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Full text of "The SALT II treaty : hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session on EX. Y, 96-1 .."

THE SALT II TREATY 



HEARINGS 

BBFORB THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
ON 

EX. Y, 96-1 

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE 
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO- 
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT 
II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18, 
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 



SEPTEMBER 6, 7, 10, 11, AND 12, 1979 



PART 4 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 




THE SALT II TREATY 



HEARINGS 

before: thb 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-SIXTH CONGKESS 

FIRST SESSION 
ON 

EX. Y, 96-1 

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THB 
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO- 
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT 
II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18, 
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 



SEPTEMBER 6, 7, 10, 11, AND 12, 1979 



PART 4 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 




y4'f 76/z:^f2/shlf 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
<8-260O WASHINGTON ; 1979 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

Stock No. 052-070-05135-3 



COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho. Chairman 



CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island 
GEORGE McGOVERN, South Dakota 
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware 
JOHN GLENN, Ohio 
RICHARD (DICK) STONE, Florida 
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland 
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine 
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska 



JACOB K. JAVITS, New York 
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois 
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee 
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina 
S. I. HAYAKAWA, California 
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 



WiLUAM B. Bader, Staff Director 
Albert A. Lakeland, Jr., Minority Staff Director 



(U) 



CONTENTS 



Hearing days: ^^^ 

September 6, 1979 1 

September 7, 1979 149 

September 10, 1979 275 

September 11, 1979 397 

September 12, 1979 435 

Statement of: 

Baugher, Peter Vincent, past chairman and present member, national 

governing board, Ripon Society, Washington, D.C 166 

Brennan, Donald, director, national security studies, Hudson Institute 363 

Carey, John, past national commander. The American Legion, Washington, 

D.C 157 

Corterier, Peter, Grermany, Rapporteur, Political Committee, North Atlan- 
tic Assembly 312 

de Vries, Klaas G., Netherlands, Rapporteur, Military Committee, North 

Atlantic Assembly 318 

Earle, Hon. Ralph, II, Chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation 435 

Hoffmann, Prof. Stanley, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 277 

Karber, Phillip A., vice president, BDM Corp 253 

King, Mrs. Coretta Scott, member, Americans for SALT 87 

Kirkland, Lane, secretary-treasurer, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C 191 

Krol, John Cardinal, Archdiocese of Philadelphia, on behalf of the U.S. 

Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C 116 

Lodal, Jan, executive vice president, American Management Systems 398 

May, Michael, associate director, Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory, Liver- 
more, Calif 406 

Mclntyre, Hon. Thomas J., Jr., president, Americans for SALT 84 

Moorer, Adm. Thomas (retired), cochairman. Coalition for Peace Through 

Strength, Washington, D.C 39 

Nitze, Hon. Paul, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and former Secre- 
tary of the Navy 402 

Panofsky, Dr. Wolfgang, director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 351 

Perry, Hon. William J., Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, 

Department of Defense 438 

Randall, Dr. Claire, general secretary. National Council of Churches 131 

Rostow, Eugene, chairman, executive committee. Committee on the Pres- 
ent Danger, Washington, D.C 1 

Schlafly, Phyllis, American Conservative Union 202 

Schmidt, Robert D., president, American Committee on East-West Accord, 

Washington, D.C 149 

Scoville, Herbert J., Jr., member, governing board. New Directions, Wash- 
ington, D.C 176 

Teller, Dr. Edward, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace 231 

Thyness, Paul, Norway, president. North Atlantic Assembly 298 

Vorspan, Albert, vice president. Union of American Hebrew Congrega- 
tions 139 

Wall, Patrick, United Kingdom, Chairman, Military Committee, North 

Atlantic Assembly 307 

Warnke, Hon. Paul, former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency and former Chief, SALT negotiations 345 

Winn, Brig. Gen. David W. (retired), policy board. Institute of American 

Relations, Washington, D.C 79 

Yost, Ambassador Charles W., cochairman of Americans for SALT 90 



(ffl) 



IV 

Insertions for the record: ^^^ 
Letter from Professor Rostow to Senator Church, dated September 27, 1979, 

in regards to amendments, reservations and understandings 15 

Foreign Relations Committee staff memorandum of June 25, 1979 on SALT 

II legal and procedural issues 18 

Prepared statement of Prof. Eugene V. Rostow 31 

Prepared statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Retired 60 

Prepared statement of Hon. Thomas J. Mclntyre, Jr 86 

Prepared statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost 92 

Prepared statement of John Cardinal Krol 127 

Prepared statement of Dr. Claire Randall 136 

Prepared statement of Albert Vorspan 143 

Prepared statement of Robert D. Schmidt 153 

Prepared statement of John Carey 160 

Prepared statement of Peter V. Baugher 170 

Prepared statement of Herbert J. Scoville, Jr 178 

Prepared statement of the AFL-CIO executive council 193 

Prepared statement of Phyllis Schlafly 219 

Prepared statement of Charles L. Teevan 228 

Prepared statement of Dr. Edward Teller 239 

Prepared statement of Phillip A. Karber 264 

Prepared statement of Prof. George F. Kennan 276 

Prepared statement of Prof. Stanley Hoffmann 289 

Prepared statement of Paul Thyness 302 

Prepared statement of Patrick Wall 309 

Prepared statement of Peter Corterier 314 

Prepared statement of Klaas G. de Vries 321 

Prepared statement of Ambassador Paul C. Warnke 349 

Prepared statement of Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky 357 

Prepared statement of Donald Brennan 369 

Passage from General Rowny's prepared statement of July 12, 1979, 

supplied by Donald Brennan 380 

Ambassador Warnke 's responses to additional questions submitted for the 

record • 385 

Dr. Panofsky's responses to additional questions submitted for the 

record 387 

Mr. Brennan's answers to additional questions submitted for the record ... 393 

Prepared statement of Hon. Paul H. Nitze 403 

Prepared statement of Michael M. May 411 

Letter from Senator Church to Secretary Vance, dated July 16, 1979, 
regarding Soviet views concerning multiple protective structure basing 

for M-X missile, and his response thereto 433 

Production rate of ALCM's, supplied by DOD 454 

Protocol limitations on GLCM's and ALCM's, supplied by DOD 455 

Prepared statement of Hon. William J. Perry 474 

Ambassador Earle's and Dr. Perry's responses to additional questions 

submitted for the record 480 

Appendix: 

Comparison of the Russian and English texts of the SALT II Treaty 487 

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's responses to additional questions for the 

record of July 16, 1979, part 2 491 

Additional comments submitted for the record by General Rowny 492 

Additional statements received for the record: 

Statements of Dr. Wes Schwemmer Cady, Katherine Eaton, and Dr. J. 
David Edwards, on behalf of the American Association of University 

Women, Washington, D.C 494 

Statement of Raymond Nathan, director, American Ethical Union, Wash- 
ington, D.C 497 

Statement of Walter Hoffmann, chairman, Campaign for U.N. Reform, 

Wayne, N.J 497 

Statement of Glenn E. Watts, president. Communications Workers of 

America, Washington, D.C 502 

Statement of Edward F. Snyder, executive secretary of the Friends Com- 
mittee on National Legislation, Washington, D.C 503 

Statement of Stephen E. Seadler, president. Ideological Defense Center, 

New York, N.Y 504 

Statement of Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, president. Pax Christi USA, 

Chicago, 111 509 



Page 
Statement of Dr. Alan Geyer, representing the Council of Bishops and the 
Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, Washing- 
ton, D.C 512 

Statement of Col. Phelps Jones, U.S.A. (retired), director, National Security 
and Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, 

Washington, D.C 516 

Statement of The Woman's National Democratic Club, Political Action 

Committee, Washington, D.C 520 

Statement of Lester H. Ahlswede, representing Citizen-Taxpayers, Silver 

Spring, Md 520 

Statement of Benjamin M. Becker, Highland Park, 111 523 

Statement of Roger A. Singerling, Hackettstown, N.J 525 

Statement of Joseph E. Tracey, Jr., Wheaton, Md 526 



SALT II TREATY 



THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1979 

United States Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, at 10:03 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden presiding. 

Present: Senators Church, Biden, Stone, Zorinsky, Javits, and 
Hayakawa. 

Also present: Senator Cranston. 

Senator Biden. The hearing will come to order, please. 

opening statement 

This morning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins its 
final series of hearings on the SALT II Treaty. Today and tomor- 
row spokesmen for public groups will be testifying on this agree- 
ment. Unfortunately, we will not be able to hear from all such 
groups who have requested an opportunity to testify, but we have 
asked for written statements from those not scheduled to appear 
before this committee. 

This morning we will hear from three groups critical of the 
SALT II agreement, the Committee on the Present Danger, the 
Coalition for Peace Through Strength, and the Institute of Ameri- 
can Relations. 

First, we will hear from Eugene Rostow, speaking as chairman of 
the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger. 
After questioning from the committee, we will hear from Adm. 
Thomas Moorer on behalf of the Coalition for Peace Through 
Strength. I understand that accompanying Admiral Moorer to re- 
spond to questions is Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former head of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Finally, we will hear from retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr. 
Victor Fediay, who will speak on behalf of the Institute of Ameri- 
can Relations. 

Professor Rostow, would you please proceed? 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE ROSTOW, CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, WASH- 
INGTON, D.C 

Mr. Rostow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to express my own thanks and that of the Commit- 
tee on the Present Danger for your invitation to appear today to 
testify on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am appearing on 



' See page 31 for Mr. Rostow's prepared statement. 

(1) 



behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, as you said. You 
have the two formal statements we have issued, as well as related 
materials, and the statement prepared for these hearings. 

The conclusions in our July 19 statement prepared for the hear- 
ing before your subcommittee. Senator Biden, states: We believe, a 
positive and affirmative program for putting SALT II and the 
SALT negotiating process into the context of our foreign and de- 
fense policy as a whole. I emphasize that these conclusions are the 
basis for our approach, and we have repeated them in the begin- 
ning of the statement prepared for my submission this morning. 

I thought that my brief opening remarks today would be most 
useful to you if I supplemented our earlier work on this subject by 
commenting on some of the key issues which have emerged in the 
hearings so far. 

The strongest argument for SALT II which has thus far been put 
forward by the administration was summed up by a distinguished 
Senator in these terms, "To reject SALT II would be to go over the 
abyss." The variations on this theme are infinite. Some years ago I 
counted a couple of hundred remarks of this tenor and then gave 
up counting. President Carter has said that those who oppose the 
treaty as it stands are warmongers and opponents of detente. Sec- 
retary of State Vance is reported by the press to have said that he 
would resign rather than preside over the end of detente and the 
revival of the cold war. , 

The notion that the cold war is over, the notion that Soviet- 
American relations have improved in recent years is, in our opin- 
ion, a dangerous symptom of autointoxication. The cold war is 
worse today than it has ever been, featured by Soviet threats and 
thrusts far more sophisticated in character and on a far greater 
scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the 
attack on Greece. But, as things get worse, many Americans tell 
each other that they are getting better. o * t m tt 

SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, SALT II 
would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet 
superiority and military superiority in all spheres. It would be a 
great Soviet victory in the cold war and would be so perceived 
everywhere in the world. But we keep repeating to ourselves that 
SALT II would be a step toward stability, detente, and peace. 

This statement is made so often that we accept it as self-evident. 
But it is not self-evident. The SALT I package was ratified in 1972 
on the basis of the same litany of arguments which have been 
offered to the Senate and the American people this year, offered 
under very different political and military circumstances, but of- 
fered nonetheless. 

The period since 1972 has been the worst period of the cold war. 
It has been the period in which the agreements made for peace in 
Indochina were openly violated. The promises made to President 
Nixon in May 1972, with respect to peace in the Middle East were 
openly violated. It has been the period of the Soviet campaign in 
Africa and Asia and even of Soviet attempts to penetrate the 
Caribbean, as we have noticed suddenly in the last few days. 

In view of the betrayal of every promise and every expectation 
on the basis of which SALT I was ratified, how can these argu- 
ments be put forward and how can they retain their plausibility? 



The fact that they do recalls President Kennedy's celebrated quip 
that if you are cheated once, it is their fault, but if you are cheated 
a second time, it is your own. 

Many of those who believe that rejecting SALT II, as it stands, 
would be "going over the abyss" attribute nearly magic influence 
to arms limitation agreements. Nothing in the history of such 
agreements gives the slightest encouragement for such beliefs. 

The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of modern arms 
limitation agreements. It set limits on German armaments and it 
prescribed the demilitarization of the Rhineland, which was also 
guaranteed by the Locarno Treaty. If Britain had been willing to 
join France in enforcing that treaty, World War II would never 
have taken place. But when the treaty was violated — secretly at 
first, then openly when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and 
marched into the Rhineland in 1936 — Great Britain and France did 
nothing but wring their hands and try to persuade Hitler to sign 
new treaties limiting arms. 

The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern 
times was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its successors 
of the early 1930's. Our experience under that treaty, too, was 
hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles. 

I could mention other instances, even more depressing: the agree- 
ments for demilitarized zones in Korea and Vietnam, for example; 
the Laos accord of 1962, or the arrangement to keep the PLO out of 
southern Lebanon. 

The argument that to reject SALT would be to go over the abyss 
has another dimension, the notion that such action on our part 
would make the Soviet Union more aggressive than it is. The claim 
betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and 
of the serious and devoted men who govern it. They are already 
behaving as badly from our point of view as they dare. They take 
every opportunity to expand, and they manufacture several. There 
is no use getting excited about it. That is the nature of their policy. 
As a distinguished professor at Princeton has said, they are still in 
the mood of imperialism of the eighteenth century which we in the 
west have long since given up. 

There is only one argument which can deter Soviet expansion 
and that is the calm confrontation of unacceptable risks. This 
factor prevailed in a dozen crises since 1945, from the Berlin block- 
ade to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion of 
that conviction since 1972 or so which has invited a series of Soviet 
thrusts on every continent and every ocean. In recent years, the 
pace of Soviet expansion has increased as a result of the shock of 
Vietnam and Watergate to American public opinion and the per- 
ception in the Soviet Union of President Carter as a weak Presi- 
dent. 

The claim that it would cost us more money to refuse ratification 
of SALT at the present time or to ratify it only on the conditions 
that we have outlined here is equally specious. Administration 
spokesmen have taken many different positions on this question. 
Paul Warnke has said that it would cost more money if we ratified 
SALT, but that the increase could not be ratified. Secretary of 
Defense Brown has testified that it would cost perhaps between $1 
billion and $2 billion a year for 4 or 5 years. Now he offers higher 



estimates. Mr. Gelb has recently written that saving money is the 
main argument for ratifying SALT. The fact is that in an area of 
complex and rapidly changing technology, none of these estimates 
is of much consequence. 

Ambassador Harriman has offered a variant of the abyss argu- 
ment. Not to accept SALT, he said, would lead to the election of a 
hardliner to succeed Mr. Brezhnev. The notion that Mr. Brezhnev 
is a moderate in any sense that we can recognize is denied by 
anything he has said and done since he became a public figure. He 
is the author of the Brezhnev doctrine. He claims the right to 
intervene in any country at any time in behalf either of a socialist 
government or of a progressive movement, that is to say, a move- 
ment he regards as progressive. He is the author of the attacks on 
°the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, and of the attack on Czechoslo- 
vakia in 1968. To call Brezhnev a moderate is an abuse of the 
English language. 

Of course, there are differences within the Kremlm, and there 
probably are groups and sects within the Kremlin, but according to 
any information we have or have seen, they do not concern Soviet- 
American relations, nor is there any evidence that any Soviet 
leader accepts our definition of detente. Of course they all want to 
see SALT II ratified. They made enormous progress under SALT I, 
and they expect to make even more under SALT II. Furthermore, 
if we ever do wake up and decide to restore the military balance, 
they would surely lose as a consequence, because their economy is 
so much smaller and weaker than our own. But these are hardly 
reasons to take the treaty as it stands. 

The second best argument offered by the administration for the 
treaty is that it would not do much harm and should therefore be 
ratified to demonstrate to our friends and our adversaries that we 
really do have a government. It is an argument which appeals very 
strongly to all Americans. For the best of reasons, we tend to rally 
to the flag when it is under fire, and President Carter is surely 

under fire. 

The fatal flaw in this argument, however, is that the treaty is 
not harmless. It would do a great deal of harm. It would lock us 
into a position of strategic inferiority which would also be unstable 
and unverifiable, the perfect recipe for Soviet nuclear blackmail 
during the period of our greatest relative weakness in the early 
and middle 1980's. 

Moreover, it would prevent us from redressing the military bal- 
ance during that period. No spokesman for the administration has 
as yet seriously addressed the principal issues raised in this con- 
nection by its critics. All studies of the problem agree that if 
present trends continue just a few years longer, the Soviet Union 
will have significant nuclear superiority in the early 1980's, the 
capacity, that is, to make a pre-emptive first strike by destroying 
our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our submarines in port 
with a fraction of their nuclear force, holding enough accurate 
missiles in reserve to neutralize the whole of our own nuclear 

This possibility has been on everybody's mind as a nightmare for 
years. The prospect that these risks will materialize has become 
very much worse because President Carter has canceled, postponed. 



or stretched out the programs initiated by his predecessors to deal 
with them. The answer of the administration to this analysis is 
that we could use our submarines in response to any such threat 
and we could therefore deter it. 

Some have even come so far £is to argue — Secretary Vance did 
so — that we might launch our ICBM's on warning within a few 
moments of receiving a radar signal that such an attack was on its 
way. Then, finally they say that when the M-X missile becomes 
available in significant quantities in 1989, it will provide an answer 
to the vulnerability of our ICBM force. But what are we supposed 
to do in the meantime, between now and 1989, or between the 
period in the early 1980's when this possibility becomes a somber 
prospect? 

The administration answers this question by ignoring it. 

Under these circumstances, we should be vulnerable to nuclear 
war or nuclear blackmail. We should face a condition of diplomatic 
impotence and be totally unable to use our conventional forces. 
That is the linkage between the nuclear balance and the whole of 
the rest of our foreign policy, which can never be escaped. 

What would we do if there were a Macedonian uprising in 
Greece, for example, supported from Bulgaria? If Iceland or 
Norway were pushed somehow out of NATO? If we were told by 
the Soviet Union to get our fleet and our forces out of the Mediter- 
ranean? Under such circumstances, would either the Soviet Union 
or our allies believe in the possibility of reprisal from submarines 
which in turn would be suicidal for us? That was the argument, 
you will recall, that General DeGaulle made some years ago about 
the credibility of our nuclear weapons, and it is an argument which 
is becoming more and more visible in the minds of our allies as 
well as in the minds of the Soviets. 

The only answer thus far from President Carter and his aides 
has been a reiteration of their blind faith in the doctrine of mutual 
assured destruction, the McNamara doctrine, by which we have 
lived for more than a decade. It is the heart and nearly the whole 
of the administration case for SALT II. 

As former Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized in Brussels 
last Saturday, that argument is losing its intellectual and political 
plausibility. We simply must move and move rapidly to counter- 
force strategies. 

But the treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most 
feasible and perhaps the only credible and practical counterforce 
program that could preserve our second strike capability during 
the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III produc- 
tion lines which the President has recently closed, to make a great 
many Minuteman Ill's; and to deploy them in multiple vertical 
protected shelters, the so-called shell game. 

The Soviets take the view that any such approach on our part is 
prohibited by article IV of the treaty and by the provisions of the 
treaty banning deliberate concealment. They say that each shelter 
would be considered a fixed launcher, whether or not it contained a 
missile, and in any event it would be a form of concealment in 
their view which the treaty prohibits. 

On either theory it would be banned. It may be an impracticable 
approach for another reason under the treaty, because the number 



required would be too great for the quotas of the treaty. That is, 
Minuteman III is much smaller than many of the Soviet weapons, 
and it carries only three warheads. 

The administration has not, to my knowledge or to the knowl- 
edge of any of my colleagues who have followed these things close- 
ly, addressed the issue of a possible quick fix approach. Indeed, the 
administration seems to assume that any program for protecting 
our fixed ICBM's and other ground-based launchers in the early 
eighties is impossible. 

There are many other features of this treaty which are far from 
harmless. The provisions with respect to heavy missiles, for exam- 
ple; or the Backfire bomber; or the common understanding in 
paragraph 8 of article IV which deals with the relationship of the 
SS-16 intercontinental missile, and the SS-20 missile; or the cruise 
missile problem, too, which has been much discussed. 

Here we find the answer offered by the administration in these 
hearings to be either nonexistent, or unresponsive and unsatisfac- 
tory. This is true as well of what the administration has said on 
verification. The administration has concentrated on the possibili- 
ties of verifying the testing of new weapons, but has not answered 
the questions which we and others have raised about the possibility 
of counting missiles in warehouses and the absence of any re- 
straints or any possible monitoring of restraints on the manufac- 
ture of missiles rather than the deployment of launchers. 

Our committee has recommended that the Senate should not 
give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the most 
important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment 
and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a 
specific program that would achieve and maintain essential equiv- 
alt^nce and adequate deterrence. Among the deficiencies of the 
treaty requiring amendment I should list first our right to deploy 
ICBM's in modes and in numbers we deem necessary to insure the 
survival against surprise attack; the equal right of the two sides to 
use heavy missiles; the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS- 
20 within the numerical limits of the treaty; and provision for the 
adoption of programs which would reverse the present ominous 
situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including 
change in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based 
cruise missiles and a clarification of the transfer of technology 
issue causing so much concern to our allies. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me stress that the responsibility of 
the Senate in voting on SALT II is unique in our history. Every 
American shares the goal of achieving true detente with the Soviet 
Union, which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of 
scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the rules of the charter of the 
United Nations regarding the international use of force. True de- 
tente in this sense is a central objective of the Committee on the 
Present Danger and, I am sure, of the American people. Every 
President and Congress since 1945 have gone to great lengths to 
reach that goal, but President Carter's quest for detente with the 
Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of 
unilateral disarmament on our part and other unilateral conces- 
sions will induce the Soviet Union to follow suit. 



As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our defenses and 
weakened our alliances and abdicated his responsibility for the 
security of the Nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility 
therefore falls on the Senate with respect to this treaty and ulti- 
mately on the whole Congress and the people. We have not faced 
decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Buchanan. 

President Carter likes to compare the debate over SALT II with 
the controversy over the League of Nations in 1919, but the anal- 
ogy is misleading. If you go back and look at it, the League vote 
was not the result of the blind opposition of a small group of 
willfuU men who prevented the ratification of the treaty. It was 
President Wilson himself who urged the Democrats who followed 
his lead on this matter, and there were 23 of them, to vote against 
the treaty, with the reservations which had been negotiated by 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts as the leader. If only 
seven more Democrats had refused to follow the President's lead 
and had voted their convictions, the course of history might well 
have been very different. 

In the second place. President Wilson was proposing full and 
responsible American participation in world politics. The position 
today is just the opposite. President Carter is conducting a policy of 
retreat to isolationism, and unless that policy is promptly reversed, 
it will soon be beyond our power to do so. 

The coming decade will be as difficult and as dangerous as any 
we have faced in our past. We have a very short time in which to 
protect our future through allied diplomacy and deterrence rather 
than through war. A two-ocean navy cannot be restored in a day or 
a year, nor can the other programs we require to achieve effective 
deterrence at every relevant level. It will be a ticklish time, calling 
for cool nerves and a firm grasp of the problem. 

The Soviet Union will not view an American awakening with 
equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions 
of relative superiority and the presence in office of a President 
whom it perceives as weak. 

The time to begin is now, and the place to begin is here. Normal- 
ly, we look to our President to take the lead in decisions of this 
order. It is now clear that President Carter is firmly committed to 
another view. What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance 
of power alone, but the future of liberty. Democracy cannot survive 
in the world unless America plays its full part in assuring its 
future. 

Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the thirties 
were being swept away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the 
House of Commons to address the great issue of the looming war. 
Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in the political wil- 
derness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began: 
"Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, speak and 
vote for America. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Biden. Professor, I am not sure where to begin. 

First of all, I think your characterizations of President Carter 
retreating to isolationism and abdicating his responsibility are a 
little bit, to say the least, exaggerated. If we are in all the trouble 



8 

we are in, is because of the President, it is amazing to think he was 
deft enough to do it all within 2 ¥2 years. 

It reminds me a little bit of Henry Kissinger's testimony. He 
came up here and told us all about what was wrong. Somehow I 
just had the impression that he had been around when all this was 
taking place. 

ARMS UMITATION NOT A WISE WAY TO PROCEED 

It seems as though you have made a very strong case for the 
position that arms limitation treaties, regardless of the form, are 
essentially useless documents. Isn't it really your position and the 
position of the committee that arms limitation under any circum- 
stances is not a wise way to go? 

You give us the Treaty of Locarno. You go back and talk about 
naval agreements. You offer through a historical analysis of how 
every treaty related to arms limitation really was a useless docu- 
ment. Isn't that what you are saying? 

Mr. RosTOw. No. The Committee has said that it is m favor of 
fair and verifiable and balanced arms limitation agreements. 

Senator Biden. But do you really mean that? 

Mr. RosTOW. Yes, we really mean it. I have pointed out that 
there was one very famous arms limitation agreement, which has 
worked very well, that is the agreement with Great Britain about 
the demilitarization of the Great Lakes, which was made back at 
the time of the War of 1812, just after that war. It has lasted for a 

long time. t i • 1 t 

Senator Biden. I think I am getting the picture. I think I am 

beginning to understand. 

Mr. RosTOW. The point is, if you have arms limitation treaty 
arrangements between people who fundamentally agree with each 
other, they can be very useful, or if you have arms limitation 
agreements between people who do not at all agree with each 
other, or who agree with each other about the meaning of the 
terms, they could be useful. 

Senator Biden, you suggested that I couldn't possibly mean what 
I said, that I was attacking the President unfairly. I should like to 
respond to that if I may for a moment. 

Senator Biden. Please try to do it as briefly as I did, because I 
have other questions. 

Mr. RosTOW. I had only 15 minutes in which to open this morn- 
ing. 

Senator Biden. Right, I only have 10 minutes. 

Mr. RosTOW. I wanted to focus on the issues that have emerged 
in this debate over the ratification of the treaty. In a great many 
other statements over the years, I have severely criticized the 
administrations of President Nixon and President Ford with great 
impartiality for various things which they did and did not do. I 
think the responsibility, for example, for initiating the notion that 
detente had replaced the cold war goes to President Nixon, who 
claimed much too much for his policy of rapprochement in negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union. But remember. Senator Biden, my 
primary responsibility in life is that of a professor, and our respon- 
sibility, I believe profoundly, is to call the shots as we see them. 



I do think that the President's foreign policy, and particularly 
his action in canceling and postponing the B-1 bomber and the 
neutron enhanced radiation warhead, his treatment of the M-X 
Minuteman III, the Trident, and all the rest of that sad story is 
very costly and has been a very damaging series of moves. 

REOPEN MINUTEMAN III PRODUCTION UNES 

Senator Biden. Professor, you stated that the United States 
should reopen the Minuteman III production line and deploy the 
Minuteman in multiple vertical shelters, but the Defense Depart- 
ment says if the Minuteman III were modified and made mobile, it 
would be ready only a year ahead of the M-X. It would also have 
considerably less capability than the M-X, because it would not be 
capable of handling 10 MIRVed vehicles. So it really would not 
change our strategic position in the early 1980's. 

Do you agree with that or not? 

Mr. RosTOw. Certainly if the M-X could be produced earlier I 
would not be in the slightest bit interested in reopening the Min- 
uteman production lines. I am trying to fill this gap with the 
Minuteman, but my understanding was that it would not take so 
long to resume the production of Minuteman III as it would take 
now to perfect the M-X, which has been delayed for so long, but 
the fundamental point is whether under a forced draft we could 
move ahead quickly either with the M-X or the Minuteman III. 

I should, of course, be in favor of the one the experts thought 
was most effective. 

Senator Biden. The experts tell us that is the M-X. 

Mr. RosTOW. The basic point is, the treaty would prevent either 
solution. 

Senator Biden. How can you say that? Why would the treaty 
prevent either solution? I just came back after 6 days in Moscow. 
We raised the M-X question with the Soviets. We told them we 
would be going forward with the M-X. They are fully aware of its 
going forward. Nobody in the whole world has any real doubt about 
what the intentions are. There was no indication that there was, as 
you have indicated, a firm position taken that that would absolute- 
ly violate the SALT agreement. I don't know where you get your 
information. I have not been able to find any of that information. I 
have not been able to find any information that any of our allies — 
any of our allies, any of them, including the military people with 
whom I met, from General Rogers to the German Command — 
doubt that we are going ahead. 

I don't know where you get your information. I don't know 
where it comes from. You make these bald assertions. Quite frank- 
ly, I find no s)mipathy for them. Please tell me what we can't do. I 
have asked you this question before. What can we not do that you 
feel needs to be done if this SALT Treaty goes forward and is 
ratified? 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, I just testified, and I put into my prepared 
statement. Senator Biden, that the Russian view of the matter is, 
and I have in front of me a State Department paper prepared for 
Senator Stennis and the Armed Services Committee confirming 
that 

Senator Biden. Please read it to me. It would be helpful. 



10 



Mr. RosTOW. Yes. 



MPS System in Relation to The Treaty Discussion. This issue was raised by the 
Soviet delegation in Geneva in July 1978, referring to newspaper accounts concern- 
ing the multiple aim point system using vertical shelters. The Soviets stated that it 
appeared such a deployment would violate both the ban on construction of new 
fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate concealment measures. 

The United States delegation replied that no decision had been made regarding a 
basing mode, but that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that 
violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets. 

They further stated that: 

A draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment after protocol expiration 
of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved from point to 
point. The subject matter was not addressed again by the delegations. 

Senator Biden. Right. That was 1978, a year ago. Since then we 
have signed a treaty. Didn't you say that was July 1978? 

Mr. RosTOW. Yes; that is what it says. 

Senator Biden. All right. That was 1 year ago. In the meantime 
there was a great deal of negotiation and the treaty was signed. 

Mr. RosTOW. It says this issue was never raised again. 

Senator Biden. But it was raised by us publicly. It was raised by 
us throughout the world. We made what we are going to do clear. 
There has been no response to it, indicating the Soviets objection. 

Mr. RosTOW. Do you think that constitutes Soviet acceptance? 

Senator Biden. I don't think the Soviets have to accept it. We go 
forward with what we tell the world we are going to do, and what 
we tell them we are going to do prior to the treaty's ratification. 

Mr. RosTOW. Then they will say we violated the treaty, 

Senator Biden. If they then say we have violated the treaty and 
they want to pull out, then they can pull out. We have stated our 
position. If in fact they respond by not saying anything and do not 
physically or verbally respond to it, and we are able to go forward, 
then they have acquiesced. 

Mr. RosTOW. But Senator Biden, how do you reconcile these fixed 
shelters with the definition of the launcher in article IV? 

Senator Biden. Actually the way I reconcile it is that our De- 
fense Department tells us we should not go the way you suggest 
anyway. We should go the M-X route. 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, very well, but on the M-X route, which mode 
of deployment has the administration adopted as of August 1? 

Senator Biden. They have not adopted one. 

Mr. RosTOW. That is right. 

Senator Biden. But the point is, we will adopt whatever our 
military indicates to us is the best mode to adopt. 

Mr. RosTOw. Within the limitations of the treaty. 

Senator Biden. And all of them are within the limitations of the 

treaty. 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, Senator, I am sorry, but I cant agree with 
you. I think that the Soviet analysis of the treaty is correct. To get 
into a position under a treaty before it is ratified in which you 
have a dispute with the Soviet Union as to its meaning on an 
absolutely fundamental point is in my opinion a most unwise pro- 
cedure. It may be, as you say, that this would put the onus of 
abrogating the treaty on the other fellow, but that is not the object 
of going into a treaty. 



11 

The object of going into a treaty of arms limitation is to clarify 
things as much as possible and to help build mutual good faith and 
trust. 

Senator Biden. Precisely. We would clarify that. 

My time is up. I will come back to that if there is time. 

Senator Javits? 

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

RIGHT TO DEPLOY ICBM's IN NUMBERS WE DEEM NECESSARY 

Professor Rostow, I notice in your statement you say something 
which I would like to read into the record. You give your conclu- 
sions, and the second conclusion reads: 

That the Senate withhold its consent to the ratification of the treaty the Presi- 
dent has submitted unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficien- 
cies and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program 
that will achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence. 

I then look further in your statement in which you say that: 

The Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the 
most important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment: "Among the 
deficiencies of the treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to deploy 
ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure survival against sur- 
prise attack." 

Now, isn't it a fact that if we ask for that, the Russians will too? 
This is not a one-party game. In other words, they will ask for the 
right to deploy whatever ICBM basing mode and numbers they 
please. Mr. Rostow, is that a treaty, or are you engaging in a 
charade with us? 

You know very well, as well as I do, that there is no treaty the 
minute they deploy as many as they want and we deploy as many 
as we want. What are we talking about? 

Mr. Rostow. I am not talking about a charade. I am not very 
good at charades. Senator Javits. I am talking about a negotiation 
to adjust the modes and numbers provided for in the treaty so that 
we can deal with the problem of the vulnerability of the ICBM's 
which has been so much discussed. I want to solve that problem 
through agreement with the Russians. You ask whether the Soviets 
won't ask for equal priviledges, of course. But they are already 
deploying variable range mobile SS-20 missiles which are MIRVed, 
and can reach the United States, but are not covered by the treaty. 
The Soviet Union now has the capacity through its SS-20's in 
Europe to reach the United States by a simple device, well, by two 
simple devices, either by adding an extra booster to the SS-20 and 
making it into an SS-16, or by substituting a single warhead on the 
SS-20. 

Now, we raise the question here as well in paragraph 3, to clarify 
those points, of including the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within 
the numerical limits of the treaty for that reason. We are trying 
simply to point out consequences of this treaty as we analyze it 
which would make it a much fairer, more equal, more balanced, 
and more livable treaty. This is not a charade at all. This is dealing 
with the most vital subject of our national security, the question of 
whether the strategic balance on which the possibility of diplomat- 
ic influence and the use of conventional force depends is going to 
be tipped adversely to our interests. 



1+8-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 2 



12 

Senator Javits. Professor, I asked you directly this: if we want to 
build all the ICBM's that we choose to build under a treaty, don't 
you expect the Russians to get the same right? Would you say yes 
or no to that? 

Mr. RosTOw. Senator Javits, I cannot say yes or no to that 
because that is not what I said. I didn't say that we want to deploy 
all the ICBM's we want. We want to deploy ICBM's in modes and 
numbers we deem necessary to insure their survival, and we are 
talking about negotiating an agreement with the Russians on that 
point. 

Senator Javits. And that is not equivalent to all we want as you 
define it? 

Mr. RosTOw. No, I am talking about negotiation. There is no 
limit on ICBM production in the treaty. We are talking about using 
them and being very direct with the Soviet Union. I am talking 
about amendments, not unilateral declarations. 

SIMPLY AGAINST THE TREATY 

Senator Javits. My dear friend, you are talking about no treaty. 
What I am trying to get you to say, because that is what you do 
say, whether you are trying to avoid it or not, is, you are simply 
against the treaty. You want no treaty. Why do you give us this 
nonsense about renegotiation of a treaty with amendments when 
you know that you are taking the whole heart out of the treaty 
when there is no limit on us and no limit on them? We are just 
playing with words. 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, I haven't characterized the administration in 
that way, but yes, I think it is a fair characterization. 

Senator Javits. I am not saying it is the administration. I am 
saying it is you, not the administration. 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, there can be two opinions about that. I am 
talking here, or was trying to talk here. Senator Javits, about 
renegotiating this treaty. The treaty is not the essential point. The 
essential point, as we tried to make clear in our statement is to 
have a foreign policy and a defense policy that would secure the 
interests of the Nation. 

A fair and balanced and verifiable treaty might do that, but we 
do not think that this treaty is fair, balanced, and verifiable, and 
we think it would be a profound mistake for the Senate to approve 
its ratification, to consent to its ratification in its present form. 

Now, you can characterize that position as anything you like, of 
course, but we have tried to make it clear in a succession of 
statements going back to 1976 exactly what we are saying and why. 

ARMAMENTS TREATY BETWEEN NATIONS THAT AGREE 

Senator Javits. I have already given my view as to what you are 
trying to do to this treaty. I wish that your organization, like other 
organizations, would simply be frank about it and say you are 
against it, and you believe that the only eventuality is for us to 
make the maximum degree of preparation as rapidly as we can. 
You gave your own analogy, and please correct me if I am wrong, 
the only treaty that you believe can be an effective treaty to limit 



13 

armaments is between people who essentially agree with each 
other. That excludes all treaties with the Russians. 

So, should we just forget it and arm to the teeth and expect the 
atomic war which is sure to come, as all of history has shown since 
man began? 

Mr. RosTOW. Senator Javits, in my reading of history war comes 
when people feel they are losing control of the situation and when 
one side becomes very much stronger than the other. Then they 
strike out in desperation. The point was never better put than by 
Thucydides about the causes of the Peloponnesian War, which 
destroyed Greek civilization. He said, there were all sorts of epi- 
sodes preceding that war, but the real cause of the war was the rise 
in the power of Athens and the fear which this caused in Sparta. 

Now, it is that fear which we are trying to overcome by urging 
preparations for deterrent strength that would prevent war. The 
Romans used to say, if you want peace, prepare for war, and we 
say that in dealing with the Russians, there is no use getting 
excited about it. The only way to deter them is to present, very 
calmly, unacceptable risks. That is what we did in the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962. That is what we did in Berlin in 1948, and in 
Greece, and in Turkey, and in a dozen other crises of the period. 
We stood firm. We used conventional forces, and in the end, we 
prevailed. 

Now, the risk of war in my opinion is just the reverse of what 
you say. I don't think that a SALT II Treaty would advance the 
cause of peace any more than the SALT I Interim Agreement did. 
The SALT I Interim Agreement was signed, and I think it was very 
reasonable to sign it under the expectations of that period. I sup- 
ported it. I support it now. But we have to recognize that all the 
expectations on the basis of which we signed that treaty have been 
betrayed. 

That is to say, we were promised peace in Indochina and peace in 
the Middle East, instead of which we got the reverse. 

Senator Javits. All right. I see that my time is up. We can get 
back to this. 

Senator Biden. I will yield to you my time to keep up this line of 
questioning. 

Senator Javits. Thank you. 

LEGAUTY OF ATTACKING RESERVATIONS 

I am not yet myself committed to this treaty, but the administra- 
tion, I think, has put it to us on the basis that we do not lose the 
opportunity to go forward, but we put a cap at least on where we 
both are. I don't see that you have answered that at all, and 1 will 
tell you why, if I may. 

I do not think that we are defining terms in the same way. Let 
me give you a practical example. I notice in your testimony which 
you made when you appeared before us in July, you were asked by 
Senator Biden, "The vertical shelter game can be done, assuming 
that we pass a reservation interpreting the verification provision so 
as to allow the vertical shelter game." At that point you interrupt- 
ed: "Mr. RosTOW. Mr. Chairman, a reservation has the same legal 
effect as a letter from my mother." 

Now, do you still maintain that position? 



14 

Mr. RosTOW. Yes. 

Senator Javits. Why? 

Mr. RosTOW. In the context of this kind of a treaty; that is, as 
compared with a tax treaty or a multilateral treaty, a reservation 
would have the most ambiguous and uncertain effect on the other 
side. The Russians have said very openly that they would regard 
such a reservation as a unilateral, domestic matter and would not 
treat it as significant. 

Senator Javits. Let me interrupt you. I would like to give you an 
historical analogy. When the Russians signed the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, they announced publicly that they would not consider a 
unified Europe to be a nuclear power even though France and 
Britain were both nuclear powers and would be part of it. We 
announced exactly the contrary at exactly the same time. That did 
not invalidate the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did it? We both are 
going to wait for the eventuality, and if either of us wanted to pull 
out, we could. 

Mr. RosTOW. My clear recollection is that we told the Russians 
that if they said that a united Europe could not become a nuclear 
power by virtue of the doctrine of succession in international law, 
that the treaty was abrogated. That is the background of the 
unilateral interpretations controversy over the 1972 agreement. 

Now, it is not my recollection that the Russians ever made any 
public announcement. I may be wrong — indeed, I often am — but 
my recollection is that the Russians kept quiet on the issue after 
both Rusk and Rogers testified. 

Senator Javits. Well, there is no use in our arguing that, be- 
cause that will just have to be corrected from the record, but my 
recollection is exactly the contrary. 

Mr. RosTOW. Very well. 

INSISTENCE ON AMENDMENT TERMINOLOGY 

Senator Javits. Now, the reservation proposition is a declaration 
which is put into the instrument of ratification so that when we 
ratify, we ratify with that reservation, and when they ratify they 
ratify with that reservation in it. I don't understand why you want 
the amendment business, except that you know as well as I do that 
now the Russians have to face the proposition on amendments. 
Brezhnev and Gromyko have said: "If you call it an amendment, 
forget it, we can't take it, there is no treaty," so we are going to 
call it a reservation. What is the difference? Do you just want to 
call it an amendment to torpedo the treaty? Is that why you insist 
on it? 

Mr. RosTOW. After my exchange with Senator Biden, which you 
just quoted, I checked with my colleagues, with professors of inter- 
national law at the Yale Law School. They agree with me that a 
reservation under these circumstances would not be binding on the 
other party unless it were accepted, that silence would not be 
acceptance, and therefore the reservation could not be regarded as 
more than a unilateral statement for this kind of treaty. 

There is no possibility that these issues would go to the courts. In 
one of the leading American cases on the distinction between reser- 
vations and amendments, the Court of Appeals for the Second 



15 

Circuit in New York threw out a reservation for a treaty on the 
ground that it was not germane to the subject matter. 

CIRCUMSTANCES MAKING RESERVATION INOPERATIVE 

Senator Javits. Well, I think you are qualifying it. Now I am a 
lawyer, too, and I don't know what circumstances you are talking 
about. What are they? What are the particular circumstances that 
make a reservation inoperative under this matter? 

General Winn. Mind you, they have been included in the resolu- 
tion of ratification which the President must do. He has no choice, 
and therefore they will be part of the ratification papers of both 
parties. I just do not understand that particular effort to attack 
this matter. 

UNILATERAL MATTER NOT BINDING SOVIETS 

Mr. RosTOW. The Russians have already said that this is a uni- 
lateral matter and it would not bind them. 

Senator Javits. Professor Rostow, if this treaty is ended because 
we don't agree on an interpretation, doesn't that suit you fine? You 
wouldn't be complaining about it. You would love it. You are 
against the treaty. Why are you debating with us as to what we 
want to put in if we are for it? You are against it. So if it blows up, 
you are delighted. You think it is good for the country. 

Mr. RosTOW. Senator Javits, first of all, I have spent a large part 
of my life trying to make agreements with the Russians. I was the 
lend lease desk officer in the State Department during the war, 
and developed the plan for the first reconstruction loans to the 
Russians. Second, as you know very well, I am a professor. I cannot 
resist the lure of an issue. 

Senator Javits. Right, and I don't think you can resist the lure 
of your own thinking either, whatever may be the realities of the 
situation. 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, that is a sin from which we all suffer. Sena- 
tor. [General laughter.] 

Senator Javits. Would you be good enough to submit a memo- 
randum to us, a legal memorandum by you and your associates as 
to why you believe that a reservation in this treaty has the same 
legal effect as a letter from my mother? 

Mr. RosTOW. All right, I shall be glad to do that. I shall be happy 
to submit a legal memorandum to you. Senator. 

[The following information was subsequently received for the 
record:] 

Yale Universit\-, Law School, 
New Haven, Conn., September 27, 1979. 

Senator Frank Church, 

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: On September 6th, I was asked by Senator Biden, the 
Acting Chairman, and by Senator Javits to comment on the staff analysis of the 
comparative legal status of "amendments", "reservations", and "understandings" 
with which the Senate might decide to qualify its consent to the ratification of 
SALT n. The staff analysis appears in two memoranda sent to me by Frederick S. 
Tipson, Esq., on September 14th. Mr. Tipson's letter and its enclosures arrived here 
on September 24th. Mr. Tipson also called my attention to the Administration 
position on these questions contained in an exchange between you and Secretary 



16 

Vance at p. 182 of Part 1 of your Hearings on the SALT II Treaty, and in answers to 
questions on the subject at pp. 606-607 of the same volume. 

I have consulted my colleagues Professors Myres S. McDougal, Robert H. Bork, 
Joseph W. Bishop, Leon Lipson, and W. Michael Reisman on this issue, and I am 
authorized to say that they join me in this letter. 

Both our own usage and international practice have employed a number of words 
to identify conditions imposed on the ratification of treaties, as the undated memo- 
randum of Mssrs. Glennon and Tipson points out: amendments, reservations, unilat- 
eral or common understandings, declarations, explanations, clarifications and so on. 
Some may deal only with domestic legal or political problems, or indeed with 
problems not germane to the subject matter of the treaty. For example, if the 
Senate should condition its consent to the ratification of SALT II on an increase in 
our own defense budget of 3%, 5%, or 10%, that condition— however it is labelled— 
would not concern the Soviet Union, and obviously would not require its agreement. 

On the other hand, the issues listed in my testimony on September 6th as 
problems which should be clarified by the Senate before ratification do concern the 
substance of the Treaty. They are matters on which the utmost precision is desir- 
able in the interest of the great national objectives sought through the negotiation 
of SALT IL ^ ^. 

The heart of our disagreement with those who would deal with questions of this 
order through "reservations" or "understandings" rather than "amendments" ap- 
pears on p. 8 of the Glennon-Tipson memorandum, where the authors say that if 
"reservations" or "understandings" adopted by the Senate as conditions to its con- 
sent to ratification are included in the instrument of ratification, and if the Soviet 
Union "proceeds with the exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence consti- 
tutes assent to the treaties as modified by the United States." We believe it is 
impossible to state the idea as a universal rule in this absolute form. Neither 
international law nor political prudence justify placing so heavy a burden on the 
interpretation of Soviet silence. 

The supposed rule of assent through silence urged in the Glennon-Tipson memo- 
randum does not correspond to the rule stated in Sections 124 and 126 of the 
American Law Institute Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States and in many other authoritative comments on International law. There is no 
assurance that the construction favored by your advisers is widely accepted for the 
modification of bilateral treaties. Even more important, there is every indication 
that the Soviet Union does not accept such a rule, but continues to rely on -more 
formal distinctions among amendments, reservations, and other forms of treaty 
modification. . ,, 

Soviet spokesmen say repeatedly that they do not care what reservations we 
adopt, since "reservations" are entirely internal in their effect. SALT II concerns 
matters of the highest possible importance to the security of the United States and 
of many other nations. International law on this subject, never clear cut, is now in 
flux, in large part because of the influence of certain obscure, potentially inconsist- 
ent, and controversial provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 

To assume that the future of SALT II would be governed by so simplistic a rule as 
that stated in the Glennon-Tipson memorandum would be risky at best, and, on 
matters essential to the security of the United States, foolhardy. 

Traditionally, both international law and our own practice used different words to 
identify somewhat different procedures for altering a Treaty during the ratification 
process. "Amendment" was the least ambiguous word customarily used. When the 
Senate consented to ratification with an amendment, it was understood that the 
President would submit the proposed change in the text of the Treaty to the other 
party or parties, and obtain his or their consent to the amendment prior to ratifica- 
tion. "Reservation", on the other hand, was a more ambiguous word used in a 
variety of contexts. Section 124 of the Restatement defines the word "reservation" 
as "a formal declaration made by a signatory before it becomes bound by an 
international agreement that the agreement will not be binding upon it except upon 
terms that it regards as changing the effect of the agreement under international 
law." International and American usage is, however, less strict than the Restate- 
ment definition. Often, the word "reservation" denotes unconditional consent by the 
Senate to ratification, subject to a proviso which could have different consequences 
in different settings. It is most often used in connection with multilateral treaties. 
"Understanding" and "interpretation" have been used in even more fluid ways. 
Since the Glennon-Tipson memorandum seems to rely heavily on a paragraph of 
Article 20 of the Vienna Convention, it should be noted that in this regard the 
Convention is having a regressive effect on international law. It seems to lump all 
forms of treaty emendation and alteration together as "Reservations". Thus it 
multiplies doubts and ambiguities, and reduces clarity. Some experts believe that 



17 

the provisions of the convention on reservations apply only to multilateral treaties. 
Others believe the purpose of the Convention is to deal with the problem universal- 
ly. But all must concede that the purport and scope of the provisions are uncertain. 

(The text of Articles 19 and 20 of the Vienna Convention appears in an Appendix 
to this letter.) 

In their language and range of reference, Sections 2-4 of Article 20 seem to refer 
only to multilateral treaties. And the Commentary of the International Law Com- 
mission on the Draft which became the Vienna Convention is clearly of the view 
that the Convention would apply only to multilateral treaties, on the ground that "a 
reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, because it amounts to a new 
proposal reopening the negotiations between the two states concerning the terms of 
the treaty. If they arrive at an agreement whether adopting or rejecting the reser- 
vation — the treaty will be concluded. If not, it will fall to the ground." 

If however, these provisions of the Vienna Convention should be interpreted to 
apply to bilateral treaties like SALT II, would Section 2 govern? Section 5? If they 
do not apply, under what circumstances should agreement to a reservation be 
inferred from silence during the ratification process, even after twelve months? 
Customary international law is full of episodes of controversy, doubt and confusion. 

In view of the unsettled character of international law on the subject at this time, 
we believe that if the Senate wishes to condition its consent to the ratification of 
SALT II on certain modifications, clarifications, or interpretations of the text before 
it, it should proceed only upon the express condition that the Soviet Union formally 
and explicitly agree to each of our proposals for change in its instrument of 
ratification. 

It is, however, clear both in Secretary Vance's comments to you at p. 182 of the 
Hearings and from the State Department's statements on pp. 606-607 that the 
Administration is rel3ring heavily on Soviet "silence" as an important part of the 
cement of this Treaty, and on our capacity to denounce the Treaty as the sanction 
behind our views. But where is the evidence that the Soviet Union accepts "silence" 
as a modality for binding itself to solemn international agreements? Whatever 
evidence we have seen goes the other way. 

The melancholy history of the "unilateral interpretations" of the Interim Agree- 
ment on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms put forward by Administration 
spokesman in 1972 is enough to warn against reliance on such a procedure. In that 
case the Soviet Union remained silent while we expounded our interpretations of 
the Agreement. They then violated the agreement as we interpreted it. Despite our 
repeated statements to the contrary, we did not denounce the Agreement. Too much 
was deemed to be at stake to make such a course advisable. Furthermore, our 
capacity to denounce such a Treaty at will was thought to be at least doubtful, in 
the absence of a violation of an unambiguous and major term of the Treaty by the 
other party. Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 340 (1886). 

It is clear from the debate that many people prefer to label Senate conditions to 
its consent as "reservations" rather than "amendments", despite the uncertainties 
such a course would generate, because they are afraid that the Soviet Union would 
simply refuse to negotiate any further in order to resolve questions which might be 
raised by the Senate. It is almost inconceivable that the United States Senate would 
adopt such a posture after mature reflection. As President Kennedy once said, "the 
United States should never negotiate out of fear, and should never be afraid to 
negotiate." Surely we should never knuckle under to a position of "Take it or leave 
it", or any other form of ultimatum. 

"The Senate should reach its conclusions about SALT II in terms of its analysis of 
the Treaty's impact on our foreign and defense policies as a whole. If it finds there 
are certain issues on which it would be desirable to alter the text, or to obtain 
clarification from the Soviet Union, it should proceed to state those points in a form 
that would require the unequivocal and explicit concurrence of the Soviet Union. 
The notion that we should hesitate to raise fundamental questions for further 
discussion with any nation out of fear is repugnant to our nature and to our history. 
If the Soviet Union were as arbitrary and unreasonable as some spokesmen for the 
Administration seem to think, no agreement with it would be worth having. 
Yours sincerely, 

Eugene V. Rostow. 

The signatories to this letter, all members of the Yale Law School faculty, are: 

Myres S. McDougal. 
Robert H. Bork. 
Joseph W. Bishop. 
Leon Lipson. 
William M. Reisman. 
Eugene V. Rostow. 



18 

Appendix— Vienna CkJNVENTiON on the Law of Treaties 

ARTICLE 19 — formulation OF RESERVATIONS 

A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, formulate a reservation unless: 

(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 

(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include 
the reservation in question, may be made; or 

(c) In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 

ARTICLE 20 — ACCEPTANCE OF AND OBJECTION TO RESERVATIONS 

1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent 
acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides. 

2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the 
object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety 
between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be 
bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties. 

3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and 
unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent 
organ of that organization. 

4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty 
otherwise provides: 

(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the 
reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when 
the treaty is in force for those States; 

(b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not pre- 
clude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving 
States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State; 

(c) An act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and contain- 
ing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has 
accepted the reservation. 

5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise 
provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall 
have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months 
after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its 
consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later. 

Foreign Relations Committee Staff Memorandum of June 25, 1979 Referred 

TO IN Mr. Rostow's Letter 

Memorandum to: Members, Committee on Foreign Relations. 
From: Michael J. Glennon and Frederick S. Tipson. 
Subject: SALT II— Legal and Procedural Issues. 

This is a preliminary summary of legal and procedural issues relating to the 
SALT II Treaty. It attempts to clarify certain basic questions regarding Senate 
consideration of the treaty and identifies other issues for more detailed considera- 
tion in subsequent memoranda. Still other issues will undoubtedly arise in the 
course of the debate and we will respond to particular inquiries as quickly as 
possible. 

The following subjects are addressed: 

1. The Treaty and Associated Documents. 

2. Consideration by the Senate. 

3. Presidential Alternatives after Senate Action. 

4. Soviet Ratification and Modification. 

I. THE treaty and RELATED DOCUMENTS: LEGAL STATUS AND ANALYSIS 

President Carter signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna on June 18. As a signatory, 
the United States is not legally bound to the terms of the treaty, but under 
international law it is generally accepted that a treaty signatory undertakes in good 
faith a) to proceed with the process of ratification in accordance with its own 
constitutional law, and b) to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty during a reasonable interim period. 

The President has asked for Senate advice and consent only to the Treaty and 
Protocol, presented as a single document. The Protocol is regarded as an "integral 
part" of the treaty itself and is distinguished by its earlier expiration date: 1981 
rather than 1985. (The 1972 SALT Interim Agreement contained a Protocol on 



19 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the 1972 ABM Treaty was amended with 
a Protocol in 1974.) 

The President's formal letter of transmittal contains, in addition to the Secretary 
of State's report on the purpose and provisions of the agreement, the following 
documents: 

1. Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, relating to particular articles 
in both the Treaty and the Protocol; 

2. A Memorandum of Understanding by the two sides certifying the figures on 
their present numbers of strategic offensive systems, in accordance with article 17(3) 
of the Treaty; 

3. A Joint Statement of Principles agreed upon by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev 
representing their general objectives with respect to further SALT negotiations; 

4. A memorandum from the Secretary of State communicating the exchange of 
statements on the Soviet "Backfire" bomber which took place at the Vienna summit 
meeting in June. 

These four documents, according to the President's letter of transmittal, have 
been transmitted "for the information of the Senate," not for its advice and consent. 
Under Senate precedent, such instruments are not susceptible of amendment in the 
strict sense.' However, the Senate could "reach" such documents by conditioning its 
advice and consent in one of several ways. First, it could amend the Treaty to 
incorporate the terms of a collateral agreement (or an amended version thereof^ 
within the text of the Treaty itself — as it did in the case of the Carter-Torrijos 
"Joint Statement" regarding the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty. Second, it could 
insist in a reservation that the terms of a collateral agreement be modified in 
accordance with its instructions prior to ratification. Third, it could announce in a 
reservation or understanding that it regards the provisions of a collateral agree- 
ment or assurance as equal in status to the Treaty itself and consents to ratification 
subject to that understanding. All such conditions, of course, would have to be 
accepted by the Soviet Union prior to the exchange of the instruments of ratifica- 
tion. 

In the absence of explicit conditions attached by the Senate, the status and effect 
of collateral or derivative agreements would be governed by international legal 
principles of treaty interpretation. Thus, the Treaty would be interpreted in light of 
the negotiating context including those agreements made or assurances offered in 
connection with its conclusion. Subsequent agreements between the parties regard- 
ing the interpretation or application of treaty provisions would also be taken into 
account. 

1. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings comprise, in effect, a set 
of supplementary agreements designed to elaborate the meaning of particular arti- 
cles in both the Treaty and the Protocol. Earlier in the negotiations, "Agreed 
Statements" were considered to have a somewhat higher standing than "Common 
Understandings," but the Administration no longer suggests that there is any legal 
or political basis for distinguishing between them. Similar terms were used in 
connection with the SALT I agreements, but unlike SALT I, there are no "unilater- 
al statements" by either side and all Agreed Statements and Common Understand- 
ings have been signed by both sides. 

2. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base on 
the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms relates to Article 17(3) of the Treaty. By 
the terms of that article, the Parties agree to maintain such a data base on an 
ongoing basis through the Standing Consultative Commission. The "M.O.U." itself 
contains figures on strategic arms as of November 1, 1978. In accordance with an 
earlier understanding, these figures were updated as of the date of treaty signature 
(June 18, 1979), and these updated figures are contained in accompanying submis- 
sions of each side. 

3. The Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia- 
tions on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, though agreed to by both sides, is not by 
its nature a binding legal agreement. It represents a set of general common objec- 
tives rather than specific undertakings. A comparable joint statement of principles 



' The chair noted on March 24, 1922, during the consideration of a treaty with the British 
Empire, France and Japan concerning their insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean, that a 
declaration of the signatories as to their understanding and intent made at the time the treaty 
was signed was not a part of the treaty and not subject to amendment. Cong. Rec, March 24, 
1922 at p. 4496. Similarly, the chair (Vice President Mondale, presiding), in response to a 
parliamentary inquiry by Sen. Allen at the outset of the debate on the Panama Canal Treaties, 
stated that only "the body of the treaty, including all of the articles, annexes thereto, protocols 
to it, et cetera, is before the Senate for consideration and therefore amendable." Cong. Rec, Feb. 
8, 1978 at p. SiSOO. "Other documents," the chair stated, "would not be subject to amendments." 
Id. 



20 

for the SALT II negotiations was issued at the Washington summit meeting of June 
21, 1973. 

4. The section of the President's submission to the Senate headed "Soviet Backfire 
Statement" comprises, in effect, a memorandum of the Secretary of State certifying 
the exchange of statements (written and oral) regarding Soviet production and 
deployment of the Backfire (TU-22M) bomber which took place at the summit 
meeting in June. The form of the exchange apparently was negotiated in advance, 
with the U.S. signature of the Treaty conditioned upon Soviet acceptance of the 
restrictions contained in their written statement on the Backfire. The nature of this 
agreement raises a number of legal questions. Because of the special role of the 
Secretary of State in negotiating and communicating this exchange, it will be 
important to clarify his own expectations regarding the Backfire statements. 

Unilateral written or oral declarations can provide the basis for binding commit- 
ments under international law and diplomatic practice, especially if the State 
making them expects another State to rely upon them. In this case, U.S. reliance 
upon the Soviet assurances is made explicit. However, it is not clear whether the 
Soviets would regard the violation of this understanding as equivalent to a violation 
of the Treaty itself. It is also not clear whether the Soviet undertakings are limited 
to the period of the Treaty only— i.e., whether their effective date and termination 
date are identical to those of the Treaty. 

Finally, the Secretary of State's Report to the President refers to President 
Carter's affirmation "that the United States has the right to an aircraft comparable 
to Backfire" (p. 35), but this affirmation does not appear in the Secretary's memo- 
randum recording the exchange of statements in Vienna (p. 73). In view of the 
careful orchestration of these statements, it is not evident why it was not included. 
Therefore, it is not apparent whether U.S. development and deployment of a compa- 
rable bomber would be subject to the same restrictions on capability and production 
rate as the Backfire. 

II. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY 

Upon transmittal to the Senate, the Treaty will be routinely referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, which has exclusive jurisdiction over all treaties 
under Rule 25. Ij of the Standing Rules of the Senate. While another Committee 
may hold hearings on certain aspects of the agreement, treaties are never referred, 
jointly or sequentially, to any Committee other than Foreign Relations. 

A. Consideration by the committee 

Committee rules make no special provision for the handling of treaties. Thus, 
unless the Committee determines otherwise, the same procedure followed during the 
consideration of other measures will be followed in considering the SALT II Treaty. 

The Committee will have before it two items: the text of the Treaty (including the 
Protocol and perhaps other documents considered part of the Treaty), and the 
Resolution of Ratification. The latter can be introduced beforehand or reported as 
an original resolution; the procedural difference is described in part B below. 

The Senate may grant its advice and consent conditionally, and if the Committee 
wishes to recommend that it do so, two kinds of conditions are available. The first is 
an amendment to the text of the Treaty itself. The second is an amendment to the 
Resolution of Ratification. Amendments to the Resolution are typically designated 
reservations, understandings, interpretations, declarations, and statements. These 
are also discussed in more detail below. If it approves the Treaty, the Committee 
will thus report two instruments to the Senate: (1) the Treaty itself, with or without 
amendments; and (2) the Resolution of Ratification, with or without amendments-^ 

Treaties are placed on the executive calendar of the Senate in the order reported 
and are taken up in that order. A motion to proceed to the consideration of 
executive business is in order at any time and is not debatable unless any other 
treaty is already on the executive calendar, in which case a motion to proceed to 
consideration of the SALT Treaty would be debatable. 



^ During consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties, the Carter-Tornjos Joint Statement was 
incorporated in the Neutrality Treaty in the form of two "leadership amendments. The 
Committee had declined to adopt these amendments formally so as to allow other Senators the 
opportunity to join in their co-sponsorship; instead, it voted to recommend to the Senate that it 
incorporate the amendments. The procedural effect was minimal; the amendments were as a 
result noor amendments, rather than Committee amendments. Thus, they were not moved by 
the Floor Manager and did not have priority over other amendments (see part B below). 



21 

B. Senate floor action 

I. Types of conditions 
As discussed above, two types of conditions may be imposed by the Senate upon 
its consent: amendments to the text of the Treaty itself, and amendments to the 
Resolution of Ratification. 

a. Textual amendments. — An amendment to the text of a treaty is in one sense 
similar to an amendment to a bill — it may strike out certain language in the treaty 
and insert other language in lieu thereof; it may do the same with respect to 
numbers appearing in the treaty; or, it may add new articles or sections, or delete 
entire articles or sections. On the other hand, unlike a bill a treaty is not directly 
modified by the Senate; rather, the Senate gives its consent upon the condition that 
an amendment be made, and the treaty is actually amended by the President, who 
does so upon bringing the treaty into force. 

b. Amendments to the Resolution of Ratification. — Amendments to the Resolution 
of Ratification may be designated as follows: 

i. "Reservation". — A reservation modifies or limits the substantive effect of one or 
more of the treaty provisions. It in effect adds something of substance to the treaty 
or takes something of substance from it, and gives notice that the United States will 
not, in that respect, give effect to the treaty except in accordance with the reserva- 
tion. 

The text of a treaty thus need not be amended explicitly in order to effect a 
change in its substance. An implicit but equally effective amendment may be 
achieved through a reservation or even an understanding (see below). The Senate 
may provide by reservation, for example, that a certain provision will be without 
force and effect; such a reservation would be the functional legal equivalent of an 
amendment to the text of the treaty which strikes out the provision line by line. 

ii. "Understanding". — An understanding is a statement which is not intended to 
modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty. Rather, it is intended to clarify 
or explain a treaty provision or to deal with some other matter incidental to the 
operation of the treaty in a manner other than in a substantive reservation. Some- 
times an understanding is no more than a statement of policies or principles or an 
indication of general procedures for carrying out provisions of the treaty. An under- 
standing may relate to the rights and obligations of either party; like a reservation, 
it need not be limited to the rights and obligations of the party entering the 
understanding. Understandings are also on occasion called "interpretations". As 
noted above, however, their practical effect may be the same as a reservation. 

iii. "Declarations" and other statements. These are used most often when it is 
considered essential or desirable to give notice of certain matters of policy or 
principle, without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights or obliga- 
tions stipulated in the treaty. "Explanations", "clarifications", and "recommenda- 
tions" are other designations which occasionally have been used. 

2. Procedure 

Rule 37 of the Standing Rules of the Senate (attached) governs the consideration 
of treaties. The procedure to be followed in the Senate, and options available to it if 
it wishes the Treaty modified, are as follows: 

The Senate will first consider the Treaty as in "Committee of the Whole." (The 
Committee of the Whole procedure may be avoided only by unanimous consent or 
by suspension of the rules.) At this stage, the Senate will go through the Treaty 
article by article, at which time amendments to each article may be offered; there is 
no vote on each article as such. Amendments recommended by the Committee on 
Foreign Relations will be considered first, after which other amendments may be 
offered. The Treaty is amendable in two degrees (i.e., amendments to amendments) 
and all votes are by a majority of those present. 

Only actual amendments to the text of the Treaty will be in order during the 
Committee of the Whole proceeding. Amendments to the Resolution of Ratifica- 
tion — i.e., reservations, understandings, etc. — are therefore not in order at this 
stage. Articles of the Treaty are considered in numerical order, with consideration 
of the Protocol following considering of the Treaty. Amendments may not be offered 
to Articles that have not yet been taken up, but may be offered to Articles previous- 
ly considered once the entire treaty has been considered in the Committee of the 
Whole proceeding. 

After the Senate has considered each article of the Treaty for possible amend- 
ment, it will, in effect, "dissolve itself from the Committee of the Whole and then 
vote a second time on each of the amendments (if any) passed earlier. (The Senate 
may accept all the amendments by a single vote only with unanimous consent.) 
Entirely new amendments may also be offered at this stage. 



22 

Following a wait of one day, the Resolution of Ratification is taken up, which will 
automatically incorporate any amendments to the text of the Treaty. At that point, 
amendments to the Resolution of Ratification itself are in order. Amendments to 
the Resolution must be approved by a simple majority. Like amendments to the text 
of the Treaty, they are amendable in only one degree. The vote on advice and 
consent, which requires the approval of two-thirds of those present and voting, 
occurs after the Senate has concluded consideration of the Resolution of Ratifica- 
tion. All votes on amendments, reservations, understandings, etc., require only a 
majority vote for approval. 

Several additional procedural matters should be noted at this point. 

Cloture.— The cloture and germaneness provisions of Senate Rule 22 (attached) 
apply to the consideration of treaties. Thus, in the absence of cloture, an amend- 
ment to a Treaty article need not be germane to that article. Cloture, if invoked, 
would pertain to all aspects of the process: the Committee of the Whole and action 
on both the Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification. The rule of germaneness 

would then apply. .. . , , j . 

Closed sessions.— A motion to consider the Treaty in secret ( with closed doors ) 
may be made at any time by any Senator and requires only a second. In accordance 
with Senate rule 35 (attached), no vote is taken on such a motion; in contrast, a 
motion to return to open session, while non-debatable, requires a majority vote. 

Recommittal.— The concept of "recommittal" has been used, somewhat loosely, in 
reference to two quite different procedural steps: returning the Treaty to the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations for reconsideration (possibly with instructions), and 
returning it to the President for renegotiation with the Soviets. The former repre- 
sents a simple "motion to recommit" and is in order at any time prior to the final 
vote on the Resolution of Ratification. The latter is more complex: a treaty may be 
returned to the President only through the adoption of an order by unanimous 
consent, or a resolution by simple majority. However, such a resolution would 
normally be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 

III. PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVES AFTER SENATE ACTION 

Senate action on the SALT II Treaty could take any one of a number of courses, 
each of which presents the President with various alternatives. 

A. Senate consent without conditions 

The Senate may grant its consent without imposing any conditions, as is done 
with the great majority of treaties. If so, the President may then proceed immedi- 
ately to ratify the Treaty. Contrary to popular impression, the Senate does not 
"ratify" treaties as such— it gives its "consent" to ratification by the President. 
Senate consent constitutes authorization, rather than a directive, to bring the treaty 
into force. The President may, moreover, withdraw a treaty for which he has 
requested Senate consent at any time prior to the final vote on advice and consent. 
Ratification occurs upon the exchange of "instruments of ratification' with the 
other signatory; these are documents indicating each state's intent to be bound and 
containing any conditions either state may impose. In the case of bilateral treaties. 
United States practice has been to execute a "Protocol of Exchange" as well, which 
is a document signed by both states indicating that each has examined the instru- 
ments of a ratification tendered by the other and that each accepts the conditions, if 
any, imposed by the other. 

B. Senate consent with conditions 

In the event that the Senate conditions its advice and consent upon the accept- 
ance of certain amendments, reservations, or understandings, the President has 

several options: ,,,. .. .c 4.u rr + 

1. Consider the conditions unacceptable and decline to ratify the Ireaty; 

2. Reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union and seek their acceptance of the 
conditions; 

3. Submit a new Treaty to the Senate; or 

4. Resubmit the original Treaty. 

Several additional issues arise in connection with the various conditions which 
the Senate may impose upon its consent: xu o i *• 

Presidential objection to the resolution.— Frior to the final vote on the Resolution 
of Ratification, the President may decide that amendments or other conditions 
already attached to the Resolution make it unacceptable to him. He may then 
request those siding with him to vote against the Resolution, rather than to risk 
Senate advice and consent with unacceptable conditions. (This situation occurred 
when the Versailles Treaty failed to receive a two-thirds vote because of President 
Wilson's opposition to Senate approval with the so-called "Lodge Reservations. ) 



23 

Requirement of Presidential transmittal. — With the possible exceptions of a condi- 
tion relating solely to a matter of domestic concern (e.g., that a given treaty will be 
non-self-executing) and a statement not germane to the treaty, the President is 
required to include each Senate-added condition in the instrument of ratification 
given the other signatory. "That such conditions must be so included," the Commit- 
tee said in its report on the Panama Canal Treaties, "is as much a part of custom- 
ary constitutional law in this country as the right of the Senate to grant conditional 
consent." Ex. Kept. No. 95-12, Feb. 3, 1978 at p. 11. 

Acceptance of United States conditions by the Soviet Union. — Instruments of ratifi- 
cation are not exchanged until the views of the other government concerning 
United States conditions have been obtained. If the Soviet Union proceeds with the 
exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence constitutes assent to the treaties 
as modified by the United States. If the Soviet Union objects to any such condition, 
however, the treaty may not, in accordance with traditional United States practice, 
be brought into force by the President. The United States practice of executing a 
"Protocol of Exchange" incorporating any conditions attached prior to final ratifica- 
tion makes certain that Soviet acceptance or rejection of Senate conditions will be 
clear. 

Right of rejection by the Soviet Union. — Any condition imposed by the United 
States upon its consent to a treaty gives rise to a right of rejection by the Soviet 
Union which has agreed tentatively only to the version it signed. A condition is thus 
analogous to a counteroffer in the law of contracts. It may, if the "offeree" so 
chooses, require that negotiations be reopened, be rejected outright, or, if the offeree 
accepts it, bring a legally different agreement into effect. 

Significance of the label. — From a strictly legal standpoint the particular label 
attached to a condition is not determinative. Whether called an "amendment," 
"reservation," "understanding," "declaration," or something else, any condition im- 
posed by the United States upon its consent to be bound may be rejected by the 
Soviet Union as incompatible with the original agreement. Alternatively, once 
accepted, every condition becomes binding along with the provisions of the treaty 
itself. The significance of a label, as distinguished from the substance of the condi- 
tion, is therefore more "political" than legal. While a condition designated an 
"understanding" or an "interpretation" would be no less effective legally in condi- 
tioning United States ratification than the same condition labeled a "reservation," 
or even one cast in terms of an amendment to the Treaty text, it might be regarded 
by the Soviets as less offensive politically and thus be more easily accepted by them. 
Practically speaking, therefore, it is the Soviet leadership which will judge the 
acceptability of any condition attached to the Treaty, which may be influenced by 
its designation (see part IV below.) 

C. Senate inaction 

The Senate may simply decline to act on the Treaty, as it has in the case of a 
number of other treaties. In such event, a treaty simply remains on the Senate's 
Executive Calendar unless and until withdrawn by the President or returned to him 
by the Senate. 

D. Senate rejection 

The Senate may decline to approve the Treaty by failing to accord it the requisite 
two-thirds vote of approval. This has occurred only 11 times in our history, the most 
recent occasion being in 1960.^ Where a final vote on the resolution of ratification 
fails to achieve the requisite two-thirds, the Senate customarily adopts a resolution 
returning the treaty to the President. 

The Treaty may, of course, be resubmitted thereafter by the President. Two 
additional options have lately received some attention in the press. One would be to 
resubmit the SALT agreement for approval by joint resolution — i.e., as a so-called 
Congressional-Executive agreement. The SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive 
weapons was handled this way from the outset and might be cited as a precedent. 
However, the Senate may take a dim view of this approach. 

The other option occasionally mentioned would be for the President to issue a 
unilateral statement announcing the intention of the United States to adhere to the 
provisions of the defeated Treaty. Prior to the October 1977 expiration of the SALT 
I Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the United States and the Soviet Union 
each declared its intent to observe the limitations of the agreement as long as the 
other did so. While the Administration did not claim that such parallel declarations 
constituted commitments "binding" the United States, and some Senators defended 
the President's action as within his Constitutional power, others criticized the 



' The Dispute Settlement Protocol to the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea. 



24 

approach as a circumvention of appropriate constitutional procedures, and a viola- 
tion of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.^ 

Concern about such an approach to SALT II has centered not only on Presidential 
declarations following rejection of the treaty, but also on any attempt by the 
Administration to extend the limitations of the Protocol beyond its expiration date 
at the end of 1981. The Administration has conceded on several occasions (most 
recently during testimony before the Committee on the treaty termination issue) 
that treaties and treaty provisions may not be formally extended or amended by 
executive agreement or parallel declarations.' This issue will be considered in a 
later memorandum. 

IV. SOVIET TREATY RATIFICATION AND MODIFICATION 

It is not clear whether the Soviets will proceed to ratify the SALT II Treaty in 
advance of Senate consideration. Treaties are ratified for the Soviet Union by the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the country's parliament. While this procedure is 
generally deemed to be merely a formality, it is probably the stage at which the 
Soviets would attach conditions of their own in response to conditions that might be 
imposed by the Senate. In the case of the SALT I Agreements, the Presidium did 
not act until the Senate (on the ABM Treaty) and the Senate and House (on the 
Interim Agreement) had approved them. 

With the possible exception of a matter of purely domestic concern or a statement 
not germane to the treaty, if the Soviet Union ratifies the SALT II Treaty subject to 
a condition, the text of the condition must be communicated to the President of the 
Senate to obtain Senate approval for the acceptance thereof (if the President wishes 
to accept the reservation or amendment). If, prior to receipt of notification concern- 
ing the condition, the Senate has already given its consent to ratification of the 
SALT II Treaty, the express consent of the Senate to acceptance of the condition 
must be obtained before proceeding to exchange the instruments of ratification. If 
the Senate still has the Treaty under consideration at the time the notification is 
given, the Senate's consent to acceptance of the reservation may be either express 
or implied; that is, if the Senate, with knowledge of the reservation, advises and 
consents to United States ratification without reference to a Soviet reservation of 
which it is aware, Senate approval may be inferred. (See page 23 for discussion of 
the procedure for Soviet acceptance of Senate conditions.) 

Senator Biden. After Senator Stone asks his questions, I will 
read you our legal memorandum relating to reservations. 
Senator Stone? 
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

USE OF MPS FOR EXISTING LAND-BASED MISSILES 

Professor Rostow, regardless of the niceties of the form in which 
a modification of this SALT II Treaty ought to take and which we 
will explore, the substantive issue here is, should we modify the 
treaty to specifically permit the use of multiple protective shelters 
for our existing land-based missiles? Is it correct that your position 
is that we need to do that because of the vulnerability of our land- 
based missiles to first strike by the Soviet Union during the life of 
this treaty? 

Mr. RosTOW. Yes, sir. 

DETERRENCE OF SOVIET FIRST STRIKE 

Senator Stone. People say, why should we spend all of this 
money to protect these existing missiles. Really, don't we have 



* Section 33 provides that "no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will 
obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of 
the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the 
Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the 
United States." 

= See, e.g., the testimony of the Justice Department spokesman on page 220 of the Committee's 
"Treaty Termination" hearings. 



25 

enough other missiles apart from those that could be destroyed in a 
first strike to deter the Soviets from even contemplating a first 
strike? What is your answer to that? 

Mr. RoSTOW. My answer to that is this: It is a question of 
numbers. The threat to blow up Soviet cities and population had a 
certain credibility during the period of our nuclear monopoly, and 
then of our very great nuclear superiority, but as former Secretary 
Kissinger has emphasized, both in his statement here and in his 
statement in Brussels last week, as Soviet nuclear parity was ap- 
proached, and then as Soviet nuclear superiority is threatened, 
that possibility of retaliation in that way steadily loses its credibil- 
ity. 

I have never been much impressed with the possibility that an 
American President would actually do it, but I think he certainly 
would not do it, and no one would believe that he would do it, 
knowing that the Soviet Union had enough accurate missiles in 
reserve to blow up our own cities. That would be suicidal and 
irrational and no one would believe it would be done. The threat to 
do it would have no deterrent effect, and if we ever allowed such a 
situation to develop, we should be impotent. 

REASON FOR DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE MISSILES 

Senator Stone. Is that the reason why the administration is 
proposing to build and deploy mobile missiles, the M-X missile? 

Mr. RosTOW. Yes. 

Senator Stone. Precisely what you just said? 

Mr. RosTOw. That is exactly right. 

Senator Stone. And is what you are saying that that same 
doctrine must be extended to the period of our vulnerability in the 
early and mid-1980's? 

Mr. RosTow. That is correct. 

PROVOKE SOVIETS TO GO FOR MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS 

Senator Stone. Suppose we did it. Suppose we did take for our- 
selves the legal right to deploy our existing land-based missiles in 
multiple protective shelters or in a multiple mode during the eight- 
ies? It is then said by opponents of this option that we would 
provoke the Soviets into doing likewise and more so, and that that 
would lessen our security and increase our risk. What is your 
answer to that? 

In other words, they will go for the multiple protective shelter. 
They will hide even more effectively in their closed society than we 
will hide, and we will therefore be more at risk than before. What 
about that? 

Mr. RosTOW. As I brought out in my colloquy with Senator 
Javits, the Soviets are now deploying mobile MIRVed SS-20's 
which are causing great alarm in Europe and which can readily be 
converted into missiles that can reach the United States as well. 
Mobile missiles are very difficult for us to target and very difficult 
for us to knock out. When you add this capacity to the Soviet 
stockpile of extra missiles stored in unknown sites, in effect, they 
are already doing the equivalent of what we are proposing. 



26 

Now, it may be, as many people have contended, that the devel- 
opment of technology, nuclear technology, has made security 
through verifiable arms control methods nearly impossible, and 
that soon, hopefully as soon as possible, the Soviet Union the 
United States, and other nations which have become nuclear 
powers will recognize the folly of the entire development and go 
back to the ideas of the Baruch plan which we proposed immediate- 
ly after the war, a very wise proposal of which I am very proud. 

We, while holding a nuclear monopoly, proposed to international- 
ize nuclear weapons and nuclear science. They are becoming very 
complicated. They are becoming very dangerous, and they are pro- 
liferating all over the place. I have always favored and will always 
favor such an approach as soon as the Soviet Union is ready to 
accept it. 

Senator Stone. Professor Rostow, may I say that I completely 
agree with protecting our land-based missiles with multiple protec- 
tive shelters of one kind or another during the period of our 
vulnerability. I agree with that, but I want to address these argu- 
ments that have been raised so that whatever form it takes, the 
committee, the Senate, and the country will feel, as you do and as I 
do, that we ought to do this. 

CHANGE FROM MAD STRATEGY TO COUNTERFORCE 

You are saying that we should convert our strategy from a 
mutual assured destruction strategy in which our missiles kill 
people and their missiles kill people to where, since their missiles 
can now in the next year or two destroy our missiles, then our 
missiles should be able to destroy their missiles as opposed to 
people. That is counterforce strategy, right? 

Mr. RosTOW. Right. 

Senator Stone. So I return to this issue which I just raised with 
you. If they can go mobile more effectively than we can, how can 
they by putting in the MPS have a good counterforce? Will it be 
sufficiently a counterforce if we protect our current land-based 
missiles to give us a credible counterforce at all, or have we gotten 
so far behind that we don't even get that with the multiple protec- 
tive shelter? 

Mr. Rostow. I am not now, nor have I ever been an expert on 
arms, and I do not pretend to be, but my experience has been on 
this side of the river in the State Department, and I am concerned 
with the political effect of these weapons, but the people I know 
best who are experts on arms tell me that they believe that for this 
transition period this is the most feasible and quickest way to 
assure our ICBM's against the possibility of destruction, which 
could be the basis of nuclear coercion and nuclear threat. 

Their arguments seem to be reasonable, as a practical matter. 

EQUAL CREDIBILITY IN OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE 

Senator Stone. Professor, is what you are arguing for equal 
credibility in our strategic posture as compared to the Soviets' 
credibility as to their strategic posture? You are not arguing for 
firing any of these things? 

Mr. Rostow. No, I am arguing for a stalemate. 



27 

Senator Stone. You are arguing for a proper stalemate or for 
what they call these days a rough equivalency, but in this case a 
rough equivalency of counterforce credibility. 

Mr. RosTOW. That is absolutely correct. We are arguing for a 
stalemate, for the nonuse of these weapons, to guarantee against 
their either being used or being brandished. 

Senator Stone. During the life of this treaty? 

Mr. RosTOW. During the life of this treaty, and above all during 
the period of the early 1980's when, as a result of a series of 
decisions made by President Carter we face what everyone seems 
to agree are very grave risks. How do we deal with those risks in 
this period, and how do we deal with these risks in the long run? 

BASIC FIREPOWER WOULD BE CREDIBLE DETERRENT 

Senator Stone. Doesn't that also provide somewhat of an answer 
to the question I raised about the capability of the Soviets to deploy 
mobile missiles during the period, and that is that during this 
period, the basic firepower would be a credible deterrent because of 
the number of mobile missiles that the Soviets could deploy during 
the period, during the treaty period? 

Mr. RosTOW. Absolutely. 

Senator Stone. Thank you. I see that my time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Biden. Professor, I have several questions. First, I have a 
question from Senator Percy, who cannot be here this morning. He 
would like me to ask it of you and of Admiral Moorer when he 
testifies. 

television coverage of the salt DEBATE 

His question is whether or not the groups which you gentlemen 
represent, in this case the Committee on the Present Danger, favor 
television coverage of the SALT debate. That is the question. Does 
your group favor television coverage of the SALT debate on the 
floor of the Senate? 

Mr. RosTOW. The group has taken no position on the question, 
and therefore I cannot speak for the executive committee of the 
Committee on the Present Danger, but personally I do favor such 
coverage. 

Senator Biden. Thank you. 

BINDING EFFECT OF SENATE RESERVATIONS ON U.S.S.R 

Now, with regard to the binding effect of Senate reservations on 
the U.S.S.R., let me read to you from a memorandum, and then we 
can exchange memoranda. 

Mr. RosTOW. I shall be grateful for a copy of it. 

Senator Biden. It says: 

Under U.S. treaty practice, all reservations which the Senate attaches to a resolu- 
tion of ratification are included in instruments of ratification which are exchanged 
with the Soviet Union and are signed by the Soviet Union. It is this exchange under 
article XIV of the treaty which brings the treaty into force. The protocol of ex- 
change itself reads that the treaty will be carried out by both parties in accordance 
with the reservation or other conditions contained therein. 

Therefore, in agreeing to go forward with the exchange, the Soviets must accept 
the conditions contained in the protocol of exchange. They can, of course, refuse to 



H8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 3 



28 

go forward with the exchange, if they do not like one or more of the conditions 
contained in the instrument, but if they do go forward, they are clearly bound and 
clearly bound in law. 

Now, I would be anxious to hear what your friends at Yale will 

say. 

Mr. RosTOW. I shall be very grateful for a copy of this document. 

Senator Biden. We will give you a copy. 

Mr. RosTOW. I can say now with great respect that that is a good 
recitation of black letter law on the subject, but it does not meet a 
very important qualification which has developed in a good many 
cases, which is that the courts have sometimes said that the reser- 
vation is incompatible with the treaty and outside the power of the 
treaty-making process, and therefore can be disregarded. 

That kind of control would not be available, of course, in this 
sort of treaty. 

SOVIET CONVERTING OF SS-20 TO SS-16 

Senator Biden. I will not debate with you now, sir. You are 
concerned that the SS-20 will be converted in effect to an SS-16 
and be able with a single warhead to strike the United States. The 
Soviets have approximately 100 SS-20's deployed. One thing I do 
agree with you about, after extensive discussions over the last 6 
months with European political and military leaders, is that they 
are concerned about the SS-20. But I don't understand why in the 
world the Soviets would ever consider converting the SS-20, either 
through adding the extra stage or lightening the payload by substi- 
tuting one warhead for three when to do so would give them only a 
relatively few extra ICBM warheads, while denuding their theater 

capability. 

It seems that you double-count that SS-20 argument. You use it 
in the theater to whip that one up, and then you also use it as it 
relates to central systems, the same with the Backfire bomber. 

Mr. RosTOW. Isn't that true of Backfire? 

Senator Biden. Yes, as I said, as you do with Backfire. 

Mr. RosTOW. I can't help it that the wretched things have multi- 
ple purposes. 

Senator Biden. Yes, but you can only use them one way. You 
can't use the same missile two ways. Once it is used it is used. 

Mr. RosTOW. I agree with you completely you can't shoot them 

twice. 

Senator Biden. Right. I am glad we have agreed on something. 

Mr. RosTOW. We have agreed on many things. Senator Biden. 

Senator Biden. I want the record to show we agree on very little. 

Mr. RosTOW. All right. . 

Senator Biden. That is important to me, as it probably is to you. 
[General laughter.] 

PROGRAMS united STATES NEEDS THAT TREATY PROHIBITS 

Senator Biden. You mentioned one possible basing mode of the 
M-X being inconsistent with the treaty. 

Is there anything else that the United States must do in your 
opinion to insure its security but cannot do because of the treaty? 
You have mentioned the M-X. Is there anything else? 



29 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, I mentioned the multiple basing mode. It is 
the verification problem under this treaty which presents a very, 
very difficult problem for me, rather than the question of what we 
should do to rebuild our strength. 

Senator Biden. But on that one point, before we get to verifica- 
tion, is there anything that we can't do if this treaty is passed 
which your Committee has recommended? 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, I would say certainly the rapid deployment of 
an alternate basing mode is the first item we have mentioned. I 
have mentioned also the range on cruise missiles which is mattter 
of great importance. 

Senator Biden. The range on ground-launched, on sea-launched 
cruise missiles, but is that range affected after the expiration of 
the protocol? Once the protocol expires on December 31, 1981, is 
there anything we cannot do with regard to cruise missiles that 
you would like done? 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, about the protocol, we had a very unfortunate 
experience with the expiration of the Interim Agreement which the 
President has perpetuated by Executive agreement. Now, therefore, 
the expiration of the protocol date and the effectiveness of that 
against the possibility of similar action on the part of the President 
of that period is a matter of some concern. 

Senator Biden. You would agree, though, that the U.S. Senate 
can bind this President or any future President of the United 
States on that issue, wouldn't you? 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, the whole U.S. Congress did in the ACDA 
statute. In section 33, it said that no limitation on our arms shall 
be effective unless accomplished by treaty or statute. The President 
has perpetuated the Interim Agreement by Executive agreement. 

Senator Biden. Don't you agree that if the U.S. Senate passes a 
resolution specifying that under no circumstances can the Presi- 
dent of the United States continue the protocol beyond December 
31, 1981, that he would be bound by that? 

Mr. RosTOW. Yes; but I think he is equally bound by section 33 of 
the ACDA statute, and it has not proved effective. 

ABIUTY TO deploy GLCM AND SLCM AFTER EXPIRATION OF 

PROTOCOL 

Senator Biden. Do you have any doubt about the ability to 
deploy ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles after the 
expiration of the protocol? Is there anything in the treaty that 
would prevent us from deploying the type of ground- or sea- 
launched cruise missiles that we would need, in your opinion? 

Mr. RosTOW. Well, not for ourselves, I suppose. I am not quite 
certain, but the transfer of technology point might affect the use of 
such instruments by our allies. 

Senator Biden. I specifically went to Moscow with six of my 
colleagues for that very purpose, and met with their military com- 
mand, with the members of the Supreme Soviet, and with Mr. 
Kosygin for 3 hours, and made it very clear that certain things 
were going to be done by the Senate. I will read from my prepared 
text and tell you what their response was: 

In my view and on the basis of my work as Chairman of the European Affairs 
Subcommittee, there must be a clarification of Article XII of the treaty, 



30 
the one to which you referred, non-transfer. 

This provision concerns the issue of non-circumvention. Here I want all concerned 
to be put on notice, our allies, the American people, you in the Soviet Union, that 
nothing, absolutely nothing in that treaty or protocol can or will inhibit existmg 
patterns of collaboration between the United States and its allies. 

I then went on to specify that with regard to the protocol: 

Finally, I know you will see a condition of the treaty that makes clear that the 
protocol means what it says, that is, that it ends in 1981, period, and that there is no 
possibility of continuing that protocol beyond that date, and at that time the 
ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile will be deployed. 

I can tell you that the Soviet reaction at all levels was that this 
was our right under the treaty, that there is nothing that prevents 
that. They did say they hoped we would continue to discuss that 
with them but they understood full well that was our right. It 
seems to me you raise an awful lot of red herrings. 

Mr. RosTOW. But, Senator, with great respect, I don't think you 
have answered my question. Of course, you are under no obligation 
to do so, as I am, but still, you have not answered my question 
about what happened to section 33 of ACDA. 

Senator Biden. There was no formal extension. 

Mr. RosTOW. Oh, please, sir. The United States and the Soviet 
Union made simultaneous and identical announcements that they 
were unilaterally extending the agreement. Are you suggesting 
that there was no prior agreement to do that? 

Senator Biden. I am suggesting that if the U.S. Senate specifical- 
ly tells this President or whomever will be President in the year 
1981 that he cannot, absent affirmative action by U.S. Senate, 
extend, then he cannot extend the protocol. 

Now, obviously, any President at any time can refuse to take 
action. 

A President can engage in inaction. 

Mr. RosTOW. But with regard to section 33, it was not a question 
of inaction. It was a question of action. 

Senator Biden. What I am saying is that can be specifically 
handled by a specific reservation by the U.S. Senate on that specif- 

ic issue. 
Mr. RosTOW. But doesn't section 33 of the ACDA statute do so 

already? 

Senator Biden. The answer is, I don't know. 

Mr. RosTOW. All right. 

Senator Biden. My time is up once again. If there are no further 
questions, we thank you very much, Professor. We appreciate your 

testimony. 
Senator Zorinsky, do you have any questions of this witness.'' 
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have one 

question. 

BETRAYAL OF PROMISES AND EXPECTATION IN SALT I 

Mr. Rostow, in your testimony you allege the Soviet betrayal of 
every promise and expectation on the basis of which the SALT I 
package was approved. Would you enumerate what these promises 
and expectations were and who made them? 

Mr. Rostow. Yes. In the agreement of May 1972, between Presi- 
dent Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, cooperation was assured to put out 



31 

fires all around the world, to work together specifically in the 
Middle East to assure agreement in conformity with Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 242, to cooperate in ending the war in Indochina on 
favorable terms, and to give warning when certain kinds of events 
occurred or were threatened. Instead of cooperating to end the 
conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Union had agreed with 
President Sadat the month before President Nixon came to Moscow 
in May 1972, that is, in April 1972, to cooperate with President 
Sadat in launching a war in 1973 and to send all the necessary 
equipment, experts, and so forth for that purpose. 

So far as Indochina is concerned, of course, the Soviets cooperat- 
ed in obtaining the agreements of January and of March 1973, 
which from our point of view were satisfactory and reaffirmed the 
Laos Agreement of 1962, but they cooperated with the North Viet- 
namese in breaking those agreements and every aspect of those 
agreements, and in denying their essential purpose. 

Those are the two chief items I recall, and I think they are 
sufficient to indicate that the agreements were not made in all 
sincerity and were not carried out. 

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Rostow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have. 

Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Professor. 

Mr. Rostow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Mr. Rostow's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Professor Eugene V. Rostow 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to testify on the ratification of the 
SALT II Treaty. I am here in behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, a 
nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' committee which began to function on 11 November 
1976. Our position on SALT II has been stated on two occasions. In July, 1977, our 
Executive Committee issued a pamphlet called "Where We Stand on Salt," which 
was later approved by the Board of Directors. And in July of this year, the Execu- 
tive Committee adopted a statement which was submitted to your Subcommittee on 
Europe on 19 July 1979. Both those documents, together with related materials, are 
before you. They are the basis of what I shall say. 

Our conclusions on the Treaty as it stands are summed up on pp. 2-3 of our 19 
July statement. They constitute, we believe, a positive and affirmative seven-point 
program for action, which puts the SALT Treaty and the SALT negotiating process 
into the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole. 

Permit me to recall those conclusions for ready reference: 

"In view of the gravity of the issues raised by the Treaty now before you, and all 
that has happened since the SALT I package was approved in 1972, we recommend: 
(1) That the Senate advise the President and the nation of the need to seek a more 
positive, forward looking, and effective foreign and defense policy, and state the 
goals and principles on which that policy should be based; and (2) that the Senate 
withhold its consent to the ratification of the Treaty the President has submitted 
unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficiencies, and the 
President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that will 
achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence. 

"The Committee on the Present Danger is the first to recognize that withholding 
the Senate's consent for the SALT II Treaty now before you is not in itself a foreign 
and defense policy. We have concluded, however, that the action I have just outlined 
is a necessary condition for developing a sound and prudent policy. And it is the 
only available way to convince the President that the SALT II Treaty he signed in 
Vienna fails both as a means for protecting our national security, and as an arms 
limitation measure. 

"It is our conviction that what the country needs above all else is to turn a sharp 
corner in our foreign and defense policy. To recall the language of President 
Carter's speech of July 15th, we believe the nation should start on a new course, 
based on a clear recognition of the truth. Such a course, in our view, should include 
these elements: (1) To shake off our post-Vietnam depression about foreign affairs 
and the yearning for isolation which is implicit in it; (2) to reach a bipartisan 



32 

consensus on what our national interests in this turbulent world really are; (3) to 
rebuild conventional and nuclear force deterrence so that we can protect those 
interests by political means or by the use of conventional forces if we have to; (4) to 
cooperate closely and continuously with our allies and other nations whose interests 
in a peaceful and stable world political order and economic system are parallel to 
our own; and (5) on that basis to continue negotiating with the Soviet Union about 
the limitation of nuclear arms, including both intercontinental and intermediate 
range nuclear weapons like those threatening Europe and other areas of great 
importance to us. 

There is still time for that great task to be accomplished in peace. As a group, 
the NATO allies, Japan, China and other like-minded nations have more than 
enough power and potential power to contain the Soviet drive for domination. But 
that power is dispersed and inchoate. It is not being mobilized ir/o forms which can 
become political power— naval squadrons and armored divisions; planes, reserves 
and research formations. The potential power of the nations which favor a peaceful 
world order cannot be brought to bear on world politics unless the energy, optimism 
and intelligence of the American people are liberated and harnessed once again in 
considered programs designed to restore the peace and prosperity of the nation. In 
the bipolar world of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail, no coalition to guard 
the peace can act without the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and 
confidence that our nation is willing and able to meet its commitments." 

II 

I thought I could be most useful to you today if this opening statement supple- 
mented our earlier statements by commenting on some of the key issues which have 
emerged in the SALT hearings so far. President Carter's case for SALT rests on 
something more than complacency about our ovm strength and an underestimation 
of Soviet power and Soviet intentions. 

The strongest argument for SALT II thus far put forward by the Carter Admmis- 
tration is an argument of political myth. It was summed up by a distinguished 
Senator in these terms: "To reject SALT II would be to go over the abyss." 

The variations on this theme are infinite. One hears it said everywhere that to 
reject SALT, or to ratify it with amendments or on conditions, would be to "end" 
detente and revive the "Cold War." The President has said that those who oppose 
the Treaty as it stands are war-mongers and opponents of "detente." The Secretary 
of State is reported to have said that he would resign rather than preside over the 
end of "detente" and the revival of the "Cold War." Some years ago, I counted a 
couple of hundred remarks of this tenor, and then stopped counting. 

The notion that Soviet-American relations have improved in recent years, that 
the Cold War is over, and that negotiation has been substituted for confrontation is 
a dangerous symptom of auto-intoxication. The Cold War is not over. On the 
contrary, it is worse than ever, featured by Soviet threats and thrusts on a far 
greater scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the crisis in 
Greece. But as things get worse, many Americans insist on telling each other that 
they are getting better. SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, it 
would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet superiority— a great 
Soviet victory in the Cold War, and so perceived everywhere in the world. But this 
Administration keeps repeating that SALT II would be a step towards stability, 
detente, and peace. . j ^ n. 

This Delphic assertion is made so often that we tend to accept it as self-evident. It 
implies that the Russians would behave even worse than they are behaving now if 
SALT II is not ratified in its present form; that it would cost us more to keep up 
with them in such an event; and that the process of negotiating with the Soviet 
Union about nuclear weapons somehow contributes to peace and stability. In 1972, 
the SALT I package was ratified under different geo-political circumstances, but on 
the basis of this same litany of arguments. The period since 1972 has been the worst 
and most disastrous period of the Cold War, featured by Soviet deception of the 
United States in Indochina and the Middle East; the Soviet campaign in Africa and 
Southern Asia; and an extraordinary Soviet military buildup, far greater than that 
of the United States and its Allies. In view of the betrayal of every promise and 
expectation on the basis of which the SALT I package was approved, it is difficult to 
understand why these arguments are still so popular. But they are. As President 
Kennedy once remarked, "If you are cheated once, it is their fault. But if you are 
cheated a second time, it is your own." 

The contention that the failure to ratify SALT II in its present form would be 
"going over the abyss" is not really an argument, but an appeal to fear which 
attributes nearly magic influence to arms limitation agreements. Those who are 
swayed by this appeal are hypnotized by the SALT negotiating process as MacDon- 



33 

aid, Baldwin, and Chamberlain were hypnotized by the chimera of disarmament 
forty-five years ago. 

Nothing in the history of arms limitation agreements gives the slightest encour- 
agement for such beliefs. The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of 
modern arms limitation agreements. It prescribed strict limits on German arma- 
ments and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. If Britain had been willing to join 
France in enforcing that Treaty, the Second World War could never have taken 
place. But when the Versailles limits on arms were violated, secretly at first, and 
then openly; when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and marched into the 
Rhineland in 1936, Britain and France did nothing except wring their hands and try 
to persuade Hitler to sign new treaties limiting armaments. We can see parallels to 
this behavior nearly every week in our reaction to Soviet behavior raising serious 
questions about whether they are violating the Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I 
agreements, or the agreement of 1962 about the Soviet presence in Cuba. 

