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Regional Oral History Office University of California 

The Bancroft Library Berkeley, California 

Government History Documentation Project 
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era 


Interviews with 

Joseph E. Bodovitz 

Melvin B. Lane 
E. Clement Shute, Jr. 

Interviews Conducted by 
Malca Chall 

Copyright (c\ 1986 by the Regents of the University of California 

This manuscript is made available for research 
purposes. No part of the manuscript may be quoted for 
publication without the written permission of the 
Director of The Bancroft Library of the University 
of California at Berkeley. 

Requests for permission to quote for publication 
should be addressed to the Regional Oral History Office, 
486 Library, and should include identification of the 
specific passages to be quoted, anticipated use of the 
passages, and identification of the user. 

It is recommended that this oral history be cited 
as follows: 

To cite the volume: The San Francisco Bay 
Conservation and Development Commission, 
1964-1973, an oral history conducted in 1984, 
Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft 
Library, University of California, Berkeley, 

To cite individual interview: Joseph E. 
Bodovitz, "Management and Policy Directions," 
an oral history conducted 1984 by Malca 
Chall, in The San Francisco Bay Conservation 
and Development Commission, 1964-1973, 
Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft 
Library, University of California, Berkeley, 
' 1986. 

Copy No. 






Management and Policy Directions 

The Role of the Chairman in Setting 
and Maintaining Goals 

The Place of the Courts in the 
Solution of Controversial Policy 





California government and politics from 1966 through 1974 are the focus of 
the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series of the state Government History Documenta 
tion Project, conducted by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft 
Library with the participation of the oral history programs at the Davis and 
Los Angeles campuses of the University of California, Claremont Graduate School, 
and California State University at Fullerton. This series of interviews carries 
forward studies of significant issues and processes in public administration 
begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. In previous series, inter 
views with over 220 legislators, elected and appointed officials, and others 
active in public life during the governorships of Earl Warren, Goodwin Knight, 
and Edmund Brown, ST., were completed and are now available to scholars. 

The first unit in the Government History Documentation Project, the Earl 
Warren Series, produced interviews with Warren himself and others centered on 
key developments in politics and government administration at the state and 
county level, innovations in criminal justice, public health, and social welfare 
from 1925-1953. Interviews in the Knight-Brown Era continued the earlier 
inquiries into the nature of the governor's office and its relations with 
executive departments and the legislature, and explored the rapid social and 
economic changes in the years 1953-1966, as well as preserving Brown's own 
account of his extensive political career. Among the issues documented were 
the rise and fall of the Democratic party; establishment of the California Water 
Plan; election law changes, reapportionment and new political techniques; 
education and various social programs. 

During Ronald Reagan's years as governor, important changes became evident 
in California government and politics. His administration marked an end to the 
progressive period which had provided the determining outlines of government 
organization and political strategy since 1910 and the beginning of a period of 
limits in state policy and programs, the extent of which is not yet clear. 
Interviews in this series deal with the efforts of the administration to increase 
government efficiency and economy and with organizational innovations designed 
to expand the management capability of the governor's office, as well as critical 
aspects of state health, education, welfare, conservation, and criminal justice 
programs. Legislative and executive department narrators provide their perspec 
tives on these efforts and their impact on the continuing process of legislative 
and elective politics. 

Work began on the Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series in 1979. Planning and 
research for this phase of the project were augmented by participation of other 
oral history programs with experience in public affairs . Additional advisors 
were selected to provide relevant background for identifying persons to be 
interviewed and understanding of issues to be documented. Project research 
files, developed by the Regional Oral History Office staff to provide a 
systematic background for questions, were updated to add personal, topical, and 
chronological data for the Reagan period to the existing base of information 
for 1925 through 1966, and to supplement research by participating programs as 
needed. Valuable, continuing assistance in preparing for interviews was 
provided by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which houses the 
Ronald Reagan Papers, and by the State Archives in Sacramento. 


An effort was made to select a range of interviewees that would reflect 
the increase in government responsibilities and that would represent diverse 
points of view. In general, participating programs were contracted to conduct 
interviews on topics with which they have particular expertise, with persons 
presently located nearby. Each interview is identified as to the originating 
institution. Most interviewees have been queried on a limited number of topics 
with which they were personally connected; a few narrators with unusual breadth 
of experience have been asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. When 
possible, the interviews have traced the course of specific issues leading up 
to and resulting from events during the Reagan administration in order to 
develop a sense of the continuity and interrelationships that are a significant 
aspect of the government process. 

Throughout Reagan's years as governor, there was considerable interest and 
speculation concerning his potential for the presidency; by the time interview 
ing for this project began in late 1980, he was indeed president. Project 
interviewers have attempted, where appropriate, to retrieve recollections of 
that contemporary concern as it operated in the governor's office. The intent 
of the present interviews, however, is to document the course of California 
government from 1967 to 1974, and Reagan's impact on it. While many interview 
ees frame their narratives of the Sacramento years in relation to goals and 
performance of Reagan's national administration, their comments often clarify 
aspects of the gubernatorial period that were not clear at the time. Like 
other historical documentation, these oral histories do not in themselves 
provide the complete record of the past. It is hoped that they offer firsthand 
experience of passions and personalities that have influenced significant events 
past and present. 

The Reagan Gubernatorial Era Series was begun with funding from the 
California legislature via the office of the Secretary of State and 
continued through the generosity of various individual donors. Several 
memoirs have been funded in part by the California Women in Politics Project 
under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a 
matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; by the Sierra Club Project 
also under a NEH grant; and by the privately funded Bay Area State and 
Regional Planning Project. This joint funding has enabled staff working with 
narrators and topics related to several projects to expand the scope and 
thoroughness of each individual interview involved by careful coordination of 
their work. 

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobio 
graphical interviews with persons significant in the history of California 
and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. 
Hart, Director of the Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office. 
Copies of all interviews in the series are available for research use in 
The Bancroft Library, UCLA Department of Special Collections, and the State 
Archives in Sacramento. Selected interviews are also available at other 
manuscript depositories. 

July 1982 Gabrielle Morris 

Regional Oral History Office Project Director 

486 The Bancroft Library 
University of California at Berkeley 


Advisory Council 

Eugene Bardach 
Charles Benson 
Nicole Biggart 
John Burns 
Lou Cannon 
Bert Coffey 
Edmund Constantini 
Lawrence deGraaf 
Enid Douglass 
Harold E. Geiogue 
James Gregory 
Ronald Grele 
Gary Hamilton 
Mary Ellen Leary 
Eugene C. Lee 

James W. Leiby 
Edwin Meese III 
Sheldon L. Messinger 
James R. Mills 
William K. Muir 
Charles Palm 
A. Alan Post 
Albert S. Rodda 
Ed Salzman 
Paul Seabury 
Alex Sherriffs 
Michael E. Smith 
A. Ruric Todd 
Molly Sturges Tuthill 
Raymond Wo 1 finger 


Malca Chall 
A. I. Dickman* 
Enid Douglass 
Steve Edgington 
Harvey Grody 
Ann Lage 
Gabrielle Morris 
Sarah Sharp 
Julie Shearer 
Stephen Stern 
Mitch Tuchman 

^Deceased during the term of the project 

On behalf of future scholars, the Regional Oral History Office wishes 
to thank those vho have responded to the Office's request for funds to 
continue documentation of Ronald Reagan's years as governor of California. 
Donors to the project are listed belov. 

Margaret Brock 
Monroe Brown 
Edward W. Carter 
Sherman C bicker ing 
Aylett B. Cotton 
Justin Dart* 
William C. Edwards 
James M. Hall 
William Randolph Hearst 
William Hewlett 
Jaquelin Hume 
Earle Jorgensen 
L. W. Lane, Jr. 
Gordon C. Luce 
Norman B. Livenaore, Jr. 
Joseph A. and Gladys G. Moore 
David Packard 
Robert 0. Reynolds 
Henry and Grace Salvatori 
Porter Sesnon 
Dean A. Hat kins 
*dec eased 



The three interviews in this volume document the pioneering years of the 
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) . The first 
hand recollections are those of Joseph E. Bodovitz, the commission's first 
executive director; Melvin B. Lane, the commission's first chairman; and E. 
Clement Shute, Jr., the commission's first legal counsel representing the 
attorney general. 

In 1985 the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission 
celebrated its twentieth anniversary. Considerable publicity heralded this 
observance, much of it centered on the question "Has the bay been saved?" No 
one today would claim that the bay has been saved, for the meaning changes with 
time. But a quarter of a century ago the very existence of the bay was at stake. 
By 1960 more than one-third of the bay's original acreage had been converted to 
dry land and development. More filling and development were being planned by 
the cities ringing the bay. "Bay or River?" became the rallying cry of an 
unprecedented number of aroused citizens, who, under the leadership of the newly 
organized Save San Francisco Bay Association, moved the legislature and two 
governors to create BCDC. In 1965 it began, under Governor Edmund G. (Pat) 
Brown, as an interim planning and regulatory agency. In 1969 it became, under 
Governor Ronald Reagan, a permanent regional planning and regulatory agency to 
control bay fill and development and open up the waterfront to public access 
and recreation. 

Given its mandate and the inherent tensions, the fact that BCDC survived its 
crucial first years, let alone a successful twenty, has made it a subject well 
worth documenting. Important also is the fact that BCDC served as a model for 
the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, established in 1972 when the electorate 
overwhelmingly passed Proposition 20, and that both Joseph Bodovitz and Melvin 
Lane left BCDC in 1973 to assume positions with the new coastal commission. 

The Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era Oral History Project, recognizing the 
Reagan administration's role in the passage of the legislation making BCDC a 
permanent agency and in shaping policies regarding conservation and the environ 
ment, sponsored this study of BCDC's formative years. The Water Resources 
Center at U.C. Davis, often a contributor to this Office's water resources oral 
history projects, added support. In progress is an oral history of the Save 
San Francisco Bay Association. 

These oral histories on BCDC and the Save San Francisco Bay Association 
add links to the Regional Oral History Office's long-time studies on the history 
of land-use planning and water development in California. They follow most 
recently the three-volume State and Regional Land-Use Planning in California, 
1950-1980, completed in 1983. This is an overview of the history of 
the previous thirty years through interviews with twelve persons who, from 


differing positions of influence and responsibility, were major players in the 
development of landmark state, regional, and local land-use policies during a 
period when an aroused and organized citizenry moved the environmental movement 
from the background to center stage. 

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobio 
graphical interviews with persons significant in the history of California. The 
Office is under the administrative supervision of James D. Hart, director of The 
Bancroft Library. 

Malca Chall, Project Director 
Land-Use Planning Series 

Willa Baum, Division Head 
Regional Oral History Office 

12 July 1986 

Regional Oral History Office 

486 The Bancroft Library 

University of California at Berkeley 




Richard Carpenter, Alfred Heller, Francis Lindsay, William 
MacDougall, Samuel Wood 


Victor Jones, T.J. Kent, Jr., Stanley Scott 


John Knox, Bill Press, Paul Sedway, Ilene Weinreb 

Joseph E. Bodovitz, Melvin B. Lane, E. Clement Shute, Jr. 


Barry Bunshoft, Esther Gulick, Catherine Kerr, Sylvia McLaughlin, 
Mel Scott 

Regional Oral History Office 
The Bancroft Library 

University of California 
Berkeley, California 

Government History Documentation Project 
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era 


Joseph E. Bodovitz 

Management and Poliay Directions 

An Interview Conducted by 

Malca Chall 

in 1984 


1986 by the Regents of the University of California 


TABLE OF CONTENTS Joseph E. Bodovitz 


The San Francisco Bay Conservation Study Commission 

The McAteer Petris Act: The Bay Conservation and Development 

Commission, 1965-1969 

Relationships with Developers and Conservationists 
Establishing BCDC as a Permanent Agency, 1969 21 


Joseph Bodovitz began his career with the Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission in September, 1964, shortly after Governor Edmund G. 
(Pat) Brown signed State Senator Eugene McAteer's bill setting up the San 
Francisco Bay Conservation Study Commission. As its director, Bodovitz vas 
assigned to direct the commission's study of problems inherent in filling 
the bay and to recommend legislation for protecting the public interest if 
there vas found to be a public interest. 

At the end of an extraordinarily hectic four months, the commission 
published a report which defined the public interest and recommended 
legislation to halt the heretofore unrestricted filling of San Francisco 

The McAteer-Petris Act followed in June, 1965, creating a twenty-seven 
member San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission and 
granting this agency three years to come up with a plan which would balance 
conservation and development. In that interim period, through a permit- 
granting process, all filling would be halted unless it was deemed to be in 
the public interest. The future of the agency, and to a great extent, 
according to its adherents, the future of the bay itself, depended on how 
well BCDC handled its assignment. It handled it well enough to be accorded 
permanent status, in 1969. 

Joe Bodovitz was reappointed executive director in 1965, a post he 
retained until 1973, when he became executive of the state Coastal Zone 
Conservation Commission. Today, he is the executive of yet another 
controversial regulatory agency, the state Public Utilities Commission.* 

Much has already been published about the formative years of the bay 
commission and Mr. Bodovitz's management role. Much, too, is already known 
about his background as a journalist and former staff member of the San 
Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR). With that 
background already available, and considering the limitations of his 
schedule, this brief interview was planned to provide a few additional 
insights into the early history of the BCDC. 

*As this volume goes to press Mr. Bodovitz has resigned from the PUC to head 
the California Environmental Trust. 

The interview took place on October 10, 1984 in Mr. Bodovitz's San 
Francisco office of the state Public Utilities Commission immediately prior 
to a scheduled FUG meeting. He had read and considered the lengthy outline 
sent ahead and was well prepared. The interview could have taken from three 
to four hours, but because of his preparation and his enviable ability to 
speak clearly and to the point, most of the essentials were covered in the 
pre-arranged hour. 

Ma lea Chall 

24 January 1986 

Regional Oral History Office 

486 The Bancroft Library 

University of California at Berkeley 

Regional Oral History Office University of California 

Room 486 The Bancroft Library . Berkeley, California 94720 

(Please print or write clearly) 

Your full name Joseph E. Bodovitz 

Date of birth 10/29/3Q Place of birth Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 

Father's full "*~> Volley J. Bodovitz 

Birthplace A-rdmore, Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) 

Occupation Lawyer 

Mother's full name Frieda Gottlieb Bodovitz 

Birthplace Pleasanton. Kansas 

Occupation Teacher; housewife 

Where did you grow up ? Oklahoma City 

Mill Valley, CA 
Present community * ' 

Education B.A., Northwestern University, Evanston IL. 1951 

M.S. in Journalism, Columbia University, NYC, 1956 

Occupation(s) Newspaper reporter; executive & director of 

San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, Coastal 
Commission, and Public Utilities Commission; teacher and consultant 

Special interests or activities 


The San Francisco Bay Conservation Study Commission. 1964-1965 

[Date of Interview: 10 October, 1984]## 

Chall: We have asked you to participate in an oral history dealing with 
the early history of BCDC [The Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission]. Actually, what I have found is that this book by 
Rice Odell is probably as complete as one would want to make it. 
I understand that you and Kay Kerr and others had a great deal to 
do with helping him write it and that's why it's complete. 
There is also much good material on the subject.* 

Bodovitz: Right. 

Chall: In oral history, what we really try to do is to get the first 
person story that complements the written material. So, since 
much of that is available there are only some aspects of this 
story that I'd like to take up with you. So, we'll start. 

With respect to the setting up of the study commission the 
main question is: How did the staff and Senator [Eugene] McAteer 
meld this thing? What were the dynamics? You obviously did it 
and you did it well; but what were the dynamics behind it the 
kind of thinking that went into it from your point of view and 
McAteer 's? 

symbol indicates that a tape or segment of a tape has 
begun or ended. 

*Rice Odell, The Saving of San Francisco Bay, a Report on Citizen 
Action and Regional Planning, (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation 
Foundation, 1972). 

Bodovitz: Well the background is, Senator McAteer had become involved in 

the issue because of Kay Kerr. I'm sure that story is either in 
Odell's book or you know it otherwise. She is a very determined 
person, and I think he realized she was really going to keep 
after him and I think he was very intrigued by the bay fill issue. 
I think what people tend to forget now is how unusual it was to 
have anybody of McAteer's stature interested in an environmental 
issue in the sixties. It would be common now, but part of what 
was intriguing about it at the time was, here was a person who 
had not been identified with environmental causes at all part of 
the establishment in the state senate suddenly taking up a 
brand-new and obviously glamorous, important kind of issue. 

Another part of it was that Senator McAteer was obviously 
interested in being a candidate for mayor in the election of 
whatever year that would have been. I think, therefore, he saw 
an opportunity to take on a whole new kind of issue with 
potentially, not only a new constituency, but something that 
would be in the public eye that he could keep in the public eye 
that would show him to good advantage. I don't mean by that to 
convey insincerity. That is, I think when he became aware of Mel 
Scott's book and the things that Mel laid out for everybody, it 
was easy to be genuinely concerned.* So, I think it was all 
those things coming together at the same time. 

There was then, probably more than there is now, a tradition 
of this sort of study commission in California government. That 
is, there was a tradition in the legislature although I can't 
tell how many there had been before. But, here was a big issue 
brought by conservationists for a couple of years through Nick 
[Nicholas] Petris's bills in the assembly and otherwise, and here 
was the legislature not wanting to legislate there was no 
consensus that would have let a bill pass. Yet, here was 
somebody with the power of McAteer able to say, "Well let's have 
a study commission." How he and Bob Mendelsohn designed the 
composition of that commission, I don't know, but it was not a 
big deal in the legislature to get a short-term study commission 
with a little bit of money. Then, everybody could forget about 
the issue and assume that the study commission would either do 
something or not do something. McAteer obviously had enough 
clout with the governor and with both houses to get a relatively 
simple thing like that through. 

*Mel Scott, The Future of San Francisco Bay (Berkeley, The 
Institute of Governmental Studies, 1963). 

So, in a way the session ended with no big tough bill 
passed, but with that kind of study commission enacted into lav. 
One of my recollections is that everybody was surprised that 
that's what had happened. But here, all of a sudden there was 
legislative interest and there was progress. 

Chall: What about the commission? Was it made up of people who were on, 
presumably, both sides of the fence with respect to the basics? 

Bodovitz: Oh yes, and I think it had to be. I really can't recall how that 
was formed. My recollection is, and Bob Mendelsohn I don't know 
who else can tell you maybe Mrs. McAteer if you're talking to 
her. Again, the tradition in this kind of study commission is if 
the author was on good terms with the governor these were part 
governor, part senate, and part assembly appointments as I recall 
it the governor would be inclined to say, "Who would you like 
me to consider for appointment?" 

Whether Fat Brown first suggested to McAteer, "Well you know 
you're interested in this issue, why don't you be chairman. It's 
the interim, there's no legislative session" or whether that idea 
came from somewhere else, I don't know. 

Chall: What were the hearings like? 

Bodovitz: Okay the hearings. Here we were with a law that has a study 

commission with slightly less than four months to complete the 
assignment, and a small budget. So what do you do next? Well, 
given the tremendous public interest that had brought this about, 
and given the effect that McAteer could have in energizing an 
issue, and given his willingness to spend some time at it, it 
seemed just very logical that you would want to hire consultants 
for a couple of small, research-oriented things that you needed 
to know about but you would want to be as visible and public as 
you could possibly be. 

My background was in reporting and covering public meetings 
(I'm a great afficionado of well-run public bearings), so I was 
enthusiastic about that idea. So we arranged public hearings. I 
think we did a dozen of them in slightly less than four months, 
and had a couple of consultant reports on some ownership 
questions and some other financial things. By getting really 
excellent people to speak at those hearings, we had an impact 
that made news television and press coverage and I think the 
hearings were genuinely informative. Again, I think the things 
that worked in the public arena were also genuinely useful. I 
don't think it was a case of imagery and fluff. I think the 
hearings educated people. 

When you had people like Frank Stead and Frank Hortig and 
just the whole range of people that came to these meetings, you 

were educating a commission of people that knew a little bit but 
not a whole lot. With a leader like McAteer it was marvelous. 
In some ways it was the most fun I've ever had in government. 
With a staff of myself, Bob, and one secretary, you don't have 
inter-office memos, and it's the height of efficiency; it was 
just great. 

Then, because we had a little bit of a budget we were able 
to do what you probably couldn't do now get a very attractive 
report printed. The senator was obviously aware, as were all of 
us, that if this report was going to have an impact, it had to 
look lively and professional. I think just the fact that we were 
able, in that short a time, to do work of that quality, and come 
up with so attractive a presentation, I think that gave the thing 
a lot of momentum that it might not otherwise have had. 

Chall: What kind of a person was McAteer? Pretty hard-driving when he 
got on to something that he was really working on? 

Bodovitz: Yes, very hard-driving, but everybody who worked for him would 
have a different opinion of how he was to work for at whatever 
time. I came in about the time Leo McCarthy had left. McAteer 
could be very demanding on his staff. I think Bob was hired 
after Leo left, actually. He could be very hard on his staff. 
If you want to get into this much, Leo would be somebody good to 
talk to also. He enjoyed being part of the sort of club in the 
senate and having the kind of power he had. If he had lived and 
had been elected mayor, obviously Joe [Joseph] Alioto wouldn't 
have been, and who knows 

Given his background as an orphan, and having done things on 
his own I don't think he had too many illusions about the world 
and about people. I found him a delight to work with partly 
because he was so energetic and lively. But at least the side of 
him I saw also was that he was a very compassionate person. I 
thought he would have been a terrific mayor even though because 
of his sort of hard-driving nature, he could have been very hard 
to work for for many people. 

I can't imagine the bay fill issue having gone the way it 
did without him. If you look at the make-up of the study 
commission and say, "Well suppose one of the others had been 
chairman?" Obviously, who knows? Nick Petris is very able, Joe 
[Joseph] Houghteling is very able, and we might have come out 
well, who knows? But as I say, the kind of political novelty of 
a McAteer being involved in a "do-gooder", "posy-plucker" issue 
just made it a different kind of issue. I don't know what would 
be a good example like Ronald Reagan really being serious about 
protecting redwoods or something, [laughs] 

Chall: Like Nixon going to China. 

Bodovitz: Yes, like Nixon going to China or something. I mean it's that 
kind cf 

Chall: You had to stop and take notice* 

Bodovitz: Yes, it had to all of a sudden elevate this beyond just one more 
thing that a small handful of well-meaning but hopelessly naive 
people were trying to do. 

The McAteer-Petris AcJ 
Commission. 1965-1969 

The Bay Conservation and Development 

Chall: As a matter of fact, none of it looks naive. 

It seems that just getting the bill the McAteer-Petris bill 
through was a sophisticated act because you had something really 
set to go. You had everything in place. It seems that nobody 
was leaving any stone unturned, no relevant facts omitted. Now, 
that was probably a result of McAteer or a result of your 
background? I don't know. 

Bodovitz: You're talking about now in the legislature? 

Chall: Yes, I'm talking about getting the interim bill passed from this 
original study. Working it out through getting Pat Brown to sign 
it, when he was wavering a bit. 

Bodovitz: Well, I think it's in the nature of governors on issues like this 
to waver because there were competing interests. I mean here 
is Pat Brown feeling terrific about being the great freeway 
builder which was a big thing in the fifties and early sixties, 
and here is his own Department of Transportation saying, "Gee 
this means we can't build freeways wherever we want in the bay, 
and we can't build bridges." There were obviously things of 
concern to Pat Brown that would have made him waver. I would be 
concerned about a governor who, if he didn't occasionally waver, 
would be a kind of zealot. 

I think it was McAteer's ability to understand what the 
concerns were going to be, and to try, in the bill, to allay 
them. Sophistication is exactly the right word. Among the 
things we did that were unusual, were to create a commission that 
had federal, state, and local people all on it, and was as large 
as it was [BCDC]. People said both those things would make it 
totally unworkable, and we thought, "baloney." It was the fact 


that no major point of view was going to be excluded from the 
place where the decisions were going to be made, that in fact 
makes it workable. 

McAteer said over and over and over, and this was part of 
his answer, "The law says if you've got a good case you get a 
permit." or, "You're going to be there, you make your case. If 
you've got a good case you get your permit." That's hard for 
people to answer because that then puts them saying, "Well no I 
don't just want to make my case, I want to be guaranteed I can do 
what I want." McAteer would then say, "See, that's what 
everybody says. Everybody just wants to fill his little part of 
the bay and be let alone, you're just like everybody else." 

The kind of novelty of that argument and that issue, and 
press coverage, and Don Sherwood whom I trust is mentioned in 
Rice Odell. Okay, what I mean is all that was going on at the 
time, just made it a very lively time. 

I think the opponents were somewhat off guard. One of your 
questions was about ABAC [Association of Bay Area Government] 
saying, "We can do it all." McAteer thought that was ludicrous, 
and he thought the same about their threats that if he didn't do 
things their way they would kill his bill. He was both amused and 
annoyed at the presumption of ABAG's telling him that if he 
didn't do something they wanted they'd kill his bill. 

Again, it's been so long since I've read Rice's book, but 
one of the key hearings was where McAteer took on Randy 
[Randolph] Collier who was the advocate of the freeway builders 
and was campaigning against the bill. My recollection is Collier 
finally took a walk or backed down on something that he was 
giving McAteer a hard time about. McAteer jumped down his throat 
very effectively and dramatically. It was the kind of thing that 
had not happened that somebody with McAteer' s power would take 
on Collier, whom everybody was terrified of. It was an 
interesting issue not only because of the welfare of the bay, but 
the fact that somebody of McAteer's standing and perceived 
perceptions people had of him, would take this on and do battle 
with a Randy Collier, for example; that was a big deal. 

Chall: In terms of the size of the commission and the comprehensive 

powers that it had even at the beginning, was some of this out 
of Mel Scott's recommendations particularly permits, or the 
opportunity to have an interim commission. I haven't read it 
recently, but I recollect that he was pretty specific about the 
requirements needed to start that kind of a program. 


Bodovitz: I'm sorry to say I don't recollect either where the idea came 
from, but that's as good a possibility as any. It was very 
obvious that if you didn't maintain some kind of control on the 
bay, the mere existence of a planning agency would provide great 
incentives for people to get the next ten years worth of filling 
done right away, because they might be stopped by the plan. The 
plan could be rendered useless simply by the existence of the 
planning agency, if I'm making sense the fact that people 
thought they might be stopped would give them an incentive to go 
do something. So, you really needed to be able to protect the 
bay while you were planning for it or the risk was you wouldn't 
have much left. 

There had been a very highly publicized lawsuit in which the 
state court of appeals upheld a Monterey case that temporarily 
denied somebody a permit to develop. There was a redevelopment 
area in downtown Monterey and somebody came in and wanted a 
permit to build a high-rise building or some large development in 
the middle of the redevelopment area. The city turned it down 
saying, "How can we plan for a redevelopment of this area if we 
give you a permit to build this great big building?" The appeals 
court said, "Yes, that is a reasonable thing." You can't deny 
them forever because that would be "taking," but for a limited 
period, while bona fide planning is taking place you can do that 
kind of denial. 

So, there was a precedent. Again, it was easier to say, 
"Well look, this isn't permanent and we'll look carefully at what 
ownership rights and what rights people have, but in the meantime 
you can't do anything unless you get a permit, and you can't get 
a permit unless you meet these criteria. Again, the existence of 
the permit process said: If there's some really valuable public 
thing, all you have to do is make your case and you're entitled 
to a permit. 

Chall: Then you had to be sure that you gave everybody a good hearing. 

Bodovitz: The hearings had great value because not only ought people to 
have a fair hearing on a permit application, but the danger of 
planning agencies obviously is that the planning isn't rooted in 
reality. When you're hearing somebody arguing the case for a 
permit, and you're hearing the argument against the permit, you 
have some understanding of what is going on not only in that part 
of the shoreline which the whole commission might or might not 
have been familiar with but you begin to get some idea of what 
issues you're dealing with in the planning. So, I felt and feel 
very very strongly, that the plan benefited from the permit 
process, and the permit process benefited from the knowledge we 
were acquiring through the planning. 




It definitely did and that is one of my other questions. How did 
you come to that conclusion? By this time you would be working 
with Mr. [Melvin] Lane. Did you both see it rather clearly at 
that point the causal relationship between the permit and 
planning process? Odell, of course, is looking at it in terms of 
hindsight; but on the other hand you had the foresight. I just 
wondered where the foresight came from? 

The foresight, which may be foresight or good luck or whatever 
was probably good luck, and we'll now say was utter brilliance. 
It seems to me the danger in this kind of governmental planning 
is people don't think in chess terms, they don't think a couple 
of moves ahead. In seemed to me you have to work backwards a 
little bit from where you're trying to get, not "lets just go 
down this road and see where it leads." 

What we had in 1965 was a temporary commission. This means 
if you don't score a touchdown the ballgame is over. You don't 
go on forever; you don't have the luxury of permanence. You have 
a probably skeptical legislature when you go back; you have the 
people that didn't like the temporary commission and sure aren't 
going to like the permanent commission, so you're not going to be 
loved by everybody. You have a very large and diverse commis 
sion, some of whom have very different points of view. We had to 
take an advisory committee as you remember, that had all kinds of 
different people. So somehow, out of all that, you have to come 
up with something that can be the basis for legislation in 1969. 
The goal, as we saw it then and I would think correctly, was not, 
"Let's have a lot of fun preparing a plan." The goal was, "Let's 
do something that will be the basis for successful legislation in 
1969, that will both protect the bay and encourage appropriate 
shoreline development." 

When you think of it in those terms, then you think, "Well 
what do you need to be the basis of that kind of legislation?" 
One, you need a good plan that's rational and shows you 
understand what you're doing with as much specificity as you can 
have about what is going to happen around the bay if the plan is 
carried out. Almost certainly, you're going to need some form of 
continuing permit operation, so you have to show that you have 
exercised the permit power responsibly during the interim period. 
That is, if you've blown it, no one is going to want to continue 
the permit power. But, if you've shown, over the four years, 
that people were fairly treated, that rational, necessary 
development was encouraged, not discouraged, and that the values 
of the bay were protected, you make a case for continuing. 

Finally, because the people that oppose you are going to be 
very strong, very well-financed and all, you have to maintain the 
public support that got the whole thing started if you lose 
that, you've got nothing. You've got a plan and nobody who 



Bodovitz : 

cares. When you reasoned that way, it seemed to me you just came 
to the inevitable conclusion of two things: One, the planning 
had to be done in an open, public way so that two audiences, the 
commissioners themselves and the public, would understand the 
planning. Secondly, that meant you couldn't commission one of 
these great big plans and just turn it all over to consultants, 
because no one would understand what they were doing, and no one 
would have a stake in it. 

