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Full text of "Scope of Soviet activity in the United States. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress, second session[-Eighty-fifth Congress, first session] .."

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NOVERIBER 14 AND 15, 1956 

PART 46 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

i r -:) 8 iL I c ] 

72723 WASHINGTON : 1957 




Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 


OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, Nortli Dakota 






Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal, Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 




Robert Mokris, Chief Counsel 

J. G. SOURWIXE, Associate Counsel 

William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandbl, Director of Research 



Witness : 

Hazafi, Arpad 319G 

Laszlo, Istvan 3182 




United States Senate Subcommittee 
To Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal, Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
! Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 : 05 a. m., in the caucus 
room, Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D, Johnston presiding. 

Present : Senator Johnston. 

Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel ; J. G. Sourwine, asso- 
ciate counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; Benjamin Man- 
del, director of research; and Robert McManus, research analyst. 

Senator Johnston, The subcommittee will come to order. 

We have an oath here that we will ask the interpreter to listen to 
very carefully. 

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness 
the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers 
given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God? 

Miss Low. I do. 

Senator Johnston. Counsel, you may proceed with the witness. 

I think, before we start, I want to say that it is very important that 
we get a true picture of what is going on in Hungary at tlie present 
time. All good Americans and all people in America that believe in 
our way of life — and I am glad to say that most of the people in the 
United States do — are very much interested in this matter of Hungary 
at the present time, or any other activities that may be going on here 
in America or elsewhere by the Communists. 

We want to know how they go about it, in order to keep the Com- 
munists from breaking down our way of life. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, we have here today a young man — he will 
give his age as 21 — who was the head of a large student organization 
in one of the westernmost counties of Hungary. When the revolu- 
tion took shape, despite the fact that he had only 2 months' military 
training, he was elected to be the head of 6,000 men. 

These are facts that he will testify to, Senator, as we go along today. 

But he has been chosen by the Hungarian fighters to come to the 
United States, and the subcommittee heard about his presence in the 
country, and we asked him to come here today to give testimony along 
the lines that you have described, Senator. 

Senator Johnston. And I suppose that that is the reason that you 
have him masked at the present time. 

Mr. Morris. The reason for the mask, Senator, is that this man has 
a family in Hungary. Accompanying him this morning are two peo- 



pie who want to stress the security aspects of his visit today. One of 
them is acting as interpreter here today. They point out that, if this 
man's picture appears m tlie press, or if it is picked up on any of the 
motion-picture or television cauieras, that will, naturally and very 
understandably, possibly jeopardize the lives of his family. 

Rather than take that responsibility, we have agreed that he would 
appear with this mask that you see here. It is strictly for the pro- 
tection of his family, who are still in Hungary and subject to reprisal 
for what he may say here today. 

Senator Johnston. I think that is very appropriate, and that ex- 
plains why he comes here masked today. 

Mr. Morris. Will you stand and raise your right hand ? 

Will the interpreter ask him to repeat after you the oath that the 
Senator will administer? 

Senator Johnston. Do you swear the evidence you give to be the 
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

The Intertreter. He says "Yes." 

Mr. JNloRRis. Now, this witness, Senator, will not give his right 
name here today; he has identified himself in executive session, but he 
will give us a name which he is using in connection with his visit here 
to the United States. 

What is that name ? 



The Interpreter. Istvan Laszlo. 

Mr. MtiRRis. Your name is Marian Low ? 

Miss Low. Marian Low. 

Mr. Morris. In what city do you reside? 

Miss Low. Cambridge, Mass. 

Mr. JNIorris. And when did you first meet the witness here today ? 

Miss Lo"\v. I first met him on Sunday night when he spoke at a 
rally in Boston, a protest rally for Hungarian relief, given by the 
International Rescue Conmiittee. 

Mr. jMorris. Xow, Mr. Laszlo, you resided in the western part of 
Hungary, did you not? 

The Inti-^rpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And you were active in student affairs, were you not? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What county did you reside in ? 

The Interpreter. Sopron. 

Mr. ]MoRRis. I wonder if you could point to that county, Sopron 
County, on the map of Hungary that appears on the chart. 

Mr. Laszlo. Yes [indicating on maj)] . 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what your student activity was during 
the month of October of this year. 

The Interpreitir. Before the revolution, or after, or during? 

Mr. ]MoRRis. We want to lead up to the revolution. Tell us, in the 
first place, what is your age. 

The Interpreter. 21 years. 

Mr. Morris. And, during the month of October, prior to the up- 
rising, you were engaged, as you have just told us, in student activi- 
ties; is that right? 


The Interpreter. Before the revohition he was enabled to work in 
student affairs because he was shut out of the Communist Youth Or- 
ganization. A few weeks before the revohition, however, his student 
friends demanded that something should be done, and this is how 
lie got the leadership. 

Mr. Morris. Was there, therefore, prior to the revolution, some agi- 
tation for broadening the scope of the student activity? 

The Interpreter. He says there was the Petofi circle, a Hungarian 
youth group, which actually gave the idealistic leadership of this 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about the circumstances leading up to 
the first outbreak. 

The Interpreter. The entire youth group in the university was dis- 
satisfied with the activities of the Communist Youth Organization; 
that is, the DISZ. 

Mr. Morris. You say the student body at the university became dis- 
satisfied with the Communist leadership of the student organization. 
And then what happened? 

The Interpreter. The youth groups throughout the country left the 
Communist Youth Organization and set up a list of demands, and 
when the Pluiigarian radio in Budapest refused to read these demands, 
the entire country, the youth groups decided to revolt. 

Mr. Morris. What form did the revolt take? This is the revolt of 
the students^ 

The Interpreter. That is right. 

The revolt started when the youth group went to the radio station 
witliout arms and only with stones, and just threw stones at the radio 
station. The AVH, the Hungarian security police, shot at the stu- 
dents, at which point the Hungarian students and workers in Buda- 
pest went out to the arsenal. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give a date for each one of these occurrences. 

The Interpreter. The 23d. 

Mr. Morris. The 2y'd of October? 

The Tnterpreter. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. That was the date that the students were refused the 
radio facilities for their demands? 

The Interpreter. That is right. 
. Mr. Morris. And at that point they decided to engage in this revolt? 

The Interpreter. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. And that was, you say, on the 23d of October. Now, 
will you tell us in detail what happened in each one of these steps. 
At this point had you elected a student leader? 

The Init.rpreter. By this time he was the head of the youth council 
in his town, in the county which he mentioned. 

The next day the students took over the leadership of the town 

Mr. Morris. Now, when you were first elected student leader, how 
many students so elected you? 

The Interpreter. There were 1,000 students selected him as their 

Mr. Morris. And then after the revolt took place, was the organi- 
zation that you were in charge of broadened to include others than 
students ? 


The Interpreter. The organization itself was not broadened. How- 
ever, the revolt was joined first by the workers and then by the anny 
itself, and, he says, in fact, the entire country. 

Mr. Morris. I wish you would give us each stage of this broadening. 
In other words, at the beginning there were just a few thousand stu- 
dents, with you as the leader ; is that right? 

The Interpreter. The thousand students were the entire university, 
all the university students, and they elected him, and he will now give 
it step by step. 

Mr. Morris. We are not asking you to name the university, because 
naturally that will identify you, because you were selected as the leader 
for a particular university. 

The Interpreter. He says that he was in constant communication 
with the head of the student group in Budapest, and that they coordi- 
nated all their steps according to what was going on in Budapest. 

Mr. Morris (to the interpreter). May I break in. Will you try to 
translate this in the first person. You are using the third person ; if 
you will use the first person I think it will be better for our record. 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

The workers in Budapest broke into the arsenal and fought the army 
with just simple arms, that is, just guns. 

In Budapest the army went to the side of the rebels. At the same 
time, in the county of Sopron, we organized the entire town, the work- 
ers and the students, and at this time we were still unarmed, and I 
sent this group out to defend the town. 

Mr. Morris. At this point, you were now in command of how many 
people ? 

The Interpreter. At this time I was head of the student regiment, 
which was about 800 students. 

Mr. Morris. But you also broadened this command of youre to in- 
clude others than students; did you not? 

The Interpreter. Various delegations from factories went to the 
student council, which was leaving the county, and asked them to give 
them arms and to join them, they wanted to go to Budapest to help the 
rebels there with arms. But this was impossible at this time, because 
the students themselves did not have arms yet. 

Mr. Morris. What was the date of this occurrence ? 

The Interpreter. The 25th. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did any of these workers whom you have de- 
scribed thereupon join your gi'oup? 

The Interpreter. Yes, the workers in the entire neighborhood 
joined the students, and not only the workers but peasant delegations 
came up and promised all the help that they could give. 

Mr. Morris. Now, the ranks swelled to what number after these 
people joined you? 

The Interpreter. In the entire county, about 80,000 people. 

Mr. Morris. 80,000? 

The iNTERPRE'rER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And what was the number of the group that you 
commanded ? 

The Interpreter. Until the revolt became armed in this county, a 
council was running the county affairs. But when they formed the 
county into army units they made me the military leader, and I had 
about 5,000 men under me. 


Mr. Morris. Now, how did you obtain arms ? 

The Interpreter. When the army units in the county saw that 
the workers and the students were organizing, they came to us — they 
took down the red stars from their caps and put on red, white, and 
green, the national colors, on their caps. And when we saw that 
this was happening, we asked, the council asked the heads of the 
police, the border guards, and the army in the county to come to us 
and to give us arms. 

Some of them were reluctant, but the police head was the first to 
give them to us, and later on the others also acceded to our demands. 

We received larger arms from units near our town 

Mr. Morris. Military units? 

The Interpreter. Military units near our town, where there were 
larger army divisions who also joined our revolt. 

Mr. Morris. At tliis time liow mucli military training had you had ? 

The Interpreter. I had only 2 months' military training, which 
I received as a university student, but I was only a foot soldier there 
and I liad no officer's training whatever. 

Mr. Morris. Now, after you and your group obtained arms; what 
did you do ? 

The Interpreter. We set up military regiments, formed of stu- 
dents and other groups, and we sent them out to defend a 6-mile line. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us roughly where this 6-mile line is on 
that map ? 

Mr. Laszlo. Yes. [Pointing.] 

Mr. Morris. You are very near the border ; are you not ? 

(Mr. Laszlo points on the map.) 

Mr. Morris. Now, up until this point had there been any blood- 

The Interpreter. No; up to now there was no bloodshed. 

Mr. Morris. And all the people that you encountered, the police 
and the Hungarian military forces and the border patrol, none of them 
offered you any resistance? 

The Interpreter. Not only did they not resist, but I have to say 
that when the Soviet memorial statue was thrown down, the police 
commander himself, the commander of police officers, helped to bring 
it down. 

Mr. Morris. Now, when did Soviet or Russian forces first appear 
on the scene, as far as you are concerned ? 

The Interpreter. Around the 30th of October. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you said tliat you and your group went forth 
to defend the particular area that you have described. Did you 
establish some kind of a military formation ? 

The Interpreter. There were three lines along the 6-mile line that 
I pointed out. The first one was the artillery, the second the stu- 
dents, and the third the workers. They each formed separate regi- 

Mr. Morris. And you were the commander of that particular 
formation ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, when did the Soviet forces first appear? 

The Interpreter. On the 30th, 30 tanks came from the city of 
Gyor toward the town where I was. 

72723— 57— pt. 46 2 

3186 SCOPE or soviet activity in the united states 

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that city, please ? 

The Interpreter. G-y-o-r; there are two accents on the "o." The 
name usually used on foreign maps is Rab. 

Mr. Morris. So Gyor is often called Rab ? 

Tlie Interpreter. Yes ; it is. 

(Pointing on map:) The Soviet tanks came toward the town, and 
they were stopped before one of tlie Aallages because they met our 
units there. After a brief firing, the Soviet commander declared an 
armistice and moved back from the county. 

They went back in the direction of Gyor, which is where they came 

Mr. Morris. Now, what had your experiences been with Russian 
military forces occup^ang Hungary ? 

The Interpreter. Those Russian troops which came into the coun- 
traj^ then and whicli were in tlie country then agreed with the revo- 
lutionists and were on the side of the rebels. 

I will tell of several instances to prove this. 

Mr. Morris. Please tell us those instances. 

The Interpreter. Many of tlie Soviet soldiers told us that they 
were sent to fight Fascist uprisings, but wlien we told them, and 
when they saw they were actually fighting against the people, they 
refused to fight us, they refused to shoot us, and they asked the Imre 
Nagy government to give them asylum. 

In Budapest, it happened that an officer comniandiiig a tank got 
out of his tank with a white flag and gave the tank to the Hungarian 

It also happened in Budapest wlien one of the tank units was going 
down Andrassy Avenue that the first, the leading tank, turned its 
gun on the Soviet tanks behind it and shot at his comrades. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what you did wlien you were the com- 
mander of this group which you have described, wlien the Russian 
tank commander declared an armistice, when he put up a white flag 
and declared an armistice ; will you tell us what you did then ? 

The Interpreter. When the armistice was declared, a large Soviet 
tank unit came to the outskirts of our town, where they faced our 
armed units. I went to meet them with a white flag to ask them why, 
since there was an armistice, they came to us. And although I came 
with a white flag, the Russian soldiers greeted me with a tommy 
gun and took me to their commander. 

I asked them what they were doing there, and he said they liad 
good news for me, the Russian troops were leaving Hungary, they 
were actually just there to prevent Western armed help from coming 
through the border. 

The interpreter, the Russian interpreter wlio was witli me, 
the officer one of the pamphlets which he had printed in Russian, 
with our demands. The Russian officer read this 

Mr. Morris. What were these pamphlets that you refer to? 

The Interpreter. The pamphlet stated in Russian, asked the Rus- 
sians to leave the country, since they were fighting an entire nation 
of people that merely wanted its freedom. 

Mr. Morris. How many such pamphlets were prepared ? 

The Interpreter. We printed 4 kinds of pamphlets, and we got 1 
from the Radio Free Europe Committee. 

Mr. Morris. And in what quantity were these produced? 


The Interpreter. "\Ye printed 4,000, and we got about 1,000 from 
Free Europe. 

Mr. Morris. What were the demands that you set forth in these 
pamphlets ? 

The IxTERPKETER. I have already told what Tve said in our pam- 
phlets, that we wanted liberty, we wanted the Russians to leave the 
country. The Free Europe pamphlet demanded that there should 
be a revolt in Russia itself, addressed to Russia, and that the Rus- 
sians should not oppress and suppress Hungary's fight for freedom. 

Mr. Morris. And what were the limits of your demands? 

The Interpreter. This was the demand, that they should leave the 
country. And I think we stated that this was a nation fighting and 
not Fascist groups. 

Mr. ^loRRis. And that was the extent ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us at this time what the 
general conditions were in the countiy that gave rise to this uprising. 

Tlie Interpreter. I would not say that the first cause of the revolt 
was material. I would say that the most important was idealistic, 
and mental oppression. But I would add that a material depression 
and economic problems added to it, as well. 

To prove that the main cause w\as not material, when the Kadar 
government promised double wages to the workers to stop the general 
strike, nobody stopped the strike. 

Mr. Morris. You had a security police in Hungary ; did you not? 

The Interpreter. Yes ; there was a security police, the AVH, which 
terrorized the entire countiy continually. And it proved by its 
actions that it represents only the Rakosi government, or the Soviet 

Mr. Morris. What was the makeup of these security police ? Were 
they mostly Hungarian nationals, or were there Russians and other 
nationals involved? 

The Interpreter. The AVH consisted mostly of Hungarians, but 
the top leaders are Russians. One of the leaders was INIihaly Farkas. 

Mr. Morris. Those leaders that you mentioned, were they Hun- 

The Interpreter. Yes; thej Avere Hungarian. 

Mr. Morris. For the most part, though, the leaders were Russian ; 
is that right? 

The Interpreter. Yes; the leaders were mostly Russian, and both 
Farkas, as well as Ernest Gero, had Soviet citizenship. 

Mr. Morris. Ernest Gero had Soviet citizenship? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you coidd tell me what the makeup of 
the Soviet police, or the AVH, as you call them, was in your particular 

The Interpreter. Before the revolution it was difficult to know 
who the top leaders were, and during the revolution we shut them up 
in order to hold a trial later and to examine their cases. Among them 
there were Russians. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us in detail how you shut them up, as you say; 
tell us of that. 

The Interpreter. When we received arms, we went out to arrest 
the members of the AVH. We found them in different place?, some- 


times hiding in attics and sometimes trembling, coming to us and 
giving us their arms. We also arrested a number of AVH men who 
were coming armed in their cars from Budapest trying to get to the 

Thus, we disarmed and arrested about 250 members of the security 
police, whom we shut up in the town prison. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you then inspect their headquarters ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. During the revolution, the people broke 
into the AVH headquarters in my town, as well as in Gyor and in 
Budapest, as well as other towns in Hungary. Here they found tor- 
ture instruments, which prove the statements I made about them 
before. Among these was a small chamber with a roof that could be 
pushed down so that the person in this chamber was completely 

Mr. Morris. Did you see that with your own eyes ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what other instrmnents of torture you 
personally experienced? After a while you went to Budapest, did 
you not? I don't want to get ahead of the story, but later on you 
went to Budapest ; is that right ? 

The Interpreter. Yes ; I was in Budapest for 1 day. 

Mr. Morris. And there you also saw some of the headquarters of 
AVH, did you not? 

The Interpreter. Yes ; there I saw a security -police crematory. 

Mr. Morris. Now, all together, will you tell us, both in your own 
town and in your own county and in Budapest, what torture instru- 
ments and torture chambers that you did see that were maintained 
by the AVH? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

I saw one chamber in which they hanged people by their feet, about 
half a meter from the ground. And at the left of their hands there 
were two steel plates which moved toward each other. The situation 
was all right when they could hold their hands next to their body, 
but as soon as their hands fell down they were crushed by these two 
steel plates. 

The beginning of this torture was usually that people were made to 
stand against a white wall with their feet pushed against the wall and 
their hands behind their bodies, and had to stand there for hours, 
which was both physically and mentally true torture. 

As far as physical hurt, that is, beatings, and so forth, that was 
just the beginning of such a process. 

Mr. Morris. And these instruments of torture which you have de- 
scribed you personally saw after the initial success of your uprising ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else you can tell us about that 
particular subject, that is, the AVH at this point, up until this point? 
This is now October 30, is it not ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

When the Hungarian Government declared the armistice and the 
Soviets themselves were holding the armistice, the AVH alone did not 
put down their arms, because they knew that they themselves could 
expect nothing but death or prison. 


As far as my personal experience is concerned, I myself spent some 
time at AVH headquarters, and I myself went through this standing 
against the white wall. 

Mr. Morris. You mean, you personally had been arrested by the 


The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris, When was that? 

The Interpreter. One year ago — in January, last year. 

Mr. Morris. And why were you apprehended by the AVH ? 

The Interpreter. It is a long story, but I think I can just say that 
our university had traditions that went back to Hungary's freedom 
fight at other times. And I wanted to bring back these traditions, al- 
though the Communists had forbidden them. And for this I was first 
shut out of the Hungarian Communist Youth Organization, and then 
taken to the AVH and given this going over. 

Mr. Morris. How long were you detained by the AVH? 

The Interpreter. I was there 2 days, and after that I had to report 
to them for observation. 

Mr. Morris. And you were subjected to torture, as you have de- 
scribed ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, may we go back to this truce formation in which 
you and your forces were arrayed on one side against the Soviet tanks 
on the other, you had this truce, and you approached the Russian tank 
commander. "\^niat happened after that? 

The Interpreter. After we went up there 

Mr. Morris. After there was this truce. 

The Interpreter. After that our delegation went back to the town 
by car, and since there was an armistice we went to bed in peace for 
the first time in 2 weeks. 

The next dawn I was awakened by the news that the Russians have 
started a general offensive against Hungary, and that new tank units 
were coming toward our town from the direction of Gj^or. 

Mr. Morris. Were these the same tank units that you had encoun- 
tered earlier? 

The Interpreter. Yes, they were. 

Mr. Morris. Proceed. Tell us what happened. 

The Interpreter. When we heard the general offensive we mo- 
bilized all our units and sent them out to the point where the Russian 
tanks were coming. The entire headquarters was in an uproar, and 
our telephone connections with the entire country were stopped. 
Therefore, we were depending entirely on our own forces. 

Firing began between our forces and the Russian tanks, and they 
brought news from the border that Anna Kethly, who had been in 
Vienna, was trying to get back to the country and was coming to our 

I asked all the leaders of the military units to come to headquarters, 
and I also asked Anna Kethly to participate in our talks. 

Anna Kethly said that if she was unable to reach Budapest because 
of the fighting, she would return to Vienna, and from Vienna go 
to New York and try to tell the U. N. that the Kadar government was 
not the legal government, and that the Nagy government was de- 
manding that the Russian troops leave Hungary. 


Somebody in the council decided that somebody from our group 
should go to the U. N. with Anna Kethly to represent all Hungarians, 
and they elected me to be this person. 

My task was not to stay in America for a long time ; I was merely to 
go to the U. N. and represent our cause there. 

Mr. Morris. Did you then proceed to the United States ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

This was Sunday at noon, and in tlie afternoon Ave took a plane 

Mr. Morris. This was a week ago Sunday? 

The Interpreter. Yes. And on Monday we were in New York, 
on the 5th. 

Mr. Morris. Now, would it be violating any security to say how you 
left Hungary and got into Austria ? 

The Interpreter. I can say. I got in the first car, Imre Szelig got 
into the second car, and Anna Kethly got into the third. And until 
the border, I was watching with arms, because I was not sure that we 
would not be attacked. 

On the way we were not attacked, and the Austrian Minister of 
Interior gave the order to allow us to pass the border. 

Mr. Morris. May I recapitulate here. The first truce had been 
effected between you and the tank commander, and that was observed 
for a period of 1 day ; is that right ? 

The Interpreter. No ; the armistice lasted more than 1 day, and this 
event of which I told you happened on the last day of the armistice. 

Mr. Morris. How long did the armistice last, from what date to 
what other date in October ? 

The Interpreter. The armistice lasted about 4 days, from the 30th 
to the 3d. And during that time we sent Red Cross units to Budapest 
with a convoy. 

Mi\ Morris. And you yourself went to Budapest ; did you not? 

The Interpreter. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Morris. What date did you go to Budapest? 

The Interpreter. I am afraid I can't remember that. It must have 
been about the middle of the armistice. 

IMr. Morris. And you stayed there for only 1 day? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what conditions did you observe in Budapest? 

The Interpreter. I saw the city was in ruins, which was bad as after 
1945. In fact, in the last days of the revolution some more of this 
had taken place, so, at the moment, the city is in ruins more than after 
the Second World War. 

Now, I shall tell what I myself saw. The streetcar lines are either 
bombed or mined or taken up. For quite a while in some places you 
could not see a single house. The Soviet tanks which pass on the 
streets looking for rebels turn their guns on the liouses and fire into the 

These were the things which I saw. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you were elected by the council to go to the United 
Nations on what date? 

The Interpreter. On the 4th. 

Mr. Morris. On the 4th. That is when the large Soviet counter- 
offensive began? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what have you done, since you have come to the 
United States, by way of presenting the case of the people you repre- 


sent and who designated you to come to the United States, to the 
United Nations^ 

The iNi'EKrRETER. Unfortunately, I was unable to appear before 
the U. N. Anna Kethly was able to arrange for an interview with 
Dag Hammarskjold, but I came a few minutes later and I was not 
allowed to enter. 

Mr. MoKRis. Have you seen any U. N. officials ? 

The Interpreter. Unfortunately not. I was in the U. N. Building, 
[ind all I saw was delegates going up the stair to a meeting. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. You have tried, however, persistently, have you not, 
to present your case ? 

The Interpreter. Yes, I did. xVnd what I could not do before the 
U. N., I tried to do before the others to present my case. 

Mr. Morris. Now, do you still have hopes of carrying out your 
mandate, from the forces you represent, to the United Nations? 

The Intiirpreter. Yes ; if somebody enabled me to do this, I would 
be glad to do it, because the U. N. is the first and the United States 
is the second that can force the Kussians to leave Hungary, if not 
with arms, with their moral strength. 

My only wish, the Hunganan people's only wish, is that the U. N. 
should force the Russian troops to leave Hungary. We can forge our 
freedom ourselves. 

I want to say, furthermore, that the Hungarian people do not want 
fascism, and they do not want the pre- World War II Govermnent 
back. They want freedom and democracy. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could answer this question. 

If Soviet forces withdrew from Hungary, knowing the temper of 
the Hungarian people as you do, do you think there would be any 
chance that Hungarian Communists could keep your country attached 
to the Soviet empire? 

The Interpreter. If the Russians left Hungary there would be 
free elections, and I do not believe that there are such Communists 
in Hungary today who would want to keep or could keep Hungary in 
the Soviet bloc. Hungary wants to live in freedom with all countries 
but not belong to any bloc. 

Mr. JNIoRRis. Now, j-ou gave us some details about the Russian offi- 
cers and the Soviet officers being well disposed and friendly to the 
Hungarian people. Are these the same Soviet forces that have 
brought such devastation on Hungary now ? 

The Interpreter. No. Since then, two Mongolian divisions have 
come from the Soviet Union, and from Czechoslovakia more divisions 
have arrived to replace the units that were friendly with us. 

Mr. ]SIoRRis. Is it your testimony that the Soviet occupation military 

forces were withdrawn and these which j'ou have mentioned, two 

Mongolian divisions, among others, have been used to crush Hungary? 

The Interpreter. Nobody was taken out of Hungary, they are all 

there, but they have been increased by the Mongolians. 

And those Russian troops which have been friendly to Hungary 
before are now terrorized by their commanders into obeying. 

Senator Johnston. I believe your statement was, if the Soviet troops 
were to leave Hungary you would be willing to abide by the results 
that would follow? 
The Ini'erpreter. Yes. 


Senator Johnstox. It is your belief, then, that if they were to leave 
Hungary — that is, the Soviet troops — you would then probably carry 
out the objective you had when you started your revolution? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Senator Johnston. And you do not fear, then, that they have a 
sufficient number of Communists that are loyal enough to give you 
any amount of trouble ? 

The Interpreter. From my talks with Hungarian workers and 
former Communists, I am quite certain that there are not such Com- 
munists who could do that. 

Senator Johnston. So the only thing you wish at this time is to 
be left alone to act, as your people see fit ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Senator Johnston. That being so, I think, personally — and I am 
speaking individually now, not for the committee — I think the 
United Nations should have some committee to interview you and 
get your line of thought, for it might be real helpful in the future 
as to what the United Nations action might be. 

Any other questions ? 

Mr. Morris. I have two questions, just for the record. 

There is one point that the witness brought out in executive session 
that I would like to ask him about here, because I think it is rather 
interesting for our record. 

You yourself personally arrested many of the A\'n people, did 
you not ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And you told us at one point how you and 6 others 
captured 13 of these AVH people, even though they were armed; 
walked into their headquarters? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would just give us that episode for 
the record, please. 

The Interpreter. Wlien the revolt started and we did not have 
arms yet, we sent six university students out to the Hungarian Com- 
munist Party headquarters, which we heard was unoccupied at the 
moment. However, it was not unoccupied; there were six party 
secretaries meeting in one of the rooms. They were armed. 

The students simply locked the door on the armed party secre- 
taries, and when other secretaries were coming in to join this meeting 
they showed them this room ; they asked where the meeting was, and 
they were led to the room, and they were allowed to enter the room, 
and the door was immediately locked again, and in this way we 
captured 13. 

Mr. Morris. How many Hungarians died in this revolt, to your 
knowledge ? 

The Interpreter. About 25,000. 

Mr. Morris. How many of those died prior to the time that you 
left on November 4 ? 

The Interpreter. That number referred to the number of pex^ple 
who died before November 4. How many died since then, I know 
only from newspapers in this country. 

Mr. Morris. Was there much bloodshed in your own county that 
you experienced ? 


The Interpreter. After the fight, 80 percent of my university 
escaped to Vienna. That 80 percent represented the remaining liv- 
ing part of our university, because the rest had died in the fight. 

Mr. Morris. When did they die, specifically, at what one of these 
stages that you have described? You haven't told us of any bloody 
fighting where all those people could have died. 

The Interprei'er. In the first invasion, there was not much blood- 
shed, because it was mostly between the infantry and tank units. 
Some of the army died. In the second general offensive, a great num- 
ber of students, workers, and members of the army died. I don't 
know exactly how many, but I know that two to three hundred defi- 
nitely died in this battle. 

Mr. Morris. That is the battle in your own county ? 

The Interpreter. Yes, in my county. 

Senator Johnston. Were there very many of the secret police 

The Interpreter. In Budapest, yes; in our town, no, because we 
did not want terror trials, we did not want to besmirch the revolution 
with such an act. 

Senator Johnston. What happened to the people that you arrested ? 

The Interpreter. When I left Hungary they were still arrested, 
locked up in the town prison. Since then the Russians probably have 
let them out. 

Senator Johnston. How many Russian soldiers were killed? 

The Interpreiter. In my count}^ or in the entire country? 

Senator Johnston. The entire country, if you know. 

The Interpreter. About 2,500 people in the entire country. And 
in my county, about 5 or 6 tanks, which means about 30 to 40 people. 

Mr. Morris. Thirty to forty Russian soldiers ? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, there have been reports about Soviets deporting 
trainloads of Hungarian youths and trainloads of Hungarian workers. 
Did you personally observe any of that? 

The Interpreter. No, I only heard about it. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I have no more questions of this witness. 

Senator Johnston. Any other questions? 

(No response.) 

Senator Johnston. I believe that completes the testimony of this 
particular witness at this time. So we will adjourn the meeting, at 
the call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject 
to the call of the Chair.) 

72723— 57— pt. 46- 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administr^vtion 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washmgton, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p. m., in the caucus 
room. Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presiding. 

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William Rusher, ad- 
ministrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and 
Robert McManus, research assistant. 

Senator Johnston. The committee will come to order. 

We will begin the hearing. 

Mr. Morris, you may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Johnston, we have arranged for the witness 
here today to come into the country, and he arrived in the United 
States during this present week. He has come from Budapest. 

Now, again, Senator, we must say that, because i his man has a fam- 
ily, and a rather extensive family, still in Hungary, that we cannot 
take the responsibility of identifjang him, or in this particular case, 
identifying the job that he had in Hungary. We can say that he 
was a government worker. His age is between 30 and '10. 

As I say, he has come into the country during this past week, and 
even the method of his arrival in the country we cannot say, for se- 
curity purposes. 

And with those limitations, we can offer his testimony for the rec- 

Now, Senator, he has written a short clironicle of the events lead- 
ing up to the revolution and of some of the events subsequent to the 
outbreak of the revolution. He wrote in Magyar, his native language. 
It has been translated for him, and it appears here in the form of a 
statement. It isn't even finished yet; we worked on it until late last 

I suggest. Senator, with your approval, tliat we allow him to read 
from this — his English is fairly good — and, as he is reading we can 
break in and get supplemental information, as our own purposes 

Senator, we have here present someone who is in a representative 
capacity with the American Plungarian Federation, wlio is acting 
as this man's sponsor while lie is in tlie United States. He is going 
to be available in the event that we may need some interpreting. 

I think. Senator, that just to anticipate such a possibility, that we 
might begin the hearing by swearing in the interpreter, wlio is ready 
to testify noAv. 

Senator Johnston. Will you raise your right hand. 



Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness 
the questions directed to him and will truly interpret the answers 
given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God ? 

Mr. RoNTO. I do. 

Mr. Morris. What is your name ? 

Mr. RoNTo. John J. Ronto, John Joseph. 

Mr. Morris. In what city do you reside ? 

Mr. RoNTO. Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you. 

(To the witness.) Will you stand and raise your right hand, please ? 

Senator Joiinstox. Do you swear the evidence you will give before 
this subcommittee to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr, Hazafi. I do. 


Mr. Morris. Senator, this man has given us his name in executive 
session, and we are keeping it classified. For the purposes of his testi- 
mony here, he has given us the name of Arpad Hazafi, and he will 
testify under that name today. 

Senator Johnston. We understand all the conditions under which 
you are testifying, and we will try to keep from having you recog- 
nized as much as possible. 

Mr. Morris. Arpad, will you commence to read this statement, and 
we will break in as we go along and ask you questions. 

Mr. PIazafi. As I am writing these lines, the struggle for liberty 
is still continuing in Hungary. The nation, even if only for a few 
days, won their liberty and now it is ready to sacrifice its life rather 
than renounce freedom. 

Only a few days ago I was myself in the thick of the fighting of 
Budapest, therefore as a witness I can tell the world about the revo- 
lutionary events. 

Let my writing be conducted with the clearest objectivity, although 
it is difficult to suppress my hate and prejudice. I cannot give you my 
true name as I have beloved ones at home and I fear vengeance. I 
am no coward, but I am filled with fear on accoimt of the suppressing 
trampling on our rights which lasted for 8 years. 

I would like to give a short picture of the revolution, and its prece- 
dents, which raised the tension and finally caused the events of October 
23, 1956, to erupt. 

Let my documentary writing be also the SOS call of my nation, 
as I cannot stand idly by, to see the prophecy expressed by one of our 
poets, who died a 100 years ago, fulfilled. He wrote : 

The grave, in which a nation sinks, is surrounded by other nations, and tears 
fill the eyes of millions, and millions. 

I am no chauvinist, but now I am proud to be the son of this small 
nation. I was always afraid that, in time of danger, people would get 
scared, and they would cowardly and spinelessly submit to their fate. 
I am glad I was wrong. They fought with courage and united, and 
they still fight on for a free and independent Hungary.- 

To this struggle, against tyranny and slavery, I beg the help of 
every nation and creed. 


Ever since 1948, the Soviet-directed MDP (Hungarian Communist 
Party) conducted Hungary's interior policy and foreign affairs. How 
they conducted it is evident before everybody. 

The situation became worse and worse every year. The Commvmist 
government, year after year, talked about the raising of the living 
standard but always the opposite happened. The economic situation 
worsened every day. 

A very substantial portion of the nation's income was spent to in- 
crease the newly established army, and later for its maintenance. 

The greatest part of the produced goods was transported to the 
Soviet. What was left was sold by the state in the West and its value, 
whether in cash or goods, again enriched the Soviet. The barest mini- 
mum only was left for the Hungarian people. 

The main principle of the regime was that everyone in a family 
should work, the husband, wife, and also the children who finished 
school. However, their joint income does not equal the average earned 
by a single person in the Western World. 

Taking into consideration the most important life necessities — rent, 
heat, light, gas, transportation, food, clothing — the monthly earning 
of a skilled worker amounted to $35-$-45 and those in leading positions 
made about $50. 

Beside the low earnings, one of the principal causes of trouble was 
the Soviet type norm system. Essentially, a task wage (piecework) 
which was changed from time to time so that the workers' wages could 
not rise. 

The introduction of the norm system caused the constant deteriora- 
tion of the quality of production.' The goods which could not satisfy 
the internal demands could be, even with greater difficulty, sold abroad, 
and this only augmented the already existing misery of the people. 

The forcibly executed economic plans — 3- and 5-year plans — seem- 
ingly transformed an agrarian country, poor in industrial raw ma- 
terial, into an industrial nation, but the plans were frustrated by the 
continuous lack of raw materials. 

Out of the small community of Dunapentele they created Sztalin- 
varos (Stalin City) and its ironworks. The Communist regime 
proudly announced that this was the workers' city and the regime's 
glory. How far this was from the truth is proven by the fact that 
Dunapentele's workers even today fight with arms against the Soviet. 
During the last 8 years they tried to fool the workers with constant 
propaganda actions. 

Communist Party members went from house to house trying to 
convince the people that life in Hungary is superior to that in the West, 
where they claimed capitalism was on its last legs, and where, with 
the exception of a small layer of big capitalists, the masses of people 
were starving. Not even the agitators believed that, and those to 
whom they spoke believed it even less. 

The bosses of the regime sometimes started spectacular things in 
an effort to pacify public opinion. It was for this reason they started 
to build the Budapest subway network, upon Soviet advice and pres- 

It was well known for a long time that the warm springs under 
Budapest make such undertaking geologically impossible, yet against 
the strong protests of the Hungarian engineers, they started this proj- 
ect, with Soviet support. This construction project lasted for 4 years 


and had to be finally abandoned. Entire city blocks to alleviate tlie 
great need for houses in Budapest could have been built with the 
money and manpower wasted on that project. 

Mr. Morris. May I break in at this point and just ask you to say 
for the record whether, up until very recently, you have been work- 
ing for the Hungarian Government. 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Continue. 

Mr. Hazafi. The forced industrialization was protested even by 
Zoltan Vas on the Communist Party paper in a memorable article. 
Vas lost favor with the Communists but in times of trouble was al- 
ways reinstated because of his organizational ability. 

The Communists in general follow the old Roman custom : "Panem 
et Circenses," and this they followed in Hungary, too. They built the 
Peoples' Stadium and, thi'ough holding frequent sporting events, at- 
tempt to divert the attention of the people and the outside world from 
the widespread economic and social misery. 

The Soviet Union and its satellites frequently sent their best sports- 
men and artists, under political guardians, to western lands in an 
effort to prove the superiority of the Communist system. These 
events frequently dazzled the free world but we, behind the Iron Cur- 
tain, knew well the face hiding behind the smiling mask. 

With the worsening of the economic situation, tlie dissatisfaction 
of the workers grew in direct proportion. The peasants were also 
forced into kolkhozes, called collective farms, and those that did not 
join were constantly pressured with extreme food production quotas. 

Mr. Morris. May I break in at this point. All during this period 
of time you are telling us about, you were residing in Budapest ; were 
you not ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And all of these experiences you were seeing daily; 
is that right? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You are now telling us about the experiences you your- 
self observed while living in Budapest with your family ? 

Mr, Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr, Morris. And you were a Government worker ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Proceed. 

Mr Hazafi. The Communist leaders, to maintain and secure their 
dictatorship, organized, in addition to the regular army and police 
organs, the cruel AVH (Allamvedelmi Hatosag), Authority for the 
Protection of the State. 

This organization spread fear throughout the entire country and 
in all the people, who were already suffering greatly from economic 
depression. The slightest disapproval of the regime, corespondence 
with Western relatives or friends, sometimes baseless accusation was 
sufficient to cause arrest, torture, or even death for the people, without 
court trial or verdict. They were imprisoned most times for years. 

In May and June 1951, from Budapest alone, about 60,000 people 
were deported to the countiyside, regardless of age and religion. 
Their apartments were confiscated and given to people serving the 

Mr. Morris. May I break in there, Arpad ? 


Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. 'Wlien tliey were deported to the countryside, that does 
not mean they were deported outside of Hungary; does it? 

Mr. Hazafi. No. 

Mr, INIoRRis. They were deported to a certain region of Hungary. 

Mr, Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us where that region was ? 

Mr. Hazafi. It was near the Soviet border, but not out of the 
country, about in the district of Debreen, Miskolc, Bekescsaba, 

Mr, Morris. Did some of the people rettirn after they had been 
deported to that area? 

Mr. Hazafi. In 1953, 

]\Ir, Morris, In 1953 they began to let some of them back ? 

Mr, Hazafi, Yes ; but not to Budapest. 

Senator Jofinston. What kind of work did they do when thej^ were 
moved to this countryside? 

Mr. Hazafi. Tliey weren't obliged — they had not to work in the 
countryside, they could live there without working if they had money 
enough. But somebody who had no money, he had to work to earn 
some money. 

Mr. Morris. Proceed. 

Mr. Hazafi. The population lived in a fear entirely unknown in 
the free world, as no one knew if a knock on the door meant the 
appearance of AVH men and subsequent imprisonment. In 1953, 
when the Eakosi regime for a short time turned over power to Imre 
Nagy, the deportees were permitted to leave their places and return 
to their homes but not to Budapest. 

Senator Johnston. When you say they returned to their homes ; did 
they get theh' homes back? 

Mr. Hazafi. No ; they could return to the district of Budapest, but 
not to Budapest itself. They could live in the district of Budapest. 

Senator Johnston. But the property that had been confiscated, 
what ha])pened to that, when they forced them out? 

Mr. Hazafi. Their apartments were taken on the day of deporta- 
tion, in 1951. 

Mr. I\IoRRis. After the apartments were confiscated, what happened ? 

Mr. Hazafi, In 1953? 

Senator Johnston, In 1951, when they were forced out of Budapest. 

Mr, Hazafi, Those people that were faithful to the Communist 
regime they gave the apartments. 

Senator Johnston, The apartments had been taken away from 
them and given to someone else who was loyal to them? 

Mr, Hazafi, Yes ; to the Communist regime. 

Senator Johnston, Proceed, 

Mr, Hazafi, But Moscow disliked even that small measure of dem- 
ocratization brought on by the Nagy regime, and therefore these acts 
were soon followed by the Rakosi darlmess. 

Life in Hungary became a hopeless treadmill. The much advertised 
.Soviet culture showed its influence in Hungary, too. We could not 
secure a good book to read and between 1949 and 1955 very seldom 
would the Russians let a good film in. The theaters had excellent 
actors but no plays. 

The campaign and propaganda departments of the Communist 
Party puts its stamp on literature, theater and film, and directs all 


fields of the art with "socialist realism." It is not a good painting or 
a statue that does not depict a worker or peasant during work. 

It is understandable that, under such circumstances, people do not 
care to live and struggle. The Communist system completely extin- 
guishes every individual initiative, the state expropriating without 
compensation every individual idea or invention. The people live 
from one day to the other without spirit, goal, or reason. 

After Stalin's death and the XXth Soviet Party Congress, no 
changes were noted for a long time. Suddenly, as if the Kremlin 
pushed a button, the so-called "democratization" process of the Com- 
munists started. 

The Moscow puppets, who until then followed the Stalin line, now 
started to dance backward, vilifying Stalin and his system, outbidding 
each other in doing so. At the same time the press criticized Stalin 
and his methods, it nevertheless continued to express the Communist 

The real democratization was actually started by the intelligentsia. 
It is also an interesting symptom of the times, that young men filled 
with Communist ideology were the first ones who dared to give voice 
to non-Communist ideas. 

The DISZ — Federation of the Working Youth — which was a Com- 
munist youth organization, started a debating circle called the Petofi 
Kor. At these debates only young people took part at the start. How- 
ever, later, they were joined by the writers, newspapermen, and scien- 

Many speakers, while of Communist belief, criticized sharply the 
sins of the Stalin era and objectively criticized also the mistakes of 
the "new look." Well-known writers, like Tibor Dery, Tibor Tardos, 
Sandor Fekete, public personalities like Geza Losonczy took part in 
this activity. 

The Moscovite Communist also let its orators speak: Marton 
Horvath, chief editor of the Szabad Nep, Sandor Nogradi, chief of 
the party's propaganda department, as well as Zoltan Vas, member of 
the Central Committee. 

After a few days, upon the personal request of Matyas Rakosi, the 
Szabad Nep in several articles condemned the debates, and later, on 
the basis of a decision of the Central Committee, the Petofi circle was 

The embers continue to glow under the ashes. Great excitement 
and mixed feelings were caused by the publication that Laszlo Rajk 
and his companions were innocent when they were executed in 1949, 
on the basis of false accusations. 

The people, while they cannot express it, believe that Ecakosi and 
his clique are the murderers. They arranged, 6 years after the mur- 
der, a tragicomically looking funeral in the Kerepesi-ut cemetery. 
Over the metal coffins the falsely sounding unctuous funeral orations 
were held by the murderers themselves. 

The press began to get more and more courage. It was hungry for 
truth, and men who were cut off from the voice of the press fought 
furiously for a copy of the Irodalmi Ujsag — Literary Gazette — in 
which Gyula Hay, Judith Mariassy, Klara Feher, and the rest criti- 
cized with courage, and with erupting force. 

The "Hetfoi Hirlap" — Monday News — appeared on the streets. 
Although it was edited by the same Ivan Boldizsar, who formerly 


edited Communist papers, and who was the author of the Blue Book 
against Rajk, yet the people clamored for the new newspapers which 
promised a "new slate." 

This clean slate was stained by blood and terror of the Russian 
forces that interfered in the internal affairs of Hungary. 

While in our Hungary the elimination of the mistakes of Stalin 
and his dedicated disciple Rakosi had only started, events in Poland 
followed each other much faster. Wladislaw Gomulka, the Polish 
Laszlo Rajk, who during the Stalin era spent years in prison, took 
over the leadership of the United Polish Workers Party and imme- 
diately started to fight for the independence of his country. This is 
the pattern which will eventually develop in all the enslaved coun- 
tries because humanity will not forever stand for tyranny and 

Mr. Morris. Now, Arpad, it might be said of you that you are an 
amateur photographer, or one who has a hobby of photography; is 
that right? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And when this uprising began, you used your camera 
a great deal, did you not ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the witness here today has brought in several 
hundred negatives of shots he has taken. 

Mr. Hazafi. I beg your pardon ; not myself only, but others, too, 
and I have some negatives I took myself. 

Mr. Morris. Of the approximately 300 you have given us, what 
percentage have you personally taken? 

Mr. Hazafi. About 75 percent. 

Mr. Morris. And the rest were taken by people that you know, of 
scenes that you know about ? 

Mr. Hazafi, Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And you have come to the United States, have you 
not, in order to show the free world these pictures that you and your 
comrades have taken of the uprising? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, we have blown up 10 of these. These photo- 
graphs will accompany the narrative as we go along, and they will 
tell rather graphically precisely how the uprising began. 

Will you read the next j^aragraph ? I think you are going to begin 
with the second paragraph on the next page, are you not? How did 
it start? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You are skipping that first paragraph ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

How did it start ? How did a peaceful demonstration of sympathy 
change into a revolution ? Where did they get the arms ? How is 
it possible to fight heavy tanks with small arms? These were the 
firs't questions to which people expected an answer. But let us take 
the events as they occurred : 

Stalin's prediction. No matter how paradoxical it may sound, 
Stalin himself predicted the Hungarian events, even if he imagined 
them in a different way. In one of the works of the bloody handed 
dictator we read the following : 

A revolution can only break out where a revolutionary soil already exists. 
72723— 57— pt. 46 4 


Well, this revolutionary soil really very much existed in Hungary. 
The peoples' bitterness, the 11-year terror and dictatorship, a hope- 
less future, the exposure of the leaders, the constant lies, the disre- 
garding of public opinion, the complete agony of the economic situa- 
tion, all were slowly burning in the individuals, waiting for the spark 
to put it into flames. This was the revolutionary soil, wetted by tears 
and blood, and plowed through by wounding and humiliating laws. 

The spark. In the forenoon of October 23, 1956 

Mr. Morris. May I break in there. Is this photograph that you 
have of the demonstration the first one ? 

Mr. Hazafi. That is the first. 

Mr. Morris. This is the scene. You took this picture yourself, 
did you not ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat is the scene, then ? 

Mr. Hazafi. The scene is Bem Square. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Bem was a Polish general, was he not? 

Mr. Hazafi. Polish general in the 1848 revolution in Hungary 
against the Hapsburg monarchy, when the Russians came to help the 
people defeat the Hapsburgs in the Hmigarian revolution at that 

Mr. Morris. This was a demonstration that was somewhat Polish 
in content ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. It became that because the university students 
showed sympathy for the Polish people. 

Mr. Morris. And just prior to this was the uprising in Poland 
which brought the Gomulka government into power; is that right? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And this demonstration was in sympathy for that? 

Mr. Hazafi. Sympathy demonstration. 

Mr. Morris. And that was on October 23 ? 

Mr. Hazafi. In the afternoon, about 3 p. m. 

Mr. Morris. And this is in Bem Square ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Bem Square. 

Mr. Morris. And Bem is a Polish general. 

Now, wliat does that picture show ? 

Mr. Hazafi. The picture shows the Bem statue, in the upper left 
the Danube River, and our Parliament House. This is the Foreign 
Ministry of Hungary, and there, wliere you cannot see, is a great 
barracks, military barracks. 

Mr. Morris. Now, the name Budapest, the city takes its name from 
Buda on one side of the Danube, and Pest on the other side ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. INIoRRis. And this is in the Buda section ? 

Mr. Hazafi. The Buda section. 

Mr. Morris. How many people participated in that demonstration ? 

Mr. Hazafi. About 25^000. 

Mr. Morris. 25,000. 

Senator, may this picture go into the record at this time ? 

Senator Joiinstox. That will become a part of the record. 

(The picture referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 411" and ap- 
pears on the opposite page :) 


Exhibit No. 411 

>i t^ 

















































1— 1 














Mr. Morris. Is there anything that you want to add, or have you 
told us the story about that ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

In the forenoon of October 23, 1956, everybody knew, although no 
newspaper or radio published it, that there will be a demonstration 
at the Petofi monument, at 3 p. m. The demonstration was organized 
and led by the university students. They were preparing already in 
the morning the signs which contained sympathy slogans for the 
Poles and which also demanded that Imre Nagy be reinstated in a 
leading State position. 

Mr. Morris. You said, Mr. Hazafi, that was Bem Square. Wliat is 
Petofi Square? 

Mr. Hazafi. Petofi is another part of Hungary, on the Pest side; 
they gathered there, and after that they went to Bem Square. 

On some signs it read : 

Let's talk with the Russians but ou equal basis. 

Some other signs said this : 

Let the Russian troops be withdrawn from our land. 

At the entrance of the university the students established a guard 
to prevent, that — for actual provocations — the authorities prohibit 
tlie meeting, tlie demonstration. This, notwithstanding Laszlo Piros, 
Minister of Internal Affairs, sent messengers and announced through 
the radio tlie prohibition of the youth movement. 

This was the moment when it was decided whether the hated AVO 
is stronger or whether the youth of Hungary has retained its tradi- 
tional desire for freedom. Peter Kucka, the poet, who is also a Com- 
munist, but was silenced during the Rakosi regime — Peter Kucka 
answered in the name of the young that the demonstration will take 
place regardless of tlie prohibition. 

Mr. Morris. You have taken a picture of Peter Kucka, have you 

Mr. Hazafi. Not of Peter Kucka ; he is Peter Veres. 

Mr. Morris. You will come to him later ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. At 2 p. m. the first deputy of the Minister of 
Internal Affairs was obliged to announce before the assembled people 
at the Technological University that the "collective" of the Interior 
Ministry decided to let the demonstration take place, but warned the 
young people of excesses. 

Fekete tried to get at the head of the crowd but he was called down. 
The parade was ready. And the long-awaited demonstration began. 

Waving multitude of the youth, for the first time, dared to carry 
signs with slogans which we until then dared only to express to the 
immediate members of our family, and not even that in every family : 

"Get Rakosi before a court." 

"Out with the Russians." 

"Let's have independence," et cetera, et cetera. 

Men and women on the street stopped and waved to the orderly 
marching youth. 


At the Petofi monument-statue, Imre Sinkovitz, a young actor, de- 
claimed Petofi's national song. The mass of the people with tears 
in their eyes repeated with the actor the refrains of the poem : 

"We swear, we swear, we no longer will remain slaves." The voice 
of the people was terrifying, yet elevating. No police are in sight. 
Order is maintained by the youth wearing armbands. 

Let us go to the Bem monument-statue. Events start to move more 
rapidly. The first flag appears, its center cut out, where the hated 
emblem stood, signifying colonial fate, satellite position. 

At this moment we could have numbered about 60,000. One after 
another new flags appear until someone remembers to put the old 
Kossuth coat of arms on the flag in lieu of the cutout Communist 
emblem. A new flag was made by the mass. 

In the meantime we all sang the Hungarian National Hymn, the 
Szozat appeal to the nation. This was followed by Peter Veres, who 
from tlie top of a loudspeaker car read the demands of the Hungarian 
writers, which on the whole corresponded with the demands of the 
young people. 

Mr. MoKRis. This is a photograph. In this photograph Peter Veres 
is the gentleman with the mustache, just to the left of the right hand 
clenched ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes, he is Peter Veres, who is the leader of the writers' 
association in Himgary. 

Mr. Morris. Did you take that photograph, too ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, may that photograph go into the record ? 

Senator Johnston. Hearing no objection, it will be made a part of 
the record. 

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 412" and 
appears on p. 3206. ) 


Exhibit No. 412 


Mr. Hazafi. Tibor Deri, head of the Hungarian writers, intended 
to speak, but on account of the narrow space could not reach the car. 
Let's go to the Parliament. Again we started and marched in 
orderly lines, now only with Hungarian flags, the new Hungarian 
flags, to the Parliament. During the march we were joined by work- 
ers returning from work so that, before the Parliament, already 
150,000 men shouted their rightful demands. They were in a boiling 

Put out tlie red star on the Parliament roof ! Notwithstanding the 
fact that many young men called to attention that the red star also 
is a symbol of the workers and the proletariat, those in the Parliament 
building put out the red star's light. Those in the Parliament did 
everything possible to calm the mass. But they have lied too much 
in the past, and they were clumsy, too. 

Thirdly, just tliose who for years talked about the people and the 
workers, have failed to recognize the strength of the mass. 

"We won't move from here until we hear from Imre Nagy that 
our demands will be fulfilled." 

A crowd of 150,000 stood there like one man. The streetcars 
stopped on Kossuth Lajos Square. The Parliament is deaf. Then 
a thin voice is heard from the Parliament : 

"Give us 20 minutes. Comrade Imre Nagy is on the way, and the 
loudspeaker is being set up." 

