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oi' nixDc riin.osoi'iiY 



K. i;. ruWKLL, M.A. 

ritoncMnK or hanhkrit amp rBi.i.ow or cokpcm ciikimti •-oi.i.mK ix thk 



A. K. cjorcni. M.A. 

rKoriJMoR o» niiiAWoriiv in tiik rur.-iiDKNcv cou-kur, amo 


7////f/} EDITION. 

KKCAN I'AIU IKlAt II. TKl HM.U .v r< ) I 


Thr rights r>f,ranslafi.n ami of rcprodnction «r, 

'c reserved. 

1 90S 


I WKLL remeiiibcr the interest uxciteil tiinonj^ tlie learne*! 
Hindus of Calcutta l>y tlio |»ulilicatiou nf tlio Surva-dar- 
^aim-sain^'raha of Miidliava Aclu'uya in tlie Hibliotheca 
Iiidica in 1858. It was ori^'inally etlitud by Pandit Uvara- 
clianilra Viiiyasiigara, but a subsequent edition, with uu 
important alter.itions, was publislieil in 1872 by I'andit 
'laranatba Taikavaeliaspati. The work had been used by 
Wilson in his ".Sketch of the Heli;^ious .Sects of the Hin- 
dus " (first publislied in the Asiatic Researches, vol. xvi., 
Calcutta, i8j8) ; but it does not appear to liavt- been ever 
much kniiwn in Indi:i. MS. copies of it are very scarco ; 
and these found in the North of India, as far as I have had 
an opportunity of examining them, seem to be all derived 
from one copy, brought originally from the South, and 
therefore written in the Telugu character. Certain mis- 
takes are fouml in all alike, and probably arose from 
some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I 
have noticed the same thing in the Na^ari copies of 
Miidhava's Commentary on the Black Yiijur Veda, which 
are current in the North of India. 

As I was at that time tlie Oriental Secretary of the l>en- 




gal Asiatic Society, I was naturally attracted to the book ; 
and I subsequently read it with my friend Pandit Mahesa- 
chandra Nyayaratua, the jDresent Principal of the Sanskrit 
College at Calcutta. I always hoped to translate it into 
English ; but I was continually prevented by other en- 
gagements while I remained in India. Soon after my 
return to England, I tried to carry out my intention ; but 
I found that several chapters, to which 1 had not paid 
the same attention as to the rest, were too difficult to be 
translated in England, where I could no longer enjoy the 
advantage of reference to my old friends the Pandits of 
the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation 
aside for years, until I happened to learn that my friend, 
Mr. A. E. Gough, at that time a Professor in the Sanskrit 
College at Benares, was thinking of translating the book. 
I at once proposed to him that we should do it together, 
and he kindly consented to my proposal ; and we accord- 
ingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He 
had the advantage of the belp of some of the Pandits of 
Benares, especially of Pandit Eama Misra, the assistant 
Professor of Sankhya, who was himself a Eamanuja, 
and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some 
things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have 
been able to throw light on many of the dark say- 
ings with which the original abounds. Our translations 
were originally published at intervals in the Benares 
Pandit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been 
carefully revised for their present republication. 

The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu 
critical ability. The author successively passes in review 

PRl IA( !■: vii 

tlie sixteen philu^ophiLul systems cuirt-nt in the fourteenth 
century in the South of India, ami gives wlmt appeared 
to him to be their most important tenets, and the principal 
arguments by which their followers endeavoured to nuiin- 
tain tlirm ; and he often displays some quaint humour as 
he throws himself for the time into the position of their 
advocate, and holds, as it were, a temporary l)rief in 
behalf of opinions entirely at variance with his own.* 
We may sometimes differ from iiim in his judLj'mentuf the 
relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always in- 
teresting to see the point of view of an acuto native critic. 
In the course of his sketches he freijuentlv explains at 
some lengtii obscure details in the difterent sy-lcms ; and I 
can hanlly imaj,'ine a better guide for the European reader 
who wishes to study any one of these Darhanas in its 
native authorities. In one or two cases (aa notably in the 
Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaiua system) he could only 
draw his materials second-hand from the discussi<»ns in 
the works of r*rahmanical controversialists; but in the 
»:reat majority he quotes directly from tlu" wnrks of their 
founders or leading exponents, and he is continually fol- 
lowing in their track even where he does not quote their 
exact wortla' 

The systems are arranged from the Vedantn point of view, 
— our author having been elected, irt a.d. 1331. the head 

' Tin* mrwt ri-niarkitb|p in»tJinc»" ' -\n imlcx of thpnatnonof .-viithnri 

of thU )iliil<>»>|>liicAl »|tuuiiiiiity i.t nnti wi>rki« iiuiiti)! i.i i;iv<-ii in Dr. 

that of Vit-h».<i|>ati .Minni, M'lio wr<>t<! IIaII'm Itililii>Kra}>liii':kl CiitAlu}^!)-, 

ttAn<tar<i trratiiwi on I a<-h of th<: nix \<\: 162 |f>t, aiul nlfo in IVtiftiunir 

ii^iit4'niM<'Xc>-|itth<' \'ai.< Hhika,a<|i>pt- Atifn-cht'M ll4Hll(.'iau C'atAluguo, p. 

inx, of oturiH.', th<.- (toculiar |>oint <>f 247. 
view of tach, anil cxclu>iin^ for the 
time ernj alien t<>n< t. 

viii PREFACE. 

of the Smarta order iu the Matli of Sringeri in the 
Mysore territory, founded by Samkava Acharya, t.lie great 
Vedantist teacher of the eighth century, through whose 
efforts the Vedanta became what it is at present — the 
acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems 
form a gradually ascending scale, — the first, the Charvaka 
and Bauddha, being the lowest as tlie furthest removed 
from the Vedanta, and the last, the Saiikhya and Yoga, 
being the highest as approaching most nearly to it. 

The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their 
study the noblest minds in India throughout the mediaeval 
period of its history. Hiouen Thsang says of the schools 
in his day : " Les ecoles philosophiques sont constamment 
en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionn^es 
s'el^ve comme les flots de la mer. Les h^retiques des 
diverses sectes s'attachent k des maitres particuliers, et, 
par des voies differentes, marchent tous au meme but." 
We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read 
the mediaeval literature. Thus, for instance, when King 
Harsha wanders among the Vindhya forests, he finds 
" seated on the rocks and reclining under the trees Arhata 
begging monks, Svetapadas, Mahapa^upatas, Pandarabhik- 
shus, Bhagavatas, Varnins, Kesaluiichanas, Lokayatikas, 
Kapilas, Kanadas, Aupanishadas, Isvarakarins, Dharma- 
^astrins, Pauranikas, Saptatautavas, Sabdas, Panchara- 
trikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets and 
zealously defending them." ^ Many of these sects will 
occupy us in the ensuing pages ; many ot them also are 
found in Madhava's poem on the controversial triumphs 

^ Sriharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.) 


of Arluirya, suul in the spurious prose work on 
the sniiio suhject, iiscrihi'd to Aiiaiit.inainia'^Mri. Well 
may some oM poet havf put into tin' njouth of Yu<iliisli- 
thirn the lim-s whicli one so often hears from the lips 
of ni'iiirii pandits — 

Vwlii vibliinnrili smritayo vihiiinna, 
NiliMiii iiiiiiiir ya-'<yn iii.ttniii iia liliiiiinim, 
I >hariiia'<ya tuttvai|i nihitnip ^niliiiyiip, 
Miih.kjano Venn i.'ntuli sa p:kiithali. ' 

An«l may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria, 
/i«K roit'vv ovaij^i ti)^ a\ri$ela^, to 'yap •\\r€v^o<; fivplat 
eiCTpoTTft'i t\'K, Karmrep ai fSit/c^ni tu tov /7t"/'^tro9 Bi(i(f>o- 
pi)aaaai /xtX'/ ni t//«,- (f)t\oao<f>t(f\ Tf)<» Te fSapfSdpov t >;9 re 
EWiji'iKpj'i nipt(T€t<i, eKdarij ontp e\a^ei\ tov iriiaav avytl 
TTjv d\t')0(iai'. (fxoros S', oipai, iivaToXf) rruvra (fytoTi^tTai. 

R r.. c. 

' Fnnml in thf Mali.ihh. iii. 17402, with somo variations. I jfivc theni 
M I have heard theui fruiii Paiulit IUiiian;iniyana ViJyaratna. 

CUNT E N r S. 

I. The Chdrvak.i System (H. H. C.) . 
II. Th.- IJjui.lJha Syslc-m (A. K. Ij.; . 
HI. The ArhaU or Juina Svsloin (K. 1'.. ('.) . 
IV. The lUmlinuja System (A. K. (;.) . 
V. The I'urua-prajnai System (.\. E. G.) 
VI. The Nakuli&i-Pd.4upata System (A. E. CJ.) 
VII. The Saiva Syhle!ii (E. R C.) . 
VIII. The Pr.ityahhijuci or Reio^nitive System (.\. E. CI 
IX. The or Mercurial Systt-m (A. E. (J.) 
X. 'i'he Vai^'shikii or .\iiliikya System (E. U. C.) 
XI. The AkshapA^a .-r N>A.v:i System (E. 15 C.) 
XII. The Jaiminiya System (E. B. C.) . 

XIII. The Pilniniya Sy>tem (E. B. C.) . 

XIV. The S.ihkhya System (E. B. C.) . 
XV. The Batafijala or Yo<„m System (E. Ii. T.) 

X VI. The Veihiiita or System of A« h.iry i 
Aii'KNDi.x-Oii the U|».i.llii (E. B. ('.) . 

I 2 


1 12 




: ■ I 

- ■)' 

Till- S.\i:V\-I).\i:s\X\-SANGI!AIIA. 

TlIK I'liOUXJUl-l 

1. I worship Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the 
storehouse of supreme felicity ; by whom the earth and 
the rest were produced, in hitn only has this all a maker. 

2. Daily I follow my Cluru Sarvajna- Vishnu, who knows 
all the Agamas, the son of Sarngapani, who has gone to 
the further sjjore of the seas of all the systems, and has 
contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper mean- 
ing of the term Soul. 

3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the vener- 
able Madhava, nngiity in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of 
the milk-ocean of the fortunate Sayana. 

4. Having thoroughly searched the Sastraa of former 
teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sayana - 
Madhava^ the lord has expounded them for the delight of 
the good. Let the virtuous listen wiih a mind from which 
all envy has been far banished; who linds not deligiit in 
n garland strung of various flowers ? 

* Pr. A. C. Bumcll, in hiit preface »le«cri|>tion of hi* Ixxly, himself being 

to hi.i edition of the Vani^'l^cih- tlic ctornal huuI. Hia uho of the 

inana, ha« lutlvcd the riilJIc uf the tenn K.kyana-Ma(ihavati here (uut 

relation of Mttilhava an-l S.lyana, the' •'■«'tn<< ti prove that tho two 

iUyana in a pure l>ravi(jian naitiu naiii< thu same person, 

given to a child who is born after all Th< '< icant by the Saya-ia 

Iho • ' ' ' ■' ' ' V' III ...i. Miiyana waji thu 

(Jha. r of .Nl.kJhava, and the true 

" _v y..{ nia^ be ir/imin-mdyrt^o. 

( ^ ) 



[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation 
to Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of 
supreme felicity,"] but how can we attribute to the Divine 
Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion 
has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, the crest-gem of 
the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine of 
Brihaspati ? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to 
be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the 
current refrain — 

While life is yours, live joyously ; 
None can. escape Death's searching eye : 
When once this frame of ours they burn, 
How shall it e'er again return 1 

The mass of m.en, in accordance with the Sastras of 
policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the 
only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object 
belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the 
doctrine of Charvaka. Hence another name for that 
school is Lokayata, — a name well accordant with the 
thing signified.^ 

In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the 

* " Sankara, Bhaskara, and other etymologically analysed as " preva- 

commentators name the Lokaya- lent in the world " (loka and dyata). 

tikas, and these appear to be a Laukiyatika occurs in Punini's uk- 

branch of the Sect of Charvaka" thagana. 
(Colebrooke), Lokdyata may be 


origiual principles; from these alone, wlion ti-ansformed 
into the body, intelligence is pruiluced, just as the in- 
ebriating power is devi-lopcJ from the mixing of certain 
ingredients ; * and when these are destroyed, intelligence at 
once perishes also. They quote the Siuti for this [Brihad 
Arany. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these ele- 
ments, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyeil when they 
are destroyed, — after death no intelligence remains."* 
Therefore the scul is only the body distinguished by tlie 
attribute of intelligence, since there is no eviilence for any 
soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, 
since this school hoMs that perception is the only source 
of knowledge ami does not allow inference, &c. 

The only end »»f man is enjoyment produced by sensual 
pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be culled 
the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind 
of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure plea- 
sure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevi- 
tably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish 
Uikes the fish with their scales and bones, autl havin<» 
taken as many as he wants, desists ; or just as the man 
who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having 
taken as nmch as he wants, desists. It is not therefore 
for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which 
our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do 
not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are 
wild animals to devour it; nor do they refuse to set the 
cooking-poU on the lire, because forsooth there are besuars 
to pester us for a share of the contents. If any one were 

> A'MiTrt ; 



' ' ' li.-jvo nn <-»liiI.irji* 
t found in tItoM 

in the mail 

■Ug»r, tlMMIA, ftc. ' .^ fp'fn S.nMc.-ir.i : 



fa. ulty 


" UJ cour»c Safjkara, in lii« coin- 
mcntary, ^'U-.^ .» v. ry difT. r- nt in. 
toq)f • I. 
tioii..' •.i.j 

!..■ H i>IICO 

Com in. J.U- 


•rvcm, lime, and extract of catvcliu 


SO timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed 
"be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet — 

The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects, 
Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain, — such is the reasoning 

of fools ; 
The berries of paddy, rich with the finest while grains, 
What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because 

covered with husk and dust ? ^ 

If you object that, if there be no such thing as happi- 
ness in a future world, then how should men of experienced 
wisdom engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices, which 
can only be performed with great expenditure of money 
and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be accepted 
as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are 
only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted 
by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tau- 
tology ; 2 then again the impostors who call themselves 
Vaidic pundits are mutually destructive, as the authority 
of the jnana-kanda is overthrown by those who maintain 
that of the karma-kanda, while those who maintain the 
authority of the jnana-kanda reject that of the karma- 
kanda; and lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only 
the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs 
the popular saying — 

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smear- 
ing oneself with ashes, — 

Brihaspati says, these are but means uf liveliliood for those who have 
no manliness nor sense. 

Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mun- 
dane pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, 
&c. ; the only Supreme is the earthly monarch whose 
existence is proved by all the world's eyesight; and the 
only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By hold- 
ing the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, 

^ I take iana as here equal to the Bengali iunr. Cf. Atharva-V., xi. 
3, 5. Aivdh hand f/dvas tauduld mamL'ds tushdh. 
^ See Nydya Sutras, ii. 57. 


such plirasca as "I am Ihiii," "I am Mack," &e,, are at 
once intelligibK', as tlie atlribiues of tliinness, &c., and sclf- 
cousciousness will rcsiilo in the same subject [the body]; 
like and llie use of the jjlirase " my body " is metaphorical 
"the head of Kaliu " [Ilalm being really all heail]. 
All this has beiii thus summed up — 

In tln3 school there arc fiiir elements, earth, water, fire, and air ; 
And from these lour elements alone is intolligencf produceil,— 
Jnst like the intoxicating power from kinwa, &c., mixed tofjcthcr ; 
hince in "lam fat," "1 am lc;ui," iliesc aitrilutes' abide in the 

same subject, 
And since fatness, &c., resiile only in the body,^ it alone is tlie soul 

and no other, 
And such phrases as ''my body " are only significant metaphorically. 

" I'e it so," says tlie op})onent ; " your wish would be 
gained if inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then 
they have this force; else, if they had not, then how, on 
perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligent 
immediately proceed to fire; or why, on hearing another 
say, • There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do those 
who de.-irc fruit proceed at once to the shore ? " 

All this, however, i-? oiilv tlm inflation of tin* world of 

Those who maintain tue authority <>f intLicnci; accept 
the siV^n or middle term as the causer of knowledge, which 
middle term must be found in the minor and be itself 
invariably connected with the major.' Now this invariable 
connection must be a relation destitute of any condition 
accepted or disputed;* and this connection does not po.ssess 
its power of causing inference by virtue of its existmc^, as 
the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of 
its being known. What then is the menus of this con- 
nection's being known ? 

' /r.,pcnM>naIity and ffttnc«, Ac. ♦ For the tnrdijdha and nikhila 

• I rraU drhf fi.r drhith. tipddhi (•'•c Si'iilli iiitA .Muktdvaii, i>. 

* I •'. . • t>o an attribute IJ5. Tlic former u accepted onl/ 

o( - Lave invariable by one party. 

cot: -ij." 


"VVe M'ill first show that it is not perception. Now per- 
ception is held to be of two kinds, external and internal 
[i.e., as produced by the external senses, or by the inner 
sense, mind]. The former is not the required means ; for 
althougli it is possible that the actual contact of the 
senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the 
particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can 
never be such contact in tlie case of the past or the future, 
tlie universal proposition ^ which was to embrace the in- 
Taiiable connection of the middle and major terms in 
every case becomes impossible to be known. Nor may 
you maintain that tliis knowledge of the universal pro- 
position has the general class as its object, because if so, 
there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the inva- 
riable connection in this particular case^ [as, for instance, 
in this particular smoke as implying fire]. 

Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot 
establish that the mind has any power to act indepen- 
dently towards an external object, since all allow that it 
is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by 
one of the logicians, " The eye, &c., liave their objects as 
described ; but mind externally is dependent on the 

Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the 
universal proposition, since in the case of this inference 
we should also require another inference to establish it, 
and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad 
infinitum retrogression. 

Nor can testimony be the means thereof, since we may 
either allege in reply, in accordance with the Vaiseshika 
doctrine of Kanada, that this is included in the topic of 
inference ; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of 
testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that 

^ Literally, the knowledge of the — thus idiots are men, though man 

invariable concomitance (as of smoke i ^ a rational animal ; and again, this 

by fire). particular smoke might be a sign of 

^ The attributes of the class are a fire in some other place. 
not always found in every member, 


Stopped the progress of infLiciico, since ii depends iUili 
on llie recognition of a si</n in llie furni uf tlie language 
used in the child's presence by the old man ; ^ and, more- 
over, there is no more reason for oiii believing un another's 
Munl tiiat smoke and fire are invariably connected, than 
for our receiving tlie ipse dixit of Manu, &c. [which, of 
course, we Charvakas reject]. 

Anil again, if tesiimtmy were to be accepted as the only 
means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then 
in the case of a man to wIkiui the fact of tiic invarialile 
connection between the middle and major terms liad not 
Ijcen pointed out by another person, there could be no 
infi rence of one thing [as i\ie] on seeing another thing [aa 
femukc] ; hence, on your own showing, tlio whole topic of 
inference for oneself- wouM have to end in mere idle 

Tlien again coniparison,^ &c., must be utterly rejected as 
the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, 
f ince it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge 
of the unconditioned connexion [i.e., the universal pro- 
position], because their end is to produce the knowledge of 
•juite another connection, viz., the relation of a name to 
something so named. 

Again, this same absence of a condition,* wliich has been 
given as the definition of an invariable conuectiun [i.e., a 
universal proposition], can itself never be known ; since it 
is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects 
of jterception ; and therefore, although the absence of j>er- 

' Sc« Sdliitva Darpann (rallan- namf<i." Uallantync'a Tarka San- 

tviic'* tram. p. i6\ and >iJiJhanta- grahx 

M., p. 80. * The upiidhi is the con. lilion which 

' Tlic properly li>',^ical, a.^ liUtin- niust Xhi supplinl to restrict a too 

piUhed from the rhetorical, ari^- (;cncral miiltllc term, an in the in- 

iD^nt. ferencu " tliu mountain haa smoke 

• " I'jamdiM or th^ Vnow!r<!(fo of tiocauso it haa fire," if we add wet 

a •ioiilahtv i« the ii n tti'; fuel aa the condition of the fire, the 

production «f an :rtjin middle t<-rm will be n» longer t<o 

(iinilahty. Tl : r»«n> K<ncral. I n the caM of a tnio vydpti, 

roitjiista in t ' the there in, of course, do upddliu 
ril.«lii<n of a I ' n;* mi 


ceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of 
non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible ; and 
thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, 
&c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already 
been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the 
definition of the condition, " it is that which is reciprocal 
or equipollent in extension^ with the major term though 
not constantly accompanying the middle." These three 
distinguishing clauses, " not constantly accompanying the 
middle term," " constantly accompanying the major term," 
and "being constantly accompanied by it " [i.e., reciprocal], 
are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three 
such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the 
non-eternity of sound, as " being produced," "the nature 
of a jar," and " the not causing audition ; " ^ wherefore the 
definition holds, — and again it is established by the ^loka 
of the (Treat Doctor beginning samdsama.^ 

1 'AvTiffTp^cpd (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). 
We have here our A with distributed 

- If we omitted the first clause, 
and only made the upddhi "that which 
constantly accompanies the major 
term and is constantly accompanied 
by it," then in the Naiydyika argu- 
ment " sound is non-eternal, because 
it has the nature of sound," "being 
produced " would serve as a Mimdm- 
saka upddhi, to establish the vya- 
bhichdra fallacy, as it is reciprocal 
with "non-eternal ;" but the omitted 
clause excludes it, as an upddhi 
must be consistent with eitha' party's 
opinions, and, of course, the Naiya- 
yika maintains that "being pro- 
duced " alicays accompanies the class 
of sound. Similarly, if we defined 
the upddhi as "not constantly accom- 
panying the middle term and con- 
stantly accompanied by the major," 
we might have as an upddhi "the 
nature of a jar," as this is never 
found with the middle term (the 
class or nature of sound only resid- 
ing in sound, and that of a jar only 
iu a jar), while, at the same time, 

wherever the class of jar is found 
there is also found non-eternity. 
Lastly, if we defined the upadhi as 
"not constantly accompanying the 
middle term, and constantly accom- 
panying the major," we might have 
as a Mimdrnsaka upddhi "the not 
causing audition," i.e., the not being 
apprehended by the organs of hear- 
ing ; but this is excluded, as non-eter- 
nity is not always found where this 
is, ether being inaudible and yet 

'■* This refers to an obscure ^loka 
of Udayandchdrya, " where a recip- 
rocal and a non-reciprocal universal 
connection {i.e., universal proposi- 
tions which severally do and do not 
distribute their predicates) relate to 
the same argument (as e.g., to prove 
the existence of smoke), there that 
non-reciprocating term of the second 
will be a fallacious middle, which is 
not invariably accompanied by the 
other reciprocal of the" Thus 
" the mountain has smoke because it 
has fire " (here fire and smoke are 
non-reciprocating, as fire is not found 
invariably accompanied by smoka 

TUP. niARl'AKA ^YSTI'Sf. 9 

Rut since tlie kuowleilge of the cuiulition must hero 
precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is 
only when there is tlie knowledj^e of the condition, that 
the knowledge of the universality of the proposition i.s 
possible, i.r., a knowledge in the form of such a coniiectiuu 
lietween the middle term and major term as is distinguished 
by the absence of any such condition; and on tlie other 
hand, the knowledge of the condition dejiends upon the 
knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus we fasten 
on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunder- 
bolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the 
impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition 
it bt'comos impossible to establish inference, &c.^ 

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of 
smoke, &c., to the knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted 
for by its being based on a former perception or by its 
being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified 
by the result, is accidental like the coincidence of 
ctVects observed in the employment of gems, charms, 
drugs, &c. 

From this it follows that fate, &c.,^ do not exist, since 
these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent 
will say, if you thus do not allow adrishta, tlie various 
plienomena of the world become destitute of any cause, 

though UDoke Ubj fire), or "b«cau4o which u tho reciproc&l of fire. I 

it h*« fire from wet fuel " (amoke aiul wish to add hcrr, once for all, that 

fire from wi-t fuel Ix-ing recipri>c;il I own my explanation of this, u.* 

and alway* !nr^-..i.ii .nying each well as many another, dilFiculty 

other) ; tho i. ''iug tcnn in the Sarva-darMHia-sangraha t-t 

of the fi«rmcr ' iveafalla- my old friend and ttacher, Paridit 

cioua inference, becau^M.- it i.t also, of Mahe.<<a Chandra Ny.kvaratna, of th^) 

co<«n—, not invariably accompanied Calcutta Sanskrit Colli jje. 

by •■ ''''■■{ firp, that pro- ' Cf. Scxtuii Empiricu!*, P. Hyp. 

dii liut this wi!I ii. In tho chapter <>n the 

not . .. ;.frc tho non-ri-- nystem infra, we have an attempt 

dpr • \" : .: *.■ rm it thus invariably to establish the authority of tho 

acci'i:.; A!.-.' i dv ihr other reciprocal, universal projH»»iiion from the r»rla- 

a* " the mountain ha.<i fire Ix-cauM; it tion of caute and effect or genus and 

haa smoke;" h««r««. ttiLHi^h fin- and apecies. 

•rooko do not : ' ' Adrishta, 1' ' •" it and do- 

Will be a tni iH' tit in o\ir .k . pnxluc* 

iovariably a-. ...,-... ..v. .. ,. ..i, their efTcctn in :..: .. < 


But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since 
these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously 
from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been 
said — 

The fire is hot, the water colJ, refreshing cool the breeze of morn ; 
By whom came this variety 1 from their own nature was it born. 

' And all this has been also said by Briliaspati — 

There is no heaven, no final libeiation, nor any soul in another 

Nor do the actions of the four castes, order?, &c.. prodi'ice any real 

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smear- 
ing one's self with ashes, 
Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of know- 
ledge and manliness. 
If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven, 
Why then does not the sacrificer forthwitli offer his own father 1 ^ 
]f the Sraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead, 
Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless 

to give provisions for the journey. 
If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Sraddha here, 
Tlien wliy not give the food down below to those who are standing 

on the housetop ? 
While Hfe remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even 

though he runs in debt ; 
"When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again ? 
If he who departs from the body goes to another world, 
liow is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his 

kindred ? 
Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Crahmans have estab- 
lished here 
An these ceremonies for the dead, — there is no other fruit any- 
The three authurs of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons. 
All the well-known formula; of the pandits, jarphari, turphari, &c.'-^ 
And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in tlie Aswa- 

' This is an old Buddhist retort. Aswamedha rites, see Wilson's Rig. 
Bfe Burnouf, Introd., p. 209. Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii. 

^ Kig-Veda, x; 106. For the 


Tinsi' were inventetl by bufToniis, and so all the various kinds of pre- 

Bciit') to the priests,* 
While the eaiiiij^ of llcsh wa« simihirly coinmanded by ni(,'ht-prowling 


Hence in kimlness to the mass of living beings must we 
fly for refuge to the doctrine of Charvaka. Such is the 
j>leasant consummation, l\ B. C. 

' Or this may mean " and &1I the various other thingn to bo hfcudled in 
Ihc ril*.-*." 

( 12 ) 



At this point the Buddhists remark : As for what you 
(Charvakas) laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining 
invariable concomitance, your position is unacceptable, 
inasmuch as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable 
by means of identity and causality. It has accordingly 
been said — 

"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity 
as a determinant, results a law of invariable con- 
comitance — not through the mere observation of 
the desired result in similar cases, nor through the 
non-observation of it in dissimilar cases." ^ 
On the hypothesis (of the Naiyayikas) that it is con- 
comitance and non-concomitance {e.g., A is where B is, 
A is not where B is not) that determine an invariable 
connection, the unconditional attendance of the major 
or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being 
impossible to exclude all doubt with legard to in- 
stances past and future, and present but unperceived. 
If one (a Naiyayika) rejoin that uncertainty in regard to 
such instances is equally inevitable on our system, we 
reply : Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect 
may be produced without any cause would destroy itself 
by putting a stop to activity of any kind ; for such doubts 

1 This sloka is quoted in the the second line is there read mors. 
" Benares Pandit," vol. i. p. 89, with correctly, ^dariandn na na darsandt. 
ti. comnientary, and the latter part of 

rilE DAUDDllA SYSlLSf. 13 

alone are to be entertained, the entertainment of whicli 
does not implicate us in {>racLical absurdity and tlu; like, 
as it has bc> a saiil, " Doubt tcrniiiiatcs where tliere is a 
practical absurdity." ^ 

1. By ascertainment of an eifectuatioii, then, of that (viz., 
of the designate uf llie middle) is ascertained liie invariable 
concomitance (of the major) ; and the ascertainment of 
such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of 
five causes, in tlie perceptive cognition or non-cognition of 
cause and efTect. That fire and smoke, for instance, stand 
in the relation of cause and efrect is ascertained by five 
indicaiions, viz., (i.) That an effect is not cognised prior 
to its elTectuatiuu, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) 
the efTect is perceived, and that after the elTect is cognised 
(4.) there is its non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) 
cause is no longer cognised. 

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascer- 
tained by the ascertainment of identity {e.g., a sisu-tree is 
a iree, or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we 
observe also the attribute arboreity), an absurdity attach- 
ing to the contrary opinion, inasmuch as if a sisu-tree 
should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self. But, 
on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and 
where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, 
who can exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? 
An ascertainment of the iilentity of sisu and tree is com- 
jM-tent in virtue of the reference to the same object {i.e., 
j>redication), — This tree is a sisu. For reference to the 
same ol>ject (predication) is not competent where there is 
no difference whatever {e.g., to say, " A jar is a jar," is no 
combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), 
because the two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be 
simidtaneously employed ; nor c;in reference to the same 
object take place wliere tltere is a reciprocal exclusion (of 
the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, for instance, 
horse and cow predicated the one of the other. 

' Kutntn;tnJAli, iii. 7 


It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same 
supposes a cause or a self-same (as invariable concomi- 

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of 
ey'idence, jjramdiia, one may reply : You merely assert thus 
much, that inference is not a form of evidence : do you 
allege no proof of this, or do you allege any? The former 
alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that 
bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted, Nor is 
the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert 
that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some 
truncated argument (to prove, i.e., infer, that it is none), 
you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted 
your own mother to be barren. Besides, when you affirm 
that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the 
corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homo- 
geneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, 
when you affirm that the disseutieucy of others is known 
by the symbolism of words, you yourself allow induction 
by causality, "When you deny the existence of any object 
on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself 
admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle 
term. Conformably it has been said by Tathagata — 

"The admission of a form of evidence in general results 
from its being present to tlie understanding of 

" The existence of a form of evidence also follows from 
its negation by a certain person." 

All this has been fully handled by great authorities; 
and we desist for fear of an undue enlargement of our 

These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man 
from four standpoints. Celebrated under the designations 
of Madhyamika, Yogachara, Sautrantika, and Vaibhashikri, 
these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of a 
xmiversal void (nihilism), an external void (subjective- 
idealism), the inferribility of external objects (representa- 


tionism). and tlie perceptibility of oxternal objects (pre- 
"^entationisni).* Tliou;^'h the venerated liuddlia be the only 
one teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of 
this diversity of views; j\ist as Mhen one has said, "Tho 
sun has set," tlie adulterer, the thief, the divinity student, 
and others understand that it is time to set about their 
assiijMiation.'', their theft, their relijjious duties, and so forth, 
according to their several ir.clin.ition.s. 

It is to be borne in mind that fnur points of view have 
been laid out, viz., (i.) All is moinentaiy, momentary; (2) 
all is puin, pain; (3.) all is like itself alone; (4.) all ii 
void, void. 

Of these points of view, the momentariness ot tlet-tiiii^ 
things, blue and so forth {i.e., whatever be their quality), 
is to be inferred from their existence; thus, whatever w 
is momentary (or lluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all 
these things are^ Nor may any one object that the 
middle term (existence) is unestablished ; for an existence 
consisting of practical eHiciency is established by perceji- 
tion to belong to the blue and other momentary things; 
and the exclusion of existence from that which is not 
momentary is established, provided that we exclude from 

' The BftuddbM nrc tliua divided is that? Tlint conclu.tion is that 

into — you iKjver, even for the .shortcKt tiino 

(I.) Midhjrainikiu or Nihilists. thnt can be named or conceived, soe 

(2.) Yogdchura-H i>r Jiubjective any aLidinfj colour, any colour which 

Ide&listA. truly it. SV'ithin the millionth part 

(3.) Sautrintikaa or Repn-senta- <^f a necond the whole ^'lory of thu 

tioaistA. |>aint<-d heaven.n ha.<t undergnnu an 

(4.) Vaibbi«hiluM «r I^rGMnta- incalculable HurieH of niutatiouii. Onu 

tiooi«t«. shade m Hu]iplnnted by another with 

' Cf. Ferricr's Ijcctures and He- a rapidity which wts all meni*urc- 

inainii, vol. i. p. 119. ment at defiance, but because thu 

"S«ppo«« youmolf gazing on a proce«3 iit ono to which no nu'a.sure- 

' TIjc whole western ment applien, . . . reason refuiHrit 

■wing with<! to lay an arreittmeiit on anv |KTiod 

i.u-.'s '• .w < 1 .kfo av ■'■ '■' ■• ••'•' ■' •' •• • • • -x-vne, or to declare 

in half an hour a.\. •• in the very act of 

tint* wi!I ):\.\'- fad- : , it has given ploco Ui 

dull Vou aev tiiein even eisc. It ia a neriejt of 

now »v l>"f"r<» your fvf^, .lur*. no una of which u, 

alth e < ach of iheni continually 

for> .c» in anothiT." 
rva.* >i. .1 ■... . .'v.. ..■....•; ■■II'. ...',. 11 


it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, accord- 
ing to the rule that exclusion of the continent is exclusion 
of the contained. Now this practical efficiency (here 
identified with existence) is contained under succession 
and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between 
succession and non-succession (or simultaneity) ; there 
being a manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, accord- 
ing to the rule — 

" In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior 
alternative ; 

" Xor is their unity in contradictories, there being a 
lepugnance in the very statement." ^ 

And this succession and simultaneity being excluded 
from the permanent, and also excluding from the per- 
manent all practical efficiency, determine existence of the 
alternative of momentariness. — q.e.d. 

Perhaps some one may ask : Why may not practical 
efficiency reside in the non-fluxional (or permanent) ? If 
so, this is wrong, as obnoxious to the following dilemma. 
Has your "permanent" a power of past and future practical 
efficiency during its exertion of present practical efficiency 
or no ? On the former alternative (if it has such power), 
it cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because 
we cannot deny that it has power, and because we infer 
the consequence, that which can at any time do anything 
does not fail to do that at that time, as, for instance, a com- 
plement of causes, and this entity is thus powerful. On the 
latter alternative (if the permanent has no such power of 
past and future agency), it will never do anything, because 
practical efficiency results from power only ; what at any 
time does not do anything, that at that time is unable to 
do it, as, for instance, a piece of stone does not produce a 
germ ; and this entity while exerting its present practical 
efficiency, does not exert its past and future practical 
efficiency. Such is the contiadiction. 

You will perhaps rejoin : By assuming successive sub- 

^ Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria. 

run DAVDDHA SYSrilM. 17 

sidiaries, there is coiupelont to the pennaneiit entity a 
successive exertion of past and future practical efllciency. 
If so, we would ask you to explain: Do the subsidiariea 
assist the entity or not ? If they do not, they are not 
required; for if tlioy do nothing, they can liave nothinj; 
to do with the successive exertion. If lliey do assist the; 
thing, is this assistance (or supplementation) other tiian 
the tiling or not ? If it is other than the thing, then this 
adscititious (assistance) is the cause, and tlie non-nionien- 
tary entiiy is not the cause : for the eflect will then follow, 
by concomitance aiul non-concomitance, the adventitious 
supplementalitiu. Tiius it has been said: 

*' What have rain and shine to do with the soul ? Their 

eftect is on the skin of man ; 
*' If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-perma- 
nent ; and if the skin were like the soul, there could 
be no etfect ]>roduced upon it." 
Perhaps you will say : The entity produces its effect, 
together xcitk its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let 
the entity not ;.jive up its subsidiaries, but iiiiher tie them 
lest they lly with a rope round their neck, and so ])roduce 
the eflect which it has to produce, and without forfeiting 
its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does the 
additament (or supplementation) constituted by the sub- 
sidiaries give rise to another additament or not? In 
either case the afore-mentioned objections will come down 
upon you like a shower of stones. On tlie alternative 
that the additament takes on another additament, you will 
be embarrassed by a many-sided regress in infinitum. If 
wiien the additament is to be generated another auxiliary 
(or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless 
series of such additaments : this must be confessed to bo 
one infinito regress. For example, let a seed be granted 
to be productive when an additament is given, consisting 
of a complement of objects such as water, wind, and the 
like, as subsidiaries ; otherwise an additament would be 
manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking 


on the additament takes it on with the need of (ulterior) 
subsidiaries ; otlierwise, as there would always be sub- 
sidiaries, it would follow that a germ would always be 
arising from the seed. We shall now have to add to the 
seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves 
requiring an additament. If when this additament is 
given, the seed be productive only on condition of sub- 
sidiaries as before, there will be established an infinite 
regression of additaments to (or supplementations of) the 
seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries. 

Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for 
the production of the effect produce its effect independently 
of the seed and the like, or does it require the seed and 
the like ? On the first alternative (if the supplementation 
works independently), it would ensue that the seed is in 
no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation 
require the seed), the seed, or whatever it may be that is 
thus required, must take on a supplementation or addita- 
ment, and thus there will be over and over again an end- 
less series of additaments added to the additament con- 
stituted by the seed ; and thus a second infinite regression 
is firmly set up. 

In like manner the subsidiary which is required w^ill 
add another subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be 
that is the subject of the additions, and thus there will be 
an endless succession of additaments added to the addita- 
ments to the seed which is supplemented by the sub- 
sidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to 
your embarrassment. 

Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted 
that a supplementation identical with the entity (the seed, 
or whatever it may be) is taken on. If so, the former 
entity, that minus the supplementation, is no more, and a 
new entity identical with the supplementation, and desig- 
nated (in the technology of Buddhism) Iciirvad rupa (or 
effect-producing object), comes into being : and thus the 

7///- DAi'DDHA SYitTEM. 


tree of my desires (ray doctrine o£ a universal lliix) h;is 
borne its fruit, 

Traciical etiiciency, thercfuro, in iho. non-nionientaiy is 
inadmissible. Nor is practical efficiency possible apart 
from succession in time ; for such a possibility is redur^'ucd 
by the foUowin;^' tliiemma. Is this ({)ermancnt) entity 
(which you contend for) able to produce all its efTects 
simultaneously, or does it ccmtinue to exist after produc- 
tion of ellects ? On llic former alternative, it will result 
that the entity will produce its effects just as much at one 
time as at anotlicr; on the second alternative, the expecta- 
tion of its permanency is as reasonable as expectin.' siid 
eaten by a mouse to germinate. 

That to which contrary determinations are attributed is 
diverse, as lieat and cold; but this thinj^ is determined by 
contrary attributions. Such is the argumentation applied 
to the cloud (to prove tiuit it has not a permanent but a 
lluxiunal existenc*;). Nor is the middle term disallowable, 
for possession and privation of power and impotence are 
allowed in rcizard to the permanent (which you assert) at 
ddVerent limes. The concomitance an<l non-concomitance 
already described (viz., That which can at any time du 
anything dues not fail to do that at that time, and What 
at any lime does nut do anything, that at that time is 
unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence 
uf such power. The negative rule is : What at any time 
\.i unable to pnxluce anything, that at that time does not 
iroducc it, as a piece of stone, for example, does not pro- 
duce a genu; and this entity (the seed, or whatever it 
may bo), while exerting a present ]>ractical etticicncy, is 
i:,< .: i' !.' of past and future practical efficiencies. The 
cuuUa.iuaion violating this rule is : What at any time 
docs anything, that at tliat time is able to do that 
-. as a complement of causes is able to produce its 
...^L; and this (permanent) entity exerts at time past 
and time future the practical efficiencies proper to those 


(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the niomen- 
tary ; there being observed in regard to existence a nega- 
tive rule, that in regard to permanent succession and 
simultaneity being excluded, existence -which contains 
succession and simultaneity is not cognisable; and there 
being observed in regard to existence a positive rule, in 
virtue of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent 
is accompanied or "pervaded" by the momentary), and 
in virtue of a non-concomitance observed (viz., that the 
non-momentary is accompanied or "pervaded" by the 
non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jnana-^ri — 

" What is is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent 
things ; 

" The power of existence is relative to practical efi&ciency, 
and belongs to the ideal ; but this power exists not 
as eternal in things eternal (ether, &c.) ; 

'■ Xor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could 
do the work of another ; 

" For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and simul- 
taneity), a momentary flux is congruous and re- 
mains true in regard to that which we have to 

Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis 
of the Vai^eshikas and Xaiyayikas, that existence is a 
participation in the universal form existence ; for were 
this the case, universality, particularity, and co-inhesion 
(which do not participate in the universal) could have no 

Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, par- 
ticularity, and co-inhesion dependent on any sui generis 
existence of their own ; for such an hypothesis is operose, 
requiring too many sui generis existences. Moreover, the 
existence of any universal is disproved by a dilemma 
regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the 
many) ; and there is not presented to us any one form 
runnins; through all the diverse momentary thincrs, mustard- 
seeds, mountains, and so forth, like the string running 


through the gems strung upon it. Moreover (we would 
lusk), is the universal oninij)reseMt or j)resent everywliere in 
its subjicible subjects? If it, is tverywliere, all things in 
the universe will be confoundeil togetiier (chaos will be 
eternal), and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, 
since Tra^asla-jiada liAs saiil, " Present in all its subjects." 
Ayain (if the universal is present only in its proper sub- 
jects}, does the universal (the nature of a jar) residing in 
an already existing jar, on being attached to another jar 
now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the 
other, or not come from it? On the lirst alternative (if it 
comes), the universal must be a substance (for substances 
alone underlie qualities and motions); whereas, if it does 
not come, it cannot attach itself to tlie new jar. Again 
(we ask), when the jar ceases to exist, does the universal 
outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another place ? On 
the first supposition it will exist without a subject to 
inhere in ; on the second, it will be improper to call it 
eternal (as you do) ; on the third, it will follow that it is 
a substance (or base of qualities and motions). Destroyed 
OS it is by the malign influence of these and the like 
objections, the universal is unauthcnticated. 

('onformably it has been said — 

"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one 
place, engages without moving from that place iu 
producing itself in anoilier j»lace. 

" This entity (universality) is not connected with iliat 
whtrt'in it resides, and yet perva<les that which 
occupies that jjlace : great is this miracle. 

" It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subse- 
quently divided, it t[uits not its former repository : 
what a series of dillii ulties ! " 

If you ask : On what does the assurance that the one 
exists in the many rest? You must be satisfied with the 
reply that we conceiie it to repose on difference from that 
wliich is different (or exclusion of heterogeneity). We 
dismiss further prolixity. 


That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain 
is the common verdict of all the founders of institutes, 
else they would not be found desirous to put a stop to it 
and engjafrincf in the method for bringinfT it to an end. 
We must, therefore, hear in mind that all is pain, and pain 

If you object: When it is asked, like what ? you must 
quote an instance, — we reply : Not so, for momentary 
objects self-characterised being momentary, have no com- 
mon characters, and therefore it is impossible to say that 
this is like that. We must therefore hold that all is like 
itself alone, like itself alone. 

In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void 
alone. For we are conscious of a determinate negation. 
This silver or the like has not been seen by me in 
sleeping or waking. If what is seen were (really) existent, 
then reality would pertain to the corresponding act of 
vision, to the (nacre, &c.), which is the basis of its par- 
ticular nature (or hocceity), to the silver, &c., illusorily 
superposed upon that basis, to the connection between 
them, to the co-inherence, and so forth : a supposition not 
entertained by any disputant. Xor is a semi-effete exist- 
ence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a fowl 
may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying 
eggs. The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of 
the illusorily superposed (silver, &c.), the basis (nacre, 
&c.), the connection between them, the act of vision, and 
the videns, if one or more be unreal it will perforce ensue 
that all are unreal, all being equally objects of the nega- 
tion ; the Madhyamikas excellently wise explain as follows, 
viz., that the doctrine of Buddha teiininates in that of a 
total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow 
progression like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through 
the position of a momentary flux, and through the (gradual) 
negation of the illusory assurances of pleasurable sensi- 
bility, of universality, and of reality. 

The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from 


four alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from 
l»oth (rt-ality anil unreality), and from neither (reality ni)r 
uni-eality). To exem}>lify this: If real exi.^tence were the 
nature of a water-pot and the like, the activity of its 
maker (the ])otter) would be superlluous. 

If non-existence be its nature the same objection will 
accrue ; as it is said — 

"Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and 
the like, for instance ; 

" No cause is eflicacious of a non-existent efl'ect, llowers 
of the sky and the like, for instance." 

The two remaining alternatives, as self-contrailictory, 
are inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by 
the venerated Buddha in the Alankiiiavatara^ — 

" Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is 
ascertained ;- 

"Those things are thcefore shown to be inexplicable 
and natureless." 
And again — 

"This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, 
No sooner are objects thought than they are dis- 

Tliat is to say, the objects arc not d(!termined by any one 
of the four alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said — 

"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog 
have three views of a woman's person, respectively that it 
is a carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey." 

In consecjuence, then, of these four points of view, when 
all ideas are come to an end, final extinction, which is a 
void, will result. Accordingly we have overtaken our end, 

' Qupnr, lAi'tkavAtarm ? to which ipfttUT ih irduced by thu 

' Cf. Fcrricr'* Iniititutai of Mota- taolica of iipvculatinn ; and thi» pn-- 

phytic, p. 2 1 J. " 11 every ••"in fJrtni liiratnrnt ia dwcrrtK-d not unaptly 

obj<""* ..f ,-,, • iii..,, ., , .• .., ...t ..f I ■ ..,'!;„,» it 't^i/x— «ir, a* wc hav.- 

o\<- •vhcrc, iH-rhnpA mori- 

*»!• '. u a npvpr-cn(Jinj{ 

plrtc, that ijs uicti«al« — ttial tjs ii<> i<-<i''tiipttuu •>!' non-icn** into ■rtiM.', 

taMaiblo nbj<Tt of knowledge at all. »n>l a nevcr-i-ndin); rcla{kiic uf sc-uac 

Thin i« the di»tft-»«ing prciJicanirnt into nonaciuc." 


and there is nothing to be taught to us. There conse- 
quently remain only two duties to the student — interroga- 
tion and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the putting 
of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained. 
Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred 
teacher. These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assent- 
ing to that which the religious teacher enounces, and de- 
fective in interrogation, wlience their conventional desig- 
nation of Miidhyamikas (or mediocre). 

Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogacharas, because 
while they accept the four points of view proclaimed by 
the spiritual guide, and the void of external things, they 
make the interrogation : Why has a ^■oid of the internal 
(or baselessness of mental phenomena) been admitted ? 
For their technology is as follows : — Self-subsistent cogni- 
tion must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole 
universe is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed 
by Dharmakirti : " To one who disallows perception the 
vision of objects is not competent." 

An external percijnhile is not admissible in consequence 
of the following dilemma. Does the object cognitively 
apprehensible arise from an entity or not ? It does not 
result from an entity, for that which is generated has no 
permanence. Xor is it non-resultant, for what has not 
come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do 
you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, 
as begetting cognition ? If so, this is childish nonsense, 
because it conflicts with the apparent presentness of the 
object, and because on such a supposition the sense organs 
(and other imperceptible things) might be apprehended. 
Further (we ask), Is the percipibile a simple atom or a 
complex body ? The latter it cannot be, this alternative 
being 'ejected by the dilemma as to whether part or whole 
is perceived. The former alternative is equally impossible, 
an atom being supersensible, and it not being able to 
combine simultaneously with six others; as it has been 
said — 


" If an aU)iu could srtnultaneously combine with six, it 

Nvoukl have six surfaces ; 
" And each of these bein;* taken separately, there would 

be a body of atomic ilimeiision." 
Intellect, therefore, as having no other percipilnle but 
itself, is shown to be itself its own percipibile, self-sub- 
sistent, luminous with its own light, like light. Therefore 
it has been said — 

" There is naught to be objectified by intellect ; there is 

no cognition ulterior thereto ; 
"There being no distinction between percept and per- 
cipient, intellect shines forth of itself alone." 
The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, 
thus : That which is cognised by any cognition is not 
other than that cognition, as soul, for instance, is not other 
than the cognition of soul ; and blue and other momentary 
objects are cognised by cognition;?. For if there were a 
<liirerence (between percept nnd percipient), the object 
could not now have any connection with the cognition, there 
being no identity to determine a constancy of connection, 
nnd nothing to determine the rise of such a connection. 
As for the appearance of an interval between the object 
and subject consciousnesses, this is an illusion, like the 
appearance of two moons when there is only one. The 
cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream 
without beginning and without interruption; as it has 
been said — 

" As invariably cognised together, the blue ubjtct and 

the cognition thereof are identical ; 
"And the difference should be accounted for by ilhusory 
cognitions, as in the example of the single moon." 
And again — 

"Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by 

reason of illusory ]»erceptions, 
" Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts 

and of percipient," 
K< 1 must it be*s\ipj>osed that (on this liypoihcsis) the 


juice, the energy, and the digestion derivable from an 
imaginary and an actual sweetmeat will be the same ; for 
it cannot be questioned that though the intellect be in 
strictness exempt from the modes of object and subject, 
yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in 
virtne of the succession of illusory ideas without begin- 
ning, by reason of its possessing diverse modes percept 
and percipient, conformably to its illusory supposition of 
practical agency, just as to those whose eyes are dim with 
some morbid affection a hair and another minute object 
may appear either diverse or identical ; as it has been 
said — 

" As the intellect, not having object and subject modes, 
appears, by reason of illusory cognitions, 

" lUuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept 
and percipient ; 

" So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the 
example of the differences of the cognition of a hair 
and the like, 

" Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as 
percipient and percept." 

Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected 
by beginningless ideation, manifests itself under diverse 

When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four 
points of view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, 
there arises knowledge purged from the illusions which 
take the form of objects, such illusions being now melted 
away ; and this is technically called Mahodaya (the grand 
exaltation, emancipation). 

Others again (the Sautrantikas) hold that the position 
that there is no external world is untenable, as wanting 
evidence. Nor (they contend) can it be maintained that 
invariability of simultaneous cognition is an evidence, for 
this simultaneous cognition which you accept as proof of 
the identity of subject and object is indecisive, being found 
in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they 


proceed) : Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this 
proof be invariability tif sinniltaiieous coc^nition, — we refuse 
tl)i.<, because inasmuch as coc;nition must ultimately havi; 
some object, it is nianifesteil in duality, and because such 
invariability of simultaneity as to time ami plare is im- 
possible. Moreover (they continue), if the object, blue 
or whatever it be, were only a form of coonition, it 
should be presented as Ei/o, not as l{<>c aliquid, because 
the coi,'nition and the object would be identical. Peiliaps 
you will say: A blue form consisting of cognition is 
illusorily presented as external and as other than self, and 
consequently the Kgo is not sugj^ested ; and so it has been 
s;iid — 

"This side of knowledge which appears external to the 
other portion, 

"This appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is 
an illusion." 
And again — 

"The principle to be known as internal also manifests 
itself as if it were external." 

To this we reply (say the Sautrantikas): This is unten- 
able, for if there be no external" objects, there beinji no 
genesis of such, the comparison "as if they were external " 
is illegitimate. No man in his senses would say, " Vasu- 
niitra looks like flie son of a childless mother." Ajrain. if 
the manifestation of identity be proved by the illusoriness 
of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of 
duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, 
you are involved in a logical circle. Without controversy 
we observe that cognitions take external things, blue or 
whatever thoy may be, as their objects, and do not take 
merely internal niodifications as such, and we see that 
men in their everyday life overlook their internal states. 
Thus this argument which you adduro to prove that there 
is difference between subject and object, turns out a more 
alxsurdity, likc>railky food made of cow-dung. When then 
you say " as if it were external," you must already suppose 


an external percipibile, and yonr own arrow will return 
upon you and wound you. 

If any one object that the externality of an object 
synchronous with the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sau- 
trantikas) reply that this objection is inadmissible, inasmuch 
as the subject in juxtaposition to the sensory imposes its 
form upon the cognition then in production, and the 
object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The 
interrogation and response on this point have been thus 
summarised — 

"If it be asked, How can there be a j)ix&t percipibile? 
They recognise perceptibility, 

" And a competent inferribility of the individual thing 
is its imposition of its form." 

To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a 
thriving look, as nationality is inferred from language, 
and as affection is inferred from flurried movements, so 
from the form of knowledge a knowable may be inferred. 
Therefore it has been said — 

" With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition) 
without losing the nature of a half ; 

" The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a know- 
able is the nature of the knowable." 

For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being 
of the cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, 
and if indifferenc'e were to attach itself to this, it would 
reduce all things to indifference. Accordingly the formal 
argument for the existence of external things: Those things 
which while a thing exists appear only at times, all depend 
upon something else than that thing ; as, for instance, if I 
do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of speaking 
or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or 
walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity 
under discussion, while there exists the recognition of a 
subject of them, are only at times manifested as blue and 
so forth. Of these, the recognition of a subject is the 
presentation of the Ego, the manifestation as blue and 


80 forth is a presentment of activity, as ii has bcoii 
sail! — 

" That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant 
about the Ego : 

"That is a presentment of activity which manifests 
blue and the rest." 

Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject- 
recognitions, let it be understood that there is an external 
object world perceptible, which is the cause of present- 
ments of activity ; and that this external world does not 
rise into being only from time to time on occasion of pre- 
sentments resulting from ideation. 

According to the view of the Sensationalists (viji\d- 
navddiji}, ideation is a power of generating such and 
such sensations (or presentments of activity) in subject- 
recognitions which exist as a single stream. The matur- 
escence of this power is its readiness to produce its eflect; 
of this the result is a presentment (or sensation) ; the 
antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental 
train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being 
admitted to exercise such causality. It must therefore bo 
stated that all momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in 
the subject-consciousness are alike able to bring about that 
maturescence of ideation in the subject-consciousness, which 
maturescence is productive of presentments of activity. 
If anyone (of these fleeting sensations) had not this power, 
none would possess it, all existing alike in the stream of 
subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all 
have this power, the elTects cannot be diversifieii, and 
therefore any intelligent man, however unwilling, if ho 
has a clear understanding, must decide, without putting 
out of sight the testimony of his consciousness, that to 
account for the occasional nature (of sense percepts) the 
six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, of 
pleasure, and so forth, arc produced on occasion of four 
conditions. These four conditions are known as (i.) iho 
data, (2.) the suggestion, (3.) the medium, and (4.) tiio 


dominant (organ). Of these, the form of blue or the like 
arises from the condition of blue data in the understanding 
in which there is a manifestation of blue or the like, which 
manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of 
forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. 
The restriction to the apprehension of this or that object 
arises from the medium, light, for instance, as a condition, 
and from the dominant, the eye, for example, as another 
condition. The eye, as determinant of one particular 
cognition (form) where taste, &c., might have been equally 
cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday 
life he who determines is regarded as dominant. We 
must thus recognise four causes of pleasure and the rest 
which constitute the understanding and its modifications. 

So also the universe, which consists of mind and its 
modifications, is of five kinds, entitled (i.) the sensational, 
(2.) the perceptional, (3.) the affectional, (4.) the verbal, 
and (5.) the impressionaL Of these, the sensible world 
(rupa-skandha) is the sense organs and their objects, 
according to the etymology, viz., that objects are discrimi- 
nated {rupyante) by these. The perceptional world is the 
stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of 
activity. The affectional world is the stream of feelings 
of pleasure and pain generated by the two aforesaid 
worlds. The verbal (or symbolical) world is the stream of 
cognitions conversant about words — the words " cow," and 
so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as desire, 
aversion, &c., caused by the affectional world, the lesser 
miseries, as conceit, pride, &c., and merit and demerit. 

Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode 
of pain, and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire 
a knowledge of the principles, the method of suppressing 
this pain. Hence it has been said — 

" The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint 
the four methods of suppressing the aggregate of 

* Cf. Burnouf, Lotus, p. 520.— Should we read samudayai 


In these words the sense of pain is known to every one ; 
the " a<;<:re<,'ate " means tlic cause of pain. This ug.i;re<,'ate 
is tM'ofoUi, as (i.) dt'termiiu'd by concurrence; or (2.) deter- 
mined by causation. Of these, there is an apliorisra com- 
prisinj^ the aijgregate determined by concurrence, " wliich 
other Ciiuses resort to this illect;" the condition of these 
causes thus proceeding is concurrence ; the concurrence of 
causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious 
being, — such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify 
tins. A germ, caused by u seed, is generated by the con- 
currence of six elements. Of these, eartii as an element 
produces hardness and smell in the germ ; water as an 
element produces viscidity and moisture ; light as an 
element produces colour and warmth ; air as an element 
produces touch and motion ; ether as an element produces 
expansion and sound ; tlie season as an element produces 
a titting soil, &c. The aphorism comprising the aggregate 
determined by causation is : " With the Tathagatas the 
nature of conditions is fixed by pro iuction, or by 
non-production ; there is continuance as a condition, and 
determination by a condition, and conformity of the pro- 
duction to the cause ; " that is to say, acconiing to tlic doc- 
trine of the Tathagata lUiddhas, the nature of these condi- 
tions, that is, the causal relation between the cause and 
efl'ect, results froux production or from non-production. 
That which comes into i)eing. provided that someiliing 
exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the expla- 
nation of the nature (or caudal relation). Continuance as 
a condition is where the ellect is not found without its 
cause. The (abstract) aflix tal (in the word sthilita) has 
the sense of the concrete. Determination by a condition 
is the determination of the elTect by the cause. Here some 
one might interpose the remark that the relation of caus« 
and effect cannot exist aj>art from some conscious agent. 
For tl)is rea-un it is adiled that there existing a cause, 
conformity of the genesis to that cause is the nature 
which is fixed in conditions (that is, in causes and 


effects) ; and in all this no intelligent designer is observed.'^ 
To illustrate this, the causal determination of a genesis to 
be gone through is as follows : — From the seed the germ, 
from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, 
from the hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, 
from the spicules the blossom, from the blossom the fruit. 
In this external aggregate neither the cause, the seed and 
the rest, nor the effect, the germ and the rest, has any 
consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of being 
brought into being by the seed. In like manner in mental 
facts two causes are to be recognised. There is a whole 
ocean of scientific matter before us, but we desist, apprehen- 
sive of making our treatise unduly prolix. 

Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal 
aggregates, or the rise of pure cognition subsequent to 
such suppression. The method (path, road) is the mode of 
suppressing them. And this method is the knowledge of 
the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former 
ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautran- 
tika arose from the fact that the venerated Buddha said 
to certain of his disciples who asked what was the ultimate 
purport (anta) of the aphorism {sutra), "As you have in- 
quired the final purport of the aphorism, be Sautrantikas." 

Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, 
consisting of odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of 
colours, &c., in order to produce unbelief in these, declared 
the universe to be a void. These the venerated Buddha 
styled Prathamika (primary) disciples. A second school, 
attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain 
that sensation is the only reality. A third school, who 

^ Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of property of bricks, mortar, wood, 

Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85. "We not and glass. But what we know of 

only see that the architect's plan organic materials is that they liave 

determined the arrangement of this spontaneous tendency to arrange 

materials in the house, but we see themselves in definite forms ; pre- 

why it must have done so, because cisely as we see chemical substances 

the materials have no spontaneous arranging themselves in definite 

tendency to group themselves into forms without the intervention of 

houses ; that not being a recognised any e.xtra chemical agency." 


contend that both are true (the internal and the external), 
and maintain that sensible objects are inferrible. Others 
liold all this to be absurd language (rirudtlhd hlidshd), and 
are known under the designation of Vaibh;ishikas. Their 
technical language springs up as follows : — According to 
the doctrine of inferrible sensibles, there being no percep- 
tible object, and consequently no object from which a 
universal rule can be attained, it will be impossible that 
any illation should take place, and therefore a contradiction 
will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects, 
therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of 
these apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of 
knowledge as other than mere representjition ; cognition 
which is discriminative is not a form of evidence, as being 
a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said — 

"Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, 
is nun-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting 
from the appearances of things, is without con- 
troversy an illusion. 

"The perceptible evidence of things is perception: if 
it were aught else, 

"There could neither be things, nor evidence of things 
derived from verbal communication, inference, or 

Here some one may say : If discriminative cognition be 
unauthentic, how is the apprehension of real objects by one 
energising thereon and the universal consentiency of man- 
kind to be accounted for ? Let it be replied : This question 
docs not concern us, for these may be accounted for by 
the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just 
as if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may 
yet handle the gem, because it underlies the light, wiiile 
if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold 
of any silver). The rest has been fully discussed in 
describing the Sautmntika.s (cf. ]>. 27), and therefore need 
not here be further detailed. 

It should not be contendevl that a diversity of instruction 


according to the disciples' modes of tliouglit is not tra- 
ditional (or orthodox) ; for it is said in the gloss on the 
Bodha-chitta — 

"The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha) 
accommodating themselves to the character and dis- 
position (of those wlio are to be taught), 

" Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a 
plurality of methods. 

"For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep 
and superficial, 

" Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of 
a universal void which is a negation of duality." 

It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship 
of tlie twelve inner seats (ayafana) is conducive to felicity. 

" After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner 

" Are to be thoroughly reverenced ; what use of reveren- 
cing aught else below ? 

" The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, 

"The common sensory and the intellect have been 
described by the wise as the twelve inner seats." 

The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in 
the Viveka-vilasa : — 

" Of the Bauddhas ^ugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the 
universe is momentarily fluxional ; 

" The following four principles in order are to be known 
by the name of the noble truths : — 

"Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is 

"And the path (method); of all this let the explication 
be heard in order. 

" Pain, and the skandhas of the embodied one, which are 
declared to be five, — 

" Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form. 

"The five organs of sense, the fiv^e objects of sense, 
sound and the rest, the common sensory, 
* These are not the usual four ' sublime truths ; ' cf. p. 30. 

THE DAUDDHA svyii-.v. 35 

" And (ilic intellect) the abode of merit, — tliesc are the 

twelve inner seats. 
" This should be the complement of desire and so forth, 

when it arises in the heart of man. 
" Under the name of soul's own nature, it should be 

the aggre^'ate. 
" The fi.xed idea that all impressions are momentary, 
"This is to be known as the paili, and is also styled 

" Furfliermore, there aie two instruments of science, 

perception and inference. 
"The liauduhas aie well known to be divideil into four 

sects, tlie Vaibiidshikas and the rest. 
" The Vaibhiishika hiijhly esteems an object concomitant 

to the cognition ; 
"The Sautriintika allows no external object apprehen- 
sible by perception ; 
"Tiie Yogaciiaia admits only intellect accompanied 

with forms ; 
" The Madhyaniikas liuld mere consciousness self-sub- 

" All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim tlie same 

"Arising from the extirpation of desire, Sec, the stream 

of cognitions and impressions. 
" The skin garment, the water-pot, im- .wn-iue, tiie rags, 

the single meal in the forenoon, 
" The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by 

the iJauddiia mendicants," ^ A. K. Ct. 

I \i ; H. ■• . 1 r,,i,-,i !i- .;. ri. . I i„ost (A.<t, r.y, that of t>i$iiudtii/a or mimu- 

of ! iuc- litti/n, &c.) soctii to bo »t variaiios 

thti ; on- with IhoMi givcti ia liuJdbUt 

•e<]u«ut.Iy •uuic ui lii« fkpitkUiktions works. 

( 36 ) 



The Gymnosopliists ^ (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of 
the Muktakachchhas,^ and maintaining continued existence 
to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momen- 
tariness of everything. (They say) : If no continuing 
soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means 
for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless. 
But surely this can never be imagined as possible — that 
one should act and another reap the consequences ! There- 
fore as this conviction, " I who previously did the deed, 
am the person who now reap its consequences," establishes 
undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which 
remains constant through the previous and the subsequent 
period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as unten- 
able the doctrine of momentary existence, i.e., an exist- 
ence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or 
subsequent part. 

But the opponent may maintain, " The unbroken stream 
(of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argu- 
ment, so who can prevent it ? In this way, since our 
tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, ' whatever 
is, is momentary, &c.,' it follows that in each parallel line 
of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the 
agent and the subsequent one reaps the fruit. iSTor may 

^ Virasanas, "without garments." liarity of dress, apparently a habit 
- " The Buddliists are also called of wearing the hem of the lower 
Mnltafcadtchhas, alluding to a pt-cu- garment wutucked." ^Cohhroolc 


you object that, ' if this Wfie true, elTects mi;^l»t extend 
beyond all bounds' — [i.e., A might act, and B receive the 
punishniL'iit] — because there is an essentially controlling 
relation in the very nature uf cause and ell'ect. Thus we 
see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in sweet 
juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite 
certainty tiiat sweetness will be found in the shoot, the 
stalk, the stem, the branches, the peduncle, &v., and so on 
by an unbroken series to the fruit itself; or again, when 
cotton seels have been sprinkled with lac juice, there will 
be a similar certainty of linding, througli the same series 
of shoot, &c., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As it 
has been said — 

"In whatever series of successive states the original 
impression of the action was produced, 

"'There verily accrues the result, just like the redness 
produced in cotton. 

'•'When lac juice, &c., are poured on the flower of the 
citron, &c., 

" ' A certain capacity is produced in it, — do vuu not see 

But all this is only a drowning man's catching at a 
straw, for it is overthrown by the following dilemma: — 

In the example of the "cloud," &c. [supra, p. 15], was 
your favourite " momentariness " proved by this very proof 
or by some other? It could not be the fi'rmer, because 
your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible 
in the cloud, and consequently, as your example is not 
an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to the 
ground. Nor can it be tlie latter — because you migiit 
always prove your ductrine of momentariness by this new 
proof (if you had it), and consequently your argument 
regarding all existence [" wliatever is, is momentary," 
&c.] would become needless. If you take as your defini- 
tion of "existence" "that whicli produces an efTect," thi.s 
will not hold, lis it would include even the bite of n snake 
imagined in the rope, since tiiis undoubtedly produces the 


effect [of fear]. Hence it has been said that tlie definition 
of an existence is "that which possesses an origin, an end, 
and an [intermediate] duration." 

As for what was said [in p. i6] that "the momentari- 
ness of objects is proved by the fact that tlie contrary 
assumption leads to contradictory attributes of capacity 
and want of capacity existing contemporaneously," that 
also is wrong — for the alleged contradiction is not proved, 
as the holders of the Syad-vada^ doctrine [vide infrci] 
willingly admit the indeterminateness of the action of 
causes. xVs for what was said of the example of the 
cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, 
and we do not accept even in that instance a separate 
destruction [at each moment]. And again, your supposed 
continued series cannot be demonstrated without some 
subject to give it coherence, as has been said, " In indi- 
vidual thinofs which are of the same class or successivelv 
produced or in mutual contact, there may be a continued 
series; and this series is held to be one [throughout 

Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite 
relation between causes and effects. For even on your 
own admission it would follow that something experienced 
by the teacher's mind might be remembered by that of 
the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter might ex- 
perience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; 
and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing 
done passed away without result, and that the fruit of the 
thing not done was enjoyed. This has been said by the 
author of the Siddhasenavakya — 

" The loss of the thing done, — the enjoyment of the fruit 
of a thing not done, — the dissolution of all existence, — 
and the abolition of memory, — bold indeed is the Buddhist 
antagonist, when, in the teeth of these four objections, 
lie seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary destruc- 
tion ! " 

^ In p. 26, line 3, read Sijud-vddindm, 


Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), 
as at the time uf the perception (tlie second numienl) the 
object (of the lirst moment) does not exist, and similarly 
at the time of the object's existence the perception does 
not exist, there can be no such thin^^s as a pcrceiver and 
a thin^' peiceivcd, and couseiiuciilly the whole course of 
tlio world would come to an end. Xor may you suppose 
lliat the object and the perception are simultaneous, be- 
cause this would imply that, like the two iiorns of an 
animal, they did not stand in the relation of cause and 
ellect [us this relation necessarily involves succession], 
and consequently the Alavilxnia, or the object's data 
[supra, p. 29]. would be abolished us one of the four con- 
current causes {pratyayu)} 

If you say that " the object may still be perceived, 
inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception, 
even though the one may have existed in a difTerent 
moment from the other," this too will not hold. For if 
you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception 
lias a certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the 
impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception 
can possess the power of impressing a form ; and if you 
say that it has no form impressed upon it, you arc equally 
niet by the fact that, if we are to avoid incongruity, there 
must be some definite condition to determine the perception 
and knowledge in each several case. Tiius by perception 
the abstract consciousness, which before existed uninflu- 
enced by the external object, becomes modilied under the 
fonn of a jar, kc, with a definite reference to each man's 
personality {i.e., I see the jar], and it is not mei-ely the 
passivt • of a reflection like a mirror. Moreover, 

if the 1 :i only reproduced the form of the object, 

there would be au end of using such words as " far," 
" near," &c., of the objects.' Nor can you accept this 
toucluiiion, "as exactly in accordance with your own 

• I i>n>po«e to read in p. 2f«, line 5, it^ra, <jr\ihyaaif<i for oyntMyujfm. 
• A« tbrar tcnn« ntccw rilj reUte to th# p«rcci»cr. 


views," because, in spite of all our logic, the stubborn 
fact remains that we do use such phrases as "the moun- 
tain is nearer " or " further," " long " or " large." ISTor may 
you say that " it is the object (which supplies the form) 
that really possesses these qualities of being ' further,' &c., 
and they are applied by a fashion of speech to the per- 
ception [though not really belonging to it "] — because we 
do not find that this is the case in a mirror [i.e., it does 
not become a far reflection because it represents a far 
object.] And again, as the perception produced by an 
object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if 
the object be insentient, it ought equally to assume its 
form and so become itself insentient. And thus, accord- 
ing to the proverb, " wishing to grow, you have destroyed 
your root," and your cause has fallen into hopeless diffi- 

If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that 
" the perception does not follow the object in being in- 
sentient," then there would be no perception that the 
object is insentient,^ and so it is a case of the proverb, 
"While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another 
drops." " But what harm will it be if there is no percep- 
tion of a thing's being insentient ? " [We reply], that if 
its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form 
is perceived, the two may be quite distinct [and as different 
from each other as a jar and cloth], or it may be a case of 
" indeterminateness" [so that the two may be only occasion- 
ally found together, as smoke with fire]. And again, if in- 
sentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue 
form, how could there then be conformity between them 
[so that both the blue and the insentience should together 
constitute the character of the thing ?] We might just as 
well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived 
universe entered into it as also constituting its character.- 

^ I correct the reading iasydgra- may be not seen though the avayavin 

lianam to tasyd graha.nam {tasyd is seen, then I may say that the post 

heii\g jadatdydh). is the avayavin, and the unperceived 

* /. e., if you say that the avayava three worlds its avayara .' 


All this collection of topics for proof has been discusseil 
at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratapachandra ami 
others, in the Pravieyakamalamdrlanda, &c.. and is here 
omitted for fear of swelling' the bouk too much. 

Tlierefore those who wish for the sumvium bonum of 
man must not accept the doctrine of Buddha, but rather 
honour only the Arhata doctrine. The Arhat's natun; 
has been thus described by Arliachchandra-suri,' in hii 
A pta n iichaydla n kd ra. 

"The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient 
one, who has overcome all faults, desire, Sec, — adored by 
the three worlds, the declarer of things as they arc." 

But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul 
can enter the j'ath of proof, since none of the five alTirma- 
live proofs can be found to apply, as has V»een declared by 
Tautiitita [Bhatta Kumarila^] ? 

1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in 
this world by ourselves or others ; nor is tliere any part 
of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his 

2. " Nor is there any injunction {yidhi) of scripture 
which reveals an eternal omniscient one, nor can the mean- 
ing of the explanatory passages (arthavdda) be applie>l 

3. " His existence is not declared by those passages 
wiiich refer to quite other topics; and it cannot be con- 
tained in any empiiaiic repetitions (anuvdila\ as it had 
never been mentioned elsewhere before. 

4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning ran 
never be tiie subject of the eternal Veda ; and how can 
be be established by a made and spurious Veda ? 

5. " Do yoti say that this omniscient one is accepted on 

* I read arhalttariipam arhaeh- Ktiniurila ha<l » littlu n<lcntin(( to- 

fkttndra in p. 27, lino 3, in/r.i. wartiji th<-Jaitia.< .it thi'i'ixl of hi* lifo. 

' The following' luuMAifu ix-cunt in Ilu n'|M<nt<-«i of having' itocriicllv {Mr> 

••Mil ■ ' •.,! ' .:n\ 

•II ^ • h«r»! vttui ••IT 

iac.;- ^ .^ . . .. ..iti^. Jaii.^j . , JuJ 

jsja, chmp. Iv., it i« otcnttonM that ndjf<tlt30 JdluJ^ 


his own word ? How can you establish either when they 
thus both depend on reciprocal support ? 

6. " [If you say,] ' The saying is true because it was 
uttered by one omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's 
existence ; ' how can either point be established without 
some previously established foundation ? 

7. " But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on 
the baseless word of a parviscient know nothing of the 
meaning of a real omniscient's words. 

8. " And again, if we now could see anything like an 
omniscient being, we might have a chance of recognis- 
ing him by the [well-known fourth] proof, comparison 

9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], 
which embraces virtue, vice, &c., would not be established 
as authoritative, if there were not in liim tlie attribute of 
omniscience,^ and so on." 

We reply as follows : — As for the supposed contradiction 
of an Arhat's existence, derived from the failure of the 
five affirmative proofs, — this is untenable, because there 
«7'g proofs, as inference, &c., which do establish ^ his 
existence. Thus any soul will become omniscient when, 
(its natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining 
the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done 
away. Whatever thing has a natural capacity for know- 
ing any object, will, when its hindrances to such knowledge 
are done away, actually know it, just as the sense of 
vision cognises form, directly the hindrances of darkness, 
&c., are removed. Now there is such a soul, which has 
its hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasj)- 

1 Kumdrila tries to prove that no would not be true and authoritative, 
such being can exist, as his existence but we see that they are, therefore 
is not established by any one of the he is omniscient." He answers by 
five recognised proofs, — the sixth, retorting that the same argument 
ahJidva, being negative, is, of course, might be used of Buddha by a Bud- 
not applicable. I understand the dhist; and as the Jaina himself woulil 
last sloka as showing the inapplic- disallow it in that case, it cannot be 
ability of "presumption"' or arthd- convincing in his own. 
fotti. A Jaina would say, " If the - In p. 29, line 2, read tatsadbhdvd- 
Arhat were not omniscient, his words vedakasya for tatsadbhdiddelasya. 

Till-: ARllATA SYSiliM. 43 

inj; all thiiii;s reinaiiiin;j; unchangt'd ; therefore there is 
an omniscient being. Nor is the assertion unestablished 
that the soul has a natural capacity for gras|iing all things; 
for otlierwise the Minuimsist could not maintain that a 
knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the 
authoritative injunction of a text,^ — nor could there other- 
M ise be the knowledge of universal propositions, such as 
that in our favourite argument, "All things are indeter- 
minate from the very fact of their exisit-nce" [and, of 
course, a follower of the Nyiiya will grant that universal 
propositions can be known, though he will dispute the 
truth of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the 
teachers of the Purva Mimamsa acce]>t the thesis that the 
soul has a natural capacity fur grasping all things; since 
they allow that a knowledge embracing all things can bo 
produced by the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions, 
as is said [by Sahara in his commentary on the Sutras, 
i. I, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, 
tlie future, the minute, the obstructed, the distant, &c." 
Nor can you say that "it is impossible to destroy the 
obstructions whieli hinder the soul's knowing all things," 
because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are certain 
special means to destroy these obstructions, viz., the three 
["gems"], right intuition, &c. By this chaim also, all 
inferior assaults of argument can be put to flight. 

But the Naiyiiyika may interpose, " You talk of the 
pure intelligence, which, after all hindrances am done 
away, sees all objects, having sense-j»erception nt its 
heiglit ; but this is irrelevant, because there can be no 
hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has 
been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof 
uf your eternally liberated being. There cannot be au 
omniscient who is eternally " liberated," from the very 
fact of his Ix'ing " liierated," like other liberated persons, 
— since the use of the ti.-rm " liberated " necessarily im- 

' Tn fK 30, line 9, for nUkOiMtntjUantH notpatty, I pmpoM to read 


plies the having been previously bound ; and if the latter 
is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of 
the ether. " But is not this being's existence definitely 
proved by his being the maker of that eternal series of 
effects, the earth, &c. ? according to the well-known argu- 
ment, ' the earth, &c., must have had a maker, because they 
have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This argument, 
however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they 
have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from 
the fact of their being composed of parts, because this 
supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma. Does this 
" being composed of parts " mean (i.) the being in contact 
with the parts ; or (ii.) " the being in intimate relation to 
the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or 
(iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation ; or (v.) 
the being the object of an idea involving the notion of 
parts ? 

Not tJie first, because it would apply too widely, as it 
would include ether [since this, though not itself composed 
of parts, is in contact with the parts of other things ;] nor 
the second, because it would similarly include genus, &c. 
[as this resides in a substance by intimate relation, and 
yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor the third, because 
this involves a term (" produced ") just as much disputed 
as the one directly in question ; ^ nor the fourth, because 
its neck is caught in the pillory of the following alterna- 
tive : — Do you mean by your phrase used above that it 
is to be a substance, and to have something else in in- 
timate relation to itself, — or do you mean that it must 
have intimate relation to something else, in order to 
be valid for your argument ? If you say the former, it 
will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and 
has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation ; if you 
say the latter, your new position involves as much dispute 
as the original point, since you would have to prove the 
existence of intimate relation in the parts, or the so-called 

^ Jail y a is included in Kdrya and equally disputed. 


•'intimate causes," uhiili you mean hy 'something else." 
Wc use these terms in compliance with your torminohigy ; 
but, of course, from our point of view, we do n^t allow 
such a thing as "intimate relation," as tliere is no proof of 
its existence. 

Nor can the Ji/th alternative be allowed, because this 
vould reach too far as it would include soul, &c., since 
soul can be the olject of an idea involving the notion 
of parts, and yet it is acknowledged to be not an ellect.^ 
Nor can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerp- 
tible in itself, but by reason of its connection with some- 
thing possessing parts may itself become metaphorically 
the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, 
l>ecause there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of 
that which has no parts and that which is all-jiervadiiig, 
just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not all- 

Anil, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is 
lie independent? 

In the furmer case your position will apply too far, as 
it will extend erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for 
ourselves the work of many diflerent men, as carpenters, 
&c., and [in the second case] if all the world were producetl 
by this one maker, all other agents would be superfluous. 
A.-* it has been said in the VitardgastiUi, or " I'raise of 
Jina" — 

1. "There is one etenud maker for the world, all- 
pervading, independent, and trui' ; they have none of 
these inextricable dflu-^idiis wImm' tcacli. r :ir! thou" 

And again — 

2. " Tliere is here no luaker acting by his own free will, 
else his influence would extend to tiie making of a mat. 
"What would be the use of yourself or all the artisans, if 
liwara fabricates the three worlds ? " 

' Tlni* " I am po«M>iuwHj of a pnnlicatf inviilvinff the notion nf 
Iwidy " (ahttm i^arin), "my hanil," |<artH in applicU to iLc soul " 1." 
kc, arc all acntvncvs in whicli a 


Tlierefore it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience 
is produced when the hindrances are removed by the three 
means before alluded to. 

Kor need the objection be made that " right intuition," 
&c., are impossible, as there is no other teacher to go to, — 
because this universal knowledge can be produced by the 
inspired works of former omniscient Jinas. Nor is our 
doctrine liable to the imputation of such faults as AnyoJi- 
ydh-ayatd} &c., because we accept an eternal succession 
of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers, like the end- 
less series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from 
seed. So much for this preliminary discussion. 

The well-known triad called the three gems, right 
intuition, &c., are thus described in the Paramdgamasdra 
(which is devoted to the exposition of the doctrines of the 
Arhats)— " Eight intuition, right knowledge, right conduct 
are the path of liberation." This has been thus explained 
by Yogadeva : — 

(a.) Wlien the meaning of the predicaments, the soul, 
&c., has been declared by an Arhat in exact accordance 
with their reality, absolute faith in the teaching, i.e., the 
entire absence of any contrary idea, is "right intuition." 
And to this effect runs the Tattvdrtha-siuLtra, " Faith in the 
predicaments ^ is right ' intuition.' " Or, as another defini- 
tion gives it, " Acquiescence in the predicaments declared 
by a Jina is called ' right faith ; ' it is produced either by 
natural character or by the guru's instruction." " Natural 
character" means the soul's own nature, independent of 
another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge pro- 
duced by the teaching of another in the form of explana- 
tion, &c. 

(&.) " Eight knowledge " is a knowledge of the predica- 
ments, soul, &c., according to their real nature, undisturbed 
by any illusion or doubt ; as it has been said — 

^ Reasoning in a circle. I sup- that it is actually borne out in a caso 

pose the &c. includes the Atiavastkd- before everybody's eyes. 

dosha or reasoning arf infinitum. He ^ In p. 31, line 5, infra, read tat" 

accepts tlie supposed fault, and holds tvdrthe for tattnlrtham. 

TIIL .IA7/.17.-I SYSIl-M. 47 

"That knowleilge, wliicli embraces concisely or in detail 
the |ireiiicaments 03 they actually are, is called 'right 
knowlod'^e ' l»y the wise." 

This knowledge is fivefold as divided into mati, ^ru(a, 
avadhi, vianas-pari/dt/a, and kerala ; as it has been said, 
"Mati, Sniia, nm<//n', mnnasparydija, and kcvala, these 
are knowledge." The nienniu;.,' of this is as follows: — 

1. Mati is that by which one cognises an object through 
the operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions 
of knowledge being abolished. 

2. bruta is the clear knowledge produced by 7uati, all 
the obstructions of knowledge being abolished. 

3. Avadhi is the knowledge of special objects caused 
by the abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right 
intuition," &c} 

4. Manas-par Uja is the clear definite knowledge of 
another's thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the 
obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy. 

5. Kerala is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake 
of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance. 

The first of these {mati) is not self-cognised, the ollar 
four are. Thus it has been said — 

"True knowledge is a ])roof which nothing can ovcr- 
throw, and which manifests itself as well as its object; it 
is both supersensuous ami itself an object of cognition, as 
llie object is determined in two ways." 

But the full account of the further minute divisions must 
be got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned. 

(c) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions 
tending to evil courses by one who possesses faith and 
knowledge, and who is diligent in cutting off the series of 
actions and their effects wiiich constitutes mundane exist- 
ence. This has been explained at length by the Arhat — 

I. " Kight conduct is described as the entire reliuquish- 

' f - - ' • ■ V- '• "^ ' - '' kltnlition of hin>iraac«a pnv 

\iy the qiialilii-a, wrong lu- 

i •"," Ac 


ment of blamable impulses ; this has been subjected to a 
fivefold division, as the ' five vows,' ahimsd, sunrita, asteya, 
hrahmacliaryd, and aparigralui} 

2. " The ' vow ' of ahimsd is the avoidance of injuring 
life by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or 
immovable thing. 

3. " A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 
'vow' of sunrita. That truthful speech is not truthful, 
which is unkind to others and prejudicial 

4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to 
be the ' vow ' of asteya; the external life is a man's pro- 
perty, and, when it is killed, it is killed by some one wlio 
seizes it. 

5. "The 'vow' of hrahrnacharyd (chastity) is eighteen- 
fold, viz., the abandonment of all desires,^ heavenly or 
earthly, in thought, word, and deed, and whether by one's 
own action or by one's consent, or by one's causing another 
to act. 

6. " The ' vow ' of aparigraTia is the renouncing of all 
delusive interest in everything that exists not; since 
bewilderment of thought may arise from a delusive interest 
even in the unreal. 

7. " When carried out by the five states of mind in a 
fivefold order, these great ' vows ' of the world produce the 
eternal abode." 

The full account of the five states of mind (bhdvand) 
has been given in the following passage [of which we only 
quote one ^loka] — 

" Let him carry out the ' vow' of sunrita uninterruptedly 
by the abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, 
and by the deliberate avoidance of speech," ^ — and so forth. 

These three, rio;ht intuition, right knowledge, and ricrht 
conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally; 
just as, in the case of an elixir, it is the knowledge of 

•* Cf. the five yamas in the Yoga- ^ I read Tcdmdnd/m for Icumdndm 
ttUr as. 11.2,0. Hemachandra (j46AirfA in p. 33, line 7 (2 x 3 x 3 = 18]. 
81) calls them yamas. ^ For abhdshana, see Hemach. 16. 


what it U, faith in its viitues, and tlie aclual application 
of the medicine,* united, which produce the elixir's eflect, 
but not severally. 

Here we may say concisely that the iatUas or predi- 
caments ai-e two, ytV(f and ajCva ; tlie soul.yiVa, is pun- 
intelligence; the nun-soul, a/iVtf, is pure non-iutelligeuce. 
radmanaudin has thus said — 

"The two higJK'st predicaments are 'soul' and 'nun- 
soul ; ' ' discrimination ' is the power of discriminating 
liu>se two, in one who pursues what is to be pursued, aud 
rejects what is to be rejected. The an'ection, &C., of the 
a:.,'ent are to be rejected ; these are objects for tlie nou- 
iscriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone 
to be pursueil, wliich is defined as upayoija" 

U^Hiyoga [or " the true employment of the soul's acti- 
vities"] takes place when the vision of true knowledge 
recognises the manifestation of the soul's innate nature; 
but as long as the soul, by tiie bond of pradcsa and the 
lutual interpenetration of form which it produces [between 
(le soul and the body], considers itself as identilied with 
;:3 actions [and the body wliicli they produce], knowledge 
should rather be defined a^ "the cause of its recognisiug 
that it is other than these." - 

Intelligence {chaitamja) is common to all souls, and is 
tlie real nature of the soul viewed as parinala [ue., as it is 
:;i Itself]; but by the influence of vpaiaviaks}iaya and 
JiayopaJitma it appears in the "mixed" form as {x>s- 
ssing both,^ or again, by the influence of actions as they 
arise, it assumes the appearand e of foulness, &c.* As hits 
l)cen saiil by Viichakacharya [in a sutra] — 

' I tr j-'^- in j' ; ;. line 17, ra- * Or tlii.i nmy mean "by the io« 

<'> I ' /''/i-'i>i<ini for fluvDCv uf upasoma-LtA'tya ur tthu- 

r<iiii. yopaanui, it Appears charactcruvd 

y ■ vol. ii. by one or the other." 

p. '.}~. '. !• Ikj til" * I reail in p. : 

tnj'> r>.vliiu-, I •»■. *. ntr-un </"/iiX«/rr»ia for 

l> H' !:.» :..'.iiari», Ah^idJt. Jf. be ii<.-»cnbvvL 


" The aiqjasamika, the Kshdyika, and the ' mixed ' states 
are the nature of the soul, and also the audayilca and the 

1. The aicjjasamika state of the soul arises when all the 
effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions 
arise [to affect the future], as when water becomes tem- 
porarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the 
bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant,^ &c. 

2. The Kshdyika state arises when there is the absolute 
abolition of actions and their effects, as in final liberation. 

3. The "mixed" (misra) state combines both these, as 
when water is partly pure. 

4. The audayika state is when actions arise [exerting 
an inherent influence on the future]. The Pdrindmika 
state is the soul's innate condition, as pure intelligence, 
&c., and disregarding its apparent states, as (i), (2), (3), 
(4).^ This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, 
is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. 
This is the meaning of the siitra quoted above. 

This has been explained in the Svarupa-samhodhana — 
" Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical 
with it, — in some way both different and the same,— 
knowledge is its first and last ; such is the soul described 
to be." 

If you say that, " As difference and identity are mutually 
exclusive, we must have one or the other in the case of 
the soul, and its being equally both is absurd," we reply, 
that there is no evidence to support you when you 
characterise it as absurd. Only a valid non-perception ^ 
can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd ; but this is not 
found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the 
advocates of the Sydd-vdda) it is perfectly notorious that 
all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory 

^ Strychnos potatorum. ^ A valid non-perception is when 

* Just as in the Sdnkhya philo- an object is not seen, and yet all the 

sophy, the soul is not really bound usual concurrent causes of vision are 

though it seems to itself to be so. present, such as the e\'e, light, &c. 

THE ARIUTA syyiiiM. 51 

Others lay down a diflereut set of taitcas fiuiu the twct 
mentioned abv)ve, jtVa and ajiva ; they liold tliat tlicic 
are five adikdya.^ or categories, — -jiva, dkdia, dharnnf^ 
adhanna, and pudjala. To all these five we can apply 
the idea of "existence" (asti),^ as connected with the 
three divisions of time, and we can similarly apjdy the 
idea of ■' body " '/''?v/\- fr 'in lliL-ir <H'cupying sevt!::il iiait'^ 
of space. 

TUvJi , uic d:viwi.d mlu two, the " nuuidaiic 

and tlic i." The " ninndane " pass from birth to 

birlli ; and these are also divided into two, as those pos- 
sessing an internal sense (samanaska), and those destitnte 
of it (amanaska). The former possesses samjild, i.e., the 
ix)wer of apprehension, talking, acting, and receiving in- 
struction ; the latter are those without this power. These 
latter are also divided into two, as " locomotive " {trasa), 
or " immovable " {sthdvara). 

Tiie "locomotive" are those possessing at least two 
senses [touch and taste], as shell- fish, worms, &c., and are 
thus of four kinds [as possessing two, three, four, or five 
senses]; the "immovable" are earth, water, fire, air, and 
irce.'^.^ But here a distinction njust be made. The dust 
of the road is properly " earth," but bricks, &c., are aggre- 
gated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body 
13 appropriated becomes " eartlien-bodied," and that soul 
whieh will hereafter appropriate it is the " earth-soul." 
The same four divisions must also be applied to the others, 
water, &c. Now the souls which have appropriated or 
will apji'i riate the earth, &c., as their bodies, are reckoned 
as " imuiu\ able ; " but earth, &c., and the " bodies of earth," 
kc, are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.* 
These other immovable things, and such as only possess 

' I rc«d In p. 35, line 5, 'diti for / " ' >u tmtdi chatunidJuik 

stMti. ; • '• 

» I(rn. .• f> .. f, TTM here u*cd for "i' ■• ■' T m\ tnAdm 

"cat' . '• 1/ wo 

» 'I .i'Mfth. Ji\ ; . t Inui- 

|->^««M j.i.iv '^ii ' U.4.a;i**i tl.v 'v.-Uicr on!jf 

J .;5. lioc IC\ I : :ii*tc.'* 


the one sense of toucb, are considered as "released," since 
they are incapable of passing into any other state of 

Dharma, adharma, and dJcdsa are singular categories 
[and not generic], and they have not the attribute of 
" action," but they are the causes of a substance's change 
of place. 

Dharma, "merit," and adharma, "demerit," are well 
known. They assist souls in progressing or remaining 
stationary in the universally extended^ sky [or ether] 
characterised by light, and also called Lokakasa; hence 
the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred 
from progress, that of " demerit " from stationariuess. The 
effect of dkdsa is seen when one thing enters into the 
space previously occupied by another. 

Pudgala, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour. 
Bodies are of two kinds, atomic and compound. Atoms 
cannot be enjoyed ;2 the compounds are the binary and 
other combinations. Atoms are produced by the separa- 
tion of these binary and other compounds, while these 
arise from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds some- 
times arise from separation and conjunction [combined] ; 
hence they are cdXlQd ])udgalas, because they "fill" {'pur), 
and "dissolve" {gal). Although " time " is not properly 
an astikdya, because it does not occupy many separate 
parts of space [as mentioned in the definition], still it is a 
dravya [or tattva'\, as the definition will liold ; "substance" 
{dravya) possesses "qualities and action." ^ Qualities reside 

^ In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I time throws himself into the Jaina 

read sariatrdvasthite for sarvatrdvas- system which he is analysing, when 

thiti. In the preceding line I read we see that he gives the Jaina ter- 

dlokendi-aclidihinne for dlolcendvicli- minology for this definition of drai^ya, 

chhinne. — ci.Yaiiesh. Sdtra,\. I, l'^. Parydya 

^ Cf. Siddhdnta-muktavali, p. 27. is explained as larmcm in Hemach. 

The vishayn is upabhoga-sddhanam, Anek. Parydya, in p. 36, line II 

but it begins with the di7/anw/i«. This {infra, p. 53, line 9*, seems used in 

category takes up the forms of sthd- a different sense from that which it 

vara which were excluded ivomjiva. bears elsewhere. I have taken it 

■• It is an interesting illustration doubtingly as in Hemach. Abhidh. 

how thoroughly Miidhava for the 1 ^ot,, parydyo 'miJcramah h'amah. 

Tlin A R II ATA iV57;r.\/. 53 

in substance but do not themselves po&sess qualitiis, 
fts the ;,'euenil qualities, knowledge, &c., of the yuYi, ft^rm, 
Ac., of the body, anil the power of causin;^ proj^ress, 
stationarines-s, and niotiDU into a place pnviuusly uoeu- 
pied, in the case resjHictively of "merit," "demerit," and 
dktUa. "Action" (^paryuya) has thus been defined; the 
actions {panjdydh) of a substance are, as has been said, 
its existence, its production, its being what it is, its 
development, its course to the end, as, e.g., in ih^ijiva, the 
knowleil;.,'e of objects, a.s of a jar, »)y:c., happiness, pain. *Sfe. ; 
in the piuhjala, the lump of clay, the jar, &c. ; in merit 
and demerit, the special functions of progress, &c. Thus 
there are six substanoes or (atlra.'i [i.e., the five al)ove 
mentioned and " time ' j. 

Others reckon the tnttias as seven, as has been said — 
"The tattvas are 7 mi, njiva, usruia, handho, sumvara, 
nirjard, and moksha.' , Jira i\iu\ oJCiu hiivc been already 
tlescribed. Asrara is described as the movement of the 
soul called ifoga} through its participation in the movement 
of its various bodies, tiuddtika, &c. As a door opening 
into the water is called <ismta, because it causes the stream 
to descend through it,' so this yoga is calleil tfsntra, be- 
« ause by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences 
flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the 
du^t brought to it from every side by the wind, so the 
soul, wet witii previous sins, collects, by its manifold points 
of contact with the body, the actions which are brought 
to it by yoga. Or as, when \Cater is thrt)wn on a heate 1 
lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water altogether, so 
the jivu, heatetl by previous sins, receives from every side 
the actions which are brought by yoga. Kashdyn ("sin," 
"defilement") is so called because it " hurts " (^Aa,s7t) the 
soul by leading it into evil states ; it comprises anger, pride, 
delusion, and lust. Asrara is twofold, as good or evil. 
Thus abstaining from doing injury is a gooil yoga of the 

' Ko^ ■M'tn* to Im> herr the fiAtund ' In line iS, rtaJ ilfraiu^oitiru- 
itnptiUc of the •oul to »ct. foirrici. 


body ; speaking what is true, measured, and profitable is a 
good yoga of the speech. 

These various subdivisions of dsrava have been described 
at length in several Sutras. " Asrava is the impulse 
to action with body, speech, or mind, and it is good or 
evil as it produces merit or demerit," &c. Others, how- 
ever, explain it thus : — "Asrava is the action of the senses 
M'hich impels the soul towards external objects ; the light 
of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by 
means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge 
of form, &c." 1 

Bandlia, " bondage," is when the soul, by the influence 
of "false intuition," "non-indifference," " carelessness," and 
"sin" (hashdya), Qjidi also by the force of ^/o^a, assumes 
various bodies occupying many parts of space, which enter 
into its own subtile body, and which are suited to the 
bond of its previous actions. As has been said — 

"Through the influence of sin the individual soul 
assumes bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 
' bondage.' " 

In this quotation the word "sin" {Jcashdya) is used to 
include tlie other three causes of bondage as well as that 
properly so termed, Vachakacharya has thus enumerated 
the causes of bondage : " The causes of bondage are false 
intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and sin." 

(a) "False intuition" is twofold, — either innate from 
one's natural character, as when one disbelieves Jaina 
doctrines from the influence of former evil actions, irre- 
spectively of another's teaching, — or derived, when learned 
by another's teaching. 

(b) " Non-indifference " is the non-restraint of the five 
senses, and the internal organ from the set of six, earth, 

(c) " Carelessness " {jjramdda) is a want of effort to 
practise the five kinds of samiti, gupti, &c. 

^ The jndna is one, but it becomes tion with the senses and e.xternal 
apparently manifold by its connec- objects. 


(d) "Sin" consists of anger, &c. Here we must nmkc 
the distinction that the four things, false intuition, &c., 
cause those kimb of bondage called sihiti and anuhli&va ; 
yoga [or (f^Trtiv*] causes those kinds called praJq-iti and 

" I'.ondage " is fourfold, as has been said: " Prakrit i, 
ithiti, anubhdva, and pradcia are its four kinds." 

I. I'rakriti means " tlie luitural qualities," as bitterness 
or sweetness in the viinba plant or molasses. This may 
be subdivided into eight mula-prakrUU} 

Thus obstructions {dvarana) * cloud the knowledge and 
intuition, as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. 
Tliis is (a)jndndrara m, or {h) darsandvarana. (c) An object 
recognised as simultaneously existing or non-existing pro- 
duces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a 
sword's edge, — this is vedaniija. (d) A delusion {mohaniya) 
in intuition produces want of faith in the Jaina categories, 
like association with the wicked ; delusion in conduct pro- 
duces want of self-restraint, like intoxication, (f) Ayvs 
prirtiuces the boml of body, like a snare.' (/) Ndman, or 
"the name," produces various individual appellations, as a 
painter paints his difT-'rent pictures, {g) Gotra produces 
the idea of noble and ignoble^ as the potter fashions ids 
pots, (h) Aniardya produces obstacles to liberality, &c., 
as the treasurer hinders the king by considerations of 

Thus is ihc prakriti-bandha eightfoM, i-eiug denominated 
aa the eight ynulu-prakritis, with subdivisions acconling 
to the dilTerent ai tii>ns of the various subject-matter. 

And lhu8 lias Unniswati-viichakdcharya* declared: "The 
first kind of handha consists of obstructions of the know- 
ledge and the intuition, vedaniya, mohaniya, dyti.t, 7idtnan, 

' Thr»« »r«» aUo called tbo eight imcd for rir<iriMi ( Piin. jii. 4, 68). 

larmant in Govindiiiuuidft'a glona, Cf. Yoya ' where VytU»'i 

I'rtf >-f . i\ ?. -"v Comin. h.^ 

• u\» ddar- * Jdtarnt ! Th-j printed text bM 

Mt; in p. 37, jalarat. 

\*»l . : • I... 'I "1 I niav Jx« ♦ Unil«vjln>i- ? 


(jotra, and antardya;" and he has also reckoned np the 
respective subdivisions of each as five, nine, twenty-eight, 
four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been 
explained at full length in the Vidydnanda and other 
Avorks, and here is omitted through fear of prolixity, 

2. Sthiti. As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, &c., 
have continued unswerving from their sweet nature for so 
long a period, so the first three mula-prakritis,jhdndvarana, 
&c., and the last, antardya, have not swerved from their 
respective natures even through th'e period described in 
the w^ords, " sthiti lasts beyonds crores of crores of periods 
of time measured by thirty sdgaropamas." ^ This con- 
tinuance is sthiti. 

3. Anuhhdra. As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, 
&c,, there exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special 
capacity for producing^ its several effects, so in the different 
material bodies produced by our actions there exists a 
special capacity {anuhhdta) for producing their respective 

4. Pradesa. The handhci called pradcsa is the entrance 
into the different parts of tlie soul by the masses, made 
up of an endless number of parts, of the various bodies 
which are developed by the consequences of actions. 

Samvara is the stopping of dsrava — that by which the 
influence of past actions (karman) is stopped from enter- 
ing into the soul. It is divided into gupti, samiti, &c. 
Giipti is the withdrawal of the soul from that " impulse " 
{yoga) which causes mundane existence, — it is threefold, 
as relating to body, speech, or mind. Samiti is the acting 
so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided 
into five kinds, as iryd,^ hhdshd, &c., as has been explained 
by Hemachandra. 

^ For the sdgaropama, see Wil- pracJnjutih sthitih for iiracliyutisthi- 

son's Essays, vol. i. p. 309. In tih. 

p. 38, line 16, I read ityddyukta- - In p. 38, line iS, read siahirya- 

Ldhkl ilrdhram. api for the olDscure karane. 

ityddyulctam h'lJadurddhdnaiat. I ^ In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, for 

also read at the end of the line irshyd read iryd, — a bad misreading. 


1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to 
walk circunispectly so as to avuiil injuring' living beings, 
this the good call iryd. 

2. " I^a him practise' ^ a nieasuied utterance in liis 
intercoui-se vviili all people; this is calle«l h/uUIui-samid, 
dear to the restrainers of speech. 

3. " The food which the sage takes, ever free from the 
forty-two faults which may accrue to alms, is called the 

4. " Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself 
U|)on it, let hiui take a seat, &c., set it down, aiul meditate, 
— this is called the <Uldna-samiti. 

5. " That ihe goo<l man should carefully perform his 
b«Klily evacuations in a spot free from all living creatures,^ 
— this is the utsarffa-samiti* Hence samvara has been 
ctymologically analy-cd as that which closes {sam + vrinoti) 
the door of the stream of lisrara;' as has been said by the 
learneil, " Asrara is the cause of mundane existence, sarii- 
rara is the cause of liberatit)n;° this is the Arhat doc- 
trine in a hiiniful; all else is only the amplilicatiun of 

Xirjard is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay 
by self-niortitication, &c. ; it destroys by the body tlie 
merit and demerit of all the previously performed actions, 
and the resulting hapj)iiu"is and misery; "self-morlifica- 
tion" means the plucking out of the hair, &c. This nir- 
j'ard is twofold,'^ " temporary " {yathdkdla) and ancillary 
(atiptikrottifinika). It is "temporary" as when a desire is 
•lormanl in consequence of the action having produced its 
fruit, and at tliat particular time, from this completion of 

' In p. 30, line 6, I rt-ad dpadyrt<l Marma, "the ten tliitic^ of ad m- 

fur <ipad^UI. c«'tic, |»ati<-rio<'. cntlcnemi," Ac. ; 

' ^" i' 39. line 9, f<>r trthantl rf«<r IJttlrarul, ' ," mjch iw lh»t 

yiithttHa. worldly < ■ n'>t itcntal, 

1 i_ _ ... ijjij, 12, join nirjantu kc; fhiirUi ••. ^ .:\v'in ulnM-rviMcv." 

• In p. ;9, line 14, njul <i«rnra- 

•iiiiU tin? rcin*iniii;; ir/katn. 

,\ \ Ml. n« "f mtmritm. Wilnon, Ktmvt, * For nu>A<t, in line l^\rr*d molJut, 

>••!. i. j>. Jl I, ^'tx." thomi»ii/xiri«A«Ai», ' In j>. 39, lino a m/mti, I rc»d 

" fmlnr«nc«-," m of a vnw ; ynli- y^tOuiltua-lot yatkii Ltla-. 


the object aimed at, nirjard arises, being caused by tlie 
consumption of the desire, &c. But when, by the force of 
asceticism, the sage turns all actions into means for attain- 
ing his end (liberation), this is the nirjard of actions. 
Thus it has been said : "From the decaying of the actions 
which are the seeds of mundane existence, nirjard arises, 
which is twofold, sahdtnd and akdmd. That called 
sakdvid belongs to ascetics, the akdnid to other embodied 
spirits." ^ 

Moksha. Since at the moment of its attainment there 
is an entire absence of all future actions, as all the causes 
of bondage (false perception, &c.) are stopped,^ and since 
all past actions are aboli-shed in the presence of the causes 
of nirjard, there arises the absolute release from all actions, 
— this is moksha ; as it has been said : " Moksha is the 
absolute release from all actions by the decay (nirjard) of 
the causes of bondage and of existence." 

Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. 
As a potter's wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves 
on even after these have stopped, until the impulse is 
exhausted, so the previous repeated contemplations of the 
embodied soul for the attainment of moksha exert their influ- 
ence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul onward 
to the end of the world ; or, as the gourd, encased with 
clay, sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed 
from its encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, 
rises upward by its isolation,^ from the bursting of its 
bonds like the elastic seed of the castor-oil plant, or by its 
own native tendency like the flame. 

^ This passage is very difficult and dormant ; the latter is sakdmd, be- 
not improbably corrupt, and my in- cause the ascetic conquers the lower 
terpretation of it is only conjectural, desire under the overpowering influ- 
The ordinary nirjard is when an ence of the higher desire for libera- 
action attains its end (like the lull- tion. 

ing of a passion by the gratification), - I read nirodhe for nirodhah in 

this lull is temporary. That nirjard p. 40, line 6 ; of. p. 37, line 13. The 

is "ancillary' which is rendered by causes of bondage produce the as- 

asceticism a means to the attainment sumption of bodies in which future 

of the highest good. The former is actions are to be performed. 
aldmd, " desireless," because at the ^ Literally "absence of sanya.' 
moment the desire is satis6ed and so 


" Bon(la;^'e " is tlie condition of being unseparated, with 
a mutual inter})enetration of jmrts [between the soul and 
the body] ; sninja is merely mutual contact. This has 
been declared as follows : — 

" [Libi'iation] is unliinih'ied, from t'lie continuance of 
former impulses, from the absence of saivja, from the cut- 
ting of all bonds, and from the natural development of the 
soul's own powers of motion, like the pt)tter's wheel, the 
gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the castor-oil 
phitit, or the flame of tire." 

Hence they recite a ^loka: — 

" However often they go away, the planets return, the 
sun, moon, and the rest; 

"But never to this tlay have returned any who have 
gone to Alokakii^a." 

Others hold moksha to be the abiding in the highest 
regions, the soul being absorbed in bliss, with its know- 
ledge uidiindered and itself untainted by any pain or im- 
pression thereof. 

Others hold nine /a/^jw*-, adding "merit" and "demerit" 
to the foregoing seven, — these two being the causes of 
pleasure and pain. This has been declared in the Sid- 
dhdnta, " Jiva, ajiva. punija, jodpa, dsrava, samvara, 7iir- 
jarana, haiulha, and moksJia, are liie nine tatticas." As 
;iur object is only a .summary, we desist here. 

Here the Jainas every wliere introduce their favourite 
logic called the sapta-bhaiitji-naya} or the system of the 
seven ]'aralogisms, "may be, it is," "may Ik3, it is not," 
" may be, it is and it is not," " may be, it is not predicable," 
" may be, it is, and yet not predicable," " may be, it is not, 
and not predicable." " may be, it is and it is not, and not 
l>r«Mlii\ablo." All this Anantavirya has thus laid down: — 

I When you wish to establish a thing, the proper 
C'uric is to say ' may be, it is;' when you wish to deny 
it. ' may be, it is not.' 

When you desire to establish each in turn, let your 

In {> 41, line 7, r«ftd lafiabhaHjinaya, tco VciL S. GtoM., ii. 3, 23. 


procedure likewise embrace both ; when you wish to 
establisli both at once, let it be declared 'indescribable' 
from the impossibility to describe it. 

3. " The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to 
establish the first as well as its indescribableness ; when 
the second as well as its indescribableness, tlie occasion 
for the sixth process arises. 

4. "The seventh is required when all three characters 
are to be employed simultaneously." 

Si/dt, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the 
form of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of in- 
determinateness ; as it has been said — 

" This particle sj/dt is in the form of a verb, but, from 
its being connected with the sense, it denotes 
indeterminateness in sentences, and has a.qualify- 
ing effect on the implied meaning." 

If, again, the word sydt denoted determinateness, then 
it would be needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but 
since it really denotes indeterminateness, " may be, it is," 
means "it is somehow;" sydt, "may be," conveys the 
meaning of " somehow," kathamchit ; and so it is not 
really useless. As one has said — 

"The doctrine of the sydd-vdda arises from our every- 
where rejecting the idea of the absolute ; ^ it depends on 
the scqJta-hJiangi-Jiaya, and it lays down the distinction 
between what is to be avoided and to be accepted." 

If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, 
everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or 
place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as 
it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an 
object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or 
indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and 
in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. More- 
over, suppose that the question to be asked is this : " Is 
lci7ig or non-heing the real nature of the tiling?" The 

^ I cainiot understand the words tadddlceh, and therefore leave them 
at the end of the first line, hm vrita- untranslated. 


real natuie of the tiling cnnnot bo hciitj, for tlieu yoii 
loulil not properly use the phnise, " It is a pot " {gha(o'sti), 
as the two words " is " and " pot " would be tautological ; 
nor ought you to say, " It is not a pot," as the words thu.s 
used would imply a direct contradiction ; and the saint! 
argument is to be used in other questions.^ As it has 
been declared — 

" It must not be said ' It is a pot,' since the word ' pel' 
implies ' is ; ' 

" Nor may you say ' it is not a pot,' for existence and 
non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c. 

The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of 
our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence, 
non-existence, existence and non-existence successively, 
and tiie doctrine that everytliing is inexplicable (anina- 
chaniyaid) ;- three other classes hold one or other of the 
three first theories combined with the fourth.' Now, when 
they nit-et us with the scornful questions, " Does the thing 
exist ? " &c., we have an answer always possible, " It exists 
in a certain way," &c., and our opponents are all ab;ishctl 
to silence, and victory accrues to the holder of the Sydd- 
rdda, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things. 
Thus said the teacher in the Syddvdda-mafijari — 

"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the 
object only of the omniscient; a thing partly determineil 
is held to be the true object of scientific investigation.* 
When our rea-sonings based on one point proceeil in the 
revealed way, it is calleil the revealed Sydd-vdda, whicli 
nscerUiins the entire meaning of all things." 

" All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual 
propositions and counter-propositions; it is only the doc- 
trine of the Arhat which wiih no partiality equally favours 
all sects." 

' Thus Govindiiiancla applies it Uinct in the KkaH4ana-kkandalka- 
I Vtd. iSut., ii. 2, 33) to " may bo d>ja. 

it ia one," "may bo it U many," * In p. 42, ! rtmimuri- 

kc. tuni n-a<J ma:- 

* '.KfaTa\r}^ia. This ia Sriharsha'i * In p. 43, Uu: 2, {•>r na jfa(;<i 

rrtktl vntftBya. 


The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by 
Jinadatta-suri — 

" The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual 
pleasure, giving and receiving, — sleep, fea.r, ignorance, aver- 
sion, laughter, liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of in- 
difference, desire, sorrow, deceit, these are the eighteen 
'faults' {dosha) according to our system.^ The divine 
Jina is our Guru, who declares the true knowledge of the 
tattwas. The path ^ of emancipation consists of knowledge, 
intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof 
{pramdna) in the Sydd-vdda doctrine, — sense-perception 
and inference. All consists of the eternal and the non- 
eternal; there are nine or seven tattwas. T\\e, jiva, the 
ajiva, merit and demerit, dsrava, samvara, handha, nirjard, 
muJdi, — we will now explain each. Jiva is defined as 
intelligence ; ajiva is all other than it ; merit means bodies 
which arise from good actions, demerit the opposite; 
dsrava is the bondage of action s,^ nirjard is the unloosing 
thereof; moksha arises from the destruction of the eight 
forms of karman or "action." But by some teachers 
" merit " is included in samvara,^ and " demerit " in dsrava. 

" Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things ^ 
and is hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are 
abolished, absolute liberation is declared by Jina. The 
Swetanibaras are the destroyers of all defilement, they 
live by alms,^ they pluck out their hair, they practise 
patience, they avoid all association, and are called the 
Jaina Sddhus. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they 

1 This list is badly printed in the ^ This seems corrupt, — a line is 

Calcutta edition. It is i-eally identi- probably lost. 

calwith that given in Hemachandra's ■* In last line, for samsrave read 

A bhidhdiui-chintdmani, 72, 73; but samvare. 

we must correct the readings to * Does this mean the knowledge 

antardyds, rdgadiccshdv aviratihsma- of the world, the soul, the liberated 

rah, and hdso for himsd. The order and liberation ? These are called 

of the eighteen doshas in the Cal- ananta. See Weber's Bhagavati, 

cutta edition is given by Hema- pp. 250, 261-266. 

chandra as 4, 5, i, 2, 3, 10, II, 12, ® Sarajoharandh is explained by 

7, 9, 17, 16, iS, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14. the rajoharanadhdrin (= vratin] of 

" In p. 43, line 13, for rartini read HaMyudha, ii. 189. 


carry peacocks' tails in their hauds, they ihiuk from their 
liands, and they eat ui>rii,'ht in tlio ;,'iver's liouse, — these 
arc the second class of the Jaina Risliis. 

' A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she 
enters not Mukti, — so say the DiLianibaras ; but tliere is 
a great division on this point between them and the 
^wetambaras.^ K. 1'.. C 

' Cf. Wilson, t'$Mi/$, i. 340. For $triin nad itri. 

( 64 ) 



This doctrine of the Arhatas deserves a rational con- 
demnation, for whereas there is only one thing really 
existent, the simultaneous co-existence of existence, non- 
existence and other modes in a plurality of really existing 
things is an impossibility. Nor should any one say : 
Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of exist- 
ence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contra- 
dictory, why should there not be an alternation between 
existence and non-existence? there being the rule that 
it is action, not Ens, that alternates. Nor let it be sup- 
posed that the whole universe is multiform, in reliance 
upon the examples of the elephant-lieaded Ganesa and of 
the incarnation of Vishnu as half man, half lion; for 
the elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one 
part, and the human in another, and consequently there 
being no contradiction, those parts being different, these 
examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of a nature 
multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and 
the same part (or place). Again, if any one urge : Let 
there be existence in one form, and non-existence in 
another, and thus both will be compatible ; we rejoin : 
Not so, for if you had said that at different times existence 
and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then 
indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. 
Nor is it to be contended : Let the multiformity of the 
universe be like the length and shortness which pertain 


to the same thiug (in dUrerent relations); for in these (in 
this length ami sliortness) there is no contrariety, in- 
asmuch as they are contrasted with ilitrerent objects. 
Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-exist- 
ence as reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the 
same time in the same thing. In a like nmnner may he 
understood the refutation of the other hhahijcis (Ariiata 

Again, wc ask, is this doctrine of the seven hhahijas, 
wjiich lies at the base of all this, itself uniform (as ex- 
cluding one contradictory), or muhiform (as conciliating 
contradictories). If it is uniform, tliere will emerge a 
contradiction to your thesis that all tilings are multiform ; 
if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wislud 
lo prove, a multiform statement (as botii existent and 
non-existent) proving nothing.^ In eiiher case, there is 
rope for a noose for the neck of the S}dd-Vddin. 

An ailmirable author of institutes has the founder of 
tlie Arhata system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), 
proved himself to be, when he has not ascertained whether 
his result is the settling of nine or of seven principles, 
nor the investigator who settles them, nor his organon, the 
modes of eviience, nor the matter to be evidenced, whether 
it be ninefold or not ! 

In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as 
the Arhatas .say), an extension equal to that of the body, 
it will follow that in the case of the souls of ascetics, who 
by the efficacy of asceticism assume a plurality of bodies, 

Heraklciu-an iiiiixt g<> through like 
other jH.r!toiiJt, aikI wht-n, if \w pro 
ccoded ujxm hi* own •' — ' •: ! 
iiiitht r j,'ivc nor n 
l>y njx:«ch, nor g'' 1 

upon tho bc-licfa whivii he duciarrs 
to <v> f>ri«t in hi"* <^wn ivifv!. Ac- 

» Cf. 

is a T 


nnt-nt in tUfcntx- 

of the 
that it 

Contnuiictinn is 

' * -■ vid in 

all the 

a« to 


that a III. 

■I upon wlun 

hmr 1 • 

rt ; A )>o)itu. 
• ii-ny it, no 


lit or lru»t- 


' ' •' 



. rote'a 

action in the detail of hit, which titc 


there is a differentiation of the soul for each of those bodies. 
A soul of the size of a human body would not (in the 
course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the ^A'hole 
body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its 
elephantine body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose 
its capacity of filling its former frame. And it cannot be 
supposed that the soul resides successively in the human, 
elephantine, and other bodies, like the light of a lamp 
which is capable of contraction and expansion, according 
as it occupies the interior of a little station on the road- 
side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the 
interior of a stately mansion ; for it would follow (from 
such a supposition) that the soul being susceptible of 
modifications and consequently non-eternal, there would 
be a loss of merits and a fruition of good and evil un- 

As if then we had throv/n their best wrestler, the re- 
dargution of the rest of their categories may be anticipated 
from this exposition of the manner in which their treat- 
ment of the soul has been vitiated. 

Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, 
infallible revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated 
Vyasa accordingly propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), 
" Nay, because it is impossible in one ; " and this same 
aphorism has been analysed by Eamanuja with the ex- 
press purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. 
The tenets of Eamanuja are as follows : — Three categories 
are established, as soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as sub- 
ject, object, and supreme disposer. Thus it has been 
said — 

"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: 
Hari (Vishnu) 

"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible 
world is not-soul." 

Others, again (the followers of Sahkaracharya), maintain 
that pure intelligence, exempt from all differences, the 
absolute, alone is really existent; and tliat tliis absolute 

77/7: KAMAS'UyA SYSTI-M. 67 

whose essence is eternal, pure, intelligent, ami free, the 
identity of which with the individuated spirit is learnt 
from the "reference to the same ohjeet" (pretlicatiiju). 
"That art thou," undergoes bondage and enjuneipation. 
The universe of dilVeretices (or conditions) such as that of 
subject and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as 
in that (one reality), as is attested by a number of texts : 
Kxistent only, fair sir, was tiiis in the beginning, One only 
without a second, and so forth. Maintiiining this, and 
acknowledging a suppression of this beginningleas illusion 
by knowledgt! of tiie unity (and identity) of individuated 
spirits and the undillerenced absolute, in conformity with 
hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that 
knows spirit jjasses beyond sorrow; rejecting also any 
real plurality of things, in conformity with the text con- 
demnatory of duality, viz., Death after death he undergoes 
who looks upon this as manifold ; and thinking themsflves 
very wise, the Sankaras will not tolerate this division 
(viz., the distribution of things into soul, uot-soul, ;ind 
Ix)rd). To all this the following eounterposition is laid 
down: — This might be all well enough if there were any 
proof of such illusion. But thero is no such ignorance (or 
i!Ii;-iun), an unl)eginning entity, suppressible by know- 
^ i_-', testitied in tiie j)erceptinn>;, I am ignorant, I know 
not myself and other things. Thus it has been said (to 
explain the views of the ^ftkar.i) — 

'■ Kntitutive from everlastin.:, wlii'h i.-^ dissolved bv 

"Such is illusion. Tiiis Ofimitioii mr wise enumii:--. 

