SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITI|;|„td .JJftESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION o'e. IHE, INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL'''SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 5, 1957
PART 50
Printed for the use of tlie Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNaiENT PRINTING OFFICE}
93215 WASHINGTON : 1957
ywUMCv,'-* »'
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
AUG 27 1957
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wiseonsin
CLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANQER, North Dakota
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Caroliaa ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
SUBCOMMITTEK To IXVESTIC.^TE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
Act AND Other Internal Security Laws
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
Robert Morris, Chief Counsel
J. G. SouEWTNE, Associate Counsel
William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
II
CONTENTS
Testimony of — Page
Abrey, Richard Henrich 3407
III
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1957
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act
AND Other Internal Security Laws,
OF THE Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p. m., in room
424, Senate Office Building, Senator Roman L, Hruska presiding.
Present: Senator Hruska.
Also present: William Rusher, associate coimsel.
Senator Hruska. AU right. The meeting ■will come to order.
The Chair would like to make a brief statement before we proceed
to swear the witness, and to his interrogation.
The Internal Securit}?" Subcommittee has been trying to determine
whether the Soviet Union is causing money to come into the United
States to serve one or more of its purposes, all of which are calculated
to undermine the security of this country and to extend Communist
power abroad.
The Board for the Validation of German Bonds in the United States
was set up for the purpose of determining which foreign currency
bonds of German origin shall be validated and honored as existing
obligations of the companies concerned.
When Richard H. Abrey, today's witness, sought to vahdate
$245,000 worth of bonds of^the United Steel Works, the Board held
that the bonds were physically located, on January 1, 1945, in the
vaults of the Reichsbank in Berlin. This finding of the Validation
Board is tantamount to a holding that these particular bonds were
acquired by the Soviet Government and subsequently disposed of by it.
Mr. Abrey has been called today because we desire his testimony,
in order to learn from him where he obtained the bonds in question.
Mr. Abrey, will you be sworn at this time, please.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to
give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mr. Abrey. I do.
Senator Hruska. Mr. Rusher, wiU you proceed to the interrogation.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HENRICH ABREY, NEW YORK, N. Y.;
ACCOMPANIED BY MINER CRARY, HIS COUNSEL
Mr. Rusher. What is your name, please?
Mr. Abrey. Richard Henrich Abrey.
Mr. Rusher. Senator, I believe counsel for Mr. Abrey would like
to make a statement.
3407
3408 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator Hruska. Leave is granted.
Mr. Crary. My name is Miner Crary. Subsequent to the deter-
mination of the Vahdation Board, Mr. Abrey instituted a proceeding
as plaintiff, in the United States district court in New York, in an
action to seek a determination that the requirements for the vahdation
of his bonds had been met; that after instituting that proceeding,
various motions were made by both parties, and there is now pending
a decision by that court on those motions, which has not been decided.
Furthermore, after a particular newspaper article, an action in
libel was commenced also by Mr. Abrey in the New York Supreme
Court, and that also is still in process of litigation.
Mr. Rusher. Mr. Abrey, I believe 3'ou originally were of Polish
nationality; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. Will you give us the Polish form of j^our name?
Mr. Abrey. Ryszard Henryk Abranowicz.
Mr. Rusher. In 1939 you were in Poland, were you not, at the time
of the outbreak of war?
Mr. Abrey. Yes.
Mr. Rusher. Will you tell us from whom, and when, you acquired
the 245 bonds of the value of $1,000 apiece, of the United Steel Works,
which you subsequently, in 1953, registered for validation with the
Board for Validation of German Bonds in the United States?
Mr. Abrey. I purchased it through the Bank Dyskontow^^ in War-
saw, Poland, in the early part of the spring of 1940, shortly prior to
my departure from Poland for Honduras, in Central America.
Mr. Rusher. You were, I believe, planning at that time to leave
Poland as a result of the dislocations in that country following the
German and Russian occupation; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. And you say that you bought these bonds from the
Bank Dyskontow}"?
Mr. Abrey. I bought them at the Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw.
Mr. Rusher. In Warsaw.
Can you tell us who had suggested the transaction, or how it had
come about, directlv, how it came to vour attention and was con-
summated?
Mr. Abrey. It was suggested to me b}' a Mr. Radzinski.
Mr. Rusher. Would you spell that, please?
Mr. Abrey. R-a-d-z-i-n-s-k-i, Radzmski. He was one of the execu-
tives of the Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw. He was known as Director
Radzinski, which means one of the members of the board, or managers
of the bank. He suggested these bonds as secm*ity which, by alter-
ability, permitted by the German occupation authorities to be taken
with me abroad at the time when I left Poland.
Mr. Rusher. Did he mdicate who were then the owoiers of the
bonds?
Mr. Abrey. No; he did not.
Mr. Rusher. Are you aware that the Validation Board, in its
opinion denying validation to these particular bonds, stated, and I
would quote from the opinion of the Board :
Dr. Laschtowiczka, member of the board of directors of the Bank Dyskontowy,
Warsaw, for the period 1935 to May 1940, who served as Deputy Chief of the
PoHsh Banking Supervisory Office after May 1940, testified that the Bank Dys-
kontowy had no United States Steel works debentures prior to August 31, 1939,
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3409
and that, to the best of his knowledge, no such debentures were acquired after
that time.
And then it adds in a footnote :
The witness —
meaning Dr. Laschtowiczka —
was on leave from the bank from September 1939 to May 1940 but states he kept
in close contact with the head of the bank, a Dr. Mikulecki.
In view of this apparent testimon}^ that the bank did not have such
bonds, will you explain how you came to acquke them from the bank?