The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern times was the 
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Our exp)erience under that agreement and its 
successors is hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles. Lulled by the 
delusive security of the Treaty, we, the British, and the French persistently kept 
our navies relatively low, while Japan and later Germany built to the limits of the 
Treaty and beyond. 

There is another aspect of the Administration's argument that to reject SALT II 
would be "to go over the abyss": the notion that such action on our part would 
make Soviet policy even more aggressive than it is. The claim betrays a misunder- 
standing of the nature of the Soviet Union and of the serious and devoted men who 
govern it. The Soviet Union is already behaving as badly as it dares. It is moving as 
rapidly as it deems prudent toward the strategic and political goals of its policy. It 
takes advantage of every opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. There is no 
use getting excited about this fact. It is simply a fact. As Professor Bernard Lewis 
has remarked, the Soviet leaders are still in the imperial mood of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, which the West has long since abandoned with relief. In 
the interests of our own survival, we have to persuade the Soviet Union that this 
ruthless and cynical process must stop before it results inevitably in war. 

There is only one argument that can deter expansion — the conviction on their 
part that a given action would expose them to unacceptable risk. That is the factor 
which made our diplomacy persuasive and effective in a dozen crises since 1945, 
from the Berlin Blockade to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion 
of that conviction since 1972 which has invited a series of Soviet thrusts on every 
continent. In recent years, the Soviet Union has increased the pace of its expansion 
because of the impact of Vietnam and Watergate on American policy, and now 
because it perceives President Carter as weak. As a result, the Soviet Union is 
moving forward with incredible boldness in several areas of the world, including 
even the Caribbean. 

Some who accept this view of Soviet policy argue for SALT II nonetheless on the 
ground that under SALT II it would be easier for us to verify Soviet behavior, and 
confine the Soviet impulse to expand. I shall comment later on the verification 
controversy as such. Suffice it to remark at this point that there is no reason to 
suppose that we should have any more confidence in our knowledge of Soviet 
activities under SALT II than we have had under SALT I. Since our intelligence 
estimators have recently confessed to being in error by a factor of 100 percent, that 
is not a comforting thought. 

The claim that the ratification of SALT II would save us money is equally 
specious. Short of general mobilization, it is hardly feasible for the Soviet Union to 
spend more on military hardware than it has been spending for the last fifteen 
years or so. I have heard General Jones say that the task of restoring the military 
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union will cost the same with or 
without SALT II — an estimate which may be erroneous in a perverse way, because 
some programs — M-X, for example — may cost a good deal more than otherwise if 
SALT should be ratified, in order to meet its verification standards. Administration 
spokesmen have offered a variety of opinions on the cost consequences of not 
ratifying SALT. Paul Warnke has said that the rejection of SALT would be costly, 
but that its cost could not be quantified. Leslie Gelb has written recently that 
saving money is the chief reason for ratifying SALT. Others have said quite differ- 
ent things on the subject. The fact is that in an area of complex and rapidly 
changing technology, none of these estimates are of much consequence. 

Averell Harriman and George W. Ball have offered a variant of the "abyss" 
argument which brings out its basic weakness. Not to accept SALT II, they have 
told you, would help lead to the election of a "hard-liner" to succeed Brezhnev. The 
notion that Brezhnev is a "moderate" in any sense we can recognize, or that he 



34 

believes in our concept of detente, is denied by everj^hing he has said and done in 
all the years of his high office. Brezhnev was the architect of the attack on Czecho- 
slovakia in 1968, and on our whole Middle East position in 1967 and 1973. He is the 
man who broke his solemn agreements with us about Indo-China and the Middle 
East. In the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine, he claims the right to use force 
internationally in order to protect or promote regimes or revolutions he regards as 
socialist or progressive. To call him a "moderate" is an abuse of the English 
language. 

There are of course differences within the Kremlin and no doubt there are 
groupings among its members. But there is no serious evidence that any of these 
differences concern Soviet-American relations. Of course all the Soviet leaders want 
SALT II ratified. They have never made so much progress as they did under SALT 
I, and they expect SALT II to be at least as productive for them. And they know 
that if the United States ever does wake up, and decide to restore the military 
balance, both in strategic and in conventional forces, they would lose ignominiously. 
Their economy is only half as large as ours. But these are hardly reasons for us to 
take the Treaty as it is. 

There is thus nothing in the contention that to reject SALT would be "to go over 
the abyss." The leaders of the Soviet Union are patient realists. They will negotiate 
with us so long as it is in their interest to do so. And it will be in our mutual 
interest to negotiate about strategic weapons only when we have fully restored 
essential equivalence and adequate deterrence at every level relevant to our inter- 
ests. 

Ill 

President Carter's second best argument for his Treaty is that it wouldn't do 
much harm, would not prevent us from restoring the military balance, and should 
therefore be ratified to demonstrate to our friends and adversaries that we really do 
have a government. This argument appeals strongly to all Americans. For the best 
of reasons, we tend to rally to the flag when it is under fire. Foreigners have their 
own view of our government, based on their daily experience on a dozen issues. In 
my talks with the leaders of friendly foreign governments in recent years, it became 
clear that what they want from us is a policy of vigorous and imaginative resistance 
to the process of Soviet expansion. I am confident that the program our Commiteee 
has outlined would be well received by friendly nations, and fully respected by our 
adversaries abroad. 

There is, however, a fatal flaw in the argument which would wrap SALT II in the 
flag of patriotism. The SALT II Treaty is not harmless; it would do a great deal of 
harm; it would make it far more difficult for us to redress the military balance; and 
no spokesman for the Administration has as yet seriously addressed the principal 
issues raised in this connection by its critics. 

All studies of the nuclear balance agree that if present trends continue just a few 
years longer, the Soviet Union will have significant nuclear superiority in the early 
1980's authorized by the SALT II Treaty — the capacity, that is, to make a preemp- 
tive first strike by destroying our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our 
submarines in port with a fraction of their nuclear force, leaving enough accurate 
missiles in reserve to neutralize our own nuclear arsenal. If we should ever allow 
such a position to develop, the military doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction on 
which we have relied since Secretary McNamara's time would become obsolete, and 
our submarines and other less accurate missile launchers would be ineffective. 
Facing such threats, we should be unable to use conventional forces, and our 
diplomacy would be without influence. 

Slowly and reluctantly, the Administration has conceded that at a given point 
fairly soon our ICBM's and other ground based-launchers will become vulnerable to 
a Soviet first-strike attack. Some Administration spokesmen say that such a devel- 
opment would not mean the end of the world, because we could always strike back 
from our submarines, or, in an argument of desperation, even launch our ICBM's on 
warning. It is hard to believe, but Secretary of State Vance himself has expressed 
this bizarre view. Others say that our allies must realize that there are limits to our 
nuclear umbrella: that is, in plain words, that the American nuclear guarantee 
would be worthless. The official Administration doctrine is that the concerns of 
SALT critics about our vulnerability to a preemptive first strike are valid, but that 
they will be cured by the M-X missile, long delayed by President Carter. A decision 
on its mode of deplojTnent was supposed to have been made by August 1, but has 
not yet been announced. 

But the M-X missile cannot be ready, the Administration says, before 1989 at the 
earliest, even if President Carter finally solves the problem of reconciling its mode 
of deployment with the SALT II Treaty. 



35 

What are we supposed to do in the meantime — that is, during the period of the 
1980's when everybody agrees we shall be in a position of maximum exposure to 
nuclear war or nuclear blackmail? If the Soviet Union gains sufficient superiority in 
the early 1980's to threaten our land-based missile launchers with one-third or one- 
fifth of their force, would it be rational or even conceivable for an American 
President to use our submarine-launched missiles to destroy Soviet cities, knowing 
that the Soviets had enough missiles in reserve to blow up a very large fraction of 
our population in reprisal? Calculations of these gruesome scenarios are affected of 
course by Soviet active and passive air defense programs and absence of such 
programs on our part. Such calculations are currently most unfavorable to the 
United States. In effect, they would reverse the position of the two nations at the 
time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Under those circumstances, would the Soviet 
government believe in the possibility of American retaliation to a first strike, and 
be deterred by it? Such retaliation would be suicidal for us. No one could believe in 
so irrational a policy. 

This is the key question to consider in evaluating the nuclear balance and its 
bearing on the political influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States. I 
have been unable to find an answer on the part of any proponent of the Treaty 
beyond a blind reiteration of faith in the continued vitality of the McNamara 
Doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. This is indeed the heart and nearly the 
whole of President Carter's case for SALT II. As former Secretary Kissinger empha- 
sized in Brussels last Saturday, this position will soon be intellectually and political- 
ly untenable. We simply must move to counterforce strategies or abandon the 
notion of nuclear deterrence altogether. 

But the Treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most feasible, perhaps the 
only credible counterforce program that could preserve our second-strike capability 
during the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III production lines, 
which President Carter has recently closed, and deploy Minuteman Ills in multiple 
vertical protected shelters. Such shelters would be considered "fixed launchers" 
under Article IV of the Treaty, and would be prohibited. And the number of 
Minuteman Ills required for such a program would exceed the quotas established by 
the Treaty, since Minuteman III carries only three warheads. Here again, the 
Administration has simply not addressed the issue. It is still struggling with its 
attempt to reconcile the M-X missile with the provisions of the Treaty — a problem 
that doesn't seem to worry the Soviet Union, which continues to develop and deploy 
large numbers of mobile intermediate range missile launchers that can be converted 
into intercontinental missiles by the addition of an extra stage. 

There are many other aspects of SALT II which are far from harmless — aspects 
which have been repeatedly called to the attention of the Administration, and 
ignored or evaded in these hearings. The strange provision of the Treaty allowing 
the Soviet Union more than 300 heavy missiles, while we can have none, has been 
much discussed, but it has not been explained. These heavy missiles of enormous 
throw weight are designed primarily as first-strike weapons against hardened tar- 
gets. The essence of the Soviet Union's capacity for a credible first strike is the fact 
that if present trends continue they will be able to destroy a large part of our land- 
based missile force with one-third or one-fifth of their missiles. It is quite true that 
another combination of weapons might also threaten our land-based missiles and 
submarines in port. But there is all the difference in the world between a strike 
which would require one-fifth of the Soviet force and one requiring four-fifths of 
that force. In the strange calculus of nuclear terror, the difference is decisive. It is 
what is left after the first strike that counts both politically and militarily. 

Similarly, the provisions of the Treaty regarding the Soviet Backfire bomber have 
been vehemently discussed, but the Administration's answer is totally unconvincing. 
There is no doubt now that the Backfire is capable of reaching targets throughout 
the United States from the Soviet Union, and that it can be refuelled in the air and 
land in Cuba. Why is it not counted among the launchers covered by the Treaty, 
like our B-52's or B-l's? We have to count even mothballed B-52's, cannibalized for 
spare parts. The Administration does not answer the question, but asks us to be 
content with Mr. Brezhnev's assurance that the Soviet Union will make no more 
than 30 Backfires a year. Why 30 a year is to be considered de minimis in a Treaty 
which purports to limit launchers to some 2,000 on each side isn't immediately 
apparent, even if there were any way we could monitor these limits. How much 
damage could 30, 60, or 90 Backfires do from Cuban bases? 

Further, the restrictions of the Treaty and its protocol on the development of 
cruise missiles, especially of land- and sea-based cruise missiles, and the ambiquities 
of the Treaty about our capacity to transfer cruise missile technology to our Allies, 
are both dangerous to our security and without any justification. Here again, the 
testimony offered by the Administration is both unresponsive and unconvincing. 



36 

As for the verification provisions of the Treaty, I can find no answer in the 
testimony thus far available to the facts pointed out on pp. 17-18 of our July 19 
statement. My distinguished colleague Paul H. Nitze testified on this aspect of the 
problem on July 30 before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. I 
have included a copy of his Prepared Statement in my submission, and call it 
particularly to your attention. 

IV 

The Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger has recom- 
mended that the Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II 
unless the most important deficiencies of the Treaty are modified by amendment, 
and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that 
would achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence. Among 
the deficiencies of the Treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to 
deploy ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure their survival 
against surprise attack; (2) the equal right of the two sides to use heavy missiles; (3) 
the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within the numerical limits of 
the Treaty; (4) provision for the adoption of programs which would reverse the 
present ominous situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including 
changes in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based cruise missiles 
and the transfer-of-technology which is causing so much concern to our Allies. 

There are other deficiencies and ambiguities noted in our earlier statements, and 
in the studies of my distinguished colleagues who have written, spoken, and testified 
on these matters during the last few years. And there are many which have come to 
the surface in your hearings and those of other committees of the Senate. These too 
should be given serious consideration before the Treaty is ratified. 



In closing, permit me to stress the extraordinary responsibility of the Senate in 
voting in SALT II. The arguments put forward for the SALT I package were the 
same as those advanced for SALT II today. Under the political and military circum- 
stances of 1972, they were plausible arguments. But there is no rational way to 
accept them as the basis for policy in 1979. It is simply too late to entertain such 
views. Too much has happened to contradict them. 

Therefore, the burden of responsibility on the Senate with respect to the Treaty is 
unique in our history. 

Every American shares the goal of achieving true detente with the Soviet iJnion, 
which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of scrupulous and recipr':'cal 
respect for the rules of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the internation- 
al use of force. True detente is a central objective of the Committee on the Present 
Danger, and, I am sure, of the American people. Every President and Congress since 
1945 have gone to great lengths to reach that goal. But President Carter's quest for 
detente with the Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of 
unilateral disarmament on our part, and other unilateral concessions, will induce 
the Soviet Union to follow suit. As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our 
defenses and our alliances, and abdicated his responsibility for the security of the 
nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility therefore falls on the Senate 
with respect to this Treaty, and ultimately on the whole Congress and the people. 
We have not faced decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Bu- 
chanan. 

President Carter sometimes compares the controversy over the ratification of 
SALT II to the battle over our entry into the League of Nations after the First 
World War. The analogy is misleading. 

In the first place, despite the pervasiveness of the political legend, it cannot be 
said that "a small group of willful men" blocked the ratification either of the 
Covenant of the League or of the Security Treaty with France which had been 
promised to France in order to induce its acceptance of the League, and was 
therefore brigaded with the League Covenant. President Wilson gave up and indeed 
strongly opposed the Treaties when he realized that he would have to compromise 
with the Senate to obtain ratification. In the end, and at President Wilson's urgent 
request, twenty-three loyal Democratic Senators voted against ratifying the League 
Covenant with the reservations negotiated by Senator Lodge. History might well 
have been different if seven members of the Senate had voted then for their 
convictions. The Treaty with France never came to a vote. President Wilson was 
always the kind of man who refused half or two-thirds of a loaf when he couldn't 
get the whole thing. And at the time of the fight in 1919, he was seriously ill as 
well. 



37 

Secondly, President Wilson was proposing full and responsible American partici- 
pation in world politics, which some members of the Senate were resisting. The 
position today is just the opposite. For nearly three years. President Carter has been 
conducting a retreat to weakness and isolation. Unless that policy is promptly 
reversed, it will soon be beyond our power to do so. We should then be squeezed into 
a position of passive dependence on the Soviet Union. The program the Committee 
on the Present Danger is recommending to you today, on the contrary, is one 
through which we could remain what we have been and are, the bastion of democra- 
cy, and a responsible member of the society of nations, capable with our allies and 
associates of maintaining the balance of world power on which the future of human 
freedom depends. 

It is therefore not hyperbole to say that the state of the union for the next decade 
at least, and perhaps for much longer, will be determined by the outcome of your 
vote on the Treaty. 

Your vote on SALT is important because the Treaty is important, and in our 
judgment dangerous to the security of the nation. It would lock us into a position of 
strategic inferiority which would also be unstable and unverifiable — a perfect recipe 
for Soviet nuclear blackmail during the period of our greatest relative weakness in 
the early and middle 1980's. President Carter found that possibility staring him in 
the face when he took office in 1977. He made the situation worse by cancelling or 
postponing the programs which his predecessors had initiated to prevent the prob- 
lem from arising: B-1, the enhanced radiation warhead, M-X, and the rest of the 
sad story. 

Your vote on SALT II is important for another reason. It is the only chance you 
are likely to have to pass judgment on President Carter's foreign and defense policy 
as a system: his abandonment of the United Nations Charter as the lodestar of our 
policy, and many other contradictions, paradoxes, and retreats. 

These aspects of President Carter's foreign policy are not extrinsic to the merits 
of the SALT Treaty. They are what the Treaty is all about. SALT II is not 
concerned with a remote and upleasant subject of interest only to experts. It is not 
limited to assuring the immunity of the United States from nuclear attack. The 
United States has vital security interests beyond Fortress America. There is no 
escaping the "linkage" between SALT II and the rest of our foreign and defense 
policy. The state of the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United 
States is the fulcrum on which the entire process of world politics is poised. The 
visible and unquestioned availability of usable force has always been the key to 
effective diplomacy. This maxim has never been more obviously true. Unless we 
restore and maintain our clear second strike strategic nuclear capability, and our 
naval and other conventional forces, the American nuclear umbrella will lose all 
credibility, our political influence will continue to decline, and we shall be unable to 
use either conventional or nuclear forces anywhere in the world if such action on 
our part should be required. The pattern of our diplomatic impotence during the 
last few years will become our normal condition, until it is succeeded by something 
infinitely worse. 

Many have compared the policies of the Carter Administration revealed in its 
defense of SALT II to the posture of the ostrich taken by Great Britain and to a 
lesser extent by France during the Thirties, when they failed to act together in time 
to prevent the Second World War. The comparison is fair. In the Thirties, British 
policy was determined by wishful thinking and a nearly suicidal paralysis of will. 
Thus far, these two attitudes have dominated the foreign policy of the Carter 
Administration. But there is one fundamental difference between the dilemma faced 
by the United States today and that of Britain and France a generation ago. Even 
in the darkest days of the Second World War, Britain and France could always hope 
that the United States and the Soviet Union would somehow be drawn into the fray, 
so that victory would become possible. There are no great powers in that position 
now, no nations in the wings who might help to turn the tide if we persist in our 
folly as Britain and France did during the Thirties, until it was too late to do 
anything but fight. If we allow the Soviet rush for dominance to continue un- 
checked; if we allow Europe to be enveloped and reduced, through the Middle East 
or the Northern seas or both, Japan, China, and many other countries would fall 
under Soviet control. We should then be truly isolated, living in a state of siege, and 
confronting the pressures of a hostile Soviet foreign policy backed by an overwhelm- 
ing array of force. Under such circumstances, if history is a guide, an episode trivial 
in itself^the murder of an Archduke or the sinking of another Lusitania — would 
prove again to the flash point of war. This is the nightmare probability at stake in 
your vote on SALT II. 

Some will say that I am too gloomy about the way things are going. The Russians 
are not ten feet tall, we are frequently reminded. But for decades now the Soviet 



38 

Union has been keeping the living standard of its people low in order to support an 
arms buildup and a foreign policy geared to indefinite expansion. This has hardly 
been done in a fit of absent-mindedness. You have only to compare the map today 
with the map in 1945 or 1972 to realize what extraordinary gains the Soviet Union 
has made in its quest for geopolitical mastery. One after another, the old naval 
bases of the nineteenth century imperial system are being taken over by the Soviet 
Union. This process has to be faced and evaluated, not denied or ignored. 

Let me appeal directly to those among you who believe that the Soviet Union is a 
conservative, peaceful power, that the Cold War is over, and that active military 
and political efforts on our part are not needed to preserve the world balance of 
power and restore the vitality of the United Nations Charter. In Cromwell's famous 
words, "Consider that ye may be wrong." If our analysis is correct, isn't it better 
and more prudent to take precautions now than to be sorry later? If President 
Carter is wrong, we shall face, over and over again, the choice of surrender or war 
against bitter odds, alone and unprepared. 

President Carter's case for SALT II is the same mixture of incompatible themes, 
myths, and moods one finds in reviewing the history of the years before the Second 
World War. The finest study of Pearl Harbor, that of Roberta Wohlstetter, com- 
ments that in going over the record one is faced time and time again on the 
American side "by the paradox of pessimistic realism coupled with loose optimism 
in practice." If you read what President Carter has said on these problems, you can 
see exactly what Mrs. Wohlstetter meant. On several occasions, President Carter 
has described the Soviet arms buildup as offensive in character, and incompatible 
with any theory of defense. But he has also characterized the Soviet position as 
defensive in nature, based on exaggerated anxieties about the risks the Soviet 
Union faces. Clearly, both the President's policies and his actions are based on the 
second hypothesis, that of an essentially harmless, conservative, and defensive 
Soviet Union. How he reconciles this view with his daily diplomatic and intelligence 
reports is a mystery beyond my understanding. It is true that the President is prone 
to boast that our military power is greater than that of any other nation, despite 
the statistics, and what Secretary of Defense Brown says. We are left with the 
disquieting thought that President Carter's defense budgets and policies are based 
on jejime complacency and on the assumption that the Soviets have feet of clay. 

The coming decade will be as difficult and dangerous as any we have faced in the 
past. We have a very short time in which to protect our future through allied 
di ilomacy and deterrence rather than through war. A two-ocean Navy cannot be 
restored in a day or a year. Nor can the other programs we require to achieve 
effective deterrence at every level. It will be a ticklish time, calling for cool nerves 
and a firm grasp of the problem. The Soviet Union will not view an American 
awakening with equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions of 
relative superiority, and the presence in office of a President whom it perceives as 
weak. 

The time to begin is now. And the place to begin is here. Normally, we look to our 
President to take the lead in decisions of this order. It is now clear that President 
Carter is firmly committed to another view. 

What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance of power alone, but the future 
of liberty. Democracy cannot survive unless America plays its full part in assuring 
its future. 

The tide has been running against us now for nearly a decade. The leaders of the 
Soviet Union are pursuing a program of break-neck expansion, and treating our 
interests everywhere with open contempt. 

Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the Thirties were being swept 
away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the House of Commons to address the 
great issue of the looming War. Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in 
the political wilderness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began. 
"Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, "Speak and vote for 
America." 

Senator Biden. Our next witness is Adm. Thomas Moorer, co- 
chairman of the CoaUtion for Peace Through Strength. Admiral 
Moorer is accompanied by Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, cochairman of 
the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. 

Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Admiral, please proceed in 
any way that is most comfortable. 



39 

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS MOORER (RETIRED), COCHAIR- 
MAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH, WASH- 
INGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM 
(RETIRED), COCHAIRMAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH 
STRENGTH » 

Admiral Moorer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to 
have the opportunity to testify again before this committee on the 
SALT II Treaty. Today I am testifying as chairman of the executive 
committee of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. 

The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan alli- 
ance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and 
other pro defense leaders across America. The American Security 
Council, which I serve as a member of the board of directors, is the 
program secretariat for the coalition. 

The purpose of the coalition is to work for the adoption of a 
national strategy of peace through strength. The perception of 
weakness on our part in 1941 prompted the Japanese to attack 
Pearl Harbor. Mr. Chairman, at the end of World War II, I was a 
member of the strategic bombing survey sent to Japan to investi- 
gate the Japanese decisionmaking process that led to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, as well as other matters. 

Since I was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, I was 
charged with investigating this particular question. Why did the 
Japanese attack Pearl Harbor? I discussed this matter with the 
Prime Minister, with all the military leaders, the seniors in the 
Japanese Government, and all without exception said the same 
thing. They said that the Congress had refused to pass the draft 
initially, and then they passed it only by one vote. They had 
refused to fortify Wake and Guam Islands, and that the U.S. Army 
was in Louisiana training with wooden guns, all of which was a 
fact, and consequently they did not think that we had the military 
capability or the will or determination to oppose them. 

So, they decided to attack Pearl Harbor. 

My point is, if the relative balance as perceived by the potential 
enemy gets to a point where they think they can attack and 
succeed, then the country is in danger. 

Senator Biden. Do you think it has reached that point. Admiral? 

Admiral Moorer. I think we are just at that point, yes, sir. 

It is our belief that if the U.S. Senate consents to the SALT II 
Treaty, as now configured, it would make the adoption of such a 
strategy most unlikely. 

We did prepare a detailed study entitled "An Analysis of SALT 
II." Copies are available to you, and I urge every member of the 
committee to study the report. However, since this is a 78-page 
document and thus too long for me to cover in the time alloted 
today, I will ask permission at this time simply to read a 3-page 
joint statement signed by 1,678 general and flag officers from all of 
the armed services. A list of the names of these officers is being 
provided to the members of the committee. I have the list right 
here, sir. 

Senator Biden. Are they all retired, Admiral? 



' See page 60 for Admiral Moorer's prepared statement. 



40 

Admiral Moorer. Yes, they are all retired. As you know, active 
duty military leaders are not permitted to flatly oppose SALT II. 
This is why we at the Coalition for Peace Through Strength have 
sought out the views of retired military leaders who are now free 
to speak out. 

From my conversations with active and retired military leaders, 
I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as writ- 
ten. This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the 
retired officers contacted so far have declined to join in the state- 
ment because they support SALT II as written. Another 33 de- 
clined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or thought 
that the statement should be written differently. 

We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give 
each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers 
at that time. 

With your permission, sir, I will now read the letter that we 
have written to the chairman of this committee: 

Hon. Frank Church, 

Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 

Dear Senator Church: We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag 
officers of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose ratification of 
SALT II. 

We are in full agreement with most of our fellow Ar^ericans in preferring inter- 
national cooperation and equitable arms limitation agreements to hostility and 
competition. But we cannot agree that we can wish this congenial state of affairs 
into being by blinding ourselves Lo the stark realities of our strategic situation and 
our closely related conventional situation. In our view, SALT II as now written 
epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the facts. The facts which must be 
faced are these: 

Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclf ar field rooted in our faith in the 
SALT process has not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviets 
have pursued an unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive capabili- 
ty which, as^ Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is aimed at a war-winning 
capability. In this pursuit, the Soviets have stretched to the limit or broken when 
they felt it desirable solemn agreements such as weapons test restraints aimed at 
slowing down nuclear expansion. This leaves them now with a technical base that 
we cannot match. 

The concept of mutual assured destruction which has shaped U.S. policy since the 
1960's was never accepted by the Soviets and has been completely negated by their 
massive strategic defensive effort, including civil defense. The aggressiveness of 
Soviet behavior throughout the world has increased ominously as the military 
balance has tilted in favor of the U.S.S.R. This behavior is part of an overall grand 
design of which SALT negotiations are an integral part. 

Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Iran, and now combat troops and 
fighter pilots in our own back yard, Cuba, are examples of what I am talking about. 
Certainly I commend the chairman of this committee. Chairman Church, for taking 
a strong position in opposition to this action by the Soviets here on our side of the 
globe. U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with arms control 
agreements have been seriously eroded through compromise of satellite reconnais- 
sance systems and loss of key monitoring facilities. 

It seems to us, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, that there is little 
disagreement inside or outside government that these are the facts, yet the Senate 
has been asked to ratify a treaty which apparently ignores these facts. We are told 
by defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down the Soviet 
military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the process. 

The proponents insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the inequities of 
SALT I and SALT II, and in my view this ignores Soviet behavior since SALT I. The 
Soviets have become harder, not easier to deal with, and as they gain confidence 
from obvious superioiity, I predict they will become even harder. The proponents of 
SALT II insist that we will improve our security through ratification because the 
situations would be worse without SALT II. We find it hard to believe (hat the 
Soviets could significantly accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact 
that they are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on arms, 



41 

and we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be followed 
by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gap between U.S. and Soviet military 
capabilities. 

It is almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the 
United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of the Soviets 
and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of mutual assured destruction. 
This means further decline of our capability to declare war or to defend ourselves. 

We respectfully submit that the arms control process has become dominated by 
persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure of the twin policies of detente 
and disarmament. 

SALT II doesn't even limit arms. SALT II is only a set of rules for building arms 
and some of these rules are nonenforceable. The image of limitation is provided by 
alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the real destructive ele- 
ments of nuclear force — missiles and explosive power — where the Soviets have been 
allowed a heavy advantage. To make matters worse, the "equal" numbers are 
contrived by failing to count Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most 
advanced strategic bomber in the operational inventory of either side, or the SS-20. 

We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to finesse this issue 
by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is much more complex than SALT I 
and covers qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of nuclear armaments enor- 
mously more difficult to monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification 
satellite systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot ensure 
against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions. 

State Department documents describing SALT II now redefine verification. Where 
adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence that at- 
tempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now requires only that we 
can detect cheating on such a large scale that it alters the strategic balance in time 
to assure an appropriate U.S. response. 

This new definition completely finesses the problem of adequacy of our intelli- 
gence capability since it is totally dependent upon one's view of what constitutes a 
strategic balance and an appropriate response. For those who find the actual bal- 
ance of strategic capabilities irrelevant and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon 
submarine is an adequate deterrent, regardless of the size of the Soviet forces, SALT 
II can be considered adequately verifiable with no U.S. intelligence capability at all. 

We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the Soviets are building 
forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war with the United States and its 
allies, but we strongly disagree with his view that this aim can be thwarted by 
ratifying SALT II. Soviet participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties, 
is primarily designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. acquiescence and even 
cooperation in creating the necessary imbalance of power required by that goal. 

I should point out at this time, Mr. Chairman, that like you, I also have been 
traveling. I spent the last weekend in Brussels at the NATO meeting commemorat- 
ing the 30th anniversary of NATO. This meeting was attended by very influential 
legislative leaders in Europe as well as Senators Roth, Morgan, and Garn, and 
Representatives Zablocki, Beard, and others. I can say that you and I obviously do 
not talk to the same people, because the facts are that whereas the leaders in 
NATO have supported SALT II, there is considerable concern within the rank and 
file of the leadership of NATO, and I can tell you why. 

They see this imbalance that has developed with our strategic forces. No longer 
do they believe that the United States in case NATO is attacked by Russia will be 
willing to generate or initiate a major nuclear exchange between the United States 
and Russia because Europe was attacked by the Russians. 

Consequently, I think this makes the restraints of the protocol very important, 
because the NATO nations at this time should begin immediately acquiring a 
capability to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack on NATO by an attack from Europe 
on Russia. 

I talked to Lord Chalfonte, who is the publisher of the London 
Times, and in fact he mentioned this. He noted that Pravda had 
recently said words to the effect that the Americans have the 
rather forlorn idea that the protocol will cease in 1981, but they 
say it is not the case, it will be extended. This is the Russians 
talking in Pravda. 

I think that this point was discussed by you and by the previous 
witness here with respect to what happened with the SALT I 
interim agreement. It was extended. Now, I am not a lawyer and 



42 

cannot debate with you about what it means for Senate passage 
and resolution, but I am just saying that there are many people 
who fear that the protocol will be extended. 

Mr. Chairman, in sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the 
grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country to the 
continuation of disarmament policies and philosophy which, however promising 
when adopted, have imperiled the security of the United States and its allies and 
encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT process is not so sacro- 
sanct that we must accept a lopsided and unverifiable agreement simply to show 
progress. We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers, as all who 
oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some. 

As military professiuiials, and with all due resp)ect for our more circumscribed 
colleagues still bound by their active service, we strongly urge you to reject SALT II 
as currently written as being injurious to the security interests of the United States 
and its allies. 

That is signed by me with grave concern. 
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

CONCERN OF NATO ALLIES ON PROTOCOL EXTENSION AND 

NONCIRCUMVENTION 

I would like to proceed with two lines of questioning, one con- 
cerns the attitude of our NATO allies. I am not quite sure that we 
disagree. You say that our allies express grave concern, and then 
you point out what that concern is. The concern really relates to 
the extension of the protocol and the noncircumvention provision, 
doesn't it? 

Admiral Moorer. Yes. 

Senator Biden. Did anyone suggest to you that the central ele- 
ments of the treaty concerned them, and that the United States 
should not ratify the treaty? 

Admiral Moorer. They did that by inference, in the sense that 
they feel that the treaty as now constructed further enhances their 
insecurity. They have what I would call a crisis of confidence. 

Senator Biden. Sure. Doesn't that crisis of confidence relate to 
the theater nuclear force relationship between NATO and the 
Soviet Union and not to the central systems? You have already 
said to us that you believe it was amplified in what they said that 
they do not believe that the United States would engage its central 
systems? 

Admiral Moorer. So say them. 

Senator Biden. Yes. If that is the case, isn't really their concern 
the theater? 

Admiral Moorer. Of course, and I think that the protocol inhib- 
its, in my view, the development in the theater of the kind of 
capability that they have. 

Senator Biden. How did it do that. Admiral? How does it inhibit? 

Admiral Moorer. Well, as I see it, it restricts the range. 

Senator Biden. It restricts the deployment. 

Admiral Moorer. Yes. In other words, the protocol as I read it 
restricts the United States and has no impact on the Soviets. 

DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE AFTER DECEMBER 1981 

Senator Biden. Isn't it true that we can continue research and 
development, we can do all we are capable of doing short of deploy- 
ing, and we are not capable of deploying until December 1981 



43 

anyway. Isn't that true? I mean, even if we wanted to deploy the 
ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile tomorrow, we 
don't have that capability, do we, to deploy? 

Admiral Moorer. Well, I think it depends entirely on what we 
feel is urgent. As a matter of fact, when we built the Polaris 
submarines under a posture of urgency, we turned them out at one 
a minute. If this becomes an overriding objective, if you view what 
happened in World War II, certainly we can deploy the missiles 
before 1981. 

Senator Biden. I see, and is it your firm belief that a significant 
portion of our NATO allies wish us to reject the treaty? 

Admiral Moorer. I think they certainly wish it to be significant- 
ly modified. 

CHANGES NATO WANTS AMENDED OR CHANGED 

Senator Biden. Is there anjrthing beyond those two provisions 
that they believe has to be amended or changed? Do you hear 
anybody suggest that unless we include the Backfire bomber, we 
should reject the treaty? Have you heard anybody say that? 

Admiral Moorer. Yes. 

Senator Biden. You did? 

Admiral Moorer. Yes. They feel that the Backfire bomber and 
SS-20 should be part of the overall package and is not counted. 

Senator Biden. They think they should be counted as part of the 
central systems? 

Admiral Moorer. Yes; because this in effect, withdrawing them 
from the Soviet numbers, changes the relative balance between the 
weapons systems, the central system. 

Senator Biden. How does it do that? 

Admiral Moorer. It degrades the U.S. willingness as part of this 
crisis of confidence that you and I just mentioned. 

including backfire in central systems 

Senator Biden. I see. I thought their concern was that they be 
able to move forward with TNF modernization, introduce the long- 
range Pershing, have access to cruise technology, and deploy their 
ground-launched or sea-launched cruise, and that that was the only 
prospect that would have any impact in countering the Soviet 
theater systems, the theater systems being the Backfire bomber 
and the SS-20. 

Now, I am at a loss to understand the argument you have just 
put forward, that by including them in the central systems, we 
would in any way alleviate their concern. I don't understand that. 
They are still sitting there. They are still there directed toward the 
theater, not toward the United States. 

By the way, I spoke to military people in NATO, and they know 
what the Backfire bomber is for. Not a military man in Europe 
whom I have run across doesn't know what the Backfire bomber is 
intended for. 

It is not intended for intercontinental use. It is intended for 
them, and they know it, so they are very worried. How does includ- 
ing it in the central systems affect that at all? 



48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 



44 

Admiral Moorer. Well, Senator Biden, I don't know how much 
experience you have had in military planning, but when you begin 
to plan any kind of military strategy on the basis of predicting 
what the intentions of the other sides are, you are in deep trouble. 
You have to look at the capabilities of the other side and not the 
intentions. 

Senator Biden. Precisely. The capability of those aircraft and 
what they are designed for. I don't know of any military men in 
Europe who believe the primary capability and design purpose of 
these aircraft is for anything but the theater; do you? 

Admiral Moorer. Instead of the word "primary" I think it is 
probably true that they are primarily devoted to European targets, 
but they have an easy capability for reaching the United States, 
and we have no air defense worthy of the name, as you well know. 

Senator Biden. You know, we can do all kinds of things with any 
kind of weapon, but it seems to me that you have to look at the 
purpose, the primary purpose for which they are constructed. Obvi- 
ously, you can do anything with almost any weapon. I have not run 
across anybody in Europe, any military people who have any doubt 
about the Backfire bomber being a theater weapon. 

I see that the General is shaking his head no. General, do you 
know of any military men in Europe who say that is not the 
purpose? 

General Graham. I know a lot of military men in Europe who 
would say: "Good for you. United States," sarcastically. You don't 
count the Backfire bomber because you hope they are going to use 
them on us. I don't think that causes much confidence, and when 
you come around to say what it was built for, the Backfire bomber 
is the best bomber the Soviets have ever built for attack on the 
United States. We are counting 50- to 60-year-old prop jobs in the 
SALT Treaty, and the Soviets are going to have 400 of these new 
jobs, and we are not counting them because some believe, and 
apparently you believe, that they were not built for attack on the 
United States. 

I don't know how you possibly can come to that conclusion. 

PRIMARY purpose OF BACKFIRE BOMBER 

Senator Biden. General, let me ask you the question again, if I 
could. Are there military people in Europe that you know who 
believe that the primary purpose for which the Backfire bomber is 
being built is for use against the United States, or do they believe 
that the primary purpose of the bomber is for use in the theater? 

General Graham. Military men both on this side of the Atlantic 
and on the other side of the Atlantic look at weapons systems in 
terms, as the Admiral said, of their capability. They know that it is 
capable both of attacking peripherally and attacking the United 
States. Every bomber in anybody's inventory is better for attacking 
closer targets than farther targets. 

Senator Biden. Now you are begging the question, sir. Let me 
ask it in another way. What do the military men in Europe whom 
you know believe is the mission for which the Backfire is presently 
tasked? What do you think? 

General Graham. I don't know of anybody who says they know 
what the mission of the Backfire is on this side of the water or over 



45 

there. It is, of course, a bigger threat to anything to which it is 
closer, and that is Europe, Japan, and China. It is a lesser threat if 
it has a distance to go, but so are the Soviet bombers that we are 
counting in SALT, and this is a better bomber than any of them. 

Senator Biden. So the SS-18, because it has less distance to go to 
get to Bonn, is also more of a threat to Europe than here. 

General Graham. No, sir. There is a difference between aircraft 
and missiles. 

Senator Biden. Well, tell me the difference in terms of the ra- 
tionale that you just put forward. You said any target ^hat is closer 
is obviously more vulnerable. Isn't Bonn therefore more vulnerable 
to the SS-18 than we are? 

General Graham. Yes, sir; but you can get to Bonn without 
refueling the Backfire, and you have to refuel the Backfire to go to 
some farther distant target, so there is a great deal of difference 
how you look at a missile and how you look at an aircraft. 

Senator Biden. My time is up. Ihank you, gentlemen. 

Senator Javits? 

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, two questions occur to me, and I would like to ask 
them of you. I apologize for having to run over to the floor of the 
Senate while you were reading your statement, but I gather you 
read the letter of your organization into the record. Is that correct? 

Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir. It is in the record. 

SALT I effect on U.S. ARMAMENT BUILDUP 

Senator Javits. I notice you make the point which is probably 
summed up in these words: "The Soviets have become harder not 
easier to deal with after SALT I." Would you say that there was 
anything in the SALT I Treaty which prevented us from taking the 
same steps forward in armaments that the Soviets did during that 
time? 

Admiral Moorer. No, sir, Senator Javits, and as I have said 
many times, as you recall I am sure, when I as Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the content of the SALT I Interim 
Agreement on offensive systems, I had telephone calls between 
Washington and Moscow on this matter as they were coming down 
to the fine wire to sign the treaty. We came up with what we 
called conditions, if you will, or assurances that we felt were neces- 
sary in order to make SALT I viable. 

The administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De- 
fense, if you read the testimony, strongly supported the assurances 
that were requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is a mattter 
of record, but subsequent to that time, the B-1 bomber has been 
canceled, and many other of the actions with respect to the cruise 
missile, for instance — now, we have agreed to place a restraint on 
the cruise missile range for land-based and sea-based missiles, and 
overall the general thrust of what we have been talking about has 
been slowed down. 

I agree with you that we were not restricted from doing any of 
those things, but I believe you will agree that SALT I created a 
kinc! of euphoria in the Congress and in the eye of the public, and 
consequently people more or less kind of sat back in their chairs 



46 

and the progressive buildup of the Soviets continued while ours 
went down. 

DIFFERENCE IN TIME PERIODS FOLLOWING SALT I AND SALT II 

Senator Javits. I think that is a very fair statement, Admiral. 

Let me refer to another sentence in the letter which reads as 

follows: 

And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be 
followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gaps betwen U.S. and Soviet 
military capabilities. 

I ask you this question. Is there any difference between this 
period which will follow a SALT II ratification if we do ratify and 
the period which followed SALT I? In other words, will we still be 
in the same position where we could, if we wanted, build up to the 
Soviets or get way ahead of them? What is there in this treaty, in 
your judgment, aside from the euphoria which you feel will contin- 
ue, which will block us from taking the action we should have 
taken, assuming your argument after SALT I? What is there in 
this treaty that will prevent us from moving forward if we wish to 
with the same vigor and the same strength that you prescribed 
after SALT I? 

Admiral Moorer. You are really asking me two questions. First, 
what is different about the time today and the time back in 1972? I 
think there is a radical difference. I think that the rapid buildup 
by the Soviets in all phases of military equipment, missiles, and 
conventional forces, and so on, has put them in a far stronger 
position. That is the first point. I think in 1972 they would not 
have dared to put troops and fighter pilots in Cuba. I think they 
are just thumbing their nose at us. 

I think they know that they can move ahead and we are not 
going to do anything about it, so there is a major difference be- 
tween 1972 and 1979. 

Now, so far as the specific treaty is concerned, what can't we do? 
I have already mentioned what I think are the unnecessary re- 
straints imposed on the United States by the protocol which im- 
posed no restraints on the Soviets, and in my view will slow down a 
buildup of the NATO countries which is mandatory. 

Second, you have such things in the treaty as article IX, I believe 
it is that article, which restricts us from putting ballistic missiles 
on ships. Now, if we are a maritime power and the Soviets are a 
land power, why did we agree to accept a disadvantage which I do 
not think is necessary? The Soviets were the ones who suggested 
this. Obviously, they have IVz times the land area that we do. I 
think there is another aspect of this about which people do not talk 
very much, Senator Javits, but if you will look at a map, you will 
see that our ballistic missiles are west of the population centers of 
the United States, namely, the Chicago-Boston-Washington trian- 
gle, and if the Soviets would undertake a counterforce attack on 
our land-based missiles, the fallout would come right across the 
most densely populated area of our country. 

Conversely, the Soviet missiles are on the east side of Soviet 
Russia, and if we were to attack them, as we well know, the fallout 
would go over Japan and China. 



47 

So, I think that we should not just agree to remove an option 
which could possibly remove the target from the center of the 
United States. 

FEASIBILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ON SHIPS 

Senator Javits. Have ballistic missiles on ships ever been consid- 
ered by you as the Chief of Naval Operations as a feasible proposi- 
tion? 

Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, many times. This was at a time, of 
course, when we were beginning to get seriously concerned about 
the accelerated Soviet buildup that was taking place subsequent to 
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. This was looked on very seriously 
in the Pentagon as an alternative means of rapidly increasing our 
missile capability. 

Senator Javits. We will inquire into that. Admiral. So far as I 
know, it is the first time this has been raised. We will inquire into 
it. 

Admiral Moorer. But the treaty does prohibit this. 

Senator Javits. Yes, I see that. We will include article IX in the 
record at this point, and we will investigate it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Article IX — Special Prohibitions on Weapon Systems 

This Article prohibits or restricts certain types of weapon systems. 

Subparagraph 1(a) prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic 
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on water- 
borne vehicle other than submarines, and of launchers of such missiles. This provi- 
sion prohibits the development of a long-range ballistic missile system for surface 
ships. The United States has no plans for such a system. An Associated Common 
Understanding declares that this prohibition does not affect current practices for 
transporting ballistic missiles, such as would be used in supplying missiles to 
operating bases. 

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article IX prohibits the development, testing, 
and deployment of fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the 
seabed or on the beds of internal waters, or mobile launchers of such missiles which 
move only in contact with the beds of such waters, as well as missiles for such 
launchers. The effect of this provision is: (a) to extend the prohibitions of the Seabed 
Arms Control Treaty ' to the entire territorial waters and internal waters of the 
Parties; and (b) to extend its obligations to include development and testing in 
addition to deployment. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty essentially prohibits Par- 
ties from emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as well 
as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for 
storing, testing or using such weapons, on the seabed and the ocean floor (or its 
subsoil) beyond a 12-mile coEistal "seabed zone" measured from the baseline of the 
territorial sea. An associated Agreed Statement makes clear that the obligation 
contained in this subparagraph applies, inter alia, to all areas covered by the 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty. 

The prohibition on mobile launchers which can move only in contact with the 
seabed does not include launchers on submarines, as submarines need not be in 
contact with the seabed in order to move. 

Subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX prohibits the development, testing and deploy- 
ment of systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of 
weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. This subpara- 
graph expands the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty,^ in that the Outer Space 



' The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons 
of Mass Destruction • the Seabed and the Ocean Floor a. id in the Subsoil Thereof, signed at 
Washington, London ani. Moscow Feb. 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS 7337. The United States and 
Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty. 

^ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London and 
Moscow Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347. The United States and Soviet Union are both 
Parties to this Treaty. 



48 

Treaty prohibits only the actual placement in space of weapons of mass destruction, 
and does not cover fractional orbital missiles. 

An associated Common Understanding states that the prohibition on fractional 
orbital missiles does not require dismantling or destruction of existing launchers of 
either Party. However, under the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 2 of 
Article VII the Soviets have agreed to dismantle or destroy twelve SS-9 launchers 
at the Tyura-Tam test range which have been used to test a fractional orbital 
bombardment system (FOBS) several times in the past. Moreover, any fractional 
orbit missiles in existence must be dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the obliga- 
tion of paragraph 4 of Article XI, and such missiles cannot be developed in the 
future. 

Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 prohibits the development, testing, and deploy- 
ment of mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs. This obligation complements what is in 
effect a ban on additional fixed launchers of modern heavy ICBMs contained in 
Article IV. Heavy ICBMs are defined in paragraph 7 of Article II. 

Subparagraphs (e) and (f) prohibit heavy SLBMs and their launchers and heavy 
ASBMs. These subparagraphs in effect define heavy SLBMs and heavy ASBMs in 
language parallel to that for the definition of heavy ICBMs in paragraph 7 of 
Article II. A heavy SLBM or ASBM is one with a launch-weight or throw-weight 
heavier than that of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM. The First and Second Agreed State- 
ments defining launch-weight and throw-weight and the Common Understanding 
concerning "other appropriate devices" for SLBMs and ASBMs also parallel those 
under paragraph 7 of Article II. The mutual understanding of the Parties on the 
terminology related to the definition of throw-weight set forth in the plenary 
statements by both Parties on October 29, 1976 (stated above), applies here as well. 

The second paragraph of this Article prohibits the flight-testmg and deployment 
on heavy bombers of long-range cruise missiles equipped with multiple independent- 
ly targetable warheads. An Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 defines "independent- 
ly targetable" warheads of cruise missiles. This definition is similar to that of 
MIRVs, which are defined under paragraph 5 of Article II. This definition does not 
include cruise missiles equipped with "cluster warheads"; nor does it include a 
recoverable, single-warhead cruise missile which can attack independent targets on 
separate flights. 

Admiral Moorer. I am just saying that we should not voluntar- 
ily accept the restraint that the Soviets are not going to use 

an3rway. * i • i 

Senator Javits. Well, I know, but it takes two to tango. Admiral. 

We are not going to have everything our way, if we have a treaty. 

If we are not going to have a treaty, we and they will each go our 

own way. That was my argument with Professor Rostow, and that, 

of course, is another very different matter. 
Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, but I think you can carry that only so 

far, or you will wind up as the low man on the totem pole. 

EFFECT ON NO ARMAMENTS PROGRAM OF SALT IS DEFEATED 

Senator Javits. But that depends on the will of the United 
States. That is what I am trying to get from you. I am asking you 
this question. Suppose we do not enter into this treaty and we are 
still in a state of euphoria. Are we then worse off or better off. In 
other words, we remain in the same state of euphoria then, but do 
not make the treaty. You gentlemen will have been successful in 
defeating the treaty, but if you are not successful in an armament 
program, then what? 

Admiral Moorer. Well, in the first place, I think I emphasize 
two or three times that we are not opposed to arms limitations. I 
have never known a military man who was. Second, what we are 
opposing is the contents of this particular document. We are not 
opposing disarmament. . 

Senator Javits. If I may have just 2 more minutes. Admiral, let 
me say that we are now in a very particular situation. You have no 



49 

guarantee whatever, believe me, that if we reject this treaty the 
Congress is going to vote all the things you want or that you think 
we ought to have. I should not say "things you want;" you are not 
capricious. You are one of our military leaders. 

Admiral Moorer. I am a retired man. 

Senator Javits. That is all right, but I have known you for years, 
and I still honor you. I would not take away one whit from you. 
You cannot assure us of that at all. If we reject the treaty and are 
still euphoric, aren't we then much worse off? 

Admiral Moorer. Senator Javits, I think that the treaty can be 
put in such a form that it would be a far more balanced and 
equitable treaty, and we have discussed some of the points here. 

Senator Javits. Well, Admiral, then you are superimposing your 
judgment on that of the President, the negotiators, and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and saying that we can negotiate a better deal if we 
turn this down. Now, that is a big question, a very big one. You 
can't guarantee that. 

Admiral Moorer. Of course not, but I feel it would be better to 
try than to accept this treaty verbatim as written. 

Senator Javits. By turning it down, whatever may be the conse- 
quences? 

Admiral Moorer. I think it should be negotiated further. 

Senator Javits. I know, but that is turning it down. Sir, great 
nations cannot bluff. The Senate is going to vote on this treaty, and 
it is going to turn it down if you win. Then where does that leave 
us? In my opinion, it threatens to leave us with the same euphoria, 
with no treaty, with an exacerbated situation in the world, and 
with far more scared European powers than they are today. 

Admiral Moorer. Sir, I think you also have to ask the question 
of where does it leave us if we sign it. That is what concerns me. 
You can say that it is a matter of opinion, but I think the facts 
speak for themselves. I think the Soviets have reached a point now 
that they really do not care what we think. Otherwise, thej' 
wouldn't be down in Cuba today. 

Senator Javits. Well, we will see about Cuba, sir. You are too 
much of a professional to jump at first assumptions. I do not know 
what Cuba amounts to, but believe me, we will dig into it carefully. 
There is indirect linkage for me between Cuba and SALT, and I 
believe there is for everybody else. There is no use in kidding 
ourselves about that. However, we are not at the bottom of that 
story yet. 

AGREEMENT TO SALT I TIED TO ADMINISTRATION PRESSURE 

You say at the end of your letter. Admiral: "As military profes- 
sionals, and with all due respect for our more circumscribed col- 
leagues still bound by their active service." Admiral, did you agree 
to SALT I because the administration wanted you to or because 
you were convinced it was the right thing to do? In other words, 
are you attributing a standard to the present Joint Chiefs of Staff 
which is lower than yours? 

Admiral Moorer. No, sir, certainly not, but I can tell you this. 
Based on years and years of experience in our system of govern- 
ment, we are the only nation to my knowledge that requires a man 
in uniform to testify before the legislative branch of the Govern- 



50 

ment. I do know from my experience that it makes no difference, 
and I am not getting political on this at all, it makes no difference 
whether it is a Republican or a Democratic administration. There 
are pressures brought to bear on the military people which I think 
are probably proper in an executive pyramid, but they do not have 
an opportunity to speak as I am speaking to you today. 

This is an absolute fact in our system. Now, I do not oppose that. 
I think in an executive branch, whether it is in the executive 
branch of the U.S. Government or in the structure of General 
Motors, that the chairman of the board, or the President, or who- 
ever happens to be the chief executive officer, in all honesty and 
fairness should ask his assistants, his vice presidents, or his joint 
chiefs of staff what they think about this issue. 

Then, he might say, I hear you but I am going to do it another 
way. I have done that many times myself with my own staff. I am 
sure you have, too. Senator Javits, but once the chief executive 
makes the decision, then the staff is obligated to do everything it 
can to support that decision. These people have two options, to 
either support or to resign. That is the way the system works. I do 
not think it should be changed or that it can be changed. 

RELIABILITY OF JCS TESTIMONY 

Senator Javits. Admiral, you would have us believe, and perhaps 
this is the most portentious part of your testimony, that in order to 
get the truth out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have to wait until 
they retire, and they are then no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

Admiral Moorer. No; I did not say that at all, and I hope you 
are not suggesting that I am accusing the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 

lying. 

Senator Javits. No; I did not mean to do that at all. You are 
absolutely right to object, and I apologize, but in order to get what 
they really think, you tell us we will have to wait until they resign 
and they are no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff; therefore we cannot 
rely upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is probably the most 
serious thing that has been evidenced in this whole hearing. 

Senator Biden. Or the political leadership you pointed out of the 

Western World. n c^ rr i. 

Senator Javits. Let's talk about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
professionals, and you were one of them. Did you want us to rely 
on you when you were Chairman? 

Admiral Moorer. Certainly. 

Senator Javits. You did? Well, why do you not want us to rely 
on the present Joint Chiefs? 

Admiral Moorer. I did not say that. I said you must take the 
lead of the Chief Executive, and all the people who work for him 
are required to support him. That is what I said. That is what they 

all do. . u . T 

Senator Javits. Well, sir, this is where you are an expert, but 1 
must say in my opinion you leave our country in an extremely 
exposed and vulnerable position to tell us that we can't really 
know what they think. They will somehow rationalize or conform 
to the Chief Executive when they are the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You 
have to face that. Admiral. There is no way of ducking it. That is 
what you are telling us, in my opinion. 



51 

Admiral Moorer. Senator Javits, let me say that the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff sent several memoranda to the Secretary of Defense 
on SALT II and they expressed essentially the same concerns that I 
have expressed today. As a matter of fact, I think some members of 
this committee remarked at the time the Joint Chiefs were sitting 
right here that what you are doing is damning the treaty with 
fai!.t praise. If you are fair about it, if you read what they said, I 
don't think that they just can't wait until this treaty is signed. 

Senator Javits. Sir, I am sorry. They are men of authority and 
decision. I am not a professional, but I have served, too. I know 
that military people know how to decide and how to give an order, 
whatever may be their reservations, and they have stated them. 
They have been given an order. They have said, we are for this, so 
ratify it. I will say that you worry me very much about many, 
many things, and not just this particular treaty, but major deci- 
sions which involve the very existence of our country, 

QUESTION OF VERIFICATION 

Senator Biden. Let me follow on that one point. You mentioned 
the question of verification, General, and Admiral. I sit on the 
Intelligence Committee. I have for a year now heard the testimony 
of the very men who are the experts both in the military and 
outside of the military. I have heard Admiral Inman, who is an 
incredibly qualified fellow. I have heard the heads of our intelli- 
gence community come before us and say that we can verify this 
treaty. I have only one source for classified information. I cannot 
even go to you any longer. You don't have the access. 

The very eminent retired generals and admirals whom you have 
listed do not have the access to up-to-date information which the 
people who are now charged by our Government with our security 
have. They have said to us that this treaty is verifiable. Barry 
Goldwater says this treaty is verifiable, after listening to them. We 
all must rely at some point on experts. We are not talking about 
political questions in terms of verification. We are asking them, 
can you see X, Y, and Z, and the experts say, yes, we can. You are 
telling us in your statement, and all of these retired people appar- 
ently agree, that it is not verifiable. You go on to tell us that the 
rank and file of the military in Europe have much deeper reserva- 
tions about the treaty than the present military leadership. You go 
on to say that the political leadership is strongly for SALT, but 
underneath there is really no support. 

It seems to me that you have made the most damning indictment 
of political and military leadership and expertise not only in this 
country but in the entire alliance that I have ever heard. You are 
right that I don't have the experience with strategic planning that 
you do. I am a 36-year-old U.S. Senator, not a retired Admiral with 
a very distinguished career. But because of what I am, I look to the 
people who supposedly know, the leadership in the military, the 
leadership in the intelligence community, the leadership in the 
alliance, and uniformly they tell me, with reservations that have 
been expressed, that we should ratify this treaty. And you are 
sajdng to us that retired people know better, that we should listen 
to them, and you, and not to this leadership. And you imply that 
they are really not telling us what they think. 



52 

If that is true, you don't leave us much to rely on, not just in this 
treaty, but in anything relating to our military establishment. 

Admiral Moorer. Senator Biden, I don't wish to leave it in those 
terms. It is true, as I said before, that we do have a different 
system which was established by the Congress in the Defense Reor- 
ganization Act of 1958 as well as the National Security Act of 1927, 
I believe. You might want to take a look at that. But when you get 
to technical matters, in terms of the capability of the intelligence 
system or the capability of our own equipment, of course, you get 
the greatest detail in this, but when you get into a flat question of, 
do you approve of the Vietnam conflict, which I did not, and I said 
so many times, nevertheless, we also talk all the time about civil- 
ian control. I'll bet I have heard that term a thousand times, the 
term "civilian control." We do have civilian control in this country. 
I have never known a military man who does not support the 
Constitution, but I think there are pressures put on military people 
to go along with the administration's policy, and that is just a fact. 

I think if you were President, you would do the same thing. 

Senator Biden. Sure, there is pressure, and I would attempt to do 
the same thing if I believed it were right, but honorable military 
men are faced with the same choice that honorable men in politics 
are, and that is that they can't go along with it if they really 
believe the security of the country is being jeopardized. Then they 
would have an obligation to resign. That is a real obligation, not a 
fictitious one. 

You are implying that this treaty truly jeopardizes the security 
of the United States, and that the military men who are telling us 
otherwise know that. Now, it seems to me for them to continue in 
office if they believe that means they would be dishonorable men, 
regardless of the pressure. If I in fact totally disagree with a 
position my party takes, my State takes, or my constituency takes, 
i don't have an obligation to go along. I have an obligation to 
follow my conscience, and I should resign if I can't go along with it. 

These men, you are saying to us, know that this treaty jeopar- 
dizes the security of the United States of America but because of 
political pressure they are not coming forward. 

Admiral Moorer. No, sir; I didn't say that. I said that what they 
told you, I am sure, was their opinion, but I think that this treaty, 
as I say in my statement, is ill-advised in its present form. I am not 
like you in the sense that I do not have access to the intelligence 
reports that you have. General Graham was director of the intelli- 
gence agency, and so far as the verification capabilities are con- 
cerned, he is an expert. 

Senator Biden. I know that. I am not suggesting that General 
Graham cannot disagree with Admiral Inman. 

General Graham. I don't think I do, as a matter of fact. One of 
the problems I think for a Senator getting briefed on verification 
is, you may not know what questions to ask because you don't 
know enough about it. Have you questioned this part of the treaty 
that says the Soviets will not produce an SS-16 missile, will not 
produce the third stage of it, will not produce the warhead? I don't 
know of an honest intelligence man, Bobby Inman included, who 
will say, yes, I can verify that they are not producing the warhead 
for an SS-16. He knows they can't do that. 



53 

I'll bet you if you ask him bluntly, can you tell me, Bobby, can 
you verify whether or not the Soviets are producing a warhead for 
an SS-16, he will tell you he doesn't know. I will bet you Admiral 
Turner, who knows a lot less about it than Bobby does because he 
hasn't been in it as much, will also tell you no, and General Tighe 
will tell you know if you ask the right question. 

Senator Biden. You are a very interesting fellow. General, to 
imply that after a Senator spends a full year, involving several 
hundred hours of reading and briefings, that he is not able even to 
ask the right questions. You guys make such an incredible indict- 
ment of the system that I just find it absolutely difficult to believe 
you are saying it. 

Senator Stone. Don't go away mad, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Biden. Oh, no, I won't do that. 

INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA 

Senator Stone. Admiral Moorer, on July 17, you and Admiral 
Zumwalt testified before this committee and for the first time the 
issue of Soviet military buildups was raised by me in questioning 
you. I asked you was it not the case that Soviet Golf II submarines 
carry nuclear misssiles, and that if servicing such a submarine 
took place in Cuba, it would be a violation, and you said it would ' I 
asked you both this question: I would like to ask either or both of 
you whether you think a direct or indirect effort to establish a 
military base would be established by the introduction of a large 
number of combat troops of the Soviet Union into Cuba. 

Admiral Zumwalt said there is no question in his mind. You, 
Admiral Moorer, said absolutely, yes, sir. I then asked, would you 
say that if other than advisers, the Soviet Union attempted to 
introduce as much as a brigade of combat troops into Cuba, that 
that would constitute a direct or indirect effort to establish a base. 

Well, since that time, within a day, the administration witnesses 
denied that the Golf II submarine does or did carry nuclear mis- 
siles, but within a week admitted it, and it is in the record. Within 
3 or 4 weeks after that, they have now conceded and now they 
assert that there is a Soviet brigade of combat troops in Cuba. 

My final question to you was this: "I have already inquired about 
the Soviet submarine visits. I have already inquired about the Mig- 
23 and Mig-25 presence in Cuba. If in addition to that there were a 
major introduction of Soviet combat troops into Cuba, could there 
be any further doubt that we just do not care about protecting our 
hemisphere against Soviet military bases in this hemisphere?" 

At that time you said, Admiral Moorer: "None whatsoever, none 
whatever, and I think it would be the height of folly for the United 
Stated to permit that to happen, sir." 

It has now happened. What is your suggestion to our policy- 
makers at this juncture? And I would like the opinion of you. 
Admiral Moorer, and also General Graham, of you. 

Adi.Jral Moorer. In my opinion this is directly linked, as I 
pointed out, this action by the Soviets — as a matter of fact, I 
predicted this was going to happen when I testified on the Panama 
Canal issue. I stated that there was a Torrijos-Moscow-Castro axis, 

■ See the SALT II Treaty hearings, part 2, pp. 178-180. 



54 

and that the Senate should not be surprised if we did not find an 
expansion of Soviet activity in Cuba in very short order. 

I was sitting right here in this very room, I believe. 

In the first place, I believe this is part of the overall effort of the 
Soviets to gain major influence worldwide. I think there is no way 
that you can unlink this from the SALT discussion. As I said this 
morning, I think it is all part of an overall grand design on their 
part. 

In the first place, I think the SALT discussions should be halted 
until the Soviets reconcile this point. If they refuse to do that, then 
I think there are several courses of action open to us. Of course, I 
am not in a position to decide on these. 

Certainly I think we should make it crystal clear to the Soviets 
and to the world at large that we are not going to tolerate this 
gradual creeping injection of Soviet forces all around the world. I 
mentioned Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Yemen, and other areas. 
Obviously, we will give the perception to the world at large that we 
are engaged in a massive program of worldwide retrenchment. 

Senator Stone. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Graham? 

General Graham. When I heard about the brigades. Senator 
Stone, the chill that went through me was related to the fact that I 
was one of the key analysts at the time of the 1962 missile crisis, 
which is the last time that the Soviets had a brigade in Cuba. 

We were thinking about deploying our troops. As a matter of 
fact, we did deploy our troops down in Florida to go in. The 
question put to the intelligence people was, what are those Soviet 
troops going to do? Why are they there? Some of the theses were, 
well, maybe they put them there to try to deter us from attacking 
Cuba, but we said one brigade will not deter us from moving 
against Cuba. 

Then maybe they are there to help make sure Castro stays in 
power as sort of a palace guard. That was rejected. The final 
analysis from all knowledgeable Sovietologists is that they were 
there to guard nuclear weapons because the Soviets have never 
allowed nuclear weapons to get in the hands of even their most 
trusted satellites. This is a consideration that should be taken very 
much to heart by the Senate of the United States, because it does 
have to do with strategy. This business about saying, well, don't 
worry about them, they are not going to invade Florida, no, they 
are not going to invade Florida, but the last time a group like that 
was there, the Government of the United States decided, and the 
intelligence organs of the United States decided they were there to 
guard nuclear weapons. 

INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT INTO CUBA 

As you brought out, and much to your credit. Senator, you did 
raise your voice when the Soviets introduced new nuclear capable 
aircraft into Cuba that were better nuclear delivery systems than 
the ones that Jack Kennedy said they had to take out at the time 
they took out their missiles. They had some old IL-28's in there, 
much poorer aircraft than what they put in there now that are 
nuclear capable, and then there was a chat about, well, this is not 
the right model, and we don't know whether they are wired and so 



55 

forth, but I will tell you, every one of those aircraft that is de- 
ployed opposite NATO is counted by the NATO people as a nuclear 
threat to NATO. 

Senator Stone. Are you speaking of the Mig-23's? 

General Graham. Yes, the Mig-23's, the floggers. So, this is an 
extremely serious business, and it should not be handled simply 
through an expression of concern. I believe something must be 
done about checking what may be just the tip of the iceberg. This 
is what we see now in Cuba. What else is in Cuba? Once again, we 
are getting the kind of reports that one of your colleagues. Senator 
Keating, was getting before the Cuban missile crisis. They said, 
watch out, something very sinister is going on down there in Cuba. 
We could say, well, this is just Cuban exiles having their say again, 
but now we had better pay some attention to them, as we did not 
pay attention to them in those days until we took pictures and 
found out what was going on. 

There is one other aspect of this, and here I agree with Henry 
Kissinger, and sometimes Henry Kissinger and I have not agreed 
on things. Dr. Kissinger always insisted that we continue to fly 
reconnaissance flights over Cuba while some of my colleagues even 
in the Pentagon said that for cost purposes we are getting enough 
pictures with satellites, so why send aircraft? He said, t^e day you 
stop sending the aircraft over Cuba, you are going to py:2 a signal 
to the Soviet Union that it is now open season for Hem to do 
anything they want in Cuba. 

When this administration came into power, I regret to say those 
reconnaissance flights were stopped. I think that makes Henry 
Kisssinger something of a prophet on this particular occasion. 

Senator Stone. Mr. Chairman, may I have an additional 2 or 3 
minutes? 

Senator Biden. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Moorer. Senator Stone, please permit me to make an 
additional comment. I have been extremely concerned about the 
Soviet pilots in Cuba because I feel that in the short term they are 
more destabilizing than the troops were, because should they inter- 
cept an American plane in the vicinity of Cuba, a situation would 
be generated which can bring about a confrontation. For them to 
have their pilots in Cuba, I think, is another matter that should be 
taken up with the Soviets by the strongest means available. 

Senator Stone. Thank you. Admiral. 

General, I have another question on this point. How recently did 
you retire as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency? In what 
year was that? 

General Graham. It was January 1, 1976. 

SECRETARY VANCE's ASSERTION — BRIGADE IN CUBA SINCE 1975 

Senator Stone. 1976. As of that time, could you comment on the 
Secretary of State's assertion of yesterday that the brigade prob- 
ably was there in 1975 or even earlier? 

General Graham. If that is so, then there was absolutely no 
evidence of that when I was Chief of Military Intelligence. 

Senator Stone. And you were conducting the aerial reconnais- 
sance then? 



56 

General Graham. That's right. In those days we were looking a 
lot better than we have been in the last V-k years. 

Senator Stone. Well, in the last V-k weeks we did conduct the 
appropriate reconnaissance, the administration says. That is what 
a lot of them do, piece the jigsaw puzzle together. What you are 
saying is that that same or equivalent surveillance, up until Janu- 
ary 1, 1976, had not produced that kind of evidence or anything 
like that kind of evidence? 

General Graham. That is correct. The most that we could find in 
those days of evidence of Soviet presence was that they had con- 
structed some facilities for Soviet sailors coming into Cienfuegos. 
We could see the recreation facilities and some barracks there. 
They put up some kind of sports fields that— I forget which it 
was — Cubans don't play, so we know it was Soviets. 

Senator Stone. Gentlemen, I am saying, as I have said repeated- 
ly in the last weeks, that what you saw then in Cienfuegos as a few 
recreational facilities is considerably, substantially, and in a major 
way more than what is seen now in Cienfuegos. Isn't that a fair 
comment, from what you know? 

General Graham. Yes, sir, that is right. I was amazed to see in 
the newspapers where somebody said, well, those troops have been 
there for 5 or 6 years. If they were, we sure missed them, and we 
were covering Cuba very well. I believe that these troops are part 
of the pattern that you have begun to see with Mig-23 aircraft 
arrriving, with the Soviet pilots in their flying combat missions in 
allegedly Cuban forces, and now this brigade. We are only seeing 
that which is hard to hide, and we had better take this extremely 
seriously. 

Senator Stone. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Admiral, I particularly want to thank you for assisting with the 
disclosure and discovery of what General Graham calls the tip of 
the iceberg, but which had to come out, and which is now out. 

General Graham, I thank you for clarifying this question of 
when this test substantially began. Thank you. 

Senator Biden. Thank you. Senator Stone. 

Senator Hayakawa? 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

soviet successful first strike possible by 1982-83 

There seems to be general agreement that regardless of whether 
or not we ratify SALT II, by about 1982 or 1983, the Soviets will be 
able to make a successful first strike. 

General Graham. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Moorer. Yes. 

Senator Hayakawa. Now, the M-X will not be fully deployed 
before 1988. Is that right? 

General Graham. I believe it is 1986, sir. If everything stays on 
track, you will get some of them in 1986. 



57 

WHAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DO TO COUNTER SOVIET STRATEGIC 

SUPERIORITY 

Senator Hayakawa. What could or should the United States do 
now, promptly, in order to counter the danger of Soviet strategic 
superiority by 1982 or 1983? 

What are the things we should be doing? 

Admiral Moorer. Well, Senator Hayakawa, I have always felt 
that you cannot uncouple the conventional capabilities from the 
strategic capabilities, so in my view, in answer to your question, we 
should start now to redress this imbalance in both the conventional 
and the strategic areas. Now, some people will say that we can't do 
an5^hing about that until the treatj' expires, so what is the use? 
However, firm action that is clearly perceived by the world at large 
that this is what we are doing in itself would have, in my view, a 
deterrent effect. Had we done this a year ago, I don't think the 
Soviets would have put troops in Cuba or built them up as they 
have. 

separation of strategic AND CONVENTIONAL PREPARATION 

Senator Hayakawa. Admiral, possibly to ask another question, 
you say that strategic preparations and conventional ones cannot 
be separated from each other. Is that so? 

Admiral Moorer. That's right. 

Senator Hayakawa. Are we not being asked in considering the 
SALT 11 Treaty to consider the strategic elements only and to 
ignore ever3d;hing else that is going on in conventional weaponry 
and conventional warfare? 

Admiral Moorer. That is correct. I have felt from the outset and 
have said that SALT 11 should be a national security debate and 
not just a SALT debate. SALT should be merely a part of the 
debate. 

General Graham. May I add to that, Senator? 

Senator Hayakawa. Please do. 

NEED TO ERADICATE CLASH OF STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHY 

General Graham. The fundamental problem is to get rid of this 
crazy notion that we have been pursuing for 15 years called mutual 
assured destruction [MAD]. You in the Senate, in your hearings, 
have produced some evidence of a profound clash of doctrine in the 
Pentagon. On July 9, Secretary of Defense Brown said that mutual 
assured destruction was the bedrock of our strategic doctrines. On 
July 16, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked, 
what do you think of mutual assured destruction, he said, it is an 
extremely dangerous idea, and we in the military, no matter how 
much our civilian masters think that is a good idea, have not 
followed it. 

So, until that clash of philosophy or clash of strategy is removed, 
it seems to me that we are not going to make the kind of military 
moves that we must in order to defend this country. There are 
things that are never mentioned. Why don't we go ahead and 
defend the American people? Under the MAD concept, we have 
gotten rid of all our defense. We have encouraged the Soviets to 



58 

come up with a Backfire bomber by getting rid of all of our de- 
fenses against bombers. 

Civil defense is not a long leadtime item, and that in itself would 
help greatly to rectify the gross imbalance in power, but if we only 
stare at that little piece of the military problem which is called 
intercontinental delivery, nuclear systems, and then insist on ex- 
cluding some of them because they get in the way of making an 
agreement, we aren't even looking at the U.S. military problem. 
We are not even looking at our strategic problem. We are certainly 
not looking at the total complex of economic, political and military 
matters that should be a national strategy. 

Instead, we are picking this tiny thing and arguing about cruise 
missiles, accuracies, and so forth. While we stare at that little piece 
of the picture, we find the whole Western position crumbling away 
at an ever increasing rate. 

DEGREE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA NEEDED TO DISCARD LINKAGE THEORY 

Senator Hayakawa. General, I am grateful to you for confirming 
my worst suspicions. The insistence on the part of both the Soviets 
and our own administration that we consider the SALT agreement 
in isolation with no linkage between that and Soviet adventurism 
in Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and so on, we are not supposed to 
think about at all, they say, but that seems to require of us a 
degree of schizophrenia of which I am not quite capable. 

General Graham. I think there is a gross illogic in that position, 
too. I am on the road all the time with the administration SALT 
sellers to try to offset them. When they talk to the people, they 
say, look, there is no linkage between Soviet past and present 
behavior and SALT. SALT is in an area all by itself. Then the next 
speaker gets up and says, we have to have SALT because the 
Soviets will behave better with it and worse without it, so in the 
future there is linkage, but in the present and past there is no 
linkage. These people have no logic to their positions whatsoever. 

SUSPENSION OF SALT DISCUSSIONS UNTIL CUBAN PROBLEM IS 

RESOLVED 

Senator Hayakawa. General, didn't I understand you to say that 
our response to the presence of that Cuban brigade should be to 
suspend the discussion of the ratification of SALT II? 

Admiral Mooorer. That is what I said. In my opinion, we should 
suspend it until this issue is settled. If this is a manifestation of 
what the Soviets are planning overall in conjunction with the 
revolutionaries in Cuba, this is only the beginning. We have seen 
Nicaragua go down the drain, and I think certainly effort is now 
going to be focused on all of Latin America and South America too, 
here, right in our own backyard, where the Panama Canal is one of 
the maritime gateways of the world, it connects the U.S. Western 
States with the east coast, but the whole objective, in my view, of 
the Soviets from the outset has been to control the approaches to 
that Panama Canal for the same reason they are working on the 
Suez Canal. Now that they have gone into Cam Ranh Bay, which is 
the best naval base in all of the Pacific they have the Malacca 
Straits in Singapore staring down their throat. 



59 

So, they are working hard all the time to control maritime traffic 
from one ocean of the world to the other. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much, Admiral. I think you 
will be happy to learn that at a press conference in response to 
press inquiries yesterday as to what I thought ought to be done 
about the presence of Cuban troops, I said we should call off the 
SALT negotiations altogether. 

Admiral Moorer. Senator, I think you are absolutely right. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you. 

Senator Stone [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Hayakawa. 

Admiral, General, thank you very much. 

[Admiral Moorer's and General Graham's prepared statements 
follow:] 



48-260 0-79 Pt . U - 5 



60 
Prepared Statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Retired 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

I am honored to have the opportunity to testify again before 
this Committee on the SALT II treaty. 

Today, I am testifying as Chairman of the Executive Committee of 
the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. 

The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan 
alliance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and 
other pro-defense leaders across America. The American Security 
Council, which I serve as a member of the Board of Directors, is the 
program secretariat for the Coalition. 

The purpose of the Coalition is to work for the adoption of a 
national strategy of Peace Through Strength. 

It is our belief that if the United States Senate consents to 
the SALT II Treaty, it would make the adoption of such a strategy 
most unlikely. 

We did prepare a detailed study called AN ANALYSIS OF SALT II. 
However, this is a 78-page document and thus too long for me to 
cover in the time allotted to us today. 

Instead, I ask permission to read a three-page joint statement 
signed by 1678 retired general and flag officers from all the armed 
services. 

As you know, active duty military leaders are not permitted to 
flatly oppose SALT II. This is why we at the Coalition for Peace 
Through Strength have sought out the views of retired military 
leaders who are now free to speak out. 

From my conversations with active and retired military leaders, 
I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as written. 
This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the retired 
officers contacted so far have declined to join in the statement 
because they support SALT II as written. Another thirty-three 
declined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or 
thought that the statement should be written differently. 

We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give 
each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers 
at that time. 



61 



COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH 

Program Secretariat: American Security Council 
Educational Secretariat: American Security Council Education Foundation 



September 6, 1979 



The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman 

U.S. Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

Dear Senator Church: 

We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag officers 
of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose 
ratification of SALT II. 

We are in agreement with most of our fellow Americans in pre- 
ferring international cooperation and equitable arms-limitation agree- 
ments to hostility and competition. But we cannot agree that we can 
wish this congenial state of affairs into being by blinding ourselves 
to the stark realities of our strategic situation. In our view, SALT 
II as now written epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the 
facts. The facts which must be faced are these: 

Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclear field 
rooted in our faith in the SALT process has not been recipro- 
cated by the Soviet Union; rather, the Soviets have pursued an 
unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive 
capability which, as Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is 
aimed at a war-winning capability. 

The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which has 
shaped U.S. policy since the 1960 's was never accepted by the 
Soviets and has been completely negated by their massive stra- 
tegic defensive effort including civil defense. 

The aggressiveness of Soviet behavior throughout the world has 
increased ominously as the military balance has tilted in favor 
of the USSR. 

U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with 
arms-control agreements have been seriously eroded through com- 
promise of satellite reconnaissance systems and loss of key 
monitoring facilities. 



Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003 
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713 



62 



It seems to us that there is little disagreement inside or outside 
government that these are the facts, yet the Senate has been asked to 
ratify a treaty which apparently ignores those facts. We are told by 
defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down 
the Soviet military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the 
"process." They insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the 
inequities of SALT I and SALT II. This ignores Soviet behavior since 
SALT I. The Soviets have become harder , not easier, to deal with. 

The proponents of SALT II insist that we will improve our security 
through ratification because the situation would be worse without 
SALT II. 

We find it hard to believe that the Soviets could significantly 
accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact that they 
are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on 
arms. And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of 
SALT II would be followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the 
widening gaps between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. It is 
almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the 
United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of 
the Soviets and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of Mutual 
Assured Destruction (MAD) . This means further decline of our capa- 
bility to deter war or to defend ourselves. 

We respectfully submit that the arms-control process has become 
dominated by a persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure 
of the twin policies of detente and disarmament. 

SALT II doesn't even limit arms. The image of limitation is pro- 
vided by alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the 
real destructive elements of nuclear force — missiles and explosive 
power — where the Soviets have been allowed a heavy advantage. To make 
matters worse, the "equal" numbers are contrived by failing to count 
Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most advanced stra- 
tegic bomber in the operational inventory of either side. 

We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to 
finesse this issue by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is 
much more complex than SALT I and covers qualitative as well as quan- 
titative aspects of nuclear armaments enormously more difficult to 
monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification satellite 
systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot 
insure against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions. State 
Department documents describing SALT II redefine verification. Where 
adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence 
that attempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now 
requires only that we can detect cheating on such a large scale that it 
alters the strategic balance in time to assure an appropriate U.S. re- 
sponse. This new definition completely finesses the problem of 



63 



adequacy of our intelligence capability since it is totally dependent 
on one's view of what constitutes a "strategic balance" and an "appro- 
priate response." For those who find the actual balance of strategic 
capabilities irrelevant, and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon sub- 
marine is an adequate deterrent regardless of the size of the Soviet 
forces, SALT II can be considered "adequately verifiable" with no D.S. 
intelligence capability at all . 

We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the 
Soviets are building forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear 
war with the United States and its allies but we strongly disagree with 
his view that this aim can be thwarted by ratifying SALT II. Soviet 
participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties, is primarily 
designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. accjuiescence and even 
cooperation in creating the necessary Imbalcince of power required by 
that goal. 

In sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the 
grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country 
to continuation of disarmsunent policies which, however promising when 
adopted, have imperilled the security of the United States and its 
allies and encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT 
process is not so sacrosanct that we must accept a lopsided and unveri- 
flable agreement simply to show "progress." 



We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers, 
oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some. 



as all who 



As military professionals, and with all due respect for our more 
circumscribed colleagues still bound by their active service, we 
strongly urge you to reject SALT II as injurious to the security 
interests of the United States and its allies. 



With Grave Concern, 




Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, OSN, Ret. 
On behalf of the following retired 
generals and flag officers 



Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm, 


Rear 


Adm. 


Brig 


. Gen 


Rear 


Adm. 


Brig 


. Gen 


Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 



Elmer P. Abernethy, USN, Ret 

Raymond B. Ackerman 

Charles Adair, USN, Ret 
. Charles J. Adams, USAF, Ret 

Frank Akers, USN, Ret 
. Frank Albanese, USA, Ret 

John W. Albrittain, USN, Ret 

Clarence E. Aldrich, OSN, Ret 

Leroy J. Alexanderson, USNR, Ret 



Maj. 


Gen. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Brig, 


, Gen 


Brig, 


, Gen 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Brig, 


. Gen 


Brig, 


. Gen 


Brig, 


, Gen 


Rear 


Adm. 



Jesse M. Allen, USAF, Ret 

John M. Alford, OSN, Ret. 
. Lawrence H. Allen 
. Richard C. Allgood 

John R. Allison 
. Conrad S. Allman, USAF, Ret 
. Walter F. Alt 
. Kenneth G. Althaus, OSA, Ret. 

Richard G. Altmann, USNR, Ret. 



64 



Rear Adm. Stephen H. Aitibruster, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John G. Ames, III, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Glenn C. Ames, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles C. Anderson, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Earl O. Anderson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Herbert H. Anderson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Roy G. Anderson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Vernon L. Anderson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Winston P. Anderson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John D. Andrew, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. R. S. Andrews, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John G. Appel, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Jack J. Appleby, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Howard H. Arbury, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert J. Archer, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Wilbur W. Aring, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Theodore A. Arndt, USA, Ret. 

Admiral Jackson D. Arnold, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Kelly Arnold, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Walter E. Arnold, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Arnott 

Rear Adm. G. W. Ashford, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Milton H. Ashkins, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. James H. Ashley, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Frederick L. Ashworth, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Raymond Astumian 

Vice Adm. Bernard L. Austin, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edward Austin, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Kenneth A. Ayers, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Leo A. Bachman, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert M. Backes 

Brig. Gen. Van. N. Backman, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Donald G. Baer , USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. George H. Bahm, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. James A. Bailey, 'Jf-AF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William B. Bailey, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William S. Bailey, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lee E. Bains, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Duncan S. Baker, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Felix L. Baker, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Harold D. Baker, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Felix P. Ballenger, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richaird R. Ballinger, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph R. Barbaro, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Eugene A. Bar ham 

Rear Adm. Christopher S. Barker, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Roland J. Barnick, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles H. Barnwell, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles D. Barrett 

Brig. Gen. Paul L. Barton, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John W. Baska, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Thomas E. Bass, III, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Raymond H. Bass, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Bastion, USA, Ret. 



Rear Adm. Harold Bater, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bauer, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Rudolph C. Bauer, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. George W. Bauernschmidt, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard M. Baughn, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William H. Baumer , USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edward Bautz, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth H. Bayer, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles Beach 

Rear Adm. Charles B. Beasley, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles Becker, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frederick J. Becton, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Theodore C. Bedwell, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Aaron W. Beeman, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles S. Beightler, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John K. Beling, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. David B. Bell, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Frederick Bell, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John H. Bell, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Russell J. Bellerby, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Herbert G. Bench, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Russell A. Berg, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William W. Berg, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, USAF, Ret. 

Admiral Russell S. Berkey, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Ferdinand V. Berley, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Joseph L. Bernier, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Robert Bernstein, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Paul D. Berrigan, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Walter B. Bess, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Wendell L. Bevan, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Irwin F. Beyerly, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William W. Beverley, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Horace V. Bird, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John F. Bird, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William H. Birdsong, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Max K. Bitts, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Donald F. Blake, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William H. Blakefield, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles E. Blaker 

Brig. Gen. R. M. Blanchard, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John R. Blandford 

Maj. Gen. Jonas L. Blank, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Albert M. Bledsoe, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Frederick B. Blessee, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Elliott Bloxom, USN, Ret. 

General Philip T. Boerger, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Calvin M. Bolster, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Jones E. Bolt, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles R. Bond, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas Bonner, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Milton O. Boone, USA, Ret. 

Admiral Walter F. Boone, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John L. Boros 



65 



Rear Adm. John T. Bottoms, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Aubrey J. Bourgeois, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Clarence M Bowley, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. George M. Bowman, USNR, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. A. L. Bowser 

Brig. Gen. John H. Boyes, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. George S. Boylan, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William A. Boyson, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Russell Boyt, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Anthony A. Braccia, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William T. Bradley, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frank A. Braisted, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frank A. Brandley, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William H. Brandon, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Arthur F. Brandstatter , USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. L. Render Braswell, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. James T. Brewer, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James R. Bright, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Russell C. Brinker, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James Brittingham, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John C. Brogan, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Douglas B. Brokenshire, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Allison C. Brooks, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Grady S. Brooks, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thad A. Broom, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles R. Broshous, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles P. Brown, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Jay G. Brown, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Brown, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William D. Brown, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Browning, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frederick J. Brush, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Albert S. Brussel, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Henry C. Bruton, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William E. Bryan, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Carleton F. Bryanc, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John H. Buckner, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Carl E. Bull, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ross P. Bullard, 

Brig. Gen. Cady R. Bullock, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Howard G. Bunker, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William O. Burch, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harvey P. Burden, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Allen M. Burdett, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Raymond W. Burk, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William A. Burke, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John W. Burkhart, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John C. Burney, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John R. Burns 

Maj. Gen. Merrill D. Burnside, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Albert C. Burrows, USN, Ret. 

brig. Gen. Ernest H. Burt, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles R. Bushong, USA, Ret. 



Brig. Gen. Chester J. Butcher, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Benjamin J. Butler, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Ogbourne D. Butler 

Maj. Gen. Robert G. Butler, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Butt, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John L. Butts, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Victor A. Byrnes 

Rear Adm. Jose M. Cabanillas, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William R. Calhoun, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John U. Calkins, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. William M. Callaghan, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph W. Callahan, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Thomas S. Cameron, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John M. Campbell, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert L. Campbell, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Roland A. Campbell, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William B. Campbell, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. C. Craig Cannon, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert H. Canterbury, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Daniel Carlson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Martin D. Carmody, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edwin H. Cams, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Stephen W. Carpenter, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Bruce L. Carr, USN, Ret. 

General W. Reynolds Carr 

Brig. Gen. Richard C. Carrera 

Lt. Gen. Charles W. Carson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harry R. Carson, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph M. Carson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Albert S. Carter, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Jesse H. Carter, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Cassiday, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. George W. Casslercnr, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Gordon L. Caswell. USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Richard C. Catledge, USAF, Ret. 

Gen. Jack J. Catton, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Cecil T. Caufield, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John H. Caughey, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert W. Cavenagh, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William S. Chairsell, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Alvin D. Chandler, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Curtis W. Chapman, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harry M. Chapman, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James W. Chapman, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Steve A. Chappuis, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. P. N. Char bonnet, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Chardon 

Maj. Gen. Charles H. Chase, USA, Ret. 

General Max M. Cherry 

Brig. Gen. William H. Cheeseraan, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John H. Chiles, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Keith L. Christensen, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen, USA, Ret. 



66 



Rear Adm. John S. Christiansen 

Vice Adm. Ralph W. Christie, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Gordon P. Chunghoon, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Albert H. Clancy, USN, Ret. 

General Albert P. Clark 

Brig. Gen. Allen F. Clark, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adra. David H. Clark, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Jeane R. Clark, USN, Ret. 

Admiral John E. Clark, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John M. Clark, USAF, Ret. 

General Bruce C. Clarke 

Admiral Ralph S. Clarke, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Winton R. Close, USAF, Ret. 

Brig, Gen. John B. Coates, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph G. Coburn, Jr., USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Lor is R. Cochran, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Samuel G. Cockerhara, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Benjamin Coe, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. James E. Cohn, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Philip P. Cole, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William C. Cole, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lewis E. Coley, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. R. W. Colglazier 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. Collins, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John L. Collis, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. John B. Colwell, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Walter V. Combs, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. J. Richard Compton 

Brig. Gen. Ross R. Condit, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Admiral Ray R. Conner, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Raymond C. Conroy, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Louis J. Conti 

Rear Adm. Albert B. Cook, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph E. Cook, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William R. Cooke, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Damon W. Cooper, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joshua W. Cooper, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Marcus F. Cooper, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Paul T. Cooper, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Cooper, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Richard H. Cooper, USAR 

Rear Adm. Bennett S. Copping, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frederic W. Corle, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Peter Corradi, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Ted H. Corry, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edward J. Costello, Jr., USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Cox, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adra. William R. Cox, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John S. Coye, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Jarred V. Crabb, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Kenneth Craig, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William H. Craig, USA, Ret. 



Rear Adm. Wyatt Craig, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard S. Craighill, USN, Ret. 

General Reginald M. Cram 

Brig. Gen. William J. Crandall, USAFR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Albert B. Crawford, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. B. Hayden Crawford 

Rear Adm. George C. Crawford, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edward I. Creed, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles H. Crichton, USN. Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Richard G. Cross, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Crouch, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Albert B. Crowther, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harry Crutcher, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adra. Robert R. Crutchfield, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Allman T. Culbertson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles R. Cundiff, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John W. Currier, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. R. D. Curtin, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Robert H. Curtin, USAF, Ret. 

General Donald Curtis 

Maj. Gen. Gilbert Curtis, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Curtis, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adra. Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ben Scott Custer, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles S. D'Orsa, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. John A. Dabney, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Leo P. Dahl, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Theodore 0. Dahl, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adra. Carl M. Dalton, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. 0. T. Dalton 

Rear Adm. Winfred P. Dana, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Maurice W. Daniel, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Darcy, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Carlton S. Dargusch, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Carl Darnell, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Don O. Darrov?, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Anthony F. Daskevich, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Frederick J. Dau, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Lester A. Daughter ty, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Buddy R. Daughtrey, USAF, Ret. 

General Harry J. Davidson, Sr. 

Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Davidson, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles L. Davis, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. George M. Davis, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Glenn B. Davis, USN, Ret. 

General Raymond G. Davis 

Maj. Gen. Woodard E. Davis, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Thurlow W. Davison, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Donald S. Dawson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Willard H. Day, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James K. DeArmond, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Arthur R. DeBolt, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Chester B. DeGavre, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Merlin L. DeGuire, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John W. Dean, Jr., USA, Ret. 



67 



Maj. Gen. Elbert Decoursey, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Russell Defauver, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Clinton G. Defoney, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Leon Delighter 
Maj. Gen. Marvin C. Demler, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Kenneth C. Dempster, USAF, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Francis C. Denebrink, USN, Ret. 
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Clyde R. Denniston, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John A. Des Fortes, USAF, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Harold T. Deutermann, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. J. P. S. Devereux 
Maj. Gen. Lawrence R. Dewey, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. E. B. Dexter, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William J. Deyo, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Dick, USA, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. William W. Dick, Jr., USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. George W. Dickinson, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. William A. Dietrich, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Dissinger, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Divk, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Ernest W. Dobie, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John W. Dobson, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen Nevin W. Dodd, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Sydney B. Dodds, USNR, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Roy T. Dodge, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Joseph E. Dodson, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Carl R. Doerf linger, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. John W. Dolan, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. William A. Dolan, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. John M. Donalson, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Jack N. Donohew, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Philip J. Donovan 
Lt. Gen. Stanley J. Donovan, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Donovan, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Dooley, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Doran, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Paul P. Douglas, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Williain R. Douglas, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Wallace R. Dowd, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Admiral James H. Doyle, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William C. Doyle, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Abraham J. Dreiseszun, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Donn R. Driver, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Raymond F. DuBois, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Thomas H. Dubois, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Francis R. Duborg, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. James R. Dudley, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John H. Dudley, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Clifford H. Duerfeldt, USN, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Irving T. Duke, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Robert W. Duke, USA, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. Leo J. Dulacki 
Admiral Charles K. Duncan, USN, Ret. 



Brig. Gen. Donald Dunford, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William D. Dunham, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Frank Dunkley, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles G. Dunn, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard T. Dunn, USA, Ret. 

Admiral Lewis W. Dunton, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James K. Durham 

Rear Adm. Willijun H. Duvall, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. R. T. Dwyer 

Brig. Gen. John R. Dyas, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Victor A. Dybdal, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. E. R. Eastwold, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Robert E. L. Eaton, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Seimuel K. Eaton, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harvey W. Eddy, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Alan C. Edmunds, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. James V. Edmundson, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Morris 0. Edwards, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Parmer W. Edwards, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Clarence T. Edwinson, UAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edward S. Ehlen, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Milton Ehrlich 

Brig. Gen. Charles V. Elia, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ernest M. Eller, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Elliott, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Howard V. Elliott, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John C. B. Elliott, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. William E. Ellis, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ernest B. Ellsworth, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Hugh M. Elwood 

Lt. Gen. William J. Ely, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Henry E. Emerson 

Lt. Gen. Jean E. Engler, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. William P. Ennis, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Horace H. Epes, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William H. B. Erwin, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Graydon C. Essman, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William E. Eubank, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harry L. Evans, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Evans, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Gordon S. Everett, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harry G. Ewart, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Arthur E. Gxon, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Francis L. Fabrizio, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. D. S. Fahrney, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William H. Fairbrother, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Ivan L. Farman 

Rear Adm. Eugene H. Farrell, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph E. Faucett, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. James B. Faulconer, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Albert J. Fay, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edward L. Feightner, USN, Ret. 

General James Ferguson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William E. Ferrall, USfi, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Angelo L. Ferranti 



68 



Rear Adm. Harold F. Pick, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard D. Field, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph E. Fielding, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Russell R. Finn, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Alvan Fisher, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Ralph E. Fisher, OSAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard E. Fisher, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John A. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Phillip H. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. W. F. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William H. Fitzgerald, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Michael P. D. Flaherty, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Edward M. Flanangan, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Francis E. Fleck, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Lawrence J. Fleming, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Morton K. Fleming, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William B. Fletcher, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William O. Floyd, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George C. Fogle, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Francis D. Foley, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harry J. P. Foley, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph F. Foley, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Winston P. Folk, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. J. E. Fondahl 

Brig. Gen. Paul P. Foran, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Bernard B. Forbes, USN, Ret. 

General G. Foreman 

Rear Adm. James E. Forrest, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edward C. Forsyth, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. George I. Forsythe, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Newton P. Foss, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm., Walter M. Foster, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. C. Lyn Fox, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Claud M. Fraleigh, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John W. Francis 

Rear Adm. Nickolas J. F. Frank, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John F. Franklin, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Joe N. Frazar, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Dewitt L. Freeman, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Mason Freeman, USN, Ret. 

General Paul L. Freeman, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Leonard F. Freiburghouse, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Leonard Frisco, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William J. Fry, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas Fuller, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Samuel G. Fuqua, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles M. Fur low, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frederick R. Furth, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Walter D. Gaddis, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Frank L. Gailer, USAF, Ret. 

George R. Gallagher 

Rear Adm. W. Earl Gallaher, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William 0. Gallery, USN, Ret. 



Brig. Gen. Clarence J. Galligan, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Walter T. Galligan, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Jack K. Gcimble, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Wayne N. Garnet, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Robert G. Card, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George W. Gardes, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. E. Blair Garland, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Francis L. Garrett, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Malcolm E. Garrison, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph S. Garrison, USNK, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Norman F. Gar ton, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Eugene W. Gauch, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John D. Gavan, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Donald Gay, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. J. Edwin Gay, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Arthur A. Gentry 

Brig. Gen. William F. Georgi, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harry E. Gerhard, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John H. Germeraad, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William K. Ghormley, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frederic Gibbs, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Gibson, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harold B. Gibson, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Kenneth H. Gibson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. W. M. Gibson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Gilbert, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Thomas E. Gillespie, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gingles, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard P. Glass, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James Glore, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William R. Goade, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George W. Goddard, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Guy H. Goddard, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George A. Godding, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William H. Godson, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Melvin A. Goers, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert R. Goetzman 

Rear Adm. William B. Goggins, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Morton J. Gold, USAF, Ret. 

General William B. Gold, Jr. 

Admiral Henry W. Goodall, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John C. Gordon, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Gordon T. Gould, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. C. L. Grabenhorst, USNR, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James E. Graham 

Maj. Gen. Donald W. Graham, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Gordon M. Graham, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Arthur R. Gralla, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John G. Gramzow, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Etheridge Grant, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Elonzo B. Grantham, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Alfred M. Granum, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Guy J. Gravlee 



69 



Rear Adm. Oscar Gray, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Philip H. Greasley, USAF, Ret. 

General William O. Green 

Brig. Gen. Jaraes W. Green, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George B. Greene, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William M. A. Greene, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John F. Greenslade, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Elton W. Grenfell 

Admiral Charles D. Griffin, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. James A. Grimsley, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Francis H. Griswold, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Sidney Gritz, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. August H. Groeschel, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Rowland H. Groff, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John V. Grombach 

Rear Adm. Royce L. Gross, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Donald G. Grothaus, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William H. Groverman, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Bradford E. Grow, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Richard A. Grussendorf, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William S. Guest, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William M. Gullett, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frederick A. Gunn, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Karl W. Gustafson, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Kermit L. Guthrie, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frank S. Haak, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Chester E. Haberlin 

Maj. Gen. Herbert R. Hackbarth, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Louis J. Hackett, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Jaraes F. Hackler, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ira F. Haddock, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Theodore G. Haff, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Hamilton Hains, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Peter C. Hains, III, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Dudley D. Hale, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Stewart L. Hall, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. William E. Hall, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Kay Halsell, II 

Maj. Gen. Milton B. Halsey, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Lyle E. Halstead, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Archelaus L. Hamblen, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edward J. Hamilton 

Rear Adm. Thomas J. Hamilton, USN, Ret. 

Gen. Barksdale Hamlett 

Rear Adm. Wellington A. Hammond, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George F. Hamner , USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William L. Hamrick, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Jack L. Hancock, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Walter J. Hanna, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Clifford P. Hannum, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harry J. Hansen, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Norris B. Harbold, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Eads G. Hardaway, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert M. Hardaway, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harold F. Harding, USA, Ret. 



Maj. Gen. Donald L. Hardy, USAF, Ret. 

General Robert B. Harkness, Jr. 

Vice Adm. F. J. Harlfinger, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John Harllee, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Robert W. Harper, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Talbot E. Harper, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Brooks J. Harral, USN, Ret. 

