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Full text of "Scope of Soviet activity in the United States. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress, second session[-Eighty-fifth Congress, first session] .."

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FEBRUARY 5, 1957 

PART 50 

Printed for the use of tlie Committee on the Judiciary 

93215 WASHINGTON : 1957 

ywUMCv,'-* »' 

Boston Public Library 

Superintendent of Documents 

AUG 27 1957 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 


CLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANQER, North Dakota 





SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Caroliaa ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 


Act AND Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Robert Morris, Chief Counsel 

J. G. SouEWTNE, Associate Counsel 

William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Testimony of — Page 

Abrey, Richard Henrich 3407 




United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 

OF THE Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p. m., in room 
424, Senate Office Building, Senator Roman L, Hruska presiding. 

Present: Senator Hruska. 

Also present: William Rusher, associate coimsel. 

Senator Hruska. AU right. The meeting ■will come to order. 

The Chair would like to make a brief statement before we proceed 
to swear the witness, and to his interrogation. 

The Internal Securit}?" Subcommittee has been trying to determine 
whether the Soviet Union is causing money to come into the United 
States to serve one or more of its purposes, all of which are calculated 
to undermine the security of this country and to extend Communist 
power abroad. 

The Board for the Validation of German Bonds in the United States 
was set up for the purpose of determining which foreign currency 
bonds of German origin shall be validated and honored as existing 
obligations of the companies concerned. 

When Richard H. Abrey, today's witness, sought to vahdate 
$245,000 worth of bonds of^the United Steel Works, the Board held 
that the bonds were physically located, on January 1, 1945, in the 
vaults of the Reichsbank in Berlin. This finding of the Validation 
Board is tantamount to a holding that these particular bonds were 
acquired by the Soviet Government and subsequently disposed of by it. 

Mr. Abrey has been called today because we desire his testimony, 
in order to learn from him where he obtained the bonds in question. 

Mr. Abrey, will you be sworn at this time, please. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to 
give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

Mr. Abrey. I do. 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Rusher, wiU you proceed to the interrogation. 


Mr. Rusher. What is your name, please? 
Mr. Abrey. Richard Henrich Abrey. 

Mr. Rusher. Senator, I believe counsel for Mr. Abrey would like 
to make a statement. 



Senator Hruska. Leave is granted. 

Mr. Crary. My name is Miner Crary. Subsequent to the deter- 
mination of the Vahdation Board, Mr. Abrey instituted a proceeding 
as plaintiff, in the United States district court in New York, in an 
action to seek a determination that the requirements for the vahdation 
of his bonds had been met; that after instituting that proceeding, 
various motions were made by both parties, and there is now pending 
a decision by that court on those motions, which has not been decided. 

Furthermore, after a particular newspaper article, an action in 
libel was commenced also by Mr. Abrey in the New York Supreme 
Court, and that also is still in process of litigation. 

Mr. Rusher. Mr. Abrey, I believe 3'ou originally were of Polish 
nationality; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. Will you give us the Polish form of j^our name? 

Mr. Abrey. Ryszard Henryk Abranowicz. 

Mr. Rusher. In 1939 you were in Poland, were you not, at the time 
of the outbreak of war? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us from whom, and when, you acquired 
the 245 bonds of the value of $1,000 apiece, of the United Steel Works, 
which you subsequently, in 1953, registered for validation with the 
Board for Validation of German Bonds in the United States? 

Mr. Abrey. I purchased it through the Bank Dyskontow^^ in War- 
saw, Poland, in the early part of the spring of 1940, shortly prior to 
my departure from Poland for Honduras, in Central America. 

Mr. Rusher. You were, I believe, planning at that time to leave 
Poland as a result of the dislocations in that country following the 
German and Russian occupation; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And you say that you bought these bonds from the 
Bank Dyskontow}"? 

Mr. Abrey. I bought them at the Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw. 

Mr. Rusher. In Warsaw. 

Can you tell us who had suggested the transaction, or how it had 
come about, directlv, how it came to vour attention and was con- 

Mr. Abrey. It was suggested to me b}' a Mr. Radzinski. 

Mr. Rusher. Would you spell that, please? 

Mr. Abrey. R-a-d-z-i-n-s-k-i, Radzmski. He was one of the execu- 
tives of the Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw. He was known as Director 
Radzinski, which means one of the members of the board, or managers 
of the bank. He suggested these bonds as secm*ity which, by alter- 
ability, permitted by the German occupation authorities to be taken 
with me abroad at the time when I left Poland. 

Mr. Rusher. Did he mdicate who were then the owoiers of the 

Mr. Abrey. No; he did not. 

Mr. Rusher. Are you aware that the Validation Board, in its 
opinion denying validation to these particular bonds, stated, and I 
would quote from the opinion of the Board : 

Dr. Laschtowiczka, member of the board of directors of the Bank Dyskontowy, 
Warsaw, for the period 1935 to May 1940, who served as Deputy Chief of the 
PoHsh Banking Supervisory Office after May 1940, testified that the Bank Dys- 
kontowy had no United States Steel works debentures prior to August 31, 1939, 


and that, to the best of his knowledge, no such debentures were acquired after 
that time. 

And then it adds in a footnote : 

The witness — 

meaning Dr. Laschtowiczka — 

was on leave from the bank from September 1939 to May 1940 but states he kept 
in close contact with the head of the bank, a Dr. Mikulecki. 

In view of this apparent testimon}^ that the bank did not have such 
bonds, will you explain how you came to acquke them from the bank? 

Mr. Abrey. Well, Dr. Laschtowiczka stated that to his knowledge 
the bank did not have it, but it does not m.ean that the bank did not 
purchase it for specific purpose for me, for selling it to me. 

Mr. Rusher. So that you feel that the bank, although it did not 
have it, purchased it to sell to you; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. That is my imderstanding at this 

Mr. Rusher. Did you know Mr. Mikulecki? 

Mr. Abrey. Not personally. 

Mr. Rusher. Would he have known of this transaction, if it took 

Mr. Abrey. Dr. Alikulecki was a German trustee of this bank, and 
it was rather my understanding that he instigated this transaction. 

Mr. Rusher. And yet Dr. Laschtowiczka, who, according to his 
testimony before the Validation Board, kept in close contact with 
him, apparently was not familiar with this transaction; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. It is quite possible, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Now, after you acquired the bonds, as you say, from 
the Bank D3'skontowy, what did you do \vith them? Did you take 
them with you out of Poland? 

Mr. Abrey. I took them with me out of Poland. 

Mr. Rusher. And after a number of months, I believe it was, you 
came to San Francisco in the United States; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And you were traveling on what kind of a passport? 

Mr. Abrey. Diplomatic passport, of the Republic of Honduras. 

Mr. Rusher. And j^ou arrived here in the status of a person in 
transit; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Air. Rusher. That is to say, m transit to Honduras? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you change your status after you came here? 

Mr. Abrey. I did. 

Mr. Rusher. To what? 

Mr. Abrey. To that of visitor. 

Mr. Rusher. Status of a visitor to the LTnited States? 

Mr. Abrey. On the Polish passport. 

Mr. Rusher. On a Polish passport? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Air. Rusher. Now, in connection with this change in j^our status 
from "in transit" to "visitor," did you execute a form for the Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Office in which you declared that you had 
no foreign securities? 

Mr. Abrey. I have no recollection of executing this form. How- 
ever, if such form was required, I am sure that it was executed. 


Mr. Rusher. Senator, I am informed from the report of the Valida- 
tion Board, for the year beginning September 1, 1955, and ending 
August 31, 1956, that the registrant, meaning Mr. Abrey, in acquiring 
visitor's status, executed the form required by the Bureau of Immi- 
gration and Naturalization, declaring that he owned no foreign 
securities, and that was the basis of my question. 

You say you do not recall whether or not you executed such a form? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. Subsequently, however, in December 1941, December 
16, 1941, did you execute a sworn report of assets to the Secretary 
of the Treasury of the United States, as required by Federal regu- 

Mr. Abrey. I did. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you in that report state that you did not have 
such foreign securities? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. I did not. 

Mr. Rusher. But at that time you did have them with you? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And you say that you subsequently have them in 
this country, in your possession? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. Where did you keep them, physically? 

Mr. Abrey. I had them at home. 

Mr. Rusher. You had them at home? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. Until what date, roughly? 

Mr. Abrey. Until early August of 1942. 

Mr. Rusher. What did you do with them at that time? 

Mr. Abrey. I gave them for safekeeping to Mr. Funes in Honduras 
consulate. He is the consul general in New York. 

Mr. Rusher. Mr. Abrey, though you now tell us that you kept 
them at home until August 1942, it is a fact, is it not, that your 
original statement to the Validation Board at the time of registration 
in 1953 forward, until late July 1955, was to the effect that these bonds 
were in a safe deposit box that you maintained in the Chemical Bank, 
in New York? 

Mr. Abrey. Correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And I believe there was evidence, tending to show 
that they were not in that safe deposit box, presented before the Board; 
is that right? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. It was subsequent to that, on July 26, 1955, that 
you submitted a further affidavit to the Board from your wife with 
respect to what had been the actual disposition of those bonds in that 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. What was her subsequent explanation; will you teU 
us the facts as you now understand them to be? 

Mr. Abrey. When I was confronted with the statement that these 
bonds were not in the safe deposit box, I was amazed, as I was all the 
time under the impression that my wife took it to the bank and placed 
them in the safe deposit box. 

Mr. Rusher. Had you told her to do this? 

Mr, Abrey. Yes, I did; very specifically. However 


Mr. Rusher. About when was this? 
Mr. Abrey. About 1941. 

Mr. Rusher. The particular month, can you give us that? 
Mr. Abrey. I can't recall, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Some time in 1941 you had told her to take it to 
the safe deposit box? 

Mr. Abrey. I gave her the package and told her to take it to the 
safe deposit box which we had at this time, and I never inquired of 
her whether she did place it in the safe deposit box. I was all the 
time under the impression that they were there. Apparently my 
wife decided it was unnecessary, or she had neglected or forgotten. 
Only recent, within the last couple of years when I learned they were 
not there, I started to inquire with her why weren't the bonds placed 
in the safety deposit box, and she said she never bothered to take 
them over there. 

Mr. Rusher. And you presented her affidavit to the Board? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. When did you claim these bonds from what you then 
took to be the safe deposit box in the Chemical Bank, but which you 
now knew was in the personal custody of your wife? 

Mr. Abrey. Before joining the Army in August of 1942, I asked 
my wife to give me the bonds, that I was going to the Honduras 
consulate to place them for safekeeping in case something happened to 
me. She then gave me the package and I took them to the consulate, 
to Mr. Funes. 

Mr. Rusher. You were still under the impression that she got the 
package from the safe deposit box? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. And under that impression, you made your subse- 
quent statement to the Validation Board? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. I might add at this point, just to keep the record in 
balance. Senator, that the Validation Board's annual report states — -I 
correct that — -it is the opinion of the Board in connection with its 
decision in the matter that the particular safe deposit box of the 
Chemical Bank, which they identify as No. A346-970, was not large 
enough to hold the 245 debentures in question. 

Mr. Abrey, when you did recover these from your wife — these 
bonds — you say j^ou gave them to the representative of Honduras in 
New York? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. Is that the consul general? 

Mr. Abrey. The consul general, Mr. Funes. 

Mr. Rusher. F-u-n-e-s is the name? 

Mr. Abrey. Correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And Mr. Fimes held these for you? 

Mr. Abrey. For me, until I called for them' in December 1950. 

Mr. Rusher. Did he actually see the bonds, or simply the package? 

Mr. Abrey. No. I opened the package, and I was under the im- 
pression that he saw these were the bonds. 

Mr. Rusher. You were under the impression that he had seen the 

Mr. Abrey. Yes. 

93215— 57— pt. 50 2 


Mr. Rusher. Subsequently, however, in his testimony before the 
Validation Board, it is correct, is it not, he testified simply that he 
had a package for you, and that it contained a bluish-green paper 
which he did not otherwise identify, and which he could not specif- 
ically identify as containing these bonds? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. So he held them for you until 1950, you say? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And in that year you withdrew them from his cus- 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Where did you put tliem then? 

Mr. Abrey. I had them at home, in Great Neck. 

Mr. Rusher. You had them at home, in Great Neck, Long Island? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, Long Island. 

Mr. Rusher. You kept them there until how long? 

Mr. Abrey. LTntil the validation proceeding started to take place. 

Mr. Rusher. When was that? 

Mr. Abrey. 1953, I believe. 

Mr. Rusher. Some time in 1953? 

Mr. Abrey. Do you have that exact, Mr. Crary? 

Mr. Crary. September 1953. 

Mr. Rusher. September 1953. 

Now, at any time after your arrival in this country, and up until, 
let's say, the time when you registered these bonds for validation in 
1953, had you considered selling them for what they would bring? 

Mr. .Abrey. Well, I was, perhaps, tliinkiag of selling them, but I 
didn't do any steps toward the sales. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you discuss the possibility of selling them, or the 
market value of them? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. With whom did you discuss that? 

Mr. Abrey. In 1949 — in the period covered by your question? 

Mr. Rusher. That's correct; after you arrived in the United States 
with the bonds. 

Mr. Abrey. In 1941, I had two friends here in the United States, 
both from Poland, both in banking business in Poland, and I spoke to 
them on this subject. 

Mr. Rusher. \Vho were they? 

Mr. Abrey. Mr. Keh. 

Mr. Rusher. Would you spell that, please? 

Mr. Abrey. K-e-h; and Mr. Bagniewski. 

Mr. Rusher. Would you spell that, please? 

Mr. Abrey. Bagniewski, B-a-g-n-i-e-w-s-k-i. 

Mr. Rusher. Where are they now? 

Mr. Abrey. Both dead. 

Mr. Rusher. They are both dead? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. But j'-ou did speak with them, you say, about these 
bonds in 1941? 

Mr. Abrey. In 1941. 

Mr. Rusher. Did j^ou speak to anybod}" else concerning them? 

Mr. Abrey. Not to my recollection — I am sorry; I spoke to Mr. 


Mr. Rusher. Would you give us his name? 

Mr. Abrey. Alexander Gross, G-r-o-s-s. 

Mr. Rusher. And since the war, have you considered selling these 

Mr. Abrey. Well, I was thinking of it. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you discuss it wdth anybody? 

Mr. Abrey. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Rusher. It is fairly clear in your mind that you have not 
discussed it with anyone since then? 

Mr. Abrey. Fairl-y clearly, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you know the late Stanley T. Stanley, the first 
and last names are both S-t-a-n-1-e-y ; Stanley T. Stanley, who in 
Poland, I believe befoi'e the war, was know^n by the name of Ruziewdcz? 

Mr. Abrey. I met him in Poland before the war, socially, a couple 
of times, and I knew him under that nam.e. I didn't know that his 
name in the United States was Stanley. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you hear that he was associated in his business 
in the United States after the war with the late Serge Rubenstein? 

Air. Abrey. I read to this effect in the newspapers after Rubenstein 
was killed. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you have any business dealings of any sort with 
Stanley? ^ y 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir; never. 

Mr. Rusher. Or with Rubenstein? 

Mr. Abrey. Never. 

Mr. Rusher. Do you know a man named Joseph Gruss, who has 
an office at 30 Broad Street, New York City? 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Have you ever had any business dealings with him? 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Do you know a man named Nicholas Deak? 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you ever have any business dealings with him? 

Mr. Abrey. Never. 

Mr. Rusher. Do you know a man named Peter Kemp? 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. When did you arrive in the United States? 

Mr. Abrey. In November of 1940. 

Mr. Rusher. November of 1940. Were you well fixed, relatively 
speaking, financially, or were you in a position where a matter of tliis 
size was of some importance to you? 

Mr. Abrey. Well, I wasn't well oft', if that's what you mean. 

Mr. Rusher. Certainly, this was a matter of large concern; would 
that be fair to say? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes and no, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. It is a subjective question, and I don't want to press 
it too much. 

I wonder, though, whether or not you might not have made some 
inquiry at the New York Stock Exchange in late 1940 regarding the 
possible sales value of these bonds. 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. You did not? 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir. I arrived here in the early part of November 
1940, and at this time we did intend to go to Honduras. My wife 


took sick immediately upon arrival over here, and she was in bed 
for several weeks, and I didn't even open my suitcases, which were 
still sealed at this time, and these bonds were in the suitcases. 

Mr. Rusher. They had come in on your Honduran passport; 
is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Would you explain — by the way, tliis is going back 
a bit — how you came to acquire a Honduran passport? 

Mr. Abrey. I was honorary consulate general of Honduras, in 
Poland, and that is how I came under diplomatic status as a traveler. 

Mr. Rusher. These bonds were in your baggage that you brought 
with you? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. And were not inspected, therefore? 

Mr. Abrey. They were not inspected. 

Mr. Rusher. Were they under diplomatic seal of some kind? 

Mr. Abrey, That is correct. And, answering your question, sir, 
for this reason: Until the very end, or rather the beginning of 1941, 
being under the impression that I would proceed to Honduras, I 
did not open the suitcase, I didn't take out these papers and I did 
not inquire. 

Mr. Rusher. You couldn't inquire without opening the suitcase? 

Mr. Abrey. I did not open the suitcases. 

Mr. Rusher. Isn't it a fact that the bonds, series A debentures, 
were selling on the New York Stock Exchange at a price of from 
SOYi to 36}Mn November and December of 1940? 

Mr. Abrey. 1 didn't know about that. 

Mr. Rusher. Do you know whether that happens to be the case, 
from subsequent information? 

Mr. Abrey. Only from the statements of the Validation Board. 

Mr. Rusher. That's what I was quoting it from. Mr. Abrey, in 
your testimon}^ before the Validation Board, I believe you testified 
that you probably would have sold the debentures for $50,000 in 1940, 
as you needed money badly, but that you were not aware that in 
November and December of 1940 the debentures were sold on the 
New York Stock Exchange at 30^ to 36^. 

Mr. Abrey. I may have said it, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Would it have been true, if you had said it? 

Mr. Abrey. I doubt it. 

Mr. Rusher. You think you might have misstated the fact before 
the Validation Board? 

Mr. Abrey. Perhaps. I was quite confident at the time, when I 
brought these bonds with me from Poland, that eventually the war 
would turn against Germany and that the bonds would be redeemed 
at the full value, and that I woiild salvage whatever was left from my 
prewar fortune. I wouldn't attempt to sell them at $50,000 at this 

Mr. Rusher. We have, on two occasions, instances in which, 
given an opportunity, indeed, required to declare foreign securities, 
nevertheless you did not do so. When you changed your status from 
"in transit" to "visitor," a form required by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, and again a form required by the Treasury, 
I believe, of aliens; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 


Mr. Rusher. Will you please tell us why you violated that 

Mr. Abrey. Well, as I see it today, my way of thinking then was 
probably that, because I entered this country under diplomatic status 
and I did not declare these German bonds at the time of entry in 
San Francisco, it might be in conflict with my status in which I arrived 
here, later on, to declare these German bonds. And I was probably 
also afraid they might be confiscated, being German bonds, and my 
knowledge of the English language, at this time, 1940, 1941, was 
rather very poor, and I was not too familiar with all the regulations, 
all the newspaper reports on the status of the foreigners. I was a bit 
confused, or even more than just a bit confused — I was just simply 
scared after I went through from Poland where I had seen confisca- 
tion without any reason. 

Mr. Rusher. Yet you had competent legal advice throughout, 
Mr. Abrey? 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir; I did not. 

Mr. Rusher. You had had legal advice in this country about the 
matter of citizenship as far back as 1938? 

Air. Abrey. That is correct; only about obtaining citizenship. 

Mr. Rusher. You subsequently sought legal advice about the 
change of your status from "in transit" to "visitor"? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. But, although one of the forms, which was maccu- 
rately filled out, was executed in connection with that change of 
status, nevertheless you did not seek and did not have legal advice in 
connection with the filling out of that form; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. Foolishly, I did not. 

Mr. Rusher. How often, altogether, did you visit that safe-deposit 

Mr. Abrey. Well, I can't recall the exact number of times I was 
over there. How^ever, Mr. Crary, here, during the period of waiting 
here, brought to m}^ attention that there are two photostatic copies 
of the bank's statement that I was twice in the bank; at least, I 
signed the necessary paper in the bank, in 1941, or, I believe, also 1942. 

Mr. Rusher. This is the paper necessary in order to enter the 
safe-deposit box; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes. 

Mr. Rusher. Twice in the period of 1941 or early in 1942? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. A\Tiile the bonds, presumptively, were in the safe- 
deposit box? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. Were you alarmed not to find them there? 

Mr. Abrey. Well, to mv recollection, I haven't seen this box. I 
believe that I v/ent with my w4fe over there, and I probably signed 
the papers, but I can't recall entering this box. In all probability, 
my wife went to the safe-deposit vault and took out the box. 

Mr. Rusher. She must have had, independently, the right to go 
into the box. 

Mr. Abrey. She did; she did. We had rented it in 1938, and each 
person had independent access. 

Mr. Rusher. So that, as you now visualize it, Mr. Abrey, the 
records of the bank show that you went there and you signed to enter 


the safe-deposit box; you feel that you waited, after having signed, 
while your wife actually went to the safe-deposit box?. 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir; yes, sir. 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Abrey, does your wife's signature appear on 
the same occasion, on this photostatic copy? 

Mr. Abrey. No; just only mine. I believe only one signature was 
required to get access to the box, and it was my signatm-e on the 
photostatic copy which I have seen. 

Senator Hruska. As a matter of fact, isn't it the practice of all 
safe-deposit-box companies that all who enter the premises sign, 
whether their name is required or not? 

Mr. Abrey. That I don't know, Senator. 

Mr. Rusher. But the two occasions you were there, were you 
accompanied by Mrs. Abrey? 

Mr. Abrey. I can't recall it, sir. I would presume this was the 
case, as I can't recall my entering this box. 

Senator Hruska. On neither of those occasions does Mrs. Abrev's 
signature appear on that card to which you refer? 

Mr. Abrey. On neither one. 

Mr. Rusher. Do you have, Mr. Crary, the photostats of those 
occasions, and are thej^ available for the inspection of the subcom- 

Mr. Crary. Yes, sir; they are. They are exhibits which were in- 
troduced by the Validation Board, and I'd be very happy to show yow. 
these copies. 

Mr. Rusher. If we could make copies for the record of the sub- 
committee, would that be agreeable to you? 

Mr. Crary. Certainly. These are public records. 

(Copies of the reports of access to the safe-deposit box were marked 
"Exliibits No. 425 and 425-A" and appear below:) 



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Cat* of 4cc»8!t ^'g*»**.st«^^/*£^«^f naej ^--^^2*^- 
Siss)Sla«'« of- f>«rsoss fearla^ aeeeass "~" .^c:;2:ti;;^lX., "*" 


Senator Hruska. If they are available for that purpose, they wiU 
be returned to you immediately upon being reproduced. 

Mr. Rusher. I might explain, Senator, that the decision of the 
Board in the matter of Mr. Abrey's bonds is already in the public 
record of the subcommittee, and has been, I believe, since the testi- 
mony of Mr. Reinstein in 1956. 

I will, however, if I may, submit the report of the Validation Board 
in the German dollar bonds for the year beginning September 1, 
1955, insofar as it pertains to the matter of these challenged, so-called 
challenged, registrations. 

Senator Hruska. The report will be received for the record. 

(The section of the report above referred to was marked "Exhibit 
No. 426" and reads as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 426 
VII. The Challenged Registrations 


Of the total of $142,459,600 principal amount of German dollar bonds registered 
with the Board under 40,620 separate registrations, 54 registrations have been 
challenged. These challenged cases represent bonds having a principal value of 
$1,319,000. In all of these cases objections have been filed with the Board by the 
issuers and examining agencies. Such objections are accompanied by evidence 
tending to show that the bonds were, in fact, within Germany on January 1, 1945, 
and that they were unlawfully removed from the vaults in which they were 

In 6 of these cases representing a total principal value of $274,000, the Board 
has rendered formal decisions denying validation. 

In 12 of these cases involving bonds totaling $329,000 principal value, the 
registrants, after receiving the Board's letter outlining the facts and evidence 
against the validation, have withdrawn their registrations. 

There are still pending before the Board 36 cases involving $716,000 principal 
value. The registrants in these cases have been or will be notified that objections 
to validation have been filed with the Board by the issuers and examining agencies 
and invited to rebut the objections and to supplement the evidence submitted with 
their registrations in support of their claims that the bonds were, in fact, outside 
of Germany on January 1, 1945. 

In 14 of these cases the Board has given formal notice of its intention to deny 
validation, informing the registrant that unless further evidence supporting the 
registrant's case is received within 90 days, the Board would proceed to render its 
decision denying validation. 

Although a public hearing has been held in only one of the challenged cases, 
the Board has been ready at all times to meet and discuss evidence with any of its 
registrants or their representatives, either privately or in public hearing. Every 
possible assistance has been ofi'ered to its registrants in suggesting sources of docu- 
mentary evidence or granting additional time within which to find evidence. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. Rusher. Mr. Abrey, when you first pm'chased these bonds, as 
you say, in Poland in 1940, was it early 1940? 

Mr. Abrey. 1940. 

Mr. Rusher. Whom did you deal with in the Bank Dyskontowy? 

Mr. Abrey. Mr. Radzinski. 

Mr, Rusher. Would you spell that for the record, please? 

Mr. Abrey. Radzinski, R-a-d-z-i-n-s-k-i. 

Mr. Rusher. Did you deal with anybody else? 

Mr. Abrey. No, sir; only with him. 

Mr. Rusher. He was the only bank official that you had any 
dealings with? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes. 


Mr. Rusher. And he carried through the transaction? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. How did you pay for these bonds? 

Mr. Abrey. By check, in Polish currency, drawn against my 
account in the Bank Dyskontowy. 

Mr. Rusher. To whom did you pay in the bank? 

Mr. Abrey. Bank Dyskontowy. 

Mr. Rusher. To whom, specifically; a clerical emploj^ee? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Can you tell us a little bit about the physical situa- 
tion of the transaction; did you go to the bank? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes; I went to the bank personally, at which time 
I was told that export permit was granted to me; and at this time 
only I authorized the bank to obtain the title to these bonds. 

Mr. Rusher. Now, you say an export permit was granted to you. 
Was that necessary at that time? 

Mr. Abrey. This was the main purpose of purchasing these bonds, 
or anything else; whatever was available of any value to me. 

Mr. Rusher. These particular bonds were of a type for which the 
German authorities would grant an export permit? 

Mr. Abrey. They granted me a permit for these particular 

Mr. Rusher. "Were you aware that the decision of the Validation 
Board, in denying validation to your bonds, states, and I quote: 

Erich Tetzner, former head of the German office in Poland, charged with con- 
trol of foreign currency assets, testified that under the regulations in effect during 
the German occupation of Poland he personally would have had to approve a 
transaction involving the purchase, sale, or export of $245,000 in face value of 
United Steel Works debentures, and that no application was ever filed with his 

Mr. Abrey. I understand that that is what the Validation Board 

Mr. Rusher. Is that your own understanding, that he would have 
had to approve such a transaction? 

Mr. Abrey. I wouldn't know, sir. I never went to his office, I 
never applied for permit to him personally. 

Mr. Rusher. Yet you say that the bank told you that a permit 
had been granted? 

Mr. Abrey, That is correct; and I have seen this permit myself. 
I had it in my hands. 

Mr. Rusher. Where is it now? 

Mr. Abrey. Well, I don't have it. 

The German authorities, when inspecting my luggage at the time 
it was packed and sealed, they took it with them, 

Mr. Rusher. In Poland? 

Mr. Abrey. In Poland ; in Warsaw. 

Mr. Rusher. But they left the bonds? 

Mr. Abrey. But they left the bonds in my suitcases. 

Mr. Rusher. So this one man in the bank that you referred to is 
the only man who had knowledge of the transaction? 

Mr. Abrey. Of the officials of the bank. 

Mr. Rusher, Where is he now? 

Mr. Abrey. He is dead, as I understand from the report of the 
Validation Board. 

3420 SCOPE or soviet activity in the united states 

Mr. Rusher. I see. 

Let me ask you: You had seen the safe deposit box, yourself, had 
you not, prior to these two occasions on which you say your wife 
actually went into it? 

Mr. Abrey. At the time I rented the box in 1938, 1939, I had seen 
the box. I 

Mr. Rusher. Go ahead. 

Mr. Abrey. I placed whatever we left there in 1939, prior to return- 
ing to Poland; I placed that myself personally. 

Mr. Rusher. What kind of things were those? 

Mr. Abrey. They were personal jewelry of my wife, some United 
States Government savings bonds, and some cash. 

Mr. Rusher. You put this physically in the box yourself? 

Mr. Abrey. In the box, myself. 

Mr. Rusher. You had a clear physical impression of it; you knew 
roughly what it was, and its size; is that correct? 

Mr. Abrey. Well, I don't have the impression now, su\ 

Mr. Rusher. You do remember having gone to it and put these 
things in it? 

Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rusher. Is it j^our impression that the 245 bonds of the United 
Steel Works would fit into that box? 

Mr. Abrey. My impression at that moment? 

Mr. Rusher. At that time. 

Mr. Abrey. I can't recall; it was about 19 years ago. 

Mr. Rusher. And it is your recollection that you told your wife, 
nevertheless, to put them in? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Mr. Rusher. And you are now familiar with the testimony before 
the Board to the effect that it would not have fitted? 

Mr. Abrey. That is correct. 

Senator Hruska. Will that be all, Mr. Rusher? 

Mr. Rusher. I have no further questions. Senator. 

Senator Hruska. Very well. 

The subcommittee Wl continue its hearings at a time and date to 
be fixed bv the Chahman. 

We will continue our efforts to find out as to some of the aspects of 
the testimony, both of the Validation Board and that which you have 
given, Mr. Abrev. 

There do seem^to be some conflicts, and it will be the subcommittee s 
desire to resolve those conflicts, if possible, and to see if they can be 

Mr. Crary. Mav I say for the record, Senator, that if there is any 
further help Mr. Abrey can give, I believe I speak for him in saying 
that we will be glad to do so. 

Senator Hruska. I appreciate that. 

Anything further? 

Mr. Rusher. Not at this time, Senator. 

Senator Hruska. The meeting is adjourned, and the witness is 
excused for the time being. 

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.) 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization 
in this index. 


Abranowicz, Ryszard Henryk (Polish form of Richard Henrich Abrey's Pago 
name) 3408,3417 

Abrey, Mrs. (wife of Richard Henrich Abrey) 3410, 3411, 3413, 3415 

Abrev, Richard Henrich: 

testimony of 3407-3420 

Miner Crary, counsel 3407 

Ryszard Henryk Abranowicz (Polish form of name) 3408 

Purchased bonds through Bank Dyskontowy, Warsaw 3408 

Diplomatic passport, Republic of Honduras 3409 

Arrived in United States in 1940 3413 

Honorary consulate general of Honduras in Poland 3414 

Affidavit (Mrs. Abrey's to Board) 3411 


Bagniewski, Mr 3412 

Bank Dyskontowy (Warsaw, Poland) 3408, 3409, 3418, 3419 

Board for the Validation of German Bonds in United States 3407, 3408 


Chemical Bank, New York 3410, 3411 

Chemical Safe Deposit Co., New York 3417 

Communist 3407 

Crary, Miner (attorney for Richard Henrich Abrey) 3407 


Deak, Nicholas 3413 

Diplomatic passport 3409 

English 3415 

Exhibits Nos. 425 and 425-A — Reports of access to safe-deposit box — 

Chemical Safe Deposit Co 3417 

Exhibit No. 426 — "VII. The Challenged Registrations", portion of report 

of the Validation Board 3418 

Export permit 34 19 


Foreign securities 3409 

Funes, Mr. (Hunduras consulate) 3410, 3411 

Consul general in New York 3410 


German authorities 3419 

German bonds 3407, 3408, 3415, 3418 

German office in Poland 3419 

German occupation 3408, 3419 

German origin 3407 

Germany 3414 

Great Neck, Long Island 3412 

Gross, Alexander 3412, 3413 

Gruss, Joseph, 30 Broad Street, New York City 3413 



H Page 

Honduras, Central America 3408, 3409, 3413, 3414 

Honduras consulate 3410, 3411 

Hruska, Senator Roman L 3407 


Immigration and Naturalization Office 3409, 3410, 3414 

"In transit" status 3409, 3414, 3415 


Key, Mr 3412 

Kemp, Peter 3413 


Lamb, Lester 3417 

Laschtowiczka, Dr 3408, 3409 

Member of Board of Directors of Bank Dyskontowy 3408 

Deputy Chief of the Polish Banking Supervisory Office 3408 


Mikulecki, Dr. (head of Bank Dyskontowy) 3409 

German trustee of bank 3409 


New York Stock Exchange 3413, 3414 

New York Supreme Court 3408 

Passport : P 

Diplomatic 3409 

Honduran 3414 

Polish 3409 

Poland 3408, 3409, 3412, 3414, 3415, 3418-3420 

Polish 3408, 3419 

Polish Banking Supervisory Office 3408 


Radzinski, Mr 3418 

Radzinski, Director 3408 

Executive of Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw 3408 

Reichsbank (Berlin) 3407 

Reinstein, Mr 3418 

Rubenstein, Serge 3413 

Rusher, William 3407 

Russian occupation 3408 

Ruziewicz (Polish name for Stanley T. Stanley) 3413 


Safe-deposit box 3410, 3411, 3415, 3416, 3420 

San Francisco 3409, 3415 

Soviet Union 3407 

Stanley, Stanley T. (Ruziewicz, Polish name) 3413 


Tetzner, Erich 3419 

Treasury 3414 

Treasury, Secretary of 3410 


United States District Court in New York 3408 

United States Government savings bonds 3420 

United States Steel works debentures 3408, 3419 

United Steel Works 3407, 3408, 3420 


V Page 

Validation Board 3408-3412,''3414, 3416, 3418-3420 

"Visitor" status 3409, 3414, 3415 


Warsaw, Poland 3408, 3419 

White, Geo. B ' 3417 














FEBRUARY 14 AND 15. 1957 

PART 51 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 



»3215 WASHINGTON : 1957 \ 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

OCT 9 -1957 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 


CLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 





SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Robert Morris, Chief Counsel 

J. G. Sourwene, Associate Counsel 

WiLLUM A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Ma:jdel, Director of Research 



Testimony of — Page 

Grube, Robert F 3439 

Orlov, Alexander 3421 




United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 

Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 

OF THE Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pm-siiant to notice, at 11:05 a. m., in room 
424 Senate OfRce Building, Senator John L. McClellan presiding. 

Present: Senator McClellan. 

Also present: Robert Morris, Chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, as- 
sociate counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; Benjamin 
Mandel, research director; and Robert McManus, investigations 

Senator McClellan. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Counsel, will you make a brief statement of the hearing. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness this morning is a former 
official of the Soviet Secret Police, economic adviser to the NKVD, 
who is prepared to testify on Soviet espionage relating to the United 
States, as well as Soviet manipulation of money, I believe. 

Senator McClellan. Has his testimony been taken in executive 

Mr. Morris. It has. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

Sir, you may stand and be sworn. 

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence yow shall give before this 
investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Orlov. I do. 

Senator McClellan. All right, Mr. Counsel, proceed. 


Mr. Morris. Where were you born, Mr. Orlov? 

Mr. Orlov. In Russia. 

Mr. Morris. In what year? 

Mr. Orlov. 1895. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could sketch for us some of your more 
important assignments with the Soviet Government? 

Mr. Orlov. Well, during the civil war in Russia I was commander 
of the guerrilla detachments on the southwestern front, the Twelfth 
Red Army, to be exact. 

Mr. Morris. You were in charge of operations on the Spanish front? 

Mr. Orlov. No ; in Russia, during the civil war. 



Mr. Morris. I am sorry. 

Mr. Orlov. Then, I was chief of counterintelhgence of the Army. 
In 1921, 1 was commander of the frontier troops of the northern region 
of Russia, and also of the local troops there, based at Archangel. 

In 1921, 1 was sent to the supreme court of the Soviet Union, which 
at that time was not called the Soviet Union but just the Federal 

From 1922 to 1924 I was assistant prosecutor of the supreme court 
of the whole country. 

In 1924 I was sent to the OGPU, which is the same as the NKVD, 
as deputy chief of the economic department, which had to supervise 
industry and trade. 

Mr. AIoRRis. You were the deputy chief? 

Mr. Orlov. Deputy chief of the economic department of the OGPU, 
or the NKVD. 

Mr. Morris. And that was the Soviet secret police? 

Mr. Orlov. You may call it that way. It was the Ministry of the 

Mr. Morris. As opposed to the military intelligence operations? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

Then, in 1925, I was sent to the Caucasus as commander of the 
frontier troops, which guarded the borders of the Soviet Union with 
Persia and Turkey. 

In 1926 I was named chief of the economic department of the 
NKVD for the supervision of foreign trade. 

At the beginning of 1936 or the end of 1935, I was named acting 
chief of the department of NKVD for railways and sea transport. 

In 1936, when civil war started in Spain, I was sent as a Soviet 
diplomat to Aladrid and adviser to the Republican Government of 
Spain on matters pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, and 
guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. I directed the guerrilla warfare 
there, and it is a matter of record in the newspapers that we suc- 
ceeded in organizing two rebel gi-oups, one in the region of La Roche 
and the other, Rio Tinto, among the miners, which was very successful 
and which forced General Franco to issue an order to divert two divi- 
sions from his active forces at the front, in order to combat the 
guerrilla forces. 

I arrived in Spain in 1936, the beginning of September, and I left 
Spain on July 12, 1938, when I broke with the Soviet Government 
and made my way through Canada to the United States. 

Mr. Morris. Now, have you since been living in the United States? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. I have been all that time in the United States, 
in complete hiding, for 15 years, until 1953, when I published my book, 
the Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, and a series of articles in Life 

Mr. Morris. You had never testified before a congressional com- 
mittee or tribunal of the Government of the United States? 

Mr. Orlov. I testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee 
in executive session, in September. 

Mr. Morris. On September 28, 1955? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Other than that, you have not testified any^vhere? 

Mr. Orlov. No, I have not. 


Mr. Morris. And you are not known in the United States as 
Alexander Orlov? 

Mr. Orlov. No, not generally. I lived in complete hiding because 
I had to dodge assassins which would be sent, or which had been sent 
out, I am quite sure, by the Soviet NKVD on orders of Stalin. 

When I broke witli the Soviet Government, I had to think about 
my mother and the mother of my wife, who remained in Russia, and I 
surely was aware that attempts would be made on my life. 

So, I wrote a letter to Stalin, with one copy to Yezhov, who was 
then the right-hand man of Stalin, warning them that if anything 
happened to our mothers or if I were killed, my memoirs would bo 
published and the secrets known to me about Stalin's crimes exposed. 
To show forcefully enough to Stalin that I meant business, I, in spite 
of the protests of my wife, attached to that letter a whole list of 
Stalin's crimes, with some of the expressions which he himself had 
used in secret conferences with the NKVD chiefs, when he was 
forging, fabricating the evidence against the leaders of the revolution 
during the Moscow trials. 

That probably had a certain effect, and I knew that they would 
not kill me outright in the street, but would try to kidnap me to 
some remote place and force me to yield all my notes and memoirs, 
and things like that. 

In 1953 I came to the conclusion that our mothers could no longer 
be alive, because so man}' years have passed, and I decided to take 
the chance, and I submitted my manuscript, while Stalin was still 
alive, to the editors of Life magazine. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Orlov 

I might say. Senator McClellan, when we learned in 1955 that 
this particular witness knew a man who was at that time operating 
under a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation and was working in 
the Veterans' Administration in the Bronx, in New York, we knew 
that Air. Orlov, through his own experiences in the Soviet organiza- 
tion, knew that that man was a Soviet agent, we called Mr. Orlov 
to testify on that particular subject. 

I wonder if you could tell us now — it was only in executive session, 
then, so this testimony has not become known — did you know Mark 
Zborowsky, or know of him? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes, I did. 

If you wish, I may tell you in short the story about that. 

Mr. Morris. He is an anthropologist, operating under a grant from 
the Russell Sage Foundation, in the Veterans' Administration, and 
he is in the Bronx. 

Mr. Orlov. Before I left Russia in 1936, I learned that the NKVD 
had succeeded in planting a spy in the entourage of Trotsky and his 
son, Leon Sedov, and that Stalin himself knew about that agent and 
used to read his reports about Trotsky and Trotsky's son. I under- 
stood very well what that meant. I understood that Stalin was doing 
his best in order to corner Trotsky and assassinate him, and I under- 
stood that through this man Stalin might introduce, under the guise 
of a guard or secretary, an assassin into Trotsky's household. 

When I heard about that, I understood that only a very few chosen 
people knew about that agent. And I was afraid to ask for his name 
because, after he had been exposed, after he would have been exposed 
by me, there would be an investigation as to who had exposed him. 


So, without asking that name, I left for Spain. I knew that that 
agent was working in Paris where Trotsky's son lived and edited 
the Bulletin of the Opposition. 

Mr. Morris. What was Trotsky's son's name? How was he 

Mr. Orlov. He was known as Leon Sedov. 

While working in Spain during the civil war, I used to come on 
business to France, and there I did my best to find out the identity 
of this agent from the chief of the NKVD in Paris, in France 

I found out that this agent had become the closest friend of 
Trotsky's son, Leon Sedov, and that he was in correspondence with 
Trotsky himself. 

Again, I did not ask for his name, but I found out that his first 
name was Mark, 

Mr. Morris. The agent's first name was Mark? 

Mr. Orlov. The agent's first name was Mark. 

I did not know at that time that his name was Zborowsky. Then 
I learned that he used to sign his articles in the Trotsky Bulletin of 
the Opposition, under the pen name of Etienne. I found out also 
that he was married, about his age, and that he had a baby, a little 
child about a year old, and I have also found out that that agent 
worked at the Research Institute, which belonged to an old, well- 
known Socialist, Boris Nikolayevsky. 

So I had something to go on in order to expose that man. 

Soon after that, I broke with the Soviet Government and came to 
the United States. 

Mr. Morris. You say you decided to expose that man? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes, I decided to expose that man, and to warn 
Trotsky that he might expect an assassin, from that man. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you had already fallen out with the 
ideals of the Soviets? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

And as soon as I came to the United States and arranged my 
personal affairs, I wrote two letters, one to Trotsky in Mexico, and 
the other, a copy to his wife, also in Mexico, warning them about 
that agent provocateur who was planted in their midst, and warning 
Trotsky to be on guard against that man. 

I have a copy of that letter, which I have given in executive session 
to the Internal Security Subcommittee. This is the photostat of my 
carbon copy, and here is a translation of the letter. 

Mr. Morris. That is the one you sent many years ago to Trotsky 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. I sent it on December 27, 1938. 

Senator McClellan. Do you wish to have the letter read into the 
record at this point? 

Mr. Morris. I think it would be helpful. Senator. 

Senator McClellan. If you will, just read the letter into the 

Mr. Orlov. Because the letter is long, I would ask permission to 
give only these quotations from it. 

Senator McClellan. Well, the whole letter 

Mr. Morris. I suggest, maybe we put the whole letter in the 
record, and ask the witness to read the pertinent sections. 


Senator McClellan. All right. The letter will be printed in the 
record at this point. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 426." A transla- 
tion reads as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 426 

[Transcribed copy] 

December 27, 1938. 

Dear Lev Davidovich, I am a Jew who came from Russia. In my youth I 
was close to the revolutionary movement (the Bund Party). Later I emigrated 
to America where I have been living for many years. 

I have close relatives in Russia. Among them there was one by the name of 
Lushkov, Henry Samoilovich, a prominent Bolshevik and chief of the Cheka. It 
is the same Lushkov, who, being afraid for his life, fled 8 months ago from 
Khabarovsk (Russia) to Japan. That story was printed in all newspapers. 
From there (Japan) he wrote to me in America, asking me to come to Japan and 
help him. I went there and helped him as much as I could. I found for him a 
lawyer to make sure that he is not extradited to the Soviets and gave him a little 

Why am I writing all this to you? — Because I have learned from Lushkov that 
there is within your organization a dangerous agent provocateur. I am no longer 
a revolutionary, but I am an honest man. And an honest man has a definite 
attitude toward agent provocateurs. Here is what I learned from Lushkov: 

All the work against the old Bolsheviks in Russia was concentrated in the 
hands of Molchanov, chief of the secret department. He was in charge of the 
preparation of the Moscow trial against Zinoviev. Lushkov was Molchanov's 
assistant. After the arrest of Yagoda, Lushkov was transferred to Khabarovsk 
and appointed chief of the political police and assistant to General Blukher. 
Meantime, Molchanov and all other leading police officers, who had served under 
Yagoda were executed on Stalin's orders. Lushkov understood that his turn was 
near and escaped to Japan. 

From my conversation with Lushkov it has become clear to me that he himself 
had also taken part in the persecution of revolutionaries and the preparation of 
the trial against Zinoviev. Lushkov is now an enemy of Stalin, but he declined 
my suggestion that he take action to vindicate the revolutionaries imprisoned in 
Russia, because he is afraid that if he did so the Russian Government would 
insist on his extradition and might come to terms with Japan on that score. 

But I think that that's not the point, and that the real reason for Lushkov's 
reluctance lies in the fact that he himself, spurred on by promotions and love of 
power, took an active part in the crimes committed against the revolutionaries. 

When I returned to the United States I acquainted myself more closely with 
the tragedy of the Russian revolutionaries and read the books Not Guilty and 
The Case of Leon Trotsky. 

Dear L. D., these books arouse indignation at the cruelties which are being 
inflicted in Russia on people who gave their whole lives to the revolution. Under 
the influence of these books I decided (a little late to my regret) to write to you 
about the most important thing which I learned from Lushkov: about one impor- 
tant and dangerous agent provocateur, who had been for a long time assistant to 
your son, Sedov, in Paris. 

Lushkov is categorically against publishing the things which are known to 
him and does not intend to make any public revelations himself, but he does 
not object to letting you know who the principal agent provocateur or the Stalin 
Cheka in your party is. 

Lushkov gave me detailed information about this agent provocateur with the 
understanding that no one, even you yourself, should know that this informa- 
tion came from him. In spite of the fact that Lushkov forgot the last name of 
the provocateur, he supplied enough details to enable you to establish without 
any error who that man is. This agent provocateur had for a long time assisted 
your son L. Sedov in editing your Russian "BuUeting of Opposition," in Paris, 
and collaborated with him until the very death of Sedov. 

Lushkov is almost sure that the provocateur's name is '"Mark." He was lit- 
erally the shadow of L. Sedov ; he informed the Cheka about every step of Sedov, 
about his activities and personal correspondence with you which the provocateur 
read with the knowledge of L. Sedov. This provocateur wormed himself into 
the complete confidence of your son and knew as much about the activities of 

93215— 57— pt. 51 2 


your organization as Sedov himself. Thanks to this provocateur several officers 
of the Cheka have received decorations. 

This provocateur worked till 1938 at the Archive or Institute of the well-known 
Menshevik, Nikolayevsky, in Paris and, may be, still works there. It was this 
Mark who stole a part of your archive (documents) from Nikolayevsky's establish- 
ment (he did it twice if I am not mistaken). These documents were delivered to 
Lushkov in Moscow and he read them. 

This agent provocateur is about 32-85 years old. He is a Jew, originates from 
the Russian part of Poland, writes well in Russian. Lushkov had seen his photo- 
graph. This provocateur wears glasses. He is married and has a baby. 

What surprises me more than anything else is the gullibility of your comrades. 
This man had no revolutionary past whatsoever. In spite of the fact that he is a 
Jew, he was about 4 years ago a member of the Society for Repatriation to Russia 
(this is a society of former czarist officers, in Paris). According to Lushkov, this 
was well known in Paris even to members of your organization. In that society 
he acted already as a Bolshvist agent provocateur. After that the Cheka assigned 
him to your organization, where for some reason, he was trusted. This provocateur 
represented himself as a former Polish Communist, but it is very unlikely that this 
was true. 

Lushkov said that after the theft of your archive from Nikolayevsky's Institute, 
they were almost sure in Moscow that you would discover who the provocateur 
was, because only a few persons worked at the insitute and all of them with the 
exception of the provocateur Mark, had some revolutionary past. When I asked 
Lushkov whether this provocateur was in any way responsible for the death of 
your son L. Sedov, he answered that this was not known to him, but that the 
archive was definitely stolen by Mark. 

Lushkov expressed apprehension that now the assassination of Trotsky was on 
the agenda and that Moscow would try to plant assassins with the help of this agent 
provocateur or through agent provocateurs froyn Spain under the guise of Spanish 

Lushkov said that you knew this provocateur well from letters of L. Sedov, 
but that you had never met him personally. Lushkov told me that the provocateur 
has regular meetings with officers from the Soviet embassy in Paris and Lushkov 
expressed surprise why your comrades have not discovered this, especially after 
your documents had been stolen from Nikolayevsky's Institute. 

Dear L. D., this is all that I can tell you now. I hope that in the future I will 
succeed in learning from him a lot of things, which might be important for the 
purpose of exposing the frameups of the Moscow political police and proving that 
the executed revolutionaries were innocent. 

I ask you not to tell anybody about my letter and, especially, that this letter 
came from the United States. The Russian Cheka, no doubt, knows that I made 
the trip to Lushkov, and if they learn in some way about this letter they will 
understand that Lushkov supplied the information through me. And I have 
close relatives in Russia to whom I send food parcels and they might be arrested 
as a reprisal for this letter. 

Do not tell also that you obtained this information from Lushkov. The best 
thing, don't tell anybody about this letter. Ask your trusted comrades in Paris 
to find out whether Mark belonged to the Union of Repatriation to the Home- 
land, to check on his past and to see whom he meets. There is no doubt, that 
before long your comrades will see him meet officers from the Soviet Embassy. 

You have all the right in the world to check on members of your organization, 
even when you have no information that they are traitors. And besides, you 
are not obliged to believe me. 

The main thing: be on your guard. Do not trust any person, man or woman, 
who may come to you with recommendations from this provocateur. 

I am not signing this letter and I am not giving my address, because I am 
afraid that the Stalinists might intercept and read this letter at the post office in 
Mexico. They might even confiscate the letter. 

In order that I may know that you have received this letter I should like you 
to publish a notice in the newspaper Socialist Appeal in New York that the 
editorial office has received the letter from Stein; please, have the notice appear 
in the newspaper for January and February. 

To make it safer, I am sending 2 identical letters: one addressed to you and the 
other to your wife, N. Sedov. I have learned your address from the book The 
Case of L. T. 

Respectfully, your friend, 


Senator McClellan. Now you may comment upon certain quotes 
from it. 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. Here are the quotations, but before quoting 
this, I would like to say that, while I was sending that letter, I was 
aware that Trotsky's correspondence was being intercepted by 
agents of the Russian police at the Mexican Post Office, and I laiew 
they would read my letter, and thus find out where I was hiding in 
the United States, and that would facilitate my assassination. 

So I had to find some way of transmitting the true message to 
Trotsky and, at the same time, disguise my identit}^. I was success- 
ful in doing that, thanks to one incident that occurred a few months 

Senator McClellan. Go right ahead. 

Mr. Orlov. There was another person abroad who knew about 
the identity of that Soviet agent among the Trotskyites. That man 
was General Lushkov, who had been, before that. Deputy to Marshal 
Blucher. Blucher was in the far eastern maritime provinces of 

It happened that General Lushkov, who was one of Stalin's right- 
hand men in the preparation of the trials against the old Bolsheviks, 
became afraid for his own life and fled to Japan some time in Jime 

So I decided to send that message to Trotsky in such a way that 
he shoidd think that that information came from General Lushkov, 
and I knew pretty well that the Russians would read that letter and 
would then thmk that Lushkov, who made revelations in Japan before 
newspapermen, was the man who exposed ALark Zborowsky. 

So I devised a legend and wrote to Trotsky that I was an old 
immigrant, a Russian immigrant in America, that my "nephew," 
General Lushkov, fled to Japan, that I had received a letter from, him 
saying he needed help, and was afraid he would be extradited to 
Russia. So I went to him and helped him with whatever I could, 
and found a la\v\"er for him. This is what I learned from Lushkov, 
I wrote in my letter to Trotsky that Lushkov was one of the organ- 
izers of the famous trials for Stalin, one of the men who falsified the 
testimony in those trials and who became afraid for his life because 
Stalin got into a habit of Idlling everybody who knew his secrets and 
his crimes. 

So, I wrote, I learned from Lushkov about the dangerous agent 
provocateur in their midst, who is close to Trotsky's son, and who 
might become instrumental in the assassination of Trotsky. 

And here are some of the extracts from that letter. I wrote the 
letter as a Russian immigrant would write it. I tried that my lan- 
guage should not be very good, not in very good Russian: 

I decided to write to you that I learned about an important and dangerous 
agent provocateur M'ho had been a long time the assistant of your son, Sedov, 
in Paris. The name of this provocateur is Mark. He was literally the shadow 
of Leon Sedov. 

Those are little pieces, quotations from the letter. 

This provocateur worked until 1938 for the archives of Nikolayevsky in Paris 
and maybe works there now. It was this Mark who stole a part of your archives 
from the Nikolayevsky Institute in Paris. 

This agent provocateur is about 32 to 35 years old. He is a Jew, originates from 
the Russian part of Poland, speaks good Russian. He wears glasses. He is 
married and has one child, a baby. 


This provocateur has no revolutionary past whatsoever. In spite of the fact 
that he is a Jew, he was about 4 years ago a member of the Society for the Re- 
patriation to Russia. (This is a society of former Czarist officers.) He was already 
a Bolshevist provocateur then. 

Now the assassination of Trotsky is on the agenda and they will try to plant 
assassins through this agent provocateur or through provocateurs from Spain 
under the guise of Spanish Trotskyites. 

This provocateur meets a Soviet agent from the Soviet Embassy regularly. 

The main thing, be on your guard. Don't trust any person, man or woman, 
who may come to you with recommendations from this provocateur. Ask your 
trusted men to check on this man and find out whom he meets. There is no doubt 
that before long they will see him with an officer from the Soviet Embassy. 

Being afraid that that letter might be stolen altogether from the 
post office, and I would never know whether Trotsky had received 
the letter, I asked Trotsky to place an ad in his own newspaper in 
New York, which was called Socialist Appeal, and address it to Stein. 
This is the name with which I signed the letter, but I wrote in the 
letter that that was not my real name. 

Soon enough, a month later, I received his frantic ad: 

I insist, Mr. Stein, I insist that you go immediately to the editorial offices of 
the Socialist Appeal and talk to Comrade Martin. 

I went there without disclosing my identity. I took just a side 
look at that Martin, and he did not inspire too much confidence in me, 
so that w^as all. 

Mr. Morris. You say he did not inspire any confidence? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

After that I tried to call up Trotsky by phone. His secretary talked 
to me. Trotsky did not want to come to the phone. He was afraid 
I was a journalist who just wanted to exploit him, for my own pur- 
poses. So that was all about it. 

Now, I have been in hiding for 15 years, in complete hiding. In 
1953, when I published my life articles, and cam.e out, if not into the 
open, at least into sem.ihiding. I met som.e of the Old Russian Socialists 
who had lived in exile in Fiance for many years and are now in the 
United States. I asked them whether they knew such a, because 
I was interested in preventing his treacherous work, which he mioht 
have been continuing somewhere else, betraying Socialists, devia- 
tionists, and other people. 

Within 6 months I have found out — which was a big surprise to 
me- — that that man was here in the United States since 1941, that he 
became an American citizen, that he enjoyed Government and social 
grants, quite substantial ones. 

I immediately suspected that he had been sent by the Russians to 
America to conduct espionage and to betray people. I learned this 
on Christmas night, 1954, and, as soon as the holiday was over, I 
went to the assistant United States attorney, B. Atterbury, in New 
York, and told him the story. He called in two FBI ro.en, and I 
repeated the story before them. 

As a result — only then have I learned that his real name here was 
Zborowsky, because, if you may have noticed, I have never asked what 
his last name was — this Zborowsky was called before the Internal 
Security Subcommittee where he confirmed everything, in the minutest 
detail, of what I had said about him. 

I gave my information about him — about his activity until 1938 — 
because I did not have any way of knowing what he did afterward. 



But he confessed that he maintained connections with the Soviet 
intelHgence service, through the Soviet Embassy here, until 1945. 

I got then a suspicion that he decided to hmit his activities by 1945, 
because then he would have enjoyed here the statute of limitation. 
But I don't know, probabl}^ the investigative agencies of the Govern- 
ment are talking or have been talking to him, and I think that he might 
have told them much more than we have heard about him here in his 
testimony in the Internal Security Subcommittee. 

Mr. Morris. Senator McClellan, when Mr. Zborowsk}^ testified 
here on February 29, 1956, he acknowledged that, when the FBI 
first went to him after this disclosure by Mr. Orlov, he had first denied 
that he had been working for the secret police, but then afterward, 
in subsequent sessions, he did make confessions that he had indeed 
been doing these things. Now 

Senator McClellan. Where is he now? 

Mr. Morris. Senator, we last heard, when he testified at that time, 
that he was operating under this grant in the Veterans' Administra- 
tion hospitals in New York. He was working among the patients, at 
the veterans' hospitals, studying pain and the reaction of pain on the 
part of the wounded soldiers, wounded service people. 

I could not tell you whether he is still there now or not. We have 
not pursued Zborowsky now, the subject of Zborowsky, now for some 

Now, is there anything more you would like to know about that 
particular man, Senator, that Zaborowsky? 

Senator McClellan. I think we would all like to know where he 
is and what he is doing now. 

Mr. Morris. We will fmd out whether he is still up there now. 

Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you would tell us about yom* role in Spain. 
You had to handle — you were in charge of the rather substantial gold 
transfer from the Spanish Government to Moscow, were you not? 

Mr. Orlov. Well, that was just an exceptional operation 

Mr. Morris. An exceptional operation. 

Mr. Orlov (contmumg). Because my basic work m Spam was 
organizing for the Spanish Republican Government the counter- 
mtelligenee and intelligence agamst Hitlerite Germany and against 
General Franco's forces. 

My second task was to organize guerrilla warfare behind the enemy 

But the gold operation was just a unique operation which had been 
entrusted to me by Stalin personally. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, you were personall^^ in charge of this 
transfer of gold, and you were personall}^ deputized b}^ Stalin to 
arrange that; is that right? 

Mr. Orlov. That is true. 

I wish to say that the secret of the shipment of the Spanish reserves 
of gold to Russia had been known to a very few selected persons. 
After Prime Minister of Spain Largo Caballero died, after the Presi- 
dent of Spain, Azana, died, there remain now in the Western World 
only 3 persons who know about that operation of gold, and after the 
death of the Prime Minister Negrin, only 3 persons. One is Indalecio 
Prieto, one of the biggest statesmen of Republican Spain, the former 
Minister of Defense. The second person who knew about the opera- 


tion was the Chief of the Spanish Treasury, Senor Mendez Aspe, who 
later became Finance Minister of Spain, and the third person is me. 

Mr. Prieto is a very old man. We don't know how long he will 
last. So, actually, 2 persons might still remain as witnesses, 1, this 
Aspe, who is somewhere in Mexico, and me, Alexander Orlov, who 
is now in the United States. 

Until approximately November of last year, there was no proof of 
any kind that that gold had been shipped to Russia, because the re- 
ceipt which had been issued in Moscow after the gold had been 
counted, was in safekeeping of the former Prime Minister Negrin, 
who did not want the gold to go to Franco. 

As I read in the newspapers. Franco's men succeeded in stealing or 
otherwise obtaining, maybe with the consent of Negrin himself, of 
that receipt, and that the receipt is now in the hands of the Franco 
government. There is some suspicion that Negrin himself, feeling that 
his end was approaching, decided that, after all, that huge hoard of 
gold belongs to the Spanish people. Regimes come and go. The 
Spanish people remain, and the Spanish nation is entitled to the gold 
and there were expressed suspicions or conjectures that he, Negrin, 
instructed his own son to turn over that receipt to the present Spanish 

The story about the Spanish gold developed as follows 

Mr. Morris. Ai-e you going to relate your own role in that particular 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

On the 20th of October, when I was in Madrid, the situation at the 
front was desperate. The enemy came to within 20 miles of Madrid. 
People were leaving the city, and the opinion of the Government was 
that Madrid could not be held and the Government was getting ready 
to abandon Madrid. 

At that time, 1 day my code clerk came into my office with a code 
book under his arm, and with a telegram which he started to decipher. 
He deciphered only a few words, after which there was an order that 
I should myself decipher the rest of the telegram. 

The telegram read: 

I transmit to you the personal order of the boss — 


And there followed the telegram of Stalin: 

Together with Ambassador Rosenberg, arrange with the head of the Spanish 
Government, Caballero, for the shipment of the gold reserves of Spain to the 
Soviet Union. Use for that purpose a Soviet steamer. This operation must be 
carried out with the utmost secrecy. 

If the Spaniards demand from you a receipt, for the cargo, refuse. I repeat, 
refuse to sign anything, and say that a formal receipt will be issued in Moscow 
by the State Bank. 

I hold you personally responsible for this operation. Rosenberg has been 
instructed accordingly. 

Mr. Morris. Now, this is the secret instruction sent to you by 
Yezhov. What was his title at that time? 

Mr. Orlov. He was at that time Minister of the Interior, the head 
of all the Soviet Intelligence Service, the Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Party and, above all, the righthand man of Staliii. 

Mr, Morris. And you were being given instructions from Stalm 
that you were to act with respect to the Spanish gold? 


Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

Senator AIcClellan. Who was Rosenberg? 

Mr. Orlov. He was the Soviet Ambassador. 

Senator McClellan. In Spain? 

Mr. Orlov. In Spain; in Madrid. 

I immediately went with that telegram to Soviet Ambassador 
Rosenberg and found him deciphering a similar telegram, with his 
code clerk waiting m a I'emote corner, waitmg because maybe his 
help would be needed. Probably the Ambassador had instructions 
also that he should decipher that telegram himself. 

The next day, or the day after, I had a conference with our Ambas- 
sador Rosenberg and with the Spanish Finance Minister Negrin, who 
eventually became Prime Mmister. Negrin asked me how many 
men I would need in order to carry out that operation. I told him 
that I would carry out the operation with my own men, and I had 
m mind our tank soldiers who had recently arrived in Spain. 

Mr. Morris. Soviet soldiers? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes; Soviet soldiers. 

From there we went to the Spanish — from our Embassy we went 
to the Spanish Ministry of Finance, where Negi^m, the Fmance 
Minister, introduced me to the Chief of the Spanish Treasury, Senor 
Mendez Aspe. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did Negrin understand what was going on here? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes, Negrin understood, and only three men of the 
Government knew about the operation. No one else of the Cabinet 
knew it. Those were Prime Minister Caballero, Finance Minister 
Negrin, and the President of the Republic, Azana. 

Mr. Morris. May I break in there, Mr. Orlov? 

Knowing from the Soviet outlook, was this gold bemg taken from 
the Spanish Government for safekeeping or simply being taken away? 

Air. Orlov. It was being sent for safekeeping. 

Mr. Morris. Was that the Soviet mtention at that time? 

Air. Orlov. Yes, that was the Soviet intention at that time, and I 
must say that Ambassador Rosenberg and myself were flabbergasted 
when we were told that the Spanish Government was willmg to trust 
Stalin with all the savings of the Spanish nation — Stalin, who had been 
already known to the world for what he was, a man who did not 
actually deserve any confidence at all. 

Senator AIcClellan. What was the value of the gold? 

Air. Orlov. It is difficult to say. I think about — it was estimated 
between $600 million and $700 million. I thmk it was about 600 tons. 

I wish to stress that, at that time, the Spanish Government, which 
was a coalition government that consisted of leaders of various parties, 
was not in full control because there were many parties, many armies, 
uncontrollables. Anarchists had their own army. I franldy told 
Fmance Almister Negrm that if somebody got wmd of it, if the 
anarchists intercepted my men, Russians, with truckloads of Spanish 
gold, they would kill my men, and it would be a tremendous political 
scandal all over the world, and it might even create an internal 

So my suggestion was, I asked him whether the Spanish Govern- 
ment could issue to me credentials under some fictitious name, naming 
me there, representing me there as a representative of the Bank of 
England or of the Bank of America, because then, figuring as a repre- 


sentative of the Bank of England or of America, I would be able to 
say tliat the gold was being taken for safekeeping to America, but it 
would be dangerous to say that I was taking it to Russia because that 
would really create a revolution. 

Negrin did not object. He thought it was a fine idea. I spoke 
more or less decent English, and I could pass for a foreigner. 

So he issued to me credentials in the name of Blackstone, and I 
became the representative of the Bank of America. 

Mr. Morris. You had the credentials of a man named Blackstone, 
of tlie Bank of America? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. Blackstone. 

The order was that I should put that gold on a Russian steamer, 
but I decided to spread the risk and to load it on as many ships as I 
could lay my hands on. I commandeered four Soviet steamers who 
were then in Spanish ports. 

Senator McClellan. Four what? 

Mr. Orlov. Foiu- Soviet steamers who had been there then, in 
Spanish ports, after they had unloaded armaments and food. And I 
left for Cartagena, the Spanish port where the gold was stored in a 
huge cave, hewn out of a mountain. 

I asked the Government to give me 60 Spanish sailors to do the 
loading of the gold. The Spanish sailors were kept for 3 nights and 
3 days in that cave. They understood pretty well what was in those 
boxes, because there were huge sacks, plain sacks, filled with silver 
coins, and they knew that that was their treasury. But they did not 
know where the gold was being taken, maybe to another Spanish city. 

For 3 nights the loading of the gold was done during the night, 
and transported during the night in complete blackout, to the pier, 
where it was loaded on Soviet ships. During the day the Spanish 
sailors slept on those sacks of silver. 

On the second or third day there was a tremendous bombardment, 
and somebody mentioned that, if a bomb hit the neighboring cave 
where thousands of pounds of dynamite were stored, we would be 
blown up into bits. The health of Mendez Aspe was a very serious 
thing. He was a nervous man. He told us we must discontinue load- 
ing or we will perish. I told him we could not do it, because the Ger- 
mans would continue to bombard the harbor and the ships will be 
sunk, that we must go on with it. 

So he fled and left just one assistant, a very nice Spanish fellow, 
who did the counting of the gold for them. 

The first day I saw that our count of the gold coincided, but after 
Mendez Aspe fled and that lone officer did the counting, the figures 
began to diverge. 

When the loading was finished, the Chief of the Treasury, Mendez 
Aspe, wished to compare the figures with mine. My figures were 
7,900 crates. His figures were 7,800. The error was by 2 truckloads 
because each truckload, according to my instruction, contained 50 
boxes, to facilitate the count. Each box weighed about 125 pounds. 

I was afraid to tell him my real count because if I told him that we 
had 100 boxes of gold more than he thought we did and later his count 
would prove to be correct, then I would have to be responsible for 
100 boxes of gold. So I did not tell him anything, but I telegraphed to 
Moscow and told them later about that difference. 


Before the gold was loaded, I decided to ask the Spanish Govern- 
ment for an order to spread Spanish warships along the route, the 
Mediterranean, at certain intervals, with instructions to the skippers 
of the ships that if they received a special SOS with a special signal, 
which would mean that the Soviet steamer had been attacked or was 
being abducted, then the ships should hurry immediately to the rescue 
of that Soviet steamer. 

That order was issued to the skippers of Spanish warships in sealed 
envelopes; they did not know anything, they did not know anything 
before that. But the instructions were that as soon as an S O S, 
with a certain special signal, is intercepted, then the skippers were 
supposed to tear the envelopes, to read the instructions, and the 
instruction was a Soviet steamer with very valuable cargo is being 
attacked; hurry to rescue and engage in battle. 

I knew that such an order could not be issued without Prieto, the 
Minister of Defense — ^at that time he was the Minister of the Navy — 
who did not know anything about the whole plan of the gold operation. 

So, I called up the Soviet Ambassador in Madrid, Rosenberg, and 
asked him to take it up with Prime Minister Caballero and arrange 
that the Navy Minister, Prieto, should issue orders to the Spanish 
warships, to the skippers. 

In a few days, the Spanish Finance Minister, Negrin, and the 
Defense Minister, Prieto, came to Cartagena. The orders were 
issued. After that, I was waiting for about 7 or 8 days on tenterhooks, 
waiting and wondering whether the ships will pass safely through the 
dangerous stretches of the Mediterranean, not far from Italy. 

In about 8 days, when I saw that the ships had already passed, I 
sent a cable to Yezhov saymg that, accordmg to my count, there were 
7,900 crates, according to the Spanish count, 7,800 crates, and I 
should like them to check on it. 

Well, this is a mystery. When I see now in the newspapers that the 
receipt issued by the Soviet State Bank was for 7,800 boxes, not for 
7,900, I think that probably Stalm decided that he could use 100 
boxes of gold, maybe for some Comintern work or for something else. 

Several months after the shipment of the gold, when I was lying in a 
surgical clinic of Professor Bergere, in Paris, the Chief of the Soviet 
NKVD himself, Sloutsky, came to see me and he told me about the 
gold, what a great event it was when it arrived in Moscow, and he 
told me on good authority that that gold, according to Stalin, would 
never be returned to Spain. 

