Salvage programs following the 1968 hurricane : Berkeley, Calif., 1968

vafou^

University of California • Berkeley

University of California Bancroft Library /Berkeley
Regional Oral History Office

Earl S. Peirce

SALVAGE PROGRAMS FOLLOWING THE
1938 HURRICANE

Edited by
Amelia R, Fry

Berkeley
1968

Produced under the auspices of
Resources for the Future

All uses of this manuscript are
covered by an agreement between
the Regents of the University of
California and Earl S. Peirce,
dated October 15, 1967. The
manuscript is thereby made avail
able for research purposes. All
literary rights in the manuscript,
including the right to publish,
are reserved to the Bancroft
Library of the University of
California at Berkeley. No part
of the manuscript may be quoted
for publication without the written
permission of the Director of
Bancroft Library of the University
of California at Berkeley,

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Earl S. Peirce

September 26. 1886
1901-1902

1902-1906
1906-1909

1910

July 1. 1910

1915-1916

1917-1921

1922-1932

From 1933 to 1951

Prom 1936 to my
retirement in 1951

Born at Frankfort, Maine

Attended Peekskill Military
Academy, Peekskill, New York

Attended Phillip Academy,
Andover, Massachusetts.
Graduated 1906

Yale University, New Haven,
Connecticut. Graduated 1909,
"3.S." degree

Attended Yale Forest School,
New Haven, Connecticut

Entered U.S. Forest Service
as Forest Assistant, Bighorn
National Forest, Sheridan,
Wyoming

Forest Examiner in Black Hills
National Forest, Deadwood,
South Dakota

Forest Supervisor, Medicine
Bow National Forest, Laramie,
Wyoming

Director of Extension, New
York State College of Forestry,
Syracuse, New York

Held various positions with
U.S. Forest Service at Regional
Office at Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
and at head office in Washington,
B.C.

Was Chief of the Division of
Co-operative Forest Protection,
having to do mainly with co
operation with state forestry
departments and private timber
land owners in protecting forests
from fire damage.

Was assigned to the timber
salvage project in New England
(administered by the U.S. Forest
Service) following the hurricane
of 1938.

PREFACE

This interview was made possible by a grant from Resources
for the Future, Inc., under which the Regional Oral History
Office of the Bancroft Library at the University of California at
Berkeley embarked on a series of interviews to trace the history
of policy in the U. S. Forest Service. Dr. Henry Vaux, Professor
of Forestry, University of California, Berkeley, is the Principal
Investigator of this project. Copies of the manuscripts are on
deposit in the Bancroft Library of the University of California at
Berkeley; also in the Department of Special Collections, UCLA
Library; in the Forest History Society, Yale University; and in
the library of Resources for the Future, Washington, D. C.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape
record autobiographical interviews with persons prominent in the
recent history of the West. The Office is under the administrative
supervision of the Director of the Bancroft Library.

Willa Klug Baum, Head
Regional Oral History Office

Regional Oral History Office
Room 486 The Bancroft Library
University of California
Berkeley, California

ii

THE RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE SERIES

tape recorded interviews on
THE HISTORY OF FOREST POLICY, 1900-1950

1. Clepper, Henry, Executive Secretary, Society of American

Foresters.

2. Dana, Samuel T. , Dean, School of Natural Resources, University

of Michigan

3. Gill, Tom, Forester, author, head of Pack foundation.

4. Granger, Christopher, Assistant Chief of the Forest Service,

national forest administration.

5. Hall, R. Clifford, Director, Forest Taxation Inquiry.

6. Hartzog, George B. , Director, National Park Service.

7. Hornaday, Fred, Executive Secretary of American Forestry

Association; and Pomeroy, Kenneth, Editor for A. F. A.

8. Kotok, I. E., Assistant Chief of the Forest Service, state

and private forestry; research.

9. Kniepp, Leon F., Assistant Chief of the Forest Service, land

and acquisition.

10. Marsh, Raymond, Assistant Chief of the U. S. Forest Service

under Earle Clapp.

11. Peirce, Earl, Chief, Division of State Cooperation, USFS .

12. Ring land , Arthur, Regional Forester, Region 3; Executive

Secretary of National Conference on Outdoor
Recreation.

13. Roberts, Paul, Director, Prairie States Forestry Projects;

14. Shepard , Harold B., in charge of Insurance Study, conducted

by the Northeastern Experiment Station with Yale
University.

15. Sieker, John H. , Chief of Division of Recreation and Lands.

16. Swift, Lloyd, Chief of Division of Wildlife Management.

NEW ENGLAND

11 SLOWDOWN" TIMBER AND FOREST FIRE HAZARD

CAUSED BY THE SEPT. 1938 HURRICANE

measure of foreJt fire hazard, by town

Over /0,000,0O0 i>d. ft. down
(Extreme fire hazard)

/,000.00O to /0,O 0O.OOO id. ft
(Moderate fire hazard)

Xes; ihan /.000.000 td.ft
(Jliyht fire hazard)

— I //of affected or no report

STATE

SLOWDOWN" VOLUME
SALVAGE ABLE -M

HURRICANE DAMAGE:

NO COUNTIES NO. TOWNS "SLOWDOWN"

AFFECTED AFFECTED VOLUME -M

MAINE _4 ._40-_ _. 50.000. _ 45,000

NEW HAMPSHIRE- _IO_. - 259 _ _ 1,005,000 620,000

VERMONT _I4 248 360,000 190.000

MASSACHUSETTS-. __IO_ - 1 50 _. I,OOO.OOO_. 600.00

RHODE ISLAND- _5__ 39 _. 85,000 60,000

CONNECTICUT- _ 8_. 168- 1 50.000 ... 85.000

TOTAL NEW ENGLAND _ _5I_ 904_ 2.650,000 1,600,000

iii

POREWOHD

This historical report was prepared in March,
1965,— twenty-seven years after the big hurricane
in 1938. It is based in part on memory, but mostly
on reports and records made during or soon after the
completion of the program.

The Federal activities in New England following
the hurricane were undertaken in response to urgent
requests from responsible individuals, groups, and
high officials of all the states involved. The dou
ble barrelled program, (1) reducing the forest fire
hazard and (2) salvaging the damaged timber, was made
possible through the cooperation of at least six
separate Government agencies. The work involved was
most closely related to the Department of Agriculture,
so the responsibility for participation by the govern
ment was assumed by the Secretary of Agriculture. It
was delegated by him to the Chief of the United States
Forest Service, and within the latter organization
the overall directing job was centered in the "Division
of State Cooperation". The writer at the time was
in charge of that division.

iv

While the hazard reduction-fire protection pro
gram had ample precedent in the annals of Forest Ser
vice history, it did provide a test of Forest Service
leadership and ability to carry on a big job, demanding
a high degree of cooperation with many local, state
and Federal agencies. On the other hand, the timber
salvage program was something entirely new to the
Forest Service, a project without a modern prototype,
one so large and hazardous that no individual, corpor
ation, or state could undertake it, and one that de
manded the stabilizing influence of a competent and
experienced Federal agency. The Forest Service ad
mit* some mistakes but offers no apologies for the
conduct of the program. Most of the policies which
guided the various activities were fundamentally
sound and in the best public interest. Purposely
no names have been mentioned. To do so would make
it difficult to know where to stop. Many persons,
mostly regular Forest Service officials, played
important roles in the program at one time or another
and in various capacities. However, the Project
Director located at Boston had by far the most diffi
cult task. It required supervisory ability, sound

judgement and sincere will to cooperate. The
success of the entire program was in the hands
of the Project Director. Two men shared that
responsibility - Leslie S. Bean during the initial
fifteen months, and John F. Campbell from there
to the close of the Boston office on January 30,

1943.

The hurricane caused a great loss of human
lives and tremendous damage to properties of all
kinds but the dark clouds had a tinge of silver
lining. It provided a huge volume of lumber and
other wood products when and where it was urgently
needed in the war effort. In that respect, it
added some counterweight to the old English proverb,
"It's an ill wind that blows nobody good."