General Ben Harrell 

Maj. Gen. William S. Harrell, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Alfred R. Harris, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin T. Harris, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Roy M. Harris, USNR, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Bertram C. Harrison, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Harrison, USA, Ret, 

Rear Adm. Lloyd Harrison, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Gerald A. Hart 

Brig. Gen. Frederick O. Hartel, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles C. Hartman, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William H. Hartt, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Harry L. Harty, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Valery Harvard, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert A. Harvey 

Brig. Gen. David C. Hastings, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. W. G. Hathaway 

Maj. Gen. John J. Hayes, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Hugh C. Haynsworth 

Maj. Gen. Stuart G. Haynsworth, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Raymond F. Hebrank 

Vice Adm. Truman J. Hedding, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Hef felf inger , USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William T. Hef ley, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles A. Heira, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Roger C. Heimer 

Rear Adm. Paul R. Heineman, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. John A, Heintges 

Lt. Gen. Rolland V. Heiser 

Rear Adm. Frank V. Heimer 

Brig. Gen. Jack W. Hemingway, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William H. Henderson 

Maj. Gen. Raleigh R. Hendrix, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Hendry, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John P. Henebry 

Maj. Gen. William H. Hennig, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John B. Henry, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Karl G. Hensel, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph L. Herlihy, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Vincent Hernandez, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John H. Herring, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Hickey, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. George L. Hicks, USNR, Ret. 



70 



Maj. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adin. Paul L. High, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. John M. Hightower, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Jim D. Hill 
Maj. Gen. Roderic L. Hill, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Hillyard, USA, Ret. 
Vice Adra. William 0. Hiltabidle, USN, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. B. J. Leon Hirshorn, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Howard M. Hobson, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. John H. Hoefer, USNR, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. John A. Hoefling, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Herbert L. Hoerner, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Bartholanew H. Hogan, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. R. Wesley Hogan, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Harold R. Holcomb, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William H. Holcombe, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adra. Richard Holden, USN, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, USA, Ret. 
Admiral William R. Hollingsworth, USN, Ret. 
General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Harland E. Holman, USNR, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Ernest V. Holmes, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Carl O. Holmquist, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Everett W. Holstrom, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. William H. Holt, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. J. Stanley Holtoner, USAF, Ret. 
Admiral Ernest C. Holtzworth, USN, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hooper, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. John E. Hoover, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lewis A. Hopkins, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles F. Home, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard C. Home, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles T. Homer, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John S. Horner, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John B. Horton, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Herschel A. House, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Howard, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. James H. Howard, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Hamilton W. Howe, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Hugh H. Howell 

Rear Adm. C. C. Howerton, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lester E. Hubbell, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edward M. Hudgins 

Brig. Gen. Oscar Conrad Hudson 

Brig. Gen. Ronald S. Huey 

Brig. Gen. Harry J. Huff 

Brig. Gen. Robert B. Hughes, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert L. Hughes, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. H. E. Humfeld, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Ladd F. Hunt 

Rear Adm. Louis H. Hunte, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Albert E. Hunter, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. George P. Hunter, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Raymond P. Hunter, USN, Ret. 



Rear Adm. Robert N. Hunter, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Benjamin Hunton, USAR, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Jack E. Hurff, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Richard M. Hurst, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Samuel H. Hurt, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Eugene L. Husdon, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Vincent G. Huston, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Hutchison, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Joseph C. Hutchison, USA, Ret. 
Admiral John J. Hyland, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. John P. Ingle, Jr., USNR, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Walter D. Innis, USNR, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Donald G. Irvine, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Roy M. Isaman, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Ives, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. William A. Jack, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. David H. Jackson, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Ivan E. Jackson, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Milton C. Jackson, USNR, Ret. 
Rear Adm. P. W. Jackson, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adra. Robert W. Jackson, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Oscar J. Jahnsen, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adra. Williara J. James, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Frederick E. Janney, USN, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. Carl H. Jark, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Irby B. Jarvis, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Hal B. Jennings 

Rear Adra. M. J. Jensen 

Rear Adm. John R. Johannesen, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles E. Johnson, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. E. Gillis Johnson 

Maj. Gen. Earl L. Johnson, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Johnson, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Henry C. Johnson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John B. Johnson, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth L. Johnson, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph C. Johnson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard H. Johnson, USA, Ret. 

Admiral Roy L. Johnson, USN, Ret. 

General Warren R. Johnson 

Admiral Means Johnston, Jr. 

Rear Adm. Don A. Jones 

Brig. Gen. Bruce B. Jones, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Carlton B. Jones, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George M. Jones, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Stanley W. Jones, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William C. Jonson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Allen R. Joyce, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles E. Jung, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Carl S. Junkermann, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Williara L. Kabler , USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph I. Kane, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adra. Constantine A. Karaberis, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Draper L. Kauffman, USN, Ret. 



71 



Rear Adm. John H. Kaufman, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Louis Kaufman, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Paul Kaufman, USNR, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Albert Kaye, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Edgar S. Keats, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. George Keegan, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Gerald F. Keeling, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Naiff H. Kelel 
Brig. Gen. Harold K. Kelley, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Kellond, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Maurice w. Kendall, USAF, Ret. 
Maj- Gen. Richard C. Kendall, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John M. Kenderdine, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Kennedy, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Richard A. Kern, USNR, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Redmond F. Kernan 
Brig. Gen. H. E. Kessinger, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Wayne 0. Kester , USAF, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Dixwell Ketcham, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Gerald L. Ketchum, USN, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. King, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. James I. King, USA, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Jerome H. King, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John J. King, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Philip V. King, USNR, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Thomas H. King, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Leon S. Kintberger, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John M. Kinzer, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Louis J. Kirn, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Bernard J. Kitt, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Julius Klein 
Lt. Gen. Richard P. Klocko, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Richard A. Knobloch, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Frank J. Kobes, Jr., USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Herman J; Kossler, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm, William J. Kotsch, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Edgar P. Kranzf elder , USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Krause 
Brig. Gen. Martin R. Krausz, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Philip F. Kromer , USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Clifford J. Kronauer 
Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak 
Rear Adm. Howard F. Kuehl, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Chester A. Kunz, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William B. Kunzig, USA, Ret. 
General Laurence S. Kuter , USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Paul L. Lacy, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. John J. Laffan, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. James A. Lake, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Kir by Lamar, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Valdemar G. Lambert, USN, Ret. 
General F. H. Lamson-Scribner 
Maj. Gen. James E. Landrum, USA, Ret. 



Maj. Gen. Robert B. Landry, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard Lane, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Clarence J. Lang, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Cyrille P. Laporte, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Louis R. Laporte, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Wharton E. Larned, USNR, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Harold O. Larson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harold V. Larson, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William B. Latta, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert E. Laub, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John T. Lawler 

Brig. Gen. John D. Lawlor, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Baskin R. Lawrence, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Sidney J. Lawrence, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Osmund A. Leahy, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William H. Leahy, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John E. Leary, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John E. Lee, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lamar Lee, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Leek 

Rear Adm. James E. Leeper , USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William C. Lemly 

Rear Adm. Frederick W. Lemly, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Kelley B. Lemmon, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles F. Leonard, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William N. Leonard, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Cecil P. Lessig, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph W. Leverton 

Maj. Gen. William P. Levine, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. B. E. Lewellen, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Oliver W. Lewis, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Porter Lewis, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Vernon B. Lewis, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William D. Lewis, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. R. E. Libby, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. David I. Liebman, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Lightner, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Walter E. Linaweaver, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln 

Gen. Rush B. Lincoln, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Lingle 

Brig. Gen. Andy A. Lipscomb, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John J. Liset, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Elmer L. Littell, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Olin A. Lively 

Brig. Gen. B. C. Lockwood, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Thomas A. Long, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Victor D. Long, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William H. Longley, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Michael Lorenzo, USNR, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Walter E. Lotz, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles E. Loucks, USA, Ret. 



72 



Rear 


Adiii. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Mai. 


Gen. 


Br iq 


. Gen 


Brig 


. Gen 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Brig 


. Gen 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Brig 


. Gen 


Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Brig 


. Gen 


Brig 


. Gen 


Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Maj. 


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Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Maj. 


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Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Brig 


. Gen 


Rear 


Adm. 


Maj. 


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Brig 


. Gen, 


Rear 


Adm. 


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ral R, 


Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Brig, 


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Rear 


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Brig. 


. Gen, 


Maj. 


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Rear 


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. Gen, 


Brig, 


. Gen, 


Vice 


Adm. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Brig, 


. Gen, 


Maj. 


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Rear 


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Kenneth Loveland, USN, Ret. 
Jess up D. Lowe, OSAF, Ret. 
Sumter L. Lowrv, USA, Ret. 
. Bernard R. Luczak, tJSA, Ret. 
. Garland A. Ludv, USA, Ret. 
Robert P. Lukeman, USAF, Ret. 
William S. Lundberg, USA, Ret. 
. Reginald P. Lyman, USA, Ret. 
George E. Lvnch, OSA, Ret. 
. George P. Lvnch, USA, Ret. 
John J. Lynch, USN, Ret. 
Ralph C. Lynch, USN, Ret. 
Nelson M. Lynde, USA, Ret. 
. Donald J. Lynn 
. Archibald W. Lyon, USA, Ret. 
Harvey E. Lyon, USN, Ret. 
Hylan B. Lyon, USN, Ret. 
Raymond R. Lyons, USN, Ret. 
Clinton S. Lvter, USA, Ret. 
Donald J. MacDonald, USN, Ret. 
Duncan C. MacMillan, USN, Ret. 
John J. Maginnis 
John B. Macgregor, USN, Ret. 
Robert A. Macpherson, USN, Ret. 
. Robert S. Macrum, USAF, Ret. 
Dashiell L. Madeira, USN, Ret. 
Frank M. Madsen, USAF, Ret. 
. W. S. Magalhaes 
Thomas B. Magath, USNR, Ret. 
. J. Maglione, USAF, Ret. 
Charles J. Maguire, USN, Ret. 
Harrv P. Mahin, USN, Ret. 
, Thaddeus F. Malanowski, USA, Ret. 
Ralph W. Ma lone, USN, Ret. 
Robert W. Maloy, USAF, Ret. 
, Ben J. Mangina 
Daniel J. Manning 
Joseph I. Manning, USN, Ret. 
, Alexander Marble, USA, Ret. 
, Theodore H. Marshall, USA, Ret. 
William J. Marshall, USN, Ret. 
Clarence A. Martin, USA, Ret. 
, Edward 0. Martin, USAF, Ret. 
Sherman F. Martin, USAF, Ret. 
David L. Martineau, USN, Ret. 
Harrv C. Mason, USN, Ret. 
Stanhope B. Mason, USA, Ret. 
Theo. C. Ma taxis, USA, Ret. 
Paul L. Mather, USN, Ret. 
Salve H. Matheson, USA, Ret. 
Bob O. Mathews, USN, Ret. 
John H. Maurer, USN, Ret. 
Azro J. Maxham 

William S. Maxwell, USN, Ret. 
Walter S. Maver , USN, Ret. 



Brig. 
Brig. 
Mai. 
Maj. 



Brig. Gen. 
Rear Adm. 



Maj. 
Rear 



Gen. 
Adm, 



Brig. Gen. Richard W. Mavo, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. John H. McAuliffe, USNR, Ret. 

Gen. Madison M. McBrayer, USAF, Ret. 
Gen. George H. McBride, USA, Ret. 
Gen. William D. McCain 
Gen. Chester E. McCarty, USAF, Ret. 
Admiral J. W. McCauley, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Arthur J. McChrystal, USA, Ret. 
Clyde F. McClain, USAF, Ret. 
John G. McClaughry, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. William M. McCloy, USNR, Ret. 

Charles M. McCorkle, USAF, Ret. 
James R. McCormick, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Victor B. McCrea, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Kenneth A. McCrimmon, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Leo B. McCuddin, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Robert H. McCutcheon, USAF, Ret. 
Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Everett A. McDonald, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Ellsworth D. McEathron, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John A. McEwan, USA, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. Thomas K. McGehee, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Francis M. McGoldrick, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McGuire, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Godfrey T. McHugh, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. D. E. McKay, USN, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. George H. McKee, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Logan McKee, USN, Ret. 
General Seth J. McKee, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William A. McKee, USA, Ret. 
Gen. C. M. McKeen, USA, Ret. 

Henrv R. McKenzie, USA, Ret. 
Eugene B. McKinney, USN, Ret. 
William R. McKinney, USN, Ret. 
John R. McKnight, USN, Ret. 
John H. McLain, USAF, Ret. 
Richard E. McLaughlin 
Ephraim R. McLean, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. G. A. McLean, USN, Ret. 
Gordon McLintock 
Robert McMath 
Gen. Henry W. McMillan, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. George J. McMillin, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Edwin E. McMorries, USN, Ret. 
James A, McNally 
Raymond F. McNelly, USA, Ret. 
Melvin F. McNickle, USAF, Ret. 
Richard R. McNulty, USNR, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Claude M. McQuarrie, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Charles J. McWhinnie, USNR, Ret. 
Gen. John C. McWhorter, USA, Ret. 
Gen. Keith E. McWilliams 
Rear Adm. States M. Mead, USNR, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. Fillmore K. Mearns, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Edward P. Mechling, USAF, Ret. 



Maj. 
Maj. 
Rear 
Rea r Adm 
Rear Adm 
Brig 



Gen. 
Adm. 



Gen. 



Major Gen. 
Vice Adm. 



Vice Adm. 
Brig. Gen. 



Maj. 



Rear 
Maj. 
Maj. 



Adm. 
Gen. 
Gen. 



Rear Adm. 



Maj. 
Brig. 



73 



Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, USA, Ret. 

General Vernon E. Megee 

Rear Adm. Roqer W. Mehle, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John L. Melqaard. tJSN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert E. Mellinq, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Albert L. Melton, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Corwin Mendenhall, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Chauncey D. Merrill, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles H. Mester, Jr. 

Briq. Gen. Frank Meszar, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph M. Metcalf, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Alfred B. Metsger, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edward F. Metzer, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Richard J. Meyer, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Walter C. Michaels, USNR, Ret. 

Briq. Gen. Howard E. Michelet, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Bill A. Miles, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edwin S. Miller, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. George H. Miller, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harold B. Miller, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Junior F. Miller, USA, Ret. 

Briq. Gen. Robert B. Miller, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ward S. Miller, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Eugene J. Mincks 

Maj. Gen. Charles F. Minter, Sr., USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Minton, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Clinton A. Misson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Burt L. Mitchell, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Cleo N. Mitchell, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. S. Edward Mittler, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Chester J. Moeglein, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert L. Moeller, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert E. Moffet, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William A. Moffett, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lloyd W. Moffit, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edmund W. Montgomery 

Lt. Gen. Richard M. Montgomery, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harley F. Moonev, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Benjamin E. Moore, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. French R. Moore, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harlev L. Moore, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John B. Moore 

Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore 

Brig. Gen. Leon A. Moore, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Moore Moore, Jr., USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert L. Moore, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William T. Moore, USNR, Ret. 

Vice Adm. William J. Moran, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. James L. Moreland, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Henrv S. Morgan, Jr. 

Maj. Gen. Martin J. Morin, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William F. Morr, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John H. Morrill, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Albert R. Morris, USA, Ret. 



Briq. Gen. John H. Morrison, USA Ret. 

Briq. Gen. Manlev G. Morrison, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard I. Morton, USA, Ret. 

Briq. Gen. Alvin J. Moser 

Rear Adm. Charles W. Moses, USN, Ret. 

Admiral William C. Mott, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Horace D. Moulton, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles F. Mudgett, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Dolf E. Muehleisen, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. E. L. Mueller, USA, Ret. 

General Richard Mulberrv, Jr. 

Maj. Gen. Hal L. Muldrow, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Henry J. Muller, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. George W. Mundy, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George P. Munson, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John D. Murphy, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John W. Murphy, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert F. Murphy, USA, Ret. 

General S. A. Murphy 

Maj. Gen. James L. Murrav 

Brig. Gen. Joseph Murrav, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Llovd M. Must in 

Brig. Gen. Philip D. Myers, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Warren E. Mvers 

Rear Adm. Charles D. Nace, USN, Ret. 

General Gus G. Nagv 

Brig. Gen. Ezekiel W. Napier, USAF, Ret. 

Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, USAF, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Ray C. Needham, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Spurgeon H. Neel, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard C. Neeley, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Carson R. Neifert, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Roy W. Nelson, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William T. Nelson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. J. H. Nevins, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James P. Newberry, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Langdon C. Newman, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Henry C. Newton, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Franklin A. Nichols, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard E. Nichols, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles A. Nicholson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Wallace H. Nickell, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Herman Nickerson Jr. 

Rear Adm. Hugh R. Nieman, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Samuel Nixdorff, USN, Ret. 

Admiral A. G. Noble, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Paul R. Norby, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert H. Northwood, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William P. Nuckois 

Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Nurre, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Howard O'Connor 

Rear Adm. Michael G. O'Connor, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. James W. O'Grady, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles S. O'Mallev, USA, Ret. 



74 



Rear Adm. John F. Oakley, USNR, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. Arthur W. Oberbeck, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Odell, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. T. C. Odora, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Russell G. Ogan, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Milton L. Ogden, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William U. Ogletree, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Nils 0. Ohman, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Clay Olbon, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Richard M. Oliver, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. William M. Oiler, OSN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Alfred C. Olney, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Carl B. Olson 
Brig. Gen. Gustaf P. Olson, USA, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Howard E. Orem, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. William H. Organ, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. David P. Osborne, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski 
General J. A. Ostroph 

Rear Adm. William W. Outerbridge, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Owen, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Hinton A. Owens, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Norris W. Potter, USNR, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Roger W. Paine, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Ralph A. Palladino, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Charles J. Palmer, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. George G. Palmer, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. George A. Pappas, Jr. 

Rear Adm. Charles W. Parker, USN, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Edward N. Parker, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Parker, USAF, Ret. 

Admiral George A. Parkinson, USNR, Ret. 

General Harlan C. Parks, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joel D. Parks, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Frank J. Parrish 

Brig. Gen. Benton K. Partin 

Maj. Gen. William A. Patch, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Goldsborough S. Patrick, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Stanley F. Patten, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Alex M. Patterson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard 0. Patterson, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. H. C. Pattison, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Leonard E. Pauley, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Albert G. Paulsen 

Admiral Charles N. Payne, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. D. J. Peacher 

Rear Adm. Rufus J. Pearson, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Theodore E. Pearson, USNR, Ret. 

Lt. Gejj Willard Pearson, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edwin R. Peck, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Byron E. Peebles, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Howard W. Penney, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Donald G. Penterman, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Louis W. Perkins 



Brig. Gen. Howard P. Persons, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Roy W. Peters, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. George E. Peterson, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Richard W. Peterson, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Frank I. Pethick, Jr., USAR, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Petit, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Roger E. Phelan, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Tobias R. Philbin, Jr., USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Chester G. Phillips, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Eugene Phillips 
Lt. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adro. Ben B. Pickett, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Pieklik, USA, Ret. 
General Arthur J. Pierce, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Russell K. Pierce, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Gladwyn E. Pinkston, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Ernest A. Pinson, USAF, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Robert B. Pirie, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Eli P. Plaskow 
Rear Adm. William G. Pogue, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Boleslaw H. Pokigo, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. David P. Polatty, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Douglas C. Polhamus, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Jack P. Pollock, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Joseph G. Poneroy, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Mackenzie E. Porter, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert L. Porter, USN, Ret. 
General Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Alton G. Post, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William S. Post, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Powell, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth R. Powell, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George T. Powers, III, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard R. Pratt, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Arthur W. Price, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Admiral Frank H. Price, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Oran 0. Price, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett, USA, Ret. 

Admiral Alfred M. Pride, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William M. Pugh, II, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harold F. Pullen, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George S. Purple 

Rear Adm. Ira D. Putnam, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frank E. Raab, Jr., USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William H. Rafferty, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Lawson P. Ramage, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Paul H. Ramsey, USN, Ret. 

Admiral John E. M. Ranneft 

Maj. Gen. Henry A. Rasmussen, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William T. Rassieur, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Clemens V. Rault, USN, Ret. 

General Edwin W. Rawlings, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ralph W. Rawson, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Clarence C. Ray, USN, Ret. 



75 



Rear Adm. 
Brig. Gen. 
Vice Adm. 
Maj. Gen. 
Maj. Gen. 
Brig. Gen. 
Rear Adm. 



Rear Adm. 
Brig. Gen 



Maj. 
Brig 



Herman L. Ray, USN, Ret. 

Joseph G. Rebman, USA, Ret. 
E. F. Rectanus, USN, Ret. 
William H. Reddell, USAF, Ret. 
William N. Redling, USA, Ret. 

Albert Redman, Jr., USA, Ret. 
Allan L. Reed, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Michael J. Reichel, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Leslie L. Reid, USNR, Ret. 

George H. Reifenstein, USNR, Ret. 

Stewart E. Reimel, USA, Ret. 
Richard D. Reinhold, USAF, Ret. 
Henry J. Reis-El Bara 

Reiter, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Reitz 
Edward E. Renfro, USN, Ret. 
Thomas F. Rew, USAF, Ret. 
Vorley M. Rexroad, USAF, Ret. 
Reynolds, USA, Ret. 
Reynolds, USAF, Ret. 
Z. Reynolds, USN, Ret. 
E. Reynolds, USA, Ret. 
Rice, USN, Ret. 
Rice, USN, Ret. 
Rice, USN, Ret. 
Rich, USAF, Ret. 
Richards, USA, Ret. 
Richardson, USN, Ret. 



Gen. 
Gen 

Rear Adra. Harry L 
Brig. Gen. Ivan A 
Rear Adm. 
Gen. 
Gen 
Gen 
Gen 



Maj. 
Brig 
Brig 
Brig 



Emmett R. 
George E. 



James R. 
, William 
Lester K. 
Joseph E. 
Robert H. 
Clyde K. 
George J. 
Alvin F. 



Rear Adm. 
Rear Adm. 



Rear 
Rear 



Adm. 
Adm. 



Rear Adm. 

Brig. Gen 

Rear Adm. 

Rear Adm. 

Vice Adm. 

Brig. Gen 

Maj. Gen. 

Rear Adir.. 

Rear Adm. Clifford G. Richardson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Richeson, USA, Ret. 

James B. Ricketts, USN, Ret. 

Herman P. Riebe, USN, Ret. 

Charles E. Rieben, USNR, Ret. 

Robert E. Riera, USN, Ret. 

Cecil D. Riggs, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Whitaker F. Riggs, USN, Ret. 
General D. E. Riley, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Richard A. Risden, USA, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. James P. P.iseley 
Brig. Gen. Robinson Risner, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. B. A. Robbins 
Lt. Gen. Jay T. Robbins, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Joe A. Robbins, USN Ret. 

Levi J. Roberts, USNR, Ret. 

Armand J. Robertson, USN, Ret. 

Pearl H. Robey, USAF, Ret. 

Ray A. Robinson, USAF, Ret. 

Allan B. Roby, USN, Ret. 

Harry J. Rockafeller, USAR, Ret. 

Walter F. Rodee, USN, Ret. 

Jermain F. Rodenhauser , USAF, Ret. 
Rafael Rodr iguez-Ema, USA, Ret. 
Frederick C. Roecker , USA, Ret. 
Andrew W. Rogers, USA, Ret. 



Rear Adm. 



Rear 


Adm. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Rear 


Adm. 


Maj. 


Gen. 


Brig 


. Gen 


Brig 


. Gen 


Brig 


. Gen 



Brig. Gen. Jack A. Rogers, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Kenwood B. Rohrer 

Maj. Gen. Andrew P. Rollins, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Michael R. Roman, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William K. Rcmioser , USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. David L. Roscoe, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Drig. Gen. John M. Rose, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Philip H. Ross, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard M. Ross 

Rear Adra. Henry J. Rotridge, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John A. Rouse, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles H. Royce, US.^, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edward A. Ruckner, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adra. Thomas J. Rudden, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adra. Theodore D. Ruddock, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Paul E. Ruestow, USAF, Ret. 

Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George Ruhlen, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Louis J. Rumaggi, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard G. Rumney, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adra. Joseph W. Russel, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Michael P. Russillo, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Clifford G. Ryan 

Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edward A. Sahli 

Maj. Gen. Charles E. Saltzman, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. James G. Sampson, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Kenneth O. Sanborn, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. E. R. Sanders, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Harry Sanders, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Homer L. Sanders, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ira T. Sanders, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Leo A. Santini, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edward W. Sawyer, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Valentine H. Schaeffer, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. George E. Schafer 

Brig. Gen. Evan W. Schear, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harold G. Scheie, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Otto A. Scherini, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edward C. D. Scherrer, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John J. Schieffelin, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Walter F. Schlech, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Howard F. Schlitz, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John W. Schmidt, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Raymond J. Schneider, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adra. William A. Schoech, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Herbert E. Schonland, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Robert A. Schow, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Ned Schramm, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Floyd B. Schultz, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Carl F. Schupp, II 

Brig. Gen. Francis F. Schweinler, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Albert B. Scoles, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Tom W. Scctt, USAF, Ret. 



48-260 



7 9 Pt.U 



76 



Rear Adm. Eugene T. Seaward, OSN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Wiltz P. Segura 

Rear Adm. F. Gordon Selby, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Moise B. Seligman 

Vice Adm. Benedict J. Semmes, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John W. Sessums, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Paul E. Seufer, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. W. T. Sexton, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John N. Shaffer, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Leland G. Shaffer, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Louis D. Sharp, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Raymond N. Sharp, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William J. Sharrow 

Rear Adm. Charles W. Shattuck, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Shaw 

Brig. Gen. William L. Shaw 

William H. Shawcross 

Rear Adm. Maurice W. Shea, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William F. Sheehan, USA, Ret. 

General Ralph A. Sheldrick 

General Lemuel C. Shepherd 

Brig. Gen. Paul D. Sherman 

Lt. Gen. James C. Sherrill, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Stephen Sherwood, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Ralph L. Shifley, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Clarence B. Shimer, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Allen M. Shinn, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. James M. Shoemaker 

Lt. Gen. Raymond L. Shoemaker 

Vice Adm. Wallace B. Short, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Anthony T. Shtogren, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Roland P. Shugg, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William R. Shuler, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Shull, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Burton H. Shupper , USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Sibley, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William B. Sieglaff, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Norman D. Sillin, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Rupert M. Simmerli, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert H. Simmert, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Cecil L. Simmons, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Henry Simon, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Maurice E. Simpson, USN, Ret. 

General William H. Simpson 

Maj. Gen. John F. Sims 

Brig. Gen. Turner A. Sims, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William K. Skaer, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert B. Skinner, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Lecount H. Slocum, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Morris Smellow, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Curtis S. Smiley, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Allen Smith, Jr, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Bertram D. Smith, USN, Ret. 



Brig. Gen. C. Coburn Smith, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Charles H. Smith, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Donald J. Smith 

General Frederic H. Smith, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George F. Smith, USAF, Ret. 

Admiral Harold P. Smith, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Hugh R. Smith 

Brig. Gen. James M. Smith 

Brig. Gen. L. W. Smith 

Brig. Gen. Lynn D. Smith, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Paul E. Smith, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Spencer R. Smith, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Stuart H. Smith, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Wilbur A. Smith, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William T. Smith, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Willard W. Smith, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Ralph A. Snavely, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William O. Snead, USN, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Edwin K. Snyder 

Maj. Gen. Oscar P. Snyder, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Maxwell C. Snyder, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Albin R. Sodergren, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Leo E. Soucek, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard B. Spear 

Brig. Gen. Max H. Specht, USA, Ret. 

General John F. Speer 

Brig. Gen. William Spence, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Donald 0. Spoon, USA, Ret. 

General R. I. Stack 

Brig. Gen. John E. Stannard, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George R. Stanley, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Conrad L. Stansberry, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Allen T. Stanwix-Hay, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. James B. Stapleton, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Merlin H. Staring, USN, Ret. 
General Albert B. Starr 
Maj. Gen. Maxwell W. Steel, USAF, Ret. 
Vice Adm. George P. Steele, II, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Wycliffe E. Steele, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Floyd W. Stewart, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. James L. Stewart, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. LeRoy J. Stewart, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Kenneth Stiles, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Alden E. Stilson, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. James J. Stilwell, USN, Ret. 
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Lewis W. Stocking 
Vice Adm. Thomas M. Stokes, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Jack W. Stone, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Frank B. Stone, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Leslie 0. Stone, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Martin R. Stone, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Aaron P. Storrs, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Charles L. Strain, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Leland S. Stranathan, USAF, Ret. 



77 



Rear Adm. William W. Strange, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Elliott B. Strauss, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Strickland, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Strong, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William A. Stuart, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Coulter R. Sublet t, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Henry Suerstedt, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Henry R. Sullivan, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John B. Sullivan, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William A. Sullivan, USN, Ret. 

William F. Suraraerell 

Rear Adm. Paul E. Summers, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Alexander D. Surles, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Frederick J. Sutterline, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Frank C. Sutton, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Daniel J. Sweeney, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Willieim E. Sweeney, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Douglas M. Swift, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles A. Symroski, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Alden P. Taber, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Avelin P. Tacon, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. C. M. Talbott, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. George C. Talley, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Lawrence F. Tanberg, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Robert M. Tarbox, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Raymond D. Tarbuck, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Tarpley, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. August F. Taute, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edwin A. Taylor, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Taylor 

Rear Adm. Ford N. Taylor, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph I. Taylor, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Leonard B. Taylor, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Robert Taylor, III, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. William A. Temple, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Joseph N. Tenhet, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Frederick R. Terrell, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Roy M. Terry, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harold C. Teubner , USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thoralf T. Thielen 

Maj. Gen. Arthur Thomas, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lloyd H. Thomas, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Charles S. Thompson, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. James H. Thompson, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Mark R. Thompson, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Roy E. Thompson, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Walter G. Thomson, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Wallace 0. Thompson 

Rear Adm. William Thompson, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. John F. Thorlin, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harrison R. Thyng, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Paul W. Tibbets, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Murray J. Tichenor, USN, Ret. 



Vice Adm. Eramett H. Tidd, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Carl Tiedeman, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberraan, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. James B. Tipton, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Benton C. Tolley 

Rear Adm. Kemp Tolley, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Rutledge B. Tompkins, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William A. Tope, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Harold W. Torgerson, USNR, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. John D. Torrey, Jr., USA, Ret. 

General Salvador Torros 

Vice Adm. George C. Towner, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Charles 0. Triebel, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Thomas K. Tripp, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. George W. Trousdale, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Herman J. Trum, III, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Richard B. Tuggle, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Benjamin O. Turnage, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Carl C. Turner, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Turner, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Hiram L. Tuttle 

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Harold H. Twitchell, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Achilles L. Tynes, USA, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Edward H. Underhill, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edgar H. Underwood, USAF, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger , USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Clarence Unnevehr , USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Fay R. Upthegrove, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Lee N. Utz 

Lloyd W. Van Antwerp 

Rear Adm. Clyde J. Van Arsdall, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Willicim M. Van Harlingen, USA, Ret 

Rear Adm. Blinn Van Mater, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Thaddeus J. Van Metre, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harry Van Wyk, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. James E. Van Zandt, USNR, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Roland B. Vanasse, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Daniel Vance, Jr. 

Rear Adm. George Vandeurs, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Walter M. Vann, USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Frank W. Vannoy, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. K. L. Veth, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Fred W. Vetter, Jr., USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Felix L. Vidal, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Warren C. Vincent, USNR, Ret. 

Admiral Quentell Violett, USNR, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Norman H. Vissering, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edward H. Vogel, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ernest S. Von Kleeck, USN, Ret, 

Rear Adm. Curtis F. Vossler, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John R. Wadleigh, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Ruben E. Wagstaff, USN, Ret. 



78 



Rear Adm Charles L. Waite, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. George H. Wales, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Edward K. Walker, USN, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Thomas J. Walker, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Henry T. Waller 
Rear Adm. Harry N. Wallin, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Harvey T. Walsh, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Louis A. Walsh, Jr., USA Ret. 
Rear Adm. Wilfred A. Walter, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Ernest K. Warburton, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Norvell G. Ward, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Ward, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Herbert O. Wardell, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Wardrop, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Thomas G. Warfield, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Aln D. Warnock, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Henry L. Warren, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Hugh Warren, USNR, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Jacob W. Waterhouse, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. John R. Waterman,. USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Odale D. Waters, Jr., USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William W. Watkin, USA, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. James H. Watkins, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF, Ret. 
Lt. Gen. Albert Watson, II, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Carl E. Watson, USNR, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Harold E. Watson, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Paul C. Watson, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. George A. Weaver, USNR, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Wilburn C. Weaver, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. John H. Weber, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. David A. Webster, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. George B. Webster, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Charles S. Weeks, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. John F. Wegforth, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Harold F. Weidner 

Brig. Gen. Walter D. Weikel, AUS, Ret. 

Major Gen. Frank D. Weir 

Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Seth L. Weld, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Vice Adm. Charles Wellborn, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph A. Wellings, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Benjamin 0. Wells, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. David J. Welsh, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Walton K. Weltraer 

Maj. Gen. Donald L. Werbeck, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Holden C. West 

Brig. Gen. Leslie J. Westberg, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Edward W. Westlake 

Maj. Gen. James H. Weyhenmeyer , USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William J. Whelan, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. David L. Whelchel, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Sherburne Whipple, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Richard S. Whitcomb, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Roger E. Whitcomb, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles F. White, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles H. White, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Donald M. White, USN, Ret. 



Maj. Gen. John W. White, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Marshall W. White, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Scott Whitehouse, USNR, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Otis M. Whitney, USA, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Howard R. Whittaker, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Carlos W. Wieber, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Geoffrey P. Wiedeman, USAF, Ret. 
Vice Adm. Charles W. Wilkins, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. John H. Wilkins, USAF, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Collin P. Williams 
Maj. Gen. George V. Williams, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. James W. Williams, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Macpherson B. Williams, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Richard C. Williams, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Roy D. Williams, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Delbert F. Williamson, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Francis T. Williamson, USN, Ret. 
Rear Adm. John H. Willis, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Delmar E. Wilson, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Edwin Mark Wilson, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. George H. Wilson, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. James A. Wilson 
Maj. Gen. Thomas N. Wilson, USAF, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. William R. Wilson 
Vice Adm. L. J. Wiltse, USN, Ret. 
Maj. Gen. Loren G. Windom, USA, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Walter C. Winn, USN, Ret. 
Brig. Gen. Jowell C. Wise, USAF, Ret. 
Rear Adm. Narvin 0. Wittmann, USN, Ret. 

Lt. Gen. Thomas Wolfe 

Brig. Gen. Frank P. Wood, USAF, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Hunter Wood, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Lester O. Wood, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Robert R. Wooding, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. William R. Woodward, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Francis A. Woolfley, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Joseph M Worthington, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Stanley T. Wray, USAF, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Thomas K. Wright, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Henry J. Wuensch 

Rear Adm. Don W. Wulzen, USN, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Ira T. Wyche, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Evan W. Yancey, USN, Ret. 

Rear Adm. Earl P. Yates, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles E. Yeager , USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George H. Yeager, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Emmett F. Yost, USAF, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Charles M. Young, Jr., USA, Ret. 

Admiral Edwin J. S. Young, USN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. George H. Young, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Mason J. Young, USA, Ret. 

Maj. Gen. Carl A. Youngdale 

Brig. Gen. Ninian L. Yuille, USA, Ret. 

Rear Adm. William T. Zink, Jr., OSN, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Kenneth F. Zitzman, USA, Ret. 

Brig. Gen. Virgil L. Zoller, USAF, Ret. 

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Ret. 

Briq. Gen. Edwin A. Zundel, USA, Ret. 



79 

The committee will stand in brief recess while the Senators go to 
vote. When we come back, we will take our final witnesses. Again, 
may I thank you both? 

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.] 

Senator Biden [presiding]. The committee will please come to 
order. 

Our next two witnesses are retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr. 
Victor Fediay. They will be speaking on behalf of the Institute of 
American Relations. 

Dr. Fediay, would you please come up to the witness table? 

General, thank you very much for your patience in sitting here 
as long as you have. I assure you that the lack of attendance is not 
due to a lack of interest in your statement but due to the confusion 
of voting and other matters taking place on the floor of the Senate 
right now. I am sure you know this is a very busy time. I am very 
anxious to hear your statement. Please proceed in any way that 
would be most comfortable to you. 

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID W. WINN (RETIRED), 
POLICY BOARD, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS, 
WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR FEDIAY, 
PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS 

General Winn. I had a chance to learn a little bit about patience, 
so that was no problem, Mr. Senator. 

The statement I am about to make reflects my own opinion. It 
should not in any way be attributed to my former period with the 
Air Force. It does not represent the Air Force. 

Senator Biden. Are you speaking on behalf of the Institute of 
American Relations? 

General Winn. They have arranged for my presence here. To 
that extent, yes, but as far as speaking for the Institute of Ameri- 
can Relations officially, I do not do so. 

I am very pleased to be here to contribute my opinions to this 
discussion. 

Senator Biden. We are anxious to hear from you. 

General Winn. My last job was Commander of the North Ameri- 
can Defense Command Combat Operations Center. This facility is 
located in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex near Colorado Springs; 
with all sources of intelligence available. They watch the Soviet 
Union each day around the clock. Our responsibilities were to 
provide the President and the National Command authorities 
warning and evaluation of any threat to the North American conti- 
nent. From that window, Soviet capability was impressive. 

For example, they outshot us 5 to 1 in space launchers and 4 to 1 
in missiles in 1977. We saw some events that exceeded our own 
capabilities and our technological expectations. Sometimes it took 
us too long to know what we were seeing, and sometimes we were 
not sure at all what we were seeing. Our intelligence collection is 
good, but in my opinion it does not support the conclusion that 
adequate technical verification of Soviet capabilities is possible. 

Yet my concern for the future does not stem from verification 
limitations that I know exist. I am concerned about the basic 
premise of our strategic arms limitation negotiations. The lopsided 
conception of the SALT II Treaty implications worries me far more 



80 

than the prospect of ICBM's flying both ways over the Arctic. I got 
out of the Air Force early because I could not find an arena where 
positions, policies, or concepts could be debated. 

For example, I tried to raise issues against the decision eliminat- 
ing ADCOM [the Aerospace Defense Command]. That decision to 
me did not make sense from a military or management point of 
view. I objected to killing the only integrated homeland air defense 
command we possessed. Nobody even answered the mail. All argu- 
ments were totally ignored from start to finish, not just mine. The 
ADCOM decision was steamrollered from the top. 

Shredding out our only full-time, dedicated heartland defense 
command contributes directly to the SALT II imbalance. The mis- 
sion of a fully integrated command is now to be split four ways. 

It was said that this would save $12 million a year. At the same 
time, we were in the process of eliminating all but a handful of 
ground radars with combat capability, turning our air sovereignty 
over to the FAA with civilian radars and controllers. 

I asked a senior officer privately, if the decision to kill ADCOM 
were yours to make, would you do it, and he said yes. I turned 
away, and he said, Dave, you just don't understand the pressures. 

Well, he is right, I don't know the pressures, and I don't under- 
stand the pressure for SALT II. Why do we insist on this treaty? 
The bottom line of the SALT II advocates is that we are better off 
with it than without it. I think the opposite is true. Take for 
instance the Backfire bomber problem. B-52's are counted in SALT 
II, despite their age and the high threat under which they might 
have to fly. The Soviet Backfires are not counted, despite our near 
total inability even to detect them, much less to destroy them. 

Contrast that with the defense our aging B-52's and FB-lll's 
would meet to reach a Soviet target. While we systematically re- 
duced both our homeland defense interceptor aircraft and ground 
control radars, Russia has built and built and built. The Soviets 
took the lesson of the Cuban crisis of 1962 very seriously. This 
lesson was simply that the power ratio at that time was wrong for 
them. The United States could defend herself. In the early sixties, 
it didn't matter where our interests were threatened. The numbers 
were wrong for them. Now the numbers are different. You have to 
conclude that we haven't paid the price to maintain our military 
parity. The reason that Russia arms is to become a force against 
which there is no defense. With SALT II, we see in action the belief 
that there is a disconnect between raw military power and their 
international behavior. 

The SALT II issue is more than ballistic missiles, bombers, and 
submarines. A lot of history and a few fundamentals are involved. 

It has been over 6 years since I returned from Hanoi's Hoa Lo 
Prison. During these 6 years, and especially during the last 30 
months, a pattern in American dialog has developed that is famil- 
iar to me, and that pattern goes back to Hanoi. When my para- 
chute popped open over North Vietnam, there was little doubt that 
my own freedom was over. The Hanoi prisoner had no choices. 
Pressure was total. Control was complete. There was no end short 
of yielding. For the prisoner, the inevitable result was inability to 
continue resistance. 



81 

Now America is being challenged, and we have all been condi- 
tioned in a sense much like that prisoner in Hanoi. 

Freedom throughout the world is being squeezed left, and I 
wonder how many of us are aware and anxious about it. The 
prisoner in Hanoi was left with nothing to link him to tradition, 
family, or country. The United States is not yet cut off from its 
traditional, historical, and constitutional strength, but the same 
inexorable pressures faced by the prisoner in solitary can be seen 
ahead for the American people. America's solitary confinement is 
our isolation from the premises on which SALT and other issues 
are being faced, and the same temptation to cave in is working on 
free people in the same way they did on the captive man in Hanoi. 
We are being pushed, and pushed very hard. 

The basic question, I think, of the SALT II Treaty debate is, do 
we have a choice in this matter? SALT II is an agreement which 
we will honor with those whose aim is the destruction of free 
choice. Is the SALT II ratification process the final argument that 
everything will come out OK if we simply trust those who say they 
understand these things? 

The American people just as the Soviet citizen may not under- 
stand the technicalities of assured destruction, or even when it is 
about to occur, but every person understands that life without 
choice is the ultimate weakness. 

This treaty lacks fundamental logic and ignores history. Its worst 
feature is that it is being sold on a mother knows best basis, when 
people ought to wonder whether mother knows what she is doing. 
We don't have to do this, but the circle of decision gets smaller and 
smaller. We risk having fewer choices in deciding when wisdom 
needs the strength to say no in meeting its responsibilities. 

In its recently published annual report, the International Insti- 
tute of Strategic Studies in London warns the free world that the 
Soviet Union leaves the United States and its allies far behind in 
military force, both strategic and conventional. The new generation 
of missiles developed and deployed by the Soviet Union is more 
powerful than any of ours, which have not been significantly im- 
proved since the sixties. The Institute estimates that the Soviet 
Union is in the position of achieving a first strike capability 
against the United States. 

These conclusions of the prestigious London Institute, plainly 
stated, put the ratification of SALT II into a very dubious category. 
During the 10 years of SALT negotiations, the balance has clearly 
changed in the overall security posture vis-a-vis that of the Soviet 
Union. We still have a fundamental policy objective of essential 
equivalence. 

Defense Secretary Brown, speaking of the uncertainties of Soviet 
response, said: 

Basically they require us to insist on essential equivalence with the Soviet Union 
in strategic nuclear forces. 

He also said: 

The issue is now to make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot gain any 
military or political advantage from their strategic forces. Insistence on essential 
equivalence guards against any danger that the Soviets might be seen as superior, 
even if the perception is not technically justified. 



82 

By way of partial clarification of what is understood to be the 
essential equivalence, Secretary Brown said: 

By essential equivalence we mean the maintenance of conditions such that Soviet 
strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage 
coverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage. Any advantage in force char- 
acteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteris- 
tics, and the U.S. posture is not in fact and is not seen as, inferior in performance to 
the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. 

These conditions exist today, and our objective in the current SALT II negotia- 
tions is to maintain them in the future. 

The International Institute of Strategic Studies disagrees with 
Secretary Brown. The conditions for essential equivalence of Febru- 
ary 1978, obviously are not a reality in September 1979. According 
to the London Institute, the Soviets are "seen as superior, and the 
U.S. posture is in fact seen as inferior." 

As if to prove that the strategic forces are usable instruments of 
political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage, the 
Soviet Union has special military troops to maneuver jointly with 
Cubans on Cuban territory. Under the umbrella of strategic superi- 
ority, the Soviets apparently feel free to use their forces in the 
proximity of Nicaragua or any country which may become their 
next target. The presence of 3,000 Soviet troops is not a direct 
threat to the United States, but for wars in Central America it 
could be decisive. 

It is imperative that a SALT Treaty which the United States 
ratifies does not force the United States to look the other way at 
every geopolitical move the Soviet Union makes, even in the west- 
ern hemisphere. If the U.S.S.R. should decide to test our will today 
or tomorrow, how many warheads would be presumed to be aboard 
the SS-18? As agreed in the treaty? If they chose to use their 
superior navy to close the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean in 
1980, where would the Backfire bombers be based? And what range 
would Backfires reach, to what targets, just in case we tried to 
respond? 

Would SALT II have helped? Treaties do not deter. Negotiations 
never reach the bottom line of deterrence. 

Without any agreement at all, we halted the B-1 and enhanced 
radiation weapons, and stretched out other programs into the 
period we now seek to cover with SALT II. 

Advocates of SALT II insist that it puts a cap on the number of 
MIRV-type warheads the Soviets can install on the 308 heavy 
missiles. It is a strange argument. The agreement prohibits the 
United States from having any such missiles. By 1985, the Soviets 
will probably have improved the accuracy and yield of increased 
numbers of warheads. They could increase the MIRV's on each SS- 
18 to 20 or even 30. 

There is an argument that the M-X will re-establish the strate- 
gic balance in our favor, but if the production of the M-X moves 
forward as rapidly as possible, it would be ready for initial deploy- 
ment only by 1986, and not fully available until 1989. By that time, 
the SS-18's could be fully MIRVed with 30 accurate warheads per 
missile. That could give the Soviet Union the capability of striking 
all M-X and Minuteman missiles in one attack, forcing the United 
States to launch on warning or face destruction without retali- 
ation. 



83 

The SALT II numbers game is obviously not in our favor, but 
that clearly is not the main reason why the treaty should not be 
ratified in its present form. The conditions for negotiation of SALT 
III will be even more restrictive for the United States than experi- 
enced in SALT II if it is ratified as it stands. The vulnerability of 
peace arrangements will be absolute if the conditions of SALT II 
permit the maximization of Soviet advantage in space and in the 
air while Soviet conventional forces continue to grow. 

Simply by having so much to negotiate away, the Soviet Union 
has sent us a message. The first line is, let's negotiate if it makes 
you feel better. The last line is, let the results speak for them- 
selves. 

Senator Biden. Thank you very much. General. Your testimony 
is very straightforward, and it reiterates some of the points that 
have been made earlier by your former colleagues and evidences 
the same concern. Consequently, I only had a few questions, but in 
light of the fact that I have only SV2 minutes to vote on the next 
amendment that is up on the floor, I will not even attempt to ask 
those questions. I thank you on behalf of the committee for your 
statement. Thank you for your patience. 

This hearing will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, the committee recessed, to meet again at 2 p.m. 
the same day.] 



84 

Afternoon Session 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318, 
Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of 
the committee), presiding. 

Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Sarbanes, Muskie, 
Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa. 

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order. 

OPENING STATEMENT 

This afternoon we continue to hear from public witnesses on the 
SALT II Treaty. 

Appearing first will be Hon. Charles Yost, Senator Thomas Mcln- 
tyre and Coretta Scott King, on behalf of Americans for SALT. 

Next we will hear from three religious groups. Cardinal Krol will 
testify for the U.S. Catholic Conference. Dr. Claire Randall will 
appear for the National Council of Churches. Albert Vorspan will 
testify on behalf of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. 

Ambassador Yost, we will ask you to begin, if you will. 

Ambassador Yost. Senator Mclntyre will open for us if that is 
agreeable to you, sir. 

The Chairman. That is an appropriate way for us to commence 
these hearings. 

Tom, it does my heart good to see you again. 

Senator McIntyre. Even with my bald head? 

The Chairman. To see you looking so well. And I think that I 
express the feeling of all of your colleagues and friends in the 
Senate when I give you a warm welcome back. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. McINTYRE, JR., PRESIDENT, 

AMERICANS FOR SALT> 

Senator McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of 
the Foreign Relations Committee. Today I offer my testimony on 
the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a 
nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am president. 

Americans for SALT is a coalition of individuals and major orga- 
nizations in support of the ratification of the SALT II agreement. 
The individuals include retired military officers, former Govern- 
ment officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations 
include religious groups, business associations, labor unions, scien- 
tific and educational organizations, and public interest groups. 

The working consensus of these many Americans is that the 
ratification of SALT II is essential for the security of the American 
people in several important ways. 

First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat 
we would likely face without SALT will be both quantitatively and 
qualitatively more formidable than the threat under SALT. 

It is precisely because many of us are concerned about an unre- 
stricted Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT re- 
strictions on the Soviets. The more one is concerned about the 
formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more one should seek to 
avoid an even greater threat, one without SALT. 



See page 86 for Senator Mclntyre's prepared statement. 



85 

Second, under this treaty we will be able to plan our defense 
programs more effectively because we will be able to predict with 
greater accuracy and greater confidence the size and shape of the 
Soviet threat. The treaty requires them to fit their forces into a 
well-defined grid of specific limits, sublimits, and qualitative re- 
strictions. 

Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with 
our national technical means of monitoring their weapons develop- 
ment and deployment. Under SALT, we will be able to focus our 
R. & D. moneys much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup 
since that threat itself will be more predictable. 

Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater 
weapons we need to secure our common defense. 

When I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military 
Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Commit- 
tee, my colleagues and I were especially vigilant on this point. So I 
am particularly reassured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified 
that the United States will be free to exploit its truly formidable 
military technology to meet the Soviet challenge. 

Fourth, I believe we have an opportunity to reunite our Nation 
behind a prudent national defense program through the debate on 
SALT. For too long, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 
we have been divided about both our defense requirements and 
SALT. 

At the heart of this division is a fallacy, a fallacy that SALT and 
national defense are mutually exclusive. The American people 
want both a strong national defense and a SALT agreement. The 
SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad work- 
ing American middle that will support both a strong defense pro- 
gram and arms limitations as a means to that same end. 

However, Mr. Chairman, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will 
return to a polarized politics which will make it difficult for us to 
rally a stable base of public support behind defense programs. At a 
time when we find a deep American desire to get together to 
manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas — inflation, 
energy, taxes — we need to demonstrate again to ourselves and our 
allies and our adversaries that we can find common ground to 
manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weapons. 

This suggests my final point. Although it cannot be proved in 
any systematic way, we somehow all know that this agreement 
enhances our security because it represents the common interests 
of both nuclear superpowers in avoiding the use of nuclear weap- 
ons. 

The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but 
it does, because of this unstated premise, make the use of these 
weapons somehow less likely. SALT will not eliminate military 
competition, but it will make it less dangerous and more orderly. 

In sum, I believe the American people, and in fact people all over 
the globe, know they will be more secure in a world in which the 
two most powerful nations continue to work in our common inter- 
est to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war within the framework of 
this treaty. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas J. Mclntyre follows:] 



86 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas J. McIntyre, Jr. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Today I offer 
my testimony on the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a 
nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am President. Americans for SALT is a 
coalition of individuals and major organizations in support of the ratification of the 
SALT II Agreement. The individuals include retired military officers, former gov- 
ernment officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations include reli- 
gious groups, business associations, labor unions, scientific and educational organiza- 
tions and public interest groups. 

The working consensus of these many Americans is that the ratification of SALT 
II is essential for the security of the American people. I believe SALT will enhance 
our security in several important ways. 

First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat we would likely 
face without SALT will be both quantitatively and qualitatively more formidable 
than the threat under SALT. 

As Secretary Brown has testified: 

The Soviet total strategic missile and bomber force will likely be 30 percent larger 
without SALT than with it. 

Their total strategic MIRVed ballistic missiles, both land and sea, will likely be 50 
percent greater without SALT than under SALT. 

Their MIRVed ICBM's could be up to 75 percent greater if unrestricted by SALT. 

Their total strategic nuclear warheads and gravity bombs could easily be half 
again as large a force if unrestricted by SALT. 

The threat to our ICBM's from their silo killer warheads could double without 
SALT restraints on MIRVed ICBM launchers and number of warheads permitted on 
each. 

Without SALT, the Backfire bomber production could grow unrestricted beyond 
its current level. Without SALT, the Soviet SS-16, the only mobile ICBM fully 
developed by either side, could be deployed. Without SALT, the Soviets could pro- 
ceed to develop their fifth generation of ICBM's without any restrictions. 

In sum, it's precisely because many of us are concerned about an unrestricted 
Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT restrictions on the Soviets. The 
more one is concerned about the formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more 
one should seek to avoid an even greater one without SALT. 

There is a second way SALT will enhance our security. Under this treaty, we will 
be able to plan our defense programs more effectively, because we will be able to 
predict with greater accuracy and confidence the size and shape of the Soviet 
threat. Under SALT, we will know the number and kinds of strategic weapons 
developed and deployed by the Soviets, because the treaty requires them to fit their 
forces into a well defined grid of specific limits, sublimits and qualitative restric- 
tions. Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with our national 
technical means of monitoring their weapons development and deployment. Since 
our own military research and development programs must be designed to hedge 
uncertainties about the Soviet threat, the greater the unknown, the more difficult 
our own R. & D. task. In other words, under SALT, we will be able to focus our R. & 
D. monies much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup since that threat 
itself will be more predictable. 

Let me suggest an important way this is true. As we all know, current intelli- 
gence projections suggest the Soviets will be able to mount a technical threat to our 
ICBM's in the early to mid-1980's. Any of the basing schemes under consideration to 
ensure our ICBM's would survive this threat is designed against a specific presup- 
posed number of attacking silo-killer Soviet warheads. Under SALT II, we can 
predict the maximum number our M-X basing design must be able to counter, 
because the treaty will limit the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers and the 
number of warheads permitted on each. Without SALT, that number will be much 
higher and much more difficult to predict. 

This is vividly true in the case of the threat to our ICBM's from the Soviet heavy 
missiles. SALT restrict's the SS-18's to 308 with no more than 10 warheads on each. 
Without SALT, they could keep their hot production line going and could relatively 
cheaply build up to 500 SS-18's. They could also double the number of warheads on 
each. So instead of having to design an MX basing scheme that would counter a 
threat of 3,000 warheads from the SS-18's under SALT, we would have to design 
one to counter 10,000 warheads from the SS-18's. So in this case as in others, SALT 
will help us design an effective solution to a critical military problem we will face. 

Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater weapons we need 
to insure our common defense. With virtually no exceptions and certainly no impor- 
tant exceptions, the United States will be free to exploit its formidable military 
technology to meet the Soviet challenge. I am particularly reassured that the Joint 



87 

Chiefs of Staff testified this is the case. When I served as Chairman of the Subcom- 
mittee on Military Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Com- 
mittee, my colleagues and I were particularly vigilant on this point. Throughout our 
hearings, we consistently inquired about the degree of technological freedom the 
emerging agreement would leave us. We urged the Administration to avoid as much 
as possible any such restrictions. 

I realize that our success in ensuring this freedom is a source of some frustration 
to some who wish that SALT would have resolved domestic debates about what 
weapons systems we require. I never believed that this was a proper objective of 
SALT negotiations. If, of course, we would have been required in the bargaining to 
accept restrictions, we could judge that bargain in the aggregate. But I personally 
reject the view that it should be an objective of SALT either to preclude or mandate 
a particular U.S. weapons system. I always felt that was something we should 
decide for ourselves in our councils. 

There is a fourth way SALT can enhance our national security. I believe that we 
have an opportunity to reunite our nation behind a prudent national defense 
program through the debate on SALT. For too long, we have been divided about 
both our defense requirements and SALT. At the heart of this division is a fallacy 
that SALT and national defense are mutually exclusive. I believe SALT should be a 
means to a more effective common defense for our nation rather than as an aspect 
of detente or as an end in itself. Further, I believe, the American people want both 
a strong national defense and a SALT agreement. 

The SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad working Ameri- 
can middle that will support both a strong defense program and arms limitations as 
a means to that same end. For the first time since Vietnam, we have an opportunity 
to rebuild a working majority on this common ground. 

However, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will return to a polarized politics 
which will make it difficult for us to rally a stable base of public support behind 
defense programs. At a time when we find a deep American desire to get together to 
manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas — inflation, energy, taxes — we 
need to demonstrate again to ourselves, our allies, and our adversaries that we can 
find common ground to manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weap- 
ons. 

This suggests my final point. Although it can't be proved in any systematic way, 
we somehow all know that this agreement enhances our security because it repre- 
sents the common efforts of both nuclear superpowers to avoid the use of nuclear 
weapons. The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but it does, 
because of this unstated premise, make the use of these weapons somehow less 
likely. SALT will not eliminate military competition, but it will make it less danger- 
ous and more orderly. 

In sum, I believe that the American people, in fact people all over the globe, know 
that they will be more secure in a world in which the two most powerful nations 
continue to work in our common interests to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war 
within the framework of this treaty. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator, for an excellent 
statement. 

I believe that in the interest of time, we should hear from each 
member of the panel. Then we will address questions to the panel. 
I think that Mrs. King might testify next. 

Mrs. King often speaks for the poor, and we would be interested 
in knowing what there is in SALT for Americans who are con- 
cerned about food, housing, and living standards for our own 
people. 

Mrs. King, I am very pleased to welcome you this afternoon. 

STATEMENT OF MRS. CORETTA SCOTT KING, MEMBER, 
AMERICANS FOR SALT 

Mrs. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your distinguished 
colleagues on the committee. 

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before this com- 
mittee in support of ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am doubly 
honored to appear before you today, honored by the privilege of 



88 

speaking to this important committee on a subject of such grave 
significance to the peace of the world. 

I am honored to be the first woman, the only mother, and the 
only representative of any American minority to have this privi- 
lege. I am not unaware of the heavy responsibility that this places 
on me, Mr. Chairman, because it is exactly the women, the moth- 
ers, and the minorities of this country that are the real silent 
majority, who pay the highest price for the continuance of the 
world's arms race and would pay the highest price for any nuclear 
or even nonnuclear war. 

In the course of the past few weeks, the committee has heard 
voluminous testimony on the merits and shortcomings of this 
treaty by experts in the field of nuclear and strategic matters. I, 
too, come to you as an expert because I am a citizen of this Nation; 
and as a citizen, I know that the issues in this historic debate on 
SALT are not confined to missile counts and throw-weight and base 
modes. 

As we all know, a more basic and fundamental issue tests us and 
challenges us today, and it is this: Shall we, in the name of nation- 
al security, commit ourselves to a course of confrontation and 
potential nuclear annihilation by rejecting this treaty; or shall we 
as a Nation seek a more lasting security through the peaceful 
resolution of conflict in a way that allows us to free our spirits and 
resources for the development of human potential in our society? 

These are public policy choices which must be made by citizens, 
for they are the true experts. They are the people whose lives are 
to be risked, whose children's lives are to be mortgaged, and whose 
parents' lives are to be wasted should we choose to pursue a course 
of superiority and winability in an arms race that knows no win- 
ners. 

Yet, most Americans are overlooked and excluded from this 
debate. Public polls showing citizen support for the SALT process 
are ignored or glossed over because we are told citizens are not 
experts. 

My husband, Martin Luther King, Jr., knew these same frustra- 
tions during another historical national debate. Though a recent 
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, my husband was informed by 
so-called specialists on the Vietnam war that he was not enough of 
an expert to discuss this basic issue of war and peace, of violence 
and nonviolence. 

I fervently hope that we as a Nation, in contemplating the 
wisdom of this treaty to limit nuclear weapons, will listen to those 
whose lives are directly affected by the outcome of this debate: The 
mother in Utah who gives her child milk knowing the dangers of 
radiation from nuclear weapons testing— that mother is an expert 
on SALT; the unemployed youth who cannot find a job and knows 
that military spending creates less jobs than spending on human 
need— that youth is an expert on SALT; the elderly American 
holding his grandchild, who witnessed the massive loss of life in 
past world wars — that American is an expert on SALT. 

Indeed, no issue of public policy is more personal than this issue 
of limiting nuclear weapons and ending this senseless arms race. 
Let me give you an example from an area of personal concerns: 
unemployment. Studies have shown that $1 billion of military 



89 

spending creates about 75,000 jobs. The same amount, if spent on 
construction, creates 100,000; on health care, 139,000 jobs; on edu- 
cation, 188,000 jobs. 

Thus, the military budget swells in the name of national security 
while our most precious resources stand idle. Our communities 
may be ringed by missiles and our cities surrounded by silos, but 
how secure are we if America's future, blighted by high unemploy- 
ment, holds only the prospect of deterioration and decay. 

The twiii perils of unemployment and inflation are not confined 
to our shores. Today, the economically dislocating effects of the 
arms race can be felt throughout the world. Children with distend- 
ed bellies still suffer for want of adequate food; yet global military 
expenditures now exceed $400 billion a year. 

This vast expansion of destructive power at the expense of 
human needs has served to decrease our global security and leaves 
us ever more vulnerable to random annihilation through nuclear 
exchange or accident. Yet we recognize these perils and have 
shown the vision and moral leadership to engage in a process of 
negotiated restraint. 

As we in this country reexamine our commitment to the SALT 
process, we must ask ourselves this question: What perception will 
the world community have of our Nation should we fail, after 7 
years of deliberation, to proceed with this historic agreement to 
limit nuclear weaponry? Nothing less than our future is at stake. 

Without SALT, any prospect of progress toward further arms 
limitation is clouded. Without SALT, any hope of replenishing our 
human resources is undermined. Without SALT, any dream of 
peace for our children and their children is diminished; in its place, 
a legacy of tension and fear. 

Skeptics will say that the SALT process is untenable in today's 
world, that mutual accommodation is unthinkable, and that har- 
mony in international relations is impossible. They choose instead 
to pursue a policy of confrontation and violence, despite the poten- 
tial for human extinction. 

I am accustomed to a great deal of skepticism and even outrage 
at the thought that the principles of nonviolent social change are 
relevant to world affairs. Yet, I firmly believe that the world's 
people, though often divided by nationalism and racism, are united 
in their instinctive will to live and their civilized will to do so in 
peace. 

I am reminded of my husband's words almost 15 years ago now, 
and I quote: "I refuse to accept the cynical notion that nation after 
nation must spiral down a militaristic stairway into the hell of 
nuclear destruction. I believe that unarmed truth and an uncondi- 
tional love will have the final word of reality." 

Mr. Chairman, this treaty to limit strategic weapons is not a 
perfect agreement. Indeed, it has been termed "a modest step." 
How do you define "modest" when any progress toward bringing 
nuclear weapons under some control means a better chance for a 
peaceful future for everyone? 

I am sure I will be well understood when I say I have learned the 
virtue of patience, although patience can seem a terrible taskmas- 
ter when every fiber of one's being longs for speed in setting right 
what one knows to be wrong. 



90 

The important thing is to keep pressing forward, to take advan- 
tage of every opportunity for making progress, even if it is only one 
step at a time. This opportunity to limit nuclear weapons under 
the SALT II Treaty, to reduce the probability of destroying civiliza- 
tion itself, and to turn our labors toward improving the quality of 
all our lives rather than the useless waste of our resources must 
not be lost. 

My experience, Mr. Chairman, is that the United States is most 
respected in the rest of the world where our other virtues are most 
recognized, the virtues of quiet rather than noise, of the power to 
build rather than the power to destroy, and of the spiritual power 
of being a mediator in disputes, a reconciler among nations rather 
than a belligerent and demanding nation. 

We as a people are by far the most powerful nation in the world, 
Mr. Chairman, not only politically, economically, and militarily 
but, I firmly believe, spiritually. We have the potential for world 
leadership. What other nation could have sponsored a Camp David 
peace conference? What other world leader but Jimmy Carter 
could have brought together those two ancient enemies to a table 
of dialog? What other nation could have sent an Andrew Young to 
the United Nations for the healing of the nations and the opening 
of conversation and dialog of all peoples until he gained the love 
and respect of almost everyone in that most suspicious and conspir- 
acy-ridden of all world institutions? 

The United States, Mr. Chairman, is a great hope for peace if we 
can but learn to use our power with more dignity and restraint. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, let us not delude ourselves out of the 
challenge before us. It is not a technical nor a military one; it is a 
moral one, a challenge of moral leadership. The whole world is 
watching the United States, whether the United States will take 
the high road of making the dramatic offer to continue this small 
peace process that we already have started with SALT II. 

My late husband found it necessary to remind his listeners that 
once to every man and nation is given the moment to decide. That 
this is an hour for courage and decision. The U.S. Senate can 
decide to take one small step forward for dialog and peace with the 
Soviet Union, which could be one giant step forward for the 
women, the mothers, the children, and the poor, not only for this 
country and the Soviet Union, but for the whole world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mrs. King, for a very 
eloquent statement given with much feeling. 

I would now like to ask Ambassador Charles Yost to present his 
testimony. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST, 
COCHAIRMAN OF AMERICANS FOR SALT ' 

Mr. Yost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I testify before you today as a cochairman of Americans for 
SALT and as a former foreign service officer with some 45 years of 
experience in international affairs. That service included substan- 
tial experience in negotiating with the Soviets at the Dumbarton 
Oaks, San Francisco, and Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in 



' See page 92 for Ambassador Yost's prepared statement. 



91 

Vienna under the Four Power occupation, director of the State 
Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the 
United Nations for 7 years, including those of the BerHn, Cuban, 
and Congo crises. 

I have, therefore, no illusions either about Soviet objectives or 
about the need for great vigilance in doing business with them. 

Senator Mclntyre has described the character and purpose of our 
organization. I am submitting as an annex to my testimony a list of 
the cochairmen, of the members of our advisory council and of 
about 140 prominent persons who are publicly supporting our orga- 
nization and our goals. 

As you will note, many of those persons are officers or repre- 
sentatives of other organizations with substantial nationwide mem- 
berships, some of which assisted in the establishment of Americans 
for SALT, and many of which have taken a public position in 
support of ratification of the treaty. 

With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the 
treaty, you gentlemen are, of course, aware that a substantial 
number of public opinion polls taken over the past year show that 
about 70 percent of Americans polled consistently favored a strate- 
gic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. 

The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the senior officials of the administration in 
their testimony to you before the recess have submitted convincing 
evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty before 
you will, on balance, reinforce the security of the United States, 
will not inhibit us from further strengthening our armed forces in 
ways necessary to our defense, and will in several important re- 
spects place the United States in a more advantageous military 
position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed. 

Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiat- 
ing with the Soviets, such as Averell Harriman and John McCloy, 
have supported these views and have recommended ratification. So, 
indeed, have the principal leaders of our European allies. 

After studying the testimony offered to this committee and ex- 
amining the provisions of the treaty thoroughly, Americans for 
SALT is strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified, 
will serve to reinforce both the security of the United States and 
the prospects of world peace. 

It therefore, in our view, clearly meets the objective which those 
70 percent of Americans who in opinion polls supported an arms 
control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports from 
public interest groups throughout the country which are alined 
with us confirmed that this is the case. 

Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the 
treaty provide for more substantial reductions. However, part of a 
loaf is decidedly better than no bread. If the SALT process is 
continued and not interrupted, such larger reductions, to which 
both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in 
the next stage of the negotiations. 

On the other hand, as Mrs. King has just pointed out, rejection 
or indefinite delay would seriously increase international tensions 
and risks of world conflict. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets 



48-260 0-79 Pt.U 



92 

would gain specific substantial military advantages which the 
treaty would deny them. 

They would, instead of being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to 
2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by 1985 to as many as 
3,000. Instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their 300 
heavy missiles, they would be able to install as many as 30 on each, 
a difference of 3,000 warheads. 

They would be able to deploy three or four new strategic systems 
rather than only the one permitted under the treaty. They would 
be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring of their mili- 
tary activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty. 

All these options offered to 'die Soviets by rejection of the treaty 
could constitute, together, a most serious threat to our national 
security. I should like to recedl in this connection the public state- 
ment Secretary- Kissinger made in January 1977, just before leav- 
ing office, and I qvjote: 

I believe that to achieve a usable <"jperiority in strategic n'jclear weapons is 
extremely unlikely and relatively easy to prevent, and the obsession vdth it dis- 
tracts us. 

What I presume Mr. Kissinger meant was that as long as we 
maintain a credible second strike capability and show a clear in- 
tention to use it if necessary, any superiority the Soviet Union 
might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or 
politically, because their use would bring about almost total devas- 
tation of their homeland. 

We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the 
process of reinforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and 
with air-launched cruise missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no 
obstacles in the way of our maintaining that capability. As long^ as 
we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to nuclear 
blackmail are, in my view, wholly implausible. 

The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any 
further depth with the substance of the treaty. I should like, there- 
fore, to submit for the record a statement of 10 points explaining 
briefly why I personally support the Treaty and why the principal 
arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing. 

I trust that a sober assessment of the benefits of the SALT II 
Treaty and of the quite predictable consequences of its being reject- 
ed will commend themselves to you gentlemen and lead you to the 
same conclusions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost fol- 
lows:] 

Prepared Statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I testify before you today as a Co- 
Chair of Americans for SALT and as a former Foreign Service Officer with some 45 
years of experience in international affairs. That service included substantial expe- 
rience in negotiating with the Soviets— at the Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco and 
Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in Vienna under Four Power occupation, as 
Director of the State Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the 
United Nations for seven years, including those of the Berlin, Cuban and Congo 
crises. I have no illusions, therefore, either about Soviet objectives or about the need 
for great vigilance in doing business with them. 

"Americans For SALT" is a private organization established for the purpose of 
mobilizing public support for the conclusion and ratification of the SALT II Treaty. 
There is submitted as an annex to this testimony a list of the co-chairmen, of the 



93 

members of our Advisory Council and of about 140 prominent persons who are 
publicly supporting our organization and our goals. As you will note, many of these 
persons are officers or representatives of other organizations with substantial na- 
tionwide memberships, some of which assisted in the establishment of "Americans 
For SALT" and many of which have taken a public position in support of ratifica- 
tion of the treaty. 

With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the treaty, you 
gentlemen are of course aware that a substantial number of public opinion polls 
taken over the past year show that about 70 percent of Americans polled consistent- 
ly favored a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The Secretar- 
ies of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior 
officials of the Administration in their testimony to you before the recess have 
submitted convincing evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty, 
SALT n, will, on balance, reenforce the security of the United States, will not 
inhibit us from further strenghthening our armed forces in ways necessary to our 
defense, and will in several important respects place the United States in a more 
advantageous military position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed. 
Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiating with the Soviets, 
such as Averell Harriman, John J. McCloy, and, subject to some conditions, Henry 
Kissinger, have supported these views and recommended ratification of the treaty. 

After the study of testimony offered to this Committee and a careful examination 
of the provisions of the treaty by its own experts, "Americans For SALT" is 
strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified, will serve to reenforce both 
the security of the United States and the prospects of world peace. It therefore 
clearly meets the objective which those 70 percent of Americans who in opinion 
polls supported an arms control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports 
from public interest groups throughout the country which are aligned with us 
confirm that this is the case. 

Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the treaty provide for 
more substantial reductions. However, part of a loaf is decidedly better than no 
bread. If the SALT process is continued and not interrupted, such larger reduction, 
to which both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in the next 
stage of negotiations. 

Returning for a moment to Mr. Kissinger, I should like to recall a public state- 
ment he made in January 1977, just before leaving office: "I believe that to achieve 
a usable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relative- 
ly easy to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us." 

What Mr. Kissinger meant was that, as long as we maintain a credible second 
strike capability, and show a clear intention to use it if necessary, any superiority 
the Soviet Union might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or 
politically, because its use would bring about almost total devastation of their 
homeland. We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the process of 
reenforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and with air-launched cruise 
missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no obstacles in the way of our maintaining that 
capability. As long as we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to 
nuclear blackmail are in my view wholly implausible. 

The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any depth with the 
substance of the treaty. I should like therefore to submit for the record a statement 
of 10 points explaining briefly why I personally support the treaty and why the 
principal arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing. 

In conclusion I would recall that when the actor Maurice Chevalier was asked 
how he felt about getting old, he replied that he was not particularly enthusiastic 
about it but he preferred it to the alternative. I believe that a sober assessment of 
the benefit of the SALT II Treaty, and of the quite predictable consequences of 
rejecting it, should lead us to the same conclusion. 

I have carefully followed the debate on the SALT II Treaty during the past year, 
including testimony pro and con before this and other Senate committees. To 
summarize my conclusions, there seem to me ten major points which emerge in 
favor of ratification of the treaty. Several of these points seem to me to refute 
convincingly the principal arguments put forward by opponents of the treaty. 

1. The highest officials of our Government, including those responsible for our 
national defense, have testified unequivocally that this treaty will, modestly but 
usefully, strengthen the security of the United States. I see no reason to doubt 
either their judgement or their sincerity. 

2. The treaty does not prohibit the United States from taking a wide variety of 
additional measures to strengthen its national defense, if the Administration and 
the Congress deem it necessary to do so. Such permitted measures, several of which 
are already under way, include Minuteman modernization, deployment of Trident 



94 

submarines and missiles, deployment of cruise missiles, deplojonent of the MX 
missile, and an unlimited range of improvements in conventional forces. 

3. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets would gain specific substantial 
military advantages which the treaty would deny them. They would, instead of 
being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to 2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by 
1985 to as many as 3,000; instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their 
300 heavy missiles they would be able to install as many as 30 on each (a difference 
of 6,000 warheads, more than their total present number); they would be able to 
deploy three or four new strategic systems, rather than only the one permitted 
under the treaty; they would be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring 
of their military activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty. All these 
options offered gratuitously to the Soviets by rejection of the treaty could constitute 
together a most serious threat to our national security. 

4. One of the principal arguments by opponents of the treaty relates to an alleged 
approaching vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles. If such a vulnerability were 
to occur, it would occur either with or without the treaty. Personally I consider such 
a supposed vulnerability to be purely theoretical. As long as we maintain other 
invulnerable systems, such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets will not be fools ., 
enough to risk destruction of most of their cities and industries by attacking us. 
Moreover, they would not be able to achieve political advantages by threatening to 
do so, since both we and they would know that such threats were bluff and would 
not be carried out. 

5. Our principal NATO allies have publicly urged ratification of the treaty and 
several of their leaders have publicly emphasized the dismay they would feel if it 
were rejected. In his testimony before this Committee July 31 Henry Kissinger said: 
"There is no doubt that failure to ratify the treaty will shake European confidence 
in an American government that for seven years assured them that it knew what it 
was doing." 

6. There can be little doubt that rejection of the treaty, afer seven years of 
painstaking negotiation, would lead to a further escalation of the arms race, the 
deployment of additional new systems on both sides, and very heavy expenditures 
which would not be incurred if the treaty takes effect. There is no warrant for 
believing that the Soviets have reached a ceiling of military expenditure. Experi- 
ence clearly shows that they will spend whatever amounts they think are required 
to keep even with us. 

7. On the question of linkage with SALT of Soviet behavior in the Third World, 
there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the Soviets would behave better if 
SALT is rejected than if it is ratified. On the contrary, a significant inhibition on 
their objectionable behavior — their concern not to risk being too offensive to us — 
would be diminished by the interruption of the SALT relationship. 

8. There is no reason to believe that, if the treaty is rejected or if amendments are 
added which would require renegotiation, such renegotiation could be either begun 
or concluded quickly. The United States is about to enter an election year. More 
important, the Soviet Union is already preparing for and about to undergo a change 
in leadership. It is highly probable that the SALT process would remain in suspense 
until that change, which as Mr. Harriman has pointed out could be adversely 
affected by rejection of SALT, has been completed and assimilated. By that time any 
one of a dozen contingencies could occur, as we have seen so often in the past 7 
years, to cause further and indefinite delay. 

9. If the treaty ever should be renegotiated, to accommodate amendments pro- 
posed by the United States, we would of course, if we expected a new treaty to 
result, have to be prepared to make concessions to the Soviets to balance those we 
would be asking of them. What concessions would we be prepared to make? We 
might in fact end up with no treaty at all or with one worse on balance than the 
one we now have before us. 

10. Finally, rejection of the treaty would delay indefinitely, perhaps for many 
years, the process of negotiating the more substantial reductions which are stipulat- 
ed in the Statement of Principles in the present text and which both proponents 
and opponents of the treaty solemnly proclaim is their principal objective. 

Americans for "SALT 

President 
Thomas Mclntyre, Former United States Senator. 

Cochairs 

Marjorie Benton, Delegate to the United Nations Special Session on Disarma- 
ment. 

Clark Clifford, Former Secretary of Defense. 



95 

The Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C, President, University of Notre 
Dame. 

Townsend Hoopes, Former Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

Henry Cabot Lodge, Former United States Senator; Former Ambassador to the 
United Nations, and to Vietnam. 

Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers of America. 

Charles Yost, Former Ambassador to the United Nations. 

Advisory council 

Thomas Bradley, Mayor, City of Los Angeles. 

Marjorie Bell Chambers, President, American Association of University Women. 

Norman Cousins, President, World Federalists Association. 

Milton S. Eisenhower, President Emeritus, The Johns Hopkins University. 

Murray Finley, President, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union. 

Douglas Eraser, President, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America. 

Emil Mazey, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America. 

Joyce D. Miller, President, Coalition of Labor Union Women. 

Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Associate Director, The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institu- 
tion. 

Rabbi Arthur Schneier, Park East Synagogue. 

Stuart Symington, Former United States Senator; Former Secretary of the Air 
Force. 

Foy Valentine, Executive Secretary, Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission. 

Jerome B. Wiesner, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 



96 



Hayward Alker, Pmlenor of Political Science. 

Maisachus^-inlCwnite of Technology 
Marion Anderson! Employment Research 

Auociation 
Les Aspin. Member. United States House of 

Representatives 
Richard Bamet. Senior Fellow. Institute for 

Policy Studies 
Dons Bato 
Roben S. Benismm, Chairman of the Board of 

Governors. United Natior.s Association 
Meyer Berger. Chairman, Meyer Berger Company 
Charles V. Bergstrom, Executive Director. Office 

for Governmental Aflairr, Lutheran CoufKil in 

the U S. A. 
Hans Bethe. Professor of Nuclear Physics, Cornell 

University 
David Blumberg. Former President. B'nai B'rith 
Philip W Bonsai, Form«r United States 

Ambassador 
Kenneth Bouldmg. Ptofettor of Economics, 

University of Colorado 
Thomas Bradley. Mayor. City of Los Angeles 
Joel Brooke. Former President, Fund for Peace 
Helen Caldicon. M.D. 
Bob Carr, Member, United States House of 

Representatives 
Marjone Bell Chambers. President, American 

Association of University Women 
Charles N. Coilatos. Commissioner of Veteran's 

Services, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Arthur Collins. Jr.. Lt General. US Army (Ret.) 
Randloph P. Compion, Chairman of the Board, 

Compton Foundation 
Howard R. Conant. Chairman, Interstate Steel 

Company 
Sister Carol Coston, Executive Director, Network. 
Norman Cousins. President, '.Vorld Federalists 

Association 
Anhur Macy Cox, Former Specialist in Soviet 

Affairs. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
Karl Deutsch, Stanfield Professor of tnternationai 

Peace. Harvard University 
James A. Donovan. Colonel, United States 

Marine Corps (Ret.) 
Paul Doty, Director. Program for Science and 

International Affairs, Harvard University 
Thomas Downey. Member, United States House 

of Representatives 
Sidney DreH. Deputy Director, Stanford Linear 

Accelerator Center 
TiUord E. Dudley, President, Property 

Management and Maintenance 
Charles Dyson, Chairman of the Board, Dyson 

Kissner Corporation 
Helen W Edey, M.D 
Milton S. EiFenhower, President Emeritus, The 

Johns Hopkins University 
Abraham Femberg. Chairman Emeritus, The 

Weinman Institute of Science 
Bernard T- Feid, Professor of Physics. 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Joseph Fiiner, President, Nobiemet International 
Stanley Fine, Rear Admiral. United Stales Navy 

(Ret } 
Murray Finley. President, Amalgamated Clothing 

and Textile Workers Union 
David Fmn, Chairman of the Board. Ruder 

& Finn 
Douglas Fraser, President, United Auto, 

Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 

of America 
John Kenneth Gaibranh, Profe*sor Emeritus, 

Department of Economics, Harvard University 
Edward Garvey. Executive Director, National 

Football League Players Association 
Robert W Gilmore. Vice Chairman, Narional 

Committee on U.S. -China Relations 
Ernest Gross. Attorney at Law 
C. Jarrett Gray, President. Women's Division of 

Global Ministries. United Methodist Church 
Morton Halpenn. Director. Center for National 

Security Studies 
Armand Hammer, President, Occidental 

Petroleum 
T. Walter Hardy. Jr , Chaimian of the Board, 

Hardy Salt Company 
Tom Harkin, Member, United States House of 

Representative* 



SUPPORTERS* 

James Herman. President, International 

Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's U^ton 
Beniamin L. Hooks. Executive Director. National 

Association for the Advancement of Colored 

People 
Proctor W. Houghton. President, Houghton 

Chemical Company 
Most Reverend Raymond G- Honthausen, 

Archbishop of Seattle 
Henry George Jacobs, President. H.G. Jacobs 

Foundation 
Michael F Jacobson, Executive Director, Center 

for Science in the Public Interest 
Mildred Jeffrey, Former National Chair, National 

Women's Political Caucus 
Mark Kaplan, Attorney at Law 
Donald M. Kendall, Chairman and Chief 

Executive Officer, PepsiCo, Inc. 
Henry Kendall, Founder, Union of Cor>cerned 

Scientists 
Isaac C. Kidd. Jr . Admiral, United States 

Navy (Ret.) 
George Kutiakowsky, Professor Ementus of 

Chemistry. Harvard University; Former * 

Presidential Science Advisor 
Phihp M Klutznick. Senior Panner. Ktutrnick 

Investments 
Betty Goei? Lall. Associate Director, New Yorn 

State School of Indusi'ia! and Labor Reiatic^s: 

Oeltgate to United Nations Panel of Experts on 

the Relationship between Disarmament and 

International Security 
Edward Lamb. Chairman of the Board, Lamb 

Entc'orises. Inc. 
Eugene Lang, Chairman, REFAC Technology 

Development Corporation 
John Marshall Lee, Vice Admira!. United States 

Navy (Pet. I 
C. Payne Lucas, Executive Director. Africare 
Bishop James K. Maihewi. Washington D.C. 

Area United Methodist Church 
Robert Matteson. Former Director, Program 

Planning Staff. United States Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency 
Emil Mazey, Secretary-Treasurer, United Auto, 

Ae'ospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 

of America 
Eugene J. McCarthy. Former United States 

Senator 
George C McGhee, Former Ambassador, Former 

Under Sei.re'.dry of State for Political Affairs 
Joyce D. Miller, President, Coalition of Labor 

Union Women 
Patsy Mink. President. Americans for Democratic 

Action 
Ins Mitgang. National Chair, National Women's 

Political Caucus 
Dsvid Mtxner. Mixner Scott Associates 
L. Calvin Moore. Citizenship Legislative Director. 

Oil, Chemital and Atomic Workers 
Kenneth Montgomery, Attorney at Law 
Edward P. Morgan. News Commentator 
Hans J Morgenthau, Professor of Political 

Science, New School of Social Research 
Frank E. Moss, Former United Slates Senator 
M, Stewart Mott, Ne« York, New York 
Paul Newman Actor 
Henry E, Niles. Chairman, Business Executives 

Move for New National Priorities 
Ara Ot^emal, Chairman SATRA Corporation 
Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, Stanford Lmear 

Accelerator Center 
John Aristotle Phillips, Princeton Student who 

designed his own bomb 
Harvey Picker, Dean, School of International 

Affairs. Columbia University 
Rabbi Ely Pilchik. President. Central Conference 

of American Rabbis 
Jo Pomerance, Chairperson, Task Force for a 

Nuclear Te^t Ban Treaty 
Avery Post. President. United Church of Christ 
Max Potash. President, Polyvinyl Chemical 

Industries 
Neal Potter. President, Montgomery County 

Council (Maryland) 
William Potter, Professor of Political Science 

Tulane University 
Bernard Rapoport, Chairman, American Income 

Life Insurance Company 



AMERICANS FOR SALT Gg>^^ 

Rudolph Rasin, President, The Rasin Corporation 
Roger Raveile, Professor of Science and Public 

Policy, University of Cahfornia, San Diego 
Joseph Reber, President. The Reber Corporation 
Charles Robinson, Chairman. Delaware Trust 

Company 



Robert V. Roosa. Former Under Secretary of 

Treasury for Monetary Affairs 
.James W. Rouse, Chairman of the Board, The 

Rouse Company » 

Ralph Rudd. Clark, Friends Committee on 

National Legislation 
Jack Rutna, Professor of Electrical Engineering. 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Bruce Russeit. Professor of Political Science, 

Yale University 
John Ryor, Former President, National 

Education Association 
Stanley Salen. National Commission for Citizens 

in Education 
Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Associate Oirectoi, The 

Wilson Center, Smithsonian inttilution 
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, President, American 

Hebrew Congregation 
Lo'j'S Schneider, Executive Secretary, American 

Friends Service Committee 
Rabbi Arthur Schneier, Park East Synagogue 
Patricia Schroeder, Member, Uniied States 

House of Representatives 
Herbert ScoviHe, Jr., Formei Deputy Director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency 
Peter Scott. Mixner Scott Associates 
Glenn T. Seaborg, Former Chairman, Atomic 

Energy Commisi.on 
Jacob Sheinkman, Secretary-Treasurer, 

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 

Union 
Sargent Shriver, Former Ambassador to France, 

Former Director of the Peace Corps 
J. David Singer, Mental Health Research Unit. 

University of Michigan 

C. Maxwell Stanley, Chairman of I'le Board, 
Stanley Consultants, Inc. 

Sol Stctin. Senior Executive Vice President, 

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 

Union 
Philip Stewart, Professor of Political Science 

Ohio State University 
Robert Stuart. President, National Can 

Corporation. Chairman of the Board, World 

Federalists Association 
Louis Susman. Attorney at Law 
Stuart Symington, Former United States 

Senator; Former Secretary of the Air Force 
William Thompson, Stated C;erk of General 

Assen-ibly, United f-reEbyte'ian Churches 
Jarnes C. Thomson, Curator. Nieman Foundation 

tor Journalism 
John Toll. Chairman, Arms Reversal Program 
John Topping. President, Ripon Society 
Arnold E. True. Rear Admiral, United States 

Navy (Ret.) 
Kosta Tsipis. Research FeKow. Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology 
Foy Valentine. Executive Secretary, Southern 

Baptist Christian Life Commission 
Nan Waterman. Chairperson, Common Cauae 
Bernard S Weiss, Former Vice President. 

Gimbel Brothers 
Charles W. Whaien, Jr., Former Member, United 

States House of Representatives 
John H Whitaker. Senior Vice President, 

Whitaker Cable Company 
Jerome B. Wiesner, President, Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology; Former Presidential 

Advisor 
William Winpisinger. President, International 

Association of Machinists 
Emily Womach, Chair of the Board and 

President, Women's National Bank 
Jerry Wurf. President. American Federation of 

Slate, County and Municipal Employees 
William Wynn. President. Retail Clerks Iniernationat 

Union 

D. Robert Varnail, Jr . Chairman. Yarwey 
Corporation 



'Inclusion of the rwmet listed above does not necessarily indicate organizational endorsement. 
'This is a paaial list. 



97 

DR. Kissinger's testimony on salt ii 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Yost, for a very clear 
statement of your position. The 10 points to which you refer will be 
incorporated in the record. 

You refer to Mr. Kissinger and his statement of January 1977 in 
which he said, I believe, that to achieve a usable superiority in 
strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relatively easy 
to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us. Have you read 
Mr. Kissinger's more recent testimony on the SALT II Treaty? 

Ambassador Yost. I have, indeed. And he referred, I noted, to a 
statement somewhat similar to this which he had made in a press 
conference, as he described it, in a moment of fatigue and exas- 
peration. This particular statement, however, I don t believe was 
made in any such context. It was made in a relaxed moment when 
he was about to retire. And I have no reason to believe he would 
have changed his mind in regard to the statement or that it is not 
just as true now as it was then. 

The Chairman. You believe that this statement has the candor 
that we normally associate with a death statement; that is, he was 
approaching the end of his tenure and could consider these matters 
in a reflective and candid \yay? [Laughter.] 

Ambassador Yost. I do think so. Senator. Actually, if one reads 
the statements he made in the last month or two before he left 
office, they were characterized by that frankness which I think 
reflected exactly the state of mind you describe. 

NUCLEAR superiority PROMOTES SOVIET ADVENTURISM 

The Chairman. I found his argument unconvincing, that is the 
argument that he made when he appeared before this committee 
that nuclear superiority, whatever that may be, somehow creates 
political advantages that can be used tactically in promoting Soviet 
adventurism. 

It seems to me that in the past, there is no evidence nor do I 
recall that the Secretary was able to cite any evidence to support 
that proposition. At times when we have had that nuclear superior- 
ity, we have been faced with extreme Soviet adventurism, as in 
Berlin and, indeed, in Cuba in 1962. And I hardly believe that the 
Russians will withdraw from Angola, Ethiopia, or, indeed, from 
Cuba where, we now know, they have deployed a combat brigade, 
because of any belief that we will nuke them if they don't. 

Ambassador Yost. I would quite agree. Senator. I think both 
sides realize that the results of resorting to nuclear weapons would 
rebound on them in such a devastating fashion that they are 
extremely unlikely to use them. And since each side knows that 
the other feels that way, nuclear blackmail is simply not convinc- 
ing. 

The Chairman. It is not convincing, and Secretary Kissinger did 
not make it so in his testimony, at least not to me. 

OVERKILL CAPACITY TO DESTROY 

Would you agree that once the two countries have achieved that 
degree of nuclear strength that both have overkill capacity to 
destroy the other even after surviving an initial attack, that then 



98 

the further accumulation of these weapons becomes irrational, 
wasteful and, indeed, can only increase the level of danger that 
any nuclear war that might result from such gross miscalculation 
or some tragic mistake would prove to be utterly devastating to 
both civilizations? 

Ambassador Yost. It certainly seems so to me. Nor do I think 
that we can rely — if, for example, the treaty should not be ap- 
proved — on the Soviets not continuing to match whatever we felt 
we should spend on nuclear weapons. I noticed that one of the 
witnesses this morning expressed the view that they would be 
unlikely to do so, that they had reached the limit of their expendi- 
tures. 

Frankly, I think that is a rather naive point of view. I think they 
have demonstrated over many years that at no matter what cost or 
sacrifice, they will spend whatever they think is necessary to 
match us. 

MINORITY AWARENESS OF SALT II 

The Chairman. Mrs. King, you spoke from the heart this after- 
noon, and I have no question about your personal commitment to 
the support of this treaty. What I would like to ask you is, to the 
extent that you feel you can answer the question: Does the black 
community in this country as a whole really care about SALT, or 
does any other minority group, for that matter? Do you think that 
there is an awareness of how SALT relates or could relate to these 
other problems that you have mentioned, that is, the problems of 
poverty, the problems of insufficient food, the problems of inad- 
equate housing, that tend to plague so many of our black citizens? 

Mrs. King. Yes, I think very definitely that the black community 
is aware of this relationship. I think that that awareness was 
created during the Vietnam war period when Martin Luther King, 
Jr., tied that relationship between excessive spending on an ill- 
fated, immoral war to the lack of resources for the disadvantaged 
and deprived communities. 

Also, the concern is that blacks have in the past been selected in 
larger numbers to participate in combat when there was a war, 
and we know what that means in terms of broken families and 
lives that are destroyed and so on. So I think that the black 
community is very much aware of what this could mean. 

We are very concerned about the bread and butter issues. Most 
black people feel that we can have both. There was a discussion 
during the last Vietnam crisis, guns versus butter and so on. I 
think black people want the Government to be prepared but they 
do not feel that being prepared means neglecting those human 
needs that are so vital to the survival of our culture and heritage 
and our very being. 

The Chairman. I wanted to make a comment on that particular 
portion of your testimony because it seems to me a very poignant 
example of how weak a given government can be despite the enor- 
mity of the arms with which it surrounds itself. That is the recent 
case of Iran. 

There was certainly no insufficiency of weaponry to protect the 
Shah and his regime; yet the lack of solidarity among his people, 
the lack of support, rendered those forces impotent when the 



99 

people once took to the streets against him. And in the long run, 
the strength of this country will depend in part upon its weapons 
but far more fundamentally upon the cohesiveness of the American 
people and their willingness to support the country in times of 
danger and to fight for it. 

That, in turn, as you have said, does not depend upon surround- 
ing our cities with missiles if our cities are full of decadence and 
decay and the needs of our people left unattended. 

CONTRIBUTION SALT MAKES IN CONTROLLING NUCLEAR ARMS 

Senator Mclntyre, I have just one question I would like to ad- 
dress to you, and then I will turn to Senator Javits. I ask this 
question because Senator McGovern is not here and he might not 
return. It is a question I think he might want asked. He has often 
brought up the point in the course of the hearings. 

If this treaty depends on a cocommitment to a whole series of 
new weapons systems such as the M-X missile, the cruise missile, 
the Trident submarine, the others that have been urged upon us, 
what contribution do you think the treaty makes to the ostensible 
objective which it seeks to serve, namely, putting wraps on the 
nuclear arms race? 

We know that under the treaty, both sides can continue to add 
thousands of nuclear warheads to their arsenals. And we are told 
that we should ratify the treaty only if we also approve a very 
expensive new commitment to the construction and deployment of 
additional nuclear weapons systems not prohibited by the treaty. 

So there are those, including Senator McGovern, who have asked 
whether this is really an arms control treaty or an arms accelera- 
tion treaty when viewed in that context. 

Senator McIntyre. Mr. Chairman, I think it is regrettable, but it 
is a matter of fact of life that the treaty is being subjected to all 
forms of linkage. As I said in my statement, I believe the treaty 
puts on a cap, some limitations on the Soviet threat. The treaty 
continues the SALT process, which hopefully will begin to bring 
the levels further down in SALT III and SALT IV. 

We do have to recognize, what I know we saw in the R. & D. 
subcommittee 6 or 7 years ago, what we considered to be quantum 
leaps in the research and development that the Soviets were sup- 
porting compared to which had previously been more or less incre- 
mental. 

So we have to turn our attention to the fact that our land-based 
missiles may very well be in jeopardy by the mideighties. 

Now, I don't suppose you recall, Mr. Chairman, but when the 
M-X was first broached, it had a $20 to $50 billion price tag, and the 
Air Force could not tell your Armed Services Committee how they 
were going to do it. I believe I went to the floor and spoke against 
the M-X system as being premature. As history shows, the Navy 
was wrong to go too fast on the Trident. 

But now I do think we are ready to move out with a solution. So 
if an M-X system can be put together that will insure that the 
land-based missiles will not be at risk in the mideighties, then I 
would be for it. 

So I regret, too, that this treaty did not do all we wanted it to do. 
I regret that the turndown is not more significant. Yet, you want 



100 

to cite one thing, the Russians are bound to do something under 
this treaty. It may be singular, to demolish and destroy some 250 of 
their missile launchers. 

Now, you can say they are obsolete launchers, but they are as 
good as the ones we have on our Minuteman 11. We know the 
Soviets are aggressive. They are adventuresome, and nothing will 
change them. 

If we do not pass this treaty, it is not going to make them worse 
or better. If we pass the treaty, it is not going to make them any 
different. 

As a young man in World War II, I ended up in Czechoslovakia 
in the Army of Occupation, in Strakonice, Czechoslovakia. I will 
never forget it. We were along side the Russians, and the Russians 
were as aggressive as any people I have ever met in my life. 

Their soldiers thought nothing of trying to steal our Jeeps, and 
the only Vvay you could get it through their head that they were 
not to take the Jeep was to take your 45 and put it in their face. 

We are dealing with a difficult people. But we must try to 
understand them. We must realize that the SALT process is so 
important, because, as Ccretta King has said, and I have heard 
scenarios as you have of nuclear exchanges, it is just insanity. 

So I say yes, we must continue to improve our nilitary system to 
be sure to balance, to maintain the essential equivalence and to 
continue to strive so that the SALT process will eventually turn 
this arms race around. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Senator Javits. 

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to join the Chair in welcoming the witnesses. 

It is a great service you have produced for the committee today, 
and I am very happy to see you going out and answering many of 
the questions that many people in the communities ask. You have 
great talent. It is a good thing. 

We had this morning a very powerful aggregation of organiza- 
tions on the other side. That is good, too. It puts us to our proof to 
argue with them. But I am glad to see that there is an effective 
committee on the pro side. 

UNITED STATES SEIZED BY STATE OF EUPHORIA AFTER SALT I 

I have one question to ask of you, Senator. We served together. 
Retired admirals and generals testified this morning. They say that 
in the 5 years after SALT I was ratified, the United States was 
seized by a euphoria that disarmament was at hand. 

We were sold on the idea of overkill without taking account of 
the fact that in the meantime, counterforce had perhaps overtaken 
that concept; that, therefore, we allowed the Soviet Union to race 
way ahead of us until today we don't have superiority, and even 
the doctrine of equivalence has now been, they think, seriously 
jeopardized. 

Now, from your own experience, would you be kind enough to 
make any comment that you wish? 

Senator McIntyre. Senator, I have great respect for our retired 
military and great respect for the military people I had the oppor- 
tunity to work with while in the Senate. I once decided that the 



101 

difficulty with the admirals of the ocean and sea when they 
became Chief of Naval Operations is that they wanted every ship 
they could get. 

I thought it was our job to try to test their requests in the 
Yankee sane way. So I believe that our retired military and other 
distinguished people who may have testified this morning — and I 
didn't hear their testimony — can recount all our past mistakes, but 
when they tell you that the Russians are far superior, I disagree. 

We have a new Trident submarine about to go in. We are putting 
in F-14's to replace the F-4's that were so successful. We have 
more things going for us. I have been constantly amazed with our 
technology and with the creativity of our experts. So I don't say we 
are second at all. I think we are in a period of essential equiv- 
alence. 

I deplore the tactics of the people who are against this treaty. It 
is so easy to be against, picking away and trying to say that 
mistakes have been made in the past when they probably contrib- 
uted to those mistakes. 

UNITED STATES AT MERCY OF SOVIET BLACKMAIL BY 1985 

Senator Javits. The argument is also made by the same wit- 
nesses that they believe that a euphoria could seize us again after 
we sign SALT II and that we will slip even further behind, so that 
by 1985, at the expiration of the treaty period, we will be complete- 
ly at the mercy of whatever the Soviets want to do through nuclear 
blackmail. 

Senator McIntyre. Let me say here, and then I will quit on this, 
the question of what we are going to construct and build for our 
defense is one that should be taken by itself and not in conjunction 
with this important treaty. We should be able to decide in our own 
minds, and in your debates on the floor of the Senate and in the 
committees, with the help of our military, whether there are gaps 
we should close and whether there are weaknesses we should over- 
come. These issues should stand by themselves, our Armed Forces 
and our defense system. The treaty, which I believe is a step 
toward what we all want, sanity and peace, should be judged on its 
own. 

