that one can foresee.

The Chairman. If your assessment of the American military
balance and the trends is correct, and it echoes an assessment we
have heard from the Chiefs of Staff and others

Secretary Kissinger. I have the impression that Harold Brown
agrees with it too, substantially.

The Chairman. Yes; if that is a correct assessment, the trend has
not been brought about either by the SALT I Treaty or the SALT
II Treaty. Wouldn't you agree? And I think you have stated that
neither of these treaties is at fault with respect to whatever danger
the present trend may present to the United States, and what the
answer is is to do the things that are necessary to redress the
balance in the coming years.

Secretary Kissinger. I have indicated my specific concerns with
respect to the SALT II Treaty and the methods for dealing with
them. As a general proposition, the present strategic balance has
come about by our unilateral decisions extending over a fairly
lengthy period of time, and can be importantly remedied by our
unilateral decisions.

The Chairman. I want to commend you for your support of
SALT as you have conditioned it and for the specific proposals you

179

have made for the consideration of the committee in connection
with the instrument of ratification.

I am sure, as you know, Dr. Kissinger, they will be given very
serious consideration.

Secretary Kissinger. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Javits.

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I join in thanking you for your testimony, which I
will say lives up to expectations in its understanding of the issues
and its sophistication. I am very glad you said one thing, that you
are not here to assess blame. You are here to establish a condition
and to present your approach to how to deal with it. I am glad to
see that you confess blame yourself.

In your statement, you say that in 1974:

I gave an answer to a question at a press conference which I have come to regret.
"What in the name of God is 'strategic superiority,' " I asked. "What is the signifi-
cance of it * * * at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?' My
statement reflected fatigue and exasperation, not analysis, et cetera.

I think that is the right spirit for SALT.

Secretary Kissinger. It also makes for a historical occasion.

[General laughter.]

ABILITY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE

Senator Javits. Yes; very much. Well, we wish to establish histo-
ry, and you are helping us with your testimony. I am a pragmatist
in that ultimately we have to do something and write something,
and you are helping us.

I find one basic question in your testimony which I think is the
key to your ability to help us. You say about the SALT Treaty in
your statement, 'The Senate is in the anomalous position of being
asked to ratify a treaty which is essentially peripheral * * *" You
repeat the same thing further on. Nonetheless, notwithstanding
that it is peripheral, you seek to build a structure of commitment
in your statement. You ask us at the end of your statement not
only to resolve to do certain things about strengthening our de-
fenses and our military establishment, but to defer until the next
session of Congress the final action on this treaty. What is even
more important, and what to me is the reverse of what you asked
us to do, you imply that we do not have trust in ourselves; you say
that you want an obligatory commitment by both branches of our
Government to this very major program of rearmament. Nor do
you trust the administration.

You say you want an obligatory commitment from the adminis-
tration. You want it in binding form. Now, whether that can be
done or not I do not know. It seems to me that, if the United States
is going to take the position that it does not trust itself to go ahead
with this business, if the pledge is any good— with Congress appro-
priating every year — I wonder how you come to the conclusion at
the end of your statement: "At this moment, our major obligation
is to restore the confidence of all those who depend on us." How
are we going to restore their confidence, if we have no confidence
in ourselves?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I believe that a SALT agreement that
is perceived as simply perpetuating existing trends, even if it is

180

received with temporary relief, will sooner or later lead to massive
global insecurity when the nature of what I have described will
become apparent. I therefore think it is in our national interest
that we make both commitments simultaneously, to a program of
arms control and to a program of fixing the shortcomings in our
national defense.

I remember after SALT I there were a number of intentions with
respect to defense programs which then turned out to be extremely
difficult to fulfill in later budgetary cycles.

Second, I believe that as the facts that I have described sink in
on the rest of the world, we will face a crisis in the conduct of our
foreign policy, and I believe this has to be rectified quickly. It is
not a question of not having confidence in ourselves. It is a ques-
tion, on the contrary, of having enough confidence in ourselves to
do what is necessary simultaneously and not defer it to some
indeterminate future in an election year when then we will be
under strong pressure after ratification from the Soviet Union that
what we are doing is incompatible with the spirit of our relation-
ship.

I think we should put it all on the table simultaneously, so that
everybody understands the framework within which we are operat-
ing.

MEANING OF OBLIGATORY COMMITMENT

Senator Javits. Dr. Kissinger, I am all for putting it all on the
table simultaneously, but having been Secretary of State, will you
explain to me how you can get an obligatory commitment either
from the Congress or from the President in view of the fact that in
1981 neither we nor the President may be here? In short, isn't
what you are suggesting just a brake on action and a brake on
expressing our confidence in ourselves. By saying that we will go
ahead with SALT II, perhaps with many of the precautions you
propose — I like many of them very much — and by saying we are
going ahead with a rearmament program, we will not be sitting on
our hands until such time as we legislate these things. It may not
mean anything because it can be undone by the next Congress.

Secretary Kissinger. Yes, but it is one thing for the next Con-
gress to undo something that was solemnly decided in connection
with an agreement. It is another to have to start the whole process
from the beginning.

Senator Javits. The process can be started. I am still trying to
get what you mean by an obligatory commitment. What is an
obligatory commitment?

Secretary Kissinger. I have suggested one way of doing it which
would be for the administration to submit a supplementary budget
and a 5-year program that the Congress could look at. Of course, it
could be undone by a future President and a future Congress, but
at least we would then know what we are talking about and others
would know what we are talking about in terms of what is consid-
ered essential for our national defense.

Also, you flatter me, of course, when you say that as Secretary of
State I should know how the Congress can conduct its business. I
seem to remember that is not what it was usually said I would go
down in history for. [General laughter.]

181

I am sure that the Senate and the gentlemen here could find
other methods by which to record a solemn understanding between
the Congress and the President which would be found to weigh
heavily with whoever is in office in 1981.

Senator Javits. There I am with you, but I do not believe that it
would serve our purposes or the national or international interest
of the United States to simply lay this over while we fight around
about a new armaments program. I believe that we can by a
suitable resolution pledge ourselves to bring our armament up to
proper equivalency and that that would serve the purpose which
you and all the proponents of the tranquilizer theory have in mind.
That is the only thing I am proposing.

Secretary Kissinger. I would have to see what that method is
and what the resolution is before I could pass a judgment on it.

Senator Javits. I understand that.

Secretary Kissinger. If it is kept in general terms, it would not
meet my purposes. I do not want to prescribe precisely how to do it,
but I am sure that between the Senate and the President there
must be some way that can be found that is substantially binding
and at least during the period of this Congress.

RUN THE RISKS IF WE REJECT SALT

Senator Javits. Dr. Kissinger, before my time is up, I wanted to
ask you one other question. I do not think you testified clearly
enough to the fact that we are better off without the SALT Treaty
than we are with it, if we do not fulfill your conditions. In other
words, we have to vote yea or nay. Suppose all of your conditions
cannot be fulfilled; in your judgment, should we reject it and run
whatever the risks?

Secretary Kissinger. That is such an inconceivable idea to me
that I have not addressed it. [General laughter.]

I would have very grave doubts about voting the SALT Treaty up
or down without the major part of at least the spirit of the propos-
als that I have made here. Under those conditions, I would be very
reluctant to go along with the treaty.

Senator Javits. Thank you.

Senator Biden. What was the answer, yes or no? I am not sure I
understood that.

The Chairman. He would be reluctant.

Secretary Kissinger. If the issue were simply up or down, which
I think should not happen, then I would recommend that the
Senate hold it over until it can find a position that can encompass
my concerns.

Senator Biden. But if it does not, then you would vote no?

Secretary Kissinger. Then I would vote no, yes.

Senator Biden. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Pell is next.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

three caveats to support salt ratification

Mr. Secretary, as I understand your testimony, and it was a very
strongly erudite statement, you would support ratification with
three caveats: that there be an increase in our military budget,

182

certain reservations, to the treaty, and a degree of linkage to
Soviet behavior around the world. In this regard, I would like to go
down each one of these three points.

In connection with the military program or enlargement, I think
you are dealing here with a political process, and there are some of
us, maybe a minority, who feel that if the price to secure SALT is a
vastly enlarged arsenal, with all the expense that goes with it, we
would prefer not to see SALT come along, because equally impor-
tant as our military strength is, it would seem to me, our economic
strength, upon which you have not touched in your testimony. I
was wondering what your own view was as to whether you truly
believe that we can engage in a program, as you have suggested
and as some of our colleagues have suggested, without doing tre-
mendous damage to our somewhat imperfect economic machine
now which is suffering.

Secretary Kissinger. What we must try to bring about is a
situation of substantial reduction of armaments on both sides. I do
not believe that this will occur as long as the Soviet analysis of the
military balance roughly coincides with the one that I have de-
scribed. I therefore share your objective of lowered military ex-
penditures, and on the other hand, I believe that the consequences
of the strategic imbalance that I have analyzed will be so serious
for us over the period of a decade that its costs would be infinitely
less than the costs that I have described.

Second, I look ahead over a 10-year period. I see every possibility
of the pressures on the Soviet system leading to a better definition
of coexistence than to my great regret has proved possible. I had
hoped very much in 1972 at the initiation of that period of detente,
that it would lead to restrained political conduct and to a reduction
in armaments which I believe must be the ultimate objective.

This not having taken place, we must now face the facts. And
compared to the dangers that have resulted from the geopolitical
offensive, the rapid Soviet buildup, and the lack in our efforts, I
think we now must meet that danger, but with the attitude that
we will move then to new negotiations that will seek to bring about
the objectives that were originally envisaged.

Senator Pell. If the price of doing this in economic terms is
moving from where we are now, which is practically, I believe, a
12- or 13-percent rate of inflation to a 20-percent rate of inflation,
and the continuation of the energy problems we have, I would
question whether the price would be worth it. Do you think it
would?

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, I am not in a position to say
whether it would lead to a 20-percent rate of inflation and what
sacrifices have to be made. But we have seen that upheavals, not
primarily caused by the Soviet Union, say, in Iran, can produce a
change in the economic environment.

If we suddenly find ourselves in a world which is substantially
hostile and which is pursuing policies over which we have lost any
degree of influence, I think the economic price to us would be
potentially greater than anything that might have to be undertak-
en under what I am proposing.

Senator Pell. Still, on the question of military weapons; I am
wondering, looking back at SALT I and the early days when we all

183

agreed that weapons in submarines were probably less destabilizing
than weapons ashore — and you will recall, I am sure, that old
triplet.

Let's put the weapons out to sea
Where the real estate is free; and
Far away from you and me.

Why was there not more of an effort made in those early days to
try to restrict the increase in weaponry to nuclear submarines?

Secretary Kissinger. As a general proposition, we, of course,
moved a much greater proportion of our weapons to sea than has
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, for a variety of reasons, kept
most of its effective throw-weight on land; partly, one has to
assume, because this is a more effective way of achieving a first
strike capability, partly because its submarine technology is prob-
ably behind ours. So, in the long-term evolution I would think that
increasing the invulnerability of both sides' strategic forces will be
in the interest of both sides.

However, one has to add this proviso to it, as far as the United
States is concerned. For the United States, for better or worse, a
much greater emphasis for our security depended on our counter-
force capability throughout all of the postwar period. We were
always inferior in forces for regional defense. As this counterforce
capability is lost, either as a result of unilateral decisions by the
United States or as the inevitable result of technology and there-
fore through no fault of ours, a totally new security problem arises
for our allies and for the composition of our military forces, a
problem to which none of us paid adequate attention in the period
that arms control theory was being developed. I confess that I
myself did not adequately analyze the crucial role that our strate-
gic superiority played in defending peripheral areas, so that even if
equivalence is achieved, even if we lose our present relative vulner-
ability, that, too, will constitute a fundamental change in the stra-
tegic relationship which we should address, and we do not need to
discuss whose fault that is.

That may be an inherent fact of life, to which I am trying to call
attention and which will dominate the 1980's, even if we make the
proper efforts in the strategic area.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

Senator Pell. Returning for a moment to submarines, isn't it a
fact that now the Soviets are putting more of their emphasis on the
development of nuclear weapons and submarines than on the other
elements of their military forces?

Secretary Kissinger. I think you can get a better judgment on
Soviet strategic prcgrams from the intelligence community than
from me. My impression is that the Soviet Union is approaching
the completion of the buildup of its MIRVed missiles, and that this
buildup is sufficient to give them a counterforce capability against
our ICBM's and still leave them with a very large residual force, so
they can put more into submarines. I think one cannot draw any
conclusions.

I would be convinced that they are shifting into submarines if
they began dismantling some of their land based forces and putting

184

them to sea. That would represent an important change in the
strategic equation and a very positive one.

JUDGING DECISION MADE ON MIRVING

Senator Pell. Speaking of MIRVed weapons, I remember some
years ago some similar discussions. I was in the minority that said
we should really not go for MIRVing because it was just a question
of time before the Soviets would follow us in that pursuit. In
retrospect, do you think we were correct in moving ahead then in
MIRVing?

Secretary Kissinger. Of course, it depends on your judgment of
whether our failure to MIRV would have brought about a Soviet
decision not to MIRV. At the time when proposals on limitations of
MIRVing were made, what the Soviet Union counterproposed was
a limitation on deployment of MIRV's but no limitation on testing
of MIRV's, which led us to the thought that they wanted to use the
moratorium to catch up on our technology.

Second, our predecessors made the decision in the sixties to stop
the buildup of the numbers of missiles — we essentially stopped our
numerical buildup in 1966 and 1967 — and we substituted for that
an increase in the number of warheads.

Whether that was the right decision, whether we should have
continued to build more missiles with single warheads, whether we
could have achieved from the Soviets an agreement not to test
MIRV's at an earlier stage, must remain conjectural. In retrospect,
I think, if one could have avoided the development of MIRV's,
which means also the testing of MIRV's by the Soviets, we would
both be better off.

Senator Pell. Thank you. I see that my time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Pell,

Senator Percy?

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

recommend senate delay advice and consent

Dr. Kissinger, I am interested in pursuing Senator Javits ques-
tion in regard to the statement you made:

If the Administration is unable to put forward such a program to this session of
Congress, I would recommend the Senate delay its advice and consent until a new
military program has been submitted to and authorized by the next session of
Congress.

I am afraid that might be used by those who will do anything to
delay consideration of this treaty in an attempt to wreck it.

Could you clarify whether you feel there is any sense of urgency
in regards to considering this treaty? We have to stay here until
the end of the year, dealing simultaneously with the problems of
energy, inflation and the weakened dollar and all of the problems
that we face in lagging productivity. Should we also keep our feet
to the fire on this issue and try to finish it, vote up or down, on it
this year? Wouldn't that be a goal that we should establish?

Secretary Kissinger. If the conditions that I have outlined here
can be met this year, I would prefer that to delay. I would prefer
an up or down vote within the framework that I have outlined this

185

year. I do not see why it should be impossible for the administra-
tion to put before the Congress a program on which they must
already be working as part of the budgetary process anyway, which
from my recollection of the process must be well advanced by now,
or why, if there is a serious intention on both sides to deal with
this, one could not advance this during September and October and
complete it by the end of this year.

Senator Percy. I, for one, would join you in urging the adminis-
tration to put forward such plans for our consideration, to develop
them in the month of August for our consideration in September.
It is essential that we be assured that we will maintain our strate-
gic balance in future years. I think that is a fine contribution.

I would like to read from your testimony before this committee
on the Panama Canal Treaty

Ambiguity is, of course, the essence of diplomacy. It often permits each side to
maintain its essential international interest. I have resorted to it in negotiations on
several occasions. I have never considered ambiguitive language acceptable, howev-
er, if it masked a true difference of interpretation.

Do you still stand by this statement?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes. This is why I am trying to remove
differences of interpretation in the treaty.

Senator Percy. Did you want to expand on that at all?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I have grave concerns about the pro-
tocol. The protocol is now being advanced with two contradictory
propositions. One is that the Soviets would not have signed the
agreement without the protocol, but we need not worry about it
because it will end in 1981 anyway, and we could not do what we
might do under its terms. I therefore would like to put the Senate
unambiguously on record that the protocol in its present form
cannot be continued after 1981, and that its particular restrictions
can only be negotiated in the future as part of a theater nuclear
balance which includes the Backfire and SS-20 on the Soviet side,
the cruise missiles and correlative systems on our side. Then one's
concerns about the protocol's ambiguities would disappear, as one
example.

NEED TO ADOPT CLEAR-CUT UNDERSTANDING ON PROTOCOL

EXTENSION

Senator Percy. Even though President Carter has assured us
that he would not unilaterally extend the protocol, we have had
strong evidence from General Rowny and others that the Soviets
would attempt to interpret its possible extension as a part of SALT
III. They would apply great pressure to extend it. Don't you feel it
would be a good idea for us to adopt a clearcut understanding that
no President could unilaterally extend the protocol without the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate?

Secretary Kissinger. Senator Percy, I actually go further than
that. I am opposed to the continuation of the protocol in its present
form because in its present form it limits unilaterally an American
system, and the only justification for it is, under present terms,
that we are told we could not do these systems in the period of the
protocol. Also it sets a precedent where for the first time we have
limited theater systems without reciprocity. We should make clear

186

that any future negotiation must involve comparable systems on
the Soviet side.

If one leaves it vague, the negotiation is bound to start with the
protocol, and the reservation that the protocol must be approved by
the Senate does not change the fact that one will then have a
completed document, and the reservation in fact implies that under
some conditions the existing protocol might be continued.

I would recommend an instruction that makes it clear that
future negotiations would lump comparable systems, so that if we
restrict systems that are relevant to the theater nuclear balance,
the Soviets will be forced to restrict systems relative to the theater
nuclear balance. On that basis, there can be no ambiguity or mis-
understanding about the follow-on negotiations or about the signifi-
cance of the protocol.

AMBIGUITY WITH REGARD TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO NATO

ALLIES

Senator Percy. I met earlier this morning with Jack McCloy,
who will be testifying before us on Thursday and who is uniquely
qualified to talk about the reaction of our NATO Allies. I think he
will indicate some lack of enthusiasm on their part.

During the course of the negotiating process, I understand the
Soviets demanded a nontransfer provision in the treaty. We reject-
ed that demand because we want to transfer anything that is
necessary to our NATO Allies, but we did agree to article XII in
the treaty which prohibits circumvention through third parties.

I have offered for consideration of the Senate an understanding
of the treaty stating that this article does not prohibit continued
defense cooperation with our allies.

As I interpret your testimony, you would concur particularly
with respect to transfer of cruise missile technology. However, an
administration official told me privately that the Soviets would
object to this understanding, if it specifically mentions cruise mis-
sile technology.

Now, if they would object to such an understanding, it stands to
reason that they believe the treaty does affect our collaboration
with the allies. This, in my view, is an issue which we should set
straight. We cannot afford to have any ambiguity, it would seem to
me, on that particular point.

Do you think that, if we left it ambiguous, it might create some
problem later? Should we adopt an understanding, even though the
administration objects to it, clearly stating that we have the right,
without any equivocation, to transfer technology to our NATO
Allies involving cruise missiles or any other systems involved in
our mutual defense?

Secretary Kissinger. I am not in a position to judge whether the
Soviet Union would object to it or not. It seems to me that either
the administration is prepared to share cruise missile technology
with our allies, in which case it should welcome such an expression
from the Senate, or it does not, in which case it would have
massive difficulty with our allies, and we had better know it now.
But if there is an intention to share cruise missile technology with
our allies, it is in everybody's interest — ours, our allies', and the

187

Soviet Union's — that this be made clear and that the treaty not be
ambiguous on this point.

Senator Percy. I would feel strongly enough about it that I do
not see how I could vote for ratification without an absolutely
clear-cut understanding on the transfer of technology to our allies.
I think the testimony before us is evidence that we do intend to
continue sharing technology with our NATO Allies, but I think we
ought to put it clearly on record as part of the treaty process itself.

You mentioned in your testimony the geopolitical consequences
of the treaty. In rereading an interview you had with The Econo-
mist, I know that you are particularly concerned about this. Some
of us have concentrated a good deal of our time on trying to
determine what effect this treaty has on our allies. I think it is
extraordinarily important that we fully understand NATO views of
not only the political leadership, but also the military leadership.

In my view, the strength of our alliance is a major factor in
determining the strength of our own national defense. Could you
give us your views on the impact defeat of this treaty in the Senate
would have on our NATO Allies? How would it be interpreted?
There is support shown by the political leadership and ministers of
defense, but do you see some degree of skepticism by the NATO
military? Do you see skepticism that could not be answered by
understandings or reservations?

Secretary Kissinger. I have not had an opportunity to talk to
the defense ministers of our European Allies, and therefore I think
General Haig, when he testifies here, will be in a better position to
give you a conclusive judgment on that. I believe that what I have
outlined here would meet the concerns of our allies. I think there
is a pervasive ambivalence among our allies. If the treaty is reject-
ed, they will conclude that a negotiation that went on for 7 years,
on which they were briefed for 7 years, then failed at the very last
stage, and it would reinforce doubts about the American political
process, since they approved every stage of this, and since some of
the fine points will be elusive to them.

On the other hand, if the treaty ratifies a situation in which
their military security will be seen to be jeopardized in another
year or two, that, too, is going to have the profoundest conse-
quences on us, even if not immediately. Therefore, I think the
necessity of statesmanship is to find a solution as far as our allies
are concerned that avoids both of these dangers, one that avoids
the sense of growing impotence, and that avoids the reflections
about whether the United States knows where it is going.

This has been what I have attempted to present to this commit-
tee and on which, of course, others may have modifying views, but
this is my best judgment of what I think is needed for both of these
requirements.

Senator Percy. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator McGovern?

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, thank you for your testimony.

188

J. FORMULA NOT FOR ARMS LIMITATION BUT ARMS ESCALATION

Dr. Kissinger, after listening to the terms that you have laid
down as a condition of your support for SALT II, I have serious
doubts that this treaty is worth the price, because I think what you
have offered, and not you alone, but many others who have testi-
fied here, is a formula not for arms limitation but for arms escala-
tion. Indeed, having sat at this table for the last month and lis-
tened to a parade of witnesses my doubts are more serious than
ever about the whole SALT process. I think it may very well have
come a cropper in terms of any limitations or reductions of arma-
ments.

I am slowly coming to the conclusion that with or without my
vote SALT II will probably be ratified by the Senate, but I fear it is
going to be ratified at the price of a more costly arms race. I fear it
will not live up to what we had expected to get from anything
called strategic arms limitation, and because of the influence of
you and other distinguished Americans who are demanding the
price for this treaty in the form of more and more weapons, we will
lose anything we might have gained by the whole process.

It seems to me the trouble with the SALT process is that it
moves so slowly, and no one knows that more painfully than you.
The military technology always races ahead of the negotiations.
You never catch up. You, yourself, have pointed out this morning
that the Soviets had 3,200 warheads when we signed SALT I, and
now they have 6,000, and you tell us they will have 12,000 by the
end of SALT II. We have been producing those weapons, as you
know, at about the same rate of four or five a day all these years,
so we will probably end up with 12,000 or 13,000, too, by the end of
1985.

I can see some advantages of this treaty in preserving detente or
what is left of it and avoiding a shock to our allies which would
result from rejection, but it does seem to me that the greatest
possible advantage of the treaty is that it might set the stage for
SALT III and genuine reductions. I am as interested as you are in
trying to arrive at some formula that would achieve national unity
on this question of national security. I do not like this debate
between hawks and doves. I do not even like the words. I never
have. I have always hoped that we could somehow find a basis on
which Americans could agree what our security posture ought to
be.

Now, you have laid out your terms for supporting the treaty.
Just give me a minute to lay out mine, and then I wish you would
respond to it.

RESOLUTION IN SALT II FOR SALT III NEGOTIATION

I would like to see a resolution accompany this treaty that would
clearly instruct our negotiators on SALT III to begin working the
day after ratification of SALT II on real reductions in SALT III.
Perhaps we could begin with a freeze, a mutual freeze, by both the
Soviet Union and the United States on all nuclear weapons sys-
tems and accompany that with a serious effort to get a 10-percent
reduction in all the categories— their big SS-18's, the whole range
of nuclear weapons that are covered by this treaty. Then, work out

189

an arrangement, a serious effort to reduce nuclear arms at the
rate, let us say, of 10-percent a year on both sides.

It seems to me, having listened to a lot of people who were
described as hawks, that that is what they want. They want genu-
ine reductions on both sides. You have talked about the growing
vulnerability of our land-based system, presumably because the
Soviets are building so many warheads, but wouldn't it appeal to
those who are extremely conscious of our security position if we
could negotiate that kind of arrangement in SALT III to get genu-
ine reductions on both sides? Would it not also provide a basis for
unity on the part of those most closely identified with arms control
and those who are on the other side of that equation.

Secretary Kissinger. Before I deal with your proposal, Senator,
let me make two comments on your preliminary observations. First
of all, I do not think the Senate should pay any price for getting
the treaty ratified. I do not think it is a desirable way of putting
the issue, because it implies that something is paid that one really
should not do. I think what the treaty provides is an opportunity to
address problems that have to be solved anyway.

Supposing that the opponents of increased spending in military
efforts defeat this treaty on their grounds that it is not adequate
arms control. We would be right back at the strategic situation
that I have described, and we would still have to make, in my
judgment, the efforts that I have outlined.

I am not asking a price for SALT. I have tried to indicate a
serious situation that has developed over an extended period of
time which in my view has to be remedied with or without SALT.

Senator McGovern. Mr. Secretary, if I could interrupt you there,
I think one point on which you and I agree is that the central issue
here all along has not been so much the terms of SALT II as the
future of American foreign policy.

Secretary Kissinger. That is right.

Senator McGovern. That is what comes across in your state-
ment, and I agree with that. I think that is why this ratification
process is equally important, maybe more important than the exact
terms of the treaty, because it is what we do here in the next few
weeks in the Senate and the Congress that may determine what
happens in terms of American foreign policy and American nation-
al security policy.

So, it is not so much what is in SALT II to which I object. It is
the whole process of ratification in which I see yoff as a threaten-
ing part. [General laughter.]

And I say that with the greatest respect. [General laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger. I am trying to outline the circumstances
that have to be addressed whether SALT is ratified or rejected. The
particular imbalances that have been developing over an extended
period of time, and that have largely been the result of many
unilateral decisions by us, in my view must be remedied.

I also agree that SALT III should deal with reductions as its pre-
eminent objective. I would welcome an instruction to the negotia-
tors that that should be their principal goal, but reductions ought
to operate from a relatively equal base, and that is a concurrent
concern of mine, to bring about a strategic situation in the overall

48-250 0-79-13

190

balance less threatening to our overall interests than the one I now
foresee.

Senator McGovern. Dr. Kissinger, don't you think we are at
rough equivalence now? That has been the testimony of the Joint
Chiefs.

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, I think that rough equivalence is
one of the slogans which in itself does not mean anything. We are
at rough equivalence in the capacity to destroy civilians. I am of
the view that this is the most demoralizing, indeed, the most im-
moral strategy that we can adopt.

Second, I believe that rough equivalence in that sense, even
assuming that we were willing to execute such a strategy, which I
would hope we would not be, then raises in much more acute form
the issue of regional balances, as I have described, which has been
neglected by us and by our allies over an extended period of time.
It is that to which I want to call attention.

In the long run, if adequate efforts are made, it should be possi-
ble to demonstrate that superiority in the strategic field is bound
to be ephemeral, and that would be the basis for significant reduc-
tions. Unfortunately, that situation does not fully exist today.

Senator McGovern. I am anxious to get back to that, but I see
that my time is up. Thank you. Secretary Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator McGovern.

Senator Baker?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

agreement with points made by dr. KISSINGER

Dr. Kissinger, I think we owe you a debt of gratitude for a well
thought out and comprehensive statement on a highly complex and
difficult subject. I think it was extraordinarily well done. There are
some parts of it with which I disagree and will discuss if time will
permit in a moment, but there are many parts with which I do

agree. .

I agree particularly with the thrust of your statement which, as
Senator McGovern pointed out, seems to be a recitation of the fact
that strategic arms limitation negotiations cannot exist in a
vacuum; whether it is SALT I, the interim agreements at Vladivos-
tok, SALT II or SALT III— these treaties, these undertakings must
be considered in the real world as it exists. You have to take
account of the real world situation, and the fact of the matter is,
we do live in a hostile world or a world that is at least threatening.
We must, therefore, consider this treaty in the context of recent
Russian foreign policy and world conditions elsewhere.

Some of us for a while referred to that as linkage. I noticed that
in your statement you used the term "linkage," so I was particular-
ly pleased to see that you suggested the committee and the Senate
should consider this treaty in the context of the real world circum-
stances that exist. I recall that when I was in Russia in January, I
had the privilege of meeting with President Brezhnev. I spoke of
linkage. I spoke of Cubans in Africa and Russians in Cuba, and on
the situation worldwide.

I was lectured at some length by President Brezhnev about the
inappropriateness of linkage. He admonished me that the treaty

191

should be considered, as he put it, within the four corners of the
document. You have to read the language. It must stand on its own
merits. He rejected the idea of linkage, the idea that you consider
this treaty in the context of Russian foreign policy or military
adventure.

I was appalled then to find that the Carter administration also
suggested that we must not consider linkage. I have not heard the
administration suggest that lately, but that was its early position. I
think the administration was wrong then, and I think you are
right now. We must take account of it. That permits me to lead
into your specific recommendations, which I would like to discuss
with you.

I take it that the recommendations are made to take into ac-
count the world situation as we find it.

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

Senator Baker. And that you find the world situation to be
threatening or potentially so.

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

Senator Baker. And that we must take certain clearly defined,
easily understood steps in this country to improve the military
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger. Yes; also to make clear that constant pres-
sures on the geopolitical balance are bound to create a crisis situa-
tion threatening the peace of the world, and that we have to move
simultaneously on controlling arms and restraining political con-
duct.

suggested improvements for salt ii

Senator Baker. Dr. Kissinger, I agree with that. As you know, I
supported SALT I, the Vladivostok accords, and I would like to
support this treaty if that is possible in this context.

So, I would like to examine your proposals, but before I do, let
me suggest that I have some concern about whether we can afford
to postpone until SALT III changes in or improvements of SALT II.
I understand that to be the burden of your remarks as well — that
rather than amend this treaty, we ought to resolve that in the next
treaty and we will do certain things in addition to the unilateral
action we can take in the Congress to improve our military
strength.

Secretary Kissinger. I suggested two improvements in the pres-
ent treaty, one with respect to the protocol, the second with respect
to the noncircumvention clause. The issue of heavy missiles, which
has a long history, and which in any event cannot be solved during
the term of this treaty, I would recommend postponing to SALT III,
not because we necessarily want to build a heavy missile, but
because I think we ought now to make it a principle of SALT to
have equivalent positions so that the psychological impact on other
countries is taken into account.

Senator Baker. What about the Backfire bomber? Would you
consider that now in the context of this treaty, or would you
postpone that consideration to a future possible SALT III?

Secretary Kissinger. My recommendation with respect to the
Backfire bomber is to handle it in the follow-on negotiations to the
protocol, that is to say, to bring its limitations into relationship to

192

limitations on cruise missiles or overseas deployed missiles by the
United States and airplanes and to seek equivalence in theater-
based striking forces in that manner.

Senator Baker. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we
can do this. Would you agree with me that if we can obtain some
changes in this treaty, if not by amendment, then at least by
mutual understanding between the United States and the Soviet
Union with respect to heavy missiles, the Backfire bomber, noncir-
cumvention, or verification — if we can do it now, wouldn't it be
better to do it now than to do it later?

Secretary Kissinger. What has to be judged at that point, cer-
tainly, is whether we can achieve it now; one would have to judge
that on the merits of each of these proposals.

My particular proposal on Backfire, the relationship of Backfire
and cruise missiles, would have to begin in the real world to be
implemented almost immediately if we were to negotiate it. If my
proposal were accepted, we would have to begin negotiating it
almost immediately if it were to become effective by the end of
1981.

Senator Baker. So it really is a value judgment, then, on wheth-
er or not we would make a serious effort to amend or change this
treaty, or to reserve on the treaty with a mutual understanding
between our countries, which would be the functional equivalent of
the same thing

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

Senator Baker [continuing]. Or to postpone that until the next
negotiations. You recommend that it is more likely to succeed if we
reserve that for negotiations in SALT III, but only if we go ahead
with the weapons development program now that will help redress
the military imbalance that has occurred in the last few years.

Secretary Kissinger. Absolutely; that is the absolute condition.

Senator Baker. Dr. Kissinger, those are extraordinarily impor-
tant ideas. They are ideas that I would like to consider fully in the
course of the next few days and weeks.

I would like to conclude this round, Mr. Chairman, by expressing
to Dr. Kissinger again my appreciation for a well thought out and
highly important statement of these considerations.

The Chairman. Senator Biden?

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

As usual, your statements are thorough and provocative. I am
not sure that I completely understand what I see to be some of the
inconsistencies, which I would like to explore, if I could.

If your assessment of the relative posture of the U.S. military
capability is correct, and the reasons for this shift relative to the
Soviet Union are correct, then Vietnam did a great deal more
damage to our national security and future than even I thought it
did, and I have been consistently opposed to that policy as a stu-
dent and as a Senator.

In listening to you today discuss predictions of cataclysm, it
seems to me the cataclysmic predictions we hear from witnesses
somehow increase after a political cataclysm has occurred regard-
ing that witness. In other words, the political cataclysm is, you are

193

out of office, and the predictions of cataclysm have seemed to
escalate.

You have said that you would oppose SALT, that is, vote against
it unless the conditions you suggested are met. If you were a
Senator, and I know you have never entertained that thought, but
that is, if you were

[General laughter.]

CONDITIONS FOR RATIFYING SALT II

Senator Biden. Now, the conditions you have stated seem to fall
into two categories. The first concerns a number of clarifying meas-
ures relating to provisions of the treaty: Our intent to carry out
military cooperation with our allies, the noncircumvention clause,
and the termination of the protocol. Quite frankly, I do not find
these a very significant aspect of your testimony.

The reason I say that is, I am already confident that the Senate
is going to adopt all of these. As a matter of fact, on the second day
of the hearing, I for one and many others introduced reservations
or amendments, whatever you would like to call them, that specifi-
cally take that into effect. I think the administration is totally
unrealistic if it thinks there is any prospect of passage of this
treaty without those reservations or a version of them being
adopted.

The second category of concern which you have expressed is your
condition that a special augmented program be launched to im-
prove our strategic arsenal. Now, this is going to be a significant
gesture, symbolic and practical, but I am not sure exactly what you
want.

You mention the B-1 bomber repeatedly, but the B-1 bomber in
any of the military testimony I have heard will not in any way
allay our ICBM vulnerability problem, nor given our ability to put
ALCM's on B-52 and other ALCM carriers, will the B-1 improve
our counterforce capability.

What else do you want? You have indicated the M-X. We are
already moving ahead with the M-X, with the Mark 12 A warhead
for the Minuteman missile, with the cruise missile, and with the
Trident. The fact is, we are moving rapidly to render the Soviet
arsenal in the mid-to-late eighties much more vulnerable to a first
strike than our arsenal would be because ours is more diversified,
if you will. Our Trident is deployed in a way that makes us less
vulnerable by the mid-to-late eighties than the Soviets will be with
70 percent of their force in their land-based ICBM's.

So, I think you would probably be able to vote with confidence
knowing now what I have just told you for the SALT agreement
because I think all of those things that you have spoken of are
clearly in motion. If you talk about this binding commitment with
respect to our defense budget, as you well know, the way the
operation works here, certain things are already in the mix.

First of all, the 1979 supplemental has already been completed.
Second, the Senate has completed action on the 1980 authorization
bill, and it is almost identical to the $135 billion which the admin-
istration requested. The House Armed Services Committee has re-
ported the bill and in the process has added about $2 billion. The
House Appropriations Committee is currently marking up the 1980
defense appropriations, and so on and so on.

194

So, the mechanism by which we would get the binding commit-
ment that has been suggested is well underway, if not completed. It
would be an extraordinary procedure — and I do not understand
how it would work— to be able to do what I think is fair to say we
have already done. We have done all of the things that you suggest
are important. There is one caveat.

I sit on the Budget Committee, and it was the Congress and not
the President which reduced this defense budget. The President
wanted 3 percent real growth. Some may argue that it is 4 or 5.
The President came forward with a 3-percent real-growth request.
The Congress said, no, we are not going to do that, so we can in
fact turn around our own actions, it seems to me.

ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE TREATY BASED ON U.S. SUPERIORITY

Specifically, I am confused by your comments about rough equiv-
alence. I think I will at least paraphrase if not quote you. You said
rough equivalence is a strategy that we should not follow. Now,
how can we have a contractual agreement, if that is what the
SALT agreement is, with a party when ahead of time we say we
want an agreement that will clearly insure that you are inferior to
us, that we are strategically superior, but yet we want you to
agree? Isn't that inconsistent with the concept of SALT which you
so articulately argued and formulated?

CONCERNS ABOUT PROTOCOL EXTENSION

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, first with respect to your view
about the amendments or reservations that I put forward, I do not
consider they are disqualified by the fact that you agree with them,
and have even thought of some of them ahead of time. I have
attempted to phrase the relationship of the protocol's continuation,
I think, in a more specific way than the amendments that I have
seen before the committee which require that the protocol cannot
be extended except by the agreement with the Senate.

I am saying that the protocol in its present form should not be
extended, and that the cruise missile limitations should be ab-
sorbed in a negotiation on theater nuclear balances, which is a
somewhat more precise definition of it.

Senator Biden. That is precisely what the administration has
said publicly, isn't it? Maybe we shouldn't take them at their word,
but the administration publicly has said, that the United States
will not discuss theater systems such as the cruise missile except in
the context of reciprocal theater reductions and will not extend the
protocol except with the concurrence of the Senate and our allies
and in the context of TNF.

Secretary Kissinger. But our allies could again be in the same
position that they are now, where they are confronted with a
negotiation in which, for example, one has traded the cruise mis-
siles for some additional reduction in Soviet strategic forces, and
thereby we magnify the distinction between our allies and our-
selves.

My concern here is not to attempt to demonstrate who has

thought of what first.

Senator Biden. I did not mean to suggest that it was.

Secretary Kissinger. My concern is to indicate what I think is
required. If it is as easy as you suggest, then we will be in better
shape than I think we are.

195

MEANING OF ROUGH EQUIVALENCE

Now, since I see the yellow light, I would like to make a point
about rough equivalence. I did not say we cannot accept rough
equivalence. I am saying the rough equivalence to which the ad-
ministration witnesses referred is a rough equivalence in the capac-
ity of destroying industrial targets and civilian populations. It is
not a rough equivalence in the capacity to destroy military targets.

Senator Biden. Oh, sure, it is. Their ICBM is more vulnerable
with the Mark 12A's coming on in 1983, the cruise missile, the
ALCM, the SLCM, the GLCM's, the whole works, the Soviets are
going to be considerably more vulnerable.

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, pardon me. ALCM is not useful as
a counterforce weapon.

Senator Biden. But it has the capability of hard targeting kill.

Secretary Kissinger. Well, it has the theoretical capability, but
it takes 12 hours to get there.

Senator Biden. The Mark 12A doesn't, and that can knock them
out right now.

Secreatry Kissinger. There will be, at best, 1,500 of those on the
500 Minutemen, which makes it about one for each Soviet missile,
which most people will tell you is not adequate.

Senator Biden. 820.

Secretary Kissinger. But you also have to count the single war-
head missiles. There are 820 MIRVed missiles, but 1,460 is the total
number of land-based missiles.

All I am saying is, rough equivalence is calculated by the doc-
trine of assured destruction, which in turn is based on the destruc-
tion of civilian populations, and that, I think, is a strategy that
should not be pursued. And when both sides have reached that
point, then I think they should not execute that strategy but
should rely on other balances; namely, theater and conventional
balances.

It is that which I meant, and not that we must be superior and
they must be inferior as a result of SALT. No negotiator can
negotiate one into a position of superiority that is not voluntarily
accepted by the other side.

Senator Biden. Thank you. Dr. Kissinger. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Helms?

Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I welcome you to the committee and thank you for
your testimony. It is very scholarly, and is very thoughtfully done.

I want to read it again, because my first impression of it is such
that it reminds me of the man who was struggling to find some-
thing nice to sav about the next door neighbor, and he said for a
fat lady she don t sweat much. [General laughter.]

SALT II SENT BACK FOR MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS

Senator Helms. I believe that is your impression of the SALT II
Treaty. You are exactly right about noncircumvention. I was in
London earlier this month, and they are exceedingly concerned. If
we do not do anything else right, we had certainly better spell out
what we mean about this.

I also appreciate your comments about rough equivalency. I hope
the American people will understand exactly what you are saying.

196

Now, you indicated that what we need to do is to build strategic
equality to prevent the absolutely unacceptable condition in the
1980's wherein our land-based missiles are in jeopardy. It appears
that there is another way, and that is to have a treaty where
meaningful reductions are made, where neither side can put the
other's strategic forces in jeopardy.

Of course, if this is done, this Nation could avoid the massive
outlay of funds that will be required to build the strategic equality
about which we talk.

Mr. Secretary, my question is this. Do you feel really that there
would be any significant loss to our security if the Senate sent this
treaty back and asked forcefully for meaningful reductions? What
would be the hazards of rejecting this treaty and saying to the
world that we must start reducing nuclear capability and stop the
arms race?

Secretary Kissinger. First, on the strategic side, there are two
dangers. One is the danger to our land-based missiles. I do not
believe that the Soviets will exercise that capability against our
land-based missiles, except that it will give them greater confidence
in the handling of regional crises, some sought by them, some
developing out of revolutionary situations.

So, even if a strategic equivalence were achieved, we would still
have the serious problem of how to remedy the various regional
balances around the world that have arisen.

Second, I believe that under current circumstances it will not be
possible to negotiate reductions unless we are seen to be building.
The danger that I see in the course you propose is that it will lead
to a protracted negotiation during which current SALT limits will
be observed, and at the end of which, if it fails, we will be right
back to where we are today, under perhaps even more adverse
circumstances.

UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. ECONOMIES STRAIN UNDER MASSIVE

MIUTARY BUILDUP

Senator Helms. The economies of both the United States and the
Soviet Union are in rather desperate circumstances in terms of
inflation and other aspects of a weakened economy. Is that not
correct? Neither side. Dr. Kissinger, really can afford in the
normal set of circumstances a great thrust in arms building.

Is that not essentially correct?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I think we can afford it better than
they can.

Senator Helms. True. This would make more valid our saying to
the world that this Nation is ready to start arms reduction. Now,
you were quite effective in explaining to the world various matters
of foreign policy. Is this not the time, Mr. Secretary, for the United
States to take the lead and say, let's stop this insanity and we will
go first, hand in hand with the Soviet Union? How could we lose on
a proposition like that?

Secretary Kissinger. Because I think as a practical matter it
would be impossible to explain to the American people that we are
turning this down in order to get arms reduction, while at the
same time— what would be our military program that goes with it,
if I might £isk?

197

Senator Helms. Oh, I would have the same condition that you
stated so eloquently in your statement. There are all sorts of ways
to send that signal, as you know.

Secretary Kissinger, Under the military conditions that I have
outlined, I believe we can negotiate arms reductions under SALT II
conditions. I certainly agree that the Senate should attach the
strongest recommendation to the administration that the purpose
of SALT should be reduction.

Now, the question that you and I are discussing is whether that
is best accomplished by sending SALT II back or whether it is best
accomplished by ratifying SALT II with the various conditions
attached and then insisting that the preeminent objective of SALT
III must be that the reductions to military programs that we are
recommending would be, as I understand it, substantially identical.

Under those conditions, I would lean toward ratification.

Senator Helms. With those conditions?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes, with my conditions. I have already
indicated that I would not lean toward it in the absence of a major
defense program by the United States plus all of the clarifying
amendments that I have proposed.

Senator Helms. But without your conditions, you hold your posi-
tion stated earlier this morning of no ratification?

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

Senator Helms. Mr. Secretary, again, I commend you for your
statement, and I want to thank you publicly for your great helpful-
ness in connection with the Rhodesian problem. You have been
immensely helpful. I know it took courage for you to take some of
the positions that you have taken, and I want to thank you for
that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Glenn?

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEED for military BUILDUP STRESSED

Mr. Secretary, these buildups that you have talked about that
the Soviets are making have been going on for a very long time.
They did not just occur in the last 2V2 years since you have been
out of office. Why were you not stressing the need for these build-
ups as strenuously prior to your departure from office as you are
today? What has changed in this interim period?

Secretary Kissinger. I think when the internal records of the
administrations in which I served become public, as seems to be
the destiny of all classified documents these days

[General laughter.]

Senator Glenn. Intentionally or unintentionally, too.

Secretary Kissinger [continuing]. It will be clear that I consist-
ently from 1969 on warned against the danger that would arise for
the United States under the doctrine of assured destruction and
under the doctrine in which strategic equivalence is defined by the
relative capability of destroying civilian populations and industrial
targets.

We suffered severe inhibitions partly as a result of the military
program we inherited, partly as the result of the divisions caused

198

by the Vietnam war in which our military budget proposals were
slashed by some $35 billion over a 4-year period. So, I believe that
it is fair to say that my theoretical position at least was consistent.

Now, in addition, I have been profoundly disturbed by the Soviet
geopolitical offensive as it has developed since 1975, in other words,
preceding the current administration. I was hoping in 1972 that
when we coupled SALT I with a declaration of principles of con-
duct, both of these documents might serve as a charter for the next
period, and lead to a slowing down of the arms buildup on both
sides and above all, lead to restrained conduct in international
affairs.

As late as 1974, at Vladivostok, our intelligence estimates were
that the Soviets would not develop a counterforce capability
against the United States until about 1985, 1986. That turned out
to be overoptimistic. But starting in 1975, we have been confronted
with a more rapid pace of Soviet technology, a major geopolitical
offensive by the Soviet Union, plus the abandonment of some of the
programs that were going on, plus the maturing of trends that
preceded this administration, that took a long time to reach their
present state.

So, it would be wrong to blame any one administration.

SOVIETS' CONTINUED BUILDING OF STRATEGIC FORCES

Senator Glenn. You previously expressed yourself, I believe, that
you felt there was a limit above which it did not pay to build more
strategic nuclear weapons, and felt that the Soviets probably would
limit themselves to such a self-imposed limitation also, I suppose,
just on cost-effectiveness. When did it become clear to you that at
least the Soviets did not share this theory and they would keep
right on building their strategic forces?

Was there any one incident or any one time that led you to see a
change in their view?

Secretary Kissinger. Until 1974, they really did not have any
MIRV's. When they continued to push the development of the SS-
17's, 18's, and 19's, and kept working on the accuracy of their
missiles and on the throw weight, and when they pushed against at
least the spirit of what we had in mind in the 1972 agreement with
respect to the conversion of "light" to "heavy" missiles, one really
could interpret that only in terms of an intention to achieve a
counterforce capability against the United States. I think this
began to dawn on me in 1975.

TREATY BASED ON LAUNCHERS RATHER THAN DELIVERABLE WARHEADS

Senator Glenn. Why did we make the treaty based on launchers
rather than on deliverable nuclear warheads?

Secretary Kissinger. Because when SALT I was negotiated, we
were dealing initially with single warhead systems.

Senator Glenn. But we had MIRV's under development and
knew that they did, too, at that time.

Secretary Kissinger. That is right. I suppose that this is one of
the legacies of a period in which technology outran us.

Senator Glenn. You mentioned in your statement a changed
direction a little bit. Let me say that I hope in any future SALT —

199

SALT III, IV, V, or VI— that they do deal specifically with deliver-
able nuclear warheads. What we are faced with now is a rather
preposterous situation that under a strategic arms limitation
treaty we would be permitted to build 50 percent beyond what we
have now theoretically; they can triple their strength and still be
within the treaty, so it does become a little incongruous here that
we are calling this strategic arms limitation, and that is all it is. It
is finally putting a cap where there was no cap before, but it is
tremendously above anything that we had hoped for.

Secretary Kissinger. I think deliverable warheads is a much
better criterion than launchers.

Senator Glenn. Yes. You mentioned that the administration had
perhaps pressured our allies some. That portion of your statement,
as I read it, inferred that perhaps our allies really did not want
this treaty as much as we had been led to believe and that their
public statements had indicated. Would you follow up on that?

Secretary Kissinger. I think our allies are extremely ambivalent
about the treaty. They do not want the treaty to fail.

Senator Glenn. Now, their leadership's statements have not
been particularly ambivalent.

ALLIES are ambivalent ABOUT TREATY

Secretary Kissinger. I can only give you my impression, which
may be incorrect, and my impression is that there is considerable
ambivalence, that they do not want the treaty to fail. It would
create a real crisis of confidence if the treaty failed. I completely
agree with that statement. On the other hand, they are also deeply
worried about the military balance. They are putting these two
things into two different baskets, and it is quite possible that a
year from now they will blame us for conditions of the military
balance even when we have carried out their recommendations
with respect to the treaty.

All I am suggesting is that the relationship with our allies is
more complicated. But without doubt, nonratification of the treaty
would have a negative impact on our allies. And I am proposing a
means by which we can avoid both the negative impact of an
unfavorable military balance and the unfavorable impact of non-
ratification.

SOVIETS TO abide BY SALT IF WE CAN MONITOR

Senator Glenn. I know we are putting a tremendous effort these
days into recouping, getting back some of the information sources
regarding monitoring, has caused much of the verification problem.
You mentioned that just in a couple of sentences in your statement
but then you put more emphasis on it by following up and saying
that every 2 years the Senate should reassess whether they are
complying with the treaty or not and revote on it again, which
would be a very drastic change in how we have ever operated
under any treaty before.

Evidently, you do not trust them very much to live up to this
unless we can monitor it, and I hope with some of the develop-
ments going on now we can monitor this also. Would you care to
elaborate on that?

Secretary Kissinger. There are two separate things. I think the
Senate ought to view at regular intervals, as the Intelligence Com-
mittee would do anyway, the verification problem with respect to

200

SALT. I, myself, am not an expert on the verification issue, and
while I have had a briefing on it, I really do not feel confident to
pass a judgment.

I think the judgment should be made by the Intelligence Com-
mittee and by what other committees review our verification capa-
bilities. What I would like the Senate to review every 2 years are
the principles of international conduct which I think need to be
spelled out, and which would be an attempt to go back to what we
agreed to in 1972, to make sure that political restraint and military
restraint go hand in hand.

CONCENTRATING ON MILITARY TARGETS RATHER THAN POPULATION

CENTERS

Senator Glenn. I see that my time is almost up, but I would like
to comment on your view regarding concentrating on niilitary tar-
gets and keeping away from population centers. War is not very
pleasant, as everybody knows. When you go to the Soviet Union
these days, the first thing they tell you when you get there, and
you still hear it when you leave in speech after speech after
speech, is how they lost 20 million people in World War II.

They talk about the buffer states and the Eastern European
states, and a lot of their policy regarding Europe apparently stems
from their paranoia about never having a Napoleon or Hitler come
into the Soviet Union. I think they are most concerned about that.
I would submit that our possible inaccuracies, as you described
them, with our submarine weapons, with the SLBM's and all, is
not a disadvantage. I think if the Soviets know that if they are so
stupid as to make any attack on this country, that they can fully
expect to lose not 20 million people but perhaps 150 million people
or more out of their population, that may be our biggest deterrent
to them ever making such a crazy move.

Secretary Kissinger. My concern is also for an attack on the
United States. But I do not believe they would attack the territory
of the United States without feeling that they are running an
unacceptable risk. My concern is the gradual undermining of secu-
rity on a global basis. I would hate to see the American President
in a position where he has to decide to initiate what amounts to
the mutual mass extermination of civilians as the only means of
protecting overseas commitments of the United States. That is my
concern. .

Senator Glenn. I would agree with that, but I thmk the Soviets
should be well advised by any U.S. President that if they are crazy
enough to take the Nitze scenario and make the first strike on this
country, that the retaliation is going to be mammouth and horren-
dous and across the board on the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger. That is clear, but a first strike against the
United States I would put very low in the category of dangers,
except insofar as the consciousness of the capability gives them
greater confidence in the management of local crises.

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hayakawa?

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

201

Dr. Kissinger, let me thank you, first of all, for your presenta-
tion. I always enjoy the texture of your thought, the stately proces-
sion of your sentences and paragraphs, and the way it all weaves
together, its logic. I must say, I enjoy it very much.

NO AMENDMENTS OR CHANGES IN SALT TREATY

Let me start out by asking a broad and elementary kind of
question. Why is it that the Soviets and our President are so united
in insisting that there can be no amendments or changes in the
SALT Treaty? I must say I am puzzled by this either or proposition
that says, in effect, that we either ratify this treaty as written and
thereby proceed toward SALT III and peace, or reject it at the risk
of incresised hostilities and war.

Are these indeed the only alternatives before us?

Secretary Kissinger. Of course, any group of national leaders
who have negotiated over an extended period of time, and who
know all the agonies through which they went to achieve the
balance of compromises which constitutes any major document, are
going to be massively reluctant to alter it.

Obviously, they believe, or they would not have signed it, that
this balance of compromises represents the best that is attainable,
and indeed I found myself in that position. Second, I suppose it also
involves a question of prestige, whether once one has gone through
this whole question of negotiation, it should be reopened.

On the other hand, I have indicated certain areas which do not
require renegotiation but which do require some changes unilater-
ally on our side, which I believe are necessary.

SKEPTICISM OF EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATY NEGOTIATORS

Senator Hayakawa. Well, Foy Kohler, who is the former Ambas-
sador to the U.S.S.R., has been very critical of the negotiating
process. He says that Americans tend to look in negotiations for a
common ground, whereas the Soviet negotiator is not interested in
a common ground, but simply in getting his way, and he gives
away only as much as is necessary, so that we approach negotia-
tion with different assumptions, different ideas in our heads, and
General Rowny has also testified as to his skepticism about the
effectiveness of American negotiators in this treaty.

Do you have reason from your past diplomatic experience, Dr.
Kissinger, to have similar doubts?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I think that American negotiators
tend to come from an environment in which there are no
irreconcilable differences domestically, and therefore they find it
very difficult as a national phenomenon to deal with dedicated
revolutionaries who prefer success to compromise. American nego-
tiators have a tendency to believe that they have an obligation to
break every deadlock with a new idea. This has the strange conse-
quence of putting a premium on intransigence, because it tempts
the other side to wait to see what our impatience will produce in
the way of new ideas as the negotiation continues.

Our negotiators have a tendency to believe that if two parties
disagree, the truth is found somewhere in the middle, which has
the paradoxical consequence of really rewarding extreme positions

202

in order to make the compromise proposal come as close to the
middle position. All of this one can say really is a national charac-
teristic, which one could trace through negotiations over an ex-
tended period of time. I would say that the major Soviet negotiat-
ing asset in my experience is not diabolical cleverness, which is
often presented, but persistence. They adopt an idea and they keep
sticking to it, and they are not embarrassed to repeat it year after
year after year, until we just get tired of it, and we are told, at
home: "Come on, now, change your position a little bit," and then
we are on the road that you have described.

UNKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL CONDUCT

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much.

With Senator Baker, I am very grateful to you for bringing up
this whole linkage question. As you point out in your statement,
the Cubans have been romping all over Angola, Ethiopia, and
around Africa. They have gone into Afghanistan, South Yemen,
and so on, and you enumerate numerous instances of the continu-
ation of the cold war.

You say that recent political conduct of the Soviet Union and its
allies, whether cold war or opportunism, must be ended if there are
to be any prospects for East-West coexistence or cooperation. I
would like to ask you. Dr. Kissinger, how can we put muscle into
that demand if such conduct must be ended?

In your statement, you propose a vigorous expression regarding
linkage, a vigorous expression of the sense of linkage between
SALT and the Soviet geopolitical conduct. What do you mean then
by vigorous expression? How vigorous can it really be to guarantee
any kind of Soviet compliance?

Secretary Kissinger. You cannot be vigorous in guaranteeing
Soviet compliance but you can be vigorous in expressing your view
as to what constitutes acceptable conduct and assessing sonie pen-
alties for noncompliance. Who would have thought it possible 10
years ago that in policy discussions it would be said that we must
do this or that in Africa lest Cuban troops intervene? Whatever
other arguments might have been used. The idea that a small
Caribbean country would send expeditionary forces all over the
world, supplied, trained, equipped, and financed by the Soviet
Union, that Soviet airplanes are in Cuba flying air defense mis-
sions so that Cuban airplanes can be in Africa, not to speak of East
German military and police instructors all over the Middle East
and Africa, is a disturbance and a challenge to any sense of inter-
national conduct and any concept of detente. And it cannot be even
in the long-term Soviet interest that this be continued, because
sooner or later somebody is going to resist, and then the danger of
a confrontation is increased.

This is what I mean by linkage. Linkage is not an invention of a
particular administration, of a particular individual. It either re-
flects reality or it does not. I do not see how we can speak only of
restraint in arms and not about restraint in international conduct.
Soviet conduct has been in my view, at least since 1975, unaccepta-
ble. Every war since 1971 has been started by Soviet arms, encour-
aged by Soviet friendship treaties, protected by Soviet vetoes, or

203

been fought by Soviet proxies. Some end must be put to this
process.

Senator Hayakawa. So at the same time, as Senator Baker said,
we are asked by Brezhnev to look at the treaty around the four
corners of the piece of paper on which it is written and to think of
nothing else. Dr. Kissinger, this seems to me to require of us a
level of schizophrenia of which I am hardly capable, to think of the
Soviets in one respect totally independently of thinking of the
Soviets in the other respect.

Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much.
I Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hayakawa.

TENDENCIES OF U.S. NEGOTIATORS TO MOVE TO MIDDLE GROUND

Dr. Kissinger, I was fascinated with your analysis of the national
character and the tendency of our negotiators to exhibit impatience
and to move toward the middle ground. Were these tendencies
which afflicted our negotiations with the Soviet Union while you
were presiding over them?

Secretary Kissinger. I think it is fair to say that the pressures
on any Secretary of State in that direction are very great, and the
temptations of any Secretary of State in that direction must always
be guarded against. This is the conventional advice one tends to
receive. And it does not reflect the worst qualities in the American
character, either. I tried to guard against them, but I would not
exclude that I, too, felt subject to them from time to time.

The Chairman. And you feel every Secretary of State is con-
' fronted with that problem?

Secretary Kissinger. I think it is a national characteristic.

The Chairman. Senator Stone?

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

major soviet geopolitical offensive since 1975

Dr. Kissinger, in these hearings the issue of the Soviets' refusal
to consider reductions in this SALT II process has been raised. It
looks unyielding. The issue of our own increase in arms strength in
order to reduce our vulnerability and redress the balance has been
raised, and the issue of verification has been raised here by Sena-
tor Glenn and others.

As for me, I have pursued one of the thrusts of your main
testimony here today. That has to do with Soviet conduct in the
world and our response to it. What good is verification if we find
the Soviets pushing, probing, and going over the line and we do
little, if anything, about it? What good is having valid military
offsetting strength if they push and we yield?

I want to discuss this in general, and then I want to discuss this
in particular with regard to the Soviets in Cuba and the Cuban
situation, particularly in the light of the negotiation you had in
1970 regarding the submarine servicing.

In general, you have described today that since 1975, you have
seen the Soviets conduct a major geopolitical offensive, mainly
through Soviet weapons and proxies in regional theaters, and to a
very great extent through the use of Cuban forces as those proxies.

204

You stated in your presentation that no democracy can court con-
flict, and I could not agree with you more. Then you said that all of
the conflicts and issues that have been thrust upon the world in
recent years have been at the initiative of the Soviets in connection
with this geopolitical offensive. What response is practical to that
kind of a major geopolitical offensive, apart from or in addition to
our redressing the military balance by our own increase in invest-
ments?

Secretary Kissinger. Without an adequate military balance
there is no possibility of doing anything. Second, the use of proxy
forces must be made too costly, both to the proxies and to the
instigator, by attaching clear penalties to such conduct and increas-
ing the risks for the proxy in the area where he is operating. It is
very hard to make abstract statements, but I fmd the proposition
hard to accept that Cuban forces should be invincible.

Senator Stone. If they are not opposed, then they are invincible.

Secretary Kissinger. If they are not opposed, but if they are
opposed, you cannot require a huge amount of opposition to resist
them.

SOVIET CONSTRUCTION OF NAVAL BASE IN CUBA

Senator Stone. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the Soviet presence in
Cuba, in a letter to me released publicly Friday by the Secretary of
State, he describes an agreement entered into in communications
between the two governments in the fall of 1970 concerning the
establishment of Soviet naval bases in Cuba, and then says: "We
have no evidence that the Soviets are in violation of this under-
standing."

Does that exchange of communications establish a commitment
by the Soviet Union that the Soviets will not construct a naval
base in Cuba sufficient to service Soviet submarines or only Soviet
nuclear powered submarines, or only Soviet submarines carrying
nuclear missiles.

Secretary Kissinger. I do not have the text of the documents in
front of me, so it is very difficult for me to answer what a textual
analysis would show. The concern which we felt in 1970 was that
the Soviets were developing a capability from which to service
submarines carrying nuclear missiles in Cienfuegos. Those subma-
rines as a practical matter happened to be all nuclear powered,
with a few exceptions. But what concerned us was the capability of
nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and the understanding which
we sought and in my belief achieved was the prevention of servic-
ing submarines carrying nuclear missiles.

What the exact phraseology is, I do not know. I just do not have
the text before me.

Senator Stone. Mr. Secretary, would an occasional port call of a
Soviet submarine which is carrying nuclear missiles violate that
understanding?

Secretary Kissinger. As in every agreement with the Soviet
Union, as soon as you make it, you find that it is constantly being
tested. That understanding or exchange was reached in the fall of
1970. From the fall of 1970, then, until about May 1971 the Soviets
tried just about every combination that the human mind can imag-

205

ine except the crucial combination of a submarine tender and a
nuclear missile-carrying submarine.

We violently protested every encroachment on the understanding
even when there was no such combination. The concern was that
the submarine tenders would service the missile-carrying subma-
rines. And they would try out various combinations. We protested
strongly the individual arrival of these ships even when not in
combination, and then, to the best of my recollection, after May
1971 there was no further attempt to test the limits of that under-
standing during the term of my incumbency. I do not remember
that we had any other occasion to protest it, but I don't have all
the evidence in front of me. That is my recollection of it.

Senator Stone. I understand. I will read now again from Secre-
tary Vance's letter to me of Friday. The essential understanding is
that "the Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons could not
again be introduced into Cuba? In 1970, it was made clear that this
understanding included sea-based systems." Would you agree with
that?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes.

Senator Stone. Therefore, does it make any difference if a Soviet
submarine carrying nuclear missiles claims that it is on port call
and stays for several weeks or claims that it is not being serviced
and stays for several months?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, we had a tendency to protest such
actions as maybe within the verbal limits of the understanding but
against its spirit. But I have no independent knowledge whether
this is taking place.

Secretary Stone. Dr. Kissinger, is there an increasing risk of
Cuban export of revolution to Central America and countries out-
side of it, in addition to Nicaragua, and does that pose a security
threat to the United States and its allies and friends?

Secretary Kissinger. I am not sure that Nicaragua should be
conceived as a direct export of the Cuban

Secretary Stone. No; outside of Nicaragua. I do not mean from
Nicaragua.

Secretary Kissinger. I think there is a danger that as the radical
elements in Central America gain ascendency, they will tend to
look toward Cuba for training, political leadership, military leader-
ship, and that in this sense the combination of certain events in
the Caribbean, events in Nicaragua, raise disturbing prospects for
the stability of Central America and indeed the northern rim of
Latin America.

Senator Stone. Thank you. Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Certainly, Senator Stone.

Senator Lugar, please.

Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR MILITARY
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Dr. Kissinger, earlier in the conversation this morning, you took
issue with what we have been doing in our own ball park, and said
an obligatory commitment was required that would make certain
we proceeded with our needed defense plans and modernization.

206

Senator Javits in the questioning picked that up and asked, why
should we have a debate among ourselves or with ourselves on this
situation? You have pointed out we could have been doing these
things all along, and your comment does imply a degree of mistrust
or unease about our will really to proceed in doing so.

Now, in addition to that, we have had questions this morning
that tended to ratify that sense of unease. My colleagues Senator
Pell and Senator McGovern, as I understood them, pointed out that
the price that you were suggesting was too high, and you protested
it was not a price, that this was a policy, things that we ought to be
doing. They are interpreting it as a price, suggesting, as I recall
Senator Pell's comments, that we might have 20-percent inflation
as a price to pay for this treaty, for example, or further energy
crisis in the country.

Is it not a fact that as you witness this hearing, as you take a
look at debate in America today, that there is in fact a real debate
in this committee, there is a certain lack of trust, really, within our
group as to whether we would proceed with the defense moderniza-
tion if we had a quick signing or ratification of the SALT Treaty,
and is it not a fact that right here in the hearing or in the
ratification process we must determine what our political will will
be?

In essence, what is your perception right now as to the likelihood
that the administration, or as Senator Biden has pointed out, even
if the administration suggests the 3-percent increase, that the Con-
gress would proceed with the modernization you have suggested, if
this is not battened down before the SALT is ratified?

Secretary Kissinger. I believe that if present strategic conditions
continue, the United States faces a very grave danger in the 1980's.
The problem in many parts of the world, including, for example,
the Middle East, is doubt on the part of those who have heretofore
relied on us in our ability to protect them against the dangers that
they are facing. Since many of their energy decisions really are a
price they pay for their protection, for example, in countries like
Saudi Arabia, there is a greater danger of an energy crisis as a
result of perceived American impotence than as a result of building
up our strength.

My suggestions arise from my conviction that we must move to
remedy these dangers, however they arose, as rapidly as possible,
and that we must give a clear signal to the world as rapidly as
possible, and that this provides the opportunity to do it.

I fear if we do not do it in conjunction with this treaty, this
opportunity will be lost.

Senator Lugar. Dr. Kissinger, I agree with your analysis, but the
fact of life as I perceive this debate is that many people do not. In
other words, you are presenting a clear warning to the country but
if your analysis were unanimously agreed to by this committee, by
the Senate, by the President of the United States, indeed, by the
country, people would already be moving.

The point I am trying to raise in this question is that I perceive a
lot of people do not believe you. They are saying your analysis is
very interesting, but all things considered, let's get on and ratify
this treaty, and do a little better if we can with SALT III and let's
modernize here and there as we are doing. In fact, the sequence

207

you are suggesting is radically different, and in fact, if I heard you
correctly, you are saying that you have such a mistrust really of
where we are headed right now that those of us who are seriously
concerned as you are had better get this thing signed and signed
among ourselves. In return for our support we are going to have
modernization, that that is the quid pro quo for willy-nilly going on
with the treaty, which might otherwise be almost irrelevant. Is
that not so?

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct. First of all, I am not talk-
ing about modernization of strategic forces. I am talking really
about a combination of strategic doctrine and an overall strength-
ening of our military forces beyond those that are covered by the
SALT Treaty.

Senator Lugar. Could you describe that a little more explicitly?

Secretary Kissinger. As I have already pointed out, I believe
that even if we fix some of the imbalances that now exist in the
strategic equation, this will still not restore the situation as it
existed in the 1950's and 1960's, because the numbers of strategic
weapons that have grown on both sides are so large that the risk of
regional conflict, and of the sort of pressure that we have been
witnessing in the last few years, is bound to multiply over the next
few years, and may in not too long a time even reach traditional
allies in Europe. Therefore, we must be prepared to deal with the
theater balances side by side with the strategic balance.

If I am right and we do not do anything, we are running a grave
risk to our national security. If I am wrong, I do not think that we
are running anything like that risk in following my course.

Senator Lugar. Are you suggesting now that in this 5-year plan
the administration might present to the Senate in the next month
or in the next 2 months that these theater weapons, the theater
buildup, the overall aspect of defense could be presented in a
comprehensive form so that we had in essence a debate and an
agreement that this is our 5-year plan before we get on to the
ratification of SALT?

Secretary Kissinger. I believe that the administration is in any
event already working on a 5-year program. Secretary Vance yes-
terday indicated that he wants a 3-percent increase. The difficulty
with the previous formula, the 3-percent increase, has been that
there has been no agreement as to the baseline. There has been no
agreement as to how you compute inflation rates. There has been
dispute about the allowances you make for productivity and so
forth. So in fact it has amounted to less than a 1-percent increase,
and in some categories even, a reduction of forces.

So, I think it ought to be possible for the administration to put
before the Senate in a conceptual way what it is attempting to do
in the world strategically, what kind of forces it thinks it needs,
and to translate those into a 5-year program.

In that way, one would understand what the 3 percent means, or
whether it should be 4 percent or 2,5 percent. This I am in no
position to judge. But major shortcomings now exist which will
produce a serious danger in the eighties, and have already pro-
duced enormous instabilities.

The fact that every nation, every ally is acting like an ostrich
and attempting to avoid the problem only will make the eventual

208

crisis that much more serious when it hits us. This is the obligation
of the Senate, I believe. This is the urgency, and not just the
personal distrust of members of this committee for each other.

Senator Lugar. Isn't it a fact, however, that the President is
going to have very considerable political problems with this? For
example, Ambassador Young to the United Nations suggested that
the increased spending is just not in the cards as he sees it, given
the domestic difficulties and promises of the President. The Presi-
dent is coming into a 1980 campaign, thinking about all the types
of spending.

Does this not make it all the more critical, given their political
problems, problems even within that particular party, that things
be buttoned down with regard to the 5-year plan this year? If I can
ask your advice in terms of negotiations, would it not be wise of
some of us who are pursuing the course you have suggested to be
patient, to be persistent, to say in essence that SALT does not have
to occur next month or the month after or even 3 months from
now, but that certain things must occur before two-thirds of the
Senate will ratify this treaty?

Secretary Kissinger. As I have already indicated, I would insist
on a statement by the administration both conceptually and in
detail of how it perceives the defense needs of the United States.
The debate between the President and Ambassador Young can only
be resolved in terms of what do we actually need. What is our
defense plan? If we have certain requirements, then Ambassador
Young's considerations have to be subordinated. If these require-
ments are excessive, then of course nobody wants to spend exces-
sively for defense.

It is for this reason that I support those who have insisted on
seeing the 5-year plan and some translation of it into concrete
terms before ratification proceeds.

Senator Lugar. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Lugar.

Senator Sarbanes is next.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

IS treaty in U.S. interests

If the clarifications that you referred to in your statement are
included, do you consider the treaty in our interests?

Secretary Kissinger. If it is coupled with the military program
that I have indicated.

Senator Sarbanes. I am not asking whether we should ratify it. I
want to know whether the treaty, coupled with those clarifications,
is in our interests.

Secretary Kissinger. The thrust of my statement is that you
cannot separate the treaty from the strategic environment, and
therefore I would suggest that both are required, that we change
the strategic environment. And in that context I would think the
treaty would be in our interest.

Senator Sarbanes. We could change our strategic environment
without approving the treaty.

Secretary Kissinger. That is also true.

Senator Sarbanes. Is the treaty alone in our interests, with the
clarifications?

209

Secretary Kissinger. The treaty alone with the clarifications I
would be very uneasy about, if it were not also coupled with a
change in the strategic balance.

Senator Sarbanes. I understand that, but I want to know wheth-
er you see the treaty itself with the clarifications as being disad-
vantageous to us. You discussed that in your statement.

Secretary Kissinger. I have made it very clear in my statement
that I agree with Senator Nunn and others who have indicated
that they want to see the 5-year program before they can make a
final judgment on the treaty. I am in the same position. I have
indicated that with the appropriate strategic program and with the
particular clarifications that I have indicated, I would support the
treaty. I think that makes my position clear. I cannot separate it.

Senator Sarbanes. In your statement you discuss some of the
beneficial aspects of the SALT II agreement. Then you state that
"a good case can be made for the proposition that in the absence of
a treaty, the relative numbers would be even worse."

Secretary Kissinger. Yes.

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY TREATY

Senator Sarbanes. Now, does the treaty impose limitations that
are beneficial to us or does it impose limitations that you see as
being harmful to us?

Secretary Kissinger. I think if the treaty is perceived as ratify-
ing the existing strategic environment, then I believe it would have
a harmful effect. I believe if the treaty as it now stands, with the
clarifications that I have recommended, if we were placed into a
different strategic environment— then I would support it. I think,
as I have pointed out in my statement, these achievements of the
treaty are essentially irrelevant to the danger we face, and there-
fore do not alter the need for changing the strategic environment.
They do not change the threat to our strategic forces. They do not
change the threat to the regional balances. Probably no negotiation
can achieve what unilateral efforts have not created the predicate
for.

WOULD KISSINGER HAVE SIGNED SALT II

Senator Sarbanes. Would you have closed on this treaty? Would
you have signed off on it?