Earl S. Peirce

March 29, 1965 -
Washington, D. C.

vi

INTRODUCTION

It was retired Assistant Chief of the U.S. Forest
Service Ed I. Kotok who in 1963 first mentioned to me
that the federal emergency salvage of the New England
hurricane of 1938 was a milestone in federal forestry
in the enormity of the effort and in the complex co
operation between federal, state, county, and private
timberland representatives.

Sometime later, during an exchange of letters
with another retired assistant chief, Chris Granger,
the subject of the 1938 blow-down was again approached,
this time as a suggested topic to include in a memoir
that he was planning for the Resources for the Future
series on the history of policy in the U.S. Forest
Service. Granger suggested that Earl Peirce was the
man to write about the colossal cleanup job, since at
the time of the hurricane Granger had been in charge of
timber management of the national forests and Earl
Peirce was heading Co-operative Forest Protection, a
Division that dealt with state and private timber
owners. It was he, then, who had been assigned to
direct and co-ordinate the emergency protection and

vii

salvage operations.

Mr. Peirce readily agreed to write his account
for the Regional Oral History Office at Berkeley,
using his records and those available in the U.S.
Forest Service office. He received no outlines from
me, as such; only suggestions that he try to supple
ment the information available in the records and
emphasize the why and the how of the operation."
Edee Mezirow, Regional Oral History Office repre
sentative in Washington, D.C., where Mr. Peirce lives,
was alerted to help him if he needed assistance in
checking records and digging out documents. Prom the
Forest Service files and elsewhere, Peirce also
collected several photographs and a map of the hurricane
area for inclusion in his manuscript.

Working without a typewriter "or the ability to
operate one," he wrote out what, in his opinion, were
the major activities of the entire fire protection and
salvaging effort. Some of "the facets and ramifications,"
he says, have not been touched, but, fearing that too
much detail would make for deadly reading, he avoided

Letter in appendix, Fry to Peirce, January 27, 1965 •

viii

anything that might seem trivial and stuck to the
"broad outlines. "Even so, it is difficult to tell

%?

the story without considerable detail," he writes.

The manuscript was returned to the Regional Oral
History Office in Berkeley for typing, inserting the
necessary pictures, indexing, and binding. No editing
was done other than checking for errors in spelling
and typing.

Amelia R. Pry
Project Director

"see Appendix, March 29, 1965, letter from Peirce to Fry.

TABLE OP CONTENTS

PREFACE
FOREWORD

INTRODUCTION vi

THE 1938 HEW ENGLAND HURRICANE 1

The Storm and Its Aftermath 1

REDUCING THE FOREST FIRE HAZARD 8

Organization 8

Accomplishments 14

Benefits 15

SALVAGING THE DAMAGED TIMBER 18

Policy Development Within the Program 21

Operations 26

purchasing logs 27

sawing the logs into lumber 34

selling the lumber 37

SUMMARY Afi.

APPENDIX 49

PARTIAL INDEX 50

FEDERAL EMERGENCY PROGRAMS FOLLOWING
THE 1938 NEW ENGLAND HURRICANE

THE STORM AND ITS AFTERMATH

One of the moat destructive hurricanes of all
times swept through the New England States on Septem
ber 21, 1938. It left in its wake tremendous damage
in loss of human lives and property values. It cov
ered an area of 160,000 square miles, causing varying
damage in all six New England states and small por
tions of Long Island. The hardest hit areas centered
along the north shore of Long Island Sound and ex
tensive interior portions of New Hampshire and Massa
chusetts..

Other great storms had killed more persons, but
in terms of property losses this one topped them all.
A few statistics will give an idea of the severity of
the storm and its destruction: 682 persons lost their
lives and an additional 1754 were more or less injured,
Destroyed were 8924 dwellings, three-quarters of them
summer homes, 9807 other buildings, and 2605 boats.
Public utilities were severely damaged with 20,000
miles of electric power and telephone lines put
out of service and order. The Bell System then

reported 600,000 telephones out of commission
and estimated its damages at ten million dollars.

Loss of life and damage, especially in the
coastal areas, would have been far greater had it
not been for advance warnings by the U.S. Weather
Bureau and the U.S. Coast Guard, which enabled
some emergency preparations to meet the shock.

An unusual feature of this hurricane was its
great damage to shade trees and forests. Literally
millions of large trees were toppled over like ten
pins. The capricious storm, contacting the earth
lightly in some places, viciously in others, left
a tangled mass of debris over extensive areas. Con
tributing to the heavy tree damage was an abnormally
high rainfall during the preceding week which softened
the ground and made the trees vulnerable to wind throw.
This applied especially to the relatively shallow
rooted white pines, which comprised the major tree
species.

Throughout the hurricane area there was great
damage to valuable shade trees - in city or town parks,
bordering streets or surrounding homes and residences.
Mostly, they were large and beautiful trees, highly
valued by their owners and local residents.

Timber Management, Injured Trees, New Hampshire
No. 3 of a series of panorama photos showing the
storm damage at Wheelock Park at Keene, New
Hampshire. This damage was caused by the hurricane
of September 21.
Taken by B. W. Muir--0ctober 1938

they could not be replaced within 50 years or more,
their loss was deeply felt.

Damage to forests involved both extensive tracts
of timber and many small woodlots over some 15 million
acres or about one third of the total land area in
New England. The area of almost complete damage was
about a thousand square miles - more than fifteen
times the size of the District of Columbia - centered
largely in central Massachusetts and Southern New
Hampshire. As the accompanying map shows it involved
904 townships in 51 counties and comprised 30,000
separate landowners*

The appalling damage over such a large area naturally
caused widespread concern which was not limited only
to the landowners* It posed two urgent problems: the
threatening potential fire hazard, and the immense
task of salvaging the merchantable portions of the
damaged trees.

How to quickly reduce the fire danger was para
mount, for it was generally recognized that, until
the damaged fire protection facilities were restored
and the highly inflammable debris was removed, dis
astrous forest fires would surely follow. Local
residents felt they were sitting on a powder keg

likely to explode any minute. Concern was under
standable and fully justified by the actual facts,
but to make matters worse some unduly alarming items
appeared in the press and over the radio. For example,
one widely circulated magazine predicted that a forest
fire could spread over the entire area in less time
than it tppk the hurricane - a matter of some five
hours. Incidentally, this demonstrated the need in
similiar catastrophes for some central news control,
which in this case was undertaken and proved helpful
later as an organized hazard reduction program became
operative.

The public utility companies began immediately
to restore their facilities and the highway depart
ments to clear up the highways and primary roads.
Also many landowners, both individually and corporate,
commenced clean-up on their lands, but in general the
job was too much for them to handle. Most of them
lacked the needed labor, equipment, or ability to cope
with the situation. In New England, with its long
tradition of local government by town meeting, most
of the heavily hit towns created special "emergency

committees11 to coordinate immediate relief measures.
Fortunately there existed in all the states in
volved State Forestry Departments, whose primary re -

sponsibility was to protect forest lands against fire.
Also, as a part of the overall state protection system,
many of the towns had local agencies for controlling
nearby woods fires. All these state and local protection
agencies went to work immediately to clean out woods
roads and trails, repair telephone lines and other
protective facilities. A small portion of the heavily
damaged areas were located on national or state forests
and here the responsibility was taken by the respective
agencies who began to clear up the debris. Most of
the damage, however, was on private land belonging
to a large number of owners, most of whom were unable
to handle a prompt and adequate clean-up job on their
lands. To effectively reduce the overall fire danger
the debris had to be cleaned up in whole or partially
on all ownerships. How this could be accomplished,
before the inflammable material became tinder dry and
thus a serious fire menace, was the big problem. And
closely related was how the merchantable portions of
the damaged trees could be salvaged before rot or
insects wiped out all their redeemable value. This
phase of the operations will be discussed later under
the "Timber Salvage Program". Time was of the essence

6

in both activities and both problems had to be con
sidered in any practical solution.

Immediately following the hurricane numerous
local meetings of interested individuals and groups
were held to ascertain the damages and discuss plans
for meeting the emergency. The concensus was that,
due to the urgency of the needs and the interstate
scope of the problem, Federal aid was needed to co
ordinate and take overall direction of the whole job.
The first urgent request for government help came with
in a few days after the hurricane, directly to the
Chief of the U.S. Forest Service from the Director
of the Harvard Forest at Petersham, Massachusetts
which property had been severly damaged. A barrage
of other requests soon followed; some came through
New England representatives in Congress and others

directly to the U.S. Forest Service; the Secretary
«•

of Agriculture received some and at least two went

•5H5-

directly to the President. One each came from the
Governors of New Hampshire and Massachusetts.

