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THE SCIENCE OF WAR

STONEWALL JACKSON

AND THE

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

By COLONEL G. F. R. HENDERSON, C.B.

With 2 Portraits and 33 Maps and Plans.
2 vols. Crown 8vo. 16s. net.

Fueld-Marshal Earl Robrrts, K.G., on 'The Army: as it Was and
as it Is' (THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, January 1908).— 'The late
Lieut.-Colonel Henderson did more than anyone else to make the Students
(of the Staff College) appreciate the importance of military history. They
read with the deepest interest his fascinating book— The life of Stonewall
Jackson.'

LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO., S9 Paternoster Row, London, E.C. ;
New York, Bombay, and Calcutta.

THE SCIENCE OF WAK

A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND LECTURES

1891—1903

BY THE LATE

COLONEL G. F. E. HENDERSON, C.B.

AUTHOR OP
' BToNE WA.Lh JACKSON AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAS ' ETC.

EDITED BY

CAPTAIN NEILL MALCOLM, D.S.O.

ARGYLL AMD SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS

WITH A MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOK

BY

FIELD MAESHAL EARL ROBERTS, V.C,

WITH A PORTRAIT AND 4 MAPS

FIFTH IMPEESSION

LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA

1912
▲11 rights reserved

PKEFACE

For some years before his death it had been Colonel Henderson's
intention to make a collection of his occasional papers and to
publish them, in book form, in the hope that they might be of
service to the profession he loved so well.

Unfortunately, he never found time to carry this intention
into effect ; and consequently, in the absence of the master-
hand, the duty of selection has been entrusted to me.

In the years covered by these pages, 1891-1903, the world
learned much of war. It is therefore probable that something
of what was written in 1891 would not have been written in
1903 ; it is even possible that, in some respects, the war in the
Far East would have affected the opinions formed in South
Africa. Nevertheless, I have found so much food for reflection
in each one of these papers that I have not hesitated to include
even the very earliest of them ; for in these earlier writings is
to be found the germ, at least, of nearly all the military
thought of to-day.

Similarly the text-books referred to are not those now in
use. For unless tactical text-books were constantly to change,
they would soon cease to be of any value whatever. The im-
portance of these books as the foundation, but the foundation
only, of a military education is as great now as ever it was.

In the Chapter on * The Training of Infantry for Attack,'
which was written before the South African war, the true use of
the text-books, as well as their limitations, is most ably
expounded ; while the danger of looking upon them as the

vi THE SCIENCE OF WAR

coping stone, instead of as the foundation, of knowledge is
clearly shown in the essay on * The British Army.'

But if, in some minor respects, Colonel Henderson's earlier
teachings are not altogether borne out by the riper experience
of 1905, his great reputation will in no way suffer. Infallibility
is not claimed for him, nor is the gift of prophecy. It will, I
think, be generally acknowledged that in the main he was far
in advance of his time ; and the loss the nation has suffered by
his death will, I hope, be even more widely recognised than it
is at present.

My thanks are due to the Proprietors of the * Encyclopaedia
Britannica,' who have permitted me to reproduce the first four
articles, as well as to the Editors of the 'Journal of the
Royal United Service Institution,' and of the ' United Service
Magazine,' in whose pages Chapters VL, VII., and XII. originally
appeared. For the paper on ' Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War' I am indebted to the Proprietors of the 'Edinburgh
Review,' while ' Foreign Criticism ' originally formed the intro-
duction to Count Sternberg's book 'My Experiences of the
Boer War,' and is published here by the permission of Messrs.
Longmans, Green and Co. The Secretaries of the Military
Society of Ireland and of the Aldershot Military Society have
also been most kind in placing at my disposal all the material
at their command.

Finally, the essay on ' The British Army ' was practically
the last thing Colonel Henderson ever wrote. The proofs were
corrected by him at Assouan very shortly before his death. It
therefore possesses a peculiar interest which distinguishes it
from anything else included in this volume.

NEILL MALCOLM,

Captain, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

April 12, 1905.

CONTENTS

pag a
MEMOIR. By Field-Marshal Eabl Robebts, E.G., V.C. . . . xiii

CHAPTER I

WAR

Modern Conditions— Scientific Training — The German System of Com-
mand— ' Orders ' and ' Instructions ' — The New Conception of War —
Statesmen and War— Preparation of the Theatre of War— The War
Minister — Moral Effect of Fire — Naval and Military Force — Joint
Action — Weakness of Allied Armies— Railways — The Sea as a Line of
Operation — Amphibious Power — Importance of Strategy — Unprofes-
sional Troops 1-38

CHAPTER II

STRATEGY

Definition — General Principle — Essential Problems — Overcoming Superior
Numbers — Pedantic Applications of Principles — Difficulties — Import-
ance relatively to Tactics —How to study Strategy — Experience and
Theory — Knowledge of History 39-SO

CHAPTER III

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY

History — Shock Tactios — American Developments — Duties — Modern Re-
quirements— Fundamental Principles — Combined Action — Armament
— Importance of th« Staff 51-69

CHAPTER IV

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED

Proportion of the Three Arms— Combination — A Modern Battlefield —
Increased Power of Defenoe — Increased Power of Attack — Converging

viii THE SCIENCE OF WAR

PAOl

Attack— Artillery and Infantry — Long Range Fire— The Use of
Ground — The Normal Attack — The Defence — False Fronts and
Flanks 70-86

CHAPTER V

NOTES ON WELLINGTON

His Early Difficulties — Want of a Satisfactory ' Life ' — The European
Situation in 1808 — Wellington's Insight— The Secret of England's
Strength — Want of Organisation — Wellington's Strength of Character
— Hia Strategy — His Tactics — His Genius for Surprise — Personal
Character and Sense of Duty 87-107

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS

Tendency of Criticism to run to Extremes — Cavalry on the Battlefield —
Moral Influence of Cavalry — Opportunities for Decisive Action —
Mounted Infantry— The Old Doctrine and the New — German Leader-
ship and French Failures — Methods of Wellington and Lee — English
Soldiers and the Lessons of 1870-71 — Traditional Tactics of British
Army — American Tactics — Two Schools of Thought — Confusion on
the Battlefield — Extended Order — Peace Training — Neglect of Prin-
ciples— Line Formations— Want of Control — Skobeleff's Tactics — The
English Text-Books— Frontal Attacks— St. Privat — The Sortie from
Plevna— Eules of War 108-164

CHAPTER VII

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT

The Value of Study — Home and Clery — Minor Tactics and Grand Tactics
— Moral Force — Human Nature in War — Character — How to Cultivate
an Eye for Ground— The Battle of Austerlitz — The Eight Way to
Study War 165-186

CHAPTER VHI

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

The ' Century Papers ' and the ' German Official History ' — National
Militia — Defective Discipline — • Seven Days' Battles ' — Comparison
of the two Armies — Training — Marching — Federal and Prussian —
Stragglers — Insubordination — Need of a Trained Staff — The Regi-
mental Officers— Our Own Volunteers 187-229

CONTENTS ix

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

PAGM

PART I

Causes of the War — Election of Abraham Lincoln — The Outbreak of
War — Modern Inventions — Numbers — The Theatre of War — Educa-
tion and Training — Selection of Commanders — The Cavalry — Geo-
graphical and Political Conditions — Objectives — Grant appointed
Commander-in-Chief — Lee's Surrender

PART II

Confederate Strategy — Federal Strategy — Command of the Sea — Moltke'a
Strategy — Artillery Tactics — Massing for Attack — Gettysburg, Chick-
amauga, Spottsylvania— Ammunition Supply — Mounted Riflemen —
Comparison with European Cavalry — Cavalry Action at Brandy
Station — Sheridan's Cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley — Wilson's
Raid, Maroh 1865— The Cavalry Screen— Outpost Duty . . 230-279

CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

Lee takes the Offensive — His Reasons and Plan of Campaign — His
Force — Difficulties and Apparent Rashness — He crosses the Potomac
— Meade appointed to Command the Northern Army — Stuart sent
off on a Raid — Ewell reaches Carlisle and York — Lee concentrates at
Cashtown — Absence of the Cavalry — Importance of Gettysburg — Con-
federate Advance Guard meets Federal Foroe and retires — Federals
Reinforced — Courses open to Lee — Reasons for his Choice — Skill
of General Buford — Dismounted Action of Cavalry — General Hancock
— Meade's Movements — July 2, Confederate Delay — Fighting Re-
newed— Staff Work — The Attack on the Devil's Den and Round Top —
General Warren's Initiative — July 3, The Federal Position — Lee's
Problem — And Scheme of Attack — The Battle — Comments — Employ-
ment of Cavalry — Stuart's Orders — Preparation for Attack — The
Confederate Staff— Handling of Artillery 280-306

CHAPTER XI

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA, 1864

A Neglected Campaign — Its Special Lesson — England's Oversea Expe-
ditions—The Navy and the Army — The Art of Command — Topo-
graphical Difficulties — Moral Effect and Individual Character — The
Military Situation in May 1864— Grant's Problem— His Solution —
Lee's Daring — He attacks Grant in the Wilderness — Wood Fighting
— Grant's Determination — Lee outmanoeuvres Grant — Spottsylvania

THE SCIENCE OF WAR

PAOl

—May 10— The Great Attack, May 12— Grant again Manoeuvres,
but without Success— Fighting on the North Anna— Lee's DlnesB— A
Great Opportunity— Cold Harbor— The Passage of the James River
— Defensive Tactics— Hasty Entrenchments— Lee's Eye for Ground-
Napoleon's Battlefields— Appendix 307-337

CHAPTER XII

THE TBAININQ OF INFANTRY FOB ATTACK

Tactios in 1878 and in 1899— Eecent Campaigns— Reasonable Deduc-
tions—A Battlefield— Normal formations— The Experience of Woerth
—And of the North-West Frontier— A Sound System— The Light
Brigade in the Peninsula— The 52nd at the Nivelle— Americans in
Cuba— The Battles of 1870— Training of Officers— The Use of the
Drill-book— Wellington and Moore— The Teaching of Jena— Counter-
Strokes— Duties of the Staff 388-364

CHAPTER XIII

FOBEIGN OBITIGISM

German Ideas on the South African War— Theory and Practice— Sir
Redvers Buller's Difficulties— Lord Roberts' Position, January 1900
—Continental Armies under Modern Conditions— War and Field-days
— R61e of Cavalry— Volunteers and Consoripts— Statistical Juggling
—An Imperial Army 365-381

CHAPTER XIV

THE BBITISH ABMY

Available Forces, 1899— Their Defects— Their Distinctive Merits— The
British Officer— The Rank and File— Lack of Instruction— False
Economy— A Properly Trained Staff— Over-Centralisation— The
British Soldier Abroad— Mechanical Discipline— Individuality— The
Enveloping Attack— Want of a « Thinking Department '—The Private
Soldier— The Auxiliary Forces— The Colonial Contingent*— Imperial
Strategy— A Defective System— The Nation and the Army . . 382-434

INDEX 4ai

*

MAPS

The Vicinity of Brandy Station .... To face page 231

The Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg . . „ 281

The Campaign in the Wilderness . „ 307

Virginia and Maryland , . . at end

Portrait of Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, C.B. . . Frontispiece

MEMOIR

In 1852 the Rev. William George Henderson
(afterwards Dean of Carlisle) was appointed Head
Master of Victoria School, Jersey, and there, at
St. Helier, two years later, on the 22nd June, George
Francis Robert, the eldest of his fourteen children,
was born. In that retired spot the family spent the
next eight years, when they moved to Yorkshire,
where the father was appointed Head Master of
Leeds Grammar School. Here Frank Henderson's
education commenced, and he gradually worked his
way to the top of the school.

Good at work and good at games, with a fine
physique and a sunny nature. Henderson became
a great favourite with his school companions, and
evidently left a lasting impression on their minds, for
one of them writes of him : ' As a boy he possessed
many of the qualities which go to make a great
leader, and I can readily believe that his personality
acted largely in his influence as a teacher.'

We are told that Henderson won the English
prize for his essay on ' Alexander the Great,' an
indication of the line his literary talent would follow
in after life, from which his readers — military readers

xiv THE SCIENCE OF WAR

especially — have derived so much instruction as well
as pleasure.

Henderson's amusements seem to have been
chiefly cricket, football, and acting, ■ but cricket was
his favourite pastime.' Even in his games his influ-
ence for good made itself felt. * I served under him,'
writes a schoolfellow, ' when he captained the cricket
eleven, and in those early days he was no ordinary
boy ; by his own example he made us all feel that we
must play the game.'

Henderson put the finishing touch to his school
career by gaining a History Scholarship at St. John's
College, Oxford.

At the University Henderson somewhat dis-
appointed those who expected him to devote himself
entirely to study. His father had intended him for the
Church, but his own predilections did not incline that
way. He had set his heart on a military career ; at
Oxford he devoted a good deal of his time to the
pursuit of those manly sports best suited to strengthen
his physique, and, in 1877, he left the University for
Sandhurst an exceptionally well-grown young man.

After a year's sojourn at Sandhurst — where he
was captain of the cricket eleven — Henderson was
gazetted as 2nd Lieutenant to the 65th Foot at
Dinapore, being then nearly twenty-four years old,
an unusually advanced age at which to enter the
army. He had been but a short time with the
battalion in India, when he returned to England,
having been promoted to a lieutenancy in the 84th
Foot — the linked battalion — then stationed at Dover.

MEMOIR xv

In August 1882 Henderson left the Curragh
with his battalion to take part in the first Egyptian
campaign. It is characteristic of the self-forgetfulness
and the tender nature of the man that his first
thought was not of the excitement of the coming
campaign, nor of the chance of his own advance-
ment. His sympathy went out to those who were
to be left behind, and the anticipation of the women's
grief at the inevitable partings from their male
belongings for the moment cast a shadow over the
glamour of military glory. ' The route,' he wrote to
his mother, ' has not yet actually arrived, but we are
nearly all packed and ready to start. ... It is a
great bore for us being kept in suspense like this. Of
course it is all right for us fellows, we have the voyage
and all the excitement and novelty to look forward
to, but it is sad work for the women. ... I hope we
shall do our duty and come back safe and sound.'

The voyage to Alexandria, where the battalion
arrived on August 17, was uneventful, but with the
talent for using to advantage every spare moment,
which was so marked in Henderson's later life, the
time was not allowed to hang heavily on his hands.
' I have been improving the shining hours,' he writes
to his mother, ' by learning Arabic, but it is a difficult
language to master.'

Henderson made the most of his opportunities in
this campaign. He commanded a half company in
action at El Magfar and Tel-el-Mahouta ; at Kassassin
he commanded a company, whilst at Tel-el- Kebir
a few days later he led it into a redoubt occupied by

xvi THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the enemy. For these services Henderson received
the 5th Class of the Order of the Medjideh, the
Egyptian medal and clasp, the Khedive's Star, a
mention in despatches, and he was also noted for a
brevet majority, which he obtained on promotion to
the rank of captain four years later.

The day after the battle of Tel-el- Kebir Arabi
Pasha surrendered, the campaign closed, and soon
after Henderson accompanied his regiment back to
England. He hoped, however, that it would not be
long before he returned to Egypt, for he had sent in an
application for the new Gendarmerie of the Egyptian
army, and General Graham, under whom he had
been serving, strongly recommended him * as having
shown great discretion and coolness throughout the
campaign.' The General, when bidding the regiment
good-bye, asked especially for Henderson, and told him
he would no doubt get what he wanted, expressing
a hope that he would see him back before long.
Apparently it was the fact that Henderson was on
one occasion the first to get into a redoubt that
brought him prominently to notice, and it was rather
marvellous that he was not killed in the performance
of this brave action, for the first man — almost always
an officer — in every other case of the kind was shot
dead.

Henderson's hopes of returning to Egypt were
doomed to disappointment. For, fortunately for the
army, if not for himself, he did not get what he had
asked for, as the subsequent nine years (1890-1899)
passed at Sandhurst and the Staff College were of

MEMOIR xvii

incalculable advantage to the youths and men who
were lucky enough to work under his guidance, and
had he returned to Egypt he would not, in all pro-
bability, have gone to either of the colleges.

In 1883 Henderson married an Irish lady, Mary,
the daughter of Mr. Pierce Joyce, of Galway, who
proved a true helpmeet to her husband ; for, as the
years went by and work and responsibilities in-
creased, she rose to each emergency with unfailing
cheerfulness and unselfishness, encouraging him by
her appreciation and sympathy to carry on those
literary labours which eventually brought him world-
wide fame.

The first two years of the young couple's married
life were spent on a tour of duty with the regiment
in Bermuda and Halifax. It was while in the former
place that the idea of writing a history of the
American War of Secession first presented itself to
Henderson's mind. Communication with the main-
land being easy, numbers of Americans frequented
the island, and no doubt it was association with them,
especially those of them who had been through the
war, that first aroused Henderson's interest in the
subject and determined him to undertake his great
work.

In 1885 Henderson and his wife made a trip to
Virginia that he might have the opportunity of study-
ing the battlefields on his own account ; this he did
to such good purpose that when later he paid them a
second visit, his knowledge of the ground and his
grasp of the circumstances under which the various

a 2

xviii THE SCIENCE OF WAR

battles had been fought, excited the astonishment of
men who had themselves taken part in the stirring
events of which he afterwards gave the world such a
graphic description in ' Stonewall Jackson.'

Thus usefully and pleasantly was Henderson's
spare time occupied, and what he wrote of his hero
Stonewall Jackson is applicable to himself at this
time, for he certainly thoroughly ' enjoyed the life and
love which had fallen to his lot, and thanked God for
that capacity for happiness with which his nature was
so largely gifted.'

The one drawback to perfect happiness was want
of means. Henderson was a poor man ; there was
very little but his subaltern's pay to depend upon, and
it became necessary for him to look for some position
which, while increasing his income, would leave him
sufficient leisure to arrange the mass of information
he had collected, as a foundation for the books he
intended eventually to write. The Ordnance De-
partment appeared to fulfil these conditions, and in
January 1885 he joined it as a Deputy Assistant
Commissary General.

It is the popular belief that military officers
devote their time and their thoughts to the pursuit of
pleasure and amusement rather than to the study of
their profession, and I am afraid it must be acknow-
ledged that the belief has not hitherto been without
foundation as regards a certain proportion of young
men, especially those for whom there was no need
to make a career in the army, and who looked on
soldiering as a pastime for a few years rather than as

MEMOIR xix

a serious profession to which it was their duty to give
all their best powers of mind and body. But it is
also true that there have always been a number of
officers (it is happily a largely increasing number)
deeply impressed with a sense of their responsibility
in joining the army, and the necessity for devoting
themselves from the first to the intelligent under-
standing of their duties. Henderson belonged to
this category ; he read with avidity all military his-
tory and carefully studied the plans of the great
battles of the world. Yet he was no mere bookworm ;
he is described by those who knew him best as a
model company officer. His consideration and his
absolute fairness in his dealings with his men endeared
him to them ; he heartily joined in their games, at
which he was always the most skilful, and the soldiers
trusted him as they will always trust and follow a
man in whom they thoroughly believe. He was, in
fact, a favourite with all ranks, and yet his letters
about the time when he joined the Ordnance Depart-
ment show that he was diffident regarding his own
powers, and had no selfish aims or hopes as to
personal distinction.

Henderson's first station as a departmental officer
was Fort George, in Inverness-shire, and here he
began to put in order the material he had so indus-
triously collected. But neither his professional nor
his literary work prevented him from taking a part in
what was going on around him. He greatly inter-
ested himself in the local Volunteers and joined in
their cricket and other amusements, and it was mainly

xx THE SCIENCE OF WAR

for their instruction that he brought out his first
publication, the result of his practical study of the
theatre of war in Virginia, entitled ' The Campaign of
Fredericksburg, a Tactical Study for Officers.'

'This campaign,' he writes in the Preface, 'has
been selected, amongst other reasons, as having been
fought by two armies very largely composed of un-
professional soldiers. The lessons it teaches, the
shortcomings it reveals, are likely, therefore, to be of
exceptional interest and value to that class of officers to
whose consideration I venture to recommend them.'

But it was much more than a tactical study, and
appealed to a far wider circle of readers than the Volun-
teers, for it threw a new and brilliant light on the
importance of strategy, which came as a revelation to
many a professional soldier.

The year 1886 was a memorable one for Henderson,
for it brought him his promotion and the promised
brevet majority. Thus, his thirty-second birthday,
June 22, found him a field officer and an author,
whose first work had met with marked success, the
little book having attracted so much favourable
notice, that it sold at a rate which was quite satis-
factory to the author.

Encouraged by the results of his first essay in
literature, Henderson plunged yet deeper into work
and study, and next turned his attention to the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, from which he deduced
those lessons which he afterwards taught with so
much advantage to the students at the Staff
College.

MEMOLR xxi

Henderson had been able to study the details of
the American War of Secession from the original
records written in his own language, but the most
authentic accounts of the Franco-Prussian War were
written in German — of which Henderson had a very
superficial knowledge — he therefore set himself to
learn the German language that he might not have
to depend upon translations in his study of the war.
This is but one example of the thoroughness which
characterised all his undertakings.

The battle of Spicheren was his first study, and
again he had the instruction of the Volunteers in
mind. ' A consideration of the battle will prove of
use to those who are interested in the land defence of
England, for the ground over which it was fought is
in many respects similar to the range of heights which
intervene between London and the Channel. There
are the same steep hill-sides covered, as is often the
case in Kent and Surrey, with woods and with the
same open plateaux and deep gullies behind the crest.
Volunteer officers whose brigades and regiments have
been detailed in case of invasion to occupy portions
of this line, will do well to study the manner in which
the Spicheren position was defended and attacked.'

The study was a masterly one, but it involved
intense application. ' Spicheren,' Henderson writes
in 1887, ' is getting on but slowly. I have a mass of
material which has to be unravelled and put into
order and decent English — not an easy job, especially
when the military problems have to be solved as well.
I cannot say I work with lightning rapidity ; it is

xxii THE SCIENCE OF WAR

hammer, hammer, hammer, and at present chaos
reigns supreme.'

The main lessons which Henderson sought to
teach in this most instructive work were the absolute
necessity for initiative, and the ready acceptance of
responsibility by even the most subordinate officers,
the discipline of self-reliance and the fact that self-
reliance could only be gained by the most careful
education and training.

This was no new theory — General Gneisenau, one
of the greatest of Prussian leaders, had recognised
its truth as early as 1814. ' What he enjoined,'
Henderson tells us, 'was that when a subordinate
commander had an opportunity of furthering the
general plan of attack, and when, were time to be
lost in waiting or sending for orders, the opportunity
might escape, he was to act without delay. Such
too were the orders of Wellington. But when the
rifle and breech-loader came to be employed, it was
not at first understood that a deeper zone of fire and
a wider front had so increased the difficulties of
command, and occasioned so much delay in trans-
mitting orders, that the same latitude which had
hitherto been allowed to the leaders of advanced
guards and other detachments, must now be granted
to the leaders of the fighting line.

* A strong spirit of initiative, correct and deep-
rooted instinct and unity of action are the qualities
which are essential for the successful leading of the
fighting line ; and these are created by sound general

MEMOIR xxiii

principles " being engrafted into the flesh and blood,"
thereby securing intelligent decision ; by a careful
training of the capacity for independent action ; by
the uniform tactical education of the officers, and by
the constant practice of battle exercises.'

To the Prussian army von Moltke had given this
uniform training. The French army were without
it. To quote Henderson again : — ' The Emperor
and his councillors relied on the experience of the
army, although gained under obsolete conditions ;
on its courage and warlike aptitude ; but they taught
it nothing. The nation blindly believing in the in-
vincibility of its arms, and ignorant of the causes of
success and defeat in war, acquiesced in this neglect ;
and in the hour of trial, the army, although con-
spicuous as ever for gallantry and devotion on the
field of battle, proved unable to arrest the victorious
march of a well-trained enemy.

1 At no single point did the Prussians show them-
selves superior in courage or hardihood to their
opponents. But they did not, like their opponents,
rely on natural attributes or martial spirit alone.
Officers and men had received the highest training,
both of mind and body, that was possible in peace.
It was this training which turned the scale.'

Is not the very same lesson being now repeated
in Manchuria ? The Russians, who considered them-
selves invincible, trusting to their numbers and their
prestige, have been beaten in every instance by the
carefully trained Japanese.

xxiv THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Surely these two examples of the futility of
numbers and courage without training should be a
warning sufficiently clear to rouse the British public
to the advisability of taking a real practical interest
in their army, and should prevent their waiting until
some terrible crisis opens their eyes to the fact that
the most disastrous consequences must result to us,
as to other nations, from the fatal policy of delaying
to prepare for war until war is about to be declared.

We have hitherto been saved from the horrors of
invasion by possessing a navy superior to that of every
other country to protect our sea-girt islands, and we
have therefore been spared the burden of conscription.
But our most important and valuable possession —
India — now places us in the position of a Continental
Power. No navy can save us from invasion in that
quarter : India must be defended by an army, and by
a numerous and well-trained army, such an army as
we can never hope to possess unless the manhood of
this country is willing to undergo a carefully con-
sidered course of physical training and tuition in the
use of the rifle.

To return to the subject of my Memoir.

Henderson appears to have been very despondent
about his prospects in the army while he was at
Gibraltar, to which station he was moved in 1887.
What he wanted, and what he felt himself best fitted
for, was an appointment at Sandhurst. The prospect
of obtaining such an appointment was one of the
objects which acted as a spur to him in his literary
endeavours.

MEMOIR xxv

lie had not, however, to wait very long. A few more
months of Ordnance work, a spell of leave, and then
the desired goal was reached, and in September 1889 he
was sent to Sandhurst by Lord Wolseley as Instructor
in Tactics, Military Administration, and Law.

Henderson's first book, ' The Campaign of
Fredericksburg,' which had been published anony-
mously, had attracted Lord Wolseley 's notice, and so
soon as he found out who the author was, he interested
himself in Henderson's future.

There is so much that is similar in the conditions
of the early lives of ' Stonewall Jackson ' and Hender-
son, that much that the latter wrote of the former
seems to me to be applicable to his own career, and
one cannot help thinking that the feeling he ascribed
to Jackson in like circumstances must have been the
reflection of his own. Each had been through a
campaign in which he had gained distinction : Jackson
in Mexico, Henderson in Egypt. A period of garrison
duty had to be gone through in each case before, to
Jackson came the offer of the Professorship of Artillery
Tactics at the Virginia Military Institute, and to
Henderson that of the Instructorship at Sandhurst.
Like ' Stonewall Jackson,' * it was with the view of
fitting himself for command ' that Henderson accepted
this post, and took up the congenial duty of teaching
tactics to the cadets at the Royal Military College,
a task for which his exhaustive study of Military
History had so eminently fitted him.

Henderson spent three most useful years at Sand-
hurst. His teaching was not limited to lectures in

xxvi THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the classroom. A practical soldier himself, he felt
that theory and practice should go hand in hand, and
that demonstrations in the field were necessary to the
perfect comprehension of his theoretical teaching ;
accordingly he obtained permission to take the cadets
out skirmishing and patrolling. Nor was Henderson
content to be merely the instructor of his pupils. As
at school and with his regiment his geniality, his love
of fun, his skill at and participation in games added
much to his popularity, and exemplified the fact that
it is possible to combine a fine intellect with an apti-
tude for games requiring bodily strength and capa-
city, while it proved the reality of his belief that, to
the training of the intellect by hard study should be
added the training of the body by the practice of
whatever game or sport was conducive to the pro-
duction of a quick eye and ready hand.

Henderson seems thoroughly to have enjoyed his
Sandhurst days. His official work was congenial,
and he had time for his literary studies. His reputa-
tion as a writer on military subjects was now estab-
lished, and in 1891 the third edition of ' Fredericks-
burg ' was issued. Letters in the ' Times ' and essays
in the ' Edinburgh Review ' from his pen appeared,
and offers from publishers poured in upon him. ' I
have more offers of articles than I can accept,' he
writes ; ' the new " Military Magazine " offers me a
guinea a page for anything I like to write. This is
cheering, but I shall stick to the " Edinburgh." The
worst of it is that it is such hard work.'

Work seems at this time to have become rather a

MEMOIR xxvii

trouble to him, and it is now apparent that even at
that early date his health had begun to suffer. But,
notwithstanding this, and the extraneous labour
which circumstances forced upon him, and to which
he applied the same zeal and conscientiousness that
made all his work so valuable, he gave a proportion
of his time and thoughts to his great book ' Stone-
wall Jackson and the American Civil War.' It was
a labour of love, and remains a monument of his
industry and originality. Begun in 1890, it was not
published for eight years, years which were even fuller
than those which had preceded them, for the end of
1892 saw Henderson transferred from Sandhurst to
the Staff College as Professor of Military Art and
History.

The change was welcomed by Henderson because
the new appointment gave him the opportunity of
impressing his ideas more directly on those for whom
the immediate future, in the event of war, might have
in store great responsibilities.

At Sandhurst, Henderson's usefulness was limited ;
the utmost he could do was the influencing young
minds, fresh from public schools, by turning their
thoughts to the serious study of then- profession.
But, at the Staff College, he had as pupils the best
brains of the army, requiring no incentive to study,
but prepared to absorb eagerly the knowledge which
he was so fitted to impart, and only too anxious for
the opportunity which would enable them to prove
they could bear the test of service in the field.

As at Sandhurst, so at the Staff College, Hender-

xxviii THE SCIENCE OF WAR

son introduced original methods of teaching. He
added largely to the practical out-of-door work, and
in his personally conducted tours to the battlefields
of the campaigns upon which he had been lecturing,
his intimate knowledge of the ground and his splendid
memory for detail enabled him to describe to his
auditors what actually took place, with a realistic
distinctness which created a lasting impression on
their minds.

Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hildyard, who
was Commandant of the Staff College during the
greater part of Henderson's professorship, has con-
tributed an appreciative account of the manner in
which he carried on his duties at the College, which
is interesting and valuable, as the deliberate opinion
of the man best able to describe his life at this time,
and to judge of the merit of his work. Sir Henry
writes : — ' It may be safely said that no period of his
career was fraught with greater advantages than the
seven years between December 1892 and December
1899, when he occupied the post of Professor at the
Staff College. The importance of this position, as
affording unparalleled opportunities for influencing
the officers placed in his charge for instruction in
military art, was fully recognised by Colonel Hender-
son. From the moment of his taking over the
duties till the day he left the College, he devoted
himself to them with the closest application and
most complete single-mindedness. The spirit in
which he conceived those duties was one that may
well serve as an example to those who follow him.

MEMOIR xxix

He considered that his mission was not restricted to
the mere teaching of the subjects that entered into
his curriculum, but extended to the extraction from
those subjects of every lesson that should go to the
making of an efficient commander in the field, and to
its complete assimilation by the officers under his
instruction. If any testimonial were necessary to the
success of the system adopted by him, it is to be
found strikingly recorded in the exploits of many
of the column commanders in the late war, who
graduated under Colonel Henderson at the Staff
College. The amount of work he got through was
enormous : the preparation and delivery of most
carefully thought-out lectures on " Military History,"
from which were drawn valuable lessons on every
aspect of strategy and tactics. Whole days were
spent on the ground working out and criticising
tactical schemes. No practical point, whether in
connection with the tactical use of ground, the aspect
of fire, or the framing and conveyance of orders,
being ignored. In all these exercises, whether in the
lecture-hall or in the field, the extraordinary qualifica-
tions of Colonel Henderson as an instructor were
equally conspicuous. He showed great clearness of
thought and perception, simplicity and correctness of
demonstration, a practical mind that discarded at
once methods impracticable in war, and untiring
industry and patience.

'There was yet another way in which Colonel
Henderson made the influence of his sound views and
profound knowledge of military operations felt, and

xxx THE SCIENCE OF WAR

this was in the observations made by him on the
military memoirs written by officers on past cam-
paigns, and on subjects of imperial military interest.
There was no paper, however crude, wherein he did
not notice points for encouragement towards renewed
effort ; so there was no paper, however complete, to
which his practical and well-thought-out remarks did
not add value. To him it was a labour of love, and
each memoir, good or indifferent, received the same
measure of attention from him ; it was, nevertheless,
a very severe labour, gone through with indomitable
perseverance and pluck which always characterised
him.

' There is one more aspect of Colonel Henderson's
influence while at the Staff College which must not
be left without mention — for it was a most important
one — his hours of recreation, rare and curtailed as
they were, he loved best to spend at the College,
talking over, with the many who were anxious to
discuss them, disputed points raised by the latest
lecture, or the most recent work on military literature.
And it would be difficult now to say where most was
really learned by the officers anxious to acquire know-
ledge in the military art — in the lecture-hall or in the
ante-room of the Staff College Mess.'

It is a pleasing picture which General Hildyard has
placed before us. Henderson by the ante-room fire-
side pouring out the rich treasures of his well-stocked
mind in familiar converse, ready to receive suggestions
from the veriest tiro in strategy, with no parade of
superior knowledge, never tedious, never didactic,

MEMOIR xxxi

entering into the difficulties of each and all, and by
his own enthusiasm carrying with him his listeners,
who, while intensely interested, remained wholly un-
conscious of being instructed.

It was at this time that I became acquainted with
Henderson. The various military societies throughout
the country were glad to secure the services of so
interesting and instructive a lecturer, and in response
to the invitation of the Dublin Military Society he
came over to Ireland in 1897 to lecture on Wellington,
when I had the pleasure of receiving him at the Royal
Hospital.

Soon, like all others with whom he came in contact,
I succumbed to the spell of Henderson's most fasci-
nating personality. The lecture that he delivered in
Dublin is included in the pages of this book, and all
who read it will be able to realise the pleasure with
which his audience listened to him.

Henderson's success as a lecturer was great. Gifted
with a finely modulated voice, and an easy but
impressive delivery, his cheery pleasant manner of
speaking, absolutely free from any symptom of
pedantry or attempt at forced eloquence, added charm
to the intellectual appreciation with which an intelli-
gent audience listened to his lectures. His style was
simple and clear ; he marshalled his facts with ease,
and enforced them with a wealth of illustration
drawn from his wide reading, and from those facts
he deduced with impressive directness the lessons
he wished to convey.

Henderson's great work, ' Stonewall Jackson and

b

xxxii THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the American Civil War,' published in 1898, was on
rather different and wider lines than his previous books,
which had been written for a limited class, and were
intended for professional instruction. ■ Fredericks-
burg ' and ' Spicheren ' were merely studies of cam-
paigns, although they contain, especially the former,
some pleasant reading for the amateur, touches of
portraiture, and pictures of scenery, sufficiently vivid to
show the effect of the physical features of the country,
or the movements of the troops engaged.

But in ' Stonewall Jackson ' Henderson gives an
elaborate and delightful study of character, drawn
with a loving insight born of intense sympathy. As
a biography it is a model, and as such it may be read
with pleasure by those for whom the details of the cam-
paign may not have any great interest. The amount
of work put into it must have been stupendous, but
the object which the author had in view, to teach the
nation generally to understand the supreme import-
ance of a knowledge of strategy, sustained him in his
arduous task throughout the eight years he gave to it.1

1 In his Preface to this interesting book, Henderson writes :
' Strategy is a science which repays the student, even if he has
no direct concern with military affairs ; for not only does a compre-
hension of its inimitable principles add a new interest to the
records of stirring times and great achievements, but it makes him
a more useful citizen.

' In free countries like Great Britain, her colonies, and the
United States, the weight of the intelligent opinion, in all matters
of moment, generally turns the scale ; and if it were generally
understood that, in regular warfare, success depends on something
more than the capacity for handling troops in battle, many far-
reaching mistakes might be avoided. The campaigns of the Civil
War show how much ma; be achieved, even with relatively feeble

MEMOIR xxxiii

We are told how Jackson applied himself day by
day to the details of his profession, and how he read
and re-read the history of the campaigns undertaken
by the acknowledged Masters of the Art of War ;
how when Jackson, in his turn, became engaged in
war himself, all the knowledge thus gained, in the
seclusion of the study, was brought to bear upon the
problems he was called upon to solve, and how he
was guided by the consideration of what these great
masters had done under similar conditions.

Having seen the effect that Captain Mahan's works
had produced in modifying the naval policy of the
British nation, Henderson, I quite believe, hoped that
his own writings might exert the same influence
on its military policy. My earnest desire is that his
hope may yet be realised.

No sooner had Henderson finished and published
'Stonewall Jackson' than he turned again to the
lessons of the war of 1870, and in the ' Battle of
Woerth' he gave to the world yet another of his
enlightening studies. It appeared in 1899 and com-
mended itself to the military reader. But from the

means, by men who have both studied strategy and have the
character necessary for its successful practice ; and they also show,
not a whit less forcibly, what awful sacrifices may be exacted from
a nation ignorant that such a science exists. How seldom do we
hear a knowledge of strategy referred to as an indispensable
acquirement in those who aspire to command ? How often is it
repeated, although in so doing the speakers betray their own
shortcomings, that strategy is a mere matter of common-sense ?
Yet the plain truth is that strategy is not only the determining
factor in civilised warfare, but that, in order to apply its principles,
the soundest common-sense must be most carefully trained.'

xxxiv THE SCIENCE OF WAR

study of the theory of war, soldiers were now called
to the practice of its grim reality, for in this year
began the struggle in South Africa, and the nation
was forced to make an effort such as had not been
called for since the beginning of the century.

Unprepared as we were, and with the theatre of
war six thousand miles from our shores, the campaign
began most unfavourably for us, and it soon became
apparent that the task before us was a far harder one
than had been realised, except by a very few.

For some time before war was declared, I had
given a considerable amount of thought to the
probability of an outbreak of hostilities in South
Africa, and to the measures which should be adopted
to meet such an outbreak. While still thinking over
this problem, I read ' Stonewall Jackson,' and was
much struck with the extraordinary effect which
strategy — whether Lee's or Jackson's — had upon the
campaign in Virginia, and also with the result of
Jackson's swift and unexpected movements, as
described by Henderson.1

1 < He knew the effect his sudden appearances and disappearances
would have on the moral of the Federal Generals, and he relied as
much on upsetting the mental equilibrium of his opponents as in
concentrating against them superior numbers. Nor was his view
confined to the field of battle and his immediate adversary. It
embraced the whole theatre of war. The motive power which
ruled the enemy's politics as well as his armies was always his real
objective. From the very first he recognised the weakness of the
Federal position — the anxiety with which the President and the
people regarded Washington — and on this anxiety he traded.
Every blow struck in the Valley campaign from Kernstown to Cross
Keys was struck at Lincoln and his Cabinet ; every movement,
including the advance against Pope on Cedar Run, was calculated

MEMOIR xxxv

Bearing all this in mind, when appointed to the
chief command of the Army in South Africa, I
determined that the wisest thing to do, both from
a military and political point of view, was to march
on the capitals of the Orange Free State and the
Transvaal, and so to break up their combination.

It will be seen from this what a high opinion
I had formed of Henderson's abilities. I was con-
vinced that he was well fitted for Staff employ in the
field, and that, given the opportunity, he would be
able to turn his knowledge to practical account — I
therefore applied for his services. My request was
granted, with the result that Henderson accompanied
me to South Africa, and, on my taking over the
command in January 1900, I appointed him Director
of Intelligence. He threw himself into his work
with his usual energy, and did much to reorganise
and extend this most important department.

We were sadly in want of maps. Of the Orange
Free State there were none, but, during the short
time we were in Cape Town, Henderson managed to
get skeleton maps prepared of the several districts,
which proved of the greatest use to me.

As regards maps of the Transvaal we were more
fortunate, for Henderson discovered, lying in the Post
Office, several hundred of that province, which had

with reference to the effect it would produce in the Federal
Councils ; and if he consistently advocated invasion, it was not
because Virginia would be relieved of the enemy's presence, but
because treaties of peace are only signed within sight of the hostile
capital.' — Stonewall Jackson, vol. ii. p. 697.

xxxvi THE SCIENCE OF WAR

been prepared by the Transvaal Revenue Authorities,
under the superintendence of a Mr. Jeppe\ The
printing of the maps had been done in Austria, and
they had quite recently arrived in Cape Town.
When the advance into the Transvaal began, these
maps were of the utmost service.

Since his death it has become evident that Hen-
derson knew himself to be in a bad state of health
when he was offered this appointment at the seat of
war, and that he even hesitated about accepting it,
for he wrote from Cape Town : — ' It was far better
to accept. I could not have stood waking up every
morning and thinking that I was one of the few
soldiers who were doing nothing for the country ; I
should never have felt like a man again.'

In February Henderson accompanied the Army
Headquarters to the Modder River, and with the
nearer approach to the enemy his thoughts naturally
turned to the fate that might be in store for him.
* I went to Holy Communion just before starting/
he writes, 'and I hope I shall get another chance
before we meet the enemy : but even if 1 don't
I feel quite cheery about everything. God has been
very good to us — to me especially — and whatever is
to be it is all right. I hope He will help me to do
my duty.'

In this calm trustful spirit Henderson reached the
Modder River camp, and there ' his boys ' of the Staff
College came to him at all hours, eager to discuss
those actual problems of war which they had so often
studied in theory, glad of the chance given them of

MEMOIR xxxvii

referring their doubts and difficulties to the instructor
the influence of whose teaching they still felt. Good
it was for them to be associated at such a time with
one whose counsel was sure to be wise, and whose
example they could not do better than follow.

For a few days longer Henderson continued in
the field ; he witnessed the move from the Modder,
but he did not get far himself, for he completely
broke down and had to leave for Cape Town before
we reached Paardeberg.

It was an intense disappointment to Henderson
(as it was to me) that he should have to abandon the
work which he had begun with such marked success.
In referring to this unhappy necessity in a letter
written a few weeks later, he showed a manly resigna-
tion and a trust in God that is most touching. * I
have got over my disappointment at not being up at
Cronje's surrender, and I feel that whatever is, or what-
ever will be, even if it is to go home invalided, is best.'

Henderson arrived in England greatly shattered
in health, and it was not until the following August
that he was sufficiently recovered to undertake fresh
duties. He was then appointed to write the official
history of the war, a work for which he was eminently
fitted, and it is indeed a misfortune that he did not
live to accomplish it.

In the autumn of 1901 Henderson went back
to South Africa to review the battlefields and
study that part of the country which he had not seen.
He travelled rapidly from place to place and worked
incessantly. It all proved too much for him ; his

xxxviii THE SCIENCE OF WAR

health again broke down, and in February 1902 he
returned to England.

For a short time after his arrival Henderson im-
proved in health and applied himself with his wonted
zeal to the work in hand. He laboured continually
until the end of 1902, when it became only too
evident that he had overtaxed his strength, and that he
could not, in his weakened state, get through an English
winter. He was, therefore, ordered to Egypt, where he
continued to work almost to the last day of his life.

Towards the end of February Henderson took a
turn for the worse, and the end came at Assouan on
March 5, 1903.

The affectionate tributes to Henderson's memory
by his many friends are a testimony to his pure and
stainless character. Blessed with a cheerful tempera-
ment, he brightened the lives of all with whom he
was associated, and his letters display a spirit of
playful tenderness towards those whom he loved,
which is most attractive. Generous and thoughtful
for others, he took no thought for himself, and only
valued money for what it might have enabled him to
do for those who needed his help.

The influence of such a man must bear good fruit,

and the more widely his writings are read, and the

more closely his teachings are followed, the more

successful will be our would-be commanders and the

better it will be for England when again she is forced

to go to war.

ROBERTS, F.M.

Apr a, 1905.

THE SCIENCE OF WAR

CHAPTER I

WAR

(From the ' Encyclopedia Britannica ' Supplement, 1902)

It is not easy to determine whether industrial progress, im-
proved organisation, the spread of education, or mechanical
inventions, have wrought the greatest change in the military art.
War is first and foremost a matter of movement ; and as
such it has been considerably affected by the multiplication
of good roads, the introduction of steam transport, and by
the ease with which draught animals can be collected. In the
second place war is a matter or supply ; and the large area
of cultivation, the increase of live stock, the vast trade in
provisions, pouring the foodstuffs of one continent into another,
have done much to lighten the inevitable difficulties of a
campaign. In the third place war is a matter of destruction ;
and while the weapons of armies have become more perfect
and more durable, the modern substitutes for gunpowder have
added largely to their destructive capacity. Fourthly, war
is not merely a blind struggle between mobs of individuals,
without guidance or coherence, but a conflict of well-organised
masses, moving with a view to intelligent co-operation, acting
under the impulse of a single will, and directed against a
definite objective. These masses, however, are seldom so
closely concentrated that the impulse which sets them in
motion can be promptly and easily communicated to each,
nor can the right objective be selected without some knowledge
of the enemy's strength and dispositions. Means of inter-
communication, therefore, as well as methods of observation,

B

2 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

are of great importance ; and with the telegraph, the telephone,
visual signalling, balloons, and improved field-glasses, the
armies of to-day, so far as regards the maintenance of connection
between different bodies of troops, and the diffusion, if not
the acquiring, of information, are at a great advantage com-
pared with those of the middle of the nineteenth century.

War, then, in some respects, has been made much simpler.
Armies are easier to move, to feed, and to manoeuvre. But
in other respects this very simplicity has made the conduct of
a campaign more difficult. Not only is the weapon wielded
by the general less clumsy and more deadly than heretofore,
less fragile and better balanced, but it acts with greater
rapidity and has a far wider scope. In a strong and skilful
hand it may be irresistible : in the grasp of a novice it is
worse than useless.

In former times, when war was a much slower process,
and armies were less highly trained, mistakes at the outset
were not necessarily fatal. Under modern conditions the
inexperienced commander will not be granted time in which
to correct his deficiencies and give himself and his troops the
needful practice. The idea of forging generals and soldiers
under the hammer of war disappeared with the advent of
' the nation in arms.' It is not too much to say that every
state in Europe, except Great Britain, can employ the whole
of its resources, physical, material, and intellectual, at the
outset. Military organisation has become a science, most
carefully studied, both by statesmen and soldiers. Its prin-
ciples, as a general rule, have been so thoroughly applied,
that the moment war is declared the manhood of the country
stands ready, armed, organised, and trained to defend the
frontier. The lessons of history have not been neglected.
Previous to 1870, in one kingdom only was it recognised that
intellect and education play a more prominent part in war
than stamina and courage. Taught by the dire disasters of
1806, Prussia set herself to discover the surest means of
escaping humiliation for the future. The shrewdest of her
sons undertook the task. The nature of war was analysed
until the secrets of success and failure were laid bare ; and on

WAR S

these investigations a system of organisation and of training
was built up which, not only from a military, but from a
political, and even an economical point of view, is the most
striking product of the nineteenth century. The keynote of
this system is that the best brains in the state shall be at
the service of the war lord. None, therefore, but competent
soldiers are entrusted with the responsibility of command, and
the education of the officer is as thorough, as systematic, and
as uniform as the education of the lawyer, the diplomatist,
and the doctor. In all ages the power of intellect has asserted
itself in war. It was not courage and experience only that
made Hannibal, Alexander, and Caesar the greatest names of
antiquity. Napoleon, Wellington, and the Archduke Charles
were certainly the best educated soldiers of their time ; while
Lee, Jackson, and Sherman probably knew more of war
before they made it than anyone else in the United States.

But it was not until 1866 and 1870 that the prepon-
derating influence of the trained mind was made manifest.
Other wars had shown the value of an educated general, these
showed the value of an educated army. It is true that Moltke,
in mental power and in knowledge, was in no wise inferior to
the great captains who preceded him ; but the remarkable
point of his campaigns is that so many capable generals had
never before been gathered together under one flag. No
campaigns have been submitted to such searching criticism.
Never have mistakes been more sedulously sought for or more
frankly exposed. And yet, compared with the mistakes of
other campaigns, even with that of 1815, where hardly a
superior officer on either side had not seen more battles than
Moltke and his comrades had seen field days, they were
astonishingly few. It is not to be denied that the foes of
Prussia were hardly worthy of her steel. Yet it may be
doubted whether either Austria or France ever put two finer
armies into the field than the army of Bohemia in 1866 and
the army of the Rhine in 1870. Even their generals of divisions
and brigades had more actual experience than those who led
the German army corps. Compared with the German rank
and file, a great part of their non-commissioned officers and

b2

4 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

men were veterans, and veterans who had seen much service.
Their chief officers were practically familiar with the methods
of moving, supplying, and manoeuvring large masses of troops ;
their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers. And yet
the history of modern warfare records no defeats so swift and
so complete as those of Koniggriitz and Sedan. The great
host of Austria was shattered to fragments in seven veeks;
the French Imperial army was destroyed in seven weeks and
three days ; and to all intent and purpose the resistance they
had offered was not much more effective than that of a
respectable militia. But both the Austrian and the French
armies were organised and trained under the old system.
Courage, experience, and professional pride they possessed
in abundance. Man for man, in all virile qualities, neither
officers nor men were inferior to their foes. But one thing
their generals lacked, and that was education for war. Strategy
was almost a sealed book to them ; organisation a matter of
secondary importance. It was no part of their duty, they
declared, to train the judgment of their subordinates ; they
were soldiers, and not pedagogues. Knowledge of foreign
armies and their methods they considered useless, and of war
prepared and conducted on ' business principles ' they had
never even dreamt.

The study of war had done far more for Prussia than
educating its soldiers and producing a sound system of organi-
sation. It had led to the establishment of a sound system of
command ; and this system proved a marvellous instrument in
the hands of a great leader. It was based on the recognition
of three facts : first, that an army cannot be effectively con-
trolled by direct orders from headquarters ; second, that the
man on the spot is the best judge of the situation ; and
third, that intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value
than mechanical obedience. To explain more fully. In mili-
tary operations space, time, and opportunity are dominant
factors. For many reasons an army in the field can never be
closely concentrated, and it is thus impossible for the com-
mander to see everything for himself, to detect with his own eyes
every blunder the enemy may commit, or to communicate his

WAR 5

orders in such good time that openings shall not be lost. Nor can
he forecast and provide for every contingency, for it is generally
the unexpected that happens ; the enemy's blunders cannot be
foreseen ; and events move with such rapidity that an order an
hour old is often quite inapplicable to the situation. More-
over, if those portions of the army unseen by the commander,
and not in direct communication with him, were to await his
orders before acting, not only would opportunities be allowed
to pass, but other portions of the army, at critical moments,
might be left without support. It was understood, therefore,
in the Prussian armies of 1866 and 1870, that no order was to
be blindly obeyed unless the superior who issued it was actually-
present, and therefore cognisant of the situation at the time it
was received. If this was not the case, the recipient was to use
his own judgment, &nd act as he believed his superior would
have directed him to do had he been aware how matters stood.
Again, officers not in direct communication with headquarters
were expected not only to watch for and to utilise, on their
own initiative, all opportunities of furthering the plan of
campaign or battle, but, without waiting for instructions, to
march to the thunder of the cannon, and render prompt assis-
tance wherever it might be required. It was long before the
system was cordially accepted, even in Germany itself ; and it
has been fiercely criticised.

To soldiers whose one idea of command might be sum-
marised in the sentence, ' I order, you obey,' and in whose
eyes unqualified and unthinking obedience was the first of
virtues, the new teaching appeared subversive of all discipline
and authority. If, they said, subordinates are to judge for
themselves whether an order is to be executed or not ; if
they are to be encouraged to march, to attack, or to retreat,
on their own volition ; if, in a word, each of them is to be
considered an independent commander, the superior can never
be certain, at any given moment, where his troops are or
what they are doing, and to manoeuvre them as a united whole
will be out of the question. Was it likely, they asked, that a
junior officer left to himself would act as his superior would
have directed him to act had he himself been present ? Was it

6 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

not probable that he would hinder rather than further the
general plan ; and would not such untrammelled freedom lead
to independent ventures, prolific perhaps of personal glory, but
absolutely destructive of the harmony of action essential to
success ? These dangers, however, had been foreseen ; and,
while they were recognised as real, they were not considered so
inevitable as to forbid the encouragement of an unfettered
initiative, nor so formidable as to be insurmountable. The
first step was to make a clear distinction between ' orders ' and
' instructions.1 An ' order ' was to be obeyed, instantly and to
the letter. ' Instructions 1 were an expression of the com-
mander's wishes, not to be carried out unless they were mani-
festly practicable. But * orders,1 in the technical sense, were
not to be issued except by an officer actually present with the
body of troops concerned, and fully aware of the situation ;
otherwise ' instructions 1 only would be sent. The second step
was to train all officers to arrive at correct decisions, and so to
make certain, so far as possible, that subordinates, when left to
themselves, would act as their superiors would wish them to do.
The third step was to discourage to the utmost the spirit
of rash and selfish enterprise.

In the German army of to-day the means employed to
ensure, so far as possible, correct decisions are, first, a
uniform training in handling troops. Every German officer,
practically speaking, is educated in the same school and
taught to adapt his action to the same principles. The
school is that of the General Staff. The principles, few but
comprehensive, are those laid down by the chief of staff;
and they are disseminated through the army by his assistants,
the officers of the General Staff, whom he himself has
educated. Each army corps and each division has its own
chief of the staff, all of them replicas of their teacher ; and no
general, so far as possible, is appointed even to the command
of a brigade unless he is thoroughly acquainted with the official
principles. Instruction is not necessarily given at Berlin.
Every commander has not passed through the Kriegsakademie
or served at headquarters. But at field exercises and manoeuvres,
at war games and staff rides, the official principles, especially

t^ **-*£*•

^AR 7

those concerned with ' orders,1 are the groundwork of all
criticism and the touchstone of every operation. The field
exercises, too, are arranged so as to afford constant practice,
under competent instructors, in solving the problems which
present themselves in war. The second means is a systematic
encouragement, from the first moment an officer joins his
regiment, of the spirit of initiative, of independent judgment,
and self-reliance. Each has his definite responsibilities, and
superiors are forbidden, in the most stringent terms, to entrench
upon the prerogatives of their subordinates. The third means is
the enforcement of the strictest discipline, and the development
of camaraderie in the highest sense. Despite the latitude that
is accorded him, absolute and punctual obedience to the most
trifling ' order ' is exacted from the German officer ; while
devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice, exalted to the same level as
personal honour, and inculcated as the loftiest sentiment by
which the soldier can be inspired, are trusted to counteract the
tendencies of personal ambition.

It may be remarked that Napoleon at St. Helena, in his
criticisms of his marshals, frequently made use of the significant
expression that so-and-so failed ' because he did not understand
my system.1 It is possible that Moltke, the real founder of the
German system, took those words to heart. Be this as it may,
he knew not only how to command an army, but how to teach
an army ; how to form skilled leaders, strategists, and tacticians,
men who could plan, execute, and instruct ; and in this respect
he was far superior to Napoleon, or indeed to any general of
modern times. In 1866 the system was not quite perfected ;
but in 1870 there were few German officers who were not
thoroughly penetrated with the ideas of the chief of the staff ;
few who did not thoroughly understand how to interpret and
how to issue ' orders ' and * instructions.1

The benefit to the state was enormous. It is true that
the initiative of subordinates sometimes degenerated into
reckless audacity, and critics have dilated on these rare in-
stances with ludicrous persistence, forgetting the hundreds of
others where it was exercised to the best purpose, forgetting
the spirit of mutual confidence that permeated the whole army,

a THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and forgetting, at the same time, the deplorable results of
centralisation in the armies they overthrew. It is incon-
ceivable that any student of war, comparing the conduct of
the German, the French, and the Austrian generals, should
retain even the shadow of a prejudice in favour of blind obedi-
ence and limited responsibility.

'To what,"* asks the ablest commentator on the Franco-
German war, ' did the Germans owe their uninterrupted
triumph ? What was the cause of the constant disasters of the
French ? What new system did the Germans put in practice,
and what are the elements of success of which the French were
bereft ? The system is, so to speak, official and authoritative
amongst the Germans. It is the initiative of the subordinate
leaders. This quality, which multiplies the strength of an
army, the Germans have succeeded in bringing to something
near perfection. It is owing to this quality that, in the midst
of varying events, the supreme command pursued its uninter-
rupted career of victory, and succeeded in controlling, almost
without a check, the intricate machinery of the most powerful
army that the nineteenth century produced. In executing the
orders of the supreme command, the subordinate leaders not
only did over and over again more than was demanded of them,
but surpassed the highest expectations of their superiors, notably
at Sedan. It often happened that the faults, more or less in-
evitable, of the higher authorities were repaired by their sub-
ordinates, who thus won for them victories which they had
not always deserved. In a word, the Germans were indebted to
the subordinate leaders that not a single favourable occasion
throughout the whole campaign was allowed to escape unutilised.
The French, on the other hand, never even suspected the
existence of so powerful a factor ; and it is for this reason that
they met with disasters, even when victory, so to speak, belonged
to them by every rule of war. The faults and omissions of the
French subordinate leaders are to be attributed to the false
conception of the rights and functions of command, to the in-
grained habit of blind and inert obedience, based on a principle
which allowed no exception, and acting as a law, absolute and
immutable, in all degrees of the military hierarchy. To the

WAR 9

virile energy of the Germans they could oppose nothing but
impetuous courage. Compensation for the more powerful fire
of the German artillery was found in the superior weapon of the
French infantry. But to the intelligent, hardy, and even at
times somewhat reckless, initiative of the German subordinate
leaders, the French had nothing to oppose, in the grand as in
the minor operations, but a deliberate inactivity, always await-
ing an impulse from above. These were the real causes of the
numerous reverses and the swift destruction of the valiant
French army, and therein lies the true secret of German
strength. Her foes of davs to come will have to reckon seriously
with this force, almost elementary in its manipulation, and
prepare themselves in time to meet it. No well-organised army
can afford to dispense with the initiative of the subordinate
leaders, for it is the determining factor in modern war, and up
to the present it has been monopolised by Germany.'

That the Prussian system should be imitated, and her army
deprived of its monopoly of high efficiency, was naturally inevi-
table. Every European state has to-day its staff college, its
intelligence department, its schools of instruction, and its
courses of field manoeuvres and field firing. But that the full
import of the German system has been thoroughly realised is
very doubtful. So far as the history of warfare since the fall of
Paris can be regarded as evidence, the contrary appears to be
the case. In many of the campaigns since 1870, brains and
system can hardly be said to have played the leading part.
Individual generals have made great names as strategists, as
organisers, as leaders of men ; but want of foresight, inadequate
preparation, contempt of the enemy and ignorance of his
strength, violation of great principles, and indifferent training,
both of the staff and of the troops, have been too often apparent.
It is possible that the same faults and deficiencies will be con-
spicuous in the twentieth century, unless a knowledge of the
real nature of war is far more widely diffused than it is at
present. It is not quite true that some terrible catastrophe is
required to bring home to a nation the vast importance of mili-
tary efficiency, and to make all men realise in what that
efficiency consists. If Jena and Auerstadt made the Prussian

10 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

army of 1870, and Sedan the French army of 1900, it is to the
writ inns of Mahan that Great Britain owes in large measure
the reform of her naval deficiencies. His brilliant analysis of the
nature of naval warfare, and his masterly elucidation of the
great principles of success and failure, have proved as effective
a tonic as the occupation of Berlin or the fall of Paris.

But before a new conception of war, such as is involved in
Moltke's system, can take hold of the instincts of a people there
are many obstacles to be overcome. Not the least is a very
natural reluctance to admit that any foreign army is in any way
better than their own, just as Oliver Goldsmith, the loyal
citizen of London, believed that ' Nature never exhibited a more
magnificent prospect than that seen from the top of Hampstead
Hill.1 But the chief are the traditional ideas that intellectual
capacity is of far less value in the field than the military virtues,
courage, endurance, and skill at arms, that the problems which
confront the general are all to be solved by the exercise of
ordinary common-sense, and that war is a matter of such sim-
plicity that it is hardly worth serious study. In a lawyer, a
doctor, an engineer, in the mates of an Atlantic liner, or the
officers of a battleship, the public expects to find a mastery of
their profession, a proved capacity for conducting it, and a
knowledge that is up to date. Nor does the ordinary layman
venture to interfere with these acknowledged specialists. As
regards the military art it is far otherwise. Soldiers are not
acknowledged as specialists. Few Anglo-Saxons are not secretly
convinced that with some knowledge of drill they would be
most formidable rivals to the officers of the German General
Staff, and many of the fiercest critics of the professional soldier
are in exactly the same case as the Austrians of 1866 and the
French of 1870. They believe that they possess the military
virtues, that they are fearless, cool, and resolute, and they
flatter themselves that they are fitted with sufficient common-
sense to enable them to decide wisely and promptly in critical
moments. Nor is it to be denied, especially in a nation of
sportsmen, whose familiarity Avith danger breeds energy and
resolution, that so far they are perfectly right. They forget,
however, that common-sense, to be a really useful guide to the

WAR 11

judgment, must be trained common-sense, fortified by knowledge
and increased by practice, and they forget that encounters with
the enemy are only incidents of a campaign. When they
assume the form of pitched battles, they are undoubtedly the
most important incidents. But unless the strategy is sound,
unless the preliminary operations, such as the concentration on
the frontier, the measures for protecting the communications,
the arrangements for fortifying the bases, the marches, the
reconnaissances, have been devised and executed in such manner
as to enable the troops to meet the enemy under the most
favourable conditions ; and unless, when the victory has been
won, the movements of the army are so directed as to reap the
fruits thereof, battles, even if successful, are not likely to pro-
duce decisive results.

But with strategy — that is, the operations which lead
up to battle, and those which follow battle— the ordinary
military virtues are not directly concerned, or rather, are
much less concerned than intellectual capacity and a wide
knowledge of war. For instance, in the war of 1870, the head-
quarters were so far to the rear that neither Moltke nor his
assistants saw a shot fired before the day of Gravelotte, the
sixth great battle. It would seem, therefore, to have been
perfectly immaterial whether the officers of the headq uarters
staff possessed a superabundance of the military virtues, or
whether they were absolutely without them. Yet the skill with
which they planned the preliminaries was the foundation of the
victories. Had not the general scheme ot operations been
thoroughly sound, the judgment and initiative of the subordi-
nate leaders would assuredly have gone astray. But Moltke
committed no mistake. Long before war had been declared
every possible preparation had been made. And these included
much more than arrangements for rapid mobilisation, the
assembly of superior numbers completely organised, and the
establishment of magazines. The enemy's numbers, armaments,
readiness, and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching
examination. Every possible movement that might be made,
however unlikely, had been foreseen, every possible danger that
might arise, however remote, discussed and provided against.

12 THE SCIENCE OF WAB

The concentration on the frontier was so devised that not only
were the troops placed in the best position for either invasion
or defence, but the chance of even a small reverse was hardly
possible. Moreover, when the campaign opened, although holf
a million of men had to be supplied and manoeuvred in a hostile
country, and, as each victory brought about a fresh situation,
fourteen army corps, every one of them as large as the army
with which Wellington fought the battle of Quatre Bras, had
to be given a fresh direction, transferred to other roads and
assigned a new objective ; the French were never offered a real
opening from first to last. It is true that the Germans were
superior in numbers ; but if it be borne in mind that exact in-
formation was but seldom forthcoming, that the movements of
these huge masses depended on slight indications, and on in-
ferences drawn from a knowledge of war, from a knowledge of
the enemy's leaders, and of the influence on those leaders of
French public opinion, it will be evident that the successful
result was the fruit of a sustained intellectual effort of no
ordinary kind.

The popular idea that war is a mere matter of brute force,
redeemed only by valour and discipline, is responsible for a
greater evil than the complacency of the amateur. It blinds
both the peopfe and its representatives to their bounden duties.
War is something more than a mere outgrowth of politics. It
is a political act, initiated and controlled by the Government,
and it is an act of which the issues are far more momentous
than any other. And yet no branch of political science is less
studied among the Anglo-Saxon communities. That obstacles
to a mastery of the subject are very numerous it is idle to deny.
A youthful Hohenzollern can be taught by a Moltke ; to train
the sovereign people to a proper understanding of things
military is a different matter. Moreover, it is not easy to
find instructors. There is no standard work on war in the
English language, no volume of permanent value which deals
with the organisation, maintenance and employment of armies
from the point of view of the statesman and the citizen.
History, as taught at the present day, includes an immense
variety of subjects, but there is one subject which it ha?

WAR 13

sedulously shunned, and that subject is the defence of empires.
Hardly any well-known political writer, except Spenser Wilkin-
son, appears to have the least inkling that such knowledge
should be part of the intellectual equipment of every educated
man, and no great teaching body has yet endeavoured to supply
the deficiency. So, in both Great Britain and the United
States, organisation has been neglected, efficiency has been
taken for granted, and the national resources have been either
wasted or misused. Costly, ill-planned, and ill-conducted
enterprises have been the inevitable result.

It is not pretended that if military history were thoroughly
studied all statesmen would become Moltkes, or that every
citizen would be competent to set squadrons in the field. War
is above all a practical art, and the application of theory to
practice is not to be taught at a university or to be learned by
those who have never rubbed shoulders with the men in the
ranks. But if war were more generally and more thoroughly
studied, the importance of organisation, of training, of education,
and of readiness would be more generally appreciated ; abuses
would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance ; efficiency
would be something more than a political catchword, and
soldiers would be given ample opportunities of becoming masters
of every detail of their profession. Nor is this all. A nation
that understood something about war would hardly suffer the
fantastic tricks which have been played so often by the best-
meaning statesmen. And statesmen themselves would realise
that when war is afoot their interference is worse than useless ;
that preparation for defence, whether by the multiplication of
roads, the construction of railways, of arsenals, dockyards,
fortresses, is not the smallest of their duties ; and, lastly, that
so far as is possible diplomacy and strategy should keep step.
Each one of these points is of far greater importance now than
in the past. In the wars of the eighteenth century, English
Cabinets and Dutch deputies could direct strategical operations
without bringing ruin on their respective countries. The armies
of Austria in 1792-95, controlled as they were by the Aulic
Councils, were more formidable in the field than those of the
French Republic. In the campaigns of 1854 and 1859 the

14 THE SCIENCE OF WAH

plans of Newcastle and Napoleon III. worked out to a successful
issue ; and if Lincoln and Stanton, his Secretary of War,
imperilled the Union in 1862, they saw the downfall of the
Southern Confederacy in 1865. But in every case amateur was
pitted against amateur. The Dutch deputies were hardly less
incapable of planning or approving a sound plan of campaign
than Louis XIV. The Aulic Council was not more of a marplot
than the Committee of Public Safety. Newcastle was not a
worse strategist than the Tsar Nicholas I. Napoleon III. and
his advisers were quite a match for the courtier generals at
Vienna; while Lincoln and Stanton were not much more
ignorant than Jefferson Davis. The amateur, however, can no
longer expect the good fortune to be pitted against foes of a
capacity no higher than his own. The operations of Continental
armies will be directed by soldiers of experience whose training
for war has been incessant, and who will have at their command
troops in the highest state of efficiency and preparation. It
is not difficult to imagine, under such conditions, with what
condign punishment mistakes will be visited. Napoleon III., in
1859, committed as many blunders as he did in 1870. But the
Austrians had no Moltke to direct them ; their army corps
were commanded by men who knew less of generalship than a
Prussian major, and their armament was inferior. Had they
been the Austrians of to-day, it is probable that the French
and their allies would have been utterly defeated. And to come
to more recent campaigns, while American officers have not
hesitated to declare that if the Spaniards at Santiago had been
Germans or French, the invasion would have ended in dis-
astrous failure, it is impossible to doubt that had the Boers of
1899 possessed a staff of trained strategists, they would have
shaken the British Empire to its foundations. The true test
of direction of war is the number of mistakes. If they were
numerous, although the enemy may not have been skilful enough
to take advantage of them, the outlook for the future under
the same direction, but against a more practised enemy, is
anything but bright.

As regards preparation for defence, history supplies us with
numerous illustrations. The most conspicuous, perhaps, is the

WAR 15

elaborate series of fortifications which were constructed by Vauban
for the defence of France ; and there can be no question that
Louis XIV., in erecting this mighty barrier against invasion,
gave proof of statesmanlike foresight of no mean order. An
instance less familiar, perhaps, but even more creditable to the
brain which conceived it, was Wellington's preparation of
Portugal in 1809-11. Not only did the impregnable stronghold
of Torres Vedras, covering Lisbon, and securing for the sea-
power an open door to the continent of Europe, rise as if bj
magic from the earth, but the whole theatre of war was so
dealt with that the defending army could operate wherevei
opportunity might offer. No less than twenty supply depots
were established on different lines of advance. Fortifications
protected the principal magazines. Bridges were restored and
roads improved. Waterways were opened up, and flotillas
organised ; and three auxiliary bases were formed on the
shores of the Atlantic. Again, the famous ' quadrilaterals ' of
Lombardy and Rumelia have more than fulfilled the purpose
for which they were constructed ; while both Austria and
Turkey owe much to the fortresses which so long protected their
vulnerable points. Nor has the neglect of preparation failed
to exert a powerful effect. Moltke has told us that the railway
system of Germany before 1870 had been developed without
regard to strategical considerations. Yet the fact remains that
it was far better adapted both for offence and defence than
those of Austria and France ; and, at the same time, it can
hardly be denied that the unprovided state of the great French
fortresses exercised an evil influence on French strategy. Both
Metz and Strasburg were so far from forming strong pivots of
manoeuvres, and thus aiding the operations of the field armies,
that they required those armies for their protection ; and the
retreat on Metz, which removed Bazaine's army from the direct
road to Paris and placed it out of touch with its supports, was
mainly due to the unfinished outworks and deficient armament
of the virgin city. Since 1870 it has been recognised that
preparation of the theatre of war is one of the first duties of
a Government. Every frontier of continental Europe is covered
by a chain of entrenched camps. The great arsenals are amply

16 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

fortified and strongly garrisoned. Strategy has as much to say
to new railways as trade ; and the lines of communication,
whether by water or by land, are adequately protected from all
hostile enterprises. It is to be recognised that the amount of
preparation must vary with the extent of the frontier and with
the character of the foe beyond. For example, to make the
vast boundaries of the British Empire as secure as the eastern
marches of France would be a financial impossibility and a
military folly. Yet this does not imply that questions of
defence may be postponed until war is imminent. Plevna has
demonstrated, indeed, that hastily constructed earthworks may
be more useful than the most formidable citadel. But it was
only the stupidity of the enemy that allowed Plevna to become
impregnable.

We now come to the third point, the importance of close
concert between strategy and diplomacy. On the continent of
Europe they can easily keep pace, for the theatre of war is
always within easy reach. But when the ocean intervenes
between two hostile states, it is undoubtedly difficult to time an
ultimatum so that a sufficient armed force shall be at hand to
enforce it, and it has been said in high places that it is prac-
tically impossible. The expedition to Copenhagen in 1807,
when the British ultimatum was presented by an army of
27,000 men carried on 300 transports, would appear to traverse
this statement. But at the beginning of the twentieth century
an army and a fleet of such magnitude could neither be
assembled nor despatched without the whole world being
cognisant.

It is thus perfectly true that an appreciable period of time
must elapse between the breaking off of negotiations and the
appearance on the scene of an invading army. Events may
march so fast that the statesman's hand may be forced before the
army has embarked. But because a powerful blow cannot at
once be struck, it by no means follows that the delivery or the
receipt of an ultimatum should at once produce a dangerous
situation. Dewey's brilliant victory at Manila lost the greater
part of its effect because the United States Government was
unable to follow up tbe blow by landing a sufficient force.

WAR 17

Exactly the same thing occurred in Egypt in 1882. The only
results of the bombardment of Alexandria were the destruction
of the city, the massacre of the Christian inhabitants, the
encouragement of the rebels, who, when the ships drew off,
came to the natural conclusion that Great Britain was power-
less on land. Again, in 1899, the invading Boers found the
frontiers unfortified and their march opposed by an inadequate
force. It is essential, then, that when hostilities across the
sea are to be apprehended, the most careful precautions should
be taken to ward off the chance of an initial disaster. And
such precautions are always possible. It is hardly conceivable,
for instance, that a great maritime Power, with Cyprus as a
place d'armes, could not have placed enough transports behind
the fleet to hold a sufficient garrison for Alexandria, and thus
have saved the city from destruction. Nor in the case of a
distant province being threatened is there the smallest reason
that the garrison should be exposed to the risk of a reverse
before it is reinforced. It may even be necessary to abandon
territory. It will certainly be necessary to construct strong
places, to secure the lines of communication, to establish ample
magazines, to organise local forces, to assemble a fleet of
transports, and to keep a large body of troops ready to embark
at a moment's notice. But there is no reason, except that of
expense, why all this should not be done directly it becomes clear
that war is probable, and why it should not be done without
attracting public attention. In this way strategy may easily
keep pace with diplomacy ; and all that is wanted is the
exercise of ordinary foresight, a careful study of the theatre of
war, a knowledge of the enemy's resources, and a resolute
determination, despite some temporary inconvenience and the
outcry of a thoughtless public, to give the enemy no chance
of claiming first blood.

The Franco-German war supplies a striking example.
Moltke's original intention was to assemble the German
armies on the western frontier. The French, inferior in
numbers, and but half prepared, would, he thought, probably
assemble as far back as the Moselle. But, as so often happens
in war, the enemy did what he was least expected to do.

18 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Hastily leaving their garrisons, the French regiments rushed
forward to the Saar. The excitement in Germany was great ;
and even soldiers of repute, although the mobilisation of
the army was still unfinished, demanded that such troops as
were available should be hurried forward to protect the rich
provinces which lie between the Saar and Rhine. But the
chief of the staff became as deaf as he was silent. Not a single
company was despatched to reinforce the slender garrisons of
the frontier towns ; and those garrisons were ordered to retire,
destroying railways and removing rolling-stock, directly the
enemy should cross the boundary. Moltke's foresight had
embraced every possible contingency. The action of the
French, improbable as it was deemed, had already been provided
against ; and, in accordance with time-tables drawn up long
beforehand, the German army was detrained on the Rhine
instead of on the Saar. Ninety miles of German territory were
thus laid open to the enemy ; but the temporary surrender of
the border provinces, in the opinion of the great strategist, was
a very minor evil compared with the disasters, military and politi-
cal, that would have resulted from an attempt to hold them.

It is hardly necessary to observe that no civilian minister,
however deeply he might have studied the art of war, could
be expected to solve for himself the strategic problems which
come before him. In default of practical knowledge, it would
be as impossible for him to decide where garrisons should be
stationed, what fortifications were necessary, what roads should
be constructed, or how the lines of communication should be
projected, as to frame a plan of campaign for the invasion of
a hostile state. His foresight, his prevision of the accidents
inevitable in war, would necessarily be far inferior to those of
men who had spent their lives in applying strategical principles
to concrete cases ; and it is exceedingly unlikely that he would
be as prolific of strategical expedients as those familiar with
their employment. Nevertheless, although he would be more
or less bound by expert advice, and although he might be
aware that the attempt to control military operations, even
so far as regards the preliminaries of a campaign, is a most
dangerous proceeding, yet a knowledge of war could hardly

WAR 19

fail to serve him in good stead. Arnold, in his * Lectures on
Modern History,1 puts the matter clearly : ' There must be
a point up to which an unprofessional judgment on a pro-
fessional subject may not only be competent, but of high
authority, although beyond that point it cannot venture
without presumption and folly. The distinction seems to lie
originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing
and that of perceiving whether it is well done or not. " He
who lives in the house," says Aristotle, " is a better judge of
its being a good or bad one than the builder of it. He can
tell not only whether the house is good or bad, but wherein
its defects consist ; he can say to the builder, ' This chimney
smokes, or has a bad draught ' ; or * This arrangement of the
rooms is inconvenient,"1 and yet he may be quite unable to cure
the chimney, or to draw out a plan for his rooms which
should suit him better. Nay, sometimes he can even see
where the fault is which has caused the mischief, and yet he
may not practically know how to remedy it." Following up
this principle, it would appear that what we understand least
in the profession of another is the detail of his practice. We
may appreciate his object, we may see where he has missed it,
or where he is pursuing it ill ; nay, may understand generally
the method of setting about it, but we fail in the minute
details. . . . But in proportion as we recede from those details
to more general points, first, as to what is generally called
strategy, that is to say the directing the movements of an
army with a view to the accomplishment of the object of the
campaign, in that proportion general knowledge and power
of mind come into play, and an unprofessional person may,
without blame, speak or write on military subjects, and may
judge of them sufficiently.1

Applying this wise rul<» to statecraft, the point where civilian
control of military operations becomes presumptuous, as well
as the extent of that control, may be easily defined. In the
first place, to frame a sound strategical plan, whether for
defence or invasion, requires not only an intimate acquaint-
ance with innumerable details of which only a professional
soldier can really judge, such as methods ot supply and

c 2

20 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

transport, the use of fortifications, the effects of climate, the
maintenance of the lines of communication, the value of
positions, the management of marches, the moral, armament,
organisation, tactics and resources of the opposing forces, but
an intimate acquaintance with the principles and stratagems of
war. It is here that the amateur strategist fails. He may
have read enough to give him a good knowledge of principles,
but he has no knowledge of the practical difficulties of war,
and his criticism, as a general rule, is consequently of little
value. All war is simple, but the simple is most difficult, and
how difficult only those who have made it, who have witnessed
with their own eyes the turmoil, the confusion, the friction,
which, even in the best armies, attend the most ordinary
operation, are in a position to understand. Even a theoretical
acquaintance, derived from historical study of the practical
difficulties, is insufficient. Unless he who prepares a strategical
plan has before his mind's eye a clear picture of all military
operations, of marching, quartering, supply, entraining, and
detraining, embarkation, and debarkation, and a personal
knowledge of the difficulties which attend on war, his work
will be of little value. It is essential too that he should have
a thorough knowledge of both officers and men, of the peculiar
characteristics of the army, and of the system on which it
works, of its strong points and its weak. A German, suddenly
placed in command of British soldiers, would be much at sea,
and vice versa. Every army has an individuality of its own.
It is a living organism of a very sensitive temper, and it can
neither be properly controlled nor efficiently directed except
by those who are in full sympathy with its every impulse.

It would appear, then, that while a statesman may be com-
petent to appreciate the general principles of the projects of
operations laid before him, he should never attempt to frame a
project for himself. Still less, when once he has approved of
a plan of campaign, should he attempt to limit the number of
troops to be employed, or to assign the position of the necessary
detachments. Nevertheless, a knowledge of war may still be
exceedingly useful to him. A minister of war cannot divest
himself of his responsibility for the conduct of military opera-

WAR 21

tions. In the first place, he is directly responsible for plans
of campaign to meet every possible contingency being worked out
in time of peace. In the second place, he is directly responsible
for the advice on which he acts being the best procurable.
It is essential, therefore, that he should be capable of forming
an independent opinion on the merits of the military projects
which may be submitted to him, and also on the merits of those
who have to execute them. Pitt knew enough of war and men
to select Wolfe for the command in Canada. Canning and
Castlereagh, in spite of the opposition of the King, sent
Wellington, one of the youngest of the lieutenant-generals, to
hold Portugal against the French. The French Directory had
sufficient sense to accept Napoleon's project for the campaign
of Italy in 1796. In the third place, strategy cannot move
altogether untrammelled by politics and finance.

But political and financial considerations may not present
themselves in quite the same light to the soldier as to the states-
man, and the latter is bound to make certain that they have
received due attention. If, however, modifications are necessary,
they should be made before the plan of campaign is finally ap-
proved ; and in any case the purely military considerations should
be most carefully weighed. It should be remembered that an
unfavourable political situation is best redeemed by a decisive
victory, while a reverse will do more to shake confidence in the
Government than even the temporary surrender of some portion
of the national domains. * Be sure before striking ' and reader
pour mieux sauter are both admirable maxims ; but their practical
application requires a thorough appreciation of the true princi-
ples of war, and a very large degree of moral courage, both in
the soldier who suggests and in the statesman who approves.
If, however, the soldier and the statesman are supported by an
enlightened public, sufficiently acquainted with war to realise
that patience is to be preferred to precipitation ; that retreat,
though inglorious, is not necessarily humiliating, their task is
very considerably lightened.

Nothing is more significant than a comparison between
the Paris press in 1870 and the Confederate press in 1864.
In the one case, even after the disastrous results of the first

22 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

encounters had proved the superior strength and readiness of
the enemy, the French people, with all the heat of presumptuous
ignorance, cried out for more battles, for an immediate offen-
sive, for a desperate defence of the frontier provinces. So fierce
was their clamour that both the generals and the Government
hesitated, until it was too late, to advise the retreat of Bazaine's
army ; and, when that army had been cut off at Metz, the
pressure of public opinion was so great that the last reserve of
France was despatched to Sedan on one of the maddest enter-
prises ever undertaken by a civilised state. In 1864, on the
other hand, while Lee in Virginia and Johnston in the West
were retreating from position to position, and the huge hosts of
the Union were gradually converging on the very heart of the
Confederacy, the Southern press, aware that every backward
step made the Federal task more difficult, had nothing but
praise for the caution which controlled the movements of their
armies. But the Southern press, in three crowded years of
conflict, had learned something of war.

In 1866 and 1870 the German press was so carefully
muzzled that, even had there been occasion, it could have done
nothing to prejudice public opinion. Thus both the sovereign
and the generals were backed by the popular support they
so richly merited ; but, it may be remarked, the relations
between the army and the Government were characterised by a
harmony which has been seldom seen. The old King, in his
dual capacity as head of the state and commander-in-chief,
had the last word to say, not only in the selection of the
superior officers, but in approving every important operation.
With an adviser like Moltke at his elbow, it might appear
that these were mere matters of form. Moltke, however,
assures us that the King was by no means a figurehead.
Although most careful not to assert his authority in a way that
would embarrass his chief of staff, and always ready to yield his
own judgment to sound reasons, he expressed, nevertheless, a
perfectly independent opinion on every proposal placed before
him, and on very many occasions made most useful suggestions.
At the same time, while systematically refraining from all
interference after operations liad begun, he never permitted

WAR 23

military considerations to override the demands of policy.
In 1866, when it was manifestly of the first importance,
from a military point of view, that the Prussian army should
be concentrated in a position which would enable it to cross the
border immediately war was declared, the political situation
was so strained that it was even more important to prevent the
enemy from setting foot on any single point of Prussian territory.
The army, in consequence, was dispersed instead of being con-
centrated, and the ultimate offensive became a difficult and
hazardous operation. It is true that the King was an able and
experienced soldier. Nevertheless, the wise restraint he dis-
played in the course of two great campaigns, and the skill
with which he adjusted conflicting factors, form an admirable
example of judicious statesmanship. And such statesmanship
is not merely a valuable aid to the military chiefs, but it is
imperatively demanded by the nature of great wars. Campaigns
are not likely to be prolonged. Space has been annihilated by
steam ; and it was space that was the real cause of such weary
struggles as the war in the Peninsula or that of Secession in
America. Troops are so easily transported and fed by means
of railways and steamers, and organisation is so perfect, that, as
a general rule, far larger numbers will be assembled for the
initial encounters than heretofore. There will be more in front
and fewer in rear ; and the first battles have assumed a new
importance. In fact, unless one side has been completely
surprised, and merely fights to gain time, they may be as decisive
of the war as Jena, Eckmuhl, or Waterloo. It is, therefore, of
the utmost importance that when once the plan of campaign
has been approved, the military chiefs upon the spot should be
given an absolutely free hand.

The duration of a campaign is largely affected by the deadly
properties of modern firearms. It is true that the losses in
battle are relatively less than in the days of brown Bess and the
smoothbore cannon, and almost insignificant when compared
with the fearful carnage wrought by sword and spear. The
reason is simple. A battlefield in the old days, except at close
quarters, was a comparatively safe locality, and the greater part
of the troops engaged were seldom exposed for a long time

24 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

together to a hot and continuous fire. To-day death has a far
wider range, and the strain on the nerves is consequently far
more severe. Demoralisation, therefore, sets in at an earlier
period, and it is more complete. When troops once realise
their inferiority, they can no longer be depended on. If attack-
ing, they refuse to advance ; if defending, they abandon all
hope of resistance. It is not the losses they have actually
suffered, but those that they expect to suffer, that affect them.
The ordeal of facing the hail of modern fire tells so heavily on
ordinary flesh and blood that those who have been hotly
engaged, if casualties have been very numerous, will seldom be
brought to fight again, except on the defensive, the same day,
or even the same month. There is no bringing up men again
and again to the attack, as in the days of Napoleon ; and unless
discipline and national spirit are of superior quality, unless even
the private soldier is animated by something higher than the
mere habit of mechanical obedience, panic, shirking, and whole-
sale surrender will be the ordinary features of a campaign.

These phenomena made themselves apparent, though in a
less degree, as long ago as the War of Secession, when the weapon
of the infantry was the muzzle-loading rifle, firing at most two
rounds a minute, and when the projectile of the artillerv was
hardly more destructive than the stone shot of Mons Meg.
With the magazine rifle, machine guns, shrapnel, and high
explosives, they have become more pronounced than even at
Vionville or Plevna. 'The retreat of the 38th [Prussian]
Brigade,1 writes Captain Hoenig, an eyewitness of the former
battle, ' forms the most awful drama of the great war. It had
lost 53 per cent, of its strength, and the proportion of killed to
wounded was as 3 to 4. Strong men collapsed inanimate. . . .
I saw men cry like children ; others fell prone without a sound ;
in most the need of water thrust forth all other instincts ; the
body demanded its rights. " Water, water " was the only in-
telligible cry that broke from those moving phantoms. The
enemy's lead poured like hail upon the wretched remnant of the
brigade ; yet they moved only slowly to the rear, their heads
bent in utter weariness ; their features distorted under the thick
dust that had gathered on faces dripping with sweat. The

WAR 25

strain was beyond endurance. The soldier was no longer a
receptive being ; he was oblivious of everything, great or small.
His comrades or his superiors he no longer recognised ; and yet
he was the same man who, but a short time before, had marched
across the battlefield shouting his marching chorus. A few
active squadrons, and not a man would have escaped ! Only he
who has seen men in such circumstances, and observed their
bearing, knows the dreadful imprint that their features leave
upon the memory. Madness is there, the madness that arises
from bodily exhaustion combined with the most abject terror.
... I do not shrink,' he adds, ' from confessing that the fire
of Mars-la-Tour affected my nerves for months.1

If such are the results of ill-success, a whole army might be
reduced to the condition of the 38th Brigade in the first month
of the campaign, and it is thus perfectly clear that some small
mistake in conduct, some trifling deficiency in preparation, an
ill-conceived order, or a few hours1 delay in bringing up a rein-
forcement, may have the most terrible consequences. That
mistakes can be wholly avoided is to expect too much. But
the state has every right to demand that to make prepara-
tions complete, to ensure skilful leading, close co-operation, and
resolute action, neither by statesman nor soldier should thought
labour, or expense be spared.

The importance, nay the necessity, that the people, as a
governing body, should keep as watchful an eye on its armed
forces and the national defences as on diplomacy or legislation
is fully realised, naturally enough, only by those nations whose
instincts of self-preservation, by reason of the configuration of
their frontiers or their political situation, are strongly developed.
So remote is the prospect that either British or American
soldiers may suddenly be called upon to confront the trained
hosts of Continental Europe, that the efficiency of the army has
comparatively little interest for the nation at large. Yet even to
these maritime empires an efficient army is of the first necessity.
Their land frontiers are vulnerable. They may have to deal
with rebellion, and a navy is not all powerful, even for the
defence of coasts and commerce, It can protect, but it cannot
destroy. Without the help of an army, it can neither complete

26 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the ruin of the enemy's fleet nor prevent its resuscitation. It
can ward off attack, but counter-attack is beyond its scope.
Without the help of an army it can hardly force a hostile
Power to ask for terms. Exhaustion is the object of its warfare ;
but exhaustion, unless accelerated by crushing blows, is an ex-
ceedingly slow process. In the spring of 1861 the blockade was
established along the coasts of the Southern Confederacy, and
maintained with increasing stringency from month to month.
Yet it was not till the spring of 1865 that the colours of the
Union floated from the capitol of Richmond, and it was the
army which placed them there.

A state, then, which should rely on naval strength alone
could look forward to no other than a protracted war, and a
protracted war between two great Powers is antagonistic to
the interests of the civilised world. With the nations armed to
the teeth, and dominated to a greater or smaller extent by a
militant spirit ; with commerce and finance dependent for health
and security on universal peace, foreign intervention is a mere
question of time. Nor would public opinion, either in Great
Britain or America, be content with a purely defensive policy,
even if such policy were practicable. Putting aside the tedium
and the dangers of an interminable campaign, the national pride
would never be brought to confess that it was incapable of the
same resolute effort as much smaller communities. ' An army,
and a strong army,' would be the general cry. Nor would such
an army be difficult to create. Enormous numbers would not
be needed. An army supported by an invincible navy possesses
a strength which is out of all proportion to its size. Even
to those who rely on the big battalions and huge fortresses,
the amphibious power of a great maritime state, if intelligently
directed, may be a most formidable menace : while to the state
itself it is an extraordinary security.

The history of Great Britain is one long illustration. Cap-
tain Mahan points out that there are always dominant positions,
outside the frontiers of a maritime state, which, in the interests
of commerce, as well as of supremacy at sea, should never be
allowed to pass into the possession of a powerful neighbour.
Great Britain, always dependent for her prosperity on narrow

WAR 27

seas, has long been familiar with the importance of the positions
that command these waterways. In one respect at least her policy
has been consistent. She has spared no effort to secure such
positions for herself, or, if that has been impracticable, at least
to draw their teeth. Gibraltar, Malta, St. Lucia, Aden, Egypt,
Cyprus are conspicuous instances ; but above all stands Antwerp.
In perhaps the most original passage of Alison's monumental
work the constant influence of Antwerp on the destinies of the
United Kingdom is vividly portrayed. ' Nature has framed the
Scheldt to be the rival of the Thames. Flowing through a
country excelling even the midland counties of England in
wealth and resources, adjoining cities equal to any in Europe
in arts and commerce ; the artery at once of Flanders and
Holland, of Brabant and Luxembourg, it is fitted to be the
great organ of communication between the fertile fields and
rich manufacturing towns of the Low Countries and other
maritime states of the world.1 Antwerp, moreover, the key of
the great estuary, is eminently adapted for the establishment of
a vast naval arsenal, such as it became under Philip II. of Spain
and again under the First Napoleon. ' It is the point,1 con-
tinues the historian, ' from which in every age the independence
of these kingdoms has been seriously menaced. Sensible of her
danger, it had been the fixed policy of Great Britain for
centuries to prevent this formidable outwork from falling into
the hands of her enemies, and the best days of her history are
chiefly occupied with the struggle to ward off such a disaster.1
In ascribing, however, every great war in which Great Britain
has been engaged to this cause alone he has gone too far. The
security of India has been a motive of equal strength. Never-
theless, it was to protect Antwerp from the French that
Charles II. sided with the Dutch in 1670 ; that Anne declared
war on Louis XIV. in 1704 ; that Chatham supported Prussia
in 1742 ; that Pitt, fifty years later, took up arms against the
Revolution.

The trophies of the British army in the great war with
France were characteristic of the amphibious power. The
troops took more battleships than colours, and almost as many
naval arsenals as land fortresses. Many were the blows they

28 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

struck at the maritime strength of France and her allies ; but
had the expedition which landed on the Isle of Walcheren in
1809 been as vigorously conducted as it was wisely conceived,
it would have hit Napoleon far harder than even the seizure of
the Danish fleet at Copenhagen. The great dockyard that the
Emperor had constructed on the Scheldt held the nucleus of a
powerful fleet. Eight line-of-battle ships and ten frigates lay
in mid-channel. Twenty vessels of different classes were on the
slips, and in the magazines and storehouses had been accumu-
lated sufficient material to equip all these and twenty more.
The destruction of Antwerp — and for a full week it was at
Lord Chatham's mercy — would have freed scores of British
frigates to protect British commerce ; Wellington, in his great
campaign of 1813, would not have had to complain that, for
the first time, the communication by sea of a British army was
insecure ; the Americans, in the war which broke out in 1812,
would have been more vigorously opposed ; and Napoleon, who,
while Antwerp was his, never altogether abandoned hope of
overmastering Great Britain on her own element, might, on his
own confession, have relinquished the useless struggle with the
great sea Power. The expedition failed, and failed disastrously.
But for all that, fulfilling as it did the great maxim that the
naval strength of the enemy should be the first objective of the
forces of the maritime power, both by land and sea, it was a
strategical stroke of the highest order.

The predominant part played by the army under Wellington
in Spain and Belgium has tended to obscure the principle that
governed its employment in the war of 1793-1815. The army,

Iin the opinion of the country, was first and foremost the
auxiliary of the fleet ; and only when the naval strength of the
enemy had been destroyed was it used in the ordinary manner,
i.e. in the invasion of the hostile territory and in lending aid
to the forces of confederate Powers. Events proved that these
principles were absolutely sound. It was not in the narrow seas
alone that the army rendered good service to the navy. De-
priving France of her colonies, occupying her ports in foreign
waters, ousting her from commanding posts along the trade
routes, it contributed not only to her exhaustion, but to the

WAR 29

protection of British commerce and to the permanent establish-
ment of maritime supremacy. Few of these operations are of
sufficient magnitude to attract much notice from the ordinary
historian, yet it is impossible to overrate their effect. To the
possession of the dominant positions that were captured by
the army, Great Britain, in no small degree, is indebted for the
present security of her vast dominions. The keynote of the
fierce struggle with the French Empire was the possession of
India. Before he became First Consul, Napoleon had realised
that India was the throne of Asia ; that whoever should sit on
that throne, master of the commerce of the East, of the richest
and most natural market for the products of the West, and of
the hardiest and most enlightened nations of the golden hemi-
sphere, would be master of more than half the globe. But his
prescience was not surer than the instinct of the British people.
Vague and shadowy indeed were their dreams of empire, yet the
presentiment of future greatness, based on the foothold they
had already gained in Hindustan, seems always to have con-
trolled the national policy. They knew as well as Napoleon
that Malta and Egypt, to use his own phrase, were merely the
outworks of their stronghold in the East ; and that if those
outworks fell into the hands of France, a great army of Mahom-
medans, led by French generals, stiffened by a French army
corps, and gathering impetus from the accession of every tribe
it passed through, might march unopposed across the Indus.
So, from first to last, the least threat against Egypt and Malta
sufficed to awaken their apprehensions ; and in their knowledge
that India was the ultimate objective of all his schemes is to be
found the explanation of the stubbornness with which they
fought Napoleon. It is not to be denied that in thwarting the
ambition of their mighty rival, or perhaps in furthering their
own, the navy was the chief instrument : but in thrusting the
French from Egypt, in adding Ceylon, Mauritius, and Cape
Colony to the outworks, the army, small as it was then com-
pared with the great hosts of the Continent, did much both for
the making and for the security of the British Empire.

But the scope of the military operations of a maritime state
is by no means limited to the capture &f colonies, naval arsenals

30 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and coaling-stations. Timely diversions, by attracting a large
portion of the enemy's fighting strength on the mainland, may
give valuable aid to the armies of an ally. The Peninsular War
is a conspicuous example. According to Napoleon, the necessity
of maintaining his grip on Spain deprived him of 180,000 good
soldiers during the disastrous campaign of 1813 ; and those
soldiers, who would have made Dresden a decisive instead of
a barren victor}', were held fast by Wellington. Again, it was
the news of Vittoria that made it useless for the Emperor to
propose terms of peace, and so escape from the coils that
strangled him at Leipzig.

Nor is the reinforcement supplied by a small army based
upon the sea to be despised. In 1793 a British contingent,
under the Duke of York, formed part of the allied forces
which, had the British Government forborne to interfere,
would in all probability have captured Paris. Twenty-two
years later, under wiser auspices, another contingent, although
numbering no more than 30,000 men, took a decisive part in
the war of nations, and the blunders of the older generation
were more than repaired at Waterloo. But the strength
of the amphibious Power has been even more effectively
displayed than in the campaign of 1815. Intervention at the
most critical period of a war has produced greater results than
the provision of a contingent at the outset. In 1782 the
disembarkation of a French army on the Virginia Peninsula
established the independence of the United States ; and in
1878, when the Russian invaders were already in sight of
Constantinople, the arrival of the British fleet in the Dardanelles,
following the mobilisation of an expeditionary force, at once
arrested their further progress. Had the British Cabinet of
1807 realised the preponderating strength which even a small
army, if rightly used, draws from the command of the sea,
the campaign of Eylau would in all probability have been as
disastrous to Napoleon as that of Leipzig. The presence
of 20,000 men at the great battle would have surely turned
the scale in favour of the Allies. Yet, although the men were
available, although a few months later 27,000 were assembled
in the Baltic for the coercion of Denmark, his Majesty's

WAR 31

ministers, forgetful of Marlborough's glories, were so imbued
with the idea that the British army was too insignificant to
take part in a Continental war, that the opportunity was let
slip. It is a sufficiently remarkable fact that the successive
Governments of that era, although they realised very clearly
that the first duty of the army was to support the operations
and complete the triumph of the navy, never seemed to have
grasped the principles which should have controlled its use
when the command of the sea had been attained. The march
of the Allies on Paris in 1793 was brought to a standstill
because the British Cabinet considered that the contingent
would be better employed in besieging Dunkirk. After the
failure of the expedition under Sir John Moore to achieve the
impossible, and, in conjunction with the Spaniards, to drive the
French from the Peninsula, the ministry abandoned all idea
of intervention on the main theatre, although, as we have
seen, had such intervention been well timed, it might easily
have changed the current of events. It is true that when
the main theatre is occupied by huge armies, as was the case
during the whole of the Napoleonic conflict, the value of a
comparatively small force, however sudden its appearance, is
by no means easily realised. For instance, it would seem at
first sight that a British contingent of 100,000 men would be
almost lost amid the millions that would take part in the
decisive conflicts of a European war. It should be remembered,
however, that with enormous masses of men the difficulties
of supply are very great. Steam has done much to lighten
them, and the numbers at the point of collision will be far
greater than it was possible to assemble in the days of Napoleon.
Nevertheless, the lines of communication, especially railways,
will require more men to guard them than heretofore, for
they are more vulnerable. The longer, therefore, the lines of
communication, the smaller the numbers on the field of battle.
Moreover, the great hosts of the Continent, not only for
convenience of supply, but for convenience of manoeuvre, will
deploy several armies on a broad front. At some one point,
then, a reinforcement of even one or two army corps might
turn the scale.

32 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

The objections, however, to intervention of this character
are numerous. Between allied armies, especially if one is far
larger than the other, there is certain to be friction, as was
the case in the Crimea ; and the question of supply is not
easily settled. If the decisive point is near the coast, as
in the campaign of Eylau, the army of the maritime Power,
possessing its own base, can render effective aid without
embarrassment either to itself or its ally ; but, under all other
conditions, independent operations of a secondary nature are
distinctly to be preferred. Such was clearly the opinion of
the British ministries during the war with France. They
recognised that by giving vitality and backbone to popular
risings even a small army might create useful diversions. But
their idea of a diversion was a series of isolated efforts, made
at far distant points ; and even so late as 1813 they were
oblivious of the self-evident facts that for a diversion to be
really effective it must be made in such strength as to con-
stitute a serious threat, and that it should be directed against
some vital point.

Fortunately for Europe, Wellington foresaw that the perma-
nent occupation of Portugal, and the presence of a British
army in close proximity to the southern frontier of France,
would be a menace which it would be impossible for Napoleon
to disregard. Yet with what difficulty he induced the
Government to adopt his views, and how lukewarm was their
support, is exposed in the many volumes of his despatches.
In all history there are few more glaring instances of incom-
petent statesmanship than the proposal of the Cabinet of
1813, at the moment when Wellington was contemplating the
campaign that was to expel the French from Spain, and was
asking for more men, more money, and more material, to
detach a large force in the vague hope of exciting a revolution
in southern Italy.

Whether the improvement in communications, as well as
the increase in the size of armies, has not greatly weakened
the value of diversions on the mainland, it is difficult to say.
Railways may enable the defender to concentrate his forces
so rapidly that even the landing may be opposed, and with

WAR 33

the enormous numbers at his command he ma} well be able
to spare a considerable force from the main tneatre. It is
possible to conceive that a small army, even if it completed
its embarkation, might find itself shut up in an entrenched
position by a force little larger than itself. If, however,
the diversion were made at a crisis of the campaign, the
sudden appearance of a new army might be decisive of the
war. Otherwise, the army would probably do moie good if
it refrained from landing and confined itself to threats. So
long as it was hidden by the horizon, it would be invested
with the terrors of the unknown. The enemy's knowledge that
at any moment a well-equipped force, supported by a powerful
fleet, might suddenly descend upon some prosperous port or
important arsenal, would compel him to maintain large garrisons
along the whole seaboard. The strength of these garrisons,
in all probability, would be much larger in the aggregate than
the force which menaced them, and the latter would thus
exercise a far greater disintegrating effect on the enemy's
armed strength than by adding a few thousand men to the
hosts of its ally. On theatres of war which are only thinly
populated or half civilised, a descent from the sea might easily
produce a complete change in the situation. The occupation
of Plevna, in close proximity to the Russian line of com-
munications and to the single bridge across the Danube,
brought the Russian advance through Bulgaria to a sudden
stop, and relieved all pressure on Turkey proper. The dead-
lock which ensued is suggestive. Let us suppose that the
invaders1 line of communications had been a railway, and
Plevna situated near the coast. Supplied from the sea, with
unlimited facilities for reinforcement, Osman's ring of earth-
works would have been absolutely impregnable ; and had the
ring been pushed so far inland as to secure scope for offensive
action, the Russians, in all human probability, would never
have crossed the Balkans. It is perfectly possible, then, that
if an army lands within reach of a precarious line of com-
munications it may compel the enemy, although far superior
in numbers, to renounce all enterprises against distant points.
Railways in war are good servants but bad masters. In

9

34 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

some respects they are far superior to a network of high roads.
Two trains will supply the daily needs of 100,000 men several
hundred miles distant from their base. But the road-bed is
easily destroyed ; the convoy system is impracticable, and the
regular course of traffic is susceptible to the slightest threat.
So, when railways become the principal factors, as when an army
finds itself dependent on a long and exposed line, a powerful
aggressive combination becomes a matter of the utmost
difficulty. The whole attention of the commander will be given
to the security of his supplies, and even if he is not thrown on
the defensive by the enemy's activity, his liberty of action will
be exceedingly circumscribed.

The relative values of the different kinds of communication
have a most important bearing on the art of war. A great
waterway, such as the Nile, the Mississippi, the Danube, or
the Ganges, is safer and surer than a railway. But railways
are far more numerous than navigable rivers, and a series of
parallel lines is thus a better means of supplying a large
army. But neither railways nor waterways as lines of supply
or of operation are to be compared with the sea. Before
the War of 1870, for instance, a study of the French railway
system enabled Moltke to forecast, with absolute accuracy, the
direction of Napoleon's advance, the distribution of his forces,
and the extent of front that they would occupy. In a war,
therefore, between two Continental Powers, the staff of either
side would have no difficulty in determining the line of attack ;
the locality for concentration would be at once made clear ; and,
as the carrying capacity of all railways is well known, the
numbers that would be encountered at any one point along the
front might be easily calculated.