It became dark in the meantime. Various cars with loudspeakers 
are among the crowd, but the people did not let everyone to speak. 
The 20 minutes are up and another characteristic deceit takes place. 
Instead of the promised loudspeakers by which the situation could 
have been saved, had Imre Nagy been at the microphone, the street 
lighting went out on Kossuth Lajos Square, 150,000 people stand 
there, stamping on each other, choking in the crowd and in darkness. 
Who could have thought of such abysmal meanness. Whoever he 
was, he did not realize what a mass can do if they really want some- 

This baseness is characteristic of the Communists, of their depravity 
and cynicism, but better yet how they underestimate men. They 
figured that the crowd, like a little child, with the coming of darkness, 
will decide to quit and go to bed. Instead, clever young men impro- 
vised torches from newspapers. It was a wonderful sight to see 
10,000 lighted torches. 

Imre Nagy is constantly delayed, the crowd becomes more and more 
impatient. Let us go to the Stalin monument but no longer to declaim 
poems but to pull it down. 

In the meantime, Imre Nagy arrives. 

"Comrades"- — he starts to speak but the crowd interrupts him. 
"Tliere are no more comrades. We all are Magyars — Hungarians. 
Let us have some light on Imre Nagy." The lights of three pocket 
electric lamps now shine on Imre Nagy, who continues his speech. 

In the meantime, someone else spoke through the Hungarian radio, 
someone who was hated by the entire Hungarian nation. It was Erno 
Gero, who made a speech calling the demonstrating university stu- 
dents Fascist mob and bandits. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know, as a matter of fact, whether Erno Gero 
was killed ? There are reports that he was. 


Mr. Hazafi. I have heard that he was killed, but I am not sure that 
he was. 

He did this at the same time while Imre Nagy declared from a 
Parliament balcony loudspeaker that the demand of young people and 
the Hungarian workers — no longer comrades — were justified. 

"Imre Nagy to the radio" was the new slogan. Many marched to 
the radio station. Now the demonstration is held simultaneously in 
three places. At the Parliament, where Imre Nagy speaks, at the 
radio station where tear-gas bombs were thrown at the defenseless 
crowd and at the Stalin monument, where they unsuccessfully tried 
to pull down the statue with three tractors. God knows from w4iere 
they got a couple of torch pistols, and now they try to cut down the 
statue of the hated dictator. 

The first Soviet tanks appear but they are only onlookers. It is 
somehow characteristic of the entire political situation as the Stalin 
statue leans and leans, yet it is still held by its boots. It's pulled 
strongly by the tractors, the torch pistols work feverishly and the 
statue while bending, still stands. The crowd erupts in cheers. 

In the meantime, news continues to flow from the Parliament, from 
the radio station, brought by civilian motorists or shouted from motor- 
trucks. At the radio station people were shot at. We go there by 
truck. Looking back from the Dozsa Gyorgy Street we still see how 
the Stalin statue falls forAvard with a tremendous noise to the ground. 

So far I have written down myself. In a few days I will have 
finished about the revolution. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Hazafi, were you yourself ever a Communist? 

Mr. Hazafi. No. 

Mr. Morris. How is it that you never joined the Communist Party, 
even though you worked for the Hungarian Communist government ? 

Mr. Hazafi. I hadn't because I hated the idea myself, and I heard 
by my father that communism is slavery. And so I understood after 
1949 that it wouldn't be a good thing to be a Communist, to work for 
the — I don't know if I could speak better English, but perhaps you 
understand what I am saying. 

Senator Johnston. Did the ones in authority over you know that 
you were not a Communist ? 

Mr. Hazafi. I have never been a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. The Senator asked if your superior knew that you were 
not a Communist. 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes, they knew. 

Mr. Morris. They knew what the Communist Party rolls were? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And they knew that you were not a Communist ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What percentage of all the people were Communists, 
under a Communist regime, roughly what percentage ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Communists, or party members ? 

Mr. Morris. Party members. 

Mr. Hazafi. I don't know. About, I think, 15, 20 percent. 

Mr. Morris. About 15 or 20 percent ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. But I am not sure ; perhaps more, perhaps less. 


Mr. Morris. You have described here the original outbreak of this 
Hungarian revohition ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any knowledge that the United States 
or any foreign government took part at all in causing this original 
demonstration ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Ask it once more. 

Mr. Morris. Did the United States or any other government out- 
side of Hungary spark or give rise to this revolution ? 

Mr. Hazafi. No. I knew that this revolution was not for foreign 
interests, it was for Hungarians, made by Hungarians themselves, 
and it was quite spontaneous. 

Mr. IMoRRis. You say it was spontaneous ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And you have described the spontaneity of it in this 
paper that you have prepared for us ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if we may get back to the photographs 
here. These tell the next part of the story, do they not, Arpad i 

Mr. IIazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. This is the third photograph. "Was this taken by 

Mr. Hazafi. This photograph was taken by me on the 24th, after 
the day of the outbreak of the revolution, and shows the Stalin statue 
on the ground. 

Mr, Morris. In other words, this was torn down, as you told us in 
your narrative, on the night of the 23d, and it was taken by tractors 
over to the National Square ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

This is the most traffic point of Budapest. It is before our Na- 
tional Theater on the corner of Dozsa Gyorgy Street. 

Mr. Morris. Now, there are marks on the statue ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes, there are descriptions. For instance, "W. C." 
means "water closet." 

Mr. Morris. And what does "STRKI" mean? 

Mr. Hazafi. I cannot tell 

Mr. Morris. You told us in executive session it was a "low gigolo." 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And that is somewhat censored? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And is there anything else now about that photograph 
that you think we should know ? 

Mr. Hazafi. I cannot tell about that. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Senator, may this photograph go into the record? 

Senator Johnston. Hearing no opposition, it will be made a part 
of the record. 


(The pliotograpli referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 413'' and 

appears below:) 

Exhibit No. 413 

Mr. Hazafi. 
Mr. Morris. 
Mr. Hazafi. 

This photograph was made on the same day. 
This is still October 24? 
24th of October. 

And this tank was taken from the Soviet Army. It is a T-34 type 
Soviet tank, with the Hungarian flag on the top of the tank. And 
they went with this tank to the Parliament House at noon, and before 
the Parliament House they demanded their rights, 30,000 people were 
demonstrating there on the Kossuth Lajos Square. And then the 


people Avere siirroiinded by Soviet tanks, and from the roof of the 
upper house, it was the Ministry of Agriculture, the AVO shot the 

Mr, Morris. This, now, is a captured tank — we call this photograph 
No. 4 — this is a Russian tank, a T-34 type — — 

Mr. Hazafi. I am not really an expert, but I think it is a T-34 type. 

Mr. Morris. This was captured 

Mr. IL^ZAFi. By the freedom fighters. 

Mr. Morris. By the freedom fighters, and there some of them are 
mounting it, and they are en route to the Parliament House where 
there is a demonstration taking place; is that right? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And in front of the Parliament House already 30,000 
peo]3le have gathered ? 

Mr. PIazafi. Yes ; there have been about 34,000 people. 

Mr. Morris. While these people were demonstrating in front of 
Parliament House, Russian people opened fire on the crowd? 

Mr. BUzAFi. The AVO people. 

Mr. Morris. They first fired on the crowd ? 

Mr. Hazafi. From the roof of the Ministry of Agriculture. 

Mr. Morris. Then did the Russian tanks open fire ? 

Mr. Hazafi. The Russian tanks opened fire onto the scpiare. 

Mr. Morris. And how many people were killed and wounded ? 

Mr. Hazafi. About 600 people Avere killed and wounded. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else now about that photograph No. 4 
that we should know ? 

Mr. Hazafi. I can relate, perhaps, that on the opposite side is a 
drug store fired out in the night, during the battle, during the night 
from the 23cl to the 24th, there was a drug store there. 

Mr. Morris. You took this photograph, did you ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, may this go into the record ? 

Senator Johnston. This will be made a part of the record. 


(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 414" and 
appears below:) 

Exhibit No. 414 



Mr. Morris. That is photograph No. 5. 

Mr. Hazafi. No. 5 shows a window shop on about the 26th-27th, 
with the inscription : 

"Free Election With U. N. Supervision." 

The people wanted free elections, but they knew that unless it was 
with United Nations supervision, it wouldn't be free. 

Mr. Morris. And a literal translation of that is "Free election with 
U. N. supervision" ? 


Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And this Avas taken on what date ? 

Mr. Hazafi. The 26th or 27th, I don't remember. 

Mr. Morris. And the window is on Rakosi Square ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And who was Rakosi ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Rakosi was the 17th century great Hungarian revohi- 
tionist and freedom fighter, who led revolutions in the l7th century. 

Mr. Morris. And he needs to be distinguished from the Rakosi 
who is one of the Communist leaders of Hungary ? 

Mr. Hazafi. He is not the same. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, may picture No. 5 go into the record? 

Senator Johnston. This will become a part of the record. 


(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 415" and 
appears below:) 

Exhibit No. 415 




























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• pH 







'2 XI 




1— 1 


















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• I— I ^ 

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^i.i^x ^,^ ^';--«»»4iS8*s#.>«r* ■^^/i.^ 

ioV ii-^p'.iSlim>l'y<.Jt>.-^ »^ ^ „.*,v^ -1^ 


Mr. Morris. Photograph No. 6. 

Mr. Hazafi. This photograph shows a bookstore on Kossuth 

Mr. Morris. And the building on the right is ^yhat buikling ? 

Mr. Hazafi. This building is the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship 
House, and that is a bookstore from which the people order Soviet 
books and newspapers, they were taken to the street and put to flame. 

Mr. Morris. What is the name of the bookstore ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Horizont. 

Mr. Morris. Translated, "Horizon" in English ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And what is depicted in that scene? What do you see 
there ? 

Mr. Hazafi. The people have put out from the store all the Rus- 
sian books and newspapers in the street, and it was put to flame. 

Mr. Morris. Burned up ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you take that particular photograph? 

Mr. Hazafi. I don't remember ; I was there, but I don't remember 
whether it was mine or some of my friends'. 

Mr. Morris. But you were on the scene and you witnessed that ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes, I have seen it. 

Mr. Morris. And may photograph No. 6 go into the record? 

Senator Johnston. Photograph No. 6 will become a part of the 


(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 416" and is 
reproduced below :) 

Exhibit No. 416 

TT^i"^ ■*<;-/>■ ::v^^'. 

Workers and students burn books and plates from the Soviet library and book- 
store Horizont in Kossuth Lajos Square. We rejoice to see the hated Commu- 
nist and Russian books go up in flames ! 

Mr. Morris. Next, No. 7; you did not take this photograph? 

Mr. Hazafi. No ; but a friend of mine took it. It was made, I think 
he mentioned, in Dumbovar. And it is the first edition of the free 


Morris, This is the first edition of the free press ? 
Hazait:. Yes. 

How long was this free press printed ? 

Only, I think, 2 or 3 days. 

And what is it called ? 

Truth, Igazshaz. 

Igazshaz is the Hungarian for the English word 


Mr. Morris. 
Mr. Hazafi. 
Mr. Morris. 
Mr. Hazafi. 
Mr. Morris 
Mr. Hazafi. 






And these people are dancing with joy ; is that it ? 
Yes : they jumped up from a truck. 
Senator, may that No. 7 go into the record ? 
Senator Johnston. No. 7 shall become a part of the record. 
(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 417" and is 
reproduced below :) 

Exhibit No. 417 


The first issue of the new Hungarian free press reaches a village outside Buda- 
pest. Peasants eagerly grab copies of Igazsag (Truth) as they are thrown 
from a truck. 


Mr. Hazafi. No. 8 shows a freedom fighter on the street, Kakosi 
Street. There was shooting, and people on the opposite side and here, 
too, were hidden behind trees and other places. The shooting was 
going on in the district of the Rakosi Hospital. 

Mr. Morris. That is Eakosi Street, and Rakosi Hospital ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Rakosi Street and Rakosi Hospital. 

Mr. Morris. And did you take that particular picture ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, may this go into the record as photograph 
No. 8? 

Senator Johnston. It will become a part of the record. 

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 418" and is 
reproduced on p. 3219.) 


Exhibit No. 418 

s; s 

^ <^ 

A freedom fighter with an automatic rifle captured from the Soviets stands guard 
on Rakosi Street as the battle between patriots and Soviet tanlvs continues in 
the direction of the Rakosi Hospital. On Ulloi Road a children's hospital was 
fired on by Soviet tanks. 


Mr. Morris. Photograph No. 9. 

Mr. Hazafi. Photograph No. 9 shows a dead freedom fighter, with 
the Hungarian flag covering him, with the inscription : "You didn't 
die for nothing."" 

Mr. Morris. You translated it before as : "You died for our free- 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes, "You died for our freedom." 

Mr. Morris. Is that what it says : "You died for our freedom" ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And the Hungarian national flag is there ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And the flowers are strewn alongside of the body? 

Mr. ILvzAFi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You took that picture ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. May that photograph go into the record as photo- 
graph No. 9 ? 

Senator Johnstox. Photograph No. 9 will become a part of the 


(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 419" and 
is reprodiTced below :) 

Exhibit No. 419 

A Hungarian freedom fighter in death is covered with the Hungarian national 
flag and an inscription which says, '"You died for our freedom." 


Mr. Morris. And photograph No. 10. 

Mr. Hazafi. Another freedom fighter, dead freedom fighter, lying 
covered with flowers. I didn't make it myself, it was made by a 
friend of mine. 

Mr. Morris. Who is the man on the lower left who is in the uniform ? 

Mr. Hazafi. He is, I think, a railway man. 

Mr. Morris. And he is legless ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. May this go into the record ? 

Senator Johnston. It will become a part of the record. 

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 420" and 
is reproduced on p. 3223.) 


Exhibit No. 420 

Bodies of freedom fighters which lie on a Budapest sidewallj are covered with 
flowers. A legless veteran — a victim of World War II — is among the 


Mr. Morris. Now, will you continue for us in the future your narra- 
tive, just as you have told us today ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, in addition to that, there are certain questions we 
would like to ask you. 

Were you designated by the fighting forces back in Hungary to come 
and tell this story to the United States and to the United Nations? 

Mr. Hazafi. No, I myself, I liad the idea myself to come to the 
free world to show what happened in Hungary, and to ask help from 
the free nations for my people. 

Mr. Morris. Do you plan to go to the United Nations with your 
story ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes ; if it is possible, I shall tell it to the United Nations, 
before the United Nations. 

Mr. Morris. Did you fraternize with any of the Russian soldiers, 
did you mix with and talk with at any time any of the Russian 
soldiers ? : 

Mr. Hazafi. During my- 

Mr. INIoRRis. At any time. 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes ; I have. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what was their attitude toward the Hungarian 
people, for the most part ? Did they like the Hungarian people, were 
they well disposed toward them ? 

Mr. Hazafi. They showed us they were delighted, but everybody 
knew it wasn't true. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have any experiences whatever as to Russian 
forces joining with you in this demonstration, this uprising? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did any of the Russian officers or men at all participate 
with you ? 

Mr. Hazafi. On the second or third day it happened that Russian 
tanks, a few Russian tanks, joined with the revolutionary youths, 
and they let the people put out Hungarian- national flags on the tanks. 
Everybody had the feeling that the Russians in this town and the 
second time would help the people against the hated secret policemen. 

Mr. Morris. Tlie feeling was that the Russian soldiers and the 
Russian officers would help you against the secret police ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. And perhaps it was so, because I thought that 
these soldiers were Ukrainians, and later I heard that the Russians 
had changed their troops, and their troops were Mongolian troops. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, the first troops who seemed to be well 
disposed and whom the people thought would possibly join with 
them, they were replaced, they being Ukrainians for the most part, 
they were replaced by Mongolians ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And when did that change take place ? 

Mr. Hazafi. During the first 6 days. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have any dealing with the AVH either before 
or after this uprising ? 

Mr. Hazafi. Not myself ; no. 

Mr. Morris. Did you witness any of the torture chambers ? 

Mr. Hazafi. No ; I did not. 


Mr. Morris. Noav, you used the expression "AVO." Is that any 
different from AVH? 

Mr. Hazafi. The AVH is Allamvedelmi Hatosag, national security 
autliorities, and the AVO is the national security section. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I would suggest, then, in view of the fact that 
this man has been pressured, he worked very late last night with us on 
the pictures — we have, as I say, two or three hundred of these things. 

I think, Senator, with a little more time we can have a subsequent 
hearing in wliich we will complete the narrative and make available 
the rest of the pictures. 

Senator Johnston. Speaking for the subcommittee, I wish to thank 
you for coming here and giving us this information. 

I personally think it clearly shows that the people of your country 
are not satisfied with the conditions there, and, if given an opportunity, 
they will throw off the yoke of communism in your country. These 
pictures show that you are willing to give your lives for that. 

I think that it will be well that you do it as soon as possible, in order 
to save your country. I can say that myself. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the next session of the committee will be at 
10 : 30 tomorrow, when we will hear Lt. Gen. Jolin W. O'Daniel, who 
was formerly the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Islands. 

His testimony will be in connection with the subcommittee's forth- 
coming inquiry on communism in the Hawaiian Islands. That will 
be tomorrow morning at 10 : 30. 

We will work further with this witness and develop further the 
narrative and the photographs. 

(Whereupon, at 4: 15 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 : 30 a. m., Friday, November IG, 1956.) 


Note. — The Senate luternal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to 
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization 
in this index. 



Agriculture, Ministry of (Hungary) 3211 

American Hungarian Federation 3195, 3196 

Andrassy Avenue (Budapest) 3186 

Austria 3190 

Austrian Minister of Interior 3190 

AVH — Allamvedelmi Hatosag (Authority for the Protection of the State). 3183, 

3187, 3188, 3192, 3193, 3198, 3199, 3223-3225 

AVH headquarters 3188, 3189, 3192 

AVO (national security section) 3204,3211,3225 


Bekescsaba, Hungary 3199 

Bern (Polish general in the 1848 revolution) 3202 

Bem monument-statue 3205 

Bern Square 3202-3204 

Blue Book against Rajk 3201 

Boldizsar, Ivan 3200 

Border patrol 3185 

Boston, Mass 3182 

Budapest 3183, 3184 

3186, 3188-3190, 3193, 3195-3199, 3203, 3209, 3210, 3214, 3217, 3223 


Cambridge, Mass 3182 

Central Committee 3200 

Communist/s 3181, 

3183, 3189, 3191, 3192, 3197-3201, 3204, 3205, 3207, 3208, 3213 

Communist Party 3197-9199, 3208 

Communist Youth Organization (DISZ) 3183,3189,3200 

Czechoslovakia 3191 


Danube River 3202 

Debreen, Hungary 3199 

Deri(y), Tibor 3200, 3207 

DISZ (Communist Youth Organization) 3183,3189,3200 

Dozsa Gyorgy Street 3208, 3209 

Dumbovar, Hungary 3216 

Dunapentele, Hungary 3197 


Exhibit No. 411 — Photograph of students gathered at Bem Statue in 

Budapest 3203 

Exhibit No. 412 — Photograph of Peter Veres in the midst of demonstrat- 
ing students at Bem Square 3206 

Exhibit No. 413 — Photograph of students and workers gathered around 

demolished statue of Stalin in Budapest 3210 

Exhibit No. 414 — Photograph of captured tank flying Hungarian national 
flag 3212 




Exhibit No. 415 — Photograph of sign chalked on window in Baliosi Square 

during early days of freedom rebellion 3214 

Exhibit No. 416 — Photograph of burning books from Horizont (Horizon) 

Book Store, Kossuth Lajos Square 3216 

Exhibit No. 417 — Photograph of distribution of first issue of Hungariau 

free press (Igaszag) 3217 

Exhibit No. 418 — Photograph of freedom fighter standing guard with 

captured Soviet automatic rifle 3219 

Exhibit No. 419 — Photograph of a dead freedom fighter covered with Hun- 
garian national flag 3221 

Exhibit No. 420 — Photograph of a dead freedom fighter covered with 

flowers 3223 


Farkas, Mihaly 3187 

Fekete, Sandor 3200, 3204 

Feh6r, Judith Mariassy Klara 3200 

Foreign Ministry of Hungary 3202,3203 


Gero, Erno (Ernest) 3187,3207 

Gomulka government 3202 

Gomulka, Wladislaw 3201 

Gyor (often called Rab), Hungary 3185,3188,3189 


Hammarskjold, Dag 3191 

Hapsburg monarchy 3202 

Hay, Gyula 3200 

Hazafl, Arpad : 

Testimony of 3196-3225 

Interpreter and sponsor, John Joseph Ronto of the American Hun- 
garian Federation 3196 

Hetfoi Hirlap (Monday News) 3200 

Horizont (Horizon) Book Store 3215 

Horvath, Marton__ 3200 

Hungarian Communist Party (MDP) 3192,3197 

Hungarian Communists 3191, 3208 

Hungarian free press (Igazshaz) 3217 

Hungarian freedom fighters 3181,3211,3219-3223 

Hungarian Government 3188, 3198 

Hungarian military forces 3185 

Hungariau national hymn 3205 

Hungarian nationals 3187 

Hungarian radio 3183 

Hungarian-Soviet Friendship House 3215 

Hungarian students 3183,3184, 3193 

Hungarian workers 3184, 3193 

Hungarian writers 3205, 3207 

Hungarians 3190, 3192, 3197, 3205, 3213, 3219, 3220, 3223 

Hungary 3181,3182. 

3186-3189, 3191-3193, 3195-3199, 3201, 3202, 3204, 3205, 3208, 3213, 3223 


Igazshaz (Truth), Hungarian free press 3217 

Interior, Austrian Minister of S190 

Interior Ministry 3204 

Internal Affairs, Minister of (Hungary) 3204 

International Rescue Committee 3182 

Irodalmi Ujsjig (Literary Gazette) 3200 

Iron Curtain 3198 

Johnston, Hon. Olin D 3181. -3195 




Kadar government 3187, 3189 

Kerepesi-ut cemetery 3200 

Kethly, Anna 3189-3191 

Kossuth coat of arms 3205 

Kossuth Lajos Square 3207, 3211, 3215, 3216 

Kremlin 3200 

Kucka. Peter 3204 

Laszlo, Istvan : 

Testimony of 3182-3193 

Interpreter, Marian Low 3182 

Losonczy, G^za 3200 

Low, Marian 3182-3193 


Magyar (native and/or native language) 3195, 3207 

Mandel, Benjamin 31S1, 3195 

McManus, Robert 3181, 3195 

MDP (Hungarian Communist Party) 3197 

Miskolc, Hungary 3199 

Mongolian divisions 3191, 3224 

Morris, Robert 3181, 3195 

Moscovite Communist 32(X) 

Moscov(r_ 3199 


Nagy government 3189 

Nagy, Imre 3186, 3199, 3204, 3207, 3208 

NationalSquare 3209 

National Theater (Budapest) 3209 

New York 3189, 3190 

Nogradi, Sandor 3200 

Nyiregyhaza. Hungary 3199 


Parliament House 3202, 3203, 3207, 3208, 3211, 3212 

PetCfi Kor (a Hungarian youth debating group) 3183, 3200 

Petofl monument 3204, 3205 

Photographs (see exhibits Nos. 411-420) 3203-3223 

Piros, Laszlo (minister of Internal Affairs) 3204 

Poland 3201, 3202 

Polish 3202 


Radio Free Europe Committee 3186,3187 

Rajk, Laszlo 3200, 3201 

Rakosi (17th century Hungarian freedom fighter) 3213 

Rakosi government 3187, 3199, 3201, 3204 

Rakosi Hospital 3218 

Rakosi, Matyas 3200 

Rakosi Street (Budapest) 3210,3218 

Rakosi Square 3213, 3214 

Red Cross units 3190 

Ring Street (Budapest) 3210 

Ronto, John Joseph, Amei-ican Hungarian Federation 3196 

Rusher, William A 3181,3195 

Russis. _ _ _ ^18T 

Russian/s 3187, 3189, 3191, 3193, 3199, 3201, 3202~3204, 3211 

Russian forces 3185, 3192, 3211. 3223 

Russian military military forces occupying Hungary 3186 




Security police (AVH) 3183.3187,3188,3192,3103,3223-3325 

Security police crematory 3188 

Sinkovitz, Iiure 3205 

Sopron County, Hungary 3182, 3184 

Sourwine, J. G 3181 

Soviet 3186, 3188-3191, 3193, 3199, 3203, 3208,3215 

Soviet bloc 3191 

Soviet memorial statue 3185 

Soviet Party Congress, 20th 3200 

Soviet Union 3187, 3191, 3198 

Stalin 3200, 3201, 3207, 3208 

Stalin monument 3208-3210 

Stalin Sqiiare 3210 

Szabad Nep 3200 

Szelig, Imre 3190 

Sztalinyaros (Stalin City, formerly Dunapentele) 3197 


Tardos, Tibor 320>> 

Technological University 3204 

Torture chambers 3188 

Torture instruments 3188 

Ukrainians 3224 

United Nations 3189-3192, 3212 ,3223 

United Polish Workers Party 3201 


Vas, ZoMn 3198, 3200 

Veres, Peter 3204, 3205 

Vienna 3189. 3193 


Washington, D. C 3181,3195,3196 

West 3188 

World War II 3190 

World War II Government (Hungary) 3191 

Youth groups 3183 














DECEMBER 18 AND 19, 1956 

PART 47 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUL 2 5 1957 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 


OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Daltota 






Subcommittee To Investigate the Administiiation of the Internal Secubitt 
Act AM) (JxHEK iNTEiixAL Secukitt Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 




Robert Morris, Chief Counsel 

J. G. SoDRwiNE, Associate Counsel 

William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Testimony of — ^'^^'^ 

Bachki, Bela 3230 

Bubos, Lexi (assumed name) 3300 

Joseph, Max (assumed name) 3228 

Kovacs, Istvan (assumed name) 3232 

Ruff, Lajos 3243 




United States Senate, Subcommittee to 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal 

Security Act and Other Internal Security 

Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 : 10 a. m., in the 
caucus room, Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston 

Also present : Kobert Morris, chief counsel ; and William A. Rusher, 
administrative counsel. 

Senator Johnston. I am going to ask the interpreter to raise his 
hand to be sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness 
the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers 
given by the witness, to the best of your ability, and tliat you under- 
stand the language that he is speaking and can at all times interpret 
it ? Will you do that to the best of your ability ? 

Mr. Hadik. I do. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter? 

Mr. IIadik. My name is Laszlo, L-a-s-z-1-o, Hadik, H-a-d-i-k. The 
address is 4200 Cathedral Avenue IsTW. 

Mr. Morris. Will you, as Senator Johnston administers the oath to 
the witness — and. Senator, may I say that the reason tlie witness to- 
day is appearing with this surgical mask and cap is that he has rela- 
tives who are still in Hungary, and his appearance here today would 
subject them to reprisals, in his opinion, and we are going to respect 
his wish to be anonymous, and therefore present him in this way, 
Senator, and also under an assumed name, for the record. He has 
given us his identity in executive session. 

Senator Johnston. I want the witness to feel free to answer the 
questions, and we are going to try not to ask him questions which will 
identify or embarrass him or his family. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the subject of this morning's hearings, com- 
ing under the topic of tactics of world communism, is information 
and evidence we have received of efforts on the part of the Soviet 
Union to deport Hungarians from their own land, and Hungarians 
have been the object of mass deportation. 

Now, we have arranged to have four witnesses here this morning, 
Senator. There has been a great delay in air traffic, and I am able 
to present only two of them here at this time, Senator, this witness 
and tlie one following, and it will be on the subject of mass deporta- 



Senator Johnston. Let the witness stand and be sworn, also. 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give before this sub- 
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr, Joseph. I do. 


Mr. Morris. Would you tell us, without revealing your identity, 
ai^proximately your age, and how long you have been in the United 
States ? 

Mr. Joseph. I am 20 years old. I would like to stay in America. 

Mr. Morris. How long have you been i n the United States ? 

Mr. Joseph. Since the 10th. 

Mr. Morris. That is December 10 ? 

Mr. Joseph. Since December 10. 

Mr. Morris. Were you born in Hungary ? 

Mr. Joseph. In Debrecen, in Hungary. 

Mr. Morris. And you resided in Hungary all your life? 

Mr. Joseph. Yes ; I lived in Hungary. 

Mr. Morris. Did you participate in the uprising in Hungary — 
October and November uprising? 

Mr. Joseph. Yes ; I did take part. 

Mr. Morris. Again without identifying yourself, without reveal- 
ing your identity, will you tell us generally what your role was in 
the uprising? 

Mr. Joseph. I was in the armed resistance. I was myself fighting 
in Budapest. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything that you can tell us about whether 
or not the Soviet Union is now deporting Hungarians, either to the 
Soviet Union or outside of Hungary in general ? 

Mr. Joseph. The evidence I have concerns a written letter received 
by me with approximately 50 names signed to it, in which they were 
saying, "Help us. We are being deported." 

Mr. Morris. You say you received a letter from 50 persons who 
wrote to you, and this letter said, "Help us. We are being deported"? 

Mr. Joseph. This document was brought to the student association 
by a railroad worker. 

Mr. Morris. Did you recognize the names of any of the persons 
signing that letter ? 

Mr. Joseph. I recognized approximately six such names of students 
who had been together with me in the students' dormitory. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat did you do when you received the letter? 

Mr. Joseph. The students then decided to go to the homes of these 
people whose names I recognized, and there they found out that every 
single one of them had not been heard of for 5 days. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you persist in your efforts to find these 
people ? 

Mr. Joseph. Of the 6, we established without doubt that the 5 were 
not home for more than a week. And we spent the week searching 
for them. 

Mr. Morris. What about the sixth? 


Mr. Joseph. We didn't have time to track down the sixth, because 
he lived far out of town. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know anything more about what happened 
to this particuhir group of 50 people who sent the letter ? 

Mr. Joseph. I do not know anything definite. 

Mr. Morris. Have you any other evidence 

Senator Johnston. "\Mien were you last in a position so that you 
could find out anything about them ? 

Mr. Joseph. This was on October 27 or 28, and the document was 
mailed from approximately the vicinity of Miskolc in northern Hun- 
gary, M-i-s-k-o-l-c. 

Mr. Morris. How far is that from Budapest? 

Mr. Joseph. Approximately 200 to 220 kilometers. It is very near 
the border. 

Mr. Morris. Near what border? 

Mr. Joseph. Near the Russian frontier. 

Mr. Morris. So, in other words, if this thing was signed by students 
whom you knew as residents of Budapest, and it was mailed near the 
Soviet border, 200 kilometers from Budapest, the presumption you are 
engaging in is that they were en route to the Soviet border ? 

Mr. Joseph. There was no reason for the students to be in the 
vicinity that they were. The letter was delivered by a railroad 
worker, and the text of the letter said, "We are being deported to 
Russia. Please help us in any way you can." 

Mr. Morris. Where is this letter now ? 

Mr. Joseph. This letter is, as far as I know, in possession of the 
students association still in Budapest. 

At the same time, they copied this letter in many copies, and posted 
it as far, as wide, as they could in town. 

Mr. Morris. Are any copies outside of Hungary now ? 

Mr. Joseph. Xo : as far as I know. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any other evidence of the fact that the 
Soviet Union is deporting fellow Hungarians ? 

Mr. Joseph. The only other thing I know is that a colleague of 
mine who was a classmate of these six deported is now here in New 
York, and the address can be found out. I have not got it. 

Mr. Morris. Was he the gentleman who was supposed to be down 
here with you this morning ? 

Mr, Joseph. No, it isn't. We couldn't find him in town, because I 
only got the notice late at night that I was to come here. 

Mr. Morris. So you will assist us in making this man whom you 
mention now, available for testimonv here? 

Mr. Joseph. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. There was another incident that you told us about in 
the office a little while ago, which indicated to you that the Soviets 
were activelj' deporting Hungarians. 

Mr. Joseph. I talked to refugees in Austria, other refugees, who 
had already been rounded up from the streets, put into vans, and only 
at the last minute before being shipped out of Budapest could they 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more you can tell us on this particu- 
lar subject? 

Mr. Joseph. These students, these people had also been rounded up 
in Budapest, and the only other evidence that I can think of is having 


talked to a number of people who had rushed to them asking for 
help, because a member of their family or their husband had been 
grabbed by the Kussians mider some pretext or other. 

Mr. Morris. You had encountered people who had rushed to them 
for assistance because these people had contended that their relatives 
had been deported ? 

Mr. Joseph. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Can you tell us about that ? 

Mr. Joseph. One case is of a young couple. He was a driver, and 
he went down out of the apartment to bring something home, and the 
police, the Russians, arrested him on the street under the pretext of 
his papers not being in order, and of taking him down to the station, 
so to speak, to fix up his papers. 

His wife had known that this was, in Budapest, the equivalent of 
being taken away witliout — and never being returned. That excuse 
apparently had been used before. 

Another story that I saw was approximately 160 

Mr. Morris. You saw? 

Mr. Joseph. Yes; I saw — approximately 160 to 200 people as- 
sembled at the railroad station, the west station. Of course, I don't 
know for what reason, but they were assembled in the railroad sta- 
tion, and they were herded in to wait 

Mr. Morris. What? 

Mr. Joseph. They were herded in all together, and guarded. 

Mr. Morris. By the Soviets ? 

Mr. Joseph. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And these 160 to 200 people were Hungarians? 

Mr. Joseph. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you recognize any of them or did you know who 
any of these people were ? 

Mr. Joseph. I recognized a number of students from the medical 
faculty of the university. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know what happened to them ? 

Mr. Joseph. No; I don't know what happened to them, because 
they were not close enough friends. I knew them, but they were not 
close enough friends for me to be particularly interested in their fate, 
and because circumstances and other activities carried me away from 

Mr. Morris. Now when you beheld them, were they closely herded 
together, or did they occupy a broad area ? 

Mr. Joseph. They were collected in one waiting room, and armed 
guards were keeping them in there. 

Mr. Morris. Is there any other evidence that you encountered that 
would indicate that Hungarians were being forcibly expelled from 
Hungary ? 

Mr. Joseph. I can't remember any. 

Mr. Morris. Did you witness any Russian defections from the 
Soviet Army? 

Mr. Joseph. I personally never saAv any, but I had constantly heard 
stories of that happening. 

Mr. Morris. I don't know. Senator, whether, regarding things he 
didn't see with his own eyes, whether you would want to have what 
he did here in the record. 


Senator Johnston. I think it would be well to put that in the 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us Avhat you did there? 

Mr. Joseph. I have one story of paratroopers having been dropped 
in the vicinity of Szekesfehervar, S-z-e-k-e-s-f-e-h-e-r-v-a-r — that is 
about 60 kilometers southeast of Budapest — of the paratroopers hav- 
ing been dropped there, and as they were landing they didn't know 
where they were. They didn't know they were in Hungary. As 
soon as they found out that they had been in Hungary, they threw 
their uniforms off. 

Mr. Morris. Do you believe that story to be accurate, and if so, 

Mr. Joseph. I believe it to be true, because I heard it from more 
than one unrelated source, and because one of the people who told it to 
me is a friend of mine, and I believe that that person would tell the 

Mr. Morris. Did the friend of yours see it ? 

Mr. Joseph. I can't answer that exactly. 

Mr. Morris. Is there any other information that you feel you have 
which you should give this subcommittee which is now taking into 
consideration the tactics of world communism ? 

Mr. Joseph. One very important fact that I would like to mention 
is that the Russian soldiers did not know that they were fighting in 
Hungary when they were brought in. It was a well-known fact in 
Hungary that the Russians were looking for the Suez Canal. Some 
of them believed themselves to be in Western Germany, and thej'^ all 
were convinced they were fighting against Fascists. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more you want to tell us about that ? 

Mr. Joseph. This happened, these Russian soldiers who believed 
that they were in Western Germany or were looking for the Suez 
Canal, were those who had arrived in Hungary subsequent to the 
revolt; and it is also, was also a well-known fact in Hungary that the 
Russian soldiers who had been on Hungarian soil before did not wish 
to fight against the Hungarians, and for this reason the newly arrived 
troops would encircle them in some way or keep them close to their 

Mr. Morris. Encircle the occupying troops ? 

Mr. Joseph. The occupying troops. 

Mr, Morris. How do you know that ? 

Mr. Joseph. This is a story which is current in Hungary, all people 
know of it, and the only proof I have got of it is having talked to a 
Russian soldier. 

Mr. Morris. You spoke to a Russian soldier ? 

Mr. Joseph. I spoke to a Russian soldier, who told me they had 
been sent to fight against Fascists, but when they had found out it 
was against the Hungarian people they were fighting, they decided 
that they were not going to carry out their orders. And this soldier, 
though he didn't fight on the Hungarian side, he allowed the students 
to take his tank. 

Mr. Morris. Were there many such examples as that ? 

Mr. Joseph. I have heard of many, and I have personally seen 3 
or 4 such examples of Russians handing over their tardus. 

Mr. Morris. You have seen it with your own eyes ? 

72723— 57— pt. 47 2 


Mr. Joseph. Yes. Yes ; with my own eyes. 

Mr. Morris. This other episode, a Russian soldier told you per- 
sonally that he had allowed 

Mr. Joseph. Yes ; I personally talked to the Russian soldier. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I think that about covers the subject. Be- 
cause of the shortness of time this morning, because of the late planes, 
we have not been able to have an extended session with this particular 
witness, or even with the subsequent one, but I suggest that maybe 
if he stands by and maybe if he stays in the back of the hearing room 
here, Mr. Bachki is back there, and he might talk with him further; 
and if there is any more information he has, we can bring him back. 

Senator Johnston. I think it would be well. 

One other thing before you go. Mr. Interpreter, would you give 
him a pseudonym that would serve to identify him ? 

Mr. Joseph. I have chosen Max Joseph. 

Senator Johnston. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the situation I described prior to the testi- 
mony of the last witness prevails as to this next witness. He, too, 
has relatives in Hungary, and he has asked us to conceal his identity 
for fear of reprisals against his relatives; and. Senator, inasmuch 
as it is a most understandable request, and he has identified himself 
to us in executive session, we do know the people with whom he is 
staying here in the United States, and he, too, will testify on that 
same general subject as the preceding witness, Senator, we are going 
to respect his wish. 

Senator Johnston. Will the interpreter please stand and take the 

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness 
the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers 
given by the witness, to the best of your ability, and that you also 
understand the language that he speaks, so help you God ? 

Mr. Hadik. I do. 

Senator Johnston. Let the witness be sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give before this com- 
mittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mr. KovACs. I do. 

Mr. Morris. Have j^ou a pseudonym that can be used for the pur- 
pose of this testimony today ? 

Mr. KovACS. Stephen, or I-s-t-v-a-n, Kovacs, K-o-v-a-c-s. 


Mr. Morris. When did you come to the United States ? 

Mr. KovAcs. Four days ago. 

Mr. Morris. Today is December 18. That was December 14. 

Were you born in Hungar}' ? 

Mr. Kovacs. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. How old are you ? 

Mr. KovACS. I am wondering whether I have to give 

Mr. Morris. If it tends to identify you, naturally you do not. 


If you give your approximate age, tliat would be satisfactory. 

Mr. KovAcs. i am under 30 years old. That is all I would care to 

Mr. Morris. Did you participate in the recent uprising in Hungary ? 

Mr. KovAcs. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us, without identifying your precise 
role, tell us generally what role you had in that particular uprising? 

Mr. KovACS. The' revolt had 'started on the 2od of October, and 
on the 25th of October was the massacre in front of the Parliament 
Building at 10 o'clock in the morning, and from tliat moment on I 
was a fighting participant in the revolt. 

]Mr. Morris. Did you experience the massacre m front of the Par- 
liament Building on October 25? 

Mr. KovACS. I was present on the Parliament Square when they 
phot down around four to five hundred people. 

]Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that ? 

Mr. KovAcs. Around 10: 30 on the morning of the 25th, a number 
of tanks, manned by Hungarian students flying the Hungarian flag, 
were converging on the Parliament from various directions. The 
students on these tanks were yelling to the crowds that the Russians 
had defected to their side, and that there was going to be a large 
meeting in front of the Parliament, 

Mr. Morris. JNIay I break in there to ask, do you know that the 
llussians were defecting to your side ? 

Mr. KovACS. This was the first time we had heard that the Rus- 
sians were defecting. We were very surprised when we heard this. 

Mr. Morris. As a matter of fact, were the Russians defecting at 
that time ? 

Mr. KovACS. It was not just a rumor, because the very tanks which 
the Hungarians were riding in had belonged to the Russians, and in 
many cases Russian drivers were still driving the armored cars which 
were covered by Hungarian students. 

Mr. Morris. The Russian drivers were still in the tanks ? 

]Mr. KovAcs, They were still on the armored cars. 

Mr. Morris. Proceed with the narrative. I am sorry I interrupted 

Mr. KovACS. As a result of this, in front of Parliament, approxi- 
mately, according to my judgment, 5,000 to 10,000 people had assem- 
bled. They sang the Hungarian national anthem, and then in 
rythmic chants demanded the removal of Gero, G-e-r-o, from the 

Mr. Morris. He is the Hungarian Communist leader? 

Mr. KovACS. Yes. Pie was first secretary of the Communist Party 
at that time. 

Mr, Morris. His first name is Ernest ? 

Mr. KovACS. Ernest. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis, Proceed with the narrative. 

Mr. KovAcs. ,0n the square at the entrance to the Parliament 
Building, there were Russian tanks and machineguns, and, on the 
buildings all around the square, Hungarian secret police, AVH men, 
were in hiding with machineguns. 

They didn't think that this was any danger, first of all because they 
were so surprised by the fact that some Russians had defected, and 


secondly, because they were completely unarmed, and never had a 
second thought about being shot upon, under the cirmumstances. 

When this crowd assembled, they were allowed to sing the national 
anthem in peace, because the secret police didn't know their inten- 
tions yet. But when they demanded in chants the removal of the 
first secretary of the Communist Party, then they realized that this 
was some sort of revolution, and the first machinegun that I know of 
started shooting from behind the iron bars of one of the entrances 
to the Parliament Building. 

The crowd dispersed in panic, and many stayed there, lying around, 
some dead, some wounded, and some, also, who were either trampled 
to death or were pretending that they were already dead so that they 
wouldn't be shot at. 

That is when my activity started, when I returned for three truck- 
loads of wounded from the square. 

Mr. Morris. From that time on, you participated in the uprising? 

Mr. KovAcs. Yes, then. Until then, of course, I was all for it, but 
this is the first time that I took active part as a soldier. 

Mr. Morris. Were you the object of any deportation effort on the 
part of the Soviets ? 

Mr. KovACS. Yes; I was, around November 15 or 16, after the 
Russians had returned with the new troops. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us what happened. 

Mr. KovACS. Three days before this date, three railroad 

Mr. Morris. Three days before November 15 ? 

Mr. KovACS. Three days before the 15th, 16th, three carloads came 
in from Eger with antitank weapons hidden under straw, and that 
came into Budapest ; although the fighting was not at its highest then, 
they were still preparing and ready for more. 

Mr. Morris. These are Hungarian guns ? 

Mr. KovACS. These were, of course, Russian munitions, but they 
were smuggled into Budapest by Hungarians. 

Mr. Morris. For use of Hungarians ? 

Mr. KovACs. Yes. Two railroad workers notified us of the fact 
that these weapons had arrived. 

There were not many. They were under straw in these vans. We 
couldn't get to these weapons, although we had heard 3 days before 
the 15th of their arrival ; we couldn't get to it because the west station 
was so heavily guarded by the Russians. 

On the 15th or 16th, we went to the railroad station, sometime be- 
tween nightfall, when it got dark, and the curfew, which, according 
to my memory, is somewhere either 8 or 9 o'clock at night. 

The plan was to bring them out of the station into a building some- 
where in the vicinity of the railroad station. 

Of the 9, 5 approached the railroad cars, 4 staying a little bit be- 
hind, but, the minute we arrived as far as the railroad cars, we were 
surrounded by the Russians. The Russians then arrested all nine 
of us, plus another Hungarian who didn't belong to our group. 

They took us out through a side entrance of the railroad station 
and put us in a Russian truck whose sides were boarded up. This was 
the Russian regulation army troop transport. 

In front of this truck there was parked a Russian officer's car with 
more than one aerial, presumably radio aerial, on it. There were very 


few people on the street, because the curfew had come, and we spent 
the night in this truck — the better part of the entire niglit. 

At dawn, about 3 or 4 other such trucks joined our group, which 
were also full of Hungarians, not all students, but some older men 
together with them. 

With these newly arrived people together, we were taken to the 
same railroad cars which we had tried to reach the evening before. 
The straw was still in the railroad vans, but the weapons were no 
longer there. 

Approximately 80 people were gathered by then, and we were locked 
in these 3 vans, which were coupled together, on a siding which was 
out of the way. 

Mr. Morris. You were locked in a van ? 

Mr. KovACs. It was the normal red-colored cattle van, and we were 
locked in. 

Mr. Morris. How many to a van ? 

Mr. KovACs. Approximately 25 in my van, and they were more or 
less evenly scattered. 

Mr. Morris. This made for crowded conditions inside the van ? 

Mr. KovAcs. There was still some more could have fitted in. 

Senator Johnston. That is, standing up. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you remain in the van ? 

Mr. KovAcs. I stayed— I was locked in some time at dawn on the 
day after I was captured, and I stayed — I was freed about 2 o'clock 
in the afternoon of the next day, so it was more than 24 hom's. 

Mr. Morris. Before we get to that part of the story, I want to ask 
you, How big are these vans? Do they compare with our boxcars, 
railroad boxcars ? 

Mr. KovACs. I can't compare it to an American thing, but my esti- 
mate is that it is 5 or 6 meters long ; that is, 5 or 6 yards long. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. That is considerably smaller than our boxcai-. 

Senator Johnston. Have you seen the French boxcars ? About the 
same as that ? 

Mr. KovACs. Approximately the same as the Austrians. They are 
considerably small, is all I know. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you remain in this van ? 

Mr. KovACS. I made a mistake before. I was locked into the truck 
on the street outside the railroad station at approximately 8 o'clock 
at night, and 5 o'clock in the morning I was moved to the cattle van, 
and on the same day, at about 2 or 3 in the afternoon, I escaped from 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances about the escape? 

Mr. KovACS. The vans were locked from the outside, but they were 
poorly guarded, and among the guards was a Hungarian secret-police 
man, too. We only met the Hungarian guarding us at 5 o'clock when 
we were transferred from the truck to the cattle van. 

Mr. Morris. Five in the morning? 

Mr. KovAcs. Five in the morning. This Hungarian secret-service 
man let us all know if we were to be loud or to start yelling we would 
be shot down, and not to raise our voices for this reason. 

In spite of this, we did talk quietly between cars, and I succeeded 
.m communicating to one of the railroadmen who had brought these 
three vans up from Eger, and he had also been arrested at the same 


I thought there might be a chance to escape, and so I sort of lagged 
behind with the group, and that is why I was put in a different car 
from what my friends were, and also this railroadman. Therefore, 
they were one car away. 

This railroadman talked to me from the other van, and said that he 
was quite certain we were going to be deported. 

By this time it was a well-known fact in Budapest that deporta- 
tions were going on, and I myself had talked to people who believed 
that their relatives had been deported. 

Mr. Morris. Because they had disappeared? 

Mr. KovACS. Because they had disappeared. 

Two other gentlemen were in the van, and they had been captured 
in another part of Budapest already, 24 hours before I was, and they, 
too, had been kept in a cellar until they were moved to this van. 

Senator Johnston. Approximately how far from the place where 
you were captured ? 

Mr. KovACS. These two prisoners didn't say where the cellar was 
where they were imprisoned, but they were captured on the other side 
of the Danube in Buda, which is approximately 4 to 5 kilometers 

We were convinced and are convinced today that unless we had been 
freed, we would have been deported, although we have no proof of 

Mr. Morris. What other evidence have you or what other experi- 
ence have you had with circumstances indicating that deportation is 
going on ? 

Mr. KovACS. One of these two railroad men who had brought the 
arms to Budapest was not arrested, and it is probable that one who 
had organized our release at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. And the 
reason I have to believe that we were going to be deported is that this 
railroadman came and freed me, saying that is what he was freeing me 

Mr. Morris. Freeing you from deportation ? 

Mr. KovAcs. Deportation. 

Mr. Morris. To the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. KovAcs. Our only rumors were that it was Russia, not any other 

Senator Johnston. How many others were freed ? 

Mr. KovACS. All three vans were freed by the railroadmen. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any other instances or of any other 
evidence which would indicate that the Soviet Union is deporting 
Hungarians i 

Senator Johnston. Just to get the record clear, where were the 
guards when you were freed ? 

Mr. KovAcs. The things happened so fast, we didn't stop to investi- 
gate how it had happened, but we have a suspicion that the guard 
or two guards who were left there while the others had gone to lunch, 
Avere bribed bv some sort of alcohol, bribed with some drink. 

Mr. Morris. The fact of the matter is that you knew tlie doors were 
opened and everyone got out ; is that right ? 

Mr. KovAcs. Yes. Even a couple of seconds before the doors 
opened, I had heard Hungarian voices saying, "Escape as soon as you 
can, because tlie Russians are on their way back." 


Senator Johnston. Do you know of any Russian soldiers that had 
been punished in any way for helping or aiding and assisting in the 

revolt ? 

Mr. KovAcs. At the massacre on Parliament Square, the Russians 
who were driving the armored cars on which the Hungarians were 
riding, were also shot on the spot. 

Mr. Morris. The Russians were shot on the spot ? 

Mr. KovACS. The Russians were shot on the spot because they were 
driving the armored cars on which the Hungarians were riding. 

One thing which was missed, the railroadman who was locked up 
with me in the train or in the next van, had come from Eger, the 
town of Eger, which is on the Russian border, and he based his idea 
that thev were going to be deported on the fact that he had seen such 
vans going through. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, this man who was in the car with you 
yourself, had seen vans going across the border ? 

Mr. KovAcs. He asserted with complete certainty that he had seen 
such vans going through his town in the direction of Russia. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us more about that. How many vans ? 

Mr. KovACS. We were concerned with quite diiferent things from 
finding out, and therefore the conversation never came to a number, 
how many, 

Mr. Morris. But were they the same kind of cattle vans that we are 

Mr. KovACS. According to the rumors, there must have been a num- 
ber of such train units leaving Hungary, and they were all, as far I 
know, cattle vans. There was no passenger transport. 

Mr. Morris. Did this man, the railroadman in tlie car with you, 
know that they contained Hungarians? 

Mr. KovACS. He was quite certain of the fact that Hungarians were 
in these vans that he was reporting about. 

Mr. jNIorris. Do you have any other evidence or information whieli 
indicated that deportation was going on ^ I think you mentioned 
that in executive session. 

Mr. KovACS. It was a commonly discussed topic that a certain num- 
ber of vans had left Hungary along the Russian border, from which 
Hungarian yells and screams were heard, yells for help. 

Mr. ]\IoRRis. At the border ? 

Mr. KovACS. Yes, near the border. 

Mr. Morris. Did you notice any defections on the part of Russian 
troops ? 

Mr. KovACS. Apart from the tanks which joined them at the Pa.rlia- 
ment house, I have heard directly from workers in the Csepel factory 
that they had a number of Russians fighting alongside with them. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more you can tell us about that sub- 

Mr. KovACs. As a personal opinion of mine and my compatriots, 
everywhere in the west, including Austria and here, the organization 
and the might of the Russian troops is vastly overestimated; we were 
in no sense as awed by the strength of the Russians when we were 
meeting them in the field. 

We don't consider the Russian soldiers j^ersonally very eft'ective, 
and if we had had antitank weapons, the fight would probably still 
be going on today. 


Their organization is bad, too, because I know from experience 
where I was figliting, that for many hours, for lack of organization, 
the Kussians were fighting each other, shooting at each other, by 

Mr, jNIorris. Woukl you tell us about that? 

Mr. KovAcs. This square is called Moricz, M-o-r-i-c-z, Zsigmond, 
Z-s-i-g-m-o-n-d, and that was one of the centers of the revolt. The 
freedom fighters had captured the square, and the Kussian armor had 
surrounded them. 

When the freedom fighters had become weak, then they decided to 
retreat, and they sifted out through the buildings, one by one. And 
Ave know for a fact that 2 or 3 hours later the Russians were still 
shooting, although the Hungarians were not there, presumably think- 
ing the Hungarians were still encircled. This was at night. 

I have talked to a number of eyewitnesses who saw the Russians 
hand over their armor, including tanks, for food, a couple of kilo- 
grams of bread, for instance, because they were so badly supplied. 

One of the reasons we didn't consider them very serious and good 
soldiers was because, with a bottle of brandy we could achieve almost 
anything with the Russian soldiers. 

I have a very good and reliable friend who was asked by the Rus- 
sians where the Suez Canal is inside Hungary. 

We heard of a number of incidents from eyewitnesses, of those 
Hungarians mIio could speak Russian and talk to the Russian soldiers, 
and tell them what the situation was, whom they were fighting against ; 
and in practicallj^ every one of those cases, the Russians refused to 
continue to carry out their orders. 

Upon escaping from Hungary, I got the impression that the Rus- 
sian soldiers were also very afraid, because particularly at night when 
it was dark, they never separated ; they always stayed in large gToups, 
and almost always within the shadow of their tank. 

Mr, Morris. Is there anything else that you feel you can tell this 
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee about the general subject of 
Soviet tactics and Soviet world communism? 

Mr. KovACS. Apparently, when the new Russian contingents arrived 
they, in almost every case, replaced the ones who were there; and as 
far as I know, they either completely relieved the old ones, shipping 
them home, or just sent them to another area where they were unknown 
and where they didn't, they couldn't communicate, where they didn't 
communicate with the peo])le. 