Mr. Abrey. Well, Dr. Laschtowiczka stated that to his knowledge
the bank did not have it, but it does not m.ean that the bank did not
purchase it for specific purpose for me, for selling it to me.
Mr. Rusher. So that you feel that the bank, although it did not
have it, purchased it to sell to you; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct. That is my imderstanding at this
time.
Mr. Rusher. Did you know Mr. Mikulecki?
Mr. Abrey. Not personally.
Mr. Rusher. Would he have known of this transaction, if it took
place?
Mr. Abrey. Dr. Alikulecki was a German trustee of this bank, and
it was rather my understanding that he instigated this transaction.
Mr. Rusher. And yet Dr. Laschtowiczka, who, according to his
testimony before the Validation Board, kept in close contact with
him, apparently was not familiar with this transaction; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. It is quite possible, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Now, after you acquired the bonds, as you say, from
the Bank D3'skontowy, what did you do \vith them? Did you take
them with you out of Poland?
Mr. Abrey. I took them with me out of Poland.
Mr. Rusher. And after a number of months, I believe it was, you
came to San Francisco in the United States; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. And you were traveling on what kind of a passport?
Mr. Abrey. Diplomatic passport, of the Republic of Honduras.
Mr. Rusher. And j^ou arrived here in the status of a person in
transit; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Air. Rusher. That is to say, m transit to Honduras?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. Did you change your status after you came here?
Mr. Abrey. I did.
Mr. Rusher. To what?
Mr. Abrey. To that of visitor.
Mr. Rusher. Status of a visitor to the LTnited States?
Mr. Abrey. On the Polish passport.
Mr. Rusher. On a Polish passport?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Air. Rusher. Now, in connection with this change in j^our status
from "in transit" to "visitor," did you execute a form for the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Office in which you declared that you had
no foreign securities?
Mr. Abrey. I have no recollection of executing this form. How-
ever, if such form was required, I am sure that it was executed.
3410 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Rusher. Senator, I am informed from the report of the Valida-
tion Board, for the year beginning September 1, 1955, and ending
August 31, 1956, that the registrant, meaning Mr. Abrey, in acquiring
visitor's status, executed the form required by the Bureau of Immi-
gration and Naturalization, declaring that he owned no foreign
securities, and that was the basis of my question.
You say you do not recall whether or not you executed such a form?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. Subsequently, however, in December 1941, December
16, 1941, did you execute a sworn report of assets to the Secretary
of the Treasury of the United States, as required by Federal regu-
lations?
Mr. Abrey. I did.
Mr. Rusher. Did you in that report state that you did not have
such foreign securities?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct. I did not.
Mr. Rusher. But at that time you did have them with you?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. And you say that you subsequently have them in
this country, in your possession?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. Where did you keep them, physically?
Mr. Abrey. I had them at home.
Mr. Rusher. You had them at home?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. Until what date, roughly?
Mr. Abrey. Until early August of 1942.
Mr. Rusher. What did you do with them at that time?
Mr. Abrey. I gave them for safekeeping to Mr. Funes in Honduras
consulate. He is the consul general in New York.
Mr. Rusher. Mr. Abrey, though you now tell us that you kept
them at home until August 1942, it is a fact, is it not, that your
original statement to the Validation Board at the time of registration
in 1953 forward, until late July 1955, was to the effect that these bonds
were in a safe deposit box that you maintained in the Chemical Bank,
in New York?
Mr. Abrey. Correct.
Mr. Rusher. And I believe there was evidence, tending to show
that they were not in that safe deposit box, presented before the Board;
is that right?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. It was subsequent to that, on July 26, 1955, that
you submitted a further affidavit to the Board from your wife with
respect to what had been the actual disposition of those bonds in that
period?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. What was her subsequent explanation; will you teU
us the facts as you now understand them to be?
Mr. Abrey. When I was confronted with the statement that these
bonds were not in the safe deposit box, I was amazed, as I was all the
time under the impression that my wife took it to the bank and placed
them in the safe deposit box.
Mr. Rusher. Had you told her to do this?
Mr, Abrey. Yes, I did; very specifically. However
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3411
Mr. Rusher. About when was this?
Mr. Abrey. About 1941.
Mr. Rusher. The particular month, can you give us that?
Mr. Abrey. I can't recall, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Some time in 1941 you had told her to take it to
the safe deposit box?
Mr. Abrey. I gave her the package and told her to take it to the
safe deposit box which we had at this time, and I never inquired of
her whether she did place it in the safe deposit box. I was all the
time under the impression that they were there. Apparently my
wife decided it was unnecessary, or she had neglected or forgotten.
Only recent, within the last couple of years when I learned they were
not there, I started to inquire with her why weren't the bonds placed
in the safety deposit box, and she said she never bothered to take
them over there.
Mr. Rusher. And you presented her affidavit to the Board?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. When did you claim these bonds from what you then
took to be the safe deposit box in the Chemical Bank, but which you
now knew was in the personal custody of your wife?
Mr. Abrey. Before joining the Army in August of 1942, I asked
my wife to give me the bonds, that I was going to the Honduras
consulate to place them for safekeeping in case something happened to
me. She then gave me the package and I took them to the consulate,
to Mr. Funes.
Mr. Rusher. You were still under the impression that she got the
package from the safe deposit box?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. And under that impression, you made your subse-
quent statement to the Validation Board?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. I might add at this point, just to keep the record in
balance. Senator, that the Validation Board's annual report states — -I
correct that — -it is the opinion of the Board in connection with its
decision in the matter that the particular safe deposit box of the
Chemical Bank, which they identify as No. A346-970, was not large
enough to hold the 245 debentures in question.