Secretary Kissinger. This is a very difficult question to answer. I
have continuously expressed my reservations about the protocol,
for example, in all of my discussions with administration officials,
who, incidentally, kept me generally briefed about the discussions.
I am not here to criticize the signing of the treaty. I am addressing
the question of the context in which ratification should take place.

Senator Sarbanes. I understand that, but assuming those clarifi-
cations you mentioned had been negotiated, would you have signed
the treaty and presented it to the Senate for our consideration?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, you see, in any administration in
which I served, I would have opposed the unilateral changes in our
defense program that took place since 1976, and therefore I would
expect that the treaty would have come up under conditions of the
military environment different from the ones that now exist. So it
is very hard for me to answer the question in the abstract of what I
would have done if I would have signed this. I am not objecting to
the signing of it.

210

Senator Sarbanes. Would you have signed it under the circum-
stances?

Secretary Kissinger. If I had been in office and had had an
influence over the military program, we would have had a different
military program, and with that different military program

Senator Sarbanes. I understand that hypothetical. If you had
had the clarifications that deal with the protocol and the noncir-
cumvention provision, would you have now signed the treaty and
presented it to the Senate?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes, probably, but probably I would have
then simultaneously asked for the changes in the military environ-
ment as an administration request. I think we have a real problem
that is incumbent upon us.

STRATEGIC CHANGES OVER LAST SEVERAL YEARS

Senator Sarbanes. I understand that. I am not dealing with that
issue at the moment. What I want to try to understand is whether
you perceive weaknesses in the terms of the treaty itself that make
those terms in and of themselves harmful to our interests.

Secretary Kissinger. I think the treaty has to be seen in the
context of the Soviet geopolitical offensive that has taken place,
and of the military crisis that we are facing. I am attempting to
deal with all three issues simultaneously. It is therefore impossible
for me to separate these issues.

Senator Sarbanes. At the time of signing of SALT I, should
there have been this agreed statement on our force status that you
are asserting we should have now?

Secretary Kissinger. At the time of the signing of SALT I, there
was a totally different situation. First, at that time, we still had a
considerable strategic superiority. Second, there had not been the
massive geopolitical assault about which I am talking. Third, I
would have welcomed at that time such an agreed statement — our
difficulty then was to get any defense appropriations out of the
Congress — but I would have welcomed that.

Indeed, we committed ourselves unilaterally to do certain things,
accelerating certain programs as part of SALT I, which we then
had great difficulty funding in subsequent years.

Senator Sarbanes. In 1976, if you had worked out the cruise
missile Backfire questions, would you have gone ahead to sign the
treaty if you had not had the problems of an election year and a
partisan issue?

Secretary Kissinger. In 1976, I was in favor of the formula that
we were negotiating in January which linked ship-launched cruise
missiles to the Backfire, left ground-launched cruise missiles un-
constrained, and therefore went beyond what I am proposing here
as a solution. At that time, we still had the B-1, the M-X, and the
Trident I and Trident II on a much more accelerated schedule.
Under all of those circumstances, I would have proceeded.

Senator Sarbanes. Despite the Soviet adventurism in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, it was a very marginal case. I began
to feel very dubious in January 1976 about whether I should go
into that negotiation. I went. It might have been a mistake to have
gone. This was the first Soviet adventure of this kind. Since that
time, we have had Ethiopia, Zaire, Afghanistan, South Yemen,
Cambodia, and a whole collection of these moves.

So, we now face a much graver situation than we did then.

211

Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Secretary, I just want to go back to my
opening question. I do not think you can totally intertwine the
question of the merits of the treaty with these other two consider-
ations you have raised and I will just underscore this by leaving
you with this thought before we all go to vote. Suppose the Soviets
foreswore adventurism, and suppose we carried out the military
program you are suggesting. You still might vote against the
treaty

Secretary Kissinger. No.

Senator Sarbanes [continuing.] Whose terms were not accept-
able?

Secretary Kissinger. Oh, yes.

Senator Sarbanes. Therefore you would have to make a judg-
ment about the terms of the treaty.

Secretary Kissinger. But my whole point, Senator, is, the terms
of the treaty cannot be isolated, but have to be analyzed in terms
of the strategic situation.

Senator Sarbanes. You would not recommend a treaty to us
whose terms you perceived as negative on the basis that that was
balanced off and outweighed by a falling off in Soviet adventurism
and an increase in the American arsenal, would you?

Secretary Kissinger. The practical effect of any SALT Treaty,
however cleverly negotiated, is to ratify the existing balance. If,
therefore, I am uneasy about the existing balance, I am bound to
be uneasy about the treaty, even if I otherwise agree with its
terms.

Senator Pell [presiding]. The committee will recess for about 5
minutes, and then Senator Church will be back to preside.

[A recess was taken.]

The Chairman. The hearing will please come back to order.

Senator Zorinsky is our next and last Senator for the first round
of questioning.

Dr. Kissinger, Senators may wish a second round of questioning,
and that questioning period should be limited to 5 minutes, depend-
ing upon how many Senators wish to ask questions. Otherwise,
they would have the regular 10-minute period.

I would like to ascertain your own desires. Would you prefer to
continue and complete your testimony or to break and come back
this afternoon?

Secretary Kissinger. Whichever is more convenient for the com-
mittee.

The Chairman. The committee has two conferences with the
House of Representatives this afternoon, one of which is to begin at
2 o'clock.

Secretary Kissinger. Then you would probably prefer to finish it.

The Chairman. Yes; we would prefer to finish it.

Secretary Kissinger. Then I would be happy to oblige.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Zorinsky.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Dr. Kissinger, to the committee.

STEPS RECOMMENDED TO HALT SOVIET ADVENTURISM

Dr. Kissinger, you refer to Soviet adventurism in the world re-
marking that it is not an acceptable state of affairs and cannot be

212

continued. You date that unacceptable state of affairs from 1975, 2
years before you left the State Department. What steps did you
recommend in those 2 years to encourage a halt to Soviet adventur-
ism?

Secretary Kissinger. I, of course, sought to resist the Cuban
efforts in Angola. We were prevented from doing so by various
congressional actions. We wanted to support forces that were re-
sisting. I thought that was a watershed decision in the postwar
period. The Cuban forces did not show up in Angola until the fall
of 1975, so in fact we did not have 2 years to deal with it; we only
had 1 year, in effect, before the election, after which we were lame
ducks and could not do anjrthing anyway.

In that 1-year period, we then gradually froze all negotiations
with the Soviet Union on other issues. But the major debacle was
the inability to resist the Cubans in Angola, in my perception.

SPECIFICS OF REQUIRED PROGRAMS

Senator Zorinsky. Dr. Kissinger, I am interested in your propos-
al that we should spell out what programs are needed to maintain
strategic equivalence and express our determination to carry out
such programs. Indeed, I have recommended that we do just that
since the first day of these hearings.

How specific do you think the Senate should be in terms of
listing the programs required and what items specifically would
you include in that list as being essential for equivalence with the
Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger. I of course am not a technical military
expert, and this is not a matter on which I should comment lightly.
First, in terms of specificity, I think we need a 5-year program that
indicates the kind of strategy that the administration envisions for
the United States and some theoretical concept which addresses
specifically the question of what happens under conditions of the
relationship of strategic forces that are foreseeable for the 1980's,
and what happens even if rough parity is achieved.

Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Secretary, you are aware of an imbalance
between this Nation and the Soviet Union, so therefore you must
have a perception of what is needed.

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, we need two things. We need a
concept of what we are trying to do. Then we need some specific
forces to try to meet that concept. I want to avoid just throwing
weapons systems around. I think that for strategic forces we have
one of two requirements. Either we need an equivalent counter-
force capability against the Soviet Union, or they have to get rid of
their counterforce capability against the United States.

Since I do not see the latter happening, I would therefore urge
an accelerated deployment of M-X.

Senator Zorinsky. Being fully cognizant that no administration
can bind a future administration and no Congress can bind a
future Congress, how do you perceive our ability in the U.S. Senate
to lock in some of these suggestions that you have made?

Secretary Kissinger. Of course, there is no safeguard against a
President and Congress determined to act against what I consider
the national interest, in their perception of the national interest.
But let me put it more positively, I would think that the Congress,

213

having carefully considered the military position of the United
States in relationship to the SALT Treaty, together with the ad-
ministration, could articulate a program. This would be something
that a future administration and a future Congress would take
seriously. If they are determined to undo it, they will probably
undo it. But that would certainly weigh heavily on the scale, and
those members of the Congress who are of a different view would
then be able to appeal to that prior determination.

To continue to answer your question, I think we need to do
something on theater nuclear balances. I think we need to do
something on the capacity of our conventional forces for regional
defense. And I think in this our allies must make a larger effort or
this whole enterprise is not going to be successful. But that part, of
course, you cannot legislate here.

Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Secretary, unfortunately, both you and I
know that given the choice between national health insurance and
doing some of these things we are speaking about doing now, that
national health insurance could run a very strong first.

Secretary Kissinger. It could then happen that by 1982, 1983,
our national security would run a very strong second, and we will
pay the sort of price that was paid in the thirties.

Senator Zorinsky. I fear you may be right.

SURVIVABILITY OF NATO SHOULD SALT BE REJECTED

Secretary Kissinger. My duty is to indicate what is needed. I
recognize your problems with various constituencies.

Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you this question.
The current Secretary of State was unable to give me a definitive
answer, and replied "I don't know," but that being as it may, I
thought maybe from your perspective you might tell me if NATO
would be able to survive the nonratiflcation of SALT II?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes, I think NATO would survive the non-
ratification of SALT II because our allies in NATO are tied to us
by their self-interest in having American protection in case of
aggression. On the other hand, I agree with the Secretary of State,
for whom I have a very high regard, that nonratiflcation would
have an unfortunate impact in many European countries, and
would raise serious questions about the stability of our governmen-
tal processes. But so would a perceived military imbalance. That is
our problem.

Senator Zorinsky. From your contact with the nations of the
NATO alliance, is it your assessment that they are supportive of
the ratification of SALT II?

Secretary Kissinger. They are in the same position I was in with
Senator Sarbanes. If you press them to ratify or not ratify, separat-
ed from all contexts, they will say they are in favor of ratification,
but they would also be deeply worried in my judgment about
changes in the strategic balance. And they should not have that
choice put to them. But there is no question in my mind that the
European leaders would prefer ratification to nonratiflcation.

Senator Zorinsky. Were you aware that this Nation could not
get the acceptance of the NATO nations to deploy the neutron
bomb?

Secretary Kissinger. Was I aware of that?

214

Senator Zorinsky. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger. Well, you see, Senator, this is one of those
situations in which we are perceived to be doing and what we are
perceived to want has a major impact. As the custodian of nuclear
weapons for the alliance, we are putting our allies into a very
difficult position if we ask them whether we should or should not
deploy a weapon and leave it up to them without indicating a
preference of our own.

Therefore, their reaction is apt to be a reflection of their percep-
tion of how firm we are in our determination. If we had said we
intend to deploy this unless you object, I doubt seriously that we
would have had an objection, at least not from Germany.

Senator Zorinsky. Do you feel, then, that this Nation should
take it upon itself to mandate where we do deploy these types of
armaments?

Secretary Kissinger. No, but I think with respect to nuclear
weapons, in which we have almost a monopoly of experience, that
we have a special reponsibility of leadership. I think we are putting
a heavy burden on allies, especially on the Germans, of asking
them to take a positive step before we make a decision.

Senator Zorinsky. I might point out that we cannot even find a
State in this country that will accept the burial of nuclear wastes,
let alone the deployment of something like the neutron bomb.

Secretary Kissinger. There is no question that every country has
major domestic problems. What we face is how long this can con-
tinue without somebody having to pay a price for it. It is not free.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, as we start the second round, and
to accommodate Dr. Kissinger and all of our time, may I suggest
that the second round be 5 minutes for each member?

The Chairman. Is there objection?

[No response.]

The Chairman. Without objection, each Senator will have 5 min-
utes.

Secretary Kissinger. I don't know whether I can give an answer
in 5 minutes. [General laughter.]

The Chairman. As you have said, you do not get to the verb
until then. [General laughter.]

feasibility of obligatory commitment on future congresses

Dr. Kissinger, you have talked about an obligatory commitment.
We do not quite understand how an obligatory commitment can be
made, because all of us appreciate that one Congress cannot bind
another. We cannot put a handle on the future, but you have not
been very precise about what we should commit ourselves to.

As I understand it, the administration is committed to the build-
ing of the Trident, a very big, new weapons program. We are
committed to cruise missiles which will have a far better penetrat-
ing capacity than the B-1 and we are well ahead of the Soviets in
that field. We are committed now to the M-X, which does have the
capacity to strike and destroy the most hardened Soviet military
weapons, and thus is a kind of counterforce strike. What more do
you think we should commit ourselves to?

215

When you answer that question, will you also be precise in
numbers? Suppose that the administration does keep its commit-
ment for a 3-percent increase in real terms in the military budget.
Is that sufficient, or do you want 4 percent or 5 percent? What is it
you are asking us to do?

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, I can answer better the category of
weapons in which I think we need improvement, rather than give a
precise budgetary estimate which requires a kind of technical
knowledge and staff which I do not have. I believe, however, that
between the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Armed Services Committees, and the knowledge of this committee,
it ought to be possible to work out an agreed framework.

As I have said, in the strategic field I would like to see an
accelerated schedule for the M-X and a clear-cut basing system —
which still does not exist. In the field of theater nuclear forces, I
would like to see a precise program and not a theoretical program
for cruise missiles, and some theater missiles to offset the SS-20
and the Backfire.

Third, I would like to see a program for strengthening conven-
tional forces and our capabilities for rapid overseas deployment.
What percentage increase this requires, I am not in a position to
say. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated 5 percent. I said in my
statement that the burden of proof that this is too high ought to
rest on the administration, given the military expertise of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. But I think we need a rapid and visible effort in
these categories.

Some of it may already be coming on. I am not saying everj^hing
is new that I am proposing.

SALT II DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT OVER SALT I

The Chairman. Would you agree that the SALT II Treaty is a
distinct improvement over the SALT I Treaty and the Vladivostok
agreement from our standpoint?

Secretary Kissinger. It is a much more complex treaty than the
SALT I Treaty, and it is therefore almost impossible to compare
these two, because they occurred in different circumstances. With
respect to Vladivostok, it is an improvement in the lower numbers
and in the ceilings on the numbers of warheads. It is less good, I
would think, in the ambiguities with respect to cruise missiles, but
I am not criticizing it for being less good than Vladivostok. I think
it has some improvements over Vladivostok. In some respects I
would say it is slightly

The Chairman. On balance, it reduces the overall numbers to
2,250, since for the first time it does establish limits on warheads.
Since it also creates a sublimit on MIRVed intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles and things that they do, on balance, wouldn't you have
to say that it was better?

Secretary Kissinger. I would list all of those as positive achieve-
ments.

The Chairman. Those are positive achievements.

Secretary Kissinger. Definitely.

The Chairman. Just to sum up your testimony, if the suggestions
you have made on reservations and clarifications of certain ambi-

216

guities with respect to the treaty and a commitment to strengthen
our own defense posture is also made

Secretary Kissinger. And the geopolitical linkage which I indi-
cated.

The Chairman. I do not know what that means, really. I would
have to get into that in more time than I have, and my time is up.
I think that this whole discussion overemphasizes the importance
of the nuclear balance of terror as it affects political activities of
the Soviet Union. I just think that is a revolutionary country, it is
not going to change, it will not change its stripes. It is not going to
withdraw from Africa or from other places where it seeks to in-
crease its influence, whether or not we enter into the SALT II
agreement.

I see no basis in past experience to expect that they will. If they
would build a wall in Berlin, if they would turn Cuba into a Soviet
military base, when we had a preponderance of nuclear superiority,
then it does not strike me as very persuasive that they will be
more inhibited if we build the M-X.

Secretary Kissinger. I think they may be less inhibited if we do
not build it.

The Chairman. Senator Javits?

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

• ABSENCE OF COOPERATION IF SALT II IS HELD HOSTAGE

Dr. Kissinger, I am concerned about the sense of timing here. If
you agree that there would be a serious blow of confidence to at
least some European temperaments,, and if two of the three defense
programs which you wish the Congress and the President to articu-
late precisely heavily depend upon our allies — to wit, theater nucle-
ar balance, and the capacity of conventional forces for regional
defense, the other being the accelerated M-X — won't we have a
very tough time getting that kind of cooperation if the SALT II
Treaty is held hostage to the obligatory commitment you want
from Congress and the Executive? It is likely to tear apart the
McGoverns and the Helms in terms of what it ought to be and how
precise it ought to be, and could just tie this thing up for months?

Secretary Kissinger. If the McGoverns and the Helms are torn
apart now, why would they not be torn apart next year?

Senator Javits. I understand, sir. I only say that this will repre-
sent a struggle over a finite thing which we have to decide even
before the SALT II Treaty. Won't this undermine our hopes for
getting that kind of confidence and that kind of unity which we
need for more effective defense?

I ask the question because it is a thesis.

Secretary Kissinger. Before I interrupted the chairman, I
thought he was heading in the direction of asking me whether if
all these things could be achieved, I would then support the treaty.
I want to make clear that I would.

I say that. Senator Javits, before I answer your question.

The Chairman. You would? I see. I wish when I had put the
final question to you, what I had meant to say, and I do not know
whether I said it properly, was that I fail to see the connection
between the great emphasis that is placed on the connection be-
tween the balance of our nuclear deterrent, however important

217

that might be for the avoidance of a nuclear war between our two
countries. That is quite a separate question, but I do not see in the
history of the relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union since the Second World War much evidence to support the
proposition that that nuclear balance, if maintained as you would
maintain it, will have any great effect upon Soviet behavior in
other parts of the world.

I think they are a revolutionary country, and will continue to
support revolutions. I do not think that they will regard the nucle-
ar deterrent as credible, as a weapon that would actually be em-
ployed because it involves the self-immolation of both countries,
and therefore when they were willing to take big risks, when they
were terribly inferior to us, it seems hard for me to understand
why they should not be equally willing to take big risks when they
have the equivalent of our power.

Secretary Kissinger. They were willing to take finite risks when
they were inferior to us, from which I would draw the conclusion
that when they are superior to us in strategic effectiveness or in
the military use of strategic weapons — or equal, if you do it on the
basis of population damage and destruction — then they are bound
to run bigger risks. Therefore I would think that the various other
balances become more and more important.

This is my concern, and this is why I am convinced that we will
face, if present trends continue, dangerous situations in the 1980's.
This is what I am trying to deal with and on which I would like to
get some sort of national expression and within a framework that
does not unbalance the perceptions.

I am sorry. Senator Javits. I felt that I had cut off the chairman.

EFFECT OF KISSINGER PLAN ON SOVIETS AND BREZHNEV SUCCESSION

Senator Javits. That is all right. We appreciate having your
answers to our questions. I would like to have you answer one
question, though, and abandon the other one, because I do not
want to intrude. We have looked at only one side of the equation,
to wit, the United States, how do we react, what do we think is
necessary, and so on. What do you think would be the effect of
your plan on the Soviets, including the Brezhnev succession?

Let's look at that side of the equation. Would you inform us on
that subject as you see it?

Secretary Kissinger. I think that successions in communist coun-
tries are always very uncertain matters. I doubt that Brezhnev
knows who his successor is going to be. If you look at successions in
other Communist countries, and in the Soviet Union, it almost
always has been somebody who had not been predicted by outsid-
ers — partly because if somebody emerges as a clear successor, he is
not always allowed to stay in his current position indefinitely.

With respect to the Soviet Union, we have two somewhat contra-
dictory problems. On the one hand, we have to foreclose opportuni-
ties for expansionism, for adventurism, and for escaping their very
serious domestic dilemmas by conspicuous successes abroad. At the
same time, we have to keep open the possibilities of genuine coexis-
tence. But that always gets us into a massive domestic debate,
because there are some people in our country who are willing to

218

back only one side, either the confrontation side or the coexistence
side.

I think if we do not have a balanced approach we are not likely
to be able to succeed in either. If we emphasize only confrontation,
then sooner or later this is bound to become the dominant feature
of our relationship, and in the nuclear age that is extremely dan-
gerous.

If we emphasize only conciliation, we will become subject to
nuclear blackmail and we will create opportunities for adventur-
ism. I do not think the Soviets have a master plan of world con-
quest. I think the Soviets have a master plan, if any, of accumulat-
ing power, without a precise concept of how they are going to use
it. This is why the opportunities have to be foreclosed. One cannot
look at this buildup at has been going on since 1963 uninterrupted-
ly without assessing the options it opens up for them in the
eighties.

So, I think for the Soviet succession it is important both that
they be discouraged from adventurism but also that they have an
opportunity for a relationship of coexistence with the United
States. We need both of these.

Senator Javits. So you feel your policy adjusts to both?

Secretary Kissinger. This is what I have in mind.

Senator Javits. Thank you.

I thank the Chair for his indulgence.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Javits.

Senator McGovern?

Senator McGovern. Dr. Kissinger, a mutual friend of ours
thought I was disrespectful to you earlier in the day in suggesting
that you were part of the threat.

Secretary Kissinger. Absolutely not.

Senator McGovern. I assume it goes without saying that I was
not talking about you personally. I was talking about the fact that
I feel that the cause of disarmament and of arms control is threat-
ened by the position that you and many other distinguished wit-
nesses have taken that we cannot have this treaty unless it is
accompanied by military buildup. That is what worries me.

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, we have faced each other across a
gulf of perceptions, always with mutual respect.

NEED FOR MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator McGovern. We have indeed.

If we could in fact get to a freeze, a moratorium on nuclear
weapons on both sides, rather quickly, in SALT III, with agreed
upon percentage reductions, in your judgment, would that remove
most of the things you seem to fear, not only about the treaty, but
about the ratification process? Would it, for example, mean that
the ICBM systems on both sides would then be survivable, and that
there would be no need for the M-X?

Secretary Kissinger. I would have to see the current numbers
before I can make a judgment. I know what the trends are. I do not
know exactly what the current deployments are.

Senator McGovern. As I understand it, you have been concerned
throughout your career with the problem of how to make nuclear
weapons relevant to foreign policy. I think back as early as the

219

1950's you were arguing that the doctrine of massive retaliation is
so horrible that it would never be used, and therefore becomes
irrelevant to the conduct of foreign policy.

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

Senator McGovern. You seem to be saying the same thing now,
that we have to develop a concept of limited war, the so-called
counterforce capability whereby we could knock out Soviet missiles
without necessarily destroying Soviet cities. Is that in fact your
position? Are you trying to develop a scenario under which a
nuclear exchange might become thinkable and therefore a possible
foreign policy tool?

Secretary Kissinger. Any nuclear war would have enormous
casualties, even a war confined to strictly military targets. The
situation that I find unacceptable is where the Soviet Union can
destroy our land-based weapons while we cannot offer a significant
threat to their land-based weapons, and on top of it are inferior in
theater nuclear weapons and in conventional forces.

I think the cumulative impact of all these imbalances is
unacceptable. I would therefore recommend since that is the only
thing we can do now, that we develop a counterforce ability against
their weapons which will then either drive them to sea or make
them accept substantial limitations that would reduce the counter-
force threat to both sides, which I would welcome.

85 PERCENT OF SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT IN VULNERABLE TARGETS

Senator McGovern. Just a short time ago, I think, in 1974 or
1975, you said that the Soviet Union has 85 percent of its throw-
weight in the most vulnerable targets, that is to say, land-based
missiles. The United States has only about 25 percent of its throw-
weight in vulnerable targets, and this is continuing your quote:

In the 1980's, the greater flexibility of our force and the greater vulnerability of
their forces is very likely to bring about a situation in which the threat to their
force is likely to be much greater than the threat to our total force, regardless of
the weight of the individual warhead.

Now, that was only a very short time ago. What has changed?

Secretary Kissinger. What has changed is the abandonment or
the stretch-out of the strategic programs that would have made
their force vulnerable. At that time, the M-X was going to be in
operation in 1983. Now it will be 1987. At that time, we were
thinking of B-l's with cruise missiles, and of a much faster Trident
program. I think that the conditions that I described may still
come about, but they cannot now come about until the late
eighties, so that there will be a time period in which the relative
capabilities are dangerously against us.

At that time also, in 1974, we thought that our forces would not
become vulnerable until 1985, or later. After 1985, was the official
estimate that we had at that time. These are the changes that have
occurred.

Senator McGovern. Mr. Secretary, I am frustrated by this 5-
minute rule. We never seem to be able to finish anything that we
start here. Of course, I am not complaining, Mr. Chairman. That is
the nature of the process.

The Chairman. I understand the process, and I have to apologize
to the Secretary for leaving now. I need to get a cup of soup before

220

we get into conference with the House at 2 o'clock. I am going to
pass the chairmanship on down the table, if I might. Gentlemen,
we are operating under a 5-minute rule, so that the Secretary can
get away some time this afternoon at a reasonable hour.

Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, I, too, have to join the chairman
for the conference, and I apologize to you for leaving.

The Chairman. May I turn the gavel over to you, Senator Pell? I
believe Senator Percy is next. Thank you very much, Mr. Secre-
tary, for your testimony. We are much indebted to you.

Senator Pell [presiding]. Senator Percy?

Senator Percy. Mr. Secretary, I would like to spend 15 seconds to
also express my appreciation to you for the immense contribution
that you have made to this committee and to Members of the
Senate. You have analyzed this problem in a careful and thought-
ful way and given us the benefit of your advice and counsel.

One of the great privileges that I have had in the Senate has
been working with you intimately through the years, and I look
forward to continuing that close relationship.

A former Secretary of State said to me some years ago that the
foreign policy of this country can be no better than the understand-
ing of it by the American people and the support given to it by the
American people. I presume you would agree with that.

Another treaty, the Panama Canal Treaty, carried with a margin
of one vote, and it was implied that without administration com-
mitments to public works and other extraneous things, there would
have been no ratification. I understand there will be no deals cut
by this administration on extraneous matters to get consent from
any Senators, and I think that is a wise policy.

ALLOWING MEDIA COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE

Do you think that to enhance public understanding of this
treaty, it would be well for the Senate to open up the Chamber to
allow television, radio, and recordings to be made under the rules
of the Senate? All of the proceedings of the Senate in this debate
on a treaty that involves the future security of the United States of
America, the free world, and our relationship with the other super-
power would be opened to public view.

Secretary Kissinger. I really am reluctant to offer advice to the
Senate on its procedures.

Senator Percy. You did not hesitate in the past.

Secretary Kissinger. Oh, but on its procedures, I have hesitated.
Given the eloquence of the Members of the Senate, I think what
you suggest might produce a longer delay in ratification than
anything that has heretofore been proposed. [General laughter.]

Senator Percy. I do not think that is a factor that has inhibited
the House. There is some concern about that, but the House has
adjusted. Do you think it would be good for the country to have a
better understanding of it that could be provided by sharing the
debate?

Secretary Kissinger. What would have to be weighed is the
advantage to the country in sharing the debate against what it
would do in the long term to the kind of debate that would be
conducted. I frankly just have not thought that through. If I could
limit it to that debate itself, it would certainly seem to me benefi-

221

cial to the country to see as much of the debate as possible, but I
have really not thought this one through.
Senator Percy. Thank you.

UNDERSTANDING CLARIFYING TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO ALLIES
AND EXPIRATION OF THE PROTOCOL

The administration has argued against attaching an understand-
ing to the instruments of ratification, stating that we can transfer
technology to our allies. The reasoning they use is that it would
look as though we were asking for Soviet consent. Certainly that
would not be the intention of any of us who would offer such an
understanding. It would simply be notification to the Soviets that
our ratification is conditioned upon our understanding that we are
free to transfer whatever technology is necessary for the security of
our NATO allies and for our own security.

Do you feel that there is sufficient validity to the administra-
tion's position that we should not consider such an understanding?

Secretary Kissinger. No, I favor such an understanding.

Senator Percy. Do you believe that the ambivalence that you
have said our allies feel about this treaty can be satisfied if we
adopt understandings on protocol extension and noncircumvention?
I understand the concerns are mainly military concerns in terms of
how this treaty could affect their own security.

Secretary Kissinger. I think their concerns would be substantial-
ly eased.

Senator Percy. Finally, in your statement you state that limita-
tions on cruise missiles after the protocol should be submitted to
Congress only if it is part of an equitable arrangement for theater
nuclear forces. I certainly commend your making this recommen-
dation to us, and many of us will study it carefully.

The administration has committed itself to this position. Do you
think an additional statement by the Senate is necessary to reas-
sure our allies, taking into account that the election of 1980 could
bring any kind of results and we should bind any President in the
future?

Secretary Kissinger. I have not studied the record enough to
say. My understanding is that what the administration is willing to
accept is that there be no extension of the protocol without the
advice and consent of the Senate. My view is that there should be
no extension of the protocol, period — that any cruise missile limita-
tion should be done only in the context of an entirely new negotia-
tion on the theater nuclear forces on both sides.

In this respect, I believe my position differs from theirs, but I
have not studied the record enough. If it agrees with the adminis-
tration, I am delighted.

Senator Percy. We will certainly study it in that context, and I
thank you for your suggestion on it.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Mr. Secretary, I was interested in your comments about the
eloquence of Senators and the effect television might produce. In
the House it has had a certain prolonging of events. My own view
is that probably we should do it with public radio as we did with
our debate on the Panama Canal, and leave open the question of
television. This is a question that will be discussed in the coming
weeks.

48-250 0-79-15

222

I appreciate your testimony very much indeed. I think you have
a marvelously diplomatic way of not being too precise sometimes,
and I am trying to figure out in my mind if you are really a hawk
in dove's feathers, or really a dove with hawk's feathers.

I think basically, whichever it is, it is a sensible road, and obvi-
ously has a very real appeal to all of us, and in this regard, I was
wondering if your suggestions for amendments — actually, each one
of those amendments as I studied them could be equally easily
construed as reservations or understandings. The very word
"amendment" is a word that indicates, I think, in international
law, the necessity for renegotiation. Isn't that correct?

Secretary Kissinger. I think what I have in mind here is achiev-
able without renegotiation, but should be expressed as a binding
instruction by the Senate to the administration.

Senator Pell. That could be an understanding or a reservation
just as easily, could it not?

Secretary Kissinger. Probably.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

question of geopolitical linkage

Now, coming to your third point, the question of geopolitical
linkage, do you really feel it is necessary that we take this treaty,
which is concerned with the strategic balance of the two superpow-
ers' forces, and link it to the various political problems around the
world? It seems to me you are putting an awful lot of weight on a
pretty frail back. It reminds me a little bit in domestic political
terms of how we want to get rid of all prejudice and bigotry by
having desegregation in our Nation's schools, and that has been a
pretty heavy load for the schools to carry.

I am wondering if you try to link Soviet good behavior to the
treaty, if that is not a pretty heavy load on the treaty, and if by
the same token they will not make counterdemands on us.

Secretary Kissinger. I am not linking Soviet good behavior to
the ratification of the treaty. I would like to use the occasion of
ratification of the treaty to have the Senate express its view of
what is acceptable international behavior, and to relate future
negotiations not to every dispute that exists in the world, but to an
overall pattern of conduct.

Obviously, competition is going to continue. Obviously, history is
not going to stop. But proxy forces financed by the Soviet Union do
not have to march around the world; Soviet planes do not have to
be in Cuba so that Cuban planes can be in Africa; East German
military personnel do not have to be all over the world. This is the
point that I am trying to make, in gross terms rather than linking
it to any one individual situation. All I am suggesting is a periodic
review on whether these criteria have been met, after which a
decision can still be made on what conclusions to draw from it.

Senator Pell. If I understand you, your linkage would be more
like the Helsinki Accords. You would set up a norm of what we
expect of the Soviets; is that correct?

Secretary Kissinger. I would not make the present ratification
conditional on a retroactive analysis of what the Soviets have done
in the recent past, but I would use this ratification to put the
Soviets on notice that future negotiations will be affected, not by
every little dispute we may have, but by the overall conduct, in
terms of criteria that could be worked out by this committee or by

223

this committee together with the administration. And a periodic
review would be made in the form of a report by the administra-
tion to the Senate, and then a periodic review by the Senate of
whether these criteria have been met, after which the conclusion
to be drawn would still be open to judgment, including whether
any SALT negotiations then going on should be continued. But I
think it would put the Soviets on notice that in our mind political
conduct and military buildups and military restraint are related.

Senator Pell. Thank you. My time is up. I am very glad to have
been with you. I ask you to excuse me, too. The gavel will be
passed to Senator Biden.

Senator Biden [presiding]. I knew the day would come, Mr. Sec-
retary, when I would be chairman of something you were testifying
at, if I just waited long enough. [General laughter.]

Mr. Secretary, you see, you have me conditioned to speak in
conditions.

Dr. Kissinger, I apologize for leaving for about an hour. I do not
know whether any of my colleagues have asked this question. If
they have, I will leave it on the record and you need not respond.

That is, do you have any doubts about our ability to verify this
treaty?

Secretary Kissinger. I am not an expert on verification. I have
had one briefing which I found impressive. There are certain as-
pects which in the nature of things are difficult to verify. For
example, since we do not have a baseline on the volume of the
missiles, we will not be able to tell exactly whether it is a 5-percent
or 8-percent increase. I have concluded that I do not know enough
about the verification issue, but not enough doubts have been
raised in my mind with respect to the verification issue for me to
raise it.

IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Senator Biden. With regard to the role of nuclear arsenals shap-
ing regional outcomes, I think Senator Church, as I believe he
usually does, has identified a very basic issue, and that is, can
nuclear weapons really influence the outcome of regional develop-
ments? My knowledge of the chairman's position is that he is very
skeptical of their having an influence on regional outcomes as am
I. You, in contrast, seem to be saying that the vulnerability of the
Minuteman at a minimum has a political value or weighs in the
political mix. That is, it seems to indicate that if we, the Soviets
and the rest of the world perceive that Minuteman is vulnerable,
as a consequence of that perceived vulnerability we in turn will not
have the backbone potentially to stand up in areas of regional
conflict. It seems to me there are a couple of things to be said
about that, and I would like you to comment on them.

The first is that if the ICBM vulnerability question is a problem
for the United States, the Soviets are going to have an even greater
problem by the time the decade of the 1980's is out. We are talking
about a window here somewhere between 1983, 1984, 1987, and
1988. Once our new Trident is on, the M-X— I misspoke and said
cruise the last time, I meant to say M-X— the Mark 12A warhead,
all of these and all the things which you suggested are important
to go forward with are on line, then the vulnerability that we are
going to feel in the early to mid-1980's will be contrasted to the
vulnerability of the Soviets with their land-based system in the late

224

1980's. The Soviets might have more to worry about in that regard
than we, and the lifespan of these kinds of agreements is a matter
of 4 or 5 years. That is not significant. We think further ahead
than that. It takes a long time for these systems to come on.

The second thing that needs to be said is, as Senator Church
argued, that these weapons are simply not that important in shap-
ing regional outcomes. For example, there was Hungary in 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Vietnam up through the early 1970's.
The Soviets have been adventurists for the past 35 years. They
view us as having been adventurists for the past 35 years, and I do
not think it is realistic to assume that the theoretical calculations
of the vulnerability of land-based systems is going to fundamental-
ly curb this adventurism on the Soviets' part. I wonder if you
would comment on that.

Secretary Kissinger. Let me clarify my position. I am not saying
that superiority and strategic striking power by itself is going to
solve regional conflict. I am saying that in the 1950's and 1960's,
and even in the early 1970's, we used superiority and strategic
striking powers to affect at least some local outcomes.

Senator Biden. Where?

Secretary Kissinger. All of the situations which you have men-
tioned were those in which it w£is very clear that the United States
would not resort to general nuclear war — in Czechoslovakia, in
Hungary. In those instances in which the United States really
confronted the Soviets, they generally pulled back rather quickly —
over Berlin in 1961, on Cuba in 1962; during my period in office, in
1970 in the Jordan crisis, in 1970 in the Cienfuegos crisis, in 1973
during the Mideast alert — at least in part because we still had a
substantial nuclear superiority.

Now, I would not want the United States with the present num-
bers of weapons, no matter what theoretical superiority we could
achieve, to rely on strategic nuclear weapons for the prevention of
regional conflict. The problem is, the Soviet Union has been superi-
or regionally in the entire postwar period, and that superiority, if
anything, has grown. No substantial efforts have been made to
redress it.