A third consideration was, it seemed to me the report of the 
commission had to be as unanimous as we could make it. To go to 
the legislature with a divided report, with big dissenting 
opinions at the end of it, vould make it very difficult to 
legislate because there would be such a strong dissent, that you 
would just have a foretaste of what was going to happen in the 
legislature. It didn't seem to me that that meant we had to 
homogenize everything down to the lowest level that everybody 
could agree to; it meant that it really had to be the 
commission's plan. All kinds of people had to say, "Yes, we 
didn't get everything we wanted, but this is a good deal for this 
region and we're going to support it." 

That meant, we had to give the commission understandable 
chunks of the plan one at a time, and they had to vote on them. 
This was a new and novel idea. 

Was that kind of thinking a combination of the fact that Lane 
understands setting up a magazine or a publication that people 
would read; and that you had had a background in publicity, and 
government? Was it a combination? Can you think of meetings 
that you might have had initially, when you first started, to 
decide how you would go about getting things done? 

I think it grew out of a lot of discussions that Mel and I had, 
but I can't tell you a particular day. Mel was terrific at 
everything. He would make me think through things. I would say, 
"I think this will work," He'd say, "Well, have you thought 
about this or that and something else?" I would realize that I 
hadn't thought about that, so I'd think about it, we would have 
some staff discussions and we would talk again. 

You would have to ask Mel his feelings at the time, but 
there was a considerable leap of faith on Mel's part, because I'd 
never done this before, Jack [Schoopj had never done this before, 
Al Baum had never done this before. And there was McAteer 
looking over our shoulders. Mel was adding his reputation and 
prestige as chairman of this thing, with a great leap of faith, 
agreeing that as we had worked this out it sounded good to him 
but he couldn't begin to say he knew where it was going to go 


The kind of things that he agreed with strongly, as I 
recollect, were: That if the commissioners voted to adopt a 
planning report that said marshlands were important, it was going 
to be awfully hard for them to then say at the next meeting, 
"Well we don't care whether we destroy marshlands or not." 
Therefore, this idea of building the plan piece by piece, so that 
everybody could understand understand what they were voting for. 
We the staff did a reasonably detailed report on each subject, 
as detailed as time or money would allow, and a summary, and then 
very simple propositions that the commission would vote on. They 
weren't voting on whether they agreed or didn't agree with the 
consultant, and they didn't have to agree with the summary, but 
they had to vote that marshlands were important and that the 
marshlands and the bay had been shrinking by such and such 
amount; and that it's important for fish and wildlife for us to 
protect remaining marshlands. 

Chall: They had to see it regionally? 

Bodovitz: Yes. I don't want to make this sound like trickery. We didn't 
sucker people into voting for things that, if they had known 
better, they wouldn't have voted for. But it worked both ways: 
the more development-minded people had to take a look at 
marshlands, but similarly the absolute conservationists, if 
that's the right term, had to understand there was an economy in 
the bay area, and that shipping after all, did depend on ports, 
and ports did depend on dredging and deep water access. People 
had to confront the legitimate interests of both conservation and 
development. The idea that Mel felt very strongly about, and I'm 
sure he will tell you it was a cardinal principal of his, is that 
reasonable, fair-minded people, dealing with facts in a 
reasonable, unemotional way, are going to come out largely 
agreeing to the same kinds of things. They may disagree on a 
particular permit or a particular issue, but no fair-minded 
person can say marshlands aren't important. Similarly, no fair- 
minded person can say ports aren't important to the bay area 
economy, to use those two examples. 

First, there was a commission vote on the planning 
principles from each of the issues marshlands, ports, 
recreation, et cetera. Each decision was meant to be reasonably 
complete. We didn't say, "This vote is absolutely final," but we 
weren't going to go over each issue at every meeting. Once the 
commission said, "That's our tentative policy," that's our 
tentative policy. We might have to change it when we look at 
another policy, or we may decide near the end of the line that we 
are going to have to change it, but that's what we're doing. 

Chall: And, working it out so that at the same meeting you would have 
discussed some aspect of the plan, and come to some conclusions 
tentatively, or table it for a time? Also, as you took up 


permits you were looking realistically at the bay in total? That 
was a planned concept for the meetings? 

Bodovitz: Yes, absolutely. We had permit hearings at the same meeting for 
fear that some people would say, "Well the plan isn't important, 
I'll just show up when my vote counts on a permit." We also, as 
I recall, quickly decided that because the planning had to be 
paramountthe permit was an interim control, the plan was for 
the future of the bay the plan had to have priority. Therefore, 
we would go to the planning issues at the beginning of the 
meeting, and then we would go to the permits. If anybody had to 
leave early, it was the permit hearing that would suffer, and 
there would be a very unhappy applicant. 

Chall: Was there quite a bit of lobbying of the commissioners prior to 
some of these permit meetings? 

Bodovitz: I'm not sure I would have been aware of all the lobbying, but I'm 
sure there was some. I can't believe there was any more than 
exists in a typical city council, planning commission, or board 
of supervisors. They were the same kinds of projects that had 
probably gone through a local government, and the developers or 
proponents would have lobbied commissioners here in probably the 
same way. 

Chall: How about commissioners interacting with the staff on some of 
these cases? 

Bodovitz: To the best of my recollection, there would be a phone call now 
and again somebody wanting information. I just don't ever 
recall being leaned on by anybody about a permit. I didn't 
encourage anybody to do that. And, I think we would have lost 
credibility if we seemed to be bending one way or another. I 
have no doubt that people might try to call any commissioner they 
thought might be favorable either proponents or opponents. 
Somebody might call me and say, "A friend of mine is interested 
in this project, what's it all about." Part of the purpose of 
the large commission, with the diverse representation, was so 
that there was no automatic bloc and that part was extremely 

Chall: I noticed, from reading a couple sets of minutes at random, that 
the commissioners were very very careful about everything. Their 
questions seemed to me to be good. They were based on fact, they 
were based on concerns of theirs, and the concerns seemed to be 
very largely, "What will this do for the bay? Will it pollute 
the bay? Will it mess up the scenic view?" Things of this kind. 


I don't know who all these people were, but there was enough 
give and take so that it would seem as if everybody cared 
whatever the side of the fence they might have been on. The 
staff and the consultants had to answer, and Mr. Lane had also to 
say, "Maybe we don't understand enough about this, let's look at 
it another time." I was impressed with the total concern not 
only that, but the detail that these people had in their 
backgrounds. Did they really do their homework well? 

Bodovitz: Certainly many of them did. One of the reasons that we went to 
the planning summaries have you seen those planning documents? 
They must be in somebody's file over there? 

Chall: Yes, I think I've seen some of the summaries, and I've seen 
something like this confidential report which is based on a 
summary and really asks some very very pointed questions.* For 
example, what the assumptions are, what the conclusions might be, 
what the problems and alternatives might be. I think that I'd 
like you to tell me a little more about those too. But, let's go 
on into the summaries first. 

Bodovitz: The summary had two values. One is, our staff wrote the 

summaries. A consultant was hired or another agency or whatever, 
to prepare a report. Our staff then wrote the summary because we 
wanted to aim it at the commissioners and to put it into clear 
English. One of the things you learn in that process is you read 
a consultant's report and you think you understand it, and then 
you try to write a summary of it and explain it to someone else, 
and you find the holes. So, this process let us go back to the 
consultants right away and say, "Well this isn't clear, and you'd 
better explain that." 

While I don't know how many commissioners read the full 
reports probably the answer is that some read some and some read 
them all and some read few, I don't know. The intent of the 
summaries was to be concise and interesting and informative. I 
would guess by and large that everyone could read those with no 
great strain. People did read them, and then the policy 
statements that were included were what the commission voted on. 
I would think the homework was done quite well. 

*Briefing Report; Tentative Conclusions as to the BCDC Plan, 
September 7, 1967, Stamped CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT. See also pages 

Regarding the use of the confidential reports, Rice Odell, page 
51, wrote: (for continuation see page 17) 


We did the same thing in the Coastal Commission plan. 
Commissioners had to feel comfortable that this was their plan. 
Inevitably, ve couldn't satisfy everybody. We couldn't take all 
the time everybody wanted on every issue, but you had to make 
sure you didn't run over anybody. If somebody was raising an 
important point, you got an answer, and then you wanted that 
person to be satisfied this was reasonable and to vote for the 
resulting policies. 

*6 . Review and Evaluation. 

"Confidential drafts of the staff reports and the possible 
planning conclusions were submitted to members of the citizens' 
advisory committee for full review and comment. They were 
returned to the staff, which made revisions as it felt 

"The reports and possible planning conclusions, along with the 
advisory committee comments, were then presented to the 
commission. In case of disagreement within the advisory 
committee, or among staff or consultants, written procedures 
stipulated that 'all points of view will be presented to 
the commission, so the commission can have the widest possible 
range of information and opinion in reaching its decisions.' 

"In addition, members of the public could and did testify and 
write letters expressing their opinions of the suggested 
policies. 'Dozens of suggested revisions in the conclusions were 
made from the floor by the public, ' said Baum. 

"The 'possible planning conclusions' were debated, revised and 
voted on. They then became part of the tentative overall bay 
plan. 'The idea was not to have a plan prepared by staff and 
consultants,' said Bodovitz, 'but a plan actually prepared and 
adopted by the commissioners themselves, with the hope, which I 
think has been proved correct, that in this manner the 
commissioners would be committed to the final plan.' This 
commitment would be important in generating public and political 

"The BCDC, in a very important move, altered the normal 
procedure for obtaining agency concurrence in a plan. Usually, a 
large, detailed package of research and recommendations is 
presented to a commission after a year or two of work. "The 
trouble with such plans,' said Bodovitz, 'is that at the end you 
take one big vote to adopt it or reject it, and everybody's 
against it because there's something in it they don't like.' 
This would have been particularly difficult with the BCDC, 
because of its comparatively large membership." 


Relationships with Developers and Conservationists 

Chall: What about your public relations or your relationships with other 
groups like the Save the Bay people, the Sierra Club, and the 
League of Women Voters? Did you have contacts with them over the 
plans or some of your decisions in here, or assumptions? Did 
they talk to you regularly. Did Kay Kerr? 

Bodovitz: Yes, Kay was never bashful. We had much more contact with Save 
the Bay than with the league, or the Sierra Club with the 
exception of Dwight Steele from the Sierra Club, certainly. I 
better amend that because on this issue, Dwight Steele was the 
Sierra Club for all intents and purposes, so the fact that there 
weren't a lot of other people around didn't matter a lot. 

Dwight and Kay were eloquent, effective, and knowledgeable 
obviously. They felt, I think very strongly, that there was a 
danger the commission would be pushed in the developer's 
direction if they didn't push equally strongly. So, they or 
their representatives spoke at commission hearings. They talked 
to the staff so did all kinds of other people; I mean it wasn't 
limited to them. We felt it important to understand what 
everybody wanted and thought. We obviously couldn't satisfy 
everybody on every issue all of the time. 

In addition, the news media were interested in the bay 
issue. And the commission met in various places around the bay, 
so there was lots of public attention to what we did on some of 
the planning issues. We were short-handed on our staff, so we 
didn't really have a public relations person. It really depended 
on different ones of us making speeches or whatever. But having 
four city representatives and a supervisor from each county meant 
there was somebody local for people to talk to if they wanted. I 
think it would have become somewhat embarrassing for some of 
those people if they hadn't known what was going on because 
people would come and ask questions. 

Chall: Well, and you were dealing with rather major problems, like the 
San Francisco port, Candlestick, and all these other interests 
like Westbay. Media would be there whether you had a P.R. person 
or not. 

Bodovitz: Right, correct. 

Chall: What about ABAC, and the League of California Cities, and the 

Bay Area Council? Those are people who would have basically been 
on the other side? Was that about the same kind of contact as 
you had with the environmentalists, or was it different? 


Bodovitz: You're aware of the ABAC appointments? 
Chall: Yes. 

Bodovitz: Well there was a kind of turmoil within ABAC at the beginning, so 
that the initial appointments were replaced by people like 
Bernice May and Mike [Michael] Vornum. I think they felt it was 
their obligation to keep ABAC informed, and be the conduit. I 
went to ABAC meetings, and I'm sure I talked to ABAC groups, and 
I'm sure others on our staff did, but there were four people on 
the commission picked by ABAC, and I think they reported with 
some regularity to the relevant ABAC committees. Mike Wornum 
might be somebody you could talk to about that, but my 
recollection is that ABAC initially felt burned by having 
threatened McAteer, and then having McAteer steam roller them. 
Then, they made what were thought to be pro-development 
appointments to the commission, and that created a sort of 
commotion within ABAC that led to some different appointments 
being made. I think some of the ABAC people probably felt for a 
time, "Gee we've had enough of this." And, there probably was 
also a feeling that the thing would probably fall of its own 
weight, so why should they worry about it. When it collapsed 
they would be back to local control as before. Also, McAteer was 
nobody that you wanted to tangle with more than you needed too. 

I remember once, I can't remember what year, they invited 
him to speak at the ABAC general assembly, and he was mildly 
conciliatory but let them know who was in charge. But I don't 
think that up to the time of his death he was ever a fan of ABAC. 

Chall: I see. Well, at the time too, there was some concern about 

whether the future of BCDC would be a single-purpose agency or 
part of an umbrella regional government group. The 1969 act 
specified that if there weren't any regional government to 
identify with, BCDC would be a single-purpose agency, which is 
what happened at the time. But, within a year or two, there was a 
[John] Knox bill a BARO [Bay Area Regional Organization bill], 
and it almost passed. What was the thinking of BCDC at that 
time? They would have been brought in under a general planning 
agency, or regional government set-up. 

Bodovitz: I don't recall specifically. I'm sure the reaction would have 
been that those who thought a regional government, with its 
ability to do regional trade-offs, was probably of such value 
that even if the bay were slighted in the process it was worth 
doing. I'm sure there were others, and I'm sure Kay Kerr was one 
of them, who thought the bay was so important and this other 
thing was a mirage, that we were crazy to think that way. I 
suspect the staff Jack, Al, and I probably saw more merit in a 
regional government with regional land use and planning and other 
kinds of powers, than we did with a lot of single-purpose 


agencies. I suspect we thought that in the long run, with a 
regional government structured as I recall BARO was, the bay 
stood to benefit because a multitude of competing single-purpose 
agencies was likely to be trouble no matter what. Although, of 
course, there might have been parts we didn't like. I remember 
the election/ appointment problems. 

My recollection is that conservationists really didn't agree 
with Jack Knox on parts of what he was doing. I remember lots of 
meetings at the Faculty Club in Berkeley with Gene Lee and Stan 
Scott, trying to get us all together and straighten out our 

Chall: There were a couple of those. Well he [John Knox] had sponsored 
BARO bills for nearly a decade. The one in 1972-73 almost 
passed. There was another one in '74. You would have been gone 
by then. 

Bodovitz: Right, I was gone by then. 

Chall: There was a considerable concern on the part of the 
conservationists over that one. 

The final vote on the plan itself, before you went into the 
1969 session, was, I think, 20 to 1 

Bodovitz: I know you wrote that in your note. Was Frank Hortig the one you 
recall from reading? 

Chall: I don't know who cast the vote. I haven't reread the minutes. 

Bodovitz: I bet Rice has got who it is. My recollection of it is that it 
was either Well why don't we [Checks Odell] Somebody at BCDC 
could look up the minutes and tell you. I'll tell you my 
recollection. Wait a minute, here we are: "The end result of 
these procedures was a remarkable plan and virtual unanimity in 
approving it. In the final, dramatic, 19 to 1 vote on September 
20, 1968, only one county representative dissented." (I'm sure 
that would have been somebody from Solano county.) "He did so 
because he thought more industry or fills should be allowed. 
Another man,- a state official" (that would have been Frank Hortig 
of the State Lands Commission) "abstained because he considered 
the plan in conflict with his position, a third member said he 
was unhappy, but voted yes anyway."* 

*Rice Odell, The Saving of San Francisco Bay, a Report on Citizen 
Action and Regional Planning, pp. 55-56. 


So I've read that into the record. I can't vouch for that 
independently, but all of us were anxious to have Rice get it 
down correctly at the time he was doing it, so I assume that was 
accurate. We were smarter than we knew because you don't think 
at the time you're going to forget all this stuff and you do. 

Establishing BCDC as a. Permanent Agency. 1969 

Chall: Can you give me some background on making BCDC a permanent 

agency? Now there's been a lot written about that it's high 
drama. I've talked to Jack Knox about it, so we do know 
something about those tense days.* Nonetheless what were you 
doing? I don't have that from your perspective. 

Bodovitz: Once we got into the '69 session, as you are aware, there were 
several competing bills Jack Knox's, there was a Milton Marks 
bill, and there were others. Knox put in a bill because he 
didn't think anybody else's was going anywhere. We'd had some 
meetings as to whether you ought to begin in the senate or 
assembly, those kind of things you do at the beginning of a 
session. Marks, because by then he was in the seat that McAteer 
had left, thought there was a sort of tradition and that he ought 
to put in a bill because that had been a good thing for McAteer 
and he ought to continue the tradition. So, for better or for 
worse, things got started in the senate. 

I don't have enormous recollections of what we were doing. 
Obviously legislators and their staffs were more involved than we 
were with the interest groups and all the committee consultants 
and all of that. We were mostly trying to provide information 
and say that, "this amendment would cause problems and that one 
wouldn't be so bad." We felt that it was our job to explain and 
defend the plan. I think we also felt that the commisson had 

*John Knox, "Bay Area Regional Organization, the Environmental 
Quality Act, and Related Issues in the California Assembly, 1960- 
1980," an oral history interview conducted in 1982, Volume III 
Four Perspectives on State. Regional, and Local Mandates for 
Land-Use Planning. 1960-1982. Regional Oral History Office, 
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1983. 


Bodovitz : 


neither the power nor really the responsibility for saying, "This 
compromise is acceptable and that one isn't." Although I don't 
recall that clearly, it may be that in the minutes the commission 
did or didn't agree with certain versions of the bill or 
whatever. John Zierold was involved and would be somebody to 
talk to about his recollections at the time. Certainly Knox, 
certainly Tom [Thomas] Willoughby. 

We were one step removed from the process, so I'm not sure I 
have really clear perceptions. I've always had a great deal of 
doubt about how effective agencies themselves are in this kind of 
thing. You don't really know what is going on, you don't really 
know what all the political pressures are on different 
legislators. You're not there every day you're not living it. 
You risk having good intentions but making wrong decisions. 

I think our basic idea was to try to educate as many people 
as we could as to why various ideas had or had not been included 
in the plan. When somebody would want to do something that 
hadn't been agreed to in the plan, I think our tactic was to say, 
"Look, don't spend a lot of time on that. That isn't a new 
issue. Contrary to what these people tell you, they were in fact 
heard. We listened to them and we just didn't think their 
position was right and here is why." So I think we were doing a 
lot of that, but I don't know that we were saying, "We want this 
bill," or, "We like this author and don't like that author." We 
were trying to help anybody who wanted help in drafting anything. 

You're talking about staff now? 

Staff now, yes. 

Mr. Lane could have seen the governor. 

The governor that was one of your questions. As you're aware 
the Resources Agency had a person on the commission. For most of 
that time my recollection is that it was Al Hill who worked for 
Ike [Norman] Livermore. The people who were probably most 
influential within the Reagan administration were Al Hill and his 
boss Ike Livermore. Ike and Mel had been friends and had known 
each other and were both Republicans. Reagan had an appointments 
secretary (I can't remember the exact dates) named Ned Hutchinson. 

He was there then. 

I don't know that he would have joined Kay Kerr's organization, 
but he was very sympathetic and thought it was bad for the 
administration to not be identified with responsible 
conservation. He was very helpful with advice as was Al Hill. 

I think very highly of Al Hill, and likewise, obviously, Ike 


Livermore. Ike was in the lumber business, a respected 
businessman, but he had an environmental family an environmental 
conscience. It was hard to imagine Reagan having a better kind 
of person running state resources. 

Chall: So when it came to the bill being acceptable to him, given 
amendments, he was for it. 

Bodovitz: Right, but I'm sure there were plenty of people on the other side 
within the administration. So, I think it was important to have 
somebody like Ike. It would be good to ask Mel about this. 

Chall: When it came to his appointments to the commission of course 
he'd already started making appointments before this did they 
change the tenor of the commission in any way at all? 

Bodovitz: Reagan kept Mel, and he appointed [William] Evers, and he 
appointed Bessie Watkins, and who were the others? 

Chall: I understand he appointed Marcel la Jacobson. 

Bodovitz: Yes, Mar eel la. Well, just to recite the names answers the 

question. I really think he thought those were the days when he 
negotiated with Tony Beilenson on the abortion bill, and did 
some things that were quite progressive and balanced. I think 
when Ike and other people said, "Well not everybody is going to 
like it, but it's a balanced solution and there really is a 
problem," he was willing to go along. Both there and with the 
Coastal Commission, he didn't just stack the thing with people 
who were against the whole program. 

Well, there were a few people who were hell-bent to undo 
the thing. But Reagan also appointed Mel chairman of the Coastal 
Commission, even though he opposed Proposition 20. When the 
thing was the will of the voters, he didn't try to undo it, and I 
think the same thing happened with BCDC. 

Chall: In terms of BCDC being a permanent agency it continued with 
practically the same staff the same chairman. You didn't do 
anything about the plan anymore, but you did have to follow it. 
And, you had to determine your one hundred foot band priorities 
et cetera. How do you recollect the next few years? 

Bodovitz: I recollect we had lots of things to do, and I think the momentum 
really carried forward. We'd had a permit process that was in 
place; I think people understood what the hearings were like and 
who came. The commission didn't particularly change. There was 
great continuity. 

I think the concerns the business people had this was true 
of every regulatory job I've been in is the dislike of 


uncertainty. They may not like the rules, but if they know what 
the rules are they can invest or not invest, do something or not 
do something. But, when no one is sure what the rules are going 
to be, then everything is up in the air. I think there was 
probably a kind of relief that at least the law was now the law. 
The ground rules were established, there would be fights about 
one thing or another, but everything wouldn't be all up in the 
air again. 

Tour third question here about the charges that the staff 
was made up of conservation-oriented people this is an issue 
that somebody raises all the time, virtually, with all government 
planning and regulatory agencies. The question is not what they 
think, or whether they're nice to their wives and kids, or 
whether they ride bicycles to work. They have to be judged on 
how they do their jobs. I felt I was accountable (as I do in any 
agency) for the quality of work we produced, not for the opinions 
of the people who were there. I wouldn't want to be judged by 
whether everybody who ever worked for me was right-thinking by 
somebody else's standards, but I feel it's fair I be judged by 
the work we put out. If we were not upholding the law, or if we 
were doing something crazy, we ought to be called to account for 

Those kinds of things lead to some interesting internal 
discussions within the staff; even people who have never met 
business payrolls have some interesting ideas. Sometimes they're 
right, sometimes they come up with good ideas, and sometimes 
somebody has to say, "That is interesting but we're not going to 
do it." 

Chall: What about the inter-relationship among the staff in terms of 
when you came out in the plan with some of your proposals, or 
your stand on permit appeals. 

Was there argument within staff so that there would be 
differences of opinion? How did you resolve those? I know that 
there were differences among staff in the Coastal Commission 
because I've read your interviews with Stan Scott.* I wondered 
whether that took place also in BCDC. 

*Joseph Bodovitz was interviewed by Stanley Scott during 1978- 
1979 on Mr. Bodovitz's experiences as executive director of the 
state Coastal Commission. 


Bodovitz: My recollection certainly, is much more within the Coastal 

Commission just because of so many more issues. I think the 
difference is just in the range of issues. I don't mean to make 
the BCDC planning sound simple because God knows it wasn't; but 
relative to what we were dealing with in the Coastal Commission 
it was simpler, because it was bay fill and it was a narrow 
shoreline band. 

It was a very small staff and it was people who basically 
Cliff Graves, George Reed, Jack Schoop, Al, and myself, and one 
or two others. By and large we saw eye to eye on a lot of 
things. Sometimes Al, with greater permit responsibilities would 
say, "Wait a minute, we're out of sync here. The permit is going 
this way and the plan is going that way; we better decide what 
we're doing here." 

That kind of tension or balance is very healthy. But, I 
don't recall enormous disagreements or whatever. With the 
Coastal Commission, because, as I say, we had so many more 
issues, and the issues were often much more complex, and such a 
much bigger area to deal with, it was very easy to have all kinds 
of different internal disagreements. 

Finally, moreover, one of the virtues, and I think one of 
the reasons why the public had confidence, was because we had 
somebody of Mel's stature and experience. Mel obviously met all 
the business criteria anybody could look for, and Mel was a great 
sounding board. As I say, over and over he just would say, 
"Well, you think that's a good idea, but have you thought about 
this this and this." And I would say, "You're right, we 
shouldn't do it," or "Yes I have thought about it and we still 
should go forward." Once in a great while I would recommend 
something he wouldn't totally agree with, which I think is about 
how things ought to be. 

He has just tremendous judgment, and could see right away 
something we on the staff were too close to see and hadn't 
thought about. I could send him a draft of something, or I could 
say, "What do you think about this idea?" He would say thinking 
three jumps ahead "These people over here are going to give you 
a bad time about it." And, I'd embarrassedly concede I hadn't 
thought about it and was glad he had pointed it out. As I said 
in my stuff with Stan Scott, I came to generally realize that 
when he and I didn't initially see eye to eye, he was much more 
likely to be right than I was, [laughs] and I'd better go back 
and figure out what I was doing wrong. I just think that no one 
could really believe that an agency that Mel was chairman of was 
going to go off and do wild and crazy things. 


The other side of it also, is you really want a staff that 
is creative and thinks, and you need to be able to say, "Well 
that's a good idea but let's not do it." But you also need to be 
able to say, "That's a terrific idea, and, but for you, we 
wouldn't have thought of it." So, somehow it's finding a halfway 
balance between real creativity and innovative people and people 
who go off the deep end. 

Chall: If they go off the deep end too often they don't have to stay on 
your staff. 

Bodovitz: Yes, precisely. 

Chall: I have talked to Mr. [Clement] Shute about the legal matters, but 
in terms of getting together and making decisions, was this 
difficult? For example, let's sue, let's go to court. I know he 
was probably a good advisor in his advice to the staff and 
commission, but was it sometimes a problem to decide, "Let's 
take a stand here, let's go to court."? 

Bodovitz: As with any relationship of that kind, again we were blessed by 
having somebody as good as Clem, because he had the combination 
of an aggressive commitment to the laws we were trying to 
enforce, and a creative streak so that he could figure out ways 
around problems. He also had the cautionary judgment you'd 
expect a good attorney to have "This one we can win, that one's 
just too far out." or "You can go this far and the courts will 
sustain you; you do that and my advice is you're going to get 
shot down." 

You come to have confidence in a lawyer like that. You 
don't tend to have confidence in a lawyer who says you never can 
do anything, because you think, "Well, there's some lazy guy who 
doesn't want to think about what you might do, he just wants to 
tell you don't do this or don't do that." You don't need that. 
But you do need somebody who says, "Well here's a creative 
solution to that problem," or "Here's a problem there is no 
solution for; you just can't do it." Clem was terrific. He was 
energetic and creative, and very valuable. So that when he said, 
"No." I came to agree the answer was "No." The commission came 
to have confidence in his judgment as well. We lucked out with 
good lawyers at the Coastal Commission too, from the attorney 
general's office, because if you get leaden influences, you can 
be in awful trouble. 

Chall: I know you have to go off to an appointment, and perhaps we've 

covered about as much as we really need to cover, even though it 
was done in a shorter time than I would have expected. So much 
has been written that maybe we've got enough. If, when you 
see your transcript, you want to add anything, then that would 
be a good time to do it in terms of getting down some aspects of 


BCDC you didn't think about while we were talking. Otherwise then, 
we can just say we're through. I do appreciate your giving me 
this hour out of your very tight schedule. 

Bodovitz: Okay. Well, you asked me about this thing [Confidential Report] 
which I have totally forgotten about for I can't tell you how 
many years. Just looking at it again I can't totally recall 
what led to it. But just looking at it quickly, it seems to be 
an example of our trying to make choices clear to the commission. 

Chall: That was one of your ways of dealing with a problem. 

Bodovitz: But, it was an effort on our part If this was in 1967, it still 
looks good to me right now. In some ways I've been 
bureaucratized, and my writing has gotten worse than this, 
instead of better. This would have been the kind of ideas we 
would have tried to show to the commission. You asked if people 
did homework. We would have tried to say, "Well here in four 
pages, is what the main issues are." We would have thought that 
with anybody who wanted to be on the commission in the first 
place, it was not a great burden to expect him or her to take the 
time to read and understand something like this. And, as I say 
as I look at it, it seems to me to be a clear setting forth of 
issues and possibilities. I can't say how much of that was 
written by Al or Jack or me. 

Chall: What were your reasons for leaving BCDC? What do you consider to 
be your personal accomplishments and frustrations during your 
decade with BCDC? 

Bodovitz: I left BCDC to become executive director of the Coastal 

Commission, after Proposition 20 had been approved by the voters 
in the fall of 1972. I left, I think, in January, 1973. 

The frustrations were those that go with managing in state 
government the restrictions of the budgeting and personnel 
systems, which are slow and cumbersome. The best parts were 
obviously my good luck at having been able to help start a 
conservation and development commission for San Francisco Bay, a 
commission structure that has proven workable over many years 
now. And I think I'm proud of the open, clear planning process 
we used, and of the good permit hearings we held. There were so 
many excellent people involved on the commission, on the staff, 
and in the various organizations we dealt with. It was a very 
exciting and interesting time. 

Transcriber: Lisa Grossman 
Final Typist: Richard Shapiro 

_ ~\ 

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.:' *',>-: ' ;! '. 

September 7, 19^7 16 months to go f ^ 

. :-;.-; . :' ; "'" ' 



Assumption No. 1. As required "by the McAteer-Petris Act, the BCDC plan for 
the Bay and. its shoreline will be enforceable, not merely advisory. An advisory 
plan can be accepted or rejected by governmental jurisdictions and private property 
owners as they wish. An enforceable plan can be put into operation through various 
forms of compulsion, if necessary. 

Assumption No. 2. As required by the McAteer-Petris Act, the BCDC plan for the 
Bay and its shoreline will be comprehensive . The plan will thus deal with the Bay 
and its shoreline as a whole. 

Assumption No. 3 Many of the key decisions remaining to be made involve 
methods of carrying out the plan. There is, for example, no point in planning for 
a. certain area as open water if its owner has already advertised his plans to fill 
it, unless decisions are made as to how the area cannot only be shown on the plan 
as open water, but actually kept as open water. 

Assumption No. h. While there is some question as to the validity of the title 
to certain Bay lands claimed by private owners, any effort to assert that these 
lands are in reality owned by the State, not the private claimant, would result in 
extensive litigation. The lawsuits would probably be ultimately decided by the 
U. S. Supreme Court. Since the outcome of such litigation cannot now be predicted, 
the BCDC plan will assume that the lands in dispute are actually in private 
ownership (at the same time, however, any lawsuits or other means to resolve the 
title controversy should be vigorously pursued) . 