A few months later, there came to see me a close friend of mme who 
was in Spain at that time with me, whom I considered liquidated until 
now, but it has been established now through the Soviet press that 
about a month ago he had been rehabilitated and his books are being 
reprinted now in Russia — so I would not name his name, not to 
embarrass him. He was a very close friend of Yezhov, a man who 
used to report to Stalin personally. He came from Moscow, where 
he spent about a month, to Spain and told me about the great event 
of the gold when it arrived in Russia, and he asked me why didn't you 
tell me about that gold? 

But the most mteresting thing he told me was that Stalm said at a 
banquet, at which members of the Politburo were present, and at 
which the arrival of the gold was celebrated, that — here are Stalin's 
words : 

93215— 57— pt. 51 3 


"The Spaniards will never see their gold again, as they don't see 
their own ears." This is a Russian proverb. 

Now, since then, so many years have passed, the gold is still locked 
up in the underground vaults of the Kremlin, and if nothing is done 
about it, it probably will never be returned. That gold belongs to 
the Spanish nation. Regimes come and go, but the gold belongs to the 
people, and the Spanish nation has a right to it, and I think it would 
be a good idea if the leaders of the Spanish political parties, irrespec- 
tive of their political affiliations and ideas, would combine together 
and demand that the gold should be returned or transferred to the 
United Nations or to the World Bank, ui safekeepuig for the Spanish 

Mr. Morris. Senator McClellan, I suggest that masmuch as this 
is du-ect testimony here today and, therefore, evidence that this $600 
million worth of gold actually belongs to the Spanish people, that we 
transmit a copy of this testimony, through our Ambassador at the 
United Nations, to the United Nations, so that they perhaps may 
consider some steps in order to effectuate justice in this matter. 

Senator McClellan. This is a public hearing. Of course, the 
information will be news, will be in the press. They will get the 

I think, possibly to take official action of the committee to carry 
out your suggestions, the Chair would not want to order it. The 
Acting Chair would not want to order it. I think it is a matter that 
addresses itself to the committee as a whole, and I assume that can 
be arranged simply by sending around a notice or request and let 
the majority of the members sign it. 

Mr. Morris. That will be done, Senator. 

Senator McClellan". All right. 

(Certain newspaper articles bearing on the Spanish gold shipment 
were ordered mto the record by Senator Arthm- V. Watkins, presiding, 
at a hearing February 20, 1957, and appear below:) 

[The New York Times, January 6, 1957] 
Soviet Gold Issue Stirs Spain Anew 
madrid reports recovery of receipt for reserves sent to moscow to foil 


By Benjamin Welles — Special to The New York Times 

Madrid, January 5. — A tale of several hundred tons of Spanish gold turned 
over to the Soviet Union in 1936 has become headline news here. 

A brief, cautiously worded announcement by the Foreign Ministry, December 
29 has led to widespread comment in the controlled press and in official and 
diplomatic circles. 

The Ministry asserted that exhaustive eflforts carried out abroad over the last 
year had resulted in the recovery of the official Soviet receipt for the nation's 
gold reserves. These were shipped secretly to Moscow in September 1936, at 
the start of the Spanish Civil War. 

The Ministry paid tribute to the family and friends of the late Dr. Juan Negrin, 
Republican Premier during most of the civil war, for the reported recovery of this 
important document. The paper gives Spain a legal basis for demanding the 
return of her treasure, the statement said. 

The announcement is the latest — and perhaps the most important — step in the 
Franco government's 20-year effort to recover the gold shipment. 



Officials here prefer not to estimate the quantity of gold. One highly placed 
source has set it privately at "between 600 and 700 tons." Others, quoting Span- 
iards in exile, say that on November 6, 1936, 510 tons of gold bars and gold 
pesetas totaling 1,734 million gold pesetas reached Moscovi^ in 7,800 crates. 

Unofficiallv the value of such gold today is believed to be considerablv more than 
$500 million." 

[Present gold reserves in the Bank of Spain have been reported authoritativelv 
at $200 million.] 

It has been disclosed that the Soviet receipt for the gold shipment was pre- 
served in the personal archives of Dr. Negrin, who lived in exile in Paris and 
London until his death in the French capital on November 14. During the last 
year officials of the Franco government began negotiating secretly with Dr. 
Negrin for the return of the receipt. On his death it was handed to Spanish 
officials by one of his sons. 

The shipment was carried out in extraordinary secrecy when the Republican 
government began seriously to fear that the gold might be captured by the rebels 
under Gen. Francisco Franco. 


As pieced together from various accounts by Spanish and Communist sources, 
the shipment was ordered by Dr. Negrin, then Minister of Finance, on September 
13, 1936. It had a dual purpose: to safeguard the gold from the Franco forces 
and to serve as securit}' for Soviet arms shipments to the Republican government. 

Under the personal direction of Francisco Mendez Aspe, Director General of 
the Treasury, the bars and coins were loaded into trucks. On September 15, a 
special train left for Cartagena, on the Mediterranean coast. At Cartagena the 
treasure was transferred to three Soviet vessels, which were guarded by Spanish 
Navy units. The ships sailed to Odessa, and on arriving there the docks were 
guarded by special Soviet security units while officials from Moscow helped load 
the gold into a special train. 

At this point the trail becomes obscure. 

What steps the Spanish Government will now take to recover the gold from 
the Soviet Union are not being officially disclosed here. It is pointed out that on 
January 7, 1955, the Government warned many countries that Moscow might 
seek to make gold payments out of the Spanish national treasure. 

It is generally believed Spain will take up the case at the International Court 
in The Hague and in the United Nations. 

One Son Issues Denial 
(Special to the New York Times) 

Paris, January 5. — Romulo Negrin, 1 of the 3 sons of the late Dr. Juan Negrin, 
denied today that he had handed over the receipt to the Franco regime on his 
father's instructions. 

Romulo Negrin, who lives in Mexico City and is in Paris on a visit, said he had 
no knowledge of such a receipt. 


A similar denial was made by Miguel Negrin, who said the only 1 of the 3 
brothers in Paris when his father died was Romulo. Senor Miguel Negrin, 
reached by telephone at his home at Sands Point, Long Island, said that whatever 
was to be said on the subject was to be said by Romulo Negrin. It was conceded, 
however, that the late Dr. Juan Negrin might have handed over the paper at some 
time other than at his deathbed, but Miguel Negrin cautioned that "this would be 

The third brother, Dr. Juan Negrin, was reported out of town and could not be 


[The New York Times, January 10, 1957] 

Two Spanish Envoys Arrive in Soviet 


By Benjamin Welles — Special to the New York Times 

Madrid, January 9. — Two Spanish envoys were reported today to have arrived 
in Moscow. 

They are Dr. Luis de la Serna, a high official of the Spanish Red Cross, and 
Salvador Vallina, a reporter of Arriba, newspaper of the Falange. 

Officially it is explained that Dr. De la Serna is visiting the Soviet capital in 
connection with the repatriation of Spaniards in exile. About 1,500 have returned 
so far, there may be 3,000 more in the Soviet Union. About 300 are due to sail 
from Odessa for Spain in a few days. 

Observers have noted that the visit coincides with the wide publicity given 
in the Spanish press to the Spanish gold reserves. These were shipped to the 
Soviet Union by the Spanish Republican Government at the start of the 1936 civil 


According to informed sources, the Soviet Government suggested late in 1955 
that there be Spanish-Soviet discussions covering the repatriation of Spaniards, 
the renewal of diplomatic relations, and, inferentially, the return of the gold. 

Talks were accordingly held between Soviet and Spanish diplomats, first in 
Paris and later in Hamburg, although no final agreements were reached. 

The treasure thought to be in Moscow is estimated at 510 metric tons of gold 
(16 million troy ounces). This is worth $560 million at the United States Govern- 
ment price of gold, which is $35 a troy ounce. 

Details of the shipment of Spanish monetary reserves are given in documents 
that have recently come into the possession of the Spanish Government. 


These documents include the following: 

A Spanish Repubhcan decree of September 13, 1936, which authorized the late 
Juan Negrin, then Finance Minister, to export the monetary treasure "wherever 
he considers safest." The decree is signed by Manuel Azana, President of the 
Republic, and by Largo Caballero, Premier. 

An eight-page document in French in four parts, which tabulates the gold 
coin, ingot bars and nugget gold received in Moscow by Gokhran, the state depot 
of precious metals in the Finance Commissariat. This document was signed 
February 5, 1937, by Marcelino Pascua, Spanish Republican Ambassador to 
Moscow, and by G. F. Grinko, People's Commissar for Finance, and N. N. 
Krestinski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. It provides in 
paragraph 2, section 4, that the Spanish Republican Government may reexport 
or otherwise dispose of its deposits freely. 

The documents here were obtained after a year's confidential negotiations in 
Paris with Senor Negrin, who died there November 14, 1956. He had agreed 
before his death to return them to the Spanish state, officials here say. 

The documents had been held for many years in safekeeping in the United 
States, but not in Paris or London as was originally reported. The death of Senor 
Negrin before the transaction was completed caused serious concern in Govern- 
ment circles here. 

These circles feared that the important papers, which formed the Spanish 
nation's legal basis for renewed international efforts to get the treasure back from 
Moscow, might be destroyed or might pass otherwise into Soviet possession and so 


"Through the cooperation of one of Senor Negrin's sons, whom officials choose not 
to identify, and of other members of his entourage, including his housekeeper, 
the papers were retrieved from the United States and are now in the Madrid 
government's hands. 

These documents give the Spanish Government what is considers watertight 
legal proof that the Soviet Government received the Spanish national gold 
reserves. Hitherto, this claim has rested solely on the Spanish Government's 
word. With the documentary proof available, IVIadrid is expected to submit its 


claim for the return of this treasure both in the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague and in the United Nations and through diplomatic channels. 

The documents have been carefully perused. They show among other things 
that the total gold shipment, which reached Odessa in 3 Russian vessels, 
weighed precisely 510,079,524.3 grams, or about 510 metric tons. 

New York Times, International Edition, January 21, 1957] 
Foreign ^\ffairs 

the hidalgo and the commissar warm the atmosphere between moscow 

and madrid 

(By C. L. Sulzberger) 

Paris, January 20. — The most interesting diplomatic colloquy now being 
carried on in Paris is between a Spanish grandee and a Communist professor of 
history. The ultimate purpose of their drawn-out talks is to decide whether 
formal relationships shall be established between the antipathetic regimes of 
Franco Spain and Bolshevik Russia. 

Each dialogist serves his Government as Ambassador to France, which has 
been chosen as the arena for this curious engagement. Jose Rojas y Moreno, 
count of Casa Rojas, representing Madrid, is a well-dressed Valencian gentleman 
with pale face, white hair, and cultivated, conservative manner. Sergei Alexan- 
drovitch Vinogradov, representing Moscow, is a heavy-set, muscular Russian 
with metallic smile and considerable suavity of expression. He was once on the 
faculty of Leningrad University. 

Casa Rojas and Vinogradov were acutely aware of each other's existence 
during World War II when they served simultaneously in Ankara. They did 
not speak to each other at the awkward diplomatic receptions staged by neutral 
Turkey. But, from a distance, they observed the maneuverings and activities 
of their mutually hostile embassies. 

When Casa Rojas and Vinogradov found themselves again together in Paris, 
they maintained this atmosphere of frigidity. This continued until the autumn 
of 1954. 

That November President Coty, as is his custom, invited all ambassadors to 
the annual bird shoot at Rambouillet where thousands of plump and not very 
agile pheasants are driven into the diplomatic guns. Casa Rojas and Vinogradov 
were there. And, to the surprise of the hidalgo, the Bolshevik professor was 
effusively agreeable. He joked. When a Soviet ambassador jokes it is not 
without instruction. 


Soon the peculiarly tense situation existing between Madrid and Moscow began 
to ease. Russian representatives attended various nongovernmental international 
conferences in Spain. Informal conversations began at several neutral points 
concerning Madrid's desire to repatriate Spanish emigres from the U. S. S. R. 

Approximately 2,000 of these had asked Moscow for permission to go home. 
They included prisoners of war from the blue division that fought with Hitler 
on the eastern front and grown up children of Loyalists who had been evacuated 
to Russia during the civil war. 

The U. S. S. R. permitted the departure of 286 veterans. By autumn it also 
granted exist permits to more than 1,300 refugees. The first Soviet ship to touch 
at a Spanish port since 1938 arrived in Valencia last September. Another is now 
en route. 

By October, Spaniards were even contemplating the approach of diplomatic 
recognition. "The U. S. S. R. refrained from vetoing Spain's entry to the U. N. 
Madrid saw this as tantamount to de facto acceptance of the Franco government. 

At this point, when Vinogradov began direct conversations with Casa Rojas, 
the latter was instructed to raise the subject of Spanish gold. Ten years ago 
Juan Negrin, then Finance Minister of the Republican government, arranged to 
export the national reserve to Moscow in order to protect it from seizure by Franco . 


The treasure, amounting to 510 metric tons, is worth considerably more than 
half a billion dollars. But when Franco sought to press its claim, Moscow argued 
that he had no legal proof of ownership. 


Last November 14 Negrin, an embittered Emigre, died in Paris. On his death- 
bed the old Loyalist leader asked one of his sons to collect from their hiding place 
the official receipts for the gold and to present them to Franco. These were 
photostated. Seventeen days ago Casa Rojas called on Vinogradov and gave 
him copies of these documents. He officially requested that the buUion be re- 
turned. If Moscow does not now oblige, Madrid will push its claims in the Hague 
World Court. 

While Negrin lay dying, however, a new element was intruded into the situa- 
tion. The revolt of the largely Catholic Hungarian people — and its brutal re- 
pression — made it politically still more difficult for a devoutly religious Spanish 
regime to recognize Communist Russia. 

Moscow desires to exchange embassies with Madrid for highly pragmatic 
reasons. A diplomatic mission in Spain could help coordinate clandestine prop- 
aganda and direction of espionage against American military bases. It could 
also promote expansion of hitherto indirect commercial relationships. The 
Soviets wish access to Spanish mineral wealth. 

Madrid certainly covets its treasure. The national finances are in desperate 
condition. A half a billion dollars would aid immensely in putting the country on 
its feet. The question therefore resolves itself quite simply. Does Spain want 
the gold enough to give recognition? Does Russia want recognition enough to 
give up gold? 

There is no prospect of any swift resolution of this problem. But both coun- 
tries involved in the discussion are noted for their qualities of patience and en- 
durance. The word "tomorrow" and the words "soon it will be done" have equiv- 
alent significance in Spanish and in Russian. 

[Washington Post, AprU 6, 1957] 

Gold of Spanish War Spent, Soviets Report 

London, April 5 (UP). — Radio Moscow reported today that $420 million 
worth of Spanish gold smuggled to Russia 20 years ago had been sent "to finance 
the (Spanish) Republican cause." 

The broadcast also said the Spanish Republicans never did repay $50 million 
of $85 million lent them by Russia during their brief period in power. 

[Informed sources in Madrid said Spain will continue to press for the return of 

The gold, taken from the Spanish treasury, was smuggled out of the country 
by the Communist-supported Republican government. Spain has been trying 
ever since to get it back. 

Today's broadcast, quoting what it said was an editorial in the Communist 
organ Pravda, said there was no gold left. 

"Some foreign newspapers carry articles concerning the deposit of Spanish gold 
in the U. S. S. R. 20 years ago, completely ignoring the expenditure incurred by 
the Spanish Republican government * * *." it said. 

"After the Spanish Republican government had deposited the money in Moscow, 
it frequently asked the Soviet Central State Bank to make payments abroad from 
it. The payments became so frequent that the money soon was all gone." 

Mr. Morris. Is there anything more about that one particular 
episode that you would like to know, Senator? 

Senator McClellan. No, I don't think so. 

Is there anything further that j'OU think of that you w^ould like 

Mr. Orlov. No. I have no more suggestions. 

Senator McClellan. In connection with that. 

x4.ll right; proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Did j^ou know, Mr. Orlov, about Stalin personally 
undertaking to counterfeit United States currency? 

Mr. Orlov. Oh, yes. That was a well-known affair in the circles 
of the NKVD chiefs. It is a bizarre affair for a huge country to start 
counterfeiting American dollars with the purpose of passing it in the 

It is true that at the time when it had been prepared and done, it 
was 1929, and Stalin was in need of money for financing the industriali- 


zation of the country. But everyone, and he himself, probably under- 
stood that, no matter how good the forgeries, you cannot pass more 
than $1 million because it will become known to the banks. The banks 
would be warned about the serial numbers, and that would be the end 
of it. 

But in spite of that, Stalin did it. And how could we explain that? 
My explanation is — and I am quite sure I am right — it stems from 
the character of Stalin, who was 90 percent a criminal and 10 percent a 

Senator AIcClellan. From whom? ' 

Mr. Orlo V. From Stalin ; from Stalin himself. 

In this respect, I should like to have your permission to quote a 
well-known Russian Socialist revolutionary, who spent 6 months with 
Stalin in prison in 1908, under the Czar. The name of this man is 
Simon Vereshchak. As a matter of fact, Stalin himself confirmed 
that he knew Vereshchak, and, in 1927, Pravda published an article 
concerning the memoirs of that man. Stalin liked something of what 
Vereshchak said about him while they were both in prison, and 
that is why a special article was published in Pravda. 

• But here is what Vereshchak, that Socialist revolutionary, wrote in 
his memoirs: 

While the politicals — 

that means the political prisoners — 

tried not to mix with ordinary criminals and especially warned their younger 
members against doing so, Koba- — 

this is the revolutionary pseudonym of Stalin — 

was always to be seen in the company of the murderers, blackmailers and robbers. 
He was always impressed by men who had brought off an affair. He shared a 
cell with two forgers of 500-ruble notes, Sakvarelidze, and his brother Niko. 

That was written about events when they were both in prison in 

Mr. Morris. Mt. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate at 
this time if we excuse this witness from testifying for just a few 
minutes. We have a Treasury- representative who has a sample of 
some of these counterfeit bills that Mr. Orlov has just referred to, 
and I think if he will testify for the record, Senator, we would know 
in a concrete form what was involved in this particular testimony. 

Senator jNIcClellan. All right. 

Will the witness come around here? 

Do 3'ou solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this 
Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Grube. I do. 

Senator McClellan. Counsel, you may interrogate. 


Mr. Morris. Will vou give your name and address to the reporter? 

Mr. Grube. Robert F. Grube. 

Mr. Morris. And for whom do you work? 

Mr. Grube. United States Secret Service. 


Mr. Morris. Now, I might say, Mr. Grube, that there are no 
photographers here, so you will have no problem about photographs 
being taken of existing Government obligations. 

Have 3"ou brought samples of certain counterfeit mone}^ here with 
you today? 

Mr. Grube. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Will you offer Ihem to the chairman? 

Mr. Grube. Mr. Chairman, those are counterfeit $100 Federal 
Reserve notes of the old issue, and thev oi'iginally appeared in the 
United States, in Texas in 1928, and $100,000 worth of those notes 
were involved in an operation in Chicago, and also we had information 
relative to the circulatio]i of those notes more extensively in foreign 

Mr. McClellak. How many millions of dollars were circulated? 

Mr. Grube. That would be hard to say, because we did not have 
the complete information from all the foreign countries. As far as 
the United States was concerned, we only had the 1 case involving the 
$100,000 in Chicago but, in addition to that, we received many, what 
we called floaters, in other words, brought in from foreign sources in 
small amounts either by tourists or people who brought them in 

Senator McClellan. What is the total amount that has been 

Mr. Grube. The total amount by this country was the $100,000, 
plus those passed in Chicago. 

Now, the amount involved in Chicago, the $100,000, they were only 
able to place $25,000 of that money in circulation. We recovered the 
$75,000 before they had an opportunity to put them in. 

Senator ]McClellan. Before curulation? 

Mr. Grube. Yes, sir. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Counsel, do you want these made an 
exhibit to the testimony? 

Mr. Morris. I thiik not. Just let the records show we can't 
reduplicate them. 

Senator McClellan. Take the numbers that you present here. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I respectfully call attention to the fact that the 
important thing about these is the difference in serial numbers and 
Reserve banks, and other indicia on the notes. It is not just a smgle 
note as a run-of-the-mme counterfeiter might make. This is a mass- 
production operation, with many changes in the plates. 

Mr. Grube. That is right. 

Each one of these notes has different characteristics, as far as their 
identifying features. Either a different Federal Reserve bank, a 
different check letter, a different face plate number, or a different back 
plate number, and normally, on a counterfeiting operation, we will 
get one note which will represent the entire lot turned out by that 

In other words, they will stick to the same Federal Reserve bank, the 
same check letter, the same face plate number and back plate number, 
but in this particular instance here are two, what we consider, varia- 
tions from the same plant. 

Mr. Morris. From a technical point of view, they are good duplica- 
tions of our existing operation, are they not? 


Mr. Grube. These are extremely deceptive. They are perhaps 
the most deceptive counterfeit samples of the old issue that have ever 
been brought to our attention of the $100 issue. 

Mr. Morris. Were you able to trace these to any Soviet source? 

Mr. Grube. No, sir, we were not. 

Mr. Morris. There was one man arrested, was there not? 

Mr. Grube. Right. 

Mr, Morris. What was his name? 

Mr. Grube. Dr. Valentine Burtan. 

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions of this witness. 

Senator McClellan. All right. Thank you very much. 

Now you may resume. 


Mr. Morris. Mr. Orlov, tell us what you know about this particular 

Mr. Orlov. I learned about this operation of counterfeiting $100 
bills in 1930, and I have learned that that operation had been directed 
by Stalin personally and was supervised by 2 men. The name of 
one of them is Boki. 

Mr. Morris. Who was Mr. Boki? 

Mr. Orlov. Mr. Boki was an old Bolshevik, the chief of the special 
department of the NKVD, a man who became famous in the party 
because he was the secretary who transcribed the so-called April deci- 
sion taken by Lenin and his associates in April 1917, to start, to pre- 
pare for the revolution which occurred later, in October. 

The other man was Berzin, the head of the Soviet Military Intel- 
ligence Service. 

I also learned that, in preparing for the passing of the money on 
orders of Stalin, a bank, a German bank, had been acquired, bought, 
in order to facilitate the distribution of the money. 

Mr. Morris. You mean, the Soviets even bought a German bank? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

The Soviets bought a German bank, or a financial house in Berlin, 
which was called Martini, and another word, Sacks or Sass. Maybe 
Mr. Mandel will correct me. 

Mr. Morris. Will you spell that? 

Mr. Mandel. S-a-a-s — M-a-r-t-i-n-i. 

Mr. Orlov. That bank had been acquu'ed by some Canadian 
people, also under Communist direction, and finally was resold to a 
German Communist by^thepame of Paul Roth. 

Mr. Morris. Paul Roth? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. He was also a Communist? 

Mr. Orlov. He was also a Communist, and the main distributor 
of that money. The man who became the chief customer of the 
bank was a man by the name of Franz Fischer. 

Mr. Morris. I offer you some photographs. WiU you tell us if 
that is the man you refer to? 

Mr. Orlov. I have never seen Fischer, so I cannot recognize it. 

Mr. Morris. Can you identify those, the picture of Franz Fischer, 
or can Mr. McManus do that? 

93215— 57— pt 51 i 


Mr. McManus, I wonder if you could identify those photographs 
which I just offered to Mr. Orlov, of Franz Fischer. 

Senator McClellan. Is he a witness or a member of the staff? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. McManus is a member of the staff. 

Senator McClellan. He can make the statement. 

Mr. Orlov. Will you permit me to add that that money was well 
fabricated, because it was made in the Russian Engraving and Printing 
Offices, in the Government Offices which make Russian money, and 
which have the greatest experts in the world, who were able to produce 
the so-called Czarist, you know, bills, which were the most compli- 
cated in all the world! So that it is no wonder that that money is 
undistinguishable from American $100 bills. 

But it was a bizarre, foolish operation, because, after all, nobody, 
could distribute more than $1 million. 

Mr. Morris. How much was involved here, do you know? 

Mr. Orlov. The plan was for $10 million first. That is all I know. 

Senator McClellan. How much did they actually — how much 
were they actuallv able to place in circulation? 

Mr. Orlov. I don't know. But one thing I know: In 1931 I met 
in Berlin a man. I became curious to see this man, and it might also 
be interesting for you to know that this operation was tied up with the 
common underworld, with criminals. 

When I was in Berlin, in 1931, I was told that a noted criminal, a 
common criminal, arrived from Slianghai, China, that he had been 
arrested there and extricated himself in spite of the fact that $100 bifis 
had been found in his possession. He probably bribed the pofice. 

So I wanted to see that man, to learn more about it. 

I met him. I don't remember the name of that man. And he 
told me how a number of his men were arrested and how he saved 
himself, and that he got 50-50 from that operation, from all the 

I was just curious to see a real common criminal for the first time 

in my life. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. McManus, wifi you tell us where 3-ou obtained 

those photographs? 

Mr. McManus. These are photographs that were made available 
to me by the Secret Service, from the files on Valentine Burtan. 
There were a number of pictm-es. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, these photographs were taken from 
the files concernmg the testimony regardmg these $100 bills which 
have been identified, and there is in that file a picture of Franz Fischer? 

Mr. McManus. These are from the file containmg pictures which 
bore on their face the name of Franz Fischer. 

Mr. Morris. This witness has testified that from his knowledge, 
Franz Fischer was the Communist agent that was taking part m this 
operation. I mention that by way of identifymg those two things. 

Mr. Mandel has prepared some contemporaneous news cHppings, 
which do tell us some more about this particular counterfeiting 

Mr. Mandel. In the New York Times of February 24, 1933, on 
page 1, is an article I would like to place in the record, which is headed 
as fallows: ''Flood of fake bills is traced to Russia; agents investigate 
report Dr. Burtan, held as one of ring, was a Soviet agent." 

And secondly 


Senator McClellan. That article may be printed in the record. 
(The newspaper article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 
427" and reads as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 427 

[The New York Times, New York, February 24, 1933] 

Flood of Fake Bills Is Tkaced to Russia 

agents investigate report dr. burtan, held as one of ring, was a soviet 

agent he loses removal fight commissioner advises he be sent to 

chicago for trial in $100,000 conspiracy 

The origin of $100,000 in counterfeit $100 notes, many of which were success- 
fully passed last month in Chicago, has been traced by Federal agents to Soviet 
Russia, it was disclosed yesterday at the Federal Building. 

The notes, which have turned up as far away as China, have been pronounced 
by experts of the Treasury Department to be the most genuine-appearing counter- 
feits ever uncovered. They are said to have been made 6 years ago. 

The Government, it was disclosed, is investigating a report that Dr. V. Gregory 
Burtan, New York physician, who was arrested on January 4 as the American 
principal in the alleged international counterfeiting plot, is, or was, an agent of the 
Soviet Government. 

It is believed that foreign governments have been notified of the facts of the 
conspiracy as they have been revealed in New York and Chicago, and that an 
international effort is being made to learn the identity of those higher in the 
scheme than Burtan is alleged to be. 


While the inquiry was being carried on with secrecy on orders from Washington, 
Francis A. O'Neill, United States Commissioner, handed down an opinion recom- 
mending the removal of Dr. Burtan to Chicago, where he and "Count" Enrique 
Dechow von Buelow, German aviator, have been indicted on a charge of possessing 
and passing the notes. 

Alvin McK. Sylvester, assistant United States attorney,, immediately arranged 
to present the opinion to Federal Judge Alfred C. Coxe, who, it is expected, will 
sign a removal order today and order Dr. Burtan, formerly an assistant physician 
of the staff of Polvclinic Hospital, to surrender. Dr. Burtan is free in bail of 

Von Buelow, who is said to have made a full confession of the part he played in 
attempting to dispose of the counterfeits, is in Chicago awaiting trial. 

Dr. Burtan has insisted ever since his arrest that he was connected in no way 
with any counterfeiting plot. During the removal proceedings Frank H. Smiley, 
a private detective of Chicago, testified that Von Buelow had introduced him to 
Burtan. Smiley and two of his friends arranged to dispose of $100,000 in counter- 
feit notes in the innocent belief, he said, that they were genuine bills which boot- 
leggers sought to dispose of because they feared income tax investigation if they 
themselves attempted to pass them. 


Louis Mead Treadwell, assistant United States attorney, said that Smiley 
took some of the notes to banks in Chicago, suspecting that they might be counter- 
feits, but tellers in five banks said they were genuine, and the detective accepted 
Von Buelow's story as true. 

Smiley told Commissioner O'Neill that the actual passers had been promised 
30 percent of all profits in the scheme. Twenty percent was to be divided among 
himself, Burtan, Von Buelow and two of Smiley's associates, while 50 percent 
was to go to the "bootleggers." 

In his opinion. Commissioner O'Neill wrote: 

"The only question involving doubt in this case is one as to whether the de- 
fendant knew that these bills were counterfeit. It has been established that they 
were counterfeit and that the defendant offered to sell them." 

Dr. Burtan, a heart specialist, is represented by Benjamin Hartstein. When 
he was first arraigned on the counterfeiting charge he said that he would prove 
that he had been innocently involved in the case through professional services to a 


Mr. Mandel. From the New York Times of May 16, 1934, page 15: 
Guilty in counterfeiting, New York man convicted in alleged $2 million ring. 

This, again, deals with Dr. Valentine Burtan. 

Senator McClellan. All right. That one may also be printed in 
the record. 

(The newspaper article above referred to was marked "Exhibit 
No. 428" and reads as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 428 

[The New York Times, May 6, 1934] 
Guilty in Counterfeiting 

new york man convicted in alleged $2 million ring 

Chicago, May 5 (AP). — Authorities claimed partial disintegration of a $2 
million international counterfeiting ring with the conviction last night of Dr. 
Valentine C. Burtan of New York. 

The defendant, accused with others with disposing of some $100,000 in spurious 
currency, was convicted by a jury which deliberated only 2 hours. 

Prosecutors Hall and Sullivan asserted after the trial that the ring had for 
several years been under the personal investigation of W. H. Moran, Chief of the 
Secret Service. They said Mr. Moran rated the bills as the best ever circulated 
in the United States. 

Dr. Burtan, they asserted, was a prominent New York Communist, but that 
since his arrest in this case he had been expelled from the Communist Party. 

They said the ring had been formed chiefly to flood the United States and 
several South American countries with spurious money, in an attempt to discredit 
this Government. 

Senator McClellan. Proceed. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, this particular episode, together with the 
details about the Spanish gold episode, should be related generally 
in our record with the inquiry that this Internal Security Subcom- 
mittee is now undertaking with respect to the theft by the Soviet 
forces in Berlin of $350 million worth of German bonds. 

In 1945 the Soviet occupation forces took from German bank vaults 
an amount of bonds worth approximately $350 million. Those bonds, 
we believe, are now appearing for validation here in the United 
States. The German-American Validation Board recently rejected a 
claim of validation for a particidar man applying for $245,000 worth 
of these bonds, and they rejected this application because they 
concluded that his particular $245,000 worth of bonds were, in fact, 
in German vaidts when the Soviet occupation forces arrived in Berlin, 
and I would like this related, in the record, with that particular Soviet 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Orlov, in your experiences in Spain 

Senator, may I offer these pictures of Franz Fischer for the record? 

Senator McClellan. All right. They may be admitted in the 

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 429" and 
is reproduced below:) 


Exhibit 429 
AMei?!QUE (Etats-Unis d ) 

FISCHER, frmi. 


Mr. Morris. When you were in Spain, Luigi Longo, an Italian 
Communist, worked generally under you, did he not? 

Mr. Orlov. No. Luigi Longo w^as an Italian who was one of the 
chiefs of the Garibaldi Brigade which fought in Spain during the civil 
war, between 1936 and 1939. 

Now, Luigi Longo is the deputy of the Italian party boss, Palmiro 
Togliatti. He is the secret director of the military forces of the party, 
which consist of the former members of the Garibaldi Brigade that 
fought in Spain, and I am quite confident that they have caches of 
arms hidden all over Italy. That means the leftovers from the World 
War, in case Moscow gives orders to stage a revolution there. 

Palmiro Togliatti was also in Spain at that time with me, and he 
had been a good friend of mine at that time. He directed the Spanish 
Communist Party and the Spanish Communist military forces in 
behalf of Moscow. 

Mr. Morris. Now, could you tell us what you know about the 
present Italian Communist Party? You mentioned Mr. Togliatti. 
He is an Italian Communist, is he not? 

Mr. Orlov. He is an Italian Communist. 

As is well known, the Italian party is the biggest and strongest 
party in the West after the Soviet Communist Party. They have 2 
million members in the Communist Party in Italy, which is a tre- 
mendous percentage, if you take into account that the whole 
population of Italy is 48 million. 

The power of the Communist Party in Italy has been underesti- 
mated. They actually dominate the biggest trade union there, which 
controls more than half of the Italian workers. 

Now, if you consider all that, and the fact that at the head of the 
Italian Communist Party stands the most able man in the Communist 
movement — that means Palmiro Togliatti, who had tremendous ex- 
perience in militar}^ conspiracies in the civil war in Spain — you rnight 
realize how serious the danger is, that if Moscow orders an uprising 
in Italy, it might easily succeed. 

I should like also to mention that in Trieste, the port of Trieste, 
which is in the northern part of Italy, very near to Yugoslavia, there 
is a man by the name of Vidale who heads the Communist Party of 

Mr. Morris. Do you know Vidale? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. I Imew him in Spain. He was one of the chiefs 
of the genera] staff of the International Brigade. He passed also under 
another name, Contreras. 

Vidale was not accidentally placed at that strategic position in 
Trieste, because, in my understanding, if Moscow orders an uprising 
in Italy, Moscow will need badly the help of Marshal Tito of Yugo- 
slavia, who holds in his hands the gates to northern Italy, and in that 
case, if Marshal Tito woidd be amenable to Soviet conspiratorial de- 
signs against Ital}^, he would bs able to let through volunteers and 
surreptitiously supply the Italian rebels with arms. And I think that 
was the chief reason why Russia last year has been wooing Tito to a 
tremendous extent. 

If you allow me. Senator, to elaborate for 5 minutes on that subject, 
I will give you some data. 

Senator McClellan. I will be glad to. 


In the course of your elaboration, 1 would like for you to comment 
on what advantage you think we are getting by giving military aid to 
Tito, under these cu-cumstances. 

Mr. Orlov. I would like to refresh some pertinent facts. 

In 1948 there was a break between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia. 

The reason was that at that time Tito, who had become a Yugo- 
slavian hero, the only head of a satellite state who really liberated his 
own country without the help of the Red army, but with his own 
partisans, demanded from Stalin at least a limited measure of inde- 
pendence for Yugoslavia. 

Stalin did not like that, and he wrote a letter to Tito, which was also 
signed by Molotov, w^arning him against insubordination and con- 
taining inambiguous threats or unequivocal threat. The letter read 
as follows: 

Dear Comrade: We warn you, Trotsky's — 

this is verbatim — 

case should be instructive to you. 

By that time Trotsky was already 8 years dead, assassinated, 
liquidated by Stalin in Mexico. 

In spite of that, Tito did not acquiesce to Stalin's demand and was 
expelled from the Cominform as a traitor. Tito did not have any- 
thing else to do but to turn for help to the West. He turned for help 
to the United States, which gave him help which amounted to $1 
billion — $500 million in economic assistance, industrial, food, and 
things like that; and more than $500 million in military tanks, fighter 
jets, and things like that. 

That made Tito a double traitor in the eyes of Russia. 

Now, in 1950, Tito signed the so-called Balkan Pact, together with 
Turkey and Greece, in defense against the Soviet Union. It should 
be appreciated that Turkey had been a traditional enemy of Russia 
for hundreds of years. That made Tito a triple traitor in the eyes 
not onl}^ of the Russian Government but of the Russian people. 

After Stalin's death, relations, dij^lomatic relations, have been 
restored between Russia and Yugoslavia, and that was enough to take 
care of the relations between both countries. But since 1955 the world 
has seen something very unusual, an unusual wooing of Tito by the 

In 1955 no less important a person than Khi'ushchev and Bulganin 
themselves went to Belgrade and officially apoligized for the break 
that had occurred in 1948. In 1956, in June, the beginning of June, 
Tito was invited to Russia. He had been accepted almost as a na- 
tional hero. He had been feted as no other foreign visitor had ever 

Before he came to Moscow, the Cominform was disbanded in 
deference to Tito, because the Cominform had expelled Tito from its 
ranks in 1948. 

A day before Tito arrived in Moscow, Molotov was fired as Foreign 
Minister, also in deference to Tito, because Molotov's signature was 
on the threatening letter that Stalin sent to Tito in 1948. And, as if 
Molotov had not been humiliated enough, he was made to go to the 
railway station and bow to Tito. 

I will not enumerate all the honors which were bestowed on Tito 
there. I asked myself at that time what was the reason. A traitor 


to Russia in the eyes of the Russians, a triple traitor, why had he been 
wooed to such an extent, and I wish to say that that wooing went so 
far that it was'done'^with undisguised obsequiousness. 

In his report to the 20th party congress, Khrushchev had this to 
say about Tito, and about Stahn. First of all, he blamed Stalin for 
the break with Tito, and then he said: 

Stalin boasted — 

declared Khrushchev fit the 20th congress of the party— 

I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito. He will fall. 

But that did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin 
shook not only his little finger but everything else that he could shake, Tito did 
not fall. 

This was humiliating not only to Stalin; this was humiliating to 
the Russian state and to the Russian people itself. 

Then, looking for an answer, for the reasons why Tito had been 
wooed to such an extent, I came to the following conclusion: that the 
answer to that strange wooing could be found, first, in the strategic 
position which Yugoslavia occupies on the map of Europe, and, 
secondly, that it was dictated by a change in Soviet strategy which 
was caused by the emergence of, or the appearance of the H-bomb. 
Before the H-bomb had been invented and before the appearance of 
nuclear weapons had changed the military thmking in both opposing 
camps, Russia was madly increasing its war potential, in the hope 
that some day they will grab the Western World by direct assault. 

But the threat of a nuclear war made this plan too dangerous, and 
Khrushchev and the other leaders of the Soviet Union decided that 
the retaliatory power of the United States is too strong to attempt 
plans of open warfare against the West, and that it is time to change 
their open warfare plans to sm-reptitious schemes of spreading the 
power of the Kremlin over the globe by subversion and staging 
revolutions from the inside. 

Then, it is well known, and I think it has been already noted by other 
analj^sts, that the target countries where the Russians entertain their 
plans and ideas of staging an inside revolution are two countries, 
Italy and France, because there the Communists are the strongest. 

But for the success of staging a revolution in Italy, where everything 
actually has been set and prepared, as I mentioned before, the Kremlin 
needed the help of Tito because Tito is located at the very gates, 
Yugoslavia is located at the very gates of Italy. 

Was Tito amenable or receptive to Russian plans and conspiratorial 
designs on Italy? Studying the speeches which had been made in 
Moscow, at the Moscow Stadium, before some 70,000 members of the 
Soviet elite, speeches made by Tito and by Khrushchev, and studying 
also the announcement they made to the press, and even such a trifle 
as the slogan, "Forever Together," which was spelled out by the 
multicolored formation of the athletes at the stadium, and then the 
speech by Marshal Zhukov, who said "from now on we and our Yugo- 
slavian comrades, our armies, will march shoulder to shoulder to- 
gether," showed me that Tito was quite receptive to such a plan. 

What could be actually Tito's interest in such a plan? Well, as we 
know, every dictator who has entrenched himself in power, begins to 
dream about territorial aggrandizement. We also know that Tito 
had been coveting the port of Trieste for a long time, and he knows 


very well that his good friend, Palmiro Togliatti, who, at the age of 63, 
can hardly wait to become the Italian dictator, would hardlv begrudge 
him a cit}^ a port, or a little Italian territory. 

There were also other instances which showed to me that a deal 
was being consummated between Moscow and Tito in this respect: 
Tito, who, for years, had been excluded from the Communist world, 
has been allowed by Russia to interfere in the affairs of the satellite 
people. He demanded that Rakosi, the party boss of Hungary, be 
dismissed. Khrushchev and Bulganin defended Rakosi as the best 
man, but the Kremlin had to bow to the demand of Tito. 

Now, Tito protested against Chervenkov, the head of Bulgaria, 
and again the Kremlin had to bow to the demands of Tito that 
Chervenkov be dismissed, and another man by the name of Yugov 
was appointed head of Bulgaria. 

Then we remember, also from the press, another case that, after 
the dismissal of Rakosi as head of Hungary, the Kremlin suggested 
that another man by the name of Erno Gero, a Hungarian Communist, 
be put at the head of Hungary instead of Rakosi. I knew him ver;y 
well in Spain. He had been there as assistant of Palmiro Togliatti. 

Tito at a conference with Khrushchev in the Crimea protested 
against Gero, but Khrushchev succeeded, after long hours or days of 
persuasion, to obtain Tito's consent to the appointment of Gero. 

Now, another sign that Tito was consummating a deal with the 
Kremlin and that the Kremlin, in order to woo him and to win him 
over to their plan, had to make concessions to him, can be seen from 
the fact that, if you remember, during last summer, on the order of 
the Kremlin, all the heads, party heads of all the satellite states, made 
actually a pilgrimage to Belgrade, where they had to bow to Tito. 
In other words, the ambitions of Tito were not only territorial but 
also to play the first fiddle in the party movement of all Communist 
parties of all satellite states. 

That is not a new ambition. That ambition was known to us from 
the press. In 1948, in Pravda, was published an announcement 
about the proposed so-called Federation of the Balkan States. At 
that time the big Communist leader, George Dmitrov, entertained 
ambitions of combining all the satellite states into a Balkan federation 
and to head it. It was actualh^ discussed in the press, the Cominform 
press and Pravda, and later Stalin decided that Dmitrov might 
become too powerful, and he actually overruled this idea. 

But now Tito, remembering the old ambitions of Dmitrov, and 
seemg that he can put conditions to the Kremlin because he was so 
needed to the Kremlin for the Italian affair, for the staging of sub- 
versive revolutionary uprising in Italy, he put in the biggest demand 
he could. 

Now, as we know, the Hungarian revolution occurred approximately 
at this time, and the Hungarian revolution, which produced a lot of 
very interested consequences, has actually set back those plans, the 
Italian plans of the Russians, for a time at least. 

Mr. Morris. May I break in there, Mr. Orlov? 

In other words, it is your testimony here that, based on your 
knowledge of the principals involved, this Luigi Longo, Togliatti, 
Gero, the Hungarian, Vidale, the Communist who is 

Mr. Orlov. Leader in Trieste. 


Mr. MoRKis. On the basis of all of your knowledge of these people, 
and your knowledge of Communist strategy, you believe that the 
Soviets are planning some kind of a coup, using military forces, the 
military forces involved in the Communist Party in Italy, and for 
that reason thej^ are trying to court Tito. 

And one of the things 3"ou believe they are offering Tito, by way of 
inducing him to go along with that conquest, is the cit}" of Trieste, the 
now internationalized city of Trieste? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. That is what it comes down to; right? 

Mr. Orlov. This is my conjecture, and I wish to note that not only 
the Hungarian revolution has upset the Soviet plans but, if you re- 
member, approximately in September of last year, Tito, who had been 
given by the Kremlin every sign that they want him to be a man of 
great influence in the Balkans, suddenly discovered that the Kremlin 
was double crossing him, that the Kremlin had sent out a secret circu- 
lar letter to all the Communist satellite states not to take Tito too 
seriously, saying that: 

The Yugoslavian Party is not a true Marxist party in the real sense of the word, 
and the Italian Party is tinted with social-democratic tendencies. 

When he learned about that, he protested, and then you remember 
how the Soviet Party boss, Khrushchev, made a dash by airplane to 
Belgrade and then to the island, Brioni, Tito's retreat, where they were 
wrangling and haggling for a couple of weeks, and then they flew to- 
gether to Yalta, where they had conferences with the rest of the Soviet 
leaders, who tried to allay Tito's suspicions, but the result, as I see, 
was a failure, because now jou see a new rift between Tito and the 

My idea is that, having recovered from the Hungarian debacle, the 
Russians might try to reactivate their Italian plan, because, if the 
Kremlin succeeded in seizing Italy, then they would flank France, 
which has also a tremendous, a very strong Communist Party, which 
polled, if I am not mistaken, about 20 percent of the votes in France, 
and that would be the end of Europe as we know it. 

The Communist leaders very often quote Lenin, not believing either 
in Lenin or anybody else, believing only in their own method of 
spreading their power over the globe by the means which they see fit. 
But they remember one precept of Lenin, who taught the Communist 
Party that a revolutionary, so-called revolutionary situation ripens 
very rarely, and to miss a revolutionary situation is tantamount to 
death, or something like that, to complete failure. 

So, seeing now that the Communist Party of Italy is losing followers 
as a result of Hungarian events and of the ferment in all the Commu- 
nist parties, the Kremlin might decide that, if they wait too long, they 
may lose that golden opportunity forever, and that is why I would 
not be surprised if Moscow would maybe — I don't know when, this 
year or next year — revert to their plan, and if that happens, we 
shall witness another vigorous attempt to woo Tito back into the 
Communist fold, to share the spoils. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, we have gone over with Mr. Orlov other 
testimony, particularly as to how espionage abroad, that is, abroad 
from the Soviet Union, is financed. We have gone into that. I know 
there are time limitations here, but that is a whole subject in itself. 


So I suggest, if your time commitments are otherwise, that this might 
be a good time for a break. 

Senator McClellax. What are your plans for the afternoon? 

This is off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Senator McGlellan. The committee will stand in recess until 
tomorrow morning at 10:30. 

Thank you very much. 

(Whereupon, at 12 :35 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene 
at 10:30 a. m., Friday, February 15, 1957.) 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:35 a. m., in room 
424 Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan presiding. 
Present : Senator McClellan. 

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate 
counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, 
research director. 

Senator McClellan. The committee will come to order. 
Mr. Counsel, you may resume the hearing from which we adjourned 


Mr. Morris. Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you could tell us precisely 
what your assignment was with the NKVD? 

^ Mr. Orlov. I occupied a number of important posts in the system, 
NKVD. I do not think I should enumerate all of them, but 1 may 
mention that I was commander of the frontier troops of the NKVD ; 
Deputy Chief of the Economic Department of the NKVD; Chief of 
the Economic Department for the Supervision of the Soviet Foreign 
Trade; and my last job was that of Soviet diplomat and adviser of 
the Soviet Government to the Republican Government of Spain on 
matters pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, and guerrilla 
warfare behind enemv lines during the civil war in Spain from 1936 
to 1938. 

I also served as a member of the little council in the NKVD, of 6 
people who were chosen to evaluate secret documents obtained by 
NKVD rings from abroad, in order to advise the Soviet Foreign 
Office on foreign operations and the intentions of foreign governments, 
and to evaluate the documents also for the Politburo of the party. 

Mr. Morris. You say you were 1 of a group of 6 people who were 
evaluating foreign documents from abroad? 

Mr. Orlov. Foreign documents, with the view of giving their 
opinion about the intention of foreign governments, concerning the 
Soviet Union. 

And Stalin would also get it after that. 



I was also the author of a textbook on mtelhgence and counter- 
mtelhgence, which was accepted by the NKVD. It was called Tac- 
tics and Strateg}^ of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. This work 
was written by me at the beginning of 1936, was accepted by the 
NKVD, and became the handbook for the NKVD schools preparing 
Soviet intelligence officers for service abroad. 

Mr. Morris. That was called Tactics and Strategy — of what? 

Mr. Orlov. Of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 

I also directed for a number of years, but this was a sideline, the 
faculty, you might say, on intelligence and counterintelligence in the 
Central Military School of the NKVD in Moscow, which was also 
preparing not only commanding officers for troops but also officers 
for the intelligence services. And I used to lecture there, but that 
was just a sideline. 

Mr. Morris. I see. 

I wonder if you would tell us, Mr. Orlov, how Soviet intelligence 
and counterintelligence is organized from the very top. 

By the way, is your textbook still in use, to your knowledge, in the 
Soviet Union? 

Mr. Orlov. I do not know, but I am almost sure, because it created 
quite a stir. 

A number of people were assigned to wi'ite a book, and my book 
was chosen for the purpose, and because, actually, it collected all the 
cases, the most important cases, of counterintelligence and intelli- 
gence work in NKVD, ^vith a view of warning operative officers 
against mistakes which were committed by others and which brought 
them to peril abroad, to arrest, and on the wa^^s, actually, of obtain- 
ing documents, of engaging spies, of using them, of covering up if 
they fell through — all those little things which are a must for every 
intelligence officer. 

And because that book actually accumulated all the operative ex- 
perience of the NKVD, I do not think it could be changed in any way. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us how Soviet intelligence 
operates, with respect to the various foreign countries. 

Mr. Orlov. I would mention first the lines or targets of Soviet 
intelligence abroad. 

Soviet intelligence is a manifold tiling. I must say that intelligence 
and counterintelligence work in Russia has been turned into a science 
and almost an art. And through the jeuTs the work of Soviet in- 
telligence services have crystallized in a number of directions. 

The first direction, the first target of the Soviet intelligence service, 
is the so-called diplomatic intelligence. That means to find out for 
the Politburo the intentions of the capitalist governments a.gainst 
each other, and the main thing is to find out the intentions of the 
capitalist governments against the Soviet Union. That has been 
done through the years successfull}^. 

And Stalin would receive, have on his desk, at least once a week, a 
full report on the information obtained by the NKVD in this direction. 
And verj^ often Stalin would get copies of the diplomatic notes which 
the foreign offices of capitalist countries were preparing for him, long 
before those notes were actually received by the Soviet Foreign Office. 

The second line of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence is 
military intelligence. The name itself explains what it is: to obtain 
complete data on the military strength of the western and eastern 


countries, and on militarj' inventions such as new armament, new 
submarines, new bombs, and things hke that. 

Then, the third hue of Soviet intelUgence occupied itself with so- 
caUed industrial intelligence. Although intelligence service, as such, 
has been known for hundreds of years, this was something new, which 
was created by the Soviet intelligence services. 

The purpose of that industrial intelligence was to obtain the secret 
processes of western industries, mainly of American industries, of new 
inventions. And for that purpose, the Soviet intelligence service 
recruited a number of engineers, scientists, inventors, over the woi-ld, 
and especially in America. 

And if you remember, for instance, the engineer Gold, who pla^^ed 
such a big role in the atomic thing, he used to supply the Soviet intel- 
ligence service with matters of inventions in private industry. 

But when the war came, all those engineers, like Gold, the most 
talented of them were mobilized, as we know, for the war effort, and 
thus the}" found themselves in the most secret departments of Ameri- 
can defense, or British defense, and were able to supply Soviet Russia 
with all the military inventions wliich were developed during the war. 

The fourth line of Soviet intelligence is the so-called economic 
intelligence. This economic intelligence has nothing to do with the 
so-called industrial intelligence, and actually is a defensive operation 
on the part of the Soviets. It is directed to defend the Soviet foreign 

As you know, all the trade which Soviet Russia conducts with the 
foreign world is monopolized, and the Soviet Government was inter- 
ested to know whether that trade was being conducted by American 
companies, or by western companies, on a level. 

It has been found out, for instance, in 1931, that industrial trusts 
of various countries in the West who traded with Russia used to 
overcharge Russia up to 75 percent. And I must here confess that 
it was I who, in 1930, discovered the existence of a so-called gentle- 
men's agreement, or bloc, among the electric companies of the world, 
and to my desk came documents stolen from, for instance, General 
Electric in America. I remember a document signed by Vice President 
Minor, a letter addressed to the German A. E. G. Co., also something 
like General Electric, to Director Bleiman, and to Switzerland, to 
another director of the Brown Boveri Co., an electric firm, with a 
list of prices that ought to be charged the Soviet Union, ostensibly 
because the Soviet Union's credit was no good. 

And the prices were from 60 percent to 75 percent higher than the 
normal prices at which other companies of the world were able to 
buy the same electric motors, and things like that. 

This cartel, or gentlemen's agreement, has been broken up by the 
Soviet Government. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you could tell us how 
intelligence in the United States operated 

Mr. Orlov. If you would permit me just to finish these points? 

Mr. Morris. I am sorry; yes; excuse me. 

Mr. Orlov. The fifth line of intelligence work is the so-called mis- 
information. The Soviet Government is not only interested in obtain- 
ing the best information it can from abroad, secret information about 
the activities of the foreign governments, but also to misinform, to 
mislead foreign governments. 


For that purpose, there was a special department which forged 
diplomatic documents which were sold and peddled around the world, 
with the view, for instance, of arousing suspicion in Italy against 
Germany, in Ital}" against France, or something like that. And that 
was very successful at times. 

The sixth line of Soviet intelligence was a very peculiar one, which 
I would define as paving the way for the Soviet Foreign Office in 
ticldish international manipulations. First of all, for instance, the 
Soviet intelligence helped the Foreign Office and helped the central 
committee of the party to pave the way for the recognition of the 
Soviet Union by various countries. 

Senator McClellan. For what? 

Mr. Orlov. For obtaining recognition of the Soviet Union, diplo- 
matic recognition, by various countries. 

And I know of some people who used to go to the United States to 
see whether the recognition of the Soviet Union could not be expedited. 
I am speaking of operators of the NKVD. 

That means the Soviet Foreign Office was interested in influencing 
the policies of foreign governments by pitting one part of a govern- 
ment, for instance in France, against the other. For that purpose, 
members of the government had been bribed, bought. With influence 
attained by other means, they would also keep the intrigues within 
foreign governments alive. 

For instance, I had an assignment, it was when I was in Spain, to 
get in touch with former Foreign Minister of Rumania Titulesku, 
who was out of power at that time and lived in Menton, on the border 
of France and Italy, to see whether he would not help the Soviet 
Union to unseat the Prime Minister of Rumania, Alaniu, and surely 
the Soviet Union was ready to finance such manipulation. 

I know of another case when, on personal instructions of Stalin, 
the NKVD tried to bribe one of the most important members of 
Mussolini's Cabinet, who was the Minister of Corporations. Well, 
I do not know whether he is alive and I would not like to mention his 
name right here. That was in the early thirties, and it had been 
arranged through an NKVD representative in Italy that that Cabinet 
Minister should come to Berlin to accept his bribe. 

He came to the then head of the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin, 
by the name of — excuse me, I ^vill recall the name, I forgot it — 
and when the member of the Italian Cabinet came to the head of the 
Soviet trade delegation, they had a talk, and the head of the trade 
delegation had an envelope for him. There was $15,000 — yes; the 
name is Lubimov. 

Mr. Morris. He was the Soviet head of the trade delegation in 

Mr. Orlov. In Berlin, in Germany. 

Later that man, Lubimov, became the Soviet Commissar for Light 
Industry in Russia. 

Mr. Morris. So he gave this member of Mussolini's Cabinet 

Mr. Orlov. Yes; $15,000. 

And the aftermath of that story: When he saw that he had only 
$15,000 in that envelope, he decided it was better to go and teU the 
story to Mussolini. So he came and talked to Mussolini, and Musso- 
lini protested about it, you know, in an unofficial conversation with 


the Soviet Ambassador, and Stalin's directive was: Too little money, 
you ought next time to try $50,000. 

Mr. Morris. Now, could 3'ou tell us why he was being bribed? 

Mr. Orlov. The idea was that that important member of the 
Cabinet of Mussolini had a following, and there was a hope that if 
the Soviet Union could obtain the services of that man and conduct 
an intrigue within the Government, ma^^be they might succeed finally 
in unseating Mussolini. 

Mr. Morris. Just a minute, now, and see if I understand that. 

You sa}^ the bribe of $15,000 was offered to a member of Mussolini's 

Mr. Orlov. Cabinet, yes. 

Mr. Morris (continuing). For the purpose of just getting his gen- 
eral sympathies, because he had a followmg? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

He had a following, and with a view that in future developments 
he might help, under Russian influence, to conduct political intrigues 
within the Alussolini Government itself. 

Mr. Morris. And when did this take place? 

Mr. Orlov. This took place in 1932. 

Mr. Morris. What was the name of the Cabinet member involved? 

Mr. Orlov. He was the Minister of Corporations. 

Mr. Morris. Of corporations? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

I forgot to add that he made a trip back to Berlin and returned the 

Mr. Morris. Why did he return the $15,000? 

Mr. Orlov. Because he had shown already to Mussolini, proved 
his devotion to Mussolini by that, and Mussolini instructed him to go 
back and return that money. 

And that was the case when Stalin said: Too little, vou ought to 
have given $50,000. 

Senator McClellan. I thought it was Mussolini who said it was 
too little. 

Mr. Orlov. No, not Mussolini. 

Senator McClellan. Maybe I misunderstood. 

Mr. Orlov. Stalin said: 'Tt is too little, you ought to have given 

And after that, he came to Berlin and returned the $15,000. 

Now, the seventh line of the NKVD work was engaged in influencing 
the decisions of a foreign government, not only in obtaining informa- 
tion but influencing decisions through powerful agents placed in high 
places in foreign councils. 

You may remember even from the American experience that during 
the past decade you had in the very high councils people who were 
willing to help Russia in the Chinese direction, not only with informa- 
tion but were influencing the policy of the American Government in 
connection with Germany, and other countries. 

Senator McClellan. Can you give us the names of anyone who 
has not heretofore been exposed, who was engaged in that operation? 

Mr. Orlov. Well, I do not know whether I should give the name 
of the man. 

Senator McClellan. Will you give them in executive session? 

Mr. Olov. I might give them in executive session. 


Senator McClellan. I suggest, Mr. Counsel, that at the proper 
time we have an executive session and interrogate the witness on 
that line. 

Mr. Morris. We will do that as soon as possible. 

Mr. Orlov. The eighth line of the NKVD work is guerrilla opera- 
tions. The purpose of guerrilla operations, it is self-understood, is 
sabotaging war installations, arsenals, warships, and things like that. 

The NKVD has a number of schools which prepare very skillful 
sabotage agents. 

Wlien I was in Spain, I had there about six schools 

Senator McClellax. Had what? 

Mr. Orlov. Six. I organized six schools for saboteurs, which were 
used for sabotaging enemy installations, behind enemy lines. 

They were mostly recruited of Spaniards and of members of the 
international brigades, mostly Commiuiists. Among them were a 
number of Americans, Englishmen. I remember at one opening of 
the school in Barcelona for about 600 students, during the inter- 
mission I spotted a group of about 30 or 40 persons speaking English. 

So I approached them, and we talked in English, they were mem- 
ners of the international brigades, of the British International 

Senator McClellan. Do you know of any Americans attending 
those schools? 

Mr. Orlov. I do not know the Americans, but I have seen and 
talked to those people, and they did a good job behind enemy lines. 

Senator McClellan. Do you know where any of them are, now? 

Mr. Orlov. I do not know where they are, now, but they are prob- 
ably in the United States. 

And what I want to say is that that guerrilla line of NKVD opera- 
tions was developed during the second World War into a tremendous 
business. At the head of that business stood a man by the name of 
Etingon. His other name was Kotov. Defector Khokhlov, about 
whom you read in the newspaper, and who I think testified somewhere 
here, wi'ote that during his times in the Soviet Union, my former 
assistant, Kotov — he called him General Kotov — from Spain directed 
all those operations. 

The guerrilla operations were so vast during the Second World War 
that saboteurs were counted by the tens of thousands, and I would not 
be surprised if Russia has here now on the territory of the United 
States a few hundred saboteurs who will get active as soon as war 
danger arises, or when the cold war becomes hot. 

Senator McClellan. In that connection, could you give any advice 
or counsel that would enable either the Congress, this committee, or 
the FBI, or any other agency of the Government, to identify them and 
take other proper action? 

Mr. Orlov. My advice in that respect would be, first, to guard the 
most sensitive and important installations. When I am speaking of 
the most sensitive, those are the atomic, hydrogen, and nuclear 
weapons, missiles, and things like that. 

Because knowing well how guerrilla operations are conducted 
by the Russians and their methods, I would not be surprised if a few 
days before the war started, a pseudo-American battalion — that means 
a battalion dressed in American uniforms, with English-speaking 
officers — would march by a certain place, for instance, where atomic 


bombs are stored, and if that place is guarded by an American platoon 
or by an American company, and so on, nobodj^ would even suspect 
that the approaching group of American soldiers stepping by is 
an enemy outfit. And then, those would be 90 percent Russians 
dressed in American uniforms, with 10 percent of American guerrilla 
fighters who served in Spain, who can conduct themselves as officers, 
and that suicide brigade would make an attack. 

Similar attacks could be made anywhere else, where very important 
things like, for instance, guided missiles are stored. 

Mr. Morris. Air. Orlov, I wonder if I may break in there. 

While you had these positions in the NKVD and while you were 
running the sabotage schools, how did intelligence operate in the 
United States, and how many rings were there in existence at the time 
of your separation from that service? 

Air. Orlov. I can judge by certain facts. In 1938, a country like 
the United States, like France, like Britain, had one director resident. 
That means a chief representative of the NKVD, with six assistants, 
Russian assistants 

Mr. Morris. Is this the situation that existed in the United States 
when you broke away in 1938? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

And this is the picture which existed here: There was here a chief 
director resident of the NKVD, by the name of Gusev, a man who had 
been in the former years my assistant. Then Gusev had six assist- 
ants. Each assistant had three American assistants, from the Com- 
munist Party usually, who were the contact men with the spies in the 
United States. 

Each of the Russian assistants took care of at least three rings. 
So you multiply 3 rings by 6 assistants, and that makes 18 rings, 
18 spy rings. 

Since then the picture has become even more ominous, because 
since then, as jo\: know, a war followed when America and Russia 
were allies, and Russia had the greatest ease of planting spies here, of 
bringing their people here. 

Not only that. Since the war, Russia has acquired a number of 
countries which are called satellites: Those satellites have now 
embassies and consulates in this country. Consulates and embassies 
have always been covers for vSoviet espionage, and it stands to reason, 
there is no doubt in my mind that the NKVD has in every embassy of 
that kind also their own rings. 

Then there is the United Nations, which did not exist before the 
war, and it has been established that there were Soviet spies in the 
United Nations. 

Even if the number of rings which the NKVD possesses now in the 
United States is not larger than it had been in 1938, then still, there 
ought to be 18 rings. Two rings, as we know, two spy rings, have 
been exposed, one a military ring from the Red army, by Whittaker 
Chambers. The other ring was exposed by Elizabeth Bentle}^, whc 
came and reported to the American authorities. 

Now, nobody else from other rings came and volunteered informa- 
tion. It stands to reason that at least 16 rings are at large and have 
the free run of this country. 

Mr. AIorris. Air. Orlov, these rings, to your knowledge, were 
directed by Soviet intelligence operatives; were they not? 


Mr. Orlov. Yes; they were directed by Soviet intelligence opera- 
tors, and they comprise only the NKVD rings. I am not speaking 
about the rings which are directed by the Fourth Department of the 
Soviet Army. 

Mr. Morris. That is the military inteUigence ring. That is 
something separate; is it not? 

Mr. Orlov. Something separate. 

And I have read that a former Soviet defector by the name of Ege 
gave an estimate of the number of those military rings in the United 
States as approximately 20. 

Mr. Morris. And Ege testified, Senator, before this committee, 
and he said, to his knowledge, that the Soviet militar}" intelligence 
had 20 rings in operation. 

Senator McClellan. Who was that? 

Mr. Morris. His name is Ege. 

But the rings you are talking about were NKVD rings? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. These are rings that are directed by Soviet officials; 

Mr. Orlov. By Soviet officials. 

Mr. Morris. But do 3'ou know below, when j^ou get into the work- 
ing range, for the most part, who are the people who do the work? 

Mr, Orlov. The people who do the work were Americans, or any 
other foreigners who lived here, and at least from 40 to 60 percent of 
them were usuall}* American Communists. 

Mr. Morris. And the rest of them? 

Mr. Orlov. The rest of them are non-Communists, working either 
for money or for some other reasons. 

And I should like to add, these rings w^iich I define here, although 
they conduct themselves illegally and commit espionage, they are 
called in Russia a legal network. Why is it called legal? Because it 
is conducted from legal coverups from Soviet embassies, which are 
legal, and directed by officers who have legal passports. 

But besides those rings there is another set of NKVD rings in the 
United States, which are called underground rings. They are called 
so because the Soviet leaders of those rings do not serve in the embassy 
or in the United Nations, but live under false passports as foreign 
businessmen or as American citizens and conduct their espionage. 

They have private lines of communication with Moscow, they never 
use the diplomatic pouch. They are forbidden even to approach the 
Soviet embassy. 

Senator McClellan. They usually try to become American citi- 
zens, do they not? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. They come with false passports 

Senator McClellan. I know, but they usually try to seek American 

Mr. Orlov. They tr}^ to become American citizens. If they are 
not satisfied with their forged American passports, then they try to 
obtain somebody's natm'alization papers and to get naturalized in the 
usual way as American citizens. 

Mr. Morris. I think the Senator was asking, was he not, that 
generalh^ they draw an American citizen to do their work? 

Senator McClellan. No. I had in mind that the leaders of those 
rings ostensibly try to become American citizens, to further cover 
up their identity and their purpose. 


Mr. Orlov. Yes, this is their main purpose. Because every one 
of them is afraid of an outright forged passport, becuase if he is 
arrested, then everything comes out. They would hke to adopt an 
American identity on the basis of true documents, and some of them 
succeed in immigrating here, obtaining immigration with somebodj^'s 
help from Europe, and gradually become American citizens. 

For instance, that man Zborowsky, whom I mentioned yesterday, 
he was sent here by the NKVD under his own name in 1941, and in 
1947 he was already an American citizen. 

Mr. Morris. Now, how can we know, Mr. Orlov — In order to learn 
the identity of these rings it is necessary, is it not, for us to get a defec- 
tion from some one of the Soviet NKVD persons in the United States? 
Isn't that the way we are going to solve the thing? 

Mr. Orlov. There are many ways of solving that problem. And 
I must say that Soviet intelligence services are the most skillful in the 

In this connection, I will ask permission to read a little quotation 
here, because I would never be able to put it, to formulate it, better 
than this man has formulated it. I do not know the name of this 
man, but I have found this in the newspaper. International News 
Service report, from Chicago, saying: 

Dan T. Moore, of Cleveland, former counterintelligence officer in the Middle 
East, says that never in history has spy warfare been so important as it is now, or 
such vital secrets to lose or such important secrets to steal. 

He added: 

"Of all nations on earth during the last 200 years, the most skillful in spy 
warfare are the Russians. The secrets we lose this year may cause us to lose a 
war 2 years from now. 

"No nation now would think of declaring war unless it is established, through 
a spy system, that it is going to win." 

I think no one could put better the state of affahs and the impor- 
tance of espionage in our times as this man did. I do not know who 
he is, but whoever he is, that man could contribute much to the 
struggle against foreign espionage in behalf of America. 

Now, I would like to mention the last, the ninth, line of NKVD 
work. That is infiltration of security agencies of the United States 
and of other countries. 

They have done, I think, a good job on that. And here I jotted 
down just three lines, a quotation from Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. 
He said : 

I believe the Communists are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated 
practically every security agency of the Government. 

I took it from a New York Times, September 30, 1953. 

Now, concerning the ways and how to combat espionage. There 
are many ways. The Russians are very skillful in espionage, but 
they are not invincible, they are not supermen. If that science of 
intelligence were raised in the western countries to a proper level, 
why, Soviet spies or any other spies could be checkmated. 

One of the ways of obtaming information about the spies, the most 
direct way, is obtaining defectors. 

Senator McClellan. Obtaining what? 

Mr. Orlov. Soviet defectors. 


For instance, had a Soviet intelligence officer who conducted the 
work here decided to defect, he could have exploded the whole network 
in the same way, for instance, as the American, Elizabeth Bentley, did. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

In view of your experience and background, what is the prospect of 
getting those men to defect? 

Mr. Orlov. That is a very good question, Senator. 

I think nothing has been done in that direction until now. I know, 
because I was one of them, and I know what every Soviet intelligence 
officer feels. " 

When they started their work, they honestly served their country — 
they were good patriots. But through decades of assassination of 
innocent people, of liquidations by Stalin of every NKVD officer who 
knew his criminal secrets, through all those decades there has been 
created an atmosphere, a psychological atmosphere, among the 
NKVD chiefs and the intelligence officers of the Soviet Union, that 
each of them, at one time or another, usually during periodical purges, 
would be happy to quit and to start his life anew. 

They say, for instance, that the life of pilots, aviators, is very short; 
but the life span of NKVD officers is the shortest of all. In my 
memory, there was the chief of the NKVD, Yagoda, his assistants, 
chiefs of all the departments — I was one of them — and they were all 

Then came a new prophet appointed by Stalin, Yezhov, who was 
Stalin's right-hand man. Yezhov recruited new men from the central 
committee, taught men, mobilized and created a new apparatus of 
the NKVD, who started their work. Finally, it was unavoidable 
that those people that worked closely with Stalin learned about his 
crimes. Wishing to remain in history as the most pure, honest man 
in the world, Stalin could not let them live either, because some of 
them might have survived him and written their memoirs. So he 
liquidated them. 

Then came, finally, Beria, a man whom I knew very well because 
we worked together when we were both young men. As a matter of 
fact, in the Caucasus in 1926 I was his senior. Beria was a man 
who seemed to be the best man and most guaranteed man from any 
execution, because he was a Georgian, hke Stalin himself, and very 
close to him. And finally we have seen that Beria, the new 
whom he brought in the NKVD, had been also executed, together 
with all of them. 