If we add to that the vulnerability of our strategic forces, so that
there is no possibility whatever that in an extreme we might resort
to nuclear weapons, then it seems to me that the willingness to run
risks that the Soviets demonstrated — as the chairman correctly
pointed out, even during the period of our nuclear superiority —
must exponentially increase. That is the danger I see. Nor am I
saying that we can solve this problem by trying to reconstruct the
situation of the 1950's and 1960's. That is beyond our capability,
and is undesirable. But at least we should not add a vulnerability
in the strategic field to the existing vulnerability in the theater
field. We should work drastically to overcome the vulnerabilities in
the regional field, because then we can be somewhat more relaxed
in the strategic field. This is the general concept I am putting
forward.

Senator Biden. My time is up, I am afraid.

Secretary Kissinger. If I could make one more comment, you are
quite right. Senator, that prospects for the late 1980's are really
quite favorable, both in terms of the military trends and in terms

225

of economic and political trends, provided we can overcome our
various energy crises and economic problems, and so on. But for
that very reason, if there is a window of, say, 5 years, in which the
Soviets are faced with a problem of whether to change their society
or first clean up their international environment, the temptation
may be very great to try to clear up the international environment.
This is the period that I would call our period of maximum danger.
If we can get through that, I would say the trends in the longer
term are very much in our favor. I would like to compress that
window as much as possible.

Senator Biden. I would really like to pursue that point, but my
time is up. Thank you very much.

Senator Glenn?

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Although I think the balance of nuclear terror idea as proposed
by Chairman Church and then as followed up somewhat by Sena-
tor Biden has not deterred Soviet behavior, it certainly may well
have deterred other nations from following the Soviets more close-
ly, and I think that is the important point, that is, the perception
of the other nations as to where the balance of power lies. I think
if other nations perceive one of these days that the Soviets really
are almighty in the strategic field, there will be a far greater
likelihood that they are going to follow the Soviets by tolerating
local communist parties, negotiating more favorable trade agree-
ments or permitting Soviet naval bases or whatever the issue
might be at that particular time, I think that is the important
thing.

Secretary Kissinger. I agree completely.

WOULD KISSINGER SIGN SALT II

Senator Glenn. Let me get back to another subject. With all of
the changes that you feel have occurred and the short-term bene-
fits of this treaty, would you have recommended that the President
sign this treaty when he did?

Secretary Kissinger. I was asked the same question by Senator
Sarbanes.

Senator Glenn. I am sorry, I was not here then.

Secretary Kissinger. I did not give a clearcut answer.

Senator Glenn. OK, then, I will give you another shot at it.

Secretary Kissinger. The answer I gave to Senator Sarbanes was
that it is very difficult to separate a treaty from the general
strategic environment. What I would probably have done is recom-
mend to the President to sign the treaty and then to come to the
Congress with the sort of program that I am proposing, and I
would have tried to incorporate into the treaty the reservations
that I have indicated here need to be made. That would have
probably been my recommendation. It is very hard to know what
you would recommend.

Senator Glenn. It has been said that some 80 percent of the
treaty was negotiated by you prior to your leaving office. What
would you have negotiated differently since you have left office?

Secretary Kissinger. Primarily it would be in the area of the
protocol. I think perhaps a disproportionate effort was made on the
definition of new missiles, considering that in effect they really do
not limit anything. But, you know, any outsider can nitpick any

226

agreement when he has not been in the conference room and has
not been present in the balance of give and take.

Senator Glenn. Mr. Secretary, I disagree with you. We were not
in the conference room. We were not negotiating it, either, yet we
are going to have to vote yes or no. There is not any maybe column
for us to check. This is why we are calling on your expertise.

Secretary Kissinger. Senator, I have indicated those areas of the
treaty as it now stands that I would like to see clarified by the
Senate. With those clarifications and with the military program
that I have proposed, I would recommend ratification.

AMBIGUITIES IN THE TREATY

Senator Glenn. But in addition to those caveats you have also
mentioned ambiguities that you would like to get straightened out.
I have gone through those in your statement, and I would trust
that you have several more ambiguities and perhaps understand-
ings of unilateral statements that you would like to get ironed out.
Would there be others besides the ones you mentioned here?

Secretary Kissinger. Those are the principal ones.

Senator Glenn. The main one that you mentioned is noncircum-
vention.

Secretary Kissinger. They are noncircumvention, the protocol,
and future negotiations on SALT III. Those are the three that I
mentioned.

Senator Glenn. Those are not exactly ambiguities. We under-
stand the protocol situation, and when it runs out.

Secretary Kissinger. That is right. Noncircumvention is the
main ambiguity.

Senator Glenn. Are you concerned about any of the unilateral
statements that we have made through all of the negotiating histo-
ry? I have been very concerned about this, and I asked the other
day for a complete rundown from the Secretary of State for the
whole history of this as to where we have made a statement, and
even though the Soviets did not reply we have taken it that that is
accepted because of their nonreply.

I question that modus operandi.

Secretary Kissinger. I agree with you. Senator. We resorted to it
ourselves to perhaps an excessive degree in 1972, and in speaking
to a group of Congressmen in the White House at the time, I
mentioned unilateral statements that we had made as a restraint
on Soviet conduct. I think experience has shown that the unilateral
statements that we have made are not a restraint on Soviet con-
duct, that they do not bind the Soviet Union. And as a general
proposition I would think it unwise to rely on them unless we are
really determined to break up the agreement over noncompliance,
and in practice we are not likely to be willing to break up the
agreement on noncompliance.

Senator Glenn. I hope we get a complete listing on that. If you
could add to any of that for the Secretary of State, I am sure they
would appreciate your interpretation.

Secretary Kissinger. I think any unilateral statements that we
made are in writing somewhere. I do not believe there are any for
which there is no record.

Senator Glenn. I am sure they will all be in the record, and I
hope to get a complete listing of those very shortly, because I think
they can be very, very important. The issue of the Backfire and the

227

number to be produced is an example of the problem. We have a
unilateral statement. They did not reply. Then when they came
down to really pushing apparently to get a firm positive statement,
there was all sorts of foot-dragging and reluctance on the part of
the Soviets to really finally come out and make a firm public
statement that yes, this was the limit.

I would imagine if it came to push and shove on all the unilater-
al statements, we might find the same reticence on their part.

Secretary Kissinger. Unilateral statements are very difficult to
enforce.

Senator Glenn. Thank you.

Senator Biden. Thank you. Senator Glenn.

Senator Stone?

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. protested nuclear missile submarines in CUBA

Dr. Kissinger, you testified in my first round that the U.S. Gov-
ernment protested every time the U.S.S.R. tested us on the visits of
all kinds and combinations of Soviet submarines to Cuba following
the Cienfuegos crisis.

Secretary Kissinger. I think nuclear missile-carrying subma-
rines.

Senator Stone. Nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and you
testified that the essence of the understanding that you negotiated
was to not prohibit nuclear-powered submarines but to prohibit
Soviet nuclear-missile-carrying submarines. That is what we are
concerned about. Is that not right?

Secretary Kissinger. That is right. But you have to remember,
Senator, that I am doing this from memory, so if you find that
some submarine called there that we did not protest, I just do not
remember.

Senator Stone. I am in a position to summarize and wrap this up
in just a minute. I have just one more question. Do you recall, Mr.
Secretary, whether when you negotiated the agreement, you nego-
tiated an exception, to wit, that even if a Soviet submarine carry-
ing nuclear missiles would be in violation, such a visit to Cuba
would not be in violation even if it lasted several weeks. If it were
called a port call. Do you recall an exception under the denomina-
tion of port calls?

Secretary Kissinger. I am sure we did not negotiate an excep-
tion. The major concern we had was the servicing of nuclear sub-
marines from Cuban ports. Now, how you define servicing— I do
not think the issue ever arose where a submarine carrying nuclear
missiles made a port call, at least what our definition of nuclear
missiles was, which would be G, H, or Y class submarines. So, I do
not believe we negotiated the exception, but those who have the
records ought to be able to check all of this.

Senator Stone. Well, something as important as a loophole

Secretary Kissinger. But there would be no point in negotiating
a formal exception.

Senator Stone. Exactly. There would be no point in allowing a
Soviet missile-carrying submarine to stay around in Cienfuegos at
the base for several weeks carrying nuclear missiles and then when
you challenge them, to accept as an excuse, that this is just a port
call, would it?

228

Secretary Kissinger. We would have emphasized the issue of
whether they were being serviced in Cienfuegos. At that time we
had some criteria for servicing which we in fact even wrote down.

Senator Stone. To take on provisions? Would that be included?

Secretary Kissinger. Not knowing the facts to which you are
referring, my tendency would be to protest this rather strenuously.

Senator Stone. Thank you, Secretary Kissinger.

I think I can now summarize what I have been after in all of this
submarine questioning. You have testified that you protested and
would protest Soviet missile-carrying submarines making visits or
being serviced at Cienfuegos, at least.

Secretary Kissinger. There were a number of occasions when the
Soviet activity was not in legal violation of the agreement, or
where the agreement was sufficiently ambiguous that you could
have a debate about it, but where we felt that it was a needless
provocation and made rather sharp and pointed comments.

Senator Stone. You did make protests of some of those visits, did
you not?

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

Senator Stone. You consider some of them to be violations, did
you not, and therefore protested them?

Secretary Kissinger. We considered them incompatible with

Senator Stone. With the agreement.

Secretary Kissinger. And with good relations between us.

Senator Stone. I would like to proceed for at least one extra
minute after the red light goes on in order to summarize what this
line of questioning has been all about.

Senator Biden. That is all right with me if it is all right with
Senator Zorinsky.

Senator Zorinsky. It is fine with me.

Senator Stone. Thank you. Senator Zorinsky.

The administration asserts or least implies that the prohibition
that you negotiated is against nuclear-powered submarines. They
assert that in supplementing the record, as against the earlier
statement of my question and the Chief of Naval Operations
answer. I read from the supplementation of the record recently
received:

It is my understanding that as a result of an October 13, 1970, exchange between
the United States and Soviet representatives, President Nixon subsequently an-
nounced that servicing of nuclear submarines either in or from Cuba would be a
violation of the understanding. This would apply to servicing of nuclear-powered
submarines, both SSBN's [nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine] and SSN's
nuclear-powered attack submarine. It would not, however, prohibit port calls by
such submarines.

I challenge that in the light of the logic of your testimony that it
is nuclear missiles we are trying to keep out of Cuba, and not
whether the platform that brings them in is either powered by
diesel or powered by nuclear. That is point 1. Point 2, I asked the
Chief of Naval Operations, did the Golf submarines which visited
Cuba in 1972 and 1974 carry nuclear missiles. He denied that they
did. The administration has now supplemented the record, a por-
tion of which is classified, and my question and his answer now
read as follows:

229

If it were the case that the Golf-l-II submarines had visited Cuba, and there
were two, and they were as recent as 1974, actually carried SS-N-5 ballistic mis-
siles, would that be a violation?

Admiral Hayward. As I indicated earlier, Golf II diesel submarines carry the SS-
N-5 SLBM's which is not accountable under the SALT I Treaty or the provisions of
SALT IL The SS-N-5 SLBM is assessed to have a nuclear warhead [deleted.] The
Go//" // submarines which visited Cuba in [deleted] 1972 and [deleted] 1974. Charac-
terization of those visits as violations, or non-violations, of an understanding with
the U.S.S.R. is more properly within the purview of the State Department, to which
I would defer on the issue.

I have now had a letter from Secretary of State Vance denying
that any of the submarine occasional port calls were violations. I
will read his answer.

Subsequently, in the early 1970's submarines did make occasional port calls.
According to the understanding with the Soviet Union, such port calls do not
constitute violations.

Yet you have testified that we did raise the question that there
were visits which were in violation.

I am not quite through, but if you have a comment, I will take it.

Secretary Kissinger. IVIy comment would be this. I think the
Secretary of State is correct in pointing out that port calls not
involving the servicing of the submarines or missiles would not be
a technical violation. On a number of occasions, and I just don't
remember the years now, we protested even though technically a
sharp lawyer could prove that there were not violations, we felt
they were incompatible with the spirit of what we were trying to
accomplish.

Therefore, we protested it.

Senator Stone. It troubles me. Dr. Kissinger, very much when
the administration denies that nuclear missiles are what this is all
about, and when they imply by their answers that we never pro-
tested anything because there were no violations when in fact we
did protest those visits.

Secretary Kissinger. Again, I have to say in defense of the
administration, to the best of my knowledge the protesting always
occurred in White House channels' so it may be that there is no
formal record in the State Department about whether we protested
or not.

Senator Stone. It troubles me greatly. Dr. Kissinger, that when I
inquire using open, unclassified information from Janes Fighting
Ships, that the two Soviet submarines which visited Cuba carried
nuclear missiles, that is denied. Then, later, by supplementing the
record, it is admitted.

What I am troubled by is our posture of requiring compliance
when we are pushed by the Soviet Union even in our own hemi-
sphere. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Biden. You are welcome. Senator.

Senator Zorinsky?

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

requirement that the administration report on soviet behavior

Mr. Secretary, in your statement with respect to your recommen-
dations concerning those criteria which should accompany SALT II,
you precondition ratification of the treaty on the following: "That
the Administration be required to submit an annual report to the
Senate on the degree to which the Soviet Union is living up to
these criteria, that the Senate vote every 2 years its judgment
whether the Soviet Union has lived up to these criteria. If the

230

judgment is negative, the Senate should then vote whether what-
ever SALT negotiations are taking place should be continued."

If these provisions had been proposed in connection with SALT I,
would you have supported these provisions?

Secretary Kissinger. Probably not, but that was before the
Soviet geopolitical offensive. We tried to act on some principles like
this. The idea of linkage was one that was hotly debated, and that
we affirmed we were carrying out. So, I would have supported it in
practice. Whether I would have supported it as a Senatorial
amendment, I do not know. I think now, after 4 years of a geopo-
litical offensive by the Soviet Union, we face a more difficult situa-
tion than we did in 197L Now I think it is important to put them
on notice that this conduct is unacceptable, and indeed dangerous
for them as well. So I think under the conditions of 1979 that it is
necessary.

EFFECT OF AMENDING THE TREATY

Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Secretary, what would you envision in the
event that the Senate approves a direct amendment to the treaty?
Do you feel that would put us back to square one?

Secretary Kissinger. No. I expect that in case of an amendment
by the Senate, it would probably end any negotiations until our
election. I believe that there would be a tremendous blowup, a
crisis atmosphere, and that nothing further would happen until
after our elections. In all probability, the administration would
follow, as the President has already indicated on a number of
occasions, the SALT limits. We would not get the higher defense
program that I am talking about, and therefore the process of
rectification that I consider essential will be delayed by 2 or 3
years, at which point probably negotiations would start again. This
is why, on balance, I prefer to find a way to implement the remedi-
al measures now.

Senator Zorinsky. Let me summarize this, because I want to
know your thinking.

Now, you do support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty by
the Senate?

Secretary Kissinger. Within the framework that I have
indicated.

LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND OTHER SOVIET ACTIONS

Senator Zorinsky. With the changes in the determination of this
Nation to recognize certain deficiencies and to link and tie Soviet
actions elsewhere directly to this treaty?

Secretary Kissinger. I would say Soviet geopolitical conduct else-
where, and with the clarifications that I have indicated, yes. I
would support it.

Senator Zorinsky. Is this an inseparable linkage that you are
presenting to us?

Secretary Kissinger. Yes.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I will just detain you one more
moment, if I may. I think your clarification of how linkage relates
to SALT II is important, at least as I understood it, and I would
like to repeat what I think it is, and have you tell me if I am
correct or not.

231

You are not saying that we are linking Soviet conduct to passage
of SALT II, but what we are doing, you are saying, is that at the
time passage of SALT II, we are putting the Soviets on notice that
for SALT III we are going to consider Unkage?

Secretary Kissinger. Correct.

Senator Biden. And one other point. I think I understand your
explanation, and it explains what I quite honestly, quite bluntly
viewed as an inconsistency based on a political motivation, but
maybe I was too cynical, and I mean this sincerely.

In SALT I, at the very time we were mining Haiphong Harbor,
you were arguing, no linkage.

Secretary Kissinger. I was not arguing anything.

Senator Biden. I know well there were those in the Senate — I
was not here then, but if I am not mistaken — who were arguing,
although the word did not take on the meaning to the full extent
that it has now when we say linkage, that SALT I should be
viewed in the context of overall United States-Soviet relations, yet
at that time literally we were in Vietnam and literally mining
Haiphong Harbor, and it did not seem to get in the way of whether
or not we should have a SALT agreement.

Secretary Kissinger. First of all, literally, the North Vietnamese
were launching a major offensive with Soviet weapons —

Senator Biden. I know. That is the whole point.

Secretary Kissinger [continuing]. Which is what triggered the
whole enterprise. Secondly, when the decision was made to mine
Haiphong Harbor, we fully expected that the Soviet Union would
apply linkage, and in fact expected that they would. They decided
for reasons of their own that they had too many other interests at
stake, so they did not apply it. We have the option under what I
am suggesting here also not apply it in specific circumstances. I
believe that as a general proposition the conditions that have exist-
ed in the last 5 years are too dangerous.

Senator Biden. Maybe focusing on Haiphong Harbor was the
wrong focus. The point was that the Soviets were supplying arms
and were part of the Vietnamese offensive. They were supporting
the North Vietnamese offensive which brought us to the point of
deciding to mine Haiphong Harbor. The whole point is, we were in
conflict more directly with the Soviet Union there than we are
now, and yet we went forward with SALT I.

You just stated that the Soviets had the option if you will, to
apply linkage from their perspective, and they chose not to, the
same option that we would have in SALT III if we adopted your
language, but I wonder as a practical matter — you knowing the
political system as well as any person in this town — if the language
which you suggest attend this treaty as it relates to SALT III and
to linkage were to be passed, would there be any option for a
future Congress to make the choice of what it considers to be
linkage that would warrant us not going forward with a SALT III.
As a practical matter, once that language is in there, I doubt
whether we would have that option.

Secretary Kissinger. First let me deal with the point you made,
that this was put forward for political reasons. I have not noticed
that the word "linkage" evokes wild public applause in front of
audiences or that this is an issue on which the political benefits are
self-evident to anybody. I believe that we are facing a very serious
problem in the use of proxy forces, in the assault on the general

232

world equilibrium, and I am groping for some way of finding a
national consensus to indicate that this is unacceptable. I will not
insist on every last word of that particular provision as long as the
spirit of it can be embodied in some method of putting the Soviets
on notice of what we consider acceptable conduct, and as long as
some periodic review of it is made, whatever conclusions are then
drawn from it.

Senator Biden. I do not think that is an unreasonable approach.
For the record, to clarify, I did say that at the outset I thought it
was politically motivated, and I am not at all sure that is the case.
I think it is not politically motivated now, but to make the point
further, it would be politically advantageous — you will get much
more wild applause from the public today saying, let's get tough
with the Russians than to make the argument of let's really limit
arms, let's not have a buildup. Further, just as in the Democratic
Party, if someone attempted to get the Democratic nomination for
President, let's say, so you will know I am not talking about you
because you are constitutionally ineligible to be President by
reason of birth, but if someone were seeking the nomination for
President in the Democratic Party, it would be very difficult in my
political opinion for them to take a very, very hard line anti-SALT,
antinegotiation posture, and not run the risk of losing the liberal
wing of the Democratic Party, and conversely in the Republican
Party.

I think it would be very difficult for someone to come out four-
square strongly jumping in with both feet for a pro-SALT position,
now, and not at least have to face the element of the party that is
represented by fine men, and I mean it sincerely, like Jesse Helms
and others. So there are political considerations that might be
taken into consideration not by you but by some of us possibly in
deciding how we came down on SALT, depending on what are our
interests and aspirations and what political party we are in.

That is all I meant. It can have some relevance. It is not pristine.

Senator Stone?

Senator Stone. Dr. Kissinger, I simply want to thank you for
putting this SALT hearing in the context of the real world —
particularly what you have been able to enlighten the American
public on today with regard to the regional challenges, the proxy
challenges, the gnawing away not directly at the United States but
at the Third World and in other regions, and just all over the
world, and in linking not the wording of treaty but the posture of
the United States to both what we do about our own strength and
what we do about the challenges.

I think you have made a great contribution today, and I thank
you for it.

Secretary Kissinger. I thank you. Senator.

Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I think you
have made a contribution today and I appreciate it very much.

As chairman, it is my task to do two things at this point. One is
if not to announce, at least to suggest that this committee may
very well like to have you back in September if you would consider
coming back and testifying. You are always a brilliant witness.

Also, I wish to announce that tomorrow the committee will meet
in executive session all day on the question of verification. On

233

Thursday, the committee will meet in this room in open session to
hear John J. McCloy and General Haig testify. Again, Mr. Secre-
tary, thank you for your indulgence. This meeting is adjourned
until tomorrow.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the committee adjourned subject to call
of the Chair.]

SALT II TREATY

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1979

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of
the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, Biden, Glenn, Stone,
Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa.

Also present: Senator Cranston.

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.

opening statement

We are pleased to have before the committee this morning John
J. McCloy, a distinguished elder statesman in the field of arms
control as well as United States-European relations. Mr. McCloy
was High Commissioner for Germany from 1949 to 1952. Since the
early 1960's he has been involved in disarmament and arms control
activities and has been a senior adviser on arms control to Presi-
dents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford.

Mr. McCloy, I am pleased to welcome you to the committee this
morning. We look forward to your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. McCLOY, COORDINATOR OF U.S.
ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES, 1961-63, AND FORMER U.S. MILI-
TARY GOVERNOR AND HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY,
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. McCloy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think, if I may, instead of reading my statement I will summa-
rize it and then open myself to your questions. I do not want to
impose on the committee's time. I know that it has been very
pressing. I will refer a little bit to my experience to which you have
already referred, Mr. Chairman. I was also the Assistant Secretary
of War, as you know, and had a combination of military defense
and disarmament experience and a considerable amount of con-
frontation with the Soviet Union.

I do not go quite as far back as Averell does, Averell Harriman—
I think he went back to Trotsky the other day— but 1 go back to
Stalin and to Molotov, and certainly Khrushchev, but I wanted to
start off by talking a little bit about the treaty process, which has
troubled me a little bit.

The other day I called the White House to try to find out how
this two-thirds thing really got into the Constitution. Well, he

(235)

236

couldn't tell me, because he was doing something else, but they
referred me to the State Department, and in the meantime I went
up and did a little research myself, and I think it is very revealing.
I am sure there are Members of the Senate that are quite as
familiar as I am with the subject, or more familiar than I am with
this subject.

The Chairman. Mr. McCloy, would you please pull the micro-
phone up a little closer?

Mr. McCloy. Certainly.

As I said, my research was quite revealing. I went back to some
very early records. I found that in the Articles of Confederation,
the whole treaty making process from beginning to end, from the
negotiations and first contacts to the final approval was in the
Continental Congress. It was in Congress assembled. They didn't
have any President or didn't have anybody else involved, and they
had agents. They called them agents. I think John Adams was one.
I think John Jay, for whom I have been named, was one, too. But
then they came to the Constitutional Convention and they had to
have a new provision because they had two bodies in the Congress,
the House and the Senate.

The first draft that came through in the Constitutional Conven-
tion provided that the Senate would have all of the complete
authority in respect to a treaty, no President, nobody else involved.
That was the first draft. Then they began to think a little about
the inconvenience and how hard it would be to negotiate, and they
said, well, we have had agents in the past, and as a matter of
convenience, they brought the President into this process.

At that time, the House of Representatives got a little restive
and wanted to get into the act, and I think it was Wilson of
Pennsylvania and Mason of Virginia who tried to get the entire
Congress in. That was defeated. Then they put what in effect is the
present provision into the Constitution with a two-thirds vote, so
the two-thirds figure seems to have come from the old Articles of
Confederation where nine out of the 13 states had to assert
approval.

Again, John Jay began to talk about how elite the Senate was
and how much more significant it was than the House of Repre-
sentatives. He gave a great deal of kudos to the Senate and said
what a fine deliberative body it was, but he pointed out that the
Senators were appointed by the States. That is how it was then. It
was not changed, I believe, until around 1912.

So, by one vote they put the two-thirds provision into the Consti-
tution. , , . , , ^, .

The significant thing to me is that they treated this whole thing
as a legislative problem, because they talked in terms of the law,
the supreme law of the land. Well, who makes the law of the land?
It is the legislative body; the executive does not make it.

Then Alexander Hamilton made a statement which I have in my
statement. I thought this was a very interesting statement. If I
may, I will just read it. This is regarding the Constitutional provi-
sion as it is now, and was adopted. He said, "The qualities else-
where detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign ne-
gotiations"— he spelled it with a "c" in those days and we spell it
with a "t"; I see it has been corrected in my draft though I had

237

hoped they had left the "c" in there — "point out that the executive
as the most fit agent in those transactions" — he was referring to
the convenience of it — "while the vast importance of the trust and
the operation of the treaties as laws plead strongly for the partici-
pation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office
of making them."

James Madison said the same thing even more pointedly, and as
I said, the Senate was ultimately chosen to receive this trust on the
argument of John Jay regarding the significance of the Senate as it
was selected by the legislatures of that time.

When they went back to the original record, I could not help but
see the tremendous emphasis placed upon the legislative aspect of
this, and the fact that from the very beginning it was thought to be
a legislative problem because of its association with the supreme
law of the land.

In my original draft, I commented that I had the impression that
if it was thought at any point that the Executive was exerting any
influence or pressure on the legislative body in the course of its
deliberations on a treaty, I used the expression that they would
turn in their graves. However, I dropped that rhetoric and said
that they would not look kindly upon it.

Bear in mind that treaties were very unpopular in those days,
and there was a great deal of criticism. There was a great deal of
criticism with this particular provision. Later on, John Hay criti-
cized it. He was Abraham Lincoln's secretary, as I recall it, and
later he was Secretary of State in the Roosevelt administration.

In any case, the essence of the thing lies in the legislative body.
It was pointed out that a treaty could get you into a war, you could
come to the aid of another country, and you could even dispose of
some property in the United States, because it was the supreme
law of the land, and therefore it was fundamentally a legislative
prerogative.

I thought that was very interesting. As I say, it is only an aside,
but I am concerned about the treaty process, because I have a
feeling that as we go along, something is wrong with it. We get into
these sort of Army-Navy games just before the treaty. We have the
pressures to reach an agreement. There is pressure on our delega-
tion to reach an agreement. I think the idea of having success
rather than failure, public opinion, media all have an effect on the
process. We are subjected to pressures which I do not believe the
Soviet negotiators are. They know they are the beginning and the
end of all of their process, but I think others have spoken about
that here.

I have read some of the transcripts, and they indicate this. My
experience has been that, at least as of my time, there was a
pressure exerted to get to a treaty at the last minute, and that
pressure generally was favorable to the Soviets rather than to us.
Now, I do not want to make too much of it. In here, I used the
term "they get agreementitis." That is a term that I have coined. I
have noticed it develop. I think that we are subject to pressures by
reason of our open society to a degree.

The Chairman. It really is the fundamental difference between
an open and a closed society.

48-250 0-79-16

238

Mr. McCloy. That is right. That is exactly what it comes down
to.

My other point is this, and I will not spend so much time on it.
You know, we send out task forces all over the place, and I have
attended two or three of those. Now, they did not help me. I was
struggling to try to find my own answer to this question of what do
you think about this treaty. I went to two or three of those meet-
ings. There were lawyers' briefs presented. They were minimizing
the arguments on the other side and maximizing their own argu-
ments.

I do not recall having any talk about the buildup or the vulner-
ability aspect, which has been such a large part of your delibera-
tions here. I suppose this is part of our democratic process, but I
have the feeling that the country and the Senate deserves a little
better than this. But at this point let me say that I am very much
impressed because I have read the transcripts of the presentations
made here to date. I think they have been objective, well done, and
that there has been a rather high order of testimony, so my criti-
cism does not go to that. My criticism goes to the drumming up of
sentiment throughout the country, which I do not think is very
helpful.

How the questions are put is not significant. Of course, it is too
late to change our constitutional provisions. We certainly don't
want to change that now. If I said that the Founding Fathers
turned over in their graves, well, they have been turning over a
good bit in the last 200 years when they see what has happened to
the Constitution in that period, but I do think this is worthy of a
study by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

This treaty making process— I got a Macedonian call in connec-
tion with the Panama Treaty to try to push things through. I
would hope that somehow we could space the process so that some-
how it would not have the political aspect, and particularly in this
one which so vitally affects the security of this country.

I think both sides, pro and con, doves and hawks, have to get
together to try to work out the proper solution and proper answer
to this question.

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I was the first Chairman of the
Advisory Committee. I formed the original ACDA. President Ken-
nedy asked me to come down and set that up, which I did, and I
did become the first Chairman.

Let me say a word or two about verification. I will not dwell on it
because I think you have gotten some very good briefings in con-
nection with it. At one time I was very familiar indeed with this
verification process, and what we had in the way of material, and
the extent to which we could really verify what the Soviets were
doing, and I have seen all of this technique. I have not been briefed
up to date on this, but I am sure it is better now than when I was
here.

I want to emphasize again that when we are in an open society
and they are in a closed society, and we are dealing with a security
matter, they start with a verifiable treaty and we do not have a
verifiable treaty, despite all the techniques and the signs that we
have.

239

We cannot get so much knowledge of what is going on in their
country, not as much as they can get about us. They have a passion
for secrecy as opposed to our passion for disclosure and leaks. That
is a big asset on their side, but I do want to say this about
verification, if I may. I believe the President said that he would
assure the American people that he would not sign any treaty that
could not be verified. Well, that is OK, but there has been a great
deal of emphasis on adequate verification.

However, I go beyond that. I say that the Soviets are a strong
and powerful nation. They have an ideology that is different from
us. We have to take some risks, and even though we know we
cannot verify as well as they do, if we are going to get on with this
thing and have a modus vivendi with them and try to achieve
peace and some reduction of armaments which is so important, we
have to take those risks. I would want to say one or two things
more about that.

First, let me say that the amount of intelligence I think we have
to gather now is very much greater than what we had in the past,
what with the killer satellites, of the Cuban business, and so many
other things. There is generally information that we do not have.
We must not be misled by the fact that when you see some of these
photographs, they will show you the head of a screw on a missile.
That is not the measure of our ability to tell what is going on in
nuclear weaponry in the Soviet Union.

As one man said to me, Mr. McCloy, don't be misled by that. You
must not think because we see that screwhead on that missile that
we can tell every time Mr. Brezhnev goes to the bathroom. He said
there is an awful lot we do not know in areas beyond the testing
areas, but as I say, it is a fact of life, and you have to take some
risks. We have to trust them to some degree and they have to trust
us to some degree or we will not be getting it on, and this is such a
very vital element, this problem that we have for us. I did talk in
terms of what my experiences have been in connection with the
bona fide of the Soviet Union, as I call it. I have dealt with a great
many of them in Berlin and West Germany, and then on the
missile crisis.

When I sat on the fence and negotiated with Kusnetsov, he made
me go out and sit on the fence because he thought my house was
lougged, and we were trying to work out the removal of the missiles
in Cuba. He had been educated in this country, and was absolutely
meticulous in following the understanding that we arrived at. He
leaned over backwards. It was clearcut and there was no chance for
equivocation on it.

Having that, he certainly honored his commitment. On the other
hand, if I had to rely in the process of verification on the word of
the Soviet foreign minister, I would not be so happy. Everybody
knows that he was less than frank, let's put it that way, in connec-
tion with the missiles in Cuba, when he knew they were there, and
he told the President that they were not there, and he told Adlai
Stevenson in my presence that they were not there when he knew
perfectly well that they were there.

So, it depends, like everything else, I suppose, on the individual,
but generally, my experience has been, if the thing is clearcut and
definite, and not subject to equivocation, the Soviets are apt to

240

honor their commitment. For what it is worth, I would say that in
respect of the verification issue.

There are a number of other things I could say about verifica-
tion, but you have heard so much about that, and you have been so
well briefed on it that I think that probably this is as much of it
that I would like to take my time on.

Somebody in one of the transcripts I read was asking what sort
of negotiators these people were. I said I would summarize my
experience in this way. They are good chess players, as everybody
knows. On top of this, they have a deep-seated or gut instinct as to
what they want to feel they should have for their security. After
having been the victims of Western European aggression for two
successive centuries — once, you remember, it was the French in
one century, then it was Hitler in the other century. They resist all
blandishments. There is no such thing as the force of good exam-
ple.

They operate in terms of size, quantity, and power, and I am
going to emphasize that, because power and size is a very big
aspect in their sense of security. When I was dealing with Mr.
Khrushchev over in Putsinda on the Black Sea, he gave me the
same treatment that he later gave President Kennedy. Wielding
those big cannisters around his head and threatening, he said, I
have got to have the biggest, and I began talking about the fine
quality of ours, and he said, I don't care, I want the biggest. He
does want the biggest, and they place a great deal of emphasis
upon the biggest. They have the concept that this connotes power.
Why do they strut out those big cannisters around Red Square the
way they do? Why, we would not think of putting our cannisters
out and parading them around on the Fourth of July, but for them
it is meant to impress. It is the idea of the prestige of size. It is like
the old days when Navy ships were in the harbor, who had the
biggest guns. He was the fellow who sat on the right of the execu-
tive.

It is that aspect. I guess it is the perception of power, as has been
said here. That is a very important thing for them, and he stressed
it with me when I talked with him at Putsinda. He was very
threatening at that time. It was only a few weeks after that that
he talked with President Kennedy.

Let me say this next. In terms of what their intentions are, I
rather agree with the Chief of Staff that they are not planning for
a bolt out of the blue. I do not think they are preparing for a
nuclear exchange with us. I think they are just too intelligent for
that, but some think they are. I just say that I think they are too
intelligent to risk the terrible consequences of a nuclear exchange,
but I want to emphasize this. There is no question about it. They
have been constantly seeking a position in relation to us in which
they felt they might be able to apply pressures or leverages which
would enable them to extend their influence and their so-called
hegemony.

I have no question about that. You have to believe these people
when you have been in contact with them after a time. When they
make a certain statement to you, you are inclined to accept it.

When I finished my conversations with Kusnetsov, and we got off
the fence, we sat down and we shook hands. He said, Mr. McCloy,

241

we are going to live up to this commitment, but we are never going
to be in this position again. I think you will be able to trace around
that time the increase in the so-called buildup. He said another
very ominous thing, and Senator Javits, I think you will be inter-
ested in this. He said, it is all very well for us to be sitting on this
fence talking about Cuba, but this is inconsequential. The real
thing that some statesmanship should be applied to is the Middle
East, because there I see — and he went into this exposition.

Later, I heard and read in the newspaper that Mr. Kissinger
talked a good bit about geopolitics. Well, I have not had the advan-
tage of seeing his testimony. I hope to get a chance to see it today,
but I read something about it in the newspaper. He pointed out
that the Middle East was the juncture between the east, the west,
the north, and the south, the old caravan routes, the navel idea of
the strategic aspect of that.

He said, now we have oil there. We have energy there. He said
there is one place where there is more apt to be an exchange, and
besides that, we think there are some nuclear weapons there.
There may be rumors that there are some there.

Now, that is the area statesmen should be dealing with, because
that is where pressures are most apt to arise. He said, when I was
a young man, we were always told in Russia that our destiny was a
warm water port and the warm water ports are the Mediterranean.

Now, I found that to be pretty enlightening.

Next, we get to a real problem, and I will gallop through this
because I do not want to take too much time. It is indisputable, and
I think everybody agrees, that there has been a major buildup on
the part of the Soviets. There has been a period of 10 years or so
where they have been spending far more than we have, not only on
strategic weapons and ICBM's, but they have been doing it in other
respects, too, and there are consequences that have flown from that
and that are just beginning to emerge. You know what they are.
You have had a lot of testimony in regard to that.

There are ICBM's in the west. That is our main nuclear battery,
and we cannot afford to have a weakness in that area. There has
been a lot of talk around about rough equivalence. Well, you can
talk about rough equivalence in a number of areas, but if you talk
about rough equivalence in that area after the buildup has been
going on for several years and the new stages of that thing, and the
amount of sheer poundage that they can deliver— Nitze points out
the potentiality of something like 7 or 8 to 1 when you multiply the
launchers and the MIRV's. It is in that character with respect to
ours. Well, if that is rough equivalence, you have to put an awful
lot of reliance on the word "rough." In my judgment, we cannot
afford to have the most symbolic of our nuclear weaponry in an
inferior position.

From what I read in the transcripts, this seems to be the case.
Secretary Brown seems to feel that. I have a very high regard for
him. I was involved with him in the early days in this nuclear
business when he was out in the laboratory out west. I think he is
very aware not only of the nuclear potential but of the convention-
al potential as well.