It was quite natural that the U.S. Forest Service
would be singled out as the logical federal agency
to head up a government aid forestry program. For
many years it had been cooperating closely with the

-*Henry A. Wallace
•:K:-?ranklin D. Roosevelt

State Forestry Departments in forest fire control
and other forestry work under the Clarke - McUary
Act of June 7, 1924 ( 43 Stat. 653).

Even before formal requests for aid reached
Washington the Chief Forester held several conferences
to discuss and determine how the Forest Service could
be most helpful. On September 29 a delegation from
Massachusetts called on Chief Forester F.A. Wilcox,
and with him met with Secretary of Agriculture Henry
A. Wallace o On the following day the Secretary re
quested the Chief Forester to coordinate the job
for the Department and to assist the States to the
fullest extent possible with existing funds and
personnel.

Special funds were not then available for an
emergency program, and Congress was not in session
to appropriate any.

Steps were taken promptly to cooperate with
State and local agencies primarily responsible for
forest fire protection in the area. On October 3
the Regional Forester, in charge of Federal forestry
activities in the hurricane area, met with the New
England State Foresters and other interested parties
in Boston to discuss and formulate plans. The first

8

job was to survey the extent of the damages and this
task was undertaken in large by the respective State
Forestry personnel.
REDUCING THE FOREST FIRE HAZARD

Following several days of discussion and con
ferences in Washington to determine how the Depart
ment of Agriculture could be most helpful, a small
group of Federal foresters proceeded to Boston on
October 7 to set up a Project Director's office
and to launch an action program.
Organization

On the following day the President, partly in
response to a telegram from the Governor of New Hamp
shire, directed the administrators of the Civilian
Conservation Corps (CCC) and the Works Progress Ad
ministration (WPA) to cooperate with the Forest Ser
vice in fireproof ing activities. This made available
a very substantial and much needed source of labor,
in large part well organized and equipped, for woods
work.

^n the fall of 1938 the country had not recovered
fully from the great 1929 depression and fortunately
there were still in operation 50 CCC Camps and some
15,000 WPA workers in the hurricane area. Activities
of these agencies were immediately concentrated on

clean-up work and remained so until the hazard re
duction program was completed in the fall of 1940.
The CCC camps had experienced personnel to super
vise hazard reduction work, but this was not the case
with 1PA. They had the laborers but lacked the super
vision required of them by the Forest Service. During
the early part of the program the Forest Service
was handicapped by insufficient funds and personnel
to adequately administer the WPA work. To correct
this situation WPA employed foresters and other
qualified technidais to assist in directing the work.
They were under complete jurisdiction of the Forest
Service. Many of these technicians proved to be of
high calibre and contributed a great deal toward the
success of the program. Although the Forest Service
had overall direction of WPA activities on this job,
close cooperation existed between the two Federal
agencies. The WPA crews were trained in fire fighting
techniques but except in emergencies were not con
sidered as a fire suppression force.

Actually, WPA and CCC workers formed the back
bone of the labor force used on this phase of the
Government emergency operations. There were, how
ever, heavily damaged areas too remote to be reached

10

by existing camps of the CCC or by HifPA commuting
crews, so other means were needed to cover such
areas.

When Congress reconvened in March, 1939,
various bills were introduced to authorize additional
Federal aid. These were provided on March 15 by a
$5,000,000 appropriation for work on non-Federal
lands and an additional $500,000 for National Forests
in New Hampshire and Maine. By amendment on May 2,
1939 $60,000 of the original appropriation was to
be used on damaged properties on Long Island. Subse
quently an additional $300,000 was made available for
the fiscal year 1940/1941.

Unlike the customary Clarke-McNary Law procedure
(whereby Federal funds were allotted to cooperating
states for expenditure by the states) these Federal
emergency funds were for use by the responsible govern-
ment agency. However, they were to be on a matching
basis - in other words, the Federal expenditures in
any state could not exceed the state, local and pri
vate expenditures for similiar work in that state.

'^he operations stemming from these Federal funds
were known as the "NEFE" ( New England Federal Emer
gency) program. Up to this time, the small super-

11

visory force needed for the federal hurricane
emergency activities were on loan from the U.S.
Forest Service. They had functioned primarily
in coordinating the work carried on by the various
interested agencies, including the state forestry
departments, local groups, private landowners,
other Federal agencies and the CCC and WPA. This
initial group of Federal Foresters formed the
nucleus for the NEFE and additional experienced
personnel was recruited, largely from the Forest
Service, as needed to carry out the expanded respon
sibilities.

Two plans were adopted for working areas which
could not be reached by existing CCC or WPA workers.
First, as far as possible, local crews, generally
20 men each, were hired on a hourly basis, in most
cases 504, to cover areas within commuting distance
from their homes. Each crew was supervised by a
capable foreman. Four or more such crews were under
the supervision of an experienced District Supervisor.

Laborers were obtained largely through cooperation
of the U.S. Employment Service. Local men were chosen,
insofar as possible, for work within easy commuting
distance of their homes. They furnished their own

12

transportation and subsistence. Many of these crews
were organized and operating "by late April. They were
given thorough training in the use of hand tools, both
as applied to their hazard reduction job and for fire
control purposes. High standards of efficiency were
required of the men, and if they failed to respond
to repeated attempts at training they were dismissed.

Secondly, to cover areas where local commuting
crews were not possible or practicable, it was neces
sary to construct camps to house from 50 to 100 work
ers. 19 of these so called "DA" (Department of Agri
culture) camps were established at an average cost
of $7500 for a 50-man camp and $9500 for a 100-man
camp. Except for laborers and cooks all other employ
ees were taken from Civil Service registers. A large
number of the laborers were young men who had served
their two years in the CCC. Also many were University
forestry students. The camp superintendent was respon
sible for organizing, planning and accomplishing the
work, but to a large degree the practice of self govern-
ment prevailed and proved effective. Although the
primary objectives differed, these camps were quite
similar to the Job Corps camps of today. Most WDA"
camps operated until the end of 1940, when the last
one was closed*

A WPA clean up crew reducing the fire hazard at Lady Wheelock and Lady Parks
at Keene, New Hampshire, caused by the storm of September 21, 1938.
Taken by B.W. Mulr, U.S. Forest Service, October, 1938

13

It was necessary, of course, to obtain written
permission from the landowners before performing any
work on private lands. This proved to be no small
task due to the large number of cases, and it was
complicated further by absentee owners, many of whom
were difficult to reach. The responsibility for con
tacting owners was assumed by interested local citi
zens and groups. In this endeavor the 1PA workers
were helpful since they were local citizens, more or
less familiar with landowners in their areas. Prac
tically all owners were naturally glad to sign agree
ments for cleaning up their lands at no expense to
them. Strangely enough, there were several cases
where permission was refused on the grounds, in their
words, that they had "no use for the President".

As the program developed, the Project Director's
office was staffed as needed to do the overall super
visory job, and State Directors were appointed in
each of the six New England states. In the heavily
damaged areas of the states they were divided into
districts with District Supervisors made directly
responsible for all project activities within their
areas. This general supervisory type organization
was followed throughout most of the program, but

14

revisions were made as needed to meet changing needs,
as major objectives shifted from "hazard reduction"

to "timber salvage."

Accomplishments

The combined accomplishment on fire control
activities of the three Federal work agencies, WPA,
CCC, and NEFE, was 10,121 miles of roads and trails
cleared and 214,902 acres of debris disposed of on
roadside strips, near villages and homes, and on
"breaker strips" for controlling fires in large
"blow down" areas. In addition substantial assist
ance was given state and local fire protection agen
cies in restoring damaged fire control facilities
(such as 15 toppled-down lookout towers and 563 miles
of telephone lines) and in locating and constructing
many water holes for fire suppression use. A grand
total of 4,876,519 man-days of labor were spent on
Federal fire proofing activities.