This iKjrception (they would further contend) is not 
conversjint about the absence of knowledge. For who 
I an maintain this, and to whom ? One who leans on the 
irm of I'nibhiikara, or one to whom Kumarila-bhatta gives 
iiis hand ? Not the former, for in the words — 

" iJy means of its own ond of another's form, eternal in 
the existent and non-existent, 

" Thing is recognised something by some at certain time<» 


" Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of 
relation. ISTon-entity is but another entity, naught 
else, for naught else is observed," 

They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non- 
entity being cognisable by the sixth instrument of know- 
ledge (anvjmlccMhi), and knowledge being always an object 
of inference, the absence of knowledge cannot be an object 
of perception. If, again, any one who maintains non-entity 
to be perceptible should employ the above argument (from 
the perceptions. I am ignorant, I know not myself, and 
other things) ; it may be replied : •' Is there, or is there 
not, in the consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension 
of self as characterised by an absence and of knowledge 
as the thing absent or non-existent ? If there is such 
apprehension, consciousness of the absence of knowledge 
will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there 
is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which 
consciousness presupposes a knowledge of the subject and 
of the thing absent, will not readily become possible. In- 
asmuch (tlie Sankaras continue) as the foregoing difficul- 
ties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be entitative, 
this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and 
other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an 
entitative ignorance. 

All this (the Eamanuja replies) is about as profitable as 
it would be for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether : 
for an entitative ignorance is not more supposable than 
an absence of knowledge. For (we would ask), is any 
self-conscious principle presented as an object and as a 
subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition ? If it is 
presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by 
knowledge of its essence, can the ignorance continue ? If 
none such is presented, how can we be conscious of an 
ignorance which lias no subject and no object ? If you say : 
A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is revealed 
only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or ilkision), 
and thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignor- 

riir NAMASuyA systi.m. 6, 

ance accompanioJ with a consciousness of its subject 
and object; then we rejoin: — Unfortunately for you, this 
'eonsciousnejS of subject) must arise equally in the absence 
of knowledge (for such we define illusion to be), notwith- 
standing your assertion to the cnutrary. It must, there- 
fore, be acknowleiiged that the cognition, I am ignorant, 
I know not myself and other things, is conveisant al)OUt 
an absence of cognition allowed by us both. 

Well, then (the Sai'ikanus may contend), let the form of 
cognition evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputa- 
tion, be inference, as follows : — Right knowledge must have 
had for its antecedent another entity {sc. illusion), an entity 
difTerent from' mere prior non-e.xistence of knowledge^ 
which envelops the objects of knowledge, which is ter- 
minable by knowledge, which occupies the jdace of know- 
ledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illumin;ites an 
object not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp 
springing up for the first time in the darkness. This argu- 
ment (we reply) will not stand grinding (in the dialectic 
null) ; for to prove the (antecedent) illusion, you will 
require an ulterior illusion which you do not admit, aud a 
violation of your own teneta will ensue, while if you do 
not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, 
the example is incompatible with the argunient, for it can- 
not be the lamp that illumines the hitherto unillumined 
object, since it is knowledge only that illumines; and an 
illumination of objects may be effected by knowledge 
even w iihout the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only 
ancillary to the visual organ which eflectuates the cogni- 
tion, ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the 
obstruent darkness. We dismi.'ss further prolixity. 

The connierposition (of the Kumanujas) is as follows: — 
'Die illusion under dispute does not reside in lirahman, 
who is pure know l.-d.^-e, because it is an illusion, like tl«e 
illusion about nucre, &c. If any one ask: Has not the 
self-conscious entity that underlies tlie illusion about 
nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature ? they reply : 


Do not start such difficulties ; for we suppose that cou- 
sciousness by its bare existence has tlie nature of creating 
conformity to the usage about (i.e , the name and notion 
of) some object; and such consciousness, also called know- 
ledge, apprehension, comjDrehension, intelligence, &c., con- 
stitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and 
know\?. If any one ask : How can the soul, if it con- 
sists of cognition, have cognition as a quality? they 
reply : This question is futile ; for as a gem, the sun, 
and other luminous things, existing in the form of light, 
are substances in which light as a quality inheres — for 
light, as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, 
and as being a mode of things though a substance, is still 
styled and accounted a quality derived from determination 
by that substance, — so this soul, while it exists as a self- 
luminous intelligence, has also intelligence as its quality. 
Accordingly the Vedic texts : A lump of salt is always 
within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this 
soul is within and without an entire mass of knowledge ; 
Herein this person is itself a light ; Of the knowledge of 
that which knows there is no suspension ; He wdio knows, 
smells this ; and so also. This is the soul which, consisting 
of knowledge, is the light within the heart ; For this per- 
son is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the 
thinker, the understander, the doer ; The person is know- 
ledge, and the like texts. 

It is not to be supposed that the A^'eda also affords 
evidence of the existence of the cosmical illusion, in the 
text. Enveloped in untruth (anrita) ; for the word untrutli 
(anrita) denotes that which is other than truth {riia). 
The word rita has a passive sense, as appears from the 
words. Drinking rita. Rita means works done without 
desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the 
bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In 
the text in question, untruth (anrita) designates the scanty 
fruit enjoyed during transmigratory existence as opposed to 
that (which results from propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), 

nil-: RAMAScyA systi-m. 71 

which lemponil fruit is obstructive to the nttuiiunoiit of 
supreme existence {Irrahman); the entire text (wlioii tlie 
context is supplied) being: They who find not this sup- 
reme spliere {brahma-lukui) are enveloped in untruth. In 
such texts, iii^ain, as I^'t him know illusion [indyd) to be 
the primary cmanative cause {prakriti), the term {mdyd) 
designates the emanative cause, consisting of the three 
"cortls" (yH/ia), and creative of the diversified univt-rse. 
It does not designate the inexplicable illusion (f<>r whirh 
the SaAkaras contend). 

In suih passages as, By him the defender of the botly of 
the child, moving rapidly, the thousand illusions {mdyd) of 
the barbarian were swooped u|)on as by a hawk, we observe 
that the word " illusion " {mdyd) designates the really 
existent weapon of a Titan, capaVde of projective divei*sified 
creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an inexplicable 
illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred from 
the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words. 
That art thou, being incompetent to teach unity, anil in- 
dicating a cuuditionate Supreme Spirit, we cannot under- 
stand by them the essential unity of the mutually exclusive 
supreme and individual spirits; for such a supposition (as 
that they are identical) would violate the law of excluded 
middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the 
Supreme Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimit- 
able excellence, a repository of innumerable auspicious 
attributes, to whom the emanation, sustentaiion, retractii- 
lion of the universe is a pastime ; * such being the Supreme 
Spirit, spoken of in such texts as, That desired, let me be 
many, let me bring forth. Terhajis the word Thou, refer- 
ring to the sanje object (as the word That), denotes the 
Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all 
individual spirits as his botly; fur a "reference to the 
same object " tlesignates one thing determined by two 
modes. Here, perhaps, nn Advaita-v;ulin may reply : Why 

' f f. th" ilictiim of IIpntklt'itiiM : p. So;> : Man i« made to Ijc the 
Mnkins; wurltU i« Z«tu'* UMtiiitc ; |ilayttiiiig oi Cjod. 
au<J that or rUtu iLaw«, iVxik vii. 


iTiay not the purport of tlie reference to the same object 
in the words, That art thou, be imdifferenced essence, the 
unity of souls, these words (That and thou) having a 
(reciprocally) implicate power by abandonment of opposite 
portions of their meanincj ; as is the case in the phrase, 
This is that Devadatta. In the words. This is that Deva- 
datta, we understand by the word That, a person in rela- 
tion to a different time and place, and by the word This, 
a person in relation to the present time and place. That 
both are one and the same is understood by the form of 
predication ("reference to the same object"). Now as 
one and the same thing cannot at the same time be knowii 
as in diiferent times and places, the two words (This and 
That) must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents 
of time and place), and unity of essence can be understood. 
Similarly in the text, That art thou, there is implicated 
an indivisible essence by abandonment of the contradictory 
portions (of the denotation), viz., finite cognition (which 
belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and infinite cog- 
nition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul). 
This suggestion (the Eamanujas reply) is unsatisfactory, 
for there is no opposition (between This and That) in the 
example (This is that Deva-datta), and consequently not 
the smallest particle of " implication " {lahshand, both This 
and That being used in tlieir denotative capacity). The 
connection of one object with two times past and present 
involves no contradiction. And any contradiction sup- 
posed to arise from relation to different places may be 
avoided by a supposed difference of time, the existence in 
the distant place being past, and the existence in the near 
being present. Even if we concede to you the " implica- 
tion," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable by sup- 
posing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it 
is unnecessary to admit that both M'ords are implicative. 
Otherwise (if we admit that both words are implicative), 
if it be granted that the one thing may be recognised, 
with the concomitant assurance that it differs as this and 


fts that, permanence in things will be inadmissible, an<l 
the Bmlilliist asscrtur i)f a niuiiientary flux of things will 
be triun.phant. 

We have, therefore (the Kamanujas continue), laid it 
down in this question that there is no cuntrailiction in the 
identity of tiie individual and the Supreme S]iirit, ihe 
individual spirits being the body and the Supreme Spirit 
the soul. For tlie individual spirit as the body, and there- 
fore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with the 
Supreme Spirit, according to another text, "Who abiding 
in the soul, is the conlioller of the soul, who knows the 
soul, of whom soul is the body. 

Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. 
All wuids are designatory of the Supreme Spirit, They 
are not all synonymous, a variety of media being possil)le; 
thus as all organised bodies, divine, human, &c., are forms 
of individual spirits, so all things (are the body of Sup- 
reme Spirit), all things are identical with Supremo Spirit. 
Hence — 

God, Man, Yaksha, I'i^acha, serj>ent, llakshasa, bird, 
tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth, — these and all 
other words, be they what they may, whicii are current 
among mankind as denotative by means of their base and 
its sutlixes, as denoting those things, in denoting things of 
tins or that apparent constitution, really denote the in- 
dividual souls which assumed to them such body, and the 
whole complexus of things terminating in the Supreme 
Spirit ruling within. That God and all other words what- 
soever ultimately denote the Supreme Spirit is stated in 
the TattvamuktavaH and in the Chaturantara — 

" God, and all other word?, ' ••' the soul, none else 

than That, called the < i-d entity, 

" Of this there is much significant and undoubted 
ex.inplification in common .speech antl in the 

"Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; 
in the form of gods, mortals, and the rest 


" When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite 
has made a diversity of names and forms in the 

In these uords the author, setting fortli that all words, 
God, and the rest, designate the body, and showing in the 
words, " No unity in systems," &c., the characteristic of 
body, and showing in the words, " By words which are sub- 
stitutes for the essence of things," &c., that it is established 
that nothing is different from the universal Lord, lays down 
in the verses, Significant of the essence, &c., that all words 
ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be 
ascertained from that work. The same matter has been 
enforced by Eamanuja in the Vedartha-sangraha, when 
analysing the Vedic text about names and forms. 

Moreover, every form of evidence having some deter- 
minate object, there can be no evidence of an undetermined 
(unconditionate) reality. Even in non-discriminative per- 
ception it is a determinate (or conditioned) thing that is 
cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could 
not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already 
presented form. Again, that text, That art thou, is not 
sublative of the universe as rooted in illusion, like a sen- 
tence declaratory that what w^as illusorily presented, as a 
snake is a piece of rope ; nor does knowledge of the unity 
of the absolute and the soul bring (this illusory universe) 
to an end ; for we have already demonstrated that there 
is no proof of tliese positions. 

Nor is there an absurdity (as the Sankaras would say), 
on the hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, 
in affirming that by a cognition of one there is a cognition 
of all things : for it is easily evinced that the mundane 
egg, consisting of the primary cause (prakriii), intellect, 
self-position, the rudimentary elements, the gross elements, 
the organs (of sense and of action), and the fourteen worlds, 
and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and so 
fortli, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all 
forms, is all an effect, and that from the single cognition 


of absolute sjiirit as its (euianative) cause, when we recog- 
nise that all this is absolute spirit (there being a tautology 
between cause anil effect), there arises cognition of all 
tilings, and thus by cognition of one cognition of all. Be- 
sides, if all else than absolute spirit were unreal, then all 
Wing non-existent, it would follow that by one cognition 
all Cognition would be sublated. 

It is laid down (by the llanKinujas) that retractation 
into the universe {pralaya) is when the univeree, the body 
M-hereof consists of souls and the originant (prah'iti), 
returns to its imperceptible state, unsusceptible of division 
by names and forms, existing as absolute spirit the emana- 
tivt; cause ; and that creation (or emanation) is the gross 
or |>erceptil>le condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof 
is soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and 
forms, in the condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute 
spirit. In this way the identity of cause and effect laid 
down in the aphorism (of Vyasa) treating of origination, 
is easily explicable. The statements that the Supreme 
Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to 
deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped 
from by those that desire emancipation. The texts which 
deny pluiality are explained as allowe<l to be employed 
for the denial of the real existence of tilings apart from 
the SuTTenif Spirit, which is identical with all things, it 
being Suj>rcnie Spirit which subsists under all forms as 
the soul of all, all things sentient and unsentient being 
fonns .;s being the body of absolute Spirit.^ is the principle here involved, pluralism or motitsm, 
or a universe both one and more than one ? Of these 
alternatives monism is ailmitted in saying that Supreme 
Spirit alone sulisists in all forms as all is its bmly ; both 
unity and plurality are admitted in saying that one only 
Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse 
as soul autl uot-soul ; and plurality is admitted in saying 

' " Wboac body nature U, ftod Gud the m)vl."—Pope. 


that the essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, 
are different, and not to be confounded. 

Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual 
spirits, or souls, consisting of uncontracted and unlimited 
pure knowledge, but enveloped in illusion, that is, in 
works from all eternity, undergo contraction and expan- 
sion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits. 
Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and 
pains proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues 
knowledge of the Lord, or attainment of the sphere of the 
Lord. Of things which are not-soul, and which are objects 
of fruition (or experience of pleasure and pain), uncon- 
sciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man, suscepti- 
bility of modification, and the like, are the properties. 
Of the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as 
the internal controller (or animator) of both the subjects 
and the objects of fruition ; the boundless glory of illimi- 
table knowledge, dominion, majesty, power, brightness, and 
the like, the countless multitude of auspicious qualities ; 
the generation at will of all things other than himself, 
whether spiritual or non- spiritual; various and infinite 
adornment with unsurpassable excellence, singular, uni- 
form, and divine. 

Veiikata-natha has given the following distribution of 
things : — 

" Those who know it have declared the principle to 

be twofold, substance and non-substance ; 
" Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient ; 

the former being the unevolved (avyakta), and 

"The latter is the 'near' {pratyak) and the 'distant' 

(pardk) ; the ' near ' being twofold, as either soul 

or the Lord ; 
" The ' distant ' is eternal glory and intelligence ; the 

other principle some have called the unsentient 

Of these — 


" Substance undergoes a plunility of conditions ; the 
originant is possessed of goodness antl the other 
cords ; 
"Time has the form of years, &c.; soul is atomic uiul 

couMiisant; tlie oilier spirit is the Lord ; 
" Eternal bliss has been declaretl as transcending the 
three cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), 
and also a? characterised by goodness; 
"The cognisable manifestation of tlie cognisant is intel- 
ligence ; thus are the characteristics of subsUmce 
summarily recounted." 
Of these (soul, not-soul, and tlie Lord , individual 
spirits, called souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit 
and eternal. Thus the text : Two birds, companions, 
friends, &c. (Rig- Veda, i. i6-i, 20). Accordingly it is 
stated (in the aphorisms of Kaniida, iii. 2, 20), Souls are 
divei*se by reason of diversity of conditions. The eternity 
of souls is often spoken of in revelation — 

" The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor havinjz been 

shall it again cease to be ; 
" Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is 
not killed when the bo^iy is killed" (Bhagavad- 
gltii, ii. 20). 
Other>vise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow 
a failure of requital and a fruition (of pleasures and pains) 
unmerited. It has accordingly been said (in the aphorisms 
of Gautama, iii. 25) : Because no birth is seen of one who 
is devoid of desire. That the soul is atomic is well known 
from revelation — 

" If the hundredtii part of a hair be imagined to bo 

divided a hinidred times, 
"The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is 
:apable of infinity." 
An 1 again — 
" Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a 
wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence 
as atomic." 


The visible, imsentieut world, designated by the term 
not-soul, is divided into tliree, as the object, the instru- 
ment, or the site of fruition. Of this world the efficient 
and substantial cause is the Deity, known under the 
names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vasudeva (a patrony- 
mic of Krishna), and the like. 

" Vasudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with 
auspicious attributes, 

" The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the 
animator of spirits." 

This same Vasudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to 
those devoted to him, the Supreme Spirit, with the pur- 
pose of bestowing various rewards apportioned to the 
deserts of his votaries in consequence of pastime, exists 
under five modes, distinguished as " adoration " (archd), 
'"emanation" (vilhava), "manifestation" (yyuha), "the 
subtile" (sukshma), and tlie "internal controller." (i.) 
"Adoration" is images, and so forth. (2.) "Emanation" 
is his incarnation, as Eania, and so fo) th. (3.) His " mani- 
festation" is fourfold, as Vasudeva, Sankarshana, Pra- 
dyumna, and Aniruddha. (4.) " The subtile " is the 
entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vasu- 
deva. His attributes are exemption from sin, and the 
rest. That he is exempt from sin is attested in the Vedic 
text: Passionless, deathless, without sorrow, without 
hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5.) The "in- 
ternal controller," the actuator of all spirits, according to 
the text : Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. 
When by worshipping each former embodiment a mass of 
sins inimical to the end of the soul (i.e., emancipation) 
have been destroyed, the votary becomes entitled to prac- 
tise the worship of each latter embodiment. It has, there- 
fore, been said — 

" Vasudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives, as 
desired by each, 

" According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, 
large recompense. 


"For that eml, in luustime hu makos to himself hi-s five 

emboclimcnu ; 
" Imaj^os ami tlie like arc 'adoration ;' itia incarnations 

arc 'enjaiiations ;' 
"As Sai'ikarshai'ia, Vilsudeva, I'ladyuuina, Aniriuldlia, 
his manifestation is to be known to be fourfold ; 
'the subtile' is the entire six attributes; 
"That self-same calleil Vasudeva is styled the Suprenu' 

Spirit ; 
"The internal controller is declared as residinjj; in the 

soul, the actuator of the soul, 
" Described in a multitude of texts of the Upanishads, 

such lis ' Who abidiiv^ in the soul.' 
" r>y the worehip of 'adoration,' a man castinu' "fl" his 

defilement becomes a qualified votary ; 
"By the subsequent worsiiip of 'emanation,' he be- 
comes qualified for the wor>liip nf • manifestation ;' 
" By the worship liien-after of ' liic aubLiie,' he beconiccj 

able to In'hold the 'internal controller.'" 
llie worship of the Deity is described in the Paucha- 
ratra as consislin;^' of five element^, viz., (i.) the access, (2.) 
the preparation, (3.) oblation, (4.) recitation, (5.) devotion. 
Of these, access is the sweeping, smearing, and so fortli, 
of the way to the temple. The preparation is the jtrovision 
of perfumes, flowers, and the like appliances of worship. 
Oblation in worship of the deities. Kecitulion is the 
muttered ejaculation of sacred tcxUs, wiih attention to 
what they mean, tlie rehearsal of hymns and lauds of 
Vishnu, the commemoration of his names, and study of 
institutes which set forth the truth. Devotion is medita- 
tion on the Deiiy. When the vision of the visible worhl 
has been brou;^ht to a close by knowledge accumulated by 
the merit of sucli worship, the infinitely com]>asj»iouato 
Supreme Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon thj 
votary devoted to his lord and :n iiis lonl, !iw 

own spiiere infinite and endless, u. .;.. . :>)■ consciousne^^ 


of being like him, from which there is no future return 
(to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the 
traditionary text — 

" When they liave come to me, the high-souled no 
longer undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, 
transitory, having attained to the supreme con- 
" Vasudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him 
his own mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence 
there is no more return." 
After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the 
teaching of the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on 
the Vedanta aphorisms by the venerated Bodhayanacharya 
too prolix, Eamanuja composed a commentary on the 
Sarirakamimansa (or Vedanta theosopliy). In this the 
sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute 
must be desired to be known," is given as follows : — The 
word then in this aphorism means, after understanding the 
hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the glossator writes : 
" After learning the sacred rites," he desires to know the 
absolute. The word hence states the reason, viz., because 
one who has read the Veda and its appendages and under- 
stands its meaning is averse from sacred rites, their 
recompense being perishable. The wish to know the 
absolute springs up in one who longs for permanent 
liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By the 
word absolute is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom 
are essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimi- 
table excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. 
Since then the knowledge of sacred rites and the perform- 
ance of those rites is mediately through engendering dis- 
passionateness, and through putting away the defilement 
of the understanding, an instrument of the knowledge of 
the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and know- 
ledge of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, 
the former and the latter Miman.'a constitute one system 
of institutes. On this account the glossator has described 


tljis system fw one with tlie slxteenfold system of Jnimini. 
That the fruit of sncretl rites is perishable, mid that of tljo 
knowledge of the absolute imperishable, has been laid down 
.1 virtue of Vcdic texts, such as: Scanning the spheres 
;iined by rites, let him become passionless ; Not wrought 
i y the rite performed, accompanieil with inference and dis- 
junctive reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when 
una' cnmpanied by the other, shows that it is knowledge 
together witli works that is ellicacious of emancipation, in 
the words : Blind darkness they enter who prefer illusion, 
and a greater darkness still do they enter who delight in 
knowledge only; knowledge anil illusion, he who knows 
hese both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, 
tastes immortality by knowledge. Conformably it is said 
in the Panchariitra-rahasya — 

"That ocean of compassion, the Lord, tender to his 

"For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments 

upon him. 
"These are styled Adoration, Iju UKiiiuu, Muuiiesiatuin, 

the Subtile, the Internal Controller, 
'* Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of 

" As a man's sins are worn away by each •'tKCCssive 

" He bcc'tmes qualified for the worship oi •• uii next 

" Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and 

'■ Ry the aforesaid worship Vasudeva becomes propitious* 

to mankind. 
'■ Ilari, when propitiated by devotion in ih^ 'orrc of 

" At once brings to a close that illusion which is the 

aggregate of works. 
"Then in souls the essential attributes, from which 
transmigration has vanisiied, 



" Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and tLe 

" These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits 
and the Lord, 

" Universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to 
the Deity. 

" Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute, 
which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior ; 

"They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit." 

It is therefore stated that those who suffer the tliree 
kinds of pain must, for the attainment of immortality, 
investigate the absolute spirit known under such appella- 
tions as the Highest Being. According to the maxim : The 
base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, and of 
these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion 
of desire is predominant (in the word jijndsitavya) , and 
desired knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism, Tlien 
hence the absolute must be desired to be known). Know- 
ledge is cognition designated by sucli terms as meditation, 
devotion ; not the merely superficial knowledge derived 
from verbal communication, such being competent to any 
one who hears a number of words and understands the 
force of each, even without any predication ; in conformity 
with such Vedic texts as : Self indeed it is that is to be 
seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be pondered ; He should 
meditate that it is self alone ; Having known, let him 
acquire excellent wisdom; He should know that which 
is beyond knowledge. In these texts " to be heard " is 
explanatory, hearing being understood (but not enounced) 
in the text about sacred study (viz., shadangena vedo 'dhycyo 
jneyascha, the Veda, with its six appendages, is to be 
studied and known) ; so that a man who has studied the 
Veda must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and 
its appendages, engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain 
the sense by examining it and the occasion of its enounce- 
ment. The term " to be thought " (or " to be inferred ") 
is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being under- 


stood ai the coinpleinentary moaning of hearin;,', accordin,; 
to the aphorism: lieforn its sii^'nilication is attained th<: 
system is sii^niticant. Miulitation is a reminisceiioi; con- 
sistiiii; of an unhioken succession of reminiscences like a 
stream of oil, it heiny; revealed in the text, in continuity 
of reminiscence there is a solution of all knots, — that 
1 1 is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of 
emancipation. Ami this reminiscence is tantamount to 

" Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts, 
"And exhausted are all his works, when he ha.s seen 
the lli.:hesL and I-owest, ' 
In-'cause he becomes one with tliat Supreme. So also in 
the words, Self indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this 
reminiscence that it is an intuition. lieminiscence be- 
comes intuitional through the vivacity of the representa- 
tions. The author of the Vukya has treated of all tliis in 
detail in the piissage beginning Cognition is meditation. 
The characters of this meditation are laid out in the text: 
This soul is not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, 
nor by much learning; Whom God chooses by him God 
may be attained. To him this self unfolds its own 
nature. For it is that which is dearest which is choice- 
worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord 
is of Himself most dear, as was declared by the I..ord 
Himself — 
"To them always devoted, who worship me with love, 
" I give the devotion of understanding whereby they 
come t" III-' " 
And again — 

"That Sujucmo Spiiil, Arjuna, is attainable by faith 


But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which 

admits no other motive than the illimii; " " " ■ , and 

is free from all other desires; and the ^ : ilm 

icvotion U by discrimination and otlier means. As is 

said bv the author of the Vakva: Attainment tliercof 


results from discrimination (riveka), exemption (vunoJca), 
practice (abhydsa), observance [kriyd), excellence (Jicdydna), 
freedom from despondency (anavasdda) , satisfaction {anud- 
dharslia), according to the equivalence (of the definition), 
and the explication (of these terms). Of these means, 
discrimination is purity of nature, resultant from eating 
undefiled food, and the explication (of discrimination) is 
From purity of diet, purity of understanding, and by 
purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. 
Exemption is non-attachment to sensuous desires ; the 
explication being, Let the quietist meditate. Practice is 
reiteration ; and of this a traditionary explication is quoted 
(from the Bhagavad-gita) by (Eamanuja) the author of 
the commentary : For ever modified by the modes thereof. 
Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revela- 
tion and tradition according to one's ability ; the explica- 
tion being (the Vedic text). He who has performed rites 
is the best of those that know the supreme. The excel- 
lences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity (alms- 
"'ivino-l and the like ; the explication beinn, It is attained 
by veracity. Freedom from despondency is the contrary 
of dejection ; the explication being, This soul is not attained 
by the faint-hearted. Satisfaction is the contentment 
which arises from the contrary of dejection ; the explica- 
tion being, Quiescent, self-subdued. It has thus been 
shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness 
has been dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, 
propitiated by certain rites and observances, which devo- 
tion is meditation transformed into a presentative mani- 
festation of soul, without ulterior motive, as incessantly 
and inimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit 
(Vaikuntha) is attained. Thus Yamuna says : Attainable 
by the final and absolute devotion of faith in one internally 
purified by both (works and knowledge); that is, in one 
whose internal organ is rectified by the devotion of works 
and knowledge. 

In anticipation of the inquiry, But what absolute is to 


Ik5 desired to be known ? the definition is given (in the 
second aphorisiii). Froni wliieh tl -, and so fortli, 

of this. Tiie i^fiu'.si.s, ami so forti , :■ .ition (t-nmna- 

tion), sustentation, and retractation (of the universe). 
The purport of the aphorism is tliat the emanation, sus- 
tentation, and retr.iclalion of this universe, inconceivahly 
multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, 
from IJralimil to a tuft of grass, of det-rminate ; ' 
time, and fruition, is from this same univn.sal Lord, 

ssence is contrary' to all qualities which should be escaped 
from, of illimitable excellences, sucli as indefeasible voli- 
tion, and of innumerable auspicious attributes, omniscit-nt, 
lud omni{K)tent. 

In anticipation of the further inquiry, "NVliat proof is 
there of an absolute of this nature ? It is stated that the 
system of institutes itself is the evidence (in the third 
aphorism) : Because it has its source from the system. 
It) have its source from tiie system is to be that whereof 
the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then, is 
tiie source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause 

f knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the 
absohite. Nor is the suspicion possible that the absolute 
may be reached by some other form of evidence. For 
()erception can have no couvcrsancy about the absolute 
it is supersensible, Xor can infcnMice, for the 
..ju, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, be- 

luse it is an effect like a water-pot, is worth about as 
nni -h as a rottfii pumpkin. It is evinced that it is such 
t«xis as, Whence also these elements, that prove the 

xistence of the absolute thus described. 
T ■ • (it may b«> . " ' " " 

_ ;ni of proof, ; i 

-fer to activity and cessation of activity, could not posit 

., . . . . . ,j. • • • , • , . , 

'1 . 

i>ut that is from the construction. This ia intended to 
xclude the doubt anticipated. Tlie evidence, then, of the 


system is the only evidence that can he given of tlie 
absolute. Why ? Because of tlie construction, that is, 
because the absolute, that is, the highest end for man, is 
construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz.. Then 
thence the absolute is to be desired to be knoAvn). More- 
over, a sentence which has nothing to do either with acti- 
vity or with cessation of activity is not therefore void of 
purpose, for we observe that sentences merely declaratory 
of the nature of things, such as, A son is born to you. This 
is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz., the cessation of joy 
or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We 
have here given only a general indication. The details 
may be learnt from the original (viz., Eamanuja's Bhashya 
on the Vedanta aphorisms); we therefore decline a further 
treatment, apprehensive of prolixity ; and thus all is 
clear.i A. E. G. 

^ For further details respecting tva-nndddvali was printed in the 

Raindnuja and his system, see Wil- Pandit for September 1S71; but tlie 

son's Works, vol. i. pp. 34-46 ; and lines quoted in p. 73 are not found 

Banerjea's Dialogues, ix. The Tat- there. 

( S; ) 

( iiAriKi: V. 


AxANDA-TfuTlIA (IVuna-piajri;!, or Muilhva) rojeit«Ml this 
.saiue Ituiiuiunja system, becuuse, though like liis own 
views, it tenches the atomic size of the soul, the servitude 
of tlje soul, the existence of the Veda without any jter- 
sonal autlior, the authenticity of the Veda, the self-evidence 
of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences, 
dejHjndency upon tlie ranclia-nitia, the reality of plurality 
iu the univei-se, and so forth, — yet, in accepting three 
liypotheses as to reciprocally contradictory divisions, &c., 
it coincides with the tenets of the Jainas. Showing that 
lie is soul, Tliat art thou, and a number of otlier texU of 
the Upanishads bear a diflerent im{>ort under a dilTerent 
f'Xi ' ' i> a new ' -" of a 

new ^ • Iirtiluii i . ^ 'a). 

For in his doctriue ultimate principles are dichotomised 
into inle{)endcnt and dependent; as it is stated in the 
Tattva-viveka : — 

" Independent and dependent, two principles are re- 
ceived ; 
" The iudeiHindcnt is Vishnu the Lord, exempt from 

nn{xjrfections, and of inexhaustible excellences." 

il.rr it will I ! (by the \ ' • ' ' " : Why 

predicate of tin - tiiese i;. llences 

in the teeth of the Upanishads, which lay down that the 

' ! :'n principle is void of honjngcneity and helcro- 

. and of all plurality in it.svlf ? To tliis be it 


replied: Not so, for these texts of the Upanishads, as 
contradictory of many proofs positive of duality, cannot 
afford proof of universal unity ; perception, for example, 
in the consciousness, This is different from that, pronounces 
a difference between things, blue and yellow, and so forth. 
The opponent will rejoin : Do you hold that perception is 
cognisant of a perceptional difference, or of a difference 
constituted by the thing and its opposite ? The former 
alternative will not hold : for without a cognition of the 
thing and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, 
which presupposes such a cognition, will be impossible. 
On the latter alternative it must be asked. Is the appre- 
hension of the difference preceded by an apprehension of 
the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, 
its contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously appre- 
hended ? It cannot be thus preceded, for the operation 
of the intellect is without delay (or without successive 
steps), and tliere would also result a logical seesaw (appre- 
hension of the difference presupposing apprehension of 
the thing and its contrary, and apprehension of the thing 
and its contrary presupposing apprehension of the difler- 
ence). Nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension (of 
the thing, its contrary, and the difference) ; for cognitions 
related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous, and 
the counidon of the thing is the cause of the recognition 
of the difference ; the causal relation between the two 
being recognised by a concomitance and non-concomitance 
(mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised even 
when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent 
contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the 
opponent concludes), is not easily admissible. To this let 
the reply be as follows : — Are these objections proclaimed 
against one who maintains a difference identical with the 
things themselves, or against one who maintains a differ- 
ence between things as the subjects of attributes ? In the 
former case, you wnll be, as the saying runs, punishing a 
respectable Brahman for the offence of a thief, the objec- 


tions you adduce being irrelevant. If it bo ur^ed tlint if 
it is tho essence of the thing that is tl ico, then 
it will no longer re<iuiro a contrary c- . ; but if 
difTercnce presupi»05e a contrary counterpart, it will exist 
everywhere; this statement must bo disallowed, for whih* 
the cascnce of a tiling is fii-st known as ditViTout friMii 
everything else, tho dcterrainato usago (name and notion) 
may be shown to depend upon a contrary * ■ " 
for examj-lo. the issiiicu of a thing so far a 
by its dimensions is first cognised, and afterwards tl be- 
comes the object of some dct --■ ' rit, as long or^ 

short in relation to some \ ;ari (or con- 

tracted object). Accordingly, it is said in the Vislinu- 
tattva-nirnaya : " Diflerenoe is not proved to exist by tho 
rt'lalion of determinant and determinate; for this relation 
of determinant and dt'leiminale (or predicate ami 
presupposes diflference; and if difference were j. ;-.... > . 
depend upon the thing and its counterpart, ond the thing 
and its counterpart to presui»pose difference, tiiffercnce as 
involving a logical circle could not be accounted for; but 
difference is itself a real predicament (or ultimate entity). 
For this riMSon (viz., because difference is a thing) it is 
that men in quest of a cow do not act (as if they hail 
found her) when they see a uayal. and do not recall tiic row. Nor let it I 1 that if diT 

real 'iitity and as such ; i) on seeing i 

nulk and water, there would be a presentation of differ- 
ence; for the ■ 
ment about, tl; 
force of (the same) olistructives (as hinder the |>erception 

of Oth' ' ' ' ' :.'St. 

Thus r - 

" From too great rcmotenes<«, from too great nearness, 
f ' ' ' 'lie organs, from instability of the 

"From ftuotiity, from int n, from being over- 

lowered, and from aj^^^ie^uwiuti of similars." 


There is no perception respectively of a tree and the 
like on the peak of a mountain, because of its too great 
remoteness ; of collyrium applied to tlie eyes, and so forth, 
because of too great proximity ; of lightning and the like, 
because of a defect in the organs; of a jar or the like 
in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is be- 
wildered by lust and other passions, because of instability 
of the common sensory ; of an atom and the like, because 
of their subtility; of things behind a wall, and so forth, 
because of interposition; of the light of a lamp and the 
^like, in the day-time, because of its being overpowered ; 
of milk and water, because of the aggregation of similars. 

Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be 
granted, and no harm is done ; for given the apprehension 
of a subject of attributes and of its contrary, the presenta- 
tion of difference in their modes is possible. Xor let it be 
supposed that on the hypothesis of difference in the modes 
of things, as each difference must be different from some 
ulterior difference, there will result an embarrassing pro- 
gression to infinity, there being no occasion for the 
occurrence of the said ulterior difference, inasmuch as we 
do not observe that men think and say that two things are 
different as differenced from the different. Xor can an 
ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference, for 
tliere being no difference to serve as the example in such 
inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of infer- 
ence. And thus it must be allow^ed that in raising the 
objection you have begged for a little oil-cake, and have 
liad to give us gallons of oil. If there be no difference for 
the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride is 
not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There 
being, then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite pro- 
gression presents no trouble. 

Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. 
Thus the Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul 
as the object of its obedience ; and he who is to be obeyed 
by any person differs from that person, a king, for in- 


stance, from his aitenilant. For men, desirinj,' ius ihey do 
the end of nuin, Let me have pleasure, let me not have 
the slightest i>ain, if they covet the position of tlieir lord, 
do not become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they be- 
come recipients of all kinds of evil, lie who asserts his 
own infcrionty and tlu; excellenci; of his sui»urior, he it 
is who is to be commended ; and the gratified superior 
grants his eulo^'ist his desire. Therefore it has been 
said : — 

" Kings destroy those wlio a,ssert themselves to be 

" And grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre- 
eminence all that they desire." 

Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vadiiis) in their 
thirst to be one with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme 
excellence of Vishnu is like a mirage, is as if they were to 
cut ofT their tongues in trying to get a fine plantain, since 
it results that through offending this supreme Vishnu they 
must enter into the iiell of blind darkness (aiulha-lamasa). 
The same thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the 
Malnibharata-tiitparya-nirnaya : — 

"0 Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Vishnu's anger is 
waxed great; 

" lie hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because 
they decide blindly." 

This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is 
trichotomised into (i.) stigmatisation, (2.) imposition of 
n. • worship. 

t (i.) stigmatisation is (the branding upon one- 

self) of the weapons of Xarayuna (or Vishnu) as a memorial 
of him, and as a means of attaining the end which is 
needful (c-mancipatioti). Thr;-' t!:e scijud i.f the tjukalya- 
sumhilii : — 

" Tiiu man who i> I'lantn-i m i.iiu iiic discus of 
the immortal Vislinu, wlii<li jg the mi-jiit of the 

" Ho, slinking off Ins guilt, .,<>'■- c luc 1 ■ .i^. u ^Vaikun- 


tha) which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, 
enter into : 
" The discus Sudarsana by which, uplifted in his arm, 

the gods entered that heaven ; 
" Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emana- 
tion of the world, that weapon Brahmans wear 
(stamped upon them) ; 
" Stigmatised ^yherewith they go to the supreme sphere 

of Vishnu ; 
" Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Vishnu), 

let us become beatified." 
Again, the Taittiriyaka Upanishad says : " He whose 
body is not branded, is raw, and tastes it not : votaries 
bearing it attain thereto." The particular parts to be 
branded are specified in the Agneya-purana : — 

" On his right hand let the Brahman wear Sudarsana, 
"On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who 
know the Veda declared." 
- In another passage is given the invocation to be recited 
on being branded with the discus : — 

" Sudarsana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million 

"Show unto me, blind with ignorance, the everlasting 

way of Vishnu. 
" Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in 

the hand of Vishnu, 
" Adored by all the gods ; Panchajanya, to thee be 

(2.) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and 
others by such names as Ke^ava, as a continual memorial 
of the name of the Supreme Lord. 

(3.) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (i.) 
veracity, (2.) usefulness, (3.) kindliness, (4.) sacred study; 
with the body, (5.) almsgiving, (6.) defence, (7.) protection; 
with the common sensory, (8.) mercy, (9.) longing, and 
(10.) faith. Worship is the dedication to Narayana of 
each of these as it is realised. Thus it has been said : — 


** Stigrnatisation, imposition of namos, worshij); thu hist 
is of ten kimls." 

DifTeretice (or duulity between the Supreme lieing ami 
the universe) may i\\<o be inferred from cognisabiliiy and 
oihor marks. So also tlilTeivnce (or duality) may be 
umlerstood from revohilion, from texts setting out tlualily 
in emancipation and beatitude, such as: " All rejoice over 
truth attained; truthful, and celebrating liie gift of the 
divine Indra, they recount his glory ; " " Sarva, among those 
that know the truth, llniiiniaii, is in the universe, true 
spirit; true is individual spirit; truth is duality, truth 
is tluality, in me is illusion, in me illusion, in me 

Again : — 

"After attaining tliis knowledge, becoming like unto 

"In creation they are not born again, in retractation 
tliey perish not" (Bhagavad-gitii, xiv. 2). 

Accordiiig also to such aphorisms as, " Excepting coo- 
mical operation because of occasion, and because of non- 

Nor should suggestion be made that individual sj)irit 
is God in virtue of the text. He that knows the ahsolute 
Wcomes the absolute; for this text is hyperbolically 
eulogistic, like the text. Worshipping a Uniliman devoutly 
a i^udra becomes a I>nihman, i.e., becomes exalted. 

If any one urge that according to the text : — 

"If the tini verse existed it would doubtless come to an 
this duality is merely illusory, and iii reality a unity, 
and that duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined ; it may 
be replied : What you say is true, but you do not under- 
stand its meaning ; for the real meaning is, If this world 
had 1 luced, it would, without «: ne to an 

cntl ; tliis univirsc is from v. , a live- 

fold dual universe ; and it is not non-exi.stcnt, because 
it is mere illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will uf 


the Lord, in virtue of the testimony of many such pas- 
sages as : — 

" The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilder- 
" The originant, ideation, — thus is thy will called, 

'•' The originant, because it originates greatly ; ideation, 

because it produces ideas ; 
'•■ The illusion of Hari, who is called a, is termed (a-vidyd) 

ignorance : 
" Styled (mdyd) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for 

the name mdyd is used of the pre-eminent; 
" The excellent knowledge of Vishnu is called, though 

one only, by these names ; 
" For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is character- 
ised by spontaneous beatitude." 
That in which this excellent knowledge produces know- 
ledge and effects susteutation thereof, that is pure illusion, 
as known and sustained, therefore by the Supreme Lord 
duality is not illusorily imagined. For in the Lord illu- 
sory imagination of the universe is not possible, illusory 
imagination arising from non-perception of differences 
(which as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine 

If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is pre- 
dicated, the answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, 
that is in reality, Vishnu being better than all else, has 
no equal and no superior. Accordingly, the grand revela- 
tion : — 

" A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference 

between the unsentient and the Lord, 
" A difference among souls, and a difference of the 

unsentient and the soul each from the other. 
" Also the difference of unsentient things from one 

another, the world with its five divisions. 
"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had had 
a beRinnintr it would have an end : 

run systi-m or nRXAPRAysA. rj^ 

"WluToas it does not come to an uiul ; iiiul it is not 

illusorily iniaj;ineil : 
*' For if it were imagined it would cease, but it neviT 

"That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of 

tliose tliat lat-k knowledge ; 
"For this the doctrine of those that have knowled''e is 


known and sustained by Vishnu." 
The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out tho 
supreme excellence of Vishnu. Willi this in view the 
Lord declared : — 

"Two are these persons in iho universe, the perishable 

and tlio imji'-ri-^huble; 
"The perishable is all the elements, the iuiperishable is 

the uumoditied. 
"The other, the most excellent person, called tin* 

Supreme Spirit, 
"l8 the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the 

three worlds. 
"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent 

than the imperishable (soul), 
" Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda 

as the best of persons (I'urujihottama) ; 
"He \\\u) uninfatuated knows me thus the best of 

persons, he all-kiujwiug worships me in every wise. 
" Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blame- 
less (Arjuna) : 
" Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have clone 

what he has to do, Bhurata" (Biiagavad-gfla, 

XV. 16-20). 
So in the Maha-vauilia — 
"The primary purport of all tho Vodas rrlatf^s to the 

supreme spouse of S: . 
" Its purport regarding the e.\r,u. nc ,,i any uuiei uer.y 

must be subordinate." 
It is reasonable that the primary purport should reganl 
the supreme excellence of Vishnu. For emancipation is 


the highest end of all men, according to the text of the 
Bhallaveya Upanishad : While merit, wealth, and enjoy- 
ment are transitoiy, emancipation is eternal ; therefore a 
wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto. 
And emancipation is not won without the giace of Vishnu, 
according to the text of the Xarayana Upanishad : Through 
whose grace is the highest state, through wliose essence he 
is liberated from transmigration, while inferior men pro- 
pitiating the divinities are not emancipated ; the supreme 
object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated 
from this snare of works. According also to tlie words of 
the Vishnu-purana — 

" If lie be propitiated, what may not here be won ? 
Enough of all wealth and enjoyments. These are scanty 
enough. On climbing the tree of the snpreme essence, 
without doubt a man attains to the fruit of emancipa- 

And it is declared that the grace of Vishnu is won only 
through the knowledge of his excellence, not through the 
knowledge of non-duality. Nor is there in this doctrine 
any confliction with texts declaratory of the identity (of 
personal and impersonal spirit) such as. That art thou (for 
this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance 
of the real purport. 

"The word That, when undetermined, designates the 
eternally unknown, 

" The word Thou designates a knowable entity ; how can 
these be one ? " 

And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not 
identity) like the text. The sun is the sacrificial post. 
Thus the grand revelation : — 

" The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either 
similarity of cognition, 

" Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the 
place of the individual ; 

" Not essential unity for even when it is emancipated 
it is different, 


•' Tlie iliflereiice being iiidupemleucc' an*l completeness 
(in tlie Supreme S[)irit}, an'l smallness and depend- 
ence (in the individual spirit)." 
Or to propose another explanation of the text, Atmd 
(tit tvain asi, That art thou, it may be divided, litmu 
(tlal ivaiii asi. lie alone is soul as possessing indepen- 
dence and other attributes, and thou art not-that (alat) 
as wantin;^' those attributes; and tiuis the doctrine of 
unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said : — 
"Or the division may be Atat ^ra/n,aud thus unity will 

be well got rid of." 
According, therefore, to the Tattva-vada-rahasya, tlir 
words in the nine examples (in the Chluindogya Upani- 
>had), lie like a bird tied with a string, &c., teach unity 
Nvith the view of giving an example of non-duality. 
Accordingly the Mahopanishad : — 

"Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various 

trees ; 
" Like rivers and the sea ; like fresh and salt water ; 
"Like a robber and the robbed; like a man and his 

energy ; 
" So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different 
" Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of 

form, the supreme llari 
" Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the 

individual spirit, though he is its actuator; 
"On knowing tiieir diversity a man is emancipated: 
otjjerwise he is bound." 
And again — 

" I'.rahma, ^iva, and the greatest of the gods decay with 

the decay of their bodies; 
"Greater than these is llari, undccaying, because hi-^ 

body is for the sustentation of I^kshmf. 
"P.y ri'xson of all his attributes, independence, j>ower, 

knowledge, pleasure, ami the rest, 
"All thev, all the deities, are iu unlimited obedience to 




And again : — 

" Knowing Vishnu, full of all excellences, the soul, 
exempted from transmigration, 

" Eejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless 

"Vishnu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their 
supreme ruler. 

" Obedient to him are they for ever ; he is the Lord." 

That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of 
all things may be evinced from its supremacy and causality, 
not from the falsity of all things. For knowledge of the 
false cannot be brought about by knowledge of real exist- 
ence. As we see the current assurance and expression 
that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village 
is known or not known ; and as when the father the cause 
is known, a man knows the son; fso by knowing the 
supreme and the cause, the inferior and the effect is known). 
Otherwise (on the doctrine of the Advaita-vadins that the 
world is false and illusory) the words one and lump in the 
text. By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is made of clay 
is recognised, would be used to no purpose, for the text 
must be completed by supplying the words, By reason of 
clay recognised. For the text, Utterance with the voice, 
modification, name, clay (or other determinate object), — 
these alone are real, cannot be assumed to impart the 
falsity of things made; the reality of these being admitted, 
for what is meant is, that of which utterance with the 
voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name 
such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would 
result that the words name and alone would be otiose. 
There is no proof anywhere, then, that the world is unreal. 
Besides (we would ask) is the statement that the world is 
false itself true or false. If the statement is true, there 
is a violation of a real non-duality. If the statement is 
untrue, it follows that the world is true. 

Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind 
of fallacious reasoning, like the dilemma: Is transitoriness 


permanent or tninsitory ? There is a difTiciiUy in eiilnr 
case. As it is saiti by tlie author of the Xyaya-nirvdnu : 
The proof of the permanence of the transiiury, us beiiii; 
both ^xrmunent and transitory, is a }iaralogism. And in 
the Tiirkika-raksh;i — 

" Wlien a moue cannot be evinced to be either such aiul 
sucli, or not sucli and sucli, 

"The denial i»f a sul»jeci characterised by sucli a mo ic 
is called Nilya-sama. 

With the implied mention of this same technical ex* 
prcssion it is stateii in the rrabodhu-siddhi : Ivjuulity of 
characteristic modes results from signilicancy. If it Ihj 
said, This then is a vali«l rejoinder, we reply, This is a 
mere scarint; of the uninstructed, f«>r the source of fallacy 
hsis not been pointed uuU This is twofold, geneml ami 
particular: of these, the former is self-destructive, and the 
latter is of three kinds, defect of a ix;quisite element, 
excess of an element not requisite, aiui residence in thai 
which is not the subjicible subject. Of these (two forms 
of the fallacy), the general form is not si!S{>ected, no self- 
l»ervasion lein.; observed in the dilejiima in question (viz , 
Is the statement that the world is unreal itself true or 
false? &a) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar 
l>e said to be non-existent, the aliirmation of its non- 
existence is equally applicable to the water-jar as that of 
itj existence. 

If you reply : We accept the unreality (or falsity) of 
the world, not its non-existence; this reply is about as 
wise as the procedure of the carter wijo will lose his head 
rather than pay a hundred pieces of money, but will at 
once give five score ; for falsity and non-existence aro 
synonymous. We liismiss further prolixity. 

The meaning of Uie first aphorism, viz.. Then hence the 

is to Ih3 desired t ' ' ' ' ws; — ^The 

■n is allowed to ; ^ •*, and to 

designate subscquency to the qualiticution (of the aspirant) 

The word hence indicates a reason. 

loo THE sarva-darsana-sangraha: 

Accordingly it is stated in the Garuda-purana : — 
" All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and 
Hence regularly ; what then is the reason of this ? 
" And what is the sense of those words, sage ? Why 

are those, the most excellent ? 
" Tell me this, Brahma, that I may know it truly." 
Thus addressed by Narada, the most excellent Brahma 
replied : — 

" The word Then is used of subsequency and of com- 
petency, and in an auspicious sense, 
" And the word Thence is employed to indicate the 

It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about 
the absolute, because emancipation is not attained with- 
out the grace of Narayana, and his grace is not attained 
without knowledge. The absolute, about which the in- 
quiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of the 
second aphorism) : From which the genesis, and so forth, 
of this. The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute 
is that from which result emanation, sustentation, and 
retractation ; according to the words of the Skanda- 
purana — 

"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are 
emanation, sustentation, retractation, necessity, 
knowledge, involution (in illusion), and bondage 
and liberation ; 
and according to such Vedic texts, From M'hich are these. 
The evidence adducible for this is described (in the third 
aphorism) : Because it has its source from the system. 
That the absolute should be reached by way of inference 
is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the Veda 
cogitates not . that mighty one ; Him described in the 
Upanishads. Inference, moreover, is not by itself autho- 
ritative, as is said in the Kaurma-purana — 

" Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case 
" Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form 
of evidence ; 


" Whatsoever other form of evidence, compnnioiifHl hv 

rcvolfttion nml tradition, 
"Acquires the rank of ])roi.ation, about this thii- . ui 

be no liesitution." 
What a Sastra (or system of sacred institute«) is, has 
been stated in tlie Skanda-puiiina : — 

"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda. the Sama-veda, the 
Alharva-vedii. the >rahabharata, iho rancha-nitra, and 
tlie original Katuayai.\u, are called Scistras. 

"That also which is confornmble to these is called 

"Any a;4^'rej»ate of composition otluT than thi^ is a 

A ■ then, to the rule ihaL ih' [ 

ins: not to bo taken from otliei -c, 

the Monist view, viz., that the purport of the texts of the 
Veda relates not to the duality learnt from those but to 
non-duality, is rejected: for as there is no proof of a God 
from inference, so there is no proof of the duality between 
(lod and other things from inference. Therefore there 
can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, 
an<l the texts must bo understood to indicate the duality. 
Hence it is that it has said : — 
" I ever laud Nanlyana, the one being to 1)6 known from 
genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable 
and the im{)erisha1)le, without imperfections, and 
of inexhaustible excellences." 
It has thus been evinced that the sacred insfitutes are 
the evidence of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, 
Brahman). (The fourth aphorism is) : Hut that is from 
the ion. In rcj^ard to this, t!ie . 

and aients are stated to be ti:e ma::. . 

blrui-ui.n, in the Brihat-samhita : — 

Ton.- •. 

the purport is ascertained." 
It is thus stated that in accordance uiih iho purport ul 


the Upauisliads the absolute is to be apprehended only 
from the sacred institutes. We have here given merely 
a general indication. What remains may be sought from 
the Anandatirtha-bhashya-v\'akhyana (or exposition of 
the Commentary of Ananda-tirtha). We desist for fear 
of giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery 
was promulgated by Piirna-prajna Madhya-mandira, who 
esteemed himself the third incarnation of Vayu : — 
" The first was Hanumat, the second Bhima, 
" The thii'd Piirna-prajna^ the worker of the work of the 

After expressing the same idea in a arious passages, he 
has written the following stanza at the conclusion of his 
work : — 

" That whereof the three divine forms are declared in 

the text of the Veda, sufficiently 
" Has that been set forth ; this is the whole majesty in 

the splendour of the Veda ; 
"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that 
bowed to the words of Pidma (Hanumat) ; the 
second was Bhima ; 
"By this Madhva, who is the third, this book lias been 

composed in regard to Ivesava." 
The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering 
various Vedic texts. 

The purport of this is that Vishnu is the principle 
above all others in every system of sacred institutes. 
Thus all is clear.^ A. E. G. 

1 For a further account of Ananda- tary on the Brahma-sutras has been 
tirtha or Madhva see Wilson, Works, printed in Calcutta, 
vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commen- 

( 103 ) 

LliAl'iKl: VI. 

CkiitaIN Maheiviims disapprove of this doctrino of the 
Vai.slmavud kuuwu by its tec' : - of the servitude of 

souls and the like, iiuuiiuucli ;i i^ witli it the pains 

of ile])cndence upon anotlier, it cannot be a means of 
:i of jKiin and oilier d' ' ' 1' iso 

■ nL such argunjenlsa-> ■ .i-r 

and longing for independence do not become emancipateii, 
l>e< t ■' V still depeml upon another, bt'ing destitute of 
inti' , like oui-selves and others; and, Lib«nited 

spirits {Kxssess the attributes of the Supreme Deity, becau-i' 
at the same time, that they are spirits they are free from 
the j^erm of every pain as the Supremo Deity is. lieco^- 
nising these arguments, these Maiielvaras adopt the IViiiu- 
pala system, which is conversant about the exjiosition of 
live cate^^ories, as the means to the highest end of man. 
In this system the first aphorism is: Now then we shall 
ex|)ound the I'aiupatn union and rites of Taiupali. Die 
meaiiini; is as follows : — The word tiow refers to some- 
thin;^ an:< . I'dcnt, and this something antecedent is the 
disciple'.s interrogation of the spiritual teacher. The 
nature of a spiritual teaciier is explicated in the (Jana- 
kdrika : — 

" IJut there are eight ]>entads to be known, and a ruut.. 
one with three factors ; 

"He that knows this ninefold oggregale is a scilpun 
tier, a spiritual 'ui !•• 


" The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the 
localities, the perseverance, the purifications, 

''The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads; 
and there are three functions." 

The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral 
three (trini), instead of the feminine three (tisrah), is a 
Vedic construction. 

(a.) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realis- 
ing, and is divided into five members, viz., knowledge, 
penance, permanence of the body, constancy, and purity. 
Thus Haradattacharya says : Knowledge, penance, per- 
manence, constancy, and purity as the fifth. 

(h.) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. 
This is of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus 
Haradatta also says : — 

"False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, 
and falling, 

"These five, the root of bondage, are in this system 
especially to be shunned." 

(c.) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant 
to liberation. 

These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and 
the rest. Thus he also says : — 

" Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, con- 
stant recollection of Eudra, 

"And apprehension, are determined to be the five ex- 
pedients of acquirements." 

(d.) Locality is that by which, after studying the cate- 
gories, the aspirant attains increase of knowledge and 
austerity, viz., spiritual teachers and the rest. Thus he 
says : — 

" The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the 
burning-ground, and Eudra only." 

(e.) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of 
these pentads until the attainment of the desired end, and 
is distributed into the differenced and the rest. Thus it is 
said : — 


"The ililTerenced, tlie umlilTerenccd, muttering, accep- 
tance, and devotion ns the fifth," 

(/) Purificntion is the puttiiij^ nuay, once for all, of 
false concei>tion and the utljer four impurities. It is dis- 
tributed into five species according to the five things to Kj 
put away. Thus it is said — 

"The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of 

"And of falling, is declared to be the fivpfold purifica- 
tion of the state of bontlage." 

(g.) The five initiations are thus enuniL;..., . 

"The material, the proper time, the rile, the image, and 
the spiritual guide as the fifth." 

(h.) The five powers are as follow : — 

" Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect, 
conquest of pleasure and luiiii, 

"Merit and carofulnc.s.s, nn; tlf.l.i-nl thr fivi- ■ f 

The three funcLiuns are ihe niuuos of v..- 4 

consistent with propriety, for the diminu 

impurities, viz., mendicancy, living uj)on alms, and living 
upon what chance supplies. All the rest is to be found 
in the standard words <»f this sect. 

In the first aphorism above recited, the word now 
serves to in* ' ' ^iiion of the termination of 

pain (or en. i being the object of the 

interrogation aix»ut the putting away of pain |>cr8onaI. 
physical, and hy -' ;cal. By the word 7' ' ■ ire 
to umlersland tl. r created worhl), the 

nating that which is dependent on sometiiing uitcrior. 
By the word patt we are to understand the cause (or 
principium), the word designating the Lord, who is lh« 
cause of the universe, the pati, or ruler. The meaning of 
the words sacrifices an«l rites every one knows. 

In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds. 
impersonal and jHrsonal. Of those, •' 
sists in the absolute extirpation of all ; . 

<(M tfiteaas ttvwr© ipiyvRSOB ttitsB wisiia!!, ^^idbnDtE (ni% imie piErwer, ie, 

I '-■ ■: : -■ --rB'fe^asityiotf 'dlajjecte, mffinfeclllj 'fllfSGrfballle 

: . :s., wosion. anflittiion, ' cogitalimii, .jSkciiiiimiaiia:i, 

janiu immmBnifliiofi. '(M aib^s£ iBw^, vvTiaiian ibb lUDgniitiimi iwf 
•t'OTBiv Mmfl 'cff wifflnfill. tocttraBlL, amfl 'Olihei' sfliffliiile 'dilyficdiS, 
lliinn^ nmiljiatfcqplnim^, amttei'Ofitptefl, 'Cff -jfeniEtlie. J^iitiiaii 
ikicagmjitiimi 'Of ipmicqflte^, icacwsrsEiitt .aiijouit ;iEiIIIl :rEntioiilate 
'-Hcmmfls. <CI!o.^iiKliiaii iie (Piagmttimi -.sS. ^pmicipilfigs, icain^BrsaTict 
. all uTEt . aH. Itnim fc ,iiif rHiitiniiiiiiE. Mis miiiniiimaliigii as ■ co-gnMan < of 
jfiilmDijjILefi (omw'srfii ' le sytitsm 'df imsuiitrtfs, 

.■nnnm ffi-imirr to ttiht -...:_. „_ .. ...;....: „ug to iis fii^nificimce. 
>0>iiimi5ciiarice is 'Eogiiiitiirai naf ipmiiaiplks >£!«?ar .aniifiimg mnd 
":riniij., ire" ; " .^' " ' -^rs tkdlBiifBd -orajat 

. . .„--j - _- ; maiy'Oi-L .__ -.. ::-'] an3 srieciialised. 