He is quite prepared to admit that we are weak in that particu-
lar area, and that is a very important area, because in terms of

242

accuracy, time of flight, and command and control, it is the most
critical. It may not be so 20 or 30 years hence, but that is the way
it is now. That is the symbol of our strength, and in my judgment
we have to repair that.

In my statement, I refer to the bolt out of the blue and the
possibility is, as the scenarios go, that we could be vulnerable and
that there could be a first strike which would knock out our
counterforce, but Secretary Brown says that there are measures,
and this is in my statement, that they can take on this in the
meantime.

One of them is the release on warning. Well, that leaves you on
a very narrow ledge, and I do not believe many people have much
confidence in the thought that even after our experience at Pearl
Harbor, we just might release on warning, but it is a very short
period of time, a very narrow ledge on which to stand, and we do
not know who would be standing on that ledge at that point.

There are some things that have been done, but I gather they do
not quite fit. I am not saying that we have goofed. I am not trying
to fight over words, but in comparison with the Soviets there has
been a very definite disparity in the expenditures that we have
made in that area.

I think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others have pointed out
that if we have the will, if we have the gumption, and if we don't
overly rationalize, I think a good bit of our effort has been spent in
coining phrases that would justify inaction. The emphasis that we
put on minimum deterrent, too. There has been an awful lot of
stress on minimum and on overkill and that sort of thing. I think
all of those things tend to rationalize inaction at a very critical
point.

There was an effort to understand what was ahead of us and a
belated effort to counter it. I wish that we had had an earlier M-X
for example, and there are a number of other things that could
have been done. I do not say that nothing was done in that period.
I think there was a good bit done. I am not as familiar as I perhaps
should be with what was done in that period, but it does fall short
of what is necessary as I read the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff . ^

Secretary Brown talks about an improved submarine force and
our bombers, particularly the B-52's. He talks about the penetra-
bility of those. I have a very high regard and respect for the air
defense of the Soviet Union, which is certainly going up in its
efficiency, and I am not sure, I am not as confident, I think, as he
is that the B-52's will have the penetrability as late as that. I talk
about that in my statement, there is not a nice fix in time there,
and there may be a period when they would be tempted to strike,
but even so there would be considerable risks for them to take, but
we just cannot afford, either perceptionwise or in reality, to have
that main factor of our nuclear weaponry at a point of inferiority.
I have some difficulty in following the argument that the treaty
freezes us into a position of inferiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Secretary of Defense have placed a great deal of reliance
on them that we can in time remedy the vulnerability of our
ICBM's, and there is nothing in SALT that prevents us from doing
so. They are quite confident that that is the fact. I do not know

243

enough about it to be as confident as they are. They know what
they have in mind. I do not know what they have in mind. I do not
read the cables any more, but they do say that, and they assert
that, and they said nothing can stand in the way of our being able
to do these things unless it is a matter of will, and they say that
there is nothing in SALT II as they read it which impairs our
ability to do whatever they think is necessary to do in order to
redress this imbalance.

I place great reliance on their testimony in this respect. I sup-
pose what they have in mind is that certainly they have in mind
the M-X and the Trident submarine and missiles, and I guess the
cruise missile as well. There may be other items. I noticed that
General Jones talked about other items that he was rather vague
about. I do not know what he has in mind. They may be in the
conventional area. They may be in the gray area with the SS-20's
and the buildup in that part of the world. At any rate, there is an
area there that is something other than just the ICBM's.

Now, I have come to the conclusion that I am sure that what we
failed to do in the past is set a bad precedent. My feeling is that in
this freezing, I do not know why we cannot be as obdurate as they
are at a given point. I have no question that they will be tough in
the SALT III negotiations, as tough as they have been in coming to
their conclusions in SALT II, but at some point we at least ought to
be able to be as obdurate as they are.

So, I come to the conclusion that in taking these steps that they
refer to, that we are on balance better off with the treaty in effect
than without it. I place a great deal of emphasis in coming to that
conclusion on the ability to get information on which we need their
cooperation to a substantial degree. We know more with the treaty
than we would know without it.

As I said, we depend a great deal on their cooperation in getting
the information that we now do get, and I think that would be
excluded if we did not have the treaty. Again, I am not impressed
by the fact that we do have limits on these categories and subcate-
gories. They do not impress me very much. I gather they do not
impress Senator McGovern very much.

All I can say is, they are considerably better than no limitations
at all, and I am thinking particularly in terms of some of the
subcategories. So, I think that is a major and important factor. I
believe it is very important for us to think in terms of the so-called
next phase, SALT III, the opportunity there that we would have to
go into that area and to press upon them again the importance of
significant and equal reductions.

I was very much impressed by General Rowny's testimony. He
was before this committee, I believe, as well as before the Armed
Services Committee. He said that if we had been a little more
obdurate and more tough in 1977, we would have had significant
reductions, but we did not. We faded before their adamantine
attitude. I do not know why we always have to fade before that,
and with the SALT III coming along.

I accept the emphasis which the administration has put upon the
importance of going forward and going into that area provided we
are at least as tough as they are, and that in the meantime we do
not rationalize and drop back to a point where we are now, which

244

is very dangerous. I am impressed, I guess, as I think Senator
McGovern also said, at the many segments of opinion that feel that
we should have deeper reductions and more equal reductions which
would have deep significance.

I feel if we do move ahead with this program that we have now,
the chances of our being able to get those deeper, more significant
reductions, will be increased rather than diminished by the fact
that we are in such a program. The fact that it is futile for them to
try to freeze us into an inferior position, I think, would tend to
induce their acceptance, if we pound down hard enough on the
importance of these significant reductions, both in terms of the
arms race and the peace aspects of it, and the tremendous burdens
that we are under at the present time.

The Chairman. That must be our hope. Otherwise, the SALT
process, which we tend to view as an effort to achieve nuclear arms
control, won't be that at all. It will be arms facility rather than
arms control.

Mr. McCloy. Yes, I say, why continue with it? As somebody said
the other day in the transcripts that I read, let's get rid of all of
this talk of the hawks, doves, and calling of names. I do not think
that advances us very far. I have high regard for Paul Nitze, but I
hear him called a hawk all the time. I think he has made a great
contribution to the country, and I don't believe we would have as
clear a picture of the situation if he had not pointed out the
vulnerability that now exists there, and I would say that in respect
to anybody else, I think we need the cooperation of the pros and
the cons in order to work out the right solution for this thing.

I would like to go back and remind this committee that if it had
not been for the generals, the admirals, and the air chiefs, you
would never have any legislation. I know. I was asked by President
Kennedy to give up my practice and come down here and work on
this subject. I spent so much time in my life, and it goes back to
World War I, in destroying that I thought this was the time to try
to do something to put things together and maybe disarmament
was very much in my mind.

He made a great deal of it in his State of the Union message at
his inauguration. Well, I burned my bridges and came down here.
Then he called me up one day and asked me to breakfast and said,
Mr. McCloy, my advisers on the Hill tell me I cannot risk a defeat
this early in my administration. He said, no longer can I let you be
an administration measure, and I cannot give you White House

support.

Well, he pulled the rug out from under me. I said I had burned
my bridges and come down here. He said, well, if you want to try it
out on your own, you can. Then I was on speaking terms with
every war hero in the War Department, from Eisenhower down. I
brought them up here. I had them write in, and every war hero
that you can name testified and the thing went through with a
hoop and a holler, and he thought I was a great lobbyist.

Hubert Humphrey, who was doing all the work with the civilians
on this, as he called it in those days, the "do good" people, he was
helpful, he was fine, he was in fine spirit, but Lyndon Johnson did
not think he could deliver the votes. The people who delivered the
votes were the soldiers, the hawks. That is how the ACDA got

245

together, and some of the testimony on that is very graphic from
Eisenhower on down.

There are one or two other points I want to make. First, when
you look at the priorities, and goodness knows, we have some very
big issues at this time facing this country, I beUeve that the great-
est issue facing us, facing the human race today is this balance
between peace and war. When one thinks of the number of these
highly targeted, alerted, massive weapons and engines of destruc-
tion and their launchers all around the world and what they could
do to our civilization if they are all let go, it dwarfs some of the
other issues facing us such as energy, even inflation, even the
tyranny of bureaucracy.

These have to take second or third place. Happily, I do not think
the approval or disapproval of this treaty is the issue between
peace and war, but it is a step, and it is something that I think we
should continue to try to advance even though the discouragements
may be rather great along the line.

I do not place very much emphasis upon the fact that if we do
not go through with this treaty, it will tend to proliferate weapons.
I think the example is not all that eloquent in terms of reduction,
to cause them to start proliferating, so I do not place a great deal
of emphasis on that.

I think I have talked enough about the real and the favorable
aspects of the treaty. I like that consultive mechanism, the Stand-
ing Consultative Commission, which you can use to work out your
disputes. I think you can continue to press for these significant
reductions in the future. I think you can be sure that this hearing
itself has stimulated a great deal of interest. There is not a day
that does not go by that I do not get telephone calls from abroad
about what is going on over here.

Let me say a word about that. I have heard that everybody
abroad is enthusiastic about this treaty. I rather doubt that, and I
think I have very considerable contacts. Of course, I do not have
the same contacts that the Government has, because my bailiwick
has really been Europe and the unity of Europe. But I find more
concern today about the credibility of the American deterrent than
I have ever heard since the close of the war. They are nervous over
there. There is no question about it. They have seen the combina-
tion of our loss of superiority together with the buildup, which is
very significant.

You saw what Harold McMillan said the other day in the Ob-
server. He said the exigency is great. We do not have a Churchill
to expound it. I think that was a little extreme, but that was the
thought. Do not tell me there is not concern about the credibility of
the American deterrence. For so long they have been living under
that umbrella, and they wonder if in effect it may not be as
impervious as it once was.

This is a matter of great concern for them. I saw in the paper
this morning that Dr. Kissinger talked about the attitude of some
of our allies. He used the word "ambivalent." Well, I thought he
might have been stealing from me, because I used the word "am-
bivalent" in my statement here. In other words, I agree with him
on that. I think they are disturbed as to what might happen if
there is no agreement.

246

They are sitting on the firing line and do not want anything
unduly provocative. Do not be misled. There is a great nervousness
over there. I want to stress again the importance of Europe. For-
give me if I am rattling on, but I am trying to get through my
statement, and then I will open it to questions.

I have been involved in NATO, the setting up of NATO and in
the general unity of Europe. That has been my major concern and
interest defensewise. In fact, I go back to World War I. I am rather
proud of the fact that I was commissioned in the Regular Army in
World War I. The commission I had was called provisional second
lieutenant. If there is a lower form of animal life in commissioned
ranks, I do not know what it is.

At that point, I was a sort of lackey in the postwar negotiations,
and got a feel of the importance of the unity of Europe. The unity
of Europe and the concept of united with us, is worth I don't know
what. I would say it is worth x divisions. They say how many
divisions does the Pope get, I don't know. It is just one aspect that
is extremely important in the next step, that whatever we do, we
keep them in train.

The Soviets are always trying to undermine that relationship
between the countries on either side of the Atlantic. They do not
think we are Europeans and that we have no business over there.
Mr. Khrushchev has said, you are not Europeans, we are Europe-
ans. You have no business in Europe. They do not like the idea of
unity in the West, but it is extremely important to us. Everything
must be done to keep it. We cannot ignore that any longer and be
as cavalier as I think we have been in the past. So, I place a great
deal of stress on that.

As I have said, my main preoccupation for years has been in the
strength of the alliance and defense unity of Europe. I have had a
great many contacts with European allies. Make no mistake. There
has been deep concern about the perception of the strength of the
United States that persists. I don't know of an Allied chancellor
who is not concerned about that. I very much feel that our allies
would react favorably if the Senate took any steps to clarify or
even amend the treaty in such a way as to confirm the aspect and
the power of the U.S. deterrent.

This is particularly true in face of the realization of the loss of
American strategic superiority, and the dimensions of the buildup.

Let me end up with one little bit of history. I am not trying to
give out any flattery here, but I am very comforted by the fact that
the Senate is now squaring itself away to deal with this very
difficult problem, and it is a very difficult problem. It has many
imponderables in it. We have all heard about the great Senate
debates such as those on slavery in the old days, that on the
League of Nations at Versailles. That is a part of our history.

I want to say that I once had the opportunity to attend on the
floor one of what may be classed as the great debates of the U.S.
Senate. It was the lend-lease debate. I was then in the War Depart-
ment, and I hope the statute of limitations has run on whatever
law I violated, but I went down and posed with the pageboy. Jimmy
Burns put me down there, really, because I knew that statute like
the back of my hand, and I sat through that entire debate. I was 40
years old then, so I was a rather poor elderly pageboy.

247

Senator Biden. That explains to me why you look so young now.
[General laughter.]

Mr. McCloy. Well, we got past the Sergeant at Arms, anyway.
As I say, I was very much impressed and very amazed, really, at
the knowledgeability of issues that was shown, the way the Mem-
bers displayed their familiarity with the subject and their capacity
to deal with it. It was more than capacity. In some cases it was
sheer brilliance.

There was not a weak point that was not detected somewhere in
the course of that debate, nor a strong one that was not weighed in
connection with arriving at their conclusions. Of course, it was not
all of a magnificently high order, but there were some very fine
minds at work on it. When they got through, I really felt that they
had preserved the integrity of the Nation.

I am confident that in the consideration of the SALT Treaty, the
present Senate is quite as equipped as the old one was to reach a
conclusion that will preserve peace and security for the country.

Gentlemen, forgive me if I have rattled on, but in closing let me
say this. I would redirect your attention to Alexander Hamilton's
statement. You, like no one else, are charged with the trust. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. McCloy's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. John J. McCloy

I have been asked to appear before this Committee to express my views regarding
the pending treaty or draft treaty known as SALT II. In doing so I shall also, with
your permission, express certain views on our treaty-making process, particularly as
it relates to SALT II and our security and defense interests. I approach this problem
from what may be a somewhat different perspective than those who have been
actively negotiating the treaty provisions or serving as the immediate back-up
groups. I am a private citizen and for a substantial period of time I have not been
connected in any way with the SALT negotiations, owing, I imagine, to my past
experience with them and with other Soviet contacts I have been asked to give my
views regarding the pending treaty. I trust this experience may be of some value to
the Senate in arriving at a sound determination of its difficult and very important
task.

Perhaps I should first sketch briefly the experience I have had which gives rise to
my views. My interest in military matters and foreign affairs dates back to World
War I when I held a commission in the so-called Regular Army, serving in France
and Germany. I was The Assistant Secretary of War during World War II under
Secretary Stimson. My duties in that office were varied; they related, though not
exclusively, more to the political-military aspects of the war than to problems of
procurement. I had close relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and attended a
number of conferences with our Allies during and after the World War, including
the one at Potsdam at the close of the war where we came face to face with the
Soviet leaders. Later, following General Lucius Clay, I became the U.S. Military
Governor of Germany and after this the U.S. High Commissioner. During this
period I had various confrontations with the Soviets and their political and military
chiefs, particularly in regard to the defense of the City of Berlin. On a number of
occasions I undertook missions or attended conferences with our Allies or our own
Government on defense matters, including our force levels in Europe and the
establishment of NATO, with whose leaders I often maintained close contact.

Following the inauguration of President Kennedy, I acted as his general advisor
on matters of disarmament and helped set up the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency in 1961. At first I was acting director of that Agency, later becoming the
first Chairman of its Advisory Committee. I took part in meetings related to disarm-
ament with Messrs. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gromyko, Semenov and other Soviet
leaders. Though I never was a member of the active negotiating team which repre-
sented the United States in the negotiations leading up to SALT I, I kept in close
touch with the negotiations and attended some of those negotiations. I dealt directly
with the First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the

248

U.S.S.R., Mr. Kuznetsov, as well as with other Soviet officials, including Mr. Zorin,
on the matter of the removal of the Soviet strategic missiles from Cuba.

I had considerable experience in connection with the development of our nuclear
armament in the early days when I served under Mr. Stimson and later during the
period when I was Chairman of the Advisory Committee to which I have referred. I
was a member of the Baruch Committee and had close dealings with the Acheson-
Lilienthal Committee which gave considerable time and thought to the formulation
of our nuclear policy following World War II. At one time I was quite familiar with
our national means of intelligence gathering in regard to Soviet nuclear armament.
This experience, then, and my reading of the transcripts of the current hearing
have shaped my understanding of the issues and my comments to this Committee

today.

First, let me say something regarding our treaty-making process, for I am con-
cerned over what I consider to be some of its defects. We are now all familiar with
the constitutional process which requires that before the President can make a
treaty which becomes effective as the supreme law of the land, it must have been
arrived at "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, . . . provided two-
thirds of the Senators present concur". (Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution).
This is a rather extraordinary and unique provision and I am not aware of any
similar provision in any other country. I have heard a good bit of comment on how
this provision came to be incorporated into the Constitution of the United States. I
have consulted some constitutional historians on the subject and I have conducted
some research of my own.

Members of this Committee, or at least some of them, are probably quite as
familiar with the history of this provision as I am, but I believe it is pertinent to
point out that under the original Articles of Confederation the United States "In
Congress assembled" had the full power both to negotiate and approve any treaty,
provided 9 of the representatives of the 13 states assented. When the Founding
Fathers, with their memories of George the Third, regarded this power, they were
sensitive of the danger of concentrating too much power in one person. They
intended that the making of treaties (which were not too popular) should be a
difficult process. From the beginning of the Constitutional Convention's considera-
tion of the treaty provision, it was contemplated that a fundamental element in the
making of a treaty was the participation of a Federal legislative body. At one time,
some sought to introduce the House of Representatives into the act— for example,
James Wilson of Pennsylvania (3 Records 538) and George Mason of Virginia (4 J.
Elliott, Debates on the Federal Convention 331 (1836)) supported such a position.
Recognizing that the power of making a treaty could have far-reaching conse-
quences, the Constitutional Convention's first draft of the treaty-making power
provided that it would reside completely in the Senate. Due to considerations of
expediency and efficiency, however, later drafts introduced the President into the
process, giving him the right to "make" a treaty "by and with the advice and
consent" of the Senate provided that the consent of two-thirds of the members
present was obtained. In a somewhat different form this provision was finally
adopted by the Convention. The role of the President, as I read the early history,
was conceived of as that of an agent rather than a prime mover. In speaking of the
treaty-making power, Alexander Hamilton had this to say: "The qualities elsewhere
detailed, as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations, point out the
executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast importance of
the trust, and the operation of the treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participa-
tion of the whole, or a portion, of the legislative body in the office of making them.
Federalist Papers No. LXXV.

James Madison said very much the same thing during the debates of the Constitu-
tional Convention. (2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 329 (M. Farrand, ed.

The Senate was ultimately chosen as the more experienced and elite legislative
body to receive this "trust" being, as John Jay pointed out, not elected by the
general public, as it is now but appointed by the legislatures of the several states.
(Federalist Papers No. LXIV). In any event, and for a combination of these rea-
sons—distrust of the concentration of power, expediency and the need for legislative
participation— the provision, as it now stands, was incorporated into the Constitu-

There has been sharp criticism of the provision from time to time. Frequently
Secretaries of State, I believe, have not been very happy with it. John Hay, when he
was Secretary of State, called the provision "the original mistake in the Constitu-
tion" (3 J. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary 156 (privately printed
1908)). I am not certain that he was right. At any rate, there it is, a part °f °"^
basic law of which everyone is on notice, and the wording is very clear. Neither the

249

negotiators, nor the Secretary of State, nor even the President of the United States
can create a commitment, in any sense, binding upon the country £is "the supreme
law of the land", without the vote of two-thirds of the Senators present. I refer to
this fact because I believe the concept that the Senate, by its consideration and its
vote on the treaty, could somehow be undermining the authority of the President of
the United States or his Secretary of State, is not well founded.

I now see the Executive branch sending so-called "task forces" throughout the
country urging audiences "to write you senators". I have attended some of these
sessions in my neighborhood. They did not help me resolve the very difficult
problems I had in making up my mind on the merits of the treaty. Certainly, if my
reading of the record as to how this provision came into the constitution is at all
correct, the Founding Fathers would not have taken kindly to the thought that the
Executive should bring pressure on the Senate in the course of giving its advice and
consent to a treaty, in accordance with the provision of the Constitution.

There are two other aspects of our negotiating procedures which I would like to
mention. As I look back on our negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament
or on the limitation of strategic weapons, I feel that we have been handicapped by
the fact that our negotiators seem always to come under pressure when arriving at
an agreement in the closing or critical stages of a negotiation. Every administration
which sets out to seek a treaty, whether with the Soviet Union or someone else,
seems to come under pressure before it is over to achieve what is considered to be
the political success attached to an agreement, or at least to avoid the sense of
failure if agreement is not reached. On the Soviet side, there is no such public
opinion nor administrative pressure. Given the nature of the Soviet system, the
Soviet negotiators for all practical purposes have the final power in their own
hands. They do not have pressures on them to reach an agreement as do those of
the United States. The result has been that the Soviet negotiators could and, I
thought, did on occasion in my experience sit back and say "nyet" while waiting for
pressure on the U.S. negotiators to build up for an agreement.

The other side of this coin is, I suppose, that with Sente approval necessary the
Soviet side could claim it has been at a disadvantage since an agreement between
the negotiators, while conclusive for practical purposes so far as the Soviet side was
concerned, is not final with us until the Senate approval is forthcoming. This tends,
I imagine, to give rise to the present demand on the part of the Soviets that no
amendments to the treaty can be entertained. My experience has been, nonetheless,
that as the negotiations reach a climax, the United States side tends to contract
"agreementitis' so as to achieve the appearance of success or avoid the charge of
failure if no agreement transpires.

There is another aspect of our treaty making which, I believe, is unfortunate and
it affects the treaty now under consideration as well as some others. In the effort to
secure Senate approval we too frequently feel the need to mount an intensive public
relations program to bring about approval or rejection. Polls are taken and adver-
tised and claims are made that such and such a percentage of the people are in
favor of a treaty and such and such are opposed, without much consideration of how
well informed those polled were or how they were questioned. I deplore the fact that
our treaty-making process seems so frequently to take on this form. May I add that
from reading the transcripts and sitting in some of the hearings I believe this
Committee has been hearing a high quality of testimony and an objective presenta-
tion of the rather complicated problems involved.

At this stage in our history we cannot and should not change our constitutional
treaty-making process, but we ought to be able to arrange our negotiation and
ratification procedures in such a way as to minimize the political pressures and
maximize serious discussion and debate of treaties related to the security of the
country.

Now as to the merits of the treaty. I believe it is indisputable that there has been
in recent years a very heavy Soviet buildup of strategic and conventional forces,
army, naval and air as well as civilian defenses. For over 10 years this has been
going on in terms of appropriations substantially larger than ours and now the
consequences of this effort have quite inevitably begun to emerge. Let us face it,
these consequences are bad. In view of this, I believe that what this country and
this body need and deserve is the most objective analysis available of our present
strategic position, particularly in the light of this Soviet buildup.

I have read Secretary Brown's analysis of our position which he submitted to this
Committee and, of course, I have read the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
though they do not purport to be comprehensive. Secretary Brown has a wide and,
indeed, a profound knowledge of our nuclear and conventional potential and I
believe the same thing can be said of his knowledge of the potential of the Soviet
Union.

250

He has, at times, been one of our negotiators in the SALT process and to a large
degree he has been a proponent of it, as I have been. But I would wish it were
possible to have an analysis of our overall strategic position independent of and
quite unrelated to the present issue of the merits of SALT II. I do not know of any
general board such as we once had which would now be equipped to make an
independent analysis of our overall position. It is probably too late in the day for it
and perhaps there would be all sorts of security objections to making it public. But
it does seem that somewhere along the line there should be available to the Senate
an understanding of what our overall strategic (not only in the sense of nuclear)
situation really is in relation to that of the Soviet Union. It could serve as back-
ground to all the determinations this body has to make in considering the merits of
this treaty and the ultimate decisions as to what needs to be done to bring about
equality as well as to determine whether there is anything in SALT II which would
seriously constrain or inhibit our authority to do it. With such an analysis one
might find it easier to come to decisions. We must always bear in mind that not
only do we have an obligation to maintain our security, but we must always bear in
mind that of our Allies as well. I suggest we do not need more polls or pressures to
reach our conclusions. But every effort on the part of the Administration, as well as
on the part of the critics of the Treaty, should be voted to helping this body arrive
at an informed and satisfactory determination of these questions.

Before dealing further with the serious security considerations which, I believe,
are the main questions before the Senate, I would like to talk for a few minutes
about the matter of treaty verification as I appraise it. The President has said that
the country could be assured that he would never sign a treaty that could not be
adequately verified. Of course, it must depend heavily on what is meant by the term
"adequately" or, as it is sometimes expressed, "significantly" verified. I gather the
Senate now has the opinion of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that the treaty is adequately verifiable.

There was a period when, as Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Disarm-
ament Agency, I was rather well informed about our verification capability in
regard to the characteristics and trend of Soviet nuclear weaponry. Our capacities
in this respect impressed me very much, but it was quite clear even then that we
did not have the whole story. I received from time to time detailed presentations of
the intelligence that we had in this area. The material given us was, of course, most
sensitive. It is difficult for the Senate as a whole to satisfy itself as to the efficacy of
our so-called national capabilities without seriously risking the security of our
information. Valuable information can be imparted to selected members of the
Senate, I suppose, but in some degree it will be necessary to take something on
faith. Impressive as this material is, the sum total of our information in regard to
the Soviet nuclear and military capabilities, would not, I believe, ever be as com-
plete as the sum total of the information which the Soviet Union has of ours. Once
we enter into a treaty with the Soviet Union, with its closed society and almost
passionate attachment to secrecy, they will have a better verifiable treaty than we
will have simply because of our open society and our almost equally passionate
attachment to disclosure and leaks. What with our Freedom of Information Act, our
investigative reporters, our open publications, free wheeling commentators, over-
staffed staffs and government publications, any espionage or information gathering
system as efficient as that of the Soviet Union must certainly have a much easier
time gathering information on our weaponry in this country than our CIA or other
U.S. intelligence agencies can ever hope to attain on theirs in the Soviet Union.

Having said this I have come to the conclusion that this is a fact of life with
which we simply have to live. The Soviet Union with its might and its ideology is
not going to go away; we must continue to attempt to find a modus vivendi with
them and they with us if we ever hope to advance the cause of peace in a nuclear
world and, at the same time, retain our essential security. In short, we have to take
some risks. Even so, I must confess I am somewhat skeptical of the extent of our
"significant" knowledge with respect to verification. I believe there is much infor-
mation which we would have great difficulty in obtaining in regard to Soviet
weaponry particularly before it gets to the testing stage. Having been familiar with
the sites in Iran, I was most skeptical of the Statement made so shortly after their
loss that the verifiability of our treaties with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons
was not significantly impaired. In some way, the Senate must be put in a position to
reach a reliable judgment on our so-called national intelligence sources and our
ability to verify the important treaty provisions.

I have been impressed in the past, as I have said, by what we were able to find
out about Soviet weaponry, but I suggest that you do not let the fact that in one of
our photographs you can see a small screw head in a Soviet missile mislead you into
thinking that this is the measure of our intelligence capacity in the Soviet Union in

251

respect of its strategic weapons. As one of our intelligence officers said to me once,
"Do not think that this means we can tell you every time Mr. Brezhnev goes to the
bathroom." There is much we do not know but, I repeat, I believe we have to take
some risks in the way of trusting the Soviets and they us if we are to hope to lessen
the dangers of a nuclear exchange and to arrive at a point where we can bring
about a really significant limitation on our respective nuclear and conventional
weaponry.

I have dealt with the Soviets on a number of occasions where I have had an
opportunity to judge their bona fide. As I have indicated, I had to deal with them in
such important areas as the defense of Berlin and West Germany and in the Cuban
missile crisis. As to their attitude and negotiating tactics, I would summarize it this
way. They are good chess players, as we all know, and on top of this they have a
deep-seated or "gut" instinct as to what they want to feel they should have for their
security. After having been the victims of Western European aggression in two
successive centuries, they resist all blandishments, the force of good example or
bluffing and they operate in terms of size, quantity and power. By and large I have
come to the conclusion that once the Soviets make a commitment which is clear cut
and incapable of equivocation, they will honor it. I found this to be so in my
dealings with Mr. Kuznetsov over the actual removal of the missiles from Cuba. I
gained the impression he was meticulous in carrying out our understanding. On the
other hand, if in our verification process we were compelled to rely at any point on
the word of the Soviet Foreign Minister, I would have little confidence in it as I
cannot forget that he quite blandly stated to Adlai Stevenson among others that
there were no Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba when he knew there were.

I rather doubt that the Soviets would have much of a motive to cheat in regard to
this treaty. I believe they would very much like to see it in force and have it remain
in force. It is clearly favorable to them in that it does ensure them of at least parity
with US in strategic strength. We have come a very long way from our position of
complete superiority to the present level of relative parity or something less. I
believe they would be ill advised, as a matter of their own interest, to risk the
consequences of cheating, even though I certainly could not exclude the possibility
of it.

One more thought on verification. Although in the past we have been able to rely
heavily on our satellite photography of the Soviet ICBM sites, because it was there
that the Soviet strategic power was centered, it is now quite apparent that with the
whole Soviet buildup we face the need of intelligence on a much wider and penetrat-
ing scale than heretofore. The introduction of MIRVing on top of their civil defense,
the threat of killer satellites to our control and command systems, the great superi-
ority in armor and artillery facing West European targets, the presence of new
forces, including the Cubans, in the Middle East area, the improvements generally
in Soviet anti-European offensive systems (the gray area) will require expanded
intelligence capacities on our part. I would strongly urge that the time for open
season on the CIA and our other intelligence gathering services is passed. They will
need all the talent, energy, esprit de corps and dedication they can muster if we are
to gather the "significant" verification data, as well as the broad intelligence as to
Soviet intentions and capabilities which we should have.

In considering this treaty, I believe, the Senate is aware that there are even more
serious and wider problems before it than how the constitutional provisions regard-
ing the making of our treaties came to be adopted or even how well the provisions
of this particular treaty can be verified.

It is now a fact that by a combination of the Soviet buildup within the treaty and
our own laxity in not reacting to it while we had the perfect right to do so, we are
now in a position of vulnerability. SALT I really had little to do with it. It is clear
now that there has been a continuous series of improvements in their ICBM land-
based systems, none of which, while disappointing to us, constitutes a proven viola-
tion of any existing SALT provision. The Soviets acted within their rights under the
provisions of the treaty and we acted within ours in choosing not to react, beyond
continuing a rather well ordered maintenance of our existing land-based system
avoiding obsolescence and coining phrases such as "minimum deterrence" designed
to rationalize our failure to do anything more than we were then doing. I gather
that very few, if any, now seriously deny that our main land-based nuclear battery
has been made increasingly vulnerable and may well become compromised by this
continuous improvment of the Soviet ICBM land-based systems. The Department of
Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe, do not contest this vulnerabil-
ity, and indeed, if I have read them correctly, actually assert it.

There was some objection voiced the other day, according to a transcript I read, to
the use of the term "goofed" in describing our inaction over the last ten years. Let
us not deal in semantics; let us not waste time in ascribing fault. Let's admit there

252

were a number who could be critized. There is enough fault to go around. The fact is
we did allow our investment in our main ICBM battery to lag just when the Soviet
buildup was going along at its greatest pace. This, of course, had consequences and
we should not blink them by ignoring the facts or by creating phrases or slogans to
rationalize inaction. The basic scenario is that with an immensely greater throw
weight, together with increased accuracy and general quality due in large part to
the Soviet Union's buildup aimed at a given time in the mid 1980's, the U.S.S.R.
would be in a position to destroy or nearly destroy all our land-based ICBMs on a
first strike and still have a reserve of land-based ICBMs to deliver against the
United States. To be sure we would have the capacity to inflict some heavy reprisals
against the Soviet population and their industrial targets, but the option is not a
very satisfying one on the hypothesis that the Soviets would have a considerable
remaining potential, after a first strike, in their land-based ICBM reserves as well
as in their submarines and bombers.

If we accept the superiority of the Soviet land-based ICBM potential over that of
the United States as the Department of Defense does, together with the general
superiority of Soviet or Warsaw European-based nuclear and conventional strength
over Allied European strength, the credibility of the American deterrent on which
so much of the security and confidence of the whole free world depends could be
materially impaired.

Our ICBM land-based batteries are probably the most efficient, the most accurate
and best controlled and commanded, of all our nuclear weaponry. They are also, I
would say, the most symbolic of our strength. We cannot afford inferiority in this
area irrespective of where we stand in others. If our Allies and our potential
enemies perceive that our main land-based nuclear battery is vulnerable, it could
well induce pressures, tensions and tests of will that could lead to dangerous
confrontations.

I doubt that the Soviets are looking toward or preparing for a successful nuclear
exchange with us or a "bolt out of the blue" as General Jones calls it. Some contend
that they are. I think they are too intelligent to risk such a confrontation, but I do
believe, without any doubt, that they have been consciously seeking a position in
relation to us on which they felt they might be able to apply pressures or leverage
which would enable them to extend their influence over our Allies or their so-called
hegemony without resorting to the risks of war. The signs, particularly since Cuba,
certainly point that way.

Hopefully the scenario to which I referred will never take place. Indeed, we have
to do what we can to ensure that, in fact, it does not occur. The Secretary of
Defense points to a number of things, some of which are already in effect and some
which can be put into effect that would not only deter the Soviet Union from
undertaking such a strike but also would restore confidence all along the Allied
line, that the credibility of the U.S. deterrent remains firm.

What are these measures? First, it is suggested that there is always the possibility
facing the Soviet Commander who is contemplating a first strike that if the first
strike were attempted, the targeted ICBMs might not be there. Any such strike is
probably not going to occur without some buildup of warning signals; and the
United States, with memories of Pearl Harbor in mind, just might fire on warning.
It would require a bold decision made within minutes. However you look at it, it is a
very narrow ledge on which to stand and who can tell who will be standing on that
ledge when the decision must be made.

Next the Secretary of Defense states that by 1985 we will have in our improved
submarine force and our bombers a capability of destroying a large number of the
Soviet land-based ICBMs, which should deter them from risking a first strike on our
land-based ICBMs. The B-52 bombers, though aging, he contends, will still have
penetrability and could be put into operation either simultaneously with or before
our ALCM's begin to come in.

We also now have the belated decision to start on the MX's with their mobile
basing modes.

I am a little confused as to just when the MX and the air cruise missiles are
planned to come in. I have the impression there is not a nice time fix on which we
can rely. There may well be a time gap within which it might be tempting for the
U.S.S.R. to attack our ICBMs. I do not believe that our relations with the Soviet
Union are on such a delicate balance that we need to have all our deterrents in
place at the right time in order to create constant and full deterrence. We can strive
to do so, but if, in the meantime we show we have measures on the way and we can
improvise to a degree with our existing forces, there would still be considerable
risks for an attacker to take. Though we may have to go through a nervous period,
it is one so relatively short that the U.S.S.R. would have to make some very fine
calculations, indeed, to choose the right moment to attack.

253

But SALT II is not responsible for this. I wish we had accomplished our modern-
ization a little earlier. I wish we had been a little more discerning of what was
happening in the way of the Soviet buildup and that we had started to counter it
some years ago particularly by starting on the MX program earlier. I wish from
what may be incomplete information that we had not scrapped the B-1, but we did.
We made some miscalculations of the time it would take for the Soviets to improve
the quality of the Soviet ICBMs. However, we should waste no time, as I have said,
in assessing blame, but concentrate on restoring the balance. We shall have to play
catch up football to a degree in bringing our land-based ICBM force either through
survivability or other measure to a point when it is again, both perception wise and
in fact, essentially equal in power to the U.S.S.R.

I have difficulty following the argument that the treaty freezes us into a position
of inferiority. Secretary Brown and the Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to think we can in
time remedy the vulnerability of our ICBMs and that there is nothing in SALT II to
prevent our doing so.

If I heard the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff right, they said
there was nothing in SALT II which would inhibit or seriously impair the United
States from taking any steps which they thought were necessary to offset the
threats to our land-based ICBMs or indeed any other serious threats or to help our
Allies to offset the threats to them in the regional area. This is assuming we and
our allies have the will to do so. I place great reliance on their testimony in this
respect. I do not know that I know enough about the situation to be as confident
about this as they are, but then I do not know what measures they feel we should
take in order to regain the essential equivalence, as the phrase goes. I take it that it
certainly includes the MX, the Trident II submarine and missile as well as the
cruise missile. There may be other items. I also assume that in saying this they
mean action, and not merely reservations of options, for I believe we have passed
beyond the stage where they will prove effective.