Senator Javits. So you would not subscribe to Dr. Kissinger's 
proposition either, would you, that when you sign this treaty, you 
have to have a flat commitment of x dollars or x programs, or 
whatever else you have to promise in order to guarantee in ad- 
vance? 

Senator McIntyre. No. I do not subscribe to the theory of tran- 
quilizers. I think we can in our own House, Senate, and administra- 
tion decide what we need to close any gap. We have the technology 
to do it and more. 

Senator Javits. And that this is a democratic country, Senator, 
and that that is the way it is done, not by generals writing condi- 
tions. 

Senator McIntyre. Right. 

Senator Javits. Now, I had the great privilege of serving with 
Ambassador Yost in the United Nations in 1970. I have very high 
regard for him. I have read your 10 points, by the way, and I 



102 

believe they are excellent. I wish you had read them to us. They 
could very well be a syllabus for the debate on this treaty. 
Ambassador Yost. Thank you, Senator. 

UNITED STATES WILLPOWER TO USE TRIAD 

Senator Javits. I would like to call one thing to your attention. 
It is a very important point which I will be raising time and again. 
We have a Triad. That is our defense. The Soviet Union, in effect, 
has a unitary system, to wit, land-based missiles. 

The rest of it is coming aboard, the Navy SLBM's, et cetera, but 
they hardly pretend that it represents a major part of their offen- 
sive nuclear capability. 

Now, all the witnesses are arguing as if we had nothing but land- 
based missiles, as if we had no SLBM's and no bombers. They are 
just disregarding them, pushing it out of the window. And yet we 
have spent billions on these programs. 

The Secretary of Defense testified here that these legs of the 
Triad are critical to us, that they are a significant part of our 
counterforce capability certainly for the next 5 years until we get 
the M-X missile. 

Now, I notice that you say: "As long as we maintain other 
invulnerable systems such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets 
will not be fools enough to risk destruction of most of their cities 
and industries by attacking us." Well, if you listen to Dr. Kissinger, 
Ambassador Yost, you would not believe that. 

He says no President of the United States will dare to use them 
when the showdown comes. 

Now, you have been our representative at the United Nations 
and this is your paper. What do you say about that? 

Ambassador Yost. Senator, I have heard that argument not only 
from Dr. Kissinger but from many others, and it has never seemed 
to me convincing. After all, why did we build a Triad if we didn't 
intend to use it? The purpose, of course, is deterrence. And to 
simply assume that if one element of the Triad is outmoded or for 
any reason is unusable, that we are going to throw up our hands 
and abandon the other two seems to me to run counter to the 
entire purpose of our defense programs for the last 30 years. 

So I would entirely agree with you that we do have other ele- 
ments of our Triad, unlike the Soviets, who rely almost entirely on 
their land-based missiles, and we are in the process of reinforcing 
the sea-based missiles and we are about to go in for air-launched 
cruise missiles. 

So I would say that regardless of whether or not our land-based 
missiles become vulnerable, that we are in a very safe, secure 
situation. 

Senator Javits. We should not duplicate everything the Russians 
do man-for-man, tank-for-tank, plane-for-plane, missile-for-missile. 
On the contrary. I am a tennis player. I know the surest way to 
lose is to play the other fellow's game. 

justification for advocacy of salt 

Mrs. King, I have just one question of you. I am delighted that 
you are with us. 



103 

This is a very rough game for poor people. A huge part of our 
budget is going for defense with more in the mill. So much going 
for military spending is pretty sad stuff, and more will go, I regret 
to tell you. Under those circumstances, how do you justify, in the 
interests of the poor, your advocacy of SALT? 

It certainly maintains the level of roughly present expenditures 
and may involve us in more. Can we explain to the poor — and you 
are one of the most eloquent exponents — that without this treaty, 
if we do turn it down, the desperate of our country could be very 
much worse off than they are today? 

Mrs. King. I think, as difficult as it is to explain to people who 
are struggling with the necessities of life that the alternative is 

Senator Javits. Worse. 

Mrs. King. Total destruction, almost, we have to try to do that. 
In some of my lecturing in talking to college students who are very 
idealistic, I have had to try to answer some of these questions. And 
I am a practical idealist, you know. I dream of a day when we 
actually will have a disarmed world, you know. 

I share the views that my husband had that we have to move 
toward that time. But I realize that we are not nearly there and we 
have a long, long way to go. And as long as there are the realities 
of being destroyed by other nations, responsible people in govern- 
ment must make preparation. 

So I have said as far as I am concerned I do believe in disarma- 
ment. I am a nonviolent person. I believe that ultimately we have 
to disarm the whole world. But I can only say to people that I talk 
to that it is very unrealistic to think, even to equate not spending a 
certain amount for defense in the real world we live in, and to use 
the argument that we must take away from the preparedness in 
case there is a war, that we must take away from that and use that 
money for the resources to feed the poor. 

The poor must be fed. We must do that. But to use that as an 
argument and say that, there are some people who feel that some- 
how there is no justification for spending the enormous amount for 
our military defense and spending so little for the human needs. 

I subscribe to that, too, but I am realistic enough to know that 
our Government is not going to do that at this time. Until we can 
somehow sit down together and work these things out between the 
Russians and ourselves, we have to somehow destroy the feeling of 
fear, eliminate the feeling of fear within people. 

As my colleague has said here, it is a process. We have to start 
this process, and I think this is the beginning. We are a long way 
from having the answer, but I feel it is important for me to be here 
to say something in support of this treaty because without this, I 
fear what the alternative will be for all of us. 

Senator Javits. I can assure you, Mrs. King, without it there will 
be no limit whatever on the stakes of the game. 

Mrs. King. Yes. 

Senator Javits. Therefore, any limit is better for the poor who 
are bound to get the worst chewed up in a war. 

Mrs. King. Right. 

Senator Javits. So, the most we can do is limit the stakes and 
cut down the possibilities. 

Thank you. 



104 

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits. 

When I asked Senator McGovern's question, I didn't know he 
was going to return in time to ask it himself. So he will now ask 
the questions I had intended to put to you. [Laughter.] 

Senator McGovern. You probably did a better job with it than I 
would have, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to observe that we have three unusually thoughtful 
and qualified witnesses here today in Ambassador Yost, Mrs. King 
and our colleague. Senator Mclntyre. I wanted to ask a couple of 
general questions. 

OVERALL STANCE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP 

I would like to begin with you, Mr. Yost, if I may. 

Last spring, Richard Barnett wrote an article in the Foreign 
Affairs Quarterly in which he pleaded for a more comprehensive 
approach to the Soviet Union. He makes this observation in the 
opening paragraph of the article. 

He observes that the strategic arms limitation negotiations in 
Geneva and Moscow have been exhausting, and the arguments 
over ratification in Washington promise to be embittering. The 
process has not led to an improved international climate. Indeed, a 
strong case can be made that in the last few years, the SALT 
negotiations have exacerbated tensions between the two superpow- 
ers. 

Do you feel that through the whole SALT process — and this 
article was written 4 or 5 months ago and we have now had the 
experience for several weeks of the ratification process — we are 
improving our overall stance and our relationships with the Soviet 
Union, the relationship between the so-called superpowers, or are 
they being exacerbated. 

Ambassador Yost. No, Senator, I don't agree that without the 
SALT negotiation, the SALT process over the past few years, our 
relations with the Soviet Union would have been better. I think 
they would have been decidedly worse. With all the other differ- 
ences of opinion and conflicts that we have with the Soviets, at 
least the SALT process, although in my opinion it moved much too 
slowly, requiring 7 years, nevertheless was an anchor and it did 
serve as one common objective that we were both agreed on pursu- 
ing. 

And while, of course, there was sharp argument about some 
elements in it, on the whole it served to keep us from drifting 
further apart. It is, after all, the knowledge of the two governments 
that their peoples are hostage to each other, that either can de- 
stroy the other, that provides some limits on the ambitions or 
adventurism that might otherwise be shown. 

And the fact that both are engaging and have been willing to 
engage now for 10 years in this process of trying gradually to n.ove 
toward some more stable situation is a positive factor that has 
improved relations. 

I am confident that had that process not existed, or if it should 
now end, our relations would be infinitely worse and, as Senator 
Javits has just said, both sides would be spending far more on 
armaments than they have been. 



105 

Senator McGovern. Well, I am inclined to agree with what you 
have said, that the effort has been worthwhile. However it has also 
been frustrating. It is one process that will help remove some of 
the ambiguity between the two superpowers. How much it will do 
in the way of actual arms limitation, to say nothing of arms 
reduction, I am not at all clear on. But I do think it helps remove 
some of the elements of confusion and ambiguity between the great 
powers and in that sense is important. 

All three of you now have argued, I take it, that it is in the 
interest of the United States that this agreement be ratified. Is 
that correct? 

[Mrs. King nods affirmatively.] 

[Senator Mclntyre nods affirmatively.] 

[Ambassador Yost nods affirmatively.] 

LINKAGE TO OTHER ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP 

Senator McGovern. If that is true, it seems to me, then, that we 
ought not surrender that interest. If it is in the U.S. interest to 
ratify this treaty, we ought not surrender that because we are 
peeved or concerned or alarmed by developments in some other 
aspect of the Soviet-American relationship. Would you agree with 
that? 

Ambassador Yost. Yes, I would. It has been my experience over 
the last 30 years that clashes between us and the Soviet Union in 
many parts of the world are simply bound to occur. As regrettable 
as they are, they are, I am afraid, unavoidable in the present 
climate. 

I feel that if we should, whenever there is a clash of this kind, 
suspend the arms control process, it would aggravate rather than 
improve the situation. 

Senator McGovern. I don't think there is any doubt about the 
judgment of some of the Senators who have said that the presence 
of the Soviet forces in Cuba is going to make it harder to ratify this 
treaty. On the other hand, in terms of logical thinking about what 
is in the interest of the United States, it does seem peculiar that 
we would punish ourselves by denying ourselves this treaty be- 
cause we are unhappy about something else the Soviets do. 

If the treaty is in our interest, how does it serve the U.S. interest 
then to reject it because we are unhappy about something that has 
taken place elsewhere in the world? That is to inflict punishment 
on ourselves, is it not? 

Ambassador Yost. I would feel so. Senator. I feel, for the reasons 
I stated in those 10 points, that the treaty is very definitely in our 
security interests and that it should stand on its own feet. The 
Soviets are doing a great many things in many parts of the world 
of which I strongly disapprove. 

Nevertheless, I continue to think that it is in our interest to 
make this particular agreement with them and ratify it. 

Senator McGovern. I do think it is important for us to empha- 
size that this treaty is not a reward for Soviet good behavior, and 
rejecting the treaty is not a logical form of punishment for Soviet 
misbehavior. 

If you are going to accept the proposition that this treaty helps 
the United States, it seems to me that the so-called linkage argu- 



106 

ment on how we are going to use our support or withdrawing our 
support from the treaty to regulate the Soviets elsewhere around 
the world does not carry much weight. 

Ambassador Yost. I agree. 

Senator McGovern. My time is just about up but I just want to 
underscore again here what Mrs. King and Senator Mclntyre and 
you have said, Ambassador Yost. I think there are sources of 
American strength that are very important for us to use around 
the world. But the one area where we do not have a clear advan- 
tage over the Soviet Union is in the military field. 

There are a good many other fields where we do: the field of 
economics, the field of human rights, and in our ability to use 
intelligent diplomacy. Those are the areas where I would hope 
more of the competition would be directed rather than keeping so 
much of it focused on the military struggle. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator McGovern. 

Senator Hayakawa. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start by saying to you. Senator Mclntyre, it is a pleasure 
to see you again. Let me also welcome Mrs. King and Ambassador 
Yost. 

I would like to ask Ambassador Yost something, to start with. He 
just said the Soviets are doing many things in many parts of the 
world of which you profoundly disapprove. Ambassador Yost. 

Ambassador Yost. [Nods affirmatively.] 

ANTICIPATED SOVIET BEHAVIOR AFTER SALT II 

Senator Hayakawa. What bothers me is so many of the things of 
which you disapprove — and I am sure you and I agree on what we 
disapprove of, Soviet adventurism in Angola, Ethiopia, South 
Yemen, weapons and military advisers to 40 or more African na- 
tions, stirring things up in the Middle East, Latin America and so 
on — so many of these things happened after the signing of SALT L 
What is going to happen after the signing of SALT II? 

It seems as if SALT I gave them the assurance that they could go 
ahead with these things. 

Ambassador Yost. Well, Senator, I would not be inclined to 
associate those two elements so closely. I would think that we 
should combat those particular examples of Soviet adventurism 
which you have cited and that we should find appropriate means of 
doing so. It differs in each case, of course. There is no across-the- 
board solution. 

I personally would like to see the United Nations used a good 
deal more than it is in dealing with some of those problems you 
mentioned. But I do not think that it would be either desirable or 
effective to try to link all of them with the SALT Treaty or the 
SALT process. 

As I mentioned earlier, I am sure, since incidents of this kind are 
bound to keep occurring, that would be the end of any arms control 
negotiation because they will keep occurring. 

If, for example, the treaty should be rejected or indefinitely 
delayed, I don't think it would improve Soviet behavior one iota. 
They would go right on doing, in Angola or wherever else, exactly 



107 

what they have been doing. In fact, they might behave a little 
worse because this one element of restraint, their expectation and 
desire to have an arms control agreement with us, would be elimi- 
nated. 

So, while I agree with what Senator McGovern has said, that 
there is an obvious political connection which affects American 
public opinion necessarily, I do think that we should try to sepa- 
rate these issues to the extent that we can because in our view the 
SALT Treaty is so much in our security interest that it would be 
very foolish indeed to throw it away in the hope that it might 
make the Soviets behave better in Angola, Cuba or wherever, 
because I don't think that they would. 

SALT I NOT TIED TO ADVENTURISM 

Senator Hayakawa. Your reply essentially, then, is that the 
signing of SALT I is not to be connected with the adventurism. 

Ambassador Yost. I don't think it made any difference in their 
behavior in the past. 

SALT II MAY DIMINISH ADVENTURISM 

Senator Hayakawa. Are you not also saying the signing of SALT 
II may diminish that adventurism in the future? 

Ambassador Yost. I think the whole SALT process, as long as it 
goes on, not simply the fact that we have signed and ratified SALT 
II but that we have immediately, as the statement of principles in 
SALT II provides, started the negotiation of SALT III, will have 
some moderating effect on their behavior. It certainly will not stop 
all the behavior of which we disapprove, but it will, in my opinion, 
be less serious, less troublesome than if there were no SALT proc- 
ess. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

EFFECT OF CUBAN PROBLEM ON SALT POSITION 

The next question I would like to ask, and I address it to all 
three of you and any one of you is free to answer it in any way you 
like, is: Does the revelation of the existence of a Soviet combat 
brigade in Cuba influence in any way your position on SALT II? 
That is, not only on the treaty itself but our approach to its 
ratification. 

Ambassador Yost. Should I say a few words and see if my 
colleagues want to? 

Senator Hayakawa. Go ahead. 

Ambassador Yost. No, Senator, I think not, for the reasons I 
have just cited. I think SALT II is in our interest; that we will be 
more secure with it than without it; that their arms would be 
restrained in ways they would not be without the treaty, and 
therefore, we should go ahead and pin down that treaty while we 
can. 

I dislike seeing Soviet troops in Cuba. I hope we can find other 
ways of dealing with that and eliminating that situation. I don't 
think there is anything that we need to be panicky about. After all, 
we are a considerable power, and 3,000 troops there, while unpleas- 
ant, is obviously not going to undermine our national security. 



1+8-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 



108 

That does not mean I think we should ignore it. I think we 
should pursue with the Soviets through other means the elimina- 
tion of that situation. But I don't think that we should throw away 
the benefits I think the SALT Treaty would bring us. 

Senator McIntyre. Well, Senator, I always wonder why we are 
always surprised. There should be no surprise involved in this 
matter. But I would say, and I must say this, too, that you gentle- 
men have had the benefit now of yesterday's hearings from which 
you have the up-to-the minute information. And I don't have this. 

I would say, depending on the nature of those troops and the 
amount of them and the possibility of bases being constructed, that 
I would want them out of there. And I would also want SALT IL 

You see, the reason I want SALT II is so that we can know what 
they, our Russian adversaries, are up to. 

Mr. Chairman, you must have known that there were Russians 
in Cuba before it appeared the other day. I don't know what you 
found out yesterday, but let's get them out of there. But let's also 
get SALT II. 

The Chairman. Senator, I knew there were Russian military 
personnel in Cuba engaged in training activities and also certain 
communications activities, but not until last week did I know that 
there was a Russian combat unit there. 

I wish we lived in a world of perfect logic. I have been saying 
from the beginning that this treaty should be dealt with on its 
merits. I continue to hope that it will be dealt with on its merits. 
But I could not truthfully say that the development, the confirma- 
tion of the existence of a combat brigade of Russian troops in Cuba 
that were placed there secretly, does not have a chilling effect in 
the Senate. 

You know as a former Senator that it would have such an effect. 

Senator McIntyre. As one who knows what that means on the 
street corners of Boise 

The Chairman. Yes, and throughout the country. I also think 
that unless this matter is satisfactorily resolved, I would be mis- 
leading you and misleading the country to say that I believe the 
Senate would be prepared to ratify the treaty. 

It is one thing for the Cubans to move into Angola and Ethiopia, 
which has never exercised me very much because I think in the 
end it is going to be for the Africans to solve; but it is another 
thing to move a combat unit secretly to within 90 miles of our 
shores. I think that the Senate is bound to view the two together. 
That is just a simple statement of fact, the facts with which we 
live. 

Senator Biden. 

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. 

The Chairman. We do have a vote, I might say. The Senators 
might want to go vote and come back so that we don't have an 
interruption. 

Senator Biden. I apologize to the witnesses for not having heard 
their testimony, but I have had an opportunity to read the testi- 
mony. 



109 

SOVIETS NOT MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO UNITED STATES 

I would like to say one thing which contradicts something that 
seems to be gaining some credibility around here. I, for one, do not 
believe the Soviets are militarily superior to the United States of 
America. None of the witnesses have said that but we have been, 
in effect, for the last several weeks talking as if that is true. It is 
not true. 

We have to look at military posture not just in terms of strategic 
capability and conventional capability, but geographic location, po- 
tential enemies, reliability of allies and a whole range of other 
questions. I don't think there is a military man in this country who 
would trade places with the Soviet Union given the entire range of 
things they would have to trade if we were in a fighting situation. 

But I want to say that for the record because it was mentioned 
again here. I don't think George meant much beyond what he said. 
He talked about Soviet equality in the military field and the need 
to emphasize the other areas. I don't even concede that, if you take 
the entire spectrum of military considerations, the Soviets are 
superior. 

I wonder what would happen. I wonder what Senator Hayakawa 
and Senator Garn and others are going to say if, in fact, the 
administration is able to, by whatever means would be employed, 
force this brigade out of Cuba? If the administration forces the 
brigade out of Cuba, does that say that we should have SALT? I 
assume that that is what it means. 

I assume it means that if they say they cannot have SALT with 
the brigade in Cuba because it somehow shows how weak we are, 
that if, in fact, the brigade is forced to leave, I assume they will be 
prepared to point out how strong we are and why then it would be 
useful to have SA.LT. 

I am, as you might guess, prepared to make that argument if and 
when the brigade leaves. 

SALT DISCUSSED IN VACUUM 

I would like to compliment you, Mrs. King, on bringing into 
focus what often is not focused on here. We tend to become, as 
Senator Church says, nuclear theologians when we discuss SALT. 
And we discuss it not only in a vacuum in the military — that is, we 
discuss strategic and not conventional — but we also discuss it 
within a vacuum of what is happening in the rest of the world and 
the rest of our economy. 

And your point about inflation and unemployment being by- 
products of the failure to have a SALT agreement is one which 
should be reiterated time and again. It is not in and of itself reason 
to vote for SALT if SALT were not a good agreement, if it injured 
our security. But if it is at a minimum an even call, even if it is 
close, those two factors play very heavily. I would like to compli- 
ment you on bringing them out. 

And Senator Mclntyre, as usual you have put your finger right 
on the thrust of why we need SALT from a security standpoint. 
You point out in your statement that there are several reasons but 
two main reasons. One, failure to have SALT diminishes our capa- 
bility of monitoring and controlling Soviet threat. And second, with 



no 

the SALT agreement it allows us to do the things we have to do 
anyway if we decide we must do them and moves forward in 
continuing the process. 

But you again don't argue it, as I read your statement, from a 
position of anything other than U.S. security. U.S. military security 
is enhanced. 

The reason why I am not asking any questions is I agree with 
what you all say. And I would just like to compliment each of you 
on the way in which you have approached it. You seem to have 
covered all of the basics. 

Ambassador Yost, you point out in your statement that there are 
differences between us and the Soviets. They are always going to 
be there and we should not reject something just because we have 
differences in other areas. I guess I have no desire to be conten- 
tious after the testimony I heard this morning from the anti-SALT 
people, but I am going to have to go vote. 

I would like to compliment you all once again for putting the 
issue into what I believe is a proper perspective. I am very anxious 
to see, if the administration is successful in moving the troops out 
of Cuba, whether or not there will be the same rallying point, 
whether or not we will refer to Carter's moving the troops out of 
Cuba in the same way we refer to, throughout these hearings, the 
Kennedy blockade of Cuba, that we could do it then because we 
were strategically stronger and we can't do it now if it were to 
occur again. 

Well, the opponents of SALT have made it sound like it has 
occurred again. It has not. They make it sound like it has. And I 
would be very anxious to see what they have to say. 

Senator Sarbanes would like to question you all. I imagine he is 
on his way back. And I will be back also. I must leave now. Besides, 
if I didn't come back, with the Cardinal about to testify, I wouldn't 
be allowed back into Philadelphia anyway. So I will be back short- 

Thank you very much. 

If we could recess for 5 minutes to give Senator Sarbanes time to 
come back. I apologize for having to do this. 

[Recess.] 

The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. 

Ambassador Yost. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. King had to leave. She 
asked me to apologize to you. 

The Chairman. All right. Thank you. 

Our next member to question is Senator Muskie. 

Senator Muskie. I apologize for not being here when you read 
your opening statements, but I have read them all and I have 
listened to my colleagues in their question period. It gives me a lot 
of reading time as they all tend to use their 10 minutes, which I 
think is very useful, and the questions have been good. I really 
have nothing to add to them. 

I particularly liked Senator Mclntyre's testimony in which he 
emphasized two points which tend to get overlooked in the debate 
over the details of the treaties and the details of asymmetrical 
defense postures in the two countries. 

The first is that the Soviets without the treaty would really be 
less restrained with respect to future defense spending and arms 



Ill 

buildup than they would be with the treaty. That point, I think, 
needs to be emphasized over and over again. The treaty itself is not 
likely to be either the cause or the contributing factor to future 
Soviet buildup except to the effect that it restrains their potential. 
Without the treaty, their potential is enhanced. 

NO UMITATIONS ON U.S. OPTIONS 

On the other side of that coin, insofar as I know, based upon the 
testimony I have heard, U.S. options for defense buildup, including 
strategic nuclear weapons, are not limited in any way that we are 
now considering. Am I correct in that. Senator Mclntyre? 

Senator McIntyre. That is essentially correct, yes. 

Senator Muskie. So the net effect of the treaty from that point of 
view is that the Soviets are restrained with respect to options they 
would clearly exercise. We are not restrained with respect to op- 
tions we are considering with or without the treaty. 

Senator McIntyre. The opponents would clearly say we are re- 
straining ourselves on our GLCM's and our SLCM's, submarine- 
launched cruise missiles and the ground-launched cruise missiles. 
But the answer to that, of course, is that these provisions are in 
the protocol and do not restrict us in any practical way. We cannot 
deploy these systems before the protocol expires. Moreover, there 
was no restraint there, really, on our development or testing. 

Senator Muskie. And with respect to Ambassador Yost, I did find 
your ten points very useful. I think they are an excellent basis on 
which to rationalize for the average citizen the pros and cons from 
the national interest point. 

Ambassador Yost. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Muskie. And I think that must be done. 

Finally, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, it is very useful to 
bring into these hearings, with the exception of Senator McIntyre 
and Ambassador Yost, perhaps, the average citizen's perspective on 
these treaties and to emphasize the values and concerns the aver- 
age citizen ought to be raising as he or she evaluates the national 
interest as represented by these treaties. 

I think that is terribly important. The polls continue to point out 
that citizens are for arms control. Yet we have witnesses day after 
day, technicians, experts getting into the details of the treaty and 
tending to overlook or to overshadow or to put into a dim light the 
fundamental reasons why arms control is important. 

Mrs. King's testim.ony highlighted that point. I remember dis- 
cussing that particular point with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow in 1971, 
and clearly, we both were influenced by that perspective, the fact 
that the resources of this world were being drained away from the 
human needs of this planet's occupants to fuel an arms race which 
at that time, I think, cost about $200 billion a year. Now Mrs. King 
uses the figure $400 billion. 

The figure changes upward so rapidly it is difficult to stay on top 
of the latest statistic. But that kind of spending on arms, $400 
billion, obviously dilutes the capacity of the world's governments or 
the will of the world's governments to deal with the problems of 
the disadvantaged. And the problems of the disadvantaged underlie 
most of the tensions and confrontations upon the face of this globe. 



112 

Were it not for the problems of the disadvantaged, those who 
seek power would not find power so easily attainable as they now 
find it. And I think it is those kinds of fundamental concerns that 
ought to be highlighted as often as possible in these hearings and 
in the public debate over these treaties. There are risks to moving 
in the direction of peace. There are incomparably greater risks for 
moving in the direction of war. 

I know that oversimplifies the situation but I find some of the 
experts oversimplifying, too, and occasionally their oversimplifying 
ought to be set off against the oversimplification of human beings 
interested in simply surviving, getting enough to eat and a decent 
environment in which to raise families and to look forward to a 
better future. 

So I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, that this kind of testimony is 
now entering the hearings, and I appreciate the testimony we 
received. 

I have no further questions. I think the appropriate questions 
have been asked and, I think, well answered. 

Senator McIntyre. Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator McIntyre. 

Senator McIntrye. May I request two charts, "Potential Soviet 
Strategic Threat in 1985, With or Without SALT," and "U.S. Free- 
dom to Develop Strategic Strength Under SALT II," be included in 
the record. 

The Chairman. Very well. The data will be included in the 
record as you have requested. 

[The information referred to follows:] 



113 



i/ai.i_J:REEDOM_TO DrvFLOP Str ategic Strfnbth 
Undfr salt II 





(supplied by Senator Thomas Mclntyrel 


SALT 
Permits 


n SALT 
Prohibits 


U.S. 
Strategic 
Forces 
At Sea 


Trident I Missile 


@ 




Trident II Missile 


$ 




Poseidon Missile Improvements 







Trident Submarine 







Advanced Small Strategic Submarine 


1 




Submarine Survivability — Quietness 


§ 









SALT 
Permits 


n SALT 
Prohibits 


U.S. 

Strategic 

Forces 

ON 

Land 


Air-Launched Cruise Missile —Range 


• 




Air-Launched Cruise Missile ~ 

PFNFTRATinN 


f 




Advanced Strategic Air-Launched 

MrssTi F 


- 1 
• 




B-52 Conversion to Cruise Missile 

r.ARRTFR 


• 




Advanced Cruise Missile Carrier 


• 




B-1 


• 




Advanced Penetrating Bomber 


1 




Improved FB-111 


• 




B-52 Improvements 


1 





114 



U.S. Freedom to Drvelop Strategic Strength 



„SALT SALT 
Permits Prohibits 



U.S. 
Strategic 
Forces 

ON 

Land 


H-X Missile 


• 




Minuteman III Missile — Improved 

Yield 


1 




Minuteman UI Missile — Fractiona- 

CV..j^ ^«*i^-^ ^ "71.-*// V.th TION 




• 


Minuteman II — Replacements 


• 




SuRvivABLE Basing — M-X 


• 




SuRvivABLE Basing —Minuteman 


• 




Missile Penetration Aids 


• 









SALT 
Permits 


n SALT 
Prohibits 


U.S. 
Theatre 
Nuclear 
Forces 


Ground-Launched Cruise Missile 


• 




Sea-Launched Cruise Missile 


• 




Mobile Medium- range Ballistic 

Missile 


1 





. determined at hearings of Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Juiy /5, 1979. 



115 

POTENTIAL SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT IN 1985 
— With and Without SALT ~ 

[supplied by Senator Thomas Mclntyrel 



With SALT Without SALT 



Soviet Strategic Missile & Bombers 


2250* 


3000** 


Soviet MIRVed Strategic Missiles 


1200* 


1800** 


Soviet MIRVed Land-based Strategic 

Missiles 


820* 


1300*** 


Soviet Silo- killer Warheads 


6000*** 


10,000-15.000*^ 


Soviet Total Strategic Warheads & Bombs 


9500*** 


13.000-18.000*' 



From Treaty 

Secretary Brown's Statement to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee. July 23. 19/9 

Determined in Senate Armed Services Committee 
hearing. July 2.). 1979. during questioning of 
Secretary Brown and Undersecretary Perry 



116 

Senator Mclntyre and Ambassador Yost, thank you very much 
for your testimony. The committee is in your debt. 

John Cardinal Krol, the Archbishop of Philadelphia; the Cardi- 
nal will appear on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference. 

Cardinal Krol, we are grateful to you to come to appear as a 
witness today, and I would invite you to proceed with your testimo- 
ny as you see fit. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN CARDINAL KROL, ARCHDIOCESE OF 
PHILADELPHIA, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC CONFER- 
ENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY THE REVEREND 
J. BRYAN HEHIR AND EDWARD DOHERTY » 

Cardinal Krol. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as indicated, I am 
John Cardinal Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf 
of the U.S. Catholic Conference [U.S.C.C] comprising over 350 bish- 
ops in the United States, serving more than 50 million Catholics. 

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that my full written testi- 
mony be submitted for the record. 

The Chairman. Without objection, your prepared statement will 
be inserted in the record at the appropriate point. 

Cardinal Krol. I am accompanied by Father Bryan Hehir, the 
one with the Roman collar on my right; Mr. Edward Doherty, on 
my left, both from the U.S.C.C. 

I will confine my remarks to a summary of the complete testimo- 
ny. At the outset, I express the very sincere gratitude of the 
Bishops of the U.S. Catholic Conference for the opportunity to 
present their views on the moral dimensions of the nuclear arms 
race. My testimony, the testimony which I submit, is divided into 
three sections. The first section focuses your attention on the moral 
and religious principles which are applicable. The second section 
focuses these and applies these principles to certain aspects of the 
current debate on the SALT II Treaty, and a third section directs 
your attention to the future beyond SALT II. 

Now, the first section, the moral principles underlying my testi- 
mony have been enunciated in papal declarations and in the docu- 
ments of the Second Vatican Council. In these statements, the 
arms race is condemned as a plague on the human race, a radically 
defective way of maintaining the peace, and an aggression against 
the poor of this country and of the world. 

The imperative of our age is that all must work to put an end to 
the arms race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not 
unilaterally, indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis 
of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees. 
These principles are the authentic position of the Catholic Church 
and of faithful Catholics. 

However, the application of these principles to a particular pro- 
posal such as the SALT II Treaty admits of a divergence of views. 
Accordingly, the position I present today, while based on generally 
accepted principles, is not necessarily a unanimous position among 
the bishops, nor does it represent all the Catholics in the United 
States. It is, however, the official position of the U.S. Bishops 
Conference as adopted by its administrative board. In offering this 



' See page 127 for Cardinal Krol's prepared statement. 



117 

testimony, the bishops seek to fulfill a dual role of responsible 
citizenship and religious leadership. That dual role requires that 
we speak the truth plainly. 

The Catholic bishops of this country believe that for too long we 
Americans have been preoccupied with preparations for war. Too 
long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or 
superiority of armaments. Too long have we allowed other nations 
virtually to dictate, albeit obliquely and indirectly, how much we 
should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction. 

Is it not time to give priority to steps towards peace, to move 
toward it through gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament? 

I am here, Mr. Chairman, to support ratification of the SALT II 
Treaty as a partial and very limited step in the process of halting 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and moving toward real re- 
ductions. The support for ratification is severely qualified because 
of the moral principles which govern our view of arms control. The 
massive complexity of the nuclear arms race is something which 
diplomats and analysts grapple with daily. We respect that techni- 
cal complexity. We have tried to study and to assimilate it in this 
testimony. 

For the church, however, the nuclear arms race is principally 
defined, as Mrs. King had said, in religious and moral categories 
since war in any form raises the question of human rights and 
human life. 

In a nuclear age, the moral imperative to prevent war has taken 
on a qualitatively new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II, 
the moral teaching is unequivocal: The nuclear arms race is unre- 
servedly condemned, while the process of arms control and disarm- 
ament is urgently commended. 

The pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or Utopian view of 
the world. The Christian tradition is eloquent about the vision of 
peace. It is also realistic about the fact of war. Hence, the Second 
Vatican Council declared that "governments cannot be denied the 
right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settle- 
ment has been exhausted." 

The perspective of this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some 
forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear 
war involving the use of weapons of uncontrolled destructiveness 
surpasses the boundaries of legitimate selfdefense. 

The prohibition of use: It follows that the primary moral impera- 
tive of the nuclear age is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons. It 
is this prohibition which is reflected in the following judgment of 
the Second Vatican Council: 

Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of 
extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. 
It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation. 

It should be noted, Mr. Chairman, that in the sixteen documents 
of the Second Vatican Council, this was the onl}' formal condemna- 
tion ^'^sued, there was none other. It reflects the gravity of the 
moral problem before us in these hearings. The primary purpose of 
the bishops' support of SALT II is to join in any reasonable effort 
designed to make nuclear war in any form less likely. Our support 
of the treaty remains qualified, however, because of the moral 
paradox of the deterrence policy. 



118 

The moral dilemma of deterrence: The moral paradox of deter- 
rence is that its purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, 
but it does so by an expressed threat to attack the civilian popula- 
tion of one's adversary. Such a threat runs directly counter to the 
central moral affirmation of Christian teaching on war: that inno- 
cent lives are not open to direct attack. 

In their moral statement on strategic policy in 1976, the Ameri- 
can Catholic Bishops argued that: 

We must be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations, it is 
also wrong to threaten to attack them as a part of a strategy of deterrence. 

This moral judgment that the use of strategic nuclear weapons 
and the declared intent to use them in our deterrence policy are 
both wrong is a fundamental principle in the U.S.C.C. position. It 
means that deterrence can be tolerated as a lesser evil than use, as 
long as serious negotiations are pursued, aimed at phasing out 
nuclear deterrence. If the pursuit of that goal is forsaken, the 
moral attitude of the Catholic Church would almost certainly have 
to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and 
possession of nuclear weapons. 

Based on these moral principles, we cannot regard the SALT II 
Treaty as a major achievement in arms control. It certainly is not 
an arms reduction treaty. It is more accurately characterized as a 
measure which regulates the expansion of the arms race. Neverthe- 
less, it does set some limits. Consequently, the Catholic Bishops of 
the United States urge the Senate to ratify this treaty because of 
the process of negotiation which produced it and the further negoti- 
ations which it permits offer the promise of escape from the danger 
of nuclear holocaust, and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear 
deterrence. 

The second part is the principles governing the current debate on 
the SALT II Treaty. 

The bishops have taken this position in support of SALT II 
conscious of the objections of those who oppose SALT II. We have 
serious reservations about the treaty because we know it is a 
deceleration, not a reversal of the arms race. The analysis of this 
testimony concludes that the quantitative and qualitative limits on 
delivery systems and weapons achieved by SALT II are worthy of 
support. We are sympathetic, however, to those critics, including 
some of my fellow bishops, who cannot find in the SALT process 
thus far evidence of real arms reduction. Unless there is movement 
beyond SALT II toward more substantial measures of arms control, 
our support of SALT II will be hard to sustain. 

We are also aware of the far more numerous opponents of SALT 
II who criticize the treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. Some 
argue that the treaty will not prevent the U.S.S.R. from achieving 
a first strike capability against our land-based missiles which they 
will then use to change the strategic balance in various parts of the 
world. Others argue that the perception of the U.S.S.R. having a 
first strike potential will produce a shift in the global political 
balance. 

I am not a political or technical expert, but I must raise some 
questions. To the first criticism: Would not the leaders of the 
U.S.S.R. be insane to initiate a nuclear war, even in the possession 
of a first strike capability against our ICBM's, when the basic 



119 

reality of the nuclear age remains deterrence based on the assured 
destruction policy? Even those of us who oppose the present policy 
of deterrence have to recognize its function. 

To the second criticism: Can it be argued that an increase of 
strategic power can so easily be translated by the Soviets into an 
effective instrument of political influence? Is not the influence of 
the strategic balance on a particular political situation most com- 
plex and unpredictable precisely in those situations of the develop- 
ing world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological 
positions are vying for control? Has not the cost of using nuclear 
weapons on the part of those who employ them deprived these 
weapons of much of their strategic utility and made their political 
value equally problematic? 

Mr. Chairman, you cited some examples, including Iran and 
Soviet adventurism in the past, and I ask, has the military superi- 
ority of the U.S.S.R. enabled it to achieve a decisive political ad- 
vantage over its neighbor China? I raise these questions to mdicate 
that while we have examined the objections of those who oppose 
SALT with the arguments just stated, we have not found them 
sufficient to deter our support for the treaty. There are risks in the 
SALT II process, but we believe that they are worth taking to 
solidify what has been achieved by the treaty and to move beyond 
it to a more significant reduction. 

The third section is beyond SALT II. It is our hope that the U.S. 
agenda for future negotiations will be bold, I might say a bit bolder 
than it has been, and imaginative, aimed at demonstrable reduc- 
tions in both weapons and delivery systems. 

We realize, Mr. Chairman, that it has been argued during these 
hearings that ratification of the treaty should be linked to new and 
massive programs for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nu- 
clear and conventional forces. Several witnesses have said that 
SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the 
United States from matching expanding Soviet capabilities. Strate- 
gic equivalence has become the new name for the arms race. 

At the time of SALT I, Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking: What 
good is strategic superiority at these levels of numbers? Are we not 
justified in asking today whether strategic equivalence is an abso- 
lute necessity? Why must we accept this criterion which ties our 
defense spending to our adversary's decisions, when we now have 
the potential of destroying every human being in the world four 
times over? 

I have come here today, Mr. Chairman, because we believe in 
negotiated arms control. Because of that belief, we must question 
the logic of an absolute adherence to the criterion of strategic 
equivalence. It would radically distort our intention to have our 
support of SALT II coupled with plans for new military expendi- 
tures. The treaty should be ratified as an arms control measure, 
not as a maneuver to increase the strategic budget. 

The proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay 
of funds at a time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution 
of the United States calls upon the executive and legislative 
branches of government not only to provide for the common de- 
fense, but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare 
and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity. 



120 



Estimates for the M-X missile alone run from $30 billion upward 
over the next decade. With the national debt today at over $800 
billion, and pressure being exerted on legislative bodies at all levels 
to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion in one weap- 
ons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending tor 
essential human services here and abroad. 

It is our recommendation that systems like the M-X, as well as 
Trident II, should be considered negotiable in return for compara- 
ble concessions by the U.S.S.R. in SALT III. We have been told that 
the aim of SALT III will be deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of 
both superpowers. We fervently hope, we fervently pray, that this 

^ Mr ^Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been cap- 
tured by the new Pope John Paul II. He has already taken note of 
the significance of the SALT II Treaty for world peace. The treaty, 
he said, 

is not yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarma- 
ment But that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we 
St to greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue without which every 
hope of working effectively for peace could vanish. 

The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause 
of laying down weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective 
agreements" of peace and concord. It is in this spirit that the U^. 
Catholic Conference submits this testimony to the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee. , ^ r j.i. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the com- 

"^The^' Chairman. Thank you very much, Cardinal Krol, for an 
extremely well reasoned, comprehensive statement on the position 
of the U.S. Catholic Conference on this treaty ^ , , -.u ^ 

I have been informed that I need to go to the floor to deal with a 
resolution that is presently being debated that would call for the 
suspension of all further Senate consideration of SALT until writ- 
ten assurances are received from the President that Soviet forces 
in Cuba pose no threat to the United States nor to U.S. foreign 
policy. I think this is an indication of the realities to which 1 

^^ But beforfleaving-and I would then extend to Senator Muskie 
the balance of my time-I want to say that I appreciate very much 
the decision that has been made by the Catholic Church and by 
other churches, Protestant and Jewish churches, to speak out on 
Siportant political issues when they affect moral principles 
Indeed, the core of this whole attempt to bring nuclear arms under 
some restraint is essentially moral in nature, and I think your 
statement underscores this very persuasively. 

I sometimes think that the great moral blindness of the last 
century was the institution of human slavery, but the most respect- 
able of our leaders in that period, at least m the early part of the 
century, were content to raise no questions concerning slavery 
Even as the century advanced, it became the subject of a great 
nItSnal debate in which the most respectable people found ways to 
rationalize and to justify the continued existence of slavery It 
Sme at TasHo the\errible tragedy of the Civil War before that 
issue was resolved. 



121 

It may well be that the great moral blindness of our times is the 
nuclear arms race, and most respectable, most powerful world lead- 
ers and experts of every kind find ways to rationalize its continu- 
ation and to justify it on one basis or another. I think that the 
great contribution of your statement is to bring us back to the 
basic moral questions and force us to confront them. I am grateful 
to you for your statement. It is a very important contribution to 
the commit iecj's consideration of this treaty. 

Seiiator Muskie, please. 

Senator Muskie. This is the first time at these hearings I have 
had a chance to ask the first question, and I really don't have a 
quastion so much as a reaffirmation of what Senator Church has 
just said. 

NEED ?0R MORAL IMPERATIVE TO BE EMPHASIZED 

I was delighted in Augi!st to learn that you were interested in 
coming to this hearing because at that point the hearings, by and 
large, had emphasized the concerns of people who deal with arms 
and arms diplomacy, on the impact upon national security, and 
those who believe that national security was not so threatened that 
we should ignore the moral imperative involved were concerned 
that the moral imperative was not being sufficiently emphasized. 

It is not that those who were testifying were unaware of the 
moral imperative; it is just that they were so preoccupied and had 
been for years in negotiating the means for moving toward a 
reduction in arms that I am not sure they were as sensitive as they 
ought to be to the fact that this treaty does not produce a reduction 
in arms. 

At what level a reduction would begin, no one would dare pre- 
dict. I would not predict that a SALT III Treaty would result in a 
reduction in arms, or even a leveling off of the arms race. And I 
think it is important that we be reminded that those kinds of risks 
lie ahead of us, and indeed, that they would be exacerbated if this 
treaty is rejected. 

So I feel I have been privileged this afternoon, Your Eminence, 
to listen to your statement. I hesitate to ask questions because your 
statement is so clearly, carefully structured, thoughtfully produced, 
and based upon a rather careful study of the record, the issues, the 
questions, the challenges that have been raised that I doubt that 
the effect of your statement would be improved by interpretations 
based upon ad hoc questions put to you by Senators on this side of 
the table. 

RESERVATIONS THAT TREATY DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH 

There is just one question I would really like to ask, not that the 
point would be left ambiguous, if it is ambiguous, in the record. 
You were very careful at the outset to point out that this was the 
official position of the National Council but that it did not neces- 
sarily represent the views of every member or of every bishop. 

Would it be accurate to characterize the views of those who have 
reservations about the statement or about the SALT II Treaty to 
say that their reservations are based upon a conviction that the 
treaty does not go far enough in the direction of reducing arms. 



122 

rather than that it poses a nonacceptable risk to our national 
security? 

Cardinal Krol. The first part is correct. Their objection is that it 
simply does not go far enough. We have expressed that reservation. 
They expected that it should have moved in the direction of reduc- 
tion, disarmament. And actually it doesn't do that at all. There is 
no reversal. All it does is control or regulate the growth. And it is 
precisely, I would say, for that reason that there is a divergence of 
opinion among the fellow bishops. 

It is, I would say, a small minority of bishops, but with great 
conviction. 

Senator Muskie. I remember. Cardinal Krol, enjoying your hospi- 
tality in Philadelphia, and I remember that the bedroom which I 
occupied was also occupied by the beautiful painting of the current 
Pope whose eyes followed one wherever one moved in the room. I 
have seen those kinds of paintings before, but I had never seen 
such a dramatic one, or representing a personage whose influence 
and authority was so overwhelming. I can't say that I slept the 
sleep of the innocent totally that night under such surveillance, 
but I would say that your testimony here this morning represents 
that kind of surveillance from the enormously significant moral 
position of the Catholic Church, and as a Catholic, I am delighted 
that it has been used as you have used it here this afternoon. 

Cardinal Krol. Thank you. Senator. 

Senator Muskie. Senator Percy. 

Senator Percy. Your Eminence, we all appreciate your presence 
here and we respect the position that you have taken. 

TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE 

I think one of the most disappointing aspects of my consideration 
of SALT II, which may be one of the most important votes that I 
will cast in the U.S. Senate, has been the low level of interest 
seemingly shown by our constituents. There is no comparison with 
the high level of emotion and interest we saw on the issue of the 
Panama Canal. Yet in SALT II we are dealing with the future of 
the human race. We tried to grapple with one of the problems of 
the nuclear age in the Non-Proliferation Act that we passed in the 
Congress about 1 year ago, and we are trying to grapple with 
another aspect of the problem here. I think broadcasting these 
hearings is important. Your presence, speaking on behalf of such a 
highly valued group of men and women, is important because it 
promotes public understanding and helps focus public attention on 
the importance of this issue. 

In your opinion, would it be well for us to try to solve the 
technical problems and open up the Senate of the United States to 
television and radio coverage of the SALT debate so the people of 
this country can share in the debate and grasp its significance as 
you and the group that you represent have so ably expressed? 

Cardinal Krol. Senator, I don't think I would be the best judge 
of that. One of the problems that you would have in this is that 
you are showing the perfection of refinement of debate on a matter 
which is complex and involved. We have tried to apply the moral 
principles. There are other principles of security and so on, and I 
don't know whether you could convey that even by the intelligent 



123 

and reasonable debates that you have in the Senate. I don't know. I 
don't think I am a good judge of that. The televising of these 
hearings has provided some preparation beforehand, and there 
could be some interest generated through the media if the debate is 
to be televised. The problem is whether the coverage of the media 
would be read and to what degree would it be understood. But it 
would be very helpful to have the people interested and knowledge- 
able. 

There is also a question of priorities. If you want to talk about 
energy, or inflation, or about the shortage of gasoline, that will 
command the interest of people. But it seems the people are willing 
to entrust their elected Representatives and Senators with the 
SALT II decision. It is your responsibility with clear-minded knowl- 
edge and perception and courage to make the decisions. I am here 
only to help you by casting some light particularly on the moral 
aspects. As Mrs. King said, this was basically and ultimately a 
moral issue, which is the same theme that I developed in the first 
section. But it is up to you gentlemen who have to be courageous — 
and I appreciate fully the risks involved in the democratic process- 
es of election. I think it was Churchill who said that democracy is 
the worst form of government in the world but better than any 
other kind. I realize what you have to face when you have elec- 
tions. But there is an area where you have to be true to yourself, to 
the truth, and vote with courage. 

Senator Percy. Thank you. 

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF NATIONS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES 

I would like to clarify a point you made. You have pointed out 
that we ought to move toward de-escalating the arms race and 
bilaterally eliminate nuclear weapons, if at all possible, in their 
totality. You said this is a moral issue. 

Is it not also true, though, that it is a moral responsibility of the 
Nation to adequately and properly defend its citizens? We have a 
case in Lebanon where a nation saw fit not to provide adequate 
defense for its own borders, its own people, and it has been torn 
asunder for years now. 

Isn't there a moral obligation to see that we adequately provide 
for our defense so as to deter any aggression? 

Cardinal Krol. Yes, I have emphasized that, that the right of 
self-defense is a sound moral principle for individuals and for na- 
tions. The right of self-defense is rooted in the law of nature, and of 
nature's God. At the same time, there is a basic principle we study 
in moral theology, "en inculpate tutelae," that is, you can only use 
as much force as is necessary to repel the aggressor. 

Now, when a little child comes at you with a toy baseball bat, 
you don't run for a machine gun; and it is a crude comparison, but 
that is the concept involved there, and when you have these nucle- 
ar stockpilings on both sides, the basic moral issue is the unprotect- 
ed civilian. If somebody comes at you with a gun, with arms, you 
shoot at them, but when you have missiles and nuclear power that 
wipe out, as were wiped out in Nagasaki, hundreds of thousands of 
innocent people, unarmed, that is morally indefensible. And the 
nuclear power inherently has that kind of a potential and for that 
reason, the bishops oppose nuclear power as a viable weapon. 



48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 



124 

REJECTION OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT 

Senator Percy. You, as I see your statement, reject unilateral 
disarmament. When you face an adversary of increasing strength 
and apparently different moral persuasions than we do, there 
would be no sense, I would think, in unilaterally disarming. That is 
why this whole process of bilateral negotiation seems to be the 
sensible way to go about it. 

Do I surmise that you would concur with that conclusion? 

Cardinal Krol. Positively, Senator. That was, in fact, Paul VI 
speaking at the U.N. in 1965, when he made that statement "No 
more war; war never again," and he insisted disarmament was the 
first step toward peace. But he added a sentence which is not very 
frequently quoted. It is on the first page of my testimony: "As long 
as man remains that weak, changeable, and even wicked being he 
often shows himself to be, defensive armaments will also be neces- 
sary." 

On the following page, the "Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World" says this, that: "Since peace must be born of 
mutual trust between peoples instead of being forced on nations 
through threat of arms, all must work to put an end to the arms 
race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally 
indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis of agreements 
and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees." That is exact- 
ly the principle. 

Senator Percy. Thank you, sir, very much indeed. 

Cardinal Krol. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Muskie. Senator Biden. 

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Your Eminence, Senator Muskie said that to ask questions in a 
sense would detract from the statement and the manner in which 
it was put together, but being the product of 13 years of Catholic 
education, I can't resist the opportunity to ask a Cardinal a ques- 
tion. 

ADOPT defense POSTURE BASED ON COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY 

Your Eminence, I am concerned that one of the paragraphs in 
your statement might be taken out of context. One of the debates 
that has been raging in this committee for the past 2 months has 
been whether or not the United States should adopt a defense 
posture based upon the concept of counterforce capability. 

The argument has been made that the policy upon which our 
nuclear deterrent for the past 20 years has been based, which is 
mutual assured destruction, is not a good policy, not a workable 
policy, not a moral policy because it means just what it says: that 
the Soviets should know that if they were to strike the United 
States or its allies with nuclear weapons, then, as they say in south 
Philadelphia, school is out, it is all over. 

Now, along come Dr. Kissinger and others and they say we need 
the M-X missile, we need the enhanced radiation weapon, and we 
need other things like GLCM's and SLCM's and ALCM's, because 
we must counter the counterforce capability of the Soviet Union. 
They, with their big missiles, can strike in the mid-1980's our 
ground-based missiles and knock out those missiles, and only kill 



125 

10 to 20 million Americans, and it is suggested that if the United 
States were to retaliate massively under that circumstance, then it 
would be immoral, because the Soviets would retaliate in turn and 
we would have created mutual suicide. In your statement you say: 
"The moral paradox of deterrence is that its purpose is to prevent 
the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed threat to 
attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat 
runs directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Chris- 
tian teaching on war: that innocent lives are not open to direct 
attack." 

What I am leading to is that I don't see how nuclear weapons of 
the size that either side has now can be employed in a surgical 
way, and that a policy which is designed to deter the use of those 
weapons on civilian populations by essentially saying that we have 
no option open to us but to respond in kind seems to me to be one 
of the only ways to preclude the prospect of it occurring. And I just 
wonder whether or not you can help me as a U.S. Senator deal 
with that dilemma a little further. Should we be designing weapons 
that are designed to be surgically used? Is that what our Church is 
saying? 

Cardinal Krol. Senator, after 13 years of Catholic education, I 
am sure you have heard the expression "the lesser of two evils." 
There is a goal, there is an ideal. There is a practical reality. You 
can never lose sight of your goal, but you have got to go through 
the practical reality to achieve your goal. We do not recommend or 
favor a counterforce capability. I have described the criterion of 
strategic equivalence as a false criterion: strategic equivalence is 
another name for the arms race. What I don't like about it and 
what I think every thinking American shouldn't like about it is 
that somebody else is dictating how much we are to spend. As I 
mentioned in the testimony, we have enough power now to kill all 
the people in the world four times over. Our development is more 
than sufficient. Well, what are we going to do with the three other 
striking forces, and why do we need five? I mean, that is why it is 
a plague, it is an insanity. 

Senator Biden. I agree. 

Cardinal Krol. But in this question of the deterrence, I have 
made it plain that we are opposed to the use, even to the threat. 
But we will take deterrence in the process as the lesser of two 
evils. 

I think it was Senator Hayakawa that talked about the Soviets, 
what they are doing. I think we have to look not only at their 
actions, we must try to understand why they act as they do. I think 
we have to look at the basic integrated philosophy of communism. 
They refer to it as a dialectical materialism, a dialectic in which 
we find theses and antitheses, constant tension, constant struggle, 
all directed to the goal of world domination. 

For a while we followed the isolation policy. We would not talk 
to the Soviets. But that is not the way to pursue truth or get truth 
to prevail. We are dealing with a people and we know what their 
ideology and goals are. They have never denied that their ultimate 
goal is world domination. They have never denied or modified their 
goal of the extermination of religion. But we are dealing with them 
not because we approve their ideology, not because we approve all 



126 

of their actions, but for the interests of the human race and the 
human family, we have to try to have or at least acknowledge some 
principles of truth and agree to some principles. And even when we 
reach the agreement, we have to be aware of the fact that the 
track record of performance on agreements by the Soviets is not 
the best. We come back to another maxim which, as an attorney, 
you would know, that the law serves the vigilant and not the 
dormant. We must be alert and vigilant. 

The SALT II Treaty, as I tried to point out, is not the world's 
greatest achievement. 

Senator Biden. I was hoping, quite frankly, you would answer 
the question that way. My concern — both as a Senator who is a 
proponent of SALT and as a practicing Catholic — is that some 
might very well take that statement of yours out of context, not 
having had the benefit of the scholastic education. 

I felt certain that Your Eminence did not want to be even 
indirectly associated with being a proponent of a counterforce 
strategy. 

I would like to make one further statement, and although it 
sounds somewhat gratuitous, I really mean it. It is a sincere state- 
ment. I think the Holy Father is going to do more for opening up 
the East- West dialog and opening up the prospects for more free- 
dom and tolerance in Eastern Europe, and eventually in the Soviet 
Union, than all the arms control agreements and all the agree- 
ments that the superpowers have signed so far. I cannot think of a 
better choice that could have been made for a Pope. I just got back 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and even Communist 
leaders within those countries were talking about the impact the 
Pope has had, although some of them clearly were a little worried 
about it. And in Western Europe, they are absolutely ecstatic about 
the impact the Pope is having. 

And he is doing it in such a forthright yet tactful way. He is not 
choosing up sides, east and west and good and bad, but he is having 
a tremendous impact on the tens of millions of people who had just 
lost hope. I am really, really proud. It almost makes me want to be 
Polish. 

Cardinal Krol. That is a laudable desire. Senator. 

Senator Biden. Seriously, I just wanted to tell Your Eminence 
that from my perspective the Pope's personality and presence have 
had extensive repercussions at the highest political levels through- 
out the world. But I am sure Your Eminence already knows that. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

Senator Muskie. I have been trying for years to get Senator 
Biden to make that kind of a statement about the Poles. 

Senator Biden. My Irish mother had problems with that, but we 
may be able to work it out. 

Senator Muskie. Well, Your Eminence, clearly you made an 
impression on the committee. I am sorry that other members were 
not present because of preoccupation with similar duties elsewhere 
on the floor, but I repeat that I am delighted that you could come, 
that you made your statement. I think you have made an impor- 
tant contribution, and I look forward, too, to the visit of the Pope, 
We Poles have got to stick together. 

Thank you very much. 



127 
[Cardinal Krol's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of John Cardinal Krol 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am Cardinal John Krol, Arch- 
bishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) 
comprising over 350 bishops of the United States, serving more than 50 million 
Catholics. 

I express the sincere gratitude of the USCC for the opportunity to present the 
views of the Catholic Bishops of the United States on the moral aspects of the 
nuclear arms race. 

I. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TESTIMONY 

The moral principles underljdng my testimony have been enunciated clearly in 
papal documents and speeches, and in Vatican Council II. Pius XII pleaded on the 
eve of the World War II: "Nothing is lost by peace, everj^hing may be lost by war" 
(Aug. 24, 1939). Paul VI speaking to the General Assembly of the U.N. said: "No 
more war, war never again. Peace must guide the destinies of all peoples and of all 
mankind. . . . Disarmament is the first step toward peace. ... As long as man 
remains that weak, changeable and even wicked being he often shows himself to be, 
defensive armaments will also be necessary" (Oct. 4, 1965). 

Vatican Council II, in its "Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," 
declared: "The arms race is one of the most grievous plagues of the human race, 
and it inflicts an intolerable injury upon the world" (para. 81); "The arms race is 
not a secure way of maintaining true peace, and the resulting balance of power is 
no sure and genuine path to achieving it" (para 80); "Since peace must be born of 
mutual trust between peoples, instead of being forced on nations through dread of 
arms, all must work to put an end to the arms race and make a real beginning of 
disarmament, not unilaterally indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis 
of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees" (para 82). 

These principles reflect the authentic position of the Catholic Church and of all 
faithful Catholics. The manner and degree to which these principles are reflected in 
a particular proposal, such as the SALT II Treaty, admits a divergence of views. For 
this reason, I recognize, and I want this Committee to know, that while the princi- 
ples to which we subscribe are clear and generally accepted, the position I present 
here today is the view of the majority of the Administrative Board of the Bishops 
Conference; it is not a unanimous position within the Conference of Bishops, nor it 
it the unanimous position of all Catholics in the United States. It is however the 
official policy of the U.S. Catholic Conference, and in expressing it, we Bishops seek 
to fulfill a role of responsible citizenship, as well as the religious leadership. 

This role requires me to speak the truth plainly. The Catholic Bishops of this 
country believe that too long have we Americans been preoccupied with prepara- 
tions for war; too long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or 
superiority of armaments; too long have we allowed other nations to virtually 
dictate how much we should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction. Is it not 
time that we concentrate our efforts on peace rather than war? Is it not time we 
take that first step towards peace: gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament? 

It is impossible to regard this Treaty as a spectacular achievement in the field of 
arms control. But we support its ratification as a partial and imperfect step in the 
direction of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as part of an ongoing 
process, begun in 1972, to negotiate actual reductions in nuclear arms. Our support 
is, however, heavily qualified precisely because of the moral principles which govern 
our view of arms control. 

No question of foreign affairs surpasses the arms race in terms of moral complex- 
ity and moral content. Along with the correlative issue of world poverty, the arms 
race forms the heart of the moral agenda of foreign policy. 

The massive technical complexity of the arms race in its political and strategic 
dimensions is something that people in our government grapple with daily. V'e 
respect that technical complexity and have tried to assimilate it in this testimony. 
At the same time, for the Church the arms race is principally a problem defined in 
religious and moral categories. The specter of war, in any form, raises for Christian 
ethics the central question of the taking of human life. Since the life of every single 
human person bears the sacred dignity of the image of God, the question of the 
religious and moral significance of warfare has received more sustained reflection in 
Roman Catholic theology than almost any other moral problem. From St. Augus- 
tine's masterful treatment of war in Chapter 19 of "The City of God" to the Vatican 
Council II's injunction to the Church that it should "undertake a completely fresh 



128 

appraisal of war" there has been present in Catholic tradition an abiding determi- 
nation to limit the impact of war on the human family. 

In the nuclear age, the moral sanctions against war have taken on a qualitatively 
new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II, the moral argument is clear: the 
nuclear arms race is to be unreservedly condemned and the political process of arms 
control and disarmament is to be supported by the Christian community. This 
pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or Utopian view of the world. The Christian 
tradition is eloquent about the vision of peace; it is also realistic about the fact of 
war. Hence, Vatican Council II, recognizing the inadequate nature of the political 
structure of the international community, stated that "governments cannot be 
denied the right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settlement 
has been exhausted". (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 
para. 79.) 

The perspective which shapes this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some 
forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear war surpasses the 
boundaries of legitimate self-defense. The application of this basic moral principle to 
our present situation requires that we distinguish two problems of the nuclear age: 
the use of nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence. Both are pertinent to our 
assessment of the SALT II Treaty. 

The prohibition of use. — The primary moral imperative of the nuclear age is to 
prevent any use of strategic nuclear weapons. This prohibition is expressed in the 
following passage of Vatican Council II: ' Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at 
the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a 
crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating con- 
demnation". (The Pastoral Constitution, para. 80.) 

This was the only formal condemnation of the Council and indicates the serious- 
ness with which the bishops of the world viewed the possible use of what they called 
"modern scientific weapons". Our first purpose in supporting SALT II is to illus- 
trate our support for any reasonable effort which is designed to make nuclear war 
in any form less likely. I have said that our support of the Treaty is qualified; one 
reason for this is the paradox of nuclear deterrence. 

The moral dilemma of deterrence. — The moral paradox of deterrence is that its 
purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed 
threat to attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat runs 
directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Christian teaching on war: 
that innocent lives are not open to direct attack. The complexity of the moral 
dilemma is reflected in the statement on deterrence of the American Bishops in 
1976: "With respect to nuclear weapons, at least those with massive destructive 
capability, the first imperative is to prevent their use. As possessors of a vast 
nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian 
populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of 
deterrence. We urge the continued development and implementation of policies 
which seek to bring these weapons more securely under control, progressively 
reduce their presence in the world, and ultimately remove them entirely' . (To live 
in Christ Jesus: 1976.) 

The moral judgment of this statement is that not only the use of strategic nuclear 
weapons, but also the declared intent to use them involved in our deterrence policy, 
are both wrong. This explains the Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence 
and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race be reversed. It 
is of the utmost importance that negotiations proceed to meaningful and continuing 
reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and eventually to the phasing out altogether of 
nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutual-assured destruction. 

As long as there is hope of this occurring. Catholic moral teaching is willing, 
while negotiations proceed, to tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons for deter- 
rence as the lesser of two evils. If that hope were to disappear the moral attitude of 
the Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising 
condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons. 

With this in mind, the Catholic Bishops of this country ask the Senate of the 
United States to ratify this Treaty because the negotiations which produced it, and 
the further round of negotiations which it permits, offer the promise of escape from 
the danger of a nuclear holocaust and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear deter- 
rence. 

II. THE SALT II TREATY 

Nevertheless, we have serious reservations about this Treaty. SALT I had created 
a hope among people that SALT II would require real reductions on both sides. This 
hope has not been fulfilled and there is no clear indication that SALT III can revive 



129 

that hope. That is why some of my fellow bishops and many more concerned 
Catholics refuse to support SALT II. 

The U.S. proposals of 1977 had significant reductions in view but these were 
rejected by the U.S.S.R. The present Treaty limits strategic nuclear delivery systems 
to 2,250 (after 1981) on both sides and this will require the dismantling of about 250 
Soviet launchers. Such a reduction is not very significant considering the destruc- 
tive power (3,550 megatons for the U.S., and 7,868 megatons for the U.S.S.R.) that 
will remain and continue to increase on each side. 

Secondly the Treaty does not preclude either side from proceeding to replace its 
present land-based ICBMs wth a new system, or modif3ring existing systems within 
limits, it is true, as to size and number of warheads but obviously embodjdng 
significant improvements in accuracy. These systems will obviously be more destruc- 
tive. 

On the other hand it cannot be argued, as do some critics, that the Treaty does 
not constrain Soviet strategic weapons expansion. Under the Treaty the U.S.S.R. 
will not be permitted to deploy an already-tested mobile missile (SS-16); it must 
count all SS-18 missiles as having multiple warheads though some may not; it must 
stop its current program of deplojdng additional missiles with multiple warheads by 
about 1982 and may not increase the number of warheadls in existing missiles. 

SALT II is thus basically a deceleration, not a reversal of the nuclear arms race. 
Wliile the weight of this testimony comes to the conclusion that the quantitative 
and qualitative limits on delivery systems and weapons constitute an arms control 
achievement worthy of support, that conclusion becomes harder to defend if one 
assumes SALT II to be the end of the process. Much more remains to be done. 

By far the most numerous opponents of ratification are those who reject the 
Treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. In particular, there are those who argue 
that this Treaty will permit the U.S.S.R. to achieve a first-strike capability against 
our land-based ICBM s, and that they will use this threat to challenge and change 
the strategic balance in various parts of the world. Can this really be reliably 
predicted? With the U.S. in possession of a large nuclear arsenal and varied means 
of delivery would not the leaders of the U.S.S.R. be insane to start, or threaten to 
start, a nuclear war, even in possession of a first-strike capability vis-a-vis our land- 
based ICBM's? Can we gainsay the tragic reality that deterrence is still based on the 
posture and policy of mutual-assured destruction? Even if the U.S.S.R. were to 
acquire the capability to neutralize the U.S. Minuteman force of ICBM's, is it not 
clear that the other legs of the Triad will continue to deter a Soviet first-strike, if 
indeed that were the Soviet intention? 

Some critics of the Treaty, however, do not base their opposition mainly on the 
premise that the U.S.S.R. would risk a first-strike. Rather they argue that the 
perception in the world of the U.S.S.R. having first-strike capability will lead to an 
adverse shift in the global political balance. I do not pose as a political or technical 
expert, but I must ask whether, in the nuclear age, it can be argued that an 
increment of strategic power can so easily be translated into an effective instrument 
of political influence. This translation from the strategic balance to specific political 
conflicts seems particularly complex precisely in those situations in the developing 
world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological positions are vjdng 
for control. The cost of using nuclear weapons on the part of those who employ 
them has deprived them of much of their strategic utility and has made their 
political usefulness equally problematical. For example, the U.S.S.R. has not been 
able to achieve a decisive political advantage vis-a-vis China, despite the former's 
admitted military superiority. 

On balance, we are satisfied that while the Treaty does not require a reduction in 
nuclear weaponry on either side, at the same time it will not substantially endanger 
U.S. security. Whatever risks may be involved are worth taking for the sake of 
ensuring that the SALT II negotiations will be followed quickly by a third round 
aimed at more significant reductions. 

III. BEYOND SALT II 

By itself SALT II is no more than a beginning. It creates a certain momentum 
which should make possible more impressive arms control achievements. If not, our 
confidence may have been misplaced. What are the prospects? 

It is our hope that the U.S. agenda for future negotiations will be bold and 
imaginative, and that the aim of the negotiators should be real, demonstrable 
reductions in both weapons and delivery systems. Our negotiating posture should 
not sacrifice long-term possibilities for real disarmament in the name of short-term 
tactical advantages in the strategic competition. 

It can hardly be a source of satisfaction or pride that the ratification of this 
Treaty may be in doubt or that an arms control agreement can only be purchased in 



130 

conjunction with substantially increased expenditures for other arms. There is a 
prevalent belief in this country that our national security can only be preserved by 
the djTiamic of technlological development and investment in new and ever more 
destructive weapon systems. One reads that the decision to deploy the MX missile is 
a response to such perceptions but perhaps still not sufficient to reconcile opponents 
of the Treaty. 

We have already referred to the opportunities which the Treaty affords for 
further escalation of nuclear weaponry by both sides. It has been argued during 
these hearings that ratification of the Treaty should be linked to a new and massive 
program for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nuclear as well as conventional 
forces. If the (Congress accepts this advice, the hope which I referred to earlier for a 
reversal of the nuclear arms race will grow even dimmer. 

Many of us remember being told by the then Secretary of Defense McNamara in 
the late sixties that U.S. security depended on U.S. strategic forces being main- 
tained at a level 2 or 3 times greater than that of the U.S.S.R. in terms of 
deliverable warheads. The United States now has 9,200 strategic nuclear weapons 
(re-entry vehicles and aerial bombs) compared to 5,000 for the U.S.S.R.; yet we are 
told we are no longer superior, in fact are facing strategic inferiority, and must 
exert ourselves to maintain or recover "equivalence". Where McNamara once was 
confident that neither side would be able to acquire a first-strike capability, we are 
now told that the U.S.S.R. is acquiring a first-strike capability and that the United 
States must hasten to do likewise. Witness after witness have told this Committee 
that SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the United States 
from meeting this challenge. Strategic "equivalence" is the new name for the 
nuclear arms race! 

At the time of SALT I Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking, "what good is strategic 
superiority at these levels of numbers?". Are we not justified in asking today, is 
strategic equivalence an absolute necessity? Is this doctrine not an infallible recipe 
for continuing the strategic arms race? Are we not moving inexorably toward a 
situation in which each side has a first-strike capability, a posture and a policy, not 
of deterrence by mutual-assured destruction, but of readiness for and reliance on 
the capability for fighting a nuclear war? 

We, the Catholic Bishops, find ourselves under the obligation of questioning 
fundamentally the logic of the pattern of events implied by determined pursuit of 
strategic equivalence. Our purp)ose in coming before this distinguished Committee is 
to speak on moral-religious grounds in support of arms control designed to be a step 
toward real measures of disarmament. It would radically distort our intention and 
purpose if our support of SALT II were in any way coupled with plans for new 
military expenditures. The Treaty should be approved as an arms control measure, 
not a maneuver to increase the strategic budget. 

These proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay of funds at a 
time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution of the United States calls 
upon the executive and legislative branches of our government not only to provide 
for the common defense but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare 
of the nation and to secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity. 
Estimates for the M-X missile run from $30 billion upwards over the next decade; 
with the existing national debt at $805 billion and pressure being exerted on 
legislative bodies at all levels to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion 
in one weapons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending for essential 
human services here and abroad. 

This topic of the competition of arms for scarce resources has been an abiding 
concern for me. Speaking at the Synod of Bishops in 1971 I argued then, and still 
believe now, that: "The armaments race violates the rights of the world's poor in a 
way that is fruitless and intolerable. The reason is that it is not the way to protect 
human life or foster peace, but on the contrary the causes of war are thereby 
aggravated little by little". 

It is our recommendation that systems like the MX, as well as Trident II, should 
be considered as negotiable in return for equivalent concessions by the U.S.S.R. in 
SALT III. We have been told that the aim of SALT III will be "deep cuts" in the 
strategic arsenals of both superpowers; we fervently hope this will be true. As we 
consider the future of U.S. defense policy, including the deployment of the M-X, it 
might be well to review one dimension of the SALT I negotiations. At that time, the 
possibility existed of excluding the deployment of MIRVs; we did not take that 
option. Now we find that one of the major objections of those opposing SALT II is 
the threat posed by the Soviets to our land-based ICBM's. The Soviet MIRV capabili- 
ty is a central element of the threat to our ICBM's, a threat which we might have 
obviated by a different negotiating posture in SALT I. Our hope is that we will 
carefully consider the M-X, and related decisions in the light of their impact on the 



131 

negotiating process of SALT III. Perhaps the most important single strategic arms 
control step would be the elimination of MIRV's from the respective ICBM forces. 
Unrealistic as it may seem to hardheaded defense planners, the question should be 
raised now whether the United States could try immediately to negotiate a lower 
MIRV level for ICBM's. 

IV. SUMMARY 

The foregoing testimony may be summarized in the following propositions: 

1. Catholics reject means of waging or even deterring war which could result in 
destruction beyond control and possibly a final holocaust of humanity. 

2. In particular, strategic nuclear weapons of massive destructiveness and poison- 
ous regional or global aftereffects must never be used. 

3. Consequently, the reduction, through negotiated agreements, and eventually 
the elimination of such weapons, must be the overriding aim of policy. Without it, 
there can be only one alternative: the indefinite continuation and escalation of the 
strategic competition. The doctrine of strategic equality, by itself, does not insure 
against such competition; rather it almost guarantees it. Some risks must be taken 
in the direction of control, both to avoid nuclear war and to rescue us from the 
moral dilemma of nuclear deterrence. 

4. SALT II, the result of seven years of negotiation, represents a limited but 
acceptable agreement which constrains the nuclear forces of both the United States 
and the U.S.S.R., does not jeopardize U.S. security, and can be the beginning of a 
continuing and necessary process for obtaining meaningful and progressive reduc- 
tions. The Treaty should be ratified by the Senate. 

5. This process must not be sacrificed to a narrow and technologically oriented 
insistence upon exploitation of new nuclear options, including counterforce options. 
In particular, final decisions regarding deployment of the M-X and Trident II 
should be deferred until the utility of those options for negotiation in SALT III can 
be explored. 

6. Failure by the United States to take full advantage of the possibilities for 
further restraints and reductions will eventually rob U.S. foreign and defense policy 
of moral legitimacy. 

Mr. Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been captured by the new 
Pope, John Paul II. He has already taken note of the significance of the SALT II 
Treaty for World peace. The Pope's remarks came in his weekly Sunday talk before 
leading the noon Angelus in St. Peter's Square. The SALT accord, he said, "is not 
yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarmament. But 
that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we ought to 
greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue, without which every hope of 
working effectively for peace could vanish." 

"Believers and men of goodwill who feel themselves so impelled by conscience to 
pledge themselves as 'artisans of peace' cannot ignore the importance of anything 
that favors a climate of alleviating tensions. This helps to encourage other indis- 
pensable progress on the road to limitation and reduction of armaments". 

The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause of la3dng down 
weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective agreements" of peace and con- 
cord. It is with such sentiments that the U.S. Catholic Conference submits this 
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee. 

Senator Muskie. Our next witness is Claire Randall, General 
Secretary of the National Council of Churches. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CLAIRE RANDALL, GENERAL SECRETARY, 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, ACCOMPANIED BY 
ALLEN GUYERi 

Dr. Randall. Mr. Chairperson, I am Claire Randall, the general 
secretary of the National Council of Churches. I am accompanied 
by Dr. Allen Guyer who is one of a very large number of persons 
within the churches' ranks who have given serious and careful 
thought to these issues and who are the ones who advise and guide 
and help boards and agencies and executives as we try to deal with 
these complex issues. Therefore we work not only from our moral 



' See page 136 for Dr. Randall's prepared statement. 



132 

understandings but from some of the technical aid that we do 
receive. 

I would like also to say just briefly that 22 church bodies have 
made statements, copies of which will be coming to all Senators 
shortly, in support of SALT II, which we think is a very important 
matter, and 27 such churches and others have come together in a 
coalition, the Religious Committee on SALT II, which is working at 
this very hard and is reaching out across the country in education 
and information ways. 

So it is that we are, as churches, working on this issue. 

I might also just interject here as my friend Coretta King inter- 
jected some other pieces that perhaps have not been presented 
here, that there are many women in this country who not only as 
mothers but in other ways are deeply concerned about the issues 
that are before us in the SALT II discussion. And certainly the 
churches feel that this is a life and death issue, and therefore it is 
a theological and moral issue, as has been pointed out. 

I would like to share briefly with you some of what the Council 
of Churches would have me say in this case, and also to point out 
that we are made up of 32 denominations in this country, which 
includes the six large black Baptist and Methodist churches and 
the eight or so orthodox churches, not just the mainstream Protes- 
tant churches, which I think is important to know. 

And the National Council of Churches has, since its formation 30 
years ago, given leadership among the Protestant and Orthodox 
churches to the struggle for peace and justice. The council came 
into existence shortly after the world had witnessed the devastat- 
ing effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership and the members 
of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger to 
all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war, and in a sense, 
the line that we have gone across as we have entered into a 
nuclear age. 

In the Old Testament, we are told to beat our swords into plow- 
shares. In the New Testament we are asked not to return evil for 
evil but to love our neighbors. These biblical injunctions, because 
we believe these principles expressed in action, create the climate 
which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and nations. 
These biblical injunctions must be listened to in our opinion. 

At its meeting in May of this year, the governing board of the 
National Council of Churches voted unanimously, and I might say 
enthusiastically, in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth 
some of the reasons the National Council supports ratification. We 
have based our testimony on the short phrases that are a part of 
the introduction to the SALT II Treaty. I will not read those 
phrases but simply comment at this point on them. 

The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal, as you well 
know, enough nuclear weapons to kill every man, woman, and 
child in the world, not once, but several times. And once is too 
much, and more is impossible, and thus an absurd idea. And even 
limited use of this power would visit devastation on future genera- 
tions as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The 
devastation of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons 
might achieve what defense planners call a strategic objective. But 



133 

the winds that sweep round the globe would bring deadly radiation 
to the United States even if no Soviet bombs explode in the United 
States. And so there are devastating consequences for humankind. 

In SALT II, the United States and the U.S.S.R. are mutually 
agreeing to limit strategic offensive arms. Our country and the 
Soviet Union have opposing ideological, political and economic sys- 
tems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered, these two major 
powers must find ways to improve relations. The treaty provisions 
which limit arms are of vital significance, but we must not under- 
estimate the symbolic importance of the two superpowers' ability 
to reduce tension and danger by mutual agreement without resort 
to war. The ratification of the treaty by these two nations with 
such opposing views would give evidence to all the world that 
differences between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means. 

While the treaty is a symbol of mutual trust, it does not depend 
for its success on mutual trust, and there have been those who 
testified to help us come to that conclusion. 

In 1968, under pressure from the United States and the Soviet 
Union, many nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves 
and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article VI contains a 
promise made by the superpowers to make progress in reducing 
and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward 
completion of a ban on all nuclear testing. 

In affirming a statement that was drawn up by leaders of the 
National Council of Churches and representative leaders of Soviet 
churches this spring, the governing board of the National Council 
expressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious bal- 
ancing of humanity on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. We 
know that still more terrible weapons are being developed which 
can only lead to far greater fear and suspicion, and thus to a still 
more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice: No. In 
the name of God, no. 

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to 
accept a treaty which gives the other nation strategic offensive 
superiority. The United States and the U.S.S.R. weapons systems 
are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in 
determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has 
been reached which most American military and intelligence lead- 
ers have testified provides equality and equal security. We have 
indicated some of those facts which we believe lead us to agree that 
this is something which we can believe. 

Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can 
be no strategic stability. Each side will inevitably make huge in- 
vestments to achieve what is perceived as superiority. The fear 
that the other nation is achieving strategic superiority has fueled 
the arms race already between the United States and the U.S.S.R. 

SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. With- 
out such a mutually agreed upon ceiling, both countries would be 
tempted to an arms race which would use scarce resources, divert 
scientific research from avenues designed to benefit all human 
kind, and in fact endanger rather than enhance the security of the 
United States. Our Nation's security does not depend solely on its 
military might. It depends as much on our economic stability and 



134 

fairness, our technical competence, and the faith of the people that 
our Government is truly benefiting all its citizens. 

The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion 
dollars a day on armaments. We are informed that the World 
Health Organization required a mere $83 million to eradicate 
smallpox from this Earth. The United States now has an unaccept- 
able rate of inflation, millions of its citizens are unemployed, and 
perhaps more will be, almost 20 percent of the population is illiter- 
ate. The true strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The 
only rewards of an arms race with no limitations are widespread 
moral devastation, cynicism, hopelessness, and possibly even the 
end of civilization. 

So surely limiting the arms race meets the interests of both 
parties. 

While pressing for the earliest possible approval of the SALT 
accords, the National Council of Churches governing board af- 
firmed that while we understand that SALT II does not provide for 
more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a new and essen- 
tial framework of parity for negotiating substantial and equal re- 
ductions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general 
and complete disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to con- 
solidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The 
success of SALT II would open the way to decisive progress on 
other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two govern- 
ments, speaking of the U.S.S.R. and the United States, to share 
more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, techni- 
cal, and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of 
international relations in general. 

Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important 
step, but it is only one step among many that must be taken. SALT 
II limits the arms race. It does not reduce it. SALT II does not deal 
with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It does not ban 
chemical or radiological arms, but by limiting strategic arms, the 
National Council believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in 
which work in these vital areas can proceed. 

The joint statement on subsequent negotiations, which is at- 
tached to SALT II, established the framework for negotiating fur- 
ther limitations and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms 
and so on. Thus, the ratification of SALT II not only limits the 
current strategic arms race but helps make possible negotiations 
looking forward to an actual arms reduction. 

And so the statement that the governing board of the National 
Council affirmed expressed profound anxiety for the future of our 
own and all peoples. It was encouraged by certain things that had 
been taking place showing that the peoples of the world are calling 
for disarmament. 

Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establish- 
ment of peace. But we believe it promises a new opportunity to 
consolidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, 
opens the way to decisive progress on other critical disarmament 
issues, and enables the governments of the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in 
economic, technical and cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratifi- 
cation of SALT II. 



135 

May I say that actions by this U.S. Senate can and do affect the 
well being of all the world's peoples. We urge you to remember 
that as you deal with this critical treaty I am sure you do, but we 
would emphasize that for you. 

And may I be bold enough to close with a challenge to you from 
the book of Deuteronomy: 

"I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse, said the 
Lord. Therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may 
live." This is the strongest feeling that we in the churches I think 
have. It is embodied in that biblical quotation. 

Thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Randall, for an excel- 
lent statement, I must say. 

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES SPREADING WORD OF SALT 

SUPPORT 

I wonder what the National Council of Churches is doing to 
spread the word. You clearly feel very strongly about the treaty 
and the need for the Senate to ratify the treaty. But the Senate, 
being a representative body, is influenced by the people who live in 
each of the 50 States, and what is the National Council of Churches 
of Christ doing to spread this message? 

Dr. Randall. There are several things that we are doing. We 
have staff and committees that work on these matters in trying to 
get the materials and the educational information prepared. We 
had this consultation in the spring for three days with church 
leaders from the U.S.S.R. in which we were miraculously, I think, 
able to make a statement together calling for this kind of under- 
standing of the life and death matters that we are dealing with. 
This statement has been widely used and is being widely dissemi- 
nated, and I think has a strong religious appeal because of its very 
basic religious tone. 

In addition, I mentioned before you came back in that there are 
22 church bodies that have made statements in support of SALT II, 
copies of which are being sent to Senators. 

We also are part of the coalition, the Religious Committee on 
SALT II, which is one way we are attempting to consolidate our 
efforts of education and information being sent out. And I have 
been informed of the fact that this material and this kind of 
education is beginning to spread around, and the interesting thing 
is that when such education is made available to people, and the 
opportunity to think along these lines, that there is a very real 
appreciation and understanding and support for this direction, an 
understanding of its limitations, but also of its necessity. 

The Chairman. Well, I would expect so, but I am keenly aware 
of the money that is being raised and the rather frenetic effort on 
the part of certain organizations opposed to the treaty to saturate 
the country with arguments and frightening charges with respect 
to what the treaty would do. I don't think that advocates of the 
treaty have done as much to try and get their message out. 

The message you bring to us today is a splendid one, as I have 
said, but I would urge you to do everything in your power to reach 
your own membership with it. 



136 

Dr. Randall. We are urging, and have been urging the churches, 
the individual churches to work through the many channels that 
they have on this. 

We are quite aware of the problem which you have expressed, 
and we find that a difficult problem to deal with also since, as we 
all know, the kinds of monetary resources which such groups have 
are not available to the mainstream of the church in the same way. 
But we have analyzed and are analyzing that situation, trying to 
find those ways in which we can respond, go around or counterbal- 
ance that very problem, and we shall continue to do more. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Dr. Randall. Thank you. 

[Dr. Claire Randall's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Dr. Claire Randaul 

My name is Claire Randall. I am general Secretary of the National Council of the 
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. 

The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. is a cooperative agency 
of thirty-two Protestant and Orthodox bodies in this country. I do not purport to 
speak for all members of the communions which are constituent to the National 
Council of Churches. I am speaking for the Governing Board, the policymaking body 
which is composed of persons selected by member denominations in proportion to 
their size. It is this group which determines the policy positions through which the 
Council seeks to fulfill its expressed purpose "to study, and to speak and to act on 
conditions and issues in the nation and the world which involve moral, ethical and 
spiritual principles inherent in the Christian gospel." 

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has since its 
formation 30 years ago given leadership in the Protestant and Orthodox churches to 
the struggle for peace and justice. The Council came into existence shortly after the 
world had witnessed the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership 
and the members of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger 
to all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war. 

In the Old Testament we are told to beat our swords into plowshares. In the New 
Testament we are asked not to return evil for evil but to love our neighbors as 
ourselves — and, in fact, to love our enemies. We seek peace, but only because of 
these biblical injunctions, but because we believe these principles expressed in 
action create the climate which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and 
nations. 

At its meeting in May, 1979, the Governing Board of the National Council of 
Churches voted unanimously in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth some of the 
reasons the National Council of Churches supports ratification. My remarks will be 
related to the purpose of the Treaty as stated in its introduction: "Conscious that 
nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind (Preamble, SALT 
II Treaty, 1979), * * *." 

The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal enough nuclear weapons to 
kill every man, woman and child in the world, not once, but several times. Once is 
too much. And even limited use of this power would visit devastation on future 
generations as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The devasta- 
tion of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons might achieve what defense 
planners call a strategic objective. But the winds that sweep 'round the globe would 
bring deadly radiation to the U.S.A. even if no Soviet bombs explode in the U.S.A. 
Such "devastating consequences for all mankind" must be prevented. 

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided 
for in this treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between Parties, 
help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen internationally 
peace and security (Preamble), * * *. 

In SALT II the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are mutually agreeing to limit strategic 
offensive arms. Our country and the Soviet Union have opposing ideological, politi- 
cal, and economic systems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered these two 
major powers must find ways to improve relations. The Treaty provisions which 
limit arms are of vital significance. But we must not underestimate the s5mibolic 
importance of the two "super powers' " ability to reduce tension and danger by 
mutual agreement— without resort to war. The ratification of the Treaty by two 



137 

nations with such opposing views give evidence to all the world that differences 
between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means. 

While the Treaty is a symbol of mutual trust it does not depend for its success on 
mutual trust. Article XV provides for verification of compliance. The chief military 
and intelligence officers of our nation have said the United States is capable of 
verifying Soviet compliance. We believe the Treaty does, in fact, "help to reduce the 
risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security." 
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- 
tion of Nuclear Weapons (Preamble), * * * 

In 1968 under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union many 
nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves and joined the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Article VI contains a promise made by the super powers to make progress 
in reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward 
completion of a ban on all nuclear testing. 

The Governing Board of the National Ck)uncil of Churches, in May, 1979, ex- 
pressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious balancing of humanity 
on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. We know that still more terrible weapons are 
being developed which can only lead to greater fear and suspicion and thus to a still 
more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice — No! In the name of 
God— No! 
Guided by the principle of equality and equal security (Preamble), * * * 
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to accept a treaty which 
gives the other nation strategic offensive superiority. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 
weapons systems are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in 
determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has been reached 
which most American military and intelligence leaders have testified provides 
"equality and equal security." We note the United States now has almost twice as 
many deliverable strategic nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has 
1,400 land based missiles versus 1,054 in the U.S.A. and 950 submarine launched 
ballistic missiles to 656 in the U.S.A. Both nations in the Treaty have agreed to an 
overall ceiling of 2,250 nuclear delivery vehicles by 1985, with equally important 
sub-limits in various categories (U.S. Department of State, 1978). The agreed upon 
verifiable limits, we believe, do provide "equality and equal security." 

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the 
Parties and the interests of international security (Preamble), * * ♦ 

Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can be no strategic 
stability. Each side will inevitably make huge investments to achieve what is 
perceived as superiority. The fear that the other nation is achieving strategic 
superiority has fueled the arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. 

SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. Without such a 
mutually agreed upon ceiling both countries would be tempted to an arms race 
which would use scarce resources, divert scientific research from avenues designed 
to benefit all human kind and, in fact, endanger rather than enhance the security 
of the United States. Our nation's security does not depend solely on its military 
might. It depends as much on our economic stability and fairness, our technological 
competence, and the faith of the people that our government is truly benefiting all 
its citizens. 

The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion dollars per day— 400 
billion per year— on armaments. We are informed that the World Health Organiza- 
tion required a mere 83 million dollars to eradicate smallpox from the face of the 
earth. The United States now has an unacceptable rate of inflation, millions of its 
citizens unemployed, almost 20 percent of the population illiterate. The true 
strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The only rewards of an arms race 
with no limitations are widespread moral devastation, cjTiicism, hopelessness, and 
possibly even the end of civilization. 

Surely limiting the arms race "meets the interests of the Parties and the interests 
of international security." 

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the 
further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general 
and complete disarmament (Preamble), * * * 

While pressing for "the earliest possible approval of the SALT II accords," the 
National Council of Churches Governing Board affirmed: "While we understand 
that SALT II does not provide for more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a 
new and essential framework (of parity) for negotiating substantial and equal reduc- 
tions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general and complete 
disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting 
the spread of nuclear weapons. The success of SALT II would open the way to 
decisive progress on other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two 



138 

governments to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, 
technical and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of interna- 
tional relations in general." 

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to 
limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms (Preamble), * * *. 

Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important step, but it is only 
one step among many that must be taken. SALT II limits the arms race. It does not 
reduce it. SALT II does not deal with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It 
does not ban chemical or radiological arms. But by limiting strategic arms the NCC 
believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in which work in these vital areas can 

The joint statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia- 
tions on the Limitation of Strategic Arms which is attached to SALT II establishes 
the framework for negotiating "further limitation and reduction in the numbers of 
strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitations." Thus the ratifi- 
cation of SALT II not only limits the current strategic arms race but helps make 
possible negotiations looking forward to an actual arms reduction. 

The NCC Governing Board's May 1979 statement expressed "profound anxiety for 
the future of our own and all peoples." It was encouraged by the unprecedented 
range of disarmament negotiations; by the strengthening of the more significant 
measures taken by the United Nations for disarmament; by the renewed vitality of 
nongovernmental organizations in the disarmament field; and by the indications 
that the peoples of the world are calling for disarmament. 

Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establishment of peace. But 
we believe it promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting the 
spread of nuclear weapons, opens the way to decisive progress on other critical 
disarmament issues, and enables the governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to 
share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, technical and 
cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratification of SALT II. 

Actions by this United States Senate can and do affect the well being of all the 
world's peoples. We urge you to remember that as you deal with this critical Treatjs^. 
Therefore, may I close with a challenge to you from the book of Deuteronomy: 'I 
have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that 
you and your descendants may live" (Deuteronomy 30:19). 

NOTES 

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Limitation Df Strategic Offensive Arms, Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979. 
U.S. Department of State. SALT and American Security, November 1978. 

Preamble to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union 
OF Soviet Sociaust Repubucs on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 

Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979 

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein- 
after referred to as the Parties, 

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, 

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972, 

Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and deter- 
mined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with 
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, 

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided 
for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the 
Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strenghten interna- 
tional peace and security. . , ^ , XT T> 1 x- 

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Prolitera- 
tion of Nuclear Weapons, 

Guided by the prinicple of equality and equal security. 

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the 
Parties and the interests of international security. 

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the 
further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general 
and complete disarmament, r „lu i. 

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to 
limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms. 



139 

The Chairman. Our last witness this afternoon is Albert Vor- 
span, who represents the Union of American Hebrew Congrega- 
tions here in Washington. 

Mr. Vorspan, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee 
this afternoon. I am sorry that you have had to wait so long. It is 
now a little after 5 o'clock, so please proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ALBERT VORSPAN, VICE PRESIDENT, UNION 
OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS,' ACCOMPANIED BY 
RABBI DAVID SAPERSTEIN, DIRECTOR, RELIGIOUS ACTION 
CENTER OF REFORM JUDAISM, AND COCHAIR, RELIGIOUS 
COMMITTEE ON SALT 

Mr. Vorspan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and despite 
the lateness of the hour, I do want to thank you and the committee 
for this opportunity. I am really grateful for this opportunity be- 
cause I think what happened here this afternoon — I am grateful 
that I had to sit through it, too — what I think happened this 
afternoon is something which, to me, is indispensible to the SALT 
debate — that this debate has been placed in a moral framework. 
The issue of what is right, the issue of the future of the human 
race has been voiced and echoed this afternoon not only from the 
profound testimony of Roman Catholic and Protestant religious 
leaders, but if I may say so, from that side of the podium as well. 

And if I can say, I think we have all failed to some extent in 
posing the issue in terms of these very fundamental dimensions. I 
think most Americans, while they in general support the idea of 
SALT, are intoxicated with and mystified by what they read about 
this debate and these issues. And the reason I believe that the 
discussion this afternoon was very important is that in my under- 
standing of what SALT signifies, the testimony of the Cardinal, the 
testimony of the distinguished Protestant leader, the testimony of 
rabbis and other religious leaders are as relevant to the deepest 
issues involved here as the testimony of a general or an admiral 
presently serving or retired, and I am very grateful for the oppor- 
tunity to have been part of that. 

My name is Albert Vorspan. I am the vice president of the Union 
of American Hebrew Congregations. This is the central body of 
Reformed Judaism in the United States of America. 

In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, being very conscious of 
the weight of discussions here, including many repetitive discus- 
sions, I am going to be very brief. I would like the opportunity to 
submit a longer, more detailed statement for the record. 

The Chairman. Of course. 

Mr. Vorspan. But I will only spend a few minutes summarizing 
in sharp telescope some of the things that seem to me to be very 
important. 

The organization that I represent includes 720 Reform syna- 
gogues throughout the United States, roughly 1 million members. 
Like the distinguished people who sat here earlier today, I do not 
pretend for one moment that every member of every one of those 
synagogues shares the view adopted by the board of the Union. But 
I do say that it was very significant that after a study of an entire 
year, with proponents and opponents of the SALT Treaty being 



' See page 143 for Mr. Vorspan's prepared statement. 



48-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 10 



140 

brought before our group, in the end, the decision that was made 
was a unanimous decision, I think an enthusiastic decision, and I 
think, the onus is on us as it is on every other religious group to 
bring that message to our people, to the people in this country, and 
to oppose it in terms of the issues of choosing life. 

With me today is Rabbi David Saperstein, who is the director of 
the Religious Action Center of the Union of American Hebrew 
Congregations here in Washington. I want to echo what has been 
said, but I will do it very, very briefly. I think many Americans 
have been led to believe that the choice faced by the Senate and 
the American people is a choice between SALT II and some ideal 
treaty. The choice, as I think we have heard it today, is that 
however disappointed many of us are that SALT II does not go 
nearly far enough, that SALT II is in some measures almost cos- 
metic and atmospheric; despite that, what we are talking about is a 
SALT II compared to what? And it seems to me that the "com- 
pared to what" is the nightmare of chaos which can lead ultimate- 
ly, inevitably only to profound tragedy for the human race. 

I am one of those who shares the disappointment that this step is 
too small, but I am also one of those who believes that this treaty 
must be weighed against events happening in an onrushing way 
every minute of the day. SALT II cannot be seen in a vacuum 
because it seems to me that forces are converging on us, on all the 
human beings on this planet which make it absolutely essential 
someday, somehow, for the human race to get a handle on this 
struggle. And those events include the following: The immense size 
of the superpowers' arsenal; the fact that the nuclear club is ex- 
pected to increase sevenfold by the year 1990, from 5 to 35 nations; 
the massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as 
an energy source following the energy crisis of 1973 and 1974; the 
mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen 
fissionable material, or even tactical nuclear weapons; the rising 
curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia, 
the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, and 
Latin America, and the potential that these tensions can trigger or 
escalate a nuclear conflict; the ongoing conventional and nuclear 
arms race, reaching $400 billion in military expenditures this year 
alone; the lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarma- 
ment at the highest levels of the Government of the United States 
and U.S.S.R. 

I share with the distinguished witnesses who sat here earlier 
today the belief that mankind faces, as the Senate faces, a penulti- 
mate choice, a moment of truth, the kind of choice which God set 
out for us in the book of Deuteronomy: "I have set before you this 
day the blessing and the curse, life and death, good and evil. 
Therefore, choose life in order that you may live." 

I speak also as a representative of a Jewish organization and 
that Jewish organization has deep concerns about our fellow broth- 
ers and sisters in all parts of the country, and one of the aspects of 
this debate which resonates within the Jewish community is the 
question: Does our support for SALT II relate to our concern for 
Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East and 
would it be good or bad for those issues? Proponents of linkage 
argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II unless the U.S.S.R. 



141 

improves its human rights performance and supports progress 
toward peace in the Middle East. Deep as is our concern for Jews 
in the Soviet Union and other people in the Soviet Union, deep as 
is our commitment to peace in the Middle East, we believe that 
SALT II must be examined and measured and judged on its own 
merits. Our support for SALT II in no way signifies our approval of 
Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty is of 
momentous intrinsic moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of 
ratification on its own merits. If the world disappears into a nucle- 
ar holocaust, our concerns for human rights and peace become 
irrelevant. Human life is the ultimate civil and human right. 

In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation 
of Soviet Jewry and other dissidents, and others seeking to emi- 
grate. Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sak- 
harov, one of the truly courageous fighters for human rights in the 
Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy reported, and I quote. 

When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the 
greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea 
to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to 
create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the United States. Let the advocates of linkage explain 
how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate refusal 
to ratify SALT. 

I firmly believe that it is in the interest of Jews in the Soviet 
Union, of persons of all religious faiths, seeking liberalization and 
seeking the right to emigrate, if the stability that is involved in 
SALT II can be formalized and extended. 

I want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by indicating that I believe 
religious organizations in this country and the U.S. Senate share in 
one sense a certain responsibility, and that responsibility is what 
you, Mr. Chairman, spoke to, I believe with great eloquence, earlier 
today. 

One of the great moments in my life in dealing with public issues 
in the United States was on that day when Protestant, Catholic 
and Jewish religious bodies stood together in this Chamber, in this 
Senate, to speak for civil rights at a time when that issue was in 
danger of becoming embroiled in political considerations only. And 
I think SALT is in a similar condition today. 

And I want to pledge at least for my small group that we will do 
all in our power to raise the moral issue, to educate our people, to 
expose them to both sides and to deal with the fundamental reli- 
gious and moral message which I believe SALT bears for the 
human race. What this Senate can say can be a proclamation 
heard throughout the world, a proclamation unlike that made by a 
person named Isaiah centuries ago, that the joint benefits for both 
sides outweigh even deep differences, that there are ways besides 
bloodshed for nations to redress grievances and resolve disputes, 
that nations need not be prisoners and hostages of a bitter, unre- 
mitting past. We can be the shapers of a better world and a more 
hopeful future, that humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat 
the disasters of history. What always was, need not always be. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan. 

I have been reading from your statement parts that you were 
unable to recite in order to save time. I must say that it is an 



142 

extremely moving and profound statement, and I would want it to 
appear in the record in its entirety. 

Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. You made an argument that is often overlooked 
which is that the most fundamental human right of all is the right 
to exist. The development of nuclear weapons has put the right of 
existence in jeopardy, the existence of our people, our national 
civilization, that of the Soviet Union, and indeed, who knows, 
depending upon the scope and ferocity of the nuclear holocaust, a 
full scale nuclear exchange, perhaps the survival of the human 
race itself. And all other rights, however important they may be to 
the condition of life, rest upon that base. 

Mr. VoRSPAN. I made that argument not as a unilateral disarma- 
ment advocate in any way, but I do believe that there is a kind of a 
readiness, a kind of a weariness that prepares people for talking in 
terms of 10 million, 20 million, 40 million, 60 million in ways in 
which those figures lose all sense of meaning whatsoever. And then 
somebody comes along and says well, we have miscalculated, there 
is a way to survive this thing. It really is only 35 million. But there 
is an obscenity involved in that, and I think it is the weary accept- 
ance of the fundamental premise of the way we have been doing 
business as a civilization, about which I am talking now. And 
therefore I think that the reverence for life, the concern for the 
preciousness of life, while it sounds like a cliche and a sermon that 
we ask clergymen to come and deliver to us, is really the heart of 
the matter that we are talking about. 

So I am grateful to you for your question. 

The Chairman. I think that the answer must be found in the 
mutual recognition of the foolishness and futility of an unre- 
strained nuclear arms race, and the need for both the United 
States and the Soviet Union as the two so-called superpowers to 
not only check the acceleration of nuclear arms, but to begin to 
reverse the trend, reduce the danger, and ultimately, if a sufficient- 
ly effective inspection and control system can be devised, to elimi- 
nate nuclear weapons entirely from the face of the Earth. 

When you consider the importance of that goal and how far we 
are from it, SALT II becomes a very small step indeed, but it is 
something, it moves in the right direction, and it keeps the journey 
alive. 

Mr. VoRSPAN. The alternative to it, if I may say so, may doom 
forever the possibility of the kind of dream and the kind of vision 
we have been talking about here. 

The Chairman. There is that risk. 

No one knows for sure but there is that risk. 

Thank you very much for your statement. 

Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Javits. 

Senator Javits. Thank you. 

Thank you very much also, Mr. Vorspan. I join the chairman in 
the observations which he has made and I assure you that it is a 
matter of deep gratification to me that there is such a parallel 
approach between a Jewish representative here as with the Catho- 
lic and Protestant representatives. I was not here when the Cardi- 
nal testified, but I read his statement and I had a verbatim report 



143 

of it; there is an extraordinary parallelism. That, I think, is ex- 
tremely gratifying. Of course, Dr. Claire Randall who testified for 
the Protestant denominations took exactly the same attitude. 

So I can only tell you that all of us here on this committee, 
whether we are for or against the treaty, have the same motiva- 
tion, and I think for Senator Church and myself and many other 
members, you can be sure that we know that in this matter we are 
trying to do the Lord's work. Therefore, it deserves, more than 
diligence, more than skill, more than dedication; it deserves pas- 
sion, which I am trying to give it and so is the chairman. I am very 
impressed by your testimony and it is extremely useful. 

Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you. Senator. 

[Mr. Vorpan's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Albert Vorspan 

Good afternoon. I am Albert Vorspan. With Rabbi David Saperstein, the Director 
of the Religous Action Center of Reform Judaism and co-chair of the Religious 
Committee on SALT, I am here today to share with you the position on SALT II of 
the Union of American Hebrew Congregations which I serve as Vice-President. The 
UAHC represents over one million American Reform Jews in 700 congregations 
throughout the country. After a year of investigation and discussion, the Board of 
Trustees of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations voted unanimously in 
favor of ratification of the SALT II Treaty explaining, in part, that "in keeping with 
our mandate to 'seek peace and pursue it,' we see in the SALT process the most 
realistic chance for checking an insane, wasteful and potentially catastrophic nucle- 
ar arms race." 

A JEWISH imperative 

This is not the first time that members of the Jewish community have testified 
publicly on behalf of arms control and disarmament. "They shall beat their swords 
into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword 
against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." These words of Isaiah, 
echoing down through the centuries have been eloquent testimony of our commit- 
ment to disarmament. To ignore those words now is to impreil humankind. Since 
Hiroshima the prospect of warfare has been raised to a qualitatively different order 
of risk. We have always had warfare — but never the capacity to destroy human life 
and to make the world unliveable. Nuclear warfare requires a moral revolution, a 
revolution in which human life and peace must take precedence over worshipping 
the idols of production, technics, strategic superiorities and the military-industrial- 
complex. Because we address the issue of SALT II in this context, we have joined 
with 26 other national Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups in the Religious 
Committee on SALT. 

We all share a sense of the urgency of the time. Religious values must be given a 
chance. If not it may well be too late. Increasing numbers of experts maintain that 
nuclear war is likely by the end of this centry. This contention is supported by a 
number of political and military factors in the world today including: 

1. The immense size of the superpowers arsenal — the equivalent of 3 tons of TNT 
for every human being on Earth. 

2. A nuclear club that is expected to increase seven-fold by the year 1990, from 
five to thirty-five nations. 

3. The massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as an energy 
source following the energy crisis of 1973-74. 

4. The faltering prospects for a strong and stable non-proliferation agreement to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. 

5. The mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen fission- 
able materials or tactical nuclear weapons. 

6. The rising curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia, 
the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa and Latin America, and 
the potential that the tensions in these areas can trigger or escalate to a nuclear 
conflict. 

7. The on-going conventional and nuclear arms race, reaching $400 billion in 
military expenditures this year. 

8. The fragility of United States-U.S.S.R. detente. 



144 

9. The commitment on both sides to a quahtative build-up of increasingly sophisti- 
cated strategic weapons which go beyond the reach of verification and threaten to 
destabilize arms control negotiations, and 

10. The lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarmament at the 
highest levels of the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R. 

Thus today, we are faced in fact with precisely the choice God set out for us in 
The Book or Deuteronomy, "I have set before you this day, the blessing and the 
curse, life and death, good and evil; therefore choose life in order that you may 
live." 

Through the millennia, the Jewish tradition heis psiinfully developed a set of 
values limiting war which must serve as our guide in evaluating this treaty; 

1. The use of force is permissible for self-defense. Thus SALT II must be evaluated 
in terms of legitimate U.S. security needs. 

2. The goal of humankind is shalom. Shalom is more than the cessation of war. It 
is the opportunity for national and personal fulfillment and completeness. 

3. Any use of force must guarantee absolute protection of non-combat and civilian 
populations. 

4. Any use of force must be guided by a concept of proportionality which insists 
that no more damage should be inflicted than is necessary to pursue the limited 
goal of defense. 

The dilemma of our age is that the values and positions described above are now 
faced with a stark reality of new and incomparable proportions — weapons of mass 
destructions which threaten to erase distinctions between offense and defense; 
which if used would be a massive violation of the protection of noncombatants and 
proportionality; which would eliminate the possibility of shalom-indeed, threatens 
the very possibility of all of God's creation. Since any use of nuclear weapons 
threatens these values, the goal of the American people must be first, the limita- 
tion; then, the reduction; and finally, as President Carter pledged in his inaugural 
address, the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Thus, SALT must be regarded as a 
process which transcends SALT II and in which lies our ultimate security. 

THE QUESTION FOR THE SENATE: ARE WE MORE SECURE WITH SALT II OR WITHOUT 

SALT II 

Will we be further along the path to achieving the values discussed above with 
SALT II or without SALT II? After careful and lengthy evaluation, the UAHC 
concluded that in every way we will be more secure when this treaty is ratified. 

If SALT II should be rejected by the Senate it will be a serious set-back for the 
cause of arms limitation and control. The SALT process provides the best hope for 
arms control. It has been accepted by the United States and U.S.S.R. Recently, it 
has been accepted by China. It is accepted by the rest of our allies who are members 
of the nuclear club. Indeed, the leaders of these and many other countries have 
called for the ratification of the treaty. The General Assembly of the United 
Nations voted 127-1 in favor of SALT. The likelihood of successful renegotiation 
with the U.S.S.R. of any substantive change is very slim. For this reason, the UAHC 
would like to see the treaty passed in its present form with no amendments or 
actions which would result in the need for renegotiation. A failure to ratify the 
treaty would result in a major crisis of confidence among our allies and friends. It 
would be a major set-back for detente between the United States and U.S.S.R. Thus 
the failure to ratify SALT II would adversely affect American security. 

Without SALT II, United States and Soviet military spending will rise even more 
rapidly than now planned. Each side will redouble its efforts to achieve illusory 
superiority. Dangerous and provocative weaponry will be developed and deployed. 
Trends toward "limited" nuclear wars, massive civil defense programs and a garri- 
son state mentality will ensue. 

The economic costs to the United States and the U.S.S.R. would be enormous. 
Between $30 and $100 billion more would be spent on military expenditures, by 
1985. Balanced budgets and inflation controls would be sacrificed. The ability of the 
United States to increase its security by providing employment and educational 
opportunities to its citizens; decent health care and housing; and welfare assistance 
which provides a minimally decent living — all these would be sharply undercut. The 
result would be the development of an underclass of Americans who are out of jobs 
and out of hope — filled with frustration and despair. Intergroup tensions would be 
greatly exacerbated. The spirit and soul of America would be drained by its inability 
to maintain a fundamentally decent quality of life for its citizens. No country which 
erodes its internal strength can long endure — no matter how large its military 
budgets and how great its military forces might be. 

Without SALT II, we will be hurt strategically, as all of the compromises and 
concessions made by the Soviets in the negotiations of this treaty would be lost. In 



145 

the sometimes mean spirited and hawkish tone of the recent debate over SALT II, 
we have constantly emphasized the concessions we made and ignored the conces- 
sions which .he Soviets made. Without SALT II: 

1. The Soviets will have 3-4,000 missile launchers rather than the 2,250 to which 
they have agreed (a reduction of 250 launchers for them). 

2. We would have no common data base as opposed to that to which the two 
countries agreed under the treaty. 

3. The United States and U.S.S.R. would have a number of new land-based 
missiles as opposed to the one allowed by the treaty. 

4. We would face 20 to 30 warheads on some Soviet missiles as opposed to the 
limit of 10 to which they have agreed. 

5. There will be no production limits on the Backfire bomber as promised the 
United States in an agreement outside the treaty. 

6. The Soviets might have thousands more new warheads than they would have 
with the treaty. 

7. Whatever qualms the United States might have on verification, can any sane 
human being believe that we would be more secure and more capable of verifying 
what the Soviets did, if they had not accepted our counting rules; if they had not 
promised to continue their policy of non-interference with our national technical 
means; if they had not restricted their encryption of missile tests? 

In the abysmal ignorance which our inability to monitor the Soviets would create, 
the military hardliners in both countries would be strengthened. An atmosphere of 
intense fear and mistrust would blanket the world. Efforts to negotiate further 
reductions through SALT III or any other arms control agreement would be severe- 
ly restricted. Successful negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty would be 
unimaginable. Negotiations aimed at checking proliferation of nuclear and conven- 
tional weapons would likely break down. 

Despite the accusations of some SALT critics, the U.S. negotiators struck a fair 
bargain in SALT II. They did not undermine our security. The Soviets agreed not to 
limit our forward-based missiles. They accepted no limitation on air-launched mis- 
sile range. They gave up their demand for a non-transfer clause. They gave up their 
demand for a limit on ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missile testing. They 
permitted an average 28 cruise missiles per bomber. They accepted limitations on 
the upgrading of the Backfire bomber. They accepted our definition of what consti- 
tuted a "new ' missile. While, of course, as critics of SALT pointed out, the United 
States has made numerous concessions to the Soviets — compromise is the essence of 
a successful agreement. Our negotiators have successfully embodied the notion of 
nuclear parity in SALT II. This offers a real hope for reduction in the future. 

THE SALT DEBATE — SO FAR 

Indeed, the debate so far seems to have ignored the basic reality that the SALT II 
Treaty has balanced the needs of two fundamentally different and asymetrical 
military forces. The rhetoric of the debate has implied that for each compromise the 
United States made, the U.S.S.R. must have made a similar one. Such a provision 
by provision comparison is not grounded in reality. We must rather measure the 
total effect of the treaty. It is the position of the UAHC that when this standard is 
applied, the two superpowers have reached an accord which limits arms growth in a 
way which protects our security and the security of the U.S.S.R. 

The debate has been particularly distressing in two other ways. First, the debate 
has lost sight of the goal of arms reduction and elimination. Instead, SALT II has 
been used as a political football by those who would seek greater growth of the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal; a higher military budget or would seek to end the SALT process 
altogether. Senators who only a few months earlier had voted reductions in military 
spending now demand, in banner headlines, a sharp rise in the military budget. If 
SALT II is a bad treaty then no amount of spending will make it a good one. 

More importantly, new weapons systems and increased military spending ought to 
be decided on their own merits. For Senators today to lock the country into new 
systems, new weapons and higher budgets for years to come after a couple of 
months of debate on the SALT Treaty, does not appear to be the most responsible 
way of dealing with the real security and defense needs of our country. The series of 
extravagent pay-offs which marked SALT I should not be permitted to plague SALT • 
II. We must be most careful to avoid the technological trade-offs of SALT I. Because 
we led in certain types of technology in the early seventies — MIRV technology, 
cruise missiles and large submarines — we exempted limitations on such arms. As a 
result, the Soviets felt compelled to undertake a major "catch-up" program. Today, 
the Soviets now are MIRVing their missiles. The result is that our land-based 
ICBM's may soon be theoretically vulnerable to destruction on the ground. Today, 
because we lead in mobile missile technology, we seek to set time limits on the 



146 

controls of mobile missile deployment and thus risk escalating the arms race into a 
new and dangerous stage. We will soon introduce the unverifiable, destabilizing 
cruise missUes into the strategic picture. The decisions on the M-X missile and any 
other new system ought to be carefully evaluated on their own merits with a full 
public debate after the SALT Treaty has been ratified. 

Perhaps even more threatening in the debate has been the virtually unchallenged 
contentions of those who would provide the United States with the capacity to fight 
a "limited" nuclear war. This "counterforce" theory has increased its attraction as 
the Soviets develop the capacity to target U.S. land based missile silos. The ability 
to destroy accurately military nuclear targets raises the theoretical spectre of a 
nuclear war which would inflict "acceptable" damage to industri£il and human 
targets. Various basing modes of the proposed mobile missiles seriously raise the 
spectre of a counterforce capacity. 

Increasingly, the rhetoric of counterforce theory has been infused into the SALT 
n debate. While counterforce theory presumes solutions to strategic and technologi- 
cal problems which may be unsoluble in this century, as a religious presence in this 
country we are more concerned about the devastating moral implications of this 
theory. The counterforce theory creates the dilemma that by seeking to give either 
country various limited strategic options, it makes the use of nuclear weapons more 
thinkable. Because the effects of the use of limited nuclear strikes appear to be 
selective, discriminate and controllable, strategic planning and analysis would 
accept them as real options. If counterforce becomes a part of the strategic relation- 
ship, the likelihood of nuclear war would greatly increase. 

Given the present state of the arms race, both technologically and politically, it 
seems more prudent to accept only those weapons and strategic doctrines that seek 
to prevent any use of nuclear weapons; that renders them "unthinkable" in political 
£md moral terms. Only from this position is it possible to begin reduction of strate- 
gic arms in a reasonable, balanced and prudent manner, bring them more surely 
under control; and decrease their significance and legitimacy in world affairs. This 
is the theory of SALT, and SALT II is essential to its process. We believe that the 
whole issue of counterforce theory deserves far more analysis and attention than it 
has been given so far. 

PAST SALT II 

Opponents of SALT II have attempted to discredit the notion and the rhetoric of 
the SALT process. We categorically reject such aspersions. The pursuit of peace and 
the elimination of nuclear weapons must be a constant and continuous effort by all 
of us. The notion of a process is inherent in SALT and we must look past SALT II. 
The UAHC is disappointed in the modest limitations of SALT II. We would have 
wished that this had been a treaty embodying real arms control. 

Arms control must be the essence of the next SALT agreement. This goal should 
be reflected in understandings and reservations to SALT II which would not require 
renegotiations. The SALT II limits must be regarded as ceilings not as targets which 
must be reached. There should be an explicit rejection of the concept of "limited" 
nuclear war as an element of U.S. foreign or strategic policy. We should clarify that 
we are prepared to seek meaningful bilateral reductions even before the expiration 
of SALT II. 

The symbolism of the Soviet dismantling of missile launchers without replace- 
ment, as required by SALT II, must not be lost in the debate. It should be empha- 
sized as the tjrpe of action that will take on real meaning in SALT III. Just this 
week Senator Biden, upon returning from a series of meetings with Soviet leaders, 
indicated that they were prepared for real reductions in future arms agreements. 
The initiative created by those meetings must be seized by the Senate. The United 
States should clearly set out its intentions as to how these two countries will 
achieve real reductions and work for that goal as quickly and effectively as possible. 

The example which the superpowers sets in controlling nuclear arms will have a 
significant impact on future efforts to control horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. No dynamic in the 1980's so threatens to destabilize the world and lead to 
nuclear war as the numerical growth of those countries which will soon possess a 
nuclear capacity. The United States and U.S.S.R. have succeeded in making the 
possession of nuclear weapons a "status" symbol of power and influence in the 
world. We must act dramatically to change that. Ratification of SALT II is an 
important step in that direction. On the eve of the Second Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Conference, rejection of SALT II would inevitably undermine any hope to check the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. 



147 

ISRAEL AND SOVIET JEWRY 

As Jews, we have a special concern for our brothers and sisters throughout the 
world. Repeatedly we have been asked how does our support for SALT II relate to 
our concern for Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East? 
Proponents of linkage argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II until the 
U.S.S.R. improves its human rights performance and supports progress toward 
peace in the Middle East. We reject that notion. Our support for SALT II in no way 
signifies our approval of Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty 
is of momentous intrinsic, moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of ratification 
on its own merits. If the world goes up in a nuclear holocaust, our concerns for 
human rights and peace become irrelevant. 

In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation of Soviet Jewry. 
Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sakharov, one of the truly 
courageous fighters for human rights in the Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy report- 
ed: "When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the 
greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea 
to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to 
create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues be- 
tween the Soviet Union and the United States * • • Let the advocates of linkage 
explain how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate 
refusal to ratify SALT." 

To the extent that the United States can influence Soviet performance on human 
rights it can do so best in an atmosphere of detente and cooperation. If SALT II is 
defeated it is unlikely that the United States will have any impact on U.S.S.R. 
policies regarding human rights. 

The ability of the United States to act as a constructive partner in further 
progress towards reaching a peaceful resolution of Mid-East problems will be 
strengthened by SALT II as well. First, progress towards peace requires stability — 
stability among the superpowers and relative stability among the parties involved in 
the Mid-East conflict. To the extent that SALT II allows for continued stability on 
the nuclear front, it permits Israel and its neighbors to focus on their regional 
concerns. 

Secondly, the danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation threatens to engulf the 
Middle East in a nuclear confrontation. Recent evidence indicates that Pakistan, 
which may explode a nuclear device in a matter of months, has been bankrolled in 
its efforts to develop "the bomb" by Libya. Reports indicate that Pakistan will 
supply Libya with nuclear weapons, in return for its help. No leader on Earth would 
so threaten nuclear stability as would Qaddaffi. It would be difficult to determine 
whether his weapons would be aimed first at Egypt or Israel. Such proliferation 
poses a massive threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, to Israel's survival and, 
indeed, to the survival of the world. 

Finally, the strategic impact of the SALT Treaty would have little effect on the 
ability of U.S. forces to maintain a deterrence in the Middle East to Soviet designs. 
Indeed, by diverting limited U.S. budgetary funds from a senseless and endless 
strategic weapons arms race, we can better strengthen our conventional forces 
which would increase our capacity to help our friends in Europe and the Mediterra- 
nean basin. 

Thus, ratification of the SALT II Treaty will enhance the ability of the American 
government to further both peace in the Middle East and the cause of human rights 
in the Soviet Union. During the past year we have made significant progress in both 
these areas. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the unprecedented 
levels of Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. have been due in large measure to a 
sense of stability in the relationship of the global powers. We cannot continue to 
progress towards peace and freedom in the atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and 
intense superpower competition which would inevitably follow the failure of the 
Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Rather, the spirit of cooperation and detente 
which would be furthered by this treaty is essential to such progress in both of 
these areas. 

conclusion: the responsibility of the SENATE 

The United States has not yet met the issue of arms reduction and control as 
firmly as the situation requires. Both the religious community and the Senate must 
bear the responsibility for that failure. The religious community has not posed the 
moral challenge of the arms race with sufficient clarity and immediacy to capture 
the imagination and concern of the American people. The Senate has too often 
permitted the SALT II debate to deteriorate into rhetorical battle of militarism and 
fear. 



148 

Rabbi David Polish points out an insightful lesson in the story of Samson. Before 
he was born, Samson's mother was told that he was to grow up as a mighty savior 
of Israel. He was to be set aside as a Nazirite, as a special kind of person, dedicated 
to God, forbidden to drink wine or to cut his hair. When he was born, he was called 
Shimshon, meaning sunperson, symbolizing that the brightness of the very sun 
glowed within his being. What great promise burned within this man who grew to 
be a powerful figure and who, indeed, did rescue Israel from its enemies. But this 
giant of a man, this dazzling, brilliant judge in Israel soon forgot the source of his 
power and his greatness. He was tricked into having his hair shorn. He was 
captured by his enemies. They put out his eyes. They set him to work in the prison 
yard, grinding grain. Day in, day out, chained to a huge stone wheel, he trod his 
blind course, round and round like a beast. Time passed, and his hair grew and his 
strength was restored. On a festive day, when the enemies of Israel were all 
assembled in their Temple, he made his way there with the aid of an unsuspecting 
lad. Planting himself between two huge pillars, he pushed mightily agamst them, 
and crying, "let me die with the Philistines," he brought the Temple and its 
celebrants crashing down upon him. 

What do we know from this episode? We learn of the tragic and fatal combination 
of power and blindness. Samson was once the union of strength and vision. But with 
vision gone, all that Samson could do was to feed his renewed strength with the 
venom of revenge, destroying himself with his enemies. 

The story of Samson is a warning to America. Our nation arose m this new world 
like a special being, blessed and nurtured by the sun, the source of light and of life. 
This giant of a nation was born in the midst of a struggle against tyranny and 
consecrated to a higher order of political existence than had ever been known. This 
nation was a kind of Nazirite among the nations, denying itself the temptations of 
rule by caste and the heady wine of government by the few. It was endowed in its 
birth with the might of the continent which it straddled and the vision which it 
drew from its unique history. But we stand in danger of seeing the eyes of the 
sunblessed giant gouged out, not by its enemies, but at its own hands. Its strength 
cannot be impaired, but its vision can be mortally impaired. Nothing can be as 
destructive as the well-meaning power of a bewildered and frightened giant. How 
well our prophets understood this when they said, "Where there is no vision the 

people perish." , ^ , , , .... t> .l -x -n 

Together we can ensure that the United States does not lose its vision. But it will 
be your decision as to whether the debate over this treaty will focus attention on 
the necessity of multilateral nuclear disarmament. You alone will decide what 
message SALT II will carry beyond its substantive provisions. It might be a message 
that this is but one stepping stone in an inevitable escalation of nuclear prolifera- 
tion. Or the message of SALT II can be a proclamation heard throughout the world: 
That the joint benefits for both sides outweight even deep differences; 
That there are ways besides strife for nations to redress grievances and resolve 

disputes; „ , . .,,. .. v, i.u 

That nations will not be prisoners of a bitter, unremitting past— we can be the 

shapers of a better and more hopeful future; 
That humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat the disasters of history— 

what always was need not always be. , „ , ,, j 

Just as the Bible tells us "the effect of righteousness shall be peace so do we 

know— from observation and intuition— that we who share this vulnerable planet 

can never come into our full human inheritance until we can put bloodshed and 

war behind us. SALT II can help us achieve this goal. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan. 
Mr. Vorspan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
The Chairman. That concludes the hearing this afternoon. 
[Whereupon, at 5:24 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene 
at 10:30 a.m., September 7, 1979.] 



SALT II TREATY 



FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979 

United States Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Washington, D.C. 
The committee met, at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman 
of the committee) presiding. 
Present: Senators Church, Glenn, Stone, Javits, and Percy. 
Senator Percy [presiding]. The committee will come to order. 

opening statement 

We apologize to our witnesses for the delay this morning. Obvi- 
ously, the events of the last few days have torn into the schedules 
of many of our Senators, including our chairman. 

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues to hear 
from public witnesses on the SALT II Treaty. This morning we 
have a panel consisting of Robert Schmidt, vice president of the 
Control Data Corp., appearing on behalf of the American Commit- 
tee on East-West Accord, Dr. Herbert Scoville, who serves as co- 
chairman of the New Directions Task Force on Arms Control and 
Disarmament; Peter Baugher, testifying for the Ripon Society; and 
John Carey, appearing for the American Legion. 

Following the panel. Lane Kirkland will deliver a statement for 
the AFL-CIO. 

Gentlemen, I understand that you each have 10-minute oral 
presentations. Your longer written statements will be put in the 
record. After your presentations, the committee will direct its ques- 
tions to the entire panel. 

I think the best way to proceed is in alphabetical order. We will 
hear from the American Committee first, followed by the American 
Legion, and so on. Mr. Schmidt, if you would please begin, and as 
the Senators pay reasonably good attention to the lights, we would 
appreciate your keeping them in mind as well. They will be just a 
friendly warning to you. I think when the yellow light goes on, you 
have 1 minute left. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. SCHMIDT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 
COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD, WASHINGTON, D.C.> 

Mr. Schmidt. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I 
am Robert D. Schmidt, president of the American Committee on 
East- West Accord, and executive vice president of Control Data 
Corp. The group I represent today, the American Committee on 



See page 153 for Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement. 

(149) 



150 

East-West Accord, is a diverse one. On its board and among its 
officers and members are people of international repute, represent- 
ing academia, industry, the world of science, diplomacy, private 
foundations, labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and 
lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations 
with the Soviet Union can we maintain a workable and lasting 
peace on this planet. 

The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to 
promote the SALT process. We have a strong and continuing inter- 
est to promote United States-Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade 
and the SALT process reinforce each other. They both contribute to 
lessening those international tensions we know must be controlled 
lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it 

■jo ii'Til^fisriGH 

The hearings on SALT II thiis far have placed primary emphasis 
on military relations between the Unites States and the U.S.S.R. 
Who is ahead in what weapon? Who will be ahead in 1985? Which 
nation is likely to get a scientific breakthrough providing a mili- 
tary advantage? Which nation is spending more for military re- 
search and development? 

Both societies put more effort and money into planning for a war 
than on planning how to get along. Both societies act as though the 
best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. There has been no 
apparent progress from this kind of activity. We believe that the 
SALT Treaty represents some progress. 

Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strat- 
egy that depends more on negotiation than confrontation. 

I am not so naive as to believe that either the United States or 
the Soviet Union is about to summarily transfer research and 
development funds from military purposes to peaceful purposes. 
Nevertheless, there are many activities we might carry on in 
tandem with our potential antagonists which may lessen the likeli- 
hood of military confrontation. 

SALT AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET TRADE 

One of those areas is trade. I emphasize the importance of trade 
because the American Committee believes Senate approval of 
SALT II is essential to preserve and promote a climate in which 
nonstrategic trade, joint development of energy, and other projects 
of common interest may be carried out to the mutual advantage of 
both societies, economically and politically. 

Trade is a path to understanding. It costs us nothing. It costs the 
Russians nothing. Trade is engaged in only if both parties receive 
benefits for themselves. 

Granted that ill-conceived trade policies can generate negative 
relationships among countries, nevertheless, as Prof Thomas 
Schelling has written, "Aside from war and preparations for 
war * * * trade is the most important relationship most countries 
have with each other. Broadly defined * * * trade is what most of 
international relations is all about." 

Accepting the importance of trade in international relations, it 
follows that an even-handed, realistic, and vigorously pursued 
trade policy can produce positive results. Trade can be a weapon of 
war or an instrument for peace; or put more delicately, trade can 



151 

promote confrontation or negotiation. That is for the parties to 
choose. 

If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon 
which will exacerbate conflict will be very great. On the other 
hand, if SALT is approved, trade between the United States and 
the Soviet Union will be expanded, and the ability of the United 
States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve our 
long-term security will be enhanced. 

There is another benefit for the American economy that will 
flow from a successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the 
common sense proposition we all recognize, that both parties bene- 
fit from trading. If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of 
strategic weapons, the climate of United States-Soviet relations will 
be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet trade. Our ad- 
verse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion 
of our export market, including exports to the Soviet Union. We all 
know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help 
that that has given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as 
well as to maintain farm prices. 

We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to 
the Soviet Union. Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by 
the Jackson- Vanik and Stevenson amendments and the use of 
trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet emigration policy 
into line with our concept of free emigration have seriously im- 
paired American sales to and purchases from the Soviet Union, to 
the detriment of our economy and our political relations. 

Furthermore, these measures have not, in my view, been as 
effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually bene- 
ficial programs in science, culture, and nonstrategic trade. 

There is another advantage to the United States in expanding 
trade with the Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise 
is so much more efficient than the Soviet system that in time I 
believe we will promote greater Soviet awareness of western 
values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods of time in 
the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes, 
liberalization, if you will, which we would have thought impossible 
a decade ago. 

For example, 10 years ago, the word "profit" did not seem to 
exist in the Soviet vocabulary, at least with the people to whom I 
spoke. Now, it is commonplace to discuss profit. Five years ago it 
was not possible to discuss questions of joint ventures. Now a 
number of elements of Soviet society are exploring ways to accom- 
modate joint ventures. 

Five years ago the Soviets never mentioned the Voice of Amer- 
ica. Indeed, Voice of America broadcasts were regularly jammed by 
the Soviet Union until 1973. Not so long ago, in Novosibirsk, half- 
way around the world from my home office in Minneapolis, Minn., 
a Soviet scientist remarked to me about a news item he heard the 
previous evening on the Voice of America. 

Western views are beginning to seep into Soviet society. 

SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY 

Thus far, I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the 
expansion of trade and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union, and one 



152 

might believe that I ignore the effect of SALT on our military 
strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense Brown: 

National security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes economic 
strength. It includes, in the case of the United States, our enormous agricultural 
production. It includes our technological capabilities, and it includes also our self- 
confidence, self-cohesion, and will. 

So much of the emphasis in these hearings has been on what I 
consider to be the exaggerated strengths of the Soviet Union that 
we forget our own tremendous strengths. 

Consider, for example, some of the security advantages we have 
over the Soviet Union — borders with friendly nations, Canada and 
Mexico. In contrast, the Soviet Union has as neighbors China and a 
number of Eastern European ethnic groups always threatening 
turmoil. Consider our NATO allies in contrast to the Soviet 
Warsaw Pact allies. And consider the Soviet domestic situation in 
contrast to our own, a situation well summed up by Prof. J. S. 
Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Brandeis University and a 
member of the Harvard Research Center. 

Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles and believes 
that they have lost most of their sources of influence around the 
world that they had once hoped to have, to the point that their 
economy has lost its djmamism and is no longer a model for the 
Third World or anywhere else. 

"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major 
source of influence left, military prowess. That should be small 
comfort for all that they do not have." 

I will skip some of my oral testimony because I see the red light 
is on. 

The Chairman [presiding]. It is always surprising how fast 10 
minutes does go by. It comes to only about 4 pages of written 
testimony. 

Mr. Schmidt. Let us look at the assertion that the one major 
source of influence left to the Soviet Union is military prowess. 

In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT 
Treaty repeat and repeat that the United States is behind the 
Soviet Union in military strength. For that reason, opponents 
argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II. 

This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there 
were no SALT agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever 
on the production of nuclear weapons by either side. With SALT, 
for the first time, we have an agreed overall limit on the number 
of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side — 2,250. 

But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT 
Treaty to which Americans must look to determine whether the 
treaty is in our security interests. We need, rather, to apply our 
own commonsense. 

Is it reasonable to believe that for 7 years the Russians have 
managed to out-negotiate American representatives of three Presi- 
dents? 

Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would 
recommend the treaty to the Senate if they thought it would 
damage their security interests? 

Is it reasonable to believe that all of our NATO allies would urge 
ratification of SALT if they did not mean it? 



153 

Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promot- 
ed by a reversion to the cold war, that we are more secure in a 
world of confrontation than negotiation? 

Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians in 
some categories of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily 
across the board, which I do not accept, the problem is the failure 
of our own system to use our resources wisely to achieve a qual- 
ity — rather than quantity — defensive strategy. 

In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will 
invite a disastrous escalation of the arms race if it is rejected, but 
with the approval of SALT, I believe we will move toward further 
arms reductions which we and the Russians want and need, and 
there will be a basis for improvement in United States-Soviet rela- 
tions in other fields as well, including trade. 

Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East-West Accord 
has recently adopted statements on SALT II and on trade, and I 
ask that they be included at the end of my remarks. Thank you. 

[Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Robert D. Schmidt 

Mr. Chairman and members of the C!ommittee: I am Robert D. Schmidt, President 
of the American Committee on East- West Accord, and Executive Vice President of 
Control Data Corporation. 

The group I represent today — the American Committee on East-West Accord — is a 
diverse one. On its board, and among its officers and members, are people of 
international repute, representing academia, industry, the world of science, diplo- 
macy, private foundations labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and 
lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations with the Soviet 
Union can we maintain a workable and lasting peace on this planet.' 

The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to promote the 
SALT process. We have a strong and continuing interest to promote United States- 
Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade and the SALT process reinforce each other. 
They both contribute to lessening those international tensions we know must be 
controlled lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it is 
unleashed. 

The hearings on SALT H, thus far, have placed primary emphasis on military 
relations of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Who is ahead in what weapon? Who 
will be ahead in 1985? Which nation is likely to get a scientific breakthrough 
providing a military advantage? Which nation is spending more for military re- 
search and development? 

Both societies put more effort and money into planning for a war than on 
planning on how to get along. Both societies act as though the best way to preserve 
peace is to prepare for war. There has been no apparent progress from this kind of 
activity. 

Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strategy that depends 
more on negotiations than confrontation. 

SALT AND united STATES-SOVIET TRADE 

I am not so naive as to believe that either the United States or the Soviet Union 
is about to summarily transfer research and development funds from military 
purposes to peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, there are many activities we might 
carry on in tandem with our potential antagonist which may lessen the likelihood of 
military confrontation. 

One of those areas is trade. 



' Officers and members of the Board of the American Committee are: John Kenneth Gal- 
braith — Co-Chairman, Donald M. Kendall — Co-Chairman, George F. Kennan — Co-Chairman, 
Robert D. Schmidt — President, Fred Warner Neal — Executive Vice President, Stephen Schloss- 
berg — Vice President, Carl Marcy — Secretary-Treasurer & Co-Director, William Attwood, Meyer 
Berger, Tilford Dudley, Joseph Filner, Curtis Cans, Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C, Vice Admiral 
J. M. Lee, Jeanne V. Mattison — Co-Director, Stewart R. Mott, Harold B. Scott, Jeremy J. Stone, 
Kenneth W. Thompson, Mrs. James P. Warburg, Jerome B. Wiesner. 



154 

I emphasize the importance of trade because the American Ck)mmittee believes 
Senate approval of SALT II is essential to preserve and promote a climate in which 
non-strategic trade, joint development of energy, and other projects of common 
interest may be carried out to the mutual advantage of both societies, economically 
and politically. 

Trade is a path to understanding. It costs us nothing, it costs the Russians 
nothing. Trade is engaged in only if both parties perceive benefits for themselves. 

Granted that ill-conceived trade policies can generate negative relationships 
among countries, nevertheless, as Professor Thomas Schelling has written: 

"Aside from war and preparations for war . . . trade is the most important 
relationship most countries have with each other. Broadly defined . . . trade is 
what most of international relations is all about." 

Accepting the importance of trade in international relations, it follows that an 
even-handed, realistic, and vigorously pursued trade policy can produce positive 
results. 

Trade can be a weapon of war, or an instrument for peace; or, put more delicate- 
ly, trade can promote confrontations, or negotiations. That is for the parties to 
choose. 

If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon, which will 
exacerbate conflict, will be very great. On the other hand, if SALT is approved, 
trade between the United States and the Soviet Union will be expanded and the 
ability of the United States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve 
our long term security will be enhanced. 

But there is another benefit for the American economy that will flow from a 
successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the common sense proposition we 
all recognize — that both parties benefit from trading. 

If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of strategic weapons, the climate of 
United States-Soviet relations will be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet 
trade. Our adverse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion of 
our export markets — including exports to the Soviet Union. 

We all know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help that has 
given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as well as to maintain farm prices. 

We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to the Soviet Union. 
Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson 
amendments and the use of trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet 
emigration policy into line with our concepts of free emigration have seriously 
impaired America sales to, and purchases from, the Soviet Union — to the detriment 
of our economy and our political relations. Furthermore, these measures have not, 
in my view, been as effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually 
beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-strategic trade. 

There is another advantage to the United States in expanding trade with the 
Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise is so incomparably more 
efficient than the Soviet system that in time I believe we will promote greater 
Soviet awareness of Western values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods 
of time in the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes — liberaliza- 
tion, if you will — which we would have thought impossible a decade ago. 

For example: 

Ten years ago, the word "profit" didn't seem to exist in the Soviet vocabulary — at 
least with the people to whom I spoke. Now it is commonplace to discuss "profit." 

Five years ago, it was not possible to discuss questions of joint ventures. Now, a 
number of elements of Soviet society are exploring ways to accommodate joint 
ventures. 

Five years ago, the Soviets never mentioned the Voice of America. Indeed, Voice 
of America broadcasts were regularly jammed by the Soviet Union until 1973. Not 
so long ago, in Novosibirsk (halfway around the world from my home office in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota) a Soviet scientist remarked to me about a news item he 
heard the previous evening on the Voice of America. 

Western views are beginning to seep into Soviet society. 

SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY 

Thus far I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the expansion of trade 
and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union and one might believe that I ignore the 
effect of SALT on our military strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense 
Brown, "national security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes 
economic strength. It includes in the case of the United States our enormous 
agricultural production; it includes our technological capabilities; and it includes 
also, our self-confidence, self-cohesion, and will." 



155 

So much of the emphasis in these hearings has been on what I consider to be the 
exaggerated strengths of the Soviet Union that we forget our own tremendous 

Consider, for example, some of the security advantages we have over the Soviet 
Union— borders with friendly nations, Canada and Mexico. In contrast, the Soviet 
Union has as neighbors China and a number of Eastern European ethnic groups 
always threatening turmoil. 

Consider our NATO allies, in contrast to the Soviets' Warsaw Pact allies. 

And consider the Soviet domestic situation in contrast to our own— a situation 
well summed up by Professor J. S. Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Bran- 
deis University and a member of the Harvard Research Center. 

Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles, and believes that they have 
lost most of their sources of influence around the world that they had once hoped to 
have, to the point that their economy has lost its dynamism and is no longer a 
model for the Third World or anywhere else. 

"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major source of influence 
left, military prowess. . . . That should be small comfort for all that they do not 
have." (Taken from article to be published in the forthcoming issue of Commentary.) 

Let us look at the assertion that the one major source of influence left to the 
Soviet Union is military prowess. 

In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT Treaty repeat and 
repeat that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in military strength. For 
that reason, opponents argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II. 

This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there were no SALT 
agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever on the production of nuclear 
weapons by either side. With SALT, for the first time, we have an agreed overall 
limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side— 2,250. 

But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT Treaty to which 
Americans must look to determine whether the Treaty is in our security interests. 
We need rather to apply our own good sense. 

Is it reasonable to believe that for seven years the Russians have managed to out- 
negotiate American representatives of three Presidents? 

Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the 
Treaty to the Senate if they thought it damaged our security interests? 

Is it reasonable to believe that all our NATO allies would urge ratification of 
SALT if they didn't mean it? 

Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promoted by a reversion 
to the Cold War, that we are more secure in a world of confrontation than negotia- 
tion? 

Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians m some categories 
of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily across the board— which I do not 
accept— the problem is the failure of our own system to use our resources wisely to 
achieve a quality— rather than quantity— defense strategy. 

In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will invite a disastrous 
escalation of the arms race if it is rejected. But with the approval of SALT, I believe 
we will move toward further arms reductions which we and the Russians want and 
need, and there will be a basis for improvements in United States— Soviet relations 
in other fields as well, including trade. 

Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East- West Accord has recently adopt- 
ed statements on SALT II and on trade. I ask that they be included at the end of my 
remarks. 



U8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 11 



156 



PAGE FIVE JUST FOR THE PRESS 

AMERICAN COMMITTEE POLICIES 
ON SALT, TRADE, AND EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES. 

The purpose of ihe American Commiitee is to strengthen public understanding of arms control initiatives, and to encourage 
mutually beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-siraicgic trade beineen the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Committee 
believes this course of action is the most effective way of furthering human rights, liberalized emigration policies, exchange of 
information, and freedom to travel for peoples of all nations. 

The Board of Directors of the American Commiitee approved the following statement at its meeting on April 18. 1979: 

STATEMENT ON SALT 

The Amencan Commiitee on Easi-Wesi Accord supporis ihe draft treaty negotiated between ihe United States and the USSR on the 
limitation of strategic arms and sirongK urges ils approval by the United Stales Senate. 

The stakes are high. Either we move ahead with arms limitation and reduce the threat of nuclear war. or we slip back into an era of 
confrontation and escalating arms competition. The dangers of such a setback are obvious and serious. The increasing sophistication of 
strategic weapons on both sides seems to accord an advantage to the side which stnkes first. Even if. as we believe, neither side would 
coniemplate such a step, growing vulnerabilities would be exploited on both sides b> those wishing lo escalate ihe arms race, 
■ The proposed ireai> is the culmination of efforis b\ four US Administrations — two Democratic and tuo Republican — to stabilize the 
nuclear threat posed b\ each superpower against the other. These efforis have won the increasing support of the American pubhc; ioda\ four 
out of five approve the effort to reach a SALT agreement. Just as Americans have a high siake in the outcome of ihe Senate vote, so do our 
allies, who could — and probably would — be destroyed along with ihe two major powers b> a U.S. -Soviet nuclear conflict. 

Any agreement limiting strategic arms must meet one overriding requirement; it must enhance the securiu of the United States. We believe 
This treaty meets that requirement. The strategic forces of the United States and the USSR are nol identical; ihe\ differ widel\ in structure, 
deployment, and weapons systems, as geography makes it natural they should. But the treaty will bring these forces into overall balance. It will 
for the first lime cause a reduction in the stockpiles of strategic delivery vehicles. It will place restrictions upon development and deployment 
of certain types of strategic weapons It will moderate arms competition between the two great powers and ihus contribute to the maintenance 
of the present essential equivalence in strategic nuclear arms. 

We regret that SALT II does not place more effective controls upon improvements in the nuclear arms permitted under the treaty. Ii does 
not prevent the development of a counterforce capability on either side and thus prolongs the danger that mutual fears and suspicions could 
precipitate nuclear »ar in a critical situation. It might even encourage more intense arms competition m weapon systems nol limited or 
proscribed b\ the treaty. We therefore call upon both governments to reexamine their military concepts and strategies and to clarify and 
cunail their commitments to existing and contemplated arms programs. 

Despite these weaknesses, SALT II isanindispensablesiepin the continuing process of lifting from mankind notonly the terrible shadow of 
nuclear war but the dcbiliiaiing economic burden of arms expenditures. The resources of both countnes are already strained by the need to 
maintain and to strengthen their militarv establishments. Without further progress on arms control be>ond SALT 11. both nations will 
increase their arms ex|>enditures. thus diverting human and material resources from uses beneficial to mankind, causing both countries to 
overtax their financial and material resources and — certainly in the United States — contributing to inflationar> pressure. 

A failure to ratify SALT II would not only undermine the strategic balance which is achieved by the draft treaty but would scuttle arms 
control for years to come. The fears and uncertainties which would ensue would make even more difficult than at present the problem of 
pursuing a consistent and effective foreign policy insuppori of US, interests around the world Above all. it would be widely interpreted as a 
sign that the American people had lost interest in reducing U.S. -Soviet tensions and improving the prospects for world peace. 

Approval of SALT II should usher in a new- era in U.S. -Soviet relations. It will reduce mutual fears and suspicions. It will ease the resolution 
of disputes between the two nations. It will create an atmosphere m which trade and cooperation can prosper. In such an atmosphere lies the 
greatest chance not only for world peace but for the sort of liberalization in Soviet society that we would like to see. 

We recognize that SALT II will not produce any sudden or dramatic abatement of the U.S. -Soviet competition for world influence. But in 
approving the agreement and in continuation of the SALT process lies the greatest prospect that both countries will carry on that competition 
by peaceful means and reduce their reliance upon military power. 

The SALT 11 agreement deserves the overwhelming support of the American people and of its legislative representatives. 

STATEMENT ON TRADE j^,^. ^ ^^-j^ 

While welcoming reports that the Caner Administration is about to sign a trade agreement with China, the American Committee has grave 
misgivings as to the agreements impact on SALT II. 

We are deeply concerned that the U.S, be even-handed in its treatment of China and the Soviet Union with respect to extension of 
Mosi-Favored-Nation treatment of imports from both nations. We believe it would be a grave mistake ai this time to take any action which 
would be viewed either in the US,, China, or the Soviet Union, as tilting toward China. Any discrimination in the treatment of the two 
communist countnes on matters of trade could onK damage prospecis for SALT II. 

The American Committee is in fa\or of a Presidential waiver, under ihe authority which the President now posesses. to extend 
Mosi-Favored-Naiion treatment to both countries and Amendments to the Trade Act which would honor U.S. commitments under the 1972 
Trade Agreement to extend unconditional and non-di*.criminator\ MFN tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank credits to the USSR and 
China simultaneous!) 

The American Committee believes such moves are in ihe national interest of the United States and also of importance for the American 
economv. 

The Committee believes these moves should proceed at the same iime as Administration efforts to obtain approval of SALT II 



157 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schmidt, for an 
excellent statement. I am sorry to have to urge witnesses to limit 
their presentations to 10 minutes, but in order for the committee to 
remain on schedule and to give members an opportunity to ask 
questions, I think that is just going to be necessary. 

Our next witness is John Carey. Gentlemen, we will ask for each 
of you to give your statements, and then we will question the panel 
as the Senators may care to do. 

John Carey is the immediate past national commander of the 
American Legion. 

Mr. Carey, we are very pleased to have you here and to have the 
benefit of your testimony this morning. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN CAREY, PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER, 
THE AMERICAN LEGION, WASHINGTON, D.C.» 

Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of the Ameri- 
can Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to 
the Nation. We are well aware of the situation in Cuba, where the 
Soviets have deployed a combat brigade, including armor, infantry, 
and artillery units together with combat support units. We believe 
this constitutes a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. We also believe 
that the presence of this brigade constitutes a military base prohib- 
ited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets. 

The American Legion 3 weeks ago at its national convention 
urged Congress to take whatever action is necessary to oppose 
spread of communism within the Western Hemisphere. This fla- 
grant stationing of Soviet troops in nearby Cuba certainly violates 
the unanimous position taken by our delegates. Accordingly, we 
urge this committee to postpone any further action on the strategic 
arms limitation agreement currently pending until such time as all 
Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from the island of 
Cuba. 

All members of the organization, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of 
wartime service, and many of us have personally experienced the 
horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if conventional 
wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catas- 
trophe for mankind. Thus it should not be surprising that we have 
long supported the concept of strategic arms limitation. Our funda- 
mental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty 
should be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should 
reduce tensions and the likelihood of war, and should be fully 
verifiable. 

We have insisted that such a treaty should not place the United 
States in an inferior strategic position. We realize that each of the 
contributions made by the treaty is subject to violations, and that 
many experts have expressed concern over what they consider to 
be our Nation's limited ability to detect violations. 

Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that it can 
contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we 
have no information on the highly classified intelligence gathering 
techniques which would be the focal points of any such debate. 



' See page 160 for Mr. Carey's prepared statement. 



158 

We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the 
SALT negotiations that the total number of missiles and warheads 
could not be limited because of verification problems, and that 
therefore the criterion becomes the number of launchers, but we 
strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the princi- 
ple of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations, 
even if that means demanding onsite inspection. 

The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles 
is tantamount to legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in 
its land-based ICBM's as gained through deployment of the SS-18. 
We believe there should be a counting rule adopted under the 
treaty as an adjustment for the awesome power of the SS-18. Each 
SS-18 should be counted as more than one launcher. 

This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy 
missiles, but would necessitate some changes in the makeup or 
other components of the Soviet arsenal. 

The American Legion is fully aware of how firm Soviet negotia- 
tors have been in demanding full complement of the SS-18. It 
therefore might be advisable for this committee to consider the 
adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an effective 
date perhaps in 1981 to allow the Soviets time to make the neces- 
sary adjustments to their arsenal. 

Our next major concern over the pending treaty deals with the 
failure to include the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicle under terms of the agreement. There is general 
agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in the continental 
United States by aerial refueling or making one-way flights. We 
have two recommendations to make relevant to the Backfire 
bomber. 

The first is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and official- 
ly acknowledge the letter presented by Secretary General Brezhnev 
to President Carter which promised the bomber would not be de- 
ployed in intercontinental mode and that its production would not 
exceed 30 per year. 

Our second recommendation is that the United States develop 
and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft. Another 
aspect of the treaty that essentially disturbs us is the provisions 
regarding encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the 
encoding of radioed missile test data that would be needed to verify 
compliance with the treaty. Each side, however, is allowed to deter- 
mine whether or not such data would be needed to verify compli- 
ance. 

Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to 
encrypt any missile test data. 

We are also concerned with the treaty's protocol which bans the 
development or flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers, and 
the deployment of cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 
kilometers until the end of 1981, "will assume a life of its own," 
and that the United States will give in to Soviet demands that the 
protocol remain in force during the course of SALT III negotia- 
tions. 

We recommend that the Senate approve an understanding or 
reservation stating that the protocol will expire on schedule unless 
this extension is specifically approved by the Senate. We agree 



159 

with the critics of SALT II who express concern that the treaty 
may prevent us from transferring cruise missile or other technol- 
ogy to our NATO allies. We believe it is necessary that the Senate 
clarify U.S. intentions regarding technology transfer by adopting a 
reservation or understanding. It is very clear to anyone who consid- 
ers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO allies 
in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pend- 
ing agreement. 

Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist 
NATO in improving its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear 
weaponry, they have disputed the United States' right to continue 
to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Europe. A 
Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a con- 
tinuation of U.S. technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm 
our commitment to the alliance, and would create Soviet uneasi- 
ness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike on the same 
continent. 

Mr. Chairman, the American Legion seeks an adjustment in the 
procedure for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides 
that all actual or suspected violations be reported to a standing 
commission for consideration. We propose a reservation or under- 
standing that would require a simultaneous reporting of all such 
actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the 
appropriate committee. 

Such reporting of violations would strengthen the United States 
commitment for Soviet compliance with the agreement. 

Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a 
flaw in the treaty deals with the agreed statements and common 
understanding. It appears as though these explanations of treaty 
provisions have been presented as separate documents and there- 
fore are not subject to ratification process. If this is the case, then 
we demand formal Soviet agreement that these agreed statements 
and common understandings be made part of the treaty text. 

The treaty would be simply unmanageable without such an 
agreement. 

Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications to the 
treaty, some of which seek amendments to the language, and 
others which seek unilateral declarations by you and your col- 
leagues, and there is little doubt in my mind that the American 
Legion will be accused by some of proposing so-called killer amend- 
ments and accused of trying to sabotage the treaty. 

I began my statement by saying that our organization has 
historically endorsed the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came 
here today with that attitude, and presented these recommended 
modifications in that spirit. 

In fact, our organization would have been happy if both sides 
were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals by 50 percent or 
more, but of course we realize that such reductions ignore the 
realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of 
unprecedented weapons production. 

I have asked you to consider three amendments, to address the 
ovei-whelming Soviet advantage in heavy missiles, to prohibit the 
encryption of telemetry, and to insure that the agreed statements 
and common understandings are legally binding. Up to this point 



160 

we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reserva- 
tions by the Senate for weapons programs to help compensate for 
Soviet strategic advantages. These measures alone, ho^vever, are 
insufficient to ensure essential equivalence and effective deter- 
rence. 

As I mentioned earlier, our organization believes that the time 
has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy. Again, I 
shall have to skip in the interest of time, sir, and will say that we 
are very concerned about the position of the United States people 
and their apathy toward what may happen if a treaty is signed. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II 
Treaty, if it is adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain 
positive features, it also has a number of serious deficiencies. An 
even greater danger than the deficiencies of the treaty, however, is 
the prospect that the people of the United States will be lulled into 
a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate 
the likelihood of nuclear war. 

We must realize that we can have peace only through strength. 
The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a 
number of strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen that 
the gap will grow in years to come. The American Legion will 
consider support of the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that 
the United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we 
have outlined, and the treaty as amended and modified in the 
areas that we have mentioned. Thank you, sir. 

[Mr. Carey's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of John Carey 

Thank you Mr. Chairman: I am Jack Carey, immediate past National Commander 
of The American Legion. I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of The 
American Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to the 
nation— the limitation of strategic nuclear arms. All members of The American 
Legion, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of wartime service, and many of us have 
personally experienced the horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if 
conventional wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catas- 
trophy for mankind. Thus, it should not be surprising that we have long supported 
the concept of strategic arms limitations. 

Our fundamental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty should 
be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should reduce tensions and the 
likelihood of war, and should be fully verifiable. We have insisted, however, that 
such a treaty should not place the United States in an inferior strategic position. 

The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before the Senate does not fully meet 
those criteria, but before we enumerate the treaty's shortcomings let us acknowl- 
edge that it does make certain positive contributions. 

Although both sides— especially the Soviet Union— will continue to add consider- 
ably to their nuclear arsenals, upper limits are established on the total number of 
strategic launchers, the number of ICBM's and SLBM's and MIRVed warheads, and 

so on. 

The treaty restricts the number of reentry vehicles either country can install on 
the various types of ICBM's and SLBM missiles. 

The treaty prohibits certain basing modes for strategic launchers. 

The treaty prohibits the placing in orbit nuclear weapons of any kind including 
fractional orbital missiles. , j , i. *■ j 

The treaty establishes maximum parameters for the development, testing, and 
deployment of new missile types. , . , . 

We realize that each of these provisions is subject to violations and that many 
experts have expressed concern over what they consider to be our nation s limited 
ability to detect violations. Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that 
it can contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we have no 
information on the highly classified intelligence-gathering techniques which would 
be the focal points of any such debate. 



161 

Perhaps the most serious flaw in the pending treaty is that it covers not the total 
number of missiles and warheads possessed by each side. The Soviet Union could 
legally stockpile an unlimited number of missiles. Although the treaty pledges both 
sides to a rather vague commitment not to develop a "rapid reload" system, the 
Soviets can launch most of their missiles from a "cold launch" mode. Even without 
improving existing technology, they could launch a second, or perhaps third, salvo 
from their silos in a matter of hours. Furthermore, many of the reserve missiles 
could be stored in such a way that they could be fired in place within a short period 
of time. Then, of course, there is the possibility of outright cheating, of concealing 
full-fledged launchers in violation of the treaty. In the event of a war or a major 
crisis, the existence of such a "ready reserve" could give the U.S.S.R. an enormous 
strategic advantage. o a t m ■ • 

We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the SALT negotiations 
that the total number of missiles and warheads could not be limited because of 
verification problems, and that therefore the criterion became the number of 
"launchers". But we strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the 
principle of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations, even if that 
means demanding on-site inspections. 

Another glaring deficiency of the treaty is that the Soviet Union is allowed a 
monopoly on heavy missiles— the SS-18. As has been pointed out numerous times in 
the course of these hearings, those missiles will be sufficiently accurate by the early 
1980's to pose a significant threat to our land-based ICBM's. While we realize that 
equivalence does not necessarily require our nuclear arsenal be a mirror image of 
the Soviet Union's, we strongly recommend that the United States urgently proceed 
with the development, production, and employment of the M-X missile, which will 
give us roughly the same hard-target capabilities as the Soviet Union and a highly 
survivable back-up system to our increasingly vulnerable land-based ICBM's. 

The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles is tantamount to 
legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in its land-based ICBM's as gained 
through deployment of the SS-18. There are those who would argue that U.S. 
advantages in SLBM and cruise missile technology provides an overall strategic 
balance. However, we view the heavy missile prohibition under SALT II as an 
inequitable provision and one which must be addressed. We believe that there 
should be a counting rule adopted under the treaty as an adjustment for the 
awesome power of the SS-18. Each SS-18 should be counted as more than one 
launcher. This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy missiles 
but would necessitate some changes in the makeup of other components of the the 
Soviet arsenal. 

The American Legion is fully aware of how firm the Soviet negotiators have been 
in demanding a full compliment of SS-18's. It, therefore, might be advisable for this 
Committee to consider the adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an 
effective date several years in the future to allow the Soviets ample time to make 
the necessary adjustments in their arsenal. 

The value of the SS-18 is fully realized when evaluating the most often cited 
nuclear exchange scenario— one in which the United States accepts a Soviet first 
strike from its land-based ICBM force. With continuing improvements in Soviet 
missile accuracy we could expect to lose more than half of our retalj-^.tory capability 
during such an attack while the Soviets would retain as much as 75-80 percent of 
their strike potential. This indeed is a rather shocking possibility and one which 
should encourage our war planners to reconsider the wisdom of accepting a Soviet 
first/ st^riiC6 

We believe that one of the most effective ways of countering the SS-18 is to 
minimize the damage inflicted by the weapon through the adoption of a "launch on 
warning" policy. It s rather obvious that Soviet weapons experts have built such 
explosive power into the SS-18 for one reason— to give it a hard target kill capabili- 
ty, the sort of hard targets found in and around U.S. missile silos. If we adopt a 
policy under which the S'^-18 would strike an empty silo then we have (1) substan- 
tially reduced the effectiveness of an otherwise inflexible weapons system and (2) 
created some doubt in the minds of Soviet war planners; thereby, reducing their 
confidence that a Soviet victory can be achieved as a result of nuclear exchange. 

I will expand upon our justification for "launch on warning" later in my state- 
ment. 

Our third major concern over the pending treaty deals with the failure of includ- 
ing the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle under terms 
of the agreement. There is general agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in 
the continental United States by aerial refueling or by making one-way flights. 
We have two recommendations to make relevent to the Backfire bomber. The first 
is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and officially acknowledge the letter 



162 

presented by Secretary General Brezhnev to President Carter which promised that 
the bomber would not be deployed in an intercontinental mode and that its produc- 
tion would not exceed 30 per year. Our second recommendation is that the United 
States develop and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft. 

Another aspect of the treaty that especially disturbs us is the provision regarding 
the encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the encoding of radios missile 
test data that would be needed to verify compliance with the treaty. Each side, 
however, is allowed to determine whether or not such data would be needed to 
"verify compliance." Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to 
encrypt any missile data. 

Putting this matter in its simplest terms, we know that the United States does 
not engage in the practice of encrypting telemetry and that the Soviets have 
promised not to encrypt any telemetry which would impede verification. It seems 
only logical that both sides should agree to ban all encryption. Such a ban would be 
a demonstration of Soviet good faith as well as a commitment by them to the 
maintenance of a verifiable treaty. 

We are also concerned that the treaty's Protocol, which bans the development or 
flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers and the deployment of cruise mis- 
siles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers until the end of 1981 will "assume a 
life of its own , and that the United States will give into Soviet demands that the 
Protocol remain in force during the course of the SALT III negotiations. We recom- 
mend that the Senate approve an understanding or reservation stating that the 
Protocol will expire on schedule unless its extension is specifically approved by the 
Senate. 

There are those who argue that the Senate already has the power to veto an 
extension of this or any other treaty protocol. However, our reasons for seeking 
such an expression by the Senate is to put you and your colleagues firmly on record 
and to put the Soviets on notice that there will be no tampering with the Protocol 
termination date. 

We also agree with critics of the SALT II Treaty who express concern that the 
treaty may prevent us from transferring cruise missile and other technology to our 
NATO allies. We believe it necessary that the Senate clarify U.S. intentions regard- 
ing technology transfer by adopting a reservation or understanding. It is very clear 
to anyone who considers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO 
allies in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pending agree- 
ment. The Soviets view themselves as a people surrounded by enemies — a percep- 
tion which has led to upgrading the armament of Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern 
Europe. The activity, of course, poses a direct threat to the NATO nations and 
demands a realistic response. 

Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist NATO in improving 
its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear weaponry, they have disputed the U.S. 
right to continue to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Euroj>e. A 
Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a continuation of U.S. 
technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm our commitment to the alliance and 
would create Soviet uneeisiness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike 
force on the same continent. 

We believe that such a Senate expression would provide the additional service of 
promoting a continental balance between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact 
nations; thereby, creating a stabilizing factor. Maintaining a viable nuclear strike 
force in Europe also gives the Soviet war planners yet another contingency to be 
concerned with, a fact which we believe reduces the threat of nuclear war. 

Another step we should take to bolster the security and confidence of our NATO 
allies is to deploy updated theatre nuclear weapons in Europe to help offset the 
Soviet SS-20 intermediate range missile, which was not covered by the treaty. By 
the early 1980's the Soviets are expected to have deployed in Eastern Europe 300 
SS-20's with 3 warheads each. 

Mr. Chairman, The American Legion also seeks an adjustment in the procedure 
for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides that all actual or suspected 
violations be reported to a standing commission for consideration. We proposed a 
reservation or understanding that would require a simultaneous reporting of all 
such actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the appropriate 
committee. Such reporting of violations would strengthen the U.S. commitment to 
force Soviet compliance with the agreement. 

Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a flaw in the treaty 
deals with the agreed statements and common understandings. It appears as though 
these explanations of treaty provisions have been presented as separate documents 
and, therefore, not subject to the ratification process. If this is the case— and we 
defer to your ruling on the matter — then we demand formal Soviet agreement that 



163 

these statements and understandings be made part of the treaty text. The treaty 
would be simply unmanageable without such an agreement. 

Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications of the treaty some of 
which seek amendments to the language and others which seek unilateral declara- 
tions by your and your colleagues. And there is little doubt in my mind that The 
American Legion will be accused of proposing so called "killer amendments" and. 
accused of trying to sabotage the treaty. 

I began my statement by saying that our organization has historically endorsed 
the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came here today with that attitude and 
presented these recommended modifications in that spirit. In fact, our organization 
would have been happy if both sides were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals 
by 50 percent or more. But, of course, we realize that such reductions ignore the 
realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of unprecedented 
weapons production. 

I have asked you to consider three amendments — to address the overwhelming 
Soviet advantage in heavy missiles; to prohibit the encryption of telemetry; and to 
insure that agreed statements and understandings are legally binding. The first of 
these creates obvious negotiating difficulties but the existing treaty provisions 
simply guarantee the Soviets a superior hard target kill capability which must be 
addressed in one of the ways we've recommended. The issue of heavy missiles will 
continue to be a problem during SALT III and beyond unless we stand firm. The 
second and third recommended amendments do not seek any significant changes in 
the terms of the treaty. They are honest attempts at (1) making the agreement more 
verifiable and (2) insuring that its provisions are precise enough to be manageable. 

Up to this point we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reser- 
vations by the Senate, or weapons programs to help compensate for Soviet strategic 
advantages. These measures alone, however, are insufficient to assure "essential 
equivalence" and effective deterrence. As I mentioned earlier, our organization 
believes that the time has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy. 

Our present strategy essentially dates back to the early 1960's when Defense 
Secretary McNamara ordered a study to, for the first time, determined the specific 
criteria of effective deterrence to serve as a guide for U.S. nuclear war planners. We 
wanted to determine how much capability the United States would need, after 
absorbing a Russian first strike, to retaliate and inflict "unacceptable damage" on 
the Soviet Union. His planners concluded that the "unacceptable damage" thresh- 
hold was the destruction of 20-25 percent of Russia's population and at least 50 
percent of its industrial capacity. Any capability beyond that would be "overkill" 
and could only "rearrange the rubble". 

McNamara s "Assured destruction" led to the concept of MAD (Mutual Assured 
Destruction) toward the end of the 1960's, by which time the Soviet Union had 
developed a roughly equivalent strategic posture. The MAD concept denies any 
significance to superiority in force levels, makes "sufficiency" the standard of deter- 
rent capability, and requires that deterrence be mutual. Professor Richard Pipes 
summed up the MAD concept with the ironic comment that "to feel secure the 
United States actually requires the Soviet Union to have the capacity to destroy it". 
To avoid upsetting mutual deterrence, the MAD concept requires that neither side 
should threaten the survivability of the other's retaliatory forces. 

U.S. nuclear strategy underwent another modification in 1974, when Defense 
Secretary James Schlesinger, who continued to adhere to the Assured Destruction 
concept, made explicit a second goal, that the U.S. Strategic forces should be 
capable of limited attacks on selected economic or military targets, to provide the 
President with "limited nuclear options" in situations short of an all-out nuclear 
strike on U.S. cities. 

During a recent appearance before this committee, Defense Secretary Brown 
stated that, "We have today . . . survivable forces capable of massive destruction of 
Soviet cities and industry, even after an all-out surprise attack on our forces by the 
Soviets. We also have both the forces and the targeting and employment policies to 
allow selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited provocations". Thus 
the Carter administration essentially retains the strategy of the previous adminis- 
tration, the concept of assured destruction tempered with the concept of "limited 
nuclear options". 

It is evident that since the early 1960's we have taken what is essentially a 
"second strike" posture. We have indicated, directly and indirectly and at the 
highest levels, that we would absorb a first strike, and our basic strategy has 
centered around that assumption. In recent months, high-ranking U.S. officials have 
on several occasions sought to suggest that the United States might not absorb the 
first blow, but in each instance they have hastened to add" of course, that is not our 



164 

policy", or some other disclaimer. If their intent was to inject an element of doubt 
into the minds of Soviet war planners, it is doubtful that they have succeeded. 

The only problem with the Mutual Assured Destruction thesis is that it is not 
mutual. Western experts on Soviet military thought agree almost unanimously that 
Soviet strategists have never regarded nuclear war as unthinkable or unwinnable. 
In the words of one American analyst. "The only Soviet 'doctrine' is found in its 
concept of fighting and winning nuclear wars". 

Thus the Soviets refuse to accept any concept that would increase Soviet vulner- 
ability, and believe that "deterrence" cannot lead to "victory" and that there is no 
sense in absorbing an enemy strike merely to retaliate. During the SALT I negotia- 
tions, the American delegation officially disavowed the "launch on warning' con- 
cept which, it claimed, could result in automatic escalation or even in starting a 
nuclear war by accident. But efforts to elicit a statement on Soviet policy toward 
"launch on warning" met with silence. The only Soviet response was that such 
matters went beyond the proper scope of the SALT talks. 

Soviet military writers have clearly and consistently indicated that the Soviet 
Union will, if attacked, "launch on warning". That policy was affirmed by Secretary 
Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "Any potential aggressor is well aware 
that any attempt to launch a missile attack on our country would be met by 
devastating retaliation." This fundamental difference in strategic outlook helps 
explain the Soviet Union's relative lack of concern over the vulnerability of its 
ICBM silos. At present, its land-based ICBM's carry about 70 percent of its strategic 
warheads, which account for more than 80 percent of its megatonnage. In contrast, 
U.S. ICBM's account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage. 

Offensively, the Soviet Union has increasingly emphasized the deployment of 
"hard target killers" — very large and accurate ICBM's such as the SS-18 s — which 
according to the MAD doctrine are "destabilizing". As has been pointed out many 
times in the course of the Senate SALT II hearings, by the early 1980's the Soviet 
Union, with the improved accuracy of its powerful missiles, will be capable of 
launching a counterforce strike that could well destroy 90 percent of our land-based 
ICBM's (which account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage), at least half of 
our B-52's (which carry about half of our total nuclear explosive power), and 
perhaps one-third of our nuclear submarines. As a result, our total megatonnage 
would be reduced by about 60 percent with the expenditure of only about 20 percent 
of the Soviet nuclear force. The number of remaining U.S. ICBM's, SLBM's, and 
bombers that could reach targets in the Soviet Union would be reduced by normal 
systems failures (about 15 percent), improved Soviet anti-bomber and anti-subma- 
rine capabilities, and ABM s. The damage the United States could inflict on the 
Soviet Union would be further limited by the Soviet civil defense system, which is 
not so much intended to cope with an all-out attack on its urban/industrial centers 
as to minimize the damage that might result from U.S. strategic forces that have 
been significantly reduced by a Soviet first strike and by active Soviet defenses. 

Since it would, for example, require more than 100 SLBM's on target to inflict 40 
percent damage on a city the size of Leningrad, it is quite possible that we would 
not be capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union with our 
surviving forces, largely highly vulnerable B-52's and relatively inaccurate SLBM's. 
That would be especially true if we had to expend a significant percentage of our 
remaining delivery vehicles on counterforce targets. But our major concern is that 
in view of the enormous nuclear disparity between the United States and the Soviet 
Union following a Soviet first strike our leadership, especially if the Soviets left 
many major U.S. population centers untouched as "second strike hostages", may 
decide not to retaliate. 

Instead of opting for a "surgical" first strike aimed only at our strategic nuclear 
forces, the Soviets might attempt to strike a "knock out" blow, to paralyze the 
United States by destroying all significant military targets, communications instal- 
lations, transportation hubs, airfields, ports, refineries, power plants, governmental 
centers, etc. 'The prospect that the Soviets might opt for more than our ICBM silos 
on a first strike was reinforced by the late Marshal Krylov, Commander of Strategic 
Rocket Forces, who in one of the most authoritative public comments on Soviet 
targeting strategy, revealed that the principal targets of his forces would be the 
enemy's delivery systems and weapons storage and manufacturing sites, military 
installations, military industries and centers of political-military administration, 
command and control. Such a massive assault by as many as 10,000 warheads (the 
Soviets are expected to have deployed about 14,000 warheads by the early 1980's 
might leave us with little capability or will to retaliate. 

It should be pointed out that the first half of the 1980's, during which time the 
Soviets will be capable of launching a perhaps decisive counterforce strike, will 
precede the scheduled deployment phase of the M-X missile system (1986-1989). It 



165 

will also coincide with the period during which about half of the Polaris-Poseidon 
fleet may have to be retired but before the full Trident fleet has been put into 
service. 

In our view, the most effective way of countering the vulnerability, of preventing 
our ICBM's from being knocked out, assuring the maintenance of essential equiv- 
alence and effective deterrence, and lessening the temptation for the Soviet Union 
to launch a counterforce or nation-paralyzing first strike, would be to adopt a 
"launch on warning" posture. The adoption of such a policy would also help nullify 
any strategic advantages the Soviet Union might obtain by violating the SALT II 
Treaty^ by concealing more than the stipulated number of launchers, by increasing 
the number of reentry vehicles in MIRVed warheads, and so forth. In other words, 
no matter what the Soviet Union did would be assured of an effective deterrent. 

Those who oppose the "launch on warning" policy cite two principal objections. 
One is the danger of accidental war, that our radar and monitoring systems are not 
sufficiently reliable. We believe that there is virtually no chance of such an "acci- 
dent". General James C. Hill, Commander of NORAD/ADCOM, recently remarked 
that, "We do have the capability now to detect and assess a large-scale ICBM attack 
on the United States — and so notify the President," although he warned that there 
are deficiencies if the objective is to extend launch on warning to flexible response 
and similar kinds of graduated retaliatory actions. Our ICBM warning network 
consists of a number of redundant systems. First, there are the early warning 
satellites which detect missile firings at the moment of launch. Confirmation and 
assessment are provided by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System [BMEWS]. 
The Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (formerly part of 
the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system) has been integrated into our ICBM 
warning system. In addition, the PAVE PAWS coastal phased array radar system 
provide radar confirmation and assessment of SLBM launches to corroborate early 
detection by early warning satellite systems. We should give the highest priority to 
further improving our monitoring and communications systems, with the goal of 
eliminating, to the extent that is humanly possible, the chance of accidental war. 

The second major objection to a "launch on warning" policy is that it would 
restrict the President's ability to employ limited nuclear options. In the words of 
Secretary Brown, "While I have serious doubts about whether a nuclear war, once 
started, could be kept limited, it would be imprudent to place the United States in a 
position in which uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow. 
Massive retaliation may not be appropriate, nor will its prospect be sufficiently 
credible in all circumstances to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent." 

We take issue with the views that a launch on warning policy is destabilizing or 
may prevent uncontrolled escalation. In the first place, the Soviet Union now has, 
and has long had, such a policy. Second, if there is a destabilizing factor in the 
nuclear deterrence equation it is that Soviet war planners may be at least 90 
percent certain that, according to our present policy, we would absorb a first strike 
no matter what its magnitude. That could tempt the Soviet Union to try for a 
"knock out" blow. The possibility of their opting for such a course would be greatly 
diminished if they knew that their missiles would impact on empty silos. 

Furthermore, we believe that there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union 
would play our game of "limited nuclear options". They would in all likelihood 
attempt to inflict maximum military-economic damage on the first strike, although 
perhaps leaving certain population centers "hostage" to a second strike. We would 
be left with shattered military forces, a shattered economy, and a bag full of limited 
nuclear options. 

In sum, we believe that the United States can no longer afford to pursue a 
strategic policy that would oblige us to absorb a first strike. We must make it clear 
to the Soviet Union and while we will not be the first to start a nuclear war, we are 
prepared to retaliate immediately. This would decrease the likelihood of nuclear 
war, not increase it. 

Although the adoption of a "launch on warning" posture would go a long way 
toward assuring that we could maintain an effective deterrent, we realize that at 
the crucial moment the President may fail to act or that there may be some 
breakdown in the communications link. We, therefore, believe that the M-X pro- 
gram would be a good investment. It would provide the United States with a highly 
survivable back-up system and with an accurate, powerful hard-target system simi- 
lar to that of the Soviet Union. But deployment of the M-X system alone is not 
enough. We must recommit ourselves to the modernization of our strategic Triad— 
the concept developed as the basis for providing the President certain options 
during a crisis. The survivability and strike capability of our submarine fleet are 
matters of debate as the aging Polaris and Poseidon ships quickly approach their 



166 

scheduled retirement dates. The schedules for full deployment of the Trident 
system, therefore, must be accelerated. 

A manned penetrating bomber capable of delivering cruise missiles close to Soviet 
targets is especially critical since B-52 vulnerability to Soviet air defenses is almost 
a certainty. Our nation's war planners should also examine the feasibility and cost 
effectiveness of deploying a portion of our current land-based ICBM force in a 
mobile mode during the early 1980's since it will be a decade before the M-X system 
is fully deployed. 

We are aware that these recommended actions to modernize the strategic Triad 
are expensive and there are many people in this country who have expressed 
concern that the SALT II hearings have provided a marketplace in which defense- 
minded groups and individuals have presented military hardware shopping lists 
with the totals being the costs of their support of the agreement. We present our 
recommendations as necessary expenditures, whether SALT II be approved or re- 
jected. 

The Soviet Union is a formidable opponent but the greatest potential danger 
facing our nation today in terms of its security is not the threat of any foreign 
power but the unwillingness of our citizenry to pay the price of pursuing peace 
through a position of strength. Regardless of the disposition of this treaty, we will 
be required to step up defense spending in order to counter improvements in the 
Soviet strategic arsenal. 

Our final recommendation is that the United States should make a much greater 
effort in civil defense preparedness. The Soviet Union has long realized that civil 
defense is an integral part of strategic policy. It has devoted a good deal of effort to 
"hardening" key economic and military installations and in developing evacuation 
capabilities, with special emphasis on evacuating essential industrial and political 
personnel. An effective civil defense system would also give the Soviets a strategic 
advantage in that in the event of a developing crisis they could evacuate their major 
population centers, perhaps on the pretext that they fear a U.S. preemptive strike, 
thus presenting U.S. war planners with empty cities while ours are filled with 
people and panic. In addition to matching the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear 
weapons, we must also endeavor to match it in terms of civil defense. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II Treaty, if it is 
adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain positive features, it also has a 
number of serious deficiencies. An even greater danger than the deficiencies of the 
treaty, however, is the prospect that the p>eople of the United States will be lulled 
into a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate the likeli- 
hood of nuclear war. We must realize that we can have peace only through 
strength. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a number of 
strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen, that gap will grow in the years 
ahead. But if such a disparity is allowed to exist, that will be not so much the fault 
of the treaty as the lack of national will, as the result of our own deliberate policies. 
We are willing to support the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that the 
United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we have outlined and the 
treaty is modified in the areas that we've mentioned. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carey, and congratulations. I did 
not think you were going to manage to keep your presentation 
within 10 minutes. You had a 15-page statement, and you incorpo- 
rated all of the major points as well. 

Mr. Baugher is our next panelist. Mr. Baugher is the past chair- 
man of the national governing board and present member of the 
national governing board of the Ripon Society. 

STATEMENT OF PETER VINCENT BAUGHER, PAST CHAIRMAN 
AND PRESENT MEMBER, NATIONAL GOVERNING BOARD, 
RIPON SOCIETY, WASHINGTON, D.C.* 

Mr. Baugher. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. 

My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney, and past 
chairman of the national governing board of the Ripon Society, on 
whose behalf I am testifying this morning. 



' See page 170 for Mr. Baugher's prepared statement. 



167 

The debate over the SALT II treaty has been vigorous and far- 
ranging. We are mindful, Mr. Chairman, of the serious concerns 
expressed by those who feel that passage of this agreement would 
threaten U.S. security. We are also aware that the treaty more 
closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the nuclear 
weapons buildup already planned by the parties than it does the 
strict arms control accord we would have preferred. 

These considerations notwithstanding, we believe that the case 
for ratification remains clear and convincing. The principal bene- 
fits of SALT II can be easily summarized. 

The treaty places certain qualitative and quantitative limitations 
on the nuclear arms race. These limitations are not as stringent as 
we had hoped, but they are nonetheless a significant improvement 
over the alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all. 

The proposed treaty, moreover, is verifiable, and in fact will 
enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At a mini- 
mum, the treaty's precise limits should enable the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on worst case 
estimates. 

Finally, ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts 
to maintain strategic equality, can provide the basis for further 
negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which more substantial 
arms control measures, including real reductions in the number 
and quality of atomic weapons, might emerge. 

Opponents of SALT II argue that approval of the treaty would 
jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take 
an inordinately narrow view of what elements contribute to real 
security. The security of this Nation depends not only upon the 
status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the strength of our 
political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the 
American people. 

Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can 
provide little more than a "force de frappe" if U.S. conventional 
forces are inadequate. 

These components of national security, and the debilitating effect 
of a profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have been for the 
most part ignored by SALT II's opponents. 

Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the treaty, SALT II's 
effect upon the strategic balance will be generally favorable. The 
agreement is based on the principle of "equality and equal secu- 
rity." The United States no longer enjoys nuclear superiority over 
the Soviets, but only an essential equivalence. SALl" II acknowl- 
edges and reflects this shift in power. But the treaty is not the 
cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestab- 
lish our nuclear preeminence. 

Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in 
the force levels of the two countries, these limits will impinge most 
immediately on the Soviet Union. By contrast, the treaty interferes 
with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense programs now 
under consideration. 

It is said that we should withhold approval of the treaty because 
of the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World. 
Without a doubt, Soviet conduct has been disruptive and provoca- 
tive. Clearly, our attitudes toward the Soviet Union and our will- 



168 

ingness to enter into agreements with it are, as a practical matter, 
linked to what the Soviets do in other parts of the world. 

We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we 
admire its policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to 
our advantage in the long run to compete diplomatically, political- 
ly, and economically, rather than just militarily. The SALT II 
agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It 
ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the 
United States, and not defeated because our adversary shows every 
sign of continuing to displease us. 

Finally, the rejection of SALT II would inevitably heighten ten- 
sions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The political 
repercussions of such new tensions could adversely affect our allies, 
as well, who rely on us to manage a stable East- West relationship. 
Rejection of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the 
credibility of the Carter administration and its ability to manage 
our international relations. While as Republicans we have fre- 
quently been critical of the administration's foreign policy, as 
Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably 
unified front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet 
Union. 

Secretary of Defense Brown and General Jones both testified 
that, while today our nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to 
those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that the Soviets will possess 
advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force within 
the next few years. In particular our land-based ICBM's are pro- 
jected to be critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's. 

The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic 
position is not that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a 
nuclear first strike against the United States. In view of the very 
substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would survive any Soviet 
attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely. 

Rather, as General Jones suggested, the growing disparity would 
probably be reflected in a more confident Soviet leadership, in- 
creasingly inclined toward adventuresome behavior in areas where 
our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond 
by conventional means could be circumscribed. This is not a devel- 
opment the United States can afford to permit. 

The trend to which I refer has emerged over the past 15 years as 
a consequence of unilateral decisions by the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. It is not the result of SALT, nor will ratification of the 
proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem. Indeed, in 
that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic 
forces, it should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize 
whatever apparent strategic advantage the Soviets may have 
achieved by the first half of the next decade. 

SALT II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor 
are America's hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing 
program of upgrading our strategic forces. This means that within 
the life of the SALT II Treaty, the United States must develop and 
deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize 
those strategic systems already in existence. 

As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has become more general- 
ly known, many have assumed that the solution to our projected 



169 

strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget — typically by 
3 to 5 percent, in real dollars. This approach misses the mark. The 
new weapons systems we need will be costly, but this is exactly 
why the multibillion dollar programs now envisioned must be 
judged on an individual basis, not as part of a mandatory quota for 
overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense. 

In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic 
parity we may be required to boost our real outlays for defense by 
5 percent or more every year for the next 5 to 10 years. But this is 
a conclusion that should be reached after the relative cost-effective- 
ness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully 
evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself. 

One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment 
and modernize our forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union 
to engage in negotiations about actual reductions of nuclear arma- 
ments, not just limitations. We advocate that these approaches be 
pursued concurrently. 

It is ironic that the SALT debate has become a debate on rear- 
mament. The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to arms limita- 
tion talk, in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in 
curbing the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been 
underway now for 15 years. It began before formal SALT negotia- 
tions were inaugurated, and it has continued unabated during the 
period following the war in Vietnam when U.S. defense spending 
declined markedly. 

Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union 
have too frequently served to ratify and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s 
latest plans for military expansion. There is no reason to believe 
that SALT III will offer any more meaningful opportunity. The 
United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pro- 
nounced superiority in strategic weapons, and commenced the 
SALT II talks with a lesser but still significant advantage. The 
likelihood is that SALT III will begin with the Soviets expecting 
strategic supremacy by the end of these negotiations. 

In such circumstances, the promise of any real arms reduction is 
illusory. Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III 
reduction in arms now, while the United States still retains the 
power to forestall this shift in the strategic balance. If there are to 
be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate for 
those cuts must be written into SALT II. 

Toward this end. Senator Mojmihan has proposed an amendment 
to the treaty, directing that the United States an'^. the Soviet 
Union "effect Significant and substantial reductions in the num- 
bers of strategic offensive arms consistent with the requirement for 
the maintenance of essential strategic equivalence." If the parties 
were unable to conclude such an agr3ement by December 31, 1981, 
SALT II would terminate on that date. 

Unlike some other proposals that have been made to force the 
pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment would not 
require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II 
treaty. A less demanding alternative that could still improve the 
chances for a "deep cut" SALT III agreement would be to amend 
the resolution of ratification to include a set of explicit and appro- 



170 

priately ambitious guidelines for the next round of negotiations. 
These kinds of approaches deserve your support. 

The SALT II Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if 
modest, step in the long-range process of controlling nuclear arma- 
ments. But if the SALT process itself is to be preserved, the time 
has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of substan- 
tial arms reductions. 

We hope that your committee wdll recommend the incorporation 
of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that 
the Senate give its advice and consent to the treaty as so amended. 

Thank you. 

[Mr. Baugher's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Peter V. Baugher 

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations: I appreciate 
this opportunity to appear befor you to urge that the Senate give its advice and 
consent to ratification of the proposed Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offen- 
sive Arms (SALT II). 

INTRODUCTION 

My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney and a member of the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. I also serve on the Republican National 
Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs and 
am past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society, on whose 
behalf I am testifying this morning. 

Over the past two decades the Ripon Society has studied and taken positions on 
many issues of major public importance. Few matters have commanded as much 
attention, or aroused as much controversy, though, as has the debate over the SALT 
II Treaty. The agreement now before this Committee bears not only upon our 
military security and international political relations, but also on what America's 
role in the world ought to be, whether we are strong enough to carry out that role, 
and whether the American sun is rising or setting on the world scene. SALT II has 
thus taken on sjrmbolic importance far exceeding its value as an agreement to limit 
nuclear weapons. In evaluating the Treaty we are mindful of the serious concerns 
expressed by those who believe its passage would threaten U.S. security. We are 
also aware that SALT II more closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the 
nuclear weapons build-up already planned by the parties than it does the strict 
arms control accord we would have preferred. These considerations notwithstand- 
ing, we believe that the case for ratification remains clear and convincing. 

the benefits of salt II 

The testimony on nuclear diplomacy received by this Committee during the last 
two months has been characterized by a high level of sophistication and expertise. 
The principal benefits of SALT II can nevertheless be easily summarized. The 
Treaty places certain carefully defined quantitative and qualitative limitations on 
the nuclear arms race, which — if permitted to proceed unchecked — would be mili- 
tarily and politically hazardous, and which could impose the burden of massive 
additional defense spending upon our citizens. These limitations are not as stringent 
as we had hoped. But they are nonetheless a significant improvement over the 
alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all. The proposed Treaty, moreover, is 
verifiable, and in fact will enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At 
a minimum the Treaty's precise and agreed upon limits, reinforced by the greater 
knowledge each side will have of the other's capabilities, should enable the U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on "worst-case" estimates. Finally, 
ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts to maintain strategic equali- 
ty, can provide the basis for further negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which 
more substantial arms control measures, including real reductions in the number of 
quality of atomic weapons, might emerge. 

More specifically, the major advantages of the SALT II Treaty may be enumer- 
ated as follows: 

First, the proposed agreement sets important quantitative limitations on the 
number of strategic delivery vehicles. Both sides agree in Article III of the Treaty to 
the imposition of a common aggregate ceiling (2,400 initially, to be reduced to 2,250 



171 

by the end of 1981) on ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers, SLBM 
(submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers, and heavy bombers. This will 
compel the Soviets to dismantle or destroy over 250 of the missile launchers or 
heavy bombers they now have deployed. By contrast, because we are below the 
SALT II limits, the United States could actually increase the number of launchers 
and heavy bombers it deploys. 

Article V of the Treaty also places equal subceilings on specific categories of 
launchers. There is a limit of 1,320 on the combined total of MIRVed ICBM and 
SLBM launchers, together with heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range, air- 
launched cruise missiles (Paragraph 1). The total number of MIRVed launchers 
cannot exceed 1,200 (Paragraph 2), and the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers — 
potentially the most destabilizing weapon system — is restricted to a maximum of 
820 (Paragraph 3). 

Second, Article IV of the proposed agreement contains a number of qualitative 
restraints. The Treaty freezes the number of warheads on existing types of ICBM's 
(Paragraph 10) and establishes ceilings of 14 and 10, respectively, on the number of 
warheads that can be placed on SLBM's and on any new type of ICBM (Paragraph 
11). SALT II, further, bans new ICBM's and new SLBM's that are larger in throw- 
weight than the largest current light ICBM, the Soviet SS-19 (Paragraph 7). The 
Treaty permits production of only one new type of light ICBM for each side (Para- 
graph 9). Article IV also limits improvements to existing t5T>es of ICBM's in such 
characteristics as throw-weight, launch-weight, number of warheads, length, diame- 
ter, and fuel type. 

"There are other qualitative constraints in the Treaty. SALT II (Paragraph 5 of 
Article IV) bans rapid missile reload systems which, if made workable, could greatly 
multiply the military capabilities of ICBM launchers. To reinforce this restriction, 
storage of excess missiles near launch sites is also barred. In addition, Article IX of 
the Treaty prohibits development, testing, and deplojTnent of seabed, outer space, 
and a variety of other types of weapons not yet deployed by either side. 

Third, under the terms of Articles XV, XVI, and XVII of the proposed agreement 
our ability to monitor Soviet Strategic systems will be protected and enhanced. 
Deliberate concealment measures that impede verification, such as encryption of the 
telemetry associated with missile tests, are banned by SALT II, as is any interfer- 
ence with national technical means of verification. The Treaty, moreover, requires 
the parties to exchange information on the numbers, sizes, and kinds of their 
strategic systems, and to notify one another in advance about all planned ICBM 
launches. Through the Standing Consultative Commission (Article XVII), an institu- 
tional mechanism for discussing compliance and verification problems is also made 
available to the parties. 

Fourth, ratification of the proposed agreement will facilitate continuation of the 
SALT process. The talks on limitation of strategic armaments begun by President 
Nixon in 1969, buoyed by the signing of the ABM Treaty and Interim SALT 
agreement in 1972, and accelerated by President Ford at Vladivostok in 1974, may 
now progress to a new level of negotiations — SALT III— sustaining the forward 
momentum generated by the successful conclusions of SALT I and II. 

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TREATY 

Opponents of the SALT II agreement argue that approval of the Treaty would 
jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take an inordinately 
narrow view of what elements contribute to real security. The security of this 
nation depends not only upon the status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the 
strength of our political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the 
American people. Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can 
provide little more than a "force de frappe,' if U.S. conventional forces — those we 
are most likely to rely upon in anything short of a nuclear catastrophe — are 
inadequate. These components of national security, and the debilitating effect of a 
profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have for the most part been ignored by 
SALT II's opponents. 

Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the Treaty, SALT II's effect upon the 
strategic balance will be generally favorable. The agreement is based on the princi- 
ple of "equality and equal security" (Preamble); the United States no longer enjoys 
nuclear superiority over the Soviets, as it once did, but only an "essential equiv- 
alence". SALT II acknowledges and reflects this shift in power. But the Treaty is 
not the cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestablish our 
nuclear preeminence. 

Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in the force levels of 
the two countries, these limits will impinge most immediately on the Soviet Union. 
By contrast, the Treaty interferes with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense 



48-260 0-79 Pt.U - 12 



172 

programs now under consideration — the M-X missile, the Trident submarine and 
missiles, air, sea, and ground-launched cruise missiles, a cruise missile carrier, or a 
possible new bomber. Should we decide to fund these programs, nothing in the 
Treaty would prevent us from moving ahead with them on schedule. 

Similarly, nothing in Article XII of the Treaty or elsewhere will prevent us from 
continuing nuclear and conventional military cooperation with our allies. In partic- 
ular, SALT II does not apply to "Eurostrategic weapons" — those nuclear forces 
deployed in Europe — and we are free therefore to implement our announced plan to 
modernize and upgrade NATO's strategic capabilities. For this reason, among 
others, all of our European allies have endorsed the proposed agreement. 

It is said that we should withhold approval of the Treaty because of the Soviet 
Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World. Without a doubt Soviet conduct in 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East — and, as we learned only this week, its stationing 
of combat troops in Cuba — has been disruptive and provocative. Clearly, our atti- 
tudes toward the Soviet Union and our willingness to enter into agreements with it 
are, as a practical matter, "linked" to what the Soviets (or their representatives) do 
in other parts of the world. 

We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we admire its 
policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to our advantage, in the long 
run, to compete diplomatically, politically, and economically, rather than just mili- 
tarily. The SALT II agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It 
ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the United States and 
not defeated because our adversary shows every sign of continuing to displease us. 

Finally, any examination of the consequences of approving SALT II must be 
accompanied by an assessment of what is likely to happen if the Senate refuses to 
give its consent to this agreement. The defeat of SALT II would inevitably heighten 
tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R., further eroding whatever may 
be left of detente. The political repercussions of such new tensions could also 
adversely affect our allies, who rely on us to manage a stable East-West relation- 
ship. Rejection of the Treaty would tend, additionally, to reinforce the Soviet's 
apparent belief that the only way to attain security is to act unilaterally, and 
belligerently, to improve their position as a world power. 

Beyond this, we are now engaged in a wide range of arms control ventures with 
the Soviet Union and other nations. Although ratification of SALT II will not 
guarantee success in these other arms control efforts, the failure of SALT II would 
almost certainly damage them, perhaps fatally. In addition to the collapse of the 
SALT process itself, the most important casualty of nonratification would be our 
attempt to halt the spread of nuclear weapons through the 1968 Nonproliferation 
Treaty, Article VI of which commits all parties — including the United States and 
the Soviet Union — "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." Nations now poised 
on the brink of producing nuclear weapons might well use the breakdown of SALT 
as an excuse (or a reason) to reconsider their own commitment to the Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty. It is also likely that rejection by the United States of the SALT II 
agreement would impair our ongoing negotiations with the Soviets on a comprehen- 
sive nuclear test ban, on the prohibition of antisatelli.e weaponry, and on mutual 
and balanced force reductions in Europe. 

Defeat of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the credibility of the 
Carter Administration and its ability to manage our international relations. While 
as Republicans we have frequently been critical of the Administration's foreign 
policy, as Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably unified 
front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet Union. This does not 
mean that the Senate should abdicate its constitutional r>3sponsibility to pass upon 
all treaties between the United States and other nations. It does mean, however, 
that in judging such treaties allowance must be made for the President's role as the 
chief architect and m.anager of our foreign relations. 

CLARIFICATION OF TREATY AMBIGUITIES 

Like any negotiated agreement, the SALT II Treaty is not without problems. In 
the context of an accord supposedly premised upon equality, we are concerned about 
the Soviet Union's unilateral right to deploy 308 modern large ballistic missiles 
(MLBM), a carryover from SALT I. Clearly, the desired result would have been a 
major cutback in Soviet MLBM's in order to have reduced the U.S.S.R.'s substantial 
throw-weight advantage over the United States. For the time being, limiting the SS- 
18 to 10 warheads provides a significant restraint on their MLBM potential, but 
obtaining sizeable reductions in the number of these heavy weapons should be one 
of our major objectives in future negotiations. 



173 

Lest there be any confusion about U.S. intentions with respect to certain poten- 
tially ambiguous provisions of the Treaty, the Senate should ratify SALT II subject 
to the following understandings: (1) It should be made clear that the Protocol which, 
among other things, bars until January 1, 1982, the deplo3Tnent of ground and sea- 
launched cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers, cannot be ex- 
tended without the advice and consent of the Senate; (2) In order to clarify the 
limited scope of our obligations under article XII, the so-called "non-circumvention" 
clause, the Senate should state that nothing in the Treaty prohibits the United 
States from continuing traditional patterns of allied defense co-operation, including 
the transfer of cruise missile technology if it deems such a transfer necessary; (3) 
President Brezhnev's statement delivered to President Carter at Vienna on June 16, 
1979, pledging that the Soviet Union would not build more than 30 Backfire bomb- 
ers a year and that it would not deploy them for intercontinental missions, should 
be made a formal part of the Treaty. 

These suggested understandings are modest and would not require renegotiation 
of the agreement. They would, on the other hand, highlight several ambiguities in 
SALT II which, if not resolved now, could conceivably lead to serious disagreements 
after the Treaty has gone into effect. 

MEETING THE SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE 

From the outset of these hearings it has been conceded that the days of U.S. 
nuclear supremacy are past, and that the momentum of atomic weapons develop- 
ment belongs now to the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and 
General David Jones of the Joint Chief of Staff both testified that, while today our 
nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that 
the Soviets will possess advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force 
within the next few years. In particular, our land-based ICBM's are projected to be 
critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's. 

The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic position is not 
that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike against the 
United States. In view of the very substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would 
survive any Soviet attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely. Rather, as Gener- 
al Jones suggested, the growing disparity would probably be reflected in a more 
confident Soviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward adventurous behavior in 
areas where our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond by 
conventional means could be circumscribed. "Such a situation," the General 
warned, "would carry the seeds of serious miscalculation and run the risk of 
precipitating a confrontation which neither side wanted nor intended." Plainly, this 
is not a development the United States can afford to permit. 

This trend, which (if allowed to continue) will tip the strategic balance precarious- 
ly toward the Soviets, has emerged over the past 15 years as a consequence of 
unilateral decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. to invest at sharply 
different rates in the acquisition of nuclear armaments. It is not the result of SALT, 
nor will ratification of the proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem. 
Indeed, in that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic forces, it 
should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize whatever apparent strategic 
advantage the Soviets may have achieved by the first half of the next decade. SALT 
II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor, regrettably, are America's 
hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing program for the upgrading of our 
strategic forces. 

This means that within the life of the SALT II Treaty the United States must 
develop and deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize those 
strategic systems already in existence. As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has 
become more generally known, many have assumed that the solution to our project- 
ed strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget — typically, by three to five 
percent in real dollars. This approach misses the mark. 

The new weapons systems we need will be costly. But this is exactly why the 
multi-billion dollar programs now envisioned — whether one is speaking of the M-X 
missile with its several competing basing modes (each more expensive than the 
next), the Trident submarine or Trident missiles, the several varieties of cruise 
missiles, or the B-1 bomber — must be judged on an individual basis, not as part of a 
mandatory quota for overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense. 

Congressman Joseph Addabbo of New York, Chairman of the House Subcommit- 
tee on Defense Appropriations, commented on this subject last month (CJongression- 
al Record, August 2, 1979, pp. 7184-7185): 

There is a limit to what we can afford to spend each year [on defense], yet 
there are certain levels of capability that we must maintain. It is clear that we 



174 

are spending more and getting less for it, year by year, and that the tough 
years lie ahead, not backward. 

Budget officers, be they civilian or military, tend to stockpile dollars for a 
rainy day. We just cannot afford to let them do this any longer, nor can we 
begin a procurement unless we are reasonably sure that it will do the job it is 
supposed to do when it comes into the inventory, and unless we are reasonably 
sure it can be produced in line with what we anticipate, and unless we are sure 
it is not low on the priority list. 

These problems have been exacerbated by the failure of the Department of 
Defense to improve its weapons program review capability. Without a strengthened 
independent review effort it would be wasteful to increase the Pentagon's budget, no 
matter how unfavorable the balance of forces might become. 

In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic parity we may be 
required to boost our real outlays for defense by five percent or more every year for 
the next five to ten years. But this is a conclusion that should be reached after the 
relative cost-effectiveness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully 
evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself. 

CHALLENGING THE SOVIET UNION 

One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment and modernize 
our strategic (and conventional) forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union to 
engage in negotiations about actual reductions in nuclear armaments, not just 
limitations.' We advocate that these approaches be pursued concurrently. 

It is ironic that the SALT debate has become (as Senator Moynihan recently 
remarked) a "debate on rearmament." The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to 
arms limitation talks in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in curbing 
the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been underway now for 15 years. 
It began before formal SALT negotiations were inaugurated in 1969, and it has 
continued unabated during the period following the war in Vietnam when U.S. 
defense spending declined markedly. It has never ceased because the Soviets have 
thus far been unwilling to give up the advantages they perceive in acquiring new 
and ever more powerful weapons systems. 

Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union have too fre- 
quently served to condone and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s latest plans for military 
expansion. The agreements resulting from these talks have as often as not encour- 
aged both sides (and especially the Soviet Union) to enlarge their forces to the 
maximum size allowed and to attempt to exploit to the fullest whatever marginal 
advantages may be discerned in the accord. 

There is no reason to believe that SALT III will offer any more meaningful 
opportunities. The United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pro- 
nounced superiority in strategic weapons and commenced the SALT II talks with a 
lesser but still significant advantage. The likelihood is that SALT III will begin with 
the Soviets expecting strategic supremacy by the end of those negotiations. In such 
circumstances, the promise of any real arms reductions is illusory. 

Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III reduction in arms now, while 
the United States still retains the power to forestall this shift in the strategic 
balance. If there are to be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate 
for those cuts must be written into SALT II. 

Toward this end. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York has proposed an 
amendment to the Treaty that would add a new Paragraph 4 to Article XIX of the 
test: 

The Parties shall conclude, by December 31, 1981, an agreement which shall, 
as a result of the negotiations undertaken in accordance with the Joint State- 
ment of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limita- 
tion of Strategic Arms agreed upon at Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect signifi- 
cant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms, 
consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of essential strategic equiv- 
alence. This agreement shall enter into effect immediately upon the expiration 
of the present Treaty or sooner, as the Parties shall decide. If the Parties are 
unable to conclude such an agreement by December SI, 1981, the present Treaty 
shall terminate on that date. (Emphasis added.) 



'The agenda for future negotiations must also include (1) tighter limits on the testing and 
development of new weapons, (2) some kind of answer to the concern the MIRVed Soviet ICBM's 
will jeopardize the survivabihty of U.S. ICBM's, (3) mutual reductions in European theatre 
nuclear weapons systems, and (4) a plan for regular on-site inspection of atomic arms facilities. 



175 

This kind of approach deserves your support. Unlike some other proposals that 
have been made to force the pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment 
would not require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II Treaty. A 
less demanding alternative that could still improve the chances for a "deep cut" 
SALT III agreement of the kind we seek would be to amend the resolution of 
ratification to include a set of explicit guidelines for the next round of negotiations. 
This list of objectives would operate similarly to the amendment to SALT I which 
required that future weapons limitations impose equal aggregate ceilings on both 
countries. 

As Senator Moynihan noted in advancing his proposal: 

This much is certain: Our margin for error in SALT has disappeared. We 
must rescue the "process" from itself; otherwise, it will present us with ever 
more unappealing choices. We must recover for SALT the possibility of arms 
limitation and genuine arms reductions. This, so it seems to me, is the major 
contribution the Senate can make to preservation of the SALT process that the 
President, and others, seek. We must at least make the effort. 

This is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, worthy of the United States. The SALT II 
Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if modest, step in the long-range 
process of controlling nuclear armaments. But if the SALT process itself is to be 
preserved, the time has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of 
substantial arms reductions. We hope that your Committee will recommend the 
incorporation of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that the 
Senate give its advice and consent to the Treaty as so amended. 

DESCRIPTION OF THE RIPON SOCIETY 

Founded in 1962, the Ripon Society is a national Republican research and policy 
organization that takes its name from Ripon, Wisconsin, the birthplace of the GOP. 
It has chapters in cities across the country and members in all 50 States. The 
Society encourages young men and women to participate actively in public affairs. 
Ripon also works to formulate the kind of sound programs that will enable our 
Party to better fulfill its potential for constructive political leadership. We believe 
that we can assist the GOP in identifying and claiming the issues of the future; that 
we can help Republicans to raise the questions others will not ask and to grasp 
ideas whose times are yet to come. Above all, the Ripon Society seeks to serve as a 
spokesman for the progressive Republican tradition whose integrity and vision have 
inspired the GOP throughout its history. 

The Society maintains its national headquarters at 800 Eighteenth Street, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202-347-6477). 

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON PETER VINCENT BAUGHER 

Peter Vincent Baugher is an attorney at Schiff Hardin & Waite law firm in 
Chicago, Illinois. He was Law Clerk to Judge Philip W. Tone, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 1973-74. 

Born in Chicago in 1948, Baugher received his legal training at Yale Law School 
(J.D. 1973), and his undergraduate education at Princeton University (A.B. 1970), 
where he studied in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. 

Baugher is past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society 
and serves on the Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National 
Security and International Affairs. He is a member of the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, the American Council on Germany, the Economic Club of Chica- 
go, and a variety of other professional, civic, and community associations. 

Baugher serves on several boards of directors, including those of the Chicago 
Educational Television Association (WTTW/Chicago Public Television), WFMT, Inc. 
(which owns and operates WFMT-FM radio and Chicago Magazine), and the Prince- 
ton Club of Chicago. 

Baugher is married to the former Robin Stickney of Pacific Palisades, California. 
They live at 816 Monticello Place in Evanston, Illinois. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Baugher, for your statement. 
Our next and final member of the panel is Mr. Herbert Scoville, a 
member of the governing board of New Directions, of Washington, 
D.C. 



176 

STATEMENT OF HERBERT J. SCOVILLE, JR., MEMBER, 
GOVERNING BOARD, NEW DIRECTIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C.* 

Mr. ScoviLLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much 
this opportunity to appear before this committee and testify on the 
SALT II Treaty on behalf of New Directions. New Directions is a 
citizens' lobby for world security whose fuUtime president is former 
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. 

I, Herbert Scoville, cochair the New Directions Task Force on 
Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall. 

New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be 
ratified without amendment. We believe that SALT II improves the 
United States-Soviet strategic balance, takes important first steps 
in controlling the offensive strategic arms race, and will improve 
our knowledge of Soviet military programs, and thereby reduce the 
need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an 
uncertain and unlimited Soviet threat. 

We believe that a failure to ratify the treaty can only result in 
increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic 
balance, in accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnec- 
essary military expenditures. In such a world, the real security of 
the United States will be lower, and the Nation will be less able to 
deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it. 

Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty there has been a 
tendency to focus on what the treaty does not do and to pay little 
attention to its positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a 
distorted picture of the contribution that this treaty will make to 
our national security. We believe that it would be most useful to 
consider the treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half 
empty. 

In my written text, I have summarized some of the important 
benefits of SALT, but I believe the committee has heard these 
points from many sources already, and in the interest of saving 
time, I will not repeat them this morning, but I would like to 
address a couple of other points which have received less attention. 

While we strongly support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, 
we are increasingly concerned with a tendency during the debate 
to turn the SALT II Treaty into a Christmas tree loaded with 
presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We have already seen 
President Carter's decision only a week before he signed the SALT 
II Treaty in Vienna to proceed with a full-scale development of a 
new, large model M-X missile. 

We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability of the 
Minuteman ICBM, but it is not clear that the weapons procure- 
ment rather than the weapons limitation approach is the best way 
of solving this problem. In SALT I, the United States opted to 
continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles. Then the United 
States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had 
not yet carried out its first test of such a missile system. Now the 
United States is paying the price for its failure to deal with this 
problem through arms control. Quite predictably, the Soviets have 
followed along behind the United States, and will now in the 1980's 



See page 178 for Mr. Scoville's prepared statement. 



177 

have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRVed warheads at least to 
threaten our entire ICBM force. 

Now it appears that the United States may be repeating this 
failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possi- 
ble arms control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead of adopt- 
ing with the M-X the new weapons route, which in the long run 
may not work and would cost many tens of billions of dollars, we 
should be exploring every effort to seek an arms control solution to 
this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would 
foreclose such an option in the future. 

The most obvious approach is to establish much stricter mutual 
limitations on the total number of MIRV missiles and their war- 
heads. 

We have also seen explicit linkage of a 5-percent increase in the 
total military budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A 
decision to increase the military budget is of paramount national 
importance, not only because of its effect on our military posture, 
but also because of its effect on the economy of the country. 

Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less 
money for conventional forces. Dollars spent for the military 
means less money available for other pressing national needs. Dol- 
lars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures. 
Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed. All 
these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on 
what funds to spend on nonstrategic weapons should not be tied to 
support for SALT. 

Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet stra- 
tegic balance will be more favorable to the United States with the 
SALT Treaty than without, logic would say that there is less need 
for increased military spending if SALT were ratified than if it 
were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be an 
increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased 
budget if it were. 

Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mind- 
less connection. 

Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of SALT II 
Treaty ratification without voicing the view that the entire climate 
of the ratification debate in the United States is based on a funda- 
mental misconception that somehow our Nation has become or is 
rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to mili- 
tary coercion and blackmail. 

Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high 
levels projected for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union 
is gradually becoming dominant on the world scene and that the 
United States has been standing still militarily. They ignore three 
factors: one, U.S. strategic programs and strength, two, Soviet 
weaknesses, and three, the unlikelihood of translating nuclear ar- 
senals into political advantage. 

Let me comment briefly on these points. The United States has a 
secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's, ICBM's, and 
long-range bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a 
less secure force, of which 75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's 
which will become increasingly vulnerable in the 1980's. 



178 

Furthermore, contrary to the popular impression, the United 
States has not been standing still. We have been developing and 
deploying new strategic weapons in vast numbers in the last 10 
years. In the past decade, the United States has increased the 
number of its strategic force loadings, warheads and bombs by 
5,250, to nearly 10,000; the Soviets, by 3,590, to only slightly more 
than 5,000. 

The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way 
to prevent it from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the 
United States, but it, too, cannot prevent catastrophic devastation 
by the United States. Furthermore, it has major economic and 
political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires its 
leadership to import grain and technology from the west. Accord- 
ing to CIA estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth 
rate of the Soviet economy dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's. 

After six decades in power, the Soviet leadership has no big 
power ally. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive eastern 
European countries. Compare this situation with the close ties the 
United States has with its NATO partners and with Japan. 

Three, the Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear 
weapons for political advantage or even prevent a number of devel- 
opments that are inimical to Soviet power. This situation will 
continue into the future unless the United States talks itself into a 
position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the 
Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul from speaking to 
millions in Poland and were unable to require Romanian accept- 
ance of the military budget increased by the Warsaw Pact. 

In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or 
not to ratify the SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength 
and stop exaggerating its weaknesses. Poormouthing military capa- 
bilities can only create self-fulfilling prophecies. Statements that 
the United States would not retaliate even after a Soviet attack 
that killed tens of millions of Americans do more to undercut the 
deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles. 

Implying that the President would have no choice but to retali- 
ate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading, when our capa- 
bility and strategy have long been to attack military targets and 
the industries supporting the military. 

In conclusion. New Directions believes that security lies not in 
supporting a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all the steps to 
end it. The ratification of the SALT II Treaty is such a step. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Mr. Scoville's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Herbert J. Scoville, Jr. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate very much this opportuni- 
ty to appear before this Committee and testify on the SALT II Treaty in behalf of 
New Directions. New Directions is a citizens' lobby for world security whose full- 
time president is former Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. I co-chair the New 
Directions Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall. 

New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be ratified without 
amendment. We believe SALT II improves the United States-Soviet strategic bal- 
ance, takes important first steps in controlling the offensive strategic arms race, 
and will improve our knowledge of Soviet military programs and thereby reduce the 
need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an uncertain and 
unlimited Soviet threat. We believe that a failure to ratify the Treaty can only 
result in increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic balance, in 



179 

accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnecessary military expenditures. 
In such a world the real security of the United States will be lower and the nation 
will be less able to deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it. 

New Directions believes that a strong case can be made that with the Treaty our 
security will be significantly enhanced and the dangerous arms race provided with 
important brakes. Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty, there has been a 
tendency to focus on what the Treaty does not do and to pay little attention to its 
positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a distorted picture of the contribution 
that this treaty will make to our national security. We believe that it would be 
useful to consider the Treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half empty. 

It was never practical to expect that the SALT II Treaty would solve all our 
strategic policy problems nor lead directly to the end of the arms race. Negotiated 
arnis control agreements are only one means of ensuring that our security is 
maintained and of reducing the burden of continued weapons procurement. Nation- 
al decisions are equally important if we are to prevent new weapons from increasing 
the risks that we will be embroiled in a nuclear conflict which can only lead to 
catastrophic devastation of the United States and most of the world. 

It is, of course, impossible to list in this testimony all of the benefits which the 
SALT II agreements provide, but it might be useful to summarize some of the more 
important elements. 

1. The Treaty establishes ceilings on all t)^es of offensive strategic weapons, 
heavy bombers as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. These ceilings are low enough 
to require the Soviet Union to dismantle without replacement about 250 relatively 
modern operational strategic delivery systems; therefore it establishes the precedent 
of reducing weapons stockpiles rather than allowing continued buildups. Although 
this cutback is only 10 percent of the Soviet strategic force, the direction of the 
change is of prime importance. Furthermore, since this ceiling primarily affects the 
U.S.S.R. and only marginally affects the United States, it will improve the relative 
United States-Soviet strategic balance. Without this ceiling the Soviets could during 
the lifetime of the Treaty increase substantially their lead in numbers of strategic 
delivery vehicles. 

2. The Treaty for the first time places an upper limit on the total number of 
missile warheads that each side can have by setting ceilings on the number of 
MIRVed missiles and the number of warheads each type of missile can carry. While 
these limits are much higher than would have been desired, they will at least place 
an upper range on the number of warheads, make finite the maximum threat to 
U.S. land-based ICBM's and limit the potential advantage of the larger throw- 
weight of Soviet ICBM's. They will provide a fixed base for possible future negotia- 
tions to reduce the number of warheads on both sides to less threatening levels. 

3. The Treaty will prevent the Soviets from deploying their potentially mobile SS- 
16 ICBM, and the Protocol will ban the deployment of any mobile ICBM's by either 
nation until 1982. The failure to include this prohibition in the Treaty lasting until 
1985 is a result of the U.S. desire to keep the option open for the M-X mobile 
deployment, but in the long run this loophole may prove to the U.S. security 
disadvantage since deceptive mobile basing schemes, such as multiple launch point 
systems, may be of greater advantage to the Soviet Union than to the United States. 
Verification of future limits on ICBM's and warheads may prove very difficult, and 
this could lead to a future breakdown in the ability to control the size of Soviet 
strategic arsenals. 

4. The Treaty includes air-launched cruise missile carriers within the 1,320 MIRV 
delivery vehicle ceiling, and thus controls for the first time this new type of 
strategic weapon. Without such provisions the way would be open for an uncon- 
trolled race in this alternative to ballistic missiles. Long range ground- and sea- 
launched cruise missiles cannot be deployed for the duration of the Protocol, but 
their testing is permitted. This loophole could produce a difficult if not insoluble 
problem in controlling such weapons after 1982. Although this option was kept open 
in order to permit U.S. deployment of such weapons in the future, it could prove in 
the long run to work to our detriment by preventing the achievement of verifiable 
controls on this class of weapons. 

5. The Treaty limits each side to the testing and deployment of only one new type 
of ICBM. For many characteristics, modernization of existing types will now be 
strictly limited so that any allowed changes would have little military significance. 
For example, the launch-weight and throw-weight of current ICBM's cannot be 
changed by more than 5 percent; such a change would make little military differ- 
ence, particularly since the number of warheads a missile can carry cannot be 
increased. However, for other characteristics, such as accuracy, no verifiable limita- 
tions could be agreed upon. This loophole could not be closed, unfortunately, with- 
out relaxation of U.S. standards for verifying compliance. 



180 

6. The Treaty contains many provisions that will improve the information on 
Soviet strategic forces, without which major uncertainties could develop on the size 
and nature of the Soviet strategic threat. Without the bans on deliberate conceal- 
ment against national technical means of verification, the Soviets would be in a 
position to adopt many techniques for denying intelligence on strategic weapons 
developments to the United States. Without this intelligence the United States 
would be forced to rely on worst case estimates, which could only lead to excessive 
force buildups. 

While we strongly supj)ort the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, we are increas- 
ingly concerned with the tendency during the debate to turn the SALT II Treaty 
into a Christmas tree loaded with presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We 
have already seen President Carter's decision, only a week before he signed the 
SALT II Treaty in Vienna, to proceed with the full-scale development of the new 
large-model M-X missile. We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability 
of the Minuteman ICBM. But it is not clear that the weapons-procurement rather 
than the weapons-limitation approach is the best way of solving this problem. In 
SALT I the United States opted to continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles when 
the United States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had not yet 
carried out a first test of such a missile system. Now the United States is paying the 
price for its failure to deal with this problem through arms control; quite predict- 
ably, the Soviets have followed along behind the United States and will now some 
time in the 1980's have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRV warheads at least to 
threaten our entire ICBM force. Now it appears that the United States is repeating 
this failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possible arms 
control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead, it is adopting the new-weapons 
route, which in the long run may not work and would cost many tens of billions of 
dollars. 

Furthermore, the decision by President Carter in June to procure the largest of 
the candidate M-X missile models for full-scale development cannot be justified as a 
solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem. Because of its large size, the missile 
will be harder to make invulnerable than would smaller designs. In fact, the 
characteristics of the new missile can only increase the potential vulnerability of 
land-based ICBM's, since this M-X missile is designed to have a counter-silo capabil- 
ity against Soviet ICBM's. Such a program can only force the Soviets, who rely on 
fixed land-based ICBM's for 75 percent of their deterrent force, to take one or more 
of the following alternative actions: (1) They could in time of crisis launch a 
preemptive strike; (2) place all of their missiles on launch-on-warning, thus increas- 
ing the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict, or (3) adopt a mobile basing scheme, 
making it impossible for the United States to verify the number and type of missiles 
which the Soviets had deployed. Each of these hurt U.S. security. 

So far the Administration has not yet determined the exact basing scheme that it 
will use for the new M-X missile, but it appears likely that it will involve some sort 
of multiple-launch-point system. It is conceivable that a U.S. system could be de- 
signed in some Rube Goldberg way so that the Soviets could verify the number of 
U.S. ICBM's actually deployed. But the problem for the United States is not Soviet 
verification of U.S. compliance, but instead. United States verification of Soviet 
compliance. The Soviets may not find it so easy with their liquid-fueled missiles to 
adopt a mobile system, a ceiling on which would be verifiable by U.S. intelligence. 
Since they will feel threatened by the counter-silo capability of the United States 
M-X, tliey may be forced to adopt such an unverifiable basing scheme even if it 
were to lead to a breakdown of the entire SALT process. Yet, without SALT 
limitation on the number of Soviet warheads the effectiveness of the multiple- 
launch-point system for obtaining invulnerability for U.S. ICBM's is lost. There is 
no easy solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem, and the United States should 
not rush into \/eap>ons programs in order to solicit support for the SALT II Treaty 
when these programs could well lead to a collapse in the efforts to establish long- 
term controls on strategic nuclear weapons. 

Instead, the United States should be exploring every effort to seek an arms 
control solution to this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would 
foreclose such an option in the future. The most obvious approach is to establish 
much stricter mutual limitations on the total number of MIRVed missiles and their 
warhea<^. This should be the highest priority issue to be dealt with in the after- 
math of SAL"! II. To be successful in controlling the theoretical threat to land-based 
ICBM's, both negotiated agreements and difficult national decisions by the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. will be required in the near future. 

To date no other specific weapons programs have been directly tied to SALT 
ratification, but such linkages could implicitly or explicitly develop at any time. One 
can visualize attempts to get commitments for future deployment of ground- and 



181 

sea-launched strategic cruise missiles in exchange for SALT support. Decisions on 
these weapons are very complicated and intimately related to the military and 
political relationships with our NATO allies. They should not be taken hastily 
during the SALT debate. The reason that provisions relating to these weapons were 
placed in the Protocol, which expires in 1981, was to provide time to make these 
decisions. One should not, in the heat of the SALT debate, preclude such careful 
consideration. 

There may also be pressures to add a new manned bomber to the SALT Christmas 
tree. President Carter made the decision in 1977 against the B-1 and in favor of air- 
launched cruise missiles on purely military-effectiveness grounds, not on arms- 
control considerations. It would be a travesty if now a hasty decision were made to 
proceed with a new manned bomber as well as cruise missiles to generate support 
for an arms control agreement. 

We have already seen explicit linkage of a 5 percent increase in the total military 
budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A decision to increase the 
military budget is of paramount national importance not only because of its effect 
on our military posture but also of its effect on the economy of the country. 

Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less money for conven- 
tional forces. 

Dollars spent for the military means less money available for other pressing 
national needs. 

Dollars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures. 

Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed. 

All of these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on what 
funds to spend on non-strategic weapons should not be tied to support for SALT. 
Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet strategic balance will 
be more favorable to the United States with the SALT Treaty than without, logic 
would say that there is less need for increased military spending if SALT were 
ratified than it it were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be 
an increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased budget if it 
were. Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mindless connection. 

Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of the SALT II Treaty ratifica- 
tion without voicing the view that the entire climate of the ratification debate in 
the United States is based on a fundamental misconception — that somehow our 
nation has become or is rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to 
military coercion or blackmail. Yet Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said in his 
January 25, 1979 Annual Report: 

"National Security has always been comprised of a number of factors and has 
always required a number of strengths — non-military as well as military. The 
United States fortunately is by most measures the strongest nation in the world. No 
other country — certainly not the Soviet Union — can compete with us in economic 
power, political stability and cohesion, technological capability, national will, or 
appeal as to way of life and international policies." 

Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high levels projected 
for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union is gradually becoming dominant 
on the world scene and that the United States has been standing still militarily. 
They ignore three factors: (1) U.S. strategic programs and strengths; (2) Soviet 
weaknesses; and (3) the unlikelihood of translating nuclear arsenals into political 
advantage. 

Let me comment briefly on each of these points. 

1. The United States has a secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's, 
ICBM's, and long-range bombers; the Soviet Union has a less secure force of which 
75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's which will become increasingly vulnerable 
in the 1980's. In the past decade the United States has increased the number of its 
strategic force loadings (warheads and bombs) by 5,250 to nearly 10,000; the Soviets 
by 3,590 to only slightly more than 5,000. As Dr. Kissinger once said when he 
worked in the government, it is warheads, not delivery vehicles, that kill people and 
destroy targets. Moreover, during the same period the United States deployed 
hundreds of new Minuteman III ICBM's; upgraded its existing missiles by adding 
new guidance systems and more powerful warheads; hardened the Minuteman silos; 
deployed a thousand SRAM air-to-surface missiles; developed the highly accurate 
air-launched cruise missiles, which will virtually nullify the large, extremely costly 
Soviet Air Defense system; made major modifications in the B-52 bomber; deployed 
hundreds of Poseidon MIRVed SLBM's, and developed the quieter "Trident subma- 
rine and longer-range Trident I missile. The United States has not been standing 
still. The United States has and will continue to have a balanced, enormously 
destructive strategic deterrent, capable of retaliating after any Soviet attack and 
destro3ring thousands of Soviet military and industrial targets. 



182 

2. The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way to prevent it 
from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the United States. But it, too, 
cannot prevent catastrophic devastation by the United States. Furthermore, it has 
major economic and political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires 
its leadership to import grain and technology from the West. According to CIA 
estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth rate of the Soviet economy 
dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's. After six decades in power, the Soviet 
leadership has no big-power allies. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive East 
European countries. Compare this situation with the close U.S. ties to its NATO 
partners and to Japan. 

3. The Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear weapons for political 
advantage, or even to prevent a number of developments that were inimical to 
Soviet power. This situation will continue into the future unless the United States 
talks itself into a position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the 
Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul II from speaking to millions in 
Poland, unable to prevent Hua Kuo-feng from visiting Eastern Europe, unable to 
require Romanian acceptance of a military budget increase voted by the Warsaw 
Pact, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East, and unable to dissuade the 
Japanese from signing a peace treaty with China. In a world of two nuclear-armed 
superpowers, there is no known way for one of them to use weapons of mass 
destruction for limited political gains. 

In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or not to ratify the 
SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength and stop exaggerating its 
weaknesses. Poor-mouthing military capabilities can only create self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Statements that the United States would not retaliate, even after a 
Soviet attack that killed tens of millions of Americans, do more to undercut the 
deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles. Impljdng that the President would 
have no choice but to retaliate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading when 
our capability and strategy have long been to attack military targets and the 
industry supporting the military. 

The SALT II agreements must be understood as useful and important steps, not 
end points, toward improved security and toward controlling and reversing the 
dangerous nuclear arms race. To this end we urge prompt ratification of the Treaty 
without amendment. SALT II must not be asked to bear the burden of all the 
complex problems of foreign relations. Neither must the ratification process be used 
to adorn the SALT Christmas tree with all manner of new weapons programs, many 
of which in the long run could not only decrease security but also make future 
agreements to limit nuclear weapons more difficult, if not impossible. The United 
States should make decisions on future military programs on the basis of its true 
security needs in the light of the limitations that the SALT II Treaty provides, and 
not in the light of whether they will provide increased support for its ratification. 

New Directions believes that U.S. security between now and the expiration of the 
SALT II Treaty would be greatly enhanced by taking further steps to end the 
United States-Soviet competition in arms and to curb the spread of nuclear weapons 
to additional countries. Among the steps that should be vigorously pursued during 
this period are a Comprehensive Test Ban, an agreement banning anti-satellite 
weapons, a first-step accord on mutual reductions in conventional forces in Europe, 
and some partial agreements in SALT III that can be added as protocols to SALT II. 
New Directions is most interested in securing deep cuts in MIRVed missiles in order 
to allay fears of surprise attack. In addition, the first accords on medium-range 
nuclear weapons could be achieved during this time frame. 

Security lies not in pursuing a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all neces- 
sary steps to end it. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr. 
Scoville. I again want to thank the panel for its cooperation. 

CONTRIBUTION OF TRADE TO PRESERVATION OF PEACE 

I would like to go back first to Mr. Schmidt's testimony and its 
emphasis upon the importance of the growth of trade and the 
contribution that trade itself can make to stability in our relations 
with the Soviet Union and in the preservation of peace. I agree 
with that, and I think that the long period of time when we 
engaged in no trade with the Soviet Union because we disapproved 
of its society was typical of that tendency in our foreign policy, to 



183 

try and isolate countries that we dislike for one reason or another, 
even though such a policy is almost always self-defeating. 

I happen to think that our policy toward Cuba through the years 
has been self-defeating. We have minimized our influence in that 
country by refusing to trade with it for so many years having no 
representation there, and we can see the end result in the most 
recent developments in that country. 

It has been an unproductive, indeed, a counterproductive policy 
for the United States. I think we finally came to understand that 
the same was true for the Soviet Union, and fortunately we did 
commence some years ago to expand our trade with the Soviet 
Union. I think that has been a very important step. 

My question to you, Mr. Schmidt, is this. Don't you feel that one 
of the most important benefits that could flow from the Senate's 
ratification of the SALT treaty would be an improvement in the 
general climate that could lead to further expansion of trade and 
other peaceful contacts with the Soviet Union, and that this would 
be stabilizing and beneficial to the prospects for continued peace, 
that this indeed could help lay the basis for substantial reductions 
in these arms that we must never fire except in the act of commit- 
ting national suicide? 

Aren't these collateral benefits that could and should flow from 
the Senate's ratification of the treaty? 

Mr. Schmidt. Yes, sir. I believe you have very accurately stated 
those extra benefits that we would receive were the Senate to 
ratify the SALT II Treaty. The Soviets are great immitators of the 
United States. You see them imitate the United States in a mili- 
tary environment. You see them imitate the United States in our 
industrialization process, and if we were to ratify SALT II and 
stabilize our trade with them, I think you would see a greater 
emphasis on their part to imitate the United States in our mutual- 
ly beneficial trade relationships. They believe that the United 
States is large areas of production, and industrialization, and 
maybe we should be given credit for that. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Schmidt. I personally concur in 
your position. 

Mr. Carey, as a long-time member of the American Legion I 
want to say, first of all, that the Legion's position favoring limita- 
tion of nuclear arms has always in my judgment been a very 
enlightened position; for a veterans' organization, I think it has 
been a courageous position. 

Your statement today raising, as it does, certain recommenda- 
tions for reservations, understandings, and modifications in this 
treaty, is one that this committee will carefully weigh. I would like 
to call your attention to certain reservations and understandings 
that have been proposed by Senator Javits and myself and receive 
your response and what you think the response of the Legion 
would be to those proposals. 

Since I cannot find them at the moment, let me briefly describe 
them to you. We will supply you with a text of these proposals. 

RESERVATION ON BACKFIRE STATUS IN TREATY 

The first is a reservation. You mentioned in your testimony your 
concern about the Backfire bomber because it does have a capabili- 



184 

ty, even though it may be primarily designed as a theater weapon, 
in extremis to reach the United States with a refueUng in flight. In 
your testimony you have dealt with the commitments that Mr. 
Brezhnev made to President Carter in the unsigned statement, 
offering the suggestion that we require the statement be signed by 
Brezhnev. 

Our reservation seeks to accomplish the same thing by making 
the consent of the Senate conditional upon the reservation that the 
commitments contained in the Soviet written statement, that is the 
unsigned statement, and in his oral assurance that the production 
of these bombers would not exceed 30 per year are essential, in the 
words of the reservation, to the obligations assumed under the 
treaty. These commitments are legally binding on the Soviet 
Union, and their violation would give the United States the right 
to withdraw from the treaty. 

In other words, the reservation would in effect incorporate by 
reference these gissurances, elevate them to the status of the treaty, 
and provide that the violation of those commitments would be the 
same as the violation of any provision of the treaty, and thus 
grounds for withdrawal. 

I take it the Legion would support such a reservation. 

Mr. Carey. Yes, sir. I believe from the discussions we had from 
our special committee's hours and days spent on this, it would be 
acceptable to the organization. 

RESERVATION ON COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREED 

STATEMENTS 

The Chairman. A second recommendation you made had to do 
with the common understandings and the agreed statements. 
Again, we have proposed a reservation to the effect that the agreed 
statements and common understandings regarding the treaty and 
the protocol transmitted by the President on June 22, 1979, with 
the treaty are of the same force and effect as are the provisions of 
the treaty itself. 

The intent here is to make the Senate's consent conditional upon 
an acceptance by both parties that the agreed statements and 
common understandings are to be treated as though they were part 
of the text of the treaty itself. 

I take it that the Legion would also endorse that position. 

Mr. Carey. Well, we definitely would like to see it a part of the 
treaty. If you are saying that, Senator, I think we will have that. 

The Chairman. This will have the same effect, because the con- 
sent would be made conditional upon both parties treating these 
agreed statements and common understandings as though they 
were part of the treaty itself. 

Mr. Carey. If I could say one thing, referring to the Backfire 
bomber. Senator, it has bothered us very greatly. It bothers us as to 
why — why do they have to say that they are going to continue to 
build 30 Backfire bombers a year? Why do they need them if we 
are supposed to have this peace and live with this peace? That is 
the thing that h£is bothered us. We are recognizing that they can 
go ahead and continue to build 30 Backfire bombers a year. 

Again, in part of my statement that I was not able to make, and 
in part of the statement which is on file, I know we want to limit 



185 

spending and we want to limit the whole situation, but if we are 
recognizing and allowing them even to consider building that type 
of thing, and we recognize that in this treaty of 30 per year, we 
have to have a defense to go against that in this country, we had 
better have something that can counteract it as far as that is 
concerned. 

That bothers us. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carey. I see that my time is up. 
I want to come back to a second round in order to address a couple 
of questions to the other members of the panel, but under the 10- 
minute rule I will turn now to Senator Percy. 

Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Carey, along with Senator Church, I have been a member of 
the American Legion for a long time. I think my membership is in 
its 34th year. I was very impressed with the statement you made 
from the standpoint of the fundamental principles of the Legion, 
and I applaud your long-term support for strategic arms limita- 
tions. 

FULLY VERIFIABLE IN AREAS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY 

I would like to ask for clarification on your position on verifica- 
tion. The more we have looked into verifications, the more I have 
come to the conclusion that it would be unrealistic to look for 100- 
percent verifiability, but that if the treaty is sufficiently verifiable 
so that we can have enough advanced notice to void the treaty or 
withdraw from it and take action, that would be acceptable. 

Would you accept the statement that it should be verifiable in 
areas that affect the national security interests of the United 
States and its allies? Is that the crux of what you are after? 

Mr. Carey. That is, sir. As I said in the statement, this concerns 
a lot of classified intelligence gathering information. Therefore, we 
have to depend upon those people who have that information. 
What you are saying is the fact that the statement would be for 
those people who have that information and not available to the 
general public have to be fully satisfied and concerned with this, 
and that we would accept that. 

AFFECT OF CUBAN SITUATION ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS 

Senator Percy. The support the American Legion has given to 
the treaty understandings some of us have proposed, including our 
chairman and ranking member. Senator Javits, has been very help- 
ful indeed, and we are appreciative. In your opening comments, 
you spoke about the Cuban troop situation. What was your recom- 
mendation with respect to carrying on these negotiations with the 
Soviets regarding the troops in Cuba? 

Mr. Carey. We talked about the particular fact. Senator, that we 
feel this is a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and second, we 
believe that the presence of that brigade constitutes a military base 
which was prohibited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets in 
Cuba. 

Our recommendation was that we urged the committee to post- 
pone any further action, not hearings, but any further action on 
the strategic arms limitation agreement currently pending until 



186 

such time as all Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from 
the island of Cuba. 

Senator Percy. In other words, you feel we should continue with 
the process of ratification, but not take final action until such time 
as this is clarified? 

Mr. Carey. That is right, until some understanding comes out of 
that particular situation. 

Senator Percy. I think you and I then both disagree with the 
State Department as to whether or not this violates the Monroe 
Doctrine. I happen to think it does. Department officials feel that 
only the spirit of the doctrine is violated, but I am with you in that 
I think it really does violate the doctrine. The Soviets in their 
sophisticated knowledge of our system must really understand that 
this is a fundamental thing that we cannot permit. 

Mr. Carey. There are a lot of spirits floating around this coun- 
try, Senator, and a lot of types of spirits that we can talk about, 
too. [General laughter.] 

Senator Percy. I would welcome warmly Mr. Peter Baugher, a 
valued constituent. I commend him for the contributions he has 
made through the years. 

USE OF nuclear WEAPONS TO DEFEND EUROPE 

Mr. Baugher, you made a very good point when you argued that 
national strength is more than just military strength, that really it 
is the whole composite. You mentioned the word "will." It is the 
will that is important. Do you have any doubt that if there were an 
invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact countries and our 
conventional weaponry appeared inadequate to defend our allies, 
we would use strategic nuclear weapons? Should the Soviet Union 
be on notice that we would have the national will to use them on 
those without hesitation in the case of that kind of provocation? 

Mr. Baugher. My own view is that we do have the national will 
to protect the security of Europe with the defense umbrella of the 
United States, and this would include the use of nuclear weapons. 
The more difficult question is whether our NATO allies and the 
Soviet Union are persuaded of that point. The decline in recent 
years of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, not 
only in Europe but in the rest of the world as well, has made some 
people doubt that we would ever use our nuclear weapons. But I 
think that if we go forward with a sensible plan to strengthen both 
our conventional and our strategic armaments, we will be able to 
quiet those doubts. 

Senator Percy. I agree with Mr. Carey about the horrible nature 
of nuclear war and our abhorrence of it, but we have placed these 
weapons there as a deterrent and they do not act as a deterrent, 
we have to have the will to use them. There should be no ambigu- 
ity or misunderstanding about that. 

When the Ripon Society, not known for its right-wing positions 
through the years, can state through it representative that we have 
the will to use those weapons if it becomes necessary, then there 
cannot be any ambiguity about it or any misunderstanding. I think 
we all stand together on that — the Congress and the executive 
branch. You also mentioned that our national strength reflects. 



187 

among other factors our economic strength. Here we face a 
dilemma. 

As you well know, I am totally committed to balancing this 
budget. I am spending a tremendous amount of time and effort to 
accomplish that. I think the strength of the dollar and the strength 
of our whole economic situation is factor which is very important 
and something that the Soviet Union fully respects. It is our eco- 
nomic strength that would give us the ability to sustain an arms 
race if that is what the Soviets want to continue to engage in. 

BALANCING THE BUDGET AND FUTURE MIUTARY EXPENDITURES 

What do we do if we get to the point where the increase in 
military spending is such that we cannot balance the budget? I 
think we will have to cut some social spending but we still may not 
be able to balance the budget with large defense increases. What 
do we do then? After all, we are committed as a nation to try to 
balance our budget beginning October 1 of next year. 

Mr. Baugher. That is correct. Senator. I think the commitment 
to balance the budget is very important. In fact, it is essential to 
our national security to try to get America's economic house in 
order. If I were to list present threats to the United States, the 
possible defeat of the SALT Treaty or the nuclear arms race gener- 
ally, would not be the first items on my list. The first item on my 
list would be the serious economic straits in which we now find 
ourselves. The combination of inflation and recession is a problem 
that we are going to have to cope with if we want to remain strong 
in the world. 

Now, as to how one makes the tradeoffs between boosting de- 
fense spending and maintaining a ceiling on the overall budget, 
this is something that I think has to be done on a program by 
program basis. That is why we are critical of those who say, let's 
just increase the defense budget by 5 or more percent. That is the 
wrong way of going about the process. What we have to do is to 
decide: Do we want to be spending our discretionary tax dollars on 
the M-X missile system in 1979, or should we be spending that 
money on social programs? Should we be devoting our limited 
resources to new weaponry, whether strategic or conventional, or 
should we be reducing the burden of taxation on our citizens? 

Senator Percy. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

AFFECT OF TRADE ON U.S. STRENGTH 

Mr. Schmidt, I have a quick question for you. You have linked 
the passage of SALT to continued U.S. trade with the Soviets. 
There are those who would say there should be no trading with the 
Soviets. Anything we trade to them somehow adds to their strength 
and ability to be an adversary. 

I have faith in trade. The Yankee trader certainly might not 
always be getting the best of the deal, but we certainly should not 
get the worst of the deal time after time. 

Do you have confidence that trade can be carried on in such a 
way that it does not weaken the United States but in fact actually 
strengthens us economically? 



48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 - 13 



188 

Mr. Schmidt. I would certainly agree with the statement that 
trade with them does strengthen us economically, but it also 
strengthens them economically. As many people argue trade also 
strengthens them militarily. I always have been of the opinion that 
we can wipe the floor with the Soviets militarily, economically, and 
politically any time we decide we are going to exercise our will to 
do so. 

The Soviet Union cannot and will not get the best of us economi- 
cally. You only need to observe that system for a little while to 
observe that there is so much inefficiency in it, so much bureaucra- 
cy that they cannot possibly compete with us, so it just makes 
sense to me that we ought to strengthen our position more and 
more with trade. 

One of the things you do in business, and I am sure you may 
know better than many without business experience, is the follow- 
ing. When there is a competitive situation in business, the first 
thing one does is to get close to your adversary. You want to know 
exactly what he is going to do next. You want to know as much 
about him as possible. You want to know about his people. You 
want to know about his sales force. You have to get next to him 
before you can adequately determine what his strengths and v/eak- 
nesses are. 

Senator Percy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman, Thank you. Senator Percy. 

Senator Stone is next. 

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

AMERICAN legion's POSITION TOWARD SOVIET TROOP SITUATION 

Commander Carey, does the American Legion take a position on 
what it feels would be acceptable in this Soviet troop situation? 
Specifically, would the American Legion consider that it would be 
acceptable if the Soviets left their forces there, but assured the 
United States that they would not be used in an offensive mode, or 
would it be acceptable to the Legion if most but not all of the 
combat union were withdrawn so that a combat union presence 
much reduced would be left there or anything short of total remov- 
al of the combat union? 

Mr. Carey. Sir, what we take and what we look at are the people 
we have dealt with for years. I realize we need all the trade and 
everything else that we need. We also take what I looked at in my 
year of travel all over the world, the pincers movement that I see 
and the involvement that I see in Africa, the Middle East, the Far 
East, and so on where the Soviets' hands are in. You want to take 
a look at the isolationism, what is happening to the United States 
as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. 

Our feelings at the present time, are that we feel that that whole 
group must be removed just like they did in 1962 when they took 
the missiles and the missile launchers that they were bringing m, 
they put them back on the ships, and took them out of there. They 
have no reason to be there, and we are still of the stand that they 
should all come out of there before we continue to actually make a 
final decision on SALT IL 

Senator Stone. So the Legion's position is, it is appropriate to 
continue these hearings, to continue our work, but not to take any 



189 

definitive action on this treaty pending the total removal of the 
total combat unit. Is that right? 

Mr. Carey. That is right, sir. 

Let me make a statement to you that gets us possibly off the 
hook. I have made it all year long on public television and in other 
fora. We are a group of war veterans who have seen action. We 
take care of those who are in the hospital and the families of those 
who are killed. We never want to see war again, but we believe, as 
history shows us, that peace through preparedness keeps the wolf 
away from the door. 

I think unless this country comes forth and sets forth, such as 
the example in Cuba right now, and shows that we are the No. 1 
free nation of the world, and we want the rest to look to us, that 
we have to take this type of stand. We don't want to see another 
war. We have seen war. But we also feel that there has to be peace 
through preparedness, and through particularly not allowing their 
actions to infringe on us. They are coming closer and closer to our 
shores, and we do not feel they should be there. 

Senator Stone. Thank you. Commander Carey. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Stone. 

Senator Glenn, do you have any questions of this panel? 

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

CAPABIUTIES OF SS-18 

Gentlemen, I regret that I was not able to be here earlier. 

Commander Carey, I was going through your statement, and I 
have only one comment at this time, and it is your particular 
concern about the SS-18 and its capabilities. I share your concerns 
about that. My main concerns have been expressed in the possibil- 
ity that they could do additional testing, have additional warheads 
on that booster, and that they could theoretically come up with 
some 6,000 to 8,000 additional warheads at least. 

I know the intelligence community is doing its very best to try to 
recoup the monitoring capability that we at one time had on the 
SS-18 out of Iran, but which still, at least as of today, is probably 
not a replacement for that monitoring capability that we want 
American security to rely on in the future. 

I just wanted to make that comment. It is not in the form of a 
question, really. It would give them the potential for a breakout 
capability later on resulting in a huge preponderance of available 
weaponry opposed to the balance that we are trying to set, moni- 
tor, maintain, and verify in the whole SALT II process. I was glad 
to see that brought out in your statement. I think it is a very key 
part of this whole thing. 

We have to be able to monitor, as I see it, or we don't know what 
is happening with the launch-weights, the throw-weights, and the 
additional warheads that you talk about in your statement, which I 
think we absolutely must be able to monitor. We want to have this 
so that we can get on with SALT III, IV, V, and VI. We want to 
scale down the nuclear weaponry arsenals throughout the world, 
but it seems to me that we will only do that if we get enough 
confidence in the Soviets living up to their agreements to warrant 
going on with this. 



190 

Certainly, the Cuban situation ties into this. If we are building 
confidence in each other or trying to, it sure isn't done by moving 
troops into Cuba. No one is concerned that 2,000 or 3,000 troops 
will attack Washington, D.C., Key West, or New Orleans, or any- 
where else over here, but when we see the pattern of worldwide 
expansionism going on, whether it be in Afghanistan, the Persian 
Gulf, in Yemen or in Africa, where there are Cuban surrogates, we 
see a big pattern. We see Cuba involved throughout the Third 
World. We see MIG-23's coming into Cuba. 

Well, I don't think that the MIG-23 is a big offensive nuclear 
delivery system, but it is one more bit of a pattern where we are 
being bit and piecemealed to death. We cannot ignore it and say it 
has no relationship to SALT II. Of course, no one wants to start 
World War III over this, but I share your concern about the 
break-out capability and the SS-18 monitoring and various other 
points. I just wanted to make that comment. I would, of course, 
welcome any comment you wish to make at this time. 

Mr. Carey. Thank you, sir. I prefer to leave your statement as it 
stands. We do think there should be a new counting system which 
is basically what I believe you suggest. 

Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, I would make one other com- 
ment. When it was stated that the negotiations perhaps should 
have included some other things in SALT II, I basically agree with 
that, but perhaps when SALT II was started so many years ago, I 
do not believe anyone could have foreseen at that time the extent 
to which MIRVing would take place, and the numbers of additional 
warheads that we could put on these boosters. 

With the throw-weight that they have on the SS-18, they could 
theoretically deliver between 25 and 40 warheads. Although they 
are limited to 10 now, we have already monitored them testing 
beyond the 10 they are allowed by simulating a couple of additional 

RV's. 

It seems to me therefore they have already indicated what their 
intention is if they can get away with it. That is the reason why I 
put so much emphasis on our monitoring capability. I am willing to 
sign a treaty with the Russians. I am willing to approve a treaty 
and see it ratified, but only if we have high confidence in our 
intelligence system, so that we will know what they are doing, 
know whether they are living up to the treaty, just as they already 
know through the open literature and easy monitoring of us that 
we will live up to it. 

It is on that basis that we will go on to SALT III, SALT IV, and 
SALT V. If we don't do it on that basis, it seems to me we are just 
playing russian roulette, and I don't mean to make a horrible pun. 
We are playing russian roulette with American security for the 
future, and I don't want to see us do that. I still think the Senate's 
action should hinge in large measure on the monitoring which you 
stress, particularly regarding the SS-18 and the other missiles 
which they have tested from their southern site, the site we used to 
monitor from Iran. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Gentlemen, time seems to be slipping away, so I 
would thank you all for your help today. 



191 

Senator Percy. May I have one additional minute, please? 
The Chairman. Of course, Senator Percy. 

NEW DIRECTIONS SUPPORT FOR SENATE UNDERSTANDINGS 

Senator Percy. Mr. Scoville, you say you support this treaty and 
hope the Senate will not amend it in any way. Does New Direc- 
tions support the understandings that the chairman has read? 

Mr. Scoville. Yes, it does. 

Senator Percy. Fine. Thank you. 

TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE 

I would appreciate a one-word answer from each of the panel on 
this question. Do you think it would help public understanding if 
we were technically able to work it out so that we had television 
and radio coverage of the debate on the Senate floor, that is, the 
SALT debate? 

Mr. Scoville. Yes. 

Mr. Carey. Yes. 

Mr. Schmidt. Yes. 

Mr. Baugher. Yes. 

Senator Percy. Thank you very much. I appreciate all four ac- 
ceptances on that. 

The Chairman. Senator Percy, you have unanimous support, it 
appears. That is an enviable political position. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. I want to acknowledge the 
presence here of Carl Marcy, who is now the executive secretary 
for the American Committee on East-West Accord, and for many 
years has served this committee with ability and distinction as the 
staff director of the committee. 

Carl, it is nice to see you back again. We appreciate very much 
your continued activities in a good cause. 

Gentlemen, we thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.] 

The Chairman. Our next witness is Mr. Lane Kirkland, Secre- 
tary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor- 
Congress of Industrial Organizations]. Mr. Kirkland, the committee 
is very happy to welcome you today. We look forward to your 
testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LANE KIRKLAND, SECRETARY-TREASURER, 
AFL-CIO, WASHINGTON, D.C.> 

Mr. Kirkland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My name is Lane Kirkland. I am Secretary-Treasurer of the 
AFL-CIO. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity 
to appear before the committee to advance the views of the AFL- 
CIO on the SALT II Treaty which now awaits the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The AFL-CIO has consistently supported a 
strong national defense, not as a source of jobs, but as insurance of 
our freedoms in a very dangerous world of continued social and 
economic progress, and of the democratic values that we prize, 
including free trade unions. 



' See page 193 for the prepared statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council. 



192 

We do not subscribe to the notion of inherent conflict between 
the equally vital imperatives of necessary defense expenditures and 
domestic programs and progress. The Constitution defines the duty 
of government as to provide for the common defense and to pro- 
mote the general welfare. It does not say to provide for the 
common defense or to promote the general welfare. It is scarcely 
prudent to finance one's household improvements by neglecting to 
pay one's fire and insurance premiums. 

Such a folly holds the prospect that all may well be lost. Defense 
goals must, of course, be gaged and judged as relative to the threat 
that one perceives. We perceive the threat presented by the rate of 
expansion and improvement of Soviet strategic nuclear arms as 
real and as growing and as not seriously deterred by this treaty or 
by public need or opinion in that country, or by any benign inten- 
tions on the part of the leaders of that power, present or future. 

We believe that the security of our Nation and its allies, which is 
the real issue here, can be enhanced by either or both of two 
methods, stronger defenses or genuine significant and mutual arms 
reduction agreements with our potential adversaries. We certainly 
prefer the latter course, but we cannot assume it, and SALT II by 
its terms does not assure us that it is yet more than a hope. 

We do, however, support the proposition that that hope should be 
kept alive long enough, at least, to test it once more, rather than to 
abandon it now by rejecting the treaty. But that test should be an 
urgent, real, and searching one, and we should be fully prepared to 
live with the conclusion revealed by its success or failure. Nor 
should we meanwhile permit that process to anchor us further 
behind the defense posture that we ought to be in if the result is 
failure. 

We would welcome a treaty that would require and warrant 
drastic dismantling on our part as well as that of the U.S.S.R., and 
we would not mourn or grieve over or regard as wasted money the 
expenditures negated by that happy event. 

Limits to be obtained by dismantling only across the board ought 
in fact to be the goal rather than, as in the present treaty, limits 
well above levels currently in place in critical categories of weapon- 
ry, establishing virtual goals and time tables for the further escala- 
tion of an already staggering array of instruments of doom. 

We must in the meanwhile do what is necessary to pursue parity 
as well as security from the threat that will emerge under the 
terms of the treaty before you rather than engage, through unilat- 
eral restraint or attrition by neglect, in premature, preemptive 
compliance with a treaty that does not yet exist, and may never 
come to pass. 

We are conscious that despite the administration's assurances of 
prudent intent, there are many voices in and outside the Congress 
that will ardently press for the consent of the Senate to SALT II 
but that will, after the fact, just as ardently oppose the measures 
necessary to maintain parity and security under the terms of the 
treaty. 

Such a posture, it seems to me, is far more dangerous to peace 
and stability and destructive of the arms control process, if it 
should prevail, than is any criticism of the treaty itself. That is 
why we have conditioned our support of SALT II on a strong 



193 

expression in the instrument of advice and consent of the principle 
that parity requires that we continue to modernize and develop our 
forces and a further strong expression of a proposition that says, in 
effect, that we shall not continue to pursue the beguiling phantom 
of a process that produces nothing of consequence but dangerous 
illusions. Those are the broad considerations that underly the 
statement of policy on SALT II recently adopted by the AFL-CIO 
executive council which has been previously provided to the Com- 
mittee and which is our essential statement. 

I ask at this point that the council's statement be made part of 
the record, and I am ready to respond to any questions you may 
have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Kirkland, your statement will appear at this 
point as part of the record. 

[The AFL-CIO executive council's statement of policy on SALT II 
follows:] 

Prepared Statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council 

The Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations, begun ten years ago, have so far 
failed either to curb the nuclear arms race or to stabilize the strategic balance of 
power. Whatever restraint we have been has been in the form of unilateral U.S. 
decisions to cancel or delay new weapons systems, while the Soviet Union has 
engaged in the most massive military buildup in peacetime history. The facts are no 
longer contested. 

Whether SALT II, by contrast, will serve as a significant step toward arms control 
depends on what the U.S. government does within its terms. Inaction on the part of 
the United States while the Soviets build up to the high limits allowed in the treaty, 
would lead the U.S. into a position of gross inequality, from which this nation could 
offer the Soviets no effective inducements to accept real arms reductions. The arms 
race would continue. 

The AFL-CIO will support SALT II if the following steps are taken both to 
remedy the emerging strategic imbalance and to move toward genuine strategic 
arms control: 

(1) In its resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of SALT II, the 
Senate should stipulate that under the terms of the treaty, parity requires the 
modernization and development of U.S. strategic forces — including, and most par- 
ticularly, the MX missile based in such a mode as to survive a first strike by Soviet 
missiles. 

Without the MX, the U.S. will be restricted to 3 warheads on its Minutemen 
ICBMs' compared with 10, 6, and 4 on the Soviet's SS-18, SS-19, and SS-17. The 
only way to protect U.S. ICBM's from a Soviet first-strike would then be to rely on 
the most dangerous of all strategies: The launch-on-warning of hair-trigger missiles 
that virtually fire themselves. If instead the U.S. is to maintain multiple presiden- 
tial options in a crisis, this country must proceed to develop the MX in a survivable 
basing mode so as to remove the temptation of a first strike. 

(2) The way to reduce strategic arms expenditures is not to stand pat on inferior 
or vulnerable systems but to proceed forthwith to real and dramatic mutual arms 
reductions. 

The Senate, therefore, should further stipulate in its instrument of advice and 
consent more stringent and specific directives to U.S. negotiators than the vague 
and general language now contained in the Statement of Principles for SALT III, so 
as to assure that SALT III negotiations will constitute a genuine, early and search- 
ing test of whether or not the SALT process will, in fact, lead to significant and 
continuing reductions in strategic arms. A time limit for a final response and 
evaluation, such as the termination date of the protocol (December 1981), should be 
set forth so as to assure urgency and to avoid the endless protraction of negotiations 
while the build-up continues beyond the point of no return. 

The stipulation should also call for limits not only on launchers but on warheads- 
which are the real instruments of destruction and which SALT II permits to 
increase dramatically in numbers and accuracy. 

The Senate should stipulate that U.S. negotiators in SALT III insist on limits 
which would require the dismantling of warheads to a level of parity significantly 



194 

(at least 30 percent) below the existing level of the higher party in each leg of the 
triad (air, sea and land-based strategic nuclear forces). Once these limits are set, the 
basis will then exist for further annual across-the-board percentage reductions. 

The general, unchecked growth of warheads, combined with the acquisition of 
counterforce capability, exposes the inadequacy of Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD) as a deterrence theory. To compel an American President, in the wake of a 
SoAdet first strike, to choose between negotiating terms of surrender or launching an 
annihilative retaliatory attack on Soviet civilians is both morally unacceptable and 
lacking in the chief prerequisite of deterrence: credibility. The U.S. must move from 
MAD to Mutual Assured Non-destruction (MAN). That is, these negotiations must 
seek to create conditions which make it impossible for either side to destroy the 
other as a viable society through a nuclear attack, or to believe that it can. 

Only then can we begin to look forward with optimism to the ultimate goal of 
total nuclear disarmament. 

The Chairman. I commend you upon the clarity and precision 
with which you summarized the statement of the AFL-CIO in an 
extemporaneous way. I see that you are speaking from notes. I 
always appreciate that, because it contributes to the brevity of the 
presentation, and thus enables us to move ahead with questions. 

Senator Percy has told me that he has a time problem. Senator 
Javits has graciously agreed to permit Senator Percy to open the 
questioning. 

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much indeed. 
Senator Javits, thank you. I very much appreciate this. 

AFL-CIO COSPONSORSHIP OF NEGATIVE FILM ON SALT 

Mr. Kirkland, I think the position taken by the AFL-CIO is a 
very, responsible position, and a very powerful voice has spoken 
out on this matter. I have no doubt that the direction in which you 
have indicated this Nation should go is probably the direction in 
which it will go. 

There was a film produced within the past year, I believe, by the 
American Security Council. It was stated that the film was pro- 
duced in cooperation with the AFL-CIO. It was a very negative 
film on the whole United States-Soviet military balance and it had 
implications for SALT process. Could you clarify whether the AFL- 
CIO did sponsor that film, or was that a misimpression? 

Mr. Kirkland. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

TELEVISED COVERAGE OF FLOOR DEBATE 

Senator Percy. Not to your knowledge. Could you tell us what 
your reaction might be to having the Senate floor debate opened to 
radio and television to permit a better understanding of this whole 
process by the American people? Do you think it is essential and 
important that the American people follow more closely this debate 
and argument and have a better understanding of what the signifi- 
cance of this treaty is? 

Mr. Kirkland. I think it would be useful, sir. 

UNKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA 

Senator Percy. Do you believe the presence of Soviet combat 
troops in Cuba should be linked in any way with the SALT debate, 
and if so, in what way? What position would you as an individual 
or would the AFL-CIO take in this matter? 



195 

Mr. KiRKLAND. Well, sir, that was not, of course, before the 
council at the time we considered SALT II, so the council did not 
act with the benefit of the information that is now generally avail- 
able. I can, therefore, only speak for myself. I think it is an 
exceedingly serious matter that we should press as an issue with or 
without SALT. I find it rather difficult to see how the issue of 
SALT alone will necessarily resolve it. 

I think the important thing is to resolve the question. To put it 
in another way, I think it ought to be looked at in terms of its 
proper context. In the broad range and scale of Soviet adventures 
that have been taking place in recent years this is simply another 
episode. It calls into question two elements that I think are very 
important in our consideration of arms control negotiations with 
the Soviets. Those are the questions of intentions, and the question 
of our prudence in relying on their observation of any agreements 
that we make. But there are abundant reasons in recent history to 
have those questions in our minds before this. I suspect that the 
existence of those questions has far more to do with what misgiv- 
ings there may be in the public mind about arms control negotia- 
tions than anything else, than any appraisal of the particular 
balance of forces in the treaty, the general suspicion and lack of 
confidence in the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner, but I still 
believe that should be tested and explored to its limits because of 
the importance of the issues. 

With respect to the Soviet troops in Cuba, I personally have 
always regarded Cuba, since the advent of Mr. Castro, as a Soviet 
colony. I think so far as it relates to the Monroe Doctrine, the 
colonization of the Caribbean and that part of the Caribbean by the 
Soviet Empire is for all practical purposes as much a matter of 
concern as anything that has followed. I regard all troops in Cuba 
as soldiers of the Soviet Empire, whether they are Cuban or Rus- 
sian. I am somewhat more concerned with the presence of Soviet 
troops in Cuba as it is related to the broader question, about the 
soldiers of the Soviet Empire who happen to be Cuban, who are 
operating widely in Africa, in an active mode, than I am with 2,000 
or 3,000 Soviet troops under the same general command and serv- 
ing the same general purpose in Cuba in thus far a passive mode. 

AFFECT OF SALT DEFEAT ON NATO ALUANCE 

Senator Percy. Thank you very much. My last question is this. 
Let's assume that the conditions the council has laid down are met 
by the Congress and the President, and yet either crippling amend- 
ments are adopted by the Senate such that it is impossible for the 
Soviet Union to accept the treaty modified in that way or it is just 
flatly turned down by the Senate. 

How do you feel a defeat of SALT II under such conditions would 
affect our relationships throughout the world with our NATO 
allies? What do you think would be the reaction of the American 
people? 

Mr. KiRKLAND. Well, sir, with respect to the question of amend- 
ments which would require the renegotiation of SALT II or which 
look to the prospect that the Soviet Union will return to the 
negotiating table and deal with those issues that we raised through 
amendments, I have thought about that very carefully. I have 



196 

reached the conclusion that I would prefer to see us press forward 
with a genuine and real test for SALT III to see whether it is 
productive and mate that the acid test of our future view of the 
strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. 

If we seek a return to the table on certain elements of SALT II 
through amendments looking to renegotiation, I am somewhat ap- 
prehensive that it might delay us and hold out some false hopes. It 
would delay us from taking the prudent steps in terms of our own 
forces that we need to do in the hope that we might accomplish 
something through those renegotiations. It would also delay what I 
would like to see as an early and severe and searching test of 
whether we can achieve really genuine and severe drastic arms 
reductions as early as possible. That is why you will note in the 
statement of the council that the negotiations should be time 
urgent and there should be a deadline for us to evaluate their 
response, which would be coterminous with the expiration of the 
protocol. I think we ought to be prepared to make that judgment. 
There is some reason to say, I suppose, in SALT II that it was a 
follow-on of Vladivostok and should have run its course in those 
terms, and that these matters such as a search for more severe 
cuts ought to be scheduled for the SALT III talks. 

But let's get on with that, and get on with it quickly, and make a 
judgment fast before we get led further down this path. 

Senator Percy. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Kirkland. We 
appreciate your appearance. And I thank my colleagues for jdeld- 
ing to me. 

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Percy. Senator Glenn? 

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

AFL-CIO'S POSITION ON ABIUTY TO MONITOR AND VERIFY 

Mr. Kirkland, I was just rereading the statement by the Execu- 
tive Council that was adopted in Chicago on August 7 which you 
asked be entered into the record. I think as a statement of the 
objectives toward which we should be striving, it is an excellent 
statement. 

My question would be mainly on how we implement such a thing 
and still know what the Soviets are doing in a secret society. Our 
ability to monitor is not addressed in that statement — our ability to 
verify. I think that is the key to whether we are willing to go these 
extra steps which I agree with you completely should be our objec- 
tives for future negotiations, and we all regret we are not part of 
these negotiations. 

How we implement those and still know what is going on in a 
secret society and know, for instance, that this 30-percent reduction 
called for in the statement is being carried out, is a very difficult 
situation, and especially post-Iran, where we are not going to have 
quite as good a handle on their testing program, and we only know 
what has happened, perhaps, after the fact, after the weapons 
system is deployed. Then we can measure things to a fine accuracy. 

But did the AFL-CIO executive council consider this area of 
monitoring and of verification and what their assessment of it 
would be in getting on to these very laudible steps that are out- 
lined in the statement? 



197 

Mr. KiRKLAND. Certainly, Senator, we were aware of the issues 
raised with regard to verification in our consideration. But the 
statement does not specifically address verification. Obviously, it 
assumes at least some adequate capacity to verify the critical ele- 
ments of an arms control agreement. My own view on verification 
as it has affected negotiations in the past is that it has been 
somewhat ambivalent, a sort of two-edged sword. 

To some extent, I think it may have led us into the measurement 
of the less relevant factors in the nuclear strategic arms balance. 
The things that are simplest to verify — there is a temptation to 
count those, even though they are far less important. Launchers, 
for example, have been made largely irrelevant as a measure by 
technology. To reduce launchers while letting other aspects of 
weaponry run free, warheads specifically, is equivalent to sort of 
replacing a muzzle-loaded rifle with an Ouzi or a Kalachnikov or 
an Armalite, and I don't regard that as arms control. That is 
productivity. 

The SALT II agreement does for the first time create an obliga- 
tion and a promise that warheads must now be brought within the 
purview of our capacity to verify by at least imposing limits on the 
number of warheads that can be launched with a particular con- 
figuration of a missile. That implies to me that we must undertake 
the responsibility of counting warheads and knowing how to count 
warheads. 

I have had some exposure to verification techniques in connec- 
tion with my service on a number of presidential committees and 
commissions. I have been generally impressed with our ability to 
monitor. There are, of course, as you very well know, further steps 
in ultimate verification. It is evaluating what you monitor and 
being willing to face the results of that judgment. 

I guess, in the last analysis, I think that during the term of the 
treaty, and this perhaps bears on the question of the loss of the 
stations in Iran, the monitoring stations there, and the time that it 
will take to recover what we lost, the levels that are permitted are 
so staggering in real weaponry, in warheads particularly, that a 
modest infraction is of no great consequence. If you add another 
100 when you cheat and produce another 100 or 150 warheads, 
when you are up to the 9,000 or 10,000 level is not of earth-shaking 
consequence as affecting the real utility of these forces. 

I do think that if we succeed and were to get an agreement that 
significantly reduces these levels, and that looks to further and 
further reductions as we would hope and as we would regard as 
necessary to say that this process is productive, as you get lower, I 
think the issue of verification increases in importance. But I think 
at these levels I tend to agree with the administration that verifi- 
cation is probably adequate for all practical purposes. 

Senator Glenn. I think both sides have a tremendous overkill 
capability right now. What we are trjdng to establish, of course, is 
this balance. I thnk we all regret that we did not make warheads 
the subject of the negotiation early on in SALT II. I think the 
whole process, however, is a step forward if we can work out 
sufficient monitoring and verification capability to approve the 
treaty as it is. 



198 

At least it is a step forward in placing some limit where no limit 
previously existed, even though it is preposterously high. It is 
generally recognized that we have some 10,000 deliverable war- 
heads available right now. The Soviets have about five. Under 
SALT II, you can set up a scenario of different missiles and num- 
bers of warheads permitted that would permit them to triple their 
five and for us to go up by 50 percent on ours, so we would come up 
at around 15,000 on each side. 

Although it is a little hard for me to accept that as much 
progress in arms limitation and arms control, at least it is some 
limit where none previously existed, and it is a base for getting on 
to stressing warhead reduction in SALT III, IV, V, and VI. 

Mr. KiRKLAND. I look at it as a way station on to some real test 
of whether we are ever going to start turning that curve around. 
The curve is still going up and that concerns me very deeply. 

You mentioned that within this treaty the Soviet Union can 
increase its warheads by a factor of three. I think it is somewhat 
worse than that. They can and will increase their accuracy, I think 
from something like 1,200 feet to 600 or 700 feet, which, as I am 
told, makes a factor of four. It is not just the doubling, since there 
is a geometric ratio. You multiply the factor of four on accuracy by 
the factor of three on the number of warheads, and you have a 
factor of escalation on their side of 12, 1200 percent, which is a far 
cry from the kind of arms control that we would hope for if this 
were the end of the line, these levels of real redundancy — I ques- 
tion whether it would be of any great consequence to us whether 
they added further than that, whether it would be cost effective 
expenditure and of great concern to us. 

But as I said, our final judgment tells us, OK, we will pass this 
marker and move to the next, and let the next one be a real test 
from which we ought to be willing to hold a position and walk 
away from the table if necessary without continually bargaining 
with ourselves to formulate a new position and another new 
position. 

Senator Glenn. My time is up. Thank you. I agree that we 
should move on to that next step. I think we can only move on to 
that next step, however, if we build enough confidence each step 
along the way by knowing what they are doing so that we are 
willing to move on to that next step. We are not willing to buy just 
a pig in a poke and just assume they are living up to these things. 
We have seen too many activities in other areas of the world where 
we do not trust them to act in our best interest, to put it very 
mildly. 

I think I agree with your emphasis on warheads completely. 
Unless SALT III is to have as its basis the limitation of deliverable 
nuclear warheads, I would be prepared to vote against SALT II and 
the whole works right now because it is a sham, a charade. We 
should not go any further with it unless subsequent negotiations 
are to bear on the subject of deliverable nuclear warheads. That is 
what the big bang comes from. You are absolutely right on that. 

Mr. KiRKLAND. I agree with that completely, sir. 

Senator Glenn. I think that should be the absolute basis for any 
future negotiation, and we not continue our emphasis on launch- 
ers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 



199 

Mr. KiRKLAND. In fact, I have heard some students of this issue 
argue that it is far more stabilizing to count warheads and let 
launchers run free than the other way around. 

Senator Glenn. That might give them a little additional flexibil- 
ity that we might not prefer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Senator Javits? 

Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

ATTITUDE OF AMERICANS TOWARD RISKTAKING 

Mr. Kirkland, we welcome you here very much, first as an old 
friend, and second, because you speak for such a vast constituency 
of those who fight wars and make the things with which we fight 
wars. One thing that has bedevilled Washington policymakers on 
which I would greatly value your view is this. After Vietnam, after 
Angola, and after Watergate, what is the attitude of the American 
people toward the risktaking which is implied in your statement? 

That is, we have certain stopping points, and we go so far and no 
further, and then we will face whatever the issue is. We don't 
know. That may be a very portentious decision. The way the Krem- 
lin works, as we see it demonstrated in from Cuba, in this highly 
surreptitious way, is that you don't know what they are liable to 
spring, and you are always confronted, therefore, with the worst 
case hypothesis. 

As you reflect so ably, as you always do, the views of the Execu- 
tive Council of the AFL-CIO for us today by their designation, 
which is critically important, could you also reflect to us how you 
feel the rank and file AFL-CIO members, feel about this issue? Do 
you think notwithstanding the disillusionment of Watergate and 
the reversals of Vietnam and the frustrations which we have suf- 
fered, that they are nonetheless in the great tradition of this 
country ready to face whatever it is, putting freedom even above 
these dangers? 

Mr. Kirkland. I am confident of that, Senator. I think that our 
statement and our other statements — we had a parallel statement 
on which the Council acted at the same time which addressed the 
so-called transfer amendment with which I am sure you are all 
familiar, that puts the proposition to you that the price of social 
progress and domestic progress has to come out of defense expendi- 
tures. 

We oppose that. I think in my opening statement I refer to a 
view of that principle. I am confident that that view reflects the 
general view of the membership of the trade union movement. As 
you very well know, we have a constant system of meetings, con- 
ventions, conferences, board meetings, and so forth where these 
things emerge and come to our attention. The executive council 
represents a pretty good cross section of the leadership of the 
American trade union movement, and that leadership reflects, I 
think, quite accurately their perception of the attitudes of the 
members, or they wouldn't survive too long. 

I think the problem with any democracy is that we tend to relax 
and hope for the best in between perceived crises. When we see a 
crisis, when we see a gun at our head, we pull ourselves together 
and do remarkable things. The challenge of leadership is how to do 



200 

those remarkable things when you are not looking down that gun 
barrel, but the crisis is a little more vague and a little more 
nebulous. 

That places a great burden on leadership, but I think it is a 
burden that has to be assumed day in and day out, and not just at 
crisis time, if we are going to meet the sort of challenge presented 
by a totalitarian society, which doesn't really count, and manipu- 
lates the public attitudes or the public role. 

Senator Javits. Mr. Kirkland, that is tremendously heartening 
to me. I think it should be to the policymakers in addition to those 
of us who are here. I think these are words the President should 
hear and listen to and pay attention to. It is tremendously hearten- 
ing to the country and a great tribute to the labor movement. 

I personally agree with the two conditions that you set, that is, 
tragic as it is, as you have just said, we are going to have to 
continue to work to maintain parity. It is compelled upon us. I 
agree with you that SALT III is the watershed, that our negotia- 
tors of SALT III have to be told that we will reject SALT III if they 
bring it back, without making substantial arms reduction. 

Beyond that, from what you say, I am deeply heartened that our 
people are willing. We must be alert about becoming ensnared time 
and again in any euphoria which has been talked about so much 
which, after another SALT. We are told it will put us to sleep, will 
put us even further behind in negotiating power, and only bring us 
to a day which could mean surrender, a word which we hate to 
utter, let alone think about, but which the way this world is run, 
we cannot simply forget. 

I am very hopeful that the desires of the AFL-CIO will be 
realized through the reservations we consider respecting this 
treaty. 

Mr. Kirkland. Senator, if I may just say a word and get back a 
little bit to an observation of Senator Glenn's. I think it is true 
there is some marginal value in a treaty which in effect sort of 
administers and exchanges information and marginal assurances 
on the tremendously continuing high level of weaponry. It is sort of 
a gross redundant administration procedure. I just doubt whether 
that sort of aim or object warrants a treaty, a treaty labeled arms 
limitations, and surrounded by the hopes and expectations that we 
are going to reduce in any genuine way. 

The real treaty ought to have more substance than that. If we 
are just going to administer redundancy on a mutual basis with the 
Soviet Union, I think there are other procedures that would not 
carry with it the expectations and promises that a treaty does. In 
that case, I would far prefer to see us set up a bilateral permanent 
administrative committee with the Soviet Union and let it sink 
into the backwater that mutual and balanced force reduction has 
been in for years. 

Senator Javits. Isn't the difficulty, however, that considering 
where we are and where we came from and the necessity for catch- 
up, that you cannot just practically do that? It would put us in a 
tailspin that would indicate a condition of instability in the world 
which would make it impossible to do exactly what you want done. 

If we had come from there, I would be inclined to agree with you, 
but we have not, so it seems to me that in view of the situation 



201 

which we face, your resolution makes the best of a realistic exist- 
ing situation, to wit, go ahead with SALT II with these caveats. 

Mr. KiRKLAND. I believe so. 

Senator Javits. I thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits. 

REDUCTIONS IN SALT III IF PARITY IS NOT ACHIEVED 

I fear we will have to cut this meeting short, because Senator 
Javits and I have been asked to go to the White House, so I will 
just ask one question, Mr. Kirkland, and with this question I also 
want to express my thanks for your testimony. If parity is not 
maintained during the period of the treaty, then it is really not 
realistic to expect that we could ever secure substantial reductions 
in nuclear arms in SALT III. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. Kirkland. I agree with that completely, sir. 

The Chairman. That is what has led me to believe that these 
other weapons systems which have been proposed will be neces- 
sary, because I share with you the goal that we must bring down 
these hideous levels, and SALT III will be the test. Without parity 
in our position there is no prospect that those reductions could be 
achieved. 

It is a price we have to pay, but it is the necessary price. 

Mr. Kirkland. That is a major consideration to us, sir. The 
position we are in in the ongoing negotiations and their perception 
of our will and our x'esolve and our capacity plus, until we have a 
SALT III in hand that tells us that it is worth the candle, we have 
to operate on the assumption that this treaty defines the levels we 
are going to have to live with, at least for its term, and establishes 
the base, if the process fails us in the future. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirkland, for your 
testimony. 

This afternoon, the committee will resume its hearings on the 
SALT II Treaty at 2 o'clock. Senator Stone will chair the afternoon 
hearing, and Senator Zorinsky after him. Phyllis Schlafly will be a 
witness. Edward Teller and Philip A. Carver are the other wit- 
nesses on the agenda for this afternoon. The hearing for this morn- 
ing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to recon- 
vene at 2 p.m. the same day.] 



202 

Afternoon Session 

The committee met, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate 
Office Building, Hon. Richard Stone presiding. 

Present: Senators Stone, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and 
Zorinsky. 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Senator Stone. This afternoon we will continue taking testimony 
from public witnesses on their views on the SALT II Treaty. 

Our first witness is Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, representing the 
American Conservative Union. Mrs. Schlafly is an analyst and 
author with interests in national defense, nuclear strategy and 
weaponry. 

The American Conservative Union [ACU] is the first organiza- 
tion we will hear from today. Following the ACU, we will hear 
from Dr. Edward Teller, a world-renowned physicist, who will give 
us his view as a scientist. Dr. Teller has spent much of his career 
working on nuclear weapons and has often been termed the father 
of the hydrogen bomb. 

Our last witness this afternoon will be Mr. Phillip Karber, an 
expert on the European military balance, both conventional and 
nuclear. 

Because the overall military balance in addition to the strategic 
nuclear balance is important to our SALT deliberations, we believe 
it important to review the European balance. 

Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you to the committee and ask you to 
proceed with your statement. 

STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY,^ AMERICAN CONSERVA- 
TIVE UNION, ACCOMPANIED BY YVONNE CHICOINE AND 
SUSIE BLOSSER 

Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you, Senator Stone and members of the 
committee. I appreciate your courtesy in being willing to hear me 
today. 

My name is Phyllis Schlafly, of Alton, 111. I am an author, a 
journalist and a member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a 
representative of the American Conservative Union, of which I am 
a member of the board of directors. I am accompanied by several 
members of their staff, including Yvonne Chicoine, on my right, 
and Susie Blosser, on my left. 

For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has 
been strategy. I am the coauthor of five books on nuclear strategy, 
books which made a series of remarkable predictions which, unfor- 
tunately, have all come true. 

At a time when others were discounting Soviet intentions and 
capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets would keep build- 
ing nuclear weapons until they achieved decisive strategic superior- 
ity, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a 
self-imposed freeze on the building of additional strategic weapons. 

It is now obvious that this is exactly what has happened. 



' See page 219 for Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement. 



203 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full statement be printed in the 
record and, in the interest of time, I be permitted to summarize it. 

Senator Stone. Your full statement will appear in the record at 
the appropriate point. Please proceed. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you. 

My testimony shows that SALT II will deliver to the Soviet 
Union three powerful political and economic weapons against 
which we will have no defense. First, the oil weapon, the power to 
cut off U.S. imported oil. Second, the dollar weapon, the power to 
destroy our U.S. dollar by denying us the importation of strategic 
materials and thereby unsettling our economy. And third, the Cuba 
weapon, the power to put missiles and troops and bombers in Cuba. 

We have already had a taste of what these weapons can mean. In 
1973, we had oil embargo I when the Soviet Union openly and 
flagrantly encouraged the oil-producing nations of the Middle East 
to use their oil weapon against the West. 

We all know that after an embargo of 5 months, they jacked up 
the price fivefold. That was followed by tremendous inflation in our 
own country, following which we have lost about one-half the value 
of our dollar. 

We all know about the troops in Cuba today. In my statement I 
show several scenarios of what oil embargo II and Cuba crisis II 
might mean to the United States if initiated by the Soviet Union. 
Of course, these are just examples of what the Soviets might do. 
There are any number of variations. 

They could proceed by the salami technique instead of all at 
once, say, cut off our oil 5 percent at a time. We already know 
what that means after the cutoff of oil by the loss of Iran. 

The point is that SALT II gives to the Soviets sufficient superior- 
ity of nuclear weapons so that they can use the political and 
economic weapons with impunity. Some people think that dropping 
bombs is the only utility of nuclear weapons, but superiority would 
give to the Soviets such economic and political weapons that they 
could, in effect, tremendously upset our way of life. 

I brought with me a map which shows how these political and 
economic weapons are interrelated to Soviet strategic superiority 
and how the Soviets and Cubans are already getting ready in 
position to use them. The red countries are these where Cuba has 
stationed troops in Africa. Cuba has about 50,000 troops there and, 
of course, they are using Soviet weapons. 

The red anchors show where the Soviets have, in effect, bases for 
their fleet. They have three in the Mediterranean, two around 
where Saudi Arabia and Kuwait send out their oil, three on the 
eastern side of Africa. In addition to that, they have a bunkering 
area in the Indian Ocean, and they have a great presence through 
those vessels which are called fishing vessels stationed all around 
the coast of Africa. 

The red stars are friendly ports where the Soviets can bring 
their navy in. We, of course, have no such ports on the continent of 
Africa. 

The big green stream shows the flow of oil from the Middle East 
to Western Europe and to the United States, and the brown stream 
is the flow of oil from Africa to western Europe and the United 
States. I think the map makes it very clear how easy it would be 



U8-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 14 



204 

for the Soviets to use either their naval superiority or their strate- 
gic superiority through nuclear blackmail in order to cut off the 
flow of oil to the West. 

It is obviously a much easier job to interrupt that flow than it is 
to keep the sea lanes open. The Soviets will have sufficient superi- 
ority through SALT II in addition to their tremendous naval 
power. 

We all know what the gas lines were in June when we lost 5 
percent of our oil. I would suggest that, if you liked waiting in 
gasoline lines in June, you will love SALT II. Half of our oil comes 
from imports at the present time, and 59 percent of our imported 
oil comes from Africa and the Middle East. How in the world dare 
we give to the Soviet Union the power to cut off that oil, to cause 
the economic dislocations that that would mean, with the resulting 
effects in inflation, in the closing of plants, in unemployment, and 
in all such disruption to the economic life of our country? 

I believe that this map shows that the linkage between SALT 
and oil and the dollar is tremendous. SALT II, in effect, would pour 
salt into the gasoline tank of the free world. Translated into plain 
English, SALT II equals Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons, 
equals Soviet ability to wage political and economic blackmail in 
the Middle East and in Africa, and equals more gasoline shortages 
in America. 

We have at stake not only our gasoline but the stability of our 
U.S. dollar. The Soviets could even unsettle it by delays, by harass- 
ments, or by cut-offs of that stream of gasoline flowing to our 
country. 

The map also shows the linkage between the Soviet strategic 
superiority and Russian troops in Cuba and Cuban troops in Africa. 
They are all tied in together. If we no longer have strategic superi- 
ority, how are we going to make the Russians pull their troops out 
of Cuba? 

We can ask them. The President can say, please take them out. 
Mr. Vance can call up and say, do you realize this is a very serious 
matter, as he said the other day. The Soviets must know it is a 
serious matter. They must have thought seriously about it before 
they sent their troops into Cuba. 

But the point is, can we make them? SALT II not only allows the 
Soviets to have the power, but also the perception of power. It is 
obvious that SALT is so unequal, so unfair, so humiliating to the 
United States. It gives so many advantages to the Soviet Union 
that I don't know how the Kremlin could have anything but con- 
tempt for a country which would acquiesce in such an unequal, 
unfair deal. 

SALT allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy missiles and doesn't 
allow us to have even one. It allows them to have four times the 
number of land-based MIRV's that we have, MIRV's which will 
have 26 times the power of our land-based MIRV's. It limits the 
range of our cruise missiles but it allows their submarines to prowl 
our coasts within range of our cities. 

It does not allow us to have a mobile missile until 1982, but 
allows the Soviets to have hundreds of mobile missiles today. It 
forbids us to catch up with the Soviets in numbers of ICBM's, in 



205 

megatonnage, in throw-weight or in any meaningful measure of 
what strategic superiority is all about. 

And above all, SALT II gives to the Soviet Union the power to 
use the political and economic weapons, the power to cut off our 
oil, to destroy our dollar, and to use Cuba as a base. 

If we ratify SALT II, that is what it means. If we reject SALT II, 
on the other hand, we can be masters of our own destiny. We can 
build the weapons that we need to defend the independence of our 
country and its economic stability. Rejection of SALT II would 
show that we are not going to let the Soviets have the power to cut 
off our gasoline at the pump, to cut the value of our dollar to 10 
cents, or to put troops, missiles or submarines or bombers in Cuba. 

So the specter of gasoline lines and closed plants and unemploy- 
ment hangs over SALT II. The linkage is complete. I believe that 
our Nation is hungry for Senate leadership to say that the United 
States will rebuild our strategic power so that we can assure the 
political and economic independence of the United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly. 

Senator Helms. 

Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. Schlafly, we appreciate your coming before the committee 
today. You are a distinguished American and I congratulate our 
colleague from Illinois for having such a constituent as Mrs. 
Schlafly. 

Senator Percy. We haven't always seen eye to eye, but I have 
always admired her many qualities, her tenacity, perseverence, and 
her power of expression. It is one of the best testimonies I have 
heard. I am sorry I was tied up and could not hear it from the 
start. 

Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you. Senator. 

Senator Helms. The Chairman and I were just remarking that 
there are very few witnesses who, while delivering testimony, could 
get up and walk over to a map, describe it, come back and sit down 
without missing a syllable. [Laughter.] 

IMMORALITY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION 

Mrs. Schlafly, I had an opportunity to read your statement in 
advance. In your statement, you refer to the doctrine of mutual 
assured destruction, or MAD. Now, Henry Kissinger was recently 
quoted in the Washington Star, I believe on September 2 of this 
year, in reference to MAD. 

In that article. Dr. Kissinger described mutual assured destruc- 
tion as, and I quote: "a bloodthirsty doctrine which is immoral, 
senseless, demoralizing." A moral issue is raised because the doc- 
trine rests upon the idea that we shall use nuclear retaliation 
against a civilian population. 

Now, on the other end of the extreme of those who would target 
civilian populations are those who wish to have the U.S. disarm 
itself unilaterally. Their moral position appears to be that all kill- 
ing is immoral; therefore, we should not even have arms to defend 
ourselves since defense implies killing. 



206 

POUCY OF CHRISTIAN NATION IN WAR-TORN WORLD 

Somewhere, Mrs. Schlafly, between those two extremes must lie 
a rational explanation of how a Christian nation can conduct itself 
in a war-torn world without losing its moral values. This is the 
first question I would like to ask. 

Do you agree with Dr. Kissinger that the MAD doctrine is im- 
moral? 

Mrs. Schlafly. Senator, I think the MAD doctrine is the most 
immoral doctrine that anyone ever devised. The MAD doctrine is 
based upon the proposition that if there is a war, we must kill the 
maximum number of civilians it is possible to kill. That is what 
mutual assured destruction means. 

It is based on the doctrine that we keep all of our cities like 
sitting ducks, open to any incoming missiles from any nation, while 
we do nothing whatsoever to protect them. And if deterrence fails, 
we have no alternative except surrender. But at that point we then 
launch our missiles and kill millions of Russians who had nothing 
to do with participation in the decision to make the launch. 

I really don't know how anyone could support that theory, but it 
is the basic theory of SALT II. As a matter of fact. Secretary 
Brown testified before this committee that the MAD doctrine is the 
bedrock of our policy and the bedrock of SALT II. Yet it is based on 
killing people instead of keeping people alive. 

I do not see what good millions of dead Russians will possibly do 
for the United States if our cities have been hit. We should direct 
our attention toward keeping Americans alive rather than killing 
Russians. 

On the whole moral issue, I think one of the most immoral 
things I can think of is the absolute abandonment and default of 
the United States in retaining the great gift of strategic superiority 
that we had. Nuclear weapons in themselves are neither good nor 
evil. They are instruments of power. In 1945, our country was so 
fortunate that God allowed the great atomic weapon to be devel- 
oped by the United States instead of by Hitler or Stalin. One can 
speculate on what the world would have been like had the Nazis or 
Russians gotten it. 

But we got it and we built up that nuclear superiority to where 
it peaked at 8 to 1 in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. 
What happened? We don't have the superiority any more. The 
Joint Chiefs have said that even essential equivalence will be lost 
in the early 1980's. Our superiority is gone. We have defaulted on 
our responsibility to maintain the peace of Western civilization. 

We proved, from 1945 to 1967 or 1972, that, when possessed by 
the United States, nuclear power is the greatest instrument for 
peace anyone developed. But in the hands of the Soviet Union, it is 
not that at all. It is an instrument of aggression. 

The Gospel of St. Luke tells us that, when a strong man armed 
keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace. That is really the best 
prescription for peace. Our large, wonderful, productive country, 
has moral responsibility to defend our people and to defend the 
whole of Western civilization, and not to default and give away this 
great talent we were given in the nuclear weapon. 



207 

CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY PARALLEL TO MORAL DUTY 

Senator Helms. Well, the constitutional duty of this Government 
to provide for the common defense, I judge you are sajdng, is 
parallel to a moral duty, for this Government to protect American 
citizens from war. Is that essentially what you are saying to me? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes. To provide for the common defense is the 
first constitutional duty of our Government. But I would add to 
that the moral duty to defend this great country, the lives of our 
people and, in fact. Western civilization against an enemy, the 
Soviet Union, which h£is built the most tremendous military arse- 
nal in the history of the world and has never abandoned its goal to 
use every weapon it has to achieve world conquest. 

CONFUCT BETWEEN MORAL DUTY AND IMMORAL KILLING 

Senator Helms. How does this moral duty to protect American 
citizens at war square with the immorality of killing in the context 
of your first eloquent answer? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. We proved when we had nuclear superiority 
from 1945 through 1967 that there was nuclear peace. There was 
peace between the nuclear superpowers. And if the United States 
has nuclear superiority, there will be no nuclear war. That is the 
surest way to peace. 

As George Washington said: "To secure the peace it must be 
known that we are at all times prepared for war." And nuclear 
superiority in the hands of the United States is the surest, best 
means of peace. We proved that when we had it. 

The only reason we are nervous today and worried is because we 
no longer have it. Decisions were made which allowed that great 
superiority to shift to the Soviet Union. 

SALT II PREVENTS UNITED STATES FROM MEETING MORAL 

OBLIGATIONS 

Senator Helms. In view of the acknowledged essential equiv- 
alence by the early eighties, I take it you believe the SALT II 
Treaty will not allow the United States to meet its moral obliga- 
tions. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. That is correct, because SALT II prohibits us 
from catching up with the Russians. It is that simple. SALT II 
permits the Soviet Union to have all the weapons they need to 
control the world. It enables them to have decisive military superi- 
ority and it forbids us to catch up. It forbids us to increase our 
numbers of missiles. It forbids us all across the board to catch up 
with the Soviets in throw-weight, in megatonnage, in MIRV's, in 
missiles and so forth on down the line. 

SALT II means that, if it is ratified, we will be humbly accepting 
a position of inferiority to the Soviet Union. What is our recourse 
after that? After that, we can say please, Mr. Brezhnev, be nice to 
us, but we will not have the power to force him to do it. 

When Khrushchev put his missiles in Cuba in 1962, our great 
Strategic Air Command went on airborne alert and could drop 
50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power then. That is why we 



208 

were safe and there wasn't any war. We can't do that today. We 
can't even make a credible threat of that today. 

Senator Helms. And we will be even worse off. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. With each succeeding year, we will be worse off. 

Senator Helms. Right. My time is up. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Stone. Senator Hayakawa. 

Senator Hayakawa. Senator Percy, would you like to question 
now? 

Senator Percy. No, please go ahead. I have time. 

SOVIET STOPPAGE OF WORLD OIL FLOW 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly, for your able and 
eloquent presentation. I would like further explanation of that 
map, Mrs. Schlafly. There is that heavy green line of Middle East- 
ern oil going around the Cape of Good Hope up through Europe 
and the United States. 

This shipment can be interdicted, interrupted, or stopped, you 
are saying, by the Soviet Navy? Or what are the ways in which 
this flow of oil can be stopped? What are the ways in which it is 
likely to be stopped, given Soviet power and, as you say, Soviet 
superiority in nuclear weapons? 

Mrs. Schlafly. Once they have the strategic superiority, they 
can stop it in any one of a variety of different ways. For example, 
they could do it like oil embargo I in 1973. They could simply tell 
the Middle East and African nations, we want you to embargo oil 
for the next 5 months, and don't worry, you can recoup your losses 
after that by jacking up the price 10 times. 

The Soviets will have the power to do what they want. With 
their great naval superiority, they could simply impose a blockade. 
"They could harass our shipping line. They could cut it off at some 
of those narrow points where the oil comes through. There are any 
number of options. When you have the power, you can deal any 
card in the deck, 

AFRICAN seaports FRIENDLY TO SOVIET NAVY 

Senator Hayakawa. What are the seaports on the east coast of 
Africa which would be friendly to and therefore probably usable by 
the Soviet Navy? 

Mrs. Schlafly. They have several ports there at the present 
time, and they have that bunkering facility where there is the 
break in the green line. 

Senator Hayakawa. Yes. What is that bunkering facility? 

Mrs. Schlafly. A major place where they can come in for re- 
pairs and do an5rthing they want. 

Senator Hayakawa. What island is that? 

Mrs. Schlafly. Senator, the technical information for this is 
from a congressional source and some of the strategic authorities, 
and I will be happy to submit the name of that island to you. I 
don't have it right now. 

Senator Hayakawa. I should know these things. 

Senator Stone. It will be accepted into the record when it is 
submitted. 



209 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The name of the island is Mauritius. Data for the map was obtained from a House 
Committee on International Relations publication of the 95th Congress, dated May 
8, 1977 and entitled "The Soviet Union and the Thi-d World." 

Senator Hayakawa. But there are seaports along the east coast 
which the Soviet Navy could use, would be welcome at, and there 
are some on the west coast as well? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes, they have many friendly ports in Africa — 
any place where there is a country with Cuban troops with Russian 
arms. 

Senator Hayakawa. Like Angola? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Ycs, Angola will allow the Soviet Navy to come 
in. It is my understanding that all up and down the coasts of both 
sides of Africa, they have friendly ports where they can put in for 
repairs, and supplies, and so forth. 

Senator Hayakawa. They wouldn't have friendly ports in the 
former French colonies like Gabon, the Ivory Coast, would they? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. The French have been doing a great job of main- 
taining some very key spots, especially that one where the oil 
comes out of Saudi Arabia. The Soviets wouldn't need every coun- 
try. But as you can see by the map, they have plenty of countries 
with plenty of ports. 

Senator Hayakawa. So one of the very real dangers, given nucle- 
ar superiority on the part of the Soviets, would be their power to 
cut off oil altogether to us at any time they wanted to. 

Mrs. Schlafly. Yes. And I think it is very important to face up 
to the fact that it is not true that dropping bombs is the only 
utility of nuclear weapons. You can use them to threaten, to black- 
mail, to achieve political and economic objectives. 

U.S. STRATEGIC SITUATION NOT RESULT OF SALT I 

Senator Hayakawa. Isn't it a fact that our strategic situation is 
not so much the result of SALT I but a self-inflicted condition of 
weakness? 

Mrs. Schlafly. That is true. The original decisions were made in 
the mid and early 1960's. 

Senator Hayakawa. But after the passage of SALT I, after the 
ratification of SALT I. 

Mrs. Schlafly. No. The original decisions were made when the 
self-imposed freeze began, and that began right after the Cuban 
missile crisis. 1967 was the last year when the United States added 
a single strategic weapon. 

Senator Hayakawa. I see. So that SALT I really reaffirmed that 
which we were already doing insofar as arms limitation is con- 
cerned. 

Mrs. Schlafly. Yes; and it made public and official the second- 
rate status of the United States, which I believe destroyed the 
credibility of our nuclear umbrella and thereby led directly to oil 
embargo I. 

Senator Hayakawa. If the ratification, then, of SALT I didn't 
matter one way or the other, in effect 

Mrs. Schlafly. Oh, I wouldn't agree with that. I think SALT I 
was a dreadful mistake. SALT I was a mistake because, in the first 



210 

place, we gave up our right to defend ourselves against incoming 
missiles based upon the mutual-eissured-destruction rationale. 

Second, we accepted inferiority in numbers at the ratio of 3 to 2. 
That is, for every three ICBM's the Soviets were permitted to have 
under SALT I, we said we will have only two. And for every three 
missile-firing nuclear submarines the Soviets had, we permitted 
ourselves to have only two. 

What SALT I did was to codify and legitimize the self-imposed 
freeze that started in the mid-1960's. The Soviets kept us negotiat- 
ing until they had that advantage, and then they nailed it down in 
SALT L 

But time has gone on and the situation gets worse because the 
Soviets keep building and we remain in at a freeze. 

Senator Hayakawa. And we maintain a self-imposed reticence 
about increasing our Armed Forces, our defenses. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes. I think it would come home to people if they 
would realize that the numbers of our strategic weapons that 
defend our country today, namely, 1,054 ICBM s and 41 Polaris 
Poseidon submarines, and a shrinking number of B-52 bombers, 
were the numbers that were set and established in the Eisenhower 
administration before Eisenhower went out of office as the force we 
needed to defend our country then. 

Although some of those weapons kept coming in the pipelines up 
to 1967, their numbers have never been changed. And certainly the 
danger to us is infinitely greater than it was when Eisenhower was 
in the White House. 

Senator Hayakawa. So, if we continue in the next 10 years to 
behave as we have in the last 10 years insofar as defense is con- 
cerned, will not the nonsigning of SALT II be the solution? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. The rejection of SALT II will enable us to go 
ahead and do what we need to defend our country. The ratification 
of SALT II would deprive us of that right. 

Senator Hayakawa. Of course, I am very nervous about our 
determination to go ahead in any case. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I am nervous about that, too, Senator, but in any 
event, with SALT II our hands would be so tied that we would put 
ourselves in a legal bind as well as other kinds of binds. 

RATIFICATION TIED TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING 

Senator Hayakawa. So when people like Senator Nunn and Dr. 
Kissinger say that they would vote for the ratification of SALT II if 
we expended x billion dollars a year for the improvement of our 
weaponry, would you agree with that? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Senator, I would not put it in terms of a percent- 
age of the defense budget. Over the past few years, as we all know, 
the defense budget has gone up every year but we have not gotten 
more strategic weapons. The strategic weapons are only a small 
part of the defense budget, but they are the part that makes the 
difference. 

I think we must build mobile missiles. I think we must build the 
B-1 bomber. I think we must build whatever mix and readiness of 
weapons we need to defend ourselves. But we put ourselves in a 
legal bind with SALT II. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much, Mrs. Schlafly. 



211 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Stone. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa. 

Senator Percy. 

SOVIET PRESSURE IN 1973 OIL EMBARGO 

Senator Percy. Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you once again. I have 
just a few questions about your testimony first and then a couple of 
other substantive questions that I would like to put to you. In a few 
of the cases you cite in your testimony I view history a little bit 
differently than you do. I would like to have your amplified 
thoughts on some of these cases. 

You state: "In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and 
defiantly goaded the Middle East oil producers to use their oil 
weapon against the West." I hope there is no implication on your 
part that the Soviets should take credit for that oil embargo. That, 
as I saw it, and I was out there at the time in the Middle East, was 
entirely motivated by Middle Eastern events. 

I think such anti-Soviet countries as Saudi Arabia and Oman 
would be highly incensed at the thought that they were just a tool 
of the Soviet Union in this regard. They were working entirely 
from the standpoint of their own political interests in the Middle 
East. 

Could you document for us any evidence you have that they 
"openly, brazenly and defiantly goaded the Middle East oil produc- 
ers" and had any effect whatsoever? 

Mrs. Schlafly. Yes; they did openly and brazenly do it through 
their radio broadcasts and through their newspapers, through 
every means of communication. That is the documentation of that. 

Now, with regard to the motivation of the Arabs, of course there 
are other factors and controversies in the Middle East. But I think 
it is important to remember that in the Middle East, the Arabs and 
the Israelis had fought, I believe, three previous wars, and our 
policy was always to help Israel. 

But before 1973, the Arabs didn't use their oil weapon against us, 
and I think that is the big difference. In the previous controversies 
they may have been unhappy about what we did. They may not 
have liked our siding with Israel. But they did not use their oil 
weapon. 

And what was it that was different in 1973? It was that the 
American nuclear umbrella had been replaced by the Soviet um- 
brella, and no longer could the Arabs be in fear that we would send 
the Marines in as Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon in 
1958, in a nice clean operation. We prevented the threatened coup. 
No one got killed. It was a show of strength that everyone respect- 
ed. But in 1973, the Arabs didn't need to worry that we were going 
to send the marines in. 

Senator Percy. I respectfully disassociate myself from that anal- 
ysis. I think the Mideastern powers, the OPEC countries, acted 
strictly in their own political interests there. I wouldn't want to 
give the Soviets credit for that devastating economic blow against 
us. 



212 

SALT I AND II PREVENT BUILDING OF ICBM's 

In your statement you say our technique of keeping SALT I and 
II negotiations pending for 12 years kept the United States from 
building up any additional ICBM submarines or bombers. We have 
been building submarines. John Glenn just dedicated the U.S.S. 
Ohio, the first Trident submarine, and we have a full-scale pro- 
gram underway to continue that. 

We have the ability to build more ICBM's. We have just chosen 
not to. SALT I has not inhibited us. We also have the right under 
SALT I or II to build a B-1 bomber if we want. 

Is that statement correct, that SALT I and II keeps us from 
building any more ICBM's, submarines, or bombers? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Well, it is a fact that that is the way it has 
happened. 

Senator Percy. That is what happened but it is not because of 
SALT I or II. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But all those years of the negotiation of SALT I, 
from 1967 to 1972, we were all told no, we don't need to build any 
more weapons because we are going to have an arms control agree- 
ment. And during that period, the Soviets were digging holes like 
mad so they would have 1,618 by the time SALT I was signed. 

So I think the SALT negotiations were a tactic of the Soviets to 
inhibit our adding additional weapons. 

Now, you mentioned the submarine. Of course, that Trident that 
Senator Glenn christened is not going to be in the water for an- 
other year or two. But the U.S. plan for the Tridents that we are 
supposedly building is to take out and throw away a Polaris for 
every Trident built. The number 41 has never changed since 1967 
and it is not planned to change. 