The Agriculture Adjustment Administration (AAA)
provided a $4 per acre benefit payment to individual
landowners for cleaning up their lands. However,
little use was made of this aid, since in most cases
the cost of the work required would far exceed the
allowance.

15

The Federal hazard reduction project was com
pleted by the fall of 1940 and on November 25 of that
year the Congress authorized the transfer of the
government purchased tools and equipment to the New
England state forestry departments for forest fire
protection by the states. Distribution was made
on the basis of their respective needs as a result
of the hurricane. Under this authority a substantial
amount of fire control equipment was given to the
states, including 25 trucks, 9 station wagons, 22
fire pumps and 47,120 feet of fire hose.
Benefits

The benefits resulting from the Federal assist
ance in the fire hazard reduction operations cannot
be precisely evaluated. The major accomplishments
were headed by the help given in cleaning some 600,000
acres of inflammable debris, which, if left untouch
ed on the ground, would have created a potential fire
hazard of catastrophic proportion. The protection
taken certainly was instrumental in preventing any
major fire losses.

But how can the value of prevention be measured
against the uncertainty of what might have occured?
An old proverb tells us that "an ounce of prevention

16

is worth a pound of cure11. Disastrous forest fires
following in the wake of this hurricane would have
raised this ratio many fold. Undoubtedly, the in
tangible but nonetheless greatest benefit was psycho
logical - the lessening of local apprehension over
threatening or possible danger in the knowledge that
substantial protective measures were being taken.

Another immeasurable benefit was the widespread
public appreciation, stemming from the hurricane, of
the urgent need for proceedings against forest fires.
A benefit which could pay good future dividends to both
was the training and experience in fire control tech
niques acquired by the many hundreds of young men who
participated in the program.

A more measurable yardstick is the financial bene
fit to many thousands of landowners whose properties
were cleaned up, most of whom were unable to perform
or finance the work themselves. This benefit could
be conservatively assessed at the actual cost of the
Federal contribution, roughly estimated at 25 million
dollars.

Another measurable benefit for future forest fire
protection was the substantial amount of tools and
equipment turned over to the states, at the completion

17

of the federal program.

Still another immeasurable but possible benefit
is the experience acquired in this program in the
event of similar catastrophes which might occur with
in the not too distant future.

Prom a conservation standpoint the removal or
reduction of vast amounts of dead or rotting trees
was beneficial, for such material left on the ground
would have provided breeding places for destructive
insects and disease. Also large accumulations of
debris, if left on the ground, would retard natural
tree regeneration to a greater or less extent.

Possibly one of the greatest public benefits
resulting from the hazard reducing program was its
vitalizing influence on forest fire control thinking
and planning in New England. It provided the basis
for a unity of effort along these lines never before
experienced in the Northeast, and its effects will
become more and more apparent as time goes on. The
value of these effects became manifest early in the
program through needed forestry legislation and in the
development of improved fire control practices.

The Forest Service, in carrying out its coordinating
responsibilities, acknowledged and appreciated the valuable
assistance and cooperation of the many interested agencies,
local, state and federal. Splendid cooperation was

Timber Management, Injured Trees, New Hampshire,

White Mountain National Forest

W. P. A. workers piling brush tops and slash

cuttings from devastated trees in the Gale River

Experimental Forest along the side of the Gale

River State Road.

Taken by B. W. Muir--0ctober 15, 1938

18

obtained from those most interested - COG, WPA, and the
various State Foresters and their organizations, as
well as town committees and the lumbermen of the Northeast,
SALVAGING THE DAMAGED TIMBER

It was estimated that the trees which were uprooted
or otherwise damaged contained about two and one-half
billion board feet of merchantable lumber or other
usable forest products. Further, that nearly 70# of it,
or 1,600,000 board feet (enough to build half a million
dwellings) could be salvaged - provided it could be
processed before the values were wiped out by decay
or insects. Unless the logs could be put in water
storage this might be only a matter of a few months, so
as in reducing the fire danger, time was the important
factor. A major portion of the trees were eastern white
pine, a species valuable for lumber and box boards. By
many owners they were considered their major asset.

The problem was, first how the salvaging could be
accomplished, and secondly, what organization could best
handle the job. Both problems were widely discussed
at numerous meetings of interested persons and groups,
both locally and in Washington.

To initiate an adequate salvage project was more
complicated than was the case in reducing the fire damage.

19

There were a number of important reasons, among them:

(a)- There was no existing organization equipped
to handle a job of this magnitude,

(b)- There was no ready local market for such a
large amount of forest products.

(c)- There were not sufficient experienced labor
or suitable equipment in most areas.

Again, and largely for the reasons mentioned pre
viously the local concensus pointed toward the Federal
Government and pinpointed the Forest Service as the most
logical agency to coordinate, direct and handle the
project. Numerous requests were received from the New
England states for Federal action.

Unfortunately, there were no Federal funds currently
available and the Congress was not in session to provide
the needed legislative authorization and financing.
Neither the Secretary of Agriculture nor the Forest
Service had authority to borrow funds. However, the
Surplus Commodities Corporation, a corporate agency in
the Department of Agriculture did have such authoriza
tion. Consequently, the SCO created a special sub
division NETSA (Northeastern Timber Salvage Administra
tion) for the sole purpose of meeting the emergency and
conferred upon it all necessary authority to do the
job. An initial loan was obtained from the Disaster
Loan Corporation - a division of the Reconstruction

20

Finance Corporation (RFC) - to launch the project*
The procedure was to be a business transaction and
in no way a "grant-in-aid . " The logs to be pur
chased and the material to be processed were to com
prise collateral. Both principal and 3$ interest were
to be repaid from the proceedes from sales, to the full
est extent possible.

The Chief Forester was appointed a vice-president
of the SCC and made administrator of NETSA, with full
responsibility for all Federal operations. The formal
authorization of November 14, 1938, gave him "authority
to use all facilities and personnel of the U.S. Forest
Service and of such Federal, state, local and private
agencies as may be willing to cooperate, and to employ
such additional personnel as needed and to assume full
responsibility for the procuring, handling, processing,
exchanging, storing, transporting and sale of all in
ventories of the corporation, acquired in connection
with the timber salvage program and shall execute con
tracts in connection therewith and to designate field
agents of the corporation to carry out the last named
functions, pursuant to his direction." He was further
authorized "to establish state offices and such administra
tive units and offices as he may deem necessary to the

21

efficient effectuation of the salvage program, to ne
gotiate with the Disaster Loan Corporation and to ob
tain a loan to be made to the Federal Surplus Commodities
Corporation in an amount not in excess of $15,000,000."
He was Mto report, directly to the Secretary of Agri
culture on all matters arising in connection with the
program" .
Policy Development Within the Program

Although the authority granted the administrator
was broad and included logging operations on lands of
cooperating owners and also the purchase of sawn lumber,
the policy was early adopted of not undertaking either
of these activities. The reasons were: (l) enough pri
vate loggers were available locally or could be recruited
from other areas to perform logging work under direct
contract with landowners, (2) Federal funds were limited
to hurricane damaged material and it would be impossible
or difficult to determine the original source of pur
chased sawn lumber. As regards logging, considerable
help was given to private land owners in locating and
obtaining loggers and also in drawing up suitable con
tracts and, wherever necessary, in obtaining loans from
local banks.

A logical question, raised by persons unfamiliar

22

with the situation, was Why was not the government-
owned lumber utilized by the government itself? This
possibility was fully explored with the lumber experts
of the National Defense Advisory Commission and of the
War and Navy Departments. A number of orders were re
ceived and filled for the Navy by NETSA, but in general
its direct use by government agencies was limited. This
was due to a number of reasons:

In 1939 and 1940, when most of the logs were sawn,
the lumber business was in the doldrums and there
was little demand for wood products from any source.
This was especially so for "rough" sawn lumber, which
in general, required further processing to make it usable.
Other government agencies were not interested in "rough"
lumber and NETSA had no remanufacturing facilities. The
original sawing was done by many small portable mills,
which were not equipped with planers. In fact, the under
lying action was that NETSA would salvage the logs and
convert them into rough lumber for storing and seasoning;
the material would then be available for local wood-
using industries, to be reprocessed to suit their wood
needs or the requirements of the established lumber market.