I am quite prepared to accept the contention that what we have done or failed to
do thus far has set a bad precedent and that the Soviets can be counted upon to be
as obdurate in SALT III as they have been in leading up to SALT II. But is not the
answer that for once we can be equally as obdurate? My position is that it should be
made perfectly clear that under the treaty we intend to go ahead immediately to
restore the balance with respect to our security. It should also be made clear that
we intend to help our Allies establish the forces necessary to maintain their secu-
rity, through the transfer of technology and equipment. The treaty does not insure
our security by any means. No one can seriously contend that it does. It requires
other determined steps to do that. My belief is that in taking those steps we are, on
balance, better off with the treaty in effect than without it.

I wish to add that if I felt the approval of this treaty would recreate an aura of
complacency resulting in failure to take action to redress the imbalance caused by
the Soviet buildup, the treaty would not have my support.

In considering the favorable aspects of the treaty, I have come to the conclusion
that we shall be in a much better position to verify what the Soviets are doing and
what they are intending to do under the proposed and existing treaty provisions
than we would be without them. Moreover, though the limits set for launchers are
so high that they do not have much meaning, they do constitute limits which are
now set not only in the overall but in the important subcategories as well. They do
restrain unlimited increases in missiles and RVs and hopefully this may encourage
further limitations. To put it another way, they are considerably better than no
limits at all.

I am also ready to accept the Administration's emphasis on the importance of the
next phase, i.e. SALT III although this may be in the realm of hope rather than
reality. I believe it is important to continue in spite of our discouragements to strive
to bring about really significant and equal reductions of armaments as between
ourselves and the Soviet Union. This, I think, we should do as long as we feel there
is a reasonable hope of Soviet acceptance of arms reductions. I do not know enough
about present Soviet intentions to know whether there is such a hope. People whose
judgment and experience I respect feel there is. I have become convinced we have a
better chance of finding this out with the treaty than without it. I am impressed, as
is Senator McGovern, with the fact that so many segments of opinion among the
military and nonmilitary favor the principle of much larger equalized limitations.
General Rowny even seemed to think if we had been a little more persistent about
it, we could have had Soviet agreement to greater reductions in 1977. Larger
reductions continue to be highly desirable, both in the cause of peace and in the
relief they could give each of our countries from massive financial burdens. I would
suggest to Senator McGovern that a convincing demonstration of our willingness to
take the steps to redress the present inbalance ought to induce a willingness on the

48-250 0-79-17

254

part of the Soviets to agree to significant reductions. Or to put it another way, to
discourage them from clinging to the high levels they have been demanding. I am
inclined to agree with those who say that if there is no hope of going forward
steadily with significant and equal reductions in our armaments, there will be real
doubts as to the sense of continuing the SALT process at all.

The size and nature of the Soviet buildup is, of course, related to this treaty as
well as the security of ourselves and our Allies. It makes this debate in the Senate
take on serious proportions. I would hope that it would introduce a note of objectiv-
ity that will dispense with some of the name calling which has marked certain
phases of the earlier argumentation. I should like to record that I believe that Paul
Nitze, who was one of our early negotiators and who is an expert in security
matters and a patriot has done the country a service in pointing out publicly what
he sincerely considers to be substantial disadvantages in this treaty. But for him
and the work of his Committee, I doubt the country and this Committee would have
had as clear a picture of the problems which have resulted from the steady improve-
ments and investments in the Soviet ICBM systems over the last 10 years. I would
like also to remind this Committee of the fact that had it not been for the support of
the generals, the admirals and the air chiefs, mainly the World War II military
leaders from Eisenhower down, there would never have been a disarmament agency
or the legislation which gave momentum to arms limitation efforts.

When we look at the priorities, I believe, we must conclude that the greatest issue
facing this county, and the human race remains the balance between peace and
war. When one thinks of the number of these massive engines of destruction, all
targeted, aimed and alerted in their launchers, and what they can do to our
civilization if they were to be let go, all other issues such as energy, inflation and
the tyranny of the bureaucracy, would have to take second, third or fourth place.
Happily the question of the approval or disapproval of this treaty is not synonymous
with the issue of peace and war, but the treaty, as I see it, does give us, at least, one
more crack in the future at attempting to reduce this costly pile of armaments with
which we are now so heavily and dangerously burdened. If we have the treaty, I
repeat, I would hope that it will afford us another chance to talk seriously with the
Soviets about the real need for more significant and equal reductions of our respec-
tive armaments nuclear and conventional.

I do not place much importance on the argument that if we do not ratify this
treaty limiting nuclear arms with the Soviets, others, absent our example, will be
disposed to start proliferating on their own. I say this because the example set by
SALT II is not all that eloquent. On the other hand, I do believe, as I have
indicated, that we would be better served with this treaty with such clarifications
and reservations this body may see fit to make than we would be without it. I place
particular emphasis on the opportunity for improved intelligence and the opportuni-
ty for going forward which SALT II provides. If we do not go to sleep, and let's not
cavil about it, we at least nodded, then we ought to have a better chance of keeping
our deterrent capability alert and convincing because of certain provisions in SALT
II. The idea of having a standing consulting organization to which each side can
come with its suspicions of cheating is a helpful if not a sure way to test out each
other's bona fide. Under the treaty and with SALT III it would seem to me that \ve
could establish a continuing forum within which to press our point of view and in
the last analysis to convince the Soviet Union that we intend always to take such
action as we feel necessary to resist any attempt on their part to put us to a position
of inferiority. One must remember that, with or without SALT, the price of our
security will, remain as always in eternal vigilance.

Our progress with SALT III may tell us a good bit about the value of the SALT II
treaty. It may prove to be a decisive step. The strong emphasis which the Adminis-
tration places on the on-going effect of the SALT process seems to indicate to me its
own appreciation of the shortcomings of SALT II, as well as its conviction that the
opportunity exists for substantial progress in the next phase of the negotiations. As
long as that hope persists and as long as we remain alert to our own security needs
and those of our Allies, the more we talk with the Soviets about the limitation of
armaments the better. There may be considerable momentum generated toward
such progress by reason of the airing of the whole subject of the strategic situation
in the world which the announcement of this proposed treaty and these hearings
have provoked. One can be sure that the U.S.S.R., as well as our Allies, will "cover"
these hearings and the ensuing debates with deep interest. This is an opportunity of
going further. I believe this opportunity for going forward is worth exploring. It
might be irretrievably lost were SALT II to fail approval.

Here I wish to emphasize that in negotiations for SALT III, it is essential that we
establish a system to obtain the views and meet the requirements of our NATO
Allies whose interests will be profoundly affected by that treaty. We must never

255

forget that the unity of the Alliance remains a vital element in our defense and
that of the free world. The Soviets never cease their attempts to undermine it. We
must constantly preserve it whether we are operating under SALT II or SALT III.

I have said that the consideration of this treaty and its relevance to the Soviet
buildup and our general strategic position in the world is worthy of a profound
Senate debate. There is much more involved than just arriving at a bareboned
conclusion that we are or are not better off with this particular treaty than without
it. What clarifications it may need, what is required in the way of bolstering the
credibility of our deterrent and the security of Allies in the general strategic
situation are all involved.

When it is suggested that there is enthusiastic support for the treaty among our
Allies, I must say I fail to discern it and I have long been fairly close to European
opinion. One has to realize that the United States and the free world are faced with
the reality that this country is no longer in a military class by itself. It is matched,
or, as many serious analysts here and abroad believe, outmatched by the Soviet
Union. Our Allies are very deeply concerned about it. They are close to the division
lines between the East and the West and they are anxious to avoid unnecessarily
provocative attitudes. Their position, as I read it, is somewhat ambivalent. They are
aware of and are deeply concerned about the Soviet buildup; at the same time that
they fear what the consequences might be if after all the publicity no treaty should
ensure.

My main preoccupation for a number of years has been in the strength of the
alliance and the defense unity of Western Europe. I still have a good many contacts
among our European Allies. I am aware that the Administration sought and ob-
tained considerable Allied governmental support for this treaty, but make no mis-
take, deep concern about the perception of the strength of the United States
persists. Naturally, I do not purport to have the wide contacts that our Government
people have abroad, but from my not inconsiderable ones and from much reading of
serious comment I sense a deeper concern today regarding the credibility of the
American deterrent than at any time I can recall. I do not believe there is an Allied
Chancellory in Western Europe which is not uneasy at the thought that in the
future it may not be able to assume, as it has in the past, the U.S. umbrella remains
as firmly placed and impervious as ever. I am inclined to think that our Allies
would react favorably if the Senate took steps to clarify or even amend the treaty in
such a way as to confirm the aspect and power of the U.S. deterrent. This is
particularly true in the face of the realization of the loss of American strategic
superiority and the concurrent dimensions of the Soviet military buildup.

I am much conforted by the fact that the Senate is squaring away to deal with the
difficult problem it faces with the treaty. We all know about some of the great
Senate debates in the past— the great slavery debates, the Versailles and League of
Nations treaty, etc. They are a stirring part of our history. I had the opportunity
once to sit on the floor of the Senate through what might be classed as a great
debate. I was then in the War Department, it was the Lend-Lease debate, and I
posed as a page to get by the Sergent-at-Arms. At issue was our old isolation policy
against the call for our intervention in critical world affairs. I came away from that
debate with great respect for the body you represent.

I knew that legislation like the back of my hand, but I was frequently amazed at
how knowledgeable of the issues involved the members, as a whole, were. There was
not a weak point that was not detected nor a strong one that was not weighed in
the course of debating and concluding the issue. I am confident that in considera-
tion of the SALT II treaty the present Senate will reach a conclusion consistent
with the security of the country and preservation of peace. I would remind you of
what Alexander Hamilton said: You like no one else are charged with the trust.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. McCloy. You may be
certain that we are keenly aware of the responsibility borne by this
committee and borne by the Senate as a whole.

I think that your testimony is very helpful because it extends
back over a long period of time and your dealings with the Russian
Government give you a very special perspective. You have said
that it is your conclusion that the country would be better off with
the treaty than without it, and the reasons you have given us are
that with the treaty we will have a better grasp of what the
Russians are doing than we would have without it.

256

URGES AGAINST COMPLACENCY

You have said that with the treaty there will be at least ceilings
placed on the numbers of weapons and warheads applicable to both
sides, which.will in turn give us a better opportunity to strengthen
our own deterrent in the years ahead. I take it then that since the
Senators must decide whether to vote for or against ratification,
you would urge us to vote in favor of ratification.

Mr. McCloy. Let me point out one paragraph which I did not
read. This is very important. If I thought that adoption of this
treaty would induce the complacency that we have experienced
recently, I would be against it. I read in the newspaper this morn-
ing Dr. Kissinger's testimony, although I did not have the opportu-
nity to hear him personally.

I am urging against complacency, and if I thought complacency
were involved here, I would be against the treaty. He is now trying
to put a guarantee into the treaty, and this is a new thought with
me, one that I think you ought to take into account, because if
there is any guarantee against complacency, I would be for it. I
want to make that part of my remarks to you.

The Chairman. I do not know whether we can guarantee against
complacency. I know of no way of doing that, but there is nothing
in the testimony that we have heard over the past month that
would be conducive to complacency.

Mr. McCloy. I should think not. I would hope not.

The Chairman. That is either on the part of the proponents or
the opponents of this treaty.

RESERVATIONS OR UNDERSTANDINGS COMMITTEE SHOULD CONSIDER

You made one other observation with which I agree, but before I
go to that I would want to ask you if you have any reservations or
understandings that you think this committee should consider in
connection with the instrument of ratification.

Mr. McCloy. Oh, I think we ought to have some clarification, but
I do not know that there should be amendments. There are things
that have troubled me. They have already been expressed, and I
have not tried to repeat them here. You know them, the expiration
of the protocol, the circumvention matter, and two or three other
things.

The Chairman. The Backfire bomber.

Mr. McCloy. Yes, the Backfire. You have to have some reserva-
tions, and some fine drafting, I think, has to go into that. As I said,
I cannot believe that the allies would object to that. I think they
will all applaud that, and I think it is an element in our under-
standing of the treaty, so that we will understand and the Soviets
will understand just what we intend to do.

Let me come back to what I understand Dr. Kissinger spoke of
yesterday. He talked about a program, something that would clear-
ly demonstrate we were on our way, and demonstrate to the Sovi-
ets as well as to ourselves, and that even though we can't bind
another Congress, that this was a program that could be adopted. I
was rather intrigued with that. I didn't have any collaboration, of
course, with him at all on this. I met him at breakfast one time,
but he did not tell me what was involved.

257

I would be in favor of anything that can seal or be the earnest of
our will.

TREATY AS A STEPPING STONE TOWARD REDUCTIONS

The Chairman. Well, it may be that there is a way to deal with
two concerns. As you have already indicated, the SALT process has
not carried us very far toward arms reduction in the nuclear field,
yet everybody knows the ominous danger and the futility of a
continued buildup of nuclear weapons and the terrible devastation
that would be wrought by nuclear war.

It seems to me that the chief justification for this treaty is that it
is a stepping stone and a necessary stepping stone toward the day
that we can reduce these levels on both sides. So, possibly there is
an opportunity here to do two things. One would be to try to find a
consensus on what needs to be done to strengthen our deterrent in
the coming years, both to eliminate any possible hazard to that
deterrent and to give us a bargaining position from which we could
seriously endeavor to achieve substantial reductions on both sides.

If we could combine the two and on the one hand say these
things need to be done in connection with our own defense in the
coming years, and on the other hand say that our objective in
SALT III will be to achieve substantial reductions in the number of
nuclear weapons on both sides, and thus make it clear what our
path would be to set out the guideposts which will delineate the
path the country intends to follow in the coming years, it would be
helpful to us.

Would you agree this might be an opportunity for us?

Mr. McCloy. I was rather impressed when I read in the paper
this morning about what Secretary Kissinger said. He said, let's be
sure in the meantime that we don't slide back, because to the
extent we slide back, the less chance you have in my judgment of
getting to the objective. I think it is important therefore to exam-
ine what he had to say in regard to the assurance — he talked about
a 5-year program. I do not know how you could have just 5 years
and not bind the other years, but we do have plans. We had plans
in the War Department in my day that extended for 4 or 5 years
and there they were. It took something to change that plan. I guess
that is what he was driving at, although I do not know. I have not
talked to him about it.

I am terribly concerned that we do not find ourselves at a given
point in the same situation that we are in now, that's all. Some-
body asked me about linkage, and I wanted to talk a little bit about
that. That was a new thought that he introduced yesterday on
which I have some ideas. Forgive me for interrupting.

LINKAGE ARGUMENTS NOT PERSUASIVE

The Chairman. Surely. I think Dr. Kissinger's testimony was
very valuable. I did not think that his linkage argument was very
persuasive. I do not think that the Russians are going to leave
Angola because they think if they do not we might nuke them.
This connection between nuclear deterrent and adventurism is one
for which no one has given us any evidence, just doctrine so far.

258

Mr. McCloy. I would like to make a comment about that later
on.

The Chairman. My time is about up, so if you would like to
make a comment, please do.

Mr. McCloy. Thank you. I listened to the linkage argument and
it disturbs me. Somebody said to me the other day when we were
talking about this that we do not want to go back to the cold war.
Well, I was in the cold war. I was eyeball to eyeball in it in the city
of Berlin at that point, but what are we in now with Yemen, with
Afghanistan, with the Horn of Africa, and the other tender spots of
the world where the pressures are coming from with the Cubans
abroad. At least it was concentrated at one time in the city of
Berlin, and in and around Germany.

I do not understand the matter of linkage. Then there is this
report that you have to make every 2 years, according to the
newspaper this morning. I think that would be rather awkward,
but I do not mind saying that if you continue this adventurism and
it begins to get so utterly consistent with the concept of detente or
the concept of trust that we have to have in connection with
disarmament, that you had better watch out, but my feeling is, I
would not put it in the treaty. That is all.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. McCloy.

Senator Javits?

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we have before us this morning one of the men
whom I respect most in our country. He is from my native city, and
he and Averell Harriman are two of the most distinguished and
most experienced minds that we have related to the foreign policy
of the country.

Mr. McCloy, I thank you very much for appearing here today.

Mr. McCloy. Thank you. Senator.

Senator Javits. There is one element that our chairman said he
is thinking about, about which I am also thinking: future negotia-
tion. I am quite sure he would agree with me. This is the additional
point that we should not negotiate a SALT III Treaty without
giving notice in advance that it must substantially reduce aggre-
gate armaments. It seems to me that that begins to fashion a policy
we want because it will be remembered that in SALT I we commit-
ted to equivalency of aggregate numbers by Senator Jackson for
SALT II, and in SALT II we should give the Soviets notice in
advance that we will not have a SALT III unless there is a substan-
tial and meaningful reduction in aggregate nuclear armament.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. McCloy. Yes, I agree with that. I have something to that
effect in my statement. What is the use of going on if you cannot
achieve that?

Senator Javits. Right. The other question I would like to ask you
is this. I notice with great interest this particular sentence in your
statement: "I have difficulty following the argument that the
treaty freezes us into a position of inferiority."

It seems to me that that is the way the SALT argument is now
going. I think the proponents so far have had the edge in the
debate in the sense that we lose nothing and may be gaining
something, provided, as you and Dr. Kissinger and the Joint Chiefs

259

of Staff all say, we take the necessary precautions to insure that
we do not slip behind but that we remain where we are because
there does not seem to be any great argument that there is rough
equivalency now, to wit, August 2, 1979.

Therefore, it seems to me that the burden has shifted to the
opponents of the treaty to show that we are going to be taken by a
tranquilizer or by complacency or by something which is going to
lull us to sleep. Their argument is, don't do it, not because of what
the treaty says, but because of your own state of mind or your
psyche and so on.

What would you say about that?

Mr. McCloy. Senator, I was trying to get at that thought. As I
said a little while ago, why can't we be as obdurate as they are?
This is a substantial argument to me, as you point out.

Senator Javits. Now, no one knows the Europeans better than
you; they are the principal factor in Europe. Now, we are adopting
a new concept, to wit, superiority cannot be continued in nuclear
armaments. We are accepting the doctrine of essential equivalence.
Do you believe that Europe is likely to continue to have faith in
the U.S. deterrent and in the U.S. defense posture respecting their
security with the acceptance of that doctrine of essential equiva-
lency, assuming that we really implement it, or do you think that
that will change Europe's reliance on the United States?

Mr. McCloy. That question requires a rather difficult judgment.
They deplore the fact that we have given them superiority. They
think of the American umbrella and have thought of it too confi-
dently, in my judgment, and without enough effort on their own
part. So, anything in the way of a diminution of American superi-
ority concerns them and worries them, but I have the feeling that
they have no other alternative than to come along with us because
it is so important that we have this unity with them, and if they
have any doubt about the vigor and strength of our equality and
our parity position, if that doubt were removed, I think their
confidence would be restored.

I think for the moment they are nervous. The way it is now, in
flux, they are not secure. They do not have a sense of security, but
if we go along the way that you are talking with an honest,
definite, earnest — we won't call it a guarantee, we will call it an
earnest, which is more than just mere words — I think their confi-
dence would be restored, and you would have a confident, a much
more stable situation in Europe than you have today.

Senator Javits. Thank you.

Few men have had as much experience negotiating with the
Soviets as you have, and under very tough circumstances.

Now, there is a question before us. We have rough equivalency.
We are likely to lose it unless we follow these highly expert judg-
ments of your own, of Dr. Kissinger's, and I am sure General Haig
will tell us about this, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, there are some who would say, tell the Russians you are
going to do this and negotiate on the basis that they know we are
well able to do it once we get our teeth into it. There is another
school which says, do it, start doing it. Kissinger wants a binding
commitment, and we probably can't do that, but we can do some-
thing along that line, as I have just mentioned.

260

My question is this. Knowing the Russians as you do, are they
going to beHeve us unless we actually go ahead, spend money,
invest resources to build up? Only then will they believe that we
really intend to negotiate earnestly, or do you believe that our
reputation for being able to do fabulous industrial things is so
great and so established as to put a man on the Moon, the Manhat-
tan project with the atom bomb, and so on, that if we say we are
going to do it they will take our word for it and negotiate as if we
did?

Mr. McCloy. We have to put our redressing steps in process.
They are realists. If they see that we are moving in that direction,
they will be much more convinced and much more apt to be
responsive than if we simply say, look out, or we are going to do it.
They need a demonstration. They are realists. If they see that we
are deliberate and that the meshers are in train, I think you would
have a better chance with them and having them respond than you
would otherwise.

Senator Javits. So we have to show them, not just tell them?

Mr. McCloy. Yes. They resist blandishments. They resist good
examples. I think we have to get to the point where we are not just
reserving options, but where we are acting. The reserving of the
options is passe now.

Senator Javits. Thank you very much, Mr. McCloy. Your testi-
mony has been very, very helpful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Javits.

Senator McGovern?

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCloy, I want to join my colleagues in expressing my
appreciation for your long years of service to our country. I was
delighted with your answer to Senator Javits when you said that
you thought this treaty ought to be accompanied in some fashion
by a clear resolution on the part of the Senate that our negotiators
in SALT III ought to press hard for meaningful and substantial
reductions and, failing that, we are not really interested in SALT
III. That has been my position all along. I do not see much point in
ratifying SALT II unless it can be accompanied by that kind of
assurance.

This morning I had breakfast with a number of Senators whom I
guess you would describe as moderates. Some of them may be
liberals. They are generally Senators that I think would hold views
that you would respect. The debate was whether we ought to go
that route with a resolution that I have drafted which would
accompany the treaty, not as an amendment, but simply as an
accompanying resolution committing our negotiators and instruct-
ing them to go into SALT III with a position that we are going to
press first for a freeze and then for a certain percentage reduction
in aggregates of nuclear weapons.

There was a counterview presented by Senator Hatfield; I know
he now has talked publicly about it and would not resent my
mentioning it here today. He argued that we ought to have an
amendment to SALT II which says that we want a freeze now. We
do not want the formula that is presently written into SALT II. We
want a freeze on existing weapons systems, the theory being that
there is a rough equivalency between the two countries. So why not

261

write it into the treaty right now and go back to the drawing
boards and negotiate that freeze at the moment?

I would have to say that the Senators in the room, the 8 or 10 of
them, were pretty evenly divided between those two approaches.
Which of the two would you tend to support?

Mr. McCloy. a little while ago, I said to one of the Senators here
that my conclusions were as of this date. I am not sure that the
case is yet in. I think the case is going to develop as the debate
goes on. One of the chief points is, how do you do this drafting? I
have not addressed myself to it at all. I know it is going to be a
pretty neat bit of draftsmanship that you will have to think about
in order to put this into the right nuance.

Senator McGovern. Would you be willing to look at a possible
draft?

Mr. McCloy. Yes, I would be willing to look at it. I haven't any
thoughts about it now, but I can sense perhaps as a lawyer that
some tough drafting is necessary, whether it is amendment form,
resolution form, how it reads, and how it matches is, I think,
extremely important.

Senator McGovern. We would like to draw on your expertise
and submit that to you.

Mr. McCloy. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE

DISARMAMENT

Senator McGovern. I was reading in preparation for your testi-
mony, Mr. McCloy, the statement of principles that you negotiated
with your counterpart, Mr. Zorin, back in 1961, that you submitted
to the General Assembly, a statement of eight principles which
commits the two countries to achieve agreement on disarmament
that is general and complete.

It goes on to call for the cessation of the production of arma-
ments, the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass
destruction. Then the final point says that, states participating in
the negotiation should seek to achieve and implement the widest
possible agreement at the earliest possible date.

Now, that was 18 years ago that we committed ourselves to
complete and general disarmament. When Dr. Kissinger was here
the other day, he pointed out that when we signed SALT I, the
Soviets had 3,200 warheads. By the time we ratify SALT II, if we
do, they will have 6,000, and by the time SALT II is ended, we will
have 12,000. Now, what happened? Where did the whole process go
off the track from what you and Mr. Zorin agreed upon some years

ago?

Mr. McCloy. Well, that is interesting. Of course, that was a long
time ago, and I would have to give you my first blush reaction to
the Zorin thing. If you remember, at that point the Soviets were
making tremendous propaganda about how peaceful they were and
how we were the imperialists. The phrase was that they were in
favor of general and complete disarmament. This was all over the
world. It was a real propaganda effort. I think if you look back 18
years ago, you will find they were making great strides in their
propaganda.

262

One day I said to him, OK, I will call your bluff. Are you
prepared to sign this agreement? You are talking about general
and complete disarmament. Everybody is in favor of peace. We are,
too, so let's write this down, and this resulted. As a concomitant of
that, I said that you have to have some sort of arbitration here in
case we get into difficulties.

At that point, their enthusiasm for that propaganda died. I
would throw that in at this point as one of the elements that
caused the McCloy-Zorin statement of principles to sort of fade
away. They lost interest in it. The Soviets lost interest in it at that
point. There had been a tremendous propaganda flag at that stage,
and I came to the conclusion later on that they were not really
interested in general and complete disarmament with all that went
along with it.

I said to Khrushchev at that time, there it is. Now, then, we
have to submit to arbitration. He said, we cannot submit to any
court that I do not control.

Senator McGovern. Mr. McCloy, I have read your prepared
statement, and a good deal of it is on your own concern about the
negotiation and ratification procedures?

Mr. McCloy. Yes.

Senator McGovern. I gather that for perhaps somewhat differ-
ent reasons you share the concern that I do about this whole
process. Senator Church has described it as a stepping stone to real
reduction. I have the greatest respect for Senator Church. I guess I
am still not sure that it is a stepping stone to real reductions
because of this negotiation and ratification process about which
you talk. You talk about the political pressures. The press has been
filled with references lately that Senator Nunn and others are not
going to vote for this treaty unless the President agrees to a major
military expansion.

Senators who make those kinds of comments are always referred
to in the press as "respected Senators." Now, I respect them, but I
respect every Senator on this committee. What can those of us do
who really want substantial reductions in order to get it? We have
watched this process year after year, and the arms race continues
to escalate. I am very skeptical about what we will get in SALT III.
Do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. McCloy. Well, more and more as the years have gone by I
have noticed that process developing. As I have read your state-
ments and other transcripts, my answer is: I have the feeling that
unless you convince the Soviets that there is no chance of their
achieving any sort of superiority or putting us into a position of
inferiority, until you get to that conviction, considering ever3rthing
that has developed in terms of their buildup in these last years,
you are not going to get them seriously to consider significant and
equal reductions.

I think the best opportunity we have is to convince them that we
are serious about this. I do not know whether or not you were in
the room when I spoke about General Rowny. Well, I perked up my
ears when he said: "I thought that in 1977 if we had been insistent
enough we might well have gotten that reduction." I know at a
given point if we had insisted on onsite inspections I feel we could
have gotten it. I feel that. I have a feeling that we need that little

263

note of iron will in there to take this next step. Without it, I rather
despair of it.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. McCloy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCloy, first, let me say that knowing your own style as I
have learned to know it through the years in working with you,
out of 47 pages of testimony, I would say 45 pages represent your
own handiwork. I do not know where the other 1 y-2. or 2 might have
come from.

Mr. McCloy. Well, now, I will tell you. A very attractive young
girl works in the summer in our office. She goes to Columbia Law
School. She is at least responsible for those two pages. [General
laughter.]

Senator Percy. I pay tribute to her also, but I think the contribu-
tion you have made in researching the treaty making power of the
Senate is invaluable to us.

As you say here: "As I read history, the executive branch is the
agent rather than the prime mover." Does Secretary Vance agree
with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison that the President is
an agent and that the prime mover is the legislative body in
making a treaty? As you say the concept that the Senate by its
consideration of a treaty could somehow be undermining the au-
thority of the President of the United States or his Secretary of
State is not well founded. Have you taken that up with the Secre-
tary of State?

Mr. McCloy. I have not taken it up with Mr. Vance, although I
do know that Secretaries of State are not particularly fond of this
doctrine. Hay did not like it, and I think, as you said, there was
another Secretary who complained about the fact that he had to
submit the thing as much as he did, but I have no doubt about how
the Founding Fathers felt about it. They were pretty astute men.
These were Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, James Madison.
They are all on the record. The statement of Alexander Hamilton's
was an eyeopener to me.

It has not happened that way and, as a practical matter, I
suppose we have to take it for granted that the President does play
a larger role as a matter of custom, but the fundamental reasoning
was to me very, very persuasive. This is the law of the land, the
supreme law of the land.

effect of salt II ON confidence crisis on EUROPE

Senator Percy. I wish Senator Byrd had had your testimony with
him when he talked to Mr. Brezhnev and people in the Kremlin. I
think it would have reinforced his hand when he said the Senate's
imprint is going to be felt on this treaty. It reinforces our position
that, as we develop understandings and reservations to clarify
ambiguities, we are fulfilling a constitutional function. It is not an
intrusion. It is our duty and our responsibility.

President Carter has cited a national crisis of confidence as the
reason for much of the domestic difficulty the U.S. currently faces.
You sense a similar confidence crisis within NATO as regards the
will and capability of the U.S. Government. Does the SALT II

264

agreement erase these doubts? Does it increase them or have any
effect at all on this crisis of confidence in Europe?

Mr. McCloy. I would have to speculate as to just what the
opinion of Europe is. I tried to say a little while ago — perhaps you
were not here — that there was an ambivalent attitude which I
noticed Dr. Kissinger has addressed, also. I am sure that generally
there is a question around the world about leadership. We talk
about leadership everywhere. It is not so evident in Europe either,
and there is some skepticism about it as well.

I have a feeling that everybody craves this thing that we call
leadership, and it does not seem to be as apparent as it used to be.
I have a feeling that that is mixed in with their worries and
concerns over the Soviet buildup and the loss of American superi-
ority to which they have become so used.

I think they have to adjust themselves to what is happening in
the world just as we do. My plea is that we keep in closer contact
with them, and have a better exchange. That is why I feel this
circumvention business is so important.

EFFECT OF DEFEAT OF SALT TREATY ON NATO ALLIANCE

Senator Percy. Both you and Dr. Kissinger used the term "am-
bivalent" to describe European attitudes. There has been a signifi-
cant difference of opinion among witnesses that have appeared
before us regarding the effect the defeat of the SALT Treaty would
have on the NATO alliance. How do you feel our allies would react
if the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the SALT II Treaty by a two-
thirds vote?

Mr. McCloy. I think if the Senate failed to ratify after all of this
publicity and after all of the emphasis that has been placed upon
it — I talked to Helmut Schmidt about this a good bit — there would
be an easiness that would develop there. On the other hand, in my
judgment, they are all uneasy as to the Soviet buildup and the loss
of the American superiority, and what is it that they can lay to as
the sailors say? What is it that they can lay to in terms of what
they could hope in the way of aid and security from the United
States in the next decade or so. I think that is why they are
worried.

It is a combination of things. When somebody tells me they are
all enthusiastic for this treaty, I just do not think that is so from
the reactions that I get, because there is an element of worry. I say
there is the loss of American superiority and the dimensions of the
Soviet buildup, particularly regarding things like SS-20's and
Backfire, which they feel threaten them as they have never been
threatened before.

Senator Percy. Do you think some of that apparent lack of
enthusiasm by, say, the military might be clarified by some of the
understandings that we were discussing here?

Mr. McCloy. Yes; I think that is a very important aspect of this
whole thing.

Senator Percy. We think so, too, and we certainly will be pursu-
ing them. Until recently, the United States maintained a strategic
superiority over the Soviet Union. The consensus is that now, at
best, we are in a position of essential equivalence. Some feel this
development has been accompanied by a decline in U.S. world

265

influence and prestige, and the forecasts for the future are even
more ominous. Do you share these views?

Mr. McCloy. Oh, I think there is a nervousness all around the
world. We are in a troubled period. There is no question about
that.

Senator Percy. Are our European allies especially concerned
about the U.S. military capability, or are there other reasons for
their apparent concern about U.S. leadership? Is it essentially
based on the decline of U.S. military superiority or are there other
things about U.S. leadership that concern them just as much?

Mr. McCloy. You are getting me into political areas now. Let me
say this. I am not partisan at all in this thing. The only jobs I have
ever had in Government were given to me by Democrats, even
though I am a Republican. I think that the resignation of the
Cabinet the other day sent a tremor, judging from the telephone
calls I got. They did not understand that. There was a nuance
there that meant the collapse of government to them, those across-
the-board resignations. That sort of culminated the general worries
they had about the leadership here.

They so crave a vigorous, strong leadership from this country
because they are so used to it and so dependent upon it that any
sign of weakness is disturbing to them.

Senator Percy. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. McCloy. We
very much appreciate the time and thought that you have put into
your testimony. It has been extraordinarily helpful to us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Percy.

Senator Biden?

Senator Biden. Would Senator Pell like to go first?

The Chairman. Senator Pell had asked to pass for the moment.

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SALT II

Mr. McCloy, I found your testimony most interesting. Your his-
torical perspective on these matters, which is unique, was very
fascinating. I would like to make a few comments and ask you to
comment on my comments, if you will. It seems as though this
committee is being prepared to accept the concept of nuclear supe-
riority as having any relevance. Although I may be a minority of
one in this regard, it seems to me that nuclear superiority is a
meaningless concept. Unless we fundamentally and unilaterally
reduced our central systems we are so beyond the point where
either nation could inflict upon the other a nuclear strike with any
degree of impunity.

The other thing I would like to mention on which you can
comment is this. No one has a better perspective than you of the
European attitudes about which we frequently talk and which I
fully agree. I obviously do not have your experience, background,
or knowledge, but in my recent trips to Europe and my contacts
with the European leaders of all political parties, there is the
skittishness you referred to, but it seems to me it does not have
much, if anything, to do with central strategic systems. It has to do
with Henry Kissinger's policies, the very ones that he criticized.
The "Year of Europe" never came about because he kept us in

266

Southeast Asia. European attitudes and concerns were never ad-
dressed because we kept involved in parts of the world, not under-
standing what our real security interests were and where they lay.

Now we come about and we say, well, somehow the Europeans
have lost faith. Well, they lost faith because we paid no attention. I
have only been here since 1972, but I kept hearing what are you
guys doing in Southeast Asia, what are you doing there? Why
aren't you paying attention to Europe? Why aren't you paying
attention to your real interest? Now we have a man who has
impressed you by his testimony yesterday. He has impressed the
press. Apparently he has impressed my colleagues in the Senate,
and yet he was the problem, or at least he was part of the problem.
Let me respectfully suggest that. Yet we are sitting here talking
about Henry Kissinger's secret solution or unique solution to a
problem that I firmly believe he, although not alone, was at least a
significant part of, he and the architectural team that brought
about the malaise that exists in Europe today.

Mr. Chairman, I may be mistaken, but for the first time I believe
you have approved having European parliamentarians actually tes-
tify here in this body before this committee in September.

The Chairman. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Biden. We may hear more about it, but I have not heard
anywhere anyone suggest that their analysis of our central strate-
gic systems revealed that we are inferior. The only thing I hear
Europeans say is, well, you fellows say you are. Nitze says you are.
Haig says you are. It looked to us like you are not, but since they
are saying you are, we have to pay attention.

I am sorry to express my frustration like this, but it seems that
what is being accepted here, Mr. Chairman, is, nuclear superiority
is really a live concept, that it makes a difference, and that we are
inferior, or at least barely hanging on. That is No. 1. No. 2 is that
somehow it has been inaction on the part of an administration in
building up massively in nuclear weapons that has caused this
insecurity in Europe. Third, that we are in a position now where
all we have to do is make a massive commitment to nuclear arms
and we are somehow going to redress this attitude that worries us.
I would respectfully suggest that Europeans are more concerned,
and this is what I want you to comment on if you would, Mr.
McCloy; No. 1, they are more concerned about our will.

Our will is reflected in terms of our attitude and our attending to
their concerns, being responsive to them, listening to them, being a
partner with them. Second, they are most concerned about conven-
tional capability. Third, they seem to be concerned about our abili-
ty to be discriminating about what really constitutes U.S. self-
interest, to be able to discriminate between our interest in Angola
and our interest in the Middle East, to be able to discriminate
between our interest in Germany and our interest in Botswana. We
have shown, it seems to me, a real propensity not to be able to
discriminate, and now we have men coming before us who are
architects of that indiscriminate— my term— policy, that caused
this attitude in large part to exist, saying that the way out, the
cure, is to build more nuclear weapons. By the way, it follows that
we are not going to be able to do as much on conventional weapon-
ry if we do. What we are going to do— not quite in John Kennedy

267

terms of fight any fight or light any Kght — is to go wherever we
need to go to show the Soviets that we intend to stand up to them.