Mr. Morris. Were they Far Eastern troops or Mongolian troops 
that replaced the old troops? 

Mr. KovAcs. In the last few da3^s, they were Mongolian troops. 

Mr. Morris. What do you mean by "in the last few days" ? 

Mr. KovAcs, Approximately between November 10 and 15, just 
before I left. 

Mr. Morris. The Mongolian troops were replacing the occupying 
troops ? 

Mr, KovACS. That is when we for the first time saw a larger number 
of these Mongolian faces. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

Mr. Joseph, I wonder if I could ask you the same question back 
there. Were the troops that came in — I understand, Mr. Bachki, you 


sent up word after you talked to him back there that the troops that 
replaced the occupation troops were Far Eastern troops. 

Is that true, INIr. Joseph ? 

Mr. Bachki. He told me just a little while ago new troops were 
brought in from as far as 6,500 miles, and some Kussians with whom 
they could speak claim the reason for that being that anyone staying 
in a country like Hungary cannot be trusted by the Kussian com- 

He also claims that whatever the Kadar radio, the official Hungarian 
radio, broadcasts about workers going back to their factories is true 
only insofar as these workers go in there to pick up their food cards. 
But whenever they hear, the Hungarians hear, the broadcast that 70 
or 80 percent are working in a certain factory, they just smile. 

Mr. Morris. Well now, Mr. Bachki, you will swear, will you not, 
inasmuch as we have been taking this testimony, sworn testimony, of 
the interpreter, I wonder, just so that our record will be perfect, Mr. 
Bacliki, will you be sworn to testify that the answers Mr. Joseph gave 
you were the ones you just gave us? 

Mr. Bachki. Yes. 

Senator Johnston. Do you solemnly swear that you will truly inter- 
pret to the witness the questions directed to him, and will truly inter- 
pret the answers given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so 
help you God? 

Mr. Bachki. I do. 


Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address, Mr. Bachki? 

Mr. Bachki. B-e-l-a, B-a-c-h-k-i, Bela Bachki, 527 Mills Building, 
Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Morris. ISIr. Bachki, the answers that you gave us were the 
answers given to you by Mr. Joseph, which was the assumed name of 
the man sitting back there? 

Mr. Bachki. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. They were the answers given to you in response to the 
question I put to you ? 

Mr. Bachki. Yes, sir. 


Mr. KovAcs. One other matter I want to tell you is that commu- 
nism doesn't exist in Hungary any more, and apparently there are no 
more than a few thousand people on whom the Russians can in any 
sense rely inside Hungary. 

Senator Johnston. What has caused that change? 

Mr. KovAcs. The Communist regime, from the very beginning, from 
Gero's first regime all the way to Kadar, had made so many mistakes 
and had been caught in so many falsehoods that even the most con- 
vinced Communist was no longer taking him seriously. And whereas 
a Titoist or Gomulka type of communism would have slightly more 
adherents than the Russian type, that doesn't amount to a serious 
number, either. 

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions. 

72723 — 57 — pt. 47 3 


I want to thank the witnesses, these two witnesses this morning, 
Senator, who came with rehitively short notice. I mean we had asked 
that they come down here, but by the time the notice was brought 
to them, we found Ave had to rush them to be brought here. Senator. 
And with the bad weather tliat prevailed overnight, as I say, we 
have only 2 of the 4 people we expected to have here this morning. 

Senator Johnston. The committee wishes to thank you for coming 
here, both of you, and testifying today and giving us the information 
that you have concerning the situation in Hungary. 

I have here also a letter written to the editor of the Washington 
Post of today, which I ask be printed in the record at this time, in 
that it is from Mr. W. C. Wentworth, a member of Parliament of 

Mr. Morris. He is a well-known member of the Australian Par- 
liament. He has a proposal here with respect to the Hungarian 

Senator Johnston. In this article there is set forth a suggestion 
that I think would be well worth putting into the record, and calling 
it also to the attention of our representatives in the United Nations. 

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. — ,"' and reads 
as follows:) 

Exhibit 406 

[Washington Post, December 18, 1956] 
March Into Hungary 

It is intolerable that the Secretary General of the United Nations, acting upon 
the instructions of the General Assembly, should be refused access to Hungary 
and thus prevented from seeing what is happening there and reporting the facts 
to tlie world. 

The time has surely come when the General Assembly itself has both the 
right and the duty to convene in Budapest and to rebuke by its physical presence 
those who deny life and liberty to their fellow men. 

Therefore, let the delegates to the United Nations Assembly gather unarmed 
on the Hungarian frontier and march peacefully across it, giving thereby a 
moral lead to the world in deeds as well as in words. If they should be sub- 
jected to obstruction, indignity or murder, then at least the whole world would 
know the nature of the threats which face it, and the Hungarian people would 
know that they do not suffer alone. 

The delegates are the accredited representatives of humanity and in the 
present crisis must be prepared to risk their lives like any soldier on the firing 
line or any citizen in Budapest streets. 

If some of the religious leaders of the world would walk across the frontier 
together with the Assembly they would be acting in conformity with the tradi- 
tions which they guard. Since nobody should suggest such a venture unless he 
himself is prepared to share in it, I would add that I would be willing to accept 
appointment as Australian delegate to the United Nations for this purpose. 

W. C. Wentworth, 
Memher of Parliament. 

Canberra, Australia, 

Senator Johnston. I want to also say this : I am asking that the 
transcript of this hearing, and further hearings on this subject, be 
transmitted to the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Henry Cabot Lodge. This evidence bearing on Soviet tactics is not 
only of interest to Congress, but should be known to our delegate 
to the United Nations, and for that reason I am asking that it be 
transcribed and sent on to him. 

Mr. Morris. That will be done. Senator, as soon as we get the 
transcript back. 


Senator, I might add that since the hearing has commenced, Mr. 
Lajos Kuff, whom Mr. William A. Eusher of our staff interviewed 
in Vienna last week for the subcommittee, arrived in the counti*y 
this morning, and is available for testimony. 

I suggest, Senator, we have an executive session with liim this after- 
noon, so that he may be prepared to testify tomorrow morning. He 
was in the midst of a 15-year sentence, had served 3i/^ years of a 15- 
year sentence, when the uprising commenced in October. 

I have no more witnesses prepared to testify now, Senator. I want 
to thank the interpreter, who came down here at great personal sacri- 
fice, and who was veiy helpful to us today, sir. 

Senator JoHNSTOisr. The committee is adjourned. 

(Wliereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject, 
to call.) 




United States Senate, Stjbcommittee to 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal 

Security Act and Other Internal Security 

Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a. m., in the caucus 
room. Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D, Johnston presiding. 

Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel ; William A. Rusher, ad- 
ministrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 

Senator Johnston. The committee will come to order. 

You will please call the name of the first witness. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the hearing this morning is a continuation of 
what we commenced yesterday. In other words, these witnesses can 
give firsthand testimony of the Soviet organization's efiort to deport 
Hungarians on a mass scale from Hungary to the Soviet Union. Tho 
two witnesses today are both qualified to give testimony on that par- 
ticular score. 

The first witness this morning is Mr. Ruff, who has told us that 
he will testify without a mask. He has not expressed the fear that 
the other has of reprisals against his relatives in Hungary. 

Senator Johnston. I believe the interpreter has already been 

Mr. Morris. He was sworn yesterday. 

Mr. Hadik. My name is Laszlo Hadik. 

Will you identify yourself for the record this morning ? 

Mr. Morris. And you were sworn yesterday ? 

Mr. Hadik. I was sworn yesterday. 

Senator Johnston. The witness will raise his right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before the 
subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Ruff. I do. 


Mr. Morris. Will you give your name to the reporter. 

Mr. Ruff. Lajos Ruff. 

Mr. Morris. And that is your true identity ; is it not ? 

Mr. Ruff. That is my true identity. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, before getting into the concrete details of 
the particular subject for which the witness was called, the witness 
has a very interesting background, which I think would be of great 



interest to the subcommittee in connection with this general subject 
of the tactics of world communism. 

Mr. William Rusher, of our staff here, went to Viemia, and while 
there encountered Mr. Ruff, and has spent many hours with him, 
and I think Mr. Rusher is qualified to brmg out the underlying back- 

§ round facts which I think are rather essential at this time. Senator. 
o if Mr. Rusher may take over 

Senator Johnston. Mr. Rusher will take over. 

Mr. Rusher. Mr. Ruff, what is your age ? 

Mr. Ruff. Twenty-five and a half. 

Mr. Rusher. You were engaged at one time in resistance activities 
against the Communist government of Hungary, were you not ? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us, in a general way, the kind of activ- 
ities that you engaged in, and what years they were, what time ? 

Mr. Ruff. I took part from 1951 on. This took the form of pre- 
paring the leaflets, in the 1953 election, against Rakosi at that time. 
In 1952 and 1953, for the May 1 demonstrations, we also prepared 
leaflets, and I also gave certain information to a Western correspond- 
ent friend of mine. 

Mr. Rusher. In the course of these activities, ultimately you and 
the people you were working with were apprehended by Hungarian 
Communist authorities ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Can you tell us in a general way how you came to 
be apprehended by them ? 

Mr. Ruff. After I had become suspicious, a secret policeman had 
gotten me acquainted with a secret police captain, the AVH, and 
then he arrested me. 

Mr. Rusher. You say when you became suspicious; you mean, 
after they had become suspicious of you ? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes ; after they had become suspicious of me. 

Mr. Rusher. And how did the Hungarian Communist police find 
out about your activities ? 

Mr, Ruff. Without suspecting it, I became a personal friend of 
Mr. Bela Roezaboeldyi. I didn't suspect that he was a member of 
the AVH, and I probably mentioned things to him which caused my 

Mr. Rusher. In other words, this AVH agent won your friend- 
ship and eventually betrayed you ; is that what you mean ? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. "Wlien were you arrested ? 

Mr. Ruff. On August 10, 1953. 

Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us where you were taken and what hap- 
pened to you, in the first period after your arrest ? 

Mr. Ruff. They took me to the secret police headquarters in the 
Fo Utca, and that is known as the special matters investigation de- 
partment of the ministry of the interior. 

Mr. Rusher. Is that the AVH police ? 

Mr. Ruff. That was the AVH police, known under the pseudonym 
of special investigations department of the department of interior. 

Mr. Rusher. And what happened there ? 

Mr, Ruff. There, for approximately 6 to 8 weeks, closer to 8, they 
tried to get information out of me with common methods of torture. 


and were particularly interested in whom I had given information to. 

Mr. KusHER. What sort of torture, that you call common ? 

Mr. Rurr. They burnt my hand 

Mr. Rusher. Is that the scar you showed us on your hand yester- 

Mr. Ruff. That is the scar. 

Mr. Rusher. Would you hold it up, please ; just hold up your hand? 

Mr. Morris. Let Senator Johnston see it. 

Mr. RuTT. They knocked my teeth out. 

Mr. Morris. How many teeth did you lose? 

Mr. Ruff. Two on the left side. 

They also burnt my feet. For 5 days I stood in a cell 60 centimeters 
by 60 centimeters, without food or water, or being let out. 

For 214 days I was in a room up to my waist in water, cold water. 

Senator Johnston. Sixty centimeters would be something in the 
neighborhood of 2 feet, wouldn't it? 

The Interpreter. Two feet by two feet. 

Mr. Morris. And how many days were you in the room of those 
dimensions ? 

Mr. Ruff. Five and a half days. 

Mr. Morris. Go ahead. 

Mr. Rusher. These are the methods that you call common ; is that 
right ? 

Mr. Ruff. That is what I call common methods of getting infor- 

Mr. Rusher. So, is this what happened to you during this first 
period of 6 to 8 weeks after your arrest ? 

Mr. Ruff. This happened for the period of 6 to 8 weeks, and in 
the meantime, of course, they always took me out of the cell to ask 
me questions and grill me. One of the hearings lasted 36 hours 
without stop. 

Mr. Rusher. How did they come to knock out your teeth ? 

Mr. Ruff. After I had refused to answer 1 question, 1 of my in- 
quisitors threw an iron ashtray at me, which I couldn't duck. 

Mr. Rusher. What happened after this period of 6 to 8 weeks, 
what came next? 

Senator Johnston. Now, then, to show something concrete, I think 
you should get up and show that hand. 

Mr. Morris. Let Senator Johnston see the actual scar on your hand. 

(The witness arises and comes around the table to meet Senator 
Johnston. ) 

Mr. Rusher. I think you were about to tell us what happened in 
the second period, after the stage of 6 to 8 weeks of customary methods 
of obtaining information. '\Vliat happened next? 

Mr. Ruff. Then I was taken into special investigation, psycho- 
logical investigation room, which we nicknamed the "bewitched room," 
in which they applied special psychological methods to us. 

Mr. Rusher. How long did that last? 

Mr. Ruff. Also 6 weeks. 

Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us something about this room ? 

Mr. Ruff. One lived in this room day and night without getting 
out, and there was complete darkness outside the 1 ventilation — no 
light came in through the 1 ventilation hole in the wall. For this 
purpose there were special films designed which were shown to us 


inside that room. There were lamps whose shades had holes in them 
and were continuously revolving on the ceilino;. 

They gave us constantly shots of scopalamine and mescaline. 

Mr. Rusher. I think, Senator, scopalamine is known in this coun- 
try as a drug that weakens the will and weakens a person's power to 

Go ahead, please. 

The Interpreter. Mr. Euff would like to comment here that he 
has agreed to write an article about this, and therefore he would like 
to answer only questions which the committee puts to him. 

Mr. Rusher. All right. We have understood that, and we will 
take further information in this regard in executive session. 

Mr. Morris. Unless the Senator wishes to the contrary. 

Senator Johnston. Proceed, and I will pass on it as the questions 
are asked. 

Mr. Rusher. All right, then. 

Will you tell us, Mr. Ruff, how long this lasted ? You said 6 weeks ? 

Mr. Ruff. Six weeks. 

Mr. Rusher. And this was in the "bewitched room'' in which you 
lived during that entire period ; is that right ? 

Mr. Ruff. I was in this room day and night, and a doctor of Rus- 
sian descent, called Laszlo Nemeth — he was a Hungarian who was a 
Russian citizen — took care of me, and as far as I know, this is the 
only— he is the only expert of this method in Hungary. 

Mr. Rusher. He is an expert in these methods of psychologically 
inducing a person to reveal information ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Ruff. In these psychological methods. 

He came in every day and spoke to me for hours on end in a very 
friendly way. 

Mr. Rusher. Was he a Hungarian ? 

Mr. Ruff. He was probably of Hungarian descent, because he 
spoke very good Hungarian. He told me that they brought people 
into this room only in various special cases, because this method 
could only be used on a very intellectual sort of people. 

He also told me that Cardinal Mindszenty had been in this room. 

Mr. Rusher. The "bewitched room?" 

Mr. Ruff. The "bewitched room." 

They told me that by perfectly ordinary methods they could also 
find out w^hat I had done, but they were not only interested in what 
I had done but also in how I was thinking. 

Mr. Rusher. Wliere did you go at the end of that 6 weeks in the 
"bewitched room"? 

Mr. Ruff. At the end of these 6 weeks I pretended to be insane, 
I broke things and made noise, and then they thought — thinking that 
I was insane, they transferred me to the insane asylum of the AVH, 
the secret police. 

Mr. Morris. Before you go on, was that Laszlo Nemeth ? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes. 

]Mr. Morris. And I undestood you to say he was a medical doctor ? 

Mr. Ruff. He is probably a psychiatrist. 

Mr. Rusher. So you then feigned insanity, and were sent ultimately 
to the mental hospital of the AVH ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Ruff. It was their insane asylum. 


Mr. KusHER. And liow long were you there ? 

Mr. RuTT. Approximately 7 weeks. 

Mr. Rusher. Seven weeks. Before the trial ? 

Mr. Ruff. Before the trial. 

I met 5 people there who had all been in the "bewitched room," and 
all of them were schizophrenic. 

Mr. Rusher. As a result of their experiences ? 

Mr. Ruff. As a result of that. 

Mr. Morris. They were not pretending? 

Mr. Ruff. They were not pretending. They had been there for a 
number of years. 

Mr. Rusher. And there were others like yourself who, however, 
had pretended? 

Mr. Ruff. As far as I know ; no. 

Mr. Rusher. Now, then, were you left relatively alone in the mental 
hospital, or were further tortures inflicted ? 

Mr. Ruff. There were times when I was just plain locked up to- 
gether with normal criminal-type people, who were mentally ill, and 
sometimes they had special little tortures. They gave us electric 
current shocks, shock treatment. They wrapped us m wet blankets, 
and when the wet blankets had dried, the skin was usuallv so dried out 
that it split and cracked. 

The head of this insane asylum was a Mr. Istvan Nemeth. 

Mr. Rusher. But not the same man ? 

Mr. Ruff. Not the same man. 

Mr. Rusher. Now, from this mental hospital or prison, you were 
taken, as I understand it, to trial ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Ruff. They took us back to the special section of the Internal 
Ministry of the Interior at Fo Utca. 

Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us the circumstances of your trial, how 
long it lasted, and what you had in the way of defense counsel ? 

Mr. Ruff. In 1954, January 18, is when it approximately started. 

Mr. Rusher. How long did the trial last ? 

Mr. Ruff. Three-quarters of an hour, approximately. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you have defense counsel ? 

Mr. Ruff. I had (iefense counsel in the form of a man appointed 
by the Defense Ministry, and I had no chance to talk to him or even 
meet him beforehand. 

Mr. Rusher. Do you know whether or not he was himself a Com- 
munist ? 

Mr. Ruff. He had a large party insignia on his lapel. 

Mr. Rusher. Did he make any serious effort to defend you ? 

Mr. Ruff. He did absolutely nothing, and spoke only 3 or 4 minutes 
in all. 

Two members of the judges' bench were in secret police uniform. 

Mr. Rusher. They were members of the secret police ? 

Mr. Ruff. They were members of the secret police. 

Mr. Rusher. And I take it then, that under those circumstances, 
you were found guilty ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. What were the charges of which you were found 

72723— 57— pt 47- 


Mr. Ruff, I was condemned for 15 years for having organized 
against — having plotted against the People's Republic, for the down- 
fall of the People's Republic, and for having disseminated leaflets. 

Mr. Morris. In connection with an election campaign, or gener- 

Mr. Ruff. Elections, and with May Day demonstrations. 

Mr. Rusher. Now, after your sentence to a term of 15 years were 
you then taken to prison, to begin serving it ? 

Mr. Ruff. They took me the very next day to the collecting prison, 
so-called, in Kobanya. 

Mr. Rusher. And how long were you there ? 

Mr. Ruff. I was there until November 1, 1956, when in connection 
with the revolt, I was freed. 

Mr. Rusher. Now, was Cardinal Mindszenty in that same prison 
while you were there ? 

Mr. Ruff. He was in the same prison until 1955 when, in con- 
nection with the Geneva conferences, he was taken away. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you have occasion to see him and, if so, would 
you tell us about those occasions, or occasion ? 

Mr. Ruff. Since they still considered me slightly insane, and 
thought that I wouldn't have the memory to say anything, they 
chose me for domestic work in the prison. As such, I was trans- 
ferred to the hospital of this collecting prison, where, in a special 
wing, they were guarding Cardinal Mindszenty. And in this con- 
nection, I was detailed to clean out his cell every single day. 

Mr. Rusher. And how long did this go on ? 

Mr. Ruff. Approximately 3 months I was doing this. 

Mr. Rusher. And what caused you to stop ? 

Mr. Ruff. On each of these occasions. Cardinal Mindszenty was 
standing in a dark suit, in the corner, and in one instance he dropped 
his handkerchief. I picked it up and handed it to him, and he fairly 
softly said, "Thank you, my boy." From that point on, they im- 
mediately took me away, they didn't let me finish my work. 

Mr. Rusher. Did they see this particular incident ? 

Mr. Ruff. There was always a guard in the cell, as well. 

Mr. Rusher. So what did they do; they immediately stopped 
having you clean the cardinal's cell ? 

Mr. Ruff. They immediately stopped having me clean the cardi- 
nal's cell, took me out, stripped me and searched me, and I was never 
allowed to return. 

Mr. Rusher, And never saw the cardinal again ? 


Mr. Ruff. I never saw him after that. 

Mr. EusHER. Now, then, you served, you say, in that prison until 
you had served 3i/^ of your 15-year sentence, and you were released 
by the revolutionaries on November 1, 1956? Is that correct? 

Mr. Ruff. On November 1 ; that is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And they released all the prisoners; is that correct? 

Mr. Ruff. Only the political prisoners. This was done by form- 
ing five committees, on one of which I took part, and we investigated 
the prisoners to see whether they really were political prisoners or 
just common criminals, and the common criminals were not released. 

Mr. Rusher. TV^iat did you do after your release from prison on 
November 1 of this year ? 

iVIr. Ruff. I had a friend among the committee which freed us, he 
was a writer, and he immediately asked me to join in their work, and 
told me to go up the next day, as a reporter, to the house of former 
Premier Rakosi. 

Mr. Rusher. Former Premier of Hungary; is that correct? 

Mr. Ruff. Prime Minister, as well as head of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Rusher. AAHiere was Rakosi at this time ? 

Mr. Ruff. As far as I know, Rakosi was in the Soviet Union at the 
time, because when Gero came to power during the night, they quickly 
whisked Rakosi away from his home. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you find anything of interest in Rakosi 's home? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes; I did. I found the most personal documents of 

Mr. Rusher. Do you by any chance have those? 

Mr. Ruff. I liave them, yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Could you show them to us, please. Will you just 
describe them briefly, one by one, so that we will know what they are ? 

Mr. Ruff. This is the identity card of Rakosi in the so-called Hun- 
garian Workers Party, which is the equivalent of the Hungarian 

Mr. Rusher. This is the party card in the politburo ? 

Mr. Ruff. This is the party card, with the picture and signature. 

Mr. Rusher. Not just Rakosi's card. 

Will you pass this up to the Senator ? 


(The card described above was marked "Exhibit No. 406-A" and is 

reproduced below :) 

Exhibit No. 406-A 

■■n- : ■_ "Sis 

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Mr. Rusher. What else do you have ? 

Mr. Ruff. This is his membership card to the Hungarian National 
Assembly, with the signature of the President of tliat Assembly. 

(The card described above was marked "Exhibit No. 407" and is 
reproduced below :) 

Exhibit No. 407 

Mr. Rusher. What others do you have ? 

Mr. RuTF. There are two identity card booklets for his wife, identi- 
fying that she is a member of the Communist Party. It is Feodora 


(Pages from the identity booklets of Rakosi's wife were marked 
"Exhibit No. 408" (under her married name) and "Exhibit No. 408- A" 
(under her Russian name) and are reproduced below :) 

Exhibit No. 408 

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Mr. Rusher. And I see you have one more there. Will you tell us 
what that is ? 

Mr. Ruff. This is a booklet of telephone numbers, marked "Strictly 
confidential," or "Top secret," and it is marked "No. 1," as being No. 1 
of a limited amount of these booklets issued to the heads of the 
secret police. 

Mr. Rusher. What telephone numbers are in that book ? 

Mr. Morris. Doesn't the first page give a further description of 
what that is ? 



What does tlie cover say, first of all ? 

Mr. Ruff. The cover says, the most important telephone nmnbers, 
No. 1, on top, it says, "Top secret, Budapest, 1955, the month of May." 

Mr. And is there anything on the title page or elsewhere 
vrhicli indicates which particular telephone numbers these are? 

Mr. Ruff. It says, important information. It says, the first num- 
ber is, in case of mistake in the ministerial switchboard, in case of 
mistakes at K station, secret section ; and then it goes on and gives a 
list of most often used telephone numbers. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anj^thing that identifies these as Communist 
Party functionaries' telephone numbers? 

;Mr. Ruff. No. 1 under these most often used numbers, the political 
party members, state, Minister of Interior, airport, and the sectional 
party leaders, as well as the vacation area of the party on Lake 

Mr. Morris. Vacation area, did you say ? 

Mr. Ruff. Of the party members. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, those are the vacation telephone num- 
bers ? 

Mr. Ruff. The vacation telephone numbers. 

Mr. Rusher. Let me ask ]\Ir. Ruff these questions. 

This list of telephone numbers in these books, you have had a chance 
to study it; is that correct? 

Mr. Ruff. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Whose telephone numbers are these, generally speak- 

JNIr. Ruff. These are the numbers of, what you might say, the aris- 
tocracy of the Communist Party. They are the members of the Hmi- 
garian secret police, the AVH, as well as political organizations. 

Mr. Morris. How many pages are there in that book ? 

Mr. Ruff. There are 68 pages. 

Mr. INIoRRis. And approximately how many names to a page ? 

Mr. Ruff. Well, more or less, I would say 6 or 7 names to the page — 
more — 9 names to the page, approximately. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. So you have between 500 and 1,000 important Hun- 
garian Communist officials? 

Mr. Ruff. With office and home telephone numbers. 

Mr. Rusher. Senator, I think, in view of the significance of this 
and possibly other documents, we will ask to have them put in the 
record at this point, if you will agi-ee. 

Senator Johnston. They shall become a part of the record. 

(Note. — The leather covers could not be reproduced in readable 


(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 409" 
and is reproduced below:) 

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^ V liwnkah«5y L^k^s 

Mr. Morris. May I have these photostated, and return the original 
documents back to the witness? 

Senator Johnston. Of course, that will be understood, that he can 
have them back. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you find anything else at Mr. Rakosi's home or 
villa that would be of interest to the committee ? 

Mr. Ruff. Rakosi's villa was furnished in the greatest luxury. He 
had a private theater, not movie but players. 

Mr. Rusher. Was there a barracks nearby ? 

Mr. Ruff. On the large grounds of the villa there were three build- 
ings occujDied by the AVH. Farther down the hill, about thi^ee or 
four hundred yards away — meters away — there was another large 
building which was in constant ultrashortwave contact with the villa 

Mr. Rusher. Where exactly was the villa? Can you give us an 
address or description ? 

Mr. Ruff. It was a former cloister for nuns. 

Mr. Rusher. \'\'liere; in Budapest? 


Mr. Ruff. It was in the suburbs of Budapest, on Szechenyi Moun- 

Mr, Rusher. I think you told, us yesterday, when we first spoke to 
you, about a bodyguard barracks — will you tell us about that? 

Mr. Ruff. Excuse me. About bodyguards ? 

Mr, Rusher. About a barracks for bodyguards. 

Mr. Ruff. In the 3 smaller houses on the same property there were 
approximately 130 bodyguards of the secret service. All of them 
lived there all the time. And there were approximately 150 more in 
the other barracks, which were 300 yards away, with radio contact, 

Mr, Rusher. Was there anything in these barracks except the liv- 
ing quarters of the bodyguards ? 

Mr. Ruff. In the larger of these buildings, which was off the 
grounds, there were a number of cells, and a small-sized crematorium. 

Mr. Rusher. A small-sized crematorium? 

Mr. Ruff. A small-sized crematorium, one person at a time. 

Mr. Morris, You saw all these things with your own eyes, did you 

Mr, Ruff, Yes ; I did, 

Mr, Rusher. Can you describe the crematorium to us, the small 
crematorium ? 

Mr. Ruff. The crematorium was in the basement of the cloister, 
which adjoined the Rakosi villa, and was probably the former central 
heating apparatus of the building. 

Mr. Rusher. Do you happen to know who this crematorium was 

Mr. Ruff. In the second little slot next to the furnace itself we 
found 12 bodies. These had shown signs of beating, but were obvi- 
ously waiting to be burned, 

Mr, Rusher. Do you know who these people were or what the par- 
ticular reason or purpose for this crematorium was? 

Mr. Ruff. I don't know who these people were. As far as I know 
regarding the crematorium, it was to completely erase traces of those 
special prisoners who had been taken for interrogation in this place. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, they were prisoners ? 

Mr. Ruff. They were prisoners. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Ruff, generally, 
what you have been doing since the time of your release ? 

Mr, Ruff, The day after my freeing I investigated this Rakosi 
villa, and already that night the radio was announcing that the Rus- 
sians were occupying the airport. On the next day I started toward 

Mr. Morris. How long were you in Austria ? 

Mr. Ruff. Until the day before yesterday, from the 3d of November 

Mr. Morris. Have you been interviewing escapees during that 
period ? 

Mr. RuTF. I talked to a great number of escapees. 

Mr, Morris, Can you estimate how many ? 

Mr. Ruff. Several hundred. 

Mr. Morris, Now, Senator Johnston, we have more witnesses here 
today, and there are more who can testify as to concrete details and 
evidence about these mass deportations. Now, this witness today is 
in a particularly good position, because he has talked to many of the 


people, not only those who have been deported and come back to 
Hungary and ultimately made their way on to Austria, but to many 
others who have firsthand accounts. 

So I would like to offer the testimony of Mr. Kuff on this general 
subject of deportations, and, generally, Russian defections, as an 
overall basis, his testimony being supported by the two witnesses we 
had yesterday, the one other witness whom we will hear today, and 4 or 
5 more who are now ready to testify as to concrete details, 

I wonder, Mr. Ruff, if you can give us an estimate, based on your 
experience of interviewing refugees and escapees, as to how many 
people you believe the Soviet Union has deported, how many Hun- 
garians do you believe the Soviet Union has deported? 

Mr. Ruff. According to my estimate, about 30,000 people. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give us the basis for your estimate? 

Mr. Ruff. On the basis of day to day talks with different people, 
I found out that there were three centers, jumping-off points, for 
these deportations. One of these was a large baggage area in the 
basement of the East Station in Budapest. The other one was the 
same type of area in the basement of the West Station. The third was 
in the subway station, which is near the South Station of Budapest. 

At these various points the railroadmen knew more or less how 
many had been taken from these collecting points by train. 

Mr. Morris. Have you talked to these railroadmen ? 

IVIr. Ruff. I talked to 2 or 3 such railroadmen. 

Mr. Morris. And they have given you estimates ? 

Mr. Ruff. These gave me part of the estimate, and I also talked 
to a lady who had already returned from Russian soil; also, to the 
chief engineer of a machine factory in Miskolc, who was the leader of 
the Workers Congress in the county of Borsod. 

Mr. Morris. Now, both this lady and this chief engineer Avere actu- 
ally deported to the Soviet Union, and returned ? 

ikr. Ruff. These had both been on Russian soil, and the engineer 
was in prison for 3 weeks in a place called Strij. 

Mr. Morris. Where is that ? 

Mr. Ruff. This is in the Ukraine. He was released because the 
county of Borsod is the largest electricity-producing area in Tbin- 
gary, and the workers had struck so effectively that the Russians 
thought by releasing him they would pacify the workers. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, he was actually deported, but because 
he was needed back in Hungary he was sent back into the country? 

Mr. Ruff. He was brought back because the Kadar regime on 
December 15, seeing that they made no headway, had announced 
that it was bringing back the leaders of the old workers councils. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Johnston, we have commenced preliminary 
arrangements to brin^ this engineer back. His testimony, in addi- 
tion to the other testimony, suggests that there is very strong evi- 
dence that the deportations, Avhich the Soviet delegation has denied 
at the United Nations, have taken place. The chief delegate has 
said that there were no deportations, has flatly denied it. 

Mr. Rusher reminds us it was not the chief delegate who made the 
denial, but the Foreign Minister. And all of this suggests that his 
denial is completely without foundation. And as I say, we are trying 
to arrange for this chief engineer, who has been over to the Soviet 


Union and is now in Austria, to be brought over to the United States 
and testify, to complete our record on this subject. 

Senator Johnston. I think it is very important that we have him 
here, and also the witness who has testified today has brought us some 
information which shows the beastly methods that the Communists use 
in getting evidence. When I think of that, and I think of our way 
over here, when the only thing you have to do is say, "I ask that I be 
given my privileges under the fifth amendment" — over here that is 
the only thing you have to say, and that is the last of it. 

Mr. 'Morris. Now, is there any other evidence that you can give 
us, direct or indirect, about the question of Soviet deportations, Mr. 

Mr. RuTF. I talked to a railroad worker from the railroad station 
in Miskolc who had seen sealed railroad cars from which young people 
had slipped pieces of paper out through the cracks. One freedom 
fighter who had come out to the West told me of having attacked 
trains in the vicinity of Hatvan, and having freed the deportees from 
the railroad cars. 

Mr. Morris. These people actually were on their way to the Soviet 
Union ? 

Mr. Ruff. They were on their way. 

Senator Johnston. Give the location of this city, too, for their 

Mr. Ruff. It is approximately 65 kilometers east of Budapest. 

Senator Johnston. Now, for the record, too, I think we should in- 
sert that a kilometer is about six-tenths of a mile. 

Mr. Ruff. Also, railroadmen who were working at the frontier rail- 
road station of Zahony told of having seen a number of bands going 
through into the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Ruff, could you tell us also about your ob- 
servations and what you have known, directly or indirectly, about 
the Russian defections from the Soviet Army ? 

Mr. Ruff. In the city of Pecs, an entire division of Soviet soldiers 
went up into the Mecsek Mountains, where to this day the freedom 
fighters are holding out. The city commander of Miskolc refused to 
slioot at the demonstrators when they demonstrated in the city, and 
when lie was called to account by his superiors for this he committed 
suicide by shooting himself in the head. 

Mr. Morris. Could you estimate the number of troops under his 
command ? 

Mr. Ruff. Several thousand men. 

I talked to a freedom fighter who spent 3 weeks in the mountains 
of Borzsony, approximately 13 to 14 thousand partisans are in those 
mountains ; approximately 1,200 of them are Russian soldiers. Those 
Russians who had been in Hungary for a long time and who were of 
the white race were so friendly to the Hungarians that, for a loaf of 
bread, they very often gave their rifles. The Russians had so little 
confidence in these soldiers who had been in Hungary for a long time 
and who were of the white race, that from as far as 10,000 miles away 
they brought new forces who were of the yellow race. 

At the airport of Thokol there was an anned conflict between the 
Russians of the white race and the Russians of the yellow race, who 
had newly arrived, approximately 80 Russian dead. 

That is all I know. 


Mr. Morris. Now, was there anything in conclusion, Mr. Ruff, that 
you would like to tell the subcommittee, knowing what our objective 
is at this particular time, to get evidence about the nature of the Com- 
munist organization ? 

Mr. RuTF. If I may, I would like to tell in a few sentences what I 
think is the meaning of the Hungarian revolt, and what it means for 
the future. 

Senator Johnston. You may proceed. 

Mr. RuTT. The conclusion I draw, and I see, from having talked to 
them, is drawn by most of the escapees, is that the Hungarian revolu- 
tion has exploded the myth of Commimist dictatorship. 

What was the myth ? According to the signs, one thought that in 
Hungary there were a great number of Communists, and that the 
Soviet orbit is completely unified. The Communist system was to 
establish this feeling regarding the number of Communists upon a 
system of fear and hate. On the international plane, some sort of 
conflict, international conflict or war, had to be used, because otherwise 
there would have been no object or excuse for the war or peace, the 
fight for peace. 

On the national level, a certain class had to be constantly hated and 
persecuted. This is what is known as class war, because otherwise 
the atmosphere of hate and fear cannot be created. 

For example, within a firm or factory there was never only 1 leader 
in the factory, but 3 together. Among these three it was never clarified 
which one was the supreme one. In fact, neither of these 3 were con- 
vinced Communists, but they pretended they were such because they 
were afraid that the other of the 3 might be one. 

It is on this basis of mutual fear that the entire system was built 
upon a pinpoint, whereby everybody had a feeling that everybody 
else was a Communist. 

In the revolt, in the rebellion, when we were face to face with guns, 
we realized that the person we had been afraid of as being a Com- 
munist turned out to be not a Communist at all, and we saw that in 
Hungary there were, in effect, no Communists. There was no class 
war or brother-to-brother war in Hungary before the war. 

In 1 day after the revolt had broken out, the entire Hungarian 
Army and the entire Hungarian police had joined the Hungarian side, 
except for those who were compromised by having blowi on their 

As it turned out, those young people whom the Communists had 
raised and educated turned out to be the greatest enemies of the system. 
And against the Workers Party, which is in effect the Communist 
Party, it was the factories and worker areas which presented the 
greatest resistance. 

Actually, the Hungarians only fought against Russians. When 
they came to close quarters with the Russians in battle they realized 
that the Russians were weak, they were not unified, and that the 
Hungarians had no reason to fear them. I think that the only people 
who are afraid of the Russians are those who are too far away to 
really know them. 

There were 12-year-old children who attacked tanks with bombs, 
and they were not afraid, and today no one is afraid of the Russians 
in Hungary. 


This Eussian myth was built on a monumental and historical bluff, 
because, as Goebbels said, "If we lie, then we have to make it a very 

big lie." . j_ 1 n .1 

It has now been proved that the Russians were no match tor tlie 
Hungarian problem, and that is why I see a gi'eat future for Hungary, 
because the Hungarians have not only got the strength for armed 
resistance, as has been shown in the 1948 freedom fight, they succeeded 

in passively resisting through 18 years 

Mr. Morris. From 1948 

Mr. RuFT. I meant — compared to the freedom fight of 1848, where 

it was passive. 

That is why the escapees all voice their expectancy of western sup- 
port for them, not by arms but through at least such an effective 
blockade that the Russians should finally realize how alone they are 
in the world, because the Hungarian nation is at this point completely 
unified, and as far as I am concerned it is still a completely open 

Mr. Morris. Tell me this, Mr. Ruff : What has happened to the 500 
to 1,000 Communists whose names appear in this book that is now in 
the record ? 

Mr. Ruff. One cannot say for certain. I know of certain individual 
cases. But partly, they have been taken to the Soviet Union, partly 
they are still functioning in Hungary, having been missed in the con- 
fusion and turmoil, and partlj^ — some of them have been killed, too. 

Mr. Morris. So it is your estimate that a few Communists, 500 to 
1,000, really in effect ran Hungary? 

Mr. Ruff. By all means. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, there will be other interesting aspects of this 
witness' testimony. I suggest that we have a session this afternoon 
where Mr. Rusher can make a record with this witness, and at some 
time we can put that into the public record. 

Senator Johnston. That will be agreed to. 

Mr. Morris. There is so much valuable information, and even evi- 
dence that we have, we would like to get it in the record, and I know 
that your time is short this morning. 

Senator Johnston. I notice that you testified that the Russian 
soldier would do most anything for a little food — is that your state- 
ment ? 

Mr. Ruff. By all means. 

Senator Johnston. We had testimony to that effect yesterday. Do 
you mean to say that Russia does not feed her soldiers ? 

Mr. Ruff. Those Russian units which had been in Hungary re- 
ceived practically no supplies from home, and their entire existence 
was based on what they could collect in Hungary, or from Hungary. 

Senator Johnston. I am glad to hear that, for this reason : There 
has been a great deal of criticism in the United States about our sur- 
plus foodstuffs. And reading in the papers, I have also found that 
there are dire necessities in Russia as far as food is concerned. I have 
never known any nation to win any war on an empty stomach. And 
for that reason I believe that our surpluses, though there may be a 
few million dollars, are far better spent, probably, than some money 
even on airplanes and things that are important for warfare. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Ruff, \*^ill you make yourself available to have 
a session with us sometime this afternoon ? 


Mr. Ruff. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I would like to thank this witness; he has 
come a long way to testify. 

Do you expect to go back to Vienna, Mr. Ruff ? 

!Mr. Ruff. If I get a chance to study at some university here, then 

1 would probably stay, would like to stay. 
Mr. Morris. Thank you very much. 

Senator Johnston. We certainly thank you for coming and giving 
this information. 

Mr. Morris. If you could swear in this next witness for us, I know 
that he can give us more concrete details about the deportation that 
we are interested in at this particular time. 

Senator, this next witness, again, like the 2 witnesses yesterday, and 

2 who appeared earlier, is a man who has relatives in Hungary, and 
for fear of reprisals against them he has asked that his identity not 
be established, and tliat his photograph not appear in the press. 
Therefore, he has come liere with one of those surgical masks tluit 
we have been using for this purpose. 

Senator Johnston. Will you come around and be sworn, under 
those conditions. Raise your right liand. 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give to this commit- 
tee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God? 

Mr. BuBOS. I do. 


Mr. Morris. You have come here this morning from Ohio, have 
you not ? 

Mr. BuBOS. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And how long have you been in the United States ? 

Mr. BuBOS. A week and a half. 

Mr. Morris. You had joined the freedom fighters, had you not, in 
the recent rebellion against the Soviet occupation in Hungary? 

Mr. BuBOS. Yes. I took part, armed part, in the rebellion. 

Mr. INIoRRis. I wonder if you could tell us from your own experi- 
ence and from the experience that you may have gleaned from your 
associations, what evidence that you know of that the Soviet Union 
has been deporting Hungarians to the Soviet Union. 

Mr. BuBOs. I took part in a successful armed attempt to free two 
carloads of youths at the east station in Budapest. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that ? 

Mr. BuBos. We found out that, at the east station, there were these 
carloads of Hungarians locked up, and that Russian soldiers were 
guarding these cars. Thereupon a 30-man contingent of ours, armed 
with submachine guns and hand grenades, surrounded these railroad 
cars. And after a short battle, we had killed the Russians and freed 
the youths. 

Mr. Morris. How many youths were freed? 

Mr. BuBos. Approximately eight to nine hundred were involved. 

Mr. Morris. Now, they were on their way to the Soviet Union ? 


Mr. BuBOS. They were, as far as I know, directed towards Russia, 
because on the railroad cars the ticket of the destination had ah-eady 
been ghied on the side. 

Mr. Morris. And what was that ticket on the side ? 

Mr. BuBos. The ticket had said that they were destined to cross the 
border at Zahony. 

Mr. Morris. That is the border between Hungary and the Soviet 
Union ? 

Mr. BuBos. And the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Morris. And you say they numbered eight to nine hundred? 

ISIr. BuBos. Yes. 

JNIr. Morris. And you personally participated in freeing the 800 ? 

Mr. BuBOS. I didn't take personal part, because I was detailed some- 
where else, but I did talk to those people who had done it. 

Senator Johnston. It is a rule of the railroad that you have to have 
stamped on the boxcars when they cross over from Hungary into 
Soviet Russia ; isn't that true ? 

Mr. BuBOS. Each railroad car has got a certain space prearranged 
for its destination, where its destination is marked, and this was such 
a piece of paper glued on there. 

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us any other experience you may 
have had on that subject ? 

JNIr. BuBOS. I talked to railroadmen who had personally sabotaged 
such attempts to take Hungarians out of the country. They did this 
by blowing up the switches in the railroad yard, and by then freeing 
those who were locked in the cars. For this purpose they were not — 
they didn't have any confidence in the Russians who had been in 
Hungary before, they used the ones which they had recently brought 
to Hungary. 

The Russians who were collecting these Hungarians would whistle 
at the Hungarian, and if the Hungarian didn't immediately stop, then 
they would just shoot him on the spot. 

That is approximately all I know on the deportation. 

Mr. Morris. Now, can you tell us what you know about Russian 
defections from the Soviet army ? 

Mr. BuBos. I was at the revolutionary youth headquarters in Buda, 
which is the western half of Budapest, and we got the direct report 
of the incident which happened in the town of Gyor. 

Mr. Morris. What was that incident? 

Mr. BuBOS. The incident of the two to three thousand Russians hav- 
ing joined the Hungarians in town. 

Senator Johnston. That is just at the suburbs, is it, about 5 or 6 

Mr. BuBOS. No ; that is the western half of Budapest, the western 
half of the river. 

Senator Johnston. Three thousand that left from there ? 

Mr. BuBOS. No. The 3,000 had joined the Hungarians in tlie 
town of Gyor, and that incident 

Senator Johnston. How far is that from Budapest ? 

Mr. BuBOS. It is approximately 160 kilometers. 

And we, being at the headquarters, received that announcement 
from Gyor. 

These Russians had gone to the Hungarian workers councils and 
said that since the revolution had been successful they were requesting 


that they be allowed to settle in that town and to earn their livings 
in an honest way. The head of the workers council thereupon told 
them to return to their barracks and to wait, that they would be noti- 
fied in which way to proceed. 

It was in their barracks that they were caught when tlie newly 
arrived Russians attacked the city, and tliey, too, were attacked by 
these newly arrived Russian troops. 

Part of "this group immediately took up its arms to fight the newly 
arrived Russians, and part of them gave themselves up in the con- 
fusion. That part which had continued to fight is still with the 
Hungarians in the mountains around Gyor. 

The Hungarian city commander had received orders — this Russian 
commander of the garrison had received orders from the newly arrived 
Russians to shoot at the railroad factory, and he announced that he 
would not shoot at Hungarians, and committed suicide. 

Mr. Morris. Is that the same incident that Mr. Ruff testified to 
earlier ? 

Mr. BnBos. I am not certain, but this I know came from Gyor, 
because that is what I was in contact with. 

Mr. Morris. Maybe you were out of the room when he testified as to 
that particular incident. 

Now, is there anything else on this whole subject of Russian defec- 
tions and Russians fighting against the Soviet Army? 

Mr. BuBOs. The other incident is that of the air force pilots in the 
town of Kecskemet. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that? 

Excuse me. Before you answer that question, I wonder if you 
would give us the assumed name that you have agreed to appear under 
here today. 

Mr. BuBos. The assumed name is Lexi Bubos. 

Mr. Morris. That is for the puipose of identifying him and dis- 
tinguishing him from other witnesses, Senator. 


Mr. BuBos. This incident took place after the Hungarian Air Force 
had given the Russians an ultimatum that if they did not retreat, or 
if they moved forward, they would immediately be bombed, and his 
incident took place — this ultimatum could never be canied out, because 
they were betrayed by the Russian wife of the Hungarian commander, 
who had gotten wind of it. 

Mr. Morris. And you say they betrayed the whole movement ? 

Mr. BuBOs. Before then, the Russians who had surrounded the air- 
field had not shot at the Hungarians, but when this betrayal took 
place then the newly arrived Russians did. 

And on the recond day of the revolt, on the corner of Korut and 
Rakosi, the Russians, after we had succeeded in talking to them, got 
out of their armored cars and told us to take them and go on our 

Mr. Morris. In other words, the Russian soldiers just turned their 
armored cars over to your freedom fighters ? 

Mr. BuBOS. There were some who stayed in their armored cars, or 
tanks, but most of them got out and handed them to us. 

Senator Johnston. The ones that turned the cars over to you, were 
they the soldiers that had been in Hungary for some time, or were they 
the new soldiers that came in ? 


Mr. BuBOS. These were those who had been in Hungary for a time. 

Mr. MoKEis. In other words, then, there is considerable opposition 
on the part of elements within the Red army to communism? 

Mr. BuBos. Within those Russians troops, particularly those which 
had been in Hungary for a time, there is great opposition to the 
system and the regime, because they had a taste of the western culture, 
and they had also had a taste of what it was to be free. 

Mr. Morris. And, in fact, is it not true that there is more opposi- 
tion being expressed and given to communism right now by the Red 
armj^ than there is in the rest ? 

Mr. BuBOS. Particularly in the crack units of the Soviet army. 

Mr. Morris. You mean, in their best units there is more opposition 
to communism than in some of the others ? 

Mr. BuBOS. More concrete opposition than in the rest. 

Mr. Morris. I think that covers pretty generally the information 
that we have gone over, now, does it not? 

Mr. BuBOS. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And you have answered particularly with respect to 
those two points, have you not, now, the defections and the depor- 
tations ? 

Mr. BuBos. One other point I would like to mention is an eyewit- 
ness account of Russians shooting defenseless Hungarians. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us that ? 

Mr. BuBos. The one incident is on Korut Street, I was standing 
there when a Russian tank slowly moved down the street, one Plun- 
garian had just looked out the window, without having arms or with- 
out being belligerent, and the Russian tank immediately shot at the 
window with its cannon. 

The other incident was when the Hungarian demonstrators were 
taking the Red Star off the technical university, and they were un- 
armed, and they, too, were fired upon by the secret police — by the 

Tlie third incident is when about 150 Hungarians had lined up at 
a bakery waiting for bread, and the Russians shot at the whole length 
of the line with machineguns, so that there were a number of dead and 

Mr. Morris. And these three episodes you experienced with your 
own eyes ? 

Mr. Bfbos. These I saw with my own eyes. 

Mr. Morris. And you are giving sworn testimony here today to 
that ? 

Mr. Bubos. Yes, I swear that that is true. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, this whole transcript should be turned over 
to Ambassador Lodge, should it not ? 

Senator Johnston. It is understood that all the testimony we 
have had concerning this situation and that in Austria shall be turned 
over to the Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, who is now with the 
United Nations. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I would like to put in the record at this point 
a news clipping of the story that originated in Geneva yesterday to 
the effect that the Swiss Government has apprehended a spy ring in 
Switzerland, and according to the news reports, the man who was at 
the head of it, Emeric Pehr, was the counselor to the Hungarian Lega- 


tion in Berne from 1951 to 1055. So, a Huno;arian official was the 
head of that spy ring in Switzerland, according to this report. 

I would like to have this report put in the record at this time, 

Senator Johnston. This shall be put in the record, as a part of 
the record. I think it is pretty important that we have that. 

(The newspaper clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 
410" and reads as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 410 

[New York Times, December 19, 1956] 

Hungarian Spies Reported Caught 

swiss charge band headeid by diplomat used refugees to get nato data 

Special to the New York Times 

Geneva, December 18. — An espionage network headed by Mate Vegh, second 
secretary of the Hungarian Legation in Bern has been smashed, the Swiss Gov- 
ernment announced today. 

According to Ren6 Dubois, Swiss attorney general, the network was assigned 
to get information on military preparations in the Atlantic Pact countries neigh- 
boring Switzerland, with especial emphasis on Italy. 

INIr. Vegh left Switzerland in September. He tried to return yesterday and was 
expelled, a Government communique said. 

Two women assistants of Mr. Vegh were arrested, it added. One of them 
already has been expelled from Switzerland. The other, a Hungarian who gained 
Swiss nationality through marriage, will be brought to trial in a Federal court 
in Neuehatel. 

The names of the women were not disclosed in the communique. However, 
the Attorney General said later that one of them was an Italian who had acted 
primarily as a courier for the espionage ring. 

The spy network recruited Hungarian refugees in Switzerland as agents by 
blackmailing them with threats against their families in Hungary, the com- 
munique added. 

According to the attorney general, the spy network was formed several years 
ago by Emerie Pehr, counselor at the Hungarian legation in Bern from 1951 
to 1955. 

No details were available today on the number of persons involved in the net- 
work. The Swiss communique gave only fragmentary information and the 
Hungarian legation in Bern refused to comment on the case. 

Despite Mr. Vegh's cunning efforts, no harm was done to Switzerland's secu- 
rity, the Swiss communique said. 

Tlie first suggestions that Hungarian agents were operating in Switzerland 
came from reports by the Swiss Red Cross. These reports said that at least 
one informer had been found among the Hungarian refugees brought here for 
temporary asylum from Austria. 

Although Swiss counterespionage agents were aware of the spy ring and made 
arrests secretly, their work was kept secret until today to permit further investi- 

Senator Johnston. Another thing, as you know, Mr. Morris, we 
have been studying about money coming through from Switzerland, 
and we can't find out where the billions are coming from, so we will 
have to watch the situation in Switzerland very closely. 

Mr. Morris. For your information, we are trying to summarize 
all our information on that point for our annual report. Senator. 

Is there anything else you would like to tell us? I know you want to 
get back. You have just gotten a job in Ohio, have you not? 

Mr. BuBOS. I am draftsman at the factory in Ohio. 

Mr. Morris. We won't identify you further. 


We want to thank you for coming and giving us this valuable evi- 
dence. Thank you very much. 

Senator Johnston. We certainly thank you. 

Mr. Morris. At the conclusion, I would like to mention that we are 
trying to arrange for John Santo, who was an American Communist 
who was deported to Hungary, we are trying to arrange for his being 
brought to the country, but we are experiencing difficulties. However, 
we do know that Mrs. Santo has come into the country, and we are 
trying to talk to her, to learn more of the facts in trying to solve the 
particular problem in this case. 

I will, Senator, as we indicated earlier, make arrangement to bring 
the engineer whom Mr. Ruff mentioned in his testimony to the United 
States at an early time to give amplifying testimony on this subject. 

Senator Johnston. Anything else ? 

Mr. Morris. I have nothing more. Senator. 

Senator Johnston. The committee is adjourned, subject to the call 
of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 35 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject 
to the call of the Chair.) 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaclies no significance to 
the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organiza- 
tion in this index. 