Another factor was that all NETSA lumber was "random"
piled in hundreds of lots scattered throughout New England

23

and in nearly all cases would require grading and sorting
before orders for specific items could be filled. With
one War Department inquiry for camp construction material,
which required a high degree of large lumber and heavy
timbers, it would have been necessary to tear down piles
in 32 yards to obtain the required stock* Even then,
the lack of "dressing" facilities would have prevented
delivery of the lumber on time.

Another reason was that the salvaged material had
been either sold and delivered or was under contract a
year or more before the demand for wood for war purposes
began. Eventually, however, almost all of the hurricane
lumber was used for military needs. If the hurricane
had occurred two years later or could subsequent war
demands have been foreseen, the operations could and would
have been revised to meet military requirements. No
doubt this would have resulted in a substantial savings
to the government. On the otherhand, it might have
been at the expense of local industries whose needs for
wood products to fill government contracts came largely
from NETSA lumber.

The primary objectives in disposing of the lumber
and other forest project products was, first, to pro
vide for the needs of local industries and, secondly,

24

to sell the surplus in an orderly way so as not
to disrupt local markets. In the early meetings
and discussions with lumber industry representa
tives, both national and local, it was apparent
there was apprehension. Many thought that the
government might intrude unduly in the retail
lumber trade. To allay that concern, various
discussions were held with responsible and inter
ested local individuals and groups. On September
9, 1939 NETSA officials met with 23 representatives
of various lumber associations and wood-using in
dustries to discuss policies and procedures* This
was followed up on September 27 by a meeting at
Winchendon, Massachusetts with a committee repre
senting ten of the major lumber associations. At
this time the committee unanimously approved a sales
policy, drafted by NETSA, which was believed to re
flect the majority opinion of the industry and the
government. This statement was released to the press
on October 4, giving assurance to the interested
lumber associations that the government had no in
tention of going into the lumber business. In short
this policy provided:

(a)- To a maximum degree, logs in water storage

25

will be disposed of to existing industries with
the view of maintaining stabilized employment for
the maximum period.

(b)- Lumber owned by NETSA will be sold in
foreign markets to the fullest degree.

(c)- Preference in the sale of lumber to gov
ernmental agencies will be granted prior to sales
within the local market.

(d)- So far as possible, pine lumber disposed
of in the domestic market will be distributed through
the regularly established New England distribution
channels. The governmental requirement, that the
product must be advertised before sale, will be
followed; but lumber will not be disposed of in
small lots, the usual practice being to require the
purchase of entire yards or none at all.

This policy was followed generally throughout
the program but changing conditions necessitated
some revisions, which were made only after dis
cussion with interested local groups. Close con
tact with interested groups was maintained through
out the operations, and especially with the Secre
tary of the Northeastern Lumber Manufacturers Associ
ation, located in Boston.

26

In many instances, particularly in the salvage
operations, it was necessary to employ workers with
little or no experience in the kind of work involved
scaling and grading logs, grading lumber, sawmill
operations, fire prevention and suppression and the
like. Therefore, extensive training courses were
needed and carried out. One of the most interesting
was the training of women for sawmill work. Male
workers became very scarce with the increasing
activity of local wood-using industries to meet
military requirements. Consequently, it became
necessary to employ women to help operate several
mills where NETSA had to do the sawing. At one
site in New Hampshire nine women were used. The
experiment proved successful, for after adequate
training the women did a good job and proved very
useful at a time when help was urgently needed and
hard to find.
Operations

The salvage program embraced three main activi
ties: (1) purchasing the logs; (2) sawing the logs
into lumber; and (3) selling the lumber. These
operations will be briefly discussed in their chrono.
logical order.

Turkey Pond Sawmill located near Concord, N.H.

Mill operated by NETSA and run by 9 women and

3 men.

Taken by W. K. Williams --August, 1943

U-Saw Prod., Lbr., Mills & Log Stor.--N.H.

27

PURCHASING LOGS: Three necessary determina
tions had to be made before undertaking the pur
chase of logs. First, what log scale should be used;
secondly, what price or prices should be paid, and
thirdly, where should the logs be received.

Several different log rules were in use in the
area. After a careful study of their relative merits
it was decided that the "International Log Rule"
was the most equitable for the material involved
and so this rule was selected.

The establishment of the log prices was governed
by the desire to allow the hurricane stricken land
owners the maximum benefit for the sale of their
logs, but at the same time to provide for repay
ment of the loan which made the salvaging project
possible. Obviously, the success of the whole enter
prise would depend on purchase prices which would
interest the timber owners. The government had no
desire to make a profit for itself, but NETSA was
committed by the loan agreement to recover the pub
lic investment if at all possible.

A carefully prepared analysis, based on the
best available data, indicated prices of $18, $14
and $10 per one thousand board feet for white pine

28

logs of grades 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Other
comparable prices were determined for the rela
tively small amounts of other species and for pulp-
wood. These appraisal prices seemed to be generally
satisfactory. They provided reasonable logging and
hauling costs and left the landowners a fair sal
vage value for their damaged timber. However, they
represented values of logs at the time they were
received; if the appraisal values were paid in
full, there would be no allowance for the cost of
administration and for any depreciation in log values
until such time as they could be processed and mar
keted. In private practice such allowances ranged
from ten to twenty-five percent. The question of
how much to allow for the hurricane timber was the
subject of much discussion and controversy.

Subsequently, the original loan agreement pro
vided that logs should be purchased at 80% of their
appraised value, with the understanding that the
vendors would receive additional payments in the
event the program could be operated at a profit.
A few purchases were negotiated on that basis, but
it soon became apparent that an 80$ initial pay
ment was not attractive to most owners. This applied

29

mainly to the price established for grade 3 logs,
the catagory which covered three-fourths of the
"hurricane" timber. A great deal of protest ensued
because of the desire of vendors for full or at
least 90$ payment. Various bills were introduced
in Congress calling for appropriations, and in
one case stipulating an additional bonus of $2.50
per thousand board feet. None of these bills were
passed. However, by Executive Order the appraised
price for grade 3 white pine logs was increased by
#2. In effect, this was a subsidy, for in the final
outcome it about equalled the amount by which the
government failed to recover its investment.

Then early in January, 1939, authority was
obtained to increase the initial payment to ninety
percent of the scheduled prices, with the provision
that the government would take full title to the
logs. It was also decided that the log vendors
should understand that ultimately they would re
ceive their prorata share of all excess net receipts,
if any, derived from the program within their state.
These changes were made retroactive to the few con
tracts already made and were incorporated in all
new sales agreements. The increased payments and

the added benefits provided the impetus needed to
get the program moving. Purchase agreements were
more readily negotiated and logs began to arrive
at the various receiving stations at a rapid rate.
NETSA officials believed the amounts actually paid
for the logs represented fair prices and provided
the owners reasonable salvage values for their
damaged timber.

Locations where logs would be received were
based upon the availability of suitable sites at
reasonable rental rates and upon the expected vol
ume of timber to be received at each site. They
were established at strategic sites withing prac
tical hauling distances from the lands involved.
To the extent possible they were placed near ponds,
lakes or rivers so that the logs could be temporarily
stored in water to protect them from destructive
insects and decay - until they could be either sold
as logs or sawn into lumber, after the land stored
logs had been processed. Two hundred and forty-six
of these, so called "wet" sites, were set up through
out the area. Where water storage was not possible
"dry" sites were established. Where possible, they
were located at existing sawmills, but these were

31

few, so mostly open fields were selected. -An
essential requirement for the site was suitable
space for a sawmill and for the storage of lumber.
The ultimate disposal of sawdust and other refuse
was also considered, as were the relative risks
of fire and theft. Altogether, over 800 receiving
sites were selected, but only 721 were actually
used, of which 461 were "dry". At fourteen other
locations both water and land storage were avail
able.

Agreements for purchasing logs were on a state
wide rather than an overall basis, chiefly because
of the provision for distributing possible benefits.
In other words, there could be an excess of resale
receipts in one or more states and not in others,
so a final audit by states was deemed most equitable
to the log vendors.