After that — - 

Mr. Morris. The point is, Mr. Orlov, you say the life span of all 
of them is very short and they do not last long? 

Mr. Orlov. They do not last long. 

Senator McClellan. Let me ask you: 

It seems to me that normal human intelligence would at some time 
perceive that anyone who went into that field of work, accepted such 
responsibilities, in view of the past experience and the things that 
have happened, would know that ultimately he would come to the 
same fate. 

Now, how is it that they are able to recruit them and get them to 
assume such responsibilities? 

Mr. Orlov. You see, the difference is, in the United States you 
have to recruit a man, to invite him. Here the President calls up a 


man whom he knows to be able and says, "I want to give you a very 
miportant job," and he can say, "Well, I am devoted to my family, 
to my business, and I cannot take it." 

In Russia 

Senator McClellan. Over there they are drafted^ 

Mr. Orlov. Yes; over there they are drafted. 

Senator McClellan. Virtually drafted? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

Senator McClellan. They dare not refuse. In other words, by 
accepting it, they may prolong their life, although they may finally 
come to the same fate; is that correct? 

Mr. Orlov. That is absolutely correct. 

Senator McClellan. In other words, you have probably 10 years 
if you do what they tell you, but if you don't it is over now? 

Mr. Orlov. That is it. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

Mr. Orlov. Now, I remember the tune when I defected. When 
all the chiefs of the NKVD had been executed, I saw my assistants 
around me — Kotov, who was also liquidated with Beria — I saw how 
they were shaking in their boots. But they did not defect 

Senator McClellan. Did you tell them you were going to defect? 

Mr. Orlov. No; I did not. 

Senator McClellan. You said they were shaking in theu- boots. 
I do not understand. I am not criticizing; I am just trying to un- 

Mr. Orlov. Yes, they were shaking in their boots, because we had 
conversations with one another, and if they did not spell out so-and- 
so much, you could alwa^'^s feel and know they were afraid to go to 

For instance, I received word to go back to Russia. I received, for 
instance, an order to send my assistant to Russia, an assistant who was 
decorated by Stalin personally, and who had carried out great feats. 
He was invited to Russia to report to Stalin on the Spanish war. And 

Senator McClellan. You never knew, when you got such an 
invitation, whether it was for liquidation or for getting information? 

Mr. Orlov. No; we understood that it was for liquidation. 

Senator McClellan. Oh, you did? 

Mr. Orlov. Because only 1 month passed, and we did not receive 
a single letter from him. 

Then my other assistants would converge and say that something 
must have happened, and things like that. ''He was an honest 
fellow — What do you think?" and things like that. And they were 
gloomy, aU of them. 

And when I received a telegram instructing me to go to Belgium 
and to board a ship, ostensibly for a secret conference where a top 
member of the party would be waiting for me, two of my assistants 
talked to me privatel}^ One of them said, "I do not like that tele- 

When I asked him, "'V\'Tiat do you think; what conference could there 
be?" about this or that matter. He did not answer me, and looked 
away. He was afraid to talk, but at the same time wanted me to 
feel that — and he said, "Why didn't he come here to Spain to talk 
to you?" 


You see, everyone felt danger, everyone actually was trembling. 

Now, under such circumstances, every one of them would have 
defected. Some of them did not, because their families were in 
Russia. Some of them were afraid because, working abroad, they 
used to pilfer secret documents from every ministry in the world, and 
they were afraid that, after all, when they defect, they would be ar- 
rested and made responsible for espionage work which they conducted 
for the Soviet Union. 

And the third point was, Stalin issued orders to assassinate defec- 
tors abroad. I can name some of the men who were assassinated 
durmg that time. One of them was Ignace Reiss. He was cornered 
and assassinated in Switzerland in 1937. You remember another 
man by the name of Krivitzky died mysteriously here in Washington. 
Another man by the name of Agabekov had been cornered 8 years 
after his defection and killed in Belgium. 

In the beginning of 1938, one was killed in Rotterdam, an under- 
ground agent. 

Senator McClellan. Have there been any killed here in the United 

Mr. Orlov. I think that Krivitzky was, and another man by the 
name of Markin, who was found killed here, too. 

Now, another outstanding underground chief, a Soviet Party mem- 
ber and a Soviet national, was Idlled under the following circumstances 
in Rotterdam, Holland. He was called for an appointment to a cer- 
tain cafeteria to meetfa^Soviet intelligence man from Moscow. He 
came there. They sipped their coffee, had their talk, and then that 
man from Moscow gave him a package which ostensibly contained 3 
or 4 books. He walked out first from the cafe, the cafeteria, and 
the underground Soviet agent remained at his table for about 15 

In 15 minutes he walked out, and when he was in the doorway the 
bomb exploded. It was in the package, and he was killed. 

Those things created a double terror, and no one laiew whether he 
would survive if he defected. 

Now, I was in hiding for 15 years, and it was really a miracle that I 
survived. As a matter of fact, I met one of the Russian terrorists in 
Cleveland. I mean, I have seen him; I did not talk to him. He was 
trailing me. But probably they would not kill me outright, because 
in my letter to Stalin I wrote that if I were killed, my lawyer Avould 
publish all the documents. And they would have to trap me, get me 
into some trap, and make me yield the documents first, before they 
would kill me. 49| 

Mr. Morris. Senator, one of the problems that the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee has been having thi'oughout the years has 
been the acquisition of a defector along the lines that Mr. Orlov is 
talking about, ^^ 

Now, in Canada there was the Gouzenko defector, and he really 
exposed much of the espionage that went on there. Rastvorov 
defected in Japan, and has been able to tell the country a great deal; 
Mr. Petrov in Australia; and Mr. Ege in Turkey. 

Now, we have never had such a thing in the United States, any 
NKVD official defecting, and we continue to explore, Senator, whether 
or not there is any kind of legislation that we might enact, something 
we might do to give inducements to the people that Mr, Orlov teUs 


US about from his own experience, who he beheves would actually like 
to come to our side if there was some kind of an inducement or some- 
thing to put aside their fear 

Mr. Orlov. May I say something about that? 

Air. Morris (continuing). And it is a grave problem, Senator, as 
far as we are concerned. 

Senator McClellan. Do you feel, though, there are those over 
here engaged in spj-ing for Cominunists that would be glad to defect, 
if they felt their life would be 

Mr. Orlov. I am quite sure, because they know that although 
there is some kind of, what you call a thaw, in Moscow, some kind 
of liberalization, the time will come when the sacrifice will have to 
be laid on the altar. 

Senator AIcClellan. In other words, the thaw is only for a season? 

Mr. Orlov. Temporary. 

Senator McClellan. For a season only? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes, for a season onl}^. 

Then I must say that the success of the Soviet intelligence services 
is, to a certain extent, explained not only by their brilliant training, 
not only by the tremendous help which was given to them by the 
Communist Party here in the United States, but also by the com- 
placency of the Western governments, which do not combat Soviet 
intelligence as it ought to have been done. 

Let me give you an example 

Senator McClellan. All right. Let me ask you a question: 

What is your recommendation, what do you suggest now? As you 
say, we do not combat it as we should, and we are interested, of course, 
in getting any defections we can from these people. What would be 
your recommendation, how to go about it, how can we induce them, 
and what action can this Government take? 

Mr. Orlov. My recommendation would be that if an important 
representative of this Government, let's say the Attorney General 
or a Senator, would make a declaration at a press conference or other- 
w^ise, saying that those who quit Soviet conspiracies, those who want 
to quit their espionage work, those who want to part, to break with 
their past and go over to the free world, they will be helped to get an 
immigration visa in this country, with permanent residence in this 
country, and they will be offered immunity against their own respon- 
sibility for the things they have done in this country. 

Because, as you know, espionage laws have been corrected in a way 
which excludes the statute of limitations for espionage. So a man 
who has been here, for instance, 10 years ago and was sent here again 
because he knows the English language and he knows the country, 
he is afraid that he might be put in the dock and be responsible and 
be sentenced to some 20 years in prison. 

Now, why should he take such a chance? If he would be promised 
complete immunity against whatever he did in this country, if a 
certain promise would be given to him that he would be helped to 
establish himself — offering any money to a man of that kind would 
not be good because people who come to a decision, when they have 
to break with their country, with their families, with their past which 
they cherished for many years, their participation in the civil war, 
in the party, and in the revolution, they will not be moved by money. 
They would feel insulted. They do not want to feel that they are 


regarded as traitors, and they do not want to be traitors in their 
own eyes. 

Senator McClell-mv. Let me ask you another question: 

It occurs to me that these agents that they assign over here from 
Russia, espionage agents and so forth, they select them with some 
care, do they not, with respect to their family back home, so that 
they can always hold that as a threat over them? 

Mr. Orlov. Yes; it is usually done so. 

But you know, life takes its toil, and if you send a man and leave 
his family there, he knows he is not trusted any more — he cannot 

They would be told in Moscow: "Well, you have children; we 
want your children to get a Soviet education; let them stay in the 
schools here," and so on. 

But then in 1 year he writes he cannot work here, he wants to go 
back, and his work slackens — and it is not the same thing. You 
cannot send a man to risk his life and at the same time show him 
that he is not trusted. 

So finally, within 1 year, they sent him his wife and then they sent 
him his children. 

So, some of them who still have their families in Russia won't 
exchange the safety and lives of the members of their family for a 
doubtful future in the United States. They just continue, they 
return to the NKVD in Moscow and just take a chance that some 
time, somehow, not everyone is killed, not everyone is lic{uidated. 

Mr. AloRRis. Mr. Orlov, did you know Vasili Zubelin? He was 
the third secretary, and then second secretary to the Embassy here 
during the war. Now, he has recently figured in the espionage case 
in New York, Senator. 

Now, can we talk about that particular individual? Did you know 
him as an NKVD man? 

Mr. Orlov. I know about whom you are talking. I knew him 
under a different name. In Moscow he was, he lived under his real 
name, Zarubin, Vasili Zarubin. He was one of the outstanding 
operatives of the NKVD. I knew also his wife, Lisa Gozsky. 

Mr. Morris. She was an intelligence operator in her own right, 
was she not? 

Mr. Orlov. She was an intelligence officer in her own right, and 
she worked in my department. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about him and her, and what, gen- 
erally, their assignments were and what their connections were with 
intelligence in the United States, if they had any connection at that 

Mr. Orlov. I know that the most important work which he did 
was before the war in Germany. That was a dangerous thing, to 
work against Germany with an undergi'ound false passport. 

His wife also lived in the underground there. 

I do not know what he did in America. What I know is just 
what I read here in the newspapers about him. 

His wife was also a noted operative, and she caused the death of 
another NKVD operator by the name of Blumkin. 

Blumkin, on one of his trips abroad, went to Turkey and had a 
conversation — it was in 1930 — with Trotsky, whose chief bodyguard 
he was during the civil war. That had been found out, and the wife of 


Zarubin was assigned in order to spy on him and to find out every- 

As a result, Blumkin had been shot on orders of StaUn. 

By the way, that Bhimkin was a famous fellow. When he was 
only 17 years old, it was in the beginning of the revolution, he was a 
Socialist revolutionary and adversary of the Communists, of the 
Bolsheviks. He did not like the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which Lenin 
signed with tlie Germans, yielding to German}' a part of Kussia, so 
he called up the German Ambassador in Moscow and presented 
himself as a "cheka" man, and said: 

"We have information that you. Ambassador, are going to be 
killed, and we want to inform you about it — there is a ring here which 
wants to kill you — May I see you?". 

He said : 

"Come right away." 

So he came to him, opened his briefcase, and said: 

"Here are the papers." 

He took out some papers and took out a pistol and shot him to death. 
That was a famous affair. 

The Politburo wanted to shoot him, but Trotsky became interested 
in that fellow, 17 years old, and had a talk with him. Blumkin said: 

"I know you will shoot me, but if you will spare my life 1 will serve 
the revolution well." 

And Trotsky liked him, defended him, and made him chief of his 
bodyguard and of his military train 

That was why later, in 1929, Blumkin, when he was abroad, went 
to see Trotsky, which was his undoing. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, before we get off Zarubin there, om- evidence 
in the past has shown us that among the American Communists over 
here, the American operatives, Zarubin himself was only known as 
Peter, and his wife was known as Helen. 

In fact, the Americans, when dealing with him, the American sub- 
ordinates dealing with him, never knew his actual name as Zarubin. 

Mr. Orlov, you feel, then, do you, that there is need at this time — at 
least, it is your advice — for some kind of a public pronouncement by 
someone, such as a Senator or Attorney General, backed up with 
specific offers of immunity, permanent residence, avoiding the use of 
money because that would strike the wrong note, and urging some 
NKVD personnel in the United States to come forward to make full 

Mr. Orlov. Definitely so. 

Not only NKVD officers, but I should say any man who takes part 
in the Soviet conspiracy against the free world. It might be a Soviet 
diplomat who was not engaged in espionage, and who possesses informa- 
tion which would help to establish the conspiratorial activities of the 
Soviet camp. 

I think the reluctance to defect can be explained also by the com- 
placency which has been shown by the Western government to this 

For instance, you remember the Gouzenko case in Canada, where he 
broke open the atomic ring. Gouzenko, in 1945 or 1946, collected all 
the documents which have shown there existed in Canada a tremend- 
ous ring. He went to the Minister of Justice — he wanted to defect — 
and showed him the documents. 


The Minister of Justice showed it to Mackenzie King, Prime 
Minister, and Mackenzie King said: "Tell him to go and put those 
documents back." 

But not only that, Mackenzie King, after that, when the documents 
were examined and found to be of tremendous importance, connected 
with the atomic spy ring, made a trip to the United States to see the 
American President, and he went to Britain to see Prime Minister 

Mackenzie King made a report to the House of Commons, and here 
is what he said there. First of all, he said: 

I told the man Gouzenko he should go back and put it into the Soviet files, that 
we did not want it. And the reason I did it — 

he said — 

I did not want to complicate relations with Russia. 

And he said he wanted to go to see Stalin. Here it is verbatin: 

From what I have heard and know about Premier Stalin, I am confident that 
the Russian leader would not countenance or condone such action in one of his 
country's Embassies. 

Well, seeing liow^ Gouzenko was treated, actually he could have 
been killed, not having attained his goal of defection, he could have 
been sent or extradited to Russia. 

As a matter of fact, during the war many people were extradited 
from America to Russia — defectors. 

I have not read the latest book about the FBI, but leafing through, 
I notice a thing there, described by the authorities themselves: 

In 1943, a young sailor, a Russian sailor by the name of Egorov 
defected. He jumped his ship. So the Soviets demanded of the 
American authorities that he should be found and extradited. He 
was found and had to be put on a Norwegian ship. But while he was 
being put on the Norwegian ship, he fled and hid himself somewhere 
on a chicken farm. 

Then a year later, American police authorities noticed that four 
men were dragging a fellow to a Russian ship. The American police 
officers came up and said: "What are you doing?" 

Then 1 of those 4 kidnapers introduced himself as Lomakin, as 
Consul Lomakin, Soviet consul, and said that that man was a deserter, 
and things like that. And in spite of the protest of the American 
authorities, they put him aboard the Soviet ship. 

Two days later American investigators came to that ship and 
demanded that this man Egorov be called in for questioning. They 
brought Egorov, who was blue and black from beating. Egorov 
begged on his knees not to be sent to Russia because he would be 
liquidated. But Lomakin, who was also present there, the Soviet 
consul, said: 

"No, you cannot free that man, I have only signed him up as a 
member of the crew." 

And in spite of that, the American authorities did nothing, and that 
man was sent to Russia, where he sm-ely was shot. 

The report of the American authorities on that case is in that book 
of the FBI. And the authorities were at a loss as to what to do, and 
the man who wrote the report said : 

"That man Egorov will surely be shot dead." 


Now, in view of things like tliat, you must be doubly courageous- 

Senator McClellan. In other words, we are not offering them any 
incentive whatsoever for defection? 

Mr. Orlov. Not only incentive, but at times it was discom-aging. 

Senator McClellan. We offered deterrents rather than incentives? 

Mr. Orlov. That is true. 

Senator McClellan. For the record, I think one thing should be 
corrected here. 

There has been some reference to the fact that if one Senator, that 
is the implication of it, would make such a statement, that that would 
carry the authority of Government. That is the implication of it. 

I am sorry sometimes it does not, because I would like to say some 
things with that effect. But I think it would take action by the 
executive branch of the Government, probably some legislation by 
Congress, to authorize it. 

Mr. Orlov. I know, but what I had in mind. Senator, was that a 
Senator might make an announcement and say: 

"I will use m}^ offices, I will do whatever I can to persuade the 
executive branch to give pohtical asylum to such a person." 

Senator McClellan. In other words, what is meant is that it 
should be the policy of the Government, from whatever source author- 
ity is required, to establish such a pohcy. 

All right; let's proceed. 

Mr. AloRRis. Senator, I think in view of the time area we stake out 
here — I have one more hue of questioning, and I think I can finish 
that up very briefly. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Do you feel now that, for instance, the Soviet Union, 
present leaders of the Soviet Union, have abandoned the rule of 
Stahn and that they are now embarking on a new and different course, 
which course is being reflected even by the American Communist 
Party here in the United States? 

That is two things: the Soviet policy abroad, and the Communist 
policy here at home. That will be the last question I have. 

Mr. Orlov. No, I do not think that they have actually changed. 
It is just a temporary liberalization in Russia, which is limited to 
some free speech only. 

Actually, Khrushchev, whom I had known personally, and all the 
others in Russian leadership, they are the same Stalinists as they 
were. They have not changed anything, either in their own policy 
in their own country — because, as we know, their economic policy 
remains the same. That means stress on heavy industry for war 
armaments and nothing for the consumer, no consumer goods, very 
little food, and the shortages of food and goods and the hardship of 
the Russian people continue. 

In the aspect of foreign polic} , they continue the same policy of 
Stalin, of striving to subjugate other countries and other peoples. 

Senator McClellan. In that connection, what would be your 
comment regarding the recent action of the American Communist 
Party in its propaganda? It seems to me it possibly could be regarded 
as just window-dressing for the purpose of deception, of trjang to 
make it appear that they are not holding allegiance to Russia 
Communist domination. 

What is vour view about that? 


Mr. Orlov. You expressed it better than I could ever do. This is 
absolute deception, absolute lies. They are still a branch of the 
Russian Communist Party. 

Senator McClellan. They are still Communist revolutionaries, 
international in scope 

Mr. Orlov. Absolutely. 

Senator McClellan (continuing). And have the same objective. 

Mr. Orlov. And all their resolutions had been approved in the 
Kremlin beforehand. And they are so disciplined that they carry out 
to the minutest detail the performance of how to show that they are 
not disciplined. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

Mr. Orlov. And I should like to add also that in spite of the fact 
that in his speech before the 20th congress of the party the Soviet 
party boss, Khruslichev, has admitted that millions of people were 
exiled, without any guilt, into concentration camps, he did not throw 
open the concentration camps; they are still there. 

In spite of the fact that Krushchev has so completely exposed the 
technique of torture in obtaining false confessions, all those who were 
tried in the famous Moscow trials have not been rehabilitated. All 
the former teachers of the present leaders of the Kremlin have not been 
rehabilitated, they still stand in the books as Hitlerite spies. 

The leaders of the Red army, Tvlarshal Tukhachevsky and the rest, 
who have been shot on the charge that they had been Hitlerite spies, 
they still stand as Hitlerite spies and nobody has rehabilitated them. 

And Khrushchev has shown that he is able to use the same methods 
as Stalin. Let us recall the case of Beria. Beria was shot ostensibly 
because he was an American spy, but America knows he was not an 
American spy. And it is so ridiculous, because it was Beria who stole 
the atomic bomb secrets. So he was not an American spy. But, in 
spite of that, he and a number of persons were liquidated, ostensibly 
because they were spies. 

Mr. Morris. Could I ask you, very briefly, in a few words, how, 
generally, is espionage financed? Just in a few words, because we 
have to finish now. 

Mr. Orlov. Yes. 

This is very simple. The Soviet intelligence service is financed 
direct from the Treasury. No shady deals, they are not allowed to 
counterfeit money for that purpose, or to engage in any contraband 
to supplement their budgets. 

The budget of the Soviet intelligence service, NKVD, as in my time, 
was $2,800,000 per month, a very little sum, if you compare it by the 
sums spent by the Western intelligence services, and there was never 
a Year at that time when they spent more than $2 million of that 
appropriation of $2,800,000. 

Senator McClellan. Per month? 

Mr. Orlov. Per month — all over the world. 

Senator McClellan. How do they get by so cheaply? 

Mr. Orlov. They get by so cheaply, iu-st, because the Soviet 
officers worked for the revolution and were satisfied to get very small 


And the main thing is that about 60 percent of the most efficient 
Soviet spies were Communists, and the Communists were supposed 
to work for their spu'itual fatherland, for Russia, not for money. 

Mr. Morris. Now, if the American Communists supplant the work 
of the NKVD officials in the intelligence operation in the United 
States, there is no money going from the Soviet Union to the American 
Communists, is there? 

Mr. Orlov. No. 

You see, when you speak about the Communist Party, then I may 
tell you that the Communist Party exists on Soviet mone}', on the 
money which comes from the Soviet Treasury, from the Central 
Committee of the Party. That is whj' they have to toe the line. 

That is why, you see, when there is a split in the Communist Party 
here, the faction which has split off and has denounced Moscow, goes 
out of existence, because they are not subsidized. That is why a 
deviationist group has no chance to exist, although they may have 
all the arsenal of Leninism and of Karl ]Marx and Engels in their 
possession. They have no mone3^ He is the boss who pays the 
money, and the central committee of the party had a budget for 
the Comintern which financed all those activities of the Communist 
Party everywhere in the world. 

But concerning the so-called Communist spies, those spies worked 
without money, or they just took some little sums in order to defray 
their expenses. 

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions. 

I would like to thank Mr. Orlov for coming here. 

Senator AIcClellan. The Chair would like to ask him one or two 
questions. He probably would prefer to answer them in executive 
session and, if so, that is all right. 

I would like to inciuire of you whether you know now of any 
Communists in our Government, in any position in the Government? 

Mr. Orlov. No; I do not. 

Senator McClellan. All right. And the other is: Do you know 
any Communists in this country now who may be engaged in 
espionage that j^ou could identify? 

Mr. Orlov. No, I do not. 

Senator McClellan. That is all. 

Any further testimony? 

Mr. Morris. I have no questions. Senator. 

Senator McClellan. Thank you very much, Mr. Orlov. 

What is the further pleasure of the staff with respect to hearings? 

Mr. Morris. There is a witness coming down today. Senator. 
We will have to have a session with him some time, in executive 
session, toda}^, and make an announcement later in the day about 
when he is to appear. 

Senator McClellan. All right. 

The committee will stand adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at 11 :50 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned.) 

(The following article from the U. S. News & World Report of 
March 29, 1957, was ordered into the record during a hearing March 
29, 1957, at which Senator Olin Johnston presided:) 


Weapon of Gold 


Paris. — What may be one of the biggest "shakedown" schemes in history is 
being tried by Soviet Russia now in an effort to get a Communist foothold in 

The bait in this case is a half billion dollars' worth of Spanish Government gold, 
taken by the Russians for "safekeeping" during the Spanish Civil War 2(J years ago. 

The Franco Government is trying to get it iDack. But, from the waj^ things are 
going, the price is going to be high. So far, the Russians don't even admit — 
publicly, at least — that thej^ took the gold in the first place, even though Spain 
now has documentary proof. 

Instead, Moscow is using the gold to try to squeeze concessions out of Spain 
through roundabout talks in Paris. What Russia wants is an exchange of ambas- 
sadors, trade agreements, the right to station "news correspondents" in Spain and 
to put into effect all the other devices Moscow has used in the past to get the 
Communists established in new territory. 

Delicate negotiations about the gold have been taking place off and on since 
1954 between Spain and Russia, even though they don't recognize each other's 
governments and don't exchange representatives. 

LINK with united STATES BASES 

The talks started just about the time United States military bases were getting 
established in Spain. The Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Sergei Vinogradov, 
quietly approached the Count of Casa Rojas, Spanish Ambassador to France, at 
a big diplomatic party and suggested that relations between their two countries 
be "normalized." 

Since then, the two ambassadors have met privately half a dozen times, 3 times 
in each other's embassies, for sessions lasting from 30 to 45 minutes each. Vino- 
gradov, while pushing the idea of getting Soviet officials into Spain, has avoided 
mentioning the United States bases. Nor has he made any nasty remarks about 
Madrid's anti-Communist policies. Instead, he spends the time urging "coex- 
istence" and emphasizing that countries with wide differences can maintain 
"normal" relations. 

Throughout the talks between the two ambassadors, the Spanish position has 
been that nothing can be done until two things happen: First, all Spanish citizens 
in Russia must be returned to their homeland. And, second, the half billion in 
gold must be returned to its rightful owner, the Spanish Government. 

Last year, the Russians finally agreed to send back the Spaniards, most of 
whom had been in the Soviet Union since the 1930's when the Spanish Civil War 
was going on. More than 2,000 Spaniards, mostly people who had been sent to 
Russia as children during the civil war, have now come back. Many of those who 
grew up in Russia married there and have brought along their wives and children —  
all Soviet citizens. The presence of these persons gives the Russians a talking 
point when they suggest setting up an embassy and consulates in Spain. The 
interests of Soviet citizens, they say, must be pi'otected by the Russian 


The Spanish gold was mentioned only vaguely in the first few talks between the 
two ambassadors here in Paris because Madrid lacked legal proof that the Russians 
had taken it. But now the Spanish Government has that proof in the form of an 
8-page receipt in the French language signed by 2 high officials of Russia. 

The evidence was obtained after more than a year of negotiation with Juan 
Negrin, an exile who sent the gold to Moscow when he was Finance Minister in 
the Spanish Republican Government. 

For months Negrin refused to give up the papers relating to the gold deal. 
But, just before his death, in Paris in November, Negrin told his housekeeper to 
turn the papers over to the Franco government. 

With proof in hand, the Spaniards approached the Russians again. They 
presented photographic copies of the receipt. Ambassador Vinogradov promised 
to forward the photographic copies to Moscow. That was nearly 3 months ago. 
The Spaniards are still awaiting a reply. 



The Spanish Government is prepared for long negotiations with the Russians. 
But if direct talks don't bring the gold back, Madrid probably will appeal to the 
International Court or the United Nations to get action. Spain badly needs the 
half billion dollars' worth of gold. Franco's government is hard up for cash right 
now, and the gold would be a windfall equal to all the United States aid Spain 
has received since World War II. 

The Spaniards have told the Russians they will not make any deals to get their 
gold. However, veteran diplomats wouldn't be surprised to see a Soviet embassy 
in Madrid, once the gold is back in the Bank of Spain. 

The Russians would like access to Spanish strategic materials. They would 
like diplomatic cover for espionage against the United States bases. They want 
to get into the country to launch underground anti-Franco propaganda at a time 
when economic difficulties, strikes and student unrest are plaguing Spain and 
political troubles about the succession to Franco are beginning to appear. 


In the Spanish gold it took for "safekeeping" 20 years ago, the Soviet Union 
figures it holds a powerful weapon for prying its way into Madrid. 



Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization 
in this index. 

A Page 

A. E. G. Co., in Germany 3455 

Agabekov 3464 

Article in New York Times re Spanish gold: One Son Issues Denial 3435 

Article from New York Times dated January 6, 1957, re Spanish gold: 

Soviet Gold Issue Stirs Spain Anew 3434 

Article from New York Times dated January 10, 1957, re Spanish Gold: 

Two Spanish Envoys Arrive in Soviet 3436 

Article from New York Times dated January 21, 1957, re Spanish gold: 

The Hidalgo and the Commissar Warm the Atmosphere Between 

Moscow and Madrid 1_ 3437 

Article from U. S. News & World Report dated March 27, 1957 re Spanish 

gold: Weapon of Gold 3472 

Article from Washington Post dated April 6, 1957: Gold of Spanish War 

Spent, Soviets Report 3438 

Aspe, Senor Mendez, Chief of the Spanish Treasury 3430-3432, 3435 

Atlee, Prime Minister I 3468 

Atterburg, B 3428 

Australia 3464 

Azana, President of Spanish Republic 3429, 3431, 3436 


Balkan Pack ._ 3447 

Balkans .. . .. 3450 

Bank of America 3431, 3432 

Bank of England 3431, 3432 

Bank of Spain 3435, 3473 

Belgium 3464 

Belgrade 3447, 3449, 3450 

Bentley, Elizabeth 3459, 3462 

Bergere, Professor 3433 

Beria 3462, 3463, 3470 

Berlin 3456, 3457 

Berzin, head of Soviet Military Intelligence Service 3441 

Bleiman 3455 

Blucher, Marshal 3427 

Blumkin 3466, 3467 

Boki, Mr 3441 

Bolsheviks 3427 

Brest-Litovsk Treaty 3467 

Brioni Island 3450 

Britain 3459, 3468 

British International Brigade 3458 

Bronx 3423 

Brown Voveri Co., in Switzerland 3455 

Bulganin 3447, 3449 

Bulgaria 3449 

Burtan, Dr. V. Gregory 3441-3444 

Caballero, Largo, Prime Minister of Spain 3429-3431, 3433, 3436 

Canada 3422, 3467 



Case of L. T., the (Leon Trotsky) 3426 

Chambers, Whittaker 3459 

Chervenkov... 3449 

Chicago 3440, 3443 

Cominform 3447. 3449 

Commtern 3433, 3471 

Communists 3441, 3442, 3444, 3448, 3450, 3458, 3465, 3467, 3471, 3472 

American 3460, 3467, 3471 

Hungarian 3449 

Italian 3446 

Polish 3426 

Communist Party 3444, 3450, 3459, 3465, 3471 

American 3469 

Italian 3446, 3450 

Spanish 3446 

Soviet 3446, 3470 

Congress 3458 

Counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve notes 3440, 3441, 3442, 3443 

Coxe, Judge Alfred C 3443 

Dmitrov, George 3449 


Ege 3460, 3464 

Egoro V, Russian defector 3468 

Etingon (also Kotov) 3458, 3463 

Exhibit No. 426. Letter to Trotsky from Orlov dated December 27, 1938, 

warning Trotskv of assassin 3425-3426 

Exhibit No. 427. ' Article from New York Times dated February 24, 1933, 

Flood of Fake Bills Is Traced to Russia 3443 

Exhibit No. 428. Article from New York Times dated May 6, 1934, re 

Dr. Burtan guiltv in counterfeiting 3444 

Exhibit No. 429. Photograph of Franz Fischer 3445 


FBI 3428,3429,3458,3468 

Fis-her, Franz 3441, 3442, 3444 

France' 3424,3448,3450,3456,3459 

Franco, General 3422, 3429, 3430, 3434, 3435, 3437 

Franco government 3472, 3473 


Garibaldi Brigade 3446 

General Electric 3455 

German- American Validation Board 3444 

German bonds 3444 

Germany 3456, 3457, 3466, 3467 

Gero, Efno 3449 

Gold (Harry) 3455 

Gouzenko -. 3464, 3467, 3468 

Gozskv, Lisa 3466 

Greece 3447 

Grinko, G. F 3436 

Grube, Robert F. (testimony of), with United States Secret Service, 

Department of Justice 3439-3441 

Gusev 3459 


Hague, The 3435, 3437 

Hartstein, Benjamin 3443 

Hungarian revolution 3450 

Hungary 3449 


I Page 

International Brigade 3446 

International Court 3435, 3473 

International Court of Justice in The Hague 3437 

Italy 3446, 3448, 3450, 3456 

Japan 3464 


Khokhlov 3458 

Khrushchev 3447-3450, 3469, 3470 

King, Mackenzie 3468 

Kotov (also Etingon) 3458, 3463 

Kremlin 3434, 3447-3450, 3470 

Krestinski, N. N 3436 

Krivitzky 3464 


La Roche, guerrilla forces at 3442 

Lenin 3441, 3450, 3467 

Life magazine 3422, 3423 

Lomakin, Soviet consul 3468 

Longo, Luigi 3446, 3449 

Lubimo V 3456 

Lushkov (Henry Samoilovich) 3425, 3426, 3427 


Madrid, Spain 3430, 3436, 3438, 3472, 3473 

Mandel, Benjamin 3421, 3453 

Maniu, Prime Minister of Rumania 3456 

Markin 3464 

Martin, Comrade 3428 

Minor 3455 

McClellan, Senator John L 3421, 3453 

McManus, Robert 3421 

Mexico 3424, 3430 

Molehanov 3425 

Molotov 3447 

Moore, Dan T 3461 

Moran, W. H 3444 

Morris, Robert 3421, 3453 

Moscow 3429, 3433-3438, 3446, 3448, 3449, 3460, 3464^3467, 3471, 3472 

Moscow trials 3470 

Mussolini 3456, 3457 

Mussolini's Cabinet 3456 


Negrin, Juan, Prime Minister 3429-3438, 3472 

Negrin, Miguel 3435 

Negrin, Romulo 3435 

New York 3428, 3429 

New York Times 3434-3437 

Nikolavevsky, Boris 3424, 3426 

Nikolayevsky's Institute ^ 3426, 3427 

NKVD (Soviet Secret Police) 3421-3424, 3433, 

3438, 3441, 3453, 3454, 3456-3464, 3466, 3467, 3470, 3471 


O Page 

Odessa 3435-3437 

O'Neill, Francis A 3443 

Orlov, Alexander: 

Testimony of 3421-3439, 3441-3471 

Born in Russia 3421 

In 12th Red Army during Spanish Civil War 3421 

Chief of counterintelligence 3422 

Assistant prosecutor of Soviet supreme court 3422 

Deputy chief of economic department of NKVD 3422 

Soviet diplomat to Spain in 1936 3422 

Broke with Soviet Government in 1938 3422 

Pascua, Marcelino, Spanish Republican Ambassador to Moscow 3436 

Persia 3422 

Petrov 3464 

Politburo 3433, 3453, 3454, 3467 

Pravda 3438, 3449 

Prieto, Indalecio, former Spanish Minister of Defense 3429, 3433 


Rakosi 3449 

Rastvorov 3464 

Reiss, Ignace 3464 

Rio Rinto, guerrilla forces at 3422 

Rojas, Casa (Jose Rojas y Moreno, Count of Casa Rojas) 3437, 3438, 3472 

Rosenberg, Ambassador, Soviet Ambassador in Spain 3430, 3431, 3433 

Roth, Paul, main distributor of counterfeit $100 notes 3441 

Rotterdam, Holland 3464 

Rusher, William A 3421, 3453 

Russell Sage Foundation 3423 

Russia 3421-3423, 3443, 3448, 3449, 3455, 3457, 3463, 3464, 3466-3469 

Russian Engraving and Printing Offices 3442 

Saas Martini (German bank) 3441 

Second World War 3458, 3473 

Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, by Orlov 3422 

Secret Service, United States 3439 

Sedov, Leon, son of Trotsky 3423-3427 

Serna, Dr. Luis de la 3436 

Sloutsky, Chief of Soviet NKVD 3433 

Smiley, Frank H 3443 

Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell 3461 

Socialist Appeal, New York newspaper of Trotsky 3428 

Sourwine, J. G 3421, 3453 

Soviet Army, Fourth Department of the 3460 

Soviet Embassy 3428, 3429 

Soviet Foreign Office 3456 

Soviet Government 3423, 3424, 3436, 3443, 3455 

Soviet intelligence 3454, 3455, 3459-3462, 3465, 3470 

Soviet receipt for gold 3435 

Soviet steamers 3432, 3433 

Soviet Union 3422, 3430, 3434, 3435, 

3447, 3448, 3453-3455, 3457, 3458, 3462, 3464, 3469, 3471, 3473 
Spain 3422, 3424, 3426, 3429, 

3430, 3431, 3436, 3437, 3438, 3444, 3446, 3456, 3458, 3463, 3472 

Spanish Civil War 3421, 3434, 3472 

Spanish gold 3429, 3430, 3432-3434, 3436, 3437, 3444, 3472, 3473 

Spanish Government 3429-3431, 3433, 3435, 3473 

Spanish Republican Government 3422, 3436, 3453 

Stalin 3423, 3427, 3429-3431, 3433, 3438, 3439, 3441, 

3447-3449, 3453, 3454, 3456, 3457, 3462-3464, 3467-3470 

State Bank of Moscow ' 3430, 3433 

Sulzberger, C. L 3437 

Sylvester, Alvin McK 3443 




Tactics and Strategy of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, bv Orlov__ 3454 

Tito, Marshal _" '. 3446-3450 

Titulesku, former Foreign Minister of Rumania 3456 

Togliatti, Palmiro 3446, 3449 

Treadwell, Louis Mead 3443 

Treasury Department 3443 

Trieste, "port of 3446, 3448, 3450 

Trotsky, Leon 3423-3428, 3447, 3466, 3467 

TrotskV Bulletin of the Opposition 3424, 3425 

Turkey ,.. 3422, 3447, 3464, 3466 


United Nations 3434, 3435, 3437, 3459, 3460, 3473 

United States 3421-3424, 3428, 3430, 3436, 3438, 

3440, 3444, 3447, 3448, 3456, 3458, 3459, 3462, 3465-3469, 3473 
U. S. News & World Report 3471 


Vallina, Salvador 3436 

Vereshchak, Simon 3439 

Vidale (Contreras), head of CP of Trieste 3446, 3449 

Vinogradov 3438, 3472 

Von Buelow, "Count" Enrique Dechow 3443 


Washington Post 3438 

Watkins, Senator Arthur V 3434 

Welles, Benjamin 3434, 3436 

World Bank 3434 


Yagoda 3425, 3462 

Yalta _ _ __ _ 3450 

Yezho V, once righ't-hand" man "of Stalin 11"". /-"-""/-"-"."_' _"_" 3423^ 34"30", '3"43"3, 3462 

Yugoslavia 3446-3448 

Yugov 3449 


Zarubin, Vasili (Zubelin) 3466 

Zborowsky, Mark (pen name of Etienne) 3423, 3424, 3426-3429, 3461 

Zhukov, Marshal 3448 

Zinoviev 3425 

Zubelin, Vasili (Zarubin) 3466 














MARCH 1, 1957 

PART 52 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

93215 WASHINGTON : 1957 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

OCT 9 - 1957 


■**^*'"'^" JAMES O. SA'Aj^^P,.MississippJ, Chairman 

ESTES KEF AUVER, Tennessee ~" AlJE^'^^hfDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 





SAM J. ERVIN, JE., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 



SAM J. ERVIN, jE., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

ROBERT MOEEis, Chief Counsel 

J. G. SouBwiNE, Associate Counsel 

William A. Rdsher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 


Testimony of — Page 

Cooke, Adm. Charles N 3500 

Dunlop, Albert M 3475 



FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 1957 

United States Senate, Subcommittee To 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 

OF THE Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 35 o'clock a. m., in 
room 155, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner pre- 

_ Also present : Eobert Morris, chief counsel ; J, G. Sourwine, asso- 
ciate counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Kobert C. 
McManus, investigation analyst. 

Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order. 
Would you call the first witness. 
Mr. Sourwine. Dr. Dunlop. 

Senator Jenner. Doctor, do j^ou swear the testimony given in this 
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothmg but the truth, 
so help you God ? 
Dr. Dunlop. I do. 
Senator Jenner. Proceed. 


Mr. Sourwine. Will you give your full name and address. 

Dr. Dunlop. Albert M. Dunlop, Rural Free Delivery 4, Box 493, 
Alexandria, Va. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were born in Savoy, 111. ? 

Dr. Dunlop. In Savoy, 111., in 1884. 

Mr. Sourwine. You took your A. B. at the University of Illinois 
in 1908? 

Dr. Dunlop. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. And you took your M. D. from Harvard University 
in 1910? 

Dr. Dunlop. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You taught at Harvard Medical School in Shanghai 
from 1911 to 1916? 

Dr. Dunlop. That is right. 

Mr. SouRAViNE. You taught at the Peking University Medical Col- 
lege from 1918 to 1931 ? 

Dr. Dunlop. 1918 to 1931 ; that is right. 

Mr. Sourwine. You were in private practice in Shanghai, in the 
private practice of medicine, from 1931 through 1933 ? 

Dr. Dunlop. Yes, sir. 



Mr. SouRwiNE. You were a professor at the University of Chicago 
from 1943 to 1946? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were in private practice in Shanghai from 
1946 through 1952? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And you were a professor at the University of 
Hong Kong from 1952 through 1953 ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. That is right. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And during the time that you practiced medicine 
in China you had a clientele which included all classes ; is that right ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You had rich men and poor men, beggarmen and 
thieves, I suppose? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I expect, and including the Communists. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And including a number of high officials? 

Dr. DuNLOP. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I submit that this qualifies Dr. 
Dunlop as a gentleman of rather unusual experience, and I think 
that we may go forward. 

Senator Jenner. I certainly think so. Proceed. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Dr. Dunlop, what can you tell us about the regi- 
mentation of doctors in Communist China ? 

Dr. Dunlop. The regimentation of doctors started very soon in 
the Shanghai area — and I am speaking primarily for the Shanghai 
area, although I know by hearsay of other parts — started in late 
1949, when the Communists, in their endeavor to placate the people, 
or to meet the people with their state medicine, required all organ- 
izations, factories, and so forth, to have clinics. And for this pur- 
pose, they went out and raked in all of the well -qualified men, and 
some who weren't so well qualified, to service these places. 

In some instances, they were more or less forced to give up their 
practices and go in. 

Well, this taking away of the patients from these private men 
made their practices, of course, go down to virtually nothing at all. 
And so, these men, many of them, had to go into the hospitals and 
clinics in order to earn a living. 

That has continued. And today I would say there are a very fcAv 
medical men in private practice. 

Wlien the Communists came into China and into the Yangtze 
Valley, there were close to 3,500 well-trained, western-trained doc- 
tors. I don't include the native physicians, I don't include those 
who were trained in Japan. I include those men who had been to 
foreign institutions, either in the United States, England, Germany, 
or in institutions such as the Peking Medical College, in Peking, 
which was established by the Rockefeller Foundation. In all, there 
were something like 3,500. 

Within a year, many of those men — I say many, upward of 600 
or so — had slipped out of China, and were either in Formosa or 
Hong Kong. So that a month before I came away, a Chinese col- 
league told me that he thought at that time — and that was in late 
1952, I came out in October 1952 — that there could not be more than 
2,500 of that original group. And many of them who had not es- 


caped had come down with recurrent tuberculosis, and high blood 
pressurej which we did not ordinarily have in China — it wasn't due 
necessarily to the rice diet, but the fact is that the Chinese, as a rule, 
had not had high blood pressure. 

Is that what you mean ? 

Mr, SouRWiNE. Yes, sir, that is very much along the line. 

As a result of this regimentation, how many independently prac- 
ticing physicians, well-trained physicians, would you say, there are 
in Hed China now ? 

Dr. DuNLOP, How many are in all China ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Are there any physicians allowed independently 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes. 

I would say that of those original 2,500, there undoubtedly remain 
at least 2,000 of the well-trained ones. 

I knew some of those who are no more. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Pardon the interruption. 

The question is: Are those men practicing independently, or are 
they regimented by the Chinese Communists ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. They are regimented. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. That is the point. 

There is no free and independent practice of medicine any more 
in Bed China ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. A man may do some after hours in his own office or 
home, and many of the men had their offices in their homes, but out- 
side of that ; no. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. The Communists fix fees ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Absolutely, yes. 

And that is another thing which drove the men out of their prac- 
tice and out of their private hospitals, into the hands of the Com- 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Have the Communists done anything to foster the 
teaching or training of additional physicians ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes. 

They started in the very early days what they called the 214-year 
boys. Those were middle-school students who were brought into 
these large classes, sometimes of a thousand each, in some of the 
various old, established institutions. And then, there were some 
that were established especially for the purpose of training these boys 
who, after 21/^ years, could take on a certain amount of major work. 

Now, when I say 2i/^ years, I mean they started from scratch. For 
instance, all of my instruments were sold to a colleague who went 
into Sian Fu. And he sent his nose, throat, and ear men — I am a 
nose, throat, and ear man — down to take over my equipment, check 
it before it went back. And as we were checking it over one day, 
he said to me, "Our boys and girls are doing operations after 21/^ 
years of training." 

I said, "So?" 

"Yes," he said, "that is the present move, to utilize all of the men 
they can get, as quickly as they can get them, to meet the great need." 

Now, the Communists did try to control, after a time, these 2%- 
year boys and girls by decreeing that no major procedure could be 
done without consultation with a colleague, a man of some other 
department of training, such as a gynecologist or obstetrician, if it 


was a woman patient, or an internist, if it was to be something that 
had to do with the abdominal cavity. So that, they turned out a 
tremendous number of such individuals. 

Now, one other aspect of that business of getting enough doctors to 
meet the need of a country going wild with public health was to 
insist that all the oldtime native doctors be given modern training. 
I mean, the old men who treated with herbs, or the men who used 
acupuncture needles for inserting in different parts of the body, for 
the purpose of treating the individual. All of these people were 
required to take special training. 

And, some of my colleagues were required to give them night 
classes in modern medicine, diagnostic work, and especially how to 
take advantage of the modern antibiotics. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you make a competent physician out of a herb 
doctor, with a few months in any school. Doctor ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, they tried it for a time, and then they failed. 
And what they did was to bring back into their medical schools and 
back into practice the old, traditional medicine of China, or herb 
and acupuncture practice. 

The herb doctors — we have seen them in this country, and in China 
they are all over. In Shanghai, for instance, there are 10,000 of these 
traditional tonic men who got their training from their fathers or 
grandfathers, and so on down. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Are there any good medical schools in China? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Good medical schools? Well, you have got the Pe- 
king Medical School, to which I was attached for a long time, the 
Rockefeller Foundation Medical School. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Are they under Communist control ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. All under Communist control. 

And today, it does not take any undergraduates, but confines itself 
entirely to postgraduates. And incidentally, today it has a Chair of 
Herb Medicine and Acupuncture, which is being carried on side by 
side with modern medicine. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. For the record. Doctor, explain what acupuncture 

Dr. DuNLOP. Acupuncture is the use of a needle of varying size 
and length, which is inserted into the body in various places, in order 
to destroy a particular disease. The graduate is required to perfect 
his knowledge of the different localities into which he can thrust this 
needle. And then he takes his examination by being required to in- 
sert that needle into a mannequin, a brass mannequin, the holes of 
which have been pasted over with paper. So that if he shoots accu- 
rately and gets into the hole, he can pass his examination, and then 
he is an acupuncturist. 

Now, they have used that a great deal. Latterly, in the Peking 
Medical College they have been using it for the treatment of polio- 
myelitis, believe it or not. And they say they have cured cases of 
poliomyelitis by the use of acupuncture needles. 

Now, in the old times there was no sterilization of their needle. 
It might be wiped off through the hair of the operator, or anything 
might happen. 

Incidentally, if I might go just a step further in regard to the acu- 
puncture, the acupuncture people became very proficient in abortions. 


They would take a 3 months' pregnant uterus, thrust a fairly long 
needle through the abdominal cavity into the top of the fundus of the 
womb, and frequently there was a fairly prompt abortion. It also 
resulted in the withdrawal of that needle into the abdominal cavity, 
and then a chain of events started which would either end in the 
death of the individual or the interference of modern surgery for its 

Our man in gynecology at PTJMC used to have case after case 
where he was required to go in and remove this needle, which had 
been drawn through the contraction of the uterus within the abdomi- 
nal cavity. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You say now they have modernized that ancient 
practice, now they are sterilizing the needle ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Now they are sterilizing the needle, that is the only 

Mr. SouEWiNE. Doctor, there are some other evidences of progress 
under the Soviets, are there not, such as the transplantation of tissues 
to treat asthma and gastric ulcers ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes. 

We did a lot of transplantation of tissues after it had been 
started in Russia at one time. And I think there was a directive of 
some sort sent down into China that they should put it on there. 

Well, the tissue that was taken was merely tissue from some animal, 
such as the lip of a cow — they even went so far as to take some of the 
glands of the various animals. That was put into deep freeze or re- 
frigerator, and brought down to a very low temperature for a period, 
and then when it was to be used, it was brought out and put into an 
autoclave, that is a steam sterilizing machine, for the purpose of com- 
pletely sterilizing. 

Then a small opening was made through the skin underneath the 
ribs, preferably on the right side, and that was inserted, and then the 
skin was sewn up. And that was that. It was supposed to cure all 
sorts of things. 

And so this colleague of mine said he thought it was started in 
Russia, primarily because they didn't have enough medicines, they 
had to do something. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It is the same principle as the old asafetida bag 
around the neck, only they put this under the skin ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, they have some various reactions every now 
and then, and whether or not they have had any cures remains to be 

Mr, SouKWiKE. Doctor, I asked you a question, whether medical 
schools were good or bad. In your book, you told how the students 
in the Communist schools, in the medical schools, get the same grades, 
whether they are good or bad students, they get lectures instead of 
examination, and they all graduate, if their political thinking is right. 

Are those what you call the earmarks of a good medical school? 

Dr. DuNLOP. No. 

And I don't think that practice had been followed in such places as 
the Peking Medical School, because our own staff is there. But take 
that institution which was started in the north of Shanghai. 

The man who was in charge told me that those men were divided 
up into cells. At the time he spoke to me, there was something like 
a thousand in their freshman class. And they were, first of all, di- 

93215— 57— pt. 52 2 


vided into a hundred each, and then each hundred was divided into 
10. And they all had captains. The man who led the group, the 
smaller group, had to see to it that every man in his group knew what 
was going on. And when it came to the so-called examination time, 
they all got the same grade, regardless. 

Of course, a man had to be politically sound in order to get through. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is a special effort made to indoctrinate doctors in 
Ked China? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes. 

I knew the foreign group, because there were 10 out of 12 in that 
group that were my old students. They met, first of all, once a week 
in the evening, and had a class which lasted from 8 until about mid- 
night. And they were indoctrinated by a Communist. 

I remember his telling me once that they were required to approve 
what he told them every now and then. He would say, "Now, don't 
you think that the Americans have been subversive m the medical 
schools and these various things they have been doing in an educa- 
tional way?" And he said, "We would all raise our hands and shout 
'Yes.' " He said, "If Ave don't we are kept after the class, and we are 
interrogated for 2, 3, 4 hours." He said, "It isn't worth while, and 
what we agree among ourselves is this : We speak with our lips, but 
not with our hearts." 

I put that in this book, but that is the sense of what goes on with 
that group. 

I don't believe that they have been indoctrinated. 

Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Would you say that that is a part of the Commu- 
nist attack on independent thinking ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. That is a part of it, yes. 

And, of course, they started in Peking very early in the game for 
all educational institutions. They started, first of all, to try to con- 
trol all of their own people in their own groups. They started in 
Manchuria in August of 1950. 

And then, when they found tliat some of the educational groups 
were getting out of hand, they switched that into the educational insti- 
tutions, and they had a big meeting in Peking when Chou En-lai 
instructed the staffs as to what they should aim for in the way of 
indoctrination of the gi^oup. 

And, in the end, it was the students who indoctrinated the staffs, 
because they were more accessible to the Government. 

Mr. SouRWiNB. Do the Chinese Reds recognize physicians as an 
especially influential group, and attempt to use them for propaganda 
or for other purposes ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I don't think they have done that to any degree. 
They use the physicians primarily because they can use them in con- 
nection with this great movement of public health that they put on 
for the entire country. They can't do without them. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What can you tell us about individualism among 
the Chinese? Does that persist in spite of Red Communist efforts 
to suppress it ? And what can you tell us about those areas ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I think it does. I think individualism has existed 
back through the years, and I think it will continue to exist. 

I think there is a great attempt on the part of the Communists to 
try to destroy it. First of all, they have tried to break down the 


family unit. I can best illustrate that by the instance of my own 
colleague, whose son informed on him. 

This son, like all of the others among the youngsters, was indoctri- 
nated to the point — they were informing on their own families. It 
got to the point where, when I went to a Chinese house, if there were 
any children around there was very little speaking of any sort. 

Now, this colleague of mine, a doctor, and a nose-and-throat man, 
and myself, were very nervous about the whole thing. He was very 
anti-Communist. The Communists had required all the doctors to 
tell them how much they had in the way of property, and this col- 
league of mine withheld the sum of his property. And this young- 
ster informed against him. 

Senator Jenner. His son? 

Dr. DuNLOP. His son informed against the father. And his father 
went into his office one Saturday afternoon and filled himself with 
morphine, and that is where they found him Monday morning — dead. 

And that is only one of several incidents of this sort. It has been 
that attempt, first of all, to break down the family unit, which has 
led to a breaking down of the individualism, if you will, of the 
Chinese people. I can't believe that it will succeed. 

Mr. SouKWiNE. You do not believe it will succeed ? 

Mr. DuNLOP. I do not. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Wliy not, Doctor ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. People who have a culture that goes back almost 
4,000 years may be dented with this thing, but I don't think that in 
the end they will accomplish wliat they are setting out to do. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You are saying, then, that communism is alien to 
the ancient culture of China ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Absolutely. 

And the older Chinese, especially, look u])on the regime in Peking 
as an alien government, not as a Chinese Government. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, some of those who favor the recognition 
of Red China and the admission of Red China to the United Nations 
tell us repeatedly that communism is very much in line with the an- 
cient traditions of China, that China has always been a nation which 
was governed from above, and that they have developed their own 
kind of Marxism, and that is really indigenous to China, this Red 
communism that they have now. 

You say that is not so ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I can't believe that for a moment. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Doctor, to what extent has the sovietization of 
China progressed, if you know ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. To what extent? I didn't get the question. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. To what extent has the sovietization of China 
progressed ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I think they have insinuated themselves into 
many aspects of Chinese life. I think there is a great deal of imi- 
tation on the part of the Chinese. 

Take the matter of banking and accounting. I had some friends 
who were in the Bank of China. And at one time they told me that 
all of the accounting, all of the banking, was being changed to the 
Soviet method of banking, whatever that is. 

The Soviets are behind the scenes, not out in front. 


As an example of that, you rarely see Soviets walking around in 
the streets. That was true in my time. What happens now, I 
don't know, but I don't think there has been any change. 

The officials who came over, the so-called — what do you call 
them? — the people who came in to help direct were carted about in 
the city in closed motorcars. They took an ordinary car and put 
some green stuff around the back and the sides where the passengers 
sit, and those cars were sent through the streets at something more 
than the ordinary rate of speed, and you never saw these people out 
in the open. 

I don't know whether I have answered your question, or not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir. 

Do you know the phrase "national deviation" ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I don't think I do. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, taking that phrase with its Communist mean- 
ing to mean differences between the Communist Party of one nation 
and the Communist Party of Russia, based on differences between that 
nation and Russia — do you understand me ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I think I follow you. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say to what extent national deviation is 
tolerated in China, or to what extent there is an effort and an objec- 
tive on the part of the Communist leaders to make the Chinese Com- 
munists just the same as the Russian Communists ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I think their greatest attempt is to fashion 
themselves after the Soviet way of living or way of life. 

I was very much interested, in sitting down in my apartment in 
Shanghai, in reading some old articles that appeared in the Post and 
various places with regard to what was happening in some of the 
other places, like Rumania and Hungary. We were going through 
exactly the same thing in Shanghai. There was no difference, as far 
as I could see. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, you spoke of the changes in family life, such 
as children informing on their parents. I assume there were other 
changes in family life. 

For instance, does social visiting continue under the Communists ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. It is very much restricted. In fact, you saw very 
little of it, excepting at the traditional Chinese New Year's time, when 
it is almost compulsory for a man to go out and visit his friends. But 
they don't go out and see each other much. 

And as far as my visits were concerned, although the Chinese were 
very friendly to me, I rarely went into a Chinese home just for a visit 
unless I was pretty sure of the type of home, and knew something 
about the servants in the home, whether they were Communists. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, did the Communists make a practice of ques- 
tioning the servants, as well as the children, about what went on in 
the home ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I think they had constant contact with the servants. 
The cook, in many instances, was required to report on all gatherings 
in the home over, I think it was, eight people. 

Now, that was for another purpose as well, not only to keep tabs 
on who was meeting in some of the places, but also in order to make 
attacks on those who were giving the meal. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, in your book you mentioned consignment 
stores. Wliat are consignment stores ? 


Dr. DuNLOP. A consignment store — and they sprang up by the hun- 
dreds in Shanghai — the people had no money, it had been taken away 
from them in various ways, and so they began taking things out of 
their houses, j)ictures, shoes, clothing, all sorts of things — and these 
piled into the consignment stores, where the man in charge would put 
on a little extra fee for the article, which he would then take as his 
commission, and turn back to the man who brought in the article the 
amount that the owner wanted to receive. There were 2 or 3 in every 

They weren't very much patronized. I used to go and do some 
window shopping and see what people were getting out of their 
houses — everything and anything. 

Senator Jenner. I didn't quite understand that. They took their 
property out of their homes to the consignment store to raise money ; 
they were out of money ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Exactly. 

Senator Jenner. Sort of like a pawnshop ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes, exactly; only it was on a different basis. We 
have pawnshops in China, but it was the same idea. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Doctor, that is at one end of the scale. Now, at the 
other end of the scale are those who are well off. How did Red China 
treat capitalists ? Were capitalists wooed by the new order ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. In the very beginning, you might say that they were. 
It was for the purpose of getting in solid with the commercial city of 
Shanghai. For a time they wooed the merchants. 

And then, after they went into Korea, they needed a lot of money, 
they weren't getting it by any other means, they made an attack on 
the merchants, turned on the merchants and made a concerted drive 
to get away from the merchants as much money as they could in the 
way of fines. 

A merchant might have done something that was a bit irregular, and 
some of his staff, who were part of the interrogating groups under 
the Communists, would come along, knowing full well what had taken 
place, and interrogate him openly about it. And if they could prove 
it, then the Communists would levy a fine on him. 

Sometimes the fine was so severe that it took his entire business. 

We had a big canning group there. Ma Ling, which was fashioned 
after many of our factories at home. It was a modern, up and coming 
factory. And the Communists, in their interrogation, accused this 
firm of sending putrid canned meat to the volunteers in Korea, with 
the result that a heavy fine was put on the manager, the entire property 
was virtually confiscated, with the result that the manager and his 
wife took poison — not an unusual thing. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You mentioned in your book that the employees of 
foreign firms were sometimes held as sort of hostages. Will you tell 
us about that ? 

^ Dr. DuNLOP. I think that was true of all the foreigners in connec- 
tion with firms that had any outside-of-the-country holdings. Dur- 
ing the entire period of the early days — you must remember that the 
Communists came into Shanghai and into the port cities without very 
much in the way of money, no solid currency. 

^ I stood at my office window on the Bund in Shanghai and saw the 
silver and gold go out of the Bank of China across to the river and out 
of the city. 


I would also add, there were American banknotes, because we had a 
great many American banknotes after our boys were in Shanghai. 

Now, they had no money, really, so they made this drive on the mer- 
chants, and that meant taking all of the money, really, out of the com- 
munity, with the result that no one had any money. Therefore, they 
brought their gold bars from their hiding places, they brought their 
rings— and even the servants had gold rings, which was their way of 
storing a little property. 

They took their American banknotes and their gold dollars down 
to the bank and turned them in for the currency of the regime, and 
that is where the Comnumists were able to get a tremendous amount 
of their foreign currency. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, if you know, what were the tax policies of 
the Chinese Reds ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, from my own personal experience, I would say 
that their policy was to tax all they could get, and ask for more. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We have equality of taxation in this country. Is 
there any such thing in Red China ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. No ; I would say not. 

A lawyer friend of mine said that his property was taxed at such 
a rate that if he took the current value of the property before the Com- 
munists came in, the tax would overcome that in 2i/^ years. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. It is the policy, then, of all the traffic will bear, and 
a little more ? 

Dr. DuNLOp. Yes. 

For instance, my first tax on my motor car was the equivalent of 
$150 United States, for 3 months. I said to my secretary, "3 months? 
I thought that was for a year." 

"No," she said, "it is only 3 months." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were the Chinese Reds efficient tax collectors ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes. 

They had an article on that tax bill, when it came in, that if you 
didn't pay it at the time it was due, it accrued in interest at the rate 
of 1 percent a day. I understand that has been dropped to one-half 
of 1 percent a day. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, what can you tell us about food exports 
from China to Russia ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. In the summer of 1952 especially, I was in contact with 
the man who was renting a motor to some Russians, who were process- 
ing, or rather, inspecting, beef at the abattoir in Shanghai, before 
this meat was loaded into refrigerator cars to be sent north. 

He said that there were five men in that group that went out every 
morning to the slaughterhouse and inspected meat which would be sent 
out that day. The Communists had taken ordinary boxcars, had built 
inner walls, and cut holes in the top of the roofs of the cars so that they 
could load them with ice. 

They would bring these cars into Shanghai, load them with ice for 
24 hours, in order to cool them, and then they would fill them up with 
meat and load more ice in and send them north over the ferry at 
Nanking. They made fairly good progress north. 

They were sending beef, pork, chicken, ducks, eggs. One man who 
was in a golf tournament with me one day told me that his company 
had just processed 500 pigs that day to be sent out on this trip north. 
T said, "You mean 500 pigs, this day ?" 


He said, "Yes, and every day." 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Was this at a time when there was a surphis of food 
in China ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Anything but. No, they were beginning to have a 
great dearth of proteins — fish they could get, but not beef, very little 
chicken — they could get pigs' feet, because pigs' feet don't ship very 
easily. And you could see these fellows going through the streets all 
the time with a pole and lots of pigs' feet in front and back. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. They were, then, shipping food to Russia at a time 
when their own people in China were starving ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, they shipped grain to India. Was there a 
surplus of grain, or was that the same situation ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. No; that was just a bit of face, or what have you — it 
was nothing. 

I was coming out of China at the time those ships were being 
loaded in Shanghai, and the comments then were that China could 
ill afford to send this grain anywhere, because they were trying to 
import from all sources. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do the Communists engage in un-American propa- 
ganda among the people of Red China ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Beginning with the attack in November of 1950 in 
North Korea, they put on a very severe attack on Americans. There 
were posters on all of the buildings, walls. One of the favorite places 
was the pillars of the American Club, which were plastered over 
with these scurrilous propaganda cartoons, for the most part. 

The Chinese themselves didn't take to this readily. And many 
of these posters were torn down at night, if they were in places that 
were not protected. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You don't believe that all this anti-American propa- 
ganda developed antagonism in the people toward individual Ameri- 

Dr. DuNLOP. No, I don't. 

And when we came out — it became known that we were getting 
out — I was surprised at the number of Chinese friends who slipped 
in before we came away, who were very anxious to have us say to 
Americans, wherever we met them : "Please tell the Americans we do 
not hate them" — almost in identical words. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, has America really lost China ? You have 
heard the statement that America has lost China, meaning the Chinese 
people are no longer friendly toward the United States. Is that true? 

Dr. DuisTLOP. No, I would say not. 

During the attacks in Korea and the germ warfare thing, the 
Chinese would have none of it. They called it "this silly business." 
They liked to label things like that "this silly business" — Oh, for 
instance, the wedding business is "the red business" and the funeral 
business is "the white business." So they call this "this silly business." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is there any organized resistance movement in 
China against the Communists ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I think there is. 

There were two former Communist generals who used to take lunch 
with us in the club, the American Club, before the club was closed, 
who undoubtedly were mixed up with some underground movement 


in China. They disappeared about a year after that, and I think went 
to Hong Kong." But before they went, one of them told me that they 
were having a meeting in Hong Kong with their agents from all 
over China. 

That is the last I have heard of that man. I know nothing further 
about it. When I went to Hong Kong, I inquired about this man, 
because he was a well-known man, the one who spoke to me, and no one 
had seen him. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any evidence of anti-Communist guerrilla 
action around Shanghai ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. There was in the early days. That was very early 
cleared away. But for a long time — in May 1949, when the Com- 
munists came into Shanghai, we could hear sporadic firing in the 
suburbs, and further out. But that ceased. Along toward the last, 
we heard nothing. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, were you familiar with St. John's Uni- 
versity ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I taught there. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you at St. John's when it was taken over by 
the Chinese Communists? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I went out a few days later, and saw the smashed 
windows and the bridge which had been exploded and knocked to 
the ground. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you at St. John's or in Shanghai in early 
October of 1950, when delegates of the World Federation of Demo- 
cratic Youth came to Shanghai and visited the university ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I must have been, but I couldn't been allowed out in 
that period. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know that there were Americans in that 
delegation ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. We heard there were ; yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, I will show you a newspaper story in the 
Shanghai News of Saturday, October 7. The story is headed '^WFDY 
delegates invited to speak at universities." I will ask you if that 
refreshes your recollection about what happened at that time. 

Mr. DuNLOP. The Shanghai News was an English language Com- 
munist sheet. You want specially this about St. John's University ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. We will put that in the record. Doctor. But the 
question is whether that refreshes your recollection at all about what 
took place at that time, 

Mr. DuNLOP. I remember there was something of the sort. But 
you must remember that the newspapers and communications in the 
city at that time were rather poor, and many things went on that we 
knew nothing about. 

I knew of two men who were hand-in-hand with that group. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Who were they. Doctor? 

Dr. DuNLOP. One was John Powell, son of the late Bill Powell, who 
took over his father's Weekly Eeview, the China Weekly Review, and 
went off the deep end with regard to communism, as did his wife, who 
had been a former secretary of Mme. Sun Yat-sen. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And the other one? 

Dr. DuNLOP. The other one was a man by the name of Berges. He 
later went to St. John's and was an instructor there. But after the 


first few weeks we didn't go out to St. John's at all, the whole thing 
was closed, so no one went out there, 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr, Chairman, the doctor has opened up a couple 
of lines of questioning, but to keep things in a row here, may I ask that 
this Shanghai newspaper story go into the record at this point? 

Senator Jenner, It may go into the record, 

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 429" and reads 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 429 

[The Shanghai News, Shanghai, October 7, 1950] 
WFDY Delegates Invited to Speak at Universities 

AT revolutionary UNIVERSITY 

A rally to welcome the WFDY delegates was held yesterday morning at 9 :30 
o'clock by the students of the China Revolutionary University, including those 
of the Russian Language Institute. 

At the auditorium of the former Chi Nan University, the meeting proceeded in 
a friendly atmosphere, and amidst a thunder of applause Chang Chun-fang, the 
president of the Russian Language Institute made a welcome speech to the 
delegates, which was rendered into excellent Russian by a student of the in- 

In his speech on educational activities in the Soviet Union, Valentine Vdovin, 
the WFDY delegate and the acting editor of the Russian edition of the World 
Youth, organ of WFDY, vividly described numerous significant achievements in 
the Soviet educational and intellectual life. Owing to such achievements in 
the fields of education and learning, rapid progress in the reconstruction of the 
U. S. S. R. has been made possible. It was stressed that atomic energy is no 
longer a secret in the Soviet Union, as it has been utilized by the people for im- 
proving their standard of living. As this fact was being mentioned by the Soviet 
delegate, the eager audience burst out into thunderous applause. 

Following the stirring speech of the Soviet delegate, Hamou Kraba, General 
Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of Algeria reported enthusiastically 
to the young student fighters of China on the problems now faced by the people 
of Algeria. He first gave a brief introduction of the history of his fatherland 
and then dwelled on the colonial status of Algeria. He also told about the 
liberation movement carried on by the people of Algeria. 

The meeting concluded after student representatives had presented embroid- 
ered banners to the WFDY delegates. 

Twelve Soviet professors of the Russian Language Institute also attended the 
welcome meeting. 

At St. John's University 

At 9 :30 a. m. yesterday, two WFDY delegates, Comrades Robert N. Ebbels of 
Australia and Selma Weiss of the United States, were guest speakers at a meet- 
ing sponsored by the students of St. John's University, Great China University, 
and three high schools, at the Social Hall of St. John's University. 

Present at the meeting were some 1,500 students and professors of these in- 

The distinguished WFDY visitors were welcomed by rousing cheers from 
the eagerly waiting audience. 

Comrade Ebbels, who is a member of the Executive Committee of the Inter- 
national Union of Students, delivered a short and interesting report on the suc- 
cessful achievements of the Second World Students Conference which was held 
in Prague last August. He particularly pointed out that the sole aim of the 
second conference was to call for further unity among all students over the 
world in defending world peace and in fighting for democratic education as well 
as for a better future. 

Miss Weiss made an inspiring speech, revealing the true facts concerning the 
democratic youth of America who earnestly seek peace and have been fighting 
for it, but who have been ruthlessly frustrated by their reactionary government. 
She believes that with the valuable experiences drawn from the two great 
revolutions of the U. S. S. R. and of China, the American people, especially the 
youth, will soon win liberation. 

93215— .57— pt 52 3 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, I show you another clipping from the 
Shanghai News of October 5, 1950. It shows the pictures of the 
delegates to this so-called World Federation of Democratic Youth, 
and I call your attention to two of the pictures which are underlined, 
being Americans in both instances, Selma Weiss, who was Harvey 
Matusow's girl friend, and David McCamis. 

I would like to have you glance over these and tell us if there are 
any of those pictures that you recognize. 

Dr. DuNLOP. I am afraid not. They probably passed me on the 
street in one of these swanky buses, and I probably turned up my 
nose at them. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. I ask that this go in the record — not the pictures, 
but the caption. 

Senator Jenner. It may go in. 