■Sndh lis life iiiiiiMOgCtgBlI ipbf:^®!'. 

™ " ' ^■SGL^T aescid,i> 

i ■ ■ : je fivdfcuesS'Uf 

dhrai^ht;, ttlke ipiy.viBr (cff ;BSBDiiiiiiiiJc; Sarans ait "swiilll,, aanifl. ttlhfi 
': ' ' ' ' ' "le&e, tdlir ' '.- 

- - to aat T , >:' 

iQtileilirj:. nittg. ^EWRer (df rmffi rmfniimrr ilflniKB att WliQli Iffi tJjiaB 
:','-- ' :ugiirpe, ;imfl im^esjieclii've ccf 

- T -;aii£ - B-irmnTlHir .tund dissilialai- 

•fji an lUJiliiiiiL^ (s& iw^xwasm. IDbfi IfaDnOay lOf ifiEpaiaatioii 
ik tllb£ ]pi«raesfiimi tcff aa'tmscBiiSsitt SEp^femaey lerom mhen 
Bndh iflcgaoB laife mflt .fimjjilDyftd.. .Snah as liliis iacti've 

jyi tflk^ ik «lfffiQliefl 'or >Bfiiiiced, 'flgpenSimg on somelMng 

lilteciEQ;, at ik rtiinrefiliQlfl., SCTiJiiitiixgr, iiifc insfiEimaBl, .and the 

H-'.: -3131]^. 'QaS. iliheBfi, .■^miiujiiey is tthe ;aitaiiii3Drnrtje <0if ttiie seB- 

Tl iB tof itWT© ■clfi^--"-" ''•'■■■•■-•-•: -' its matiirrB m> 

or imcogiiaitiisRe. . - -T is didhoit)- 

:;.;s-i'.u af TTrocieaSing (fikanmiimiiiitiiy Jiiiia as Tpi'oceediii^ 

iii:LtflDr,nL'imtat&iy. IDiiB iffiBGiiiaiiiiiKlie jcrQCBdm!^, imainiBSl- 

i .: lit 'br li^ie mMtoumimitB (Btf ima wledgE, iie calllled liie cagitu- 

"tjT'fi, Tor Tiy ttlte (Cfigitaiiit iSBcgBiii e^err seutifiiit ibeJiaDg as 


co^^ui^ant of objects in eenerul, dtscriniiiiat««i or not diA- 


-ti or not characterised by tt. 

^hicli while unconscious 13 dependent 
u the cooscioos, is of two kinds, as stjied the effect and 

colour, and the : 

three internal organs, inteliect. the < aid 

,t 1 • • • 

aii^r-.c:.:. l;.-. >i:: v'.ciji is IDt an 

orj - - ; . . .. 



»._..-. . .*. » 

f V. . . - ; : lij 


\' < <-or of infinite, risual, and active nower. He is 

: of the 

.. _ _. "n Cti^l l!. rough 

of two degrees, that by 

lyd so forth; union ^ed 

,1 ^:i,a .s calleil c* 


Rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end. 
It is of two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of 
these, the principal is the direct means of merit, religious 
exercise. Religious exercise is of two kinds, acts of piety 
and postures. The acts of piety are bathing witli sand, 
lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and devotional 
perambulation. Thus the rev^ered Nakuli^a says : — 

" He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the 
dust. Oblation is an observance divided into six 

Thus the author of the aphorisms says : — 

" He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, 
viz., laughter, song, dance, muttering hum, adora- 
tion, and pious ejaculation." 

Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the 
throat and lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, 
glories, &c., of Mahe^vara, according to the conventions of 
the Gandharva-sastra, or art of music. The dance also is 
to be employed according to the ars saltatoria, accompanied 
with gesticulations with hands and feet, and with motions 
of the limbs, and Mdth outward indications of internal 
sentiment. The ejaculation hum is a sacred utterance, 
like the bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact 
of the tongue with the palate, an imitation of the sound 
hudung, ascribed to a bull, like the exclamation Vashat. 
Where the uninitiated are, all this should be gone through 
in secret. Other details are too familiar to require ex- 

The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing, 
acting absurdly, talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing 
all the signs of being asleep while really awake. Trem- 
bling is a convulsive movement of the joints as if under an 
attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking as if the legs 
were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an 
innamorato on seeing a young and pretty woman. Act- 
ing absurdly is doing acts which every one dislikes, as if 
bereft of all sense of what should and what should not 


be done. Talking nonsensically is the utterance of words 
\vliich contradict each other, or which have no meaning, 
and the like. 

The suhsitiiary religious e.xercise is purificatory sub- 
sequent ablution for putting an end to the sense of unfit- 
ness from be^sin'' livin" on broken food, &c. Tims ii is 

CO C O ' 

said by the author of the aphorisms: Bearing the marks 
i>f purity by after-bathing. 

(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of 
the cognitive power, is cognition of principles ever arising 
and ]>ervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or 
not declared, summary, or in detail). The summary is the 
enouncement of the subjects of attributes generally. This 
is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Xow then we 
.shall expound the lVi^u])ata union and rites of Pa^upati;. 
1 )etail is the fivefold enouncement of the five categories 
acconling to the instruments of true knowledge. This is 
to be fouml in the Ka^ikara-bhashya. Distribution is the 
distinct enouncement of these categories, as far as possible 
according to definitions. It is an enumeration of these 
acconling to their prevailing characters, dilVerent from 
that of other recognised systems. For example, the cessa- 
tion of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems {us in 
the Sankhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this 
system it is the attainment of supremacy or of the divine 
jerfections. In otiier systems the create is that which 
has become, and that which shall become, but in this 
system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth, the sentient 
and insentient. In other systems the principium is deter- 
mined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy 
of works, whereas in this system the principiuvi is the 
Lord not thus determined. In other insliiules union re- 
sults in isolation, &c., while in these institutes it results 
in ces.sation of pains by attainment of the divine perfec- 
tions. In other systems jxinidise and simihir spheres 
involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system 
they result in nearness to the Supreme Being, eitlier 


followed or not followed by such return to transmigratory 

Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate 
of illusions, since if God's causality be irrespective of the 
efficacy of works, then merits will be fruitless, and all 
created things will be simultaneously evolved (there being 
no reason why this should be created at one time, and that 
at another), and thus there will emerge two difficulties. 
Think not so, replies the Pasupata, for your supposition is 
baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of works, 
be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be with- 
out results, what follows ? If you rejoin that an absence 
of motives will follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence 
of motives follow ? If the efficacy of works be without 
result, will causality belong to the doer of the works as to 
the Lord ? It cannot belong to the doer of the works, for 
it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only 
when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy 
so furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in tlie case of 
the works of Yayati, and others. From this it will by 
no means follow that no one will engage in works, for they 
will engage in them as the husbandman engages in hus- 
bandry, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient 
creatures engage in works because they depend on the 
will of the creator. Nor does the causality pertain to the 
liOrd alone, for as all his desires are already satisfied, he 
cannot be actuated by motives to be realised by works. 
As for your statement, continues the Pasupata, that all 
things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreason- 
able, inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in 
the unobstructed active power which conforms itself to 
the will of the Lord, whose power is inconceivable. It has 
accordingly been said by those versed in sacred tradition: — 

" Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated 
by the efficacy of works, 

" For this reason is he in this system the cause of all 


Some otie may urge : In another system emancipation 
is atlaineil throu;^h a knowledge of (Joil, wlit-re does ilio 
diflVrencc lie ? Say not so, rei)lii'S the IVisiipata, for you 
will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere knowledge of 
God the cause of emancipatinn, or the presentation, or the 
accurate ch.iracterisation, of God ? Not the mere know- 
ledge, for then it would fulluw that the study of any 
system would he superfluous, inasmuch as without any 
institutional sy.stem one might, like tht- uninstructed, 
attain emancipation by the bare cognition that ^lahadeva 
is the lon.1 of the gods. Nor is presentation or intuition 
of tiie deity the cause of emancipatiun, for no intuition of 
the deity is competent to sentient creatures burdened witli 
an accumulation of various impurities, and able to see only 
with the eyes of the flesh. On the third alternative, vi/ , 
that tlie cause of emancipation is an accurate characterisa- 
tion of the deity, you will be obliged to consent to our 
doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation can- 
not be realiscil aj)art from the .system of the Paiupatas. 
Therefore it is that our great teacher has said : — 

"If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any 
system, but intuition is unattainable ; 

"There is no accurate characteri.sation of principles 
otherwise than by the five categories." 

Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the 
highest end of man must adopt the system tif the Pii^u- 
patas, which undertakes the exposition of the five cate- 
gories. A. K. (1. 

( "2 ) 



[The sevenfh system in Madhav'a's Sarva-darsana-san- 
graha is the Saiva-darsana. This sect is very prevalent 
in the South of India, especially in the Tamil country ; it 
is said to have arisen there about the eleventh century A.D. 
Several valuable contributions have been lately made to 
our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the Eev. 
H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes. The former 
especially, by his excellent articles in the American 
Oriental Society's Journal, has performed a great service 
to the students of Hindu philosophy. He has there 
translated the Tattuva-Kattalei, or law of the Tattwas, the 
Siva-Gnanapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of 
God, and the ^iva-Pirakasam, or light of Siva, and the 
three works shed immense light on the outline as given 
by Madhava. One great use of the latter is to enable us 
to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their TamQ 
disguise, no easy matter occasionally, as arul for anugraha 
and tidchei for dikshd may testify. 

The Saivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic 
Sankhya ; they hold that God, souls, and matter are from 
eternity distinct entities, and the object of philosophy is to 
disunite the soul from matter and gi'adually to unite it to 
God. Siva is the chief deity of the system, and the relation 
between the three is quaintly expressed by the allegory 
of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Pa^upati is a well- 
known name of Siva, as the master or creator of all things. 


Tliere seem to be tlirce didtircnt sets of so-called Sniva 
sutias. One is in five book-', calletl by Colebrookc the 
Pa^upati-^iistra, which is probably the work quoted by 
Madhava in his account of the Nakuli.4a Ta^upatas; 
anotiier is in three books, with a comtiientary by Kshc- 
niaraja, with its first sutra, chaitanyam dtmd. Tiie third 
was commented on by Abhinava-gupta, and opens with 
the ^loka givt-n in the Sarva-Dar^ana-.Sai'igraha, p. 91, lines 
1-4. The MS. which I consulted in Calcutta read the 
first words — 

Katftailchid dsdi/i/a Mahcivarasya dAsynm. 

None of these works, however, appear to be the autho- 
rity of the present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied 
on the twenty-eight Agauias and some of the ruranas. 
A list of the Agajnas is given in Mr. Foulkes' " Catechism 
of theJ>aiva Ueligion:" and of these the Kiranaand Karana 
arc quoted in the following treatise.] ^ 

Tin-: SAIVA-l>Ai;.^.VNA. 

Certain, liowever, of the Miihesvara sect receiving the 
system of truth authoritatively laid down in the ^aiva 
A'jama,^ reject the foregoing opinion that " the Supreme 
Being is a cause as independent of our actions, &c.," on the 
gn)und of its being liable to tlie imputation of partiality 
and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion 
that "the Supreme P.eing is a in dependence on our 
actions, &c.;" and they maintain that there are three cate- 
gories distinguished as the Lord, the soul, and the world 
(or literally " the master," " the cattle," and " the feltei"). 
As has been saiil by those well versoil in tlie Tanlr.i 
doctrines — 

"The Guru of the world, having lirst condensed in one 

' Colfbroolc. ■ ■' '■ . ' . • • .. tlicir namr« 

j>ttti$dMm (ill ' " Calrchi'm 

Sirtigama), %» :.. . ^ . . ). 

rXHiipftU tcct. The AganuMi arc Mid 


siitra the great tautra, possessed of three categories 
and four feet, has again declared the same at full 
The meaning of this is as follows ; — Its three categories 
are the three before mentioned ; its four feet are learning, 
ceremonial action, meditation, and morality, hence it is 
called the great Tantra, possessed of three categories and 
four feet. Now the " souls " are not independent, and the 
"fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as being 
different from these, is first declared; next follows the 
account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing 
intelligence ; lastly follow the " fetters " or matter, such 
is the order of the arrangement.^ Since the ceremony of 
initiation is the means to the highest human end, and this 
cannot be accomplished without knowledge which estab- 
lishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the Lords of 
the hymns, &c., and is a m.eans for the ascertainment of 
the real nature of the " cattle," the " fetter," and the 
" master," we place as first the " foot" of knowledge (jndna) 
which makes known all this unto us.^ Next follows the 
" foot " of ceremonial action {hriyd) which declares the 
various rules of initiation with the divers component parts 
thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be attained, 
hence the " foot " of meditation {yoga) follows next, which 
declares the various kinds of yoga with their several parts. 
And as meditation is worthless without practice, i.e., the 
fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is 

' " There must be three eternal ^ These four feet are the four 
entities. Deity, soul, matter ; " " as stages of religious life (see J. A. O. S. 
the water is co-eternal with the sea iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil 
and the salt with the water, so soul sarithei, Jcirikei, yoJcam, and gndnam. 
is co-eternal with the Deity, and The first is the stage of practical 
2Msa is eternally co-existent with piety and performance of the pre- 
soul " (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). scribed duties and rites ; the second 
In p. 58 we find the aclmita of the is that of the "confirmatory sacra- 
Vedilnta attacked. In p. 62 it is ment " and the five purifications in- 
said that the soul is eternally en- volved in true pujd; the third i.s 
tangled in matter, and God carries that of the eight observances of the 
on his five operations (see infra) to yogin ; the fourth is that of know- 
disentangle it, bringing out all that ledge which prepares the soul for 
is required for previous desert. intimate union with God. 


forbidden, Instly follows the fouilh "fi)ot" of practical 
duty {charyd), which includes all this. 

Now f5iva is held to bo tlie L<:)rd (or nnster). Although 
participaliun in the divine nature of Siva belongs t(» 
liberated souls anil to such beings as Vidye^vara, &c., yet 
these are not independent, since tliey dej^nd on tlie 
Supreme lieing; and the nature of an eflect is recognised 
to belong to the worlds, &i\, wliieii resenible hiuj, from the 
very fact of the orderly urrant;enient of their j)arts. And 
from their thus being elVeets we infer that they nuist have 
been caused by an intelligent being. Wy the sti-ength of 
this inference is the universal acknowledgment of a 
Supreme Being confirmed. 

" lUit may we not object tliat it is not proved that the 
body is thus an eflect ? for certainly none ha.s ever, at any 
time or place, seen a body being made l>y any one." We 
grant it : yet it is not i)roper to deny that a lx)dy has some 
maker on the grouud that its being made has not been 
seen by any one, since this can be established from infer- 
ence [if not from actual perception]. lk»dies, &e., must 
be eflects, because they possess an urderl}' arrangement of 
parts, or because they are destructible, as jars, &c ; and 
from their being effects it is easy to infer that they must 
have l)cen caused by an intelligt-nt being. Thus the sub- 
jict in the argument [sc. bodies, &c] must have had a 
maker, from the fact that it is an effect, lik' •■. ; that 

whieh has the aforementioned middle term 'j must 

have the aforementioned n>ajor {sddhya) ; and tiuit which 
has not the former will not have the latter, as the soul, 
&c.^ The argument which establishes the authority of 
the original inference to prove a Supreme IJeing 1ms boeu 
given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length 
licre. In fact, that God is the agent, but not 
irrespective of the actions done by living beings, is proved 
by the current verse - 

• Cf. Colchno'ki-, I MMi',1 i.'ii m , %'ii I. p. jl5' 

• yyiyfna may lure mctat "argruucoL" 


" This ignorant jivdtman, incapable of its own true 
pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direc- 
tion [and its own merits not taken into account], 
would always go to heaven or always to hell." ^ 
Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's 
indej)endence, since it does not really violate an agent's 
independence to allow that he does not act irrespectively 
of means ; just as we say that the king's bounty shows 
itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of his trea- 
surer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru — 

"It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and 

itself to employ means, &c. ; 
" This is an agent's true independence, and not the act- 
ing irrespectively of works, &c." 
And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Sruti) 
establishes the existence of an agent who knows the various 
fruits [of action], their means, material causes, &c., accord- 
ing to the laws of the various individual merits. This has 
been thus declared by the venerable Brihaspati — 

" He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means 

and material causes, — 
" Apart from him this world knows not how the desert 
that resides in accumulated actions should ripen." — 
" The universe is the subject of our argument, and it 

must have had an intelligent maker, 
" This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we 

see in any other effect, as jars, &c." 
God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical 
with everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant 
being cannot produce a thing.^ This has been said by the 
illustrious Mrigendra ^ — 

1 Scil. if there were only one cause meaning of the passage ; it occurs 

there would be only one invariable Mahabharata, iii. 1 144 (of. Gauda- 

effect. The very existence of various pada, S. Kar. 61). 

effects proves that there must be ^ Jq p §3, line 3, infra, I read 

other concurrent causes (as human Karandsamhhardclicha. 

actions) necessary. The argument ^ This may be the same with the 

seems to me to require here this Meykanda of the Tamil work in 

imnatural stress to be laid on era, J. A. O. S. His poem was called 

but this is certainly not the original the Mrigendra {?}. 

THE S.lir.lDARS.WW. 117 

" He is omniscient from liis being tlio maker of all 
thing's: for it is an established principle 

"Tiiat lie only can make a thin;,' who knows it with it-; 
means, parts, and end." 

""Well," our opponents may say, " we concede that (Jod 
is an independent maker, but then he has no body.' 
Now experience shows that all effects, as jars, &c., are 
produced by beiuLi^ -d of bodies, as potters, &c. : 

but if God were \ . of a body, then he would be 

like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or 
omnipotent." We, however, deny this, for we see that 
the incorporeal soul does still proihice motion, &c., in its 
associated body ; moreover, even though we conceded that 
God did possess a body, we should still maintain that the 
alleged defects wouUl not necessarily ensue. The Supreme 
I'lcing, as he has no possible connection with the fetters 
of matter, such as mala,- action, &c., cannot have a 
material body, but only a body of pure energy (Siikta),^ 
since we know that his body is composed of the five 
hymns which are forms of {^akti, according to the well- 
known te.xt : " The Supreme has the Isuna as his head, 
the TatpurusJia as his mouth, the Aghora as his heart, the 
Vdmcdeva as his secret parts, and the Sadyojdta as his 
feet."* And this body, created according to his own will, 
is not like our bodies, but is the cause of the five opera- 
tions of the Supreme, which are respectively grace, obscura- 
tion, destruction, preservation, and production." This has 
l)oen said in the Srfraat Mrigendra — 

' " TttiiiUiradatuUarirah of Siva (so-- .1. A. i> S iv. p. loi). 

in ? Theae five mantni.>i are ijivi-u in t!io 

invcnic onKr in T'" \r:niyaka, x. 
4_V 47 cf. .Vi, '. p. 3). 

* Thi-Ko an- ■ ■«« of the 

five nianifffltaiiuiiii ut .Siva (tcv 
.1 A O .S iv. S. iKi whi.h in thoir 

vtiiuli in pr<>- 
:, liudra, Vitknu, 

■ i .. ; .... wor.l ... 

» " Ma>/>i or Vta 
rial, Sakti tli«- ii. 
t>«itv tho efEciunt c^tu.-w 

,. ...1V1. 

... and 

Iv. p ;5»- 

* T ■■ - ' ■ 



vi«' i- 

and is to be >■ 

i iiutiitraji, 
tho U-lv 


" From the impossibility of its possessing mala, &c., the 
body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not 
like ours." 
And it has also been said elsewhere — 

"His body is composed of the five mantras which are 

subservient to the five operations, 
"And his head, &c., are formed out of the Isa, Tatpur- 

usha, Aghora, Varna, and other hymns." 
If you object to this view that " such passages in the 
Agamas as ' He is five-faced and fifteen-eyed,' assert pro- 
minently the fact that the Supreme Being is endowed 
Avith a body, organs, &c.," we concede what you say, but 
we maintain that there is no contradiction in his assuming 
such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, 
since meditation, worship, &c., are impossible towards a 
Being entirely destitute of form. This has been said in 
the Paushkara — 

" This form of iiis is mentioned for the preservation of 
the devotee." 
And similarly elsewhere — • 

" Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as pos- 
sessed of form ; 
" For the understanding cannot reach to a formless 

Bhojaraja^ has thus detailed the five operations — 
" Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation, 

destruction, and obscuration, 
" And to these must be added the active grace of him 

who is eternally exalted." 
Now these five operations, in the view of tlie pure Path, 
are held to be performed directly by Siva, but in that of 
the toilsome Path they are ascribed to Ananta,^ as is 
declared in the Srimat Karana^ — 

and Brahma. They are respectively - Ananta is a name of Siva in the 

symbolised by the ndda, vindu, m, Atharva-siras Upanishad (see In- 

M, and a of Om. dische Stud. i. 385). 

1 In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. •* This is the fourth of the twent^-- 

p. 138, we find a Tilntrik work, the eight Agamas (see Foulkes' Gate- 

iVarapatl-ja>ja-chari/il, ascribed to chism). 
ELoja the king of Dhdr. 


"111 the I'lirc ralli Siva is ileclaied to be the only 
ai^ent, but Aiiana in tliat whicli is oj)j)uSL'd to llie 
One Siii)remc'." 

It must hero be uiuierslood that the word Siva inchulos 
in its proper meuiiing " the I^nl," all those who have 
attained to llie state of ^iva, as the Lords of the Mantras, 
Mahelwara, the emancipated souls who have become Sivas, 
and lilt' inspired teachfi-s (vdi'hakas), together witli all the 
various means, as initiation, &c., fur obtaining the state of 
Siva. Thus has been explained ihu lirst category, the 
L<.nl (jxiti). 

We now proceed to explain tiie second category, the 
soul (}xi.sti). The imiiviilual suul which is also known by 
such synonyms as the non-atomic,^ the Kshitrajiia, or 
knower of the body,* &c., is the Pahi. For we must not 
say with the Ciuirvakas that it is the same as the body, 
since on this view we could not account for memory, as 
there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what 
another has seen. Nor may we say with the Xaiy;lyikas 
that it is Cognisable by perception,^ as this would involve 
an ad infinitum regressus. As has been said — 

" If the soul were cognisable, there would need to be 
again a second knower;* 

" And this would require another still, if the second 
were itself to be known." 

Nor must we hold it noji-pcrvading with the Jainas, 
nor momentary with the Hauddhas, since it is not limited 
by space or time. As has been said — 

"That object which is unlimited in its nature by space 
or time, 

"They hold to be et»rnal and j>ervading, — hence the 
soul's all-pervatiiiigness and eternity." 

Tr^i-A 1 Ar I \' 


» Th. 
r«'iv«i • i 



: .1 rurich 

. .\n in 

chlirtia, hit>Lik 4v,. 

* IVlc the Ui in 


S4, line S. 


Nor may we say with the Vedantin that it is only one, 
since the apportionment of different fruits proves that 
there are many individual souls ; nor with the Sankhyas 
that it is devoid of action, since, when all the various 
"fetters" are removed, ^^ruti informs us of a state of 
identity with Siva, which consists in intelligence in the 
form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.^ This 
has been declared in the Sriinat Mrigendra — 

" It is revealed that identity witli Siva results when all 
fetters are removed." 
And again — 

" Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in 

his soul 
" This exists always and on every side, therefore, after 
liberation, Sruti calls it that which faces every 
It is also said in the Tattva-prakasa — 

" The liberated souls are themselves Sivas, but these 

are liberated by his favour ; 
"He is to be known as tlie one eternally liberated, 

whose body is the five Mantras." 

N"ow the souls are threefold, as denominated vijndnd- 

Jcaldh, pralaydkaldh, and sakaldh.^ (a.) The first are tliose 

who are under the influence of inala only, since their 

actions are cancelled by receiving their proper fruits, or 

^ Cf. the NakulLsa Pasupatas, p. where it is said that the five vidyd- 

76, 4 (supra, p. 103). tattvas [kala, vidyd, rdga, niyati, and 

- For these three classes see kald) and the twenty-four dtma- 

J. A. 0. S. iv. pp. 87, 137. They tattvas [sc. the gross and subtile 

are there described as being respec- elements, and organs of sense and 

tively under the influence of dnavam action, with the intellectual faculties 

malam only, or this with Jcanmam maMts,buddhi, aJiamhira, and chitta), 

malam, or these with mayei malam. are all developed from mdyd. This 

The dnavam is described as original e.xactly agrees with the quotation 

sin, or that source of evil which was from Soma Sambhu, infra. We may 

always attached to the soul ; l-an- compare with it what Madhava says, 

viam is that fate which inheres in \). 7 7, in his account of the Xakulisa 

the soul's organism and metes out P;lsupatas, where he describes lcal<i 

its deserts ; mayei is matter in its as unintelligent, and composed of 

obscuring or entangling power, the the five elements, the five tanmdtras, 

soiirce of the senses. Madhava uses and the ten organs, with buddhi, 

" kald," &:c., for mdyd. The reason ahamkdra and manas. 
is to be found in J. A. 0. S. p. 70, 


by abstraction, contemplation, aiul knowledge, and since 
tliey have no "fetters" in tlie form of enjoynients, such 
as kalii, &c. (which fetters would, however, be liic cause of 
cancellinjj actions by bringing about their proper fruit). 
(b.) The secoml are tliose wlio are under the inlluence of 
mala and karman, since in their case kald, &c., arc de- 
stroyed by mundane destructions, hence their name prala- 
ydkala. (c.) The third are those wlio are bound in the 
three fetters of mala,mdyd, and karman, hence their name 
sakala. The first class are again subdivided into samdpla- 
knlushiih and asamdpln-kalitshdh, according as their in- 
lierent corruption is perfectly exhausted or not. The 
former, — having received the mature penalties of their 
corruptions, — are now, as foremost of men and worthy of 
the privilege, raised by Siva's favour to tiie rank of the 
Lords of Knowledge (the Vidye^varas), Ananta, and the 
rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of Knowledge is described 
in the Raluuiaivatya — 

" Ananta, and Sukshma, and ^ivottama, 

"P^kanotra, and ajain Kkarudra and Trinu'irttika, 

" Sn'kantha and Sikhandin, — tlicse are det-lared to be 
the Vidve^varas." 

The latter Siva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the 
seventy million Mantras.^ All tiiis is explained in the 
Tattva-praka^a.* Similarly Soma-Sambhu lias said — 

"One class is nanrnd viji\('nidkala, the second prala- 

"The third sakala, — these are the three whom the 
J^istra regards as objects of mercy. 

"The first is united to mala alone, the second to viala 
and karma, 

"The thin! are united to all the tattvas Ijeginning wiili 
kald and ending with "earth."' 

> <tM J. A. O. S ir. p. 1 37. I read vijUdna-lrrala, pnJayaltrnla, and 

ar.- " . lino 3. t'ltala. 

M it only * /.'.. thun inclij<!ini{ five of lh« 

rvj. ..; ,.. ^ It, how- ridydtattiij it\,\ a'.l tiio twenty-four 

«Ter, namc« the tbnM cliiMe* u iitmaMd 


The Pralaydkaldh are also twofold, as being pakvapdsa- 
dvaya or not, i.e., those in whom the two remaining fetters 
are matured, and those in whom they are not. The 
former attain liberation, but the latter, by the power of 
harman, are endowed with the 2^ur]/ashtaka''- body, and 
pass through various births. As has been said in the 
Tattva-praka^a — 

" Those among the Pralayakalas whose karman and mala 
are immature, 

" Go, united with the 2'^U7yashtaka body, into many 
births by the power of karman." 

The puryashtakais also thus described in the same work — 

" The puryashtaka is composed of the internal organ, 
thought {(ihi), karmaoi, and the instruments." 

This is thus explained by Aghora Siva Acharya, " the 
imryashtaka is a subtile body apportioned to each indi- 
vidual soul, which continues from the creation until the 
close of the kalpa, or until liberation : it is composed of 
the thirty^ tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending 
with kald." As has been said in the Tattva-sangraha — 

" This set of tattvas, commencing with ' earth ' and end- 
ing with kald, is assigned to each soul, 

" And wanders by the law of karman through all the 
bodies produced by the world." 

The following is the full meaning of this passage : — 
The word " internal organ," which properly includes 
"mind," "intelligence," "egoism," and "reason," ^ includes 
also the seven tattvas which enter into the production of 
enjoyment [or experience], viz., those called kald, time, 
fate, knowledge, concupiscence, nature, and quality;* the 

1 This term seems to be derived pral-riti, a,nd guna. Hoisington, how- 

from puri. "body'' (cf. purisaya for ever, puts purushan "the principle 

jnirusha, Brihad Ar. Up. ii. 5, l8), of life," instead of ^'«/k'(, which seems 

and aslitaha (cf. also the Sankhya better, as the three^/;/«as are included 

Pravachana Bhashya, p. 135). in prah-iti. He translates l:ald by 

'^ Or rather thirty-one ? "continency," and describes it as 

3 Manas, huddlii, aJiamMra, cltitia. "the power by which the senses are 

^ These are the seven vidyd tattvas, subdued and the carnal self brought 

Jcald, hila, nijati i^fate), vidyd, rdga, into subjection." 


words "thouyht" (dhf) and Aarwjaw si;,'nify the five cog- 
nisiible u'rosa elemeuts, and llieir origiuuior>, the subtile 
rudiuK-nts. I'y tlic word " insij^inncnts" are cuiii})reheiided 
the ten organs of sense and action. 

" But is it not dechircd in tlie ^rfmat K;llottara that 

* The set of live, sound, touch, form, taste and smell, in- 
tollii;ence, mind and egoism, these constitute the pur- 
i/iisJttaJca f" 

How, tiit'U, can any diflereut account be maintained? 
Wo grant this, and hence the venerable Kama Kantiiahas 
explained that si'itra in its literal meaning [i.e,i\s puri/a^i- 
taka, is derived from ushta, "eight"], so wliy should we 
be prolix in the discussion? Still, if you ask how we can 
reconcile our account with the strict nominal definition of 
j)uryash{aka, we reply that tlierc is really no contradiction, 
as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in the 
following manner: — (i.) The five elements; (2.) the five 
rudiments; (3.) the five organs of knowledge; (4.) those 
of nciiou; (5.) the fourfold internal organ; (6.) their in- 
strument;^ (7.) nature [prakriii] ; and (8.) the class com- 
I)Osed of the five, beginning with kald, which form a kind 
of case.' 

Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined 
to the puryashfaka body, Mahc^vara Ananta having coni- 
ja i ihem a.> • 1 of peculiar merit, constitutes 

ti. us lurds irld ; as has been said — 

" Mahesvara pities some and grants them to be lords of 
tiie world." 

The class called sakala is also divided into two, as 
jHikrakalusha and apakvakalusJia. As for the former, the 
Supreme Being, in conformity with their maturity (pari- 

T - Tlie thirtj'ono laUmt are lut 

fidlow : — Twenty-four iltinii UiUnu, 

I 11. 1 fivi ' ■ • • ■ ' •• ' •'. t«n 

« ! the or- four 

• 1. ; ' ho ox\, . . ••vrn 
makea it one oi the ncvi-n nil^l- r«li,>itatttytt mm cnutiirnit<'<i •bora. 
Utilrat ArcorliriK t<> MitdhftVA, it (b«« J. A. O. S. iv. {>|>. 1617.) 
•houlJ be what he call* ywnd. 


pdlu), puts forth a power agreeable thereto, and transfers 
them to the position of the hundred and eighteen Lords of 
the Mantras, signified by the words Mandah', &c., as has 
been said — 

" The rest are denominated saJcala, from their connection 
with Kald, &c., seized by time whose mouths are 
days ; 
"The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and 

eighteen of these the Lords of the Mantras. 
" Eight of these are called Mandolins ; eight again are 

Krodha, &c. ; 
" Vi'resa, Srikantha, and the hundred Eudras, — these 

together are the hundred and eighteen." 
In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the 
form of a teacher, stops the continued accession of maturity 
and contracts his manifested power, and ultimately grants 
to them liberation by the process of initiation; as has 
been said — 

"These creatures whose mala is matured, by putting 

forth a healing power, 
" He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initia- 
tion to the highest principle." 
It is also said in the Srimad Mrigendra — 

" He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds 

which previously exerted a contrary influence over 


All tliis has been explained at great length by Nara- 

yana-Kantha, and there it is to be studied; but we are 

obliged to pass on through fear of prolixity. 

But as for the second class, or those called apakvaha- 
lusha, the Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of 
their respective actions, appoints them, as bound and 
endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy the rewards of 
their previous actions,^ As has been said — 

1 I take anu in this verse as the mdyd-mala, the second dnava-mala, 

sonl, but it may mean the second the third kanyna-mala (karman). 

kind of mala mentioned by Hoising- ^ " The soul, when clothed with 

ton The first kind of mala is the these primary things (desire, know- 



"The other souls, bo utul [in thiir lualcrial boiid.s] ho 
appoints to enjoy their various deserts, 

■'According to their respective actions: such are the 
various kinds of souls." 

We now j)roceed to describe the third category, matter 
(or pdJa). This is fourfohJ, vutlu} knrman, indyd, and 
rodha-Sakti} But it may be objected, " Is it not said in 
tl»e Saiva Aganias iliat the chief things are the Lord, souls, 
and nxatter I Now the Lord has been siiown to mean 
Siva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed witli atomic 
bodies), and matter (or ' boml ') is said to be the pentad,' 
hence matter will be fivefold. How then is it now 
reckoned to bo only fourfold ? " To this we reply as 
follows: — Although the vindu or nasal dot, which is the 
g'rminal atom of indyd, and is called a Siva-tattva, 
may bo well regarded as material in comparison with 
the higliest liberation as defined by the attainment of 
the state of Siva, still it cannot really be considered 
as matter when we remember that it is a secondary 
kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the 
state of such deities as Vidye^vara, &c. Tims we see 

ledge, action, the ktiiidijxtnc/uila, ilovelopeil. From thin alum an- 

Ac.\ is an cxcccdin^'ly dniall body " ilcvclopvd the four KoumN, tho tiftv- 

iFoulktitt. Ono of tliv three mutat <>nc Saiiakrit liitoni, the Veda*, 

U called dnara, and i« de-tcritn-d a^ Maiitraii, kc, tho IxHlily, intellcc- 

the Mouros of an and aufferin^ to tual, and extt-ntal enjoyments of 

souls. the Hiiul that tuiNe not ntt.-iined to 

' The first tho«- are the three it|iiritual knowl.-.l^'e at the end of 

kin'!- '■ "• •'■ •" '• ■ ' \ n. S., viz.. each {wriod of the world's exintenc^-. 

liiyi ''I, tho last and liave been nwept away by the 

is t ■ r of Miye- waters of tho world • destroyinj; 

•uran <ci. Vul. iv. \i\t. ij, 14. Ttte deluge; after these tho three stagra 

Saivas hold that I'tuia, like the Sdn- of heavenly hftt>j>in<«« nr-- •1«'v>-!.»jm.'\I, 

khya I'rakpti, la in itself ettTiinl, to 1- ' '..we 

althou;;h its connection with any a f n . :<iua 

1>artictilar «oul i.i temporary ^see dc« . .vc* 

I A. O. S. iv. p. 22&). to t! r.v-t 

' Til' •••■ .If th"- five, vindu, mala, cont _ .■ » ix., 

liar- illi. Vindu (I.) tlic cnjuyiiunt ul liio aOude of 

is .i translation Sira ; 'J ^ thst of n'*r appr»>a«>h to 

of til'- Siva- 1'r.ik 1.-^ I .italai : "A hini : 'in" 

sound pnxx-eds out of the mystical I'l' ' A- 

sy liable om ; . . . and in that M>und O. .s i- j (■ .■,...>, ^. ».-^ '•'. vUir, 

a nidimcutary atom of matter is HtlmaMi<aHjfia Vp. ppu JIS-JIS)* 


there is no contradiction. Hence it has been said in the 
Tattva-prakasa — 

" The bonds of matter will be fourfold." 
And again in the Srimad Mrigendra — 

" The enveloper-controller {mala), the overpowerer 
(rodha), action, and the work of Maya, 

" These are the four ' bonds,' and they are collectively 
called by the name of 'merit.'" 

The following is the meaning of this couplet : — 

(i.) "Enveloping," because viala exceedingly obscures 
and veils the soul's powers of vision and action ; " con- 
trolling," because mala, a natural impurity, controls the 
soul by its independent influence. As has been said — 

"Mala, though itself one, by manifold influence inter- 
rupts the soul's vision and action; 

"It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on copper." ^ 

(2.) The " overpowerer " is the obscuring power ; this is 
called a " bond " [or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since 
this energy of Siva obscures the soul by superintending 
matter [rather than by itself partaking of the nature of 

Tlius it has been said — 

" Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend 
of all, 

" I am metaphorically called 2)dsa^ because I follow 

(3.) Action [or rather its consec[uences, harmaril as 
being performed by those who desire the fruit. It is in 
the form of merit or demerit, like the seed and shoot, and 
it is eternal in a never-beginning series. As has been 
said in the Srimat Kirana — 

" As Mala has no beginning, its least actions are begiu- 
ningless : 

" If an eternal character is thus established, then what 
cause could produce any change therein ? " 

1 See the same illustrations in J. A. 0. S. iv. p. 150. 
- Some forced derivation seems here intended as of fdsa from ixtklidt. 


(4.) " Miijfd," because herein as an energy of the Divine 
Ik'iui,' all the worUl is potentially contained (md(i) at a 
nnuulano destruction, antl attain at a creation it all comes 
(j/dii) into manifestation, hence the derivation of the 
name. Tiiis has been saitl in the Sn'mat Saurabheya — 
" The eflVct-, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorlx-d 

therein at a mundane destruction, 
" And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the 

form of efl'ects as kald, &c." ^ 
Although much more might be added on this topic, yet 
we stop here tlirough fear of extending this treatise too 
far. Thus have the three categories been declared, — the 
Ijonl, the soul, and matter. 

A diflercnt modo of treating the subject is found in the 
JniinaratnavaH, &c., in such lines as — 

"The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and 

the cause 
"Of the cessation thereof, — these are collectively the 

six categories." 
But our readers must seek for full information from the 
work itself. Thus our account of the system is complete. 

E. B. C. 

* In p. 90, lint? 2, renJ $d Itirjfena. 

( I-2S ) 



Other Mahe^varas are dissatisfied with the views set out 
in the Saiva system as erroneous in attributing to motive- 
less and insentient things causality (in regard to the bond- 
age and liberation of transmigrating spirits). They there- 
fore seek another system, and proclaim that the construction 
of the world (or series of environments of those spirits) is 
by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce 
that this Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the 
same with the several cognitions and cognita, who is 
identical with the transcendent self posited by one's own 
consciousness, by rational proof, and by revelation, and 
who possesses independence, that is, the power of witness- 
ing all things without reference to aught ulterior, gives 
manifestation, in the mirror of one's OMm soul, to all 
entities ^ as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus 
looking upon recognition as a new method for the attain- 
ment of ends and of the highest end, available to all men 
alike, without any the slightest trouble and exertion, sucli 
as external and internal worship, suppression of the breath, 
and the like, these Mahe^varas set forth the system of 
recognition (prati/ahhijnd). The extent of this system is 
thus described by one of their auihorities — 

" The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two 
explications, the greater and the less, 

•* Read hh/irdn for hhdvdt. 

THE PR A rVADHiySA DA RSA .V.I . 1 29 

'■ Tlio five topics, ami tlie exposition's.— ^?uch is the 
system of rcco<;iiition." 

The first apliorisiii in tlieir text-book is us lullows ' : — 

" Having reached somehow or other tlie condition of a 
slave of Mahe^vara, and wishing also to help man- 

" I set forth the recognition of Maheivara, as the method 
of attaining all felicity." 

[This apiiorism may be developed as follows] : — 

" Someliow or oiher," by a propitiation, efl'ected by God, 
of the lotus feet of a spiritual director identical with God, 
'liaving reached," having fully attained, this condition, hav- 
ing maiio it the unintercepted object of fruition to myself 
Thus knowing that which has to be known, he is qualified 
lo construct a system for others: otherwise the system 
would be a mere imposture. 

Mahe^vara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminous- 
ness, beatitude, and independence, by portions of whose 
ilivine essence Vishnu, Virinchi, and other deities are 
deities, wlio, though they transcend the fictitious worM, 
are yet implicated in the infinite illusion. 

The condition of being a slave to Mahe^vara is the being 
a recipient of that independence or absoluteness which is 
the essence of the divine nature, a slave being one to 
whom his lord grants all things according to his will and 
pleasure (if. 

The word / ^ that there is no restriction 

of the doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever 
he may be to whom t" ition of the divine nature i.s 

made, he reaps its higl : l,the emanator}'/>ri/jn;n«7/i 

itself operating to the highest end of the transmigrating 
souls. It has been . ' ly laid down in i- 

drishti by tliat .<;u|'i ;•• t!i<' n-'vcn^d S i- 

natha — 

"When "iKc liiC natui'"i >;\.i ■ - 111 a.i tilings 

' Cf. fupni, p. 113. M.'i'iliAVft In t' _■ of Ura •lerrnUi 

hT« conJ'-mw-* .\hhiii.iva (;iit»,-i'« !«t'* Tour in Ckah- 

comtncntAry. .\l>hiiia\.^ (Juj ' .\ In 1 


has been known with tenacious recognition, whether 
by proof or by instruction in the words of a spiritual 

" There is no further need of doing aught, or of any 
further reflection. "When he knows Suvarna (or 
Siva) a man may cease to act and to reflect." 

Tlie word also excludes the supposition tliat there is 
room in self which has recognised the nature of Mahe^vara, 
and which manifests to itself its own identity with him, 
and is therefore fully satisfied, for any other motive than 
felicity for others. The well-being of others is a motive, 
whatever may be said, for the definition of a motive applies 
to it : for there is no such divine curse laid upon man that 
self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a 
regard for others. Thus Akshapada (i. 24) defines a motive : 
A motive is that object towards which a man energises. 

The preposition upa in upapddayami (I set forth) in- 
dicates proximity : the result is the bringing of mankind 
near unto God. 

Hence tlie word all in the phrase the onethod of attaining 
all felicities. For when the nature of the Supreme Being 
is attained, all felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, 
are overtaken, as if a man acquired the mountain Eohana 
(Adam's Peak), he would acquire all the treasures it con- 
tains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what else is 
there that he can ask for ? Accordingly Utpalachcirya 
says — 

" What more can they ask who are ricli in the wealth 
of devotion ? What else can they ask who are 
poor in tliis ? " 

We have thus explained the motive expressed in the 
words the method of attaining all felicities, on the supposi- 
tion that the compound term is a Tat-purusha genitively 
constructed. Let it be taken as a Bahuvrihi or relative 
compound. Tlien the recognition of Mahesvara, the know- 
ing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full 
attainment the manifestation, of all felicities, of every 

THE PR A 1 YA DnijfNA DA KSA SA . 1 3 1 

external and internal ptinument happiness in their proper 
naiure. In the language of everyday life, recognition is 
a cognition relative to an object represented in memory : 
for example, This (perceived) is tiie same (as tlie lemcm- 
bered) Chaitra. In the recognition j)ropounded in this 
system, — there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt 
from tlie accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, 
and from argumentation, — there arises in relation to my 
presented pergonal self the co;j;nition that I am that very 
(lod, — in viitue of my recollection of the powers of that 

This same recognition I set forth. To set forth i.-^ lo 
enforce. I establish this recognition by a stringent pro- 
cess which renders it convincing. [Such is the articulate 
development of the first aphorism of the Kccognitive 

Here it may be askeil : If soul is manifested only as 
consubstautial with God, why this laboureil effort to 
exhibit the recognition ? The answer is this: — The recog- 
nition is thus exhibited, because though the soul is, aa 
you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and 
therefore identical with God), it is nevertheless umier 
the influence of tlie cosmothetic illusion manifested as 
partial, and therefore the recognition must be exhibited 
by an expansion of the cognitive and active powers in 
order to achieve the manifestation of the s( ul aa toUil 
(the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of 
insight the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the 
- " :i : This self must be God, because it possesses 

I and active jHjwers; for so far forth as any one 

is cognitive and active, to that extent he is a lord, like a 
lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king, therefore 
the soul is God. Tiie hve-niembered syllogism is here 
employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory 
order of things, the teaching of the Xaiy.'. ' .ay \^ 

aecepted. It ha.s thii-. b«cn saiil by the son <■: > — 

" What self-luminous self can aflirm or deny that self- 


active and cognitive is Mahesvara the primal 
being ? 
" Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of 
the powers, the self being cognised under illusion, 
and imperfectly discerned." 
And again — 

"The continuance of all living creatures in this trans- 
migratory world lasts as long as their respiratory 
involucrum ; knowledge and action are accounted 
the life of living creatures. 
" Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and 

action (or ritual), which is best at Kasi, 
" Is indicated by others also : different from these is 
real knowledge," 
And also — 

"The knowledge of these things follows the sequence 

of those things : 
" The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge 
without succession, is Mahesvara." 
Somananda-natha also says — 

" He always knows by identity with Siva : he always 
knows by identity with the real." 
Again at the end of the section on knowledge — 

" Unless there were this unity with Siva, cognitions 

could not exist as facts of daily life : 
" Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He 

is the one knower (or illuminator of cognitions). 
"He is Mahesvara, the great Lord, by reason of the 

unbroken continuity of objects : 
" Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of 

the deity." 
The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta : — 
The text, " After that as it shines shines the all of things, 
by the light of that shines diversely this All," teaches 
that God illumines the whole round of things by the 
glory of His luminous intelligence, and that the diver- 
sity or plurality of the object world, whereby the light 

rill- PKA T YA Bill J .V. 1 -; ). 1 /v i.l .V. 1 . 1 33 

which irradiates objects is a bhio, a yellow light, and tlio 
like, arises from diversity of tint cast upon the li;^'lit by the 
object. In reality, (lod is without plurality or dillerence, 
ns transcending;; all lindlations of space, time, and figure. 
lit' is pure intelligence, self-luminousness, the manifester; 
and thus we may read in the Saiva aphorisms, " Self is 
intelligence." Hi's synonymous titles are Intidligential 
l'>sence, Uniutermitted Cognition, Irrespective Intuition, 
Existence as a of Beatitude, Supreme Domin itimi 
Tiiis self-same existing self is knowledge. 

l>y pure knowledge and action (in the \ < : Sonia- 

uandamiiha cited above) are meant real ■ ndent 

cognition and activity. Of these, the cognition is sclf- 
Itiminousness, the activity is energy constructive of the 
world or series of spheres of transmigratory experience. 
Tliis is described in the section on activity — 

" He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects, 

through the ethcacy of his will : this activity is 

And at ihe close of the same section — 

"Tlie mere will of God, when he wills to Ijecome the 

world under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other 
' ■ Is, is his activity worked out Viy motive ami 

" This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this 
be that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motive- 
less, insentient things." 

According to these principles, causality not |)ertaining 
either to the insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, 
the mere will of Mahe^vara, tlie absolute Lrd, when he 
wills to emanate into thousands of forms, as this or tiiat 
difference, this or that action, this or that modification of 
entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in the series of 
transmigratory environments, — his mere will is his pro- 
gressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his 
universal crcativeuesa. 


How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly 
exhibited in the following illustration — 

" The tree or jar produced by the mere will of thau- 
maturgists, without clay, without seed, continues 
to serve its proper purpose as tree or jar." 

If clay and similar materials were really the substantial 
cause of the jar and the rest, how could they be produced 
by the mere volition of the thaumaturgist ? If you say : 
Some jars and some plants are made of clay, and spring 
from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition of the 
tliaumaturgist ; then we should inform you that it is a 
fact notorious to all the world that different things must 
emanate from different materials. 

As for those wlio say that a jar or the like cannot be 
made without materials to make it of, and that when a 
thaumaturgist makes one lie does so by putting atoms in 
motion by his will, and so composing it: they may be 
informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation of 
the causal relation, all the co-efficients, without exception, 
must be desiderated ; to make the jar there must be the 
clay, the potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest 
of it ; to make a body there must be the congress of the 
male and female, and the successive results of that con- 
gress. Now, if that be the case, the genesis of a jar, a 
body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the thau- 
maturgist, would be hardly possible. 

On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing 
that Mahadeva, amply free to remain within or to over- 
step any limit whatever, the Lord, manifold in his oper- 
ancy, the intelligent principle, thus operates. Thus it is 
that Vasuguptacharya says — 

" To him that painted this world-picture without 
materials, without appliances, without a wall to paint it 
on, — to him be glory, to him resplendent with the lunar 
digit, to him that bears the trident." 

It may be asked : If the supersensible self be no other 


than God, how oomes tliis implication in successive trans- 
mii^n-atory comliiions ? Tlie imswer is given in the section 
treating of accredited institution — 

"This ajient of co«»nition, blinded hv illusion, tran-s- 
migrates through the fatality of works: 

''Taught his divine nature by scii-nce, as pure intelli- 
gence, he is enfranchiseil." 

It may be asked: If the subject and the objici air 
identical, what ditlerence can there be between the self 
bound and the self liberated in regard to the objects 
cognisable by each ? The answer to this question is given 
in a section of the Tattviirtha-Saftgraha — 

" Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical 
with itself, like Mahe^vara free from bondage : 
the other (or unliberated) self has in it infinite 

An objection may be raised: If the divine nature i.s 
essential to the soul, there can be no occasion to seek for 
this recognition ; for if all requisites be supplied, the seed 
does not fail to germinate because it is unrecognised. 
Why, then, this toilsome elTort for the recognition of the 
soul ? To such an objection we reply : Only listen to the 
secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of 
two degrees, being either external, as the activity of the 
seed in developing the plant, or internal, as the activity 
which detennines felicity, which consists in an intuition 
which terminates in the conscious self. The first liegree 
of activity 1 ses no such recognition as the system 

proposes, tl; i does presuppose it. In the Kecogni- 

tive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the 
pt)Wer of unifying j)ersoiial and impersonal spirit, a power 
wliich is the aitainmeut of tlie higiiest and of mediate 
ends, the activity consisting in the intuition 1 am (Jod. 
To this activity a recognition of the essential n.iture of 
the soul is a pre-retiuisit«*. 

It may be urgeil that peculiar activity terminating 
in the conscious self is observed independent of recog- 


nition. To this it is replied : A certain damsel, hearing 
of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in 
love with him before she had seen him, and agitated by 
her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing 
him, wrote to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition. 
He at once came to her, but when she saw him she did 
not recognise in him the qualities she had heard about ; 
he appeared much the same as any other man, and she 
found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as 
she recognised those qualities in him as her companions 
now pointed them out, she was fully gratified. In like 
manner, though the personal self be manifested as identical 
with the universal soul, its manifestation effects no com- 
plete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of those 
attributes ; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director 
to recognise in itself the perfections of Mahe^vara, his 
omniscience, omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains 
the whole pleroma of being. 

It is therefore said in the fourth section — 
" As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained 
as like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, 
though he humble himself before her with all 
maimer of importunities : In like manner the per- 
sonal self of mankind, though it be the universal 
soul, in which there is no perfection unrealised, 
attains not its own glorious nature ; and therefore 
this recognition thereof must come into play." 
This system has been treated in detail by Abhinava- 
gupta and other teachers, but as we have in hand a sum- 
mary exposition of systems, we cannot extend the discus- 
sion of it any further lest our work become too prolix. 
This then may suffice.^ A. E. G. 

[^ I have seen in Calcutta a short the son of Udayilkara (cf. pp. 130, 
Conim. on the Siva siitras by Utpala, 131). — E. B. C] 

( >37 ) 

(•]iArTi:i: i x. 


Othkk Miihe^viiras tliere are who, wliile they hoUl the 
iilcutity of SL'lf with Clod, insist upon the tenet that the 
liberation in this life taught in all the systems depends 
upon the stability of the bodily frame, and tiierefore 
celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver as a means 
of strengthening the system. Mercury is called jhlrada, 
l)ecause it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of 
transmigratory states. Thus it has been said — 

"It gives tlje farther shore of metempsychosis: it is 
called jxiradd." 
And again in the lla-arnava — 

" It is styled jxirada because it is employed for iho 
highest end by the best votaries. 

"Since this in sieej) identical with me, goddess, arises 
fnnn my members, and is the exudation of njy 
l»ody, it is called rasay 

It may be ur^eil that tiie literal interpretation of these 
Words is incorrect, the liberation in this life being expli- 
cable in anotlur manner. This objection ; " Me, 
liljeration l»eing j-et out in the six systems i to 
the death of the body, and upon this there can be no 
reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it free 
from mis:^'ivings. This is also laiil down \n the same 
treatise — 

> Cf. ^' '**» 

ln«li«n • to 

Tn!. ii. p. ji • / i.|-.F j ,11 I .< . : . >..■ .i^.i-,.- -. n ..Y», ^C. 


" Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the 

death of the body. 
" Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an 

emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand. 
" Therefore a man should preserve that body by means 
of mercury and of medicaments." 
Govinda-bhagavat also says — 

" Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the 

body are not permanent, one should strive 
" After emancipation ; but emancipation results from 
knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is 
only possible in a healthy body." 
The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, 
how can its permanency be effected ? Think not so, it is 
replied, for though the body, as a complexus of six sheaths 
or -wrappers of the soul, is dissoluble, yet the body, as 
created by Hara and Gaurf under the names of mercury 
and mica, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the 
Easahridaya — 

"They who, without quitting the body, liave attained to 

a new body, the creation of Hara and Gauri, 
"They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose 

service is the aggregate of magic texts." 
The ascetic, therefore, who aspires to liberation in this 
life should first make to himself a glorified body. And 
inasmucli as mercury is produced by the creative conjunc- 
tion of Hara and Gauri, and mica is produced from Gauri, 
mercury and mica are severally identified with Hara and 
Gauri in the verse — 

"Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed; 

" The combination of the two, goddess, is destructive 

of death and poverty." 
This is very little to say about the matter. In the 
Ease^varasiddhanta many among the gods, the Daityas, 
the Munis, and mankind, are declared to have attained to 
liberation in this life by acquiring a divine body through 
the efficacy of quicksilver. 


"Certain of the gods, Mulie^a and others; certain 
Daityas, J>ukra and others; 

"CtM-tain Munis, the lUlakliilyas :md (.tlnn; cTtaiii 
kincjs, Some^vara and others ; 

" (rovinda-bhagavat, Govinda-nilyaUa, 

"Charvati, Kapila, Vyali, Kapali, Kandahiyana, 

"These and many otliers proceed perfected, lil>erated 
wliile alive, 

"Having attained to a mercurial hody, and therewith 

Tlie meaning of tliis, as explicated by Taranu-^vaia \.» 
rarame^vari, is as follows : — 

" By the method of works is attained, O supreme of 
goddesses, the preservation of the hody ; 

"And the method of works is s;iid to he twofold, mer- 
cury and air, 

" Mercury and air swooning carry oil diieases, dead they 
restore to life, 

" Bound they give the power of flying about." 

The swooning state of mercury is thus de'-cribed — 

" They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is per- 
ceived, as characterised thus — 

"Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility. 

" A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which 
the following marks are seen — 

" Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility." 

Tlie bound condition is descril^ed in another place as 
follows : — 

"Tiie character of bound quicksilver is that it is — 

"Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy, and that it 
parts asunder under friction." 

Some one may urge: If the creation of mercury by 
Ham and Gauri were proved, it might be allowed that the 
body could be made permanent; but how can that U} 
proved ? TIjo objection is not allowable, inasmuch ns that 
can \ye proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus 
it is stated bv the authorities — 


" Eigliteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully 
. " 111 the first place, as pure in every process, for perfect- 
ing the adepts." 
And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus — 

" Sweating, rubbing, swooning, fixing, dropping, coercion, 

" Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising, 

" Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and 

" And eating it by parting and piercing it, — are the 
eighteen modes of treating quicksilver." 

These treatments have been described at length by 
Govinda - bhagavat, Sarvajna - nimesvara and the other 
ancient authorities, and are here omitted to avoid pro- 

The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely 
eulogistic of the metal, it being immediately, through the 
conservation of the body, a means to the highest end, 
liberation. Thus it is said in the Easarnava — 

" Declare to me, god, that supremely efficacious 
destruction of the blood, that destruction of the body, 
imparted by thee, whereby it attained the power of flying 
about in the sky. Goddess (he replied), quicksilver is to 
be applied both to the blood and to the body. This makes 
the appearance of body and blood alike. A man should 
first try it upon the blood, and then apply it to the 

It will be asked : Why should we make this effort to 
acquire a celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected 
by the self-manifestation of the supreme principle, exist- 
ence, intelligence, and beatitude ? We reply : This is no 
objection, such liberation being inaccessible unless we 
acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the Rasah- 
ridaya — 

" That intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems 

THE RASESVM^.l /).I/vS. I.V.I. 141 

in wliich a inultitiule of uacertftitities are melted 
" Thou;^'li it manifest itaelf, what can it effect for being-j 

whose bodies arc un^h^rified ? 
" lie who is worn out with decrepitude, though he be 
free from cougli, from asthma, and similar in- 
"He is not tiualified for meditation in wiiom the activi- 
ties of the cognitive organs are obstructed. 
"A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the 

enjoyment of sensual pleasures, 
"An old man in his dotage, how should either of these 

attain to emancipation ? " 
Some one will object: It is the nature of the personal 
soul to pass through a series of ejnbodiments, and to be 
liberated is to be extricated from that series of enjbodi- 
ments ; how, tlien, can these two mutually exclusive con- 
ditions pertain to the same bodily tenement ? The objec- 
tion is invalid, as unable to stand before the following 
dilemmatic argument : — Is this extrication, as to the nature 
of which all the founders of institutes are at one. to be 
held as cognisable or as incognisable ? If it is in< ■ 
it is a pure chimera ; if it is cognisajjle, we cannot , 
with life, for that whicii is not alive cannot be cognisant of 
it. Thus it is said in the Kasasiddhanta — 

' The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the 

mercurial system, subtile thinker. 
" In the tenets of other schools which repo.'Je on a 

diversity of argument, 
"Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowo<l 

in all sacred texts ; 
"One not living cannot know the knowable, and there- 
fore tliere is and must be life." 
And this is not to be ^ ! to be iir- 1 — ^i 

fur the adi»erent5 of the d. Vishnu 

lain the eternity of the body 01 Vishnu half- man and hnii- 
lion. Thus it is said in the Sjikdra-sidilhi — 


" I glorify the man-lion set forth by Vishnu-svamin, 
"Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal 

and inconceivably perfect beatitude." 
If the objection be raised that the body of tiie man-lion, 
which appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible 
with real existence, it may be replied : How can the body 
of the man-lion be otherwise than really existent, proved 
as it is by three kinds of proof: (i.) by the intuition of 
Sanaka and others ; (2.) by Vedic texts such as, A thousand 
heads has Purusha; and (3.) by Puranic texts such as. 
That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with 
the conch-shell, the club, and other weapons ? Eeal exist- 
ence and other like predicates are affirmed also by Srikanta- 
misra, the devoted adherent of Vishnu-svamin, Let, then, 
those who aspire to the highest end of personal souls be 
assured that the eternity of the body which we are setting 
forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus 
been said — 

" What higlier beatitude is there than a body undecay- 

ing, immortal, 
" The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches, 

pleasure, liberation ? " 
It is mercury alone ihat can make the body un decaying 
and immortal, as it is said — 

" Only this supreme medicament can make the body un- 

decaying and imperishable." 
Why describe the efficacy of this metal ? Its value is 
proved even by seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said 
in the Easarnava — 

"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from 

merely remembering it, 
"From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting 

it, appear its six virtues. 
" Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues 

from seeing all the phallic emblems 
•'On earth, those at Kedara, and all others whatso- 


111 uiiotliur i)liice we read — 

"The ailoiation of the sacred quicksilver is more bontitic 
than tlie worship i)f all ihu phallic t-mblejiis at 
Kii^i and elsewiiere, 
•'Inasmuch as tlure is attained thereby inji»\ niunt, 
healtii, exenijitiun from decay, and imnjurtality." 
The sin of disparaging^ mercury is also set out — 

" The adept on hearing,' quicksilver heedlessly disparaged 

should recall (piicksilver to mind. 
" He should at once shun the bksphenier, who is by his 

blasphemy fur ever filled with sin." 
The attainment, then, of the highest end of the per- 
sonal soul takes place by an intuition of the highest prin- 
ciple by means of the practice of union (awat?) after the 
acquisition of a divine Ixidy in tiie maniiei we have de- 
scribed. Thereafter — 

" The light of pure intelligence shines forth unio certain 

men of holy vision, 
" Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines 

the universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun : 
"Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence 

whereof is luminousness, undiflc'renced, 
" From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable, 

tranquil, self- recognised : 
" Fi.xing the internal organ upon that, seeing tlie whole 

universe manifested, made of pure intelligence, 
"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, 

his b<jndage to wurks annulled." 
A Vedic text also declares : That is liasa (mercury), 
liaviug obtained this he becomes beatitude. 