The more important contract provisions were
that only logs from blown down or substantially
injured trees, resulting from the hurricane, would
be delivered; that all damaged timber would be in
cluded; that the vendor would deliver at a specified
receiving site and within a stated time, not to ex
ceed an agreed-upon volume. The administration agreed

to pay the seller, within 10 days, 90 per cent
of the scheduled price. The vendor's share of
any net profits was to be paid within 90 days after
all timber salvaged in that state had been resold.
This profit-sharing right was personal and could
not "be assigned.

As the logs v/ere delivered at the various re
ceiving sites they were scaled, and where necessary,
graded by a NETSA-trained sealer and were put in
storage either on land or in water or both, depending
on the storing facilities. The vendors were given
"purchase receipts", which were recorded and served
as a basis for payment. Payment by government check
was expedited as much as possible, but in many cases
where operating funds were needed immediately, the
vendors could generally use their delivery statements
as a basis for loans from local bankers. They be
came almost legal tender in the area.

The first logs were received at two sites in
New Hampshire on November 21, 1958 - one week after
NETSA was created and two months to a day following
the hurricane. The peak of deliveries was during
the spring and early summer of 1939 » after which
deliveries dropped rapidly. By June 1940 most of

33

the logs remaining in the woods showed signs of
deterioration and also the deliveries dwindled to
a point where administrative expenses were be
coming excessive. Consequently the purchasing of
logs ended June 30, 1940.

A total of 660,555 M (thousand) board feet of
logs was bought, of which nearly 90 per cent was
white pine. $7,860,813 was paid to log vendors
in twelve thousand separate invoices. In addition
59»586 cords of pulpwood were purchased at a cost
of $464,500, making a grand total of $8,323,313
paid to thirteen thousand landowners, mostly farmers,
for their hurricane-injured timber. Of this amount
almost 59 per cent went to landowners in New
Hampshire, 18 per cent and 12 per cent to Massachusetts
and Vermont owners, respectively; 7 per cent went
to Maine and the remaining 4 per cent was expended
in Connecticut and Rhode Island, in that order. A
large part of these payments was, of course, to
cover the cost of cutting the logs and hauling them
in between the cutting and receiving sites taken
by the timber owners, but in most cases, they in
cluded a reasonable stumage value.

SAWING THE LOGS INTO LUMBER: The government
did not want to get into the manufacturing busi
ness anymore than was absolutely necessary. It
believed that activity could best be performed by
private industry. The original hope was to store
the logs in water, where they would be relatively
safe from deterioration, then to sell them over a
reasonable period of time to local wood-using in
dustries in amounts sufficient to meet their nor
mal needs. However, early surveys showed there was
not sufficient water storage available, which made
it necessary to convert the logs into lumber as
rapidly as possible. This applied -to about 87 per
cent of all the logs purchased. An important fac
tor was the knowledge that logs stored on the ground
v/ere perishable and warm weather would lead to in
festation off the ground from borers in the white
pine logs and to a general spread of fungus dis
eases in all species.

The method of sawing naturally was determined
by the anticipated market and this, in turn, had
been decided at the September 27, 1938, policy agree-

35

ment with lumber industry representatives: namely,
that the lumber will be sold outside of New England
to the fullest extent possible. This meant that
the logs should be converted into "square edge" con
struction lumber.

Although it was necessary for NETSA to have
the dry-site logs sawn, it was hoped that milling
by the government directly would not be necessary.
Every effort was made to contract this work to estab
lished operators. There were a few stationary mills
in the area, but in general small portable sawmills
were brought in from other sections - mostly from
Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Sawing contracts were
solicited through advertisements and other means and
were administered by the lowest qualified bidders.

The maximum acceptable prices were set at $7.50
per thousand board feet for sawing and piling one-
inch square edge softwood and $1 more for the rela
tively small volume of hardwoods. To stimulate the
production of high extra quality lumber and to com
pensate operators for the nigher expense of "grade"
sawing, a bonus of $1 per thousand board feet was
granted for No. 2 common and better grades of soft-

36

wood lumber.. For hardwoods it was No. 1 common.
In all, contracts were made with 275 sawmill
operators, who processed the logs at most of the
sites. However, a few locations were left where,
for various reasons, it was not possible to con
tract the sawing and where NETSA had to perform
the work by so called "force acount". Fifteen
portable mills were purchased and operated by
the government. This was during the late stages
of the program when qualified local labor could
not be found. It was at several of these mills
where women were employed and trained for saw-
milling operations.

Milling got underway in January, 1939, at a
number of dry sites and expanded rapidly under
pressure to complete sawing of all land-stored
logs within a six-month period. Some "wet" logs
for various reasons had to be removed from ponds
and were earmarked from the the "wet" sites for
early sawing. Until early in 1940, it was still
the hope to sell most of the logs in water storage
to local industries in the form of logs. A few
such sales were made, but it was still a year or
more before preparations for war began stimulating

37

the markets. The question of disposal of logs in
ponds was given careful consideration and was fully
discussed with local wood industry groups. It was
decided they should be converted into lumber and
be added to the inventory aimed for "foreign" con
sumption. Consequently, early in the spring of
1940 sawing of the water-stored logs began. At each
milling site NETSA stationed one or more men to tally,
and where necessary grade the boards as they were
made; also to enforce compliance with contract re
quirements, such as proper piling of lumber, adequate
protection against fire and the like.

SELLING THE LUMBER: At the time of the hurri
cane all business was at a low ebb and this applied
particularly to the lumber industry throughout New
England. For many years the limited production and
consumption of white pine in that region was in the
form of "round edge" (sawn on two sides) material
for use as box boards or crating. The total con
sumption for these purposes had dwindled to 125
million board feet in 1937. Most local require
ments for construction material had long been
supplied from western and southern states and the
normal lumber business followed that general pattern.

38

To suddenly dump large quantities of white pine
lumber on a slow market presented a difficult
problem. How could it be accomplished, within
a limited time, and without seriously disrupting
the normal lumber business, especially in the New
England states? '^he most logical answer still seemed
to be the original policy as announced in September
of 1938: To dispose of the material as far as possi
ble in a broader market. It had in mind consumption
in states north of the Potomac and east of the Missis
sippi River. This seemed sound logic at the time and
up to late in 1941, when war effort activities com
pletely changed the picture. Prom then on the entire
volume of salvaged timber would have been sold lo
cally as "round edge" lumber, which would have been
advantageous to the government. However, no "crystal
ball" could foresee the events of the future.

So NETSA undertook and carried out an extensive
selling campaign through advertisement, circulars,
personal contact, etc., to interest prospective buyers.
As soon as sawing at a site was completed it was adver
tised for sale in the local press, national trade
journals and other mediums. In conformity with estab
lished policy and also for practical operational

39

reasons, sales in general included all merchantable
material at the site.

One of the first sales was to the Few York,
New Haven, and Hartford Railroad. Several lots of
softwood and hardwood lumber were advertised and
sold on a market appraisal basis during the early
part of 1940. By the summer of 1940 it became
clear that relatively small sales to local industries
were progressing too slowly, and in order not to un
duly prolong the NET8A program some faster means of
disposing of the bulk of the timber was needed. Again
the problem was thoroughly discussed at various meet
ings with industry representatives and also with in
terested government agencies, including the military.
A number of proposals were considered; most of them
centered on one large sale embracing all unsold logs
and lumber - beyond the needs of local industries.
Local needs were estimated at about one-third of the
total, but the definite amount had not been fixed.

One of the proposals showing early promise in
volved the creation of a "Cooperative Organization"
made up of local wood users who would raise ten million
dollars to purchase and market four hundred million

40

board feet of NETSA lumber. For various reasons,
principally the lack of subscription, this proposal
was dropped.

By early fall of 1940 agreement had been reach
ed to advertise a proposal to sell approximately
425 million board feet of white pine lumber. About
half of this amount had already been sawn and was
on "sticks" at some 340 sites. The other half was
in ponds and could be sawn to suit any reasonable
requirement of the purchaser.