(The caption for the pictures of the delegates referred to above 
was marked "Exhibit No. 430" and reads as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 430 

WFDY delegates: From left to right, upper row: 1. Robert Noel Ebbels, 
member of the Executive Committee of the lUS and representative of the 
Australian Democratic Youth. 2. Vladimir Semitchastny, Secretary of the Cen- 
tral Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League. 3. Lidiya 
Ilina, Director of the Young Pioneers Department of the Central Committee of 
the Komsomal. 4. Valentine Vdovin, acting editor of the Russian version of 
the World Youth, organ of WFDY and USSR delegate. 5. Chun Cheng Hwan, 
delegate of Korean democratic youth. 6. Vu Xuan Vinh, representative of Viet- 
Nam democratic youth. 7. Wladyslaw Goralski, Secretary of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Union of Polish Youth. 8. Alois Svoboda, editor of the Mlada 
Fronta, organ of the Czechoslovakia Union of Youth. 9. Hartwig Helmut, Cen- 
tral Committee member of the Free German Youth. 10. Pascu Stefanescu, 
Central Committee and Political Bureau member of the Union of Working 
Youth of Rumania. 11. Cornel Raducano, chief editor of Scanteia Tineretului, 
organ of the Rumanian UOWY. 12. Jano Birmann, representing the Union of 
Working Youth of Hungary. 13. George Vasilev Manafov, editor-in-chief of the 
Noradna Mlodech of the Dimitrov's Union of the People's Youth of Bulgaria. 
14. Quamil Buxheli, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Work- 
ing Youth of Albania. 15. Natsogdorzh, Central Committee member of the 
Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. 16. Sandag, Central Committee mem- 
ber of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. 

Lower row : 17. Ishkhand, doctor from the Choilbasan University of Mon- 
golia. 18. Rangit Guha, head of the WFDY Bureau for Youth fighting against 
Colonialism and delegate of Indian democratic youth. 19. Roger Guibert, Exec- 
utive Bureau member of the National Committee of the Union of Republican 
Youth of France. 20. Lidie Maiorelli, Central Committee member of the Fed- 
eration of Communist Youth of Italy. 21. Saverio Tutino, editor of Gioventu 
Nuova, organ of Italian FOCY. 22. Selma Weiss, director of the Student's De- 
partment of Labour Youth League of USA. 23. David Graham MacAnns (sic), 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Young Progressives of America. 
24. Dick Nettleton, chief of the Organisation Department of the Young Com- 
munist League of Great Britain. 25. Flavio Bravo, President of the Socialist 
Youth of Cuba. 26. Hans Grumm, delegate from the Free Austrian Youth. 
27. Hamou Kraba, General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of 
Algeria. 28. Palle Voigt, chief editor of Framad (Forward), organ of Young 
Communist League of Denmark. 29. Omar Walmsley, delegate of Canadian 
democratic youth. 30. Unto Minttinen, delegate of Finnish democratic youth. 

31. Jacob Wolff, Central Committee member of the Netherlands Youth League. 

32. Mou Mouni Abdou, representative of the Rally of African Democratic Youth. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Doctor, what effect would a meeting like this World 
Federation of Democratic Youth have on non-Conununist Americans 
and Chinese, if you know ? 


Dr. DuNLOP. I think it would have none. And I think we out 
there felt that all of these peace movements, and all of these various 
things that took place at that time, were merely window dressing. 
They were like ships that pass in the night ; we paid little attention 
to them. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I ask that an- 
other clipping from the Shanghai News of September 23, 1950, with 
the headlines "World youth delegation given rousing welcome at 
Peking," be put in the record at this point. 

Senator Jenner. It may go in. 

(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 431" and 
reads as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 431 

[Shanghai News, September 23, 1950] 

World Youth Delegation Given Rousing Welcome at Peking 

Peking, Sept. 23. — (Hsinhua) — Delegates of the World Federation of Demo- 
cratic Youth — 42 youth leaders representing 32 countries — arrived in Peking 
this morning after spending 12 days visiting various cities in Manchuria. 

The platform of Peking's railway station was packed with leaders of the gov- 
ernment and popular organizations, the Mayor of Peking, members of the 
diplomatic corps, heroes of the army and of labour, and representatives of 
China's young people. As the delegates stepped off the train, they disappeared 
under a mass of llowers showered on them by Young Pioneers and then ran a 
gauntlet of handshakes as they left the station. 

The delegates from Korea, Viet-Nam, and Africa especially were surrounded 
by eager groups who wanted to shake hands, pat them on the back or find some 
way of showing their affection for these frontline figbtei-s; for democracy. 


Outside the station, the Chien Men Square was packed with thousands of 
Peking's youth, gathered under crowded red silk banners and massed portraits 
of democratic leaders of the world. On a plinth backed by flags of all nations, 
Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, 
welcomed the visitors. He said, "We welcome with elation you young fighters 
who are defending world peace. The banner of unity of all world's youth — borne 
by the delegation of the World Federation of Democratic Youth is warmly 
welcomed in China. 

"On behalf of the youth of China, I bring revolutionary greetings to you and 
the democratic youth of the world whom you represent. Your courageous fight 
and industrious work are striking powerful blows in the cause of defending 
world iieace and have always been an inspiration to Chinese youth who are 
with you in that fight." 

Amid long ovations he saluted the youth of the Soviet Union, of Korea, and 
Viet-Nam, of the new democracies and colonial and capitalist countries — all 
the youth fighting for freedom, peace, and democracy. 


Enrico Boceara, of Italy, leader of the delegation, said that the delegates 
had been overwhelmed by the profound enthusiasm, fraternity, and strong dis- 
play of international solidarity with which the youth and' whole people of 
China had welcomed them. 

"All young partisans of peace throughout the world," he said, "will be with 
you with their whole heart to celebrate the great day of October 1, the anni- 
versary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. 

"We come to salute your great victories, your great successes in building up 
the now China. We come to pay homage to your people, your youth, and your 
great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung. We come to dip our flags in memory 
of the heroes who have died for the birth of a free and democratic new China, 
who have fallen in the cause of progressive mankind. 


"In the hard struggle against warmongers, the young partisans of peace 
throughout the world will know on our return that they can rely on the Chinese 
youth who are determined to bar the way to the imperialists and establish peace. 


"They will know that, through your victories, the peace forces will be ever 
more powerful than the forces of war and that our ideal of truth and liberty 
will triumph over lies and oppression." 

Vladimir Semitchastny, leader of the Soviet delegation, thanked the govern- 
ment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people and their youth for 
the welcome they had received, and said, "We have come to Peking on the 
eve of celebrations marking the first anniversary of the establishment of the 
People's Republic of China. All of the delegates are convinced of the remarkable 
successes achieved by the people under the leadership of the Communist Party 
of China and its leader Mao Tse-tung in all sections of administrative and cul- 
tural life of the country. 

"Victory of the Chinese people in its war of liberation, successes of the first 
year in social, economic, political, and cultural reconstruction are a new blow 
to the whole present-day imperialist system." 


"Soviet youth follow with great attention the building up of the young People's 
Republic of China. They greet with joy each success achieved by the Chinese 
people and their youth. 

"There is no doubt whatsoever that the two largest units of the World Feder- 
ation of Democratic Youth — Soviet and Chinese youths — will in future do every- 
thing to strengthen the camp of peace and democracy. 

"We profoundly believe that the day is not far off when the whole of China's 
territory will be united under the banner of the People's Republic of China. 
The day is near when the Chinese people and its youth will overcome all diflS- 
culties and under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and Comrade 
Mao Tse-tung will reconstruct the country and make it into an advanced nation." 

The following delegates have arrived in Peking : 


Enrico Boccara, head of the delegation. General Secretary of the World Feder- 
ation of Democratic Youth and representative of Italy. 

Robert Noel Ebbels, member of the Executive Committee of the lUS and rep- 
resentative of the Australian Democratic Youth. 

Ekbatani, delegate from the lUS and representative of the Iranian democratic 

Vladimir Semitchastny, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union 
Lenin Young Communist League. 

Lidiya Ilina, Director of the Young Pioneers Department of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Komsomal. 

Valentine Vdovin, acting editor of the Russian version of the World Youth, 
organ of WFDY and USSR delegate. 

Chun Cheng Hwan, delegate of Korean democratic youth. 

Vu Xuan Vinh, representative of Viet-Nam democratic youth. 

Wladyslaw Goralski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of 
Polish Youth. 

Alois Svoboda, editor of the Mlada Fronta, organ of the Czechoslovakia 
Union of Youth. 

Hartwig Helmut, Central Committee member of the Free German Youth. 

Pascu Stefanescu, Central Committee and Political Bureau member of the 
Union of Working Youth of Rumania. 

Cornel Raducano, chief editor of Scanteia Tineretului, organ of the Rumanian 

Jano Birmann, representing the Union of Working Youth of Hungary. 

George Vasilev Manafov, editor-in-chief of the Noradna Mlodech of the Dimi- 
trov's Union of the People's Youth of Bulgaria. 

Quamil Buxheli, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Working 
Youth of Albania. 

Natsogdorzh, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary 
Youth League. 


Sandag, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth 

Ishkhand, doctor from the Choilbasan University of Mongolia. 

Rangit Guha, head of the WFDY Bureau for Youth fighting against Colonial- 
ism and delegate of Indian democratic youth. 

Slamet, delegate of the Indonesian democratic youth. 

Tha Hia, delegate of the Burmese democratic youth. 

Roger Guibert, Executive Bureau member of the National Committee of 
the Union of Republican Youth of France. 

Lidie Maiorelli, Central Committee member of the Federation of Communist 
Youth of Italy. 

Saverio Tutino, editor of Gioventu Nuova, organ of Italian FOCY. 

Selma Weiss, director of the Student's Department of Labour Youth League 
of USA. 

David Graham MacAnns (sic), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the 
Young Progressives of America. 

Dick Nettleton, chief of the Organisation Department of the Young Commu- 
nist League of Great Britain. 

Mese, representing the Federation of the United Socialist Youth of the Repub- 
lic of Spain. 

Jandro, representing the Spanish FOUSY. 

Mitsos Kipouros, delegate of the Greek democratic youth. 

Mansouri Kazem, delegate of the Iranian democratic youth. 

Abdilkarim Mouhallami, delegate from the Union of People's Youth of Syria. 

Flavio Bravo, President of the Socialist Youth of Cuba. 

Hans Grumm, delegate from the Free Austrian Youth. 

Hamou Kraba. General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of Algeria. 

Paile Voigt, chief editor of Framad (Forward), organ of Young Communist 
League of Denmark. 

Omar AValmsley, delegate of Canadian democratic youth. 

Unto Minttinen, delegate of Finnish democratic youth. 

Jacob Wolff, Central Committee member of the Netherlands Youth League. 

Salvador Dias, delegate of the Democratic Youth of Brazil. 

Mou Mouni Abdou, representative of the Rally of African Democratic Youth. 

Mr. SouKwiNE. That clipping also reflects the presence of Amer- 

And this clipping headed "WFDY Press Conference in Prague on 
China Tour," showing that the Americans were still there as they 
toured, I ask that this be put in the record. 

Senator Jenner. That may go into the record. 

(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 432" and 

reads as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 432 

[Shanghai News, November 1950] 
WFDY Press Conference in Prague on China Tour 

Prague, November 14. — (Hsinhua) — The delegates of the World Federation of 
Democratic Youth who have been visiting China have arrived here on their way 
home. They attended the celebrations of first anniversary of the Chinese People's 
Republic during their 42-day visit to China and participated in the celebration 
of the 33d anniversary of October Revolution in Moscow. Among those who have 
arrived here are the leaders of young progressives of Italy, Britain, United 
States of America, Holland, Austria, Cuba, Brazil, Greece, Syria, French West 
Africa, and Algeria. 

This afternoon the delegates met some 30 Czechoslovak and other journalists 
here in a press conference organized jointly by the Czechoslovak Ministry of In- 
formation and Culture and the Union of Czechoslovak Youth. 


Saverio Tutino, Italian delegate, controlling his emotion with some diificulty, 
told the reporters of the unbreakable solidarity of Chinese youth with their 
fighting Korean brothers. He said that the delegates were elated to learn, 


while they were in Moscow, of the joint declaration of Chinese democratic 
parties on Chinese volunteers to Korea. 

Answering a question on the reception given by Chinese youth to American dele- 
gates, David MacAnns (sic), American delegate, a Negro, replied that the Chinese 
youth know full well the distinction between the American people and the 
American imperialists who are threatening the world with a new war. He related 
that a special meeting for Negro delegates was arranged by the Chinese youth 
as a sign of deep concern felt by the Chinese youth with regard to world's 
oppressed people. 

Bert Williams, secretary of V^FDT, said that all the delegates, many of whom 
have already returned to their respective countries, would certainly make best 
use of their experience in China and pass it on to their fellow countrymen. At 
the end of the conference, delegates all rose and sang in Chinese, Red in the East 
to express their respect to the Chinese people and their great leader, Chairman 
Mao Tse-tung. 

Mr. SouKvviNE. Now, you mentioned a man named Berges and a man 
named Powell. Is that William Berges ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I don't remember his first name, but I rather think 
that is what it was. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know a Capt. Gerald Tannebaum ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Walter Illsley, who was at one time 
with UNRRA, and was fired ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. No. 

Mr. SouR^vINE. He signed anti- American letters in the China Re- 

Mr. DuNLOP. No, I wouldn't — we rarely read those things : we ob- 
jected to them so much. And that name didn't strike a chord of any 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I have one more clipping, Mr. Chairman, to offer 
at this time. It is also from the Shanghai News of October 29. The 
headline is "WFDY Delegates Tell Their Impression of China." 
And the lead is an interview with David G. McCanns, who was a 
United States citizen, who was present at this conference. 

Senator Jenner. It may go m the record. 

(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 433" and 
reads as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 433 

[The Shanghai News, Shanghai, October 29, 1950] 

WFDY Delegates Tell Theik Impression of China 

David G. MacAnns (sic) (USA), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the 

Young Progressives of America 

Premier Chou En-lai has announced to the world that the Chinese People's 
Republic loves peace and desires peace ardently. At the same time, he has said 
that the Chinese people shall stand firm against any imperialistic aggression 
which threatens the soil of China. 

A people's china 

The Delegation of World Federation of Democratic Youth has spent more than 
a month in the new China. We have traveled from the north border, touching 
the Soviet Union, through Northeast China, to Dairen, around to Peking, and 
south to Shanghai and Canton. We have had the honour to participate in the 
historic celebration of the first birthday of the People's Republic of China. We 
have visited your factories and schools. We have seen the historic sites from 
north to south of the heroic struggle of the people of China for liberation from 
the oppression of feudalism and imperialist domination ; from the despotic, cor- 
rupt rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his willing assistants the United States impe- 
rialists. Everywhere we have seen the determination of the youth and people of 


China to build a new China, a people's China, which, in every way, serves the 
interest of the common people of China, a China which stands as a mighty 
fortress alongside the great Soviet Union, in the cause of a lasting peace for all 


This determination shows itself no less in the strong, bright faces of the young 
men and women of the People's Liberation Army of China. Young men and 
women, many of whom themselves participated in the glorious struggle of libera- 
tion, and many more who follow in the footsteps of the victorious revolutionary 
traditions of the People's Liberation Army. We have seen how these bright 
faces glow brighter at the mention of the name of the Commander and Chief of 
the People's Liberation Army, General Chu Teh, and chief of new China, Chair- 
man Mao Tse-tung. 

We have seen these faces from north to south, intent with listening to the 
accounts of the struggles of democratic youth the world over ; the Soviet youth, 
youth from People's Democracies, colonial and semicolonial youth, youth from 
the capitalist countries. Time and time again we have seen the People's Libera- 
tion Army men and women warmly and enthusiastically embrace the uniformed, 
fighting youth of Korea and Vietnam. 


In Mukden I had the honor to talk, for some time, with a fighting hero, Yuan 
Chu-mo. Yuan Chu-mo won his honor because in his company, for 3 whole years, 
no man or woman committed an act against the regulations. To me, coming 
from the United States and having spent 3 years in the U. S. Army, for one year 
of which I was a commissioned officer, this achievement is incredible. This 
could only have been possible because Yuan Chu-mo, himself, knew intimately 
why he was a member of the People's Liberation Army, and why he carried a gun 
and why he fought. He understood that he, as a member of the People's 
Liberation Army, fought in the interest of the common people of China. He 
knew that he fought against the worst enemies of the Chinese people, imperialism 
and its lackey, Chiang Kai-shek. He knew that the gun was the only guarantee 
of defeat over the enemy, who itself carried a gun against the people. He was 
confident of victory for he knew he, together with his comrades, stood on the side 
of righteousness and truth. 

Only because he knew these things well, was he able to educate the troops of 
his company to such an understanding of the principle of service to the people. 
Only because he knew and understood the fondest hopes and aspirations of the 
men of his company for a bright future, and their willingness to take up arms 
against anyone who threatened those hopes and aspirations, could he have 
gained such confidence and respect, realized such discipline from his troops. 


And how did he come to understand these things? How was it that he was 
able to impart this understanding to his troops? When I asked Yuan Chu-mo 
the question, he answered me very simply, "It was because of the education I 
received from the Communist Party," he said. "It was because of the correct 
leadership of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung." 

Let the imperialist warmongers of my country take notice. An army whose 
men and women understand why they fight ; an army whose men and women are 
united firmly with the people ; an army whose men and women are themselves 
united under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's 
Government, such an army is invincible. Such an arm.v stands in the frontlines 
in defense of the People's Republic of China, against the provocations of 
Imperialists. Such an army stands in defense of the desires of the working 
people of China and of the whole world for a lasting peace and a bright future. 

Mr. SouEwiNE. Wliat can you tell us about Berges, the gentleman 
you mentioned ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. It is all hearsay. I saw Berges on occasions at the 
American Club with Jolin Powell at luncheontime. I don't think I 
ever spoke to him. He was a taller man than John Powell, as I remem- 
ber liim. And they never associated with any of the other Americans 
in the club ; as a rule, they sat by themselves. 


The only thing that I heard otherwise about Berges was that he 
carried a flag in one of the parades which were so common in the first 
few months of the Communist occupation of Shanghai. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know anything about his attendance at a 
meeting of 2,000 professors in the Grand Theatre in Shanghai'^ 

Dr. DuNLOP. I have heard that there was such a meetmg, but that is 
all I know. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you meet Mr. Berges ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. No ; I wouldn't say that I met him. I saw him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Sidney Shapiro ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. That is a familiar name, but I don't place him. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know what part was played in the anti- 
American activities in Shanghai by Mr. Berges? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I would say as — I won't be definite about this — 
I felt he was with Powell in this Review, this Weekly Review. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is all j^ou can testify to ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. That is all I know about it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I have two affidavits 
signed by the Reverend Gerard McKernan, which I would like to offer 
for the record. 

If the committee desires to call this man as a witness, it can be done. 

The first of these is an affidavit as follows : 

I, Gerald M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen, do declare 
and affirm : 

That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954 — 

I will pause at that point. 

. Do you know Father McKernan ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE (continuing the affidavit) : 

That I personally know John Powell, formerly editor of the China Weekly 
Review, and Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), associate of Mme. Sun Yat-sen in wel- 
fare work : 

That Mrs. Powell (nee Sylvia Campbell) was also associated with Mme. Sun 
Yat-sen in welfare work ; 

That I did actually see both John Powell and Gerald Tannenbaum on at least 
two occasions riding in official Communist government cars in the streets of 

Senator Jenner. That may go in the record. 

(The affidavit of Gerard M, McKernan, dated July 18, 1955, was 
marked "Exhibit No. 433-A" and reads as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 433-A 

Affidavit of Gebard McKernan 

Senator James O. Eastland, 

Chairman, Internal Security Sul)comtnittee, 
United States Senate. Washington, D. C. 

I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen do declare 
and affirm, 

That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954; 

That I personally know John Powell, formerly editor of the China Weekly 
Review and Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), associate of Mme. Sun Yat-sen in welfare 

That Mrs. Powell (nee Sylvia Campbell) was also associated with Mme. Sun 
Yat-sen in welfare work ; 


That I did actually see both John Powell and Gerald Tannenbaum on at least 
two occasions riding in official Communist government cars in the streets of 


(Signed) Gerard McKkrnan. 

Date : July 18, 1955. 

Signed before me at Ridgewood, N. J. 

(Signed) Nataije F. Larsex, Notary Public. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The other affidavit, dated August 5, 1955, reads as 
follows : 

I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic Priest and Canadian citizen, do dechire 
and affirm : 

That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 19-54 ; 

That Mr. William Berges held up the delivery of UNICEF supplies until 
Communist attack on Shanghai was imminent, then turned over all supplies 
to the SFER (Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief), the official Commu- 
nist welfare group of Shanghai ; 

That at a general meeting of all welfare groups called by Chou En-lai and 
held in Peiping (spring of 1951), Chou En-lai stated at one of these sessions 
that "the party must do something for Mr. Berges, because of the help that he — 

]Mr. Berges — 

"had given the Communist Party welfare efforts in Shanghai'' ; 

That Mr. Berges' closest friends in Shanghai were Anna Huang (a Russian 
married and separated from a Dr. Huang). Mrs. Huang was an admitted 
Communist and worked with the China Welfare Fund (Mme. Sun Yat-sen's wel- 
fare organization) — 

I will pause there, Mr. Chairman, and ask the witness : 

Did you know Anna Huang? 

Dr. DuNLAP. No, I can't identify her. 

Mr. SouRwiNE (continuing) : 

Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), also an admitted Communist, with the China 
Welfare Fund ; Mrs. John Powell and her husband, Mr. John Powell, who also 
took part in Communist activities and organizations ; 

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum in an argument with me regarding his Com- 
munist activities stated "You will never change my mind" ; 

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum gave frequently the "clenched fist salute" 
at the "Down with America sessions" which occurred at the end of most welfare 
meetings ; 

That Mr. John Powell and Mr. Gerald Tannenbaum investigated a house (at 
the time occupied by an American citizen, later arrested) to check on the house's 
suitability as a Communist child center. 

I ask that that may go in the record. 
Senator Jenner. It may go in. 

(The August 5, 1955, affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 434" and 
reads as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 434 

Affidavit of Rev. Gerard M. McKernan 

August 5, 1955. 
Senator James O. Eastland, 

Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee, 
United States Senate, Washington, D. 6.: 
I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen, do declare and 
affirm — 
That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954 ; 
That Mr. William Berges held up delivery of UNICEF supplies until Com- 
munist attack on Shanghai was imminent, then turned over all supplies to the 
SFER (Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief), the official Communist 
welfare group of Shanghai ; 

That at a general meeting of all welfare groups called by Chou En-lai and held 
in Peiping (spring of 1951), Chou En-lai stated at one of the sessions, "that 

93215— 57— pt. 52 4 


the party must do something for Mr. Berges, because of the help he (Mr. Berges) 
had given the Communist Party welfare efforts in Shanghai" ; 

That Mr. Berges' closest friends in Shanghai were Anna Huang (a Russian 
married and separated from a Dr. Huang). Mrs. Huang was an admitted Com- 
munist and worked with the China Welfare Fund (Mme. Sun Yat-sen's welfare 
organization) ; Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), also an admitted Communist 
with the China Welfare Fund; Mrs. John Powell and her husband, Mr. John 
Powell, who took part in Communist activities and organizations ; 

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum in an argument with me regarding his Com- 
munist activities stated, "You will never change my mind" ; 

That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum gave frequently the "clenched fist salute" 
and the "down with America sessions," which occurred at the end of most wel- 
fare meetings ; 

That Mr. John Povpell and Mr. Gerald Tannenbaum investigated a house (at the 
time occupied by an American citizen, later arrested) to check on the house's 
suitability as a Communist child center. 

(Signed) Gerard M. McKernan 

(Rev. Gerard M. McKernan). 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of August 1955, a notary public 
in the District of Columbia. 

(Signed) Margaret M. Zemo, Notary Public. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, was that a common occurrence, for Com- 
munist teams to investigate homes occupied by private citizens, when 
they wanted to use them for something, and then ousted the citizens 
and took over? 

Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I had that experience in one of my own moves, 
we had to get out after they had investigated to see whether or not 
it would meet their needs. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, having mentioned Mr. Berges, I 
have here 3 clippings which bear on the subject — 2 clippings; 1 am 
sorry — on the subject of his activities. 

I ask that they may go in the record at this point. 

Senator Jenner. They may become part of the official record of this 

(The clippings referred to, were marked "Exhibits Nos. 434-A and 
434-B" and read as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 434-A 

[Shanghai News, December 15, 1950] 

Two Thousand Professors Here Hold Rally and Parade To Resist United 

States, Aid Korea 

A grand rally was held by 2,000 professors at the Grand Theater yesterday 
morning to demonstrate their strong determination to resist Inited States ag- 
gression and aid Korea in the interest of national security and defense. 

The rally was followed by an orderly parade along Shanghai's busiest thorough- 
fares with thousands of voices sht)uting such slogans as: "Down with American 
iniperialisu)" and "Resist United States aggression," which resounded all the way 
from the Grand Theater through Nanking Road and on to Honau Road, where 
the paraders turned in the direction of Foochow Road. Vociferous cheers min- 
gled with warm api»lause from students, who lined both sides of the roads, 
greeted the professoi-s to express their common stand with their teachers. 

The professors carried banners, pictures and cartoons depicting the mighty 
strength of the peace-loving people of the world against the warmongers. The 
procession was led by motorcycles to open the way for the militant marching 
professors who came from 39 local colleges and institutions. 

parade starts 

A band compo.sed of police cadres struck up a march as the professors opened 
the parade in front of the race course a little after 11 a. in. The parade pre- 
sented the impression of a forest of portraits, placards, banners, etc. to show the 


professors' resolute will to take part in the patriotic movement and to stir stu- 
dents to defend their country in face of United States aggression. 


Earlier in the rally, Cheng Wangtao, who was the chairman, declared that 
the professors will demonstrate their patriotism by firmly supporting and en- 
couraging their students to translate their love for the country into action in 
defense of the country. 

Tremendous clapping followed the speeches of four professors, among them 
Pan Cheng-liang of Chiaotung University, and Wu Chee-nan of Futan Univer- 
sity, who told the rally in deep emotional tones that they have encouraged 
their own sons and daughters to enlist for the nation's defense work. 

The rally resolved to adopt the program of action previously outlined by 
Shanghai's higher educational workers and pledged to carry out same. The 
resolution was contained in a message to Chairman Mao Tse-tung. 


Another message was sent by the professors to the Chinese volunteers in 
which, they declared, inter alia, that the victory in Pyongyang scored by the 
KPA and the Chinese volunteers had smashed the so-called general offensive 
which was intended as the final episode of the United States campaign before 
the GI's invading Korea returned home for Christmas as MacArthur pompously 

The message pledged to back the volunteers with concrete action both spirit- 
ually and materially on the part of the professors in order to preserve world 

The rally sent still another message of greetings to patriotic Chinese pro- 
fessors in Christian universities in the city, calling on them to expose Amer- 
ican aggression on the cultural front in China. The message greeted the mission 
university professors for the bold stand which they made previously to resist 
American aggression. 

Finally the rally resolved to coordinate their classwork with the study of 
international events to whip up further patriotic sentiments. 

At the conclusion of the rally, 2,000 professors and thousands more of stu- 
dents and people wbo thronged the streets joined in a final roar of righteous 
indignation expressive of their grim determination to resist United States 
aggression, amidst the explosion of firecrackers, the noise of cheering squads, 
gongs, cymbals, etc. 

Practically every window and balcony was packed with onlookers to watch 
the procession, never witnessed before in Shanghai. 


Among the professors was William C. Berges of the American-missionary 
founded St. John's L'niversity, who carried a placard urging Chinese students 
to take up their national defense tasks. 

Soviet professors from the Russian Commercial Institute of Shanghai were 
also in the procession, carrying with them the national flag of People's China 
and the famous hammer and sickle flag of U. S. S. R., symbolizing the solidarity 
of the two nations. 

Militant and patriotic songs signifying their readiness to face any eventuality 
were sung by students. The marching professors, four abreast, smiled when 
they recognized their own students from among the crowds that jammed the 

Cheers were especially loud and thrilling when the presidium of prominent 
professors with garlands, were welcomed by students in the balcony at the 
corner of Foochow Road, the "Street of Culture" known as the center of the 
largest bookstores, and Honan Road. 


In an interview with a reporter of the Shanghai News, an American professor, 
William C. Berges, of St. John's University, made the following statement: 

"This meeting of the university professors of Shanghai, which I am honored 
to attend, is a moving and powerful expression of a tine people, a determined 
people to defend their democratic, peaceful life from American imperialist 



"As one of the hundreds of thousands of progressive Americans, I fully sup- 
port the Chinese people's mass movement to defend their own country from 
aggression and to help the Korean people. 

"This meeting has great meaning for all Americans, especially for the mothers 
of America whose sons have been needlessly sacrificed in Korea. 

"Unless American imperialist aggression is checked, thousands and millions 
of mothers in America and elsewhere will weep for their sons. 

"The extension of American aggression must and shall be stopped by the 
people's might, however. The glorious victory of the Korean People's Army 
and the Chinese people's volunteers, the Vietnamese people, etc. show clearly 
that the final victory belongs to the people. 

"The American people join with all peoples of the world in resolutely de- 
fending peace and putting an end to Wall Street imperialist aggression." 

Exhibit No. 434-B 

[Shanghai News, December 15, 1950] 

Nanking Student's Accusation Group Welcomed at St. John's Rally 

Signifying the solidarity of the students of missionary schools in Nanking, 
Shanghai, a warm welcome was extended to the representatives from Nanking's 
Ginling College and Nanking University by the over 1,000 students, professors, and 
^vorkers of St. John's University and 51 other schools yesterday afternoon at 
the social hall of St. John's. 

The group of 6 from Nanking, 3 representing Ginling College, and the others 
Nanking University, reached Shanghai yesterday on a mission to lay before 
the Shanghai students the accusation of the insults made against the Chinese 
people by three Americans professors, H. Ferris of Ginling College, C. Riggs and 
A. Roy of Nanking University. 

anti-united states patriotic rally 

The first appearance before the students of Shanghai's missionary schools was 
at yesterday's anti-United States patriotic rally held by the professors, students, 
and workers of St. John's University. 

The gathering, \^hich started at 3 p. m. yesterday, first heard a speech by 
Prof. Liu Ke-liu of the department of journalism. He was followed by two 
professors of Kwanghau University, who were all former professors in St. 
John's but had left the university in 192.5 for protesting against the insults of the 
late Hav. ks Pott. They further aroused the indignation of the students against 
imperialists by recounting their own experiences under the highhanded dis- 
criminative measures of the American school authorities. 

The gathering then heard of the accusations made by a Ginling girl student 
named Chung Yu-cheng who, together with five other representatives from 
Nanking, stepped onto the platform amidst thunderous applause and cheers. In 
eloquent and forceful words, she told in detail the story of Helen Ferris' insults 
against Chinese people and the indignation of Nanking students which won deep 
sympathy and strong support from the audience. 


The other speaker at the meeting was an American professor of St. John's 
University, named William C. Berges. 

As one of the peaceloving people, he pledged himself to support wholeheartedly 
the protest of the Chinese students against Austin's shameless slanders. His 
address earned the warmest applause from all those present at the rally. 

Before the closing of the rally, a draft message for Wu Hsiu-chuan to be 
forwarded to the U. N. in protest against Austin's slanders, which was written by 
representatives of seven Christian colleges in Shanghai and Nanking, was read 
and duly endorsed by the professors, students, and workers of St. John's 

The meeting came to a close at 5 : 30 after singing in unison the Chinese national 
anthem and shouting numerous slogans. 

Following is the full text of Mr. Berges' speech at the meeting : 



"Students, faculty members, and workers: I take my stand as one of the 
American people fully supporting your protest movement against Austin's hypo- 
critical statement that the missionary colleges in China were an example of 
America's "friendship" for China. By such arrogant nonsense Austin may 
liope to fool some people in the West; but he cannot fool the Chinese people, 
who no longer are forced to obey Austin nor his missionary teachers. 

"Who is Austin? A tool of the American monopolists — the ruling clique that is 
now responsible for the aggressive war against the Korean people. Before lib- 
eration this same ruling clique used the missionary colleges in China as an im- 
portant part of their attempt to put China and the Chinese people under their 

"What was the result of missionary education? Chinese students were led to 
turn their backs upon their own country and their own people, and to look toward 
American 'culture,' represented by cheap, sensational, and often harmful 
Hollywood films, as their model. 

"Shanghai especially was full of young people who envied the purely material 
aspects of American life, and who tried to be as 'American' in their thoughts 
and actions as possible. Now many of them realize the harm they have suf- 
fered, and are acquiring a new outlook. In response to popular demand, the 
theaters have stopped showing American films, and gradually the missionary uni- 
versities will rid themselves of American educational methods and materials left 
from the past, which are unsuitable for the new China. 

"Again let me assure you of my wholehearted support in your exposui'e of 
Austin's shameless lie and your condemnation of the insult he offered to the 
Chinese people. I know that all progressive Americans, here and in the United 
States support your movement, which is part of the larger one of defending your 
country from imperialist aggression in any form. You have our sympathy and 
our active cooperation, whenever you request it, in building a strong and inde- 
pendent China, a people's China, a new China with a glorious future." 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, are there any points that we have not cov- 
ered here concerning which you have information, that you think 
would be of vahie to the committee ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I have just this one point that I would like to make. 

There has been a great deal said about the so-called overseas Chinese 
group and their attitude toward Communist China. I saw what might 
be called the overseas group or the out-of -China group in Hong Kong. 

In the beginning, that Hong Kong group was rather pro-Commu- 
nist. And then after the attack on the merchants, they turned dia- 
metrically against it. And when I was in Hong Kong there was great 
antagonism toward the Communists. 

For instance, the Communist flag was put up in only five places in 
Hong Kong on October 1, which is the Communist national holiday, 
on October 1 of 1952, whereas there had been hundreds of Communist 
flags 3 years before. 

Now, the point I want to call attention to is the question of whether 
or not the overseas Chinese have been brought back to the point where 
they are more in favor of the Communist group. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You are not questioning that the Communists are 
making a determined effort to achieve that, you are questioning 
whether they are successful in that territory ; is that right ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. That is right. 

I understand that they are trying to bring them back. From my 
observation, I would say that, at the moment, especially when there is 
a renewed effort on the part of the Communists to intimidate overseas 
Chinese in respect to their own families in China — that was done a 
number of years ago, it has been renewed — that now the overseas Chi- 
nese are inclined not to say anything which would bring about reper- 
cussions in China. 


I personally feel that it is important that the overseas Chinese do 
not swing back to the Communists, because they are an important — 
they have an important backing; to give the Nationalist group, and if 
the Nationalist group were to lose them and they would go back, I 
think tlsere would be a loss of morale which would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States in the Far East. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, if we should recognize Red China and they 
should be admitted to the United Nations, what would be the effect 
upon this group of Chinese outside of China whom you say are so 
important ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I think there would be an inclination on their part to 
swing back to Communist China. And I think that would be dis- 

Mr. SouR"\viNE. You think that would be disastrous ? 

Dr. DuNLOP. I do. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Jenner. I have no further questions. Doctor. 

We certainly appreciate your appearing before our committee and 
giving us this valuable information. 

Mr. Sour WINE. We have another witness. Mr. Morris, the chief 
counsel, will interrogate him. 

Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, would you come forward, please '? 

Senator Jenner. Admiral, do you swear the testimony given in this 
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Admiral Cooke. I do. 

Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 



Mr. Morris. Senator, while en route to Honolulu last year, I stopped 
off to see Adiiiiral Cooke in California. 

You are Aclm. Charles Cooke, and you reside in Sonoma, just north 
of San Francisco? 

Admiral Cooke. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. While I was there I took some Q and A testimony 
from Admiral Cooke, and there was no Senator present. While Ad- 
miral Cooke is here in the East, I would like to ask him if he will, 
in the presence of the Senator, state that the testimony that I took at 
that time, as counsel for the committee, is accurate. 

Admiral Cooke. Yes. 

I have been furnished a copy of this transcript, and everything in 
there is true — there is a slight correction as to the circumstances con- 
nected with General Fortier coming to Formosa at the time, which 
is corrected in a later issue — it doesn't make any difference.' 

Senator Jenner. The corrections have been made ? 

Admiral Cooke. I don't know whether it is in there or not ; I have 
called it to the attention of the counsel. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, the subject of that particular hearing 
was misinformation given out by our State Department officials, or 
some of our State Department officials, which information proved to be 

1 The testimony of Admiral Cooke on October 7, 1956, Is printed in pt. 36, beginning at 
p. 2061. 


helpful to the Communist cause and detrimental to the cause of the 
United States. 

At the same time, I would like to offer for the record, Senator, an 
exchange of correspondence, or memorandums, introduced by John 
K. Emmerson. I think that Mr. McManus, who is here today, is fa- 
miliar with that, and will be able to identify some of these particular 

Now, there was delivered to me in the month of October of last year 
from Mr. IFred Scribner, of the Treasury Department, the following 

I would like to offer that to you, Senator, and I ask, if you will, that 
that be made a part of the record. 

Senator Jenner. I have read it. It may go into the record and be- 
come a part of the official record of this hearing. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 435, 435-A 
and 435-B." and read as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 435 
[Inter-Treasury memo — Secretary] 

Treasury Department, 
Division of Monetary Research, 

December 8, 1944- 

To : Mr. White. 
From : Mr. Friedman. 

I believe that you will be interested in reading the attached memorandums 
entitled as follows : 

1. Will the Communists take over China? ^ 

2. How red are the Chinese Communists?^ 

3. The Chinese Communists and the great powers.* 

4. A statement on Japan. 

5. Proposed projects against Japan. 

The memorandums on the Chinese Communists were prepared by John Davies, 
political adviser to General Stilwell, on his return from Yenan during the first 
week of November. 

The memorandums on Japan were prepared by John Emmerson, special ad- 
viser to Stilwell on Japan affairs, who went to Yenan with John Davies and is 
still there. 

Copies of these memorandums have been sent by John Davies to Harry Hop- 
kins, as well as to the State Department. They were given to me by John Davies 
in Chungking. 

12-9/Or. to Mr. White. 

Exhibit No. 435-A 

Department of State, 
Washington, May IJf, 1956. 
In reply refer to SY/P. 
To : Mr. Clarence O. Tormoen, Personnel Security OflQcer, Treasury Department, 

Washington, D. C. 
From : Dennis A. Flinn, Director, Ofiice of Security, Washington, D. O. 
Subject: Morgenthau diary papers. 

Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1956, transmitting another docu- 
ment from the Morgenthau diary collection for review and declassification prior 
to its release to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. 

The attached document has been reviewed in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 
and no objection exists to its release to the subcommittee. This document was 
previously declassified and, therefore, its declassification at this time is not 

1 12-11 : Sent to Secretary. 


It was the opinion of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs that discretion should 
be used in the handling of this document by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal 
Security, and that undue publicity should be avoided to prevent giving unneces- 
sary offense to the Japanese Government. 

Attachment: Photostatic copy of "Proposed Projects Against Japan." 

Exhibit No. 435-B 

Proposed Projects Against Japan 

My short study of the activities of Susumu Okano and the Japanese Peoples 
Emancipation League in Communist China convinces me that we can utilize the 
■experience and achievements of this group to advantage in the prosecution of the 
war against Japan. Without going into the details of methods and materials, all 
of which are being carefully investigated here, we can suggest the following 
proposals : 

(1) Effect the organization of an intei-national "free Japan" movement 

The Japanese Peoples Emancipation League (Nihon Jinmin Kaiho Renmei) has 
an estimated membership of 450 Japanese prisoners in north and central China. 
Its declared principles are democratic. It is not identified with the Communist 
Party. Upon completion of a course of indoctrination, the more able members 
voluntarily prepare propaganda leaflets and engage in propaganda activities on 
the frontlines. There is no doubt that most of them are sincere converts to the 
antiwar principles of the league. 

Intelligence shows that the league is well known to the Japanese Army, and 
its influence is respected and feared. 

Organization of chapters of this association, or a similar one, among Japanese 
(prisoners, internees, and others) in the United States, India, Australia, and 
other countries, should be carried out. The result would be widespread dissemi- 
nation of democratic ideas, the creation of a powerful Japanese propaganda 
organ (it is indisputable that propaganda from a Japanese source and written by 
Japanese is more effective than that from enemy sources), and the stimulation of 
a force useful at the time of invasion and in postwar Japan. 

(2) Encourage the organization of cells within Japan to spread defeatism and 
thereby I'educe resistance at the time of invasion 

Preparations are now being made to send agents directly to Japan from this 
(Yenan) area. 

Simultaneous organization needs to be undertaken of underground cells within 
Japan on the same principles as the free-Japan group on the outside. Such activ- 
ities would necessarily be on a small scale, but ample evidence exists that there 
are such elements which can be useful to us. Careful preparation is obviously 

(5) Set up a radio transmitter in a Communist base area such as \8hantung 
Province for broadcasts to Japan, Korea, and Manchuria 

A transmitter on the Shantung promontory would be 400 miles nearer Japan 
proper than Saipan and 600 miles nearer than the northern tip of Luzon. 

The Japanese Peoples Emancipation League has a strong unit in Shantung 
Province and is now establishing a school there. Consequently, trustworthy 
Japanese personnel is already on the spot to operate such a station. Additional 
trained personnel could be recruited from the school in Yenan and sent to any 
designated spot. 

Identification of the station with a "Free Japan" group would insure broad- 
casts of immeasurably greater effect than those of stated American (enemy) 

(4) Train units of Japanese for activity with American pacification operations 
and n-ith military government officials during occupation 

Eighth Route Army experience has clearly proved not only that Japanese pris- 
oners can be converted, but that they can be satisfactorily and extremely effec- 
tively used in propaganda operations on the frontlines. Approximately 350 are 
now training and engaging in such activities on the north and central China 

Such Japanese personnel, with invaluable knowledge of particular areas and 
of the language, could be extremely useful in assisting American Army officers' 
in reestablishing order among the Japanese population. 


Recruitment of these persons can be made from the personnel of Japanese 
Emancipation League chapters in China, already trained, and from prison camps 
under American, Australian, or British jurisdiction. A course of training would 
be necessary. Issei and nisei in the United States could serve as instructors. 
Materials and the exiierience of the Eighth Route Army would be of inestimable 
assistance in setting up such a project. 

John K. Emmekson. 

Yenan, China, November 7, 1944- 

Mr. Morris. Mr. McManus, will you identify these papers, to the 
extent that you know them ? 

This first docmnent, Mr. McManus, is a memorandiun that you 
encoimtered in the course of your committee work, is it not ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Where did you find that ? 

Mr. McManus. In the Treasury Department, originally in room 
2028, and it was later moved. There is a filing cabinet, a 4-drawer 
filing cabinet, which was the original filing cabinet of Harry Dexter 


The subcommittee was notified of the existence of this filing cabinet 
about Octolber of 1955. And I was designated to study it. I found 
this document in that cabinet. 

Mr. Morris. And subsequently request was made for a declassifica- 
tion of that document, so that it can be used for the purposes of the 
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. And, Senator, I call your attention to a memorandum 
from Dennis Flinn, director, Office of Security, to Mr. Clarence O. 
Tormoen, Personnel Security Officer, Treasury Department, Wash- 
ington 25, D. C, dated May 14, 1956, in which the document was 

And, as I say, that, together with this top memorandum, which is a 
memorandum from Mr. Friedman to Mr. White, the first and third 
documents having been found by Mr. McManus — you found the first 
one, too, did you not, Mr. McManus ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Where did you find that? 

Mr. McManus. That was on the Emmerson memorandum. 

Mr. Morris. It was pinned on it ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes ; it was pinned on it ; it was a little yellow sheet. 

Mr. SouRW^iNE. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question, just for the 

This was received by you from Mr. Scribner in October of last year, 
that is, October of 1956 ? 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. This is material which the committee had requested 
in the spring of 1956. 

Mr. Morris. When was the request made, Mr. McManus? 

Senator Jenner. May 14. 

Mr. Morris. It was declassified on May 14. 

Mr. McManus. I made several requests. The original requests 
were verbal. 

And may I explain the oiiginal circumstances of coming in contact 
with this cabinet. 

The subcommittee was informed about the existence of this cabinet, 
and I was designated to contact, under restrictions — in other words. 


I am classified for the handling; I mean to say, I am qualified to 
handle classified material, but I was only permitted to read the docu- 
ments in this file, and not permitted to report to the subcommittee 
what I foimd in them. I was only allowed to request documents of 
the Treasury. 

Now, originally, I asked for groups of documents. And as I re- 
ported to Mr. Sourwine, it seemed to me that in this filing cabinet 
there was a piece of string that tied all these other stories together 
about Harry Dexter Wliite, and I wanted documents in bulk. 

Well, I began bringing them in to Mr. Clarance Tormoen, who 
was designated to work with me — I think he was a Special Assistant 
to the Secretary, and he has since died. I made a request for this 
document, I should say, in the winter of 1955-56. Nothing came of 
our request. 

And when Mr. Tormoen died, I was put in touch with Mr. Page 
Nelson, another Treasury official, and I asked liim for the document, 
about June 6. 

Mr. Morris. And then it was ultimately declassified on May 14, 

Mr. McMaistus. Well, it had been declassified, according to what 
we later learned, by the time I asked for it on June 6 

Mr. Morris. Of what year ? 

Mr. McManus. 1956. And Mr. Nelson informed me that — I kept 
asking for it, and it wasn't turning up — I made it clear to Mr. Nelson 
that it was an important document, because it substantiated verbal 
testimony that we had had, and it related to a person now in the 
employ of the State Department in a sensitive area in the Middle 
East, and it was — I don't want to characterize it — it characterizes 

Mr. Morris. It speaks for itself ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes. 

But Mr. Nelson kept informing me that the State Department had 
not cleared the document. 

Now, it shows in this series of letters that it had been cleared before 
I asked him for it the first time. 

Senator Jenner. On May 14 ? 

Mr. McManus. May 14, yes. 

Senator Jenner. And you asked for it June 6 ? 

Mr. McManus. That was the second or third time I asked for it; 
I asked for it originally from Mr. Tormoen. 

Nothing happened. And on approximately August 26, 1 found an- 
other document, also written by John K. Emmerson, and asked for 
clearance on that, and got it within 3 or 4 days. 

I have made records of all these conversations. 

So I then addressed a letter to Mr. Nelson, in which I asked, how 
it was possible for the State Department to clear this document so 
promptly in one instance, and so slowly in another? And I asked 
for the name of the person in the State Department who is handling 
tliis matter, so that I could approach him directly. 

Well, he never answered that letter. But as the result of it, Mr. 
Scribner brought the documents to Judge Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the importance of the document is, just to 
read two sentences from it, this is a memorandum that apparently 
ultimately made its way to the very top of our Government at the 


time. It is just fraught with misinformation. It says here that the 
Japanese People's Emancipation League was a non-Communist or- 
ganization which was operating in China. It has since been charac- 
terized by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as a Communist 
organization, organized by Susumu Okano, who held many important 
positions in the Japanese Communist Party. 

I would like to put that whole thing in the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Jenner, It may go into the record and become a part of 
the official record. 

Mr. Morris. The whole excerpt from the report of the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs : "The Strategy and Tactics of World Com- 

(The excerpt referred to above was marked exhibit No. 436 and 

reads as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 436 

Supplement IV. Five Hundred Leading Communists 

Nozaka Sanzo (alias Okano Susumu) 

Member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee, chief of 
Propaganda and Investigation Section, and director of party school, Japan Com- 
munist Party. 

Born March 30, 1892, in Tamaguchi prefecture; graduated from Kobe Com- 
mercial College, Keio University, 1919 ; went to London to study the British 
trade-union movement, 1920 ; joined British Communist Party and was deported 
from England, 1921 ; went to Moscow, returned to Japan and joined the Japan 
Communist Party, 1922 ; organized left-wing labor unions and parties in Japan, 
1922-1931 ; imprisoned, 1928-1929 ; escaped to Moscow, 1931 ; elected member of 
Executive Committee of Communist International (3rd), 1935; organized Japa- 
nese People's Emancipation League (Nippon Jimmin Kaiho Remmei), a Com- 
munist organization, at Yenan, China, 1943; returned to Japan, January 1946; 
member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee of Japanese 
Communist Party since 1946 : elected to the Japanese House of Representatives, 
April 1946 : reelected April 1947. 

Mr. Morris. The Emmerson memo goes on to say : 

The Japanese People's Emancipation League has an estimated membership of 
4.50 Japanese prisoners in north and central China. It declared principles are 
democratic. It is not identified with the Communist Party. 

And at the very same time, it was apparent that Mr. Susumu Okano, 
who was the head of this particular league, was a Communist, and 
known by Mr. Emmerson to be a Communist. 

Now, the reason that is important. Senator, is that we have Admiral 
Cooke's sworn testimony in the record to the effect that Mr. Kobert C. 
Strong, who is now our counselor of Embassy at Damascus, Syria, was 
dispensing erroneous information to the advantage of the Communists 
and the disadvantage of us, and here we have Mr. John K. Emmerson, 
who is now our counselor of Embassy at Beirut, Lebanon, both impor- 
tant positions now in the Middle East. 

I would also like to put in the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, the 
testimony of Mr. Dooman about John K. Emmerson. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, may I interrupt just for one question 
on this document that you have previously put in the record. 

This memorandum of May 14 from Mr. Tormoen to Mr. Flinn starts 

Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1956, transmitting another docu- 
ment from the Morgenthau diary collection for review and declassification prior 
to its release to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. 


This document is not, in fact, a Morgenthau diary document, is it? 

Mr. Morris. Apparently not, Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Thank you. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman has testified on page 747, in volume 23, 
in our Institute of Pacific Relations Report, about the fact that Mr. 
Emmerson did take Japanese Communists back to the United States 
for the purpose of indoctrinating prisoners captured by the United 

I would like also to have in the record at this time the testimony of 
General Wedemeyer, who said that he had four political advisers in 
China. I would like to read two excerpts from that. General Wede- 
meyer said that he had four advisers, they were John Service, John 
Davies, Raymond Ludden, and John K. Emmerson. And he went on 
to say that their intelligence reports were inconsistent with American 
policy at the time, that the reports strongly favored the Chinese Com- 
munists and were detrimental to the Chinese Nationalists. 

He went on also to say, by way of summarization of their reports^ 

If we had followed their directives and their advice, China would have gone 
Communist long before it actually did go Communist. 

And, as I say, John K. Emmerson, the man I am talking about, was 
1 of the 4 advisers. 

Another one, Raymond Ludden, now holds a position in the State 
Department in Washington. 

Senator Jenner. On these previous documents, Mr. McManus, that 
you have testified about, how long had these documents been kept in 
this file, do you know? 

Mr. McManus. Well, I was told by Mr. Nelson that this filing cabi- 
net had been there for at least 5 years, and, to the best of his judg- 
ment, it had been there probably since the death of Harry White. 

I would like to point out. Senator, that when you were chairman, at 
your instructions we began an inquiry into the policymaking activi- 
ties of Harry AVliite. And I was sent to the Treasury on that mission, 
with the support of other persons, and I was never informed at any 
time of the existence of the file, with these terribly important papers 
in it, by any of several persons with whom I conferred in the Treasury. 
And I learned afterward that the FBI had never been informed about 
the existence of this filing cabinet. 

Senator Jenner. In other words, these important documents had 
been covered up, so to speak ; the FBI had no information on them for 
several years ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

I was told when I first went there that they considered it so im- 
portant they had 10 men working on this cabinet; that was simultane- 
ously with my original examination of it. 

Senator Jenner. They considered it so important that they had 10 
men working on it, and yet they didn't consider it important enough 
to turn it over to the FBI or other officials ? 

Mr. Mr>MANus. No. 

The FBI, when they were told about this thing, thoiight it was 
BO important that they sent 10 men up there. 

Senator Jenner. I see. 


Mr. SouRWiNE. I will volunteer this : When I learned of the exist- 
ence of that cabinet, with the authority of the chairman, I immedi- 
ately informed the Bureau tliat the cabinet existed. 

Senator Jenner. I see. I was chairman at that time ; wasn't I ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That is right. 

Senator Jenner. Anything further ? 

Mr. Morris. We have Admiral Cooke, Senator. 

Admiral, could you tell us the posture of the military situation as 
it now exists in eastern Asia ? 

Admiral Cooke. I would like to explain that to the chairman and 
to the Senate, because it is very important to the United States, as 
I see it. 

I have had quite a great deal to do with saving Formosa for the 
United States, and we now recognize it as important. 

Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, you were the Chief of Staff to Admiral 
King during the war ; weren't you ? 

Admiral Cooke. I was Chief of Staff at the last part of the war, but 
I was Chief Strategical Adviser throughout the war, from April of 
1942 until the end of the war. 

Mr. Morris. And you were also there as head of the 7th Fleet, which 
was the China fleet ? 

Admiral Cooke. And while I was on that duty, I had a meeting of 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff and heads of the staffs of other govern- 
ments around the world. Later, as Mr. Morris said, I became com- 
mander of our 7tli Fleet, stationed in China in 1946. I was there 
in 1946 and 1947, and the early part of 1948 I was in command of 
that fleet before I retired. 

And I, of course, had warned the Chiefs of Staff, my own Chief of 
Staff, Admiral King, the head of the Navy, as to what was goin^ to 
come into the China area after the war was over, the precarious situ- 
ation, due to the defeat of Japan and the power of Russia. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time felt that we had to build up 
the power of China, particularly restore its fleet, and restoration of 
its fleet had to be the result of congressional legislation, which was 
drafted at that time and later passed by the Congress. 

When the war was over and I got out there in early January 1946, 
I found a different policy was being carried on. 

Well, to go back into the past history, which is very important, 
because it is repetition, we gave up a part of our own fleet in 1922, 
and gave up our right to build bases in the western Pacific, which 
passed over the control of that area to the power of Japan and, of 
course, the control of the sea routes in the western Pacific and along the 
coasts of east Asia. 

The people who wanted to expand Japan and establish the copros- 
perity area all over Asia managed to get control of Japan, and they 
began to move into China and move down the coast. 

Now, they were free to do that, because there was nothing to stop 
them, no power to stop them. And, they were hampered somewhat 
by the war in China, for the Chinese had not surrendered, but having 
control of the sea routes and the line of communications down south, 
they had gotten as far as the south end of China before the Pearl Har- 
bor attack brought us into the war. 


They got down to Thailand and north Indochina, and the people 
began to get worried. They said they would not go any farther, but 
they did go still farther, their objective being to establish a coprosper- 
ity area there and get to the rice bowl of southeast Asia, and to reach 
the oilfields and tin supplies, and so forth, in Indonesia and Malaya. 

Now, when the Russians came into the war, there was a sort of a 
repetition of that. They first took over China, and then their objec- 
tives became the industrial capacity of Japan, and also the Hice Belt 
and supplies of southeast Asia. 

After taking over China, then the Korean attack took place ; that 
was the first step. That was not, of course, completely successful, 
and they were held back. And as soon as the consummation of the 
cease-fire took place, then they moved on down to Indochina and took 
north Indochina, which we forecast would happen. 

Well, the situation now is that 

Senator Jenner. When you say "we forecast," how do you mean, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Cooke. Well, I am one of the forecasters. Actually, when 
the cease-fire negotiations started in early July of 1951, I told one of 
the press representatives out there that, if and when they did it, the 
Chinese Communists would take north Indochina, and that seemed 
to be clear to me. 

It was finally consummated several years later, and then they 
moved on in and took that. 

Now, that was an objective. 

Now, to carry out what is going on in all southeast Asia and Indo- 
china and Malaya, it has been testified before your committee yester- 
day — and I heard the testimony — about the subversion going on, par- 
ticularly among the overseas Chinese in those areas, of which there are 
about 10 or 12 million — in the papers, in the schools, in the banks, and 
so on. And that is progressing very much for the Communists. 

However, in my view- — and I think it is borne out in middle 
Europe — there must be a posture of military power ready to back 
these things up, as in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. And 
the necessary connnunications are along the sea routes. 

Well, the one thing that is an obstacle now, the biggest obstacle to 
this, is the continued occupation of Formosa by the Nationalist Gov- 
ernment in opposition to the Communists. This is very important to 
them — if they had it, they wouldn't be in exactly a position similar 
to Japan, because we still have Okinawa and the bases in the Philip- 
pines, but the key to that whole thing is the possession of Formosa. 

Now, the Chinese have a substantial force in Formosa. They have 
got a very strong force in Quemoy, which is the gateway for the 
attack against Formosa. And then they have got a substantial force 
on Matsu. 

Part of this thing that has to do here, which was illustrated some- 
what in the testimony yesterday before this committee, is the prestige 
of the free world among the overseas Chinese and, for that matter, 
the other inhabitants of that area. 

In 1949, 1950, and 1951 most of those overseas Chinese were pro- 
Communist, or the majority. And then, as time went on 

Mr. Morris. You say they were pro-Communist ? 

Admiral Cooke. Pro- Communist. 


And, then, as time went on, and they began to learn what com- 
munism was and what was going on on the mainland, then they 
turned toward the free world, and particularly toward the National- 
ist Govermnent. 

I was in these areas in 1952, myself, and talked to the Chinese m 
Hanoi and Saigon and Bangkok, and so on. 

Well, after the cease-fire was consummated, and after the surrender 
of Chusan, the feeling that they were going on began to get stronger 
and stronger, and at the same time the Communists were getting their 
people into the papers and the schools, the Chinese papers and the 
Chinese schools, in these areas. 

There are millions of Chinese in Indochina and Thailand, and in 
Singapore. And so now it is uncertain. They send their students, 
some to the expanded University of Taiwan, but they are also send- 
ing quite a number now to Red China. 

There was a noted change when the Chusan islands to the north 
were surrendered, here a couple of years ago. If these islands, off- 
shore islands, fall, there will be a tremendous increase in the change 
of these overseas Chinese who control the business in the southeast 
area, back toward communism. 

Now, the Chinese have, as I said, a very strong force on Quemoy, 
and a substantial force on the others. If the Communists decide 
to attack, part of the attack on those islands will have to be by sea 
route. And to succeed in doing it — they have moved quite a bit 
further in a disputed control of the Formosa Strait; if they succeed, 
a large part of the defenses of Formosa will be liquidated — I mean, 
if they defeat them. The Nationalists are going to defend them; 
whatever the United States does, they will defend them. 

And, of course, a big j)art of the buildup of the Communists is in 
airfields. They have built up many airfields near Quemoy and all 
along there, so they can bring in bombers, and so forth. 

They have a many times stronger air force, of course, than the 
Nationalist Government, so we are building that up somewhat, and 
in Formosa there is a very formidable bunch of airfields. 

So, if they are attacked, and it succeeds, maybe because we don't 
come to their aid soon enough or don't come at all, then the probability 
of the posture — posture is the situation in regard to the strength and 
attitude of the military forces that I am talking about — toward the 
Communist occupation and control of all southeast Asia will increase 
very much. 

So right now the Communists are carrying out a sort of a mixture 
of a peace offensive and a force — they are not bombarding Quemoy 
at the present time as much as they were when I was out there about 
2 years ago. They do carry out one once in a while, then they are 
beaming radios to Formosa and saying that "We are going to take 
you peacefully, and when we get you, everything will be all right and 
nobody will be damaged, and nobody will be hurt," and so on. "But 
if this doesn't succeed, why, we will use force." 

In other words, they play it both ways, whether that is good tactics 
or not, but they think of it as being good tactics, and that is what is 
going on. 

So that you will see a certain amount of bombardment doesn't do 
much damage on Quemoy, but ties in with the Chinese on Formosa, 
where there are about 10 million Chinese. 


So that they will try to build up weakness, and also try to convey 
to the free world that maybe they are not as strong as the free world 
would like to see them — I mean, those w^ho want to see Free China 
hold on. So that is one of the tactics. 

Another one is to have somebody come over who has had contacts 
in Peking and try to make social contact with some of the people 
representing China — like Japan, for instance. 

So they can expand that and say, "Well, negotiations are going 
on." They are not going on at all. But they want to create that 
impression to the world, to accomplish their own objective of getting 
it one way or the other, probably a combination of the two. 

So I just wanted to bring to the attention of the committee that 
even though they succeed — and they are succeeding — on the infiltra- 
tion and subversion in these areas, this will add to the picture, and 
probably turn it over, if they take that Formosa Strait. 

Senator Jenner. Admiral, nothing remains the same — and let's 
take the Formosan situation — let's assume that another 5 or 10 years 
of these tactics go on — what happens to Formosa ? 

In other words, the Army is getting older, and so forth and so on. 
Wliat is your opinion on that? In other words, will the Chinese 
Communists win by default on time alone ? 

Admiral Cooke. If they take southeast Asia, maybe so. If they 
don't take southeast Asia, I think it does not have to happen. 

Now, the economy of Formosa— there are about 10 million people 
now — is very good, it is the best governed country, as far as I have 
been able to observe, and I believe most observers agree with that, in 
all Asia. And the army is not getting old, there are new ones coming 
in, being recruited right along. 

Now, at first — I mean, we sent out a military advisory group of a 
small size, which has since been expanded, we sent it out in the 
summer of 1951, giving help. But at that time they weren't recruit- 
ing, because they just couldn't afford to do it. 

In other words, their whole armed forces is somewhat in the neigh- 
borhood of 600,000. 

Well, when you bring in recruits, you have got that additional 
thing, and also the business of retiring those that are too old. 

Now, since then, in recent years, the recruitment is going on. It 
is now going on. They have got a bunch of reserve divisions in which 
new ones are coming in all the time. And, in age, the business of 
getting too old is being handled. 

So far, the morale has held up. How long it will hold up in a status 
quo is a very difficult question to forecast. But so far it is holding 
up very well. 

Now, we are giving them some help in the navy, and in the air 
force, and we are giving it to them in the army, too. But it is essen- 
tially a problem of control of the straits, of the water thing, for the 
present; they may never ^o back to the mainland, and again, maybe 
they will, because a situation such as occurred in Hungary is possible 
any time, much of the majority of the mainland of the Chinese is 
against the Communist regime — -I would say 80 percent, maybe more. 

And the Chinese, as you probably heard before — I think Mr. Cald- 
<vell said yesterday the Chinese, as an individual, the main thing to a 
Chinese — and there are about five or six hundred million of them, 


and most of them are in this category — is his rice bowl and his in- 
dividual noninterference. 

Well, now, of course, the Communist is 100 percent interference 
with the individual. So that is a ferment that is there. 

"Wlien and if it occurs, such as happened in Hungary, but to a 
greater extent, will we of the free world be ready to cash in on it? 
That is the important thing. 

They cannot invade unless that situation exists, and unless the 
United States supports them. The United States has got to decide 
that they will support them before they can carry out invasions even 
under these conditions. 

But if the United States, because of driving into southeast Asia, 
is drawn into that picture, then they need to get ready ahead to do 
what they finally want to do at that time. 

For instance, in 1945 the Russians decided to attack Korea, and 
they decided to get ready to do it at the opportune time. They didn't 
think they were ready ior 5 years, and they didn't think they were 
ready until our troops were withdrawn. 

And in 1950, they attacked. 

Now, at the same time, we could have been getting some South 
Koreans ready to repel them, giving them striking power, but we 
denied it; we said, "You can't have any striking power because you 
might attack." 

Senator Jenner. We gave them some bailing wire; didn't we? 

Admiral Cooke. Something like that. 

Now, what we need — we have a SEATO treaty, which you know 
has eight nations in it, going as far as Pakistan, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the Philippines and Thailand, and so on — but the only 
nation in this SEATO agreement that has any power is the United 

Of course, free China and free Korea are not in it. But if they 
decided they want to be with us, they haven't any striking power. 

Striking power is, if we box, I hit you and you hit me. Well, all 
they can do is defend. We want to get up the military power to 
oppose them, and they will protest all over the place if we build up 
the striking power of South Korea and free China. 

Senator Jenner. The Communists are building up their striking 
power in North Korea, aren't they, in violation of the truce ? 

Admiral Cooke. That is right. 

Senator Jenner. What are we doing about it, if anything, do you 

Admiral Cooke. We are not changing — we are abiding by the 
agreement, truce. 

Senator Jenner. In other words, we just close our eyes to the 
violations of the truce by the Communists ? 

Admiral Cooke. In effect ; yes. 

Now, they are building up the power in all China, the airpower, 
they have got lots of Mig-15's and Mig-17's, and they have — I 
don't know how many, the last figure I had, they have 1,200 planes — 
and I know they must have more now, very modern planes. 

And they have constructed jet airfields all over China, all the way 
down to the Canton area now, and particularly opposite Quemoy — 
they call Quemoy, Kinmen, and that is the island just off Amoy, 
which is, next to Tsingtao, the best harbor they have in China. 


So, if they take Tsingtao, and if the Russians want to use that to 
base submarines, they will have it. If they don't take it — -if the Com- 
munists don't take Quemoy, then they won't have it. 

Now, the Russians right now are reported to have about 400 sub- 
marines. And I don't know the number that is supposed to be in 
the Pacific, but I have heard the figure, they say it is about a hundred, 
based in Vladivostok, and maybe some in Port Arthur, and some in 
Tsingtao, which is North China. 

Some operate just north of the Yangtze River in the Chusan 
Archipelago, which is a very wonderful base, and the best base they 
would have for a big navy in China, w^hich the Nationalists had to 
evacuate in 1950 to keep from losing everything. 

And then the next thing down here, controlling Western Pacific 
sea routes, is Amoy. And that is what is in dispute here in the United 
States, as to whether or not we let the Communists know tliat we 
will do something with our Navy and Air, in the event that Quemoy 
is attacked. 

Those are just some of the aspects of this thing for the free world 
side of it. 

That is another potential base for the expanding Russian Navy in 
the Western Pacific. 

Now, of course, they could take Quemoy, and would not take For- 
mosa necessarily right away, as long as the 7th Fleet is in the picture. 
But the pressure in southeast Asia, Communist pressure against the 
free world, or against the local controlled sovereignty there, would be 
much increased. 

I think that the United States, considering the SEATO thing, is so 
strongly dedicated to the preservation of free independence in south- 
east Asia that if they take it over and have to bring in armed forces to 
support it, it will lead to war. 

In other words, my view is that holding, assisting the free Chinese 
to hold those offshore islands in question, is more apt to stop war 
than bring war, very much more so. That is my conviction. 

Senator Jenner. Thank you. Admiral. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, I have one question, to finish this off. 

Admiral Cooke, you told me in October that you had learned last 
January — January 1956 — of the formation of a Presidential Commis- 
sion, headed by the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology, Mr. Killian, and that you therefore wrote to the Navy mem- 
ber of this Commission immediately and told him that you could bear 
witness to some very serious failures in intelligence that had caused 
great harm to the United States, and would like to appear before this 

You made the offer in January. Wlien you testified before us in 
October, that offer liad not been accepted ? 

Admiral Cooke. That is right. 

I wrote several letters, and finally, about June, I decided they 
weren't interested. And after the Angus Ward testimony that took 
place here and was published, I wrote to Mr. Morris and told him 
I didn't think they wanted it, and if he wanted it I would be glad 
to get it to him. 

And so I testified, and it was released by Senator Eastland for 
publication on November 12. 


A day or two after that I got a call from one of the members, 
asking if I did not want to testify before them. And so I said, "Yes." 

I gave them the transcript of what I had said, and invited questions. 

And so I have, in answer to their invitation, come to Washington 
at this time, and have appeared before them. 

They gave me a hearing, and I particularly wanted to be before 
them, not to repeat my testimony, which they have, but to set out in 
concrete terms the remedial action to prevent any such thing happen- 
ing in the future — which I have done, and I showed you a copy — I 
haven't showed it to you. 

Mr, Morris. Not yet. 

Admiral Cooke. I have brought it to their attention, tliis action 
that I think should be taken by the United States Government to 
prevent these things from happening in the future. 

And, I have brought it to the attention of the Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations, and to members of the State Department, and also to Congress- 
man Judd, and I will probably give it to Senator Knowland. 

So it is a rather comprehensive thing. I am glad to give a copy of 
this to this committee. I will give it to you — it is only six pages — 
because I said that concretely and briefly. 

Mr. Morris. It will be very helpful to us, Admiral Cooke. 

Senator Jenner. It will be very helpful. 

Mr. Morris. May I put in the record now the biographical sketch 
of Robert Campbell Strong and John Kenneth Emmerson, from the 
State Department hearing? 

Senator Jenner. They may become a part of our record. 