That is the shocking thing that has happened to this country. 
While we have built some new weapons, some new missiles, some 
new submarines, we have destroyed one for every one that was 
built. As I pointed out in my testimony, one of the really shocking 
things is that when we built 550 Minutemen Ill's, we could have 
had 550 additional missiles for the puny additional expenditure of 
$110 million. 

Instead of that, it was the policy of this country to destroy a 
Minuteman I or II for every Minuteman III that was built. So the 
total figures remained the same. The SALT negotiations kept us 
from ever changing the figures of 1,054 ICBM's and 41 submarines. 

Senator Percy. From all the testimony we have had from the 
Department of Defense, the decision not to go ahead with certain 
weapon systems, the B-1, accelerating the Trident program, et 
cetera, were all based on questions of cost, need, and effectiveness 
rather than on SALT restrictions. We have, after all, in the last 
decade doubled the number of warheads we have. There was no 
inhibition in SAL'S" I or II from our going ahead with that particu- 
lar program, and we did. 

Mainly, canceling the B-1 was a decision reached by the Penta-. 
gon, the administration, and backed by the Congress, although 
some Members disagreed strongly and probably were right that we 
have cut back too much. But I don't think we can attribute that to 
SALT I. 



213 

As you know, you and I did disagree on SALT I. We had the 
power under SALT I to go ahead with a second ABM site. We 
voluntarily chose not to go ahead with it, and you cannot really 
find any defenders of an ABM system today who feel that that 
expenditure would have been cost-effective. 

So whether it was right or wrong is immaterial. We voluntarily 
decided not to do certain things. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Senator, may I say something to that? I did not 
say 

Senator Percy. My time is terribly short and I have a couple of 
other points to cover with you. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I did not say SALT I prevented us from doing 
that. I said the tactic of keeping the negotiations pending kept us 
from doing it. And you are right, those decisions were made by this 
country. But I think they were wrong decisions. 

Senator Percy. You mention a scenario, which is an interesting 
scenario, of oil embargo No. 2 — and you are quoting, I think, the 
Soviet Union's presumed speech — "the oil embargo II will enable 
our Middle East friends to become richer and richer at the expense 
of the capitalist imperialist nations." 

I would hate for any of those nations to get the feeling that they 
could somehow become richer by embargoing us again. They have 
made all their investments here. I don't know of any investments 
any OPEC countries have made in the Communist world. They 
have put all their chips here. 

Every bit of inflation we have here erodes their base. Every time 
prices get higher, everything we build in Saudi Arabia gets more 
expensive. And they have their money scattered all over our banks 
and our bonds and everjrthing else. 

Anything they do to undercut us — and Saudi Arabia has made 
this very clear to other OPEC countries — undercuts them because 
they have invested so heavily here. 

DECUNE OF U.S. DOLLAR TIED TO SOVIET SUPERIORITY 

You also indicate that the rapid decline of the U.S. dollar has 
exactly tracked the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet 
Union is building toward a decisive military superiority. I agree 
with the feeling the world has that they are building toward it has 
eroded America's position and we must find a way to correct that. 

But wouldn't you agree that the thing that has really cut the 
dollar is not that perception but low productivity in this country 
and an unwillingness to work harder and smarter and better? Our 
balance of pajonents is way out of balance. Ruinous inflation and 
an excess of Federal spending, excess budgets year after year are 
the things that have really eroded the dollar. It is not military 
superiority of the Soviet Union. 

Do we agree on that? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Those are all factors. Senator, but I would sug- 
gest that the No. 1, most important factor was the 5-month oil 
embargo in 1973 followed by the fivefold increase in oil prices 
which unsettled everjrthing and was the start of the tremendous 
inflation and other economic changes that resulted. 



214 

And again, I suggest that oil embargo I was the direct result of 
the perception of who has strategic superiority, as explained by the 
SALT I statistics. 

Senator Percy. Thank you very much. My time is up and I have 
a few more questions. 

Senator Stone. Would you like to take an extra 2 or 3 minutes 
out of my time, Senator Percy? 

Senator Percy. I would be happy to. 

Senator Stone. Go right ahead. 

NECESSARY EXPENDITURE TO SAFEGUARD U.S. SECURITY 

Senator Percy. Very quickly. We have a tremendous debate now 
in the Congress as to whether our defense spending should be 
increased by 5 percent, 3 percent, some lower figure, or some 
higher figure. Could you, because of the amount of time, Mrs. 
Schlafly, you spend on these matters, give us your judgment of 
what expenditure would be necessary to really safeguard America's 
security? 

Mrs. Schlafly. As I mentioned earlier, I think it is the spending 
on strategic weapons rather than the overall defense budget that 
makes the difference. I believe that whoever has strategic superior- 
ity will determine whether we can survive as a free nation. There 
isn't anything that government does that is as important as that. 

So I think the first thing is to decide what strategic weapons we 
need and then go after that rather than saying that it should be a 
2- or 5-percent increase in overall spending. It is not the overall 
budget. The budget has been big and growing. It is the strategic 
weapons that really matter. 

I pointed out in my statement about how, for just a pitiful 
expenditure, we could have increased our ICBM force by 50 percent 
by simply digging 550 more holes. Exactly the same thing is true 
when the Poseidons were built. We destroyed a Polaris for every 
Poseidon that we built. For a minimal expense, we could have had 
31 additional submarines instead of 31 Polaris-retrofitted-Poseidon 
submarines. 

Senator Percy. Could you give us some sort of a figure, though? 
When we work with the concurrent budget resolution coming up 
on the floor, we must work with specific figures. Do you have any 
ideas you can give us as to how much you think we need to develop 
to increase our overall spending to accommodate the program you 
are talking about? 

Mrs. Schlafly. If you defeat SALT II, I will come back and give 
you those figures. [Laughter.] 

But I don't think a specific budget is necessary in order to defeat 
the treaty. 

BALANCED BUDGET AS IT RELATES TO NATIONAL SECURITY 

Senator Percy. A witness this morning said to us that the 
strength of our country, and I agreed with him, is not just our 
military superiority but it is also the will to use our weapons at the 
right time and the right place. It is also our economic strength 
which has to be dominant. 



215 

Now, when we are faced with problems like budget balancing, 
and the second concurrent resolution is coming up, we are going to 
be faced with some tough decisions. I think we have to cut back 
some social programs. I have outlined a number of them which I 
think are outrageous for this Nation at this time to be spending 
money on. 

We must cut some back, and I think we have to increase some- 
what our Federal defense spending. But how important do you 
think it is for this Nation to stick with its resolve now to balance 
the budget and, as we are now projecting, have a surplus in the 
fiscal year beginning October 1, 1981. 

How important is that insofar as the perception of America's 
strength, its will, its ability to manage its fiscal affairs in a sound 
and prudent way? How much importance do you attach to that for 
sustaining the image of this country as a powerful, strong, leading 
nation? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. There is no question but that our country and 
our Government has certain image, credibility, and confidence 
problems at the present time. And one of the big areas is money. 
But I do think that if we don't rebuild our strategic superiority, the 
effect on the dollar will be more disastrous than anjrthing else. 

I really think, as I pointed out in my statement, that the whole 
matter of cost as related to strategic weapons is a phony issue. It is 
such a small part of the budget that it does not really even figure 
in the overall total. But I am glad to hear you say that you are 
going to cut back some other programs in order to build defense, 
because I do believe that that is the first duty of government. 

Senator Percy, I think we simply have to. I think we can find a 
way to do it and keep our objectives. I hope we do agree on an 
objective to keep that budget balanced. It is a very, very high 
priority as it relates to our national security and our strength as a 
nation. Economic strength is just as important as military 
strength. That shows our ability in the long run. 

If they want to pursue an arms race and keep at it, we could 
beat them hands down on that any time we decide we want to do 
that. 

The last question, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me with one 
more. 

Senator Stone. Go right ahead. 

USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF EUROPE IS THREATENED 

Senator Percy. It is a question that I put to the Ripon Society, 
and there couldn't be a group of Republicans more on two ends of 
the spectrum than the Ripon Society and the Conservative Union. 
But I was pleased that the representative of the Ripon Society from 
Evanston, 111., answered the question I put to him because our will 
to use our weaponry has been questioned in Europe in recent days, 
as you well know, and I think many wars come about as a result of 
miscalculation by one of the adversaries as to the intention and 
will of the other. 

Is there any question in your mind that if, for instance, the 
Warsaw Pact powers in the Soviet Union moved in with conven- 
tional weaponry to threaten Western Europe, that we would and 
should, if Western Europe was in danger, use our ultimate weapon, 



216 

which none of us want to use but which we have there as a 
deterrent? Will it ever be a deterrent if we don't use it under those 
circumstances? 

Would you agree with the Ripon Society, who, I was pleased, said 
yes? He thinks the country would have the will, as he knows it. 
There are very few people who get around the country more than 
you do and know more people. From the standpoint of conserva- 
tives in the country, do you feel they would support the will to use 
those weapons and that Russia should never miscalculate our first 
line of defense being NATO and Europe? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I believe the country has the will. But it is not 
the American people who have their finger on the button; it is the 
President. And I must tell you truthfully that I don't believe the 
President has the will to use it. And he is the only one who will 
decide. 

When Secretary Brown went on "Meet the Press," he was asked 
the question: What are we going to do if the Soviets fire their 
missiles at our Minutemen? And he refused to say that we would 
launch them before the Soviet missiles arrived. He is going to sit 
there and let them be sitting ducks. 

If they would simply say, out in public for everyone to see, that if 
we get verified word of a Soviet launch, the "birds" will fly and 
there will be nothing but empty holes for the Soviets to hit, that in 
itself would be a tremendous deterrent. But when the Secretary of 
Defense leaves it unsure, uncertain, then I don't believe he would 
push the button and I don't believe the President would. And it 
will not matter what the American people want because they are 
not the ones who will make the decision. 

Senator Percy. I will let others speak for the President. I don't 
feel I can or should in this particular case. But whatever reason 
Secretary Brown might have had for not enunciating what he 
would do, I have known him for many, many years and I think he 
is a man of a very strong will and a man who would recognize that 
the potential use of a deterrent must always be present if it is to be 
a deterrent. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But if I am not sure, how are the Soviets to be 
sure? The important thing is to let them know in advance. It 
makes no sense to say that after they hit us, we will pause and 
then we will think about it, and then we don't know what to do or 
not, so we will have a conference in the situation room in the 
White House. 

It should be known in advance. 

Senator Percy. Well, I feel very strongly that we should leave no 
doubt in the minds of the Soviets where we would draw the line. I 
have tried to draw that line with China on Formosa, and I have 
tried to draw that line on Western Europe with the Soviet Union. 
And I don't think the American people would tolerate the Govern- 
ment which would not stand up for what we believe in and the 
avowed pledge that we have to protect Europe. 

I cannot conceive of the President of the United States not 
having the will to carry that out, whether he be Democrat or 
Republican. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But the real issue is not whether we will or not, 
but it is what the men in the Kremlin think we will do. 



217 

Senator Percy. That is right. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. And if I am unsure, you must admit that perhaps 
they are unsure, too. 

Senator Percy. That is why I wanted then and always to con- 
stantly repeat, so that they at least know how one Senator feels 
and interprets the will of the country and the Government of the 
United States of America, so that tney never underestimate our 
ability just because of Vietnam. 

This is a different matter. Vietnam was never a matter of our 
total national security. Our national security does depend upon 
NATO countries. I think they know it and I think the Kremlin 
knows it. 

Thank you very much. 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But the best way to send the message is to defeat 
SALT II. That would send a big message. 

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your 
yielding some of your time to me. I thank you very much and my 
colleagues. 

Senator Stone. Since I yielded my time to Senator Percy, I would 
offer Senator Hayakawa and Senator Helms a second round, and 
then I will do mine. 

Senator Helms. No, you go right ahead. 

[Senator Hayakawa indicating.] 

Senator Stone. Thank you. 

difference between soviet numbers and united states 

NUMBERS 

Mrs. Schlafly, early in your testimony, you provided quite a 
remarkable summary, which is, I think, probably the most lucid 
that I have heard, of the difference between Soviet numbers and 
the American numbers as limited by SALT II. Would you repeat 
that briefly? 

You were talking about their heavy weapons as opposed to ours. 
And in about 2 minutes you summarized the strategic numerical 
differences at the very least in this treaty. Would you repeat that? 

Mrs. Schlafly. SALT II allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy 
missiles. It does not allow us to have a single one. SALT II allows 
the Soviets to have — well, they did have 1,618 ICBM's. I think they 
are claiming they have only about 1,500 now. But it allows us to 
have only 1,054. 

SALT II allows them to have almost 4 times as many MIRV's on 
their land-based ICBM's as we have, and it allows those Soviet 
MIRV's to be 26 times more powerful than our land-based MIRV's. 

SALT II allows the Soviets to have their submarines prowling 
our coast with weapons that can reach all of our major cities. But 
we are prohibited from building a cruise missile that will reach 
Soviet territory. It allows them to build all the Backfire bombers 
they want, but we are strictly limited on our bombers and, in 
effect, are very handicapped in building the B-1 bomber if we 
choose to build it. 

Nobody knows how many mobile missiles they have. Of course, 
mobiles were the big loophole in SALT I. They had the legal right 
and the capability to build a couple of thousand mobile missiles 
under SALT I. We don't know how many they have built and 



I 218 

hidden. But under SALT II we would be prohibited from deploying 
a mobile missile until 1982. 

The disparities are so tremendous that the whole thing is humil- 
iating to us. In addition to the actual differences in power and 
numbers and throw-weight and megatonnage, there is the percep- 
tion of power. Again, I don't see how they could respect us for 
signing such an unequal agreement. 

QUAUTY EDGE VERSUS QUANTITY EDGE 

Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, the administration argues that we 
have a quality edge, while the Soviets under the treaty have a 
quantity edge. What is your understanding of that quality edge in 
the strategic missiles and other strategic weapons included in this 
treaty? 

Mrs. Schlafly. We did have a quality or accuracy edge, but I 
think most people believe that most or all of that is gone now. 
Recent tests show that the Soviet ICBM's are very accurate, possi- 
bly as accurate as ours. The whole rationale originally for saying 
that we would not build heavy missiles was a kind of pride that our 
missiles were more accurate so we didn't need heavy missiles. 

But now that their missiles are almost as accurate as ours, our 
advantage is gone. It is like the old saying that a good big man can 
always beat a good little man. If missiles are bigger and accurate, 
they are going to be tremendously more powerful than smaller and 
accurate missiles. 

WINDOW OF vulnerability OF ICBM's 

Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, witnesses in opposition to the 
treaty have expressed their military opposition, their prime mili- 
tary opposition in regard to the window of vulnerability of our 
land-based missiles, our current Minutemen III missiles, during the 
mid life of this treaty, roughly from 1981 through 1984, maybe as 
late as 1985, until the M-X mobile missile is deployed in sufficient 
quantity. 

Those opposition witnesses have advanced the thought that the 
quickest way to even this out so that the vulnerability of our land- 
based missiles would be reduced substantially would be to permit 
by specific provision in this treaty multiple protective shelters, 
vertical shelters or some other form of mobile basing. What do you 
think about that? 

Mrs. Schlafly. I think the window is very serious. Secretary 
Brown talks about it as starting in the early 1980's, and that is 
only about 4 or 5 months from now. I think the quickest way, the 
easiest way, as I mentioned in my testimony, is to adopt a launch 
on verification of warning strategy. In other words, the President 
should proclaim that, if we pick up word that the Soviets have 
launched, then our Minutemen fly; so the Soviet missiles would hit 
nothing but empty holes. 

That would give immediate invulnerability to the Minuteman 
missile force. 

I do agree that the next move should be the mobile basing. 



219 

INITIATION OF COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY 

Senator Stone. Now, in regard to them flying, the way they are 
targeted now, most people think, is against civiHan populations, 
mainly; some hardened military targets, but mainly, because of the 
doctrine of mutual assured destruction, they are targeted against 
the Soviet civilian populations. 

Others, mainly those in opposition to this treaty, have advocated 
a counterforce approach in which, as soon as we can, we would 
target the force, against the strategic missiles, of the Soviet Union, 
What is your view about that? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Of course we should have a counterforce strat- 
egy. The question is do we have the weapons that can do it? It is 
not believed that our Minuteman missiles are sufficiently powerful 
to knock out Soviet missiles in their hardened silos. 

Senator Stone. That is part of this window of vulnerability until 
we get a larger M-X missile, isn't that right? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. That is correct. And that is the reason why 
SALT is so unfair in not permitting us to have heavy missiles, 
because that is the value of a heavy missile. It can knock out a 
missile in its hardened silo. 

need for heavy missile during ufe of salt 

Senator Stone. And you are saying we need a heavy missile and 
we need it during the life of this treaty; is that right? 

Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I think we need everything, a mix, and readiness. 
I think we need whatever it takes to stay ahead of the Soviet 
Union. We have a nation that will support it. We have an economy 
that will support it. We are blessed with a GNP twice that of the 
Soviet Union. And I am convinced that the American people will 
support it. 

And if they find that some months hence we are all sitting in 
gasoline lines because half of our gasoline has been cut off, and if 
they find that we are absolutely unable to do anything about 
Soviet troops or bombers or missiles in Cuba, I think they are going 
to come right back and say: how did that happen? 

ACU'S acceptance of resolution of CUBAN SITUATION 

Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, speaking of that Cuban situation, 
would you or would you think the American Conservative Union 
would accept a resolution of this problem at less than the full 
withdrawal of the combat unit? 

Mrs. Schlafly. No, we want them out. It is a real test and it is 
only the harbinger of things to come. 

Senator Stone. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly. 

Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Mrs. Phylus Schlafly 

My name is Phyllis Schlafly of Alton, Illinois. I am an author, a journalist, and a 
member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a representative of the American 
Conservative Union, of which I am a member of the board of directors. 

For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has been strategy. I 
am the co-author of five books on nuclear strategy, which have sold in the hundreds 
of thousands of copies. Beginning in 1964, these books made a series of remarkable 



48-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 15 



220 

predictions which, unfortunately, have all come true. At a time when others were 
discounting Soviet intentions and capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets 
would keep building nuclear weapons until they achieve decisive strategic superior- 
ity, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a self-imposed freeze 
on the building of additional strategic weapons. It is now obvious that this is what 
happ)ened. 

Strategy is the science of planning and using your assets to achieve your objec- 
tive. Many people seem to assume that the only utility of nuclear weapons is to kill 
millions of people. Nothing could be further from the truth, and nothing could be a 
more dangerous assumption. Today I ask you to consider the other uses of nuclear 
weapons, and how ratification of the SALT II Treaty would allow the Soviet Union 
to have powerful political and economic weapons against which we would have no 
defense. 

Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would deliver to the Soviet Union: (1) the 
power to cut off U.S. imported oil, (2) the power to destroy the U.S. dollar, and (3) 
the power to use Cuba as a Soviet base. Ratification of the SALT II Treaty will 
prevent the United States from effectively interfering with or stopping the Soviet 
exercise of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. 

Rejection of SALT II, on the other hand, will not give the Soviet Union any 
additional power which is realistically usable, but it will permit the United States to 
control our own destiny, politically and economically. 

I. THE OIL WEAPON 

The great American industrial nation, a people on wheels to whom gasoline is 
almost as much an essential of life as water, is now facing the prospect of gasoline 
rationing. What is it that has brought us to the point of accepting rationing? 
President Carter says he needs standby power to cope with a sudden, massive oil 
shortage. Obviously, all the oil wells in the United States will not dry up at the 
same time. The very request for rationing power reveals our humiliating depend- 
ence on the whim of the OPEC nations thousands of miles away, in the shadow of 
the Soviet Union. 

In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and defiantly goaded the Middle 
East oil producers to use their oil weapon" against the West. Use of the "oil 
weapon" was so very simple: just embargo oil to the West for five months, and then 
jack up the price fivefold. It cost the Soviets nothing. With the higher prices, the 
Arabs quickly recouped their temporary losses. And the United States was exposed 
as an impotent giant who could do nothing, absolutely nothing, to force the Arabs to 
respect U.S. property and contracts. 

We have had six years since Oil Embargo I to prepare and defend our nation 
against the contingency of Oil Embargo II. Instead of improving our situation, we 
have become dependent on imported oil for an even larger percentage of our 
consumption. Nobody likes to talk about it publicly, but the only reason there is the 
slightest need for gasoline rationing is the clear and present danger from the threat 
of Oil Embargo II. Dr. Ghazi A. Algossibi, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Industry and 
Electricity, said in a July speech in Los Angeles: Your industrial way of life for the 
coming decades will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of the Arab 
countries in the face of expanding Communism cannot be maintained without your 
strength and resolve. No interdependence could be more complete." 

Translated into plain English, SALT 11 = Soviet superiority in nuclear 
arms = Soviet ability to wage political nuclear blackmail in the Middle East = more 
gasoline shortages in America. So, let's consider a possible scenario of what Oil 
Embargo II might mean to America. 

scenario: oil embargo ii 

Time: Early 1980. Scene: The Kremlin, Moscow. Members of the Politburo are 
hosting a meeting of the chiefs of the Middle East oil-producing states. Brezhnev (or 
his successor) is doing all the talking. 

"Comrades of the Middle East, we all have a common interest in world peace and 
prosperity. Although we have been enjoying apparent peace, our great leader Lenin 
warned us that, so long as Capitalist Imperialism exists, war is a constant danger. 
Our courageous intelligence agents have uncovered a massive plot by the Capitalist 
Imperialist Warmongers to launch a new world war. This would bring death and 
destruction such as the world has never seen before. This would be bad for your 
business. Your good customers, the United States and Western Europe, would be 
destroyed by our necessary retaliation. Since your economies are based on continu- 
ing revenues from your great oil resources, you have a vital interest in preventing 
such a senseless Armageddon. 



221 

"Fortunately, there is a peaceful way to avert this nuclear destruction, and that is 
why I have invited you to Moscow. I want you all to agree to impose immediately a 
total embargo on sales of oil to the warmongering United States and her NATO 
allies. Within a few weeks, hardly a wheel will be turning in Western factories. 
They will have little electricity. They will be on their knees to you, pleading for oil 
on any terms. Then you and the great peace-loving U.S.S.R. will impose our joint 
terms. The Western democracies will pay any price you set for your oil and you can 
easily recover tenfold the revenues you lost during the embargo. 

"For our part in the settlement, the Soviet Union will demand that the Capitalist 
Imperalist Warmongers surrender all their nuclear and conventional weapons to 
the United Nations. And, since most UN members do not possess the technology to 
handle the takeover of nuclear weapons, the U.S.S.R. will gladly take custody for 
the UN. 

"Do you want to know what the United States will do to pressure you into 
terminating your embargo? The answer is NOTHING. Just remember back to your 
first courageous and innovative use of your oil weapon back in 1973. What did the 
United States and Western Europe do then? Nothing! They meekly agreed to pay 
you a fivefold increase in the price of oil, even though that increase disrupted the 
stability of their economies. It was your courageous action in 1973 which brought 
about so much costly inflation and unemployrnent in the Western nations. 

"The United States had far more conventional military power than any of the 
Middle East nations. Yet the United States did not dare to use its conventional 
military power because the great peace-loving Soviet Union gave you the protection 
of our strategic nuclear umbrella. 

"The United States will never again dare to send in the Marines as President 
Eisenhower did to avert a threatened coup in Lebanon in 1958. 

"Our technique of keeping SALT I and II negotiations pending for 12 years kept 
the United States from building up any additional ICBM's, submarines, or bombers, 
whUe we built up continuously and massively. The Soviet nuclear umbrella is now 
three times more powerful than it was in 1973. During the last six years, we have 
tripled the throw-weight of our strategic forces. We have replaced a thousand of our 
older ICBM's with advanced models many times more powerful and more accurate. 
We have deployed 29 of our huge Delta-class missile-firing submarines and hundreds 
of new strategic bombers. 

"Thus, Oil Embargo II will enable our Middle East friends to become richer and 
richer at the expense of the Capitalist Imperialist nations, and it will give the great 
Soviet Union the power to enforce world peace, on our terms of course. The massive 
nuclear power we were allowed to retain under the terms of the SALT II Treaty has 
made all this possible. SALT II prevented the United States from building any 
weapons to challenge our use of the Oil Weapon. 

"We realize that Saudi Arabia recently established a friendly relationship with 
the United States, selling them oil at less than world prices and increasing produc- 
tion to help them alleviate their shortages. However, in view of the massive shift in 
the world's strategic balance, it would be very foolish of the Saudis to remain 
friends with the Capitalist Imperialists. We can stop the flow of oil with our naval 
superiority alone. It is in your own best interests to cooperate with our plan for 
world peace." 

II. THE DOLLAR WEAPON 

The second power that the SALT II Treaty, if ratified, would accord to the Soviet 
Union is the power to destroy the U.S. dollar. The value of a nation's paper 
currency is based directly on that nation's promise-to-pay credibility and on the 
public's perception of the government's ability to survive and redeem its paper- 
money promises. "The rapid decline of the value of the U.S. dollar in the last few 
years exactly tracks the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet Union is 
building toward a decisive military superiority which will soon be able to dictate the 
terms of surrender-or-survival to the United States. 

From 1945 to 1967, the United States had clear and undisputed nuclear superior- 
ity which peaked at the ratio of 8-to-l. During those years of undisputed U.S. 
nuclear superiority (which were disparagingly known as the Cold War), we had hard 
currencies, a stable dollar, and inflation only in that controllable degree which 
accompanies an increase in the Gross National Product. The U.S. nuclear umbrella 
was the basis for the stability of relationships in the Western world, not only for 
political freedom, but for trade relationships and agreements, for the stability of the 
flow of raw materials in and finished products out, and for the availability of oil and 
other energy sources at reasonable prices. 

"The year 1967 was the last year in which the United States added a single 
strategic weapon (ICBM, nuclear missile-firing submarine, or strategic bomber) to 



222 

our forces. Many of us knew that the United States that year opted out of the arms 
race at a time when the Soviets were building toward a first-strike capability, but 
most Americans refused to believe it. The U.S. nuclear umbrella remained credible, 
and therefore effective, for another five years because of the lag in international 
perception that the strategic balance was shifting in favor of the Soviets. 

The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, made it officially and 
publicly apparent that the United States had voluntarily and unilaterally put 
ourselves in a nuclear-weapons freeze and abandoned our once-overwhelming strate- 
gic superiority. Under the SALT I Treaty (on defensive weapons), the United States 
gave up our right to defend our population against incoming nuclear missiles, and 
under the SALT I Interim Agreement (on offensive weapons), we agreed that, for 
every three ICMB's and every three nuclear missile-firing submarines the Soviets 
build, we will limit the United States to only two, respectively. 

Publication of the SALT I statistics in Alay 1972 destroyed the credibility of the 
U.S. strategic umbrella. The newly credible Soviet strategic umbrella protected the 
Arabs in their effective use of the oil weapon against the great oil-consuming 
Western nations. Although the conventional military power of the Western nations 
overshadowed that of the Arabs by a factor of about 1,000-to-l, that was no help 
whatsoever in the face of the soviet nuclear umbrella. 

Thus, mere possession by the Soviets of nuclear weapons of sufficient numbers 
and power rendered impotent all other forms of American power, including conven- 
tional military power, industrial power, financial power, technological power, popu- 
lation power, and even food power. All those other factors, however mighty in 
themselves, even in combination are not enough to challenge Soviet nuclear power. 

It is not even necessary to discuss the point of whether the 3-to-2 numbers 
superiority in ICBM's and nuclear missile-firing submarines did or did not give the 
Soviets an across-the-board strategic superiority. The fact is that the SALT I gave 
the Soviets a worldwide perception of nuclear superiority, and it gave the Soviets a 
sufficiency of nuclear power to use the Oil Weapon and the Dollar Weapon. 

THE FINANCIAL COST OF SALT I 

When we plot on a graph what has happened to the U.S. dollar, it is clear that 
our runaway inflation started with the signing of SALT I in 1972. If our leaders 
don't learn the lesson of the financial cost of SALT I, we will find to our sorrow that 
the cost of SALT II is far higher. 

The (Consumer Price Index is based on the 1967 dollar (the last year the United 
States acquired an additional strategic weapon). The Consumer Price Index, which 
stood at 100 in 1967, had risen only to 125 by 1972 (the year of SALT I). However, 
subsequent to SALT I and Oil Embargo I, we slid into double-digit inflation. By 1979 
the Consumer Price Index had shot up to 217, and inflation is now running at 13.4 

gercent a year. It now takes $2.17 to buy what $1.00 would buy the year the United 
tates stopped building nuclear weapons. This means that more than half of all our 
savings in bank accounts, savings and loan companies, life insurance, pensions, and 
other money investments has been stolen from us by those who changed American 
strategic policy from superiority to inferiority. 

According to conventional wisdom, stocks are supposed to be a good hedge against 
inflation. From 1950 to 1968, stocks did as expected, rising 436 percent during a 
period of relatively low inflation. But since 1968, while consumer prices have more 
than doubled, stocks have fluctuated widely and the 1979 average is a pitiful two 
percent higher than in 1968. This means that stocks in 1979 have really lost half 
their 1968 value, because the dollars they are worth will buy only half as much. 

And the price of gold rose from $60 in the year of SALT I to $329 in the year of 
SALT II. 

American history provides a tragic lesson of what happens to paper money when 
the government which issues it lacks the military weapons necessary to maintain 
itself as an independent nation. In the South, children of the second generation 
after the War Between the States in impoverished households had a unique toy. 
Instead of play money, they had quite literally scores of thousands of dollars in 
genuine American currency. Thousands of southern patriots had turned in their 
gold for this currency in order to buy essential food and war materials from abroad. 
The first postwar generation still treasured this paper, hoping that some day it 
might be redeemed. They finally learned the bitter lesson that the paper-money 
promises of a government which has been militarily destroyed will never again be 
honored. 

However, Confederate paper money did not lose its value overnight. When it was 
first issued, it was accepted at face value in the South. Progressively, as it became 
apparent that the industrial North was building toward decisive military superior- 
ity, the credibility of the Confederate Government's promise-to-pay began to deterio- 



223 

rate. As it was perceived that the North's power would soon become overwhelming, 
C!onfederate currency began its slide down to nothingness. 

This is what is happening to the American dollar as the power centers of the 
world progressively grasp the fact that the Soviet Union is building toward decisive 
military superiority. The progressive attainment by the Soviet Union of the military 
power which will enable it to fulfill what it has openly declared to be its "historic" 
mission (to destroy the Western capitalist nations) hgis resulted in a growing loss of 
confidence in the U.S. dollar. 

SALT I and Oil Embargo I which resulted cut the value of the U.S. dollar in half. 
SALT II and any resulting Oil Embargo II will complete the destruction of the U.S. 
dollar. 

ra. THE CUBA WEAPON 

The recent relevation that there are thousands of Russian combat troops in Cuba 
is only the tip of the iceberg of what a Cuban Crisis II could mean to the United 
States. What will we do if the Soviets send 200 Backfire bombers or 225 SS-20 
missiles to Cuba? 

At the time of Cuban Crisis I (the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962), the United States 
was able to face down Khrushchev because our Strategic Air Command put our 
then-new and impressive B-52 fleet on airborne alert. This constituted a credible 
threat that we could deliver up to 50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power on 
Soviet territory. 

No U.S. President could make that threat today. It would not be credible to the 
Soviets or to anyone else. So what will our President do if the Soviets send Backfire 
bombers or nuclear missiles into Cuba? Plead with them to take them out? Humbly 
appeal to their good faith? Tell them we will denounce them in the UN or the OAS? 
Is that what the great United States is reduced to when it comes to the supreme 
matter of protecting the lives and property of our own citizens? 

First, let's consider a scenario of the Soviets sending 200 Backfire bombers to 
Cuba. Basing Backfire bombers in Cuba would give the Soviets a dramatic option to 
exercise their strategic power without the launching of a single missile or the 
dropping of a single bomb. 

"rhe Kremlin could send a flight of 200 Backfire bombers to overfly New York, 
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Chica- 
go, St. Louis, Atlanta, and any other cities convenient to a plan of concentrating on 
areas of dense population. The flight could be timed to arrive over the cities during 
late-afternoon rush hours. No bombs would be dropped, but they would be on board. 

The force of 200 could be divided into flights of 10 Backfires each, and they could 
sweep in low over our great cities at, say, ten-minute intervals; each flight could 
make two sweeps over each city. The Backfires are large and impressive, and they 
fly at mach 2.2. Sonic booms would break windows by the thousands. Motorists on 
the freeways would abandon their cars, attempting to find shelter from what they 
would think was a bombing attack. No wheels would be moving because of the 
massive traffic jams. Telephone systems would be swamped by the volume of calls 
from frightened people trying to find out where to go and what to do. 

What would our President do? Get on the Hot Line and ask the Kremlin, please 
not to drop any bombs? Or please, order the bombers home? There is no way we 
could stop the overflights because our policy for years has been one of zero defense 
against bombers. 

This use of the Backfires to create Cuban Crisis II would be in exquisite technical 
compliance with the SALT II Protocol which allegedly (though not directly) prohib- 
its the Backfire bombers from "operating at intercontinental distances" or from "in- 
flight refueling" or from a production rate of not more than 30 per year. Of course 
the Backfires would not run out of gasoline on this overflight mission; they could all 
return to their bases in Cuba. 

Second, let's consider the scenario of the Soviets' sending 350 SS-20s into Cuba. 
The SS-20 is a compact, land-mobile missile launcher having three MIRV warheads. 
The 350 SS-20s would give the Soviets a total of 1,050 warheads, or about one 
warhead for each of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 54 Titan II missiles. It is 
reasonable to suppose that U.S. intelligence will be just as slow in discovering SS- 
20s in Cuba as it was in discovering offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962 and in 
discovering thousands of Russian troops in 1979; so the Soviets could expect to get 
them all deployed before a U.S. President recognized the threat. 

The strategic power which 350 SS-20s in Cuba would give to the Soviets is almost 
incalculable. The Soviets would know that, even if we had instantaneous warning of 
a launch from Cuba, it would require 10 to 12 minutes time to launch our ICBMs. 
But missiles launched from Cuba would require only 8 or 9 minutes travel time to 



224 

reach most of our Minuteman bases. So the SS-20s could reach our ICBMs before 
they could be launched. 

The Soviets would not have to violate SALT II to carry out this SS-20 scenario. 
The SS-20 is not an ICBM, is not fixed-based, and is not a "heavy" missile, so is not 
covered by SALT II. 

Again, the question remains, what would the United States do? What could the 
United States do? We would be reduced to doing nothing at all except pleading on 
the Hot Line for the Kremlin to show compassion, mercy, and good faith. Ask 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn how much compassion the Kremlin bosses show when there 
is no force able to make them act in a civilized manner. If our State Department 
couldn't even make the Soviets accede to our request to let Russian ballerina 
Vlasova be interviewed on American soil without the intimidating presence of 12 
KGB Iddnappers, how can we make the Soviets respect our demands about Cuba? 

RATIFICATION V. REJECTION RISKS 

What are the risks of SALT II Treaty ratification versus rejection? If the Treaty 
is rejected, we risk a tantrum by Kremlin officials. If the Treaty is ratified, we risk 
Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. Is it worth 
the risk? I think not. 

If SALT II is ratified, the Soviets will be given both the power and the perception 
of power to use the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuban Weapon. If 
SALT II is rejected, the Soviets will have substantially the same power, but the 
worldwide perception of that power will be diminished because of new respect for 
the United States in rejecting such an unequal deal. Everywhere in the world, 
people will have a new respect for the determination of the United States to control 
its own destiny. 

The perception of power can be just £is important as the power itself. Neither 
idealism nor semantics can conceal the fact that SALT II is an unequal bargain for 
the United States. The Treaty does not limit the carrying capacity of either individ- 
ual weapons or the total weapons forces of the two superpowers. 

The alleged "equality" of SALT II is like saying that two intercontinental freight- 
moving firms are equal when each one has 2,250 "delivery vehicles," even though 
one firm has all 50-ton tractor-trailers and the other has only one-ton pickup trucks. 
Our principal ICBM, the Minuteman, has a "carrying capacity" of one megaton; the 
308 Soviet SS-18 ICBMs have a "carrying capacity" of 50 megatons each. 

The humiliating inequality of SALT II is also shown by the comparison of what 
the Treaty allows each side in the most powerful category of nuclear weapons: land- 
based ICBM MIRVs. Article V allows each side to have 820 land-based ICBMs which 
can be MIRVed. The Soviets have 308 heavy SS-18 ICBMs. Article IV, Section 10, 
allows each SS-18 to have ten MIRVs. That leaves 512 (820 minus 308) other land- 
based launchers of ICBMs which the Treaty allows the Soviets to equip with MIRVs. 
Since the Treaty allows the Soviets to MIRV any mix of ICBMs they choose, and 
since neither the Soviets nor the Pentagon will say how many SS-17s and SS-18s 
the Soviets have, they can choose to deploy 512 SS-19s with MIRVs. Article IV 
permits six MIRVs on each SS-19. The Treaty thus permits the Soviets to have 
3,080 (308 times 10) MIRVs on their SS-18 force, and 3,072 (512 times 6) MIRVs on 
their SS-19 force; making a total of 6,152 Soviet MIRVs on their land-based 
MIRVed ICBM force alone. 

The United States has no heavy ICBMs at all. We have 550 Minuteman Ills, our 
only ICBMs capable of being MIRVed, and the Treaty does not permit us to add any 
more. The "Common Understanding" of Article FV prohibits the United States from 
flight-testing or deplojang the Minuteman III "with more than three reentry vehi- 
cles." Therefore, the United States is effectively limited to only 1,650 (550 times 3) 
MIRVs on our land-based missile force. 

The Treaty, therefore, allows the Soviets to build almost four times as many 
MIRVs on land-based ICBM's as it allows the United States to build: 6,162 to 1,650. 

But that's not all. The treaty places no limit whatsoever on the power of MIRVed 
warheads. The Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 MIRVs are estimated at a power of 1.2 
megatons each. Multiplying 1.2 megatons by 6,152 MIRVs gives the Soviets at least 
7,382.4 megatons (7 billion, 382 million, 400 thousand tons) of TNT explosive-equiva- 
lent in our land-based MIRVed missile force. 

The U.S. Minuteman III MIRVs are only 0.17 megaton each. Multiplying 0.17 
megaton by 1,650 U.S. MIRVs gives us 280.5 megatons (280 million, 500 thousand 
tons) of TNT explosive-equivalent in our land-based MIRVed missile force. 

The Treaty thus allows the Soviets to have land-based ICBM MIRVs with explo- 
sive f>ower more than 26 times that of ours. The power centers of the world will not 
be fooled by calling this fantastic disparity "equality." With SALT II, the Soviets 



225 

will not only have the power, but just as important, they will have the worldwide 
perception of power. 

Defense Secretary Harold Brown argues that, without SALT II, the Soviets could 
build even more strategic weapons. His speculation as to how many more weapons 
the Soviets might build sets up a strawman in the SALT II debate. Nobody can offer 
any reason for why the Soviets might want to build more strategic weapons than 
they are permitted under the terms of SALT II; there simply are not that many 
targets in the world. Under SALT II, the Soviets clearly have enough weapons to 
destroy the United States as a viable Nation if they choose to use that power and 
risk our retaliation. 

But even assuming the existence of Secretary Brown's boogeyman of the addition- 
al weapons the Soviets might build if we reject SALT II, those hypothetical addition- 
al weapons add nothing whatsoever to the Soviet power to use the Oil Weapon, the 
Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. The lessons of history are impressive and 
convincing on this point. The lesson of Oil Embargo I, the decline of the U.S. dollar 
since then, and Cuba Crisis I, all prove that the Soviets now have a sufficiency of 
power to confront us with Oil Embargo II, a coordinated assault on the U.S. dollar, 
and Cuba Crisis II. The Kremlin will not need to launch any missiles against us. 
The Soviets will not even need to suggest the use of nuclear missiles against us. A 
few "peaceful" measures will suffice: cut off our oil supplies from abroad, cut off our 
imports of other essential materials, and make the dollar unacceptable in interna- 
tional trade. 

Now let's look at the differences to the United States between ratification and 
rejection of the SALT II Treaty. If SALT II is ratified, we clearly will not have the 
power to prevent the Soviets from using the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the 
Cuba Weapon. SALT II prevents us from ever catching up with the Soviets in major 
strategic weapons. We couldn't do anything to save ourseh-es from Oil Embargo I, 
and our position is vastly weaker as we face the possibility of Oil Embargo II. The 
galloping dollar decline is a pervasive reality. There is no way we could face down 
the Soviets in Cuban Crisis II. 

With SALT II ratification, we would lose the perception of power even more 
dramatically than we did after SALT I. SALT II is so obviously unequal that nations 
which respect power would lose all respect for us. Ratification of SALT II would 
advertise to the world that we have accepted strategic inferiority to the Soviets and 
are willing to place our destiny in the hands of the good faith of the Kremlin bosses. 

It is important that we not get hung up on the issue of whether the United States 
is inferior today or whether that point will arrive in 1981 or 1984. The prevailing 
dogma is that, while the United States does not have superiority today, we enjoy an 
intangible something called "essential equivalence." Nobody knows for sure what 
that is, but assuming it means something like "rough equality," even if this were an 
accurate assessment (which it is not), it would not be good enough to prevent the 
Soviets from using the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. In a 
situation of equivalence or parity, all the odds favor the aggressors, not the defend- 
ers. "The side committed to the strategy of a surprise attack needs fewer weapons 
than the side which must defend its people at all times. The side which places no 
value on human life can afford to take more risks than the side which values the 
life of every citizen. Tlie side which has the nerve to use nuclear blackmail can 
outmaneuver the side which respects life, liberty, and property. 

American strategy for survival in the nuclear age is still based on the long-since 
discredited and now hopelessly-obsolete doctrine called Mutual Assured Destruction 
(MAD). This strategy keeps American citizens as hostages in the face of the Soviet 
nuclear weapons force, hoping that the men in the Kremlin will be deterred from 
attacking us by the knowledge that we will retaliate and kill millions of Russians. If 
deterrence fails, we have no contingency plan except surrender. Even if the plan 
works, it is based on killing Russians instead of on saving American lives. 

But most immediately relevant here, this strategy is completely unable to cope 
with Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. 

If SALT II is rejected, the United States would be vastly better off It will 
immediately give us a new perception of power because it will be a clear signal to 
the world that we intend to be masters of our own destiny, and that we are not 
going to submit to Soviet blackmail in the Middle East or in Cuba or elsewhere. 

If SALT II is ratified, it will prevent the United States from taking those steps 
which are essential to the survival of our Nation. 

THE ALTERNATIVE TO SALT II 

The best and time-proven strategy for survival in the nuclear-space age is the one 
which worked so well in its first 27 years from 1945 to 1972, namely, U.S. nuclear 
superiority combined with a war-winning capability. The history of 1945 to 1972 



226 

proves — and millions of us are wdtness to it — that American nuclear superiority did 
preserve the nuclear peace between the great powers. In themselves, nuclear weap- 
ons are neither good nor evil. They are just instruments of power. In the hands of a 
peaceful nation like America, nuclear weapons can ensure world peace because no 
nation would be able to challenge them. In the hands of an evil, aggressor nation 
like the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are a force for tyranny, destruction, and 
world conquest. 

Our first priority must be to rebuild the credibility of our strategic deterrent, and 
our second priority must be to rebuild our strategic deterrent itself. Unless we do 
that, our entire population, deprived of all ABM defenses by the SALT I Treaty, will 
be sitting ducks for mass murder, nuclear blackmail, or economic disaster, at the 
will or caprice of the Kremlin. 

The fastest and easiest way of restoring the credibility of our strategic deterrent 
would be for the United States to adopt a launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy 
as a substitute for our present strategy of not launching our ICBMs until after a 
Soviet disarming strike has impacted. This is the only way we can preserve our 
Minuteman force as a credible deterrent. This changeover in strategy will immedi- 
ately render our 1,000 Minuteman force invulnerable and make it safe against a 
preemptive strike by the Soviets. Defense Secretary Brown has testified that our 
Minuteman missile force will be "vulnerable" in the 1980s, a timeframe which 
begins in only a few months. A launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy can pre- 
vent that vulnerability before it begins. 

The second way to rebuild the credibility of our strategic deterrent is to reject the 
SALT II Treaty. This would be a clear signal to the world that the United States 
will not accept a position inferior to the Soviet Union, and that we will reassume 
control of our responsibility to defend our own people and our allies from any vital 
threat, political or economic. 

Then comes the task of rebuilding our strategic deterrent. Remembering always 
that it is the mix and the readiness of weapons which are paramount, here are some 
specific suggestions — all of which would be prohibited if we ratify SALT II, but 
which becomes possible if we reject SALT II. 

1. Start immediate production of the B-1 bomber. SALT II would effectively limit 
bomber production because the Treaty would force us to count every B-1 built 
under SALT II limits. Without SALT II, we can build all the bombers we need. If 
the Soviets can build 30 Backfires a year, we can build 60 B-ls a year. 

2. Reopen production lines for the Minuteman III. Deploy the missiles as land- 
based or sea-based mobile missiles or, alternatively, install them in Minuteman I 
silos and immediately transfer the Minuteman Is to mobile launching pads. This 
would be prohibited by SALT II because the Treaty does not permit us to deploy 
mobile missile launchers until 1982. 

3. Proceed immediately and rapidly with development and deployment of the MX 
mobile missile, and deploy it variously on railroad cars and trucks. This would make 
effective use of one of our great American assets: our far-flung and efficient trans- 
portation system. This can be our counterbalance to the Soviet capability of hiding 
their mobile missiles in their enormous land mass protected by the tight security of 
their closed society. The Soviets had the capability and the legal right under SALT I 
to build and hide 2,000 mobile missiles; no one knows how many they have. 

4. Develop, test, and deploy the cruise missile in ranges that can reach the Soviet 
Union from our delivery vehicles. This is prohibited by the SALT II Protocol until 
1982. 

5. Go into immediate and rapid production of the Trident submarine and subma- 
rine-launched missiles. If the Soviets can build eight such submarines a year, we 
can build 16. The Soviets already have 27 Trident-class submarines, and at our 
present snail's pace of production, we will have only one in 1981. 

6. Withdraw from the SALT I ABM Treaty in accord with Article 15 which 
permits either country to do that when "extraordinary events related to the subject- 
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Certainly the stagger- 
ing momentum of Soviet weapons buildup and their steady substitution of heavy 
missiles for lighter missiles jeopardize our supreme interests. 

7. Proceed with research and development on the beam weapon, as urged by 
Major General George Keegan, former head of U.S. Air Force Intelligence. If ever 
developed, this beam weapon may be the "ultimate weapon" and we cannot afford 
to let the Soviets get it first. Evidence indicates that the Soviets are five to seven 
years ahead of U.S. physicists in beam weapon research. 

A country so divinely blessed as America, with boundless resources, a Gross 
National Product twice that of the Soviet Union, a technology which is the envy of 
the world, and the "can-do" resourcefulness that put a man on the moon, certainly 
has all the qualities it takes to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union — not only 



227 

against its nuclear arsenal, but also against its use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar 
Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. Some will say that the rebuilding of our strategic 
deterrent along the lines outlined here will cost too much money, and that we 
cannot afford it. I submit that "cost" is now and has always been a phony argument 
when applied to strategic weapons. Here is just one shocking example to prove that 
statement. 

This phony "cost" argument is brought forth by the same deceptive persons who 
destroyed 550 Minuteman missiles. When our nation built and deployed our 550 
Minuteman III missiles, we did not get a single additional missile because the 
Defense Department scrapped one Minuteman I or II for every minuteman III we 
built. We were told it was more cost-effective to use the same silos used by the 
Minuteman I and II. But digging holes with modern earth-moving equipment is a 
very minor expense. New holes for the Minuteman Ill's would not have cost more 
than $1 million per Minuteman III, complete with launch tube and hole, as com- 
pared to the $800,000 we paid to "modify" each existing launch tube and fit each 
Minuteman III into it. We invested at least $2y2 billion in the cost of the 550 
Minuteman Ill's. But because we used the Minuteman I and II holes, we did not add 
a single missile. For a puny $110 million more, we could have increased our missile 
force by 50 percent! Such an addition would have been vastly more valuable than 
adding extra warheads to a constant number of missiles; such an addition would 
have kept our Minuteman missile force invulnerable years past 1980. It cannot be 
argued that such an addition was prohibited by SALT I: the Minuteman Ills were 
ready for deployment in 1970, two years before SALT I imposed a freeze on digging 
new holes; and it was widely known that the Soviets were rapidly digging holes 
during that same period. 

Cost was a phony argument then, and it is a phony argument today. The funds 
spent for strategic weapons are the smallest part of the Defense Department budget; 
yet strategic weapons will determine whether we survive as a free nation, and 
whether we are able to defend ourselves against the Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, 
the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. 

In conclusion, I ask the Senators to ponder the warning given to us by Winston 
Churchill in his later years when he surveyed the prospects for survival in the 
nuclear age: 

"Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. 
Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able 
to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, 
there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever." 

Those who vote for SALT II will be abandoning our nuclear deterrent forever. 
Our nation will never get a second chance. The "peace" bought by the SALT II 
Treaty will be as fragile, as temporary, and as dangerous as the "peace in our time" 
bought by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938. 

Senator Stone, Mrs. Schlafly, we thank you and the American 
Conservative Union very much. Are there further questions? 

[There was no response.] 

Our next witness is Dr. Edward Teller of the Hoover Institution 
of Stanford, California. 

Dr. Teller, before calling on you for your testimony. Senator 
Hayakawa has a short statement he wants to make. 

Senator Hayakawa. 

Senator Hayakawa. Mr. Chairman, it was my hope that one of 
Dr. Teller's associates. Dr. Charles Teevan from the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratories, would also be one of the witnesses before 
this committee. As you know, the schedule of the committee has 
been so crowded that it was impossible to include Dr. Teevan in the 
witness list. 

I have asked Dr. Teevan, therefore, to send me his statement, 
and I would appreciate it greatly if it could be included in the 
record. 

Senator Stone. It will be included in the record at this point. 
Thank you, Senator Hayakawa, for that addition to the record. 

[Mr. Charles L. Teevan's statement follows:] 



228 

Prepared Statement of Charles L. Teevan 
salt and the control of u.s. national destiny 

The Secretary of Defense has informed us that a relatively small fraction of 
Soviet MIRVed ICBMs could, by the early to mid-1980's, reduce the number of U.S. 
MINUTEMAN ICBMs to low levels. Soviet ICBMs that threaten MINUTEMAN 
have all been developed and deployed since the 1972 SALT I agreements. We have 
also been advised by the Secretary that the Soviet Union, on the eve of a SALT II 
agreement, has a new generation of ICBMs in development, estimated to consist of 
up to four new or modified missiles. These missiles are expected to begin flight 
testing at any time or at the latest by the early 1980's; however, we know little 
about their characteristics or capabilities. We may not know these characteristics 
until they are tested — and not necessarily even then. The implications of this 
information are that the Soviet Union has maintained an industrial capability of 
producing several hundreds or more ICBMs per year and making qualitative im- 
provements in forces that undeniably are intended to further improve their strate- 
gic position; we do not even know the degree to which their posture will be 
improved nor are we preparing any concrete response, achievable within the next 
five years, to any challenge that these new missiles may present. 

New policies, and most importantly actions are required if we are to survive as a 
nation. The United States is presently committed to the negotiating table as a 
principal means of attaining and preserving national security. Our objectives during 
the 1970s were to have the Soviet Union negotiate away future military expansions 
while we offered appropriate measures in return. Although claims of accomplish- 
ment have been made concerning the enhancement of U.S. national security, these 
claims at best are misconceptions; they are overstated, incorrect, misleading, and 
self-serving to those who believe that any agreement is better than no agreement at 
all. By any measure, the relative position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union has declined more rapidly during the pjeriod following the SALT I agree- 
ments than during any other comparable period. It is important that we recognize 
the circumstances leading to this decline in U.S. strategic power during an era that 
was dominated by political control of strategic weaponry. Simply, the agreements 
represented an admirable experiment that has failed to attain the expected goals. 
The U.S. entered these agreements aware that the Soviet potential existed for 
continued improvement and expansion of their forces. The U.S. position relied on 
the good faith and good will of Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union, in return, 
manipulated the literal content of these treaties to allow accomplishment of its 
planned objectives without restrictions. The Soviet Union achieved these objec- 
tives—to a greater extent than the most farsighted U.S. observer could have predict- 
ed. The U.S., if it derived any benefit, should have learned a valuable lesson; 
however, this lesson must be explicitly understood now if it is not to be repeated. 
Time is working in favor of the Soviet Union; we can not afford to waste another 
five years. 

To understand the severity of the U.S. position, several points will be discussed in 
this paper. First, the SALT I agreements provided the mechanism for the Soviet 
Union to achieve an unprecedented, unanticipated and unopposed strategic position. 
Second, the provisions of the SALT II agreement will not allow the U.S. to enhance 
its relative strategic jwsition or to arrest the trend of growing Soviet power. Third, 
our verification process is inadequate and outdated. If we continue to place high 
confidence in this process, we practice self-deception and provide the Soviets with a 
means for subterfuge on a grand scale. 

RESULTS OF SALT I 

The U.S. claimed that SALT I had halted or frozen Soviet strategic programs. The 
Soviet Union has since accomplished, among other things, the following: 

1. Introduced new ICBMs leading to a twofold increase in overall throw-weight for 
the entire force. 

2. Introduced MIRVs on both ICBMs and SLBMs leading to more and larger 
deliverable warheads than the U.S. 

3. Developed one of the new ICBMs as a mobile system. 

4. Achieved a capability through accuracy improvements to attack and destroy a 
large percentage of U.S. ICBMs before they are launched. 

5. Introduced new and larger SSBNs. Doubled the number of SSBNs and SLBM 
launchers. Unveiled new SLBMs with ranges and throw-weights far exceeding those 
under development prior to SALT I. 

6. Developed a rapidly deployable and transportable ABM system. 

7. Developed the Backfire bomber with an inter-continental range. 



229 

8. Developed a mobile IRBM system and the technology to convert the deployed 
version to a mobile ICBM system. 

PROSPECTS FOR SALT II 

In 1972, during the SALT I debate, the U.S. pointed to several advantages that it 
believed it would maintain as a result of the SALT I Interim Agreement. These 
advantages, namely a greater number of heavy bombers and a greater number of 
MIRVed ballistic missile warheads, are disappearing. Soviet air defenses are so 
massive that the effectiveness of U.S. bombers, even if they are equipped with cruise 
missiles is questionable and the Soviets will be allowed to produce the Backfire 
bomber, in sufficient quantities to eliminate U.S. numerical superiority in this field. 
Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs will provide them with not only larger but with 
a greater number of ballistic missile warheads than the U.S. has. 

In 1979, it is not possible to point out any U.S. advantages. Furthermore, the 
SALT II agreements, do not provide for the U.S. to regain any of the lost posture of 
the past decade, nor do the provisions of the agreements reduce Soviet potential for 
causing a further decline of this posture. One reason for this is that SALT II does 
not consider strategic defensive systems or theater nuclear forces. Although it may 
be convenient for negotiators to separate strategic systems from defensive systems 
for negotiating purposes, negotiations alone are not the goal. In practice, strategic 
defenses are intimately related to offensive forces. For example, the Soviet Union 
has air defenses ten times larger than the U.S. had when the principal threat to 
this country was from an air attack. Soviet air defenses are being increased and 
improved continually. On the other hand, the U.S. has essentially no air defense; 
Soviet bombers, including Backfires, can attack the U.S. virtually unopposed. The 
Soviets can rapidly deploy an ABM defense around key targets and further develop 
and expand their already impressive Civil Defenses. The result of these efforts are a 
further reduction in the effectiveness and deterrence of U.S. offensive forces and 
therefore must be considered a very important factor of the strategic balance. 

The introduction of a mobile IRBM force by the Soviet Union is also extremely 
disturbing. This force completely dominates the European continent and, therefore, 
our allies and U.S. forces in Europe. Furthermore, by relatively simple modifica- 
tions it can be upgraded to a mobile ICBM. Soviet potential in deplo3dng this force, 
without restrictions and with its inherent technicsd flexibility, provides them with 
an opportunity to circumvent SALT II beyond any reasonable justification. 

Another reason for a declining U.S. posture is the Soviet potential for expansion 
and modernization of strategic offensive forces to achieve an almost fivefold advan- 
tage over the U.S. This paper makes no prediction but it does provide some exam- 
ples of how the Soviet Union has the capability to benefit from the technical 
flexibility inherent in their existing systems. As an example, the Soviet SSBN/ 
SLBM force although larger than its U.S. counterpart, can be considered at an 
embryonic stage in its development. It has already demonstrated an SLBM with a 
MIRV capability and with a range far exceeding that required for a missile based 
on a nuclear submarine. This excess range capability could be converted into an 
increase in the throw-weight and provide for increased numbers or sizes or war- 
heads. We also expect qualitative improvements in the Soviet ICBM force in the 
near future; however, as noted earlier, we are unaware of how great an effect these 
improvements will have on the strategic balance. 

Perhaps the greatest opportunity for force expansion as a result of SALT II is our 
acceptance of the Backfire Statement in which the Soviet Union states its intentions 
not to give the Backfire an intercontinental capability. This statement of course, is 
misleading. Backfires can fly from Russia to Mexico, Cuba, or even as far as 
Panama without refueling and with several megaton bombs on board. By further 
stating: "In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the 
radius of action (emphasis by author) of this airplane as to enable it to strike 
targets on the territory of the USA," they compound this deception — no heavy 
bomber, including those that are counted in SALT, can fly such a two-way intercon- 
tinental mission without refueling. 

Not including Backfire in SALT II, not only provides the U.S.S.R. with a modern 
bomber force that is not counted under SALT, but more importantly, it allows them 
to dispense with their older bombers that are presently counted and to replace them 
on a one-to-one basis with ICBM or SLBM launchers. 

THE INADEQUACY OF VERIFICATION 

U.S. dependence upon its verification capability can only aggravate the deteriorat- 
ing strategic situation. Our sources of information for verification of this treaty can 



230 

no longer be considered reliable; verification is based upon an intelligence system 
that has been compromised. Ck)nditions leading to this assertion are: 

1. A major portion of U.S. intelligence upon which verification depends is ob- 
tained through sensors carried by satellites and other platforms. 

2. To impress the U.S. with Soviet might and to deter the U.S. from attacking the 
Soviet Union, sufficient information on Soviet strategic military forces must be 
displayed for U.S. observation. 

3. To allow the U.S. to establish a basis for treaty verification of Soviet compli- 
ance with the SALT agreements and at the same time prevent unnecessary, unau- 
thorized or undesirable observations, rigid control and high level authorization of 
these displays are necessary. 

4. The Soviet Union deliberately conceals information on major strategic systems, 
yet we claim that they do not violate the treaty; this is further indication of the 
control and finesse that is employed in the management of our observations. 

5. The Soviet Union is therefore, sensitive to and aware of, and arranges for 
essentially all of the information obtained by the U.S. and which we regard as 
"intelligence". 

Recently, Secretary of State Vance, advised the Ck)ngress that in 1975, two years 
following SALT I, the extent of Soviet concealment activities associated with strate- 
gic weapons programs had increased substantially. The U.S. stated its concern to 
the Soviet side and, in 1975, the U.S. concluded that an expanding program no 
longer appeared to be associated with this concealment. However, the Secretary has 
also advised us of more recent Soviet concealment activities involving the SS-16 
mobile ICBM, ICBM launchers at R&D facilities, and the encoding of telemetry. 
These concealment attempts, are readily detected; they involve major strategic 
systems and politically sensitive agreements and therefore must be sanctioned and 
coordinated at the highest levels; they are unquestionably the product of a deliber- 
ate arrangement. 

From the above conditions it is obvious that the information provided by our 
national technical means for verification should be regarded with the same skepti- 
cism as that provided by a double-agent, i.e., a spy who has been identified by his 
enemies but tolerated because he becomes the means for providing information that 
is managed, probably false or misleading and, when accurate, of questionable utility. 
Moreover, and in accordance with long standing protocol, double-agents are removed 
when they have served their purpose. The Soviet Union, equipped with an op)er- 
ational antisatellite system, stands ready to destroy these satellites when they have 
served their purpose and at a time of Soviet choosing. 

As a nation concerned with our destiny, we have grave cause to review our 
position at this time. SALT II places technical, political, and military restrictions on 
what this nation can and needs to accomplish. In the light of increasing Soviet 
military strength, industrial momentum and political assertiveness, such restric- 
tions are leading to a precarious situation in which by default, our destiny as a 
sovereign nation is being placed in the hands of the Soviet leadership — an intoler- 
able posture. 

Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, may I join you in welcoming Dr. 
Teller. I look back on the days that I served together with him on 
the Rockefeller Brothers Study Project as one of the more informa- 
tive periods of my life. And for better or worse, that is what 
brought me into public life. 

I appreciate all of the time and talent Dr. Teller gave that study 
project. 

I certainly welcome you, sir. 

Senator Hayakawa. It is also my pleasure to welcome my dear 
friend Dr. Teller, who has instructed me in so many areas. 

Senator Stone. Thank you. Senators Percy and Hayakawa. 

Dr. Teller, you may proceed. 



231 

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER,* HOOVER INSTITUTION 
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. 
DAN KUYKENDALL 

Dr. Teller. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I think it has become 
very clear in the debate on SALT II that we are at a watershed. 
For many years, the balance of power between the United States 
and the Soviet Union has been shifting. Now it has shifted. 

I would like to emphasize one point. The men who are leading 
the Pentagon today are excellent, dedicated people working under 
difficult conditions. They have made the best of possible decisions 
in many respects. 

Yet almost all of them believe that unless we do something, we 
will soon be in a position of inferiority. 

One of your most eminent witnesses. General Haig, has argued 
that we are inferior even today. So have others. There is plenty of 
evidence, and I will give you some of it, that they are right. 

I think that we have made, historically throughout the years, a 
tremendous mistake. We have confused the words "arms race" 
with the concept of a race in technology. An arms race is some- 
thing that you can quantify, something that you can regulate, 
something that you can limit. A race in technology cannot be 
quantified or limited. 

It is not possible to make rules about ideas that are yet to come, 
and such ideas do emerge in a time of rapidly developing, unpre- 
dictable technology. I have been associated with intelligence, and 
unfortunately I am not allowed to tell you everything I have 
learned. 

But I know and many of you know that we have observed in 
Russia a number of projects which we do not know how to inter- 
pret. I don't think the Russians are crazy. As long as they were 
following in our footsteps, they were moving rapidly. Novv they 
have moved ahead of us according to the indications we can gather, 
not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. 

I do not believe that SALT II should be ratified provided our 
military budget is increased. What is needed is specific projects. 
And today it is extremely difficult even to propose these specific 
projects. I will try to, and I will not succeed. I am 71 years old. 

Senator Javits. You are a young man. 

Dr. Teller. Thank you, sir. 

Our young scientists, our young men have been indoctrinated 
that to work on arms is the wrong thing to do, and in scientific 
circles this point of view is widespread. Gentlemen, I had a hard 
time trying to make up my mind to work on the Manhattan 
Project. What decided me was a speech, the only speech I heard 
President Roosevelt deliver. He said that if scientists in the free 
world won't work on weapons, freedom will cease to exist. 

It was true then. It is true now. Then the world was bigger. 
Today we are more exposed. Then our opponent attacked prema- 
turely. Today our opponents are deliberate. The Russians move 
when they are sure of their goal, in the Middle East, in Europe, in 
the Caribbean. 



' See page 239 for Dr. Teller's prepared statement. 



232 

We are offered a treaty. If we reject it, it will become clear that 
we don't need to worry. If we accept it, we are apt to ignore a very 
dangerous situation which I want to describe to you. 

We are told that retaliation rests on three secure foundations: 
Land-based missiles, bombers, and submarines. Of the three legs, 
two are very doubtful. This is admitted about land-based missiles 
by the administration. They will deploy the M-X, but under pres- 
ent plans, the deplo3Tiient will not have an effect during the time 
of validity of SALT II. 

We have accepted a form of the M-X which is costly and slow to 
develop, although I am happy to see from today's press that the 
President, under the urging of the Pentagon, has decided on a big 
missile. That, at least, was a good point. Our land based missiles 
are certainly vulnerable. 

Our planes are exposed to a Russian first strike because our air 
bases are close to the coast. They can be shot down by saboteurs 
shortly after they take off, with relative ease. They can be stopped 
in mid-course, having been observed by Russian radar, before they 
can release their cruise missiles. And then they face a tremendous 
air defense. 

We have practically no air defense, not against the older Russian 
bombers and not against the Backfire. Instead of three solid legs, 
we have a single wobbly leg. Our submarines may survive, but the 
Russians are working diligently not only on acoustic detection but 
on all kinds of much more advanced detection. 

This is one of many examples where we have reason to believe 
that Russian military technology is ahead of ours. The fact that 
their civilian technology is way behind us has lulled us into a false 
sense of security. 

Apart from its inherent weakness, the treaty as it is written is 
very hard to verify. Just one example: It limits only launchers, not 
missiles. The Russians, openly or covertly, could deploy in ware- 
houses away from their launching sites, hundreds, even thousands 
of additional missiles, together with makeshift launchers we could 
never identify. Thus they could develop a much greater superiority 
even than the one they possess today. 

There are other ways in which they can further enhance their 
lead over us. 

The fact is they can evacuate their cities, threaten to destroy us, 
and I believe there is today no realistic way to respond to the 
threat. Apart from all of this, the treaty practically disregards our 
allies; there are no limitations on the Backfire, in the hope it 
might not reach us, even though it is certain that the Backfire is a 
dreadful threat to our allies. There are no limitations on the SS-20, 
which could be easily and rapidly changed to become an interconti- 
nental missile. But even as it now stands, it can destroy the Euro- 
pean forces overnight. This, together with the noncircumvention 
clauses, articles XII and XIII, is deeply discouraging to our allies. 

The testimony of General Haig, who until recently served our 
Government, is the most eloquent and the most authoritative to 
show our weakness and our need to act. 

We are in an extremely difficult situation. The debate on SALT 
II is something upon which I look as an opportunity. By voting 
against the ratification of SALT II, you can deliver a message to 



233 

the American people that we are in danger. We cannot be saved 
except by mobilizing our scientists and our industry, and we need 
that more badly than we ever needed it when the Second World 
War was impending. 

Young people with imagination are desperately needed to do 
what they should have been doing in the last 20 years, inventing 
ways out of difficulties. What we need equally, perhaps even more, 
is discussions with our allies who otherwise in their desperation 
may have to submit to the Soviet Union or else develop — openly or 
covertly — their own nuclear deterrent. 

The research, the preparation should be our main immediate 
purpose. I would not settle for any increase in the budget. I might 
be tempted to settle for concrete and helpful projects that would, in 
fact, deter the Russians. But these projects themselves should be 
preceded by thorough research and development of technology. 

It is not the money that will save us. It is the ideas. And you 
have a handle. You have a signal that you can give to the Ameri- 
can people that unless we come up with new ideas for our defense, 
the lives of all Americans are at risk. 

I want to finish by making one remark. The weakness that has 
developed throughout the years is made visible by SALT II. It has 
persuaded many, and not only Mrs. Schlafly, that we should fire on 
warning; that when the Russians fire at our missiles, we should 
retaliate by firing on Russian cities. 

I am against it. I am against the arms race. I am for new ideas. 
And one of these ideas is not so new. The Russians have a plan to 
evacuate their cities. When we notice it, we should warn our citi- 
zens to evacuate, and they could do so, promptly, provided that we 
prepare now. 

We can do many other things. Our electronics is superb. We 
could develop remotely controlled vehicles in the air, on land, and 
in the sea more cheaply and effectively. These would be both more 
expendable, more survivable than our present arms, which are, in 
fact, obsolete. 

The Russians are working on ABM. We should work on ABM. A 
new line of research is laser research. Three people shared the 
Nobel Prize for lasers: The American, Townes, who is now working 
on the question what happens in our galaxy and in distant galsix- 
ies, and two Russian scientists, Basow and Prokcroff, who are 
working on lasers and working to help Soviet defense, which is 
really preparation for Soviet aggression. All of this is narrowly and 
closely linked. 

That is narrowly and closely linked with all kinds of plans to 
increase the Communist sway over the world. 

I have in the past said that trouble is coming. Today I am not 
alone in saying that trouble has arrived. Our Secretary of Defense, 
in the guarded language imposed by his office, said, in his way, the 
very same thing. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator Javits [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Teller. We 
all know your repute and sincerity. We deeply appreciate your 
testimony. 

We operate under a 10-minute rule of questions and answers. 
Senator Helms is first. 



234 

Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of Mr. Teller 
but I do want to express to him my appreciation for his coming 
here today, and also I want to express my admiration for you, sir. 

Senator Javits. Thank you very much. 

Senator Hayakawa. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

RELEVANCE OF SALT II TO TECHNOLOGICAL RACE 

I too am extremely grateful for Dr. Teller's testimony. He 
aroused my curiousity a great deal about the coming race in tech- 
nology. The old concept of an arms race which is purely quantita- 
tive in weapons is obsolete. The future lies in a technological race, 
and to that technological race, SALT II is practically irrelevant, if I 
understand you correctly. 

Dr. Teller. SALT II is doubly relevant. 

Senator Hayakawa. Is what? 

Dr. Teller. Doubly relevant for the technology race. It is specifi- 
cally relevant, and it is relevant in connection with motivation. 
SALT II, for instance, permits only one new missile to be tested. Of 
course, that applies to the Russians as well. But what a new 
missile is is so loosely defined that the Russians can circumvent it. 
We in our open system cannot. 

The very fact that we outlaw new missiles is a clear signal to our 
young and imaginative people not to engage in this work. By 
working closely with our allies, we could mobilize the immense 
manpower and intellectual power that exists in the free world. 
That is explicitly forbidden in SALT II. 

Finally, to give you one other example, the deployment of the M- 
X is slow, clumsy and, in the end, ineffective because of real 
limitations or perceptions that today govern decisions about the M- 
X. This is one end. The other end I have indicated. 

Unless our people will hear words similar to the words that I 
heard from Roosevelt in 1940, they will continue to feel that they 
would rather look into the structure of the smallest particles in the 
world and will not worry about the defense of our country because 
that presumably has been taken care of by the SALT II agree- 
ments. 

It is up to you to tell them clearly. 

Senator Hayakawa. Would you quote again for me what you 
quoted from Franklin Roosevelt, that one sentence? 

Dr. Teller. Franklin Roosevelt, on the day after Hitler invaded 
Belgium and Holland, addressed the Pan American Scientific Con- 
gress, which I attended. It was the first political meeting I ever 
attended. He said: "You scientists are being blamed for the weap- 
ons of destruction that are now being used. But I tell you, unless 
scientists in the free world work on weapons, freedom will cease to 
exist." 

I w£is very deeply impressed, Senator Hayakawa, because I was 
there when Einstein signed a letter to Roosevelt a few months 
earlier suggesting the development of atomic weapons. I thought I 
knew what Roosevelt was talking about. 

Today, not many people and in particular not many people in 
high authority think this way. 



235 

Senator Hayakawa. What you said about young scientists at 
that point — and you were a young scientist then — struck me very 
forcibly because at that time I was teaching at the lUinois Institute 
of Technology. I remember that my colleagues in the scientific 
departments, in physics, in chemistry and metallurgy and so on, 
suddenly disappeared. And after the war was over, I learned they 
had been at Oak Ridge. 

But I do know that they were motivated by exactly the kind of 
idea that President Roosevelt formulated at that time. Unless sci- 
entists in the free world work on weaponry, there will no longer be 
any freedom. 

So, as a former college president and educator, I would like to 
ask you, what about young scientists now? Are they willing to 
engage in this kind of race in technology to protect our freedoms? 

Dr. Teller. No. And I would like to have permission to give you 
a further example. 

Senator Hayakawa. Please. 

Dr. Teller. Christmas 1950, the president of the Physical Soci- 
ety, later scientific adviser of the President, addressed a meeting of 
physicists in Pasadena at Cal Tech, of which he was then president. 
And he said: 

We are now at war in Korea. Many of the young people have come to me and 
asked should we go back and work on weapons? I had been in Washington. I had 
inquired. I can tell you the answer is no, we have all the weapons, all the ideas we 
can possibly use. All we need to worry about is that what we have learned should 
not be misused. 

As far back as 29 years ago, our young people were indoctrinated 
by their highest authority not to work for the military. We knew 
everything. 

That was just the beginning of the debate on the hydrogen bomb 
which DuBridge and many others opposed. We now know that the 
hydrogen bomb was produced by the Russians and by us, as far as 
one can tell, at the same time. Had we not produced the hydrogen 
bomb and the Russians would have produced it, we would have 
denied that it exists. We would have ignored it as we are now 
tr5dng to ignore the reality of Russian superiority. 

Senator Hayakawa. So this is a message which must ultimately 
be brought to young scientists, is it not? 

Dr. Teller. Senator Hayakawa, this is the case. And my question 
is: Who will do it? 

My hope is that you in the Senate might make a tremendous 
contribution in bringing home to our young people that peace can 
be kept if there is power in the hands of those who love peace more 
than they love domination. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Dr. Teller. Thank you very 
much. 

Senator Zorinsky [presiding]. Senator Javits. 

MAIN FAULTS OF SALT II 

Senator Javits. Dr. Teller, I just want to be sure that I under- 
stand very clearly your argument because I would like to pose 
what I consider to be a grave dilemma to you concerning young 
scientists. 



1+8-260 0-79 Pt.t - 16 



236 

In the first place, may I say that although your views and mine 
may not necessarily be parallel, there are few men in American 
life who are more valuable to our country in compounding our 
national decisions which require men of strong views, of high char- 
acter and of great professional and personal ability. 

So the fact that we may not agree does not mean a thing to me. 

Do I understand your argument to be that the main fault with 
SALT II is that it doesn't accomplish anything and that it will 
again make us complacent, and will lull us to sleep? Or do I 
understand your argument to be that SALT II affirmatively hurts 
us, for example, that at the end of the SALT II period, no matter 
what we do, the Russians will be at us. No matter what we do, 
even if we do everything you say. 

Dr. Teller. Senator Javits, I want to say two very difficult 
things. First, the possibility for us to disagree is the very essence of 
the idea of freedom and this is what both you and I want to defend. 

Second, I want to say that a few months ago I had the opportuni- 
ty to talk to an official in the White House, not a very high official, 
about SALT. I said to him, there is one condition under which I 
would consider SALT as possibly acceptable, not as helpful, not as 
valuable, but as acceptable: If the President would put it before the 
American people together with the statement that we are in deep 
trouble and in great danger; that we must take immediate steps to 
mobilize our scientists and our technologists to remedy all deficien- 
cies that we can. 

Even then, SALT would have great shortcomings. But a state- 
ment of that kind coming from the President, put forward in a 
forceful and clear manner, could sway my opinion. 

The President instead addressed the joint Congress with the false 
statement, which he should have known is false, that America is 
the strongest military power. 

Since this is the history of SALT II, I see no way in which I can 
recommend its support. 

Senator Javits. That leads me to this dilemma. As I say, I am 
not going to in any way dispute details with you. For example, my 
staff gave me a long list of all the strategic weapons we are 
developing now, including new weaponry like particle beams and 
so on, but you are very familiar with that, much more than I. 

Dr. Teller. Senator, may I tell you, on particle beams we are 
spending a few million dollars. We have a program on that. I am 
not sure that it is the most essential program but I have supported 
it. 

future role of young scientists in armament programs 

Senator Javits. I won't even debate that, but I would like to ask 
you a fundamental question. 

You spoke of young scientists. I agree with you a lot about that, I 
really do. We have an excellent educator here in Senator 
Hayakawa, and he agrees with you, which is more important than 
my agreeing. But this is an equation that troubles me. And I am 
speaking as a politician. 

These very young scientists, maybe, are much more likely to go 
to work if we approve SALT II with some declaration dedicating 



237 

ourselves to equity, parity, equivalency, whatever you may call it. I 
am sure it is coming and I will be for it, I will help to work it out. 

What concerns me is then that these young scientists who think 
differently in many respects from you and from me, may be much 
more willing to say, OK, my Senator really tried. They approved 
what was before them. They continued this process. So OK, now we 
will go with them whereas before we hung back because we didn't 
want to contribute to warmaking. We think they, too, are men of 
peace, they are trying. We will go with them. 

Whereas, if we turned down SALT II, maybe their reaction will 
confound you and other very able people who think like you, and 
they will say, oh, the jig is up. These people think about nothing 
but armament, nothing but confrontation, nothing but war. We are 
not going, we are against it. We don't believe that the human race 
should be exterminated with our aid. 

I ask you that question. Is it not possible that their reaction will 
be precisely the contrary of what you picture for us in the greatest 
good faith? 

Dr. Teller. Senator, you ask me an honest question. 

Senator Javits. I do. 

Dr. Teller. And I will give you an honest answer. I supported, I 
am sorry to say, SALT I. I did because at that time the danger was 
not as imminent as it is today. I did it because SALT I for the first 
time spelled out an actual disparity, which the Senate did point 
out. 

We did at that time what you now recommend. It did not help. 
Would it not be better this time to do the opposite and raise the 
red flag of danger? Short of that, you cannot be effective. 

It is important that our young people work for peace, but if we 
talk not of the United States but of the free world, if we combined 
the mobilization of our scientists with the unification of the free 
world for the common defense in an unreserved manner, in such a 
program there could be enough ideals to attract many young 
people who probably are not so different from what you and I used 
to be. 

Senator Javits. Dr. Teller, my time is up and I would just like to 
make this one comment. I have felt very deeply that there is 
nothing wrong with the world, including the danger of the Soviet 
Union, that could not be fixed infinitely more quickly by real 
harmony and unity in the policy of western Europe and the United 
States and Japan. 

We still have it. I don't know how long we will keep it, but we 
have it. 

Dr. Teller. And SALT II may do its greatest damage in disrupt- 
ing this harmony. 

Senator Javits. What I say to you is this: We may have even 
more trouble with the European countries and the European scien- 
tists than with the young American scientists precisely because we 
turned down SALT II, but I appreciate your thesis. It is tremen- 
dously helpful and informative. 

Dr. Teller. Sir, I appreciate yours fully. 



238 

ADVOCATE QUAUTATIVE RACE 

Senator Zorinsky. Dr. Teller, you indicate that there is a vast 
disparity between the Soviet Union's quantitative nuclear ability 
and that of our Nation. Do you advocate, rather than engaging in a 
numbers race, a quantitative race, that we direct our attention to 
technology and improving the quality of our delivery systems and 
our capability? Is that correct? 

Dr. Teller. In part, sir. 

Senator Zorinsky. Do we have time? 

Dr. Teller. I would not limit it to our delivery systems. I would 
include active defense, like ABM. And now I am in a really diffi- 
cult position because if we realize that there is trouble, what can 
be invented is not something for one person — and at that, an old 
person — to say. 

What I do know is that in our efforts, essentially new ideas have 
been missing for almost 20 years. This is a direct consequence of 
the discouragement of this type of work among scientists. This is 
the point we have to remedy. I hope that the outcome will be 
different from more arms of destruction. 

Civil defense is one thing I strongly and most seriously advocate. 
There are many other things that probably will emerge, and I 
mentioned only a few. 

Senator Zorinsky. You indicate that we should not engage in 
quantitative but rather qualitative competition, and my question is: 
Do you feel we have time to enter the qualitative field rather than 
the quantitative field inasmuch as you do indicate a feeling of 
hesitancy in the document you presented today? 

Dr. Teller. I am deeply grateful to you for this last point. I 
hesitate. There may not be time for the qualitative development. It 
may be necessary to spend more money, perhaps in a non-too- 
effective manner, because the trouble is upon us. But the more we 
delay in informing and mobilizing all the young people of the free 
world, the more we will be driven toward the ineffective and more 
destructive quantitative aspects. 

That is the very reason why we should act fast and act now. I am 
much more interested in this point of mobilization than in the 
point of any special problem. But as things are at the present, I 
believe that your best choice of appealing to the sense of urgency of 
all Americans, including the scientists 

PRECLUSION OF ACTIONS BY SALT II 

Senator Zorinsky. Other than the psychological aspects of a 
ratification of SALT II, is there anything in SALT II that would 
prohibit or preclude the American public and the scientists from 
doing exactly what you are recommending? 

Dr. Teller. Yes, there is. There are words in the whole SALT 
process, ill-defined words to the effect that more weapons, new 
weapons, should not be introduced. When we outlawed ABM, we 
made it very clear that we oppose defensive weapons as well as 
weapons of destruction. The whole disarmament procedure, the 
whole tradition of SALT negotiations is, in a sense, to discourage 
new ideas in weapons.. This is a part of the agreement which we 
observe and the Russians never have observed. 



239 

Senator Zorinsky. But it mentions no specific prohibition of 
increased technology or research and development in that area 
other, maybe, than deplojonent and a protocol beyond a certain 
year. 

Dr. Teller. It does so in this connection. But I would say — and I 
am very sorry that Senator Percy is no longer here — I most defi- 
nitely disagree with his statement that nobody any longer advo- 
cates ABM. I certainly do. I had considered it in the late fifties as 
too difficult. The more I see of scientific developments, the more I 
believe that it is possible. And the more I observe what the Rus- 
sians are doing, the more I feel that in this specific instance they 
are apt to be way ahead of us. 

If you could manage to abrogate the ABM Treaty, it might be a 
long step in the right direction. 

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you very much. Dr. Teller. I appreciate 
the context of your statement, together with your taking your time 
to appear before this committee to enlighten not only us but the 
American public as to your views on this vital issue of concern to 
our Nation. 

Thank you very much. 

[Dr. Teller's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Dr. Edward Teller 

SALT II AND arms RACE OR RESEARCH AND SAFETY 

Introduction 

The SALT II Treaty was presented to the Joint Session of Congress by President 
Carter and most Americans were listening. We were told that the United States is 
the strongest military power, that atomic weapons are too dangerous, and the 
danger for everybody can be diminished if SALT II is ratified. Ensuing discussions 
resulted in proposals that SALT II indeed should be ratified provided that by 
further expenditures we increase our military preparedness. It is indeed generally 
believed that we are involved in a quantitative arms race and our military experts 
are beginning to recognize that the Russians are outspending us. Indeed Secretary 
of Defense Brown has stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee: 
". . . the gap between U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures cannot go on increasing 
without a dangerous tilt in the relevant balances of power and a weakening of the 
overall U.S. deterrent." 

He also said: ". . . our strategic submarines and bombers are aging; the ICBM leg 
of the TRIAD is becoming vulnerable; and our command and control system is not 
as capable as it should be. ' 

I claim that all these somewhat divergent statements point in the wrong direc- 
tion. They suggest that we are, and for some time will be, involved in an arms race, 
that the race can be slowed down by ratifying SALT II and if there are residual 
dangers they can be rectified by spending more money. 

To the extent to which we are involved in an arms race, we have lost it and it will 
take many years and extremely heavy financial sacrifices to catch up. Even in the 
quality of the weapons the Soviets are ahead of us, a shocking circumstance since 
many Americans continue to think of the Soviet Union as a primitive nation. 

If we continue on our present course, adopt SALT II, and try to apply the 
proposed corrective measures we shall fail and the 1980s will become an exceedingly 
dangerous period for the United States as well as for the Free World. 

There is a possibility to correct this dangerous situation. We should get rid of the 
idea that we are involved in an arms race. We should realize that we are involved 
in a race of technology. If we turn our full attention to the weakest points in our 
defense, to qualitative improvements of our weapons, to strengthening our alliances, 
and sharing responsibilities and benefits with our friends, and if we place the 
highest priority on defending the lives of the citizens of America, we still may 
escape the consequences of mistakes that have been made in past years. 

One essential difference between an arms race and a race in technology is that in 
the former quantities are important and limitation of the number of weapons makes 
sense; in the latter qualitative improvements are emphasized and there is not much 



240 

point in counting the numbers of various pieces of equipment. In an arms race arms 
limitations such as proposed in SALT II could, under some circumstances, lead to 
more security; in a race of technology arms limitations can hardly be formulated. 

Conversely, ratification of SALT II will of necessity drive us into a continuing 
arms race. In playing "catch up" we are not apt to be successful, particularly 
because of the sense of prevailing complacency which has been strengthened by the 
President's over-optimistic presentation. 

If on the other hand we realize the present danger, if we mobilize American 
talent, inventiveness and capability of innovative production, the United States 
together with its Allies may prevail in an effort to stabilize peace and avoid war. 
The more we emphasize ingenuity in defense and the less we rely on the obsolete 
idea of an arms race the less expensive it will be to insure desperately needed 
stability. 

The imbalance of arms 

We have been told by our government officials that at present Russian and 
American strategic forces are roughly equivalent. This statement is made in spite of 
the accepted fact that in one of the categories where comparisons are most easily 
made, the land-based missiles, the Russians enjoy a 5 to 1 advantage in throw 
weight, that is, the weight of the explosives that the rockets can carry across the 
ocean. That the Russian advantage is not only in quantity but also is in quality has 
been denied by our Secretary of Defense. Even he admits, however, that the Rus- 
sians "have been developing several land-based missiles, their fifth generation of 
them." By comparison our missiles are fifteen years old. Even to maintain them 
places considerable burden on our economy. 

Our bombers have been built thirty years ago while the Soviets are turning out 
the new "Backfires," planes that constitute a formidable danger to our Allies and 
that can cross the Atlantic, deliver atomic bombs on the United States and land in 
Cuba. 

There is evidence of considerable Russian progress in submarines, which is not 
fully acknowledged by our Navy and is known to our public only through rumors. 

We are being told that our retaliatory force is three-fold assured. The 'three legs 
of the TRIAD are the land-based missiles, the American bombers, and the missile- 
canying submarines. Let us consider these three legs. 

It is officially acknowledged that by the early 1980's our land-based missiles can 
be wiped out by a Russian first strike. We are told that the new big MX missile will 
be survivable. Unfortunately MX is supposed to be flight tested only in 1983. Full 
deplo3Tnent cannot be expected before 1986 and probably not even then. In the 
meantime the Soviets have several methods by which they can destroy our present 
Minuteman together with the new MX sites. Tliis situation is in part due to the fact 
that for MX an optimal mode of deployment has not been chosen. The deplo5Tnent 
appears to have been influenced by acceptability to the Soviets even though other 
modes of deployment could be checked as easily as the presently planned MX. The 
Soviets seem to be more willing to accept our present plans which are more 
expensive, less efficient, and slower in deployment than others that have been 
suggested. From the Soviet point of view their behavior is fully understandable. 

In this difficult situation it has been even suggested that our land-based missiles 
should be fired "on warning." This is a proposal dangerously close to the concept of 
an American first strike which in my opinion we must avoid. By overemphasizing 
insufficiently controlled arms reduction we appear to be driven into the destabiliz- 
ing position where we may be willing to release our rockets before America or our 
Allies have actually suffered nuclear damage at the hands of the Soviets. 

I am not suggesting that our land-based missiles should be abandoned. I am 
suggesting that constructive improvements should be sought and that these im- 
provements should not be constrained by arbitrary restrictions presumably originat- 
ing in the Kremlin. 

Our reliance on retaliation by our airplanes is hardly more secure. Practically all 
our airfields are a short distance from the ocean and can be destroyed within a few 
minutes by rockets launched from Russian submarines. To establish an inland air 
field will cost 50 million dollars and it is difficult to understand why a considerable 
number of such air fields have not yet been established. 

Airplanes are also vulnerable shortly after takeoff by rockets fired by saboteurs. 
This is all the more easy since the course of an airplane immediately after takeoff is 
relatively easily predicted. 

Deployment of cruise missiles on airplanes is a real help. It is therefore no 
surprise that in the SALT II negotiations the Soviets objected to the cruise missiles 
in a most vigorous manner. 

There is a serious danger that for a considerable period to come our planes will be 
vulnerable to Russian air defense before they can release the cruise missiles. Taking 



241 

all this into account I am happy to express my strongest support to Secretary 
Brown's advocacy of the cruise missile. I wish he had been even more successful in 
the rapid deployment of this instrument. 

This is indeed one of the examples where American know-how is making an 
improvement in a difficult situation. 

And the situation is indeed difficult. Soviet air c'efenses are by far the best in the 
world, while we have practically nothing with which to stop Soviet bombers if they 
choose to attack us. 

Considering the danger to our air fields, the danger to our planes at takeoff, the 
danger to our planes in midcourse as they are being observed by long-range Soviet 
radar and subsequently attacked, and finally considering Soviet air defenses by 
which they can oppose airplanes and also a considerable number of cruise missiles, 
we have to conclude that our strategic bomber force is not a reliable leg of the 
TRIAD. 

This leaves a single leg: our missile-carrying submarines. Here we are moving in 
the direction of putting more and more eggs into fewer and fewer baskets. We hope, 
but we do not know, that our submarines will not be detected. We have paid careful 
attention to minimize the noise of the submarines and the Soviets may find acoustic 
detection difficult indeed. They have openly stated that they are working on non- 
acoustical unconventional means of detection. This is one field where we have to 
suspect that their technology is ahead of ours. That suspicion of course cannot be 
proved even though the Russians have stated that they have solved the submarine 
detection problem. Our information on this topic is so highly classified that the 
Navy practically keeps these data secret from itself. 

This question has been carefully discussed in a book entitled, "Strategic Deter- 
rents in the 1980's" by Dr. Roger Speed. The book is based on unclassified data. The 
relevant portion on our submarines, taken from Chapter 3 on the "The Surviva- 
bility of U.S. Strategic Forces," is attached as Appendix I to this report. 

The conclusion is that the uncertainty concerning submarines is the greatest. 
They may work, but on the other hand, they may be the first which are lost. 

CAN SALT II BE VERIFIED? 

In his testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown stated: "This (SALT II) would require the Soviets to reduce 
by approximately 250 these strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Without SALT II, if 
the present trend continued, as I believe it would, the Soviet Union would instead 
have about 3,000 such weapons by 1985, instead of 2250." 

According to the Secretary, one of the considerable advantages of SALT II is 
therefore to reduce the prospective number of Soviet weapons in 1985 by 25%. 

The remarkable point is that according to the provisions of SALT II the difference 
of 750 weapons could hardly be noticed. Indeed SALT II permits to produce addition- 
al rockets which could be stored in unknown locations, in warehouses or even in 
holds of ships as long as no launching equipment is associated wdth them.' Of 
course, these sites would not be hardened but they also would not be known to us. 
Soft launching equipment can be exceedingly simple and can be rapidly assembled, 
probably in not more than 24 hours. 

This example illustrates how easy it is for the Soviets to evade a provision of the 
SALT II agreements which our Secretary of Defense counts as one of the big 
advantages of SALT II.' 

Article XV, paragraph 2, provides that neither Party will: "interfere with the 
national technical means of verification of the other Party." 

It also states in paragraph 3 that: "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate 
concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of 
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty." 

While this seems to be a satisfactory statement it becomes dubious due to the 
Second Common Understanding attached to this provision according to which: 
"Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telernetric information 
during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provi- 
sions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in 
deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry 
encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provi- 
sions of the Treaty." 

It would be interesting to know how complete an explanation of the encryption 
would be needed in order to be assured that Soviet encryption does not carry 
additional information which is denied to our side. 



' See Appendix II. 



242 

This point is of importance, for instance, in connection with obtaining most 
important information concerning accuracy of Soviet missiles. We have consistently 
claimed that the accuracy of our missiles is considerably higher than that of the 
Soviets. This claim has been always based on somewhat involved and complicated 
inferences. SALT II opens an easy possibility for the Soviets to let us know as much 
of the details of their telemetry as is convenient for them and to deny information 
which they want to keep concealed. 

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary Brown 
rightly places emphasis on the limitation that the Treaty imposes on "fractiona- 
tion." He points out that within the Treaty only ten-fold MIRVing is permitted and 
continues: "Were it not for this limit, the Soviet SS-18 missile could be equipped to 
carry as many as 30 independently targeted warheads in the 1980's. With SALT II, 
that will not happen. . . . The treaty also provides measures to permit unimpeded 
verification by national technical means." 

The question must be raised whether a thirty-fold MIRVed SS-18 may be tested 
but only ten of the thirty reentry vehicles may be released. This would be a 
sufficient test from the point of view of the Soviets. That two-thirds of the payload 
is not released as reentry vehicles could in principle be detected by our side. Such 
detection, however, would be hard and the evidence would be dubious particularly 
in view of permission that Soviet telemetry be encrypted. 

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary Brown 
states: "The Treaty limit means that now all but one of those new missiles^ will 
have to be restricted to designs whose capabilities C£ui differ from those of their 
predecessors in only quite limited fashion." 

This claim is based on Article IV, paragraph 9: "Each Party undertakes not to 
flight-test or deploy new t5T)es of ICBMs, that is, t3Tpes of ICBMs not flight-tested as 
of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of 
light ICBM," and in particular on the Second Common Understanding, according to 
which: "the term 'different,' referring to the length, the diameter, the launch- weight 
and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent 
from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth 
launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier. 
The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last twelve of 
the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve launches before deployment 
begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than ten 
percent from anjy other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those 
twelve launches.' 

It is remarkable that the Soviets have not communicated to us the values from 
which according to the Second Common Understanding they must not deviate by 
more than five percent or more than ten percent. "These values are based on 
American inferences. The difficulty of verification is obvious and has been empha- 
sized in the press.' In particular it was pointed out that the text of Article IV was 
drafted in such a manner to give latitude for Soviet tests sufficient to gain a 
decisive advantage. 

SOVIET GOALS 

Our Secretary of Defense, to my positive knowledge, has given the question of 
Soviet goals careful thought for many years. In his testimony to the Senate Armed 
Service Committee he has stated: 

"Although Soviet intentions cannot be confidently assessed, there can be no doubt 
about the steady increase in the Soviet defense effort. As the Soviet gross national 
product has grown, so have expenditures on the defense effort; Soviet armed forces 
have improved substantially with these steadily increasing outlays. 

"My judgment is that these developments have been for more than a decade 
substantially insensitive to changes in the magnitude of U.S. and allied programs. 

"It is worth noting, moreover, that the growth in Soviet military spending has 
correlated quite closely with the overall growth in the U.S.S.R.'s economy, while our 
own military effort has steadily shrunk as a fraction of our economy. Nowhere in 
the record do I find historical evidence that if we are restrained, the Soviets will 
reciprocate — except where specific and verifiable arms control agreements are nego- 
tiated. 

"The Soviets have made steady and impressive military strides during the last 15 
years. We cannot afford either to underestimate or to exaggerate them." 

It has been widely noted that as Soviet strength has continued to increase so did 
Soviet interference in parts of the world which were not previously included in their 



' The Secretary refers here to the fifth generation of Russian missiles. 
' See Appendix III. 



243 

zone of influence. This fact has been stressed in the testimony of Secretary Kissin- 
ger. Soviet weapons have appeared in Angola, in the guerrilla fights in Rhodesia, 
and they have established Soviet dominance in the horn of Africa. South Yemen 
now does the bidding of the Kremlin. The regime in Afghanistan is based on Soviet 
arms. Soviet influence has aided in bringing about the present continuing disorder 
in Iran. 

The time may not be distant when the Soviet Union can dictate terms to the oil- 
producing countries in the Middle East. It is not difficult to foresee that Soviet 
confidence in their own arms may enable them to extend their domination into the 
Middle East, that is into a region which in turn, through the oil weapon, could have 
the most deep influence on decisions made in Western Europe, in Japan and in the 
Third World. 

To what extent and how explicitly the Kremlin intends to use its military power 
as a threat and whether any such threat may be carried to the extreme of action 
and in particular employment of nuclear weapons, this is and remains impossible to 
predict. 

EFFECT OF SALT 11 ON NATO 

The United States negotiated a treaty with the Soviet Union which includes no 
limitations on the SS-20 missiles and little limitation on the "Backfire" airplane. 
These are formidable weapons which put our NATO Allies into mortal danger. Our 
Allies not wanting to offend both the super powers are under extreme pressure to 
agree to the SALT II Treaty. This agreement is further based on general fear of 
nuclear weapons, a motivation which for understandable reasons is shared by many 
people in the United States. 

In spite of this there can be no question that our NATO Allies are deeply 
disturbed by the turn of events. It is probable that both England and France will 
increase their nuclear preparedness and thereby decrease their reliance on the 
United States. Germany and also Japan (which of course is outside the NATO 
Alliance) are in an even more difficult position. These countries may have to make 
a choice in the coming years between being Finlandized or developing, probably in 
complete secrecy, a nuclear strike force of their own. 

The upshot of all this is that SALT II, instead of decreasing the arms race, will 
contribute to nuclear arms proliferation in a most dangerous manner. 

THE TESTIMONY FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

Statements of support of SALT II from our Allies cannot be considered as being 
made in a completely free and voluntary manner. The same may hold for witnesses 
who are a part of the Executive Branch of our Government. 

I have little doubt that discussions within the Executive Branch are conducted on 
the highest intellectual level and in a free manner. But when the Executive Branch 
comes to a policy decision members of the Executive Branch must work as a team. 
For this reason they cannot oppose the policy decisions of the Executive Branch 
without losing their effectiveness or at least a great part of their effectiveness. 

In a problem as complex as SALT II it is not easy to arrive at a clear and 
conclusive answer. The result is that testimony in favor of SALT 11 must be 
carefully reviewed and should not always be taken completely at its face value. 

The division of power in our Constitution has the purpose of rendering the other 
Branches of our Government truly independent of the Executive Branch. If the 
Senate is overly influenced by testimony from the Executive Branch this would 
contradict the spirit of our Constitution. 

I would like to add a personal remark. The testimony of our Secretary of Defense 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which I have quoted on several 
occasions, comes from a person of the highest competence and of impeccable hones- 
ty. I believe that he is the best qualified Secretary of Defense this Country has ever 
had in the Modern Age. It is significant that his testimony in favor of SALT II 
contains a number of serious warnings. 

It may be even more significant that General Haig who left the Executive Branch 
before testifying came among his colleagues closest to a recommendation against 
ratifying the SALT 11 Treaty. 

CONSEQUENCES OF REJECTING SALT U 

It has been repeatedly stated that rejection of SALT 11 would result in an arms 
race and in high expenditures. Secretary Brown estimates that total added expendi- 
tures needed would be 30 billion dollars. Others have rightly suggested that in case 
of ratification of SALT II the defense budget in real dollars should be increased by 5 
billion dollars annually for a number of years, a total expenditure considerably in 



244 

excess of what Secretary Brown has recommended. In the whole discussion whether 
one argues for SALT II or against it, it seems that we will have to spend more 
dollars. This whole line of reasoning is faulty and is a symptom of the arms-race 
mentality which is closely connected to SALT II. 

I would like to recommend a radically different approach, the first step of which 
would be to deliver a negative vote on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, 
thereby providing the incentive for a number of events. 

The first is a widespread realization that we are in serious trouble. Indeed SALT 
II is not a measure by which our danger is decreased. Rather it is a measure by 
which our danger will be hidden. The ultimate consequence of a belated realization 
of our troubles will be greater and perhaps even inescapable danger to the welfare 
and perhaps even to the survival of our Country. 