I would respectfully suggest that in an attempt to overcome a
real problem — that the United States has shaken the confidence of
its allies through a whole series of events, and the United States
will is in question both here and abroad, both of which are true
and we accept or seem to be taking for granted as the basic
premise for the syllogism that we are putting together here in the
Senate to come to our logical conclusion — we are accepting the
wrong answers.

You used the phrase, slide back; we do not want to slide back. I
agree with you. What I do not want to slide back to is the Kissin-
ger era, the Johnson era, slide back to the indiscriminate misun-
derstanding of where our interest lies. That is where I do not want
to slide back to, and my time is going to be up in another 2
minutes, and I haven't asked you a question but I have expressed a
point of view that you may very well disagree with, and because I
do respect you so much, I would like you, in as discriminating a
way as you desire, to tell me why I am all wet, or why I am
correct.

Mr. McCloy. Well, that is quite a comment you made. I have
been trying to think about what appropriate comment I could give
you in response. Bear in mind that our allies abroad are nervous
every time we do not look at them. They want their hands held.
They have been through all these great disasters in Europe. When
we move toward the East, they deplore it. They say, pay attention
to us, and I was critical — I will say that I was critical of Dr.
Kissinger. I thought of him as fundamentally a European. I do not
think he paid enough attention to the European thing. I think he
was a little too confident that he could control it, and he did not
pay as much attention to mending his fences over there as I
thought he should.

I have told him this at times. There is nothing very bitter about
it, of course. I just had the feeling that we were neglecting the
European scene, but you know, you are a creature of your own
experience. This is where I have put most of my energies, and I
would deplore a diverse, indiscriminate presentation, to be sure.

Certainly, we are a world power, and some of those countries are
not world powers, and we have responsibilities in the Pacific as
well as the Atlantic, and they have to live with that. I thought for
a while we were missing the emphasis that we should have had. I
told Kissinger that at one point, but that is as far as I will go. I do
not want to criticize him. He was sitting there where he had the
responsibilities, and I did not have the responsibility, but I had the
feeling that the cohesiveness of our policy was not apparent
enough to be convincing to our most important friends.

Senator Biden. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Pell, I will turn to you.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

268

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES ENHANCED BY SALT II

Mr. McCloy, there is one point that you touched on in your
testimony, and that concerns our abihty to follow the weapons
development in the Soviet Union. I believe you said that our intel-
ligence collection capabilities are vastly enhanced by the passage of
SALT II. Could you enlarge upon that thought, please?

Mr. McCloy. I am not quite sure I understood you, Senator.

Senator Pell. In other words, by passing SALT II, we will have
an increased intelligence collection capability that we would not
have otherwise.

Mr. McCloy. We would have facilities with SALT II for collect-
ing intelligence in the Soviet Union. I think we would not have if
we did not have SALT II, because we are dependent to a substan-
tial degree on their cooperation with some of the intelligence that
we get. They would not let us fly over there the way we do if it
were not for SALT II, and I am aware of what we can do in the
way of monitoring and in the way of verification, which is very
impressive, even though I am not brought up to date with it.

So, I would just say that, but I would not say that is the differ-
ence between whether you should ratify or whether you should not
ratify. It is a broader question than that.

Senator Pell. Right, but this is one very important point that
has not been made in the past, and I think it is a very useful point
indeed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Pell.

Senator Stone is next.

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EUROPEAN distress ABOUT AMERICAN WILLPOWER

Mr. McCloy, you have referred to the perceived distress by our
European allies or at least some elements among them regarding
the state of American willpower. Historically speaking, how has
that progressed? Did they have a distress about our willpower
during the Berlin crisis?

Mr. McCloy. They were always nervous, because they are right
on the scene, but I am not aware that they were nervous about the
position that we were taking in connection with the Berlin crisis.
They were always afraid of an explosion there because they know
they are the first ones that are going to be hit, but they certainly
were cooperative with us in that connection.

I was in the center of the airlift at the time, and they were solid
with us, the Berliners were; down in the zone they were, too.

Senator Stone. Were they distressed at the status of our willpow-
er during the Cuban missile crisis?

Mr. McCloy. That was interesting. I was in Europe at the time
that thing broke. They called me home. I am just trying to remem-
ber what the atmosphere was then. The interesting thing was the
promptness with which General DeGaulle saw the significance of
those missiles in Cuba. He saw that the United States was under
the same beat, so to speak, as the Europeans, and he immediately
picked that up. He was the first one to respond in this.

269

The others were wondering what was going on in Cuba and why
we were diverting our attention from them, but DeGaulle was very
clearcut about it, and he did not hesitate a minute when he saw
the significance of that and how profoundly that would affect the
security of Europe. That is the thing that is most present in my
mind today when you ask me what their attitude was. He was the
most emphatic and striking and cooperative at that time.

Senator Stone. Mr. McCloy, during both of those crises, was the
comparative military strength of the United States and the Soviet
Union a factor in the strength of our willpower, or was it not?

Mr. McCloy. We certainly had it then, and we had it both in
conventional and in nuclear capacities.

Senator Stone. Are you saying that in both of these crises the
United States had at least some measurable superiority in some
strategic as well as conventional capabilities?

Mr. McCloy. Oh, we had superiority then, yes.

Senator Stone. All right. Now, in recent years, can it be said
that we have had or now have superiority in conventional strength
compared to the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCloy. I do not think so in conventional. I am very much
impressed with the ground strength of the Soviet Union. In the
first place, they have a conscripted army. They can bring the finest
talents into the army. They have increased their manpower. They
have this enormous superiority in armor in which they are very
good in rocketry and artillery, and they have this very much
improved air defense system, which is very impressive to me, at
least.

Senator Stone. How about strategic?

Mr. McCloy. Well, not in all categories. What I keep talking
about is in the main battery they have a superiority and I think
the Secretary of Defense will admit that.

Senator Stone. Mr. McCloy, is it fair to say that during the
1980's that superiority that you described as being current will be
reduced or increased?

Mr. McCloy. I think the trend is now toward an increase unless
we take steps to counteract it which are belated now. I wish we
had done a little more of our modernizing a little further back, and
I wish the M-X had come along a little earlier.

Senator Stone. Mr. McCloy, is it fair to say that this administra-
tion made every effort to get the Soviets to reduce their strategic
strength in these later negotiations? Did we try to get them to
reduce their heavy missiles? Did we try to get them to reduce the
numbers down below what the numbers are in this treaty?

Mr. McCloy. I think we did. I did not follow it as closely as I
used to follow it. I am thinking of what I said a moment ago about
General Rowny, who was very convinced in 1977 that if we had
been a little tougher, we might have gotten it.

Senator Stone. Right. Well, Mr. McCloy, if we were sufficiently
strong in our willpower during a time when we had superior
strength both conventionally and strategically, and if some of the
recent challenges not only to ourselves but to the Third World seen
as targets of opportunity by the Soviet Union have occurred during
a backdrop of their conventional superiority in military forces and
their emerging strategic superiority, which as you describe, and

270

really, it has not been negated, will be increased during the period
of this treaty, and if we tried to get the Soviets to reduce the
numbers and to become more strategically equal to us on a reduc-
tion basis and failed, is there any alternative, if they will not
reduce, to ourselves building up in terms of the challenges that the
Soviet Union has increasingly taken directly and through proxies
in recent months and years?

Mr. McCloy. Well, I think that unless we get to that stage,
unless we get to a stage where we do have that type of reduction, I
do not see much sense in having a SALT II, SALT III, or whatever
you call it. I believe this is the objective that we seek. We must not
lose the opportunity even if it is the last gasp.

Senator Stone. Well, Mr. McCloy, why, if during SALT I the
reductions were promised for SALT II and we didn't get them, why
are we so confident that we will get them in SALT III, when we
didn't get them in SALT II, and why, when the trend seems to
favor the Soviets' strength increasing compared to ours, will they
be more interested in reducing either conventional or strategic
strength?

Mr. McCloy. Well, I think that probably the answer to that is
that we ought to be more definite and more adamantine in respect
to SALT III than we were in respect to SALT I.

Senator Stone. Why postpone that to the future? Why can't we
get a little stronger now? Why must our strength always be seen in
the future, whether military strength or willpower?

Mr. McCloy. Well, we lagged just when the Soviet Union was
spending its greatest efforts not only in the strategic area but also
in the conventional area. Our figures went down while theirs were
going up. As I said a little while ago, that has consequences you
cannot blink at, and those consequences are just beginning to
emerge now. We have to do something about it. As I said, I wish we
had modernized earlier than we did. I wish the M-X's had not been
belated. I am a little indefinite as to how much pressure we put on
at that point. It was a little while back.

I know we had the feeling that they were not going to go bigger
than the SS-U's. I do not think there was any agreement conclud-
ed on it. We were taken by surprise when they suddenly went to
these big fellows. I think we rather had the idea it was going to be
the fine example of strength that we were indulging in that would
induce them not to move into this new area.

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Stone.

Senator Hayakawa?

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have not been privileged to hear the testimony so far, so I will
pass at this time.

The Chairman. Very well, Senator.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

role of senate in treaty ratification

Mr. McCloy, first I want to echo the comments of others in
thanking you for an extremely thoughtful and well-prepared state-
ment. I think it is very helpful to us. I was interested in the

271

introductory part about the role of the Senate and your perception
of that. Some argue that failure by the Senate to ratify it would
show that we cannot harmonize the views of the various branches
of our Government.

Failure to ratify would indicate an inability of the Executive to
lead and therefore this need to present an image of the Nation that
can act in unity is a strong argument for ratifying the treaty.

Do you agree?

Mr. McCloy. I think any evidence of unity is impressive around
the world. I think one of the most impressive things that occurred
during the war was the bipartisan — I am thinking of Senator Van-
denburg and the note on foreign policy then was quite apparent,
and it was a unified thing, and people took comfort in that, and I
think that that is an incident or at least was taken as an incident
of strength rather than complete partisan disparity,

I would like to see that type of support in respect to this very
important element of our security, and that is why I said I would
like to see the hawks and the doves get together. I am not talking
about the Republicans and the Democrats as such, but getting
together to work out what is a very difficult problem, I think, that
we face.

Senator Sarbanes. I agree with that, as far as the attitude with
which we approach it, but it seems to me that there is something of
a bootstrap argument being made. In other words, once the Execu-
tive submits a treaty, if the Senate does not simply move forward
with it, we have cast doubt over our ability to function as a nation.

I was interested in the opening portion of your statement, be-
cause it clearly underscores the fact that there is a separate and
distinct role for the Senate and we have to come at it from the
point of view of judging the thing on the merits. It seems to me the
bootstrap argument has in some instances been carried quite far.

Mr. McCloy. Well, I tried to draw some inferences, I guess, from
that research that I did to show the importance of the Senate on it,
and I rather discount the idea that unless you go through in this
way you are going to show weakness. I think there was too much of
what the lawyers call in terrorem arguments in connection with it,
but this is one of the things that affect the whole country so much
that I repeat, I would like to see a combined effort to reach a
solution on it. In itself, I think it would increase confidence, so I
deplore the argumentation to which you were referring in terms of
do it or else.

SUBSTANTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIETS

Senator Sarbanes. The Joint Chiefs and others have testified
that the treaty places only nominal restrictions on us in the strate-
gic area, and that it does place substantive restrictions on the

Soviets.
Assuming that that is the case, why would the Soviets agree to

such a treatv?

Mr. McCloy. I think that the treaty rather implicitly seals the
concept of parity, and that is a very important thing to the Soviets.
From where we have come, I have a feeling that it is in their
interest, and that we have agreed to that, and this is the way we
are going to play the game from here on. I feel that the concept of

272

our loss of American superiority is comforting to the Soviets in
their poUtical as well as military thinking.

That is one of the reasons why I am inclined to think that the
chances of their cheating are not too good. Why should they cheat?
Why should they take the risks of being caught when the funda-
mental benefit of this to them in my judgment is the sealing of the
equality aspect to them from where they were? That is my esti-
mate of their motivation.

CONTRIBUTION OF SALT I TO AURA OF COMPLACENCY

Senator Sarbanes. Do you think that SALT I contributed to the
complacency about which you are concerned in this country?

Mr. McCloy. No, I do not think SALT I as such did. No. SALT I
was more involved in the ABM's. I do not trace that element in
SALT L It was what occurred after that that I think caused the
trouble. This rationalization— Kissinger was involved in it. He is a
very good friend of mine, and I perhaps should not be bringing this
up, but in his article in The Economist he said, I thought we were
so far ahead that we did not need to think about it. He acknowl-
edged that he was wrong.

There is no sense blaming people about the thing. The consider-
ations were different then than they are now. The problem is, now
that we see it, we ought to do something about it, and I would hope
we would jointly do something about it.

Senator Sarbanes. Do you think the Soviets have any expecta-
tion that SALT II will contribute to that aura of complacency? You
have spoken against it very eloquently, but do you think they have
made the calculation that SALT II might contribute to this?

Mr. McCloy. Well, they look at the Presidents and they see what
happened in the past, and the past has enabled them to achieve a
superiority in a very critical area of our weaponry, and I suppose
they say, well, we did pretty well.

Senator Sarbanes. If we were to move toward SALT III, the
Senate could every 2 years in a formal way pass judgment on
Soviet conduct around the world. If found unacceptable, the Senate
should then decide on whether the negotiations for a SALT III
should continue. What do you think of this idea?

Mr. McCloy. I did not hear Dr. Kissinger's testimony. I saw a
reference to that in the paper. I had difficulty with that, with the
idea that every 2 years you review it. I do not know how that
would work out. It did not sound very solid to me. I would like to
see the testimony before I really express an opinion on it, but it
seems to be a very awkward situation; I should think, to have us
every 2 years tell the world whether the Soviet Union is behaving
or whether it is not, and to have a particular formal time for
expressing that view, but I would like to see his argument on it. I
think he spent some considerable time on that.

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Well, it did not take a great part of his testimo-
ny to set forth the proposition, at least, that the Senate vote every
2 years its judgment whether the Soviet Union has lived up to
these criteria. If the judgment is negative, the Senate should then
vote whether whatever SALT negotiations are taking place should
be continued.

273

Mr. McCloy. I do not think I would follow that if I were the
Secretary of State.

Senator McGovern. If we are going to do that, Mr. Chairman,
we might as well just forego trying to do everything else.

The Chairman. Yes. Well, we are pretty much preoccupied with
that assessment anyway from day to day.

Senator Zorinsky?

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PRESSURE ON BREZHNEV TO CONCLUDE SALT II

Mr. McCloy, in your statement you state: "Every administration
which sets out to seek a treaty, whether with the Soviet Union or
someone else, seems to come under pressure before it is ever able
to achieve what is considered to be the political success attached to
an agreement, or at least to avoid the sense of failure if agreement
is not reached. On the Soviet side, there is no such public opinion
nor administrative pressure," I can understand your statement
with regard to Soviet public opinion, but is the leadership and
authority of the Soviet leaders, such as Brezhnev, so secure as to
remove him from the pressures of others in the Soviet leadership?
Because SALT II negotiations began and have been carried out
during the Brezhnev leadership, do you believe he might have been
under some pressure to conclude an agreement during his term?

Mr. McCloy. Well, I do not know the inner workings of the
Soviet Union too well. I suppose there are certainly pressures
within the government, but I have the impression, for example,
dealing with Semenov, that he knows what the policy is, and there
it is, it is the end all with him. He can speak and does speak with a
great deal of authority, and there is no real pressure, there is
certainly no media pressure. There is no legislative pressure, and
Mr. Brezhnev is so firmly fixed that there is no political pressure
on him.

At least, that is the impression that I have had as our people
have sat around there and negotiated with these Soviets, that we
are always trying to find a compromise. When they say "nyet" on
this, it is instinctive, I think, for the Americans to try to bring
about an agreement. At a certain point, it gets to where the pres-
sures are so great here that I took the liberty of coining the word
"agreementitis." I have seen it afflict some of our negotiators, I
thought, when they might have held on, at the risk, perhaps, of
failure to reach an agreement.

Senator Zorinsky. Do you feel that in your opinion, from your
observations, that the Soviet leadership has no pressures on it?

Mr. McCloy. It certainly doesn't seem to me to have any public
opinion pressures in this area.

Senator Zorinsky. Well, peer pressures from within the adminis-
trative group?

Mr. McCloy. Oh, there must be dissensions. There must be.
There certainly were dissensions in the case of Khrushchev Nvhen
he was there. I know that he told me one time there was only one
thing that was wrong with the Soviet system, and that was their
succession, that we had solved succession satisfactorily in our de-
mocracy, but they had not solved it there, but he was going to solve
it. In a few weeks he was out.

274

CONTINUITY AFTER BREZHNEV

Senator Zorinsky. Well, in your opinion, then, can this Nation in
the event it does ratify SALT II be pretty well assured that whoev-
er succeeds Brezhnev will of necessity continue the SALT process
inasmuch as he can do pretty much as he wants?

Mr. McCloy. I do not know. Following a succession, I don't think
I would venture to speculate on that. I hear a lot of rumors that
there are some young people around that may be tougher than the
existing officialdom, and I do not know who they are. I do not know
who the heirs apparent are. All I am saying is, it is a very tight
discipline in the Soviet Government when you are dealing with
them that does not seem to be influenced at all by what is coming
from the street or from the journalism. There is no legislative body
that exerts any influence.

Sure, there will be all kinds of pulls and hauls and intrigues
within the Government, but I would not venture to say after Brezh-
nev leaves office, what the new character of the Soviet Government
would be. I would suppose we have a good bit of intelligence on
that, but I just do not know who the successors will be. I have not
dealt with them.

Mr. Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. McCloy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Zorinsky.

Are there any further questions?

Senator Hayakawa. Mr. Chairman, yes.

The Chairman. Senator Hayakawa?

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCloy, it is a real pleasure to greet you. I have admired
your work in Germany and elsewhere for a long, long time. It is a
real honor to see you. I would like to ask a couple of questions.

dr. Kissinger's recommendation of postponement of

ratification

First of all, Dr. Kissinger has recommended postponement of
ratification until after certain conditions are met in regards to our
own defense posture and so on. Would you agree with this assess-
ment that there should be such a postponement?

Mr. McCloy. Senator, before you came in, I pointed out that I
had a paragraph in my statement warning against complacency,
and I made a statement that if I thought SALT II would really
enhance this complacency from which I think we have suffered a
little bit in the past, I would be against ratification. Now, Dr.
Kissinger has set up a sort of means by which he would insure that
there would be no complacency. I used the word "guarantee." I do
not know if that is the right word, but he has a plan that would
dispense with complacency because that plan would do what he
feels and what I gather the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel are necessary
to bring about the redress of this imbalance.

If you can do that, that is fine. I would applaud any step to
insure that there was no complacency in that area. To that extent,
I would agree with him. I would like to know how we did it, how
we would go about it. I know you cannot bind future Congresses,
but I suppose there are plans that you could set up which would

275

demonstrate a determination and a policy sufficiently clear and
sufficiently eloquent to have an influence on the Soviets.

Senator Hayakawa. I agree that it is difficult to avoid that
complacency, especially if the treaty is signed and ratified. I think
we find as Americans that we have a kind of built-in optimism that
says, in effect, you do not really have to prepare for another war. It
is not likely to happen at all, and of course it is. This is one of the
things I fear very, very much.

Mr. McCloy, do you feel that the treaty has some ambiguities
within it? I do not know to which ambiguities you refer, but sup-
posing we were to draft some amendments which would clarify
those ambiguities. Would such clarifying amendments have to be
renegotiated?

Mr. McCloy. I suppose it would depend upon what the amend-
ment or the clarification was. There are certainly some things, I
suppose, you would not have to renegotiate in the way of clarifica-
tion. I cannot put my finger on them at this time. I do not have as
much detailed knowledge as I would like, and I know there are
some drafting problems that face us, but I would think that there
are sufficient ambiguities and other problems in this connection
that might very well be improved by clarifications or explanations
and by drafting, whether it would be an amendment that would
have to be negotiated or one that would not.

I am not familiar enough with the problem to be able to give you
specifics.

Senator Hayakawa. I suppose some of these ambiguities could be
cleared up in understandings rather than amendments.

Mr. McCloy. I would think so.

Senator Hayakawa. But certainly those ambiguities ought to be
dealt with. Do you believe that the allied support of SALT II is
prompted by the fear on the part of our allies that the United
States is psychologically unprepared to stand up to domestic and
international pressures resulting from the ratification.

Mr. McCloy. Well, I tried to speculate as best I could as to what
the allied position was. I do not know that I could go into it any
further. I think there is a combination of things that are impress-
ing them and making them nervous, which I tried to summarize. I
do not think I can go any further than I have already gone in
terms of describing or speculating what their motivation is.

I hear things that are quite different, I am sure, than what the
State Department hears. Individuals, particularly from Germany,
come into my office all the time, and when I hear somebody say
that they are all enthusiastic for the treaty, I must say that I did
not get that from them. I think they are worried if they did not
have a treaty and the consequences that would come from that, but
they do not want to see any weakening of the American deterrent.

They are going to have to face the fact, in my judgment, that the
American deterrent is no longer based on superiority.

Senator Hayakawa. Yes. We have had some testimony here to
the effect that what the allies say publicly is sometimes quite
different from what they say privately.

Mr. McCloy. Yes; I have noticed that from time to time.

Senator Hayakawa. And that is confirmed by your own experi-
ence?

276

Mr. McCloy. Yes, sir, I have frequently found that they pubUcly
say one thing and on the side they say something else. I am not
relating it to this particular matter, however.

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. McCloy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Hayakawa.

I believe that completes the questioning, if the Senators have no
further questions. Mr. McCloy, you are indeed an elder statesman,
and we appreciate having the benefit of your views.

Mr. McCloy. Do not emphasize the elder part of that too much,
please. [General laughter.]

The Chairman. A senior statesman.

Mr. McCloy. Let me tell you of an experience that I had, if I
could just impose upon you for another moment. For the bicenten-
nial I came down here. The chairmen had set up an award. They
called it the McCloy award or something like that. It was one of
these exchange things. Mr. Ford was President at that time, and he
very graciously invited me down here. This was a Bicentennial gift.
I went into the rose garden, and it was perfectly clear that Jerry
Ford had thought I was dead. [General laughter.]

He made this speech, and he dwelled considerably and I had
thought too pointedly on my age. When I had to respond, I got up
and said, well, it is perfectly true that my life span represents 40
percent of the entire lifespan of the country, but I prefer to look
upon that not as evidence of my extreme age but the extreme
youth of the country. [General laughter.]

So I guess I am a little sensitive when you use such terms as
"elder statesman."

The Chairman. I am happy to see you in such obvious vigor and
good health, Mr. McCloy. Thank you so much for your testimony. It
has been very helpful.

[The committee turned to other business.]

*******

The Chairman. Before we take a brief recess and ask General
Haig, our next witness, to come into the room, I want to read a
letter that I have received from Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency, relating to his conclusions
with respect to the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty. The letter is
dated August 1, 1979, and is addressed to me. It reads:

Dear Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure for me to appear before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to discuss details of the monitoring capabilities of the
U.S. Intelligence Community with respect to provisions of the SALT II Treaty. The
fact that my appearances were in executive session recognizes the concern of the
committee for the sensitivity and classification of the information discussed. It has
also allowed me to be totally candid while at the same time fulfilling my responsi-
bility of protecting intelligence sources and methods, as is my obligation under the
National Security Act of 1947.

While finding it my duty to keep from public view the details of my discussions
with the committee, I would like to provide the following unclassified statement of
my conclusions which you may use as you deem necessary.

My overall judgment, based on the considerations I have set forth in my testimo-
ny in executive session is that during the period of the SALT II Treaty the United
States Intelligence Community will be able to monitor most of its provisions well
enough to provide confidence that the Soviets cannot gain a substantial strategic
advantage through cheating.

277

For the few provisions that we cannot monitor with this degree of confidence, I
believe the Soviet perception of risks versus gains will make such cheating an
unattractive option to them.

I will be happy to return in executive session at any time to answer further
questions the committee may have.

The letter is signed, Stansfield Turner. Copies of this letter will
be made available to the press.

The committee will stand in recess for 5 minutes, and then we
will hear from General Haig.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

The Chairman. The hearing will please come back to order.

This morning is the final day of hearings for the committee this
month. We devoted the month of July to hearings on this treaty. In
September, we will have some further wrap-up hearings before we
proceed to a markup of the treaty.

We are pleased to welcome you as our final witness for this
series of hearings. We know of your distinguished military career.

General Haig has recently retired from the Army, having served
4V2 years as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, where he was
NATO's chief military officer. He was an able spokesman for
NATO's military interests.

General, we would invite your statement at this time, and then
we will proceed to questions.

Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, may I on behalf of the minority,
which has a very long-standing relationship with General Haig,
both in the Army and in the White House, welcome him here and
express our appreciation for his testimony and the expectation of
its importance?

STATEMENT OF GEN. ALEXANDER HAIG, JR., U.S. ARMY, RE-
TIRED, FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE,
PHILADELPHIA, PA.

General Haig. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you. Senator Javits. It is a great honor for me to have an opportu-
nity to appear before this distinguished committee this morning.
May I please proceed with my brief statement?

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity presented today to
take part in your deliberations on the SALT II Treaty. Thoughtful
analysis and assimilation of a document of this breadth and com-
plexity is a formidable task. It is clear, however, that the outcome
of your efforts will have an indelible effect in shaping the terms
and climate of United States-Soviet relations and thereby prospects
for peace in the years ahead.

Today you have asked for my views on the effectiveness of the
treaty in meeting the security requirements of the North Atlantic
Alliance, our oldest and most compelling defense commitment. In
the next few minutes I will try to characterize for you the signifi-
cance of SALT to European leaders.

NATO's strategy, as you know, calls for defense against conven-
tional attack as far forward as possible. In addition, if necessary to
limit penetrations and restore boundaries, the strategy calls for the
use of tactical nuclear weapons and ultimately central strategic
systems if escalation is not earlier contained. Although a conven-
tional attack would be met in kind, the serious historical imbal-
ance in conventional forces favoring the Warsaw Pact has led to

278

the common expectation among our allies of early resort to nuclear
weapons, both tactical and strategic. Consequently, the reason for
their interest in negotiations which affect these systems is very,
very clear.

In recent years, there has been a dramatic shift in the balance of
theater nuclear forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact. As a result of
an extremely vigorous Soviet program of modernization and re-
placement, the Warsaw Pact has redressed their historical position
of inferiority in theater nuclear systems to a position of approxi-
mately 3 to 1 advantage. The deployment of the SS-20 IRBM and
the Backfire bomber has been especially troubling throughout the
alliance. Within the context, allied concerns over SALT focus on its
impact on the existing imbalance. That is, does the treaty provide
special benefit to the Soviets, or prevent allied efforts to catch up?

Viewed in these terms, the exclusion of the Backfire and the SS-
20 and the restricting of the range and deployability of cruise
missiles has raised serious questions in NATO capitals. From their
perspective both systems have a central influence on their security,
and the exclusion of the Backfire and the SS-20 contrasted with
the inclusion of cruise missiles was both puzzling and a cause for
concern.

With respect to the integration of cruise missiles into NATO
units, no precise schedule or mode has been decided as of yet. The
need, however, is clear. The desirability of having a conventional
variant has also been raised. In this regard, I believe the potential
of these systems to be enormous. There is no question that unhin-
dered access by our European allies to cruise missile technology is
vital to restoring the balance.

Our NATO partners have always placed foremost importance
upon secure linkage of U.S. strategic forces to their defense. In this
light, the relationship of SALT to European security is very appar-
ent. During the years of unquestioned U.S. superiority, the credibil-
ity of the U.S. commitment was high. As that position of superior-
ity eroded towards parity, our reliability became less certain. As it
erodes further toward clear Soviet advantage in the next few years,
even greater doubts will arise.

Despite the foregoing, however, European political leaders have
expressed their support for SALT II. This support is conditioned
among other forces by the following factors. First, Europeans, like
Americans, are generally supportive of efforts to reduce levels of
nuclear armaments. Second, there is strong sentiment to avoid any
action which might further weaken the U.S. Presidency.

Third, there is concern that the nonratification of SALT II in its
present form would disrupt the overall United States-Soviet rela-
tionship of detente and lead to increased tension and possible
United States-Soviet confrontation which might be resolved at the
expense of our allies.

Nevertheless, despite these overarching considerations, there is a
deep concern in Europe over the very painful realities reflected in
SALT II. Consequently, they are seeking and would surely welcome
a definitive signal of reassurance with respect to the steadily wors-
ening trend in both theater and nuclear balances.

In specific terms, they would welcome actions which confirm
unequivocally the U.S. commitment to a program of prompt strate-

279

gic force modernization and improvement. They have been heart-
ened by U.S. pledges of unhindered sharing of systems and technol-
ogies designed to restore the theater nuclear balance. The obvious
corollary, however, is the absolutely imperative termination in
1981 of the protocol restrictions on ground- and sea-launched cruise
missiles.

A firm, unambiguous demonstration of renewed U.S. strength
and ability to lead is overdue. The global power balance is viewed
in Europe as shifting against us, and we can ignore it no longer. It
is in this context that Senate action on the SALT II Treaty as a
political expression of national will takes on special meaning, and I
urge you to consider it in these terms.

The SALT II Treaty is viewed as a benchmark. It can be an
instrument which marks the end of a period of drift in American
leadership, and whatever the substantive alterations the Senate
may wish to consider, it is essential that this debate result in a
demonstration of our resolve to redress this imbalance by an imme-
diate and unequivocal commitment of greater resources to our
defense needs.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am not satisfied that the neces-
sary commitments have been made with respect to our strategic
needs. I am also concerned that the administration's budgets for
the past 2 years and the President's defense budget projections
through fiscal year 1984 are inadequate to meet our conventional
needs, to say nothing of our already proffered commitment to
NATO.

Furthermore, I consider that the SALT II Treaty itself contains
flaws which must be given serious attention in your deliberations.
Beyond that, the necessary consensus between the United States
and its European allies has yet to be achieved for the implementa-
tion of absolutely essential theater nuclear modernization. This
includes determination of systems to be provided, deployment pat-
terns to be pursued, arrangement of funding, and in the light of
SALT II, the provision of necessary technology to our allies.

Finally, I believe these programmatic commitments must be
based on a two-tiered U.S. consensus which addresses the funda-
mental directions of future United States-Soviet relations on the
one hand and clearly delineates U.S. strategic nuclear policy on the
other.

Until such firm commitments and their underlying strategy have
been confirmed and resulting programs in strategic theater nuclear
and conventional areas have been carefully assessed and agreed
upon, and until the Senate has assured itself that the flaws in
SALT II have been resolved, I urge that ratification of SALT II be
held in abeyance.

That concludes my formal statement, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your statement. Gen-
eral.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO JCS TESTIMONY

I would like to go down through three or four questions which
relate to testimony that was given to this committee by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. General, I would appreciate it if you could give me
very brief answers to the questions, and then when we have com-

280

pleted the series, please elaborate as you wish. I would just like to
complete the series first. Then please feel free to elaborate in any
way you care to to make your position clear.

General Haig. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. When the Chiefs were before the committee,
General Jones told us that any changes in the strategic balance
between the United States and the Soviet Union will be, to quote
him, "the product of unilateral choices rather than the outcome of
negotiated arms control."

Dr. Kissinger made the same point. In other words, whatever
assessment one makes of the strategic balance, it is not the product
of the arms control agreements but of decisions we have made
outside the framework of those agreements which agree or disagree
with that assessment.

General Haig. That is consistent with the position that I have
taken on this for a number of months.

The Chairman. You would agree then?

General Haig. I would.

The Chairman. General Jones and the Chiefs also said the fol-
lowing in their statement before the committee with respect to
verification: "While recognizing the difficulties associated with ver-
ification, we must also acknowledge the important assistance the
SALT II Treaty will provide in this effort." Do you agree or dis-
agree with that assessment?

General Haig. On that particular subject, Mr. Chairman, I would
prefer to have the experts comment. I know we have had certain
aggravations as a consequence of certain losses in our acquisition
capabilities. We have habitually and traditionally accepted certain
risks in this area, and I would think that the committee would
want to investigate in great detail these risks that are associated
with this SALT II agreement and earlier risks that we have taken.

The Chairman. We have been looking into that subject very
carefully with the experts, as you know. General. However, it is my
understanding that when you testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee you identified verification as one of the flaws
in the treaty.

General Haig. Yes.

The Chairman. Does this mean you believe the Chiefs are incor-
rect in their assessment that the treaty is adequately verifiable?

General Haig. No; I think there may be varying judgments on
this very complex subject by serious people with differing views.
What concerns me in the verification area are aspects of the data
base and the fact that if we were to be faced with technological
changes with a revised data base, it would make it somewhat
difficult to verify and complicate the task. But as I say, I do not
want to portray myself as an expert on verification. It is a very
dynamic area in which I have not been participating.

RESERVATION ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

The Chairman. I think that is fair enough. We did have the
conclusions of the director of the CIA today on that subject which
were made public a few moments ago. Let us get back to your
testimony. General. I would call your attention to that part of your
statement in which you say:

281

With respect to the integration of cruise missiles into NATO units, no precise
schedule or mode has been decided. The need, however, is clear. The desirability of
having a conventional variant has also been raised. In this regard, I believe the
potential of these systems to be enormous, and there is no question that unhindered
access by our European allies to cruise missile technology is vital to restoring the
balance.

I have two questions to ask in that connection. I take it from the
general thrust of your statement that you would approve of an
understanding or a reservation that would make it expressly clear
that the SALT II Treaty does not in any way interfere with our
right to transfer technology as we have done in the past to our
NATO Allies, that it is in no way an impediment to that practice.

General Haig. Whatever the committee in its wisdom feels would
assure the prevention of restrictions under the verification or non-
circumvention clauses, I think, I would welcome.

The Chairman. That would have your approval?

General Haig. Yes.

The Chairman. General, to what extent is this problem of which
you speak, that is, the theater imbalance, and the need to intro-
duce new weapons in the NATO alliance that will redress that
imbalance — complicated by the attitude of our NATO Allies them-
selves? In other words, as I have understood it, we are prepared to
introduce certain new systems, weapons systems, into the NATO
region of Western Europe, but we have run into great problems
with the NATO governments themselves when it comes to accept-
ing those weapons on their territory.

General Haig. Mr. Chairman, I have participated rather inti-
mately in the evolution of European thought on theater nuclear
modernization, starting with the controversy associated with the
so-called neutron warhead, the ER/RB system. I would be less than
precise were I to suggest that this is not an extremely sensitive and
anguishing question for our European partners; that is, the deploy-
ment of additional nuclear systems on their soil.

We have been engaged in the process of attempting to build a
consensus since the second summit. I would have been happier had
we been somewhat more vigorous as a nation in taking up the
leadership in this issue, as I certainly would have been on the
neutron warhead issue, where there were rather sharp setbacks in
political terms to certain European leaders who preside over tight-
ly balanced constituencies.

The aftermath of the neutron situation has conditioned Europe-
an attitudes on theater nuclear modernization in general. It has
made them more sensitive and more uncertain as to the role that
the United States will play in meeting this urgent military need.

They have laid out certain preconditions, some of the more im-
portant of potential recipients. They would insist that they not be
put in a position as they were in the neutron bomb to be the
demandeurs for these systems, and I remain confident today that
the problems, some of which have been reported rather extensively
and in timely fashion in the Washington press, are resolvable
issues if they are dealt with by firm American leadership and that
those nations who are primary potential recipients of such systems
are consulted with in an intense way and at the highest level.

This is not a matter to be handled at second level bureaucratic
exchanges but rather by heads of state and governments. Were the

282

American President to provide the kind of assurances which I
think he is capable of doing, I am confident the matter could be
resolved rather promptly, perhaps not fully to the degree that in
military terms I would be most comfortable with, but certainly in
an optimum way that will enable us to get on with this important
task.

The Chairman. Is it accurate to say that your hope and expecta-
tion would be that these matters could be resolved, but that as yet
they have not been resolved?

General Haig. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I do not want that,
with the broad comments I have just made, to be interpreted as
criticism of the efforts underway and the high level group, for
example, which is a multinational body considering this issue.

The Chairman. This leads me to the conclusion that whatever
imbalance may exist in the theater forces in Europe which are
outside the scope of the SALT II Treaty, at least part of that
problem is derived from our failure to date to achieve the neces-
sary consent of our own NATO Allies to deploy these new weapons
systems on their soil.