(The biographical sketches above referred to were marked "Ex- 
hibit No. 437 and 437-A" and read as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 437 

Strong, Robert Campbell, b. 111., Sept. 29, 1915 ; Beloit, Coll.. B. A. 1938 : U. of 
Wis. 1938-39 ; app. FSO unclass. v. c. of career, and sec. in Diplo. Ser. Mar. 2, 
1939 ; V. c. at Frankfort on the Main Mar. 20, 1939 ; at Prague June 20, 1939 ; For. 
Ser. Sch. Jan. 3, 1940; v. c. at Durban June 5, 1940; at Lourenco Marques, temp. 
May 6, 1941 ; at Durban May 28, 1941 : FSO 8, Nov. 16, 1943 ; FSO at Sofia to pro- 
ceed via Naples for temp, detail in office of U. S. pol. advLser, staff of Supreme 
Allied Comdr., Mediterranean theater, Oct. 23, 1944 ; FSO 7, May 16, 1945 ; v. c. at 
Sofia July 27. 1945 ; FSO 6, May 19, 1946 : to Dept. June 27, 1946 ; detailed to Naval 
War Coll. July 1, 1946 ; cons. Oct. 16, 1946 ; FSO 4, Nov. 13, 1946 ; cons, at Tsingtao 
Aug. 4, 1947 ; 1st sec. at Canton June 16, 1949 ; at Chungking, temp. June 24, 1949 ; 
cons, in addition to duties as 1st sec. at Taipei Dec. 31, 1949 : FSO 3, May 23, 
1950 ; to Dept. Aug. 4, 1950 ; special asst. to dir. Office of Chinese Affairs, Mar. 
13, 1951 ; mem., Policy Planning Staff, Jan. 4, 53 ; 1st sec. and cons. Damascus. 
Aug. 2, 54; cons, of emb. Damascus, Aug. 3, 54; FSO 2, Mar. 24, 55; m. 

Exhibit No. 437-A 

Emmerson, John Kenneth; b. Colo. Mar. 17, 1908; Colo. Coll., A. B. 1929; 
Sorbonne 1927-28 ; N. Y. U., A. M. 1930 ; Georgetown U. Sch. of For. Ser. 1931-33 ; 
instr. in social sci. (sc), U. of Nebr. 1930-31; asst. dir. Berlitz School of Lan- 
guages, Chicago, 1933-35 ; app. FSO unclass., v. c, and sec. in Diplo. Ser. Oct. 1, 
1935 ; language officer, Tokyo, Nov. 12, 1935 ; v. c. at Osaka Oct. 25, 1937, at Tai- 
hoku, temp. Apr. 12, 1939 ; at Osaka Dec. 6, 19.39 ; 3d sec. at Tokyo Apr. 3, 1940 ; 
FSO 8, Aug. 1, 1940 ; to Dept. temp. Nov. 19, 1941 ; 3d sec. and v. c. at Lima Feb. 
6, 1942; FSO 7, Oct. 20, 1942 ; 2d sec. at Lima in addition to duties as v. c. Feb. 
5, 1943 ; 2d sec. at Chungking Aug. 10, 1943 ; FSO 6, July 16, 1944 ; to Dept. May 


15, 1945; For. Ser. officer, Headquarters of Comdr. in Chief, U. S. Fleet, temp. 
Aug. 8, 1945; FSO 5, Aug. 13, 1945; FSO, office of act. U. S. pel. adviser to 
Supreme Comdr., Allied Forces, Japan, Sept. 7, 1945 ; to Dept. Feb. 18, 1946 ; asst. 
chief, Div. of Jap. Affairs, Mar. 15, 1946; special asst. to chief Oct. 28, 1946; 
FSO 4, Nov. 13, 1946 ; 1st sec. at Moscow May 1, 1947 ; FSO 3, May 15, 1947 ; cons. 
July 21, 1947 ; cons, at Moscow in addition to duties as 1st sec. Aug. 13, 1947 ; to 
Dept. May 13, 1949 ; detailed to Nat. War Coll. August 29, 1949 ; FSO 2, May 23, 
1950 ; planning adviser Bu. of Far Eastern Affairs, Aug. 15, 1950 ; conns. Karachi, 
July 28, 52 ; meritorious ser. award 54 ; FSO 1, Mar. 24, 55 ; coims. Beirut, Apr. 4, 
55. m. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do I understand that Mr. Emmerson is still in the 
American service, and is stationed in Beirut, Mr. Morris? 

Mr. Morris. As I say, Strong is our counselor of embassy at 
Damascus, Syria, and Emmerson is counselor of embassy at Beirut. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. They have both been sent from China to the Middle 

Mr. Morris. That is right. 

Senator Jenner. Thank you very much. Admiral. 

That will conclude the hearing. 

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.) 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to 
the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization 
in this index. 



Abdou, Mou Mouni 3488,3491 

Affidavit of Gerard McKernan : 

Exhibit No. 433-A 3494 

Exhibit No. 434 3495 

Algeria 3487 

American banknotes 3484 

American Club (in Shanghai) 3485,3493 

"American imperialist aggression" 3498 

Amoy 3511, 3512 

Asia 3508,3511 

Austin 3498,3499 

Australia 3511 


Bangkok 3509 

Bank of China 3481,3483 

Beirut, Lebanon 3505 

Berges, William C 3486,3492-3498 

Birmann, Jano 3488, 3490 

Boccara, Enrico 3489, 3490 

Bravo, Flavio 3488, 3491 

Bund (in Shanghai) 3483 

Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 3501, 3502 

Buxheli, Quamil 3488, 3490 


Campbell, Svlvia (Mrs. John Powell) 3494 

Canton 3492,3511 

Chair of Herb Medicine and Acupuncture 3478 

Chang Chun-fang (president of Russian Language Institute) 3487 

Chen? Wangtao 3497 

Chiang Kai-shek 3492, 3493 

Chiaotung University 3497 

Chief of Naval Operations 3513 

Chien Men Square 3489 

Chi Nan University 3487 

China 3476, 3477 

3479, 3481, 3483, 3485-3487, 3491-3493, 3497-3499, 3503, 3508, 3511, 3512 

Free China 3509, 3511 

Northeast China 3492 

China Revolutionary University ; 3487 

China Weekly Review 3486, 3492, 3494 

China Welfare Fund 3495, 3496 

Chinese 3485, 3488, 3498, 3508, 3509 

Overseas Chinese 3499, 3500, 3508 

Chinese democratic parties 3492 

Chinese national anthem 3498 

Chinese New Year 3482 

Chinese People's Republic 3491 

Chinese volunteers to Korea 3492, 3497, 3498 


Page I 

Chou En-lai 3480,3492,3495 i 

Chu Teh, General 3493 ' 

Chun Cheng Hwan 3488, 3490 ' 

Chungking 3501 i 

Chusan 3509, 3512 ' 

Archipelago 3502 1 

Clipping from Shanghai News of October 5, 1950, exhibit No. 430 3488 | 

Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, September 23, 1950, exhibit 

No. 431 3489 

Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, November 1950, exhibit No. 

432 3491 

Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, October 29, 1950, exhibit I 

No. 433 3492 i 

Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, December 15, 1950, exhibit I 

No. 434-A 349e { 

Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, December 15, 1950, exhibit \ 

No. 434-B 3498 ] 

Communism 3509 i 

Communist/s 3476-3483, 3485, 3486, 3494, 3495, 3499-3501, 3508-3510 I 

Chinese Communists 3477, 3480, 3482, 3484, 3486, 3501, 3506, 3510-3512 j 

Japanese Communists 3506 I 

Russian Communists 3482 ' 

Communist China, Red China 3476, 3480, 3481, 3483, 3485, 3499, 3500, 3509 

Communist Party 3482, 3490, 3493, 3495, 3502, 3505 ' 

Consignment stores 3482, 3483 j 

Cooke, Adm. Charles N., United States Navy, retired, Sonoma, Calif., j 

testimony of 3500-3514 i 

Czechoslovak Ministry of Information and Culture 3491 ' 

Damascus, Syria 3505, 3514 < 

Davies, John 3501 

Davis, John 3506 ^ 

Dias, Salvatore 3491 | 

Dooman, Mr 3505, 3506 \ 

"Down with America sessions" 3495 

"Down with American imperialism" (slogan) 3496 

Dunlop, Albert M., M. D., Rural Free Delivery 4, Box 493, Alexandria, Va., 
born in Savoy, 111., in 1884 ; bachelor of arts degree. University of Illi- 
nois ; doctor of medicine degree. Harvard University ; taught at Harvard ': 
Medical School in Shanghai, 1911-16 ; taught at Peking University Medi-  
cal College, 1918-31 ; private practice in Shanghai, 1931-33 ; professor | 
at University of Chicago, 1943-46; private practice in Shanghai, 1946- | 
52 ; professor at University of Hong Kong, 1952-53 ; testimony of__ 3475-3500 

E \ 

Eastland, Senator 3512 

Ebbels, Robert Noel (of Australia) 3487, 3488, 3490 : 

Eighth Route Army 3502,3503 ] 

Ekbatani 3490 j 

Emmerson, John K., data on, exhibit No. 437-A 3501, 3503-3506, 3513, 3514 J 

Europe 3508 

Executive committee of the International Union of Students 3487 i 

Exhibit No. 429 — Newspaper story re WFDY, in Shanghai News of Satur- 
day, October 7, 1950 3487 j 

Exhibit No. 430— Clipping from Shanghai News of October 5, 1950 3488 j 

Exhibit No. 431— Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, September 23, i 

1950 3489  

Exhibit No. 432 — Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, November 

1950 3491  

Exhibit No. 433— Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, October 29, '. 

1950 3492 

Exhibit No. 433-A— Affidavit of Gerard McKernan, July 18, 1955 3494 

Exhibit No. 434— Affidavit of Gerard McKernan, August 5, 1955 3495 ; 

Exhibit No. 434-A — Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, December 

15, 1950 3496 ; 


Exhibit No. 434-B — Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDT, December 

15, 1950 3498 

Exhibit No. 435 — Inter-Treasury memo — Secretary, December 8, 1944 ; to 

Mr. White from Mr. Friedman 3501 

Exhibit No. 435-A — State Department memo, May 14, 1956 ; to Mr. Clarence 

O. Tormoen from Dennis A. Flinn ; subject : Morgenthau diary papers 350? 

Exhibit No. 435-B — Proposed projects against Japan 3502 

Exhibit No. 436 — Data on Sanzo, Nozaka (alias Okamo Susmu) 3505 

Exhibit No. 437— Data on Robert Campbell Strong 3513 

Exhibit No. 437-A — Data on John Kenneth Emmerson 3513 


FBI. {See Federal Bureau of Investigation.) 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 3506, 3507 

Ferris, Helen 3498 

Flinn, Dennis 3501, 3503, 3505 

Foochow Road ("Street of Culture") 3496,3497 

Formosa 3476, 3500, 3507-3509 

Formosa Strait 3509 

Fortier, General 3500 

"Free Japan" group 3502 

Friedman, Mr 3.503 

Futan University 8497 


Ginling College 3498 

Goralski, Wladyslaw 3488, 3490 

Grand Theatre in Shanghai 3494, 3496 

Great China University 3487 

Grumm, Hans 3488, 3491 

Guha, Rangit 3488, 3491 

Guibert, Roger 3488, 3491 

Hanoi 3509 

Helmut, Hartwig 3488, 3490 

Honan Road 3496, 3497 

Hong Kong 3476, 3486, 3499 

Hopkins, Harry 3501 

Hsinhua 3489,3491 

Huang, Anna 3495, 3496 

Huang, Dr 3495, 3496 

Hungary 3508,3510 


Ilina, Lidiya 3488, 3490 

Illsley, Walter 3492 

India 3485 

Indochina 3509 

Institute of Pacific Relations Report 3506 

Inter-Treasury memo of December 8, 1944, to Mr. White from Mr. Fried- 
man, exhibit No. 435 3501 

Ishkhand 3488,3491 

Issei in United States 3503 


Jandro 3491 

Japan 3501, 3502, 3507, 3508 

Japanese Army 3502 

Japanese Government 3502 

Japanese People's Emancipation League in Communist China (Nihon Jin- 

min Kaiho Renmei) 3502, 3503, 3505 

Jenner, Senator William E 3475, 3500 

Judd, Congressman 3513 


K ^'"'^ 

Kazem, Mansouri _ _ _ _ _ 3491 

Kiiiian Mr_ ""I":::::".::::::: 3512 

King, Admiral 3-QY 

Kinmen (Quemoy) "__" ~ ~ ~_ ~ ^^-^-^ 

Kipouros, Mitsos ~ ~ ~ _"" " 349^ 

Korea 3483, 3489," 3492' 3493, 3497," 3498, ~3502, 3511 

Korean attack 3508 

Korean People'e Army ~__I_I_I__II 3498 

KPA _ 3497 

Kraba, Hamou I_"_I_" I___"3487r348"8, 3491 

Kwanghan University 3493 


Lebanon 3505 

Liao Cheng-chih 3489 

Liu Ke-lin, Prof 3493 

Ludden, Raymond 35O6 

Luzon !":::_::::::::::::::::: 3502 


Maiorelli, Lidie 3488, 3491 

Malaya 3508 

Ma Ling (canning group) 3483 

Manafov, George Vasilev 3488 3490  

Manchuria IIIII'Mm, 3489,' 3502 

Mandel, Benjamin 3475 

Mao Tse-tung ~ 3489, 3490," 3492' 3493, 3497 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3512 

Matsu 3508 

McCanns (MacAnns), David Graham 3488,3491,3492 

McKernan, Rev. Gerard ' 3494I3496 

Affidavit of July 18, 1955, exhibit No. 433-A 3494 

Affidavit of August 5, 1955, exhibit No. 434 349.5 

McManus, Robert C 3475 3500 

Mese ' 3491 

Middle East 3504 3544 

Minttinen, Unto _"_ 3488, 3491 

Morgenthau diary papers 35OI 3.503 

Morris, Robert 3475', 3500 

Moscow 3491^ 3492 

Mouhallami, Abdilkarim 3494 

Mukden ~ ~~ 3493 


Nanking 3493 

Nanking Road ~ 3495 

Nanking University 3498 

Nationalist Government (Chinese) 3508, 3509 

Nationalist group (Chinese) ' 3500 

Natsogdorzh :__:_" :_"3488, 3490 

Nelson, Mr. Page 3504 

Nettleton, Dick ^ 3488, 3491 

New Zealand 35II 

Nihon Jinmin Kaiho Renmei. (See Japanese People's Emancipation 
League in Communist China.) 

Nisei in United States 3503 

North Korea 35II 


October Revolution in Moscow 3491 

Okano, Susumu, alias of Nozako Sanzo. 

Overseas Chinese 3499, 3500, 3508 



Pakistan 3511 

Pan Cheng-liang 3497 

Pearl Harbor attack 3507 

Pieping 3495 

Peking 3476, 3480, 3489, 3490 

Mayor of 3489, 3492 

Peking University Medical College (PUMC) 3476,3477,3479 

People's Democracies 3493 

People's Liberation Army of China 3493 

People's Republic of China 3489, 3490, 3492 

Philippines 3508, 3511 

Poland 3508 

Port Arthur 3512 

Pott, Hawks 3498 

Powell, Bill 3486 

Powell, John 3486, 3492-3495 

Powell, Mrs. John (nee Sylvia Campbell) 3494 

Prague 3487, 3491 

Proposed projects against Japan, exhibit No. 435-B 3502 

Pyongyang 3497 

Quemoy 3508, 3509, 3511, 3512 


Radueano, Cornel 3488, 3490 

Red China. {See Communist China.) 

Red in the East, song 3492 

Rice Belt 3508 

Riggs, C 3498 

Rockefeller Foundation 3476 

Medical School 3478 

Roy, A 3498 

Rumania 3482 

Russia (see also Soviet Union) 3479,3484,3485 

Russian Language Institute 3487 

Russian Navy 3512 

Russians 3512 


Saigon 3509 

Saipan 3502 

St. John's University (Shanghai) 3486,3487,3497,3598 

Sandag 3488,3491 

Sanzo, Nozaka (alias Okano Susumu), data on, exhibit No. 436 3505 

Scribner, Fred 3501, 3503, 3504 

SEATO 3511,3512 

Second World Students Conference 3487 

Semitchastny, Vladimir 3488, 3490 

Seventh Fleet 3507 

Shanghai 3476, 3479, 3483-3489, 3491, 3492, 3494, 3495, 3498, 3499 

Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief (SFER), official Communist 

welfare group of Shanghai 3495 

Shanghai News (English-language Communist sheet) 3486, 3487 

Shantung Province 3502 

Shapiro, Sidney 3494 

Sian Fu 3477 

Slamet 3491 

Sourwine, J. G 3475 

South Korea, South Koreans 3511 

Soviets 3479, 3482 

Soviet Union, U. S. S. R. (see also Russia) 3487, 3489, 3492, 3493 

State Department 3500-3502, 3504, 3513 

Officials 3500 



State Department memo re Morgenthau diary papers, exhibit No. 435-A 3501 

Stefanescu, Pascu 3488, 3490 

Stilwell, General 3501 

Strong, Robert O 3505, 3513 

Data on, exhibit No. 437 3513 

Sun Yat-sen, Mme 3486, 3494 

Svoboda, Alois 3488, 3490 

Syria 3505,3514 


Tha Hia 3491 

Tannebaum (Tannenbaum), Capt. Gerald 3492,3494,3495 

Tax policies of the Chinese Reds 3484 

Thailand 3508, 3509, 3511 

Tormoen, Clarence O 3503-3505 

Treasury Department 3501, 3503, 3504, 3506 

Tsingtao 3511,3512 

Tutino, Saverio 3488, 3491 


UNICEF 3495 

Union of Czechoslovak Youth 3491 

United Nations 3481,3500 \ 

University of Taiwan 3509 ; 

V i; 

Vdovin, Valentine 3487, 3490 

Vietnam 3489, 3493, 3498 i 

Vladivostok 3512 

Voigt, Paile 3488, 3491 i 

Vu Xuan Vinh 3488, 3490 j 

W i 

"Wall Street Imperialist Aggression" 3498 I 

Walmsley, Omar 3488, 3491 

Ward, Angus 3512 ! 

Wedemeyer, General 3506 ' 

Weiss, Selma (Harvey Matusow's girl friend) 3487, 3488, 3491 | 

WFDY. (See World Federation of Democratic Youth.) I 

"WFDY delegates invited to speak at universities," nevrspaper story in 

Shanghai News of Saturday, October 7, 1950, exhibit No. 429 3486, 3487 ' 

White, Harry Dexter 3501, 3503, 3504, 3506 J 

Williams, Bert, secretary of WFDY 3492 | 

Wolfe, Jacob 3488, 3491 > 

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) 3486-3492 

List of delegates 3490, 3491 ' 

World Youth (organ of WFDY) 3487 \ 

Wu Chee-nan 3497 ' 

Wu Hsiu-chuan 3498 < 


Yangtze Valley 3476 1 

Yenan 3501-3503 ] 

Young Pioneers :. 3489 . 

Young Progressives of Algeria, America, Austria, Brazil, Britain, Cuba, , 

French West Africa, Greece, Holland, Italy (all delegates to WFDY) _ 3488, 3491 ] 

Yuan Chu-mo 3493 i 















FEBRUARY 20 AND 21, 1957 

PART 53 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

93215 WASHINGTON : 1957 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

OCT 9 - 1957 


JAilES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 


OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 





SAM J. ERVIN, Je., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Inteknal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

Robert Morris, Chief Counsel 

J. G. SoDRWiNB, Associate Counsel 

William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Witness : ^^^e j 

Beichman, Arnold 3515 

Rachlin, Carl 3533 j 

Appendix I -- 3549 

Summary trials in Hungary 3549-3552 | 

Annex A — Decree law on criminal procedure 3552 i 

Annex B — Decree on summary jurisdiction 3552-3553 ) 

Annex C — Decree on martial law 3553-3554 ] 

Annex D — Decree on detention for public security 3554 ; 

Annex E — Sixth Congress of the International Association of • 

Democratic Lawyers, Brussels, May 1956 3554-3555 "• 

Appendix I-A 3555 \ 

The Hungarian situation in the light of the Geneva Conventions < 

of 1949 3555-3559 ; 

I. Obligations in an internal conflict 3556 i 

II. Internal or international conflict? 3556-3557 

III. Obligations in an "international conflict" 3557-3559 ; 

Appendix II 3559-3561 

The situation behind the Iron Curtain, statement by the executive ; 

council, AFL-CIO 3559-3561 

Article from AFLr-CIO News, February 16, 1957, by Arnold Beichman, ^ 

Labor No. 1 Target of United States Communists 3561-3562 : 

Article from Las Vegas Sun, February 16, 1957, by Victor Riesel 3562-3563 ] 

m ' 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF THE Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws, of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room 
457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding. 

Present: Senators Jenner and Watkins. 

Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher, 
associate counsel. 

Senator Jenner. The meeting will come to order. 

Mr. Morris. The witness this morning is Mr. Rachlin. Will you 
come forward, Mr. Rachlin ? 

Senator Jenner. Will you please raise your right hand and be 

Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Rachlin. I swear. 


Mr. Morris. Would you like to sit at that end of the table, Mr. 

Senator, before beginning the hearing today, Mr. Rachlin has 
agreed to come here to testify on the nature of the Communist Party 
convention that was recently held in New York. 

I would like to note for the record that Mr. Ludwig Rajchman was 
subpenaed by the subcommittee. The subpena was issued on Monday 
of this week. It was served on him last night at the Westbury Hotel 
on 69th Street and Madison Avenue, New York City, at 7 : 31 p. m., 
by a member of the subcommittee staff. Rajchman threw the sub- 
pena to the floor of the hotel rather than accept service. 

Immediately thereafter the chairman of the subcommittee. Senator 
Eastland, sent a telegram, asking that it be personally delivered upon 
him, notifying him that the subpena which had been served on him 
and which he had thrown to the floor was indeed a directive for him 
to appear at room 319, Senate Office Building, at 10 a. m., this morning. 

Senator, I left room 319 between 25 minutes after 10 and 10 : 30 
this morning, and Mr. Rajchman had not yet appeared. I bring 
that to your attention, Senator, in the event you want to pass it on to 
the subcommittee, whether Mr. Rajchman is in contempt of the 



Senator Jenner. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Morris. I also would like to mention that Mr. Rajcliman is 
being subpenaed because his name has frequently turned up in the 
course of the inquiries conducted by the subcommittee into the nature 
and extent of the Soviet activity in the United States. He figured 
in the Harry Dexter White case, in the Alger Hiss case, and the white 
papers. The fact that he left his position here as financial adviser to 
the National Chinese delegation and became a Polish delegate gives 
the committee reason to believe he may have been one of the Soviet 
superiors of the ring that was operating in Washington. 

[To the witness :] I wonder if you would give your name? 

Mr. Kachlin. My name is Carl Rachlin and I reside at 187 Brown 
Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., and I maintain my office for the practice of 
law at 11 West 48th Street, New York City, N. Y. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell the subcommittee whether or not you 
were an unofficial delegate to the recent Communist Party convention 
that was held in New York ? 

Mr. Rachlin. If I may, I was an unofficial observer. I was in no 
way a delegate. 

Mr. MoREis. Would you tell us exactly what your role was ? 

Mr. Eachlin. The New York Civil Liberties Union, of which I 
am on the board of directors, was asked if it wished to have anv ob- 
server present at this convention held only last week. I was called 
by the director of the New York Civil Liberties Union and asked 
whether I would like to go. I immediately talked it over with my 
partner, Lester Migdol, and we thought it would be a good idea if 
both of us went to this convention for reasons which I would be 
happy to explain. That is, in addition to the usual feeling that all 
Americans have about the Communist Party, we had a special interest, 
because among our clients are several trade unions and one of them, 
particularly, is in a field which had formerly been under the control 
of the Communists, and when it had been under the control of the 
Communists it had been expelled from the CIO, back in 1948. 

The old United Office and Professional Workers was one of the 
unions expelled for Communist activity by the CIO. One of the suc- 
cessor groups of that, which had later been chartered by the CIO, was 
the Communities and Social Agencies Employees Union and that 
union is our client. Prior to the expulsion of the Communist leader- 
ship, I had been consulted by the people who are now the leaders 
of that union. And they had consulted with me to help them finally 
kick out the Commmiist leadership so that I became deeply personally 
involved in the activities of Communists in order to assist my clients 
in preventing a resurgence of Communist activity in that field. Be- 
cause it was commonly talked about that the field of Communities and 
Social Agencies was one of the areas in which Communists had a 
particular interest. 

In view of the fact further that my partner who was general counsel 
of the American Veterans Committee and was one of those instru- 
mental in expelling the Communists from the AMVETS back some 5 
or 6 years ago and particularly John Gates, who was one of the leaders 
of the Communist Party, we had this special interest. 

Mr. Morris. Now what was it ? Was it a closed convention to every- 
body else? 


Mr. Rachlin. Except for the special observers it was closed to 
everyone else. There may have been a few visitors, but they were 
obviously associated with the Communist movement. It was obvious 
that these people in the rear as visitors were associated with the Com- 
munist movement. The press was excluded. 

Mr. Morris. How many observers were there ? 

Mr. Rachlin. To the best of my recollection, 6 or 8. There was a 
Rev. J. A. Muste, who was a fairly well-known pacifist in New York 
City, a man introduced to me as Stringfellow Barr, who I understood 
either is or was the president of St. Johns College of Maryland ; there 
was a man whom I had met before, Bayard Russin, who again was 
identified with some of the pacifist movements in New York. 

There was a man I had met previously by the name of Roy Fitch 
whom I knew to be a pacifist. One or two others whose names escape 
me now whom I had not met before and have not seen since. 

Mr. Morris. And you did attend all the sessions of the convention? 

Mr. Rachlin. I was there every day but not every session. Unfor- 
tunately, I had some family duties with my children that required my 
being home part of the time. So I did not see all the sessions all the 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we feel, in view of the experience that 
Mr. Rachlin had, he is qualified to give us some testimony about this 
Communist Party convention. And the Internal Security Subcom- 
mittee is interested in this particular convention because of the bear- 
ing on events, in the months ahead and the years ahead, of decisions 
and policies adopted at that convention. Those decisions thus have 
a direct bearing on the work of the Senate Internal Security subcom- 

Mr. Rachlin, I wonder whether you could tell us your general ob- 
servations, your analysis, and your general interpretation of what hap- 
pened while you were attending the Communist Party convention. 

Mr. Rachlin. I would be pleased to, Mr. Morris. 

The convention was held in a building known as Chateau Gardens 
in New York, which formerly was a church and is now used as a ban- 
quet hall or reception hall. 

The press was excluded from the convention so that the pretention 
of the convention being an open convention, of course, was immediately 
dissipated by the fact that members of the press were kept outside in 
an anteroom and could not see or hear any of the proceedings that took 

I, myself, went into the pressroom on 1 or 2 occasions for the pur- 
pose of finding out whether it was possible at least to hear and it was 
not possible to hear from this room. 

Mr. Morris. Did the Communists give any reason for excluding the 
press ? 

Mr. Rachlin. The reason given by Simon Gerson, I understand, 
who is the propaganda head of the Communist Party, was that if 
the press were present they might identify delegates from areas where, 
if it were known that these people were Communists, they would be 
seriously handicapped in their daily activities. 

This was an absurd statement because the press was all around the 
building and movie cameras were around the building photographing 
everybody who went in and out of the building. 


So the reason was absurd and I am quite sure was merely a reason 
and now the true basis for excluding the press is apparent. 

Now, there are some overall observations that may be of some 
interest. This, I think, should be pleasing to most people. There 
were very few young people present. I took particular notice of that. 
Even though I could not see the faces of many of the people — we 
were at a little table in the left of this hall so most of the delegates 
facing the front of the room had their backs toward us so it was not 
always possible to see the general appearance of all the people but 
it was quite clear that there were relatively few young people. Many 
less than perhaps might have been the case back 20 years ago when 
student activities were much more vigorous than they are at the 
present time. 

Another observation which may possibly be of some interest is that 

I would estimate that approximately 50 percent of the delegates were 
women. I am not qiiite certain of the significance of it. 

Senator Jenner.How many delegates would you estimate were 

Mr. Kachlin. Approximately 300, Senator. I am quite certain that 
figure is relatively accurate. How many people they represented is 
not clear because they are given in relative terms and one cannot be 

However, I made a rough estimate based on the culling together of 
statistics from various sources. At one point during the convention, 
the Communist Party announced that they were going to have approxi- 
mately 40 district representatives to the national committee of whom 

II would be from the State of New York, which was roughly the 
percentage of Communist Party members in New York to the whole 
United States. 

They indicated that New York actually had a higher percentage 
than the 11 would indicate. However, going through the list, say 
California would have 5 and Illinois 4, and so on. At the end of the 
reading a person got up and asked, "Well how about Missouri ? There 
doesn't seem to be any delegates from Missouri." The interesting 
answer was that "we gave representation on the basis of at least 100 
members," and apparently the inference was there were not 100 
members of the Communist Party in the State of Missouri. 

But using that — and the general figures that were talked about — 
the figure of 100 in that area seemed to be the basis of representation — 
so, figuring 40 delegates to the national convention, using their own 
figures, I think there probably is about 2,000 members in the State 
of New York, and perhaps 7,000 or 7,500 in the United States. 

Now, I have no special way of knowing that. That is an estimate I 
made trying to cull together statistics. 

Senator Jenner. Any Indiana delegate ? 

Mr. Raghlin. I will be able to tell you that in a moment. I took 
fairly copious notes. 

Senator Jenner. All right, sir. 

Mr. Morris. If you have representation of the various States 

Mr. Raghlin. I would be glad to read them into the record. 

Senator Jenner. That would be good. 

Mr. Raghlin. First of all, there were to be 20 delegates at large to 
the National Committee of the Communist Party under its new setup. 


And then there were to be 40 from the various districts as follows: 
New York, 11; California, 5; Illinois, 4; New Jersey, 2; eastern 
Pennsylvania, 2; Ohio, 2; the entire southern region of the United 
States, 2 ; New England, 1 ; western Pennsylvania, 1 ; Maryland, 1 ; 
Indiana, 1 ; Wisconsin, 1 ; Minnesota and the 2 Dakotas, 1 ; the Rocky 
Mountain region, 1 ; Oregon, 1 ; Washington and Idaho combined, 1 ; 
and this totals up to 40 and, together with the 20 at large, makes a 
total of 60 which will be the new national committee. The 40 from 
the districts, as of the closing of the convention, had not been selected 
partly because. I think, there is a good deal of internal jockeying in the 
Communist Party as to who is going to come out as topmost. 

Mr. Morris, Now, Mr. Rachlin, in connection with the numbers, 
your estimated number of 7,500, that is on the basis of just the broad 
representation ? 

Mr. Rachlin. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover has made the statement that there 
are now between twenty and twenty-five thousand Communists in the 
United States. 

Mr. Rachlin. He would have much better sources of information 
than I. This was a rough estimate that I made without having any 
special knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. For instance, based on your observation, there was no 
one from Missouri ? 

Mr. Rachlin. That is right — I am sorry, there was no one from 
Missouri, and the entire southern region had only two. Using a few 
little figures, a few little things like that, I made the estimate which 
could be inaccurate. 

Mr. Morris. If Missouri had less than 100 and was not represented 
then whatever the number, if they were less than 100, were presumably 
unrepresented ? 

Mr. Rachlin. If I understand what they did, they were somehow 
included in the southern region. I am not sure of that. 

Mr. Morris. That is right. We appreciate the difficulty. 

Mr. Rachlin. Now, I mentioned previously that approximately 50 
percent were women. Another observation that most of the delegates 
were elderly or getting along in years. There were very few young 
people. Among the limited number of spectators who obviously were 
attached, as I said, to the Communist movement in one form or an- 
other, the average age was even older. This, I took as a rather 
heartening sign that the Communist Party seems to be making no 
impression or very limited impression on the younger people in the 
country and I was particularly aware of that and my partner and I 
discussed that observation. 

Now, it was quite clear that the main concern of the Communist 
Party at the present time and one which should be of great interest 
to all Americans, is that they have felt and feel particularly their 
isolation from the rest of the United States. No matter what the 
political representation might be. Liberal, Conservative, Republican, 
Democratic, they feel they are completely out of touch with the United 
States and this convention was desig-ned to create the atmosphere and 
the machinery to return them to the main stream of American life. 

This was expressed in two generally different attitudes, though hav- 
ing the same overall purpose, in my estimation. 

93215— 57— pt. 53- 


One might be called the attitude of the unregenerate Stalinized 
position led by William Z. Foster who, of course, has been the leader 
of the Communist Party in the United States perhaps since its very 
beginning, I guess. Foster is an elderly man — of some 75 years of 
age — whose introductory speech was read to the convention by Ben 
Davis, who had been some years ago a city councilman in the city of 
New York. 

The other position which follows some of the more deviating posi- 
tions of the Communist Party is led by John Gates. John Gates is 
the editor of the Daily Worker, and his general attitude, and of his 
followers, is that the Communist Party must create a kind of inde- 
pendence from the Soviet Government. It must appear to make de- 
cisions on its own and based on what they consider the merits rather 
than the position given to it by the Soviet Government. 

Senator Jenner. Did the words "national Communist" appear ? 

Mr. Rachlin. That term, itself, did not appear as such but Foster 
in his introductory statement to the convention the first day. Senator, 
came very close to suggesting or using those terms, because he com- 
pared Gates and his followers and the whole group that circulates in 
and through the Daily Worker to being modern Browderists, and 
modern Lovestoneites, the term meaning, as he explained the term, \ 
Lovestone being the Communist Party secretary who preceded ] 
Browder and was an exponent of the idea of American exceptionalism, ! 
which was the term used. America was supposed to be the exception 
to the general Marxist-Leninist principles of revolution and Foster ^ 
accused Gates of following that position and also accused Gates of | 
following the position of Browder who used the term "20th century , 
Americanism," again trying to create a kind of Communist within the : 
framework of American life and Gates, in his position, is supposed to | 
be following that kind of thing because Gates does want to abolish the | 
Communist Party as a political party and keep it up as a kind of \ 
political association. ; 

It is something less than a party, and Foster uses the old Stalinist j 
terms in referring to his own opponents. The terms they used which ' 
were mildly amusing, Gates is a rightwinger or opportunist and also i 
he is a liquidationist. This apparently a new term of abuse which the | 
Communist Party uses to refer to the people who wish to do what . 
Gates does, that is, abolish the Communist Party and create this ' 
Communist political association which, by the way, had been done for \ 
a brief time in the middle forties during the last years of Browder's '. 
term as a general secretary to the Communist Party. 

But, when Browder was expelled after the famous letter from | 
Jacques Duclos, the leader of the French Communists back in the 
middle forties, the Communist Party re-created itself from the political ' 
association. j 

Interestingly enough, there was another Jacques Duclos letter read 
to the convention, which was a similarly hard letter, urging the Ameri- 
can Communist Party to take a hard line favorable — undeviatingly 
favorable — to the Soviet Government, and Foster, in his introductory 
speech which I said was read to the convention by this Ben Davis, ' 
urged support of the Duclos letter and, in other words, wanted all-out 
support of the Soviet Government, and, of course, it is well known i 
that the French Communist Party is among the most Stalinist of all ' 
the Communist parties throughout the world. 


Now, interestingly enough, Dennis — who was the national secretary 
of the Communist Party and I see, according to the daily press today, 
is due to testify here Monday— said, "We listen to Mr. Duclos' letter 
but we reject it." 

Now, this again is undoubtedly part of the general tactic of trying 
to bring the American Communist Party back into the mainstream of 
American life. And so Dennis took the position in his remarks that 
they should reject the Duclos letter, they should create internal Com- 
munist Party democracy and permit dissents from Communist Party 

On that point, however, I would like to show the inherent contra- 
diction and how these words are really tactical rather than basic in 
belief. There was a resolution passed on "democratic centralism" and 
"monolithic unity." These are words that are Communist words; no- 
body else that I know of uses these terms. But it is interesting to see 
from the last paragraph of this resolution that it is quite clear that 
their desire to have internal democracy in the party is merely tactical 
and for the purpose of fooling the public. I would like to read this 
short statement referring to "monolithic unity." The Communists gen- 
erally mean by "monolithic unity" a unified position that all follow 
undeviatingh\ And here is what this says in the resolution : 

As to "monolithic unity," originally this term meant simply a common ideology 
or outlook as opposed to a Marxist ideology. In practice it came to mean a rigid 
conformity of views on all matters of theory, policy, and tactics. The concept of 
a common ideology must be retained as essential to a Marxist party. 

Here is the sentence that is the key to how tactical this is rather than 
basic : "But the term should be dropped because of the harmful prac- 
tices and connotations that have groAvn around it." 

In other words, they are going to have monolithic unity but they 
are going to call it spinach or something else in the hopes that we 
will be taken in by this change. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Eachlin, may I break in at this point? Where 
you are talking about differences between various groups — Mr. Chair- 
man, we have a source of information from among the Communists 
themselves who has been reporting to the subcommittee on these events 
and, as you may know, he himself will testify before this subcommittee, 
but I think it probably will be restricted to executive session. 

I would like to read to you his analysis which we have just received 
from him, this man who is going to testify and to ask you for your 
comments on his particular statement : 

Because of certain facts which came to my attention, it was possible for me 
to submit in my recent statement to the committee a forecast of the character 
and the tone as well as the suggested analysis of specific decisions, public and 
private announcements, of the recent Communist Party, United States of Amer- 
ica convention several months before it took place. The convention itself con- 
firms my previous statement that the controversies and final decisions to break 
with Moscow were all deliberately prearranged and, what is even more sinister, 
all of it was done under the direct guidance of and with the approval of the 

To accomplish this result, the Kremlin played upon real convictions and differ- 
ences of opinion on the part of leaders and rank and file of the American party 
over an 11-month period and achieved their final desired result in the recent unit 
convention. It is unimportant that certain principal participants in the con- 
vention did not and still do not know they were pawns in the Kremlin-controlled 
farce. The purpose of the so-called break with Moscow and the avowed aban- 
donment of force and violence along with one's party dictatorship, etc., is the 


path to a "Socialist America" by democratic means, is to secure legality of the 
American arm of the Kremlin in order to build a large mass party out of the 
present decimated organization within the next 2 years. 

I wonder whether you would comment on this man's observation. 

Mr. Rachlin. I would be glad to. There is little doubt in my mind, 
I would agree basically with the comments made by your informant. 
There is no doubt, the positions taken by the three different groups, 
the group led by Foster, the group led by Eugene Dennis, and the 
group led by John Gates, while they have the appearance to differ they 
are not essentially different, and the differences are tactical rather 
than philosophic. 

Furthermore, all three of these people are longtime Communist 
Party leaders. This is no new blood coming to the fore for asserting 
new principles. These are the people who have led the Communist 
Party for the last generation, and I find it difficult to believe that these 
differences are more than how to get back into the good graces of the 
American people, and not symptomatic of a real basic difference of 

I think, if there were a real basic difference of philosophy among 
the 3 or any one of the 3, that person would not be long for the Com- 
munist Party. I think the thing to do, however, before any of us here, 
this committee or any American who watches this thing carefully, we 
ought to at least — I won't say just suspend judgment — we ought to 
watch carefully for the purposes of seeing how far Gates is going to 
go in his so-called position toward greater democracy. I, for example, 
will try to watch it as closely as I can. As I even told one of the peo- 
ple who was the so-called host of this delegation, a national committee- 
man by the name of Blumberg, this was only a tactical question ; that 
I could not see any serious change in the Communist Party at all. 

What I told him at the time was — 

it is all well and good for you people to go through the pretense of creating 
criticism of the Soviet Union of acts that happened several years ago, but I do 
not see any criticism of any current activity. For example, all Americans, no 
matter what their personal political views of a unified position on Hungary, we, 
all of us, dread the Soviet intervention in Hungary. We all recognize it as 
interference in the affairs of a small state trying to come out from the Communist 
control. And yet you people have not criticized the Soviet Government for what 
is obvious — 

using your words — "Soviet imperialism." 

When I see that, maybe I will take a new look but until that time, I am con- 
vinced that your actions are just tactical differences and not basic. 

Therefore, in general, while I do not know anything about the plans 
of the Soviet Union with regard to this convention. I would basically 
agree with the conclusions that you read to me in that statement. 

Mr. Morris. Was there, in fact, any resolution on Hungary? 

]Mr. Rachlin. None whatsoever on Hungary and, interestingly 
enough, there was a minor undercurrent among some of the unimpor- 
tant people there 

Senator Jenner. Didn't you hear anything discussed at all ? 

Mr. Rachlin. There were things discussed. For example, the 
things that were discussed were really technical points like how they 
should use the term "Marxism-Leninism." 

The Gates crowd wanted to soften the use of the term so it would 
not appear they were following Marxist-Leninist dogma. "Wliereas, 


Foster was insisting that there be undeviating wholehearted and com- 
plete unswerving support of the term "Marxism-Leninism." However, 
there were a few of the delegates who got up on the floor and actually 
made statements which 

Senator Jenner. I want to interrupt to state that you may go ahead. 
I have to attend another meeting. Senator AVatkins will be here to 
relieve me. 

Mr. Rachlin. Shall I continue ? 

Mr. Morris. Yes, continue, Mr. Rachlin. 

Mr. Rachlin. For example, there w^as a delegate who got up and 
said that Foster advocated a converted aspect of Soviet policy. This 
antagonized everybody. He said under Foster the Communist Party 
waited for the Soviet Union to support peace before the United States 
Communist Party did. 

And this delegate went on to add that the United States Conununist 
Party must see the contradictions in the Soviet Communist Party and 
not wait to receive the line from the Soviet Government. 

This was just an miimportant delegate. He said, for example, that 
Pravda, the Soviet daily paper, does not print any stories about the 
United States Communist resolutions which were at all critical in 
any way of the Soviet Government except Dennis', and Dennis' state- 
ments were excised. Then he made a vigorous attack on Foster as 
being one who was just following undeviatingly the Soviet line. 

I am just trying to show here that while the leaders of the party 
are going in one direction, there is some kind of midercurrent among 
some of the people, a few of them seemed generally disturbed. For 
example, a young woman from California, whose name I do not know, 
got up and said, "It is not enough to say we did not know what was 
going on," that is referring to the Stalinist murders and things of 
that sort — she w^ent on to say, "Oiu- policy" — meaning the Communist 
Party policy — "in the United States was complete subservience to 

Oddly enough, there was a fair rippling of applause at the finishing 
of this statement. I thinlv this is a good sign. It means there are 
some people in the Communist Party who may be preparing to ac- 
tually break from the Communist Party. There was one girl who 
got up and criticized the leadership of the Communist Party. She 
said, "You taught us to know more about Russian history than about 
American history. This influence is not going to carry the party by 
even the remotest possibility. The party is still in the hands of the 
professionals and will be for a long time. 

"But I hope that some day some of us will be able to develop ways 
of encouraging these people to refuse the Communist Party and rejoin 
the rest of the United States." 

Mr. Morris. On that point, the subcommittee is very desirous of 
trying to determine if there are defectors and who the defectors are, 
because naturally they are prime sources of evidence. We are very 
eagerly looking for someone who is a defector and someone who would 
testify about the work of the Communist Party. 

Did you learn of any particular defectors? 

Mr. Rachlin. No, except this : Several of the newspapermen had 
received a story from somebody inside the convention, and the rumor 
was going around to the effect that, at the end of the convention, some- 
body was going to get up and severely criticize all the leaders : Foster 


for being no different from what he always has been, and Gates for 
selling out a liberal position on these issues, and the rumor was that 
he was going to get up and say there was no resolution on Hungary, 
there was no resolution on the Soviet anti-Semitism. But, as far as 
I know, this event never took place and who this person was, I do 
not know. But there is no doubt there were rumors going around 
that this was going to happen. 

Mr. Morris. You say there was no resolution on Soviet anti- 
Semitism ? 

Mr. Rachlin. No resolution on it; no, sir. This was obviously a 
cause of undercurrent because this had been publicized throughout 
the press of the United States, I guess tliroughout the press of tlie 
world. This was one of the issues that was completely avoided. 

And nothing was said at all. 

Now, there are 1 or 2 other points that I miglit indicate. Of the 
20 people who were elected to the national committee of the Com- 
munist Party as delegates at large, I have their names — I was saying 
of the 20 people who were elected to the Communist national com- 
mittee at large, I tried to estimate from the information that I heard 
how they divided it among the 3 groups. And the way that I have 
it of those 20, I would have 6 or 7 among the Gates group, approxi- 
mately 6 among the Dennis group, and 7 among the Foster group. 
There obviously is some fight for power going on, because no new 
national chairman or new general secretary was chosen. I think the 
conclusion from that was that they could not agree among them- 
selves who was goin^ to hold the seat of power on this score. 

I made a rough estimate of the people in the different groups. They 
read off the people who were elected. While one could not be sure 
who was in what group, there was some evidence of who belonged 
to whom. As I indicated, they were fairly equally divided. 

Now tliere are 1 or 2 things that we might watch for in the future. 
For example, a term we are going to hear with great frequency from 
now on, which is going to be a Communist slogan, will be the anti- 
monopoly coalition. This term was used by all sides and it indicates, 
following up your point, that differences may have been more appar- 
ent than real. Everybody, whether it was forced or real, used the 
term "antimonopoly coalition." And we can rest assured that that 
term is one we are going to hear at great length. 

Another thing that they made quite clear at the convention and 
which, in a way, was disturbing, is that the Communist Party is 
going to make an extra special effort to infiltrate into Negro mass 
organizations. I read in tlie press later that Roy Wilkins, who is 
the head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, publicly repudiated them, but there is no doubt from the 
nature of the national committee elected — approximately 5 or 6 of the 
20 were Negroes — that the Communist Party is going to make an 
extremely special effort to infiltrate and take over control of Negro 
groups. I trust this will not happen and it is one we will all have to 
watch carefully. 

Mr. Morris. Tell me this, Mr. Rachlin : Would it be your opinion 
that, at the present time, the Communist Party as a mass organization 
is not successful now, and one of the purposes of this convention 
was to try to arrange a framework wliereby they could get back in 
operation as a mass organization ? 


Mr. Eachlin, That statement, Judge, is absolutely correct. There 
is no doubt they are not a mass organization. They are, fortunately, 
completely isolated from all general activities in the American life. 
I have the feeling, from the comments that were made, that this is 
true not only of their political life but also their social life. Their 
social life, as a result of their being isolated by all Americans, is only 
with themselves. They have no contact with people except in the most 
casual way, except Communist Party members. 

Mr. Morris. Now we are talking about the Communists as Com- 
munists ? 

Mr. Eachun. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. If there is — and the subcommittee is constantly en- 
countering it — evidence of covert activity, miderground activity, of 
secret Communist Party members who do not operate as Communists, 
therefore do not participate in the so-called Communist mass move- 
ment ; who even have instructions, not to associate with Communists, 
then when we talk about the diminution of the Communist forces we 
are talking about the Communist organization and not the under- 
ground ? 

Mr. Eachlin. That is right. In view of the fact they had some 
outside observers like myself present, there was no evidence whatso- 
ever of any underground or covert activity. Everybody there, except 
the observers, was an open member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Watkins, may I mention this is Mr. Carl 
Eachlin, a New York attorney who has attended the recent Commu- 
nist Party Convention in New York as an unofficial observer. He 
represented the New York Chapter of the American Civil Liberties 
Union. He has attended virtually all the sessions of the convention. 
He is a trained political observer. He represents many trade unions 
which have a Communist problem within them, and he has consented, 
at our request, to come here to give us his firsthand observations and 
analysis of the recent Commmiist Party convention. As you know, 
Senator Jenner had to leave to attend another session. 

Senator Watkins. Let me ask you this question : Was this a closed 
convention ? 

Mr. Eachlin". Senator, it was closed with the exception of a few 
observers like myself. It was closed to the press. There were some 
guests there, but they were obviously in one way or another identified 
with the Communist Party. The press was not admitted. 

As a matter of fact, because of that, the press would grab hold of 
me to give them some details, and I was in a sense responsible for some 
of the stories appearing in the public press. The New York Times 
and the New York Herald-Tribune in fact quoted me on some of the 
things that took place because they could not get any reliable informa- 
tion from within the convention itself, except the handouts of the 
propaganda office of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Morris. In that comiection, were the handouts given by Gates 
a fair representation of what was going on inside ? 

Mr. Eachlin. Gerson was handling all the press releases for the 
Communist Party. They were merely the briefest summaries, one 
might say. There were no details as to what took place. They would 
not give information on who said what, except in the case of a man 
like Dennis or Foster. 


Every effort was made to cover up any real discussion that might 
have taken place. All that was given out was just the vote, and the 
resolution was such-and-such, and a copy of the resolution that was 
passed; but there were no efforts made as to any discussion that might 
have taken place. 

Mr. Morris. There was an effort made, at least some few delegates 
would like to have a resolution on Hungary and Soviet anti-Semitism ? 

Mr. Rachlin. That is right, it was quite clear that some of the 
delegates wanted those resolutions, and the press knew it. Appar- 
ently they had some representatives in the Communist Party that 
advised them. 

Mr. Morris. Did you see any evidence that the Communists were 
adapting and regulating the machinery of their party in such a way 
that they had an eye on the Smith Act prosecutions ? 

Mr. Rachlin. From my observations, there is no doubt that that 
was one of their objectives. And they had a special resolution on the 
Smith Act which I have in front of me. And the whole tenor of the 
convention was to create the appearance of separating themselves 
from the international Communist conspiracy, with the idea they 
could then defend under the Smith Act and that they were not part 
of the Communist conspiracy and they might defend in other areas 
of government security or industrial security where there would be 
the question of being part of the apparatus of Communist conspiracy. 
There is no doubt their terminology is geared to create the appear- 
ance of separation so they can take a stronger position in court. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, if they passed a formal resolution and 
tho resolution purported to be the official position of the American 
Communist Party which is in real variance with the organization, by 
promulgating those official positions, they feel they can possibly con- 
fuse the courts and confuse the Government? 

Mr. Rachlin. I am sure that is what they hope to do. There is no 
doubt that they hope to create that illusion. 

But that was just part of the whole atmosphere, Judge Morris. 
That is part of it, but they are trying to create the impression that 
they are good Americans and maybe their views are different from 
yours or mine, but that they are really good Americans and that their 
main interest is the United States. 

That is the impression they are going to try to create. And they are 
going to use the term — they are going to try to aline themselves with 
all kinds of groups, even refer to the fact they want to aline them- 
selves with conservative groups who might be interested in opposing 
what they call the coalition of large corporations into monopolies. 
And that is going to be one of their big slogans, the antimonopoly co- 
alition and that is one of the things we will have to watch for. 

Mr. Morris. Thank you, Mr. Rachlin. 

Senator, do you have any questions ? 

Senator Watkins. You may proceed. 

Mr. Morris. One other thing, you are acquainted with the term 
"Aesopian language" ? 

Mr. Rachlin. I have read about it, I am familiar with the term. 

Mr. Morris. Can you comment whether or not there was any Aeso- 
pian language used in connection with the convention ? 


Mr. Eachlin. Well, there is no doubt — for example, that para- 
graph I read from their resolution on democratic centralism and 
monolithic unity is a use of the Aesopian language. And they are 
very blunt about stating that they are going to try to give the ap- 
pearance of one thing so as to make people believe they mean some- 
thing else. 

In other words, they are going to use a term which will have a spe- 
cific meaning to them, which they hope will confuse you and me and 
the American public. All three positions of the Communist Party 
when they criticize the Soviet Government or any activity of any Com- 
munist Party throughout the world is a kind of use of Aesopian lan- 
guage, because it is done with a view to creating an illusion which 
most of them — almost all — do not reallj^ believe. 

Some of the members of the Communist Party undoubtedly do be- 
lieve the criticism of the Soviet Union that the Communist Party 
passes out. But among the leadership, there is little belief it is more 
than a tactical question with them. 

Just perhaps a few more observations I might make : Some of the 
leading well-known Communists were not reelected to the national 
committee. Betty Gannett, who has been the subject of prosecutions 
under the Smith iVct and been a well-known Communist for many 
years, was apparently badly beaten in her efforts to be elected to the 
national committee. 

Simon Gerson was defeated for the national committee. I referred 
to him before as the one in charge of propaganda. Blumberg, who 
had been a member of the committee for a long time, was likewise 
beaten for election. How the ballots were comited, of course, I do not 
know but there were actually, from the appearance, half the number 
of people running who were defeated. That was interesting and it 
may be because — even if there are no real differences in ideology, there 
is a difference in the efforts to obtain power, and I am sure that the 
efforts to elect people to the national committee was an effort to create 
a power situation whereby one or the other of the three groups could 
assert enough power. On the question of continuing the Commmiist 
Party as a political organization, the group led by Dennis supported! 
the group led by Foster. 

Dennis wants to continue the Conununist Party as a political organ- 
ization as opposed to Gates, who openly stated that he wants to termi- 
nate the Coimnunist Party as a party, but does want to continue it 
as a political association. 

On the other hand, on resolutions that had anything to do with 
the program, the Dennis group by and large supported Gates group 
against Foster. For example, the draft resolution, which was the 
subject of all their programmatic material which indicates the efforts 
that the Communist Party has gone to to create the appearance of 
rejoining the American people, was supported by Dennis and rather 
severely criticized by Foster. Foster, for exainple, was for all-out 
support of the Soviet Government in its activities in Hungary, and 
so forth, whereas Dennis and the others play around with words that 
all add up to nothing on the subject. 

So that, I think the thing perhaps that we can do in the future is 
to watch the power fight. Because the fact that they could not elect 
a national chairman and a general secretary indicates to me that they 
are in a power fight. It may be of use to all of us— because, if it 

93215— 57— pt. 53 3 


becomes a real power fight and people are expelled or leave, obviously 
such people can be the sources of great information to all of us. 

If I may utter one word of caution: This is the thing that might 
be of help to all of us: One of the things I have learned over the 
years in having to watch the Communist Party because of the situa- 
tion mentioned earlier by me, was that the Communist Party, unlike 
any other political group in the United States — I do not care whether 
they be Republican, Democratic, or Socialist- — is the whole life to 
the people who are its members. It is not merely something you do 
once in a while on maj-be regular occasions, or argue about with your 
friends while listening to the radio, it is everything. The Communist 
Party member does nothing which, in his own mind, is not in some 
way identifying him as a Communist Party member, whether it is his 
job or social life or politics or as a member of a trade union. And the 
word of caution I want to utter — and I do not want to sound like a psy- 
chologist because I am not, even though in one of the trade unions 
I deal with I deal with a lot of social workers — it is not like the 
ordinary American who disagrees with his political party. It in- 
volves an emotional upheaval. In encouraging the people to break 
with the Communist Party, I think one of the things we have not 
recognized strong enough is this difficulty they face. 

I was speaking to the reporter who interviewed Howard Fast, when 
he broke with the Communist Party just a few weeks ago. You 
know Howard Fast was a moderately popular novelist and was asso- 
ciated with the Communist Party a long time. He broke with the 
Communist Party a month or so ago. And the reporter indicated 
very clearly that this had been on Fast's mind for many, many months 
but it involved a great effort on his part to come to the final break. 
So this is a thing we perhaps ought to try to understand a little more. 
And we ought to encourage them. The first thing they do is — of 
course they all react almost unanimously in the same way, that their 
emotional break is different, and they are not going to become a public 
spectacle and discuss internal affairs of the Communist Party. I 
think the thing that we have learned about such people is that all of 
them eventually will discuss these matters publicly and disclose what 
information they have. Many of them find it difficult at first. And 
the only word of caution that I want to urge — if I may be so pre- 
sumptions — is to say that we should try to recognize this difficulty 
among some of these people who have this emotional difficulty ana. 
encourage them and perhaps play along with it for a while, because 
our experience has shown that every one of the people who have broken 
with the Communist Party at one point or another, in a matter of 
months or maybe a year or more have come forward and disclosed 
information which has been of great value to all of us. 

So this is the thing that I have watched over the years, and I recog- 
nize the difficulty because it is important for all of us to have the 

At the same time, if we are overzealous, we may create a kind of 
blocking which would prevent the person from disclosing the necessary 

Mr. Morris. I might mention that the subcommittee has found that 
to be very true. We had recent dealings with somebody who has 
defected recently and he has indicated that he would be willing to 
talk, but did not want to be subpenaed and go on the record. 


Now, if we want to be strictly formal about it, the Senate com- 
mittee should not deal with anyone who has broken with the Com- 
munist Party unless he is under oath. But we realize he is emotionally 
involved and by applying strict attitudes toward him, we may freeze 
him in a certain position. And we have found it takes at least 3 years 
for a man who is a Communist to become completely detached so he 
can be in a position to see the world situation clearly enough and his 
own situation clearly enough that he can begin to give testimony and 
evidence against the conspiracy. 

Mr. Rachlix. I have found that to be the fact and I am very happy 
to hear Avhat you have said, Judge, because we are all anxious to get 
this information. The reason I mention that specifically now is 
there is an undercurrent — they are not among the top leaders, because 
they are too hardened and too dedicated to break away, but I feel, 
because of the Hungarian situation, because of the revelations of 
Stalinism and the revelations of Soviet anti-Semitism, there are going 
to be public breaks in the not too distant future. And we ought to 
encourage this. The circumstances of events over the past few years 
have made it difficult for the Communist Party. 

If I may make this further one last comment : In the thirties it was 
possible, for various reasons, for the Communist Party to work with 
other groups as they did. One of tlie reasons was that the great pub- 
lic enemy at that time was not Russia but Xazi Germany. jSIost of us 
were concerned with Nazi Germany, Russia only as a secondary force. 
Second, none of us had tlie ex])erience in the thirties that we have now 
as to what Connnunists are, actually, what they are like. 

But at the ])resent time quite certainly the efforts of the Commu- 
nists to come back to the main stream of American life- — because all 
Americans and most people throughout the world recognize the Soviet 
Union as the great hungry power trying to alisorb free peoples and 
destroy democratic government. 

So their efforts — they will not haA^e the same friendly atmosphere 
they might have experienced in the 1930-s, and Avhile we should watch 
carefully, I do not think we ought to be too frightened that they are 
trying to come back into American life, I do not see any serious pos- 
sibilitv of it becoming a strono- influence. 

Senator Watkins. You do not think for a moment the American 
people are frightened about the possibilities ? 

Mr. Rachlin. Not even remotely, Senator. 

Senator Watkins. You used the word "frightened." 

Mr, Rachlin. I misused the term. What I meant is — I am trying 
to think what I did actually use. 

Senator Watkins. We can be vigilant but not frightened. 

Mr. Rachlin. That is right: there is nothing to be afraid of at all. 
The American people have had a lot of education on this subject, 
through all the legislative activity, through good public groups, and 
what not. There is not much danger that the Communists will gain 
any influence in any of the mass organizations in the United States. 

Senator Watkixs. Maybe you have already expressed just lu-w you 
came to cover this convention— did you take notes? 

Mr. Rachlin. I took rather detailed notes which I have in front 
of me. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Watkins, he has been reading from the notes 
he actually took at the time. 


Mr. RACHLiisr. I have on several occasions referred to my notes. 

Senator Watkins. Did you make direct quotes ? 

Mr. Rachlin. In 1 or 2 cases I actually made direct quotes. 

Senator Watkins. From what? In other words, what you have 
been giving us is a summary ? 

Mr. Rachlin. Yes ; based on my recollection and my notes. 

Senator Watkins. How long did this convention last ? 

Mr. Rachlin. It ran over a period of 4 days, beginning on the Sat- 
urday, a week ago, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, and the 
convention closed last Tuesday evening a week ago. 

Senator Watkins. Did you attend all sessions ? 

Mr. Rachlin. The sessions were all day long — I am sorry, Senator. 
I attended all the sessions but not all parts of all sessions. There 
were times that I had duties at my office which unhappily took me 
away. And, also, family duties — playing with the children took part 
of my time, too. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Rachlin, on behalf of — Senator Jenner asked me 
to thank the witness for him before he left — on behalf of Senator 
Jenner and the chairman of the committee and myself, I want to 
express our appreciation to you for arranging your business so that 
you could come here and tell us about this convention. 

Mr. Rachlin. I was happy to be here. 

Senator Watkins. I join with my colleague. Senator Jenner, and 
also Judge Morris in thanking you. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, the witness tomorrow will be Mr. Beichman, 
who was the reporter for Christian Science Monitor who covered 
every one of the sessions at this convention. However, he was not 
at the vantage point of Mr. Raclilin. But he is scheduled to be a 
witness tomorrow. And we may have one other witness. 

Mr. Rusher. With your approval we would like to place in the 
public record of the subcommittee certain documents submitted to 
us by Mr. Nicholas who testified before the subcommittee on May 10, 
1956; records of the Communist Party and travel agency which 
arranged transportation for the Communist Party. 

(The above material appears as an appendix to pt. 23: Scope of 
Soviet Activity in the United States.) 

Mr. Rusher. Secondly, a continuation of the testimony of Dr. 
Andriy ve who testified before this committee last year, a f oiTiier Soviet 
citizen who defected to the West and who has made a careful analysis 
of the meaning of de-Stalinization. 

(The above material appears in pt. 45: Scope of Soviet Activity.) 

Mr. Rusher. Thirdly, a memorandiun prepared by the Interna- 
tional Commission of Jurists on the Hungarian situation m the light 
of the Geneva Convention of 1949. 

(The above memorandum appears as appendix I following the testi- 
mony in this volmne.) 

Mr. Rusher. Fourthly, three articles with regard to recent subject 

matter before the committee on the question of Spanish gold now held 

by the Soviet Union. These articles appear in the New York Times 

on Sunday, January 6, Thui-sday, January 10, on Monday, January 21. 

Senator Watkins. Of this year? 

Mr. Rusher. Of this year. 

(The articles above referred to appear in pt. 51 : Scope of Soviet 
Activity. ) 


Mr, Rusher. Lastly, a statement by the executive council of the 
AFL-CIO dated February 4, 1957, entitled "The Situation Behind 
the Iron Curtain." 

With your consent, we would like these placed in the public record. 

Senator Watkins. They may be placed in the public record. 

(The AFL-CIO statement referred to above appears as appendix II 
following the testimony in this volume.) 

Mr. Morris. May we stand adjourned until 11 o'clock tomorrow 
morning ? 

Senator Watkins. The committee will be in recess until tomorrow 
morning at 11 o'clock. 

(At 11 : 45 a. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 11 a. m., 
Thursday, February 21, 1957.) 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF the Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws, of the 
commiitee on the judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 : 10 a. m., in room 
457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner and Hruska. 

Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel ; and "William A. Rusher, 
associate counsel. 

Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order. 

Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, before beginning the session today, I 
would like to put into our public record a statement in connection with 
the subpena that was issued for Ludwig Rajchman. We have here a 
confirmation from the Western Union that the telegram that Senator 
Eastland sent after Mr. Rajchman had rejected our subpena and threAv 
it on the floor, the subpena that served notice on him that he was due 
down here, that the telegram was delivered at 7 : 30 a. m. yesterday at 
the Hotel Westbury in New York. 

I would like to make that statement part of the record. 

Senator Jenner. It may become part of the record. 

Mr. Morris. The witness is Arnold Beichman. 

Will you stand and be sworn ? 

Senator Jenner. Do you swear that the testimony given in this hear- 
ing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. 


Senator Jenner. Will you give your name and address for the rec- 
ord, please? 

Mr. Beichman. Arnold Beichman, 20 West 84th Street, New York. 

Senator Jenner. What is your occupation ? 

Mr. Beichman. I am a newspaperman. 

Senator Jenner. For what newspaper ? 

Mr. Beichman. I am a contributor to the Christian Science Moni- 
tor and the AFTv-CIO News, and the New Leader. 

Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. You also have some other positions ? 



Mr. Beichman. I am cliairman of the board of directors of the 
American Committee for Cultural Freedom, which consists of several 
hundred cultural figures and scientific personnel who are opposed to 
commmiism and have been fighting it for several years. 

The chairman of that national committee is Prof. Sidney Hook, of 
the New York University Department of Philosophy. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Beichman, in connection with that particular expe- 
rience, the experience that you have set forth, you drew on that partic- 
ular background, did you not, in connection with the assignment that 
you had last week of covering the New York Communist Party con- 
vention ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you appeared at the convention in what 
capacity ? 

Mr. Beichman. As a reporter for the AFL-CIO News, and for 
the Christian Science Monitor. 

Mr. Morris. Did you cover every session of the convention ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir — that is, you couldn't cover the sessions, 
because thej^ wouldn't let you in. AVe were the pariahs. And we had 
to wait in a little anteroom which was called the press room. So, to 
that extent, we covered the sessions. 

Senator Jenner. In other words, it was a closed session, to all 
intents and purposes ? 

Mr. Beichman. It certainly was. Senator. 

Senator Jenner. And all you got was handouts ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir — well, we got oral comments, but it was 
impossible to follow through with any questions, because the spokes- 
anen would simply say, "I don't know." And when we would ask, 
could we talk to, say, Foster, or Dennis, or Gates, they would say, 
"Well, we will see," so that what we got were self-serving declara- 
tions, but without any opportunity to cross-examine the responsible 
leaders of the Communist Party as to what they meant. 

For example, they said in one statement they gave us that there 
have been mistakes made in the Soviet Union, but some of these mis- 
takes are bemg corrected — I am paraphrasing. I asked the spokes- 
man, "What mistakes are you referring to, and which mistakes have 
been corrected?" 

"The statement speaks for itself." 

I asked, could we interview any of the leaders. 

"We will try." 

We never got any satisfaction. At one point we signed a petition, 
three of us, three reporters, which we submitted to Simon Gerson, 
who was the deputy spokesman, three reporters, one from the Herald 
Tribune, one from the New York Times, and myself, saying we 
wanted to see Jolin Gates. Apparently this had some influence. 
Gates came out and said he couldn't talk, because there was a gentle- 
men's agreement not to give any private interviews. 

That was the extent of our contact with the leadership. 

Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Beichman, the first report that proceeded from 
the convention, the first reportorial report that proceeded from the 
convention, indicated pretty generally — it is hard to generalize — I 
have here now the newspaper articles of three established east-coast 
newspapers. The headline on one is: "Reds in U. S. Vote to Cast 


Off Moscow." The second is: "U. S. Reds Vote End Control by 
Soviet." Third: "U. S. Reds Quit Foster and Kremlin." They are 
the headlines in the newspapers of February 13, the day after the 
final session. 

Now, the subcommittee has been looking into this, and we find 
pretty generally that Gerson, Si Gerson, as public-relations official, 
was in fact giving out handouts as to what happened at tlie conven- 
tion, whereas what actually happened there was at variance with 
what he gave out. 

Now, I wonder if you could generally state whether or not, on the 
basis of your having access to whatever you — you tell us about that — 
whether, in fact, the Reds in the United States have voted to cast off 
Moscow, whether they have voted to end control by the Soviet, 
whether they have quit Foster and the Kremlin. 

Mr. Beichman. Judge Morris, the only way the Communist Party 
of America can be independent of Moscow is to be anti-Moscow. There 
is no way it can be anything else but that. 

If I may analogize for a moment, supposing we think to 1938, 
when we had a Nazi bund in America, and supposing the Nazi bund 
had a convention and, "We are going to be independent of Nazi 
Germany ; from here on in we are going to interpret Mein Kampf the 
way we think, according to American conditions. However, we still 
believe in nazism, we still think that Hitler is a great fellow." 

Would anybody for a moment say that the Nazi bund had become 
inde])endent of Nazi Germany ? 

I think the analogy would hold here, because the Communist Party 
today, is in what the agencies on Madison Avenue call the soft sell 
phase. They are not pushing quite as hard. We used to say there 
was a hard sell in advertising, and there is a soft sell. And the 
Communist Party on the propaganda level is in the soft sell stage; 
it has to be. 

There have been some very serious ideological problems in the 
Comminiist world. They have had an uprising in East Germany in 
1953. You liad a Poznan uprising. You had a Hungarian uprising. 
You have had an uprising even in Tiflis, in the heart of Soviet Georgia. 

These have revealed an ideological bankruptcy. In the days of 
Stalin when Russia suffered defeats, as, for example, under Hitler, 
under Mussolini, under Franco, those were external defeats which 
they could weather, because this showed they were resisting the so- 
called march of Fascism. To the Communist movement, internal 
defeats of this kind where the masses behind the Iron Curtain refused 
to acce])t Soviet dictation, and thereby demonstrate the bankruptcy 
of Soviet ideology, this becomes a much mure t,erious problem within 
the Communist Party throughout the world, particularly in Western 
Europe, where you have seen some defection, in France, or in Italy, 
among intellectuals, and among some of the trade unions. 

Because of that I think the Communist Party in America has had 
to go into its soft sell phase. It did that once before — as a matter of 
fact, it did it twice before — in the midthirties, with its popular fronts, 
and during World War II under the aegis of Earl Browder, when they 
suddenly came out and said they were willing to accept the united 
front with anybody who believed in winning the war, including the 
National Association of Manufacturers. 

93215 — 57 — pt. 53 4 


That is a quotation from Earl Browder. I don't think the NAM 
went for it. 

However, at the present time the Communist Party is probably 
in one of its strongest positions that it has been in, despite its defeats, 
because tests demonstrated quite clearly that it has shucked off a lot 
of its weak links, so-called, and what they are down to is the hard core. 

For example, out of the 20 members elected to the national com- 
mittee, 14 are men who have either been in jail or are under indict- 
ment under the Smith Act, or for harboring fugitives — 14 out of 
the 20 under indictment for harboring are in jail — that is a hard 
core, because those are people who are willing to give up their freedom. 

For what? They know perfectly well there is no chance of estab- 
lishing communism in the near future. It is to protect and to nurture 
and to strengthen Soviet foreign policy. 

In other words, what you have seen at this convention is, they have 
seen perhaps the errors of their tactics, but not the errors of their 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Beichman, if I may, to get back to the first 
question I asked you, were you able to draw any conclusion on the 
basis of your analysis of the resolutions that ultimately came to you, 
and your general understanding of what went on there, as to whether 
or not the Communists in the United States did vote to cut off 
Moscow ? 