Austria 3229, 3295, 3297, 3303 

AVH (Hungarian secret police) 3233, -3244, 3246, 3258, 3294 

Bachki, Bela : 

Testimony of 3239-3241 

527 Mills Building, Washington, D. C 3239 

Berne, Switzerland 3304 

Borzsony Mountains 3297 

Bubos, Lexi (pseudonym) (testimony of ) 3300-3305 

Buda 3236,3301 

Budapest 3228, 3230, 3231, 3234, 3236, 3240, 3258, 3294-3297, 3300, 3301 


Communist(s) 3244, 3247, 3297-3299, 3305 

Communist Party 3233, 3234, 3249, 3251, 3258. 3298 

Congress , 3240 


Deportation of Hungarians 3228-3230, 3236, 3237, 329.5-3297, 3301 

Dubois, Rene 3304 


Eger .3224. 32.35, 32.37 

Exhibit No. 406 — Letter to editor of Washington Post, dated December 

18, 1956, from W. C. Wentworth 3240 

Exhibit No. 406-A — Identity card of Rakosi in Hungarian Worker 
Party 3250 

Exhibit No. 407 — Rakosi's membership card to the Hungarian National 

Assembly 3251 

Exhibit No. 408— Pages from identity booklet of Rakosi's wife under mar- 
ried name 32.52, 32-53 

Exhibit No. 408-A — Pages from identity booklet of Rakosi's wife under 

her Russian name 32.54-3257 

Exhibit No. 409 — List of between 500 and 1,000 important Hungarian Com- 
munist officials 3259-3294 

Exhibit No. 410 — Clipping from New York Times dated December 19, 1956, 
re Swiss Government apprehension of spy ring headed bv Emeric 
Pehr _■ .3304,3.305 


Far Eastern troops 32.38, 3239 

Fo Utca (special matters investigation Department of Ministrv of ' 
Interior) "_ 3244, .3247 


General Assembly, U. N 3240 

Geneva 3048. 3303, .3.304 

Germany, Western 3231 



Gero, Ernest, first secretary of Communist Party 3233,3239,3249 

Goebbels 3299 

Gomulka 3239 

Gyor 3301,3302 

Hadik, Laszlo : 

Interpreter for Max Joseph 3228 

Interpreter for Lajos Ruff 3243 

Hatvan 3297 

Hungarian (s) 3227-3230, 3233, 3235, 3237, 3243, 3296, 3300, 3301, 3303 

Hungarian Air Force 3302 

Hungarian Army 3298 

Hungarian Legation 3303, 3304 

Hungarian National Assembly 3251 

Hungarian revolt, October 23, 1956 3233 

Hungarian Workers Party 3249 

Hungary 3227-3229, 3231, 3233, 3237-3240, 3243, 3244, 3249, 3296-3303, 3305 


Johnston, Senator Olin D 3227,3243 

Joseph, Max (pseudonym) : 

Testimony of 3228-3232 

Entered United States on December 10, 1956 3228 

Born in Hungary 3228 

20 years old 3228 


Kadar 3239,3296 

Kadar radio 3239 

Kecskemet 3302 

Kobanya 3248 

Korut Street (incident re Russian tank) 3303 

Kovacs, Istvan (pseudonym) : 

Testimony of 3232-3239 

Eentered United States on December 14, 1956 3232 

Born in Hungary 3232 


Lake Balaton 3258 

Letter received by Max Joseph with signatures of deported Hunga- 
rians 3228,3229 

Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot 3240, 3303 


Mandel, Benjamin 3243 

May Day 3248 

Mecsek Mountains 3297 

Mindszenty, Cardinal . 3246, 3248 

Miskolc, Hungary 3297 

Mongolian troops 3238 

Moricz, Square Zsigmond 3238 

Morris, Robert 3227. 3243 


Nemeth, Istvan 3247 

Nemeth, Dr. Laszlo 3246 


Parliament Buildins 3233, 32:34, 3237 

Pehr, Emeric 3303, 3304 

People's Republic 3248 

Politburo 3249 




Railroad cars used for deporting 3234.3235,3297,3301 

Kakoski, Feodora 3244.3249,3251 

Villa 3294, 3295 

Refugees i 3229 

Roezaboeldyi, Bela 3244 

Ruff, Lajos 3240 

Testimony of 3243-3300 

Rusher, William 3227, 3240, 3243, 3244 

Russian{s) 3229-3231, 3233, 3234, 3288, 3295, 3296, 3298, 3299, 3302, 3303 

Russian defections 3296, 3297, 3301, 3302 

Russian soldier (s) 3231, 32:32, 3237, 3297 


Santo, John 3305- 

Secretarv General of U. N 3240 

Soviet Army 3230,3302 

Soviet Union 3227-3229, 3236, 3243, 3249, 3296, 3297, 3299-3301 

Suez Canal 3231,3238- 

Swiss Government 3303 

Switzerland 3303, 3304 

Szechenyi Mountains 3295 

Szekesfehervar 32:^1 


United Nations 3240, 3296, 3303 

Vegh, Mate 3304 

Vienna 3241, 3244, 3300 


Wentworth, W. C, Member of Parliament of Australia 324;>- 

Workers Congress 3296^ 

Workers Party 3298 

Zahony i 3297,3301 














JANUARY 15, 1957 

PART 48 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

93215 WASHINGTON : 1957 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Document* 

AUG 27 1957 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman I 


OLIN D. JOHNSTON, Soutii Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 





SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Robert Morris, Chief Counsel 
J. G. SouRwiNE, Associate Counsel 
William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 
• Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Witnesses: Page 

Karlor, Sabo 3308 

Karoly, Sabad 3316 

Kossuth, Frank 3325 

Mogar, Imre 3329 

Nagy, Imre 3322 

Szekely, Janos 3328 

Szep, Istban 3331 




United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 

Administration of the Internal Security Act 

and Other Internal Security Laws, 

of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a. m., in room 
457, Senate Office Building; Senator Jolinston presiding. 

Also present: Robert Moivis, cliief counsel; William Rusher, 
associate counsel, and F. W. Schi-oeder, chief investigator. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, before beginning today's hearing, 
I would lilve to mention that these witnesses today are being called in 
connection with the hearings that we have been conductmg since last 
October on the nature of world communism as manifested by Hun- 
garian events. 

The hearing today will have a bearing, not only on the nature of the 
Soviet organization, with its manifestations in Hungary, but as you 
will see, Senator, by the evidenc8, right here in the United States. 

Father Gregory, Father Berzinec Gregory, has come down with the 
seven Hungarian escapees from Camp Kilmer today. They left there 
at 5 :30 this morning. We are now ready to proceed. Father Gregory 
will also act as the interpreter for the witnesses today. 

Senator Johnston. Glad to have you with us, too, Father. 

The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Morris. Father Gregory, will you take the interpreter's oath? 

Senator Johnston. Raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness 
the questions directed to him, and will truly interpret the answers 
given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God? 

Father Gregory. I do, sir. 

Senator Johnston. Now will the witness be sworn? 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you give before this 
subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God? 

Mr, Karlor. So help me God, I do. 

Senator Johnston. Be seated, 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chahman, before beginning the hearing today, I 
would like to have the record show an episode that occurred in con- 
nection with our present inquiry. 

Chief investigator Frank Schroeder and investigator Edward Duffy 
spent most of the week at Camp Kilmer. 

Prior to going there the subcommittee had had several leads about 
Communists coming into the United States in connection with some 



of the escapees. The subcommittee received information concerning 
a certain refugee by the name of Gregory Lang, a lawyer by profession, 
and the subcommittee information was that he was in the Communist 
Party in the suburban section of Budapest. 

Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Duffy called upon camp authorities to 
produce Mr. Lang. He was brought in to the chaplain's office, and 
there present was Father Gregory, wdio is here with us today, to act as 
an interpreter, and the representatives of the Immigration Service. 

When the staff members asked Mr. Lang, through an interpreter, 
if he had any connection with the Communist Party in Hungary, at 
first he denied it. Later, when they persisted in their questioning, 
he admitted that he had been a member of the Communist Party, 
that he had joined it in 1945 and even worked as a card clerk in the 
office of the political secret police. 

He went on to say that he left the Communist Party sometime in 
1948. When he was asked why he did not record this on his applica- 
tion when he went into the country, he said if he had stated it he 
could not come in. 

Mr. Lang has been turned over to the immigration authority and he 
is being held in custody. Now, we. Senator, cannot presume whether 
or not he is presently a loyal Communist. His story, I think it is 
clear from what he said, that if he said he w^as a Communist he would 
not have gotten out. Yet, Senator, as we know from our experience 
with people, we cannot very well just accept the mere say-so that he 
has left the party, particularly when it was as late as 1948, as Mr. 
Schroeder has told us. 

We think it is a serious case to be studied by the subcommittee. 

Senator Johnston. I can only speak personally for myself, but I 
have been fearful all along when we let them in b}^ the thousands 
that we were letting in probably some Communists that would come 
over here and do nothing but spread Communist activities here in 
America. So we have got to watch that side of it, also. 

(The witness was m.asked.) 

Father Gregory. He has a father and mother still in Hungary, 
and he is fearful of their fives. 

Senator Johnston. All right. Any pictures made of him, he must 
have the mask on. That is in order to protect his relatives in Hun- 
gary, fiving in the old country. 



Mr. Morris. And is it your testimony today, is it your staternent 
here under oath, that you have relatives back in Hungary against 
whom there would be reprisals if you felt your identity became known? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir; my father and mother and my sister would 

Mr. Morris. Senator, we have a tremendous responsibifity in these 
things. We do not fike to present witnesses in this manner; yet, it is 
so very understandable that we do so. The story this particular 
witness has to teU, Senator, is extremely important, andl think his 
testimony is very necessary and we will have to check into it very 


I ask, Senator, that we respect his wishes and allow him to testify 
with the pseudonym and having his face disguised so his picture 
cannot be shown to the Hungarian secret police. 

Senator Johnston. I think, personally, the witness, being from a 
foreign country, certainly should understand how the law is here, 
that if they testify under oath and should testify to something that is 
not true, then they are liable to a prosecution. 

Father Gregory. He understands that, Senator. 

Mr. Morris. Will you give us the name under which you will 
testify today, other than your own name, which you have given us 
and which, Senator, I have on this particular card here? 

Mr. Karlor. I want to testify under my own name. 

Mr. Morris. Does he understand if he testifies under his own name, 
this will be a matter of public record? 

Father Gregory. He says if this will go out, behind the Iron 
Curtain — I said this will be a public record, and therefore, if he wants 
to assume another name, and he says he does. 

Mr. Morris. Now what is the name? 

Mr. Karlor. Under the name of Sabo Karlor. 

Mr. Morris. Would you spell that, please? 

Father Gregory. S-a-b-o K-a-r-1-o-r, 

Mr. Morris. Is that a first name? 

Father Gregory. The first name is given always, the family name, 
and then his Cluistian name is Karlor. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you were employed in the American Legation 
in Budapest for a number of years, were you not? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. You were born in Hungary? 

Mr. Karlor. I was born in Austria. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Without giving a date, because that would 
tend to identify you, will you tell us generally over a period when 
you went into Hungary? 

Mr. Karlor. 1911, with my father, I got to Hungary. 

Mr. Morris. Well now, can you tell us without identifying your- 
self — can you tell us without identifying yourself — roughly, what you 
did in the American Legation in Hungary? 

(The answer was stricken physically from the record.) 

Mr. Morris. Senator, may I ask that that be expunged from the 
record? In consideration for the human qualities involved here, I 
ask the press that they will ignore that particular identifying feature. 

Senator Johnston. Under the rule, I will rule that will be stricken 
from the record. 

Mr. Morris. Father Gregory, will you ask him — he should think 
before he answers these questions, because we cannot necessarily 
guarantee the security of that statement. 

Father Gregory. He understands that, sir. 

Senator Johnston. Cm- trouble is this, we do not know everybody 
that is sitting in the room here. This is a public hearing, and some- 
body may be sitting here listening to him in order to make a report 
to the Communists. 

Mr. Karlor. We must be very careful. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you participated — you were present in Hungary 
at the time of the start of the October 23 rebellion, were you not? 


Mr. Karlor. Yes, I was. 

Mr. Morris. Now, again without identif3ano; yourself, could j^ou 
tell us what your role was in that particular rebellion? 

Father Gregory. I did not get that, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Without identifying, again without telling us details 
that will identify himself, could he tell us generally what he did in 
connection with the October 23 rebellion? 

Air. Karlor, The American Legation gave us strict orders not to 
go into the garage as soon as the revolution started. Since we lived 
far away from the Embassy, the American Legation give us orders 
not to come into the garage because they were fearful for our lives 
and they did not want to assume responsibility for us since we were 
the employees of the Legation. 

Mr. Morris. Did you do anything, therefore, at all, subsequently 
in connection with assisting the freedom fight? 

Mr. Karlor. As a fighter I did not participate in the fight. I 
was well aware that I was employed by the American Embassy, and 
I stayed away from the fight. 

Mr. Morris. And when did you come to the United States? 

Mr. Karlor. 1956, September 16 I left— December 16, 1956, I 
left Hungary; and the 18th of the same month I came into Austria: 
and the 30th or 31st of December I arrived at Camp Kilmer, United 

Mr. Morris. Now, in connection with your work at the American 
Legation, did j^ou get to know the other Hungarian employees of the 
American Legation there? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you know any of them to be agents of the 
Hungarian secret police? 

Mr. Karlor. About oiae, I know positively. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I wish that you would not, at this time, give 
us his name in the pubhc record, but will you tell us how you positively 
know that he was an agent of the secret police? 

Mr. Karlor. Because he has told me so. 

Mr. Morris. Now, are there any others that you have 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir, about whom we had suspicion, there were 
many more. 

Mr. Morris. I want to use a device here. Senator, by which we 
will know. He has given us on this card, he has identified them, 
but 1 do not want to put the names in the record until we are able to 
check further into the story. But I am going to give him a list of the 
names here that he has given us. 

I wonder if Mr. Schroeder will do this? 

1 have there the fom- names that you have given Mr. Duffy and Mr. 
Schroeder. Can you tell us just by number only — 1, 2, 3, 4 — which 
was the one you definitely know as the secret agent? 

Father Gregory. You should number them. 

Mr. Morris. Just by number? 

Mr. Karlor. Number one. 

Mr. AloRRis. No. 1 is the man that you definitely know. 

Now, how recently, to your loiowledge, was he working in the 
American Embassy in Budapest, American Legation? 

Mr. Karlor. December 16. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, he was there when you left? 


Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what about the No. 2 man on that hst, what 
can you tell us about him — again, without mentioning his name? 

Mr. Karlor. No. 2, we had suspicion and reason to believe that 
he was also connected with the secret police of Hungary. 

Mr. Morris. What is the reason you believe that? 

Mr. Karlor. Because he worked for so many years at the American 
Legation, and nothing ever happened to him. 

Mr. Morris. Will you explain that? 

Mr. Karlor. We l-mow, because every man that worked for the 
American Legation was constantly under surveiUance by the secret 

Mr. Morris. Now, were you yourself constantly under surveillance 
by the secret police? 

Mr. Karlor. I was — for the last 2 weeks of my being there, I was. 
They talked to me ; they approached me. 

Mr. Morris. Why was he not under surveillance for the period of 
time that he worked there? 

Mr. Karlor. Because I was a very insignificant person, I was 
just washing cars, and a very minor official. 

Mr. Morris. Wliy would the No. 1 man tell you, the person 
identified as No. 1 tell you, what were the circumstances under which 
he would actually say he was an agent for the secret police? 

Mr. Karlor. I enjoyed a particular kind of confidence of all 
people because I did favors, was a very small man there, considered a 
small man, and when he came around just 2 weeks before I saw that 
he was in the same state that I was, because I was approached then, 
and he was nervous and he begged me to help him escape, and he 
confided to me. 

Mr. Morris. He confided in you that he was an agent then for the 
secret police? 

Mr. Karlor. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And you say he was then considering the fact that 
he wanted to break away from his allegiance? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes; we made a decision, and we both escaped, but 
he was caught on the border. 

Mr. Morris. He was caught by whom? 

Mr. Karlor. The Russians. 

Mr. Morris. Now, v/ith respect to the No. 2 man, what other 
reason have you to believe that he was a secret agent of the AVO's? 

Mr. Karlor. As we discussed many times who is under the sus- 
picion here, who could be, we all always agreed that he, the No. 2 and 
No. 3 — we were awfully fearful from both of them. 

Mr. Morris. But you have no direct evidence, or you have no evi- 
dence whatever, that they are? 

Mr. Karlor. I have no evidence to that effect. 

Mr. Morris. What about No. 4? 

Mr. Karlor. No. 4 was jailed for passing dollars and Napoleon 
gold money, sehing, and after a short jail sentence No. 2 immediately 
employed him again because he was his chief. He also, incidentally^, 
was a piano player in a nightclub at the same time that he worked in 
the American Legation, and it was not a practice of the American 
Legation, or any other Legation, to hire a man to hold two jobs down. 

93215— 57— pt. 48 2 


He was a piano player at night, was employed in nightclubs which 
were owned by the government, consequently controlled by the secret 
police, and j^et they allowed him to work at the same time that he 
worked at our Legation. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you have told us, then, have you not, that the 
housekeeper for two American officers attached to the Embassy was 
an agent of the secret police? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. How do you know that? 

Mr. Karlor. If I may, I will elaborate on it. 

Mr. Morris. Please do. 

Mr. Karlor. This girl was emploj'ed by the American Embassy 
attache, and a chauffeur, private chauffeur, of an American Embassy 
attache told the Embassy attache that this woman is a spy for the 
secret police. 

An American Embassy attache told him what to say to the secret 

Mr. Morris. I did not understand that, Father. 

Father Gregory. You have 2 persons involved — '3. One is a mem- 
ber of the Embassy staff, an American officer, who hired a girl to work 
for him. He had also had a chauffeur, and the chauffeur was loyal 
and told about this girl, his maid, that she was a member of the 
secret police. 

Then the American officer told the chauffeur to to tell her whatever 
he wants her to know. Later on, when they found out that the 
chauffeur has reported on the maid, the chauffeur was immediately 
arrested and sentenced to jail for life. First he was imprisoned and 
sentenced to death, and then they gave him amnesty to life imprison-, 
ment. And he suspects that this information came from the maid. 

Mr. Morris. Now, could you tell us whether this maid is— when 
did he last see this maid? \Yhen did you last see this maid? 

Mr. Karlor. Just before I left; December. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, to your knowledge she was still 
working there at the time? 

Mr. Karlor. She immediately married to the chief of the garage, 
who was an Austrian citizen, and then she started to spy on her hus- 
band, too. Whatever happened in the Legation, he would talk about 
it at home, and she immediately would tell the AVO's — secret police. 

Mr. Morris. How do you know that? 

Mr. Karlor. Because the No. 1 once tried him out, tried this ring 
out. The No. 1 tried it out in such a way that this maid was posi- 
tively a secret police; that he has passed on some information to her 
and then he heard it in a couple days already from the secret police. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, the No. 1 name on this list 

Mr. Karlor. No. I. 

Mr. Morris (continuing). Confirmed to you, the fact that she was 
a secret agent? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes; he told me. 

Mr. Morris. That is the period when he had taken you into his 

Mr. Karlor. This maid also was employed by another Embassy 
attache — she worked for both of them as a maid — and she implicated 
another chauffeur, and that one was sentenced to life, too. But he 


was released 2 years later. After he received a sentence, life sentence, 
2 years later he was released. 

Mr. Morris. What is the significance of that? 

Mr. Karlor. I think that the jails are opened and lots of criminals, 
such as this one, was let out also by freedom fighters. 

Also, there is another man that is not numbered here, nor his name 
does not appear here. He also received a life sentence, but then they 
let him out 4 years later and told him to report in January to the court; 
secret police. And the revolution broke out on the 23d of October, 
and he did not report; everybody escaped. 

Mr. Morris. What have these people been doing since they were 

Mr. Karlor. Most of them were trying to escape to another 
country. Quite a few have succeeded. Some of them stayed back, 
but I do not know what happened to them. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you also have told us about two chauffeurs who 
were agents of the secret police, have you not? 

Mr. Karlor. These were the chaiiffeurs upon whose vanity this 
maid played. She is the one that they were identified with, those two 

Mr. Morris. And were the chauffeurs themselves secret police 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir; both of them. But they also told the 
American Legation member, told the Chief, that they were members 
of the secret police. 

Mr. Morris. They admitted to the American Legation member 
that they were secret police? 

Mr. Karlor. That is right. 

Mr, Morris. How do you know that? 

Mr. Karlor. They told me. 

Mr. Morris. They told you they had told him? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did he say anything about it? 

Mr. Karlor. He said, "That's fine, you stay a member, and I will 
give you the information that you can pass on to them." 

Mr. Morris. An American member told him that? 

Mr. Karlor. Both American officials said this, and if you wish, I 
will tell you their names. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you do not know whether he meant that he 
wanted to give them misinformation that they should carry back — —  

Mr. Karlor. That is exactly what he means. 

Mr. Morris. That is what he meant. So, in effect, they were 
really double agents? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir. That is why, then, the maid reported 
them, that they were double agents, and that is why they got the 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else you can tell us about the 
secret police, gathered from your experience as an employee at the 
American Legation? 

Mr, Karlor. Yes, sir. They tried to approach me. 

Mr. Morris. Tried to approach jou. All right. 

Now, in telling us that story, remember that they know the details 
of the story, and if you give too many individuating notes about that 


story, you will be giving your identity. Bear that in mind when you 
tell us how they did it. 

Mr. Karlor. I am the instrument of this whole plot, and Your 
Honor is right that only I know, and they know, that, and then I 
would be identified. But off the record, I am willing to state — it is 

Mr. Morris. May we have that later on today? 

Senator Johnston. You may. 

Mr. Morris. Don't tell us now here publicly. Father. 

Mr. Karlor. As soon as I came to Austria, I told the American 
officials about it and I asked them also not to divulge because of safety 
of my family. 

Mr. Morris. Now, would you tell me this, did you tell anyone in 
the American Legation about your knowledge at the time, yom- knowl- 
edge of who these various secret police agents were? 

Mr. Karlor. I did not say it, 

Mr. Morris. Then w^hy did you not tell the American employers 
about — 

Father Gregory. He mentioned a name. 

Mr. Karlor. I must relate to you gentlemen that I know what Mr. 
Voegler said w^hen he came out of jail, right in Hungary, that he said 
the secret pohce of Hungary told me such amazing secret things that 
only could come out of the American Legation, only American Lega- 
tion officials knew about it, and I was afraid to tell them about an 
approach of the secret police that they made to me in a proposition. 

He asked me — may I continue a httle bit more? 

Mr. Morris. By all means. 

Mr. Karlor. Even when I arrived in Vienna, I got myself an 
interpreter and went to American officials^ — and I was even afraid of 
him- — to relate this story and until when I came to Camp Kilmer 
because I was too close to the Soviet Union. But in Camp Kilmer I 
divulged everything. 

Mr. Morris. Do you think that the United States has a security 
problem, then, in its Legation? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes. Not only me, but Mr. Voegler confirmed that 
himself; we hav^e a security problem. 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else you can tell us about 
the security aspect of the American Legation, or whether or not you 
know of any other secret police, Hungarian secret police, who are 
working there? 

Mr. Karlor. I made, I told a full story at Camp KOmer — and it 
must be there before Your Honor — and that is all I wish to state at 
this time. 

Mr. Morris. Now, have you told more to the authorities at Camp 
Kilmer than you have told us this morning, apart from the identity 
of the people? 

Mr. Karlor. I told in Camp KUmer, in detail, everything, includ- 
ing names and how they approached me and what they wanted me 
to do, which I did not relate in here. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I will take up with the immigration author- 
ity, since you asked, to find out whether or not this particular con- 
gressional committee should have access to this information, since you 
know. Senator, that we have the responsibility of presenting the facts 
and recommendations that will bear on any legislation that might 


proceed in the present session of Congress with respect to this whole 
problem, and that the Senate looks to the Internal Subcommittee to 
supply the facts on these various security aspects. And it would 
seem proper, Senator, that we should have the rest of this story. 

Now, if there is any security involved, we would be able to screen 
it out, as we have tried to do, and make it available to the Senate 
and House of Representatives. 

Senator Johnston. I am going to ask the staff to look into that 
and see about the possibility for getting all that. And if we can receive 
it, I think it will be better for us to have it. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Cardinal Mindszenty? 

Mr. Karlor. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Does Cardinal Mindszenty know you? 

Mr. Karlor. He saw me only once or twice. 

Mr. Morris. I see. What were the circumstances? 

Mr. Karlor. I was in a coffeeshop while Cardinal Mindszenty was 
upstairs, and he called down for a piece of bread. The elevators did 
not function because the electricity was disconnected, as a result of 
the revolution. I picked up a piece of bread and took it up, walked 
up three flights, and took it to the Cardinal's room. 

The Cardinal says: "Well, you are not my servant here, how come 
that you brought this?" 

"Well, the elevators are not functioning, I just brought it up for 
your Eminence, this piece of bread." 

"Thanlv you very much," the Cardinal said, and then he said, 
"What are these people doing outside?" 

"They are all waiting to buy up bread." 

He said: "Oh, in that case, take this to them, too." 

Then I asked him to give me holy communion, and I was the first 
one that received holy communion from the Cardinal — ^after being in 
jail — in the American Legation. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Father Gregory, you were present, were you 
not, in connection with that first episode that I mentioned here 
today, about this man Gregory Lang, a lawyer by profession, when 
he admitted to our staffmen there that he had been a Hungarian Com- 
munist, working as a card clerk in the i^VH? You witnessed that? 

Father Gregory. I was present, I translated. As a matter of fact, 
I asked the question that Mr. Schroeder put to me, and Mr. Duffy —  
they were both there — and the immigration officer. I asked him 
specifically, "Have you been a member of the Communist Party, and 
did you ever work for them," and he said, "I was employed as a minor 
clerk in police headquarters in my town." 

Air. Morris. I wonder if I might ask you, sir, if you could tell us 
what was the significance of the man who was working as a card clerk 
in the secret police headquarters? Would that be an important per- 
sonality, securitywise? 

I am asking the witness. Father. 

Mr. Karlor. He could not be a good Hungarian. 

Mr. Morris. Well, I mean, is it an miportant position security- 
wise? That is the significance of it. Would the security police allow 
anyone to be a card clerk unless they were pretty sure that he was 

Mr. Karlor. If they did not believe him, if he wasn't a trusted 
employee, they would never let him come into the police headquarters. 


Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything more you can tell us now about 
this present scope of inquiry? 

Mr. Karlor. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Johnston, the time element that we calcu- 
lated was very much off. You have notified us that you have an 
appointment at a quarter of twelve. I wonder, Senator, if you would 
swear in the other witnesses that we have and hear as many as you 
can, say, this afternoon. And if you cannot give us a fuU hearing, 
at least we could do that and then we could release that testimony 
just as soon as we get it printed and make that part of the record. 

Senator Johnston. I will be glad to do that. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would ask the other people who have 
come all the way from Camp Kilmer to come back here at 2:30 this 

Father Gregory. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you very much. 

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the subcommittee stood in recess 
to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., of the same day.) 

afternoon SESSION 

Senator Johnston. Will you, Father, raise your right hand? 

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness 
the questions directed to him and will truly interpret the answers 
given by the witness to the best of your ability, so help you God? 

Father Gregory. Yes, sir. 

Senator Johnston. Raise your right hand and be sworn. 

Do you swear that the evidence that you give before the sub- 
committee to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

Mr. Karoly. I do. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chahman, this particular witness is being asked 
to testify here today in connection with the tactics that he, himself, 
has experienced at the hands of the AVH, that is, the Hungarian 
secret Coinmmiist police, and this is in connection with the information 
we are trying to get as to the nature of the Communist organization 
of the Communist tactics and strategy. 



Mr. Morris. You have expressed a wish, have you not, to testify 
under an assumed name? 

Mr. Karoly. Yes, Your Honor, because I have a mother and sister 

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Chairman, this man has given us his name, 
his right name and address, and we have his barracks number at 
Camp Kilmer with autobiographical information on him, and that is 
in our files at this time. 

Senator Johnston. In that we have this information, we will 
permit you to testify under this assumed name. That is understood. 

Mr. Morris. Were you born in Hungary? 

Mr. Karoly. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And what is jour business or profession? 


Mr. Karoly. I am a construction engineer. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, where were you at the time of the 
uprising against the Hungarian Communist Government? 

Mr. Karoly. I was in Budapest. 

Mr. Morris. You were not in prison at that time, were you? 

Mr. Karoly. No. 

Mr. Morris. What were you doing, generally, without identifying 

Mr. Karoly. Mj work was highly special, and as soon as I tell 
them what I did, the Communists will identify me immediately. 

Mr. Morris. I see. All right. 

Now, you have been arrested on many occasions, have you not  

Mr. Karoly. Yes, sir. 

Air. Morris. Will yoii tell us about your first arrest? 

Again now, be careful. If you tell exactlj^ what the cause was, 
you may be identifjang yourself. 

(The answer was physically stricken.) 

Mr. Morris. I wish you would expunge that date from the record. 

Senator, may that date be expunged from the record? 

Senator Johnston. It is expunged from the record. 

Mr. AIoRRis. Because it will identify you. 

Senator Johnston. You do not want anything that might identify 
you, you see, and probably bring harm to your family. 

Mr. Karoly. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. In the late 1940's you were arrested for the first time. 
Now, generally, without identifying the particular role, tell us what 
the nature of it was. 

Mr. Karoly. Yes; in the late 1940's I was arrested. Forty-one 
men swore allegiance to free Hungary, and I took part in this. One 
of those men was in prison with me, and he was a very dear friend of 

They charged the leader, who was a colonel in the Hungarian Royal 
Army, who was the leader of this society, that he had placed a time 
bomb in an open window in one of the government buildings, knowing 
that his own father was working in the office just above; that he 
wanted to blow up this building, which was not so. But they con- 
victed him, made him sign a confession, and killed him. 

Mr. Morris. You say some colonel? 

Mr. Karoly. A colonel. I laiow the name, but 

Mr, AloRRis. What was the connection with this man? He was 
arrested because he was a friend of his? 

Mr. Karoly. Because they charged him that he was one of the 

Mr. Morris. Now, what happened to you after they arrested him? 

Mr. Karoly, I was caught on the Austrian border and brought 
back to the secret police headquarters inside of Hungary, where for 
3 weeks, every day, they beat me, the bottom of my feet and my kid- 
neys, to admit that that man — that they were creating a revolution 
here. For 3 weeks I was beaten constantly, and I know the name of 
every one that beat me, and his whereabouts. 

Mr. Morris, Were you released at the end of the 3 weeks? 

Father Gregory. I beg your pardon? 

Mr, Morris. Were you released at the end of the 3 weeks? 


Mr. Karoly. No, sir. Three weeks later they took me to another 
camp near Buda. 

Mr. Morris. And then what happened? 

Mr. Karoly. They took me to this prison. They beat me and 
tortured me again, but since tliey had no evidence whatsoever whether 
I participated or instigated anytliing hke that — they held me, however, 
for 8 months in that prison. 

Mr. Morris. Now, were you subjected to any other torture during 
those 8 months? 

Mr. Karoly. Of this particular prison, the headmaster and tor- 
turer was a fellow b}' the name of Rushak Mate. 

We are a very deeply religious people, and Clu-istmas has the same 
meaning to us, of course, as in America. A lot of families come over 
to visit prisoners. When he saw them — amongst them was my wife 
and baby, my little girl — he opened up the faucets, the fire faucet hoses, 
and sprayed us in the cold winter, the children and women; chased 
them away from the prison. 

Mr. Morris. With fire hoses? 

Mr. Karoly. Fire hoses. 

Mr. Morris. On Christmas? 

Mr. Karoly. On Christmas. 

On one occasion my mother came over to see me, and she kissed me 
and embraced me, and then he saw that. He subjected me to 6 times 
6 hours — they call that. They got an iron and tied the right hand to 
the left foot and the left hand to the right foot, and I had to be like 
that for 6 times 6, 36 hours, as a punishment for kissing my mother. 

Mr. Morris. What else happened? 

Mr. Karoly. On anotiier occasion they called us together and they 
told us that somebody smuggled letters out to the citizens from the 
prison. On this occasion they would pick up 45, 50 men, and take 
them up to the tower, the torture tower they called it, which had no 
windows, and water was constantly dripping on them, and they would 
chain them in this tower, where always a few men would die — not all of 
them would come back — as punishment. 

But in one batch they would take 45 to 50 men into this tower and 
make water drip on them, and tie them with the chains to the concrete 

I even know the names of those that did not return from that tower. 

Mr. Morris. Now, would you be wUling, if we could convey your 
story, say to the United Nations, to give us the names of these people 
in executive session — with the assurance that we would conceal your 
identity — the names and some of the atrocities that these people 
have performed? Would you tell us in executive session those names? 

Mr. Karoly. Not only myself. Your Honor, but at Camp Kilmer 
we had 300 persons, like I am, that were subjected to the same beating 
and imprisonment. We would all go before the United Nations and 
testify against the atrocity and brutality of the Soviets. 

Senator Johnston. Proceed. 

Mr. Karoly. Just to describe in a little detail the brutality of this 
man. We were standing, the prisoners, in the prison yard, and this 
man passed by in his buggy, and the horse broke the centerpiece on 
the wagon. He got so mad that he had his horse shod, front feet to 
one shoe, and back, and tortured the horse in front of all of them. 


And his wife just said a word to one of the prisoners, and he also put 
his wife in the same prison. 

Mr. Morris. Now, how many times, in all, were you subjected 
to torture like this? 

Now, again, may I warn you that if it is a multiple number, do not 
give the exact number, because that will tend to identify you. 

Mr. Karoly. I was about 3 or 4 times subject to most terrible 

Mr. Morris. How many times? 

Mr. Karoly. 3 or 4. 

Mr. Morris. And can you tell us more things like this that these 
people performed — —  

Mr. Karoly. After I was released from this prison for 2 months, 
they got a hold of me again on the same charge, on conspiracy, and 
they took me to another prison. They tied my hands, our hands — 
several of us— to the back, and then they put under our arms, in the 
back, a Sam Browne belt, on which they tied a rope, and they hoisted 
us up, hanging, until we fainted, and then they dropped us. They 
poured water, and hoisted us up again until we fainted. For 2 daj^s 
this torture was going on. 

Father Gregory. I do not think that, as a priest, I would like to 
have ladies present, because this is — -I never heard of anything like that, 
and I studied all the brutalities, and everything. But I do not think 
we should, I should, translate this in front of the ladies. 

May I translate it to you, Senator? 

Senator Johnston. Anything that you have that you think should 
not be brought out here, when ladies are present, we will be glad for 
you to submit in executive session. I think that would be better. 

Father Gregory. And ladies won't be present. Fine. 

Senator Johnston. There won't be anybody there but the Senator 
and the staff. 

Father Gregory. I will tell him exactly what I said, that in America 
we do not let ladies hear anything hke that, and that the Senator 
assures us that we could have an executive session on this subject. 

Senator Johnston. How long have these brutahties been going on? 

Mr. Karoly. It was from the beginning until 1953 when Nagy 
became a Premier, and then it stopped for a while. 

Mr. Morris. You say "stopped for a while;" did it resume again? 

Mr. Karoly. Well, it resumed again because Nagy did not last 
ver}^ long the Premier. 

It was not a question that when he came in everything stopped, 
except that if the Nagy government caught any secret police handling 
prisoners like that, political prisoners, or any other, he would punish 
them, too. 

Mr. Morris. How long did he last? 

Mr. Karoly. 8 months. 

Mr. Morris. Did the tortures resume in full vigor after those 
8 months? 

Mr. Karoly. It just started all over again just like before. 

Senator Johnston. Now, the Hungary Secret PoHce, was that made 
up of all Hungarians, or were some Soviets in it — some of the Russians? 

Mr. Karoly. The specialists were imported from Soviet Russia. 

Mr. Morris. The speciaHsts were brought in from the Soviet Union? 

93215— 5,7— pt« 48 3 


Mr. Karoly. From the Soviet Union; they were all there. On the 
front they would name people, "Now you are the secret police," but 
they directed everything. 

There was one priest that was also tortured, given a third degree 
by them, who was also blinded by the klieg light that they threw 
into his face. He was exceptionally treated and had the privilege to 
be treated by pure Soviet secret police and torturers. 

Senator Johnston. So when they use the name Hungarian secret 
police, that is in a certain way a misnomer for it was the Russian 
secret police? 

Mr. Karoly. They were taught, directed, of course — the Hun- 
garian secret police — by Russian secret police. But Communists 
are the same all over. Once they get that bloodthirsty, they do not 
care who it is or what nationality. But it is all directed from Moscow, 
of course. 

I spent 4 years in the prisons, various prisons, and out of those 4 
years I was tortured for 3 years — slaved; and the only reason that I 
am alive today is because I am strong, constitutionally, and they 
were not able to prove one single thing on me. 

Mr. Morris. So this is a case of Soviet acts of aggression against 
Hungarian people, is it not? 

Mr. Karoly. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I mean, it may not be important to him. As he 
said, the Communists are the same all over. But look at the frame- 
work, the way we must look at these things. If things are performed 
by the Soviet leaders, the Soviet secret police, under their supervision, 
it is the act of a foreign country against the foreign people. 

Mr. Karoly. This is why the revolution broke out, because we were 
actually occupied, every director, every undertaking, every manufac- 
turing center all over, were Russian Soviets. It was an actual occupa- 
tion of the country, and that is why we started the revolution. 

Mr. ]M orris. Well now, you told us in our staff interview that the 
particular effective way of forcing information from prisoners was to 
use strong floodlights, having strong floodlights focused on your eyes. 
Coidd you tell us about that here for the public record? 

Mr. Karoly. The lights were so strong that when they threw that 
in anybody's face, yom* eyes immediately blacked out and your ears 
were piercing with terrific pain and you had to tell. And as soon as 
they threw it on me, I told them I would tell them. Then they took 
the lights off. I had nothmg to tell them because I was completely 
innocent of anything. 

Senator Johnston. What did they do then? 

Mr. Karoly. They locked me up, as other prisoners, for 6 days into 
a solitary pen, and they gave us a piece of bread baked twice in salt 
and salted water, that we could dip that into salted water, and eat 
it only that way, but no fresh water to drink for 6 days. 

It wasn't a case for me, that I was strong; I had nothing to teU. 
But if they told me imder those lights that I kiUed my own mother, 
who was alive, yet, I would have said "Yes." 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest — I mean, with this 
witness' stories, such as this, we could consume today, tomorrow and 
the next day putting them in the record. 

However, I think since there are other witnesses here, Senator, 
maybe we should just make known the fact that this man has more to 


tell and let the story go on, unless there is something extraordinary 
that you think you should tell us. 

Mr. Karoly. This time I want to relate — which I have not seen 
myself, but my buddies who are also in Camp Kilmer saw this — that 
the Red Army, at Street No. 140, they saw two electrical furnaces, 
crematoriums, where the}^ used to throw live people and burn them 


He is now in Camp Kilmer, this man who was captured, during the 

revolution, this building and place, and saw this. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have the name of the man who actually 
captured the building and saw this? 

Mr. Karoly. Yes, he was the leader. 

Do you want his name now? 

Mr. Morris. Give it to Mr. Schroeder. We want to give him the 
same amount of secm"ity that you yourself requested. 

Senator Johnston. I certainly thank you for coming before the 
committee, and we want to get other evidence from 3-ou in executive 
session. We have already gotten some other before. 

I think that we have completed with you for this present time. 
Thank you for coming. 

Mr. Karoly. May I relate. Senator, before I leave — I just want to 
make another statement, that at Temesvar, 35 prisoners were in 1 
camp, 35,000, and 18,000 died within 5 months. And I know the 
cemetery; I had to bury them and I can identify them. 

Senator Johnston. Approximately when was that? 

Mr. Karoly. 1944 to late 1945. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, 18,000 out of 35,000 died? 

Mr. Karoly. Yes, 18. And I can identify and make a drawing of 
every grave, how they are located and everything, and where. 

Mr. Morris. What is the assumed name you want to use? 

Mr. Karoly. Sabad Karoly. S-a-b-a-d K-a-r-o-l-y 

Senator Johnston. Thank you. 

I have been asking the other Senators of this subcommittee that 
the United Nations hear the testimony of all the witnesses from Hun- 
gary who have been testifying to details of Soviet aggression against 
the people and the acts of brutality and savageiy. That should pro- 
vide a basis for some kind of action by the United Nations against 
the barbarians who perform these deeds. 

I renew my request, and request that they be heard as soon as 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I think there is one man here who is pre- 
pared to testify under his own name, and I think possibly we will take 
him out of order because of that. 

Senator, the testimony of this particular witness is a little bit dif- 
ferent from that of the other witnesses that we have heard. I think, 
in trying to understand the whole picture of the story of Hungary 
and what it means, the actions the Communists have provoked, we 
should know something about the spirit of the Hungarians who par- 
ticipated in the uprising. I think by calling this particular witness 
we can get a pretty good idea of the caliber of the people who performed. 

Father Gregory. Alay I add. Senator, for clarification, the boy is 14. 

Senator Johnston. How old? 

Father Gregory. Fourteen. And he is the product of so-called 
Communist indoctrination. He is their baby; they taught him how 
to shoot. 


Senator Johnston. I do not think it is necessary to swear you 

Father Gregory. No; he is too young for that. 

Senator Johnston (continuing). But tell him to raise his right hand. 

Do you swear that the evidence that you give before this subcom- 
mittee to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

Mr. AloRRis. You understand the nature of the oath? 

Mr. Nagy. I understand that I have to tell the truth. 

Senator Johnston. He understands if he does not tell the truth 
before this committee, he could be indicted for perjury? 




Mr. Morris. You have the name Imre Nagy, the same as the 
former Premier? 

Mr. Nagy. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Are you related to him in any way? 

Mr. Nagy. No; just relatives in name. 

Mr. Morris. Did you take part in the October 23d uprising against 
the Communist leaders of Hungary? 

Mr. Nagy. I took part in the whole revolution from October 23 to 
November 9. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I might say at this time, did you come over to 
the United States to stay, or is it your intention to return back to 

Mr. Nagy. I wish to remain in the United States, and I want to 
become an American officer, in the American Army, and I never want 
to return. 

Mr. Morris. Now, would you tell us of your role in the uprising? 

Mr. Nagy. On October 23a I came from the store where my father 
was the manager, a restam-ant, and I was going home, 9 o'clock 
in the evening, and I came to the Square of Budapest where I saw a lot 
of students, and posters were hung all over with the demands of the 
students. When I went fm-ther in the crowd, there was an auto- 
mobile tm'ned over, and I jumped on this automobile and we began 
to shout, "Disappear, damn you Communists, ricochet," and then we 
started in this automobile and began to shout from the top of the 
automobile all over Budapest to "Rise Hungarians, and fight the 

When we came back to the square, we climbed up on the building, 
and we began to tear down the Red stars. I tore one, then I broke 
about twenty windows. This happened before the headquarters of the 
Secret Police, AVO's. They came out armed and started to shoot at 
unarmed people. We jumped them, and we took their guns away 
from them. 

This time we got the guns from the AVO's. We jumped aboard the 
trucks and we immediately went to Belojamis ammunition dump to 
get more guns. When we were on our way there, workers from Csepel 
Works joined us, and we went after the ammunition but they were 
already armed weU. 


Then we heard that, on Brody Sandor, radio studio, they call it, 
that there was shooting and blood being spilled. We immediately 
joined those people fighting at this Brody Sandor Street. 

It was about 12 o'clock when I got there, at night, and guns were 
being distributed. I got a hold of one, a Russian guitar. It had 
70 shots in it. 

(The interpreter: It is something like a tommygun. He calls it a 
Russian guitar — 70 bullets.) 

I was shooting until about 6 o'clock in the morning, but then I 
found out that my mother did not see me since night, so I went back 
because I am the only son. When I arrived home, my father got 
hold of me and told me, "What am I doing out in the streets, such a 
young kid," and he ordered me to stay in the house. 

I stayed in the house until the next day, and at 4 o'clock I escaped 
from my house and joined my gang. When I escaped, I joined my 
gang there, and the shooting was going on, but not as fierce as before 
and I decided that I should start doing something about it, so I got 
the gasoline in the bottles and I began to throw at tanks. But then 
I went back and told my mother and father that I was still fighting. 
My father got hold of me and beat me up. 

The next morning I escaped again and joined m^^ gang again, to 
fight. When I escaped the second time, I went to Prater Street 
School, where we assembled again, and heard that there was fierce 
fighting in the square. Two hundred of us went there to help them 
out because the AVO's were shooting down people all over the streets. 

At this time Russian tanks began to enter the city, and the fire 
began again from Freedom Fighters. We had a particular job to do. 
We were hunting down the secret police. But then when we saw so 
many tanlvs come in, we got hold of a couple of boys, and the three of 
us drew the fire of the tanks. I sneaked up on the back and threw 
a Molotov cocktail at them. 

Mr. Morris. Each of the times? 

Mr. Nagy. Yes, when the tank got on fire, the Soviets would get 
out of the hut, and the other buddies would pick them off. And we 
continued this fighting for 3 daj^s without sleeping, without eating — 
four of us in a gang. 

Mr. Morris. How many tanks did your particular gang, as you 
put it, destroy? 

Mr. Nagy. We are sure of about 16 to 18; there might have been 

I would place the other three men, three boys like myself, in the 
shut-out and burned-out buildings. When we saw the tank coming, 
they fired at the tank. The tank would open up the fire, and then I 
sneaked up on the back and threw the bottle, and then repeated the 
same thing. When they got out of the hut of the tank, they would 
shoot them down. And they continued this operation right along. 

We also captured from secret police nitroglycerine. We had to 
watch so that the bottle would be tight. They were stored in thermos 
bottles, and these were a great help to us. 

Senator Johnston. I believe you were using the Molotov bomb, 
which has gasoline, and when you throw it and it strikes something, 
it explodes. Is that right? 

Mr. Nagy. That is right. They call it Molotov cocktail. You 
throw it, and naturally these wheels, the chain, it sparks and it burns 
immediately and the whole tank catches on fire. 


When the Russian tanks spotted us, our headquarters was at Prater 
Street School. They threw — they fired mines at us, and they de- 
stroyed the building completely, disregarding anything. They were 
just shooting and tumbling down building after building. 

And we escaped to Rakovci Vasarcsarnok, where we fought again 
for two days, constantly firing. They surrounded us, and we were 
unable to shoot our way out. But when they got tired, 400 of us 
escaped from the solid steel ring, and we began to shoot our way all 
the way to Austria. 

Going to Austria, we were attacked twice. The first time they 
attacked us, out of 400 only 17 of us remained alive. The rest were 
taken prisoners or shot. The second time when they attacked us, 
only three of us remained alive, and we came to Austria. 

Mr. Morris. What about your mother and father? 

Mr. Nagy. My daddy is in Germany — I was informed that he 
escaped — and mother is seeking employment now. 

Mr. Morris. Wliere is his mother? Is your mother in the United 

Mr. Nagy. Yes; I met my mother in Eisenstadt. 

Mr, Morris. Where is that? 

Mr. Nagy. In Austria. 

Mr. ]\loRRis. I think that is the substance of the story, Senator, as 
far as we know, that he has told the staff, Mr. Schroeder and Mr. 
Duffy, up at Camp KUmer. 

Senator Johnston. Is there anything else? 

Mr. Morris. I suggest the four other witnesses we have today, 
that we proceed to your office. Senator, and swear them in and get 
as much of the evidence that we can. We have promised to take 
them back to Kilmer tonight, and I notice there is a snowstorm 
setting in and it is a long drive, and I would like them to be able to 
get back as soon as possible. 

Senator Johnston. Then we will adjourn this meeting, and I will 
go to my office and we will have them come up. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, since this morning I have called the Immi- 
gration people and asked them to make available Gregory Lang. He 
is the person who we discovered is a Communist, in Camp Kilmer, 
and he is the one, Senator, we presented with the information that he 
was a Communist. After denying it, he finally admitted he had been 
and that he worked in the AVH headquarters as a card clerk. 

We have asked the Immigration people if they will produce him 
for testimony here before the subcommittee, and then we can really 
go into the thing as far as his individual case is concerned. 

Senator Johnston. You have not set a date for that, yet? 

Mr. Morris. No. They will look it up and try to make him 
available as soon as possible. Senator. 

Senator Johnston. The committee wUl adjourn to my office. 

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned to room 
253, Senate Office Building where the hearing was resumed.) 

Senator Johnston. Would you step forward and raise your right 

Do you swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
3^ou God? 

Mr. Kossuth. I do. 


Senator JoHNSTOisr. Will you swear that the evidence you give 
before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. MoGAR. I do. 

Senator Johnston. Do you swear that the evidence 3"ou give before 
this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help yoxi God? 

Mr. SzEP. I do. 

Senator Johnston. Do you swear that the evidence you give before 
this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. SzEKELY. I do. 

Mr. Rusher. I understand that this witness, ]ike the others that 
we had today, wants to give the committee, for the record, an assumed 
name, although the committee does know his real name. 

Mr. Kossuth. K-o-s-s-u-t-h. 

Mr. Rusher. And the first name, or the Christian name? 

Mr. Kossuth. Frank. 


Mr. Rusher. Were you a participant in the Hungarian revolution 
in October and thereafter? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us, without revealing by details your 
identity, in a general way, your part in the affair? 

Mr. Kossuth. The 23d of October I came home from my work, 
with my wife, and immediately returned to the square where I joined 
a crowd to sliout for the return of Imre Nagy, the Premier, to pro- 
nounce the Government. 

Mr, Rusher. To form a government? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes, to come out and speak to the people and make 
a pronouncement that the students demanded. 

We were there until morning, with my wife. We could not join 
the fight, as yet, because we did not have rifles. The next day, with 
my wife, I returned to the square, saw a lot of dead people all around. 
And I was going back to work because I did not receive my pay, as yet. 

However, I found that the freedom fighters had turned the bus 
direction the other way, and I could not get back to the factory. 

Since I speak very well in Russian, I began to talk to the Russian 
soldiers, and a Russian major came to me and he says, "Here"- — be- 
cause we want to shoot the Communists — the major said, "Here", 
he said, "3 tanks, 3 armored cars, give it to him". 

Mr. Rusher. Now, do I understand that the Russian major made 
an offer of 3 tanks and 3 armored cars and actually gave them to 3'ou? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes. These armored cars were loaded already with 
loot that the Russian soldiers had stolen from the stores of Budapest, 
and he turned everything over to us. 

Air. Rusher, Did you at any time during the revolution participate 
in raids on the headquarters of the AVO agents? 

Mr. Kossuth, Yes, sir. Being myself a leader of the bloc, having 
all that ammunition at my disposal, I commanded the whole bloc and 
I captured a party headquarters. 


Mr. Rusher. Communist Party headquarters? 

Mr. Kossuth. Headquarters. 

Mr. Rusher. Was this also the headquarters of the secret pohce, 
or simply of the party? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes, su\ 

Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us what you found there? 

Mr. Kossuth. When I captm-ed that — the reason I was able to 
capture that as soon as possible was because they told us that there 
were 200 secret police there. However, when I got in there, I only 
found 7 or 9. I do not know, because it was so swift. And amongst 
them was a Kirghiz. 

As soon as I chased them out, the people right away shot them down. 

Mr. Rusher. I do not understand — -a crosseyed person is this? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes, he was actually a Communist from Russia, 
member of the secret bunch, that were there in this headquarters. 
He was one of the secret police and — — 

Mr. Rusher. And he happened to be crosseyed? 

Mr. Kossuth. Not crosseyed, this (indicating) slant eyes. 

Mr. Rusher. Slant eyed, I see. A Mongol, in other words? 

Mr. Kossuth. A Mongol. 

Mr. Rusher. And so he was chased out of the headquarters 

Mr. Kossuth. They started to run, because they are dressed in 
civilian clothes already, they are afraid, but people recognized, and 
as soon as they stepped out the door, they mowed them down. 

Mr. Rusher. And were killed? 

Mr. Kossuth. They were killed. 

Mr. Rusher. These were Russian agents? 

Mr. Kossuth. This particular one; the others were Hungarian. 
He had Hungarian boots and pants, but the blouse was already 
Hungarian. American reporters also photographed this. 

Mr. Rusher. What did you find in the headquarters besides the 
people that you have described — this building? 

Mr. Kossuth. This building has four stories under ground. We 
were informed that there were 200 people, so we were looking for the 
rest of them. We were looldng for the rest of them, and this build- 
ing had four stories under ground. 

So I was looldng for my men because this building was all shut up, 
and I was still looking, because I knew that there must be some 
basement. So we started to walk down, and we did not know, we 
got into confusion, because it had two entrances from the main yard. 
So when I got down to the second story, I found a beautiful oriental 
rug down below on the second story down. The whole room was 
lined with glass, with looking glass, and beautiful oriental rugs. 

Mr. Rusher. Was this an office of some sort? 

Mr. Kossuth. The whole thing was lined with rugs, thick rugs, so 
nobody would hear cries or anything in the torture chamber. 

Mr. Rusher. The torture chamber; there was a torture chamber? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Would j^ou tell us about the torture chamber? 
Would you describe that for us? 

Mr. Kossuth. "When we left this torture room, we went two 
places, and then in a third we found that there was a machine, that 
there were knives in it just like in a meat grinder. I looked at it, 
and I wanted to start it but I could not start it. 


Mr. Rusher. Now, just a minute, let me go back a little bit. You 
said when you left this torture chamber — that is the room with the 
oriental rugs? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. And all the glass? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. What was in there besides oriental rugs? 

Mr. Kossuth. There were chairs 

Mr. Rusher. What I am trying to get is, why does he call it the 
torture chamber? 

Mr. Kossuth. Then there were tables, chairs, and these lights that 
the other person — the other fellow (a previous witness) — talked about. 

Mr. Rusher. Lights that they would shine on a person? 

Mr. Kossuth. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Off the record. 

(There was discussion off the record.) 

(Mr. Rusher left the hearing room and Mr. Schroeder resumed the 

Mr. Schroeder. Continue. 

Mr. Kossuth. And we went into another room, but we could find 
no more doors there. The building upstairs was burning, so we 
had to leave. 

The next day I returned again to the same place, and people told 
us that they picked up voices coming down from the second base- 
ment, on a microphone they picked it up, the shouting that there 
are 147 of us here. So they brought some bulldozers there, but they 
could not pick them up. 