Mr. Abrey, when you did recover these from your wife — these
bonds — you say j^ou gave them to the representative of Honduras in
New York?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. Is that the consul general?
Mr. Abrey. The consul general, Mr. Funes.
Mr. Rusher. F-u-n-e-s is the name?
Mr. Abrey. Correct.
Mr. Rusher. And Mr. Fimes held these for you?
Mr. Abrey. For me, until I called for them' in December 1950.
Mr. Rusher. Did he actually see the bonds, or simply the package?
Mr. Abrey. No. I opened the package, and I was under the im-
pression that he saw these were the bonds.
Mr. Rusher. You were under the impression that he had seen the
bonds?
Mr. Abrey. Yes.
93215— 57— pt. 50 2
3412 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Rusher. Subsequently, however, in his testimony before the
Validation Board, it is correct, is it not, he testified simply that he
had a package for you, and that it contained a bluish-green paper
which he did not otherwise identify, and which he could not specif-
ically identify as containing these bonds?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. So he held them for you until 1950, you say?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. And in that year you withdrew them from his cus-
tody?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Where did you put tliem then?
Mr. Abrey. I had them at home, in Great Neck.
Mr. Rusher. You had them at home, in Great Neck, Long Island?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, Long Island.
Mr. Rusher. You kept them there until how long?
Mr. Abrey. LTntil the validation proceeding started to take place.
Mr. Rusher. When was that?
Mr. Abrey. 1953, I believe.
Mr. Rusher. Some time in 1953?
Mr. Abrey. Do you have that exact, Mr. Crary?
Mr. Crary. September 1953.
Mr. Rusher. September 1953.
Now, at any time after your arrival in this country, and up until,
let's say, the time when you registered these bonds for validation in
1953, had you considered selling them for what they would bring?
Mr. .Abrey. Well, I was, perhaps, tliinkiag of selling them, but I
didn't do any steps toward the sales.
Mr. Rusher. Did you discuss the possibility of selling them, or the
market value of them?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. With whom did you discuss that?
Mr. Abrey. In 1949 — in the period covered by your question?
Mr. Rusher. That's correct; after you arrived in the United States
with the bonds.
Mr. Abrey. In 1941, I had two friends here in the United States,
both from Poland, both in banking business in Poland, and I spoke to
them on this subject.
Mr. Rusher. \Vho were they?
Mr. Abrey. Mr. Keh.
Mr. Rusher. Would you spell that, please?
Mr. Abrey. K-e-h; and Mr. Bagniewski.
Mr. Rusher. Would you spell that, please?
Mr. Abrey. Bagniewski, B-a-g-n-i-e-w-s-k-i.
Mr. Rusher. Where are they now?
Mr. Abrey. Both dead.
Mr. Rusher. They are both dead?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. But j'-ou did speak with them, you say, about these
bonds in 1941?
Mr. Abrey. In 1941.
Mr. Rusher. Did j^ou speak to anybod}" else concerning them?
Mr. Abrey. Not to my recollection — I am sorry; I spoke to Mr.
Gross.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE tTNlTED STATES 3413
Mr. Rusher. Would you give us his name?
Mr. Abrey. Alexander Gross, G-r-o-s-s.
Mr. Rusher. And since the war, have you considered selling these
bonds?
Mr. Abrey. Well, I was thinking of it.
Mr. Rusher. Did you discuss it wdth anybody?
Mr. Abrey. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Rusher. It is fairly clear in your mind that you have not
discussed it with anyone since then?
Mr. Abrey. Fairl-y clearly, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Did you know the late Stanley T. Stanley, the first
and last names are both S-t-a-n-1-e-y ; Stanley T. Stanley, who in
Poland, I believe befoi'e the war, was know^n by the name of Ruziewdcz?
Mr. Abrey. I met him in Poland before the war, socially, a couple
of times, and I knew him under that nam.e. I didn't know that his
name in the United States was Stanley.
Mr. Rusher. Did you hear that he was associated in his business
in the United States after the war with the late Serge Rubenstein?
Air. Abrey. I read to this effect in the newspapers after Rubenstein
was killed.
Mr. Rusher. Did you have any business dealings of any sort with
Stanley? ^ y
Mr. Abrey. No, sir; never.
Mr. Rusher. Or with Rubenstein?
Mr. Abrey. Never.
Mr. Rusher. Do you know a man named Joseph Gruss, who has
an office at 30 Broad Street, New York City?
Mr. Abrey. No, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Have you ever had any business dealings with him?
Mr. Abrey. No, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Do you know a man named Nicholas Deak?
Mr. Abrey. No, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Did you ever have any business dealings with him?
Mr. Abrey. Never.
Mr. Rusher. Do you know a man named Peter Kemp?
Mr. Abrey. No, sir.
Mr. Rusher. When did you arrive in the United States?
Mr. Abrey. In November of 1940.
Mr. Rusher. November of 1940. Were you well fixed, relatively
speaking, financially, or were you in a position where a matter of tliis
size was of some importance to you?
Mr. Abrey. Well, I wasn't well oft', if that's what you mean.
Mr. Rusher. Certainly, this was a matter of large concern; would
that be fair to say?
Mr. Abrey. Yes and no, sir.
Mr. Rusher. It is a subjective question, and I don't want to press
it too much.
I wonder, though, whether or not you might not have made some
inquiry at the New York Stock Exchange in late 1940 regarding the
possible sales value of these bonds.
Mr. Abrey. No, sir.
Mr. Rusher. You did not?
Mr. Abrey. No, sir. I arrived here in the early part of November
1940, and at this time we did intend to go to Honduras. My wife
3414 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE tJNITED STATES
took sick immediately upon arrival over here, and she was in bed
for several weeks, and I didn't even open my suitcases, which were
still sealed at this time, and these bonds were in the suitcases.