Mr. Beichman. No, sir. And I think it is easily provable. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat is easily provable? 

Mr. Beichman. That they have not voted to cut themselves off from 
Moscow. They can't. 

Mr. Morris. Well, I wonder if you would address yourself to 
whether as a matter of fact they did on did not? 

Mr. Beichman. They did not. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us why you make that statement? 

Mr. Beichman. For examj^le, cutting itself off from Moscow would 
entail certain specific acts. For example, they held out the hand of 
friendship in one of their resolutions to the American Socialists, or 
what they called Social Democrats. But they didn't talk about free- 
ing the Socialists behind the Iron Curtain, democratic Socialists who 
have been imprisoned by the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain. 

They didn't ask for the freedom of political prisoners, let alone 
ask for a fair trial. They didn't ask for an end to the one-party system. 
They didn't ask for a withdrawal of Soviet troops in Hungary. They 
haven't asked for freedom of the press or opinion. They haven't 
even asked in an area in which many Communists in America are 
interested, the issue of anti-semitism — they didn't even dare raise 
that at the Communist Party convention. 

And in one specific act, the case of Alter and Ehrlich, two Polish 
Jewish Socialists who were executed by Stalin, allegedly because 
they were allied with the Fascists, despite the admissions of some 
Polish Communist newspapers that those were frameup trials, never- 
theless the Communist Party here avoided taking any issue with that. 

Now, to say you have broken with something without showing 
where and how is purely, as I say, a self-serving declaration. They 
have not broken — if I mav 20 back now — because they cannot break —  
because the day they break with Moscow there will be a new Commu- 
nist Party in America which will have the label "Communist Party," 


and then those who broke become just a little sect on the level with 
the Trotskyites, or the Greenback Party, or the Vegetarian Party, 
with as much significance. 

They exist because they are the arm of the Soviet Union in America. 
So when they break here they are no longer the arm. Where have 
they broken ? 

Senator Jenner. What about Titoism in America? 

Mr. Beichman. I don't think it is of any major consequence. 

Senator Jenner. Could they go that far 2 

IMr. Beichman. No, sir. 

Senator Jenner. You say they can't break, but can they have a title 
break ? 

Mr. Beiciiman. They have not, because — it is very interesting — in 
Foster's speech at this convention he particularly attacked a so-called 
pro-Tito movement in the party. 

There has been no talk in tlie Daily Worker about Tito for months 
now. In fact, throughout the Communist world today there is now 
a developing anti-Tito movement all over agam — not that Tito is any 
less of a Communist than he was. 

Senator Jenner. I was interested in your ideas on that. In other 
words, how do you tell the ditference between communism, interna- 
tional communism, and national communism ? 

Mr. Beichman. Words, because when it gets down to cases, where 
do they stand ? The issue has been acceptance of the primacy of the 
Soviet Communist Party. Jacques Duclos, in his greetings to this 
Communist Party convention, made it very clear that you have to 
accept the primacy of the Soviet Communist Party, because they are 
the experienced fighters, and so on. And it is important to note that 
the Kremlin, in two of its major ideological organs in January, came 
out for a full support of the Foster leadership of the Communist 

Despite the fact that, for several months before the convention, 
the Daily Worker and its editor, John Gates, did criticize the Soviet 
Union, when it came to a showdown, when the chips were down, they 
went completely with the Foster move. 

For example, the magazine Party Life^ — I am now reading from an 
article in the Baltimore Sun by Howard Naughton, Moscow corre- 
spondent, January 5 : 

"Party Life is the chief ideological organ of the Soviet Union." It 
denounced Gates, it said "it comes out against the dicatorship of the 
proletariat, against the party of the Leninist type," and so on. 

On February 4 in the New York Times there was a story that the 
Soviet — that the magazine called Soviet Russia, has come out against 
the Gates group and for Foster. 

The greetings by Jacques Duclos to the Communist Party conven- 
tion denounces the revisionists, as they called them, who want to 
change the Communist Party. 

And then we come to the Foster speech. Foster says : 

We must not change the Communist Party in any way. 

The Gates faction had said : 

We want to change the Communist Party and make it a Communist political 

and Foster won hands down on that. 


The next one was to endorse Foster — Foster called for the endorse- 
ment of the theoretical base of the Communist movement under its 
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. There was going to be a great 
quarrel, because Marxism-Leninism, the Gates group said, could not 
always apply it quite the same way to American's different conditions, 
different customs. 

The Gates group accepted the Foster evaluation without change. 
They said they would be opposed to democratic centralism and mono- 
lithic units, it is called, which means one-party dictatorship. 

When it came to a showdown they accepted it, the Gates group, 
always in the interest of unity in the party. 

Foster, on the Hungarian question, where the Communist Daily 
Worker had said : 

We stand with the masses of Hungary — 

where they said — 

We do not condone the Soviet policies in Hungary or those of the Hungarian 
Communist Party — 

when it came to a showdown the resolution that was passed by this 
convention says : 

The imperialists intervened in the Hungarian tragedy — 

a complete reversal, accepted in the name of party unity. 

Throughout everything that Foster demanded in his speech they 
came — the Gates group accepted it, always in the interest of national 
unity, of party unity. 

Now, of course, there were debates, there were votes, but I think 
that was purely to pull the wool over the eyes of the innocents. They 
had never had debates before, they had never had votes, now they 
could say, "Look, we had a vote, and it has carried with so many people 
voting against." But it was, I think, the great hoax of our time, to pull 
the wool over the eyes of innocents and dupes. And we met some of 
them who were observers at this Communist Party convention. 

I asked one of the observers, whose name I would rather not men- 
tion, "Do you think there is now democracy in the Communist Party 
in America?" 

And the answer was, "Sure look at the debates, look at the votes; I 
think there is more democracy" — note, "more democracy" — the impli- 
cation being that previously there had been some democracy. 

I think that this has been an example, gentlemen, of one of the great 
fakes of our time, one which we have gone through before. I think 
the Communist Party is in a spot and has to come out of it. And I 
think they have succeeded very well, because a lot of people who 
might have left the Communist Party can now say, "Well, look, here is 
Gates, he was opposed to a lot of the stuff, but he is staying in the 
party in the interest of unity, he will fight it out in the party, there- 
fore we can stay in while Gates is there." 

That there have been no defections is to me the most interesting 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Beichman, would you say that that is a 
parallel or counterpart of the situation that prevails in the Soviet 
Union, the fact that you have a faction that, when the political climate 
seems to be in one direction, that particular faction, or the person 
identified with the particular faction within the framework of the 


party, is trotted out, as the case may be, in this case general secretary — • 
do you iind there is a parallel in that ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. Until Stalin consolidated his power you 
did not have differences in the Communist Party in this country. You 
have had different factions. When Stalin consolidated his power he 
ran the Communist Party in America, as he ran the Communist 
Parties of any other part of the world. 

Today you have an obvious internal struggle with Khrushchev as 
the No. 1 and the so-called collective leadership. This immediately 
reflects itself in the Communist Party here, as it has in other parties, 
notably that of Great Britain. But they always come back^ — -these are 
temporary, minor, and relatively insignificant phenomena. 

Mr. Morris. We had a witness yesterday, Mr. Beichman, Carl 
Rachlin, who was an official observer, and he said that these differ- 
ences are tactical differences, he used the expression 4 or 5 times. 

Mr. Beichman. Exactly. 

Mr, Morris. What would you say to that ? 

Mr. Beichman. Purely tactical difference, and like that famous 
saying of Earl Browder in 1936, that "Communism is 20th-century 
Americanism," it has about as much significance as that. 

Senator Hruska. Mr, Beichman, we have some testimony available 
to the committee from a witness who indicated that in his judgment 
and opinion the so-called final decision to "break with Moscow" was 
deliberately prearranged, and all of it was done under the direct 
guidance — as a matter of fact, under Moscow — and that the purpose 
of the so-called break was to secure a sort of legality and an atmos- 
phere of respectability for this American arm of the Kremlin, but 
everything else has just stayed put, just as it has always been. What 
comment would you have on that thought? 

Mr. Beichman, Senator, I couldn't say, because I don't know if 
it was prearranged — 1 have got no evidence, and I have no information 
one way or the other. 

Senator Hruska, Wliat would you say as to its plausibility ? 

Mr, Beichman, There is a certain amount of plausibility to that. 
I would still say, however, that undoubtedly there have been differ- 
ences within the Communist Party, using your words "tactical differ- 
ences," In other words, "We are losing an election, we are losing 
a union, we are losing organizations, we are doing it the wrong way, 
let's try it a different way, maybe if we say we are against what they 
are doing in Hungary we can attract more people. Maybe if we 
criticize Khrushchev for being anti-Semitic we can save some of our 
members who want to leave. Maybe if we are more emphatic on the 
Negro question we will keep people together in the party more close," 
and so on. It may be that there were some differences in the Commu- 
nist Party. 

Senator Hruska. Would you say that they are superficial, and the 
underlying basis and the fundamental basis still remains, and that 
the alliances with the international Communist organizations are still 
the same? 

Mr. Beichman. Absolutely. Their resolutions show this committee 
that they intend to maintain the closest fraternal relationship, as they 
say, with Communist Parties throughout the world, despite the disso- 
lution of the Comintern and the Cominform. 


Senator Hruska. Can you specifically point to some of those reso- 
lutions and give us your comments on tliis^ 

Mr. Beiciiman. Yes, sir. 

For example — this is Resolutions Committee No. 5, it doesn't say it 
is in the Communist Party, it is a mimeographed sheet of paper. But 
I was handed this by Mr. Gerson, the Communist Party spokesman, 
at the convention. 

Senator Hruska. What did he say it was ? 

Mr. Beiciiman. He said this was a resolution on relations — I am 
now quoting: 

* * * on relations with other Marxist parties — 
et cetera, and that resolution, which was passed by the convention, 

says : 

Serious mistakes and shortcomings in relations between the U. S. S. R. and 
other Socialist states, as in the examples of Poland and Hungary, have been 
revealed, and some have been corrected. 

It was at that point we tried to ask him, what were the corrections, 
but we couldn't get any information. 

Membership in the national working class or party includes the right and 
the responsibility to make friendly criticism of brother parties or the actions of 
Socialist governments. At the same time, it requires that such criticism shall be 
within the framework of recognition, that the fundamental conflict of all peoples 
is with the forces of imperialism— 

which means us, which means democracies, imperialism being the 
-Aesopian word that they use. 

Now, what that means to me is that there will be certain criticisms 
made — I don't think significant criticisms — certainly in the future, but 
that the enemy is still democracy, still freedom. 

Senator Hruska. How many resolutions of that kind were handed 
to you ? 

Mr. Beichman. Senator, I haven't counted them, but if you have 
ever covered a Communist Party convention, you have been drowned 
in the sea of paper that they hand out. 

Senator Hruska. Would you care to estimate how many ? 

Mr. Beichman. Infinity. " 

Senator Hruska. You weren't there long enough to have gotten 

Mr. Beichman. I have got a suitcase full of nonsecret documents — 
I would say probably 50, plus draft resolutions and amendments to 
the draft resolutions, and amendments to the amendments — that goes 
on and on, if I may, ad nauseam. 

Senator Hruska. And you have indicated already that nowhere in 
those resolutions or anywhere else has there been a stand taken which 
would be in opposition to the so-called Moscow or Kremlin line of 
communism ? 

Mr. Beichman. Nowhere. 

Senator Hruska. Nowhere any opposition ? 

Mr. Beichman. Not only that, but they have reemphasized their 
position, so that there is no misunderstanding — they have reem- 
phasized their position on things like the class struggle, for example. 

Now, there had been some talk in the Dailv Worker that there is no 
real class struggle, perhaps, in the United States, so maybe we have 
to use a different approach. But Foster told them off. He talked 


about the sharpening- class struggle in the United States, and they 
accepted it in his formulation. 

One of the cute things is that the Daily Worker has been saying 
that "we are not for violent revolutions, we believe in the constitutional 
road to socialism." 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there a general secretary of the party ? 

Mr, Beichman. No. Technically there are no officers, they are 
all acting. 

Mr. Morris. How can you account for that ? 

Mr. Beichman, I think perhaps a lawyer who knows the Smith 
Act could account for it, better than I can. Technically, they are 
in no position to elect, because they only elect at their convention 20 
members of their national committee. They have to elect 40 more by 
States — in other words, to make a total of 60 — and presumably, when 
they elect those 60, they would elect the officers. 

Senator Jenister. May I ask, were you permitted to see who came 
and went to the convention? You were off in an anteroom, you 

Mr. Beichman. Yes. In fact, we had a rather amusing incident. 

We were off in a press room about half the size of this one, with 
perhaps 30 to 40 photographers and reporters — it was even smaller 
than this one — and half of that was closed off by a screen about 6 
feet high, behind which there were typists — we could hear typing 
going on. And we were never allowed back there. 

At one point, I got very curious to see what was behind those 
screens. So I got up on a chair and stood up. And I could see that 
it led into a little hallway. And I figured that that hallway led into 
the meeting room on my left. As I stood up there, I saw Eugene 
Dennis, whom I recognized, standing probably about 25 feet away. 
And I turned to one of the reporters who was standing on the floor, 
and I said : "Gee, there is Eugene Dennis standing there." 

So he got up on the chair and said, "Where ?" 

And I pointed, "There is Dennis in the hallway." 

There was a Communist watchdog standing by the screen to prevent 
us from going through, and he saw us standing on the chairs, and he 
heard me say, "There is Dennis," and he quickly ran up to the cor- 
ridor and closed the drapes. And somebody said, "There goes the 
Iron Curtain." 

Senator Jexner. Did you see Mr. Foster ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes ; just once. 

Senator Jenner. How close were you to him ? 

Mr. Beichman. He came out of the meeting room — in the street. 

Senator Jenner. To your knowledge, was he there at the conven- 
tion every day ? 

Mr. BEicHMAisr. Every day, I don't know. 

Senator Jenner. He was at the convention ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Jenner. Would you say that he was so ill that he wasn't 
able to stand a trial, yet he could conduct a Communist meeting in 
New York? 

Mr. Beichman. I think doctors can answer that question far bet- 
ter — he looked to me like he was breathing, and the body was warm — 
I don't mean to be flippant 


Senator Jenner. For several years he has been too sick to stand 
trial, but he is not too sick to conduct a Communist meeting in New 

Mr. Beichman. I didn't mean to be flippant with you, Senator, but 
that was a question that occurred to us in New York, but we had no 
means of judging, since we weren't actually present at the meeting. 
We were told many times that he was so tired that he wasn't in the 
meeting room himself, we were told it by Mr. Gerson, and now I 
have passed the message. 

Mr. Morris. One of these headlines that I read to you at the begin- 
ning of the hearing was that the United States Reds had quit Foster 
and the Kremlin. Now, had the United States Reds quit Foster ? 

Mr. Beichman. No. Foster is, I think, the major power in the 
Communist Party — there may be people who are secret operators, I 
don't know, but Foster's speech today is the Communist Party line, 
and it hadn't changed 

Mr. Morris. Why do you say that ? 

Mr. Beichman. Because the resolutions adopted by the convention 
are based on Foster's speech. And I think his speech is the answer 
to what happened. 

Mr. Morris. You say that the speech that Foster made was the basis 
of the resolutions that were finally adopted ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Could you give us some examples? 

Mr. Beichman. Foster said : 

We must reaffirm the continued existence of the Communist Party. It is the 
main single thing the convention must accomplisli. 

The first day of the convention the Communist Party passed a res- 
olution which said — I am now quoting from the resolution adopted at 
the morning session of February 10 — 

1. That this convention go on record to affirm the continuation of the Com- 
munist Party of the United States. Our chief task is to strengthen, rebuild, and 
consolidate the Communist Party and overcome its isolation. 

That this convention opposes the transformation of the party into a political 
or educational association. 

And then, since there had been some opposition from the so-called 
Gates faction, they said that this, the first two points, should not close 
the door to all constructive exploration and discussion of the subjects 
as may be, repeat, as may be organized by the incoming national 

Now, when you deal with the Communist movement you have to play 
games with words, too, because they never quite mean what they say, 
and you have to interpret what they say. I thinlv there isn't going to 
be very much debate in the Communist Party from here on in as to 
whether there should be a Communist political association, or chang- 
ing the name, or anything else. 

This is just a sop that was thrown in to satisfy some of the opposi- 
tion. The party is still the party, still the party. 

Mr. Morris. Now, wasn't there a speech made by William Z. Foster 
on November 26 that forecast many of the things that took place ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Tell us about that. 


Mr. Beichman. Foster was very critical about the Gates faction, 
and spoke in very harsh terms about the attempt to transform the 
Communist Party into what he called— here is what he said : 

The Communist Partv of the United States cannot be some vague "Marxist"— 
[in quotation] "Marxist"— party without a real theoretical basis. It must be 
founded solidly upon the general principles of Marxism-Leninism skillfully 
adopted to the American scene. 

That is what happened, no change. 

The New York State Communist Party, which probably has half the 
membership, and probably half the deleo^ates to the convention, had 
called as late as January 3 of this year for changing the Communist 
Party name and turning it into a nonparty political action association. 
That was thrown out the window. But they could have debated it, 

mavbe. . • , i, i i. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Beichman, yesterday, in connection with the last 
statement you made, Mr. Rachlin who was there as a nonofficial rep- 
resentative, said that of the 40 delegates there were 11 from New York. 
How many delegates were there altogether? 

Mr. Beichman. 298, or 300— let's say roughly 300, it varied, and 
298 was the figure they finally used. 

Mr. Morris. They had a large group, did they not, of 40 that were 
formally elected to be the delegates? 

Mr. Beichman. No, they elected 20 and 40 are to be elected in com- 
ing months by the State Communist Party. So it will be a total of 
60 when they have elected their full roster of central committee 

Mr. Morris. Were their indentities known, the 40 to be elected?^ 

How about the delegates who attended from the various States in 
the Union ? 

Mr. Beichman. They didn't give any names. 

Mr. Morris. They didn't give any names ? 

Mr. Beichman. Just the people you saw that you knew — Steve 
Nelson, Foster, Dennis, Gerson, et cetera — the people that were open 
Communists that you knew, you could recognize. Claude Lightfoot 
was there, I recognized him, Fred Fine, Sid Stein, and others, whom 
you could recognize from photographs in the Daily Worker, and so on. 

Senator Hruska. Were you given the names of the 20 who were 
elected to this committee? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir, they were made public in the newspaper, 
you have the clipping. 

Senator Hruska. You were not given the names of those who gen- 
erally attended the convention { 

Mr. Beichman. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I alluded to the information 
that was being supplied to the subcommittee by a man whom we 
described as someone who was moving among the Communists and 
was accepted by them. He came in yesterday afternoon, and he was 
sworn, and testified to, and affirmed some of the information he had 
given us as true facts. 

One thing in particular, the thing that Senator Hruska mentioned 
today, I think I would like to read into the record in its total. But 
I would like to point out that he bases this not on any word that he 
received from Moscow — that is the point you said you didn't know 


about — but on the basis of his own observation from talking to some 
of the Communist leaders who accepted it. I would like to read this 
into the record. 

Senator Jenner. Proceed. 

Mr. Morris (reading) : 

Because of certain facts which came to my attention, it was possible for me to 
submit in my recent statement to the committee a forecast 

By the way, Senator, he told us that there were going to be no 
officers elected at this convention in December, and he has given us an 
estimate as to who the men were who were going to be elected — and who 
was going to be elected secretary-general — but I think I had better not 
put that into the record at this time — 

My recent statement to the committee was a forecast of tlie character and tone, 
as well as a suggested analysis of specific decisions, public and private pronounce- 
ments of the recent CPUSA convention several months before it took place. The 
convention itself confirms my previous statement that the controversies and 
final decisions to "break with Moscow" were all deliberately prearranged, and 
what is even more sinister, all of it was done under the direct guidance of and 
with the approval of the Kremlin. To accomplish this result the Kremlin 
played upon real convictions and differences of opinion on the part of leaders 
and rank and file in the American party over an 11-month period and achieved 
their final desired result in the recent "unity" convention. It is unimportant 
that certain principal participants in the convention did not and still do not 
know that they were pawns in a Kremlin-controlled farce. The purpose of the 
so-called break with Moscow and the avowed abandonment of force and violence, 
along with one-party dictatorship, et cetera, as a path to a "socialist America." 
by democratic means, is to secure legality for the American arm of the Kremlin 
in order to build a large mass party out of the present decimated organization 
within the next 2 years. 

Mr. Beichman, have you noticed any deterioration of hard-core 
Communist power in the labor unions that you are conversant with? 

Mr. Beichman. I think the answer to that question is yes that they 
are trying to get into the trade-union movement in America — well, 
that is history, it goes back to 1920, when Lenin said in his book Left 
Wing Communism, and ] quote : 

We must resort to all stratagems, maneuvers, illegal methods, evasions, and 
subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to 
carry on Communist work within them at all costs. 

There is no question that this is their intent. Their draft resolu- 
tion on trade unionism made it very clear that they intend to be more 
active, more skillfully active, if you will, than they had been before. 

Their resolution, about 7,000 words, is a confession of complete 
defeat. They were mistaken in this and they were mistaken in that. 
But now they are going to do it more intelligently. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the background of 
the particular question I asked Mr. Beichman, the subcommittee in 
its analysis of the Communist strength in labor unions during the 
last year, as you know, will be reflected in the forthcoming annual 
report, when you look at specific reserves of power that the Commu- 
nists had control over the last few years, you will see that there was no 
break in their actual power, even though the overall prestige that you 
refer to, Mr. Beichman, is on the decline because of the international 
situation and the breaks within their own organization. 

Mr. Beichman. Yes. 


Mr. Morris. Now, as some one who is following the labor movement 
on a day-to-day basis, as you have stated, have you noticed that there is 
any break in Communist power as opposed to Communist prestige 
in\he labor movement in the last 2 or 3 years? I don't know about 
before that, the situation was very different. 

Mr. Beichman. You mean — let's say in the midforties and up to 
say, 1948, 1949, and 1950, of course they did have a very major role, 
because they had officers, and they controlled unions. At one point 
they had probably 10 unions in which their officers. Communists, 
avowed Communist Party members, were in charge. That obviously is 
not tlie case. There isn't a Communist in the AFL-CIO executive 
council out of 29 men. Out of those 29 men I would say you have 
29 good, solid, tough, knowledgeable anti-Communists, from George 
Meany down, men who have gone through the battle with the Com- 
munist movement, and have licked it in their unions. 

On a local level, certainly, you have Communists who have pene- 
trated. But I think they are being watched very carefully. 

Mr. Morris. I am sorry, Mr. Beichman, I didn't mean in the AFL- 
CIO trade union, I don't mean that, but in the unions that the Com- 
munists controlled, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the Inter- 
national Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union, the United Elec- 
trical, Radio and Machine Workers. 

Mr. Beichman. Harry Bridges, the Mining and Smelter Workers, 
the Electrical workers, yes. 

Mr. Morris. In all those unions that the Communists do control as 
a result of the developments of the last 2 or 3 years, have there been any 
defections ? 

Mr. Beichman. No, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Because we are searching out defections, and we have 
those particular three unions under careful study before the sub- 

Mr. Beichman. There has been no defection. 

Mr. Morris. And we can find no diminution of their power, and, in 
fact, in many cases they are extending that power. 

Mr. Beichman. Exactly. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if, as an official observer, you could tell us 
something about that? 

INIr. Beichman. I think in the three unions that I have referred to, 
their power is just as great as it ever was. And I think that industry 
must bear some burden of responsibility in this area, if I may intrude 
a comment. 

I think what is important is what they are going to do now about 
the trade union movement. And I refer you to the Daily Worker of 
Januarj' 20, where George Morris, its labor writer, said: 

Only very recently has there been stronger and more consistent effort on the 
part of progressives — 

I interpolate here that "progressives" means Communists and fellow 
travelers in Daily Worker parlance 

progressives to establish their rights and make their contributions vpithin the 
conservatively led unions. It can be expected that, following the convention of 
the Communist Party, and revival of their influence and activity, the worker 
progressives in the labor movement will reach a still higher level. 



They are not going to give up, because tlie trade union movement is 
the major base that they must have. Without control of the trade 
union movement they cannot seize power. In Czechoslovakia they ^ 
first had to suborn the trade union movement, and then they came to 
power. I 

Senator Hruska. As a matter of fact, they made that evident in 
Hungary, too. 

Mr. Beichman. Exactly that, I was going to say that; it was the 
trade unions in Hungary and the workers who rose up on October 23. 
And one of the first actions they took was to announce that they were 
going to withdraw from the Communist World Federation of Trade 
Unions, and they would seek to join the International Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions. That was the first thing. 

In a sense, it is a revelation of the bankruptcy of the Communist 
ideology that the revolution in Hungarj^ came from the workers and 
the intellectuals — 10 years of Communist propaganda, 10 years of 
brainwashing, had no effect, they rose up. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think that as far as the session that 
we have had previous to this with Mr. Beichman is concerned, I have 
pretty generally covered the field that he has indicated he is prepared 
to talk about. 

Is that light, Mr. Beichman ? 

Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. And I am speaking for myself, knowing Mr. Beichman 
and asking him to come down here, we arranged the schedule for him | 
to come, and I want to thank him for coming. i 

Do you have any more questions, Senator? t 

Senator Hruska. No more, except to join in the expression of | 
appreciation to you for your coming here at this time and giving us i 
this very valuable information. j 

Mr. Beichman. Thank you, sir. I 

Mr. Morris. What was done in connection with the coming hearings, j 
we have asked Mr. Eugene Dennis to testify — in fact, he has been sub- , 
penaed to testify — I have arranged so that he will be here at 1 : 45 for \ 
an executive session on Monday afternoon, and we will have an open j 
session at approximately 2 : 15. And after that — now, one thing we 
have been straining to do. Senator, I would like to have the record | 
show — is to find a defector from the Communist Party who would be ! 
willing to testify. And we find it is very difficult. i 

We have one man who broke — I can't think of the date— in 1949 or i 
1950, and who hasn't testified before a congressional committee before, ' 
although he has testified before the SACB, and he said that he will , 
testify on the basis of his interpretation of the Communist Party con- i 
vention and what it means. ! 

The reason we want someone who has been in the party is that by j 
virtue of that fact he is qualified to testify. _ ] 

Mr, Beichman. I wanted to enter in again for just a moment to i 
try to clean this up. ' 

I hold here two clippings, one an A. P. Dispatch, and one a U. P. ! 
Dispatch, both from Moscow. The A. P. Dispatch is headed "U. S. , 
Keds' Stand Hailed by Pravda." And the U. P. Dispatch says, 
"Pravda Hails U. S. Reds." And Pravda says, it hailed the Commu- 


nist Party in the United States for remaining loyal to the principles 
of Marxism-Leninism. 

I think that about closes that question of whether they are inde- 
pendent of Moscow or not. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, the fact that Pravda applauded the 
stand that they took 

Mr. Beichman. In a very friendly way, no criticisms, "Bless you 
and go and do your good work." 

Senator Hruska. If that is all, the meeting is adjourned, subject 
to the call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the 
call of the Chair.) 


Appendix I 


The Hague, Netherlands, January J), 1951. 

Dear Sir : The enclosed paper on legal aspects of summary trial procedure in 
Hungary supplements the information given and views expressed in the luipers 
published by the Commissicm oh November 16 and December 7. The Commis- 
sion considers that it is important to appreciate the extent of the poAvers given 
to the Kadar regime under the decrees discussed in this paper and the threat 
which they must present to established conceptions of justice recognized by all 
natictns with developed legal systems. 

The Commission does not however claim to have full information on the extent 
to which these powers have been exercised ; the object of this paper is to make 
clear that the passing of these dec-rees constitutes a breach of a treaty and of 
conventions to which Hungary and the Soviet Union were parties. Although 
there are some indications that in its very grave economic situation the Kadar 
regime has hesitated to use tlie powers of summary trial to the fullest extent, 
nevertheless it is in the view of the Commission imixvrtant to establish as fully 
as possible the legal background against which the historic events in Hungary 
have developed. 

This paper may be reprinted in whole or in part or used as the basis of com- 
ment without further reference to the Commission but it would be appreciated 
if the name of the Commission was given in connection with any use made of 
this summary and a copy of the relevant article or news item sent to the 

Yours truly, 

A. J. M. VAX Dal. 
Vice President, International Conmiission of Jurists. 

Summary Trials in Hungary 

1. Recent decrees and laws passed by the Kadar regime in Hungary must 
be profoundly disturbing to members of the legal profession throughout the 
world, who are concerned to ensure that accused persons in criminal trials 
are accorded the safeguards recognized in all developed systems of law. Fur- 
thermore, it would appear that in certain aspects these decrees and laws con- 
stitute a violation both of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947,' and of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were ratified by the Hungarian Peoples 
Republic" and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

'2. The relevant decrees and laws are set out in full in an annex to this 
paper. They may be summarized as follows : 

A. Decree-Law of November 10, 1956 (hereinafter called Decree A)." This 
authorizes the Procurator's department to present a prosecution before the 
court In a wide range of offenses : * 

{ i ) without submitting a bill of indictment. 

(ii) without the issue of summons or fixing of a day for hearing by 
tlie court. 

1 This Treaty was concluded b.v U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, U. S. A., Australia, the 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia with Hungary 
at Paris on February 10, 1947. 

'English text: Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne, 
vol. I. 

3 Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, November 10, 1956, 14.00 hrs (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, psirt II B. No. 777, November 15, 1956, pp. 8-9). 

* These include "mui-der, wilful! manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, any kind of crime 
committed by the unlawful use of firearms, including the attempt to commit the aforesaid 



These powers are limited not only to cases where the accused was caught 
flagrante delicto but also extend to any case where "the Procurator's department 
can submit immediately the necessary evidence to the Court." The Prosecutor's 
department is specifically authorized to rely merely on a verbal presentation 
of the charge at the trial. It would appear that under this procedure the 
accused may have no foreknowledge of the offense with which he is charged 
and can have no adequate opportunity to prepare his defense. 

B. Decree-Law of December 9, 1956, amended December 12, 1956 (hereinafter 
called Decree B).^ This empowers Military Courts to try the offenses listed 
in Decree A and adds to the list certain other offenses, notably the failure to 
report knowledge of the possession of firearms by third parties, other than 
next of kin. The appointment of other courts of summary jurisdiction by 
the Presidential Council of the Republic is also authorized by this Decree. 
The amendment of December 12 provides a mandatory death sentence for offenses 
specified in Decree A and B. Thus, a person tried in accordance with the pro- 
cedure laid down under Decree A stands in peril of his life with virtually no 
provision for his defense. 

C. Decree of December 15, 1956 (hereinafter called Decree C)." This reg- 
ulates in greater detail the composition and powers of Military Courts. This 
Decree exempts certain categories of accused (persons who are suffering from 
serious illness or who are insane, as well as pregnant women) from the jurisdic- 
tion of Military Courts and limits the sentence on those under 20 to imprisonment. 
It also envisages the substitution of imprisonment for the death sentence "if 
the reestablishment of peace and order no longer requires the imposition of 
the death penalty." But this Decree provides that there shall be no appeal 
except by way of revision ^ and a petition for clemency can only be made by a 
unanimous decision of the court; failing such leave the death sentence has 
to be carried out within two hours. In view of the latter provision it is not 
unfair to suggest that no serious miscarriage of justice, should it occur, could 
be rectified, except posthumously. 

D. Decree-Law of December 20 (hereinafter called Decree D). This in 
effect, reintroduced the system, abolished by Imre Nagy in 1953," whereby 
the Procurator's department on the recommendation of the police can order 
detention without trial for a period not exceeding six months. 

3. The situation created by the above Decrees is not the exclusive concern 
of the Hungarian government but must be considered in the light of inter- 
national conventions and treaties binding on Hungary. 

A. The Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947. Part II, section 1, article 2, 
provides inter alia that "Hungary shall take all measures necessary to secure 
all persons under Hungarian jurisdiction * * * the enjoyment of human rights 
and of the fundamental freedoms." 

Although the precise meaning to be given to this article is a matter of 
interpretation, it clearly constitutes a legal obligation, which is to be inferred 
from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the In- 
terpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Roumania." In 
interpreting this article it is not possible directly to rely so far as criminal 
justice is concerned, on the provisions of Articles 9-11 of the Universal Declara- 

"Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, December 9 and 12, 1956 (BBC Summary, 
loe. cit. No. 785, December 13, 1956, p. 4 and No. 786, December 18, 1956. p. 2). 

« Radio Budapest, December 15, 1956 ; German translation in Neue Zflrclier Zeitung, 
December 17, 1956, p. 1. 

■^ Article 10 ; the appeal by way of revision is a characteristic of the countries which 
followed the Soviet system. In Hungary the revision can only be initiated by the Procu- 
rator or the President of the Supreme Court and is heard by the Supreme Court (Sec. 225 
of the Hunsrarian Code of Criminal Procedure 1951 : III tv. amended under Law 1954 
V tv. 8). Cf. Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe, Washing- 
ton, D. C, November 1956, p. .360. 

8 Resolution No. 1034/1953 (VII.26) Mt. h. published in Torv^nvek 4s Renedeletek 
Hivatalos Gyiijtemenye, 1953, p. 193 (also in Nepszava, July 26, 1953) English transla- 
tion : Highlights, loc. cit., October 1953, No. 5, p. 10. 

8 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania (Second 
Phase) ; Advisory Opinion of July 18, 1950, p. 228. In this Opinion the Court held that 
although the Governments of those countries were legally bound to carry out the provisions 
of the Peace Treaties relating to settlement of disputes, including the appointment of 
their representatives to the Commissions provided for by the treaties, the Secretary Gen- 
eral of the United Nations was not authorized to make such appointments after the parties 
refused to do so. Judges Read and Azevodo dissenting. Judge Krylov concurred with 
the opinion but was unable to concur with the reasons dealing with the problem of 
international responsibility as these in his opinion went beyond the scope of his request 
for opinion. 


tion of Human Rights, 1948,'° or on Articles 5-6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights."' Nevertheless it is well established in interpreting treaties 
that reference may be made to "the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations" a source of law specifically recognized by Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is difficult to conceive that 
these principles would be held not to include: Freedom from arbitrary arrest 
or detention; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 9; European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(1). 

The right of the accused to be informed of any criminal charge preferred 
(European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 5 (2), 6 (3) (a)). 

The right of the accused to have adequate time and facilities for the prepa- 
ration of his defense (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11, 1; 
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6(3) (b) ) . 

It is significant that the International Association of Democratic Lawyers 
(lADL), which has been consistently supported by the U. S. S. R. and by other 
Eastern European countries, in the findings of its Committee on Penal Pro- 
cedure (Brussels Conference, May 1956), attended among others by leading 
Soviet and Hungarian lawyers, include inter alia the above-mentioned rights 
among the elements necessary "in a system of criminal procedure to preserve 
the rights of the individual." (The text of the findings is set out in the annex 
to this paper. ) Indeed in some respects the Committee goes further in requiring : 
From the moment of arrest every accused must have the right to con- 
sult with his legal advisers without surveillance (Report of Committee on 
Penal Procedure, Article 5 (c) ) . 

There must be at least one appeal in all criminal proceedings (ibid., 

No state of emergency abrogating these principles shall be permitted in 
time of peace (ibid., article 9) . 
It is therefore submitted : 

1. that the words "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental 
freedoms" in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947, must be interpreted as 
including the above-mentioned rights of accused persons in criminal trials. 

2. that the decrees and laws of the Hungarian Government particularized 
above are in breach of section 1, article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 

B. Geneva Conventions of 1949. The views of the International Commis- 
sion of Jurists on the application of these Conventions to the present situation 
in Hungary were fully discussed in the paper entitled "The Hungarian Situation 
in the Light of the Geneva Conventions of 1949" published on December 7th, 1956. 
This Commission considered that certain provisions of the Conventions were 
applicable to the Hungarian situation whether the conflict were to be regarded 
as ■•internal" or "international." 

(i) If it is regarded as "internal" then "the passing of sentences and the 
carryinging out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, afl;orded all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" is prohibited (Art. 3, 
Convention IV). 

For the reasons above given and from the explicit wording of Decrees 
A, B, C, and D above cited, it is evident in the view of the International 
Commission of Jurists that they do not afford such guarantees and there- 
fore, that the Kadar regime is in breach of the Convention. 

(ii) If, on the other hand, it is regarded as an "international conflict" 
it is firstly relevant to note the provisions of Article 47 of Convention IV : 
"Protected persons" * * * shall not be deprived, in any case or in any 
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention * * * by any 
agreement between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occu- 
pying Power * * *". It must follow that, if the Government of the Occu- 
pied Power, introduces measures at the instance of the Occupying Power, 
such measures are subject to the provisions of the Conventions dealing with 
the administration of justice by the Occupying Power. 

^"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was proclaimed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is neither a treaty nor an interna- 
tional agreement and is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal 
obligation. (See Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights. 1950, p. 399.) 

11 The European Convention on Human Rights was signed on November 4, 1950, by the 
members of the Council of Europe, and came into force in 1953 after ratification by 10 
countries. Neither Hungary nor the U. S. S. R. are parties to this Convention. 


These provisions deal separately with the protection of civilian persons and 
with members of the armed forces. 

(a) As far as civilian persons are concerned, it is sufficient to mention articles 
71-73 of Convention IV which provide for "regular trial" and give the accused 
person the riglits of defence and of appeal. 

(b) As far as membei's of the armed forces are concerned, a term which in- 
cludes both members of organized resistence movements and inhabitants who 
carry arms openly to resist the invading forces (Article 4A of Convention III) 
the following provisions of Convention III protect those who fall into the hands 
of the enemy : — 

Detained persons are entitled to be tried by independent and impartial courts 
the procedure of which affords the accused the rights of defence and appeal 
(Articles 84, 99, 105 and 106 of Convention III). 

The fact that the Decrees of the Kadar regime do not afford accused per.sons 
such rights as are provided under the Conventions both to civilian persons and 
members of the armed forces has been sufficiently demonstrated In paragraph 2 
of this paper. 

Annex A 

Decbee-Law on CniMiNAL Procedure ^ 

(November 14, 1956) 

Article 1. (i) In cases of murder, wilful manslaughter, arson, robbery, loot- 
ing, and any kind of crime committed l)y the unlawful use of firearms, including 
the attempt to commit the aforesaid crimes, the Prosecutor's Office may take 
the perpetrator to court, without submitting a Bill of Indictment, if the perpe- 
trator has been caught in the act, or if the Prosecutor's Office can submit imme- 
diately the necessary evidence to the court. 

(ii) Under (i) above the Court will not fix a date for the hearing nor issue 
summonses. The Prosecutor's Office will present the indictment verbally dur- 
ing the trial. It is the duty of the Prosecutor's Office to see that witnesses 
and experts appear in court, and that other evidence is submitted to it. 

Article 2. This Decree-Law becomes effective on the day of its promulgation. 


President of the Presidential Conncil. 

ISTVAN Kbistof, 
Secretary to the Presidential Covnml. 

Annew B 

Decree on Summary Jueisdictiox " 

(December 9, 1956) 

Article 1. The Presidential Council of the People's Republic proclaims Sum- 
mary Jurisdiction over the whole territory of the country, starting at 18.00 hours 
[local time] on 11th December, as regards the following crimes : murder, wilful 
manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, crimes committeed by wilfully damaging 
enterprises of public interest or enterprises producing vital supplies for the popu- 
lation, attempts to commit any of these crimes, and the possession without license 
of firearms, ammunition and explosives. 

Article 2. Those who have in their possession firearms, ammunition, explosives 
etc. without license must hand them over to one of the oj-gans of the armed forces 
of public order by 18.00 hours on 11th December 1956. Those who hand over 
their arms etc. between the promulgati<m of this Decree-Law and the date fixed 
for the handing over cannot be punished for hiding arms. 

Articles, (i) Conspiracy with the object of committing the crimes mentioned 
in Article 1, and orgauisatory steps taken to connuit such crimes are subject to 
summary judicial procedure. 

(ii) Those who obtain credible knowledge of other persons possessing fire- 
arms, ammunition etc. without license, and do not report this [two words indis- 
tinct] to the authorities, commit a crime and are subject to summary jurisdic- 
tion. This decree is not applicable to their next-of-kin. 

1= Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest. November 3 0, 1956, 14.00 hrs (BBC Summarv 
of World Broadcasts, Part II B, No. 777, November 15, 1956, p. .8-9). 

"Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest. December 9 and 12, 1956 (BBC Summarv of 
World Broadcasts, No. 785, December 13. 1956, p, 4). 


Article Jf. The Government will take steps to promulgate this Decree-Law. 
The promulgation can be made also through the Press, radio and posters. The 
procedure under summary jurisdiction comes under the competence of the Mili- 
tary Courts, but the Presidential Council of the Republic may take steps to 
appoint other courts of summary jurisdiction also. The Presidential Council of 
the Republic authorises the Government to define the rules of summary juris- 
diction in detail. 

Article 5. This Decree-Law enters into force on the day of its promulgation. 


President of the Presidential Council. 


Secretary to the Presidential Council. 


(December 12, 1956) 

The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic is amending 
its Decree-Law concerning Summary .Jurisdiction as follows : 

The third paragraph of the basic Decree ends with the following clause : If the 
accused is declared guilty by the summary court of justice on any of the charges 
falling within the categories of summary process, the verdict at the same time 
involves the imposition of the death sentence. The amendment comes into force 
at the time of its promulgation. 


Chairman of the Presidential Council. 


Secretary of the Presidential Coimoil. 

Annex C 

Decree on Martial Law " 

(December 15, 1956) 

Article 1. The application of this law belongs to the competency of th^ aiilitary 
courts, but the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic reserves the right 
to itself, to designate also other courts. 

Article 2. The court-martial shall be composed of one professional judge and 
two people's assessors. 

Article 3. Every person who is to be tried by a court-martial has to be taken 
into custody. 

Article 4. Only those accused who were found in flagranti or whose guilt can 
be proved before the court may be referred to a court-martial. 

Article 5. Persons who are insane or seriously ill as well as pregnant women 
must in no event be referred to a court-martial. 

Article 6. The duration of the trial may in no case exceed three times 24 
hours. If the appointed time cannot be observed, the case has to be transferred 
to an ordinary court. 

Article 7. The court-mai'tial proclaims the death sentence in case it is con- 
vinced that the accused committed the crime on account of which he has to 
appear before the court-martial. 

Article 8. The court-martial may impose imprisonment for from six to fifteen 
years, if the re-establishment of peace and order does no longer require the 
Impo^tion of the death penalty. 

Article 9. The accused can by no means be sentenced to death in case he is 
less than 20 years old. In such a case a sentence to imprisonment for from 
10 to 15 years shall be pronounced, and if the accused is under 18 years of age, 
imprisonment for from 5 to 10 years shall be imposed. 

Article 10. Persons sentenced by a court-martial are entitled to lodge an appeal 
only in case the trial is revised. 

Article 11. After the sentence is pronounced the court has to decide imme- 
diately on the filing of a petition for clemency. Such a decision can only be taken 

^^ Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, December 9 and 12, 1936 (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts. No. 786, December 18, 1936, p. 2). 

^ Radio Budapest, December 15, 1956: German translation in Neiie Ziircher Zeitung, 
December 17. 1956, p. 1. 


Article 12. In case the court-martial refuses to file a petition for clemency, 
capital punishment has to be executed within two hours. 

Annex D 

Decree on Detention fob Public Security ^* 

(December 20, 1056) 

A decree issued by the Presidential Council said that "persons whose activity 
or behaviour endanger public order, especially production, can be placed under 
detention for public security. On suggestion of police authorities the State 
Prosecutor can order detention which will be carried out by the police." 

The Chief Prosecutor must investigate the case of the detained person within 
30 days and internment can last a maximum of six months. The decree is valid 
for one year. 

The decree did not mention internment, but used instead the expression "de- 
tention for public security." It was not published in the government press 
which is on sale to the population, but only in the official gazette which has a 
very limited circulation. 

Armfix E 

Sixth Congeess of the Inteenational Association of Democratic Lawyers, 

Brussels, May 1956 

report of committee on penal procedure 

On the basis of the discussion there was general agreement on the elements 
requiring to be present in a system of criminal procedure to preserve the rights 
of the individual. This agreement was reached by lawyers from different 
countries and different social systems. These elements and the suggestions 
agreed by the Committee to them are set out below : 

1. Nullum crimen sine lege 

We have observed with regret many infringements of this principle in which 
we re-affirm our belief. We consider that the doctrine of analogy ought not to 
form part of any procedure and that offences should be clearly stated. In 
particular, we reject the conception of collective punishment. 

2. The need for the accused to he brought to trial speedily 

(a) The period from time of arrest to appearance before a magistrate or 
judicial functionary should not exceed 48 hours. 

(b) To ensure this there must be effective legal sanction, civil or criminal and 
unjustified detention should give a right to an action for damages. 

(c) During the preliminary investigation the accused must not be kept in 
detention more than three months without the permission of the Court after 
public hearing of the parties. 

3. Fair trial 

{a) It is desirable that Courts of first instance should contain a lay element 
appointed on democratic principles. 

(&) No punishment involving deprivation of liberty to be imposed except by 
a judicial tribunal. 

4. No discrimination against the accused 

There shall be no discrimination in the forms of penal procedure or punish- 
ment for reasons of race, religion, class, or any other cause. This point arises 
because in some legal systems, particularly in colonial countries, sections of its 
population are tried by a procedure which provides less guarantees than those 
afi!orded by the procedure to which other members of its population are subject. 

5. Right of defense 

(a) An accused without means shall be entitled to effective legal aid and 
representation by a qualified lawyer of his own choice before all tribunals with- 
out exception. 

(&) That the accused and his Counsel shall have the same rights at the hearing 
as has the prosecution. 

^* As reported by Associated Prt-ss, Budapest, December 20, 1956. 


(c) From the moment of arrest every accused must have the right to consult 
with his legal advisers without surveillance. 

(d) That in countries where the preliminary investigation is in private de- 
fending counsel should be entitled to be present with the accused at all stages 
of the preliminary investigation and to have access to the prosecution dossier 
before the examination or confrontation of the accused. 

(e) Lawyers should not be subjected to prosecution or pressure because of 
their professional status on behalf of their clients. 

6. Proof 

(a) A confession particularly made to the police must be corroborated by 
independent evidence before it can be the basis of a conviction. Evidence of an 
accomplice also requires corroboration by independent evidence. 

(&) Conviction must be based only on facts proved in evidence. 

(c) No arrested person shall be subject to any physical pressure, threats, or 
promises calculated to produce a statement. 

7. Appeal 

There must be at least one appeal in all criminal proceedings. 

S. Punishment 

(a) Corporal punishment should be abolished. 

(&) The death penalty should be abolished in time of peace. 

9. State of emergency 

No state of emergency abrogating these principles shall be permitted in time 
of peace. 

We consider that one of the strongest guarantees of the application of these 
principles is to assure full and fair publicity for all criminal proceedings with 
the exception of those involving state secrets or matters of serious indecency. 

We put forward these proposals as minimum suggestions only in the belief 
that their adoption would involve significant advances in nearly every criminal 
procedure throughout the world. We urge all lawyers to do whatever they 
can to secure their implementation in their own countries. 

Appendix I -A 

Inteenational Commission of Jurists, 
The Hague, Netherlands, December 7, 1956. 

For immediate use 
Dear Sir : The enclosed paper on "The Hungarian Situation in the Light of 
Geneva Conventions of 1949," summarizes the international law governing 
the actions of Soviet forces and the Hungarian Govex-nment in Hungary. It 
supplements the paper on "Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression" 
published by the Commission on November 16, 1956. 

It may be reprinted in whole or in part or used as the basis of comment 
without further reference to the Commission, but it would be appreciated if 
the name of the Commission was given in connection with any use made of 
this summary and a copy of the relevant article or news item sent to the 

Yours truly, 

Norman S. Marsh, 
Secretary-General, International Commission of Jurists. 

The Hungarian Situation in the Light of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 

The reports from Hungary about mass arrests, summary trial," deportations," 
and other measures which are alleged to have infringed the Rule of Law have 
attracted worldwide attention. 

^■^Cf. Decree on criminal procedure of November 10, 1956 (Radio Budapest, November 
10, 1956, 14.00 hours, as monitored in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part II B, No. 
777/1956/, pp. 8-9, with text of Decree). 

MCf. Report of Radio Budapest, November 14, 1956, 15.00 hours (BBC, The Monitoring 
Report, No. 5, 200/November 15, 1956/, p. 1), as well as the case of Imre Nagy and his 
group. According to several testimonials of Hungarian refugees, camps of deportees exist 
in Soviet Carpatho-Ukraine, 


The present Government of Hungary contends that the national uprising sup- 
pressed by Soviet armed forces is an internal affair of Hungary. The Soviet 
Union holds the same view. 

It is, however, to be remembered that there are rules of international law 
which apply even if the conflict in question is merely a civil war. These rules 
are laid down in the Geneva Conventions for the protection of the victims 
of war,"* concluded in 1949 and ratified among others by the Soviet Union.^" 
and by the Hungarian People's Republic.^^ 

The obligations entered into by the signatories of the Convention depend on the 
character of the conflict, and are more speciflc if it is an international conflict 
and less detailed if it is an internal one. 


If it is assumed that the conflict is an internal one, the parties are bound 
to apply among others the following provisions at least : 

Persons taking no active part in the hostilities shall be treated humanely. The 
following acts in particular are prohibited : 

"(c) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila- 
tion, cruel treatment, and torture ; 
" ( & ) taking of hostages ; 

"(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrad- 
ing treatment ; 

"((i) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 

previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording 

all the judicial guaranties which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 

peoples" (Art. 3, Convention IV). 

During the negotiations the Soviet Union supported ^' a draft approved by the 

XVIIth International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in August 1948 ^ which 

served as a basis for discussion at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in 1949. 

This text reads : 

"In all cases of armed conflict not of an international character * * * the 
Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present 
Convention [i. e., as a whole, not only Art. 3 mentioned above], subject to the 
adverse party likewise acting in obedience thereto." 

When this text met with opposition on the part of a number of government 
delegates, the Soviet Union introduced the following version of the provision : 

"* * * The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions 
of the present Convention which guarantee : humane treatment of the civilian 
population ; prohibition within the territory occupied * * * of reprisals against 
the civilian population, the taking of hostages, * * * damage to property * * * 
prohibition of any discriminatory treatment of the civilian population * * *." " 
The delegate from Hungary also favoured as wide as possible an application 
of the Convention to civil wars : 

"The essential aim of the Conference was to extend the fleld of action of the 
Convention as much as possible for the protection of the victims of conflict." *° 


The view that events in Hungary represent merely an internal conflict has 
no basis in international or Hungarian law. It is the considered view of the 

19 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (hereafter called Convention I). 

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereafter called Convention II). 

Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter called Convention 

Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereafter called 
Convention IV). 

^ The Belorussian and Ukrainian Republics are also signatories of the Conventions. 

21 English text : Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne 
(hereafter cited Record), Vol. I; Franch text: Actes de la Conft'rence diplomatique de 
GenSve de 1949, Berne, Tome I ; Russian text : Zhenevskie konventsii o zashchite zherty 
volny, Izdanie Vedomostei Verehovnogo Soveta SSSR (publication of Gazette of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR), Moscove, 1954, 219 pp.; German text: Bundesgesetzblatt, 
Bonn, Teil II, S. 781 ff. ; Die Genfer Abkommen zum Schutz der Krlegsopfer vom 12 
August 1949 hrsg. vom Deutschen Roten Kreuz, 2 Aufl., Bonn 1953. 

=2 Cf. Record, Vol. IIB, pp. 13-14, 34. 37, 42, 44, 47, 76, 93, 325-327. 

23 Art. 2. par. 4, of the Draft. Text : Record. Vol. I, p. 113. 

2* Amendment of the Soviet Union, July 21, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex Nr. 15, p. 28). 
Corresponding amendments for the other Conventions. 

25 Joint Committee, First meeting, April 26, 1949 (Record, Vol. IIB, p. 11), 


International Commission of Jurists that the events in Hungary amount to an 
international conflict with two adverse parties — the Hungarian nation on the 
one side and the Soviet Union on the other side. The reasons for this view 
are as follows : 

1. The suppression of the national uprising in Hungary constitutes an aggres- 
sion in the sense of the Soviet definition of aggression proposed to the United 
Nations in 1953 (cf. the paper "Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression," 
released by the International Commission of Jurists, November 16, 1956). 

2. The overthrow of the Nagy government and the setting up of the Kadar 
regime was effected with the help of Soviet armed forces and constitute an "in- 
direct aggression" in the sense of the Definition just mentioned. 

3. The request for military assistance made by the Kadar government was 
therefore not valid under international law. 

4. The request was also invalid in Hungarian constitutional law. The armed 
attack began before the Kadar regime was in power. Five days later — on No- 
vember 9 — a constitutional amendment was enacted to legalize subsequently the 
existence and the acts of the Kadar government.^ 

5. The request, even if validly made, could have had no legal effect on the 
application of the Convention, since Art. 47 of Convention IV stipulates: 

"Protected persons * * * shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner 
whatsoever, of the benefits of the present convention * * * by any agreement be- 
tween the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power. * * *" 

The Soviet and Hungarian Governments are therefore under a legal duty to 
carry out those obligations which the Geneva Conventions provide for cases of 
an international conflict. 


The obligations apply to all cases of armed conflict between two or more of 
the Parties as well as "to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory 
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance" (Art. 2/2/2/2)." 

The obligations of the signatory states in such cases include among others : 

A. With respect to all Victims of War 

The provisions mentioned under this heading "cover the whole of the popula- 
tions of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based in par- 
ticular on * * * political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings 
caused by the war" (Art. 13).^' 

1. Particular protection of the wounded and children (Art. 16-22, 24). 

2. Allowing free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores 
and, if intended for children and mothers, also of essential foodstuffs, clothing, 
and tonics (Art. 23).'° 

3. Allowing family correspondence and facilitating enquiries made by members 
of dispersed families (Art. 25, 26). 

B. With respect to Civilian Persons 

The provisions mentioned under this heading cover all persons who are na- 
tionals of a State bound by the Convention and flnd themselves in the hands of 
an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. The protection extends 
to all persons who are not covered by one of the other three Conventions (see 
note 3) (Art. 4). The protection lasts for the duration of the occupation (Art. 
6). If a protected person is suspected or engaged in activities hostile to the 
security of the Occupying Power he forfeits certain rights under Convention IV, 
but retains at least the right of fair and regular trial (cf. infra under 10) (Art. 5) . 

4. Human treatment, respect for the person, honor, family rights, religious 
convictions, customs. Equal treatment, "without any adverse distinction based, 
in particular, on * * * political opinion" (Art. 27). 

5. No exercise of physical or moral coercion (Art. 31). Prohibition of any 
measures causing physical suffering or extermination of protected persons, 
including e. g. torture, or any other measure of brutality (Art. 32).^° 

2" Decree of November 10, 1956. Text broadcast by Racllo Budapest, November 9, 1956, 
19.00 hours (BBC Summary, Part IIB, No. 777 (1956), p. 7). 

^ Article common to all four Conventions. 

^ This and the following article refer to Convention IV. 

28 Cf. Text proposed bv the Soviet Union (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 222, p. 114). 

=»Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 231, 
p. 116), supported bv Hungary in the 13th meeting of Committee III, June 15, 1949 
(Record, Vol. IIA, p. 717). 


6. Prohibition of collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terri- j 
torism (Art. 33)." Prohibition of taking hostages (Art. 34). \ 

7. Prohibition of "individual or mass forcible transfers,'- as well as deporta- i 
tions of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupy- 
ing Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, * * * regardless 
of their motive." (Art. 49, cf. also Art. 52, 76-77.) 

The phrase "into the territory of the Occupying Power or the territory of | 
any other country" was incorporated on the suggestion of the Soviet Union.'^ 

8. No sanctions or any measures of coercion against public oflBcials or judges, 
should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience 
(Art. 54). 

9. Duty to ensure food and medical supplies to the population (Art. 55) " 
as well as hospital establishments and services (Art. 56). Duty to allow and 
facilitate relief schemes for the population if inadequately supplied (Art.. 59-62). 
Red Cross Societies shall be able to pursue their activities (Art. 63).^ 

10. Respect for existing criminal legislation (Art. 64). Duty not to enact 
retroactive criminal laws (Art. 65). Courts of the Occupying Power shall apply 
only those provisions of law which are in accordance with general principles 
of law (Art. 67). The penalty shall be in proportion to the offense (Art. 67-68). 
There shall be no prosecution for acts committed or for opinions expressed 
before the occupation (Art. 70). No sentence shall be pronounced by the compe- 
tent courts of the Occupying Power except after a regular trial (Art. 71). An 
accused person shall have the right of defense (Art. 72) and a convicted person 
the right of appeal (Art. 73). They shall be detained and serve their sentences 
in the occupied territory (Art. 76) . 

C. With respect to prisoners of war 

The Convention also protects apart from the traditional category of "members 
of the armed forces of a Party" the following persons among others : 

(a) members of organized resistance movements, if they are commanded 
by a person responsible for his subordinates, if they carry arms openly and 
respect the laws and customs of war. 

(6) members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a govern- 
ment or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 

(c) Inhabitants who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take 
up arms to resist the invading forces, if they carry arms openly and respect 
the laws and customs of war (Art. 4 A).^® 
The Convention applies to these persons from the time they fall into the 
power of the enemy until their final release (Art. 5) . 

The inclusion of the persons mentioned under a-c was considered imperative 
considering the experience of Nazi occupation of Denmark and other countries 
which were invaded without resistance on the part of the armed forces. The 
innovation was supported by the Soviet delegate who declared : 

"Civilians who took up arms in defense of the liberty of their country should 
be entitled to the same protection as members of armed forces." " 
He spoke also in favour of protection of members of resistance movements 
(partisans).'^ The Hungarian delegate supported the Soviet Union in both 

The individual obligations of the Detaining Power include among others : 

11. Duty to treat prisoners of war humanely (Art. 13).** Respect for their 
person and honour (Art. 14). Equal treatment "without any adverse distinction 
based on political opinions" (Art. 16) . 

31 Cf. Text presented by the Soviet Union, June 7, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 234, 
p. 117). 

32 The words "individual or mass" are missing from the Russian text, as reproduced In 
the source quoted, supra, note 5. The English and French texts are, however, authentic 
(Art. 55/54/133/150K 

33 Amendment of the Soviet Union, May 12, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 45, 
p. 130). 

3*Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 28, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 282, 
p. 136). 

35 Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 28, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 292, 
p. 139). 

3" This and the following articles refer to Convention III. 

37 Committee II, Fifth meeting. May 16, 1949 (Record, Vol. II A, p. 426). 

38 Loc. cit, p. 429. 

39 Source as in notes 21 and 22. 

*" Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, May 4, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 99, 
p. 64). 


12. Duty to allow prisoners of war to send and receive letters and cards 
(Art. 71). 

13. Duty not to bring a prisoner of war before a court unless it offers the 
essential guaranty of independence and impartiality as generally recognized 
and in particular, a procedure which affords the accused the rights of defence 
(Art. 84, 105) and of appeal (Art. 106). 

14. No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not for- 
bidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at 
the time the said act was committed. No moral or physical coercion may be ex- 
erted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit his guilt. No prisoner 
of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his de- 
fence and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel (Art. 99). 

15. Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after 
the cessation of active hostilities (Art. 118). 

D. Provisions for enforcing these oMigations 

The following provisions are incorporated into all four Geneva Conventions in 
order to assure their strict performance. 

1. The Parties "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con- 
vention in all circumstances" (Art. 1/1/1/1) ."■ 

2. The protected persons "may in no circumstances renounce in part or in 
entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention" (Art. 7/7/7/8). 

3. The Convention "shall be applied with the cooperation and under the 
scrutiny of the Protecting Powers" (Art. 8/8/8/9). The Parties may agree to 
entrust to an impartial organisation the duties incumbent on the Protecting 
Powers (Art. 10/10/10/11).'^ 

4. The Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective 
penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering to be committed, any grave 
breaches of the Conventions (Art. 49/50/129/146 and Art. 50/51/130/147).'^ 

The Hungarian delegate stated that the Hungarian Military Penal Code, in 
force since February 1, 1949, stipulates severe penalties for violations of the 

5. An enquiry shall be instituted concerning any alleged violation of the Con- 
vention (Art. 52/53/132/149). 


In publishing this paper the International Commission of Jurists hopes to act 
in the interests of the signatories of the Geneva Conventions, including the Soviet 
Union and Hungary, since Articles 47/48/127/144 of the Conventions provide : 

"The High Contracting Parties undertake * * * to disseminate the text of 
the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, * * * 
so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population." 

December 7, 1956, International Commission of Jurists, Buitenhof 47, The 

Appendix II 

The Situation Behind the Iron Cuktain 
Statement by the Executive Council, AFL-CIO, Monday, February 4, 1957 

The growing revolt for national independence behind the Iron Curtain Is a 
development of the greatest historic significance. Its outcome will be a decisive 
factor in determining whether mankind will be able to insure peace, whether 
human freedom or Communist despotism will prevail. 

The satellites are in the throes of an economic crisis aggravated by years of 
ruthless Soviet exploitation and looting. Moscow sought their resources for 
speedily building its own gigantic war machine, for developing the Chinese 
Communist war potential. Years of Communist oppression have generated 
bitter resentment and deep-going unrest, mass strikes and open revolt. At first, 
the Kremlin sought to dispel the mounting discontent by softening certain 

^^ This and the following articles are common to all four conventions. 

*-Ct. an amendment by the Soviet Union, July 20. 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex 26, 
p. 34), and the reservation of the Soviet Union and Hungary to Art. 10/10/10/11. 

^Qt. Amendments of the Soviet Union of July 20 and 21, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex 
Nr. 53 and 53 A, pp. 44). 

« Record, Vol. II B, p. 32. 


features of its dictatorship, by introducing some so-called liberal reforms. After 
the 20th Soviet Communist Party congress and the Khrushchev indictment of 
Stalin as a mass murderer, the forces of revolt— particularly among the workers, 
students and intellectuals— began to assert openly their demand for democratic 
rights, better conditions of life and labor, and national independence. This 
historic development reaches its highest point to date in the inspiring Hungarian 
democratic revolution. This heroic revolt has intensified political unrest 
throughout the Iron Curtain domain. 

By resorting to brute force, Moscow has for the moment slowed down the 
trend toward disintegration, but it has not overcome the crisis. Whether the 
Kremlin reverts to the method of Stalinist massive suppression by armed force, 
as in Hungary, or accepts the more subtle technique of national communism, as 
in Poland, its fundamental aims are the same— to prevent freedom and genuine 
national independence. Soviet savagery in crushing the Hungarian revolt has 
aroused the conscience and moral indignation of the civilized world as no other 
event has done in many years. The international Communist movement and 
Soviet prestige have been seriously weakened in the free world. Communism 
is now detested most by the very people whom it has pretended to serve most. 

Hastening to stem the tide of doubt and disintegration in the camp of world 
communism, the Soviet ruling clique has vigorously reasserted its primacy 
in international communism. This primacy was promptly acknowledged by 
Chou En-lai and Gomulka in their support of Russia's barbarous suppression 
of the democratic revolution in Hungary. 

In this situation, the free world must guard against perilous pitfalls and the 
continuation of errors in policy, such as: (a) lack of unity, passivity and inade- 
quate military strength; (&) timidity of policy in the face of Soviet threats and 
appeasement measures which can only help bail Moscow and its satellites out 
of their serious difficulties ; (c) hesitation and refusal to break with colonialism 
(Algeria, Cyprus) ; (d) failure to assist adequately the promotion of economic 
development and improved living standards in the industrially underdeveloped 
countries committed to the building of democracy; (e) slowness in eliminating 
shortcomings in the social, economic, and political fabric and institutions of 
the free nations. 

Toward helping the democracies to utilize the crisis behind the Iron Curtain 
in the interest of peace and freedom, we urge our Government to : 

(1) Reassure the captive countries that America will: (a) oppose all policies 
for an agreement with Moscow based on delineated spheres of control (mutual 
acceptance of old and new colonialism) and will not accept as final their present 
status; (6) not allow these lands to serve as spheres of exploitation or areas 
from which to launch invasions of other countries; (c) repudiate all efforts and 
elements seeking to replace the present despotic regimes with other reactionary 
governments or to impose on them any particular economic, political or social 
system; (d) seek U. N. supervised free elections to enable them to establish 
democratic governments fully sovereign in their foreign as well as domestic 

(2) Place the problem of the captive countries and German reunification be- 
fore the U. N. which should call upon Russia to abide by the Yalta agreement 
providing for free elections in the satellites and to comply with its promises 
regarding German reunification in freedom. 

(3) Urge the U. N. to appeal to the free governments of Asia, especially India, 
to declare their solidarity with and pledge support of the Hungarian freedom 
fighters in their courageous passive resistance to Soviet colonial oppression and 

(4) Provide the victims of Soviet tyranny in Hungary with free food — via the 
International Red Cross or an especially designated agency — and desist from 
aiding the quisling Kadar regime through selling it consumers' goods and 
industrial products. 

(5) Condemn the puppet Kadar regime for executing the leaders of the 
workers councils and seek to have the ILO expel it for its flagrant violation of 
all human rights. 

(6) Sever diplomatic relations with the Kadar regime and seek its unseating, 
as a foreign-imposed government, from the U. N. 

(7) Demand that the Rumanian puppet government should free Hungary's 
legitimate Premier Imre Nagy, upon pain of expulsion from the U. N. 

(8) Seek to have the U. N. invoke economic sanctions against Russia for 
its persistent refusal to heed the U. N. decision that it withdraw its invasion 
army from Hungary. 


(9) Urge all free governments to join in giving full support to the Hungarian 
National Government representation (Kethly, Kiraly, Koevago) as rallying 
center of Hungarian freedom fighters seeking full national independence and 

(10) Cancel all plans to have the Communist dictator Tito and the Falangist 
dictator Franco visit the United States. Such visits would serve no useful 
purpose for the democratic forces in their worldwide struggle against totali- 
tarians of every hue and stripe and would be an affront and injury to the 
peoples of Yugoslavia and Spain now increasingly demanding human rights 
and democracy. 

The following newspaper articles were ordered into the record at 
a subsequent hearing of the subcommittee : 

[AFL-CIO News, Washington, D. C, February 16, 1957, p. 13] 

Labor No. 1 Target of United States Communists 

By Arnold Beichman 

New York. — The Communist Party of the U. S. A. has concluded its first 
convention in 7 years with a decision to attempt to penetrate the AFL-CIO. 

It was also announced to the world that henceforth the Communist Party is 
going to be "independent" of Moscow. It formulated its new program at a 4- 
day convention from which the press was barred. Whatever the newspapers 
printed about the convention came from "official spokesmen" who were obviously 
under orders to answer no questions on anything discussing the American trade- 
union movement. 

they just "confess" 

Nowhere in the 7,500-word statement on trade unionism did the Communists 
ask why they had been defeated by the labor movement. They just "confessed" 
and having done so, denied with fiery indignation that it is "Communist policy" 
to interfere with, "bore from within," or to seek to capture or control the trade 

The Communist Party bemoaned the fact that "what is dominant in the AFL- 
CIO leadership is a trend bitterly hostile to the Soviet Union and other 'Socialist' 

"This dominant trend," said the Communist Party resolution, "equates negotia- 
tions with 'appeasement,' keeps an iron curtain between workers of our country 
and workers of Socialist lands and rejects the possibility of peacefvil coexistence." 

STRESS "changes" 

The task of the convention was primarily to persuade Americans that Com- 
munists have changed, that they don't follow Moscow orders. Here's what they 

They charged that "the imperialists intervened in the Hungarian tragedy" 
although a few months ago the Daily Worker conceded that the Hungarian up- 
rising was not Fascist-inspired. 

They said they would love to work with Socialists in America but they forgot 
to call for the liberation of Socialists in iron curtain prisons. 

They dumped a proposal to dissolve the Communist Party, and to change its 

So far as is known, they said nothing in any resolutions which was critical of 
Soviet anti-Semitism. 

A few weeks ago the Daily Worker wrote that over the last decade Com- 
munists have been "shrinking away from the association with great masses of 
workers * * * only very recently has there been stronger, and more consistent 
effort on the part of progressives (Communists and fellow travelers) to establish 
their rights and make their contributions within the conservatively led imions 
* * * it can be expected that following the convention of the Communist Party and 
revival of its influence and activity, the work of progressives in the labor move- 
ment will reach a still higher level." 



From its position of unparalleled weakness the Communist Party is de- 
termined to make a comeback. It is moving its national headquarters to Chicago 
from New York City to be closer as the Communist Party said, to the industrial 
and agricultural heartland of America. 

Years of declining membership and party purges have left the Communist 
Party with a powerful "hard-core" group of dedicated revolutionaries. Its 
national committee of 20 numbers 14 Communist leaders who have gone to jail 
or have been indicted and are awaiting trial. 

The latest Communist Party convention disclosed what everybody knows — no 
matter how much its leaders may mumble unhappily about Khrushchev or Stalin 
or some single Soviet policy or other, when the chips are down, Communist 
Partyers here as in other countries of the free world, will toe the Kremlin 
mark or else. 

Yet is should also be remembered that the Communist Party has emerged 
from this convention stronger than it entered. There will be differences and dis- 
putes within its ranks — but it will be over power, who is to be top dog — not 
whether the Soviet Union is right or wrong. 