Thus, then, il has been shown that mercury alone is the 

means of passing beyond the burden of transmigratory 

pains. And conformably we have a verse whicli sets 

forth the identity between mercury ami t: If — 

"May that mercury, which is the very . . : . <j us 

from dejection and from the terrors o( metem- 



" Which is naturally to be applied again and again by 

those that aspire to liberation from the enveloping 

" Which perfected endures, which plays not again when 

the soul awakes, 
"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which 

shines forth by itself from itself." A. E. G. 

( 1+5 ) 

C'lIAl'TKK X. 


Wuoso wishes to escape llio reality of j)aiii, which is 
esliil)l;s!:eil by llie consciousness of every soul through iU 
being felt to bo essentially contrary to every rational 
being, and wishes tliereforo to know the means of such 
escape, — learns that tlie knowledge of the Supreme Ileing 
is the true means thereof, from the authority of such pas- 
sages as those {!;>i-ttiUcatara Upan. vi. 20) — 

" When men shall roll uj) the sky as a piece of leather, 

"Then shall there be an end of pain witlmut the know- 
ledge of Siva." 

Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by 
hearing (imrana), thought {manana), and reflection {bhd- 
rand), as it has been said — 

" By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated 
meditation, — 

" By these three methotls producing knowledge, he gains 
the highest union iyoga).^' 

Here thought depends on inference, and inference de- 
pends on the knowledge of the vydpti (or universal pro- 
position), and the knowledge of the rtjdpti follows the 
right understanding of the categories, — hence the saint 
Kn^ada' establishes the six categories in his tenfold 

I- ftixi ^ » 

(qitiHcU ill Aulm-iila i.'aUtl |>. 53 6 Kana)>lia«!i)ii*. 


treatise, commencing with the Avords, " Xow, therefore, we 
shall explain duty." 

In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he 
describes all the categories whicli are capable of intimate 
relation. In the first dhnika he defines those which pos- 
sess "genus" (Jdti), in the second "genus" (or "generality") 
itself and " particularity." In the similarly divided second 
book he discusses " substance," giving in the first dhnika 
the characteristics of the five elements, and in the second 
he establishes tlie existence of space and time. In the 
third book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the 
former in the firet dhnika, the latter in the second. In 
the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts, 
the latter in the first dhnika, and the former in the second. 
In the fifth book he investigates action ; in the first dhnika 
he considers action as connected with the body, in the 
second as belonging to the mind. In the sixtli book he 
examines merit and demerit as revealed in Sruti ; in the 
first dhnika he discusses the merit of giving, receiving 
gifts, &c., in the second the duties of the four periods of 
religious life. In the seventh book he discusses quality 
and intimate relation ; in the first dhnika he considers the 
qualities independent of thought, in the second those 
qualities which are related to it, and also intimate rela- 
tion. In the eighth book he examines "indeterminate" 
and " determinate " perception, and means of proof. In 
the ninth book he discusses the characteristics of intellect. 
In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of 

The method of this system is said to be threefold, 
"enunciation," "definition," and "investigation." ^ "But," 
it may be objected, " ought we not to include ' division,' 

^ It is singular that this is in- dilTerence of the qualities of the 
accurate. The ninth book treats of soul, and the three cauf;es. 
that perception which arisco from "'' For this extract from the old 
supersensible contact, &c , and infer- hTidshija of Vdtsyilyana, see Cole- 
ence. The tenth treats of the mutual brookt-'s Essays (new edition), vol. i. 

p. 2S5. 



aiivl so make the methotl foiufoUl, not thrcofoltl? " Wo 
(lemur to this, because " division " is really inchuled in u 
particular kind of enunciation. Thus when wc declare 
that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and 
intimate relation are the only six positive categories, — 
this is an exanj]»le of enunciation. If you ask "What is 
the reiison for this dclinite order of the categories?" we 
answer as follows : — Since "substance" is the chief, as being 
the substmtum uf all the categories, we enounce this first; 
next "quality," since it resides in its generic character in 
all substances [though difTerent substances have different 
cjunlities] ; then " action," as it agrees with " substance " 
and "quality" in possessing "generality;"* then "gener- 
ality," as residing in these three; then "particularity," 
inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"' histly, 
" intimate relation " itself; such is the principle of arrange- 

If you ask, " Why do you say that there are only six 
categories since 'non-existence ' is also one)" wc answer: 
Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, 
i.e., as being the objects of conceptions which do not 
involve a negative idea. " Still," the objector may retort, 
"how do you establish this definite number 'only six? 
for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is 
the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascer- 
tained or not ? If it is thoroughly ascertained, why do you 
exclude it ? and still more so, if it is not thoroughly 
ascertained ? What sensible man, pray, spends his strength 
in denying that a has horns ? Thus your definite 
number ' only six ' fails as being inapplicable." This, how- 
ever, we cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to 
fonn ccrtiiinly a seventh category (as " non-existence"), 
we thus (by our definite numWr) deny it to be one of the 
six posUirt categories, — and if others attempt to include 

' Cf. BMd*k.i-paritJuJiA*da^ iloka bv " inthiuitc rcUtiou " in Ihc et«r 
14. Dal Atom*, kc. 

* " VATtioi'-tuilj " irinaka) miika 


" capacity," " number," &c., wliich we allow to be certaiiil)- 
positive existences, we thus deny that they make a seventh 
category. But enough of this long discussion. 

Substantiality, &c. {dravyatvddi), i.e., the genera of sub- 
stance, quality, and action, are the definition of the triad 
substance, quality, and action respectively. The genus of 
substance (dravyatva) is that which, while it alike exists 
with intimate relation in the (eternal) sky and the (tran- 
sitory) lotus, isiitself eternal/ and does not exist with 
intimate relation in smell.- 

The genus of quality (gunafva) is that which is imme- 
diately subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with 
intimate relation in whatever is not an intimate or mediate 
cause.^ The genus of action {karmatva) is that which is 
immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and is 
not found with intimate relation in anything eternal.* 
Generality (or genus, sdmdiiya) is that which is found in 
many things with intimate relation, and can never be the 
counter-entity to emergent non-existence.^ Particularity^ 
{viiesha) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute 

1 This clause is added, as other- the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit 

wise the definition would apply to College Library, 

"duality" and "conjunction." ^ le, it can never be destroyed. 

- This is added, as otherwise the Indestructibilit}', however, is found 

definition would apply to "exist- in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, 

ence " (saiiiO- which is th.e summum therefore, the former clause of the 

genus, to which substance, quality", definition is added, 

and action ai-e immediately sub- ® " Particularity " (whence the 

ordinate. name Vaiseshika) is not " individu- 

^ Existence (sattd) is the genus of ality, as of this particular flash of 

dravya, guna, and hfiyd. Dravya lightning,'' — but it is the individu- 

alone can be the intimate cause of ality either of those eternal sub- 

anything ; and all actions are the stances which, being single, have no 

mediate (or non-intimate) cause of genus, as ether, time, and space ; 

conjunction and disjunction. Some or of the different atomic minds ; or 

qualities (as mmyoga, riipa, &c.) of the atoms of the four remaining 

may be mediate causes, but tliis is substances, earth, water, fire, and 

accidental and does not belong to air, these atoms being supposed to be 

the essence of gutui, as many gunas the ne plus ultra, and as they have 

can never be mediate causes. no parts, they are what they are by 

^ As all karmas are transitory, their own indivisible nature. Ballan- 

Icarmatva is only found in the anitya. tyne translated viksha as "ultimate 

I correct in p. 105, line 20, nityd- difference." I am not sure whether 

tamavetatva ; this is the reading of the individual soul has vUtsha. 

Tin- wusiisinKA or alii-kya darsasa. 


of geuenility, whicli stops mutual non-existonco,* Iiitimnte 
relation (samavdt/a) is that coniieitiou which itself has 
not intimate relation.- Such arc tlic ilcfinitinns nf th.' 
six categories. 

Substance is ninrfuKi,— earth, water, tire, air, ether, time, 
sj)ace, soul, and mind. The j^enera of earth, &c. {jjrithi- 
ri(ra),aic the definitions of the first four. The genus of earth 
is that generality which is immediately subordinate to 
substance, and resides in the same subject with colour 
produced by baking.' 

The i^enus of water is that generality which is fountl 
\vith intimate relation in wati-r, being also fnund in intimate 
relation in river and sea. The genus of fire is that gener- 
ality which is found with intimate relation in fire, being 
also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold. 
The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate 
to substance, and is found with intimate relation in the 
organ of the skin.* 

As ether, space, and time, from their being single, can- 
not be subonlinate genera, their several names stand 
respectively for their technical appellations. Kther is the 
abode of particularity, and is found in the same subject 
with the non-eternal (Juni/ii) special quality which is not 
produced by contact.* 

Time is that wiiich, being a pervading substance, is the 
alxxle of the mediate cauj^e'of that idea of remoteness 

bh.' '11 two ||i>tinn< 

y\)i. rty in ciitiinion, 

%» a ]-■'■ >' 11"'^ ilt>lb;" but the 
(((■niu iii til*' .H.inio in two pot*, btith 
alik>' !- In ' I ■•.« 

"«i»U *«• 
mil ii. .Mukt. 

{Siijiyujil IxHi^ 3k, juna h.ui iJuntUnt 
cxiating in it with intimate n-la- 

* The fwJ or touch cif cnrth in naltl 

to !-■ •' n. ith. r l.,.f 11. r i . .! 1 .iTl ! !• • 



»h.k|>AricliJiUJA, d. iuj, 104;. 

* Tho organ of toucli {• an aerial 
int'>guin««nt. — Coteh>i)oLt. 

* Sound in twofi>lcl. — "pn»ducr«i 
* inil, anti 

• Vi-IllJc 


':. ia 


from contact,"" 
" pr«Kiwc»-«l fr' 
tfcitnd. Jani/tt ; 
(:.».l"» kn..w"l.-.lj; 

jitn>it t\r\';\,'. ' 


• -1 

u f 



{2)aratva) which 13 not found witli intimate relation in 
space ; ^ while space is that pervading substance which pos- 
sesses no special qualities and yet is not tiine.^ The general 
terms dtmafva and manastva are the respective definitions 
of soul {dtman) and mind (manas). The general idea of soul 
is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found 
with intimate relation in that which is without form^ amurt- 
ta). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate 
to substance, being also found existing with intimate rela- 
tion in an atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate 
cause of any substance. There are twenty-four qualities; 
seventeen are mentioned directly in Kanada's Sutras (i. 1,6), 
" colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, severalty, 
conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, intelli- 
gence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort;" and, 
l)esides these, seven others are understood in the word 
"and," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, 
demerit, and sound. Their respective genera {r{ipatva, 
&c.) are their several definitions. The class or genus of 
" colour " is that which is subordinate to quality and exists 
with intimate relation in blue. In the same way may be 
formed the definitions of the rest. 

" Action " is fivefold, according to the distinction of 
throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, ex- 
panding, and going: revolution, evacuating, &c., being 
included under " going." The genus of throwing upwards, 
&c., will be their respective definitions. The genus of 
throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it 
exists with intimate relation, and is to be known as 
the mediate cause of conjunction wdth a higher place. In 
the same manner are to be made the definitions of throw- 
ing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is twofold, 
extensive and non-extensive ; existence is extensive as 
found with intimate connection in substance and quality, 

' Paratva being of two kinds, ever, is not pervading but atomic. 

daiiika and Mlilca. ^ The three other paddrthas, beside 

- Time, space, and mind have sonl, which are awi»r<^a, — time, ether, 

no special qualities ; the last, how- and space, — are not genera. 


or in quiility and action ; substance, &c., are non-extonsivf. 
Tlie iletinition of generality lias been j^iven before. Par- 
ticularity and intimate relation cannot be divided, — in 
the former case in consequence of the infinite numl>er of 
separate particularities, in the latter from intimate relation 
beinj,' but one; their delinilions have been given Itefore. 

There is a popular proverb — 

" Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction 
produced by disjunction, — lie whose mind vacillates not in 
these three is the true Vai^eshika; " and tliercforo wo will 
now show the manner of the production of duality, &c 

There is here fir?t the contact of tlie organ of sense 
with the object; thence there arises the knowledge of the 
genus unity; then the distinguishing perception a/W»a/i<i- 
hiuiilhi [by which we apprehend " this is one," " this is 
one," &c.] ; then the proiluction of duality, dvitva (in the 
object) ; * then the knowledge of the abstract genus of 
duality (dvitcatva) ; then the knowledge of the quality 
duality as it exists in the two things; then imaginatiou '^ 

But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, 
&c., being thus produced from apekshdhiuidhi t The great 
doctor (Udayana) maintained that apckshdbuddhi must bo 
the producer of duality, Sec, because duality is never 
found sejiarated from it, while, at the same time, we 
cannot hold apekshdhuddhi as the cause only of its being 
known [and therefore it follows that it must be the cause 
of its being prcKluce*! *], just as contact is with regard to 
sound. AVe, however, maintain the same oi>inion by a 

> All nunibcns fmin (iuality up- 


\>r< \ i '■; .'•■ ■■ 

1. ill.vl to it by 

wardi, ari>, it., th«y arc 


1 orKMi or 

nuulu liy <»ir ' :!. !i ; ':n:tv »]rinr' 



«>\i-.t< in Ih 


biin^ one; a: 

'. &• 

two, Ac. by .. ii . ;: .;.-; i r .;.it 1 

11 .k M< 1 

. > ti. i'K >>oua 

thi-ii) K's and thiu j-iimiii; thvm in 



« r.v. 

i-t 1-- -ittier 

* .Sitiuliira is her* th>' i' !••.•» con- 



ceivol bv tl»o mind — crvaU-d, in 



fact, by it« own cncr^'i<-i utit of tbr 



different argument ; duality, &c., cannot be held to be made 
known {jndpya) by that non-eternal apprehension whose 
object is two or more individual unities (i.e., apelcshdhuddhi), 
because these are qualities which reside in a plurality of 
subjects [and not in any one individual^] just as "seve- 
ralty " does [and, therefore, as apelcshdhuddhi is not their 
jndpaJca, it must be their janaJca]. 

Next we will describe the order of the successive destruc- 
tions. From apelcshdhuddhi arises, simultaneously with the 
production of duality (dvitva), the destruction of the know- 
ledge of the genus of unity ; next from the knowledge of 
the genus of duality [dvitvatva) arises, simultaneously with 
the knowledge of the quality duality, the destruction of 
apelcshdhuddhi; next from the destruction of apelcshdhuddhi 
arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two sub- 
stances, the destruction of the duality; next from the 
knowledge of the two substances arises, simultaneously 
with the production of imagination {samsTcdra), the destruc- 
tion of the knowledge of the quality; and next from 
imagination arises the destruction of the knowledge of the 

The evidence for the destruction of one kind of know- 
ledge by another, and for the destruction of another know- 
ledge by imagination, is to be found in the following 
argument; these knowledges themselves which are the 
subjects of the discussion are successively destroyed by 
the rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, 
like sound, is a special quality of an all-pervading sub- 
stance, and of momentary duration.- I may briefly add, 
that when you have the knowledge of the genus of unity 
simultaneously with an action in one of the two things 
themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite 

^ ylpffoA«6!(rf(i/a apprehends "this pervading substance, but the in- 

is one," "this is one," &c. ; but dividual portions of each have ditter- 

duality, for instance, does not reside ent special qualities ; hence one man 

in either of these, but in both to- knows what another is ignorant of, 

gether. and one portion of ether has sound 

- The Valseshikas held that the when another portion has not. Dr. 

jivatnian and space are each an a!!- Koer, in his version of the Bhashd 



to tlie conjunction that produced the whole, iit that 
case you have the subs«'qu(Mit destruction of duality pro- 
duced by the destruction of its ahidin<^-{>lace (the two 
things) ; but where you have this separate action taking 
place simultaneously with the rise of aj)ckshdlntddhi, there 
you have the destruction of duality jtroduced by the 
united influence of both.^ 

Apfkshiihiuidhi is to be considered as that operation of 
the mind which is the counter-entity to that emergent 
non-existence {i.e., destruction) which itself causes a sub- 
sequent destruction.' 

Parichc-lihtvlft, has t-- 
ini|>«irtaiit Sutra w ! 
puint. It i- -li i !• - 

wllirh f}' 


ti"'>ii. i"ii 

il nn ether nnil %o\\\ (i.e., nonn-l, kni«\v- 
i this \vAiH\ Ac ) art! liniiti'l to ditrrtiit 
jHirtions liiid of iiioiiit-ittnry dura- 

' The author hero mentions two 

other cau.<M!]t of the dcstniction of 

not mean "the special dritfa besides that already given 

her and 9«nd are iinii- in p. 152, 1. 14 (it}>fk*hiibuddhi-fuiia), 

\\M.\ nionicntarv dura- viz.,«ijr<iyan<i«r,;iud the united action 

iie s{H;cial qualities of of both : — 


knhnniko ruttha- 
.1 ttliyate. 

1. Kkatvajhilna. . . 

2. Ap.kshil.ii.ldhi . . 

3. l)vitTot[.attiand ek- 


4. I)vitvatvaj^ana . . 

5. Dvitva^nina- buddhi 

and apekshiibud- 
dhin.LM .... 

6. Dvitva - niUa and 

drovva-buddhi. . 

i Avayavft-kriyil . , . 
' Avayava-vibhiign . . 
I Avayava - saipyoga- 


' Dvitv:idhi(rasya (i.e., 

avayavina^') ntdiaf) 

Dvitva • n-Lia (I'.r, of 

ava\avii)). . . . 

A \ aya\ A- vibbiiga. 

A vay a v« -saitiynga- ii!i.-'a. 

Adhiira-iuUa (of ava- 


T» ' - 

.. 1 ,\ :..\ 



jAitn't, Ac , one 

i, i..-!f ,i:v.:.!.-l 

or ■ 


€>l the two j«»rtJi 

'•ithcr at the .«>// 

!it. In th" first 

•.h- whol.- i,. .1. . 


. .... 1 


or, ■« M 
ritti I 

:ii ■ 


(j , ..i. I ii.n. ■ 1. 

.■i;,._. .- .»■ ii. — i I- 

parts atu-r ih" iM-c-.nd moment 
wo'dd l>c unitnjvrtnnt, n.^ th** iwlWi 
of the</ri7tMi o:' • ; take 

j'lac" l)V lh< • in 

'■■ --. ...■...'•nt; 

uld b« too lat« 

- /.r, it\^m the 
„,^|,*.,A.,,/,/Ai foil. 




Next we will inquire in how many moments, commenc- 
ing with the destruction of the compound of two atoms (the 
dvyanuka), another compound of two atoms is produced, 
having colour, &c. In the course of this investigation the 
mode of production will he explained. First, the com- 
pound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series 
of steps commencing with the contact of fire;^ secondly, 
from the conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the 
qualities black, &c., in the single atom; thirdly, from 
another conjunction of fire arises the production of red, 
&c., in the atom ; fourthly, from conjunction with a soul 
possessing merit arises an action - in the atom for the 
production of a substance ; fifthly, by that action is pro- 
duced a separation of that atom from its former place; 
sixtiily, there is produced thereby the destruction of its 
conjunction with that former place ; seventhly, is produced 
the conjunction with another atom ; eighthly, from these 
two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; ninthly, 
from the qualities, &c., of the causes {i.e., the atoms) are 
produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (i.e., the 
dvyanuha). Such is the order of the series of nine mo- 
ments. The other two series,^ that of the ten and that of 
the eleven moments, are omitted for fear of prolixity. 
Such is the mode of production, if we hold (with the 
Vaiseshikas) that the baking process takes place in the 

the knowledge of dvitvatva arose length in the Siddhdnta Mukttlvali, 

from the destruction of ekatvajrkina, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we 

&c. (cf. Siddd. Mukt., p. 107K I have — i. the destruction of the rfiv/a- 

may remind tlie reader that in Hindu nuka and simultaneously a disjunc- 

logic the counter-entity to the non- tion from the old place produced by 

existence of a thing is the thing itself, the disjunction (of the parts); 2. 

1 From the conjunction of fire is tlie destruction of the black colour 

produced an action in the atoms of in the dvyanuka, and the simul- 

the jar ; thence a separation of one taneous destruction of the conjunc- 

atojii from another; thence a de- tion I'f the rfr^/aftifia with that place ; 

struction of the conjunction of atoms 3. the production of the red colour 

which made the black (or unbaked) in the atoms, and the simultaneous 

jar ; thence the destruction of tho conjunction with another place ; 4. 

compomid of two atoms. the cessation of the action in the 

" I.e., a kind of initiative ten- atom produced by the original con- 

dencj'. junction of fire. The remaining 

^ These are explained at full 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above. 


atoms of the jar.' Tlie Naiyuyikas, however, inaintain 
that the I akin 1,' process takes jtUice in the jar. 

" Disjunction produced by disjunction " is twuf«ild, — 
that ])roduccd by the disjunction of the intimate [or 
material] causes only, and tluit produced by the disjunction 
of the intimate cause and the non-cause [i.e., the pi. ice]. 
We will first describe the former kind. 

It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking' arises 
in the [material] cause which is in.sejjarably connected 
with the eflect [i.e., in one of the two halves of the pot], 
antl produces a disjunction from the other half, there is 
not pro luced at that time a disjunction from the place or 
point of space occupied by the pot ; and, again, when there 
is a disjunction from that point of space occupied by the 
pot, the di.'^junction from the other half is not contem- 
porary with it, but has already taken place. For just as 
we never see smoke without its cause, fire, so we never see 
that eflect of the breaking in the pot which we call the 
disjunction from the point of space,' without there having 
previously been the origination of that disjunction of the 
halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot was 
brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in 
the parts produces the ilisjunction of one part from another, 
but not the disjunction from the point of .<'j)ace ; next, thi.s 
di.sjunction of one part from another pnxluces the destmc- 
tion of that conjunction which had brought the j>ot into 
existence ; and thence arises the destruction of the pot, 
according to the principle, cr.KMinte eausd cessat rffechis. 
The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which 

c/'.: , 

two au<u>«, he, tM.'ii)^ (i<'<ir>>\<'.i ; aini, wit: 

thv JU.-tion of tllC fiTv thill plM<[uoii olil jrir, ; 

th>' red cilour in tbv iH'|>aruto atoim, c\>\ 

ami, joininiT l\v*'- into tx'w c<>iii- tl.' 

I*. ' A lllf •..III.' jur, (■ii.> i. 11 n>i, I. k 

f. liUck. 

ll. .,,...: - ' In p 109. Unc 14. I r.a.I -r^j*- 

iiig the ch»ngo cf tb« ^n. The naritAdyakarifitraBj 


resides in both the lialves (which are the material or 
intimate causes of the pot) during tlie time that is marked 
by the destruction of the pot or perhaps having reference 
only to one independent half, initiates, in the case of 
that half where the breaking began, a disjunction from 
the point of space which had been connected with the 
pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no 
cause to produce it.^ 

But the second kind is as follows : — As action whicli 
arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that 
with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction ^ froin 
the points of space in which the original conjunction took 
place ; and this is " the disjunction of the intimate cause 
and the non-cause." When the action in the hand produces 
an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates also 
in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect 
and the non-effect ; thus the disjunction of the body [the 
intimate effect] and the points of space arises from the dis- 
junction of the hand and the points of space [the hand being 
an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of 
space being not a cause]. This second disjunction is not 
produced by the action of the body, because the body is 
supposed to be at the time inactive ; nor is it produced by 
the action of the hand, because it is impossible that an 
action residing in some other place [as the hand] should 
produce the effect of disjunction [in the body]. Therefore 
we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view 
— that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the 

1 The Siddhdnta Muktdvali, p. 112, conjunction with that old place ; 7. 

describes the series of steps : — i. An the conjunction with the new place ; 

action, as of breaking, in one of the S. the cessation of the original im- 

halves ; 2. the disjunction of the pulse of fracture. Here the second 

two halves ; 3. the destruction of disjunction (viz., of the half of the 

the conjunction which originally pot And the place) is produced bj 

produced the pot; 4. the destruc- the previous disjunction of the halves, 

tion of the pot ; 5. by the disjunction the intimate causes of the pot. 

of the two halves is produced a dis- ^ The original has a plural r;'- 

junction of the severed half from the hhdgdn, i.e., disjunctions from the 

old place ; 6. the destruction of the several points. 


non-cause ^ which causes the second ilisjuuction of the 
boily ami the points of space. 

But an opponent may here object that " what you for- 
merly stated (p. 147) as to existence being denied of dark- 
ness, &c., is surely unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no 
less llian four dinerent opinions maintained on tliis point, — 
thus (a.) the Bluitta Miniaqisakas and the Vcddntins hold 
that darkness is a substance ; (b.) ^ruihara Aiharya- holds 
that tlie colour of dark blue is imposcl [and thus darkness 
will be a quality]; (c.) some of the rnibhakara Miinamsaka3 
hold that it is the absence of the cogaiiiou of liglit; (d.) 
the Naiyayikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." 
In reply, we assert that as for the first alleged opinion (a.) 
it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with 
neither of the two possible alternatives ; for if darkness 
is a substance, it must either l>e one of the nine well- 
known substances, earth, &c.,' or some different one. But 
it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever 
one you wouM i)lace it, all the qualities of that substance 
should certainly be found in it ; nor can you, on the other 
hand, assert that it is some substance different from these 
nine, since, being in itself destitute of qualities, it cannot 
properly be a substance at all [tiie very definition of sub- 
stance being " that which is the substratum of qualities "], 
and therefore, of course, it cannot be a difTerent n ' 
from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you 
darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as 
p ' f the dark blue of the tamala blossom?" We 

r- , : this is merely an error, as when men say tliat 

the [colourless] sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught 
on ancit.nt .'5a:,'e3.* (b.) Hence it follows that darki; 
not iiuve its colour impt.sctl upon it, since you cai. 
an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum 

' I.e., the (iiiijunction of iho hand * I am not nxxre t 

»n'J thr p«i;Ti*.=t ■■• <i{)«cc. be li^*.*.<-r tn r«-a<l 

\ cuinmentAry ou rr» '> ., iiuU^l u/ 

tl ' rri . 


to receive it;^ and again, we cannot conceive the eye as 
capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the con- 
current cause, the external light. Xor can we accept that 
it is an impression independent of the eye [i.e., produced 
by the internal sense, mind], because the concurrence of 
the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condi- 
tion to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that 
" absence or non-existence {abJidva '^) is incapable of being 
expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we 
do use such phrases as tenebrce oriiintur, darkness cannot 
be a mere non-exfetence "] ; because your assertion is too 
broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a 
mundane collapse, destruction, inattention,^ &c. [and yet 
we all know that men do speak of any of these things as 
past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of abhdvd]. 
(c.) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of 
light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ which 
perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it 
would follow that darkness would be perceived by the 
mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions].'* 
Hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion 
must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the 
absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is 
very difhcult to account for the attribution to non-exist- 
ence of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the 
quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain, and 
the idea of separation is connected with the absence of 
conjunction. And you need not assert that " this absence 
of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the 
eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an 
object possessing colour,^ as we see in the case of a jar's 

^ Unless you see the rope you can- dhalca-hriyd. It has that meaning 

not mistake it for a serpent. in Kavyaprakdsa, V. (p. 1 14, 1. l). 
^ In p. no, last line, read ^bJidre. ■* The mind perceives dZoi-a-_;Kd«a, 

•^ Read in p. 1 10, last line, a/Ktra- therefore it would perceive its ab- 

dhxinddiaku. Vidkipratyai/aTpToperly sence, i.e., darkness, but this last is 

means an imperative or potential perceived by the eye. 
atfix implying " command ; " but the ^ I.e., light possesses colour, and we 

pandit takes vidhi here as hhaixtlo- cannot see a jar's absence in the dark. 


absence," because by the very rule on wliich you rely, viz., 
that that on which the eye depcmls to perceive an cbject, 
it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, 
it follows that as there is no dependence of the eyo on 
light to perceive lii,'ht, it need not di'j)entl thereon to per- 
ceive this light's absence. Nor need our oppojieiit retort 
that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] 
necessitates the cognition of tlie place where th' 
n siili s [and t?iis will require light]," as such an a 

is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in onler to 
have a conception of absence it is nocessary to have a 
conception of the place where the absence resides, else 
we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, 
as is implied in such an expression as ' the tumult ha.s 
ceased."* Hence, having all these difticuliies in his mind, 
tlie venerable Kanada uttered his aphorism [as an ipsr 
dixit to settle the question]: " Dravi/a-f/umi-kanna-nisJi- 
palli-raidharmj/dd aUidras tamas" (Vaii. Siit. v. 2, 19), 
" Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to 
the production of siil»stances, qualities, or actions." The 
same thing has been also established by the argument that 
darkness is perceived by the eye^ [without light, whereas 
all substanccis, if perceptible at all, recpiire the presence 
of light as well as of the eye to be visilde]. 

Non-e.xistence (ahhdva) is considered to be the seventl; 
category, as establisiied by negative proofs. It may be 
concisely dcfmed as that which, itself not having intimate 
rehitiun, is not intimate relation;' and this is twofohl, 
"relative non-e.xi.>ittn' e "* and "reciprocal non-existence." 

• Sound naiidc« in the iinpcrc»'p- tra nl Utmah t>j*tt, nihyiUokapraynt' 

tiV-' ' '" and CfMuatinn i* the ham anUtmta ckakthuthd na gfi^- 

fit I, or "ctucrgcnt non- yta." 

t\. ■ * Intiuutc rvlation bxt t.\ro no 

' Ti. inti'iiat"' r<l.-»lion. 

I • 



The former is agaiu divided into "antecedent," "emer- 
gent," and "absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-exist- 
ence which, thougli without any beginning, is not ever- 
lasting; "emergent" is that which, though having a 
beginning, is everlasting ; " absolute " is that non-existence 
which abides in its own counter-entity;^ "reciprocal non- 
existence" is that wliich, being different from "absolute," 
has yet no defined limit [i.e., no terminus ad quern nor ter- 
minus a qiio, as " antecedent " and " emergent " have]. 

If you raise the objection that " ' reciprocal non-exist- 
ence! is really the same as 'absolute non-existence/" we 
reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's 
highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence " is that negation 
whose opposite is held to be identity, as "ajar is not cloth;" 
but " absolute non-existence " is that negation whose 
opposite is connection, as " there is no colour in the air." - 
Nor need you here raise the objection that " ahhdva can 
never be a means of producing any good to man," for we 
maintain that it is his summum honum, in the form of 
fmal beatitude, which is only another term for the absolute 
abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the cate- 
gory of dbhdval. E. B. C. 

^ I.e., the absolute absence of the jdii ghafatva which resides iu the 

jar is found in the jar, as, of course, jar. 

the jar does not reside in the jar, - The opposite is "there is colour 

but in the spot of ground, — it is the in the air." 

( '(i« ) 

ciiArrKK XI. 

TiiK akshapXda (ok nvAya) dar^ana. 

The principle that final l)li>?3, i.e., the absolute abolition of 
pain, arises from the knowltHJge of the truth [ihoui;h iu a 
certain sense universally accepteii]. is established in a 
special sense as a particular tenet* of the Nyaya school, 
as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the wonls 
" proof, that w Iik h is to be proved, &c., — from knowledge 
of the tmth as to these things there is the attainment of 
final bliss." This is the first aphorism of tlie Nyaya 
J>astra, Now tlie Nyaya Su-stra consists of five books, 
and each book contains two "daily portions." In the 
first daily portion of the first book the venerable Golama 
discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning wiiii 
" proof," and in the second those of the remaining seven, 
beginning with "discussion" (rdda). In the first daily 
portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses 
the four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggostetl 
objections to their being instruments of right knowledge; 
and in the second he shows that " presumption," &c., are 
really included in the four kinds of "proof" already given 
[and therefore need not be added by the Miujain^akas as 
separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the tlurJ 
book he examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their 
objects; in the second, " underatardiug " {bucUiht), and 
" mind " (manas). In the firet daily portion of the fourth 
book he examines "volition" (pravritti), the "faults." 

• Cf. Nyijr» Sdtn*, I i ) 


"transmigration," "fruiL" [of actions], "pain," and "final 
liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth ^ as 
to the causes of the " faults," and also " wholes " and 
" parts." In the first daily portion of the fifth book he 
discusses the various kinds of futility (j'dti), and in tlie 
second the various kinds of "occasion for rebuke" (nijra- 
Iiasthdna, or " unfitness to be argued with "). 

In accordance v/ith the principle that " to know the 
thing to be measured you must first know the measure," 
"proof" {2Jramana) is first enunciated, and as this must 
be done by defining it, we have first a definition of " proof." 
"Proof" is that which is always accompanied by right 
knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from 
the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the 
site of knowledge [i.e., the soul] ; ^ and this definition thus 
includes the peculiar tenet of the Nyaya School that God 
is a source of right knowledge,^ as the author of the 
aphorisms has expressly declared (ii. 68), "and the fact 
of the Veda's being a cause of right knowledge, like spells 
and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit 
one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge." 
And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher 
Udayana, who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of 
logic, declared in the fourth chapter of the Kusumanjali : 

" Eight knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right 
knowing is the possession thereof; authoritativeness is, 
according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all 
absence thereof. 

" He in whose intuitive unerring perception, insepar- 
ably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets, 
the succession of all the various existing objects is con- 
tained, — all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away 

1 In p. 112, line i6, of the Cal- {vishaya), as these are, of course, 

cntta edition, I read doslianimitta- connected with right knowledge. 

tattra for doshanimittakatva (compare ^ I'svara is a cause of right know- 

Kyava Sut. iv. 68). ledge (pramdna) according to the 

- Without this last clause the definition, because he is I'ramdyd 

definition might include the objects dsrai/ah. 


by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the 
slii^htest want of observation in Him,— He, ^iva, is my 
authority ; what have I to tlo with others, ilarkeneil as 
their authoiity must ever be with rising doubts?" 

"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, 
inference, analogy, and testimony. The " thing to Ikj 
proved" [or the "object of right notion"] is of twelve 
kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, under- 
standing, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, fruit, pain, 
and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose 
nature is uncertainty; nnd this is threef<ild, as being 
caused by the object's possessiui; only qualities which are 
common to other things also, and therefore not distinctive, 
— or by its i)Ossessing only irrelevant qualities of its own, 
which do not help us in determining the particular point 
in question,^ — or by conflicting testimony. The thing which 
one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a 
motive ' (prayojana) ; this is twofold, t.«., visible and 
invisible. " An example " is a fact brought forward as a 
ground for esiablishing a general principle, and it may 
be either aflirmative or negative.' A " tenet " {siddMnta) 
is something which is accepted as being authoritatively 
settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common to 
all the schools," " jHiCuliar to one school," "a pregnant 
assumption " [leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], 
and "an implied dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of 
a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an 
inference for the sake of another; and these are five, the 
proi : he reason, the example, the application, and 

the u (i. 32-38}. "Confutation" (tarka, i. 39) is 

the showing that the admission of a false minor necessi- 
tates the adn»ission of a false major' (cf. Siit, i. 39, an I 

> On thi.« coinp»ro SidJhdnU the «mnkp, U thco'iifnt.iti u >'f thcro»Ii. p. 115. being no fire in • lUtltan- 

« On th'-t" rr.TTipar- mT nnt<« to fvnrV Or, in ■. " ihm 

CoU» '• 

* • .'•■ 

thai tl.' r-- All I- III fU- K- 111 ti.' " lu' •; u'< <■■■■ .■\- •- 'f'ifijv ; 

hill if there be no firr, while we trt 


iv, 3) ; and this is of eleven kinds, as vydghdta, dtmdsraya, 
ilaretardsraya, &c. 

" Ascertainment " (iiirnaya, i. 40) is right knowledge or 
a perception of the real state of the case. It is of four 
kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy, or 
testimony. "Discussion" (vdda) is a particular kind of 
conversation, having as its end the ascertainment of truth 
(i. 41). "Wrangling" (jalpa) is the talk of a man only 
wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments 
for either side of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" {vi- 
tandd) is the talk of a man wdio does not attempt to 
establish his own side of the question (i. 43). "Dialogue" 
{Icaihd) is the taking of two opposite sides by two dis- 
putants. A " fallacy " is an inconclusive reason which is 
supposed to prove something, and this may be of five 
kinds, the "erratic," the "contradictory," the "uncertain," 
the "unproved," and the "precluded" or "mistimed" 
(Slit. i. 44-49). " Unfairness " (chJiala) is the bringing 
forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in 
an ambiguous sense; this is of three kinds, as there may 
be fraud in respect of a term, the meaning, or a meta- 
pliorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility" {jdti) is a self- 
destructive argument (i. 58). This is of twenty-four kinds 
(as described in the fifth book of the Nyaya aphorisms 
(1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant 
loses his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two 
kinds (as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 
44-67). "We do not insert here all the minute sub-divi- 
sions through fear of being too prolix, — they are fully 
explained in the aphorisms. 

But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, 
proof, &c., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has 
received the name of the Nyaya Sastra, [as reasoning, i.e., 
Nydya,ox logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics 
which it treats of ? "] We allow the force of the objection; 
still as names are proverbially said to be given for some 
special reason, we maintain that the name Nyaya was 


rightly applied to (Jutaina's system, since "reasouii%" or 
inference for the sake of nuother, is ju>tly held to be a 
prtduininant feature from it^ usefulness in uU kin«l3 of 
knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every 
kintl of pursuit. So it has been said by Sarvajua. "This 
is the pre-eminent science of Xyiiya from its estubli.sijing 
our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing 
action;"^ and by Pakshila Swamin, " Tliis is the science 
of reasoning {djivi'lshikC) diviiled into the diflVreiit cate- 
gories, * proof,* &c. ; the lamp of all sciences, the mean:) 
for aiding all actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious 
duties, well proved in the declarations of science."* 

r>at here an objector may say, " Wlien you declare that 
final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth, do 
you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this 
knowledge being attaineii?" We reply, 'No," for it is 
said in the second Nyaya aphorism, " Pain, birth, activity, 
faults, false notions, — on the successive auiiihiiation of 
tliese in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next 
before it," by means of this knowledge of the trutjj. Now 
false notions are the thinking the body, &c., which are 
not the soul, to Ikj the soul ; " faults " are a desire for those 
things which seem agreeable to the soul, uiul a dislike to 
tiiose things which seem disagreeable to it,' though iu 
reality nothing is either ' ' ' 'm 

soul. And through the n. iit 

" faults " the stupid man desires and the desiring man is 
stupid; the stupid man is angry, and th-- is 

stupid. Moreover the man, imiK-Ucd by ti. .-s 

tliose things which are forbidden: thus by the body he does 
injury, thett, &c. ; by the voice, falsehood, &c. ; by the mind, 
malevolence, &c. ; and thi.H same sinful " activity " pro- 
duces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by 

> A iho » The \> <l 

» ■ M :■ r j-t-ki/ ! I. 


his body, as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, 
upright counsel, &c., by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., 
by his mind ; and this same right activity produces merit. 
But both are forms of activity, and each leads to a 
similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifesta- 
tion ; and while this birth lasts there arises the impression 
of "pain," which we are conscious of as of sometliing that 
jars against us. Now this series, beginning with " false 
notions" and ending with "pain," is continually going 
on, and is what we mean by the words " mundane exist- 
ence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And 
whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his 
previous good deeds, obtains through the teaching of a 
great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is 
only a scene of pain and bound up with pain, he recognises 
that it is all to be avoided, and desires to abolish the 
ignorance, &c., wliich are the causes that produced it.^ 
Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the 
knowledge of the truth ; and as he meditates on the 
objects of right knowledge divided into the four sciences,^ 
there arises in his mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in 
other words, a right view of things as they are ; and from 
this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear. When 
false notions disappear, the " faults " pass away ; with 
them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and 
with the cessation of " birth " comes the entire abolition 
of " pain," and this absolute abolition is final bliss. Its 
absoluteness consists in this, that nothing similar to that 
which is thus abolished can ever revive, as is expressly 
said in the second aphorism of the Nyaya Sutras : " Pain, 
birth, activity, faults, false notions, — since, on the successive 
annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of 

^ In p. 1 1 6, line 3, I would read the causes of the stability of the 

tannirvartalcani for tannivartalcam. world " (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It 

^ This refers to the couplet so occurs in Kamandaki's Nltisdra, ii. 

often quoted in Hindu authors, 2, and seems to be referred to in 

'•Logic, the three Vedas, trade and Vatsj'ayana's Com. p. 3, from which 

agriculture, and the eternal doctrine Madhava is here borrowing, 
of polity, — these four sciences are 


the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the 
last of tliem] tinal beatitmle." 

" lUit is not your tkfniition of tlie summum bonum, 
liberation, i.e., ' tlie absolute abolition of pain,' after all 
as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to 
the tongue;^ why ilien is this continually put forth as if 
it were establisheil beyond all dispute if " Wu reply that 
as all those who maintain liberation in any furni do 
include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our defini- 
tion, as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, 
may well be called the royal highway' of philosophy. 
No one, in fact, mainUiins that pain is possible without 
the individual's activity. Thus even the ^ladhyamika's 
opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of soul," 
docs not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it 
is the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that 
the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be alx)lished just 
like the body, &c., we reply that this does not hold, since 
it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by 
"the soul," (a.) the continued succession of cognitions, or 
(6.) something difTerent therefrom ? (a.) If the former, we 
make no objection, [since we Naiyuyikas allow that cogni- 
tion is evanescent,' and we do desire to abolish cognititMi 
as a cause of pravritti or action*], for who wouKl oppose 
a view which makes for his own side ? (b.) Hut if the 
latter, then, since it must be eternal,' its abolition is 
impossible ; and, again, a second objection would be that 
no one would try to gain your supposed "summum bonum;" 
for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate 
the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the pri:i- 

' Con){>arc the Ei)i,'ti'<l> provcrU, fint inoiiiput, ninniii* durini; th« 

" An KJon M the cat can lick h«r •cconl, sn I r-n in iho tltird. 
eiu-." * -■ ■ 2. 

' Lit-rmll? th« '• Jw»n r«wJ," f«., » \ -.r ttioalJ ww 

"tli ■■■■•.■■■■' .. ■• -. 

<:«d in Ui" 


fij'lo that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;" 
unci, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," 
[and this very term refutes the idea of annihihation or 

" But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the 
doctrine of pure intelligence [i.e., the Yogacharas and the 
Sautrantikas ^], that 'the summum honum' is the rising of 
pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the con- 
scious subject? " To this view we object that there is an 
absence of means; and also it cannot be establislied that 
the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For 
the former, if it is replied that the \vell-kiiown fourfold 
set of Bauddha contemplations- are to be accepted as the 
cause, we answer that, as [according to the Bauddha tenet 
of the momentary existence of all things] there cannot be 
one abiding subject of these contemplations, they will 
necessarily exercise a languid j^ower like studies pursued 
at irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce 
any distinct recognition of the real nature of things. 

And for the latter, since the continued series of cogni- 
tions when accompanied by the natural obstacles ^ is said 
to be " bound," and when freed from those obstacles is 
said to be " liberated," you cannot establish an identity 
of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say 
that the very same being which was bound is now 

Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, a^z., that " Libera- 
tion is the releasing from all ' obstructions,' " a path en- 
tirely free from bars to impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our 
Jaina friend kindly inform us what he means by " obstruc- 
tion"?* If he answers " merit, demerit, and error," we 
readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that 
" the body is tlie true obstruction, and hence Liberation is 
the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on the 

^ See supra, pp. 24-32. ^ In the form of the various Uem^ 

^ All is momentary, all is pain, or " afflictions." 
all is sui rjcncris, all is xmreal ^ Ararana, cf. pp. 55, 58. 


body's anniljilation, ns of a panot relenstnl from il9 
aij,'e," then we must inquire whether this said soul 
possesses form or not. If it possesses form, tlien has it 
parts or not ? If it has no parts, then, since the well- 
known definition of an atom will apply here as " that 
which h:is form without parts," it will follow tliat the 
attributes of the soul are, lii<e those of an atom, ini|>crcep- 
tible to the senses.' If you say that it has parts, then 
the general maxim that " whatever has parts is non- 
eternal," would necessitate that the soul w non-eternal ; 
and if this were conceded, then two grand difTiciilties 
[ajjainst the Providential course of the world] wuuld buMl 
in unop|K)sed, viz., that what the soul has done would, at 
it3 cessation, perish with it [and thus fail of producing 
the proper fruit], while it would have reaped during life 
the efl'ects of what it had not lione [as the good and evil 
wliich happened to it would not be the consequences of 
its actions in a former birth]. If, on the other hand, the 
Jaina nuiintains that tlie soul does not pus-iss form at all, 
then how can he talk of the soul's " upsprinj,'ing," since 
all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent 
possessing; form ?^ 

Again, if we lake the Chartaka's view " that the only 
bondage is dependence on another, and therefore indepen- 
dince is the true lil>eration," — if by "in' " mco " he 

means tlie cessation of pain, we have no 1.. atrovert 

it. iJut if he means autocratic power, then no sensible 
man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power 
involves the idea of a capability of being increaseil autl of 
being equalled.' 

Again, the Sankhya opinion, which first lays down that 
nature and suul are utterly distinct, and then holds that 

» |l„t th* Nv.Syn hol.U thi»t tK« !• <lifRr«ilt. but I h»l!«v« th*t praii' 
mtr M it (lor« 


I>v I..- li. -- 1 1'.*! -■ !■»• iiiin't i....i-.... . ■• ... ...... .•nai tniwt 

I'. S .S3). be nintlixijfd,— inc»|<abio of bring 

* The rvailini; n uri' i/>m(iAaiNiA<i( Added to. 


"liberation is the soul's remaining as it is in itself after 
nature [on being known] has withdrawn," — even this 
opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of pain; but 
there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of 
the distinction between nature and soul resides in the 
soul or in nature. It is not consistent to say that it 
resides in the soul, since the soul is held to be unchange- 
able, and this would seem to involve that previously it 
had been hampered by ignorance ; nor can we say that it 
resides in nature, since nature is always held to be un- 
intelligent. Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or 
inactive ? If the former, then it follows that there can be 
no liberation at all, since the spontaneous actions of things 
cannot be set aside ; and if the latter, the course of mun- 
dane existence would at once cease to go on. 

Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition 
of pain " in the doctrine of Bhatta Sarvajna and his 
followers, that " Liberation is the manifestation of an 
eternal happiness incapable of being increased ; " but here 
we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not 
come within the range of definite proof. If you allege 
Sruti as the proof, we reply that Sruti has no place when 
the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception ; ^ or 
if you allow its authority, then you will have to concede 
the existence of such things as floating stones.^ 

"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the 
manifestation of happiness,' and then accept such a view 
as that which holds it to be only the cessation of pain, 
does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic 
patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour rice- 
gruel ? " Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter 
for some speech in a play [rather than for a grave philoso- 
phical argument]. The truth is that all happiness must 

^ Yogydnupaldbdhi is when an " grdvdnah plavanti," see Uttara 

object is not seen, and yet all the Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phrase 

usual concurrent causes of vision are ahndnah jiJavanti occiirs in Shadv. 

present, as the eye, light, &c. Br. 5, 12. 

2 Alluding to the Vedic phrase, 


Ite included under the category of pain, since, like honey 
mixed with jioison, it is always accompanied hy jaiii, 
eitlier as admitiiug of increase/ or as being an oljrct of 
perception, or as being exposed to many hostile inlluences, 
or a.s itivolving an irksome necessity of seeking all kindi 
of instruments for its production. Nor may you retort on 
us that we have fultilled the proverb of "seeking one 
thing anil dropping another in the search," since we have 
abolishcil happiness as being ever tainted by some inci- 
dental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite 
alternative is one which no one can consider -' - ' . 
For the truth is that any attempt to establish i. 
as the summum bonuin, since it is inevitably accompanied 
by various causes of pain, is only like the man who 
would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion 
that it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got 
together by rightful nieans, we may find many firelly-like 
pleasures; but then how many are the rainy days to drown 
them ? And in the case of those got together by wrong 
means, the mind cannot even conceive the future issue 
which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers 
consider all this, anil not attempt to disguise their own 
conscious experience. Tiicrefore it is that we hold it o.^ 
indisputable that for him, pre-eminent among his fellows, 
who, through the favour of the Supreme I»cing, has, by 
the regular mctiiod of listening to the revealed Sruti, &c., 
attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of tbo sou). 
for him the absolute abolition of pain is the tr- 
But it may be objected, "Is there any pi 
tl>o existence of a Supreme Heing, ie., perception, infer- 
ence, or ^ruti? C«'rtainly ; 
since the Deity, as uevoiii 

the sensea Nor can inference hold, since there is nu 
universal proposition or true middle term w!. 
apply.' Nor can Sruti, since iieiliier of the : 

' Or pcrh«p« "ca|i*ble <>f Iwing ■ur y ^ cJ ." 
* .^inoa th« Supreme IWing b » dogl* iaaUace. 


alternatives can be sustained ; for is it supposed to reveal, 
as being itself eternal, or as non-eternal ? Under the former 
view au established tenet of our school would be con- 
tradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal] ; under the 
latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.^ As for 
comparison and any other proof which might be adduced 
[as that sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need 
not be thought of for a moment, as their object matter 
is definitely limited, and cannot apply to the present case.'^ 
Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as unreal as a 
hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need excite 
no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at 
once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., 
must have had a maker from tlieir possessing the nature 
of effects just like a jar." (a.) Xor can our middle term 
[possessing the nature of effects] be rejected as unproved 
{asiddha), since it can be established beyond a doubt by the 
fact of the subject's possessing parts. " But what are we to 
understand by this ' possessing parts ' ? Is it ' existing in 
contact with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? 
It cannot be the first, since this would equally apply to 
such eternal things as ether,^ &c, ; nor can it be the 
second, since this would prove too much, as applying to 
such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, which abides 
in intimate relation with the individual threads. It there- 
fore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, 
that it holds if we explain the " possessing parts " as 
" belonging to the class of those substances which exist in 
intimate relation."^ Or we may adopt another view and 

1 Since the Veda, if non-eternal, tact with the parts of everything, as 

must [to be authoritative] have e.[/., a jar. 

been created by God, and yet it •* The whole (as the jar) resides 

is brought forward to reveal the by intimate relation in its parts (as 

existence of God. the jar s two halves). But the eter- 

- The Nviiya holds presumption nal substances, ether, time, the soul, 
to be included under inference, and mind, and the atoms of earth, M^ater, 
comparison is declared to be the fire, and air, do not thus reside in any- 
ascertaining the relation of a name thing, although, of course, the cate- 
to the thing named. gory tUesJui does reside in them by 

^ Since ether is connected by con- intimate relation. The word " sub- 


maintain that it is cisy to infer the " possessing the nature 
of eflects " fron\ the consiileration of their possessing in- 
termediate nm^:nitiule.^ 

(h.) Nor can our middle term he rejected as " con- 
tradictory" {viruililha],- since tliere is no such acknow- 
ledged universal proposition connected with it as would 
establish ti;e opposite major term to that in our syllogism 
[ie., tiiat they must have had no maker], (c.) Nur is our 
middle term too general (anaikunta), since it is never 
found in o{>positc instances [such as the lake, which is the 
rijnikgha in the argument, 'Tlie mountain has fire because 
it lias smuke"]. (d.) Nor again is it piecluded {bddhila 
or kdldtyayopadislipx), for there is no superior evidence to 
i\t .•( ise such a precluding power, (e.) Nor is it counti-r- 
i.u>i:.eed {sat-pratipakshita), fur there does not appear to 
be any such equally valid antagonist. 

If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, 
" The mountains, «l!cc., cannot have had a maker, from the 
fact that they were not produced by a body, just as is the 
case with the eternal ether," — this pretended inference 
will no more stand examination than the young fawn can 
stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional 
words " by a body " are useless, since " from the fact that 
thi-y were not produced" would be a butiicient middlu 
term by itself [and ihe argument thus involves the fallacy 
called rydpyatiix-siddht]} Nur can you retort, " Well, let 
lliis then be our middle term ;" for you cannot establish 
ii u.s a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise the 

older Naiviiyik&t iiiaititaiticil that 
Uiv ar;:tuiii lit ' the iiioiiiit.iiii li.X't tin- 

h. : - ■■ ' ■ 1 • ^ - :,,;a 

t :hi, W- 

i I nil Wfct 

iiiiii'O-JiAariiy rcstrictcii \ik-c Sid- 

illi.iiila Muktiiv.p.77>. Th** modornis 

u ntvw luuiii where the niAJor ttriii bowtvcr, more *i '■■ r it a< 

tj. » hanulcM cmo. wuuld 

' T' • :' - of tlie r^-' - ' •' rt- 

iiiiii thf ii 

K ,. . .. Tact iny t;. . i- 

note on the tawgc tb«re. "The terra.' 

>'.A!l<-' ^ ' • \ 

. . !• ttaniKtra, and "ex- 

* I r < 

.-. rt'Ution" excludt-s 

' 1: 

brtwcfii iiilinit'- 

and ^: 

, all eternal sub 


<>no or thf t)ther. 

» 'i. 

iketu u that wbicli 


smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be 
liable to limitation by any suggested condition {upddhi)} 
[such as "the being produced by a corporeal agent," to 
limit our old reason "from having the nature of effects"], 
because we have on our side a valid line of argument to 
establish our view, viz., "If the mountains, &c., had no 
maker, then they would not be effects " [but all do acknow- 
ledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world 
that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature in- 
dependently of any series of concurrent causes. And this 
series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker ; 
and I mean by "being'a maker" the being possessed of that 
combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of 
the proper means, wliich sets in motion all other causes, 
but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold 
that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the 
necessity of the acticn of all the other causes would be 
simultaneously overthrown, since these are dependent 
thereon ; and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine 
that effects could be produced without any cause at all. 
There is a rule laid down by Sankara-kiiikara which 
applies directly to the present case — 

" When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argu- 
ment to establish its validity, 

" Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting con- 
dition on account of the [supposed] non-invariable 
concomitance of the major term." 

If you maintain that there are many sound counter- 
arguments, such as " If the Supreme Being were a maker, 
He would be possessed of a body," &c., we reply, that all 
such reasoning is equally inconsistent, whether we allow 
that Supreme Being's existence to be established or not.^ 

^ For the upddhi cf. pp. 7, 8. itself non-existent, cannot be the 

- As in the former case it would be locus or subject of a negation (cf. 

clear that it is a subject for separate Kusumunjali, iii. 2). "Just as that 

discussion; and in the latter you subject from which a t'iven attribute 

would be liable to the fault of dh-ay- is excluded cannot be unreal, so 

rfs(cW/i(', a "baseless inference," since neither can an unreal thing be the 

your subject (or minor term), being svbject of a negation." 


As lias been said by Udaynna Achiirya [in the Kusuuiafi- 
jali, iii. 5] — 

"If Sruti, &c., have any authority, }onr negative argu- 
ment fails from being precUuled ; if they are falla- 
cious, our oKl objection of a 'baseless inference' 
returns stronger than ever." 

Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contra- 
diction to our argument, since it wouM be overthrown by 
either alternative of God's being known or unknown.* 

" Well, let all this be granted ; but the activity of God in 
treating the world, what end did it have in view ? His own 
advantage or some other being's ? If it was for the former 
end, was it in order to attain something desired, or to 
avoid something not desired ? It could not be the first, 
l»ecause this would b»? quite incongnious in a being who 
I'ossesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same 
reason too it could not be the second. If it was for the 
latter end [the advantage of another] it would be equally 
inconj^ruous ; for who wouUl call that being "wise" wh(» 
busied himself in acting for another? If you replied that 
His activity was justified by compassion, any one would at 
once retort that this feeling of compas.sion should have 
rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and 
not checkered with misery, since this militates against 
His compassion; for we define compassion as t: 
terested wish to avoid causing anotlur pain. li 
conclude that it is not befitting for God to create the 
world. This has been said by 1" 

"Not even a fool acts without in view ; 

"Suppose that Gotl did not create the M-orld, what end 
would bo left undone by Him?" — 
We reply, O cr.?* jwl of the atheistic school, be 

» If « ; ' 

tcncp II 


Him? 1 ri'ail iinra 1 ; 

120 o( the C*IcutlA cUk. 

laii tim. 



pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, 
and to consider the following suggestions. His action in 
creation is indeed solely caused by compassion ; but the 
idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is 
inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot 
but arise eventual differences from the different results 
which will ripen fi'om the good or evil actions of the beings 
wdio are to be created. ISTor need you object that this 
would interfere with God's own independence [as He 
would thus seem to depend on others' actions], since there 
is the well-known saying, " One's own body does not 
hinder one;" nay rather it helps to carry out onfe's aims;^ 
and for this there is authority in such passages of the 
Veda as that (in the Sveta^vatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "Tliere 
is one Eudra only; he admits ^ not of a second," &c. " But 
then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reason- 
ing in a circle ? [for you have to prove the Veda by the 
authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's 
existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to 
point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do 
you suspect this "reciprocal dependence of each," which 
you call " reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being 
produced or in regard to their being known ? ^ It cannot 
be the former, for though the production of the Veda is 
dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there 
is no possibility of Mis being produced; nor can it be in 
regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge 
of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be 
learned from some other source ; nor, again, can it be in 
regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, 
for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by 

^ The aggregate of the various " The usual readhig is tasthuv for 

.subtile bodies constitutes Hiranya- tasthc. 

garbha, or the supreme soul viewed •* For these divisions of the anyon- 

in His relation to the world as creator, ydiraya fallacy, see Nydyasutra vritti, 

while the aggregate of the gross i. 39 (p. 33). 
bodies similaily constitutes his gross 
body (viraj). 


any yogin endowed wi'ih the transcendent fjionlties {tivra,^ 

Therefore, when God has been remlcu- i |i; 'iPHMiis by 
the perfornuince of duties which pro luce His favour, tlio 
desired end, Liberation, is obtained ; thus everything is 
clear. K. B. C. 