In response to wide advertisement in the press
and trade journals, negotiations were finally con
summated on September 25, 1940, in a sale to the
Eastern Pine Sales Corporation - a concern formed
specifically to purchase the salvaged lumber. Short-
ly after the contract was signed the company be
gan removing lumber from the various sites included
in its contract. The company was incorporated in
Delaware but during most of its life was controlled
and operated by Grossman and Sons of Boston. The
contract provided for the purchase of up to 425
million board feet of rough square-edge white pine
lumber at an initial price of $21 per thousand board
feet. Among its provisions was a price-adjusting

Earle H. Clapp, Acting Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, signs
the agreement selling 425,000,000 feet of salvaged logs and
lumber to the Eastern Pine Sales Corporation, represented by
Mr. Harry Joseph, in center. Time is September 25, 1940, the
consummation of two years of an intensive salvage program
directed by earl S. Peirce, Acting Chief of the branch of
State and Private Forestry of the U.S. Forest Service, after
the 1938 New England hurricaine.
Photo by U.S. Forest Service.

41

formula, to be computed at three month intervals,
which was designed to stabilize the market value
of NETSA lumber. The index correlated the contract
price with both Boston and New York markets for
various comparable items of pine lumber from western
states. Under the index the price for each quarter
varied somewhat, but gradually increased to around
$25 in line with general lumber trade.

The original contract provided for the pur
chase of square-edge lumber only but it was later
amended to the advantage of both parties concerned,
to include round-edge lumber and also the logs in
water. In the former case the price would be $3
less, and, for logs, $10 less than the current con
tract price for square-edge lumber.

Up to the time the EPSC sale was made, 35 million
board feet of white pine logs and 48 million board
feet of sawn lumber had been sold - roughly one-
eigth of the total volume salvaged. In November,
1940, the lumber associations of New England were
informed that NETSA still had about 225 million board
feet of logs stored in ponds of which 120 million
were reserved for the use of local industries, the
balance having been committed to EPSC. It was the

42

intent to give New England industries the first
choice of the various ponds so they might pur
chase those logs nearest to their mills and best
suited for their use. At the same time, it was
only fair to inform EPSC officials what specific
ponds were to be sawn for them, so they could
make plans and negotiate contracts for establish
ing planing mills and concentration yards.

Accordingly, in agreement with interested
local industry committees, March 1, 1941, was
set as a deadline by which time the industries
v/ere to indicate which ponds they wished to pur
chase. Logs in ponds not then reserved were to
be included in the EPSC contract. At the time
there were about 89 million board feet of logs in
water that were eventually sold in the form of
logs - 60 per cent to local industries directly,
and 40 per cent to EPSC under its contract.

Although all the salvaged timber had now been
either sold, reserved, or contracted, the end of the
government's task was yet far away. Most of the
water-stored logs had to be sawn or sold in the
"rough". In the latter case, the purchasers gen
erally accepted them on the basis of the original

43

scale made at the time they were received at the
site, thus saving the expense of rescale. Some
purchasers, however, fearing possible loss from
sinkage or the dangers present, were not willing
to accept the accuracy of the initial tally. In
those cases a second scaling was necessary. Where
the "wet" logs required sawing, NETSA personnel
had to enforce the contract requirements, tally
and grade the lumber etc. - the same as was done
at the dry sites. The many lumber piles, scattered
over a wide area, presented a serious protection
problem. Fire was the greatest danger, but also
theft always was present. Until the lumber was
sold and removed it was government property and
collateral under the loan agreement. Insurance
was considered but given up due to exorbitant premiums,

Upon completion of the sawing program, NETSA
still had the responsibility for carrying out the
government obligations under the EPSC contract and
for enforcing satisfactory performance by the com
pany. With such a large contract, comprising mater
ial at hundreds of widely scattered locations, it
was inevitable that many unforeseen problems would
crop up. In some instances differences of opinion

44

between government and company personnel arose as
to how they should be handled. In general, they
were minor and were readily resolved. The real
marvel was that there were not more disagreements
and some of a serious nature. That this did not
occur can be attributed to the willingness of both
contract parties to cooperate in good faith in work
ing out problems in the most practical way and the
desire to get on with the job.

The company established three concentration
locations to which the rough lumber was hauled for
planing or otherwise processing for reselling, ^hree
or more NETSA employees were stationed at each con
centration yard to tally the lumber - by grades where
that was needed, ^ring the final stages practically
all the lumber was used for military purposes, large
ly in the construction of training camps.

The salvage program was nearing completion by
the end of January 1943, at which time the Project
Director's office was closed. The responsibility
for ending all Federal activities in New England
relating to the hurricane was turned over to the
Regional Forester at Philadelphia. Understandably,
this was probably the least rewarding phase of the

45

entire program, for it involved a wide variety of
cleanup jobs. They ranged, for example, from place
ment of personnel to sawing out the last ponds,
closing of contracts, cleaning up storage and saw
mill sites, including the disposal of sawdust piles,
terminating leases and disposal of miscellaneous
equipment. The closing out job in itself was no
small task. The entire program was terminated on
December 31| 1943.

46

SUMMARY

— A summary of the NETSA program showed that a
little over 651 million board feet of wood products
had been salvaged from the hurricane-damaged timber*
Of this total, nearly 89 million board feet were
sold in the form of logs; 533 million board feet
were sawed and marketed as lumber (77 per cent
"square-edge" and 23 per cent "round-edge") and almost
30 million feet of pulpwood were sold.

— Over eight million dollars were paid to
thirteen thousand landowners, mostly farmers, for
the logs frora their damaged trees,

— The total cost of the salvage program was
$16,269,300, of which almost $15,000,000, or 92 per
cent, was recovered by the government.

— Altogether, 640 persons, exclusive of day
laborers, worked on the program at one timber site
or another and in varying capacities. Almost all

of the supervisory force was on loan from the regular
United States Forest Service organization.

47

— The benefits resulting from the salvage
program cannot be evaluated accurately. Unquestion
ably they were substantial. The objectives for which
the program was undertaken — namely to help landowners
dispose of their damaged timber and at the same time
not disrupt the local lumber markets — already have
been shown to have been accomplished. It is safe
to say that, except for the program, most of the
two-thirds billion board feet of merchantable wood
products would have been left on the ground to rot.
Its removal left the woodlots in better condition
for growing future crops of timber and helped mater
ially in the overall hazard reduction work — the benefits
of which have been previously outlined.

The most direct beneficiaries were the thirteen

thousand timber owners who participated in the program
and received about eight million dollars. A large part
was used for labor and provided jobs for many persons
other than the landowners.

Altogether, over sixteen million dollars were

spent on the salvage work, which gave the economy of
New England a boost at a time when business was at a
low ebb.

48

— There were other benefits, such as: stabilizing
the local lumber, providing raw material to local wood-
using industries, (giving employment either directly

or indirectly to hundreds of persons when jobs were
scarce and training many young men in various lines
of forestry and allied activities).

— As events turned out, probably the greatest
public benefit was providing a huge amount of seasoned
lumber, which was urgently needed and used in the
country's preparation for war.

The salvage operations were performed at a
net cost to the public of a little over one and one-
fourth million dollars — certainly a small sum when
compared to the overall benefits.

49

APPENDIX

REGIONAL CULTURAL HISTORY PROJECT

January 2?, 1965
Room l;B6

Mr, Earl Peirce

3733 Kuntington Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 200l£

Dear Mr, Peirce :

Mr, Chrlstooher Grander has written that you were
cl osely connected with the salvage operations that fol
lowed the New England hurricane of ceptember, 193% an^
that he has talked with you regarding the oosslblllty
of your writing a statement which could become a part of
a series on the history of oollcy In the forest Service,

Such a statement would be deposited In the Univer
sity's Bancroft Library which Is an archival depository
used by serious scholars. You would retain all publica
tion rights If you so desire; In any event, quotations
can be used only with your permission,

I assume that ^r. Granger has sum-narlzed for you
the forestry project that Is unhderway. Operating under
a grant from Resources for the Future, th's project Is
attenntlng to gather as much first-hand information re
garding the development of policy In forestry as can be
made available to us through tape recorded 'ntervtews or,
as In your case and Mr, Granger's, written statements of
what happened,

In government archives and documents can be found the
statistics of such things as the 3*000,000 board feet In
the blow-down, the 5,000,000 plus ? 500,000 annropr Nations ,
the 11,000 employed CCC boys, and the rather confusing net
work of agencies that worked with the Forest Service,
Perhaps your main contribution would b» the story of why
these things occurred as they did: how the decisions were
made, why other decisions were not made, examnles of reac
tions among the general public, ;he lumbermen, and others
with whom you worked, ^ersonal anecdotes are valuable
In that they, too, cannot be found elsewhere, usually;
and of special imoortance would be your evaluation of the
operation— In terms of conservation, of economy of the
forest industry, of the value In terms of government ex
penditures (92^ of the loan repaid from the sales, I be
lieve), and In terms of human values.