Conclusion No. 1. Enforcement of the BCDC plan by individual units of local 
government, each having jurisdiction over only a part of the Bay and none having 
responsibility for the Bay as a whole, would result in such fragmented control as 
to mean no enforcement at all. 

Therefore, an enforceable plan can be carried out only by an agency of govern 
ment having jurisdiction over the entire Bay and shoreline. 

Still to be determined; 1. What kind of governmental agency should it be 
single -purpose (the Bay alone) or multi-purpose (the Bay, plus other regional 
matters)? How should its governing body be chosen? What powers and financial base 
should it have? Possible answers to these questions are contained in the BCDC 
report on Government; these and others will be debated by the Joint Legislative 
Committee on Bay Region Organization (SCR 4l study). 


Ccnclusion No. 2. To carry out the BCDC plan effectively, a regional agency 
oust have the maximum possible control over Bay filling (a power as nearly 
comparable as possible to the power now exercised by the BCDC). This means that: 

a. All filling and dredging in the Bay should continue to be controlled by 
a permit process similar to the present BCDC process. For the successor agency, 
the criterion for granting or withholding permits would be the extent to which 
the proposed filling or dredging was in accordance with the BCDC plan. 

b. Any State agency wishing to dredge or place fill in the Bay would be 
required, as at present, to obtain a permit from the successor agency. 

Political Problem; Probable opposition from the State Department of Public 
Works the Division of Highways and the Division of Bay Toll Crossings to 
this provision. 

Political Answer: There should be no compromise on this issue. If the 
freeway and bridge builders are sufficiently important to be exempted from the 
controls of the successor agency, then other would-be fillers will seek similar 
exemptions there will then be no enforcement, a"d thus no enforceable plan. 

c. Any city or county holding grant lands in the Bay must be required to 
obtain a permit from the successor agency to BCDC before dredging or filling, 
notwithstanding the provisions of any existing grant statutes. 

Legal Problem; Should existing grants n be amended to make this provision 
clear? Or will passage by the Legislature of a law adopting the BCDC plan be 
sufficient for this purpose? 

Political Problem; Probable opposition from the Port of Oakland and other 

grant-holders . 

Political Answer; No compromise on this issue. With about 20 per cent of the 
Bay having been granted to municipalities, exempting these lands from control of 
the successor agency would mean no enforcement, and thus no enforceable plan. A 
comparable political battle was fought, successfully, over grant lands in San Diego 
Bay, and there may be no way to duck the fight here. 

d. While there is no legal means for a State-created agency to control 
filling by Federal agencies, a strong State agency, with a clear position on 
filling, will exert considerable influence on fill proposals by Federal agencies 
as has been true with the BCDC. 

Political Problem; Can the Army Engineers really be kept from filling parts 
of the Bay and shoreline with the spoil from dredging projects? 

Political Answer; This may involve a fight, but aggressive efforts to promote 
spoil disposal at sea will continue to be needed. Other estuaries in the country 
face similar problems, and perhaps joint effort by governmental agencies in 
several areas will influence Congress. The new joint permit program of the Army 
and Interior Departments is also an encouraging sign of Federal interest in wise 
use of estuaries. 



e. A federal-state-local compact commission, of the sort envisioned by 
Mel Scott, is neither necessary nor desirable now, though it could become so in the 
future. It is by no means clear that such a compact commission would really 
represent any additional control over federal projects than can be obtained as 
outlined above; and regulation of state, regional, and local fill and shoreline 
projects can certainly be accomplished without such a commission. 

f . The primary problem involves control by the successor agency over 
privately-owned lands in the Bay. Two alternatives exist: 

Alternative 1. The successor agency (or the Legislature) should assert the 
legal right to prohibit filling of privately-owned Bay lands without compensation 
to the owners, along the lines of legal argument advanced by Mike Heyman in his 
report to BCDC. 

Problems ; Is it ethical to do this, considering that the owners bought their 
lands in good faith, with no intent to harm the public? Is it politically realistic 
to expect either the Legislature or the successor agency to assert this right 
considering its implications for public policy in California? On the other hand, 
is there any other way to prevent substantial filling of private lands? Is it 
realistic to expect enough federal, state, regional, and local funds to buy Bay 
lands now at a time when rising population exerts great pressure for filling 
and taxpayers grumble at rising tax bills? Is assertion of the "total regulation" 
alternative necessary in any event to buy time, allowing court tests of the legal 

Alternative 2. The successor agency should be empowered to approve fill 
projects on privately-owned lands while at the same time making the 

possible effort to attract funds from all possible sources to buy such lands 
shown on the BCDC plan as preferably retained as open water. 

Under this alternative, the successor agency would consider a fill proposal 
much as a local planning commission evaluates a Planned Unit Development for an 
upland area. Approval of the fill could be granted only if the proposed project 
met several criteria, such as: 

a. Before submitting a plan calling for Bay fill, an owner would be required 
to give the successor agency six months' notice of his intentions, allowing time 
for the agency to possibly buy the lands through negotiation if possible, or 
eminent domain if not. 

b. A proposed fill plan would have to be reviewed and approved by an advisory 
panel of design professionals, as recommended in the BCDC report on Design and 

c. A proposed fill plan would have to be reviewed and approved by a panel of 
geological, soils engineering, and structural engineering experts, as recommended 
in the BCDC report on Fill. 

d. A fill project would have to observe a win-innm ratio of water to land 
perhaps a certain minimum percentage of the area to be left in open water. 

e. A fill project creating new waterfront would have to include provisions 
for permanent public access for some mini mum percentage of the new shoreline, 
through hiking and riding trails atop dikes, etc. 



f . A bonus systen should be provided whereby a developer would achieve 
some benefits (perhaps a more intensive use of his land) in return for reducing 
the amount of fill. 

Problem No. 1; These requirements need to be spelled out more precisely. It 
is important that the restrictions be strict, but not so severe as to amount to 
inverse condemnation of privately-owned lands. 

Solution No. 1; The Commission should contract with qualified consultants 
for advice on these points. 

Problem No. 2; Much more information is needed as to the costs of buying Bay 
lands, the influence of inflation over a period of time, possible sources of funds 
for such land purchases, and legal factors involved in condemning Bay lands. 

Solution No. 2; The Commission should contract with qualified consultants for 

this work. 

Conclusion No. 3. To carry out the BCDC plan effectively, a regional agency 
must have control over shoreline development. A plan designed solely to regulate 
Bay filling can be carried out by an agency having jurisdiction over water areas 
only. But a plan designed to also provide for the region new shoreline recreation 
areas, adequate industrial sites, etc., can be carried out only by an agency having 
jurisdiction over the shoreline as well as the Bay. 


1. How should the shoreline be defined? Does the shoreline include %ll the 

salt ponds? 

2. What is the minimum jurisdiction necessary for the successor agency to BCDC 
to carry out a shoreline plan? Possibilities: 

a. Review power over federal grants, thus providing financial incentives 
for carrying out shoreline aspects of the BCDC plan. 

b. Concurrent jurisdiction i.e., before a shoreline development could 
proceed, permits would be required from both the regional and the local agency. 
(But how could stalemates be avoided under this procedure?) 

c. Reserve jurisdiction i.e., the right for the regional agency to step 
in with veto power over actions by a local government contrary to the BCDC plan, 
but no power over local shoreline developments that are in agreement with the plan. 
(For example, San Leandro would retain sole jurisdiction over its waterfront as 
long as the waterfront continued in use for public recreation; likewise, the Port 
of Oakland would continue with sole control over its port lands. But a change in 
land use would require approval of the successor agency. 

3. How should new shoreline park and recreational areas be financed? 


Af\ Th Doily Review 

*V/ Fridoy, March 14, 1986 

PUC director resigns 

ecutive director of the state Public 
Utilities Commission has resigned 
his |78,000-a-year post to head the 
new California Fund for the 

Joseph E. Bodovitz resigned on 
Wednesday to work with the fund, 
which will help steer foundation 
money to environmental cleanup 

His resignation will take effect on 
May 1. 


Regional Oral History Office 
The Bancroft Library 

University of California 
Berkeley, California 

Government History Documentation Project 
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era 


Melvin B. Lane 

The Role of the Chairman in Sett-ing and Maintaining Goals 

An Interview Conducted by 

Malca Chall 

in 1984 


1986 by the Regents of the University of California 






PLANNING YEARS, 1965-1969 32 

The Appointment as Chairman of the Commission 32 
Establishing the Administrative Concepts and Relationships 

among all Interested Groups 34 
Tensions over Future Governance and Property Rights in the 

Bay Area 41 


Ronald Reagan's Interest in the Agency 51 
Controversy Regarding Bay Area Regional Organization: 

The Knox Bills 53 

Continuing to Develop Strategies as Chairman 56 

Accepting and Working with the Plan 59 

The Conservationists and Their Relationsip with BCDC 61 

Evaluating BCDC and its Future 64 




The success of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission through 
its interim permit /planning stage in 1965-1969, and its first years as a 
permanent agency, 1969-1973, has been attributed to many factors. One of 
these was the appointment by Governor Edmund G. (Fat) Brown, and later, by 
Governor Ronald Reagan, of Melvin B. Lane to the position of commission 

Mel Lane is a Republican, a respected businessman as publisher of 
Sunset Magazine with an abiding concern for environmental protection. 
Independence and even- hand edness marked his chairmanship. He was committed 
to protecting the bay from further depredation and to establishing a 
permanent state agency with authority to insure that protection. 

How and why he developed his own style as chairman, how he worked with 
the large diversely representative board of commissioners, with strong- 
willed developers and equally strong-willed conservationists, with members 
of the legislature, and with representatives of Governors Brown and Reagan 
is the focus of this two-hour interview. 

Prompted by self-confidence based on his years as a successful 
businessman, and by his observations of and participation in local 
government agencies, Mel Lane determined how he would work with his staff 
and commissioners and in what ways he would set out to accomplish his goals. 
"I'd pretty well figured out what I wanted to do, and what you have to do is 
to get them to take some of the responsibility. ... I was very often 
having to remind them that we're not the same [as city and county 
government] and we aren't going to operate the same way, and that created 
some tension. . . . Again, I tried to make them take some responsibility, 
share in the planning. I was surprised the extent to which. . . if you walked 
all people through the same educational knowledge on a point, that we nearly 
always arrived at the same conclusion." 

During the dramatic legislative battle of 1969, Mel Lane lobbied the 
governor and the legislature for passage of the bill that would secure BCDC 
as a permanent agency. He even took an apartment in Sacramento. 

From his experience with BCDC, Mr. Lane thought the California 
coastline could be protected by the same permit/planning mechanism he had 
know at BCDC. He turned his attention, in 1972, to the Coastal Zone 
Initiative, Proposition 20. After its passage he was appointed by Governor 
Reagan to chair the newly formed state commission. How that mechanism was 
transposed to the coast has been a subject for books, articles and debate 
since 1972. Someday it might be instructive to have another round of 
interviews with Mr. Lane. 


The interview took place during the afternoon of October 12, 1984, in 
the conference room of Sunset's offices in Menlo Park. Mr. Lane had studied 
the interview outline, copies of letters, memoranda, and newsclippings which 
had been sent ahead. With these as general guidelines he discussed 
thoughtfully and candidly his experiences during seven years as chairman of 
BCDC. He quite obviously takes his public responsibilities and commitments 
seriously, but, as the interview indicates, was able to see the humor in 
many situations. 

Malca Chall 

24 January 1986 

Regional Oral History Office 

486 The Bancroft Library 

University of Califronia at Berkeley 

legional Oral History Office University of California 

loom 486 The Bancroft Library . Berkeley,' California 94720 

(Please print or write clearly) 

Your full name MELVIN BELL LANF 

Date of birth May 11. 1922 Place of birth Des Moines, Iowa 



Father's full name Laurence William Lane 

Birthplace Morton, Kansas 

.- Publisher 


Mother's full name Ruth Bell Lane 

Birthplace Des Moines, Iowa 

Occupation Publisher. Homemaker 

Where did you grow up ? Palo Alto. CA. 

Present community Menlo Park, CA 

Education Stanford University, BA 1944 

Occupation^ ) Publisher 

Special interests or activities Environmental Organizations 

Stanford University Board of Trustees 



PLANNING YEARS, 1965-1969 

The Appointment as Chairman of the Commission 
[Date of Interview: 12 October, 1984]** 

Chall: How did you come to get jour appointment as chairman of BCDC from 
Pat Brown? I understand that you are a Republican. How did he 
happen to pick you? Why did you accept? 

Lane: As far as I know it was on two scores. One, I was the initial 

public member of the San Mateo County LAFCO [Local Agency Formation 
Commission], and they had a lot of annexations of special districts 
which involved bay fill. I got very upset about those, and I think, 
therefore, some of the conservationists tagged me as somebody that 
might fight the cause. 

I think the other part of that, equally important, was that I 
had some good friends who were close to the Pat Brown administration 
and gave me a boost. Whether they initiated it or the Brown people 
checked with them I have no way of knowing, but I have reason to 
believe [among them were] Mrs. Ed Heller she was a regent; Joe 
Houghteling was big in the Democratic world I remember he was on 
the highway commission at that time, long before he was on BCDC. 
There were some others, I've forgotten who they were now, that I 
would guess made a major difference. 

Chall: I see. It didn't take you very long to decide to go on to the 

Lane: Not a long time. I first heard about it when one of the local 
environmentalist ladies called me and said I might be getting a 
call she's in Redwood City and still active as far as I know, Pat 
Barrentine I think was her name. The other woman that called me was 
Marcel la Jacobson. I think these two women were probably the ones 
who put my name in the hopper. 

symbol indicates that a tape or segment of a tape has begun 
or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 67. 


Then, I actually got a call from Fat Brown when I was on 
vacation in Montana. It took a week or two when I got back just to 
find out about it. I was vaguely aware that some legislation had 
passed, but really didn't know anything about it. 

I was not involved in the battle of getting the legislation 
through, which I guess leads to the next thing. I became aware 
quite quickly, that this was Gene [Eugene] McAteer's baby, and had a 
hunch, which was later confirmed in spades, that he was not at all 
happy with my appointment. 

Chall: Really? 

Lane: It took me a little while to figure out that it was that he thought 
that this was his patronage plum and not the governor's. I knew 
Gene a little bit, he and my father were friends. He had appointed 
my dad to the Cow Palace board and some things, so it wasn't as 
though we were enemies or anything. But, he was very unhappy that 
the governor had appointed me and hadn't even cleared it with him, I 
guess. Even so, I think in fact I'm sure, Gene really thought he 
was going to pick the person, and it would be somebody who was, in 
effect, beholden to him. He was very unhappy with that, but it 
wasn't a personal thing I realized later. It was just whoever it 
was, if it wasn't his doing and he didn't get the credit for it 
Because it meant he didn't have nearly the control over it, and 
that's where patronage works. 

The first month or so was pretty rugged. I was pretty green to 
those processes, and Gene was a very strong, dynamo kind of a 

Chall: Did he really take that much of a close interest at that time? 

Lane: Oh he did at the beginning, yes. No, he'd gone a long ways out on a 
plank at a great expense. He was fighting all these big 
developers they were the biggies, and he took the whole bunch of 
them on and rammed this legislation through. So, his pay-off had to 
be visibility and getting credit for it and what not. The Save the 
Bay Association was the main vehicle for that, but he couldn't 
assume that I was going to help him as far as giving him visibility 
and credit. 

Chall: What did he do? 

Lane: He started telling me how I was going to do things, and that I had 
to hire Joe Bodovitz as executive director. I had never heard of 
Joe Bodovitz, so I told him I couldn't do that, at least until I 
knew more about him. That really made him mad. He told me that the 
commission had to hire part-time his administrative assistant, Bob 
Mendelsohn, and I told him I wasn't sure I wanted to do that. 


So I had some fairly lengthy sessions with Joe Bodovitz. In 
fact when my wife and I took him to dinner was my first introduction 
to him. I very quickly gained confidence in him both in his 
ability and the feeling that I could work with him, and that he 
wasn't so beholden to McAteer that it would be a problem. 

We did hire Mendelsohn for a little while, but I stopped it 
after a while. We were paying him a round amount of so many dollars 
a month with no accounting for what he did. He did do a lot of 
things, but it would have left a vulnerability that I just 
didn't want. So, Gene was mad at that. 

But, eventually we got along pretty well. Gene led the key 
senate committee for two or three more years about two years I 
guess after that, and really was quite helpful to us in Sacramento 
when we went up on budget matters and whatnot. He was disappointed 
he didn't get more points, and couldn't use the commission more to 
enhance his own political world. All of this is legitimate; I 
really don't mean to imply anything otherwise. 

Chall: Would it have made any difference, had he been given his way 

completely, in the outcome of the final plan or in your permit work 
or research that went into it? 

Lane: I don't know. He had some consultants he was hoping we would use 
that we didn't whether they would have done as good a job or a 
better one, those kinds of things I just don't know. 

Chall: A wide-ranging control then, he wanted or influence? 

Lane: Yes, oh yes. No, I'm saying that's the basic system of government 
patronage. I have no problem with the American process. 

Chall: But you were in charge. 

Lane: I was in charge [laughs], or at least more so. 

Establishing the Administrative Concepts and Relationships Among all 
Interested Groups 

Chall: That's interesting inasmuch as Rice Odell and others who have 

commented, attribute the success of BCDC to your chairmanship very 
largely, and to your staff, and to the working relations with your 
staff, and the method that you developed to work with the 


commission.* Particularly interesting is that you had determined 
that you were going to develop most of the research within your own 
staff and hire consultants only as you absolutely needed them, and 
then that you write summaries in understandable English. 

Lane: The concept of that came primarily from Bodovitz. We had a lot of 
opposition to it. I know Save the Bay Association was unhappy with 
some parts of that. They were kind of like Gene, they really had 
assumed that they would have a lot of say in our work. Their 
feathers were definitely ruffled that we were not only not asking 
for advice, but really weren't even taking it very well, [laughs] 
They had an image of how we were going to proceed. I'm not sure 
just what it was now, but we did our own thing. 

So anyway, where Joe got that approach I don't know for sure, 
but it was primarily from him. It took us about six months to hire 
a chief planner. Joe and I made trips East and other places. 
Eventually we did Jack Schoop was still in Anchorage and we 
interviewed him in the Seattle airport I remember, and hired him 
or we recommended to the commission that they hire him. 

I just made a point of getting to know each of those people on 
the commission. I had to memorize twenty-seven names in a hurry, 
and then find ways to be in touch with each one to develop an area 
of trust. 

Chall: How did you do that? 
Lane: Just talked to each one. 
Chall: Met them over lunch or 

Lane: A lot of them were lunch, but I didn't try to romance them a lot. 

Just at the meetings, I tried to let them know that I really wanted 
them to have their say, and that nobody owned me, because they were 
looking to see where I was coming from. I had an advantage over 
most of them because I really wasn't beholden to anybody I wasn't 
running for office, I didn't need to make a buck on it. So, it was 
easier for me to do that than it would be most people. 

Chall: That brought about trust in you. I also understand you were 

exceptionally good at handling the meetings keeping the agenda 

*Rice Odeil, The Saving of San Francisco Bay A Report on Citizen 
Action and Regional Planning, (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation 
Foundation, 1972). 


moving along, and yet giving everybody a chance to be heard. Had 
you been a chairman of other agencies or commissions or study groups 

Lane: No, I really hadn't. I'd seen a lot of them and I didn't like the 
way they worked very well. Particularly city and county government 
where they just went on and on and on. No, I'd figured out pretty 
well what I wanted to do, and that what you have to do is to get 
them to take some of the responsibility, "If you want to hear 
people talk we're going to be here until midnight. Do you really 
think it's productive?" and so forth. You kind of shame them into 
it a little bit. But it's really the concept of common ownership of 
the problem, and if you get other people to accept some of the 
responsibility for something, then it's easier for them to go along 
with you. 

Chall: Was that the reason for working on the plan each time with the whole 

Lane: Yes, that was classic because again, it was different with half of 
these people from city and county government. They unconsciously 
assumed we were going to work the same way. I was very often having 
to remind them that we're not the same, and we aren't going to 
operate the same way, and that created some tensions. Again, I 
tried to make them take some responsibility, share in the planning. 

One of things that Joe and I would always do would be to bring 
in a proposal of what the consultant or staff planner was going to 
do what they were going to study and where they were going to make 
proposals. The commission had to accept that if they voted for it. 
They couldn't later criticize the fellow, "Why are you meddling in 
this?" or "Why are you making recommendations in this area?" or "Why 
did you consider this?" because the commission had already had to 
sign off on that. That made a lot of difference. There was always 
a minority from the city and county experience, who would play games 
with that sort of thing. At that time San Mateo was one of the 
worst. Their representatives were, just generally "stirring the 
pot," but I had to remind them that they'd okay'd this or that at 
least the majority of the commission had okay'd it, so the planners 
or consultants were doing exactly what we hired them for. If they 
didn't like it, they could get mad at the commission, don't take it 
out on the consultant. Well, [laughs] they didn't want to fight with 
the rest of the commission. 

Chall: It was a good psychological ploy on your part. So, from the very 

beginning, determining what was going to be studied, through to the 
end, to agreeing on a plan, there was an open understanding and 
discussion. By the end, then, it was more or less their plan. Did 
you see them coming along, and becoming more regional in their 
approach some of these people who had been starting out as very 


local in their thinking? 

Lane: I was surprised the extent to which in the planning and the permits 
helped in their own way if you walked all the people through the 
same educational knowledge on a point, that we nearly always arrived 
at the same conclusion. In some cases, people who felt they were 
really there to represent a constituency rather than just their own 
thoughts, eventually overcame those biases and they would agree that 
filling the bay was not a good idea. We learned that we couldn't 
dump as much of our sewage out there if we made it smaller by 
filling, and these were tradeoffs. You had to decide which way you 
wanted to go. So, pretty much everybody agreed when we got down to 

It's when you look at the total of something, by and large 
people agree. It's only when you look at one little piece, because 
you can say, "Well, it doesn't make enough difference, and 
therefore, let's give old Joe whatever he wants," or whatever, but 
if you get them looking at the total, they come out about the same 

Chall: They seem to have done this. 

Lane: Yes, we had a pretty much unanimous vote on things. 

Chall: Yes, I noticed from reading just a random sampling of minutes, that 
everybody seemed to be concerned really about the same sorts of 
things. Now maybe it's just a few that got into the minutes who did 
the most speaking, but there were good questions asked all the time. 

Lane: Yes, there were. 

Chall: People were really concerned. These were basically either permit 
appeals or your plan but 

Lane: Yes, the planning was tougher, it's more nebulous and they couldn't 
quite see where things would fit together, and I wasn't sure whether 
they would, [laughs] But permits the city and county people 
particularly, boy that was their meat. They knew about permits, and 
they wanted to talk too long, but other than that 

Chall: In terms of your working with the staff, was the quality of their 
work the result of Bodovitz's leadership? 

Lane: Absolutely. Schoop was very good, but Bodovitz was the In many 
ways it was a publishing project. 

So, I was comfortable with figuring it out. Eventually, we 
were going to come up with this document for the legislature, so 
that was the end of the line. The permits were something that you 
just had to put up with in the meantime, and try to minimize the 







damage from them, and put out fires. But, this was a publishing 
project, and therefore, I had a good understanding of that and so 
did Bodovitz. 

You were all working under great deadlines, so I guess staff had to 
be able to do that. 

Oh yes, and they were very dedicated people. Private enterprise 
could never do any better as far as people, really very caring. 

There had been some criticism that the members of the staff were all 
planners, and they'd never met a payroll and, therefore, what would 
they know about this kind of thing? How would you answer that 
comment, when I'm sure people would make it to you? 

Oh, I've forgotten, but I would guess, "Let's judge what they do. 
Before we put our name on it we're obviously going to " This came 
mostly from people applying for permits. Our primary job was to 
plan, so professional planners were needed. In the permit world you 
are talking at three levels. One of them is the substance the 
thing you should be talking about, "Does this project fit these 
laws?" But, if the applicant sees they're going to lose at that 
level, they then challenge process as being faulty in some way, 
rather, unfair. One of the ways you con a permit granting body is 
to make them feel guilty that they haven't been fair to you. Then, 
if that doesn't work, then the last shot is at the capability or 
integrity of the individuals doing it. You can see it go up and 
down in a meeting you're here, then you're down here, then you're 
back up here, [laughs] 

Did you learn that while you were on the job, or had you known that 

Lane: No, I learned that one here. 

Chall: In terms of going out among your peers in the business world, how 

did you find their acceptance of what the BCDC was doing? And, your 
role in it? 

Lane: Well, one of the things I "milked," took advantage of, was the fact 
that I did know most of these people, or at least had entree to the 
president of Standard Oil Company, or whatever. I think I made them 
more responsible, just in terms of their own self-respect. Once I 
got them into a public meeting with other people there, they 
couldn't just have the company lobbyist and public relations man 
fire away at us with total ease. I'd write them back and send 
copies to everybody, so I think I kept them a little more on track. 

Chall: I wondered, because it could have been uncomfortable at cocktail 
parties or dinner parties or Bay Area Council meetings. 


Lane: Yes, sure there was some of that. Although, being the token 

environmentalist wasn't all bad because at least I got the floor. 
The Bay Area Council kind of liked me because they could say, "We 
now have both sides here, and we're hearing both viewpoints." They 
might vote 37 to 1 or something once in a while, but usually I'd 
pick up a few votes. It was a podium. 

I was telling them things that they'd never heard otherwise. 
One of the things that goes on within the world of developers, 
particularly the big corporations, is if they're fighting something, 
their hired consultant will make some ridiculous charge before they 
know it, they're all believing it. They forget that they've paid 
some flack to come up with this thing. It would start with what in 
effect would be a rumor, but very quickly it was accepted. This 
gave me a chance to tell them, "This is where it started, it just 
has no accuracy to it, and you should tell your political 
consultants to check their facts." 

So, Bay Area Council kinds of things were very helpful in that 
regard toned them down. I enjoyed that part [laughs]. 

Chall: You were an educator. You did do quite a bit of public speaking 
didn't you -on your own, all over the area? 

Lane: I did some, I didn't like it very well. I like meetings where we 

talk and argue and go to it. Like a Bay Area Council meeting. But 
just the Rotary Club kind of thing I don't like very well. I don't 
do it very well those usually go together because you really are 
entertaining as much or more than you are discussing and 
communicating and that part of it. I had to do more of it with the 
Coastal Commission, but I can't say it came easily. 

Chall: What about your relationships with federal and state representatives 
in those first years? I know you said you had to get acquainted 
with the commissioners. What about the federal and state agency 

Lane: There was an outstanding man a colonel in the Corps of Engineers 
named Allen [Robert H.] who was on there, and he was swell. The 
corps was really the enemy of everybody at that time, so I was 
totally surprised by him. He was just fine. He played it straight, 
and set up meetings for me, or whatever I wanted. 

Having the Sacramento agencies on the commission was excellent. 
Again, I had the right guy right there. The fellow from San Diego 
who was head of the Resources Agency was a former senator passed 
away now, was a judge later. Hugo Fisher. I had never even heard 
of him before. He was fine. He told me there were a few things 
that realistically, I had better accept, and we worked that out. 
I've forgotten what they were now, but some things about state 
government and the Brown administration I didn't understand. But I 


got, certainly, fair treatment from him, and having him on the 
commission was just great. 

Chall: The kind of commission then that was set up, that was in the McAteer 
bill, and I guess that was very largely his idea, of this wide 

Lane: I think the wide representation was more because all those agencies 
wanted to be there and protect themselves more than their wanting to 
save the bay, but that was Gene's trade-off. He wrote a pretty 
tough law, but he said, "Okay, now you guys are going to run it, so 
they aren't going to abuse this law unless you're a party to it or 
at least if you are a participant." 

So, Bob [Robert] Bradford who was head of the Public Works 
Division which did the highway building, was there and he was a 
tough cookie, but he was fine. He was very helpful in expediting 
the meetings. We would get in these darn impasses where nobody was 
happy, and you start floundering around. He would say, "What's a 
middle ground we can find that people can live with?" He was good. 

Chall: So it was a good idea to put all these people together. They 
learned, I suppose. 

Lane: Yes, it was. Telling twenty-seven people they only have a half-hour 
to decide something got overwhelming to them at times, but pretty 
soon they respected other people's time, and they knew if they 
talked a long time and everybody else talked a long time, we were 
all going to be there longer than we wanted to be. So, with a 
couple of exceptions they were pretty good. 

Chall: Did you time people? Did you give them a time or did you just try 
to monitor it? 

Lane: I did, yes. Not like I had to in the Coastal Commission where I 

just literally had a stop watch, [laughs] But BCDC might have three 
or four permits at a meeting, the Coastal Commission might have 
thirty and you had five hundred people out there, so it was a 
different scale of things. 

We did set time limits, and I held it to them pretty closely, 
so that I'd let them know when they'd hit their time and to finish 
up quickly or whatever. Then, if they abused that I'd shut them 
down, but you didn't have to very often. The commissioners though, 
once we closed the hearing, then they could talk make their 
statements or ask questions, and that was harder. 

Chall: They obviously wanted to know quite a bit I could tell from the 

minutes. They asked rather searching questions, but that was what 
they were there to do. 


Lane: Yes, sure 

Tensions Over Future Governance and Property Rights in the Bay Area 

Chall: We've talked about industry and the cleavages on the commission and 
things of that sort. What about ABAC [Association of Bay Area 
Governments]? You were concerned both with the regional agency and 
regional governance. 

Lane: ABAC went away in a little while. Initially they were a big threat 
to us. ABAG was a phony in my opinion in that it was a facade of 
regional government, which really allowed the cities and counties to 
do what they wanted to do anyway. There was, whatever you call it 
in a government body, where you split it up and you say, "You do 
what you want in your area and I'll leave you alone, and vice versa, 
and we'll all " It was that kind of an operation. 

ABAG had no real authority of any kind, but they did have it 
was just really developing about that time an increasing role as 
the dispenser of federal funds. The federal government said, "You 
have to have a regional coordination group or we won't give you some 
of these funds." So, ABAG had that kind of power, but I really 
think most of them not all obviously, but most of them really 
didn't want ABAG to do anything, but they wanted it to look like it 
so other agencies wouldn't be brought in who really would do 
something. They looked at BCDC, Louis Chess and those people, San 
Mateo County was in some ways the strongest on that, was very strong 
in ABAG and its structure they were pushing very hard that they 
would be the ones to run the bay. 

Chall: Run the bay, govern the bay area. Well, the press release and the 
information that I gave you on this question shows that there was 
tension. Mr. [Warren] Schmid's answers are rather interesting.* 
Would you like to comment on that? 

Lane: Oh yes, Schmid was the one with the 
Chall: He was the executive director. 

*See following pages for copy of correspondence and related 


50? Polk St., San Francisco 9^102 557-3686 


The Cc.rmittee expressed support for Senator "J" Eugene McAteer's 
proposal tliat the various regional agencies in the Bay Area cooperate in 
jointly studying the governmental needs of the Bay Area. 