But if the enemy's army, supported by a powerful fleet,
were to advance across blue water, the case would be very
different. Its movements would be veiled in the most com-
plete secrecy. It would be impossible to do more than guess
at its objective. It might strike at any point along hun-
dreds of miles of coast, or it might shift from one point to
another, perhaps far distant, in absolute security ; it could
bewilder the enemy with feints, and cause him to disperse

WAR 85

his forces over the whole seaboard. Surprise and freedom of
movement are pre-eminently the weapons of the Power that
commands the sea. Witness the War of Secession. McClellan,
in 1862, by the adroit transfer of 120,000 men do wn the reaches
of the Chesapeake to the Virginia Peninsula, had Richmond
at his mercy. Grant in 1864, by continually changing his line
of communication from one river to another, made more pro-
gress in a month than his predecessors had done in two years.
Sherman's great march across Georgia would have been impossi-
ble had not a Federal fleet been ready to receive him when he
reached the Atlantic ; and, throughout the war, the knowledge
that at any moment a vast fleet of transports might appear off
any one of the ports on their enormous seaboard prevented the
Confederates, notwithstanding that the garrisons were reduced
to a most dangerous extent, from massing their full strength for
a decisive effort.

The power of striking like a ' a bolt from the blue ' is of
the very greatest value in war. Surprise was the foundation of
almost all the grand strategical combinations of the past, as it
will be of those to come. The first thought, and the last, of
the great general is to outwit his adversary, and to strike where
he is least expected. And the measures he adopts to accomplish
his purpose are not easily divined. What soldier in Europe
anticipated Marlborough's march to the Danube and Blenheim
field ? What other brain besides Napoleon's dreamt of the passage
of the Alps before Marengo ? Was there a single general of Prussia
before Jena who foresaw that the French would march north
from the Bavarian frontier, uncovering the roads to the Rhine,
and risking utter destruction in case of defeat ? Who believed
in the early June of 1815 that an army 130,000 strong would
dare to invade a country defended by two armies that mustered
together over 200,000 unbeaten soldiers ? To what Federal
soldier did it occur, on the morning of Chancellorsville, that
Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would detach the half
of his own small force of 50,000 to attack his enemy in flank and
rear ? The very course which appeared to ordinary minds so
beset by difficulties and dangers as to be outside the pale of
practical strategy has, over and over again, been that which led

i>2

36 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

to decisive victory ; and if there is one lesson more valuable
than another as regards national defence, it is that preparation
cannot be too careful, or precautions overdone. Overwhelming
numbers, adequately trained, commanded, and equipped, are
the only means of ensuring absolute security. But a numerical
preponderance, either by land or sea, over all possible hostile
combinations, is unattainable, and in default the only sound
policy is to take timely and ample precautions against all enter-
prises which are even remotely possible. There is nothing more
to be dreaded in war than the combined labours of a thoroughly
well-trained general staff, except the intellect and audacity
of a great strategist. The ordinary mind, even if it does not
shrink from great danger, sees no way of surmounting great
difficulties ; and any operation which involves both vast dangers
and vast difficulties it scoffs at as chimerical. The heaven-born
strategist, on the other hand, 'takes no counsel of his fears.'
Knowing that success is seldom to be won without incurring
risks, he is always greatly daring ; and by the skill with which
he overcomes all obstacles, and even uses them, as Hannibal and
Napoleon did the Alps, and as some great captain of the future
may use the sea, to further his purpose and surprise his ad-
versary, he shows his superiority to the common herd. It is
repeated ad nauseam that in consequence of the vastly improved
means of transmitting information, surprise on a large scale is
no longer to be feared. It should be remembered, however, that
the means of concentrating troops and ships are far speedier
than of old ; that false information can be far more readily
distributed ; and also, that if there is one thing more certain
than another, it is that the great strategist, surprise being still
the most deadly of all weapons, will devote the whole force of
his intellect to the problem of bringing it about.

Nor can it be disguised that amphibious power is a far
more terrible weapon now than even in the days when it crushed
Napoleon. Commerce has increased by leaps and bounds, and
it is no longer confined within territorial limits. The arteries
vital to the existence of civilised communities stretch over every
ocean. States which in 1800 rated their maritime traffic at a
few hundred thousand pounds sterling, value it now at many

WAR 37

millions. Others, whose flags, fifty years ago, were almost un-
known on the high seas, possess to-day great fleets of merchant-
men ; and those who fifty years ago were self-dependent, rely in
great part, for the maintenance of their prosperity, on their
intercourse with distant continents. There is no great Power,
and few small ones, to whom the loss of its sea-borne trade
would be other than a most deadly blow ; and there is no great
Power that is not far more vulnerable than when Great Britain,
single-handed, held her own against a European coalition.
Colonies, commercial ports, dockyards, coaling-stations, are so
many hostages to fortune. Year by year, they become more
numerous. Year by year, as commercial rivalry grows more
acute, they become more intimately bound up with the pro-
sperity and prestige of their mother-countries. And to what
end ? To exist as pledges of peace, auspfcia melioris cevi, or to
fall an easy prey to the Power that is supreme at sea and can
strike hard on land ?

Even the baldest and briefest discussion of the vast subject
of war would be incomplete without some reference to the rela-
tive merits of professional and unprofessional soldiers. Volun-
tary service still holds its grounds in the Anglo-Saxon states ;
and both the United Kingdom and America will have to a great
extent to rely, in case of conflicts which tax all their resources,
on troops who have neither the practice nor the discipline of
their standing armies. What will be the value of these
amateurs when pitted against regulars ? Putting the question
of moral aside, as leading us too far afield, it is clear that the
individual amateur must depend upon his training. If, like the
majority of the Boers, he is a good shot, a good scout, a good
skirmisher, and, if mounted, a good horseman and horsemaster,
he is undeniably a most useful soldier. But whether amateurs,
en masse — that is, when organised into battalions and brigades —
are thoroughly trustworthy, depends on the quality of their
officers. With good officers, and a certain amount of previous
training, there is no reason why bodies of infantry, artillery, or
mounted infantry, composed entirely of unprofessional soldiers,
should not do excellent service in the field. Where they are
likely to fail is in discipline ; and it would appear that at the

38 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

beginning of a campaign they are more liable to panic, less
resolute in attack, less enduring under heavy losses and great
hardships, and much slower in manoeuvre than the professionals.
To a certain extent this is inevitable ; and it has a most impor-
tant bearing on the value of the citizen soldier, for, as we have
already seen, the beginning of a campaign is a most critical
phase. In short, troops who are only half-trained, or who have
been hastily raised, may be a positive danger to the army to
which they belong ; and the shelter of stout earthworks is the
only place for them. Yet the presence of a certain number of
experienced fighting men in the ranks may make all the differ-
ence ; and, in any case, it is probable that battalions composed
of unprofessional soldiers, the free citizens of a free and pro-
sperous state, are little if at all inferior, as fighting units, to
battalions composed of conscripts. But it is to be understood
that the men possess the qualifications referred to above, that the
officers are accustomed to command, and that both have a good
practical knowledge of their duties in the field. A mob, however
patriotic, carrying small-bore rifles is no more likely to hold its
own to-day against well-led regulars than did the mob carrying
pikes and flint-locks in the past. A small body of resolute
civilians, well-armed and skilful marksmen, might easily, on their
own ground, defeat the same number of trained soldiers, especi-
ally if the latter were badly led. But in a war of masses, the
power of combination, of rapid and orderly movement, and of
tactical manoeuvring is bound to tell.

CHAFrER II

STRATEGY

(From the ' Encyclopedia Britannica ' Supplement, 1902)

The exact meaning of the word ' strategy ' is as generally mis-
understood as the study of the art it describes is generally
neglected. By civilians it is continually confounded with
' tactics,' and it would seem that even soldiers are not always
quite clear as to the essential distinction between the two main
branches of their profession. Yet such confusion is not due to
the want of definition. Almost every military writer of repute
has tried his hand at it, and the only embarrassment is to
choose the best. The last perhaps will serve our purpose as
well as any other. Strategy, according to the official text-book
of the British infantry, is the art of bringing the enemy to
battle, while tactics are the methods by which a commander
seeks to overwhelm him when battle is joined. It will thus
be seen that strategy leads up to the actual fighting — that is,
to the tactical decision : but that while the two armies are
seeking to destroy each other it remains in abeyance, to spring
once more into operation as soon as the issue is decided. It
will also be observed that the end of strategy is the pitched
battle ; and it is hardly necessary to point out that the
encounter at which the strategist aims is one in which every
possible advantage of numbers, ground, supplies, and moral
shall be secured to himself, and which shall end in his enemy's
annihilation.

The means by which this desirable consummation is attained
are many, but the guiding principle is generally the same, and
may be summed up in Napoleon's dictum, the secret of war lies
in the communications. The line of supply may be said to be
as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a
human being. Just as the duellist who finds his adversary's

40 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard
astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's movements,
and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the
commander whose communications are suddenly threatened
finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he
has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more
or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers
on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where
defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin
or the surrender of his whole army.

This great principle is common both to the offensive and
the defensive. In the first case, the strategist is generally
confronted with the following problem ; The enemy holds a
strong position ; how is he to be forced out of it? In the second,
the difficulty may be stated thus : The enemy is advancing in
superior numbers ; how is he to be cJiecked f The answers are
identical : By threatening or cutting his line of communications ;
and so reducing him to the situation described in the preceding
paragraph. It is evident, however, that so vulnerable a point
will be most carefully guarded ; and, also, that the application
of the principle is complicated by the fact that it is two-edged,
or, to put it in plainer words, that a general in seeking to
reach his adversary's heart may expose his own. In short, to
place a force in such a position that it either threatens or
severs the enemy's line of supply, is not only a difficult but a
hazardous operation which, unless the force is overwhelmingly
superior, and can push its way through all obstacles by sheer
weight of numbers, can never be carried out except by stratagem
and manoeuvre.

The scope and nature of such expedients must to a great
extent depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
There are certain principles, however, which serve as guides;
and it will be seen that they are all accessory to a rule of
strategy which is intimately connected with that which bids us
strike at the enemy's communications, viz. the concentration of
superior strength, physical and moral, on thejield of battle.

' How often,' says Napier, ' have we not heard the genius of
Buonaparte slighted, and his victories talked of as destitute of

STRATEGY 41

merit, because at the point of attack he was superior in number
to his enemies ! This very fact, which has so often been con-
verted into a sort of reproach, constitutes his greatest and
truest praise. He so directed his attack as at once to divide
his enemy and to fall with the mass of his own forces upon
a point where their division, or the distribution of their troops,
left them unable to resist him. It is not in man to defeat
armies by the breath of his mouth ; nor is Buonaparte com-
missioned, like Gideon, to confound and destroy a fort with
300 men. He knew that everything depended ultimately upon
physical superiority ; his genius is shown in this, that although
outnumbered on the whole, he was always superior to his
enemies at the decisive point.'

We will now take the case of an army superior in numbers,
and note down in succession the methods by which those
numbers may be reduced by an adversary who is operating
against its communications : (a) If the superior army is not yet
concentrated, or is so distributed that the different parts cannot
readily support each other, it may he defeated in detail, (b)
If the superior army is concentrated, its commander, by one
means or another, may be induced to make detachments and thus
be weak everywhere.

To accomplish (a) the means are : — 1. More rapid mobi-
lisation. 2. Surprises, effected by hard marching, secrecy,
feints, and the adoption of an unexpected line of operations.

To accomplish (b) : — 1. The skilful use of detached forces,
threatening points which the enemy is bound to protect, such
as his immediate base of operations, or his line of supply.
2. Concealment, begetting uncertainty and apprehension. 3.
Drawing the enemy forward into ' a zone of manoeuvre ' where
topographical obstacles, the difficulties of supply, or judicious
feints will compel him to split up his army.

In addition to these shifts of war, which are more or less
aimed at the hostile army, there are others which are aimed
almost exclusively at the hostile general. The moral equilibrium
of the commander is often of even greater importance than
the spirit of his troops. Ii that equilibrium can be upset,
or his imagination so played upon that he gives way to

42 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

recklessness, over-confidence, or despair, victory should be very
near. The methods which may be employed arc numerous :

1. Drawing the enemy into a trap by an apparent dis-
persion of the forces against him.

2. Feigned retreat, inducing the enemy to pursue needlessly,
and so commit mistakes.

3. Spreading false information.

4. Changing the base, and adopting a new and unexpected
line of operations. This is one of the most effective weapons
in the armoury of the strategist, who thereby not only secures
great freedom of manoeuvre, but may completely baffle his
adversary's penetration.

Lastly, there are two great principles which are the
foundation and the crown of all strategical methods, and which
strike heavily and directly at the moral both of the hostile
commander and of the troops he commands. They have been
defined for us by Stonewall Jackson .

1. Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy.

2. Never give up the pursuit so long as your men have
strength to follow, for an army rotded, if hotly pursued, becomes
'panic-stricken, and can be defeated by half their numbers. To
move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of
victory is the secret of successfid war.

It will be noted that some of these principles are to a certain
extent conflicting. The concentration of the whole army in
one body is undoubtedly a rule which is not to be infringed
with impunity, and yet the use of detached forces is continually
recommended as the surest means of making the enemy dis-
perse his troops or commit other mistakes. The fact is,
however, that strategical principles are neither to be rigidly
applied nor over-scrupulously respected. They are to be
obeyed rather in the spirit than in the letter ; and the strategist,
to be successful, must know exactly how far he can go in
disregarding or in modifying them, and be ingenious enough
to bring those into adjustment which are apparently irre-
concilable. For instance, a superior army may derive the
greatest advantage from a breach of the rule of concentration.
If it divides at the outset into two wings, each approaching the

STRATEGY 43

enemy on a different line, and possibly supplied from a different
base, it may not only cause the enemy the very greatest
embarrassment, but eventually crush him between them, as
Napoleon was crushed between the English and the Prussians
at Waterloo, or Benedek between the Crown Prince and Prince
Frederick Charles at Koniggratz, or Hooker between Lee and
Jackson at Chancellorsville. It is to be observed, however,
that the breach of rule is more apparent than real, in that
concentration is merely deferred to the field of battle, instead
of taking place before the troops march against the enemy.
Thus, although the letter is infringed, the spirit is respected.

But because a partial application, or even an absolute
disregard, of the principles of strategy does not necessarily
spell disaster, it is not to be assumed that they are merely
theoretical and pedantic formulae. A general who was an
absolute slave to them, who obstinately refused, for example,
to make a detachment, would probably fail to achieve decisive
success ; but a general who acted in defiance of them would,
to put it in the mildest form, run enormous risk. This is
well shown by the campaign of Waterloo. Wellington and
Bliicher, at the outset, were not concentrated, and despite
the fact that they had 210,000 men against Napoleon's
130,000, they had certainly the worst of it in the opening
operations. Two days after their retreat from the line Quatre
Bras — Ligny they retrieved the situation at Waterloo, con-
centrating successfully on the field of battle ; but even on
June 18, with all their numerical superiority, there were times
when victory hung in the balance. It is thus quite clear that
departure from the established principles involves great dangers,
and it is therefore impossible to deny that those principles are
no dry-as-dust apophthegms, but living forces, permeating the
whole heart of strategy and exerting absolute control over the
issue of a campaign.

The array of principles, as set out above, is by no means
formidable, yet it contains all those that are absolutely essential
in the field ; and it might be imagined, therefore, that the
practice of strategy is exceedingly easy. The exact contrary,
however, is the case ; and this arises mainly from the fact

44 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

that the operations of war are carried out in such obscurity,
that it is always difficult for a general to see his way to the
application of the ruling principles. It is on this point that
soldiers have such deep distrust of civilian critics. The latter,
as a very general rule, judge after the event. Ignorant of the
practical difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of obtaining
accurate information, and oblivious of the fact that so long
as troops are mobile the military situation may be entirely
changed in the course of a few hours, they almost invariably
assume that the general, when he made his plans, must have
been acquainted with the exact condition of affairs within the
hostile lines.

The soldier, on the other hand, is aware that full knowledge
on any one point connected with the enemy is very seldom
forthcoming ; that the data of the problems to be solved are
never clear ; that the condition of affairs has always to be
more or less inferred ; and that almost every operation is so
involved in uncertainty, from beginning to end, that success
is invariably a matter of doubt. ' I have fought,1 said
Wellington* 'a sufficient number of battles to know that the
result is never certain, even with the best arrangements ' ; and
it is within the experience of all those who have had to do
with strategy in the field that the density of the * fog of war »
is almost appalling. For example, it would surely be imagined
that a commander would have no difficulty whatever in ascer-
taining the direction of his adversary's line of communications.
In practice, however, especially where small forces are con-
cerned, this is exceedingly difficult ; aud there is always the
embarrassing feeling that the enemy may have established a
secondary line of supply, to which he may transfer his forces
at any given moment. Again, a fortress or extended camp
has, in theory, what may be called a fixed value : that is, it
may be expected to hold out for a certain definite period.
In war, however, the possibilities of accident invariably appear,
and in reality often are, so numerous, that calculations which
are based on the strength of the garrison and the works lose
all their weight ; and thus, when a fortified town is beleaguered,
operations for its immediate relief become almost imperatively

STRATEGY 45

necessary. It is true that operations for this end may often
be strategically unsound, and that the general should consider
the probabilities of the case rather than the possibilities. But
human nature asserts itself in war as strongly as elsewhere.
It is as constant and as important a factor as the difficulty of
procuring information ; and it is the recognition of these
elemental facts which is the great point of difference between
practical and theoretical strategy.

War is assuredly no mechanical art. Broadly speaking, it
is a war between the brains and the grit of the two commanders,
in which each strives to outwit and outlast the other ; a con-
flict in which accident plays so prominent a part that mistakes,
in one form or another, are absolutely unavoidable. It is thus
pre-eminently the art of the man who dare take the risk ; of
the man who thinks deeply and thinks clearly ; of the man
who, when accident intervenes, is not thereby cast down, but
changes his plans and his dispositions with the readiness of a
resolute and reflective mind, which, so far as is possible, has
foreseen and provided against mischance. Particularly is this
the case with strategy. The tactical errors of a commander
have often been redeemed by the skill and courage of his troops,
but it is seldom indeed, against a vigilant enemy, that a
strategical blunder does not carry its own punishment. Defeat,
indeed, is far more often due to bad strategy than to bad
tactics. An army may even be almost uniformly victorious in
battle, and yet ultimately be compelled to yield. So the
Confederates in 1861-65, the Turks in 1877-78, the Boers in
1899-1902, despite their numerous successes, were beaten in
the end ; but in each case the same strategical faults were
conspicuous, the failure to concentrate in sufficient numbers to
reap the fruits of victory, the unnecessary dispersion of the
troops, and the deliberate disregard of the great end of strategy,
viz. the annihilation of the enemy's fighting men, and the
destruction of his material resources. To bring a stubborn
enemy to his knees the war, like that of Rome against Carthage,
' must be carried into Africa.'

Strategy, then, is an art which almost more than any other
is concerned with the fate of nations. Its study should be as

46 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

assiduous as its practice should be correct ; and we now come to
the questions : By whom should it be learned, and how should
it be taught ? It has been the fashion to assert that strategy
is the province of the few, tactics of the many ; that only those
who are destined for, or ambitious of, high command need trouble
about what is perhaps the most important branch of the art of
war, and that it is therefore to be taught to staff officers alone.
The fallacy of this most preposterous argument, if argument it
may be called, is glaring. What soldier can possibly say that
he will never be called upon to exercise an important command ?
Ambitious or not, he can no more foresee the responsibilities a
campaign may force upon him than he can make sure, at the
critical moment, of having a trained staff officer at his elbow to
suggest the right course of action. But there is more to be said
than this. If only the few are possessed of a knowledge of strategy,
what terribly one-sided creatures must be the remainder !

Imagine an officer being asked some question as to
Wellington or Napoleon and being compelled to confess that
he knew nothing whatever of their achievements, or of the
methods by which they had won so many victories ! Could a
man who thus admitted that he despised the experience and the
teaching of the greatest and most successful masters of his
profession by any conceivable stretch of courtesy be rightly
called a professional soldier ? If so, then a doctrine is applied to
the profession of arms that is repudiated by every other pro-
fession, by every trade, and by every sport, in the wide world.
What would be said of a man who, without the slightest know-
ledge of the habits of his quarry, the importance of the wind, of
background, of silence, and of invisibility, started off unaccom-
panied to shoot red deer in a Scotch forest ? He might be a
first-rate rifle shot, but even if he got within sight of the herd
it is in the last degree improbable that he would bring back a
head. He would be looked upon by the commonest gillie as
the most ignorant of novices, and most assuredly he would
never be called a sportsman. And yet it is openly asserted
that men who may one day become generals need no more
knowledge of strategy — the art of approaching the quarry —
than the cockney has of forest-craft ! Is it possible to hold any

STRATEGY 47

other opinion than that this extraordinary doctrine is either a
most impudent excuse for idleness, or an abject admission that
the more intellectual branch of the art military is utterly
beyond the capacity of the ordinary soldier ? Yet what can be
more humiliating to the great body of officers than the reflec-
tion that only a few of their number are considered capable of
wielding the weapons of the great captains ; and that these
few have to be bribed by high pay and good appointments to
undergo the necessary study !

Nor is there any truth in the idea that the practice of
strategy in the field can be confined to the higher ranks. Every
officer in charge of a detached force or flying column, every officer
who for the time being has to act independently, every officer
in charge of a patrol, is constantly brought face to face with
strategical considerations ; and success or failure, even where
the force is insignificant, will often depend upon his familiarity
with strategical principles. The tide of warfare ebbs and flows
on an ocean which is studded with strategical objectives.
Positions, bridges, road and railway junctions, towns and
villages, are always of the utmost importance to the accomplish-
ment of a plan of campaign. Their occupation leads up, as
it were by stepping-stones, to the attainment of the ultimate
objective — that is, to the destruction of the enemy's army ; and
a quick recognition of their bearing on the course of operations,
perhaps on the part of a very junior officer commanding a small
column or conducting a reconnaissance, may go far towards the
achievement of a decisive success. We accordingly arrive at
the conclusion that all officers of every grade should, if it is
deemed necessary that they should be professional soldiers — and
it is for this that they are paid — be thoroughly familiar with
strategical principles. Let us now consider how that familiarity
is to be acquired.

We have not far to go to find the whole case put before us
in a nutshell. ' Tlw only right way of learning the science of
war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains.''
Such is the opinion of Napoleon ; and he is a bold man who
dares set himself in opposition to the great Corsican, who, if not
the finest soldier that ever lived, was at least one of the most

48 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

sagacious of men. What could be more beneficial to the soldier
than that the atmosphere he breathes from the first hour he
determines on the profession of arms should be purely military ;
that the traditions of the army should be constantly before him,
the campaigns of great generals the groundwork of his daily
study, and famous marches or manoeuvres the commonplaces of
his ordinary knowledge ?

It has been objected that pure theory can never be a sub-
stitute for practice ; and that therefore what Napoleon intended
to convey was, that the study of military history was a useful
supplement to actual experience. It may be remarked, however,
that ' staff-rides,1 as exercises on the ground without troops
have come to be called, are just as effective a means of teaching
strategy as field days are of teaching tactics ; in fact, a better
means, for they bear a far closer resemblance to strategical work
on a campaign than do the mimic battles of the manoeuvre
ground. The strategist might perform every one of his functions
out of sight and hearing of the battle. The situations, then,
in which he would find himself in war, and the problems he
would have to solve, may be easily and almost exactly counter-
feited in time of peace. The problems of tactics, on the other
hand, in which shell and bullet are the predominant factors,
can never be more than dimly and lifelessly presented.

But we cannot admit that Napoleon meant anything but
what he said. In the first place, it can scarcely be denied that
an intimate acquaintance with the processes of war, even though
it should be purely theoretical, is as useful to the young officer
as a knowledge of common law to the newly-called barrister.
In the second place, military history offers a more comprehensive
view of those processes than even active service ; the platform
is loftier, and every phase of warfare, from the marches of great
armies to the forays of the guerilla, comes under observation,
In the third place, the art of war, as we have already seen, is
crystallised in a few great principles ; and it is the study of
military history alone that makes such principles so familiar
that to apply them, or at all events to respect them, becomes a
matter of instinct. It is not sufficient, any more than in the
study of any other business, merely to place before the tiro

STRATEGY 49

a general summary of the maxims by which he is to be guided.
He must convince himself of their scope and value by constant
reference to apt illustrations. His study of the campaigns of
his famous predecessors must be active and not passive ; he must
put himself in their place, not content with merely reading a
lively narrative, but working out every step of the operation
with map and compass ; investigating the reasons of each
movement; tracing cause and effect, ascertaining the relative
importance of the moral and the physical, and deducing for
himself the principles on which the generals acted. It is
probable that he will only discover what has been discovered
already. But the value of the discovery will not be in the
smallest degree diminished. Far from it ; for knowledge that
is gained by hard labour and independent effort is of higher
worth, and much more likely to be permanently absorbed, than
that which comes in by the ear.

Can the truth of this be questioned ? In every human
transaction the most fruitful cause of failure and of error is the
imperfect comprehension or the neglect of principle. He who
invariably sees the right course to be pursued is the man of
ability, endowed with that clearness of perception which may
sometimes be a natural gift, but is more often the product of
sound training ; he who follows that course, come what may,
is the man of high character, of resolution, and of genius. If
men fail to do what they ought to do, it is, more often than
not, because on their horizon the true principles of conduct do
not stand out above the mists of passion and minor issues as
beacon lights, for the one reason that the mind's eye has not
been trained to see them ; or, in other words, that they have
not, by study and reflection, realised the paramount importance
of these ' living oracles.'

We may take it that in soldiering there is more to be learned
from the history of great campaigns than from the manoeuvres
of the training-g'-ound. For instance, a man thoroughly
penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon's warfare would hardly
fail, in all circumstances, to make his enemy's communications
his first objective ; and if Wellington's tactical methods had
become a second nature to him, it would be strange indeed if he

s

50 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack. Moreover,
although genius and resolution are no artificial products, there
can be no doubt that a man who is aware that a commander
cannot hope for success without running risks, that he must be
prepared to act on very meagre information, and that he will
often have to decide quickly under most disturbing conditions,
is more likely to do well in war than the leader who has no idea
of the magnitude of the personal responsibility inseparable from
command against the enemy. Again, the study of military
history results in the accumulation of a mass of facts. Now
the knowledge of facts, however it may be acquired, constitutes
experience ; and the product of experience is habit, which, as
being all powerful in moments of excitement or danger, plays
an even more important part in warfare than in any other phase
of human affairs.

Lastly, a knowledge of military history not only supplies
a touchstone by which actual experience, whether of peace
manoeuvres or field service, may be tested, mistakes discovered,
and reflection justified, but gives life and vigour to all in-
struction, and in the long years of peace the chief work of every
officer, no matter how low or how high his rank, is the in-
struction of his subordinates. In every respect, then, it is
absolutely clear that a knowledge of military history is an
essential ingredient in the making of a really useful soldier;
and that any system of military training or education which
leaves strategy untouched, except by the few, is not only an
insult to the officers of the army, but a danger to the State.

CHAPTER ni

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY

(From the ' Encyclopcedia Britannica ' Supplement, 1902)

In what manner the cavalry of the twentieth century will differ
from the hussars and cuirassiers of the nineteenth is undoubtedly,
from a military point of view, one of the most interesting and
most momentous questions of the day. Of the three arms, cavalry
has undergone the least change since the introduction of gun-
powder. The load upon the horse has been gradually lightened,
but defensive armour has not yet been altogether discarded ;
and although the carbine and revolver have been added to the
equipment of the trooper, there are armies in which weight, of
both man and horse, is reckoned a more important attribute
than either marksmanship or activity. Shock-tactics, the charge,
and the hand-to-hand encounter are still the one ideal of cavalry
action ; and the power of manoeuvring in great masses, main-
taining an absolute uniformity of pace and formation, and
moving at the highest speed with accurately dressed ranks, is
the criterion of excellence.

To such an extent has this teaching been carried that the
efficiency of the individual, especially in those duties which are
carried out by single men or by small parties, cannot fairly be
said to have received due attention. When cavalry held the
pride of place upon the battlefield, as in feudal times and even
later, the mastery of both horse and weapons by the individual
officer and trooper was the predominant factor. In the English
Civil War, for instance, the horsemanship and skill at fence of
both Cavalier and Roundhead were remarkable ; and their en-
counters were far more hotly contested, and much more bloody,
than any which have since been seen. That the parliamentarians,
after the first year or so of the war, were generally successful, is
to be ascribed to Cromwell's introduction of a severer discipline

Ml

52 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

in the ranks of the Ironsides, no less than to his admirable
leading. His troopers were taught the value of co-operation ;
and the means of ensuring co-operation, i.e. uniformity of pace
and precision of movement when in mass, were constantly
practised upon the training grounds. Nor are we to suppose
that Cromwell was blind to a further advantage derived from
the capacity for manoeuvring at speed. He had seen too much
of cavalry fighting, at the time he first took over the command
and training of a considerable force, not to understand the great
moral effect of large bodies of horsemen, wheeling and forming
with mechanical smoothness, covering the ground at a speed
that almost made each attack a surprise, and charging in lines
whose unbroken front produced a most powerful impression of
solidity and resolution. He saw, as Rupert never saw, that
the power of swift movement in mass conferred upon the troops
possessing it the enormous advantage of tactical mobility ; and
the readiness with which his regiments and brigades were trans-
ferred from one quarter of the battlefield to the other, throwing
in their whole weight, time after time, at the point where their
presence was decisive, in contradistinction to the reckless and ill-
managed onsets of the Royalists, which ended, as a rule, in a
confusion which it took hours to abate, show that he had fully
realised the practical value of steady and continuous drill. It
is to be noted, however, that Cromwell built up his cavalry on
a foundation of high individual efficiency.

As time went on and armies became larger, and skill at
arms, as a national characteristic, rarer, drill, discipline, man-
oeuvres in mass, and a high degree of mobility came to out-
weigh all other considerations ; and when the necessity of arm-
ing the nations brought about short service, the training of the
individual, in any other branch of his business than that of riding
boot to boot and of rendering instant obedience to the word or
signal of his superior, fell more and more into abeyance. Shock-
tactics filled the entire bill, and the cavalry of Europe, admirably
trained to manoeuvre and to attack, whether by the squadron
of 150 sabres or the division of 3,000 or 4,000, was practically
unfitted for any other duty. The climax of incompetency may
be said to have been reached during that cycle of European war-

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 53

fare which began with the Crimea and ended with the Russo-
Turkish conflict of 1877-78. The old spirit of dash and daring
under fire was still conspicuous. Discipline and mobility were
never higher. The regiments manoeuvred with admirable
precision at the highest speed, and never had great masses of
horsemen been more easily controlled. And yet, in the whole
history of war, it may be doubted whether the record of the
cavalry was ever more meagre. It is true that in the course
of the campaign of 1870-71 the German cavalry learned some-
thing of scouting, and that, owing to the utter supineness of
the enemy, it obtained a large amount of valuable information.
But its failures in this respect, especially at the outset, were
very many ; and it is not too much to say that, so far as
peace training is concerned, it was little, if at all, superior to
the cavalry of any other European Power. Moreover, when
called upon to act dismounted, and to meet the enemy
with fire instead of with Varme blanche, it proved absolutely
useless. The carbine was a popgun ; the troopers knew nothing
whatever of fighting on foot ; their movements were impeded
by their equipment ; and a few francs-tireurs, armed with the
chassepot, were enough to paralyse a whole brigade. That the
cavalry so far screened the march of the armies in the rear that
the French could obtain no information of the various move-
ments is not to be gainsaid ; but the efforts of the French to
pierce the screen were feeble in the extreme, and there is no proof
whatever that against a more active adversary the same result
would have been achieved. In fact, to the student who follows
out the operations of the cavalry of 1870-71 step by step, and
who bears in mind its deficiencies in armament and training,
it will appear very doubtful whether a strong body of mounted
riflemen of the same type as the Boers, or, better still, of
Sheridan's or Stuart's cavalry in the last years of the War of
Secession, would not have held the German horsemen at bay
from the first moment they crossed the frontier.

Had the successes gained by shock-tactics been very numer-
ous, it might possibly be argued that the sacrifice of efficiency
in detached and dismounted duties, as well as the training of
the individual, was fully justified. But what are the facts ?

54 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

The successes gained by shock -tactics, where anything larger
than a regiment was engaged, are confined to the following : —

1. The victory of the British Heavy Brigade at Balaklava.

2. The charges of some twenty squadrons at Custozza,
manoeuvring by brigades, which checked and partially routed
three divisions of most indifferent infantry.

3. The charges of the Austrian cavalry at Koniggratz, which
drove back the Prussian horse and enabled Benedek's defeated
troops to get away in safety.

4. The charge of six squadrons at Mars-la-Tour, which went
through a French army corps, largely composed of recruits.

5. The defeat of 2,500 French horsemen, also at Mars-la-
Tour, by about the same number of Germans.

6. The charge of the 11th and 17th German Hussars, near
Vionville, against retreating infantry.

7. The charge of the German brigade at Loigny-Poupry,
when a small brigade charged down on the flank of a large body
of half- trained French infantry, and put them out of action for
about three-quarters of an hour.

Such is the record : one great tactical success gained at
Custozza ; a retreating army saved from annihilation at Konig-
gratz ; and five minor successes, which may or may not have
influenced the ultimate issue ; not one single instance of an
effective and sustained pursuit ; not one single instance, except
Custozza, and there the infantry was armed with muzzle-loaders,
of a charge decisive of the battle ; not one single instance of
infantry being scattered and cut down in panic flight ; not one
single instance of a force larger than a brigade intervening at
a critical moment. And how many failures ! How often were
the cavalry dashed vainly in reckless gallantry against the hail of
a thin line of rifles ! How often were great masses held back
inactive, without drawing a sabre or firing a shot, while the
battle was decided by the infantry and the guns ! How few the
enterprises against the enemy's communications ! How few men
killed or disabled, even when cavalry met cavalry in the melee !
Can it be said, in face of these facts, that the devotion to
shock-tactics, the constant practice in massed movements, the
discouragement of individualism, both in leaders and men, was

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 55

repaid by results ? Does it not rather appear that there was
some factor present on the modern battlefield which prevented
the cavalry, trained to a pitch hitherto unknown, from reaping
the same harvest as the horsemen of previous eras ? Was not
the attempt to apply the same principles to the battle of the
breech-loader and the rifled cannon as had been applied
successfully to the battles of the smooth-bore, a mistake from
beginning to end ; and should not the cavalry, confronted by
new and revolutionary conditions, have sought new means of
giving full effect to the mobility which makes it formidable ?

The answer comes from across the Atlantic. It was as
much the length of the War of Secession as native ingenuity
which enabled the Americans to work out so many military
problems to their logical conclusion. Their cavalry, in the
beginning, was formed, as far as possible, on the European
model. But before long it became a new type. It could
manoeuvre sufficiently well for all practical purposes. It was
exceedingly mobile. It could charge home with the sabre or
the revolver. In addition, it was so equipped that it could
fight on foot as readily as in the saddle, and it was so armed
and trained that when dismounted it was but little inferior to
the infantry. Environment undoubtedly had much to do with
its evolution. In the forests of the South there was seldom
space for the manoeuvres of a mass of horsemen, and obstacles
were so numerous that a few men, armed with rifles, were
generally able to beat back the charge of many squadrons.
Nevertheless, the ground was not so cramped and difficult that
shock-tactics were out of the question. Great cavalry combats,
in which both sides rode at each other, were far more frequent
than in any of the European campaigns referred to above ; and
the instances of cavalry charging infantry are so numerous as
completely to disprove the common belief that the American
horsemen were merely mounted infantry. The truth is that
the Americans struck the true balance between shock and dis-
mounted tactics. They were prepared for both, as the ground
and the situation demanded ; and, more than this, they used
fire and Varme blanche in the closest and most effective combina-
tion, against both cavalry and infantry. Due respect was paid

56 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

to individualism. The veteran trooper, when in the last years
of the war he attained the proficiency at which his great leaders
had always aimed, was a good shot, a skilful skirmisher, a good
horseman, and a useful swordsman. He could charge home
either mounted or dismounted. He had learned to scout, both
in the saddle and on foot. His individualism was carefully culti-
vated : and if, for the purpose of manoeuvring in large bodies,
he was less well drilled than his European contemporary, as a
fighting man, trained to all the exigencies of war, he was very
much his superior. So brilliant were the achievements of the
cavalry, Federal and Confederate, that in the minds of military
students they have tended, in a certain measure, to obscure the
work of the other arms. Space forbids an enumeration of even
its most considerable successes. But it may be said that there
is no finer instance of a pursuit than that of Lee's army by
Sheridan in 1865 ; none of a screen impenetrable, even by a
vigorous enemy, than that formed by Stuart in 1863-4 ; none
of a well-contested cavalry battle than that near Brandy Station,
June 9, 1 863 ; none of cavalry on the defensive than the resist-
ance of the Confederate horsemen before Spottsylvania on
May 8, 1864, or of the Federals near Hawes' Shop, six weeks
later ; none of effective intervention on the field of battle than
Sheridan's handling of his divisions, an incident most unaccount-
ably overlooked by European tacticians, when Early's army was
broken into fragments, principally by the vigour of the cavalry,
in the Valley of the Shenandoah.

Nor are these all. Continental •writers have persistently
decried the value of the so-called raids, in which whole divisions
of cavalry rode boldly round the hostile army, crossing his
communications, and spreading panic and embarrassment far
and wide ; and doubtless, in several instances, the results were
hardly worth the risks involved. But many of these enterprises
were much more than forays or reconnaissances. Large bodies
of cavalry, accompanied by horse artillery, and stripped of
everything which would impede their mobility, operated for
weeks, and even months, as detached forces, with specific
strategical missions, and the value of their work cannot be
overrated. * The secret of war,1 said Napoleon, ' lies in the

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 57

communications.' The profound wisdom of this remark has
never been more forcibly illustrated than in the great American
conflict. The lines of supply and of retreat were the first pre-
occupation of every leader of an army ; their importance is
continually impressed on even the casual student of the several
campaigns ; and they appear to have played a far more promi-
nent part than is usually the case. To a certain extent the
character of the theatre of war was accountable ; but the
strategical use of a well-organised, well-trained, and well-led
cavalry had even more to say to it. If the chief difficulty of
the American generals was the maintenance of their communica-
tions, it was because these communications were attacked with
a method and a persistence which had been hitherto unknown
in warfare. The operations of Forrest, of Grainger, of Wilson,
of Earl van Dorn, of Sheridan, and of Hampton are brilliant
examples of the great strategical value of a cavalry which is
perfectly independent of the foot soldier, and which at the same
time is in the highest degree mobile. Those who have never had
to deal with the communications of an army may be unable to
realise the effect that may be, and has been, produced by such a
force ; but no one with the least practical experience of the
responsibilities which devolve upon a commander-in-chief will
venture to abate one jot from the enormous strategical value
assigned to it by American soldiers. It may, however, be
unhesitatingly admitted that no cavalry of the nineteenth
century, except the American, could have achieved the same
results ; and, as these results were far greater than those
produced by any other cavalry since the advent of the breech-
loader, it may be just as unhesitatingly declared that the
horseman of the American war is the model of the efficient
cavalryman.

The evolution of the American trooper is due, in the main,
to new tactical conditions. In 1861 fire had already become
the predominant factor in battle. In range and accuracy the
rifle so far surpassed the musket that the infantry was more
formidable than ever ; and, even small forces, unless taken at a
disadvantage, had very little to fear from a much larger number
of cavalry armed with lance or sabre. In order, then, to avoid

58 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

being brought to a standstill at every turn by a few riflemen,
the cavalry leaders soon found it necessary that at least a
portion of their command should be equipped with firearms.
A trial was given to the carbine, but despite its handiness, it
was soon discarded in favour of the long rifle ; and it was not
long before the whole of the cavalry, with the exception of
those regiments which carried breech-loading carbines, were
armed, in addition to the sabre, or to the sabre and the revolver,
with the same weapon as the infantry. It may fairly be asked
whether a European cavalry, in case of war, would not be com-
pelled, and compelled with even greater force, to follow
precisely the same course as the Americans of 1861-65, sub-
stituting the rifle for the carbine, and modifying its tactics to
meet the conditions of modern battle.

Let us consider the duties which cavalry is called upon to
perform. In the first place, it is required to cover the front and
flanks of the army to which it is attached, securing it from
surprises, and enabling it to carry out movements of concentra-
tion or other strategical manoeuvres unobserved. In the second
place, it is required to burst through the screen which covers
the movements and manoeuvres of the opposing army, and to
obtain the information which is absolutely essential to the
commander-in-chief. Its action is thus twofold, protecting and
at the same time aggressive ; but its immediate enemy being
the same in both cases, the enemy's mounted troops, it is
evident that a bold offensive, which succeeds in sweeping away
the hostile squadrons, is the readiest means of accomplishing
the double duty. Attack, therefore, would seem to be imposed
upon the cavalry so long as the armies are manoeuvring ; and
the collision of large masses of horsemen, both seeking the
encounter, a necessary preliminary to the meeting of armies
on a decisive field. Now, when two bodies of cavalry meet in
conflict, shock-tactics and Panne blanche are unquestionably the
speediest, the traditional, and the most natural method of
deciding the issue. Thus shock-tactics, until one or other of
the opposing bodies has been reduced to impotency, have been
generally assumed to be the usual method by which cavalry
will seek to attain its object. This conclusion, however, will

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 59

not stand the test of examination. In the first place, the
action of the covering cavalry cannot be entirely aggressive.
While the main body is moving to seek the enemy, there will
be points, such as roads, bridges, fords, and the like, which, in
the interests of the duty of protection, as well as to give the
cavalry due freedom of manoeuvre, will be economically and
effectively held by riflemen. In the second place, fire, both
before and during an encounter, has always been a most
valuable auxiliary, as is proved by the existence of horse
artillery. Thus in this phase also the presence of a body of
riflemen, accompanied by machine-guns, will confer the greatest
freedom of manoeuvre on the force to which they belong, em-
barrassing the enemy, covering the line of retreat, and relieving
the cavalry commander of all anxiety for the safety of his
waggons and the security of his communications. In the third
place, it is exceedingly improbable that in one quarter or other
of the theatre of the cavalry operations the ground will not be of
such a character as to favour dismounted tactics. It is evident,
therefore, that cavalry, even when confronted only by mounted
troops, cannot rely on shock- tactics only to achieve its object,
and that the rifle is an absolutely indispensable auxiliary.

Arising out of these considerations two most important
questions present themselves :

1. Are shock-tactics any longer possible against a force
which is endowed with a high degree of fire-power ?

2. Should the fire-power which has been shown to be essen-
tial to the free and effective working of cavalry be supplied by
the cavalry itself, or by highly mobile infantry ?

A force endowed with a large degree of fire-power possesses
the most formidable attribute of infantry, and not even the
most vehement partisan of Varme blanche denies that against
infantry, unless surprised, shock-tactics have the very smallest
chance of success. But troops who dismount to make use of
their rifles have two great disadvantages to contend with. The
led horses are a source of weakness, physical and moral. They
form a most sensitive and most vulnerable point. It is not
always easy to place them in security ; and the fact that they
constitute the sole means of retreat renders them a source of

60 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

continual anxiety both to officer and man. The former is pre-
occupied with providing for the safe cover of a crowd of animals ;
the latter, fully realising his helplessness and discomfort if
deprived of his mount, is never quite happy when there is the
slightest chance that they may become separated. In conse-
quence there is always a tendency on the part of dismounted
men to think more of getting safely into the saddle than of
offering a protracted resistance ; they are thus less stubborn in
defence than infantry, and more inclined to give way when
there is a danger of their being outflanked. Now, there can be
no doubt, when led horses and a safe retreat are concerned, that
shock-tactics, which are the essence of rapidity and surprise, are
far more to be feared than the slower process of an attack on
foot. It is beyond question, therefore, that, in dealing with a
dismounted force, whatever may be the degree of fire-power with
which it is endowed, shock-tactics may play a most important
part. The opportunities of effective outflanking or of surprise
may possibly be few ; but the very fact that the enemy has both
the power and the will to seek out such opportunities and to
charge home, is bound to hamper the movements and to affect
the moral of any force of horsemen which depends on fire alone.
Such a force, even if it could hold on to its position, would be
unable, except under favourable conditions of ground, to make
any forward progress, for directly it mounted it would be at
the mercy of its antagonist, and it would thus be absolutely
prevented from bursting through the hostile cavalry, and from
acquiring the information which it is its main object to obtain.
In the Valley of the Shenandoah, in 1864, the Confederate
squadrons were armed only with rifles, while the Federals,
under Sheridan, were trained both to fire and to charge. The
result is significant. The Southerners, though admirable horse-
men, were worsted at every turn, and their commander had at
last to report that his mounted infantry were absolutely useless
against the Union cavalry. At the same time, in consequence
of the increased range, accuracy, and rapidity of both gun and
rifle, the opportunities for charging will undoubtedly be fewer
than before, and with every improvement of the firearm they
must necessarily become more rare. A force while looking for

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 61

an opportunity must keep at such a distance from its objective
that when the moment comes a surprise will not be easy to
effect ; and it would seem that small bodies, of the size of a
squadron or so, which can make use of even insignificant cover
to creep up where a heavier column would be at once detected,
are far more likely to bring about success than are larger ones.
What is required, therefore, for shock-tactics against cavalry
endowed with fire-power — and, as we have seen, all cavalry
comes under this designation — is great independence and skilled
leading on the part of individual squadrons and, on the part ot
the commander of the whole force, a judicious distribution and
handling of his troops, part making use of their rifles to hold
the enemy's attention, while the remainder, moving at the will
of their immediate leaders, seek for openings to ride home with
lance or sabre.

The second question that arises, viz. whether the necessary
fire-power should be supplied by the cavalry itself, or by a body
of mounted riflemen attached to the brigade or the division, is
intimately connected with psychological considerations, and it
is from the standpoint of the individual horseman that it must
be discussed. Let us see what peculiar qualities are required
from the trooper in the charge — that is, in the operation which
differentiates him from his comrades of the other arms. In the
first place, there is resolution ; in the second, a certain eager-
ness for battle ; and in the third, the quick decision which
seizes an opportunity the instant it offers.1 The sum of these
three qualities is dash, and it is above all things important that
dash, the most precious possession of the cavalry soldier, should
never be tampered with, either in training or in war. A cavalry
without the true cavalry spirit, lacking all spark of chivalry,
and jibbing at the prospect of self-sacrifice, would be of small
value in shock-tactics ; yet, if this spirit is not to disappear,
it must be sedulously fostered. The cavalry soldier must be
taught to consider himself as, first and foremost, the soldier of

1 It is true that the quality of quick decision is more necessary to the
leaders than to the men ; but it is much to be doubted whether any body of
cavalry could really be called efficient of which both leaders and men were not
of the same temper.

62 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the charge and of the melee. It is this that he must be led to
look upon as the consummation of his training, the justification
of his existence, as well as the finest, the most manful act ot
war. Now, if the cavalry soldier is called a mounted rifleman ;
if he is told that it is more useful to be a good shot than a
good swordsman : if he is continually dismounted in preference
to risking something by advancing ; if he is not sometimes
allowed to lose himself in the exhilaration of a charge, his dash
invariably deteriorates. So, while it is absolutely essential that
the trooper should be a good skirmisher and a good marksman,
it is undoubtedly good policy to relieve him, so far as possible,
of the necessity of fighting on foot.

Furthermore, from the psychological point of view, it is
exceedingly desirable that for certain duties a force should be
available which has a different training, different traditions,
and a different ideal of the supreme incident of battle than the
lancer or hussar. The mounted troops of an army, if they are
handled as effectively as in the War of Secession, will often be
called upon to capture and to hold localities and posts which
are of strategic or tactical importance ; and for the thorough
fulfilment of their mission it is essential that they should be
capable of carrying out, dismounted, an attack which culminates
in an assault, as well as of defending a hastily occupied posi-
tion against a hot counter-attack. Now, an attack on foot,
culminating in an assault with the bayonet, demands in the
troops who make it the same concentration of will and aspir-
ation, the same exclusive training, and the same confidence in
the weapon, which, as already shown, give shock-tactics their
best chance of success. Dismounted cavalry, disposed as skir-
mishers, can render great assistance during the progress of an
attack, holding the enemy to his ground, threatening him, and
feinting ; but the assault, that is the actual storming of the
position, will be most effectively carried out by a force which,
while for purposes of mobility it has been trained to ride, for
purposes of fighting has been trained as infantry. So, too, on
the defensive. The cavalry trooper, regarding himself and his
horse as inseparable, habituated to constant movement, and but
little concerned with the occupation of positions, is not likely

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 63

to offer so stout or so skilful a resistance as the soldier to whom
the horse is but a secondary consideration, a stubborn defence
the highest point of honour, and familiarity with the use of
cover one of the chief ends of all instruction.

The need, then, of attaching some sort of special force to
the cavalry brigades and divisions, from the psychological point
of view, is clearly demonstrated ; and it has now to be decided
whether this force should be a permanent organisation, forming
an integral part of the cavalry brigades and divisions, or
whether the work can be done by a body of infantry organised on
the spot, who have had sufficient practice in equitation to enable
them to sit in their saddles and to groom their horses. Broadly
speaking, and putting aside the question of expense, there can
be little question but that the first suggestion is the better. A
permanent force would be accustomed to work with the cavalry.
The men would be better horse-masters, a most important
consideration, both as regards mobility and the waste of horse-
flesh. They could be trusted to act as scouts and take their
share of reconnaissance work ; and furthermore, it would be
possible to give them sufficient instruction in the use of the
sabre to enable them to have recourse to shock-tactics when
these were the only means of defence, or in a pursuit or a
melee when it was useless to fire. The fear that such a force
might degenerate into indifferent cavalry cannot be accepted
as a valid reason against its formation. Much, naturally, must
depend upon the officers, more perhaps upon the system of
inspection ; but in a body of troops armed with the bayonet,
and encouraged to prove themselves equal, if not superior, to
the best infantry at purely infantry work, the cultivation of a
healthy and distinctive esprit de corps should not be an insur-
mountable difficulty.

The formation, however, of a permanent force of mounted
riflemen is a counsel of perfection ; and in default, a mobile
infantry, mounted on cobs, cycles, or even in light carts, is the
only alternative. Such infantry, if well trained and well
officered, is capable of excellent work in conjunction with
cavalry, and is a source of strength with which it would be
simply pedantic to dispense.

64 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

It has been shown in the preceding pages that when acting
against mounted troops the following are the fundamental
principles of cavalry tactics : —

(1) The combination, in the conflict, of shock and fire.

(2) The fire of the dismounted portion of the force, as well
as of the guns, to be utilised as a pivot of manoeuvre.1

(3) The line of retreat to be secured by dismounted rifle-
men.

(4) Independence of regimental and squadron leaders.

(5) An incessant watchfulness for opportunities of surprise.

(6) Skilful use of cover by regiments and squadrons, so
as to take advantage of these opportunities by an unexpected
charge.

(7) Protection of led horses is often only to be secured by
shock.

So far as the details of shock-action are concerned, such as
formation in one, two, or three lines, the movement and posi-
tion of the horse artillery batteries, it is quite useless to lay
down hard and fast rules. Four principles are to be observed :

(1) The enemy's line should always be outflanked.

(2) A reserve should always be retained in the hand ot the
commander.

(3) The guns should, if possible, accompany the cavalry
when it advances with the view of charging, and, by securing one
of the flanks, form a pivot of manoeuvre.

(4) If the enemy is surprised, or attacked while he is
manoeuvring, success will be best assured. Beyond this it is
unnecessary to go. Everything must depend on the readiness
of the commander to adapt himself to the needs of the situation,
to the quickness of his subordinates in apprehending and
executing his instructions, and to the drill, training, and con-
dition of both men and horses.

We now come to the employment of cavalry on the field of
battle in conjunction with the other arms, and we have to note
that with a certain school of tacticians the intervention of a
vast mass of horsemen at the moment the defender is forced to

1 A pivot of manoeuvre is a force, fortress, or natural obstacle, which secures
a flank.

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 65

evacuate his position is still, as ever, a pious expectation. The
direction of the charge is presumably to be round the flank of
the defeated array, and it appears to be anticipated that the
cavalry, if led with sufficient boldness, and thundering forward
in a close succession of steel-tipped lines, will have the supreme
satisfaction of riding down a mob of panic-stricken fugitives,
whose bandoliers are empty, or who are so paralysed by terror
as to be incapable of using their rifles.

To this picture two objections may be taken. First, it is
only exceedingly bad troops that have ever been reduced to such
a prostrate condition as, for the application of their theory, the
advocates of the cavalry torrent are compelled to postulate ;
and even bad troops possess, in the present firearm, a power of
resistance, derived as much from confidence in the magazine
as from magazine-fire, against which the flood will break in vain.
Even if some portion of the retreating troops be surprised, it is
unlikely in the extreme that the panic will spread far. The great
extent of the battlefield is against it ; the troops not imme-
diately attacked will have ample warning, and the artillery and
machine guns will have time to occupy positions. Moreover, it is
exceedingly improbable that any army whatsoever will not have
made adequate arrangements for an organised and deliberate
retreat. Again, it is quite a delusion to expect that when a
position is carried, the defending troops will dissolve into an
uncontrollable and terrified mob. Men are not cattle ; a few
cool and intelligent riflemen, especially if favoured by the
ground, can easily hold at bay a far larger number of mounted
troopers ; and it is not to be expected, even in an indifferent
army, that such men will be lacking. So, even where the
character of the country facilitates the deployment and the
approach of a large force of cavalry, and makes surprise a
possibility, the action of a mass of brigades or divisions will not
penetrate beyond the fringe of battle ; and it may be confidently
expected that against guns and infantry, even if defeated and
retreating, shock-tactics will be confined to regiments and
squadrons acting independently and content with small captures.
Whether such action will be worth while, whether it would not
be better policy to concentrate the whole of the cavalry, and to

66 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

occupy positions which will block, or at least flank, the lines of
retreat, must be determined by the commander in accordance
with the circumstances of the particular case.

The second objection is that if the cavalry is armed with a
rifle it will be simply a waste of fire-power to hold it in reserve
for an opportunity that may never offer. The regiments must
be dismounted and take part in the general attack, working, for
preference, on the extreme flanks, or assailing posts and localities
which cover the line of retreat. It is true that if it is to keep
up a sustained pursuit when the enemy retreats, the cavalry
must be nursed so long as he holds his position. But this
applies rather to the horses than to the men ; and while the latter
are fighting on foot, the former are getting quite as much rest
as if the regiments were kept back in reserve. It may be urged,
however, that in case of the failure of the attack, the cavalry, if
it has been kept back, will be available to cover the retreat.
The answer is simple. If the cavalry is employed in the attack,
reinforcing the efforts of the infantry by an appreciable accession
of fire-power, the possibilities of retreat will be much reduced ;
while the mobility of the arm, on the emergency arising, should
enable it to withdraw from the line of battle in time to protect
the guns against counter-attack, and to give the infantry the
opportunity of rallying, re-forming, and occupying a defensive
position.1

What cavalry will have to apprehend during a pitched
battle is that it will be constantly engaged with the cavalry of
the enemy. The mass of the horsemen on both sides will be
found far out on the flanks, striving to put mobility to the best
use, threatening whatever is in rear of the hostile front, and at
the same time protecting whatever is in rear of their own. But
it is not, therefore, to be anticipated that the charge and
counter-charge of all the available sabres on either side will be
a feature of the great combats of cavalry that are bound to
occur. It will very seldom be the case that the two sides will
be so equally matched as to be equally prepared to risk the
issue on the chances of a gigantic melee. One side must be the

1 This does not mean that a portion of the cavalry should not be attached
to the general reserve.

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 67

weaker, morally, numerically, or both, and it will certainly make
the best use of the fire-power at its disposal, while, at the same
time, it is in the highest degree unlikely that the stronger side
will care to dispense with so valuable an auxiliary. These
conflicts of cavalry will therefore take the form already indi-
cated, even in the case when one army has been decisively
defeated and its horsemen have the task of covering the retreat.
Fire is a far better means of keeping the foe at a distance and
of gaining time than shock ; and a letreat from position to
position, making full use of the rifle and the machine gun, may
be less glorious but much more effective than the supreme self-
sacrifice of a desperate onslaught on the masses of a victorious
enemy at the very moment of his triumph.

The principles of cavalry tactics in conjunction with the
other arms may now be summarised :

(1) Action on the flanks, protecting and aggressive simul-
taneously.

(2) Posts and localities covering the lines of retreat and
communication, the proper objective.

(3) Action against infantry confined to surprises effected
by bodies not larger than regiments or squadrons.

(4) The main object in pursuit to occupy positions blocking
or flanking the line of retreat.

(5) The main object in retreat to occupy a succession of
positions, and so hold the pursuers at a distance, and gain time.

The question of armament can hardly be excluded from a
dissertation on cavalry tactics. We have seen that a rifle is
indispensable. A sword, it is generally admitted, must be
carried by every mounted man as the best means of protection
against a sudden charge ; and the rifleman is useless without
his bayonet. Controversy is thus confined to the lance, and it
may be said at once that the lance is undoubtedly a far more
formidable weapon, even if it is not in reality more deadly,
than the sabre or the revolver. Although there are many
objections to it, such as its weight, its inconvenience in scouting
and detached duties, the time taken up in mastering it, its
uselessness in the melee or in the hands of a second or reinforcing
rank, and the fact that its killing power depends altogether on

r 2

68 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the momentum of the horse, its moral effect is so great that a
force carrying it is irresistible in the shock. So much is this
the case, that it may be doubted whether a cavalry armed only
with swords and revolvers, if opposed by one armed with lances,
would not absolutely decline to cross weapons in the saddle.
If, then, mounted troops are to meet lancers in the field, they
must either be able to oppose them with the same arm, or they
must be restricted to the tactics of mounted riflemen, and
condemned to comparative immobility. But no army, except
one whose only mission is the defence of a mountainous or forest
country, dare make the smallest sacrifice of mobility ; and there
is no escaping the conclusion that a really good cavalry must
be trained to use the lance as well as the sabre and the rifle.1

It may be said, in conclusion, that the trooper of the
twentieth century, if he is to fulfil the conditions of efficiency,
must not only be a picked man, but that his facilities for
training must be ample, his education protracted, and his
instructors and leaders men of exceptional capacity. But
when it is remembered that the cavalry is par excellence the
strategical arm, that it depends on the cavalry, and on the
cavalry alone, whether the commander of an army marches
blindfold through the ' fog of war,1 or whether it is the oppos-
ing general who is reduced to that disastrous plight, it will be
admitted that to spare trouble or expense in the training and
organisation of the mounted branch is as unpardonable a mis-
take as to adhere to obsolete traditions.

There are still other points that deserve attention. En-
trenchments play as great a part in modern campaigns as in
those of 1861-65 or of 1877-78, and entrenchments are all
in favour of the force that awaits attack. But, as suggested
above, antidotes exist, such as surprise, the sudden seizure of
tactical points which have been left unoccupied, outflanking
manoeuvres, and movements against the line of retreat. Now

1 As has been suggested, however, the nature of the country in which the
army is likely to be engaged has muoh to say to this question. There are
theatres of war, such as the greater part of America, Great Britain, Switzer-
land, Sweden, all mountainous countries, where the lance would be an
intolerable incumbrance.

THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY 69

the effect of each of these operations depends, broadly speaking,
on rapidity and secrecy ; and, for reasons already alluded to,
cavalry is the arm which best fulfils the required conditions.
The principle of combination, however, demands that cavalry
should always be supported in battle, directly or indirectly,
by the other arms ; or, to put it in another form, that the
artillery and infantry should be so mobile as to be always
within supporting distance when the cavalry comes into action.
So far as the guns are concerned, there is no great difficulty ;
with the slow-moving foot-soldiers it is quite another matter.
Much, however, may be done by constant training in combined
manoeuvres ; much by sound administration, and by due regard
for the physical condition of man and horse ; more still — and
here we touch the secret of all tactical, as well as strategical,
success — by a thoroughly efficient staff. It is impossible to lay
too much stress on this most powerful auxiliary.

Take any army of the nineteenth century, famous for the
excellence of its grand tactics ; Napoleon's army of 1805-06-07
Wellington's army of 1813-14 ; Lee's army of 1864-65
Grant's, Sherman's and Johnston's armies of the same period
Moltke's army of 1870 : the staff of each one of them had been
welded by years of experience and by the teaching of a great
soldier into a magnificent instrument of war. They were not
composed only of administrative officers, concerned with supply,
organisation, quartering, and discipline, but of tacticians and
strategists of no mean order. Combinations in war too often
'gang agley' from the neglect of some trifling precaution,
some vagueness or omission in orders ; and in the excitement
of battle, or of approaching battle, when arrangements have to
be made, possibly on the spur of the moment, for the co-
operation of large bodies, unless he has been so trained that
the measures necessary to ensure simultaneous and harmonious
action occur to him instinctively, it is an exceedingly easy
matter, even for an able and experienced soldier, to make the
most deplorable mistakes. The practice of the staff in peace
should not be less constant, to say the very least, than that of
the units whose co-operation, as the only road to victory, it is
the business of the staff to ensure.

CHAPTER IV

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED

(From the ' Encyclopedia Britannica ' Supplement, 1902)

Strategy is the art of bringing the enemy to battle. Com-
bined, or, to use the phraseology of the Napoleonic era, ' grand *
tactics are the methods employed for his destruction by a force
composed of all arms — that is, of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.
Each of these possesses a power peculiar to itself, yet is depen-
dent, for the full development of its power, to a greater or lesser
degree upon the aid and co-operation of the rest. Infantry and
artillery, unaccompanied by cavalry, if opposed by a force com-
plete in all arms, are practically helpless, always liable to
surprise, and whether attacking or defending, hampered by
ignorance of the enemy's movements and bewildered by uncer-
tainty. Cavalry trained to fight as infantry, and carrying a
magazine rifle, is the ideal arm. But without artillery the
most mobile cavalry cannot be expected, in ordinary circum-
stances, either to hold or to storm a position ; and, when fight-
ing dismounted, the necessity of protecting the horses so cramps
its freedom of movement that it is less effective than infantry.

It is essential, then, for decisive success that every force
which takes the field against an organised enemy should be com-
posed of the three arms. Their relative proportions in the
armies of the great Powers stand as follows : —

Five to six guns per 1,000 infantry soldiers ;

One cavalry trooper per six infantry soldiers.

These proportions have undergone a marked change during
the past hundred years. The number of guns has been very
largely increased, while that of the cavalry has been slightly
diminished. It is probable, however, that the proportion of
the latter will soon be restored to the old standard, and in
small armies will very greatly exceed it. The reason for these

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 71

disturbances is not far to seek. Before the introduction of the
breechloader and the rifled cannon, the three arms of the service
employed very different methods of combat. The infantry
depended principally on the bayonet ; the cavalry on the lance
or sabre ; the artillery on fire. Since the advent of the small-
bore rifle and the quick-firing gun there is practically but one
method, common to all arms. The bayonet and the sabre still
have their part to play ; but in almost every phase of the com-
bat both infantry and cavalry, as well as the artillery, must rely
on fire, and on fire alone, to compass the enemy's overthrow.
All movements and all manoeuvres have but one end in view,
the development of fire in greater volume and more effectively
directed than that of the opposing force ; and it is ' superiority
of fire,' to use the technical term, that decides the conflict.

For the attainment of this superiority no further rule can
be laid down than that the three arms must combine. In
war every situation differs. Moral, ground, numbers are never
identical, and it is these considerations that form the basis of
the problems with which a general has to deal. Of all errors in
the conduct of war, none is more pernicious than the attempt to
fight battles according to a sealed pattern. Even the forma-
tions in which troops approach the enemy or occupy a position
must vary with the circumstances. In like manner, it is impos-
sible to dictate a normal procedure for the combination of the
three arms. Certain principles demand respect, for to infringe
them generally spells disaster. But even this rule is not abso-
lute. Great victories have been won not merely in spite of
great principles being disregarded, but because they have been
disregarded ; and those are the greatest generals who have
known when and where to discard the accepted maxims of war.
Yet it would be very far from the truth to say that they did
so because the principles embodied in those maxims had no
weight with them. On the contrary, Napoleon, for instance,
unfolded much of his practice of the art of war in a series of
maxims, and the volume containing this series was Stonewall
Jackson's constant companion in the field. We are not, how-
ever, to conclude that these great soldiers invariably shaped
their conduct in accordance with the precepts they so diligently

72 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

studied. They looked on them as warnings of the dangers that
generally follow certain courses of action, rather than as finger-
posts showing the path to be pursued. When they formed their
plans for defeating the enemy they undoubtedly weighed these
warnings, instinctively, perhaps, rather than deliberately ; but
whether they obeyed them or rejected them was a question ot
judgment. They were in no way bound by them. Far from it.
They would have no fetters cramping their intelligence and
common-sense, for it was on their intelligence and common-sense,
and on no normal procedure and hard-and-fast rules, that they
relied to solve the problems of war. And herein is the key to
successful combinations on the battlefield ; the habit of using
the wits, of subordinating the rules of theory to the needs of the
moment, and if necessary discarding them in toto ; the habit of
improvising stratagems, of inventing on the spot new methods
of attack and defence. Habit is all-powerful in war, especially
under the excitement generated by the near presence of the
enemy ; and it is undeniably the case that when conflict is
imminent the average officer will act exactly as he has been
accustomed to on the manoeuvre-grounds of peace. If he has
been accustomed to stereotyped proceedings ; to a perfunctory
reconnaissance of the enemy and of the ground ; to beginning
the fight with the whole of his guns massed in a central posi-
tion ; to handling his infantry in one invariable formation ; to
using his cavalry without regard for their horses, he will pro-
bably do the same in action. The danger is great. A slavish
adherence to set form and inelastic regulations had much to do
with the destruction of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt, of
the Austrians in 1866, and of the French in 1870 ; and if ill-
organised and half-trained levies have sometimes triumphed
over highly-educated and well-disciplined soldiers, it is because
the latter have come to look on war as a mechanical rather than
an intellectual art, and have lacked all power of originality and
resource in dealing with tactical difficulties.

As we have already implied, the first principle of grand
tactics is co-operation, i.e. the full development of the force
inherent in each arm at the right place and the right time;
and before discussing the methods of producing this develop-

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 73

ment it will be well to describe the conditions which affect it.
The flat trajectory of the magazine rifle, smokeless powder,
and the quick-firing field gun, have wrought a greater change
in tactics than did the substitution of the breechloader for
the musket and of the rifled cannon for the smooth-bore.
With the older rifle, deadly as it was, the ground in front ol
a position was not thoroughly covered by bullets for more than
500 yards at most. Beyond that range, owing to the elevation
of the trajectory, a great many bullets flew high over the
heads of men even in an upright position. Nowadays, the
ground for 900 yards in front of a strong line of infantry,
provided that the rifles are held a few inches above the level,
is so closely swept by the sheet of lead as to be practically
impassable by men standing upright or even crouching. The
long deadly zone of this horizontal fire, which every im-
provement in the firearm tends to increase, is the most potent
factor in modern battle. Of little less importance is smokeless
powder. The absolute invisibility of a skilful enemy renders
reconnaissance tenfold more difficult than heretofore. Smoke
betrayed not only the position but the strength of the troops
who held it ; the new powder tells nothing. Moreover, the
rattle of rapid fire is most deceptive, for a few riflemen, or
a few guns, firing at their utmost speed, give the idea of far
larger numbers than are actually present. Again, at the
crisis of the conflict the quick-firing field-piece is far more
effective than the gun it superseded. ' On troops whose power
of resistance is already strained to the utmost, on masses of
men and horses, on crowds breaking to the rear, on a line
suddenly assailed in flank, the constant hail of shells, even if
less devastating than might be imagined, is terribly demoralising.
Nor is greater range and greater accuracy without influence on
moral. Enfilade fire, the most telling of all, is more easily
brought to bear, and more deadly ; while the knowledge that,
if once they are outflanked, they can no longer reckon, owing
to the range of the enemy's projectiles, on a secure line of
retreat, tends to shake the nerves of the most stubborn fighters.
Such are the conditions of modern battle, and it is often
urged that they are distinctly in favour of defensive tactics ;

74 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

in other words, that the force which awaits attack can develop
the full force of each arm with more facility than that which
delivers it. The contention may be true ; but it is not always
realised that anything which gives new strength to the defence
at the same time adds something to the advantage of the
army which attacks. The net outcome of the improvements
in rifles, guns, and powder is that far fewer men are required
to hold a position than of old. A direct (or frontal) attack
against good troops well posted, always a desperate undertaking,
has now become suicidal. To a certain extent this favours
the defence. A much larger number than formerly can be
employed by the defenders in attack. This is to the good.
But the assailant profits in an almost equal ratio. His strength
has always lain in his power of manoeuvring, of hiding his
movements, and of massing suddenly against some weak point.
To-day his power of manoeuvring is greater than before. The
increased strength of the defence renders it comparatively
easy for him to form with a part of his force an impenetrable
barrier behind which the remainder can move unobserved. He
needs far fewer men and guns to cover his communications ;
and a general counter-attack, delivered like those of Wellington,
of the French in 1870, of Osman at Plevna, direct to the
front, is very little to be dreaded. Moreover, the object of
the assailant's manoeuvres will be to place portions of his force
on the flank, or flanks, of the position he is attacking. If he
can accomplish this, the effect, moral and physical, of the
enfilade fire he brings to bear upon the enemy's front will be
far greater than that which attended a similar operation when
fire was of less account. In short, the process of envelopment
is easier than it used to be ; and envelopment, which means
that the enemy is under fire from several directions, is much
more effective than in the past.

It does not appear, then, that the new conditions are
altogether in favour of the defender. To win a decisive
victory and annihilate the enemy he must, at some time or
another, leave his position and attack. But the time, if not
the place, must depend on his adversary's movements, and
will only be disclosed during the progress of the battle. What

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 75

time will be given the defender for the long preliminaries which
attack against even a shaken force demands, for the preparation
by artillery, for the massing of the infantry, for their deploy-
ment in line of battle, for the issue of adequate orders ?
Tacticians have long been puzzled over the rarity and in-
effectiveness of the counter-stroke in modern campaigns. The
reason lies in the increased power of the local defensive, even
with the needle-gun and the slow-firing cannon. With the
newer weapons this power is trebled. The counter-stroke,
therefore, is more difficult than ever ; and this difficulty, com-
bined with the greatly enhanced effect of enveloping fire, gives
a marked advantage to the assailant. Resistance is more
protracted than heretofore, but defence, as a method of giving
battle, is no stronger.

The question will probably suggest itself, why should
envelopment be the monopoly of the advancing army ? The
reply is easy. Save in exceptional circumstances, the force
that surrenders the initiative and stands still in position will
be too weak for far-reaching manoeuvres. Envelopment requires
a numerical superiority or a vastly higher moral ; and an army
possessing these advantages must needs seek out its adversary
and attack him, for the very simple reason that not otherwise
can he be brought to battle. Yet it is not to be understood
that the numerically inferior army is debarred from attacking ;
but it may be taken for granted that it will not do so until
it sees the opportunity — the fruit, as a rule, of more skilful
strategy — of falling on an isolated portion of the enemy's
forces.

It would seem, however, that under the new conditions an
army can split up into detachments with greater impunity than
heretofore. Some of the most remarkable victories in history —
Vittoria, Bautzen, Waterloo, the first and second Manassas^
Chancellorsville, Koniggratz — have been won by two distinct
forces, operating from different bases, or approaching the field
of battle from different directions, and crushing the enemy
between them. This 'sweep of the dragon's wings' is by
no means an easy operation to put into successful practice.
Moltke, indeed, has laid it down that the junction of two

76 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

previously separated forces on the field of battle is the highest
triumph of generalship ; and Napoleon, although on more than
one occasion he availed himself of the expedient, was never
weary of pointing out the risk. It cannot, therefore, be ques-
tioned that separation has hitherto involved great dangers.
Unless the separated forces acted in perfect unison, unless their
leaders displayed the utmost activity and resolution, it was
always to be apprehended that the one might be attacked and
defeated before the other could intervene. At Waterloo, for
instance, some of the Prussian generals, when they reached the
neighbourhood of the field and saw, as they believed, the
British retreating, were for turning back immediately. Again,
the timidity of Ney, on finding himself separated from the main
army, made Bautzen a barren victory ; and if there is one thing
more conclusively proved by military history than another, it is
that without determined, energetic, and skilful leaders, without
superiority of moral, or great superiority of numbers, move-
ments entailing separation were, under past conditions, very
likely to end in disaster. To a certain extent this still holds
good, for human nature, in war, recoils from nothing so much
as from isolation. Nevertheless, the use of the field tele-
graph has done much to modify the risks that were formerly
attendant on such manoeuvres, and the increased strength of
the local defensive has brought them within the scope of
everyday tactics. It may be assumed, therefore, that the
directors of future campaigns will have always in view the
advantages to be derived from hurling a fresh force — whose
approach, if possible, has been concealed until it opens fire —
against the enemy's flank and rear ; and the sudden onset of
Blucher at Waterloo, of Lee at the second Manassas, of
Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, of the Crown Prince
of Prussia at Koniggratz, will be the ideal of the decisive act
of battle.

It is to be observed, however, that successful converging
movements have been carried out more frequently by a force
acting on the offensive than on the defensive. In the first
place, as has been said above, an army which adopts the
offensive has usually the superior numbers or the superior

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 77

moral, and it consequently incurs less risk of separation. In
the second place, it is usually superior in cavalry, and is thus
able to prevent all knowledge of the separation from reaching
the enemy, as well as to conceal the march of the outflanking
column. We may conclude, therefore, that it is only when the
defender has the more powerful cavalry, and is at least equal to
his adversary in numbers and in moral, that he will dare to
deliver a converging counter-stroke.

The army, then, which assumes the strategical offensive has,
as a general rule, the best chance of employing this most effective
manoeuvre ; but much depends on the quality and handling of
the cavalry. If the cavalry is so armed and trained that it is
capable of holding off the enemy's scouts and patrols, a tactical
surprise may be effected, and surprise is far more than half the
battle, not only in offensive operations from different bases, but
in every species of attack. An ordinary enveloping movement
for which a portion of the main army is detached after it reaches
the vicinity of the battlefield, is much more likely to be effective
if the troops making it are protected from observation up to the
last moment. Cavalry, then, sharing the enormous defensive
power conferred by a low trajectory and rapidity of fire, play a
role in grand tactics of which the importance can hardly be
over-estimated. They make it possible for a general to adopt
the most brilliant of all manoeuvres, the converging attack, and
to make that attack, as indeed all other attacks, more or less of
a surprise.

But to protect the troops in rear from observation is not
the only duty of cavalry. Reconnaissance of the enemy's posi-
tion is the foremost of its functions, and the occupation of
points of tactical vantage, such as hills, woods, villages, &c,
behind which the main army can deploy in security, or the out-
flanking columns march unobserved, is not far behind. The
pursuit, too, falls upon the mounted arm, the destruction of the
enemy's trains, the capture of his guns, the spreading of
demoralisation far and wide. But most important, perhaps, of
all its functions are the manoeuvres which so threaten the
enemy's line of retreat that he is compelled to evacuate his
position, and those which cut oft his last avenue ot escape. A

78 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

cavalry skilfully handled, as at Appomattox or Paardeberg, may
bring about the crowning triumph of grand tactics, viz. the
hemming in of a force so closely that it has either to attack at
a disadvantage or to surrender.

The cavalry attached to an army on the defensive acts on
much the same lines, furnishing a large proportion of the out-
post or advanced troops, and making use of its mobility to
prolong the line of battle when a flank is threatened, and of its
power of defence to hold back any force which may attempt to
work round in the rear. In a word, the cavalry of the defence
endeavours to obstruct that process of envelopment which the
cavalry of the attack endeavours to complete.

It has long been understood that to attain the superiority of
fire over a vigilant enemy in a strong position, a heavy artillery
bombardment is as absolutely essential a preliminary as a
thorough reconnaissance. It has not, however, been always
realised that unless the infantry co-operate, the artillery is not
likely to produce the slightest result. If the infantry is kept
behind the guns, or at such a distance from the position that it
cannot pass quickly to the assault, the enemy during the
cannonade will keep his troops under cover, perhaps leaving his
trenches unoccupied, and thus present no target to the guns.
It is an important principle, therefore, of combined tactics that
the infantry should co-operate with the artillery in the pre-
liminary bombardment, for by this means only will the enemy
be compelled to man his defences, to show himself above his
parapets, and thus expose himself to the demoralising effect of
shrapnel.

Again, however thorough the artillery preparation may
have been, it is not likely to have caused such losses that the
defender's fire will be altogether innocuous when the attacking
infantry advances. In fact, the assailant will probably suffer
very heavily, for infantry advancing to the attack — that is,
before it has established a strong firing line at decisive range
(within 800 yards) from the enemy's position — can do nothing
towards attaining the superiority of fire. Over 800 yards,
if the enemy is well covered, its fire will be practically harmless,
for the very good reason that the men will see no target at

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 79

which to aim. But if the artillery co-operate by pouring a
heavy and concentrated fire on the defender's lines, and, if
necessary, by pushing forward batteries or guns to the most
effective range, it will so disturb the aim of his riflemen as
to secure the attacking troops from heavy loss. We deduce,
therefore, another principle ; superiority of fire can only be
gained by the close co-operation of the artillery and infantry
at every stage of the attack.

Nor is it the guns alone that should cover the infantry
advance. Where the ground permits, a portion of the infantry
should be detailed for this purpose before the remainder move
forward. At 2,000 yards telescopes and strong glasses can be
used to locate the exact position of the enemy's trenches ; the
range, by means of mechanical appliances, can be accurately
measured ; and the fire of the companies can be controlled with
the same ease as that of the machine guns. Such fire is little
less effective than that of field or horse artillery. It may be
less demoralising ; but, if the exact range can be ascertained, it
will be more accurate, for infantry has not to contend with the
technical difficulties, fuzes, the errors of the day, &c., of the
sister arm. Especially will it be effective when it enfilades, or
strikes at an oblique angle, the front of the defence. We are
justified, therefore, in laying down the secondary principle that
long-range rifle fire is an important auxiliary to the artillery in
covering the advance of attacking infantry.

It cannot escape notice that the application of these prin-
ciples is intimately connected with the use of ground. If there
are favourable positions for the artillery or localities adapted to
the development of long-range rifle fire ; if the enemy's line is
so exposed and well marked that the guns can fire over the
heads of the attacking infantry until the very moment of
assault ; or if it is open to enfilade, the co-operation of infantry
and artillery should be comparatively easy. But it is no simple
matter, without constant practice, to recognise at a glance the
capabilities of the ground, and the manner in which the various
physical features, hills, knolls, ridges, woods, should be em-
ployed in order to attain the superiority of fire.

80 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

If we look back on history, we cannot but be struck by the
exceedingly important part that the appreciation or neglect of
the capacities of ground has played in every campaign. The
most brilliant victories have been won by manoeuvres which, if
not suggested by the physical features of the battlefield, were
at least deprived, by the nature of the ground, of half their
risk. Rosbach, Leuthen, Austerlitz, Friedland, Dresden,
Vittoria, Orthez, Chancellorsville, the Green Hills at Plevna,
are examples. Nor can we fail to notice that the object of
the great masters of tactics in carefully reconnoitring the
enemy was to discover the key point or points of his position,
and to judge for themselves how each separate locality, wood,
village, farm, or hill, might be turned to account and fitted into
the plan of battle. In short, we see in many most successful
battles an almost methodical progression from point to point,
each successive capture weakening the enemy's position, and
paving the way for a further and more decisive advance ; and
the method pursued seems to have been in every case the same.
' By threatening the village on the left, and seizing the wood
in rear of it, I shall attract the enemy's attention, and perhaps
his reserves. As soon as I have succeeded in doing this, I
shall attack the hill on his right, and having captured this,
bring every available gun to bear upon the central ridge, and
attack, under cover of their fire, in full strength."' This, or
something very like it, appears to have been the ordinary
mental process of such leaders as Frederick, Wellington,
Napoleon, and Lee, and in many respects it is still eminently
adapted to the field of battle. The difficulty of reconnaissance,
the increased power of the defence against direct attack, the
difficulty, owing to the wide front occupied by a defending
force, of developing flank attacks, the general use of entrench-
ments, will make the fight for each locality long and exhausting ,
and it will consequently be necessary for a general to proceed
with the utmost caution, and to make certain of securing one
point of vantage before he attacks the next. The attack,
moreover, of each point will consume far more troops, in pro-
portion to the strength of the army, than heretofore. The
whole army, indeed, may be employed in mastering one single

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 81

point, part keeping the enemy employed elsewhere, the remainder
combining for the decisive attack. The battle, more often
than not, will thus resolve itself into a distinct series of engage-
ments, each ranging round a different locality and each pro-
tracted over many hours.

A systematic attack, wresting point after point, in the order
of their importance, from the enemy's possession, is not, however,
the only expedient by which the defensive may be overcome.
Surprise may be called into play. Manoeuvring, which has
been described as the ' antidote to entrenchments,' is likely to
be a conspicuous feature in all skilful tactical operations.
Feints will seldom be neglected ; and night marches, preparatory
to an attack at dawn from an unexpected direction, will be con-
stantly resorted to. With the exception of the first, each of
these is made easier by the increased power of the local defen-
sive, and by the enhanced difficulty of reconnaissance. A
screen, behind which troops moving to a flank or making a night
march will be secure from observation or interference, can be
established in any ordinary country without much difficulty and
maintained by comparatively small numbers ; while no better
means of deceiving the enemy, or of making feints effective,
could have been invented than the magazine rifle, the quick-
firing gun and smokeless powder.

But while the latest productions of mechanical invention
have done much to help the general offensive, they have by no
means made combination easier, and the success of the attack, as
a rule, has always depended on the combination between the
units, be they battalions, brigades, or divisions, of which an
army is composed. To secure such combination has therefore
been the constant aim of all tacticians. The ideal of many has
been a simultaneous attack against the front and flank, or front
and flanks, made on a uniform system, with all the troops dis-
posed in a uniform manner. They apparently assumed that
everything must give way before the rush of superior numbers ;
that localities would be submerged beneath the flood ; that
accidents of ground, even if utilised by the enemy, would never
produce a serious check ; in fact, that the effect of physical
features might be ignored, and each separate attack from left,

82 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

right, and centre might be expected to reach close quarters at
approximately the same time. On the other hand, there are
those who have taken into account both the ground and the
flat trajectory, and who have taught that the normal, simulta-
neous system, described above, is far less practical than a system
which gives to each unit its specific task, which allots that task
in accordance with the ground, and which arranges for combina-
tion by instructions which differ for every unit. In this
system there is no uniformity, and it is therefore less simple
than the other ; but it is founded on sound principles. It
does not, indeed, ensure combination ; but inasmuch as it takes
each physical difficulty into consideration, and recognises that
a battle is a succession of efforts, not one continuous rush, it is
likely to come much nearer than the other. It is not a popular
system. It is more complicated than the almost mechanical
manoeuvres of the first ; it is less easy to practise in peace ;
owing to the lack of uniformity, it is much less picturesque ;
and it makes a large demand on the intelligence of all ranks.

An officer commanding several units, if he wishes to make such
use of the ground that each unit may support the others, and if
he determines to allot to each its specific task, must not only
make a careful reconnaissance and think out a definite plan of ac-
tion, but he must issue such clear and comprehensive orders that
every subordinate commander will thoroughly understand the
general design, the part he has himself to play, and the manner
in which he is to co-operate with others. By this means only
can he ensure intelligent combination and resolute action ; but
it is hardly necessary to say that to frame adequate orders to
this end requires a sustained intellectual effort, plenty of
previous practice, a cool brain, a mind which knows exactly
what it intends to do and how it is to be done. Moreover,
unless the commanders of units and those under them are well
trained, even the clearest and most comprehensive orders will
probably fail to produce the desired results.

There is one more point connected with the attack which
demands notice. It should always be the aim of a general, even
when in command of a superior force, to destroy his enemy with
as little loss as possible to himself. Napoleon prided himself

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 83

on winning his great triumph at Ulm with * the legs of his
soldiers,' and Moltke's stupendous victory at Sedan, where
140,000 Frenchmen laid down their arms, with an additional
loss in killed and wounded of 18,000, cost the Germans no
more than 2,800 lives. At first sight, then, it would appear
that an attack on a strong position, especially if entrenched and
prepared, should be consistently avoided, and the enemy
manoeuvred out of it. And no doubt this is an excellent rule.
Nevertheless, strategical reasons often forbid delay ; and there-
fore, when time presses, it may happen that the attack has to
be delivered then and there, and the consequent sacrifice of life
deliberately accepted. But it is worth noting that the necessity
of taking time by the forelock is apt to produce undue haste,
disregard of ordinary precautions, and the neglect of essential
preliminaries, such as reconnaissance, the conception of a
comprehensive plan of battle, and the issue of clear orders.
Furthermore, a reluctance to incur losses often leads to a small
portion only of the force being employed in attack, while the
remainder are either kept in reserve or so timidly handled as
to lend no assistance whatever to the assaulting troops. Such
half-hearted tactics bring with them their own punishment.
Even if the battle be won, the losses of the troops actually under
fire are generally heavier than would have fallen ou the whole
army had it been resolutely engaged ; while it is exceedingly
unlikely that the victory will be decisive. To take a strong
position without suffering enormous losses demands the very
closest co-operation of every element of force which the com-
mander has at his disposal. What should be the object of such
co-operation is a question of much interest. Under the old
conditions the general idea of offensive tactics was by feints and
secondary attacks to draw off the defender's attention, and, if
possible, his reserves, from the weakest point of the position,
and then to attack that point with an overwhelming mass of
men and guns. It would be too much to say that this principle
is no longer applicable, for it will always be necessary that the
full weight of the artillery, when once the battle has become
general, should be directed against some particular portion of
the defender's line ; but envelopment, and the capture of good

o 2

84 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

1 fire positions,' especially of localities which favour enfilade or
oblique fire, are a far surer and much less costly means, against
good troops, of attaining that superiority of fire which decides
the victory.

The grand tactics of the defence, of which the soul is the
counter-stroke, are in many respects similar to those of the
attack. The assailant at the outset occupies certain localities,
and so long as he holds out he covers his communications, and
the greater part of the force is available for active operations.
The defender acts in much the same fashion. He occupies a
position which protects his communications, and, if possible,
threatens the communications of his adversary, and, using this
position as a pivot of manoeuvre, he keeps a large force in
hand for the counter-stroke.

It is in the employment of the force in hand that the
great difference arises between an active and a passive attitude.
The defender can seldom decide, when he takes up his position,
at what moment and at what place he will let this force slip ;
his adversary, on the other hand, can determine the exact role
of every unit before a shot is fired. It is most important,
therefore, that the force detailed for the counter-stroke should
be kept absolutely distinct from the garrison of the pivot
of manoeuvre, that it should be in every respect mobile, and
be used for no other purpose than delivering a vigorous
attack at the place and at the time a good opportunity
offers. Whether it should be tied down to one particular
spot is a debatable question. Some part of the battlefield
may be more favourable to counter-attack than another,
and it is of course desirable, when the blow is struck, to
aim at the enemy's line of communication and his strategic
flank. But the opening for the counter-stroke is more often
offered by the enemy's mistakes than by the ground, and it is
impossible to predict where mistakes are likely to be made.
We might say, then, that the force set aside for the counter-
stroke, unless it came from a distance like Bliicher's army at
Waterloo, should be posted where it can rapidly intervene on
any part of the battlefield. Yet in conflicts fought over a very
wide front this would manifestly be impossible ; and, as a matter

TACTICS OF THE THREE ARMS COMBINED 85

of fact, the whole question is so dependent on local circum-
stances that no rule can be laid down. It is clear, however,
that the value of mounted troops in this respect is very great.

It has been suggested that the attack will draw more
advantage from feigned attacks than heretofore ; but it is not
the attack alone that will derive benefit from the power or
deception that lies in quick-firing weapons. By detaching
small mobile forces to tactical points beyond the flanks, and by
pushing them forward in advance of the main line of defence,
the difficulties of reconnaissance on the part of the assailant
will be largely increased ; and it will be always on the cards
that uncertainty and the loss of time may betray him into
undue extension, dissipation of strength, and purely frontal
attacks on the strongest points of the position. In ordinary
country, where troops can manoeuvre with facility, a few quick-
firing guns, constantly changing their position, will add enor-
mously to the effect of these ' false fronts ' and * false flanks,'
and it may here be stated that the mobility of field and horse
artillery confers a great advantage on the defender. In
ordinary circumstances, that is, when he is outnumbered in
guns, it is questionable whether he is likely to gain anything
by accepting a duel with the opposing batteries. His heavy
artillery should be sufficient to protect the front and flanks of
the central fortress — his pivot of manoeuvre — leaving the re-
mainder available to prevent the assailant from securing strong
tactical points and to prepare the counter-stroke. Especially
will it be important for the artillery to keep down enfilade and
oblique fire, and cover should always be provided whence guns
can sweep with shrapnel the hills or ridges which lie beyond
the flanks.

The artillery of the defence, in fact, should be handled on
the same principles as the light artillery which forms part
of the armament of a fortress, and it should only be con-
centrated when it is clear that the enemy is about to deliver
a resolute attack against some one point of the position,
or just previous to the counter-stroke. In both cases as many
guns as possible should co-operate. The assailant will en-
deavour to cover the advance of his infantry by overwhelming

8G THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the entrenchments with the fire of a mass of guns, and this
the defender's artillery must do its best to render inaccurate
and harmless, leaving the enemy's infantry alone until it is
clear that the advance is progressing, and that the attack is
gaining the upper hand. For the counter-stroke, concentration
is even more important. As a rule, the time for preparation will
be short, and yet preparation is as essential as in the attack ; the
more guns, therefore, that can be brought into action, the less
likelihood of failure. It is true that the counter-stroke, as a
rule, will only have to deal with troops shaken by long fighting
or by repulse ; but behind them will be the batteries un-
demoralised, probably superior in numbers, and maintaining an
iron grip on the ground already won. The combination, then,
of infantry, cavalry, and artillery should be as carefully planned
in the counter-stroke as in the attack. Superiority of fire must
be attained by a skilful use of the ground, by enveloping and
enfilading the point of attack.

CHAPTER V

NOTES ON WELLINGTON

(A Lecture to the Military Society of Ireland, March 31st, 1897)

The ordinary attitude of Englishmen towards the men who
are engaged in making history, in pushing forward the expansion
of the Empire, and in leading the nation forward on the path
of progress, is not generally an attitude of wholesale apprecia-
tion. Our great men as a rule have to wait for their reward
until their work is done ; until the flood of party and social
opposition has subsided ; until facts assume their true signi-
ficance, and great results, disencumbered of all the circumstances
which tended to obscure them, stand out in bold relief. Then,
although late in coming, the recognition of Englishmen is no
longer half-hearted nor is it insincere ; if tardy, it is thorough.
The history of Wellington is no exception. While his
work was doing, while he was stemming the tide of Napoleon's
conquests, and creating a new army, he met with scant support
from either the nation or the Government, and even his generals
and his officers were not always loyal. Until the Peninsular
War was well-nigh over, he was under-rated both by friend and
foe. It was not Napoleon alone who considered him a mere
' Sepoy general.1 It was not only the French who overlooked
the characteristics he had displayed in India — his strength of
character, his daring, his rapidity of movement, his prudence,
his ability. For many years, when beset by the difficulties of
his arduous campaigns, he had to struggle against the mis-
representations of the Press, the insubordination of his generals,
the dislike of his army, and the lukewarm confidence of the
Ministry. We know that he reformed the army; that he
introduced a higher standard of discipline, a new system of com-
mand, improvements in tactics, improvements in administration,
improvements in interior economy. And we know now that

88 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

every one of these innovations was wise and judicious. But it
would be a great mistake to think that they were welcomed by
his contemporaries. On the contrary, each one of the changes
he insisted on was stubbornly resisted. There were plenty of
officers who declared that the army must go to the dogs when the
men were ordered to cut off their pigtails. There were many
who thought their rights were infringed when they were ordered
to look after their own companies. And yet, to-day, who remem-
bers his critics, the leader-writers who vilified him, the generals
who knew so much better than he did what ought to be done, and
how to do it ; the enemies who despised him, the regimental
officers who abused him ? or, if they are remembered, how mean
and ridiculous do they appear !

It may be questioned, at the same time, whether the
admiration with which we now regard the great Duke is
always of a practical nature. An American sailor was the
first to reveal to the English people, and even to English
sailors, the influence of sea-power, and the real import of
the deeds of our great admirals. Has the same light been
thrown on the deeds of Wellington, on his methods of war,
and on the tremendous force of the counter-stroke which
sea-power enabled his army to deliver ? Do soldiers realise
how his military character was formed ; whence came his skill,
both as strategist and tactician, and how he perfected himself
in the exercise of his profession ? Do we always remember that
it was by hard work, in peace as well as in war, by devotion to
duty in its highest sense, by doing whatsoever his hand found
to do with all his might, that Wellington not only won his
battles, but made his soldiers the most formidable in Europe ?
A reply in the affirmative is hardly possible, and there is some
excuse. Although there has been no lack of writers who have
dealt with his career, the majority have been neither competent
nor sympathetic. It is true that his achievements have been
portrayed by the greatest of all military historians. But
Napiers volumes are occupied with too many events to throw
such light as we should wish on the character of his great com-
mander. Nor, when we wish to study the course of the Penin-
sular campaign is Napier's history an altogether satisfactory

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 89

guide. He gives but small space to details, and although the
broad features of the battles and manoeuvres are described and
criticised with extraordinary insight and brilliant eloquence, yet
there are many gaps in his narrative, and many incidents, of
minor interest perhaps from his point of view, which he pur-
posely left obscure. Of those who have made the biography of
the Duke their sole subject, Brialmont and Gleig have been the
most successful, but the military portion of their interesting work
is much inferior to Napier's. Hooper, a fine writer, was not
a soldier. Moreover his consistent depreciation of Napoleon's
genius, arising, it would appear, from an inability to dissociate
the soldier from the man, as well as his stubborn refusal to admit
that Wellington ever made a single blunder, do not commend
his works to the impartial reader.

The same prejudice, the same blind admiration, disfigure
the greater part of the voluminous literature on the campaign
of 1815. The majority of writers appear to consider it
essential to take one side or the other. They must be either
English, or French, or Prussian, arrogating all the ability
and courage to their own general and their own people, allow-
ing no virtues to their enemy, and but few to their allies.
The battle of the pens has been as fierce as the battle of
Waterloo itself; and it was not till General Maurice set the
example that the subject was approached in a more philosophic
and a fairer spirit. And of late years Waterloo seems to have
occupied the entire field. The campaigns of the Peninsula
have been neglected ; Wellington with them. Lord Roberts'
sketch of the Duke's military career is the only biography which
has recently appeared, and, unfortunately for his brother-soldiers,
' The Rise of Wellington ' is no more than a sketch. I may
be permitted to say, therefore, that there is no thoroughly
satisfactory Life of the great Duke in existence.1 No attempt
has been made to derive lessons for all time from the record of
his achievements, or to examine in detail his strategy, his tactics,
his methods of discipline, and his system of command. No
Mahan has yet taken the subject in hand, and until some

1 It must be remembered that Sir Herbert Maxwell's ' Life of Wellington '
had not appeared when these notes were written. — En.

90 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

successful soldier, who has himself had experience of high com-
mand, with all its responsibilities, does for Wellington what
Lord Wolseley is doing for Marlborough, we shall have to be
content with making the best use we can of inferior writers. It
is to give some small assistance to those who care to make such
writers their study that these notes have been written. While
drawing attention to the importance of such study, I propose to
point out some few of the valuable lessons to be derived from
it, and to make clear, so far as I can, those broad principles,
both of strategy and tactics, on which Wellington consistently
acted, but which are consistently lost sight of by the historian.

More than this I shall not attempt. I shall certainly not
criticise the operations of the Peninsular or Waterloo cam-
paigns. When the Duke was an old man, he one day found
himself opposite Apsley House, and the street between alive with
traffic. A gentleman who happened to be passing offered his
arm to pilot him across, and after they had reached the othei
side, the Duke thanked him for his assistance. He was not,
however, to be easily shaken off. Hat in hand, he expressed in
high-flown language his gratitude at the honour which had
been done him by the hero of so many battles. The Duke,
who was very deaf, listened for a moment, and then, catching
his meaning, rapped out, ' Don't be a d — d fool, sir,1 and walked
off at his best pace.

In that particular class of fools it would not be unjust to
class an ordinary soldier who should dare to pass judgment on
the hero of Waterloo.

Nor do I intend to touch — except incidentally — upon the
Duke's career previous to the Peninsular War. His Indian
campaigns are undoubtedly most instructive, and were not
without their effect on the destinies of our Eastern Empire.
But it is with the great struggle with Napoleon that his fame
is more intimately connected. The stage was larger than India,
and the issues involved of far greater moment, not to England
alone, but to the world at large. It has been said, and with
justice, that the most critical period in English history, and not
in English history alone, but in European history, is comprised
in the thirteen years from 1802 to 1815. Not when the huge

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 91

hulls of the Armada darkened the Channel, nor when the
splendid armies of the Grand Monarch threatened invasion,
and his navy passed and repassed unmolested along our coasts,
was the danger more imminent. Let us consider for a moment
the political situation when Wellington was first assigned to a
command in the Peninsula. Napoleon was practically master
of all Europe. The tricolor waved in almost every European
capital ; Austria, the great German Monarchy, had been de-
cisively defeated ; Prussia, the kingdom of Frederick the Great,
had been crushed to the earth ; Italy was practically a province
of France ; Holland and Belgium her dependencies ; the
Russians had been driven back to their own inhospitable
wastes ; Spain, although unconquered, had surrendered her
capital and her chief cities, and a Marshal of France held his
Court in Lisbon. Never had one European state, since the days
of Rome, attained such overwhelming power as France, and to
enforce the Emperor's behests there stood behind him an army
which had never known defeat, and which in the Peninsula
alone included 200,000 veterans. And what were the means of
resistance ? The raw levies of Spain, ill armed, ill disciplined,
and ill commanded ; the militia of Portugal, and 17,000
British soldiers. But behind this handful of armed men stood
Sea-Power. Great as was the strength of Napoleon, his
influence extended not a foot beyond low-water mark. The
land was his and the people, the cities of Europe and their
commerce ; not a village on the Continent but felt the terror of
his name ; yet wherever blue water rolled the flag of England
still floated in proud defiance ; and beyond the horizon of the
ocean, which even the eagle glance of Napoleon was unable to
penetrate, the storm was arising, although the cloud as yet
was no larger than a man's hand, which was to sweep away
his dominion like the unsubstantial fabric of a dream.

It was not the least of the Duke's laurels that he should
have perceived, in 1808, at the moment when Napoleon's power
was at its height, the spot where that power was most vulner-
able. Fortunately for England, the Ministry, when they re-
solved to deliver the counter-stroke which Trafalgar had made
possible, had listened to the advice of their joung general. In

92 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

opposition to their own ideas, he had advocated a landing in
Portugal. In that rugged but fertile kingdom, inhabited by a
small but independent race, he saw that an impregnable base of
operations might be established ; that, under the care of English
officers, a Portuguese army might be created ; that on this dis-
tant and difficult theatre of war, bounded throughout its length
by the high seas, the Spanish revolution might be most effec-
tively supported, and a conflict waged which might eventually
exhaust the strength of France. It is impossible not to notice,
from first to last, how clearly he grasped the secret of England's
strength. In all his correspondence the same idea rules his
conceptions, the immense influence that may be exerted by the
State, even if her army be relatively insignificant, that com-
mands the sea. It is true that he had had experience of
maritime expeditions. On no less than six occasions, before he
landed in Portugal, he had had to do with the transport of
large forces across the ocean, and several times he had been
called upon by the Government to submit plans of campaigns
which involved a landing on an enemy's coast. There can be
no question whatever that he was fully alive to the enormous
strategic advantages which accrue to the army that has the sea
behind it. He knew that under such conditions the influence
an army can exert, with facilities for changing the line of
operations, and for receiving supplies and reinforcements, is out
of all proportion to its numbers ; and his views may be com-
mended to those who, because European armies are of such
enormous size, believe that the intervention of English troops
in a Continental war is an idle dream. Let it be remembered
that the English army of 1808 was almost as small, compared
with that of France, as it is to-day ; and that the substitution
of steam for sails has given a force based upon the sea a
mobility which has been hitherto unknown.

One of the first of German strategists, long employed in
Turkey, has fully recognised the length of England's arm. He
compares Wellington's occupation of Torres Vedras with the
crisis of the war of 1877-8. ' The French ' (marching on
Lisbon, and brought up by Torres Vedras), ' when almost
touching their object, were too weak to completely attain it.

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 93

From the moment that this became clear, the turn of the
tide in the Peninsular War — indeed, in Napoleon's career —
began. A similar thing would have happened if the Turkish
armies, after the loss of Plevna and the line of the Balkans,
had retired to, and made a firm stand at, the position of
Czataldcza, which extends from sea to sea, west of Constanti-
nople. The Russian army, arriving in a reduced condition,
would neither have been able to capture the intrenched
lines, nor to envelop or turn them, especially if England
had decided to help the Porte, not only with diplomatic
notes, but also with troops. A hostile fleet could have
annoyed the assailant on both flanks, and an allied army
could easily have been assembled in the fortified quadrilateral
on the Danube, still in possession of the Turks ; and the advance
of such an army would have made the retreat of the victors
necessary. There is no case in recent military history in which
a situation — although apparently a hopeless one — which upon
close examination afforded all the means for a brilliant rescue,
has been so completely overlooked.'' We may be permitted
to believe, then, that those who would restrict the English
army to colonial enterprise have not fully realised the extent
of the influence of the sea-power, and that even the most
brilliant writers on Imperial defence have something to learn
from Wellington.

And it was not in numbers alone that the English army
of 1808 was relatively feeble. In the first place, it was totally
wanting in prestige. Not only by Continental nations, but
by its own people, it was considered incapable of meeting
such troops as Napoleon's. The descendants of Marlborough's
soldiers had never recovered the reputation they had lost
in America. Since the wars of the French Revolution had
begun they had been often engaged ; but they were more
familiar with retreat than triumph. Alexandria, Maida, and
Corunna were the only victories over European troops, and
these were insufficient to balance the long tale of disasters.
Nor is this want of success a matter of wonder. The men
were brave and hardy, the battalions well-drilled, and there was
no lack of confidence. But brave soldiers and well drilled

94 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

battalions do not make an efficient army ; and an army, in the
real sense of the word, England had not.

The force which landed in the Peninsula was deficient in
the first elements of organisation. The commissariat was a
skeleton, and the officers who controlled it were without ex-
perience. The hospital service was utterly inadequate to the
needs of the troops. There were neither ambulances, nor
pontoons, nor army parks ; there was no siege train, no
ammunition column, and there were no engineers. Both staff
and officers were inexperienced ; the majority of the rank and
file had just been drawn from the militia ; the cavalry was very
weak ; the guns were drawn by bullocks ; and the majority of
the generals, appointed for any other reason than proved
capacity, had yet to learn their trade. It was of this hetero-
geneous mass that the Duke had to create an army capable of
encountering the war-seasoned soldiers of Napoleon. And the
process was attended with constant friction. The discipline
of the army, although the punishments were terribly severe,
was anything but good. The men broke out into excesses of
the worst kind at every opportunity, and mutiny was the only
crime at which they drew the line An examination of the
army ' states ' still kept at the Record Office reveals the
astonishing fact that desertion was almost as frequent in
Portugal as in England, and the insubordination of the officers
is shown by the files of court-martials.