Mr. Schroeder. Could you elaborate on this machine that was 
in the room? 

Mr. Kossuth. It looked like a funnel, this machine. There were 
knives on it all around, and I looked at it but I did not pay too much 
attention to it. My friends, my men that were with me, they 
examined it more closely than 1 did, and they said that pieces of meat 
came, a hunk like that, like a pulp — human flesh. 

Air. Schroeder. Do j^ou know of any instance where any human 
being was ground in that machine? 

Mr. Kossuth. All our people talked about — I did not see a human 
being in there, but all our people said that the}^ saw where the human 
beings were disposed of in this machine. Because it had a sewer 
connected to the Duna River right from this machine, and as the 
human body would be ground up, it went down into the river. 

Mr. Schroeder. And this machine was in the secret police head- 

Mr. Kossuth. This machine was in the secret police headquarters, 
and also part}^ headquarters, police headquarters and partj^ head- 

My men saw it in other places, but I personally did not see it. 

Mr. Schroeder. Do j^ou know of any other acts of brutality? 

Mr. KossuiH. Yes; my own brother was subjected to brutality. 
He was sent for lOK years to Siberia. Both his ribs were broken, his 
stomach was kicked into, the}' puUed his hair out. 

Mr. Schroeder. Thank you very much. 

Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 




Mr. ScHROEDER. You are going to use the assumed name of 

Mr. SzEKELY. S-z-e-k-e-1-y, J-a-n-o-s. 
Mr. ScHROEDER. \\Tiat is your age? 

Mr. SzEKELY. 24. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Where were you born? 

Mr. SzEKELY. In Gering, Czechoslovakia. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Where are 3^ou residing now? 

Mr. SzEKELY. Newark, N. J. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. When did you escape. 

Mr. SzEKELY. November 21, 1956. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. And you escaped into Austria? 

Mr. SzEKELY. Austria. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Were you ever a member of the Communist 

Mr. SzEKELY. No, sir; never. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Were you ever asked to join the Communist 
Party while living in Hungary? 

Mr. SzEKELY. Yes, sir; we were even forced, the whole school, to 
join the Communisty Party, but I never did join the Communist 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Now, will you relate the events when you saw 
Soviet troops outside of Budapest. 

Mr. SzEKELY. I was at Nyiredhaza Station, inciuiring about 
transportation to Budapest, and at the station, as I went in the 
station, the train passed through the station; letters and notes being 
thrown out of the train, and the people were shouting, "What kind of 
Hungarians are you, that you are letting us be shipped to the Soviet 
Union?" And this train consisted of 20 cars packed with people. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Hungarian citizens being shipped to Siberia? 

Mr. SzEKELY. Hungarian citizens being shipped to Siberia, Soviet 

And at this station they changed crews; not Hungarian personnel 
took the train, but they brought from the Soviet Union the train 
personnel to take the train over and take it to the Soviet Union. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Was the train heavily guarded by Soviet troops? 

Mr. SzEKELY. Yes. In each carload there is a brake, where the 
brakeman stands in each car, and I saw in each place 2, 3 Soviet 
soldiers guarding the people. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. And these people were calling from the train, 
"We are Hungarians, do not allow them to send us to Siberia."? 

Mr. SzEKELY. "Shame on you, that you are letting other Hungar- 
ians be shipped to Siberia." 

Mr. ScHROEDER. And Hungarian people there at the scene were 

Mr. SzEKELY. They were completely helpless, they could not even 
get near them. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Are jout relatives still in Hungary? 

Mr. SzEKELY. Yes, I have my uncle still in Budapest, my aunt; 
but I also have in Soviet Union proper my father and mother — not 
in Hungary, but in Soviet Union. 


Mr. ScHROEDER. Do you know of any brutality being administered 
to any persons? 

Mr. SzEKELY. In 1956, October 27, I was in church, in a Roman 
Catholic church at Nyiredhaza, and Soviet tanks were passing by 
going to Budapest. And as they were passing by, 2 of them got into 
an accident, and 2 Red Army soldiers were killed in this incident. 

And as people were coming out of church, completely without 
weapons, the Soviets got so mad that 2 people got killed, 2 of their 
soldiers, that they opened fire and killed on the spot 18 people before 
the church. 

Mr. ScHEOEDER. Approximately what time of day was this? 

Mr. SzEKELY. 11:30, noon. 

As soon as they started to open fire on the people and killed 18 
people, at that time also 2 bombers appeared over the crowd, but 
they did not throw any bombs. 

The Russian soldiers robbed— the only other thing that I saw that 
was, to my estimation, plain misbehavior of any army — was on 
November 4, 1956, in the same city, they broke into the post office 
and they shot the door down witli machineguns, walked in there 
and robbed everything, left and right, of the Government post office. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Thank you. 



Mr. ScHROEDER. What is your name? 

Mr. MoGAR. Imre Mogar. 

Mr, ScHROEDER. When were you born? 

Mr. Mogar. I would not like to relate that. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Tell him he does not have to answer it. 

Mr. Mogar. I would like to at least take some town, but the town 
where I was born, they will find out. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. I Said, when was he born. 

Mr. Mogar. 25th, 6th month, 1934. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. You were a soldier in the Hungarian Army? 

Mr. Mogar. I was a soldier under communism in Hungary. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Plcasc relate what happened on the night of 
October 23. 

Mr. Mogar. The Hungarian Red Army had a dance on the 4th of 
October, 23d of October, in the afternoon at 4 o'clock. 

At eight o'clock, Erno Gero— who was the Premier of Hungary 
then- — we listened to his speech. We were listening to him speaking 
at 8 o'clock exactly in the evening, and then the speech stopped. 
Then right away they put some sort of music on the radio. 

We were there until 10 o'clock, and then we left. We went back 
to the barracks at 10 o'clock. 

I met my bride, and my bride related to me that the revolution 
had started for freedom in the city. As soon as I arrived — it was 
about 11 o'clock in the evening, and after my bride told me about the 
revolution, we had an alarm. We had an alarm in our barracks. 
We came out, all appeared in the field and then, after a few minutes, 
they told us to go back to the barracks. 

But at 1 o'clock they had another alarm. At 1 o'clock the}^ selected 
25 men, who were the riot squad. They were the ones that were 
immediately dispatched to the city. 


I was one of the riot squad. But in the trucks, as we were riding 
toward the city, we decided between ourselves that even if the officer 
gives us the order to fire upon the crowd, we would not do so, but we 
will shoot the officer. 

They locked us up immediately after that in another barracks, and 
we could not get out of the rooms, except into the yard and go back. 
We could not get out of the camp. 

So they locked up the rest of the soldiers, but on the 24th we 
escaped from the camp. There were five of us that escaped, and we 
immediately rushed near the town, and as the young people came, 
we told them not to go into the city because there were soldiers 
waiting for them, they would mow them down. 

We told them to take another road. 

The next day, the other four soldiers went their way, and I also 
went my wa}". I joined the rest of the crowd, where they had sur- 
rounded the AVO [secret police] headquarters. I was there until 
Friday noon. I was fighting there until Friday, and Friday evening 
I wanted to go into Buda, back to my barracks. But I could not 
get back because the road was closed already. I could not go back 
to my barracks. 

I went and found part of my outfit in the next street and reported 
to them, and they asked me where I had been, and I told them I 
was in Budapest. 

"What have you been doing?" 

"I was shooting down the AVO's". 

Mr, ScHROEDER. Did they disturb you? 

Mr. MoGAR. Yes, they did. 

"Come on in, and I want jou to take your rifle and leave your 
ammunition here." 

Then they immediately put me to be on guard duty night and day 
around the barracks. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Now, please tell the story of seeing 11 carloads of 
Hungarians being transported to U. S. S, R. 

Mr. MoGAR. November 4 the revolution was resumed partly, and 
we, the soldiers, escaped and divided into parts and joined the freedom 
fighters. And as I was approaching the railroad station, the political 
commissar asked me "What are you carrying hand grenades for?" 

I said: "I want to fight for freedom and for the truth, and I need 
these hand grenades"- — because there were three of us at that time. 

We went immediately to Budapest by railroad station, and we 
were told that they had began to load the people up into the trains. 
And this interested us, and we went in to look around- — just to see 
what was happening. 

So then I immediately went over and found six friends hke myself 
and asked them to elect a leader. And they said, "Well, 3'ou be our 

Then I accepted the leadership and immediately told them to 
spread to different parts of the train, and we opened up 11 carloads of 
people- — 11 cars. We told them^ — as soon as we opened the doors, 
they started to jump out- — to immediately go up to the hills of 

And then immediately we blew up every car, and we blew up the 
railroad tracks all around. We had dynamite, we had hand grenades. 


Then I returned home to change my clothes from mihtary to 
civilian. And the neighbors told me the secret police had been looldng 
for me all over. Then I attached myself immediately to another 
family from the same village that I am from, and we left for Austria, 
the 11th of December, Wednesday, and the 16th of December I 
arrived in Austria. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Thcsc people in the 11 cars, railroad cars, they 
were being deported to Siberia 

Mr. MoGAR. They were just ready to leave for Siberia. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Thank you very much. 



Mr. ScHROEDER. What name vnW you use? 

Mr. SzEP. I want to be called I-s-t-b-a-n S-z-e-p. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Now, please tell us the story of your court-martial 
in Vienna. 

Mr. SzEP. I was caught in Vienna, and they charged me with being 
a war criminal. From there they shipped me to Sopron. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Where is Sopron? 

Mr. SzEP. Sopron, Hungary. 

In Sopron I was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. And they 
picked us up, 10,000, and placed us in 1 train. 10,000 of us were 
entrained, between 8,000 and 10,000 were entrained 

Father Gregory. And this is interesting; I did not hear this before, 
but I got it during the lunch. You might take this. 

The car consisted of 3 floors; this ordinary boxcar was divided into 3. 
There were people on top, on the bottom. 

Mr. SzEP. And that way between 8,000 and 10,000 were shipped 
all the way up to Lwow. That is already Soviet Union. 

We were there for 2 weeks, children, women, old people, young 
people, and 1 week later they again packed us in the train and shipped 
us to Kiev and Moscow — they shipped us to Orcut prison camp, 
located at — we can find it on the map — Novazemla, North Sea. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Well, how many of these people survived out of 
the 8,000 or 10,000? 

Mr. SzEP. Only 800 of us arrived. Only 800 arrived because we 
saw, as the train was going day and night, that they were thi-owing 
people out of the train, dead people. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. What type of work did you do when you arrived 
in the Soviet Union? 

Mr. SzEP. I was a miner for 9 years. 

Air. ScHROEDER. In the Soviet slave camps? 

Mr. SzEP. Yes, I was a slave laborer in Orcut coal mines. There 
are 73 mines there and 250,000 people, slave labor, work there. And 
in the Soviet Union proper, of all the nationalities, there are 30 million 
people in jails. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. You mean labor slave camps? 

Mr. SzEP. Labor slave camps. 

When in 1949 they demanded that the prisoners be released from 
Russia, the Soviets could not produce the prisoners because they were 
dead. So what they did, they got the prisoners that were not sen- 
tenced, yet, and made them sign the documents that they had been 
sentenced to 25 years. 


Mr. ScHROEDER. How do you know that there are approximately 
30 million 

Mr. SzEP. 30 million. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. 30 million in slave labor camps? 

Mr. SzEP. Every prisoner in Russia knows that; we know that — 
we have grapevines. And we know for a fact that there are 250,000 
in Orcut behind barbed wire. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Are there any professional men in these prison 

Mr. SzEP. A lot of them, especially Germans. 

In 1953 we Hungarians received, 1,400 of us, amnesty. As 1,400 
of us were given amnesty in 1953, we were going back and around 
Kiev, in the vicinity, we found somewhere between 200 and 300 pris- 
oners that were imprisoned since the Spanish revolution, and to our 
amazement we found that they were professional men, such as chem- 
ists, scientists, electronics men who took part in all the Soviet atom 

We were amazed that they could not talk, that they were one after 
another deaf and dumb. So we had some people that were able to 
talk with their fingers, as you talk to the deaf and dumb, and we 
found out that they were all atom research men that were for 20 
years in this field, and when they were finished, so they would not be 
able to say just what they did, they cut their tongues out and punc- 
tured their eardrums so they could not hear nor say what they were. 
And they warned us that even as much as they said, not to tell any- 
body, because if they found out, if the Soviets would find out that 
they said and divulged anything — of course, they could not give us 
their location — that they would kill them. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. That story is so horrifying, will you repeat that 
again, and name the town, and tell about the time that you came 
across this horrible scene. 

Mr. SzEP. They brought us to the central prison camp in Kiev on 
10th of ^lay, 1953, and we found these atom research scientists, 
chemists, in that prison. They opened their mouths and they showed 
us that they had no tongues. 

I have a friend who was with me and who went to Italy, and from 
Italy he is coming to the United States; he has petitioned the United 
States Government. He can testify to this. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Will you give the name of your friend to the 

Mr. SzEP. Be very careful. I gladly will give you the name. We 
received the last telegram from them, from Pisa, Italy. 

Air. ScHROEDER. Of the scientists who had their tongues cut out, 
were most of them Germans? 

Mr. SzEP. They were all Spanish and German engineers. 

Mr. ScHROEDER. Thank you very much. 

(Whereupon, at 5:06 p. m., the committee recessed, subject to the 
call of the Chair.) 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organiza- 
tion in this index. 

A Page 

American Embassy 3310 

American Legation in Budapest 3309-3311, 3313-3315 

Austria 3309, 3310, 3314, 3324, 3328, 3331 

Austrian border 3317 

AVH (Hungarian secret Communist police) 3309, 

3310, 3315, 3316, 3319, 3320, 3324 
AVO 3312, 3322, 3323, 3325, 3330 


Belojamis ammunition dump 3322 

Boxcar 3331 

Brody Sandor radio station 3323 

Buda 3318, 3330 

Budapest 3308, 3317, 3325, 3328, 3329, 3330 


Camp Kilmer 3307, 3310, 3314, 3316, 3318, 3321, 3324 

Communists 3307, 3309, 3320-3322, 3324, 3325, 3326 

Hungarian 3315 

Communist Party 3308, 3315, 3326, 3328 

Csepel Works (in Hungary) 3322 


Duffv, Edward 3307, 3308, 3310, 3324 

Duna River 3327 


German engineers 3332 

Gero, Erno 3329 

Gregory, Father Berzinec: 
Interpreter for — 

Sabo Karlor 3308 

Sabad Karoly 3316 

Imre Nagy 3322 

Frank Kossuth 3325 

Janos Szekely 3328 

Imre Mogar 3329 

Istban Szep 3331 


Hungarian rebellion, October 23, 1956 3309, 3313, 3322 

Hungarian Red Army 3329 

Hungarian Royal Army 3317 

Hungary 3308-3311, 3314, 3317, 3321, 3322 


Immigration Service 3308 

Iron Curtain 3309 

Italy 3332 





Karlor, Sabo (pseudonym), testimony of 3308-3316 

Arrived in United States, December 31. 1956 ._ 3310 

Karoly, Sabad (pseudonym), testimony of 3316-3322 

Kiev 3331,3332 

Kossuth, Frank (pseudonym) , testimony of 3323-3327 


Labor slave camps 3331, 3332 

Lang, Gregory 3308, 3315, 3324 

Lwow 3331 


Maid (attached to American Embassy) 3312, 3313 

Mate, Rushak 3318 

Mindszenty, Cardinal 3315 

Mogar, Imre: 

Testimony of 3329-3331 

Soldier in Hungarian Red Army 3329 

Morris, Robert 3307 

Moscow 3320,3331 


Nagy, Imre, testimony of 3322-3325 

Nagy, Premier Imre 3319, 3325 

Nyiredhaza Station 3328 

Orcut prison camp 3331 

Prater Street School 3323, 3324 


Rakovci Vasarcsarnok 3324 

Red army 3321, 3329 

Rusher, William 3307 

Russians- — 3311, 3319, 3324 

Russian secret pohce 3320 


Schroeder, F. W 3307, 3308, 3310, 3315, 3321, 3324 

Siberia 3327, 3328, 3331 

Sopron, H ungary 333 1 

Soviet troops 3328 

Soviet Union 3314, 3319, 3320, 3328, 3331 

Spanish engineer 3332 

Spanish revolution 3332 

Square of Budapest 3322 

Szekely, Janos (pseudonym), testimony of 3328-3329 

Szep, 1st ban (pseudonym) , testimony of 333 1-3332 


Temesvar 332 1 

Torture chamber 3326 

United Nations - 3318, 3321 

United States 3307, 3310, 3322 

Vienna 3314,3331 

Voegler, Mr 3314 















FEBRUARY 7, 8, AND 19, 1957 

PART 49 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

93215 WASHINGTON : 1957 


Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Docunoients 

AUG 27 1957 


JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chahman 


OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANQER, North Dakota 





SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration op the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Robert Morris, Chief Counsel 

J. O. SouRwiNE, Associate Counsel 

WtLLiAM A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Witness : Pasr« 

Fonagy, Dezso 3333 

Kiraly, Gen. Bela 3381 

Rastvorov, Yuri 3377 

Szeradesi, Jeno 3335 

Turani Capt. Andras 3353 





United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 

Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 

of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a. m.,in room 
424, Senate Office Building. 

Present: Senator Eoman L. Hruska, presiding. 

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher, 
associate counsel. 

Senator Hruska. The committee will come to order. 

This subcommittee has been trying to learn the true facts about the 
Hungarian uprising so that ^ve can knovr the nature of vrorld commu- 
nism and its manifestations here in this country. 

Accordingly, we have asked two witnesses, whom v/e deem to be 
quite competent, to testify in that regard. We will first administer 
the interpreter's oath, inasmuch as I understand the two witnesses 
cannot express themselves in English. 

Will you state your name? 

Mr. Von Cseh. My name is Louis Von Cseh. 

Senator Hruska. Will you stand, please, and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear that you will truly interpret to the witness 
the questions directed to him and will truly interpret the answers 
given by the witness, to the best of your ability, so help you God? 

Mr. VoN Cseh. I do, so help me^God. .' 

Senator Hruska. Now, will the witnesses stand. Maybe we can 
swear the two of them together. 

Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear that the testimony which 
you are about to give v/ill be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God? 

>»Ir. Fonagy. So help me God. 

Mr. JsNO Szeradasi. So help me God. 

I\Ir. :Morris. 'Mt. Chairman, Air. Fonagy will be the first witness. 



Mr. TvIoERis. Win you give your name to the reporter. 

The Interpreter. His name is Dezso Fonagy. 

Mr. Morris. Nov/, how long have you been in the United States? 

The Interpreter. Since January 1, 1957. 



Mr. Morris. And by what means did you arrive in the United 

The Interpreter. By aeroplane. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

When did you leave Hungary? 

The Interpreter. He says, December 18, 1956. 

Mr. Morris. December 18, 1956? 

The Interpreter. December 18, 1956. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you bear with you, do you not, the credentials 
of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, will you present those credentials to Senator 
Hruska, who is presiding here today? 

(A document was handed to Senator Hruska.) 

The Interpreter. He is begging the Senate to not disclose the 
names, the signatures; everything else but the signatures. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. I will explain that to the Senator. 

Senator Hruska, this witness says he will allow, he will be willing, 
without objection, this go into the record as it is except for the people 
who are now in Hungary, their names, who are the representatives of 
the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament, because to give their names 
would be tantamount to a death sentence, if those names were set out. 

He has made a copy of that same paper, which is identical in every 
respect, except that the names of those actually in Hungary at that 
time do not appear here. 

Senator Hruska. The exhibit wiU be received for the record in its 
censored form, if we can put it that way, Judge Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you. Senator. 

Now, you are willing that the representations herein go into the 

The Interpreter. He says yes. 

Mr. Morris. And the name Csepel Iron Works, and so on? 

The Interpreter. Yes; all of those can be on it, with the exception 
of the signatures, which were omitted from that English translation. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, may I please read that into the record at this 

Senator Hruska. Yes; please do. 

Mr. AIoRRis (reading): 


The Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament (functioning underground) hereby 
appoints Dezso Fonagy, Dezso Pragai, and Doctor Bala Janko, members of the 
Committee, as its delegates to the United States and to all the member nations of 
the United Nations, in order to inform them of the creation this day of the Hun- 
garian Revolutionary Parliament, as well as of its objectives. We, the Revolu- 
tionary Parliament, through our above representatives, wish to call attention to 
the tragic plight of our beloved Hungarian people at the hands of the hated 
U. S. S. R. Also, to implore the heads of all freedom-loving_ nations to lend us 
their much-needed support in our struggle for freedom and justice. 

Our representatives carry our solemn pledge to the Free World that we will not 
cease fighting until Hungary will be free of ALL its enemies! 
Signed : 

Revolutionary Workers Council of Greater Budapest: Csepel Iron Works — 
Mav, Ganz, Egyesult Izzo, Standard, Kispesti, Lorinci, Ujpesti, Rako- 
spalotai, Kabelgyar, Lampagyar. 

Peasants and Farm Workers: Revolutionary Council of Students and Intel- 
lectuals of Greater Hungary. 
Dated and signed in Budapest, November 22, 1956. 


The original copy is on file. 

Now, I wonder if you will read and translate the places that are 
represented on the council. 

The Interpreter. Csepel Iron Works; Mav, which means the 
Hungarian Government steel factory; Ganz means Ganz Iron Works, 
Electrical Works, et cetera; the Egyesidt Izzo Lamp Works, in- 
candescent lamp works of Hungary; and there is Standard, evidently 
an American subsidiary, or something; then the Kispesti, which was a 
small town which is now connected to Budapest with a separate — 
which has its own revolutionary council, which is a member of this 
Parliament; and then there is Lorinci, which was also another town 
outside of Budapest, which is also connected now to Greater Budapest 
under 19 districts; Ujpesti, which is another town outside of Budapest; 
Rakospalotai, which is also another town close by Budapest; and then 
the Kabelgyar, which is the manufacture of wires, cables, et cetera, 
electrical cables; then the Lampagyar, which is a factory where they 
manufacture lamps, et cetera. 

Then, the Peasants and Farm Workers of Greater Hungary; then 
the Revolutionary Council of Students and Intellectuals of Greater 

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us the meaning of this authoriza- 

The Interpreter. Would you — he wants to know if you gentlemen 
care to ask him to explain the way this Parliament was created. 

Mr. Morris. Precisely; all the circumstances leading up to his 
authorization to come to the United States to speak for the Hungarian 
Revolutionary Parliament. 

The Interpreter. I think we have enough to go ahead. Now, 
we are going to make the chart, he [indicating the witness Szeradasi] 
was going to, but he was interrupted — he was going to make a chart 
to show you exactly. 

Mr. AloRRis. Well, maj-be he can complete that when the next 
witness is on the stand. 

The Interpreter. Well, he [indicating] was going to do it. 

Mr. Morris. Maybe while he is waiting he can make it up. 

The Interpreter. It is right there. He has been working on it 
and in maybe 10 minutes he can finish it. 

Sir, Mr. Fonagy states that in November, around the middle of 
November, when the Hungarian freedom fighters, which we were 
called up to that time, saw that there was no hope of any United 
Nations help for the cessation of the murder, et cetera, against the 
Hungarians by the Russians all over the country, they decided that 
they were going to take the situation in their hands and people were 
elected in every district throughout Hungary and Greater Budapest 
and they created this Parliament who would actually take up the 
fight of the people and the administration of the government. 

Mr. Morris. You say they did this because they realized the 
United Nations were not going to carry on —  —  

The Interpreter. Its obligations or its function as it was meant 
to function as the United Nations. 

So they elect — each district from their leadership elected five mem- 
bers which were sent up to Budapest in this Revolutionary Parlia- 
ment, and these people would consist of a total of — (addressing Mr. 
Fonagy) — how many? 


Each one of these sections, hke industrial workers, the farm 
workers, and the peasantry, the university students, the intellectuals 
of Greater Hungary, sent five members into the Parliament. 

The totnl m^embership of this Parliament consisted of 20 members, 
of which ho is one. 

Mr. Morris. You a,re one of the members of this Revolutionary 

The Interpreter. Yes. He is representing the industrial workers. 

Mr. Morris. Now, when was this Parliament constituted? 

The Interpreter. This was between November 18 and November 

Mr. Morris. Noav, did you function as a member of this Parliament 
until 3^ou left Hungary on December 18, 1956? 

The Interpreter. Up to November 12 they all were fighting, 
when they started to organize the Revolutionary Parliament he was 
very active until the date he left Hungary to represent the Revolu- 
tionary Parliament to the West. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you come to the United States in order to 
stay here or is it your intention to return to Hungary? 

The Interpreter. He states that if the United Nations would not 
fulfill its obligations as it was organized to do, or the West will not 
give any help to the Hungarian cause, then he would sooner that he 
goes back and fights there than stay here or any^vhere in the 
world- — die with the rest of those Hungarians. 

Mr. Morris. Now, in other words, a^ou are here in a refugee 
capacity, is that right? 

The Interpreter. He is not over here as a refugee but he is sent 
out as a delegate from the Parliament, revolutionary Parliament. 

Mr. Morris. Now, wha,t have you done since you have been in the 
United States? 

The Interpreter. Since he cam.e he made several attempts to see 
Mr. Lodge to take up the Hmigarian — present his credentials in the 
Hungarian cause, but Mr. Lodge was busy and in the meantime he 
contacted some of the United Nations representatives v\^ho were 
championing the Hungarian cause in the United Nations and spoke 
to them. 

Mr. Morris. Who were they? 

The Interpreter. One was the Cuban representative. 

Mr. Morris. Who were thej'', tell us who they were. 

The Interpreter. Nunez-Portuondo, Cuban delegate to the United 

Mr. Morris. And he is the Cuban delegate to the United Nations? 

The Interpreter. Yes. (addressing witness) And who else? 

Miss Palmer, you have the names of these delegates he has already 
contacted — -the Um-uguay delegate? 

Miss Martha G. P.\lmer. He contacted, I think, all of the South 
American countries' permanent representatives on the United Nations. 

Mr. Morris. Give him the list of them. 

Miss Palmer. I don't have the list but I can get it so it mU be 
included in the record. 

The Interpreter. This is the Uruguay representative, Rodriguez 
Fabregat. That is the Uruguay representative. And I contacted 
the Chinese representative, Dr. Yen, and I have spoken only on the 


telephone yesterday, but he was very busy and he is requesting we 
go and see him as soon as he gets back from New York. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, would it be in order at this time — it 
will take about 5 or 10 minutes — if I read the exchange of correspond- 
ence into the record at this time between Senator Eastland, chairman 
of the Senate committee and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge? 
Senator, it will give the preface to this particular hearing, by way of 
what this subcommittee has been doing in this particular field and 
bring the situation up to date. 

Senator Hruska. That will be in order. Will you please proceed? 

Mr. Morris. Senator Eastland's letter dated January 17, 1957 is 
as follows: 

Dear Ambassador Lodge: I am transmitting herewith the transcripts of the 
sworn testimony of seven Hungarian escapees. This testimony is evidence of the 
savage acts of aggression on tlie part of Soviet officials against the Hungarian 
people. Some of the details are so harrowing and bestial that we could not even 
put them into the official record. However, those that are in the official record 
reflect a savagery that is, to put it mildly, inconsistent with the professed purposes 
of the United Nations. 

As you know, we have been transmitting to the Department of State other 
transcripts such as these, all abundantly reflecting acts and deeds of aggression 
which are, as of this moment, unpunished and only ineffectually deplored by the 
United Nations. Senator Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina, who presided at 
all of these hearings, has repeatedly but unavailingly asked the United Nations 
to hear this evidence. Added up, it is irrefutable proof of aggression on the part 
of the Soviet Union against the people of Hungary. 

As far as we have been able to observe here in Washington, the only visible 
reaction on the part of the United Nations has been to dissolve the observation 
team which it had set up to go into Hungary to learn the facts. It appears that 
efforts are presently being made to bring this evidence before the forum of the 
United Nations, but as yet we have seen no tangible results. We would appreciate 
hearing from you exactly what steps are being taken by the United States to 
insure that the United Nations will pursue the Hungarian issue. 

These transcripts which the subcommittee makes in connection with its primary 
function of making a record on the nature of the Communist organization for the 
Senate of the United States, are being sent to you because we feel that, in the 
hands of the chief delegate to the United Nations, they may be used effectively 
to bring about a situation where justice will be satisfied and confidence in the 
work of the United Nations will be restored. 

Senator William E. Jenner, a member of the subcommittee, in a letter to the 
State Department which we asked to be transmitted to you, has observed the 
great disparity between the reaction of the United Nations in connection with 
the aggression in the Middle East and its reaction to the Soviet aggression against 
Hungary. I feel that the fact that the United Nations allows this disparity to 
stand on the record to be seen by the whole world, goes a long way toward under- 
mining confidence in that world body. 

Trusting that these and other transcripts will be of use to you, I am 
Very sincerely yours, 

James O. Eastland, 
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee. 

On January 26, 1957 Ambassador Lodge replied: 

Dear Senator Eastland: Thank you for your letter of January 17, enclosing 
transcripts of the hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee, dated January 
15, on Soviet repression of the Hungarian people. 

In my opinion these transcripts represent precisely the type of testimony which 
will be valuable to the newly established United Nations Special Committee on 
Himgary, and I shall transmit them to that Committee along with such other 
relevant transcripts as your subcommittee makes available to the State Depart- 
ment. The United Nations Committee was established by the General Assembly 
by a resolution adopted January 10, a copy of which I enclose for your information. 

93215— 57— pt. 49- 


Also enclosed is a copy of the Assembly's resolution of December 12, which, by 
a vote of 55 to 8, condemned Soviet actions in Hungary — the strongest condem- 
nation of the United Nations has ever voted against one of its members. 

In your letter you ask me "exactly what steps are being taken by the United 
States to insure that the United Nations will pursue the Hungarian issue." The 
establishment of the committee I just mentioned, with representatives from 
Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, is designed to make sure 
that the Soviet assault on the Hungarian people is not forgotten either by the 
United Nations or by world opinion. The United States delegation took a leading 
part in the movement to have this committee established. Fifty-nine nations 
voted to set up the Committee; and only the Soviet Union and its satellites voted 
against it. 

In the light of the foregoing, it is inaccurate to say, as you said in your letter, 
that "the only visible reaction on the part of the United Nations has been to 
dissolve the observation team which it had set up to go into Hungary to learn the 
facts." The Committee I mentioned was established to replace a group pre- 
viously appointed by the Secretary General which was dissolved at its own request. 
The new Committee gives every evidence of taking its job seriously. The United 
States intends to submit a great deal of information to it, and to facilitate the 
appearance before it of recent Hungarian refugees now in this country. 

I note your reference to Senator Jenner's statement about the "disparity 
between the United Nations actions in the Hungarian question and in the Middle 
Eastern question," a view with which you associate yourself. The disparity you 
refer to is obvious, and derives mainly from the fact that Britain, France, and 
Israel are civilized nations which responded to the conscience of the world as 
expressed through the United Nations, whereas the Soviet Union is willing to 
defy that same expression of world opinion. 

However, it must not be supposed that the debates and resolutions in the United 
Nations have been ineffective. For the first time many Middle Eastern and Asian 
countries, which had hitherto been uncommitted on differences between the free 
and the Communist worlds, have voted in the United Nations to condemn the 
Soviet Union and to set up an investigating committee to publicize Soviet crimes. 

Moreover, we have been advised that pressures brought to bear through the 
United Nations caused the Soviet Union to stop its mass deportations of Hun- 
garian citizens. 

In your letter you refer to repeated requests by Senator Johnston to the United 
Nations to hear the evidence on this question collected by the Internal Security 
Subcommittee. I have not received any such request, but I am glad to learn 
that we will have the benefit of this material as part of the United States con- 
tribution to the United Nations investigation. 

It may well seem that no United Nations action, short of war, would be 
adequate when measured against the heroic sacrifices of the Hungarian freedom 
fighters. However, in the long run, they may prove to have struck a mortal 
blow against the whole Communist system. The United States delegation to 
the General Assembly, and I, personally, have, I believe, lost no opportunity 
to see that their sacrifice proves worthwhile. We shall, I am sure, lose no oppor- 
tunity in the future. 

Sincerely yours, 

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. 

And Senator Eastland acknowledged that on January 31, 1957: 

Dear Mr. Ambassador: Thank you for your full letter of January 26. 

I have noted with some satisfaction that, since my letter of January 17, the 
Committee established by the General Assembly through a resolution adopted 
January 10 has begun to take testimony. It was precisely with a view toward 
this eventuaUty that the subcommittee has been transmitting to you on November 
19 and to the State Department on December 20 the transcripts of the hearings. 
Naturally we are delighted that the United Nations is now taking this testimony. 
I am also gratified to learn of your sanguine expectations with respect to the 
determination of the United Nations in keeping alive the savagery of the Soviet 
conquest of Hungary which you deplore. 

Thanking you for your response on this very serious issue, I am, 
Sincerely yours, 

James O. Eastland, Chairman. 


Now, Mr. Chairman, this witness who, I believe, arrived here on 
January 1, is the latest representative witness we have been able to 
speak to on this whole subject. 

I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Fonagy, of any deportations, acts 
of deportation against Hungarian people that you know of, based on 
your own experiences in Hungary. 

The Interpeeter, He knows of two deportations in which he 
participated, in their flight to freedom; in one place by the name of 
Czegle — actually, the revolutionary Parliament tore up the railroad 
tracks so they cannot proceed — however, those they could not free. 

And then, another city by the name of Godolo, which is a few miles 
outside Budapest, they actually broke open railroad cars and freed 
340 university students which were on their way to be taken to 
Russia, they freed those. 

And, naturally, many trains they could not open up and could not 
help, but these they actually halted and he took participation, in 
which they succeeded in freeing, and in others they tore up railroad 
tracks, but they were in such numbers they wouldn't be able to do it. 

Senator Hruska. Would the witness be able to estimate the num- 
ber of trains which were observed but which had gone on their way? 

The Interpreter. They had their people at the border at Zahony 
and from where they got reports of — this was just for a short time — 
they got reports of 5 trains which passed by which they couldn't 
help, and each train had between 400 to 600 students in them which 
they could not halt or could not break open. This part is definite 
that he knows. 

However, there are stories about more which he does not care to 
state, because he has no evidence of it. 

Senator Hruska. What dates were those 4 or 5 observed? 

The Interpreter. This was in the last part of November and 
first part of December of 1956. 

Senator Hruska. What kind of cars were they, regular passenger 
cars or were they boxcars? 

The Interpreter. They were actually wagons that transport 
horses and cattle; they usually fit 40 people, I think, each wagon. 

Yes; he says they have the sign on them, 6 horses or 40 people on 
each one of those wagons and so each one of these trains must have 
consisted of 10 to 12 wagons, each train. 

Senator Hruska, Were there women as well as men? 

The Interpreter. These were mostly young people, students and 
17-year-old people, et cetera. 

He says he actually has spoken to several of these young people who 
escaped from Russia, the ones that were deported that escaped, and 
he also has spoken to several people who were too young. A few were 
15, 16 years old that they released after some pressure was given 
somewhere, were released back to Hungary, 

Senator Hruska. Before taking them on board the trains? 

The Interpreter. No; after they got to Russia, they were released 
after; 16, 17-year-old boys, he actually spoke to many of those. 

Senator Hruska. Were any of the escapees those that are refugees 
in this country, as far as the witness knows? 

The Interpreter. With his knowledge with the Hungarian Na- 
tional Council, there are several on record and the ones that were 
released from Russia from the prison, being too young. 


Mr. Morris. Do you know, when these young people are deported 
and sent to the Soviet Union, do you know where in the Soviet Union 
or where in the far-flung Soviet Empire these people were forced to 

The Interpreter. He says he has been around those sections, 
around Vladivostok and the Urals where they have the lead mines 
and that is where they claim they took them. However, he has not 
seen it. He was there previous to that. 

Mr. Morris. He was there previously? 

The Interpreter. He was there previously, because he was fight- 
ing during the war. 

And from 1942 to 1944 they were taken into Russia and they were 
used for fighting these Hungarians, 

Mr. Morris. You, yourself? 

The Interpreter. He was there; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us briefly your experiences in the Soviet 

Tiie Interpreter. He says that was one of the reasons that he, 
as soon as — the first opportunity he had, he started fighting against 
Soviet oppression, he had seen Soviet Russia while he was there as a 
soldier. He says among many things- — — 

Mr. Morris. Now, you were a member of the Hungarian Division 
that fought with the Russians, is that right? 

The Interpreter. Oh, he was fighting against the Russians. 

Mr, Morris, I see. And then you were taken prisoner by them? 

The Interpreter, No; they never took him prisoner. 

Mr. Morris, Well, tell us about your experiences. 

The Interpreter, He says this is what his experience was: 

Naturally, in the last 15 j^cars, he says, in Hungary they were teach- 
ing the blessings of communism, and over there he has seen what the 
"blessings" is. Outside of Moscow the people were hving with pigs 
and goats and chickens, m.aybe there were 8 or 9 of them shoved into 
1 room., they were living there, cooking there, sleeping there, and they 
never knew about a bath, et cetera. 

And as soon as he had the opportunity of enlightening the Hun- 
garian people of the Soviet — that they really started doing it from 1948 

Senator Hruska, What was he doing in Russia? 

The Interpreter. Well, he was fighting the Russians with the 
Hungarians, he was fighting there, and while fighting he had the 
opportunity to be in these villages and towns where there is no glitter 
like in Moscow, 

Mr, Morris, Fighting with whom? 

The Interpreter, With the Germans. Hungarians, Italians and 
Germans were fighting there, 

Mr, Morris. Now, were you, yourself, a prisoner of the Soviet 
Union at any time? 

The Interpreter, He was never a prisoner of the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Morris, Now, were you a prisoner of the Ulvrainian Com- 
munist Government in the postwar period? 

The Interpreter, Yes, he was. 

He was first taken prisoner by the Ukrainian secret police, which 
they called AVO, in 1949. 


He was imprisoned for 6 days and he escaped. And then they 
caught him again in 1950 on February 8, also for a few days and he 
escaped agahi and kept on — and tlien in 1951 they caught up with 
him again and for 7 months he was tortured at the AVO headquarters, 
which is the Ukrainian secret police, and then he escaped again and 
then they caught him again in 1953. 

In 1953, then, they were — from 1953 until October 31, 1956, he was 
continuously in confinement. 

Senator Hkuska. Where? 

The Interpretee. In Hungary. 

Senator Hruska. Where in Hungary? 

The Interpreter. In seven different prisons. Among these there 
were two slave labor camps in the mines, one bj' the name of 

Mr. Morris. This was a slave labor camp in Hungary, now? 

The Interpreter. Yes, and this is at Tataban^v^a — I am going to 
write it down, these slave labor camps in these mines. Tatabanya 
and Csolmok. These are the two places where he was in forced-labor 

Senator Hruska. Getting back to those deportation trains, what 
was the source of his information that these trains went to Vladivos- 
tok, to the lead mines? 

The Interpreter. His information is personal, his years while he 
was in Russia between 1942 and 1944, all the prisoners which were 
taken by the Russians were taken to \^adivostok lead mines to 
work — the Hungarians, Italians or Germans, they all were taken 
there — and that is his assumption, they took all these other ones 

Senator Hruska. So the information is not based on direct re- 

The Interpreter. No. No direct reports, yes — he had direct re- 
ports but he was not present so he could not say. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if you would describe some of the 
tortures you were subjected to — this was by the Hungarian Commu- 
nist Government, I am speaking of. 

The Interpreter. In 1948, when they starting arresting, like 
Msgr. Varga, who is here now at the Ulvranian National Council, 
that is when he started into the whole Ulo-anian underground revolu- 
tionary movement, to work in it. 

There were certain tortures there he had been subjected to, but 
due to the fact of these ladies, it is very hard to explain, see? 

(After speaking to witness.) 

All right, this is the most ridiculous thing you ever heard, but it 
can be true, the effects are on him, the evidence, and due to the fact 
there are ladies here, I don't know how to explain it, unless you gen- 
tlemen want me to, the biggest torture. 

Mr. Morris. W^hy don't you describe it, if you can, without too 
many specific details? 

The Interpreter. For mstance, they undressed him and they put 
him on a table and they had thumbtacks into his skin, and they were 
beating him to disclose the other members of the council, and — well, 
I think this is the most terrible thing, and then they tied his hands to 
his feet and for 75 days they kept him like that 

Air. Morris. Seventy-five days? 

The Interpreter. Seventy-five days, day and night, they wouldn't 
release him, tied his hands to his feet and he had to just hop like 



that and crawl with these shackles on him continuously, 75 days and 
75 nights — and then they knocked his teeth out, kicked his teeth out, 
cracked his skull and they did many of these — well, indescribable 

Mr. Morris. Now, tell me, was this done by the Hungarian 
secret police or was it done under the supervision of the Soviet over- 

The Interpreter. Everytime when he was tortured like that, like 
for instance in 1950, between March 15 and 17, he was subjected to 
very much torture by General Peter Gabor. That was the same 
man that 

Mr. Morris. Spell that name? 

The Interpreter. General Gabor, G-a-b-o-r — in the company of 
eight other Hungarian generals and one Soviet general. The Soviet 
general was directing what to do and how to torture and he was the 
directing agent of this whole group. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I think that would be of particular interest 
to the committee, because that would be an act of aggression on the 
part of the members of the Soviet organization against the Hungarian 
people and Hungarian Government. 

Senator Hruska. How was he able to identify the Soviet general? 

The Interpreter. First, he was in a Kussian general's uniform. 
Second, he spoke and gave the instructions in Russian, and he (indi- 
cating Mr. Fonagy) understands Russian. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if you could identify this paper. 

The Interpreter. Yes. He has one of these. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, what is this? Will you tell us what this 
paper is? 

The Interpreter. This is a document which was given to each one 
of these people, the ones that were in these forced-labor camps, they 
were given by the Miners Revolutionaiy Council that released them 
from prison. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know what prison he was released from? 

The Interpreter. That was Csolmok. 

Mr. Morris. I see, and this is the actual release that you received 
from this particular prison camp? 

The Interpreter. Yes, and on here it states that he has served 
5 years, 7 months and 15 days for instigating the overthrow of the 
Soviet Government, overturn of the Soviet Government, that is what 
it says here. 

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, when did he serve in that particular 
prison camp? 

The Interpreter. He was moved to this labor camp July 1956 and 
he was at this particular labor camp until October 1956. 

Mr. Morris. 1956? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

Mr. Chairman, may I offer that particular document for the record? 

Now, we have what appears to be — this is the form that is filled out, 
is it not? (Exhibiting.) 

The Interpreter, Yes. 

Mr. Morris. May we take your original, which is your actual 
certificate, is it not, and you will so testify right now, which you just 
handed to Senator Hruska? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir, he^will. 


Mr. Morris. Senator, may we take this original and conform this, 
which appears to be a copy of the form? This is a copy of the form? 

The Interpreter. It is not this [indicating], but it is a copy of such 
form, yes. 

Mr. Morris. I see, and will you conform this with the original and 
may that go into our record. Senator? Photostats will be just as well. 

Senator Hruska. The exhibit will be received in the record in 
photostatic form. 

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 421 and is 
reproduced below:) 

mi^hzjlM Ml 


Az igazolvany ty^ajdonosa; 

Sziilelesi helyc es sdej 
Anyja neve: -- *'^- 
Csaladi allapota; 


Magassaga:.^cf .^*-^ .._ Fogazata: .. 

^5ceme:- ^.^^^t^^^ Hajszine: .... 

Alia. ^W«^r?r Szaja: .-... 

Szem6iddke:.-.-«J^^^^*l^, Arcforrnaja • 

Bajusza: 1..^^^^^^ Orra .- 

Homloka: i^.C^^ Szskalla: 

Kiiloaos ssmertt'tojele: 

FeninevQzeit ....... 

^km»...£.M^:^........ buntette miatt kle^abott 

bojrt6nbunteiesboi-_i.,..l',..., evet t'r. ..... hdnapct— ^ XTJl..^,. 

napot kitoltott. 

ia27l/5 — Vdi'^s C«USa« Nyomcia, Busiest (M) IS73 


BSntef^se hiif&^^S ii##lre, a 2 s z 1 9 ^ h^-ry » --.'■■/ -■ ^^ » 

.....,,.,.,...-..,szamu hataroiataval felteteias szabadsagra i>0" 

csatotia, ezer! 5t a mai' napoa sz^abadiaiixa^ fi^iyeziem, 

Megerks2esek«r koteles a --.^ ,..0-|^"---<---^--'^l'-: ..,..' 

readSrhatds^gfial riyomban Jekatke^nL ^ . 

• ielentl<e2esekor Ig-asolvioyat fel k«?il mMtatnta, hogy axon Jelentkeae- 
• set igaxolni khessen. 

IgBzolvAnyM koteles gondosaa megorixtti es hstosagi kozeg fels&d- 
Mtasarai felmutatnl 

|: Feltetelcs sxabadsaganak ideje iua't kcielea az erkokstt-'f-n r^ hzi" 
kos eletmodlol lartozkodns, Ig-azoltan murkaviszonyba i<pnu vagy 
jogsiabaiy a?^l ne,m Ulio'd egyeo keresS logl?i!ko-t.^st tolyiiiinl. liu 
ebben beteg»«ge ak.:,<-.,'^'yoz/.i, beteg&eget l-.iidsag! orvosi igazol- 
vanrsval kell bz ellenorzo rendori sEervnel Igaioloia.,  

. Allando lakoheiyet csak a rendorhatdssg tudomavsaval hagyiiatja eL 

, ' Ma aU -.'■'* 'c ■'' ''^:<6lielyC"t rendes io^^'i'djkozm&nBt fog-va kenyteien tmpon- 
Mm, v;. , videbb idoko2onkei?t elhag-yni, e2t is be ken jeiijntenie. 

Felieleias s.jabadsjiganak leleP.e utan jei«iitkezzek az Hletefes- rc-ad- 
ori szervnel es igazofvany/^t x?<r<i (];%©! as vegett mutassa be. ,, 

A niagaviseleii szabalyok f;^ : ■, vaf{y buntett e!kf?ve!ese a set- 

Uie-^c-. -i-'badsag me<J'^>:^n^ .._; ,,.::i>;Uja a«aea utiin. 

Sz?- kor aivett  Formloi es . — . 

.--... 4. 

St'irnMyi iga;iolvi;ivaniik '^zarna; -.....- 



4V ' 


, LattgiBoxIs, kkdlif>lym«^llfozlalass.ra¥OiiatkaEdeRg«tteiy, xaradekd- 
I las €s az illelekes reRiJorhsic&agf, vagy fendoi-| szttv 'tgyib feliegv- 

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if you could tell us what is the out- 
look, what is the intention of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parlia- 
ment with respect to the future? 

The Interpreter. When the Parliament was organized November 
19, between the 18th and 22d of November 1956, they decided that — 
they took up the fight, going underground, and started to direct the 
movements of the Hungarian people. 


But then they, the people of Hungary, decided that the promised 
help which was to be given to the revolutionaries was not forthcoming, 
so they had to take it in their hands. 

I just asked him, why did they assume that help was coming from 
the West, why should they believe that and he answered they believed 
the United Nations structure is such that they would go to the help 
of oppressed people. 

They thought as soon as the Suez question was settled then the 
Hungarian question was going to be settled. 

Senator Hruska. Now, Mr. Interpreter, you used the words 
"promised help." 

The Interpreter. That is right. 

Senator Hruska. Are those the words that the witness used? 

The Interpreter. He sa^^s they believed that the United Nations 
was set up — it was to defend the oppressed, the smaU, that is why they 

Senator Hruska. So it was not a promise from any individuals or 
any radio broadcast 

The Interpreter. No, he did not say that. 

Senator Hruska. Or any representatives, it was an assumption? 

The Interpreter. No, he does not say that. 

Senator Hruska. I just wanted that point cleared up. 

The Interpreter. WeU, they tried to make contacts with the 
Kadar government, and in this contact they tried to reason — to 
come to some conclusion, so that from the revolution something 
could be saved, some accomplishment that the revolution may have 
accomplished could be saved. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you say the Hungarian Revolutionary Parlia- 
ment did make contact with the Kadar government in order to save 
something from the revolutionary activit}^? 

The Interpreter. He was one of the representatives to go ahead 
and try to deal with the Kadar government, to save something of it. 

Mr. Morris. Well, tell us what happened. 

The Interpreter. When it was on the radio, on the Hungarian 
radio, that the workers, representatives of munkacz- — farmers — they 
had the headquarters of the Uki-ainian iron workers, where the radio 
said they had the right to — to select of their representatives and 
they were going to listen to their grievances, and so forth. 

Senator Hruska. Did they meet, did they actually meet? 

The Interpreter. Yes, they met. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us w^hat happened. 

The Interpreter. They gathered together from 28 different big 
factories and 3 mining sections, representatives, they gathered in 
one of the big places of these Hungarian iron workers. 

And then they told them that this is not a legal place, or a legal 
body, but there is another one somewhere else where there is a meeting 
going on. 

Senator Hruska. Who told them that? 

The Interpreter. Well, they always had these secret police 
people around, buy them out 

Mr. Morris. Let me see If I understand that. This was a meeting 
between the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament and representatives 
of the Kadar regime? 

93215— 57— pt. 49 3 


The Interpreter. This was where all these representatives were 
going to select a committee and go up to Kadar, they hadn't gone to 
Kadar yet. 

So, while this meeting was in progress to select the representatives, 
the ones that were going to go to the Kadar government, the word 
was passed that a couple of streets down below there was another 
meeting which was more attended — then, they are always trying to 
interrupt them, so 150 from that meeting proceeded over here to this 
other street, and at this other street there were Russian soldiers 
with machineguns. 

So, when they arrived, these Russian soldiers put their machineguns 
in readiness, while they told them to go ahead, "Have your meeting, 
we are not going to do anything," and in about half an hour the Kadar 
government's representatives came and they were apologizing for the 
Russian soldiers with the guns, and they say, "Look, we are with 
you, and we are sending them away." 

Then the Kadar government representatives sent away the Russian 

That was the first and the last contact they had with the Kadar 
government, because while the soldiers were gone away, they left also, 
and they had to go and went back to the underground. 

Mr. Morris. Was that the answer to your request of the Kadar 

The Interpreter. No; they were not interested. 

Well, their first demand was that the Soviet troops have to leave 
Budapest because there were no factory workers will go back to work 
until the Soviets aren't there. 

Also, please to remove the tanks and the Soviet troops from Buda- 
pest because the workers were afraid to go to work, because on every 
corner, street corner, were tanks and machineguns and Soviet troops. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, the Kadar government did not listen 
to your request to have some accommodation between themselves 
and you? 

The Interpreter. Instead of that, next day on the Hungarian 
radio the Kadar government issued a statement, in which statement 
they stated that 20 factory representatives were together and they 
had meetings, and they decided that all the workers were going back 
to work. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, it was a false report of what actually 
took place, and you know it was false because you were present? 

The Interpreter. So he says, yes; he was there when this hap- 
pened, and they were betrayed again — among them they had many 
of these informers and these secret police people, evidently, and just — 
the idea was they had met together and the people knew of this com- 
mittee's meeting, and the only decision they ever brought was that 
the workers should go back to work, and then they were to get to- 
gether again after they went to work. 

Mr. Morris. Now — have you finished? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you will tell us, you as the representative 
of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament here in the United States, 
will you tell us how many people in Hungary you think you speak for? 

The Interpreter. He says that he testifies, and every Hungarian 
knows, that the Kadar government hasn't got more than about 1,000 


followers in Hungary, and the rest of the 9 million are behind the 
Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament. He himself was one of the 
organizers who was sent out to the farms to get the peasants, and the 
peasants are 100 percent behind this Parliamentary government, 
which is their elected undergi-ound leadership. 

Mr. Morris. So it is your contention here you represent ninety- 
some — that you are the spokesman of some ninety-some percent of 
the Hungarian people? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if you would tell us what you expect 
to do, what the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament expects to do 
in the coming days, in view of all of the circumstances which now 

The Interpreter. He says he is getting very much complaint 
that the Revolutionary Parliament thinks that he is not doing enough 

to help the Hungarian cause 

Mr. Morris. You hear from that inside Hungary? 
The Interpreter. No. He is in contact continuously. 
Mr. Morris. Yes. 

The Interpreter. What they want to do, and nothing happens, 
and it is getting to be a month since he has been away. 

And the Revolutionary Parliament actually stated the following: 
Now, there is a date set, but he doesn't know the date — in the near 
future — in which, if by then nothing has been done by the United 
Nations or the West to free Hungary from the Soviet troops, then 
they are going to start sabotage, blow up everything and put Hungary 
in a chaos, because the Hungarian people will not give up the fight. 
They are not going — if they have to — if they are going to be exter- 
minated the}' are not going to live under the Soviet 3''oke any longer. 
Mr. Morris. So, in other words, your testimony is that unless 
the United Nations or tlie West, generally, does something to aid 
the plight of the Hungarian people, that the Hungarians are going 
to take it on themselves to force some kind of a second uprising in 
the near future? 

The Interpreter. Yes. His contention is, and his representation 
to the Revolutionary Parliament is, that if the United Nations and 
the West will not help them, then the third phase of the revolution 
is going to start, in which there is going to be a finish fight; either 
the extermination of the Hungarian people or the exit of the Soviet 
oppressors from Hungary. 

Mr. Morris. Now, was the original revolt — what was the cause of 
the original October 23 revolt against the Soviet occupation? 