NOTK ON rA<JKS 17:, 173. 

Wc havv here an cxcmpHfication of the I'ivl- falhuies or A<£nf&A<f«u 
"f the iiKxlern Hindu lo,'ic (of. SidMuinlamuki.^ § 7'f TitrliLt«aqigr„ 
55-67), viz., anaii-anUi, viruddhoy cuuidJi i^ ktildtyayopoAii-ikfu ur Ui- 
i/7»»/a, and pradfxikiJiitu or aat-pra:ipijluhii. The four first of thew 
:;>-'ncralIy 'to the titvifiibf,ic'nira ut '' ctt.C ■' Iha or 

••contr.vii tyjOTrmi or " unprove«l," and "mia- 

t:in«Nl,* I.e., '• piccluJetl," aa ^iven in the list of fallaci-v. i tin- nMtr 
1 .I*- in p. 164; \>nt fyriitipaJuhita corresp<>mla inip< rfe>lly Ut prjki- 
rnji.'t- I. Thb prakaranasjma or " unceiUuu '* reason is properly 
thai rii->:i which is enually available for both sitlcs, a-s e.y., the, 
argument, ''Sound ia eternal because it ia audible," which couM Iw 
met by the equally plausible argument, "."^otind is non-eternal be- 
cause it ia audible ; " or, acconling to other authorities, it it that 
reaM>n which itaelf raiaes the same ditficalties as the ori^nn&l ques- 
tion, a.«, e,g., " .-ound in non-eternal l>ec;»uae eternal (|ualiiiea are not 
p<rceivuil in it ; "* here thia a!'. ' : <n i« as uiucli tl ' >f 

ilixpiit'' aa the old qucs:ion, *" '. mal J " But ; c- 

a ia one wliich is J by an e<i':.i.;y v.iIiJ 

I '' Sound is eternal l- ible," an<l ".'^o^^d i« 

non eternal because it is a protluct. 

> For Uwro et. Kd^s ttUrm, i. 3i, 23. 

( J7S ) 


THE J A 1 M I N I - D A R S A N A. 

An objector may here ask, " Are you not continually 
repeating that merit (dharma) comes from the practice of 
duty (dharma), but how is duty to be defined or proved ? " 
Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this ques- 
tion has been given in the older ^ Mimamsa by the holy 
sage Jaimini. Now the Mimamsa consists of twelve 
books.2 In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness 
of those collections of words which are severally meant by 
the terms injunction (vidhi), " explanatory passage" (artha- 
vdda),\iymi\ (ma?ii!ra), tradition (smriti), and "name." In 
the second, certain subsidiary discussions [as e.g., on apurva] 
relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of 
(erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance 
[as in " constant" and "voluntary " offerings]. In the third, 
^ruti, " sign " or " sense of the passage " {linga), " con- 
text" (vdhya), &c., and their respective weight when in 
apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called 
■pratipatti-'karmdni, things mentioned incidentally (andra- 
hhyddhita), things accessory to several main objects, as 
'praydjas, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the 
fourth, the influence on other rites of tlie principal and 
subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the juhu being 
made of the lutca frondosa, &c., and the dice-play- 
ing, &c., which form subordinate parts of the rdjasuya 
sacrifice. In the fiftli, the relative order of different 

' Miidhava here calls it Vi\Q prdclii Mlmdmsd. 
^ Cf. /. Nyciyamdldvist, pp. 5-9. 


passages of Uruli, &c., tlio order of difTorent parts of a 
sacrifice [as tlie seveiUi'cii animals at the viijitj)fi/a'\, tlic 
muhiplication and nou-niulliplicatioii of rites, an«l the 
iLSpictivc for(.e of tlie words of Sruti, order of mention, 
\c., in determining the order of performance. In the 
tixth, the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, tli' 
lions, the substitutes fur enjoined materials, su_ ^ 
lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the saUra offer- 
inj,'S, thini;s proper to be given, and the diffi ; 
fires. In the seventh, transference of the i 
one sacrifice to another by direct command in tlie Vaidic 
text, and tlien as inferred by " nan>e" or "sign." In the 
lighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or 

I)scurely expressed *' sign," or by the predominant " sign," 
and cases where no transference takes place. In the 
ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation 
of hymns when quoted in a new connection {uha), the 
adaptation of sumans and mantras, and collateral questions 
connected thercwiti). In the tenth, the discussion of 
occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite 
involves the " preclusion " and uon- performance of the 
dependent rites, and of occasions where rites are prccludeil 
because other rites produce their special result, iliscussions 
connected with the graha offerings, certain sdmnns, and 
various other things, and a iliscussion on the different 
kinds of mgation. In the eleventh, the inciilental mention 
and subsequently the fuller discussion of (antra ' [where 
several acts are combined into one], and dvdjxi [or the per- 
forming an act more than once]. In the twelfth, a dis' u.<- 
^ion on prasahga [where the rite is performed for oni* c.i- f 

arpose, but with an incidental further reference], tanira. 

imulation of concurrent rite-^ 
Now the first topic whicli in" 

' Thnn It is M»iH thtkt h*> who «1"»- (tmtrn tm» nff«nnif U* Apnl vouM do 

two «■]«• 


the Piirva-Mimamsa arises from the aphorism, "Now there- 
fore a desire to know duty [is to be entertained by thee "]. 
Now the learned describe a " topic " as consisting of five 
members, and these are (a.) the subject, (h.) the doubt, 
(c.) the primd facie argument, {d.) the demonstrated con- 
clusion, and (e.) the connection (sangati). The topic is dis- 
cussed according to the doctrines held by the great teachers 
of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the 
sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" wliich 
arises is whether the study of Jaimini's sdstra concerning 
duty, beginning with the aphoiism, " Duty is a thing which 
is to be recognised by an instigatory passage," and ending 
with " and from seeing it in the anvdhdrya," is to be com- 
menced or not. The prima facie argument is that it is not 
to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the Veda 
be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and 
future fruit, (a.) If you say that this injunction must have 
a visible fruit, and tins can be no other ^ than the know- 
ledge of the meaning of what is read, M-e must next ask 
you whether this said reading is enjoined as something 
which otherwise would not have been thought of, or 
whether as something which otherwise would have been 
optional, as we see in the rule for shelling rice.^ It caii- 
not be the former, for the reading of the Veda is a means 
of knowing the sense thereof from its very nature as 
reading, just as in the parallel instance of reading the 
Mahabharata ; and we see by this argument that it would 
present itself as an obvious means quite independently 
of the injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alterna- 
tive; just as the baked flour cake esilled jMroddsa is made 
only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar, 
when, but for the injunction, it might have been unhusked 
by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon and full 
moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is 

^ In p. 123, line 4, I read vilak- the lines vidldr atijantam aprdpto 

shana-drishtaphala. niyamah pdlcshike sati, tatra ckdn- 

^ In the former case it would be a yatra cha prdptau pa7-isamlhi/d vidlii' 

vidhi, in .the latter a niyama. Cf. yate. 


the priiicifial apurm, by tneiius of the various minor effecifl 
or suboidinatc iipurvas, i)roduced by the viirious subordi- 
nate parts of llic whole ceremony; and cousocjuc-ntly th« 
minor apiirva of the uuhuskingis the reason there for the 
restricting injunction. liut in the case which we are dis- 
cussinij, there is no such reason for any such restriction, 
as tl»e rites c:iu be equally well performed by gainin;; the 
knowledge of tiie Veda's meaning by reaaiug a writtca 
book, or by studying under an authorised teacher. Hence 
we conclude that there is no injunction to study the Turvu 
Miinainsu as a means of knowing tlie sense of the \'edaL 
(h.) " What, then, becomes of the Vedic injunction, ' The Veda 
is to be readT' Well, you must be content with th" fact 
that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit, 
although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the 
literal words of the Vedic text [without any care to unl'-r- 
stand the meaning which they may convey], since hcivcn, 
though not e.xpressly mentioned, is to be assumed as tlie 
fruit, atcoiuiii;,' to the analogy of the Vi^vaji' Just 

a-: .laimini, in iiis ajiiioiism (iv. 3, 15), " ],• : nit be 

h< aven, since it equally applies to nil," establishes that 
tjjose who are nut e^ " ' d 

to olTer ihe Visvajii > it 

its characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be 
in t! • -Uo. Asi- ' . ' •. "' 

:iuitwou. .;ned witli- 

out the injunctton, tiiis cannot be its sole object ; we must 

.1 , . -'.o fruit fr •* njunction's 

of the \ . V J' 

Tims, too, we shall keep the Smfiti ruie from being 
violated : '• Having read the Veda, let him bathe." For this 
rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place 
between reading the Veda and the studrnt's return to his 
liome; while, according to your oj)inion, after h- '" ' •^•"t 
the Veda, he would still hnvn tr> nMuain in hi.s 
house to read the Mimam * 

«'f no interval between w 


for these three reasons, (a.) that the study of Mimamsa is 
not enjoined, (h.) that heaven can be obtained by the 
simple reading of the text, and (c.) that the rule for the 
student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, we maintain 
that the study of the IMimarnsa discussions on duty is 
not to be commenced. 

The " authoritative conclusion " (siddhdntct), however, is 
as follows : — 

We grant that it cannot be a case of vidhi, for it might 
have been adopted on other grounds ; but not even Indra 
with his thunderbolt could make us lose our hold of the 
other alternative that it is a case of niyama. In the sen- 
tence, " The Veda is to be read," the af&x tavya expresses 
an enforcing power in the M'ord,i which is to be rendered 
visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain 
effect into existence ; and this enforcing power seeks some 
corresponding end which is connected with the man's crea- 
tive effort. Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as 
suggested by the whole word adhyetavija, which it thus 
seeks as an end; for this act of reading, thus expressed 
by the word, could never be regarded as an end, since it 
is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, consisting 
in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could 
the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be 
regarded as the end. For the mass of words called " Veda," 
which is what \\q really mean by the words " portion read," 
being eternal and omnipresent, could never fulfil the con- 
ditions of the four " fruits of action," production, fee- 
Therefore the only true end which remains to us is the 

^ The Mimamsa holds that the make up a sacrifice possessing a cer- 
potential and similar affixes, which tain mystic influence ; " next it im- 
constitute a vidhi, have a twofold plies an enforcing power residing in 
power ; by the one they express an itself (as it is the word of the self- 
active volition of the agent, corre- existent Veda and not of God) which 
spending to the root-meaning [artka- sets the hearer upon this course of 
bhdrand) ; by the other an enforcing action. 

power in the word [mhda-bhdvand) . - These four "fruits of action" 
Thus in svargaMmo yajeta, the cte are obscure, and I do not remember 
implies " let him produce heaven by to have seen them alluded to else- 
means of certain acts which together where. I was told in India that 


knowledge of the tnoauing, as obtained by carrying out the 
sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old 
ruU', " He has tlie riglit who has tlie want, the power, and 
the wit," those who are aiming to undcrstami certain tilings, 
as the new and full moon sacrifices, use tlieir thiily reading 
to learn the truth about tlicni. And the injunction for read- 
ing, since it virtually excludes the reading of written books, 
&c, [from the well-known technical sense of the word 
"read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea 
that the reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated 
character [as taught by a duly authorised teacher]. Tliere- 
fore, as the principal apurva, produced by the great new 
and full moon sacritices, necessitatfs and establishes tho 
subordinate apiirvas produceil by tho inferior sacriticial 
acts, as unhusking tho rice, &c., so the moss of apuroa 
proiluced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes 
a previous apurva produced by the restricting injuncliou 
(niyania), which prescribes reading the Veda as the meaoi 
to know how to perform these sacrifices. If you hesitate 
to concede that a nij/ama could have this future intluenco 
called apurva, the same doubt might equally invalidate 
the efficacy of a vidhi [as the two stand on th- ' vel 

as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the s ._ :i a 

valid one that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy 
of the Vihajit ofTering, since, if there is a i»re*ent an«l 
visible fruit in the form of a knowledge of the meaning of 
the sacred text, it is improper to suppose any other future 
and unseen friiit. Thus it has been said — 

" Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not 8Upi>05c 
an unseen one; but if a vidhi has the restricting 
meaning of a nii/ama, it docs not tiiereby become* 

ihfj WCr' -■ • • •'. .,;.,. ;•<>.. iff l-ir.TiM.l-M !?'' •//• n.11 

beinjr. gr 

i«hin;j. I 

tbinl, ftftt), AU'i mklU •■! liiu Ail •>.' <i/>s.rid, •«:. , ^- 

9ihinu m-ntii>nr<l in Sautum'i pi/li, and amyi. :^y* 

V»jnuMichi, 5, t.e ,<tst»,jiiytte, raniA- M. V. ii. 1, ;. 


But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads 
the simple text of the Veda may not attain to a know- 
ledge of its meaning, still, as he who reads the Veda with 
its angas, grammar, &c., may attain to this knowledge, the 
study of Mimarnsa will be useless." But this is not true : 
for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of 
the literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend 
on this kind of discussion. For instance, when it is said, 
" He offers anointed gravel," neither grammar nor nigama ^ 
nor nirukta will determine the true meaning that it is to 
be anointed \vitli ghee and not with oil, &c. ; it is only by 
a Mimamsa discussion that the true meaning is unravelled 
from the rest of the passage, " Verily, ghee is brightness."^ 
It is therefore established that the study of Mimamsa is 
enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts 
the passage of Smriti, "Having read the Veda, let him 
bathe," which implies that he should now leave his teacher's 
house, and prohibits any further delay ; as the words do 
not necessarily imply tliat the return to the paternal roof 
is to follow immediately on his having read the Veda, but 
only that it is to follow it at some time, and that both 
actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see 
in the common phrase, " Having bathed, he eats." There- 
fore from the purport of the injunction we conclude that 
the study of the Piirva Mimamsa Sastra, consisting of a 
thousand "topics,"^ is to be commenced. This topic is 
connected with the main subject of the Sastra as being a 
subsidiary digression, as it is said, " They call that a subsi- 
diary digression which helps to establish the main subject."-^ 

I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the 
same "topic " in accordance with the teaching of tlie Guru 

In the Smriti rule,^ " Let him admit as a pupil the 
Brahman lad when eight years old (by investing him wiih 

^ The nigamas are the Yedic ^ This is to explain the last of the 

quotations in Y^ska's nirulia. five members, the saypc/ati. 

- See Nyaya-mala-vistara, i. 4, 19. * Cf. Asvaliljana's Grihya Sutras, 

•* The exact number is 915. i. 19, i. 

Tlil: JAIMISI DAK^iASA. 185 

tlie sacred cord), let liiiu insjlruct liim," the ulject of tho 
diifcliou appears to be the pupil's instruction. Now a direc- 
tion must have reference to somebody to be directed; aud if 
you usk who is here to be directed, I reply, "lie who desires 
to be a teacher," since, by Panini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root ni 
is used in the dtmancpada wlieu honour, &c., are implied, i.e., 
here the duty which a teacher performs to his pupils. He 
who is to be directed as to admitting a pupil is the same 
j)erson who is to be directed as to teaching him, since both 
arc the object of one aiid the same command. Hence the 
in.spired sage Maun has said (ii. 140), "The l>r.ihman wiio 
girds his pupil with the Baciilicial cord and tlieu instructa 
him in the Veda, with its subsidiary aii^as anil mystic 
doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (dc/uirjfa)." Now 
the teaching which is the function of the te;icher cannot 
be fultilled without the learning whieh is the funciiun of 
tlic pupil, and therefore the very injunction to teach im- 
plies aud establishes a corresponding obligation to learn, 
since the iidluencer's efVurts fail without those of one to be 
induenced. If you object that this view does not make 
reading the Veda tlie ol ject of definite injunction, I reply, 
What matters it to us if it is not ? For even if there is 
no reason for us to admit a separate injunction for reading 
the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined as a 
du" ' • which mentions it is ":al 

am lary ripetiiion." ' Ti i»e 

former privid facie argument and ita answer, which were 
given Wfore under the idea that tljere was a definite 
injunction to read the Veda, must now be iliscusscil in 
anotljer way to suit this new view. 

Now the privid facie * was that the study of 

Miiuslmsa. not being aui . ly enjoined, is not to be 

commenced ; the "conclusion" was that it is to be com- 
meneeil as being thus authoritatively enjoined. 

> "ni.- tinufoli. ..( r..'ir..-. iii,i.'i.-i .in-...<.f<i in thr j.f. wr,* r»»r U th« 


Now the upholders of the former or prima facie view 
arjue as follows : — " "We put to the advocates of the con- 
clusion the following dilemma: Docs the injunction to 
teach imply that the pupil is to understand the meaning 
of what is read, or does it only refer to the bare reading ? 
It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of teaching 
cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understand- 
ing what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a 
recipient]; and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare 
reading is sufficient, the Mimamsa discussions in question 
will have no subject or use. For their proper subject is a 
point in the Veda, which is doubted about from having 
been only looked at in a rough and impromptu way ; now 
if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, 
why should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope 
of ascertaining the true meaning by means of laborious 
discussion ? And therefore in accordance with the well- 
known principle, ' That which is a thing of use and not a 
matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an intelligent 
man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and in 
contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is 
in the present case no such thing as a subject to exercise 
it upon, or a useful end to be attained by it, Ave maintain 
tliat the study of Mimarnsa is not to be commenced." 

We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does 
not imply a corresponding necessity that the student must 
understand the meaning; still when a man has read tlie 
Veda with its subsidiary angas, and has comprehended 
the general connection of the words with their respective 
meanings, this will imply an understanding of the mean- 
ing of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human 
compositions. " But may we 'lot say that, just as in 
the case of the mother who said to her son, ' Eat poison,' 
the meaning literally expressed by the words was not 
what she wished to convey, since she really intended to 
forbid his eating anything at all in such and such a house; 
so if the literal meaning of tlie Veda does not express its 


real purport, the old objection w ill recur with full force 
that the study of Mi'inam-:;! will liave neither suhjt( t nor 
end [as there will be no use in understanding the liteml 
meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only leatl 
astray, and so common sense must be the ultin 
We reply, that your supposed illustration 
in question are not n-ally parallel. In the supposed 
illustration the primary meaning of the wonls would 
be obviously precluded, l)ecaus.' a direction to eat poison 
would be inconceivable in the mouth of an aulhoritativo 
and trustworthy speakt-r like a mother, and you wouM 
know at once that this could not be what she wished to 
say ; but in the case of the Veda, which is underivcd from 
any personal author, why should not the literal : - 

be the one actually intended? And it is just tl. 
that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this 
intemled meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of 
Mimamsd discussion; and the settlement of these doubts 
will bo its proper " end." Therefore, whenever the tnie 
meaning of the Veda is not obtained ^ by that reading 
which is virtually prescribed by the authoritative injunc- 
tion to a rrahman to teach, it will be a proper subject for 
systematic discussion ; and hence we hold that the study 
of is enjoined, and should be commenced. 

" Well,* be it so" [sny the followers of the Xyaya], " btit 
how can the Vedas be saiil to be underived frouj any personal 
author, when there is no evidence to establish this ? 
Would you maintain that they have no p- thor be- 
cause, although there is an unbroken line : n, there 

is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case with 
the soul"?' This argument is weal 
characteristics [unlToken tradition, "> ^ : 

for those who hold the human origin of the Vedns main- 

' I rcaU in p. 127, line \2, (imirn- I>r. ^tuir'a tr»n*}atino in hia JS>im1tVI 
I b*vo frc<{ucntly Unrowrri (mm ning. 


tain that the line of tradition was interrupted at the time 
of the dissolution of the universe. And, again, what is 
meant by this assertion that the author is not remembered? 
Is it (i.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that no author 
is remembered ? The first alternative cannot be accepted, 
since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. 
iSTor can tlie second, because it cannot stand the test of the 
following dilemma, viz., is it meant («.) that no author of 
the Veda is remembered by some one person, or (h.) by any 
person whatever ? The former supposition breaks down, 
as it would prove too much, since it would apply to such 
an isolated stanza as " He who is religious and has over- 
come pride and anger," &c.^ And the latter supposition is 
inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person 
who was not omniscient to know that no author of the 
A^eda was recollected by any person whatever. Moreover, 
there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal author, 
for we argue as follows : — The sentences of the Veda must 
have originated from a personal author, since they have 
the character of sentences like those of Kalidasa and other 
writers. And, again, the sentences of the Veda have been 
composed by a competent person, since, while they possess 
authority, they have, at the same time, the character of 
sentences, like those of Manu and other sages. 

But [ask the Mimarnsakas] may it not be assumed that 
" all study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study 
of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda 
nmst always have had one common character which was 
the same in former times as now ; " and therefore this un- 
interrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of 
the Veda ? This reasoning, however [the Naiyayikas 

^ MadhaVii means that the author sons did not know the origin, but 

of this stanza, though unknown to which, nevertheless, had a human 

many people, was not necessarily author. The stanza in question is 

unknown to all, as his contempo- quoted in full in Bohtlingk's In- 

raries, no doubt, knew who wrote it, dische Sprtiche, No. 5598, from the 

and his descendants might perhaps MS. anthology caDed the Subhdshi- 

still be aware of the fact. In this tdrnara. For muktaJca, see Sdh. 

case, therefore, we have an instance Barp., § 558. 
of a composition of which some per- 


answer], cannot rise to the heiylit of proof, for it has no 
more validity than such obviously illu.sory rcaaoniut,', ;m 
" All stiuly of thu MaliaibharaU was i»recodeU by an earlier 
study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study 
of the Miihabluiratii, which must have been the same in 
former liines as now." 15ut [the ^limaipsakas will ask 
whether there is not a diflerence beween these two cases, 
since] the Sniriti declares t' ' '." ' '' i 

was tiie author of the M a 

the line, " Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishnu could be 
the maker of the Mahahharata ? " [while nothin-^; of this 
sort is recorded in any Sniriti in regard to ih"' Veda]. This 
argument, however, w pithless, since those words of the 
Purushasukta (Rii,' V., x. 90), " From him s] ■ IT ' 

and Siiman verses; from him sprang; the Mti: 
the Yajus arose ; " prove that the Veda had a maker. 

Further [proceed the Naiyayikas] we hold that soun I 
is non-eternal * because it has genus, and is also percep- 
tible to the external organs of beings such as ourselves, 
just as a jar i.^.* "But," you may object, "is not this 
argument refuted by the pr^of arising from the fact that 
we recognise the letter g (for example) as the same we 
have heard before?" This objection, however, is extrrr: ' 
weak, for the recognition in question is powerless lo : 
our argument, since it !ias reference only to identity of 
speeus, as in the case of a man whose hair ha-s ' •. 

and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has : i 

afresh. " liut [asks the Mimarnsaka] how can the Ved.i 
have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameivara, who 
has r.o palate or other organs of speech, and therefore 
cannot have pronounced the letters?" "This objection 

• The ettniity of the Vc^a dc- « 

prrfli < n ?! ;- t- rvt of the Mimdiitaa i 

t ■ -11*1. t' 

.:* (M the atomi of 1 

■ ■ .,...- r I • iii« 

t : thui u» tlM 

tb«j arv mil impenxptibir 


[answers the Naiyayika] is not happy, because, though 
Paramesvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume 
a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his wor- 
shij)pers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the 
doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are in- 

I shall now [says the Mimamsaka] clear up the whole 
question. What is meant by this paurusheyatva [" deri- 
vation from a personal author "] which it is sought to 
prove? Is it (i.) mere procession (utpannatva) from a 
person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such 
as ourselves, when we daily utter it ? or (2.) is it the 
arrangement — with a view to its manifestation — of know- 
ledge acquired by other modes of proof, as in the case of 
treatises composed by persons like ourselves ? If the first 
meaning be intended, there Mill be no dispute between 
us.^ If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is 
established (a.) by inference,^ or (h.) by supernatural testi- 
mony ? (a.) The former alternative cannot be correct, be- 
cause your argument would equally apply to the sentences 
in dramas such as the Mdlatimadhava [which, of course, 
being a work of fiction, has no authoritative character]. 
If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving 
clause, "while they possess authority,"^ [as supra, p. 188, 
line 21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philo- 
sopher. For the sentences of the Veda are universally 
defined to be sentences which prove things that are not 
provable by other evidence. But if you could establish 
that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable 
by other evidence, this definition would be at once con- 

^ The Mimdmsaka allows that the like the compositions of Manu, 

ucJichdrana or utterance is non- &c." 
eternal. ^ The argument will now run, 

- The inference will be as follows : " The Vedas were arranged after 

" The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of 

being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess 

proof, with a view to their manifes- authority, they still have the nature 

tation, from the very fact of their of sentences, like the composition of 

having the nature of sentences, just Manu, &c." 


tradicted, just as if a man were to say that Iiis mother 
vas a barren woman. And even if we "jranted that Para- 
me^vara niiglit assume a body in sport, in order to sliow 
kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow 
that he would perceive things bt^yond the reach of the 
senses, from tlie want of any means of apprehendinj; 
objects removed from him in place, in time, ond in nature.* 
Nor is it to be a>.sumed that \.'. ■ 
alone would have ll»e power of | 

for we can only ilraw upon our imagination in accordance 
with our past experience. This has bee: ' ' 1 by the 
(luru [I'rabliakara] when he refutes the .u of an 

omniscient author — 

" Wherever we do find the power of on organ intensified,* 
it is done without iis going beyond its own proper 
objects ; thus it may appear in the power of seeing 
the very distant or the very minute, but not in the 
ear's becoming coj^nisant of fonu." 
Hence (b.) we also maintain that your position cannot 
be established b) any supposed supernatural testimony 
[as that quoletl above from the IJig-Veda, " from him 
sprang the Rich and Saman verses "]. For the rule of 
I'aniui (iv. 3, loi) will still remain inviolate, llmi the 
grammatical ailixes with whicli such names as Kd^haka, 
K:ila| a, and Taittiriya are formed, impart to those deri- 
vatives the sense of "uttered by" Kafha, Kahipin, Ac, 
though we maintain that these names have rcfen>nce [not 
to those parts of the Veda as first c<-: 
sages, but] to the fact thai these sages ; 
schools of traditional study. And in the same way we 
hold [in reference to this verse from ihe K '.' 
it only refers to the institution of certain s< , 
ditional study of these Vedas. 

Nor will any supposed inference establish the uon> 

' In AMuniing a in»Uri*l bndv. he <■ 

winild be mbjcct to Di»tcri*l limiU- •' 


eternity of sound, because [as we said before] it is opposed 
to the evidence of our consciousness, [since we certainly 
recognise the letter now heard as the one heard before]. 
Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although the letters are 
not the same, they seem to be so on account of their 
identity of species. For here we ask our opponents a 
question — Is this idea that " the apparent sameness arises 
from identity of species " put forward from a wish to 
preclude entirely any idea of the letters being the same, 
or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experi- 
ence shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous 
[as in the cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above] ? 
(a.) If it arises from the latter reason, we Mimamsakas, 
who hold that the Veda is its own evidence, have said in 
reference to this timid imagination — 

"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet 
unknown to him will come hereafter to stop his 
present conclusion, will go to utter ruin in every 
transaction of life, his mind a mass of doubts." 
(h.) "But [the Naiyayikas will ask] does not this recog- 
nition of g and other letters [as the same which we heard 
before] refer to the species which exists the same in each, 
and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we 
perceive that they are different as uttered by different 
persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions 
as we do when we say ' Soma^arman is reading ' ? " This 
objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its prede- 
cessors, for as there is no proof of any distinction between 
the individual ^'s, there is no proof that we ought to 
assume any such thing as a species (j; and we maintain 
that, just as to the man who does not understand [the 
Naiyayika doctrine of] the species g, the one species [in 
the Naiyayika view] will by the influence of distinction of 
place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as 
if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as 
small, as great, as long, as short ; so to the man who does 
not understand our [Mimarnsaka doctrine of] one individual 

run J A IMIM DA RSA SA . 1^3 

(/, llie one g (in our view) will by the diversity of " nmni- 
festers," ' appear to him associated with their respective 
peculiarilies; and as contrary characters arc in this way 
ascrilK-d [to tlie letter*/], there is a fallacious appearance 
cf distinction [between dillcrcnt g's]. But docs this asciip- 
tion of contrary characters, which is thus roi^anlcd as 
creaiiny a diilerence [between the fj's], result (i.) from the 
nature of t)ie thing, or (2.) from our imagination ? There 
is no proof of the former alternative; for, if it were true, 
as an inherent dilTerence wouM have to be admitted be- 
tween different g'a, we sliould have to say, " Chaitra has 
uttered ten </'«," a»id not " Ci ' the same 

«/ ten times." On the latter ?u^ ^ s no proof 

uf any inherent distinction between </'s, for inherent one- 
ness is not destroyed by a difTerence of ext< ' : -. 
Thus we must not conceive, from the appai 'ii 
caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., that tliere 
is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivi- 
siMe ether. Tiie current use of the rejected phrase [i.e., 
"difTetent" as applied to the g'a] is really caused by the 
noisf, which in each case is difl'erent. This has been said 
by the great teacher — 

"Tlie object which the Naiyiiyikas seek by supi>osing a 
sjKJcies is, in fact, gained from the letter itself ; 
and the object w hich they aim at by supposing an 
individuality in letters, is attained from audible 
noises;' so that the assumption of spe-- •••^ - 
And again — 

" Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct 
of recognition is always awake within us, it pre- 
cludes by its superior evidence all the iuferencea to 
prove sound's non-cterniiy." 
This at once refutes the argument i;iven in the fNaiya- 

' Jaimini mninlainn ihut the vihr»- "<^- 

ljon» of t>.. .Ai'r •■ manifcut " the :'• "• 

~'"\\ . V .kut bj 'noiM' (N" ' «7- 



yika] treatise by Vagi's wara, entitled Mdna-manohara, 
'■ sound is non-eternal from the fact of its being a special 
quality belonging to an organ of sense ^ (sc. tlie ear), just 
as colour is to the eye." 

We can also refute it in the following ways : (a.) If we 
follow the [Sankhya and Vedanta] view that sound is a 
substance, it is evidently overthrown- [as in that case 
sound cannot be a quality] ; [h) if we take it as referring 
to the noise, not the sound, we have no dispute, as it only 
establishes what we ourselves allow; and (c.) the infer- 
ence is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [lipdrfAi] 
of asrdvanatva, or "the not causing audition."^ So Uda- 
yana tries at great length to establish that, although ether, 
the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of 
that which abides in this site is perceptible ; and he then 
brings forward as an evidence for the non-eternity of 
sound, that sense perception which causes the use of such 
common expressions as " The tumult is stopped," " The 
sound has arisen." * But he is sufficiently answered ^ by 
our old reply [in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of 

^ The Nydya holds that colour and is too wide, i.e., it is sometimes found 

sound are respectively special quali- where the major term "non-eternal" 

ties of the elements light and ether: is not found, as, e.g., in sound itself, 

and as the organs of seeing and according to the Mimdmsa doctrine, 

hearing are composed of light and To obviate this he proposes to add the 

ether, each will, of cor.rse, have its "condition," "not causing audition," 

corresponding special quality. as he will readily concede that all 

- In p. 131, line 7, I read jwa- those things are non-eternal which, 

ti/ukshdsiddheh. while not causing audition, are special 

•^ Cf. my note pp. 7,8, (on the Char- qualities belonging to an organ of 

vaka-darsana) for the upddhi. The sense, as, e.g., colour. But I need 

xi.pddhi or " condition " limits a too scarcely add that this addition would 

general middle term ; it is defined make the whole argannent nugatory, 

as " that which always accompanies In fact, the Piirva ^Mimamsa and the 

the major term, but does not always Nyaya can never argue together on 

accompany the middle." Thus if this question of the eternity of sound, 

the condition "produced from wet as their points of view are so totally 

fuel " is added to " fire," the argu- different. 

ment " the mountain has smoke be- ■• In the former case we have the 

cause it has fire '" is no longer a false dhuamsa of sound, in the latter its 

one. Here, in answer to the Ny;iya prdgabluh-a. 

argument in the text, our author " In p. 131, line 12, I read sama- 

objects that its middle term ("from jxiulii for samdpohi, i.e., the passive 

the fact of its being a special quality aorist of sam + aja + uh. 
belonging to an organ of sense ") 

TUB jfAf\llSlDARSASA. 19; 

distinction arises from contrary cliaractors being crroue> 
ously ascriU'd, just as, in the story, the demon Tala went 
away [jis well as Hotalu] when the ofTeiing of l>lo(xl w;n 
given to the latter.^ And as for the objection raised by tho 
author of tlie yi/dyahhusfiam- that, if sound were eternal, 
the conclusion must follow that it would be either always 
perceptible or always imperceptible, tliis also is obviated 
by our allowing that we only {>erceive that sound which 
is manifested by our articulate noise.' And as for the 
(Naiyuyika) argument against the existence* of such a 
constant relation as this which is supposed iKtween tho 
manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since 
they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense 
of hearing, this is invalid, as it will indisputably apply 
with equal force in the case of the soul* 

Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not 
originated from any personal author, and as the minutest 
germ of suspiiion against it is thus absolutely desinjyed, 
we hold ii a3 satisfactorily demonstrated that it has u 
self - established authority in all matttis relating to 

"Well"* [say our opi)onents]. "let this question rest; 

' I du not know thU U-^'md. TiUa 
and IV-r.-i!* »:>• thr t'.v^i '!'-m'>n<i who 

C»IT^ ^ 

in tl 

* 1 '.) I.' r-' U'* i..'i-'.r.itiii^- 

\jiWLT can •uflicv for two 





p. 26). 

* Jjkmni, 

J. IndrJ, 

or oar ** arliculato 

1 rt^iiU> uui^-i^t^uU liM Af^- 

* I 

roXu^ , 

* It would Item OMe of rf 


but how al30ut another well-known controversy ? It is 
said — 

" ' The Scinkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and 
non-authoritativeness are self-proved ; the folloM-ers of 
the Nyaya hold that both are proved by something else 
[as inference, &c.] ; the Buddhists hold that the latter is 
self-proved and the former proved by something else ; the 
teachers of the Veda maintain that authoritativeness is 
self-proved and non-authoritativeness proved by some- 
thing else.' Now we ask, amidst all this discussion, how 
do the Mimamsakas accept as established their tenet that 
the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved ? And what 
is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritative- 
ness ? Is it (a.) that authoritativeness springs from itself ? 
or (&.) that it springs from the right knowledge in which 
it resides ? or (c.) that it springs from the instrumental 
causes [as the eye, &c.] which produced the right know- 
ledge in wliich it resides ? or (d.) that it resides in a par- 
ticular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes 
which produced the right knowledge?^ or (c.) that it 
resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instru- 
mental causes only which produced the right knowdedge ? 

" (a.) It cannot be the^rs^, because wherever the relation 
of cause and effect is found there must be a difference, 
and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject 
[i.e., authoritativeness cannot cause itself], (h.) It cannot 
be the second, because if knowledge, which is a quality, 
were the cause of authoritativeness, it would have to be a 
substance, as being an intimate cause.^ (c.) It cannot be 
the third, because ' authoritativeness ' cannot properly be 

^ This is Prabhrikara's view (see - Substances are "intimate c.iuses" 
Siddh. Muktdv., p. 118). The first to their qualities, and only substances 
knowledge is in the form " This is a have qualities ; now if authoritative- 
jar ; " the second knowledge is the ness, which isa characteristic of right 
cognition of this perception in the knowledge, were caused by it, it 
form "I perceive the jar;" and this would be a quality of it, that is, 
latter produces authoritativeness right knowledge would be its inti- 
(prdmdnya), which resides in it as mate cause and therefore a sub- 
its characteristic. stance. 


'produced' ut all/ wheihcr we call it u yeiieial characUT- 
istic (upddhi) or a species (/i/t);' for if we call it an 
upddki, it is defined as the absolute non-existenco of any 
contradiction to a certain kind of knowledj^e Nvhich does 
not possess the nature of recollection ;' and this cannot be 

produced, for wc all allow that absolute non-"- • • • 13 

eternal ; and still less can wo speak of its bcin ?d, 

if we re^^ard it as a species. (</.) Nor can it be Uw fourth, 
for wronu' knowledge [as well as right knowledge] is a par- 
ticular kind of knowledge, and the instrumental causes 
whicii produce the general are included in those which pro- 
duce the particular,* just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied 
to ' tree,' is included in the particular seed of any special 
tree, as, e.g., the Dulbetgia Sisu ; oiherwise we nii.^ht sup- 
pose that the particular had no instrumental cau^o at all. 
Your definition would therefore extend too far [and include 
erroneous as well as true knowlodgc] ; for ii" : utive- 
ness, which Vedantists and most Miniaip- v to be 
produced by something external, must also be considered 
ns residing in a pariicular ki " ' [«.r. a wrong know- 
ledge] produced [in part] iiy i ; mental causes wiiich 
produced the right knowledge, (e.) As for your fi/lk 
view, \\ ' ' r by b» ! :u- 

mental ^ Aiiich pi' _j ou 

mean to include or exclude the absence of a 'defect*? It 
cannot be t! : alternate ' of 

the Xyaya u . that au . oy 

something external [as inference, &cj. would at once grant 
that author:' -.::...; ;. ...^| 

causes tifk:. t.' 

> T i^: iU in- » 'P '" -• • ^' ' - 'hAt 

•tr: r«c<.: 

•tail "•ction," bjr !■ 




Neither can it be the latter alternative; for, inasmuch as 
it is certain that the absence of a * defect ' is found com- 
bined with the various instrumental causes, this absence of 
a ' defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of 
right knowledge, since right knowledge will always ac- 
company its presence, and be absent if it is absent,^ and 
it will at the same tune be not an unimportant condition. ^ 
If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a 
cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can 
be an effect or not ? If it cannot, then we should have to 
allow that cloth is eternal, as its " emergent non-existence" 
or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, 
then why should it not be a cause also ? So this rope 
binds you at both ends. This has also been said by Uda- 
yana [in his Kusumafijali, i. 10] — 

" ' As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause 
as well as an effect.' 

" The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows : — Eight 
knowledge depends on some cause^ other than the common 
causes of knowledge, from the very fact that, while it is an 
effect, it is also knowledge, just as wrong knowledge does.^ 
Autlioritativeness is known through something external to 
itself [e.g., inference], because doubt arises in regard to it in 
an unfamiliar case, as we also see in non-authoritativeness. 

" Therefore, as we can prove that autlioritativeness is 
both produced and recognised by means of something 
external, the Mimamsa tenet that ' autlioritativeness is 
self-proved ' is like a gourd overripe and rotten." 

This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a 
vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist ; for (a.) we 
mean by our phrase " self-proved " that while right know- 
ledge is produced by the instrumental causes of know- 

^ Scil. if there be doshdbhdra there ^ Sril. or the absence of " defect," 

is j^ramd; if not, not. Inp. 132, line doshdbhdva. 

20, I read doshdbhdvatvena for do- * Wrong knowledge has dosha- 

shdhhdvasahakritatvena. bJuiva or tlie presence (if a " defect " 

- Anyathdsiddhatvam means ni- as its cause, in addition to the com- 

yatapurvavartitve sati andvasyakut- mon causes. 



ledge, it is nut i.roiluceJ by any other cause («s " defect, ' 
&c.) The fuUowini^ is our arj^unieut as drawn out in 
full: — Right kuowleilgo is not produced by any other 
instrumental causes tlian those of knowledge, while, ai 
the same time, it is produced by those, because it is no' 
the site of wnmgness of knowledge, — just like a jar.' Nor 
can Udayanas* argument be brought forward as establish- 
ing the dependence of authoritativeness on something 
external, for it is swallowed up by tiie dragon of the 
equally potent contrail ictory argument. " Right know- 
ledge is not .produced by any cause which is other than 
the causes of knowledge and is also other than •defect,'* 
from the very fact of its being kn —like wrong 

knowledge." Again, since right knov. . , .ui arise from 
the causes of knowledge per se, it would be a needless com- 
plexity to snjtpose that anything else is a cause, whether 
you call it -.xjuna or the absence of a "defect" {doslia)} 

" Rut surely if the presence of a defect is the caaso of 
wrong knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence 
must be a cause of riglit knowledge ? " We meet this, 
however, by maintaining that the absence of defect is only 
an indirect and rerr. , as it oi " ively by 

preventing wrong k: ■, As it ; — 

it cniitiot rt'.-ii-i'' III % jar. The jnr 
i.«, of r"'ir»<-. !T-»!".''»"! hv f'th'T in- 




b. '• , 

inentai cause* ot > 

which >tha< n<ithi; 

and to \ ■■ 

obvioui> . 





• thv aq^mcnl 
'f Uio prvvkxu 


rauarti I ' ■ 

.'- ia 

;Vv. " .!■ 

. by 
'• that wrno* 


b^ the al* lie. 

; 'A • ' 

•• .or 


"Therefore we reasonaLly conclude from the presence 
oi gvnas the absence of ' defects,'^ from their absence 
tlie non-existence of the two kinds of non-authori- 
tativeness,^ and from this the general conclusion." ^ 

(6.) We maintain that the recognition of right know- 
ledge is produced by the same causes only which make 
us perceive the first knowledge* [sc. the eye, mind, &c.] 
Kor can you object that this view is precluded, because it 
would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt ; 
for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, although 
all the causes which produce knowledge are present, there 
is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, 
as a " defect," &c. 

As for your argument [0 Naiyayika ! given supra, in p. 
198, lines 17-24], I ask. Is your own argument an authori- 
tative proof by itself or not ? If it is, it proves too much 
[for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its 
own dependence on external proof, whereas you hold it to 
be independent of such] ; and if it is not, we sliould have a 
case of rcgressus in infinitum, for it will want some other 
proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its 
turn will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever. 

As for the argument urged by Udayana^ in the Kusu- 
manjali, when he tries to establish that immediate and 
vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty 
as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him 
acting: "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that 

' The guna (or ^^XricrTrj ^|is) of a jar," the second knowledge is the 

an organ is not properly a cause of cognition of this perception in the 

pramd but rather dosJidbkdia-bod- form "I perceive the jar;" and 

hala. ' simultaneously with it arises the 

- Scil. "doubtful" (sandiydha) and cognition of the truth of the percep- 

" ascertained non-authoritativeness " tion, i.e., its authoritativeness or 

(n ikhitdprd mdnya). prd mdnya. 

^ Utsarga is a general conclusion * This seems to be a quotation of 

which is not necessarily true in every Udayana's own words, and no doubt 

particular case ; but here it means is taken from his very rare prose 

the conclusion that "right knowledge commentary on the Kusumanjali, a 

has no special causes but the common specimen of which I printed in the 

causes of knowledge, the eye," &c. preface to my edition. This passage 

* The first knowledge is '* This is must come from the fifth book (v. 6 ?) 


of llie wi-h,' wisli on the kMO\vleil<,'e that tl»o thing wished 
for is !i nn'niis to attain .si»ine wislied-for eml, aiut tliis '\^ 
only ascertained by an inferenoo hasetl on some 'sij,'n' wiii ii 
proves that the thin^j is ch)3ely connected with the wishoil- 
for end, and this inference depends on the thii: - " 
in direct contact willi tlie agent's senses; but tl;: 
the whole series of antecedent steps the Miinanisji idea of 
the perception of authoritativencss is never mwo fuun I ni 
a cause of action." All tins appears t<j us simple l)lu>' r, 
like tiiat of the tliief who ostentatiously tiirows open all 
his limbs before nie, when I hail actually found the jjold 
under liis armpit. It is only the knowledge that the thing 
is a means to attain the desired end, and this knowledge 
recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which 
causes the definite volition to arise at all ; and in this we 
can distinctly trace the inthieiice of that very j- 

of authoritativencss [whose existence he so vtl. 

pretended to deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in 
any case from tloubt, then, as it might always a; 
every given case, all ascertainment of aulhoriia ., .. 
would be useless; and as the very existence of what i< 
unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor aulhorita;. 
ncss would have to be considered as lUad ami bur; , 
Hut enough of this pnilix controversy ; since it has been 
said — 

** Therefore the authoritativencss of a cognition, which 
(authoritativeness) presented itself us representing 
a real fact, may be 
of a 'defect,' which : . . 

sign that proves the discrepancy Iwtwecn the cog- 
nition and the fact."* , 
Now with regard to the Veda, which is the selfrrov ! 
and authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [wi- 
following divirgency between *' " ^ " ' 

> I rraU tatj'riiihuryam (or tat- a<i' 

prtifkttTjft in p. I V4. '•'•" 7- •"■ '*""* 

■ Thia aUnxA »ltinii« ttut Mcord- •u:. ' I 

ing to the Miniiii|i«i Kboul, while 


schools] : — The Veda is composed of three portions, respec- 
tively called "hymns" (mantra), "explanatory passages" 
(arthavdda), and "injunctions" (vidhi) ; and by "injunc- 
tion " we mean such sentences as " Let him who desires 
heaven sacrifice with the jyotishtoma." Here ta, the affix 
of tlie third person singular, denotes an enjoining power, 
Avliich is " coloured " [or rendered definite] Ly the meaning 
of the root, according to the opinion of the followers of 
Bhatta Kumarila, who maintain that words signify ^ some- 
thing definite by themselves [apart from the sentence]. 
The followers of Guru Prabhakara, on the contrary, hold 
that the whole sentence is a command relating to the 
sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an 
action or something to be done.- Thus all has been made 
plain. • E. B. C. 

^ I take vijutpatti here as used for i.e., the bovine genus as conuectfd 

ialti ; siddhe mesins ghafddau. with "bringing." We cannot have 

- These are the two great Mlm- a case of a noun without some 
itmsa schools The former, called governing verb, and vice versa. Cf. 
abhihitdnvaya-vddinah, hold (like Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce 
the Naiydyika school) that words by {Comparative Philology, page 136): 
themselves can express their sepa- " We do not think in words but in 
rate meaning by the function a^Airf/dt sentences; hence we may assert 
or " denotation ;-i' these are subse*_ that a living language consists of 
quently combified into a sentence sentences, not ' of words. But a 
expressing one connected idea. The sentence is formed not of single 
li^tter, called a7ivitdbhidhd7ia-vddinah, independent words, but of words 
hold that words only express a mean- which refer to one another in a par- 
ing as parts of a sentence and gram- ticular manner, like the correspond- 
niatically connected with each other ; ing thought, which does not consist 
they only mean an action or some- of single independent ideas, but of 
thing connected with an action. In such as, connected, form a whole, and 
(/dm dnaya, gdm does not properly determine one another mutually." 
mean gotva, but dnayandnvita-gotva, 

( 203 ) 



If any one asks, " Wlicre are we to learn how to separate 
a root an<l an aflix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the 
original root ami this is an aflix,' " may we not reply that 
to those who have drunk ilie waters of Patafljali this 
question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that 
the rules of grammar have reference to this very pi>int of 
the separation of the original roots and affixes ? Thus the 
very first sentence of the venerable Palanjali, the author 
of the "Great Commentary," is '' athn dalxldnuJldsanam," 
"Now comes the exposition of words." The particle atha 
("now") is used here as implying a new topic or a com- 
mencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of wonls," is 
meant the system of grammar put forth by Panini. Now 
a doubt might here arise as to wlieliter this phrase implies 
that the exposition of words is to be tlic main topic or 
not ; and it is to obviate any such doubt t 

the particle atha, since this particle iu.^ ... , i 

follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion 
of everj'thing else. 

Tlid word " exposition " (anu4(isana), as here used, im- 
plies that thereby Vaidic wonls, such as those in the line 
^aifino (frrir af' ' ser'ular '• iriciilary 

t(» the»«', .!S t;i>: ■ r "cow, . " mun," 

' MidhATB u«c-s thia |«' t' nil i< • t- rnal. H« thorr/oro trraU of 

Iwcftuae th« tn'=^»»*ri.^: r«, and iioC io hb Jaliatiii 
ftnd fuller (k-vt'l<>|irtl thf > 

iVrTaMimiir-tt •chool iLai »>uu^1 iU^ Vr<U, - 


"elephant," " bird," &c., are made the subject of the exposi- 
tion, i.e., are deduced from tlieir original roots and properly 
formed, or, in other words, are explained as divided into 
root and affix. We must consider that the compound in 
this phrase represents a genitive of the object [saMdnitsd- 
sanam standing for sdbdasydnusdsana7n\ and as there is a 
rule of Panini {karmani dm, ii. 2, 14), which prohibits 
composition in such a construction, we are forced to con- 
cede that the phrase sahddjiusdsanayn does not come before 
us as a duly authorised compound. 

Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true appli- 
cation of the alleged rule of Panini], for we hold that, by 
ii. 3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both ex- 
pressed in one and the same sentence in connection with 
a word ending with a krit affix, there the object alone can 
be put in the genitive and not the agent ; ^ this limitation 
arising from our taking utlwyaprdpti in the siitra as a 
hahuvrihi compound.^ Thus we must say, "Wonderful is 
the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We 
may, however, remark in passing that some authors do 
maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in th.e 
genitive (as well as the object) ; hence we find it stated in 
the Kasika Commentary : " Some authors maintain that 
there should be an option in such cases without any dis- 
tinction, and thus they would equally allow such a con- 
struction as ' the exposition of words of the teacher ' ov ' bi/ 
the teacher.' " Inasmuch, however, as the w^ords of the 
phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" 
intended relates to words and not to things, and since this 
can be at once understood without any mention of the 

^ Sahddmisdsana, if judged by the we cannot say dscharyo godoho UksliU 

apparent sense of P;lnini, ii. 2, 14, tena gopdlena (as it would violate ii. 

would be a wrong compound ; but 2, 14), neither can we say dkhari/o 

it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be gavdm doho ' silshitasya gopdlasya (as 

interpreted in the sense of ii. 3, 66, it would violate ii. 3, 66). 
whence it follows that the compound - That is, the uhhayaprdpti of ii. 

would only be wrong if there were 3, 66, is a bahuirihi agreeing with 

an agent expressed as wdl as an kriti in ii. 3, 65. These points are 

object, i.e., if such a word as dchdr- all discussed at some length in the 

yena followed. In the example given, Commentaries on Panini. 


ngLTit, i.e., the teacher, any such mention would be {ilainly 
superfluous ; and therefore as the object and the agent 
are not buih exi)ressed in one nnd the same sentence, this 
is not an instance of tlie i^criitive of the objict (coming 
under ii. 3, 66, and ii. 2, 14), but rather an instance of 
quite another rule, viz., ii. 3, 65. which dii(ct.s that an 
agent or an object, in connection with a word cndin<; with 
a krit aflfix, is to be put in the genitive [wlncli in tliis 
instance is expressed by the tutpunisha compound]; and 
the compound in question will be strictly analogous to 
such recognised forms as idhma-pravr<tscJtana, pithUa-id- 
tana, &c.* Or we might argue that the genitive case 
implied in this shasJttH/atpuriisha is one of the class 
called "residual," in accortiance with Panini's rule (ii. 3, 
50), "Let the genitive be used in the residuum," [i.e., in 
the other constructions not provided for by special rules];' 
and in this way we might defend the ]■ iiist the 

opponent's attack. "But," it might '(■ . .-:, "your 
alleged ' residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, 
and we shotdd thus lind all the pn • of c('mp<^>si- 

tion in constructions with u genitive :. ered utterly 

nugator)-." This we readily grant, and hence Bhartrihari 
in his Vdl- " ' shown t" • " 

useful whi : ^ ;..n relat. 1 ^ 

eflect are the words of the great doctor Vardhamana — 

"In secular utterances men may j ' ' II, 

"But in Vaidic paths let ininutf .1 :; be 


"Tlius have they ixi'i;iin<<i il»«- meaning ti i upini s 
sutras, since 

"He himself uses such phrases nsjaniXarluh and tal- 
prai/ojakah." * 

' The«c»cto»lIy occur in the Com- * Tin - . . t. t-tw.!. .^...r in W- 
mrntAriM to Piinioi, U. 2, 8 ; iii 3« nini't r. ! i. 4, 

117, Ac. 55'. »»i ' fi!^ 

' Thi» Ukcii in all ca*— of r«U- 
tion, mmbaiuUui (I'.r, $)>.:4i.ih\m»- 

* Af in such rule* m « i. 3, 1 39. 

* Th<^. 

> . ti t-.iii..!» I'-ii.r 

nini't r> 

55'. *" ' 

in ■ 


» «i. ».u. /....<. 


Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence 
in question (of the Mahdhhdshya) is that "it is to be 
understood that the rules of grammar which may be 
taken as a synonym for ' the exposition concerning words ' 
are now commenced." 

"■ "Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding 
this intended meaning, it Avould have been better to have 
said 'now comes grammar,' as the words 'now comes 
the exposition of words ' involve a useless excess of 
letters." This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since 
the employment of such a word as sahddnusdsanam, 
the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its 
etymology, proves that the antlior intends to imply an 
end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate 
study (anga) to the Veda.^ Otherwise, if there were no 
such end set forth, there would be no consequent applica- 
tion of the readers to the study of grammar. Nor may 
you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced 
by the injunction for study, " the Veda with its six sub- 
ordinate parts must be read as a duty without any (special) 
end," 2 because, even though there be such an injunction, 
it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if 
no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an 
aiiga of the Veda. Thus in old times the students, after 
reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say — 

"Are not Vaidic words established by the Veda and 
secular by common life, 

" And therefore grammar is useless ? " 

Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an 
aiiga of the Veda that they applied themselves to its 
study. So in the same way the students of the present 
day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either. 
It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set 
forth some end which shall, at the same time, estal)lish 

1 The very word sabda in iabdd- - Cf mpare Max Miiller, Sanslc. 
nuidsanam implies the Veda, since Liter., p. 113. It is quoted as from 
tills is pre-eminently mbda. the Veda in the Mahilbhiishya. 


that grammar is an an^a of the Veda. If. ulioii the ciul 
is explaiiieil, lliey should still not apply themselves, then, 
heing destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of 
secular words, they would become involved in sin in the 
course of sacrificial acts, and wouUl conseriutntly lose their 
rt'ligiuus inei it. Hence the followers of saci iticc read, " One 
who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word, 
should offer an expiatory olTeriiiu to Saraswatf." Now it 
is to dechire ihis end which t- laliji.shes that it is an aii^a 
of the Veda that he uses the words alha iaUldnuJdMnam 
and not atha lydkarttnam. Now the rules of grammar 
must have an end, ami a thing's end is determinetl hy men's 
pursuit of it wiih a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice 
undertaken with a view to heaven, hcavi.n is the end; in the 
same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction 
concerning word.-*, i.e., propriety of speech. "But," an objec- 
tor may say, " will not the desired end be still unattained 
for want of the true nuans to it ? Nor can it be said 
that reading the Veda word by word is the true means; 
for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words, 
since their number is infinite, as divided into proper and 
improper wonls.^ Thus there is a tradition that Hfihas- 
pati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study 
of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda 
is read wonl by word,' and still he came not to the end. 
Here the teacher was Hrdiaspati, the pupil was Indra, and 
the time of study a thousand years of the gods ; and yet 
the termination was not reached, — how much less, then, 
in our day, let a man live ever so long ? Learning is 
rendered efficient by four appropriate means, — reading. 
understaU' g. and : -i to others; 

but in the j ; ^ ,. life woul . for ll»« baio 

time of reading; therefore the reading word by word ia 
not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequently, 

■ In tho CalcutU U v :<lo dam^* in Uo« j kXtcr Ukant, and 

iniicrt it in line 4 aft«r 1 

* At in the M>-akI!c<J fada U*U 


as we said at first, the desired end is not established." 
We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the 
knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading 
word by word. And again, since general and special rules 
apply at once to many examples, when these are divided 
into the artificial parts called roots, &c. (just as one cloud 
rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can 
easily comprehend an exposition of many words. Thus, 
for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, i), karmani, the 
affix an is enjoined after a root when the object is in 
composition with it; and by this rule we learn many 
words, as Jcumihakdra, " a potter," kdndaldva, " a cutter of 
stems," &c. But the supplementary special rule (iii. 2, 3), 
dto 'nuiMsarge kah, directing that the affix ka is to be used 
after a root that ends in long d when there is no ujpasarga, 
shows how impracticable this reading word by word would 
be [since it would never teach its how to distinguish an 
iipasargcC]. " But since there are other aiigas, why do you 
single out grammar as the one object of honour ? " We 
reply, that among the six aiigas the principal one is 
grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal is 
sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said — 

" Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious 

" The wise have called grammar the first aiiga of the 

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the 
direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is 
the preservation, &c., of the Veda. Hence it has been 
said by the worshipful author of the great Commentary 
[quoting a Varttika], " the end (or motive) is preservation, 
inference, scripture, facility, and assurance." ^ Moreover 
prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word ; 
thus Katyayana has said, " There is prosperity in the 
employment of a word according to the sdstra; it is equal 
to the words of the Veda itself." Others also have said 

^ See Ballantyne's Mahdhhdshya, pp. 12, 64. 


tlmt "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly 
used becomes in Swargn the desirc-inilking cow." Thus 
(they say) — 

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happincs-. 
in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech ; 

"But those who use such false forms as adiUcnnnxtn 
must trudge ihiiher on foot."^ 

Nor need you ask " how can an irrational word possess 
such power?" since we have revelation declaring that it 
is like to the great god. For the Sruti says, " Four are its 
horns, three its feet, two its heads, anil seven its hands, — 
roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great goil enters 
mortals" (Rig- Veda, iv. $8, 3). The great commentator 
thus explains it: — The " four horns" are the four kinds 
of words — nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its 
" three feet " mean the three times, past, present, and future, 
expressed by the lense-atlixes, la(, &c. ; the " two heads," 
the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distin- 
guished as the "manifested" and the *' manifester ; " its 
"seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including the 
conjugational terminations; " thrcefoUl bound," as enclosed 
in the three organs — the chest, the throat, aud the head. 
The metaphor "bull" ug 

ivrih {rars/iana),i.e.,: _ v. ;»H 

knowledge. " Loudly roars," i.e., utters sound, for the root 
ru means "sound ; " heie by the word " " ; "d 

speech (or language) 'is implied; "i. - rs 

mortals," — the "great god," i«., speech,— rulers mortals, 
i.e., : . . • . . . •..■ j^ 

de< ^ . ^ . ill. 