Nor was it till late in the war that the Duke commanded
implicit confidence. In the earlier campaigns, so long as he
led them to victory, the army was ready enough to cheer him ;
but when reverses came, when it became necessary to retreat
before the overwhelming numbers of the French, to decline
battle, and to take counsel rather of prudence than audacity,
its temper changed. The men grumbled, and the officers
criticised. Subordinate generals were loud in their expressions
of disapproval, and some, returning home on leave, filled the
ears of their influential friends with complaints of their chiefs
incompetence. And added to this flood of misrepresentation
came the abuse of the Press and the ravings of the politicians.
Those who at any future time may have the direction of

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 95

English armies may find consolation in the thought that never
was a successful general vilified, mistrusted, and disliked like the
greatest of English soldiers. None was ever more thwarted by
the Government ; none had fewer friends or fiercer critics.

And yet throughout it all the Duke was immovable. With
every officer in the army, even those more able men who knew
his worth, against him, he still held fast to his purpose of
holding Portugal. When the troops grumbled at his inaction,
and demanded to be led to battle, he steadfastly refused to
indulge their wishes. He was betrayed into no outbreak of
temper. As patient under calumny as unmoved by success, he
treated his detractors with contempt, laughed at his in-
subordinate officers, and submitted with equanimity to the
eccentricities of the Government. Great man as he was, it
may be questioned whether his strength of character, his self-
control, and his extraordinary power of bearing responsibility,
ever showed to greater advantage than at this period of his
career.

Then, as at every other period, his confidence, not only in
his own ability to hold his ground, but that he would finally
bring about the downfall of Napoleon, is most remarkable.
That confidence, however, was based on no flimsy foundation.
He was a comparatively young man, still under forty, when he
assumed command in the Peninsula, and he had no large
experience of European warfare. He had served in the
disastrous campaign of 1794 as a regimental officer, and he
had commanded a division at the investment of Copenhagen
in 1807. But in very many respects his Indian experience
was more valuable than any he would have gained upon the
Continent. In India he had to improvise armies ; to arrange
every detail of administration ; to organise the staff and the
departments ; to make the troops mobile ; to pay them and
to feed them, and to keep them in health. In India, too, he
had been accustomed to deal with questions of government
and finance, of statesmanship and diplomacy ; and this varied
and wide experience must have done much to strengthen an
intellect already powerful. If one quality more than another
is conspicuous in Wellington's mental armoury, it is the

96 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

power of thinking clearly, and thinking deeply and thoroughly.
He was a most voluminous writer, necessarily so, for his corre-
spondence with the different Governments he had to deal with
was enormous ; but it is difficult to find a single despatch in
Gurwood's volumes which does not treat the questions at issue,
whether strategical, financial, or diplomatic, in an absolutely
satisfactory fashion. And many of these despatches were
written under the most unfavourable conditions, in miserable
quarters, after a long march, or even after a great engagement.
It is not unusual to hear Wellington spoken of as the personifica-
tion of common-sense. And the assertion is true enough, if by
common-sense is meant practical ability, the ability which both
conceives and executes, and which in the soldier, if allied with
a strong will, and properly cultivated, is very near akin to
military genius.

It is a truism to say that no man can become a great,
or even a good, soldier unless he has been endowed by nature
with certain characteristics — coolness, resource in danger,
presence of mind, and the power of bearing responsibility —
and these indispensable attributes are not derived from educa-
tion ; but it is not always understood that common-sense, or
practical ability, if it is to be useful in war, must be trained
on the right lines. And to supply this training Wellington,
from the first year he joined the service, was always careful.
He was exceedingly observant both of men and things. No
new discovery, in science or in mechanics, escaped his investiga-
tion. As he himself told one of his chief officers, it was his
invariable habit to give up some hours daily to the study of
his profession. He read all the best military writers of the
time, and his despatches and correspondence reveal to us how
wide the extent of his reading was. His brain, therefore,
when he was placed in independent command, was thoroughly
well trained ; he had not permitted it to rest ; he had not
been content with the knowledge that suffices for the regimental
officer ; he had endeavoured to qualify himself for higher
things, and when his time came for great responsibilities, he
proved himself capable of bearing the weightiest burden that
ever fell on a general's shoulders.

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 97

To strategy, then, he had paid much attention before he
came to apply it in the field, and the principles on which he
consistently acted, although they differ but little from those of
the other great masters of war, are well worth record, especially
as great misconception exists as to what those principles were.
The popular idea is that his was a Fabian system ; that he
never fought unless absolutely certain of victory ; that he
preferred the defensive to the offensive, and that, in one word,
he was pre-eminently cautious. This opinion, however, will not
be held by those who, when studying his campaigns, give due
weight to his difficulties, and work out his operations with
map and compass. I think they will agree with me that his
strategy, although seldom rash, was pre-eminently daring. This
characteristic has undoubtedly been obscured by the fact that
for the first four years of the Peninsular War his means were
so small that he aimed at nothing more than the defence of
Portugal ; secondly, by the number of defensive battles, due to
paucity of numbers, that he was compelled to fight ; lastly
by the defensive attitude, forced upon him by the situation,
at Quatre Bras and Waterloo, and by the shallow criticism
of foreigners. Not yet has he been forgiven for defeating
Napoleon and avenging Ligny.

The plain truth is that his genius was eminently aggressive.
He was always on the watch for an opportunity to attack,
and it is a most significant fact that he never fought a
defensive battle without apologising for it. Wellington, be
it remarked, had seen something more of war than manoeuvres
and the war-game. No general was ever more alive to the
preponderating force of the moral element, and no general
ever surrendered the initiative more reluctantly or sought to
regain it with more persistence. Wellington knew well that
the issue of battle lies in the hearts of men — in the heart of the
commander even more than in the hearts of the soldiers — and that
human nature, even when disciplined, is peculiarly susceptible
to a strong, sudden, sustained attack. Moreover, his tempera-
ment was naturally ardent and impetuous. He was not an Irish-
man for nothing. Putting aside his Indian achievements, as an
instance of his boldness we may cite his advance on Lisbon in 1809.

H

98 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Landing in Mondego Bay with 9,000 men, he at once determined
to attack Junot, who had 20,000, and only unexpected circum-
stances placed him on the defensive at Vimiero. The campaign of
the Douro and Talavera was, as regards conception, of a piece with
Napoleon's campaign of 1796. His enemy was far superior in
numbers, but had divided his forces. Soult was at Oporto, and
Victor in the valley of Tagus. Marching with great rapidity,
eighty miles, over rough roads, in three and a half days, he
made the famous passage of the Douro, a splendid tactical
achievement of the most audacious character, and then turned
upon Victor. The deficiencies of his commissariat and the
lethargy of his allies interfered with the success of his design,
and instead of attacking, as he proposed, at Talavera, he was
reduced to the defensive, and his victory was, consequently,
indecisive. Again, his capture of the twin fortresses, Badajos
and Ciudad Rodrigo, in 1812, was so audacious as to have been
characterised, even by his own officers, as the height of rashness ;
and passing by the operations on the French frontier in 1813-14,
his occupation of the position at Waterloo was criticised as
foolhardy by Napoleon, himself the most daring of generals.
This is a circumstance that has been very generally overlooked.
The historians hardly seem to appreciate the full bearing of
the situation. We are asked to believe that Wellington's
chief merit lay in the selection of his ground, in the skill of
his tactical disposition, and in the stubbornness of his defence.
I cannot think, however, that his tactics were more admirable
than his strategy.

On the morning of June 17, when he resolved to retreat
to Waterloo, he was aware that the Prussians, who were mostly
young troops, had been beaten at Ligny ; that Napoleon had,
before that battle, over 120,000 men, and that he himself had,
all told, 68,000, of whom only 31,000, including the King's
German Legion, were British. Yet he retreated from Quatre
Bras with the full determination of standing at Waterloo, and
of fighting Napoleon's army, if Marshal Blucher would come to
his assistance with one army corps : that is, with a heterogeneous
force, largely composed of untrustworthy contingents, and rely-
ing on such aid as might be rendered by a young army, that had

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 99

been defeated but two days previously and had retreated by night
over wretched roads, he dared to face a victorious army which
might be far superior in numbers to his own, far better supplied
with artillery and cavalry, and commanded by the greatest
general that modern ages had known. And this on a position
which was eminently favourable for the massing of artillery and
the manoeuvres of cavalry. Had Marshal Bliicher failed to
redeem his promise, as he well might have done, considering the
state of the roads and the exhaustion of his troops, and the
battle ended in a French victory, Wellington would in all
probability have been put down as absolutely insane. But at
Waterloo, as elsewhere, his strategy was the result of profound
calculation. It was undoubtedly risky ; but if risk is to be
always avoided, nothing great will be achieved, and the Duke-
was never averse to risk so long as the chances were in his favour.
So far, then, from Wellington's strategy being of a timid
and over-cautious character, the exact contrary is the case ; but,
at the same time, his patience was inexhaustible. None knew
better how to play a waiting game ; none was ever more resolute
to fight only on ground of his own choosing and at his own time.
And when we consider his temperament, naturally inclined to
quick and energetic action, the pressure put upon him by the
army, the politicians, and the newspapers, and last, but not
least, the extreme aversion every fighting soldier must feel to
retiring before the enemy without a trial of strength, it will be
admitted, I think, that here he was especially admirable. His
principles were those of the greatest captains. He did not enter
upon a campaign with the idea of awaiting attack in a strong
position, for such an idea rests on a false conception of the first
principles of war. The aim of every general is to concentrate
superior force on the field of battle ; thus only can he hope for
decisive results. And to concentrate superior numbers strategy
must be vigorous. If the enemy divides his forces each
separate portion must be crushed before they can concentrate.
If he keeps his forces in hand he must be compelled, by skilful
manoeuvring, to separate them. If, however, he remain concen-
trated, the inferior force has nothing for it but to fall back
to a strongly entrenched position, as Wellington did to Torres

h 2

100 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Vedras, or to a zone of manoeuvre, as Napoleon did in 1814, and
await its opportunity. Such, broadly and briefly stated, is the
whole secret of strategy ; and it is evident that in dealing with
an enemy in detail a defensive attitude cannot be adopted.
The grand object is to prevent the enemy from concentrating,
from receiving reinforcements, and from gaining time, and
attack is, consequently, the only possible course of action for
the superior numbers, except under most unusual conditions.

I now come to the Duke's tactics ; but before describing
them a few words of explanation may not be out of place. It
is possible that the doubt may have suggested itself whether it
is worth while to discuss the methods of what have been called,
so far as weapons are concerned, the prehistoric ages. Is any
instruction to be gained, it may be asked, from the dispositions
for the attack at Vittoria, or for the defence at Waterloo ?

I hope I shall not be considered exceedingly unpractical,
lagging hopelessly in rear of modern thought and modern pro-
gress, if I say that, in my humble opinion, the campaigns of
Wellington, not in strategy alone, but in tactics also, are prolific
in instruction ; even should I emphasise this assertion by declar-
ing that if, instead of accepting the Germans as infallible, we
had, when we started to learn on what principles we should make
war, sought instruction from our own great soldiers, we should
have pursued a more profitable course. It is perfectly true
that both in strategy and in tactics important modifications
have been brought about by modern science. In the one we
have to take into account steam and the telegraph, in the other
a vastly increased fire-power. But steam and the telegraph
have hardly touched the grand principles of strategy ; they have
only introduced new means of applying them ; nor have modern
weapons wrought a complete change in tactics. The bayonet is
now subordinate to the bullet. A long preparation by fire is
now absolutely essential to the success, and both the formation of
infantry in the attack and the action of artillery are governed by
different conditions from those which prevailed in the Peninsula.

But just as the attack is not the only phase of tactics, so
infantry formations and artillery action are not the sole con-
sideration, nor even the most important consideration, in the

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 101

attack. On other phases of tactics, and on the more important
considerations in the attack, the campaigns of the Peninsula
throw just as much light as the campaigns of 1870-71. To
define my meaning. In the selection of a defensive position
to-day we look for exactly the same features as in the time of
Brown Bess, with the one exception that we demand a wider
field of fire. Otherwise, as regards cover, the protection of our
flanks, lines of retreat, and lines of communication, we are
guided by the same principles as our forefathers. Moreover,
as regards the distribution of infantry and artillery along the
front, the delivery of local counter-strokes, and even as regards
the delivery of general counter-strokes, the conditions have not
greatly altered. Nor have modern firearms changed either the
formation of cavalry or the work of the independent cavalry
which precedes the army. Outposts are still established on the
system which obtained in the Peninsula, and, above all, the
enemy is deceived, outwitted, and outmanoeuvred by exactly
the same means as were adopted by the great generals of the
pre-breechloader era. I would lay special stress on the fact,
which none can gainsay, that human nature, the paramount
consideration of all questions of either tactics or strategy,
remains unaltered. And the art of generalship, the art of
command, whether the forces be large or small, is the art of
dealing with human nature. Human nature must be the basis
of every leader's calculations. To sustain the moral of his own
men ; to break down the moral of his enemy — these are the
great objects which, if he be ambitious of success, he must always
keep in view.

It is this aspect of war, then, that those who aspire to
become real generals should study. This aspect remains un-
changed, and nowhere can it be studied with more profit than
in the campaigns of those great captains, who owe their great-
ness to the one fact, that it was the mainspring of all their
actions. It should be remembered, too, that while attack for-
mations and development or avoidance of fire are a part of the
soldier's daily training, taught in the drill-books and practised
at manoeuvres, neither the drill-book nor manoeuvres throw
much light on the way human nature is to be dealt with.

102 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

When once an officer has mastered the theory of formations,
and understands the effects of fire, the means of producing
those effects, and also of reducing them, he cannot do better
than study the Indian and the Peninsular and the Waterloo
campaigns. There he will learn how to outwit, to out-
manoeuvre, to deceive, in one word, to surprise his enemy, and,
as has well been said, ' Surprise is the deadliest of all foes,' a
more terrible instrument of war than even the Lee-Metford
rifle or the Maxim gun. There he will find teaching that will
rectify the false lessons of manoeuvres ; for manoeuvres, where
the moral element is altogether absent, are not a real picture
of war, nor even an approach to it. I cannot conceive any-
thing more useful to a soldier than to be thoroughly imbued
with the methods of Wellington. What could be more valuable
than to have learned so thoroughly that their application has
become instinctive the following principles : —

Always endeavour to mystify and mislead your enemy,
whether you are attacking or defending ; if you can surprise
the enemy's general his army is already defeated.

Always attack at that point where the moral effect will be
greatest. Strike the enemy's flank in preference to his front,
enfilade his line, and threaten his retreat.

Never fight except on your own ground and at your own
time.

Never attack unless you are superior in numbers.

Never knock your head against a strong position.

Such maxims may seem truisms, and to put them forward
mere idle repetition. I cannot agree, and I will give a reason.
In our Indian Empire different conditions have imposed a
different set of rules upon every second lieutenant: — 'Never
refuse battle,1 ' never show a sign of hesitation,' and ' when
you get the enemy on the run keep him there.' I am con-
vinced that the constant repetition of these principles, and
their very general recognition, have left their mark on our
roll of victories ; and it would possibly increase that roll in the
time to come, when we meet more formidable foes, if the
principles on which Wellington acted had become the general
rule of conduct throughout the army.

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 103

To describe in detail what those principles were is impossible.
I can only direct attention, in very general terms, to those
which are specially prominent. I have already said that his
instincts were eminently aggressive ; but, whether marching to
attack the enemy, or waiting in a selected position for the
chance of a counter-stroke, his one aim and object was to mis-
lead and mystify his enemy. It is true that he did not invari-
ably succeed ; but, at the same time, it may be questioned
whether any general, even Napoleon himself, ever brought
about so many startling surprises. The passage of the Douro,
the capture of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, Graham's flank
attack at Vittoria, the passage of the Adour : each and all of
them were absolutely unexpected by the French marshals ; and
they are by no means the only, or even the most conspicuous,
instances. Was ever general more surprised than Marshal
Massena when, pursuing his retreating enemy through Portugal,
in full anticipation of ' driving the leopards into the sea,1 he
suddenly saw before him the frowning lines of Torres Vedras,
the great fortress which had sprung, as it were, from earth at
the touch of a magician's wand ? Nor in all his long career
was Napoleon ever so completely deceived as when he found the
allied army in position at Waterloo, apparently at the mercy
of his victorious veterans.

It is not from the pages of English writers that we learn
to appreciate the extraordinary skill with which the Duke
concealed his movements, and deceived both friend and foe,
but from the despatches and correspondence of the French
generals who were opposed to him. Despite their experi-
ence of war, their system of spies, their excellent cavalry, far
superior, during the first years of the war, both in numbers
and in training, to the English, it was very seldom, indeed,
that they had more than a vague knowledge of their adversary's
movements, his intentions, or his strength. Neither in Ger-
many, in Italy, in Belgium, nor in Holland, had they ever
encountered so mysterious an enemy. If they stood to receive
battle they were deceived by feints and demonstrations ; their
attention was drawn away from the real point of assault, and
the decisive blow delivered where they least expected it. Nor

104 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

was it on the offensive alone that he managed to surprise them.
In this respect his defensive dispositions are a model for all
ages. Always, under such conditions, the weaker army, for if
he were superior he invariably attacked, he made such use of
the ground that neither his numbers, the extent of his front,
the position of his reserves, nor even the position of his first
line, could be easily determined. Cover was made use of, not
only to save his men, but to conceal his dispositions, to lead his
enemy into ambush, to induce him to make false movements,
and thus to create the opportunity for effective counter-stroke.
Consider for one moment the embarrassment of the French
marshals when they found their cavalry checked at the foot of
a long ridge. Except a line of skirmishers, half way down the
slope, with a few batteries of artillery in support, there was
nothing to be seen. It was impossible to detect the extent of
the English line, for outlying detachments, pushed far out on
either hand, stood in the path of the patrols. No shelter-
trenches, standing out against the sky line, defined the front.
The attack, for want of a target and objective, could not be
prepared, and there was nothing for it but to take the bull by
the horns and launch the columns of assault, in the vague
hope that they might encounter inferior numbers. I venture to
think that as regards the occupation of a defensive position,
there is more to be learned from the practice of Wellington
than from the theory of the drill-books.

It has been said that he did not make sufficient use of his
artillery. He certainly did not sacrifice his guns in the vain
hope of overpowering a superior artillery ; and, as he was well
aware that infantry is the arm which must bear the brunt of the
defensive battle, in the choice of ground the gunners had to give
way. The first requirement of a position, to his mind, was cover
for his battalions, and protection from the artillery fire of the
enemy. And what were the results of his consistent regard for con-
cealment and surprise ? When the French attack was launched
not a single English infantryman, except the skirmishers, had
come under fire. The battalions were in perfect order, and
their ranks were full, and the counter-stroke, made with fresh
and unbroken troops, was quickly decisive. So much did these

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 105

tactics impress the French generals, that at length they hesitated
to attack at all. On the morning of Quatre Bras, when that
most important position was but thinly held, even Ney was reluc-
tant to engage. That there were very few troops to be seen was,
in the j udgment both of himself and his subordinates, no proof
whatever that the whole English army was not hidden away in
the woods and valleys, and the opportunity was suffered to
escape. We may recall the Duke's criticism, on this same
June 16, of the Prussian dispositions at Ligny. Bliicher
occupied a strong position ; but his troops were posted where
every man could be seen, and where the first line, at least,
would be exposed to artillery fire. On his return from Ligny
to Quatre Bras he said that he had expostulated with the
Marshal, but that the old hussar had replied that his Prussians
liked to see their enemy, and, added the Duke, ' they will get
most damnably mauled.'

Whether as a strategist, tactician and organiser the Duke
may be fitly compared with Napoleon can never be fairly
settled. But it is always to be remembered that, as the
general of a suspicious and parsimonious Government, with
small powers, small support, and still smaller resources, he
had far greater difficulties to contend with than the supreme
master of a great and wealthy nation.

It has been said that his operations lacked the brilliance of
Napoleon's. Personally, I do not exactly understand what is
meant by this word 'brilliance.' If it means manoeuvres
which were utterly unexpected by either friend or foe, I can
only say that, with inferior means, Wellington effected just
as many surprises as did the conqueror of Europe, and it was
due only to the inferiority of those means that they were so
seldom decisive. It may be admitted, however, that, although
he gained the implicit confidence of his troops, he had never
the least hold on their affections, and here, it seems, he was
distinctly inferior to his great rival. But, says Sir Edward
Hamley, ' This is a question on which his fame in no way
depends. The same regard which his countrymen felt for him
in life, and which they continue to feel for his memory, rests
on sure and sufficient grounds. They knew that he was a good

106 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and a groat man. They were proud of his deeds and virtues.
Thev loved his personal dignity, his manliness, his simplicity
and strength. Their confidence in his judgment and sagacity
was profound, and they were assured that those pre-eminent
qualities were placed absolutely without reservation at the
service of the State, unbiassed by the hope of popular applause,
or the fear of popular censure. In him, too, they believed they
saw an embodiment of the national spirit in its best aspect —
the spirit which, in its most practical aims, is directed still by
the noblest influences. Recalling the memory of mighty con-
quests and of great successes, that good grey head, with its
halo of former glories, stood amid the latter times like the peak
of a prolonged world. Thus it was that he passed through life
in a charmed circle of deference, as if surrounded by an
invisible bodyguard of his victories ; and when he died, at an
age when most men have long receded from the public regard,
he was mourned for as universally and sincerely as if he had
still been in the freshness of his fame, and had but yesterday
delivered Europe.

' His body lay in the old castle for a time, while the people
came to look on his well-known face. Then his remains were
taken through London by night, to lie in state at Chelsea ; and
the Queen came, first of the mourners, to look upon the remains
of her trusty counsellor and greatest subject. The spontaneous
mourning of the people lent solemnity to the funeral splendour
in which England sought to express her respect ; and great
assemblies have rarely felt such profound and general emotion
as that which shook the multitude when, amid the cathedral
gloom of St. Paul's, deepened by the storm that beat upon the
dome, the coffin of " the high and mighty Prince,1' whose long
list of titles had just been recited, and whose form was so
familiar, descended through the pavement to the vault beneath.
With it seemed to vanish some of the force and majesty of
England, and much of the old traditionary loyalty and reverence
for authority which yet continued to leaven the utilitarian
character of the age. But he left to his country a rich inherit-
ance— the increase of a reputation abroad, which sprang from
his achievements and his policy, and the gain at home which a
people derives from a noble example and a great name.''

NOTES ON WELLINGTON 107

And, if I may be permitted to add my feeble words to this
most eloquent tribute, he left to the army a special legacy.
Throughout the whole of his career he had been the most
obedient of subordinates. Loyalty to his superiors, whether
statesmen or soldiers, was the first rule of his life. Whether he
approved their action or not, he invariably supported them, and
he never permitted himself to criticise. The most bitter remark
he ever made was after the battle of Vimiero, when the in-
terference of a stupid superior, who had just come upon the
field, held him back from a pursuit which must have proved
decisive. ' Gentlemen,' he said, turning to his staff, ' there is
nothing left for us but to hunt red partridges.'' Further than
such caustic speech he never went. That a soldier should
criticise his superiors, either in public or in private, did not
square with his ideal of an officer and a gentleman. In the
age in which we live it is well sometimes to think of these
things. It would be untrue to say that loyalty has diminished,
nor is there any lack of patriotism. But it is impossible to
deny that a most mischievous spirit is abroad. Men seem to
have forgotten that loyalty is not only due to the Crown, but
to the State, and to those that represent the State. To defy
the Government, to make its task more difficult, to force it to
break treaties and to deny obligations, and to embarrass our
relations with other Powers, appear to be considered most
praiseworthy actions ; while to vilify those in high places, the
great functionaries of the realm, is held to be no longer a stain
on the honour of an Englishman. It may be useful, then, when
such doctrines find advocates, to remember the example of
Wellington, and to determine that whatever may be the case
elsewhere, the army will still preserve the same traditional
loyalty, the same reverence for authority, as did the greatest
Boldier of us all.

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS
(From tlie ' United Service Magazine,' October 1891)

Military criticism takes a long time to recover its equilibrium.
The practical effects of a new explosive, an improved firearm,
or a novel formation, no matter what the circumstances, are
sufficient to drive it to extremes. Such was the case when the
Seven Days1 Campaign of 1866 first drew general attention to
the capabilities of the breechloader. General Maurice long ago
made allusion to the fact that in June 1870 it was stated,
during a discussion at the Royal United Service Institution,
that the strength of the defensive had been so much increased
by the introduction of a quick-loading firearm that France
needed no more than 100,000 infantry to defend her frontiers.
Translated from the Institution papers, this unfortunate attempt
at forecast appeared in a French review two days after Grave-
lotte !

This tendency to over-estimate the value of a new develop-
ment has been but lately exposed in a fashion sufficiently
remarkable. In the Secession War, American soldiers revived
an obsolete arm ; and, under circumstances which were excep-
tionally favourable, used it with remarkable success. Fifteen
years later the Boers taught English soldiers that they had over-
looked at least one of the lessons of the American campaigns ;
and in 1889, after the mounted infantry had done good service
against enemies who had either very indifferent cavalry or
none at all, the Infantry Drill Book laid down that it might
' usefully be employed ' in the scouting and patrolling of an
advanced guard. Already had able critics — amongst them
Colonel Valentine Baker — pronounced against the possibility
of employing cavalry in battle except against cavalry alone ;
and now, when a substitute was found upon the outpost line,

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 109

its occupation appeared to have gone indeed. And then,
suddenly, the pendulum swung back. When, at manoeuvres
on the Berkshire Downs, a battalion of mounted infantry
was asked to manoeuvre independently against a regiment of
hussars, its commander declared that in an open country,
without cavalry to reconnoitre for him, he was helpless ; and
for the above-mentioned paragraph a sentence was substituted
to the effect that mounted infantry may be employed ' under
exceptional circumstances,' to provide information, and to en-
sure the security of an advanced guard ; these exceptional
circumstances existing, we may presume, only when cavalry is
not available.

But although this would-be rival has found its level, and
no more is now claimed for mounted infantry than, in Lord
Wolseley's words, ' to save the cavalry from having to dismount
and adopt a line of fighting which is not theirs,' the question of
the employment of cavalry on the field of battle is still suffering
from impatient criticism. Neither its officers nor those who
help the arm to do its thinking are to blame. It is true
that the cavalryman of to-day cherishes a well-founded hope
that his share of glory will not be confined to screening or
scouting, nor even to the overthrow of the opposing squadrons
side by side with the sister arms. The extreme depression
induced, after 1870, by the slaughter of Woerth, of Mars-la-
Tour, and of Sedan, has at length passed away, and buoyancy
has been restored. But this desirable consummation has been
reached by no hasty process. By none have the tactics and the
tactical situations of 1870 been more patiently investigated and
more thoroughly discussed than by writers on cavalry. At the
same time, new developments have been fairly faced, the problems
of the future, so far as is possible, carefully examined, and ample
evidence collected to show that, in this instance also, criticism
has overshot the mark. It is not the cavalry, then, who are
to blame. It is not the writers who represent them that have
shirked difficulties or discounted history. With them special
pleading has found no favour, but with a certain school of
infantry tacticians, of whose views the writer of an article in
the ' United Service Magazine ' is the latest exponent. * These

110 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

military Nihilists, who swear that the action of cavalry on the
battlefield is a thing of the past,1 have, naturally enough, based
their deductions on the War of 1870. But in their anxiety to
prove that infantry have nothing to fear from horsemen, they
have looked upon the battles of that war as if they had been
games of chess ; they have underrated the effect of bad tactics
and unsuitable ground ; they have disregarded the indications
of the moral influence of cavalry, even if ill-handled ; and not
only have they minimised the tactical successes actually achieved,
but have used their utmost endeavours to demolish theories
which the cavalry never dreamt of putting forward. But the
writer alluded to betrays an uneasy consciousness that he has
by no means proved his case. The very earnestness with which
he strives to inspire his own arm with a contempt for cavalry
shadows forth an apprehension, unacknowledged, perhaps, even
to himself, that cavalry, boldly led and skilfully manoeuvred, may
be a real danger even to the staunchest infantry. In the last
century, says the author of the ' Cavalry Division,1 ' infantry
was never charged except when it could be surprised and taken
in flank.1 It is within those limits, i.e. the surprise or flank
attack of exhausted infantry, that he, together with those who
have faith in Varme blanche, claims that cavalry can still exert
a powerful influence on the fight ; and, at the same time, he
lays stress on the fact that the long fire-fights of the present
are more destructive of the moral and physical energy of the
infantry than the close-quarter conflicts of the past. His
opponents, in producing a long array of arguments to prove
that cavalry are useless against unbroken and forewarned
infantry, are but tilting at windmills. That men on horses are
no match for men on foot, with confidence in their weapons, in
good heart, and expecting the attack, has been apparent since
men were first drilled and disciplined. No cavalry soldier
dreams — nor ever did dream — of supporting so wild a proposi-
tion. The most ambitious cavalry soldier asserts no more
than this : that, although weapons have improved, human
nature still remains the same, and that ' surprise is still the
deadliest of foes.1 Nor need infantry officers fear that the re-
cognition of these facts will be aught but beneficial to their own

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 111

arm. It is well to teach the men in the ranks with the rifle that,
holding their ground and keeping cool, they are a match for
the most daring horsemen ; yet to inspire the infantry generally
with a contempt for cavalry may improve its moral, but will
most assuredly lead to a neglect of those precautions which
alone can secure it from surprise. ' The less cavalry are sup-
posed to be able to act,' says General Maurice, ' the more
numerous will be the chances presented to them.1 We do not
attempt to strengthen the moral of our infantry by telling
them that the enemy's fire is harmless. On the contrary, we
point out its terrible effect, and inculcate the methods by which
it may be avoided. Let all know when and where cavalry is
to be feared, and they will be better prepared for the eventual-
ities of battle than were they to go down to the fight full of
a confidence which one day might be rudely shattered. Better
trust to stout hearts, strong discipline, and incessant vigilance
than to moral strengthened in dubious fashion.

Such false teaching as that set forth in the article alluded
to has, moreover, the result of weakening the reliance of our
own infantry on our own cavalry. As a most useful element
of moral support this reliance should not be rudely tampered
with. Nor does such teaching exercise other than a baneful
effect upon combined tactics. Let both arms recognise that
situations may arise where the enemy's horsemen will be the
chief danger to infantry and artillery, and the cavalry will
be at pains to detect such situations, as well as to learn in
what manner they can there render the most effective support.
Let both arms recognise that tactical successes won by our
own horsemen will not be decisive unless the infantry is at
hand to follow them up ; and the latter will learn how, when
the cavalry has opened the way, it may best improve the
opportunity.

The first duty of cavalry in action is to drive the hostile
horsemen from the field ; but despite the arguments of its
detractors, it has a second duty — that is, active participation
in the struggle of the infantry and artillery for the key of the
position. The principal lessons of the Franco-German war
as regards this last phase of action are these : first, in order

112 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

to attain or to prepare the way for enduring results, cavalry
must be used in large masses ; and, secondly, without skilful
leading, good use of ground, and ready initiative, it is of little
value. Given these essentials it will go far towards redeem-
ing the reputation which it lost in 1870. But it is idle
to expect cavalry, deprived as it is of the employment of fire,
to achieve great successes unless it is efficiently supported —
that is, unless its strokes are delivered in close combination
with those of the other arms. Infantry officers, therefore, will
find useful employment in the study of combined tactics,
especially as regards the methods by which their own arm may
best profit by the address and valour of their mounted comrades.
Nor would it be amiss were they to reflect on the means of
preventing cavalry arresting a strong attack or counter-stroke.
It may be true that the French cuirassiers were almost
annihilated before Morsbronn, but they gained time for the
infantry to withdraw unmolested to the Niederwald. It may
be true that it was Bazaine, and not von Bredow, who
stopped the advance of Canroberfs corps against the exhausted
Prussian left at Mars-la-Tour ; but it cannot be gainsaid that
the death-ride of the six squadrons held back the attack for
a precious breathing-space. It may be true that at the same
battle the three squadrons of the Guard Dragoons lost fifteen
officers and ninety-seven men in their onslaught on the French
brigade that was bearing down upon the Prussian rear, but
it is a fact that the enemy never again attempted an
advance on this side, and that time was gained to bring up
reinforcements to the threatened point. Such are the results
that may be attained by cavalry, even when unsupported.
Costly, indeed, they are, but well worth the sacrifice. And
be it remembered that owing to the obstacles at Morsbronn,
the absence of cover at Mars-la-Tour, and the unbroken ranks
and unshaken bearing of the opposing infantry, the conditions
in each one of these cases were as unfavourable as possible.

They must be difficult of conviction who in the face of
such evidence depreciate the influence of cavalry when backed
up by the other arms. Moreover, in the time to come, if the
peace practice of Continental nations goes for anything, not

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 113

six, but six times six squadrons will be sent on such errands
as Bredow's at Mars-la-Tour, and not one line, but two or
three, will break through skirmishers and batteries and ride
down upon the reserves in rear. Nor will this mass of horse-
men be unsupported. Infantry and gunners will not stand
gazing, open-mouthed and idle, at the wild conflict at the
front, but will be pressed forward at their utmost speed, secure
for a time from fire, to pour in through the breach thus opened
by the horsemen.

Let us remember, also, that the moral influence of cavalry
is as great as heretofore. In his report of the fight at St.
Privat, Major-General von Kessler, who commanded the 2nd
Guard Brigade, hints that, when the attack came to a stand-
still, the distant appearance of a squadron or two of Chasseurs
d'Afrique on the flank of the fighting line had a demoralising
effect on a portion of the troops. Von der Goltz, also, has
a significant passage in ' Das Volk in Waffen ' : ' The cavalry
will again play its role in deciding the day. This claim is,
for the most part, justified by the recollection of certain
situations in the late wars [^S and 170-171]. . . . The lines
of sharpshooters were seen to dissolve under the fire, to become
thinner and thinner, and, in their endeavours to surround the
enemy, to extend, disperse, and become ragged. Their energies
had become exhausted in advancing through thick corn or
underwood, in climbing hills, in a breathless charge, following
immediately a long march, and the evolutions of compact
masses across country. The ammunition had almost given
out, many officers had fallen, command nearly ceased altogether.
There arose in the hearts of many who saw all this the fearful
question : how if the enemy's cavalry appeared on the flank,
and careered over the battlefield ? It would, without more
ado, sweep away the wreck of the infantry ! When, in the
evening of Mars-la-Tour, the dusk descended, and scarcely
anything could be discerned of the infantry on the wide
battlefield, and the great mass of artillery in the centre, more
than 100 guns, stood defenceless, a similar thought arose in
our breast. It appeared impossible to check a resolute charge
of cavalry that might have hurled itself upon these batteries.'

I

114 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

The tactician who suggests the method by which Napoleon's
grand principle of using the three arms in combination at the
decisive moment may be applied to the conditions of a modern
battlefield will do good service. To imitate exactly the
methods of Austerlitz and Borodino, of Rosbach and Salamanca,
may be impracticable ; but, if the principles of tactics be
immutable, they may still be applied, though after a different
method, and those who have refused to slavishly accept the
doctrine which, after 1870, relegated the cavalry to a secondary
position have made the first step in the right direction. Look
at it how we may, we must needs confess that in the European
wars of the past half-century the combination of the three
arms has been far inferior to that which characterised the
tactics of the great captains who have long since passed away.1
Nor can we accept the excuse that development of fire has
driven combination, even in a less degree, for ever from the
field. It may be more difficult, but von Bredow, absolutely
unsupported, and without aid from circumstance, showed us
at Mars-la-Tour that the cavalry has not yet been deprived
of all its vigour, and the general who first masters the art of
bringing the action of each arm into close co-operation will
initiate a new era in the art of war.

The Germans have long ago recognised that if, in 1870,
the artillery and infantry worked in with each other in a
manner that left little to be desired, the cavalry did not do
its full share on the field of battle, and the present experiments
in the employment of cavalry in masses as vast as those com-
manded by Seidlitz or Murat are but an attempt to give the
foot soldiers and the gunners that effective assistance which
decisive victory demands. It has been objected that so costly
is our cavalry, and so few in number as compared with the
mounted arm in Continental armies, that an engagement in
which they were unsparingly used would leave the British army
without sufficient force to carry out the essential duties of
screening and reconnaissance. But opportunities for decisive

1 It is pertinent to the argument set forth in the succeeding pages to notice
that in 1882, both at Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir, the English cavalry was
most effectively employed.

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 115

action on the part of cavalry are not of such frequent occurrence
as to give this objection weight. Either the ground is un-
favourable, or they are retained on the flanks by the presence
of opposing cavalry, or the resolute bearing and skilful conduct
of the enemy's infantry, even though defeated, give no opening.
Take the seven battles of the Metz campaign. On two oc-
casions only did the nature of the country offer scope to the
mounted arm, at Mars-la- Tour and Gravelotte, and on the
later date the exhaustion of the Prussian Guard before St.
Privat gave the only fair opportunity for a successful charge.
Take the Peninsular battles. Salamanca was the only field
where Wellington's horsemen found room and opportunity to
engage with success the opposing infantry. At Fuentes d'Onoro
Marmont's cavalry had space to act against the battalions of
the English right as they withdrew from their first position.
But Montbrun, the commander, was no Kellerman to profit by
the confusion of the moment, and yet this was the only chance
offered to the leaders of the French cavalry during their long
years of warfare with the Duke. Take the campaigns of
Napoleon, a captain who never hesitated — save at Borodino,
where, although the victory was incomplete, the Imperial Guard
was held back in reserve — to engage his last man and his
last horse. In few of his many battles were his cavalry asked
to charge unbroken infantry full in front. Before Austerlitz,
Marengo alone saw his horsemen employed unsupported to
carry out the crowning act of conflict. Of his later actions,
four only, Aspern, Wagram, Borodino, and Waterloo, called
for supreme efforts and gigantic sacrifices. And at the two
former the horsemen were employed to gain time, as were
von Bredow's squadrons at Mars-la-Tour, or the French
cuirassiers at Woerth ; at Borodino and Waterloo they were
ordered to attempt a task before which the infantry had
quailed. To employ the cavalry either to gain time or to act
as a substitute for the infantry may be characterised as an
expedient of despair. It is an expedient, destructive indeed,
but one which has been but seldom resorted to in the past,
and the necessity for its adoption is not likely to arise more
often in the future. Active participation in the battle does

12

116 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

not entail the same reckless expenditure of life, but it requires
something more than resolute courage ; it requires the quick
coup (Tail that enabled Murat and his colleagues to choose
their own time and place for striking in, and, whilst doing
their full share in the work of victory, to secure their squadrons
from annihilation. That this will be more difficult and more
costly in the future may be admitted. Cavalry can no longer
be held in readiness within a few hundred yards of the
enemy's line. But the opportunity will still come, as it did
at St. Privat. If we have but a small army, strength must
compensate for lack of numbers ; and the strength of an army
is its power of combining its whole force in a single blow. One
great victory is less costly than a series of indecisive battles, and
to win a great victory, to become master of every opportunity,
our generals must have in their cavalry an auxiliary that
can act as skilfully and as resolutely in the centre of the
field against opposing infantry as on the flanks of the battle
against the opposing cavalry. To do either it must be imbued
with the self-devotion of von Bredow, and with that confidence
in its own powers which critics of the school already spoken of
are doing their best to undermine.

Moreover, in their anxiety to destroy the idea that cavalry
is a foe to be feared, these critics have not only failed to
extract the true meaning of the tactical facts of 1870, but,
intent on a single object, have overlooked the latest develop-
ments of the mounted arm. Accompanied by mobile infantry
cavalry has acquired an independence to which it has as yet
been a stranger in European wars. Its offensive strength has
expanded, and, at the same time, it has been supplied with the
defensive capacity it has hitherto lacked. The author of ' The
Cavalry Division , has pointed out that the turning movement
of the 3rd French Corps at Gravelotte was held in check,
first, by the charge of the Guard Dragoons, and secondly, by
the presence of the 5th Cavalry Division on the extreme flank ;
and it has been said that at Gravelotte had du BaraiPs division,
posted throughout the day behind St. Privat, been employed
in the same manner, the decisive turning movement of the
Saxons might at least have been delayed long enough for the

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 117

French Imperial Guard to have come up into line. With
cavalry and horse artillery alone, it is suggested, the deploy-
ment of the Saxons might have been made at least a tedious
process, and perhaps protracted until nightfall. Had a force
of mobile infantry lent its aid, the difficulty and delay would
certainly have been greatly increased. Here is a new field
for consideration. How is the mass of infantry and artiDery,
employed in a wide turning movement, to secure a rapid
deployment and perhaps a change of front in the face of a
force composed as above ?

If the real value of the mounted arm be once recognised,
infantry critics will find in problems of the like nature a new
field, and the proper combination of the three arms — a question
that has been somewhat lost sight of in the storm of arguments
for and against the use of cavalry in the shock of battle — will
once more assume the prominence it deserves.

But it is not the cavalry alone that has to complain. The
infantry has also been made the sport of theory. So startling
were the phenomena which followed the introduction of the
breech-loader into battle, so radical the changes it involved,
that the earliest exponents of the new art of fighting appear
to have believed that the first principles of tactics were already
obsolete. They set themselves to create a system ab ovo, and
in their anxiety to develop the power of the improved firearm
ignored altogether the teaching of the past. The extra-
ordinary elasticity of the company column impressed those who
had seen it employed in 1866 and 1870 to such a degree that
the dangers it brought with it were overlooked. Even Marshal
von Moltke, in his ' Influence of Firearms upon Tactics,'
committed himself to most curious logic in order to prove the
efficacy of the new formation. Taking the Alma as an instance,
he first of all demonstrated the inferiority of the line to the
column ; and then, after describing the disadvantages of the
latter, without a single word of explanation, quietly summed
up to the effect that the company column was superior to the
line ! Recent wars have indeed given us no reason to doubt
the justice of his conclusions. The company column, indeed,
in one form or another, has been everywhere adopted as the

118 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

best means of maintaining the strength and energy of the
fighting line. But our contention is this : that it was too
hastily accepted, that its disadvantages were never pointed out,
that no endeavour was made to secure to the new formation the
sound principles of that which it superseded. If there is one
principle more than another which is important in war, it is
that in unity there is strength. For this maxim the Germans
substituted one of contrary tendency. They broke up the
attacking line into a number of small bodies, acting indepen-
dently, although with common impulse. There was no attempt
to combine elasticity and cohesion.

Instead of ' slowly broadening down, from precedent to
precedent,' infantry tactics underwent a violent revolution.
The old order was utterly discarded. It was asserted that the
old doctrines had had their day, that the experience of centuries
was a dead letter, and that the company column was the spell
with which to compel success. The battles of 1870 served
rather to confirm than to dispel the illusion. The new forma-
tions were never tested by a strong and well-sustained counter-
stroke, although the result of offensive returns on a small scale
indicated what the result would probably have been. And
they were never tested for this reason : the tactics of the French
army had been framed in accordance with theories even more
one-sided.

An unprejudiced examination of the methods of the Franco-
German war reveals the fact that the infantry on both sides
suffered from theories that were, to say the least, injudiciously
formulated. It may be that these theories were carried far
beyond what the authors intended. It may be that the
advocates of wholesale reforms had no thought of putting on
one side fundamental principles ; that, whilst founding their
demonstrations ' on the nature of the arm ' they still held in
mind that victory now, as heretofore, depends on moral
influences, the most telling of which is the strength imparted
by unity ; but it is none the less true that the very vehemence
of their arguments in favour of the new order obliterated in the
minds of those who followed them the very recollection of those
immutable rules of warfare which had hitherto been their guide.

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 119

There is little doubt that the remarkable work of Captain May,
*The Tactical Retrospect of 1866' — discredited as it was by
the supreme authorities, had an extraordinary effect on the
leading of companies and battalions in 1870. And, whilst the
startling doctrines there set forth as to the absolute indepen-
dence of the subordinate leaders had much to do with the
dispersion of units and the difficulties of command in the
battles of August and September 1870, the well-known
pamphlet of Prince Frederick Charles, ' On the Art of Fighting
the French,1 was directly accountable for even greater evils — for
the reckless impetuosity of the German officers of every rank.
Such was the general impatience to anticipate the enemy, to
seize the initiative, and to force on him the defensive, that it
almost seems as if the furia Francese was a veritable night-
mare.

In both theories there was, nevertheless, a large germ of
truth. The company column certainly does give elasticity to
the attack ; and it is absolutely necessary under rifle fire,
breech-loading or otherwise, that the subordinate leaders should
be given a free hand at the moment when the zone of effective
fire is reached, for from that moment higher control is, generally
speaking, absolutely impracticable. But it was not necessary
that the line of battle should be broken up into company
columns at the moment of deploying, often far beyond the zone
of effective fire ; it was unwise to make the company column
the tactical unit, for such was the practical result of deploying
battalions, brigades, and even divisions in line of company
columns, without leaving any reserve whatever in the hands of
the commanders ; and the feeling that the subordinate leaders
had so free a hand as to be almost encouraged to lose touch
of their own battalions, and to embark on independent enter-
prises, was exceedingly prejudicial to decisive success. Even
Moltke himself complains that the maxim ' Aus der Tiefe zu
fechten ' was generally neglected, and that the entry into
battle usually degenerated into an impatient rush. The Red
Prince, too, was in the right when he urged before his comrades-
in-arms the importance of the initiative, the power of the
offensive, and the necessity of anticipating the French onset

120 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

But it may be doubted whether he commended in his heart the
blundering into battle which was seen at Woerth, at Spicheren,
at Colombey, and at Gravelotte. Had not the French leaders
been so influenced by Marshal Kiel's theory, again true in itself,
that the proper tactics for an army carrying the breech-loader
was to remain on the defensive until the enemy had shattered
himself against an invulnerable front, they would have re-
membered that to take immediate advantage of the enemy's
mistake is the true practice of war ; they would have remem-
bered that the flank is generally the weakest point, and the
disciples of the royal soldier would have paid deeply for their
temerity. It has been said by a great tactical authority that,
so far as his reading goes, such a thing as a normal battle, that
is the battle of the text-books, where due preparation and fitting
dispositions precede the assault or the defence, very seldom occurs.
Now, this is a dictum which it is impossible to deny. In war,
more than in aught else, ' the best laid schemes gang aft agley.'1
But it by no means follows, because it is impossible to attain
the ideal, that the principles on which it is based should not
always be held in mind. The Franco-German War was
certainly remarkable, it may almost be said singular, for the
absence of normal battles. There are few, if any, actions in
which a deliberate plan, either of attack or defence, had been
conceived before the troops came into collision. The state of
chaos which the advance school of theorists, already spoken of,
had wrought in German tactics, was, perhaps, the chief cause that
made the Metz campaign so unlike the campaigns of Wellington
and Napoleon. But the extraordinary shortcomings of their
enemy had much to do with the eccentric leading of the victors.
Never was seen in any disciplined army such absolute neglect
of precaution, so inactive a cavalry, so complete a disregard of
the value of time. Except at Gravelotte — and even there the
troops at St. Privat were still waiting for their entrenching
tools — the French were always unprepared. Even at Woerth,
although MacMahon had already fortified and manned the
position, de Failly was not yet up. It was the abnormal
unreadiness of their enemy that, in part, induced the Germans
to depart from ordinary procedure.

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 121

Three times in fourteen days, at Vionville, on the left at
Gravelotte, and at Beaumont, the German advanced guards
found themselves within range of the French camps, the tents
still standing, the men engaged in cooking, and the whole force
without the slightest suspicion that the enemy was in the
immediate neighbourhood. Such opportunities gave no time
for precise arrangements, for concentrating the troops before
attack, or marshalling them in battle array. Moreover, at
Vionville strategical necessities dictated immediate action. At
Beaumont the tactical situation was equally imperious. But at
Spicheren and Colombey it was the vaulting ambition or the
too eager daring of the subordinate generals which initiated the
risk and confusion which characterised these two battles.

At Woerth the dislocation of the Crown Prince's plans was
due rather to the fact that from his position far in rear at Sultz
he was unable to control the ill-concerted enterprises of his
advanced guards. At Gravelotte, again, the battle of the right
wing was begun, contrary to the instructions of Moltke,
by the commander of the 33rd regiment, who, on his own
volition, attacked the advanced post of the French in the Bois de
Genivaux.

In the war of 1866, also, impromptu engagements were
more frequent than deliberate encounters ; but the Austrians
suffered from the same shortcomings as did the French in 1870 :
lack of reconnaissance and incapable leaders. Surprises were
the rule rather than the exception ; and, moreover, the Prussians,
striving to gain room for deployment in the open ground
beyond the mountains, were compelled to attack the hostile
posts, which maintained so slack a watch over the defiles,
without hesitation or delay.

Such were the circumstances which hindered the battles of
these two campaigns from being conducted in normal fashion ;
and although it is idle to argue that such circumstances will not
recur, that the enemy will never lay himself open to surprise,
or the advanced-guard leaders always act with circumspection,
it must be acknowledged that, with these shortcomings rectified
pitched battles — that is, engagements where both sides have
sufficient time to make preliminary dispositions — will again

122 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

become the rule ; and German tacticians are careful to inculcate
the importance of a deliberate entry into action.

Because the breech-loader was the most effective factor in
both these wars, a belief appears to have arisen that its intro-
duction has rendered impracticable the deliberate and carefully
prepared attacks of large masses of men. It is true that long-
range fire has diminished the control of the superior leaders.
It is no longer possible for the commander to bring his troops
to within so short a distance of the enemy that, when launched
on the objective, his subordinates have no space wherein to
wander from the true direction ; but if due precautions be taken
to reconnoitre far to the front, and the value of preparation
and of unity be thoroughly realised, it will seldom happen that
time will be lacking to devise a plan of battle or to make fitting
arrangements for its prosecution. Take the campaigns of the
greatest soldiers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
soldiers who were tacticians as well as strategists — Marlborough,
Frederick, Napoleon, Wellington, and Lee. In how many
instances were they compelled to fight unprepared ? Not one
of them, save on very rare occasions, was taken at such a dis-
advantage as to be prevented from marshalling his troops in
such order as best befitted the circumstances, and of meeting
the enemy, either when attacking or on the defensive, with his
whole strength. Frederick, indeed, was surprised at Hohenkirch.
At Busaco, had Massena obeyed Napoleon's rule and been
present with his advanced guard, Wellington, in all probability,
would have been defeated. For some reason which Napier
makes no attempt to explain, 'the position was only half
occupied, and the allies were moving with the disorder con-
sequent on the taking unknown ground, when forty thousand
French infantry and a large number of batteries crowned the
opposite ridge.1 Lee, too, cautious almost to a fault on the
defensive, neglected to entrench his left at Mine Run, when
confronted by the Army of the Potomac in October 1863, and
two Federal corps, nearly equal in number to his whole force,
had already been massed opposite this point when the impending
assault was countermanded. But these are the only instances.
The necessity for immediate attack without waiting for supports,

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 123

a proceeding which destroys all symmetry of action, which sends
units into the struggle on an abnormal front, renders impossible
the retention and decisive employment of the reserve, and
reduces superior leading to a minimum, will probably occur in
the future as in the past.

But, whilst we may rate at its true value, under such
circumstances, that spirit of energetic initiative which the
Germans are so sedulous to foster, the dangers of the abnormal,
that is — the accidental battle — should also be given their
due weight. If the confusion, and the but partially decisive
results consequent on that confusion, which the battles of
1866 and 1870 display are to be avoided, the general-in-
chief must be allowed time to frame and to communicate his
plans, to point out the various objectives, and to dispose his
troops in accordance with the scheme of attack or of defence
that he has conceived. Thus only will the purpose of battle be
fulfilled : the annihilation or demoralising defeat of the enemy's
army. Regarding the question from the broader point of view,
it is interesting to note the methods of the two greatest English-
speaking generals of the nineteenth century, Wellington and
Lee. Both having indicated to their subordinates the space
they were to occupy in the line of battle and the tactical
objectives they were asked to seize, frankly surrendered into
their hands the further conduct of the fight. Wellington on
the defensive, taught, perhaps, by the danger of the rash
counter-stroke of the Guards and Germans at Talavera, sternly
forbade all local offensive action beyond the limits of the
position. Lee, probably from the more extensive front of battle
which he had to superintend, was content to leave the decision of
limit to the judgment of his lieutenants. 'During the battle,1
wrote Lee, * my direction is of more harm than use ; I must
then rely on my division and brigade commanders. I think
and I act with all my might to bring up my troops to the right
place at the right moment ; after that I have done my duty.'
Moreover, both these commanders appear to have instilled into
these same lieutenants a wholesome apprehension of bringing on
accidental battles.1 Nor did they find it impossible to make

1 With the exception, perhaps, of Craufurd, the famous commander of the
Light Division.

124 THE SCIENCE OF AVAR

their orders explicit without at the same time hampering their
subordinates.

This faculty seems to have been somewhat lacking in
1870. At Spicheren, on August 6, even the commander of
the First Army, General von Steinmetz, had no knowledge
of the ultimate intention of the Commander-in-Chief, which
was to delay the crossing of the Saar until the 9th. For
two days frequent reports had come in from the cavalry that
the enemy was preparing to retreat. The unaccountable
evacuation of the Saarbriicken ridge, covering the bridges over
the frontier stream, heightened the impression ; and the com-
mander of the 14th Division, having occupied the abandoned
position, took upon himself the responsibility of attacking the
hostile troops that faced him on the Spicheren heights. These
he believed to be but a small rearguard. In reality, they
numbered 27,000. The Prussian force was increased during the
course of the day to 30,000, but had Bazaine and his subordinate
commanders acted with greater promptitude a French reinforce-
ment of 30,000 men might easily have been brought on to the
field. The Official Account, determined to do nothing to dis-
courage initiative, discovers that ' the independent action of the
14th Division was perfectly in unison with the spirit of German
generalship, which directed every effort to hanging closely on
the adversary.' That this partakes somewhat of the nature ot
a suppressio veri may be suspected from the fact that on the
following day, when it was uncertain whether the French were
retreating or had taken up a fresh position near Bouzonville,
the advance of the infantry, set in motion by von Steinmetz,
was stopped by a direct order from the King, and the task of
keeping touch assigned to the cavalry alone. Again, at Grave-
lotte, as the author of ' Das Volk in Waffen ' has pointed out,
the leader of the 9th Corps, who was intended to maintain a
demonstrative action against the enemy's front until the turning
movement should be developed, was not explicitly instructed to
this effect, and hence came about the premature engagement of
the corps, the losses and the withdrawal of its fourteen batteries.

These criticisms are made in no carping spirit. But whilst
we may admire to the full the excellence of the Prussian organi-

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 125

sation, the soundness of their system of practical training, their
magnificent discipline, the self-devotion of the officers, their
superabundant energy, and their unshrinking acceptance of
responsibility, it is, of all things, unwise not to recognise their
faults. None are readier to do so, now that the majority of the
great leaders of 1870 have passed to a bourne where criticism is
powerless to annoy, than the Germans themselves. No more
scathing stricture, not only on tactical procedure but on the
bearing in battle of both officers and men, has ever been
published than the pamphlet of German origin, * The Summer
Night's Dream,1 which appeared in the United Service Magazine.

'The time,1 says Laymann, in the 'Frontal Attack of
Infantry,' written after 1870, ' which is spent in making good
dispositions and introducing the attack is never lost. . . . The
least we can do is to make the most careful preparation, in
order to secure the greatest possible chance of success.'

' Whenever it is possible,' says von der Goltz, ' the advance
of a well-ordered development of the forces should precede
entrance into fire. ... A careful arrangement of the battle
secures the simultaneous and collective employment, if not of all
forces, yet of the major part of them. It spares much blood-
shed, and, in the course of battle, readily recoups the time it
has cost. . . . The action of the future,' he adds, ' will demand
more thorough preliminaries, a clearer comprehension of the
object to be attained, a more careful arrangement, a more
intimate co-operation of all three arms, and the simultaneous
employment of all available troops to decide the combat.'

It is not without reason that attention has been drawn
to the methods of war as practised by Wellington and Lee.
After the war of 1870, and its stupendous successes, a school
arose amongst us which saw nothing but perfection in the army
and the methods of the victors. It is difficult to get rid of the
idea that the very warmth of the opposition which the new
ideas excited drove these critics to extremes. That the opposi-
tion was strong is certain ; but looking back at the conflict, now
that the excitement has passed away, it seems as if both parties
were partially in the right. The one cried with truth that a
reform in tactics was absolutely necessary; the other, with

126 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

equal truth, that its opponents had forgotten that there were
1 fortes ante Agamemnona,1 and great wars before 1870. In
the minds of some was, perhaps, working the unconscious feeling
that what Wellington had handed down was not to be lightly
discarded. The experience of the Crimea and of the Mutiny
taught others — and there was much experience in the ranks
of the British army — that in the disorder, the precipitation
and recklessness of the new methods, lurked the seeds of
great disasters ; and the majority of English soldiers were
loth to throw away, at the bidding, as it were, of a foreign
nation, the heritage of tactical skill which is the birthright of
our race.

Neither in England nor in America did the new theories meet
with aught but a grudging acceptance. And the instinct that
withstood them was sound to the core. For many a century we
have been proud apprentices to war, and it is not strength nor
courage, pride ourselves on them as we may, but sheer tactical
adroitness, the quick perception of the means to the end, the
mingled finesse and resolution which success demands, that have
wrought our triumphs both by sea and land.

To the mingled strain of Norseman, Celt, and Saxon we owe
that combination of staunchness on the defensive and elan in the
attack to which even the greatest and bitterest of our enemies
paid a generous tribute. But such attributes are not sufficient
of themselves, and to whatever era of our national history we refer
we shall find that they have been supplemented by the tactical
skill which was necessary to their full development. It is true
that victory has not always been constant. The memory of our
ignominious expulsion from the Low Countries in 1792 was
obliterated by the triumphs of the Peninsula. But neither the
disasters of the war of the American Revolution, nor the defeats
which marked the war of 1812, have a place in our catalogue of
failure. Inflicted by an enemy who was flesh of our flesh and
bone of our bone, they can no more be cited as a proof of our
inferior aptitude for war than Bannockburn or Prestonpans.
* Pares aquilas, et pila minantia pilis ' : our own were the hands
that smote us. The same tenacity which retained the ridge of
Waterloo retained, with Howe and his troops in possession of

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 127

Philadelphia, the defiant American battalions in their winter
camp at Valley Forge, dwindling slowly and exhausted, but
still unable to recognise that they were beaten. The same
quick perception which immortalised Torres Vedras, and taught
our generals how to destroy the columns of the French, raised
the entrenchments of Bunker's Hill, extemporised the defences
of New Orleans, and taught the colonial levies that their only
chance of coping with the well-drilled battalions of the English
army was to imitate the tactics of the Indian and the snare
that had been laid for Braddock.

To English soldiers of the present generation, who are ac-
customed to have held up to them the supremacy of Prussia
in all things warlike, this may appear a startling assertion.
But if history be examined it will be found that it is an
assertion susceptible of proof. From Cressy to Waterloo,
from Sluys to Trafalgar, from Plassey to Tel-el-Kebir,
the same characteristic is always present. To what do we
owe the successes of the Peninsula ? Principally to the line
formation, and its superior development of fire ; secondly,
according to General de Segur, to the manner in which the
defensive positions were occupied. It was the custom of other
nations with whom the French fought to man the crest of the
position, and he relates that not only were their troops thus
exposed to artillery fire, but that when the attacking column
ascended the slope the bullets of the defenders passed over their
heads. The British troops, on the contrary, were generally
posted at musket-range in rear of the crest. Here they
suffered little from the hostile guns, and when the attacking
column surmounted the hill it was received with a heavy frontal
and overlapping fire, and was then charged with the bayonet.
Again, although it is a fact which is often disregarded, the
Peninsular army won even more victories when attacking than
defending, and here the line played an all-important part.
Wellington's formation for attack was in several lines, following
one another in close succession ; and it is worthy of remark that
it was in all probability an instinctive adherence to traditional
methods that won the Alma. The formation in three lines,
due rather to the memory of Salamanca than to any set purpose,

128 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

forced of itself the way to victory. These were the tactics,
then, that defeated the conquerors of Europe, and they were
by no means novel. In the days of Marlborough, as in those of
Frederick, the line was the normal order of battle. When the
majority of nations, after the outbreak of the French Revolu-
tion, saw fit to break entirely with the past, and to imitate the
columns that had worsted them, England held fast to her
traditions, meeting the new tactics by modifications of her
system, extending the front by employing two ranks instead of
three, and shielding the thin line, whether in attack or
defence, by a cloud of skirmishers. Prussia, on the other hand,
although she still retained the linear tactics of Frederick the
Great at Jena and Auerstadt, employed no skirmishers, and the
men still stood three deep. At Wagram, also, the Archduke
Charles marshalled his Austrians in line, but again without those
modifications which gave the formation sufficient strength to
oppose the onset of the French.

It is a curious fact that none of the French marshals in the
Peninsula nor Napoleon himself at Waterloo attempted any
other method of attack except that of deep columns, preceded
by skirmishers, against the English. Neither the formation in
small battalion columns, nor continuations of line of column,
giving a broad front of fire as well as weight for the charge,
which had been the rule up to Austerlitz, and had been re-
suscitated by Napoleon in 1814, were ever employed. It may
be noted, however, that both at Alexandria and Maida they
failed ; and so the English tactics, combining the elasticity of
the new order with the vigour of the old, proved superior to
the tactics of the nations who disdained reform as well as to
those of the French who had altogether discarded the experience
of the past.

It has already been implied that the Americans in the
Revolutionary War gave proof of their kinship, although the
method of showing it was scarcely fraternal, and the Secession
War is strong evidence that years of separation have in no wise
impaired the aptitude they then displayed. With a regular
army of less than 20,000 officers and men, possessing no more
experience of service than that won in the Mexican campaign of

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 129

more than twenty years before, and in punitive expeditions
against the redskins of the western border, the nation found
itself plunged into a conflict on the vastest scale. And yet,
despite the absolute ignorance of war and its requirements which
existed amongst the mass of combatants, despite the lack of
experience, the tactics of the American troops, at a very early
period, were superior to those of the Prussians in 1866. In
organisation and in discipline there were gross shortcomings ; in
strategy, controlled as it was by the Government and not by
the military chiefs, grave errors were committed ; but on the
field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself. The success
with which from the very first the cavalry was employed on the
outpost line puts to shame the inactivity of the Prussian horse-
men in Bohemia ; and, whilst the tactics of the Prussian
artillery against the Austrians were feeble in the extreme, the
very contrary was the case in the Secession War. If the
necessity of preparing the way for the assault by silencing the
enemy's guns, and shaking the moral of his troops by a heavy
bombardment, was not always realised, the batteries, neverthe-
less, were always massed when the ground permitted, and so
early as Bull Run we find the gunners on both sides rendering
effective support to the infantry by boldly pushing forward into
the fighting line. Nor were the larger tactical manoeuvres even
of 1870 an improvement on those of the American campaigns.
In many respects they were identical ; flank attacks and
wide turning movements were as frequent in one case as in the
other ; and not only were the victors of Sedan anticipated in
the method of attack by successive rushes, but the terrible
confusion which followed a protracted struggle, and for which
Prussian tacticians still despair of discovering a remedy, was
speedily rectified by American ingenuity. That the American
troops, acting on the offensive, were not called upon to face
so formidable a weapon as the chassepot is true enough ; the
effects of fire were not felt at so great a range, but their tactical
formations were far better adapted to preserve cohesion than
those of the Prussians. Moreover, if it be asserted that such
formations were impossible against the breech-loader, there
is no doubt whatever that the Americans made more careful

130 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

preparations for attack, were far more zealous to re-form the
ranks after every phase of battle, and, whilst developing a
broad front of fire, kept within proper bounds the initiative ot
their company commanders. An American officer, speaking of
the extraordinary intermingling of units and the delay in
rallying at Koniggratz, writes as follows : ' The German troops
were green in 1866. American troops of 1865 would have
assembled much quicker. But in 1862 the Americans would
have been nearly as slow about it as the Germans.'

Nor is the fact that the tactical capacity which is claimed
as the birthright of both English and American soldiers has
been found wanting in individuals a valid argument against its
existence in the mass. Many a man is a soldier in name who
is morally unfitted for command. There are men so bound by
regulation and method as to have lost all power of initiative,
who are incapable of assuming responsibility, whose only guide
in battle is the Drill-book, and who have lost the ability of
adapting principles to circumstances.

Moreover, tactical instinct seldom acts by inspiration. It
is seldom possible, when confronted by an enemy who employs
novel and unexpected tactics, to devise on the field the best
means of meeting them.

To maintain that every Englishman or every American is
naturally a better soldier than any Frenchman or any German
would be ridiculous, but that a capacity for conquest is inherent
in the English-speaking race it would be useless to deny.
Whether this attribute is the gift of Providence, whether it is
the outcome of climate, of freedom, or of blood, is a question
with which we have no concern ; it is enough that it exists, and
we have, therefore, no need to ask another nation to teach us
to fight, nor are we bound to accept the ' Tactics of 1870 '
or the German ' Field Exercise ' of to-day as infallible and
conclusive.

But, at the same time, we cannot afford to despise the
experience of others. As regards the tactics to be employed
against a civilised enemy, we have scarcely sufficient personal
data on which to build. To understand the moral and physical
effect ot modern firearms, to recognise the dangers that beset a

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 131

modern battlefield, the obstacles that we shall there meet with,
the enhanced difficulties of command and of manoeuvring, we
must turn to recent history, and with recent European history,
so far as war is concerned, we have fortunately had nothing to
do. It would be unwise, moreover, not to give full weight to
the conclusions at which Continental critics, practically en-
lightened, have arrived, but it is not essential either to assent to
or to adopt these conclusions.

We have to prepare for war under present conditions, and
we must prepare for it on certain definite lines ; but judgment
should be suspended until we have mastered the experiences of
the breech-loader battle, until we have considered the effects of
differences of organisation, of discipline and moral which exist
between ourselves and others, and have decided whether deviation
from principles and methods, which not tradition merely, but
success almost unvarying, has hall-marked, is j ustified or not. To
quote General Maurice, ' the less we imagine we can dispense with
any of the lessons of the past, the sounder our conclusions will be.
Such is the fashion after which we should exercise the critical
faculty, and, fortunately, the instinct which leads to sound
conclusions is present to preside at our deliberations.

The echoes of the triumphal march of their returning army
had hardly died away * Unter den Linden ' before the Prussian
soldiers of '71 began taking stock of the methods by which
they had been making history. They found, in the first place,
that successful infantry attacks, generally speaking, had been
carried out by swarms of skirmishers ; that the only way of
gaining ground, when once the zone of effective fire had been
reached, was by feeding the skirmishers with constant rein-
forcements ; and that, in a hotly contested battle, battalion
had to be piled upon battalion in order to maintain the firing
line at full strength.

Now the outcome of such methods as these, as Boguslawski
says, was a return to ' the combat of savages, who, fighting
without any regular order, rush in masses upon the enemy,
wishing to come as quickly as possible to single combat.1 And
he further confesses that ' such a dispersion of the combatants
does not contribute to our control over the fight nor to its

k 2

132 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

quick conclusion.1 But these methods, with all their dis-
advantages, had been successful, and by the Prussians they
were accepted as the true tactics of the breech-loader battle.
Extreme disorder was held to be inevitable ; and for a long
time the only improvements suggested were a stricter fire-
discipline and constant practice in fighting in a medley of
different companies, battalions, and brigades. No change in
formation was advocated. A single line of skirmishers, fed
by the constant accession of small bodies from the rear,
remained the normal disposition for infantry on the offensive.

These tactics were diametrically opposed to those that had
been hitherto taught in England. The Prussians held that,
not only was the attack to be prepared, but that the assault
was to be carried out, by the skirmishers. A second line,
except as a means of feeding the firing line, they considered
useless. Our own authorities, on the other hand, held tha
the duty of the skirmishers was merely to cover the advance of
the main body, which, moving shoulder to shoulder, was to pass
through the firing line and carry the position with the bayonet.
So soon as the experience of the war of 1870-1 began to
be discussed in England, the two schools of critics came into
violent opposition on the question of the infantry attack.
The first favoured Prussian methods. The second held fast
to tradition. The first, so far as numbers went, were much in
the minority. The second had, perhaps, less skilful advocates ;
and, moreover, the details of the Franco-German battles
were not then sufficiently known to enable them to overthrow
arguments, which their antagonists based on incidents of
the recent struggle. The conflict between these two opinions
is a matter of ancient history. It is, nevertheless, interest-
ing, not only as an instance of the tendency of criticism
to touch extremes, but of the value of an instinctive regard for
the lessons of the past. It was not that the more conservative
school considered reform unnecessary, but it held that our former
tactics were based on sound principles, principles that had with-
stood the practical test of many years of warfare and were not
now to be lightly thrown aside.

There is no need to refer to text-books or theorists ; the

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 133

details of the Peninsular battles show us practically what was
the traditional attack formation of the British infantry.
(1) As a preliminary disposition, the troops were divided into
three lines before they were set in motion. (2) The objective
of each division was clearly indicated, either by direct in-
structions, or by the division being placed opposite that point
of the enemy's position which it was to assault, and being
allotted a space in the line of battle that it could adequately
cover, and no more. (3) During the attack itself, the skirmish
line was given a free hand, and the leaders of units were
allowed to act on their own initiative. So fully was this last
necessity recognised, that General Maurice, in his Wellington
essay, says that the regulations of 1870, based on the old
skirmishing tactics, 'although introduced before skirmishing
had attained its present importance, appear to be compiled on
as sound principles as if all the experience of the Franco-
German war had been before the writers.1 What these tactics
were may be gathered from Napier's account of the operations
of the Light Division on the Coa. ' Here, as in every other
part of the field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion
officers remedied the faults of the general. . . . There was no
room for a line, no time for anything but battle. Every
captain carried off his company as an independent body,
and joining as he could with the 15th and 52nd, the
whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties
and under no regular command, yet each confident in the
courage and discipline of those on his right and left, and all
keeping together with surprising vigour.' (4) The second
and third lines in close order behind the skirmishers maintained
their tactical unity throughout the advance. When the
position was carried, no time was lost in resuming the original
formation, and the troops were in a position to prosecute a
further attack, to follow up the enemy, or to check a counter-
stroke. (5) The knowledge that strong supports were close
at hand, and the very aspects of their solid lines and gleaming
bayonets, not only added that element of moral strength to
the attack which is above all things essential, but shook the
moral of the staunchest enemy.

134 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Such were the principles, putting aside for the moment
the consideration that the bayonet was expected to be the
supreme arbiter of the fight, of our offensive tactics. The
first and most important of these was the formation in three
lines, preceded by skirmishers. In this, as I have already
stated, there was nothing novel. It is recommended by
Vegetius, the most ancient writer on minor tactics. It was
familiar to the Black Prince. ' Let us consider,' he said, when
the French were reported to be advancing on Poitiers, ' how we
can best receive thern at advantage,1 and the English army
was then drawn up in three lines of battle. Marlborough
found it sufficient. It was abandoned at Fontenoy, and with
it victory departed. It was invariably employed by Wellington.
It had become traditionary in England, and no English soldier
had hitherto doubted its efficacy. It is scarcely matter for
wonder, then, that the great majority of English soldiers
refused to be convinced that the Prussian system, which, in
almost every single respect, ignored the principles on which
their own formations had been founded, could be anything but
vicious. They were ready to admit that the new firearms had
made modifications necessary, but they would go no further.
They felt, truly enough, that the new methods absolutely
invited the disorder which practical experience taught them
was so great an evil, and that the evidence brought forward
was scarcely strong enough to prove that there was no speedier
means of carrying a position than by wearing out the defender
by sheer stress of fire. However, the views of the reformers
prevailed. The different editions of the ' Field Exercise ' issued
between 1870 and 1888 followed, to a great extent, the lead
of the Prussians. The line of skirmishers and its supports
became the fighting line. The second line was merely to be
employed to stiffen the fighting line prior to the final advance
on the demoralised enemy. The skirmishers were to give the
coup cle grace. In other respects the views of the conservative
school prevailed. The leaders of companies were not allowed
the same independence as in Prussia ; and the retention of
a second line in the hands of the battalion commander, and
its advance at the critical moment in full strength, was

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 135

calculated to preserve tactical unity and to render moral
assistance at the right time. In 1888, however, although no
new experience had been gained, and the introduction of the
magazine rifle had even increased the power of fire, and had
seemingly rendered further modifications necessary, the ' Field
Exercise ' appeared under a new title containing radical changes
as regards formations for the attack and the method of its
execution. Radical, that is, with respect to the theories of
the Prussian school that had been accepted since the fall of
Paris. But radical in no other sense, for the present tactics
of the British infantry are essentially those that were advocated
by the more conservative school when the necessity of modifica-
tion was first recognised, and are based on the same principles
which tradition had handed down to us as sound. The
attacking force is once more divided into three lines, each with
a distinct duty. The skirmishers no longer bear the title of
the fighting line, and whilst they have still the most important
part to play in beating down the enemy's fire and breaking
down his moral, the bayonet has once more asserted itself.1 To
the second line, relying on the cold steel only, as in the days
of the Peninsula, is entrusted the duty of bringing the battle
to a speedy conclusion, and of inserting, in the midst of the
enemy's position, a body of troops in such unity and order as
to enable pursuit to be rapidly taken up, a further attack
initiated, or a counter-stroke beaten back. To this point the
pendulum has swung. It remains for us to examine whether
the tactical instinct, which has been already claimed as peculiar
to our race, is in consonance with the teaching of recent
history.

The most remarkable phenomenon of the wars of 1866,
1870-1 and 1877-8 was the extraordinary intermixture of
units which took place during the infantry attack. Now. it
may be granted that even in the days of muzzle-loaders the
same confusion was by no means unusual. But it is open to

1 It must be remembered that this was written some years ago. Since
then much has happened ; but the bayonet, which was somewhat under a
cloud as the result of the abnormal conditions of South African warfare, has
again justified its existence in the Far East. — Ed.

136 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

doubt whether it lias not been magnified by the advocates of
the Prussian system. Colonel Gawler, one of the most reliable
authorities as to the tactics of the Peninsula, asserts, indeed,
that every stoutly fought battlefield saw men of different
companies, of different regiments, even of different divisions,
fighting side by side. But he refers only to the skirmishers.
Colonel Home, again, brings forward the Alma as an instance.
But the advance across the Alma, although made in three lines,
was not conducted in the same fashion as the advance at Sala-
manca or Vittoria. In the first place, the troops of '54 were
unpractised in the movements of large bodies, however well
drilled they may have been in battalion. Secondly, the staff
was equally inexperienced, and the front to be taken up by the
first line was underestimated by a thousand yards. Thirdly,
the troops moved forward in line for more than a mile. In the
Peninsula, on the other hand, the advance was invariably made
in line of quarter-columns until the zone of effective fire was
reached. In fact, Wellington and his lieutenants knew that
' columns,1 to quote Napier, ' are the soul of military operations ;
in them is the victory, and in them is safety to be found after
a defeat. The secret consists in knowing when and where to
extend the front.'' Columns for the preliminary movement, line
for the assault ; a combination which assured strength, rapidity,
and order, was the weapon of Wellington. Raglan relied on
the line alone, and hence the confusion on the heights of Alma.
The Germans have preferred to recognise confusion as an
inevitable evil, and endeavour to minimise it by training their
men in peace to such control and obedience as is possible under
such untoward circumstances. This they had done before 1870,
and the system bore good fruit. To quote General Maurice,
speaking of the great war : ' The distinction between the form
in which the Prussians and French severally fought, after
each had begun to realise the necessity for change, was not that
the French were less scattered than the Prussians ; on the
contrary, they are expressly said to have been much more so.
The distinction was this : the Prussian training had prepared
them to be in hand though scattered. The French, unprepared

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 137

for any other use of skirmishers than an auxiliary one, were out
of hand as soon as they were scattered.1 With the system
which wrought such sound results it is impossible to quarrel.
It is one that is absolutely necessary. But it is well to ask
whether it is all that is necessary. Is it not wise, whilst
doing all in our power to evolve order out of disorder, to
begin at the very beginning, and to endeavour to prevent
that disorder assuming abnormal dimensions ? The * battle-
discipline' of Boguslawski and other tacticians does not com-
mend itself as a sufficient remedy even to their own comrades-
in-arms. One German officer, at least, arguing from his own
experience, has asserted, in no measured terms, his conviction
of its insufficiency. In this respect there are few who are
not disposed to agree with the author of ' A Summer Night's
Dream.' It is his revolt against a procedure which has
been instinctively condemned as vicious that has aroused so
much interest in his revelations. At the same time his pro-
posals for improvement have not met with approval. They
ignore the fundamental evils of the German system of attack.
They upset the modifications of the tactics of the pre-breech-
loader era, which every school has accepted as necessary. They
introduce others with which history and experience will have
nothing to do ; and they directly violate the principles which
have governed infantry tactics since the wars of the French
Revolution. In the first place, the author suggests that instead
of the first line of attacking infantry being formed into a chain
of skirmishers, allowing each man five feet in the ranks, it
should be composed of a number of sections, each fifty strong,
in single rank and in close order. His objection to extended
order appears to be not so much that it produces confusion and
the intermixture of units, but that it presents so many oppor-
tunies of skulking ; and skulking, if his statements are to be
swallowed, existed in the Prussian army of 1870 to a degree
that was never heard of in a well-disciplined army of regular
troops before or since. Now, extended order has been adopted
as part of the infantry combat, not only, as the Drill-book,
following Boguslawski, implies, because within a certain range

138 THE SCIENCE OF WAll

the advance in close order is no longer practicable, but for the
following very excellent reasons :

1. Extended order is specially adapted to rapid move-
ment over ground made difficult either by natural or artificial
obstacles.

2. Fire action can be best developed in extended order.
The men have latitude in the choice of a position, and have
plenty of space wherein to use the rifle.

3. Latitude in the choice of a position means latitude in the
selection of cover ; and this, combined with the facts that a
change of position may be made with the utmost rapidity, and
that ' dressing , is not insisted on, as it must be in close order,
renders the extended line the least favourable target for the
enemy's fire.

The objections to the proposals of this dreamer of dreams
are (1) That time, an important factor in the attack, where
the chief endeavour is to pass over the ground and to get within
effective range as speedily as possible, would be lost if, after the
passage of every obstacle, the taking or leaving cover, the sections
were to be accurately dressed. (2) That these sections, with a
compact front of forty yards, and a wide interval between each,
would invite a concentrated fire. (3) That a shoulder-to-shoulder
movement, if it is not allowed to degenerate into loose order, lacks
the rapidity of the rush of a number of men who have nothing
to think about except reaching the next halting place in the
speediest and safest manner they can devise.

Loss of time and loss of life would be the results of such a
formation. And sympathise as we may with his endeavours to
restore ' the bloody energy of battle,' it is impossible to approve
of unnecessary waste of vital power. Such methods are too
drastic. The presence of the faint-hearted would scarcely
compensate for the sacrifice of stouter hearts ; and it is scarcely
necessary to revolutionise tactics in order to check an evil
with which a few file-closers, aided by a copious vocabulary and
the regulation revolver, would be well able to deal. The
disorder which accompanied and followed the attack of the Prus-
sian infantry in 70-71, was not due to the use, but to the
abuse, of extended order ; and this abuse arose from the want of

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 139

preparation ; the hurrying through or neglect of the preliminary
stages ; faulty dispositions at the outset, the impetuosity of
all ranks, and the excessive independence of the subordinate
leaders.

The truth is that, in many respects, the whole structure of
the Prussian tactics of 1870 was fundamentally unsound. This
sweeping statement is, of course, open to the objection that the
regulations in force before the war made careful provision
against the occurrence of the faults that there made themselves
so prominent. There are two ways, however, of reading regula-
tions. The one to master them so thoroughly that each has its
due prominence in the mind, and therefore its due prominence
in action ; to become, as it were, instinctively imbued with the
spirit of the whole. The other, the more universal, to regard
only those which affect everyday procedure, such as drill,
manoeuvres, and inspections, and which are therefore thrust
into undue prominence ; relegating the remainder to the second
place in peace ; and consequently, as in times of excitement
men act rather by habit than on reflection, ignoring them in
action. That portion of our own Drill-book which refers to
attack and defence is merely the essence of tactics. There is
no single sentence which is not of primary importance, no single
principle laid down that can be violated with impunity, no
single instruction that should not be practised over and over
again. And yet how often, in the attack of a battalion, are the
diagrams, intended merely as a general guide under the least
complicated circumstances, the only things that are considered !
It is not so much that the spirit is neglected for the letter, but
that the constant attention to those rules in the daily work of
the drill-ground leads to other rules and principles, less suscep-
tible of methodical procedure, being overlooked. Certain
principles are exalted to the exclusion of others. It was thus
with the Prussians in 1870. The power of the initiative, the
strength of the offensive, the excellent results of the company-
column formation, had been dinned into their ears. They went
into battle with their minds saturated with these ideas, and
fundamental principles were cast to the winds. It is for this
reason that the groundwork of an officer's education should be

140 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the tactical regulations ; the drill-book, and the drill-book
alone. When every word and every principle contained therein
has been tattooed into his brain, theoretically and practically,
so that it is impossible for him to act otherwise than in accor-
dance with them, then, and not till then, let him be introduced
to grand tactics and the operations of war. Let him learn
how the individual soldier, the individual section, company, and
battalion, is expected to act in every phase of active service,
and the knowledge he has thus acquired will render it easy for
him to learn the art of independent command. Skill in placing
his men in good position for using their rifles, in leading them
from cover to cover, in knowing when to close and when to
extend during an attack, is of infinitely more value to the
regimental officer than a knowledge of how Wellington crossed
the Douro or Steinmetz passed the defile of Nachod. Four
weeks' company-training is a better education for a company
leader than a year's study of Hamley.

However, if it is anything at all, the education of the
Prussian officers is pre-eminently practical. It would therefore
appear that if they failed when brought face to face with reality,
peace practice is of little value in the field. But, as already
mentioned, the Prussians derived much benefit in one respect
from their peace practice ; and if in other respects their methods
were vicious, it was because the first principles of war had not
become second nature ; and that ideas, good in themselves, had
been engrafted at the expense of others equally sound and even
more important. Space does not permit more than a very
general glance at the conduct of the earlier battles of 1870, but
it requires no more than a brief survey to prove that funda-
mental rules were flagrantly broken, and that this was in great
degree the cause of that confusion which the author of the
'Summer Night's Dream' proposes to set right by remedies
worse than the disease.

In the first place, the necessity of preparing the attack by a
heavy artillery fire was habitually neglected, not by the artillery
itself — it was always ready and always in position to carry out
its duty — but by the subordinate commanders. The leaders of
advanced guards never troubled themselves to give the gunners

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 141

time to do their work. The action was generally begun before
the batteries had deployed. So, at Spicheren, the infantry was
moved off to the attack at the same time that the batteries
came into action, although the Rotherberg, the point of the
enemy's position most dangerous to the advancing troops, was
open to a concentric artillery fire, and held only a single battery
to oppose it. So, at Woerth, the advanced guard of the
11th Army Corps, before the French guns were silenced,
sent four battalions across perfectly open meadows to assault
the Niederwald, which, after penetrating the wood for a
short distance, were repulsed in the utmost disorder. At an
earlier hour, on the same day, the 4th Bavarian Division
attempted to move forward on Froschwiller, employing four
battalions for the purpose. After a brief march ' a shell and
mitrailleuse fire prevented their further progress.' There was
no artillery in support. And even when reinforced by six fresh
battalions, the attack, reading between the lines of the official
account, appears to have come near disaster. At Colombey the
advanced guard of the 7th Corps rushed into action exactly
as had done the advanced guards of the 11th Corps and the
Bavarians at Woerth. At Gravelotte the famous assault of
the Prussian Guard upon St. Privat was not prepared by the
artillery. Although 180 guns were in position against the
French right, 'the centre of the St. Privat position was still
untouched when the 1st Guard Division advanced to the
attack.1

Before the French left wing, moreover, although the first
rush of the 15th Division on the Bois de Genivaux may in
some degree be excused by the determination of the infantry to
gain ground for the advance of the artillery, its further attempt,
when it cleared the wood, to move against the exceedingly
strong line of trenches on the Point du Jour plateau was alto-
gether premature. Here, then, is one important rule, which
was in several instances utterly disregarded, and this by officers
of the highest rank. Had it been observed, unity would have
stood a better chance. It is not one of the least beneficial
results of the preliminary artillery fire that it gives time for the
infantry to deploy into line of battle ; for the commanders to

142 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

select and point out objectives, and to assign to each unit an
adequate task in the coining struggle ; as well as for the leaders
of the latter to examine the ground over which they are to
move, and to devise measures for doing so in the method most
conducive to economy of life and development of fire. If these
preliminaries are neglected, either from the premature action of
the advanced guards or by the impatience of the commanders,
disorder asserts itself from the very outset. And, as we have
seen, they were neglected by the Prussians under circumstances
which were no excuse whatever for their doing so. This, then,
was one reason for the confusion and impossibility of control
which the ' Summer Night's Dream 1 laments.

But, to make matters worse, even when time was available,
the dispositions of the Prussian leaders, so far as regards the
infantry, were generally faulty, often insufficient, and some-
times left to chance. Now the disposition of infantry for
battle must inevitably exercise a very great influence on the
progress and issue of the engagement. Where it is in harmony
with tactical principles, the result is concentrated energy, con-
certed action, and such order as is possible in the heat and
excitement of the conflict. Where these tactical principles
are departed from, we find want of combination, isolated enter-
prises, lack of strength at the decisive moment, the dispersion
and intermingling of tactical units, and the control of the
troops taken out of the hands of the superior leaders. In one
of the ablest and most practical works on tactics that has ever
been written, General Verdy du Vernois, indirectly criticising
the Prussian leading of 1870, lays the greatest stress on two
points. First, in his comments on an imaginary action near
Trautenau, he thus speaks of the action of a brigade, and his
remarks apply equally well to the army corps and the division :
' The position of the brigade before the commencement of the
action was by wings, which would allow of a well-regulated
guidance during the course of it, and permit the regiments
being kept separate. When the first line came into action it
occupied a front of about 2,000 paces ; had this been formed
from a single regiment, its commander could not possibly be at
every point where his presence was required. . . . Again, when

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 143

the reinforcement of the first line became necessary, the second
regiment of the brigade would have to be brought up — portions
of it pushed into the first line. A mixture of the two regiments
must ensue, and their commanders will have to pick out their
companies as they may require them. The dispositions of the
two commanders will then almost inevitably clash with one
another, and the full power of the troops will not be brought
out. ... Of what use is the compact coherence of a regiment
if it is to be abandoned at the very moment that the most
severe test is before it, just as the real action commences?'
' Lateral extension,' he adds, ' does not admit of the connected
conduct of portions of troops belonging to the same body,
nor of their being brought into action as required ; and the
only way to ensure this, is to form them in rear of one another.1
It is true that this formation can only be adopted by the
larger units — army corps and divisions — when the country
affords facilities for movements on a broad front. But in the
actions of August and September 1870, these facilities often
existed. They were seldom utilised. At Gravelotte, indeed,
the orders issued by the Red Prince for the corps of the Second
Army to advance ih mass of divisions brought the Saxons into
contact with the enemy j ust in time to win the battle ; but
along the front of the 9th Corps and of the First Army
the disorder was great, for each brigade and each division were
deployed to their full extent, and the reinforcements that came
up were in many cases supplied by troops that belonged to
different army corps, and even different armies. At Spicheren
the commander of the 14th Division extended his leading
brigade over a front of nearly 3,000 paces, whilst he sent the
other to strike the enemy's rear. The enemy bearing heavily
on his front, reinforcements drawn from other army corps and
another army were sent in piecemeal, and hence arose the
historic intermingling of thirty-two companies in inextricable
confusion on the Rotherberg and in the Giferts Wald. It is
useless to multiply instances. ' A connected leading,' says
Verdy du Vernois, ' can only be effected by deepening the
formations. The troops fighting in the front line must be
furnished with immediate supports belonging to the same

144 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

tactical units as themselves, for without this precaution a joint
action of the whole cannot be produced. . . . Whenever, in
the campaign of 1870, this principle was overlooked, a con-
nected conduct of the action was rendered impossible, and
the evil consequences resulting from it could be traced in
almost every case. I have already quoted Moltke to the effect
that the maxim ' Aus der Tiefe zu fechten ' was generally
neglected.

' Science in a Pickelhaube,1 says General DragomirofF, ' has
taken possession of the field of battle ; . . . but there is
nothing to make a fuss about in all the pretended revelations
of the science of war. Modern tactics remain substantially
what they were in the days of Napoleon. Napoleonic tactics
rest on a firm basis, on principles which can never be affected
by changes of armament.' One of the primary principles, often
carried to excess by Napoleon and his marshals, was in the depth
given to tactical units. This principle the Germans in 1866 and
1870 entirely ignored. Generally speaking, the attack was
carried out in two lines. This formation was almost invariably
employed, whenever, that is, special dispositions were made
preparatory to thrusting a force into action. Now science had
arrived at the conclusion that what are practically linear tactics
are best adapted to present conditions : with this difference,
that the line should be elastic instead of rigid. But, from the
earliest days of the new formation, it had never been considered
sufficient, save under exceptional circumstances, to leave the first
line unsupported by less than two other lines in rear. This
was the formation approved by Wellington, than whom we
have yet to learn there has lived in modern times a more
able tactician. This principle the Prussians departed from.
So great was the lateral extension of every unit, that there
were seldom troops remaining to form a third line or reserve
for either brigade, division, or army corps. And when we
read in the history of 1870 of the failure or, at best, the
indecisive success of the infantry attacks, we shall find, if
we examine the details, that the cause of such failures or
indecisive successes was that support was not forthcoming at

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 145

the critical moment. The formation had not depth enough to
push its way through the storm. Moreover, the duties of the
second line were ill defined. In conjunction with the fighting
line it was expected to assault the position ; but, being under
no special command, it gradually drifted into the fighting line
as gaps occurred ; it seldom, if ever, remained intact at
the critical moment, and it certainly never exerted a decisive
influence at that moment. In fact, the over-prominence given
to the old rule that all strong positions should be turned and
not assaulted in front, brought about a constant tendency
to increase the front, and the second line was, consequently,
generally employed to fill the gaps left in the first line by the
divergence of the skirmishers to right and left. In the older
tactics, if a position was to be turned, special troops were
detailed for the purpose, taken from the reserves ; the duty of
the first line being to occupy the enemy in front whilst this
was being done. Had this principle been adhered to by the
Prussians, the first line would have remained a compact body,
strongly supported by the second, and the danger of their lines,
extended over a wide front, which, as Captain May pointed
out, resulted in the disasters of Trautenau and Langensalza,
would have been avoided. Perhaps the repulse of the right
wing at Spicheren is the best instance in the War of 1870 of
the evils resulting from over-extension, and the neglect to keep
in hand a strong reserve. Shortly after five o'clock the attack
on Stiring Wendel came to a standstill. Twenty-nine and a
half companies (7,250 rifles at full strength), generally speaking,
in a single line, invested the north-west side of the village on
a front of nearly 3,000 paces ; that is, allowing one-fifth for
losses — and their losses had been heavy — there was not more
than one rifle available per yard. A great portion of the
troops were exhausted by severe fighting and long marches
under an August sun ; and when, below the opposite slopes of
the Spicheren wood, a French column was seen in motion,
the whole line, with the exception ol a small force that clung
obstinately to the Stiring copse, gave way in confusion.

A second error which intensified disorder, and which applies
to the individual battalions, even more to the brigades, was the

L

146 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

undue extension of the front. More often than not, battalions,
whilst as yet exposed only to unaimed fire, or even when
not under fire at all, deployed into line of company columns at
intervals of eighty paces, and advanced covered by the four
skirmishing Ziige. This exaggerated application of the principle
of the development of fire brought many evils in its train.
The Prussian officers, as previously stated, had given ear to
the theories of Captain May in his 'Tactical Retrospect of
1866.1 They saw in the new doctrines which advocated the
almost complete independence of the company leaders boundless
opportunities for personal distinction. When the battalion
deployed, each captain found himself with his compact unit of
250 rifles. Orders, very probably, could no longer reach him.
At all events, the voice of the commander was soon drowned in
the rattle of the breech-loader. The company had become free
from all control and interference. It was in the hands of its
own leader to do with as he pleased. Not the slightest tie
bound it to its own battalion. If it were in the direst straits
the battalion could not stretch a hand to help it. The
commander could not send a single rifle to swell its ranks, for
he had retained no second line under his own hand. When the
battalion went into action without a reserve, every link that
bound it together as a unit snapped ; and the line of battle
became formed of a number of small bodies, each fighting for
itself, and wandering to and fro across the battlefield as the
judgment or ambition of its immediate leader might dictate.
Nor were single Ziige always to be restrained. Unreasonable
initiative often carried them far away from their companies. It
is little to be wondered at, then, if the individual soldiers
when they saw their superiors part so lightly with the bonds
they had been taught to deem inviolable in peace, were only too
ready to free themselves from supervision and restraint.

Another cause of confusion was the habit the troops
acquired of swerving to one flank or the other in order to seek
cover, and thus abandoning the line of direction. This was
not confined to individuals ; but whole companies, or the
greater part of whole companies, acted in this respect with
wonderful unanimity. When we study the battles of 1870

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 147

with maps and books, we are often at a loss to account for the
devious wanderings of various companies. If we study the
battles on the ground itself, the cause is soon revealed. Tiny
depressions, commodious ditches, convenient banks, although
often at right angles to the true direction, clearly mark the
reason and the course of these meanderings.

Cover exercised a magnetic influence, to which the unity of
the battalion, disregarded as it was both in theory and in
practice, opposed no counter-attraction.

Well has it been said that 'the company leader who,
regardless of losses, carries out the task assigned to him, is a
better servant than the company leader who manoeuvres.1

Lastly, General Verdy du Vernois may be summoned as
evidence to prove that dispersion being accepted as an inevit-
able and at the same time a minor evil, the Prussian officers
neglected opportunities for restoring tactical unity. ' The
experience,1 he says, 'of many of our late battles shows us
practically that, after successfully overcoming any difficult
phase, the last thing thought of is to restore the forma-
tions of the shattered troops, and to re-form the masses ready
for further employment. This point should not only be
attended to at critical moments, but should also be kept
constantly in view during the course of an engagement itself.1
Again — and be it remembered that the whole of his book is
an indirect criticism of the war of 1870 — care must always be
taken to re-form as far as possible behind such cover as may be
met. When the nature of this will admit of it, the companies
should be drawn closer to one another again, or half-battalions
or even battalions re-formed.

Such is the account of the German shortcomings in 1866
and 1870. That their own critics have not been backward in
exposing these shortcomings is true. May, the great innovator,
Verdy du Vernois, and the author of * The Prussian Infantry in
1869,1 of < The Frontal Attack of Infantry,1 of < The Tactics of
the Future,1 and of * The Summer Nighfs Dream,1 to mention
but a few, have all of them held a brief against their own
comrades. To expose these shortcomings is to repeat a twice-
told tale. And, moreover, suddenly confronted by the havoc

l 2

148 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

wrought by the fire of the chassepot, a fire which did not come
within the bounds of their experience, it is little wonder that
they failed to devise, then and there, on the field of battle, the
tactics best suited to this unexpected emergency. But with
this we have no concern. The point to bring home is this :
that the confusion of the Prussian battles was, in a large degree
due to their neglect of the immutable principles of tactics, and
that, therefore, in regard to tactics, they are a bad model for
us to follow. The sagacity of our own people is a surer guide,
and if, after 1870, we wanted a model, the tactics of the last
great war waged by English-speaking soldiers would have
served us better. At the same time, it is important to recog-
nise that confusion, even to a very great extent, will be some-
times unavoidable. It will be absolutely necessary, in order to
prepare the way for the bayonet, that battalion must be piled
on battalion. At all costs, the firing line must be kept at
sufficient strength, and to this intermixture of units the
Germans are wise in constantly practising their troops.

It has been claimed by an American general that the
Americans taught the Prussians the use of extended order.
This claim I can scarcely admit. The devastating effects of
modern fire forced extended order on the troops in both cases.
The Prussians learnt nothing from either Federal or Confederate
unfortunately for themselves, for they might have learnt a
great deal. Had the battles of the Secession War been studied
in Berlin instead of being dismissed with a contemptuous
allusion to mobs of skirmishers, the faults enumerated above
would have been foreseen ; and a knowledge of the modifica-
tions of the old formations necessary to achieve decisive results
would have been gained without the lavish expenditure of life
which the defective tactics of 1870 entailed. Skobeleff, the
first of European generals to master the problem of the offen-
sive, knew the American War ' by heart,' and in his successful
assault on the Turkish redoubts on the otherwise disastrous
September 10 ' he followed the plan of the American generals
on both sides when attempting to carry such positions : to
follow up the assaulting column with fresh troops without
waiting for the first column to be repulsed.'

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 149

The American tactics, although so far as drill went the
French rapidity of evolution and manoeuvre was adopted, were
very English in their methods. That we taught their fingers to
fight we have not the slightest wish to assert. But a strong simi-
larity exists between the tactics of the Civil War and those
taught in the English 'Field Exercises,' from 1870 downwards.
It is possible, on the contrary, that the lessons of the war had
not been altogether lost in England, and that they exerted
an influence of which English soldiers were scarcely conscious.
In the first place, the unity of the battalion was scrupulously
respected ; and although the leaders of the units in the fighting
line were allowed a free hand as soon as superior control became
impossible, they were neither encouraged to manoeuvre nor per-
mitted to deviate from the line of direction the commander had
assigned. Secondly, the traditional formation in three lines
was the basis of all dispositions for battle. Thirdly, the second
and third lines of each division were, as a rule, supplied by
its own brigades, and not by strange units ; that is, the division
went into battle on a narrow front and with great depth.
Fourthly, the preliminary dispositions were carefully carried
out : and lastly, as both common sense and experience taught
the leaders that to carry a position, line after line, regardless of
cohesion, must be piled one on top of the other, the process of
rallying, not only when the enemy had been driven back, but
at every pause in the attack, was a universal rule in battle, and
constantly practised in the camp.

' The American troops,' says an officer who commanded a
famous volunteer regiment, ' found their places surprisingly
quick after a charge. Many regiments were constantly drilled
in rushing and assembling after being checked in confusion.

' Battalions,1 writes another officer of higher rank, ' had to
deploy when the fire became heavy, and became more or less
scattered and disorganised in the advance. There was confusion
after a successful attack, but our men rallied readily ; generally
the colours were planted in convenient places, and the men fell
in on them rapidly.1

Again : ' There was always more or less confusion, but only

150 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

momentarily, in a successful charge. ... in such cases re-form-
ing was but the matter of a few minutes.''

Now this consensus of opinion as to the rapid re-formation
of the American tactical units indicates that the methods of the
attack and the disposition of the battalions were based on sound
principles. The high intelligence of the men and the practice
of the drill-ground doubtless had a share in so satisfactorily
overcoming confusion, but sound principles played the chief
part. It may also be remarked that the Americans adhered to
the essentially English organisation of the battalion into a
number of small companies, which was so strongly upheld by
the almost unanimous voice of the British army when the
tacticians who chose the Prussians as their model attempted to
overthrow it in favour of four large companies. American
experience quickly detected the faults of the Prussian system,
and the opinion of General Upton, the officer selected after the
war to re-write the drill-book of the United States infantry, is
well worth notice.1

I have already spoken of SkobelefTs successful employment
of American tactics in the third battle of Plevna, and if we
study the accounts of his operations against the Turkish lines,
it will become apparent that there was a fundamental difference
between his ideas of battle and those which prevailed amongst
the Prussians in 1870. True to the traditions of Suvaroff, and
to the teachings of American soldiers, Skobeleff's end and pur-
pose were to bring the bayonet into play ; to prepare the way by
fire, but to hand over to the bayonet the decision. The Ger-
mans, on the other hand, relied on fire, and on fire alone, to
beat down the enemy's resistance ; the final charge was a secon-
dary consideration altogether. The result of this was the great
development of the front of battle, the constant pressure
towards the flanks, in order to seek out positions from which to
bring an oblique or flanking fire to bear, and thus to develop
the power of the firearm to the greatest possible extent. To
surround the enemy in a circle of fire, as exemplified by Sedan,
was the chief aim of German officers of every rank. Generally

1 The Prussian Company Column. Pamphlet. Published 1875. B.U.S.I.
Library.

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 151

speaking, no endeavour was made to hurry on the decision by
more resolute methods. Now, the Americans had come to a
very different conclusion : they had not to do with an army like
the Austrians, who could not reply to their fire, nor to one like
the French, who habitually neglected their flanks, and from
whose partial counter-strokes they had nothing to fear.1 The
experience of Cold Harbor and Chancellorsville taught the
Federal and Confederate not only how to secure their flanks,
but also the necessity of powerful counter-strokes. The generals
on both sides, unless their numbers — as were Sherman's, in his
Atlanta campaign — were far the greater, found that enveloping
tactics were seldom possible and always dangerous ; and that to
prevent the battle degenerating into a protracted struggle
between two strongly entrenched armies, and to attain a speedy
and decisive result, mere development of fire was insufficient.
The fighting qualities of the men must also be taken into
account. It may fairly be questioned whether any amount of
fire would have driven back the troops which garrisoned the
opposing entrenchments of Lee and Grant at Petersburg in the
last nine months of the war. From a very early period the
tenacity which there displayed itself in such heroic fashion had
been remarkable. 'Time and again,1 says one of the officers
above quoted, ' according to all precedent, one side or the other
ought to have been whipped, but it declined to be anything of
the sort, and obstinately refused to give up. The losses show
this. They are often out of all proportion to results, as results
would have been shown on the continent of Europe. We in
America agree with Colonel Chesney, who thinks that this was
due, in no small measure, to the quality which the troops on
both sides inherited from the stock that furnished his infantry
to the Duke of Wellington.1 Nothing is more noticeable in
the history of the Civil War than the manner in which the
American troops refused to recognise that their position was
turned. The ordinary rules of war were over and over again
set at defiance. * Never to know when they were beaten,1 was
a characteristic of both North and South. But the troops

1 Nor, it might be added, an enemy like the Boers, who never attempted a
counter-stroke and were particularly nervous about their flanks. — Ed.

152 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

possessing this quality can only be defeated by sheer weight of
numbers, by superior physical force ; and it was for this reason
that the dominant idea of American tactics was to come to push
of bayonet. The fire of the skirmishers was employed merely to
cover the advance of the assaulting line, not as in Germany to
open a path into the enemy's position. The American troops,
therefore, were drawn up for battle in the deep formations usual
in shock-tactics; that is, in three lines closely supporting one
another.