Senator McAteer proposed that these studies be undertaken by the 
BCDC and the Bay Area Transportation Study Cconission, the Bay Area Air 
Pollution Control District, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, the Bay 
Regional Water Quality Control Board, and also the Association of Bay 
Area Governments. 

The Committee agriei not to confine its studies to the question of 
controls necessary for Bay fill, but rather to consider the entire 
question of regional government in the Bay Area. All reasonable 
alternatives should be studied, including the proposal made this week for an 
elected multi-purpose regional agency to deal with problems of Bay fill, 
water and air pollution, transportation, and other regional issues. 

The Committee adopted the attached statement of its objectives. 



BCDC Governmental Study Committee 


BCDC's final report to the Legislature must contain "the Commission's recommenda 
tion of the appropriate agency to maintain and carry out the comprehensive plan," 
the Commission's estimate of the funds required to implement the plan, an indication 
of the possible sources of funds, and other related information and recommendations 
(Section 66551, McAteer-Fetris Act). 

Background: Existing Regional Agencies 

In the Bay Area, four regional agencies with governmental powers have been 

a. Bay Area Air Pollution Control District 

b. Bay Area Rapid Transit DicCrict 

c. Bay Conservation and Development Commission 

d. Bay Regional Water Quality Control Bo.ird (Vlhile this bcrd is part of a 
Statewide system, itc members are Bay Area residents.) 

A fifth regional agency the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission has no 
regulatory powers but has the same assignment from the Legislature as the BCDC: to 
recommend the appropriate governmental agency to carry out its plan. The BATS Com 
mission has recently created a special study group, consisting of members of the 
Commission and of its advisory committee, to investigate the governmental issues in 
volved in carrying out a transportation plan. 

The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), a voluntary association of eight 
counties and 82 cities in tlie Bay Area, has undertaken the governmental function of 
preparing a regional land-us-a plan. In addition, ABAG has recently created a Goals 
and Organization Committee to study the problem of regional government in the Bay 

Various other regional agencies have been proposed, including: 

a. A Golden Gate Authority to administer toll bridges and other transportation 
facilities such as airports and harbors. 

b. A regional airport district, recently proposed by Assemblyman John Foran. 

c. A regional open- space district to acquire large regional parks and agri 
cultural preserves in areas threatened with urbanization, as proposed by 
T. J. Kent, Professor of City and Regional Planning at the University of 

d. A regional planning district as proposed in a bill introduced by Assembly - 


man Byron Rumford in 1963. 


~ 2 ~ 

Programs for Committee Study 

1. What relationships should a permanent commission controlling the Bay have to 
other regional agencies? 

Is the development of various regional special districts desirable? Should a 
new multi-purpose district be created to administer the functions of some or a?T 
existing regional governmental agencies? If so, how can merger be achieved, since 
the geographic boundaries of existing agencies differ? If merger of existing agencies 
is not possible or not desirable, should a permanent comnission with jurisdiction 
over the Bay be structured so that it can assume now regional functions, such as those 
of a future transportation agency, if and when the Legislature or the electorate of 
the Bay Area choose to give it such functions? If merger of existing or proposed 
regional agencies is not considered feasible, should the same individuals be the' 
directors of the various agencies to promote coordination of their activities? 

2. What governmental powers are needed to conserve the water of the Bay and to 
develop its shoreline? 

Should the permit system now employed by the BCDC be continued on a permanent 
basis? Can this legally be done under the police power, i.e., under a zoning system? 
What governmental powers are needed to implement the BCDC plan for the Bay and shore 
line? How should "shoreline 1 ' be defined? 

3- What organizational structure should a governmental agency have if it is to 
carry out the BCDC plan for the Bay and shoreline? 

How should the governing body of such an agency be selected? Many methods are 
now used in the Bay Area: directors of the Air Pollution Control District and BARTD 
are appointed by Boards of Supervisors and councils of Mayors. The Governor appoints 
members of BATS and BCDC. Direct election is employed by some large special districts 
such as the East Bay Regional Park District and the East Bay Municipal Utility Dis 
trict. Other methods have been suggested, such as assigning regional governmental 
powers to ABAG, or to a caucus of State Senators and Assemblymen elected from Bay 
Area constituencies. Or there could be direct election of delegates to a regional 
agency, perhaps on the basis of two delegates for each Assembly district in the nine 
Bay Area counties. Still other methods may be discovered. 

^. How should a governmental agency to carry out plans for the Bay and shore 
line be financed? 

The McAteer-Petris Act requires a report to the Legislature as to "possible 
sources of money" for implementing the comprehensive plan and "an indication of the 
possible sources of money for such purposes, such as local bond funds, Federal grants, 
State funds, funds from foundations, and funds from private subscription." (Section 
66651). Similar questions arise as to the source of funds for administrative expenses 
Whether the Commission should have the power of eminent domain, the power to sell 
bonds, and the power to levy property taxes must also be considered. The committee 
should consider these sources of funds, as well as other sources, for administrative 
expenses as well as for the major expenses involved in carrying out the plan. 

/ , t -. f - 





- Chairman 


Mr. T. Louis Chess, President, Association of Bay Area Governments 

and Chairman, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District 
Mr. Adrien Falk, Chairman, Bay Area Rapid Transit District 
Mr. Nils Eklund, Chairman, Bay Area Transportation Study Commission 
Mr. Grant Burton, Chairman, Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board 

Re: Governing the Bay Area A Program for Action 


I am writing this letter to propose that our six agencies, with the 
cooperation of other groups mentioned herein, Join in a program of action to 
determine how best to provide for the future governmental needs of the San 
Francisco Bay Area. 

I am sending copies of this letter to the Bay Area Council, the Leagues 
of Women Voters of the Bay Area, and the San Francisco Planning and Urban 
Renewal Association (SPUR). These three groups have already indicated a 
strong interest in the Bay Area's governmental problems; other groups will 
undoubtedly express a similar interest, and they should also be invited to 
take part in this work* 

Never before have regional problems received so much attention in the 
Bay Area. Two commissions the Bay Area Transportation Study Commission 
and the Bay Conservation and Development Commission have been directed by 
the Legislature to make recommendations as to the governmental means of 
carrying out plans for transportation and for the Bay. Senator "J" Eugene 
McAteer of San Francisco has proposed that existing regional agencies 
"undertake a Joint study of the governmental needs of the Bay Area and make 
explicit recommendations to the Legislature and to the citizens of the Bay 
Area." Mayor John F. Shelley of San Francisco has proposed that a regional 
government be created with clearly-defined powers and with an elected legis 
lative body; the San Francisco Board of Supervisors has supported this 

Metropolitan government is already here ~ in the form of our agencies 
and others that serve sizable parts of the Bay Area. The question is no 
longer whether there should be regional government in the Bay Area; the fact 
that several regional agencies exist has already answered that question. The 
real problem we face is this: what form should regional government take in 
the future? 

- 2 - 

The existing regional agencies, together with the Association of Bay 
Area Governments as a voluntary association of local governments, have served 
the people of the Bay Area well over the past several years. But the question 
remains as to whether this system of fragmented responsibility will be ade 
quate in the coming years of intensive population growth in the Bay Area. 

Certainly we must all be concerned about the extent to which Federal and 
State governments are involved in making decisions that affect the Bay Area. 
Federal and State governments will make more and more regional decisions if 
we who live in the Bay Area do not ourselves decide on the governmental 
machinery we want. Those of us who now serve on regional agencies are par 
ticularly well-qualified, because of our experience and our interest, to 
undertake the task of trying to arrive at answers to these regional questions. 

Our analysis may conclude that the existing governmental machinery is 
adequate to meet the needs of the Bay Area, both now and in the future. I 
am well aware that governmental proposals created on paper may well have an 
appeal that would disappear under actual practice. Existing governments may 
suffer unduly by comparison to theoretical forms of government. Certainly 
we should insist that any new governmental machinery show promise of greater 
benefits to the people of the Bay Area than the' existing machinery before we 
make a change. 

To evaluate the various governmental possibilities will require careful 
studies both of our present governmental machinery and of alternatives to it. 
I am thoroughly aware that dozens of studies have already been made of many 
aspects of local and regional government. But isn't it equally true that the 
most successful solutions to complex problems generally begin with- an effort 
to gather and analyze facts and opinions? 

Objectives. I propose therefore that: 

First, we should analyze the governmental needs of the Bay Area, 
collecting and evaluating information so that we can determine: 

a. The present and future needs for governmental services in the 
Bay Area. 

b. Whether we in the Bay Area should continue our present system 
of assigning regional responsibilities to separate, single- 
purpose agencies; i.e., to a special district for rapid transit, 
to a State-created board to control water quality in the Bay, 

to a special district to control air pollution, and to special 
State-created commissions to plan for the future transporta 
tion network in the Bay Area and for the future of the Bay. 

c. Alternatives to our present system, including modifications 
in existing regional agencies. 

d. The advantages and disadvantages of different kinds of govern 
mental machinery to solve regional problems, compared to each 
other and to our present system. 

- 3 - 

(I am attaching an outline of a proposed "Analysis of Govern 
mental Needs in the Bay Area," which spells out more fully some 
of the questions that I believe need to be answered,) 

Second, we should provide for publication of the findings of 
our studies, and the widest possible public debate on them. 

Third, we should find the maximum possible agreement among existing 
governmental agencies on future courses of action. 

Fourth, we should see that our decisions and recommendations are 


The program I am proposing should be completed in 12 to 18 months. 
The work is estimated to cost about $150,000, and two-thirds of this 
amount should be sought from Federal planning funds available under 
Section 701 of the U. S. Housing Act. Citizens' groups such as the 
Bay Area Council, the Leagues of Women Voters of the Bay Area, and 
SPUR should be closely involved in the study, as should other govern 
mental agencies that serve more than one county but not the entire 
Bay Area; these latter groups would include the AC Transit District, 
the San Francisco Water Department, etc. 

As the next step in this program, it is important that the agencies 
wishing to participate should so indicate as quickly as possible. A 
meeting of representatives of participating agencies should then be 
held at once. 

I believe the BCDC must do substantially the things I have outlined 
in this letter even if we must do them alone. I believe, however, 
that a program of this sort can best be carried out by our agencies 
Jointly, and therefore I hope your response to this proposal will be 
favorable. Because of the urgency of meeting deadlines imposed on our 
Commission by the Legislature, I would hope for your response as 
quickly as possible. I would be happy to meet with you further to 
discuss this program more fully if you wish. 




ec: Joseph Bodovitz 

Jud Callaghan 

John Harrison 

Warren Schmid 

Bin Stokes 

Richard Zettel 

507 Polk Street, Sc_n Francisco 9-O.C2 557-3686 

Attachment to letter of April 13, 1966, to: 

Mr. T. Louis Chess, President, Association of Bay Area Governments 

and Chairman, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District 
Mr. Adrien Falk, Chairman, Bay Area Rapid Transit District 
Mr. Nils Eklund, Chairman, Bay Area Transportation Study Commission 
Mr. Grant Burton, Chairman, Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board 

An Analysis of Governmental Needs in the Bay Area 

The following outline is intended as a suggestion as to how the first phase 
of a joint governmental program for action might proceed. This first phase would 
involve the gathering and analysis of information. Undoubtedly other regional 
agencies will have additional requirements for information to be obtained and 

I. How are regional decisions in the Bay Area being made now? 

A. Effectiveness of coordination of policies among existing governmental 
agencies, local and regional 

B. Present and future influence of Federal government on decisions regarding 
development of the Bay Area 

C. Present and future influence of the State government on decisions regard 
ing development of the Bay Area 

D. Advantages and disadvantages (costs and benefits) of present process of 
regional decision-making, relative to other possible processes. 

CI. Alternatives to the present system of regional decision-making 

A. Creation of additional special-purpose districts, such as the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit District, and Bay Area Air Pollution Control District 

B. Creation of a new multi-purpose district to administer the functions 
of some or all existing regional governmental agencies (and possibly 
additional functions) 

1* Difficulties in merging existing regional agencies into multi 
purpose district e.g., differing boundaries of such agencies 
as Bay Area Rapid Transit District (3 counties) and Bay Area 
Air Pollution Control District (6 counties at present) 

2. If complete merger is impossible, should the same persons be 
selected as directors of two or more regional agencies to insure 

3. If merger is not workable, should a new governmental agency be 
created, with control of one or more regional functions, such 



as transportation or Bay conservation and development, and with a 
sufficiently adaptable structure to be able to assume new regional 
functions if and when the Legislature or the people of the Bay Area 
so decide? 

C. Association of Bay Area Governments with different and greater responsi 

III. Which of the following areas of governmental concern should be under State 

jurisdiction, which under regional jurisdiction, and which under local juris 

A. Transportation within the Bay Area highways, bridges, etc. 

B. Transportation to other areas--ports and airports 

C. Police and fire protection 

D. Sewage disposal 

E. Disposal of garbage and other solid wastes 

F. Air pollution control 
6. Water pollution control 

R. Open space, parks, and recreation 
I. Bay conservation and development 

J. Area-wide planning and land use controls such as zoning, to guide 
urban expansion 

K. Housing 
L. Other 

IV. What powers are needed to solve each of the governmental problems determined 
to be of regional concern? This question would need to be answered for each 
of the regional functions. 

A. For example, to answer questions the BCDC must answer in any event, 
because of its mandate from the Legislature to do so, the following 
information is needed: 

1. How can governmental powers best be used to conserve the waters of 
San Francisco Bay and to guide development of its shoreline? 

a. To what extent can conservation and development controls be 
exercised under the police power, i.e., under a system of 
zoning or a permit system such as that now employed by BCDC? 



b. What governmental powers are needed to carry out the BCDC plan 
for the Bay end shoreline? 

c. How should "shoreline" be defined? 

V. If a governmental agency were to be created with responsibility in more than 
one area of regional concern--such as air and water pollution, control over 
Bey filling, transportation, etc. what structure should such an agency have? 

A. How should the legislative body be selected? 

1. Through appointments made by various governmental bodies, as is 
presently the system for choosing directors of the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit District and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District? 

2. Through direct election, as is presently the system for choosing 
directors of the East Bay Municipal Utility District and the East 
Bay Regional Park District? 

a. If so, how should electoral districts be established? 

B. How should the chief executive of the regional agency be selected? 

a. Through direct election? 

b. Through appointment by the legislative body? 

VI. How should a governmental agency with regional responsibilities be financed? 

A. Should the agency have power to tax property and to sell bonds? 

B. Should the agency receive funds from Federal and State governments? 

Have the Same Objectives? 

Are the Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission and 
the Assn. of Bay Area Govern 
ments seeking federal funds to 
accomplish essentially the same 
objective: studies of the region- 
|al problems of the Bay Area? 
| That was the question raised 
when Warren Schmid, executive 
(director of ABAG, met with the 


Hie Goals and Organization 
| Committee of ABAG is prepar 
ing an' inventory of the prob 
lems common to the Bay 
Area, a study of those problems 
that have not been met by re 
gional agencies, and recommen- 

But Chairman Mel Lane said | regional problems that cover a 
that, until he heard Schmid's broader spectrum than just the; 
remarks, it was his understand- Bay. We are not attempting ba-j 

ing the BCDC was eligible to 
accept the grant, but the appli 
cation would be filed through 

Commissioner David Pierce, 
mayor of Richmond, pointedly 
asked Schmid whether he 
thought there was a "duplica 
tion of effort" if both agencies 
sought federal funds for the re 
gional studies, and whether he 
would "look unfavorably" on 
the dual applications. 

"At this stage I wouldn't at 
tempt to make an evaluation," 

dations on how those problems I replied Schmid, "but if we don't 
'may be solved. ABAG expects I get our houses in order HUD 

*_ __t f t i * f i_ . _ ft l^ --- 

to apply for federal funds to fi- 
| nance part of the cost of its on 
going study program. 

And the BCDC recently de 
cided to proceed independently 
with a study of how to estab- 

will." The applications would 
be filed with the regional office 
of the Dept. of Housing and 
Urban Development. 

"Don't you feel that the $25,- 
000 for the study by ABAG is 

sic new research or new fea-! 
sibility studies with this money."! 

"Then there's no duplica 
tion?" asked Pierce. 

"I'm not trying to express an 
opinion on that question today," 
replied Schmid. 

Pierce then asked Richard M. 
Zettel, director of BATS, wheth 
er "you can foresee cooperation 
between BATS and the BCDC 
in a joint study of such prob 
lems as transportation and Bay 

"We haven't precluded that! 
possibility, but we need a bet 
ter definition of the problem," 
replied Zettel. --.,-. ' 


lish a regional government to i inadequate to deal with this 

protect the Bay. The federal 
government will be asked to pay 
two-thirds of the cost of this 
proposed six - month, $45,000 

Schmid reported that he un 
derstood the BCDC is ineligible 
to apply directly to the federal 
government for the usual "701" 
planning grant. Consequently, 
the BCDC may have to use an 
agency such as ABAG to ac 
cept the grant, Schmid com 
mented. He said ABAG had ac 
cepted such a grant on behalf 
of the Bay Area Transporta 
tion Study Commission, which is 
preparing a study of the re- 1 
flan's transportation problems. 

'problem," asked Pierce. 

"I'm not trying to solve the 
commission's problem," said 1 
Schmid. "ABAG is 


Lane: Tea, I think he was initially, yes. And, they had a director who 

went to jail for absconding with all their funds I think that came 
just a little bit later; I've forgotten nov. 

Chall: Apparently this problem of who's going to make a study of future 

governances of the bay area region created some concern and tension 
between ABAC and BCDC. 

Lane: We wanted to have our oar in this and not let it get away from us. 
I think this letter came as a tactical move of ours to position 
ourselves in it. If we called the meeting they couldn't say they'd 
never heard from us. 

Chall: But, you said a little while ago, before I turned the tape on, that 
ABAC had been an irritant. 

Lane: Well, they were opposing us very strongly in Sacramento. Anything 
to do with BCDC, they were pushing against us up there. They were 
in effect, making critical judgments and statements through their 
positions in their local government roles, and they were making it 
tough for us, no question about it. 

Chall: That's because you were supposed, ultimately, to decide what was 
going to be the governmental structure to continue BCDC. 

Lane: We would in effect, be deciding what was going to happen on their 
shoreline of the bay. And, [laughs] it was real turf, and they 
wanted the freedom to all do what they had been doing, of course. 

Chall: Out of this concern apparently, you hired Stanley Scott and John 

Bollens to write the report on what kind of governmental structure 
there might be. They were taken on as consultants on a particular 

Lane: Yes, another of them is your chancellor over there [UC Berkeley] 
Mike Heyman. 

Chall: Yes, Chancellor [Ira Michael] Heyman. 

Lane: I had dinner over there the other night, and he had pleasant 
memories of doing that chore. 

Chall: Oh really? As I understand it he came out with the idea that 

private property the people who owned property in the bay really 
didn't have the same control over it as any private landowner. 

Lane: He did that, but he also said that even on land in effect he was 
saying there is a lot of misconception as to what your rights are 


because you own land. You don't necessarily have the right to do 
anything different on it. You have the right to continue the 
present use. You have a right to make some reasonable use of it, 
but the fact that you want to build a big building here doesn't mean 
you have any right at all to do that. 

Chall: That must have been a great shock to certain people. 

Lane: It sure was. The classic case that he put on the spotlight was 
Consolidated Rock Company. It was a case in southern California 
where a man had this mountain and the city wouldn't let him do 
anything up there. Finally this fellow got some goats and he put 
them up there with a big fence around them, and even the goats 
couldn't live they died for lack of food. So, this fellow's proof 
was, "This isn't even good for goats, now you've got to let me do 
something with my land." The city said, "No, you're not going to do 
anything," and the state supreme court upheld it. 

Chall: That must have sent quite a ripple through the community. We 

haven't talked about some of these groups that you would have had 
dealings with besides the Bay Area Council, Leslie Salt, Westbay. 

Lane: Yes, okay, let's go through them quickly. At the time BCDC was 

created there were some firms who were fighting it extremely hard, 
and they'd fought McAteer all the way through on the legislation. 
This is where McAteer, of course, felt that he had points coming, and 
I don't blame him. One of those certainly was Leslie Salt. They had 
& lawyer whose name I've forgotten now, I used to see him up in the 
Bohemian Grove. 

I knew the Schilling family quite well. Aug [August] 
Schilling, the president and major stockholder, was a friend of my 
family and my wife's family. They were a customer of my company. 
No, how do I say that? They bought things from us or at least we 
were trying to sell them both advertising in our magazine, and 
publishing a book for them. One of the companies they owned was 
Spice Islands, and we published a book for Spice Islands. They were 
our biggest single customer in book publishing for a period of years 
right in the middle of all this fighting. So anyway, I knew them. 

They had a president at the time under Aug, Sheldon Allen, or 
some such name like that. This lawyer I mentioned worked with this 
president. They had decided a couple of years before BCDC came into 
being, that they were going to start making money on their real 
estate, because they were never going to do it in the salt business. 
So, they were off on these grandiose plans for filling in all the 
salt ponds and were, therefore, scared to death of BCDC as they 
should have been. We did fight and scratch with them, and anything 
we ever had in Sacramento they were right there trying to give us 
trouble putting out press releases and all the rest of it. 


Chall: Considered you socialists, Fabian socialists? 

Lane: Yes, exactly. Harry something was that lawyer. But then they got 
in such financial problems that they were less of a problem, and 
they realized they were just going to have to wait until our four- 
year process had run its course. 

Chall: I brought in some press clippings on some of your basic property 
rights controversies. 

Lane: [Reading] Candlestick, that was bad news. It was one that was more 
of an irritant than a serious problem. Quentin Kopp was the lawyer, 
and that was my first introduction to Quentin in that situation. He 
was certainly a hired gun. He's a good lawyer and he was doing 
exactly what he got paid for, but boy, he was just challenging us on 
everything he could think of, on all three of those levels I 
mentioned [laughs] but particularly on process, he really hit us on 
the question of due process. 

Chall: But, then you took it to the courts, and you won on that? 

Lane: Yes we did very well in the courts. We didn't lose many of the 
important ones. They bought one hundred and eighteen thousand 
square feet of tidelands, yes. They're still there. Chet Smith is 
the man's name that's the building you see from the bayshore 
there and he's got the world's biggest American flag flying above 
it. I guess it's still there, I don't know. 

Chall: Let's see, there was the Marin plan. You may not want to talk about 
these, unless something strikes you as you look at these press 
clippings. Because you were the chairman you must have felt the 
impact first. 

Lane: Yes. [reading] Frank Burke was a tough one. One of the things in 
the permits was that we could turn down a permit if we thought that 
it might be in conflict with the plan that we had not yet written. 
That's tough because you don't know what's in your plan so how can 
you say what is in conflict? All you can say is it probably will 
be. Anything that filled marshland was unacceptable. The law 
didn't specifically say that, but anything that had bay fill was 
carefully scrutinized. The marshes were considered bay to us, and 
they were considered bay to marine biologists, but they were not 
considered bay to a lot of developers, so we had to argue that one. 

Anyway, this one as I remember, was the Burke property up 
there. It did have some marsh on it. He wanted to put it to some 
light industrial uses. Part of what we were fighting was to prevent 
using the bay lands particularly the ones that had been filled, for 
things that weren't water-related and could just as well go some 
place else. This was one of those, but it was a very tough one. 



Legal Step 
I Bay Fill 

fr -. ..:'.:: 

V The chairman of the Bay 

- Conservation and Develop 
ment Commission yesterday 

- asked the Attorney General's 
office- to' begin legal action to 

', top Emeryville's HJ5-acre 
fill project in San Francisco 

f Bay. 

' ' Melvin Lane said he asked 
Deputy Attorney General E. | 
Clement Shute Jr. to seek an 
immediate injunction halting 

: the fill operation. 

"' Last month, Lane's om- 

. mission voted overwhelming- 

'. ly to bring suit if Emeryville 

... did not voluntarily stop. On 
Monday night, the Emery- j 

Lrville City Council voted toi 

' < continue the filling. 

V "We're not certain exactly 
when the suit will be filed," 
said Lane, "but we expect it 
win be filed in Alameda Su 
perior Court." 

Lane, the publisher of Sun- 
set Books, said the Commis 
sion wants the court to an 
swer two questions: does the 
Commission have jurisdiction 
over the Emeryvflle fill and 
does the Emeryville plan for 

- development of the tidelands 
comply with the state grant' 
which allows them use of the 

. land? 

"We claim that we do have 
jurisdiction and that the Em 
eryville fill does not comply 
with the state's grant," he 

Meanwhile, other legal ac 
tion involving Emeryville's 
controversial plans is still i 
pending in Sacramento Supe- 
i rior Court 

The East Bay city filed suit i 
for a declaratory judgment ' 
- there last year, asking the ' 

- court to approve its plans as 
being in accord with the state 
grant of use of the tidelands. 
The State Lands Comission, 
which says the plans are not 

- in the statewide public inter- 
: est as required by the 

opposing EmeryvfUt 


The county of Marin was another one that never liked BCDC very 
veil and resented its interference and so forth. Some of these 
others here Emeryville was a very tough one right from the start, 
and Albany even though they worked separately. Emeryville was the 
toughest. They were working with the Port of Oakland on a major 
project which was actually right next to Emeryville, but the two 
were working together on the north side of the Bay bridge where all 
the funny sculptures are. Emeryville had a triangular piece hunk of 
land out there and they had planned to fill all of it and we stopped 
them. But later, through sheer muscle, they did get those tall 
buildings in there. 

When the final bill went through in Sacramento [to make BCDC a 
permanent agency], the one real exception was Emeryville. They 
wrote some special language that just let Emeryville go ahead. The 
legislators who were key to it, including people who were darn good 
friends, just couldn't take the heat. Emeryville and Albany were 
the two exceptions. 

Chall: Right. Grandf athered in as it were? 

Lane: Well, no they just 

Chall: Or was that a total exception? 

Lane: Just a flat out exception, yes. 

Chall: I suppose they were afraid that they wouldn't get the bill passed at 
all? That was the only way it would get passed? 


Yes, we just wouldn't get it passed, so they got their exceptions 
in. I tell you, Emeryville particularly, was a baddy. 

Chall: The airports, I think they seem still to be a problem. I noticed in 
the material they were supposed to be determined on a regional 
basis. I don't know how that's worked. 

Lane: That worked pretty well in my opinion. The Port of Oakland which 

had the Oakland airport as well under their charge, were always very 
tough. They're a very well-run, strong government agency. Ben 
Nutter was the key power there. They were very unhappy with BCDC's 
creation because there's no question that it put a halt, at least 
temporarily, to a lot of their plans. Then they had, of course, 
great plans to compete with San Francisco's airport. They got 
through some fill for lengthening their runways that in my opinion 
then, and now, was excessive. They were using safety and a lot of 
arguments that were hard to refute, but there were a lot of 
unsubstantiated things but that was about all. 

We did arrive at one quite early in the game. Joe Bodovitz 
again figured this out for us, that one of the first-rate uses 


of the bay was dealing with the noise of airplanes, also keep them 
out over water and obviously they were safer. A plane is usually 
going to have less damage in water, particularly shallow water, than 
it is on land if it does have an accident. If the noise of planes 
taking off is somewhat lessened by doing it over water that's a good 
use, because that's a way you can have airports close to population 
centers and still not have all the noise problems. So anyway, early 
on, we said airports are a good use of the bay, and we should try to 
cooperate with the necessary needs of airports. 

San Francisco got a permit to fill an area just to the north of 
San Francisco's main airportthat's where the Coast Guard is. But, 
we put some conditions on it that they yelled and screamed about, 
and as a result, they've never filled it. It was the biggest fill 
permit we had ever allowed, it was two hundred acres or something. 

We got along with the airports pretty well, but the ports 
just resented our activities greatly. The Port of San Francisco was 
a state agency until just about the time our law passed [making BCDC 
permanent], even though the city kind of ran it for them, so that 
was sort of tricky. It was more in-fighting than what they wanted 
to do until they got into a plan for a big project when they wanted 
to put some big office buildings out in the bay. We did fight them 
on that, and everybody else took credit for it. But the big 
buildings proposed by U.S. Steel and Castle & Cook we were the ones 
that stopped those. They would have had them because they had the 
city politics of San Francisco under control. [Joseph] Alioto was 
right in the middle of it. We had awful fights with Joe Alioto over 
them, but since that was after the law was passed, in some ways we 
were in a better position because we had some clearer language. 

Chall: I guess you met him from time to time along the way, Mr. Alioto? 
Lane: Yes. I learned some political lessons from him the hard way. 
Chall: What did you learn? 

Lane: Always have at least one other person there who will remember things 
as they really were, [laughs] 

Chall: Whom did you have? [laughs] 

Lane: Because if you were there with Alioto and his friends, they would 
rewrite history any way it worked for them. It was like you hadn't 
been having the meeting. I learned I'd just invite some of the 
commissioners along. It's pretty hard for Alioto to say, "You can't 
bring them." 

Chall f Oh, when you had private meetings? 


Lane: Yes. I'd appoint a little committee, just any way to get these 

other people with me. And, they were people that Alioto couldn't 
blackjack. It would be a supervisor from some other county or 
something, [laughs] Boy, did I get taken to camp by him for a 
while there. Oooh. 

Chall: I guess those negotiations were very very tough. 

Lane: [Continuing to look through press clippings] Westbay that's the 

Rockefeller brothers. They were tough, very professional. A fellow 
named Warren something from New York was their contact, and I got to 
know him. We got along all right. They had this troika, the big 
owner of the baylands they made cement, and they were headquartered 
in the Rockies Salt Lake I think it was. 

Chall: Was that the Ideal Cement Company? 

Lane: Yes. the third part was the guys that owned the mountain. 

Chall: San Bruno? Would that be the Crocker Land Company? 

Lane: Yes. So, they would cut down the mountain, push it in the bay, and 
go right over bay shore freeway into barges and take it down and fill 
in down there. Then, Rockefeller would put up the money and all the 
professional skills of planning the land and marketing it and so 

Chall: What a phenomenal concept. 

Lane: It's like Candlestick park. Pushing land into the bay. Developers 
just love that God they think that is so wonderful. Anyway, we 
finally wore them down, but they were tough and very able. 

Chall: During all this period you did have quite good press coverage didn't 

Lane: Yes, although we worked at it. Bodovitz was very good at it. He'd 
been a reporter and understood how they worked, and had good 
contacts. But, we worked the press, no question about it. 

Chall: Well, that would help. 

Lane: We knew that the ultimate test was whether the legislature approved 
our plan or not, and that it was going to be a popularity contest 
more than on merit. If it looked like the public wanted this, we 
had a good chance. If it didn't, we were deader than a duck, so the 
public was where it counted. 