Mr. Rusher. They had come in on your Honduran passport;
is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Would you explain — by the way, tliis is going back
a bit — how you came to acquire a Honduran passport?
Mr. Abrey. I was honorary consulate general of Honduras, in
Poland, and that is how I came under diplomatic status as a traveler.
Mr. Rusher. These bonds were in your baggage that you brought
with you?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. And were not inspected, therefore?
Mr. Abrey. They were not inspected.
Mr. Rusher. Were they under diplomatic seal of some kind?
Mr. Abrey, That is correct. And, answering your question, sir,
for this reason: Until the very end, or rather the beginning of 1941,
being under the impression that I would proceed to Honduras, I
did not open the suitcase, I didn't take out these papers and I did
not inquire.
Mr. Rusher. You couldn't inquire without opening the suitcase?
Mr. Abrey. I did not open the suitcases.
Mr. Rusher. Isn't it a fact that the bonds, series A debentures,
were selling on the New York Stock Exchange at a price of from
SOYi to 36}Mn November and December of 1940?
Mr. Abrey. 1 didn't know about that.
Mr. Rusher. Do you know whether that happens to be the case,
from subsequent information?
Mr. Abrey. Only from the statements of the Validation Board.
Mr. Rusher. That's what I was quoting it from. Mr. Abrey, in
your testimon}^ before the Validation Board, I believe you testified
that you probably would have sold the debentures for $50,000 in 1940,
as you needed money badly, but that you were not aware that in
November and December of 1940 the debentures were sold on the
New York Stock Exchange at 30^ to 36^.
Mr. Abrey. I may have said it, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Would it have been true, if you had said it?
Mr. Abrey. I doubt it.
Mr. Rusher. You think you might have misstated the fact before
the Validation Board?
Mr. Abrey. Perhaps. I was quite confident at the time, when I
brought these bonds with me from Poland, that eventually the war
would turn against Germany and that the bonds would be redeemed
at the full value, and that I woiild salvage whatever was left from my
prewar fortune. I wouldn't attempt to sell them at $50,000 at this
time.
Mr. Rusher. We have, on two occasions, instances in which,
given an opportunity, indeed, required to declare foreign securities,
nevertheless you did not do so. When you changed your status from
"in transit" to "visitor," a form required by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and again a form required by the Treasury,
I believe, of aliens; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3415
Mr. Rusher. Will you please tell us why you violated that
requirement?
Mr. Abrey. Well, as I see it today, my way of thinking then was
probably that, because I entered this country under diplomatic status
and I did not declare these German bonds at the time of entry in
San Francisco, it might be in conflict with my status in which I arrived
here, later on, to declare these German bonds. And I was probably
also afraid they might be confiscated, being German bonds, and my
knowledge of the English language, at this time, 1940, 1941, was
rather very poor, and I was not too familiar with all the regulations,
all the newspaper reports on the status of the foreigners. I was a bit
confused, or even more than just a bit confused — I was just simply
scared after I went through from Poland where I had seen confisca-
tion without any reason.
Mr. Rusher. Yet you had competent legal advice throughout,
Mr. Abrey?
Mr. Abrey. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. Rusher. You had had legal advice in this country about the
matter of citizenship as far back as 1938?
Air. Abrey. That is correct; only about obtaining citizenship.
Mr. Rusher. You subsequently sought legal advice about the
change of your status from "in transit" to "visitor"?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. But, although one of the forms, which was maccu-
rately filled out, was executed in connection with that change of
status, nevertheless you did not seek and did not have legal advice in
connection with the filling out of that form; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. Foolishly, I did not.
Mr. Rusher. How often, altogether, did you visit that safe-deposit
box?
Mr. Abrey. Well, I can't recall the exact number of times I was
over there. How^ever, Mr. Crary, here, during the period of waiting
here, brought to m}^ attention that there are two photostatic copies
of the bank's statement that I was twice in the bank; at least, I
signed the necessary paper in the bank, in 1941, or, I believe, also 1942.
Mr. Rusher. This is the paper necessary in order to enter the
safe-deposit box; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. Yes.
Mr. Rusher. Twice in the period of 1941 or early in 1942?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. A\Tiile the bonds, presumptively, were in the safe-
deposit box?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. Were you alarmed not to find them there?
Mr. Abrey. Well, to mv recollection, I haven't seen this box. I
believe that I v/ent with my w4fe over there, and I probably signed
the papers, but I can't recall entering this box. In all probability,
my wife went to the safe-deposit vault and took out the box.
Mr. Rusher. She must have had, independently, the right to go
into the box.
Mr. Abrey. She did; she did. We had rented it in 1938, and each
person had independent access.
Mr. Rusher. So that, as you now visualize it, Mr. Abrey, the
records of the bank show that you went there and you signed to enter
3416 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
the safe-deposit box; you feel that you waited, after having signed,
while your wife actually went to the safe-deposit box?.
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir; yes, sir.
Senator Hruska. Mr. Abrey, does your wife's signature appear on
the same occasion, on this photostatic copy?
Mr. Abrey. No; just only mine. I believe only one signature was
required to get access to the box, and it was my signatm-e on the
photostatic copy which I have seen.
Senator Hruska. As a matter of fact, isn't it the practice of all
safe-deposit-box companies that all who enter the premises sign,
whether their name is required or not?
Mr. Abrey. That I don't know, Senator.
Mr. Rusher. But the two occasions you were there, were you
accompanied by Mrs. Abrey?