Now the question is, which was right ? The extreme exten-
sion of front, its consequent medley of units and difficulty ot
control, or the determined charge of successive lines of battle,
with its great expenditure of life compressed into a short time
and a small space, and culminating in a vigorous assault. The
decision is no easy one ; but for those who have faith in the
traditionary tactical capacity of English soldiers, there is no need
to go far to find a judge. This capacity has found expression
in our drill-books, and in the pages devoted to the attack will
be found the true solution of the problem. It may be noticed
in the first place that in those pages but little stress is laid on
flanking fire or flanking movements. And for this reason, that
the drill-book does not profess to instruct those who have the
supreme control over offensive operations, but those who have
to carry out the details. This omission makes clear, therefore,
that flank attacks and the development of flanking fire (on a
large scale) are held to be the province of the superior
authorities : they are not within the province of those officers
whose commands merely form units of the whole force. On the
contrary, instead of encouraging excessive exercise of initiative,
the paramount importance of order, of the cohesion of the
attacking body, and of maintaining the true direction is incul-
cated on every page.

' Extended order is the rule, close order the exception ' :
' great clouds of skirmishers and small tactical units, that is the
form for infantry.1

These were the cries that were heard on all sides after 1870,
in England as well as on the Continent. But in England there
were men who saw the dangers and the exaggeration of the new

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 153

theories, who held that close order was now, as heretofore, the
backbone of the attack, extended order no more than an essen-
tial accessory. Nor did they — and here the army was always
with them — accept the necessity of breaking up the battalion,
and of sacrificing unity to the initiative of the subordinate
leaders. To their views opinion has veered round. The true
mean has been struck. Close and extended order combined are
officially taught as the form for infantry ; close order whenever
it is possible, extended order only when it is unavoidable.

Secondly, the instructions of the drill-book are principally
concerned with the execution of a frontal attack. There is no
disposition manifested to shirk the difficulties of such an opera-
tion, but neither is there timid insistence on those difficulties.
That flank attacks are, for the troops engaged therein, to all
intents and purposes, frontal attacks ; that flank attacks must
be assisted by attacks on the front of the position, and that
frontal attacks will often be the only way to victory, are tactical
truths which have been fairly faced. Moreover, and this point
is most deserving of attention, the success of the frontal attack
is considered well within bounds of possibility, and the delivery
of the final assault of no less importance than the preparation
by fire. It is here that the system of attack differs so radically
from the practice of 1866 and 1870, and approaches so close to
the practice of the Secession War.1

It is scarcely necessary to mention that this system was
scouted after 1870 by the Prussians and their admirers ; and, it
may be remarked, that although the latest regulations appear
to indicate that the Kriegs Ministerium contemplates a return
to older methods, the question has not been approached with
confidence. Even the author of the ' Summer Night's Dream,1
reformer as he is, makes no further use of his closed Ziige than
to bring the units intact into the firing line. The firing line, in
Germany, is still the fighting line.

1 The assurance with which frontal attacks were pronounced impossible by
English military critics after the South African war, and the complete refuta-
tion of those critics by the successes of the Japanese, are well worthy of note.
There could be no better evidence of the truth contained in the opening sen
tences of this chapter. — Ed.

154 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

To those who are willing to accept the drill-book as an
infallible guide it will be perhaps more satisfactory if we test its
teaching by the light of history. At the outset we must bear
in mind that it is written for a voluntary army and not for a
host of conscripts. Despite the overthrow of the professional
army of France by the national levies of their great antagonist,
the old adage that expresses tersely the relative efficiency of
volunteers and ' pressed men ' still holds good, and in comparing
English and American tactics with those of other states, should
never be lost sight of. It would be rash, however, to assert
that had the Prussian Guards, in the disastrous attack on
August 18, been replaced by men who had taken arms of their
own free will, St. Privat La Montagne would have fallen with-
out the aid of the flank attack of the Saxons. The courage of
the men who advanced up the long glacis under that terrible
rain of bullets is beyond suspicion. Where they failed none
could have succeeded. But at the same time it is fairly open to
question whether, had other tactics been employed, St. Privat,
instead of being quoted as an instance of the futility of frontal
attacks, would not be now held out as a convincing proof, not
only of the possibility but of the decisive results of a vigorous
frontal attack on the key of the enemy's position. In the
official report of General von Kessler, commanding the brigade
of the 2nd Division, we find the details of the combat, so far as
regards the battalions engaged, and the impression made at the
time on the mind of an experienced soldier.

It has already been mentioned that the attack had not been
prepared by artillery. The French guns had been reduced to
silence, but they had suffered no great loss in men or material,
and from fifty to seventy were still available for further action.
St. Privat itself, the strong stone village which crowns the slope,
2,000 yards in length, which lay between the opposing lines,
was as yet untouched. Nor does it appear that the French
infantry had been shaken by the duel between the two artilleries.
A thick line of skirmishers occupied the very meagre cover 600
yards in front of the position. Heavy reserves were hidden
in security in the long hollow which stretches from St. Privat
to Amanvillers, and a force ot nearly 20,000 rifles was ready to

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 155

overwhelm the attack with the long-ranging fire of the
chassepot.

The formation of the Guards was in two lines only, the
first extended, with supports in company column, the second
in column of half-battalions. As they left their shelter by
St. Marie-aux-Chenes, they were met, at a range of over 1,500
yards, by a storm of bullets. Men and officers fell fast ; the
supports pushed into the fighting line, the whole moving forward
by rushes, and lying down wherever some slight undulation
offered cover.

The second line followed at short intervals, but its serried
masses afforded a tempting target, and the French appeared to
watch the moment that they rose to their feet, for von Kessler
tells us that such moments were the signal for outbursts of
heavier fire.

Greatly exaggerated as is the estimate of the Duke of
Wiirtemburg, that in ten minutes 6,000 fell, the losses were
enormous, especially in officers. But still the Guard pressed
on ; the outlying French skirmishers were driven back, and it
was not until the long lines of wall which surrounded St. Privat
and the Jerusalem Farm were approached within a distance of
400 to 600 paces that the attack came to a stand. The second
line had become merged into the first. The commanders
recognised that in the absence oi support it was useless to press
forward, and their further efforts were now limited to holding
the ground won at so great a sacrifice. This was done success-
fully. A counter-stroke against their right flank was beaten
back by the fire of the two batteries in close support to the
right rear, and the French made no attempt to sweep down in
mass upon the thinned and exhausted line. Eventually, when
the turning movement of the Saxon Corps was fully developed,
the remnant of the brigades did good service in the converging
attack before which St. Privat fell.

General von Kessler's report is too long to quote, but it
contains passages which are full of interest. One of these
refers to the moral effect of a daring advance. As the brigades
approached St. Privat, he relates that the stubbornness of the
defence began to relax, that the French seemed to lose heart

156 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and confidence at the sight of a large mass of men pressing
resolutely forward, despite the terrible fire to which they were
subjected. A conviction that the chassepot was powerless to
check the advance appeared to spread amongst them, and more
than once he states his impression that had fresh troops been
available, they could have been brought up in close order under
cover of the fire of the fighting line, and that the position might
have then and there been rushed.

A careful examination, therefore, of this attack shows, in
the first place, that every single condition was unfavourable,
and that, nevertheless, an experienced officer, who had his
fingers on the pulse of the action throughout, believed that
with further support success was not impossible. The unavoid-
able disadvantages against which the Prussians laboured were
almost overwhelming. The position was phenomenally strong.
The ground was absolutely open, and both its hard surface and
the gentle slope gave the greatest possible effect to ricochet
fire. And yet the French first line was driven in, and a sensible
effect produced on the tenacity of the defence. But natural
disadvantages were not the only obstacles. The preliminary
dispositions were insufficient, and the formations faulty. The
attack was altogether unprepared either by artillery or by
infantry, for the needle-gun was not effective over 600 yards.
The brigades, however, occupied a front too extensive for their
strength— 12,000 rifles (not 20,000, as the Duke of Wurtemburg
states) to 2,500 paces — little more than four rifles to the pace.
There were not troops sufficient to form a third line, and be it
remembered that even if the third line is not designed to bear
an active part in the attack, the moral support of its presence
is of the greatest value. The absence of a third line was of
course due to the fact that the Saxon Corps was employed in
the turning movement which ultimately forced the position.
With this we have nothing to do ; we are considering the
operation as a frontal attack pure and simple. A heavy bom-
bardment of the village, and the possession of a firearm able to
reply at once to the enemy's fire, and a strong force in support,
would, in all probability, have brought about success. The
total losses would have been excessive, but the result would

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 157

have been decisive ; the battle would have been won whilst
daylight still remained in which to improve the victory, and
the general total of casualties would not have been increased.

Equally gallant, at first even more successful, but in the
end no less disastrous, was Osman's desperate attempt to break
the investing lines at Plevna. A force of thirty-three battalions
numbering, perhaps, 15,000 rifles, and organised into a single
division of four brigades, crossed the River Vid on the night of
December 10, and as the winter morning broke, was arrayed
in two lines, covered by a swarm of skirmishers, behind
an undulation 3,500 yards from the first of the triple
lines of the enemy's entrenchments. After a very short
and ineffectual artillery fire, they advanced up an open slope,
exposed to the fire of more than fifty heavy field guns and
of 3,000 infantry, sheltered behind their parapets. At 1,500
yards from the position the attack faltered. Osman, riding in
the midst of his battalions, reinforced the skirmishers, and the
lines swept on. In three-quarters of an hour they had ap-
proached within striking distance, notwithstanding the heavy
fire that met them full in face and exploded the caissons of
the few batteries that accompanied them. Two battalions were
completely destroyed, but there was no further check. The
first line of trenches was carried, and the redoubts were stormed ;
so swift was the work that the Russian gunners had not even
time to bring up their teams, and eleven field-pieces were left
in the hands of the Turkish infantry. One thousand paces
beyond was the second line of works. Whilst the majority of
the force secured itself in the position already won, six battalions
advanced over the open ground and stormed a lunette and
trenches in the second line. Russian reinforcements were now
coming up on all sides, but the position was pierced, and
another resolute effort would have carried at least a portion of
the troops beyond the circle of investment. But that effort
was not to be. The second division of the army of Plevna, on
which Osman relied to improve the advantages he had gained,
found the bridges choked by a dense crowd of fugitives from
the town with their household goods piled high on carts and
waggons. Only a few battalions were able to make the passage.

158 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and it was then too late. The enemy was pressing on in front
and flank ; the trenches ran so deep in blood, the redoubts were
so full of dead and wounded men, that even the Turkish soldiery
could scarcely abide the horrors of them. Still, whilst they
saw the man they had obeyed so well during four months of
battle and famine riding calmly along the line they never
flinched ; but when the great Pacha, severely wounded, was
borne away from their midst, then they gave back, and retired
slowly to the river.

Such is the history of two great failures. And it may well
be asked if they can be considered as anything else than decisive
proofs of the impossibility of the frontal attack, if the English
system, tested by the experiences of St. Privat and of Plevna,
should not be pronounced faulty and impracticable. But of
these two operations the latter at least gained a measure of
success. This success was due to the fact that the force was
marshalled in several distinct lines ; that at the moment of the
final rush strong supports were at hand, in good order, and
obedient to control. The ultimate failure was due to the fact
that it was impossible to follow the principles advocated by the
English Drill-book : the preparation was insufficient, the
numbers employed were insufficient, and the artillery did not
co-operate. Nothing could be done to secure the flanks of the
attack or to distract the attention of the troops on either side
of the point assaulted. These are principles as important as
those which were held in mind. It was to their neglect that
the triumph of the Turks was short-lived, and it is for this
reason that it has been cited. Frontal attacks, then, have won
partial success. Their ultimate failure was due to the violation
of practical principles, and is therefore no proof that frontal
attacks are impossible. On the contrary, there is ground for
the belief that Napoleon's decisive stroke of piercing the centre
of the enemy's line may be successfully applied on modern battle-
fields. Nor are those above quoted the only instances of frontal
attacks in recent campaigns. If we cannot point to attacks
en masse, successfully conducted in the first phase of the war of
1870, when the mettle of the enemy was that of a disciplined
army, there were battles both in Armenia and Bulgaria which

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 159

supply examples. And despite the general opinion of American
leaders, that veteran troops behind well-constructed earthworks
could hold their own against five times their number ; still, over
and over again in the Secession War, the strongest entrench-
ments fell before the determined rush of closely succeeding lines.
Wherever the principle was applied of concentrating a powerful
force against a single point, of meeting the enemy in superior
force at the decisive point, the defence failed, and the presence
of intact bodies of troops, answering readily to the demands
of their leader, gave the means of securing a decisive victory. I
may instance Sheridan's and Wood's attack at Chattanooga,
and Longstreet's at Chickamauga. The massing of 30,000
Federals against the ' Bloody Angle ' at Spottsylvania, had it
not been for the precipitation of the second line, would have
probably been more than partially successful, whilst Meade's
charge at Fredericksburg, and Pickett's at Gettysburg, owed
their repulse to the same cause as did Osman Pacha's at Plevna,
the want of a strong third line.

In 1870, when the long line of skirmishers induced the
enemy to yield his position before their developing fire, and the
battle paused, the enemy had time to rally, to man his second
line, to bring up his artillery and his reserves. Except at
Woerth and Gravelotte, where the victors were in overwhelm-
ing numbers, success was never decisive. But a battle divides
itself into phases. The defender, if he has any choice in the
selection of the field, will take care to have a strong second
position to fall back upon. To break his first line so suddenly
as to disconcert all his plans, to have a compact force at hand
ready to follow up without giving him a moment's breathing
space — this is the task of the attack ; to drive a wedge into the
heart of his disordered masses, forcing his wings asunder, instead
of merely pushing his whole line back, and the tactics laid
down in our own regulations, are the means whereby the task
may best be executed. Neither smokeless powder nor the
magazine rifle will necessitate any radical change. If the
defence has gained, as has been asserted, by these inventions,
the plunging fire of rifled howitzers will add a more than pro-
portional strength to the attack. And if the magazine rifle

160 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

has introduced a new and formidable element into battle, the
moral element still remains the same. Weapons improve, but
human nature remains the same. Under a plunging fire from
which no bomb-proofs, constructed in the field, can give
sufficient shelter, and continued to the very moment of the
assault ; under the bombardment of an artillery which is
not content, as was the artillery at Gravelotte and at Plevna,
with silencing the enemy's guns, but sweeps the parapets
with shrapnel, and aims at producing more than a mere
moral effect, will men's nerves be sufficiently steady to enable
them to reserve the magazine for the supreme moment ? And
even if their discipline and endurance enable them to do this,
will not the saying hold good, that the value of fire diminishes
with its intensity ?

It is true that ' the working value of any system of
tactics cannot be ascertained, except experimentally.' But
it is possible to test the system by history ; and history,
not of one war only, but of those waged by the great captains
of modern times, bears evidence that the principles on which
our present system of infantry tactics, and of infantry organisa-
tion, are based, are sound in every particular. We have no
need, then, to go further than our own regulations to learn the
method in which troops are to be handled in attack or defence.
It is probable, when these regulations come face to face with the
realities of war, that modifications in some respects will be
found necessary ; but, so far as lies within the wit of man, they
have blended the best lessons of the past with shrewd forecast
of the future, and if modifications have to be made, they will in
no way interfere with the general structure of the offensive battle.

There are rules of which some are old as the art of war
itself, others produced by the discovery of gunpowder, and by
every improvement in firearms ; and to break these rules is to
court disaster. It is, therefore, of extreme importance that those
whose duty is to lead men in action should have these rules en-
grained into their very instinct. To act in accordance with them
should have become habitual. It is for this reason that the
normal formations for the attack are valuable and even necessary.
If these formations are adopted at the outset of an engagement

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 161

the preliminary dispositions, which have been shown to be
essential, will always have been made. And if the formations
are unsui table to ground or circumstances, they are exceedingly
elastic — susceptible of ready modification. In every case,
the foundation for sound offensive tactics will have been
firmly laid. It is wiser to establish a habit than to expect
in every case unerring initiative. Be it remembered, that the
German system of ensuring able leaders is very different from
our own. The officers of the Imperial Army are under constant
supervision. Their tactical capabilities undergo incessant tests.
So ruthless is the system of rejection, that a few mistakes in
field manoeuvres lead to speedy retirement. The application of
the system is short and sharp. The supreme authorities are not
called upon to decide, nor do they admit appeal. The hint of
a brigadier that an application for sick-leave will be favourably
considered is enough, or an explanation of the mistakes com-
mitted in presence of the whole of the officers of a battalion.
So precarious is the tenure of command, that one often hears
the remark that So-and-so goes to bed with his Pickelhaube on
one side and a silk hat on the other, for he does not know whether,
when he wakes up, he will find himself soldier or civilian.

With such summary retribution staring them in the face,
German officers might be safely left to work out their own
salvation in the way of formations. It is otherwise with our-
selves. English soldiers are brought up with the idea that
obedience is of more importance than initiative ; they are
accustomed neither to the independence which wrought such
disorders in 1870, nor to the despotic methods which cut short
so many a career. We have no reason to fear, looking at past
history, that initiative will not be forthcoming when it is
required ; but trained as our officers usually are to look for re illa-
tions at every point, it seems unwise to trust them entire y to
their own resources in the most important work they ha\ e to
undertake. It is not only in this respect that such an inst ac-
tion is dangerous. The normal practices make the habit of
acting on sound principles instructive ; and if an officer is left
to his own ideas, without other guide than such general regu-
lations as appear in the German ' Field Exercises,' it is very

M

162 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

probable that he may overlook or disregard some principle of vital
importance. Under constant and close supervision this would be
impossible. But English battalions are seldom under constant
supervision. They are not always under the eye of officers as
well trained as those who compose the German General Staff,
and bad habits would not always find an immediate corrector.

With the vexed question of initiative versus subordination
we have now nothing to do ; but I may express the conviction
that the actions and the tactics of 1866 and 1870 are, in this
respect, exceedingly dangerous models, especially as regards
the conduct of infantry on the offensive. Order and con-
centration are of no less value than energy, and an adherence
to the normal formations provides for both. Moreover, if the
decisive attack is to retain the form which has always proved
successful, i.e. the rush of successive lines after due preparation
by fire on some selected portion of the enemy's position, it is
difficult to conceive circumstances in which these formations
would not be strictly applicable. The distances between the
various supporting bodies will naturally depend on the ground,
and also on the manner in which the successive lines are brought
up ; in this last process, and in the judicious employment of
fire, initiative will find scope; but the division into three
lines, the distribution of strength, and the duties assigned to
the three lines, as laid down in the normal formation, must
never be departed from. And with an army whose daily
practice it is to carry out these formations, it will be seldom
that these important principles, the foundation of success, will
be disregarded. Lastly, if, as I am firmly convinced, the
attack of a large force upon a single point, whether as stroke
or counter-stroke, is still the crowning act of battle, it is an
operation which should be familiar to every officer and man.
It is necessary that divisions, and even larger forces, should be
exercised as the single unit to which this duty is assigned,
for it is full of difficulties. Many are the obstacles which may
be expected to interfere with the progress of the attack.
Advanced posts to be carried, counter-strokes to be repelled,
cavalry to be driven back, and incidents of like nature
are well calculated to destroy symmetry and create confusion,

MILITARY CRITICISM AND MODERN TACTICS 163

Nor will it be an infrequent occurrence that the firing line
will have exhausted all its supports and reserves without
shaking the enemy or approaching within effective rifle range.
Then, if the attack is to be driven home at all costs, it will
be necessary to strengthen the skirmishers from the second
line, thus piling battalion upon battalion, and to bring up
troops from the third line to fill the gaps in the second. To
this mixture of units men and officers must be trained ; and
such training will not be harmful if the paramount importance
of order and cohesion is understood by all.

It is, perhaps, a consequence of our little wars, and of our
small, isolated garrisons, that there is a tendency amongst
regimental officers to look upon the attack formation as
a procedure which principally concerns the battalion. But
against a civilised enemy, and on more extended battlefields
than those to which we are accustomed, the individual battalion
would play but an insignificant part. It would form but one
amongst many units, for a decisive attack would be seldom
committed to any force less than a division, and it is even
probable that a whole army corps, with two divisions in front
line and one in reserve, would be called upon to undertake
the operation. In any movement made in such strength as
this, order and precision are the most important considera-
tions. To each division would be allotted a certain front, and
unless that front were accurately maintained, crowding, con-
fusion, and deviation of parts of the line from the true direction
would be the inevitable result. Now, if every battalion engaged
in the firing line were to adopt a different formation, and, it
the commanders were left to their own initiative, such might
well be the case, it would be difficult in the extreme to preserve
the necessary intervals between the component parts of the
attacking force. For an operation of this kind a normal
formation is absolutely necessary.

It may be argued that the Germans, who are far more
likely to have to employ great masses in the attack than
ourselves, have, in their latest Field Exercise, discarded all
definite prescriptions. This is true enough, so far as the Field
Exercise goes. Here it is constantly held in view that to

M 2

164 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

trammel the independence of the leaders of the firing line is
to forego victory, and therefore general principles only are
inculcated. But, so far as the daily work of the German
officers and soldiers is concerned, it will be found that in
every army corps certain rules are laid down which must be
followed by the battalion when attacking in combination with
other troops ; and if these are not quite so precise as those
given in our Drill-book, they are supplemented by more detailed
regulations in every single infantry regiment. What the
Germans are careful to do is to recognise that once the zone
of aimed infantry fire is reached, the control of the firing line
must perforce be resigned to the section leaders, and that even
the captain can only exercise a very general supervision over
his company, whilst battalion commanders are expressly for-
bidden to interfere, during the passage of this zone, with the
action of their subordinates. There is no disposition to
restrict the responsibility of the subaltern officers, and the
maxims laid down in the Field Exercises, as well as the training
of the battalions, have for their object the fitting of the junior
officers for their important duties.

The success of an attack depends, in the first place, on
its strength, its power of gaining fire superiority, of taking
instant advantage of success, and of progressing rapidly from
one success to another. To effect all this, to restore the order
and cohesion to the attack which it lost in 1866 and 1870,
to substitute for rashness, impatience, and individual fighting,
the strength and momentum of concentrated numbers bound
together by a discipline which permits no swerving from the
line of direction : to do this and thereby revive that ' bloody
energy of battle ' which seeks not the exhaustion but the
annihilation of the enemy, our own system, even as it now
stands, is fcr better adapted than the disintegrating methods
of the Germans or the fantastic visions of the ' Summer Night's
Dream/

CHAPTER VII

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT

(A Lecture at the United Service Institution, May 25th, 1894)

Although every soldier who takes his profession seriously ad-
mits that there is much to be learned from the experience of
others, especially when these others were far greater men than
he is himself, the extent and nature of the knowledge to be
acquired from a study of military history are not always
recognised.

In the first place, this study is far too restricted. It is time
that ever since war became a science, since battles ceased to be
mere gladiatorial combats, and since campaigns have been won
rather by the intellect of the commander than the skill at arms
of the men, military history has been considered as a valuable
means of war training. But even now this means of training
has by no means reached its full development, for it has stopped
short at the very point at which it was beginning to be really
useful.

It will probably be said that to England, at all events, this
assertion can scarcely be applied, that there, at least, the
theoretical education of the soldier has reached its limit.
Appearances are certainly in favour of this view. Our text-
books are all based upon the experiences of the past, and when
we recall the frequent illustrations, furnished by innumerable
campaigns, which add such weight to the deductions drawn by
Home and Clery, we cannot but admit that the essence of
military history, so far as regards Minor Tactics, has been by
them most ably extracted. Sir Edward Hamley, again, did
the same for Strategy ; and it is unnecessary to expatiate
on the ability with which he dissected the manoeuvres of the

166 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

acknowledged masters of the art of war. Nor is this all. The very
list of lectures delivered at the Royal United Service Institution,
as well as in kindred places, is sufficient in itself to prove that
the study of military history has attracted for many years the
very greatest interest ; whilst in our official publications — the
infantry, cavalry, and artillery drill-books — those sections which
are devoted to tactics are inspired throughout by the actual
experiences of the battlefield. There is no want, moreover, in
the English language, of books of another kind to teach us, so
far as books can, what war is really like. I do not refer to our
regimental histories, for war pictures are too often absent from
their pages, but to that long catalogue of memoirs, narratives,
and biographies, embracing every climate under heaven, and
introducing enemies of every nationality, from the Old Guard
of Napoleon to the tribes who hold that far-off country * where
three empires meet.'

Still, with all this mass of literature at our command, and
notwithstanding the interest evinced in the study of military
history, I believe that, even with ourselves, this method of
fitting men for war is still in process of evolution, and I hope
to indicate the direction which I think the next steps in this
process of evolution ought to take.

Let us first of all ask what the lessons are which are taught
by Hamley, Home, and Clery, and whether their teaching is
not confined within too narrow limits ? Do their books, in fact,
draw all those lessons from military history which Napoleon
referred to when he wrote ' read and re-read the campaigns of
the great captains ; this is the only way of rightly learning the
art of war ' ? I do not wish to be misunderstood. I have not
the very slightest intention of decrying works to which every
educated soldier owes so much. If they are limited in their
scope it is because their scope was limited of set purpose ;
because they are only intended for a certain class of student,
and for the inculcation of a certain amount of knowledge. Not
one of them aspires to comprehend the whole art of war. They
make no claim to be more than introductions to a more extended
course of study, no more than elementary treatises on strategy
and tactics.

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 167

Let us take Home and Clery, as the best known of our
tactical manuals. What do they teach ? The very title of
Clery's book answers the question, so far as this one work is con-
cerned. It teaches Minor Tactics, and the preface to the first
edition declares the limits of its lessons. ' The following pages
formed originally a course of lectures delivered to sub-lieutenants
studying at Sandhurst.'' That is, the book was written for the
instruction of officers of the most junior rank, and a reference
to the table of contents, comprehensive as that table is, shows
that the scope of the book goes no further than the title. It
deals with Minor Tactics only ; with the elementary know-
ledge without which it would be difficult to handle troops
efficiently either on manoeuvres or on service. Similarly with
Home's Precis, although it appeals to a higher grade of officers
than the Sandhurst text-book, it is little, if at all, wider in
scope. ' It has been prepared,' says the original preface, ' chiefly
to aid officers in the examinations for promotion,' and to give
the several branches of the Service ' knowledge of each other's
capabilities.'

Nor is the last issue, so admirably edited by Colonel Pratt,
a whit more ambitious. ; A work of this kind,' he says, ' has no
pretension to be exhaustive.'

As a matter of fact, however, the study of Home and Clery,
as those authors well understood and took care to explain, is no
more than the first step in a most important section of the art
of war. That this is not always recognised is due to the fact
that the division of tactical science into two parts — Minor
Tactics and Grand Tactics — is very generally overlooked. The
very phrase ' Grand Tactics ' looks strange in its English guise,
and I cannot help thinking that Colonel Home, when he called
his book a Precis of Tactics, instead of a Precis of Minor
Tactics, did something towards confusing the minds of his
brother officers. This, however, is not a question of importance.
But it is of importance that it should be clearly understood
that the science of tactics is divided into two parts, and, also,
that the difference between Minor and Grand Tactics should be
clearly defined. This last is difficult, for in many respects the
two branches of tactics overlap ; and I must regret that as I can

168 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

nowhere find, although I have no doubt it exists, an exact
definition, I have to ask my readers to accept one of my own,
which I cannot help suspecting will do very little towards
establishing the distinction which undoubtedly exists. However,
as definitions — even feeble ones — are necessary when it is
desirable that any two parties should consider a subject from
the same point of view, I may say at once that Minor Tactics
include the formation and disposition of the three arms for
attack and defence, and concern officers of every rank ; whilst
Grand Tactics, the art of generalship, include those stratagems,
manoeuvres, and devices by which victories are won, and concern
only those officers who may find themselves in independent
command.

Minor Tactics are more or less mechanical. They may be
called the drill movements of the battlefield ; they deal princi-
pally with material forces, with armament, fire, and formations ;
and their chief end is the proper combination of the three arms
upon the field of battle.

Grand Tactics are far less stereotyped. They are to Minor
Tactics what Minor Tactics are to drill, i.e. the method of
adapting the power of combination to the requirements of
battle ; they deal principally with moral factors ; and their
chief end is the concentration of superior force, moral and
physical, at the decisive point.

It is not necessary to discuss this distinction at greater
length. It is only necessary to ask anyone who believes that
Home and Clery are sufficient in themselves to fit a soldier for
independent command against a civilised enemy, whether he is
of opinion that the art of Napoleon, Wellington, and Moltke
is contained within the covers of those unassuming volumes ?
Whether a man who has mastered those admirable chapters in
which they treat of attack and defence, and of combined tactics,
possesses all the knowledge — putting aside the question of
practice — which a general should possess ? Or, again, will a
thorough acquaintance with Hamley's 'Operations of War"'
make a strategist of the same type as any one of the three great
leaders whose names have just been mentioned ?

Not one of those three books professes to be anything more

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 169

than elementary ; and not one of those three distinguished
authors has touched, except incidentally, upon the art of
generalship.

The methods by which the great generals bound victory to
their colours are scarcely mentioned in the tactical text-books ;
and in Hamley's ' Operations of War ' the predominating in-
fluence of moral forces is alluded to only in a single paragraph.
In short, the higher art of generalship, that section of military
science to which formations, fire, and fortifications are sub-
ordinate, and which is called Grand Tactics, has neither manual
nor text-book.

But whilst recognising the imperative necessity, if the three
arms are to work in harmony, and the General-in-Chief is to
find in his army a weapon which he can use with effect, of the
thorough knowledge and constant practice of minor tactics, it
should never be forgotten that success depends far more on the
skill of the General than on the efficiency of the troops. There
have been soldiers1 battles, it is true, battles like Albuera and
Inkermann, where the Generals gave no order, and which were
won solely and entirely by the courage and endurance of the
officers and men ; but soldiers'" battles are only exceptionally
victories. The truth of Napoleon's saying that in war ' it is
the man who is wanted and not men ' is incontestable ; and his
own magnificent campaigns of 1796 and 1814 are sufficient in
themselves to prove that an able general, although with far
inferior numbers, need never despair of success. Let the con-
verse— that superior numbers, if indifferently commanded, may
be utterly defeated and demoralised — be taken to heart, and
the supreme importance of good leading, and of thorough
training in the art of leading, becomes at once apparent.

There is no instance more convincing of the truth of this
assertion than our great war at the beginning of the last century.
Of what fine material our armies were made there is no need
to speak. But it is a significant fact that during the period
of the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns those magnificent
soldiers, when neither Wellington nor his great lieutenants,
Hill and Graham, commanded them, were unable to win victories.
Pakenham, with a force of those veterans whom Wellington

170 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

declared could go anywhere and do anything, was decisively
defeated by the American Militia at New Orleans. Other
veterans were beaten by their own general at Plattsburg. The
unfortunate expedition to Walcheren, undertaken in the same
year as Corunna, cost the army the lives of thousands without
a single success to compensate ; in the same year 5,000 English
soldiers were turned out of Egypt by the Turks ; and the
campaign in Holland of 1814, although conducted by Lord
Lynedoch, was not fortunate. It is a melancholy fact that
throughout the great war the army suffered in its leaders. We
may recall the Duke's scathing observations to the Military
Secretary : —

'When I reflect upon the character and attainments of
some of the general officers of this army, and consider that
these are the persons on whom I am to rely to lead columns
against the French generals, and who are to carry my instruc-
tions into execution, I tremble ; and, as Lord Chesterfield said
of the generals of his day, " I only hope that when the enemy

reads the list of their names he trembles as I do." And

will be a nice addition to the list ! However, I pray God and

the Horse Guards to deliver me from General and

Colonel .1

I may be accused of merely repeating truisms ; but in the
present condition of tactical study it seems to me that it is
scarcely out of place to emphasise the momentous issues that
hang on the higher leading. This study, as I have already
suggested, suffers for want of expansion. It has been restricted
to Minor Tactics, while Grand Tactics, the Art of Command,
if not forgotten altogether, have been very generally over-
looked. Yet it is to Grand Tactics that Napoleon referred
when he said, ' Read and re-read the campaigns of the great
captains.' He was not thinking of Minor Tactics, of formations,
of fire, and of the combination of the three arms, for he added
the list of the campaigns which he considered useful. And
what were they ? They were not alone the campaigns in which
the troops had been armed with the weapons then in use.
They were not his own campaigns, or those of the Archduke
Charles, or those of Wellington ; but they were campaigns in

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 171

which the battles were fought out with swords and spears, with
slings and arrows, in which the infantry wore armour, and the
cavalry used no reins ; they were the campaigns of Alexander,
Hannibal, and Caesar, as well as those of Gustavus Adolphus
and Turenne.

I cannot believe that he thought there were lessons in
Minor Tactics to be drawn from the battles of Cannae or
Arbela, or that the formations of the legion and the phalanx
could be advantageously employed against the musket and the
cannon, or that the combination of slingers and archers with
swordsmen and spearmen could have anything in common with
the co-operation of infantry and artillery. It was, on the
contrary, the Art of Command he had in mind when he penned
his advice ; the stratagems of Hannibal, the manoeuvres of
Alexander, Caesar's utilisation of moral forces, and the strategic
marches of Turenne. His meaning, however, has not been
always rightly interpreted ; it is not generally understood ;
and it is, perhaps, for this reason that the study of military
history is very largely confined to the study of Minor
Tactics.

I must again say a few words to prevent misunderstanding.
My remarks are by no means intended to apply to everyone.
I have not the very slightest intention of claiming to be first to
explain the true meaning of Napoleon's advice. The list of
recent publications and forthcoming articles would in itself be
sufficient to prove that there are many students of Grand
Tactics amongst English officers. We have Lord Wolseley
attaining the highest literary fame as the biographer of Marl-
borough, Lord Roberts engaged on the Life of Wellington, and
Sir Evelyn Wood recording the achievements of cavalry. Nor is
the study, and even the writing, of history a new feature amongst
officers of high rank. The Great Duke himself was not only an
indefatigable student, but he was also an author. He had been
accustomed to study his profession, so he told Sir James Shaw
Kennedy, for some hours daily throughout the greater part of
his military career, and in one of the volumes of his despatches
is to be found a long review of Napoleon's Russian campaign,
written in 1825. Moreover, the majority of our military heroes

172 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

are numbered amongst the students ; Wolfe, Sir John Moore,
Picton, Craufurd, Sir Charles Napier, and Sir Henry Havelock.
But, at the same time, notwithstanding this array of famous
names, I believe that regimental officers, as a body, are content
with Minor Tactics, with Home and Clery ; or, if they go
further, with such study of recent campaigns as will enable
them to understand what a battle between modern armies
means, and to realise the effect of modern fire. With the art
of independent command they have little concern, and Napoleon's
maxim carries no weight whatever.

I venture to think, however, that as all officers may find
themselves some day in independent command before the
enemy, responsible not only for the lives of their men but for
the honour of their country, lessons in Grand Tactics are
amongst the most important that can be drawn for the present
from the past.

Unfortunately, the study is difficult and laborious. There
are no convenient summaries, like those of Home and Clery ; and
without a competent instructor it is no simple matter to extract
profit from reading the account of some complicated campaign.
There is no guide to tell the student what to look for, or to
what points he should direct special attention. To include
such summary here would be impossible, even if I were capable
of making it complete, but as I have gone so far, it would
be scarcely satisfactory if I made no endeavour to point out
the lines on which the study of Grand Tactics should
proceed.

In the first place, what campaigns should be studied ? Now,
there is an impression abroad that it is of little use, at all events
for the acquirement of tactical knowledge, to study campaigns
in which breech-loaders and rifled guns were not employed.

But after what I have said as to the true meaning of
Napoleon's advice, it is scarcely necessary to say that it still
holds good ; increase of range and more rapid loading, although
they must always be taken into consideration, have affected
Grand Tactics to a very small degree. It is to the campaigns
of the great masters of war that we must still turn if we would
learn the art of generalship, and the campaigns of Marlborough

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 173

and Wellington are as valuable for this purpose as those of
Moltke or of Skobeleff.

Perhaps the most useful lesson to be drawn from the famous
campaigns of history concerns the great principle of moral
force ; and regarding this principle experience, both as student
and instructor, teaches me that a few words of explanation will
not be wasted.

' Moral force,' says Napoleon, ' is to the physical,' that is,
to numbers, armament, and training, as ' three to one.' Clause-
witz, the most profound of all writers on war, says that every
one understands what this moral force is and how it is applied.
But Clausewitz was a genius, and geniuses and clever men have
a distressing habit of assuming that everyone understands
what is perfectly clear to themselves. They often forget that
they are speaking to or writing for men of average intelligence,
who do not reflect deeply, and have to be told important truths
instead of discovering them for themselves. Referring to my
own experience, I am convinced that the young officer of average
intelligence but seldom grasps the meaning ot Napoleon's
maxim. He accepts it, as soldiers accept the words of the
greatest soldier of them all, without question. But he gets no
further. His text-books repeat the maxim, but being con-
cerned with minor tactics only, he does not discuss it ; and
there is no treatise, so far as I r.m aware, which explains what
the nature of this moral force is or how it has been utilised in
the field. Nothing is more difficult than to drive into men's
heads the fact that the great generals took this moral force
into account in all their plans of battles, that the effects they
expected from their combinations were based upon moral
considerations, and that it was because of this that we call them
' great.' To those, therefore, who find themselves in the same
predicament as I certainly was once myself — accepting the
maxim without in the least understanding it — I venture to add
a few words which may enlighten them.

Such enlightenment may prove of no immediate benefit.
But no general, no commander of an independent force, can
hope for great and decisive success without grasping Napoleon's
meaning so thoroughly that he is always trying to express it in

174 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

action ; and the sooner officers gain this knowledge the more
familiar will it become — the more likely to be utilised when
their time for command arrives. Moreover, when they read of
war, when they hear of war, or when they criticise generals and
operations, as young officers sometimes do, they will see things
from a new point of view, listen to them with a more in-
telligent interest, and perhaps be more judicious in the way in
which they apportion praise or blame.

The first thing is to realise that in war we have to do
not so much with numbers, arms, and manoeuvres, as with
human nature.

What did Napoleon find in the history of the campaigns of
Alexander, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar ? Not merely a record
of marches and manoeuvres, of the use of entrenchments, or of
the general principles of attack and defence. This is the
mechanical part — the elementary part — of the science ol
command.

No ; he found in those campaigns a complete study of
human nature under the conditions that exist in war ; human
nature affected by discipline, by fear, by the need of food, by
want of confidence, by over-confidence, by the weight of
responsibility, by political interests, by patriotism, by distrust,
and by many other things. The lessons he learned from the
campaigns he studied so carefully were not mechanical move-
ments and stereotyped combinations. He was not merely an
imitator. Not one of his campaigns has its exact prototype in
history — but he learned from history the immense value of the
moral element in war ; to utilise it to the utmost became
instinctive, and he played upon the hearts of his enemies and
of his own men with a skill which has never been surpassed.

Now, in the long history of war we find a number of
generals who were good soldiers, men who understood the
mechanical part of their business, who could maintain disci-
pline, who could organise, who could handle their troops care-
fully in attack, who had a good eye for country, and who
could select and occupy strong defensive positions, and yet,
although they escape the reproach of being bad generals, no
one ever calls them ' great.' Read through their campaigns

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 175

and you will find it hard to point to occasions where they
actually broke the ordinary rules of war ; you will certainly
never find occasions where they ran unnecessary risks. Now,
turn to the campaigns of the great generals, and you will find
the rules of war violated again and again, until you get into
a hopeless confusion as to what the real rules of war are ; you
will find them conducting operations which, if they were not
the enterprises of a lunatic, were apparently full of risk, and you
find it an easy matter to point out some obvious manoeuvre or
simple precaution on the enemy's part which would have ruined
the whole operation. But the curious fact is this, that the
operations very seldom did fail, and that, if they did, it was
not because the rules of war were set at defiance, but because
of some fault in execution.

The explanation of the brilliant successes that the great
generals gained in spite of rules and against enormous risks
is to be found in the fact that they looked not only on the
physical side — on the numbers and armament of the enemy
— but that they saw his weaknesses ; they played upon his
susceptibilities and apprehensions ; every movement that they
made was calculated to destroy the moral and confidence of
both general and soldiers ; if they made movements which set
at defiance the rules of war, it was because they were aware
that the moral influence of such movements made them ab-
solutely safe ; and if in appearance great risks were run, it was
with the full knowledge that the enemy's character or his
apprehensions would prevent him from taking those simple
precautions by which the critics point out that the whole enter-
prise might easily have been ruined. ' They had penetrated,1
to use a phrase of the late Colonel Charles Brackenbury, ' their
adversary's brain.'

These considerations are often overlooked by those who
know little of war. In order to explain satisfactorily the
causes of success which they are unable, from their lack of
knowledge to comprehend, they put the whole thing down to
chance, and brand the commander with the epithet of lucky.
Now. that there are lucky generals it is impossible to deny ;
but the epithet is more appropriately applied to those who

176 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

commit flagrant mistakes and get off scot-free, because they
have to deal with an incapable antagonist. To call generals
who are invariably successful ' lucky ' is as much as to say that
there is no such thing as skill in generalship, or no such
quality as aptitude for war. You may call them ' unlucky,1
if you will, when their plans are ruined by some incapable
subordinate ; but when you try to find a reason for their long
roll of successful campaigns and cannot do so, consider whether
it is not possible that what you call ' luck ' is the result ot
profound calculation, of a grasp of the situation far wider
than your own, and of a utilisation of moral force which even
special correspondents do not always understand, and which the
official despatches do not reveal.

The ordinary general, on the other hand, even if he takes
into account the peculiar characteristics of the enemy, does not,
like the great generals, take into account the character of the
hostile commander ; and he runs none of those apparent risks
which bring about decisive victories, because he neither under-
stands his opponents' weaknesses, nor the art of turning them
to his own advantage. He does not set mind against mind ;
and yet war is more of a struggle between two human intelli-
gences than between two masses of armed men. The great
general, whilst raising to the utmost the moral of his own men,
reckoning up that of the enemy, and lowering it in every
possible way, does not give his first attention to these points,
nor to the numbers against him. He looks beyond them,
beyond his own troops, and across the enemy's lines, until he
comes to the quarters occupied by the enemy's leader, and then
he puts himself in that leader's place, and with that leader's
eyes and mind he looks at the situation ; he realises his weak-
nesses, the points for the security of which he is most ap-
prehensive ; he considers what his enemy's action will be if he is
attacked here or threatened there, and he sees for himself,
looking at things with his enemy's eyes, whether or no apparent
risks are not absolutely safe. If he knows something of his
opponent's personal character he has a powerful weapon put
into his hand. 'It is to be ignorant and blind,' wrote the
Grecian biographer of Hannibal, ' in the science of commanding

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 177

armies, to think that a general has anything more important
to do than to apply himself to learning the inclinations and
character of his adversary,' and to Hannibal's observance of
this maxim he ascribes the extraordinary victories of the great
Carthaginian. Look at Napoleon. When his luggage was
captured during the retreat from Moscow, Sir Robert Wilson,
the English Commissioner with the Russians, relates that there
were found amongst his private papers biographies of all the
Russian generals opposed to him. In the Waterloo campaign
again, his first move, when he found himself in a position to
attack the Allies in detail, was to strike at the Prussians,
knowing that Bliicher, impetuous fighter as he was, would never
decline a battle in order to fall back and combine with his
more cautious ally. Look at Wellington. It is Napier who
tells the story. When the British army was in the Pyrenees,
entangled in very difficult country, very skilfully defended by
the French, the Duke on one occasion gave orders for a certain
movement. As soon as he had done so, he rode up to the out-
posts to observe the French for himself, and the men cheered
him all along the line. The French commander, Marshal
Soult, surrounded by his staff, was on the opposite hill, and
Wellington observed their uneasiness at hearing the cheers
across the valley. ' Soult,' he said, * is a very cautious com-
mander. He will delay his attack to find out what these cheers
mean ; that will give time for the 6th Division to arrive
and I shall beat him.' The event turned out exactly as he
anticipated.

Again, let us go across the Atlantic. The Great Civil War
in America was fought out by generals who were, some of them,
in the first rank, for the respect they paid to the moral aspect
of war was remarkable. The greatest of all was Lee, and
his military secretary writes as follows : * He studied his
adversary, knew his peculiarities, and adapted himself to them.
His own methods no one could foresee ; he varied them with
every change in the commanders opposed to him. He had
one method with McClellan, another with Pope, another with
Hooker, and yet another with Grant. But for a knowledge
of his own resources, of the field, and of the adversary, some

N

178 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

of his movements might have been rash. As it was, they were
wisely bold.'

The next point I would refer to is stratagem ; and on this
I think it is hardly necessary to dilate at length. It is not
difficult to understand the importance of deceiving and be-
wildering your opponent ; to realise the force of Stonewall
Jackson's advice, ' Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the
enemy.1 Surprise is the greatest of all foes ; by stratagem
surprise is made possible, and stratagems have been used since
the night when the army of the Midianites, ' like a multitude
of beasts, with camels innumerable as the sands of the sea-
shore,1 fled before ' the trumpets and the empty pitchers, and
the lamps within the pitchers,1 of Gideon's 300 men. Had
Lord Wolseley completed his biography of Marlborough, there
would be no occasion to remind English officers that the
greatest of English soldiers was only equalled as a master of
stratagem by Hannibal and Napoleon. If upon this account
alone, the story of his campaigns is in the highest degree
instructive, and we may trust it will not be long before English
soldiers are as familiar with his methods of war as with those
of Wellington.

Lastly, there is the use of ground. Many soldiers may
perhaps be inclined to disagree with me when I say that instruc-
tion as to use ot ground may be gathered from books. I do not
for a moment wish to assert that any amount of reading will
compensate for the study of ground on the ground itself. But
I am still of opinion that there is very much to be learnt in this
respect from great campaigns, and that the value and scope of
the practical study can be very largely enhanced by theoretical
knowledge.

On this question of ground the text-books of Minor Tactics
give us some assistance. For instance, it is one of the most
valuable characteristics of Clery that the capabilities and
influence of the ground are alluded to in every chapter. But,
as the book is little concerned with generalship, there are few
allusions as to the manner in which Napoleon or Wellington
made use of natural features ; there are no illustrations of their
methods, and, indeed, if the subject were treated thoroughly

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 179

from the point of view of Grand Tactics, a larger volume than
Clery would be the result. On this point Hamley is admir-
able, and his chapters on topographical obstacles, and the use
to which they may be put, form an excellent introduction to
the study of this question from a strategical point of view.
But he considers it from this point of view alone, and so, as
regards Grand Tactics, we must go to the campaigns of the great
captains, follow their manoeuvres on the best maps we can
procure, learn with them to recognise the weak points of a
position, to utilise the cover which the country affords in order
to mass unexpectedly against some one of those points, and to
derive that advantage from natural features which has so often
outweighed the advantages of numbers.

I may here anticipate the objection that increased range
of firearms has altered everything. This increase, as I have
already remarked, must always be taken into consideration, and
there can be no doubt that the power of modern fire has made
ground which was formerly eminently favourable for attack
eminently favourable for defence ; and, also, that as regards
defensive positions, the necessity of great depth of cover for
supports and reserves, and for second and third lines from the
far-reaching shrapnel, has changed the conditions under which
troops are distributed. But, in reply to the objection, I assert
that general principles, so far as Grand Tactics are concerned,
still hold good. For instance, if we select a defensive position
Wellington's dispositions under such circumstances are no bad
guide. Not only may we notice his use of advanced posts, but
the positions of his second and third lines are well worth con-
sideration, and how it was they were always at the right place
at the right time. If we are inferior in artillery — as he gene-
rally was — is it not useful to consider his occupation of a position
under the same conditions — the skirmishers half way down the
slope, drawing the enemy on, whilst the main line was hidden
behind the crest at such distance as prevented the enemy, when
his columns reached the height, from bringing up his guns to
support his infantry ?

Again, in the attack ; look at the extraordinary profit to
which Napoleon turned those natural obstacles perpendicular to

n 2

180 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the line of battle at Rivoli, at Friedland, and at Dresden ; at
the value in a counter-stroke of such tactical points as the
village and the knoll which formed the centre of the Allied
position at Austerlitz. Look at the almost precipitous slopes
— as steep as and far higher than the famous Rotheberg at
Spicheren, up which he led two army corps during the night
which preceded the surprise and victory of Jena ! Look at
Lee, in the great campaign of 1864, where he allowed an army,
double his numbers, to turn his flank, enticing his adversary
into the jungle which is called the ' Wilderness of Virginia1 —
a jungle of which his men knew every path, and of which the
Federals knew nothing — in order that he might overwhelm their
unwieldy masses.

I am tempted here to give a very brief description of
Austerlitz. It was the most brilliant, because the most skilful,
of Napoleon's victories — and as the result of a combination of
the application of moral factors — of stratagem, and the use
of ground, affords a most forcible and complete illustration of
the art of Grand Tactics.

In November 1806, Napoleon was encamped with his army
east of Briinn, in Moravia, with his line of communications
running southwards to Vienna. At Olmiitz a Russian and
Austrian army was slowly assembling. Another Austrian army
was in Hungary, and it was probable that Prussia might declare
war. Napoleon pretended to enter into negotiations, and on
the Allied army moving forward from Olmiitz, he permitted it
to capture an advanced detachment.

His inactivity before Briinn — so different from his usual
rapid offensive — his apparent desire for peace, and his per-
mitting his detachment to be captured without an effort to
support it, led the Allied generals to believe that he feared a
battle, and would retreat on their approach in the direction ol
Vienna. As he had anticipated, whilst continuing their forward
movement they threw forward their left, with the evident design
of cutting him off from his base of operations. On December 1,
they arrived opposite the French position, and the tendency to
turn the enemy's right was still more manifest.

The ground or ~ hich the battle was fought is an undulating

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 181

plain — lying between two parallel chains of mountains, which
run east and west at a distance of some ten or twelve miles.
Napoleon had taken up a position behind a brook, where the
ground gave some cover, with his left flank almost touching the
northern of the two ranges, and with a great gap between his
right and the southern range. Through this gap — several miles
in width — it seemed easy to penetrate, to turn his flank, and
block his communications. The Allies fell into the trap. The
very line of their bivouac fires, blazing on the opposite ridge
the night before the battle, revealed to their astute antagonist
the movement projected for the morrow and, in a proclamation
to his soldiers, he not only told them what the enemy would try
to do, but explained the manoeuvre by which he should win the
battle.

This manoeuvre was as follows : —

The allies were posted on a long bare ridge, of which the
culminating point was a commanding hill, with a little village
half-way up the slope. Napoleon determined to attack their
right vigorously, to permit their left wing to get well away on
its great outflanking manoeuvre, and then, with 30,000 men — in
one huge mass — to attack their weak centre, to seize the village
and the hill, and by the occupation of this strong tactical point,
the value of which his trained eye for ground had detected, to
cut their army in two.

In order, moreover, to draw the turning movement on, he
showed only very few troops on the threatened flank, the
division with which he intended to hold the outflanking attack
being encamped during the night several miles distant from
the field of battle.

His anticipations were fulfilled to the letter. The result
of his extraordinary combinations was the destruction of nearly
half the opposing army, and when the original equality of
force is considered, it must be allowed that the genius of a
great general has seldom been more effectively displayed.

But even if there still be some who do not admit that
the principles on which Wellington and Napoleon acted
are applicable to modern conditions, they will at least allow
that an intelligent study of their battles will emphasise the

182 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

importance of ground, and will induce the student not only
to appreciate the value of topographical features, but to try to
acquire that eye for country which is a distinguishing char-
acteristic of every great general.

These are only some of the elements of Grand Tactics, but
they are among the more important. And it is well to note
that the study of the art of command need not necessarily
entail a great amount of reading. On this point some remarks
made by Lord Wolseley at a lecture in Dublin are undoubtedly
sound.

' A certain amount of reading,1 he said, ' and a certain
amount of study is absolutely necessary for any man who
ever wishes to command troops in the field ; and,1 he added,
' so far as I know of the study of war, the great thing is to
read a little and think a great deal — and think of it over and
over again.1 I do not believe that this advice can be bettered.
A few campaigns thoroughly studied will do more to strengthen
the intellect, to develop a capacity for hard thinking, and to
teach the art of leading troops, than fifty campaigns that have
been merely skimmed. General knowledge is often superficial.
There is no great benefit, for instance, to be derived from
reading the whole of Napier or the history of Napoleon, but
if, in the course of a single winter, an officer were to work out
and think out the campaign of 1796 in Italy, or the campaign
of 1812 in Spain, he could not fail to profit by his study.
When I say < work out and think out,1 I do not imply that he
should be content with reading the narrative and the criticisms,
and with following the operations on the map. By far the
most useful way of studying military history is to find out
from your books, so far as possible, what the situation was at
any given time ; then to shut the books, take the map, decide
for yourself what you would have done had you been in the
place of one of the commanding generals, and write your
orders. You are thus dealing with a problem which actually
occurred ; and in working out the solution you are training
your judgment — and remember that war presents a constant
series of problems to every officer who may hold an independent
command. If an officer has been accustomed to deal with

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 183

military problems — even on paper — the powers of his mind
and his natural ability will have been strengthened in the right
direction, and the process of reasoning, which the solution of
difficulties involves, will come easier to him than to the man
who has to depend in all the excitement of battle on a rusty
intellect and the chance of a happy inspiration. I may remind
you that if there was one quality more than another in which
the great captains excelled, it was their power of reasoning.
The despatches of Napoleon, of Wellington, and of Moltke
prove that they depended for success on their hard thinking
and careful calculation. In fact, those magnificent strokes of
genius which seemed dictated by the circumstances of the
moment were due, as Napoleon himself implies, to a habit of
calculation so rapid and so accurate as to seem to the un-
initiated like inspiration.

' If,' he said, ' I always appear prepared, it is because before
entering on an undertaking I have meditated for long and
have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals
to me suddenly and secretly what I have to do in circumstances
unexpected by other people ; it is reflection, it is meditation.'

Nor do I think that for the purpose of learning how to
handle a small force of the three arms it is necessary to study
a whole campaign. Such a study has the advantage of teaching
strategy and tactics at one and the same time, and it is certainly a
very thorough means of education. But it is by no means a bad
thing if education proceeds by successive stages, and it is well to
learn how to handle a small force on the field of battle before
we aspire to manoeuvre an army on the theatre of war.

I would advocate the study of a few famous battles, fought
by able leaders. Take, for instance, such a series of English
victories as the following : — Vimiera, Rolica, Sabugal, Redinha,
Maida, Alexandria, Almaraz, Barossa. Here is a list of actions,
fought by comparatively small forces, in all of which skilful
generalship was displayed. No one can object that they are
either dull reading, or would occupy too much time, and all
of them will afford many suggestions as to stratagems,
manoeuvres, the art of concentrating superior force, and the
occupation of positions. It does not appear to me too much

184 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

to ask the British officer of to-day to follow the example of
Wellington, Wolfe, Moore, and Napier, and the course of
study I suggest is not a very lengthy one. The first thing to
do is to learn the tactical sections of the drill-books thoroughly
— if not by heart. There the concentrated essence of modern
fighting is to be found, based on the experience of many wars,
and it is absolutely useless for any officer to study military
history until he has the rules, maxims, and principles contained
in the official manuals at his fingers1 ends. Then, to elucidate
points which are necessarily much condensed in the drill-books,
read some manual on Minor Tactics. A single battle of the
1870 era will give you an idea of what a modern battlefield is
like. Certain chapters in Mayne"s ' Fire Tactics ' are invaluable.
When you have done this, set to work at Grand Tactics, study
the battles of Napoleon, or of Wellington, or of Marlborough,
sleep with ' The Soldier's Pocket-Book ' under your pillow, and,
so far as theory can help you, you will have done your duty.

If I were asked to put my finger on the most important
* Lesson that may be drawn from the Past,' I should reply that
history teaches us that courage, numbers, armament, and en-
trenchments are of no avail if the troops are badly led, and that
the honour and safety of the Empire depend on the skill and
knowledge of British officers.

It is true that theory by itself will avail but little. When
he was asked the best means of learning the art of war, Lord
Seaton, the famous Colonel Colborne of the Peninsula and
Waterloo, replied, 'Fighting, and a d — d deal of it.' But
practical experience, at all events of civilised warfare, falls to
the lot of few, and practical experience, unless it forms a basis
for reflection, and is amplified by comparison with the experience
of others, loses half its value.

Frederick the Great in speaking of officers who relied on
their practical experience alone, caustically remarked that there
were in the army two commissariat mules which had served
through twenty campaigns, * but,' he added significantly, ' they
are mules still.1 To draw all the good out of practical experi-
ence, reflection and comparison are necessary ; but reflection
and comparison will be impossible unless the brain has been

LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT 185

trained to think, and the mind is stored with knowledge of the
past. Moreover, as regards Grand Tactics and the art of inde-
pendent command, our experience as junior and subordinate
officers is little to the point. It is rare indeed that an officer
progresses gradually from the control of a small independent
force to the control of a large one. As a very general rule his
first experience of independent command is the charge of im-
portant operations. He rises suddenly from the position ot
a subordinate, obeying orders, and concerned only with the
execution of a plan devised by another, to the vast responsi-
bilities which attend the functions of a General-in-Chief, and,
under the burden of those responsibilities, in order to bring his
operations to a successful issue, he must rely on his natural
aptitude for war, on his moral courage, and his theoretical
knowledge of the art of command. Theory, applied to the
profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious sound.
But it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the
advice, or to take warning from the practice of Napoleon, ot
Wellington, and of many of our own most famous generals.
* It is not pretended,1 says M'Dougall, ' that study will make a
dull man brilliant, nor confer resolution and rapid decision on
one who is timid and irresolute by nature ; but the quick, the
resolute, the daring, deciding and acting rapidly, as is their
nature, will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly
in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon
to practise.'

The following advice was written to a young officer by Sir
Charles Napier, himself an example of the highest military
genius, who not only did not disdain incessant study of his pro-
fession, but thought it indispensable to success : * By reading
you will be distinguished ; without it, abilities are of little use.
A man cannot learn his profession without constant study to
prepare especially for the higher ranks. When in a post of
responsibility, he has no time to read ; and if he comes to such
a post with an empty skull, it is then too late to fill it. Thus
many people fail to distinguish themselves, and say they are
unfortunate, which is untrue; their own previous idleness
unfitted them to profit by fortune.'

186 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

In a time of peace when there is nothing to attract the
minds of soldiers from the ordinary routine of their profession,
and especially in a time when the chances of England becoming
involved in a great war are considered as remote as they were
in the era which preceded the Crimea and the Mutiny, there is
a danger that the ordinary routine may be considered as
sufficient for every purpose. Captain Mahan has pointed out
that the cordial reception which his books on the Sea Power
have met with in England is virtually an admission that the
systematic study of ' The Conduct of War ' has been to some
degree overlooked by English sailors. The real reason of this
enthusiasm, I believe, is rather that a most brilliant intellect
has thrown new light upon the lessons of the past. But, be
this as it may, we soldiers may take warning from our comrades
of the Navy. It is true that in some respects we have been
more fortunate than they, for we have been long provided with
capable teachers. The Memoirs of Napoleon, the Despatches
of Wellington, Napier's History of the Peninsular War, to take
but a few amongst many, are as instinct with genius as even
the works of Captain Mahan. We have only to ask ourselves
whether these volumes are studied as they should be, and
whether our younger officers realise the importance, and under-
stand the methods, of preparing themselves for the responsibilities
of command.

CHAPTER VIII

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

(From the 'Edinburgh Review,' April 1891)

The War of Secession was waged on so vast a scale, employed
so large a part of the manhood of both North and South America,
aroused to such a degree the sympathies of the entire nation,
and, in its brilliant achievements, both by land and sea, bears
such splendid testimony to the energy and fortitude of their
race, that in the minds of the American people it has roused an
interest which shows no sign of abating. There are few families
that did not contribute to swell the rolls of the gigantic armies
which stretched in broad line of battle half across the continent ;
few homes where the voice of the mourner was not heard : few
cities that cannot point with pride to the deeds of those who
were born within their boundaries. It is little wonder, then,
that this intense national interest should have found many
channels of expression. The most valuable of these is the
stupendous work published under the authority of the Senate,
containing as it does every authentic document connected with
even the most trivial incident of the war. This official record,
however, is inaccessible to the majority of European readers ;
and its bulk, as well as the nature of its arrangement, renders
it valueless to the general public, military or civilian.

The future historian of the great Translantic strife — for,
excellent as is the work of the Comte de Paris, the history of
the Civil War has yet to be written — will find in the auto-
biographies of many of the prominent leaders, and in the
memoirs of others, compiled, as a rule, by members of their
personal staff, material sufficient to enable him to explain the
purpose of each strategic movement, and to ascribe victories

188 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and disasters to their true causes. In addition to these sources
of information, and to the numerous histories of individual
regiments, almost every State has its Historical Society, and the
records of their proceedings contain papers on every aspect of
the conflict, contributed by men vrho took part in the events of
which they write. These publications, however, are naturally
of a more or less private nature, and their circulation is limited.
It has been left to the enterprise of the ' Century ' Company to
give to the world the reminiscences thus accumulated, and to
present them in the most attractive form. Almost without
exception, every single article in the four large volumes edited
by Messrs. Johnson and Buel is accompanied by illustrations of
the ground over which the actions treated of were fought.
These illustrations are of a high order of art ; they have been
executed with a most exact fidelity to nature ; and there
exists no other method which enables the student to realise
so readily the features of the battlefields. Without incessant
practice, few can reproduce in their mind's eye the landscape
depicted on a map ; and in any case, as military surveyors
have lately recognised, sketches of nature, however rough, are
most valuable adjuncts both to maps and reconnaissance reports.
The authors of the various papers are of every rank, from the
commander-in-chief to the private of infantry ; and, taken as
a whole, as a picture of war, or a study in tactical science,
these volumes are without an equal.

As moral influences remain longest in the memory, and
leave the most vivid impressions on the minds of those who
have experience of service in the field, it is the moral aspect of
war which is invariably the more prominent in personal narra-
tives of marches and of battle. It is in this respect that the
' Century ' papers have a value exceeding that of the official
accounts of the wars of 1866 and 1870-1. No one can fail to
remark the frankness with which the American soldiers speak
of the vicissitudes of their campaigns. The simplicity with
which they refer to the demoralisation of this brigade, the mis-
behaviour of that, to the neglect of precaution, to straggling
on the march, and to skulking on the field, is in marked con-
trast to the euphemistic paragraphs compiled by the historical

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 189

section of the German staff. The latter are so worded as to
maintain the invincibility of the German army. It is doubtless
considered as essential to impress on successive generations of
conscripts that their predecessors yielded neither to panic nor
irresolution, as it is unnecessary to inform those who are still
their foes how often victory trembled in the balance ; and,
therefore, we hear but half the truth. On the other hand,
with full confidence in the well-proved courage of his people,
and without formidable enemies to fear, no American soldier
feels either shame or hesitation in admitting that the weak
ness of human nature prevailed at times over courage and
goodwill.

' We heard all through the war,1 says a New York private,
' that the army was eager to be led against the enemy. It
must have been so, for truthful correspondents said so, and
editors confirmed it ; but when you came to hunt for this
particular itch it was always the . next regiment that had it.
The truth is, when bullets are whacking against tree trunks
and solid shot are cracking skulls like egg shells, the consuming
passion in the heart of the average man is to get out of the
way. Between the physical fear of going forward, and the
moral fear of turning back, there is a predicament of exceptional
awkwardness, from which a hidden hole in the ground would
be a wonderfully welcome outlet.1 1

It is in these admissions that the lessons contained in the
* Century 1 series are exceedingly valuable. Let a man know
the exact worth of the instrument he uses, the extent to which
its temper may be trusted, the conditions under which it may be
expected to fail him, and he will be better armed than the man
who looks upon it as an instrument which is to be relied upon
under any circumstances whatever. The worth of the instrument
with which war is waged depends chiefly on the moral influences
to which it is subjected. Armies are not machines, but living
organisms of intense susceptibility. It is the leader who
reckons with the human nature of his own troops and of the
enemy, rather than with their mere physical attributes, numbers,
armament, and the like, who may hope to follow in Napoleon^
1 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii. p. 662.

190 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

footsteps. To create physical strength in an army is far more
easy than to endow that army with moral superiority. ' Many
a man,1 says the Spanish proverb, ' can make a guitar ; few can
make music from it.'

' In the " Century " papers,1 writes General Maurice, ' you
get a sense of dealing with armies of flesh and blood, and not
mere war-game counters, unique in my experience.1 1 It is the
absence of this element that makes the German histories such
terribly dry reading, and, in one important particular, so de-
ficient in instruction. It is its presence in the volumes before
us that not only teaches the reader to appreciate the truth of
Napoleon^ maxim, but suggests the methods in which it may
be applied.

There are many questions of importance on which much
light has been thrown by the events of the Secession War — for
instance, the naval operations, mounted infantry, field entrench-
ments, and the relations of the Government with the leaders of
its armies. To these, however, and to other tempting themes,
I shall make no further allusion. My present purpose is to
examine the history of the war from one aspect only. The
great conflict was fought out by unprofessional soldiers, by a
national militia, leavened by a sprinkling of regular officers.
The armies of both North and South differed little in constitu-
tion from an integral portion of our own army of defence. The
soldiers were of our own stock. Their experience, therefore,
will help us to anticipate the shortcomings likely to occur
amongst our own volunteers should they be called upon to take
the field, and may enlighten us as to the measures by which
these shortcomings may be most readily corrected.

The bombardment and surrender of Port Sumter, which
first announced to the world that the Northern and the Southern
States of America, in Lincoln's homely but expressive phrase,
could 'no longer keep house,1 took place in April 1861. The
regular forces numbered but 15,500, and the greater part of
the troops were far away on the Indian frontier. The men
held fast to the Union. The officers took the part of their
native States, and, under their supervision, armies of volunteers
1 Journal of B.U.S.L, vol. xxxiii. p. 1082.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 191

were immediately t mustered by either side. Three months
elapsed between the assembly of the troops and their meeting
on the field of battle, and by both sides this interval was
devoted to the work of drill, discipline, and organisation. Men
and officers were, generally speaking, without experience of
war ; and, with the exception of a small minority, the regular
officers were utterly ignorant of soldiering. Some few had
imbibed a slight knowledge of drill at the military academies
which, on the model of West Point, had been established in
several of the Southern States. Many had served in the militia
and home guards, but these organisations were seldom mustered,
and had no more instruction or discipline than was required to
quell a riot or take part in a procession.

In the Union States, more intensely democratic than the
Confederate, it by no means followed that the more experienced
were placed in command. Commissions were given by the
suffrages of the men in the ranks, and officers who owed their
position to the favour of their former comrades were generally
careful not to lose their popularity by the enforcement of an
obnoxious discipline. The hold of the officers on their commands
was thus of the slightest in the North, and it was but little
stronger in the South. The men resented obedience to those
who were superior neither in social standing nor professional
knowledge to themselves. Of the regular officers available
the Confederates made the best use, immediately assigning
them to the command of brigades and to posts on the general
staff. Nevertheless, despite the presence of these trained instruc-
tors, when the two principal armies met at Bull Run, an insig-
nificant stream in Virginia within thirty miles of Washington,
the Union capital, on July 21, they both were weak in discipline ;
and the event goes far to prove that ninety days of camp life
were insufficient to give citizen soldiers more than the outward
semblance of a regular army.

As regards the actual fighting qualities of the men, the
battle was no discredit to either side. Indiscipline was the
cause both of the defeat of the Northerners and of the failure
of the Southerners to pursue.

* We had good organisation, good men, but no cohesion, no

192 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

real discipline, no respect for authority, no real knowledge of
war. Both armies were fairly defeated, and whichever had stood
fast the other would have run.'' '

' The Federals left the field about half-past four. Until
then they had fought wonderfully well for raw troops. There
were no fresh forces on the field to support or encourage them,
and the men seemed to be seized simultaneously by the convic-
tion that it was no use to do anything more, and they might as
well start home. Cohesion was lost, the organisation being
disintegrated, and the men walked quickly off. There was no
special excitement, except that arising from the frantic efforts
of officers to stop men who paid little or no attention to any-
thing that was said.' 2

* At four o'clock on the 21st there Avere more than 12,000
volunteers on the battlefield who had entirely lost their regi-
mental organisation. They could no longer be handled as
troops, for the officers and men were not together. Men and
officers mingled promiscuously ; and it is worthy of remark that
this disorganisation did not result from fear.1 3

Nor were their opponents in better plight. It is related
that as the Confederate President was riding to the field at
about four o'clock on the day of battle, ' he met a stream of
panic-stricken rebel soldiers, and heard such direful tidings
from the front that his companions were thoroughly convinced
that the Confederates had lost the day, and implored him to
turn back.'4

Early in the afternoon the Confederates had been driven
back by a skilfully conceived movement against their left flank.
The generals arrived upon the scene.

' We heard the commanders resolutely stemming the further
flight of the routed forces, but vainly endeavouring to restore
order, and our own efforts were as futile.

' Every segment of line we succeeded in forming dissolved

1 Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, vol. i. pp. 181-2.

2 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. i. p. 191, article by General
Fry.

3 The Outbreak of tlie Bebellion, Nioolay, pp. 195-6.

4 Ibid. p. 197.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 193

while another was being formed ; more than 2,000 men were
shouting each some suggestion to his neighbour, their voices
mingling with the noise of the shells hurtling overhead, and
all words of command drowned in the confusion and uproar.' :

More noteworthy, perhaps, was the inability of the Federal
troops, although they had been exercised for the best part of
three months in camp, to perform the very trifling marches
necessary to bring them into contact with the enemy in good
order and in good time.

'The march preceding the battle demonstrated little else
than the general laxity of discipline ; for with all my personal
efforts I could not prevent the men straggling for water, black-
berries, or anything else they fancied.1 2

' General McDowell was anxious to reach Centreville on the
17th, and so to fight on the 19th instead of the 21st, but the
regiments, who had only marched from Vienna (six miles), were
so fatigued that they either could not or would not push on six
miles further the same evening. Their fatigue was partially
caused by delays and dawdling, consequent on the ignorance of
the rules of marching on the part of the officers, and by the
undisciplined state of the troops ; and also by the absence of
good marching qualities in Americans, and their inability to
carry even the slight weights required in light marching order.1 3

Had the attack been made on the 19th the Northern army
would have been opposed by but half the numbers that were
present on the 21st.

The disaster of Bull Run roused the Northern States to
a truer appreciation of their difficulties, and the President
immediately assembled near Washington an army of more than
140,000 men, increased during the winter to 220,000 with 520
guns. In the seven months which elapsed between the first
great battle and the second attempt of the North to crush the
main army of the Confederates, this force, thanks to the skill

1 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. i. p. 201, article by General
Beauregard.

2 Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, vol. i. p. 181.

1 History of the American War, by Lt.-Col. Fletcher, Scots Fusilier Guards,
vol. i. pp. 129-30

O

194 THE SCIENCE OF AVAR

and patience of General McClellan, its new commander,
gradually assumed the organisation and aspect of a real army.
A beneficial change was instituted in the terms of enlistment ;
the battalions were asked to volunteer for three years or for the
duration of the war ; and both officers and men set themselves
to work more earnestly than their unfortunate predecessors.
At the beginning of April 1862, McClellan, selecting the
shortest line of invasion, transferred the greater part of his
army by sea to Fort Monroe. Richmond, the seat of the
Confederate Government, was the objective of the campaign,
and so, on the Yorktown Peninsula, already historically famous
for the surrender of Cornwallis in 1781, began that series of
operations which culminated in the ' Seven Days' Battles,' the
defeat of the Federals by Lee, and the withdrawal of their
troops to Washington. Whether this repulse was due to the
shortcomings of the leader or to the interference of the Govern-
ment is a question with which we have no concern. The
efficiency of the officers and men is the subject of this enquiry
and it is only right to state that in the desperate fighting
round Richmond, the troops showed far greater stability and
endurance than at Bull Run. At the same time they had not
yet by any means attained either the consistency or the mobility
of professional soldiers. The men had not yet acquired the
habit of mechanical obedience, which alone makes an army an
effective weapon in the hands of its commander. Where duty
became irksome it was neglected. Straggling on the line of
march was a conspicuous evil. The details connected with
sanitation and the care of equipment were generally over-
looked, and the health of the troops and the efficiency of their
armament suffered in consequence.

Amongst the critics of the campaign are two experienced
European soldiers, the Comte de Paris and Colonel Fletcher.
The one served on McClellan's staff during the operations, the
other accompanied his army as a spectator. The French
prince was prejudiced in favour of the North ; the Englishman's
sympathies were with the aristocracy of the South ; but,
divergent as were their predilections, they are at one in pointing
out that the bonds of discipline in the army of the Potomac,

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 195

as the force commanded by McClellan had come to be called,
were weak in the extreme. It is in the pages of these eye-
witnesses that evidence as to the condition of the Northern
troops can best be found.

One of their most serious shortcomings was that on the
field of battle the men were accustomed to conduct themselves
in accordance rather with the dictates of their own judgment
than with the orders of their superiors. At Cold Harbor,
where Lee struck the isolated right wing of the Federals, and
compelled McClellan to make his famous change of base from
the York to the James River, both sides fought with the
greatest courage and persistence, and it was not till after seven
hours of battle that 50,000 Confederates drove 35,000 Unionists
from their strong position on the left bank of the Chickahominy.
General Porter, commanding the Northern troops engaged, had
exhausted his reserves some time before his line yielded ; but
fresh troops had been sent across the river by McClellan, and
an orderly retreat might have been easily effected, for the Con-
federates were in no good trim for further action. As it was —
'When the crash came no one could stop the current of
fugitives: large numbers of men without order, with arms in
their hands, left the ranks and walked to the rear, officers were
intermingled with them, in some instances leading their
companies away from instead of towards the enemy. There
was little or no panic ; the men said they were weary, had had
enough fighting for the day or were in want of ammunition ;
some squadrons of cavalry attempted to stop the fugitives, the
officers threatening them with their revolvers ; but all in
vain. . . . The regular infantry regiments preserved their
discipline better than the volunteers (as they had done at Bull
Run), and many, without yielding to the influence of the
now widely spread panic, fell, disdaining to fly. As the stream
of fugitives, ambulances, and caissons (the guns themselves
were abandoned) arrived on the other side of the Chickahominy,
they were halted and formed into some sort of order by a line
of sentries and strong patrols which guarded the bridge.' :

Now this retreat from Cold Harbor did not resemble the
1 History of the American War, vol. ii. p. 88.

o 2

196 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

rout of Austerlitz or the debacle of Woerth. It was not the
wild rush of a terror-struck mob seeking safety at any price, as
at Vittoria or Waterloo. It was not due to lack of courage or
to demoralisation, but to defective discipline. But there is
something more demanded from soldiers than the struggle for
victory ; there is the task cf preventing defeat degenerating
into irretrievable disaster. It was precisely this task that the
Federal volunteers were incapable of executing. Men habituated
to discipline, when defeat stares them in the face, throng
together, for they have imbibed the instinct that only in unity
is there safety. They can trust their comrades and their
commanders ; they have learnt the necessity of mutual support,
and the common danger serves but to bind the ranks the closer.
But with troops half-disciplined defeat, for a time at least, has
the effect of disintegration ; order vanishes, and, however great
the courage of the individual soldier, a well-trained enemy,
vigorous in pursuit, has such an army at his mercy. It is
necessary, therefore, that soldiers should be capable of doing
more than sustaining the shock of combat. Every battle
cannot be a victory, for war is the playground of Fortune. An
army must have stamina sufficient to preserve itself from
annihilation : and that stamina is given by discipline alone.

Cold Harbor was but the first of the ' Seven Days' Battles.'
Day after day the Northern army, falling back through swamp
and forest, battled with Lee's victorious troops. But there was
no further disaster. Under the most adverse and dispiriting
circumstances, the Federals fairly held their own until they
reached the strong position of Malvern Hill. There McClellan
turned at bay, and repulsed with heavy slaughter the disjointed
attacks of the Confederates. No further fighting took place
south of Richmond, and the army of the Potomac was soon
afterwards transferred to the river from which it drew its name.
It may fairly be asked how it happened that the Federals,
after their defeat at Cold Harbor, found strength to show
so bold a front, and to administer such sharp blows during
the retreat ? An army without the discipline to struggle
against defeat is an easy prey to a vigorous foe ; but the
Confederate pursuit was by no means vigorous. For a whole

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 197

day Lee was baffled by the change of base. The cavalry, who
might have cut the enemy's line of retreat, had been despatched
to break up his original line of supplies upon the York River,
and did not arrive till their opportunity had passed. Maps
of the country and guides were wanting. Unpractised generals
and staff officers failed to accomplish the combined movements
ordered by the commander-in-chief ; and even Stonewall Jackson
for once broke his own famous maxim ' never to " let up " in a
pursuit.'

Having relieved Richmond, Lee turned on Pope, who with
an inferior army lay between the Southern capital and Wash-
ington. Pope was outgeneralled and outmarched, and the
second battle of Bull Run was as decisive a victory for the
South as its predecessor. Then followed the Confederate in-
vasion of Maryland ; the capture of Harper's Ferry ; the drawn
battle of the Antietam, where Lee with 40,000 men held his
ground against the army of the Potomac, although it had been
recruited to twice his strength ; his leisurely retreat ; and in
December, to close a year of many battles, the bloody repulse
of the same army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg in Virginia.
During this period, on one occasion only, at Malvern Hill, were
the Federals decisively victorious in any considerable engage-
ment ; the remainder of the great actions which stand out as
landmarks in the history of the time, if not Southern triumphs,
were in no wise disasters.

Now, if there is one thing more than another apparent to
the student of the Civil War, it is that the soldiers on both
sides were exceedingly well matched in courage and endurance.
It is evident, therefore, that if we would discover the reasons of
the superiority of the army of Northern Virginia over the army of
the Potomac we must look further than the temper and spirit
of the regimental officers and men. Northern writers have at-
tempted to account for this superiority in a variety of ways.
Even Colonel Fletcher has been induced to lend his support to
the statement that the agricultural pursuits, the hunting, the
riding, the open-air existence of a majority of the Southerners
were better adapted to produce good fighting material than
the sedentary occupations of the New Englanders. But, as the

198 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Confederate ranks were composed in part of town-bred men,
so in the Union armies not only battalions, but brigades and
divisions, were recruited from the backwoodsmen of Wisconsin
and Ohio, from the farmers of Pennsylvania and the lumberers
cf Maine. Moreover, in all soldierly qualities, the contingents
furnished by the crowded cities of the eastern seaboard never
at any period of the conflict suffered by comparison with the
Western pioneers. There are those, too, who allege that whilst
the gaudium certaminis inflamed the passionate nature of the
Southerner, the colder temperament of the Northern citizen
shunned rather than sought the arbitrament of battle ; others,
citing Jackson's remark that ' he could beat anything with a
herd of cattle behind it,' would have us believe that the
certainty of finding ample supplies in the hostile camps nerved
the resolution of a half-starved soldiery. I am of opinion,
however, that in order to discover the secret of the Confederate
successes there is no need either to search for nice distinctions
in races closely akin, or to appeal to the fact that Lee and his
great lieutenant, Jackson, were a head and shoulders above any
Union leaders who had as yet appeared. It was not only the
genius of its commanders that won the laurels of the Virginian
army. Many of its victories were achieved by sheer hard
fighting, they were the work of the soldiers themselves, and
that the Confederates were able to wrest success from opponents
of equal vigour was due to their superior organisation, more
accurate shooting, and above all to their stronger discipline.
As to the first, the Federal Government allowed the pernicious
principle of the election of the officers by the rank and file to
flourish without restraint ; and secondly the strength of the
army was kept up not by a constant stream of recruits to the
seasoned battalions, but by the formation of new regiments.
Thus battalions which had served in more than one campaign,
and had gained experience and discipline, were soon reduced to
the strength of a couple of companies ; whilst others lately
raised boasted a full complement of rifles, but were without
officers, commissioned or non-commissioned, capable of in-
structing or leading their unpractised men. One State,
Wisconsin, created no new regiments, but maintained the

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 199

strength of those she had originally sent into the field ; and so
'we estimate a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary
brigade. I believe that five hundred new men added to an old
and experienced regiment were more valuable than a thousand
men in the form of a new regiment, for the former, by associa-
tion with good experienced captains, lieutenants, and non-
commissioned officers, soon became veterans, whereas the latter
were generally unavailable for a year.' :

The Southerners, on the other hand, early adopted the
conscription ; the superior officers were appointed by the
Government, and the recruits sent to fill the vacancies in the
ranks. The President was so strong in the unanimity of his
people as to be free from the necessity of conciliating party
supporters of the governors of individual States. Few ' poli-
tical ' regiments existed in the South ; men commanded because
they were competent to command, and not because they could
influence votes.

Secondly, ' a great advantage in favour of the Confederate
troops was their skill as marksmen. Accustomed as many of
them were from their boyhood to shooting with ball bears,
deer, and other game, their certainty of aim was acquired by
instinct.' 2

Lastly, as to discipline, whether we agree or not with
Colonel Fletcher that the conditions of life in the South were
the more favourable to military excellence, we cannot reject
his conclusion that * the rich planter possessing many slaves
entirely dependent on him in regard to food, clothing, medicine,
and discipline, acquired habits of command and organisation
highly useful to the officers of an army.1 Moreover, the
population was as distinctly divided into classes as the subjects
of a monarchy. The line of demarcation was strictly drawn
and the social precedence of the old colonial families was undis-
puted. The Confederate States were free from the aggressive
independence of the North. Obedience was a quality of which
they had previous experience. Throughout their history their
people had unreservedly committed their political destinies to

1 Memoirs of General W. T. SJierman, vol. ii. p. 388.
0 Life in the Confederate Army, by W. Watson, p. 230.

200 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the members of their great houses, and they followed them now
as loyally in the field. Unfortunately for their cause, neither
statesman nor soldier was able to persuade them that, however
strongly the presence of trusted leaders may assist discipline,
it is devotion to duty alone that makes an army always for-
midable.

So far as history can tell us, no army, however high the
standard of education, has become really efficient until obedience
has become an instinct, and the presence in the ranks of men
accustomed to think for themselves and to reason before acting,
however weighty the authority which bids them act, renders
the acquirement of such instinct a long process. When soldiers
become once imbued with the habit of obedience, then doubtless
the more intelligent will be the more useful ; but enthusiasm
and intelligence will not stand the stress of battle and the
hardships of campaigning, unless their possessors have learnt
to subordinate their reason and inclinations to their duty. It
is open to those in whose ears the very name of discipline
smacks of slavery to assert that a powerful instinct of obedience
dwarfs the intellect, turns the man into a machine, and rusts
his power of reasoning ; and in this there is a shadow of truth,
but it is only a shadow. If a soldier is never permitted to use
his intelligence, never placed in a position of responsibility,
allowed neither to act nor move except at the word of command,
sooner or later he loses all power of initiative, and there are
many occasions in the field where a man must be left to his
own unaided judgment. But if the soldier's training is what
it should be, his education for individual action will go hand
in hand with his acquirement of the habit of self-effacement.
It may be difficult to combine two such opposite characteristics,
but it is not impossible. The officers of any regular army
have the same instincts of obedience as their men, and yet
their power of initiative, developed by responsibility, is seldom
impaired ; and again, the skirmishers of the Light Division,
when they had learnt, on the outpost line of Wellington's
army, to use their intelligence, and to act without a corporal
at their elbow, proved themselves as skilful and as enterprising
as the famous voltigeurs of France, and this without losing

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 201

their capacity for moving like a wall under heavy fire. It is
important to be clear on this point, for it is unfortunately
to be apprehended that few, except professional soldiers,
understand the nature or the value of discipline. They were
certainly not understood in America before the war. The
sovereign people of the Northern States could create mighty
armies, could equip those armies as none had ever been
equipped before ; but it could not create the discipline of habit
— that was deemed unworthy of free men — and in its place
relied on the discipline of reason and of patriotism.

From the pages of the Comte de Paris we may learn
whether the American product was an efficient substitute for
the mechanical subordination of regular troops. Speaking of
the sluggishness with which operations were carried on in
McClellan's Peninsular campaign, he writes as follows :

' This sluggishness is in a measure enforced on the generals
by the nature of their troops. Those troops are brave, but
the bonds of subordination are weak in the extreme. It
follows, then, that there is no certainty that what has been
commanded will be exactly executed. The will of the individual,
capricious as popular majorities, plays far too large a part.
The leader is obliged to turn round to see if he is being
followed ; he has not the assurance that his subordinates are
bound to him by ties of discipline and of duty. Hence
come hesitation and conditions unfavourable to daring enter-
prise.' x

Again : * . . . Open to impressions, as are all crowds, the men,
accustomed to a complete independence of action, were brought
to battle actuated by obedience more reasonable than passive,
by a sentiment of duty to the State rather than by the instinct
of the disciplined soldier, who forgets his own inclination and
draws inspiration from that of his officers alone. So, despite
their courage, time was necessary to teach them that on ground
where the lines of battle were brought close together, it was
almost always less dangerous to charge the enemy than to
remain exposed to a decimating fire. In default of the
mechanism which, in armies well organised, communicates to
1 Campagne du Potomac, pp. 144-5.

202 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

every man controlling influences as rapidly as do the nerves
in the human frame, there were constant failures to transform
a first advantage into a decisive success. When certain death
awaited the foremost, then it was easy to march slower than
the rest — personal courage being by no means equal — it sufficed
that only one should hesitate, or be permitted to hesitate with
impunity, for that hesitation to become contagious ; and so
the brave soldier lost his elan, the most resolute officer his
daring. . . .' 1

I have already said that an ill-disciplined army lacks
mobility. Marching, strange as it may appear to those who
have never served with troops in the field or in protracted
peace exercises, makes the greatest demands on the subordina-
tion of the men and the exertions of the officers. It is no
light task to bring a battalion of a thousand bayonets intact
on to the field of battle at the proper time. Something more
than enthusiasm is required to enable a mass of men to over-
come the difficulties of bad weather and bad roads, or the
sufferings of fatigue and hunger.

That the American troops, when they entered on the
Peninsular campaign, had improved in this respect on the
holiday soldiers of Bull Run there is no reason to doubt ; but
it seems that the marching power of neither army was con-
siderable. The slow progress often made during important
operations may be in part attributed to the inexperience of
the staff, and in part to Napoleon1s ' fourth element,1 mud ;
but we are, nevertheless, justified in believing that it was
mainly due to the absence of order and regularity on the line
of march. Writing of McClellan's advance, Colonel Fletcher
states that ' the whole extent of the road for twelve miles from
the scene of action to the lines round Yorktown was encum-
bered and blocked up by the advancing brigades. Artillery,
cavalry, infantry, and baggage were intermingled in apparently
inextricable confusion. The rain fell in torrents, the roads
were deep in mud, and the men straggled, fell out, and halted
without orders, so that the column of route of the Federals

1 Eistoire de la Guerre Civile en Amiriqiie, vol. i. pp. 343-4.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 203

resembled much more the line of retreat 01 a defeated than
the advance of a successful army.'' *

In the papers, not the least entertaining and graphic ot
the series, contributed to the * Century ' by a gentleman who
served as a private in McClellan's army, we find the following :

* It was a bright day in April — a perfect Virginia day —
the grass was green beneath our feet, the buds of the trees
were just unrolling into leaves under the warming sun of
spring, and in the woods the birds were singing. The march
was at first orderly, but under the unaccustomed burden of
heavy equipments and knapsacks, and the warmth of the
weather, the men straggled along the roads, mingling with the
baggage waggons, ambulances and pontoon trains in seeming
[sic] confusion. . . . After leaving Big Bethel we began to
feel the weight of our knapsacks. Castaway overcoats, blankets,
parade coats, and shoes were scattered along the route in
reckless profusion.1 2

I have stated that the Southerners of the earlier years of
the war proved themselves better soldiers than those who served
the Union. Both sides showed themselves stubborn on the
defensive, but nowhere did the Federals display the dash and
energy which characterised the assaults of the Confederates
during the * Seven Days' Battles.' Nor was the superiority of the
Southerners less marked upon the line of march. Lee's victories
were due as much to sturdy limbs as to stout hearts. But the
discipline of his troops was insufficient to prevent straggling.
It has been recorded that nearly 20,000 men were absent from
his ranks at the Antietam. A long series of hard marches and
fiercely contested battles, deficiencies of supplies, the want of
boots, and the indomitable spirit which induced many wounded
and foot-sore men to report themselves as fit for duty when
they were incapable of doing a long day's work, had, it is true,
a share in creating the great gaps which existed in the muster
rolls on the morning of the battle. But Lee's official reports
leave no doubt whatever that indiscipline was the real cause of

1 History of the American War, vol. i. p. 439.

8 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii. p. 191.

204 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the undue weakness of the army. On September 7, ten days
before the Antietam, he reported as follows to the President :

1 One of the greatest evils, from which many minor ones
proceed, is the habit of straggling from the ranks. It has
become a habit difficult to correct. With some — the sick
and feeble — it results from necessity, but with the greater
number from design. The latter do not wish to be with their
regiments, nor to share in their hardships and glories. They
are the cowards of the army, desert their comrades in times of
danger, and fill the homes of the charitable and hospitable on
the march.1 1

That this vice was by no means unknown even in Jackson's
command, which accomplished such remarkable feats of march-
ing as to earn for itself the name of ' foot cavalry,' we find
convincing testimony. General Taylor, an old regular officer,
was promoted early in the war to the command of a brigade,
and was ordered to join Jackson on the Shenandoah.

' The end,1 he writes of one of his first marches, c drew
heavily on the marching capacity, or rather incapacity, of the
men. Straggling was then, and continued to be throughout,
the vice of Southern armies . . . When brought into the field
the men were as ignorant of the art of marching as babes, and
required for their instruction the same patient, unwearied
attention. On this and subsequent marches frequent halts were
made, to enable stragglers to close up . . . The men appreciated
care and attention, following advice as to the fitting of their
shoes, cold bathing of feet, and healing of abrasions, and soon
held it a disgrace to fall out of the ranks.1 2

Within a month his brigade had acquired discipline and
cohesion. When he first reported his arrival to Jackson the
latter enquired the road and the distance marched that day.
' Keazletown road,1 was the reply, ' six and twenty miles.1 * You
seem to have no stragglers.1 * Never allow straggling.1 * You
must teach my people ; they straggle badly.' 3

It is scarcely necessary to refer for confirmation of these
statements to General Hazen's ■ The School and the Army in

1 Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, p. 622.

8 Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 36-7. * Ibid. p. 66.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 205

Germany ' ; but it is worthy of remark that this officer, who
served with much distinction under Grant and Sherman and
also accompanied Moltke to Versailles, whenever he discusses the
relative merits of the Federal and the Prussian soldiery, never
hesitates to acknowledge that the average mobility of the
latter was by far the greater. That he is compelled to draw
a comparison unfavourable to the American troops he attributes
rather to the ignorance and indolence of their officers than to
the indiscipline of the men ; but it must not be forgotten that,
at the outset of the war, inexperience and physical incapacity
were equally destructive of cohesion. To take, for instance,
the operations preceding Bull Run : The rank and file of
McDowell's army were not all city-bred ; many of the battalions
were recruited from the lumbering and agricultural districts ;
many were in great part composed of men in good position and
active habits ; but want of practice in the mere mechanical
action demanded by the orderly progression of a large body of
troops neutralised their powers. Now, want of mobility, under
any circumstances whatever, is a fatal fault.

In a country like our own, whose limits are small and where
railways are as numerous and as closely connected as the threads
of a spider's web, it might seem that no more is required than
to bring the men up by train and to set them down behind
lines of earthworks. But this is an idea which every practical
soldier will scout as chimerical. The transit of great masses of
troops by rail is, for short distances, less speedy than movement
by road, even when everything has been prepared beforehand ;
the very existence of earthworks will cause the enemy to avoid
them, to mask his intentions, and to concentrate his troops
at some unexpected point. To meet him at that point the
defenders must be capable of rapid and orderly movement.
Troops that cannot march are but untrustworthy auxiliaries.
They cannot be readily transferred to the threatened point.
They cannot be relied upon to execute the counter-stroke, the
soul of the defence, involving both expedition and endurance.
It is useless to call upon them to pursue. And yet, in the face
of this fact, marching has been suffered to become a lost art in
England ; and it is beyond question that, although the picked

206 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

contingents of volunteers which take part in the Easter
manoeuvres excite admiration by the precision of their move-
ments, and by the ease with which they accomplish long
distances in trying weather, there are many men in every
regiment who, although manifestly unfit for the fatigues of
service, are allowed, for want of a physical test, to take their
places in the ranks, and are, therefore, absolute encumbrances
to mobility. And these men, be it noted, in case of war would
not have had the benefit of eight or ten weeks of camp life, as
had the men who failed McDowell at Bull Run. How much
the Germans in 1870 owed to their constant practice in march-
ing, to their rigid rejection of weakly men, and their sound
system of physical training, may be realised from the following
instances : Within three weeks of mobilisation, 'the troops
had already evinced great marching powers ; thus the 5th
Infantry Division, under a glaring sun and over unfavour-
able ground, had made marches of over fourteen miles on four
consecutive days.' x On August 2, part of the 14th Infantry
Division traversed twenty-seven miles. The 33rd Regiment,
about the same period, completed in three days a march of
sixty-nine miles over mountainous country. At the battle of
Spicheren the advanced guard of the 13 th Division, when it
came into action against the left rear of the French, was twenty-
five miles distant from its morning bivouac ; and a battalion of
the 53rd Regiment took but thirteen hours to cover the 27£
miles that separated it from the field. And be it remembered
that in every one of these cases more than half of the men,
drawn from the reserve, had only just rejoined the ranks.

A little later, after the battle of Gravelotte, but still only
a month distant from the date of mobilisation, the six army
corps which composed the armies of the Crown Princes of
Prussia and of Saxony marched for nine days consecutively in
their pursuit of MacMahon, in many instances traversing four-
and-twenty miles a day. Stonewall Jackson's division, both in
the Shenandoah Valley and in the campaign against Pope, often
covered an even greater distance in a single day ; but no large
army in the first three years of the American War went near
1 Franco-German War, 1870-1, part 1, vol. i. p. 111.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 207

rivalling this continuous movement of 220,000 men, encumbered
with a huge supply train — for the district was barren — and an
enormous mass of artillery. That this gigantic effort stripped
the Crown Prince of Saxony of one-third of his infantry we
know on the authority of Prince Kraft von Hohenlohe.1 But
the missing men were to be found in ambulance and hospital.
Stragglers, in the worst sense of the word, there were none.
No abandoned knapsacks marked the route ; and the absence of
all irregularity on the line of march is constantly remarked by
those who witnessed the campaigns in France. Every man who
was physically fit answered to his name at the evening bivouac.
Every man who could carry his rifle was found in his place when
the battle opened. Had an American army of '61 or '62 been
opposed by one of the same strength disciplined on the German
pattern, a few rough marches would have produced an inequality
in numbers greatly in favour of the latter.

In the war of 1870-1, the outpost service of the German
armies was carried to a perfection which is, perhaps, without
parallel in history. In exceedingly few instances were even the
smallest detachments surprised ; and during the tedious invest-
ments of Metz and Paris, ample notice was received of every
threatening movement. The standard of discipline and effici-
ency attained by the German army is that which every
European army is now striving to reach, and it is by that stan-
dard that the volunteers of America must be judged. I have
already shown that they fell far short of German perfection in
the matter of marching ; and I may now be permitted to add that
their enthusiasm and patriotism were by no means proof against
the exacting duties of the outposts. Surprises were frequent
throughout the war. More than one of the great battles was
ushered in by a sudden rush on troops asleep in their tents
or in the act of cooking. Many were the instances where the
enemy was able to mass almost within rifle shot of the sentries
without exciting suspicion of his presence. Little less numerous
are the occasions when, of two armies in close proximity, the
one withdrew during the night without the other having the
slightest knowledge that such a movement was in progress.
1 Strategische Briefe, vol. ii. p. 230.

208 THE SCIENCE OF AVAR

It is true that the dense forests which covered the theatre
of war were favourable to every kind of secret operation. But
the war of 1870 was waged in part in thickly-wooded districts,
and there we find not only that the Germans were secure from
attack, but, no matter how great the exhaustion of the troops
or the danger of the undertaking, that information of the
enemy's movements and dispositions was always forthcoming.
Every subaltern in charge of a piquet knew his duty. After a
forced march or a hard day's fighting no relaxation was allowed.
Before the fires of the bivouac were lighted, scouts were moving
far to the front. Through the night watches every road and
path was traversed at short intervals by patrols ; and the
earliest light saw stronger parties pushing forward towards the
enemy's lines. Had the officers been always as diligent, had
the men been sufficiently disciplined to face the fatigues of this
arduous service, the American armies would also have been free
from the reproach of negligence and surprise.

It is not sufficient for the security of an army that the
majority do their duty, as doubtless did the majority of both
Federals and Confederates. The carelessness of a few may
give the enemy his opportunity. It was the absolute uniformity
with which duty was done in the German army that made it so
formidable an adversary and so excellent a model.

As to the discipline of the American troops in camp and
quarters, in some respects it was decidedly good. Drunkenness
was almost unknown, for the men acquiesced without complaint
in the orders which forbade the introduction of intoxicating
liquors within their lines. Nor was insubordination in the
active sense a prevalent crime. But of passive disobedience
there was much. The men, in the early days more especially,
were accustomed to yield only such obedience as they considered
necessary. The officers dared demand no more, and an appeal
to the intelligence of the battalions was a far more effective
means of rousing them to action than a mere command. At
the same time, leaders conspicuous for skill and valour soon won
the confidence of the troops, and then their task became an
easier one. The soldiers followed the man they trusted without
hesitation, and endured the privations he imposed without a

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 209

murmur. So far their good sense served them ; but it did not
teach them that instant obedience to orders, no matter by
whom they are given or how injudicious they may seem, is more
valuable than the obedience which is merely a tribute to
superior ability.

* No man but the commander can judge of what is impor-
tant and what is not. . . . Soldiers must therefore obey in all
things. They may, and do, laugh at foolish orders, but they
nevertheless obey, not because they are blindly obedient, but
because they know that to disobey is to break the backbone of
their profession.' *

It is thus that individual intelligence is best exercised ; in
realising and maintaining the important truth that prompt and
entire obedience, mechanical if you will, but none the less power-
ful, is the mainspring of success.

That the intelligence and patriotism of the American
soldiers were not sufficient to keep them in the ranks upon the
line of march I have said enough to prove ; but in yet another
respect these qualities, unbacked by discipline, were found want-
ing. In the supreme moment, in the hour of battle, when it
required no greater acumen than is possessed by the most
ignorant of ploughboys to comprehend that every rifle was
needed at the front, numbers, that in some cases exceeded those
of a strong division, were found hastening to the rear. At
Seven Pines, McClellan states that when Hooker brought up his
division about dark he had been delayed * by the throng of
fugitives, through whom the colonel of the leading regiment
had to force his way with the bayonet.1 2 At the Antietam,
three months later, two Federal army corps, roughly handled in
their attack on Lee's left, almost entirely dissolved ; and it was
reported on the following day that the reduction in one of them
was not due only to the casualties of battle, but that a consider-
able number had withdrawn from the ranks, 'some having
dropped out on the march, many dispersing and leaving during
the battle.' 3

Again, at Shiloh, in the spring of 1862, General Buell,

1 Remarks on Military Law, by Sir Charles Napier, p. 13.

2 McClellan's Eeport, pp. 224-5. * Ibid. p. 401.

P

210 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

coming up to reinforce Grant, who had been surprised and
driven back after a desperate resistance, found a crowd of
soldiers, which he estimated at near 15,000 men, about one-
third of the whole force, cowering under shelter of the river
bluffs. And a careful perusal of the numerous narratives of
survivors of the battle reveals that unwillingness to remain
under fire was no less conspicuous amongst the Confederates.

However sound the discipline, however efficient the police,
there are men in every army whom no earthly consideration —
neither habit, nor honour, nor fear of punishment or disgrace —
will induce to face death and danger on a hardly-contested field.
Long before La Haye Sainte had been carried, and while as yet
Napoleon's massive columns had been everywhere beaten back,
men galloped through the streets of Brussels crying that all was
lost. Craufurd's Light Division, making its famous march to
Talavera, met ' crowds of runaways ; not all Spaniards ' ] signi-
ficantly adds the great historian. And when on August 18,
1870, the First German army reeled back in confusion from
Frossard's impregnable position, it required the presence of the
King himself to arrest the flight of the panic-stricken mob in
Gravelotte village.

At the same time, I cannot recall a single incident from
the historv of any disciplined army to show that leaving the
colours, before the battle was decided, has ever occurred on the
same wholesale scale as in many of the great engagements of
the American war. Even the insubordinate French regulars of
1870, straggle as they might on the line of march, held staunchly
to the eagles in the hour of combat. To find a parallel to the
Antietam or to Shiloh we must turn to the operations of Gam-
betta'a levies on the Loire, where whole regiments of cavalry
were posted in rear of the line of battle to drive back the
fugitives and drive on the laggards.

But there was still another manner in which the vice of
insubordination showed itself, a manner characteristic of armies
in which the bonds of discipline are frail, and more fruitful of
disastrous consequences than the hesitation or misconduct of
the soldiery. Insubordination is the most contagious of moral
1 Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. ii. p. 178.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 211

diseases. Let it burst out amongst the lowest, and, if it be
not instantly crushed, its poisonous breath will infect the
highest. It is no respecter of persons. If the supreme
authorities wink at its existence amongst the rank and file,
officers even of superior rank will become contaminated. Let
men become once accustomed to overlook remissness, and their
own respect for discipline relaxes. So it was in France previous
to the downfall of the last Napoleon. In 1859 the army had
shown symptoms of insubordination. At Solferino the cry had
been heard, ' Les epaulettes en avant ! ' ; and when, in July
1870, the Emperor set out on his last campaign, there were
those amongst his most trusted subordinates who had lost all
sense of duty. Distrust and jealousy reigned in the highest
places. Camaraderie was a forgotten word ; and the absence of
concert, the neglect of the most ordinary precautions, and the
indifference of the generals to the action or requirements of their
colleagues point to indiscipline of the most pernicious kind.

The great fault of the American soldier in the early part of
the war was that the obedience he rendered was based on in-
telligence rather than on habit. He did not resist authority
when he considered its demands were reasonable, but when
he thought those demands vexatious or unnecessary he
remembered his birthright as the citizen of a free State, and
refused compliance. This vice spread upwards. As the soldiery
followed with reluctance an untried or unpopular leader, as
they did not deem it incumbent on them to obey an officer
merely because he was their military superior, so the generals,
even those next in rank to the commander-in-chief, were not
at all times to be relied upon to render cheerful obedience.