The eternal word, called sphofa, without parts, aud the 

cause of the world, is verily Drahmau ; thus it has been 

I ' I tu^mn put hero aa lUiArtrituiri which immcdiaUljr fal« 

a |«;i -'> form of the ire- \>'-v 

ilticul*it«v ui Lr\tm for a(AaiU-ra- "(^ 

Mjrata. i- 

' l)r it may mean " the .l.\il..j».- I *'• •> ""i ."- iwJ- 

universe." C^mpAre the tin-* ••( ^7)' 


declared by Bhartrihari in tlie part of liis book called the 
Brahmakanda — 

" Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible 
essence of speech, 

'•' Which is developed in the form of things, and whence 
springs the creation of the world." 

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of 
words into nouns and verbs, how conies this fourfold 
division ? " We reply, because this, too, is well known. 
Thus it has been said in the Prakirnaka — 

" Some make a twofold division of words, some a four- 
fold or a fivefold, 

"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, 
and the like." 

Helaraja interprets the fivefold division as including 
karmapravaclmniyas} But the fourfold division, men- 
tioned by the great commentator, is proper, since Tcarma- 
pravaclianiyas distinguish a connection produced by a 
particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a par- 
ticular kind of connection and so marking out a particular 
kind of verb, they are really included in compounded 
prepositions {upasarga.s)?' 

" But," say some, " why do you talk so much of an 
eternal sound called splioia? This we do not concede, 
since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We 
reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there 
is one word "-cow," since all men have the cognition of a 
word distinct from the various letters composing it. You 
cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, 
thai this perception of the word is a false perception. 

^ /.e. , prepositions used separately ample, S'dhalyasamhitdm anu prd- 

as governing cases of their own, and rarshat, "he rained after the Sdkalya 

not (as usually in Sanskrit) in com- hjnms," anu implies an understood 

position. verb nisami/a, "having heard," and 

- The karmapravachanlyas imph' this verb shows that there is a rela- 

a verb other than the one expressed, tion of cause and effect between the 

and they are said to determine the hymns and the rain. This anu is 

relation which is produced by this said to determine this relation, 
understood verb. -Thus in the ex- 


Hence you must concoile tliat ihoro is such a thin<» a\ 
sphota, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition 
of the nicaning of the word. Fur the answer that iU 
cognition arises from tlie letters cannot h.-ar exaiuinatiun. 
since it breaks liown before either horn of lht» f 

ililemma: — Are the letters supposed to produce i; , 

nition of the meaning in their united or their individual 
capacity ? Not the first, for the letters sin;.l 
for a moment, and therefore cannot form a .;: 
at all ; and not the second, since the single letters have no 
power to produce the cognition of lii' 
word is to convey]. There is no ci':. 
other than their single or united capacity ; and therefore 
it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the 
letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there 
must be a sphota by means of which arises the knowledge 
of the meaning; and this spho(a is an eternal sound. •!{.<?- 
tinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes 
the cognition of the meaning. " It is disclosed {sphu(ijatt) 
or revealed by the letters," hence it is called spho(tt, aa 
revealed by the letters ; or " from it is disclosed tlie 
meaning," hence it is called sphota as causing the knowlo i.-e 
of the meaning, — these are the two etymologi*'^ • ■ ■•^' ! du 
the meaning of the word. And thus it hath by 

the worshipful Patafijali in the "Now 

what is the wonl ' <»u>' (/aui^Z U ./which. 

when pronounced, there is produced the simuliancom 
cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, 

i9 e.x[)OUuded by Kaiyaja in v.. , 

" Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct 
from the letter-!, whicii e.x; • if 

the letters expressed it, th'.: : ">- 

nouncing the second and following ones [03 the first would 

ha-. ■ " ■ ■■ ■ ' '" 

Vu-j . ^ 

which, distinct from rs and revealed by the sound 

expresses the n 


Here, however, an oLjector may urge, "But should we 
not rather say that the spliota has no power to convey the 
meaning, as it fails iinder either of the following alterna- 
tives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself 
manifested or unmanifested ? Not the latter, because it 
would then follow that we should find the effect of con- 
veying the meaning always produced, since, as sphota is 
supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever- 
present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect 
could not possibly fail to appear. Therefore, to avoid this 
fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz., that spliota 
conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, 
then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting 
power separately or combined ? Whichever alternative 
you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against 
the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will 
have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this 
power to manifest sijliota. This has been said by Bhatta 
in his ]\Iimamsa-sloka-varttika — 

"The grammarian who holds that spliota is manifested 
by the letters as they are severally apprehended, 
though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby 
escape from a single difficulty." 

The truth is, that, as Panini (i. 4, 14) and Gotama (Sut. 
ii. 123) both lay it doM-n that letters only then form a 
word when they have an affix at the end, it is the letters 
which convey the word's meaning through the apprehen- 
sion of the conventional association of ideas which they 
help.^ If you object that as there are the same letters i» 
rasa as in sara, in nava as in vana, in dind as in nadi, in 
mdra as in rdma, in rdja as in jdra, &c., these several 
pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we 
reply that the difference in the order of the letters will 
produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said 
by Tautatita — 

1 This is not very clear, the anu and so imply the successive order of 
in anugraha might mean Iramena, the Utters. 



" As are the letters m uumber aud kind, wiiose power 

is porcL'ived in conveying any given moaning of 

a word, so will in» thf meaning which tbcy 


Tlwrcfoi :c i^ a uuil-u:. ..\n rule that wiien tlic 

same fault to both sides of an argument it cannot 

be uj-ged against one alone, we maintain tliat the hypotlieais 

of the existence of a separate tiling called " an- 

necessary, as we have proved that it is the . . .licU 

express the word's mennin;.: Qvour arguments against our 

view having been shown to be irridcvanl]." 

All ibis long oration is really only like a drowning man's 
catching at a straw;' for either of the alternatives is im- 
possible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or 
their a.:gregation which convevs tjje meaning of the woitl. 
It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate 
letters, without any one pervading cause,* ' ■ ■ ver 
produce the idea of a word any more than a :i of 

separate flowers would form u garland without a string. 
Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being sepa- 
rately pronounced and done with, cannot rnmbino into 
an aggregate. For we use the term r.s a 

CO o 

number of objects are perceived to : iu 

one ])lace; thus we apply it to a Grislea t' an 

Acacia catociiu, a Hutt-u trondosa, &c., or to au mcpiiant, 
a man, a horse, ^cc, sten togeiher in one place ; but thciio 
letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are 
severally produced and pass away ; and even on the 
hyijothesis of their having a "manifesting" |»ower, they 
can have no power to form an atigrcj^ate, as they can only 
mnnifcsl a • 

Korean V' . . . _ u --, ^ 

because tJiis would involve a " mutual dependence " 'or 
reasoning : !••); fur, on the one 1 " 

would onlv a word w!.on their ; 

' In the CdcutU e<lil«-»n, p. .:,-. '■ In p. UJ, '.in- i :. I ».i.l ni^t 

line 1 1 , I rc*d taipam (ur knl/Htmmmt. afur iiMiiltoai. 


one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand, 
their power to convey one meaning would only follow 
when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, 
since it is impossible that letters should express tlie mean- 
ing, we must accept the hypothesis of splwta. " But even 
on yonr own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called 
qjliota which expresses the meaning, the same untenable 
alternative will recur which we discussed before; and 
therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the 
dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house 
close by.' " ^ This, however, is only the inflation of the 
world of fancy from the wide difference between the two 
cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, 
reveals the invisible spJiota, and each successive letter 
makes this sphofa more and more manifest, just as the 
Yeda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure 
by repetition ; or as the real nature of a jewel is not 
clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely mani- 
fested at the final examination. This is in accordance 
with the authoritative saying (of the teacher) : " The seed 
is implanted by the sounds, and, wlien the idea is ripened 
by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained 
simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore, 
since Bhartrihari has shown in his first book that the 
letters of a word [being many and successive] cannot 
manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the 
very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from 
such and such a word," we are forced to assume the exist- 
ence ^ of an indivisible spJiota as a distinct category, which 
lias the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this 
has been established in the discussion (in the Mahabhashya) 
on " genus " {jdti), which aims at proving that the mean- 
ing of all words is ultimately that summum genus, i.e., that 

^ The gliatta is the place where house just as day dawns and is thus 

dues and taxes are collected. Some caught. Hence the proverb means 

one anxious to evade payment is iiddchjdsiddhi. 

going by a private way by night, - In p. 143, line 13, I read s/i/io/a- 

Lut he arrives at the tax-collector's kahhdvam for spliofdbhdiam. 



cxistencu whose oharacteristio is j>erfcct knowledge of the 
Eujtreiau reality » (Brahnmii). 

" But if all words mean unly that supreme existence, then 
ail wonls will be synonyms, havini; all the same imvinin;.'; 
and your grand lo-ical ingenuity would produce an aston- 
ishing result in demonstrating the usclessness of human 
language as laboriously u>ing several words to no purpose 
at the same time I Thus it has been said — 

" The employment of synonymous terms at the same 
time is to be condemned; for they onl- 
their meaning in turn nnd not by 

"Therefore this opinion ui your? is really hardly woriii 
the trouble of lefuting." 

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for 
just as the colourless crystal is afTected by dilT " 

which colour it as blue, red, yellow, &c., so, .s 
mum gams, Brahman, is variously cognised through il« 
connection with dilTerent things, ns severally identified 
Willi each, we thus account for the use of the various con- 
^cntional words which ari->e from the different species,' as 
cow, &c., these being "existence " (the summuin genui) as 
found in the individual cow, Sec To this purport we 
have the following authoritativ. ly — 

"Just as crystal, that colourl. , ,iance, when seve- 
rally joined with blue, red. or yellow objects »*» 
seen a- ::ig that colour." 

And so it h ,.iid by Hari, " Existence [pure and 

8ini[de] being divided, when foun»l in cows. Ac. by reason 
of its connection with dilV • - 

that species, and on it all . ^ i 

the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is exist- 
ence, this the great soul ; and it is this which the affixM 
tva, tal. Sec, express " (^Banini v. i, 1 19). 

• r* ns»«in<vn*'« TnuuL of Ihc InHlrWtMU fpj^ai*^ ;»!»• Niri«i 1x0*1 

■ • U.V ' '.»:*.. 

thiU ■ word <l ^ * 

I ; . ..'li- *iiJ not th- 


'■ Existence " is that 'gvQdX summum genus which is found 
in cows, horses, &c., differentiated by the various subjects 
in which it resides ; and the inferior species, " cow," 
"horse," &c., are not really different from it; for the 
species "cow" and "horse" {gotva and asvatva) are not 
really new subjects, but each is " existence " as residing 
in the suliject " cow " and " horse." Therefore all words, as 
expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one 
summum genus existence, which is differentiated by the 
various subjects, cows, &c., in which it resides ; and hence 
"existence" is the meaning of the stem- word (jprdtipadiJca). 
A " root " is sometimes defined as that which expresses 
hJidva ; ^ now, as hlidva is " existence," the meaning of a 
root is really existence.^ Others say that a root should be 
defined as that which expresses " action " (Jcriyd) ; but here 
again the meaning of a root will really be " existence," 
since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to 
reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common 
definition of a genus, in the line — 

" Others say that action (Icriyd) is a genus, residing in 
many individuals." 

So, too, if we accept Panini's definition (v. i, 119), "Let 
the affixes tva and tal come after a word [denoting any- 
thing], when we speak of the nature (bhdva) thereof," it is 
clear from tlie very fact that abstract terms ending in tva 
or td [as asvatva and asvafd] are used in the sense of hhdva, 
that they do express " existence." " This is pure exist- 
ence " from its being free from all coming into being or 
ceasing to be; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are 
developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, 
time, or substance : this existence is called " the great 
soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's two Jcdrikds quoted 
above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on sam- 
handha [in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of all 

1 Cf. Rig- Veda Pratis. xii. 5. monly received definitions of soma 

- He here is trying to show that grammatical terms, 
his view is confirmed by the com- 


words is that sometliinj; whose characteristic is perfect 
kiin\vled|^o of the real n f the w- 

"ThetrucRi'ulity is :i >ll> , tlie 

true substance is declared by words through illusory dis- 
•juises; as the object, ' Devadatta's house,* in 
by a transitory cause of discrimination,' but 
'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."' 

So, too. the author of the^fahabhashya, wh.: 
the Vartlika,' *• a word, its meaning.', and i: 
beincj fixed," in the passage beginnin;^ "substance is eter* 
nal," has shown tliat the. meaning of all wo^ls is Iirahmnn. 
expressed by tlie won! " substance " and dcterniinctl by 
various unreal* conditions [as " the nature of horse," «tc.] 

According to the opinion of Vajapyayana, who main- 
tains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," 
&c.,* denote a geniis which resides by intimate relation in 
diflferent substances; and when this genus is "• • -^ ' • led, 
through its connection with it we apprehend t dar 

substance in which it resides. Wortls like " wiute, " &c., 
denote a genus whicli similarly resides in qualities; through 
the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, an 1 
through the connection with the quality we apprehend 
the individual substance. So in tiie case of words express- 
ing particular names, in consequence of the rcco-^nition 
that "this is the same person frnm his first coj: 
existence to his final destruction, in spite of the d.:. 
produced by the various states of childhood, youth, ailoles- 
cence, &r,'' we must accept a fixed genus as D 
liood," &c. [as directly denoted by them]. So. too, ::. 
expressing " action " a genus is denoted ; this is the root- 
meaning, as in pafhati, "he roads," &c.,' since we find hero 
a meaning common to all who read. 

> Sinm DerftdatU b only lu * In p 115, line 8, rrtl oM/ytt 

tn :;or. for 

•vonLi "hor»«,'" "cow," txtro iho well known 

k ■ r«^!y iitPMit, th« fn ^' ' '• 

.1:: '.OW. 7 

■ * Mahibtutjliy*. 
pp 44, 50. lin'" li. 


In the doctrine of Vyadi, wlio maintained that words 
meant individual things [and not classes or genera], the 
individual thing is put forward as that M^hich is primarily 
denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic 
mark] ; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of " indefinite- 
ness," and " wandering away from its proper subject." ^ 

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Panini; 
since in i. 2, 58, he accepts th^ theory that a word means 
the genus, M'here he says that " when the singular is used 
to expre-s the class the plural maybe optionally used " 
[as in the sentence, " A Brahman is to be honoured," which 
may equally run, " Brahmans are to be lionoured "] ; while 
in i. 2, 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the 
individual thing, where he says, " In any individual case 
there is but one retained of things similar in form " [i.e., 
the dual means Eama and Eama, and the plural means 
Eama, and Eama and Eama; but we retain only one, 
adding a dual or plural alnx]. Grammar, in fact, being 
adapted to all assemblies, can accept both theories with- 
out being compromised. Therefore both theories are in a 
sense true ; ^ but the real fact is that all words ultimately 
mean the Supreme Brahman. 

As it has been said — 

" Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, 
one true universal meaning, identical with the one 
existent, shines out in many forms as the thing 

Hari also, in his chapter discussing samhandha, thus 
describes the nature of this true meaning — 

^ Thus we read in the Siddhdnta should not include ; if it is held to 

Muktavali, p. 82, that the Mlmdmsa mean many individuals, it will have 

holds that a word means the genus an endless variety of meanings and 

and not the individual, since other- be "indefinite." 

wise there would be vyahhichdra and ^ This seems the meaning of the 

iniantya (cf. also Mahesachandra text as printed tasntdt diayam sat- 

Nyayaratna's note, Kavya-prakdsa, yam, but I should prefer to read 

p. 10). If a word is held to mean conjecturally tasmdd advayam sat- 

only one individual, there will be the yam, "therefore non-duality is the 

first fault, as it will "wander away" truth." 
and equally express others which it 


"That meuuing in which the subject, the object, niid 
the perception [which unites tljom] are iiHusccp- 
tible of doubt,' that only is cnllcd the trulli by 
those wlu) know the end of the throe Vedns." 
So too in his description of substance, he says — 
" That wliich ri mains as tlie Iteal during tlio presence 
of nioditication, as tlie gold remains under the 
form of the earring, — that wherein change comes 
and goes, that they call the Supreme Nature." 
The essential unity of the word and its meaning is 
maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality 
of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philo- 

" This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all 
■words, and it is identical with the word; but the relation 
of the two, while they are tlius ultimately identical, varies 
as does the relation of the two souls."' 

The meaning of this Karika is that Brahman is the 
one object denoted by all wonis ; and this one object has 
various diflerences imposed upon it according to each 
particular form ; but the conventional variety of the 
differences {>roduced by these illusory conditions is only 
the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the tiue state; 
but through the power of "concealment"' [i-xerciseil by 
illusion] at the time of thf ' ' !s a 

manifold expansion takes \. ring 

sleep. Thus those skilled in Vedanta lore tell us — 
"As all the extended world of dreams is < ' 
development of illusion in me, so all this • 
wakin;.' world is a development of illusion like- 
When the unchangeable Supremo Hrahman is thus 
known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the 
individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished, 

> .Srii. thry ran ontj b«? the ab«olut« ' Ti • >'.i .n/i.f li,. •- •. . . :, , 

I'rAtimiu) who ftlnno exisU. to ' 

- .Stil. the in<liviilu*l toul {jtm) qn' : 
ftiiki Krahman. 


final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the 
abiding in identity with this Brahman, according to the 
text, "He Avho is well versed in the Word-Brahmau 
attains to the Supreme Brahman." ^ And thus we estab- 
lish the fact that the " exposition of words" is the means 
to final bliss. 

Thus it has been said— 

" They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine 
of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, 
the science of sciences." ^ 
And so again — 

" This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder 

of final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the 

travellers to emancipation." 

Therefore our final conclusion is that the Sastra of 

grammar should be studied as bein" the means for attain- 

ing the chief end of man. E. B. C. 

^ This passage is quoted in the Upanishad, L 3, i, where it is ex- 
Maitri Upanishad, vi. 22. plained by ^amkara as vidydsv adki 

2 Adhividyam occurs in Taitt. yad darkinain tad adldvidyam. 

( -.'« ) 

<I[\!'TI"i; XIV. 

Til E S A N i; 11 Y A- DAKS AN A. 

" But liow can we accept the doctrine of illusory emana- 
tion [ihus held by the grammarians, follnwiiii^ tin- 
of tiie }>urva and uttara Mfmumsa scliuolsj, \s. 
system of development propounded by the Sdftkhyas is 
still alive to oppose it ?" Such is their loud vaunt Now 
the Sdstra of this school may be concisely saitl to maintain 
four several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evol- 
vent^ only, that which is evolute only, that which is both 
evolute and evolvent, and tiiat which is neither, (ii) Uf 
these the first is that which is only evolvent, called the root- 
evolvent or the primary ; it is not itself the evolute of any- 
thing,' else. It evolves, hence it is called the evolvent 
(prah'ili) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium of the 
three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is 
expressed [in the Saiikhya Kiirika], "the root-*»volv*»nt is 
no evolute." It is called the root-evolvent, :. • )th 

root and evolvent; it is the root of all the va; v..i;cts, 

us the so-called " great one," &c., but of it, as the pritnnry, 
there is no root, as otherwise we should have a ' 

ad injinilum. Nor can you reply that such a re</ii.^ 

in^nitum is no objection, if, like the continued series of 
seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evi . lur 

senses,' — because here there is no evidence to . : . ihe 

hypothesis, {b.) The "evolutes and evolvents" are ibe 
great one, egoism, and the subtile elements, — thas the 

» I iMirrow thU term frrun Dr. HalL 
• Comixuc K«wiiiuf j»n, L 4. 


Sankliya Karika (§ 3), "the seven, the great one, &c., are 
evolute-evolvents." The seven are the seven principles, 
called the great one, &c. Among these the great prin- 
ciple, called also the intellect/ &c., is itself the e volute of 
nature and the evolvent of egoism ; in the same manner 
the principle egoism, called also " self-consciousness " 
(ahhimdna), is the evolute of the great one, intellect; but 
this same principle, as affected by the quality of dark- 
ness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called subtile 
elements; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it 
is the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs 
of perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the five 
organs of action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and genera- 
tive organ ; and the mind, partaking of the character of 
both ; nor can you object that in our arrangement the 
third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a cause by 
producing action in the others. This has been thus 
declared by Isvava Krishna in his Karikas- (§ 24-27), 
'•' Self-consciousness is egoism. Thence proceeds a two- 
fold creation, the elevenfold set and the five elemental 
rudiments. From modified ^ egoism originates the class of 
eleven imbued with goodness ; from egoism as the source 
of the elements originate the rudimentary elements, and 
these are affected by darkness ; but it is only from egoism 
as affected by activity that the one and the other rise. 
The intellectual organs are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the 
tongue, and the skin ; those of action are the voice, feet, 
hands, anus, and organ of generation. In this set is mind, 
which has the character of each ; it determines, and it 
is an organ (like the other ten) from having a common 

1 One great defect in the Sankhya ^ It is singular that this is jNIad- 

nomenclature is the ambiguity be- hava's principal Sankhya authority, 

tween the terms for intellect (i«rft//iO and not the Sankhya Sutras, 

and those for mind (?na»as). Mad- -^ TaiV-rfYa is here a technical term 

hava here applies to the former the meaning that goodness predominate.s 

term antahkarana or " internal over darkness and activity. On 

organ," the proper term for the this Karika, comp. Dr. Hall's pre- 

latter. I have ventured to alter it face to the Si'ukhya-sdra, pp. 30- 

in the translation. 35. 


property wi h tliem." ' All this haa been cxplniuud at 
length by the teacher Vuchaspati Miira in the Stitikhya- 

(c.) The "evolute only " means the five gross elements, 
ether, &c., and the eleven organs, as said in the Kurikd, 
"The evolute consists of sixteen;" that is. the set of six- 
teen is evolute only, and not evolvent. Althouj,'h it may 
be said that earth, &c., are the evolvents of such protluc- 
tions as cows, jars. &c., yet ihese are not a difTereut " prin- 
ciple " {tattva) from earth, &c., and therefore earth, Ac, 
are not uhat we term ''evolvents;" as the acccpt<'d iiK-a 
of an evolvent is that which is the material cauae of a 
separate principle; and in cows, jars, &c., there is the 
absence of being any such first primiple, in con 
of their being all alike gross [i.e., possessed of din. . ^ 
and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements, 
ether, &c., are respectively piotluced from - 
form, taste, and smell, each subtile element ■ , 
pnnied by all those which precede it, and thus the gross 
elements will have respectively one, two, three, f ' 

five qualiiies.- The creation of the organs has i 
viously described. This is thus propounded in the J>ttA- 
khya Karika % 22) — 

" From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, 
from this the set of sixteen, and from five among 
the sixteen proceed the five gross elementa." 

((i) The soul is neither,— as is said in the Kauka, "The 
soul is neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, 

being absolute, eternal, and subject to no dcv ' • 

itself neither the evolvent nor the evolute of 
Three kinds of proof are accepted as . 
twenty-five principles; and thus the Ku....i s •» 

" Perception, inference, and the tesiin»ony of worthy 
persons are acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for 

ifl' •{ \Ai j •a .14. rr I 1 1. ■;■•■. i"' (.tf • ii.- i; ' . - . -| - 

rvtUU by the .Srtiikl.yn Kihki. o< lb« grtrnt elrmmU. 


they comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from 
proof that there results belief of that which is to be 

Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature 
of cause and effect. The Saugatas^ maintain that the 
existent is produced from the non-existent ; the Naiya- 
yikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from 
the existent; the Vedantins, that all efTects are an illusory 
emanation from the existent and not themselves really 
existent; while the Sankhyas hold that the existent is 
produced from the existent. 

(a.) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since 
that which is itself non-existent and unsubstantial can 
never be a cause any more than the hare's horn; and, again, 
the real and unreal can never be identical. 

(&.) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the 
existent ; since it is impossible that that which, previous 
to the operation of the originating cause, was as non- 
existent as a hare's horn should ever be produced, i.e., 
become connected with existence ; for not even the cleverest 
man living can make blue yellow.^ If you say, " But are 
not existence and non-existence attributes of the same 
jar ? " this is incorrect, since we cannot use such an 
expression as " its quality " in regard to a non-existent 
subject, for it would certainly imply that the subject 
itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is 
existent even previously to the operation of the cause, 
which only produces the manifestation of this already 
existent thing, just like the manifestation of the oil in 
sesame seed by pressing, or of the milk in cows by milk- 
ing. Again, there is no example whatever to prove the 
production of a thing previously non-existent. 

^Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being 
either connected with it or not connected ; in the former 

1 A name of the Buddhists. cannot be made a cow, nor a woman 

- I.e., the nature of a thing {Sva- a man. 
Ihdva) cannot be altered — a man 

Till- SASKHYA n.lRSASA 2i$ 

alternative the ufiVct's existence is settled by the rule 
thftt connection cftu only be between two existent things; 
in the latter, any and every effect iniglit (irisu from any 
and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the 
action of an unconnectt-d ihin;^. This lias hccu llius ptit 
by the SaAkhya teaclicr: — ' From the supposed nun-exist- 
ence of the (.fleet, it can have no connection with causes 
which always accompany exis'.rnce; nntl to him who 
holds llie production of a noii-cunnecled thing there arises 
an litter want of determinalencss." If you rejoin that " tho 
cause, thougli not connected with its elTect, can yet pro- 
duce it, wluro it has a capacity of so doing, ami this caj»a- 
city of producing is to be inferred from seeing the efTect 
aclually produced," still this cannot be wi" ' ;nce in 
such a case as " there is a capacity fur j i , oil in 

sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is 
non-existent, tliat there is tliis capacity in the sesame 
seeds, whichever alternative you may accept as to their 
being connected or not witli the oil [since our before-men- 
tionetl dilemma will etiually apply here]. 

From our tenet liiat the cause and eflect arc identical, 
it follows that the eflect does not exist distinct from the 
cause ; thus the cloth is not something distinct from the 
threads, as it al)ides in the latter [as its material cause]; 
but where this identity is not found, there we do not find 
the relation of cause and eflect ; thus a horse and a cow are 
distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the 
other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but 
the cloth is an acknowlctiged eflect, and therefore not any- 
thing difTereut from its cause.' If you object that, if \h\^ 
were true, the separate threads ought to fulfil • 
clothing, we reply, that the oftice of clothing ks 
the threatis manifesting the nature of clotii \\. i:e 

placed in a particular arrangement. As the a 

tortoise when they retire within its shell arc d. 

« I take artkdntaram here m k«ricbM]«U't oot*. Ta/Zin A'.iw 
•imply bMnnam cf. Tirauith« Titf- mm/X, p. 47). 


and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular 
effects, as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they 
come forth and are revealed, are said to be produced ; and 
when they retire and are concealed, they are said to be 
destroyed ; but there is no such thing as the production 
of the non-existent or the destruction of the existent. As 
lias been said in the Bhagavad Gi'ta (ii. i6) — 

" There is no existence for the non-existent, nor non- 
existence for the existent." 
And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we 
establish the existence of the great evolvent, Xature (pra- 
kriti). This has been said [in the Karika, § 9] — 

" Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation 
of cause be brought into existence ; materials, too, 
are selected which are fit for the purpose; every- 
thing is not by every means possible ; what is 
capable does that to which it is competent ; and 
like is produced from like." ^ 
Nor can we say [with' the Vedantin] that the world is 
an illusory emanation from the one existent Brahman, 
because we have no contradictory evidence to preclude 
by its superior validity the prima facie belief that the 
external world is real [as we have in the case of mistaking 
a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will discover 
the error] ; and again, where the subject and the attributed 
nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman 
and the unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the 
supposed attribution to be possible than in the case of 
gold and silver [which no one mistakes for each other]. 
Hence we conclude that an effect which is composed of 
happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause 
similarly composed ; and our argument is as follows : — 
The subject of the argument, viz., the external w"orld, must 
have a material cause composed of happiness, misery, and 
stupidity, because it is itself endued therewith ; whatever 
is endued with certain attributes must have a cause endued 

■■ Colebrooke's translation. 


with tlie same,— thus a ring has gold for its material cnuso, 
because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a 
similar case, thert'fure we may draw a sin " -n. 

What we call " beiny composed of lui: : : iho 

external world is the quality of goodness ; the " being 
composed of misery" is the quality of activity;* the 
"being composed of stupidity" is the quality of dark- 
ness; hence we establish our cause composed of the throe 
qualities (i.e., pmA7*t7i, Nature). And w. ' * ali- 

vidual objects are found by ex|H.'iienco to i .rcc 

qualities; thus Maitra's happiness is found in his wife 
Satyavatf, because the quality of "goodness" in her is 
nianife:;tcd towards him ; but she is the misery of hi>r 
fellow-wives, because the quality of " activity " is mani- 
fested towards them ; while she causes indifference to 
Chaitra who docs not possess her, because towards him 
the quality of "darkness" is manifested. So, too, in 
other cases also ; thus a jar, when obtained, causes us 
pleasure ; when seized by others it causes us pain ; but it 
is viewed with indilTerence by one who has no interest in 
it. Now this being regarded with no interest is what 
we n»eaii by " stupidity," since the word rnoha is derived 
from the root muh, " to be confused," since no :on 

of the mind arises towards those objects to i n 

indifTerent. Therefore we hold that all things, being 
CO!. • ■ • • ' 'as 

th' ,; . - .OS. 

And so it is declared in the Svetiiivatora Upouishod 

(iv. 5)- 
" The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaolies the 
one unborn (Nature) whicli is red, white, and black, 



I' rti," "while." ond ••»''' »•« 

th. V," "•j^n.iiu'ss /• and ' . w 


their severally possessing the same attributes of colouring, 
manifesting, and concealing. 

Here, however, it may be objected, " But will not your 
uuintelli'geut Nature, without the superintendence of some- 
thing intelligent, fail to produce these effects, intellect, 
&c. ? therefore there must be some intelligent super- 
intendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing, 
supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since 
even unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an 
impulse ; and experience shows us that an unintelligent 
thing, without any intelligent superintendent, does act for 
the good of the soul, just as the unintelligent milk acts for 
the growth of the calf, or just as the unintelligent rain acts 
for the welfare of living creatures ; and so unintelligent 
Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it has 
been said in the Karika (§ 57) — 

" As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of 
the calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul." 

But as for the doctrine of " a Supreme Being who acts 
from compassion," which has been proclaimed by beat of 
drum by the advocates of his existence, this has well-nigh 
passed away out of hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet 
either of the two alternatives. For does he act thus before 
or a/fe7' creation? If you say "before," we reply that as 
pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will 
be no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to 
free living beings from pain [which is the main character- 
istic of compassion] ; and if you adopt the second alterna- 
tive, you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand 
you will hold that God created the world through com- 
passion [as this is His motive in acting at all], and on 
the other hand ^ that He compassionated after He had 
created. Therefore we hold that the development of 
unintelligent Nature [even without any intelligent super- 

i In other words — on the one on the other hand it was the exist- 

hand the existing misery of beings ence of a created world which caused 

induced God to create a world in their misery at all. 
order to relieve their misery, and 

Till: SASKllYA DARSASA, 329 

iiiteiulciJl] — in ihe oriitT of llie series intellect, self-oon- 
sciousncss, &c., — is caused ])y the union of Xnture An<t 
Soul, and the moving impulse is the j>;ood of Soul. Just 
as there takes place a movement in the iron in the prox- 
iniiiy of the unmoved m.t;.,'not, so there takes place a 
movement in Nature in the proximity of the unmoved 
Soul ; and this union of Naturo and Soul is caused by 
mutual do]Hii<ience, like the union of the lame man aiui 
the blind num. Nature, as the thin;» to be exjierienccd, 
depends on Soul the experienccr; nnd Soul looks to ftnnl 
bliss, as it seeks to throw o(T the ■ ' on, 

which, though really apart from it. I by 

its comin<:^ under the shadow of intellect through not 
1' own <r ' " >tn.* T' 

\'.. ^ 10 isolat: ^ y the di-' 

tion of Nature and Soul, nor is this end possible without it; 
therefore Soul '' :i Xatur. * ' '"' T - 

a lame man aii<i man,' ir 

van, by some accident having* become separated I'nmi 
their companions, wandered slowly abotit in great dismay, 
till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame 
man mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind 

nmn, following the path indicated by the la;: t- 

reached his desired goal, as diii the lame man nl«o ■ 
on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation i by 

Nature and the soul, which are likewis** u. , ...., de- 
pendent. , Thi* ha.<» b<><»n said in the Karika (§ 21) — 

"For the s< 1 of N- ita 

final sei . >. .. v.. ... n of lx)t.. . m 

of the lame man and the blind man. Hy that 
union a ere; 1." 

"Well. 1 grant .... . ,.. activity may take place 
for the good of the soul, but how <lo you account for iu 

I noiitlAKt!. fte. iwid* in the in- picoe ol folk-Ian It U Umod ia 

t,:- -j..^i >' !•-> vi.ini«n Taltni»il. -SaiU^WnM, 

f, Mn>i in ibo U««Ui Kunaa- 

i/.,., . .... . . . 

' Till* »polog*itf M • wtdmij mfwxm*i 


ceasing to act ? " I reply, that as a wilful woman whose 
faults have once been seen by her husband does not return 
to him, or as an actress, having performed her part, retires 
from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said 
in the Karika (§ 59) — 

"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spec- 
tators, desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, 
having manifested herself to Soul." 

For this end has the doctrine of those who follow 
Kapila, the founder of the atheistic Sankhya School, been 
propounded. E. B. C. 

( 23« ) 

ciIArTKi: XV. 


"We now set forth the doctrine of timt school which pro- 
fesses the opinions of such Munis as PataAjali and othfr*, 
who originated the system of ilio Theistic S.!!" ' ' " ' 

Sophy. This school follows th'» sn-mllcd \ 
promulgated by Patafijali, and ( of four chapters, 

wliich also bears the name of the .^.niKuya Pr:-- "or 

detailed explanation of the Siifikhya.* In th ;-ter 

thereof the venerable Pataftjali. having in the opening 
aphorism, " Now is the exposition of Concentration " 
{yoga), avowed his commencement of the Yofja 2^a.stra, 
proceeds in the second aphorism to give a . of 

Ids subject, " Concentration is the hindering w. ... ....nii- 

fications of the thinking principle," and then lie expounds 
at length the nature of Mriitatio:; 

second chapter, in the series of ap: — :.., 

" The practical part of Concentration is niorti Heat ion. 

muttorinp, and resignation ' 

the practical part of yoya pr ; 

yet thoroughly abstracted (iil q), vis., the five external sub- 

.servients or mean<?, "f 

tlnnl chapter, in the s. . \ 

fastening [of the mind] on some spot," he expounds the 

I],- ■■ ■ . • • 

(satfiyama), and also the various superhuman powers which 
> On ibU «r« Dr HaU's FW. to OUUilijr* Pr. Blubh^ pk SO : H. SAra, p. ii. 


are their subordinate fruit. In tlie fourth chapter, in tlie 
series commencing, " Peifections spring from birth, plants, 
spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the 
highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account 
of the five so-called "perfections" (siddhis). This school 
accepts the old twenty- five principles [of the Saiikhya], 
" Nature," &c. ; only adding the Supreme Being as the 
twenty-sixth — a Soul untouched by alfliction, action, fruit, 
or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body 
in order to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic 
traditions,^ and is gracious towards those living beings who 
are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence. 

" But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the 
[glossy] leaf of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should 
need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it ? " 
To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself 
as the understanding, and it is this which is, as it were, 
burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the 
influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this 
suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the 
teachers have declared — 

"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the 
understanding and the substances belonging to 
Act-ivity which torment,- 
And it is through the modification of Darkness, as 
wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as 

It has been also said by Patanjali^^ " The power of the 
enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of 
transference, in an object which is developed and trans- 
ferred experiences the modifications thereof." 

Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intel- 
ligence, and this is the soul; and in an object which is 

1 i.e., he revealed the Veda, and - I read ye for te with T>r. Hall's 

also originated the meanings of MS. " Tapya means rather " suscep- 

words, as well as instructed the tible of suffering." 
first fathers of mankind in the arts ^ This is really Vyasa's conim. 

of life. on Sut , iv. 21. 


" developed " and " transferred," or reflecled, — ui., in ihu 
think iplf or the luuierstanding, — it ex; 

tlie 11, us tliereof, i.e., the power of int,..., 

being reflected in the understanding, receives itself tbo 

shadow of the un»lerstandinj:, and imitates the • 

tions of it. Tiuis the sonl, lliough in itself i^ , 

ncconiing to the idea produced by the understanding: and. 

while thus seeing 

feiont from the uti' 

with. It is whilt! the soul is thus sufTering. that, by the 

y " ■•'.•'•.'■,■■— ' : ■ ■ 

fr . ■ ' . . 

long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme 

Being, at Icni^th there is produced an u: ' 

tion of the distinctiou between liie qua.. 

the Soul ; and the five " atllictions," ignorance, &c., arc 

railically destroyed, and the various "stocks of desert," 

fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, ami, the 

undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation 

is accomplished. 

The words of the first apiiorism, " Now is the exposition 
of concentration," establish the four preliminaries which 

lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the ■• '■ •• into 

practice, viz., the object-matter, the end i : the 

connection [between the treatise and tl 

person properly qualified to study iL I 

(at}ia^ is accepted as having hero an inceptive meanim;. 

[as ii. ' that a distinct topic is now 

"But, ;....y be objected, "there are . ^ 

sible si;^nifications of this word atha ; why. then, should 

you show an unwarranted pii: 

'inceptive' meaning? The gi 

their gender [tlie Amara Kosha Diciionar>'] gives nmoj 

such ! ' 

cious J 

natively). — and all (comprohensivel> 

burrcnder such senses as inlerrogauou vt conij r«!MMi>?!vc. 


ness ; but since there are four senses certainly suitable, 
i.e., ' after/ ' an auspicious particle,' ' reference to a pre- 
vious topic,' and ' the inceptive now,' there is no reason 
for singling out the last." This objection, however, will not 
stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you 
maintain the sense of " after," then do you hold that it 
implies following after anything whatever, or only after 
some definite cause as comprehended under the general 
definition of causation,^ ig., " previous existence [relatively 
to the effect] " ? It cannot be the former, for, in accord- 
ance with the proverb that " No one stands for a single 
moment inactive," everybody must always do everything 
after previously doing something else ; and since this is at 
once understood without any direct mention at all, there 
could be no use in employing the particle atha to convey 
this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative ; be- 
cause, although we fully grant that the practice of concen- 
tration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquil- 
lity, &c., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries 
to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have 
that avowed predominance [wliich the presumed cause 
should have]. " But why should we not hold that the 
word atJia implies that this very exposition is avowedly 
the predominant object, and does follow after previous 
tranquillity of mind, &c. ? " We reply, that the aphorism 
uses the term " exposition " (anumsana), and this word, 
etymologically analysed, implies that by which the yoga 
is explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and 
detailed means and results ; and there is no rule that such 
an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, 
&c., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is 
concerned, it must follow a profound knowledge of the 
truth and a desire to impart it to others ; for it is rather 
the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge, 
which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precur- 
sors, in accordance with the words of Sruti : "Therefore 

^ Cf. Bhdskd-parichchheda, 15, a. 

TllF. r.iTANJALI PARSASA. :'j', 

having become tranquil, self-subilued, lyftily* indiflei' !.; 
patient, full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in 
tliesoul."* Nor can the woril a//m imply the t- '' 
precedt nco, in the teaclu r, of a profound knowle.; 
trutli an<l a desire to impart it to others; because, even 
granting that both these are present, they need not to U» 
meutionod thus prominently, as they nn^ pnu'»>rle<« in 
thumsclves to produce the necessary intt I 
in the student. Still [however we may .st>... ... \ 

the question arises. Is the exposition of the yoga a- 
to be a cause of final beatitude or not ? If it i", 

still a desirable object, even if certain presuppo-i. 

tions should be absent ; and if it is not, then it nutst be un- 
desirable, whatever conditions may be present.' 1 
clear that the exposition in question is such a cau , 
we have such a passage of the ^nili as that [in the Ka^lia 
Upanisliad, ii. 12]: "By the a in- 

tense concentration on the Suy .nan 

having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow;" and 
aj^'ain, such a passage of the Sniriti as that [m il. '"' 
vad Gita, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in 
plation will then attain yoga." Hence we conclude that it 
is un' ' '- atha as imply in,* that ;' 

sition r " a previous in«[uiry un 

of the student, or "after" a previous course of ascetic 
training nnd use of elixirs, &c, [to render the body 

But in the case of the Vetlanta S<iira«, which open with 
tho aphorism, " Now, th<rof">rr "' ■ ' * ' ■ ••," {^ifikara Acl ary.i I. 

tive meaning of atha must be left out of the qucHiion, ad 
the wish to know Biahman is not to I ■ ^ * 

will]; and therefore it must bo there in: 
"after." i.e., that this desire must follow n previous 

» !^Up«thA Br, ilv. 7. a, aS. differem e«f»«liliaft* »Mfh «|A« h 

* I rmd in the wooad oUuM tmi- niMMMd to mmmm m brinf mcm- 
M<1rr'r«. un'irnUndtnff bv Utd Um mHIJ prwmt. 


course of tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known 
rule whieli enjoins the practice of tranquillity, self-control, 
irrdifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object 
being to communicate the teaching to a proper student 
as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called 
" means." ^ 

" Well, then, let us grant that atha cannot mean ' after;' 
but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" 
But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection 
between the context and such auspicious meaning. Aus- 
piciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and 
desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the 
attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain ; but this 
auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of yoga, 
since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of 
pain.2 Therefore it cannot be at all established that the 
meaning of the aphorism is that " the exposition of the 
yoga is auspicious;" for auspiciousness cannot be either 
the primary meaning of atha or its secondary meaning by 
metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself 
auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like 
tlmt of a drum. " But why not say that just as an im- 
plied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a 
sentence, so an effect [like this of auspiciousness] may 
also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far 
as the actual words are concerned ? " ^ We reply, that in 
the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between 
the meaning of one word and that of another ; otherwise 
we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of 
the grammarians has set, that " verbal expectancy* can be 
fulfilled by u-07^ds alone." 

1 These are, i., the discrimination ^ Granting that atJia does not 

of the eternal from the phenomenal ; here mean " auspicious," why should 

ii., the rejection of the fruit of ac- not this be the implied meaning, 

tions here or hereafter ; iii., the pos- as all allow that the particle atha 

session of the six qualities, tranquil- does produce an auspicious influ- 

lity, &c. ; and, iv., the desire for ence ? 

liberation. ■* i.e., a word's incapacity to con- 

- It may be sukha-jancda, but it vey a meaning without some other 

is not itself siifcha. word to complete the construction. 

Tin: PATAS'JAl.l DARS.ISA. iyj 

" But ouj^ht not n i>rayer fur uii auspicious cotniucucc- 
luent to be put at the beginning: of a Jvi-* 
lay thu liu^l.s i>f ubsladcs tliat wuuKl hi:, 
pletiou of the work wliich the author desires to bet;iit, 
and also to obsi'ive llio iiiinjt'Uioriul \n.. f ' 

since it lias been sai.i by the wise, ' Ti. 
widely famous which liave auspicious cownienccmeiits. 
auspicious middles, and auspicious endings, and '"' 
students have lung lives and are invincible in di- 
tion ' ? ' Now the word atha implies ' uuspiciousness,' 
since there is a Sntfiti which says, 

'"The woixl Om und the word atha, — these two in the 
ancient time, 

•*' Cleaving tlie throat of lira hmon, came forth; there- 
fore they are both auspicious.' 

" Therefore let the worvl atha stand hero as 
' auspiciousness,' like ihc word ' ijiddhi' used , . .„...•••• 
in his opening sutra ' cridilhir dd aick.' " * This view, 
however, is untenable ; since the very word atha, wlit-n 
heard, has un auspicious intlueuce, even thou;,ii it be 
employed to convey some other special signification, just 
as the bearing the suund of lutes, flute- 
]»ioiou8 for one starting on a journey]. If } ^ .:, 

" How can the particle alha have any other efTect, if it i^ 

reply that it certainly ran have such other oddiliooal 

efTii t, just lis we :' ' ; '; 1. " 

other ])urj)ose a:- ^ 

ment of a journey.' Nor does this contradict the smntt. 

> Thia is foui. . •' rarift. m " Um Mooad ■iMaftbcm. 

tioiu ill ll.< M. * (p. 7, vowel." 

Ki.ll » I.. • 

« 'I '.Mor* holii Uuit tha dl, «< 

■ ii|$ ' lucrviMtt," |>f u*|.^'i ilv , ■••id * JAI i'mm. -^ t»AUi. Hv LvAta 


since the smriti will still hold good, as the words "they 
are both auspicious " mean only that they produce an 
auspicious effect. 

Nor can the particle atha have here the meaning of 
" reference to a previous topic/' since the previously men- 
tioned faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning 
really involves that of " after " [which we have already dis- 
cussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as 
this, as to whether this particular atha means "the inceptive 
now " or " after," if another topic had been previously sug- 
gested, then " reference thereto " would be a possible mean- 
ing ; but in the present case [where no other topic has been 
previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. There- 
fore, by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for 
the atJia of the siitra, the remaining meaning of " the 
inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the Tandya Brah- 
mana, xvi. 8, i ; xvi. lo, i], "Now this is the Jyotis," 
" Now this is the Visvajyotis," ^ the particle atha is 
accepted as signifying the commencement of the descrip- 
tion of a particular sacrifice, just as the atha in the 
commencement of the Mahabhashya, " now comes the 
exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the 
Institutes of Grammar. This has been declared by 
Vyasa in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, 
" the atha in this opening aphorism indicates a com- 
mencement;" and Vachaspati has similarly explained it 
in his gloss ; therefore it may be considered as settled 
that the atha here indicates a commencement and also 
signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view 

on his right hand the sound of fire omen according to all s.istras, and 
and a cowherdess calling " milk " to so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the 
buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, tuberous root of the water-lily, and 
a woman calling "jaya," (i(«'!/-d grass, a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a 
rice, garlands of Mowers, diamonds, kite, a lizard, and a woodman carry- 
sapphires, pearls, corals ; and on the ing wood are called bad omens, 
left twelve women. He hears drums ^ These are the names of two out 
and cymbals, and men >'ancing and of the four sacrifices lasting for one 
singing " Hari." It is, however, all day, in which a thousand cows are 
spoiled by seeing a gmrna, igodhikd). given to the officiating Brdhmans. 
The author adds, "This is a bad 


tliat this atha iinplic3 a commencement, let ;it be 

left in peace to strive after a successful un 
the lustra through the nttaiument of the j 
its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explana- 
tion of its entire ])urport. But here some 
"Does not the sniriti of Yajnavalkya say, ' 11 
is the promulgator of the Yoga, and no oiiier a: 
sa-^e ?* how then is Patafijali the teacher thereof?" V., 
reply that it was for this reason that the venerahlfi PntnA- 
jali,' that ocean of c^ 

it was to grasp all the ;....;..... \^ 

and down in the Puraiias, &c., and wishing to c 
together their essence, commenced his anu^asana, 

preposition anu implying that it was a teaching u 

followed a primary revelation and was not itself the 
immediate origin of the system. 

Since this atha in the aphorism signifies " commence* 
ment," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as 
follows: "be it known that the institute f ; ' 
tion of the yoga is now commenced." In : 1 

the " object-matter," as being that which is produced by 
it, is yoya [or the " cv :* *' ' "' ' '.' ■< 

means and its fruit; tli 

supreme absorption (kaivaiya) is the highest "end" of the 
yoga when it is ])roduced. The " coi 
the institute and yoga is that of thi 
thing to be produced; the "connection" between yoga 
and supreme absorption is that of the means an>i *' 
end ; and this is well known from J^ru?i and S : 
as I have before shown. And it is • d by the 

general context that tliose who aim at ....... .-wi are the 

duly qualified persons to hear this insiitute. Nor need 
any one be alarmed lest a similar 

adopted with the opening aphorism of 1.. . 

'• Now, therefore, there is a wish to know I ' and 

' He M b«rr nU«d jAmmtf^: thor oi %h» Mahibh^Utvik bviag iv 
•'lord of iiuikM,"— P»U6j«li,tlMA-- ' » tnAk* in mjrtboiogjf. 


lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the geueval 
context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly 
qualified students of the Vedanta. For the word atha, as 
there used, signifies " succession " [or '■ after "] ; and it is a 
settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted 
through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and 
consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any 
other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has 
been said, " When Sruti comes [as the determining autho- 
rity] ' the subject-matter ' and the rest have no place." ^ 
The full meaning of this is as follows : Where a thing is 
not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the " subject- 
matter" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not 
otherwise ; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a 
direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are 
irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the 
Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the " sub- 
ject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary con- 
clusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the 
authority which would establish this contrary conclusion 
is [by the very nature of " sruti "] already precluded from 
having any force ; and in the latter it is useless. This is 
all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14] ; " A definite 
text, a ' sign,' the ' sentence,' the ' subject-matter,' the 
' relative position,' or ' the title,' — when any of these come 
into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its 
meaning is more remote " ^ [and therefore less obvious]. 
It has been thus summed up — 

^ Cf. Sankara, Vedanta-Sut., iii. must be a liquid like ghee, since a 

3, 49. ladle could tiot divide solid things 

- This is the Miinamsa rule for like the baked flour cakes. 3. 

settling the relative value of the Vdkya, " the being mentioned in 

proofs that one thing is ancillary to one sentence," i.e., the context, 

another, i. /§?•«</, "a definite text," as in the text " ' il cut) thee for 

as "let him offer with curds," where food,' thus saying, he cuts the 

curds are clearly an ancillary part of branch;" here the words "(I cut) 

the sacrifice. 2. Linga, " a sign," or thee for food " are ancillary to the 

" the sense of the words," as leading action of cutting ; or in the text, " I 

to an inference, as in the text " he offer the welcome (oblation) to 

divides by the ladle ; " here we in- Agni," the words "the welcome 

fer tliat the thing to be divided (oblation) to Agni," as they form 


•' A text always precludes the rest; tho * liilo* U always 
precluded by any of tho preccdinij modca ; 

" But whether any iutfrvvniivj; tmc is precluded, or 
itself precludes, depends on circumstances. " 

Therefore [after all this Ion*; discussion] it may l»e now 
considered as siUle. I till " " as well 

as the other pieliniinaii ', whjrli 

teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like that of tho 
Veddnta, \\' ' usscs the natun; of " iJut,'* 
it may be it is the Y«»^m wliich w.w s;iid to bn 

the object- matter, since it is this which is to be produced, 
not the Sa-5tra." We grant that the Yoga is the principid 
object, as that whiidi is to be pnxUucd ; but since it ii 
produced by the SiUtra, especially directed thereto, this 
Sdstra is the means for its production, and, as a {general 
rule, the agent's nrtivity is directly concerned with tlie 
means rnilier than with tlic end. Just as the operations 
of Devadatta the woodcutter, t.e., his lifting his arm up 
and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, i.e , the 
axe, than to the object, i.e,, the tree, so here the siHiakcr, 
Patanjali, in his immediate action of speaking, means 
the Yoga-Sa^tra as his primary object, while he intends 
the Y' • in his idtimale action of ' »n." 

In c >i. i- .. c of this distinction, the real ;..;.^' is 

that the commencing the Yogaiiistra is that which primarily 

«m* •cntcncu with the wnr>^» " I divSn« tmrk," in onnn*«H»<in with IK- 

offtT," arc aiicillArv to ■' 
offcnnff. 4. J'ntiitrtut t, 

J .. - ; 


in t 

where ti. iW 

have n ^^ 

proUuce, Ai ; 

cnc3c (•i/'M'-ro 

th.V -" • 



br U^ 

" r. »•!- 

the f -cilal ! I . M.'-.Jmtd- 
dJkram, Ac , " I 


claims our attention ; while tlie " yogn," or the restraint of 
the modifications of the mind, is what is to be expounded 
in this Sastra. "But as we read in the lists of roots that 
the root yuj is used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the 
word yoga, its derivative, mean ' conjunction,' and not 're- 
straint' ? And indeed this has been said by Yajnavalk ya •} — 
' The conjunction of the individual and the supreme 

souls is called yoga.' " 
This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility 
of any such action,^ &c., in either as would produce this 
conjunction of the two souls. [Nor, again, is such an 
explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of 
other philosophical schools] ; for the notion of the con- 
junction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines 
of the Vaiseshika and Xyaya schools [and therefore they 
would still oppose our theory]. And even if we accepted 
the explanation in accordance with the Mi'mainsa [or 
Vedanta], our Yogasastra would be rendered nugatory by 
this concession [and the very ground cut from under our 
feet]; because the identity of the individual and supreme 
souls being in that school something already accomplished, 
it could not be regarded as something to be produced by 
our Sastra, And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are 
used in many different senses, the root yvj may very well 
be used here in the sense of " contemplation." ^ Thus it 
has been said — 

"Particles, prepositions, and roots — these three are all 

held to be of manifold meaning ; instances found in 

reading are their evidence." 
Therefore some authors expressly give yvj in this sense, 
and insert in their lists " yuj in the sense of samddhi." 
Nor does this contradict Yajnavalkya's declaration, as 
the word yoga, used by him, may bear this meaning ; and 
he has himself said — 

1 I.e., Yogi-Yajnavalkya, the au- Iriyu, wliich properly Lelongs only 
thor of the Ydjiiavalkya-rjitd. See to the body, as the soul is drashtri. 
Hall, Bibl. Index, p. 14 ; Aiifrecht, ^ Scil. samddki, or the restraining 
BocU. Catal , p. 87 b. the mind and senses to profound 

2 Karman seems here used U r contemplation. 


" Sumudhi is tl»c state of identity of the imliviilnnl an. I 
suj)remo souls; this ahitling absolutely in I'rahmnn 
is the samildhi of iho iiuliviilunl soul." 
It has been also said by the venerable Vyjisa [in his Com- 
meutary on the Yoga-siitias, i. i], " Yoya : ii." 

An objecuon, however, may bo hero r... . . "the 
term sanuUlhi is used by Patafijali [in ii. 29] in the sense 
of one of the ci-^ht ancillary parts * of the cij,'htfohl con- 
centration (or j/oi/a) ; and the whole cannot be thus itself 
a ])art as well as a whole, since the principal and the 
ancillary must be completely difTennt from each other, na 
all their attendant ciicumslances must be different, just as 
M'e see in the darsa/^uruamdsa sacrifices and their ancillary 
rites the prai/djas, and tlitTcforr he 

meaning of yo^a." We however 1 ^ _ ^ :on 

is incorrect ; for although the term sttrndilhi is used for 
etymological reasons' to express the • " p:irt which 
is really defined [in iii. 3] as " the < iiion which 

assumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of 
any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term to 
describe the principal state is justified by the author's 
wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as 
the inferior ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor 
can you hold that etvmology alone can decide where a 
word can be used ; because if so, as the wonl go, " a bull," 
is derived by all granunarians from the root gam, " to go," 
we ought never to use the phrase " a standing bull " [as 
the two words would be contnidictory], and the man 
Devadatta, when going, would properly be colled go, " a 
bull;" and, moreover, the Sutra, i. 2, distinctly gives ua 
a definite justification for employing the wonl in this 
sense when it declares that " concentrati"" '■ "' i- '? •• 
suppression of the mollifications of the lh;i 
[The second or prin i will Lhcrcfuiu 

be quite distinct fn:.. j 

Krvan-*-. Mhc » ^ -^f 

bncj'.li, r ■'•in- «»«/* . 


" But surely if yoga is held to be the suppression of the 
modifications of the thinking principle, tlien as these modi- 
fications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of tlie 
nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words 
their ' destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a 
principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and de- 
struction abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to 
these negations ; ^ and consequently in accordance with the 
maxim, ' This newly produced character will affect the sub- 
ject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the 
soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not 
allow ; because we maintain that these various modifica- 
tions which are to be hindered,^ such as " right notion," 
"misconception," "fancy," "sleep," and " memory " (i. 6), 
are attributes of the internal organ (chitta), since the power 
of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become 
the site of this discriminative perception. Nor can you 
object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent 
soul ^ has not been proved, since there is an argument to 
establish it ; for the intelligent soul must be unchange- 
able from the fact that it always knows, while that 
which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the 
internal organ, &c. And so again, if this soul were sus- 
ceptible of change, then, as this change would be occa- 
sional, we could not predicate its always knowing these 
modifications. But the true view is, that while the 
intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness, 
there is another essentially pure substance* which abides 
always the same ; and as it is this which is affected by 
any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which 
is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces an 

^ Thus, e.^., the antecedent non- '•' 1 niioddhavi/dndm ior tiiro- 

existence and the destruction of the dlu'nuim. 

pet are found in the two halves in ■' Chit - ^alti- and cJiiti - sakti — 

which the pot itself (the cnmter- soul. 

entit}' to its own non-existence) re- •* The sattva of the buddhi or the 

sides by intimate relation [sainavd)/a- internal organ. 


iinpressiun ;* ;ind ilius Soul ilself is pi-cservcd in ils own 
pruper indopciuicnce, nnd it is inaintainod to be Uir 
always knowing', and no suspicion of " ' '■ ,iiK>n 

it. That ol)joct by which tlie un men 

aflectod is known; that object by which it is not aitVcled 
is not known; for the understanding is called "suscfptiblc 
of cliange," because it resembles tlie iron, as it is suscep* 
liiile uf beinj; aflVctcd or not by the influence or want of 
influence of the ubject which resembles the nmgnet, — this 
influence or want of influence pro«.lucin.j r«spectivoly 
knowledge or the want of knowlelgo. " But inasmuch lu 
the understanding and the senses wiiich spring from egoism 
are all-pervading, are they not always connected with 
all objects, and thus would it not follow that t iM 

be a knowledge everywhere and always of ;i.. -,^?" 

"We reply that even altiiough we grant that they are all- 
pervading, it is only wlieiv a givtn un 'tig has 
certain modifications in a given body, ani objects 
arc in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of 
thr ;s only, and none other, is ] > "to that 
un ^'g ; Jii>d therefore, as this lin :s abso- 
lute, we hold that objects are just like magncta, and 
alTect the und. r>tan ' 1 as these do ir : 
in contact with it ihe channels of 
Therefore, the " modilications" belong to the uuderetanduig. 
not to •' '. and so '-r ;ti, " Desi- '"ion. 
doubt, i at of fui .vant of — 
all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage ! iia 

declared the un' '' " ' '' • ' il, 

•The i)ower tl . i -t- 

afijali also (iv. 18;, "Hie moo; of tiie under* 
star. re always known, — li..- ....... fr '- • -in- 

ch . ess of the Iluling Soul." The : is 

the argument drawn out formally to establish tiiu otiauge- 

' ThU Mcond •uUUQcn, "nlod'' Um lm«tf« of Um obj«ct oa • *-<'-tMi 

ofu.ul.r- >/n. ,!.„... I..."....., ..,1 

i» like A '■ 


ableness of the understanding. The understanding is 
susceptible of change because its various objects are now 
known and now not known, just like the organ of hear- 
ing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is no- 
toriously threefold, i.e., a change of "property," of "aspect,"^ 
and of " condition." When the subject, the understanding, 
perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of 
" property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a 
bracelet, a diadem, or an armlet ; there is a change of "as- 
pect" when the property becomes present, past, or future ; 
and there is a change of " condition " when there is a mani- 
festation or non-manifestation^ of the perception, as of blue, 
&c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] newness or oldness 
[at two different moments] would be its change of condi- 
tion. These three kinds of change must be traced out by 
the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus 
we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our 
thesis that, since " right notion " and the other modifica- 
tions are attributes of the understanding, their " suppres- 
sion " will also have its site in the same organ. 