Chall: You talked to me a little bit about McAteer wanting some influence 
over the commission. Over the period of time did you have any 



Tideland k ^ 

A tentative plan for 
major development of 
{ay tidelands although 
ts backers decline to call 
t that has been sub- 
nitted to San Mateo coun- 
y authorities for their 
consideration it was dis 
closed yesterday. 

Involved is a vast area 
stretching from San Fran 
cisco International Airport 
on the north to the San 
Mateo bridge on the south. 

The plan was submitted by 
3 acific Air Commerce Cen 
ter of San Francisco and will j 
>e discussed with the San 
Mateo County Regional Plan- 
ning Committee a week from 


Warren T. Lindquist, presi 
dent of the firm, declined to 
discuss details of the plan in 
advance of that meeting. 

In fact, he hesitated to call 

t a plan. 

We are in no sense going 
jefore anybody with a plan 
which we are trying to get 
developed nor will we at 
tempt to undertake any de 
velopment which is not in ac- 
cord with a plan that has 
been developed by all the 
jlanning bodies concerned," 
tie said. 


"We expect to discuss with 
lie committee our thinking as 
to how some of the San Ma 
teo county bay frontage area 
might be constructively im 
proved in the public in 
terest . .- . 

We would hope that these 
ideas could serve as a basis 
for further discussion a 
starting point for a dia 

He insisted that "The last 
think we have in mind would 
be a massive fill" of theJJay. 

Unless there is a plan, for 
provement of tlur 




From Page 1 

develop our properties, that's 
all. We just won't do it." 

Existence of the plan was 
disclosed yesterday by May-' 
or John F. Shelley, who said- 
he had discussed it Tuesday 
with Lindquist and San Ma 
teo publisher J. Hart Clinton. 

Shelley said he understood 
the plan involves some 780 
acres with commercial de 
velopment at the north and 
south ends and in the mid 
dlea mile-square lake sur- 
|TO u n d e d by high-priced 
' apartment developments. 
- "They told me they had a 
green light from the San Ma 
teo county Board of Supervi 
sors," Shelley said. 

This was denied by County 
Manager E. R. Stallings, who 
said such a development 
wouldn't be in the county's 
jurisdiction but in that of 
three cities San Mateo, 
Burlingame and Millbrae. 


The regional planning corn- 
mi 1 1 e e, which will consider 
the plan at 8 p.m. next 

Thursday in the San Mateo 

City Hall, is comprised of 
one county supervisor, one 

county planning commission 
er, and a city councilman 
and planning commissioner 

.from each of the county's cit- 


K The firm behind the plan, 
f Pacific Air Commerce, is 
comprised of the David 
'Rockefeller interests of New 
;York, Crocker Land Compa- j 
. ny and Ideal Cement Compa- > 


: The same group in 1964, 
presented a similar develop 
ment plan which involved, 
in addition, construction of 
an air cargo center for the 
airport but shelved it the 
following year after San 
Francisco withdrew its sup 

The plan envisioned filling 
trf tidelands owned mostly 
Ideal Cement using 
:h from San Bruno Moiui- 



Lane : 



contacts with Governor Brown? Was he concerned about what you were 
doing? Were people getting to him? 

No, he was great. I was concerned on that because Pat was more of 
an "old school" politician. It wasn't a corruption kind of a thing, 
but the normal course of events in Sacramento would be if some big 
Democrat called Pat Brown's office and said, "I've got this problem 
over in the so and so department," they'd help move it along. So I 
expected we would get a lot of that, but we didn't. 

Bodovitz was the one that I was concerned about. There was no 
way they were going to push this commission around. Normally they 
would do it through the paid staff, but it was not a serious 
problem. I never felt any pressure personally. Occasionally they 
would call and say, "We have this problem, would you mind talking to 
somebody and let him down easy?" I'd say, "Fine, I'm happy to talk 
to anybody." So, if the guy just felt better having an interview, 
that's fair enough we do that in business all the time; but as far 
as giving him some advantage, or something that he wouldn't have 
received anyway to please the governor, we didn't have that problem. 

Sometimes you could very clearly see somebody on the commission 
was carrying the baggage. They would suddenly come on very strong 
on a given permit, raising all the questions about the staff 
procedure, or those three levels I was talking about. They were 
helping out a friend but that's different. The governor's office 
could have put them up to it, and in some cases I think that was the 
case, but we could handle that. 

What about representatives from the League of California Cities, or 
CSAC [The County Supervisor's Association of California]? 

When we were passing legislation, then those people were important 
in Sacramento, but they were seldom involved in our other 
activities. That was not true in the coast they were very 
involved. As a matter of fact, we really got along with the league 
pretty darn well. I got to know some of those people, and they were 
really helpful in some of our legislative battles. But we didn't 
see them in the day-to-day work really. 

They probably were able to work through their own commissioners 
anyway. The mayors on the one hand and supervisors on the other. 

Yes, very definitely, 
of the league 

Mr. Maltester. 

The fellow from San Leandro was the president 

Jack. So they were getting it that way 


Chall: You lost out on some plans for your permanent BCDC plan. One of 
them was to have control over one thousand feet of shoreline. 

Lane: We started out proposing a varying distance, which drove a lot of 
them up the walls, but we did it. [laughs] There we are.* In 
terms of the land usage, I think it made very good sense. In terms 
of simplistic American law, if you get a six-foot fence then I get a 
six-foot fence, and it's that kind of simplicity, it did not fit in 
with that. Anyway, the legislature did cut it back, and then they 
eventually cut it to one hundred feet, which was too bad because 
there's just a lot of awful things around the bay right now, that we 
wouldn't have had. It did give us bargaining power. In some cases, 
in order to get what they wanted in the first hundred feet you could 
get some trades on what they did in back of it. 

On the other hand, having looked at it on the coast, I'm not 
sure if the commission would have had one thousand feet, they would 
have been over their head. They'd have responsibilities that were 
excessive to what an unpaid, twice-a-month group could really 
handle. But, we got most of what we wanted. 

Chall: Yes, in fact a little more than you might have expected at some 
times during the battle. 

Lane: Yes, as I remember we did get a few more. 

Chall: It was an exciting period while you were trying to get the law 

passed. I guess the fact that you did depended on a few flukes. 

Lane: No question. Howard Way's support was a fluke there were a bunch 
of flukes there and I'm trying to remember what they were now; that 
was one. He would not normally have been with us philosophically; 
he was very conservative. How he got in that position on this 
particular piece of legislation, I don't know. 

Chall: I think he became head of the senate. 

*San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, San 
Francisco Bay Plan [Sacramento: California State Office of State 
Printing, 1969] p. 38. 


Lane: Yes, but his becoming head of the senate, our bill was one of the 
things he took a stand on, and as I say, it was not a great fit.* 

Chall: But he apparently helped a great deal in getting the legislation 

Lane: Yes, he did. 

Chall: The other one I suppose was the fact that Mr. Dolwig, Senator 
[Richard] Dolwig got turned around? 

Lane: Yes, Dolwig in some ways I didn't think got fair treatment. He 
played a very good role in Sacramento that last year when he got 
turned around. Yet, he was the enemy of the conservationists. They 
were unrelenting in ever giving him a point for doing anything. 
Dolwig was very effective, and did everything he'd said he'd do. I 
found him very straight to deal with. I was surprised. 

Chall: Was he your senator? Did you try to this is before the turn 

around did you try to reason with him, talk to him about the issue? 

Lane: Oh yes, you bet I did and didn't make any headway. He finally sent 
out a questionnaire to constituents and was very surprised by the 
results. I think he got religion through that. He called me and 
said, okay he was going to join the team, and vould I help him? So, 
he wrote his own bill and I assured him he would get equal time at 
commission meetings and a bunch of stuff, because if he was going to 
join the team I was glad to give him points. I had no problem with 
that. But the conservationists [laughs], they wouldn't give him a 
nickel. He did a lot of important things for us in Sacramento. 

Chall: In getting the bill passed? 
Lane: Yes. 

Chall: Well I don't see how anybody could fault him for that. Apparently 
it was touch and go for a couple of months the last six weeks. 

Lane: There were some other coincidental things, and I'm trying to 

remember now what they were. Howard Way was certainly one of them. 
There were some other just good people in that senate, particularly 
because that's where the opposition was centered. 

Chall: Well Senator Marks was carrying the Reagan bill but changed his mind 
too at some point. 

*See Rice Odell, pp. 79-84. 


Politics In Review 

Battle Over The Bay 

Richard Rodda, Political Edifor 

HELPLESS The old guard of the 
State Senate never was so helpless as 
it was Friday during the final debate 
on the Bay Conservation Develop 
ment Commission legislation. 

Forces determined to save the San 
Francisco Bay from uncontrolled 
> landfill by the special interests won a 
complete victory. 

This was a triumph also for Sen. 

'Howard Way, R-Tulare County, the 

; new president pro tempore of the 

upper house, and the strong coalition 

of Democrats and Republicans who 

effected the first change of Senate 

leadership in nearly 13 years. 

Way's election last May 13 was a 
.- blow to the lobbyists for the liquor in- 
" dustry, the race tracks, the land spec 
ulators, and other special interest 

groups whose close ties with Sen. 

- Hugh M. Burns, D-Fresno County, the 
former Senate leader, permitted 
them often to write their own ticket 

UNITED Last week these forces 
united again in an attempt to block 
the BCDC legislation, which would in 
terfere with plans for huge commer 
cial centers, industrial tracts and resi 
dential subdivisions along the 276 
miles of bay shoreline. 

- But without Sen. Way and the 
Rules Committee to help in their 
strategy they were handicapped. 

Nonetheless, they resorted to every 
parliamentary maneuver in the rule 

book, hoping against hope something 
would work and thwart the conserva 
tionists. Crippling amendments were 
proposed, efforts were made to send 
the legislation back to committee and 
the rarely used "appeal from the rul 
ing of the chair" was tried. It was all 
in vain. Sen. Way was at the rostrum 
and had a firm grip on the gavel 

As the debate wore on Sen. Way's 
power in the Senate chamber seemed 
to grow by the minute. As the climax 
came the opposition was confused 
and dazed, one senator sputtering al 
most incoherently in a futile attempt 
to prevent a rollcalL 

BILL SAVED When the dust had 
settled only nine senators recorded 
themselves against AB 2057, Knox, 
the measure which extends the life of 
BCDC and increases its power to reg 
ulate land development along the bay 
shoreline. This is a far cry from the 
days the forces involved in the anti- 
BCDC effort could put together 21 
votes in the Senate almost at will 
Twenty-one, of course, is the magic 
number in the upper house a ma 
jority of the 40 senators. 

The no votes on that key rollcall 
were cast by Senators Burns, William 
E. Coombs, R-San Bernardino County; 
Lou Cusanovich, R-Los Angeles 
County; Ralph C. Dills, D-Los Angeles 
County; H. L. Richardson, R-Los An 
geles County; John G. Schmitz, 

R-Orange County; Jack Schrade, 
R-San Diego County; James Q. Wed- 
worth, D-Los Angeles County; and 
James E. Whetmore, R-Orange 

legislation has been perhaps the most 
controversial of any during the 1969 
legislative session. Early attempts to 
bottle up the measure in the Senate 
Governmental Efficiency Committee 
reportedly contributed to the move to 
oust Burns in the first place. 

This committee for years has been 
known as the graveyard for bills the 
special interests do not want Sen. 
Way has vowed to change this and al 
ready has demonstrated he means 
what he says. 

Senators Nicholas C. Petris, 
D-Alameda County; and Richard J. 
Dolwig, R-San Mateo County, were the 
leading spokesmen for BCDC. Dolwig 
underwent a change in his thinking a 
few months ago. He was being 
blamed by San Mateo County citizen 
groups for trying to kill the legisla 
tion. Feelings were so intense bumper 
strips Fill the Bay With Dolwig 

Conservation leaders say that had 
not Dolwig changed his attitude, his 
political future was in jeopardy. Re 
publicans still may challenge him 
with a formidable candidate in the 
1970 primary election. 








Oh, he changed his mind minute to the minute, [laughs] He meant 
veil, but he was just changing his mind by the second, and his bill 
vas not strong enough to do anything. 

There vas another senator up in that northern Marin, Contra 
Costa area. 

Miller [George]? 

No, it wasn't Miller but Miller was very helpful. Miller really 
replaced McAteer in many ways as sort of our "leader of causes" up 
there. He was a powerful guy, and he was excellent. Then he died. 

Yes, so that left rather a vacuum. 

Nejedly [John] replaced him and was okay, but not nearly as good. 
This other fellow, Lew I remember we flew somewhere on an airplane. 

I can look it up somewhere. [Lewis Sherman] 

It didn't get much press, but when we finally got the bill passed, 
he was the one to get the senate to reconsider after they had voted 
us down once. He was a "clutch player" and didn't have to do it 
because it didn't help him particularly. Anyway, I've forgotten who 
some of those others were now. 

Were you most active in lobbying? 

I sure was. I was up there a lot. I even had an apartment there 
for a while. 

Is that so? Were other commissioners helping you? 
care as much as you did? 

Did any others 

Not much. There were a few. We would try to sic them on a specific 
legislator. Some of them were very effective in that way, but they 
were kind of looking for somebody to tell them what to do in nearly 
every case. Most of them really didn't want to do too much 
lobbying. It was not a field they were comfortable in. 

Ronald Reagan's Interest in the Agency ft 

Chall: Did you have to go in and see Governor Reagan from time to time on 
this to bring him around? 


Lane: Yes, that was nervous. I had two good friends on his so-called 
cabinet in this and previous worlds. Ike [Norman] Livermore, 
Resources, and a fellow who is now Secretary of the Army 

Chall: Gianelli? 

Lane: No, in Washington 

Chall: Not Caspar Weinberger? 

Lane: No, but I did work with Weinberger when he was at Finance there for 
a while. Let's see I'll think of this fellow's name. His wife's 
mother and my mother were good friends in Iowa it was one of 
those Verne Orr! Verne Orr, he was Finance after Cap. Anyway, the 
cabinet only had four or five people, so I had two people that I 
could talk to. They didn't carry my flag, but they would see that I 
got a hearing. That made a lot of difference. 

Chall: Did you go in to see Ronald Reagan sometimes, to talk? 

Lane: I went to cabinet meetings maybe a dozen times, and you'd get three 
minutes to make your little pitch. 

Chall: Was he there? 

Lane: Yes, usually. Other times you would just see Bill Clark or Ed 
Meese. Clark I also had known outside of his role we'd go on 
horseback rides down in Santa Barbara every year. So, I had friends 
up there that helped in access to the administration. Meese, we got 
to know through Verne Orr's wife. She brought them down here for 
lunch a couple of times, and we got to know the Meese family. 

Chall: Did that help? 

Lane: Oh sure It helped on entree. They didn't just do us a favor per 

se, but if you had a problem, or the governor was sore at something 
we did, I could get a better hearing on why we did it and what we 
did, than I could have otherwise. 

Chall: Was he attentive at cabinet meetings? Do you think he was paying 
attention, or was he more interested in having his cabinet pay 

Lane: Oh, as a rule our things were not that important to him. He, I 

think, usually had his little one-page summary sheet. There were 
three parts to it, I've forgotten how he organized it. Then, and 
now as I perceive it, he has kind of a philosophical approach to 
something, and that's more important to him than the specifics of 
it. He just is generally for something, or is generally against 
that kind of thing. 


Chall: He did come out for retention of BCDC. 

Lane: He did sign it. He didn't like it very well. He made some very 

funny comments about it not humorous funny but surprising. One of 
them was that one of the reasons he had signed the bill was that it 
avoided having regional government, [laughs] We said, "Right on, 
you're right!" [laughs] 

Chall: What was the other one? [laughs] 

Lane: [laughs] Hmm, some chamber of commerce kind of a thing. It would 

save money or it would facilitate better airports or something. It 
was not an incorrect statement. But one thing that we discovered 
very early in those days was that he had to have a non-environmental 
justification to get him to approve an environmental project. You 
had to give him something he could say to the California 
Manufacturers' Association, that he could justify himself with. Ike 
Livermore used that very well. The governor didn't build a freeway 
across the Sierra because it cost too much fine. His [Reagan's] 
record in Sacramento was actually pretty darn good environmentally. 
He did a lot of things and did not play games with us on budgets or 
those things. He was straight. 

Chall: Of course you had many Republicans in the legislature who were 
strongly for the environmental controls. CEQA [California 
Environmental Quality Act] came out during that period too, and the 
Republicans really were as responsible for it as anybody. 

Lane: Yes, that's right, but most of them were in the assembly. 

Controversy Regarding Bay Area Regional Organization: The Knox Bills 

Chall: Yes, the rising tide. Well, now you became a permanent agency and 
a single-purpose agency because there was no type of regional 
government or regional agency to take it on. Even so, . the Bay Area 
Regional Organization studies were going on under John Knox. There 
ultimately were many Knox-sponsored BARO bills, but the one that 
would have come out while you were still around was A.B. 1057 in . 

Lane: Yes, gosh we spent time on those! None of it went anywhere, but we 
certainly spent a lot of time on it. 

Chall: Was BCDC amenable to the Knox bill one of the first ones 1057, 
that almost passed within one or two votes. I think BCDC would 



Save-The-Bay Bill 

d G^j*t ' ^Af <r c. *' r <-t w <A ,, _ <y f 

Signed By Reagan 


Mtrcvnr Sacrament* Buru 

Ronald Reagan on Thursday 
signed legislation intended to 
permanently preserve San 
Francisco Bay, which he 
called "one of the most im 
portant resources that Call 
fornia possesses." 

The governor was flanked 
by a host of Bay Area legisla 
tors as he signed the bill with 
14 different pens that he aft 
erward distributed to co 
authors of the historic legisla 
tion ,and to conservationists 
who had made it possible. 

"This bill will save the 
bay," Reagan said. "It is, I 
believe, a milestone in our 
continuing efforts to pre 
serve the quality of life 
not only for this generation 
but also for those who will 
follow us." 

In marked contrast to the 
acrimony among 'legislators, 
lobbyists and conservationists 
that often accompanied the 
seven-month struggle to pass 
bay preservation legislation, 
the bill-signing Thursday was 
accompanied by a mutual ex* 
change of compliments. 

Assemblyman John Knox 
(D-Richmond), principal au 
thor of the measure and a 
usually partisan Democrat, 
pointedly praised . the gover 

"Your statements were ex 
tremely helpful," Knox told 
Reagan. "You kept jabbing 
fthem a bit every week." 

The only note of criticism 
that intruded into the bill 
signing came from the gover 
nor, when he said his "one re 
gret" was that the Legisla 
ture had exempted two 
projects from jurisdiction of 
the Bay Conservation and De 
velopment Commission 

One project, an apartment 
[house development on al 
ready-filled land in Emery 
ville, is minor in nature. The 
other would allow Albany to 
fill 105 acres for a marina 
complex known as Albany 

In his statement accompa 
nying the bill-signing, the. 
governor called the bill "an 
example of creative partner 
ship through which we can 
preserve the irreplaceable" 
and added: 

"We can be proud of the 
fact that while we have taken 
action to preserve something 
that belongs to all of us, we 
have also protected the rights 
of private property owners. 

"We have accomplished 
this without imposing the 
Stifling controls of a region 
al government on the cities 
and counties that surround 
the bay." . . 

The Knox measure would: 

Extend indefinitely the 
life of BCDC, which had been 
scheduled to go out of exist 
ence 90 days after the legisla 
tive .session. 

Give the commission ju- 
risdiction over the 50,000 
acres of salt ponds, four-fifths 
of them in the south bay that 
are owned by Leslie Salt Co. 
and over another estimated 
20,060 Acres of "managed 

wetlands" now used as duck 
ponds or open marsh area. 

Authorize the BCDC to 
exercise jurisdiction of a 
100-foot wide shoreline strip 
extending around the 276 
miles of bay shoreline. 

But the new authority that 
BCDC will have over the salt 
ponds and shoreline, which 
presently are outside the 
'commission's jurisdiction, is 
balanced by the specific pro 
tection for private landown 
ers referred to by the gover 

BCDC will be required with 
in a year to designate areas 
designed for public use such 
as" parks and wildlife refuges. 
Within three years after this 
designation is made, an ageu- 

cy would have to buy the land 
and dedicate it to the public. 

If the publicly-designated 
land is not purchased by an 
other governmental agency, 
BCDC would have jurisdiction 
only to determine that the use 
made by the prospective de 
veloper was properly 

Thus, BCDC would have 
limited zoning power over 
areas such as the salt ponds 
with power to guide develop 
ment but not to deny the own 
er use of his land. 

The commission has since 
its inception in 1965 blocked 
bay filling and dredging ex 
cept "for such public projects 
as parks, ports and airports. 
This power to control bay fill 
is preserved: intact in the 
Knox bill. 

The bill, heavily opposed by 
lobbyists for Leslie Salt, 
Westbay Community Asso 
ciates and the Santa Fe Rail 
way Co. at various stages of 
the legislative process, was a 
compromise effort worked out 
by Knox and Sens. Richard 
Dolwig (San Mateo), Nicholas 
Petris (D-Oakland) and Mil 
ton Marks (R-San Francisco). 

Dolwig, who originally in 
troduced legislation that con 
servationists groups said 
would seriously weaken 
BCDC, was a frequent target 
for bay preservationists in the 
early months of the session. 

But he played the leading 
role in restoring shoreline 
control powers to the bill on 
the Senate floor last week and 
Thursday issued a statement 
praising the legislation as "an 
important victory for conser 
vationists and all persons who 
believe in fighting to preserve 

The turning point in the bat 
tle to save the bay, according 
to Knox and conservation 
ist-minded Sen. Alfred Alquist 
(D-San Jose), came when 
Sen. Howard Way (R-Exeter) 
replaced Sen. Hugh Burns 
(D-Fresno) as president pro 
tern of the Senate. 







have been folded in in some way. 

I don't remember. I know there was the threat of it, and we had many 
meetings with Knox and his administrative assistant Tom Willoughby 
on those bills. Every year they were up and the Bay Area Council 
got all involved. Some of them would have enveloped BCDC, but it's 
a big blur in my mind now.* 

Some of them would have, and some of them wouldn't have. The Save 
the Bay Association I take it, was never in favor of them. 

No, and I think as I remember it, Bodovitz and I figured our role 
was not to publicly oppose what they were doing, but not to go out 
of our way to help it along either if it was going to water down 
BCDC. BCDC's function was the test of it. It didn't have to be the 
same organization, but it would have to be a law that was as strong, 
and with a capability that was as strong in protecting the bay. 

But that apparently took quite a bit of your time? 

It did. It was a very popular subject. There were meetings all 
over the place, conferences, and all that stuff went on and on. 

What's your general opinion about bay area regional government? Did 
you come up with one that satisfied you? 

I never was for one on general land use. I guess I liked the 
special-purpose agencies, but the more you could coordinate them so 
they didn't contradict or overlap, obviously, was desirable. There 
were some things that you could do that way, but I would liked to 
have seen the maritime/port things under one group. 

Edgar Kaiser worked very hard on that in the early sixties. I 
remember Edgar coming back to a meeting once. He really pushed it, 
and he worked very hard. He got it very close, and who was the 
state senator that was the "daddy of freeways" in the north? 

Chall: Collier? 

*See John Knox, "Bay Area Regional Organization, The Environmental 
Quality Act, and Related Issues in the California Assembly, 1960- 
1980," an oral history interview conducted in 1982, Volume III Four 
Perspectives on State. Regional, and Local Mandates for Land-Use 
Planning. 1960-1982. Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft 
Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1983. 


Lane: Yes, [Randolph] Collier. Anyway, he came back from a meeting with 
Collier, and Edgar Kaiser said, "I've decided I can't afford a 
legislature." [laughs] I didn't know exactly what he meant, but I 
had a pretty good idea that it was going to be a very expensive 
trip, [laughs] 

Chall: You're talking about then, the idea for a Port Authority, is that 
what you're talking about? 

Lane: Yes, the San Francisco/Oakland/Contra Costa competition was counter 
productive in my opinion. Anyway that was one. I think 
coordinating the airports in the area, again, it's a Port Authority 
kind of thing, would be an improvement. The bay shoreline and 
water access needed one. Water quality of course is another one. 
Highways, you certainly need that one. But, to just have a general 
land-use agency, that is not likely and in my opinion desirable. 

Chall: How about garbage? That seemed to be so great a problem still is. 

Lane: Garbage would definitely be one, yes. Local government, political 
boundaries don't make any sense on that. No, I'd agree with that. 
So too, solid waste or at least sanitary waste, and I think we're 
learning now, late and the hard way, toxic waste certainly needs 
something. Whether its regional or state or federal or whatever, 
I'm not so sure, but leaving it up to cities doesn't do it. 
Underground aquifers, same thing; they don't respect boundaries. 

As a result, nobody does anything. Twenty years ago most of 
the environmental battles were fairly specific, and you could get 
public support Save the Trees, the Bay, or Clean the Air. We set 
up government machinery that could cope with most of those, if the 
public wants them to. Gosh, but we're dealing with stuff now You 
just start with the potential damage of radiation, or nuclear, or 
population growth, greenhouse atmospheric problem, or underground 
water aquifers either they're endangered by pollution or over- 
consumption. We don't have government machinery for them, and we 
don't know how to deal with it. 

Few politicians are going to really get their necks out, 
because they won't get enough points to make it worth it. If he 
starts worrying about greenhouse effects, he's got all of the 
polluters in the area on his back. But the greenhouse is the whole 
world, and so you just aren't going to get enough votes in your 
district to make any difference. So, the incentives to tackle these 
environmental problems is a much tougher one. 


Continuing to Develop Strategies as Chairman 

Chall: Now Governor Reagan reappointed you as chairman, and you were 
willing to stay with it I take it. 

Lane: Oh yes. We were still in our three-year project. I worked on 
getting reappointed. I went to a bunch of friends Bay Area 
Council, and Steve Bechtel, Sr. McAteer was still alive then, and 
he didn't have a lot of say with the governor, but I gathered that 
he at least didn't object to my staying in there even though I was 
Republican. I called in favors with some of my friends that were 
big in the Reagan world to stay on. 

Chall: You probably felt that you still had to insure BCDC as a permanent 
agency that it wasn't weakened. 

Lane: BCDC was only one year old when Reagan came in. He reappointed me, 
but he dumped the other four who were all Democrats. He got a lot 
of pressure to get me out of there by people who just wanted to 
weaken the thing, and get some good developer in the slot. He did 
replace the other four, and that's what brought on Bill Evers and 

Chall: Bessie Watkins? 

Lane: Bessie Watkins, yes. I've forgotten who the other two were now. 

Chall: Was that when Marcella Jacobson came in? 

Lane: I think it was. She's the other one that called me right at the 

Chall: Oh, I see. She is a Republican. 

Lane: Yes. 

Chall: Strong in Save the Bay wasn't she? 

Lane: Yes, and really, she more than that other woman I mentioned [Pat 

Barrentine], was the one that really talked to me long and hard, and 
explained to me all that was going on, which I didn't know anything 

Chall: So, Ronald Reagan's appointees were good ones would you say? 

Lane: They were fairly good. A lot of us were working on it, and we 

particularly pushed for Bill Evers, because I was looking for a good 


Chall: How was Mrs. [Dorothy] Erskine? 

Lane: Very nice, a lovely, wonderful woman, and she was fine. I had no 

problem with her, we were good friends, and I loved her but she was 
not the one that was going to run a big meeting, or those things. 
Her place was in organizing a lot of volunteers to go. 

Chall: She could do it. 

Lane: She sure could. Her thinking was certainly clear, and she knew what 
she was trying to do. But, the world of lobbying and those things 
just didn't seem to come naturally to her or building up the 
personal relationships with commissioners this kind of activity. 
Everyone liked her. 

Chall: So, did you request through your channels to put Mr. Evers on there? 

Lane: Yes. 

Chall: Did he do what you had anticipated he would do? 

Lane: Yes, Bill was fine excellent. Bill was vice-chairman, and then 

later became chairman. I've forgotten how that worked for a while 
there, because Bessie Watkins was vice-chairman. I think she became 
vice-chairman after I left though. 

Chall: I think so. 

Lane: Yes, with Joe Houghteling. Bessie was fine. I didn't know her, I 
knew her husband [Dean] pretty well, and he's quite conservative 
so I didn't know what to expect, but Bessie was fine. She was 
very faithful and able. 

Chall: Then there were members of his [Reagan's] staff who were on the 
board like Livermore as part of the administration. 

Lane: Yes, by then we had gotten a bill through for proxies. As I 

remember it, Senator Miller was the one that helped us get that 
through. People like Ike did not show up as a rule. The Democrats 
like Hugo Fisher, those people did come, but in the Reagan 
administration the agency heads did not come, but they could have an 
alternate or a proxy, so it worked all right. 

Chall: When you say that you, through channels, pushed for Mr. Evers, could 
you explain what those channels were and how they worked? did you 
have any influence over any other appointees? If so who were they? 

Lane: I called friends who were prominent Republicans to put in a good 

word for me and for Bill Evers. Steve Bechtel Sr. was one of them. 
Bill Evers was the only one I urged besides myself. 


Chall: Now during the Reagan period, were there any attempts to lean on 

you, or any commissioners, different from what you experienced with 
Pat Brown? 

Lane: No, they were totally hands-oft. But, you see, Brown was generally 
too. It wasn't a problem I guess, is what I'm saying. The fellow 
whose name I'll think of that was Ike Livermore's proxy, was also in 
the Republican Central Committee and those things. 

By that point I had a group of four of five people that joined 
me for lunch every time before a meeting. Then I'd ask other people 
if there was something on the agenda that was of interest to them, 
or where they were a participant. If we had a great big project in 
Oakland, we had a supervisor named [Emanuel] Razeto from Alameda 
County so I'd ask Emanuel to come, and we'd just discuss it. 
Nobody got surprised. 

Chall: It was a luncheon meeting before every meeting? 

Lane: Before every meeting yes. I told the commission we were doing it, 

so there were no surprises. If they had a big project in their area 
coming up, they were welcome. 

Chall: Was that so you would understand it? 

Lane: Yes, so I would understand it and would save time in the meeting. 
One of things we had to do was plot our legal case always. Clem 
[Clement Shute] was there, and one of the questions to him was, 
"Okay, if this goes to court, what are we going to wish we did at 
this meeting?" Then he'd tell me, "You've got to be sure you say 
this, and you've got to be sure you do that." [laughs] 

Chall: Oh I see, just as important as planning your agenda. 

Lane: Yes, because these kind of suits, when it gets into the courts you 
cannot introduce new information. The courts are looking for what 
happened. Therefore, if you're going to get challenged on some 
procedural thing or something like that, you better figure it out. 
So anyway, it was part of the process. 

Chall: That didn't run you afoul of the Brown Act the public ? 

Lane: No, because we didn't have a majority of the commission. But we 
really weren't trying to steer the thing to a given vote or 
conclusion, we were just concerned with the process. No, I thought 
I might have trouble with that, but I never did. I always told the 
commission about it. I'd tell them, "We've been advised by the 
attorney general, that in processing this permit we should do X and 
Y." So, they were seeing the results of it; it didn't come as a 


Chall: Did you do the same thing when you went to the Coastal Commission, 
or try it? 