A stronger Communist Party, no matter how tiny numerically, represents a 
threat to American democracy, and, esi)ecially, to the American labor movement. 

[Las Vegas Sun, February 16, 1957, p. 16] 
Victor Riesel — Inside Labor 

New York. — Though it met those past 4 days just around the corner from 
the Bowery, the Communist Party was far from hitting the skids. When 
its national leaders quietly slipped out of the city, their party was still a 
noticeable item in Moscow's cold war budget. 

Couriers from the Kremlin had brought word that the Party's press would be 
heavily subsidized in America once again. The national headquarters would be 
refinanced. Funds for agitation-propaganda would be available once more. 
There would be stronger backing for the Party's labor friends — some of whom 
were in town from as far off as the west coast. There would be money for good 
lawyers and undercover organizers to help re-infiltrate the AFL--CIO. 

The American Communist Party had agreed to behave itself and not to "Tito." 
Moscow was selling gold in London and Brussels. Some of the money would be 
funneled into the United States. Moscow had wanted to keep its American 
mouthpiece from fading out. 

This was no convention ; this was a conspiracy. And it would have been a 
mistake to cover the drones as we cover the national major party parleys. Among 
the chairmen, and dispersed through the 300 delegates and 110 visitors, were 
men awaiting jail on charges of teaching the violent overthrow of the Govern- 
ment. There were several Soviet secret police officials. 

And, of course, the fellow who led the fight to free the electrocuted atomic 

The press was barred so that we, and perhaps some undercover men who 
might slip in with us, would not recognize the so-called delegates. But not 
because the delegates feared they'd lose their jobs— as the indicted Steve Nelson 
told several of us out on the sidewalk. The press was barred because the four- 
hundred-odd men inside were the top Communist functionaries in the United 
States — and among them were the men taking direct orders from Moscow via 

These 400 were older people. They were the hard core. They made up — not a 
convention — but the first full gathering of the party's operatives throughout the 
United States. They were mostly from New York, California, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan and Illinois. They run the apparat in 34 States. They're tough. They 
are the ones the party can count on to walk through the street near the Chateau 
Gardens and scurry into the old hall — even after the blood bath of Budapest and 
the Soviet's ties with the Nazified Nasser. 

There was talk of this as a convention. You know, three delegates representing 
every hundred members, caucuses, etc. 

They took the pains to vote and count. But what did they count? The alleged 
"delegates," by the party's own total, would have spoken for slightly under 7,000 
registered Communists. But this is like a wrestling referee's count. The party 


has almost 20,000 registered members. That's positive. It has several thousand 
secret members who take orders from a tricky cell-like chain of command. 

Furthermore, the party still operates on the 10 to 1 formula. Its leaders boast 
that they have 10 persons ready to work for them for every one of their official 

That puts their count way up. So what you had at the Communist Party's 
16th National Convention was a gathering of the top 300-man committee. These 
were not really delegates but regional chiefs being briefed by men who had taken 
their orders by courier from abroad. 

Not all of them, however, were ready to take direction unquestioningly. So 
they were permitted to sound off about the new road to American socialism. Or 
about the yoke of "democratic centralism" which, translated, means "You have 
5 minutes to talk Comrade, and then sit down, shut up or take orders." They 
had their hopes raised that they might be men again after the depurification of 
Stalin. But over the past weekend they were told that they must go along with 
the Kremlin, or their Moscow gold will be cut off. 

The convention's press officer. Si Gerson, worked hard at giving us a fairly 
good facsimile of what a capitalist public relations man would be — with just one 
twist. Somebody asked for a drink and Gerson said, "Why don't you fellows send 
in a case of Scotch?" 


Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organi- 
zation in this index. 


Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the interpreta- Page 

tion of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania 3550 

"Aesopian language" 3526, 3527 

AFI^CIO 3561,3562 

AFL-CIO executive council 3545, 3559-3561 

AFL^CIO News 3533, 3534, 3561 

Alter (Polish Socialist) 3536 

American Civil Liberties Union, New York chapter 3525 

American Committee for Cultural Freedom 3534 

American Communist Party (see also Communist Party) 3521, 

3523, 3526, 3535, 3539, 3544 

American Veterans Committee 3516 

AMVETS 3516 

"Antimonopoly coalition" 3524 

Asia 3560 


Baltimore Sun 3537 

Barr, Stringfellow 3517 

Beichman, Arnold 3533-3547, 3561 

20 West 84th Street, New York 3533 

Testimony of 3533-3547 

Newspaperman 3533 

Chairman, board of directors, American Committee for Cultural 

Freedom 3534 

Contributor to AFI^CIO News 3533 

Contributor to New Leader 3533 

Contributor to Christian Science Monitor 3533 

Blumberg 3522, 3527 

Bridges, Harry 3545 

Brooklyn, N. Y 3516 

Browder, Earl 3520, 3535, 3536, 3539 

Browderists 3520 

Brown Street, 187 (Brooklyn) 3516 

Brussels 3554, 3555, 3562 

Brussels Conference, May 1956 3551 

Budapest 3562 

Bulgaria 3550 


Chateau Gardens 3517 

Chinese Nationals 3516 

Chou En-lai 3560 

Christian Science Monitor 3533, 3534 

CIO 3516 

Civil Liberties Union, New York 3516 

Cominform 3539 

Comintern 3539 

Committee on Penal Procedure 3551, 3554 



Communist/s 3516, 3517, 3519- 

3521, 3524-3526, 3529, 3536-3539, 3541, 3542, 3544-3546, 3559-8562 

Communist Chinese 3559 

Communist Party 3518- 

3529, 3534-3537, 3539, 3540, 3542, 3543, 3545-3547, 3561, 3562 

Communist Party convention 3516,3517,3525,3538 

Communist Party delegates to 3518, 3519, 3523, 3543, 3562 

California 3518, 3519, 3523, 3562 'I 

Dakotas 3519 'i 

Idaho 3519 \ 

Illinois 3518, 3519, 3562 '| 

Indiana 3518, 3519 

Maryland 3519 i 

Michigan 3562 '; 

Minnesota 3519 ,i 

New Jersey 3519  

New York State 3518, 3519, 3543, 3562 ' 

Oregon 3519 i 

Pennsylvania 3519, 3562 

Washington 3519 \ 

Wisconsin 3519 \ 

Commimist Party, National Committee of 3518 

Communist Party, 16th National Convention of the 3563 

Commimist World Federation of Trade Unions 3546 

Communities and Social Agencies Employees Union 3516 

Czechoslovakia 3546 


Daily Worker 3520, 3537, 3538, 3540, 3541, 3543, 3545, 3561 

Davis, Ben 3520 

"Democratic centralism" 3521, 3527, 3538 

Denmark 3558 

Dennis, Eugene 3521, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3527, 3534, 3541, 3543, 3546 

Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, 1949 3556 

Dobi, Istvan 3552, 3553 

Duclos, Jacques 3520, 3521, 3537 


East Germany 3535 

Ehrlich (Polish Socialist) 3536 

Eighty-fourth Street, 20 West 3533 

European Convention on Human Rights 3551 


Fast, Howard 3528 

Fine, Fred 3543 

Fitch, Roy 3517 

Foster, William Z 3520,3522-3225,3534,3535,3537,3538,3540-3543 

France 3535 

Franco 3535,3561 

French Communists 3520 

French Communist Party , 3520 


Gannett, Betty 3527 

Gates, John 3516, 3520, 3522, 3524, 3525, 3527, 3534, 3537, 3538, 3542, 3543 

Geneva Conventions of 1949 3549, 3551, 3556, 3557, 3559 

German 3560 j 

Gerson, Simon 3517, 3525, 3527, 3534, 3535, 3540, 3542, 3543, 3563 1 

Gomulka 3560 i 

Great Britain 3539 ! 


H I 

Hague, The 3549, 3555, 3559 

Hiss, Alger 3516 , 


Hitler 3535 

Hook, Prof. Sidney 3534 

Hoover, J. Edgar 3519 

Hruska, Senator Roman L 3533 

Hungarian 3529, 3588, 3558, 3559 

Hungarian Communist Party 3538 

Hungarian Government 3550, 3551, 3555-3557 

Hungarian Military Penal Code 3559 

Hungarian National Government 3561 

Hungarian People's Republic 3549, 3556 

"Hungarian Situation in the Light of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 

the" 3551, 3555 

Hungary 3522, 

3524, 3526, 3527, 3536, 3538-3540, 3546, 3549, 3550, 3557, 3559, 3560 
"Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression" 3555, 3557 


ILO 3560 

India 3560 

International Association of Democratic Lawyers 3551, 3554 

International Commission of Jurists 3549, 3551, 3555, 3557, 3559 

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 3546 

International Court of Justice 355I 

International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union 3545 

International Red Cross 3560 

International Red Cross Conference, 17th (Stockholm) 3556 

Iron Curtain 3535, 3536, 3541, 3559, 3560 

Italy 3535 


Jenner, Senator William E 3515, 3533 


Kadar regime 3549, 3551, 3552, 3557, 3560 

Kethly 3561 

Khrushchev 3539, 3560, 3562 

Kiraly 3561 

Koevago 3561 

Kremlin 3521. 3522, 3535, 3537, 3539, 3540, 3542, 3544, 3559, 3560, 3562, 3563 

Kristof, Istvan 3552, 3553 

"Labor No. 1 Target of United States Communists," by Arnold Beichman__ 3561 

Las Vegas Sun 35g2 

Left Wing Communism, by Lenin ~~ 3544 

Lenin " 3544 

Lightfoot, Claude 3543 

London ~_ ~_~_ 3552 

Lovestone 3520 

Lovestoneites ~~ 3520 


Marsh, Norman S 3555 

Marxist 3521 3543 

Marxist-Leninist 3520, 3522, 3523,~3538, 3543', 3547 

Meany, George 3545 

Mein Kampf ~~~ I_~_I_ 3535 

Migdol, Lester II_~IIII 35I6 

Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers _ _Z" _~ ~~_ 3545 

^^««'^",^i-- — TV i~"::::i5i8, 3519 

"Monolithic unity" 3521, 3527, 3538 

Morns, George 3545 

Morris, Robert II~~I~3515 3533 

Moscow 3521, 3535-3537, 3539, 3540, 3543,1544, 3546, 3547, 355^568 



Mussolini 3535 

Muste, Rev. J. A 3517 


Nagy government, 3557 

Nagy, Imre 3540, 3560 

Nasser 3562 

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 3524 

National Association of Manufacturers 3535, 3536 

Naughton, Howard 3537 

Nazi 3558 

Nazi Germany 3529 

Nelson, Steve 3543 

Netherlands 3549, 3555 

New Leader 3533 

New York 3515, 3516, 3517, 3533, 3541, 3542, 3561, 3562 

New York Communist Party 3534, 3543 

New York Herald Tribune 3525, 3534 

New York Times 3525, 3534, 3537 

New York University, department of philosophy : 3534 


Party Life (magazine) 3537 

Poland 3540, 3560 

Polish 3516 

Poznan 3535 

Pravda 3523, 3546, 3547 

Presidential Council of the People's Republic : 3552, 3553, 3554 


Rachlin, Carl 3515-3530, 3539, 3543 

187 Brown Street, Brooklyn, N. Y 3516 

Testimony of 3515-3530 

Lawyer (11 West 48th Street, New York City) 3516 

Board of directors, New York Civil Liberties Union 3516 

Unofficial observer to Communist Party Convention, New York 3516 

Rajchman, Ludwig 3515, 3533 

Riesel, Victor 3562 

Rumania 3550 

Rumanian puppet government 3560 

Rusher, William A 3515, 3533 

Russia 3529, 3535, 3540 

Russian 3523, 3560 

Russin, Bayard 3517 


SACB 3546 

Smith Act 3526, 3527, 3536, 3541 

Soviet anti-Semitism 3524, 3526, 3529 

Soviet Communist Party 3523, 3537 

Soviet Communist Party Congress, 20th 3560 

Soviet Georgia 3535 

Soviet Government 3520, 3522, 3523, 3527, 3557 

"Soviet imperialism" 3522 

Soviet Russia (magazine) 3537 

Soviet Union__ 3522, 3523, 3527, 3529, 3534, 3536-3538, 3549, 3556-3559, 3561, 3562 

Spain 3561 

Stalin 3535, 3536, 3539, 3562, 3563 

Stalinism 3529 

Stalinist 3520, 3523 

Stein, Sid 3543 

St. Johns College of Maryland 3517 

Summary Trials in Hungary 3549 




Tiflis 3535 

Tito 3537, 3561 

Treaty of Peace With Hungary, 1947 3549-3551 

Trotskyites 3537 

"20tli Century Americanism" 3520 


United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers 3545 

United Nations 3557, 3560 

United Office and Professional Workers 3516 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 3550, 3551 

van Dal, A. J. M 3549 


Watkins, Senator Arthur V 3515 

Westbury Hotel (New York City) 3515, 3533 

Western Union 3533 

White, Harry Dexter 3516 

Wilkins, Roy 3524 

World War II 3535 


Yalta agreement 3560 

Yugoslavia 3561 















FEBRUARY 25 AND 26, 1957 

PART 54 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

93215 WASHINGTON : 1957 

Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

OCT 9 - 1957 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 


OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota 





SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 


Act AND Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 

ROBERT Morris, Chief Counsel 

J. G. SODRWiNE, Associate Counsel 

William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Witness : Page 

Dennis, Eugene 3566 

Meyer, Frank S 3577 




United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

or the Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws, of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 : 15 p. m., in room 
318, Senate Office Buildin<r, Senator Roman L. Hruska presiding. 

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine and 
William A. Rusher, associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director 
of research. 

Senator Hruska. The committee will come to order. 

There was recently held in New York City a convention of the Com- 
munist Party of the United States of America. I believe the last day 
of the session was February 12, 1957. 

This committee has had several witnesses appear before it in connec- 
tion with reporting some of the things which transpired at that con- 
vention. Carl Rachlin was here. He was an unofficial observer at 
the sessions of the convention, as I understand it. 

And Arnold Beichman was a reporter who covered as best he could 
the proceedings of that convention. 

This committee, in connection with the inquiries in this general 
field of the activities of the Communist Party here in this country, 
would like to continue its inquiry into this situation. 

And we have, therefore, invited Mr. Eugene Dennis to appear 
before this committee.^ 

^ See the following letter : 

United States Department of Justice, 

United States Attorney, 
Southern District of New York, 
New York, N. Y., Fehruary 18, 1957. 
Re Eugene Dennis. 
Robert Morris, Esq., 
Chief Counsel, 

Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Bob : Enclosed herewith is copy of letter to attorney for the above-named subject 
which is self-explanatory. 

tom bolan. 

February 18, 1957. 
Re United States versus Eugene Dennis. 
.TOHN J. Abt, Esq., 

320 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 
Dear Sir : Confirming telephone conversation with my assistant, Thomas A. Bolan, this 
afternoon, please be advised that the United States attorney's office has no objection to 
the above-named defendant's traveling to Washington, D. C., on February 25, 1957, to 
answer a subpena issued by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, or on any day 
to which his appearance may be adjourned by said subcommittee. 
Very truly yours, 

Paul W. Williams, 
United States Attorney. 
By Thomas A. Bolan, 
Assistant United States Attorney. 



I presume at this time it would be well to swear the witness. 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Senator Hjiuska. Will you please rise ? 

You solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth in the testimony which you are about to give ? 

Mr. Dennis. I do. 

Senator Hruska. So help you God ? 

Mr. Dennis. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. I might say by way of preliminary that the Daily 
Worker, a well-known newspaper in this field, in commenting on the 
subpena issued to the witness here, Mr. Dennis, made a statement which 
included this language : 

Far from being a cellar conspiracy, our convention was held in the glare of 
white-hot publicity. 

And it was our thought that perhaps, inasmuch as it was that, 
maybe you would sliare with us some of the things that transpired 
there, and also some of the parts which you assumed in that connection. 

Judge Morris, would you like to proceed at this time to interrogate 
the witness, or do you want to do otherwise ? 



Mr. Morris. I will proceed. 

What is your name and address, please ? 

Mr. Dennis. My name is Eugene Dennis. I reside at 628 West 
151st Street, New York City. 

Mr. Morris, "\'\^iere were you born, Mr. Dennis ? 

Mr. Dennis. At this point, counsel and Senator, I would like to 
read a very brief statement. It is extremely short but it sets forth 
my legal and political position on these hearings. 

Senator Hruska. Suppose we dispose of the preliminary questions 
first, Mr. Dennis, and then you may at a later time read that statement. 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Morris. Wliere were you born ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I am going to decline to answer that question, Mr. 
Morris, first, invoking my rights under the first amendment, which 
precludes the Congress or any of its committees prying into my opin- 
ions, political beliefs, or associations. 

Secondly, on the grounds of my conscience, because I consider this 
a lawless coimnittee, headed by a chairman who is a notorious racist 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Dennis, you may make a short statement, 
but this coimnittee will not tolerate any aspersions of that kind upon 
a member of this committee. They are not necessary for any state- 
ment which you have in this connection, and we would respectfully 
request that you desist from any further remarks of that kind. 

Mr. Dennis. May I complete the grounds on which I am declining! 

Senator Hruska. Not if they include any further reference to any 
member of this committee, a fact which is not necessary in order to 
make your position clear in respect to your legal rights, Mr. Dennis. 

Mr. Dennis. And the further gromids on wliich I decline to answer 
this and other questions that I may so refuse to answer, is that I claim 


my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against 

Senator Hruska. The Chair will overrule all of those objections, 
all of those grounds except that of the fifth amendment at this time. 

Mr. Dennis. May the record show that I am still standing on the 
grounds which I have stated ? 

Senator Hrusk.4. The record so shows. 

Judge Morris, will you proceed ? 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dennis, to reframe the question, you were born in 
Seattle, Wash., were you not? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to ansAver on the grounds previously stated. 

Mr. Morris. Were you born in Seattle, Wash., under the name of 
Frank Waldron ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as stated before. 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Chairman, I assume we have the same ruling? 

Senator Hruska. The record will show that the same ruling will 
apply to all of the same assertions of refusal to answer. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dennis, you had your training, did you not, in 
the Lenin Institute in Moscow; that is, your Commmiist Party 
training ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer that question under the grounds as 
previously stated. 

Mr. Morris. Have you ever been to the Lenin Institute in Moscow ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer the question on these same 

Mr. Forer. Pardon me. 

Mr. Dennis. As stated previously. 

Mr. FoRER. Have you gotten beyond the preliminary question, so 
the witness' request to read his statement may again be renewed ? 

Senator Hruska. Yes, I think so; subject, however, to that limita- 
tion which I placed on it, if that statement contains any reference 
which casts those kind of aspersions as were made a little bit ago 
upon the chairman of this subcommittee, we respectfully ask that they 
be withheld and not given. 

Mr. Morris. Might I also add that there is a subcommittee rule 
with which I think counsel is acquainted that before statements are 
going to be read or presented to the committee, that the committee 
rule requires that they be filed 24 hours in advance. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, we had an executive session, as you know, just 
a short time ago and there was no reference whatever made at that 
time to the filing or the reading of any statement here in this open 

Mr. FoRER. It is only a procedural rule which I am sure you can 

Senator Hruska. It will depend. 

Mr. Dennis. May I state, Mr. Senator 

Senator Hruska. The Chair at this time requests that a copy of 
that statement be submitted in advance so we may consider whether 
or not we want to waive the committee rules to which reference has 
just been made. 

Mr. Dennis. I might say at this point, Senator, that contrary to — 
being the remark that you must have made inadvertently — I was not 
invited here. I was subpenaed. And, therefore, I think after being 


brought here that I should be entitled to read a very brief statement 
which is pertinent. 

Senator PIruska. The record will stand corrected, insofar as it was 
a subpena which brought you here as opposed to an invitation. 

However, the committee rules have not yet been waived and I do 
not know that they will. Your ability to make that statement will 
be governed by the decision of the Chair, which will be made in just 
a little bit. 

In the meantime, may we proceed to other questions while that 
statement is being analyzed by the staff? 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Dennis, you have been the general secretary 
of the Communist Party of the United States of America, have you 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer the question on tlie grounds pre- 
viously stated. 

Mr. Morris. Well now, did you attend the recent Communist Party 
convention in New York City ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer the question for reasons stated 

Mr, Morris. Mr. Dennis, as the chairman read just a short time 
ago at the time that you were served with a subpena, the Communist 
Party, the national committee of the Communist Party issued the 
statement in connection with your very appearance here, that — 

far from this being a cellar conspiracy our convention was held in a glare of 
white-hot pubUeity. 

Do you, even after that statement was issued, refuse now to tell us 
whether or not you were even present at the convention ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I repeat, I refuse to answer the question on the basis 
of the gromids as previously stated. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know that Irving Potash surre[)titiously ent- 
ered the United States in the closing days of 1956 ? 

( Consultation between witness and attorney. ) 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the basis of the grounds pre- 
viously given. 

Mr. Morris. Well now, to your knowledge did Irving Potash secret- 
ly meet with leaders of the American Commmiist Party at that time ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. That is absurd, Mr. Morris. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat is absurd, that he met — that he met with lead- 
ers of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Dennis. My answer to your question is that is absurd. Be- 
yond that I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons previously 

Mr. Morris. Well now, let me ask this, did you meet with Mr. 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse, sir, on the basis of reasons as previously 

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge did Potash meet with any leader of 
the Communist Party known to you? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for the reasons as previously 


Mr. Morris. Wlien you say — when you give^ — when you gave your 
preceding answer, "it is absurd," did you mean that it is absurd that 
I should ask you that, Mr. Dennis ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I meant by that the implications contained in the 
question were absurd, fantastic, preposterous. 

Mr. Morris. Well, did he meet with you ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as previously given. 

Senator Hruska. Do you know Mr. Potash, Mr. Dennis ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer, sir, on the basis of the reasons 
as I have stated before. 

Senator Hruska. Do you know who he is ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons as given previously. 

Mr. Morris. Well now, Mr. Dennis, the New York Herald Tribune 
of January 9, 1957, contained an article, which said that Ii-\^ing Pot- 
ash has illegally entered this countiy carrying secret orders from the 
Kremlin to leaders of the Communist Party in the United States. 

Now, did you know that Potash was in the United States at any 
time that he was in the United States ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the basis of the grounds as pre- 
viously stated. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have any knowledge that he was secretly meet- 
ing with leaders of the Communist Party of the United States? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the basis of the reasons as I 
have given them before. 

Mr. Morris. Did he, to your knowledge, bear any instructions to 
members of the Communist Party in the United States ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. Would you kindly repeat the question ? 

Mr. Morris. Eead it. 

(Question read.) 

Mr. Dennis. I certainly did not receive anything or act upon any- 
thing that I regarded as a directive or an instruction. 

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, did he have any advice or instruc- 
tions for any member at the top of the Communist Party — did he — to 
your knowledge, did you know that he was imparting instructions 
or orders to any leader of the Communist Party ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. That is preposterous, Mr. Morris. I am sure, to the 
best of my knowledge, nothing was received that anyone in his right 
mind could regard as directives. 

Mr. Morris. How about advice? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons I stated 

Mr. Morris. You will not enter a denial with respect to the term 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds I have just given. 

Mr. Morris. Would you be willing to tell us the purpose of Mr. 
Potash's trip to the United States ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as previously given. 

Mr. Morris. "W^ien did you first learn that Potash was in the United 

93215— 57— pt. 54 2 


Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons as stated before. 

Mr. Morris. Do you know a man named John Williamson who was 
previously one of the leaders of the American Communist Party? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for the reasons as previously given. 

Mr. Morris. AVould you tell us, Mr. Dennis — would you tell us 
Vvdien you last had a communication from John Williamson? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for reasons I have stated before. 

Mr. Morris. Have you received instructions from Jolin Williamson ? 

Mr. Forer. Just a moment, do you have in mind any particular 

Mr. Morris. Within the last 6 months, did you receive a letter or any 
communication of any kind 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to 

Mr. Morris. With recommendations or advice from John Wil- 

Mr. Forer. Let us get it straight. Your first question was instruc- 
tions. Now it has become a letter. Which question do you want 
him to answer. 

Mr. Morris. Have you received any letters from John Williamson ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for grounds previously given. 

Mr. IMoRRis. Would you be willing to turn over to the committee 
any letters that you have received from John Williamson in the last 
6 months ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons as stated before. 

Mr. Morris. Have you received any written instructions from 
John Williamson in the last 6 months ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I repeat, Mr. Morris, that is preposterous, absurd. 
I am sure to the best of my knowledge nothing was received that 
anyone in his right mind could regard as directives. 

Mr. Morris. Did you receive any letter— a letter or any other 
communication from Mr. Williamson which gave you any advice as 
to how the Communist Partj^ of the United States should be run? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for reasons as stated before. 

Mr. Morris. Again, you will make the distinction between "in- 
structions" and "advice"? 

Mr. Forer. There is a distinction, you know. 

Mr. Morris. Again you are making the distinction in your answer 
between "instructions" and "advice" ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for the grounds previously stated. 

Mr. Morris. Did you know, Mr. Dennis, that John Williamson 
went from London, where, to my knowledge, he now is, to Moscow, 
during the fall of 1956? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons I have stated 

Mr. Morris. Isn't it so, Mr. Dennis, that after he returned from 
Moscow, he commenced to write you and to give you instructions and 
advice with respect to how the Communist Party of the United States 
should be run ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as stated before. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Dennis, did you receive, or did you or any 
other leader of tlie Communist Party receive any letters or instruc- 
tions or bits of advice from a French Communist named Duclos? 

( Consultation between witness and attorney. ) 


Mr. Dennis. Mr. Morris, that is a very compounded question. I 
would appreciate it if you would break it down into its particulars. 

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, Mr. Dennis, did Mr. Khrushchev 
in addressing the 20th party convention of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, on March 7, 1956, state : 

There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries violent overthrow 
of the dictatorship of the bourgeois and the aggravation of the class struggle 
connected with this are inevitable. 

Is that so, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as previously 

Mr. Morris. Now, to your knowledge was the declaration made by 
a leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that peaceful 
transition is possible only in countries where there is voting socialism, 
but that there must be a revolutionary transition where the particular 
country concerned has an entrenched capitalist society? 

To your knowledge was that statement made ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons given 

Mr. Morris. Was the decision made in connection with any policy 
decision of the Communist Party of the United States that the United 
States was such a country where there is an entrenched capitalist 
society ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as previously stated. 

Mr. Morris. When did you last hear from Mr. Duclos ? 

Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as stated previously. 

Mr. ISIoRRis. And will you not tell us about any instructions and/or 
advice that the Communist Party of the United States received from 
Mr. Duclos ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I would appreciate, Mr. Morris, if you would break 
that question up. 

Mr. Morris. Well, I mean that has come up several times before, 
Mr. Chairman. The witness has stated that he has entered a denial 
with respect to any instructions that have been imparted to the Com- 
munist Party of the United States but has claimed privilege on the 
same question when the noun used is "advice." 

Now, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that the witness is draw- 
ing a distinction here that we should take cognizance of. On the basis 
of his denials of having received any instructions, I think, Mr. Chair- 
man, that we can pursue this further and make recommendations and 
expect answers with respect to any communication where instruction 
is involved. 

Senator Hruska. The witness will answer. 

Mr. Forer. We don't know the question. 

Mr. Morris. Did you receive any communication from Mr. Duclos 
which contained an instruction to the leaders of the Communist Party 
of the United States? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. FoRER. Are you talking — as of what time are you talking about? 

Mr. Morris. At any time within the last 6 months. 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 


Mr. Denxis. I wish to repeat, as I have stated earlier to a similar 
Question, Mr. Morris, that is preposterous. I am sure, to the best of 
my knowledge, that iiothino; was received by anyone in his right 
mind— which anybody in his right mind could regard as directives 
or instructions. 

Mr. Morris. Is that the end of the answer ? 

Mr. FoRER. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Would you deny that Duclos sent any instructions to 
the United States? 

Mr. FoRER. He could only answer to the best of his knowledge which 
he already did. 

Mr. Morris. What is the best of his knowledge ? 

Mr. FoRER. He just told you, he had no such knowledge. 

Mr. Morris. No knowledge of any communications from Mr. 
Duclos ? 

Mr. FoRER. That was not the question. You asked if there had 
been any instructions, not if there had been any communications. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us, on the basis of that answer, what 
instructions that you know of that have been received by the American 
Communist Party from Mr. Duclos? 

Mr. Forer. You are talking in the last 6 months? 

:Mr. :Morrts. In the last 6 months ? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. FoRER. He said he didn't know of any. How can you ask him 
what they were? 

]\f r. Morris. Did he Imow of any communication of any kind ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the 
grounds as previously stated. 

Mr. Sourwine. May I inquire ? 

Senator Hruska. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. I believe I quote you correctly, sir. You said : 

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard 
as directives. 

You stated that in response to questions about communications from 
Mr. Potash. 

You stated it again in regard to communications from Mr. Wil- 

You stated it again in regard to communications from Mr. Duclos. 
On the latter occasion you added the words "or instructions." 

It appeared to me that you were reading that statement and that is 
how ;^ou repeated it precisely. 

I will ask you if that is true, were you reading that statement ? 

Mr. FoRER. That is a pertinent question, Mr. Chairman. Isn't the 
witness entitled to use his notes ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I intend to inquire here for the 
purpose of testing the witness' credibility in connection with the 
positive statement he has made to the committee, and for the purpose 
of pursuing, so far as the committee has a right to pursue it, the 
implications of that question. 

Senator Hruska. The Chair rules that the question is proper. 

Mr. FoRER. The question is whether he was reading his answer ? 

Senator Hruska. That is right. 


Mr. SouRwiNE. No implication that he does not have the right to 
read it. 

Mr. FoRER. Then I do not understand why you ask the question. 
All right, then. 

Mr. Dennis. "Wliat is your 

Mr. SouRWiNE. The question is, When you stated on several occa- 
sions these words : 

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard 
as directives — 

were you reading that phrasing ? 

Mr. Dennis. I have various notes here Avhich I refer to from time 
to time. 

Mr. Sotjrwine. Do you have in front of you a note which carries 
these words : 

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard 
as directives. 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 
Mr. Forer. Give him time while he looks over his notes. 
You are talking about those precise words ? 

Senator Hruska. The record will show that the witness has been 
given opportunity to scan the notes in front of him. 
Mr. Dennis. Not the notes — the notes are not in those precise words. 
Mr. SouEwiNE. Then let me ask you this question : When you said : 

I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard 
as directives. 

were you saying precisely what you intended to say ? 

Mr. Forer. I clon't get this. 

Mr. Dennis. I don't understand the question. 

Mr. Sourwine. You made an answer three times here. It seems 
quite obvious that is what you intended to answer, that you had 
made up your mind that that was what you were going to say to a 
particular kind of question. When that question came up you then 
did say it. 

Is that what happened ? 

Mr. Dennis. As you know, I was brought here under subpena 
against my will and in violation of the first amendment. And I am 
offering testimony under oath and that testimony is mine. 

And I don't w\ant anybody to put any words into my mouth. 

Mr. Sourwine. Fine, fine. 

Now, you have stated that you are sure— and I speak now with re- 
gard to your answer to the question which was asked as to Mr. Pot- 
ash — you have stated that you are sure that nothing was received 
that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives. 

I will now ask you. Do you have any knowledge whatsoever which 
will serve as a basis for your judgment as expressed in those words? 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I rest on my previous answer to reply to that ques- 
tion just formulated, I decline to answer on the grounds as previously 

Mr. Sourwine. I ask that the Chair direct that this question be 
answered. The witness has made a voluntary statement and we are 
not to put anything in his mouth. He made the statement. I ask 
that he be ordered and directed to answer that question. 


The committee is entitled to find, out the basis on which he gives the 
committee his opinion with regard to this matter. 

Senator Hruska. The witness is directed by the Chair to answer 
the question. 

Mr. FoRER. I would like the record to show, Mr. Chairman, that I 
am here as Mr. Dennis' counsel and that I am the one advising him 
on his legal rights, not Mr. Sourwine, and that in my opinion it is 
perfectly clear that the witness was entitled to claim his privilege to 
that question. 

And I am advising the witness now that he is entitled, if he so 
desires, to persist in his refusal to answer for the reasons he gave 

Senator Hruska. The record will show what the counsel has just 
stated and the Chair further directs the witness at this time, not- 
withstanding that advice and the words of counsel, to answer the ques- 

Mr. Dennis. Mr. Chairman, I will abide by my refusal on the 
grounds and reason as previously stated. 

Mr. Sourwine. Now, Mr. Dennis, you have stated that you are 
sure that nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would 
regard as directives. 

I will ask you : Unless you know everything which was received how 
can you make that statement ? 

(Consultation between witnesses and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I don't understand the question. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have stated that notliing was received which 
fell in a certain category — notliing was received from Mr. Potash 
which fell in a certain category. That is the category of things which 
anyone in his right mind would regard as directives. 

Now, if you do not know what was received from Mr. Potash, how 
can you make that statement ? 

Mr. Forer. That is not a question — that is an argument. Keally, 
Mr. Chairman, in temis of time, I am going to object to this line of 
questions because Mr. Sourwine is arguing with the witness. He is 
not asking him questions of information. 

Mr. Morris. Isn't it apparent to you what Mr. Sourwine has just 
done was made very clear ? 

Mr. FoRER. If he wants to make something clear he can do it — say 
whatever he has to say without asking the witness argumentative 

I mean if he wants to state what his position is, that is one thing. 
But that does not mean he has to do it in the form of questions to 
Mr. Dennis. 

I think it is really just a waste of time. 

Senator Hruska. It will be necessary for the committee to recess 
very shortly to resume this hearing in the morning. Before we do 
that, however, I should like to make a comment on the statement which 
was submitted by the witness, preceded by a couple of additional state- 
ments by Judge Morris here. 

Mr. Morris. I have two questions that I would like to ask. 

Senator Hruska. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Do you have a son now in Moscow, Mr. Dennis ? 


Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer the question on the grounds as 
previously stated. 

Mr. Morris. Your son, Timothy, is now in Moscow ? 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons just given. 

Mr. Morris. I have here an article that appeared in the New Leader 

of February 25, 1957. This reads : 

In fact, the main issues at the Communist convention were hammered out in a 
secret session which began 3 days before the convention, held on the 6th and 7th 
floors of the National Theater Building in a special room and nearby hall. 

Is it true that there were secret sessions preceding the convention of 
the Communist Party held in the second week of February 'I 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as stated before. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions. 

Senator Hruska. Very well. 

With reference to the statement which was submitted by you, Mr. 
Dennis, the Chair will rule that there will be a conditional acceptance 
of a part of it. You are free, if you choose, to read the first page 
thereof, but the Chair holds that it would be improper for you to 
I ead the second part thereof at this time. 

So if you want to accept that and read the first page you may do so. 

JVir. Dennis. Mr. Chairman, I shall read the first page of the state- 
ment according to the ruling of the Chair, and under protest, I shall 
not read the latter part, but I assume the statement in its entirety will 
be entered into the record. 

Senator Hruska. Before you start, on the inquiry as to the in- 
clusion of the entire statement into the record, we will let you read 
the first part, and the second part will not be read at this time nor 
will it be included in the record which is being made. 

It will, however, constitute a part of the files of this committee. 

(Consultation between witness and attorney.) 

Mr. Dennis (reading). I hold to the basic constitutional doctrine 
embodied in the first amendment of our Bill of Rights — Congress 
shall make no law denying the freedom of speech and assembly. 

It follows that congressional committees may not investigate these 
areas, since they are not empowered to legislate in them. 

I will, therefore, answer no questions involuntarily which relate 
directly or indirectly to my political beliefs or associations. 

In so doing, I will invoke all constitutional guaranties available 
to all Americans — the first amendment, the fifth amendment, and all 
other guaranties of my rights. 

Whatever political discussion I shall carry on, it will be in the 
market place of public opinion, and not under the gun of a congres- 
sional subpena and witchhunt. 

Let me make clear, however, that whatever the legalities, I place 
special emphasis on the first amendment. I hold firmly that neither 
this committee nor any other congressional body may constitutionally 
investigate peaceful assembly — whether exercised by conventions of 
Republicans, Democrats, Socialists, Communists, ADAers, or trade 

I contend that this is so, even though this committee may endeavor 
to camouflage its unconstitutional invasion of the first-amendment 



area mider the pretext of investigating alleged "directives from 
abroad," or some other equally preposterous accusation. 

Senator Heuska. The Chair would like to observe that such a state- 
ment as this witness has just read is a far cry from the words of Daily 
Worker of February 20, 1957, commenting upon that convention in 
New York, ending on February 12, which reads as follows : 

Far from being a cellar conspiracy, our convention was held in the glare 
of white-hot publicity. 

There are other observations and other questions which will be 

followed up a little later and we will recess until 10 tomorrow morn- 1 

ing in a room to be determined, and notice of same will be given in 

due time. ^ 

We are recessed until that time. t 

Mr. FoRER. You do not mean that you want Mr. Dennis back? \ 

Senator Hruska. Yes; we want Mr. Dennis back. i 

(Whereupon, at 3 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene ; 

Tuesday, February 26, 1957.) i 



United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF THE Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws, of the 

Committee on the Judiciary, 
Washington^ D. G, 

The subcominittee met. pursuant to notice, at 2 p. m., in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner and Hruska. 

Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher, 
associate counsel. 

Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Meyer, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about 
to give to this Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Meyer. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the hearing today is a continuance of 
(he present series of hearings being held by the Internal Security Sub- 
committee, by way of determining the nature of the purported or pro- 
fessed changes of the Communist pai'ty line. We have heard Carl 
Rachlin and ]\Ir. Beichman. Yesterday we had Mr. Dennis, and now 
we have ]Mr. Frank Meyer. 

We are going to do everything we can in order to get people who 
are competent to testify on Communist party policy, to testify in these 


]Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, 
please ? 

Mi-. Meyer. Frank S. Meyer, Woodstock, N. Y. 

Mr. Morris. And what is your business or occupation, Mr. Meyer? 

Mr. Meyer. I am a writer. 

Mr. Morris. And what do you write, for instance? 

Mr. Meyer. I am working on the finishing up of one book, and in 
the middle of another, and I have been doing a good deal of writing 
also, of a free-lance magazine character. 

My first book, which is approaching the stage of production, publi- 
cation, is a stud}^ of the molding of Communists, the training and 
making of Communists. 

93215— 57— pt. 54 3 3577 


My second one is a study in American political theoi-y. Most of my 
free-lance work recently lias been for National Review, of which I am 
associate editor. 

Mr. Morris. And do you do any other writin_2:s ? 

Mr. Meyer. I have done a good deal of free-lanc-e writing here and 
there, but recently that is the main thing I have been working on, the 
two books, and the National Review work. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Meyer, where were you born ? 

Mr. Meyer. Newark, N. J. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what your education has been? 

INIr, Meyer. I went to school at Newark Academy, Newark, N. J.; 
then to Princeton, N. J., where I spent a couple of years, and then I 
went abroad to England where, after studying privately for a year, 
1 went to Oxford, Balliol College, Oxford. 

Mr. Morris. How is that spelled ? 

Mr. JNIeyer. B-a-l-l-i-o-1. 

I took a bachelor-of-arts degree there, which later was trans- 
formed to a master of arts from Oxford University, and later did 
graduate work, though I never took a degree, a couple of years at 
the London School of Economics, and several years at the University 
of Chicago. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Meyer, you joined the Communist Party 
as you went along the line, did you not ? 

Mr. Meyer. 1931. 

Mr. Morris. Where were you at that time ? 

Mr. Meyer. Oxford. 

Mr. Morris. "Wliat was your first introduction to the Communist 
Party organization? 

Mr. Meyer. I was rather active in the Labor Party organization, 
and a group of us became dissatisfied with what we thought was the 
slowness of affairs, reformism of the Labor Party. 

We founded a small group at Oxford and made our own connec- 
tions with the Communist Party. That is, we went up to London 
and saw the Communist Party and said we wanted to found a Com- 
munist Party group at Oxford University. 

We then founded a public group called the October Club, which is 
a small group. Communist-controlled, and which became a small 
group in the University, along with the Labor Club and the Con- 

That actually was founded, I think, about December 31, just before 
the vacation. 

Mr. INfoRRis. And tell us, generally, the nature of your Communist 
activity while you were still in England. 

Mr. Meyer. 'After I left Oxford in the spring of 1932, June 1932, 
I went as a graduate student to the London School of Economics, and 
at this point I became the secretary of the student bureau of the Com- 
munist Party of Great Britain, That is, I was responsible for and 
the head of the students' activity. 

Mr. Morris. You were secretary of what group ? 

Mr. Meyer. The Students' Bureau of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain. 

Mr. Morris. Secretary of the Students' Bureau of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain. How extensive an organization was the Stu- 
dents' Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain ? 


Mr. Meyer. By the time I left England, about 1934, I would say 
that we had from 400 to 500 Communist Party members, disciplined 
Communist Party members, in the British universities, which is a 
more significant figure, perhaps, than in America, because there are 
only about 50,000 or 60,000 university students altogether. 

Mr. Morris. So, of the 50,000 or 60,000 university students, there 
were 400 disciplined Communists ? 

Mr. Meyer. 400 to 500. At Oxford, I remember distinctly, there 
was a disciplined university group of TO, and at Cambridge of ap- 
proximately 100. 

Mr. Morris. How many at the London School of Economics ? 

Mr. Meyer. At the London School of Economics, I would say, the 
group ranged somewhere around 45 or 50, from memory. 

Senator Jenner. Let the record show Senator Hruska is now in 

Mr. Morris. Senator Hruska, I will bring you up to date with what 
the witness has said today, thus far. 

Mr. Frank Meyer is the witness. He has testified that he was born 
in New Jersey, attended Princeton University and Oxford. While 
he was in Oxford, he became a Communist ; that he then rose to posi- 
tion of secretary of the student bureau of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, and, as such, was in charge of or head of a disciplined 
group of between 400 and 500 Communists, of which 70 were at 
Oxford and 100 at Cambridge. And how many 

Mr. Meyer. About 45 or 50 in the London School of Economics. 
Something like 150 or more at London University, as a whole, of 
which the London School of Economics is one school. 

Mr. Morris. Were there any Communists from the other units of 
the British Empire in London at that time? 

Mr. Meyer. The situation in that regard is rather an interesting 
one. I was in constant commmiication, through the British Central 
Committee, in a conspiratorial manner, with both the Chinese Com- 
mmiist Party unit and the unit of the Communist Party of India. 

That is to say^ I never met, as such, any member of either the In- 
dian or the Chinese group, but we had constant communications 
through a third source ; that is, through the central committee of the 
Communist Party. I was, as a matter of fact, at this point a member 
of the central committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
and had specific contacts for this purpose, and my guess is — it has to 
be something of a guess 

Mr. Morris. A guess or an estimate ? 

Mr. Meyer. My estimate. But first — this is not an estimate — there 
was a powerful unit of the Indian group of the Communist Party in 
the London School of Economics, so far as I was informed by the 
party, and observing their result. That is to say, we coordinated our 
activities and one could see, when certain things were to be done, 
that the basic mass of the Indian student body could be swung by 
our Communist unit, when we wished to have them so swung. 

I have no real estimate as to how many that group would be, but 
my general idea is that there must have been 25 to 30 members of the 
Commmiist Party of India in the school, in addition to our own 
group, judging by their results, and judging by my general memory 
of what sort of a group it was. 


As a matter of fact, I was elected president of the student govern- 
ing body of the London School of Economics, as a known Commu- 
nist, on a United Front ticket. That is to say, we were supported by 
some elements of the left Labor Party, as well as our own following, 
and many scattered students, and, specifically, by an almost solid 
support of the organized Indian students. 

Now, that organized Lidian student group were nationalists. They 
were not Communists, as such, but it was very clear to me from the 
results we could achieve, that the decisive force within the Indian 
national group, the nationalist group, was the Communist Party unit. 
And they were our main allies in every campaign we carried on dur- 
ing that period. 

It may be of interest that 

Mr. Morris. Who was the leader of that Indian group ? 

Mr. Meyer. The public leader of the Indian students and the 
Indian nationalists at the London School of Economics in the union 
debates was Mr. Krishna Menon. 

Mr. Morris. Did Krishna Menon support you, for instance, when 
you were in these various activities you were carrying on ? 

Mr. Meyer. Very definitely; because in terms of any negotiations 
made with the Indian student grouping, where one met with 2 or ?> 
of them to decide on policy, he was the outstanding spokesman of the 
Indian students. 

As a matter of fact, there is a rather odd story. I was a candidate 
for the president of the London School of Economics Student Union. 
It was a very hard- fought election. 

JNIr. Morris. Running as a known Communist ? 

Mr. Meyer, United Front candidate, but as a known Communist, 
and I was defeated by, I think, 8 or 10 votes, whereupon Krishna 
Menon discovered there had been fraud in the election. It did turn 
out that the fraud was somebody on our side, but at least it was fraud, 
and the election was canceled at his demand and after constitutional 
discussions in the union the election was held again, and this time I 
was elected by 35 votes. So that, in this case, the Indian students and 
their leader played a rather big part in my election, in the election 
of the Communist candidate. 

Mr. Morris. And you Icnew there was a hard core operating there, 
but you did not know precisely which was a Communist ? 

Mr. Meyer. Precisely. I l^new there was a hard core operating 
within the Indian national group. I knew some of the leaders were 
Communists, but I did not know which were which. 

Mr. Morris. "Wliat are some of the other Communist assignments 
you had while you were in England ? You left in 1934, did you not ? 

Mr. Meyer. Yes. 

I joined the party, as it were, in 1931 to 1932. I have to make it 
general because this group attached itself and it was sort of infor- 
mally associated with the party vmtil we consolidated ourselves in 
early 1932. 

Then, after I left Oxford, my main assignment was secretary of the 
student bureau of the Party. I was a member of the central committee 
of the party, and of the Young Communist League. I was 

Mr. Morris. Member of the national committee of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain ? 


Mr. Meyer. That is right. 

And I was, at a couple of specific times, occupied in the leadership 
of youth and student delegations, both, to international antiwar and 
3nti-Fascist congresses, which were held in Paris and in Amsterdam 
during those years. 

The first of these, the Amsterdam one, was the international con- 
gress from which the American League Against War and Fascism 
proceeded. The others were secondary followup congresses of the 
same kind. 

I was at the European Workers — I think it was called — the Euro- 
pean Workers Anti-Fascist Congress, which was often referred to as 
the Pleyel Congress, and also at an international youth congress in 
Paris a few months later. 

Now, these congresses, in addition to being publicly what they were, 
were also utilized for international student fraction meetings under 
the aegis of the Communist International, where international stu- 
dent policy was worked out, international youth fraction meetings, 
and so on. 

Furthermore, during the time I was in England, I had other scat- 
tered assignments. I worked at one point for the central committee 
with the leading fraction of the London Busmen, and at another point 
with an important rail unit. But basically, my work was student work 
and, in general, united front work of the antiwar and anti-Fascist 

Mr. Morris. Generally, Mr. Meyer, as a general point of interest, 
would some of these students who are subordinates of yours in the 
Communist program work at Cambridge, Oxford, and the London 
School of Economics, have they gone on to be well-known personalities 
in some cases in Great Britain? 

JNIr. Meyer. I think so ; in many cases. I have noticed names from 
time to time — writers, editors, political people in the Labor Party, 
scientists; yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Well, now, when you came to the United States, did 
you recognize there was any link, organizational link, between the 
Communist Party of Great Britain and the Communist Party of the 
United States? 

Mr. INIeyer. ]My movement, as it were, from the Communist Party 
of Great Britain to the Communist Party of the United States was "a 
transfer between one section of the Communist International and an- 
other section of the same world party, the Communist International. 
And it was so handled officially. That is, I was transferred, as I might 
have been transferred from Chicago to New York, I was transferred 
from England to the United States. 

Mr. Morris. Was there any effort to maintain a fiction that the 
Communist Party of Great Britain was wholly independent and some- 
thing separate from the Communist Party of the United States ? 

Mr. Meyer. In those years there wasn't even an effort at that fiction. 
In those years it was openly accepted that each section of it, each 
national party was a section of the Communist International, with the 
same relationships to the executive committee of the Communist Inter- 
national that, say, the Chicago district of the American party would 
have to the national committee of the American party. 

And far from being concealed at that point, it was taught, boasted 


For example, in France, in ordinary newspaper talk they very 
often — the newspapers did not say "Communist Party of France." 
They said the "S. F. I. C," Section Francaise Internationale Com- 
mimiste — French section of the Communist International, and very 
often in England or America during those years the party was simply 
referred to as the American section of the Communist International 
or the British section. 

Mr. Morris, Well, now, what was your assignment in the Com- 
munist Party in- the United States, your first assignment in 1934? 

Mr. Meyer. When I arrived in the United States in 1934, the stu- 
dent work in England had been Communist Party work. In the 
United States it was directly under the control of the Young Com- 
munist League, which at that period was simply a youth section of 
the Communist Party, and I was transferred, so far as my effective 
work was concerned, from the party to the Young Communist League, 
and some weeks, perhaps some months, passed before it was decided 
exactly what I would do. 

During that time I participated in the preliminary discussions 
which led to the capture of the American Youth Congress by the 

I did other odds and ends of work around New York. I went up to 
Canada to attend the founding congress of the Canadian Students 
League and Antiwar Congress there, and attended a convention of the 
Young Communist League of Canada at the same time. 

And finally, it was agreed that I would go to Chicago, continue as 
a graduate student at the University of Chicago, and work with the 
district bureau of the Young Communist League in Chicago, and 
with the American League Against War and Fascism, as the party 
force in the youth section of the American League Against War and 
Fascism in Chicago. 

And my student and YCL work in Chicago lasted about a year and a 
half, as my main assignment, after which I transferred over to party 
work, though I still had connections with the university, some respon- 
sibilities for it. 

Shall I continue with that ? 

Mr. Morris. When you attended this meeting in Canada, what was 
the nature of the Communist Party of Canada that you observed at 
that time ? 

Mr. Meyer. Well, at that point the Communist Pai'ty of Canada 
v.'as more or less underground. It was — it considered itself an under- 
ground party. There was an anti-Communist law. The Young Com- 
munist League did not fully come under that statute, so it met half 
conspiratorially, half open, and half closed, as it were. 

Mr. Morris. And again, the relationship that existed between the 
Canadian Communist Party and the American Communist Party was 
the same as you have described as existing between the American 
Communist Party and the English party ? 

Mr. Meyer. Very definitely. 

There was a delegation from New York, consisting of Gil Green, who 
was then national secretary of the YCL, I believe, and Max Weiss, 
who was then educational director of the Young Communist League, 
and a man named Max. I cannot give him a last name because I 
never heard one. He was a representative of the Young Communist 
International from Moscow. 


Mr.MoREis. Was he Eussian ? 

Mr. JSIeyer. I have no idea what he was. He was obviously, by his 
accent, of some SLavic hmguage originally. And I would gather from 
the authority he showed in Canada, that he was not only the repre- 
sentative to the Young Communist League of the United States, 
which I knew, but that Canada was, so to speak, secondary and under 
the leadership of him and the American Young Communist League. 
At least, both he and Gil Green spoke with great authority in the 
Canadian Young Communist League inner meetings. 

As a matter of fact, the Canadians suggested that perhaps I should 
work in Canada for a period, but that was vetoed. 

Mr. Morris. In describing the general nature of your work, Mr. 
Meyer, how far have you gone by way of point of time, from 1934 

Mr. Meyer. I got to Chicago in the fall of 1934, and I would say 
about a year and a half or so m the student movement, and some time 
in late 1935, early 1936. 

Mr. Morris. And now, what did you do after 1936 ? 

Mr. Meyer. My first serious party assignment after I left the stu- 
dent movement was in the South Side section in Chicago, which is the 
Negro area of Chicago, like Harlem in New York, also including the 
university area of Hyde Park. And I was the educational director of 
that section, which was considered a ]3retty important section by the 
party, since the section organizer was a member of the political bureau, 
actually still a member of the political bureau assigned to work there. 

Mr. Morris. Who was he ? 

Mr. Meyer. Harry Haywood. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you carry on work there ? 

Mr. Meyer. I would say about, again, roughly a year and half. I 
can date the time I went into full-time district work, which was 1938, 
but during this period I was still attempting to do some graduate 
student work at the university, as well as being pretty active on the 
South Side section committee. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what positions did you subsequently attain in the 
Communist Party of the United States ? 

Mr. Meyer. Beginning in 1938, I became a full-time functionary 
in charge of the education work in the Illinois-Indiana district, whose 
center was Chicago, which included the whole of the State of Illinois 
and the State of Indiana. And at one point or another bits of Mis- 
souri and bits of Wisconsin, but most of this period it was Illinois and 

And I was, simultaneously, the director of the Chicago Workers 
School, which was an open party school, similar to and part of the same 
chain as the New York Workers ScJiool. 

But as educational director of the party, I was responsible for all 
inner education, agitation, and propaganda, public meetings, printed 
matter, shop papers, everything that used to be called by the Commu- 
nists agit-prop, but more politely in America called educational di- 
rector at that point. And also as a district leader, I had from time to 
time all sorts of other general responsibilities. 

I would be responsible for this section for a period of time, then for 
that one, for special campaigns, and so on. But my main work was 
educational director. 


Mr. Morris. Now, was there any — did the direction of all this Com- 
munist Party activity come from above — from a Communist organiza- 
tion above — or was it democratically decided among the various func- 
tionaries carrying on this work ? 

Mr. Meyer. I would like to put it this way : 

At every level — in this case we will take the district level — a great 
many problems of execution were decided on the spot, but basic line 
came from above. 

For example, in the position I held in charge of a department, it 
came in from two directions. One, from the district bureau and the 
district organizer himself of Illinois-Indiana who, in turn, had his 
directives from New York, from the central committee, and also di- 
rectly to me from the educational apparatus in New York itself. 

I would say that at each level in my experience the basic policies 
are laid down from on top, even to the degree of important personnel 
decisions being made from on top. But the execution of policies is 
your responsibility at the level you are at, and the same thing applies 
in your relations with the lower level. 

Mr. Morris. Now, how long did you remain a Communist Party 
functionary, Mr. Meyer? 

Mr. Meyer. I became — incidentally, I did not finish the actual posts 
I held. The last year or so of my activity, that is, beginning in the 
spring of 1941, 1 went from educational work into organizational work, 
so that I was involved in the organizational commission for about a 
year, until the summer of 1942, at which time I entered the Army as 
a volunteer officer candidate. 

I would say that my active work continued until about a month 
or two before I was accepted as a volunteer officer candidate in, I 
imagine, August or so. I was actually inducted in the Army in 
October of 1942. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat happened when you were inducted into the 
Army, Mr. Meyer ? 

Mr. Meyer. Well, as a functionary, and since as I was not im- 
mediately draftable, there was considerable opposition from the 
party leadership to my volunteering, and it took several months of 
argument to get the O. K. to do so. 

Wlien I was actually inducted into the Army, as was the case 
generally, a formal breaking of formal membership in the party 
was the normal case. That is to say, as of that moment you were 
not a party member until you came out again, and became a party 
member again. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, if you were asked under oath, were 
you, during the period you were in service, a member of the Com- 
munist Party, could you, without fear of incriminating yourself, 
honestly deny that you were a party member ? 

Mr. Meyer. If you are a good casuist and a good Communist, you 

Mr. Morris. There is no doubt about the fact, even though you 
were in that reserve status, you were a dedicated Communist? 

Mr. Meyer. Of course ; of course. 

Mr. Morris. How long did you serve in the Army ? 

Mr. Meyer. I went in as a volunteer officer candidate in 1942, in 
October, and went through basic training, and so on, and was washed 


out for lack of sufficient physical agility at Fort Benning in late 

Mr. Morris. A few months later ? 

Mr. Meyer. Seven months later, six months. I dont know- 
five months, actually ; late February, early March— I am not sure of 

Wliereupon, under the VOC situation, you were discharged hon- 
orably and reverted to draft status. But my feet had broken down 
completely in the Army, and I had to follow that up with a couple 
of operations, which kept me immobilized for about a year and a 


Mr. Morris. Then, after you left the service, you did some work 

in Washington, did you not ? 

Mr. Meyer. No. I had in mind the possibility of getting a job m 
Washington, in order to be able to do something, and also I was a 
Communist, and thinking in terms of where I could be most effective 
in that period. 

The point of the matter is this : that having been m the Army and 
still being draftable, and having these medical problems, the party 
felt that it was not worthwhile my going back into an organiza- 
tional job that I might either, for medical or draft reasons, have to 
leave in a few months, and I was a member at large, living in and 
near New York, and at 2 points in 1943, and again in 19-±5, before 
and after the operations, I thought in terms of getting a job of some 
sort where my attitudes would be useful, and so on, in Washington. 
And I made some efforts in 1943. 

Then it became absolutely necessary to have the operations, and 
then in 1945 I made efforts again. 

Mr. Morris. Senator Jenner, while you were chairman of this sub- 
committee, the subcommittee made an extensive inquiry into how 
Communists were able to get into Government and move around in 
Government. I wonder if we might ask Mr. Meyer how he, as a 
member at large at that time, went about his efforts to get Govern- 
ment employment. 

Senator Jenner. Proceed. 

Mr. Meyer. Actually, the person with whom I made contact, and 
it was done as so many things in the party are done in these circum- 
stances, without specifically saying "he is a party member, you are a 
party member, you ought to work together," but by a series of recom- 
mendations, the details of which I don't even remember, I was intro- 
duced to a man named David Wahl, who seemed to me to be function- 
ing as a sort of informal employment bureau for the party in Wash- 
ington, because I know of one or two other cases where he was helping 
people in this way. 

Mr. Morris. I might say David Wahl has been a witness before the 
subcommittee, at least in executive session here, connected with this 
particular aspect of his experiences. 

Proceed, Mr. Meyer. 

Mr. Meyer. Various possibilities arose. I unfortunately do not re- 
member at this point exactly whom I saw. I was introduced to a 
number of people in Washington, where nothing happened to work 
out or come through. 

The one I remember most distinctly, because it appealed to me very 
strongly at the time, was a proposal made by a friend of Mr. Wahl's 

93215— 57— pt. 54 4 


who was then Mr. Seller. I think it is Dick Seller. He had been, I 
believe, in a newspaper strike in Chicago, and was then secretai*y to 
Congressman Hugh JDe Lacy of Washington or Oregon. Washing- 
ton, I believe. 

Mr. Morris. Now, was Seller a Communist, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Meyer. To the same degree that I would say I talked and acted 
with Dave Wahl, as though he was a Communist, I talked and acted 
with Seller as though he were a Communist. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony that Congress- 
man Hugh De Lacy was a Communist during this period. 

Will you proceed, Mr. Meyer ? 

Mr. Meyer. The scheme or the proposal that Dave Wahl and Seller 
worked up was to get me a job as secretary to Congressman Helen 
Gahagan Douglas, who, so far as I know, was not aware of the cir- 
cumstances by which this thing was being done. She apparently re- 
lied on Mr. Seller to a considerable degree for advice and general 
knowing the way around, and he was working to find her a person as a 
speech writer. I don't know which specific assistant to a Congress- 
man or secretaryship it was but, as the job was discussed, it would have 
consisted of speech writing, general activity, and so on. I think this 
was before the period of the Congressional Reorganization Act any- 
way, was it not, and I don't know exactly what the specific post was. 

Mr. Morris. Wliat year was this, Mr. Meyer ? 

Mr. Meyer. This was 1945. 

Mr. Morris. Well, our records show, Mr. Chairman, that from 
January 3, 1945, to January 2, 1947, a person named H. Richard Seller 
was on the House Disbursing Office rolls, employed by Congressman 
Hugh De Lacy, at a salary of $6,219. This is the House disbursing 
record. Senator.^ 

The fact of the matter is you did not get the job, did you ? 

Mr. Meyer. No. The fact of the matter is I didn't. I don't even 
remember who did, except I knew he said there were other people he 
had in mmd, and it did not work out. 

I perhaps should go back a year or so to explain what I was, in gen- 
eral, doing at that point, and finish up this biography. 

I was, as I say, a member-at-large. I had been very much out of 
activity because of the two operations and the recoveiy that occupied 
a lot of time, and I was in a wheelchair. I was in the country doing 
a certain amount of writing, and when I was in New York, in com- 
munication, personal conversations, with a number of national com- 
mittee members — about the same time as I considered and looked into 
the Washington thing again for a few weeks, I was also discussing 
with the national committee what they had in mind for me to do 
from a party point of view. 

' A study of the payroll records in the House'disburslng office showed'employment in DeLacy's office 
of the following individuals, their highest salary per annum, and their duration of tenure in his office. 




H. Richard Seller . . . 

Jan. 3, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947 

$6. 219. 84 

Isabella Saverv 

Jan. 3, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947 


Barbara Z. Richardson 

Jan. 13, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947 


Gladvs Castle 

Jan. 3, 1945, to Oct. 31, 1945 


Suzanne S. Blumenkranz ».. 

Nov. 1, 1945, to Aug. 31, 1946, and Nov. 1, 1946, to Jan.;2, 1947. 

1, 145. 00 

' Blumenkranz is not listed on the roUs for the months of September and October 1946. 


I should say that I think tliat, at that time, my mind was moving 
a little in the direction it later took. That is, I was critical of the 
party position. I was thinking in terms of very much what became 
the Browder position. I had drafted a memorandum to Browder 
just before he opened up the broad, so-called Teheran position of the 
Communist Party. 

I was a little unsettled already, let us say, and perhaps might have 
moved still further away from the party during that long exile, had 
it not been that the Browder position seemed to me to be just what 
[ wanted, and I remained in for a couple of more years, and became 
rather enthusiastic about it, moving in the direction of making it 
more that way. 

Mr. Morris. And some time within a year after Browder's expul- 
sion from the Communist Party you, too, lost your interest in the 
Communist Party? 

Mr. JNIeter. What actually happened is this : 

During this period of 1945 or so, I finally, after discussions with 
John Williamson and Gil Green, it was agreed that I should write 
and teach for a year or so before taking on further organizational 
responsibilities, and I taught at the Jefferson School, wrote for the 
New Masses, and I had previously, incidentally, written a number 
of articles for the theoretical journal of the party, the Communist, 
later Political Affairs. 

I don't believe my articles appeared when it was Political Affairs. 
I think they appeared in the earlier prints. And I actually broke with 
all or most inner party connections, or was broken with most inner 
party connections, almost identically at the time of the Duclos article 
and the big Browder removal from the position of power. 

Mr, Morris. Did you know Browder well? 

Mr. Meter. I knew Browder extremely well right at that time, and 
somewhat later, during those first few months after he was removed 
from power. I knew him somewhat before. 

Mr. Morris. Were you acquainted with a woman who was closely 
associated with Mr. Browder, Josephine Truslow Adams? 

Mr. Meter. Yes. 

As a matter of fact, it was through her that I first personally met 
Browder ; otherwise, in a very informal official capacity. 

Mr. Morris. Who was Josephine Truslow Adams? 

Mr. Meter. Miss Adams is a woman, formerly a teacher at Swarth- 
more, who became involved in the United Front and Communist Party 
activities, in the first place, on campaigns on questions of so-called 
civil liberties, Spanish Civil War, and so on and, at the time I knew 
her, was teaching at the Jefferson School in New York. 

Mr. Morris. You were a teacher, or she was a teacher? 

Mr. Meter. Both of us were teaching, as a matter of fact. I met 
her when we were both teaching there. 

Mr. Morris. You say you both were in the general Communist 
framework ? 

Mr. Meter. That is right. 

I was introduced to her by Howard Selsam, as a matter of fact, who 
was the director of the Jefferson School. 

Mr. Morris. And a Communist ? 

Mr. Meter. iVnd a Communist. 


At the time I met her, we got to know each other quite well through 
a series of accidental circumstances, and she was a very close friend 
of Browder's and had become a very close friend of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, of the President. 

During the year or so I knew her, she was in constant communication 
with both of them, and insofar as my discussions with her were con- 
cerned, we acted, talked, and generally acted and talked as Communists 
together, in the perfectly normal way that Communists would act 

In the circumstances in which I knew her, she talked to me at very 
great length through tliose years, had many long conversations, and 
from it I got a very detailed idea of what was going on in the course 
of her visits between New York and Washington, or between New 
York and Hyde Park. 

So far as I can deduce from it, deduce from — I won't say deduce. 
My memory of what she told me from day to day and week to week 
was that these were not simply the carrying of messages, as it were, 
but a continuing political conversation devoted toward attempting to 
show Franklin Roosevelt the similarity of aims of the Communists 
and of liis, and persuading him, or attempting to persuade him, with 
much receptivity on his part, that the United States and the American 
Communist Party, the United States and the Soviet Union were and 
should be moving in the same direction, toward a democratic socialism, 
as it was put. 

That is to say, Franklin Roosevelt was, I believe, from the conver- 
sations I had with Miss Adams, convinced that the Soviet Union would 
move from its lack of civil liberties toward civil liberties M'hile the 
United States moved from its constitutional and free enterprise situ- 
ation to socialism, and both would end at the same point, and that, as it 
were, he and Browder were very close political friends, though they 
never met personally, working toward the same goal from somewhat 
different positions. 

This was the general framework of the conversations I had with 
Miss Adams. 

Many detailed points could be raised in connection with it. I don't 
know to what degree you want me to go into the problem. Many ques- 
tions were discussed concretely from time to time. 

Mr. Morris. Well, now Mr. Meyer, is it so, then, that Miss Adams 
was seeing both the President and Earl Browder, who was at that 
time the head of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. IMeter. Right. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you learn from what she told you about these 
conversations, as she would meet these two people involved — she would 
come back and tell you about it ; is that the situation ? 

Mr. Meter. Yes. 

She would talk to me — it so happened during that period I was 
teaching once a week at the Jefferson School in New York, and spent 
1 day a week in New York, living out in the country, and the people 
with whom I stayed at the time, Miss Adams also lived with. Both 
she and I were people who liked to stay up late at night and talk and 
talk, and she would tell me a very great deal of what occurred the daj 
before, the week before, what occurred a week before. 

Mr. Morris. Browder trying to influence Mr. Roosevelt, or Roose- 
velt trying to influence Mr. Browder ? 


Mr. Meyer. Mr. Browder was trying to influence Mr. Eoosevelt 
specifically, and Miss Adams was acting as an influence from Mr. 
Browder on Mr. Roosevelt. 

Senator Jenner. Did she tell you how she got into that position? 

Mr. Meter. Yes. It is quite a long, complicated story. 

It began when, after leaving Swarthmore, I believe, she had some 
difficulties because of her political activities. After leaving Swarth- 
more and being active in Philadelphia in this kind of general activity, 
she became involved with — I don't know if she was an official member 
of it, but she became involved with the Free Browder Committee. 
Earl Browder had been sent to jail on a passport charge, and Elizabeth 
Gurley Flynn and others were running a committee to bring pressure 
to bear to free him. 

She was working with that, and she had previously had personal 
relationships through old friends of hers with Mrs. Roosevelt. 

It was suggested to her that she should do what she could to utilize 
that relationship to help the work of the Free Browder Committee. 
She wrote many letters about the matter through Mrs. Roosevelt to 
the President, to Mrs. Roosevelt, and finally she was invited to Hyde 
Park to an art exhibit of some kind. 

Miss Adams is a painter, incidentally, and some art exhibit was 
going on, of some WPA painter, or something of the kind, and she 
was invited there, along with a lot of other painters, and was quietly 
ushered into the President's office, study, whatnot. 

He said a word or two about the exhibit to her, and then, as I re- 
member her story, he turned to her and said, "Wliat would happen if 
I freed Earl Browder tomorrow ? What do you think would happen ? 
How would the country react?" And she gave him the pitch of what 
the Free Browder Committee would want, argued with him a bit, and 
said things would be good, it would help national unity, that sort of 
thing. And they talked about it. 

Now, I am not clear, I cannot remember distinctly one interview 
she had with Roosevelt from another. 

Either at that one or at one fairly shortly thereafter, Roosevelt, in 
talking to her about her claim that there were a large number of peo- 
ple who — there was sufficient mass pressure to support him if he freed 
Browder, sort of half jokingly and half seriously said, "There is a 
meeting going on in Philadelphia at which, I believe, ^Vlieeler and 
Nye and Lindbergh were speaking, and — well, if you know people and 
have people that can get mass pressure, it might be a good idea ; maybe 
you might be able to do somethino; about that meeting." 

It was half jokingly done, half seriously done, rather sparringly 

Miss Adams went down to Philadelphia, had all her connections 
through her friends around the party and near the party and, pre- 
sumably, in the party. I don't know exactly what she did, and a 
rather spectacular countermeeting was held, which stole the headlines, 
or at least equaled the headlines of the Wheeler-Nye meeting. They 
got big caricatures of Wheeler and Nye. 

I believe Mr. Cudahy was chairman of the meeting, and connected 
with the meeting, and he made some remark about Roosevelt which 


was regarded as odd. It was misinterpreted. I don't know exactly 
the circumstances. They got big slogans. 

To make a long story short, they got enough counterpublicity so i 
that the anti-Wheeler- Nye-Lindbergh meeting got as much publicity ] 
as the original meeting. 