' The success of our army [of the Potomac] was undoubtedly
greatly lessened by jealousy, distrust, and general want of the
entente cordiale? l

Even the influence of Lee, trusted and beloved as he was by
his veterans, was insufficient to ensure at all times unhesitating
compliance with his orders. Jackson, indeed, declared that he
would follow him blindfold. But Jackson's conception of duty
was not shared by all. Still, the great Virginian captain had

' The Aniietam and Fredericksburg, General Palfrey, p. 59.

r 2

212 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

rarely to complain of disobedience or lukewarmness. Nor did
McClellan, Jackson, or Grant, when once they had established
their reputation, find it difficult to exact submission from their
subordinates. But far otherwise was it with those in whom
their lieutenants had little confidence, who, like Pope and
Burnside, were suddenly raised by the caprice of the President
above their fellows, or, like Bragg and Halleck, lacked both tact
and fortune. To remain loyal to such men was a severe test, and
the discipline of many of their officers lost its hold. It is hardly
necessary to comment on the extraordinary means adopted by
the Federal Government to ascertain the fitness of the military
chiefs, the Congressional Committee on the war, before which
subordinate generals were examined as to the conduct of their
commander, and encouraged to express their opinions on his
ability, his strategy and his tactics, with all the freedom that
envy could suggest. The ' Century ' papers teem with instances
of disobedience, of argument, and of hostile criticism on plans
of battle ; and the reader of such campaigns as that of
Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Murfreesboro1 can realise for
himself the disastrous results of such breaches of discipline
in the higher ranks.

I have written at some length on this question, and for
this reason, that, notwithstanding the increased knowledge of
war and its requirements, it appears probable that in the
future the canker of insubordination is likely to manifest its
presence in this form. The spirit of indiscipline is abroad ; not
only the indiscipline that is bred of self-seeking, envy, or dis-
appointed vanity, but indiscipline conscientiously advocated as
the rule of life and morals. ' To render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's' is a precept, we are told, that has lost its
application. There are those who are unpractical enough to
believe with Plato that obedience is of value only when based
on reason, and to assert that no man need obey a law the
enactment of which has not received his individual sanction.
However hurtful to the State, such opinions are a hundredfold
more dangerous to the army. Without absolute obedience to
the spirit as well as to the letter of the law ; without a
determination on the part of all to render loyal service and

BATTLES and leaders of THE CIVIL WAR 213

cordial support to every authority, however distasteful such
a course may be; without the resolution to forego and to
check criticism of the acts of superiors, skill and courage are
of no avail. A great military writer has recorded in the
pages of the ' Edinburgh Review ' that, notwithstanding their
vast superiority in numbers, wealth, and armament, the twenty
millions who upheld the Union were powerless to crush five
millions of Secessionists until they had introduced into their
armies a sterner discipline. Intelligence and enthusiasm had
their trial. For three long years the infatuation of the Northern
people in favour of individual freedom lasted, and during those
three years the national cause made little progress. At length
the scales dropped from the eyes of the Government and the
troops. A leader was chosen who throughout his military career
had been constant in obedience, chary of criticism, and patient
under misconception ; but unsparing of condemnation when it was
deserved, and impatient of insubordination in his lieutenants.

Under Grant, backed by the unreserved support of Lincoln,
whose conversion to the new doctrine of unhesitating obedience
was whole-hearted, the army of the Potomac entered on a new
phase of existence and of efficiency. On one occasion only —
at the second battle of Cold Harbor, where, after having already
lost more than 40,000 men in less than three weeks, the
Federal troops were ordered to renew an assault on an en-
trenched position which had already cost more than 10,000
men — did either officers or men venture to dispute the judgment
of the general- in-chief.

Relying on the discipline no less than on the courage of his
lieutenants and his soldiery, Grant was able to carry out his
policy of wearing out his opponent by incessant attack. The
army of the Potomac was employed as if it was a battering-ram,
without consciousness and without feeling. It was a machine,
perhaps unskilfully used, but challenging admiration by the
manner in which it answered every touch of the manipulator.
The lesson had taken long to learn, but it was thoroughly
mastered. Brigadiers and colonels forbore to obtrude their
advice upon the general commanding. Divisional leaders no
longer asked audience of the President to expose the errors of

214 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

their superior. No leader of an army corps criticised adversely
the plan of battle in the hearing of his troops, as Hooker had
done before Fredericksburg. The necessity of co-operation and
ready support had become apparent ; and the truth was at last
recognised that even indifferent tactics have a better chance of
success, where those who carry them out are in accord, than
more skilful strokes if cordial acquiescence in their expediency
is wanting. Those who had held high rank in the regular
army obeyed, without a sign of mortification, men who had been
their juniors in the old service, who had retired after a few
years, had been again brought in from civil life, and were now
promoted above their heads. The commander-in-chief had no
longer occasion to complain, with Marshal Junot in Portugal,
that what he wanted was inferior officers who would obey him,
and not comrades who thought themselves as good as he was.
That knowledge had come to all which at first had seemed the
possession of the few, that absolute devotion to duty is a more
substantial good than brilliant exploits in the field, and a more
enduring glory than the applause of press and populace.

As to the discipline of the troops on the field of battle, I
have already quoted the Comte de Paris's statement that, on the
part of the Federal troops, there was a decided disinclination to
decide the combat with the bayonet. Over and over again, in
the pages of the ' Century ' volumes, instances can be found of
the line of battle approaching within a hundred, and in some
cases within even fifty, paces ot the enemy, and there stopping
short, not, however, preparatory to retreat, but to seeking cover,
and maintaining a fire fight more fruitful in casualties to itself
than a determined advance.

That the battalions were capable of maintaining their position
under such circumstances is in itself a proof of fine courage.
The Germans impress on their infantry the maxim that, when
such close quarters are reached, ' if you don't go away the
enemy will ' ; but here were soldiers who refused to move, and
who could be depended on to hold out to the last extremity.
The Confederates, on the other hand, successful in so many
offensive battles, were manifestly capable of the supreme effort
necessary to cross the narrow intervening space between the

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 215

lines, to carry out decisive assaults, and to pierce their adver-
saries1 front.

Mutual confidence is the force that drives a charge home ;
and this quality is the fruit of discipline alone, for in almost
every campaign it is the better-disciplined troops who have
displayed the greatest vigour in assault. In the war of 1870
the furia Francese appears to have passed over to the men of
Brandenburg and Bavaria, and in place of the impetuous
advance of the long lines of bayonets which made the battle of
Napoleon like 'the swell and dash of a mighty wave,' were
the isolated counter-strokes of a few brave men whose daring
but served to accentuate the irresolution of the mass. Very
early in the War of Secession, the Federal commanders, recog-
nising their enemy's disposition to bring matters to a speedy
issue, made use of earthworks and entrenchments ; the Con-
federates, at a later period, when the desperate assaults on the
Fredericksburg heights taught them that the Northern battalions
had at length learnt to follow their officers to certain death,
gave up their trust in broken ground and sheltering coverts,
and adopted the same means of stiffening the defence.

In 1863, the third year of the war, both armies became equally
formidable on the defensive, and — we have it on the authority
of officers who took part in the campaigns — the confusion of
the earlier fields of battle was no longer seen. After a charge
or a repulse the troops rallied quickly to their colours ; there
was little intermixture of units ; and constant practice on the
drill-ground enabled the battalions to reform after a hot fight
in an exceedingly short time, to take up the pursuit without
delay, or to oppose a counter-stroke with unbroken front.
Fire discipline, on the other hand, did not exist. Occasionally,
when protected by unusually strong defences, the leaders were
able to induce their men to reserve their fire to close range, but,
as a general rule, whether defending or attacking, the men used
their rifles at will.

' The officers were never sufficiently masters of their soldiers
to prevent them, when bullets were whistling past, from im-
mediately answering the enemy's fire. In the best Confederate
regiments, in the midst of a conflict, the ardent and burning

216 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

inclination of the soldiers was obeyed rather than the commands
of the officers.1 1

That the fire of infantry should be under the same control
as that of artillery is now recognised as the most vital principle
of battle tactics ; and it is instructive to note that the American
volunteers were incapable, at any period of the war, of answer-
ing the very trifling demands made by the discipline of an age
which rated fire of less value than the bayonet. The official
reports of Gettysburg are significant. Amongst 24,000 loaded
rifles picked up on the field only a quarter were properly
loaded ; 12,000 contained two charges each (both sides were
armed with muzzle-loaders) and the other quarter from three
to ten.

It has been stated by Lord Wolseley, speaking with the
authority of one who is an earnest student of Lee's campaign,
and who accompanied the Confederate army in the operations
succeeding the Antietam, that at any time during the war a
single army corps of regular troops would have turned the scale
in favour of either side.2 This assertion, as I understand it,
implies a conviction that 30,000 regulars would, by their
superior mobility and cohesion, have given the leader who
controlled them the power of assembling superior numbers at
the decisive point ; in fact — and their own commanders were
fully conscious that such was the case — that even at a late
period ot the war the armies lacked the attributes of regular
organisations. Now, the military experience of the combatants
was large, their goodwill remarkable ; the military code ex-
isted in full force, and officers of proved capacity had little
difficulty in securing prompt obedience. How was it, then,
that not until the war was drawing to a close did discipline
become firmly established, and mobility and cohesion charac-
teristic of the troops ? The answer is not far to seek. Both
Lord Wolseley and Colonel Fletcher have alluded to the
extraordinary difficulties thrown in the path of the commanders
by the inefficiency of the regimental officers and the staff, but
I prefer to appeal to evidence more direct.

1 Life of General Lee, by C. Lee Childe, p. 46.
* Macmillan's Magazine, vol. lv. p. 328.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 217

* The great difficulty, I find,' wrote Lee to the Confederate
President in March 1863, ' is in causing orders and regulations
to be obeyed. This arises not from a spirit of disobedience,
but from ignorance. We have therefore need of a corps of
officers to teach others their duty, see to the observance of
orders and to the regularity and precision of all movements.
This is accomplished in the French service by their staff corps.'
Enumerating then the various appointments necessary, he adds,
' If you can fill these positions with proper officers . . . you
might hope to have the finest army in the world.' *

' When I compare the 41st Ohio,1 says General Hazen,
* with other regiments which worried the patience by their snail-
like and uncertain movements, I am strongly impressed with
the immense loss which our country sustained in consequence
of the indolence, ignorance, and shiftlessness of its officers.1 2

One of the first acts of McClellan, on assuming command
of the Union forces in 1861, and also of Grant, on his promotion
to the same office in 1864, was to weed the commissioned
ranks ; the first by a system of examination, the second by the
unsparing exercise of his powers as commander-in-chief. During
the regime of those able administrators several hundred officers
were dismissed the service. These facts speak for themselves.
There is no need to produce further testimony. At the begin-
ning of the war, in both the Federal and the Confederate armies,
well-trained officers, staff and regimental, were largely wanting.
There were few who understood the careful preparations
necessary for manoeuvre and movement, few who could enforce
the discipline or carry out the details essential to their
execution. At a later period many had been suffered to fill
the frequent vacancies who had, no doubt, a large acquaintance
with warfare, acquired in the ranks, but had not received the
training necessary for those who aspire to command. As
regards the staff, the number of officers in the regular army of
the United States, including those who had retired, did not
exceed 2,000 ; of these, many on the Northern side remained
with their own regiments ; on both sides many were detailed to

1 Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, p. 619.

* The School and the Army in Germany, p. 221.

218 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

command the larger units. Of those who remained available
for staff duties few had received special training, and it was
some time before they became fitted for their onerous positions.
At the outset, the sovereign people, deeming a staff but an
ornamental appendage, objected to its formation. McDowell
was accompanied by only two aides-de-camp at Bull Run ; and
when the scanty number employed was at length allowed to
be recruited from the volunteers, the majority had yet to learn
the very rudiments of their business. And so, throughout the
earlier campaigns, the generals were compelled to work single-
handed. They were without ' the hundred voices,' the ' hundred
eyes,' the ' hundred ears ' which alone make possible the skilful
direction of the movements of large armies. They had no
means of knowing that their orders had been executed as they
wished, or even executed at all. They had no assistance in
framing the multifarious instructions which the troops required.
The thousand details which must be attended to during every
hour of a campaign, if not supervised by the general himself,
were altogether neglected.

Those familiar with the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 know
how deeply the principle of co-operation has penetrated the
spirit of German generalship, with what extraordinary effect
it was put into practice, and how the lucidity of the orders
issued by the various headquarters simplified its application.
But both in Lee's and McClellan's armies the means of ensuring
concerted action were defective, and lack of combination was
consequently the great tactical fault of almost every battle.
The commanders were without the slightest practical experience
of the movements of great masses of troops, such as is imparted
to the officers of Continental armies in the autumn manoeuvres.
Their military life had been passed in the scattered forts along
the Indian frontier, where, like General Ewell, a Confederate
brigadier at Bull Run and an officer of nearly twenty years
service, they 'had learned all about commanding fifty United
States dragoons and had forgotten everything else.1 x

When we read the orders issued by the Confederate head-
quarters for the assault of the formidable position of Malvern
1 Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 38.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 219

Hill, we cease to wonder at the failure to arrest the Federal
retreat from the Chickahominy to the James. The staff' who
considered the following production sufficient to ensure a
combined attack in a wooded country must have been utterly
incapable of directing the intricate movements devised by Lee
to ensnare McClellan :

' Batteries have been established to act upon the enemy's
line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can
witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a
yell. Do the same.' *

Unfortunately the enemy's line was not broken. Armistead's
division did not charge. But three of his regiments became
involved in action, and, so far as I can ascertain, their shouts
were construed as the signal. Two divisions attacked at
different times. They were unsupported, and lost 5,000 men
without shaking the enemy's hold on his position. It may be
admitted that co-operation when in contact with the enemy is
no easy matter to bring about, especially in a country covered
by swamp and forest. There are, however, three means of
overcoming the difficulty : the first, constant communication
between the units ; the second, thorough reconnaissance of the
ground over which movements are to be made ; the third, clear
and well-considered orders. Now in both the Federal and
Confederate armies of 1862 these three points, as a general
rule, were disregarded. The staff was possibly too small to
attend to the first, too inexperienced to carry out the second,
and insufficiently trained to produce the third. When time is
pressing and quick decision essential, when an infinite variety
of details has to be considered and provision made for
numerous contingencies, the framing of orders is a task that
demands not only a wide acquaintance with war, but constant
practice. It constitutes a special branch in the education of
the general staff, and should find a prominent place in the
training of all officers, for the power of explaining his
intentions so that none can fail to comprehend is as necessary
to the subaltern in charge of a patrol as to the leader of an
army corps.

1 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii. p. 392.

220 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Several of the most important battles of the Secession War
would, in all probability, have assumed a different aspect had
not i misunderstanding of orders ' — a phrase with which the
reader of the ' Century ' papers soon finds himself familiar, and
which is in itself a proof of an ill-trained staff — so frequently
occurred. Nor can we fail to remark the inability of even
the supreme commanders to inform themselves of the situation
of affairs at the front or on the wings. This arose from the
fact that ' the general staff did not and could not assist the
commander as he should have been assisted. . . . There was
not a large personal staff of experienced and talented officers,
capable of keeping the general fully informed of the operations
of his corps.'' J The battle of Williamsburg, fought in May
1862, began at seven in the morning. Although he had sent
aides-de-camp to the front for the express purpose of reporting,
it was one o'clock before McClellan was made aware that his
troops were in contact with the enemy. At Seven Pines,
June 30, 1862, Johnston, the Confederate leader, remained for
several hours in ignorance that a division had taken the wrong
road, and that the attack he had ordered had not been
made. At Gettysburg, in July 1863, as will be seen later,
exactly the same error occurred. With every allowance for
the close and wooded nature of the country, such a state of
things is as inconceivable in an army possessing a well-trained
staff as the fact that, although Jackson's flank movement round
Pope, in August 1862, was seen and reported by the Federal
signallers, not a single cavalry regiment, nor even a single scout,
was sent out to ascertain the direction of his march ; or that
Longstreet's division at Seven Pines, ordered to begin the
attack, should have crossed a stream by an improvised bridge
in single file, when, in the words of one of his brigadiers : ' if
the division commander had given orders for the men to sling
their cartridge boxes, haversacks, &c, on their muskets and
wade without breaking formation, they could have crossed by
fours at least, with water up to their waists, . . . and hours
would have been saved.' 2

1 The Peninsula, General Webb, p. 183.

3 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii. p. 229.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 221

Lack of reconnaissance was a fruitful source of indecisive
successes and of unnecessary loss. Movements were projected
and carried out without previous exploration of the ground or
selection of the most effective line of advance. Little care was
taken to discover the weak points of the enemy's position.
The influence of topography upon tactics was unappreciated
and the Confederate divisions attacked exactly where the
adversary wished them to attack, instead of being directed by
staff officers who, riding with the advanced scouts, had already
made themselves acquainted with the ground, to the approaches
most favourable to the assailant. We may also notice, that,
owing to the simple expedient of placing finger-posts at cross-
roads, or leaving an orderly to point out the route, being
neglected, on several occasions — amongst others at Cold
Harbor, South Mountain, and Gettysburg — the Confederate
brigades came into action either at wide intervals from the
rest of their division, or when the opportunity had passed, or
in some cases, not at all.

During the strategic movements designed to bring an
army to such a position and in such formation that it can
readily exert its whole strength against the enemy, the duties
of the staff are no less important than on the field of action.
Few but those who have witnessed or studied the operations
of large masses of troops can realise the nice arrangements,
the constant supervision, the tact, training, and experience
necessary to the successive execution of such movements. For
all these operations the intervention of the staff is needed, but
chaos and confusion are likely to ensue if the officers composing
it are but novices.

In more than one respect the Confederate staff was superior
to that of the Union army. The intelligence department was
exceedingly well organised. The hunters of the South took
kindly to scouting and patrol ; and the certainty with which,
in the dense Virginian woodlands, the Confederate generals
received early warning of their enemy's every movement is
proof of the priceless service that may be rendered by bold
and enterprising horsemen working in their own country. To
train volunteer cavalry to move in mass with the speed, the

2'22 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

unity, and the precision essential to effective action in the
shock of battle is impossible, but the audacity of the Southern
troopers, their adventurous and at the same time useful rides
within the enemy's outposts, indicate that such troops can
still fill an important role, especially in a close country, where
individual daring and intelligence, as well as superior horse-
manship, have free play.

Again, in the earlier campaigns the Confederates were the
better marchers. Jackson, in the movement round Pope's
right in August 1862, traversed fifty-six miles in two days;
Longstreet was little less expeditious. And although the
Southern army was unencumbered by the same superfluity of
baggage and supplies as the Federal — the troops depending for
subsistence on the fields of Indian corn or apple-orchards
through which they passed, and the train consisting of a few
ambulances and the ammunition carts— for this rapid advance
due credit must be given to the staff. At the same time, as
regards combinations for battle, the reconnaissance and mapping
of the country over which the army was to move, the supply
of guides capable of directing the divisions through the swamps
and forests — and this in the midst of a friendly population —
the arrangements were deplorably deficient.

General Lee's letter, already quoted, conclusively proves
that in 1863, two years after the outbreak of the war, the
staff had still much to learn. His suggestions for its im-
provement were, however, unheeded — they were perhaps im-
practicable, for staff officers cannot be made in a month or two
— and Gettysburg was the result. The greatest conflict of
the war was the most prolific of blunders. The story of the
second of the three days' battle presents a picture of mis-
management that is almost without parallel. On the second
day Longstreet, commanding the Confederate right wing, had
been ordered to attack at an early hour. The famous position
was as yet but thinly occupied, and Lee hoped to crush his
enemy in detail.

;At 9 o'clock the general had been expecting to hear
of the opening of the attack on the right, and was by no
means satisfied with the delay. . . . About 10 a.m. ... he

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 223

received a message that Longstreet was advancing. This
appeared to relieve his anxiety, and he proceeded to the point
where he expected the arrival of the corps. Here he waited
for some time, during which interval he observed that the
enemy had occupied the peach orchard which formed a portion
of the ground that was to have been occupied by Longstreet
.... On perceiving this he again expressed his impatience,
and renewed his search for Longstreet. It was now about
1 o'clock p.m. After going some distance to the rear he
discovered Hood's division (of Longstreet's corps) at a halt,
while McLaws' division was yet at some distance on the
Fairfield road, having taken a wrong direction. Longstreet
was present, and, with General Lee, exerted himself to correct
the error, but before the corps could be brought into its
designated position it was 4 o'clock. . . . The opportunity
which the early morning had presented was lost. The entire
army of the Potomac was before us ! ' *

Moreover, the fighting which ensued showed that the
mechanism for securing co-operation was still deficient. ' The
whole affair,' writes Lee's adjutant-general, * was disjointed.
There was an utter absence of accord in the movements of
the several commands.' 2 Now, we are all well aware that the
difficulties in the way of a double attack are very great. As at
Gettysburg, the failure of one wing or the other to move out at
the appointed time may be due to the action of its immediate
commander ; and there are those who will argue that want of
co-operation should be charged to the general rather than
to the staff. It is true that in the campaigns of 1866 and
1870, notwithstanding the excellence of the Prussian staff,
isolated attacks were by no means unfrequent. But there is
absolutely no reason why, if the advance of one column is un-
avoidably delayed, the circumstance should not be immediately
reported to the other ; and it is the fact that the isolated
attacks at Spicheren, Woerth, and Gravelotte were, in every
instance, initiated by generals who had full knowledge of the
situation, and assumed the sole responsibility of advancing with-
out support. There was no failure of co-operation, for it was
1 Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, pp. 281-2. * Ibid. p. 286.

224 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

deliberately rejected. In the American battles, on the other
hand, the generals who sent their troops forward to what seems
wanton destruction did so in expectation of support, and in
ignorance that support had become impracticable. This
ignorance was due to the want of communication between the
different units ; and the establishment and maintenance of such
communication are the duty of the staff. Whilst the American
offensive, therefore, during the first phase of the war, was a
series of spasmodic efforts, the German offensive of 1866 and 1870
resembles nothing so much as the resistless sweep of a flowing
tide, wave after wave hurrying from beyond the far horizon to
break in close succession on the shore ; and the singleness of
purpose, the untiring energy, which were then displayed were
due to the training of Moltke's pupils, the officers of the
general staff. Never was Napoleon's golden rule, * marcher au
canon,' more zealously obeyed. Superficial students have indeed
pointed out that to construe the words of the great soldier so
literally as did the Germans is fraught with danger ; but they
have failed to discern that when the Germans adopted this
principle they took care to provide a means of applying it
without risk. They understood Napoleon better than their
critics. They were well aware that their ancient enemy
advocated no blind and reckless rush to the first scand of
conflict, but that he held it a matter of course that every
general, whether of army corps, division, or brigade, kept him-
self by means of his staff officers informed of the situation at
the front, and was thus able to fix the exact point where his
presence was most needed. The staff recognised this linking
together of the various units to be among the most important of
their duties ; it had become a matter of routine at the annual
manoeuvres and peace exercises ; and if the rashness or the am-
bition of the subordinate leaders sometimes led to irregularity,
still the means of assuring co-operation, so deficient at Gettys-
burg, were always there ; and, save when they were wilfully
neglected, never failed to bring about the unity of action so
essential to success.

I have often thought that the night marches of both
Confederates and Federals through the Wangled thickets and

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 225

over the indifferent roads of the Virginian wilderness in May
1864, as well as the ease with which the troops were handled
in the many terrible battles that those marches led to, are
remarkable instances of the way in which all obstacles disappear
before the skill of an experienced staff. There can be no
question that the future historian of the war will find little to
criticise as regards the interior control of either army in the
later campaigns. But, to show the necessity of the members of
the general staff being trained to an average pitch of efficiency,
I will refer to the last effort of Lee's heroic army to prolong the
struggle. After resisting for nearly nine months, with much
inferior forces, every effort of the Union commander to breach
the long lines of earthworks which covered Petersburg and
Richmond, the Confederates, on April 2, 1865, were compelled
to abandon their defences. It was still possible to save the
army by a movement past the enemy's front, and Lee was able
to gain some hours1 start. Grant followed quickly, hoping to
intercept him. The Confederates were well-nigh starving, and
* Lee pressed on as rapidly as possible to Amelia Court House,
where he ordered supplies to be deposited for the use of his
troops on their arrival. This forethought was highly necessary,
in consequence of the scanty supply of rations provided at the
commencement of the retreat. The hope of finding a supply of
food at this point, which had done much to buoy up the spirits
of the men, was destined to be cruelly dispelled. Through an
unfortunate error or misapprehension of orders the provision
train had been taken on to Richmond, without unloading its
stores at Amelia Court House. . . . Not a single ration was
found to be provided for the hungry troops.1 x Some one had
blundered, and the result was the dispersion of a great part of
the army and the subsequent surrender of the rest.

The question of the general staff is one of special im-
portance to States who depend for their defence on an army
which is not permanently organised for war. It may be
possible to assemble armed men in vast numbers, and, if precise
arrangements have previously been made, even to concentrate
them at a given rendezvous ; but to give them mobility — that

1 Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, p. 412.

ft

226 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

is, the capacity for moving in full strength and speedily to any
quarter of the theatre of war — to enable each unit to take its
part in battle, and to secure the co-operation of the whole,
a large contingent of specially trained officers is absolutely
necessary. Regimental officers, however efficient in their own
line, however familiar with war, are necessarily ignorant of the
duties of the staff. I would draw attention to the fact that,
notwithstanding the existence of the regular army as a source
of supply, two years of actual service had elapsed before either
the Confederate or Federal staff could be classed as trustworthy,
and I would remind my readers that the German staff owes its
perfection not only to a long course of theoretical education
under the best soldiers of the day, but to the practical ex-
perience of the movements of great masses of troops, acquired
at the annual manoeuvres.

I have already pointed out that national characteristics
opposed great obstacles to the acquirement of discipline by the
American troops ; and I may be told that these characteristics
being peculiar to America, the lessons of the war do not apply
to our own volunteers. But I have also pointed out, and have
produced unanswerable testimony in support, that the indiscipline
which was the primary cause of the comparative inefficiency of
the American armies was mainly due to the shortcomings of
the regimental officers.

'The men,1 says General Palfrey, 'were such soldiers as
their officers made them.' 1 Whilst I am ready, therefore, to
admit that on this side of the Atlantic indiscipline would find
less genial soil, I cannot blink the fact that here, too, the
means of checking its growth is wanting.

I do not wish to imply that, had the American officers been
well trained, the troops they commanded would have at once
assumed the bearing of veterans. To impart to men unbroken
to restraint the instinctive subordination which is the life-blood
of armies is the work of time, however efficient the officers ; but,
as we have seen, with intelligent men, confidence in the ability
01 their leaders supplies the place of mechanical discipline

1 The Antietam and Fredericksburg, p. 185.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 227

with extraordinary effect. And even if it be asserted that the
individual intelligence and patriotism of our volunteers are
sufficient of themselves to prevent the recurrence of the faults
and disorders of the Americans, it is not difficult to show that
their officers must needs be thoroughly competent. In the
Secession War nothing more than discipline was required to
give either belligerent an easy triumph. The leading on both
sides being equal, the side which possessed the greater mobility
and cohesion would have won by weight of numbers at the
decisive point. Now the volunteer officers of England and her
colonies have a task five-hundredfold more difficult than had
Confederate or Federal. To create and to maintain discipline
is not in itself sufficient. Their fellow-citizens demand of them
that they should be capable of opposing with hope of success, not
unprofessional soldiers, but armies led by officers, both staff and
regimental, trained to that perfection of efficiency which Prussia
was the first to establish and the first to profit by. By those
who understand war in the new aspect given to it by German
thoroughness the old idea that a man of ordinary courage,
intelligence, and activity needed but the habit of command and
an acquaintance with drill to make an excellent officer, has long
since been repudiated. To lead men in battle is a profession
demanding careful education and thorough training. That the
country at large is very far from realising this truth is evident
from the reluctance of Parliament to vote the sum necessary for
even the most limited field manoeuvres, although in the opinion
of every professional soldier, without exception, these practical
exercises are the only means of educating its officers. But if
our professional soldiers at home lack the opportunities of
learning their work that are afforded to the soldiers of every
Continental nation, however poor, the volunteers are in still
more evil case. Brigade camps, Easter manoeuvres, and schools
of instruction are certainly, so far as they go, valuable means of
education ; but the five or six days, at most, of practical in-
struction in the business of a campaign afforded are a very
poor substitute for the sixty or eighty days devoted annually
in every battalion of the French and German armies to tac-
tical exercises. It may, however, be argued that, by passing a

ci 2

228 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

professional examination, volunteer officers prove themselves at
least sufficiently well trained to secure the confidence, and thus
to establish the discipline, of those they command. Of examin-
ations in military subjects I am no blind admirer ; they are by
no means fair tests of comparative efficiency.

But I acknowledge that examinations are necessary. If the
study which they impose does not always lead a man to think,
it at least gives or revives a knowledge of useful details. More
than all, the attainment of the required standard proves earnest-
ness, and earnestness goes a long way towards winning the
confidence of others. Now, the examinations which volunteer
officers are called upon to pass before promotion are of so
perfunctory a nature, and the standard to be attained is so very
low, that they neither compel reflection nor teach details ; and
so small is the modicum of study and practice they demand
that even the most indolent and indifferent are not deterred
from facing the ordeal. The examination in tactics is a severer
test, a tax on leisure and on application ; but it is noteworthy
that by no means a large proportion avail themselves of the
opportunity of learning something of the science of fighting,
and of earning an increased pecuniary grant for their corps.
The truth is — and it is time that it was fairly faced — that the
weak point of the volunteer forces is the dearth of well-trained
officers. No practical soldier who has experience of our citizen
troops, either at home or in the colonies, will be found to deny
that these troops suffer from the same deficiency which, in their
earlier campaigns, rendered the American armies, brave and
intelligent as they were, inferior to the European armies of
to-day. Yet I am far from believing that the possible efficiency
of the volunteer force has been exhausted. On the contrary,
I am firmly convinced that, if a higher standard of military
training were exacted, a large proportion of both officers and
men would welcome its introduction. It is possible that in-
creased demands would thin the ranks ; but, even if their
numbers were reduced by a third, with a corresponding increase
of efficiency, few thinking soldiers would deplore the loss of
those whose lack of leisure, inclination, strength, or energy now
acts but as dead weight on the zeal of the remainder. If their

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 229

discipline and leading be defective, providence seldom sides
with the big battalions.

In the preceding pages I have said little of the good
qualities of the American soldiers. I am none the less con-
vinced that in some respects they were superior, as every army
of volunteers will always be, to the conscript levies of European
States ; and I am of opinion that only sounder training is
required to make our own citizen soldiers fully equal to the
troops of any possible invader. This is a bold assertion. But
if a strict system of rejection were to eliminate from the ranks
all, whether officers or men, whom indolence, indifference, or
physical incapacity renders unfit to bear arms, leaving only
men of the same stamp as those who now, whether at schools
of instruction, brigade camps, Easter manoeuvres and the
meetings of tactical societies, seize every opportunity to in-
crease their knowledge, we might endure without anxiety even
the absence of a large part of the regular army beyond the
seas. The zest with which good volunteer officers undertake
their duties is in itself sufficient to ensure the rapid mastery of
these duties. With work which is half a pastime, wherein they
find relief from the routine of their ordinary avocations, mono-
tony has no place. The very freshness of their obligations is
attractive of zeal and industry. Nor are they burdened with
the thousand details of interior economy which occupy so
largely the time and energy of the professional soldier. They
can give almost every hour which they devote to their military
duties to preparing themselves for the business of a campaign.
They can bestow their whole attention on what is assuredly the
most interesting, as it is the most important, part of the
profession of arms, the leading of troops on the field of battle.
The volunteer force, as at present constituted, is an excellent
school of physical training. But this is scarcely the purpose
for which it is maintained. Give it capable officers, trained
company leaders and an educated staff, raise the standard of
efficiency, exact a physical test, and it will become the strong
arm of a free people, a safeguard against invasion, and an
efficient substitute for conscription.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865

(A Lecture to the Aldershot Military Society)

PART I

(February 9th, 1892)

THE COMPOSITION, ORGANISATION, SYSTEM AND TACTICS OF THE

FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES

The subject I have chosen for this paper is one of very wide
extent, not only from the vast size of the theatre of war, the
enormous armies engaged, the huge loss of life and expenditure
of money, the number of battles and engagements, and the long
time that the conflict lasted, but also from the many marked
characteristics which distinguish American from European war-
fare, the novelties in organisation and in tactics, and the many
new developments and inventions that for the first time made
their appearance.

I shall, therefore, have to confine myself to a very brief and
general sketch of the history of the war between the Northern
and Southern States of America, that four years1 struggle which
is called by one side the Great Rebellion, by the other the War
of Secession.

Which of these titles is the true one is still a vexed question,
and one that it would be useless to discuss, but it is impossible
to grasp the significance of certain circumstances and their
bearing on the military operations without understanding the
cause of quarrel.

At the end of 1860, and in the spring of 1861, the thirteen
Southern States separated themselves from the remaining twenty
with whom they had hitherto been joined as the United States
of America. In thus seceding they exercised a right which
they undoubtedly believed was theirs under the terms of the
constitution. It is possible that they may have been wrong in

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 231

their interpretation of these terms, but a close examination of
the text of the constitution justifies, I think, the course they
took. At the same time, it may be said that whilst clinging to
the letter they ignored or missed the spirit. The framers of
that charter most certainly never intended that one or more
individual States should be free to leave the Union whenever
they thought fit to do so.

However, in breaking away from the North, and in forming
the Independent Republic of the Confederate States of America,
in opposition to the Federal Union, not only did the people of
the South believe that they were within their rights, but they
also believed that the Government, in refusing to acknowledge
their independence, and in attempting to bring them back to
the Union by force of arms, acted without warrant or justifica-
tion.

Whatever we may think of its wisdom, there is no doubt
that the strength of this belief accounts for the length and
bitterness of the war, and for the extraordinary resolution and
devotion displayed by the whole population of the Confederate
States.

The primary cause of war was the existence of slavery in the
South. Here, in a cotton and tobacco growing territory, where
the climate prevented the white man labouring on the planta-
tions, there were 4,000,000 negro slaves. In the North, where
the climate was more temperate, and where the greater part
of the community was engaged in manufacture, there were no
slaves and but few negroes. The constant tide of immigration
provided an abundance of labour.

But slavery was only the indirect cause of the split between
the States, and it was not the sole cause. For many years the
United States had been divided into two sections, on the one
side the slave-holding cotton -raising States of the South ; on
the other, the great manufacturing cities of the east, and the
farming and backwoods territories of the west and north.

Between these two sections, corresponding, roughly speaking,
to the two great political parties of the country, Republican and
Democrat, had gradually sprung up a spirit of bitter hostility,
created by collision on questions of the tariff and finance, and

232 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

intensified by a wide difference in social life and habits. The
South, colonised in old days by the English Cavaliers, possessed
in its great planters and landowners an aristocracy, and by this
aristocracy it was ruled.

The North, colonised by the Puritans and by Dutch traders,
was devoted principally to commerce and manufactures. The
two sections had little in common ; and we are not surprised to
find that for many years before the war broke out they had
been drawing further and further apart.

The breach between them was widened by the existence of
a party in the North who demanded the abolition of slavery
throughout the States. This party was but small in numbers
before the war. Indeed, to read the Northern newspapers oi
the period when it began to put forward its doctrines most
vehemently, it would seem that slavery had as many advocates
in the North as in the South. But, be this as it may, when, in
1860, Abraham Lincoln, who, rightly or wrongly, was believed
by the slave-holders to be but a tool in the hands of the
Abolitionists, was elected President of the United States, the
Southerners, regarding the institution to which they owed their
prosperity as menaced with destruction, determined to exercise
the right of secession. The North drew the sword in order to
punish them as rebels, and by no means with the purpose of
giving freedom to the slaves. In fact, in his inaugural message
to Congress, President Lincoln distinctly affirmed that the
Federal Government had no right to interfere with the domestic
institutions of individual States.

The first State to secede was South Carolina, on December 20,
1860. It was followed at short intervals by the remaining
Southern States ; but it is worth while noticing that it was not
until April 14, 1861, nearly four months later, that the Federal
Government, in the person of the President, declared its intention
of restoring the Union.

This long delay is curious. It was due to the generous temper
of Lincoln, who seems to have believed that time and discussion
would heal all differences, and to the aversion of the whole
Northern people from civil war. In fact the temper of the North,
when secession was first proclaimed, was anything but warlike.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 233

The Abolitionists came in for more abuse than the Secessionists.
But this temper changed into uncompromising hostility when
the South Carolina Militia bombarded Fort Sumter, in Charles-
ton harbour, and compelled a small garrison of United States
troops to surrender. The insult to the national flag appears
to have made the Northern people at last realise that the
Union was in danger. Lincoln's first act was to call for
75,000 volunteers, each State furnishing a certain number of
regiments.

Now the first idea that occurs to us, when we hear of the
Southern States being declared rebels, is, why did not the
Government employ the army and navy, the national police,
to punish the seceders ? Unfortunately for the Government
both army and navy were on the very smallest scale. There
were but 18,000 regular soldiers in the United States, and these
were serving on the far western border, protecting the frontier
settlements against the Indians. And again, the Southern
States, directly they seceded, had called out their Militia and
formed corps of volunteers, soon amounting to a considerable
force. The North, in default of other troops, had to follow suit ;
and so the great conflict was fought out by hosts of unprofessional
soldiers, of whom, broadly speaking, the superior officers alone
belonged to the regular army.

Now the fact of the personnel of the armies being for the
most part unprofessional had the effect, in the minds of
European soldiers, of causing a certain contempt for the
American troops. All acknowledged their courage and endur-
ance ; but it was generally considered that the war was con-
ducted on unscientific principles, and had, therefore, few lessons
worth the learning. A saying, attributed — wrongly, I believe
— to Moltke, that the American battles were no more than
conflicts between armed mobs, well illustrates the attitude of
European soldiers. But a certain number of officers, English,
French, and German, who had the energy to go over and look
at the fighting for themselves, amongst them Lord Wolseley, the
Comte de Paris, and Colonels Fletcher and Fremantle, of the
Guards, convinced themselves, from actual experience, that this
attitude was unjust,

234 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Whatever may have been the faults, due to want of discipline
and training, during the first year of the war, 1862 saw a
different state of things : and these competent eye-witnesses
found then that, whilst the constitution of the armies and their
methods of making war differed very greatly from those in force
on this side the Atlantic, there were hosts of magnificent fighting
men, with leaders who knew the secret of maintaining discipline
amongst their volunteers, and of handling them in the field
with skill and with success. They learned, also, that if the
procedure of European warfare was very often departed from,
it was because the nature of the country and the conditions
under which marches were made and battles fought were utterly
unlike anything that obtained in Europe. No European
general has yet been called upon to carry on a campaign in a
wilderness of primeval forest, covering an area twice as large as
the German Empire, and as thinly populated as Russia. Nor
has any Government been obliged to organise enormous armies
for the invasion of such a territory from a multitude of un-
trained and inexperienced civilians, with the help of a handful
of regular officers, and to manufacture, to collect, and to issue,
the whole of the materiel needed for their use. Moreover, as
the war came to be more closely studied, it was found that every
appliance which ingenuity or science could suggest had been
brought into play, and that in very many matters Europe had
been anticipated. Breech-loaders, repeating rifles, and ironclads
were all of them first employed in America ; and balloons, torpe-
does, submarine mines, the telegraph, signalling both by flag and
lamp, were utilised to a degree hitherto unheard of; while the
extraordinary engineering works of several of the campaigns have
no parallel in European warfare. I may instance one. In the
year 1863, the Northern army in the west found it necessary
to repair a line of railway 102 miles in length. An infantry
division, 8,000 strong, was detailed for the work. The whole
of the tools necessary had to be forged by the men, and no less
than 182 bridges had to be rebuilt. The work was done in
forty days.

Great sieges were also undertaken; and earthworks and
entrenchments assumed an importance far greater than had

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 235

hitherto been the case, and were applied with an ingenuity of
which we have not a single previous example.

Even from a very early stage, the cavalry was far more
successfully worked as the eyes and ears of the commanders than
by either Prussians or Austrians in 1866 ; and in their mounted
force the Americans developed a new arm, whose achievements
are one of the most remarkable features of modern campaigns.

Nor were the Americans — the Federals, at least — behind-
hand in matters of supply. The transport both by land and
sea was most efficient. The commissariat exceedingly well
managed, and often plentiful even to luxury, All the resources
of civilisation followed the troops into the field. Before some
of the greatest battles, when the men were lying down waiting
for the signal to advance, the newsboys went down the ranks
crying the latest edition of the daily papers ; and in certainly
one of the camps of the invading armies were posted notices
stating that agents were present to arrange for the embalming
of those who fell in action, and for forwarding them to their
friends in the very neatest coffins at the very lowest prices.

Even those who regarded the American volunteers as in-
different soldiers had always to allow that their courage was
beyond question. A few details will give an idea of the re-
solution with which they fought.

In the four years of the war there were more than 2,200
engagements, including skirmishes.

Of these 149 were important actions, generally involving a
loss of at least 1,000 men.

The loss of life during the whole war has been reckoned at
something like 500,000. In the soldiers1 cemeteries, scattered
through the States, 300,000 Federals are known to be buried.

In each of two of the greatest battles, Gettysburg and the
Wilderness, the loss, of both sides together, amounted to
50,000 killed, wounded, and missing. In both of these battles
the number of those who met their death in the field was larger
than the death-roll of the English army during the whole of
the Peninsular War, and including Quatre Bras and Waterloo.
In both of them the loss of life was greater than at Gravelotte
although the numbers engaged were not half so large.

236 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

In the month's fighting in Virginia, in 1864, the Federal
army under Grant lost 70,000 men.

I have emphasised these bloodthirsty statistics in order to
give some idea of the scale on which the battles were fought ; and
if the ' butchers1 bills ' were gigantic, the numbers engaged and
the extent of the theatre of war were even more remarkable.

At one period the number of men actually serving amounted
to 1,500,000 ; the number of enlistments during the war, on
the Northern side alone, was close upon 3,000,000, and this out
of a population of 20,500,000.

As regards population, and consequently physical strength,
the South was much inferior. There were but 7,500,000 whites
to 4,000,000 slaves. The latter were not employed as soldiers
by the Confederates, but their labour was of the greatest value,
releasing the white men for service with the armies, providing
them with food and equipment, and building fortifications.
Nevertheless, the strength of the South always fell short of that
of the North, and during the last year of the war amounted to
verv little more than a fourth.

The North was the invader. Twice was her territory
penetrated by the Confederates, but never for more than a few
score miles, and no single district was occupied for more than a
few weeks.

During the four years of the war, on the other hand, nearly
every part of the Confederacy was, at one time or another,
trodden by the enemy. The theatre of war, then, spread over
the thirteen seceding States, and the area of those States con-
tained nearly 800,000 square miles ; in other words, a territory
as large as the whole of the Continent and more than half as
large as India. To India, an English soldier, Sir Henry
Havelock- Allan, who witnessed some part of the operations
in America, has likened the face of the country over which
the armies moved. There are the same great plains and
mighty rivers, navigable almost from thei^ source ; the same
absence of hills ; the same great level spaces between far distant
mountain ranges ; the same scarcity of roads and railways ; the
same long journeys, not counted by hours but by days and
weeks, between town and town. Like India, it is a country of

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 237

* magnificent distances.1 In two essential particulars there was
a difference. The Southern States, generally speaking, were
covered by enormous forests, and the climate was not too hot
for military operations at any time of the year. In fact, the
mud of the South was an infinitely worse obstacle than its
fiercest heat.

One point should always be borne in mind in studying the
war. The roads of the South, few in number, were infamous in
quality. The railroads were rough in the extreme, made of the
rudest material ; but if they were easily destroyed they were
just as readily repaired.

I have already said that the higher commands on either
side were filled by regular officers. When the war began there
were more than 1,200 individuals in the States who had passed
through the Military Academy at West Point ; of these one-
fifth were Southerners and joined the Confederacy. In order
to appreciate the work these officers did in the war, it will be
well to turn for a moment to the method in which they were
educated and trained.

West Point is, undoubtedly, one of the most remarkable of
military institutions, and one of the most satisfactory of military
schools.

The word school is almost a misnomer. It is, in fact, a
university, where the cadets are under military discipline and
command, organised as a battalion, and taught military duties
in addition to a very severe course of general education. Four
years is the length of their stay. During that time they learn
their duties, practically and theoretically, as soldiers of the
infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and the discipline is
strict as the instruction is thorough. Up to 1850, military
history and minor tactics, and the art of war, were not included
in the course, but it speaks well for the good sense of the
American officers that the majority of them recognised and
remedied this deficiency themselves. A society was formed for
the study of Napoleon's campaigns, and the greatest of his
campaigns were familiar ground.

The practical training of both officers and men was peculiar.

The army was split up into numerous small detachment-;

238 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

along the Indian frontier. The largest garrison consisted only
of a few troops or companies. It was seldom that a colonel
had the whole of his command under his hand at one time.
Many of the posts, isolated in the Western deserts, were held
only by a handful of men. ' During my army service,' said
one of the great Confederate generals, ' I learned all about
commanding fifty United States dragoons and forgot everything
else.'

Now although this system of dissemination and detachments
prevented the senior officers and the staff from gaining any
practical experience of the movements of troops in large bodies,
or learning how to work the three arms in combination, it had
a good side as well as a bad one. Not only were the officers in
command of the numerous posts compelled to act on their own
responsibility, but command had often to be exercised by those
of junior rank ; and the constant expeditions against the
Indians, sometimes employing a thousand men, but more often
a troop or company, increased the self-reliance and habits of
command already acquired in time of peace. I think there is
nothing more remarkable in the history of the war than the
capacity for accepting responsibility, and acting on their judg-
ment, shown by the regular officers ot every rank. And they
were cool-headed enough to draw the line between initiative
and rashness. In the very first great battle, that of Bull Run,
the quick initiative of two young brigadiers, Jackson and
Evans, who had neither of them commanded even a battalion in
peace, practically saved the day for the South. The capacity
for accepting the responsibilities of independent command is
the more remarkable when we learn that by far the greater
number of those who rose during the war to the command of
army corps and armies had held no higher grade in the old
service than that of captain.

Of the other officers holding high rank on both sides, those
who went into the war straight from civil life, some did excellent
service even in command of army corps and on the staff ; but
many, who were too rapidly promoted, failed ignominiously, and
in many cases the purchase of experience was a very costly
business for the cause they served. As a proof of the value of

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 239

the training given by a military life, I may mention that on*»
of the few foreigners — and there were many engaged — who was
promoted to a high command, had once been in the English
army, holding the rank of corporal in the 41st Foot. Cleburne's
division was by no means the least efficient in the Confederacy,
and he himself attributed his rapid, rise to the habits he had
acquired in the ranks of his old regiment, and prided himself
that he at least knew how to keep his white facings cleaner
than those of any other general in the Southern army.

Of practical experience the senior officers had nearly all had
a good deal in the Mexican War of 1846-7, and the majority
of all ranks had seen service against the Indians.

I have said that one-fifth of the West Point graduates
resigned their commissions in the regular army, and offei-ed
their swords to the Confederacy. The rest of the army, officers
and men, held to the Union. It is interesting to note how the
services of the officers were utilised by either side.

The Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, was himself
a * West Pointer.1 He had served with distinction in Mexico ;
and afterwards as Secretary of State for War he had had many
opportunities of learning the capabilities of the senior officers
of the army. This knowledge he turned to good account.
His selections for command were judicious in the extreme.
Regardless of seniority he chose the man he thought best
suited for the billet, and his choice seldom belied his judgment.
All those regular officers who joined the Confederacy were
placed in high command, or on the General Staff; some took
over volunteer battalions, but as a rule at least a brigade was
found for them.

In the North, on the contrary, the regular officers were at
first somewhat overlooked in favour of the volunteers, and
nearly 600 captains and subalterns were retained with their
own regiments.

Nor did Mr. Davis, taught by his military experience, desert
a commander because he had been unfortunate. He knew too
well how much luck has to do with military operations, and so
long as a commander showed skill and resolution he was main-
tained in his position. Both his greatest generals, Lee and

240 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Stonewall Jackson, met with ill success in their first independent
command. Once only did the Southern President depart from
this rule, in relieving General Johnston in 1864, and then he
committed an irreparable mistake.

Very different was the procedure in the North. Neither
Abraham Lincoln nor his Secretary at War had any previous
knowledge of military affairs, but, notwithstanding, they not
only attempted to dictate to the generals in the field, but
settled for themselves who those generals should be. If their
efforts to direct military operations were disastrous, as Lord
Wolseley has pointed out, their efforts at selection were little
better. The voice of the people exercised much influence over
their choice, and generals who had won trifling successes over
inferior troops were preferred to those who had proved them-
selves worthy, if unsuccessful, opponents of the best generals
of the Confederacy. Commander succeeded commander with
startling rapidity. The chief army of the North, that which
was engaged in Virginia, was commanded by no less than six
different officers, each one of whom, except the last, was
degraded for ill success. At the same time, volunteer generals
who commanded great political influence were retained in their
command, despite the constant exhibition of the most glaring
imcompetency. Later in the war, the President and his
advisers, and even the sovereign people, learned wisdom. In
General Grant they found at last a successful leader, and they
forbore to interfere with him. He was allowed to choose his
own subordinates, and to dismiss those who were incapable as
he pleased. The power entrusted to him he carried out with
no sparing hand. In almost the last battle, during the night
which intervened between its phases, a corps commander, who
had served with much distinction throughout the war, but had
shown himself somewhat deficient in energy at critical moments,
was summarily relieved of his command ; and this not by
Grant himself, but by Sheridan, the general in immediate
charge of the operations.

Not the least interesting study connected with the war is
that which concerns itself with the individual commanders on
either side. Their personal histories are all well known, and

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 241

a general survey of them brings a number of interesting facts
to light. As a rule they were young. Very few of those who
made great names for themselves were more than fifty. Stuart
and Sheridan, the two great cavalry leaders, were under thirty
when the war broke out, and several of their most distinguished
lieutenants had no more than four or five years1 service. The
most dashing Horse Artilleryman in the Confederacy was
twenty-three when he was killed ; and one of the best cavalry
divisional commanders on the Federal side, General Mackenzie,
did not even leave West Point until the war was nearly half
over. There are also some interesting facts bearing on the
question of training and experience. I have already alluded
to General Cleburne. We should scarcely expect to find that
some three years1 service in the rank of corporal in an English
regiment fitted a man to command a division in the field.
Some of the volunteer officers, moreover, who joined without
any previous military knowledge whatever, made dashing and
skilful leaders, notably General Terry on the Northern side,
and Forrest on the Southern. The latter, who proved himself
a most able tactician, would most certainly have failed in any
written examination for promotion. He could read or write
only with the greatest difficulty.

Again, several of the most famous generals had, for a long
time before the war, severed themselves from all connection
with command and with the service.

Longstreet, one of the very ablest officers in the South,
came from the pay department. Grant had been regimental
quartermaster, had left the army and been employed as a clerk
in a tannery. Sherman had only thirteen years1 army service,
and had since been lawyer, banker, and professor in a military
school ; D. H. Hill had been professor in a university, and
afterwards a lawyer ; McClellan, president of a railway company ;
and Stonewall Jackson, perhaps the greatest soldier of them
all, had served but four years in the Artillery, and for the ten
years preceding the war had been Professor of Mathematics
and Artillery in the Military Institute of Virginia. Another
Confederate general was at the same time a bishop ; and he
was not the only ecclesiastic who, having left the army for the

242 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

church, resumed his former trade when the war broke out.
Lee's chief of artillery, General Pendleton, was an Episcopal
clergyman, who, it is said, condoned his relapse by always
prefacing the command to fire with the words, ' The Lord have
mercy on their souls ! '

None of these officers appear to have found the want of
that practice and training which are given by immediate contact
with the troops. Grant and Sherman both tell us in their
memoirs that when they first took command they were ignorant
of the drill then in use. But it is possible that had they never
severed their connection with the army, their success would
have been far more remarkable than it was. Many others in
like case with themselves failed ignominiously. They were but
the exceptions that prove the rule. Without character and
capacity, physical and moral courage, coolness, and self-reliance,
it is impossible that a man can become a great soldier. But,
however strong he may be in the possession of such qualities,
study and practice can never be anything else but beneficial.
In some degree they are essential ; and those who are not ex-
ceptionally gifted should take to heart the opinion of one of the
most experienced of the Confederate generals. * Conscientious
study,1 he says, ' will not perhaps make them great, but it will
make them respectable ; and when the responsibility of com-
mand comes, they will not disgrace their flag, injure their cause,
nor murder their men.'

Now as to the regimental officers and men.

The private soldiers on both sides were drawn from all
classes of society. Men of the best breeding and culture in
America, of high education and great wealth, marched shoulder
to shoulder with small farmers and clerks, with mechanics and
labourers. In the North there was a proportion of men who
enlisted merely for the sake of high bounties, and a number of
foreigners. In the South a proportion were conscripts ; but,
on the whole, the patriotism and good-will of the armies were
undeniable.

The number of foreigners in the Federal armies has been
greatly exaggerated, but there were whole divisions of Germans,
and on both sides there were battalions and brigades of Irish.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 243

It may be interesting to mention that whilst the Irish were
everywhere counted as excellent soldiers, the Germans fell short
of such a reputation.

The moral of the armies, leavened by the presence of men
of intelligence and high principle, was necessarily good. Crime
was practically unknown ; of insubordination there was very
little, but, at the same time, the standard of discipline was
never a very high one. It appears to have depended altogether
on the personal character and capacity of the commanding
officers, and even in the best regiments it seems to have been
impossible to exact the same strict regard for duty as in a
professional army. The truth is that neither officers nor men
possessed the habit of obedience. They were willing enough,
patriotic enough, and as plucky as soldiers ever were, but they
could not be depended on to obey under every circumstance, no
matter by whom the order was given. Obedience was not an
instinct, and good-will did not prove an efficient substitute for
the machine-like subordination of the regular. The question of
American discipline is a difficult one. I do not know of any
writer on the war who discusses it at length, and all direct in-
formation on the subject comes from stray remarks and admis-
sions that might easily pass unnoticed. But at the same time
it is an interesting question, especially to those who may have
to deal with our own Volunteers, and perhaps it will not be out
of place if I give the impressions that a long study of the his-
tory of the war leaves on my own mind. In the first place it
seems that the men wanted a deal of humouring, and the regi-
mental officers also. Mistakes had to be overlooked and
ignorance excused. Marks of respect to rank and the ordinary
etiquette of an army had often to be dispensed with, and it was
injudicious to interfere between the regimental officers and their
men. Freedom of speech could not be checked, and there was
much familiarity between even the generals and the privates.
Still, taking into consideration the democratic constitution of
the States, it is possible that these things might have existed,
and ' the thinking bayonets,' as their leaders were so fond of
calling them, have been as reliable soldiers as the best of
European troops. But there are certain facts which show, I think,

a 2

244 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

that ' the thinking bayonets.1 however high their spirit, would
have done better had their habits of obedience been so ingrained
as to rise superior to all personal feelings whatever, whether
of danger, hunger, or fatigue. These facts are as follows : —

1. The very prevalent habit of straggling from the ranks on
the line of march which seems to have existed certainly for the
first three years, and to have existed unchecked, and we can
understand how much the generals must have been hampered in
their operations by their uncertainty as to the number of men
they could count on to reach a fixed place at a fixed time.

2. The very indifferent manner in which the infantry out-
post duties were carried out, at least for the first two years of
the war. Instances of surprises, not of small parties, but of
whole armies, wrere numerous. Of course in the forests of the
South outpost duty was most exacting, but that more than one
great battle should have been begun by the rush of a long line
on troops surprised in the act ot cooking, or asleep in their
tents, seems a proof that sentries and patrols were not so
vigilant as they should have been.

3. The absolute want of control over the fire of the
men. The only symptom of fire discipline was that the men
could generally be induced to reserve their fire to short range
where they were well sheltered and the enemy was advancing
without firing. Directly the bullets began to fly the men
* took charge.'

These shortcomings bear out Lord Wolseley1s opinion that
the presence of a single army corps of regular soldiers would
have turned the scale in favour of either side.

Before I turn to the actual campaigns there are two cir-
cumstances bearing very strongly on tactical efficiency which
should be noticed.

The Southern States were a wilderness of forest, swamp, and
river. Game was abundant, and the great hunting grounds were
free to all. Sport in all its forms was the regular pastime of the
whole population, and the men of the South were accustomed
from childhood to the use of the gun and rifle. ' Nine-tenths
of our men,1 says a Confederate officer, ' were excellent shots
and practised judges of distance.1 A book written by an

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 245

Englishman, who served with a Confederate regiment, tells us
that on Enfield rifles being issued to the men the first thing
they did was to knock off the elevating back-sight. They
judged distance by instinct and wanted no mechanical contriv-
ance to assist their aim. Now in the North, the people of the
Eastern States and the foreigners who enlisted knew very little
about shooting ; and I do not believe that they had much ball
practice during their service, except on the field of battle. It
was by these troops that the Confederates were opposed in
Virginia, and the superior marksmanship of the Southerners
had undoubtedly much to do with their long succession of
victories. In the western quarter of the theatre of war on the
other hand, in the Mississippi Valley, the fighting was of a
much more give and take character ; in fact here the Northerners
were more often successful. To this result their superior
numbers had doubtless something to say. But it was probably
due rather to the characteristics of the Northern troops engaged.
The men were drawn from the Western States ; and among them
were many farmers or backwoodsmen, as expert with the rifle as
their opponents.

The second circumstance is that the Southerners were a
nation of horsemen. Fox-hunting flourished in many parts of
the States, and no white man ever walked when he could ride.
In the North the very contrary was the case. Horsemanship
was practically an unknown art, and had it not been that the
regular cavalry regiments were available for service with the
Federal armies, it is probable that the superiority of the
Southern troopers in the first two years of the war would have
been more marked than it actually was. It will be seen, then,
that the Confederacy, inferior in numbers, in resources, and in
wealth as it was, started with two great tactical advantages,
advantages which it took the North a very long time to over-
take. But at the same time there were counterbalancing ad-
vantages on the side of the Federals. Their artillery was
always superior to that of the Confederates, both in material
and in personnel. The forty-eight batteries of the regular
army served as models to the Northern volunteers. One
regular battery was grouped with three manned by volunteers.

246 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and the latter quickly profited by the example set them.
Again, the supply of horses in the North was practically in-
exhaustible, whilst in the South there was always the greatest
difficulty in providing the cavalry and artillery with remounts.

No preliminary sketch of the armies would be complete
without a reference to the mounted arm. Wooded and close
although the country was, this branch of the service soon showed
its value, and at the end of the war the strength of the Federal
cavalry was over 80,000. As is well known, the American
horse resembled mounted riflemen rather than ordinary cavalry.
Although they were quite capable of charging, and were just
as efficient on the outpost line as the best of European cavalry,
the principal part of their fighting was done on foot. And
this was not because they were indifferent riders or were ill-
trained — far from it — but because of the close and difficult
nature of the country. Lord Wolseley has been rather severely
criticised in America because he has stated that on the theatre
of war there was no ground suitable for cavalry engagements
as we understand them in Europe. His critic asserts that there
was a large extent of such ground. I believe, however, that
the ideas of Lord Wolseley and his opponent as to what sort
of ground is suitable for cavalry work differ very greatly. The
former was probably thinking of the great plains of France and
Germany, stretching away for mile upon mile without the least
obstacle to free movement. The American was probably
thinking of the clearings in the Southern woodlands, spaces
very circumscribed in comparison with the rolling downs of
Mars-la-Tour. There is a set of maps, in minute detail, of the
scene of many of the American campaigns, and it is hard to
find on any of them any locality so unencumbered with wood-
land as to afford a satisfactory arena for the ideal cavalry
battle. I have carefully measured the scene of the battle of
Brandy Station, the greatest cavalry engagement of the war,
and I can find no open ground, free from wood or stream, more
than a mile square. Besides, the large clearings which did
occur had been made by the farmers, whose barns and fences
considerably interfered with the manoeuvres of the cavalry. A
personal knowledge of Virginia has convinced me that it is a

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 247

country just as unsuited to ordinary cavalry fighting, as we
understand it, as England itself. It is quite possible that had
the country been open the Americans would, before the war
had ended, have possessed a splendid force of cavalry pure and
simple. But, as it was, in such a country, there was little use
for such a force, and the cavalry leaders very quickly discovered
that their men were far more valuable as mounted riflemen.

The next interesting question is : to what degree did these
mounted riflemen combine their two characteristics ? Were
they good infantry and at the same time good cavalry ?

On the outpost line they were most efficient. The extra-
ordinary raids they made on communications and magazines
were a distinctly new feature in war. They stormed earth-
works, they captured cities, and they even went so far as to
attack and capture gunboats, but, at the same time, when dis-
mounted they were not considered as efficient as the ordinary
infantry, and as cavalry I do not believe that they would have
been able to cope with good European troops in open country.
But they were admirably adapted for all mounted work in the
Southern forests, and no European cavalry would have been
able to touch them on their own ground. The American idea,
to this day, however, is that good mounted riflemen are more
than a match, on any ground, for European cavalry.

The chief staff" officers on both sides were recruited from
the regular forces, but the enormous armies demanded a very
large reinforcement from the volunteers. I need hardly say
that an army of 18,000 men, scattered all over the western
prairies, could scarcely be expected to supply any large number
of well-trained staff" officers, and, at first, whilst the staff was
new to its work, many were the blunders which were due to
the inexperience and ignorance of those who composed it.
Later in the war things were very different, and in many of the
campaigns, such were the celerity and precision with which
enormous masses of men were moved, handled, and supplied,
that the first thing that strikes us is what a remarkably efficient
staff" the generals must have had.

As to armament, I may add that the infantry on both sides
were armed with muzzle-loading rifles. The guns also were

248 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

muzzle-loaders, rifled and smooth bore. The Northern cavalry,
after the first year, earned breech-loading and repeating car-
bines, as well as sabres and revolvers. In the arms of the
Southern troopers there was little uniformity. Many of the
regiments were supplied with carbines, but others carried long
rifles. There were regiments of lancers raised by the Federals
in 1861, but they were soon converted into ordinary dragoons.

After the bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter had
brought matters to a crisis, and President Lincoln had called
out his volunteers, the Federal Government set to work to
devise a plan of campaign ; and there are certain geographical
and political features which must be made clear before that
plan can be properly understood.

1. The long seaboard of the Southern States, and the small
number of harbours.

2. The Mississippi river, running from north to south right
through the States, and dividing Texas, the great cattle-raising
State, from the remainder of the Confederacy.

3. The position of the north-western corner of Virginia,
running up into the heart of the North, and contracting the
isthmus which, south of Lake Erie, joined the eastern and
western portions of the Northern territory to a neck little more
than 100 miles in width.

4. The position of the rival capitals, Washington and
Richmond, not more than 100 miles apart, and connected by
two lines of railway. Washington was only separated from
Virginia by the Potomac, which is there a magnificent river,
nearly a mile wide. Thirty miles higher up it is fordable.

5. The Shenandoah Valley, bounded east and west by high
mountains, exceedingly fertile, and the great corn-growing
district of Virginia. Not only did it supply the rest of the
State, but it afforded a covered approach into Maryland,
threatening the Federal capital.

6. The divided opinions of the border States, Missouri,
Kentucky, and Maryland ; and the very strong feeling in the
north-western corner of Virginia in favour of the Union.

The first step the Northerners decided on was to blockade
the Southern ports. The North had nearly all the vessels of

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 249

the navy at its command ; very few of the crews had joined the
Confederacy, and it was thus possible to prevent supplies of any
kind reaching the South from Europe. As the South was
dependent for almost everything, except bread, meat, sugar,
and tobacco, on other nations, the blockade was a most effective
weapon against her. To starve her into submission did not
seem difficult. She had no manufactures, except a few iron-
foundries ; no wool or cloth ; no tanneries ; no powder factories,
no gun factories ; almost all the railway workshops were in
the North ; there was very little salt in her stores, and no tea
or coffee. In fact, almost every single necessary of existence
came from abroad, and had it not been that the arsenals within
her territory were well supplied, and that her victories in Vir-
ginia provided her troops with equipment captured from the
enemy, it is difficult to see how she could have carried on the
war at all. As it was, the dearth of material resources always
hampered her generals, as may be imagined when I state
that they appear to have often depended for fresh supplies of
ammunition on what they could take from the enemy.

The next step was to occupy north-west Virginia, and to
deprive the Confederacy of this point of vantage. This was
done without much difficulty, and the South was never able
to reconquer it.

After the blockade had been established, and north-west
Virginia occupied, the military policy of the Federals had two
objectives.

1. In the east, the capture of Richmond.

2. In the west, the occupation of the Mississippi Valley.
Before the latter could be accomplished, the border States

of Missouri and Kentucky had to be secured. These States
were important to the Confederates as recruiting grounds, and
they fought hard to retain them. But eventually the North
proved superior. The border States were lost ; and in July
1863, by the capture of Vicksburg, the great fortress of the
Mississippi, General Grant made the river free to the Federal
gunboats from New Orleans upwards, and thus cut the Con-
federacy in two.

During the third year of the war, July 1863 to July

250 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

1864, the Federals in the west were occupied in securing the
State of Tennessee, and in pushing forward towards the lines
of railway which connected the States of Georgia and Alabama
with Richmond. Their progress was slow, and they met with
stubborn resistance at every point.

Meanwhile, in the east, during these three years, the North
had won no important advantage whatever. They had sent,
at intervals, no less than five commanders into Virginia, with
the purpose of capturing Richmond, but their armies had never
won a single victory on Southern soil.

Twice had the Confederates, under Lee, crossed the Potomac ;
the first time into Maryland, in order to get recruits ; the
second time they had advanced into Pennsylvania. On both
occasions Lee was compelled to retire ; and in July 1863, the
same month and almost on the same day that Vicksburg fell
in the west, he was defeated at Gettysburg, in Pennsylvania,
by General Meade.

Still, when the fourth year of the war opened, the Federals
were very little nearer Richmond than they had been at the
very outset. The capture of tha chief city of the South and
the destruction of her armies seemed as far off as ever.

In April 1864, the Northern people were scarcely hopeful.
They saw no signs as yet of the end, and it seemed as if the
frightful expenditure of life and money might drag itself on
for years and years. But early in 1864 Grant had been
appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Federal armies, and
President Lincoln not only refrained from interference with
his strategy, but gave him most loyal support.

Grant was a man of iron will and indefatigable energy, and
he infused something of his own spirit into the operations of
the Northern armies. His strategical conceptions, too, were
broad and sound. Before he took over the chief command the
Federal forces in the east and west had been entirely in-
dependent of each other ; they had never worked in combination,
and the Confederates, possessing the interior lines, had been
able to transfer troops from one quarter of the theatre of war
to the other without impediment. The Southern forces were
divided into two main armies, one in Virginia, the other in

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 251

the west, and Grant determined, with his superior numbers, to
give these armies no respite, and to prevent the one from rein-
forcing the other.

The western operations were entrusted to General Sherman.
The Commander-in-Chief accompanied the army moving against
Richmond. As to Sherman's campaign, I need only say that
it was completely successful, and had for its results the de-
struction of the army opposed to him, and a march across
Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah, for the second time cutting
the Confederacy in two, destroying the Southern arsenals and
magazines, and isolating Virginia and North Carolina from the
States on the south coast. Savannah was taken in December
1864.

But, although successful in Georgia, the Federals in Virginia,
opposed by Lee and the finest of the Confederate armies, an
army small in number but composed of veteran soldiers in-
spirited by many victories, met with the most determined
opposition.

The first week in May Grant set out with 130,000 men to
crush Lee's 60,000 and to capture Richmond. For a whole
month the two armies fought day after day, the Federals dash-
ing fiercely at the Confederate lines, recoiling with fearful losses,
and then moving off to try to turn their enemy's flank. But
no sooner was the Northern army set in motion than Lee moved
too, and whenever Grant turned in the direction of Richmond
he found his watchful antagonist still barring the way. At
length after fifty days1 marching and fighting, Grant found him-
self with the Confederate army between him and the Southern
capital, holding the famous lines of Petersburg. He had lost
in battle since the campaign commenced nearly 70,000 men, the
Confederates not more than 25,000. But the Federal Govern-
ment continued to pour in reinforcements, and his numbers were
still almost twice as large as those of his opponent. But he
had had enough oi attacking the Southern breastworks ; and,
it is said, so appalled were the Northern people at the awful
slaughter of their soldiers, and so hopeless of success, that the Con-
federates were never so near to independence as in August 1864.

Grant now determined to lay siege to Petersburg, and to

252 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

starve his enemy out. And indeed it seemed an easy task. If
the war lay heavy on the North, it lay far heavier on the South.
There were no more men to fill the ranks of her armies. The
greater part of the country was exhausted by the march of the
invaders. Old men and boys, unfit for service, were called upon
to take their places at the front. As Grant himself said, ' the
Confederacy was robbing the cradle and the grave to fill the
ranks.1 Of the sufferings in Richmond during the long siege of
eight months it is pitiable to speak. The soldiers themselves
were badly fed. The work at the front, with their inferior
numbers, was unceasing and exhausting, and yet they bore it
without complaint. But in the great city behind, in the
hospitals, and in the homes of those whom the war had made
widowed and fatherless, want and famine bore a far more
terrible aspect. And yet there were none who murmured.
Whilst Lee and his army still held their ground that in-
domitable people never abandoned hope.

But at length the end came. Richmond was cut off almost
on every side. Sickness and starvation had reduced the army
to 40,000 men, and Lee was compelled to abandon the lines he
had so long defended. He broke away ; but it was too late.
The net closed round him, and at Appomattox Court House,
some seventy miles west of Richmond, the army of the Confederacy
surrendered on April 9, 1865. The great war was over and the
Union was restored.

Such is a very bare sketch of the salient points of the
military operations.

PART II

(February 16th, 1892)
THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE BELLIGERENTS

I have already discussed the strategy of the American War in
so far as it was affected by geographical and political considera-
tions ; I have now to deal with the actual strategical conceptions
and operations of either side. As regards the main principle
on which they acted, it has been said that the two belligerents
fell naturally into their respective roles. The North, intent on
crushing out rebellion, was the invader ; whilst the South, as

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 253

Colonel Chesney writes in one of his essays on the war, as the
weaker party outnumbered by nearly three to one, was com-
pelled to stand on the defensive. Now, despite this very high
authority, I cannot help thinking that the principle laid down,
like almost every other military maxim, may be more honoured
in the breach than in the observance. We know the stereo-
typed answer to all tactical problems, ' it depends on the nature
of the ground.' That answer, vague as it is, is often the best
that one can give. It implies that tactics are subject to no
rule of thumb ; and the same applies to strategy in general, and
to the maxim we are speaking of in particular. There is no
compulsion about it. The possibility of the weaker party
assuming the role of invader depends not on the relative
numbers of the two armies, but upon their moral, on their
condition of readiness, and, above all, on the possibility of
meeting the enemy in detail. Napoleon, whenever he could
seize the initiative, never hesitated to throw himself into hostile
territory, even when he was inferior in strength to the mass of
the opposing forces ; and it is remarkable that General Stone-
wall Jackson, certainly one of the greatest of American generals,
constantly advocated the invasion of the North. But in the
councils of the South political expediency over-rode military con-
siderations. Defence not defiance was the motto of the young
Republic ; and her rulers, always trusting that sooner or later
the European Powers would intervene in her favour, preferred
that the Confederacy should pose as a State defending her
liberties rather than as one seeking them aggressively. Twice
only did General Lee, with the finest army of the South, cross the
border and advance into Northern territory. On the second
occasion he was met and defeated by Meade, at Gettysburg, in
Pennsylvania, north of Washington ; but to anyone who reads
the history of the war, and realises the apprehension, the
unreadiness, and the military weakness of the Northern States
at the time the battle was fought, the truth of the saying that
at Gettysburg the South was ' within a stone's throw of in-
dependence' is no less manifest than the wisdom, under the
conditions, of an offensive policy.

But, preferring the defensive as they did, the Confederates

254 THE SCIENCE OF WAK

made good use of their opportunities. Two point* are re-
markable. The main armies, one in Virginia and one in the
west, were, generally speaking, always maintained at the greatest
possible strength ; strategical points, which lay outside the
reach of these armies, were garrisoned by the very smallest force
compatible with security. The principle was recognised that
such points usually stand or fall with the success or failure of
the larger operations. However, there was one remarkable and
fatal exception. After the fall of Vicksburg no less than
55,000 men were retained in Texas and Louisiana, the trans-
Mississippi States, and this at a time when the main armies of
the South, for want of reinforcements, were absolutely unable to
assume the offensive. Owing to the loss of the Mississippi these
States were useless to the Confederacy. Fifty-five thousand men,
who would probably have turned the scale elsewhere, were thus
injudiciously employed in guarding unprofitable territory. It
is only fair, however, to notice that there seems to have been a
certain reluctance amongst a portion of the troops to serve
outside their own States. The second point is the advantage
afforded by the possession of interior lines. The Federal
armies, invading the South from the north-west and north-east,
were more than 1,000 miles apart ; and when, after the second
year, they had secured the border States and the Mississippi,
they practically surrounded the enormous territory which the
Confederates still possessed. Within this huge half-circle the
Southern generals were free to move their troops as they wished.
They used their freedom to some purpose. The point most
actively threatened was again and again reinforced from the
other quarter of the theatre of war. Thus, in 1863, after
Gettysburg, 20,000 of Lee's army, under Longstreet, one of his
best generals, were sent to the west, and enabled the army in that
section to gain the important victory of Chickamauga, which
for several months completely paralysed the Federal advance
into Georgia.

At the same time it must be said that this constant and
effective shifting of strength from one wing to the other was
made feasible by the errors of the Federals. Their two main
armies of the west and east worked on wholly independent lines.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 255

Until Grant took command in 1864, they never operated in
combination. Whilst one was moving forward the other was
resting or preparing for a fresh advance ; and this disjointed
state of things permitted their enemy to reinforce the threatened
point at his leisure. Grant initiated a new policy. He pressed
his opponents at every point simultaneously. Relying on his
superior numbers he neutralised all the Southern advantages of
interior lines. It may be argued that this strategy entailed a
useless waste of life ; that the better plan would have been to
hold the enemy on one wing, and to attack him in force upon
the other. But here we must remember the enormous extent
of the theatre of war. It was easy enough for the Southern
armies to get across the Confederacy in a very short time, and,
by destroying the railroads, to make pursuit hopeless. This
was prevented by Grant's energy in pushing the attack at every
point.

The Federal strategy of the last year of the war, with
Grant in command and Sherman his lieutenant, stands out in
marked relief to the disjointed, partial, and complicated opera-
tions of the previous years. The plans of campaign evolved
during the first phase of the war were ingenious in the extreme.
Simplicity was despised. The great idea was to surround the
enemy, to cut off all his communications, and to attack him in
front, flanks and rear, at one and the same time. Unfortunately
this conception made it necessary to break up the invading army
into several columns, and the enemy, using his interior lines,
had little difficulty in spoiling the whole plan. He either
defeated each column in succession or, by crushing one of them,
compelled the others to fall back. The second invasion of
Virginia, in 1862, was carried out by no less than four different
armies, all converging on Richmond, and numbering all told
about 200,000 men. The Confederates had but 100,000, but
the brilliant strategy of Lee, backed up by the marvellous energy
of Jackson, cleared Virginia of invaders within three months.
This tendency to discard simplicity in favour of complication
appears in the tactics of the Federals as well as in their
strategy. Commanders were always trying to imitate Napoleon,
forgetting that intricate manoeuvres require a well- trained staff

256 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and well-drilled troops ; and it is noticeable that the least
experienced leaders were generally the most eager to attempt
involved movements. Grant seems to have been the first to
recognise that, as Moltke puts it, the true objective of a cam-
paign is the defeat of the enemy's main army, although he
may be said to have erred on the side or simplicity, and too
many of his battles took the shape of frontal attacks against an
entrenched enemy. General Sheridan's summing up of the
handling of the army of the Potomac, as the army of the east
was called, before Grant took command, is to the point. ' The
army,' he says, ' was all right ; the trouble was that the com-
manders never went out to lick anybody, but always thought
first of keeping from getting licked.1 Grant, like Moltke, was
always ready to try conclusions.

Perhaps the most interesting strategical question is that
connected with bases of operations and lines of communication.
Grant was the first to perceive that in a comparatively fertile
country it was possible to subsist an army without magazines ;
and he was able to invest Vicksburg, the Mississippi fortress,
by cutting loose from his base, marching completely round the
place, defeating the troops that opposed him, and then estab-
lishing a new line of communication. In his famous march to
the sea Sherman did the same thing. In September he found
himself at Atlanta with a Confederate army, inferior in numbers,
in front of him , and in October this army passed round his
flank and struck his line of communications in rear. But his
magazines, depots, and the important bridges were fortified and
well garrisoned ; the border States, Kentucky and Tennessee,
were strongly held ; and so on November 15, cutting loose
from his communications, he started on his march of 300 miles
across Georgia, entering Savannah on December 21. The
Confederate army of the west, which he had left in his rear,
was heavily defeated at Nashville on December 15 and 16.

I may add that the command of the sea and of the great
rivers both in the west and east greatly assisted the Federal
generals in their operations, as they assisted General Ross of
Bladensburg, in that remarkable campaign which resulted in
the capture of Washington by an English army.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 257

In 1864, Grant, with an army 130,000 strong, moved
southward against Richmond through Virginia, always keeping
his left within reach of the navigable rivers and estuaries which
intersect the eastern portion of that State in a direction parallel
to the line of march. The district through which he moved
was completely exhausted, and he was compelled to rely on his
magazines. In fifty days he changed his bases and line of
communications no less than four times ; a fact which speaks
volumes for the efficiency of the Federal departments of supply
and transport.

In comparing the broad principles of the strategy of the
Federals with those followed by Moltke in 1870, we are at
once struck with the complication, the vagueness, and the
weakness of the one, as compared with the simplicity, the
strength, and the concentrated energy of the other. In 1870
we find a vast army, divided into two groups, disdaining every
object except that of concentrating every single available gun,
sabre, and bayonet against the main forces of the enemy.
Everyone is aware that Moltke's plan of campaign, seemingly
so simple, had been most carefully worked out in the winter
months ot 1867-68. The Federals, on the other hand, not
anticipating war, had no such opportunity of thinking oui.
at their leisure the proper line to be followed, and the result
was that for the first three years they made but little progress.
Now the Federal generals were, as a rule, men of strong common
sense, and it is often urged that strategy is merely a question of
common sense, but in 1870 we have one of the most earnest
students spending four months in evolving a plan of campaign
which proved completely successful, and in 1861, ^S, and '63,
men of undoubted ability, producing and acting upon con-
ceptions of which the most ordinary Sandhurst cadet is able
to point out the shortcomings. Common sense made a most
conspicuous failure. It is true that the Federal generals were
much hampered by the President and his advisers, who never
ceased, until the coming of Grant, to interfere with the military
operations ; but the fact that the ideas of these civilian councillors
were almost invariably unsound goes to prove the proposition
that for judicious strategy something more is needed than mere

S

253 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

natural intelligence. In General Grant's Memoirs is an anecdote
much to the point. When he first took command, he had
an interview with the President, Abraham Lincoln. Now
Lincoln was undoubtedly one of the very ablest men that
America ever produced ; he had given advice to every general-
in-chief, had received every report, and had naturally followed
the course of the war with the most intense interest. Yet mark
the following ; — ' In our interview,' says Grant, ' the President
told me he didn't want to know what I proposed to do. But
he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted
me to hear and then do as I pleased about it. He brought
out a map of Virginia . . . and pointed out on that map two
streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that
the army might be moved on boats and landed between the
mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac
to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our
flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not
suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while
he was shutting us up.'

I think that when we compare the strategy of the American
war with that of 1870 we realise the truth of Napoleon's saying :
' Read and meditate on the wars of the greatest captains. This
is the only way of learning the science of war.'

Now, as to the tactics of the three arms.

To take the Artillery first. In the first year of the war we
find, as we should naturally expect, knowing that the batteries
had never had opportunities of working together, that in battle,
whether on the defensive or offensive, their action was entirely
independent. In 1862, however, came a change. The first
symptom was seen at the battle of Malvern Hill, where the
Federal army, retreating from before Richmond after a crushing
defeat, fought a most successful rearguard action. Its success
was due not so much to the strength of the position as to the
fact that the chief of artillery had massed nearly 300 guns
to meet the attack of the Confederates. This principle of
massing guns gradually worked its way to the front, and the
last great charge of the Confederates at Gettysburg, in July
1863, was preceded by an artillery duel for nearly two hours,

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 259

with 137 guns on one side and about 90 on the other. The
ground on which this battle was fought, however, was fairly
open. In the forests of Virginia space for the deployment of
more than six or seven batteries at most was seldom to be
found ; in fact there was so little opportunity for its employ-
ment, and it was so liable to capture, that, after a few days'
campaigning in the Wilderness in 1864, General Grant sent
back a large portion of his artillery. Naturally, in such a
country, surprise played a most important part in the operations,
and one of the Federal generals, Hazen, in his memoirs, speaks
somewhat contemptuously of the * old custom of advertising
one's intentions by a cannonade.1 He is of course referring to
fighting in a very close and intersected country.

Shrapnel was little used in the war, and the guns were far
from possessing the killing power of those of the present day ;
it is, therefore, scarcely worth while speaking at length on the
effects of artillery fire on the troops. Generally speaking, the
effect, whether moral or physical, was very small. Like all raw
troops, in the first year of the war the men appear to have
dreaded the artillery a good deal : but when they found that
' masked batteries,' a great bugbear in the earlier days, were
very seldom met with, and that the losses inflicted by the
artillery were out of all proportion to the noise, contempt
seems to have taken the place of apprehension. At all
events, neither infantry nor mounted riflemen had the slightest
hesitation in charging artillery, and I doubt if any troops
ever faced guns with less perturbation of spirit than the
Americans.

At Fredericksburg, in December 1863, the Federal army
was on one side of the river Rappahannock, on commanding
ground ; Lee's army on the other, well out of range, but
holding the little town of Fredericksburg, on the bank of the
stream, with a small brigade. Before crossing the river, the
Federal commander determined to clear the town, and bom-
barded it for nearly an hour with some fifty or sixty guns,
including several 20-pounders. ' Although the effect on the
buildings was appalling ; although flames broke out in many
places and the streets were furrowed with round shot, the

s 2

260 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

defenders not only suffered very little loss, but at the very
height of the cannonade easily repelled an attempt on the part
of the Federals to cross the river.1 The stream was eventually
crossed in boats, and the Confederate brigade driven out at
the point of the bayonet.

Daring, characteristic of all arms, was very conspicuous
in this branch of the service. In the Mexican War of 1846-47,
the field artillery had done excellent service, always pushing
forward with the fighting line. It had brilliant traditions,
and one of the marked features of the Civil War is the almost
reckless fashion in which the batteries assisted the attack.
They were often to be found in line with the most advanced
skirmishers, and rendered the infantry the most effective
support. No false shame of losing guns ever kept the battery
commanders back when they could do good work at the front,
and the greater part of their fighting was done at canister
range.

The Southern artillery was much inferior in material ; the
fuzes were very bad and the ammunition indifferent ; but, on
the whole, it did remarkably good work. This was due to a
more judicious organisation. The artillery officers in General
Lee's army were given a much freer hand than in the North.
The chief of artillery in each army corps advised his chief on
all matters appertaining to his own arm, and all tactical details
were left to him and the officers under him. Four batteries
formed a battalion, generally attached to an infantry division,
but not permanently to any one division in particular, and
these battalions were very seldom split up.

In the Northern army, a varying number of batteries were
attached to each infantry division ; but there was always a
disposition to allow the divisional commanders to use their
batteries as if they were independent commands, and not as
if they constituted only a section of a unit. Chiefs of artillery
were considered useless ; there were no competent staffs ; and,
generally speaking, there was an absence of concentrated effort
on the part of this arm which greatly minimised its effect.
The divisional commanders were accustomed to use their
guns without reference to the artillery officers, and hence,

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 261

as one of the artillery generals writes, ' idle cannonades were
the besetting sin of some of our commanders.''

There are two points connected with the artillery duel
which I may notice in passing.

The first has reference to artillery on the offensive.

The Americans appear, like the Germans at Gravelotte and
elsewhere, to have generally limited the action of their batteries
to merely silencing the enemy's guns ; and the preliminary
bombardment had often very little effect on the issue of the
fight.

Thus, at Gettysburg, of which I have already spoken, the
Federal artillery commander, after maintaining a rather unequal
contest for nearly a couple of hours, ordered his guns to cease
fire. His opponents, as he implies in an account he wrote of
the battle, had sufficiently advertised their intentions ; and he
simply ceased fire to save ammunition for the infantry attack
which he knew must follow. The Confederates, believing that
they had silenced him altogether, let loose their infantry, on
which seventy Federal guns opened at short range with terrible
effect. In fact, it was St. Privat anticipated.

The generals on both sides took very good care to keep
their infantry either well under cover, or well to the rear,
while the artillery duel was going on. During the bom-
bardment, preliminary to the Federal attack on Lee's position
at Fredericksburg, I believe that the Confederate front was
manned by no more than half a dozen battalions at most. The
main army of 80,000 men was hidden in ravines and woods, well
out of range. In one of the Wilderness battles, forty Federal
guns were engaged for a long time bombarding a line of
earthworks from which the garrison had been withdrawn to
the shelter of the neighbouring forest.

At Gettysburg the Federal infantry were not withdrawn.
They lay in open order, behind slight entrenchments and stone
walls. They were not very far in front of their own batteries,
and the latter were the Confederate objective. I have looked
through the reports in the official records sent in by the
infantry regiments. All of them speak of the bombardment,
but none of them appear to have lost more than one or two

262 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

men from the fire of the guns. When the Confederate in-
fantry advanced, these regiments were unshaken and perfectly
ready to do their share of the business.

In fact, the attacking artillery had only carried out the
first part of the bombardment ; it had silenced the opposing
batteries, but it had done nothing whatever towards destroying
or demoralising the opposing infantry.

On other occasions the infantry assisted the artillery in
the bombardment, and here the infantry of the defence were
compelled to show themselves. They could not be with-
drawn from their earthworks with an infantry force watching
its opportunity not many hundred yards to the front, and
gradually creeping up under fire of its own guns. They were
obliged to join in the action, and directly they exposed them-
selves above their entrenchments the artillery took them for its
target.

At the battle of Nashville, December 1864, where the
Confederate army of the west was finally defeated, the day was
won by a smart stroke of combined tactics.

A hill which formed part of the Southern line was
strengthened by an earthwork. The Federals massed guns
against tins point, and sent a brigade across the valley to storm
it. ' The fire of these guns,' says the Confederate commander,
' prevented our men from raising their heads above the earth-
works, and the enemy's infantry made a sudden and gallant
charge up to and over our entrenchments. Our line, thus
pierced, gave way ; soon after it broke at all points, and I be-
held, for the first and only time, a Confederate army aban-
doning the field in confusion.1

As to the infantry, the battalions on either side, organised
in ten companies, used a drill which was more French than
English ; all movements were very quickly carried through, and
much use was made of skirmishers to cover the advance of the
line or column. The usual formation for attack was in line,
with either two companies per battalion or a battalion per
brigade deployed as skirmishers. Attacks in close column were
infrequent ; and the advance was generally made in successive
lines, as was advocated by Skobeleff. In fact, Skobeleff, who,

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 263

according to Archibald Forbes, was an earnest student of the
American War, seems to have adopted many of his ideas from
the practice of the great American generals.

There are not many points of peculiar interest about the
infantry tactics.

One of the Federal divisional leaders, General Hazen,
complains that there was a singular lack of tactical manoeuvring
in the war. Many battles, he says, were little more than the
posting of lines to give or receive the attack. The men then
fought the matter out in their tracks, and the affair ended with
a disorderly retreat or a broken and ineffective pursuit. * This
was in part,1 he writes, ' due to the too loose moulding of the
regiments by drill and discipline, . . . but very largely to the
lack of a staff clearly comprehending the situation and needs of
the moment.'

It is perhaps more probable that this lack of manoeuvring
was due to long-range firearms. General Hazen seems to me
to be comparing the battles of Lee and Grant with those of
Frederick and Napoleon ; for the same lack of manoeuvring
under fire — for this is what he refers to — was just as apparent
in 1870, and is a necessary evil of modern fighting. The
American advance was made in what were literally successive
lines of skirmishers. The men opened out under fire, and
abandoned touch of their own accord. It has been said that
the Germans, in 1870, adopted extended order because they
held the very curious belief that therein lay the royal road to
victory. I hold, myself, a very contrary view. I believe that
the Germans extended their men because they knew it was
impossible to get them to advance in any other formation
under the stress of modern fire. And in this opinion I think
American soldiers will be found to agree. At all events a
veteran of the Civil War, who commanded a famous volunteer
regiment, when I asked him whether men could be got to
advance shoulder to shoulder in close order under the fire of the
breech-loader, gave a most decided negative. 'No,1 he said,
' God don't make men who could stand that.1

One of their great generals thus speaks of the Confederate
attack. * Whoever saw a Confederate line advancing that was

264 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

not as crooked as a ram's horn ? Each ragged rebel yelling on
his own hook, and aligning on himself ! '

If the attack by successive lines of skirmishers was invented
by the Americans, so also was the advance by means of succes-
sive rushes. ' The troops,' says the officer just referred to,
' invented the attack by rushes, that is, they fell into the habit
of making their attacks that way, because it was the only way
to work sensibly.'

The attack of large bodies underwent a marked development
during the war. It is curious to find an experienced leader
like Sherman, at Bull Run, the first great battle, sending the
battalions of his brigade into action successively ; when one
was beaten another took its place. But Sherman, like many
of the others, had to buy his experience in the field. In the
earlier period, and indeed generally speaking right through,
the traditional English formation of skirmishers, followed by
three lines, seems to have been universal ; but in the third
year there was a tendency to mass troops on a great depth
for the assault of the tactical objective. At Gettysburg,
after the great artillery duel of which I have already
spoken, Lee put in 15,000 men to breach the Federal centre,
and, but for some misunderstanding, they would have been
followed by 15,000 more. At Chickamauga, two months later,
Longstreet formed seven brigades, in column of brigades at
half-distance, and in this formation made a successful breach
of the Federal lines. At Spottsylvania, in May 1864, Grant
massed no less than 30,000 men for the assault of what was
afterwards called the ' Bloody Angle,' so fierce was the fighting
and so terrible the slaughter round it. The centre of this
attack was formed of two divisions in line, and two in column
in rear. It was but partially successful. The supports
mingled with the first line as they stormed the entrenchments ;
there was another strong line of earthworks in rear, and here
the Federals were roughly checked.

At Chattanooga, in November 1863, Grant carried the
centre of the Confederate position, a ridge 500 feet high, with
four divisions disposed in three lines.

At Chancellorsville, May 1863, Jackson's famous flank

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 265

attack, which rolled up the right wing of the Federal army,
was made by 25,000 men, drawn up by divisions in three lines,
and covered by skirmishers.

It is important to note that the attacks in which each line
was formed of a single division appear to have been far more
productive of confusion, and were never so thoroughly success-
ful, as those where each division was drawn up in three lines, as
at Chattanooga.

I can do no more than refer very briefly indeed to Lee's
great flank attacks, made with every man that he could spare,
imitating Frederick the Great, and anticipating the decisive
movement of the 12th Corps upon St. Privat. Tactically
speaking they were the most brilliant manoeuvres of the war.

I have already spoken of the very slight control that the
regimental officers exercised over their men when the bullets
began to fly. This absence of fire discipline greatly increased
the difficulty of supplying ammunition.

' The complaint,1 writes General Hazen, ' out of ammuni-
tion,1 used to be heard from regimental commanders fifty times
during a great battle. This was often due ' to want of control
over the fire owing to poor drill.1 Here he is referring to the
infantry, who were armed with muzzle-loaders ; and it is an
interesting fact that General Lee, owing to the same difficulty of
control, was averse from arming his infantry with breech-loaders.

The ammunition was kept in the battalion carts, and the
packets carried to the firing line in bags, but the supply, or
rather the means of bringing it up, were very often unequal to
the demand.

I think that these are circumstances well worth the closest
attention of those who may have to deal with unprofessional
troops ; and that the more we read of the American War,
the more we realise the value of steady drill and strict disci-
pline. At one time many of the Federal soldiers in the west
threw away their bayonets ; and in Sherman's march to the
sea the men got rid of their knapsacks, finding it more com-
fortable to march with their necessaries rolled up in the
blankets that were slung round their shoulders.

This very rough description of the American artillery

266 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and infantry shows that their tactics differed little, if at all,
from those now in vogue in Europe ; but in the tactics adopted
by their mounted riflemen we come to what was practically
a new feature in modern war. This new departure was due
principally to the nature of the country ; the mounted arm
on either side, at all events in Virginia, was in no sense of
the word mounted infantry, that is, soldiers who use the horse
merely as a means of locomotion, as transport for their rifles,
instead of as the principal and most direct means of defeating
their enemy.

The truth is, I believe, that the American mounted regi-
ments, after the first two years, when they had become sufficiently
trained, preferred to fight on horseback rather than on foot.
But they were accustomed always to adapt their tactics to the
ground. If the ground was unsuitable for mounted work they
converted themselves into infantry. If they engaged infantry,
they fought that infantry with its own weapons so long as it
gave them no opening for a charge. And, as a matter of fact,
the ground generally compelled them to fight dismounted.
The best way, I think, of opening a discussion on the merits
and value of this force is to put the question : — Were these
mounted riflemen efficient both as infantry and as cavalry ? This,
I take it, is what we all want to get at. Do the records of the
mounted riflemen of America assist us to decide the much-vexed
point whether cavalry can be so trained as to work well on
foot without impairing their efficiency when mounted ? When
I use the term ' much-vexed question,' I do not wish to be mis-
understood. It has been settled in England by the action of
our own authorities in establishing training schools for mounted
infantry. But other nations refuse to be convinced. I can, of
course, do no more than bring forward certain facts and
offer certain suggestions ; and I must preface my remarks by
saying that, owing to the different conditions of warfare in
America from those that obtain in Europe, and the meagre
records of their mounted branch, the evidence I shall produce
will possibly be insufficient to warrant a verdict either way.

I have already alluded to the efficiency of the American
men on the outpost line. But there were two other tactical

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 267

operations in which they shone even more conspicuously.
One is the ' raid ' ; those extraordinary enterprises which did so
much harm to the enemy's communications, and so completely
thwarted and disordered his manoeuvres. The other is the
delaying power possessed by the mounted arm ; the manner in
which the cavalry and horse artillery alone were able to check
for many hours the advance of the enemy's infantry or artillery,
or to hold that infantry and artillery fast until reinforcements
arrived. Every soldier knows that the American mounted rifle-
men possessed a most remarkable strategical independence ; and,
as Sir George Chesney, with these riflemen in his mind, long
ago asserted, ' 30,000 such horsemen would, if handled boldly,
wholly cripple and confound an opposing army of 300,000 !
Riding to and fro in rear of an army, intercepting its commu-
nications, cutting off its supplies, destroying its reserve ammu-
nition and material, such a force would undoubtedly create
panic and confusion far and wide.' That all cavalry should
possess this measure of strategical independence we are probably
all agreed. The question is, can it be done? The reply is,
certainly, if the mounted arm can fight equally well mounted
and on foot ; if it combine, as did the American horse, shock
and fire-action.

Now, I will try to explain, in as few words as possible,
the standard of efficiency reached by Stuart's and Sheridan's
mounted men. First as infantry. I do not think that any-
one dare assert that their best mounted regiments, when
fighting on foot, were anything like so efficient as the
ordinary infantry. Read Sheridan's account of the battles of
Five Forks and Sailor's Creek, where his command gained its
brightest laurels, and you will observe a note of triumph when
he writes that his dismounted cavalry were able to hold their
own against the Confederate infantry. These battles occurred
at the very end of the war, and I believe that it was not till
that time, four years after the war began, that the cavalry
fancied themselves anything like a match for the infantry.
And, at the same time, we must always bear in mind that the
cavalry were armed with breech-loading and repeating carbines,
the opposing infantry with muzzle-loaders. This last is a most

268 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

important point, and was, of course, all in favour of the cavalry.
' The difference,1 writes Stuart's Adjutant-General, 'between a
Spencer carbine and an Enfield rifle is by no means a mere
matter of sentiment.' This evidence refers to the eastern
theatre of the war. A single extract will show, I think, that at
the same period the infantry in the west had very little dread
of the trooper on foot. Writing of the last great battle in the
west, Nashville, a Federal staff officer, describing the advance ot
the Confederates, writes, * Bradley was assailed by a force which
the men declared fought too well for dismounted cavalry.1 This
shows the estimation they were held in in the west, and I think
we are justified in believing that the cavalry, notwithstanding
their superiority of armament, were only fair infantry.

Secondly, were they good cavalry ? Let us divide the battle
duties of cavalry into the attack on infantry and artillery, and
the attack on cavalry. Now it seems to me that these two
duties require very different qualifications, and that the latter
is by far the more difficult. Indifferent cavalry, so long as the
men ride well and their hearts are in the right place, can
charge successfully even good infantry and artillery, if surprised
or demoralised ; but the same troops, were they to meet good
European cavalry on a fair field, would be nowhere. Now the
American cavalry had never much hesitation in charging guns ;
and in the last year of the war, when Sheridan came to the
front, they were just as capable of charging infantry as either
the French or Germans in 1870. I believe that there were
many brigades in both the Federal and Confederate armies who
would have charged just as gallantly, and possibly just as far,
as did von Bredow at Mars-la-Tour ; but whether, in a country
far more open than their own, they could have met the German
cavalry of that date with any hope of success, or whether they
could have done all that the Germans of to-day anticipate may
be done by enormous masses skilfully manoeuvred, is a very
different question, the solution of which is beset by many diffi-
culties. In the first place, we are all aware that it takes a long
time to train cavalry to manoeuvre in mass with speed and
cohesion ; and, also, that without manoeuvring capacity you
can scarcely hope for success against hostile cavalry thoroughly

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 269

well trained ; nor, without high manoeuvring capacity, would
enormous masses achieve against infantry the results anticipated
in future wars by the Germans.

Now I ask whether it is likely that either the Federals
or Confederates, beginning with men and horses absolutely un-
trained (except in so far that the Southerners all rode well),
and with only a few senior officers, and fewer non-commissioned
officers, who knew anything of their work, should have been
able to acquire, during incessant active service, great manoeuv-
ring capacity. We know that the thorough training of the
horses has much to do with the efficiency of the German
cavalry. It is impossible that the Americans, who had no
establishments of trained horses to fall back upon, no depots at
which to train the remounts, and who had to supply casualties
with horses unseasoned and impressed straight from the farm,
should have been able to approach European cavalry in
mechanical perfection of movement. And yet from this
mechanical perfection come rapidity of manoeuvre and cohesion.
The two qualities are absolutely essential to success in a cavalry
engagement. Again, there was want of discipline. To quote
a Lieutenant-General of the Confederate army : ' The difficulty
of converting raw men into soldiers is enhanced manifold when
they are mounted. Both man and horse require training. . . .
There was but little time, and it may be said less disposition,
to establish camps of instruction. Living on horseback, fear-
less and dashing, the men of the South afforded the best
possible material for cavalry. They had every quality but
discipline. . . . Assuredly our cavalry rendered much excellent
service, especially when dismounted and fighting as infantry.
Able officers, such as Stuart, Hampton, &c. &c. developed
much talent for war; but their achievement, however distin-
guished, fell far below the standard that would have been
reached had not want of discipline impaired their efforts and
those of their men.'

However, these are but opinions ; and I will now give as a
practical illustration, a sketch of the most famous cavalry
battle of the war, that of Brandy Station, fought in Virginia
on June 10, 1863. I may say, first of all, that before this

270 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

engagement there had been plenty of hand-to-hand fighting
and cavalry charges, but the charges were made in column of
sections down the roads.

On June 9, 1863, the Confederate cavalry, under Stuart,
was stationed near Brandy Station, in Virginia. The Federals
were on the other side of the river Rappahannock, the numer-
ous fords being held by the Confederate pickets. Stuart had
ordered his division, of seven brigades, about 10,000 strong, to
march at an early hour ; but at the very earliest dawn, the
Federal cavalry, under General Pleasonton, consisting of three
small cavalry divisions with infantry supports, and also about
10,000 strong, crossed the Rappahannock in two columns, with
the intention of reconnoitring towards Culpeper Court House.
The right column crossed at Beverly's, the left at Kelly's Ford,
about five and a half miles lower down the stream.

We will take the right column first. It had some difficulty
in dislodging the Confederate picket and support, and here
there was a good deal of hand-to-hand fighting on a narrow
road. Eventually the Confederates, who formed part of General
Jones' brigade, were pushed back to St. James' Church, where
they found three of their brigades drawn up in position, dis-
mounted, under cover of stone walls, forming the front line,
with mounted regiments on the flanks. The Federals dis-
mounted and attacked the left wing of this position ; but they
were repulsed, and charged, it is said, by cavalry. But whether
there was any hand-to-hand fighting at this point there is no
evidence to show. On the Federals falling back the Confederates
advanced ; and it seems that for several hours there was a great
deal of skirmishing, relieved by a dashing charge of Federal
cavalry. This was made by the 6th United States (regulars).
' It was made,' says an eyewitness, ' over a plateau fully 800
yards wide, and its objective point was the artillery at the
church. Never rode troopers more gallantly than did those
steady regulars, as, under a fire of shell and shrapnel and
finally of canister, they dashed up to the very muzzles, then
through and beyond our guns. Here they were simultaneously
attacked from both flanks and the survivors driven back.'

Now for the left Federal column. It crossed the river with-

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 271

out difficulty, and then divided into two columns, two divisions
advancing on Brandy Station, the other on Culpeper. Eluding
a Confederate brigade, which had come up to support the
picket at the ford, the two columns moved forward. The first
was soon seen by the Confederate scouts to be moving
directly on Brandy Station, and when reported was visible from
Fleetwood Hill and was actually in rear of the Confederate
lines engaged beyond St. James1 Church. Fleetwood Hill,
although nothing more than a gentle undulation, commanded
the whole of the neighbouring country. Stuart was at the
front ; but he had left his Adjutant-General on the hill,
having selected it as his headquarters during the action, and
this officer, who had a single howitzer with him, but no troops
beyond a small escort, opened fire on the Federal column and
sent an urgent report to Stuart. The Federals halted and
their horse artillery came into action. Stuart, on receiving
the message, sent back a couple of regiments from the centre of
his line to Fleetwood Hill. ' The emergency was so pressing,1
writes the Adjutant-General, 'that the leading regiment had
no time to deploy. It reached the top of the hill just as the
single piece of artillery was retiring. Not fifty yards below a
Federal regiment was advancing in magnificent order, in
column of squadrons. A hard gallop had enabled only the
leading files of the 12th Virginia (a Confederate regiment) to
reach the top of the hill, the rest stretching out behind in
column of sections. With the true spirit of a forlorn hope the
colonel and a few men dashed at the advancing Federals, but
did not check their advance. The other Confederate regiment
now came up, but so disordered by their rapid gallop that
after the first shock they recoiled and retired to re-form.1 This
left the Federal regiment in possession of the hill ; the two
Confederate regiments, having re-formed, again charged and
drove them back for a time, but eventually had to retire
leaving the Federals masters of the situation. Two squadrons,
passing round the west side of the hill, charged the Federal
horse artillery, which had advanced to its foot. The cavalry
escort was dispersed, but the gunners fought splendidly, and
the Southerners were unable to carry off the guns. The officer

272 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

commanding the Federal battery reports that he was * sur-
rounded by a squad of rebel cavalry, firing with carbine and
pistol.1 By this time Stuart and the greater portion of his
force was on his way back to Fleetwood Hill. One regiment
from the right of the line led the advance, and, moving towards
Brandy Station, was ordered by Stuart to charge a Federal
force, the main body of the column, near the Miller House.
The enemy appear to have been surprised by this attack, and
were retiring slowly at the time. The attack was successful,
and the squadrons even rode through a section of artillery ;
but the Federals re-formed, charged the Confederate regiment
with far superior numbers, and drove it back. The Confederate
charge — the regiment was but 200 strong — was made in line.
By this time, the whole of the right wing of Stuart's first line,
consisting of four regiments, was retiring on Fleetwood Hill,
the whole force in column of squadrons.