General Haig. I would not want to portray it in such simplistic
terms, although I recognize the desirability of doing so. In this
issue, there are contradictions, but I would say that the most
fundamental aggravating problem, was the precedent of the neu-
tron experience which has converged with traditional reservations
on the part of our European allies as they exist in our own coun-
try, about additional nuclear systems in general. But, I think our
allies have agreed and they have formally committed themselves
that there is a need for prompt steps to be taken to modernize our
theater nuclear capabilities.

What remains to be done is to flesh out the bona fides of this
consensus with specific program deployment modes and numbers of
systems. There is another aspect to this, Mr. Chairman. When we
were vastly superior in the central area and when we were superi-
or in the theater nuclear area, these kinds of precise determina-
tions were less relevant. Today, as we have gone into parity and
the prospect of inferiority in the central area, these regional bal-
ances take on increased significance in the context of our overall
deterrent.

Beyond that, the rapid deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire
is a fundamental challenge to European confidence in our overall
deterrent.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. General Haig. My time is

up.
Senator Javits?

ABEYANCE THEORY AND LINKAGE

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General I will not go over the ground that Senator Church did. I
heard the particularity with which you defined the need for main-
taining our armament and improving our state of readiness. We
are faced with this question, with which I hope you will help us. I
have looked forward to your testimony. I know you so well, and I
believe it could prove very important and very helpful to us. We

283

have been faced with the "tranquilizer theory." That is the theory
that if we sign the treaty, it will lull us to sleep.

Then Mr. Nitze gave us the "shock theory" that we should turn
it down, and that will let the Russians know that we mean busi-
ness. Now you give us the "abeyance theory." That is, don't do it,
do other things first. I can understand how we might try something
respecting armament. We have discussed it this morning with Mr.
McCloy, and you have given us certain specifics. Although I do not
see how Dr. Kissinger's idea that we should get a binding commit-
ment from the Congress or the President would work, I think we
can work to contrive something which will fill that gap. I notice in
your prepared statement an interesting thing that you have added
to your position that you gave before the Armed Services Commit-
tee, and that is another dimension to the abeyance theory. Forgive
me. I am not trying to be invidious. It is important, very impor-
tant. It is contained in the final page of your statement where you
said.

Finally, I believe these programmatic commitments must be based on a two-tiered
U.S. consensus which addresses the fundamental directions of future United States-
Soviet relations on the one hand and clearly delineates U.S. strategic nuclear policy
on the other.

Now, I have just spoken to the last, but what about the first,
which is the linkage question? Dr. Kissinger and, I assume you by
reference, have ticked off Angola, the Horn of Africa, Southern
Africa, the Middle East, and so on referring to the linkage ques-
tion. Now, if you are going to negotiate such linkage what are we
prepared to give. General? Do we think the Russians are going to
give us everjdhing and just walk out of all these places? What are
we prepared to give? How long will it take and what effect will it
have on the abeyance theory?

General Haig. Senator, first let me address the abeyance theory.
I suppose one could read that as a suggestion that we go into
never-never land in terms of the ratification process. I would not
suggest that at all, really. These are matters which have long been
under consideration in this committee and in our body politic in
both the executive branch and the Congress. These are matters for
which a prompt clarification of the American executive branch's
view could be elicited and proposed and rapidly endorsed by the
legislative branch.

So, I am not talking about an interminable delaying tactic. I am
talking about sorting out our thinking, being sure that the prem-
ises upon which we enter into this treaty and develop our strategic
forces and conduct arms control at large are at least defined within
a broad conceptual framework of approved and agreed upon Ameri-
can policy.

Let me turn first to the linkage problem, and I want to assure
you that I do not feel the least bit inconsistent about having been
more specific, because in the conduct of the discussions in the
Armed Services Committee it became clear that there was some
confusion in this area and I wanted to be more specific for this
body which is far more concerned with foreign policy in its broad-
est sense.

I have always been a proponent of linkage. I do not feel that the
suggestion that linkage be reapplied to the conduct of American

284

foreign policy is retroactive in character and that we now have to
extract retrenchments from the Soviet Union in areas where our
failure to challenge these illegal interventionisms have resulted in
de facto changes in status quo; hardly at all. What I am suggesting
is, and not too differently from what Dr. Kissinger suggested before
this committee, that I think the time has come for the United
States to recognize that it is very self-defeating to proceed in a
mindless way in a number of functional areas — whether they be
arms control, credit, or technology transfer with the Soviet
Union — while they are simultaneously conducting blatant illegal
interventionisms aimed at our vital interests and those of our allies
and our traditional friends in the Third World.

I feel the Soviet Union should be put on notice that this kind of
activity which we have witnessed over the past 3 years in Africa,
the Middle East, and Eurasia is not consistent and not conducive to
continuing dialogs in other areas, and that they must be brought
into some synchronism.

Now, again, I am not an advocate with an overzealous attitude
on this. I recognize the U.S. President, the executive branch must
have a degree of flexibility in orchestrating the linkage per se, and
linkage is not a plus and minus, debit and credit exercise.

On the other hand, I think in our efforts to discredit this concept
we have gone beyond the limits of prudence and it is time for us to
pull up our socks and rethink this issue and put the Soviet Union
on notice that the kinds of activities we have been facing recently
are no longer acceptable. I would suggest it would be important for
this committee to ascertain what Chairman Brezhnev said to Presi-
dent Carter at Vienna on this subject.

Senator Javits. General, I just want to refine that because it is
critically important. Does that mean that what you want is for us
to state our policy — whether Brezhnev accepts an)d:hing we say or
takes any action respecting it or not — that we hold in abeyance
until the President of the United States declares what is his policy
respecting each of these matters upon which you want linkage?

Is that your position?

General Haig. Absolutely, Senator. We should make our position
clear, and the President henceforth should be held responsible by
the American people and by this committee and the Congress for
implementing that policy in a consistent way.

Senator Javits. And, you consider that wise in terms of the way
in which the President should negotiate with the Russians? That is,
he should tell them all our policy, and whether they respond or not
is not material? You want to lock him into our policy in each of
these matters now before we ratify the treaty?

General Haig. I would like clarification from the executive
branch that there is at long last recognition that these illegal
Soviet interventionisms are not consistent with the overall im-
provement of East-West relations in general, arms control and
other functional areas of improved East- West relations.

Senator Javits. Forgive me. I want to extract what it is you are
really recommending to us. What you want from the President is
the acceptance of the doctrine of linkage. That is, look, Mr. Russia,
we are not going to negotiate SALT III, we are not going to negoti-
ate a trade agreement, we are not going to negotiate anything with

285

you that is not linked to the overall situation, and if we are not
satisfied with the overall situation, we won't make agreements.
Would you apply that to SALT II, however, in short? Would you
turn down SALT II or is this irrelevant to whether we turn it down
or not?

General Haig. No. I think it is very relevant. Senator, along with
the overall approach in the other areas that I have recommended
to assess existing faults in this treaty as a precondition to ratifica-
tion so that we can really assess with greater clarity in the context
of our overall security needs what is dangerous in this treaty, what
is perhaps unacceptable and needs some kind of improvement and
adjustment by the committee. But when you start out from a fuzzy
point of departure, I find it an extremely dangerous way to pro-
ceed. It could be very deleterious to American interests in the
period ahead.

Incidentally, I don't want to suggest preoccupation with the term
"linkage." It now generates a great deal of visceral reaction by the
pros and cons, as do a number of other things historically, such as
the domino theory. I really do not like the term, except in a
sophisticated group like this for telegraphic purposes. It does not
lend itself to a legalistic formula of the kind your question would
suggest. Rather, it lends itself to an understanding, first within our
own Government, that what has been going on over the past 2
years is unacceptable from the American policy point of view.

Hopefully, that can be clearly conveyed to the Soviet Union and
their leaders, but it should be done in the most delicate way, and
no one has a precise formula. I certainly would not suggest here
how that should be done. But I would say that we have had
confusion in this area, and it does impinge on functional activities,
such as arms control.

Senator Javits. General, would you consider what you have de-
fined, just to close this argument, as "a political expression of
national will, a demonstration of our resolve, even though we then
ratify the SALT II Treaty?"

General Haig. With respect to this aspect of my statement and
not prejudging the other aspects of the statement, I think this is an
important step to be taken.

Senator Javits. Is it what you say? You want a political expres-
sion of national will, a demonstration of our resolve.

General Haig. That is correct.

Senator Javits. If we get that from the President and we satisfy
the flaws, et cetera, and he charts out what he proposes to do about
defense, then is your answer to my question yes, that is a political
expression of national will, a demonstration of our resolve?

General Haig. And then, I believe, with that and the other
measure —

Senator Javits. Is your answer yes?

General Haig, My answer is then the flaws in the treaty, as it is
currently written, should be examined against that backdrop.

Senator Javits. Is your answer no, that we still ratify, doing all
the things you say, that this is a political expression of national
will and a demonstration of our resolve? Is it or isn't it? You are
the one who set the standard and now you have given me your
condition. I still want to know whether that meets your condition.

286

General Haig. Well, it may be that I am not sufficiently clear as
I lay them out. But I think what my statement says is if we can
satisfy these conditions, then we can very promptly look at the
risks associated with the existing flaws in the treaty and decide
whether they are acceptable or not acceptable, or whether they
lend themselves to the kinds of recommendations that, for exam-
ple. Dr. Kissinger put before the committee.

Senator Javits. Thank you. General. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Pell [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Javits.

General Haig, I have two separate lines of questions that I would
like to go through this morning. The first is in connection with our
relationship with our allies.

NATO ALLIES SUPPORT SALT II

Would you agree that our allies, our NATO allies, without excep-
tion, strongly support the SALT II agreement?

General Haig. I think I have said that in my statement.

Senator Pell. Well, you said it in a qualified way in your state-
ment.

General Haig. Yes; with the qualifications that I would insist be
applied to my answer to your question right now.

Senator Pell. The reason I am puzzled by your qualifications is

this.

I have been Chairman of the Senate Delegation to the North
Atlantic Assembly for the last year, and on each of my trips to
Europe, without exception, my opposite numbers in the European
parliaments have come up to me to say how much they hope SALT
is ratified and how important they feel it is. At the same time, we
hear that some of our allies don't really want it or that they have
been pressured into supporting it and so forth. So, I get a complete-
ly different impression from those two different views. I have not
had one European at these meetings tell me that they oppose
SALT or that they think we would be better off not ratifying it—
not one. This is without reservations and without qualifications.

At the same time we hear that there is a great deal of sentiment
against it. What is the reason for this dichotomy?

General Haig. Well, this is not an unusual situation. I would
suggest also, at the time you discussed this with your European
counterparts, that their knowledge of this agreement and the re-
sulting imbalances that would emerge in the period of the 1980's
was, at best, shallow. I think probably the last occasion was at the
Lisbon meeting, and even at that meeting. Senator, I think you will
recall that there was great controversy among the participants and
the parliamentarians.

Senator Pell. Well, there was great controversy among the
American Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly. That delega-
tion was almost evenly split. But I do not recall great controversy
from the other allies, at least not anywhere near to that extent.

General Haig. I agree that the primary controversy was within
the American Delegation. But my discussions with a number of the
parliamentarians suggested that there were mixed views in
Europe. But this is the important thing and this, I thmk, needs a
clarification because it is difficult to comprehend. I would describe

287

European support as premised not essentially, but largely, on tacti-
cal or political expediency. Beneath the surface there is, at the
same time, concurrently, a fundamental concern about the pros-
pects of worsening balances between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the strategic area and the possibility that SALT
somehow is contributing to this or could codify it in a way that
would be henceforth a permanent state of affairs.

Senator Pell. Let's put it in another way. Let's say that we
attached a reservation to the SALT II Treaty requiring that each
one of our NATO partners would have to approve it. Is there any
doubt in your mind that they all would approve it?

General Haig. I have no doubt at all at the political level that
the European political leaders — and I think most of them are on
record today — would support this. On the other hand, I think we
have all lived in a world where contradictions of the kind we are
trying to discuss here have been normal, and the long-term propo-
sition facing us as a Nation in our relationship with our allies is
not what is their immediate attitude on SALT II per se, but what
will be the long-term attitude of our European allies as some of the
worsening strategic realities begin to become more evident to them
in a situation where there are growing doubts about American
reliability, consistency, and willingness to provide the historic U.S.
mantle of leadership and guarantee.

Senator Pell. But certainly a rejection of SALT II would do
nothing to enhance those thoughts of American reliability and
determination.

General Haig. No, it certainly would not.

REJECTION OF TREATY AND INCREASE IN SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

Senator Pell. Do you believe that the Soviets would or would not
increase their strategic forces beyond the limit, beyond the cap of
SALT II if SALT II is rejected? In other words, if SALT II is
rejected by us, would that not result in a greater increase in Soviet
strategic weaponry than would be the case otherwise?

General Haig. I think we have to be very careful about glib
generalizations on this subject. Senator. For example, with SALT
II, it is very clear that the Soviet Union will enjoy a level of
superiority that would not suggest to me a motivation for extensive
increases in numbers without SALT II, especially as you look at
the potential within SALT II in the fractionation area, where they
could explode from 10 warheads on their heavies to 20 or 30, and
perhaps even beyond that.

I would look to the Soviets with or without SALT II to focus
ahead on improved accuracies and improved reliabilities in their
new systems, rather than on dramatic increases in numbers. So, I
think this can be a straw man alternative that can be deceptive to
those who are analyzing this difficult question.

Senator Pell. I believe that there have been intelligence esti-
mates that the Soviets, without SALT II, would have, by 1985, 3,000
central weapon systems, as opposed to 2,250 under this treaty;
1,800 MIRV systems, as opposed to 1,200; 1,200 MIRVed ICBM's, as
opposed to 820.

Would you agree with those estimates?

288

General Haig. I think that the inference of that statement is
correct, that they certainly could do so.

Senator Pell. How do you feel that rejecting SALT II could
possibly help us meet the Soviet threat of competition, or whatever
you want to call it?

General Haig. I don't think that in my statement I have been
laying out the historical alternatives posed by your question. You
want my judgment on this isolated question, I take it, which is not
relevant to my own point of view.

Senator Pell. The point is that so many people have come here
to give us advice, and they are always for it, but with a whole lot of
reservations, amendments, and things of that sort.

We try, perhaps, to achieve too great a simplicity because we
have to vote on this issue. If we are faced with voting yea or nay
on this treaty, we would like to have your advice. We respect your
advice without qualifications.

General Haig. First, Senator, I do not envy you your responsibili-
ty because I think it is extremely important. Perhaps no issue has
been of comparable importance than this one in post World War II
American history.

Senator Pell. Would you vote yea or nay under those circum-
stances?

General Haig. Today?

Senator Pell. Yes, today.

General Haig. Today I would insist, were I in your chair, that I
have the clarifications in the two areas my statement laid out:
What is our approach to East- West relations, in general, and to the
kinds of illegal Soviet activity that are underway today; second,
have we clarified our doctrinal strategic thinking and do we know
whether or not we are trending, consciously or unconsciously,
toward mutual assured destruction or minimum deterrence, which
is the de facto reality of our trending in recent years, or are we
determined and dedicated to the proposition of a more balanced
equality, which will avoid the sterile, self-defeating, and immoral
implications of the MAD concept.

I know from reviewing the questions of the members of this
committee that there is confusion, even within this committee, on
this vitally important subject, and I think you should clarify that
before you go on with such a vitally important step as ratification.

Senator Pell. I don't feel my view is clarified particularly by
your statement. But let me return, for a moment, to this.

If you had to vote yea or nay today on this, without qualification,
how would you vote. General?

General Haig. I would refuse to vote until the questions have
been answered.

You know, the United States has lived for 200 years without
SALT II and has done quite well. I do not understand the breath-
less urgency of consumating a matter of such gravity to the Ameri-
can people until we have assured ourselves of the backdrops under
which we proceed.

Senator Pell. I would agree with you that it has been a tremen-
dous national policy to overemphasize the importance of SALT II.
This SALT II is just one small step in a long process; "a useful and
modest step" I believe was the expression of the Joint Chiefs. I

289

agree with you in that I do not believe it is that significant a
treaty; but it has been made one by the proponents and opponents
of it. It has gotten completely out of context from the viewpoint of
its importance.

That is my feeling.

Thank you, General Haig.

Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, I would like to say that if you would refuse to
vote, you would afford yourself a luxury we have never been afford-
ed. I have had to cast 10,000 votes yea or nay. I have never refused
to vote, and very few of my colleagues ever have. You are uncer-
tain, sometimes, but you have to vote.

General Haig. Senator, I know that. I think you are somewhat
humble about your ability to manage your affairs.

Senator Percy. We have to vote this up or down.

CONDITIONS FOR RATIFICATION

Now you and others have said that it is flawed. But there seem
to be two schools of thought among those who feel it is flawed.
There are those who feel it is so fatally flawed that it requires a
total renegotiation, which means it must be turned down. On the
other hand, there are those who feel that the flaws are such that
we can, through reservations, understandings, and modifications,
improve the treaty by making changes that would not send it back
to the drawing board and require total renegotiation.

As I interpret what Dr. Kissinger has said, he could endorse this
treaty providing certain things are done. I do not see an5rthing that
he has laid out that is unreasonable or that could not be achieved
by the United States in most respects. I am saying that he is not
attempting to wreck the treaty. He is not recommending that it be
sent back to the drawing board. He is in the school that says it can
be ratified if certain conditions are met.

Into what category would you put yourself? Would you concur
with Dr. Kissinger?

General Haig. Clearly, I am in the latter category. I suppose
there is a nuance of difference between Henry and me. He likes to
describe the bottle as half full; I tend to describe it as half empty.

He said that he could ratify or recommend ratification if certain
conditions were met. I have said that I would not ratify and I
would hold in abeyance until certain things are done.

Senator Percy. But isn't that really saying the same thing?

General Haig. That is what I am saying — these are differences in
nuance.

On the other hand, I have not agreed, as has Henry, that the
flaws can be remedied exclusively by changes that need not be
negotiated. That is a judgment I personally would not feel comfort-
able making until I have seen what progress we have made in
meeting these other conditions which I have asked for.

So there is another difference in nuance, if you will.

Senator Percy. I was tremendously interested in your testimony
before the Armed Services Committee because you did address one
of the principal concerns I have had about the treaty. I have tried
to determine what effect it does have on our NATO allies — our

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first line of defense and our greatest single commitment beyond
our own shores.

ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT SALT TREATY

In your testimony you indicated that there was greater concern
among Europeans about this treaty than might be reflected in the
official positions of the governments. In fact, you said that profes-
sional and military men have uniformly expressed a grave concern
about the imbalance in this treaty and the implications of these
imbalances for the period ahead.

Since your statement, with the help of our own staff and the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, I have tried to
research the proceedings of NATO meetings that have been held in
past years. I have found evidence of some of the concerns you have
expressed.

From what I have seen, I believe that military concerns, if I
could summarize them, break down into two principal areas. First,
NATO military leaders are concerned about how this treaty affects
their own plan for modernization of their forces. Second, they are
concerned about the tranquilizer effect to which Senator Javits
referred, that is, that this treaty will reduce public willingness to
spend the money necessary to maintain a strong defense.

In essence, is this what you have summarized the European
concerns to be?

General Haig. Yes, Senator, and I would also add two other
factors which influence that.

One is just the stark reality of worsening balances between our-
selves and the Soviet Union, about which European professional
military men are extremely cognizant. So, it is just an expression
of reality.

I would take credit for your first two and say, fourthly, that
there is an underlying discomfiture in Europe today about the
United States in general, its ability or willingness to stand up to
the Soviet Union, and its overall will.

Senator Percy. I would hope that they never misunderstand or
misinterpret the will of this country to move, and move swiftly to
use whatever military resources we have to defend Europe. I don't
see any lack of will in the United States in that regard.

Vietnam was a different situation, I think. We did not have the
kind of commitment in Vietnam that we have to Europe.

General Haig. I had to be an exponent of that view for the past
4 ¥2 years with my European partners, and I have never shrunk
from stating it with vigor.

On the other hand, there are manifestations of American policy
which, in a prudent circle, could be described as rather confusing
to those whom we asked to accept this assurance.

PRECEDENTIAL CHARACTER OF CRUISE MISSILE CONSTRAINTS

Senator Percy. Is it true that our NATO allies, particularly the
military, are concerned about the precedential character of cruise
missile constraints?

General Haig. They are very concerned about that, sir, of course.

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Senator Percy. The administration has argued that these con-
cerns have been met because they have made it clear that the
protocol will expire on its expiration date.

Has that assurance by the administration wholly satisfied the
NATO military?

General Haig. Not at all, sir. There are two levels of argument.
One is the logic of the issue in its first instance. Our European
allies could not understand that if we had written a prohibition
which we intend to lift at the end of a set period of time, why we
had put in the prohibition in the first instance. So, it is the logic of
the issue which is giving them great difficulty. I must admit that it
gives me equal difficulty.

The other aspect of it has to do with this shifting strategic
balance situation between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Our
European allies begin to question whether or not, at the end of the
protocol period, when we are obligated in the statement of princi-
ples to negotiate, we will have the leverage to, in fact, reverse the
precedent. So, the assurances become rather legalistic and not
sufficiently clear to our European allies in purely political terms.

I must say that I have serious questions myself about this prob-
lem.

Senator Percy. I anticipated that you would respond in that way
because I think the European allies, the military personnel particu-
larly, would not be satisfied with a unilateral statement by the
administration in this regard.

For that reason, many of us have discussed an understanding,
one that I have introduced, which states that nothing in the state-
ment of principles for SALT III commits the United States to enter
into a future agreement on protocol issues and that any such
agreement takes a two-thirds vote of the Senate to be approved. In
the legislative history of the discussion of this treaty, we would
make it eminently clear that there should be absolutely no chance
that two-thirds, or even a majority, of the Senate would concur to
an extension.

Would that understanding be the kind that should be entered
into as a part of the ratification process and yet be the kind of
understanding that would not wreck the treaty?

General Haig. Again, Senator, the value judgment for me on
that issue is this. Clearly I am comfortable with the general thrust
of your proposal. But I could only give you a clear value judgment
on it in the context of what forces the United States was going to
be proceeding with in the interim period. There we leave the
legalistic aspect which your fix would be— rather exclusively that —
and we get into the business of leverage on the part of the United
States at the end of the protocol period to effect, in practical terms,
what we have stated we will in legalistic terms. I do not suggest
subterfuge.

Senator Percy. Dr. Kissinger suggested on Tuesday that the
Senate state that any such agreement, including restrictions on
cruise missiles, can be submitted only as a part of an equitable,
balanced arrangement in theater nuclear forces in Europe. Do you
think this would be helpful to allay our allies' concerns, particular-
ly those of military personnel, about SALT III?

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General Haig. In general, I would be comfortable with that. But
again, what I would prefer is the achievement of a programmatic
consensus that is so fundamental to our theater modernization
target, which incidentally, we have already established as a nation
and within the NATO family, to achieve by the end of this year.

Whether we are going to be able to succeed in that I think in
large measure will be a consequence of the kind of leadership the
U.S. exercises between now and then, and at the highest level.

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, may I take just another 30 sec-
onds to finish up on this, please?

Senator Pell. Yes; Senator.

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, the last question I would like to ask you is whether
article XII is a particularly bothersome article. It is about noncir-
cumvention.

Is it essential, in your judgment, that we absolutely clarify that
particular issue beyond the statements of the administration?

A "yes" or "no" answer would be fine.

General Haig. My answer is yes. I think there are different
views on both sides.

Senator Percy. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Pell. Senator McGovern.

Senator McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, first of all, I agree with the observation that
Senator Pell expressed, which I think you at least partially agreed
with, that this treaty probably has been vastly oversold in terms of
what is really in it. I would only add that I think those who
welcome the treaty express too much joy about it and those who
oppose it probably express too much fear.

If I were back in the classroom instead of in the Senate, I would
give this treaty about a D minus.

nuclear weapons and AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

In any event, here we are with this treaty. I think perhaps the
superficial character of the treaty has contributed in part to a
situation where the debate has become one not so much about
what is in it, but a debate about America's global role and about
the relationship of nuclear weapons to American foreign policy.

I think we have needed for a long time, at least since Vietnam, a
fundamental, far-ranging debate on American foreign policy in the
post-Vietnam period. We have not yet had that kind of debate.

After listening to the hearings here for the last 4 weeks— and I
believe you are the last witness before we go into our August
recess — I am wondering more and more if a nuclear treaty is a
good vehicle around which to build a debate on American foreign
policy. The problem is that the debate necessarily is distorted in
the direction of military ends, especially nuclear ends.

I have thought here at times that if I were a theater commander
out somewhere around the globe, I would be very nervous about
the public focus, the exaggeration, that is being placed on the
nuclear equation at the expense of any attention to conventional
systems. I am sure if I were an economic or a political planner
looking at American strength, I would worry about the absence of

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any foreign policy implications based on, let us say, our dependence
on oil from a rather unstable region of the world, the growing
inflation, the loss of productivity — I would worry about all those
things and how they bear on American strength around the world.

But what has happened is that we have listened to one person
after another whose expertise is primarily in the military field,
and, goodness knows, we need that expertise.

General Haig. I hope you are not putting me in that category.
Senator. [General laughter.]

Senator McGovern. Well, I put you in the field as a military
expert. But most of the recommendations that have come from
these references — and I am not speaking about you, specifically —
have dealt with matters like public perceptions. They have dealt
with political judgments about American foreign policy. They have
dealt with negotiating questions. It has tended to just distort the
whole direction of what is becoming a foreign policy debate toward
military ends.

I guess the question I am leading up to is this. Are you con-
cerned about the discussion of American foreign policy in the con-
text of a nuclear debate, which may very well distort the whole
emphasis of what we ought to be doing in terms of devising a
foreign policy that is relevant to the world we face?

General Haig. Senator, I suppose I have to go back to my Jesuit
training

Senator Biden. Oh, now I am beginning to understand. [General
laughter.]

General Haig [continuing]. But I think, in general, the thrust of
your question is very, very understandable to me. I think it is a
shame that we do have to address SALT II in the broad context
that I am suggesting we must. The reasons for that are that we
have now reached a level of imbalance with worsening trends
between ourselves and the Soviet Union in the central strategic
nuclear area which do, indeed, impinge on all of these broad issues
that have been now raised in the context of SALT II.

For example, certainly as a theater commander I am concerned
about our conventional capability to deal with potential difficulty
in perhaps the energy area — oil in the Middle East. But, you know,
every day I see a very, very clear linkage between worsening
strategic balances between ourselves and the Soviet Union and the
attitude of oil producing nations upon whose good will we so vitally
depend.

You know, Saudi Arabia today could get by with about 4 million
barrels-a-day production. The rest of that production we are realiz-
ing is based in large measure on their confidence in our credibility
as a nation. That is what is under discussion today.

Senator McGovern. General, you do not really believe they are
setting their oil production standards on the basis of the nuclear
equation, do you? What does one have to do with the other? I don't
understand that kind of linkage.

General Haig. I had supposed that was why the question was
asked in the first place.

Clearly we have built our deterrence since the Second World
War on a combination of our central strategic military power, in

48-250 O - 79 - 19

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which we have enjoyed superiority until very recently, and our
conventional power.

Senator McGovern. But what is the implication — that the
Saudis are going to fear a nuclear strike if they do not increase the
number of barrels of oil? What is the point you are making?

General Haig. No, Senator, it is not that at all. Perhaps I was
not clear.

What I am suggesting is that Saudi attitudes, the convergence of
Saudi Arabian policies with our own, the level of oil production in
which they engage, as well as the prices which they ask, are
influenced by their perception of American guarantees to maintain
stability in that area of the world — an obligation we have incurred
since the Second World War and have, until recently, rather rigid-
ly adhered to.

Senator McGovern. But isn't our energy policy much more rele-
vant to the question of Saudi oil production than our nuclear
policy? I do not mean that the nuclear policy is not important, but
I don't see what it has to do with oil.

General Haig. In my judgment it is very much interrelated, or I
would not be urging the assessment I am urging here.

SPENDING FOR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Senator McGovern. You testified before the Armed Services
Committee, General, that if we had spent $2 billion or $3 billion a
year, presumably additional money beyond what we did spend, on
strategic systems since 1962, we could have the kind of superiority
we had enjoyed at that time. I believe that is a direct quote.

Now, according to figures that I have, in 1962, the United States
had about 1,840 strategic missiles and bombers and the Soviets had
about 215. In other words, we had about eight or nine times as
much.

Are you advocating, when you say we could have maintained
that kind of superiority, that this is what we should be striving for
now — eight or nine times as much as the Soviets?

General Haig. No, Senator, not at all.

History and technology have passed us by. I am not so sure I
would have been an advocate for that kind of superiority in 1962.

The statement which you have quoted was merely to reflect that
the situation in which we find ourselves today is a consequence of
conscious, unilateral American policy decisions with respect to the
level of nuclear capability we were willing to maintain and pay for,
and that the cost, for example, of the extreme superiorities that we
had in 1962 could have been realized in very modest terms if you
look at our Federal budget and our defense budget.

Senator McGovern. But if it wasn't feasible to think in terms of
maintaining an eight or nine times American margin of superior-
ity, why should we not have made a unilateral decision not to try
to sustain that posture?

General Haig. That is not the point.

Senator McGovern. What is the point?

General Haig. The point. Senator, is this. At the time— and what
generated this statement, which was taken somewhat out of con-
text is— we Americans decided that both these costs, the $2 billion
to $3 billion, plus the more overriding belief that we had that if we

295

managed ourselves from superiority to parity with the Soviet
Union, it would influence the Soviet leaders to exercise restraint in
their building programs. In other words, we would have a more
stable international environment.

The point I made at the time that statement was made was that
we were wrong in this belief.

Senator McGovern. I wish we had tested that restraint theory
when we had the MIRV capability and the Soviets had not made
any move in that direction and we decided we had to build it as a
bargaining chip. In retrospect, wouldn't we have been much better
off if we had restrained the building of the MIRV system which
now makes our land-based system vulnerable and tried to work out
an arrangement with them for neither side to build it?

I think Secretary Kissinger once said that he wished, in retro-
spect, that we had done that.

General Haig. I might be inclined to share that view, but not for
those reasons.

When we decided to go with MIRV's, and my memory is accurate
on this since I was working for Secretary McNamara at the time, it
was predicated on the proposition that we had no need for larger
yields for which the Soviets were opting, and that our technology,
our ability to achieve accuracy with miniaturization would have
enabled us to achieve our goals in the strategic area far more
cheaply and perhaps more moderately under the MIRVing concept.

We were wrong again because the Soviets have subsequently
developed the kinds of technology and accuracy which we should
have known at the time they ultimately would. That has been
superimposed on the huge yields which they enjoy today, and we
are faced with the explosion of Soviet systems at the end of this
treaty period, in 1985, if we do not maintain the leverage to pre-
vent that.

Senator McGovern. I see that my time is up. It is getting kind of
discouraging hearing our distinguished military leaders tell us how
many times we were wrong about military judgments.

General Haig. Well, Senator, I could write a book on that.

Senator McGovern. Thank you. General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Pell. Senator Helms.

Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I am a little bit astonished at the suggestion that there
is no relationship between SALT II and oil.

On July 4, I was in London and I spoke with and met with about
75 or 80 Members of Parliament. You had better understand that
they know the relationship between this treaty and the availability
of oil in the future and the impact it will have on the oil-producing
nations or the impact it could have.

Of course, anything we say now is purely speculative, but we had
better hedge our bets. I think that is what you were saying to
Senator McGovern.

Furthermore, there is, or was, great concern expressed by those
Members of Parliament with respect to articles XII and XIII con-
cerning noncircumvention.

Have you discussed this aspect with any legislators?

General Haig. Yes, Senator, I have.

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Senator Helms. What precisely was their attitude or their con-
cern?

General Haig. Well, sir, I suppose it was twofold.

First is whether or not the understandings between the United
States and the Soviet Union on the noncircumvention clause are
consistent with the provision of the necessary technology that they
feel they are going to need in the cruise areas and in other areas.

Second, and I must say this to this committee, there are serious
European parliamentarians and officials who doubt, whether or not
that restriction in the language of the treaty is binding, who doubt,
whether or not the United States is really willing to share with
them in the nuclear area. This is because of a perceived attitude
developing in our own country suggesting animosity toward any-
thing nuclear.

Senator Helms. That was precisely the concern that was empha-
sized to me in my meeting.

When I came back here, I was surprised to see the constant
portrayals before this committee and others that everything is fine
with our allies, that they just love this treaty, that it is better than
sliced bread. That is not the attitude that I found among the
Members of Parliament. They are terribly apprehensive about it.

Do you agree with that?

General Haig. Yes, sir. A great number are.

Senator Pell. If the Senator would yield, sir, your experience is
diametrically opposed to mine. I was Chairman of the Delegation to
NATO and we must have just talked with different parliamentar-
ians.

Senator Helms. Well, I do not know with whom my distinguished
friend met. But I met in a relatively private set of circumstances.
There was no press. As the saying goes, we let our hair down. They
expressed their concerns very candidly as I would imagine some
have done with you.

We were talking about the will of this Nation, and that is pretty
good rhetoric.

I have to divide it into two categories. One is the willingness of
the people to sacrifice. But how are they going to do that without
the proper leadership?

I think this delineation ought to be made, and I think that is
what you are talking about this morning.

General Haig. I could not agree more, Senator, and not only the
proper leadership but the accurate facts.

Senator Helms. Well, I agree with that.

salt II an escalation treaty

Let me raise a question with you that I have raised with several
other witnesses. General.

This is not a limitation treaty. In my view it is an escalation
treaty. And yet, there have been propaganda forces at work for a
year or more going around this country. They spent something
more than $1 million in travel alone for Government officials to go
around to every talk show and rotary club to say that this is fine,
that this treaty will end our problems. Mostly the spokesmen were
people who would not know the difference between SALT II and a

297

hog trying to rollerskate. But, nevertheless, that much money was
spent.

Here we confront a situation where the American people really
believe this is going to work out in terms of our fears about the
Soviet Union.

General, what would be wrong with this Government taking a
stand before the court of world opinion and saying this is not really
a good treaty — which it is not? Let us both have an arms reduction
treaty, a true arms reduction treaty, and get out of this insanity,
which everybody questions.

How would that play, not in Peoria, but in our allied nations?
Would they understand what we are talking about?

General Haig. I think that is a difficult question to answer.
Senator, because events that follow such an act by the United
States would influence what essentially would be a dynamic reac-
tion in Europe.

I think it is awfully important that we consider this as well.

I clearly believe that no treaty is better than a fundamentally
bad treaty. But we are now dealing with a situation in which I
think we are going to have to step back, because I know from my
point of view and from my military experience — and this is, after
all, arms control, and arms control is the business of military
people because you are dealing with the discipline to which we
dedicate our professional lives and training. So, we have not only a
right, but an obligation to be engaged, and a very special expertise,
to be tapped in this area.

We are here today, after 7 years of negotiations with the Soviet
Union, and, as an individual, I would be more inclined to look to
this as a great opportunity for our Nation to sort out its thinking,
to blow the pipes clean, if you will, rather than to take steps which
may require further steps which this clarification of thinking
should precede before we would be able to do the right things and
then take the subsequent steps — if you gather what I am suggest-
ing.

Senator Helms. I follow you.

General Haig. So, I think it is so important, whatever the Senate
does, in its wisdom, with respect to SALT II, per se, that we, as a
nation, step back and take a look at the two areas I have suggested
we look at in my statement.

Senator Helms. I do not disagree with that at all.

I certainly agree with you that no treaty is better than a bad
treaty, which I consider this one to be. But I still believe that
ultimately, if humanity is to survive, we have to confront the
question of genuine arms reduction. Why wait until the next
round? Why not lay this treaty aside and go before the court of
world opinion and say to the Soviet Union: "OK, if you need this
thing, let's start now."

I don't know about the Soviet people. Theirs is a closed society.
We had some discussion of this at a code word level meeting
yesterday. It may be that the Soviet people are beginning to get fed
up with so much of their GNP [gross national product] going to this
sort of thing.

I don't know when the first step ought to be taken. General, but
we have to take it sometime.

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General Haig. There are some other very fundamental consider-
ations with respect to that, and I share your concern, Senator, and
your disappointment that this is not a treaty that has really
brought down the limits of strategic nuclear power and could be
even an incentive to build up with greater intensity. But we also
have to know some other things as we make generalizations in the
nuclear disarmament area. First, we must know that we get to a
certain point in balances between ourselves and the Soviet Union
where their yields and their demography,