Mr. Abrey. I can't recall it, sir. I would presume this was the
case, as I can't recall my entering this box.
Senator Hruska. On neither of those occasions does Mrs. Abrev's
signature appear on that card to which you refer?
Mr. Abrey. On neither one.
Mr. Rusher. Do you have, Mr. Crary, the photostats of those
occasions, and are thej^ available for the inspection of the subcom-
mittee?
Mr. Crary. Yes, sir; they are. They are exhibits which were in-
troduced by the Validation Board, and I'd be very happy to show yow.
these copies.
Mr. Rusher. If we could make copies for the record of the sub-
committee, would that be agreeable to you?
Mr. Crary. Certainly. These are public records.
(Copies of the reports of access to the safe-deposit box were marked
"Exliibits No. 425 and 425-A" and appear below:)
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3417
THE CHISMICAL, SAFK DEPOSIT COMPANY
nmvf voita. ,
Sr-^?e OF A'""?S/ to BOX S?S^R
Date of Ac.-^sss* C-£T2li<i4 n«»» / 7- S^ /^ %-f
.^ — — %
. / . -c
TIfE ClIMMfCAL, SAFE OEPOSiT COMI^AKIT
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Cat* of 4cc»8!t ^'g*»**.st«^^/*£^«^f naej ^--^^2*^-
Siss)Sla«'« of- f>«rsoss fearla^ aeeeass "~" .^c:;2:ti;;^lX., "*"
3418 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator Hruska. If they are available for that purpose, they wiU
be returned to you immediately upon being reproduced.
Mr. Rusher. I might explain, Senator, that the decision of the
Board in the matter of Mr. Abrey's bonds is already in the public
record of the subcommittee, and has been, I believe, since the testi-
mony of Mr. Reinstein in 1956.
I will, however, if I may, submit the report of the Validation Board
in the German dollar bonds for the year beginning September 1,
1955, insofar as it pertains to the matter of these challenged, so-called
challenged, registrations.
Senator Hruska. The report will be received for the record.
(The section of the report above referred to was marked "Exhibit
No. 426" and reads as follows:)
Exhibit No. 426
VII. The Challenged Registrations
A. GENERAL
Of the total of $142,459,600 principal amount of German dollar bonds registered
with the Board under 40,620 separate registrations, 54 registrations have been
challenged. These challenged cases represent bonds having a principal value of
$1,319,000. In all of these cases objections have been filed with the Board by the
issuers and examining agencies. Such objections are accompanied by evidence
tending to show that the bonds were, in fact, within Germany on January 1, 1945,
and that they were unlawfully removed from the vaults in which they were
deposited.
In 6 of these cases representing a total principal value of $274,000, the Board
has rendered formal decisions denying validation.
In 12 of these cases involving bonds totaling $329,000 principal value, the
registrants, after receiving the Board's letter outlining the facts and evidence
against the validation, have withdrawn their registrations.
There are still pending before the Board 36 cases involving $716,000 principal
value. The registrants in these cases have been or will be notified that objections
to validation have been filed with the Board by the issuers and examining agencies
and invited to rebut the objections and to supplement the evidence submitted with
their registrations in support of their claims that the bonds were, in fact, outside
of Germany on January 1, 1945.
In 14 of these cases the Board has given formal notice of its intention to deny
validation, informing the registrant that unless further evidence supporting the
registrant's case is received within 90 days, the Board would proceed to render its
decision denying validation.
Although a public hearing has been held in only one of the challenged cases,
the Board has been ready at all times to meet and discuss evidence with any of its
registrants or their representatives, either privately or in public hearing. Every
possible assistance has been ofi'ered to its registrants in suggesting sources of docu-
mentary evidence or granting additional time within which to find evidence.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Rusher. Mr. Abrey, when you first pm'chased these bonds, as
you say, in Poland in 1940, was it early 1940?
Mr. Abrey. 1940.
Mr. Rusher. Whom did you deal with in the Bank Dyskontowy?
Mr. Abrey. Mr. Radzinski.
Mr, Rusher. Would you spell that for the record, please?
Mr. Abrey. Radzinski, R-a-d-z-i-n-s-k-i.
Mr. Rusher. Did you deal with anybody else?
Mr. Abrey. No, sir; only with him.
Mr. Rusher. He was the only bank official that you had any
dealings with?
Mr. Abrey. Yes.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3419
Mr. Rusher. And he carried through the transaction?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. How did you pay for these bonds?
Mr. Abrey. By check, in Polish currency, drawn against my
account in the Bank Dyskontowy.
Mr. Rusher. To whom did you pay in the bank?
Mr. Abrey. Bank Dyskontowy.
Mr. Rusher. To whom, specifically; a clerical emploj^ee?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Can you tell us a little bit about the physical situa-
tion of the transaction; did you go to the bank?
Mr. Abrey. Yes; I went to the bank personally, at which time
I was told that export permit was granted to me; and at this time
only I authorized the bank to obtain the title to these bonds.
Mr. Rusher. Now, you say an export permit was granted to you.
Was that necessary at that time?
Mr. Abrey. This was the main purpose of purchasing these bonds,
or anything else; whatever was available of any value to me.
Mr. Rusher. These particular bonds were of a type for which the
German authorities would grant an export permit?
Mr. Abrey. They granted me a permit for these particular
securities.
Mr. Rusher. "Were you aware that the decision of the Validation
Board, in denying validation to your bonds, states, and I quote:
Erich Tetzner, former head of the German office in Poland, charged with con-
trol of foreign currency assets, testified that under the regulations in effect during
the German occupation of Poland he personally would have had to approve a
transaction involving the purchase, sale, or export of $245,000 in face value of
United Steel Works debentures, and that no application was ever filed with his
oflSce.