The Interpreter. In July 1956, through some unknown factors, 
thousands of political prisoners were freed, and these political prisoners 
were agitating for the overthrow of the Soviet yoke. 

His torture, which was very terrible, is only the story of one man, 
but everybody knows throughout the world that tens of thousands of 
Hungarians were imprisoned by the Soviets and tortured, and the 
situation was such it didn't make any difference to them, if they are 
killed by torture or fighting for freedom. 

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know, or have you had any dealings with 
Cardinal Mindszenty? 

I notice a news report that he has been accused of being in contact 
with religious people in Hungary. There is a protest on the part of 


the Communists to Cardinal Mindszenty communicating with re- 
ligious people in Hungary. 

Did you have any experience with him or with that whole situation? 

The Interpreter. He was in Bacz, and in this prison camp were 
all the other people who were imprisoned from the Mindszenty case. 
Mindszenty was not the only person who was imprisoned at that time; 
there were very many; thousands of people, thousands of people 
were imprisoned in the Mindszenty case and he was — he studied the 
situation, and when the revolution came he was among the people who 
freed Mindszenty. 

Mr. Morris. You were one of the people who freed Cardinal 
Mindszenty, were you not? 

The Interpreter. No, when he got to Budapest, he was there, 
with him. 

Mr. Morris. I see. He didn't see Cardinal Mindszenty since that 

The Interpreter. He has seen him until he took refuge into the 
United States. 

Mr. Morris. You did see him, then? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you talk to him? 

The Interpreter. No; he didn't speak to him. 

Mr. Morris. Now, do you know anything about the circumstances 
surrounding Cardinal Mindszenty's asylum in the American Legation? 

The Interpreter. He says since Cardinal Mindszenty took refuge 
in the American Embassy, it was very difficult to anybody to go 
because they were surrounded with spies all around and they took 
pictures of people and anybody that even attempted to speak to 
anybody who entered the American Legation. They just gathered 
them in and they disappeared and so for that reason they could never 
get near him after he took refuge. 

Senator Hruska. Now, you have testified that if help does not 
come from the United Nations or from the West that the people of 
Hungary will arise again and enter into this third phase of the revo- 

How long do you think they will wait before they undertake that 
third phase? 

The Interpreter. He says that he has not got the date but it is 
not — it is not very long; maybe a month, 1 or 2 months — not before 
spring — and they are waiting for him to come back with the reports. 

Senator Hruska. Have they fixed a definite date; does he know? 

The Interpreter. There is no definite date set. 

Mr. Morris. Well now, have you testified before the United 

The Interpreter. Not yet. 

Mr. Morris. Do you hope to? 

The Interpreter. Yes, he would like to. 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else that you feel that this 
subcommittee should know about the Hungarian Revolutionary 
Parliament, its purposes, its aspirations? 

Is there anything else you feel that the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee should have in its public record about you or your 
personal experiences or the experiences of the Hungarian Revolu- 
tionary Pa.rliament in general? 


The Interpreter. He believes that, due to the fact that tomorrow 
is the eighth anniversary of the imprisonment of Cardinal Mindszenty, 
the Hungarian people will come, if nothing else but in silent protest, 
and this silent protest might end up in something, as it happened in 
October when the students were asking for a silent protest against 
their oppression. 

However, definite knowledge he has none when the date is. 

What he wishes to testify in front of the United Nations, however, 
his experience in this 1 month is very sad and the Parliament, the 
Revolutionary Parliament, which is sad, that regardless of what 
resolution is brought by the United Nations, they did not bring actual 
help or does not ease the suppression of the Hungarian people, so the 
Hungarian people are going to take it into their hands and fight to the 

He says that one of the main wishes of the Hungarian people would 
be if some help would come through the United Nations or through 
the Western Powers, and if it doesn't there is only one way, that 
would be for the Hungarian people to give in to the Russians, which 
they don't wish to do, and the}'' are not going to do; and the second 
would mean the complete extermination of the Hungarian people 
because they are going to fight to the very last. 

He said that the two points which the Hungarian people are begging 
the free world to see are very simple. The only thing that they ask 
is that the free world and the United Nations see to it that Soviet 
free Hungary and the Hungarian people should have the freedom to 
elect their own representative government, which they don't think is 
too much. 

Senator Hruska. All right. Any further questions? 

Mr. Morris. I think not of this witness. Senator. 

As you know. Senator, there is present here ready to testify, Mr. 
Jeno Szeradasi. He was the vice chairman of the original Hungarian 
National Revolutionary Council until the execution of Chairman 
Joseph Dudas, and, therefore, it is presumed he is now acting chau-- 

Do you know when Mr. Dudas was executed? 

The Interpreter. He was executed after he left. 

Mr. Morris. I see; in other words, after December 18 he was 

You see, Mr. Chairman, this other witness was vice chairman of that 
Hungarian National Revolutionary Council and is here ready to 

We were also scheduled to have here Gen. Andrew Turani. I under- 
stand there was a delay in some of the plans, for which reason General 
Turani is not here. So, it is yom* choice. Senator, whether we are 
going ahead, whether you think we should hold this other witness 
over until tomorrow. 

Senator Hruska. Well, the hour is getting late and there are other 
things the Senators are engaged in and I would suggest that the witness 
be held over tentatively until tomorrow until we ascertain the wishes 
of the chairman of the subcommittee. 

It is my own reaction after hearing this testimony that it is very 
important that it be sent in transcript form to Ambassador Lodge and 
for the attention of the United Nations' Special Committee on Hun- 
gary, or for whatever use he wants to make of it. 


It is important, it seems to me, not only what the witness has nar- 
rated of his own experiences, but also on some of the things which the 
Western World has long suspected the Russians have done and it is 
also important for the things which are forecast in the future and the 
indications thereof, and certainly the United Nations and our Ambas- 
sador should be informed of the testimony that has been made avail- 
able here. 

Subject to the approval of the chau-man of this subcommittee, that 
transcript will be forwarded in that fashion. 

For the time being, then, and until further order of the chairman, 
this meeting is adjourned. 

Thank you very much for coming here, Mr. Witness. 

(Wliereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject 
to call of the Chair.) 



UiViTED States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 

OF THE Committee on the Judicl-^iRy, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a. m., in room 
424, Senate Office Building. 

Present: Senator Roman L. Hruska (acting chairman), presiding. 

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, 
associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director. 

Senator Hruska. The committee will come to order. 

There Avill be resumed the hearings \vith reference to the Hungarian 
Revolutionary Parliament. The Internal Security Subcommittee 
heard yesterday the testimony from one of the representatives of that 
Parliament. He testified, among other things, that the Hungarian 
people may rise up again in the near future and complete the third 
phase of the Hungarian revolution. 

The subcommittee is interested in ascertaining the full scope and 
duration of the Hungarian revolution because no other event in the 
last 10 years has raised a potential threat to the Soviet Empire as 
this one has. 

This development may have had repercussions, we believe, even on 
the Communist Party here in the United States. We are trying to 
determine whether or not events in Hungary may have caused some 
defections here in this country. For this reason we would like to 
learn as much as possible about the forthcoming events in Hungary. 

It is of considerable interest to the committee that we learned, 
since yesterday and since the hearings that we had yesterday, that 
Mr. Fonagy, the witness who testified before us, has been invited by 
the United Nations Special Committee on this subject to appear 
before that committee. 

Will you ask the witness to verify that? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 



Senator Hruska. Mr. Morris? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Fonagy had just a few things he wants to tell us. 
He asked if he could say a few words before we start the session. 
Senator Hruska. That would be fine. If he has anything by way 



of a supplement to yesterday's statement, we wouldbe pleased to 
receive it at this time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, let the record show that both the 
interpreter and the witness now on the stand have been previous^ 

Now, 3^ou told me today that you wanted to say a few words before 
we began our hearings this morning. 

The Interpreter. First, he wants to remind the committee that 
today is the eighth anniversary of the imprisonment of Cardinal 

For the last 10 years the Hungarians were exterminated. It is 
a very sad situation. The Hungarians wish, in Parliament, that all 
this killing, et cetera, which has been going on^ — tens of thousands 
of people have been imprisoned and the United Nations hasn't moved 
its fingers to ease this situation. 

The Hungarian revolution has not expected any help, like soldiers, 
et cetera. The only thing, they wanted some moral support that 
they should have fought off the Russian hordes. The Soviet Union 
was in such a weak position when this revolution broke out that if a 
hundred soldiers under the flag of the United Nations would have 
arrived in Hungar}^-^ Hungary would be a free nation, and probably 
the whole world would be in a better position today. 

Instead of that, nothing happened from the West, and that is when 
the Russians got more momentum and brought in more soldiers and 
started the extermination of the Hungarian people. 

He said the reason he was sent out by the Hungarian Revolutionary 
Parliament was that he took an oath that he was going to come and 
explain the plight of the Hungarian people, and he is going to return. 
He is not going to leave the Hungarians behind, like many people 
have done. 

As soon as he determines if any kind of help through the United 
Nations or the free West is not coming, he is returning. 

Mr. Morris. Well, tell me this: Will there be any other repre- 
sentatives of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament coming to 
this country? 

The Interpreter. At this moment the only thing he knows is 
three of them were sent out. One went to Asia, one is all over 
Europe, and he is the third one. 

Mr. Morris. Will there be others coming? 

The Interpreter. If necessary, the}' will be able to come. 

]VIr. Morris. If you hear from any who are here, or who come 
here, will you so advise the committee, so that we may hear from 
them firsthand testimony of conditions that prevailed in Hungary 
after your departure? 

The Interpreter. Absolutely he will do so. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you. 

Senator, I think we have two other mtnesses, and the time is short. 
Senator, I know there is much more he can tell us, but inasmuch as 
he will testify before the United Nations, I suggest. Senator, that we 
discontinue with this witness at this time. 

Senator Hruska. Whom do we have here? 

Mr. Morris. We have two witnesses. Captain Turani, and then 
we have Mr. Szeradasi. 


Now, in view of the last point that that witness made, I think 
Captain Turani's testimony would follow directly from the points 
he just made. So, even though the other man has been w^aiting 
here now, I suggest we call Captain Turani. 

Senator Hruska. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which 
you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God? 

Captain Turani. So help me God. 



Mr. Morris. Where are you residing now? 

The Interpreter. He is residing at Camp Kilmer, N. J. 

Mr. Morris. And your last name is Turani? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you were born in Hungary? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And you went to the mihtary academy, did you not, 
the Hungarian Military Academy? 

The Interpreter. He went to the Hungarian Lutovicum, they 
call that. 

Mr. Morris. Spell that, please. 

The Interpreter. L-u-t-o-v-i-c-u-m. This is equivalent to our 
West Point. 

Mr. Morris. And when did you graduate from that institution? 

The Interpreter. 1942. 

Mr. Morris. And did you- 

The Interpreter. It was a trial service when he finished it. 

Mr. Morris. Well, he graduated in 1942? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. What is your age? 

The Interpreter. He is going into 43. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you fought with the Hungarian Army against 
the Soviet Union and against the AUied Forces during the war; did 
you not? 

The Interpreter. He fought against the Russians, and also against 
the Germans. 

Mr. Morris. During the w^ar. World War II? 

The Interpreter. World War II; yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I wonder if you could teU us what you — you 
were active in the Smallholders Party, were you not, in the postwar 

The Interpreter. He was, and he was also secretary to Vidovicj, 
who was the head of the surroundings of Budapest, and he also was 
"what we caU a governor of a state. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Turani was the governor of the state? 

The Interpreter. No; his uncle, Vidovicj, whom he was the 
the secretary to. Turani was the secretary. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you had office in the Smallholders Party, did 
you not? 

The Interpreter. He was a member of the Small Land Owners 
Federation during Monsignor Vargas — when he was in Hungary. 

93215— 57— pt. 49 4 


Mr. Morris. What was his title? 

The Interpreter. He was a member of the Small Home Owners 
Federation, some kind of a functionary. 

Mr. Morris. He wasn't the secretary of that? 

The Interpreter. In one department in the suburbs, he was 

Mr. Morris. I see; but he was not the secretary of the general 

The Interpreter. Not the general secretary. He was also a 
member of the representatives without portfolio, under the Pfeifer 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like for the record to show 
that there is a statement — some person came down with these three 
witnesses, who was interested in these witnesses, and has a summari- 
zation of the witnesses' testimony. I would like the record to show 
that only the testimony coming from this witness is associated with 
this committee today. 

Now, would you tell me what you did after you — tell us what was 
your pohtical activity in the postwar activity? 

The Interpreter. After he was released from American prison — he 
was taken American prisoner of war in 1945, and after 5 months he 
was released- — and over the radio it was announced that Hungary was 
going to have a democratic type of election, and he went home and 
partook in this election. During this election period he was cani- 
paigning under the Small Land Owners aegis for his uncle, Vidovicj's 
election to the Parhament. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you take part in the October 23 uprising in 

The Interpreter. Yes. He did partake in the uprising of 1956, 
October 23, actively, and also directively. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what your role in that revolution 

The Interpreter. In the factory where he was working, under 


Mr. Morris. Illegally. 

The Interpreter. Yes. He was employed as a blacksmith, and 
they took all the small ammunition, whatever there was around, and 
took them out to the streets to fight with. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you participate in the fighting? 

The Interpreter. This lasted 3 or 4 days. They were fighting for 
about 4 days against the Hungarian secret poUce and against Russians, 
whatever might be the case. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you hear the testimony of the preceding 
witness, that there was a certain amount of demoralization and a 
certain amount of lack of support that the Russians, the Soviet forces 
themselves, experienced in Hungary? 

The Interpreter. The Russians, which were the occupation forces 
of Hungary, they were demoralized completely. Being a military 
man, he noticed it, and they were more or less on the side of the West. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that in great detail basing 
it on your own experience with the Soviet soldiers? 

The Interpreter. He was living very close by a Russian barracks, 
and even the Russian hospital, and he had the opportunity to gather 


with the Russian soldiers and Russian officers, and when they espe- 
cially had a little drink, they expressed their hatred for the leadership 
of Soviet Russia. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us about that. 

The Interpreter. They all said there is no difference between the 
leadership of Rakosi, and Khrushchev and Bulganin in Russia. 
They were hated by the Russian people as much as Rakosi by the 
Hungarian people. These were the words of Russian soldiers and 

Senator Hruska. What were their specific complaints? 

The Interpreter. They had seen it in Hungary, the great difference 
between the life of the people, and the life of the Russian people in 
Soviet Russia, and they are tired of the demagogs which were given 
to them. There is only one person they thought might have been 
all right, and that is Zhukov, the General Zhukov, whom they claim 
is probably pro-Western and a friend of President Eisenhower. 

Mr. Morris. Now, tell me this: Did this hostility manifest itself 
at all after the uprising began? 

The Interpreter. Yes. When the uprismg started, you could see 
on those troops, Soviet troops, the hesitancy, and they did not want 
to cooperate with the orders and they were just in the waiting period. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us what experiences you had with the Russian 
soldiers after the uprising began. 

The Interpreter. He experienced that, at the begmning, if they 
had specific orders, they rather shot over the heads of the people, the 
populace, the ones that were fightmg, and they were very friendly 
toward the people. This was the ffi-st troops which were ui Hungary. 

Mr. Morris. What else can you tell us about that? 

Senator Hruska. Were they the troops which had been garrisoned 
there, or were they the first ones who came there from the outside? 

The Interpreter. He thmks, as far as he could determine, these 
troops, 80,000 to 100,000 or more, were those troops, the ones that 
were garrisoned in Hungary, the ones reluctant to shoot at the 

Mr. Morris. How do you know they were reluctant to shoot at the 

The Interpreter. They had seen the way they behaved, and their 
behaviors they could see. They were very friendly toward the 

Mr. Morris. What else did you see? 

The Interpreter. He has seen those trains which were taking 
these Hungarian people into deportation. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you see — you told us in the executive ses- 
sion, did you not, that you saw defections, actual defections, on the 
part of the Soviet soldiers? 

The Interpreter. He has seen actually Russian officers in civilian 
clothes. They were waiting to escape. 

Mr. Morris. And they came and spoke to you, did they not? 

The Interpreter. Yes. The Hungarian people were hiding those 

Mr. Morris. Can you teU us about that, as you did tell us earlier 

The Interpreter. He says that these Russian soldiers, they were 
afraid that they were going to be liquidated, and therefore they were 


expecting to join Hungarian units, or any other units which might 
come to help, and there is such a possibility that many even escaped 
into Vienna. 

Mr. Morris. Tell me this: Did you see any Russian officers, 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you see them in civilian clothes? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about it? 

The Interpreter. These were officers, not very high ranking 
officers, who must have thought of something before, because they all 
obtained civilian clothes and were waiting for something. 

Mr. Morris. Would you ask Captain Turani if he will tell us 
exactly what he saw, and just relate to us his own experiences, what 
he beheld, his oAvn fu'sthand experiences. 

The Interpreter. He says this second phase of the Russian occu- 
pation troops are in such demoralized condition. 

Mr. Morris. Is he not going to answer the question? 

The Interpreter. Which? 

Mr. Morris. Tell us what he actually experienced when he en- 
countered these Russian officers in civilian clothes. 

The Interpreter. He has spoken to these officers many times, in a 
very long period of time, weeks and weeks, daily, due to the fact that 
he lived close by, and these officers were waiting for something, 
something might happen — help, or such, some sort of uprising, so 
they can join any kind of a new movement. 

Senator Hruska. And did they tell him that? 

The Interpreter. They told him that, and they continuously kept 
on telling him that, yes. 

Senator Hruska. And did they tell him that during the days of the 
uprising, when they were in civilian clothes, and did any of them join 
the fighting against their own troops? 

The Interpreter. He says when the revolution broke out, then 
they could not contact any more because there was a mobilization 
among them, and they also had the — the Hungarians had ammuni- 
tion. However, he has knowledge, personal knowledge, that many, 
many joined the fighters, many of these Russians. 

Mr. Morris. How do you know that? 

The Interpreter. He personally only knows of one case, this 
first lieutenant who joined. However, it was told by the rest of the 
leaders in the revolution that many Russians joined them in the fight. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us about his own experience with the one lieu- 

The Interpreter. The Russians grabbed this one, and the patrols 
took him away and they have not seen him any more. 

Mr. Morris. Now, was there anything else you can tell us about 
this particular phase of the fighting that has to do with the Soviet 
occupation, and the leader of the Soviet troops in Hungary? 

The Interpreter. Here is the whole story of the second phase, 
which is — he was caught outside of Budapest, and he and his uncle, 
Vidovicj, got hold of a radio station and they were broadcasting for 
help from the West during this period. 

Mr. Morris. You were broadcasting? 


The Interpreter. Yes. He was reading it into the radio with 
this uncle of his, Vidovicj's, help. 

Mr. Morris. How long were you doing that? 

The Interpreter. He did this for five hours continuously, and 
then the Russians came and occupied that town where this happened. 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else you can tell the subcom- 
mittee about your experiences during this particular period? 

The Interpreter. You are not interested in what he heard, et 
cetera; you are interested in what he ? 

Mr. Morris. What he knows about it. TeU us generally what he 
has learned, and tell us of his experience. 

The Interpreter. He knows of a case where the head, wliich was a 
general of the Russian occupying forces, was liquidated for the simple 
reason that he was reluctant to fight against the Freedom Fighters of 

Mr. Morris. Who was that general? 

The Interpreter. This happened in Papai. It is P-a-p-a-i. 
The name he does not recall, but he was a very high-ranking Soviet 

Mr. Morris. Well, I have no more questions of this mtness, 
Senator. Do you know something of the deportations that the Soviet 
Union is carrying on against the Hungarian people? 

The Interpreter. He himself has spoken to those young kids, 
16-year-old young children, who were taken out, the ones who told 
him that there were tens of thousands of them out in the Ukraine, and 
some of them were released, under age 15 and 16, and he himself has 
spoken to many of those children, with heads all shaven off, and they 
told him there are tens of thousands of them in the Ukraine. 

Mr. Morris. Who were the people you spoke with? 

The Interpreter. Sixteen-year-old children. 

Mr. Morris. Where did you see them? 

The Interpreter. They came back to Budapest. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, these are people who had already 
gone into the Ulvraine, and retm^ned to Budapest? 

The Interpreter. Released, for some unknown reasons. 

Mr. Morris. And they told you there were tens of thousands of 
people who had been deported to the Ula'aine? 

The Interpreter. Yes; tens of thousands. 

Mr. Morris. How man}^ of these young people did you see in 

The Interpreter. Several. In one of the big buildings they 
introduced these cliildren as they came back. That is where they 
saw them. 

Senator Hruska. At a public meeting? 

The Interpreter. This was a big gi'oup of buildings where, at 
night, the Russian soldiers returned these children, where they lived. 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything more you can tell us about 
the deportations? 

The Interpreter. These young children were telling him and all 
the other people that the older persons and the intellectuals which 
were taken, they are taldng them far inland into Russia. They are 
not going to release them. 

Mr. AIoRRis. Now, can you tell us more about that particular 
subject, deportations? 


The Interpreter. He has seen wagons getting ready for some 
more deportees. 

Mr. Morris. Seen what? 

The Interpreter. Seen some of these wagons preparing to be 
taken, and they heard people hollering for help from these wagons, 
and the Russian soldiers were chasing away the civilians from around 
that neighborhood. 

Senator Hruska. When you say "wagons," you mean those 
railroad cars? 

The Interpreter. Railroad wagons, railroad cars; yes. 

Senator Hruska. Were any efforts made to free them or derail the 

The Interpreter. There were attempts made and, by the time 
they organized into bigger groups to successfully, probabl}'^, free these, 
they were taken away, and other attempts were made at the borders. 
Some of them succeeded, some haven't. They just kept on rolling 
into Soviet Russia. 

Mr. Morris. Do you believe anything could have been done to 
encourage defections of the Soviet soldiers? 

The Interpreter. He says that his experience and his knowledge 
of the Russians, is this: Under the United Nations flag, if only just a 
small token force would have appeared, they would never have shot 
on them, and they would have defected. 

Mr. Morris. Now, when j^ou made your broadcast to the West on 
behalf of the Hungarian freedom fighters, what points did you cover 
in your broadcast? 

The Interpreter. It is all in here. 

Mr. Morris. Are you the person who made the famous appeal 
from the hidden Radio Rakoczi? 

The Interpreter. Yes. It was called Petofi, not Rakoczi. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that? 

The Interpreter. He -s going to submit the whole thing. Here 
is the whole speech, right here, which, if you care to present 

Mr. Morris. Sunday, November 4, 1956. Will you tell us speci- 
fically which was the broadcast and the appeal you yourself made 

The Interpreter. It is marked here. 

Mr. Morris (reading): 

Civilized people of the world, listen and come to our aid, not with declarations, 
but with force, with soldiers and arms. Do not forget that there is no stopping 
the wild onslaught of Bolshevism. Your turn will also come, once we perish. 
Save our souls. Save our souls. 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I recall that that particular broadcast was given 
quite a bit of currency shortly thereafter. . 

Are you the person who made that? 

The Interpreter. He is the one who occupied this radio station. 
He is the one that read that message. 

Mr. Morris. I think. Senator, that should be in the record. 

Senator Hruska. It will be incorporated in the record at this point. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 422" and 
reads as follows:) 


Exhibit No. 422 

(the revolt in hungary, published by the free europe committee, 

new york city, p. 86) 

Civilized people of the world, listen and come to our aid, not with declarations, 
but with force, with soldiers and arms. Do not forget that there is no stopping 
the wild onslaught of Bolshevism. Your turn will also come, once we perish. 
Save our souls. Save our souls. 

Peoples of Europe whom we helped for centuries to withstand the barbaric 
attacks from Asia, listen to the tolling of Hungarian bells warning against dis- 
aster . . . Civilized peoples of the world, we implore you to help us in the 
name of justice, of freedom, of the binding moral principle of active solidarity. 
Our ship is sinking. Light is failing, the shadows grow darker every hour over 
the soil of Hungary. Listen to the cry, civilized peoples of the world, and act; 
extend to us your fraternal hand. 

SOS, SOS— may God be with you. 

Senator Hruska. Now, one other question about these deporta- 
tions before we leave it. 

How were these railroad cars filled? Were they filled — did the 
soldiers just go out and gather boys and young men of this age and 
put them in, or did they have some courts, or did they have some way 
of selecting certain ones that would go into those railroad cars? 

The Interpreter. He says all these people were just gathered hap- 
hazardly. Anybody they could get hold of. And they were handled 
with chains and everythmg else, were shoved into these railroad cars, 
80 to 90 people. The actual capacity of these cars is about 36 men. 
There were 80, even, shoved in, all chained, without keeping any 
record, not knowing who was in it. 

Senator Hruska. Where did they get them; on the streets or 

The Interpreter. On the streets, houses, anywhere they could. 

Senator Hruska. What were their ages? 

The Interpreter. The ones he has seen specifically, they were 
young children, some of them from 12 years up to 25. 

Senator Hruska. Just men? 

The Interpreter. There were also women of the same ages, be- 
tween 12 and 15, all mixed up, but not as many as men. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Captain Turani, do you feel that if there had 
been action on the part of the United Nations, under the terms of the 
charter, the absence of which you have deplored here today, do you 
feel that the Soviet Union would be able to move on to aggressions in 
the Middle East, as they are now threatening? 

The Interpreter. Anj small help that would have come to 
Hungary, the Soviet Union would not have been able to do any tiling 
in the Near East or Middle East. This is a good example of the 
wealvuess of the Soviet Union, and the Himgarian revolution is an 
example, and it could be a barometer to the West how weak the 
Soviet Union is. The Soviet Union is not as strong as they like to 
have us believe, but very weak, and the only reason they try to show 
that they are strong, they try to show us how strong they are, because 
never has any actual thing happened that they should stop them in 
their bluffing, which they are actually doing, really. 

Mr. Morris. And do you feel, therefore, that they could commit 
aggressions in the Middle East if they had been preoccupied with the 


The Interpreter. He says he does not beheve that the Soviet 
Union could do anything in Asia if somebody would stand against 
them; they could never fight anything agamst the West. He doesn't 
believe they would. 

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions. 

Senator Hruska. If not, we will dismiss this witness, and get into 
the matter set for the committee by Mr. Szeradasi. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you for your testimony. 

Senator Hruska. Thank you very much. Captain, for coming 
before us and giving us your testimony. 

Mr. Morris. Before leaving, Captam Turani, what was the highest 
military grade that you reached? 

The Interpreter. He is, of course — he was demoted, but he was, 
when the war ended, a captain. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

Are you known sometimes as General Turani? 

The Interpreter. He does not know of any case where he was 
known as such. He was never a general. 

Senator Hruska. Let the record show that Mr. Szeradasi has been 
sworn, and he will proceed to answer the questions that Mr. Morris 
will give him. 



Mr. Morris. Yom- name is — your first name is J-e-n-o, and your 
last name is S-z-e-r-a-d-a-s-i ; is that right? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. When did you come to the United States? 

The Interpreter. December 28, 1956. 

Mr. Morris. Were you born in Hungary? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. In what year? 

The Interpreter. 1914. 

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us what your position is with the 
National Revolutionary Council? 

The Interpreter. The National Council, vice president; executive 
vice president, jo\i would say. 

Mr. Morris. Of the National Revolutionary Council? 

The Interpreter. Of the National Revolutionary Council. 

Mr. Morris. What is or was the National Revolutionary Council? 

The Interpreter. It was an anti-Communist organization, which 
was defending the revolutionary movement against the Communist 

Mr. Morris. Well, when was it formed? 

The Interpreter. It was organized October 24, 1956. 

Mr. Morris. That is the day after the outbreak? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

And who was the head of it? 

The Interpreter. Dudas. Josef Dudas. 

Mr. Morris. He was recently executed, was he not? 

The Interpreter. They hung him. 

Mr. Morris. You were the executive vice president of that council? 


The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

Now, what is the function of that National Revolutionary Council? 

The Interpreter. This Revolutionary Council submitted to the 
Communist government the reason the revolution broke out, and 
what is the object of their fights. 

Mr. Morris. You submitted the demands of the Hungarian Revo- 
lutionary Council to the Hungarian Government? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

He himself personally, with Dudas and another one, were in the 
Hungarian Parliament and were negotiating these points which they 

Senator Hruska. With whom did they meet? 

The Interpreter. With the Imre Nagy government. 

Mr. Morris. The Imre Nagy government? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Did you meet with Imre Nagy personally? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. What demands did you make with the Imre Nagy 

The Interpreter. They submitted 22 points. The first point was 
that they should create a government which has other factions, repre- 
sentatives, not only the Communist Party. 

The second point, to immediately denounce the Warsaw Pact. 

Mr. Morris. The Warsaw Pact? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

The third point, the immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops 
from Hungary. 

The fourth, as Austria is neutral, Hungary should declare its 

The fifth, which he emphasizes is very important, that the Hun- 
garian Goverimient should go to the United Nations and tell them it 
cannot fulfill the obligations of the peace treaty while they are under 
Soviet domination. 

Mr. Morris. Unless thev are out from under Soviet domination? 

The Interpreter. That is right. Out from. 

The free election is the sixth. The free election should be super- 
vised by the Four Powers. The elections should be supervised by 
the United States, France, England, and the Soviet Union. 

The seventh, the immediate denunciation of all the treaties they 
have. All treaties which they have, industrial and commercial, with 
the Soviet Union should be denounced and new treaties be made, 
international treaties. They should bring it to the attention of the 
people, the statistics of everything that was taken away from Hungary. 
And all the laws concerning workers, and so forth, should be rewritten, 
as is done internationally. 

The immediate permission of everybody's free travel to the West. 

The United Nations should immediately expel the Hungarian 
representatives in the United Nations. 

Senator Hruska. The present representatives? 

The Interpreter. The present ones, yes. 

And there should be representatives sent, the ones sent by the 
Hungfa'ian people. 

93215— 57— pt. 49 5 


Imre accepted this 22-point declaration, and promised next day at 
9 o'clock he was going to have an answer for them. Imre Nagy prom- 
ised this, and also shuffled around his government, which is over here, 
what he did. 

On October 30, Imre Nagy shuffled his government, which then 
consisted of Bela Kovacs, Smallholder; Zoltan Tildy, Smallholder; and 
Ferenc Erdei, Peasant Party; and three Communists. 

The National Council were not satisfied with this. 

Mr. Morris. That is, the National Revolutionary Council was not 

The Interpreter. Was not satisfied. They gathered the repre- 
sentatives of the armed revolutionaries, and all the workers' organiza- 
tions and all the unions, and then the result of this gathering was that 
Imre Nagy shuffled his government again, and only himself, as a Com- 
munist, was retained, and they elected from the other parties, such as 
Zoltan Tilday, Smallholder; Bela Kovacs, Smallholder; Istvan B. 
Szabo, Smallholder; Anna Kethly, Social Democrat; Gyula Kelemen, 
Social Democrat; Jozsef Fischer, Social Democrat; and Istvan Bibo, 
Petofi Peasant, Peasant Party. 

The weakness of the Imre Nagy government was that between Octo- 
ber 27 to November 3 they were fumbling around, and this gave the 
Soviet Union the time to come in with new troops. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you hear the testimony of Mr. Fonagy 
yesterday, that there was going to be — that the National Revolu- 
tionary Parliament is organizing, or the Hungarian people will rise 
up and complete the third phase of the revolution? 

The Interpreter. He agrees with everything Fonagy said. How- 
ever, he goes further. He says the revolution didn't cease. The 
revolution continues on, although there are no actual fightings. And 
when and if this third phase of the revolution comes, it is going to be 
a much bigger — on a bigger scale — and probably better organized 
than it was before. 

The Himgarian people lost everything, so it is going to be a much 
bigger revolution than the October 23 one. 

Senator Hrusk A. When the witness says that the fighting, the 
revolution is still going on, what specific acts are they doing to carry 
on that revolution now? 

The Interpreter. They are working and making all the contacts 
with all the people who are revolutionists and they are going to be in a 
better position to lead a revolution than they were in October. 

Senator Hruska. Can it be said that they are organizing? 

The Interpreter. Organizing, yes; that is what they are doing. 

Senator Hruska. Are they doing any sabotage or any slowdown 
of production? 

The Interpreter. Yes. He says that they are continuing sabotage 
and, practically, there is no production in Hungary, even their own 
statistics show our production went down to 30 percent instead of being 
100 percent like it was before the revolution, f 

Senator Hruska. Was the Parliament against all Communists, 
whether Hungarian or Russian Communists, or did they confine 
their efforts to just one of those? 

The Interpreter. He said that it was an anti-Communist organiza- 
tion that fought against all Communists who were under Soviet 


Mr. Morris. Was that exactly the Senator's question? 

Senator Hruska. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Well, now, would a form of national Hungarian 
communism satisfy the Hungarians at this juncture of history? 

The Interpreter. No, it would not. The Hungarian people are 
so against even the word "communism" that when they hear that they 
immediately revolt, be it any form or shape. 

Mr. Morris. What happened to Mr. Dudas? 

The Interpreter. They executed him. 

Mr. Morris. Were you nearby when that happened? When 
was the execution? 

The Interpreter. He said, when he returned the second time to 

Mr. Morris. Just a minute. When did you first leave Hungary? 

The Interpreter. November, the 4th and the 5th, in the night. 

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony you sometime subsequently 
returned to Hungary? 

The Interpreter. He returned to Hungary December 4 and De- 
cember 8 he arrived in Budapest. 

Mr. Morris. I see. What was the purpose of 3^our trip into 
Budapest in December? 

The Interpreter. His main purpose was to destroy all evidence, 
documents; and also to try to bring other people out into Austria. 

Mr. Morris. What documents did you try to destroy? 

The Interpreter. The national council's documents. 

Mr. Morris. In other words he was going to destroy the documents 
of the National Revolutionary Council? 

The Interpreter. That is right. 

Mr. Morris. Why were you going to do that? 

The Interpreter. They were is such place that, well, if it was 
found by the antirevolutionaries or the present form of Government, 
it would create maii}^ — a lot of trouble. A lot of people would be 
executed whose names were on this document. 

\h\ Morris. So jour purpose in coming back into Budapest was 
to destroy the records that might embarass or get into trouble members 
of the National Revolutionary Party? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

]\Ir. ^Morris. All right. What happened w^hen you went into 

The Interpreter. He says, this time the Russians with Hungarian 
civilians, who he doesn't know, probablv six people, went from house 
to house and were gathering those people who actually fought in the 

Mr. Morris. The Soviet-occup34ng forces were therefore going 
around gathering up people who fought in the revolution? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. He had seen it himself and he was 
instructed by people that he should not go near any of the Soviet 
troops because they were gathering those people who fought. 

Mr. Morris. What else happened? Did you see Dudas? 

The Interpreter. He has not seen Dudas. He has spoken to 
his wife and Dudas, through his wife, told him he was not willing to 
leave Hungary. 

Mr. Morris. All right. Did you see Dudas when you went there? 

The Interpreter. No. He did not. 


Mr. Morris. Now, you did see his wife? 

The Interpreter. He did see his wife. 

Mr. Morris. And Dudas conveyed a message through his wife he 
was not going to leave Hungary? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And did you suggest to Dudas that he leave? 

The Interpreter. Yes, he said he itold him — he told him that he 
definitely can get out because there are still some people sympathetic 
at the border with the revolution. 

Mr. Morris. Then what happened to Dudas ultimately? 

The Interpreter. They arrested him. 

Mr. Morris. And he was executed? 

The Interpreter. Yes; they hung him. 

Mr. Morris. When was that? 

The Interpreter. The witness was in Austria when it came to his 
notice Dudas was hung. 

Senator Hruska. Did he have a trial? 

The Interpreter. His only knowledge is what he read in the paper. 

Senator Hruska. And what was that? 

The Interpreter. That was, he was under an emergency court, 
statarium, they call it, in which he was found guilty, and he was 

Senator Hruska. And the date? 

The Interpreter. He does not know, but it is easy to find out the 

Mr. Morris. It was late December, was it not? 

The Interpreter. Yes, it was late in December. 

Mr. Morris. And when did you come to the United States? 

The Interpreter. December 28, 1956. 

Mr. Morris. Now, are you endeavoring to keep alive the National 
Revolutionary Council, you as the vice chairman? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, do you feel there is going to be continued re- 
sistance on the part of your people in Hungary? 

The Interpreter. He definitel}' knows, he doesn't think but he 
knows, that they do. 

Mr. Morris. And you, yourself, took part in the fighting, did you 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us generally what you did? 

The Interpreter. Well, he shot. 

Mr. Morris. Did you carry out for a long period of time those 
shooting activities? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hruska. Was it street fighting and did j^ou shoot at 
Russian soldiers or the secret police or what? 

The Interpreter. First, they were shooting at the Hungarian 
secret police and a couple of days later at the Russians and during this 
fighting several Russian armored cars joined them — two tanks — 
joined the Hungarian revolutionaries and fought on their side. They 
helped them to shoot the Hungarian secret police. 

Do you want to hear what he has just been telling me? 

Senator Hruska. If it bears on that question. 


The Interpreter. Well, it does. And then he said they got into 
some sort of an armistice with the Russians which they broke on the 
28th of October and started shooting. 

Senator Hruska. Who broke the armistice? 

The Interpreter. The Russians. At 3:30 in the morning they 
came with 20 tanks and started shooting the Hungarians. Then he 
was among them. 

Mr. Morris. You are an artist by profession; are you not? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Morris. Did you attend the university? 

The Interpreter. Yes. At the art school. 

Mr. Morris. And do you hold a degree? 

The Interpreter. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Did you have any experience with Soviet defections 
among the troops in Hungary? 

The Interpreter. Due to the fact that among themselves they 
had many Russians fighting — he knows that — and one of the points 
of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council, they said that any Russian 
that defects and joins them are going to be Hungarian citizens and 
going to get complete — ^how do you say that? 

Senator Hruska. Amnesty? 

The Interpreter. Amnesty. 

Senator Hruska. In other words, that was the declaration of the 
National Hungarian 

The Interpreter. Revolutionary Council. 

Mr. Morris. That if any Soviet soldiers would join them they 
would have amnesty. 

The Interpreter. And become American citizens, if they wished. 

Senator Hruska. You mean Hungarian? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. How long do you plan to stay in America? 

The Interpreter. He says that depends mostly on the United 
States and the other free nations. When and if Hungary becomes 
a free country and they are going to have free elections, he desires to 
return then. 

Senator Hruska. Will he accompany Mr. Fonagy to the United 
Nations to testify there? 

The Interpreter. He would like to. However, he has no knowl- 
edge at present if he is to be heard. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Rusher has a few questions and I don't think 
they will be long. 

Senator Hruska. Very well. 

Mr. Rusher. Who gave you this document — would you please teU 
us briefly what it is? 

The Interpreter. The Hungarian Optical Workers sent this to — 
not him but with demands. Do you want me to translate that? 

Mr. Rusher. No, I don't want it translated just yet. Tell me, 
was this forwarded through the National Revolutionary Council? 

The Interpreter. The Optical Workers' Council joined the 
Hungarian National Revolutionary Council and then through the 
Hungarian National Revolutionary Council they had it transmitted 
to the Hungarian Government. 

Mr. Rusher. Were there many such sets of demands forwarded 
through the National Revolutionary Council to the Nagy Govern- 


The Interpreter. Yes, very many of these were submitted to us. 
Not only the optical workers but all of the peasants and intellectuals 
and different factories presented their demands. 

Mr. Rusher. But this is typical of the demands? 

The Interpreter. This is a typical demand. They 

Mr. Rusher. Now, I notice — go ahead. 

The Interpreter. The only reason he submitted this is because 
here you can see that the Hungarian workers or the Hungarian people 
would not ally themselves with any Marxist ideas, et cetera. He 
wants to emphasize that fact. 

Mr. Rusher. Would you summarize this for us, just briefly, the 
substance of the document? I notice there seem to be two demands 
listed, as I understand it. 

The Interpreter. The Hungarian Optical Workers, through their 
duly elected representatives, are putting these demands forward : 

We demand that the Soviet Union should immediately start withdrawing their 
troops from Himgary. 

Only after this demand is met can they say that they will start the work in their 

We demand from the Hungarian National Government that they should im- 
mediately withdraw the present delegates to the United Nations and send out 
duly elected delegates from the present Hungarian National Government and they 
should be instructed to instruct the people of the West of the Hungarian people's 

The^bove^demandsl^we want to be broadcast through radio so every worker 
should know all those demands. 

Mr. Rusher. Over the Hungarian radio? 

The'lNTERPRETER. OvcT their radios; yes. 

The Hungarian optical workers are only going to start work if 
the'^National Government broadcasts this through radio and some of 
their demands are met. 

Mr. Rusher. Senator, if you approve I would submit this for the 
record, with an appropriate and more thoroughlv worked out trans- 
lation as a typical set of demands, demands that were forwarded by 
the workers in one factory through the Hungarian National Revolu- 
tionary Council to the Government, and they are typical, as the 
witness has said, of the demands by other workers and the peasants, 
and so on. 

Senator Hruska. It wdll be placed in the record with instructions 
to the staff that appropriate translations will be procured. 

(The document referred to was marked|"Exhibit No. 423" and is 
translated as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 423 

To Imre Nagt, President of the National Council of Ministers, Budapest: 

The workers of the Hungarian Optical Works have elected their temporary 
Workers' Council and have brought the following resolutions: 

(1) We demand that the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary 
be immediately begun, because only in this way do we see the possibility 
of securing decent working conditions in order to begin work. 

(2) We ask the Hungarian National Government that it revoke the 
powers of the old government's delegate to the United Nations, and that it 
send a new delegate who would represent the demands of the Hungarian 
people fighting for its independence. Also that the government give 
progress reports of the activity of this new delegation to the Hungarian 
working people. 


We ask that the above resolutions be broadcast by the Hungarian radio. 
The Workers' Council has seen to it that by multiplication this document has 
been brought to the attention of other factory workers. 

According to the expressed wishes of the workers of the Hungarian Optical 
Works, the Workers' Council is so disposed that the workers will only begin 
work if the delegation to your Council of Ministers has met with success and 
when, through the radio, you shall announce this success and ask the workers 
to return. 

The Temporary Workers' Council of the 
Hungarian Optical Works. 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Witness, during these times you have de- 
scribed, did you get news of what was happening in Poland? 

The Interpreter. Due to the fact that there were some of those 
people with whom the connection was held with the Pohsh workers — 
he cannot mention any names. However, for years they have been 
in contact with the Polish movement. 

Senator Hruska. Did they receive word about the uprising in 
Poland that occurred during October? 

The Interpreter. Yes, they had knowledge. 

Senator Hruska. How did they get that knowledge? Through 
newspapers or radio? 

The Interpreter. No, through courier. 

Senator Hruska. That is the underground? 

The Interpreter. That is right. 

Senator Hruska. What was the thinking of the Hungarian Parli- 
ment and members of the Hungarian National Government about 
that? Your people? 

The Interpreter. They had submitted this to the Hungarian 
people as an example of the Polish fight. 

Senator Hruska. And they did that to encourage the Hungarian 
people to also arise and take action? 

The Interpreter. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. Did they approve of what happened in Poland? 

The Interpreter. Yes, they did. 

Senator Hruska. Of course in Poland they simply changed the form 
of communism. They did not abolish communism. 

The Interpreter. That is right. 

Senator Hruska. And to that extent perhaps the Hungarians were 
not satisfied. Might not that be true? 

The Interpreter. That is the same thing to the Hungarian people 
as the other. 

Senator Hruska. But they did get some comfort out of the idea 
that the Russian Communists had been defied and that they were 

The Interpreter. The real — the little gain which the Poles prob- 
ably obtained through the revolution again shows the weakness of the 
Soviet Union and the Hungarian people therefore got a little more 
momentum from that fact that they are not so strong and if any help 
would come from the United Nations or from the West they would 
probably — it would probably prove what the Hungarian people think 
of the Soviet Union, that they are not so strong, but without any 
help they cannot do anything. 

Mr. Norris. Do you have any connections in the underground in 
the Soviet Union? 

The Interpreter. No, sir. 


Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the 
record and possibly ask a question or two of this particular witness 
about it, a press release and a report issued. 

It is a joint FAO mission report, Senator Hruska. The FAO is the 
Food and Agricultural Organization in the United Nations. It is a 
specialized agency of the United Nations. At the head is the new 
Director General, Mr. Sen, an Indian. He was recently elected as 
Director General of the FAO. 

Now, after the United Nations team had been authorized to conduct 
a fact-finding tour of Hungary and was turned down, a team repre- 
senting the FAO and the United Nations apparently did get into Hun- 
gary and they issued a report and I have that report and press release 
issued January 23, 1957, and I would like this for the record and point 
out just a few things. 

Senator Hruska. It will be received in the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 424 and 424-A 
and read as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 424 

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 

North American Regional Office, 

Washington, D. C, January 23, 1957. 
(The following press story has been received from FAO Rome Headquarters 
and is reissued from the North American Regional Office for reference purposes.) 

Substantial Food Imports Needed by Hungary, UN/FAO Mission Reports 

Rome, January 18 — A joint UN/FAO mission reported today that the people 
of Hungary urgently need "substantial imports" of agricultural supplies and an 
assurance of regular deliveries from the farms if they are to be assured an adequate 
food supply between now and the next harvest. The mission's report on the 
country's food and agricultural needs was made public simultaneously by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations. 

B. R,. Sen, Director General of FAO, said the estimates of food and agricultural 
needs listed in the agricultural chapter of the report had already been submitted 
to member governments likely to be able to supply at short notice some of the 
required goods, and that already he had received intimations that part of the 
requirements, including all of the needed seed supplies, could be found. 

The report said that a combination of a bad 1956 crop and the disruption of 
normal field work during the recent political upheaval have made it essential to 
raise agricultural production in 1957 to the "highest possible level." Otherwise, 
it warned, a period of critical shortage would develop in the summer and Hungary 
would have to prolong its dependence on external sources of supply. 

The report was prepared by a joint mission composed of Phillipe de Seynes, 
U. N. Undersecretary in charge of relief for Hungary; Dr. F. T. Wahlen, Director 
of the Agriculture Division of FAO; Arthur Ewing, Chief of the Steel, Engineering 
and Housing Section of the U. N. Economic Commission for Europe, and Pierre 
Sinard, Chief of the FAO/ECE Joint Agriculture Division. It was in Budapest 
from January 4 to 7. The full report, released at U. N. Headquarters today, deals 
with the needs of the Hungarian people under the additional categories of industry 
and transport, housing and economic policy. 

Its introduction noted that the mission, undertaken in pursuance of humani- 
tarian resolution of the U. N. General Assembly, was exploratory, and that the 
findings were based on information made available by the Hungarian authorities 
and information gathered in recent years on the Hungarian economy by the 
Secretariats of the U. N. and of FAO. It also drew on a memorandum on relief 
action prepared earlier by the International Committee of the Red Cross. By 
agreement with the U. N., the ICRC is the sole agent for channelling supplies 
and employing funds contributed to the U. N. Relief Fund. The agreement pro- 
vides in addition for action by the specialized Agencies within their fields of 
competence. The UN/FAO mission's report supports an ICRC proposal to estab- 
lish an expanded program of emergency relief towards basic needs for the period 
January 15 to July 15. 


Dr. Wahlen, in a summary submitted to Mr. Sen, pointed out that the most 
critical factor in the Hungarian economy is shortage of coal and power, and warned 
that this together with other factors "may lead to inflation, and thus severely 
affect the prices of food supplies." 

Even as the report was being prepared in final form, FAO was approaching 
certain governments to secure their cooperation in meeting the needs revealed in 
the report. A preliminary survey made in Geneva and Vienna in late December 
by Dr. Wahlen and Mr. Sinard indicated that some 15,000 tons of seed would be 
needed for spring planting. The Director General made available information on 
the quantities of various types of seeds which would be needed. And when Dr. 
Wahlen returned from the joint UN/FAO mission Mr. Sen communicated further 
information on other agricultural needs to governments which might be in position 
to satisfy them. 

"Thus far," Mr. Sen said, "I have every hope that the greater proportion of 
the immediate food and agricultural needs can be met." 

The Agricultural portion of the report emphasized that the estimates of aid 
needs were aimed primarily at maintaining the agricultural production appara'tus, 
in the interest of ensuring future food supplies. 

"Examination on the spot and discussions with the Hungarian authories" Dr. 
Whalen's summary said, "have shown that tlie supply of seeds, feeds, and ferti- 
lizers is the most effective way of accomplishing this goal." The Hungarian 
authorities had agreed that, insofar as aid goods were furnished as donations, 
FAO "shall exercise a control for their correct distribution along the lines of con- 
trol exercised by the International Committee of the Red Cross for the distribution 
of goods supplied by them." 

Dr. Wahlen said the food situation at the time of the mission's visit was "not 
alarming." Basic foods were available and price levels had been largely main- 

But there were some disturbing indications of what the future might bring. 
Among them were cited delaj-s at food-distribution points, the slaughter of val- 
uable breeding stock because of feed shortages, the disruption of the output of 
food-processing plants, the rapid dwindling of reserve stocks to keep abreast of 
day-to-day demand, the suspension of exports, and the probable effect on prices 
of the abolition in November of the policy of compulsory deliveries by farmers of 
their products at fixed prices. On this latter point, the UN/FAO report said: 

"Such far-reaching changes in economic behavior may well be accompanied by 
occasional temporary dislocation in deliveries, and it should be pointed out that 
even a temporary falling-off in the supply of certain products would inevitably 
lead to a spectacular rise in prices, consumers' purchasing power being for the 
moment quite high. Difficulties are being experienced in estimating the probable 
timing of deliveries from farms, since no comparable situation has existed in recent 
years which might furnish a basis of estimation." 

"Nevertheless, farmers have increasingly come to regard the removal of com- 
pulsory deliveries as an essential step in the improvement of rural conditions 
and to that extent they have now obtained satisfaction. The most recent official 
declarations contain for the time being no reference to or modifications of the 
arrangements announced in November, and it appears that from now on it is 
the play of the forces of supply and demand which will decide the way in which 
agricultural production will develop." 

The report said emergency measures needed to assist the recovery of agricultural 
production include: 

Provision of some 15,000 tons of seeds (spring wheat, spring barley, oats, and 
seed potatoes) for spring planting to help in offsetting the 30 to 40 percent deficit 
in autumn sowings. 

Provision of about 50,000 tons of chemical fertilizers for use in the spring, to 
make up for the loss of current production due to fuel shortages and transport 

To combat a "serious" livestock feed situation, 300,000 tons of coarse grains 
must be provided between January and March. 

The report also estimated food imports needed between now and the next 
harvest at 400,000 tons of wheat, 20,000 tons of sugar, 10,000 tons of lard and 
10,000 tons of tallow. As lower-priority items it listed 1,000 tons of cocoa beans, 
1,000 tons of coffee, 100 tons of pepper, 5,000 tons of lemons and 2,000 tons of 

Meat, the report said, was presently in plentiful supply due to the widespread 
slaughter of stock because of lack of feed. All available refrigeration space was 
filled to capacity and arrangements have been made to use facilities in neighboring 
countries. These stocks would in part offset the shortfall in meat production 
expected during the summer. 

93215— 57— pt. 49 6 


Exhibit No. 424-A 


1. A visit to Budapest from 4 to 7 January was undertaken jointly by the 
United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
in pursuance of Resolutions 1004 (ES-11) and 1006 (ES-11) by which the General 
Assembly inter alia resolved to undertake on a large scale, immediate aid for 
Hungarj', and requested the Secretary-General in consultation with the heads of 
the appropriate specialized agencies to enquire into the needs of the Hungarian 
people for relief supplies and to report thereon to the General Assembly. 

2. The mission was one of enquiry and not one to negotiate on any matters 
with the Hungarian authorities. The following report is based on information 
made available to it by the Hungarian Government in the course of three days' 
intensive consultations. The information which has been gathered in recent years 
on the Hungarian economy in the secretariats of the United Nations (particularly 
the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe) and of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization considerably facihtated the task of appraising the effects 
of recent developments. The mission had also with it a memorandum on relief 
action for Hungary prepared at an earlier date by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross in cooperation with the Hungarian Red Cross and the Ministry 
of Supplies. 

It was possible for the mission to revise and complete the estimates made in 
this memorandum in the light of additional and more recent information. The 
mission, furthermore, consulted the Directors-General of the International Labour 
Office, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organizations as well as with the President of the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross and the President of the League of Red 
Cross Societies. 

3. The national economy of Hungary has suffered a severe setback as a result 
of recent events. The fighting and subsequent unrest resulted in extensive damage 
to buildings, the destruction and depletion of stocks of food and goods, the loss 
of skilled labour and the virtual cessation of work in many sectors of the economy. 
The present situation is conditioned not only by these events but also by a rel- 
ativeh'- poor harvest in 1956 and by the changes being implemented as a result 
of the current rethinking of economic objectives. 

4. There is at present a lack of fodder necessary to maintain livestock through 
the winter months, as well as a lack of seed for the spring sowing, and of fertiliser. 
There is also the prospect of food shortage from May until the next wheat harvest. 
The short fall in coal production has already brought certain sectors of the economy 
to a standstill with the result of widespread unemployment. Furthermore, infla- 
tionary pressures are mounting due to increased pressure of consumer demand 
upon depleted supplies. 

5. The relief requirements of the Hungarian people can be assessed only in the 
light of the overall economic conditions at present prevailing and it has therefore 
been necessary to review these conditions in this report. Moreover, it is clear 
that steps designed to restore productive capacity will reduce both the duration 
and the volume of relief needs. The determination, however, of where relief ends 
and rehabilitation begins, in this situation, is not one where economic considera- 
tions are paramount. 