Two of his regiments appear to have moved straight on
Fleetwood Hill, which was now in possession of the Federals.
The colonel of the leading regiment reports : ' I immediately
ordered the charge in close column of squadrons, and swept
the hill clear of the enemy, he being scattered and entirely
routed.' The regiment in first line, according to Stuart's
Adjutant-General, used the sabre alone, but it does not appear
that the opposing cavalry rode out to meet the charge.

The two remaining regiments diverged to the left, passed
the eastern end of the hill, and encountered the enemy, who
had not long before driven back the first Confederate regiment.
' This charge,' says an officer present, ' was as gallantly made
and gallantly met as any the writer ever witnessed during
nearly four years of active service. Taking into estimation
the number of men who crossed sabres in this single charge
(being nearly a brigade on both sides), it was by far the most
important hand-to-hand contest between the cavalry of the
two armies. As the blue and grey riders mixed in the smoke
and dust, minutes seemed to elapse before its effect was
determined. At last the intermixed and disorganised mass
began to recede, and we saw that the field was won by the
Confederates.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 273

After this the Federals abandoned this quarter of the
field, and a portion of their force which held the railway
station was driven out by the charge of a fresh Virginia
regiment, sent in by Stuart. The enemy then fell back to
join that portion of his force which still remained near St.
James1 Church, having re-formed without molestation on the
ground from which he had originally advanced.

It is noticeable that Stuart, on falling back in the first
instance to Fleetwood Hill, was not followed by the enemy
with whom he had been hitherto engaged.

American writers attribute the failure of the Federals to
follow him to the position held by the Confederate brigade
about Cunningham Farm, within striking distance of the road
by which the Federals had advanced from Beverly's Ford.

But this Confederate brigade, with its right flank exposed,
was withdrawn, without molestation, to the hills overlooking
Thompson's House ; and Stuart's line now extended along these
hills, but with a gap between the extreme left and the river.

The efforts made by the Federals to penetrate through
this gap and get round Stuart's rear led to some more cavalry
fighting. A brisk dismounted skirmish was followed by the
charge of two Federal regiments. This was met by the
9th Virginia, which seems to have broken the attack and
driven its assailants back across a stone wall. The 9th was
then attacked in flank by a fresh regiment, and was driven
back in turn ; but being reinforced by the 10th and 13th
regiments, it again advanced, and the tide of battle was
finally turned against the Federals. Whether the sabre was
used in these charges or in what formation they were made
does not appear. They are but little noticed by writers on
the war. A Confederate brigade now came up from Oakshade
to fill the gap, and after a short dismounted action the
Northerners retired across the Rappahannock. ' No serious
effort,' says Stuart's Adjutant-General, ' was made to impede
their withdrawal ' ; but we may remember that the Federals
had a small brigade of infantry present. While the main
bodies had been engaged at Fleetwood Hill, two Confederate
regiments had cut in across the line of march of the Federal

T

•274 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

division, making for Culpeper, and occupied a strong position
on thickly wooded rising ground just east of Stevensburg.
The fighting was principally dismounted ; but on one of his
regiments being caught changing formation, when mounted,
on a narrow road, and dispersed by a charge in column of
sections, the officer commanding the Confederates withdrew to
Mountain Run, covering the road to Brandy Station. The
Federal division was almost immediately recalled across the
Rappahannock .

The Confederates, out of a total of 10,300, lost 523 officers
and men. The Federals, out of 10,980, lost 936, including 486
prisoners and 3 guns.

Owing to some misunderstanding, the Confederate brigade,
near Kelly's Ford, remained in that position all the morning
and took no part in the engagement.

The action, from tho time the Federals crossed the river to
when they recrossed it at Beverly's Ford, seems to have lasted
about eight hours.

Another important engagement was that at Gettysburg,
where the two cavalries came together on the right flank of the
Federal position. Here, again, the only important charge of
the day was made by two small brigades, numbering probably
not more than 800 men apiece, in column of squadrons. Met
by a regiment, also in close column of squadrons, in front, and
attacked by several small parties in flank, this charge was beaten

back.

To show how very far removed the cavalry fighting was from
European ideas, I may mention that the charge of a Virginian
regiment, which a Northern writer, in the < Century Magazine,'
records as the most determined and vigorous he ever saw, was
made against a stone wall, on the other side of which was a
Federal regiment, and hand-to-hand fighting, naturally with
the pistol and carbine, took place across this barrier.

These were the most important instances of cavalry fighting ;
and, in my very humble opinion, it does not appear that, as
a mounted force, so far as shock-action goes, the American
cavalry came near the European standard. To sum up, my im-
pression is — I give it for what it is worth — that they could

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 275

charge infantry when surprised or demoralised ; that they
fought well on foot, but were not equal to well-trained infantry ;
and that, as cavalry, they were deficient in manoeuvring power
and in cohesion.

It is true that, in October 1864, Sheridan's cavalry, in the
more open district of the Shenandoah Valley, did extraordinary
execution, and combined with the infantry in a manner which
makes his victories models of tactical skill. But his enemy was
far inferior in numbers ; and whilst the infantry attacked them
in front, the cavalry was free to manoeuvre at leisure against
their flanks and rear. Unfortunately, no account of his cam-
paign with which I am acquainted goes sufficiently into the
details of the cavalry fighting. All considerations as to
formations, pace, time, and distance are unnoticed.

However, as regards cavalry versus cavalry, I have given
a sketch of what are considered the most important engage-
ments of the war ; and I must leave it to my readers to decide
whether the action at Brandy Station, with its single charge in
mass, and that in close column of squadrons, like Stuart's, at
Gettysburg, indicate a capacity for manoeuvring or a knowledge
of purely cavalry tactics such as would have fitted the American
horseman to cope in the open with good cavalry on the European
model. I may add that at the battle of Winchester, October
1864, where Sheridan's cavalry so much distinguished itself,
the charges against the Confederate infantry were again made
in close column of squadrons, and I think it is a fair presump-
tion that this was the usual formation whenever the cavalry were
employed mounted in mass.

At the same time, no troops could have been better adapted
to the country over which they fought than the American
mounted riflemen ; no troops ever showed greater pluck ; on
the outposts they were exceedingly efficient ; their strategical
independence was great, and, as I have already said, on their
own ground they would probably have defeated any European
cavalry of the period. Naturally, as they never had to meet
cavalry trained to shock-action only, their leaders made no
attempt, in this respect, to bring their men up to the European
standard.

v 2

276 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Thus I may say that the achievements of our brethren in
arms across the Atlantic teach us what may be done by a
mounted force that is not much inferior to good infantry, and
at the same time has all the mobility of cavalry. Such a force
may yet rival the deeds of Sheridan and Stuart in the days to
come. But whether that force is to be composed of cavalry
alone or of cavalry accompanied by mounted infantry, and
whether cavalry can be trained to hold its own on foot with-
out losing something of its dash and daring, are points which,
when we take into consideration the deficient training of the
mounted forces, the history of the American war does not
decide for us. That history, however, shows us one thing, and
this is, that if you are going to make great raids on your
adversary's communications, to destroy his magazines, and defeat
his isolated detachments, or if you intend even to hold his
infantry in check with your mounted men alone, your cavalry,
when dismounted, must be able to shoot, to manoeuvre, and to
attack just as well as infantry.

A sketch of one of these raids will not be out of place here.
In March 1865, General Wilson, with some 14,000 cavalry,
marched across Alabama and Georgia. He was opposed by
General Forrest with 10,000 cavalry, and the important towns
were garrisoned by infantry. He marched in thirty days nearly
600 miles, captured three important cities, two of which were
protected by very strong entrenchments — which were stormed
— and garrisoned, one of them with 7,000 and another with
2,700 men ; he crossed six large rivers, fought five battles,
destroyed railroads, iron foundries, and factories, and captured
6,000 prisoners and 156 guns. * In this campaign,1 says
General Michie, of the Federal army, * the cavalry, armed with
the Spencer (repeating carbine), acted mostly as mounted
infantry.''

If your cavalry can be trained to shoot, to manoeuvre, and
to attack as infantry, and, at the same time, to manoeuvre well
mounted in mass, and if your officers can double the part, or, to
paraphrase Mrs. Malaprop, ' become two gentlemen at once ' — the
dashing dragoon and the smart light-infantryman — then there
is little need for mounted infantry in European warfare.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 277

I think one of the most interesting points connected with
the American cavalry is its organisation and working when
covering the march or cantonments of the armies, and perhaps
a few notes on this subject may induce others, better qualified
than I am, to study the manner in which the duties of the
cavalry screen were carried out.

At first the Confederates had it all their own way. Not
only were they better mounted and more expert horsemen, but
the regiments were organised, as early as 1861, in what was
practically an independent cavalry division. In the Peninsular
campaign of 1862, the Federals possessed the same organisation ;
but in Pope's campaign, and in the Fredericksburg campaign,
in the summer and winter of the same year, the Northern
cavalry was attached by brigades to the army corps. In the
Maryland campaign, September 1862, the divisional organisa-
tion was resorted to, but merely as a temporary measure, and
the hastily collected force, like the division in the Peninsula,
lacked the cohesion and efficiency which the Confederate division
had acquired by long association.

In every one of these campaigns, the superiority of the
Southern horsemen, in every branch of tactics, was remarkable.
Twice Stuart's division made a complete circuit of the Federal
army, and on another occasion rode right into the midst of their
cantonments, carrying back as a trophy the commander-in-chiefs
best uniform.

But in 1863 came a change. General Hooker reverted to
the divisional organisation, and his cavalry had several months
in which to learn its duties as a single unit under a single
hand. From this time forth the mounted arms met on terms
of equality ; and if the earlier campaigns, like that of 1870,
show us not only the value of cavalry well organised and well
led, but the helplessness of an army whose cavalry is wanting
in cohesion, the later campaigns give us many hints as to the
working of the independent divisions. At Chancellorsville
Hooker made a fatal mistake. As he moved off his army to
attack Lee, he sent nearly the whole of his cavalry to cut his
opponent's communications. In the battle which ensued he
had with him but one weak brigade ; and it is not too much

278 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

to say, that the surprise and rout of his right wing, and his
subsequent retreat, were due to his deficiency in mounted
regiments.

Gettysburg, from a cavalry point of view, is perhaps the
most interesting campaign of the whole series ; and we find
here a new feature. The cavalry on both sides was practically
divided into two lines, of which the first undertook independent
enterprises or endeavoured to bring into action the main body
of the hostile horsemen, whilst the second covered the march
of the army. This practice obtained during the remainder of
the war, and it is remarkable how the two fighting lines con-
tinually came into contact, almost every phase of the Gettys-
burg and the Wilderness campaigns being signalised by some
important engagement. In the former the division into two
bodies of the Confederate cavalry had the most prejudicial
effect. It seems to me that, when the first line under Stuart
cut loose from the rest of the army, neither the Confederate
staff nor the cavalry leaders in charge of the second line had
as yet fully grasped that there is no connection whatever
between an independent enterprise and the duty of screening
the march ; in fact, that it is impracticable to combine the
tasks of ' exploration ' and ' security.1 The Federals worked
in very different fashion, and their second line of cavalry,
exceedingly well handled, practically decided the issue of the
conflict.

One last remark as to the mounted branch of the American
armies. From the very outset the Confederate cavalry, un-
trained as they were, but excellent riders, knowing the country
thoroughly, and patriotic and intelligent, did most efficient
work upon the outpost line ; and I think it is a fair deduction
that our own Volunteer cavalry — the Yeomanry — in case of
invasion, would, in this respect, prove equally valuable. Nor
can I imagine for that force, taking the Confederate troopers
as their model, a more honourable and useful role than that
of mounted riflemen. England is a country which affords
even fewer opportunities for purely cavalry combats than
Virginia.

It is impossible here to touch on that most interesting of

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 279

all questions, combined tactics ; but I may note one or two
points. As with other nations, the Americans seem to have
had little difficulty in bringing infantry and artillery into
proper adjustment ; but, with one single exception, their
generals seem to have been unequal to the task of handling the
three arms together on the field of battle. The single exception
was Sheridan ; and his operations, both in the Shenandoah
Valley and during ' the last agony ' of the Confederacy, are well
worth the very closest study.

It is impossible that any soldier should not find the memoirs
of such great generals as Lee, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Stuart,
and many others, most interesting and instructive reading ;
and in the, unfortunately, rather cumbersome volumes of the
' Battles and Leaders of the Civil War ' we have a work which far
surpasses any military history that has yet been written. In
these books the history of the war may best be studied. There
is nothing in them to repel. There is nothing dry. There is
romance and sensation enough and to spare ; and if we gain
nothing else from them, we can at least learn to appreciate the
splendid fighting qualities of the American soldier.

CHAPTER X

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

July 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, 1863
(A Lecture to the Aldershot Military Society, February 9th, 1893)

In the first week in May 1863, General Robert Lee, in
command of the Confederate army of Northern Virginia, pro-
tecting the approaches to Richmond, the Confederate capital,
from the north, had, at Chancellorsville, a few miles south of
the river Rappahannock, very decisively defeated a Federal army
of invasion more than double his numbers.

This was the third attempt at invasion he had thwarted
since the war began, just two years previously ; and although
his losses at Chancellorsville made it impossible for him to pur-
sue his enemy immediately after the battle, he nevertheless
determined, when the Federal army fell back discomfited to
Falmouth, beyond the river, to carry the war across the Poto-
mac, the boundary stream between North and South, into the
Federal territory. Two causes impelled him to an offensive
policy. First : Virginia, at no time a rich country, had become
almost exhausted by the war, and both the army and the non-
combatant population were much straitened for food and
supplies. Second : far away in the west, on the river Missis-
sippi, a Federal army was investing Vicksburg, the most impor-
tant fortress in the South, whose loss would be an irretrievable
disaster. He believed it possible that, by threatening Washing-
ton, the Federal capital, and the great cities of Pennsylvania,
he might induce the Northern President to withdraw the army
besieging Vicksburg in order to prevent the Confederates moving
with fire and sword through the rich and untouched States of
the North. Third : the Federal army, after its recent severe
defeat, following on so many successive disasters, was not likely
to be strong as regards moral, whilst the spirit of the army of

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 281

Northern Virginia, after so many victories, was correspondingly
high.

His plan of campaign was as follows : — To use the covered
approach of the Shenandoah Valley, and its continuation north of
the Potomac, the Cumberland Valley, as his line of invasion ; to
threaten Washington ; to defeat the Federal army in a pitched
battle ; to bring about, if possible, the fall of the Northern
capital, and at least to create an important diversion in favour
of Vicksburg. Before his operations began, he pointed out
Gettysburg as the best point for a battle, as it was so situated
that, by holding the passes of South Mountain, he would be
able to keep open his line of communication through the Cum-
berland and Shenandoah Valleys.

At the beginning of June, his army, consisting of 57,000
infantry, 250 guns, and 9,000 cavalry, in all 70,000 men, was
at Fredericksburg, watching the Federal army of 105,000 men,
with 300 guns, under General Hooker, at Falmouth, on the
opposite bank of the Rappahannock.

The first step was to remove his troops from Fredericksburg
to the Shenandoah Valley ; and although the Rappahannock
is a broad stream, this movement involved that very dangerous
operation, a flank march across the enemy's front.

Now it is by no means sufficient for a student of war to be
made aware that a flank march is risky, but what he ought to
learn is how to minimise the risk and to escape the danger, for
success in war is won by facing danger and not by running away
from it. This is one of the great uses of military history. It
teaches us, from the experience of the great masters of war, how
movements which may be mathematically demonstrated to be
vicious, and yet are sometimes absolutely essential to success,
may be successfully executed.

The first thing that Lee had to look to was to prevent all
information from reaching the enemy. This was provided for
by his 9,000 cavalry, who carefully picketed the whole line of
the Rappahannock.

Next, he had to remove his troops secretly, and to keep his
enemy in ignorance of this movement as long as possible. Now,
as the heights at Falmouth looked down upon Fredericksburg

282 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

this was somewhat difficult. Fortunately the great Virginian
forest was very close at hand. Very few of the Confederate
camps were visible to the Federal scouts and sentries ; the
remainder were hidden in the woods.

The third step was to induce General Hooker to march
north ; thus preventing him, whilst the Confederates were
marching into Pennsylvania, from making a dash on Richmond,
which was very inadequately defended ; and also bringing him
out from his strong position and compelling him either to
attack the Confederates, or to give them the opportunity of
defeating him in detail.

The Confederate army was divided into three army corps,
commanded by Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and Hill. On
June 2, EwelPs corps, covered from observation by the forest,
and screened by the cavalry, marched to Culpeper Court
House. Longstreet's corps followed on the 4th. Hill re-
mained at Fredericksburg, in order to induce Hooker to believe
that the army was still in position at that point.

It was not till June 10 that Hooker learned what was
going on. He immediately extended his line along the
Rappahannock, his right resting at Bealeton, north of Culpeper.
Hill was still at Fredericksburg. On the 9th the Federal
cavalry, three divisions, had driven in the Confederate pickets,
crossed the Rappahannock, and encountered Stuart's cavalry,
at Brandy Station. An indecisive engagement resulted. But
Hooker discovered that a large part of the Confederate army
was at Culpeper, and determined to reinforce his right. On
the same day, Ewell was sent into the Shenandoah Valley, to
capture Winchester, and to create the impression that a flank
movement against Washington, an operation which Lee had
made most effective use of on three previous occasions, was in
contemplation.

On June 12, Hill was still at Fredericksburg with his
20,000. Within reach, on the opposite side of the Rappa-
hannock, were no less than five Federal corps (Tarmee, numbering
70,000 men. Further to the right, opposite Chancellorsville,
was another Federal corps of 15,000 men ; and still further,
yet another, round Bealeton, facing Longstreet's 20,000 at

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 283

Culpeper. Ewell had reached Front Royal. Thus the three
Confederate corps were each forty miles apart, and opposite
the space between Hill and Longstreet were massed, on a front
of some thirty-five miles, 100,000 Federals. According to all
the rules of war, Hooker ought to have been easily able to
deal with Hill and Longstreet in detail, for a march of fifteen
miles, at furthest, would have placed him between them in
overwhelming force. He had quite enough information to
make it clear what an excellent opportunity the apparent
rashness of the Confederates had given him, and he sent back
to Washington for permission to cross the Rappahannock,
defeat Hill, and move rapidly on Richmond.

He was refused ; and ordered instead to defend the ap-
proaches to Washington.

And Lee knew that he would be refused, and this was the
secret of the seemingly foolhardy position in which the Con-
federate army was distributed in face of superior numbers.

How had he come to be possessed of this information ? It
was not through his cavalry patrols, not through prisoners, not
through his spies ; but through his knowledge of the character
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern armies. He knew
well what apparent risk he might run with absolute impunity.
He knew that the superior numbers of his adversary, and his
own dangerous position, were factors in the problem of but
small account. He knew that in war moral means, according
to Napoleon, are three times more effective than physical
means, that is, than numbers, armament, and position ; and it
was on the former that he now relied.

War is more of a struggle between two human intelligences
than between two masses of armed men ; and the great general
does not give his first attention to numbers, to armament, or
to position. He looks beyond these, beyond his own troops,
and across the enemy's lines, without stopping to estimate their
strength or to examine the ground, until he comes to the
quarters occupied by the enemy's leader ; and then he puts
himself in that leader's place, and with that officer's eyes and
mind he looks at the situation ; he realises his weakness, tactical,
strategical, and political ; he detects the points for the security

284 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

of which he is most apprehensive ; he considers what his
action will be if he is attacked here or threatened there, and
he thus learns for himself, looking at things from his enemy's
point of view, whether or no apparent risks are not absolutely
safe.

This is what Lee had done before he ventured on dis-
tributing his army corps along so wide a front. He looked
beyond his own army, beyond the enemy's camps, beyond the
tent of their commander — the man who was eager to profit by
the opportunity he offered him — and across the great river
which divides Virginia from the North. Over the river he
saw Washington and the President's house, and in the President's
chair sat a man called Abraham Lincoln, by virtue of his
office, civilian though he was, Commander-in-Chief of the
Federal armies, and the motive power of the forces which
Hooker commanded in Virginia. It was this motive power
that Lee attacked. It was against this man that he fought,
and not against the masses on the Rappahannock. He knew
well that political necessities were Lincoln's chief preoccupation.
He knew his apprehensions for the safety of the Union capital.
He knew that a threat against Washington was an infallible
specific — he had tried it already — for making the enemy divide
his enormous forces, detach whole army corps for service round
the city, and for compelling his armies to withdraw from
Virginia, whether they were badly beaten or not. So, when
he sent Ewell to the Shenandoah Valley, an advance from
which, as is evident from the map, would threaten the com-
munications of Washington with the more northern States, he
was morally certain that Lincoln, the motive power of Hooker's
army, would draw that army back to protect Washington
instead of pushing it forward against Hill.

In exact accordance with this anticipation, Hooker fell
back on the night of the 13th, and changing front to the right,
occupied Leesburg, and the passes of the Bull Run mountains.

The whole Confederate army now crossed the Blue Ridge,
Stuart, with the cavalry, remaining in rear to watch the enemy
and to block the passes. On the 23rd began the passage of
the Potomac.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 285

Hooker, at Leesburg, covered the fords of the Potomac
north of that town, and threatened the flank of the Confederate
advance. On the 25th he heard that Lee had crossed the river
near Letown, and immediately followed suit, intending to operate
against the enemy's rear. The President, however, objected to
the plan of campaign, and the general asked to be relieved of
his command. He was succeeded by Meade, like Lee, an
officer of the United States corps of Engineers, who took over
his new duties on June 28, and moved the army immediately
on Frederick. Lee's advanced guard had by this time reached
Carlisle and York, and was threatening Harrisburg. Meade,
moving rapidly northward, resolved to force Lee to battle
before he could cross the Susquehanna river.

We have now to deal with a certain resolution of General
Lee's which had a very startling effect on the campaign.

On June 23, on the day on which the passage of the
Potomac began, General Lee gave his cavalry commander,
Stuart, who up till that time had been guarding the Blue
Ridge gaps against the Federal cavalry, permission to move
round the rear of the Federal army, then at and about
Leesburg, to cross the river, and doing what damage he could
to join the advanced guard of the Confederates near the
Susquehanna. He was to employ three brigades, leaving two
brigades behind, which were to watch the Blue Ridge passes
until the infantry was on Northern soil, and then to join the
army. Of the two remaining cavalry brigades, one was with
the advanced guard, the other well away on the left flank, on
the far side of the Cumberland Valley.

Now Stuart had been in the habit, in former campaigns,
of taking his division for a trip round the enemy's army,
cutting their communications and acquiring information. It
does not appear that great good invariably resulted from these
enterprises. The American railways, if easily destroyed, were
just as easily repaired, and merely riding across the enemy's
communications is a very different thing to placing an army
astride or on the flank of his communications. The latter
course almost invariably compels him to turn back on the
intruder ; the former inflicts but temporary discomfort. Still

286 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Stuart had always been successful in these raids ; by his extra-
ordinary energy, activity, and tactical skill, he had won Lee's
confidence, and his superior seems to have acquiesced without
question in the suggestion that, with the larger half of his
command, his trusted cavalry leader should separate himself
from the rest of the army at a critical time.

That the cavalry did do a certain amount of damage in this
raid is true ; but it may be doubted whether they delayed the
northward march of the Federal army for a single hour ; and,
owing to the fact that Hooker crossed the Potomac sooner than
either Stuart or Lee expected, instead of crossing the river two
days in advance of the Federals, they did so two days behind
them, and did not join the advanced guard until July 3, with
both men and horses much exhausted.

Meanwhile the two brigades of horsemen left behind proved
insufficient to keep a watch on Hooker and to break through
his cavalry screen.

Stuart marched on the 24th. On the night of the 25th
Hooker began to move from Leesburg. But it was not till the
night of the 28th that Lee was made aware, by a spy, that
the Federals had crossed the Potomac. Believing that their
army was still south of the river, he had allowed his army corps
to move in very open order.

On the 28th, Ewell's corps reached Carlisle and York ; the
other two were near Chambersburg, from thirty to fifty miles
in rear.

On the night of the 28th, hearing the Federal advance,
Lee immediately called up the two brigades of cavalry from the
Shenandoah Valley, about fifty miles distant, and ordered his
army to concentrate at Cashtown, nine miles west of Gettys-
burg.

The important circumstance to notice is, that from the
time the Confederate infantry crossed the Potomac until after
the battle of Gettysburg had been fought and lost, Lee had
not a single cavalry soldier between himself and the enemy.
For nearly four days he remained in ignorance of the Federal
movements ; he did not know that their army had crossed the
river, and he had consequently allowed his three corps to

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 287

sepaiate so far that it took four days to effect their concen-
tration.

On the 30th, Hill reached Cashtown, and the rest of the
army was not more than fifteen miles distant. The leader of
his advanced guard sent a brigade on to Gettysburg to procure
a supply of boots, and this brigade returned with the informa-
tion that the town was occupied by the enemy.

In nearly every book on tactics we have instances of the
great use of cavalry in screening the front and reconnoitring.
At Gettysburg we have an instance of this screen being alto-
gether absent ; and I think the difficulties of the general, arising
from this absence, will illustrate how completely the other arms
are paralysed without the aid of the cavalry.

That very afternoon a Federal cavalry division under
General Buford, scouting far ahead of the army, had entered
Gettysburg. This division, all told, did not exceed 4,000
men, and the nearest infantry support was over fifteen miles
distant.

Now Gettysburg was important in two ways. It was
tactically a strong position, commanding the approaches from
the west and north, and it was strategically most important, for
it was the nucleus of several good roads, leading to the Susque-
hanna and the Potomac, to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Frederick,
and Washington. The Federals, then, were most fortunate
in anticipating the Southerners in the occupation of this point
of vantage.

I use advisedly the term ' fortunate,1 for on the morning of
the 30th, the greater part of two Confederate army corps were
within nine miles of Gettysburg, Hill at Cashtown, and Ewell,
returning from York, at Heidlersburg, on the opposite side of
the town ; and by making a little haste, either or both of these
corps would have been firmly established on the heights of
Gettysburg before the Federal advanced guard arrived. Had
the Confederate cavalry been present, scouring the country to
the front, the enemy's approach would have been reported, and
measures might have been taken to anticipate him in securing
this important point.

This, then, was the first untoward circumstance which arose

288 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

from the absence of all reconnaissance. It was followed by
others.

On the morning of the same day, Hill, as I have said, had
sent a brigade, probably not less than 2,000 strong, to get
supplies at Gettysburg. The Brigadier, as he neared the town,
saw a Federal force advancing to meet him. This force con-
sisted only of cavalry, Buford's division, and as the strongest
of its three brigades had been detached to Mechanicstown, it
did not number more than 2,000 men and a couple of horse
artillery batteries.

Had the advance of the Confederate brigade been covered
by cavalry, in all probability the strength and composition
of the enemy's force, and also whether it was supported,
would have been ascertained ; and the Brigadier would have
been free to contest with the cavalry the possession of the
Gettysburg position, or at least to have sent back reliable
information.

What followed ? The Confederate brigade withdrew to
Cashtown, reporting the advance of a large hostile force on
Gettysburg; and next morning, July 1, General Hill went
forward with two divisions of infantry to ascertain the strength
of the enemy. These two divisions found the Federal cavalry dis-
mounted, holding a strong position in front of Gettysburg, and
gradually drove them back upon the town. Meanwhile, between
10 a.m. and 1.30 p.m. two Federal army corps arrived, and the
Confederates were in their turn pushed back. Then at 2.30 p.m.
up cameEwell from Heidlersburg, and a general advance drove the
Federals through Gettysburg at 4 o'clock with very heavy loss.

Near the close of the action General Lee arrived upon the
field, and the whole of his army was rapidly closing up. But
it was still far from being fully concentrated, and so exhausted
were the troops in immediate contact with the enemy, so strong
the position to which the Federals had retired, a mile south of
the town, and so uncertain the estimate of their numbers, that
the Confederate general made no effort to follow up his success.
He directed the necessary preparations to be made for an attack
the next morning as early as practicable.

Thus ended the first day's battle, in which about 22,000

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 289

men on each side were engaged, and which resulted in a
Confederate victory.

There are several points which may here be noticed ; the
first regarding the Confederate strategy on this day.

To begin with. When Lee started upon the campaign, he
had not intended to deliver an offensive battle at so great a
distance from his base of operations, but, owing to the absence
of his cavalry, and the engagement brought about by Hill's
reconnaissance, he had now no other course open but to attack
the enemy as vigorously as possible. It would certainly have
been more promising of success had his inferior army of 70,000
men been able to await, in a carefully prepared position, the
attack of the 100,000 Federals led by Meade.

Certain critics of the campaign, amongst them the Comte
de Paris, the historian of the war, and General Longstreet,
commanding one of the Confederate army corps, hold very
different views. They assert that Lee had three other courses
open to him, each of them more promising than the one he
actually adopted.

1st, to retire to the passes of the South Mountain, and thus
to compel Meade to attack him in a very favourable position.

2nd, to await attack in his present position.

3rd, to move round the left flank of the Federal position and
to interpose between the Federal army and Washington, taking
up a strong position ; and if Meade refused to attack, to move
back in the direction of Washington, which threat to the
capital would probably induce the Northern general to do so.

In his report of the battle the Confederate Commander-in-
Chief disposes of the first two of these suggestions very summarily.
His army was living on the country, and it would have been
exceedingly difficult to subsist 70,000 men, occupying a
stationary camp, in face of a numerically superior enemy. No
district, however rich, can supply a large army for more than
forty-eight hours, and the greater part of the army had just
passed through the district east and west of Cashtown by easy
marches.

As to the last proposal, which was strenuously urged after
the first day's battle by Longstreet, Lee, according to one of

u

290 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

his chief staff officers, pronounced it, under the circumstances,
impracticable.

Now, what were the circumstances that thus paralysed his
army and his own great skill in daring manoeuvres ? Why was
a flank march, possible in front of Hooker in June, impossible
in front of Meade in July ?

The answer is simple — the absence of the cavalry.

One of the chief requisites for a flank march is that it
should be made with the greatest rapidity. What speed was
possible if the infantry divisions were compelled to reconnoitre
themselves to front, flank, and rear, halting at every alarm,
harassed by the hostile horsemen ? How was Lee to ascertain
whether the enemy had not a force posted to his left rear, ready
to crush the head of the turning column ?

We have only to turn to the disastrous march of McMahon's
army, culminating in the terrible defeat of Sedan, to understand
the difficulties and danger of a flank march without cavalry to
screen the movement.

I need hardly say that the other alternative, a retreat
through the South Mountain, was never entertained for a
moment. To withdraw by narrow roads in face of superior
numbers would have been no easy matter. Moreover, a retreat
would have left to the enemy all the moral results of victory,
and would have been everywhere interpreted, by foreign nations
as well as by the Northerners, as a confession of weakness on
the part of the Confederate leader and of the Confederate
Government.

Lastly, it is evident that had Lee's army been closely
concentrated, which it would have been had he received early
information of Hooker's march northward ; he would have
been able to seize Gettysburg and to inflict an annihilating
defeat on the two corps which formed the Federal advanced
guard.

As to the Federals. We may first of all notice the brilliant
initiative of General Buford, the cavalry commander, who, on
reaching Gettysburg, and recognising the importance of the
position, determined to hold it, although hostile infantry was
visible, until his own infantry came up. Second, the value of

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 291

cavalry who were so trained as to be able, when dismounted, to
hold in check a superior force of infantry for two hours, and to
give time for the arrival of reinforcements. I may notice that
this same cavalry, later in the day, when the Federal line was
giving way, was ordered to charge the victorious enemy pressing
forward in pursuit. The charge was never made — probably
the nature of the ground, the numerous woods, walls, and
fences, forbade it — but the division formed up with every inten-
tion of charging, and it is said that the Confederate battalions
formed square, and so lost much precious time. Third, the
judicious selection of a position by this same officer, not on the
crest of the ridge immediately south of Gettysburg, but along
the banks of Willoughby Run, more than a mile west. He
recognised that the ridge to the south was the true position ;
and that as he would certainly be sooner or later forced back,
it would be better to leave it to be strongly occupied by the
remainder of the army. As it turned out, when the troops
west of Gettysburg were forced back on the morning of July 1,
they found the ridge occupied and entrenched. As we have
seen, General Lee j udged it too formidable to attack the same
evening.

There is another Federal officer whose conduct calls for the
highest commendation. This was General Hancock, command-
ing the 2nd corps. To appreciate his action we must turn to
what General Meade had been doing since he started on his
northward march from Frederick on the 29th. Till the
evening of July 1, the first day of the battle, he was ignorant
of Lee's whereabouts. All he knew was that the Confederate
army was somewhere between Chambersburg and Carlisle, and
that it was now moving southwards. His own army corps were
dispersed over a wide extent of country east and south of
Gettysburg. But he knew enough of Lee's movements, and
whilst Hill and Ewell were converging on Gettysburg for the
assault on his advanced guard, he was issuing orders for his
chiefs of engineers and artillery to select a field of battle, cover-
ing Lee's lines of approach, whether by Harrisburg or Gettys-
burg, indicating the general line of Pipe Creek as a suitable
locality.

u 2

292 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

But on receiving news of the fight at Gettysburg, he sent
Hancock to the battlefield, directing him either to bring the
two advanced corps to Pipe Creek or to prepare for a general
engagement at Gettysburg.

As soon as the action with Hill and Ewell was over, and
the defeated Federals were firmly established on the ridge south
of the town, Hancock sent back to Meade, whose headquarters
were thirteen miles in rear, informing him that the position was
a very strong one. Moreover, he kept his men behind their
entrenchments, without taking any step towards retiring to the
line of Pipe Creek. This, as it turned out, was a most momen-
tous decision, and I think that the courage of the general
who, in command of a defeated force, confronted by superior
numbers, and aware that the supporting army corps were much
scattered, refused to abandon the strong and formidable posi-
tion he occupied and to leave to the enemy the moral results of
a victory culminating in the retreat of the vanquished, is well
worth notice.

Meade, relying on Hancock's soldierly instinct, and appre-
ciating his motives, hurried the whole of his corps, scattered
as they were, to the front, and at midnight rode forward to the
field. '

By forced night marches his troops pushed on, but at day-
light next morning only four of the seven corps were present,
and two of these had been very roughly handled on the previous
day. By eight o'clock two more had come up, making in all
some 65,000 men.

At daylight, however, there were no more than 40,000
present, and it is very evident that the Confederate attack
should have been made at that hour. It is also evident that
the Federal corps, like the Confederate army, had become
separated by too wide intervals in their advance ; and, in the
absence of information, concentration should be an invariable
rule.

During the night, Lee had learned from prisoners that only
a portion of the Federal army occupied the opposite ridge. It
was clear that an opportunity presented itself of dealing
with the enemy in detail ; and the meanest capacity must have

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 293

grasped the advantage of storming the strong position south
of Gettysburg before it should be occupied in overwhelming
strength.

Now Lee's own orders to his lieutenants had been to attack
* as early as practicable.' But as a matter of fact the attack
was not made until 4 p.m., just eleven hours too late.

On this circumstance, which has given rise to much un-
pleasant controversy amongst the surviving generals of Lee's
army, I shall make no comment beyond saying that it was un-
fortunate that the attack should have waited on the movements
of Longstreet, the general who had so strenuously advocated
the flank movement to turn the Federal left.

Moreover, there was very indifferent Staff work done on this
morning in Longstreet's corps, one of his divisions taking a wrong
road, and much delay being caused by the fact that the roads
were not reconnoitred previous to the march.

As to the fighting on this day little need be said. The
Federals were strongly posted from Cemetery and Culp Hills, on
the right, to a point west of the ridge, on which stands the
Peach Orchard, on the left. The orchard, standing on a rise a
good deal lower than Cemetery Ridge, had been occupied, not
on General Meade's authority, for he intended his left to rest on
the Round Tops, but on the initiative of the general command-
ing the left wing, and, as may be seen from the map, it was
salient to the rest of the line, and much nearer to the Confede-
rate front than the right flank. Lee's plan of attack was as
follows : Ewell, from the north, that is, from Gettysburg, and
the height to the east, was to attack Cemetery Hill. Longstreet
on the right was to attack the Peach Orchard position, turn
the Federal flank, and, wheeling half -left, to advance in the same
direction up the Emmetsburg road, rolling up the Federal line
from left to right.

The two attacks were to be made at the same moment, and
this part of the programme was carried out.

Ewell assaulted the Federal right in two columns. That on
the left, Johnson's division, which moved on Culp's Hill, was
fairly successful. When night fell, Johnson's troops had pos-
session of a line of Federal entrenchments, and held on to this

294 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

position during the night. But the attack on Cemetery Hill
was a failure.

It was made by two divisions, one from the east of Gettys-
burg, to be supported by another which had to advance through
the town itself. The first division, under General Early, had
but 700 yards to traverse before it reached the Federal lines.
The second, under General Rodes, had to move out of the
town, then to deploy, and finally to move over a space of
nearly 1,400 yards. The consequence was that Early attacked
and was successful, but the co-operating column failed to come
up in time to enable him to meet a counter-attack, and he was
driven back.

Here, again, it is impossible not to criticise the working
of the staff. On the field of battle, to see that the com-
bined movements of the larger units are made with due con-
sideration for time and space is the most important duty of the
staff.

On the Confederate right, Longstreet succeeded in driving
back the Federals from the Peach Orchard line. But he was
unsuccessful in rolling up their line towards Cemetery Hill.
The Confederate right was already in position to attack
Little Round Top, the key of the position, when a Federal
general, Warren, Meade's Chief of Engineers, reached the hill
with orders from Meade to examine the condition of affairs.
From this height he saw, in the long line of woods west of
Emmetsburg road, the glistening of gun-barrels and bayonets,
and, promptly realising the situation, he sent back to Meade for
a division at least. The situation, he says in his report, ' was
almost appalling.1 Fortunately, before the Confederates could
reach this hill, where they would have been established in rear
of the Peach Orchard, and whence they would have enfiladed
a great part of the ridge, a Federal brigade, with some
batteries on their way to reinforce the line in front, came up
and were ordered by Warren, on his own responsibility, to
occupy Little Round Top. Here a heavy struggle took place,
and although Longstreet drove back the enemy from the Peach
Orchard, he was unable to turn their flank, for reinforcements
were rapidly brought up to the rocky ridge and ravine called

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 295

the Devil's Den, and the Federals made good their withdrawal
to Cemetery Ridge.

I may add that the Federal infantry, bravely as it fought,
seems to have owed its safety to the devotion of the gunners,
who showed most remarkable gallantry in covering their retreat.
One battery lost all its officers but one, six out of seven
sergeants, twenty-eight men out of one hundred, and sixty-six
horses out of eighty-eight. Moreover, a line of five-and-twenty
guns, hastily moved up to the ridge in rear, although un-
supported by infantry, did much towards checking the Con-
federate pursuit.

There is one point connected with this attack which calls
for particular comment.

I have already stated that Round Top was the key of the
position ; and it is evident that had the Confederates once
occupied this commanding height, the Federal troops, when
forced back from the Peach Orchard, would have been compelled
to retreat towards Cemetery Hill.

When Longstreet's line got into position, his right brigade
was well in front of the Emmetsburg road, at an oblique angle
to it, and this brigade was supported by a second, 200 yards in
rear. As soon as the troops took up their place, the com-
mander of the advanced brigade, General Laws, sent off a patrol
of six men to ascend the steep and densely wooded slopes of
Round Top, and to locate the extreme left of the Federal line.

Before the attack began, one of these men came back at the
double, reporting that Round Top was unoccupied, and that
there were no Federal troops in rear of the hill. This intelli-
gence was corroborated by some prisoners who were just then
captured. The Brigadier immediately rode over to his divisional
commander, and pointed out the ease with which the Federal
left might be turned. The divisional commander coincided
fully with his views, but declared that his orders were positive
to attack in front. On the Brigadier protesting, the divisional
commander sent an aide-de-camp to General Longs treet. An
order was sent back which was interpreted to mean that the
original plan of attack was to be followed out to the letter.
The right brigade, therefore, moved forward against the Devil's

296 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Den, cleared that, and when it afterward moved against Round
Top, found it occupied and was beaten back.

We can only say that it seems unfortunate that the question
whether the attack on Round Top was advisable or not should
have been submitted to the general that had so strongly advised
Lee not to attack the Gettysburg position at all.

His summary message to the divisional commander to carry
out the original plan at least lays him open to the suspicion
that, although he was prepared to obey orders, it was like a
machine and not like an intelligent being. There was no
question of acting on his own initiative even, and of taking it
on himself to modify his instructions. The Commander-in-
Chief was close at hand, and he might have communicated with
him at once, just as his subordinates had done with himself.

On this same evening of the battle of July 2 there was a
very curious exercise of initiative, a very marked assumption of
responsibility, on the part of two Federal officers. One of these
was General Warren, who, on seeing Round Top without a
single bayonet on it, dashed down the hill and ordered up the
first regiment he came across. The other was the regimental
commander, who, although following the leading battalion of
his brigade, on receiving an urgent demand for assistance from
a senior officer of the general staff, accompanied by a brief
explanation of the situation, broke the line of march of his
brigade without hesitation, and marched straight up the hill,
arriving in time to secure its possession to the Federals.

In Germany, where the advantages of the initiative are
most highly appreciated, this question of how far a commander,
coming up in support with orders to move to a certain locality, is
justified in answering urgent appeals for assistance from another
locality altogether, and in departing from his original orders, is
often very warmly discussed.

An incident occurred at the battle of Woerth, in 1870,
which has been made the text of a long discussion in a German
study of that battle ; a study which is well worth reading, and
which, for the consolation of those who do not read German,
was admirably paraphrased, by Colonel Lonsdale Hale, in the
' Contemporary Review ' for June 1892.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 297

In this case it does not appear that the need of support was
absolutely necessary in order to save the day. There was nothing
in the situation which clearly indicated, as at Round Top, that
if the supporting troops obeyed their original orders the battle
would be lost.

The third day of Gettysburg dawned on two armies that
still stood face to face on equal terras. The Confederates had
carried the Peach Orchard, and Johnson's division was estab-
lished on Culp's Hill, but the Federals occupied a stronger
position than on the previous day, the line from Cemetery Hill
to Round Top. Their strongest corps, which had not come
up until the evening of the 2nd, had not yet been engaged ;
and their troops were concentrated in a horseshoe which did
not measure more than two and a half miles. They had in-
deed suffered a severe repulse the previous afternoon. But
the Generals, assembled at a council of war after the battle
had ceased, had resolved, with scarcely one dissentient voice,
to maintain their ground despite their heavy losses ; and the
morning of one of the most momentous days in American
history saw their volunteer soldiers, worn and exhausted as they
were with two days1 fighting, which had been all against them,
outflanked on one wing, and with an enemy before them who
had beaten them — or rather their generals — in battle after
battle, still resolute, confident, and even cheerful. By all the
rules of war they should have been demoralised and unnerved.
Yet they were never in better spirit for the fight than on this
third day of battle, with theii line of retreat seriously threatened
by the presence of Johnson's division in rear of their right wing
and with nothing but disaster during the past two days to look
back upon. Surely they had inherited the best quality of
British soldiers. They refused to acknowledge that they were
beaten.

The Confederates, flushed with the partial triumph of the
preceding day, had no helpless prey before them. When the
light broke on the Cemetery Ridge, showing the Northern
batteries and battalions still in position, covered by breastworks
and stone walls, and commanding the long open slopes to the
westward, it was evident that the hardest part of the task was

298 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

yet to be accomplished. And to make matters worse, the army
was badly placed for attack. From Johnson's left on Culp's
Hill to Longstreet's right below Round Top, the front covered
no less than five miles, more than twice the front occupied by
their opponents, who were also superior in numbers.

Nor was it possible to shift troops from one flank to the
other. The roads by which they would have to pass were not
only visible from Cemetery Ridge, but were commanded by the
Federal Artillery. The army, owing to the absence of the
cavalry, had blundered into battle on the first day. Ewell had
then attacked from the north, and it was almost impracticable
afterwards to contract the line to a reasonable length. Such
an extent of front, manned by only 60,000 men, swallowed
up almost all reserves ; and on the morning of July 3, Lee had
one of the hardest problems to deal with that was ever proposed
upon the field of battle : Which part of that long extended
line should be thrust forward to make the decisive stroke, which
was to annihilate the last army of the Federals in the east, and
drive the Northern Government from the capital ?

So confident was he in the powers of the gallant men he had
led so often to victory that, difficult as was his task, Lee never
seems for a single moment to have despaired of success. Yet
the day opened ominously. As the sun rose, a vigorous attack
of the Federals on drip's Hill, prepared during the night, drove
Johnson's division in panic down the hill. But the great
Confederate general was not disconcerted by the mishap. It
would have been scarcely possible to support Johnson with
sufficient force to make an attack on drip's Hill decisive, and
his mind was already seeking to find a point where he could
attack with all his strength, and where, to the Federals, defeat
would mean annihilation. The right flank of the enemy was
secure, for he could not move troops in that open country to
attack it, and it was far from their line of retreat. The left
flank rested on the impregnable position of Round Top, and he
dared not weaken his line to turn it. There remained only the
centre, and he determined to try Napoleon's decisive stroke.

The action began at 1 p.m., by which time the Confederates
had brought 140 guns into line from opposite Gettysburg to

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 299

the Peach Orchard ridges. Their fire was answered by ninety
Federal guns upon the opposing crest. At 3 o'clock the
hostile artillery ceased fire. Eleven ammunition wagons had
been blown up, but the losses had not been heavy ; in fact, the fire
was more dangerous behind the ridge than on its crest. The
fire was not concentrated, but scattered over the whole field.
The Federal chief of artillery, however, found his ammunition
was running low, and resolved to keep his remaining rounds for
the assault which he knew must follow. The Confederates, on
finding that the enemy had ceased fire, immediately moved
forward to attack, thus making that too common mistake of
neglecting to bombard the enemy's infantry when his guns have
been silenced. During the artillery duel the Federal infantry
had been lying behind the entrenchments and stone walls.
They had suffered but little loss ; they were in no wise de-
moralised, and were perfectly ready to defend the position to
the last.

Lee's scheme of attack was this. Longstreet, who had been
reinforced in the night by a fresh division of 5,000 men,
Virginians, some of the best troops in the army, and led by
General Pickett, one of the most daring amongst the Confederate
officers, was to send in three divisions, one of his own and two
of Hill's, numbering about 15,000 bayonets, and the flanks of
the column were to be protected by the advance of the artillery.
Nor was this all, at least according to the testimony of Lee's
staff officers. He intended, according to them, that the
attack should be supported by Longstreet's two remaining
divisions, and the general was authorised to employ another
of Hill's divisions if necessary, in all 30,000 men. This General
Longstreet denies, but it is remarkable that the two divisions
of his right wing, posted opposite the Federal left, never moved
a step forward nor were ordered to make any attempt whatso-
ever even to demonstrate in favour of the attacking column.

The attack, then, was made by 15,000 men in two lines.
Pickett leading, Petti grew in short echelon (100 paces) to the
left rear, and Wilcox's brigade to the right. The distance the
men had to traverse was nearly 1,200 yards in width. The
ground was open, and intervening between them and the enemy

300 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

were several fences, a field of corn, a tiny brook, and then the
open slopes to the Federal position, covered on the crest by
earthworks and stone walls.

Notwithstanding the strength of the position they were to
storm, and the terrible fire at that range which the Federal
artillery, coming into action again as they advanced, poured
into their ranks, Pickett's Virginians advanced with a steadiness
and precision which called forth the generous admiration of
their gallant enemy. Only the skirmishers in front used their
rifles, and the long lines in rear pressed forward without a check.
Thrown somewhat into disorder in clearing the fences of the
Emmetsburg road, they wheeled half-left at the house which
stood in their path, and moved straight up the slopes in the
direction of a conspicuous clump of trees. The long lines of
Federal infantry opened on them in front. The guns, loaded
with canister, tore great gaps through the crowded ranks, and
from the slopes of Little Round Top they were enfiladed by
more than one battery. As they approached the ridge their
lines were torn by incessant volleys of musketry, and the second
line crowded in upon the first. Under the heavy fire the
supporting division on the left had given way, and a Federal
brigadier, throwing forward a regiment with ready judgment,
enfiladed Pickett's line. Yet with unfaltering courage the
Virginians broke into the double, and with an irresistible charge
went through and over the stone walls which confronted them,
driving back their defenders, from flank to flfjik, and planting
their colours on the summit of the ridge.

But they were few in number ; and, as in the history of
too many famous charges, at the moment of their success they
looked back vainly for support. Not a single Confederate
bayonet, save in the hands of wounded or retreating men, was
between them and the ridge from which they had advanced,
1,200 yards in rear. Fiercely they struggled to maintain their
position, but their courage had been thrown away. The
Federals, though driven back, had not lost heart. The defence
was as stubborn as the attack was dashing. Fresh regiments
came thronging up, and within ten minutes Pickett, with the
relics of his brave 5,000, was retreating down the slope. It

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 301

may be a fitting climax, that magnificent charge, to a battle
never surpassed for desperate fighting ; and it seems according
to the fitness or things that the two commanders should have
tacitly agreed to bring the conflict to a close. Meade made
no attempt to initiate a counter-attack ; and during the night,
slowly followed by his adversary, Lee fell back through the
South Mountain passes, and across the Potomac into Virginia.

The losses in the battle amounted to over 20,000 on either
side, and it is said that Pickett alone lost six-sevenths of his
strength.

There are two points to be noticed in connection with the
third day's battle. First, the want of co-operation. What
sight more curious than to see two armies, each of over
60,000 men, watching in breathless silence the advance of
15,000 ? Why were not E well's troops attacking on the left
and Longstreet's remaining divisions on the right ? We can
only say that some one blundered. Again, remember that
Pickett's flanks were to have been protected by the advance
of the artillery, but the Confederate batteries, when the
artillery duel ceased, had expended nearly all their ammunition,
and this all important circumstance was never reported to
General Lee.

I have said very little of the tactical use made by General
Meade of his formidable position, but I would commend to
anyone who may at some future time care to study this battle
in detail, to notice particularly how skilfully he used his re-
serves, transferring them from point to point and throwing
them without hesitation into the fight at the point where they
were most needed, and how he was assisted in so doing by the
small front and great depth of his position.

There are still a few points on which I should like to
touch.

As regards the employment or the cavalry in the battle of
Gettysburg, there are one or two incidents worth notice. On
the third day the Federal cavalry south of Round Top did
good service, both dismounted and mounted. Dismounting
and occupying some stone walls they compelled Longstreet to
detach a force to his right in order to hold them in check ;

302 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and, mounted, they made a gallant charge across very difficult
country soon after Pickett's charge had been repulsed. This
charge was certainly attended by heavy losses. But it threw
the Confederate infantry on this wing into confusion, and had
it been followed up by the Federal infantry on Round Top
might have had a startling effect. The cavalry, however, was
unsupported ; but the confusion it created in the Confederate
ranks, difficult as the ground was over which it charged — rocks,
timber, and stone walls— leads up to the reflection that had
Pickett been supported by cavalry the counter-attacks on his
flank and the rallying of the Federal regiments when he carried
the ridge would, at least, have been much interfered with.
But Lee had no cavalry available. Stuart was well away on
the left wing, north-east of Gettysburg, engaged with the main
body of the Federal horse. He made a vigorous charge about
the same time that Pickett moved out, evidently with the
design of spreading panic in rear of Meade's army and so
aiding the frontal attack, but was beaten back in a hand-to-
hand fight.

In the wars of the future, when two armies are drawing

near each other, the independent cavalry divisions will come

into contact, and they will concentrate for a cavalry battle,

possibly leaving either the front or flanks of their infantry

uncovered, and affording an opportunity for the enemy's army

to approach unobserved. This possibility is well worth notice,

for at the last French manoeuvres at which I was present, an

incident occurred which showed that when the cavalry division

is well out in front the commanders in rear feel a sense of

security which is not always justified, and that they are prone

to think themselves relieved of the necessity of reconnoitring

their own line of march. The incident I refer to was the

complete surprise of an entire infantry division by a brigade

of cavalry and a horse artillery battery, owing to the absence

of the very small force of divisional cavalry, a squadron only,

in another direction, and the belief that the independent

cavalry were watching the flank. As a matter of fact they

were on this flank, but very far to the front, and whilst they

were heavily engaged with infantry the enemy's brigade had

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 303

worked round to their rear, and appeared on the flank of the
advancing column. In the Gettysburg campaign, I cannot
help thinking that Stuart forgot for once that to cover the
march of the army and to send in timely information are
services of far greater importance than cutting the enemy's
communications and harassing his rear. The close co-operation
of the three arms is the secret of strategical and tactical success.
A curious fact, as regards staff duties, and the extreme care
that should be taken in drawing up instructions, comes out
with respect to Stuart's failures. Lee allowed him to act on his
own judgment as to moving round the enemy's rear, although
he does not seem to have cordially approved of the idea. But
at the same time he ordered him to instruct the commander
of the two brigades left behind to watch Hooker, that if the
Federals moved northward, he was to watch 'the flank and
rear of the army,' moving into the Shenandoah Valley and
' closing upon the rear of the army."' Stuart, in his orders to
his subordinates, used the words—' after the army has moved,
cross the Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right
and rear."1 The officer concerned, probably ignorant of the
plan of campaign and the distribution of the army corps, did
follow the army, with what result we know. The instructions
he received from Stuart misled him. They attempted to cover
all sorts of contingencies. In certain points they lacked
precision. No stress was laid on the fact that those two
brigades were to act as screens to the army, nor was it any-
where indicated that close contact with the army was above
all things essential. In fact, the main point was lost sight of,
or obscured by references to less important objects, which
might well have been left to the initiative of the recipient.
If his judgment could not be trusted, he was not a man to
whom the command of a detached force, and so important a
duty, should have been assigned.

Stuart's letters, and also Lee's, are quoted in ' Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War,' vol. iii. pp. 252-3.

The second point is the conduct of the great infantry
attack on the Federal centre. The Staff, as we have seen,
seemed utterly incapable throughout the battle of bringing the

304 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

efforts of the larger units into timely co-operation, and at the
most important crisis of the whole engagement their failure to
ensure combination was conspicuous. In the first place, -there
is no doubt that Lee intended that 30,000 men should have
been employed instead of 15,000. In the second place, the
supporting brigades on either flank were not well handled ; the
left brigade was too close to the centre, the right brigade, when
Pickett in the centre changed direction a little to the left,
moved forward in the original direction, soon found itself
isolated, and fell back. In fact there were no supports at hand
to confirm success when the crest of the ridge was carried,
neither infantry, cavalry, nor artillery.

It is curious that Osman Pasha's splendid attack when he
attempted to break out of Plevna was almost an exact repro-
duction of the Confederate assault at Gettysburg. He had
30,000 men, of which 15,000 formed his reserve. He also had
to move over absolutely open ground, and he also was partially
successful. Two lines of entrenchments were carried. But
when another effort was required to complete the success, the
reserve was not forthcoming. Its passage across the river had
been blocked by the carts of the fugitive inhabitants of the
town ; and nothing was left but surrender. At Chattanooga,
again, Grant's most brilliant battle, November 25, 1863, the
decisive attack was made on a part of a position which seemed
impregnable, by 25,000 men carefully formed up in three lines.
I cannot help thinking that these instances show us the neces-
sity of most careful preliminary arrangements when a large
mass of troops is sent forward to attack. The whole force
should be drawn up with proper intervals and distances. Every
commander should have his objective pointed out. No move-
ment should be permitted until every unit is ready to step off
at the same moment. Artillery should accompany the attack,
prepared, if necessary, to push forward into the fighting line,
and cavalry should follow, watching for every opportunity of
striking in. Over and over again we read of attacks of this
nature which were manifestly unsuccessful because sufficient
precautions had not been taken that the whole mass of men to
be engaged in the operation should act in close co-operation,

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 305

because the operation lacked vigour, and because Napoleon's
maxim, that in a decisive attack the last man and the last
horse should be thrown in, was disregarded.

The explanation of the failure of the Confederate staff is
not to be found in the fact that the majority had had very
little previous training before the war broke out, many of them
being volunteers, pure and simple, or that they were unaccus-
tomed to handle large masses in an attack on a single objective.
Two months before, in a far more difficult country, in a dense
forest, at Chancellorsville, far more complicated movements
had been made in exact combination, and the decisive attack
had been made by a whole army corps of 25,000 men. I am
forced to the conclusion that at Gettysburg Lee's whole army
suffered from over-confidence. Face to face with an army they
had beaten so often with inferior numbers they relaxed their
precautions ; and at Chancellorsville the preliminary arrange-
ments for the great attack were made by General ' Stonewall '
Jackson, a tactician of the first order, with the utmost deliber-
ation. Not a battalion was allowed to move forward until
every man was in his place and every available rifle was thrown
into the fight.

The last point I wish to touch upon is the conduct of both
the Federal and Confederate artillery, both before and during
Pickett's charge. In the third volume of ' Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War ' we have descriptions of the battle by the
artillery commanders on both sides, and their accounts are a
detailed object-lesson in artillery tactics such as is seldom met
with.

In the first place, the Federal batteries, although inferior in
strength, were never silenced by the Confederate fire, but simply
withdrew, in the words of the Chief of Artillery, * to replenish
ammunition and to prepare for the assault which he knew must
follow.1 On the other hand, we have it on the authority of the
Confederate Chief of Artillery that he was completely imposed
upon by these tactics. ' He had never,' he says, ' seen the
Federals withdraw their guns simply to save them up for the
infantry fight.'

Secondly, the latter officer says that the front occupied by

306 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the artillery was so long that it was not well studied ; the
officers of different commands had no opportunity to examine
each other's ground for chances to co-operate. Guns which
might have enfiladed the Federal batteries playing upon Pickett
simply fired straight to the front. In fact, concentration of
fire on the tactical point had not been arranged, and dispersion
of fire was the result. This brings us to a very curious fact.
The two officers in charge of the artillery on either side had
served in the same battery in the United States army before the
war. The Federal had been the Major, and the Confederate
had been placed under him expressly to receive instruction in
field artillery. At the final surrender of Lee's army, in April
1865, the two met and the conversation turned on Gettysburg.
1 1 told him,1 writes General Hunt, the Northerner, ' that I was
not satisfied with the conduct of the cannonade at that battle,
inasmuch as he had not done justice to his instruction : that his
fire, instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as
it ought to have been, and as I expected it would be, was
scattered over the whole field. He was amused by my criticism
and said, " I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the
fire became so scattered wondered what you would think of it." '
Well, Hunt thought very little of it, for he says that ' most of
the enemy's projectiles passed overhead ' — he was standing with
his own batteries — ' the effect being to sweep the open ground
in rear — a waste of ammunition, for everything here could seek
shelter. ... In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the
ridge than on its crest.''

The last point of many well worth notice is, that when
Pickett advanced, descending into the valley, the Confederate
guns reopened over the heads of his troops ' when the lines ' — I
am quoting the Confederate Chief of Artillery — ' had got a
couple of hundred yards away, but the enemy's artillery let us
alone and fired only at the infantry.'

Here, again, in the action of a large mass of artillery, we
have forcibly impressed upon us the importance of careful pre-
liminary arrangements, and the necessity of training officers,
when large numbers of batteries are employed, to make co-
operation against the tactical objective their first thought.

CHAPTER XI

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WILDERNESS OF
VIRGINIA, 1864

(A Lecture to the Military Society of Ireland, January 2ith, 1894)

Theue is to be found in the correspondence of Napoleon a
letter written to an official in France during the great campaign
of 1807, which has reference to the theoretical study of the art
of war. The Emperor complains that it is very difficult to
know what books are useful for the study of military history,
and declares that, owing to this difficulty, he had read a great
many books which he found quite worthless, and had thus
wasted a great deal of time.

It is perhaps a further proof — if further proof were neces-
sary— of the great importance which the greatest of all soldiers
assigned to theoretical study, that he should have found time,
in the midst of a great army actually confronted by the enemy,
to write a letter on such a subject. But it is not my purpose
to emphasise the lesson which may be deduced from his words,
and to enlarge on the necessity of our making ourselves
acquainted with the great campaigns of history. Such a course
of study has for its chief end the education of the mental
faculties, the strengthening of the intellect, and the develop-
ment of a capacity for hard thinking. I can scarcely imagine
that it is still necessary to defend the advantages of education ;
nor is there anyone bold enough nowadays to deny that an
active intellect and a capacity for hard thinking are absolutely
requisite in any officer who aspires to command troops with
honour and success. It is only the uneducated who cry out
against education ; only the ignorant who are unable to realise
the benefits of knowledge ; only the man whose ideas of war
are absolutely different from those of Napoleon and Wellington,
lacking the common-sense with which those great men were so

x 2

308 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

pre-eminently gifted, who dare rail at the study which they
considered so essential.

I think that to-day we are all of us quite willing to take
the world's most famous soldiers as our masters, and to accept
their methods and their teaching as the best means of making
and of learning war.

But Wellington and Napoleon are not the only masters of
war, and I should like to bring to the notice of our rising
soldiers a very great campaign which has by no means attracted
the attention it deserves, yet which is full of instruction for
officers of all ranks, and, in my humble opinion, gives a better
clue to the fighting of the future than any other which history
records. In May 1864, when the campaign began, the
Americans had been fighting for just three years. Their
armies, which had to be improvised on the spot, out of a
civilian population, absolutely innocent of all military know-
ledge, were not very good for the first year or so. They were
certainly not equal to regular troops. It is hardly possible,
when we consider the disadvantages under which they laboured,
that it could have been otherwise. But three years of active
service told their tale. General Sherman, a man whose ability
and honesty none can deny, has written that after 1863 — that
is, in the year of the Wilderness campaign — they were equal
to any European troops. I see little reason to doubt the
accuracy of this observation, and I believe, moreover, that in
very many respects the American armies of which he spoke
were superior and more advanced in military knowledge than
even the Germans in 1870. The American regular officers who
filled the higher grades were remarkably well-educated and
well-trained soldiers before the war began, and it would have
been strange if three years'* experience in handling huge masses
of men, of incessant fighting against very gallant enemies in a
very difficult country, had not stimulated the acute American
intellect, already well cultivated, to evolve strategical and
tactical methods admirably adapted to the needs of modern
warfare.

What these methods were I shall try to make clear, and
I think that some day the majority will be induced to agree

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 309

with my high estimate of the value of this campaign as a clue
to the fiffhtina: of the future. The American armies were
composed of volunteers, with a small leaven of regular officers,
who filled the higher commands and the principal appointments
on the staff. Now I do not think I am predicting impossibilities
when I say that armies somewhat similar in constitution may
at some future date have to be handled by ourselves. England
has before now been drawn willy-nilly into continental wars ;
she has before now had to engage in a life-and-death struggle
with the Great Powers, and the early part of the nineteenth
century saw her troops engaged, not only on the mainland of
Europe, but in almost every important island in the Medi-
terranean, and, what is perhaps more to the point, in almost
every single colony or outlying dependency in possession of her
enemies. In the great French war, although transport was far
more difficult than it is to-day, there were few parts of the
globe to which the English navy did not convey English
troops ; and a list ot the various countries and islands which
were captured, occupied, and garrisoned by English soldiers is
very suggestive reading. The very names on our regimental
colours remind us that at every point of a hostile or friendly
State which can be reached by sea those colours have been
planted ; and history tells us with what extraordinary effect the
combined naval and military force of England, often insignifi-
cant in numbers, but backed up by a long purse, have struck at
the resources, the commerce, and the prestige of her most
formidable enemies.

History repeats itself. There is no sign whatever, despite
long years of peace, that the prospect of our being drawn
into a great European conflict is more remote than hereto-
fore. Increased prosperity, greater wealth, and wider interests
can scarcely be considered as security in themselves against
attack. It is true that in the navy we have our first line
of defence, but this very title proves its weakness. The navy
is a defensive force, pure and simple, and without the assist-
ance of the army it is passive ; it can ward off the blow ; but
it cannot return it, and if our efforts were confined to naval
operations, the counter-stroke, the soul of the defence, would

310 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

be impossible. We could scarcely hope either to annihilate or
to exhaust our enemy. It is possible my judgment may be at
fault — I stand open to correction — but as yet I see no cause to
believe that in any future European struggle in which we shall
be engaged our traditions will be forgotten, and that British
troops will not be despatched to occupy those extremities of
the enemy's possessions which the command of the sea lays open
to our attack. I cannot imagine that our duties will be limited
to garrisoning ports and coaling stations, and I can easily con-
ceive a second Peninsular or Crimean campaign. And when we
consider the large resources which we have now at our disposal,
the enormous reserve which the Volunteer force of Great Britain
and the colonies provides, it is still more difficult to imagine
that this reserve will prefer to remain idle when the honour of
the country is at stake.

If I see in the future an English general at the head of
an army far larger than that which drained the life-blood
of Napoleon's empire in the Peninsula, if I see our colours
flying over even a wider area than in the year which preceded
Waterloo, you may think that I am over-sanguine ; but to
my mind the possibility exists, and with it the probability
that the forces which are employed upon the counter-stroke
will be constituted, at least in part, as were the armies of
the American Civil War. Our men will not all be regulars.
They will come straight from civil life, and to civil life
they will return. The habits and prejudices of civil life will
have to be considered in their discipline and instruction,
and officers will have to recognise that troops without the
traditions, instincts, and training of regular soldiers, require a
handling different from that which they have been accustomed to
employ. To my mind this is one of the most important
lessons to be learned from the American War by English
soldiers. Some of the American officers could get as much out
of the volunteers as out of veteran troops. Others, who did
not understand their peculiar prejudices, failed to acquire their
confidence, and, despite their ability, failed in every operation
they undertook. With regulars they would probably have been
successful ; with volunteers they fell from disaster to disaster.

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 311

It is possible that all will not agree with me. Some may consider
that the system of command adopted for the regular army is
applicable to all troops who wear a uniform. But a close study
of the American campaigns has forced upon me the conviction
that it is not sufficient to bring volunteers under military law.
The rules and regulations which govern the regular army are
doubtless enough to ensure their obedience and subordination,
but something more is required to secure their confidence, and
to make them reliable under circumstances of danger, difficulty,
and hardship. What this is may be learned from the lives ot
the American generals, Lee, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Han-
cock, and, perhaps above all, Stonewall Jackson. The following
is an extract taken from an article on Hancock, one of the most
successful corps commanders in the Wilderness campaign.

* He never sneered at the volunteers. He made them feel,
by his evident respect, his hearty greeting, his warm approval
of everything they did well, that he regarded them just as fully,
just as truly, soldiers of the United States as if they belonged
to his own old regiment. Such was the spirit in which Han-
cock met his new command. We know with what assiduity,
patience, and good feeling, what almost pathetic eagerness to
learn and to imitate, the Volunteers of 1861 sought to fit them-
selves to take their part in the great struggle. He saw that it
was of extreme importance to promote the self-respect and self-
confidence of the volunteer regiments, to lead them to think
that they could do anything, and were the equals of anybody.
But Hancock was a man of sound common sense, who under-
stood human nature thoroughly, and was therefore fit for high
command. He was not a mere drill-sergeant, not a mere fight-
ing animal, and not a mixture of officialism and routine.'

This is not the only point on which English soldiers can
draw instruction from a study of the war. The command of
the sea, and combined military and naval operations, played
throughout a most important part, and in the Wilderness cam-
paign the strategy of the attacking side depended on the same
facilities for changing the bases of supply and the lines of opera-
tions as were made use of in the Peninsula, in 1854, and in
1882. In this respect, at least, the operations of the Federal

312 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

army were the counterpart of many English campaigns.
Again, the country over which the troops moved and fought
was difficult in the extreme. The maps available were few and
bad. Virginia, the theatre of war, was thinly populated — not
half opened up. A great part of the State was covered with
primeval forest. There were immense tracts of swamp and
jungle which were terra incognita to all but a few farmers and
their negro slaves. The roads were as scarce and indifferent
as the maps. The country produced but little in the way of
supplies ; and the invaders, when they crossed the border, had
the very difficulties to face which so often confront English
troops, engaged in rounding off the corners of the Empire by
annexing some considerable tracts of savage territory. The
organisation of the auxiliary departments, the supply, the
medical, and the reconnoitring, which enabled the Americans to
overcome those difficulties, afford valuable suggestions to our-
selves.

I may also notice, though the same observation applies to
the study of any campaign whatever, that there is much instruc-
tion to be gained on two points on which text-books and
field-exercises are necessarily silent, and which are yet of far
more importance than strategical dispositions or formations.
The first of these is that almost indefinable force which
Napoleon declared was as to the physical, that is to numbers,
armament, and physique, as three to one. Any general who
ever made war successfully relied far more on the moral
effects of his manoeuvres than on the mere fighting qualities of
his troops ; and it may be said with absolute truth, that it was
because he understood the immense power of moral influences
that he was successful. But as it is the most important, so
this factor in war is the very hardest to teach. Still it can be
taught, or rather it can be learned, and I cannot help thinking
that it is to this that Napoleon referred when he said that
reading and re-reading the campaigns of the greatest captains
was the best means of learning the art of war. I should find it
by no means an unpleasant task to discuss this subject at
length, but I can do no more here than to advise young officers,
whenever they take up a book on military history, to keep this

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 313

factor always before their minds, to note every instance in which
it exerted an effect, to take to heart the way in which it was
employed, and to remember that it is to a thorough compre-
hension of its value rather than to mechanical aids, such as
formations and fortifications, that the greatest captains owed
their victories. The second point to which I refer is the
individual character of the commander. I do not mean to say
that we can all of us, by merely realising the mixture of pru-
dence and audacity, the iron will, the invincible determina-
tion, the dogged perseverance, and the incessant application of,
for instance, Wellington or Moltke, become Wellingtons or
Moltkes ourselves. We came into the world endowed with
certain mental and moral attributes ; we have, all of us,
our weak points, some perhaps have strong ones, but we were
not created equal in this respect or in any other. Nor is
the moulding of our character altogether in our hands. But
it is useless to deny that, as in some degree at least we are
masters of our own fate, we may be masters in some degree of
our own natures. Example is a potent force in this world.
We may never reach the ideal after which we strive, but it is
within our power to approach it ; and the effort to acquire the
qualities which have distinguished great soldiers will not be a
barren one.

The memories of what they did and what they dared may
inspire us some day to imitate them, however feebly ; and even
a weak imitation may be superior to the working of natural
impulse. In military history the very highest ideals may be
found ; and here again I would advise students of campaigns
to mark the influence of the character of great soldiers on
difficult operations, and to learn how determination, perseverance,
and the fixed resolve to conquer, have enabled them to triumph
over obstacles before which men of weaker fibre would have
turned aside. To keep these points always before our minds,
the influence of moral and the influence of individual character,
is the true way of studying military history.

With these observations I come to the campaign itself, and
I must now explain the general situation and describe the
theatre of war. The Civil War, as I have already said, had, at

314 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the beginning of May 1864, been going on for three years.
The respective capitals of the United States and the Confed-
eracy were Washington and Richmond. Richmond had been
the great objective of all the fighting throughout the war. To
capture Richmond was, in the opinion of the Northerners, to
break the back of the Rebellion and to end the conflict ; and
their efforts throughout had been directed to this end. During
the preceding three years they had made no less than five
attempts to reach the Southern capital. Each one of these
attacks had been beaten back.

In May 1864, the United States Government once more
resolved to attempt the seemingly hopeless task. The Northern
army (the army of the Potomac) was composed of the same
troops that had been engaged in these various expeditions.
The Southern army (the army of North Virginia) was the
army which had beaten them back to Washington. Their
respective strength at this time was as follows : — The army of
North Virginia, covering Richmond, consisted of three army
corps, two cavalry divisions, and 224 guns, giving a total of
62,000 officers and men. The army of the Potomac mustered
130,000, divided into five army corps, four divisions of cavalry,
and 316 guns.

At the head of the Confederate army was General Lee, un-
doubtedly one of the greatest, if not the greatest, soldier who
ever spoke the English tongue. He had been in command of
the army of Virginia since June 1862— that is for two years,
two years of incessant fighting and of numerous battles — and
he possessed in a very extreme degree the confidence of his
officers and the affection of his men. The Federal army, during
this eventful period, had been commanded by several different
generals. The Government elected the best general they could
find at the beginning of the war ; when he was beaten they
relieved him and sent another. Five generals in succession had
held the chief command. In 1864 came the turn of Grant.
Grant had hitherto been fighting in the west far away on the
Mississippi, where he had won some extraordinary victories,
and had displayed great ability both as strategist and tactician.
As Commander-in-Chief of the whole United States army, the

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 315

position to which he was now appointed, he had to devise a
plan to capture Richmond, and to this end no less than four
armies were set in motion. Whilst holding in his own hands
the control of the campaign, he established his head quarters
with the army of the Potomac, the pivot of the whole scheme
of invasion ; for before that army lay the main force of the
Confederates, its old rival, the army of Northern Virginia ; and
it is well to remember, in order to appreciate Grant's difficulties
and his strength of character, that with strange troops he had
now to encounter a most formidable adversary, and that those
troops had far more dread of Lee than confidence in himself.

At the beginning of May Grant decided to march on Rich-
mond. His headquarters were at Culpeper in Virginia, for the
Federals had mastered a certain portion of that State, and his
troops, generally speaking, were massed round that town. Lee
with his 62,000 men stood opposite, and the river Rapidan, a
wide and deep stream, ran between the hostile camps. The
Confederate headquarters were at Orange Court House, and the
troops extended along the river bank in a strongly entrenched
position. On the right flank of the line there ran a stream
called Mine Run, and along this stream was a return entrench-
ment, striking due south from the river. The dispositions of
the leaders raise an interesting question. Lee had to cover
Richmond. The Federal army was posted at Culpeper, so
he took up a position opposite to them and entrenched himself.
His right flank was very strongly guarded by the return
entrenchment, and his left flank was also strong by reason of
the country ; he had little fear that he would be seriously
attacked in that quarter. Grant, when he reached Culpeper
and took over command, found his opponent directly in front
of him, covered by his formidable lines, and to all appearances
barring the way to Richmond. He at once came to the
conclusion that it was no good attacking the Confederate
position ; there was not only the river to be crossed, but
there were the entrenchments to be carried. Should he move
round and try to turn Lee's left ? The railway which runs
south from Culpeper afforded a line of supply which would
have greatly facilitated this operation. But if he worked by

316 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

that flank Lee would fall back to some new defensive position,
still covering Richmond, and the Federals would find no oppor-
tunity of fighting him at a disadvantage. It is important to
note carefully, as a clue to the operations, that Grant was not
aiming to avoid Lee and then seize Richmond. That would
scarcely have been a judicious plan. Richmond was fortified,
and he could not have held the town with the Confederate
army intact behind him and cutting his communication with
the north. His intention was to crush Lee first, and then
deal with Richmond at his leisure ; and in order to crush
Lee with certainty, he wished to catch him at a disadvantage ;
i.e. to attack the army of Northern Virginia in the open, on
ground where it would have no time to entrench, or, by in-
tervening between it and Richmond, to compel Lee with his
inferior numbers to attack the army of the Potomac. Putting
the first two lines aside as impracticable or unpromising he only
had a third left, and he determined to move south past the
Confederate right.

A glance at the map will show that his line of supply, the
Orange and Alexandria railway, ran past the Confederate left,
and in selecting a line of operation by the opposite flank, he
would have to abandon his communications. This was even a
more momentous matter in Virginia than elsewhere, for there
were no supplies whatever to be procured in the country. The
question of provisions was a most difficult one, but it had no
influence on his determination. He still held to the plan he
thought most promising of success, although, in order to be free
for protracted movements, the army would have to carry ten days'
rations for man and horse. These ten days' rations for 130,000
men, together with ammunition and medical supplies, required
about 5,000 wagons, a very great encumbrance to an army,
especially in a country where the roads were few and bad. It is
evident that Grant had no easy task. Remember that before
he could pass Lee's right flank he had to cross the Rapidan, and
that his movement, which should partake of the character of
a surprise, was bound to be hampered by his enormous train.
He resolved to march under the cover of the darkness. His
orders were issued on May 2, and at midnight on the 3rd the

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 317

troops started. At dawn they reached the river, the cavalry
leading, laid five bridges, and by the night of the 4th nearly
the whole army and a portion of the train had passed. It was
certainly a successful operation to get these enormous numbers
over the river safely.

We now come to the question why Lee, who had to cover
Richmond, made no attempt either to prevent Grant's passage,
or to put himself in his way when he had got across ? This is
a most interesting point in the campaign, and it gives some
idea of Lee's ability and daring. He knew well enough that
Grant would endeavour to turn his right. He had told his
generals several days before exactly what would happen, yet he
made no attempt to stop his enemy crossing the Rapidan. He
did not allow half of them to get across, then fall upon them
and send them back defeated. He let the whole army make
the passage without the slightest molestation ; and remember he
had only half the number of men that Grant had — 62,000
against 130,000. But south of the river was a tract of peculiar
country, a district which was simply a jungle, significantly
called the ' Wilderness of Virginia.' It extended about ten
miles south from the Rapidan, nearly as far as Spottslyvania
Court House, and through this jungle lay the Federal line of
march. Before Grant could get out into the open country he
had to pass through the Wilderness. The Confederates, nearly
all of them Virginians, knew this district well. Lee had
already fought a successful battle against overwhelming odds
in those very thickets, and he determined to let Grant entangle
himself in the Wilderness and there attack him. In that
most intricate country where artillery could not be used, where
men familiar with the paths and clearings would have a good
advantage over far superior numbers, he would throw his
62,000 men on Grant's 130,000. Whatever may be said of
his judgment, everyone must admire his boldness ; and this
was the plan he had in view when he allowed Grant to
push quietly across the river and bring his enormous impedi-
menta with him. When he found that the Federal army
was well over, he marched east from Orange Court House and
attacked it in the Wilderness. Nothing would serve him but to

318 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

annihilate the whole. The Confederates, however, had a long
day's march to make before they could reach the field of battle
their leader had selected ; so, after crossing the Rapidan, Grant
had twenty-four hours to himself, twenty-four hours in which
to place his army across Lee's road to Richmond. His cavalry,
scouting to front and flank, doAvn the forest roads, found no
signs of the enemy ; there was nothing to prevent a rapid
movement south ; the Confederate commander had been ap-
parently taken unawares ; and, if he had moved at all, had
merely occupied the return entrenchments along Mine Run,
a position very strong in itself, and on the flank of the Federal
line of march.

This position it would not be difficult to turn. There was
comparatively open country to the south, where troops could
manoeuvre with ease, and the superior numbers of the Federals
could be made full use of. There only remained to get clear
of the Wilderness. This could not be done on May 4. The
infantry and cavalry could have easily made the necessary
march, but the 5,000 wagons took nearly thirty hours to
cross the river, and the troops had to remain encamped in the
jungle to protect the train. But next morning, the 5th,
although the whole of the train had not yet crossed, the
Federals struck south. Scarcely had they started on the march
when Lee's columns dashed against their flank, and the battle of
the Wilderness began.

To go into the details of this battle would take much too
long, but it is interesting as an example of wood-fighting on a
most extended scale. The armies fought for two days in the
jungle. The Federals, however, were not beaten ; their losses
were very heavy, but they just managed to hold their own. The
troops fought well, and they brought to their aid one of those
new methods of warfare which the Americans had invented.
Both sides suddenly found themselves within a few miles of
the enemy. I need not say that in this very thickly wooded
country the cavalry found themselves at a very great disad-
vantage ; they could get very little information. But the
infantry took good care of itself. Directly any brigade or
division found that the enemy was coming up, it sent out scouts

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 319

to reconnoitre and immediately entrenched. There was no wait-
ing for orders. If the general did not give the order, the
battalion or company commanders acted for themselves, and
it is even said that the men, directly they halted, threw
up shelter without waiting for their superiors to give the
word. The entrenchments were strong enough; and in this
wooded country they were easily constructed. There were
a great many expert axe-men in the armies, and trees were
soon felled, or the fallen timber gathered. A pile of logs and
branches made a good foundation, over these the men threw a
little earth, and a parapet was soon constructed that was bullet-
proof at least. With both sides entrenched, the course of this
battle was simple in the extreme. One side came out from its
entrenchments and attacked, got beaten and retired ; the enemy
followed in pursuit, but was brought up in turn by the
entrenchments. In this thick wood manoeuvring was almost
impossible ; what little took place was undertaken by the Con-
federates, who knew the ground. The troops were obliged to
use the roads whenever they made a movement in any force ;
and it is an interesting point to note that there was a great
deal of marching by the compass. The forest was so thick
that this was the only way the battalions could keep in the
right direction. The losses in this battle were very great.
The Federals, during these two days, lost 15,300 men and
officers; the Confederates 11,000. Bearing in mind the
supreme importance of individual character I may call attention
to the conduct of the rival commanders. It is impossible not
to recognise Lee's audacity. Although he was doubly out-
numbered he allowed the Federals to cross the river at their
leisure ; he made no attempt whatever to interfere with them
until they were involved in the difficult country in which he
wished to find them. It is true he did not defeat them, but
he dealt them so staggering a blow, and inflicted such heavy
losses, that he might well anticipate that retreat would be their
only thought. But in Grant he had a foe of more than
ordinary tenacity. The army of the Potomac had been defeated
over and over again, and it is not too much to say that every
general in the Federal army had hitherto considered himself

320 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

inferior to Lee. With some of them it was like the old days
upon the Border, when the English mothers used to stop their
crying children with the name of the Black Douglas. The mere
mention of Lee's name to the officers of the stamp of Hooker
and Burnside seems to have been enough. They were paralysed
at once.

Now, here was Grant, a stranger to his troops, face to face
with the hero of the war, the man before whom so many generals
had gone down. He had fought him for two days in the
Wilderness, and if he had escaped defeat he had lost a great
many more men than Lee, and the fighting all through had
certainly not been in the Federal favour. The morning after
the battle they brought in a list of losses — 15,000 men — and
the enemy was still there : still there and not retreating !
Grant had to decide what to do ; it was little use attacking
the enemy in his entrenchments ; there seemed no hope of
success, and the army would not have been surprised had he
followed the example of his predecessors and retreated. But
despite his losses, despite the demoralisation of his troops,
despite the fact that he had not won an inch of ground, he
determined to move forward, to follow out his original plan,
and, if possible, to cut Lee off from Richmond, or at all events
to force him to battle in a less impregnable position than the
one he now held. This was the turning point in the campaign.
In so deciding he had to face the difficulty as regarded com-
munications. He had only seven days1 provisions left, and
there were all the sick and wounded to be sent to the rear.
But the Federals had command of the sea. Moreover, several
great water-ways run up into the heart of Virginia. There is the
Rappahannock, and north of the Rappahannock is another and
a larger river — the Potomac — which runs past Washington and
the Northern Border. Both these rivers are navigable, and by
means of his command of the water-ways Grant was able to
change his base. He shifted it at once from the Orange and
Alexandria Railway to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock.
On May 7 the Federals marched south, and again they marched
at midnight. Grant's idea was to intervene between Lee and

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 321

Richmond, to entrench himself and compel his enemy to attack.
He had quite realised the value of entrenchments.

And now came a most curious race, in which Grant had a little
the worst of the luck. He made all his preparations to get off
as secretly as possible. He sent his trains away in the afternoon,
and the troops were not to move until darkness had set in.
Lee had an idea that something was going on. He expected
that Grant, like the other Federal generals, would fall back
upon his base, but he had an idea at the same time that the
Federal general might move on Spottsylvania Court House.
The shortest road to Richmond ran past the Court House, so
that this insignificant village was of the first importance. He
therefore made preparations co meet all eventualities : and at
the same time that Grant gave orders for his troops to march
at midnight, Lee gave orders that a road was to be cut through
the woods in the direction of Spottsylvania, so that one of his
army corps could get there without delay. But this corps was
not directed to march until the next morning. It was to move
at 3 a.m. ; Grant intended to start at midnight, and the
Federal route was by very little the longer of the two. But,
luckily for the Confederates, the army corps which was in-
structed to start at 3 a.m. did not wait so long. The neigh-
bouring woods had been set on fire by the battle, and the
general commanding the corps took upon himself to modify
his orders. He wanted to escape from the blazing forest, so,
instead of waiting till 3 a.m., he marched an hour before mid-
night. Whilst the infantry were marching through the night
on Spottsylvania the Federals had sent on their cavalry to seize
the Court House. But Lee had done exactly the same thing,
and when the Federals arrived almost in sight of the village
they fomid the way blocked by the Confederate horsemen.

This incident shows the value of cavalry who can fight dis-
mounted. The Confederates had entrenched themselves all along
the front, and the entrenchments were manned with rifles. Al-
though these rifles were only held by cavalry soldiers, the
Southerners managed to keep a much superior force in check until
their infantry came up, and General Lee's army was the first
concentrated round Spottsylvania Court House. When Grant

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322 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

reached the field he was much disappointed to find that he had
been outmanoeuvred, that his midnight march had been no good,
and that he was again confronted by lines of breast-works.

On the next day, May 9th, began the great battle of Spott-
svlvania — at least it is called a battle, but it was really a series
of engagements that continued for about nine days. The sketches
show how skilfully Lee had made his dispositions. He took up
a position between the two streams which are called respectively
the Po and Ny ; his front was exactly adapted to the numbers
he had at his disposal ; in order to turn the position his ad-
versary would have to cross one of the streams, and so divide
his army, giving him an opportunity of dealing with him in
detail, and his line was far stronger than that which he
had held in the Wilderness. The country was still very
thickly wooded — the Federals had still to face their old
difficulty of finding out where the enemy was and in what
direction his entrenchments ran. The first two days were
occupied in reconnaissance. Reconnaissances, as we read about
them in text-books, are always executed by the cavalry. The
worst of it was that, although the Federals had plenty of
cavalry, they were absolutely of no use at all in such a country ;
and so information had to be obtained by simply sending out
brigades of infantry to stir up the enemy, and to see if he was
in position at such and such a point. Reconnaissances in
force were therefore the only means by which the Federals
could find out anything about the enemy ; and it is worth
remembering, because reconnaissances in force are not operations
with which we have much to do, and a good deal can be learned
from these campaigns as to the manner in which they should be
carried out. On May 10th the Federals had gathered sufficient
information as to the enemy's position. The first thing they
did was to send an army corps across the Po to see whether
they could turn Lee's left ; but Lee was entrenched so strongly
behind the stream that attack was not permitted, and the corps
was withdrawn after beating back a counter-stroke. This was
on the morning of the 10th. By the evening they had found
that at a certain point on the opposite flank the Confederate
line was more accessible, and Grant ordered that while one

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 323

corps kept the Confederates employed, a strong attack should be
made on the weak point. The formation adopted for the attack
is interesting ; the same principle was observed which obtains
to-day on the Continent, and which is advocated in our own
Drill-book. I say the principle only ; I do not mean to convey
the impression that the Federal troops observed the same in-
tervals and distances that are now laid down. Three divisions
were employed : one, on the right, was formed in two lines ;
two-deep lines with a few skirmishers out in front at about
200 paces distance. On the left there was the same forma-
tion, a second division was formed in the same way ; but in the
centre there was a heavy column of twelve battalions formed
in four lines, at 100 paces distance.

The idea was, that the right and left wings should attract
the enemy's attention and attack first, and that the central
column, massed under cover, should rush the entrenchments. It is
well to remember that breech-loaders were not used in America
except by the cavalry ; but the infantry had rifles, and very good
rifles, for they could kill at more than 1,000 yards. About 300,
or at most 400, yards was the effective range, but for all that
they were very useful weapons although they were muzzle-loaders.
This attack was perfectly successful. It was prepared by thirty
pieces of artillery, and the central column managed, by making
use of the shelter of the wood, to get close to the enemy's
works before it Avas observed. The attack of the two wings
engaged the attention of the Confederates ; when the word to
advance was given, the whole twelve battalions moved off as
one man, charged the breast- works, swept clean over them, took
1,200 prisoners, captured twenty guns, and carried a second
line of entrenchments in rear. But the Confederates had
reserve brigades close at hand. These made a determined
counter-stroke, and the Federals, in all the confidence of a
successful attack, were driven out nearly as quickly as they got
in. The men were exhausted ; they had made a long charge,
the fighting within the works had been very heavy, and there
were no supports.

There is a useful lesson emphasised here. These great
masses of men, in several lines, one behind the other, as has

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324 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

been shown over and over again, if the ground is at all favour-
able, and the propitious moment seized, will go through any-
thing, but if you want to keep what you have won you must
have strong reserves behind. The same thing occurred at
the Alma, where the great redoubt was carried without any
great difficulty ; but when the Russian columns came forward
to the counter-stroke, the men looked back, and seeing no
supports in rear, they streamed away. Much the same thing
occurred at Spottsylvania on May 10th. I may add that, despite
their deep formation, the Federals lost but few men until they
were attacked in turn ; the actual charge — the storm of the
entrenchments — was not at all a costly proceeding.

On the 11th there was more reconnaissance, and the same
evening General Grant determined on an attack on a larger scale.
The central point of Lee's entrenchments, salient to the remainder
of his lines, was believed to be the weakest part of the position,
and during the night 20,000 men were massed against it. The
formation was similar to that which had been partially successful
on the 10th. There was one division on the right in two lines ;
a second in the centre, with a third in rear, but the battalions of
these two divisions, instead of being in line, were formed in
column, in fact they were in line of masses, and each battalion
was in column of double companies. Perhaps the most in-
teresting point in this attack was the manoeuvring which took
place before it. The whole army closed to its left, and the
corps that made the grand attack was brought into position
by a night march of some four or five miles, forming up
outside their own entrenchments at 1,200 yards from the Con-
federate lines. Twenty thousand men were thus massed ready
to attack at daybreak ; and that they were able to march
through dense woods where maps showed nothing, where the
tracks were only known to the few guides, and to form for attack
in the darkness with silence and precision show that staff duties
in the Northern army were by this time thoroughly understood.

At half-past four on the morning of the 12th this enor-
mous mass of men rushed forward, swept over the open
ground in face of a heavy fire, tore away the abattis, and
stormed the parapet. Holding the entrenchments was the best

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 325

division in the Confederate army, but nearly the whole were
captured, together with twenty guns, two general officers, and
several stands of colours. Nor were the Federals satisfied with
this first success. The men pressed forward, and sweeping
everything before them, drove the thin end of the wedge right
into the Confederate lines. But Lee, recognising the weakness
of the salient, had caused a return entrenchment, or rather
another line of entrenchments, to be constructed about half a
mile in rear. By this second line the Federals were suddenly
brought up. The confusion was very great, the battalions had
intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers
could neither make their orders heard nor form their men
for another rush. Lee threw in his reserves. He made a tre-
mendous counter-stroke. Every single battalion he could
collect was ordered to attack ; and the vigour of the blow was
such that the whole of these 20,000 men were driven back
beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the Confederates
recaptured their first position.

The fighting that followed furnishes one of the most
extraordinary stories in the annals of war. The infantry
on both sides lay for the whole day with the parapets
between them, in many places not more than ten or twelve
paces distant. But in the end the Federals had to retire ;
they had found it impossible to break through the Con-
federate line. We may notice how nearly this great attack
came to a complete success, and that the cause of its ultimate
defeat was that in the excitement of the attack the second and
third lines, instead of keeping their respective distances, closed
in upon the first. I believe it is the experience of many officers
who have been engaged in similar attacks that it is very difficult
indeed to keep the men in hand, and that second and third
lines invariably act as did the Federals. The column on which
they principally depended, as soon as the first success was won,
became a confused mass of men over which officers and non-
commissioned officers had no control whatever, and when these
men struck the second entrenchment they were merely a mob.
It was said afterwards, by officers who had taken part in the
fight, that the distance between the lines ought to have been

326 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

very much increased, and that the second and third lines ought
to have waited until they saw they were wanted, and not to have
reinforced till then.

In every country in Europe, France, Germany, Austria,
Italy, so far as the principle goes, these deep formations — not
of course in columns — have been generally adopted. The
principle is that you mass opposite one point a great wedge
which you intend to drive into the enemy^ line, and that this
wedge is composed of several lines one behind the other at such
distance as may best suit the ground and the situation. The
same formation, I need hardly repeat, is advocated in our own
Drill-book. But it is a great point to remember that you
should have a force behind this wedge in order to confirm
success when you have broken in, for whatever may be the
discipline of the troops it is impossible that confusion and
intermingling of units can be avoided.

After the 12th General Grant determined to try at a new
point. He was not done with yet ; in the great attack he had
inflicted heavier loss on the Confederates than they had on
him, and his men, although they were beaten off, had fought so
well and had come so near victory that they were quite ready
for another effort. A movement by the left promised an
opportunity of attacking Lee^ right before it could be rein-
forced or his entrenchments extended. Grant therefore moved
nearly the whole of his army by a night march of several miles
to a line opposite to and outflanking the Confederate right.
But here again he had the worst of the luck. During the
night the rain fell in torrents. The roads were knee deep in
mud. It was so dark that even the torches did nothing to
make it brighter, and the men struggled wearily along at a
very slow pace and with many halts. When day broke the
advanced guards had reached the appointed rendezvous, but
the columns in rear were so strung out and scattered, and the
troops so utterly exhausted, that all idea of attack had to be
abandoned.

This was unfortunate for Grant, as General Lee, who had
no information of this new move, had very few troops on his
right flank. If the roads had been dry it is exceedingly pro-

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 327

bable that the Confederate entrenchments would have been
stormed. We have now reached the 14th. For the next three
days Grant remained in position opposite Lee's right, resting
his men, and receiving reinforcements ; then he made another
night march, returning to the scene of the great attack.
Grant's idea was that he had been facing Lee's right for a long
time, and that the Confederate general, expecting an attack
on that flank, would probably have thinned his line in the
centre. But Lee had done no such thing. He had a suspicion
that his enemy might manoeuvre once more, as he had done
already, and he not only held his centre in force, but had
strengthened it by abattis and artillery. So when Grant had
marched round, and once more attacked the salient, he got
well beaten ; the position was a great deal too strong to be
attacked. This was the end of the fighting at Spottsylvania.
The Federals had lost 17,000 men, the Confederates about
12,000.

On the 21st Grant determined to strike boldly round the
Confederate right, and if possible to force Lee to attack.
The operations which followed are too complicated to describe
here. The main fact is that Lee found out, by means of his
cavalry, what Grant was doing, that he refused to fall into
the trap which his opponent had laid, and, slipping quietly
away, still making use of his interior lines, interposed between
the Federals and Richmond behind the North Anna river ;
there he had two bridges opposite his right, a ford opposite his
centre, and another ford two and a half miles distant beyond his
left. I do not think that he believed that Grant would come over
and attack him. He rather believed that he would move off once
more past his right flank. When Grant, however, reached the
river, and found Lee behind it, he determined to try the strength
of this new position. He, therefore, ordered one of his army
corps to cross the ford beyond the enemy's left, reconnoitre the
Confederate position, and if there was any prospect of success to
report at once. This corps crossed the bridge, and, as usual,
immediately threw up a line of entrenchments. Now, Lee had,
hitherto, been holding his own against the Federals with much
success, but he had not yet defeated them. When he saw one

328 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

corps cross the river, more or less isolated from the remainder,
he recognised the opportunity he desired, and he ordered an
immediate attack. But he was not present himself during the
engagement ; unfortunately for the Confederates he was lying
sick in his tent. However, he sent one of his best generals in
command of the attacking corps, but the counter-stroke was
unsuccessful. The Federals had entrenched, and when the
Confederates came on and assaulted the breast-works, they found
to their cost what a difficult business such an attack was, and
the defence once more prevailed. Grant reinforced this corps
by a second, and moved a third over the bridge opposite Lee's
right. As the situation now stood, he had rather the advan-
tage. One corps was still beyond the river, opposite Lee's
centre, and if he could have thrown this corps over the ford in
front of it, he would have had everything in his own hands,
and have been able to crush the Confederates. He was much
superior in numbers ; his troops across the river were strongly
entrenched, and he had no reason to fear attack.

Lee now put into practice a very curious manoeuvre. His
army was more or less separated. The corps on the left was three
miles distant from those which held the right and centre, so it was
possible that he might be beaten on one wing before his reserves
could reinforce it. His line in fact was dangerously extended.
He got out of his difficulty in this way : — he shut up his
line like one closes an umbrella ; the line had originally been
almost straight, it now assumed the shape shown in the map.
His whole force was now massed in a space not more than
two and a half miles broad, and his enemy was not only widely
separated, but would have to cross the river to reinforce one
wing from the other. He could reinforce a point attacked in
one-third of the time that Grant could reinforce at the same
point. Grant was completely nonplussed by this manoeuvre,
in fact his only idea was to get out of his uncomfortable
situation as fast as possible. He found that he had two corps
on one wing, one corps on the other, separated by a wide
interval and by the river. It was evident that nearly the whole
Confederate army might fall either on one or on the other. As
a matter of fact here was a very great opportunity — so say the

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 329

critics — which Lee might have seized, and which, if he had been
himself, he probably would have seized ; but as fortune would
have it, when General Grant was entangling himself in this
most awkward position, Lee, as I have said, was sick in his tent.
On the night of the 26th, Grant got out of his difficulties by
recrossins the river under cover of the darkness, and once more
he moved round Lee's right. Lee followed suit as before, and
the two armies eventually came into contact at Cold Harbor,
and here was fought the last battle of the Wilderness campaign.
General Grant advanced, hoping that he would find Lee getting
into position, but he found instead that the Confederates were
already entrenched with their flanks secured by streams, and
that there was no chance of catching them at a disadvantage.
And then at last he seems to have lost his temper. There was
no manoeuvring at Cold Harbor as there had been at Spott-
sylvania ; there was no massing against one particular point ;
but the army moved straight against the Confederate front, and
the order was given, ' the whole line will attack.1

There was no attempt at any formation beyond drawing up
the army corps each in two lines. The artillery was ordered
to do what it could in the way of bombardment, but that was
very little ; and when the attack was made it was driven back
in little more than an hour with a loss of 12,000 men. Grant
sent a fresh order that the attack was to be renewed, but the
men lay still and would not move. The American soldiers had
sometimes a way of their own of expressing what they thought
of their general, and this time they showed him ^iat such
attacks against entrenched positions were absolutely impossible.

This battle took place on June 3rd ; it was confined to a
single attack, and here again the Confederates made no attempt
at a counter-stroke. But they had little opportunity. Before
the attack was made the Federals had constructed long lines of
entrenchments, and Lee and his generals had found out by
experience that it was no good attacking these hasty fortifica-
tions. During these operations Grant had again changed his
base. Every time he moved by his left flank and tried to get
round Lee, he shifted his base along the water-ways. First
of all he began with the base on the railway ; then he went to

330 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Fredericksburg, then to Port Royal ; next to the White House,
and eventually to the River James. He changed his base no less
than five times ; his army was always well supplied, even his
enormous numbers of wounded were carried straight away to
the base and thence to Washington, without any difficulty ;
and he had no obstacles whatever to fight against as
regards either feeding his men or keeping up the supply of
ammunition.

The end of the campaign, so far as we are concerned, is the
passage of the last great river, the James. The James, below
Richmond, is as broad as the Danube near Vienna ; a very
difficult obstacle indeed ; and it is curious to find that, notwith-
standing this difficult obstacle, Grant not only carried the
greater part of his army over before Lee was made aware of his
movements, but that he very nearly defeated a portion of Lee"s
army, and captured a section of the earthworks which defended
Richmond, from the south. After Cold Harbor, Grant threw
all his cavalry towards Richmond along the White House
Railway. They came in contact with the Confederates, and the
Confederates could not discern what was going on behind this
screen. Meanwhile all the infantry of the army moved down
to the James, and made the passage. Grant had now deter-
mined to attack Richmond from the south, cutting the com-
munications of the capital with the rest of the Confederacy,
and in making his flank march he most certainly outmanoeuvred
Lee. It was only the slackness of one of his subordinates that
saved the Confederate army, not indeed from defeat, but from
being driven back into Richmond itself. Lee intended to defend
Richmond behind the fortifications of Petersburg, a most im-
portant railway junction. But if Grant had at this juncture
only had a little luck, the Confederate army would have been
driven into the capital. It was, of course, strongly fortified,
but it was by no means so strong as Petersburg, and the com-
munications must have been immediately severed.

It is not necessary to explain Grant's perseverance in
attacking the Confederates wherever he found them. It
is obvious that Lee's army was his true objective, and that
the occupation of Richmond could have had no decisive effect

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 331

while that army still held the field. If that army were
thoroughly defeated, the fall of Richmond, and the end of the
war, would follow.

I am afraid this is a very imperfect sketch of a very remark-
able campaign, but a satisfactory description of these operations
would make a fair-sized book. There are, however, a good many
points which will bear a little explanation. First of all there
is the question of entrenchments.

Defensive tactics, if we are to believe some people, resolve
themselves into this : — If you have a point to hold, nothing
more is necessary than to take up a position in front of it, to
entrench your line till it is as formidable as Plevna, to man it
with magazine rifles and machine guns, and to hold on. But I
doubt if this is quite enough. I think, on the contrary, that
it may be very dangerous, under all circumstances, to select
your position long beforehand, and to make sure that the
enemy will knock his head against it. Behind the Rapidan Lee
held a very strong entrenched position, covering his line of
communications, and covering Richmond. But Grant piles ten
days1 supply into his 5,000 wagons and walks round the flank
of this carefully prepared position. I am particularly anxious
not to be misunderstood. I have not the slightest intention,
under certain conditions, of denying the very great utility of
positions thoroughly prepared and selected long beforehand.
Torres Vedras is an instance of their use and value. The lines
of Petersburg, occupied by Lee after the Wilderness campaign,
are another. But their strength lay in this, that they could not
be turned ; the line of supply was secure from all attacks, and
under such conditions no man in his senses could deny the
importance of solidly constructed entrenchments. But there is
always the danger — and this is the point on which I am anxious
to lay stress — that an army which can manoeuvre like the
Federal army by day, and especially by night, an army which
can carry large supplies, or which can live on the country, or,
above all, which has facilities for changing its base, can often
s>et such entrenchments at defiance. A daring general, like
Grant, if he is not tightly bound to one line of supply, will
remember Napoleon's maxim, ' shun the position in which the

332 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

enemy wishes }'ou to attack him, especially that which he has
fortified.1 Of course it may be said that Lee, in allowing
Grant to pass round his flank, and then attacking him in
the Wilderness, showed us the best way to deal with such
manoeuvres. But this was altogether an exceptional case.
Lee relied on the difficulty of the battlefield, on the topo-
graphy with which he was familiar, and of which his opponents
knew next to nothing, and could find out nothing. So greatly
was Grant hampered by the lack of roads, that he was unable
to reach the open country south of Spottsylvania. Had he
possessed greater freedom of manoeuvre, had he not been com-
pelled to move his enormous train by two indifferent roads, it
is extremely probable that he would have intervened between
Lee and Richmond, and have met him on ground which offered
no peculiar advantage, as did the Wilderness, to the Con-
federates. I am very strongly of opinion that, as modern
armies have much practice in manoeuvring, both by day and
night, and as their men are trained to long marches, and to
movements en masse, very careful attention should be directed
to the dangers which may arise from the premature selection
and occupation of defensive positions. A change of front,
especially where large numbers are concerned, if it is to be
effected rapidly and in good order, is a most difficult operation.
I may notice here the comparative security in which the Federals
manoeuvred by night across the front and round the flanks of
the Confederate army.