Mr. Abrey. I understand that that is what the Validation Board
stated.
Mr. Rusher. Is that your own understanding, that he would have
had to approve such a transaction?
Mr. Abrey. I wouldn't know, sir. I never went to his office, I
never applied for permit to him personally.
Mr. Rusher. Yet you say that the bank told you that a permit
had been granted?
Mr. Abrey, That is correct; and I have seen this permit myself.
I had it in my hands.
Mr. Rusher. Where is it now?
Mr. Abrey. Well, I don't have it.
The German authorities, when inspecting my luggage at the time
it was packed and sealed, they took it with them,
Mr. Rusher. In Poland?
Mr. Abrey. In Poland ; in Warsaw.
Mr. Rusher. But they left the bonds?
Mr. Abrey. But they left the bonds in my suitcases.
Mr. Rusher. So this one man in the bank that you referred to is
the only man who had knowledge of the transaction?
Mr. Abrey. Of the officials of the bank.
Mr. Rusher, Where is he now?
Mr. Abrey. He is dead, as I understand from the report of the
Validation Board.
3420 SCOPE or soviet activity in the united states
Mr. Rusher. I see.
Let me ask you: You had seen the safe deposit box, yourself, had
you not, prior to these two occasions on which you say your wife
actually went into it?
Mr. Abrey. At the time I rented the box in 1938, 1939, I had seen
the box. I
Mr. Rusher. Go ahead.
Mr. Abrey. I placed whatever we left there in 1939, prior to return-
ing to Poland; I placed that myself personally.
Mr. Rusher. What kind of things were those?
Mr. Abrey. They were personal jewelry of my wife, some United
States Government savings bonds, and some cash.
Mr. Rusher. You put this physically in the box yourself?
Mr. Abrey. In the box, myself.
Mr. Rusher. You had a clear physical impression of it; you knew
roughly what it was, and its size; is that correct?
Mr. Abrey. Well, I don't have the impression now, su\
Mr. Rusher. You do remember having gone to it and put these
things in it?
Mr. Abrey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rusher. Is it j^our impression that the 245 bonds of the United
Steel Works would fit into that box?
Mr. Abrey. My impression at that moment?
Mr. Rusher. At that time.
Mr. Abrey. I can't recall; it was about 19 years ago.
Mr. Rusher. And it is your recollection that you told your wife,
nevertheless, to put them in?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Mr. Rusher. And you are now familiar with the testimony before
the Board to the effect that it would not have fitted?
Mr. Abrey. That is correct.
Senator Hruska. Will that be all, Mr. Rusher?
Mr. Rusher. I have no further questions. Senator.
Senator Hruska. Very well.
The subcommittee Wl continue its hearings at a time and date to
be fixed bv the Chahman.
We will continue our efforts to find out as to some of the aspects of
the testimony, both of the Validation Board and that which you have
given, Mr. Abrev.
There do seem^to be some conflicts, and it will be the subcommittee s
desire to resolve those conflicts, if possible, and to see if they can be
reconciled.
Mr. Crary. Mav I say for the record, Senator, that if there is any
further help Mr. Abrey can give, I believe I speak for him in saying
that we will be glad to do so.
Senator Hruska. I appreciate that.
Anything further?
Mr. Rusher. Not at this time, Senator.
Senator Hruska. The meeting is adjourned, and the witness is
excused for the time being.
(Whereupon, at 3:15 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
INDEX
Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization
in this index.
A
Abranowicz, Ryszard Henryk (Polish form of Richard Henrich Abrey's Pago
name) 3408,3417
Abrey, Mrs. (wife of Richard Henrich Abrey) 3410, 3411, 3413, 3415
Abrev, Richard Henrich:
testimony of 3407-3420
Miner Crary, counsel 3407
Ryszard Henryk Abranowicz (Polish form of name) 3408
Purchased bonds through Bank Dyskontowy, Warsaw 3408
Diplomatic passport, Republic of Honduras 3409
Arrived in United States in 1940 3413
Honorary consulate general of Honduras in Poland 3414
Affidavit (Mrs. Abrey's to Board) 3411
B
Bagniewski, Mr 3412
Bank Dyskontowy (Warsaw, Poland) 3408, 3409, 3418, 3419
Board for the Validation of German Bonds in United States 3407, 3408
C
Chemical Bank, New York 3410, 3411
Chemical Safe Deposit Co., New York 3417
Communist 3407
Crary, Miner (attorney for Richard Henrich Abrey) 3407
D
Deak, Nicholas 3413
Diplomatic passport 3409
E
English 3415
Exhibits Nos. 425 and 425-A — Reports of access to safe-deposit box —
Chemical Safe Deposit Co 3417
Exhibit No. 426 — "VII. The Challenged Registrations", portion of report
of the Validation Board 3418
Export permit 34 19
F
Foreign securities 3409
Funes, Mr. (Hunduras consulate) 3410, 3411
Consul general in New York 3410
G
German authorities 3419
German bonds 3407, 3408, 3415, 3418
German office in Poland 3419
German occupation 3408, 3419
German origin 3407
Germany 3414
Great Neck, Long Island 3412
Gross, Alexander 3412, 3413
Gruss, Joseph, 30 Broad Street, New York City 3413
I
II INDEX
H Page
Honduras, Central America 3408, 3409, 3413, 3414
Honduras consulate 3410, 3411
Hruska, Senator Roman L 3407
I
Immigration and Naturalization Office 3409, 3410, 3414
"In transit" status 3409, 3414, 3415
K
Key, Mr 3412
Kemp, Peter 3413
L
Lamb, Lester 3417
Laschtowiczka, Dr 3408, 3409
Member of Board of Directors of Bank Dyskontowy 3408
Deputy Chief of the Polish Banking Supervisory Office 3408
M
Mikulecki, Dr. (head of Bank Dyskontowy) 3409
German trustee of bank 3409
N
New York Stock Exchange 3413, 3414
New York Supreme Court 3408
Passport : P
Diplomatic 3409
Honduran 3414
Polish 3409
Poland 3408, 3409, 3412, 3414, 3415, 3418-3420
Polish 3408, 3419
Polish Banking Supervisory Office 3408
R
Radzinski, Mr 3418
Radzinski, Director 3408
Executive of Bank Dyskontowy in Warsaw 3408
Reichsbank (Berlin) 3407