6. With regard to relief programmes the International Committee of the Red 
Cross under the terms of the agreement between the Committee and the United 
Nations signed on 4 December 1956 is the sole agent for the channelling of supplies 
and the utilization of funds contributed to the United Nations Relief Fund. The 
mission had the opportunity to observe at first hand the field operations of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Hungarian Red Cross whose 
work is widely publicized in Hungary; the administration and distribution of 
supplies by these bodies are exemplary. A section of this Report refers to the 
programme of the Committee and to the proposals for expansion for the present 
ICRC activities through 15 July 1957 after which the Red Cross proposes to dis- 
continue its relief activities inside Hungary. 



Minimum conditions for recovery 

1. An adequate food supply to the population of Hungary between now and 
the next harvest can only be assured, under present circumstances, given two 

(a) that substantial imports take place urgently, so as to compensate in 
part for the abnormally low production of 1956; 

(6) that the supplies becoming available from agriculture in the coming 
months will be marketed in a regular and continuous manner. 
These two imperatives dictate the whole food supply policy of the govern- 
ment. Any reduction in the volume of imports which is envisaged or any pro- 
longed suspension of deliveries from farms would, without any question, endanger 
the supply of the large cities and towns and would aggravate a food situation 
which is already difficult. 

2. It is moreover essential that every effort should be made to raise agricultural 
production in 1957 to the highest possible level, especially crop production. 
The events of recent months have held back fieldwork, in particular the autumn 
sowing of cereals. If this lost time cannot be made up, the insufficiency of 
national supplies would not only prevent Hungary, which in the past has been a 
traditional exporter of agricultural products, from maintaining its flow of foreign 
trade during the coming year, but would also prolong its dependence on external 
sources of supply. 

Shortcomings of 1956 domestic supplies 

3. The deficit in production in 1956 can be attributed for the most part to the 
long dry period which was experienced. The production of both bread grains 
and coarse grains was greatly diminished thereby, and fodder crops and pastures 
were similarly affected. Furthermore, since the food processing industry was and 
continues to be interrupted for a long period by the shortage of transport facilities 
and of coal' (especially in the case of sugar beet factories), certain industrial 
byproducts which normally become available for feeding to livestock have been 
at least partially lacking. For these reasons the feed supply situation for breed- 
ing and fattening livestock is very difficult. 

Effects of changed system of marketing 

4. Until a few months ago the food supply of the urban centres depended 
essentially on the compulsory deliveries which farmers were called upon to make, 
and the purchase price of these quantities was fixed by the State. In the early 
part of November this system was abolished. Henceforward farmers, whether 
they operate private farms or whether they belong to a cooperative farm, can 
dispose freely of part or all of their produce to individual consumers. If sales 
are not made directly to consumers, the farmers have to deliver their products to 
the trade organizations which collect and distribute under regulations made by 
the Ministry of Internal Trade. All those transactions, however, take place at 
prices freely arrived at, and this applies at all stages of distribution. 

5. Such far-reaching changes in economic behaviour may well be accompanied 
by occasional temporary dislocation in deliveries and it should be pointed out 
that even a temporary falling off in the supply of certain products would inevitably 
lead to a spectacular rise in prices,^ consumers' purchasing power being for the 
moment quite high. Difficulties are being experienced in estimating the probable 
timing of deliveries from farms, since no comparable situation has existed in 
recent years which might furnish a basis of estimation. Nevertheless, farmers 
have increasingly come to regard the removal of compulsory deliveries as an 
essential step in the improvement of rural conditions, and to that extent they 
have now obtained satisfaction. The most recent official declarations contain for 
the time being no reference to or modifications of the arrangements announced 
in November, and it appears that from now on it is the play of the forces of supply 
and demand which will decide the way in which agricultural production will 

1 In these respects serious difficulties still exist. [Footnotes are those of Issuing ageney. 

2 This has already happened for certain products, such as eggs. 


Current food situation in Budapest 

6. At the time when the mission was carried out, the food situation in Budapest 
(and, it seems, in other large cities) was on the whole satisfactory. The basic 
commodities, bread and milk, were obtainable without rationing, though often 
only after a period of waiting, due to the reduction in the number of points of sale. 
Meat was plentiful, this being normally the time of seasonal surplus, aggravated 
this year by the scarcity of feeds which forces farmers to sell animals; vegetables 
were arriving from the surrounding districts in sufficient quantities but without 
much variety to choose from; fruit, consisting almost entirely of apples, was scarce 
and of poor quaUty. 

The price levels fixed before October have been more or less maintained for the 
essential foodstuffs, although for other products (notably eggs and paprika) con- 
siderably higher prices have been recorded. This satisfactory situation has only 
been maintained by rapidly drawing upon the stocks. In addition, exports of 
agricultural products have been totally stopped during the past few months, 
while a certain quantity of imports have continued to arrive. 

Immediate tasks 

7. Three main problems arise for the Hungarian food and agricultural services 
at the present time. 

(a) to make available to farmers without delay the means of production 
which are needed in preparation for the harvest of 1957, and for the main- 
tenance of livestock; 

(6) to secure the regular delivery of produce from the farms under the new 
system of free marketing; and 

(c) to make plans for such imports as are indispensable. 
These three points are developed more fully below. 

(a) Emergency measures to assist the recovery of agricultural production 
(i) Seeds. — 

8. Up to the present time it has beeia not possible to complete the programme of 
autumn sowings. ^ If normal weather conditions prevail in the coming months, 
this delay could be made up by prolonging the period of spring sowing. Early- 
ripening varieties of wheat, barley, and oats which are not available locally in 
sufficient quantities would have to be obtained. The requirements for these 
seeds are stated to be as follows: 


Spring wheat 5, 000 

Spring barley 5, 000 

Oats 2,000 

A list of the varieties which are requested has recently been drawn up by the 
Hungarian agronomic services, which communicated it directly to FAO. That 
Organisation has already initiated action with a number of its member govern- 
ments in Western Europe where the desired varieties might be available. It 
appears that it will be possible to meet the needs expressed in large measure, 
either in the form of gifts or by means of a barter exchange (e. g. seed barley 
against an undertaking by Hungary to furnish the equivalent quantity of malting 
barley after the harvest), or through the normal channels of trade. 

Similar provisions have already been made by FAO to secure the supply to 
Hungary in the near future of 2,500 tons of seed potatoes and 400 tons of hybrid 
maize seeds. 

In the event that gifts are forthcoming, their distribution would be controlled 
according to a procedure similar to that at present being followed for International 
Red Cross supplies. 

(ii) Fertilisers. — - 

9. Production in 1957 could also be increased if chemical fertilisers were put 
at the disposal of farmers in relatively large quantities. 

Fertiliser consumption has remained low in Hungary in comparison to the more 
advanced countries of Europe. Production in 1955 amounted to 12,800 tons of 
pure N and 28,800 tons of P2O5. It is difficult to estimate what will be the 
shortfall in fertiliser production due to the recent and continuing fuel shortage 
as well as transport and other difficulties, but it is safe to consider that the reduc- 
tion will correspond to no less than three months' output. The most immediate 
need, which is for nitrogen fertilisers for use in the spring, is on all available 
evidence considerable. 

3 According to some estimates, the axea sown with cereals this winter amounts to only 60 or 70% of the 
area normally sown. 


(iii) Livestock 'production. — 

10. The Hungarian feed situation is serious. The harvest of coarse grains, 
and especially of maize, was about 30 percent below that of the previous year. 
Fodder crops were also poor. 

Production of certain cereals 

[Million tons] 




1956 (Prelim- 










Oats . 


Maize - 


Total- - 





Breeding stock (at breeding stations) and some of the stock for meat produc- 
tion (specialized pig-producing enterprises) are particularly threatened. Their 
feed supply in the past depended mainly on compulsory deliveries coming from 
cooperative farms and family farms. These deliveries were stopped shortly after 
the maize harvest, with the result that no stocks of coarse grains were built up 
by the livestock enterprises. 

11. In order to maintain the numbers of pedigree livestock and to fatten the 
pigs which the specialized enterprises now have, 150,000 tons of coarse grains 
(essentially barley and maize) are urgently requested by the authorities. The 
delivery timetable, they consider, should be as follows: 


Before the end of January 20, 000 

In February 60,000 

In March 70, 000 

The needs for the next two or three weeks will be met by a consignment of 
barley promised by the USSR and now on its way. There have been negotiations 
with China and 150,000 tons of coarse grains will be provided by that country; it 
is not expected, however, that delivery will take place before April or May. 
Should these supplies not be forthcoming within the arranged time, the previously 
mentioned minimum requirement of 150,000 tons would have to be increased 

(b) Encouragement of deliveries from farms 

12. To encourage deliveries from farms, three series of measures have been 
taken or are envisaged: 

(i) as indicated above, steps have been taken to obtain by trade negotia- 
tion or other ways, means of production for which the farmers urgently ask. 

(ii) concerning domestic production, important changes have been made 
to the regulations which were previously applied. Farmers are under no 
obligation as regards their production plans, and they can dispose of their 
produce in any way they wish. They have obtained the right to dissolve 
the cooperative farms previously created, if they so desire.* The machine- 
tractor stations must in the future be at the disposal of all and they must 
become self-financing independent concerns. During discussions mention 
was made of the Government's intention to proceed with the sale to private 
farmers of land belonging to the State or to local communities. The purchase 
and renting of land is authorised so as to enable famil}' farms to adapt their 
area to the labour which they have at their disposal. 

(iii) finally, the Hungarian supply services are concerned to provide 
farmers with the various consumer goods which they need. The new priorities 
allocated to the industries which produce these goods, which are dealt with 
elsewhere in this report, partly reflect this concern. 

* It seems that about 50 percent (or 2,000 in number) of the cooperative farms existing at the end of October 
have been dissolved. It is reported that some have been reestablished in a modified form. 


(c) Food imports and requirements: forecasts for the coming months 

13. The food requirements to be covered by imports relate both to basic com- 
modities (cereals, sugar, fats) and to products often considered to be less in- 
dispensable (coffee, cocoa, oranges, etc.). Moreover, a serious shortage of meat 
might appear during the summer months if the coarse grains necessary for the 
maintenance and fattening of the livestock are not forthcoming in good time. 


14. The harvest of 1956 was markedly lower than the average of recent years. 

Production of bread grains 


Million tons 



1956 » 





1. 7-1. 8 

Rye --- 






2. 2-2. 3 

I Provisional. 

Some stocks had been built up before the recent events, through the operation 
of the programme of compulsory deliveries. However, it has been officially stated 
that total State procurements of bread grains up to 15 October were 20 percent 
less than had been planned. The deficit for compulsory deliveries up to that time 
(based on farm area) was only about 10 percent, but there was a failure to make 
the planned purchases at free market prices, over and above the compulsory 
delivered quantities. 

15. To maintain sufficient supplies between now and the next harvest, it is 
officially estimated that more than 400,000 tons of wheat will have to be im- 
ported. ^ After allowing for the 250,000 tons which are expected from USSR as 
part of the programme of economic aid recently prepared, a need for 150,000 tons 
would remain. Although it is desired that shipments should begin soon, it would 
suffice if this quantity were to be delivered in April or May, since the available 
stocks and the undertakings for delivery from other countries should theoretically 
cover requirements until the beginning of June. 

Sugar. — 

16. The sugar beet harvest of 1956 would normally have been sufficient to cover 
all requirements. However, as work at the sugar factories has been held up, some 
losses have occurred through a reduction in the sugar content of the roots. It is 
now necessary for 20,000 tons of sugar to be imported, at the latest during the 
summer months, if the present consumption levels are to be maintained. 

Fats. — 

17. Lard plays an important part in Hungarian food supplies. It will be neces- 
sary to import 10,000 tons to cover requirements until October. The Inter- 
national Red Cross has already taken steps to ensure a supply of 3,000 tons of fats 
to Hungary in the near future. 

18. Tallow: Normally 10,000 tons are imported annually. For 1957 this 
quantity is not yet assured and apparently cannot be obtained through the usual 
trade channels owing to lack of means of payment. 

Other commodities. — 

19. It would seem desirable to maintain a very limited supply of certain com- 
modities of lower priority, the complete deprivation of which would cause hard- 
ship. These are as follows: 


cocoa beans 1, 000 

coffee 1,000 

pepper 100 

lemons 5, 000 

oranges 2, 000 

Some of these commodities, such as oranges, could be reserved for persons with 
special nutritional needs. 

5 This estimate takes account of the quantities of wheat and flour recently received from various countries 
as emergency aid. 


Problems of meat supplies 

20. Meat is plentiful at present in Budapest and probably throughout the 
country. Slaughterings have been accelerated, especially of pigs, on account of 
the insufficient supplies of feedingstuffs. Since storage facilities are not such as 
to accommodate all the available quantities, arrangements have been made to 
utilise cold stores in neighbouring countries. 

These stocks will in part make up for the shortfall of meat production which 
will occur during the summer (after the end of May). When that time comes the 
remainder will have to come from the specialized pig enterprises for which imports 
of coarse grains are now requested. 

Certain traditional exports of Hungarian produce (poultry, for example) will 
have to continue in order to fulfil trade commitments already made and to pay 
for the planned imports of basic foods. 


60. From the preceding brief survey the following relief requirements appear 
to emerge with respect to food supply and agriculture: 

(I) Seeds: Tons 

Spring wheat 5, 000 

Spring barley , 5, 000 

Oats 2,000 

(The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is in contact with a 
number of governments with a view to facilitating arrangements for the 
provision of seed.) 

(II) Fertilizer: Tms 

Nitrogen 3, 150 

P205 7,000 

(III) Fodder for livestock: Tons 
Barley and maize 300, 000 

(The Hungarian authorities reported arrangements are being made to 
receive 150,000 tons of this amount.) 

(IV) Food Requirements: Tons 
Wheat 400,000 

(The Hungarian authorities report that arrangements are already under- 
way to secure 250,000 tons of this amount.) Tons 

Sugar 20,000 

Lard 10,000 

(The ICRC has arranged to supply some 3,000 tons of this amount.) 


Tallow 10,000 

Other Requirements (lower priority) : Tons 

Cocoa beans 1, 000 

Coffee 1,000 

Pepper 100 

Lemons 5, 000 

Oranges 2,000 

61. Since November 1956, the ICRC has been conducting a traditional emer- 
gency relief programme, which as indicated in the interim report of the Secretary- 
General (Document A/3443), is providing minimal relief to four percent of the 
population.^ Through resources available to the ICRC this relief activity can 
be carried on until the end of April 1957. In order to continue this limited 
operation until Julv 15, 1957, the ICRC is requesting additional supplies valued 
at some dollars 1,500,000. 

62. The ICRC has informed the Secretary- General that traditional emergency 
relief activities along the above lines will be insufficient to provide the necessary 
aid to the Hungarian population since reserves of basic food supplies are at a 
dangerously low level. The ICRC accordingly^ urges the establishment of an 
expanded programme of emergency relief to cover some of the basic needs in 
primary commodities such as bread-wheat, coal (for hospitals and social insti- 
tutions only) and cattle fodder (barley oats, cattle cake, maize) for the period 
January 15 to July 15. The joint UN/FAO mission wishes to endorse a programme 
of this kind. 

8 The items included in this programme are: powdered milk, cod liver oil capsules, fats, meat, fish, cheese, 
cereals, sugar, flour, soap, clothing, blankets, coal for hospitals, and window glas". Distribution is made 
through standard parcels, child feeding programs, and direct distribution of clothing and blankets. 


63. If an expanded programme of emergency relief is to be established, careful 
consideration needs to be given to the method of distribution. Items such as 
bread-wheat and fodder cannot be distributed in large quantities in the same way 
as the items in the traditional emergency relief programme. Quite apart from the 
physical impossibility of direct distribution of such items, it is necessary to consider 
the possible inflationary effect of free distribution of sizable quantities of these 
items. In view of these considerations the ICRC has prepared a plan which 
foresees that products such as bread grains would be distributed through the nor- 
mal economic channels, namely mills and bakeries, and would be sold to the popu- 
lation at the basic trade rate. For coal, it is foreseen that relief coal would be 
sold to the coal distribution agents in Budapest under an agreement stipulating 
that this coal would be exclusively used for hospitals and social institutions such as 
schools, vuiiversities, etc. As for cattle fodder, the quantities which would be 
available under the general relief programme would be sold through certain 
specified cooperatives to be used in specially designated areas of the country. In 
each case the products would be sold at the basic world average prices. The 
resulting funds would be put into a special account of the Hungarian Red Cross 
and would be used in turn with the agreement of the ICRC for such purposes as 
administrative costs of the Relief Programme, and ultimately for hospitals, social 
institutions and related welfare programmes. It is understood that before such a 
plan could be accepted, discussions both on the principle involved, and on the 
details would be required. 

64. With regard to the coal mentioned in the ICRC proposal the quantity 
involved is 260,000 tons, and as indicated the supply is intended to fulfill minimum 
needs for social institutions. The mission was unable to check on this quantity, 
but in view of the overall deficiency in coal productions it would appear that the 
amount is reasonable. 

65. In addition to the various sources of relief assistance, it is expected that 
within the framework of the technical committees of the Economic Commission 
for Europe consideration may be given to certain of the economic problems with 
which Hungary is faced. 

Mr. Morris. Now, this apparently shows that the report is based 
on information made available to them by the Hungarian Government 
in the course of 3 days' intensive consultation. In other words, they 
received the information that formed the basis of this report from the 
present Hungarian Government. 

Now, do you think for instance, that the mformation applied by 
the present Hungarian Government should be the basis of any report 
of the United Nations or the FAO? 

The Interpreter. He s&js this is similar to the fact that somebody 
goes to Tibet for 3 days' time and then describes the life of the Dalai 
Llama in Thibet. It is similar to it. He doesn't think much of it. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I would like to point out that the whole 
tenor of this report seems to deplore the uprising in Hungary, It says 
for instance: 

The national economy of Hungary has suffered a severe setback as a result of 
recent events. The fighting and subsequent unrest resulted in extensive damage 
to buildings, the destruction and depletion of stocks of food and goods, the loss 
of skilled labor and the virtual cessation of work in many sectors of the economy. 
The present situation is conditioned, not only by these events but also by a 
relatively poor harvest in 1956 and by the changes being implemented as a result 
of the current rethinking of economic objectives. 

That generally, Senator, is the whole tenor of the report and I think 
it should go into the record because it bears on the testimony we have 
had today. 

Senator Hruska. That is very fine and it will be received for that 
purpose. Is there anything fm'ther? 

Mr. Morris. No. 

Senator Hruska. If not, thank you very much for coming and 
giving us yom" testimony. And thank you, Mr. Interpreter, you have 
done a very good job. 

(The subcommittee adjourned at 12:15 p. m.) 



United States Senate, Subcommittee To 

Investigate the Administration of the 

Internal Security Act and Other 

Internal Security Laws, of the 

Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

Interrogation of Yuri Rastvorov was continued in room 319, Senate 
Office Building, at 4:20 p. m. 

Present: Robert Morris, Chief Counsel, William A. Rusher, Associate 
Counsel, and Mr. Mandel, Research Director. 


Mr. Morris. Mr. Rastvorov, the morning press carries a story 
from Stockholm, Sweden, that the Soviet Government has acknowl- 
edged that a kidnaped Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg, who dis- 
appeared 12 years ago, had in fact died in a Moscow prison. 

This announcement contradicts the statements of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment heretofore expressed, that Mr. Wallenberg had not been in 
the Soviet Union and was unknown to them. 

In fact, the Soviet Union has previously charged that the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry had used the "Wallenberg case in the most shameless 
manner for purposes inimical to relations with the Soviet Union." 

The official explanation that we now receive is to the effect that a 
"corrupt" security police official, Viktor S. Abakumov, former Min- 
ister for State Security, was to blame for Mr. Wallenberg's fate. 

Mr. Rastvorov, did you know Mr. Abakumov? 

Mr. Rastvorov. Yes, I knew him as my boss in the Ministry of 
State Secmity in the U. S. S. R. 

Mr. Morris. When did you know him? 

Mr. Rastvorov. I knew him from the time I entered the service, 
which was in 1943. 

I consider it very important to give certain facts about Abakumov 
and his background in order that tlie people of the United States may 
understand who he really was. 

During the second war, Abakumov was appointed the Chief of 
the Army Counter Intelligence Service. In this post he came to work 
very closely with Stalin himself, since Stalin was at that time con- 
cerned with counterintelligence matters. 

Because Abakumov successfully solved a couple of cases involving 
espionage in the army, his authority in the eyes of Stalin increased 



After the war, in the summer of 1946, when it came time for Stalin 
and the other leaders to decide on future policy for the state security- 
organization, the then Minster of MGB, General Merkolov — who was 
later shot with Beria and really was one of the central figures in the 
so-caUed Beria plot — made a big political mistake when he insisted that 
the main aim of the state security organ should be the struggle against 
internal enemies of the U. S. S. R. 

General Abakumov, who also participated in these meetings, 
expressed a different opinion. He declared that the principal target 
of the state security organization should be the external enemies, in 
other words the United States of America, primarily, and its allies. 

Stalin supported the opinion of Abakumov and soon after these high 
level meetings, fired Merkolov for his political blindness and short- 
sightedness, and appointed Abakumov to Merkolov's post. This 
happened in spite of all attempts of Beria, who was a friend of Merko- 
lov, to keep Merkolov in the position of Minister of State Security. 
Merkolov was then named to a small post involving the supervision of 
Soviet properties abroad, which was at that time called Gusims. 

Later in 1948 Merkolov was forgiven by Stalin and was appointed 
to a little higher post. Minister of State Control, which is a secondarily 
important ministry in the Soviet state apparatus. 

As a consequence of this shuffle, the relationship between Abakumov 
and Beria became very tense and Beria tried constantly to undermine 
Abakumov's position. At this time Beria was deputy chairman of the 
Council of Alinisters of the U. S. S. R. and while his main respon- 
sibility was for atomic energy affairs, he was also still responsible for 
all internal security. 

I had known Abakumov since 1943 when I entered this organiza- 
tion, in other words, the MGB. 

Despite Abakumov's strong start, he did not last long as the head 
of MGB. In 1951 Abakumov was arrested by order of Stalin at the 
instigation of Beria, who had prepared the case against Abakumov, 
collecting compromising material on him. 

Mr. Morris. May I break in there, Mr. Rastvorov, and ask: 

It seems from what you say then, that Abakumov was eliminated 
because of opposition from Beria? 

Mr. Rastvorov. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And that he was not executed along with Beria? 

Mr. Rastvorov. No. He was arrested by Beria before Beria him- 
self got into trouble. I estimate it was in 1951 — 3 years earlier. 

He was arrested because of his alleged social crimes, one of which 
was the charge of unlawful accumulation of several million rubles 
worth of property in Germany and other personal crimes. 

Mr. Morris. That was the formal charge against him? 

Mr. Rastvorov, Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Therefore, the Soviet explanation of Mr. Wallenberg's 
death is to your knowledge false? 

Mr. Rastvorov. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Will you finish your story on Abakumov into which 
I broke? 

Mr. Rastvorov. Yes. After Abakumov's arrest, Beria hired back 
all the old Merkolov crowd, including Merkolov himself. Abakumov 
was put in jail m Moscow, in a jail reserved for VIP's; not until 3 
years later was he tried. Then the old charges of bad conduct and 


decadent private life gave way to a new, obviously ridiculous one; 
that he was one of the participants in the Beria plot. This, of course, 
was impossible. 

Abakumov's trial was secret. He merely disappeared. Abaku- 
mov's case unquestionably parallels those of the six whose sentencing 
has just been announced. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Rastvorov, then the Soviet explanation of the 
Wallenberg death contains material falsehoods? 

Mr. Rastvorov. The Soviet's explanation of the death of Raoul 
Wallenberg represents a mistatement of facts from the beginning to 
the end: 

In the first place, when Wallenberg was arrested, General Abakumov 
was not the Mmister of MGB, and the responsibility at that time 
must have fallen on General Merkolov who was the head of MGB. 
In connection with this, it should be known that Merkolov and 
Abakumov were enemies and therefore it would be wrong to assume 
that Abakumov had reason to cover the crimes of his predecessor. 

My experience permits me to say that all acts of MVD insofar as 
arrests of foreigners are concerned could be accomplished only Avith the 
permission of the leaders of the Soviet Government, and particularly 
with the consent of former minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Molotov. 
In this connection it would be worth while to mention known to me 
the following facts: (1) In 1947, the Soviet counterintelligence service 
recruited an employee of the American Embassy in Moscow — A. 
Bukar — and this operation was possible only with the approval of the 
Foreign Office, (2) in 1948, the same counterintelligence service, in 
order to create an unfavorable opinion among its own people and 
the people of the free world about spy activities of western diplomats, 
created an incident involving a British attache who was arrested pre- 
sumably taking pictures of military installations in the Moscow area. 
This more or less small incident, according to my knowledge, was 
possible also only with the permission of the Foreign Office. These 
facts clearly indicate the responsibility, not only of the MVD, but 
directly of the Soviet Government. It is ridiculous to believe that the 
Soviet Government took 12 years to find records in connection with 
the case of the Swedish diplomat, Wallenberg. Again, on the basis of 
my own knowledge, the Soviet Government operates in a very efficient 
manner when it comes to keeping records on such incidents as that of 
the Swedish diplomat. It is clear to me that no one else but the Soviet 
Government was responsible at that particular time for the recruit- 
ment and kidnaping of foreigners for the purpose of obtaining in- 
telligence information, for the recruitment of persons to work as 
spies, and for getting from these persons documents which the Soviet 
Government needed to provide the means for illegal, subversive ac- 
tivities in democratic countries. 

Furthermore, in cases of foreign personnel who fell into the h;inds 
of the Soviet Government, if they failed to cooperate or provide the 
desired information, it was an accepted practice to refuse permission 
for such persons to return to their country. This was done obviously 
to keep such persons from revealing the ordeals they suffered at the 
hands of the Soviet security organ. 

The Soviet version of Abakumov's ultimate fate contradicts the 
time of Abakumov's arrest, trying to show that he was arrested as a 
supporter of Beria after the execution of Beria. In reality, Abakumov 


was arrested in 1951 by Stalin at the instigation of Beria because of 
his "social" crimes, which was the charge of unlawful accumulation 
of several million rubles worth of property in Germany, and other 
personal crimes. Beria prepared the case against Abakumov after 
collecting the necessary compromising material, and later Beria 
recalled to his service all the former Merkolov crowd, including 
Merkolov himself. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you. 

(Wliereupon, at 4:35 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, subject 
to the call of the chairman). 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 
OF THE Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 o'clock a. m., 
in room 457 Senate Office Building, Senator Olin D. Johnston presid- 

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; and William A. Rusher, 
associate counsel. 

Air. Morris. General, will you stand, please? 

Senator Johnston. Will you please raise your right hand and be 

Do you swear that the evidence you give before this subcommittee 
of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

General Kiraly. I swear. 


Mr. Morris. Give yom* name and address to the reporter. 

General Kiraly. Yes. I am General Bela Ku-aly. I am a major 
general in the Free Hungarian Armj^ and comiuander in chief of the 
national guard established during the Hungarian National Democratic 

Mr. Morris. May I just ask you a few questions before 3'ou begin. 

Senator Johnston. Let me ask you a question. 

I notice you speak pretty good English. Where did you go to 

General Kiraly. I learned English in the prison. I was 4 or 5 
years in prison, and I have time enough to learn the English language. 

Senator Johnston. Good. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Johnston, this witness is being called today 
in line with the general purpose of the Internal Security Subcommittee 
of learning as much as possible about the nature of and the possible 
duration of the Hungarian uprising, revolution. 

The subcommittee has perceived that there has been an effect on 
the Communist Parties all over the world as a result of the Hungarian 
revolution, and even on the party in the United States. 

Now, we find, Senator, that the two things are almost indistinguish- 
able. In order to really understand the nature of the American 



Communist movement, we must loiow something about the nature 
and the possible duration of the Hungarian revolution. 

In connection with that, we had a Communist Party convention 
here last week in New York, and we have now been endeavoring to 
get some of the principals of that convention here to testify. 

For instance, there is a subpena out for Eugene Dennis. We 
heard of some connections between Mr. Dennis and the American 
Communist Party and Moscow, and we are trying to have him come 
here and we will ask him about that particular matter. 

But, as I say, as part of this whole inquiry into the nature of world 
communism, we have General Kiraly here this morning, and we want 
to get some of his firsthand experiences. I think he is the ranking 
military man, ranking Hungarian general, are you not, nov/? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You are. 

Now, I notice in yesterday's press that there was a new chief of 
staff of the Hungarian Army, General. His name is Ferenc Ugrai. 
Now, who was Colonel Ugrai? 

General Kiraly. I know him very well. For a short time he was 
one of my students when I was a professor of military science. 

Mr. Morris. You say he was one of your students? 

General Kiraly. One of my students. 

He was, at the beginning of this 12-year period in Hungary, a 
member of the secret police of the army, which you are knowing by 
the abbreviation of AVH. 

Mr. Morris. So, you say, then — excuse me — that Colonel Ugrai 
was the head of the AVH? 

General Kiraly. No; he was not head. He 'was, in that case, a 
young man. He was a lieutenant, and afterwards captain, and in 
this rank he was a member of the secret police, and on account of his 
"merits" he has been appointed in higher ranks. He was sent to 
Moscow, to military high schools, and returned some years ago. 

I was in prison when he returned from there. He became the chief 
of staff of the highest commander of the artillery of the Hungarian 
Army, and now, as I read also in the newspapers, he became the chief 
of staff of the Hungarian Army. 

He was a top Communist, of course, and he had a lot of merits on 
the Communist line previously. 

Senator Johnston. Did Russia have anything to do with his 

General Kiraly. Of course. He is a trustee of the Russians. He 
was for a long time, for at least 4 years, in Moscow, and he was a 
trustee in Hungary of the Russian Communists, of course. 

Mr. Morris. Now, it says that the head of the pohtical department 
is Maj. Gen. Pal Ilku. 

General Kiraly. Yes; I know him also perfectly well. 

He is, according to his origin, a Ukrainian. He came to Hungary 
from so-called Carpathians in Russia, which belongs now to Russia. 

Previously, during the two World Wars, between the two World 
Wars, it belonged to Czechoslovakia. From that part he takes his 
origin, so he is Ukrainian, a very old member of the Communist 

Mr. Morris. You say a very good member of the Communist 
movement? Did you say a very good member of the Communist 


General Kiraly. From the Communist viewpoint; an old member, 
I said; yes. 

And after World War Second, he was a top man in the youth move- 
ment in Hungary, the Communist youth movement in Hungary. 
In 1948 he was brought into the army in the rank of colonel, and 
became one of the deputies of the political department's chief. 

Then he has been sent to Moscow, for 5 years' education, and during 
this revolutionary movement, the national democratic revolutiofi- 
ary movement, he was in Moscow and he played a very suspicious 
role, because when all the officers being in the Soviet Union military 
schools decided to go home and see what is happening, the Muscovites 
hold 5 high-ranking officers there in Moscow, and they wero in 
negotiation with the Russian Home Defense Ministry, and only 
sent back to Hungary on the 2d of November. 

One of this group was Pal Ilku, who has been sent on the 2d or 3d 
of November back to Hungary to play a role, taking the revolution — 
a part in it. He was one of the first men who supported this Kadar 
regime on a military basis. He is also a trustee of the Russians. 

Mr. Morris. A trustee, you say? 

General Kiraly. Trustee. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, this is very short. It is just two para- 
graphs. May I read this Associated Press release? 

Senator Johnston. You may read it. 

Mr. A'loRRis (reading): 

Budapest, February 17. Hungary's Army, riddled by desertions during the 
revolt, is to come under tight Communist Party control, the high command 
announced today. 

The new chief of staff is Colonel Ferenc Ugrai. Head of the political depart- 
ment is a major general, Pal Ilku, who was quoted today as saying: "Party 
organizations in the Army will in future have a voice in operational planning." 

Only a few of Hungary's 170,000 Russian-trained and equipped troops are 
believed to remain under the colors. They are mostly militia, on police duties. 

The Communist trade union newspaper, Nepakartat, charged today that 
nothing like the total aid promised by the United States and the International 
Red Cross had reached Hungary. It said more aid had come from the satellites. 

Now, does this change in command that was announced on the 
17th of February in Budapest, does that indicate to you the nature 
of the control exercised by the Soviets over the Hungarian Army? 

General Kiraly. Completely. I was aw^are of this even when the 
Kadar regime began its rule over Hungary, that it is only a puppet 
regime of the Soviet Union. 

They will act according to the commands of the Muscovites and to 
subdue completely, to annihilate completely, the wish of freedom 
of the Hungarian people. 

They will act according to the Stalinist system. I am completely 
convinced that, if they will be allowed, they will act according to the 
Stalin systems. It means that the suppression and exploitation of 
the Hungarian people will grow and grow, without any limit, if the 
Russians will have complete free hand in the future, in Hungary. 

Senator Johnston. So Russians are taking complete control of the 
military and police in order to subdue the Hungarians; is that right? 

General Kiraly. Completely it is so; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this witness has testified before the 
United Nations Special Committee in New York, and in going over 
his testimony today we plan, as much as possible, to avoid a repetition 


of anything there, because his testimony there will be accessible to us. 
We want to make our own record on this. 

However, there is one thing that the committee has learned. 
Senator, that these hearings that the Special Committee of the 
United Nations is holding are now being held only in executive 

(To the witness.) 
. Do you know that, that witnesses now being called are not being 
called in public, the witnesses called by the United Nations Special 
Committee in New York? 

General Kiraly. Yes. The hearings of the witnesses are in a 
secret session. It is continuously held. Almost every day they hear 
witnesses, but completely secretly. 

Senator Johxston. We are giving to them all the information that 
we receive concerning the Hungarians? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Senator Johxstok. Are they giving to us all that they receive? 

M^r. Morris. It may be. Senator. We have asked for certain 
things, and not only recently. Now, I will be able to answer that 
question next week, to what extent the testimony they are taking 
will be available to us. 

Senator Johnston. I personally think it would be helpful if we 
cooperated with them, but we also should have their cooperation 
with us. 

Mr. Morris. Very good. Senator. I will carry out your wishes. 

General Kiraly. We feel very grateful for this help to our case, 
Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Morris. Now, General Kiraly, you took part in war games, 
did you not, or staff war exercises, when you were in the Hangarian 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

I was arrested in 1951, August 17. 

Mr. Morris. August 17, 1951. 

Now, before you were arrested —  —  

General Kiraly. Before this I took part myself in war games, in 
Hungary, of course. 

Mr. IVIoRRis. Tell us about those war games you took part in. 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

In 1951, in the springtime, there were war games in Hungary, and, 
in general, the war games of an army always project whatever this 
army wants to act m wartimes. 

Now, and even during this war game in 1951, in the spring, the 
Home Defense Ministry, the top Communist, Farkas, declared that 
all those high commanders who are participating in these war games 
must ver}^ much take care of what is happening here, because this war 
game is not a play but a real projection of whatever the Hungarian 
Army, with the Russians, wants to make. 

And in 1951 the aims, the purpose of the attack that was organized, 
was what this arrow shows [indicating]. It is the Hungarian front 
here, this little point here. The Hungarian Army was gathered in 
this area withhi the Dunapen telle River, and the aims, the purpose 
of this attack, was to cross the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier, to attack 
through the big cities in Yugoslavia, to cross the Danube River, which 
he has here, and occupy a mountain chain through Fruska Gora. 


It was the task of the Hungarian Army to make a very big so-called 
military bridgehead for the Russian Army, which wanted to enlarge this 
bridgehead, and to attack to the source of the Adriatic Sea, and by 
continuing this, of course, to invade Western Europe. 

It was the first game in which I personally partook. 

At this time there was great tension between the Soviet Party and 
the Yugoslavians, and therefore it was very clear that they wanted to 
attack. Later on, in 1953, there was another very important war 
game in Hungary, led also by Home Defense Minister Farkas. 

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that name for us, please? 

General Kiraly. Home Defense Minister Farkas. His last name is 
F-a-r-k-a-s; his first name M-i-h-a-1-y. 

Of course, he was not a military expert. He was a top Communist 
and had a very high rank, and whatever he did, whatever he told, was 
whispered in his ear by the so-called chief advisor of Russia, who sits 
always by the side of him and whispered in his ear what to say. 

Air. Morris. Who was he, the chief adviser? 

General Kiraly. General Lieutenant Bojoao. 

This war game was most important than what I told up to now. 
It was an attempt toward Rijeka. It is on the shore of the Adriatic 
Sea, and it is very curious because this great attempt led through the 
so-called Ljublijana Gate. It is a strategical gate in this area (inci- 
cating), and it is a gate such as a gate between the Po Plain and Central 

This war game, this attack has been led through this Ljublijana 
Gate, and just in this area there is very great agitation from behind 
the Iron Curtain, out of which everybody, who carefully reads news- 
papers, was able to find out how the Russians are mixing together 
strategical aims with political agitation. 

In that time they accented very much how great a role has the 
Italian and the French Communist Party, even in these strategical 
purposes and plans of the Soviet Russia. They count on a great 
strike in Italy, with a great strike in France, led by these 2 Communist 
Parties when war would have commenced, and b}" these great strikes 
in Italy and France they wanted to paralyze the mobilization of these 
2 principal western parts, you know, and in the meanwhile Russia 

Mr. Morris. Just a minute. What was that word? 

General Kiraly. Paralyze, 

Mr. Morris. In other words, as part of these war games, there 
would be as a supporting gesture for paralyzing strikes by Italian 
Communist Party and the French Communist Party, in concert with 
this maneuver, and that was part of the war game? 

General Kiraly. Yes. To paratyze the mobilization, and the 
moving armies, the NATO armies in Italy and in France, and during 
these strikes they wanted to run in through this very important 
strategical gate, the Ljubiljana Gate, and have so great an advance 
which, if the strikes later on will cease, would not have been contra- 
balanced by the Western Powers. 

This war game is very important and very characteristic how the 
Russians, how the Communists are exploiting the western Communist 
Parties, not only in political reasons and causes but even in strategical 

Mr. Morris. Now, General Kiraly, there were also war exercises 
involving the general staffs of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, 


Rumania, Bulgaria, all under the personal command of Marshal 
Zhukov, were there not, at some later time? 

General Kiraly. Two such great maneuvers occurred, one in 1955, 
early autumntime, and the other in 1956, springtime. Both of these 
have been led by Marshal Zhukov, the Home Defense Mmister of 

Mr. Morris. Can you tell us what you know about those particular 
exercises and how you came to know what you do laiow about them? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

In that time I was in prison and, therefore, I myself do not partake 
in these, but when, in last September, I was released from the prison 

Mr. Morris. When were you released from prison? 

General Kiraly. September, last year. 

Mr. Morris. One month before the October 23 revolution? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

During these months after my release, and before October 23, when 
I had been released 

Mr. Morris. When you were released from prison, did you revert 
back to your military rank of general? 

General Kiraly. No. I had been bereft of all my rank and my 
position, and only the university youths called me to lead them as 
commander in chief of the freedom fighters, and only afterward when 
the university youth and other fighting groups allotted me as the 
commander in chief of them, the Government accepted me afterward 
and rehabilitated me and gave back my rank. 

So, I acted for some days in the Freedom Fight without any rank, 
of course, only appointment of the Freedom Fighters; and only after- 
ward the government accepted me also and gave back my rank. 

Mr. Morris. Now, General, will you tell us what you did know 
about these military games in 1955 and 1956, which you say were 
directed by General Zhukov? 

General Kiraly. Yes. In both mihtary maneuvers the general 
staffs of all the European satellites took part. All the home defense 
ministries of these European satellites personally took part in these 
war maneuvers. 

The first has been carried out in Carpathian Russia, in the inside 
of the Carpathian Mountain chain, which territorially belonged be- 
tween the two World Wars to Czechoslovakia. 

The second which has been carried out in 1956 has been held in the 
Ukraine, in the western Ukraine, near to Polish border, and to the 
Czechoslovakian border. It was the most interesting, this maneuver, 
which has been held in 1956. The situation was constructed so that 
the Western Powers had defended themselves, even the fundamental 
supposition has been constructed that the Eastern part was that which 
attacked the Western part. 

In these war the Western part pkyed a role in defense. 

Now, the Western part have a counterattack against the Russians, 
and then the Russians annihilated this defensive counterattack and 
began a hideous attack against the Western parties. 

This war game was very curiously organized. Both parts of the 
fighters have been represented. The most part of the satellites, of 
course, played the role of the Warsaw Pact, the Warsaw Pact army, 
and it is a funny thing of history that the Hungarians have been ap- 
pointed to play the role of the Western part, and not only in general 


the Western part but it was very curious that the Hungarian Army 
played the role of the American Army itself. It was a funny of his- 
tory, so to say. 

In general, this maneuver was held in the spirit of an attack against 
the West. When they finished this maneuver, Zliukov, Marshal 
Zhukov, had delivered a speech about the experiences of this maneu- 
ver and about this general situation of the Red army. 

Air. Morris. What did he say at that time? 

General Kiraly. He told that in the first case, the Russian Army 
is obsolete concerning the mechanization and motorization. The 
Russian Army must make a very urgent effort to become in this re- 
spect, a completely modern one. Therefore 

Mr. Morris. The first point. General, is that Zhukov told the as- 
sembled staff officers that the Russian Army, based on its war games — 
this is the 1955 war games, or was it 1956? 

General Kiraly. 1956. 

Mr. Morris. Was obsolete, and was in urgent need of moderniza- 

General Kiraly. Obsolete concerning the mechanization and 
motorization. Only this point, he pointed out. In these two respects 
it is obsolete, by the declaration of Zhukov. 

Tiiey were urged by great effort to supply this defect, and they will 
modernize the Russian Army concerning its mechanization and 

The second point he told, to lead big mechanized and mobilized 
army groups, it is a special sector of the military science, and in this 
respect a lot of the Russian generals are not skilled enough and a lot 
of the Russian generals do not do their best to have enough capability 
to lead such great mechanized groups; a lot of the Soviet generals 
are living out of their merits in the Second World War. They think 
that to be the hero of the Soviet Union it is fully enough for the end 
of their life, but Zhukov declared that if these persons, even being 
heroes of the Soviet Union, will be kicked out — excuse me for this 
slang^ — kicked out of the army, if they will not get enough skill and 
capability to be able to lead such great mechanized groups. 

And the third, what he declared was that the Russian Army is 
obliged to study the atomic warfare and make the Russian Army 
capable to exist and act among the circumstances of an atomic war. 

These three points I know out of his declaration. 

Senator Johnston. In other words, he was calling to the attention 
of the people that the need of the Russian Army was mechanized and 
mobilized armies. They were behind in that field; is that right? 

General Kiraly. Yes. He declared that it is obsolete in these two 
respects, and immediately added that they will do their best to make 
in this respect modern the Russian Army. 

Mr. Morris. Now, how did you come to learn this. General? Not 
only these particular war games, the early ones, but 

General Kiraly. I had a month after my release, and before the 
commencement of the national democratic revolution and freedom 
fight of Hungary. During these months I met a lot of soldiers and 
other people with whom I was in connection before my arrest. 

A lot of high-ranking soldiers considered something wiU happen, 
and being opportunists, began to advise me and give me a lot of 
information about the army, and I talked to two persons who partook 


in these military maneuvers. It is the source wherefrom I know any- 
thing about it. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you, General. 

Now, you have prepared a statement, have you not, General? 

General Kiraly. Yes, I have. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Johnston, the witness has prepared a sum- 
mation. It will take about 30 minutes, 35 minutes, to read it, and 
I wonder if we might receive this statement of his case as facts to be 
known by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. 

Senator Johnston. I think it would be well for you to give that to 
the committee. Go ahead and read it. 

General Kiraly. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, gentle- 
men of the Senate, Judge Robert Morris, I am deeply thankful for 
this committee's interest in the true nature of the Hungarian national 
democratic revolution and in the welfare of the freedom fighters. 

It is a great event in my life to be meeting with this high body of 
the United States Congress. We consider the United States Congress 
always the real embodiment and representation of the ideals of 
America's people. Just these ideals and their realization were what 
we wanted to establish in Hungary dming our national democratic 
revolution and freedom fight. 

We know that the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 
was the very fu*st event in the history of humanity where the assur- 
ance of human rights was codified and, with it, the age of modern 
democracy commenced. Since this day the Congress of the United 
States of America has, fully and without any breach, represented the 
real and sincere democracy and the highest ideals of humanity. Just, 
therefore, all the people of the globe who like liberty look with sym- 
pathy, honor, and trust toward this high body in which I am 

Therefore, I feel myself compelled to tell you whatever I know 
about the Hungarian national democratic revolution and freedom 
fight in order to add data for you. Because we Hungarians are 
aware of and proud of your interest in our case, I know you already 
know a lot about our freedom fight. 

As a soldier, I shall try to limit myself to those important events 
which have tragically influenced the outcome of the Hungarian 
revolution and war of independence. 

I do not think it necessary to tell you in detail what happened in 
my country, because you know very well that the Hungarian people 
made a desperate effort to shake oft' the rule of a foreign power. 

The people had no constitutions, democratic way of bringing about 
a change, because the regime imposed on them was a so-caUed "dicta- 
torship of the proletariat"- — a one-party system, police terror, and 
Communist government. Every free expression of public opinion, the 
organization of parties, and aU forms of free assembly were not only 
forbidden but punished by heavy penalties. 

In the darkest times of this Communist terror, in the years when 
Stalin's Hungarian proconsul Matyas Rakosi ruled, even the Commu- 
nists' own comrades were not trusted, and one after another they were 

Together with many other Hungarian patriots, I was jailed and 
condemned to death. I was freed from prison by that revolutionary 


atmosphere which pervaded the Hungarian people long before the out- 
break of the armed struggle, and before which Communist power 
finally had to retreat. 

The armed revolution which broke out on October 23 brought down 
the Communist state power, and revealed the true sentiments and 
demands of the Hungarian people. The demands of the spontaneously- 
formed revolutionary councils, point by point, prove that the move- 
ment was democratic, and that both the Communists and the Russi- 
ans for a short time recognized its national and democratic character. 


Hungary was occupied by Russian troops for two reasons: (1) to 
assiu'e Communist rule, and (2) in the event of an attack on Western 
Europe, Hungary would serve as an advance Soviet base. 

The argument brought up before the United Nations by the Soviet 
Union was that the Hungarian government had called for Russian 
military intervention to restore order. The Hungarian Government 
presumably had a right to do so, and the Soviet Union therefore only 
fulfilled its obligations under the Warsaw Pact when it crushed the 

I should like to ask the question: whether this statement is true or 
not; and immediately I give the answer — No, it is not. 

I would like to quote two sources on the intervention of Soviet 
troops. The first is the announcement made over Radio Kossuth, 
Budapest, on October 24 at 0900. This declaration is as follows: 

* * * In accordance with the terms of the Warsaw Pact, the (Hungarian) 
government applied for help to Soviet formations stationed in Hungary. In 
compliance with the government's request, these Soviet formations are taking 
part in the restoration of order. 

A similar report was published in Pravda (official organ of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and in Izvestia (official organ 
of the Soviet Government) on October 24, on page four in both papers. 

At the moment radio Kossuth was announcing that Russian troops 
had been called in, the Prime Minister of Hungary was Iinre Nagy. 
Actually, however, he was not yet Prime Minister when the agreement 
was made between the Hungarian and Soviet Governments. On 
October 29 in a new publication, Egyetemi Ipjubag (University 
Youth), an article explained the fact, as follows: 

The Soviet troops were called in by Andras Hegedus, former Prime Minister, 
on Tuesday (October 23) night. He said so himself to the writers' delegation 
* * * Imre Nagy was fooled and outwitted by the Gero clique which gave orders 
in his name and behind his back. 

This fact was subsequently acknowledged by Imre Nag}'- himself in 
an interview recorded on October 31 for radio Vienna. He said then: 

It was not I — 

said Imre Nagy — 

that much I can say. I was not Prime Minister at that time. I was not a member 
of the central committee of the party. 

In contradiction to the broadcast and the reported announcement, 
I must state that on October 23, at 1 p. m., Erno Gero, first secretary 
of the Communist Party of Hungary, applied for Russian military aid, 
but this measure was kept secret. 


As is known, on this day the students of Budapest planned to stage 
a demonstration of sympathy for the bloodless Polish national demo- 
cratic revolution. This event had such an effect on the Hungarian 
people that Gero and his friends, frightened of the consequences, 
instructed the Minister of the Interior not to permit the demonstration. 

This was announced on the state-controlled Budapest radio at 
12:57 p. m. At 1 :23 [the ban was^'repealed. There was nothing else 
to be done, because by that time the streets of Budapest were flooded 
with young people, students, and workmen, and the demonstration 
could not be stopped. 

Gero had obviously acted out of panic, and at his request a Russian 
armored division stationed in Transdanubia started out for Budapest 
at 4 p. m. The division arrived in the vicinity of Budapest in the late 
evening, and intervened in the fighting during the early morning hours 
of October 24. 

In those states which go by the name of proletarian dictatorships, 
the Communist Party has priority over the government both constitu- 
tionally and functionally. And consequently the first secretary of the 
party has more power \han the prime minister. However, the text 
of the Warsaw Pact is negotiated not between Communist parties but 
between the governments, and even the radio Budapest announce- 
ment of October 24 and the Pravda and Izvestia reports of October 25 
uses the term "Hungarian Government," and not party. Neverthe- 
less, it was not the Hungarian Government which called in Russian 
troops, but the first party secretary, Erno Gero, who is a well-known 
MVD agent. ' , i.. 

Let me be allowed to stop here a while and tell somethmg about this 
man, who called in the Russian troops to break down the Hungarian 
people's struggle for freedom. This man, Erno Gero, was arrested in 
Hungary on 1922 and sentenced to 14 years in prison for publishing a 
Communist newspaper. Two and one-half years later he was released 
and permitted to go to the Soviet Union as an exchange poHtical 

Thereafter, he was variously in the U. S. S. R. in 1939 and remained 
there until 1944 at which time he reentered Hungary with the Red 
army. He served on the Comintern during the thirties. He spent 
some time in France carrying on organizational work in the French 
Communist Party. According to Le Figaro, September 16, 1949: 

Gero has played for many years a very important behind-the-scenes role for 
the GPU. * * * He is Agent No. 1 of the MVD now. * * * During the civil 
war in Spain he was in control of all Soviet party activities in Spam. =^ * * 
After his return to the U. S. S. R. in 1939, he became secretary to Manuilsky (a 
Comintern official). 

This was the article in Le Figaro, and was signed "XXX." 
Le Monde carried a'' series of articles in December of 1949 and 
January of 1950 w^hich were signed by Enrique Castro Delgado, 
formerly a member of the central committee of the Spanish Com- 
munist Party and later a Comintern official in Moscow, and which 
substantiate the above-cited article in Le Figaro except that 
Delgado said that Gero was secretary to Dimitrov himself. 

In the Delgado article, it is said that Gero controlled the activities 
of the Hungarian Government on behalf of the Soviet secret pohce 
(MVD) in his inconspicuous early role as Minister of Transport and 
Communications in the postwar Hungarian Government. 


According to "Newsletter From Behind the Iron Curtain" in 
"Stockhohn" issue of October 28, 1949, Gero was the top MVD agent 
in Hungary at the time of the Kajk trial and accepted Soviet citizen- 
ship during the 1930's. This information seems to bear out the facts 
given by Delgado and "XXX" in the two French newspapers cited. 
It is this man who called in the Russian troops during our freedom fight 
in Hungary. 

I must also point out the fact that the Russians took part in the 
Budapest fighting prior to that October 24 official announcement 
calling for their intervention. Even more important is the fact that 
even under the broadest interpretation of the terms of the Warsaw 
Pact, the units of the Red army stationed in Hungary could not 
legally be used for the purposes of putting down a Hungarian revolu- 
tion. Article 8 of the Warsaw Pact, signed on May 14, 1955, reads 
as follows: 

The contracting parties declare that they * * * will be guided by principles 
of mutual respect, independence, and sovereignty, and will not interfere in each 
other's internal affairs. 

Under the pact, all parties must be consulted immediately in "the 
case of armed aggression": 

The parties to the treaty will immediately consult each other in order to take 
joint measures necessary to establish and preserve international peace and security 
(par. 2, art. 4). 

In accordance with the correct interpretation of the Warsaw Pact, 
the agreement between the Soviet and Hungarian Governments did 
not furnish sufficient basis for using Russian troops in Hungary. The 
political consultative committee should have been convened, and only 
after all of the parties had given their approval could military action 
have legally begun. 

The fact that the Russian military intervention was illegal becomes 
even clearer from the text of the Soviet Government's declarations 
issued on October 30 and published on the front pages of the October 
31 issues of Pravda and Izvestia. I quote the relevant passage 

* * * 'YiiQ Soviet Government proceeds from the general principle that station- 
ing the troops of one or another state, which is a member of the Warsaw Treaty, 
on the territory of another state which is a member of the treaty, is done by 
agreement among all its members and only with the consent of the state on whose 
territory and at whose request these troops are stationed, or where it is planned 
to station them. 

Second, the measures put into effect (in this case the military inter- 
vention into the internal affairs of Hungary) must be halted when the 
case is taken before the U. N. 