The second consequence should be to take some elementary steps to insure the 
survival of our citizens. I recommend a first inexpensive step toward civil defense 
which should consist in a careful plan for national counter-evacuation in case we 
observe that the Soviets evacuate their cities. It is a well known fact published by 
the Soviets and verified in detail by our intelligence that the Soviets have a very 
thorough evacuation plan which is obligatory for all citizens affected by it. Our own 
plan could not and should not be obligatory but should consist in advising our 
citizens to evacuate in case of an emergency and making it possible for them to find 
temporary shelter and food and to construct elementary protection against an 
atomic attack. The Federal Emergency Management Agency could provide an ade- 
quate framework for this procedure if it would be properly supported and properly 
staffed. That this Agency performs important duties in peace time is an added 
advantage. Unfortunately the President has separated its civil defense activities 
from its remaining duties and has reduced its civil defense budget recently from the 
low figure of 106 million dollars to the even lower figure of 100 million dollars. 

The third action that should follow the refusal to ratify SALT II is to introduce 
negotiations not with the Russians but with our friends and allies. We should make 
sure that our NATO Allies as well as Japan should be fully satisfied that the joint 
defenses of the Free World are being planned in an optimal fashion for the purpose 
of preserving the peace in the interest of all of us. The best and probably the only 
way to prevent dangerous nuclear proliferation is to make sure that none of the 
powerful countries perceives nuclear defense in its own hands as a necessary meas- 
ure of preserving its own independence. What the outcome of such negotiations 
should be can of course not be predicted. We must postulate however one part of the 
outcome: All parties must be satisfied, that their interests are protected, and all 
parties must understand that they must make a proper contribution to the common 
defense of all of us. 

The fourth step is the mobilization of American science and industry to insure the 
common defense. The danger to freedom from Soviet Imperialism is less visible than 
the danger signals that preceded World War II. This is due to the fact that the 
Soviet leaders are incomparably more cautious than Hitler had been. The greater 
caution on the part of our opponents provide us with some time but it also has the 
consequence that unless we take timely counter-measures it will become too late to 
defend ourselves. If this fact is fully understood by the American community I have 
no doubt that in the course of a few years we can establish a stable equilibrium in 
the world. 

What technical measures should be taken, no single person is qualified to state. 
As one man's opinion I may state that we should exploit our undoubted lead in 
electronics. This leadership position enables us to construct unmanned, remotely 
piloted vehicles in the air, on the ground, and also on the oceans. Such a develop- 
ment could reverse the trend that has dominated our defense development for many 
years: to construct ever more costly weapons which are fewer in number and 
therefore basically more vulnerable. It is a characteristic fact that a first step in 
that direction, the cruise missile, strongly advocated by our Secretary of Defense, 
has also strongly, and in part successfully, been opposed by the Soviets in the SALT 
II negotiations. 

What I have said so far could be carried out with relatively little expenditures. 
They are the preliminary steps needed to change the arms race into a technological 
race in which we could prevail and thereby serve the interest of peace. I had argued 
that our deterrent which we call the TRIAD stands on one dubious leg rather than 
being based on three firm foundations. The one presently proposed improvement 
called MX has been adjusted to Soviet demands in the SALT II negotiations and 
has thereby become expensive, late in execution and probably ineffective when 
executed. 



245 

Into what kind of deterrent the TRIAD should be changed is something that must 
be determined by careful and diligent cooperation between our scientists, our tech- 
nologists, and our military leaders. 

A compromise that has been proposed concerning SALT II starts with more 
expenditures and proceeds to si>end more money without introducing basic improve- 
ments. This is the reverse of the proper order. We should start by careful study, 
proceed to detailed technological plans and then spend the money that is necessary. 
The technological effort which we should pursue and by which we can win may in 
the end be less expensive than the present defense effort which is dominated by the 
weight of obsolescent equipment. 

CONCLUSION 

If the Senate ratifies the SALT II Treaty it will have contributed to a most 
dangerous cover-up. It will have helped to lull the American public into a sense of 
security which is not based on reality and which in itself is our greatest danger. 

If, on the other hand, the Senate rejects SALT II the American people will 
become aware of the need to reconsider our defense posture. I have the firm 
confidence that once the American people realize that they are facing a real danger 
they will act with determination, with moderation, and with success. 

SUMMARY 

The majority of Americans dislike the arms race. So do I. SALT II is offered as a 
palliative. In fact, if ratified, it will intensify the arms race and make it more 
disastrous. If the Senate refuses to ratify SALT II more reasonable alternatives will 
emerge. 

An arms race is a quantitative competition. SALT II claims to limit it. But the 
limitations are unfair and they are not verifiable. 

The Soviets have won the arms race. They possess a 5 to 1 advantage in throw 
weight of their missiles. Our planes are 30 years old, our missiles 15 years old. 
Soviet equipment is new and is in the process of rapid improvement. SALT II would 
freeze us in a state of perpetual inferiority. 

We are told that our retaliatory force, the TRIAD, rests on three solid founda- 
tions. Actually the Administration admits that one leg of the TRIAD, our land-based 
missiles, is losing its survivability. Unfortunately the remedy, called M-X, cannot be 
deployed before SALT II has expired. 

The second leg, our bomber force, can be destroyed on the ground by Soviet 
submarine-launched missiles, by saboteurs shortly after takeoff, by the Soviet air 
force in midcourse before cruise missiles can be launched or by the powerful air 
defense of the Soviet Union. We cannot rely on our B-52s as the Soviets can on 
their Badgers, Bears, Blinders or Backfires, which can penetrate practically unop- 
posed by any American air defense. 

The only remaining leg of the TRIAD is our missile-carrying submarine force. The 
Soviets have pursued unconventional detection methods in which they appear to be 
qualitatively superior to American research. This retaliatory force is the most 
uncertain one. It may survive but it may well be the first to be wiped out. 

The result of SALT II will not be safety for the United States but the illusion of 
safety. 

This Treaty apart from other shortcomings is not verifiable. Because we have 
concentrated on missile launchers rather than the missiles themselves, the Soviets 
can covertly or legally store hundreds or even thousands of additional missiles in 
warehouses or holds of ships. These missiles could well be launched within 24 hours. 

The Treaty will not impede the Soviets from testing of essentially new missiles 
which they will claim as insignificant modifications of old ones. 

The Treaty permits encrypted telemetering of tests which means that secret 
messages are exchanged but we are supposed to believe that we shall be given a key 
to all the secrets contained in the messages. 

The Treaty does not limit Soviet SS-20 missiles and relies on the Russian assur- 
smces concerning the Backfire bombers. These weapons can be used easily after 
minor changes have been made in an attack on our Country. They are an obvious 
and deadly danger to our Allies. Together with the noncircumvention provisions 
(Articles XII and XIII) the Treaty will serve to undermine the NATO Alliance. 

If SALT II is ratified, even with the provision that our defense spending shall be 
greatly increased, we shall further contribute to the arms race mentality. 

If the Treaty is not ratified, this will serve as a clear message to the American 
people and warn them of the real danger that has developed in the last decade. The 
road will be open for us to engage in a technological competition. This competition, 



246 

which is quite different from an arms race, we can win and we can, thereby, insure 
stability and peace. 

To do so two measures are necessary. 

One is to replace negotiations with the Soviet Union by careful and complete 
discussions with our friends and Allies. The free democracies are collectively strong- 
er than the Soviet Union, provided that full cooperation is established between 
these free countries. In the absence of such full cooperation our friends may have to 
choose between surrender to the Soviet Union or development, in some cases secret 
development, of their own nuclear deterrents. 

The second obvious step is to mobilize American and Allied science and industry 
for the technological race. What the result of such activity will be depends on the 
collective inventiveness and wisdom of the best experts. A technological race is, of 
course, unpredictable and cannot be limited by treaty restrictions. 

My own guess is that American superior know-how in electronics could be put to 
excellent use in defense. We should construct unmanned, remotely-piloted vehicles 
in the air, on the ground, and on the oceans. Thereby we could reverse the present 
trend toward bigger and more costly weapons which are becoming fewer in number 
and ever more vulnerable. A first step in this direction, the cruise missile, has been 
vigorously opposed by the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations. They succeeded in 
imposing serious limitations on these missiles. 

The consequences of the current trends can be illustrated by a final juxtaposition. 

One of our eminent officials stated that our missiles may have to be fired on 
warnin?. This terrible and destabilizing plan is a direct result of the SALT process. 

Would it not be better to match Soviet civil defense plans by an inexpensive 
procedure of voluntary evacuation in case that we observe that the Soviets evacuate 
their cities? Peaceful protection of our citizens is a better deterrent than missiles 
that would be fired by a hair trigger procedure. 

If the Soviets know that we are making realistic plans to survive, if they notice 
that together with our Allies we have developed novel weapons, they will never 
dare to attack us. 

Appendix I 

(Reprinted from "Strategic Deterrents in the 1980's" by Dr. Roger Speed) 

Chapter 3— The Survivability of U.S. Strategic Forces 

TRAIL 

The primary mode of protecting the SSBNs is to "hide" them in the vast expanse 
of the ocean. The SSBNs do, however, return to port after two months at sea. The 
protection of the ocean can thus be negated if the Soviets undertake a trail of 
SSBNs as they leave port. 

Because Soviet attack submarines are faster than U.S. SSBNs, they are an ideal 
vehicle for traclcing. Although it is difficult for the Soviets to maintain a covert trail 
using passive sonar (because U.S. submarines are quieter than those of the Soviets), 
a covert trail using nonacoustic techniques (to be discussed below) could be feasi- 
ble." However, even if the tracking submarine were discovered, the SSBN could 
find it difficult to break trail if the Soviet submarine used its active sonar system, 
particularly if the Soviets supported their attack submarines with surface ships. 

The argument raised against the possibility of the Soviets undertaking such overt 
trails has been more political than technical. It has been suggested that such 
threatening actions would cause the breakdown of detente. Although, the Soviets 
may not be willing at present to damage the chances for detente, a change in world 
conditions could create a state of tension lasting for several months, and detente 
may then cease to be a prime consideration in Soviet strategic planning. 

AREA SEARCHES 

If a U.S. SSBN is not trailed as it leaves port, the Soviets face the much more 
difficult task of finding it in the open ocean. Because the range of the Polaris and 
the Poseidon missiles is about 2,500 nm and because at any one time, about 55 
percent of the SSBNs are at sea, the Soviets must contend with sixteen or seventeen 
boats in an Atlantic patrol area of around one million square nautical miles. 



" It should be noted that the Soviets maintain a fleet of 128 diesel-powered attack submarines 
in addition to their 39 nuclear-powered attack submarines (see "The Military Balance 1977/78," 
op. cit., p. 69). Diesel submarines running on batteries are even quieter than U.S. nuclear 
submarines. Thus, a threat of a covert trail may exist, particularly for those SSBNs operating 
out of European ports. 



247 

Several acoustic and nonacoustic techniques that could possibly be used by the 
Soviets for this task are described below. 

Towed arrays. — The development of a line array of hydrophones that can be 
towed through the water represents a potential breakthrough in acoustic ASW 
technology. According to Larry L. Booda, an editor of Sea Technology: "The success 
of towed hydrophone arrays has been outstanding. They have b^n designed for 
towing by surface ships, submarines and helicopters. (They are used as protective 
detection devices by the ballistic missile submarines.) These arrays offer high gain 
reception combined with a very narrow beam. Thus two of them deployed one 
hundred miles or more apart can locate a submarine with sufficient accuracy for 
the pinpointing detectors of the operating forces to take over to complete the 
mission. ' ** 

In the hands of the Soviets, this new technology could pose a serious threat to the 
SSBNs. If the detection range is, in fact, at least 50 nm, the SSBN patrol area can 
be searched in two days or less.*" The data from the arrays could be processed on 
board the towing ships or relayed via satellite back to the Soviet Union for process- 
ing at a larger computer center. Once a submarine is detected, other forces (aircraft 
and surface ships) can be assigned to verify the detection and to maintain trail. 

Another approach to area surveillance is to augment these towed arrays with 
small, portable, active acoustic sources, either small, disposable explosive charges or 
more conventional, very high-powered but portable acoustic generators.*" A few 
acoustic sources could be operated by a small number of towed-array ships distribut- 
ed about the SSBN patrol area. By listening for a signal bouncing off a submarine, 
it could be possible to obtain a cross-fix and to localize a submarine in a half hour or 
less. Soviet ICBMs could then be targeted to the suspected targets, or aircraft and 
ships could be used to verify each detection.'" 

Sonobuoy surveillance. — At present, when a submarine is detected, aircraft- 
dropped sonobuoys are generally used to localize it. The data obtained from these 
buoys are relayed by radio to the aircraft for analysis. Because the buoys deploy 
hydrophones with directional capabilities, two or more buoys can give a cross- 
bearing to localize the target. 

Most buoys float on the surface and generally have a short detection range, but 
this range can be extended considerably by mooring the hydrophones to the ocean 
bottom. The United States has a program of this type called the Moored Surveil- 
lance System.** It is an aerially dropped sonobuoy system that is self-mooring and is 
intended to create a surveillance barrier. The data from these sonobuoys can either 
be transmitted to aircraft for retransmission to ships and to shore-based processing 
centers or be sent to shore by satellite relay. 

If the Soviets were to deploy a similar system, they could cover a million square 
nautical miles by using from around 1,000 to 1,500 sonobuoys if the detection radius 
at the surface were 15 to 20 nm. The sonobuoys could be clandestinely deployed by 



" Booda, op. cit., pp. 13, 40. For a description of the current U.S. progrsun, see Harold Brown, 
op. cit., pp. 181-182. 

" With a detection range of 50 nm (on either side of the boat), twenty vessels towing these 
arrays at a speed of ten knots (nm/hr) could search an area of one million square nautical miles 
in about two days. 

" The Soviets could use larger sources. By 1970, high-energy transducers that could generate 
acoustic power in the millions of watts were available. (Even a noisy submarine radiates less 
than one watt of acoustic power.) Dr. Victor Anderson of the Scripps Institution of Oceanog- 
raphy predicted that this technology, when combined with the advances in signal processing 
that enable the returning signal from a submarine to be distinguished from background noise, 
could in effect make the oceans transparent, and submarines would no longer be safe from 
detection. The Soviets could deploy such transducers from large, stable, surface platforms in the 
open ocean. However, the effectiveness of this approach is unclear. Because these large plat- 
forms could be easily detected, the United States could employ countermeasures. The outcome is 
uncertain because attempts to jam the receiver with noise might be overcome by adaptive 
processing techniques (which, in effect, filter out the noise from the jammer). (See V. C. 
Anderson, "Ocean Technology," in Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race, ed. Feld et 
al. [Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971], pp. 201-216.) 

" The effectiveness of this approach depends to a great extent on the false-alarm rate. If only 
the seventeen SSBNs are detected, it may take 150 1-MT warheads to barrage the area in which 
the submarines are thought to be located. (This assumes that the SSBNs patrol at five knots, 
that their initial positions are known within a radius of 15 nm, and the warheads arrive one 
hour after detection.) If there are 100 total targets (only seventeen actually being submarines), 
the Soviets will have to use about 800 warheads to cover the area of uncertainty. They could, in 
theory, do this with 100 SS-18 ICBMs and still have around 1,300 ICBMs left. However, 
warheads exploded at or near the ocean surface are not as effective against undersea targets as 
those burst at some depth under the ocean surface. Thus, this approach might require the 
development of a warhead that could withstand the impact of hitting the ocean surface or the 
use of more warheads if a surface burst were used. 

" Booda, op. cit., p. 40. 



248 

surface ships and set to start broadcasting at a particular time, sending their data 
via satellite to the Soviet Union for processing. All designated targets could be 
attacked using ICBMs within a half hour of the start of broadcasting. Or, on a 
longer time scale, aircraft and surface ships could be used to investigate suspected 
targets, bring them under trail, and, if required, deliver weapons against them. 

NONACOUSTIC THREATS 

Although the United States has devoted most of its ASW effort to acoustic 
techniques of detection, nonacoustic techniques also exist. Admiral Donald P. 
Harvey, director of Naval Intelligence, stated in 1978 that "methods of detection 
could include, but not be limited to, radars, optical systems, and lasers." " The 
United States now has a limited capacity to detect submarines using nonacoustic 
techniques. A more extensive, operational capability is expected in the 1980s.'* 

Some of the phenomena that the Soviets might exploit to detect submarines are 
described below." 

Surface effects. — When a body moves through a stratified medium like the ocean, 
internal waves are generated that make their way to the surface, and the interac- 
tion of these internal waves with the surface changes the reflective properties of the 
surface. This change reportedly can be detected by radars operating in the millime- 
ter wavelength region =** and possibly by other systems such as lasers. 

Other hydrodynamic phenomena associated with the passing of a submarine can 
cause a difference in surface temperature. For example: "The sea water used to cool 
machinery discharged from a submerged submarine is warmer than the surround- 
ing water and, therefore, represents a heat anomaly in that region of the ocean." " 
According to the Soviets, such temperature differences can be detected by earth 
satellites.'* 

Another potential threat results from the small rise in the surface level of the 
water above a passing submarine." Both optical and radar techniques could possibly 
be used to detect this change. 

Finally, there is another phenomenon that reportedly not only affects the ocean 
surface but also the atmosphere above it and thus may be easier to detect. Accord- 
ing to Air Force Magazine. 

"There's mounting concern that the Soviets may have made significant progress 
in submarine detection through the energy emissions that surface from the wake of 
even deeply submerged boats. These irregular emissions, called convective cells, 
show up as hot sports in the atmosphere and cause moisture. They are detectable by 
special radar and infrared detection systems on ships or in space, "^o 

Contaminant wakes. — Besides a hydrodynamic wake, a submarine can leave 
behind other indications of its recent presence. Because some neutrons escape from 
the nuclear reactor used to power a submarine, it leaves behind a trail of neutrons 
and radionuclides. It has also been suggested that a submarine leaves a biological 
track formed by microorganisms killed by its passage.*' Finally, submarines use 
electrolysis of water to obtain oxygen for their crews. If precautions are not taken, 
the residual hydrogen can leave a trail in the water and at the surface that can be 
detected by such means as lasers.*^ 



"Testimony of Adm. Donald P. Harvey, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed 
Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, 
and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilan Personnel Strengths: Hearings on S. 210, 95th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1977, part 10, p. 6655. 

" Testimony of Adm. James HoUoway, chief of Naval Operations, in ibid., part 2, p. 1043. 

'* Until about 1965, the Soviets wrote quite openly about most of these nonacoustic techniques. 
For a review of the Soviet literature, see K. J. Moore, "Antisubmarine Warfare," in "Soviet 
Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions," ed. M. McGwine and J. McDonnell (New 
York: Praeger. 1977), pp. 185-200. 

"Ibid, p. 192. 

" Testimony of Rear Adm. J. Metzel, in U.S., Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. 
cit., part 10, p. 6655. 

** Moore, op. cit., p. 191. Infrared detectors deployed on aircraft can reportedly detect tempera- 
ture variations on the sea surface of 0.2°C. (See "Strategy Survey, 1970',- London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 14. 

" Moore, op. cit., p. 192. 

«" "Focus On . . . ," Air Force Magazine, May 1978, p. 20. See also Henry S. Bradsher, 
"Vulnerability Growing for U.S. Sub-based Missiles?" Washington Star, Dec. 12, 1977, Focus 
section, p. 1. 

" Moore, op. cit., p. 191; and Bradsher, op. cit. 

'* Hydrogen in concentrations of one part per million can be detected at 300-400 yards by 
laser resonance Raman spectrography. Whether the concentration of a hydrogen wake left by a 
submarine is greater or lesser than this is unknown. 



249 

EM Signals. — Electrochemical processes generate varying electrical potentials at 
different points on a submarine.*' Because seawater is a conductor of electricity, an 
electric current (which is modulated at the frequency the propeller shaft is turning) 
travels between the points of different electrical potential. The resulting low-fre- 
quency electromagnetic (EM) field can be detected by a number of devices, such as 
those using very large magnetic loops or those using superconducting devices based 
on the Josephson effect.** 

Direct detection. — Water is opaque to visible light except for a very narrow fre- 
quency band. However, lasers operating in the blue-green region of the spectrum 
can penetrate to some depth underwater and detect submarines. This is of particu- 
lar concern because U.S. submarines must remain fairly close to the surface for 
communication purposes. 

Conclusion. — A serious threat to the SSBNs would exist if nonacoustic techniques 
could be used by aircraft to make detections. Aircraft with a detection range of 
around 10 nm could complete a search of the SSBN patrol area in a few hours.** 
Satellites would, of course, be even more effective. The detection of subsurface 
wakes by surface ships or submarines could also present a threat even though their 
sweep of the patrol area would be slower. If these subsurface wakes persisted for a 
long enough time, a covert trail might be established as an SSBN left port since the 
trailer could remain outside the acoustic range of the SSBN. 

OTHER THREATS 

In addition to acoustic and nonacoustic threats, there are a number of other 
methods of detecting submarines that do not fit either of these two categories, 
although they obviously use one or the other (or both) of these techniques. 

Trailing communications wire or buoy. — The requirement that the U.S. SSBN 
fleet remain in constant communication with the U.S. military command poses a 
serious hazard to the survival of the fleet. Because most radio waves cannot signifi- 
cantly penetrate the ocean, each submarine is required to maintain an antenna at 
or near the surface. This antenna (which is connected by a buoyant cable to the 
submarine takes the form of a long communications wire ** or a communications 
buoy. " 

The Navy has testified before Congress that this arrangement offers many oppor- 
tunities for detection.*' Both the wake of the antenna and the antenna itself can be 
detected by radar, infrared, laser, or visual (photographic and television) tech- 
niques.*' 

Other means of communication are }X)ssible. Extremely low frequency (ELF) radio 
can penetrate the ocean to great depths. An ELF communications system (originally 
called Sanguine but now known as Seafarer) has been proposed for some time by 
the Navy but has been delayed, primarily because of opposition from environmen- 
talists. Until this or other methods of communicating with the SSBNs are deployed, 
the trailing antennas will remain a significant threat to the safety of the subma- 
rines. 

Tags. — U.S. SSBNs operate from only a few ports and are constantly observed by 
Russian trawlers as they leave. It is possible that as a submarine leaves port, some 
device (a "tag") could be attached to its hull by a frogman or a trained animal (sea 



*' Moore, op. cit., p. 190. See also Giordio tacconi, "Fundamentals of ELF Communication and 
Detection," in "Applications of Remote Sensing to Ocean Surveillance." AGARD Lecture Series 
No. 88 (Neuilly Sur Seine, France: NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research & Develop- 
ment, 1977) pp. 9-17, 9-18. 

" See Frank Chilton, Lowell Wood, and Rod Buntzen, "Electric and Magnetic Sensing Sensors: 
Applications," UCID — 17597 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 1977). Also 
contained in "Applications of Remote Sensing to Ocean Surveillance," op. cit. p. 10-1. 

'' With a detection range of 10 nm (and a "sweep width" of 14 nm), 30 aircraft flying at 300 
knots could search an area of one million square nautical miles in about eight hours. Of course, 
even smaller detection ranges could be quite useful. 

** As described by Fessenden and Cheng: "Since the early nineteen sixties, U.S. submarines 
have utilized trailing-wire antennas in order to remain submerged while maintaining RF 
reception with an antenna at or near the ocean surface. The trailing wire is simply an RF 
transmission line and/or single conductor encased in a buoyant, polyethylene foam jacket and is 
usually referred to as a buoyant cable. It is normally about 2000 ft (610 m) in length and may be 
divided, functionally, into three parts: transmission line section, antenna section, and drogue 
section (if any)." A typical configuration would have a 105 ft section at the end of the cable to 
receive very-low-frequency (VLF) up to high-frequency (HF) messages. (Charles T. Fessenden and 
David H. S. Cheng, 'Development of a Trailing-Wire E-Field Submarine Antenna for Extremely 
Low Frequency (ELF) Reception," IEEE Transactions on Communications 22 [April, 1974]: 428.) 

" See U.S., Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, pp. 6690-6695. 

" Ibid. 

«» For a photograph of the trailing wire floating on the surface, see ibid., p. 6694. 



250 

lion or dolphin). This tag could take many forms and could be designed either to 
release a device that vsdll rise to the surface at a set time to reveal the submarine's 
position or to release a series of devices that will reveal the submarine's position 
over a long period of time. To reveal the position of the submarine at a preset time, 
a miniature radio broadcaster could be used. To maintain a trail over a longer 
period of time, a series of devices that remain silent until interrogated by some 
Soviet surveillance system could be used. A number of such devices are conceivable. 
For example, recent advances in large-scale integrated circuits make possible the 
construction of tiny transponders designed to respond only when interrogated by a 
specially coded pulse from a microwave radar. Thousands of these devices could be 
placed in a relatively small package and periodically released to form an easily 
followed trail on the ocean surface. 

Sabotage. — The U.S. SSBN is a formidable nuclear force, but it is also a very 
concentrated one. Normally, about half the force (around twenty boats) is at sea 
while the rest are in port and vulnerable to attack. A boat remains at sea for about 
two months and then returns to port for another month before returning to sea 
again. If the Soviets ever believed that war was inevitable, they could decide that 
the sabotage of a submarine while in port would be far easier than attacking it at 
sea. 

There are any number of chemical and biological agents that could incapacitate 
or kill a submarine crew. They could be brought on board in the ship's supplies (or 
through other means) and released at a preset time. In this way, the whole at-sea 
fleet could be attacked at once." 

Boost phase intercept. — Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) systems placed in the 
vicinity of a U.S. launch area could be more effective than those systems that have 
to wait until a U.S. RV enters the atmosphere over the Soviet Union. If Soviet ships 
(and possibly aircraft) with radars and ABM missiles were placed in the U.S. SSBN 
patrol area, a serious threat would exist to any SLBM that was fired (and also to 
the submarine because a missile could be backtracked by radar to its point of origin, 
thus revealing the submarine's position). 

Such an ABM system would be designed to attack the booster or the postboost 
vehicle (the "bus") before the RVs were released. These boosters are easy to track 
because they make very large targets for ABM radars. Once the booster is above the 
atmosphere, the computers used for guidance and control aboard the booster and 
the bus can be incapacitated by a nuclear explosion at a very large distance 
(perhaps 50 to 100 nm depending on the computer hardness and the yield of the 
ABM warhead). A successful attack on the computers insures that, at a minimum, 
the RVs will miss their targets. 

Forward-based ABMs are now outlawed by treaty. However, the Soviets have 
continued a massive ABM research and development program. If the treaty is ever 
abrogated, they may be able to deploy a forward-based system of this type much 
more rapidly than they can a land-based system. 

CONCLUSION 

The military doctrine of the Soviet Union takes the possibility of war, even 
nuclear war, seriously, and the Soviets have made a concentrated effort to develop 
countermeasures to America's strategic forces. By the early 1980s, the Soviets could 
(if appropriate counteractions are not taken) seriously threaten the ICBM and 
bomber legs of the triad. It is unlikely that they will fail to try to counter the 
SSBNs also. 

This section has discussed a large number of individual threats, but it should be 
noted that the Soviets practice "defense in depth." If one technique or system 
guarantees only partial success, then the Soviets add another to improve their 
chances. For example, the Soviet air defense system consists of many layers, and the 
Soviets continue to upgrade, improve, and expand their forces. A similar approach 
can be expected in ASW, although any one of the techniques mentioned above could 
be enough to compromise almost the entire SSBN fleet. 

Understanding the extent of the Soviet ASW threat is one of the more crucial 
tasks of the intelligence community, but it is an area in which great uncertainties 
exist. As Admiral Harvey, director of Naval Intelligence, noted in 1978, the Soviets' 



'° This approach has the possible drawback that it would take about two months before all the 
boats had been cycled through port and returned to sea with the sabotage devices aboard. This 
conflicts considerably with the general notion that a nuclear war would occur by accident or in 
the heart of a worldwide crisis. Of course, the crisis could come and appear to subside in the 
eyes of the West. The Soviet perception might be quite different. In the height of the crisis, the 
Kremlin might decide that war is inevitable and proceed with war preparations while giving all 
appearances of cooling the crisis and pushing for a return to the precrisis political atmosphere. 



251 

"extensive [ASW] R&D effort ... is the area in which we could be expected to know 
the least, because it does not have the manifestations in the open seas that their 
weapons and platforms do." " Because these ASW systems often have no easily 
identifiable characteristics, the Soviets can successfully disguise or hide critical 
aspects of their program. 

It is known, however, that the Soviets have for some time had an extensive ASW 
program, and there appears to be growing concern recently over the possibility of a 
breakthrough, particularly in the nonacoustic area." In this field, the Soviets are 
known to have research programs on lasers, processed optical scanners, advanced 
radar, and infrared detection systems." It is the evaluation of the U.S. Navy that a 
"significant advancement in any of these techniques would pose a potential threat 
to the security of our SSBNs." '< 

Considering the wide range of possible threats (acoustic, nonacoustic, and uncon- 
ventional) and the intensive Soviet ASW effort, the continued survivability of the 
SSBNs should not be taken for granted. In fact, unless appropriated countermeas- 
ures are taken, the viability of this force in the near future could be in serious 
doubt. 

Early Warning and Strategic C^ 

The United States maintains tactical warning systems to detect an incoming 
attack and a command, control, and communications (O) network to assure that 
war orders are implemented. Quick and reliable tactical warning of an attack on 
U.S. bomber bases is particularly critical because, as noted earlier, a delay of a few 
minutes could result in almost complete destruction of the strategic bomber force. 
The maintenance of a communications network between the strategic forces and the 
National Command Authority (NCA) (the president or his designated successor) is 
also critical because all strategic forces are under positive control: U.S. missiles 
cannot be launched nor can U.S. bombers proceed to target without positive authori- 
zation from the NCA. The following sections briefly describe these systems and 
discuss some of their major weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 

STRATEGIC WARNING 

Strategic warning is usually on a time scale of hours, days, or weeks before actual 
hostilities begin. It might result from an evaluation that a severe international 
political crisis existed or from positive intelligence that an attack was being 
planned. Strategic warning is important because it would allow the readiness status 
(alert rate) of the strategic forces and the C^ network to be raised. At the highest 
level of alert, the president could be airborne and prepared to direct the retaliatory 
strike if an attack materialized. 

The technical means of obtaining strategic warning (as opposed to normal diplo- 
matic assessment of the political situation) primarily consists of photographic and 
electronic satellites and numerous electronic surveillance ground stations located 
around the periphery of the Soviet Union. In addition, some observers believe the 
disposition of Soviet missile-carrying nuclear submarines (SSBNs) could offer a 
means of strategic warning. At present, the Soviets operate only a few SSBNs off 
U.S. coasts, and none are located very close. Under present bomber basing patterns, 
alert rates, and reaction times, this small force could post a threat to much of the 
bomber force in a surprise attack (at the minimum it could destroy the 70 percent of 
the force not on alert). However, most defense planners assume that the Soviets will 
move fifteen or twenty boats closer to U.S. coasts if they are planning an attack. 

To follow the movements of Soviet submarines, the United States uses SOSUS, a 
system of underwater hydrophones.'* These hydrophone line arrays are generally 
located along the edge of the continental shelf and feed their data through under- 
water cables to shore-based stations along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Ship- 
towed hydrophone arrays are being developed to supplement the SOSUS system. 
Their data will probably be relayed via satellite to a shore-based processing center. 

It is likely, but not certain, that the United States would detect a change in 
Soviet SSBN deployments. Detection depends on the noise level of the submarines, 
and it is possible that this noise level will be lowered in the future. In addition, 



" Testimony of Adm. Donald P. Harvey, in U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. 
cit., part 10, p. 6620. 

"■ Bradsher, op. cit. 

'3 Testimony of Vice Adm. Robert Kaufman, director, Command, Control and Communica- 
tions, in U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, p. 6756. 

" Ibid. 

" For a description of SOSUS and other U.S. ASW systems, see the November issues of "Sea 
Technology" for 1974, 1975, and 1976. 



H8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 17 



252 

there may be gaps in the coverage; apparently, the Gulf of Mexico is not covered, 
for example. Also, because the SOSUS hydrophones are located in the so-called 
"deep sound channel" (in order to obtain the low-frequency signals that travel great 
distances at this depth), a submarine operating close to shore in shallow water could 
go undetected. 

A more important point is that if the Soviets were planning an attack, it seems 
unlikely that they would suddenly move twenty SSBNs close to the U.S. coasts. If 
the Soviets were to build up their force over a period of several months, it is 
doubtful that true strategic warning (in the sense of a conviction that the Soviets 
were planning a war) would be obtained or acted upon. 

In general, strategic warning can be very beneficial, but, as noted in chapter 2, it 
may fail to materialize at the critical moment. This may not be due to lack of data, 
but rather to a failure to perceive the significance of the data or to believe data that 
conflict with preconceived notions of the other party's behavior. In view of the long- 
held American belief that a deliberate nuclear war is almost inconceivable, the past 
history of the success of surprise attacks is even more relevant. 

Appendix II 

SALT II, Article VI, paragraph 1 states: 

"The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are: 

(a) operational; 

(b) in the final stage of construction; 

(c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed; 

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion." 

The statement would seem to exclude keeping considerable numbers of added 
missiles in storage. Actually the number of surface-to-surface missiles is nowhere 
explicitly regulated in the SALT II Treaty. 

The limitations apply, according to Article III, only to ICBM launchers, SLBM 
launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles. Therefore production 
and widespread distribution of excess numbers of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles 
would not only be difficult to find but if found would not be in clear violation of the 
Treaty. Deployment of launchers, however primitive, would be in violation, but 
primitive launchers particularly in a not completely assembled form, could hardly 
be identified. 

Appendix III 

[From Inside Report (Field Newspaper Syndicate), Aug. 10, 1979] 

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak) 
SALT, Soviet-Style 

Washington. — Preparation of three "distinctly new" test silos for "modernized" 
Soviet long-range missiles are now receiving final preparations at Soviet test ranges, 
a piece of intelligence that could doom continuation of SALT as a game that runs so 
heavily in the Kremlin's favor. 

No longer in question is the clarity of intelligence demonstrating Moscow's intent 
to trigger a huge new test program the instant the new Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaty (SALT II) is ratified. It seems likely to harden American public opinion 
against what has come to be called the SALT "process." 

"This may well prove to be the end of the SALT process," says a Nixon-Ford 
administration official, who was one of the original authors of SAL'T II and supports 
the final version. "When our people read about what Moscow is legally doing under 
this new treaty, they may say to hell with SALT." 

Students of SAL'T, mostly critics but also including important supporters, long 
have been concerned that the "process" of SALT, replacing substance, has become 
the political objective. The impending Soviet test program could stop this dangerous 
inversion by concentrating public attention on substance. 

During the period of intense Soviet testing following SALT I, the U.S. still had 
strategic superiority. In contrast, the U.S. today is on the verge of losing, if it has 
not already lost, strategic parity. That points to outrage as the public watches four 
free years of testing for Moscow, while the U.S. fails to test a single new interconti- 
nental ballistic missile (ICBM). 

Preparations of the new test silos to let Moscow exploit Article 4 of SALT II are 
virtually complete. High Pentagon officials are privately warning Senators and 
other politicians not to be surprised when "modernized" (improved) versions of the 
main Soviet ICBM force are tested immediately following the final ratification of 
the new treaty. 



253 

One defense official made this clear last week to a meeting attended by Senate 
staff experts: U.S. negotiators of SALT II "know that the Russians deliberately 
negotiated Article 4 so that they could go ahead and test and deploy all their new 
missiles without violating the treaty." 

This Soviet upgrading or modernization of the existing force is a loophole totally 
separate from the provision in the treaty (Article 2) that gives each side the right to 
build one new missile. President Carter has announced a decision (still resisted by 
arms control enthusiasts) for the U.S. to build the MX mobile missile as its new 
missile. 

The U.S. has no plans for upgrading or modernizing its present landbased missile 
force. There is today no intention to fire a single test of any long-range missile until 
the MX itself is fired (now scheduled for 1983). 

That means silence from the Americans amid heavy Russian missile-rattling. The 
Soviet Union, without cheating, is in the same position to modernize its land-based 
long-range missiles as it was after ratification of SALT I on Sept. 14, 1972. Immedi- 
ately thereafter, the Soviets began initial tests of the huge SS-18 and the large SS- 
19, whose size did violent injustice to the spirit of SALT I. Now, both the SS-18 and 
the SS-19 will be modernized under SALT II, along with three lesser missiles. 

Skeptics within the U.S. SALT delegation sounded repeated warnings during the 
negotiations that Article 4 must not leave the "modernizing" door wide open. One 
result was to limit the modernized missiles to a 5 percent variation from the older 
missiles (which the Soviets can easily violate). 

Moscow's negotiators never have been willing to give the U.S. accurate measure- 
ments of its existing missiles from which to measure the permitted 5 percent 
variations. Indeed, the "modernizing door" was left open, as the intelligence reports 
of the new silos at Soviet test sites prove. 

That sets the stage for public outcry as soon as the new Soviet tests are launched. 
It could mark the end of the innocence that up to now has made the SALT process a 
self-contained objective even more important than the SALT substance. 

Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Phillip Karber, vice president of the na- 
tional security programs at BDM Corp. in McLean is our next 
witness. 

Mr. Karber, you have a prepared testimony. If you would like to 
give us a condensed version, you may. 

Mr. Karber. I have a prepared testimony. 

Senator Zorinsky. Fine. It will be included in the proceedings at 
the appropriate point and you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP A. KARBER, VICE PRESIDENT, BDM 

CORP.! 

Mr. Karber. I thought I would quickly summarize and perhaps 
raise some of the issues that I went into in more depth in the 
prepared text and offer you the opportunity to ask some questions. 
Before starting, I would like to emphasize that I am testifying as 
an individual, and that my remarks reflect neither the views of my 
corporation nor any agency with which I have been associated. 

I was asked to address the relationship between SALT II and the 
European balance. I don't claim great personal expertise in terms 
of strategic arms, but I have spent the last 12 years looking at the 
balance in Europe relatively closely. 

The first thing I would like to point out is I think there is a 
tendency which has grown ever since 1969 to separate the strategic 
balance from the theater balance. I think it is in some ways logical 
to do that. The systems are so complex and the quantities of the 
weapons so much greater, and it is very difficult to have meaning- 
ful negotiations in a multilateral context. 

It makes sense for two countries to negotiate together, but the 
result of that has been that we have artificially — to a great extent. 



' See page 264 for Mr. Karber's prepared statement. 



254 

to a phony extent — separated the strategic balance from the NATO 
theater balance. 

I say it is phony or artificial for several reasons. First of all, if 
you look at the history of the strategic arms race going back to the 
forties, we find that we were members of NATO, we deployed the 
Seventh Army to Europe before we really had a strategic retali- 
atory capability. 

We seemed to think that the strategic balance is sort of histori- 
cal, that it started by itself and has progressed by itself. But in fact 
the strategic arms race grew out of our concern to protect our 
NATO allies from what was then perceived as a very strong Euro- 
pean imbalance balance of forces in the late forties and early 
fifties. 

We felt we had to depend upon nuclear weapons, and have 
increasingly put a heavy dependence on them because neither our 
European allies nor we felt that we could afford to match the 
Soviets in conventional weapons. But it is not just in terms of 
history that this dependence has grown. 

The Soviets were unable through a good part of the fifties to 
target the United States, were unable to match our deployed sys- 
tems overseas which could reach the Soviet Union, and thus de- 
ployed most of their medium bombers and medium and intermedi- 
ate range ballistic missiles opposite Europe. 

In essence, they held our European allies as hostages to our 
nonuse of the nuclear weapons that were deployed to originally 
protect our NATO allies. In fact, I think to a great extent that 
experience which had a psychological impact on our allies is some- 
thing we Americans didn't really understand. 

In 1957, Khrushchev announced to our European allies that 
unless they did certain things, nuclear rockets would rain down on 
their capitals. We never experienced that hostage mentality that 
the Soviets held over our European allies. I think even today that 
background influences them. 

The Soviets have since, of course, built up a strategic retaliatory 
capability against us. They continue building a very strong nuclear 
force opposite Europe. 

I know of relatively little evidence of Soviet planning that as- 
sumes a strategic nuclear exchange out of the blue. I think when 
people talk about that, it is relatively absurd to say that Brezhnev 
wakes up in the morning and he says, "oh, gee, there's no soccer 
game and my masseuse is off, so let's start a strategic war. After 
all, the indicators look pretty good". 

I think all the evidence suggests that the Soviets tend to see a 
strategic exchange growing out of the theater conflict, and today, 
the theater that they still see as the most likely to produce a 
strategic exchange is Central Europe. 

There is another reason not to divorce the two, and that is 
NATO doctrine as it has evolved over the years, particularly as 
codified in its 1967 flexible response strategy, laid out three princi- 
ples for the defense of Central Europe, principles which we essen- 
tially sold to our European allies, principles which we said "accept 
them and we will back you up". 

The first principle was direct defense. That is, in the event of 
aggression, we want to have sufficient conventional forces to make 



255 

sure that we don't start a strategic nuclear exchange over a few 
troops across the border. We wanted that direct defense to be able 
to hold, to buy us time to feel out Soviet motivations, to try and see 
the size of the attack, see if we couldn't limit it. 

If our direct defense forces or conventional defenses could not 
hold, the second concept was deliberate escalation, to employ, in a 
restricted way, use relatively few warheads against relatively few 
targets, to demonstrate that NATO had the willpower to back up 
its conventional defense with the initiation of nuclear war, without 
starting the immediate strategic exchange. The Soviets would have 
some idea they were going too far and it was time to quit. 

But there was a third element, general nuclear response, one 
which has increasingly, I think, been ignored and which is directly 
related to SALT and our strategic balance. And to this day neither 
we nor our European allies have ever repealed that element of the 
current NATO doctrine of flexible response. 

Remember, flexible response presumes our first use of nuclear 
weapons if we can't hold conventionally and the eventual initiation 
of a strategic nuclear strike. 

To back this strategy up, we gave NATO elements of our strate- 
gic forces for to use in the general nuclear response. We even 
assumed that under certain circumstances it would be launched 
simultaneously with our SIOP. 

The point I am trying to make, through background, through 
current Soviet doctrine, through our own doctrine of the defense of 
Europe, is that we have inextricably and irrevocably linked the 
defense of Central Europe to the strategic balance. 

To a certain extent, any SALT Treaty is damaging to the doc- 
trine of flexible response. This one, ones of the past, and undoubt- 
edly ones of the future. To the extent that SALT codifies or legiti- 
mizes strategic parity and essentially symbolizes that strategic 
forces are of relatively little value other than to deter their own 
first use. Any agreement that emphasizes that, pulls out from 
underneath NATO this doctrine which says we will initiate first 
use of nuclear weapons if we can't hold conventionally and we will 
escalate the strategic level unilaterally if we have to. 

Now, that in itself, I would argue, would not be decisive in 
accepting or rejecting this treaty. We have known it for a long 
time. Analysts have been talking about it, predicting it ever since 
the fifties. 

But several things have changed since the beginning of the SALT 
process. First of all, there has been a massive arms race in Central 
Europe, one which has received relatively little attention. Since the 
SALT negotiations started in 1969, the Soviet Union and its East 
European allies. East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, have 
added — not replaced in terms of modernization, but added — 12,000 
major pieces of combat equipment. I have the charts in my pre- 
pared statement which you may want to refer later for more detail. 
The impact of this Soviet led build-up is that it has altered NATO's 
ability to fight a successful direct defense, initiate a deliberate 
escalation or deter via a credible general nuclear response. 

You might call it a NATO Triad. That is, by having a conven- 
tional defense, a deliberate escalation capability within the theater, 
and then the tie-in to strategic forces, we hope to have a credible 



256 

deterrent force that we would never really have to exercise and 
use. 

Unfortunately, the conventional balance has eroded and very 
little attention has been paid to that. 

Second, there has been no greater myth that has been promul- 
gated in the American strategic community than that American 
technology or Western technology offsets the Soviet quantitative 
superiority in Central Europe. You see it over and over. In the 
State Department bulletin several months ago, there was an article 
that said, oh, after all, NATO superiority in antitank weapons, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, offset Soviet Warsaw Pact tank 
strength. 

It has never been true when it was first stated in 1968, and it is 
not true today. The Warsaw Pact has 16,000 tanks in Central 
Europe today, and NATO has 3,500 of the new modern antitank 
guided missiles launchers. The Warsaw Pact, which ostensibly is on 
the offensive have 5,000 of the antitank guided missile launchers. 

In essence, they have more of these defensive weapons than we 

do. 

Another aspect in the late 1960's in terms of our direct defense 
was that we had a clear superiority in terms of advanced technol- 
ogy. We have lost it. We, in terms of the United States, had a lost 
decade in which we spent most of our time and most of the general 
purpose forces budget focused on Southeast Asia. 

Today in Central Europe, the Soviet Army has more of their new 
main battle tanks than we or the West Germans will have, Leop- 
ard II or X-M I, in the mid-1980's. They have more of their new 
infantry fighting vehicles than we and all of NATO will have in 
the mid-eighties. 

Their new self-propelled artillery is better than anything being 
designed in central Europe. 

The point I am trying to make is that in terms of the convention- 
al defense, it is eroded and eroded quite badly. That is not the only 
area that is eroded. 

In the late 1960's NATO had a clear intratheater nuclear capa- 
bility that supplied the link between conventional defense and 
strategic forces. Today that has been lost by a substantial increase 
in Warsaw Pact theater nuclear forces. The Warsaw Pact increase 
in theater nuclear forces combined with a strong chemical warfare 
capability, which NATO has no capacity to even defend itself, let 
alone respond in kind, offers the potential of a very devastating 
Soviet riposte or first use coercive potential vis-a-vis central 
Europe. 

I notice the lights are out. Is my time up? 

Senator Zorinsky. If you could sort of summarize. 

Senator Javits. Especially tell us what you want us to do about 

SALT 11. 

Mr. Karber. The reason I have emphasized the European de- 
fense aspects is that if we had a strong conventional defense in 
Europe, if we had a credible intratheater nuclear defense, the 
pressures on SALT II in terms of its relationship to our allies 
would be far less. The fact is, we don't. 

With SALT II essentially adding one more step in terms of the 
codification of parity, that nuclear weapons only deter the use by 



257 

the opponent in a strategic context, day by day, NATO's depend- 
ence on first use of nuclear fire is being weakened. The Euro- 
strategic linkage, the life blood of the alliance — and I am not 
saying that strategy can't be changed, but it hasn't been and I 
know of no conversations being conducted to change it — is becom- 
ing more hollow with the passing of every day. 

That in itself does not argue against SALT II. What it does 
suggest is that if SALT II is going to be a success over the long 
term, it means that we are going to have to increase two facets of 
the NATO alliance: its theater nuclear capability and its conven- 
tional capability. 

Various people have proposed in relation to SALT substantial 
spending on arms. I know of no evidence where throwing money at 
a problem is necessarily a solution. But there are some very hard 
things we need to do. I would never tie it to SALT II specifically — 
as an amendment or condition — but I think in the interest of the 
people who are in favor of SALT, more resources, the right kinds of 
resources, have to be spent to restabilize the European balance. 

Otherwise, the treaty itself in the long run, assuming it passes 
now, will be, in my opinion, in trouble. 

Senator Zorinsky. Senator Hayakawa, have you any questions 
you would like to ask? 

Senator Hayakawa. I really don't, Mr. Chairman. I am simply 
tr3dng to digest what you have said. 

If I may summarize, you are saying that we have to consider the 
strategic treaty relationship in full conjunction with the theater 
relationships and relative strength of the theater; and since we are 
very much weaker in the European theater, then what are the 
consequences of that weakness insofar as the ratification of SALT 
is concerned? That I didn't quite get clear. 

Mr. Karber. If one did not ratify SALT, I think the potential for 
Soviet malevolence to teach us a lesson could be quite high. And 
perhaps it is a statement on the European perception of our leader- 
ship or our own global military capability. But they could make 
things quite rough for us. I know of no current NATO capability, 
for example, if the access routes were closed to Berlin, to retrieve 
them other than to politically make some concessions. 

Senator Hayakawa. Our NATO allies, then, really want us very 
much to ratify SALT? 

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES 

Mr. Karber. I spent a portion of the prepared statement, and I 
apologize for not spending more time on it, tr)dng to address the 
European attitudes. I have listened to previous testimony which 
sounds like a game of "name your favorite European." People say, 
I have talked to so-and-so and he is in favor or against and the 
Government is in favor and so forth. 

My experience is that there are many people in Europe who are 
very much in favor of SALT. But having said that, I think we 
ought to realize, and it doesn't necessarily argue against the SALT 
Treaty, but we ought to realize why they are in favor of it. 

I spent some time in the statement on this and maybe I can 
recap it very quickly. I think one of the major reasons they place 
such an emphasis on SALT and believe in it, is that every time 



258 

there has been a superpower confrontation, they feel caught in the 
middle. And not only is their security directly threatened, but they 
have no recourse or they feel they have no recourse to control the 
events threatening their security. That is why they, far more than 
we, I think, have embraced the concept of detente in a political 
sense as opposed to a military power sense. They don't want to be 
caught in more confrontations. 

Second, however, and it almost produces a schizoid attitude, if I 
can use the expression, they are desperately afraid of being left out 
by the United States. And the French today are quite smug in 
pointing out to other Europeans we told you so, DeGauUe was 
right, the United States will go hand in hand with the Soviet 
Union and slowly withdraw its protection from the alliance. 

And those Europeans who are involved in defense planning, for 
example, and one has to differentiate their private views and those 
which they feel they have to support officially, repeatedly note a 
high degree of concern about the need to continue the link between 
the European balance and the strategic balance, and any percep- 
tion that the strategic balance has become so stable that it is 
unusable then is seen as dangerously eroding the European deter- 
rent. 

Now, in terms of SALT, if in fact the process of ratifying SALT 
or the negotiated treaty leads to the suggestion that the strategic 
balance is getting so stable we can no longer credibly threaten its 
use, then we have a concomitant responsibility, if we want to save 
the alliance, to start building up the other two elements of that 
Triad, which are really quite weak right now. 

OFFER OF EQUIVALENCE THROUGH SALT 

Senator Hayakawa. Do you feel that the treaty does offer equiv- 
alence? 

Mr. Karber. There are several aspects of that, I think, and 
again, to put it from a European perspective: One is the equiv- 
alence of assured destruction. I think most Europeans believe that 
once you have launched so many warheads, it really doesn't matter 
very much. I haven't found too many of them who are willing to 
get out their bomb damage calculator and run their equation and 
say, oh, yes, the Warsaw Pact is ahead by so many. 

So I think there is a point where they overdose on strategic 
numbers and say, well, they sort of all equal each other out. 

There is another aspect to it, and that is what might be called 
the perceptual aspect. We all know it is relatively simple minded, 
but when one reads in a newspaper that the Russians have x 
number of warheads or x number of missiles and we have a coun- 
tervailing number, it is very tempting for people to sort of say, oh, 
who is on top today? Who is 10 feet high and who is 6 feet high? 

I think there is a growing perception that the United States is 
becoming less and less willing to risk its own survival for that of 
the NATO alliance. I think that is not the only problem and that is 
not the sole cause of potential European disenchantment over the 
next several years, but it is certainly a key element. 

The other has been a slow erosion in their faith in U.S. leader- 
ship. 



259 

REASSURANCE TO EUROPEANS THROUGH SALT REJECTION 

Senator Hayakawa. Would we reassure the Europeans in any 
way if we were to reject SALT? 

Mr. Karber. I am sorry, I did not hear the question? 

Senator Hayakawa. Would it reassure the Europeans in any 
way if we were to reject SALT, or would it reassure them if we 
were to ratify it? 

Mr. Karber. General Haig had an interesting comment before 
this committee several weeks ago. I was talking to several Europe- 
ans about his comment that they would be relieved if it were not 
ratified and would hope that there would be a new breath of 
American leadership. 

The Europeans I have talked to — and, of course, everyone has 
their favorite Europeans, so I claim no statistical significance — felt 
generally that that was very unlikely. That if SALT were rejected, 
they felt the administration would continue to observe it, and then 
you would have sort of the worst of both worlds, from the Europe- 
an perspective. 

So I think they are very concerned that the rejection of SALT II 
is, in a way, a rejection by the United States of its role as the 
alliance's chief negotiator with the Soviet Union. 

I think there is also a danger, in several of the major NATO 
countries, some of the ones who contribute the most today to 
NATO's defense, believe that there is a growing sentiment among 
them that if the United States can't provide the negotiating leader- 
ship, perhaps they should do it themselves. 

In fact, I was told by one European parliamentarian that "maybe 
it is time for us to pack the bags and go to Moscow and see what 
kind of deal they will offer us. We are not going to give up the 
farm, but maybe they will offer us a deal." 

In West Germany today, it is no secret that one element of a 
major political party believes very strongly that the Soviets would 
like to have detente with them, a much more friendly relationship, 
use German influence to help stabilize the East German regime, 
and all they have to do is cooperate with the Soviet Union in the 
international political sphere, be very cooperative on arms control, 
be very cooperative in terms of economic relationships. 

And that, I think, is endemic of what we are probably going to 
see a lot more of unless the United States is willing to go back into 
central Europe and play a significant role as a superpower. 

It is interesting. The Soviet Army today represents over 50 per- 
cent of the forces deployed in central Europe. The U.S. Army 
represents less than 25 percent, and there is an asymmetry in 
superpower presence there that cannot help but affect political 
attitudes. 

I think it is probably a legitimate point to say what does this 
have to do with the SALT II Treaty? And I don't think it is a cop- 
out to say the impact of these issues on SALT II Treaty is far less 
in terms of whether the treaty is accepted or rejected than in 
whether the treaty is a success or a failure over the long term. 



260 

EVIDENCE OF LEADERSHIP THROUGH RATIFICATION OF SALT 

Senator Hayakawa. I want to get clear this one last question. 
Would ratification of SALT assure Western Europe and the NATO 
allies that we do maintain leadership? Can you simply say yes or 
no? 

Mr. Karber. No, and I don't think the reciprocal of that question 
would be yes, either. In other words, I think whether SALT is 
passed or rejected, I don't see it as being a major element in 
Europeans saying, ah, yes, the United States has assumed leader- 
ship again. 

Senator Hayakawa. What I am trying to get is some sense of 
what you are recommending £is a witness. 

Mr. Karber. I guess what I am trying to get across is less a point 
of whether the treaty should be ratified in terms of its specific 
elements, because they are hard to forecast. In my testimony I talk 
about some of the potential problems protocol could cause in our 
European relations, but they are relatively minor. 

They are relatively minor compared to the real question of 
whether the treaty is going to be a success or not. And it is my 
argument that the treaty is probably going to be a failure unless 
we conduct a substantial buildup in American arms, coupling it 
with very aggressive attempts at arms control in terms of central 
Europe. 

And if we don't do that and the treaty is accepted, then we, I 
think, are buying a treaty that will over the long run be relatively 
weak and we will be very sorry for it in terms of our relationship 
with the NATO Alliance. 

Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is more 
than up. 

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you. 

Dr. Karber, the day of the vote on SALT, we get to say one of 
two words, "aye" or "nay." And there is no "maybe" column. And 
therefore, I am asking you: are you a proponent or an opponent of 
SALT II? 

Mr. Karber. It is time to vote? 

Senator Zorinsky. I wish I could vote 60 percent "yes" and 40 
percent "no." But unfortunately, I only get it one way or the other. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Karber. But everyone has to live with their vote or their 
hypothetical vote. 

Senator Zorinsky. I understand. 

Mr. Karber. I will answer the question but there is an explana- 
tion for it. If I were a U.S. Senator, which I am not, and if I felt 
that there was support within the U.S. Congress to not only meet 
the administration's request for the new NATO defense plans but 
to really push forward and if I felt the kinds of recommendations 
that had been placed by General Hollingsworth, and currently by 
Ambassador Komer for the administration would receive full sup- 
port in the Congress, then I would vote yes because I think over 
the long term the treaty would have a chance of being a success. 

If I felt the current trend of imbalance in Central Europe was 
going to continue to slide and get us caught, then I think I would 
have to vote "no." Is that too much of a cop-out? 



261 

Senator Zorinsky. No. I have done it myself. I S3mipathize with 
^ou. 

EQUALIZING ABILITY OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD 

You indicate that there is a disparity in NATO concerning, well, 
ake the area of tanks. Certainly the Soviet Union is recognized as 
laving far greater superiority in that area. Would the neutron 
varhead be an equalizer of the numerical disparity numbers in 
anks? 

Mr. Karber. You know we are always talking about new technol- 
>gy. The cruise missile is another one. But the neutron bomb is an 
nteresting one as well. We are always talking about both of them 
LS if that technology is solely possessed by us. 

The current warheads for the nuclear artillery in NATO are so 
•bsolete they are almost unusable. You take the warhead apart 
ind you have 57 parts, and some tech sergeant is trying to put it 
ogether in the mud. It is really quite incredible to try to effective- 
y use them. 

They are not ballistically matched to conventional shells, so you 
ire and you don't know where it will land. We have problems with 
ur current stockpile and I suggest they need to be improved. The 
leutron bomb, the enhanced radiation warhead, coupled with other 
heater nuclear modernizations, given the current balance, and if 
he Warsaw Pact did not respond in kind, would have been a 
ubstantial increase in the credibility of NATO's doctrine, even 
uring conventional operations, because the opponent knowing 
hat you have a usable tactical capability, cannot then afford to 
lass against your conventional defenses, because you might use it 
n him. 

So it even increases the viability of your conventional defenses 
efore nuclear weapons are used. If it is solely possessed! I am not 
ure that the option of enhanced radiation warheads is solely ours. 

EXISTENCE OF NATO IF SALT IS DEFEATED 

Senator Zorinsky. Carrying that one step further then, if we 
uilt more tanks we wouldn't be the only one to have tanks, so 
herefore let's not build any more tanks because the Soviet Union 
an build tanks. But the point I am making is it is an offset to the 
umbers of tanks. 

Any military commander I have ever talked to, including Gener- 
1 Haig, has admitted to that. So therefore, I ask you why won't 
hese NATO nations looking to us for leadership allow us to deploy 
eutron warheads? If they are the ones who indicate we are not 
iving them that leadership, why not accept our attempt to equal- 
le an equation on their behalf? 

And certainly I think the leadership in this country got a bum 
ap when they held up production. The reason production was held 
p was the inability of our nation to deploy this type of equipment 
1 the very countries that are seeking leadership from us to equal- 
se the equation. 

It doesn't stop there. We have offered the deutschmark the lead 
s the monetary value of the world. They say, oh, no, strengthen 



262 

the dollar, we don't want any part of putting our deutschmark out 
there to assume the financial leadership in this world. 

Everybody looks for leadership to this country but everyone 
wants to cop out when the time comes to put their neck out where 
the United States neck is. And the point I am trying to make is 
what do you suggest in the way of getting an affirmative answer 
from the participants in NATO to allow us to exert that leader- 
ship? And if we don't, do you think that without the ratification of 
SALT II, that NATO as we know it today would continue to exist? 

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Mr. Karber. I was asked to testify before the Dutch Parliament 
not too long after the neutron bomb embroglio, and I had an 
opportunity to talk to a lot of the members and find out what it 
was that bothered them. Put yourself in their shoes. They were 
being asked, essentially, to fight what they perceived as a tactical 
nuclear war in their backyard. 

Sitting here in Washington, it is like using nuclear weapons out 
on the beltway. And they were willing to do that. But they didn't 
want to do it for a long time, and they didn't want to do it all 
across the breadth of Central Europe. So they said what is the next 
step? Are you expecting us to fight this tactical nuclear campaign 
solely within Europe? 

When do we stop targeting Eastern Europe, because while the 
majority of NATO's current tactical and theater and nuclear sys- 
tems can only reach Eastern Europe, the Eastern Europeans are 
not the ones who have initiated aggression or who have a nuclear 
striking ability in Europe. It is the Soviet Union. 

And, most significantly our allies asked — what is the likelihood 
the U.S. will go after the guy who really perpetrated this? When do 
we start targeting the Soviet Union? And the conclusion they came 
to after participating in numerous NATO exercises and watching 
the extreme hesitance of many Americans in even planning go to 
that step was that the credibility of our willingness to back them 
up by putting our cities on the line like we were asking them to do 
was not there. 

Quite frankly 

Senator Zorinsky. Are they so naive that they don't think our 
cities are targeted from the Soviet Union and that we haven't 
targeted Soviet cities? 

Mr. Karber. No, not at all. The point they make is — that is, is 
one thing to be on a target list, and it is something else, knowing 
your cities are on a target list, to start firing at the other super- 
power. They found they were being asked to fight a nuclear cam- 
paign essentially in their backyard in their countryside when it 
wasn't even clear that warheads were going to be used against 
tank armies moving through Eastern Europe, let alone major as- 
sembly points, let alone the SS-4's and SS-5's stationed in western 
U.S.S.R. or against Soviet air bases in Russia. 

They were very, very concerned that as a result of the American 
preoccupation with strategic stability, we had essentially given 
away our commitment to them that we will share vulnerability. 
We were asking them to carry a higher vulnerability ratio in the 



263 

conduct of an actual campaign as opposed to being on a peacetime 
target list than we were willing to bear. 

I am not saying that is the truth. I am saying that is a percep- 
tion which I think is growing throughout much of Central Europe. 
And the day, and I don't think it will be that far away — that is a 
personal opinion — the day that this perception becomes wide- 
spread, we will not have much of an alliance any more. 

ABILITY OF NATO TO EQUALIZE EQUATION WITH U.S.S.R. 

Senator Zorinsky. Do you feel, then, without the ratification of 
SALT II, that NATO can still proceed to equalize the equation with 
the Soviet Union? 

Mr. Karber. It is doubtful. As I said, I don't consider myself an 
expert in the strategic side as in the amount of time I have spent 
in Europe. But if one looks at it, the Soviet momentum gained in 
strategic weapons is substantial. I don't think it is within our 
capacity, at least in terms of a first strike capacity, to recoup any 
meaningful sense of superiority. There are technologies one could 
try to employ to reduce one's vulnerability, the ABM, for example, 
but they are of questionable total utility. 

One of the advantages is they tend to create a higher ambiguity 
so it allows you to have some flexibility in at least selecting a 
target. 

Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Karber, you are saying then, in conclu- 
sion, your advice to me as a Senator and to other Senators is if we 
see a commitment by the leadership to future equalization of our 
capabilities with those of the Soviet Union in the area of offensive 
and defensive weapons, to vote for SALT; and if not, to vote against 
SALT? 

Dr. Karber. That would be my personal criteria, yes, sir. 

Senator Zorinsky. And how, in your estimation, would I be able 
to bind a future administration to what this administration says it 
would do to equalize that equation, or even the Congress in which I 
serve? 

Mr. Karber. Obviously, you cannot bind another administration 
or the U.S. Congress. I think, though, you can establish a sense, not 
a formal sense of the Congress, but a sense that something needs to 
be done. 

Senator Zorinsky. Like we did under SALT I and with the B-1 
bomber and the Trident, all of those things we talked about? 

Mr. Karber. I think there was a difference there, if I might 
respond to that. I don't think we said what we wanted to do. It 
wasn't really clear why we wanted those systems. In other words, 
they were more systems, they were modern systems. Yes, the 
others were antiquated, but we didn't really get specific and say 
here is how the B-1 contributes to our defense. And this is why the 
B-1 and not a B-52 with cruise missiles is so important. 

Senator Zorinsky. I was mayor of Omaha, Nebraska then, and 
SAC headquarters is located there and they knew what they 
wanted the B-1 for. They knew exactly what they wanted it for. 
They laid out and stated what they wanted it for. 

Mr. Karber. I am not sure it was conveyed to the people who 
made decisions. It is interesting. If one looks, for example, at the 
way most weapons bills are handled here in the Congress, there is 



264 

relatively little emphasis on the mission and how it fits into the 
actual force structure and doctrine of use. 

It tends to be what kinds of tradeoffs can we make with this 
versus another one. It is frequently a very simplistic cost-effective- 
ness tradeoff. We do very little what one might call — planning for 
a strategy of long term competition — laying out what it is you are 
trying to do and then establishing a force optimized to meet those 
objectives. We tend to talk in sort of vague generalities of a Triad, 
and so forth. We don't really get down and say what specifically is 
a B-1 supposed to do or an aircraft like it. 

So it is very easy then to give them up and trade them off. 

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you very much, Mr. Karber, for taking 
your time to be with us. And on behalf of the rest of the commit- 
tee. Senator Javits and Senator Hayakawa specifically, I would like 
to thank you for your presence and your astute observations. 
Thank you for being here. 

[Mr. Karber's prepared statement follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Phillip A. Karber 

SALT II AND EUROPEAN SECURITY 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to thank you for the 
honor of testifying. The focus of my remarks will be addressed to the relationship 
between SALT on the one hand and European security and the security of the 
NATO alliance on the other. This is the subject I was asked to address and the area 
where I have spent most of my professional time. In my prepared opening remarks I 
have not recommended either the rejection or acceptance of this treaty, its protocol, 
or any recommended amendments. If you would like my views on this, I would be 
glad to give them, but, I would like to make it clear that they are my personal 
opinion and not based on professional expertise. 

There are four major points which I would like to make: 

1. European security is intimately and inextricably linked to the strategic balance 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by history, alliance politics, current military 
strategy and public perception. Any discussion of a strategic arms limitations agree- 
ment which does not take into consideration the potential impact on European 
security, even though subtle and implicit, may produce disastrous political conse- 
quences. 

2. NATO's current strategy, the doctrine of flexible response, is directly depend- 
ent on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in the event that NATO 
conventional defenses cannot hold against a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack. Since 
the beginning of the SALT negotiations over a decade ago, the conventional military 
balance in central Europe has eroded significantly, creating a potentially unstable 
correlation of forces and making NATO more dependent than ever on the first use 
of nuclear weapons. Yet NATO's once clear superiority in tactical and theater 
nuclear weapons has declined to the point that when considered with the ratifica- 
tion of parity under SALT, the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent has 
become in danger of being decoupled from Europe. 

3. There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to 
European attitudes toward SALT II. I believe it is fair to say that the NATO allies 
generally support detente and simultaneously have deep concerns about its long- 
term consequences. 'This apparent contradiction is more understandable, if more 
complex, when one looks at it from a European perspective. 

4. Failure to ratify the SALT Treaty expeditiously may produce reactions within 
the NATO alliance and by the Soviet Union which could have seriously destabiliz- 
ing consequences for European security. It is perhaps unfortunate that the negotiat- 
ed treaty— admittedly less than perfect— threatens such dire consequences to which 
both the proponents and opposition should give careful consideration. 

I. THE EURO-STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP 

There has been a growing tendency in the United States, reinforced in each 
succeeding discussion of SALT, to divorce the strategic United States /Soviet balance 
from considerations of European security. There is a certain logic for doing this. 
Soviet strategic nuclear weapons pose a direct threat to the survival of the United 



265 

States and it makes sense to reduce these weapons via arms control. That is, the 
most obvious threat must be addressed first. Second, the complexities involved in 
defining weapon systems and placing restrictive parameters on their quantity and 
technical specifications is difficult enough with strategic weapons, without adding 
the ambiguities inherent in so many of the "gray area" systems (e.g. multiple 
mission profiles, rapid redeployable mobility, and employment contingencies). Third, 
recent experience has shown that there is a much higher probability of success in 
bilateral arms control negotiations than when many states are involved each with 
differing preceptions, strengths and security requirements. 

Nevertheless, having recognized that a dyadic relationship between the United 
States and Soviet Union is important and deserving of special attention, we should 
also realize that it is an arbitrary, indeed false duality. Europe is intimately and 
irrevocably tied to the strategic balance between the superpowers. This, as I noted, 
is a product of history, alliance strategy, Soviet force posture, current NATO doc- 
trine and the political requirements of our closest allies. 

History may be prologue, but it is seldom predictive. And thus, it is quite specious 
to claim that what has been, will be. Nevertheless, the United States, the Soviet 
Union and our European allies are, to a great extent, products of our past experi- 
ence, and that experience shows a very clear interrelationship between the U.S. 
strategic deterrent posture and our commitment to Europe. It is interesting to note 
that the U.S. signed the NATO Treaty and deployed the Seventh Army in Europe to 
back it up, before we possessed a significant strategic nuclear force, before we 
adopted a doctrine of massive retaliation, and before the continental United States 
was vulnerable to Soviet retaliation. Indeed, it was the perceived Soviet threat to 
Europe and the inability of the West to match with conventional forces, which led 
us to attempt to redress the conventional imbalance by depending upon our strate- 
gic forces. Thus, it is fair to say that not only did NATO antedate our strategic 
posture, but necessitated it. Moreover, throughout the 1950's the United States used 
Eurpoean territory in order to deploy much of our strategic force capability. 

Since the Soviet Union could not match our advantage, indeed superiority, in 
their own overseas deployment, they concentrated on a major build-up of European 
oriented strategic forces (medium bombers and MR/IRBMs). In essence, the Soviets 
held the European NATO member nations as hostages to the American strategic 
deterrent that was there to protect them. Furthermore, the leadership of the Soviet 
Union showed no reticence in making this unambiguously obvious. There has been 
considerable discussion about Soviet military doctrine with respect to whether it is 
oriented to war-fighting as opposed to retalitory deterrence. The evidence is unambi- 
guously clear that whUe they do not relish the prospect of a major conflict, either 
conventional or nuclear, should such a war occur, it would be waged to achieve 
definite political /military objectives, one of which being the destruction of NATO's 
military capabilities through offensive action. Likewise, the evidence equally demon- 
strates that the Soviets believe that the most likely route to a strategic nuclear 
change is via a European connection. If they perceive the highest proximity between 
European security and strategic stability, we cannot afford to do anything less. 

Most of the political upheavals within the Atlantic Alliance have been as a result 
of U.S. attempts to cope with our growing vulnerability to Soviet nuclear strikes. 
Thus the withdrawal of France from military cooperation with NATO was a direct 
product of U.S. reluctance to share authority over nuclear weapon emplojmient with 
our allies, when we expected them to share the consequences. The imbroglios over 
the Multi-Lateral Force, the cancellation of Skybolt, and even the fallout from the 
neutron bomb decision were clearly exacerbated, if not caused, by U.S. insensitivity 
to legitimate allied security concerns. NATO's current doctrine of flexible response, 
promulgated by the U.S. at a time when we had clear strategic superiority, was 
predicted on the unambiguous and deliberate commitment of U.S. strategy nuclear 
power to NATO's security. The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized this coupling 
through such actions as: deploying large quantities of tactical nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems to our European allies (albeit under U.S. control); formally dedicat- 
ing strategic nuclear delivery systems to NATO; and announcing a selective Europe- 
an-oriented targeting doctrine for the U.S. ICBMs. 

The point is that the U.S. Government, through successive administrations includ- 
ing the current one, has drawn a direct and purposeful linkage between NATO 
security and the U.S. strategic forces. It is we who have repeatedly asked them to 
accept that linkage and we should not think anything less of them now or in the 
future for taking us at our word. Our European allies cast their future with ours, 
not because they had no other option nor because they were coerced, but because 
they had an honest faith that the United States had irretrievably cast its fate with 
them. They believed and continue to believe that we define their existence as co- 
terminous with ours, that we are consciously willing to share the threat of nuclear 



266 

annihilation equally. Any negotiations that the United States conducts with the 
Soviet Union which have the appearance — let alone the reality — of implicit hedging 
of this EURO-Strategic linkage requires the most deliberate consideration. If we 
decide to alter our commitment, we, at a minimum, owe our NATO allies an 
explanation before, not after the fact. 

In no way, however, does this suggest that the intent of the current SALT II 
Treaty or those who negotiated it, at least from the American side, was to weaken 
the linkage of U.S. strategic forces to our NATO commitment. In fact, from personal 
observation, I believe that those representing this administration have as strong a 
desire to maintain that linksige as any who have preceded them. Nevertheless, 
appearances are not always the product of conscious decisions. Strategic nuclear 
parity reduces the credibility of U.S. strategic first use against the Soviet Union. 
Suicide is not a credible means of demonstrating one's feality to a friend. To the 
extent that a SALT agreement codifies strategic parity, it gives a global recognition 
to the illogic of strategic first use. This is compounded if the targets of such strikes 
are the opponent's civilian population centers, due to limitations in the survivabil- 
ity, penetrability, and/or sufficient quantity of systems. It is magnified even more, 
if, as a result of either unilateral inhibitions or the provisions of a treaty, there is 
an appearance of asymmetrical parity — that is, if our side is notably weaker in the 
typical measures of a strategic equality: throw-weight, delivery vehicles, equivalent 
megatonage, warheads. It is unfortunate, although undoubtably necessary, that the 
expressions of "Angst" over U.S. nuclear viability produced by the current strategic 
debate does not help in giving the appearance of credibility to our European allies. 

If the United States has no intention of weakening the linkage, it is less than 
obvious that the Soviets share that same motivation. In fact, the politics that they 
have played in the SALT negotiations and other arms control forums (the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and MBFR negotiations), coupled with their theater force 
deployment and modernization, suggest just the opposite. The Soviet Union appar- 
ently considers it most fortuitous to sever the U.S. EURO-strategic relationship by 
simultaneously trying to reduce: (1) the linkage between NATO's conventional de- 
fense and its escalatory first use of tactical weapons; and (2) the European theater 
nuclear forces linkage with U.S. strategic strike systems. One does not have to 
manufacture a myth of Soviet malevolence to suggest that since the mid-1950's, they 
have considered that the de-coupling of Europe from their American strategic 
deterrent is in their highest political self-interest and is a major policy objective. 

Recognizing that the Soviets have considerable self-interest in producing such a 
decoupling does not mean that we cannot negotiate meaningful strategic arms 
agreements which are mutually satisfying. It does suggest, however, that if as the 
consequence of a strategic arms limitations agreement the linkage of the American 
deterrent to Europe should come into question, we should not optimistically expect 
the Soviets to come to our rescue. In fact, we should realistically anticipate that 
they will try and make the most political capital, should our strategic currency be 
devalued. 

II. NATO STRATEGY AND THE EUROPEAN ARMS RACE 

In 1967, NATO formally adopted the strategy of flexible response. This strategy, 
frequently cited but seldom discussed in depth, specified three sequential but co- 
equal defense requirements necessary to deter, with a sufficient level of confidence, 
any Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack on NATO's territory. The first of these require- 
ments was Direct Defense, which called for the maintenance of adequate ground, air 
and naval forces in a high state of peacetime readiness to meet any likely contin- 
gency. Although there was a recognition that defensive nuclear weapons employ- 
ment on or over NATO territory might be necessary during Direct Defense, the 
primary emphasis was on having sufficient conventional forces to meet a major 
Warsaw Pact attack. And, if unable to defeat a massive attack, then at least be able 
to hold it at bay for a considerable period of time, while defending as far forward as 
possible, so as to provide adequate time to determine the optimum level of response 
for the later doctrinal phases. 

The second phase of flexible response was Deliberate Escalation; clearly intended 
to symbolize, by a nuclear strike on Warsaw Pact territory, the seriousness with 
which NATO viewed the aggression. The scope, magnitude and duration of the 
Deliberate Escalation phase has never been explicitly defined. Rather NATO de- 
fense planners have assumed that by keeping it ambiguous, Soviet military and 
political elites will be uncertain as to its application, and thus be deterred by this 
uncertainty. There was also the implicit assumption that Deliberate Escalation is 
unlikely to be exercised until the prospect of the collapse of NATO's conventional 
defense and or the loss of sufficient territory is imminent. 



267 

Quite clearly the Deliberate Escalation phase was conceived as a transitory pause, 
after which, should the situation continue to deteriorate, NATO would initiate a 
General Nuclear Response. This large-scale nuclear strike would not only be deliv- 
ered against Eastern Europe but also against critical military targets in the USSR 
as far as the Urals. A major element in NATO's General Nuclear Response would 
be U.S. strategic forces and the implementation of this phase could either precede 
or be exercised simultaneously with the unleashing of U.S. SIOP. 

These three phases remain current NATO strategy. However, events over the 
intervening period may call into question the viability of some, perhaps all, of these 
three elements. Shortly after the adoption of flexible response, the NATO leader- 
ship recognized that arms control and force reduction could enhance the viability of 
its flexible response strategy. It was assumed that a reduction of forces to a more 
balanced position would not only increase the stability of the European balance but 
would perhaps even favor NATO, given the West's substantial qualitative superior- 
ity in conventional weapons technology. Thus, after repeated invitations, the 
Warsaw Pact joined with NATO in 1972 in the MBFR talks. To date, although there 
is increased speculation that the positions of the two sides are getting closer, there 
has been no formal agreement. 

Unfortunately, many of the assumptions upon which NATO's Flexible Response 
strategy were initially premised have been undermined. The Soviets have not been 
content with the balances that have existed in 1967 but rather have undertaken a 
major arms build-up opposite NATO in Central Europe. The clear qualitative superi- 
ority of NATO in conventional weapons technology has been nullified by the exten- 
sive modernization of Soviet forces and the overall quantitative increase in the 
threat. What could have been characterized as a fairly stable balance in which 
neither side had any incentive to undertake rash actions, has now become highly 
unstable. A Soviet-led attack, even with relatively small East European participa- 
tion, would enjoy major advantages if launched with minimum preparation (and 
thus warning) while NATO's conventional defenses are still in the process of mobili- 
zation and forward deployment. 

By striking before NATO's defenses are fully prepared, there is even the prospect 
that the survivability of NATO nuclear forces could be so seriously degraded, its air 
base and command and control elements so greatly disrupted, and ground defenses 
so rapidly and deeply penetrated and overrun, that NATO's Deliberated Escalation 
policy would be in large measure irrelevant. The accompanying charts, utilizing the 
same definitions of units and geography that are under consideration in the MBFR 
negotiations, graphically illustrate to the extent to which the arms race in Central 
Europe has been one sided— a race that NATO is clearly losing. Figure 1 shows the 
geographical area and forces involved in the MBFR discussions. 

It is interesting to note that since the inception of the SALT negotiations, the 
Warsaw Pact has introduced nearly 12,000 major combatant weapons into Central 
Europe. These are given for major weapon categories in Figure 2. In almost every 
major weapons category where they had a lead they have increased it. In most areas 
where the Soviets were behind (mostly notably in SAMS and antitank guided 
missiles), they have since taken the lead. 

In terms of the quality of conventional weapons, in many areas the Soviets have 
not only caught up but surpassed NATO's deployment of new technology. For 
example, Soviet forces in Eastern Europe today have a greater quantity of new 
tanks— the T-64— than NATO will have Leopard II and XM-1 tanks in 1983. Like- 
wise, the number of Soviet BMP's (infantry fighting vehicles) in Central Europe 
today exceeds the counterpart systems that NATO will have in the mid 80s. This is 
also true in the areas of surface-to-air missiles and self-propelled, radar directed, air 
defense guns. Where NATO had a clear lead in self-propelled artillery this is being 
matched by the extensive deployment throughout the Warsaw Pact of new Soviet 
designed self-propelled systems which are at least the equal of NATO deployed 
artillery weapons. Where in 1970 it could be rightly claimed that the quality of 
NATO aircraft more than compensated for their quantitative inferiority, the rapid 
and extensive modernization of Soviet frontal aviation in Central Europe clearly 
opens to question the long held premise of NATO air superiority over the battle- 
field. (It should be noted that Soviet frontal aviation in Central Europe by itself is 
equal to the total number of available NATO aircraft, with Soviet aircraft payloads 
in addition being doubled.) 



48-?Rn 0-79 Pt.U - 18 



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270 

There is no more persistent myth than the repeated claim that NATO's superior- 
ity in the number and quahty of its antitank weapons makes up for its quantitative 
inferiority in tanks. This misconception, which started in the late 1960s, has persist- 
ed with such resiliance that I hope you will forgive a short digression aimed at 
putting this falsehood to rest. NATO has never had a sufficient enough quantity of 
antitank weapons (either antitank guided missiles, antitank guns or antitank gre- 
nade launchers) to offset its noticible lack of tanks. Today NATO faces in Central 
Europe over 36,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored vehicles (16,000 tanks, and 
over 20,000 APC's, light tanks and armored reconnaissance vehicles). As the defend- 
er, NATO's tank and antitank crews cannot afford to concentrate solely on the 
opposing tanks while having their positions overrun by the other armored vehicles. 
To oppose this array of Warsaw Pact armor, NATO has a total of 6,000 tanks, 
approximately 4,000 antitank guided missile launchers, and no more than 2,000 
light tanks and antitank guns. While many exaggerated claims have been made for 
the antitank guided missile, the combined effect of its deficiencies to include low 
rate of fire, terrain limitations in Europe which preclude its maximum range of 
effectiveness, the lack of armored protection or tactical mobility for its crews, and 
the fact that the high theoretical accuracy of these systems is degraded by two 
thirds due to the finanical limitations on training, all contribute to minimizing the 
impact of these weapons. Moreover while NATO had a clear advantage in guidance 
technology this has been lost with the introduction of second and even third genera- 
tion guidance for Warsaw Pact ATGMs. It should be pointed out that today the 
Warsaw Pact has more antitank guided missile launchers deployed in Central 
Europe than does NATO, and over 80 percent of these are mounted on armored 
vehicles providing protection and tactical mobility to the crews. This is in compari- 
son to only 40 percent for NATO. 

In other areas NATO has not been able to exploit its supposed technological lead 
in weaponry. One looks in vain for precision delivered air munitions (such as 
Maverick) in the air forces of our European allies: their high cost, limited utility in 
European weather, and operational problems having been a disincentive for our 
allies. NATO has placed heavy emphasis on the use of the armed helicopter 
equipped with antitank weapons, but the numbers deployed or programmed are 
pathetically small in comparison to the quantities of armor they face and the 
density of the opposing air defenses. In fact, the Warsaw Pact has nearly matched 
NATO's deployment of armed helicopter; their MI-24 Hind helicopter equaling the 
best that NATO has available. The U.S. Army has been intensely developing a long- 
range multiple rocket launcher (called GSRS) for dispensing antitank mines de- 
signed to impede the rapid advance of second echelon armored formations. It is 
depressing to consider that this system, which is scheduled to be available in the 
mid 1980's, already has a counterpart deployed today with Soviet Ground Forces. 
Thus, NATO has lost the quantitative race and is rapidly falling behind in the 
qualitative aspects as well. If an MBFR agreement had been reached early on, quite 
clearly the conventional threat would be far less. In fact the Soviets have intro- 
duced more combat equipment into Central Europe since 1973 than the current 
MBFR proposals would require them to remove. Perhaps we were overly ambitious 
in attempting scaled reductions when a simple ceiling or qualitative moderization 
sub-ceiling would have helped considerably. On the other hand, no one predicted 
such a massive expansion and modernization build-up when MBFR started. 

The erosion of NATO's relative conventional capability to conduct a Direct De- 
fense, coupled with a decline in its force readiness due to the high cost of modern- 
ization, also impacts negatively on the Alliance's ability to provide sufficient time 
for a well planned and conscious exercise of Deliberate Escalation. Moreover 
NATO's clear superiority in tactical nuclear weapons has been substantially degrad- 
ed by a series of Warsaw Pact actions. They have a substantial lead in the surviva- 
bility of their tactical air bases and the command/control structure. Extensive 
modernization of Soviet Frontal Aviation gives it a battlefield and interdiction dual 
capability almost double what it had a few years ago. The extensive quantities of 
chemical warheads, and delivery systems and protective measures of the Warsaw 
Pact have no equal within NATO. And should they be used either prior to or 
simultaneously with tactical nuclear weapons, NATO's ground and air capabilities 
could be decisively impared within a few hours. This is not to mention Soviet 
doctrine, which clearly calls for the purposeful degradation of NATO's nuclear 
capability and command survivability during the conventional phase of battle. Nor 
does it include the clear escalatory dominance in Soviet long-range, theater-oriented 
bombers and MR/IRBM systems deployed in the Western USSR sanctuary — this 
being an effective staging area for launching strikes against NATO's land based 
delivery systems. 



271 

The point is that the conventional and theater nuclear legs of the NATO "triad" 
are in bad shape and seem to get worse with the passing of each year. This would 
not be so destabilizing if the U.S. had still clear strategic superiority. Those days, 
however, are long gone and while we can bemoan their passing a dependance on 
U.S. strategic forces to make up for NATO's inadequacy in conventional and theater 
nuclear weapons makes the implementation of current NATO strategy an exercise 
in Nihilism. 

III. EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SALT II 

There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to the 
European attitude toward SALT II. Some suggest that they wholeheartedly endorse 
it while others, citing unnamed sources, suggest that the Europeans haroor grave 
misgivings. While there appears to be an apparent contradiction between these two 
perspectives, the reality seems more complex and perhaps these views are even 
complementary. 

Before addressing this question, however, several points are worth noting. First, 
there is no single integrated European perspective on SALT II or an3^hing else for 
that matter. There are considerable differences between political parties, within 
governments and between the NATO members states themselves. If we are willing 
to except the ambivalence of a strategic debate in this country with all its varying 
nuances and shades of perceptions, we should expect no more certitude from our 
allies. 

Secondly, I have noticed from personal experience a considerable difference be- 
tween official utterances in public forums, and the personal convictions conveyed in 
privacy by the same people. This is neither duplicity nor lack of courage on their 
parts. Most, by definition, are "influential" Europeans tending to be officials in 
their respective governments and feel that they have an obligation to support the 
official position. They are sufficiently sophisticated to be able to differentiate per- 
sonal opinion from their official responsibility. This is no different than what 
happens daily in the United States. There is also a deep-rooted deference to the 
NATO alliance and very few individuals feel that it is worth undermining a jointly 
agreed position or appearing to contradict what the United States, as the leader of 
the alliance, has made a cornerstone of its foreign policy. 

Thirdly, no American can or should presume ' to speak for" the Europeans. All 
too often the United States has treated our allies with condescension rather than 
understanding, management instead of maturity. European governmental leaders 
have minds of their own, and, if they have decided to support SALT II it should be 
taken as a given government's position. I know of no case where any government 
has been coerced by the U.S. administration into an endorsement of SAL'T II. In 
fact — and just to the contrary — I have been told repeatedly by Europeans at many 
different levels how much they appreciate the extent to which this administration, 
far more than its predecessors, has kept them informed on the developments in 
SALT II and listened with open ears to their views and concerns, even if they were 
not reflected in the final treaty. 

Having registered these caveats, I would like to try and explain the apparent 
ambivalence that I believe many Europeans feel toward SALT II. As a whole they 
are far more committed to detente as a long term political process than we in the 
United States. There is a good reason for this. They have to live on the same 
continent as the Soviet Union, an environment which could place them directly in 
the middle of a superpower confrontation. It simultaneously heightens their anxi- 
eties with respect to their own security and yet gives them a feeling of impotence at 
not being able to control or even significantly influence actions which may have 
dire consequences for them. At the same time the Europeans realize that to a great 
extent they have been left out of the bilateral SALT negotiations. And they have 
watched from the sidelines as each successive negotiation has involved itself more 
and more with that part of the strategic balance that relates to them. Thus the 
ABM Treaty only affected Europe tangentially in that it highlighted U.S. accept- 
ance of shared vulnerability with them and the Soviet Union. In the interim 
agreement, the Soviets unilaterally interpreted the U.S. SLBM limitations as includ- 
ing French and British systems. While this did not have any effect on their pro- 
grammed forces, no one likes to have someone else to take it upon themselves to 
negotiate for them. This was more than compensated for by the onset of superpower 
agreement and the effervescent euphoria of detente. The Vladivostok Accord im- 
pacted more directly in that it appeared to codify a strategic assymetry even if the 
net affect was parity. 

SALT II has increased their direct interest not only because the protocol affects 
systems which they may receive and calls for even further discussions in their area 
under SALT III but, as a result of U.S. policy they were briefed extensively on its 



272 

developments and watched from the sidelines as the Backfire bomber slipped 
through the cracks. We should thus expect that in the future our NATO allies, 
having tasted the semblance of participation, will expect a greater amount of 
influence in the outcome of strategic negotiations. 

The greater the apprehension in the United States over the credibility of the 
linkage between our strategic systems and our commitment to European security, 
the greater will be European desire to actively participate. The key to the long-term 
success in this process is U.S. leadership in demonstrating that we know where we 
are going, that we still hold a shared destiny, and that the United States is willing 
to cooperate as well as consult. 

Our European allies have consistently followed our lead. When the U.S. ignored 
European defense during our preoccupation with Southeast Asia they followed suit 
with unilateral manpower reductions and force economizing measures. Now that 
the U.S. has "rediscovered Europe" our European allies have certainly kept up their 
end of the bargain. In fact, to the extent that NATO forces in Central Europe have 
increased at all during the last decade it has been primarily due to the European 
contribution rather than that of the U.S. 

There is no greater injustice done to our European allies than the claim that they 
are unwilling to provide for their own defense. They realize that there is a growing 
conventional imbalance and that something needs to be done with respect to 
NATO's theater nuclear modernization although they are far less certain with 
respect to what is the right course in the latter area. 

They are not blind. Increasingly West Europeans realize that the credibility of 
NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, the fundamental cornerstone of alliance 
strategy and the critical link to the U.S. strategic deterrent is becoming less credi- 
ble. Moreover there is increasing concern in the more informed circles (particularly 
the military) that the option for first use is not NATO's alone, and that the growing 
Soviet theater nuclear capability requires some point of modernization of NATO's 
systems if nothing more than to insure their survival as a deterrent to preemption. 

IV. SALT II RATIFICATION AND ALUANCE INSTABIUTY 

Whether or not the SALT II Treaty is ratified or rejected, it is my opinion there is 
a significant chance for instability within the alliance. This does not mean that the 
resultant perturbations would be the same or the consequences symmetrical. Never- 
theless, the significances of these potential instabilities ought to be given consider- 
able attention. If the treaty is ratified we should be aware of the potential dangers 
posed by: (1) the inhibiting potential for TNF moderation following the inclusion of 
cruise missile range limitations in the protocol; and (2) the transference of super- 
power confrontations in the third world to a crisis in Europe. If the treaty is 
rejected the Soviet ability to teach us a lesson and the potential anxiety wathin the 
NATO alliance should not be minimized. 

A potential problem inherent in the passage of SALT II is the political effect in 
Europe of the inclusion of cruise missile range limitations in the protocol. Recogniz- 
ing that an amendment to the SALT II Treaty may specify to the Soviets that the 
extention of these limitations is unlikely short of major arms control agreements 
dealing with theater oriented systems, nevertheless the mere fact that these sys- 
tems are covered under the treaty may mean that some European governments 
could have difficulty convincing their electorates that they should commit them- 
selves to a nuclear modernization program, parts of which are banned for the 
present. For those who witnessed the Soviet propaganda campaign directed at 
Europe on the possible deployment of the neutron bomb this raises the spectre of a 
fertile area for similar efforts with even more devisive effects upon the NATO TNF 
modernization program in particular. 

There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to 
Soviet adventurism in the Third World, and its "linkage" to the Treaty. I personally 
find this argument more convincing in a debate over detente foreign policy rather 
than in terms of the specifics of SALT II. There is an element here which could 
have an adverse effect on our European allies. If the Treaty is passed and such 
adventurism continues in the absence of an effective U.S. repoiste the tendancy in 
Europe to identify strategic parity with the loss of United States will, could lead to 
the unwarranted extrapolation that the Euro-Strategic relationship is also in doubt. 
The stability of the European balance is not unrelated to events in the Third World. 
If we and the Soviet Union should come into confrontation there is a distinct 
potential that this "macho" political posturing may be transferred to calls for 
increased readiness of the forces in Europe, the only place where units of two 
superpowers are currently in direct opposition. This could result in a breakdown of 
the very detente environment which the Europeans depend upon so heavily. Thus is 



273 

we do not deal with Soviet adventurism now in SALT the U.S. had better do it soon 
before it is too late and the reverberations are bouncing off European capitals. 
Far more likely is a negative reaction that the rejection of SALT ratification 
could have on the European alliance at least initially. The Soviet military capability 
and political capacity to "teach us a lesson" has in my opinion received far too little 
attention to date. If SALT II is spurned, there is n my opinion no small likelihood 
that the Soviet Union would take this as a national insult and it is no great 
inferential leap from there to a coordinated political/military strategy that is de- 
signed to demonstrate that the global correlation of forces has changed. To be quite 
frank, the United States and NATO have many areas of potential politico-military 
vulnerabilities in which the Soviets could apply substantial pressure with minimal 
risk. At least the option of terminating the crisis would be theirs with the escala- 
tory onus on the West. To name only one, it is difficult to conceive how the West 
would be able to achieve a favorable accommodation should the Soviets exercise a 
contingency to enforce East German sovereignty over Berlin. If the land and air 
routes were closed I can conceive of no readily available means given the current 
imbalance of forces in Central Europe to reopen them short of a political concession. 
By such action this or other less dramatic actions the Soviets could not only 
demonstrate to us that they are not to be trifled with but also bring out the most 
latent tensions inherent in the NATO alliance structure. 

The same divisive effect could be achieved, albeit less dramatically, by a misbegot- 
ten attempt to accelerate "the internal contradictions of capitalist strategy" by 
increasing Soviet theater nuclear capability. It would not surprise me to find that 
within the next several years that the Soviets have introduced a whole new genera- 
tion of tactical rockets and missiles (to replace or augment Frog, Scud, and Scale- 
board) into their forces located in Central Europe. 

Over the last several years the Soviets have been deploying considerable quanti- 
ties of the self-propelled 152mm artillery systems. There has been increasing specu- 
lation in Europe that these weapon systems are capable of firing a low yield tactical 
nuclear device and that warheads may be soon deployed. If such an eventuality 
occurs it will erase the last semblance of NATO tactical nuclear superiority repre- 
sented by the current 155mm and 203mm artillery systems. NATO has long as- 
sumed that nuclear artillery provided a substantial advantage to the defense which, 
because of its accuracy, response time, and direct battlefield impact serves as an 
inhibitant to the attackers massing of armor. However, when both sides have 
nuclear artillery of comparable range and warhead size, it is far from self evident 
that mutual possession inherently favors the defense. 

If the Soviet artillery systems are equipped with a nuclear capability it would not 
be out of the question for us to "discover" sometime in the 1980s that these 
warheads have an enhanced radiation (ER) effect— a Soviet neutron bomb. Contrary 
to many statements that were made during the recent Western neutron debate, low 
yield accurate artillery delivered munitions with an ER capability are likely to aid 
the attacker more than the defender because it is the latter's infantry, deployed on 
the ground in relatively static and open positions who are far more vulnerable than 
fast moving armored columns. Needless to say that the political reaction in Europe 
accompanying such a "discovery" would create considerable public pressure for a 
mutual cessation of TNF modernization and possibly a no first use agreement. 

Many in the West are acting as if cruise missile technology were beyond the 
reach of Soviet science. It is only a matter of time and resource commitment. They 
could appear in much larger quantities and much quicker than we expect. The short 
ranges to NATO targets, their high vulnerability, and the great number of Soviet 
medium bombers, a Soviet theater oriented ALCM could significantly tip the TNF 
balance scales with a far less sophisticated technology. 

These speculations could certainly be characterized as alarmist and I am not 
predicting them. On the other hand the Soviets may not wait for NATOs TNF 
modernization to mature or for the United States to regain strategic ascendence. Of 
course, there is nothing in SALT II that would prevent Soviet TNF "posturing" 
either except their desire to keep the treaty in force. 

Less dramatic but no less significant, even in the absence of Soviet actions (other 
than verbal abuse) following the rejection of SALT II, would be the negative impact 
on allied politics. Having committed themselves to favoring the treaty its rejection 
could lead to the most devisive tendencies. While some would hope that rejection 
would lead to a new vigor in U.S. world leadership, others would see it as a symbolic 
proof of American administrative division and impotence. In the rejection of SALT 
II, there are those in Europe, and their numbers are currently growing, who would 
argue that individually their countries should maintain the momentum of detente 
and approach Moscow to negotiate the best deal they can. The effects of such action 
on the NATO alliance would be catastrophic. 



274 

Thus, on balance, the onerous aspects of the rejection of the SALT II Treaty seem 
to have a more immediate and dangerous consequence for the stability of our 
European alliance than would be the more tangential negative consequences of 
ratification. On the other hand it is a commentary on the current state of U.S. 
military preparedness and the perception of U.S. leadership within the alliance that 
such coercive elements as Soviet crisis manipulation, TNF posturing or playmg on 
European fears, must be considered with respect of the ratification of this treaty. 

With or without SALT II, if the current trends with Central Europe continue the 
day will come when the credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee to our 
European allies will not be in doubt but a recognized anachronism. The political 
result is not likely to bear any resemblance to the much maligned status of Finland. 
If one must use analogies, the European environment is far more likely to resemble 
"Balkanization" rather than "Finlandization", with all the attendant instabilities 
and dangers to world peace. 

V. CONCLUSIONS 

With respect to SALT II, the stability in Central Europe and the security of the 
NATO alliance, I have one recommendation: the United States must increase the 
American forces deployed in and programed for Central Europe. I would not recom- 
mend this as a formal condition to the Treaty, but it seems only prudent that if 
SALT II is going to have a fraction of the success its proponents hope, the Treaty 
should neither undermine the Euro-Strategic Relationship nor be undermined by 
current force imbalance in Central Europe. 

The administration has made major strides in this direction. The positive actions 
of the Secretary of Defense and his advisor on NATO Affairs have had a noticeable 
impact in giving a renewed sense of purpose to the alliance, enhancing the commit- 
ment of its membership and in initiating major substantive improvements. Never- 
theless the administration's NATO initiatives desperately need additional congres- 
sional support. Inflation is hollowing out much of the increased NATO oriented 
defense spending, each of the services require additional support if they are to fulfill 
their NATO oriented missions, and there are many areas for force improvements 
that need even greater emphasis. Two years ago I described these initiatives as 
helpful actions to help redress the European imbalance. Now I believe they are the 
minimum necessary to keep it from getting worse. 

Arms control and the theater force improvement can be mutually supported 
rather than mutually exclusive. A dynamic U.S. leadership which encompasses both 
a combined European oriented strategy and puts the security of our allies above the 
good will of our opponents could produce a restabilization of the European military 
balance. I could think of no more meaningful contribution which could come in the 
wake of the current SALT II debate than the conveyance of the message to the 
Soviet Union that they cannot have it both ways: that Europe and the United States 
are indivisible. The security of one directly affecting the other. That the stabiliza- 
tion produced by arms control with one alliance partner must ultimately be availa- 
ble to all. 

Senator Zorinsky. This hearing is in recess until Monday at 10 
a.m. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene 
at 10 a.m., September 10, 1979.] 



SALT II TREATY 



MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1979 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee on European Affairs 
OF the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Washington, D.C. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman 
of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Javits, Percy, 
Helms and Hayakawa. 
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. 

opening statement 

Today the Subcommittee on European