Reinstein, Mr 3418
Rubenstein, Serge 3413
Rusher, William 3407
Russian occupation 3408
Ruziewicz (Polish name for Stanley T. Stanley) 3413
S
Safe-deposit box 3410, 3411, 3415, 3416, 3420
San Francisco 3409, 3415
Soviet Union 3407
Stanley, Stanley T. (Ruziewicz, Polish name) 3413
T
Tetzner, Erich 3419
Treasury 3414
Treasury, Secretary of 3410
U
United States District Court in New York 3408
United States Government savings bonds 3420
United States Steel works debentures 3408, 3419
United Steel Works 3407, 3408, 3420
INDEX rn
V Page
Validation Board 3408-3412,''3414, 3416, 3418-3420
"Visitor" status 3409, 3414, 3415
W
Warsaw, Poland 3408, 3419
White, Geo. B ' 3417
o
DEPOSITORY
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTEATION OF THE INTERNAL SECUEITY
ACT AND OTHEE INTERNAL SECUEITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUMCIAEY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 14 AND 15. 1957
PART 51
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES <
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ^
»3215 WASHINGTON : 1957 \
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
OCT 9 -1957
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFAUVEK, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
CLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, AAansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
MATTHEW M. NEELY. West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
Robert Morris, Chief Counsel
J. G. Sourwene, Associate Counsel
WiLLUM A. Rusher, Associate Counsel
Benjamin Ma:jdel, Director of Research
II
CONTENTS
Testimony of — Page
Grube, Robert F 3439
Orlov, Alexander 3421
HI
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1957
United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act
AND Other Internal Security Laws,
OF THE Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pm-siiant to notice, at 11:05 a. m., in room
424 Senate OfRce Building, Senator John L. McClellan presiding.
Present: Senator McClellan.
Also present: Robert Morris, Chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, as-
sociate counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; Benjamin
Mandel, research director; and Robert McManus, investigations
analyst.
Senator McClellan. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Counsel, will you make a brief statement of the hearing.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness this morning is a former
official of the Soviet Secret Police, economic adviser to the NKVD,
who is prepared to testify on Soviet espionage relating to the United
States, as well as Soviet manipulation of money, I believe.
Senator McClellan. Has his testimony been taken in executive
session?
Mr. Morris. It has.
Senator McClellan. All right.
Sir, you may stand and be sworn.
Do you solemnly swear that the evidence yow shall give before this
investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Orlov. I do.
Senator McClellan. All right, Mr. Counsel, proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER ORLOV
Mr. Morris. Where were you born, Mr. Orlov?
Mr. Orlov. In Russia.
Mr. Morris. In what year?
Mr. Orlov. 1895.
Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could sketch for us some of your more
important assignments with the Soviet Government?
Mr. Orlov. Well, during the civil war in Russia I was commander
of the guerrilla detachments on the southwestern front, the Twelfth
Red Army, to be exact.
Mr. Morris. You were in charge of operations on the Spanish front?
Mr. Orlov. No ; in Russia, during the civil war.
3421
3422 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Morris. I am sorry.
Mr. Orlov. Then, I was chief of counterintelhgence of the Army.
In 1921, 1 was commander of the frontier troops of the northern region
of Russia, and also of the local troops there, based at Archangel.
In 1921, 1 was sent to the supreme court of the Soviet Union, which
at that time was not called the Soviet Union but just the Federal
Republic.
From 1922 to 1924 I was assistant prosecutor of the supreme court
of the whole country.
In 1924 I was sent to the OGPU, which is the same as the NKVD,
as deputy chief of the economic department, which had to supervise
industry and trade.
Mr. AIoRRis. You were the deputy chief?
Mr. Orlov. Deputy chief of the economic department of the OGPU,
or the NKVD.
Mr. Morris. And that was the Soviet secret police?
Mr. Orlov. You may call it that way. It was the Ministry of the
Interior.
Mr. Morris. As opposed to the military intelligence operations?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
Then, in 1925, I was sent to the Caucasus as commander of the
frontier troops, which guarded the borders of the Soviet Union with
Persia and Turkey.
In 1926 I was named chief of the economic department of the
NKVD for the supervision of foreign trade.
At the beginning of 1936 or the end of 1935, I was named acting
chief of the department of NKVD for railways and sea transport.
In 1936, when civil war started in Spain, I was sent as a Soviet
diplomat to Aladrid and adviser to the Republican Government of
Spain on matters pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, and
guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. I directed the guerrilla warfare
there, and it is a matter of record in the newspapers that we suc-
ceeded in organizing two rebel gi-oups, one in the region of La Roche
and the other, Rio Tinto, among the miners, which was very successful
and which forced General Franco to issue an order to divert two divi-
sions from his active forces at the front, in order to combat the
guerrilla forces.
I arrived in Spain in 1936, the beginning of September, and I left
Spain on July 12, 1938, when I broke with the Soviet Government
and made my way through Canada to the United States.