[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection 
to what we have said above.] " But if we accept your 
definition that ' yorja is the suppression of the modifica- 
tions of the chitta,' this will apply also to 'sound sleep,' 
since there too we may find the suppression [or suspen- 
sion] of the modifications found in kshipta, vikshipta, 
wudha^ &c. ; but this would be wrong, because it is im- 
possible for the ' afflictions ' to be abolished so long as 
those states called kshipta, &c,, remain at all, and because 
they only hinder the attainment of the sumvium honum. 
Let us examine this more closely. For the understand- 
ing is called kshipta, 'restless,' M'hen it is restless [with 

^ Vdchaspati explains lalshana as of the lalshana-parindma. Cf. the 
hihihlieda. Commentaries on iii. 13. 

^ I take ddi as meaning aspJnc- ^ These are generally called the 
iatia. The change of state takes five states of the thinking principle, 
place between the several moments chittabhnmayas ov avastkds. Cf. Com- 
mentary, i. 2, 18. 


an excess of the quality rajas], as beins* toas- 
aniiilst various objects \vljic)i eip^age it. I • 

* bliiuied/ when il is possessed by ibe iiH' ... . 

and is sunk in a sea of darkness [o\vin<^ to an excess of the 
quality /<i7/u/.s]. It is called nlshipdi, ' uur- 
it is dilVerenl from the tirst state* [as Hi; 
quality sattia]. We must here, however, note a distinction; 
for, in accordance witli ti»e line of the V' 
34), 'The mind, Krisima, is fiekle, t. 
and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may 
occasionally b( " ' v tlu transient fix' ' '.' < 

objects ; but i. innate to il, or ii . , 

in it by sickness, &c., or other consequences of former 
actions ; as it is said [in ti»e Yo '" i. 30]. ' S ' 
languor, doubt, carelessness, la/ .iction t" 

erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and 
instability, — these distractions of the mind are called 
'obstacles*.* Here 'sickness* means fever, &c, caused 
by the want of equilibrium between the throe humours ; 
'languor 'is the mind*s want of activity; 'doubt* is a 
sort of notion which embraces two opixjsite alternatives ; 
'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for 
producing meditation ; ' laziness ' is a want of exertion 
from heaviness of body, speech, or mind ; ' addiction to 
objects ' is an attachment to objects of sense ; ' < 

perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing fur 

' failure to attain some stage ' is the failins for some 
reason or other to arrive at the state of 

lion; ' inst;»bility ' is the mind's failure i . , 

even when the state of abstract meditation has been 
reachetl. T we maintain tli * 

the mind'.^ ; cannot be i 

nition of yoga. 

We r-ply. t' " " " . "' 

r-'-iuds til'' tii: 

> Tbt-M thrr« comlili'tM rMp<<ctiral5 dMractoriM mm. dvmoiui, uni (od& 


mudha, and vikshipta, which [as being connected wiih 
the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states, 
the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is 
itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be called 
yoga], this does not apply to the other two conditions 
called ekdgra and niruddha, "which are to be pursued and 
attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifica- 
tions in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly- to 
be considered as yoga. Now by cldgra we mean that 
state when the mind, entirely filled with the sattva 
quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and 
by niruddha we mean that state when all its develop- 
ments are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or 
potentialities] remain. 

Now this samddhi, " meditation " [in the highest sense], 
is twofold: "that in which there is distinct recognition" 
{sai)iprajndta\ and " that in which distinct recognition 
is lost" (asanijjrajndta) [Yoga S., i. 17, 18].^ The former 
is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent 
on its own object, and all the "modifications," such 
as "right notion," &c., so far as they depend on external 
tilings, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the 
term, it is where the intellect ^ is thoroughly recognised 
{samyalc prajftdyate) as distinct from Nature. It has a four- 
fold division, as savita,rka, savichdra, sdnanda, and sdsmiia. 
Now this " meditation " is a kind of "pondering" (bhdvand), 
which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the 
exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pon- 
dered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two 
kinds, being either Iswara or the twenty-five principles. 
And these principles also are of two kinds — senseless and 
not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, 
egoism, &c., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. 
No\^ among these objects which are to be pondered^ when, 
having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth, 

^ Much of this is taken from bonowc 1 BAllantyne's translation. 
Bhoja's Commentar}-, and I have - Can chitta mean " soul " here ? 


kc, ponderiiij^ is j-ursuud in llic form of an invest i;;iitioii 
as to which is antecedent ami which consequont,' or ia 
the form of a union of the wortl, its nj^aiiiii^. an«l the 
iilca which is to be prcKluciMl [cf. i. 42]; llien the medit^i- 
tion is called "arj;unientative" (santarka). When, having 
t;iken as its object sonietliing subtile, as the five subtile 
elenients and the internal orjjaii, pondering is pursued in 
relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation i^ called 
"deliberative" (savidtdra). When the mind. cojnmin«,ded 
wiilj sttme "passion" and '■ thiiki; the 

nu'»ii:aiion is called "bealiiic" { a .,, , od- 

ness" is then predominant, which consists in the mani- 
festntion of joy.' "When pon<lei' " " ' 03 

its object the pure element of ' ^ : by 

even a little of " passion " or " darkness," then that mcdita- 

ti. : ■ " ' . • • 


becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goottness" 
has become qiiite subordinate [a> ^tcpping-stone to 

higher things]. 

But the " meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," 
consists in the suppression of all " modifications " whotever. 

'* Hut " [it may be asked] " was not ' concentration ' 

defined as the suppression of all the mod;: 


then, can the ' meditation whore there is 


lion ' be included in it at all, since we s- 


it that : ion of the mind, with t' 

prcdoiu... L.. . .^iiich views the soul ahv; v... 

"i ,' "" -.""■•- 

ne?s a<» distinrt from oarh otluT?" This, 

luiwever, is un- 



l>:- •■ •• " •••' • • ■■■ ••■ 

;, n^ 

especially stopping the operation of the "afllict tons," the 
"actions," the "fnictificaiions," and the "slock of desoris."* 

• /.€.. M. r 

prodiiCD th*- r' 

the •rn*««, he. ill ' 

1 In |>. 164. linn 4 *i^rm^ rvxl ' 
iutkapratUfttm'ifUtfa. ^ 


The "afflictions" (Ucsa) are well known as five, viz., 
ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mun- 
dane existence. " But here a question is at once raised, In 
■what sense is the word aviclyd, "ignorance," used here ? Is 
it to be considered as an avyayihhdva compound, wliere the 
former portion is predominant, as in the word " above- 
board"?^ or is it a tatpurusha [or karmadhdraya] com- 
pound, where tlie latter portion is predominant, as in the 
word " town- clerk " ? or is it a bahuvrihi compound, where 
both portions are dependent on something external to the 
compound, as "blue-eyed" ? It cannot be the first; for if 
the former portion of the compound were predominant, then 
we should have the negation the emphatic part in avidyd 
{i.e., it would be an instance of what is called the express 
negation, or pi^asajya-pratishcdha) ; ^ and consequently, as 
avidyd would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be 
unable to produce positive results, as the " afflictions," &c., 
and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but 
neuter. It cannot be the second ; for any knowledge, what- 
ever thing's absence it may be characterised by {a -f vidyd), 
opposes the " afflictions," &c., and cannot therefore be their 
source. Nor can it be the third ; for then, — in accordance 
with the words of the author of the Vritti,^ " there is a 
haJmvHhi compound which is formed with some word 
meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional 
elision of this subsequent word" * — we must explain this 
supposed hahuvrihi compound avidyd as follows : " That 
huddhi is to be characterised as avidyd (sc. an adjective), 

1 I have ventured to alter the (a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a 

examples, to suit the English trans- funeral note." 

lation. (b.) "Unwatched the garden bough 

'■' Where the negation is proini- shall sway." 

nent it is called prasajya-prati- The former corresponds to the logi- 

shedha ; but where it is not prouii- clan's atyantdbhdva, the latter to 

nent, we have the paryuddsa nega- anyonydbhdva or bheda. 

tion. In the former the negative •* Cf. the vdrttlha in Siddhdnta 

is connected with the verb ; in the Kaum., i. 401. 

latter it is generally compounded '' Thus adkcma stands for avidya- 

with some other word, as, e.g. — mdnudhana,v/ithvidyamdna oxmtttd 

iu the compound. 

?///• r.\TAS)ALll)ARs.iS'A. 151 

of which there is not a vidyd existing." But this explana- 
tion is untonalik" ; for such an ariWyti couUl not !■ 

source of the " atUiclions;" ' and yet, on the oil..; 

it ought to be their source,' even though it were cusociatcti 
with thi- sujiprcssion of all tlu- " nnKlificalions." '^ 
also acconipanioil by tlial tiiscriiniuative knowit „ 
soul ami the quality of goodness [which is found in the 
sd^mita inciiitation]. 

" Now it is said [in the Yoga Sutras, ii. 4]. " Ignorance i« 
the field [or place of origin, ».«., source] of the others, whether 
they be dormant, exlenualotl, intercepted, orsiinpK'." T' 
are said to be "donnanl " \vl>en ihoy are iiul man;: 
for want of something to wake them up; they are < 
" extenuated " when, throujjh one's 11 : * : • on sonu ". 
that is opposeil to them, they are r« .■ rl ; th< ; 

called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by 
other strong "aflliction;" they are called "simple" wi- n 
they protluce their several ellecls in the direct vicinity of 
what co-operates with them. Tliis has been expressed by 
Vachaspati Mi^rn, in his Gloss on Vytisa's Commentary, 
in the following memorial stanza : — 

" The dormant 'aOliclions' are found in th< 

are absorbeii in the taltvas [i,e., not c. < ., . ... 

existing in an interval of mundane destruction]; 

the 'extenuated'* are found in ift^jins ; but th<? 

'intercepted ' and the 'simple ' in those win. ar. in 

contact with worldly objects." 
" No one proposes the fourth solution of ■ 
aviiiyd as a dvandva comi>ound.* where bot;. , 
cfiually predominant. Wcause we cannot recognise here 
two equally indejKjndent subjects. Therefore under any 

» A« iU nibjcct would confciMiedIr * I rnk>\ lant%n^uk^it<k« m,\ 

\^ l,„in . ' r,,,.,..-.!, I,. „,,? \ .. I «|i*U»'.. i' 

1 A- i»llrr»lL b .«»»Un»tt«l 

» In ■. ' !''■. 17. r.-v! «It», r. 

my MS. ..< V . ■»«^^ Kim* 

»»rrrtm/limrw/A ■■ 
(<t(A<Ui-«>pro*t rfj/iil. 


one of tliese three admissible alternatives ^ the common 
notion of i'aiorance as bein<j; the cause of the ' afflictions ' 
would be overthrown." 

[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], 
because we may have recourse to the other kind of nega- 
tion called paryuddsa [where the affirmative part is em- 
phatic], and maintain tliat avidyd means a contradictory 
[or wrong] kind of knowledge, the reverse of vidt/d; an I 
so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it lias 
been said — 

" The particle implying ' negation ' does not signify ' ab- 
sence ' [or ' non-existence '] when connected with 
a noun or a root; thus the words ahrdhmana and 
adharma respectively signify, ' what is other than 
a Brahman ' and ' what is contrary to justice.'" 
And again — 

" We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom 
of the ancient writers; therefore a word must not 
be wrested from the use in which it has been 
already employed." 
Vachaspati also says,- " The connection of words and 
their meanings depends on general consent for its cer- 
tainty ; and since we occasionally see that a tatpurusha 
negation, where the latter portion is properly predominant, 
may overpower the direct meaning of this latter portion 
by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even here too 
[in avidyd'] the real meaning is something contrary to 
xidyd " [i.e., the negative " non-knowledge" becomes ulti- 
mately the positive " ignorance " ^]. It is with a view to 
this that it is said in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], " Ignor- 
ance is the notion that the non-eternal, the impure, pain, 
and the non-soul are (severally) eternal, pure, pleasure, 
and soul." Viparyaya, " misconception," is detined as 

^ I read palcshatraye for paA's/ia- nor, on the other hand, a "non- 

dvaye. friend," but something positive, an 

- In his Comir.. on Sut., ii. 5. "enemy." So arjoshpada is said to 

^ Thus inimicus is not a " friend," mean "a forest." 


"llioimaj»ininj' of a thing in what isnotUiat thins,"' [i.e., 

in its opjKisile]; ;i5, fur instance, llie inii 

nul " in a " non-etciniil " thing, t.<., a ji 

ing the " pure " in the '" impure " boJy,^ whon it has heen 

iluchueil by a proverbial couplet •'' — 

"The wise recognise tlio body 113 inipun*, from its 
original place [the womb], — from its primal seed, — 
from its composition [of humours, &c.]. — from ; 
spiration, — from ileath [as even a Dnihman's ! 
detilcs], — and from the fact that it haa to be made 
pure by rites." 
So, — in accordance with tlie principle enounced in the 
aphorism (ii. 15), "To the discriminating everythin.; m 
simply pain, through the pain which arises m the uliima' - 
issue of every tiling,* or through the anxiety to seciii • 
it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent impres- 
sions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual 
opposition of the intluvnces of the three qualities" [in the 
form of pleasure, pain, and stupid indifleri-nce], — ignor- 
ance transfers the idea of " pleasure " to w hat is really 
"pain," as, e.ff., garlands, sandal- wood, women, &c. ; and 
similarly it conceives the " non-soul," e.y., the botly, &c., 
as the " soul." As it has been said — 

" liut ignorance is when living beings tr:insfer the 

notion of ' soul ' to the ' non- 
"This causes bondage; but in t: 

Thus til 

" But [i . . ^ pecial kind4 

of ignorance should there not be given some general defi- 
nition applying to them all, as otherwise their special 

' Cf. Yoga Sul . L 8. hi <i of it : he odk H 

-Til i>. r ''. !!no 4 I'l^ra, read t»' 

■tM. ' 

It) ti:« ( '•■Mill 

and I h»vo ' 


characteristics cannot be established? For thus it has 
been said by Bhatta Kumarila — 

' Without some general definition, a more special defi- 
nition cannot be given by itself ; therefore it must 
not be even mentioned here.' " 
This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently 
met by the general definition of misconception, already ad- 
duced above, as " the imagining of a thing in its opposite." 

" Egoism " {asinitd) is the notion that the two separate 
things, the soul and the quality of purity,^ are one and the 
same, as is said (ii. 6), " Egoism is the identifying of the 
seer with the power of sight." " Desire " (rdga) is a long- 
ing, in the shape of a thirst, for the means of enjoyment, 
preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of 
one who has known joy. " Aversion" (dvesha) is the feel- 
ing of blame felt towai'ds the means of pain, similarly pre- 
ceded by the remembrance of pain, on the part of one M'ho 
lias known it. This is expressed in the two aphorisms, 
"Desire is what dwells on pleasure; " "Aversion is what 
dwells on pain" (ii. y, 8). 

Here a grammatical question may be raised, " Are we 
to consider this word anusayin (' dwelling ') as formed 
by the hrit affix nini in the sense of ' what is habitual,' 
or the taddhita affix ini in the sense of matup ? It cannot 
be the former, since the affix oiini cannot be used after 
a root compounded with a preposition as anusi ; for, as 
the word supi has already occurred in the Siitra, iii. 2, 4, 
and has been exerting its influence in the following sutras, 
this word must have been introduced a second time in the 
Sutra, iii. 2, yS, supy ajdtau ninis tdclicliliilye} on purpose 
to exclude prepositions, as these have no case termina- 
tions ; and even if we did strain a point to allow them, still 
it would follow by the Siitra, vii. 2, 115, aclio nniti^ that 

^ Thus " sight," or the power of a root in the sense of what is habitual, 

seeing, is a modification of the qua- when the upajiada, or subordinate 

lity of sattva unobstructed by rajas word, is not a word meaning 'genus ' 

and tamas. and ends in a case." 

^ " Let the affix nini be used after ■■ " Let vriddhi be the substitute 


the radical vowel must be subject to vriddhi, and so llio 
word must be anuMiifin, in accordance with the analoj»v 
of such words as atimj/in, &c. Nor is the latter view 
tenable (i.e., that it is the taddhUa aflix ini'), since xni is 
forbidden by the technical verse — 

•These two afljxes'are not used after n monosyllable 
nor a ^7-1/ formation, nor a word meaning 'genu«,' 
nor with a word in the locative case;' 
and the word anusaya iscleaily a X,riV formation as it ends 
with the aJTix ack^ [which brings it under this prohibition, 
and so renders it insu-ceptible of the affix ini]. Conse- 
quently, the wonl anusaifin in the Yoj^a aphorism is one 
the formation of which it is very hard to justify.*** This 
cavil, however, is not to be admitted ; since the rule is 
only to be understood as applying generally, not abso- 
lulely, as it does not refer to something uf essential im- 
portance. Hence the author of the Vfitli has said — 
"The word tVt, as implying the idea of popular accep- 
tation, is everywhere connected with the examples 
of this rule * [i.e., it is not an absolute law]," 
Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as 
kdryin, kdryika [wliere the affixes are added after a krit 
formation], (amiulin, landtdika [where they are adde<I 
after a word meaning "genus"]. Hence the prohibition is 
only general, not absolute, after lent f ' ' 

meaning "genus," and therefore the . 
justified, although the word anusaya is formed by a A-ri/ 
afTix. This doubt therefore is settled. 

of » bvte ending in » V'>w-1, when »iiM , (4 > damifumti kiLi <•.«., i/an^rf 
that which haa an lor* ofyda* *i<«l«}. 

(••How*;" titni h»« ^» ■■ * Hv iii 1, fA 

» SC- : • ' ■ 

» /ni 

Irav . ,, , 


«|'; •! I'-l'i » .'. 

uli 115. t 

in • "^wnor*' 

pr I! - ' ! 

rt ^ ' I'^i^itt rv*da 



The fifth " afliiction," called " tenacity of mundane 
existence " (ahhinivesa), is what prevails in the case of 
all living beings, from the worm up to the philosopher, 
springing up daily, without any immediate cause, in the 
form of a dread, " Alay I not be separated from the body, 
things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression 
left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which 
were suffered in previous lives, this is proved by uni- 
A^ersal experience, since every individual has the wish, 
" May I not cease to be," " May I be," This is declared 
in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing 
on through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of 
the philosopher " [ii. 9]. These five, " ignorance," &c., are 
well known as the " afflictions " (klesa), since they afHict 
the soul, as bringing upon it various mundane troubles. 

[We next describe the Tcarmdsaya of ii. 12, the "stock 
of works " or " merits " in the mind,] '' Works " (Jcarman) 
consist of enjoined or forbidden actions, as the jyotish- 
toma sacrifice, brahmanicide, &c, " Stock " {dsaya) is the 
balance of the fruits of previous works, which lie stored 
up in the mind in the form of " mental deposits " of merit 
or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own 
experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13]. 

Now " concentration " [yor/a] consists [by i. 2] in " the 
suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle," 
which slops the operation of the "afflictions," &c. ; and 
this " suppression " is not considered to be merely the non- 
existence of the modifications [i.e., a mere negation], 
because, if it were a mere negation, it could not produce 
positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather the site 
of this non-existence,^ — a particular state of 'the thinking 
principle, called by the four names [which will be fully 
described hereafter], madhumati, madhupratikd, visokd, 
and saiaskdraseshatd. The word nirodha thus corresponds 
to its etymological explanation as " that in which the modi- 
fications of the thinking principle, right notion, miscon- 

^ i.e., Thus nirodha is not vritter ahluivah, but ahhdvasyuh-ijah. 


ct'i»tion, &c., are suppressed {nirudhyanU). 'urrrcs- 
sion of the modificntions is produced bv m-l 

"dispassion"[i. 12} " PIxeicisc is ll; ii ihnt 

llie iutcruul organ shall remain in its _ [i. 13]. 

This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind 
of development, whtrehy tlie thinkin;^ pi 1 ' : 
its natural staU', uniiHicted by llmsi' u\> 
at dilTorent times assume the form of reveaiii 
•jising, and controlling.' "Exercise" is an efTort mi. . .. u 
to tiiis, an endeavour again and again to reduce the in- 
ternal organ to such a condition. The locative case, tthilav. 
in the aphorism is intended 10 express the object or aim, n^ 
in the well-known phrase, " He kills the elephant fur 
its skin." * " Dis]>assioM is the consciousness of having 
overcome desire in him who thirsts after neither the 
objects that are seen nor those that arc hcanl of in reve* 
lation " [i. 15]. " Dispassion " is thus tl«e rellection. 
" Tliese objects arc subject to me, not I to tl»em," in one 
who feels no interest in the thinjjs of this world or tho 
next, from perceiving the imperf- • > them. 

Now, in order to reduce the " ..: . - hinder 

meditation and to attain meditation, the yogin must first 
direct his n' " • r- 

cisc " and . lu- 

nient This has been said by Kfishna in the Dhagavad 
(I ltd [vi. 3}— 

" Action is the means to the Fat^e who wishes to rise tn 

" Hut to iiim who has risen t«t 11, traiu^uillity is sai.i U) 
be tl»e means." 

Patafijali has thus defined the practical yoga : " Practicnl 
cot. a is morlificalion, rccilatiun of texts, and 

res, to the " [li. 1]. YajA.ivalkya has de- 

scribed " mortification " — 

' I rea^l In p. I'S, la»t line, praliiittpnrpttiniifomarifm. from Bboj^'t 
rotnmcnt nn L 12. 

• Sc€ Ki<ik i, il. }, 36. 



" By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult 

chandrayana fast, &c., 
" Thu3 to dry up the body they call the highest of all 

mortifications." ^ 
" Recitation of texts " is the repetition of the syllable 
Ora, the gdi/atH,&e. Now these mantras are of two kinds, 
Vaidik and Tantrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, 
those chanted and those not chanted. Those chanted are 
the sdmans; those not chanted are either in metre, i.e., 
tlie riclias, or in prose, i.e., the yajuvishi, as has been said 
by Jaimini,^ " Of these, that is a rich in which by the force 
of the sense there is a definite division into p^^das [or 
portions of a verse] ; the name sdman is applied to chanted 
portions ; the word yajus is applied to the rest." Those 
mantras are called Tantrik which are set forth in sacred 
books that are directed to topics of voluntary devotion ; ' 
and these are again threefold, as female, male, and neuter ; 
as it has been said — 

" The mantras are of three kinds, as female, male, and 

neuter : 
'* The female are those which end in the wife of fire 
{i.e., the exclamation svdhd) ; the neuter those 
which end in namas ; 
" The rest are male, and considered the best. They are 

all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, &c." 
They are called " all-powerful " (siddha) because they 
counteract all defects in their performance, and produce 
their effect even when the ordinary consecrating cere- 
monies, as bathing, &c,, have been omitted. 

Now the peculiar " consecrating ceremonies " (samskdra) 
are ten, and they have been thus described in the Sdradd- 
tilaka — 

" There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which 
give to mantras efficacy : 

1 This passage probably occurs in - Mimanisa Sutras, ii. I, 35-37* 
the Ydjiiavalkyagitd of Yogi-yajna- ^ The tantras are not properly 

valkya. See Colebrooke's Essays concerned with what is niV^a cr 

(ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145, note. naimittika ; they are kdmya. 

THE P. I 7.1 S) A LI DA RSA S. I . a j.) 

"These inantras ore thus in > *•• .-..m,,.!..',. fi,yy ^^a 

thoroughly consecratcil. 
"The • be;,'t.>ttinj,',' the ' vivityiug,' tljo 'smiling/ the 

' awakening,' 
" The ' sprinkling.' the ' purifying.' the ' fattening,' 
"Tlie ' salisfyin;^'/ the ' i" ;.' iho ' concoaling,' — 

these are the ten cm ;:<? of vunUras. 

"The 'begetting' (janana) is the extracting of the 

mantra froju its vowi-ls ami • t-^. 

" The wise man shouUl niultiT ih letters of tlie 

mantra, each united to Oni. 
"Acconling to the nunihor of tiio ieiiLre. This they 

call the ' vivifying' ijivnHa). 
" Having written the letters of the man(ra, let him 

smite each with sandal-water, 
"Uttering at each the mystic * seH ' of nir.* This is 

called the 'smiting' {td'lana 
" Having written the letters of the m-ui, ,, lot him slriko 

them with oleander flowers, 
" Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the 

' awakening ' ( bodhana). 
*' Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his 

own special tanira, 
" Sprinkle the Icttere, according to their number, with 

leaves of the Ficus religioso. Tiiis is the 'sprink- 

ling'O' •. 

** Having nit . n the mantra in his mind, let him 

consume by the jyotir-mantra 
"The t mantra. Tliis is the 

* The utterance of the Jyotir-mantra, together with Oro, 

ano ' •■ \' ' '^ !. 

"And t. , . \.it«r frnm a 

bunch of kuia grass, 
■With" • ' ' • ' • i—:u',i 

ii '• 

> Th* tija ol mil ia th« ■;IUbtv>t^ 
1 Tb« f*/9 of vat«r U th« •]rIUbi« fctfi. 


. " The satiating libation over the mantra with mantra- 

hiallowed water is the 'satisfying' {tarpana). 

'' The joining of the mantra Avith Oni and the ' seeds' 

of Maya ^ and Rama^ is called its ' illtimining' 


"The non-puhlication of the mantra wliich is being 

nmttered — this is its ' concealing ' (gopana). 
" These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in 

all tantras ; 
"And the adept who practises them according to the 

tradition obtains his desire ; 
" And ruddha, Mlita, vichhinna, supta, sapta, and the rest, 
" All these faults in the mantra rites are abolished by 

these excellent consecrations." 
But enough of this venturing to make public the tantra 
mysteries connected with mantras, which has suddenly led 
us astray like an unexpected Bacchanalian dance.^ 

The third form of practical yoga, "resignation to the 
Lord" (isvara-pranidhdna),\s the consigning all one's works, 
whether mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the 
Supreme Lord, the Supremely Venerable. As it has been 
said — 

"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary, 
" That is all made over to thee ; I act as impelled by thee." 
This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as " the 
surrender of the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a 
peculiar kind of faith, since most men act only with a 
selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is sung in the Bhagavad 
Gita [ii. 47] — 

"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with 

the fruits; 
"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou 

attached to inaction." 
The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action 
has been declared by the venerable Ni'lakantha-bharati — 

^ Hrlm. - S'rim. 

' Tdndava is the frantic dance of the god Siva and his votaries. 


•* Even a peimnce accomplishfil hv ^n^i* rfTnrt, !ntt 

vitiated bv desire, 
"Produces only dis'^ust in ih" >ir u l,.'!i. i:k- uj;ik 

whicli has been licked by a il<»;4." 
Now this prescribtKl practice of mortitication. recitatiou. 
and resi«:;nation is itself called yoga, bocauae it is a 
means for pro"iucin;» yoga, this beinj; an instan*'*' of th" 
function of words called " supcrini{M>nenl pure Ii: 
as in the well-known example, " liutter is lonjjevii. . 1 ..- 
dication " is the establishing of another meaning of a word 
from the incompatibility of its pnncipal n»t'aning wiih the 
rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new 
meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on 
IK'* rioty or on a motive. This has been declared in the 
Kiiri/a-prakusa [ii. 9] — 

" When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the 
principal meaniii-^ of a wonl 
with it, another meaning is i; ^ ; 

riety or a motive, this is ' Indication,' the super- 
added function of the word." 
Now the wort! "this" [if., tat in the neuter, which the 
neuter i/at in the extract would have naturally leil us to 
expect instead of tho foi: '] wouM ! 

some neuter wor.l, like " ii!^ which i^ ^ 

subordinate part of the verb "is indicated." Hut «f is 
used in t!. 
"this is ;: 
feminine through its dependence on the predicate. 

ha^ Im en • ' I by Kaiyata, ** Of thn 

imply li; ■ "f the subject and 

former takes ;er of the former, the latter < : 

laltcr."» Now . ■-.r.r :.. " ;. 

of In<iicati'>n f:"!:. 

> Liur»:; 

onlcr tho (;• 

C/. "Tbcba: ., ,- ! 

eat," Ury, liii. 44 : " Aninwl >> 


significant in its parts by being analysed etymologically as 
Tcusavi + ldti, " one who gathers kusa grass for the sacrifice," 
is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation of 
a similarity in character, as both are persons of discern- 
ment; and this does not need a motive any more than 
Denotation does, since each is the using a word in its recog- 
nised conventional sense in accordance with the immemorial 
tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said — 

" Some instances of * indication ' are known by notoriety 
from their immediate significance, just as is the 
case in 'denotation' [the primary power of a 
Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard 
to any motive. Although a word, when it is employed, 
first establishes its principal meaning, and then by that 
meaning a second meaning is subsequently indicated, and 
so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning and 
not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word 
which originally established the primary meaning, it is 
called [improperly by metonymy] a function of the word. 
It was with a view to this that the author of the Kavya- 
praka^a used the expression, " This is ' Indication,' the 
superadded function of the word." But the indication based 
on a motive is of six kinds: i. inclusive indication,^ as 
" the lances enter " [where we really mean " men with the 
lances"]; 2. indicative indication, as " the benches shout" 
[where the spectators are meant without the benches] ; 3. 
qualified 2 superimponent indication, as "the man of the 
Panjab is an ox" [here the object is not swallowed up in 
the simile] ; 4. qualified introsusceptive indication, as 
" that ox " [here the man is swallowed up in the simile] ; 
5. pure superimponent indication, as " ghi is life ;" 6. pure 

^ I have borrowed these terms from his stupidity ; pure indication 

from Ballantjne's translation of the from any other relation, as cause and 

Silhitya-darpana. effect, &c., thus butter is the cause uf 

^ Qualified indication arises from longevity, 
likeness, as the man is like an ux 


introsusceplive indication, as " verily this is life." This 
has leen all ex|)hiinod in the Krt\ ya-jiraku^a [ii. 10-12]. 
But enough of this clnivfiitvj of thr (li'|ih.s of rhclornal 

This yo/^a has been lU. i.u'i i. 1;. IV. ci-lil t! ' 

to it (anga); these are the forWarances, n.i 
ances, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, a 
tion, contemplation, and meditation [ii. 29]. Pat 
says, " Forbearance consists in not wishinj.' to kill, v«' 
not stealing, continence, not coveting " [ii. 30]. 

observances are purifications, contentment, mot j*. 

recitation of texts, and resignation to the I»ni " [ii. 
32]; and these are described in the Vishnu Purdna [vi. 7, 

" The sage who brings his mind into a fit state fur 
attaiuing nrahnian, pncti-es, void of all desire, 

*' Continence, ab•^linenoe from injury, tiuth, non-stcaU 
ing, and uon-covcting ; 

"Self-controlled, he should ]>ra' • aion of texts, 

puriliLUiioii, contenlmenl, ai; ly, 

"And then he should make bis mind iutent on the 
Supreme Ilrahman. 

** These are respectively called tho five 'forbearances' 
and the five ' religious obser%'ance«;' 

"They bestow ••.->• > , .< 

desire of : 
void of desire." 

"A 'posture' is what i'^ ' -' • ' •' • '• '• 

it is of ten kinds, as th< 
da it4oJlM, sojxUrat/a . pa rya 1^ a . 

niyfinfiana, sn .;;..., \..^i, .1, .i.-.i,i.,d 

ta< h of them . • which ••« — 

" Let him hold his two grral Ux» with his two 

hn- ' • ' ••• r. r— ■■'•-•• "rdcr, 
" Ilav:: his feet, O chief of Hrali- 

mans, uti his tiir^uaj 
"This will be thc/w^ ■ ">"«'"r.- If!.! in honour by all." 


The descriptions of the others must be sought iu that 
work. — "When this steadiness of posture has been attained, 
'' regulation of the breath " is practised, and this consists 
in " a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and ex- 
piration " [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of the 
external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within 
the body ; and " regulation of the breath " is the cessa- 
tion of activity in both movements. " But [it may be 
objected] this cannot be accepted as a general definition 
of ' regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply to the 
special kinds, as rechaka, puraka, and kumhhaka." We 
reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the 
"cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expira- 
tion " is found in all these special kinds. Thus rcchaka, 
which is the expulsion of the air within the body, is 
only that regulation of the breath, which has been men- 
tioned before as " expiration ; " and puraka, which is 
the [regulated] retention of the external air within the 
body, is the " inspiration;" and kumhhaka is tlie internal 
suspension of breathing, when the vital air, called ^^rd/ja, 
remains motionless like water in a jar (kvvilha). Thus 
the " cutting short of the motion of inspiration and ex- 
piration " applies to all, and consequently the objector's 
doubt is needless. 

Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two 
ghatikds and a half ^ in each artery ^ {nddi), like the re- 
volving buckets on a waterwheel.^ Thus in the course 
of a day and night there are produced 21,600 inspirations 

1 I.e., an hour, a ghatikd being taas repeated with the offerings to 

twenty-four minutes. the seasons, is discussed. " The 

^ The nddis or tubular vessels are seasons never stand still ; following 

generally reckoned to be lOi, with each other in order one by one, as 

ten principal ones ; others make spring, summer, the rains, autumn, 

sixteen principal 7iddis. They seem the cold and the foggy seasons, each 

taken afterwards in pairs. consisting of two months, and so 

* Madhava uses the same illus- constituting the year of twelve 

tration in his commentary on the months, they continue revolving 

passage in the Aitareya Brahmatia again and again like a waterwheel 

(iii. 29\ where the relation of the {yhaUyantratat) ; hence the seasons 

vital airs-, the seasons, and the man- never pause in their course." 


ami expirations. IltMice it lina been said by tho«o who 
know tin' >t'(rot of trajisttuttin',' the mantras, concornin^ 
the tmn^ini5sion of the ajapdmantra ' — 

" Six liundred to Oai^eia, six thousand to the self- 
existent r.raliinan, 
*' Six thousand to Vishiju, six thou9nn«l to ^iva, 
" One thousand to the Guru (nrihospati). one thousand 

to the ? - 1. 

"And one \\\ . • : e si>ul : thus I m ik" ov-t th" 

performed muttering." 
So at the time of the i 
arteries, tlic elements, ear 

according to their different colours, by those who wish t<» 
obtain the highest good. This has been thus explaine«l 
by the wise — 

" I^'t each artery convey the nir two fjha(U and a half 

from sunrise. 
"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries* 

to the buckets on a revolving watenvliocl. 
"Nine hundred inspirations an<l cxpi' "• ■ • '^f the air 

take place [in the hour], 
•* And all combined produce the total of twenty-one 

thousand six hundred in a day and night. 
"The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six guna 

" That time elap.scs while the air passes along in iho 

interval Ivtwcen two arteri<*9. 
" There are five elements in each of the two conduct- 
ing arteries, — 

I TYt^ T^*T% to » pMnliar t«n«t of ' I omidoC MpUin thb. W« 

II ■ ' ■ - •• ^ ■ ' 

h.imink\ " I *n) he." 1 
i« rvp««to> .M,6colin' 
l»"ntT-f'^'»r hour*; it i 

^ ! XhmMM*- 

t.jil- <i ftnd ttM txtuUcd brssth 


" They bear it along day and night ; these are to be 

known by the self-restrained. 
" Fire bears above, water below ; air moves across; 
"Earth in the half-hollow ; ether moves everywhere. 
" They bear along in order, — air, fire, water, earth, ether; 
" This is to be known in its due order in the tw-o con- 
ducting arteries. 
" The palas ^ of earth are fifty, of water forty, 
" Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten. 
" This is the amount of time taken for the bearing ; but 

the reason that the two arteries are so disturbed 
" Is that earth has five proper ties,^ water four, 
" Fire has three, air two, and ether one. 
" There are ten palas for each property ; hence earth has 

fifty palas, 
"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. 

Now the five properties of earth 
" Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness; 

and these decrease one by one. 
"The two elements, earth and water, produce their 

fruit by the influence of ' quiet,' 
" But fire, air, and ether by the influence of ' brightness,' 

'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'^ 
" The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and 

ether are now declared; — 
" Of the first steadfastness of mind ; through the cold- 
ness of the second arises desire; 
" From the third anger and griei ; from the fourth 

fickleness of mind; 
"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental 

impressions of latent merit. 
" Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a 

middle finger in each nostril, 

^ Sixty palas make a ghatikcl ^ Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. 

(50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 = 150, i.e., p. 256. 

^^^e palas in two and a half (/hatikds ^ Literally "the being ever more." 
Dr one hour). 


"Aiui the little finger and tho ouo uext to it iu tlio 
curners uf Itis inoiitb, and ihc two remaining fingers 
in the comers of his eyes, 
"Then iliere will arise iu due order the knowledge of 

the eartli and the oihiT elements within him, 
"The (ii.^i four by yellow, while, dark red, and dark 

blue spots,* — the ether has no symbol." 
When tiic element air is thus comj>iehended and its 
restraint is accomplished, the evil intlucnce of works 
which concealed discriminating kuowleiige is destroyed 
[ii. 52]; hence it has been said — 

"TIare is no austerity superior to regulation of tho 
breath." « 
And again — 

" As tho dross of metals, when they are melted, is con- 
" So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regu- 
lation of the breath."' 
Now in this way, having his mind purilied by the " for- 
bearances" and the other things subservient to concen- 
tration, the devotee is to attain "self-mastery " {sainuatna) ♦ 
and " restraint " (/»r iiaint" i m- 

modution of the se:.. _ , _ , to the i. ; the 

mind,' which is intent on the soul's unaltered nature, while 
they abandon all C' : nt with '" 

jetts, widen might I ireorun^ 

ence. This is expressed by the ctyuiolo<^*y of the word; the 
senses are drawn to it (d -f / 

" But is it not the mind \s 
soul and not tlie senses, since these are only adapted for 
ox • ' N. and t!. ■■ V ' •' 



■ For Ummo eoloun ol. ChJUmtioif^ * TbU U <l<-(Ij>«<l in Um Yu|r* H6L. 

rp..«lil 6: V • ' , r| 30. ill : - td Uie imitr<l 

» ThU U *! • qnotAtiun of ^ ob)«ct ol aa«> 

in Vvojia'* C Un , H. »i»«I MMvliU- 

1*hi* •€«! 

\Vi U r, /HtHteht .-ii-d., IX. 



dated to the nature of the mind ? " What you say is quite 
true ; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having 
an eye to their want of power for this, introduced the 
words "as it were," to express "resemblance." "Eestraint 
is, as it were, the accommodation of the senses to the 
nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with 
each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of con- 
cernment with their several objects for the sake of being 
accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resem- 
blance" wliich we mean. Since, when the mind is re- 
strained, the eye, &c., are restrained, no fresh effort is to 
be expected from them, and they follow the mind as bees 
follow their king. This has been declared in the Vislinu- 
pinana[vi. 7, 43, 44]— 

"Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which 
ever tend to pursue external objects, 

" Himself intent on restraint, make them 
to the mind ; 

" By this is effected the entire subjugation of the un- 
steady senses ; 

"If they are not controlled, the yogin will not accom- 
plish his yoga." ^ 

"Attention" (dJidrand) is the fixing the mind, by with- 
drawing it from all other objects, on some place, whether 
connected with the internal self, as the circle of the 
navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of tlie sushumnd 
artery, &c., or something external, as Prajapati, Vasava, 
Hiranyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism, 
"'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. i]; 
and so, too, say the followers of the Puranas — 

" By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and 
by restraint the senses, 

" Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling- 
place of his mind." ^ 

1 This couplet is corrupt in the - Vishuu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one 

text. I follow the reading of the or two variations. The " perfect 

Bombay edition of the Purdna (only asylum " is Brahman, formless or 

reading in line 3 chahltmanam). possessing form. 


The continual How of thought in this place, resting oti 
the object to Ihj contemplated, ami uvoiding ull incon* 
yruous thoughts, is " conteiujilation " {dhydna); thus it 
is said, "A course of unifonu thought there, is 'contem- 
plation ' " [iii. 2]. Others also have said — 

"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects 
of that kind and desiring no other, 

"This is ' coiitt — it is thus efTectcd by the 

first six of i. .ry things." 

We incidentally, in elucidatinj; somethioi; else, dis- 
cus<5i'd the remaining eighth i-'n " 

(samddhi, see p. 243}. hy ^ iary 

means of yoya, pursued for a long time with uninterrupted 
earnestness, the "afllictions" which hin*]' 
abolislud, autl through "exercise " and 
devotee attains to the perfections designated by the namrs 
Madhumali and the rest. 

" But why do you needlessly frighten us with unkuoun 
and monstrous words from the dialects of Kar^d^, 
Cauda,* and Lata ? " ' Wc do not want to f ' \ ou, 
but rather to gratify you by explaining llu' - of 

these strange words ; therefore let the rentier who is so 
needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention. 

i. The Madhumati perfection. — this is tiie perfection of 
meditation, called " the knowle>ige which holds to the 
truth," consisting in the illuminaiion of v- -11 • rity 
by means of the contemplation of " goodii ; of 

the manifestation of joy, with every trace uf ' pa.'>9iuu"or 
"darkness" aWished by "exercise," " disvassion." Ac. 
Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "Id that case there is 
the knowledge which hoMs to the truth " [i. 48] ! 
"to the truth," i.«., to the real; it is nev.r . \. 's 
by error. " In that case," ».«.. when firmly • fte 

arises this knowledge to the second yogin. \\*i iho ytyiiu 

' Th« old luuiM' f« lh« crtitnJ uxJ part ol Giurnrf ; K te lb* \*f**^ 
I«rt ol iVniga). tA VXoUmj. 

' A country comprising Kh«n<ir«h 


or devotees to the practice of i/o^a are well known to be 
of four kinds, viz., — 

I. The 2J^«^^«"?'^^'a^/>^^'-'«, in whom the light has just 
entered,^ but, as it has been said, " he has not won the light 
which consists in the power of knowing another's thoughts, 
&c.;" 2. The ??iaf/7i«&Ai<,?ni7i'a, who possesses the knowledge 
which holds to the truth ; 3. The prajndji/otis, who has 
subdued the elements and the senses ; 4. The atikrdnta- 
Ihdvaniya, who has attained the highest dispassion. 

ii. The Madhu'pratika perfections are swiftness like 
thought, &c. These are declared to be " swiftness like 
thought, the being without organs, and the conquest of 
nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like thought" is the attain- 
ment by the body of exceeding swiftness of motion, like 
thought ; " the being without bodily organs " ^ is the attain- 
ment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers 
directed to objects in any desired place or time; "the con- 
quest of nature " is the power of controlling all the mani- 
festations of nature. These perfections appear to the full 
in the third kind of yogin, from the suVijugation by him of 
the five senses and their essential conditions.^ These per- 
fections are severally sweet, each one by itself, as even a 
particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second state 
is called Madhupratikd [i.e., that whose parts are sweet]. 

iii. The Visokd perfection consists in the supremacy 
over all existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, 
" To him who possesses, to the exclusion of all other ideas, 
the discriminative knowledge of the quality of goodness 
and the soul, arises omniscience and the supremacy over 
all existences " [iii. 50]. The " supremacy over all ex- 
istences " is the overcoming like a master all entities, as 
these are but the developments of the quality of "good- 
ness " in the mind [the other qualities of " passion " and 

^ In p. 178, 1. 2, infra, read //'•a- aspati explains it as " mdehdndm in- 

vritta for pravritti. Cf. Yoga S., driydndrp. haranahhdvah." 
iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in •' Yyi.s3.\ia.5karanapanch.akarilfa- 

Vydsa's Coram.) jo-y<^ ; Vdchaspati explains tujm by 

■■' Read vikaranabhdvah ; Vach- grakanddi (cf. iii. 47'. 


"darkness" being alremly nbolis)ic<i]. and exist only in 
the form of ener<;y and the objects to be energised upon.^ 
The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in tho 
modes "subsided," " emerged," or " not to bo named,"* \^ 
" omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36J. " Or 
a luminous immediate cognition, free from sorrow' [raoy 
produce steadiness of mind]." 

iv. The .^ • • 'ti stale is also ca!! ifa, 

t.^, " that !. 1 whiih distinct i ^ : an 

object is lost;" it is that meditation " without a seed" [i«., 
without any object] which is able to " ms" 

that produce fruits to bo afterwani ; tho 

shape of rank, length of life, and enjoyment ; and thi4 
meditation belongs to him who, in ' ' " 

nuxiitications of the internal organ, )i. I 
" dispassion," " The other kind of meditation [i.e., that 
in which distinct recognition of an ■ ' •] js pre. 

ceded by that exercise of tliouglit w. tho en- 

tire cessation of modifications; it has nothing leii but tho 
latent impressions" [of thought after the di- -• • fall ob- 
jects] [i.^,«a;7*.>Atira,<Jf;jAfl, i. 18]. Tiiusthj of men, 
being utterly passionless towanls everj'thing. riiuis that tho 
seeds of the "afllictions," like burned rice-grains, are bereft 
of the power to germinate, and they ore aboli.sim*! tiK'oth< r 
with the internal or^an. When these ar* .ero 

ensues, through the full maturity of his u:. . ...,cri* 

minative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and efTccti 
into the primal ; and the soul, w - .vcr 

of pure intcllio : . - ding in its own ; ... .md 

escaped from all connection with the phenomenal under- 
standing (' ' -r wiili 
isolation";^' ■). Find! 

jali as two |>erft-ctions : " Absolute isolation is the ivproniva 
absorption* of tho 'qualities' which have contummaled 

> T ' -Ti pL 179,1. II, rjram- • ' - ' 

«^ "T 

' J r , X* (wkiit, proMnt, or fu*. •' U«» u.;<<mu ^^t* 


the ends of the soul, i.e., enjoyment and liberation, or the 
abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature " 
U'^'- 33]- ^0^ should any one object, "Why, however, 
should not the individual be born again even though this 
should have been attained ? " for that is settled by the 
^vell-known principle that " with the cessation of the 
cause the effect ceases," and therefore this objection is 
utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor de- 
cision ; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the 
absence of the cause, we should have blind men finding 
jewels, and such like absurdities; and the popular proverb 
for the impossible w^ould become a possibility. And so, 
too, says the Sruti, "A blind man found a jewel; one 
without fingers seized it ; one without a neck put it on ; 
and a dumb man praised it." ^ 

Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on 
medicine, the Yoga-^astra consists of four divisions; as 
those on medicine treat of disease, its cause, health, and 
medicine, so the Yoga-sastra also treats of phenomenal 
existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. This exist- 
ence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from ; 
tlie connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our 
having to experience this existence ; the absolute abolition 
of this connection is the escape ; and right insight is the 
cause thereof.2 The same fourfold division is to be similarly 
traced as the case may be in other Sastras also. Thus all 
has been made clear. 

called vyutOidna (when it is chiefly ment of these ' qualities ' when one 

chai-acterised by ' activity,' or ' dark- or another becomes predominant, 

ness,' iii. 9) and nirodha (when it is ^ This curious, passage occurs in 

chiefly characterised by the quality the Taittiriya - Aranyaka i. 11, 5. 

of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the Mddhava in his Comment, there 

internal organ itself ; this in 'egoism' explains it of the soul, and quotes 

{asviitd) ', 'egoism' in the 'merely theSvetasv. Up. , iii. 19. Mddhava 

once resolvable' [i.e., huddhi) ; and here takes avindat as "he pierced 

buddhi into the 'irresolvable' {i.e., the jewel," but I have followed his 

prakriti)." Pralcriti consists of the correct explanation in the Comm. 

three 'qualities' in eqiiilibrium ; and - This is taken from Vdchaspati's 

the entire creation, consisting of Comm. on Yoga S. ii. 15. Cf. the 

causes and effects, is the develop- " four truths " of Buddhism. 


The system of Safikara, which coine> 
and which is tiie crest-gem of all systems, has been ex- 
phiined by us elsewhere; it is therefore left uiitouchcd K. R r. 


T)u-r« ia an iiit«.-ri>!*tiii;;iU>»crtptinn of the YogitM on thr Mnunutn 
Ruivntakn iu Maglm (iv. 5jX 
"Tlierv thv votaries of ineiiiutiuu, woU •killed in Iwnevulvuce 

, . , ,- . . . , . ' "x 


..t" .1 •■* 

ihf . I., 

— tlcsjru vet furtiicr to rvpn--. rwii tlu- 

It '\» curiotifl tu notice timt i<«aiM, wi • iit 

]iart in BtuKihisni, is cunnUtI in the Yo^a as only a : y 

cuntlitiou from which the votarj is to take, as it «••-.• ; trt 

towanls bis final };nal. It i* calletl a jMrikarman n 

Vyasa's Coniin. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term i» i' rr.wi \>y 
Maghiu Biiojii i'xprv8sly says tliat this purifying |>rt>c«s« i« an 
external ont-, . : T; ju»t as in 

nrithnifti- tli- ""t »•> tJi^m- 

helvi .1., iii elf- h 

ari.M _ :.ily. Til' 1 m 

in tliis niariceil depreciation ol its caruinal Tirtae. 

NOTE ON 1'. 237, l.AM LINU 

For the word ry<U";«i in the original h'T«* (•**• «I<h> p. 24:. I. » 
infra\ cf. Kiistimifijali, p. 6, 1 7- 

1 fk,; >.vt.'<. r.-^r-. t.. ti.. !';>/■■ •^•i)i\^\ A-l>ruhniiii> t> i>. buL If 

n)c t : ••■ * 

vivAranit - • • 
|>rc(aor t< 

\vv\:\ i)i\ 

l)N Tin: ri'ADUI (of. mtpra, pp. 7, 8. 174, 194). 

[As tlio upddhi or " conditiun " is a {•••culiarity of 
Hiiuiu logic which is little kuowu in Kun>|>«', I have 
added the following traDslation uf the sections in the 
Bhashd-pnrichchheda aud the Siddhdutu-muktavuH, which 
treat of it.] 

cxxxvji. That which always -/ 

(sdtiht/a), but doa not ait , ^ ' 

(hetu)f is eallfi the condition (upddJii) ; iXs eixunina- 
turn is now set forth. 

Our author now proceeUii to dctiue the ujAiiihi or 
condition,' which is used to stop our actiuiescenco in u 
universal proposition as laid down hy another person; — 
" that which always accompanies," 3tc. T\\e meaning ol 
this is that tlie so-called condition, while it invariably 

« Tt 


» * 


argunirni i* 


C c.:.i 

«i. . .- : . 
«« »«it a* fit' 


accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, 
does not thus invariably accompany that wiiich our oppo- 
nent puts forward as his middle term. [Thus in the false 
argument, " The mountain ha>s smoke because it has fire," 
we may advance " wet fuel," or rather " the being produced 
from w^et fuel," as an ujjddhi, since " wet fuel " is neces- 
sarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire 
is, as e.g., in a red-hot iron ball.] 

" But," the opponent may suggest, " if this \vere true, 
would it not follow that (a) in the case of the too wide 
middle term in the argument, ' This [second] son of Mitra's, 
whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitra's 
son,' we could not allege ' the being produced from feeding 
on vegetables ' ^ as a ' condition,' — inasmuch as it does not 
invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour 
does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which 
have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables ? (h) 
Again, in the argument, ' The air must be perceptible to 
sense^ because it is the site of touch,' we could not allege 
the ' possessing proportionate form ' as a ' condition ; ' be- 
cause perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the 
soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and therefore the 
' possessing proportionate form ' does not invariably accom- 
pany j^erceptibility]. (c) Again, in the argument, ' Destruc- 
tion is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could 
not allege as a ' condition ' tlie ' being included in some 
positive category of existence ' ^ [destruction being a 
form of non-existence, called " emergent,' 'dvamsdbhdva], 

^ The Hindus think that a child's fire, are sparsavat, but by si. 27 of 

dark colour comes from the mother's these air is neither pratyakslia nor 

living on vegetables, while its fair rupavat. 

colour comes from her living on •' This condition would imply that 

ghee. we could only argue from this njiddle 

^ By Bhdsha-parich. si. 25, the term"thebeingproduced"'incasesof 

four elements, earth, water, air, and positive existence, not non-existence. 


innsnaich ns {terisltability is fuuud ia antcce<luni iioii* 
existence, ami this cerUiiiily caiiuot bo said to bo iucIudeJ 
in liny posilivo catfgory of existence." 

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true mean* 
ingof the definition is simply tliis,— that whatever fact or 
murk we take to determine definitely, in reference to the 
topic, the nwijor term which our ootidiliDii is ; ' ' * 
accompany, tiiat same fact or mark muat Iw • ^ 
to determine tlie middle term which our said condition is 
not invariably to accompany. Thus (a) the " being pro- 
duced from feeding on vegetables" invar: '• ^ 

" a dark colour," as determined by the fa' 
son, whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is 
the alleged middle term of the argument ; but the pre- 
tended conimdictory instance of the dark jar is not in 
point, 03 this was not the topic discussed]. (6) Again, 
" possessing proi>ortionale form " invariably accom^Niuies 
perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thin;^ 
|»erceived is an external object ; while it docs not in- 
variably accompany the alleged middle terra " the U-in^ 
the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the 
fact that the " ' ' ' 

(c) Again, in ,, 

from its being produced," the ''being included in some 
positive category of existence " invariably 
the major term ": 
attribute of being j , . 

advanced; and therefore liie alleged contradictory in* 
stance, " anteccdcnl n'^ is not in poinU aioM 

uolKxIy pT^^ rui« '^ ' • ' ' "'1 

lUi: i: I. t ' '.hing of thi« 

kind in valid nothing thtr* 

• •* Sonl." of courp*. U oo« r .4 mmt b«l ••»• 


which invariably accompanies the major term when 
determined by a certain fact or mark, and does not so 
accompany the middle term when similarly determined. 
This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the 
reader object that " in each of our previous examples there 
has been given a separate determining mark or attribute 
which was to be found in each of the cases included under 
each ; how then, in the absence of some general rule, 
are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in 
any particular given case ? " We reply that] in the case 
of any middle term which is too general, the required 
general rule consists in the constant presence of one or 
other of tlie following alternatives, viz., that the subjects 
thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged site 
of the major term, and also the site of the condition,^ or 
else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle 
term, but excluding the said condition ; ^ and it will be 
when the case is determined by the presence of one or 
other of these alternatives that the condition will be con- 
sidered as " always accompanying the major term, and not 
always accompanying the middle term." ^ 

^ As, e.ff., the mountain and though possessing the respective 

Mitrd's first son in the two false middle terms " fire " and "the being 

arguments, "The mountain has Mitra's offspring " do not possess the 

smoke because it has fire" (when respective conditions " wet fuel " or 

the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball " the mother's feeding on vege- 

has no smoke), and " Mitrd's first tables," nor, consequently, the 

son A is dark because he is respective maj )r terms (sddhya) 

Mitrd's offspring " (when her second " smoke " and "dark colour." 

son B is fair). These two subjects ^ This will exclude the objected 

possess the respective sddhyas or case of "dark jars" in («), as it 

major terms "smoke" and " dark falls under neither of these two alter- 

colour," and therefore are respec- natives ; for, though they are the 

tively the subjects where the con- sites of the sldhya " dark colour," 

ditions " wet fuel " and " the they do not admit the condition 

mother's feeding on vegetables " are "the feeding on vegetables," nor 

to be respectively applied. the middle term " the being Mitra's 

- As, e.g., the red-hot ball of iron son." 
and Mitra's second son ; as these, 


cxxx viii. A U true Condition* rtside in ttu same aul'jfds tcUk 
their major tertnjn ; ' ami, their subjeett being thiiseom- 
JHon.tfu (erring) " i^ral 

in regard to the L . ^ . ; 

cxxxix. // is in order to prove faulty generality in a 
middle term that the Condition has to be employed. 

The meaning of this is that it is in con.'efpience of the 
middle term Wing found too general in regard to the 
coiuHiion, thai we infer that it is too general in rc^janl 
to the major term ; and hence the use of iiaving a con- 
dition at all. (a.) Thus, where the condition invarinbly 
accompanies an unlimited ' major term, we infer that the 
middle term is too general in regard to the major term, 
from the very fact that it is too general in reganl to the 
condition ; as, for example, in the instance " the mountain 
lias smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the 
■ fire" is too general in regard to " smoke," since it is too 
general in regard to * wet fuel ; ** for there is a rule that 
what is too general for that which invariably accompanies 
must also be too general for that which is ii; 
accompanied. (6.) But where we take some fact ... ...... ^ 

to determine definitely the major term which the condition 
is invariably to accompany, — there it ia from the middle 
term'- ' ' ' ' tin 

cases \ _ .. . : the 

middle term is equally too general in regard to the major 
term. Thus in the argument, " W is dark because he is 
Mitra's son," the middle term " the fact of being Mitni's 

> It. %hm ^^lUkt ^tma 



D»t th«> tedkym (M ia Um rMlboi ta| 13? 


son " is too general in regard to the sddhya, " dark colour," 
because it is too general in regard to the upddhi, " feeding 
on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitra's second son 
[Mitrti's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and 
Mitra herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his 

[But an objector might here interpose, "If your defini- 
tion of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condi- 
tion which fulfils your definition can always be found 
even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in 
the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because 
it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 
'the being always found elsewhere than in the moun- 
tain ; ' since this certainly does not always ' accompany 
the middle term/ inasmuch as it is not found in the 
mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be ; 
and yet it apparently does ' always accompany the major 
term,' since in every other known case of fire we certainly 
find it, and as for the present case you must remember 
that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point 
in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take such 
a condition as " the being always found elsewhere than in 
the subject or minor term " (unless this can be proved by 
some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute) ; 
because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argu- 
ment to convince your antagonist that this condition does 
invariably accompany the major term [since he naturally 
maintains that the present case is exactly one in point 
against you] ; and, secondly, because it is self-contradictory 
[as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed 
to overthrow the contrary argument]. 

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then 
the " being always found elsewhere than in the subject " 



becomes a true comlition, [nml serves t«> '-.-.v 

the false argument which a disputant tries 
Thus in the illusory an^'ument "the fire must bo uuu-iiot 
because it is artificial," we ctui Imve a valid condition in 
"the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we 
can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,* [thus the 
u/Hidfii here is a means of overthrowing the false aryu- 


Where the fact of its always accomiuinying the ninjur 
term, &c., is disputed, there we have what is called a 
dispuietl condition,' But "the being fountl •' 
than in the subject " can never be employed evei; .. . 
putt-d condition, in accordance with the traditional rules 
of logical controversy." 

I : c. 

' T})'' cii><ptitnnt t»\», "Fir* imwt 
In' n"'n-hi>t l>i-c.iiu«> it in nrtificial." 
"Wi-Il," you r<j"'in, "t* " * 

urily U- an artitici;i!it% 
%»ays found dsiwht-n- 
— i.e., onp which will n«<l amwer 
y<nir puq«><i«? in tryinj; to prvri* 
your point." Hi-r«« th« proixn***! 

* A. 

kc, mi 


u;al</Ai "the h«ink' »lwkvii (utnui putAtiixi *t 

pruVtiU by •«.■(»«-«.' viUtiicr U> U; t.<>t. 

(iilit>o 11 


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