Do you have t ' me to prepare such a statement? It
would be ajwelcome assistance" to the project by filling

00 T ' ,'

,iK

.'jd>^ b»^')9Tsnoo rissc £>

•• ^ f: f ji -.^ 5 ' ", gf' J 5 S> !-?C X

: f *» ri <

^

n.t — nr-

nc

-2-

in a sequence of events where otherwise a cr;ao would be
left.

If you need someone to run errands for you, s>xsh as
helping you gather resource materials, we have an able
assistant in Waah'n^ton whom we have hired psrt-tlne for
that purpose. Peel free to call her; I will write her
to expect this. Her name and address are:

••Irs. Jack Mezirow

Prospect Rt. N.V.
Washington 27 » B.C.

Telephone 333-01; 09

Thank you very much for considering tMs oroposal;
we hope It works out.

Sinoerely,

(Mrs.) Amelia 3. Pry
"C: Mr. Chr istonher Granger

• «% & - -v» 1c *- «! a nl

f » a r»

S. PEISCE

Huntington Street, N. W.
Washington 15, D. C.

**

' EARL S. PEiRCE
3738 Huntington Street, N. W.
Washington 15, D. C.

. i<\

-ew u, ^

' •'••'**' •••

*-4.>V

.

;fAL o^\L HIS? ,14 486

oteaber ; , 1967

Mr. Larl PeiWNl
either Florida
or Washington

Dear Mr. Peiroet

I aa not sure whether you ore with r. .coville in
.'i terpark or back in Vaohimton, no I am sendi c

of this letter to both addresses*

We are cojaln; in on the hoae stretch on the entire
-•'orent service series, and I have taken inventory of your
t ped manuscript today* It reads veil, is -tc

factual and informative* *'e realize what u lount of

tine and effort oust have ^one into so»ethins th.it wae
put together with such care*

livery tin* I #o over that story, it strikes ne what
a unique aoawmt MaV-ry it is*

*o complete the raanuscri t et the <- bound.

we need a few quo U • s an:/ . ies will be do JD si ted

in our Bancroft Library, in Yile's *'orest History iety,
in the resources for the ?uturo Library, in the UCiA u

:;p«clal Collactions, in your home, in our office collect! >nf
and possibly in the Torast ervico :uid ,lao at Denver* If
you wish to order additional co ;ies for i; ecicil col:
relatives, they can be had at cost— u 10. 0 to . jQ

per copy, <ie;>endiiv: on the a^aount of inserts, etc*

Here (ire the questions!

1* --he pictures are just .roat* We ore usin/j all the
-loss««t cjnci havi % reprints unde of all we con st under our
budget. You wrote ae that you want the plates, w o re rint d
on nagasiiuc P»per, back; I doubt tlu.t wo c ., I r r otions
J!u.ide of that type of picture* you have — or

do you think you know where you c ~

<?• I need a sheet showing your mt record in

^'oret;t rrvice, or (nuch better), a p'

where you went to school (beginning vith your birth ditto ),

what you studied, Lsrid then your ©Liployment record. Jo you i
you can devise such a sheet?

3* We have two types of c .fcs* I you all

publication and quotation rights, ^he otiier iv.- fch« che

University, but before anyt. n/; c .,di be p. the ;• ,

we have to ^et your permission* In both cases all .ties

go to you, in ccuse the whole shebang is fora* is

has never happened yet, but it su,;ht someday*) hich t^ne of
contract do you want?

I ho^e you can ,<ret t- is infor ^n oack .t .-way*

We aro trying to ueet a bindery deadline* rhanka for all you've done*

Earl S. Peirce

3378 Chiswick Court

Silver Spring, Maryland 20906

16

v^ — —

c. P.

Regional Cultural History Project

Room U86

Regional Oral History Office
Room 486

October 20, 1967

Mr. Earl S. Pierce
3378 Chiswick Court
Silver Spring, Maryland

Dear Mr. Pierce:

20906

One more service from you we must
request. Please initial all copies at the
deleted section, then return them once again
to our office. We must keep our legal eagles
happy. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Amelia R. Fry

Enclosures

Agreement (5 copies)
Return envelope

as I was
*ence In San
ttoe to hold
srenee , but
7 I did not
* one-of-a-

bhe detail

re to omit
a historical
deal of work
for editing,

s which you have

esources for the
finish the

what happens.

talnly keep us
and you can

"eFaonal

theju Thank
SfFwlll be a
Important that

as graphically
rythlng, It Is

that was under-
nk you again

future genera-

ils, and have It
.he way), you will

yours ,

Pry

Regional Cultural History Project

Room U86
April 5, 1965

Mr. Earl' S. Pierce
3738 Huntln*ton Street
Washington, D.C. 20015

Dear Kr. Pierce :

Your manuscript arrived last week, just as I was
about to bury myself In the Wilderness Conference In San
Francisco. Mr. Ed Crafts was able to find t Irae to hold
an Interview for our series during the Conference, but
his and other taping sessions kept me so busy I did not
get back to ray office to notify you that your one-of-a-
kind manuscript had Indeed arrived safely.

Your mention of having to cut down on the detail
makes me hope that you were not under pressure to omit
anything which you deem Important as part of a historical
record. It seems to me that you did a great deal of work
In a short time, and when we get It typed up for editing,
perhaps you will want to Include some details which you have
left out of this version. We have written Resources for the
Future for an extension of funds In order to finish the
typing and editing, and I will let you know what happens.

Meanwhile, what you have sent will certainly keep us
busy. The pictures can be reproduced here, and you can
receive IThe T plates vnen we are tnrou^n; your oun personal
eftnv rmilg !Rkiim»rl|iL •!! I M»«^*p"Er' U them. Thank

you for amassing the charts and photographs — it will be a
much more vivid story. I think that It Is important that
the extent of the entire effort be presented as graphically
as possible. Even In today's era of Big Everything, It Is
still difficult to realize the enormous task that was under
taken and accomplished so successfully. Thank you again
for writing it out systematically for us and future genera
tions.

As soon as I have time to read over this, and have it
retyped (your writing is quite legible, by the way), you will
hear from me again.

Sincerely yours,
Amelia R. Pry

it 9 <* c*f fi H 1 e its* J i/r I an

«t •cos:

'v.fv <y

50

PARTIAL INDEX

51

Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 14
Agriculture, -Dept. of, 6, 29
Secretary, powers of, i, 19

Civilian Conservation Corps, 8-9, 11, 14
Clarke-McNary Act, 7, 10
Congress, U.S., 6, 10, 19, 29

Disaster Loan Corp., 19
Disease, 17

Eastern Pine Sales Corp., 40

Education, professional schools, tech. training, 16, 26

Equipment, 15 , 16

Insects, 5, 17, 18

Lumber industry,' 21-26, 35

Marketing, 18-21, 36ff.

National Defense Advisory Commission, 22

Navy department, 22

New England Federal Emergency Program (NEFE), 10-11, 14

Northeastern Lumber Mftg. Assn., 25

Northeastern Timber Salvage Administration(NETSA) , 19

Ornamental Trees, 2

Pine areas, 2, 18, 25, 34

Policy, general comment, ii, 22-25

Roosevelt, Franklin D. , 6, 13

Silcox, Ferdinand A. , 7
State forestry, 4-5

Administration, 15
Surplus Commodities Corp., 19

Timber management, 18-21
Timber owners, 13, 14, 16, 47

United States Forest Service

Appropriations, 7, 10, 19, 29

And Congress, 6

Department of Agriculture relations, i

Public relations, 16, 17, 24

Timber sales, 18-21, 34-42

52

Wallace, Henry, 6, 7

War Department, 22

Women, 26

Woodlots, 3, 47

Works Progress Administration (WPA), 8-9, HT 14

World War' II, iii, 38

• 5 3