The country was very close, and reconnoitring parties could
not leave the roads in the darkness, but it is impossible not
to avoid the conclusion that if, when we occupy a defensive
position, we are not desirous of finding the enemy across our
flank when the morning dawns, we must use our very best
endeavours to find out what is going on under cover of the
night. It certainly strikes one as curious that the Con-
federates, knowing what they did of Grant's predilection for
night marches, should have been unable to detect his move-
ment in retreat across the North Anna. This is one lesson,
then, which may be deduced from the Wilderness campaign.
Because you have formidable earthworks along your front, you

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 333

are not therefore to consider yourself secure. Another lesson
is that the entrenchments which were of the most use in this
campaign were those which were constructed on the spot, when
the direction of the enemy's attack had become apparent.
Those at the Wilderness, Spottslyvania, the North Anna, and
Cold Harbor were thrown up when the enemy was actually
within striking distance, and yet their value was far greater
than those on the Rapidan, or, if Grant's subordinates had been
more dashing, than those beyond the James.

For those who care to study the campaign closely, it is worth
while noting with what skill Lee's positions were selected. His
flanks at Spottsylvania, at the North Anna, and at Cold Harbor,
were so secured by streams that it was very difficult indeed for his
opponent to manoeuvre without crossing one of these streams,
and so dividing his army. It was not only the entrenchments,
but the natural features of the ground also on which Lee relied
in his defensive tactics. His eye for ground must have been
extraordinary. The campaign was fought over a very large
area, an area of very close country, with few marked natural
features; and yet in the midst of woods, jungle and streams,
with very little time at his disposal, he always seems to have
selected positions than which none could have been stronger.
His eye for ground, then, had much to do with his successful
resistance to Grant's overwhelming numbers ; and this eye for
ground he possessed in common with all generals who are
acknowledged as masters of war. Now, with all respect to the
text-books, and to ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to
think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by
no means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of
positions, to the rapid adaptation of hasty entrenchments to the
field of battle, to the recognition of ' tactical ' points, i.e. ' key
points ' ; and to the immense advantages that are to be derived,
whether you are defending or attacking, from the proper utilisa-
tion of natural features. There are people who tell you that
Napoleon's campaigns are ancient history. ' Read the battles
of 1870,' they say, < visit the fields of 1870. There is no use
in studying Napoleon's battlefields, because the ranges were
so short.' With those good people I altogether disagree.

334 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Napoleon, like Lee, made such remarkable use of ground that
natural features played a very great part in many of his vic-
tories, and no one who visits the scenes of some of these victories
can fail to learn a very useful lesson ; a lesson of great value to
every officer who has any aspirations in the direction of inde-
pendent command, and this lesson is one in generalship. One of
the secrets of Napoleon's extraordinary success will be revealed,
and these secrets are well worth the learning, for natural
features, as we learn from this very campaign, can still
be utilised with great effect, and can be utilised in the very
same manner as they were by Napoleon.

Speaking for myself, I may say that I had visited the battle-
fields of 1870 very often, and studied them very closely, before
I visited any one of Napoleon's fields ; but it was not until I went
to Jena and Austerlitz that I really grasped what an impor-
tant part an eye for ground like Napoleon's, or blindness as to
ground like his opponents', at both of these battles, may play in
Grand Tactics, that is, in the art of generalship. When you look
at the position of the Allies at Austerlitz, the position that was
captured by one of the finest counter-strokes in history, one of
the first things you observe is an insignificant village half-way
up the little hill which formed the centre of the position.
Napoleon's counter-stroke met with such splendid success
because when he saw that village and the hill above it he recog-
nised at once the very great advantage which they would give
him if he could seize them. To the ordinary observer they do
not appear to be an important point, nor did they seem so to the
Allies, who altogether rejected them, or, at all events, took no
special precautions for their defence. It seems rather a curious
thing to say that we can learn the use of ground from books ;
but to a certain degree Ave may learn from the campaigns of
the great captains how to utilise the ground ; we may learn
to recognise its importance ; and then proceeding to the
ground itself, whether at manoeuvres in command of troops, or
in studying positions alone, we can put theory into practice, and
gradually acquire that eye for ground without which no man,
it is my firm conviction, can ever hope to be a great or even a
useful general.

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 335

THE ATTACK ON THE SALIENT

Report of the Corps Commander, General Hancock

I was directed to form my troops for an assault on the enemy's
line at 4 a.m. Two officers of my staff accompanied Lieut.-Colonel
Comstock of General Grant's staff, to reconnoitre the point which I
was instructed to storm, but no very definite information could
be obtained. I moved out after dark, under the guidance of an
engineer officer, over a narrow and difficult road, under heavy rain,
which rendered the marching extremely fatiguing for the men.
The head of the column arrived at the Brown House, near which it
was proposed to form up for attack, about midnight, the troops get-
ting into position as soon as they came up. The troops were formed
in rear of our picket line, about 1,200 yards from the enemy's
entrenchments. The ground ascended sharply towards the enemy's
lines and was in part thickly wooded. A small watercourse ran
parallel to the front of our line. The troops took position quietly
and promptly, although it was an unusually dark and stormy night.
The direction of the advance was ascertained by compass on the
map from the Brown House to a large white house known to be in-
side the enemy's lines, near the point we wished to strike. The
preparations were scarcely completed at daylight. A heavy fog
decided me to delay the attack till 4.35 a.m. When the order was
given to advance, the 3rd division had some difficulty in making its
way through a wood and marsh in its front, but pushed forward
overcoming all obstacles and keeping well up with the 1st division,
which moved at quick time for several hundred yards, the heavy
column marching over the enemy's pickets without firing a shot,
regardless of a sharp fire on its left flank from the reserve of the
outpost line. It continued up the slope almost half-way to the
enemy's lines when the men broke into a tremendous cheer, and
spontaneously taking up the double, rolled like an irresistible wave
into the enemy's works, tearing away the abattis in front of the
entrenchments with their hands, and carrying the line at all points
in a few moments, although it was desperately defended. The 1st
and 3rd divisions entered almost at the same moment. A fierce
and bloody fight ensued in the works with bayonets and clubbed
muskets. It was short, however, and resulted in the capture of
nearly 4,000 prisoners, 20 pieces of artillery, and upwards of 30
colours, two general officers also were taken. The enemy fled in
great confusion and disorder. Their numbers in killed and

336 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

wounded were unusually great. The interior of the entrenchments
presented a terrible and ghastly spectacle of dead, most of whom
were killed with the bayonet. So thickly lay the dead at this point,
that at many places the dead bodies were touching and piled upon
one another.

From the report of General Brooke, commanding 4tth Brigade

Our path lay, first, through a slight thicket, then over an open
field, with a slight ascent, the extreme left through a copse of tall
pines (which, however, didn't obstruct the march in any material
manner), then down a gradual declivity to within 50 yards of the
works, then up a sharp ascent for the same distance. The face of
this last ascent was covered by abattis, through which it was very
difficult to force a way. The enemy opened a terrific fire of mus-
ketry and artillery upon us, notwithstanding which our brave men
marched on, and dragging away the abattis, poured upon them in
one irresistible mass, and after a short, sharp fight, killed and cap-
tured nearly all who occupied the works. Those who still resisted
were driven in confusion. Never during the war have I seen such
desperate fighting. The bayonet was freely used on both sides ;
the enemy fought desperately and nothing hut the formation of our
attack and the valour ot our troops could have carried the works.
Not a shot was fired by my men till they mounted the works.

From the report of General Johnson, commanding the defeated

Division

On the night of the 11th (between 10 and 12 o'clock), scouts
and officers on the picket line reported that the enemy was moving
to his right and concentrating in my front, and all concurred in the
opinion that my lines would be assaulted in the morning. I ordered
my command to be on the alert, some brigades to be awake all
night, and all to be up and in the trenches an hour or so before
daylight. The order was obeyed. At the first intimation of the
enemy's advance I went to the trenches. Soon after my arrival
there, a heavy column assaulted my right. Immediately after this
a very heavy column debouched from the pines about half or three-
quarters of a mile from my works and advanced upon the Salient.
This column came up in large numbers, but in great disorder, with
a narrow front, but extending to the rear as far as I could see.
There was no surprise. My men were up and in the trenches

THE WILDERNESS OF VIRGINIA 337

prepared for the assault before the enemy made his appearance.
The ground was over open fields with abattis in front.

Note by Author

The attacking army corps lost 2,000 men in this day's fight, but
captured nearly twice as many, as well as killing and wounding
many of the enemy ; the numbers of the latter cannot be ascer-
tained, but probably amounted to at least 2,000.

CHAPTER XII

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK

(From the ' United Service Magazine,' August 1899)

Twexty-one years have elapsed since the last great European
conflict, and during this period the progress of invention and
of education has brought about important modifications in the
methods of civilised and even savage warfare. Yet the ex-
periences of the Russo-Turkish campaign, together with those
of 'TO-'Tl, still form the basis on which the training of armies
is carried out. In almost every essential respect the tactical
teaching of 1899 is that of 1878. The battle formations
of the three arms have undergone no marked change, and the
drill-books present no conspicuous points of difference. But
it is not therefore to be understood that the tactical teaching
of to-day is antiquated and unprogressive. It is true that
within the last ten years fire has become more deadly ; that
smokeless powder has introduced new difficulties ; and that the
means of inter-communication, such as visual signalling and
the telegraph, are more numerous and more certain than in "78.
Yet as regards the effect of those new factors in civilised
warfare, although we have very little experience to guide us,
it seems safe to assume they will not make the battle of the
future very dissimilar to anything that has gone before. It
will be certainly less easy to procure information. Deployment
must take place at a greater distance. The fire of both infantry
and artillery against favourable targets will produce greater
results. Frontal and flank attacks will be more easily combined ;
counter-strokes more easily arranged ; and, when troops are
exposed to heavy fire, demoralisation will set in at an earlier
period. It would be unwise to say more than this. Results
obtained on the ranges are no safe guide to results obtained

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 339

on the battlefield, and it is very easy to exaggerate the effect
of new or improved weapons.

So far as we can judge from such recent experiences as the
war between Chili and Peru, the action at Krugersdorp, the
campaigns in Thessaly, in Cuba, and on the North- West
Frontier, when two forces meet whose armament is equal, the
slaughter is not likely to be abnormal. Shrapnel, Maxims, and
the small-bore do not seem to increase the butcher's bill to
the extent that some would have us believe. The carnage at
Omdurman, where the dense masses of the Dervishes, on
absolutely open ground, were simply mown down by bullet and
shrapnel at long range, was undoubtedly appalling. Out of
20,000 men who took part in the first attack, it has been
estimated that 8,000 fell, and only a few riflemen crept up to
a point distant 700 yards from the British zeriba. But at
St. Privat, in 1870, the French chassepot, together with a muzzle-
loading field gun and most indifferent fuses, wrought almost
equal havoc. In under half an hour the Prussian Guard lost
4,500 men out of 12,000, and not only were the formations
much less dense than those of the Dervishes, but the brigades
were supported, to a certain extent, by the fire of their own
artillery. Again, in the war of ,77-,78, the long-range fire of
the Turks caused enormous losses in the Russian columns.
General Todleben, the conqueror of Plevna, relates that on one
occasion 10,000 men fell without seeing the enemy. Although
the accuracy of his figures has been questioned, the assertion is
sufficient proof that the death-dealing power of the Turkish
Martini was not far inferior to that of the Lee-Metford.

What we may expect, it would seem, is that the methods
of war which the increased fire-power of '70 and '77 made
necessary will be even more necessary in the future ; and that
the phenomena it produced will be still more marked. It was
found in '70 and 177 that infantry could only attack in open
lines ; that superiority of fire could only be attained by a close
combination at every stage of the attack of infantry and artillery ;
that reconnaissance was difficult ; that the effect of fire against
troops in the open was very great, and that cover had assumed
a new importance. Inventions and improvements have added

z 2

340 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

a new force to each of these factors, but they have not eliminated
a single one.

We may fairly conclude, then, that the battles of w70-17l and
""71-18 present in all essential respects true pictures of the
fighting of the future ; and that, consequently, the training of
our troops is based on sound and substantial foundations.

This opinion is not everywhere accepted. Very different
ideas are often put forward. But they are put forward, as a
rule, by those who are imperfectly acquainted with the history
of past campaigns. It is said, for instance, that battles will be
of far longer duration in the time to come. Yet the last battle
of Plevna was an affair of several days ; and to go still further
back, we have many instances in the American and Napoleonic
wars when victory hung in the balance for two and even three
days.

The battles of '70 are not in this respect the best of guides.
The great fault in the German tactics at the beginning of the
war was a precipitate rush into action, a general neglect of
reconnaissance, and an absolute contempt for essential prelim-
inaries, such as a study of the ground, the choice of artillery
positions, the deployment of the troops, the formation of the
larger units in several lines, the explanation of the plan of
battle, and the promulgation of maturely considered orders.
The practice of Napoleon and of Wellington, of the great
generals of America, of Skobeleff and of Osman, was very
different. Whole days of their campaigns were spent in
preparation ; in collecting information, in examining the
positions, in feeling the enemy, in deploying the troops^
in selecting the line of attack, and in making everyone familiar
with the plan of battle.

Again, we are told that the spade will be far more extensively
employed in future wars, and it is tacitly implied that this
useful tactical auxiliary has not yet seen its full develop-
ment. In 'TO-'Tl, it is true, entrenchments, especially in
the attack, played but an insignificant part. In Bulgaria,
however, Osman and Skobeleff showed its real value, and Osman
and Skobeleff only imitated the American generals of the
Secession War. It can hardly be sustained, then, that the

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 341

attack and defence of hastily entrenched positions will be a
novelty. It may be admitted, however, that the import-
ance of the spade is often overlooked in peace ; and that
entrenchments, as a tactical expedient and precaution, and
especially as an essential adjunct to attack, do not receive, at
field-days and manoeuvres, the attention they deserve ; and in
this respect our tactical training is possibly at fault. Nor is
this its only defect.

The reason, however, for such defects is not that the lessons
of '70 and '77 are obsolete, but that some have been imperfectly
absorbed, and that others have not yet been made clear. This
is undoubtedly a somewhat startling statement. No war has
been so carefully written up, so minutely analysed, so thoroughly
discussed, as that of '70 ; and although the literature of the
Russo-Turkish campaign is less voluminous and less accessible,
it is still sufficiently large to give ample occupation to the most
indefatigable student. Yet for all that, the lessons generally
deduced from these campaigns are not so plain and comprehen-
sive as they might be ; and this, it would appear, is due to the
fact that, so far as infantry is concerned, attention has been too
exclusively confined to a single phase of battle and a single
variety of ground, i.e. to that phase of battle which intervenes
between deployment and the assault, and to ground where the
only obstacle to movement is the fire of the enemy.

The attainment of superiority of fire and the breaching of
the defenders' line are unquestionably the decisive factors in
war ; and the methods by which they may be attained, such as
suitable formations, the control of fire, the reinforcement of
the firing line, and massing in strong force for the final charge,
occupy, very properly, the minds of those who look forward
to carrying out such operations on actual service. But, as
will be explained hereafter, these factors and these methods
are not everything, nor is level and unobstructed country the
most practical training-ground. In the first place, the attack
and assault of a definite position form but a single phase in
a protracted series of operations, each of very different character ;
and, in the second, attack and assault over open ground,
although perhaps the most difficult, and certainly the most

342 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

costly of manoeuvres, is neither an inevitable nor even a usual
feature of the battlefield.

It may be argued, however, that, even if this be true, it is
essential that the attack over open ground, on account of its
great difficulty and hazard, should be the more practised.
Quite so ; but, at the same time, it shows small knowledge
of war to believe that a slope like a glacis, a wide field of fire,
and an absence of all covered approaches, are the necessary
and the ordinary concomitants of a defensive position. The
very contrary is the case. In whatever theatre of war we may
find ourselves, positions which possess those desirable attributes,
and which, at the same time, are on a line which the enemy
is likely to operate, are as rare as the four-leaved shamrock ;
and it is, therefore, a waste of time to train our infantry too
exclusively for the attack and assault over open ground.

Take, for instance, the fields of the Metz campaign. In
each of the first great battles, the battles which sealed the
fate of France, and which were fought in an unusually open
country, woods played a most prominent part ; and in four —
Woerth, Spicheren, Colombey and Beaumont — the decisive
attack was made through dense thickets. The conditions of
,77_,78, so far as the fighting round Plevna was concerned,
undoubtedly resembled those which are too often supposed
to exist on every battlefield ; a glacis-like slope and a wide
field of fire were the most conspicuous characteristics of Osman's
stronghold. But in other parts of the theatre of war, in the
Balkans and in Asia, the ground was of a very different
character, and hill-fighting, with all its peculiar difficulties, was
the rule rather than the exception. We have here a significant
fact, and a most useful warning. In the same campaign, on
the same theatre of war, and even on the same battlefield, it is
exceedingly probable that we shall find two absolutely distinct
sets of conditions.

It would be going too far to say that different conditions
necessitate absolutely different formations, or absolutely different
methods of leading ; for the same principles hold good in all
infantry fighting. Whatever the ground may be like, a position
must be attacked in several lines, and the greatest depth must

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 343

be opposite the point of assault. But diversity of ground
demands a marked diversity in such details as distances,
intervals, frontage, and the means of maintaining connection
and control. And if we endeavour to apply the lesson to
ourselves, we shall find we are face to face with a very serious
question. What conditions are we likely to have to deal with
when we take the field ? What sort of ground will our
battalions be called on to attack over in their next campaign ?
Will it be open ground or close, desert or jungle, plain or
mountain, swamp or waterless, barren or well cultivated ? He
would be a bold man who would venture to predict. The
attempt would be as useless as to guess at the quality, the
tactics, or even the colour, of our next enemy.

But the deductions to be drawn are : — first, that, more
than any other, the British army has to be prepared for fighting
over every kind of country, just as it has to be prepared to
meet every known form of tactics. And, second, that even
against a civilised enemy, whom we fairly assume to be a more
formidable foe than even the bravest and wiliest of savages,
attack and counter-attack will have to be delivered over broken
ground far more frequently than over a glacis-like slope. But
how is it possible, it may be asked, to familiarise our troops
in peace with the infinite variety of surroundings they may
meet on service ? Where are the woods, the mountains, the
swamps, the jungles, the desert, the waterless and roadless
tracts over which they may practise mimic war ? And even
if such tracts were available, would they be identical with
those we may have to fight upon ? Woods, for instance, vary
much in character. The beechwood has little in common with
the oak ; the hazel-covert with the forest of pines. And so
mountains vary, in steepness, in height, in ruggedness.

How, then, is our infantry to be trained ?

There are various methods. Some will tell you that all
that can be done is to rely on good discipline and good shooting,
to practise a normal formation, and thus ensure uniformity ;
others, that special formations must be adopted under special
conditions ; but that the formations and methods of leading-
suitable to each different case should be laid down by authority.

344 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

All systems, however, which depend on explicit regulations
make but small demands on the intelligence of the individual
officer, and for that reason, if for no other, they are quite
inadequate to the exigencies of modern warfare. I will support
my opinion by three instances drawn from practical experience.

I was once standing on the battlefield at Woerth, with a
German officer, discussing the subject of infantry training, and
in order to explain his objection to normal formations, he
referred to his own experiences on that very field.

' Before the war,' he said, ' my regiment and brigade had
been very thoroughly trained, but always over open ground
and in stereotyped formation. Woerth was our first experience
of battle, and you may imagine our embarrassment, accustomed
as we were to ground which had few obstructions, when we
were ordered to advance against the French flank through
the dense and pathless wood which lies in front of you. The
formation to which we were accustomed was evidently un-
suitable. But we had very little time in which to devise a
substitute, or to consider the way in which we should advance ;
and it ended in our sending forward a strong chain of skirmishers,
with their supports, and breaking up the remainder of the
brigade into several columns. As you know,' he went on,

* we found the enemy in the middle of the wood, very strongly
posted along the edge of a clearing, and in large numbers, and
we made no progress until his flank was turned by other troops.'

* Still,' I said, ' you seem to have done all that could be ex-
pected from you. You kept your direction; the men were
well in hand; and there was no disorder or loss of tactical
unity until the fighting got to close quarters, and the enemy
began his successive counter-strokes.' ' Quite true,' he replied ;
4 we certainly did well for young and inexperienced soldiers ;
and the reason was that, although we had spent the greater
part of our time in practising a normal formation, our officers,
including the captains and subalterns, were used to respon-
sibility ; they had been to a certain extent trained to exercise
their own judgment, and to devise methods of overcoming
unexpected difficulties, without continually asking for orders.
This pulled us through. But we should have done far better

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 345

had we been more practised in skirmishing, and had as much
care been taken to develop the judgment of' our officers as to
maintain the correct distances in the normal formation. That
normal formation, I may say, we never attempted throughout
the war. On almost every occasion where my regiment was
seriously engaged, we fought either in a wood, a village, or in
enclosed country, and for neither of these was it in the least
adapted.'

The second illustration comes from the experience of a
regimental officer on the North- West Frontier of India.

' We at once found out,1 he says, ' the deficiencies of our
peace training. In the first place, the system of attack (or
rather, the systems, for we had recently changed stations,
and come under a new general) which we had taken so much
trouble to learn, was quite out of place in the hills. In the
second place, we had not been in action five minutes before
we found that volley-firing was useless, for the targets never re-
mained long enough in position for us to go through all the
elaborate preliminaries. In the third place, companies, and
even sections, had to a great extent to fight their own battles,
for it was impossible to supervise them, and sometimes even to
see them ; and lastly, both officers and men were very much at
sea in the skirmishing tactics which the ground made necessary.
As regards this last, I must acknowledge that all were not
tarred with the same brush, and some regiments, notably
several belonging to the native army, were at home from the
first. But, so far as I can learn, these regiments had received
a thorough light infantry training ; their officers, as almost all
the officers of the native army are, were accustomed to responsi-
bility, and many of the men were highlanders born and bred.
Anything better than the skirmishing of the Guides, and of the
Pathan companies of the 20th P.I., I never wish to see. I pity
the Russians that come across them in their native hills. You
must not understand, however, that I have the smallest inten-
tion of running down the British regimental officers and men.
If they were puzzled at first ; if company officers, and even
regimental commanders, betrayed a good deal of " stickiness,"
hesitated to act for themselves, and when they did so act, often

84G THE SCIENCE OF WAR

went too far ; if the men did not show the same capacity for
looking after themselves as their comrades of the good native
regiments, it was the fault of their training ; and in proof
of how good our material is, it was perfectly astonishing to see
the way in which, after a little experience, both officers and
men adapted themselves to their most difficult and, in a sense,
demoralising surroundings. After a few days1 fighting, Tommy
Atkins was nearly as clever a skirmisher, although hardly so
agile, as his Pathan comrade. But, of course, while he was
learning his business, the losses were both heavy and unneces-
sary, and this is certainly a reflection on our system of training.
What we want are the following : —

'1. Regimental officers, including company commanders, to
be left more to themselves on field days.

* 2. An extended course of physical training, jumping,
running, climbing, crossing obstacles, &c.

* 3. Practice as light infantry over difficult ground.

* 4. Careful instruction of the individual skirmisher.''

My last illustration comes from the Peninsular War, but it
is by no means the least valuable. Throughout Wellington's
campaigns the Light Brigade formed a permanent outpost line
and covering force. It took up these duties almost immediately
on landing ; and whether as skirmishers in the woods and
mountains of Portugal and Spain, or as part of the regular
line of battle, the famous regiments which composed it were
without their equals in either the French or the British armies.
Two points call for special attention. First : these regiments,
when they joined Sir Arthur Wellesley after Talavera, were
young, inexperienced soldiers, and yet their remarkable efficiency
was at once apparent. Second : the fighting in which they
made their name, on the rugged heights of the Coa, amid the
sierras of Portugal, and in the attack and defence of the
stupendous heights of the Pyrenees, bears a very striking
resemblance to the fighting on the North-West Frontier and
in Afghanistan. Two questions, therefore, are at once sug-
gested : —

1. To what system of instruction did these regiments owe
their remarkable efficiency ?

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 34?

2. Would not this system, which produced skill in skirmish-
ing, with steadiness in the line of battle, be the most effective
means of training the British infantry of to-day for its multi-
farious duties ?

An answer to the first may be found in the writings of
officers who served in the Light Brigade during the Peninsular
War. Unfortunately the system of instruction is nowhere
minutely described, but by collating and comparing the state-
ments of many contemporary writers, and by studying the
records and standing orders of the three regiments, the causes
of the high standard of efficiency which resulted may be easily
arrived at. They are as follows : —

1. The correct habits of command instilled into the regi-
mental officers, and the training of their judgment.

2. The physical training of the soldier.

3. Practice as light infantry over difficult ground.

4. The careful instruction of the individual skirmisher.
We have here the curious fact that the standard aimed at

by Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe Camp, in 1803, was identical
with that laid down by an officer who saw active service on
the Indian frontier in 1898, and we may reply to the second
question, therefore, by saying that the system under which the
Light Brigade became so famous is the most effective means of
training the British infantry of to-day. It should never be
forgotten that on such ground as was available near an ordinary
English station, Sir John Moore's command was so trained that
in a far more difficult country, a country of rocks and ravines,
of lofty precipices and barren uplands, neither officers nor men
were ever caught at a disadvantage.

But there is more to be learned from the training of the
Light Brigade than this. The secret of its efficiency lay, not
so much in the constant exercise on the green downs by Caesar's
Camp, in physical training, and in the careful instruction of
the individual skirmishers, as in the inculcating of correct habits
of command in the regimental officers. Those who have had
occasion to study in contemporary records the manner in which
the officers of the brigade handled their men throughout
the innumerable engagements of the Peninsular War, need no

348 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

further evidence to convince them that it was to the skill, the
resolution, and the trained judgment of these officers that the
success of the brigade is in the main to be attributed. Their
most marked characteristics were that when they were left alone
they almost invariably did the right thing ; that they had no
hesitation in assuming responsibility ; that they could handle
their regiments and companies, if necessary, as independent
units ; and that they consistently applied the great principle
of mutual support. It seems perfectly clear, therefore, that
Sir John Moore and the colonels of the Light Brigade
intended, when they instituted their system of discipline, of
instruction, and of command, to form in the persons of their
company officers a body of intelligent and zealous assistants,
capable of carrying- out tlieir plans and anticipating their
wishes ; and not merely a body of docile subordinates capable
of obeying orders to the letter, but untrained to resolute
initiative.

This is a point on which too great stress can hardly be laid.
If you recall the words of the officers already quoted, of the
German who fought in 1870-1, and of the Englishman who
fought the Afridis, you will find the same idea running
throughout. The good results in the one case, the less good
results in the other, are stated to be due to the previous
training of the officers ; and this, it would appear, is one of the
lessons of the 'TO-'Tl, ""11 -IS campaigns which has been im-
perfectly absorbed. It has not been ignored ; the Drill-book is
clear enough : —

* Commanders of all ranks, from generals to section com-
manders, must carefully bear in mind that in war it is im-
possible for them to exercise over their commands the same
personal control that finds place at drill exercises. Delegation
of command is a necessity, and commanders must, therefore,
take every opportunity of training their subordinates in accept-
ing responsibility for departures from, or variations in, the
mode of carrying out orders or directions originally given,
impressing on them at the same time that such departures or
variations must always be justified by the circumstances of the
case. The conditions of modern warfare render it imperative

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 349

that all ranks should be taught to think, and, subject to general
instructions and accepted principles, to act for themselves.1

Nor has the lesson failed to find acceptance by the majority
of generals and commanding officers. But that it is not uni-
versally appreciated is sufficiently proved by the criticisms
passed on the regimental and company leading by officers who
took part in the Tirah campaign. Remember what I said were
the most marked characteristics of Sir John Moore's officers :
* When they were left alone they almost invariably did the right
thing. They had no hesitation in assuming responsibility. They
could handle their regiments and companies, if necessary, as in-
dependent units ; and they consistently applied the great principle
of mutual support.'' It is an exceedingly ungrateful task to
criticise, even in the smallest degree, the operations of a cam-
paign so brilliantly conducted as that in the Afridi highlands ;
but unless we take note of the mistakes we can expect no
progress. War is the school where we must all learn, whether
the experience is our own or others'. Moreover, the instructions
on hill- warfare recently issued in India, and the manoeuvres
instituted at hill-stations, show plainly enough that the highest
authorities in India consider that improvements in our infantry
training may still be made.

The characteristics of Light Infantry fighting may be briefly
described.

1. The men must be accustomed to work at any interval
and in any formation that may be ordered.

2. Accuracy and regularity, except in maintaining the
direction and a rough general line, are not demanded.

3. The section will be the unit of command, but it will
work in due co-operation with the remainder of the company,
and the company will keep touch with the battalion.

4. The section will be divided into two sub-sections or
groups, and every group will endeavour to render support to
those on either hand.

5. The section will move in such fashion as circumstances
dictate, either by rushes, by creeping up, in quick time, or at
the double. It is often desirable that a few men should creep
up at a time.

350 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

'At the Nivelle on November 10th, 1813, the line of the
French main position was in front of the regiment with an
intervening rocky watercourse, which, it would seem, was deemed
impassable by our enemies. The 52nd moved to the small
open ravine and wood in their front under a smart fire ot
artillery from the ridge next to be assailed. In front of this
wood, the watercourse was crossed by a small and narrow stone
bridge, on the opposite side of which was a wood running
parallel to the watercourse, with a sheltered bank towards the
enemy. The officers and men of the 52nd crept by twos and
threes to the edge of the wood, and then dashing over a
hundred yards of open ground, passed the bridge, and formed
behind the bank, which was not more than eighty yards from
the enemy's entrenchment. The signal was then given ; the
rough line sprang up the bank and the enemy gave way.'
(' Records of the 52nd Light Infantry.1)

6. In moving either to front or rear every man will
endeavour, without crowding on his comrades, to expose him-
self as little as possible to the enemy's fire.

At the fight at Gausimas, in Cuba, an eyewitness thus
describes the advance of the Rough Riders under heavy fire : —

' It was easy to tell which men were used to hunting big
game in the West, and which were not, by the way they made
their rushes. The Eastern men broke at the word, and ran for
the cover they were directed to take, like men trying to get out
of the rain, and lay panting on their faces, while the Western
trappers and hunters slipped and wriggled through the grass
like Indians ; dodging from tree- trunk to tree-trunk, and from
bush to bush. They always fell into line at the same time with
the others, but they had not exposed themselves while doing so.'

T. Every man, when ordered to halt, must make the best
use of the cover that he finds before him.

This is a most important point. An officer, who served
in the campaigns in South Africa1 and on the North- West
Frontier, writes as follows : —

' Attention should be particularly directed to the training
of infantry in shooting from behind cover accurately and
1 The campaign of 1881 is here referred to. — Ed.

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 351

rapidly without exposing themselves. The Boers and some of
the natives of South Africa, and also most Pathans, excel in
this art, whereas the average British infantryman usually
exposes half his body to the view of his enemy, and frequently
puts himself into such position that he can neither aim
accurately nor shoot quickly. This is one of the criticisms
most frequently heard among the Boers and colonists of South
Africa.'

8. Whenever independent fire is ordered every man, as a
rule, will choose his own target.

9. The men must be accustomed to the intermixture of
sections, companies, and battalions.

' The true summit of perfection,1 says a veteran of the
Light Brigade, ' is the preservation of order in disorder, and
of system in confusion ; for the circumstances which accompany
skirmishes of necessity produce, almost always, more or less
mixture, inversion, and general irregularity. In hot contests
over large extents of intricate ground, men of different companies,
regiments, brigades, and even divisions, mingle with each other.
Soldiers should therefore be drilled, not indeed to fall into such
irregularities on principle, but to be ready for them in practice.
Soldiers who have not been drilled on this principle, or who
have not acquired it by experience, are, when extended under
fire, transformed into unmanageable mobs. Skirmishers who
understand it will always show a formidable front, and, under
the worst possible circumstance, act together in the mighty
energy of mutual confidence. Unreflecting mechanical precision
is at direct variance with such practice. Active intelligence
and a wise well-defined general system are its component ele-
ments. Active intelligence, therefore, in every point of view,
is invaluable to the skirmisher ; and the attention of all drill
superintendents and instructors should be unremittingly directed
to stamp it on his mind and mix it with his practice.''

10. They must be trained to observe and report on the
movements of the enemy, thus using their intelligence to assist
their section leader.

11. The men should be trained to concentrate rapidly at
any point the section leader may indicate. If there is some

352 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

spot to the front whence the section, while sheltered itself, can
bring an effective fire to bear upon the enemy's line, a rush will
be made for it.

12. They should be trained to extend as they leave cover,
even when rushing from one shelter to another.

13. They must be taught that when their leaders are down,
or when the tactical unity of their companies and sections has
become dissolved, they are still to go on fighting, maintaining
their ground or pushing forward as the case may be, but always
seeking to combine with others, and to use their rifles to the
best effect.

That a wider knowledge of light infantry duties, and an
aptitude, increased by practice, for independent leading, will be
of far higher value to the army than some suspect, is not
difficult of demonstration. More formidable foes than the
Afridi may have to be encountered on the North- West Frontier
of India. There is the most vulnerable, and, I might almost
say, the most vital, point of the British Empire. There we
may have to fight for our very existence as a great nation and
a first-class power. So in preparing for service against the
border tribes, and in practising hill tactics, we shall be prepar-
ing for campaigns which may decide the fate of England, and
practising the very tactics which will be the best adapted to
the theatre of war.

And to go further afield than India. In training our
officers and men as light infantry after Sir John Moore's model,
we shall be giving them the best training to fit them for battle,
on whatever ground it may be fought. The fields of ''lO-li
show us that the characteristics of light infantry are as necessary
on the glacis-like slope as in hills and forests. People too
often run away with the idea that an attack over open ground
will resemble the trim, orderly advance that we see at
manoeuvres. They do not always realise that, after a certain
time, control must inevitably pass into the hands of the sub-
ordinate leaders ; that under the stress and roar of fire the
issue of orders will be impossible ; that the company officers
will be left to themselves, and that they will be called upon to
use their own judgment and assume heavy responsibility.

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 353

Let us look for a moment on the picture of a protracted
struggle for superiority of fire, as illustrated by the battles of
'70 or '77. No regular lines are here, although the initial
deployment may have been methodical enough, but a series of
groups, more or less connected by scattered skirmishers ; and
these groups maintain no even front, but follow the irregularities
of the ground and the fluctuations of the fight. At one place
they have been driven back by a counter-stroke ; at another
they are checked by an advanced post ; at another they are
pressing forward, impelled by timely reinforcements ; at another
the hostile fire is so fierce that it is impossible to face it, and
there is a great gap, of which the enemy may at any moment
take advantage ; at another a roll of the ground affords some
cover, and knots of men are eagerly pressing on to decisive
range. Companies, battalions, even brigades and regiments,
have become mixed up, for it has been necessary to throw in
supports and reserves where they are most wanted, without
regard for tactical unity. Many officers have fallen. Some of
the groups are led by young subalterns, and some are without
leaders at all ; and yet it is impossible to send orders to any
part of the line. Just as direction by superiors is impossible in
woods, on mountain-sides, and in villages because the greater
part of the troops cannot be seen, or if seen are not within
reach of messages, so in open ground it is impossible by reason
of the enemy's fire. In one case as in the other the subordinate
leaders will find themselves left to their own resources ; in one
case as in the other much will depend on the intelligence, the
skill, and the readiness of the individual skirmisher.

But, as already said, the attack and assault of a defined
position form only a single phase of battle. Let us again revert
to the pictures of battles provided by the campaigns of 170-,77.
Let us imagine that superiority of fire has been attained ; that,
by the combined efforts of the infantry and the field batteries,
the enemy's musketry has been beaten down. His men no
longer aim. His artillery is silent. Part of his force is
retreating ; and his reserves are still distant. A determined
rush, preceded by the approach of the second line, or even the
third line, if the second has been exhausted in reinforcing the

A A

854 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

first, carries the assailants across the trenches, and the enemy
everywhere gives way. But he has not yet abandoned hope.
Because he has lost his position he does not at once determine
to retreat. On the contrary, the battle is very far from a
decision. The assailant has forced the defender from his
chosen ground, but a second, and perhaps a stronger, position
has already been occupied. Village after village, wood after
wood, ridge after ridge, have still to be stormed before the
victory is complete, and the great end of battle, the annihila-
tion of a hostile force, has been achieved.

This is no fanciful picture. Almost without exception the
battles of 1870 became sooner or later running fights ; and
before the day was definitely over the enemy had to be dis-
possessed of several successive positions. Take as an instance
the operations of the 11th German Army Corps against the
French right at the battle of Woerth. The first attack was
made on the ridge which formed part of the French main line.
The second was made through a wood a mile wide, the enemy
offering a stubborn resistance. The third was made on a copse
on the further side of the wood. The fourth on a village
strongly occupied and prepared for defence. The fifth on an-
other and a still stronger village. From the time the troops
came under fire until the last charge they marched over three
miles and they fought every step of the way. Nor was the
capture of these successive positions, although the French were
in inferior numbers, an easy task. Time after time they were
seized only to be lost. The enemy's counter-strokes were most
effective. Before the Germans could establish themselves in
the woods or villages they were almost invariably driven back ;
and the attack and the assaults had to be repeated, sometimes
more than once, before the ground could be considered as per-
manently occupied. This give and take of heavy blows threw
the great weight of responsibility on the leaders of the fighting
line. It was on them that depended the making good of the
captured positions and the defeat of the counter-strokes, or,
if these were successful, the quick return to the attack. And
for such work as this the German officers, owing to their
peace-training, were eminently qualified. What says Moltke

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 355

of the battles before Metz ? * The self-dependence of the
subordinate commanders, so thoroughly inculcated hy the peace
manoeuvres, in conjunction with a well-grounded training qf the
individual, here asserted themselves with all tJieir advantages.''

It is to be remembered, too, that the German officers, like
those of the Light Brigade, were trained not only to accept
responsibility, but to make use of ground, and this last is a
most important item in light infantry training. When troops
are exercised only in a normal formation the importance of
ground is apt to receive less consideration than the maintenance
of order, regularity, and fire discipline ; and officers pay more
attention to the behaviour of their men than to tactical features
and the action of the enemy. In action, however, especially at
close ranges, or in broken country, the order must be reversed
if success is to be attained. Officers must watch the enemy as
a swordsman watches the eye of his opponent, and at the same
time they must take note of the ground over which they are
passing, or have yet to pass, marking the cover, the obstacles,
the rallying points, the places swept by the hottest fire, and
the dangerous features on the flanks. To devise methods of
utilising, or crossing, or occupying these points will take all the
time they can spare from their scrutiny of the enemy, and they
will have neither leisure nor opportunity to supervise the
conduct of the individual private. The soldier, as Moltke
implies, must have received such careful training that he will
be able to act for himself, so far as his movements within the
section are concerned. He must have learned for himself to
keep a general line, to maintain direction, to utilise cover, trees,
rocks, or banks, just as he has learned to aim and to obey. I
have always been impressed with the silence with Avhich the
attack is conducted at foreign manoeuvres compared with our
own. Foreign officers who have visited Aldershot have re-
marked the difference, and have detected the cause. I remember
one of them saying that our men did not seem to be able to
act for themselves, but that they always required some one to
tell them what to do ; and it is evident that if officers have to
look closely after their men, they will have little time to give
to a consideration either of the ground or of the enemy.

A A 2

356 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

These notes are undoubtedly very general, and it may
possibly be said that while it is certainly true that the tactical
judgment of officers should be trained during peace, very little
light has been thrown on the methods to be followed ; and,
more than all, that very little has been said as regards the
rules which troops acting as light infantry should follow on
a modern battlefield. It is not, however, because my experience
is small that I have confined myself to the mere enunciation
of principles. It would have been easy to collect the opinions
of men well qualified to lay down rules, if such a course were
either practical or profitable. But it is neither. In the first
place, the secret of efficiency lies in the self-dependence, the
resource, and the resolution of the company and section leaders.
How will mere rules assist a commanding officer to instil those
habits into his subordinates ? Such habits are only to be
fostered by constantly placing the company officers in situa-
tions where they have to think and act for themselves, by
encouraging them to use their wits, to adapt their formation
to the ground, to improvise means of overcoming difficulties
and to become zealous assistants rather than unreflecting
machines. In the second place, circumstances will be different
in every different case. What is to be done must depend on
the enemy, on his tactics, his armament, his moral, on the
nature of the ground, the state of the weather, and on many
other things. In light infantry work the methods of the
attack, i.e. the formation, the means of working from cover to
cover, and of developing an effective fire, must be improvised
on the spot. They must be the outcome of trained judgment,
of an instructive appreciation of correct principles, and of well-
practised common sense. Objections have been raised to such
teaching. It has been suggested, notwithstanding the splendid
history of the Light Brigade, that our officers are incapable of
applying mere principles with the same cool intelligence as
their forefathers, and that they must have definite rules for all
sorts of situations. But it may be asked whether the fighting
in Tirah, where, when once they understood what was demanded
of them, the regimental officers and men displayed such sterling
qualities, does not give the lie direct to so weak an argument ?

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 357

Let us refer for a moment to the sister service. No manual
has ever been issued which pretends to teach the naval officer
how he is to fight his ship. There are rules for the manoeuvres
of the fleet, but there are none for the handling of the ship in
action. Yet who is there who would not place implicit trust
in the trained judgment of ' Nelson's children ' ? And who is
there who would say that the British military officer is of less
value as a fighting man than his brother of the sea ? If he be
so — an opinion to which, with all my admiration for the navy,
I should be indeed loth to subscribe — the fault must lie in his
training, and his training alone.

In the third place, what good can come from laying down a
multitude of rules and regulations ? Rules and regulations, so
far as tactics are concerned, may have a certain amount of value
if those who have to carry them out are under the constant
supervision of those who make them. Mechanical perfection,
to a greater or less degree, can certainly be produced. But
mechanical perfection, or rather, the effort made to reach it,
ends in paralysing the judgment; it is altogether inimical to
the free exercise of an intelligent initiative, and in no way
adapted to the needs of war.

Moreover, the conviction may be here expressed that, to
a very great extent, the efficiency of the army depends much
more upon those who are immediately concerned with the train-
ing of the troops than upon the Horse Guards. The impulse
towards improvement may come from above, but if its force is
to be felt it must be met more than half way from below. Is
it too much to ask of brigadiers and commanding officers what
is asked of their naval brethren ? Why should educated and
experienced soldiers, familiar as they must be with the aspects
of battle, be incapable of training those under them to meet
its vicissitudes ? Wherein does the commander of a battalion
differ, except that his responsibilities are far less, from the
commander of a battleship ? Why should he want minute
rules and stringent regulations to guide his knowledge and
common sense ? His task is indeed difficult. He knows not
against what enemy, or on what continent, he may be called
upon to lead his men. He has to train his command to meet

358 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the tactics of the savage, as well as the tactics of the regular.
He has to be prepared for South Africa, and all that may face
him there ; for the barren rocks of Afghanistan, as well as for
the lanes and hedgerows of England. Yet who, for all that,
will assert that the task which Sir John Moore and his subordi-
nates so successfully achieved is beyond the powers of their
descendants ?

It is by no means implied that the staff should be relieved
of the most important of its functions. Far from it. Super-
vision, close and constant — supervision which respects the chain
of responsibility, which does not degenerate into interference,
but is occupied more with enforcing principles than details, and
with training the judgment of the officers rather than correct-
ing the work of the men — is always its first duty. But no
amount of supervision on the part of the staff will compensate
for the lack of intelligence and zealous initiative on the part of
a commanding officer. And if he would lead his men with
credit he must have thought out for himself the problems of
modern fighting, the difficulties of command, of maintaining
discipline, and of ensuring good leading amongst his subordi-
nates, before he takes the field. The more he knows about the
tactics of his probable enemies the better he will be prepared ;
and it is on his own judgment, on his knowledge of war, on his
common sense, that he must rely, not on a mere mechanical
obedience to the precepts of the Drill-book. The Drill-book
should be accepted for what it is intended to be, and not for
what it is sometimes assumed to be.

When troops find themselves on service under conditions
with which their ordinary training has done nothing to familia-
rise them, and to which their ordinary formations are absolutely
inapplicable, a cry is at once raised against the Drill-book. At
one time, when the losses in desert fighting have been severe, it
has been, ' Why does not the Drill-book teach us something
about savage warfare ? ' At another, when the foe has been a
mountaineer, ' Why does not the Drill-book teach us how to
fight in the hills ? ' The next time it may be, ' Why does not
the Drill- book teach us how to fight in the jungles of Africa,
or in the swamps of China ? ' I think, however, that by anyone

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 359

who looks at war as a whole, and who bears in mind the con-
stant variety of ground, of climate, and of tactics with which
our soldiers have to do, such complaints against the official
teaching will hardly be approved. The Drill-book does not
pretend to be an exhaustive tactical treatise. It is nothing
more than a compendium of principles adapted to almost every
kind of warfare. It lays down a few rules for the most difficult
of all operations, the attack and assault of a defined position
over open ground, but that is all. It does not attempt to show
how these rules must be modified under other conditions, for
these conditions, as we have already seen, are so infinitely diver-
sified that it would be manifestly impossible in one small
volume to deal with them in detail.

It should be thoroughly understood, then, that the Drill-
book was never intended to be the sole guide to the training
of the troops for war. Such training would be very far from
thorough if those in immediate charge were merely content to
follow the rules therein laid down. The authorities expect
that intelligent and zealous initiative on the part of both staff'
and regimental officers of which mention has been already made,
and of what may be effected by such initiative we may take
two examples. In the year 1808, Wellington, with an army of
18,000, landed in Portugal, and on August 25 he beat the
French at Vimiero. The battle is remarkable, not only because
it was the first of that great and unbroken series of victories
which was to end at Waterloo, but because on the very eve of
the engagement the British troops were ordered to adopt a
new formation. While he was still in India, Wellington had
followed with keen interest the progress of the French armies
which were overrunning Europe. He had taken careful note of
their tactics, of their habit of attacking in column, covered by
a cloud of skirmishers ; and it is said that his anxiety to get
home was due to the fact that he had thought out the way of
defeating them, and was eager to put it to the test. The
method he devised was not, to all appearance, a very marked
departure from the normal practice of the British infantry. It
was in no way an infringement of the great principle — i.e. the
line formation on which the normal practice was based. On

3G0 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

the contrary, it was a wider and more vigorous application of
that principle than had hitherto obtained. But, at the same
time, it was in direct antagonism to the teaching of the Drill-
book. The edition of the Drill -book published in 1808, the
same year as Vimiero, contains the following : —

'The fundamental order of the infantry in which they
should always form and act, and for which all their various
operations and movements are calculated, is in three ranks.
The formation in two ranks is to be regarded as an occasional
exception that may be made where an extended and covered
front is to be occupied, or where an irregular enemy, who
deals only in fire, is to be opposed. But from the present low
establishment of our battalions they are, during the time of
peace, permitted, in order to give more extent of front in
their operations, to continue to form and use it in many of
their movements and firings, at the same time not omitting
frequently to practise them in three ranks. The formation in
two ranks and at open files is calculated only for light troops
in the attack and pursuit of a timid enemy, but not for making
an impression on an opposing regular line which vigorously
assails or resists. No general could manage a considerable
armv if formed and extended in this manner. The great science
and object of movement being to act with superiority on
chosen points, it is never the intention of an able commander
to have all his men at the same time in action ; he means by
skill and manoeuvre to attack a part, and to bring the many
to act against the few. This cannot be accomplished by any
body at open file and two deep. A line formed in this manner
would never be brought to make, or to stand, an attack with
bayonets, nor could it have any prospect of resisting the charge
of a determined cavalry. In no service is the fire and con-
sistency of the third rank to be given up ; for the third line
serves to fill up the vacancies made in the others in action.
Without it the battalion would soon be in a single rank.'

Yet, notwithstanding these explicit instructions, notwith-
standing the somewhat scornful rejection of all other formation
but that in three ranks, Wellington, on the eve of Vimiero,
deliberately ordered that his infantry should fight in line two

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 361

deep. We have proof, then, that Wellington, while still a
young brigadier, studied the tactics of a possible enemy ; that
he was not content with following the rules of the Drill-book,
although he paid due respect to the principles it inculcated ;
and that he had thought out for himself the problems he was
likely to encounter on his next field of battle.

Again, I think there can be little question but that Sir
John Moore, when in command of the Light Brigade at
Shorncliffe, did exactly the same thing. Europe was ringing
with the fame of the French skirmishers. The astonishing
victories of Napoleon were due in a great part, putting strategy
aside, to the efficiency of his light infantry, who found an easy
prey in the three and even four-deep lines or dense columns, un-
protected by skirmishers, of Continental armies. To meet the
French voltigeurs on equal terms was the object with which the
troops at Shorncliffe were trained on the lines I have described ;
and it may be noted that when Sir John Moore began his
work the Drill-book recognised neither skirmishers nor light
infantry. So we have another great English general going
beyond the Drill-book, training his troops on a system he him-
self evolved, and supplementing the rules laid down for his
guidance from the resources of his own ability.

Such intelligent co-operation in the work of instruction is
what the authorities demand from every commanding officer,
whether of a regiment or a company ; it is well to remember
that in the case of Wellington and Moore the co-operation
became effective from the fact that they made themselves
acquainted with the tactics of foreign armies. This is a lesson
which we may take to heart. It is said sometimes that English
soldiers need not trouble themselves about military systems
beyond the seas ; but such teaching seems hardly based on
common sense. It may be true that we have not much to
learn from others, and that the Continental systems are adapted
neither to our national character nor our military traditions.
Nevertheless, those who are best acquainted with European
armies are aware that each has special excellencies which are
well worth consideration, Moreover, ignorance or contempt of
foreign tactics has before now done much to bring about great

362 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

national disasters. I shall not pause to dilate on the cost to
England of the ignorance of the tactics of the Zulu, the Boer,
and the Afridi, but I will refer to the conquest of Prussia
in 1806, a conquest attended with far greater disgrace and
humiliation than the conquest of France in ''10-11. It was
well known in the Prussian army of that date that war with
Napoleon was inevitable. There was ample time for prepara-
tion ; and the tactics best adapted to meet the French infantry
had been discussed publicly and privately by the many able and
highly educated officers which the army contained. Memorial
after memorial was submitted, which proved to conviction that
Napoleon's soldiers owed the major part of their success to their
skill as skirmishers, to their clever use of cover, to the elasticity
of their formations, to the rapidity of their movements, and to
their individual intelligence. Proposal after proposal was put
forward that the small force of Prussian light infantry should
be largely augmented, that more freedom should be given to
their movements, and that the fire of the line of battle should
be very largely developed. But other influences prevailed. An
irrational confidence in the formation which had served
Frederick the Great under very different conditions, an over-
weening pride in Prussian staunchness and Prussian discipline,
and a contemptuous disregard of foreign methods successfully
obstructed the path of reform. Had Wellington and Moore
been equally narrow-minded the Peninsular War would in all
probability be a far less glorious tale. The Prussians before '70
made no such mistake as their ancestors had done in 1806.
That great fighting soldier, Prince Frederick Charles, published
privately in 1864, for the use of the army corps which he
commanded, a pamphlet entitled ' The Art of Fighting the
French ' ; and there can be no doubt that the admirable
teaching therein contained had spread far and wide through the
army before war was declared. The Russians, on the other
hand, had done very little before '77 to modify their traditional
system. They had but imperfectly absorbed the lesssons of the
Franco-German campaign. Their formations were solid, clumsy,
and inelastic. The paramount importance of attaining the
superiority of fire was not understood ; nor had the subordinate

THE TRAINING OF INFANTRY FOR ATTACK 363

leaders been trained to use their judgment, or to exercise an
intelligent initiative. There was indeed an exception, but he
stands alone, like a single star in a clouded sky : Skobeleff, the
close student of history, the close observer of foreign armies ;
Skobeleff, the thinker, as well as the great leader of men.

For two reasons particular stress is laid on this point.
First, because English soldiers in this respect are somewhat
inclined to insularity ; and such an attitude may have ill effects.
For instance, among Continental armies, almost without ex-
ception, counter-strokes, local and general, are a conspicuous
feature of every field-day, and counter-strokes, local and
general, will be a conspicuous feature of every battle in which
they may be engaged. So far as my own experience goes,
and I have seen a great deal of our manoeuvres at home for
the last ten years, the very contrary is the case with ourselves.
Counter-strokes of any character are of very rare occurrence,
although it is laid down in the Drill-book that they are the
chief reliance of the defence, and that no opportunity of
making them, at any period of the battle, should be neglected.
There is hardly need to dwell on the embarrassment of troops
who had never been trained to expect counter-strokes if they
were to encounter an enemy who constantly practised them ;
nor to point out the increased difficulties of hill-fighting when
the Afridi learns, as learn he will — for he is a progressive
fighting-man, already alive to the value of combination — to
follow up his accurate fire with a Ghazi rush against a vulner-
able point.

It seems evident, then, that to train our infantry as it
should be trained it is incumbent on those who are responsible
for that training — and officers of all ranks are included — to
make themselves familiar, as did Wellington and Sir John
Moore, with the tactics of our possible enemies. This duty
falls principally on the staff, and it is not neglected. The
Intelligence Department, constantly publishing descriptions
of foreign armies, sets an admirable example and furnishes the
material for the necessary study. But here, again, intelligent
co-operation is needed. One of the principal duties of the
staff on a foreign station is to keep a close eye on the tactics

364 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

of the people beyond the frontier, and to summarise the
results of their observations for the benefit of the whole army.
Nor should staff officers at home think that this is a duty
with which they have no concern ; while regimental officers
may rest assured that the more they know about the tactics
of our possible enemies, the better will they be prepared to
meet them, and the sounder and more efficient will be the
training of their men. And, as shown by the example of the
Light Brigade, it is not essential that there should be detailed
rules for every kind of fighting, or that the troops should
be exercised over every variety of country. The four things
necessary are :

1. To train the judgment of the officers, so that when left
to themselves they may do the right thing.

2. To make use of the most difficult ground available.

3. To avoid the constant practice of normal formations.

4. To train the individual skirmisher.

I feel that what I have &aid contains nothing that is new,
and the system I have described is probably that on which
many have been working. In the second place, some will
probably consider that I have made made too light of the
obstacles which stand in the way of tactical training, that
I have not allowed for the incessant administrative labours of
commanding officers, the small number of men at their disposal,
the difficulties in the way of getting suitable ground. Never-
theless, the repetition of sound principles is seldom altogether
useless ; and on the younger members of the profession of arms,
who have hardly as yet begun to think about the question of
infantry training in its broader aspect, but in whom we see
our future commanding officers and generals, my remarks may
not be entirely thrown away.

CHAPTER XIII

FOREIGN CRITICISM

(From ' My Experiences of the Boer War,' April 1901)

The quantity of foreign criticism on the war in South Africa
leaves nothing to be desired. The quality may be inferred
from the fact that one of the best known of German military
historians declared that khaki was not taken into wear until
after many defeats ; that the English infantry attacked in
solid line ; that volleys were the only species of fire employed ;
and that the Boers never made use of the spade ! The critics
have probably been misled by the gutter press ; for from no
other source could the many false statements which form the
basis of their criticism have been derived ; and they have no
doubt been greatly hampered by their want of experience of
modern war. It is disappointing, at the same time, to find
such deep students of European campaigns so utterly abroad
when they approach another continent ; and men who have
been, and are perhaps still, soldiers, so careless of fact and so
forgetful of fair play. The majority of the articles dealing
with the campaign are not only remarkable for inaccuracy, but
display an almost incredible disregard of the peculiar features
of the theatre of war, of the nature of the fighting, of the
disloyalty among the Dutch colonists, and of the advantages
possessed by the Boers. Others, again, betray a large measure
of pure spite, inspired, it would seem, by the uneasy conscious-
ness that the command of the sea means more than the writers
have hitherto been willing to admit, and by utter disgust at
the revelation of the unity of the British Empire.

Jealousy and injustice, however, do not greatly concern us.
It is much more to the purpose to recognise that the sweeping
condemnation lavished, in so many quarters, on our strategy

366 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and tactics is more likely to have been provoked by irritation
than to be the result of patient investigation.

The art of war is diligently studied in Continental armies,
and in certain respects with very good results. As regards the
defence of the frontier on the outbreak of war, and the initial
steps of a campaign in any part of their dominions, the great
European Powers are probably better prepared than ourselves.
The fortresses are garrisoned : the magazines full to the very
doors ; the transport effectively organised ; the maps ready for
issue ; the positions where the troops are to concentrate
selected ; and the orders for their movements and distribution
already drawn up. The circumstances, however, are widely
different. The frontiers of the European Powers, except
Russia, are, in the first place, of very limited extent compared
with those of the British Empire ; and, in the second, if they
were not adequately protected, they might be attacked at any
moment in overwhelming force. Nevertheless, when our critics
reproach us for the neglect of precaution, it may be admitted
that they are theoretically correct. Here, however, they are
on ground where they may be trusted not to err. The broad
principles which govern the defence of an exposed frontier are
the same everywhere. Fortresses, magazines, transport, maps,
positions, are always necessary ; and it is doubtless true that,
had Natal been garrisoned by 20,000 men, and Ladysmith
adequately fortified, Sir Redvers Buller might have marched
straight into the Free State, and the conquest of the Republics
have been far less costly.

It is when the critics come to discuss the strategical move-
ments of the campaign, as distinguished from the strategical
preparation, that they betray their limitations, and it is
impossible not to be struck by the narrow formalism, and often
unpractical character, of their strategical and tactical concep-
tions. If they are to be taken as the exponents of foreign
military thought, then the study of the art of war has indeed
fallen on evil days. In almost every article we mark the same
defects. First, an entire ignorance of our system of govern-
ment, of the elementary principles of political economy, and
of the responsibilities of a great Colonial Empire. Second, a

FOREIGN CRITICISM 367

reckless treatment of evidence. Third, a positive disinclination
to admit that the organisation, drill, training, and composition
of Continental armies might possibly be bettered ; and, lastly,
the habit of testing strategical and tactical operations by a
number of hard-and-fast rules.

The first of these we might pass by without further
comment, were it not that ignorance of factors of such
importance points either to superficial methods of study or to
a want of grasp. Nor would the second be worth notice if it
did not lead us to suspect that the theorists are not over-
scrupulous as to the means by which they arrive at their
conclusions. The third, to be dealt with later, is a fault more
serious than the last — the habit of testing everything by the
so-called rules of war. How often must the critics in question
have told the story of the old Austrian generals and the young
Napoleon ! And yet, like all pure theorists, they are rapidly
degenerating into formalists of exactly the same type as the
unfortunate veterans whom the great breaker of rules so hardly
treated. It is not to be wondered at. Both strategy and
tactics must be studied practically as well as theoretically —
on the field as well as at manoeuvres or in the study ; and
unless a soldier has a practical acquaintance with war ; unless
he is familiar, from personal contact, with the conditions that
govern both strategy and tactics : unless he understands that in
war it is always the unexpected that happens ; he is not likely,
except his genius be Napoleonic, to be worth much as either
critic or leader. More than this, the man who has never had
to do with the conception and execution of strategical move-
ments is pretty certain to overlook the difficulty of putting
principles into practice, to underrate the part played by the
uuforeseen ; and, in consequence, to be too apt to believe that
rules and precedents are of far greater importance than common-
sense, and that the methods sanctioned by previous practice are
the only methods that a general should use.

War, however, is no exact science ; it has no fixed code of
rules. All that can be said is that there is one good working
principle — the concentration of superior force at the decisive
point — which, if applied, will generally bring about success ;

3G8 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and a good many others which it is risky, but not necessarily
fatal, to infringe. But the theorists will have it that the rules
of war are as inflexible as the Ten Commandments. • Such and
such a principle was violated,' they cry ; ' therefore the strategy
was unsound.' It may be remarked, however, that they never
seem to consider whether any other strategy was possible. For
example, the German military historian already referred to
declares that when the Boers invested Ladysmith ' they hoped
to force the English to send their main force to Natal.
General Buller,1 he continues, ' foolishly complied with their
desire, and split up his army corps so that on no one of the
three fields of operations could he appear with the necessary
superiority.1 Passing by the fact that the Boers wanted to
occupy Natal, and not to attract the main English army
thither, it will be observed that the critic makes no attempt
to discuss the reason which induced Sir Redvers Buller to act
as he did, nor does he suggest an alternative. It is quite
enough for him that the General did not apply the first rule
of strategy. Whether it was practicable to do so he never
stays to consider ; and yet the circumstances were such that
the division of the army corps into three parts, on three
different lines of operations, was absolutely unavoidable. Had
Ladysmith and Kimberley been well-found fortresses of modern
type, such as the German critic is accustomed to see on
European frontiers, they might for the time being have been
left to themselves, while the army corps marched en masse upon
Bloemfontein. But both Ladysmith and Kimberley, as it
seemed at the time, and as the writer himself admits, might
have been stormed before the army corps could be concen-
trated ; and had either one or the other fallen, it was within
the bounds of probability that the whole of the Cape Dutch
would have risen in rebellion. In order to prevent the Boers
from pressing the sieges with vigour, as well as to keep the
would-be rebels in suspense, Sir Redvers Buller had absolutely
no alternative but to attempt to relieve both garrisons simul-
taneously.

Other instances, displaying even greater pedantry, might be
cited ; but it is sufficient to note that in every single case the

FOREIGN CRITICISM 369

critic entirely fails to grasp the bearing ol conditions which he
has never before contemplated, and that he makes no allowance
whatever for the difference between war in South Africa and
war in Europe.

The truth is that the military writers of the Continent are
so saturated with the campaign of 1870-71, and have confined
their industry so closely to the conditions of one theatre of war
— the tract of fertile, thickly populated, and highly civilised
country which lies between Berlin and Paris — that they under-
stand war under one aspect only. They are doubtless quite
right to concentrate their attention on what is of vital impor-
tance to themselves. But we are not therefore bound to
believe that they are good judges of warfare under conditions
with which they are absolutely unfamiliar, nor that the rules
which they deduce from events which occurred thirty years ago,
on a theatre of war of the easiest and most favourable character,
are of universal application. In fact, there is good reason to
suspect that their intense devotion to one aspect of war and a
single series of events is acting adversely on their own armies.
As has been already said, in war it is always the unexpected
that happens. There is no finality in either strategy or tactics.
The theorist may believe that he has anticipated everything
that can possibly occur ; but history tells us that in almost
every campaign some new factor — produced sometimes by
accident, sometimes by the genius of an individual, sometimes
by a national instinct — takes even the most experienced by
surprise, and often completely reverses the accepted teaching
of the time. So in the early battles of Napoleon the rigid
masses of Austrians and Prussians broke up into bewildered
fragments under the fire of the French skirmishers, and fell an
easy prey to the columns in rear. In the Peninsula, on the
other hand, those same skirmishers, met by the two-deep line
and its broad front of musketry, recoiled helplessly on the
columns whose advance they could no longer cover. In these
instances the surprise was tactical ; in others it has been
strategical — in 1870, for example, the rising of the French
people and the creation of the National Army, a proceeding
which even Moltke considered absolutely contrary to rule ; in

6 B

370 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

1866, Moltke's invasion on two distinct lines of operation, an
innovation which still shocks the theorists ; in 1877, Plevna ;
and in 1899, the Boer invasion of Natal.

Furthermore, in every campaign one side or the other will
have to face conditions for which it is impossible to make
provision. Defeat, as a rule, destroys the organisation of an
army, scatters the transport, reduces one or more arms of the
service to inefficiency, and puts out of gear the whole machinery
of the staff. Here neither rule nor precedent will avail.
Common-sense, the resourcefulness which is born of a varied
experience, and the habit of dealing with questions of organi-
sation to suit special circumstances, are alone to be relied on
where a new army has to be constituted from the disjecta
membra of an old one. When Lord Roberts landed at Cape
Town on January 10, 1900, and decided to march on Bloem-
fontein, and so relieve both Kimberley and Ladysmith, the
troops available for the enterprise were scattered in indepen-
dent commands over a huge tract of country. There was no
army organisation. There was very little transport. There
was a deficiency of mounted men. The railway facilities were
limited. There was no plan of campaign, and there was hardly
any information regarding the physical features of the country
to be invaded. In short, except the organisation of the com-
munications, almost everything had to be dealt with de novo.
Nevertheless, a month later an army 35,000 strong, including
10,000 mounted men, 116 guns, and transport sufficient to
enable it to reach Bloemfontein, over 100 miles from the
rendezvous, was concentrated between the Orange and the
Modder Rivers. In those thirty days the soldiers whose good luck
associated them with this achievement probably learnt more of
war, and of the training best adapted to its successful conduct,
than any theorist could teach them ; and if the question were put
to them ' Is it likely that men trained on a cut-and-dried system,
whose reliance is on rule and precedent, and whose experience is
even narrower than their reading, would have dealt so effectively
with such extraordinary conditions ? 1 not one would reply in the
affirmative.

Nearly a century ago a great conqueror scoffed at the

FOREIGN CRITICISM 371

s Sepoy General ' who had landed in Portugal with a tiny army.
Yet that Sepoy general, who had seen war under many aspects,
who had all his service been organising, and improvising, and
dealing with different races in different climates, and who, at
the same time, was a vigilant student of European warfare, was
the only general that neither Napoleon nor his marshals could
overthrow. We may still be permitted to believe that the
training of the British officer, involving, as it does, like that of
Wellington, a knowledge of many men, of many climates, of
many lands, and of many modes of fighting, does more to
sharpen and quicken both thought and action than a know-
ledge of a single campaign and the practice of peace manoeuvres
under unvarying conditions.

The same reluctance to dive deep enough to find the truth
and to make just allowances characterises the reflections on the
tactics as on the strategy of the campaign. It is not to be
denied that the Grand Tactics — that is to say, the management
of the battles and the combination of the three arms — have
been sometimes faulty. No generals, however, even of the
school of Moltke, are infallible ; and, in any case, failures in
leadership are capable of so many interpretations that the
question is too large for discussion here. But as regards minor
tactics, such as outposts, reconnaissance, formation under fire,
and methods of attack, the critics give far too little credit,
not only to the peculiar conditions of South African war and
the hunter's craft of the Boer marksman, but to the terribly
demoralising effect of modern fire and the embarrassments
created by smokeless powder. These last are the important
features of the campaign, and it is with something more than
surprise that we note a stubborn refusal to admit that the flat
trajectory of the small-bore rifle, together with the invisibility
of the man who uses it, has wrought a complete revolution in
the art of fighting battles.

To have to confess that the organisation and training of
the gigantic armies of the Continent are based on antiquated
principles would be more than humiliating : it would be the signal
for most costly and laborious reforms. Yet the phenomena of
the South African conflict permit no doubt whatever that the

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372 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

revolution is an accomplished fact. It is foolish, therefore, to
say the least, to attempt to explain away these phenomena by
questioning the courage of the English infantry, the intelligence
of the cavalry, or by calmly assuming that our methods of attack
were prehistoric, that our shooting was bad and our patrolling
careless. Hasty generalisations, based on the very vaguest hear-
say, and put forward by theorists who are notoriously prone to
superficial analysis, are not likely to find acceptance.

Nor is it to be forgotten that the last tactical revolution
was produced by exactly the same causes as the present. With
the advent of the breech-loading rifles in the decade 1860-70
the rate of fire was more than doubled, the trajectory half as
flat again, the accuracy at all but short ranges at least twice
as great. Yet the superiority of the first breech-loaders to the
weapon they superseded was assuredly not more marked than
the superiority of the small-bore repeater, in rate of fire, in
flatness of trajectory, and in accuracy, to the large-bore single-
loader ; and in 1860-70 the powder remained unchanged.

The nature of the revolution may be stated in a few words :

1. Infantry, attacking over open ground, must move in
successive lines of skirmishers extended at wide intervals.

2. Cavalry, armed, trained, and equipped as the cavalry of
the Continent, is as obsolete as the crusaders.

3. Reconnaissance, even more important than heretofore, is
far more difficult.

To the first two of these propositions the theorists will take
desperate exception. They have already proclaimed that the
attack in line of skirmishers was simply adopted, both by
ourselves and by the Boers, because neither we nor they knew
better, and that Continental soldiers would have found no need
to change their ordinary formations. The truth is, however,
that our ordinary formations, previous to the war, were almost
identically the same as those of other armies ; but that our
officers, thanks to the experience of the Tirah campaign, and
to a very general instinct in favour of less rigid methods,
recognised, before even a shot was fired, that what they had
practised in peace was utterly unsuited to the Mauser-swept
battlefield. On hardly a single occasion was the usage of the

FOREIGN CRITICISM 373

manoeuvre-ground adhered to. At least five paces between
skirmishers, with supports and reserves in the same open order,
was the rule from the very first ; and the fact that the normal
formations were so unanimously discarded speaks as highly
for the resourcefulness of the British officer as the fact that
the formations so unanimously substituted proved admirably
adapted to the new conditions.

We shall not expect to see our example universally followed.
At the autumn manoeuvres of the Continental armies the old
system of attack still holds the field ; and thick firing lines,
supported by closed bodies and offering ideal targets, advance
stolidly without the slightest attempt to make use of the
advantages of the ground, against the most formidable posi-
tions. It is still, too, an article of faith that four things only
are necessary to success in the infantry attack — viz. discipline,
energy, unity, and numbers. Such has been the opinion of
Continental soldiers, since the close of the Franco-German war,
and until their experience has been enlarged they are not likely
to abandon it. Nevertheless, it contains two fatal flaws. First,
that in these days of a flat trajectory and the magazine, mere
weight of numbers, and the piling of battalion on battalion,
will have the same effect as in the days of Napoleon. Second,
that a dense line, formed of as many rifles as can find room,
halting at intervals, will pour in so heavy and effective a fire
as to render the return fire of the defenders comparatively
innocuous.

It is not to be denied that numerical superiority is generally
essential to success. But superiority, or at least equality of
moral, is just as necessary ; and when the preponderating
masses suffer enormous losses ; when they feel, as they will feel,
that other and less costly means of achieving the same end
might have been adopted, what will become of their moral?
Good troops are not, indeed, to be stopped by the fear of
heavy losses, even up to 30 or 40 per cent., if they understand
that by no other means can victory be attained. But they are
very easily stopped if they once come to believe that they are
unintelligently handled ; and the wise leader is he who yields,
so far as discipline allows, to the instincts of those who follow

374 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

him. Numbers thrown in after the same reckless fashion as
they were thrown in by Napoleon at Wagram, or by Grant at
Spottsylvania, or by Steinmetz at Gravelotte, may win once ;
but even the best-disciplined army will not readily respond to
a second call of the like nature.

Yet if troops are formed in dense lines from the very first
they must be prepared to be lavish of their blood. The
experience of the battlefield, putting aside mere common-sense,
proves conclusively that against a well-covered enemy the
troops advancing to the attack effect very little by their fire
until they arrive within 500 or 600 yards of the position.
With smokeless power they cannot even see the target ; and,
even if the defenders are to a certain extent disturbed by the
storm of bullets flying overhead, they can hardly fail, if they do
no more than keep their rifles horizontal, to play havoc with
the mass opposed to them. It is argued, on the other hand,
that a thin line of skirmishers must necessarily lose in the same
ratio. But mathematical formulae do not hold good upon the
battlefield. The fact remains that a thin line of skirmishers
suffers much less in proportion than a thick one ; and, more-
over, the moral effect is vastly different. Twenty-five skir-
mishers covering 250 yards of front will hardly notice the loss
of five of their number ; 250 men, shoulder to shoulder, will be
sensibly affected by the loss of fifty.

Nor is there the slightest reason that discipline, energy, and
unity should not be as conspicuous in the attack of skirmishers
as in the attack of denser lines. The former method demands
much more from the individual ; and the individual, both
officer and soldier, must therefore be trained and accustomed to
independent action. But troops so trained will show a higher
intelligence than others, and higher discipline, for it will not be
merely a mechanical product ; and intelligence, backed by dis-
cipline, is the surest guarantee of energetic and united action.

The objection most frequently urged against the attack by
skirmishers who take advantage of all cover, avoid all unneces-
sary exposure, and gain ground to the front by stealth rather
than by dash, is that the men become too careful of their lives.
But is not this method of attack the reflection and the exten-

FOREIGN CRITICISM 375

sion of good leading ? The most brilliant offensive victories
are not those which were mere ' bludgeon work,1 and cost the
most blood ; but those which were won by surprise, by adroit
manoeuvre, by mystifying and misleading the enemy, by turn-
ing the ground to the best account, and of which the butcher's
bill was small. How trifling was the loss, comparatively speak-
ing, in many of the earlier and more decisive battles of
Napoleon ; how few English soldiers fell at the passage of the
Douro, at Salamanca, at Vittoria, on the Bidassoa, and in the
astonishing fight on the Nivelle ; how few Germans at Sedan ;
and yet the generalship was of the highest order.

It may be said, however, that it is one thing for a general
to spare his men, and another for the men to spare themselves ;
and undoubtedly the new system demands the very strictest
discipline, high training, and resolute leaders. But if the new
system is dangerous the old is impossible, except at a cost of
life which no army and no nation can afford.

If the truth be told, the tactics of certain foreign armies, of
which the chief characteristic is that they rely on the momen-
tum of the mass rather than the skill of the individual, are as
degenerate and out of date as the Prussian tactics in 1806, and
from the same cause. A long peace is generally fatal to mili-
tary efficiency. Too little experience of war and too much
experience of field-days have always the same results — rigid and
unvarying formations, attacks ruled by regulations instead of
common-sense, and the uniformity of the drill-ground in every
phase of the soldier's training. Uniformity is simple ; it is
easily taught, and it is eminently picturesque ; it simplifies the
task of inspecting officers ; it is agreeable to the centralising
tendencies of human nature ; and when it appears in the guise
of well-ordered lines, advancing with mechanical precision, it
has a specious appearance of power and discipline, especially
when compared with the irregular movements of a swarm of
skirmishers. Furthermore, it is far less difficult to train men
to work in mass than independently. Thus order, steadiness,
and uniformity become a fetish ; officers and men are drilled,
not trained ; and all individuality, however it may be encour-
aged by regulations, is quietly repressed in practice.

376 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

But if a state of profound peace has robbed the Continental
infantry of elasticity, it has been even more mischievous for the
sister arm. Even our own cavalry, when it took the field in
1899, was more or less paralysed by the burden of effete tradi-
tions. Despite the lessons of the American and the Russo-
Turkish wars, it had been trained, so far as battle was concerned,
to shock-tactics, and to little else. It was not equipped for
great mobility ; of fighting on foot it knew but little ; and
when confronted by the Boer riflemen the inferiority of the
carbine placed it at a great disadvantage.

Yet it has long been clear that the opportunities for shock-
tactics are very rare, and that for once cavalry has the chance
of charging it is twenty times compelled to dismount and fire.
Moreover, it is quite open to question whether the firearm, on
all occasions except in the pursuit of an absolutely demoralised
enemy, is not more deadly than lance or sabre ; and whether, in
this particular phase of battle, a cavalry which manoeuvres like
clockwork and charges in exactly dressed lines is a whit more
formidable than any scratch pack of good horsemen whose
hearts are in the right place. Be this as it may, the South
African war affords much additional proof that cavalry must be
thoroughly trained, properly equipped for dismounted action,
and made far more mobile. The extraordinary results, strat-
egical as well as tactical, that may be produced by mobility
have been conclusively demonstrated ; and it is clear as noon-
day that a mounted force as mobile as the Boers, and equal —
as were Sheridan's troopers — to any emergency of attack or
defence, will be a most effective weapon, even on a European
theatre of war, in the hands of the strategist who grasps its
possibilities.

The majority of our critics, however, are very far from
taking to heart this obvious lesson ; nor do they seem to have
realised that the small-bore and smokeless powder have destroyed
the last vestiges of the traditional role of cavalry. Otherwise
they would have been less ready to condemn the conduct of our
horsemen in South Africa, nor would they have attributed many
apparent failures, due in reality to defects which every European
cavalry possesses, to a want of enterprise and daring. It may

FOREIGN CRITICISM 377

safely be said that no cavalry could have done better than our
own regulars ; not even on reconnaissance, for, under the new
conditions, cavalry of the existing type is of very little value
except to keep touch with the enemy's scouts. As to bringing
in information of the extent of the enemy's position, of the
numbers that hold it, guns, entrenchments, and the like, it is
more powerless than ever. Than ever, because cavalry against
a skilful enemy has never been a fully effective means of finding
out what the general most wants, to know ; and in this respect
the experiences of the Franco-German campaign are most mis-
leading. In fact, it is hardly too much to say that, owing
to these experiences, reconnaissance has become a lost art.
Thanks to the utter supineness of the French, the German
squadrons, whenever they were boldly handled, discovered a
great deal ; but to think that against a vigilant and astute
enemy, armed with a magazine rifle, it could have done the
same is to imagine a vain thing. The reconnaissance of a
position is a business of which the Staff must arrange the
details and provide the means ; it is certainly not the work
of the cavalry alone. Even in the era of the flint-lock musket
it was not on the cavalry patrols that good generals relied for
the detailed information they required before committing their
troops to battle. To Napoleon and Wellington the cavalry
were merely one of many sources of intelligence. Personal
observation, often extending over several days, was a far surer
source, especially when supplemented by the reports of picked
Staff officers and well-paid spies.

But, even if we admit that the critics have some grounds,
though not those on which they take their stand, for question-
ing the efficiency of our cavalry, their sneers at the spirit and
endurance of our infantry are absolutely unjustified. It would
have no doubt been exceedingly gratifying to those who have to
sing the virtues of the conscript had the Anglo-Saxon system of
voluntary service proved a broken reed ; and the depth of their
disappointment is to be measured by the malevolence of their
abuse. A great deal has been made of the comparatively slight
loss in several of the more important engagements — notably in
those which ended in defeat ; and it has been very generally

373 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

implied that our reverses were in great part due to a want of
staying power in the men. The arguments brought forward
would be peculiar were they not of a piece with those employed
elsewhere. In the first place, comparisons are made with the
losses suffered by Continental troops in various battles, with
the view of establishing the conclusion that our infantry would
not face more than a very small percentage of loss. For
example, a German writer gives the following table :

An Austrian regiment in 1866 lost 46 per cent.

Several French regiments at Woerth, in 1870, lost 90 per
cent.

Several Russian regiments in 1877 lost between 50 and 75
per cent.

Several Prussian regiments at Mars-la-Tour, in 1870, lost
between 37 and 45 per cent.

On the other hand, he declares that our average loss on any
one occasion never exceeded 10 per cent.

But mark the utter worthlessness of his statistics ! The
large majority of the regiments alluded to owed their heavy
losses to the fact that they were badly beaten, and either
retreated under fire — the most costly operation in war — or
surrendered. Surely this is no proof of superior endurance or
moral. If he thinks it is, what will he say of the following ?

A force 4,000 strong held Spion Kop, a position on which
there was not room for more than 500, until it received orders
to retreat, although the loss was 38 per cent.

On February 23, 1900, the Irish Brigade lost over 50 per
cent. ; and, although it carried only one line of trenches, it
remained all night, and the whole of the next day, within a
few hundred yards of the second line, and beat back a hot
counter-attack.

At Magersfontein the Black Watch, although it lost 75
per cent, in officers and over 35 per cent, in men, held on,
under a heavy and continuous fire at short range, from four in
the morning till one in the afternoon.

And there is much more to be said. Whatever might be
the percentage of casualties our battalions suffered, they never
lost their moral. In the fighting on the Tugela those that lost

FOREIGN CRITICISM 379

most severely one day were foremost in the fight the next ; and
although each day success seemed further off, and the ranks
grew thinner, yet the only effect on the rank and file was to
increase their resolution. Let the critics of our soldiers ponder
these facts, let them recall the fine marching and patient
endurance of the half-starved regiments, and if they still see
no cause to doubt the superiority of the conscript, they know
little of war.

But a more serious charge than this statistical juggling has
been brought against the men. At a lecture in Vienna, at-
tended by the elite of the Austro-Hungarian Staff, it was
stated that there were times when the troops could not be got
to advance after a loss of only 3 to 9 per cent., and that at
Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso they took to flight.
Needless to say, no evidence was produced ; and we can only
presume that the lecturer was indebted for his information to
the columns of the anti-British press. Had he known that the
troops at Colenso retired by order of the General-in-chief, and
retired with the utmost unwillingness ; had he known that
at Stormberg they were suddenly assailed by a heavy flank
fire at short range ; that, instead of running in panic, they
advanced upon the enemy, and only retired when they found
that he was posted on the crest of an inaccessible cliff ; had he
known that at Magersfontein the Highland Brigade held on,
in a perfectly hopeless position, in the midsummer blaze of a
South African sun and without water, for more than nine long
hours ; had he known that throughout the campaign the great
difficulty was not to get the men to advance, but to prevent
them advancing prematurely — he would probably have realised
that the failures of an indomitable soldiery were due to mis-
takes in leading and to the peculiar conditions of modern
battle.

What foreign soldiers cannot, or perhaps will not, see is
that the war in South Africa, like the war in the Peninsula,
and the Civil War in America, is a triumph for the principle
of voluntary service. The moral of conscript armies has always
been their weakest point ; and it is the hope that the moral
of the volunteer is no longer of a higher type that accounts for

380 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

unwarrantable inferences and the unscrupulous manipulation of
flimsy evidence. For ourselves, we are content to know that
the manhood of the race shows no signs of deterioration. If
an army composed, not of regulars alone, but in great part of
men with little or no special training, has proved capable, in
circumstances of peculiar difficulty, of conquering a territory
as large as Central Europe, bravely and cunningly defended,
we need not yet be ashamed to speak with our enemies in the
gate.

Nevertheless, it is just as well that the misrepresentations
of our critics should be exposed. Reform is the natural out-
come of revolution ; and revolution in tactics must involve
many new departures, both in training and organisation.
Expert advisers will naturally be the chief guides in deter-
mining their scope and character ; but it is to be remembered
that this is a question of something more than professional
interest. The old order has given place to the new. The old
Royal Army, recruited exclusively in the British Isles and
India, has passed away. It is an Imperial Army with which
our legislators will have to deal — an army of which the Colonial
forces will form an integral part ; in which hundreds of regi-
ments of unfamiliar title — the * Young Guard ' of Canada,
Australia and New Zealand — will stand side by side with those
whose names are household words. With the establishment,
the efficiency, and the maintenance of the new army public
opinion is intimately concerned. It is of importance, therefore,
that the public should not be misled into believing that the
revolution wrought by the new weapon is purely mythical, that
voluntary service has broken down, and that salvation is only
to be found in an imitation of the tactics and organisation of
armies that have no experience of modern war.

It is on this account that Graf Sternberg's book is chiefly
welcome. It is something more than a lively record of military
adventure. The author is an experienced soldier, who saw a
great deal of South Africa, and quite enough of the campaign
to give his opinions weight. His Dugald Dalgetty-like in-
difference as to which side he fought for, so long as he did
fight, is a strong proof of his impartiality ; and the delightful

FOREIGN CRITICISM 381

simplicity of his narrative makes it impossible to doubt its
truthfulness. His ideas of English political morality may be
passed by with a smile ; but his comments on both tactics and
organisation are worth attention ; while his admiration of the
British soldier, together with his ample recognition of the
abnormal difficulties of the theatre of war, supply a wholesome
corrective to the criticisms dealt with in the preceding pages.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BRITISH ARMY

February 1903

The land forces of the Empire in the year 1899, though only
the second line of defence, were by no means insignificant. The
names of a round million of officers and men figured on the
muster rolls ; while behind them were many thousands who had
already passed through the ranks, and as many more who were
eager to bear arms in case of war. Compared with the 50,000
fighting men of the Boer Republics, even if raised to 80,000 or
100,000 by reinforcements of their Cape kinsfolk and foreign
sympathisers, the armed strength of Great Britain was apparently
overwhelming. But the relative value of armies is not to be
arrived at by merely counting heads. Force which cannot be
concentrated at the point of conflict is hardly worth taking
into account. If the elements of such force lack homogeneity ;
if they are so loosely organised that their mobilisation is slow
and their transfer to the scene of action a matter of months ; or
if, by reason of their geographical distribution, or their political
environment, they can only be employed for purposes of local
defence, it is manifest that an imposing total is very far from a
guarantee of the swift action and heavy blows which war so
imperatively demands.

Each of these defects, in an accentuated form, was present
in the military constitution of the British Empire. Of the
million soldiers 450,000 were regulars, but of these 150,000, by
reason of their colour, were held to be debarred from service in
South Africa, The remainder were militia or volunteers, and,
as no pains had been taken to form even the roughest estimate,
the number they would contribute to a distant expedition was
absolutely uncertain. Geographical distribution presented an
even greater obstacle to concentration. It was more than ever

THE BRITISH ARMY 383

true, at the end of the nineteenth century, that the morning
drum -beat of Great Britain goes round the world. The regi-
ments of the regular army had quarters in every continent
except Australasia. They held the islands of the sea ; their
bayonets glittered on the furthest frontiers of civilisation ; and
on the coasts of the seven seas their sentries looked down on the
still waters of many harbours. An even larger area swallowed
up the half-million of citizen soldiers. Had it been necessary,
or practicable, to assemble them at a single rendezvous, the
ships for their conveyance would have traversed every trade
route on blue water. In the smallest and most remote
dependencies of the Crown the principle of voluntary service
under arms had taken root. Every coaling station — and coaling
stations were numerous — provided a local force for its own defence.
Every island which flew the Union Jack had its levies of
artillery and infantry ; and each one of the larger colonies was
defended by its own army of militia and volunteers.

Yet between these several contingents, though animated by
a common patriotism, the links were light in the extreme. The
troops used the same drill, learned the same tactics. The units
of the three arms, the regiment, the battery, and the battalion,
were generally identical. The officers bore the same titles.
The men carried the same equipment. In all else, in the
methods of maintaining discipline, in the rate of payment, in
the terms of service, in the systems of command, of transport,
and of supply, the differences were marked. None, moreover,
of the colonial contingents were prepared for aggressive war, or
to form part of an army of invasion. It is manifest, then, that
such aid as the British Government might reasonably count
upon in case the Empire was threatened would be neither imme-
diately forthcoming, nor, when it reached the scene of action
of a very substantial character. It is a military truism that
allied armies, even though numerically superior, are always at
a disadvantage when pitted against a single adversary whose
troops are of one nation. The same disadvantage, though in a
less degree, was bound to exist in any assemblage of Imperial
forces in 1899. Collected from all parts of the globe, differing
in their modes of life, their social prejudices, their traditions,

384 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

their political environment, the troops when they first came
together were far from forming a solid and well-tempered mass.
The Colonials were strangers both to the regulars and to each
other ; the regulars, in certain respects, had little in common
with the Colonials. Their standards of discipline, their codes
of etiquette, their ideas of war, their views on the exercise of
authority and of the relation between officers and men, were to
a large extent divergent ; and while the one laughed at the
punctilious subordination of the professional, the other suspected
the endurance of the volunteer.

The materials, then, that went to the making of the
Imperial army were heterogeneous. The troops did not know
each other except by hearsay ; and without mutual knowledge
mutual trust is impossible. Moreover, though the strong
flame of kinship and of a common patriotism, to say nothing
of the discovery of a common manfulness, might be trusted to
obliterate all differences, the process must needs be long ; and
the foreigner, though egregiously mistaken in considering the
unity of the Empire to be a meaningless phrase, was perfectly
justified in looking upon the Imperial army as a military myth.
It was surely incomprehensible, to anyone aware of the rapidity
with which war between civilised nations now develops, of the
few days that elapse between the declaration and the first blow,
that no effort should have been made so to organise the army
that it could be mobilised and assembled in the shortest time
possible, that the component parts should not have been so
trained and administered that they would fit at once into their
places, and that no common system of command, of staff duties,
and of orders should have done away with all chance of
unnecessary friction. Little was needed beyond a mutual
understanding between the home and colonial authorities as to.
the extent of the assistance to be provided. Once it was agreed
that time was of the utmost importance, that the adminis-
tration of the various contingents should be assimilated, and
that officers should everywhere work on the same lines,
especially as regards staff duties, everything, except the
publication of a few rules and principles, might have been
left without the smallest misgiving to the Colonies themselves.

THE BRITISH ARMY 385

The reason that the Imperial army was unorganised in 1899
was not because organisation was difficult, or because the
Colonies were reluctant to commit themselves, but because the
question of Imperial defence had never been approached from
the standpoint of Imperial strategy.

The units, therefore, which eventually formed the army of
South Africa, composed of regulars, of militia, and of volunteers,
in all stages of training and cohesion, hailing from many different
States and thrown promiscuously on a far-off coast, there to
take form and substance as an invading force, suffered from the
inadequate organisation which is the inevitable outcome of the
neglect of strategy. But if they could hardly be classed, in
the aggregate, as a fine army, according to modern ideas, yet
there was no reason whatever, if time were given, why they
should not become one. Certain virtues were common to the
mass. Not a man amongst them was either a conscript or
commandeered. The spirit of noblesse oblige, the pride of
freedom and independence, inspired the rank and file. They
were in South Africa because they were eager to fight the Queen's
enemies, not because they had drawn a number ; and the Anglo-
Saxon who becomes a soldier of his own free will, even granting
that he is sometimes attracted by high pay, does far better
service than when he acts under compulsion.

The War of Secession affords the most ample evidence of
the truth of the old proverb that one volunteer is worth three
pressed men. At the outset the regular regiments were un-
doubtedly the staunchest troops in either camp. As the war
went on, and the ranks thinned under the fearful slaughter of
many battles, both Unionists and Confederates were compelled
to adopt the ballot, but the conscript soldiers, as well as
those who had sold themselves for enormous bounties, fell
short in every single respect of the volunteers ; they were more
liable to panic, less forward in attack, more prone to insubor-
dination, less stubborn in defence, and it was a common opinion
in the North that they were even inferior to the negroes.
The soldiers of Great Britain, moreover, whether regular or
volunteer, British or Colonial, were heirs to proud tradi-
tions. The glories of their predecessors, of the regiments of

c c

386 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Marlborough and of Wellington, of Raglan and of Clyde, fell
upon them like the prophet's mantle. The memories of daring
enterprises and great conquests achieved by stern endurance not
less than by superior skill, had left an abiding impression upon
the national character. The men of Badajos and Albuera did
far more than give the death-blow to the ambition of Napoleon ;
they set an imperishable example of unyielding fortitude, an
example which was to influence the coming generations not only
of their own islands, but of far distant continents, of Canada,
of Australasia, and of South Africa. The determination to
prove themselves worthy of their sires, to uphold the honour of
their race, burned, often unconsciously, in every breast ; and
those who were soldiers only for the war were not less resolved
to conquer, not less ready to accept the sacrifices by which
victory is appeased, than those who were in the ranks of some
historic regiment. The moral discipline, then, of the Imperial
army could hardly have been bettered ; and, in addition to
their common attributes, each of the several contingents was
possessed of characteristics which were peculiarly its own. To
the patriotism of the regulars not the least strenuous of their
foes has offered voluntary tribute.

Success in war is almost wholly in the hands of the officers.
There have been soldiers' battles, in which the valour of the
men has redeemed the blunders of the general, but, as has been
truly observed, there has never been a soldiers' campaign. Even
the most enthusiastic patriots must be led ; and an army of
stags, says the adage, commanded by a lion, is better than an
army of lions commanded by a stag. The war with the Boer
Republics presents this remarkable feature, that for the first
time in their history the British people were inclined to be
dissatisfied with the regular officer. And yet before Mr. Kruger
delivered his ultimatum his character stood high. Take the
opinion of an unprejudiced observer, himself a soldier of no
mean ability, and an historian of uncompromising accuracy.

' On the Canadian frontiers in 1787 the important people
were the army officers. They were imperious, able, resolute
men, well drilled, and with a high standard of honour. They
upheld with jealous pride the reputation of an army which in

THE BRITISH ARMY 387

that century proved again and again that on stricken fields no
soldiery of Continental Europe could stand against it. They
wore a uniform which for the last two hundred years has been
better known than any other wherever the pioneers of civilisation
tread the world's waste places, or fight their way to the over-
lordship of barbarous empire0 ; a uniform known to the southern
and the northern hemispheres, the eastern and the western con-
tinents, and all the islands of the sea. Subalterns wearing this
uniform have fronted dangers and responsibilities such as
in most other services only grey-headed generals are called upon
to face ; and at the head of handfuls of troops have won for
the British Crown realms as large, and often as populous, as
European kingdoms. The scarlet-clad officers who serve the
monarchy of Great Britain have conquered many a barbarous
people in all the ends of the earth, and hold for their Sovereign
the lands of Moslem and Hindoo, of Tartar and Arab and
Pathan, of Malay, Negro and Polynesian. In many a war they
have overcome every European rival against whom they have
been pitted. Again and again they have marched to victoiy
against Frenchman and Spaniard through the sweltering heat of
the tropics ; and now, from the stupendous mountain masses of
mid Asia, they look northward through the wintry air, ready
to bar the advance of the legions of the Czar. Hitherto they
have never gone back save once ; they have failed only when
they sought to stop the westward march of a mighty nation,
a nation kin to theirs, a nation of their own tongue and law,
and mainly of their own blood.' l

Whether those who commanded the Queen's troops in 1899
were as well abreast of their duties as their predecessors history
will decide. It is certain, in any case, that the British officer,
military or naval, is what Britain makes him. His natural
qualities, be they virtues or defects, are those of his race, and it
is the country, not himself, which is primarily responsible for
the development of the one and the correction of the other.
The profession of arms is no exception to the rule that efficiency
and success depend more on systematic training than on

1 The Winning of the West. By Theodore Eoosevelt [now President of
the United States]. Vol. iii., pp. 51-52. New York and London, 1894.

c c 2

388 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

inherent aptitude ; and the education of the officer is necessarily,
from the nature of his position, almost entirely in the hands of
the State.

Education, however, to be of any practical value, must be
expended on material that is capable of absorbing it. Was
this the case in the regular army of Great Britain ? Was the
material with which those responsible for the efficiency of the
land forces had to deal sufficiently receptive ? It is universally
admitted that the builders and the administrators of the Empire
beyond the seas have been, and still are, at least the equals,
both in intellect and in character, of those who control its
destinies at home ; and to their long roll of honour no class
has contributed more largely than the officers of the British
army. South Africa, not less than India or than Egypt, affords
a striking proof of their capacity for government. Who, of
those who directed the policy of that turbulent frontier displayed
the clearer insight and the shrewder judgment ? Who were
the most successful in stilling racial strife, in conciliating the
disaffected, in curbing the restiveness and in promoting the
prosperity of a young community ? Who, in a word, served
the Empire best ? Not those who carried off the prizes at
Winchester or Eton, or had taken high honours at the
Universities ; not the great statesmen of Westminster, or the
shining lights of literature, but those who had been bred in
camps, who had lived their lives in arms, and whose knowledge
of mankind was greater than their erudition.

Lords Glenelg and Grey, the disciples of Bright and Cobden,
were politicians of long experience. Bulwer Lytton and Froude
were ranked among the kings of thought. Carnarvon was the
trusted colleague of Lord Beaconsfield. Kimberley and Derby
were not the least able leaders of the Liberals ; and Glad-
stone, Oxford's favourite son, was asserted by a majority of
his countrymen to be politically infallible. Yet if these men
were to be judged by their conduct of South African affairs,
they would be set down as absolutely incapable of dealing
with the problems of Empire. And although it would be
unfair to base a verdict on what, after all, was but an isolated
and an unfamiliar phase of Imperial politics, it must still be

THE BRITISH ARMY 389

admitted that they compare most unfavourably in their man-
agement of both Boers and natives with the military adminis-
trators who represented them at Cape Town. If the people
of South Africa did not become utterly disgusted with the
vagaries and vacillations of their far-off rulers ; if they came
to realise that not all Englishmen of high station were devoid
of foresight, of firmness, and of consistency; that all did not
consider them as mere pawns upon the political chessboard —
it was due to the men of the Peninsula, to Dundas and Craig,
to Cradock and David Baird, to D'Urban and Napier, to
Harry Smith, and in later generations to George Grey and
Henry Loch.

The sphere of the Colonial governors was certainly
narrower than that of the statesmen of Westminster, and
their responsibilities smaller. Yet the administration of a
vast territory, vexed as much by the clash of barbarism and
civilisation as by racial feuds and conflicting policies, was an
excellent test of practical ability, and that the soldiers, without
exception, proved sterling metal, goes far to show that the
society which produced them was not intellectually inferior,
for all purposes of government, to that which recruited the
British Cabinet. It may even be suspected, when the gross
blunders perpetrated in South Africa by British Ministries are
taken into consideration, that the training which goes to make
men of action is of a harder and more masculine character than
that which moulds the men of the office and the pen. The
latter, it would seem, tends to form intellects which are critical
rather than constructive, persuasive rather than commanding,
and which, when they become involved in the storm and stress
of political life, instead of building solidly for the future are
content with patchwork. It is not without significance that
Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Milner, the greatest of the civilian
proconsuls, had served in India and in Egypt a probation
analogous in many respects to that of their military predecessors.

That such probation should bear good fruit is in itself
strong evidence of natural ability, as much in the soldier as in
the civilian. But it is perhaps more to the point to note that
the military administrators in the South African Colonies,

390 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

saving only Sir George Grey, were not specially selected for
the post they so worthily filled. As a rule, they owed their
appointment rather to their seniority in the Army List and
their personal predilections than to acknowledged merit. Their
seniority, it is true, was the reward of their own ability and
enterprise. But many of their contemporaries had made
equally good use of that admirable system of brevet rank which
offers so many opportunities to those officers who are resolute
to seize them. The Governors of the Cape were not even the
best men of their grade. They were capable generals, but
none, with the exception perhaps of Sir Harry Smith, had the
smallest claim to be placed in the first class. They were good
representatives of their profession, above the general average
in capacity, but distinguished by no such superiority over their
fellows as that which is generally conceded to the members of a
British Ministry.

It is an opinion, however, very commonly held, notwith-
standing that every stone in the fabric of the Empire cries out
against it, that the best brains in the country gravitate more
readily to the learned professions or to commerce than to the
army. But an investigation of the reasons which prevail with
young men in their choice of a military career hardly bears it
out. The prospect of commanding a thousand, or even a
hundred, fighting men, has far more attraction to a large
number of young Englishmen than even a seat in the Cabinet
or a partnership in Lombard Street. Boys become soldiers not
because, as the old taunt puts it, they are 'the fools of the
family ' but because the instincts of leadership are strong
within them. A life of action, seasoned with sport, with glory,
and with adventure, appeals to them with far greater force than
the promise of a less stirring existence and financial affluence,
and it by no means follows that the intellectual endowment
of men who, like George Washington, have 'a strong bent
towards arms ' is not of the highest order. Strength of
character, sound judgment, and constructive ability are the
distinguishing marks of eminent capacity ; and it is not to be
gainsaid that they have been found in the past as frequently
among soldiers as elsewhere.

THE BRITISH ARMY 391

From its earliest days the efficiency and the success of the
standing army of Great Britain have been largely derived from
the high qualifications of many of its officers. Practically every
important campaign has produced at least one great leader, and
many good ones ; and almost all of them have been well educated.
The training of some, such as Cromwell, Marlborough, and
Clive, has been altogether practical ; their wits sharpened and
their intellect strengthened, as was also the case with Nelson
and St. Vincent, by long and varied experience. These, how-
ever, are the exceptions, and it is not to be overlooked that
their natural genius for war was of the highest order. The
majority, including Wolfe and Wellington, have been deep
students of the military art, relying not merely on the
knowledge derived from their own personal practice and
conclusions, but assimilating the practice and conclusions of
the great captains. The era of Napoleon, when war first
became a science, was peculiarly prolific, so far as the British
army was concerned, in characters so trained. Wellington's
lieutenants in the Peninsula and his colleagues in India were
as earnest and as industrious as himself, and the tradition of
hard work they handed down, though at times obscured, was
never completely lost to sight. At no time was the importance
of study more generally accepted as a guiding principle than
at the end of the nineteenth century. The brilliant successes
of Moltke and his Prussians, due almost entirely to a thorough
knowledge of war and its practical application, had rekindled
the torch. Competitive examination both for first commissions
and the staff gave an impulse to intellectual activity ; while
the influence and example of Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley, the
best read soldier of his time, who from 1882 onwards was the
moving spirit in the path of progress, had a marked effect upon
the younger generation. Apathy became unfashionable, hard
work the rule ; study was no longer considered useless ; and the
professional acquirements of the officers reached a far higher
standard than they had attained since Waterloo.

The standard, however, might easily have been higher still.
Zeal was never lacking in the army. The troops had always
been well disciplined and well drilled. The internal economy

392 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

of the different units was everywhere admirable. The health
and comfort of the men were most carefully looked to ; and
the rivalry between regiments, and even between squadrons
and companies, though confined to the exercises of the parade-
ground, to soldierly bearing, and to good conduct, was a token
not only of a strong esprit de corps, but of a strong sense of duty
and professional pride among the regimental officers. They
were supported, it is true, by an excellent body of non-com-
missioned officers ; but although these men, who have been
rightly styled the backbone of the army, furnished an in-
valuable link between the private soldiers and the higher
grades, their powers were strictly limited ; they were merely
assistants to their superiors ; and it was impossible, under the
system of regimental administration, that they could become
their substitutes. Thus between the company officer and the
rank and file no obstruction whatever existed, and in no army
were their personal relations, especially on foreign service,
closer, or more constant.