Lane: Well in effect, it did not formalize. Those meetings went for two 
or three days, so I would usually huddle with Joe Bodovitz and 
the attorney general ahead of time on an airplane half the time of 
course. Then, I'd at least talk to the attorney general on the big 
ones, but the logistics just didn't allow it. 

Accepting and Working With the Plan 

Chall: I guess there weren't really many changes after the commission 
became permanent, with respect to the appointment of other 

Lane: No, and I was a little disappointed. To perpetuate ourselves kind 
of bothered my conscience that's so natural for anybody with some 
power in this world. But, it became evident that as soon as you 
started tinkering with the balance of that thing, that it just would 
become unraveled. So, we basically stayed with the same twenty- 
seven member organization. There were a few minor modifications 
I've forgotten what they were now, but they didn't amount to much. 
The state agency assignments got changed around some, I've forgotten 
what they were. 

Chall: I think too that there was one more mayor appointed, I believe four 
from ABAC, because of the loss of I think BATS [Bay Area 
Transportation Study] went out of existence. 

Lane: That's right. BATS went out, and ABAC appointed one additional 

mayor. We looked at taking it down to a smaller group for instance. 
Well who do you throw out? I decided that was not worth it. We 
could argue back that the twenty-seven member commission did work 
as dumb as it sounds so who's to say it can't keep working. 

Chall: And how did it keep working? I mean, did commission members 
continue interest in working with the plan? 

Lane: It worked pretty well. I thought it worked fine, from my point of 
view. No, I didn't see any drop-off in participation. 

Chall: By this time of course the developers and builders knew that you 

were a permanent agency and they would have to deal with you, so I 
suppose then they came in with projects that either tested you, or 
acepted the agency's premises. 


Lane: Most of the real bad ones didn't even come, it just disappeared. 

Businessmen, once they see a buck is someplace else, they move fast. 
If once they were convinced that they weren't going to make it 
filling in the bay, then they all vent up into the mountains or 
wherever they went. 

Chall: Well, the concept of having public access to the bay, certainly has 
made a difference around the bay for many people. It's also opened 
up considerable areas of marshlands. 

Lane: Yes, and one of the things that impressed me was that what it came 
down to really was important. I remember there were four or five 
basic policy concepts that pretty well took in the whole thing. 
The rest of it was just detailing it out. One of them was that, 
"You don't put something in the bay that can just as well go on 
land." The next one was, "You don't put something next to the bay 
that can just as well go inland. 

That covered an awful lot of things. A house doesn't have to 
be in the bay, a yacht harbor does, [laughs] So, if there's a 
choice, the things that are water-related get a priority over these 
others. "Things that the general public can enjoy will get 
preference over things that just a private owner can enjoy." The 
things that groups of people can enjoy will get a preference over 
the something that only is for a single person, or a single owner. 
There was the airport logic we stuck with. 

Chall: You had industrial logic. 

Lane: There are a lot of industries that do not need to be in the bay, but 
if you fill it up with houses and warehouses, you don't leave room 
for those things that really have to be there. The airports were 
one, and all the maritime things not just the ports, but the 
maritime-related industries, whether it was deep-water shipping, or 
they needed bay water for processes or whatever, they should get a 
preference over the bay. 

So anyway, it came down I was surprised, the planners can 
usually make things pretty complicated, but the real rules that were 
going to guide the bay were pretty simple. 

Chall: Mr. Bodovitz said that whenever he had a real difference of opinion 
with you, sometimes he found out that you were right and he was 
wrong, [laughs] 

Lane: Yes, we split them up I think. He was ahead of me on the processes, 
in knowledge, because he was at it full time. He knew what was 
going on and I didn't, because I wasn't there. An awful lot of what 
we were doing was strategizing, and a lot of this was not that 
different from what I do in my business. It's publishing. The way 
we sell advertising to General Motors Corporation, is very similar 


to selling a piece of legislation, [laughs] You figure out who are 
your friends, who are going to oppose you, who are the people you 
have access to, who are the people you've got to find access to. So, 
some parts of that I had some experience to put on the table. 

Chall: It seems to me there was some real sophistication behind a lot of 
action during these years in this particular agency, that made it 
successful. Why did you decide to leave in 1972? 

Lane: I got interested in the coast, and so basically Joe and I both 

decided to take a run at that. I was more involved than he was at 
least visibly in pushing the coastal legislation, because he was a 
state employee and his hands were tied a little bit, but we both 
worked on the coastal initiative. 

Chall: I'd like to talk to you about that someday. 

The Conservationists and Their Relationship with BCDC 

Chall: I didn't ask you about how you got along with the real strong 

conservationists like the Save the Bay people, Sierra Club, and what 
they did for you and BCDC? 

Lane: We got along fairly well. I have a theory I inherited from Dave 
Brower actually. That is, that environmentalists should be 
extremists. They represent an extreme, and. the people who are going 
to make a buck represent the other one, and the decison makers 
should sweat it out in the middle. If the environmentalists are 
convinced that they should be reasonable and cooperative, all you're 
doing is bringing them in here, the middle has just shifted over to 
here, [gestures] I had no problem with their telling us, "We don't 
care what's going to happen to this man, and his taxes, and his 
money problems and all that. The fact remains you're going to kill 
all of these birds, you're going to destroy this marsh," and 

When I'd tell Dwight Steele and those people that theory, they 
didn't like it too well, because they would like to say, "Well I'm 
not extreme, you ought to be right where I am." They also really 
had thought that they they would have more of a voice in our 
proceedings, I think is a fair way to say it. 

Tactically, they were not as sophisticated very often as the 
developers. There were times when at least a lot of us in the 
commission and staff were really going to go their way, but if it 
looked like we'd done it because the Sierra Club had beat us into 
doing it, it made it harder to do. But they just couldn't resist 


coming in there and raising hell. 

We really had some tough times the first year or so, with the 
Save the Bay folk, because they had been the ones that got McAteer 
to carry the bill, and they really thought they were going to have 
some real voice in things. Mrs. Kerr and some of the others, had 
some very strong ideas as to how we should do it. 

Chall: What would they have been? How were they different from what you 

Lane: They didn't like all these studies to the extent that we did, 
although they were not totally against it. As a process, they 
wanted us to start out with a framework of policies, and then kind 
of massage them and enhance them, because they were afraid we would 
go astray I think. They had good reason to, because you're trusting 
twenty-seven people who are not particularly environmentally- 
oriented, a lot of them, to do something. Anyway, we had some 
pretty strong sessions with some of them, and they were very 

There were some things that, in my opinion, were symbols to 
them rather than being very important: Where we should turn down a 
permit, not because in itself it was a big problem maybe precedent 
is a fairer word of their feeling. We felt if an applicant 
qualified under the law, in our opinion, he ought to get his permit. 

At the first meeting we had we had four permits. Stan Scott 
and others were there and they were really beating on us that we 
just had to turn these down. If we ever let developers see that we 
were going to approve things, we would just get washed away. None 
of the four had a problem. One man wanted to build a little bridge 
in his farm up in the north bay so he could get from one plot of 
land to another one. Well, to turn his bridge down was crazy. I 
remember my wife sat next to him at that one, and this guy had been 
sure that he was going to get clobbered, and couldn't believe it 
when he got his little bridge, [laughs] 

As I remember we approved all of that first batch. Martin 
Meyerson he was chancellor later, he was head of the environmental 
studies (whatever you call it, architecture) then.* He was Kay 
Kerr's choice to be one of the commission members. He was a 
governor's appointment. It took me a little longer with Martin than 

*Martin Meyerson came to Berkeley in 1963 as professor of urban 
development and dean of the College of Environmental Design. 


it did some others before we really became friends. And, Kay Kerr 
really told him what he should be doing. I assume they didn't 
always quite agree, but he was carrying her messages a lot of the 
time. That was a little tricky on some of those, but that first 
meeting he was just very upset that we approved them. 

The point I always insisted on, and I think that Joe liked it, 
was that the staff would make a recommendation; they didn't just 
throw something at us. The people involved knew it that is, the 
applicant and the opponents and whatever. So, before each project, 
they would give us the background information, most of which was 
already written out, and the staff would recommend that we approve 
it or disapprove it for these reasons. That drove a lot of people 
up the wall, but I thought it was fine. It kept the staff on their 
toes, and at least there were no hidden agendas. Everybody knew 
where everybody was. 

Anyway, I remember when Bodovitz recommended that we approve 
all these, Martin Meyerson just had a terrible time. But, he was 
very helpful later. He was a very bright man, and I had a bunch of 
meetings with him eventually, on what kind of a plan we ought to 
have, and whether we should be looking primarily in the long-run to 
the state or to local government, as to where we put power and those 
kinds of things. He was good. 

Chall: Those are the important decisions that need to be considered. Where 
did you put it? 

Lane: State. I mean we went on to be a state agency. The cities and 
counties didn't have the say they thought they ought to have. 

Chall: Well, you'd had the experience with ABAC already, enough to I'm 
sure the Save the Bay people or the Sierra Club or any of the 
others, would never have been satisfied had it not been the state. 

Lane: There's that, and land-use control is a state responsibility. 

Cities have it because the state has delegated it, but they can take 
it back anytime they want to. That's in effect what they do with 
the BCDC. They just take it away from the cities and counties and 
say, "We're going to put it in a state agency." Anyway, Martin was 

Chall: Would you meet sometimes with Kay Kerr or Mrs. [Esther] Gulick? 

Lane: Yes, but not as a regular thing at all. She would be very upset or 
want to talk us, and so we'd go over there and have a meeting at her 
house, or dinner, or something. She was always gracious. She just 
felt very strongly, and she had a great investment in it, and she 
was entitled to her hearing with us. I never begrudged that at all. 
They were very, not Kay or Esther so much as some of the others, 


very strident, demanding, and rigid in their approach, so it was not 
an easy relationship. The other one 

Chall: Mrs. [Sylvia] Mclaughlin. 

Lane: She was swell. Mrs. Mclaughlin I've known from days past. But, 
Will Siri and Will Siri's wife and those people, and some of the 
lawyers they had, would just say, "That's illegal, that's absolutely 
illegal." [laughs] 

Chall: Oh is that so? 

Lane: Barry Bunshoft was one of the lawyers. I remember he particularly 
was upset with a lot of our legal things. Clem Shute would say, 
"Don't worry." 

Chall: Yes, he seemed to be on top of it. You belonged I think to, was it 
the Planning and Conservation League Foundation, or the league 
itself for awhile? 

Lane: I was just a member and then they made me an honorary something or 
other, but I never was a 

Chall: You never were on the executive board? 

Lane: Bill Evers and Lou Butler and some other good friends, were very 
involved in all that and Richard Wilson. So I did well for a 
while they had a good lobbyist up there, so I used them as much as I 
could. That was my main real involvement with them, other than that 
I didn't do a lot. 

Chall: Were they using Mr. [John] Zierold at the time? 
Lane: Yes, John was with them, exactly. 
Chall: But you weren't an active member? 

Lane: Not really, no only as it affected the bay, or later the coast. 

They were very active proposing coastal legislation, and really did 
an awful lot of the work in developing legislation which was based 
on BCDC as far as it's legal structure of three years and all that. 
So, I worked with them a lot on that. 

Evaluating BCDC and its Future 

Chall: Looking back on BCDC, can you discuss, if you haven't already 


stated it, what you consider the great accomplishments and some of 
the frustrations you might have felt? 

Lane: [Pauses to consider] Certainly clarifying the laws as they applied 
to a lot of these things was one of our major accomplishments. One 
that happened more coincidental ly than any of the specific things we 
did, was getting a much broader and deeper appreciation of the bay 
by the general public, and by the people in the local governments. 
[Pause] If I thought about that I'd probably think of some things 
that were frustrating. 

Chall: Well, you can put it in, when you are reviewing you'll have to 
review this, so you can add anything you want. How do you look 
today at the future of BCDC under Governor Deukmejian? Are you 

Lane: Oh it's not very good. These battles are ones that you don't solve 
ever, with the coast or bay or air or water or whatever it is, 
because tomorrow there is another group of citizens and voters and 
government leaders, so those battles just go on forever. The 
picture has not been quite as attractive in the last five years or 
so as it was before that. 

Chall: Can it slip back considerably? Or is there enough in place now so 

that the concepts regarding protection of the bay are not in danger? 

Lane: I don't think it will slip back as far. I think not only the 

public, but the city and county governments have really changed. 
They're more aware of public access. They're more aware that maybe 
a marsh has some value, besides a city dump. 

Lane: I think there's that just the education process there would prevent 
it from going all the way back, to where cities and counties were 
just competing to see how much they could fill in more of their bay 
than the next guy could. I'd be surprised if there was a lot of 

Chall: But there does seem to be some real interest on the part of 

developers, to get in where they couldn't before. Do you think, as 
some of them have said, that the development side of BCDC was not 
considered over these past twenty years? That that has been shoved 
aside over the years, and that BCDC was concerned more with the 

Lane: I think, looking at the resource, and what we thought it should be 
one hundred years from now, took priority over what somebody could 
do to make a short-term profit. One of the theories I came out of 
it with I've forgotten who named it is called "salami logic." 


It's very true, in my opinion, that if you look at a slice you see 
something very different than if you look at the whole loaf. 

If somebody owns a piece of shoreline and some mud flats, and 
they go to the city council and they say, "Now I just want to fill 
in a little bit out here to help my building, but I'm going to put a 
little path around here for the public and there's a picnic table. 
I've got this architect that's going to put ivy on my building, and 
I'm going to create fifty jobs, and I'm going to pay you twenty 
thousand a year in taxes, and on and on. And, I've only taken .0007 
per cent of the bay." The city council can't turn that down. But 
if you looked at all of the privately-owned shallow parts of San 
Francisco Bay and said, "Now if this happens to even a large part of 
it, was that a good idea?" We'd say, "No." If you looked at that 
one slice, you'd say, "Yes." [laughs] 

So as planners we should be looking at the total, but a 
developer looks at only his thing. He's looking at it 
philosophically that he thinks there is a God-given American right 
that the best use of resources is to put them into the capitalistic 
system so somebody can do something with them. 

Chall: So, there's always going to be a tension between them, always? 

Lane: Yes, sure. 

Chall: What do you think of the future? I'm talking about the short-term 

Lane: There will be some gradual erosion, but I think it will be very 

gradual. I would guess that fifty years from now, most of what is 
now bay would still be there. The public's interest is not 
expressed in as strong a voice, but it's there. We had a bond issue 
in June where 64Z of the people said, "I'm willing to be taxed to 
preserve wildlife refuges." They can't even go and use it, all they 
can do is just preserve it for animals. That says something to me. 
I think the public, they won't build schools or prisons with their 
money, but they'd do that. 

So, as long as there's that public interest in these things, 
that's the real guardian. As cities get built bigger and population 
pressures greater, I think the interest in those things will get 

Chall: Well, I think that's about all of your time I'm going to take today. 
Thank you very much for the help and advice you've provided this 
project during the past several years. 

Transcriber: Lisa Grossman 
Final Typist: Richard Shapiro 


TAPE GUIDE Melvin Lane 

Date of Interview: October 12, 1984 

tape 1, side A 32 

tape 1, side B 42 

tape 2, side A 51 

tape 2, side B 65 


Regional Oral History Office 
The Bancroft Library 

University of California 
Berkeley, California 

Government History Documentation Project 
Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era 


E. Clement Shute, Jr. 

The Place of the Courts -in the 
Solution of Controversial Policy Issues 

An Interview Conducted by 

Malca Chall 

in 1984 


1986 by the Regents of the University of California 



TABLE OF CONTENTS E. Clement Shute, Jr, 



Emeryville and Fill: Setting a Precedent 76 

West bay Community Associates: The Public Trust Issue 78 

Santa Fe and Murphy: The Public Trust Issue 79 

Candlestick Properties Case: Police Power Authority 81 


The Reagan Administration 83 

BCDC Relationships with Other Federal, State, and Local Agencies 85 

Developing the Concept of Mitigation 90 

The One Hundred Foot Band: Public Access 92 



E. Clement Shute, Jr., began his career in lav in 1964 as a junior 
deputy in the state attorney general's office. In September, 1965, he was 
assigned to the newly established Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission representing the attorney general's office as its counsel. He 
remained with the agency until 1980, at which time he left government 
service and went into private practice. During those eighteen years he sat 
with the commission and handled all of their legal work. 

During the initial crucial three-year interim permit/planning period 
when local, state, and federal agencies, private developers, and 
environmentalists were testing their strengths and their turfs, many legal 
issues had to be resolved, some of which, through court decisions, would set 
precedent. This was a new agency dealing with an environmental resource, 
having such untried and broad ramifications as private property rights on 
submerged land, public access to the shore, the scope of the historic public 
trust, police power, mitigation, and regional, rather than local control 
over the bay and its shoreline. 

It was in the courts that many of these issues were settled, and it was 
Clement Shute who provided the advice, the energy, and the skill needed to 
establish BCDC's authority over future development of San Francisco Bay in 
the courts. "I started off that job thinking it was going to be 
interesting, but I had no background in ecology environmental matters by 
training or interest. So I grew with it." 

Mr. Shute agreed to fit a one-hour interview on October 8, 1984, into 
his very crowded schedule by combining lunch and taping in his San Francisco 
office on the top floor of a renovated Victorian home on Hayes Street. The 
focus was legal issues, and major court cases handled during BCDC's first 
decade. To be sure, this subject deserves more than one hour. But by 
combining excellent recall, a skill at discussing legal matters in 
understandable English, and a historical perspective, he was able in that 
brief period to add a valuable dimension to our understanding of the early 
history of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission. 

Malca Chall 
Interviewer- Editor 

24 January 1986 

Regional Oral History Office 

486 The Bancroft Library 

University of California at Berkeley 


legional Oral History Office University of California 

loom 486 The Bancroft Library - Berkeley, California 94720 

(Please print or write clearly) 

Your fun name El/ifC-h C/C-kc*^ fj trf C- 3~ tr. ' 

Date of birth ^/ 3$ _ Place of birth jaro. /V.V' 


Father's full name / /'/<**? C/&**o^ 


Occupation & *) '** g g *" 

Mother's fun name ^ c/f*% JJ/_^ ft 




Where did you grow up ? <- / ^ c^/ O CQ_. 

Present community C/ ^ ; * c/~ ^ C <x . 

^^ ^^ ^r^ A 1 *, / 

Education A- -> 0t*fHi_*tJ AGt]*,* Uh.>V Co/. 



Special interests or activities 



[Date of Interview: 8 October 

Chall: First of all I want to know at what stage you came in to BCDC. 

Shute: I was in the attorney general's office as a junior deputy, just 
having gotten out of law school in 1964. I was assigned by the 
attorney general's office to work with BCDC [Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission] from its first meeting, late in September of 
1965, or October of 1965. 

Chall: That was during the Brown administration? 
Shute: Tes, Father Brown. [Edmund G. Brown, Sr.] 

Chall: Did you come in to stay in San Francisco; were you actually on staff 

Shute: The attorney general had three offices then and four now, and always 
had an office in San Francisco and that's where I was. 

Chall: Tour particular assignment dealt with legal matters and what else? 

Shute: The BCDC was then and still is a state agency, so by law the 

attorney general is its counsel. I was assigned as the deputy that 
would represent the agency by attending meetings, writing opinions, 
or handling any lawsuits. So, I was involved from the legal 
perspective; but when you work with an agency for a while, the line 
between policy and law becomes very blurred. 

Chall: Did you feel at that time, let's see you came on in '65, when it was 
just a study commission 

Shute: No, the study commission was 1964. 

symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun 
or ended. 


Chall: That's right, it had already been granted its three-year trial 

Shute: Eugene McAteer had sponsored legislation which passed and became 
effective September 17, 1965. The agency started meeting right 
after that, and that's when I became involved. So I was there from 
the start of that initial three-year planning and permiting process. 

Chall: At that time what did you consider your stance with respect to BCDC? 
Were you an advocate for BCDC in any way? It seems to have begun 
with very positive concern among the staff. How did that affect 
your work as the state's attorney? 

Shute: I started off that job thinking it was going to be interesting, but 
I had no background in ecology environmental matters by training 
or interest. So, I grew with it, but I wasn't a Sierra Club member 
or anything like that. 

Chall: At the' time, during those first three years, they were doing a 

couple of things. One was that major plan they had to develop, and 
the other one was the permit applications. Both of these would deal 
with law. In what way were you concerned with the work on the plan? 

Shute: There were many many legal issues about what kinds of limitations 
could be prescribed against people who owned tide and submerged 
lands, that were even far less resolved then than they might be now 
because of some later court decisions. The so-called public trust 
doctrine was not nearly as well developed as it is now. The 
commission, through the studies which were being done initially, 
wanted to severely limit the opportunity for fill anywhere in the 
body of San Francisco Bay. For example, if that were in the same 
category legally as land in downtown Oakland, there are 
constitutional limits on how far you can go in preventing an owner 
from using property, or completely diminishing its value. So there 
were constant questions of, well if we only allow them to do this, 
or if we declare this an open-space zone, what sort of test can be 
made against the plan in court and what would happen? This was 
probably the major legal issue, but there were many many issues in 
connection with the plan. 

Some more examples were whether BCDC could draw lines inland 
based on the parcel depth, or was that just an arbitrary event based 
on some prior property transaction, or did it have to be uniform? 
The plan recommended that the shoreline band vary by parcel depth. 
I advised, during the legislative process, that I thought that would 
violate equal protection, so we came up with the uniform band. I 
wish it were more than one hundred feet. 

There are all the procedural questions of setting up hearings. 
"How do you have hearings? Who gets to talk? What's the level of 
formality? Are there such things as hearsay or opinion testimony 
that should be disregarded? What kind of notice has to be given?" 


This was a whole new agency that didn't exist before, and it was in 
an area that was pretty novel. Then, we had (you started off 
talking about the plan, so I'll stick to that), there were questions 
that came up during the planning process about having a fill tax for 
fill; or having mitigation requirements. Then, of course, you get 
into legal issues. How much of that can you impose on somebody and 
have it still be valid? What strength of evidence do you have to 
have? What criteria do you set up? 

I would say that I probably sat through 90Z or more, maybe 
closer to 95Z of all the public meetings of BCDC during that whole 
period [1965-1969]. Sometimes they would result in a request for an 
opinion written opinion from the attorney general, or, more of the 
time, somebody on the commission would say, "Well this has been 
raised, Mr. Shute, what do you think?" I would respond as 
spontaneously as I could. 

Chall: Had you done some prior research on the topic? 

Shute: Oh, sure. 

Chall: Did you have your own staff? 

Shute: No, not in those days. In those days I was assigned half-time to 
BCDC, and I was a tax lawyer the other half time so 

Chall: Oh my goodness, really? [laughs] Of course everybody was under 
tremendous pressure those three years. I suppose you all went 
through that kind of thing. 

Shute: That's right, yes. 

Chall: In considering the plan and research for it, the McAteer-Petris Act 
required that you had to come out with something by the end of the 
period. Did you work along with groups like the Sierra Club and the 
Bay Area Council? Did you ever have any contacts with them as you 
were working on the plan? 

Shute: I knew most of those people, but I didn't deal with them directly. 
I found it more effective to have the staff take in what they 
thought were issues that these groups were presenting. Then I would 
discuss it with staff, so I didn't have direct meetings very often 
with those kind of people. Actually, the scope of the work would be 
defined in the contracts with the consultants, who did the initial 
studies on the effects of bay fill, and then, for the most part, 
they worked with the staff. I would see a draft and go through 
that. My main objective there was to make sure that a consultant 
didn't advocate something which would put the agency in an 
impossible position, because if it relied on it, it would be 

Chall: I see. 


Shute: The only consultant I had contact with was Mike Heyman (now 

chancellor of the Berkeley campus). As you know Mike did the Powers 
report.* That was a critical report because it was going to lay out 
some of the legal parameters that the agency would have to live 
with, and get into this question of how far you could prevent fill 
without destroying property rights, so I was involved in that one. 
But, on the stuff about how much sand there was in the bay, and the 
value of marshes and so forth, I didn't deal directly with the 

Luckily we were all learning then everybody was learning. One 
of the first things that I remember happening early in the fall of 
'65, was (I think it was) Professor Tom Harvey from San Jose State, 
coming up and giving the commission a lecture on the meaning of the 
word ecology. We all take that for granted today, but I didn't know 
what it meant. So, we were all learning together. 

Chall: And, establishing some precedent eventually for use of the land 

underwater or on the shore. Mel Lane is quoted as saying in effect 
that when you own property under water, that doesn't mean you have 
the right to turn it into land. 

Shute: Well that's right. That was something which I think the BCDC plan, 
and BCDC's actions in implementing the plan, had more to do with 
than the State Land Commission, particularly by becoming involved in 
lawsuits to determine the scope of the public trust. All of those 
decisions in intervening years have been along the lines of what we 
were advocating. That if you owned underwater land that was subject 
to the public trust, the public could use it for whatever purpose 
was appropriate, and the private owner could not consider it like 
the land that I own at my home. It was a whole different character 
of land that's been pretty well established now. Although, we had 
to walk a line between hoping that would become the law, and 
honoring what we thought was the existing law which was that people 
had to be given an opportunity to use their property. 

Chall: Now, of course, that came out in permit applications. 

Shute: Yes, that's correct. I wanted to really emphasize that because I 

think that the reason the bay plan has been an enduring document, at 
least relatively speaking, is because it was developed by the same 
people that had to sit through permit hearings and make those tough 
decisions. Not sit in a corner and work with consultants in an 
abstract fashion. They saw people who said, "I want to fill this 
for a marina. It's going to create jobs and provide berthing 
facilities which are drastically needed in the bay area. I have to 

*Heyman, I. Michael, Powers; Regulation Legal Questions. Volume I, 
April 1968. Prepared for the San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission. 


fill a marsh to do it." By living through those kinds of 
experiences the BART tube was one of the first things that came up, 
and there vere lots of other controversial things those people 
became attuned to what was really happening out there, where the 
pressures were. They fashioned a plan and policies that were 
responsive to that permitting experience, and not just an abstract 
planning process. 

Furthermore, BCDC became involved right away in some major 
lawsuits. Which, in retrospect, were extremely important, because 
this was a new regional agency it was one of the first ones in the 
United States created strictly for protection of an environmental 
resource. I found it interesting that the private sector didn't 
like us a bit, but they don't like government regulation anyway. 
So, there was nothing special about that. Local government took it 
as a tremendous affront to their normal prerogatives to have this 
planning and permitting agency. Our early lawsuits were against 
local government. 

We were establishing our turf, "We are here, we have a law to 
administer and we have powers, and you just better understand that." 
You don't do that by putting out press releases or holding meetings. 
You do it by litigation because then the courts come down with 
rulings, and they see that you will enforce your law, and you 
gradually gather some standing. 

Our first major lawsuit was against the town of Emeryville. 

Emeryville and Fill: Setting .a Precedent 

Chall: Oh yes. Was that over fill? 

Shute: Yes over fill. They wanted to fill a hundred and some acres I 

think about one hundred and fifty acres of land, outboard of the end 
of their marina where it is right now, and put fifteen thousand 
people out there a new city. They had started filling and adopted 
a plan four days before the statute became effective in 1965, so 
they claimed they were grandfathered. They had a plan and they had 
started it. There was a grandfather provision in the law which 
wasn't really too well written I had nothing to do with that. 

We went to court, and it eventually ended up in the California 
Supreme Court where we won a resounding victory. The project was 
stopped. The court said it wasn't grandfathered, and gave very 
broad credence to the McAteer-Petris Act. That case has been the 
precedent for all the subsequent appellate cases on any issue that 
has come up. BCDC has never lost an appellate case, and I've been 


A Crucial 
Legal Test 
On Bay Fill 

The Bay Conservation 
and Development Commis 
sion was presented with 
its first strong legal test 
yesterday -In a suit filed 
here by a rejected Bay 
filler. I 

Candlestick . 

Inc., whose reqnest to CUT a 
square block smtthwest o^the 
ballpark was reje&ei h : Jan 
uary, attacked the legalities 
of the Commission's proce- 

Using terms such as "un- 
i constitutional and invalid," 
I "wrongful, arbitrary and ille 
gal," and "arbitrary, illegal. 
capricious and discriminato 
ry," the company asked that 
the Commission order be set 
aside, that its permit to fill 
be issued and that it rolled 
150,000 in damages. 


Minutes after the 
filed. Presiding Judge^AlvTn 
E. Weinberger of the Superi 
or Court ordered the Com 
mission to show cause on 
March 15 why Candlestick's 
petition should not be grant 

: The unhappy firm, rach fs 
related to either the ball 
park r the baseball team, 
said it bought some 118.000 
square feet of tidelands in 
1964 at a cost of $40,000. 

It planned to use the prop 
erty, which has a total size of 
2.7 acres, for dumping demo 
lition debris mainly wood, 
broken concrete and dirt. 

Filling the tidelands would 
require about two years, the 
company told the Commis 
sion, after which the land 
would be developed with 
light industrial uses. 


Quentin Kopp, attorney foi 
Candlestick Praa*rtJ*i, salt 
in the suit that fce Otnmis 
>ad no juriskattoo ovei 
land because ifr.talls with 
(fee Hunters Point Recla 

>n District. 

He also said the Commis 
sion erred by not acting with 
in 60 days after the fill appli 
cation was filed, by allowing 
proxy members of the 
24-man Commission to vote 
without written authorization 
from regular members, and 
by giving him no opportunity 
to rebut,. evidence or cross- 1 
r jotoesses who op- ! 
ed the project. 
TT1 e Candlestick applica- 

, was rejected, -1 1 no to 6 

->7*- at .-,- /*. 


Bay Unit OKs Plans for 
New West Oakland Port 

<1CLA. |7 
The San Francisco Bay Con 
servation and Development 
Commission has unanimously 
and enthusiastically approved 
plans for Seatrain Lines Inc. 
to develop a major new con 
tainer ship port on the old 
Moore Drydock property in 
West Oakland. 

The big maritime develop 
ment won't require Bay fill 

Joseph Bodovitz, BCDC ex 
ecutive director, said the fact 
that private industry is willing 
to invest millions in rehabili 
tating a deteriorated section 
of the waterfront for port de 
velopment is proof of one of 
B C D C 's basic contentions: 
that new industrial develop 
ment can be done without Bay 

Bodovitz also praised the 
company for its willingness to 
provide public access and 
public viewing spots within 
the big new shipping complex 
at the western tip of Oakland 
adjacent to the west end of 
the Estuary. 

"This is a prime example of 
what can be done and what 
could be done elsewhere In 
the Bay Area," Bodovitz said. 

Seatrain will install an 800 
foot long dock' parallel to the 
existing shore. The company 
has plans for similar docks 
along 1.600 feet of waterfront. 