Paragraph 4, article 4, provides: 

These measures will be stopped as soon as the Security Council takes the 
necessary measures for establishing and preserving international peace and 

The Soviet Union itself felt the action to be unjustifiable and, in 
the Government declaration of October 30, virtually assured the 
Hungarian Government of the right to veto the presence of Soviet 

Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary 
could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet 
Government has given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet 


military units from the city of Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary 
by the Hungarian Government. 

At the same time, the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appro- 
priate negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and 
other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet 
troops on the territory of Hungary. 

The legal Prime Minister was then Imre Nagy, who on October 25, 
at 3:25 p. m., announced over radio Budapest: 

As Prime Minister I wish to announce that the Hungarian Government will 
begin talks with the Soviet Union concerning the relations between the Hungarian 
People's Republic and the Soviet Union and, among other things, concerning the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary. 

On October 28, at 7 p. m., Imre Nagy announced an armistice over 
radio Budapest, as follows: 

The Hungarian Government has come to an agreement with the Soviet Gov- 
ernment whereby Soviet forces shall withdraw immediately from Budapest, and 
simultaneously with the formation of our new army shall evacuate the city. 

On November 1, the Nagy government announced Hungary's with- 
drawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the neutrality of Hungary, and 
also asked the United Nations to put the Hungarian issue on its 

First official word that the situation in Hungary was being brought 
to the attention of the United Nations came on the afternoon of Sat- 
urday, October 27, 1956. 

Three permanent members of the Security Council — France, the 
United Ivingdom, and the United States — ^asked for an urgent meet- 
ing pursuant to article 34 of the United Nations Charter, which em- 
powers the Council "to investigate any dispute or any situation 
which might lead to international friction, or give rise to a dispute" 
to determine whether its contmuance is likely to endanger the main- 
tenance of international peace and security. 

On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, not even using its own 
arguments, can the Soviet Union justify its military intervention in 
Hungary? Actually, a state of war existed between two countries, 
and this fact should have been handled accordingly. 

Mr. Morris. The point you make, there is actually — there is now 
a state of war between Hungary and the Soviet Union? 

General Kiraly. It was a state of war between two states. 

Mr. Morris. And the evidence, you contend 

General Kiraly. I beg yom- pardon? 

Mr. AloRRis. And you have now just set forth the conclusion that 
there is a state of war existing now between Hungary and the Soviet 

General Kiraly. The consequence was that a great power having 
about 200 million inhabitants attacked a little country having only 
about 10 million inhabitants. War between two such sort of countries 
is, mthout any question, settled in the first minute. 

This real war has been finished with a complete annihilation of the 
freedom fighters of Hungary. And, of course, it was the victory of 
this Soviet army, if such an action may be mentioned with this word 
victory. They subdued us completely, and it was entirely clear at 
the first day when they used this big army unit in Hungary. 

The charge of counterrevolution: Because the Russians and the 
Hungarian Communists could not use the Warsaw Pact as a basis 


for effective argument, they branded the Hungarian revolution as a 
counterrevohition and a Fascist plot. Obviously, their reason for 
doing this was so that they could use certain provisions of the peace 
treaty as excuses for their brutal and massive intervention. 

Article 4 of section 1, part 11, of the treaty of peace with Hungary, 
dated February 10, 1947, Paris, reads as follows: 

Hungary, in accordance with armistice agreement, has taken measures to 
dissolve all organizations of a Fascist type existing on Hungarian territory, 
whether political, military or paramilitary, as well as other organizations con- 
ducting propaganda, including revisionist propaganda, hostile to the United 
Nations, and shall not in future permit the existence and activities of such organi- 
zations, whose aim is to deny the people their democratic rights. 

An examination of the program, the action and the personnel of 
the revolutionary forces in the Hungarian uprising follows, and more 
than demonstrates how distorted an interpretation of this paragraph 
of the peace treaty was invoked to impute a nonexistent Fascist and 
counterrevolutionary character to the Hungarian patriots. 

The resolution of the October 22 meeting of the students of the 
Builders' Technical University is evidence of the fact that the Hun- 
garian Revolution was national and democratic and never went 
beyond such sort of goals. This resolution, containing 16 demands, 
has now become a historic document. It was scheduled for broadcast 
by radio Budapest on the day following its proclamation, October 23. 
When the students were denied the right to have it broadcast, demon- 
strators clashed with police and the demonstration turned into a 

Every demand formulated by the university students on October 
22-23, and later from October 25 on, stressed — • 

perfect equality in relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary, and restora- 
tion of the principle of noninterference in internal affairs between the two 

Every demand, from October 22 to the very end, emphasized the 
sovereignty and independence of the country. Certain of the de- 
mands — ^for example those made in Miskolc on October 31— urged 
the declaration of the country's neutrality. Between October 28 and 
31, a number of radio stations mentioned Austria and Switzerland as 
examples of such neutral states. On October 31 the Miskolc Workers 
Council demanded: 

That our fatherland become a member of the Danube Confederation as planned 
by Kossuth a century ago. 

From October 25 on, until the end, radio Kossuth and stations 
throughout the Hungarian countryside demanded "free and secret 
elections." On October 28, for example, every radio station, without 
a single exception, stressed this demand repeatedly. 

A recurring demand throughout the wdiole period was for "estab- 
lishment of a multiparty system." 

On October 28 radio Kossuth and the Miskolc and Gyor stations 
demanded : 

The reestablishment and freedom of activity of all those parties which existed 
in 1945. 

The various revolutionary councils and broadcasting stations 
continually demanded that : 

The Government grant full freedom of the press, of assembly, and of religion. 


For example, the Szatmar County Workers' Council declared on 
October 31 : 

Our aims include respect for human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, freedom of the press, the right of assembly, and the right to strike. 

The revolutionary part}^ of Hungarian youth, in a proclamation 
issued on November 2, voiced the following five demands: 

1. Full independence and neutrality of our homeland; 

2. Political freedom, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion; 

3. Discontinuance of the class struggle; 

4. Raising of the living standard of our people; and 

5. Preservation of the results achieved by the national democratic 

The various committees and broadcasting stations continuously 
dernanded a revision of the security organs. Can the demand for 
revision of a system responsible for the organized torture of human 
beings be classified as a Fascist demand, particularly when precisely 
this method of torture is characteristic of the Fascist system? 

The clamis voiced by the students, as well as the economic demands 
made between October 23 and 28 included: 

Revision of the planned economy, revision of industrial workers' norms and 
wages, introduction of a workers' autonomy in the plants, reform of agriculture, 
and support of individual peasant farmers. 

Let me finally quote the resolution of the Revolutionary Com- 
mittee of the Forces of Public Order — my own military organization — 
broadcast by Radio Free Kossuth on Saturday, November 3, 1956, at 
2:25 p. m.: 

The committee supports our country's independence and neutrality. We shall 
resist all aggression directed against our independence and neutrality; pending 
free, democratic elections, we shall help to preserve order with all our strength. 

Since strikes cause serious harm to our country's defense potential, we recom- 
mend that the strike be ended and organized work begun, with the proviso that 
national-guard formations keep their weapons nearby even while working, so that 
in case of aggression, they can be ready for immediate battle against the aggressors. 

As of today, persons belonging neither to the army nor to the police are per- 
mitted to carry arms only if they belong to the national guard. Persons 
belonging neither to the army, the police, nor the national guard will be disarmed 
by us in the interests of the consolidation of peace and order. 

I conclude and emphasize from the foregoing that never and 
nowhere did the revolution show counterrevolutionary tendencies, 
proclaim a counterrevolutionary program, or voice such sort of 

III. Russian tactics and cover negotiations to conceal their real 
intentions and the second Russian aggression. 

The changing Russian views were finally resolved during the 
negotiations with the Hungarian Government on the withdrawal of 
troops and recognition of Hungary's independence. Suslov and 
Mikoyan, both "experts" on satellite politics, arrived in Budapest to 
begin negotiations as early as October 24. It was they who effected 
the changes of personnel within the Communist Party, e. g., the 
replacement of First Secretary Erno Gero with Janos Kadar, the 
present Prime Minister. In the final phase of the revolution they 
discussed withdrawal of Russian troops with Communist and non- 
Communist politicians — Zoltan Tildy, for example. 

The chronology of the Russian troop withdrawal negotiations is as 
follows: On October 25 and 28: Nagy announces negotiations between 


the Hungarian Government and the Soviet Union, during which, 
among other questions, the withdrawal of Soviet troops would be 

October 31: Nagy requests the Soviet Government to state the 
time and place for negotiations between all parties to the Warsaw 
Pact regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, in the light 
of the Soviet statement of October 30 on relations between the Soviet 
Union and other Socialist states. 

Meanwhile, on October 28, 29, 30, and 31, radio Budapest an- 
nounced that agreement had been reached on the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Budapest. Between October 29 and 3 1 , further announce- 
ments on the withdrawal of Soviet troops has been made. It was 
announced that October 31 had been agreed on as the final date for 
withdrawal from Budapest. 

November 1 : Nagy demands of the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary 
that Soviet troops newly arrived from the Soviet Union be imme- 
diately withdrawn, gives notice of the termmation of Hungarian 
adherence to the Warsaw Pact, and declares Hungary's neutrality. 
Nagy informs the Secretary General of the United Nations of these 
actions, and requests that the question of Hungarian neutrality be 
placed on the agenda of the United Nations General assembly. 

November 2 : The Hungarian Government delivers further protests 
to the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, and another communication 
is sent to the United Nations' Secretary General. 

November 3: A jomt committee of Soviet military leaders and 
representatives of the Hungarian Government meets in the Budapest 
Parliament baildmgs. Radio Budapest announces that the Soviet 
delegation has promised that no more Soviet troops would cross 
Hungarian frontiers. 

The Russian negotiations served as a cover for the concentration 
of larger Soviet forces. This Soviet action was necessary because the 
troops on the spot did not prove strong enough to put down the re- 
volution, the democratic revolution and freedom fighters. While 
negotiations w^ere being conducted on all levels, and delegations re- 
ceived, combat-ready divisions were being brought into the country. 
The soldiers in these divisions believed that they were bemg sent to 
fight in Egypt or in Western Europe. 

Let me be allowed to tell some details about these Russian tricks 
out of my own experiences to show how treacherous the Russians were. 
Early in the forenoon of November 2, 1 got an agitated call from Nagy, 
Prime Minister of Hungary, himself. He said, "If anyone ever had an 
important job, you have one now." 

^Ir. Morris. In other words, Nagy called joii personally and told 
you that, in an agitated voice, 3^ou now have an important mission? 

General Kiraly. Yes, it was Nagy, the Prime Minister of Hungary 
who called me, by means of the phone. 

I have a formal note from the Prussian Ambassador. He saj's bands of Hun- 
garians are raging around his Embassy. If the Hungarian Government cannot 
control them he, as Ambassador, will be obliged to call in Russian troops. I 
think you understand the seriousness of this demand — 

Nagy told me: 

If we cannot maintain order, we will offer an opportunity for a second Russian 
aggression. Go there yourself. 


I ordered a tank company to proceed immediately to the Square 
of Heroes which was near the Embassy, and sent a mechanized 
infantry battahon to join them there. Then I rushed to the Embassy. 

When I got there the streets were empty and there w^as no sign of 
trouble. I went to the office of Ambassador Yuri Andropov. "I 
have a command from my Premier to check the rioting here," I said, 
"but I see no rioting," I said to the Russian Ambassador. 

The Ambassador appeared embarrassed. He said there had been 
reports of trouble, but it had stopped. "We Russians don't want to 
niLx in your business," he said. "We understand your troubles and 
we are on your side," the Ambassador told me. 

"Did you Imow that we have offered to negotiate with your Gov- 
ernment? Our Government wants to take its troops out of Hungary 
immediately, and we want a discussion to arrange the details of the 
evacuation," the Russian Ambassador told me, himself. 

These negotiations were commenced at noon November 3 in the 
Hungarian Parliament with all the laws and habits of an international 
negotiation. The members of the Hungarian delegation were in every 
respect fully credited diplomatic envoys. Nevertheless, they were 
arrested on the night of November 3 by the Russians. 

At 6 o'clock November 3, after the first part of the negotiation with 
the Russians, I met General Kovacs, the army chief of staff who was 
a member of the Hungarian delegation. He told me — 

It is practically agreed. We agreed, first, Russia will evacuate all her armed 
forces from Hungary. Second, to avoid disrupting transportation, the Russians 
want to leave by degrees. A committee of experts will be set up to arrange a 
timetable for the evacuation. Third, the Hungarian garrisons must cease denying 
the Russians food and fuel. Fourth, the Russians are not prepared for a winter 
movement in Hungary and Hungary must be patient; the troops will not be able 
to leave until January 15. Lastly, they say the Russian Army did not wish to 
attack the Hungarians but only did what the Hungarian Government asked. 
Therefore the evacuation must be not only peaceful but friendly. The troops 
must leave in a festive air and the Hungarians must cheer them as they leave. 

Mr. Morris. They must even achieve a festive atmosphere when 
they do it? 

General Kiraly. In effect, said General Kovacs, the committee 
had agreed to all the Russian demands, even the friendly farewell, but 
insisted that departure date be stepped up by a month. The meeting 
was to be continued that night at 9 p. m. at the Russian military head- 
quarters at Tokol, on Csepel Island. 

All this was a fantastic farce and a striking demonstration of the 
Russian love for theatrics with their treachery. At this very moment 
her armored divisions were forming two operational bases on the main 
highway from Miskolc to Budapest, here, there, Miskolc, Budapest. 
These two armored groups w^ere formed at this time. And along the 
main communication line between Budapest and Szeged, establishing 
a vast frontline fighting force of combat-read}- troops and a horde of 
4,000 tanks. Yet, as late as 11 o'clock on the night of the 3d, the 
Russians, negotiating with the committee on Csepel Island, suggested 
Maleter call me and say that everything was in good order. This 
he did. We both believed it. 

At about midnight we began to get reports from all over the country 
that Russian troops were on the move on all our highways. Tanks 
had shot up the barracks at Kiskunhalas and captured the sleeping 
troops here [indicating on chart]. 


Russian tanks streamed into the city. They moved to the Kilian 
Barracks and the Corvin Theater, two main freedom-fighter strong 
points, and started shelHng. I grabbed my direct phone to the pre- 
mier. It was about 4 a. m. 1 told him the city was being invaded 
and begged for orders to open fire. But the elaborate Russian 
"negotiations" now proved their value. "No," Nagy said, "calm 
down. The Russian Ambassador is here in my own office. He is 
calling Moscow right now. There is some misunderstanding. You 
must not open fire." 

Mr. Morris. In other words, even then when the Russian mobilized 
division is moved in, still Nagy said, "The Ambassador is here with 
me — he is trying to get Russia on the phone — ^there must be a mistake, 
don't fire"? 

General Kiraly. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And you believe that Premier Nagy, believing that 
these negotiations were in good faith, simply paralyzed his own forces? 

General Kiraly. Precisely. 

I hung up, bewildered. Suddenly I heard the sound of fh-ing near 
my headquarters. I phoned again. 

"You can hear them. They are firing." I told the Premier. 
"You can hear the sound yourself. We must retm-n the fii'e. Please 
give me orders." 

"Your job is to obey orders and not to make decisions," said Nagy. 
As a soldier I was not empowered to commit my country to war. Ten 
minutes later I heard the clatter of tank treads in the streets. I saw 
a Russian column approaching our building. Their lights were on, 
then- hatches closed. I called Nagy again. "Tanks are passing under 
my window," I said insistently. "They are not attacking us, but they 
are turning toward your building, toward the Parliament Building." 

"Thank you very much," he said, "I will need no fm'ther reports 
from you." 

About a half hour later I heard him on the radio. 

Mr. Morris. Now, this is Nagy? 

General Kiraly. Nagy's declaration on the radio. 

In the early hours of this morning — 
his voice said — 

Soviet troops launched an attack against our capital with the obvious intention of 
overthrowing the legal, democratic, Hungarian Government. Our troops are 

The nation was at war. 

This second Russian aggression was an open war against Hungary, 
and we fought our freedom fight for our Hberty, human rights, and our 

We did our best to defend our democratic system which we achieved 
subduing the Communist dictators and their hated armed forces, the 
security police. We commenced — with pure and high enthusiasm — to 
build up a political, social, and economic systern like yours by the 
means of which we wanted to make the Hungarian people free and 

Our national democratic movements were victorious, and the week 
of this victory was one of the most worthy of our whole history. These 
honest efforts and real results have been trampled down by a foreign 
power, by the Russian Red army. Fighting against these brute 


aggressors, we fought for the honesty of all humanity. Thus, our 
efforts were not a separate Hungarian problem, but in the cause of 
the entire humanity. 

Mr. Morris. Have you finished with that statement, General? 

General Kiraly. I finished the first part. 

Mr. Morris. May I ask a few questions? 

General Kiraly. Please. 

Mr. Morris. It is apparent, then, that, in connection with any 
negotiations that the free nations had been carrying on with the 
Soviet Union, they can always assume that those negotiations were 
fraudulent. Would it not appear so on the basis of that statement you 
you have just read? 

General Kiraly. Completely agreed. 

Mr. Morris. Here what happened is, the Soviet Ambassador made 
representations that there was going to be a peaceful withdrawal, and 
while you people were relying on the word of the Soviet Ambassador 
representing the views of Moscow — and even at the last minute, even 
then, you did not want to open fire against them because you thought 
they were going to live up to theu- obligations? 

General Kiraly. To issue orders to open fire, when a real danger of 
an open war is present, it is the decision of the government and not a 
high militaiy man. 

Mr. Morris. And the government who relies on those assertions of 
the Soviet Union is on very hazardous grounds, is it not? 

General Kiraly. A human being is unable to think that all these 
are treacherous things, you know, when diplomatically, in every 
respect, it was a completely rightful and legal negotiation. When the 
highest representatives of the Russian Army and the Russian diplo- 
matic service are honestly and smilingly declaring that nothing is 
happening; you know, even those who lived during the last decade 
during the Russian oppression may not believe that such cheats — 
what cheating may come out of the mouth of a human being, you know. 

Mr. Morris. There are just a few other thmgs I want to ask you. 
You are sure that m Fiume — ^that is on the eastern base of the Istrian 
Peninsula, and Trieste is on the northwestern base? 

General Kiraly. Here is Fiume and here is Trieste. 

Mr. Morris. And in between that is the Istrian Peninsula? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Trieste, that is internationalized, whereas Fiume is 
part of Yugoslavia? 

General Kiraly. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. So this drive was really against Yugoslavia? 

General Kiraly. This place [indicating] is so important that it may 
not be considered as a separate attack against Yugoslavia. If you 
see this arrow on this map, wherever this is leading, to the heart, so 
to say, of Europe, you Imow, in the European territory, if you see it, 
it only leads toward Yugoslavia territory, but, in general, it means not 
an attack only against Yugoslavia. It means that they broke through 
this strategic gate to have an opportunity to invade northern Italy 
and, through it, of course, the southern part of France. The ancient 
strategicalHne; Caesar, himself, led on that line. Napoleon led his 
campaigns against even central Europe — it is an ancient and always 
used strategical line, and it does not mean an attack only against 


Yugoslavia. It means a great offensive on the ancient strategical 
lines, which are not to be changed even in modern strateg}". 

Mr. Morris. Did the Albanian forces take part in these war games? 

General Kiraly. I do not know. They did not mention to me 
anything about Albania. 

Mr. Morris. The ones you participated in, was the Albanian gen- 
eral staff there? 

General Kiraly. No, no. 

Mr. Morris. I mean, Albania has remained loyal throughout to 
the Soviet Union? 

General Kiraly. Of course, of course. 

Mr. Morris. It, in itself, is in a very strategic position in the 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. It is right in the Adriatic and it appears right at the 
heel of the boot of Italy? 

General Kiraly. Yes; it is a gate of the Adriatic and, therefore, a 
very important place. And I think so, the Russians count it as an 
airplane carrier and control base of the Adriatic and the Mediter- 
ranean, but I have no information about whether or not they also 
were present in this maneuver or not. 

Mr. Morris. General Kiraly, when you were arrested on August 
17, 1951, what were the charges against you? 

General Kiraly. Against me, that I was an American spy and 
conspirator; it was the common charge agamst anybody who they 
wanted to execute or send to prison. 

Mr. Morris. And actually, you were not? 

General Kiraly. Of course not. 

Mr. Morris. In this conference that General Zhukov had after the 
last war, where you say that he wanted to stress the lack of mechaniza- 
tion and the lack of nuclear weapons on the part of the Soviet forces? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Why did he disclose that to the satellite military 

General Kiraly. Because it was not hidden in front of the satellite 
people because the satellite armies were completely organized accord- 
ing to the Russian sj^stem. 

Mr. Morris. By the same token, he was also criticizing the satel- 

General Kiraly. Of course, it was a program not only for the Rus- 
sian army, but for the satellite armies, too, the satellite generals and 
chiefs of staff and ministers to make the effort to mechanize the 
satellite armies. 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more about General Zhukov that 
you can tell us; about his attitude toward the West or military prowess, 
or anything like that? Anything more that you can tell us about 
General Zhukov? 

General Kiraly. General Zhukov? 

Mr. Morris. What role did he have during the Hungarian uprising? 

General Kiraly. He was the commandant in chief of all the Russian 
forces; therefore, whatever happened in Hungary, he is completely 
accountable, as every commander in chief is accountable for whatever 
soldiers are making. Whatever brutality, whatever terror has been 


carried out in great abundance — all high military leaders, including 
Marshal Zhukov, himself, are accountable for that. 

Mr. Morris. JDo you know whether he was personally in Hungary 
at any time? 

General Kiraly. I do not know. 

Mr. Morris. Now, with respect to this next paper, General — 
Hungary, a Base of Aggression for the Soviet Union. 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. This is what you took up before the United Nations? 

General Kiraly. Not completely. Some details are in it — gener- 
ally this is what I told them there, of course. 

Mr. Morris. May I make a suggestion, General? May I suggest 
that I just read the fu-st paragraph here: 

From 1948 to 1956 the Soviet Union has built up Hungary as a base of aggression 
against the West. At the same time the Soviet Union saw to it that the Hun- 
garian armed forces remain dependent, incapable of undertaking any action of 
their own; that they remain completely defenseless as opposed to the Soviet 
military mechanism, and at the same time, a suitable means for aggression against 
the West, under Soviet leadership. 

The above can be proven by the following facts — 

and then 3^ou go forth and give your evidence to support that particular 
conclusion, is that right? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I was wondering. General, if we may just put it into 
the record at this point as it is now? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You tell us now that it is adducing your reasons and 
your supporting facts to your conclusions which I have just read? 

General Kiraly. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. May we just put it into the record at this time and 
then you will not have to read it, General? 

General Kiraly. Fine. 

(The section of General Kiraly's statement: "Hungary, Base of 
Aggression for the Soviet Union," reads in full as follows:) 

_ From 1948 to 1956 the Soviet Union has built up Hungary as a base of aggres- 
sion against the West. At the same time the Soviet Union saw to it that the 
Hungarian armed forces remain dependent, incapable of undertaking any action of 
their own; that they remain completely defenseless as opposed to the Soviet mili- 
tary mechanism and, at the same time, a suitable means for aggression against the 
West, under Soviet leadership. 

The above can be proven by the following facts: 

1. The number and the equipment of the Hungarian Army was determined by 
the Paris Peace Treaty after World War II. Accordingly Hungary was entitled 
to dispose of a land army of 65,000 and of an air force of 5,000 men. Hungary 
was allowed to own 90 fighter planes, including the reserve planes, but bombers 
were prohibited. In spite of these peace treaty stipulations, from late 1948 on 
the Soviet regime started to organize a Hungarian Army, which was far larger in 
peace footing and which was equipped Avith weapons prohibited by the treaty. 

The total strength of these forces amounted to 250,000 men (about 3}^ times the 
amount allowed). This figure, however, does not include the numerous reserves 
which usually are trained with already functioning regiments. The continuing 
formation of new units suggested that the strength of the standing army was to be 

The air force consisted of 1 air fighter division, 6 single echelons, amounting to 
1 regiment with 120 planes, 1 air regiment with only 50 planes and 1 fighter bomber 
regiment with 37 planes. In 1956 the true strength of the air fighter division- 
certainly exceeded 500 planes. 

The feverish modernization of airfields and the speedy construction of numerous 
new military airfields indicated that the Russians intended to use Hungarian 
territory as a military airbase against the West. 


2. Not only the development of the army was being furthered, but great care 
was also given to the militarization of the whole country, to the training of the 
youth, to military and paramilitary training, to the military training at the 
universities, and MOHOSZ organizations (Hungarian partisan organization), etc. 

3. The reconstruction of the army on a Communist basis required that leading 
military personalities be replaced by persons who were considered trustworthy 
by the Soviets. This process started in November 1948. The top posts of the 
army were manned by party members, uneducated from the military point of view, 
and, at the same time the liquidation of the commanding officers, who had been 
members of the former army, began. 

It goes without saying that given such a supreme military command, the Soviet 
military advisers assigned to the commanders of the Hungarian Army were the 
true leaders in power. 

4. The first Soviet military advisers arrived in Hungarj^ in late 1948. The 
Ministry for National Defense and shortly afterward the army corps, the divi- 
sions, regiments and also the higher units of the military services, the central 
organs, officer schools and military academies, were all staffed by a horde of 
Soviet military advisers. 

An example of the extent to which the invasion of Russian advisers and their 
control over the Hungarian Army had grown: On August 17, 1951, when I was 
arrested and sentenced to death, the Honved Academy (of which I had been in 
command) was controlled by Nikolai Voloshin, colonel of the general staff. The 
academy also had 13 Russian general staff colonels acting as "advisers." This 
unbelievably high number meant that every single action of the organization was 
directed by them and that the real commander — myself in this case — had to be 
sentenced to death, because I had my own independent opinion characteristic 
of the Hungarian Nation. 

It was the task of the advisers — and this task was fully achieved by them — to 
transform the Hungarian Army as completely as possible according to Soviet 
standards, to establish the Soviet system of training, to teach the principles of 
Soviet tactics and military operations, and to rob the Hungarian Army of its 
national characteristics. 

5. As the chief period of development of the army coincided with the anti- 
Yugoslav campaign of the Cominform, the Hungarian Army — as one of the 
instruments of Soviet power politics in its territorial structure, in the distribu- 
tion of garrisons, as well as in political attitude — had been organized according 
to requirements of an attack against Yugoslavia in the first place, and against 
Austria in the second. 

Maneuvers and the war games, which were joined by higher units and organ- 
ized by the general staff of the armies for the high command, always reveal the 
real aims of an army. The war games, arranged in Januarj^ 1951 in Budapest, 
at the Hungarian Officer's Club and directed by Soviet Lieutenant General Bojko, 
were attended by Mihaly Farkas and I, too, was present. Mihaly Farkas, then 
Minister for National Defense, declared that the week-long study was based on 
an actual operational plan of the Soviet and the Hungarian supreme command. 

The objectives; an attack launched from between the rivers Danube and Tisza 
against Yugoslavia; occupation of the towns Szabadka (Subotica) and Ujvidek 
(Novi Sad) ; crossing the Danube, occupying of the mountain range Fruska-Gora 
(in Yugoslavia) ; and holding the territory for a further invasion of larger Soviet 

The theme of the war game ai ranged for an army group in February and March 
1953, under the leadership of Mihaly Farkas, Minister for National Defense, 
was an operation for occupying a coastal sector near Rijeka (Fiume). The Hun- 
garian Army, pushing ahead through the so-called Ljubjana gate, thus was to 
create a breach for the masses of the Soviet Army and a large-scale invasion of the 

The same picture of an attack against the West was given in the years 1951 
1952, and 1953 in the areas bordering on the southern Hungarian frontier, which 
was largely fortified. The building of these fortifications meant an excessive 
financial strain for the Hungarian people. 

6. In order to supply the army with weapons, and also to increase the war 
potential of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet command, from 1948 on, tried to resurrect 
and expand the then extinct war industry. Hungarian war industry produced 
almost exclusively on the basis of permits, issued at a high price by the Soviet 
Union. Establishing a Hungarian war industry also meant decentralization of the 
Soviet's own war industry. 


The Hungarian war industry authorized the manufacture first of infantry 
weapons and ammunition, and later, artillery weapons, military vehicles, com- 
munication instruments and technical equipment, for the Hungarian Army to 
begin with. Later still, its capacity was expanded to include supplies for the 
armies of other Soviet satellite countries. For instance, Hungarian tanks were 
delivered to Bulgaria, as well as a great amount of war equipment to North Korea. 

The rapid and significant deterioration of the living standard of the Hungarian 
population between 1950 and 1953 was partly due to Rakosi's heavy industrial 
investment program. As is well-known, heavy industry serves as a basis for 
direct and indirect expansion of war industry. Neither was in proportion to the 
country's economic capacities. 

7. All railroads serving military operations were greatly improved — the Buda- 
pest-Zahony line, for example. This included the loading facilities. Similar to 
the situation on the railroads, the highway system too had been built up according 
to military interests. During recent years, while secondary road systems of the 
counties had been neglected, main trunk routes in the main North-South and 
East-West strategic directions had been built according to the most modern 

8. Airfields capable of serving jet planes are part of the system of the attack 
bases in Hungary. Existing airfields were modernized and developed to this 
purpose and new airfields established. Such are the airfields of Taszar, Papa, 
Tokol, etc. 



In spite of the fact that the army had been developed and trained from its 
beginning according to the interests of the Soviet leaders, and in spite of the fact 
that only commanders trained in Soviet military schools were admitted to leading 
positions, that the whole army was constantly under the ideological direction of 
the Communist Party and under the strictest control of the AVH, the October 
Revolution in Hungary has proven that the Hungarian Army was far from being 
a body functioning automatically, and unthinkingly, a tool in the hands of the 
Soviets and the Muscovite Hungarian leadership, a formation suitable for breaking 
down the people's fight for freedom. 

1. The military high command, which was considered by the Soviets to be 
trustworthy, was composed of individuals who had been either in the prewar 
Communist underground, and who returned to Hungary after training in Moscow 
after the war. This military leadership was widely separated from the small 
units, and even from the somewhat larger ones, which exaggerated the innate 
opposition between the leadership and the rank and file. The leadership did not 
understand the true spirit of the army, nor did it know its striking power. The 
younger officers, who had been with the troops, could not and did not disassociate 
themselves from the temper, both political and economic, which characterized the 
whole population. 

2. These were the conditions which confronted the general staff, when it sum- 
moned the army groups into battle to suppress the revolt, and found that with 
few exceptions, from the very first moments of fighting, its men refused to use 
weapons against their people, and began actively to joining them. Thus: 

(a) as early as the night of October 23/24, mechanized troops which were 
sent to the radio station to restore order handed their weapons over to the 

(b) the army men who at first displayed sympathetic neutrality in the early 
days of the revolt, in increasing numbers joined the freedom fighters. 

(c) the army supplied the freedom fighters, when not actually joining them, 
with weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and food. 

(d) two of the Hungarian corps commanders, Major General Mikes /in 
Szekesfehervar/ and Maj. Gen. Lajos Gyurko /Kecskemet/, having given 
orders to fire on the demonstrators, had to flee to nearby Soviet units for 
protections from the burning hatred of their own troops. 

(e) the Revolutionary Council, formed by career officers and the rank and 
file of the revolutionary university youth, deposed the following persons: 
General Bata /Minister of Defense/, Lt General Szabo, Major Gen. Lajos 
Toth, Major General Hazai and Major General Hidvegi. 

(/) the Budapest Zrinyi Military Academy went over as a body to the 
fighters on October 23 to obey the orders of the defense ministry; the entire 
antiaircraft division of the Budapest Matyas Barracks went over about Octo- 
ber 24, and the entire AAA forces gave orders to open fire on the Soviets on 
November 4. 


On and after November 4, great numbers of the officers and troops took part 
in the fight against the Russians, individually and in groups. North of Obuda, 
a battle broke out between Soviet and Hungarian armored units. It can be said 
that the elite of the Rakoci Officers School and the other officer schools and 
military academies distinguished themselves in support of the revolution. 

3. The events of the Hungarian revolt have shown that the Rakosi-ite military 
high command made it impossible for the entire army to have gone over to the 
people and thus the old Rakosi military leadership remained. Accordingly, the 
revolution created its own revolutionary defense committee as a counterbalance. 
The task of this committee was to direct the military leadership and hasten the 
de-Rakosization, which it had nearly completed by November 4, but some anti- 
revolutionary Rakosi elements remained in the leadership, forming a fifth column. 
Beside the Army and the police, as opposed to the AVH, [the revolution tried 
to form its own trustworthy army, within the framework of a national guard, 
drawing on the university revolutionary units and the new factory militias. In 
course of the revolt, more and more organized units, including army units, joined 
with the national guard. Thus, had there been no Soviet intervention, the 
national guard would have developed into a powerful national army. 


In order to crush the Hungary revolution, the Soviet Army at first used only 
those troops which it already had stationed on Hungarian soil. But in order to 
assure a decisive victory, it alerted divisions in Rumania and in the sub-Carpathian 
Ukraine, some of which it moved into Hungary immediately, for immediate use, 
and others of which it grouped in positions for use in the infamous stab-in-the-back 
of the early morning hours of November 4. 

In the early days of the revolutions, Soviet troops failed to accomplish what 
their leaders had expected of them, that is, to drown the young revolution in 
blood. Accordingly, Soviet troops temporarily withdrew. 

Illustrative of the path taken by Soviet aggression are the following points: 

1. Before the revolution, the 2d and 17th mechanized (motorized) divisions 
were stationed in Hungary, having a strength of about 20,000 men and 600 tanks. 
The 2d Division was moved into Budapest to quell the mounting revolution, 
while the 17th Division was moved into western Hungary on an alert basis. The 
Soviet 32d and 34th mechanized divisions from Rumania were alerted on October 
23, and thrown into battle by the 24th (92d Infantry). Simultaneously, the sub- 
Carpathian and Ukrainian based divisions were alerted and moved into Hungary, 
battle ready. Various reports reaching the revolutionary general staff indicated 
that by November 3, the Soviets had 7 divisions and about 2,500 tanks. Of this 
number on and after November 4, it was possible to identify 6 divisions with 
75,000 troops and 2,500 tanks. 

2. The conduct of the Soviet elements during the first period of the revolution 
was characterized by an effort to retreat from their initial failure with a minimum 
of casualties, to abandon use of forces and to try diplomatic negotiations. On 
October 28 and 29, a cease-fire was negotioted and proclaimed, and Soviet units 
withdrew to confined areas, while additional divisions were put in various strategic 
positions throughout Hungary. The Soviets withdrawing from Budapest were 
replaced by the Honvedseg and National Guard, and a peaceful, victorious mood 
took hold of the capital city. However, on November 1 and 2, the aerodromes and 
supply bases were occupied by Soviet troops. On November 2 and 3, the Soviets 
began to establish two operational bases on the main highway from Miskolc to 
Budapest in the area of the Matra-Bukk Mountain Range, and along the main 
communications lines lying between Budapest and Szeged, around Csongrad- 
Szentes and Kiskunhalas and in the dawn of November 4, the second uprising 

3. Soviet intervention was characterized by its ruthlessness and savagery. It 
has become a proverb in Budapest that the Russians returned the fire of a lone 
man equipped with small arms with a barrage of cannonfire. It occurred even 
after the cessation of mass armed resistance that apartment houses were arbi- 
trarily sprayed with gun and machinegun fire. This manner of fighting was coupled 
with the deportation of the young male population, and in areas of particularly 
stubborn resistance, even of older men. 

Mr. Morris. And you have a little two-page summary you want 
to read? 

General Kiraly. Yes; I would be very glad to read that. 


My conclusions: The features and future of the Hungarian national 
democratic revolution and freedom fighters: 

A number of opinions and charges have been made about our 
movements. I should like to review the facts. 

1. The Hungarian people began their national democratic move- 
ments on their own account without any foreign initiative. During 
these movements, the nation — showing a unity never seen before in 
Hungary's history — subdued its inner enemies, the Communist Party 
and the secret police; subdued the armed forces of the Soviet aggress- 
ors in Budapest dming the fh'st aggression; and then were trampled 
down by superfluous armed forces during the second aggression. 
The Hungarian nation takes all responsibility for starting the national 
democratic revolution and freedom fight. However, the Hungarian 
people — who did not want to start a third world war out of this case, 
nevertheless hoped that the rest of the free world would help them 
by carrying out the U. N. resolutions in Hungary. Thus, the Soviet 
would not be allowed to interfere with the business of a free country 
which was itself a member of the United Nations. 

2. The Hungarian freedom fighters got neither instruction, direc- 
tion, or any other material help from foreign countries. 

3. The movement and freedom fight were national and democratic 
ones, lacldng any Fascist or counterrevolutionary character. 

4. The situation was ripe for these events on account of the follow- 
ing causes: 

(a) The embitterness of the Hungarian people because of the 
exploitation and suppression; 

(6) The Hungarian people's national pride and conscience; 

(c) The Hungarian people's love for the liberty which the country 
has fought for so many times in her liistory. 

(d) The Hungarian people's sincere hope for a democratic system 
of life. 

The Hungarian people tried all means possible to achieve their 
purposes by peaceful measures, b}^ evolution. Only when, on October 
23, the security police and the Soviet aggressors opened fire against 
peaceful demonstrators did the evolution turn into a national demo- 
cratic revolution and freedom fight. 

5. The Hungarian people's freedom fight was trampled down, but 
their wish for freedom is never to be subdued. The people at home 
and we who left Hungary will continue to work incessantly for the 
liberation of Hungar}^ The struggle will not be finished until 
Hungary has acliieved complete freedom. 

These are the things I know and believe about Hungary's National 
Democratic revolution and freedom fight. I am now at your dis- 
posal to give you any further details you may wish which I am able 
to furnish. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Morris. General Kiraly, is there anything further that you 
feel we should know now at this session? Is there anything more you 
should tell us in addition to what you have just told us? 

General Kiraly. I think so — I got together everything that is 
important to mj^ opinion, but if anything is to be questioned, I would 
be very glad to answer the questions. 


Mr. Morris. No, I think — speaking for the chairman who had to 
leave here, the acting chairman who had to leave here — it is very 
valuable, what you have told us. It goes a long way toward helping 
the Senate of the United States and the Congress as a whole, to 
understand the nature of what went on in Hungary and what is still 
going on there. And, as I say, it does have a direct bearing on the 
Communist machinery here in the United States which this subcom- 
mittee is supposed to learn all about, because the effects of the revolu- 
tion in Hungary are so profound and deep that they have caused 
repercussions in the Communist organizations all over the world and 
it is a question of our trying to forecast what the future will bring. 

So, on behalf of the chahman, Senator Eastland, and on behalf of 
the acting chairman, Senator Johnston, I want to thank you very 
much for coming and giving this very enlightening expatiation here 

(At 12:20 p. m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 
a, m., Wednesday, February 20, 1957.) 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization 
in this index. 



AAA forces (in Hungary) 3402 

Abakumov, Viktor S 3377-3379 

Adriatic Sea 3385, 3399 

Albania 3399 

Albanian forces 3399 

Alhed Forces 3353 

American Army 3387 

American Embassy (Budapest) 3348 

American Embassy in Moscow 3379 

Andropov, Ambassador Yuri 3396 

Army Counter Intelligence Service 3377 

Asia 3352, 3360 

Asian countries 3338 

Australia 3338 

Austria 3361, 3364, 3393 

AVH (secret police of the army in Hungary) 3382, 3402, 3403 


Bacz 3348 

Bata, General 3402 

Beria 3378-3380 

Bibo, Istvan (Petofi Peasant, Peasant Party) 3362 

Bojko, Soviet Lieutenant General 3401 

Bojoao, General Lieutenant [sic] 3385 

Bolshevism 3358 

British attach^ in Moscow 3379 

Budapest 3334, 

3335, 3346, 3348, 3353, 3356, 3357, 3363, 3370, 3372, 3375, 3376, 

3383, 3389-3392, 3394, 3396, 3401, 3403. 

Budapest Matyas Barracks 3402 

Budapest Parliament buildings 3396 

Budapest-Zahony line (railroad) 3402 

Budapest Zrinyi Military Academy 3402 

Builders' Technical University (in Hungary) 3393 

Bulganin 3355 

Bulgaria 3386, 3401 


Caesar 3398 

Camp Kilmer 3353 

Carpathians in Russia 3382, 3386 

Central Europe 3385 

Ceylon 3338 

Cominf orm 3401 

Comintern 3390 

Communism 3363, 3388 

Communist/s 3333, 3338, 3348, 3360, 3362, 3382-3385, 3388, 3389, 3401, 3405 

Communist government 3388 




Communist Party 3361, 3381-3383, 33S5, 3402 

French 3385, 3390 

Hungarian 3389, 3392 

Italian 3385 

U. S. A 3351, 3381 

Communist youth movement in Hungary 3383 

Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R 3378 

Csepel Iron Works 3334, 3335 

Csepel Island 3396 

Csolmok 3341, 3342 

Csongrad-Szentes 3403 

Czechoslovakia 3382, 3385, 3386 

Czegle 3339 


Danube Confederation 3393 

Danube River 3384, 3401 

Declaration of Independence, American 3388 

Delgado, Enrique Castro 3390, 3391 

Denmark 3338 

Dennis, Eugene 3382 

de Seynes, Phillipe 3368 

"Dictatorship of the proletariat" 3388 

Dudas, Joseph 3349, 3360, 3361, 3363, 3364 

Dunapatelle River 3384 


Eastland, Senator James O 3337, 3338, 3405 

Egyesult Izzo Lamp Works (incandescent lamp works of Hungary) __ 3334, 3335 

Egyetemi Ipjubag (University Youth), publication 3389 

Eisenhower, President 3355 

England 3361 

Erdei, Rerenc (Peasant Party) 3362 

Europe 3352, 3372, 3398 

Ewing, Arthur 3368 

Exhibit No. 421— Document given to those released from forced-labor 

camps 3343 

Exhibit No. 422^ — Document entitled "The Revolt in Hungary" published 

by the Free Europe Committee, New York City, page 86 3358, 3359 

Exhibit No. 423— "To Imre Nagy * * *" from the workers of the Hun- 
garian Optical Works 3366 

Exhibit No. 424 — Joint UN/FAO mission report press release 3368 

Exhibit No. 424- A— Joint UN/FAO mission report 3370 

Fabregat, Rodriguez (Uruguay representative to the U. N.) 3336 

Farkas, Mihaly, Home Defense Minister 3385, 3401 

Fascist 3393, 3394, 3404 

Figaro, Le (publication) 3390 

Fischer, Josef (Social Democrat) 3362 

Fiume 3398 

Fonagy, Dezso 3333, 3362, 3365 

Testimony of 3333-3353 

Four Powers 3361 

France 3361,3392 

Freedom Fighters of Hungary 3357, 3358, 3386, 3392 

Fruska-Gora (in Yugoslavia) 3384, 3401 


Gabor, General Peter 3342 

Ganz (Ganz Iron Works, Electrical Works, etc.) 3334, 3335 

General Assembly 3337, 3368 

Resolution of December 12 re Hungary 3338 

United States delegation to the General Assembly 3338 

Geneva 3369 

Germans 3340, 3341, 3353 



Gero clique 3389 

Gero, Erno (MVD agent) 3389-3391, 3394 

Godolo 3339 

GPU 3390 

Gyor 3393 

Gyurko, Major General (Kecskemet) 3402 


Hazai, Major General 3402 

Hegedus, Andras 3389 

Hidvegi, Major General 3402 

Honved Academy 3401 

Honvedseg 3403 

Hruska, Senator Roman L 3333, 3351 

Hungarian Army 3353, 3382, 3384-3387, 3401, 3402 

Hungarian communism 3363, 3392 

Hungarian Communist government {see also Commuuist Party, Hungar- 
ian) 3341 

Hungarian Government 3333, 3342, 3360, 3361, 3370, 3376, 3392 

Hungarian ironworkers 3345 

Hungarian Military Academy (Lutovicum, equivalent to West Point in 

United States) _' 3353 

Hungarian Ministry of Internal Trade 3371 

Hungarian Ministry of Supplies 3370 

Hungarian National Council 3339 

Hungarian national democratic revolution 3388, 3404 

Hungarian National Government 3366, 3367 

Hungarian National Revolutionary Council 3349, 3365 

Hungarian Officer's Club 3401 

Hungarian Optical Workers 3365-3367 

Hungarian People's Republic 3392 

Hungarian Red Cross 3370, 3376 

Hungarian representatives in the U. N 3361 

Hungarian Revolution 3333-3405 

Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament. _ 3334-3336, 3344-3348, 3351, 3367, 3402 

Hungarian secret police 3342, 3354, 3364. 3404 

Hungarian uprising, etc 3333-3405 

Hungary 3333-3405 

"Hungary, Base of Aggression for the Soviet Union," section of General 

Kiraly's statement 3400 


Ilku, Maj. Gen. Pal 3382, 3383 

International Committee of the Red Cross 3368-3370, 3375, 3376, 3383 

International Labor Office 3370 

Iron Curtain 3385 

Istrian Peninsula 3398 

Italians 3340 

Italy 3399 

Izvestia (official organ of tlie Soviet Government) 3389, 3390 

Janko, Dr. Bala 3334 

Jenner, Senator William. E 3337, 3338 

Johnston, Senator Olin D 3~3'37, 3338, 3381, 3405 


Kabelgyar (manufacture of cables, wires, etc.) 3334, 3335 

Kadar, Janos 3346 3394 

Kadar government ' 3345 

Kadar regime 3383 

Kecskemet 3402 

Kelemen, Gyula (Social Democrat) 3362 

Kethly, Anna (Social Democrat) 3362 

Klirushchev 3355 

IQraly, Gen. Bela, testimony of (major general in the Free Hungarian 
Army, commander in chief of the national guard established during the 
Hungarian National Democratic Revolution) 3381-3405 



Kiskunhalas 3396, 3403 

Kispesti (small town now connected to Budapest which has its own revo- 
lutionary council) 3334 

Kovacs, Bela (smallholder) 3362 

Kovacs, General 3396 

Lampagyar (factory where lamps are manufactured) 3334, 3335 

League of Red Cross Societies 3370 

Letter of January 17, 1957, from Senator Eastland to Ambassador Lodge. 3337 
Letter of January 26, 1957, for Senator Eastland from Ambassador Lodge. 3337 
Letter of January 31, 1957, from Senator Eastland to Ambassador Lodge. 3338 

Lj ublijana Gate 3385 

Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot 3336-3338 

Lorinci (town outside of Budapest) 3334, 3335 


Maleter 3396 

Mandel, Benjamin 3351, 3377 

Manuilsky (a Comintern official) 3390 

Marxist ideas 3366 

Matra-Bukk Mountain Range 3403 

Mav (Hung.irian Government steel factory) 3334, 3335 

Merkolov, General 3378-3380 

Middle East 3337, 3338 

Mikes, Major General (in Szekesfehervar) 3402 

Mindszenty, Cardinal 3347-3349, 3351 

Miners Revolutionary Council 3342 

Miskolc 3393, 3396, 3403 

Miskolc Workers Council 3393 

MOHOSZ organizations 3401 

Molotov, V 3379 

Monde, Le, publication 3390 

Morris, Robert 3333, 3351, 3377, 3381 

Moscow 3377, 3382, 3383 

Muscovite Hungarian leadership 3402 

MVD 3379, 3390, 3391 


Nagy, Imre 3361, 3362, 3389, 3392, 3394, 3396 

Nagv, Imre, government 3361, 3362, 3365 

Napoleon 3398 

National Revolutionary Council 3360-3365, 3402 

NATO armies 3385 

Near East 3359 

Nepakartat 3383 

"Newsletter Fom Behind the Iron Curtain," article in Stockholm issue of 

October 28, 1949 3391 

North Korea 3402 

Nunez-Portuondo (Cuban delegate to U. N.) 3336 


Obuda 3403 

Papa (airfield) 3402 

Papai 3357 

Paris Peace Treaty after World War II 3400 

Parliament Building 3397 

Peasants and Farm Workers 3334, 3335 

Petofi, Radio 3358 

Pfeifer government 3354 

Po Plain 3385 

Poland 3367, 3385 

Polish border 3386 

Polish movement 3367 

Polish national democratic revolution 3390 

Pragai, Dezso 3334 

Pravda (official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. _ 3389, 3390 


R Page 

Radio Budapest 3390, 3396 

Radio Kossuth 3389, 3393 

Radio Rakoczi {see Petofi). 

Radio Vienna 3389 

Rajk trial 339 1 

Rakoci Officers School 3403 

Rakosi 3355, 3401 

Rakosi, Matyas 3388 

Rakospalotai (town close to Budapest) 3334, 3335 

Rastvorov, Yuri, testimony of 3377-3380 

Revolt in Hungary, The, Document published by the Free Europe Com- 
mittee, New York City (p. 86) . Exhibit No. 422 3359 

Revolutionary Committee of the Forces of PubHc Order 3394 

Revolutionary Council of Students and Intellectuals of Greater Hungary. 3334, 


Revolutionary Workers Council of Greater Budapest 3334 

Rijeka (Fiume) 3385, 3401 

Rumania 3386, 3403 

Rusher, William A 3333, 3351, 3377, 3381 

Russia {sec also Soviet; U. S. S. R.) 3339, 3382, 3385 

Russians {see also Soviet) 3335, 3352, 3354, 3384, 3396 

Russian Army 3385, 3387, 3397 

Russian Home Defense Ministry 3383, 3384 

Russian occupation troops 3356, 3357 

Russian soldiers; troops 3346, 3355, 3356, 3361, 3364, 3383, 3389, 3390 


Second World War 3387 

Secretary General 3375 

Sen. Mr. B. R., Director General of FAO 3368, 3369 

Sinard, Pierre 3368, 3369 

Smallholders Party 3353 

Small Home Owners Federation 3354 

Small Land Owners Federation 3353, 3354 

Soviet, Soviet Union 3337, 3338, 3340, 3342, 3349, 3352, 3353, 3355, 

3358-3362, 3367, 3377, 3379, 3383, 3385, 3387, 3390-3392, 3399- 


Soviet Ambassador to Hungary 3396, 3398 

Soviet military schools 3383 

Soviet satellite countries 3402 

Soviet troops in Hungary 3356 

Soviet troops 3346 

Square of Heroes (in Budapest) 3396 

Stalin 3377, 3379 

Stalinist system 3383 

Standard ("evidently an American subsidiary or something") 3334, 3335 

State, Department of 3337 

Stockholm (publication) 339 1 

Stockholm, Sweden 3377 

Suez question 3345 

Suslov 3394 

Swedish Foreign Ministry 3377 

Switzerland 3393 

Szabadka (Subotica) 3401 

Szabo, Istvan B. (Smallholder) 3362 

Szabo, Lieutenant General 3402 

Szatmar County Workers' Council 3394 

Szeged 3396 

Szekesfehervar 3402 

Szeradasi, Jeno 3335, 3349, 3352 

Testimony of 3360-3376 


Taszar (airfield) 3402 

Tatabanya 3341 

Tildy, Zoltan (Smallholder) 3362, 3394 


Tokol (on Csepel Island) 3396, 3401 

Airfield 3401 

Toth. Maj. Gen. Lajos 3402 

Trieste 3398 

Tunisia 3338 

Turani, Gen. Andrew 3349, 3352 

Testimony of 3353-3360 


Ugrai, Ferenc 3382, 3383 

Ujvidek (Novi-Sad) 3401 

Ukraine 3357, 3386, 3403 

Sub-Carpathian Ukraine 3403 

Ukrainian 3382 

Ukrainian Communist government 3340 

Ukrainian iron workers 3345 

Ukrainian National Council 3341 

Ukrainian Secret Police (AVO) 3340, 3341 

Ukrainian underground revolutionary movement 3341 

Ujpesti (town outside of Budapest) 3334, 3335 

United Kingdom 3392 

United Nations 3335, 3347, 3349, 3352, 3361, 3365, 3367-3370, 3393, 3396 

United Nations Charter 3392 

U. N. Economic Commission for Europe 3370, 3376 

U. N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO) 3370 

U. N. Food and Agricultural Organization Joint UN/FAO mission report 

and press release— Exhibit Nos. 424 and 424-A 3368, 3370, 3372 

U. N. Relief Fund 3368 

U. N. Security Council 3391 

U. N. Special Committee on Hungarv 3337, 3349, 3383, 3384 

U. N. World Health Organization..: 3370 

Uruguay 3338 

Urals 3340 

U. S. S. R. {see also Soviet; Russia) 3334 


Varga, iNIonsignor 3341, 3353 

Vidovicj 3353, 3354, 3356, 3357 

Vienna 3369 

Vladivostok 3340, 3341 

Voloshin 3401 

Von Cseh, Louis 

Interpreter for — 

Dezso Fonagy 3333 

Andras Turani 3353 

Jeno Szeradasi 3360 


Wahlen, Dr. F. T 3368, 3369 

Wallenberg, Raoul 3377-3379 

Warsaw Pact 3361, 3386, 3389-3392, 3396 

Warsaw Treaty 3392 

West, The 3345, 3347, 3352, 3361, 3366, 3367 

Western Europe 3385, 3389, 3396 

Western Powers 3349, 3385, 3386 

Western World 3350 

Workers' Council : 3366, 3367 

World War II 3353 

"XXX" (signature on an article in Le Figaro) 3390, 3391 




Yen, Dr. (Chinese representative to the U. N.) 3336 

Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier 3384 

Yugoslavia 3384, 3398, 3401 

Yugoslavians 3385 


Zahony 3339 

Zhukov, Gen. Marshal 3355, 3386, 3387, 3399