No incident is more familiar in our military history than
the stubborn resistance of the British line at Waterloo.
Through the long hours of the midsummer day, silent and im-
movable the squares and squadrons stood in the trampled
corn, harassed by an almost incessant fire of cannon and of
musketry, to which they were forbidden to make reply. Not
a moment but heard some cry of agony ; not a moment
but some comrade fell headlong in the furrows. Yet as the
bullets of the skirmishers hailed around them, and the great
round shot tore through the tight packed ranks, the word was
passed quietly, ' Close in on the centre, men ' ; and as the
sun neared his setting, the regiments, still shoulder to shoulder,
stood fast upon the ground they had held at noon. The spectacle
is characteristic. In good fortune and in ill it is rare indeed
that a British regiment does not hold together ; and this in-
destructible cohesion, best of all the qualities that an armed
body can possess, is based not merely on hereditary resolution,
but on mutual confidence and mutual respect. The man in the
ranks has implicit faith in his officer, the officer an almost
unbounded belief in the valour and discipline of his men ; and

THE BRITISH ARMY 393

it is quite safe to say that men who have been less intimately
associated, whose interests were not so closely intertwined, and
who were not so certain of each other's worth, would never have
closed in, step by step, and hour by hour, on the bloody ridge of
Waterloo. The thought that defeat is even remotely possible
is the last that occurs to the mind of the British soldier ; and
the spirit that looks forward to victory as not less certain than
the sunrise is in great part due to the professional zeal of the
British officer.

For the purposes of war, however, it is not sufficient that
the zeal of the officers should be confined to the exact perform-
ance of their duties in camp or barracks. Monotony and
routine, and of both there must needs be much in the soldier's
existence, are certain, if unrelieved, to deaden ambition and
to contract the intellect ; and it is not to be denied that
there were officers in the army of 1899 who had no thought
beyond the mechanical performance of trivial duties. Why this
should have been the case is easily explained. There were many
whose minds refused to be circumscribed by the barrack wall.
Determined to learn something more of the business of fighting
than was taught upon the parade-ground, they found means,
like Wolfe and Wellington, to instruct themselves. Yet from
those responsible for their training, at all events in Great
Britain and her Colonies, they received but little aid. The
educational machinery of the home army was far below that
of any other profession. Instruction, in anything beyond drill,
discipline, and interior economy, was not only limited in
amount but carried on under the greatest difficulties. The
knowledge of ground, which is of such paramount importance
to the fighting man, and which we have seen is almost instinc-
tive in the Boer and the Afridi, was altogether denied to the
soldier trained solely in the British Isles. Its place was
supposed to be supplied by theoretical study. To such study
the cadet colleges were devoted ; and no further knowledge
than an acquaintance with the routine of barracks was de-
manded from those who sought commissions from the
Militia. When the young officer, lacking the very smallest
practical acquaintance with ground, with skirmishing, with

394 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

scouting, joined his regiment, he found that his opportu-
nities of practice, unless he happened to be quartered in a
peculiarly favoured station, were exceedingly few. Either there
was no space available for field-training, or the men, employed
on various duties which had nothing whatever to do with their
training for war, were not forthcoming. At the depots it was
even worse than with the regiments. The supervision of a
few recrui ts, practising the most elementary exercises for a few
hours daily, absorbed but little time, aroused less interest,
and offered no opportunities for useful practice. In his two
years of depot service, the officer, unless he chose to study in
his own quarters, learnt nothing and forgot much. Time hung
heavy on his hands, and it was often wasted.

The result may be readily surmised. Theory, if it is to leave
an impression on the mind, must go hand in hand with prac-
tice, and a system of instruction which overlooks this considera-
tion is not only useless, but revolting to common-sense. Not a
few, therefore, of the regimental officers, over-dosed with theory,
and with theory forced upon them, it may be added, in the
least attractive form, turned impatiently from the study of dull
treatises, and sought an outlet for their energies in other direc-
tions. Nor was the path of knowledge made easy for the more
active-minded. Generals and commanding officers were not held
responsible for the intellectual advancement of their subordinates,
but merely for their knowledge of the official text-books and
regulations. If an officer was inclined to read, there was no
one to whom he could apply for advice as to what to read ; his
education in the higher branches of military science was no
one's business but his own. He was even told that a knowledge
of strategy — and strategy is at least one-half, and the more im-
portant half, of the art of war — was required from staff officers
alone ; and, in consonance with this extraordinary doctrine,
military history was taught officially nowhere but at the Staff
College. Yet military history, as the record of divers experi-
ences, covering all conditions of country, of climate, and of
armament — as the storehouse of the accumulated knowledge of
soldiers of all ages — as the revelation of the practice and the
principles of the great captains — as the platform from which

THE BRITISH ARMY 395

war in its every aspect, from the manoeuvres of vast armies to
the forays of the guerilla, may be surveyed — is the one and only
means, in default of long service in the field, of forming a
military instinct, and of gaining a clear insight into the in-
numerable problems connected with the organisation and the
command of an armed force.

At a few large stations voluntary societies provided courses
of lectures during the winter ; and these no doubt did much
towards awakening a general interest in the larger questions
connected with the conduct of campaigns. But the Govern-
ment made no response whatever to this significant symptom
of a growing demand for higher and more systematic training.
Nay more, it gradually and deliberately reduced the instruc-
tional apparatus. Military education had few friends outside
the army, and no authoritative voice was raised, either in
Parliament or in the Press, when the economists, pursuing a
reckless path up the line of least resistance, proceeded to deprive
the British officer of such facilities for acquiring professional
knowledge as he already enjoyed. The large garrison libraries
which had been established in the early years of the century,
fitted with the best professional literature, and maintained at
the public expense, were ruined by the withdrawal of the annual
grant. If officers wished to read, they had to provide the books
themselves*.1 The garrison classes, conducted by specially
appointed instructors, were practically abolished. Their teach-
ing had been confined to revising a knowledge of subjects with
which the students were already acquainted, and this un-
doubtedly was a waste of energy. But, instead of making
them the vehicle of further education, their comparative useless-
ness, under existing conditions, was alone considered ; and
because they cost money, because they took officers away from
the regiments, already undermanned, they went by the board.
If officers desired further education, they had to pay for it out
of their own pockets. But more serious still was the degrada-
tion of the Department of Education. For some years it was

1 The excellent periodicals of the legal and medical professions, as well as
those dealing with engineering, building, architecture, &c, had no counterpart
in the military world.

39G THE SCIENCE OF WAR

adequate in form. At its head was a general officer, specially
selected, presumably, on account of his extensive acquaintance
with the army, and the science of education as a whole, and of
the educational systems of foreign armies in particular. In all
educational matters he was the adviser of the Commander-in-
Chief and of the Secretary of State for War. He was respon-
sible for the efficiency of the Military Colleges, for the selection
of officers employed upon instructional duties, and for all
examinations. Unfortunately he had to be paid, and a saving
was effected by throwing his duties on to the shoulders of the
Military Secretary, an officer already overworked, who might
or might not have the necessary qualifications.

The chances of practice, too, both at home and in many
colonial stations, were fewer than those of other professions ;
and while it is easy to lay overmuch stress on the necessity of
study, it is impossible to overrate the importance of practice.
According to Mahan, the naval victories of England in the
Great War were due in great part to the fact that the fleets
of France, continually in port, were always at a disadvantage
when they met their storm -tried enemies on the high seas.
In 1899 the case of the British regimental officer serving at
home was somewhat similar to that of the commanders and the
crews of Napoleon's battleships. His training, to pursue the
analogy, was in still water ; his knowledge of navigation and
seamanship was often purely hearsay, and he was never per-
mitted to face wind and waves. ' Give us men to command
and ground where we may train ourselves and them ! ' Such
was the cry throughout the army from 1870 onwards ; and
though when Lord Wolseley became Commander-in-Chief the
annual expenditure on practical training was at once increased,
the ranks of the regiments were still attenuated ; duties about
barracks had still the first claim upon the men, and field-
exercises, when compared with those of Continental armies,
were limited both in scope and in duration. In the year 1898
manoeuvres in which two army corps took part were tried for
the first time for six-and-twenty years, and it can hardly be said
that either the arrangements or the leading were so perfect as
to show that the generals and staff were in no need of instruc-

THE BRITISH ARMY 397

tion. On the contrary, the generals themselves were the first
to declare how many lessons they had learned. But beyond this
spasmodic effort nothing whatever was done to give the senior
officers, the leaders of prospective armies and army corps,
experience in handling large bodies of troops over wide stretches
of country, or to encourage them to consider strategy as well
as tactics. Yet manoeuvres on such a scale are absolutely
essential to the well-being of an army. They not only give
practice to the generals and the staff, affording them oppor-
tunities for working out strategical and tactical problems under
conditions in some degree analogous to those of actual war,
for discussing their solutions, and for initiating and testing the
modifications in established methods made necessary by im-
proved armaments or progressive theory, but they afford excel-
lent opportunities for determining their capacity for command.
If the senior officers are never tested in time of peace, it is
always possible that a man may be appointed to an important
command in the field who has lost his nerve, whose brain is
rusty, whose knowledge is out of date, who is unacquainted
with the tactics of the latest text-books, or whose claims to high
preferment rest upon a brilliant reputation, won, perhaps, in
a less responsible rank, and on an easier field. ' The great art
of government,' said Napoleon, ' is not to let men grow old.1
Manoeuvres are the best means of making certain that the
superior officers of an army do not grow stupid.

It was recognised, however, that something more than regi-
mental experience was indispensable for those who provided
the brains of the army, and the majority of the generals had
either passed through the Staff College, or had been employed
upon the staff. But just as the importance of giving such
officers facilities for keeping up their knowledge and of improv-
ing their practice by means of manoeuvres on a large scale was
not apparently realised, so the importance of training the whole
of the staff on the same system and on the same principles
was overlooked. Economy again intervened. No more than
thirty-two officers passed out yearly from the Staff College
at Camberley, and the supply, even in time of peace, was not
enough for the needs of the army. The result was that nearly

398 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

half the staff appointments in the army were filled by men
drawn direct from the regiments. The majority were no doubt
excellent officers. It is unquestionably an advantage, however,
in any business, that the men responsible for its administra-
tion should abide by the same rules, follow the same procedure,
and be thoroughly acquainted with the methods which en-
sure smoothness and despatch ; and nowhere more than in
the conduct of a campaign is friction embarrassing, delay
dangerous, and misunderstanding, even on some apparently in-
significant point, fraught with the possibilities of the gravest
mischief. It is only by the establishment of a sound system,
with which every staff officer is thoroughly familiar, and of
which the details receive the most scrupulous attention, that
such rocks are to be avoided.

This has been the secret of every staff which has won a
name for pre-eminent efficiency, such as that of Wellington,
of Lee, of Grant, of Sherman, and of Moltke. These great
soldiers, distinguished each one as much for his capacity for
business as for his strategical acumen, would have all things
done in due order, and they would take no risks. Their
first precaution, in assuming command against the enemy, was
to arrange for the regular and timely issue of all orders and
instructions, for the collection and transmission of reports, and
for the distribution of information. They left nothing, so far as
could possibly be foreseen, to the improvisation of the moment.
They had no place in their military families for an officer, how-
ever brilliant his regimental reputation, who had no knowledge
of staff duties in the field ; and it was the rule that the adminis-
tration of the army which they commanded should be con-
ducted on a uniform system, by officers who had been trained to
it. Wellington, for instance, reported to the Horse Guards that
six or seven years1 staff experience in the field was required to
make a good staff officer ; and this opinion was given near the
close of the Peninsular War, when men who filled the conditions
were present in every brigade.

At the outset of a war, however, it is impossible that
officers who have already seen active service on the staff
should be available for all appointments ; and the difficulty

THE BRITISH ARMY 399

is to be overcome by training a large number of officers in time
of peace, by training them in the same school, and, when the
campaign opens, by leaving them, so far as possible, with the
brigades and divisions with which they are already serving.
This at least provides that the members of the staff are not
strange to each other's methods, and that they are imbued
with the same principles. An army when it takes the field
should be organised on the same system as a regiment, and
this system, thoroughly applied, is the foundation of efficiency.
Not only because officers and men are comrades, acquainted
with each other's excellences and a little blind to each other's
foibles, but because it is thoroughly business-like, economis-
ing time, reducing labour, and producing an equality of
result with a minimum of friction. It rests, like every other
well-organised aggregate of human beings, upon the authority
of a single will ; and this authority is exercised by means of
orders and instructions. Orders and instructions, then, are
the mainstay of the fabric, and it is essential, where they
deal with large numbers, either as regards movements, or
health, or training, that they should be so clear as to penetrate
the dullest brain, that they should be so comprehensive as to
omit no essential detail, that the arrangements for their imme-
diate communication to all concerned should be automatic, that,
to facilitate understanding, they should be drawn up in a familiar
form, that to save time they should be issued, so far as possible,
at regular hours, and that everyone affected by them should
understand exactly the quality of the obedience he is expected
to render, whether absolute or conditional, to the letter or to
the spirit. In a certain sense this method of control is purely
mechanical. But it is not for that reason easily improvised,
especially when troops are mobilising or the enemy is already
advancing, and the prudence which takes care that it is firmly
established throughout the whole army, while there is yet time,
cannot be too greatly extolled. War is turmoil, and whatever
tends to mitigate confusion, and to make things easier for the
fighting men, is of such inestimable value that no sanely
governed State can afford to dispense with it.

In Great Britain, where the instinct of self-preservation

100 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

was less strong than on the Continent and where Wellington's
methods of command and administration were not always rated
at their true value,1 the portals of staff employment were less
jealously guarded ; nor was it expected that every officer who
had the good fortune to pass them should work on exactly the
same lines. On the same staff one man might have passed
through the Staff College, another have been trained in India,
another in Egypt, and each might have different ideas of organi-
sation, of tactics, of the importance of orders, of the form in
which they should be issued, whether verbal or written, and of
the amount of latitude to be accorded to those who received
them. It has been noticed elsewhere how often in South Africa
alone, even with small forces, the bad work of the staff was
responsible for failure. At the Berea, Isandlwhana, Inhlobane
Mountains, and Laing's Nek the mechanism of command was
evidently defective. In each case the orders issued by the staff
were either insufficient or misunderstood. It is exceedingly
improbable, if history is to be trusted, that this would have been
the case under Wellington or Moltke, and it is clear, therefore,
that the system of filling staff appointments in the British
Army of 1899 was, to say the least, a dangerous experiment.

Nor was this all. The Staff College was the only school
of strategy, of organisation, of Imperial defence, in the Queen's
dominions. It thus followed that those staff officers who were
appointed direct from regiments presumably knew nothing
whatever, except in so far as they had been able to teach them-
selves, of the three great subjects which are pre-eminently the
province of the General Staff. It may be noticed, too, that
a thorough education, embracing the higher branches of the
military art, was more necessary for the staff officers of the
British army than for those of any other. The most distant
province, occupied by a small garrison, might, as was so often
the case in South Africa, become the scene of operations which
involved vast issues, and the honour, if not the existence, of the
Empire might, at any moment, depend on the strategical skill, the
tact, and the judgment of officers of comparatively junior rank.

1 In two of the best military text-books, dealing specially with the command
of armies, Clarke's Lectures on Staff Duties and Home's Precis of Modern
Tactics, Wellington's staff was not even mentioned.

THE BRITISH ARMY 401

Nor is it to be overlooked that since war has become a
science, and the armies of the nations are directed by men
of the highest ability, an extended course of education for all
staff officers has become an imperative necessity. Staff officers
are not merely the assistants of the generals, but it is from
their ranks that the generals are chosen ; and if we would meet
our enemies on equal terms our leaders must be equal to theirs,
not merely in knowledge and experience, but in mental equip-
ment. In war brain is matched against brain ; the trained
strategist bends all the powers of his intellect and the resources
of his knowledge to deceive, to surprise, to overwhelm ; and
against a slower-witted and less-practised adversary the odds in
his favour are great.

Previous to 1870 trained strategists were few ; the majority
of generals and staff officers relied simply on their experience
and common sense ; all were on the same footing, and there
was seldom reason to fear that the enemy would display a
superior science or a higher capacity for devising irresistible
manoeuvres. Nothing is more noticeable in the history of
warfare prior to the victories of Moltke than the common
level of ability of the body of officers. In many campaigns,
as for instance those of the Crimea, of 1859, and of 1877-8,
the commanders on both sides were men of such mediocre
abilities that the issue seems to have been the sport of for-
tune. In others, a great mind ruled supreme, or was limited
only by the dearth of material resources ; but in all, the
subordinate leaders and their assistants were cast in the same
mould. Under such conditions any further training for generals
and staff officers than that of the regiment was considered
unnecessary. If they had experience of war so much the
better ; if they were without it they were probably no worse off
than their prospective adversaries. But with the advent of
Moltke to power in Berlin this comfortable system came to an
abrupt end. So many trained strategists, so many accomplished
subordinates, so many capable staff officers, had never before
been seen in the same army as in 1866 and 1870. The cam-
paigns of Sadowa and Sedan were intellectual triumphs, not
for the directing brain alone, but for the subordinates whom he

D D

402 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

had trained. Man for man, the generals and staff officers of
Austria and France, though they had far more warlike experience,
were inferior in every single respect, save physical courage, to
those of Germany. At no single point, with equal or even
with larger numbers, did they gain the smallest advantage ;
in small enterprises as in great, in the operations of isolated
detachments as of the main armies, they were continually
worsted, outwitted, and out-manoeuvred, the lore of camp and
barrack proving utterly incapable of dealing with the judgment
and the science of the Kriegsakademie.

The lesson was not lost upon the world. It did not escape
the notice of European soldiers that a new factor of extra-
ordinary force had been introduced into the conduct of war,
and every Continental Government determined that henceforth
the brains of its generals and staff officers should be as bright
and as vigorous as hard exercise could make them. For the
attainment of this end the British Staff College, which had
been instituted in 1858, was greatly extended and improved.
It still aspired, it is true, to nothing more than laying the
foundation of a useful career, and the two years1 course was
only an introduction to the study of war. But though it could
not insure that the habits of study and of thought essential to
continued mental activity were made permanent, nor prevent
relapses into indolence, as a mental gymnasium the Staff
College fulfilled its purpose. Impossibilities were not to be
achieved, as many apparently expected, in its lecture halls.
It possessed no cauldron in which folly might be transmuted
into wisdom, or ambition purged of the vanity which is as
dangerous to soldiers as to angels. But it could make good
men better, broaden their views, strengthen their powers of
reasoning, and improve their judgment. The course of studies
had gradually changed its character. Up to 1893, when
Colonel Hildyard took over command, its chief object was
the accumulation of knowledge, and preparation for paper
examinations. The new chief brought in a more practical
system. Thenceforward the time of the students was largely
occupied in the solving of problems of strategy, of tactics, and of
organisation, both in their quarters and in the field ; the paper

THE BRITISH ARMY 403

examinations gave way to a continual series of practical tests,
applied on the ground; and this method of training, accom-
panied as it was by a salutary friction with other brains, not
of the instructors only, but of the remainder of the class, was
undoubtedly a great advance. It was identical, so far as it
could possibly be made, with the processes of war, which are
nothing more than the treatment of problems. It was more
exclusively practical than the method pursued at any Staff
College in Europe ; and it was thus the best substitute for
the complete experience on which Wellington laid stress, and
also the best supplement to the partial experience, common to
so many British officers, of one or more minor campaigns.
Unfortunately, the college was far too small to supply the
needs of the army. Further comment is needless ; the educa-
tional equipment of the staff, no less than that of the regimental
officer, was manifestly insufficient.

In addition it may be observed that centralisation, the
invariable refuge of administrative incompetency, exerted an
evil influence both on the efficiency of the troops and on the
character of the officers. Owing in a great measure to the
inelasticity and suspicion of the financial system, and to the
existence of a strong civilian element at the War Office, all
power, down to the pettiest details, was absorbed by the
gigantic establishment in Pall Mall. Not supervision, but
direct control, extending to the smallest item of interior
economy, was the watchword of the great departments. To
enable them to keep eye and hand on each individual officer
and soldier, an interminable series of regulations, complicated
by an overgrowing mass of explanations and amendments, and
demanding an infinite number of reports, weekly, monthly,
and annual, made the clerical work of the various commands,
as far down as the companies, an astounding burden. And
further, by compelling the officers, on almost all occasions, to
refer for instructions either to the letter of the law or to head-
quarters, by thrusting them into a groove from which there
was no escape, the system went far to deprive them of all power
of initiative, to make them timid of responsibility and constitu-
tionally averse from exercising their own j udgment. Nor was the

D D 2

404 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

system of promotion calculated to encourage professional zeal.
Selection by merit, according to the regulations, was the
principle, but, although matters had mended since the Zulu
and the Transvaal wars, it was but timidly applied. Staff
employment and brevet rank undoubtedly offered openings to
those whose acquirements and capacity were above the average ;
but the rule still held good, to far too great an extent, that
good appointments were made for the men, and not good men
for the appointments.

Such, then, were the difficulties which the British officer
had to contend with in home and Colonial garrisons ; and
while it may be admitted that the British Isles, with their
teeming population, their high cultivation, their limited area
of waste land, and their old and exclusive rights of property,
are the most costly and least convenient of training-grounds,
it is unquestionably the fact that the attitude of the nation and
the legislature towards the education of the officer was one of
supreme indifference. The true nature of war had never been
brought home to them. They had forgotten, if they had ever
heeded, the terrible warning of the Crimea. The disasters of
1881 had occurred in such exceptional circumstances, and had
involved so small a portion of the army, that they had made
no abiding impression ; and, above all, since the days when
Napoleon threatened invasion, the instinct of self-preservation
had not been touched. Deep down in the national heart lay
the belief that the army, after all, was only the second line of
defence. So loudly had the impossibilities of invasion been
preached to them, so long had been their period of immunity,
that to the people of Great Britain the chances of the soldiers
being called upon to protect the empire from dissolution and
their countrymen from ruin, seemed remote in the extreme.
They had yet to learn that the empire is vulnerable elsewhere
than on the shores of the Channel or the frontiers of Hindostan ;
that a great navy is not an infallible safeguard : that an army
unprepared for war means, in the best of cases, an enormous
debt ; and for their salutary lessons they had to thank an
enemy whose power and resolution they had consistently
despised. England owes much to Paul Kruger.

THE BRITISH ARMY 405

But, fortunately for the Empire, the service of the British
officer was not confined to the commons of Hampshire, or to
the dull barracks which rose like prisons in the roaring streets
of the great cities. It was not here, where his movements were
as confined as his horizon, and where for the free air and
wide spaces that military training demands was substituted the
crushing monotony of endless bricks and mortar, that he
learned his trade. The laureate of the army has nowhere
struck a truer note than in the line which crystallises the
distinctive character of the British soldier.

' I have heard the reveille" from Birr to Bareilly.'

How far do its echoes reach, gathering in one sheaf the
memories of a lifetime ? And not the memories only, but the
experiences. Experiences of many men and many lands ; of
divers races and of the extremes of climate ; of long voyages
over lonely oceans ; of storm and pestilence ; of service in
island fortresses ; of outposts in brown deserts, far beyond the
verge of civilisation ; of times and places where men hold their
lives as lightly as their gloves ; of vast cities, teeming with
an alien population, overawed by a few companies of redcoats ;
of great armies of dark faces, loyally obedient to a handful of
white officers ; of warlike expeditions hastily organised, where
one man has to do the work of ten ; of long campaigns in
waterless solitudes under a brazen sun ; of enemies who give no
quarter, and of comrades who know no fear.

A man must have been east of Malta before he is qualified
to sit in judgment on the regular army of Great Britain. The
beardless regiments of Aldershot or the Curragh can no more
compare with the masses of strong men, horse, foot and artillery,
soldiers of whom no conscript army has seen the like, who hold
India and Egypt, than the lazy routine of English quarters
can compare with the vigilance and stir of the restless East.
It is in those far regions, where the menace of peril is always
present, that the British army is seasoned for war. It is there,
on the great training-ground, amid strife and turmoil, that the
character of its officers is developed, their fibre hardened, their
observation quickened, their resourcefulness called into action.

406 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

It was there, on the wild frontiers of the Empire, that the Sepoy
generals, who caused the author of that felicitous phrase such
an infinity of discomfort, who established the Pax Britannica in
the vast jungles of Burma, who saved India in the time of the
Great Mutiny, and who planted the Union Jack on the ruins of
Khartoum, were fashioned out of the same material that was
the sport of criticism at home.

In the constant association of bivouac and cantonment,
under the shadow of a common danger, the British officers learnt,
not only how to command, but how to govern, to think for
themselves as well as to obey orders, to organise as well as to
lead. Civilian travellers, investigating with impartial minds
the conditions of the Indian and the Egyptian armies, saw
with astonishment young subalterns fulfilling, and fulfilling no
less wisely than cheerfully, the most onerous responsibilities.
Nor did it escape such observers that the practical training
of the British officer in these distant dependencies was emi-
nently adapted to the development of the warlike qualities.
The history of the last twenty years of the century afforded
abundant proof. A long series of campaigns, carried out
under the most adverse conditions of ground and of supply,
had been brought to a successful conclusion. Large tracts
of country had been added to the Empire. Tribes of fierce
savages, inhabiting almost inaccessible fastnesses, had felt the
weight of England's arm. The prestige of the Sirkar had
never stood higher, since the days of John Lawrence and the
downfall of Delhi. Burma, Hunza-Nagar, Chitral, Tirah,
Uganda, Ashanti, Nigeria, and the Soudan had added fresh
honours to the history of the army ; and such was the nature
of the fighting that these honours had been won, in great
measure, by the juuior officers.

It is true that even in India the intellectual side of the
officer's education received too little attention. The influence
of the War Office permeated even to the most remote com-
mands. The indifference of the nation to higher training
exercised its baneful influence. Strategy was not taught at
all. There was no college on the lines of Camberley for the
instruction of the generals and of the staff. Voluntary associa-

THE BRITISH ARMY 407

tions, as in Great Britain, took the place of official institutes,
and the practice of manoeuvres, more, perhaps, by reason of
financial difficulties than of good-will on the part of the
Government, was neither consistent nor comprehensive. The
garrison classes, however, had not been affected by measures
of retrenchment; centralisation was gradually disappearing;
the distribution of the troops into four armies had produced
increased efficiency ; musketry was more carefully taught ; and
on the whole, the level of military education was higher than
that which obtained at home.

Such, then, was the British officer of 1899 ; as a rule a
zealous and hard-working soldier, who had already received
his baptism of fire, and who, if he were not always an earnest
student, was imbued with an intense, if silent, pride in his
profession, in the traditions of the army, and in the men he
commanded. It is not to be denied that all were not cast in
the same mould. In the ranks of even the best regiments were
to be found men who had mistaken their vocation, and others
who were possessed by an invincible indolence. But of what
profession, not even excluding the navy, where the rejection of
the useless and the undesirable is more summary than in any
other, cannot the same be said ? And it is to be remembered
that even the idlest of British officers was not altogether an
unwholesome subject. The unattractive and unpractical nature
of his training in the United Kingdom or the Colonies was at
the root of his apathy. Nauseated with dull theory, cramped
by the want of responsibility, his energy unawakened by appeals
to his intelligence, with no opening offered to him to acquire
that higher knowledge which would have aroused his interest
and kindled his ambition, and with abundant leisure at his
command, it is no wonder that he sought distraction in other
fields. But his instincts were healthy. If he was a mere
barrack-square soldier he was generally a sportsman ; and in
his cricket and his football, in his hunting, his polo, and his
shikar, he was at least hardening his nerve and learning the
great lesson of self-control, improving his power of observation,
training his eye to country, and acquiring to some extent those
qualities which make the Boer so formidable an enemy.

408 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

But strong nerves, and even clear wits, when allied with
ignorance of essential details, go for little in the field. Even
the Boer himself took care that he learned all that his elders
could tell him about the art of fighting. If the man who finds
himself suddenly placed in the midst of peril, with the safety
of others and his own reputation depending on his unaided
judgment, knows nothing of the weapon in his hands, of the
principles on which it should be employed, and of the means of
putting it to the best use, he is apt to lose not only his head but
his moral courage. Indolence, and its consequent ignorance, are
prolific causes of military disaster.

They are not, however, the only causes. Knowledge, and
even experience, may be paralysed by loss of nerve, and failure
be the inevitable result. It is foolish criticism, moreover,
which judges a soldier's capacity by results alone, ignoring the
plain fact that accident is nowhere more active than in the
game of war, that the players are always in the dark, and
that every general, even the most skilful, has committed as
many mistakes as he has won victories. No army was ever
more thoroughly seasoned, or more thoroughly trained, than
that of Wellington in the closing years of the great
Napoleonic conflict. The officers, if not all the men, were
veterans, with crowded years of the most varied experience
at their back. Yet the army was not perfect. Famous
generals were heavily defeated. The mad enterprise of New
Orleans and the retreat from Plattsburg were followed by the
reverse of Castalla. Even under the Duke's own eyes regiments
were as ill handled as were the 58th at Laing's Nek or the 24th
at Isandlwhana. Outposts were surprised. The scouts failed to
bring in information. The cavalry lost opportunities of charg-
ing, and whole companies of infantry were taken prisoners.
Some of the most experienced generals did the most foolish
things ; and at the last great battles, Quatre Bras and Waterloo,
blunders were so many that Wellington refused to speak of
them. It is not too much to say that had the army of the
Peninsula been accompanied by a corps of Press correspondents,
suffering no incident to pass unnoticed, and ruthlessly making
public every instance of failure, its character, in the eyes of

THE BRITISH ARMY 409

those ignorant of war, would have been worse than that of the
army of South Africa. Yet in the main it was a magnificent
force ; and the skill of the officers was not inferior to the reso-
lution of the men. Failure, then, and even disaster, are no
proof of general, and not always of individual, inefficiency ; and
it is not to be overlooked that failure is never so loudly
blazoned abroad as during a campaign. Fame takes little or no
notice of the shortcomings of the lawyer, of the parson, or the
man of business ; but the subaltern who rides into an ambush
is criticised and derided at every breakfast-table, and his reckless-
ness or misfortune furnishes smug common-sense with a new
and unanswered argument against the inefficiency of the whole
body of his brother officers.

Failure, again, is often more correctly ascribed to want of
character and to antiquated tactics, as exemplified in the Trans-
vaal in 1881, than to the absence of professional zeal. A man
endeavouring to forecast the events of the South African War
by the light of the system of training which obtained in the
British army of 1899, would have been justified in assuming
that the strategy would be indifferent, for strategy was never
practised and seldom studied. He might, too, have reasonably
suspected that something would be wanting in the handling of
large bodies, for in this matter both generals and staff were in-
experienced. And he would have been perfectly correct —
especially if he had studied the experiences of the campaign of
Cuba in 1898, and those on the North- West Frontier of India
in 1897-8, where, for the first time, both sides were armed,
partially if not wholly, with the small-bore repeating rifle — had
he considered the tactics of the three arms to be but ill adapted
to the new conditions. An enormous advance, it is true, had
been made in tactical training since Amajuba. The annual
allowance of ammunition for target practice had been largely
increased. Drill in close order had been relegated to its
proper place ; the time given to the practice of spectacular
movements had been greatly reduced, and the barrack-square,
whenever men and space were available, was deserted for the
open country. All this was to the good. Fighting was really
taught. But, in some respects, it was a kind of fighting that

410 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

had never been seen by mortal eyes. The secret of success in
battle is to concentrate superior strength, moral, physical, or
both, at the decisive point ; and such concentration, as a rule,
is not only a protracted process, but requires the closest co-
operation between the various units. The manoeuvres by which
the general designs to achieve his object must, in execution, be
rapid, orderly, and well combined ; the whole mass must be
animated by one purpose, and every individual move under the
same impulse. The British army of 1899 was taught that this
co-operation and cohesion were to be attained, so far as the
troops were concerned, by means of discipline. But discipline
is of two sorts : the first, mechanical discipline, best illustrated
by the solid charge of the two-deep line, the men shoulder to
shoulder, dressing on the colours, and the rear rank with ported
arms ; the second, intelligent discipline, best illustrated, perhaps,
by a pack of well-trained hounds, running in no order, but with-
out a straggler, each making good use of his instinct, and
following the same object with the same relentless perseverance.
It was mechanical discipline, absorbing all individuality,
forbidding either officer or man to move or to fire without a
direct command, and throwing no further responsibility on
the subordinate leaders than that of merely passing on orders
and seeing that they were obeyed, the discipline of Isandlwhana
and Laing's Nek, that was still the ideal of the British army
in 1899. The system had certainly been modified. Stereo-
typed formations in the attack had been abandoned, except
by the artillery. It had been attempted to give the lines of
infantry skirmishers more elasticity by breaking them up into
groups ; and a certain measure of independence in action was
granted to the company commanders. But the principle was
resolutely adhered to of keeping everything in hand by means
of precise orders, of formations in which every man acted in
accordance with a carefully defined routine, and of a continual
looking to, and dependence on, the supreme authority. The
infantry, for instance, were taught to move to the attack of a
position in regular lines, or by the alternate advances of the
units into which it was divided ; and the regulation distances
between successive bodies of troops were to be as far as possible

THE BRITISH ARMY 411

preserved. In fact there was a constant endeavour to make
battle conform to the parade-ground, to apply drill of the most
mechanical character to the bullet-swept field, to depend for
success on courage and subordination, and to relegate intel-
ligence and individuality to the background.

But under fire which begins to kill at two thousand yards,
not, as in the Brown Bess era, at two hundred, troops cannot
march forward like a wall until they see the whites of their
enemies' eyes, and combination and cohesion are only to be
secured by the free exercise of trained intelligence, supported
by individual discipline. Had the Boers possessed the last
they would have been perfect skirmishers. As it was, their
system of establishing a strong firing line at decisive range by
trickling forward a few men at a time, who crept on from
boulder to boulder, from bush to bush, as at the Ingogo and
Amajuba, and who were covered also by the bullets of detach-
ments posted behind convenient shelter in rear, was far less
costly, and far better adapted to counteract the terrible power
of the new armament, than the system which prevailed, not
in the British army alone, but in every continental army of
the day.

The fallacy that a thick firing line in open country can
protect itself, outside decisive range, by its own fire, had not
yet been exposed. It was not yet realised that the defender,
occupying ingeniously constructed trenches, and using smokeless
powder, is practically invulnerable both to gun and rifle, until
the assailant gets so close as to actually see the heads behind
the parapets. Then, and then only, does the fire of the attack
begin to vie in accuracy with that of its opponents. Nor had
the effect of the flat trajectory been rightly estimated. It was
still expected, notwithstanding the lessons of history, that a
firing line at close ranges would be under the control of its
leaders, that officers would be in a position to command, and
the men in a position to obey. It was not understood that
under a hail of bullets, fired from behind cover, men in the open
must fight each for his own hand, using such shelter as he can
find, advancing in such manner as is best suited to the ground
immediately about him, choosing his own target, expending his

412 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

ammunition as seems good to him, and dependent on his own
resources. The psychology of the breechloader battle had not
been studied. It had been forgotten that the firing line in a
hot engagement is a situation which makes the most exacting
demands on human nature. It presents no solid front, but a
chain of scattered individuals, surging forwards and backwards,
susceptible to the lightest breath of panic, absorbed, almost to
the verge of catalepsy, in their deadly work, and often remaining
in position only because to retire is certain death. Yet on
these individuals, on the skill with which they handle their
weapons, utilise the ground, and, more than all, on their moral
fortitude, their determination to conquer, their spirit of self-
sacrifice, success depends. Nowhere is man so utterly alone as
in the firing line at close quarters ; yet nowhere is it more
essential that he should be forgetful of self ; and it follows that
the moral training of the soldier should be as thorough as the
physical. The discipline of the mass is insufficient. The man
must be animated by something more than the spirit of un-
thinking obedience. He must have been taught, and taught
so thoroughly that the idea has become an instinct, to depend
on himself alone, to feel that his individual skill and individual
endurance are the most important factors in the fight, and that
when orders no longer reach him, he must be his own general.
The doctrine is difficult, but least so to the men of the free
races, whose fibre has been strengthened by long centuries of
free government and individual liberty. It was not to strict
discipline, not to experience of war, nor even to native hardi-
hood, that Sir William Napier attributed the military virtues
of the British soldier, but to the British constitution.

The principles, however, on which the assault of a position
was to be conducted, as laid down by authority, had been
loyaUy accepted and faithfully followed by the British infantry,
with the consequence that the training of the individual officer
and soldier, as skirmisher and scout, was sacrificed, in great
measure, to the training of the mass. Intelligence was re-
pressed ; initiative discouraged ; drill overdone. Refinements
were introduced into the practice of brigades and battalions
which went beyond the precision of the official text-books ; and

THE BRITISH ARMY 413

every action of war, inftcted by the precise methods of the
attack, became more or less a mechanical process.

Fortunately the war on the North- West Frontier had sup-
plied a practical commentary on systems of attack and training
which had not passed unnoticed. The authorities, it is true,
gave no sign that they grasped the significance of the innumer-
able skirmishes, in which discipline was often so hard put to it
to hold its own against the wily tactics and invisible fire of the
mountaineers. But there were many officers, especially in India,
with more leisure to give to the consideration of the problems
of fighting than the overworked officials at headquarters, who
realised the paramount importance of individuality, the vulnera-
bility and weakness of long thick lines, the necessity for training
the infantry to attack and to defend in small groups, and of accord-
ing to such groups, as well as to the individuals who composed
them, a large measure of independence. It was long ago laid
down by a veteran of the Peninsula that nothing developed the
readiness and intelligence of the junior officers and the men so
quickly as patrolling in small bodies, entailing as it did con-
stant fighting ; and it has also been noted that the regiments
who were the most skilful at this kind of work were the most
famous, throughout Wellington's campaigns, for their exem-
plary discipline, both in quarters and in action. The lesson
was recalled in 1898 ; and in many commands, not in India
alone, the generals and the regimental officers inaugurated, on
their own volition, a new system of training which was practi-
cally based upon that of the Light Brigade under Sir John
Moore. Of this system the keynote was the efficiency, the
discipline, and the quick wits, sharpened by constant practice in
independent fighting, of the individual skirmisher ; and it bade
fair, as soon as it should become universal, to convert the army
into a host of active and resourceful men, professional in the
best sense of the word, and far superior to an equal number of
mere human automata.1

1 The opinion is not infrequently heard that individuality is injurious to
discipline. The examples of the Light Division, and of many of the finest
regiments in both Union and Confederate armies, effectually dispose of this
objection. But it is to be remembered that these regiments had excellent officers,
who thoroughly understood the needs of war.

414 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

In the cavalry and artillery the value of individuality was
less highly appreciated than in the infantry. Both were
thoroughly well drilled, and, taking other European armies as a
standard, well trained. But the principles which controlled
their conduct in action were those of an age which knew not
shrapnel, the machine-gun, and the magazine rifle. Great
masses of artillery had proved their efficacy in 1870-1.
Brigades of horsemen, riding knee to knee, and sweeping the
field with lance or sabre, had found a few opportunities of
charging home into the enemy's ranks ; and what had been
done then it was thought might be done again, far more effec-
tively, under more experienced leadership. It was not suspected
that the long lines of guns ranged at regular intervals on the
bare slopes of Moltke's battlefields, which had rained such ruin
on the French columns, were already an anachronism ; or that
cavalry, which was unable to reply to the adversary's fire, and,
except when actually charging, was useless either for attack or
defence, was a waste both of men and of mobility.

It was not so much that the tactics of each arm were not
abreast of recent developments, as that the fundamental con-
ception of the unified action of the three arms was inadequate.
Such action is generally placed under two headings, attack and
defence. But as defence is, as a rule, merely a preparation for
counter-attack, the distinction, in a discussion of broad prin-
ciples, may be disregarded, and attack be taken as the end of
combined tactics.

Attack is of two sorts, either direct and frontal, or envelop-
ing. The former unaided by the latter, according to the
experience of all ages, is rarely successful.1 Under certain con-
ditions, such as peculiarly favourable ground, a great superiority
of numbers, of discipline, or of moral on the part of the
assailants, it may be worth trying ; but the issue, in nine cases
out of ten, depends, like a charge of cavalry against infantry
and guns, on surprise ; and opportunities for surprise, when

1 A study of warfare in the Middle Ages, so admirably analysed in Oman's
History of the Art of War, furnishes abundant proof of the fact that attack on
a narrow front, as at Bannockburn, Crecy, Poitiers, has always been disastrous,
even when the defenders have been numerically the weaker.

THE BRITISH ARMY 415

troops are well trained, do not often offer. Otherwise, the force
of which the front overlaps the other has at least seven chances
out of ten in its favour.

As weapons improved, and the power of fire became greater,
enveloping tactics became both more effective and more easy of
application. The strength of the local defence against direct
attack made it more difficult for a force which was surrounded,
or whose line of retreat was barred, to break its way to safety ;
while the increased effect of enfilade or reverse fire, owing to
greater range and rapidity, shortened the resistance of the troops
exposed to it. To enclose the enemy, therefore, in a ring of
fire became the objective of those generals who appreciated the
potentialities of modern weapons ; and such crowning triumphs
as Marengo, Ulm, Waterloo, Vicksburg, Appomattox, Woerth,
Sedan, the Lisaine, where whole armies were obliterated, proved
that envelopment, and not mere weight of numbers, was the true
secret of decisive success. Just as the English line in the
Peninsula invariably routed the French columns, so the com-
mander who knew when and where to extend his front, throwing
forward the flanks, and stopping each avenue of retreat, invari-
ably triumphed over a less subtle enemy.1

Even South Africa afforded illustrations, for at Isandlwhana,
at Laing's Nek, at the Ingogo, on Amajuba, and in many a fight
between Boer and Kaffir, victory remained with the line that
overlapped.

It would be inaccurate to say that a truth that was instinc-
tively realised in the wilds of the Transvaal was unknown in
the war schools of Europe and America. But a truth may be
accepted, and even taught, without producing more than a faint
impression on the minds, or affecting the practice, of those con-
cerned. This was the case in Europe and America with the
great principle of envelopment. Such men as Moltke, Lee,
Jackson, Sherman, Sheridan, and, in a less degree, Grant,
grasped it at once ; for throughout their campaigns the endea-
vour to apply it is always to be observed. But with others,

1 Napoleon, it is true, won brilliant victories by breaking through his adver-
sary's front, but none of these, not even Austerlitz, Eckmuhl or Ligny, were so
absolutely complete in their results as those enumerated above.

416 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

less clear of brain and unable to cast loose from tradition, depth,
momentum, and weight of numbers were considered the decisive
factors in attack. There was an undeniable prejudice in favour
of hard hitting and forcing the decision. Uaudace^ Vaudace^
toujours Taudace, was held to express the spirit which should
inspire the attack. To pile battalion on battalion and brigade
on brigade became a usual feature of the manoeuvre-ground ;
and it was believed that a still sterner discipline and a higher
moral would enable men to push forward under the fire of the
new weapons in the same dense formations which had met with
such fearful punishment in "70 and '77.

These ideas gradually obscured the field of tactical thought
and practice. The principle of envelopment was not indeed
forgotten, but instead of being kept to the front, as the keystone
if the arch of battle, and the basis of decisive success, it was
gradually subordinated to minor considerations. The forma-
tions which had been successful against the French chasse-
pot, a breechloader with a high trajectory and no magazine,
were considered suitable to fields dominated by the raking fire
of the small-bore ; and it was thought that the effect of enormous
masses of artillery, which, against an enemy who disdained cover
and habitually fought in close order, had undoubtedly been
great, would be far greater with a more deadly projectile and
an improved powder. The fire of a superior force would, it
was believed, be so overwhelming, that the Germans laid down,
in their instructions for field exercises, that a direct attack,
provided the troops making it were not less than threefold
stronger in men and guns than those of the defence, would
probably be successful. The English regulations adopted the

same ruling.

The consequences of these false conceptions were mischievous

in the extreme.

In the first place, the importance of turning a formidable
position, and of forcing the enemy to fight on ground which he
had not had time to study or to prepare, was practically ignored ;
and entrenchments having lost their terrors, the tactics of the
manoeuvre-ground, as well as those of the lecture-hall, resolved
themselves into a straightforward rush, a heavy frontal attack,

THE BRITISH ARMY 417

generally but not always combined with an attack in flank ;
and Gravelotte, where the French were merely driven back with
half the loss they had inflicted, rather than Sedan, where they
were surrounded, became the type of the future battle. But
if the effect on the officers was bad, narrowing their conceptions
of leadership to a single operation, the effect on the training of
the three arms was worse. Nothing was thought of but working
in mass, of concentrating large numbers on a narrow space, and
of throwing them forward with mechanical precision against
the weak point of the enemy's position. Such tactics made few
demands on elasticity or on individual initiative. Cavalry,
artillery, and infantry moved in stereotyped formations and
manoeuvred in accordance with fixed rules. Ground was very
little considered ; and field-days, especially when large numbers
of troops were engaged, degenerated into drill.

Had envelopment been the practice of the armies, a very
different state of things would have prevailed. Tactics would
at once have assumed a wider scope. The three arms would
have been compelled to adopt a far larger variety of methods.
The cavalry, on whom would have fallen the duty of barring
or of threatening the enemy's line of retreat, would have been
obliged to attack and to defend positions with the fire-arm.
The artillery, in order to complete the circle, would have been
obliged to make a few guns, acting independently, at wide
intervals, do the work of many ; while the infantry, creeping,
like the Boers at the Ingogo, round the flanks, and holding
the enemy fast within a ring of fire, would have been dis-
tributed according to the ground ; at one point, where the line
was weak, on a narrow front, at others, where it was strong,
scattered in small bodies, and everywhere taking advantage of
all cover. Such tactics, involving, as a rule, great extension
over perhaps a difficult and broken country, would undoubtedly
have thrown a heavy burden of responsibility on the sub-
ordinate leaders, have increased the difficulty of combination,
and have made supervision, on the part of the higher com-
manders and their staffs, almost an impossibility. But they
would have compelled officers of all ranks to use their wits, to
look at ground with a keener eve, to vary their methods, and to

£ £

418 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

consider every detail of their profession from the standpoint of
war alone.

That Continental armies should have fallen into the slough
of crude conjecture and imperfect forecast is hardly surprising.
Men, especially in practical matters, are always inclined to
remember what they have seen rather than what they hear,
and to give more weight to their own stale experience, gained
under obsolete conditions, than to the impressions of others.
That the tacticians of Germany and France, absorbed by the
memory of the crowded and epoch-making incidents in which
they had borne part, should pay too little attention to fresh
developments was perhaps excusable. But if military Europe
tested everything by the light of the campaign of 1870-1,
there was no need, to say the least, that Great Britain should
slavishly follow the example. Her army had experience of
more recent date and more varied character than those of her
neighbours. Her wars were numerous, and though limited in
scope, they had made her soldiers practically acquainted with
the power of the latest armament. Not a few of her officers
had witnessed the fierce battles of 1877-8 and the havoc
wrought by the Martini-Henry. In the campaigns in
Afghanistan the enemy had been partially equipped with
modern rifles. In the first Egyptian expedition shrapnel and
the breechloader had been employed by both sides ; and in
the Tirah campaign of 1897-8 a number of the mountaineers
had found means to provide themselves with the same pattern
of repeating small-bore as the British infantry. Moreover,
British officers had carefully followed and minutely reported on
the interesting operations in Cuba and the Philippines. There
was thus no lack of the best evidence as to the phenomena of
the modern battlefield, and it would have been easy for the
military authorities, had the proper machinery existed, to have
evolved from the data at disposal a far sounder theory of
tactics than that which had been built up by the German
general staff.

But in the British army no means were provided for
collecting, much less for analysing, the facts and phenomena
of the battlefield and the range. Scientific investigation was

THE BRITISH ARMY 419

no part of the duties of the General Staff. History and its
teachings were ignored. Experience was regarded as the
private property of individuals, not as a public asset, to be
applied to the benefit of the army as a whole. The idea of
working out the processes of the future from the occurrences of
the past was foreign to the national conception of the art of
war ; and though objections were rarely raised to the increase
of those branches of the staff which dealt with fortification, with
building, or with ordnance, the suggestion that a branch should
be established for the purpose of dealing with strategical and
tactical problems involving both technical knowledge and
patient study, was howled down by the economists. At the
beginning of the War of Secession the War Department of the
United States looked upon a staff as merely ornamental and
exceedingly expensive. Forty years later, much the same idea
prevailed in Great Britain. The staff was an instrument for
registering decisions, for enforcing discipline, for interpreting
regulations. It had never entered into the mind of any
Secretary of State to imagine that those who composed it
needed time for thought, for study, for watching or for anticipat-
ing new developments in military science. The result was that
when manuals of tactics and instructions for field-exercises were
required, the deductions of foreign theorists were accepted
without question. The officials responsible for the training of
the army had neither the leisure nor the means for prosecuting
independent research and arriving at independent conclusions.
An examination of recent evidence would have revealed the
following : —

1. The impotence of artillery against well-constructed en-

trenchments.

2. The enhanced difficulty of reconnaissance.

3. The practical impossibility of approaching a strong

position except in the very loosest skirmishing order,
and by making good successive points.

4. The fallacy of a firing line at long ranges securing itself

from heavy loss by its own fire.

5. The paramount importance of envelopment.

ll 2

420 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

It. is probable, moreover, that a body of staff officers devoted
to the study of war would have paid special attention to the
campaigns of the United States. A kindred army, organised
on the same voluntary system, making the same large use of
irregular levies, possessing the same characteristics, conducting
operations under the same conditions of rough and wooded
country, and continually fighting against space, was a far
better model for the forces of Great Britain and her Colonies
than the hosts of the Continent. The cavalry tactics of the
Secession War would, if thoroughly studied, have thrown a
far brighter light on the needs of the future and the method
of meeting them than the achievements of the German horse-
men in 1870. But the most brilliant pages in the history of
the mounted arm remained practically a sealed book ; and
because the American squadrons made more use of fire than
of Varme blanche, they were generally regarded as mere mounted
infantry. But it was not the soldiers who were at fault. In
the year 1895, after long deliberation, Parliament produced an
elaborate scheme of army organisation. The reforms contained
therein were drastic. National defence was henceforward to
be conducted on business principles. Efficiency in the field,
adequate preparation for war, and economical administration
were to be the watchwords of Pall Mall. The importance of
sound principles was not overlooked. Responsibilities were
clearly defined ; decentralisation was foreshadowed, and the
claims of both strategy and tactics received due recognition.
Had the scheme been carried out in the spirit in which it was
conceived, the army would have been better prepared than at
any period of its existence to meet any emergency which
might arise. But it is one thing to order, another to execute.
It was laid down by Parliament that the chief duty of the
commander-in-chief should be the provision and maintenance
of plans of offence and defence, applicable to the whole Empire,
and that the adjutant-general should be responsible for the
training of the troops. That one man, unaided, could fulfil
either of these functions was manifestly impossible ; and, from a
business point of view, it would seem that the first step of
those entrusted with the supervision of the new scheme should

THE BRITISH ARMY 421

have been to ascertain the amount of assistance the com-
mander-in-chief and the adjutant-general would require. But
this was the very last question the Secretary of State and
the permanent officials at the War Office desired to ask ; an
increase of the headquarters staff would have involved a conflict
with the Treasury and an addition to the estimates. It thus
happened that not one officer was added to the staff — already
inadequate — of either the commander-in-chief or the adjutant-
general ; and the good intentions of Parliament were deliber-
ately nullified by its own servants. No less than twenty
officers, generally of high rank, were employed at headquarters
on duties connected with forts and barracks ; to deal with the
problems with which the security of the Empire was incontes-
ably bound up, not even a single subaltern was made available.
To the fine spirit of the regular rank and file a brave enemy
has offered a generous and graceful tribute.1 A certain section
of his own people, as well as the majority of foreigners, pre-
ferred to regard the man who took the shilling as a mere
mercenary, possessing only the instincts of a hired bravo.
Never was mistake more gross. The cottage homes of the
British race, whether they stand in the long unlovely streets
of manufacturing cities, in villages old enough to have sent
house-carles to Hastings and archers to Agincourt, in the
Highland glens, or on the green hillsides of Wales, were not
less loyal than the great houses. Britain, even among the
lowest of her soldiers, is still a name to conjure with. Nor is
it to be forgotten that every decade of the century had seen a
sensible improvement in the class and character of the soldier.
The ranks in 1899 were no longer a refuge and a reformatory
for the children of the slums. The wastrel and blackguard
found short shrift in the barrack-room ; and although the
exigencies of recruiting permitted a certain proportion of un-
desirables to degrade the uniform, the Queen's soldiers, as an

1 ' Were it not that so many of my compatriots lacked that which is so
largely characteristic of the British soldier, the quality of patriotism and the
intense desire to uphold the traditions of his nationality, I would ask what people
in the world would have been able to conquer the Afrikanders ? ' — My Remini-
scences of the Anglo-Boer War, General Ben Viljoen, p. 519.

422 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

almost universal rule, were worthy representatives of the indus-
trial classes.

The value of the non-regular forces of the Empire, the
Militia, the Yeomanry, the Volunteers, and the colonial forces,
differed in proportion to the relative instruction and experience
of the officers and men. The material, without exception, was
excellent. Though less indifferent to death than the regulars,
one and all were animated by a soldierly desire of proving their
manhood in the field. But, as a rule, the importance of pre-
paration in time of peace was underestimated. The factors
which make for efficiency in war were not thoroughly under-
stood by the troops themselves ; and the question of their
training, which must perforce run on other lines than that of
the regulars, had never, in default of a thinking department of
the staff, been properly threshed out at headquarters.

England, in all her greater and many of her smaller wars,
has always sought assistance outside the ranks of her pro-
fessional soldiers. To her Militia, her colonial contingents, and
her native levies she owes much. The conquest of Canada, of
India, of West Africa, of the Soudan, are honours which should
be emblazoned on other standards than those of the regular
army ; and it is hardly too much to say that without the aid
of the Militia, not only in supplying a constant stream of
recruits, but in furnishing garrisons for the fortresses, the victories
of the Peninsula and the Crimea would have been impossible.
In South Africa the duties of the Militia, guarding long lines
of exposed communication and escorting convoys, were more
onerous than those which they had hitherto fulfilled. That the
force, as a whole, was fit for these duties, involving constant
vigilance, skill in the selection and preparation of positions, and
much rough fighting, can hardly be maintained. Very few of
the battalions were to be trusted when acting independently
or on the offensive. Their peace training was at fault. As an
almost universal rule the few weeks of their annual stay in camp
were devoted to drill and ceremonial ; of skirmishing, of out-
posts, of scouting, they knew nothing whatever, and their officers,
whose professional education was of the most meagre sort, were
incapable of teaching them. As a set-off, their discipline was

THE BRITISH ARMY 423

generally excellent. It is not to be overlooked, however, that
the pick of the men forming the so-called Militia Reserve were
drafted into the ranks of the regulars. This system was un-
doubtedly most prejudicial to the efficiency of the Militia units,
but it may be questioned whether it was more short-sighted
than the neglect of successive Governments to give the officers
of the Militia a thoroughly sound professional education, and
of the military authorities to insist on marching past being
discarded in favour of the practices useful in the field. A
Militia which had never done anything else but skirmish over
broken ground would have proved a far more useful auxiliary
than one which had never manoeuvred except in the close order
of the days of Wellington. But the defects of the constitu-
tional force cannot be charged against either officers or men ; and
on the opposite side of the account stands the splendid spirit of
self-sacrifice, which, in the hour of the Empire's need, induced
them to volunteer by whole battalions for service beyond the seas.
In 1899 the Volunteers of the United Kingdom had yet to
give proof of their value as fighting men. Numerically they
were an imposing body, and the greater number found no diffi-
culty in satisfying the official conditions of efficiency. Those
conditions, however, were altogether illusory. It by no means
followed that because a man was an effective Volunteer he was
an effective soldier. His training, compared with that of the
professional soldier or the Afrikander irregular, was practically no
training at all. His opportunities of learning his work in the field
were fewer even than those of the militiaman. He was required to
fire no more than forty rounds annually, and his study of ground
was of the most perfunctory character. His intelligence, it
is true, reached a high standard, and to the performance of
his military duties he brought a freshness and individuality
which was no bad substitute for experience. It was difficult,
however, to overcome his initial disadvantages. Life in the
British Islands, except perhaps on the moors and forests of the
North, was, and is, no preparation for war whatever. The great
bulk of the population lacked every single characteristic of
the stockman, the shikari, or the mountaineer. They were
as strange to the face of the earth and all its secrets as the

424 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

inhabitant of Central Europe to the sea and ships. They knew
nothing of the use of their arms or the care of horses. And to
counterbalance these deficiencies they had only their pride of
race, their familiarity with rough sports, and the national
predilection for discipline and good order. The principle of
self-help, however, is deeply imbedded in the English character :
and for the majority of the Volunteers self-help did far more
than had ever been anticipated by the War Office. In those
regiments, and they were not a few, which were commanded
by men who were alive to the nature of the responsibilities
they had undertaken, and who had the gift of inspiring
others, a good proportion of both the officers and men, often
at great personal inconvenience, took their soldiering seriously,
and gave the larger part of their spare time to fitting them-
selves for service against the Queen's enemies. But along-
side great zeal there was great apathy. Not every unit was
well commanded ; and there was a great dearth of officers
capable of imparting practical instruction on the manoeuvre
ground. Thus the battalions were unequal in themselves.
Even in the best a large number of all ranks were merely
nominally effective ; and while the pick of the force were
but little inferior to the regulars, the bulk of the residue
were merely half-trained recruits.' The average, then, of real
efficiency was lower than that of the Militia ; and to have
despatched regiments of town-bred Volunteers, commanded
by inexperienced officers, against an army of riflemen as skilful
as the Boers would, even had it been possible, have been like
setting foxhounds to run down a pack of wolves. It was still
possible, however, to make use of this huge reserve, and before
the war the War Office had decided that in case of necessity
each battalion in the field should be reinforced by a Volunteer
company or companies of the territorial regiment, commanded
by Volunteer officers, and serving for a specified time. This plan

1 The idea of transforming the Militia and Volunteers into an army of
marksmen, capable of coping with the picked infantry of the Continent, is a
vain dream. Marksmanship in a great mass of men depends on discipline and
not on patriotism, and to believe that a large mass of men will become efficient
soldiers, except under compulsion, is to disregard human nature.

THE BRITISH ARMY 425

answered admirably. In a very short time the Volunteers were
not to be distinguished, except perhaps that they depended upon
themselves rather than upon their officers, from the regulars.

The existing regiments of Yeomanry, in 1899, were of much
the same stamp as the battalions of Volunteers, but, as a general
rule, very little work was done outside the brief annual training.
All that could be said for this branch of the auxiliary forces was
that most of the men could ride, that few of them could shoot,
and that no inconsiderable number lived an outdoor life and had
some eye for country, and that the officers were drawn from the
class of landowners.

Of the colonial contingents some enjoyed far greater advan-
tages than others. The Canadians, for instance, possessed many
of the attributes of regulars. The Militia of the Dominion have
always been noted for their military spirit. Face to face with a
mighty neighbour, with whom, in time past, their quarrels had
been frequent, they were not only actuated by the sentiment of
self-preservation, but they inherited the traditions of many fierce
campaigns. Moreover, disturbances within the frontier, the
rebellions of 1870 and 1895, had given them employment and
experience in years comparatively recent ; while the exigencies
of a new country, ever opening up new territories, and the
ceaseless conflict with Nature, in her most gigantic and
repellent form, had added to the enterprise of the Anglo-Saxon
and the daring of the Frenchman the individuality and resource-
fulness of the pioneer. Nor had the Colonial Government
been unmindful of the insecurity of an open frontier of 3,000
miles. The small force of regulars was admirably trained.
Schools of instruction existed for the Militia ; camp and field-
days were not infrequent. In many respects, then, the
Canadians were on the same level with the Boers. Generations
of voyageurs, of hunters, of men of the mountains and the forest,
had produced the same instincts as those which distinguished the
herdsmen of the veld ; warlike experience was not wanting ; and
the needs of active service were appreciated. But beyond all
these the Canadians were fully alive to the importance of disci-
pline, and the public opinion of the soldiery was indisposed to
condone infractions of the military code. The regiments of the

426 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

great Transatlantic colony possessed that backbone of cohesion
the absence of which so enfeebled the Republican forces.

The numerous contingents furnished by South African
loyalists, especially at the beginning of the war, were no
unworthy opponents of the commandos. Many of the men
had seen service in native wars ; the majority could ride, shoot,
and scout, and officers of experience were generally forth-
coming. Some of the regiments, notably those raised from
the refugees of the Rand, in Natal, were conspicuous through-
out for good discipline and resolute valour. Composed of men
of good station and trained intelligence, accustomed to sport
and eager to avenge long years of contumely and insult, they
were as useful on reconnaissance as in battle. Others, however,
drawn from a different class, whose officers were often ill
selected, were not easily broken to subordination ; and while the
men individually had all the makings of serviceable soldiers,
en masse they were of little value. The Colonial Police,
without exception, were clever scouts and excellent mounted
infantry.

It was said of the Australians and New Zealanders that
with three months' training under good officers they would
have been unsurpassed by any irregular force which served in
South Africa. The riders of the Bush had no practical
acquaintance with war; their officers were as ignorant as
themselves; they had no permanent organisation; and they
were so accustomed, in their civilian avocations, to act each
man for himself, that the claims of discipline were at first
irksome. If they knew and trusted their leaders they did well,
especially in small enterprises, where a few brave men, working
intelligently together, were all that were needed. Under
strange officers they were restive, and orders of which they did
not understand the object were often reluctantly and sluggishly
obeyed. Yet their aid was invaluable to the army. They
were fine horsemen, though indifferent horsemasters ; they knew
much of ground ; they were used to the rifle ; they could shift
for themselves in the most uncomfortable circumstances ; and if,
at the outset of the campaign, they were less cunning than the
Boers, less capable tacticians, less apt at ruse and stratagem, it

THE BRITISH ARMY 427

was not long before they had learned every trick of the warfare
of the veld.

When the war in South Africa becomes part of the materials
of those whose business it is to extract useful lessons from past
experience, it will probably be considered that the chief defect
of the great mass of British soldiery was their unreadiness for
war. To all intents and purposes the organisation of the army
was on the same low level as that obtaining in the Boer
Republics ; it had not advanced beyond the battalion —
equivalent to the commando — and the need of a further
development was not yet realised. Inasmuch as the success
of Germany, the model and exemplar of the Horse Guards,
over both Austria and France was in great part due to her
thorough organisation, this attitude of indifference was almost
inexplicable. The truth was that with the science of organisa-
tion, the official mind, naval, military, and civil, was unfamiliar,
and that, so far as the army was concerned, there was no
branch of the Staff within whose scope its application fell.
In default of any mature consideration of this important
subject the ideas put forward were so vague and unpractical
as to produce not the smallest effect on public opinion.
Something, indeed, was accomplished for good. The strength
of the army was economically raised from 200,000 to 280,000
men by keeping 80,000 (misnamed the Army Reserve) on
perpetual furlough ; and, in case of a foreign expedition, an
army corps and cavalry division, completely manned and
equipped, would be ready to embark as soon as the transports
were assembled.

But this was all. The army remained a vast congeries of
ever-shifting atoms, of regiments, battalions, and batteries,
waiting for the stroke of war to come together in the manage-
able bodies which we called brigades, divisions, and army corps,1

1 It is one of the first rules of organisation that eight units are as many as
one commander can manage in war. The same rule applies to the training and
administration of the armed forces in time of peace ; and this explains why
armies are organised in semi-independent bodies of the three arms, by the
Romans called legions and cohorts, by the moderns army corps and divisions.
It is almost needless to add that these rules had never even been heard of by
some of the fiercest critics of the War Office.

428 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

and to become familiar with each other, with their commanders,
and with the Staff. The situation was almost unparalleled.
Parliament, absolutely ignorant of the whole question, was
quite ready to do anything which the military experts thought
advisable. The experts, on the other hand, called loudly on
the statesmen to tell them for what purposes the army was
maintained. Such knowledge, they declared, was an essential
precedent to economical administration and a sound system of
organisation. The statesmen refused to commit themselves.

In the first place, no two authorities were agreed as to the
employment of the army in the case of war ; as to its distribu-
tion in time of peace ; as to the strength which should be
maintained. Some, believing that invasion was a chimera,
considered the Guards and the auxiliary forces an adequate
garrison for the United Kingdom. Others would have a force
large enough to strike a heavy blow abroad, to follow the steps
of Wellington, or to attack another Sebastopol, kept fully
equipped at Aldershot and the Curragh. Others, placing their
whole trust in the navy, would limit any foreign expedition to
a couple of divisions at most ; while others, incapable of reading
the lessons of the history to which they continually appealed,
believed that the punishment of some savage ruler, the invasion
of Ashanti, or the destruction of Benin, was the only sort of
warlike operation on which, in an enlightened age, our troops
could be engaged. In the second place, to lay down the func-
tions of the army was indubitably the province of the expert.
It was the strategist at the War Office, familiar with the
traditional conditions of national defence, with the weak points
of the Empire, with the resources of possible enemies, with the
nature and extent of the help which the navy, in case of a great
war, would demand from the land forces, who alone could
authoritatively lay down the functions of the army. The
question had very little to do with politics, for politics, except
as regards a very few general principles, are concerned only with
the needs of the moment, and it is impossible even for the most
prescient statesman to predict the numerous combinations
which may justify, or necessitate, armed intervention, even in the
near future.

THE BRITISH ARMY 429

The cynic might observe that the principal use of the
British army is to deal with emergencies which, until they are
imminent, are absolutely unforeseen. How is it possible, he
would say, if history is worth anything as a guide, to fix the
strength or the duties of the British army ? Who could have
anticipated, for instance, in the year 1775, that for the next six
years the mother country would have to maintain a fixed force
of 40,000 or 50,000 men in her own Colonies ? Did even Pitt
imagine, when he accepted the challenge of France in 1792,
that before the war was over more than 220,000 British soldiers
would be serving abroad on different theatres of war ? Who, at
the time of the Great Exhibition of 1851, had the faintest pre-
monition that within six years Great Britain would have placed
a fixed force of 80,000 in the Crimea, and another of 96,000
white soldiers in Hindustan ? Nor is Great Britain exceptional
in the obscurity of her future. At the beginning of 1861 the
army of the United States consisted of 25,000 men, and there
were few who doubted that it was quite large enough to fulfil
the purposes for which it existed. Twelve months later nearly
a million recruits had been enrolled, and the purpose for which
they stood in arms it had not entered the heart of man to
imagine.

But above and beyond the great crises which, so long as
human affairs are under human direction, are as frequent as
they are inevitable in the national life, it was by no means
difficult to define the functions and the strength of the regular
army. The lamp of history, trimmed and regulated by the
hand of strategic genius, casts a permanent radiance, exposing
the smallest detail, on each step in the growth and the expan-
sion of the British Empire ; and it seems impossible that one
who studies Mahan's pages should be at a loss to comprehend
the part to be played in future wars by the troops of the Crown.
War with a great Power, or group of Powers, must involve
now, as in the past, a fierce, and possibly prolonged, conflict for
the command of the sea ; for it is absolutely certain that to-day,
as in the day of Napoleon, the maritime supremacy of Great
Britain must be the objective of its enemies. But in the long
struggle which ended at Trafalgar it was not upon the navy

430 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

alone that the burden fell. The operations, though in every
respect maritime, were by no means exclusively confined to blue
■water nor carried through by the broadsides of the battleships and
the cutlasses of the boarders. The troops did their full share.
They captured more arsenals than fortresses ; more ships of war
than regimental colours ; more positions on the seaboard, com-
manding or threatening the trade routes, than inland lines of
entrenchments. They were more familiar with long voyages
than with long marches ; with sudden embarkations and swift
onsets than with the protracted manoeuvres of a regular cam-
paign. Steam and electricity have wrought great changes in
the warfare of the sea, but it would be unwise in the extreme
to imagine that in any future conflict the navy will be able to
dispense with the help of the army in breaking down the
enemy's resistance, in destroying his bases and supply depots, in
cutting his communications, in mastering strategical positions,
and in protecting the trade routes. These objectives will still
be the main factors of every strategic problem, in some respects —
owing to the enormously increased volume of commerce and
to the far larger needs of ships of war — of greater importance
than heretofore ; and thus the same principles, the same con-
ditions, under which such problems were dealt with in the
past will reappear in the future. The first necessity, then,
of imperial defence, so far as the army is concerned, is the
maintenance of at least three army corps l of regulars, ready to
render immediate support when the navy asks for it.

A fallacy which prevailed before the South African War was
that any such force, quartered in the United Kingdom, might
contrive to pay a double debt. Not only would it serve as a
deterrent against invasion, but it might be employed in rein-
forcing any portion of our land frontiers, such as South Africa,
which was threatened with attack. The idea arose from a
misconception of what would be required of the army in case
of a maritime struggle. The possibility of active aid to the fleet
was overlooked ; and it seems to have been held that the busi-
ness of the troops was defence, and defence only.

1 This number is based on an analysis of the work demanded from and
accomplished by the army in the wars with France in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.

THE BRITISH ARMY 431

It is essential, however, that any force which is to be at the
beck and call of the navy should be within reach of the theatre
of war; and, judging from the past, it would seem probable
that the main theatre will probably be the narrow seas of
Europe, together with the North Atlantic and the Caribbean ;
for it is in these seas that the flow of trade will be most readily
checked, and it is on these seas that are to be found the great
dockyards, many of the greatest capitals, the wealthiest com-
mercial ports, and also the ganglion of the vital lines of
communication. A distinction, then, must always be made
between that part of the army whose function it is to support
the navy and that part which is charged with the defence of
our outlying provinces. Had this been done before 1899 the
borders of Cape Colony and Natal would have been so strongly
held that even Kruger would have shrunk from the task of
forcing them. Long before the Raid the South African
garrison should have been increased to 30,000 or 40,000 men,
and why the home authorities should have been reluctant to
decrease the force at home by those numbers is inconceivable.
South Africa, in almost every respect, was a most eligible
quarter, admirably adapted for the training of the troops,
admirably situated as a strategic centre, whence the navy
might be supported or India reinforced, in the Southern seas.

That the regular army was large enough to carry out its
normal functions can hardly be questioned. There were men
enough, had they been properly distributed, to give protection
to the most remote settlements ; to furnish a strong backbone
to the Militia and Volunteers of the British Isles in case of
attempted invasion,1 and, when the command of the sea was
fairly secure, to furnish at least three army corps for maritime

Towards the question of invasion the Government took up a most sensible
line. Many amateur strategists, and notably one great newspaper, had brought
themselves to believe that invasion was a chimera ; others thought that a force
of perhaps 20,000 men might slip across the Channel. On the other hand,
many eminent sailors and soldiers were by no means satisfied that a raid
on a gigantic scale was an impracticable operation. The Government, then,
remembering the awful panic which shook the United Kingdom in the year of
Trafalgar, declined either to denude the British Isles of regular troops or to
commit their defence to forces of an inferior description. The mistake that
was made was in neglecting the organisation of the army of defence.

432 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

operations. But there were not men enough to meet an un-
expected crisis of such magnitude as the war with Napoleon
or the Indian Mutiny, nor to maintain a field army at full
strength during a protracted struggle on a distant frontier.
This, however, was not the fault of Parliament. It was impos-
sible, much as certain soldiers desired it, to give such an estab-
lishment to the army as should cover all contingencies. Great
Britain had to follow the rule of other countries, and to maintain
as large an army as she could afford. And this, if the men were
to be regulars, could not be large. Nevertheless, a further
expansion was perfectly possible. The Militia, the Yeomanry,
the Volunteers, and the colonial forces not only provided an
immediate reserve of nearly 500,000 men, but might, under a
comprehensive system, have furnished a secondary reserve, a
Landwehr and a Landsturm combined, of as many more, at an
exceedingly small price. It was here that the system of 1899
was so defective. Expansion of the field forces on service over-
seas was almost the last thing thought of. The War Office was
prepared to embark two army corps in succession, completely
equipped, to keep them at full strength for the duration of a
campaign, and to protect the lines of communication by
battalions of Militia Volunteers. But that anything further
might be required never seems to have entered into their cal-
culations. An active army of 100,000 men was the limit of
Britain's armed strength — that is, an army just half the strength
of that which fought against Napoleon, when the population of
the United Kingdom was 14,000,000 as against 40,000,000.

The remedy lay in the organisation of the secondary reserve.
Not a man who had borne arms, whether in the regulars or the
auxiliary forces, should have been suffered to disappear into
civil life. Every trained soldier should have been registered,
and cadres should have been established in which every veteran
who was still willing, in case of emergency, to serve his country
should have been enrolled.1 It would thus have been possible,

1 There was no need that these men should have been called out for
training. A small retaining fee (unnecessary in the case of the Yeomanry and
Volunteers) would have been enough to give the Government a lien on their
services in case of national emergency.

THE BRITISH ARMY 433

when the demand for more troops came, to lay hands at once
on men of some experience, to assemble them and to equip them
through their cadres with far greater rapidity and smoothness
than through a central office, hurriedly established, and, at th?
same time, to enlarge the military departments, the medical,
supply, ordnance, remount, in proportion to the enlargement of
the army.

It was not that the importance of organisation had not
been exemplified of recent years. The War of Secession, the
People's War in France of 1870-1, the Cuban War of 1898,
all told the same tale. M'Clellan's great army of 1862,
Gambetta's levies on the Loire, were equally impotent. Want
of organisation was even more fatal than want of discipline ;
and vast masses of men, admirably equipped, and animated by
the highest patriotism, fell an easy prey to inferior forces, not
because they failed in courage, but because their training was
below that of their adversaries, their corporate existence of the
shortest, and their organisation incomplete. And just as these
unfortunates failed in the field, so did the forces assembled for
the conquest of Cuba fail to withstand the ravages of disease.
The warning to Great Britain, largely dependent, as were
Republican France and the United States, on her citizen
soldiers, was as clear as the handwriting on the wall of
Belshazzar's palace. But that it was neglected was not sur-
prising. It was no one's business to note, to analyse, and to
apply the teachings derived from the operations and constitution
of foreign armies, and the time of the officials at the War
Office was already fully occupied with current work. Yet the
blame is easily fixed. England presumes that her statesmen
are as familiar with contemporary progress and political
developments as are her merchants and manufacturers with new
methods of business and the most recent inventions. Than
the great General Staff of the German army, the military
organisation which that staff evolved, and the resultant effi-
ciency of the hosts which so easily defeated Austria and France,
no more powerful forces were revealed during the nineteenth
century. Yet few British statesmen appear to have had more
than a faint inkling of their predominant influence upon the

F F

434 THE SCIENCE OF WAR

affairs of nations ; and not one had the good sense to endeavour
to apply them to the military needs of the United Kingdom.
It may, perhaps, be urged in their defence that history, as
taught in English Universities, took no notice of so trivial,
though practical, a subject as Imperial defence, and that the
officers of the army were not alone in their lack of professional
education. The army of Great Britain is practically com-
manded by the nation, through its parliamentary representatives.
Is it not the business of the nation to see that these represen-
tatives have some knowledge of the work with which they are
entrusted i

INDEX

Alexandria, bombardment of, 1882,
tad little practical result, 17

Alison, Sir A., on importance of
Antwerp, 27

Allied armies, disadvantages of, 32,
383

Alma, Moltke on, 117 ; formation
at, 127

Amateur strategists, have no know-
ledge of practical difficulties, 20

American Civil war, importance of
command of the sea in, 35 ; cavalry
became a new type during, 55 ;
American tactics in, superior to
Prussian in 1866, 129 ; lessons of,
ignored by Germans, 148 ; ordinary
rules of war defied in, 151 ; books
on, 187, 188 ; officers in, 191 ; sol-
diers on both sides well matched,
197 ; straggling in, 204 ; marching
powers of men, 206, 222 ; insub-
ordination in, 210-212 ; fire disci-
pline nil, 215, 244, 265 ; ignorance
of officers, 217 ; staff in, 217-219 ;
orders frequently misunderstood,
220 ; lack of reconnaissance, 221 ;
superiority of Confederate informa-
tion, 221 ; causes of the war, 231 ;
at beginning, only 18,000 regulars
in U.S., 233 ; vastness of theatre
of war, 234, 236; statistics, 235,
236 ; commanders on both sides,
241 ; regimental officers and men,
242 ; moral, 243 ; shortcomings of
the men, 244 ; armament, 248 ;
military geography of, 248 ; policy
of the Federals, 249 ; strategy of,
252 et seq. ; tactics, 258 et seq. ;
ammunition supply, 265 ; ' raids '
in, 267, 276 ; General R. Lee's plan
of campaign, May 1863, 280 ; criti-
cisms of his action at Gettysburg,
289 ; failure of Confederate staff at
Gettysburg, 305 ; volunteers in, 311 ;
maps, few and bad, 312 ; state of

affairs in May, 1864, 314 ; Lee's
foresight, 317 ; Lee and Grant in
the Wilderness, 314, 337

Antwerp, importance of, to Great
Britain, 27, 28

Aristotle, quoted, 19

Arnold, Dr., on unprofessional judg-
ment on a professional subject, 19

Artillery, preparation, 78 ; of the de-
fence, principles of employment, 85;
Wellington's use of, 104 ; artillery
preparation habitually neglected in
Franco-German war, 140, 141 ; in
American Civil war, 258-260 ; at
Gettysburg, 305; tactics of 1870
an anachronism, 414 ; impotence of,
against well-constructed entrench-
ments, 419

Attack, success of, depends on com-
bination between the units, 81 ; on
a strong position should be avoided,
83 ; definite prescriptions for, dis-
carded in latest German drill books,
163 ; federal formation for, at
Spott?ylvania, 322 ; wedge-forma-
tion for, 326 ; out of date system
of, in continental manoeuvres, 373 ;
by skirmishers, 374 ; two sorts of,
414

Aulic councils, control of Austrian
armies by, in 1792-95, 13, 14

Austerlitz, brief description of, 180,
181

Australians in Boer war, 426

Austrian writer, misrepresentations of
an, on Boer war, 379

Austro-Prussian war, 1866, Austrian
generals not educated for war, 4,
121 ; inactivity of Prussian cavalry,
in Bohemia, 129

Bakeb, Col. V., on cavalry, 108

Balaklava, shock tactics at, 54

Base, in American Civil war, 256 J

F F 2

436

THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Grant's constant change of, at Cold
Harbor, 329

Battles, conditions of modern, 73 ;
duration of, 340

Bayonet, has once more asserted itself,
135 ; value attached to, by Skobeleff ,
150

Black Prince on attack formation, 134

Bliicher, Marshal, at Waterloo, 99

Boer war, Boers possessed no staff of
trained strategists, 14 ; foreign criti-
cism of, 365 et seq. ; lessons of, 372 ;
English cavalry in, 376 ; casualties,
compared with other battles, 378 ;
unfounded charges on spirit of
English infantry, 379 ; a triumph for
principle of voluntary service, 379 ;
Boer numbers in, 382 ; colonials in,
384 ; Boer tactics, 411

Boguslawski, on methods of Franco-
German war, 131 ; ' battle-discipline '
of, 137

Brackenbury, Col. C, quotation from,
175

Brandy Station, 1863, account of cav-
alry action at, 269-274

Brialmoni, Life of Wellington, 89

Britain, an ' amphibious power,' 27, 30,
36 ; 1802-13, most critical period in
English history, 90 ; possibility of
being involved in a European con-
flict, 309; vulnerable elsewhere
than at home or in India, 404 ;
possibilities of invasion, 431 note

British army, efficiency of, has little
interest for the public, 25 ; took
more battleships than colours in
the great war with France, 27, 430 ;
principle of its employment, 1793-
1815, 28 ; of 1808, wanting in
prestige, 93 ; traditional attack
formation of British infantry, 133 ;
suffered in its leaders, in the great
war with France, 169, 170 ; educa-
tion of Volunteer officers, 227 ;
must be prepared to fight over
every kind of country, 343, 364 ;
foreign officers on Aldershot man-
oeuvres, 355 ; in future an ' imperial
army,' 380; in 1899, 382; the
British officer, 386, 387, 391, 407 ;
military education in, 388, 393 et
seq. ; manoeuvres, 396, 397 ; vast
experience of, 418 ; erroneous ideas
as to use of the staff, 419 ; organisa-
tion, 1»95, 420 ; spirit of the rank
and file, 421 ; main defect of, in
Boer war, 427

British Cabinet, mistakes of, in 1807,
30 ; in 1793, 31 ; in 1813, 32

Brooke, Gen., extract from his report,

Spottsylvania, 336
Buford, Gen., his brilliant initiative

at Gettysburg, 290
Bull Run, brief account of, 191-93
Buller, Sir R., German criticism of, 368

Campaigns, duration of modern, 23

Canadian contingent, value of, in
South Africa, 425

Cape Colony, governors of, 390

Casualties, increase of, with modern
firearms, 24

Cavalry, shock tactics, 52 ; climax of
incompetence reached in period
1854-78, 52 ; few successes gained
by shock tactics, 54 ; raids by, on
enemy's communications, 56, 57 ;
duties of, 58 ; shock tactics v. fire-
power, 59 ; importance of ' dash '
for the cavalry soldier, 61 ; funda-
mental principles of tactics, 64 ; in
conjunction with the other arms,
67 ; question of armament, 67 ;
importance of role of, in grand
tactics, 77 ; moral influence of, 110,
113 ; duties of, in action, 111, 112 ;
at Mars-la-Tour, 112 ; In Franco-
German war, the Peninsula, and
Napoleon's campaigns, 115-116 ; in
American Civil war, 246, 268, 269,
278 ; Lee's cavalry screen at Gettys-
burg entirely withdrawn, 287 ; in
future wars, 302; as trained and
equipped on the Continent, obsolete,
372 ; opportunities for shock-tactics
rare, 376 ; lessons of, in American
Civil war, 420

' Cavalry Division,' author of, quoted,
110, 116

Centralisation, evil influence of, 403

' Century ■ ' Battles and Leaders oi
the Civil War,' 188 et seq

Change of front, a difficult operation,
332

Charles, Archduke, one of the best
educated soldiers of his time, 3 ; at
Wagram, 128

Chesney, Col. C, on American troops,
151 ; military policy of the South,
253

Chesney, Sir G., on American mounted
riflemen, 267

Civil War, English, cavalry in, 51

Civilian ministers, control of military
operations by, a dangerous pro-
ceeding, 13, 18-20; Lincoln's in-
terference in American Civil wart
240, 258

INDEX

437

Clausewitz, Gen. C. von, on moral

force, 173
Clery, Sir C, book on tactics, 165,

106, 178
Cold Harbor, retreat from, 195 ; brief

account of battle at, 329
Colonials, in Boer war, 384, 425, 426
Command of the sea, importance of,

30, 31, 34 ; in American Civil war,

35, 256 ; in Peninsular war, 91
Common-sense, value of, after a defeat,

370
Copenhagen expedition, 1807, 16, 30 ;

Wellington in, 95
Counter-stroke, ineffective, in modern

campaigns, 75 ; opportunities for,

84; Americans realized necessity for,

in Civil war, 151 ; Lee's, at Spott-

sylvania, 325; rare, in English

manoeuvres, 363
Cover, importance of, 350 ; influence

of, 147
Crimean war, mediocre commanders

on both sides, 401
Cromwell, views on cavalry tactics,

53
Custozza, cavalry at, 54

Davis, Jefferson, services of, 239
Defence, new conditions not entirely
in favour of, 74 ; tactics of, 84, 331
Department of Education, duties of,

395
Descents on the mainland, value of,

32,33
Desertion, frequency of, in the Penin-
sula, 94
Dewey, Admiral, at Manila, 16
Discipline in American Civil war, 199,

208, 265
Dragomiroff, Gen., on tactics, 144
Drill-books, should not be slavishly
followed, 72 ; not intended to be sole
guide in training of troops, 359 ; of
1808, improved on by Wellington,
360

• Edinburgh Eevtew,' quotation from,
on American Civil war, 213

Enfilade fire, deadliness of, 73

Entrenchments, still play an impor-
tant part, 68 ; in modern wars, 340

Envelopment, a monopoly of the
advancing army, 75 ; principle of,
416 ; importance of, 419

Extended order, reasons for adoption
of, 137, 138 ; advocated after 18 10,
152

'Field Exercise,' English, editions
of, 1870-88, 134; similarity between
tactics of, and those of the American
Civil war, 149

Fifty-second Light Infantry at the
Nivelle, 350

Firearms, deadly properties of modern,
23-25, 339 ; changes in tactics due
to, 73, 122 ; value of the breech-
loader at first over-estimated, ]08

Fletcher, Col., on American Civil war,
194, 197, 199, 202

Fontenoy, traditional British forma-
tion abandoned at, 134

Fortifications, Vauban's, 15 ; Welling-
ton's in Portugal, 1809-11, 15;
quadrilaterals of Lombardy and
Bumelia, 15

France, position of, in 1808, 91

Franco-German war, 1870-71, French
generals Dot educated for war, 4 ;
cause of German success, 8; Ger-
man preparations for, 11 ; French
advance on the Saar, at beginning of,
unexpected, 17 ; cavalry in, 53 ;
remarkable for absence of normal
battles, 120 ; German official
account, on Spicheren, 120 ; con-
troversy as to lessons to be learnt
from, 125, 126, 132; German
tactics, in many respects, unsound,
139, 142 ; German critics of German
shortcomings, 147 ; marching power
of German soldiers, 206 ; perfection
of German outposts, 207 ; faults in
German tactics, 340 ; most battles
of, running fights, 354 ; continental
military writers saturated with, 369,
418

Frederick Charles, Prince, his ' Art of
Fighting the French,' 119, 362

Frederick the Great, at Hohenkirch,
122 ; his tactics retained at Jena
and Auerstadt, 128 ; anecdote of,
184

Frontal attacks against good troops,
well posted, suicidal, 74 ; Laymann's
book on, 125 ; successes of the
Japanese in, 153 note ; at St. Privat,
154 ; at Plevna, 157 ; in American
Civil war, 159 ; unsuccessful in
middle ages, 414 iwte

Frontier defence, European PoweiB
better prepared for, than Great,
Britain, 366

Fuentes d'Onoro, Marmont's cavalry
at, 115

Gawler, Col., on Peninsular war
tactics, 136

ff 3

438

THE SCIENCE OF WAR

General Staff, importance of, to a
state, '2. '2. 5

German General Staff, ensures uniform
training in handling troops, 6 ;
official history of Franco-German
war, euphemistic, 124, 188

German officers, training of, 6, 140,
161, 355

German railway system, before 1870,
15

Gettysburg, lack of fire discipline at,
216 ; artillery at, 261 ; from a
cavalry point of view, 278 ; account
of, 280-306

Gleig, llev. G. R., Life of Wellington,
89

Goltz, von der, on cavalry, 113 ; on
Gravelotte, 124 ; on tactics, 125

Grant, Gen., military policy of, 213 ;
services before the war, 241 ; ignor-
ant of drill,242 ; strategy of, 250, 255-
257 ; Lincoln's plan of campaign for,
258 ; his position, May 1864, 314 ;
his intentions against Lee, 316 ; out-
manceuvred by Lee, 322 ; tactics at
Spottsylvania, 324 ; his bad luck,
326; nonplussed by Lee, 328; his
change of base at Cold Harbor, 329

Ground, appreciation, or neglect of
capacities of, in battles, 80 ; much
to be learnt as to use of, from
military history, 178, 179 ; Lee's eye
for, 333

Gurwood, Col. J., Wellington Des-
patches, 96

Hamlet, Sir Edward, on Wellington,
105 ; « Operations of War,' 165, 168 ;
on ground, 179

Hancock, Gen., praiseworthy conduct
at Gettysburg, 291 ; appreciated
volunteers, 311 ; extract from his
report, Spottsylvania, 335

Hannibal, quotation from Greek bio-
graphy of, 176

Hazen, Gen., his ' School and Army in
Germany,' 204 ; on ignorance of
officers in the Civil war, 217 ;
artillery in the Civil war, 259 ;
infantry tactics, 263

Hildyard, Col., at the Staff College, 402

Hill fighting, in Eusso-Turkish war,
342 ; on Indian N.-W. frontier, 345

Hoenig, Capt., on Vionville, 24

Hohenlohe, Prince Kraft von, on
marching of German troops, 1870,
207

Home, Col., on the Alma, 136 ; book
on tactics, 165, 166

Hooker, Gen., his cavalry tactics, 277
Hooper, G., Life of Wellington. 89

Imagination, value of, in war, 176, 283

Imperial defence, imperial strategy
and, 385 ; first necessity of, 430

India, keynote of struggle with French
empire, 29 ; a great training-
ground, 405 ; no staff college in, 406

Indian N.-W. frontier, lessons from
fighting on, 345, 413

Infantry, should co-operate with
artillery in preliminary bombard-
ment, 78, tactics entirely changed
after introduction of the breech-
loader, 117-118 ; suffered from
theories in Franco-German war,
118 ; traditional attack formation
of British, 133 ; intermixture of
units in attack, in recent wars, 135,
136; in American Civil war, 262,
263 ; training for attack, 338-364 ;
formation for, in attacking over
open ground, 372

Initiative of subordinates, in campaigns
of 1866 and 1870, 5 ; in 1870 some-
times became reckless audacity, 7 ;
obedience considered more im-
portant than, in English army,
161 ; instances of exercise of, in
American Civil war, 296 ; Moltke
on, 355

Innovations, instances of, in war, 369

Intelligence department, its descrip-
tions of foreign armies, 363

Interior lines, in American Civil war,
254

Jackson, 'Stonewall,' on mystifying
the enemy, and on the pursuit, 42,
178 ; constantly studied Napoleon's
maxims, 71 ; services before the
war, 241 ; advocated invasion of
the North, 253

James Eiver, passage of, after Cold
Harbor, 330

Johnson, Gen., extract from his report,
Spottsylvania, 336

Junot, Marshal, on his subordinates,
214

Kesslee, Maj.-Gen. von, on St. Privat,

113,155
Kimberley, not a fortress, 368
Kipling, Rudyard, on distinctive

character of the British soldier, 405
Koniggratz, cavalry at, 54

INDEX

439

Ladysmith, not a fortress, 368
Layrnann, Capt., his 'Frontal Attack

of Infantry,' 125
Lee, Gen., at Mine Run, 122 ; methods
compared with Wellington's, 123,
125 ; appreciation of, 177 ; at Cold
Harbor, 195 ; defeats Pope, 197 ;
relations with his subordinates,
211 ; on his officers, 217 ; opera-
tions against Grant, 251 ; crossed
the border twice only, 253 ; plan of
campaign, May, 1863, 280 ; realizes
Lincoln's apprehensions, 284 ; de-
prives himself of his cavalry screen,
285 ; criticisms of, by Comte de
Paris and Longstreet, 289 ; his
orders, at Gettysburg, 293 ; scheme
of attack, third day of Gettysburg,
299 ; his position, May 1864, 314 ;
realizes Grant's intentions, 317 ;
dispositions, at Spottsylvania, 322 ;
his counter-stroke, 325 ; skill with
which he selected his positions, 333
Light Brigade in the Peninsula, 346
Light infantry, characteristics of,

349-352
Lincoln, interference in military
operations, 14, 240 ; submits a plan
of campaign to Grant, 258
Lines of communication, threatening,
or cutting of, a great principle of
strategy, 40, 41 ; in American Civil
war, 256
Loigny-Poupry, cavalry at, 54
Longstreet, Gen., at Gettysburg, 222,
295 ; came from pay department,
241 ; criticism of Lee, 289

McClellan, Gen., at Cold Harbor,
195 ; weeded out incompetent
officers, 217 ; a railway director
before the war, 241

M'Dougall on study, 185

Magazine rifle, change in tactics due
to, 73

Mahan, Capt., reform of British naval
deficiencies due to writings of, 10 ;
on the importance of dominant
positions, outside its frontiers, to
a maritime state, 26 ; works of,
88, 186, 429 ; his explanation of
British victories, in the Great War,
396

Manoeuvres of the training ground,
less to be learned from, than from
military history, 49 ; false lessons
of, 102 ; continental, 373

Manoeuvring, the 'antidote to en-
trenchments,' 81

Marching, necessity for, not done away
with by railways, 205

Marlborough, Duke of, greatest of
England's soldiers, 178

Mars-la-Tour, see Vionville-Mars-la-
Tour

Massena at Busaco, 122

Maurice, Gen., on Waterloo, 89 ;
capabilities of the breechloader,
108; cavalry, 111; lessons of the
past, 131 ; regulations of 1870, 133 ;
Franco-German war, 136; ' Century'
papers, 190

Maxwell, Sir H., ' Life of Wellington,'
89 note

May, Capt., his ' Tactical Retrospect
of 1866,' 119, 145, 146

Mayne, ' Fire Tactics,' 184

Meade, Gen., his tactics at Gettys-
burg, 301

Military history, importance of study
of, 13, 47-50, 165; Wellington a
student of, 96 ; English study of,
171, 172 ; best way of studying,
182-184 ; taught nowhere in British
army except at Staff College, 394

Military organisation, a science, 2,
437 ; importance of, 433

Military periodicals, lack of, in Eng-
land, 395 note

Militia in Boer war, 422

Moltke, Marshal von, few mistakes in
campaigns of, 3, 11, 18 ; on ' highest
triumph of generalship,' 75 ; his
' Influence of Fire-arms upon
Tactics,' 117 ; on infantry tactics,
119 ; his strategy compared with
that of Federals, 257 ; training of
the soldier, 355

Moore, Sir John, at Shorncliffe Camp,
347, 361

Moral, importance of, 101, 373; in
the American Civil war, 243 ; of
conscript armies, 379

Moral force, compared with physical,
Napoleon's dictum on, 173, 189,
312

Mounted infantry, necessity for, 63 ;
infantry drill-book of 1889 on,
108 ; lessons of, in American Civil
war, 266

Napier, Sir Charles, on study, 185
Napier, Sir W. F. P., on genius of
Napoleon, 40 ; History of the
Peninsular War, shortcomings of,
88: on Busaco, 122; operations on
the Coa, IPS', on British soldiers,
412

410

THE SCIENCE OF WAR

Napoleon I., one of the best educated
soldiers of his time, 3 ; criticisms
of his marshals, 7 ; realized the
importance of India, 29 ; dictum as
to communications, 39 ; Napier on
genius of, 43 ; enemy's commu-
nications, first objective of, 49 ; his
opinion of Wellington, 87 ; on study
of military history, 170, 258, 307,
312 ; on art of government, 397
Napoleon III., success in 1859 due to
Austrian incompetence, 14 ; dis-
loyalty of his subordinates, 1870,
211
' Nation in arms,' advent of, 2
Navies, cannot bring a war to an end
without the help of an army, 25,
26; not an infallible safeguard,
404
New Orleans, British defeat at, 170,

408
New Zealanders in Boer war, 426
Ney, Marshal, at Bautzen, 76
Niel, Marshal, on tactics, 120
Night march, Grant's, at Spottsylvania,

326
Nivelle, light infantry at the, 350

Oman, Professor, his ' History of the

Art of War,' 414 note
Omdurman, Dervish casualities, 339
Osman Pasha at Plevna, 157, 304
Outposts in 1870-71, 207

Pakenham, Sir E. M., defeated at

New Orleans, 170, 408
Palfrey, Gen., on American soldiers,

226
Panic, rare under modern conditions

of warfare, 65
Paris, Comte de, on American Civil

war, 187, 194, 201, 289
Parliament, ignorance of, on army

matters, 428
Peace, disadvantages of a long, 375
Pedantry of German writers on Boer

war, 368
Pendleton, Gen., Lee's artillery chief,

a clergyman before the war, 242
Peninsular war, hampered Napoleon's

operations on the Continent, 30, 32 ;

European political situation at begin-
ning of, 91 ; real reason of British

success in, 127 ; British mistakes in,

408
Plevna, lesson of, 16 ; deadlock caused

to Bussia by occupation of, 33 ;

Osman's attempt to break investing

lines, 157, 304 ; an ideal battlefield,

342
Press, comparison between Paris

press, 1870, and Confederate, 1864,

21, 22 ; German, muzzled in 1866

and 1870, 22
Prussia, disasters of 1806, 2 ; study of

war in, 4 ; foolish adherence in

1806 to tactics of Frederick the

Great, 362
Psychology of the breechloader battle,

412

Quick Firing field gun, change in
tactics due to, 73

Raglan, Lord, tactics of, at the Alma,

136
Railways, good servants but bad

masters in war, 33 ; repair of, in

American Civil war, 234, 237
Reconnaissance, more difficult under

modern conditions, 73, 372, 419;

first duty of cavalry, 77
Richmond, sufferings at siege of, 252
Roads, Grant hampered by want of,

in the Wilderness, 332
Roberts, Lord, 'Rise of Wellington,'

89, 171 ; his march on Bloem-

fontein, 370
Roosevelt, President, onBritish officers,

387
Ross of Bladensburg, Gen., capture of

Washington, 256
Rough Riders, method of taking cover,

in Cuba, 350
Royal United Service Institution,

lectures at, 166
Russian army, learned little from

Franco-German war, 362
Russo-Turkish war, not so thoroughly

studied as Franco-German, 341 ;

mediocre commanders on both sides,

401

St. Privat, brief account of, 154-156 ;

casualties of Prussian Guard, 339
Sea-borne trade, loss of, a deadly blow

to any power, 37
Seaton, Lord (Col. Colbome), anecdote

of, 184
Segur, Gen. de, on Peninsular war,

127
Sheridan, Gen., on the army of the

Potomac, 256
Sherman, Gen., ignorant of drill, 242;

march across Georgia, 256 ; at Bull

INDEX

441

Ban, 264 ; opinion of troops in the
Civil war, 308

Bhorncliffe Camp, Sir J. Moore's
training of troops at, 347, 361

Skirmishers, attack by, 374

Skobeleff, Gen., well acquainted with
American Civil war, 148, 262 ; relied
on the bayonet, 150; a student of
history, 363

Smokeless powder, changes due to,
73 ; embarrassments caused by, in
Boer war, 371

Soldiers' battles have been known, but
never a soldiers' campaign, 386

Soult, Marshal, anecdote of, 177

South Africa, mistakes of British
statesmen in, 388 ; value of South
African contingents, in Boer war,
426 ; admirably suited for a train-
ing ground, 431

Spanish-American war, American
opinion on Santiago, 14 ; Dewey's
victory at Manila not followed up,
16

Spottsylvania, 1864, brief account of,
322 et seq.

Staff, importance of a thoroughly
efficient, 69, 401 ; training of, 398 ;
failure of English in South African
wars, 400

Staff College, starved, 397; only
establishment of its kind in British
Empire, 400 ; instruction at, 402

Staff rides, value of, 48

Stanton, Lincoln's Secretary of War,
14, 240

Statistics, comparative, of different
battles, 378

Steinmetz, Qen. von, at Spicheren,
124

Sternberg, Count, book on Boer war,
380

Stratagem, value of, 178

Strategy, definition of, 11 ; should
keep pace with diplomacy, 17;
influenced by political and financial
considerations, 21 ; exact meaning
of, 39 ; principles of, 40-42 ; not
mere pedantic formulae, 43 ; bad,
more often the cause of defeat than
bad tactics, 45 ; the great end of,
45 ; by whom should it be learned ?
46, 47 ; the more important half of
the art of war, 394

Stuart, Gen., commands Confederate
cavalry, at Brandy Station, 270 ;
Lee allows him, before Gettysburg,
to separate from the main body, 286,
303

' Summer Night's Dream,' soathing

attack on German tactics, 125, 137,

140
Supports, want of, at Spottsylvania,

323 ; at the Alma, 324
Surprise, the foundation of strategical

combinations of the past, 35 ; value

of, 102
' Sweep of the dragon's wing,' instances

of, 75

Tactics, lessons to be learned from, in
Peninsular war, 101 ; substantially
same as in days of Napoleon, 144 ;
English text-books of, 166-169 ; not
essentially changed since 1870-71,
338 ; continental, out of date, 375

Tactics, grand, armies famous for
their, 69 ; of the defence, 84 ;
distinction between, and minor
tactics, 167

Tactics of the three arms, 70-86 ; in
European wars of last fifty years,
114 ; in Boer war, 414

Taylor, Gen., on straggling, in
American Civil war, 204

Tirah campaign, value of experience
of, 372

Torres Yedras, a German strategist
on, 92 ; an instance of a well-
chosen position, 331

Training, value of, not appreciated
before 1866 and 1870, 3 ; drill books
not sole guides for, 359 ; in British
army, neglected till recently, 393

United Sbbvice Magazine, writer in,
on cavalry, 109; article in,
• Summer Night's Dream,' 125

Upton, Gen., author of the U.S. in-
fantry drill-book, 150

Vatjban, fortifications of, 15
Yegetius, on attack formation, 134
Verdy du Vernois, Gen., on German

tactics in 1870, 142, 143, 147
Victories nullified by bad strategy, 46
Viljoen, Gen., on qualities of the

British soldier, 421 note
Vionville — Mars-la-Tour, casualties

at, 24 ; cavalry at, 54, 112
Volunteers, relative merits of pro-
fessional and unprofessional
soldiers, 37 ; task of British, 227 ;
value of, 385 ; British, in 1899, 423

Walcheren expedition, if successful,
a great blow to Napoleon, 28;
unfortunate result of, 170

442

THE SCIENCE OF WAR

War, a matter of movement, supply,
and destruction, 1; simpler than
formerly, 2 ; as a science not studied
by Anglo-Saxon communities, 12 ;
no standard work on, in English, 12 ;
interference of statesmen in conduct
of, 13, 14 ; pre-eminently the art of
a man who dares take risks, 45 ;
decisive factors in, 341 ; not an
exact science, 367

War Office, results of civilian element
at, 403

Waterloo, departure from established
principles of strategy at, involved
gTeat risk, 43, 99 ; literature of, 89 ;
British line at, 392

Waterways, safer and surer than rail-
ways in war, 34

Wellington, one of the best educated
soldiers of his time, 3 ; preparations
in Portugal, 1809-11, 15 ; dictum of,
that the ' result of a battle is never
certain, even with the best arrange-
ments,' 44 ; underrated till the
Peninsular war was nearly over, 87 ;
comparative value of works on, 89 ;
realized the advantages of command
of the sea, 92 ; abused by the press,
94 ; value of his Indian experience,
95, 371 ; his strategy, pre-eminently
daring, 97-99 ; his tactics, 100, 102 ;
skill in mystifying the enemy, 103 ;
loyalty to his superiors, 107 ; criti-
cisms of his generals, 170 ; his in-
fantry tactics, 360 ; on staff officers,
398 ; his methods ignored, 400

West Point, excellence of, 237

• Wilderness of Virginia,* operations
in, 307-337

Wilkinson, Spenser, only political
writer to appreciate importance of
defence of empires, 13

William I., Emperor of Germany,
statesmanship of, in 1866 and 1870,
23

Wilson, Gen., his maroh across Ala-
bama and Georgia, 276

Wilson, Sir B., anecdote of Napoleon,
177

Wisconsin, supply of men from, in
Civil war, 199

Woerth, a German officer on, 344

Wolseley, Lord, Life of Marlborough,
90, 171 ; on mounted infantry, 109 ;
military history, 182 ; ' Soldier's
Pocket-book,' 184 ; on Lee's cam-
paign, 216 ; Lincoln's interference
in military affairs, 240 ; regulars,
244 ; opportunities of cavalry in the
American Civil war, 246 ; his in-
fluence and example, 391 ; increases
expenditure on practical training,
396

Wood, Sir Evelyn, ' Achievements of
Cavalry,' 171

Wood-fighting, in Franco-German war,
208, 342 ; the Wilderness, 1864, a
good instance of, 318

Wiirtemberg, Duke of, estimate of
casualties at St. Privat, 155

Yeomanby in 1899, 425
York, Duke of, British contingent
under, 1793, 30

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The science of war.

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