The development marks one 
more step toward Oakland's 
emergence as the major con 
tainer-cargo port on the West 
Coast and increases the 

be selected as the West Coast 
terminal for the proposed 
"land bridge" that would 
move cargo from Europe to 
Asia by a combination of big 
ships and big unit trains. 

The commission also nar 
rowly approved plans for the 
Port of San Francisco to dike 
and fill 24 acres covering the 
site of the deteriorated Pier 72 
and the foot of 23rd St. 

BCDC also, for the fourth 
time, turned down a request 
by Frank M. Burke for per 
mission to fill half of the 
96-acre "Heerdt Marsh" at 
the south end of Corte Madera 
Creek for a housing and indus 
trial development with the 
other half of marsh being do 
nated to the Mann Conserve- 


involved in all of them including one now in private practice, where 
I represented Save the Bay (Leslie Salt v. BCDC). 

So, the willingness of the agency to go to court, or to deny a 
permit and defend it, was instrumental in establishing its turf as 
an institution. Otherwise, some groups have come and gone that had 
power, but it wasn't recognized or not exercised, so everybody 
ignored them. 

Chall: How did it come about that this particular agency was willing to 
fight for its own turf? Was that an accident or what? 

Shute: I think there was a unique combination of circumstances during that 
time. One was that the legislation coincided with a public feeling 
that the bay was threatened. So, the agency was operating generally 
with editorial support, and support in a broad sense from the 
populace in the bay area. The people named to the commission to 
start with, for the most part were outstanding people, really 
committed to the process. Like Mel [Melvin] Lane and Hans Feibusch, 
and I don't remember all the names, but they were very outstanding 
people. The staff, Joe Bodovitz and the people that he gathered 
around him, were very talented people. There was a combination of 
support and an understanding of the purpose, and so if somebody was 
going to start a fill project out there, people didn't want that to 
continue. They wanted to assert their authority and stop it. 

Chall: Did that case against Emeryville come up after the commission was 
made permanent? Did it take a long time? 

Shute: No, they were filling from the day the commission came into 

existence. We went to court sometime that fall of 1965. We had 
injunctions from the trial court immediately, and a ruling from the 
California Supreme Court sometime in 1967, so it all happened pretty 
fast. In fact, the California Supreme Court took the case directly 
over from the trial court which is very unusual. Usually, there is 
an intermediate level appellate court that you go through, but the 
supreme court thought it was so important, and had such strong 
public overtones, that it took the case over directly. 

Chall: Well, I guess the public trust was another area of concern. Was 
that the public lands commission that took that to court? 

Shute: The State Lands Commission is traditionally the agency that people 
consider to be the one charged with administering and so forth, the 
public trust. But, another reason the Emeryville case is so 
important is that Emeryville was proposing to fill these lands which 
were actually granted tidelands belonging to the state of 
California, granted in trust to the town of Emeryville for statewide 
purposes. During the course of the opinion, the supreme court said 
that the McAteer-Petris Act in effect amends every one of those 
grants to incorporate into it the restrictions of the law the 
McAteer-Petris Act. 


Now, other decisions have made it even more clear that the 
McAteer-Petris Act is an exercise of the trust, by the legislature, 
delegating that power to BCDC. So, that BCDC's planning and 
permitting decisions are a part of the trust. So the commission has 
always supported the State Lands Commission, pushed the State Lands 
Commission, gone in as a friend of the court in cases involving the 
public trust, all with a view of trying to broaden its scope and 
bring it into contemporary understanding. It's not only to protect 
commerce, navigation and fishing, which is the way it developed in 
the English common law a thousand years ago, but to protect the 
natural resource values of a body of water, which is the 
contemporary concern. 

That was accepted by the California Supreme Court in Marks vs. 
Whitney, in 1970. The suit was between two private parties over 
tidelands property in Tomales Bay. The State Lands Commission and 
BCDC came in as a friend of the court, because the issues there were 
the same as the issues in the bay, and the California Supreme Court 
came out and said that the trust encompasses contemporary needs to 
preserve the environment, protect the bay from filling, preserve 
open space and wildlife habitat and so forth; which was a major 
major victory for the trust. 

Westbav Community Associates: The Public Trust Issue 

Chall: What about Westbay litigation? It seemed to take forever. I note 
from the Fall Newsletter, 1977 from the Save the Bay Association 
that it was settled in 1977. But it seems to me, from other old 
clippings that are around, that this must have started a long time 

Shute: Yes. Well, it was actually almost all of San Mateo's shoreline 

from Burlingame down to the Dumbarton bridge right around the Santa 
Clara County line. The way it started was that there was a Westbay 
Community Associates, I don't know the legal entity, but it was 
consisting of three major interests: The Chase Manhattan Bank in New 
York, the then Crocker Land Company, which I think became part of 
Foremost-McKesson, and the Ideal Cement Company which claimed title 
to those old underwater patents. The idea was Chase Manhattan, 
David Rockefeller, would finance it, the Crocker Land Company owned 
San Bruno Mountain, they'd level it and put it in the bay on Ideal 
Cement's property. It would be thousands of acres of fill and 
residences and industry. 

Chall: Great plan. 


Shute: There were three major opponents in 1969 to the [BCDC] legislation. 
One was Westbay Associates, one was Leslie Salt, and the other was 
Santa Fe Railroad. We orchestrated a tactical maneuver. Westbay 
Community Associates was going to argue in the legislature that they 
owned this property, and they were being stymied in carrying out 
this project. So, just before that 1969 legislative session 
started, we convinced the State Lands Commission to file suit and 
challenge their title which had to be done anyway. That way we 
could tell the legislature, "What do you mean? It's been challenged 
whether they own that property, they can't come in here and tell you 
they have a right to fill it." That suit went on for a long time 
and through various machinations, and eventually we settled in, I 
forget what year. 

Chall: In favor of BCDC? 

Shute: I think so. The settlement confirmed some of their title, but all 
subject to the public trust. And, confirmed some upland parcels in 
fee which were already filled. Their project basically was 
abandoned, and they've never been able to carry out any part of it. 

Santa Fe and Murphy: The Public Trust Issue 

Chall: What about the Santa Fe and Murphy litigation, involving this 

bay shore land?* Are you familiar with that? I think it began in 

Shute: I'm familiar with that too. 

Chall: Could you tell me something about that one? 

Shute: That started off as a suit by Murphy and (I guess) Santa Fe against 
the decision by the Berkeley City Council to deny a shopping center 
down there. There were some underwater parcels that were involved 
in the ownership as well as filled parcels. I believe the State 
Lands Commission intervened in the case, or maybe the city of 
Berkeley brought them in I've forgotten how the state became a 

*The Santa Fe Improvement Company and George W. Murphy vs. The City 
of Berkeley and the State of California. 






Then they got away from litigating the validity of Berkeley's 
denial, and got into the question of the meaning of the trust. The 
California Supreme Court again, in a case called, City of Berkeley 
vs. Superior Court, which was the same Murphy litigation, held that 
any area which is currently wet subject to tidal action, is subject 
to the public trust. Any area which had been filled at the time 
that BCDC came along, was not. A practical compromise so to speak. 

It's a very complicated subject having to do with the Board of 
Tideland Commissioner sales in the 1860s, pursuant to a plan they 
had for the bay, which was a cookie-cutter subdivision with some 
canals. Then they sold that land to private parties, and some of 
the court cases in the 1913-15 era, had said that those sales 
terminated the trust because they were pursuant to a plan to improve 
the bay. So, the supreme court in effect, partially disapproved and 
overruled some of those early cases and said, "No, that's not true." 
But, rather than stick people who perhaps relied on those decisions 
and filled their property, we'll say, 'they're off the hook. That 
land isn't subject to the trust." Anyone who had not relied on that 
plan by that time, the water was still there, they're subject to 
contemporary requirements subject to the trust. Then subsequently, 
Berkeley and Santa Fe are embroiled in a whole new dispute, and that 
lawsuit has been dropped. It never did litigate the validity of 
Berkeley's denial. 

At the present time the Santa Fe is planning something on the 
Berkeley shore, but I don't know whether that involves fill or not. 

No, it does not. 

Is it just the use of their land which they're permitted under city 
planning regulations? 

Yes. Just for accuracy, I am retained by the city of Berkeley as an 
advisor to them on all the legal questions that will come out of 
that development, so I guess the record ought to show that, but 
Santa Fe's proposal does not involve any new fill, just on the 
existing fill which under the Berkeley case I just described, would 
not be subject to the public trust. 

When did you leave? I wanted to get into some other cases that I 
have here, but I don't know when you left BCDC. 

I left the attorney general's office in February of 1980. I sat 
with the commission as their counsel and handled every bit of their 
legal work for that whole eighteen years. 



The Candlestick Properties Case: Police Power Authority 

I am using some of the material on BCDC from Ora Huth's files in the 
Institute of Governmental Studies. I have a page out of a 
publication dealing with significant court actions which is dated 
July, 1973. On page 41, it reads, "The Candlestick properties case, 
finally decided in 1970, was the first major test of the 
Commission's police power authority to prevent filling of the Bay."* 

Shute: True. 

Chall: Can you tell me a little bit about that one? I think it arose in 
1967. This one has to do with police power, but is that different 
from what you have told me? 

Shute: Yes, because at the time, this was property down in the Candlestick 
Point area near the stadium, that was under water it still is I 
think, that was also within an area called the Hunter's Point 
Reclamation District. The legislature has an unfortunate habit of 
passing laws every year that don't relate to what they did the year 
before. The Hunter's Point Reclamation Act law had a requirement 
and provision in it encouraging fill. 

The owner of those properties, or the person who claimed 
ownership, came before BCDC with a proposal to fill it I don't even 
remember what the project was supposed to be, but they wanted to 
fill a substantial portion of it. The commission turned them down. 
It said, "No, that's going to be harmful to the bay, it's contrary 
to the implementation of the plan that we're working on," and 
denied it. The owner, represented by Quentin Kopp, currently on 
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, sued the commission for 
umpty ump j ill ion dollars in a claim of inverse condemnation that 
all their property rights had been frustrated. 

The case went through the superior court and then to the court 
of appeal, and the court of appeal said that the commission had 
engaged in the valid exercise of its police power to protect the bay 
during this planning period; that there were legitimate 
environmental reasons and planning reasons for that, and that the 

owner might have alternative uses available under the plan, or for 
water dependent purposes. He hadn't really tried to explain why he 

*Bosselman, F., Callies, D., Banta, J., "Taking Issue: An Analysis of 
the Constitutional Limits of Land Use Control," Council on 
Environmental Quality, (July 9, 1973), p. 41. 



The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development 
-osm iss ion is another regional agency sanctioned by the 
*lifornia Legislature, this time to deal with ecological 
-roblems associated with land use and development in 
",-d immediately adjacent to the Bay. The Commission 
'is strong powers of review over both public and private 
Development within the Bay and adjoining wetlands, 
:r.cluding undiked marshes. Applications for shoreland 
jcvelopment, however, must provide only "maximum feasible 
jrcess ... to the Bay and its shoreline" to gain Com 
mission approval, ll/ 

The Candlestick Properties case, finally decided 
;n 1970, 12/ was the first major test of the Commission's 
police power authority to prevent filling of the Bay. 
The legislative mandate approved in that case has allowed 
t.*ie Commission to take a firm stand in several cases 
wticre wetlands or the Bay have been endangered by develop 
ment proposals. Clement Shute, head of the State 
Attorney General's Environmental Unit notes that the 
frCDC's exercise of discretion is" controlled by a watch 
ful and concerned public which would sue if there were 
i.-. abuse of discretion, and also by full media coverage 
~i its meetings." 13/ 

Working within its narrow regulatory mandate, the 
'cranission works to reach an accommodation whenever 
;cssible. The staff Legal Counsel notes that it has 
icd one statutory exception allowing minor filling to 
iicilitate trade-offs in negotiation with permit appli- 
nts. An agreement allowing fill of four acres in 
-.'.c Suisun Marsh in the northwest part of the Bay in 
'xchange for dedication of 365 acres to the Conservation 

U. See F. Bosselman and D. Callies, The Quiet Revolution in 

Land Use Control. Council on Environmental Quality (December, 

1971) at 108-135. 
" Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay C & D 

Commission. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 

lj Interview with Clement Shute, Assistant Attorney General, 

September 13, 1972. 



Foundation for preservation is one of the more successf u < 
agreements reached in this manner. 14/ 

The 100 acre Hurt Marsh in Mar in County is one 
area where the Commission is currently taking a strong 
stand in an effort to prevent the loss of one of the 
few large marshes in that section of the Bay. After 
proposing several industrial uses to be located on a 
proposed land-fill, the landowner is now proposing a 
marina which meets the "water related use" requirement 
for Bay development on fill. However, recent amendments 
provide that such development must be built substantially 
on existing land, a qualification which has prevented 
approval of even the revised proposal. IS/ The property, 
if available for commercial development, may be worth 
as much as $5.5 million dollars, keeping the taking 
issue alive until the permit application is finally 

The state, supported by the Save San Francisco Bay 
Association, has filed suit to block development of a 
2.3 mile strip along the southwest side of the Bay. 16/ 
Although Westbay Community Associates owns the submerged 
land involved, the state urges that the public trust 
for navigation, commerce and fisheries would be infringed 
if Westbay is allowed to fill. The Association also 
argues that there has been long standing public access 
to the area establishing prescriptive rights in the 
public. IT/ 

The voters liked the concept of the BCDC so much 
they voted in favor of proposition 20 at the November, 
1972 elections, thereby establishing a similar control 
program along the entire coast. The Coastal Zone Act IS/ 

14. Interview with Mike Wilmar, September 14, 1972. 

15. Id. 

16. "Bay Watchers," Save San Francisco Bay Association, 
February, 1970. 

17. Id. 

18. California Public Resources Code Sections 27000 et seq. 
(1973 Supp.). 


Just because of the timing of it, coming in 1970 when other 
places like Wisconsin, New Jersey, as well as California were 
starting to grope for ways to protect their wetlands, this for 
a while, became known as the leading case on the question of the 
extent of the police power to protect waterways. 

Chall: Apparently Save the Bay as an organization, filed some suits, one 

against the Westbay Community Associates which we talked about. Was 
that important? 

Shute: Save the Bay lawyers intervened in the Westbay litigation. The 
state brought the case, Westbay was the defendant. Save the Bay 
said, "We want to come into this case because we think we have an 
interest slightly different than either party." The court allowed 
them to intervene. They have done that on a number of occasions 
over the years, and you would have to ask them about that time. My 
understanding is that their perceived role was that they wanted to 
make sure that the state was honest about staying strong and tough 
on the strict principals that BCDC was advocating, or that they were 
advocating. Particularly, if there were going to be a settlement, 
that the settlement not be weak or give away or anything like that. 
By being a party they could object to and prevent a settlement that 
was not in their interests. 

Chall: How important is a group like Save the Bay to BCDC? 

Shute: I think its very important because it provides a constituent support 
group, and a constituent group that espouses consistently a hard 
line, tough, pro-environmental, pro-protective position. 
Politically it has a certain claim to the life of the agency because 
it was very instrumental in having it enacted in the first place, 
and then in getting it extended in 1969. 

A good number of the people that have served on the commission 
and have been leading forces, have been people that came out of Save 
the Bay ranks were members or had always been supportive of Save 
the Bay objectives. So, Save the Bay had ready entree to key people 
on the commission and to the staff, and was always there as a 
counter-force to the ever present pressure of developer's, "Oh we've 
got to have it now, jobs it's only a small amount of fill." There 
was Save the Bay there all the time, "No. no." It was always 
predictable and still is what they'd say, but I think it was a very 
important role. 


The Reagan Administration 

Chall: When Governor Reagan came in, was there a change in concern about 
BCDC? His appointees, did they change the tenor of it in anyway? 

Shute: For one thing when Governor Reagan became governor, Mel Lane was 
continued as chairman. I think there were some changes, like the 
woman who was vice-chairman for years and years 

Chall: Mrs. Erskine. 

Shute: Well, Mrs. Erskine then, but it was after hei Mrs. Dean Watkins, 

Bessie Watkins, became vice-chair. She was not maybe as much of an 
environmentalist, or single-minded about protecting the bay as 
Dorothy Erskine but close. I don't remember detecting any 
significant change in the commission's direction at that time. I 
don't know whether Governor Reagan's administration just figured, 
"Well they're in the midst of a planning process, and the 
legislature's going to have another crack at it," or whether, 
because of the public support for this, they just went along with 
it. I don't believe that had much significance to what the 
commission did. 

Chall: So the commission after the big battle of 1969, just moved ahead in 
about the same way, except that you had new commissioners to 

Shute: Not all, not a whole bunch. I think that one of the changes made in 
the legislation was that alternates could not I guess there 
couldn't be any alternates. 

Chall: Yes, that's correct. 

Shute: And, a lot of the alternates had actually been the strength of the 
commission, because they weren't a member of the board of 
supervisors, they were somebody interested in the bay. Say the San 
Mateo board said, "Aw you go play with that, we don't know what it's 
all about, and we don't care." Then the legislature, pursuant to 
pressure, wanted to make sure that those politicians were there and 
not some alternate, so they knocked that out. So, those people, 
some of them required a lot of education and all that sort of thing. 
But even then there was no great change. Eventually the legislature 
put the alternate provision back in because people didn't come to 
meetings. You couldn't get thirteen votes and so the same people 
who took it out wanted it back in. 

Chall: Except that they required that their alternates be members of the 
same organization. 


Shute: That's correct. 

Chall: Yes, I noticed just on one set of minutes that I picked up at 
random, that there were this was in 1967 that there were ten 
proxies at that time, and four people absent, so it meant that those 
proxies were very important. 

Shute: They were important, that's correct. 

Eugene McAteer died sometime during 1967. He was going to be 
the hoped for champion of this legislation, and so it was kind of 
grim for a while. Eventually, four bills were introduced in that 
1969 session, and I think Senator Marks' s bill was sort of the 
"stalking horse" for the Reagan administration. Essentially all it 
did was to knock out the termination provision in the three-year 
part of the first McAteer law. The agency would continue to exist, 
but it wouldn't have any powers related to a permanent program or 
its plan. That was the Reagan solution and Marks advocated that. 

There was so much pressure in the bay area from the papers, 
from the radios, it was such a big crusade that even Reagan had to 
back off and end up supporting the strong version of the bill, and 
of course he signed it. So having done that, I guess they didn't 
decide to make the wholesale change and put a bunch of people on the 
commission who weren't sympathetic to the new statutory purpose. 

Chall: His Resources Agency director anyway was Norman Livermore who must 
have been concerned about the bay. 

Shute: Oh a lot of concern. His family has, over the years, been 

interested in conservation matters. Ike Livermore was probably 
the I don't know what the right label is, but he was the one who, 
if anything, was out of sync with the ideology of the Reagan 
administration because he did support these things. Other members 
of that administration didn't, but he, because of Reagan's policy, 
as he espoused in his debate last night, of just setting a broad 
policy framework and then letting people alone, Livermore was pretty 
much able to do what he thought was right, which for the most part 
was very constructive. 

Chall: And also on the board after '69, was Gordon Luce of the Business and 
Transportation agency. That was important in terms of his highway 

Shute: They always sent somebody from Gal-Trans much on further down as the 
actual appointee. They were either nonparticipants or went along 
with the staff. 

Chall: Were you in touch with anyone in the governor's office during the 
1969 battle over the legislation? 


Shute: On the administration's legislation? No, during 1969 the governor's 
office was really not a factor in the legislative process. 

Chall: And after that? Was there any leaning on the commission for 

particular decisions on permit applications or anything like that 
that you know of? 

Shute: I don't think so, I don't recall any. I believe that one of the 
things about BCDC that tells its story, is that almost every vote 
has been close to unanimous on planning issues and permitting 
issues. The feeling was when the commission was created, that no 
twenty-five politicians could agree on when to adjourn, so it was 
doomed to failure and it's been exactly the opposite of that. I 
think a part of that is because the state administrations from time 
to time have not tried to put pressure on them. 

BCDC Relationships with other Federal. State, and Local Agencies 

Chall: What about relationships with such state agencies as the Department 
of Water Resources, and the Regional Water Quality Control Board? 

Shute: The Department of Water Resources, the problems that they are 
involved in, have more to do, I think with the various water 
projects diversion to southern California and the central valley. 
BCDC staff and chairmen over the years, I think tried to create a 
fiction in my opinion divorcing those water projects from anything 
having to do with BCDC's role. I think it was in order to avoid 
getting sucked into the water fights and suffering politically, 
because no matter what you do you end up hurting somebody. So, the 
commission assiduously avoided positions on water projects even 
though we all know, and now pretty much concede, that there is a 
tremendous impact on the bay as well as the delta. So, there wasn't 
much contact with the Department of Water Resources. 

Now the state Water Resources Control Board, and its regional 
board in the bay area, that's a whole different thing, because they 
have direct regulatory power through the waste discharge require 
ments. There was a turf fight at the beginning as you would expect. 
The regional board saying, "We don't want you taking over things 
that we think are normally our job." And, BCDC maybe aggressively 
wanting to step on some of the things that they had normally 
administered, but that worked itself out pretty easily and I don't 
believe there's been much friction over the years between those two 

Chall: Does the Water Quality Control Board have enough police power 
enough enforcement power to bring about these requirements? 


Shute: Yes. As a matter of fact BCDC didn't have much enforcement power. 
It didn't have cease and desist or civil penalty provisions. So, 
along about the mid-seventies, I've forgotten the year, the commission 
went to I forget who it was, probably [Michael] Wornum in Marin 
County then an assemblyman. Anyway they went to the legislature and 
asked that the Porter-Cologne provisions of the water quality law be 
put into its law, to allow it to issue cease and desist orders and 
civil penalties, and that was put into its law. So, we borrowed our 
enforcement power from the state board. 

Chall: Well that certainly would help the lawsuits. 

Shute: Yes, it helped a lot because then the staff could issue a stop work 
order, in effect. If a person violated it they would be subject to 
$6,000 a day in civil penalties ordered by a court. Otherwise you 
have to go to court to get an injunction, and the other guy's lawyer 
comes in and pleads all kinds of hardship. So this sort of 
admnistrative enforcement is much more effective. 

Chall: That happened in the mid-seventies? 
Shute: The mid-seventies, yes. 

Chall: What about the federal government's Corps of Engineers and other 
water-related agencies? 

Shute: Fish and Wildlife Services? 

Chall: Some of these federal as well as state agencies were on the 

Shute: E.P.A. since it was formed in the Nixon administration, had a 

representative, but that person as you know, is non-voting and never 
really had a whole lot to say, or didn't try to coordinate federal 
policy through BCDC. I find that a very interesting process grew up 
during that time which is still somewhat the case and I think 
unfortunate. The Department of Fish and Game is the natural 
corollary to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The Department of 
Fish and Game was used to taking its crack at people who wanted to 
fill the bay, or put in a project in the bay, through the United 
State's Army Corps of Engineers permitting program. So they would 
fuss and fuss at BCDC about mitigation and reducing the project, and 
then they'd go over to the Corps and comment there and try to 
influence that process. 

The Fish and Wildlife Service, being a federal agency, was much 
more comfortable in submitting its comments to the corps, so they 
didn't do much with BCDC. And, at a permitting level, what happened 
was the state of California was acting almost with two voices. 
BCDC, which I think was the state's representative for the bay, 
would say a certain thing. If fish and game wasn't happy and they 


hardly ever were; they always wanted more they'd go over to the 
Corps of Engineers. The corps during that era was going through a 
very non-traditional change, whereby it was becoming very concerned 
in the San Francisco Bay region for the bay, and expanding its 
jurisdiction, taking tough positions, and refusing to act on a 
permit application until the state Department of Fish and Game and 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service signed off. They had no direct 
regulatory power, but unless they agreed the corps would tell the 
applicant, "Well we're not ready to make a decision, and you won't 
like the one we make. Go see fish and game and make your peace." 
So just by the "we won't make a decision" tactic, fish and game had 
tremendous leverage. 

Well, you always have to "pay the piper," and eventually there 
was a backlash to that which has been expressed through the Reagan 
administration. The corps is diminishing and retreating on its 
jurisdiction using this abuse of the regulatory process as part of 
its excuse for doing it. 

Chall: I understand that the Corps of Engineers was very cooperative with 

Shute: Very cooperative, and I think in the good old days, the chief of the 
corps the colonel in charge of the district would end up going to 
work for a big construction firm or a big engineering firm. For a 
while there people like Charlie Roberts were going to work for the 
state BCDC. 

Chall: That's right. 

Shute: Even Frank Boerger went to work for a consulting firm that was doing 
environmental evaluation. Under Charlie Robert's regime, the corps 
reinterpreted its powers to include permit control to the level of 
"historic" high water, not "actual" high water. They had a band of 
jurisdiction beyond BCDC, and that was very controversial. But they 
were very supportive. So, at that level there was a redundancy and 
a reinforcement that was even stronger than BCDC. That of course 
worked out informally, but at the permitting level the leverage was 
through fish and game refusing to agree until they were 100Z happy. 

Chall: At one time the navy was a problem was it not? Did BCDC have any 
control or was it able to get any control over that situation? 

Shute: The one example that I remember most particularly was the seaplane 
basin I think, in Alameda County. The navy was going to fill it 
ninety-some acres. Their attitude was, "We're going to fill it. We 
don't care who you are, we're the United States Navy, national 
security et cetera." I made a statement at the commission, and I 
forget whether we wrote letters, we probably did, in which we 
pointed out that under the National Environmental Policy Act, the 
navy had to comply and do an environmental impact statement and 
justify its action even though there was no direct state control. 
And, that we'd sue them if they went ahead with it without complying 


with federal law. So, they ranted and raved, and then they dropped 

Chall: What about the airport and the ports? Those are sticky problems. 
You really didn't have total jurisdiction in those areas did you? 

Shute: Well, there was total jurisdiction over new fill, there wasn't any 
other kind of jurisdiction. Probably if you add up the amount of 
approved fill over the years, ports and airports would constitute 
eighty percent or more of the total authorized fill. 

The Port of Oakland was always and has been and still is, a 
very tough adversary for BCDC. It's a tough, well-run outfit. You 
can see in the comparative performance of the Port of Oakland and 
the Port of San Francisco, some flavor of the strong management. 
They would come to BCDC meetings and they would tell it like it is, 
and they would be tough, and they wouldn't yield. But then at some 
point where they figured they could save their basic interests they 
would yield. 

They wanted to extend the length of the runway at the Oakland 
airport, again I don't remember what year. It involved a good 
number of acres of fill. The first time around I think the 
commission just plain turned it down denied the permit. Then they 
came back a year or so later, and developed jointly with the staff, 
this idea of mitigation for fill, which the airport and other people 
had always called blackmail and which the staff at BCDC called 
mitigation. The idea was, "Okay, if you're going to fill here, you 
Port of Oakland better find us an area under your jurisdiction that 
you can dedicate to natural resource protection. Or, if you don't 
own it buy it, and then make it available for natural resource 
protection and we'll consider that kind of an off-set for this 
damage." So, they did provide some mitigation I forget exactly 
where it was and the commission granted a permit for the extended 

I remember discussions. They said, "We can't fly a fully 
loaded plane to its destination without a lengthening of the 
runway." We said, "Fine, fly it half-full and half-fuel, and reload 
somewhere." Well they found that just completely outrageous, but 
eventually they got their permit with mitigation. 

The Port of Oakland's Seventh Street terminal was a 
grandfathered project. That was one where they had better legal 
advice than the town of Emeryville. They had done their steps to 
have a plan and begin filling, and so that whole mole that sticks 
out on the south side of the Bay bridge at the east end, was a 
grandfathered project. They just did it, and got it done before 
they needed a BCDC permit. 

Over the years they've had other projects for improving piers 
and building container facilities, all of which have involved fill. 


The commission and they have had tough negotiations, and basically I 
think ended up requiring the port to have some kind of a plan so you 
knew what was coming next, and providing some kind of mitigation. 
The public benefits of a port operation are there. You can't just 
say it's always got to be the environment. So that was a tough 
negotiation. I think conducted the way these things ought to be. 
In other words both agencies had legitimate reasons for being, they 
knocked heads and they came up with something which I think was 
probably reasonable. 

The Port of San Francisco is a different story. I now am a 
consultant to them for some other purpose, but I'm going to take a 
crack at them anyway. They, as part of the city of San Francisco, 
including the whole fuss over high-rise buildings in Joe Alioto's 
administration which I was involved in, took the attitude that the 
state of California was barely relevant to the operations of the 
city of San Francisco. It was a sovereign entity and, "Who the 
hell is the state?" So they would just start filling, or just start 
doing something, and then we'd land all over them. The mayor would 
scream and jump up and down, "Who are you, who are you?" But, their 
lawyers would tell them, "You can't do that without a permit." or, 
"They've got some power, you better acknowledge it." So, until very 
recently I think, there was a consistent bad feeling and bad blood 
between the staffs of those two agencies, and between the city and 

The high water mark of that was Joe Alioto's administration 
when they came up with this huge proposal for a high-rise office 
building off one of the piers in San Francisco, and the U.S. Steel 
building off another pier rising right up by the Bay bridge. They 
just came in full blazing, "This is San Francisco, we need it." 
They had gotten a grant of the port from the state, and the grant 
provisions, which I'm sure they engineered, required them to spend 
so much money on development within so many years or they would lose 
the grant. So they were saying, "The state said we have to spend 
this money, you can't tell us we can't." I was asked to write an 
opinion, "Could the commission approve fill for nonwater-oriented 
purposes?" I said no. It is a formal attorney general's opinion, 
still on the books, and published. The commission, relying on that, 
found that office buildings were not water oriented, because they've 
had a pretty strong tradition of not allowing things which can go 
anywhere to be considered water dependent; turned it down on that 

The city, not trusting its own city attorney, hired a big 
private law firm. They went to court and they were going to hammer 
us into the ground, but we beat them and they never took an appeal, 
and the project just went away. That led, eventually when 
everybody's temperature came back down, to the formulation of these 
special area plans for the San Francisco waterfront which have this 


complicated formula for getting credit for removing old fill. And, 
you can put in so much new fill if it has public access, and its for 
commercial assembly, and public use, and things like that. 

Chall: But it's better than it would have been otherwise? 

Shute: Oh yes. I think it's okay now and everybody gets along fine. In 

fact when I first was approached by the port to advise them, I said, 
"I don't know that I want to have anything to do with you people. 
All I ever remember is how much we hated each other." "Oh it's all 
different now." I called BCDC staff and they said, "Oh yes, they're 
lovely people." So, that's apparently over with, but for years 
there was a strong feeling that whatever the Port of San Francisco 
wanted to do there had to be something wrong with it, just because 
of who was proposing it. 

Chall: Well I suppose it was a decade of testing one another too. Because 
there are agencies that ultimately would back down from Mayor 
Alioto. He was a strong man* 

Shute: Well that was the hope, [laughs] 

Developing the Concept of Mitigation 

Chall: The whole idea of mitigation is one I'd like you to tell me about. 