Mr. Morris. ISIr. Chairman, at this point may I break in to say in 
connection with the story now being told us by this witness, we have 
made some kind of an inquiry. For instance, on January 17 of this | 
year Miss Josephine Adams did testify in executive session before the 
subcommittee. i 

She, in substance, tells very much the same story about that and 
about her own role as the person who would see Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. 
Browder, and bear messages from one to the other. She has estimated | 
that she acted in this capacity from 38 to 40 times and. Senator, as you 
know, we circulated this resolution yesterday, which reads : 

Resolved ty the Internal Security Committee of the Senate Committee on the j 
Judiciary, That the executive testimony of Josephine Truslow Adams, talien i 
before the committee on January 16, 1957, be hereby released from the injunction j 
of secrecy and made public ; be it further 

Resolved, That certain parts of said testimony may be used in public hearings 
from time to time. I 

Five Senators signed that yesterday. Senator. ^ . . \ 

I ask at this time, and in support of the testimony just being given \ 
here by this particular witness, that the excerpts selected by the sub- 
committee from this testimony of Miss Adams go into the public : 
record. j 

Senator Jenner. It may go into the record and become a part of the j 
offici al records of this committee. 

(The material referred to was marked exhibit No. 438 and reads as 


Exhibit No. 438 

Excerpt From Josephine Truslow Adams' Testimony, January 16, 1957 , 

Mr. Morris. Why don't you tell us how the arrangement first had its origin. , 
Miss Adams. It started this way, in a very informal way. He saw me on other j 
things. Then he asked me what I thought of the situation, what people in gen- 
eral — what was the impression from different sorts of groups. He knew I knew 
a good many different kinds of people — about the Browder situation. I mean, 
how the labor people felt, how the clergy felt, how the conservative people felt, { 
what would happen if he should pardon him, and so forth, what would be the 
reaction in the papers. He knew I was one individual, but he evidently was 
saying this to a lot of people. I don't consider I am so important. But I think 
he thought — what he was practically saying to me is how many signatures can ^ 
the Communists get in every city of people that are not just Communists, you , 
know — what I did, practically, because I knew enough people to do it. And the 
person extremely uncooperative was Darcy of Philadelphia. He was diflScult, ' 
because apparently his enmity to Browder had apparently been seething. I got 
details from Boston and New York and so on about that, and also about the 
clergymen, and so on. j 

Then there was — the first definite appointment that had anything to do with j 
talking to him about Browder that was really on that point was when some of 
the people in New York told me that it would be a wonderful thing if I could get i 
to Hyde Park to see him on that subject. i 

Mr. Morris. Who were the people in New York? j 

Miss Adams. Now, those were the people on the committee to free Browder — i 
I mean like Elizabeth Flynn and Weinstock. 


Mr. MoBKis. Louis Weinstock? 

Miss Adams. Yes. I think what they did was invite me down someplace or 
other, Hotel Alba — it was mostly — it was really run by Louis Weinstock. 

Miss Adams. * * * And as soon as he [the President] had given me directions 
on that, he turned around suddenly and began talking about the Browder case 
and asked me — he said suddenly, "What do you think would happen if I should 
pardon Earl Browder tomorrow?" Just like that. "How would the newspapers 
take it?" And I told him to the best of my ability what I thought would happen 
at that time. 

Mr. MoKKis. And what was that. Miss Adams? 

Miss Adams. Well, I felt that there would be a considerable protest from 
certain papers, but a general feeling of support and sympathy, because of the 
war situation — I think there was a strong support from labor and liberal groups, 
and even from the upper middle-class groups — on the point that he was there on a 
technicality, and that the war situation warranted it. And he pretty much 
agreed with me as to the basis of his being in prison. I think he was a little 
ashamed of the way he had been put in. He didn't like Browder at that particu- 
lar point. He thought there had been a technical frameup himself. He had 
been convinced of that. But he was embarrassed as to how to do it and what 
would happen, what kind of a reaction there might be, particularly because of 
the war situation. He didn't want to cause any confusion. And it was a long 
time after that interview he did pardon Browder. But I saw him several times 
in between — because it was at that point he hinted also about wanting to find 
out what people thought about it as much as possible. 

And after that I wrote to him a good many times, on other points, things that 
came up, anything that I thought might be useful. I think I have a list of 
some of those letters somewhere. And I always got some kind of an acknowledg- 
ment, very often from Mrs. Roosevelt instead of him, that the letter had been 
received. If it was important, he would send for me, and I would see him — 
if it was something of real importance to him. 

Mr. MoRpas. Now, on how many occasions did you see the President? 

Miss Adams. Altogether? 

Mr. MoEBis. Yes. 

Miss Adams. I couldn't say that under oath, because I might be wrong. 

Mr. MoRKis. Well, just approximately. 

Miss Adams. Oh, I should say approximately 38 or 40 times, in the whole time 
this existed. It was at Hyde Park as often as in the White House. 

Mr, Morris. Now, what was your relationship to Earl Browder at this time, 
at the time of your visits to the President? 

Miss Adams. Well, I didn't know him at all at the time when he came out 
of prison, and did not see him for some time after. But the first time that I 
ever had occasion to see him was the time when I heard the story that Roose- 
velt — I heard from him, in other words — when I was ill in the hospital, St. 
Lukes, I had an operation, flowers were sent to me by Bill and by Mr. and 
Mrs. Browder, because people told him I had worked on his release, but I 
didn't see him. And then I finally did go to one meeting that was held as a 
sort of celebration of his coming out, in which a number of people. Communists 
and non-Communists working on his release— of course, there were really lots 
of Communists — were supposed to be. I think that was on the Fourth of July 
in the year he came out in May. The first time I ever looked at him or saw 
him in person was on the Fourth of July, and I was introduced to him by Sam 
Darcy, who was sitting on the platform in front of me. And he shook hands 
with me, and that was all, said a word or two, and I think was scarcely aware 
at that point of who I was or of what I had done in the case. I think Carol King, 
his wife, told him. 

And then I heard from Roosevelt and people that knew Roosevelt approached 
me on the subject that they would like to get word around that they did not 
want a third party in the 1944 election, outside of New York State, except for 
the ALP. And I gathered that he would like this word to get to Earl Browder. 
And I didn't even know at the time where Earl Browder was, where he lived. 
But someone that I knew knew where his brother lived. So I went to see his 
brother And his brother told me he was up at Monroe, in New York State. 


So I took a bus to Monroe and went to see him, and told him the story of the 
no third party beyond New York State, and was interested to see that in those 
days he had a good deal of influence, because within a few days there were 
things in the papers all over the country about the fact that there would be no 
third party outside of the ALP in New York State — not just in the Communist 
papers, but all over. And Benson of the former labor group was approached 
and had an interview with Earl in New York, and of course Gil Greene, of later 
fame, wrote an article in the Daily Worker itself on that subject, and the Times 
came out with an article that there would be — understood there would be no 
third party beyond New York State in the 1944 election. 

Mr. Morris. AYhy was New York excepted from that? 

Miss Adams. Because the ALP was valuable to the election. In the other 
place it might cause splits, but there the support would be unanimous and they 
were sure of it. That was obvious. But that was the most amazing piece of 
political engineering, of course — the first I had witnessed of how fast things 
could go if they were well organized. In other words, that it really worked. 
And at that time he was at his peak of influence. Browder had a great deal of 
influence outside of the party at that time, although he was so shortly out of 
prison, because there was a very widespread and immediate reaction that I 
sensed. To me it was almost frightening, although I was completely in sup- 
port of Roosevelt. 

Mr. MoRuis. Almost what, you say? 

Miss Adams. Frightening. 

Mr. Morris. Do you mean the speed with which an order 

Miss Adams. Yes ; I was surprised. I was in sympathy with the project and 
completely aware of the fact that it would probably be a good thing from my 
point of view. But I was a little amazed, overwhelmed, to see something 

But during that interview, he asked me for the first time — of course it was 
the first time I really had any personal conversation with him — he told me that 
he was worried about Irene's status — this went on for years afterward, conver- 
sations about Irene's status — that was his wife. But he was worried and fol- 
lowed me down the steps in Monroe to speak about it — told me also to warn 
Roosevelt that the Puerto Ricans who were then in Atlanta were a dangerous 
setup as long as they were in this country. And he had a suggestion what 
should be done with Campos. He had gotten to know them in Atlanta. He 
thought they were pitiable, but unreliable figures. And he suggested that some 
relative of Campos in Peru would, you know, take him, because he had this bad 
heart and he was on parole in the Columbia Hospital down here in New York. 
And, of coui'se, as soon as he was out of Atlanta and was in that hospital, all the 
Puerto Ricans in New York came to see him, and they were plotting all the time. 
And I went down a couple of times myself. I got to know him through Earl. And 
every time I went down to the hospital, I gathered more and more that this 
was going on. I wrote to Roosevelt continually on that point. But, of course, 
the thing was he could not, as I found out afterwards, just order a thing like 
that, because being a Puerto Rican, Campos was a citizen in a way, you know. 
I mean it wasn't a matter of deportiiug him where you wanted to. It was a 
difficult thing to arrange. But Earl realized the danger in Campos. That was 
not a party affair — it was just a personal thing to Roosevelt. Because Campos — 
you couldn't say what Campos was. He was with the Jesuits one day, the Com- 
munists the next. He would take anybody's help to help Puerto Rico to be free, 
as lie thought, because he was a completely fanatical revolutionary. 

Mr. Morris. Miss Adams, you say that Earl mentioned to you, on the steps, of 
his wife's deportation, Irene's deportation case. 

Miss Adams. Yes. At that time it was not a question of deporting her. It 
was not as definite as that. He was not sure of the status. It had not yet been 
brought up in that sense. They had not mentioned deporting her. The last de- 
velopments had not happened at that point. But he was afraid that something 
of the sort would happen because of her uncertain status. And he wanted me 
to talk to Roosevelt if I could possibly get his ear on what could be done about 
Irene. And he assured me, as I found to be probably true through knowing 
other alien Communists, or alien members of Communist parties and so on, that 
she was not a member of the party officially, because they did not permit aliens 
to hold party cards. They considered it too dangerous. In the early days of the 
party I think most of them were aliens it was made up of. But at that point 
it was considered unwise, and I know she was not. 

Mr. Morris. But that was a mere technicality. 


Miss Adams. Of course, it was a technicality. But I think she was so wrapped 
up in her children — in all the period I knew her she was not involved with party 
people, she didn't get along with party people — Elizabeth Gurley Flynn couldn't 
stand her. 

Mr. NoRRis. And then did you relate that message suggested by Eai-1 Browder 
back to the President? 

Miss Adams. I didn't tell him that in person. I went home and wrote a letter 
about it. I wrote a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt that was sent to him. I often, in 
those days, wrote to her things that I wanted to reach him. And sometimes 
letters that I addressed to him I put inside of an envelope to her, because they 
got there faster. He had a bigger mail than she had even. If the things were 
earmarked for him they went very quickly from her office to him, I discovered. 
Her secretary knew enough to get them to him fast. Whereas if I sent it directly 
to him sometimes it took quite a while. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did Mr. Browder initiate any of these meetings? Did he 
suggest to you to go down and see the President and tell him this or take him 

Miss Adams. I don't remember that it was ever said that way. If he thought 
there was something very important that had come up, that he wanted him to 
know about, he would say, "You had better get word to him such and such." 
And if I had a chance to see him. I did. If I didn't, I wrote letters. I wrote 
endless letters all the time. In fact, people that knew me then — Bella was sur- 
prised to find out I was a mural painter, because my political activities were so 
strong, they never even knew I was an artist. 

Mr. Morris. For instance, may I just take this one document. 

Miss Adams. That is later ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. This is a paper that I had photostated, which I have taken from 
your file. Do you recognize this paper? 

Miss Adams. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Morris. What is it? 

Miss Adams. It was a paper that Earl Browder gave me in relation to the 
activities of the Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek toward the Chinese in the north, 
using materials and troops that were supposed to be used in fighting the Japa- 
nese, but were used in fighting the civil war instead. And it was a summary of 
the exact statistics, as much as they could get on that, to bring home to Roose- 
velt, which he probably may have known from other quarters, what the situation 
was in China. 

Mr. Morris. Where did Mr. Browder get this; do you know? 

Miss AoAiis. I am not positive where he got that. He handed it to me. I 
think that it came along with that other slip about the sabotage of the — no, it 
didn't — the sabotage of the airfield in Kweilin was a little later. I think he gave 
me that one separately, and it came from a suitcase that had come in from 
Burma, some place in the East. Because I saw him take some papers out of the 
lining of a suitcase somebody had brought him. It had come by plane. Some- 
body that had some connection with the Bast. 

Browder was on very good terms at that time with Mao Tse-tung. He had 
been interested in China in the past. And, of course, I may say for Browder the 
first rebellion against Stalin started with him. Tito came later. It was really 
instigated by Browder and went around the world. That I know, because I 
watched it happen. He was way ahead of the others. He had insight enough 
to know. I am bringing this in — it is extraneous, but I believe it has a con- 
nection here. Because he thought Mao Tse-tung was going to be the kind of 
Communist that Tito became, and he was very interested in him. In other 
words, he thought he would work out some kind of national movement in China 
that was not as much associated with the Soviet Union. And he was watching 
him with great interest for that reason. He seemed to have been on good terms 
with him. And I imagine some of the material he had came through people 
that he knew through Mao Tse-tung. 

Mr. Morris. It came from the Far East? 

Miss Adams. Undoubtedly. But the actual person that brought it I could not 

Mr. MoRBis. Browder gave it to you? 

Miss Adams. Browder gave it to me because he thought I could reach Roose- 
velt, either by mail or if I happened to be going down. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, he wanted you to give this to the President? 

Miss Adams. Yes, as quickly as possible. 

Mr. Morris. Did he convey any message with it? 


Miss Adams. No, simply he thought it would be of great interest to him, and 
it would be a good idea to let somebody go out there and see what was really 
going on. Of course, such statements were reinforced by people like Stilwell 
and so on. There were other people out there. 

Mr. Morris. This reads that "as of February 20, 1944, Chungking troops en- 
tirely engaged in blockading Eighth Route Army under Gen. Hu Shung Nan, 
23d Army Corps of three divisions each." This will appear in the record. 

"As of February 20, 1944, Chungking troops entirely engaged in blockading 
Eighth Route Army, under Gen. Hu Chung-nan, 23d Army Corps of 3 divisions 
each ; 30 divisions of central troops ; 39 divisions of local troops. Under Gen. 
Kao Hsang-chen, south of Suyuan : Armies Nos. 1, 3, 16, 36, 8. 9, 91, 57, 22 ; and 
third cavalry army. Under Ten Pao-hsan, new 26th division, in Tu Ling-fu 
up north. Under the Ma lirothers (mosleras) ; Ninghsia 11th Army, 81st Army; 
and mechanized regiment of 70 tanks. 

"Between October 1943 and February 1944, 4,000 tons of munitions sent from 
Chengtu and Chungking to area of Paochi and Sian, where can only be used 
against 8th Route Array. This was not directly lend-lease material, but was 
diverted from Kunming stores when replaced by lend-lease. Also vast stores of 
foodstuffs accompanied. 

"On January 14, 1944, a military conference at Sian formed an anti-Communist 
training class,' at same time sealed the radios operating at Sian and Chungking 
offices of 8th Route Army ; also sent 2 squadrons of planes with Chinese pilots 
(from 18 to 24 units) for participation in attack on border region. Exposure 
and protests in foreign press caused withdrawal of marching orders. Economic 
situation becoming worse." 

Miss Adams. I remember I did take it to the lens plant. I had seen Browder 
in the evening. I remember that I took it down instead of mailing it, because 
it was one of the times when I went from the factory where I was working, the 
lens plant, on 56th Street. I carried it to the factory, and, you know, had it 
on my desk there while I was working there. 

Mr. Morris. Now, then, you did physically turn that over to the President? 

Miss Adams. Yes. I had two copies. The reason I have that — they were on 
onionskin. And I think I kept one and sent the other to him or gave the other 
to hiro. 

Mr. Morris. Did he return it to you later on? 

Miss Adams. No. The copy I have is a second copy. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what happened after you showed this to the President? 

Miss Adams. I believe he sent Wallace out there following that. Yes, he sent 
Wallace out. And Earl himself had some memory of that, because when I made 
the Ford recording, he came in at that point and mentioned things that hap- 
pened that seemed to be a direct result partly of this and, of course, other mate- 
rial that the President had on the same subject. But he did send Wallace 
out there. 

Mr. Morris. That was as a result, you think, of this — Browder having sent 
that letter down? 

Miss Adams. Partly. 

Mr. Morris. And was there anything that Browder said to you on this other 
occasion that you just referred to, at the time of the recording, that would be 
of interest in connection with this episode, Miss Adams? 

Miss Adams. I think he said several things that would be of interest, but I 
could not be sure. No — I could add to this record — he promised me a copy of 
the record, you know, for myself. I could listen to it and then pick that up, 
send it in to you. 

Mr. Morris. And you can supplement the record. 

Miss Adams. Supplement it, yes. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did the President say anything to you? 

Miss Adams. My bringing this thing up, in other words, reminded Earl of 
things he said that he had almost forgotten and started him off. And several 
times he intervened with his voice on the record, adding things on this subject 
that came back to him as we talked. Anything the President said on that? 

Mr. Morris. Yes. 

Miss Adams. Yes. He was very interested in the Far East situation, and very 
bewildered by it, because he did not want a Communist China, if I may say 
plainly. He did not want that at all. But he realized, as I think a great many 
people had, that the leadership was very poor — that the south — that the eventual 
collapse might come for that reason, because they were not powerful or enough 
trusted — but that the Chinese would fall very fast for the Communists there — 


because his contacts with Chiang and Madam Chiang were not too happy. He 
didn't like them or trust them particularly. He told me the story about some — 
Chiang appealing for gold, because he was short, and that he had sent things 
out that could be turned into gold, and then he sent it off, and he used it in some 
way himself, instead of fighting the Japanese war, he had thought. And that 
it was the best thing he could deal with, in other words, but he worried about 
him as a leader of a caliber — that he didn't feel that they had anything like, 
say, England and France had, as allies. 

Mr. Morris. Now, do you think the President 

Miss Adams. I think he was not at all — I think it would be going to great 
extremes and very unfair to think that Roosevelt ever wanted China to become 
Communist. It was far from that idea. 

Mr. Morris. Now, I think you mentioned to me an episode about a Polish 
Government-in-exile agent. 

Miss Adams. Oh, yes. I think I have that piece of paper in another folder. 
It isn't in there. I was given a cable to get to Roosevelt that was sent by a 
Polish Government in exile, in London, an agent of same — was sent by him in 
London as a sort of survey of the situation here of elements that he considered 
were fast falling to the bottom — that was the word— he was sorry to say that 
these were the elements that were supporting him, the only elements. And he 
listed a great many different types of things — organizations in Detroit, Polish 
organizations, church organizations, different political groups and individuals, 
among them Whittaker Chambers, incidentally. And none of these groups were 
identified too much. They were just described in a very vague way. And 
Browder went over them with me, and to the best of my ability, we marked in 
red ink on the side what we thought they were. For instance, Whittaker 
Chambers was mentioned as the editor of a popular magazine. 

Mr. Morris. Time. 

Miss Adams. Yes; Time. But they did not say Time. So then we figured 
out it was Whittaker Chambers and it was Time. At that time I never heard 
of Whittaker Chambers, but Earl told me. So I labeled the different things 
and said those were his guesses as to what they were. 

Mr. Morris. Let me see if I understand this. This was a letter 

Miss Adams. It was really a cable. 

Mr. Morris. Written by 

Miss Adams. Roosevelt could have had access to it. In other words, it was 
brought to his attention this way. Roosevelt had the right to read that cable 
if he wanted to, but he didn't know it existed. 

Mr. Morris. How did Browder know? 

Miss Adams. Because somebody who must have worked in the office where 
this went through or something brought it to Browder. That is the only way I 
can figure. And so he thought the material might interest Roosevelt. It was 
simply a survey of what even the Polish people themselves thought were the 
groups that were supporting them. And he mentioned at the end that these were 
fast sinking to the bottom. In other words, in the political atmosphere of that 
day, they were very unpopular groups. 

Mr. Morris. Let's see if I can understand this. This was a cable that Earl 
Browder showed to you. 

Miss Adams. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. You do not know where he got it. 

Miss Adams. No. 

Mr. Morris. Obviously, however, it did not come from the sender 

Miss Adams. No — somebody who had access to it gave it to him. 

Mr. Morris. What did Browder say? Did he ask you to call it to the Presi- 
dent's attention? 

Miss Adams. He never put it that way. He said he thought that was very 
interesting material. He knew I would be likely to send it if it was. And he 
thought it would be interesting to the President to see it. This was when the 
Polish border question was beginning to loom large, the whole question of 
Poland. It was just before Roosevelt's death. 

I have a briefcase somewhere that incidentally was given to me by Roosevelt, 
it was something, some mineworkers in Mexico or something, some fancy thing 
they had given to him as a present, that he gave to me because I carried so 
many papers back and forth. In it was the Polish cable. That is in my home in 
Suffern, but I can send it to you. 


Mr. Morris. The effect of that would be to cause the President to lose con- 
fidence in the Polish Government-in-exile, wouldn't it? 

Miss Adams. Well, I don't think one cable would be powerful enough for 
that. But of course that was the object of it, I think — to make him realize that 
it was not a much-respected force, like a good many of the governments-in-exile. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you take that to the President? 

Miss Adams. Yes. That I believe I mailed him. I mailed him that. 

Mr. Morris. And you do not remember any conversation on his part, any 
reaction to his reception of that. 

Miss Adams. Yes — because when I did go to see him, he went over with some 
interest — he went over what these different things meant. And I can remem- 
ber then that was the first time that [the name of] Whittaker Chambers ever 
crossed my lips, I didn't know anything about him. Earl had given me a slight 
history of him at that moment. 

Mr. Morris. What did Browder say of Chambers? 

Miss Adams. Well, he said he had been a party member at one time and now 
was an editor of Time. And he sort of shook his head over him at that moment. 
And then — no mention of the later story. But he never went In for that kind 
of thing about people. But he did think that — he was apparently very anxious 
for Roosevelt to see it, and I gave it to him. And I do remember that Roosevelt 
went over the meaning of these different little red-ink marks. That is the docu- 
ment he later wrote "Dr. Johnson" on and was later found by Truman after 
Roosevelt died, and he was bewildered. It was in a dossier on Poland. 

Mr. Morris. This is the cable that Browder had acquired and you had sent it 
to the President. 

Miss Adams. Yes. And that was the only way that my name ever came up. 

Mr. Morris. It was marked "Dr. Johnson," you say? 

Miss Adams. I think all this Madam X story must have come out of that. 

Mr. Morris. What was the reference to Dr. Johnson ? 

Miss Adams. He had just written on the top "Dr. Johnson," meaning me. 

Mr. Morris. Why did he call you that? 

Miss Adams. Because I had to talk to him so much. I was a conversationalist 
rather than anything else. In other words, you know, Sam Johnson had to 
talk — I mean he was better known as a conversationalist than a writer. And 
there were many things that were the kind of things — they were not conspira- 
torial or anything like that, but you didn't want to go through the hands of a 
million secretaries and so on. that I tried to get to him by taking them down. 
And he was amused by my tearing down from the factory with a white shawl 
over my head, and coming back. So he used to call me Dr. Johnson to tease me. 

Mr. Morris. There was no Boswell involved. 

Miss Adams. No. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what specifically did he say about this cable later on, when 
you did speak to him? 

Miss Adams. Well, he told me that he thought that the Government, the 
Polish Government-in-exile, was at pretty low ebb himself. He had gotten that 
report from many quarters — much like the experience he had had with the 
Finnish Ambassador and so on. He had had that feeling, that you had to deal 
with them because — he wasn't in sympathy with the things particularly that 
were going on in the country, but he felt, I think that that was not a completely 
representative thing, the government-in-exile. I suppose he would have labeled 
it Fascist, much as Earl would ; at that time — probably it was, partly, according 
to the definitions in those days. I don't know. I couldn't say, in fairness. 
* * * * , * * * 

Mr. Morris. Now, how often did you see him, say, in Hyde Park and how often 
in Washington? 

Miss Adams. Well, I would really hesitate to give a number, because it became 
a routine almost. And I was so interested in what was going on, and I never 
thought this was something to be made a record of, and I just could not say. 
Certain occasions stand out very vividly in my mind, but I could not give an 
exact count. I can just figure the space of time and the number of times that 
I — how far apart the visits were spaced. If it was over 2 years that I saw him 
once a month, you have 24 months there, you see. And it was really 3 years. I 
think, of this kind of thing. 

Mr. Morris. Now, did you ever stay overnight in the White House? 

Miss Adams. No ; not in the White House. I stayed overnight in Hyde Park, 
a couple of times — more than once — several times. I went to the White House 
at night, but I usually went back, because I had the job. It was usually not on 


a weekend. I took sleepers back and walked into the factory. I had to be there 
at 8 in the morning. And one of the things that I was looking up for him at that 
time was sabotage in the lens plant, which was reported in New York. 


Mr. Morris. Did you discuss the Teheran Conference with the President and 
with Mr. Browder? 

Miss Adams. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could develop that for us. 

Miss Adams. Well, of course, I did not — Roosevelt didn't tell anybody before 
he went. 

Mr. Morris. He didn't go to Teheran, did he? That was Hull. He went to 

Miss Adams. Wait a minute. He went to both — oh, yes. There were pictures 
of him at both. Yes, he did — because it was after the Teheran Conference, I 
remember, that was the first time that all of them got together. There had been 
some of them in North Africa, but without Stalin. There had been the DeGaulle 
meetings. There was a lot of amusing stuff — you know all that stuff — between 
Churchill and Roosevelt on the sub.iect of DeGaulle, the way they used to speak 
of DeGaulle as the bride, his cable name. They had so much trouble with him as 
being a prima donna, that they always spoke of him as the bride. 

But it seems to me that it was after the Teheran meeting that Browder said to 
me, "Well, my work is done." He seemed to think that — and that is when he 
wrote the book that of course got him out of the party. He seemed to have an 
instinct the way that things would march forward then, from that time on, in 
the party here, would broaden out into such a thing that he would no longer 
function as he had been functioning. He seemed to realize it very early. He 
didn't know just what pattern it would take. 

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Browder try to influence the President during this period 
with his ideas about Teheran? Did he make any recommendations to the 
President, in other words? 

Miss Adams. I don't think he ever assumed that he would consider that too 
much — he never put it to me that way. In other words, he would have the hope 
that if he heard something from me, as he heard it from other people, that he 
would listen. But he had never been told that the President valued — only by 
action could he tell how much he did. The only time that he ever gave him a 
word, it was just once in a great while, sometimes indirectly, by thanking me, 
saying the thing I had done was important. Or the time that he did send word 
to Browder that he had put his country before the Daily V/orker. And I remem- 
ber there was one occasion on which he said, Roosevelt said to me, "If this is 
really put over, in a strange way you will have done as much as some of your 
ancestors for the country." I have that in some kind of notation. It com- 
pletely overwhelmed me. and of course I didn't believe it. But it had something 
to do with Browder, because I went back to Browder with it. It may have been 
when the party was turned into the political association. But I don't think it 
was that. There was something else. And I have some note on that, too. I 
would hesitate to give it to you as a fact until I look it up again, but I have. 
And you see, I think that Browder — I felt that where there had been any shrewd 
contribution, that it was not a matter — I did not take credit to myself, that it 
was my brain — where there had been a shrewd analysis that might help him in 
the war situation, it was very often Browder's. So that I felt, in a way, when 
he said something to me that it was a tribute to Browder. 

Mr. Morris. And was there any discussion between Browder and you on that, 
and then a resultant discussion between yourself and the President about 
Teheran ? 

Miss Adams. Yes, there were. 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about those? 

Miss Adams. It is very hard for me to look back at the moment and sift out 
Teheran and Yalta, although they were quite different. But I do remember that 
when the decisions at Teheran came out, they were in line with many discussions 
that I had with the President that were the outcome of things I had said to 
Browder. Not that I take credit for myself or Browder for being big enough to 
have influenced him. There must have been many, many things that influenced 
him. But I think that he had come to know by that time that Browder knew, or 
as representative of a certain group, that he was giving him what he thought, as 
far as he could. He was certainly not in contact with the Soviet Union at that 
time, but he had been in the past. I suppose he was giving him to the best of 
his ability a picture of what he thought would go on as a result of certain things. 


Mr. Morris. You say he was not in contact with the Soviet Union at that time. 

Miss Adams. No; not during the war. He had very, very little contact. I 
know this by the fact that they were always puzzling and fighting on what was 
really going on there and what they really wanted. I heard that enough inside 
to know there were very few contacts during the war period, that it was guess- 
work from over here, if they were trying to follow out the policy of the Soviet 
Union from reading things — they were able to get hold of certain things. 
They saw certain publications, certain action, and were able to interpret them 
according to what they had known before. But you see, whatever representatives 
they had here were here and stranded. In other words, they did not have con- 
tact with home too much, either. 

Mr. Morris. And you say now that 

Miss Adams. And I think that is what made such a prolonged quarrel over 
Browder's dismissal. They had no direct contact. 

Mr. Morris, Now, Miss Adams, can you tell us now specifically, give us a 
couple of concrete instances of a convei'sation on Teheran that you would have 
had with Browder and a subsequent one with the President? 

Miss Adams. I remember that he believed that the opportunity for him to get 
together and talk things over would make a longtime program for possible peace 
in the world ; that it would be of great benefit ; and he thought it was the begin- 
ning of a possible wartime program of peaceful coexistence between the Socialist 
and the capitalist nations ; that it would be of great advantage in the working 
out of the war itself, the winning of the war. And he laid great stress on the 
fact that if they had some common meeting ground, that something would be 
worked out. Of terms or advantages to the Soviet Union or the United .States, 
specific terms, I didn't hear anything beforehand, because Browder did not know 
beforehand that the meeting was going to be. We didn't know that, had no way 
of knowing that. I could sense sometimes — I mean I have a sixth sense about 
these things. I had the feeling, say, that it was coming. I very often had, you 
know, on these trips. But nothing specific was told me about it. With Yalta, 
there was a more specific talk beforehand — if there were such a meeting — about 
terms, not on the part of Roosevelt, but on the part of Browder. I remember his 
saying that he hoped this or that would happen if they got together. For in- 
stance, this business of the Japanese, that if they did go to war with the Japanese, 
what could be done about waterways with the Soviet Union and so on. But 
nothing specific that was handed to Roosevelt, say a request. I do remember that 
other people tried to pump me as to whether or not Roosevelt had — I don't know 
how they ever got word of it; it wasn't through Browder; it wasn't through me; 
but I think it was at that time through Mai-y Jane Keeney. By the way, she came 
down on the train with me. She was standing behind me on the train. She must 
have been sort of watching to see whether I was testifying, because she knows 
I would have traveled coach ordinarily. She said, "I see you are going parlor 
car." She said, "I'm going in the smoker, so I don't suppose I'll see you again, 
but I'm glad to have seen you." She was right behind me at the gate. But I 
hadn't seen her in years. But I think Mary Jane must have been the person. I 
have a reason for knowing she knew I was down here. 

One time when I did come down to stay overnight in Washington, but not at 
the White House, and saw the President, I stayed several days and saw him 2 or 
3 times, and Mary Jane knew I was around, because she saw me at that time. 
And she did some rather foolish boasting, which I warned them about, boasting 
that she knew the people in the Embassy, and she got material 

Mr. Morris. The .Soviet Embassy? 

Miss Adams. Well, everybody went to embassy receptions. But as though 
she were rather important. She boasted. 

Mr. Morris. About having gotten material. 

Miss Adams. Yes. And I knew Kouvnikoff, just because he wandered around 
New York with his boxer dog and turned up everywhere. 

Mr. Morris. Serge Kouvnikoff? 

Miss Adams. Yes. ' She seemed to have direct relationships with Serge, 
seen him every so often and let him know what was going on. And I got the 
feeling, strangely enough, although she is a twittery little thing, of all the 
people I met around, aside from Ted Baer, that she had more direct connections 
with Embassy things, with Russian people, than other people that I knew. Most 
of the party people didn't. They were just guessing. 

Mr. MoREis. Now, Kouvnikoff; was he a Russian national? 

Miss Adams. Oh, yes. 

Mr. MoBBis. He wrote for the Daily Worker, did he not? 


Miss Adams. He wrote for the Daily Worker. He had been a White Russian, 
and then he turned revolutionary. He was a fine horseman. 

Mr. MoKRis. He wrote a column called The Veteran Commander. 

Miss Adams. Yes. Ted Baer used to invite me down there. And I wrote to 
Roosevelt on this score, and I told Browder. Browder said : "Just always know 
nothing or give him something wrong." And I got the same word from Roose- 
velt. Because they began pumping me as to points about what Roosevelt 
thought. I mean, in the first place, it was a very daring assumption that 
Roosevelt would ever have told me anything of a military nature, or terms 
in any specific way before they came out, because that would be too dangerous 
a thing to do. But they thought I might have sensed something like that, or 
felt something was going on. So that, every once in a while, Ted Baer would 
try to snare me into his house, and the minute I got there, Kouvnikoff would 
walk in with the dog, as though this were just a little exercise. And then he 
antagonized me by always attacking our military as being so stupid, the cam- 
paigns in Italy 

Mr. Morris. Where was this? 

Miss Adams. Ted Baer's house. He would attack the military, our own, 
as being stupid, because he was so conceited about his knowledge of military 
affairs — particularly on the Italian campaign. What he would do, he would 
come in with a riding crop in his hand, or the dog, sit there, and in a very arro- 
gant fashion, just as though it were offhand and he could trap me — but I was 
wise to this thing — he would say, "What do you think they will do, the Rus- 
sians, if they do go into the Japanese war?" It was veiT obvious. And I 
think if Roosevelt wanted anybody like that to know it, he had his own way 
of letting him know. In other words, I wrote to Roosevelt and told him ex- 
actly what had taken place, but I never said anything there. 

Mr. Morris. Tell me this. Did Kouvnikoff have access to the Soviet Embassy? 

Miss Adams. Oh, yes. I think without a doubt. I think there was a link — 
in fact, Keeney practically told me that once — between Keeney, Kouvnikoff, and 
the Embassy. 

Mr. Morris. Well, there was a link that we were talking about, that the 
Communist Party would have a link to the Soviet Union. 

Miss Adams. Well, it would be only such^because they always felt, and I 
know, with the discussions that came over, whether the Soviet Union approved 
or did not approve of Earl's dismissal business, that there were terrific rows 
about what the Soviet Union thought. So if they had anything — of course, 
finally — what is the name of that old fellow that was in charge of the Inter- 
national Publishing House? 

Mr. Morris. Trachtenberg. 

Miss Adams. Trachtenberg finally laid down the law — where he got it from — 
that he knew what was right and what they wanted. That is the way he got 
Gurley Flynn into line. He professed to speak for the Soviet Union; that he 
knew. In fact he came to the Jefferson School. They had all voted the other 
way. He said the vote had to he made over — "You just have to change it." 
Which is what made Frank Meyer fall downstairs. That was the end of Frank. 
Frank got up and fought on that occasion. I didn't have any right to speak, 
but I was terribly knocked down by Stachel. I started to say something. 
Stachel said, "Oh, comrades, this is a very sad occasion. I am afraid Earl 
Browder is not going to see the light. He doesn't want to. We will never 
straighten this thing out." He wanted it to be this way, you know. He was 
looking for power. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, in addition, in trying to be sure that a 
story like this is accurate, I went to New York 2 weeks ago to see Earl 
Browder, and I asked Mr. Browder about this story. He said, yes, 
he knew about it. I told him the nature, the general nature, of Jose- 
phine Adams' testimony, and he corroborated it. He said : "Yes, it 
is true. She did act as an intermediary between me and the Presi- 

I said that she had estimated between 38 and 40 times. He said, 
"Yes, that would be about right," and I asked him if he would testify, 
and he now is, I believe. Senator, under indictment, and he said that 
he would not like to testify in public, in public testimony before a 


congressional committee on this subject, but authorized me, in the 
presence of his attorney, to state for our public record 

Senator Jenner. Who was his attorney ? 

Mr. Morris. O. John Rogge. He authorized me to say that the 
information, as I related it to him about the testimony of Miss Adams, 
was an accurate story, and he would generally corroborate it, and he 
said I may say so for the public. 

Senator Jenner. Had he previously denied this story, or had he not 
been asked about it ? 

Mr. Morris. This had come up before. Mr. Meyer, you did testify 
to this once before, before the Subversive Activities Control Board? 

Mr. ]Meter. Very briefly, and simply, as to the existence of the rela- 
tionship. It came up in the Jefferson School case before the Subver- 
sive Activities Control Board, and Miss Adams and Mr. Browcler 
entered denials before the press, not under oath at the time. 

Mr. Morris. It was not denied ; the substance of the thing. They 
took some particular aspects. 

Mr. Meyer. They twisted around the matter ; yes. 

Mr. Morris. Senator, this testimony, which is now in the public 
record, is an acknowledgment on the part of Miss Adams that she so 
testified under oath, that these things did in fact occur, much the 
same as Mr. Meyer's testimony. 

Senator Jenner. And Mr. Browder has substantiated this story, in 
the presence of his attorne}-, with you in New York as recently as 

Mr. Morris. Two weeks ago, but not under oath. 

Senator Jenner. Not under oath. All right. 

Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else now about your qualifica- 
tions to testify here in connection with the meeting of the recent Com- 
munist Party Convention and that j^ou think we should have in the 
record, by way of qualifying you as an expert in these particular 
hearings ? 

Mr. Meyer. Only, I suppose, that in the intervening years I have 
kept myself acquainted with Communist developments. Communist 
literature. I have worked for a year or two on a book which required 
that I make a rather special study of some aspects of it, and have 
followed the press, both American and world press. I think I remain 
acquainted from month to month with the developments in the Com- 
munist world. 

Mr. Morris. Well, now, 3^011 never formally resigned from the Com- 
munist Party, did you, Mr. Meyer ? 

Mr. ]\Ieye'r. I drifted out of it, as it were, after the Browder break, 
but the drift, so far as the Communist Party was concerned, was very 
quick, in the sense that, while I continued to teach at the Jefferson 
School a few months longer, I had no official connections with the 
party, as such. And I did not make an issue at the Jefferson School, 
and they did not. They waited until my last scheduled class was out 
of the way, and then we just let it go. 

Mr. Morris. And what was the year of that? 

Mr. Meyer. The break, as it were, with the part}^ officially was at 
the point of the Duclos letter, and a few weeks after, which is May to 
June 1945. The last course I taught at the Jefferson School ended 
in December 1945, so, let us say 1945. 

Mr. Morris. December 1945 ? 

Mr. Meyer. Yes. 


Mr. Morris. Well, now, how long after that — what was the transi- 
tional period which was necessary to set in, in your own case, before 
you, for instance, would say you would testify before a congressional 
committee about the details, about your own experiences in the Com- 
munist Party? Was there a transitional period in your case, Mr. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that that is very important 
for us, because, as you know, the Communist Control Act of 1954 
indicates that, before action can be taken against a Communist-con- 
trolled union, you have to show Communist membership within a 
period of 2 or 3 years. 

Now, we have been laboring at great length to establish that that is 
a very unreal provision in the law, Senator, because we find that it 
takes, ordinarily, many years before a witness, after he has disas- 
sociated himself from the Communist Party, sees the world issues 
clearly enough that he will come forward and testify against them. 

That is why, Senator, in each case where we have somebody who 
did break away from the Communist Party and testifies here, we 
advert to this one particular aspect of his testimony. 

Senator Jenxer. Proceed, Mr. Meyer. 

Mr. INIeyer. In my case, it might be recognized that for 2 years 
there had been a certain process going on inside of me, even before I 
left the Communist Party. But starting with 1945 as a year, it was, 
I believe, 1947 or 1948 — ^I am not quite sure — before I talked to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and it w^as 1949 before I testified 
in the Smith Act case, the Dennis case. 

Now, it so happened that I have not testified before a committee 
before, and I would say it probably would have been much more 
difficult to convince me to testify before a committee in 1949, on a 
subpena, in a judicial case. I would estimate that had there been 
any reason and had I been asked to testify before a committee, I 
might have done so as early as 1951, somewhere along there. Five 
or six years' minimum. 

Mr. Morris. And the reason for that; I wonder if you could just 
generally tell us the reason for that, Mr. Meyer. 

Mr. Meter. The problem involved is this : 

When one first breaks with only the abuses, one feels either the 
Soviet Union or Stalinism is bad, or this or that aspect is bad. 

As my wife and I used to put it, we are not anti-Communist, we 
are just non-Communist, and then, even after you get from the non- 
Communist phase to becoming rather an anti- Communist, large 
remnants of prejudices that have been instilled all your life against 
investigating agencies remain. 

One feels that, well, this is not the way to fight them, and one thinks 
it can be fought only in the labor movement, or only by intellectual 
methods. It is necessary to break first from a rejection of Stalinism, 
then of Leninism, then of Marxism. 

It is a long process of philosophical breaking, and in many cases 
that I know of it never completes itself, but I feel that somewhere 
along that line — and it differs from person to person — when certain 
problems are really finally satisfied in one's mind and one realizes 
this is totally evil — the Communist movement — then one is prepared 
to testify, and it might take anyAvhere from a year or so, to 7 and 8 


I personally know cases of ex-Communists who are perfectly sound 
people today, but who still have years to go before I think they will 
be willing to testify. 

Mr. Morris. Meanwhile, the secrets that they have remain locked 
up and inaccessible to the various agencies of the United States Gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr. Meyer. And they get rather stale in the course of that time, too. 

Meanwhile, new things have developed which will take another 
7 years to get hold of. 

Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Meyer, you have been following the Com- 
munist Party activities on the international level and national level, 
have you not, with great care ? 

Mr. JNIeyer. Yes. 

Mr. Morris. Have you read thoroughly the 20th congress reports, 
the 20th congress of the Communist Party reports, from Moscow? 

Mr. Meyer. I have seen a good deal of the material, and I have 
particularly studied both Khrushchev speeches, not merely the sensa- 
tional secret speech, which was finally released by our Department 
of State, on Stalin, but the main report made to that convention 
which laid down the line of that convention, that congress, and was 
adopted as the line of that congress. 

The main address of Khrushchev to the 20th party convention, 
which I believe is the central document for Communist Party ideol- 
ogy, policy, during this period 

Mr. Morris. Now, did that represent a retreat on the part of the 
Communists from their heretofore aggressive position? 

Mr. Meyer. It is my opinion that the line of the 20th congress, far 
from being stategically a retreat or far from being a strategic admis- 
sion of weakness in the need of retreating, is the most forward and 
aggressive strategic statement that has ever been made by the Com- 
munist international movement in all of the years of its existence. 

Senator Jenner. Why do you say that, Mr, Meyer? 

Mr. Meyer. For this reason. Previously, through all the years 
since the revolution, and up until — for a century up until this state- 
ment, or just before it, one doctrine of the Communist movement has 
been that we live, speaking for them, as it were, that we live in a 
world of capitalist encirclement. We have a Socialist island here, 
and the capitalist world could constantly encircle it. We are, as it 
were, on the strategic defensive. The main thing to do is hold on, to 
gradually strengthen ourselves, to wait for tlie day when new possi- 
bilities exist outside of the Socialist island. 

With the 20th congress, for the first time — let's put it this way : 

With the 20th congress, and with certain documents that appeared 
a few months or a year or so before it, for the first time in all the 
years of the existence of the Communist movement, the basic strategic 
point was reversed, and the constant talk was about 900 million 
people, the general tone was that of a period in which not socialism 
is encircled but capitalism is encircled, the free world is encircled. 

And the conclusions drawn from that are extremely positive, hope- 
ful, and just because, if I may be a little complicated about this, just 
because it is a strategically offensive situation when, from the Soviet 
point of view, time is on their side, everything is moving their way, it 
is possible to think much more than before in terms of tactics that are 
comparatively gentle, because at this point, with everything moving 


in their direction, the only thing that would possibly stop them would 
be a really hard, desperate understanding of the situation and resist- 
ance. Soft tactics are far and away the best way to present such a 

Hence, while the Geneva Congress line, and the Geneva agreement, 
Summit meeting line, and the 20th Congress line, which are the same — 
I am sorry. 

Hence, while they are tactically soft, they are based on a hard 
strategy which is, as it were, thinking of itself as entering the last lap, 
of having passed over to the last big struggle and moving forward on 
that, w4th considerable hopefulness. 

I have, as a matter of fact, Khrushchev's report, photostated here, 
and I think that there are a couple of aspects, a paragraph or two, if 
you would like that, that might be worthwhile reading in this respect, 
because this has to do — let me say one word more before I read, because 
these paragraphs affect several points relative to the recent convention. 

It is clear from Communist strategy and Communist principles that 
the stronger you are in a given area or situation, the less need there is 
for violent revolution. The weaker the enemy is, the less need — I 
won't say for violent— yes, for violent revolution in the immediate 
sense of uprising. The stronger you are, the more the country con- 
cerned is surrounded with Ked tanks, terrorized with Eed rocket fleets, 
infiltrated from the inside with a strong Communist Party, with a 
leadership that is weak and vacillating and doesn't know where it is 
coming, the easier it is to pull a victory for communism, like Czecho- 
slovakia where, without any actual civil war, the whole structure of 
the constitution was overthrown. 

The passages I am interested in here connect both with the problem 
of their strategical concept and with the true meaning of all the talk 
that has come out, both internationally and in the United States, about 
how violent overthrow isn't necessary ; world war is no longer neces- 
sary ; which I think these few paragraphs may enlighten a bit. 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Meyer, will you state for the record the docu- 
ment from which you are reading? 

Mr. Meyer. This is the Keport of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union to its 20th Party Congress, 
delivered by N. S. Khrushchev. 

Senator Hruska. What date ? 

Mr. Meyer. This comes from the organ, the organ of the Cominf orm, 
"For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy," that is the name of 
the journal, dated February 17, 1956. And it is the full text of the 
report delivered by Khrushchev there. 

Mr. Morris. There was some portion you wanted to read ? 

Mr. Meyer. Yes, which I think may be of interest on these two 
points : 

Our enemies like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence, always and 
everywhere. True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation 
of capitalist society into a Socialist society. 

That is to say, the recognition of a need for a revolutionary trans- 

It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists — 
which in this language means Communists — 
from the reformists, the opportunists. 


There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries, the violent over- 
throw of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie — 

that is to say, of constitutional government of a non-Communist 
kind — 

There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent over- 
throw of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class 
struggle connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution 
vary. It is not true — 

says he — 

that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society. 

Then, and this is relevant to the first question that was asked here : 

Leninism teaches us that the ruling classes will not surrender their power 
voluntarily. And the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle 
may assume, the use or the nonuse of violence in the transition to socialism, 
depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiting class 
itself resorts to violence, rather than on the proletariat. 

In other words, "if you will hand over your money without being 
shot, we won't shoot you," or "if you will hand over your freedom 
w^ithout being shot, we won't shoot you." It is a question of the rob- 
ber saying, "Your money or your life" ; in this case, "your freedom, 
your Constitution, your way of living, or your life," and "if you 
won't fight, we won't fight, either." 

Later in this passage he says, and this is relevant to the problem 
of their greater strength from their own point of view at this time, 
their feeling of Socialist encirclement : 

The historical situation has undergone radical changes which make possible 
a new approach to the question. The forces of socialism and democracy — 

that is, of the Soviet Union and its satellites — 

have grown immeasurably throughout the world, and capitalism has become 
much weaker. The mighty camp of socialism, with its population of over 900 
million, is growing and gaining in strength. 

And so on. He develops this at considerable length. 
Therefore, under these circumstances — 
skipping a bit — 

in these circumstances the working class is in a position to defeat the reac- 
tionary forces opposed to the popular interest — 

that is, the Communist Party to gain power — 

to capture a stable majority in Parliament, and transform the latter from an 
organ of bourgeoisie democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will. 

That is to say, a transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. 

The point — and it is a little complexly placed here — but the essen- 
tial point, the conclusions I draw from this are : 

First, and this is absolutely unchanged Leninistic doctrine in all the 
years that I have been a Communist, studied communism: 1. Our 
goal is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of a 
Communist society. 

2. We will do this in any manner and by any means which is use- 
ful, efficient, and successful. 

3. That inchides violence where necessary. 

4. Under the circumstances of the past period where the Communist 
camp has become stronger, where, rather than being an encircled 
island, we can almost begin to think in terms of encircling the free 


world, there will be many more places in which we won't have to carry 
through an armed civil war, but can simply penetrate parliaments, 
penetrate the government offices, stir up threats abroad and at home, 
and carry through a victory, as we did in Czechoslovakia. 

However, and I think this is vitally necessary in the present situa- 
tion and considering the kind of headlines we have had about coin- 
munism a great deal later, the one sentence here which is absolutely 
guiding and still remains is the section which says : 

There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent over- 
throw of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class 
struggle connected with this are inevitable. 

Now, he did not name any names as to the number of countries, 
but clearly he means the ones where communism is weakest at this 
point, which are strongest in their economy and in their free system, 
and I think the initials of the one he really means are U. S. A. 

I think that is about all the quotes from this. 

Mr. Morris. Well, now, Mr. Meyer, the Communist Party had a 
convention here on February 12, and, as you know, the committee has 
been holding hearings on this one particular series of hearings. 

Now, the first news headlines that came out from this convention, 
and I will mention them, are : "Reds in U. S. Vote To Cast Off Mos- 
cow." "U. S. Reds Vote End to Control by Soviet." "U. S. Reds Quit 
Foster, Kremlin." And it goes on. 

We have been hearing quite a bit of testimony to the effect that that 
is just not the case, that the opposite is so. There was a tactical 
change, and a tactical representation is made that there was a break 
from Moscow, but witnesses have indicated that their lines are still 
holding fast. 

I have been wondering if you have made a study of the reports 
of the recent Communist Party convention, the resolutions as such. 
In fact, you have studied every part of the convention, have you not? 

Mr. Meyer. I have seen a large mass of material, read everything 
that I could find in the papers, both the Daily Worker and several 
other papers, and I think I have a pretty good idea. I have also 
read some of the testimony of witnesses you have had already here, in 
the press, and summaries of their testimony, who were actually at 
the convention. 

I think I have as good an idea of what went on as anybody who 
wasn't there could have, in terms of the material issued, and I think 
I can make an interpretation that is fairly valid, on the basis of that 

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what your own interpretation of this 
Communist convention was based on, your studies and your own 
experience as a Communist, as you have described it? 

Mr. Meyer. I would like to actually pick up for a moment on the 
international Communist situation, because I don't think it is possible 
to understand even the details of any Communist Party in a given 
country without seeing it against the background of the movement, 
of which it is an integral part. 

And I have already stated my belief as to what the character of 
the main line of the* 20th party congress was, in the Soviet Union 
which is a line for the whole Communist movement, the line of strategic 


I want to make one more point about the 20th Congress and the 
period since. 

I think it is undoubtedly true that, in the whole international Com- 
munist movement, and first of all in the Soviet Union itself, a factional 
struggle has been going on since Stalin's death. But I also want to 
emphasize that that factional struggle is not a new idea or new pos- 
sibility in Communist ranks, that there have been a number before, 
and that this factional struggle, whether in Russia, internationally, 
or in the United States, is far and away less violent an inner struggle 
than others, and in particular than the stniggle that went on hardly 
without cessation from 1925 or so to 1929 or 1930, at which time also 
our papers were hourly predicting the end of communism as a serious 
threat or saying that Stalin was fighting with Zinovieff and Trotsky, 
Russia is going to mind its own business, or this, that or the other. 

That is to say, I think that there are many examples of more severe 
factional struggles in the past than this. 

Secondly, I do not find in all the reading I have been able to do, and 
despite certain new aspects of this struggle that I will mention in a 
moment, any very profound difference between the factions and serious 
theoretical factors, not as severe as between Stalin and Trotsky, or 
Stalin and Bukharin in the struggle between 1925 and 1930. 

They were arguing and disagreeing and fighting for power, with 
considerable differences of opinion. It was basically a power struggle, 
but it was also a theoretical struggle. 

So far as I can see at this point, in the general terms of Communist 
theory, there is not anything like the severity in that difference in the 
three major groupings that seem to me to turn up again and again in 
international communism in the last year or so. And those three 
groupings I would characterize as unreconstructed Stalinists on the 
one hand, a rather smaller group which seems to think in terms, for 
tactical reasons, of a certain liberalizatiou, for example, of more em- 
phasis in Russia on consumer goods to pacify the population, in- 
ternally a little gentler hand with the satellites. 

Let us call it, for the moment, a liberalizing on the other hand ; and, 
tlie third faction, and apparently at this point the dominant one, which 
I believe Khrushchev represents, a center faction which is essentially 
holding them all together in a little bit, a considerable amount of 
internecine squabbling, but in which the line moves pretty much along, 
first, making a little concession to this group, and then making a con- 
cession to that group. 

I raise this only because I do not think that it is possible to under- 
stand what went on at the convention of the Communist Party of the 
United States without this background. 

One other thing: The 20th Congress and the general Soviet at- 
titude since, have allowed, have encouraged, have, one might say, di- 
rected that such differences should be allowed to occur openly to a 
certain degree instead of being concealed as they were in the past in 
committees and bureaus. 

Hence, as I hope to show in a moment, the United States — the 
Communist Party of the United States convention will not merely 
reflect in content the same kind of divisions as occurred in the 20th 
Congress and have since occurred in the Communist International, 
but actually the very fact that these things are being fought out 
in the open to a certain degree, being argued out in the open, com- 


promises arrived at in the open, the very fact that they are doing it 
in the open, the very fact they are talking about how independent 
they are of Moscow in the open, is precisely a carrying out of the 
directive of the 20th Congress to say in the open, "We are inde- 
pendent of Moscow" — in the open. 

Mr. Morris. Do you see any sign that there is any independence 
of Moscow ? 

Mr. Meter. To make this point, I think it would be necessary to 
analyze, it would be necessar;^ to put it this way. Let me just go 
a bit further on the three groupings, as far as I am concerned. 

The Stalinists are unreconstructed Stalin groups that seem to be 
headed by Foster. 

The liberal group by Gates, and the center seems to have been most 
of the old solid leaders of the party, not the best ones, but the good 
solid leadership of years' duration. 

So far as I can see, on the question of relationship to Mos- 
cow and the relationship to international communism, the resolu- 
tions as adopted to the degree that we know them, and the draft 
resolutions where they have not yet published them, are all funda- 
mental defeats for any effort whatever to take a substantially non- 
Moscow-dominated stand. 

Basically, on the Hungarian situation where one small group, 
rather to the liberal side, wanted the adoption of a resolution being 
quite critical of the use of Soviet troops in Hungary — this was 
smashed, and a double-talking resolution on the surface passed on 
the motion of the Illinois State committee, which essentially accepts 
the Foster position, with a little window dressing, criticizes by im- 
plication the Gates position, and ends with this sentence: 

While international working-class solidarity includes the right to friendly 
criticism of the party or of the actions of Socialist governments, at the same 
time — 

And this is the key sentence — 

at the same time it requires that such criticism shall be within the frame- 
work of recognition that the fundamental conflict is with the forces of im- 

And as a directive to the party, this is a statement on the Hun- 
garian situation, that the Soviet Union acted correctly. It is against 
the forces of the rebels in Hungary, who are categorized as Fascists 
and imperialist agents, that we must direct ourselves. We must 
hold our criticism, to the degree we have any criticism at all, to a 
minor level and fundamentally support the Soviet Union in this 

As a matter of fact, somewhere in the material, someone's speech, 
in an appeal to be a little more liberalish, a little more surfacely 
critical, someone said — I cannot remember who it was offhand, but 
one of the speakers said : 

Look, I agree perfectly. We must not overdo the criticism of Stalin, overdo 
the criticism of the Soviet Union but, after all, it is all right for the Chinese 
party, who already have power, to say "Let's take a balanced view of this in 
our public statements," but recognizing, as we do, of course, that Stalin only 
made surface errors, certainly in a country with civil liberties, can't we be 
allowed a little more criticism of the Soviet Union than, say, the Chinese party 
would be? 

Practically in those words — not those exact words. 


Generally speaking, to summarize the answer to your question, 
I feel, from the evidence of the material and the resolutions passed, 
that all basic questions that were argued rather vigorously in the 
party during the months beforehand were solved before the Congress 

The convention did three things. It made a show of unity, as the 
Daily Worker and all the last speakers said. Foster did not win, 
Gates did not win, Dennis did not win. The party won. 

The first thing it did was that. 

Secondly, it developed a working agreement between the factions 
by essentially splitting all committees that were so far elected just 
about equally between them, with the center on top. 

Thirdly, it made a record for the courts, or attempted to make a 
record for the courts, in terms of verbiage but not of fundamentals on 
its relationship to the American free constitutional process. 

And fourthly, on all important questions of program, with 1 or 2 
exceptions, it passed on to the new national committee the task of 
making a program, only 1 or 2 questions on which I think this con- 
vention took concrete action in terms of its immediate program, in 
looking at it. Most were passed over to the new national committee. 

There was a point on the agenda, party program, which was totally 
passed over. 

But on one question the stand of the convention is extremely clear 
in all its resolutions, and that is that the main campaign of the Com- 
mimist Party at this point must be, to use their verbiage, the exten- 
sion of democratization in the South. That is to say, the main point 
made by the convention in terms of an immediate program fits in 
very well with an old line of Communist attitude toward constitu- 
tional processes in America. 

It goes back, to my knowledge, 15 years or so when I was rather 
deeply involved in some theoretical work in connection with the so- 
called Negro question, and it is this : To the Communist Party efforts 
to utilize mass democratic mob criterion approaches rather than con- 
stitutional ones, to attempt to turn elections into plebiscites, and the 
main obstacle is the structure, the constitutional checks and balances 

And they have recognized for 15 years, and clearly now recognize, 
that that point in the country at which this structure of checks and 
balances has its greatest support is in the Senate of the United States, 
and specifically in the State rights structure of the Southern States, 
which bring it about that the Democratic Party cannot be looked at 
by them as a totally people's party in their terms, totally a laborish 
kind of party, but split it up. 

Hence, the major drive in the sense of putting themselves at the 
head, or attempting to put themselves at the head, to penetrate the 
movement of the Negro people in the various forms it has been taking 
in recent years and previously, has nothing whatever to do with any 
interest in the aims and desires of the Negro people, but is a reali- 
zation by the Communist Party that that movement can be used as 
the most important and strongest cutting edge against the constitu- 
tional structure of the United States, by trying to develop a removal 
of division of power guaranties in the South, and, secondarily, by 
the fact that they believe, as it is clear from the resolutions, that at 
this time in a prosperous country this is the only place in which 


serious trouble can possibly be stirred up, in which there are serious 
possibilities of developing what they call mass struggles, of building 
up extra-constitutional and extra-legal actions, and so on. 

I do want to emphasize, however, that this is not in any sense a 
humanitarian position. It has nothing whatever to do with any sym- 
pathy for the needs of the Negro peoples themselves. But it has to 
do w^ith a feeling on their part that this is the point of breakthrough 
in the country at this time. 

Mr. Morris. Mr. Meyer, both Senators have advised me that they 
have 3 : 30 appointments. I wonder if we might break in at this 

Senator, I don't know whether we will be able to work out finally 
complete testimony of Mr. Meyer, but if we can, we will do it, and 
I will so notify the subcommittee. 

Senator Jenner. Well, on behalf of the committee, Mr. Meyer, I 
want to thank you. I think you have contributed a great deal to 
the work of this committee. 

I am only sorry that every Member of the Congress couldn't have 
heard you. I am only sorry that every person in the United States 
couldn't have heard you. 

We certainly want to thank you for j^our forthright, courageous 
presentation of this very important subject here today. 

Senator Hruska. I just want to say, Mr. Meyer, I think in many 
respects so many of tlie points about which many of us have been 
thinking have been corroborated by your testimony here this after- 

That is specifically true of your observations concerning the con- 
vention held in New York City. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. Meyer. Thank you, sir. 

(Wliereupon, at 3 : 30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.) 

The following newspaper article was ordered into the record at a 
subsequent meeting of the subcommittee : 

[From the New York Times, March 5, 1957] 
Soviet Attache Leaves — Russian Ousted by Denmark on Espionage Charge 

Copenhagen, Denmark, March 4. — Capt. Mikhail Roudichev, assistant naval 
attache in the Soviet Embassy here, who was ordered to leave Denmark last 
week, left Copenhagen by plane today for Moscow. 

Captain Roudichev was charged with having tried to obtain secret military 
information, particularly that concerning the new coastal defenses on Denmark's 
Baltic coast. 

In January Lt. Col. Anatol Rogov, assistant military attache at the Soviet 
Embassy here, was expelled on similar charges. 


Note. — Tlie Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to tlie mere fact of tlie appearance of tlie names of an inrtiyidual or an organ- 
ization in tliis index. 

A Page 

ADAers 3575 

Adams, Josephine Truslow, excerpts of testimony 3587, 35SS, 3590-3600 

American League Against War and Fascism 3581, 3582 

American Youth Congress 3582 

Amsterdam 3581 

Antiwar and anti-Fascist congresses 35S1 

Antiwar Congress (of Canada) 3582 

Article from New York Times dated March 5, 1957, Soviet Attache 
Leaves — ^Russian Ousted by Demark on Espionage Charges 3609 


Baer, Ted 3598, 3599 

Beichman, Arnold 3565 

Benson 3592 

Bill of Rights 3575 

Browder, Earl 3587-3600 

Bukharin 3603 


Cambridge 3579, 3581 

Campos 3592 

Canada 3582, 3583 

Canadian Students League 3582 

Chambers, Whittaker 3595, 3596 

Chiang, Kai-shek 3593, 3595 

Chiang, Madam 3595 

Chicago 3582,3583 

South Side section 3583 

Chicago Workers School 3583 

China 3593,3595 

Communist 3594 

Chungking troops 3594 

Churchill 3597 

Cominform 3603 

Communist/s 3575, 3577, 3579, 3580, 3582, 3586-3588, 3591, 3592, 3600, 3603 

French 3570 

Communist Control Act of 1954 3601 

Communist International 3581, 3606 

Communist Party 3565- 

3569, 3578-3580, 3582, 3584, 3587, 3588, 3599, 3601-3604, 3608 

American (of United States) 3568, 3570-3572, 3581-3583, 3606 

Chinese 3579 

of Canada 3582 

of India 3579 

of Great Britain 3579-3581 

British Central Committee of 3579 

Central Committee of 3603 

Communist Party Convention in New York City 3568, 3600, 3605 

Congressional Reorganization Act 3586 

Cudahy, Mr 8589 

Czechoslovakia 3603, 3605 




Daily Worker 3566, 3576, 3592, 3597-3599, 3605, 3608 

Darcy, Sam 3590, 3591 

De Gaulle meetings 3597 

De Lacy, Congressman Hugh 3586 

Democratic Party 3608 

Democrats 3575 

Dennis, Eugene 3601, 3608 

Testimony of 3566-3576 

Joseph Forer, attorney 3566 

628 West 151st Street, New York City 3566 

Born under name of Frank Waldron 3567 

Fifth amendment if got Communist Party training at Lenin Insti- 
tute in Moscow 3567 

Fifth amendment if general secretary of CPUSA 3568 

Fifth amendment if son Timothy now in Moscow 3575 

Department of State 3602 

Douglas, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan 3586 

Duclos 3570-3572, 3587, 3600 


Eighth Route Army 3594 

England 3578-3580, 3582 

European Workers Anti-Fascist Congress (Pleyel Congress) 3581 

Exhibit No. 438 — Excerpt from Josephine Truslow Adams' testimony, Jan- 
uary 16, 1957 3590-3599 


Federal Bureau of Investigation 3601 

Fifth amendment 3567, 3575 

First amendment 3566, 3573, 3575 

Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley 3589, 3590, 3593, 3599 

"For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy" 3603 

Fort Benning 3558 

Foster 3607, 3608 

France 3582 

Free Browder Committee 3589 


Gates 3607, 3608 

Geneva Congress 3603 

Great Britain 3581 

Green, Gil 3582, 3583, 3587, 3592 


Harlem in New York 3583 

Haywood, Harry 3583 

Hruska, Senator Roman L 3565, 3577 

Hu, Gen. Shung Nan 3594 

Hyde Park 3583, 3588-3591, 3596 


Illinois 3583, 3584 

Indiana 3583,3584 

International Publishing House 3599 

Italy 3599 


Japanese 3598 

Jefferson School in New York 3587, 3588, 3599, 3600 

Jenner, Senator William E 3577 

"Johnson, Dr." document 3996 


K Page 

Kao, Gen. Hsang-chen 3594 

Keeney, Mary Jane 3598, 3599 

Khrushchev 3571, 3602, 3603 

King, Carol (wife of Sam Darcy) 3591 

Kouvnikoff, Serge 3598, 3599 

Kremlin 3569 

Kweilin 3593 


Labor Club 3578 

Labor Party 3578, 3580 

Lenin Institute in Moscow 3567 

Leninism 3601 

Leninistic doctrine 3604 

Letter to John J. Abt, Esq., from Paul Williams, United States attorney, 

re Eugene Dennis, February 18, 1957 3565 

Letter to Bob Morris from Department of Justice re Eugene Dennis, 

February 18, 1957 3565 

Lindbergh 3589,3590 

London 3578 

London Busmen 3581 

London School of Economics 3579-3581 


Mandel, Benjamin 3565 

Mao, Tse-tung 3593 

Marxism 3601 

Menon, Krishna 3580 

Meyer, Frank S. (testimony of) 3577-3609 

Woodstock, N. Y 3577 

Free-lance writer 3577 

Born Newark, N. J 3578 

Newark Academy, Newark, N. J. ; Princeton, N. J. ; Balliol College, 
Oxford ; Oxford University ; London School of Economics ; Univer- 
sity of Chicago 3578 

Joined Communist Party in 1931 at Oxford 3578 

Broke with party in December 1945 3600 

Missouri 3583 

Monroe, N. Y 3591, 3592 

Morris, Robert 3565, 3577 

Moscow 3574, 3575, 3582, 3602, 3606, 3609 


National Review : 3578 

National Theatre Building (New York) 3575 

Negro people 3608, 3609 

New Leader (publication) 3575 

New Masses 3587 

New York 3568, 3582, 3584, 3586, 3588, 3597, 3609 

New York Herald Tribune 3569 

New York Times 3609 

New York Workers School 3583 

Nye 3589,3590 

October Club 3578 

Oxford 3578-3581 


Paris 3581 

Philadelphia 3589, 3590 

Poland 3595 

Polish Government-in-exile 3596 

Political Affairs 3587 

Potash. Irving 3568, 3569, 3572, 3573 

Puerto Ricans 3592 


R Page j 

"Reds in U. S. Vote To Cast OfE Moscow" 3605 i 

Report of Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union to its ; 

20th Party Congress, delivered by Krushchev 3603 j 

Republicans 3575 i 

Rogge, O. John 3600 i 

Rogov, Lt. Col. Anatol, expelled assistant military attache at Soviet Em- 1 

bassy, Denmark 3609 ' 

Roosevelt, Mrs 3589, 3591, 3593 i 

Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano 3588-3598 : 

Roudichev, Capt. Mikhail, expelled assistant naval attach^ in Soviet Em- \ 

bassy, Denmark 3609 ' 

Rusher, William A 3565, 3577 ) 

Russia ^ 3603 ' 



Seller, Dick, former secretary to Congressman DeLacy 3586  

Selsam, Howard, director of Jefferson School 3587 i 

S. P. I. C. (Section Francaise Internationle Commimiste) 3582 ' 

Smith Act 3601 1 

Socialists 3575 ! 

Sourwine, J. G 3565 \ 

Southern States 3608 -, 

Soviet Embassy 3598, 3599, 3609 ' 

Soviet Union 3588, 3597-3599, 3604-3607 I 

Spanish Civil War 3587 j 

Stachel 3599 \ 

Stalin 3593, 3597, 3602, 3606 | 

Stalinism 3601 | 

State rights structure 3608 1 

Stilwell 3594 

Students' Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 3578 

Subversive Activities Control Board 3600 

Swarthmore 3587, 3588 


Teheran 3587. 3597, 3598 

Ten Pao-hsan 3594 

Time magazine 3595, 3596 

Tito 3593 

Trachtenberg 3599 

Trotsky 3606 

20th party convention of Communist Party of Soviet Union, March 7, 

1956 3571, 3602, 3603, 3606, 3607 


United Front 3580, 3587 j 

United States 3569, 3572, 3582, 3588, 3598, 3603, 3606, 3608 \ 

University of Chicago 3582 j 

"U. S. Reds Quit Foster, Kremlin" 3605 

"U. S. Reds Vote End to Control by Soviet" 3605 j 

W ' 

Wahl, David 3585, 3586 : 

Wallace 3594 , 

Washington 3558, 3586, 3588, 3596, 3598 : 

Weinstock, Louis 3590, 3591 , 

Weiss, Max 3582 ] 

Wheeler 3589, 3590 < 

Williamson, John 3570, 3572, 3587  

Wisconsin 3583 1 

WPA 3589 i 

T ! 

Yalta 3597, 3598 

Young Communist International 3582 

Young Communist League 3580, 3582, 3583 


ZinoviefE 3603 J