How did that come about? Now I think it's under somewhat of a cloud 
with the Deukmejian people, but it worked, so it seemed. How did it 
develop? It's not in the BCDC law, and I don't know that it's in 
the plan. That whole concept seems to have evolved. How did that 

Shute: I will tell you how it evolved, and then I'll tell you the legal 
basis for it. Early, early on during the planning process, there 
was a debate about a fill tax. The idea being, "Look, if somebody's 
going to fill they're going to cause a detriment and they should pay 
for it. Maybe they should be allowed to fill because there is some 
legitimate reason for it, but they ought to pay for it." That was 
then called a fill tax. It was defeated by the commission it 
wasn't a policy that was put into the plan. The feeling was, "Well 
look, if we say something has enough public benefit to be legitimate 
for fill, then why should somebody pay a tax on top of that? We 
should just say it's not legit if we don't think it's right." So 
that was defeated. There's nothing per se about mitigation in any 
detail in the plan. 

Chall: Yes, you did say it's called blackmail 


Shute: Or extortion. 
Chall: Yes. 

Shute: The truth of it is I think, that in 1970, the California 

Environmental Quality Act was enacted the California EIR law, which 
is parallel to the National Environmental Policy Act. It has all 
kinds of language in it about mitigation. So the commission became 
involved as a routine matter, in evaluating draft EIRs 
[Environmental Impact Reports] environmental documents that came to 
them along with permit applications. Rather than go into the 
complexities of that law, the upshot of it was that the commission 
and the staff used the mitigation requirements of that law to impose 
conditions on projects or negotiate conditions on projects. 

So, they I think, felt their primary power came under what we 
call CEQA [California Environmental Quality Act]. That was never 
questioned because CEQA was there and said that. As the years went 
by, CEQA was amended in such a way as to, and that was in 1981 or 
1982, to say that none of those mitigation measures Let's see, how 
is that worded? Oh, "CEQA gave no power to impose mitigation 
measures which was not already a power that the agency had from its 
legislation or ordinances." So, BCDC had been relying on CEQA as 
the source of its authority to impose mitigation; the legislature 
came along and said, "If you have it in the McAteer Act, or you the 
city of Redwood City have it in an ordinance, you can do it but you 
can't rely on CEQA as a source of your power. 

Then, the bad guys came along and said, "Well you can't use 
CEQA anymore can you? So you're out of the mitigation business." 
Then you go back and you look at the McAteer Act, and it says in 
66605a, one of the initial policy provisions that, "The commission 
can only approve fill when it finds that the public benefit exceeds 
the public detriment from the fill." In my opinion in order to make 
sure that the public benefit outweighs that detriment, mitigation 
may be necessary in order to tip that scale in favor of the public 

Chall: That's actually in the act but nobody ever paid any attention to it? 

Shute: Yes, I mean it wasn't all that important because of CEQA. Then all 
of a sudden everybody made an issue out of it, and it's there it's 
in the law, in my opinion. 

Chall: It's been quite important to BCDC. 

Shute: Well the Dumbarton bridge mitigation, the Golden Gate ferry 

terminal, those are probably the two big ones. Over the years there 
has been lots of mitigation required in different contexts, and the 
scream has been, with some justification, there are no standards for 

9 la 

66605. The Legislature further finds and declares: 

(a) That further filling of San Francisco Bay should be authorized only when 
public benefits from fill clearly exceed public detriment from the loss of the water 
areas and should be limited to water-oriented uses (such as ports, water-related 
industry, airports, bridges, wildlife refuges, water-oriented recreation and public 
assembly, water intake and discharge lines for desalinization plants and power gen 
erating plants requiring large amounts of water for cooling purposes) or minor fill 
for improving shoreline appearance or public access to the bay; 

(b) That fill in the bay for any purpose, should be authorized only when no 
alternative upland location is available for such purpose; 

(c) That the water area authorized to be filled should be the minimum necessary 
to achieve the purpose of the fill; 

(d) That the nature, location and extent of any fill should be such that it will 
minimize harmful effects to the bay area, such as, the reduction or impairment of 
the volume surface area or circulation of water, water quality, fertility of marshes 
or fish or wildlife resources; 

(e) That public health, safety and welfare require that fill be constructed in 
accordance with sound safety standards which will afford reasonable protection to 
persons and property against the hazards of unstable geologic or soil conditions or 
of flood or storm waters; 

(f) That fill should be authorized when the filling would, to the maximum extent 
feasible, establish a permanent shoreline; 

(g) That fill should be authorized when the applicant has such valid title to the 
properties in question that he may fill them in the manner and for the uses to be 


this, we don't know what to expect. Write the rules so we'll know 
what we're supposed to do. The staff has always said the varieties 
of situations are infinite, we can't draft rules. 

The One Hundred Foot Band; Public Access 

Chall: Finally, can you tell me a little bit about the problems of 

determining boundaries for the priority areas allowed in the one 
hundred foot band along the shore? 

Shute: Shoreline band? 

Chall: Yes, you had to set priorities didn't you, and once they were set 
that was it. That was rather a hard decision, I would think, to 

Shute: The legislative history of that was that the commission's plan had 
proposed certain priority areas predominantly for parks and 
industry. The consultants had found that there was going to be a 
shortage of waterfront for industry in the future. The commission 
also went around and looked at everybody's local plan the general 
plan of a city or a county where they wanted to propose parks or 
public use areas. They put that in the plan, where they were in the 
shoreline, as potential public parks. Those would be priority areas 
which would operate like zoning; you couldn't change it. 

Then the legislature froze those, so that they couldn't be 
changed except with legislative consent. So now, the legislature 
was going to sit in judgement over whether some park site in San 
Mateo County ought to stay in the plan. The whole reason for that 
was that the idea of a state agency having land-use authority out in 
open water was novel enough, but for it to have power up on the dry 
land was beyond the comprehension of man. 

That's why the people who wrote the Coastal Initiative, knowing 
BCDC's experience, made it one thousand yards and they made it for 
all purposes. The Coastal Commission has dwarfed BCDC's power on 
uplands, and so you don't hear anything about BCDC's authority 
because compared to the Coastal Commission's its irrelevant, 

The process of setting those boundaries wasn't terribly 
difficult. There were a lot of hearings and then the lines were 
set. Most of the crunch has come with the public access 
requirements, because we were one of the first agencies to 
administer a public access requirement and the law didn't say you 
could require dedications. I mean its typical of local government 


to have an ordinance saying, "Okay developer you want to build a 
subdivision? You build us the roads inside the subdivision, and 
dedicate them to us. You're generating the traffic, you build the 
road. We're not going to spend everybody's money doing that, and 
then we'll take title to the road." That's the conventional way that 
dedications of land are handled with development. 

Well, this law says, "The commission shall find that maximum 
feasible public access consistent with the project is provided." It 
didn't say, "You can take it by dedication." There was no power in 
the McAteer Act for the BCDC to hold title to property, so it took a 
lot of doing to get where they are now with a long strong tradition 
of administrative interpretation of what public access means and the 
various forms of enforcement. That was the hard part. 

Chall: Had there been a decision, who would be responsible for what? Say 
the land that was dedicated in order to get the Port of Oakland the 
longer runway. Didn't they dedicate a park somewhere? 

Shute: Those would be permit conditions. I don't know that the commission 
staff has done this uniformly, but it was my recommendation that 
they record the permit, and that way it would become an operative 
restraint on the property. If anybody ever tried to convey the 
property, the new owner would be taken subject to, and with notice 
of these conditions and they could be enforced against any owner as 
time went along. That's not terribly important to a public agency 
because they're not selling their property, but the condition of, 
"You will do this," meant that the commission could always enforce 
their permit requirements. 

Chall: Sometimes they dedicated it to the local park department. 

Shute: There was every kind of variation you can imagine. We would try to 
get park districts, local governments, land conservancies like the 
Trust for Public Lands or the Nature Conservancy or groups like that 
to take title. We always preferred, at least I did, that title be 
transferred somehow to a neutral body to make sure that it would 

A lot of times local governments would say, "We're just going 
to get liability. Somebody falls down on a sidewalk in this public 
area and they're going to sue us. We don't want the liability, we 
don't want the property." Plus, there's a philosophical 
disagreement with BCDC about public access so they didn't want to 
cooperate anyway. Sometimes we couldn't find anybody to take a 
property interest, so we would we just say, "It's a condition of 
your permit that you do this. We're going to record the permit, and 
if you don't comply with it we will bring enforcement action." 

Chall: How can you be sure whether they do or don't comply? I think 

there's something of a public lookout point at Jack London Square 
near a couple of piers which sounds like an interesting sort of 


thing. I've never gone walking down there, but how could you be 
sure that that was there and continually kept up? 

Shute: You just have a BCDC cop running around patrolling. 
Chall: Same as a bay watcher? 

Shute: Well, there have been groups that have tried that. The Oceanic 
Society has planes they fly around, and they try to spot illegal 
fill and turn it into the commission. But, enforcement in my 
experience, has always been the lowest priority of a public agency. 
Not just BCDC but almost all of them. So they'd issue these permits 
with sixty-two tough conditions and then put them in a file. Now, 
BCDC has at least one and maybe more, people whose job is 
enforcement. They're supposed to run around and check these things 
out but 

Chall: that's difficult. What about budgets? Did you find that you were 
concerned about the budget from time to time? Funding is all from 
the state isn't it? It's really the state administration who makes 
the determinations. A couple of years ago there was an attempt to 
cut back on the budget. 

Shute: All the way up until recently, I think there was the typical budget 
struggle to get enough money for what they thought they wanted to 
do, but really they did not have difficulty getting budget support. 
From the years after the enactment of the federal law administered 
by NOA [National Oceanographic Administration] the Coastal Zone 
Management Act there was all kinds of federal planning money that 
came into BCDC, and so they had lots of money for studies and staff 
and things like that. Recently there have been struggles, but I've 
heard from my old friends over there that they still come out okay 
with the governor's office. All state agencies have suffered but 
BCDC has not suffered disproportionately. 

The Coastal Commission became a symbol, and Deukmejian ran on a 
platform of abolishing the Coastal Commission. He devastated 
their budget even to the point where he wouldn't let them spend 
federal money that wasn't even the state's money to be worried 
about. BCDC has never suffered from that kind of backlash. I think 
that's another reason why its actions have been viewed in the bigger 
political world as being more reasonable or balanced or something, 
than the Coastal Commission's. 

Chall: You think this has to do quite a bit with the staff and the 
commission itself. 

Shute: Yes I do. I use this as an example: Joe Bodovitz went over to the 
Coastal Commission in the early years and brought the same kind of 
experience and high brain power to that. But, those people got all 
caught up with what they were doing to the exclusion of, I think, 
political reality. They had power, and they carried it too far. 


The best example I know of is a woman that I saw on local T.V. 
during the say mid-seventies late-seventies, sitting with a tree 
crashed across her patio, and the glass furniture was all shattered 
and the chairs were all askew. And, there's the local T.V. guy who 
says, "Why don't you clean up this mess?" She says, "I can't." He 
says, "Why not?" She says, "The Coastal Commission won't let me." 
"What do you mean they won't let you?" She says, "The tree trunk is 
still attached to the roots, and they won't let me take the tree 

Chall: [laughs] That's pretty extreme. 
Shute: [laughs] 

Chall: Now you were working ostensibly for Evelle Younger. You were on his 
staff. Was there any contact or relationship with Mr. Younger? 

Shute: Yes. 

Chall: When you might say, "I can't make a decision, I have to check with 

the attorney general's office" or something of this kind, was he the 
person you might see, or was there somebody else in that office that 
you could check with? 

Shute: I have a little trouble with that because I was also in charge, for 
part of his tenure, of a program called the environmental unit which 
was a group of lawyers that were enforcing California's 
environmental laws under the auspices of the attorney general, and 
without regard to any state agency. On any of those kind of actions 
we had to have his personal signature on anything we did. But, 
usually when representing a client, there was not a great deal of 
involvement by the attorney general because those are decisions that 
are considered to be necessary to be made by the professional staff, 
and he would just defer. 

Deukmejian was far worse about imposing his ideological views 
on what an agency should do than Younger or any other attorney 
general has ever been. Younger was a moderate Republican who sensed 
that at the time he was in office, the people wanted environmental 
protection. Even though he didn't understand it too well himself, 
and probably wasn't terribly sympathetic, he gave some strong 
support to us in the environmental unit and we were able to 
accomplish a lot in environmental law. 

Chall: Thank you very much for taking time to talk to me about your role in 
developing BCDC. It's an important addition to the history of that 

Transcriber: Lisa Grossman 
Final Typist: Richard Shapiro 


Index Bay Conservation and Development Commission 

Alameda County, California, 87 

Albany, California, 45 

Alioto, Joseph L. , 46-47, 89-90 

Allen, Robert H. , 39 

airports, planning for, 45-46 

Army Corps of Engineers, U. S. 39, 


Association of Bay Area Governments 
(ABAC), 10, 18-19 

Barrentine, Pat, 32 
Baum, Alvin H. , Jr., 13, 25 
Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission (BCDC) 
commissioners, 15-18, 23, 35-37, 
40, 46-47, 51, 56-59, 75-79, 83- 
85, 94 
legal framework and litigation, 

58, 72-95 
McAteer-Petris Act 

1965-1969, 9-21, 32-48, 72-83, 


1969-1973, 21-27, 48-66, 83-95 
staff, 24-26, 37-38, 77, 85, 94 
study commission, 1964-1965, 5-9 
Bay Area Council, 18, 38-39, 54, 56 
Bay Area Regional Organization 

(BARO), 19-20, 53-55 
Bechtel, Stephen D. , Sr. , 56-57 
Berkeley, California, 79-80 
Bodovitz, Joseph E. , 5-27, 33-38, 
45, 47-48, 51, 56-59, 75-79, 83- 
85, 94 

Boerger, Frank, 87 
Bollens, John, 42 
Bradford, Robert, 40 
Brover, David, 61 
Brown, Edmund G. , Sr. (Pat), 7, 9, 

32-33, 47, 58 
Bunshoft, Barry, 64 
Burke, Frank, 44 
Butler, Louis, 64 

cabinet, governor's (Ronald Reagan), 

California Environmental Quality 

Act (CEQA), 91 
California State Lands Commission, 


Candlestick Properties, 44, 81 
Chase Manhattan Bank, 78 
Chess, Louis, 41 
Clark, William, 52 
Coastal Zone Conservation 

Commission, California, 17, 23- 

27, 39-40, 59, 61, 64, 92-95 
Collier, Randolph, 10, 54-55 
Crocker Land Company, 47, 78 

Deukmejian, George, 65, 94-95 
Dolwig, Richard, 50 

Emeryville, California, 45, 76-77 
Environmental Protection Agency, 86 
Erskine, Dorothy (Mrs. Morse), 57 
Evers, William, 23, 56-57, 64 

Feibusch, Hans, 77 

Fish and Game, Department of, 

California, 86-87 
Fish and Wildlife Service, D. S. , 

Graves, Clifford, 25 
Golden Gate Port Authority, 55 
Gulick, Esther (Mrs. Charles A.), 


Harvey, Thomas, 75 

Heller, Elinor R. (Mrs. Edward H.), 


Heyman, Ira Michael (Mike), 42, 75 
Hill, A. Alan, 22 
Hortig, Frank, 7 , 20 
Houghteling, Joseph, 8, 32, 57 
Hutchinson, Ned, 22 

Ideal Cement Company, 47, 78 

media, 18, 47, 84 
Meese, Edwin, III, 52 
Mendelsohn, Robert, 6-8, 33-34 
Meyerson, Martin, 62-63 
Miller, George, Jr., 51, 57 
mitigation, concept of, 88, 90-92 

navy, U. S. , 87-88 
Nejedly, John, 51 
Nutter, Benjamin 45 

Jacobsen, Marcel la, 23, 32, 56 

Kaiser, Edgar F. , 54-55 

Kerr, Catherine (Kay), 5-6, 18-19, 


Knox, John T. , 19-22, 53-54 
Kopp, Quentin, 44, 81 

Lane, Melvin B. (Mel), 12-14, 22- 

23, 32-66, 75, 77, 85 
League of California Cities, 18, 48 
Lee, Eugene, 20 

Leslie Salt Company, 43-44, 76, 79 
Livermore, Norman B. (Ike), 22-23, 

52-53, 57, 84 
lobbying, 15, 51, 57 

Mar in County, California, 44-45 
Marks, Milton, 21, 50-51, 84 
May, Bernice, 19 
McAteer, Eugene, 5-10, 13, 19, 33- 

35, 40, 43, 56, 62, 84 
McAteer-Petris Act. See Bay 

Conservation and Development 

McCarthy, Leo, 8 
McLaughlin, Sylvia (Mrs. Donald), 

Oakland, California 

airport, 45, 88 

port of, 45, 88-89 
Odell, Rice, 5, 20-21, 34-35n, 50n 
Orr, Verne, 52 

permit process, 11-12 
Fetris, Nicholas, 6, 8 
Planning and Conservation League 

(PCL) , 64 

police power authority, 81 
public access, doctrine of, 92-94 
public trust, doctrine of, 75, 77- 
78, 80 

Razeto, Emanuel, 58 

Reagan, Ronald, as governor, 22-23, 

51-53, 56, 57, 58, 83, 84, 85 
Reed, George, 25 

regional government, 19-20, 53-55 
Roberts, Charles, 87 
Rockefeller, David, 47, 78 


San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission. See Bay 
Conservation and Development 

San Francisco, California 
airport, 47 
port of, 46-47, 88-90 

San Mateo County, California, 36, 

Santa Fe Railroad, 79-80 

Save San Francisco Bay Association, 
18, 33, 35, 61-64, 76, 82 

Schmid, Warren, 41 

Scboop, Jack, 13, 25, 35, 37 

Scott, Mel, 6, 10 

Scott, Stanley, 20, 24n, 42, 62 

Sherman, Lewis, 51 

Sherwood, Don, 10 

Shute, E. Clement, Jr., 26, 58, 64, 

Sierra Club, 18, 61-62 

Siri, William E. , 64 

Stead, Frank, 7 

Steele, Dwight, 18, 61 

Water Resources Control Board, 

California, 85-86 
Water Resources, Department of, 

California, 85 
Watkins, Bessie (Mrs. Dean), 23, 

56-57, 83 

Way, Howard, 49,50 
Westbay Community Associates, 47, 

78-79, 82 

Willoughby, Thomas, 22, 54 
Wilson, Richard, 64 
Wornum, Michael, 19, 86 

Younger, Evelle, 95 

Zierold, John, 22, 64 


Ronald Reagan Era, 1966-1974 
Interviews Completed or In Process, June 1986 

Single Interview Volumes 

Beilenson, Anthony C., "Securing Liberal Legislation During the Reagan 
Administration," DC Los Angeles, 1982, 81 pp. 

Breslow, Lester, "Vision and Reality in State Health Care: Medi-Cal and 
Other Public Programs, 1946-1975," DC Berkeley 1985, 96 pp. 

Burke, Yvonne Brathwaite, "New Arenas of Black Influence," DC Los Angeles, 
1982, 46 pp. 

Busterud, John A., "The California Constitution Revision Commission," 
Claremont, 1982, 37 pp. 

Carleson, Robert, "Stemming the Welfare Tide," DC Berkeley, 1985, 107 pp. 

Coke, J. Earl, "Reminiscences of People and Change in California Agriculture, 
1900-1975," DC Davis, 1976, 265 pp. 

Dales, Jack, "Pragmatic Leadership: Ronald Reagan as President of the Screen 
Actors Guild," DC Los Angeles, 1982, 49 pp. 

Darling, Dick, "Republican Activism: The California Republican Assembly and 
Ronald Reagan," DC Los Angeles, 1981, 56 pp. 

Dunckel, Earl B., "Ronald Reagan and the General Electric Theatre, 1954-1955," 
DC Berkeley, 1982, 46 pp. 

Dunne, George H. , "Christian Advocacy and Labor Strife in Hollywood," DC 
Los Angeles, 1981, 67 pp. 

Finch, Robert H., "Views From the Lieutenant Governor's Office," CSD 
Fullerton, 1983, 107 pp. 

Flournoy, Houston I., "California Assemblyman and Controller," Claremont, 
1982, 235 pp. 

Gianelli, William, "The California State Department of Water Resources, 
1967-1973," DC Berkeley, 1986, 86 pp. 

Livermore, Norman B., Jr., "Man in the Middle: High Sierra Packer, 

Timberman, Conservationist, and California Resources Secretary," DC 
Berkeley, 1983, 285 pp. 

Livingston, Donald G., "Program and Policy Development in Consumer Affairs 
and the Governor's Office," UC Berkeley, 1986, 90 pp. 

Plog, Stanley, "More than Just an Actor: The Early Campaigns of Ronald 
Reagan," UC Los Angeles, 1981, 29 pp. 

Reagan, Neil, "Private Dimensions and Public Images: The Early Political 
Campaigns of Ronald Reagan," DC Los Angeles, 1981, 58 pp. 

Reinecke, Ed, "Maverick Congressman and Lieutenant Governor for California, 
1965-1974," DC Berkeley, 1986, 96 pp. 

Riles, Wilson C., '"No Adversary Situations': Public School Education in 
California and Wilson C. Riles, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
1970-1982," UC Berkeley, 1984, 134 pp. 

Wright, Donald, "A View of Reagan and the California Courts," CSU Fullerton, 
1984, 87 pp. 

Younger, Evelle J., "A Lifetime in Law Enforcement," UC Los Angeles, 1982, 
60 pp. 

Mu It i- Interview Volumes 

REAGAN, 1967-1974, DC Berkeley, 1983, 232 pp. 

Adams, Winfred, "Strategies for Republican Elections, State Government 

Management, and Water Resources, 1963-1976." 
Haerle, Paul R. , "Ronald Reagan and Republican Party Politics in 

California, 1965-1968." 

Martin, Jerry C., "Information and Policy Research for Ronald Reagan, 


146 pp. 

Breed, Allen F. , "Theory and Practice in Juvenile Justice." 
Procunier, Raymond K. , "Administering Your Prisons." 

UC Berkeley, 1982, 490 pp. 

Bagley, William, "Some Complexities of Social Progress and Fiscal 

Mills, James R., "A Philosophical Approach to Legislative and Election 

Realities, 1959-1981." 
Monagan, Robert T., "Increasing Republican Influence in the State 


Rodda, Albert, "Sacramento Senator: State Leadership in Education and 

Luce, Gordon, "A Banker's View of State Administration and Republican 

Orr, Verne, "Business Leadership in the Department of Motor Vehicles and 

State Finance." 
Reagan, Ronald, "On Becoming Governor." 

Brian, Earl W., "Health and Welfare Policy, 1970-1974: A Narrow 

Spectrum of Debate." 
Stearns, James G. , "Joining Reagan's Campaign in Sacramento: 

Conservation, Agriculture, and Employee Relations." 
Thomas, Edwin W. , Jr., "The Governor's Cabinet as Policy Forum." 
Walton, Frank J., "Transportation Policies and the Politics of 

Conservatism, 1964-1974." 

UC Berkeley, 1986, 101 pp. 

Boas, Roger, "Democratic State Central Committee Chairman, 1968-1970." 
Warren, Charles, "From the California Assembly to the Council on 
Environmental Quality, 1962-1979: The Evolution of an 

UC Berkeley, 1986, 125 pp. 

Beach, Edwin W., "Some Technical and Political Aspects of State 


Bell, Roy M. , "Revenue Policies and Political Realities." 
Dwight, James S., "Early Reagan Administration Perspectives on State 
Finance, 1966-1967." 

1967-1974, UC Berkeley, 1984, 301 pp. 

Beck, Paul, "From the Los Angeles Times to the Executive Press Office, 

Sherriffs, Alex C., "Education Advisor to Ronald Reagan and State 

University Administrator, 1969-1982." 
Tooker, John S., "Director of the Office of Planning and Research, and 

Legislative Assistant, 1967-1974." 
Hannaford, Peter, "Expanding Political Horizons." 


MEASURES, Claremont, 1982, 102 pp. 

Stubblebine, William Craig, "The Development of Proposition #1." 
Uhler, Lewis K. , "Chairman of Task Force in Tax Reduction." 

1974, UC Berkeley, 1985, 235 pp. 

Gillenwaters, Edgar, "Washington Office Troubleshooter and Advocate for 

Commerce in California, 1967-1973." 
Jenkins, James, "Public Affairs, Welfare Concerns in Washington and 


Procunier, Florence Randolph, "Working with Edwin Meese." 
Walker, Robert, "Political Advising and Advocacy for Ronald Reagan, 

Walton, Rus, "Turning Political Ideas into Government Program." 


UC Berkeley, 1980, 187 pp. 

Nofziger, Franklyn C., "Press Secretary for Ronald Reagan, 1966." 
Parkinson, Gaylord B. , "California Republican Party Official, 1962-1967." 
Roberts, William E., "Professional Campaign Management and the 

Candidate, 1 960-1 966." 
Spencer, Stuart K. , "Developing a Campaign Management Organization." 

CSU Fullerton, 1983, 157 pp. 

Dart, Justin 

Mills, Edward 

Salvatori, Henry 

Tuttle, Holmes 

1985, 300 pp. 

Ellingwood, Herbert, "Law Enforcement Planning and Coordination, 1969- 

Gunterman, Joseph F., "Sacramento Advocate for the Friends Committee 

on Legislation of California." 
Houghton, Robert A., "Law Enforcement Planning in the Reagan 

Administration, 1971-1974." 
Marinissen, Jan, "'To Let the Legislature Know 1 : Prison Advocacy and 

the American Friends Service Committee in California, 1960-1983." 
Palumbo, Anthony L., "Law Enforcement, Emergency Planning, and the 

Califonia National Guard, 1965-1974." 


Fullerton, 1983, 157 pp. 

Carpenter, Dennis E., "Republican State Committee Chair and 


Beverly, Robert, "Reflections of a Republican Assemblyman." 
Zenovich, George, "Senate Democrat in the Reagan Government." 
Moretti, Robert, "Recollections of an Assembly Speaker." 


1983, 315 pp. 

Cory, Ken, "Education Consultant and Assemblyman, 1961-1974." 

Hall, Kenneth, '"Playing Devil's Advocate 1 : The Governor's Office and 

The Department of Finance in California, 1966-1974." 
Kehoe, John, "Advocacy for Education, Consumerism, and Governor Ronald 

Reagan, 1966-1974." 
Miller, John, "Issues of Criminal Justice and Black Politics in 

California, 1966-1974." 
Sturgeon, Vernon, "State Senator, Reagan Advisor, and PUC Commissioner, 



1984, 183 pp. 

Post, A. Alan, "Public Aims and Expenditure: A Divergent View." 
King, Warren, "Governor Reagan's Use of Task Forces and Loaned 

Executives, 1966-1968." 
Volk, Robert, Jr., "Government Reform and the Maturity of the Political 

Lucas, Harry, "New Approaches to Vocational Rehabilitation." 

DC Berkeley, 1986, 105 pp. 

Chickering, A. Lawrence 

Hawkins, Robert B. , Jr. 

1986, 201 pp. 

Cristina, Vernon J., "A Northern Californian Views 

Conservative Politics and Policies, 1963-1970." 
McDowell, Jack S., "Press Work and Political Campaigns, 

1966-1970. " 
Todd, A. Ruric, "Experience and Advice for the Reagan 

Administration, 1966-1968." 
Watts, Skip (Norman), "Observations of a Youthful Political 



Hume, Jacquelin, "Basic Economics and the Body Politic: Views of a 

Northern California Reagan Loyalist." 
Storrs, Eleanor Ring, "Parties, Politics, and Principles: 'It's at the 

Local Level. 1 " 

Wrather, Jack, "On Friendship, Politics, and Government." 
del Junco, Tirso, "California Republican Party Leadership and 

UC Berkeley, 1986, 98 pp. 

Bodovitz, Joseph E. , "Management and Policy Directions." 
Lane, Melvin B. , "The Role of the Chairman in Setting and 

Maintaining Goals." 

Shute, E. Clement, Jr., "The Place of the Courts in the Solution of 
Controversial Policy Issues." 

SAN FRANCISCO REPUBLICANS, DC Berkeley, 1980, 100 pp. 

Christopher, George, "Mayor of San Francisco and Republican Party 


Weinberger, Caspar, "California Assembly, Republican State Central 
Committee, and Elections, 1953-1966." 

In Process - March. 

Barrett, Charles, UC Berkeley. 
Bradley, Melvin, UC Berkeley. 
Camilli, Richard, UC Berkeley. 
Cans on, Virna, UC Berkeley. 
Carter, Louis, UC Berkeley. 
Connelly, Margarete, UC Berkeley. 
Deaver, Michael, UC Berkeley. 
Dumke, Glenn S. , UC Berkeley. 
Fenlon, Roberta, UC Berkeley. 
Habecker, Jackie, UC Berkeley. 
Hall, James, UC Berkeley. 
Heine, Carolyn, UC Berkeley. 
Lovry, James, UC Berkeley. 
Magyar, Roger, UC Berkeley. 
Meese, Edwin, III, UC Berkeley. 
Miller, Anita, UC Berkeley. 
Mott, William Penn, UC Berkeley. 
Swoap, David, UC Berkeley. 
Watson, Philip E. , UC Los Angeles. 
Way, Howard, UC Berkeley. 

Williams, Spencer M., "The Human Relations Agency: Perspectives and Programs 
Concerning Health, Welfare, and Corrections, 1966-1970," UC Berkeley. 

Participating Institutions 

Oral History Office, Department of Special Collections, University of 
California, Davis, California, 95616. 

Oral History Program, California State University, Library 243, Fullerton, 

California, 92634 

Oral History Program, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, 

Oral History Program, Powell Library Building, University of California, Los 
Angeles, California, 90024. 

Regional Oral History Office, 486 The Bancroft Library, University of 
California, Berkeley, California, 94720. 

Malca Chall 

Graduated from Reed College in 1942 with a B.A. 
degree, and from the State University of Iowa in 
1943 with an M.A. degree in Political Science. 

Wage Rate Analyst with the Twelfth Regional War 
Labor Board, 1943-1945, specializing . in agricul 
ture and services. Research and writing in the 
New York public relations firm of Edward L. 
Beraays, 1946-1947, and research and statistics 
for the Oakland Area Community Chest and Council 
of Social Agencies 1948-1951. 

Active in community affairs as a director and 
past president of the League of Women Voters of 
the Hayward Area specializing in state and local 
government; on county-wide committees' in the 
field of mental health; on election campaign 
committees for school tax and bond measures, and 
candidates for school board and state legislature, 

Employed in 1967 by the Regional Oral History 
Office interviewing in fields of agriculture and 
water resources. Project director, Suffragists 
Project, California Women Political Leaders 
Project, and Land-Use Planning Project. 



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