Mr. Morris. Now, have you since been living in the United States?
Mr. Orlov. Yes. I have been all that time in the United States,
in complete hiding, for 15 years, until 1953, when I published my book,
the Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, and a series of articles in Life
magazine.
Mr. Morris. You had never testified before a congressional com-
mittee or tribunal of the Government of the United States?
Mr. Orlov. I testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee
in executive session, in September.
Mr. Morris. On September 28, 1955?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Other than that, you have not testified any^vhere?
Mr. Orlov. No, I have not.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3423
Mr. Morris. And you are not known in the United States as
Alexander Orlov?
Mr. Orlov. No, not generally. I lived in complete hiding because
I had to dodge assassins which would be sent, or which had been sent
out, I am quite sure, by the Soviet NKVD on orders of Stalin.
When I broke witli the Soviet Government, I had to think about
my mother and the mother of my wife, who remained in Russia, and I
surely was aware that attempts would be made on my life.
So, I wrote a letter to Stalin, with one copy to Yezhov, who was
then the right-hand man of Stalin, warning them that if anything
happened to our mothers or if I were killed, my memoirs would bo
published and the secrets known to me about Stalin's crimes exposed.
To show forcefully enough to Stalin that I meant business, I, in spite
of the protests of my wife, attached to that letter a whole list of
Stalin's crimes, with some of the expressions which he himself had
used in secret conferences with the NKVD chiefs, when he was
forging, fabricating the evidence against the leaders of the revolution
during the Moscow trials.
That probably had a certain effect, and I knew that they would
not kill me outright in the street, but would try to kidnap me to
some remote place and force me to yield all my notes and memoirs,
and things like that.
In 1953 I came to the conclusion that our mothers could no longer
be alive, because so man}' years have passed, and I decided to take
the chance, and I submitted my manuscript, while Stalin was still
alive, to the editors of Life magazine.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Orlov
I might say. Senator McClellan, when we learned in 1955 that
this particular witness knew a man who was at that time operating
under a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation and was working in
the Veterans' Administration in the Bronx, in New York, we knew
that Air. Orlov, through his own experiences in the Soviet organiza-
tion, knew that that man was a Soviet agent, we called Mr. Orlov
to testify on that particular subject.
I wonder if you could tell us now — it was only in executive session,
then, so this testimony has not become known — did you know Mark
Zborowsky, or know of him?
Mr. Orlov. Yes, I did.
If you wish, I may tell you in short the story about that.
Mr. Morris. He is an anthropologist, operating under a grant from
the Russell Sage Foundation, in the Veterans' Administration, and
he is in the Bronx.
Mr. Orlov. Before I left Russia in 1936, I learned that the NKVD
had succeeded in planting a spy in the entourage of Trotsky and his
son, Leon Sedov, and that Stalin himself knew about that agent and
used to read his reports about Trotsky and Trotsky's son. I under-
stood very well what that meant. I understood that Stalin was doing
his best in order to corner Trotsky and assassinate him, and I under-
stood that through this man Stalin might introduce, under the guise
of a guard or secretary, an assassin into Trotsky's household.
When I heard about that, I understood that only a very few chosen
people knew about that agent. And I was afraid to ask for his name
because, after he had been exposed, after he would have been exposed
by me, there would be an investigation as to who had exposed him.
3424 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
So, without asking that name, I left for Spain. I knew that that
agent was working in Paris where Trotsky's son lived and edited
the Bulletin of the Opposition.
Mr. Morris. What was Trotsky's son's name? How was he
known?
Mr. Orlov. He was known as Leon Sedov.
While working in Spain during the civil war, I used to come on
business to France, and there I did my best to find out the identity
of this agent from the chief of the NKVD in Paris, in France
I found out that this agent had become the closest friend of
Trotsky's son, Leon Sedov, and that he was in correspondence with
Trotsky himself.
Again, I did not ask for his name, but I found out that his first
name was Mark,
Mr. Morris. The agent's first name was Mark?
Mr. Orlov. The agent's first name was Mark.
I did not know at that time that his name was Zborowsky. Then
I learned that he used to sign his articles in the Trotsky Bulletin of
the Opposition, under the pen name of Etienne. I found out also
that he was married, about his age, and that he had a baby, a little
child about a year old, and I have also found out that that agent
worked at the Research Institute, which belonged to an old, well-
known Socialist, Boris Nikolayevsky.
So I had something to go on in order to expose that man.
Soon after that, I broke with the Soviet Government and came to
the United States.
Mr. Morris. You say you decided to expose that man?
Mr. Orlov. Yes, I decided to expose that man, and to warn
Trotsky that he might expect an assassin, from that man.
Mr. Morris. In other words, you had already fallen out with the
ideals of the Soviets?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
And as soon as I came to the United States and arranged my
personal affairs, I wrote two letters, one to Trotsky in Mexico, and
the other, a copy to his wife, also in Mexico, warning them about
that agent provocateur who was planted in their midst, and warning
Trotsky to be on guard against that man.
I have a copy of that letter, which I have given in executive session
to the Internal Security Subcommittee. This is the photostat of my
carbon copy, and here is a translation of the letter.
Mr. Morris. That is the one you sent many years ago to Trotsky
himself?
Mr. Orlov. Yes. I sent it on December 27, 1938.
Senator McClellan. Do you wish to have the letter read into the
record at this point?
Mr. Morris. I think it would be helpful. Senator.
Senator McClellan. If you will, just read the letter into the
record.
Mr. Orlov. Because the letter is long, I would ask permission to
give only these quotations from it.
Senator McClellan. Well, the whole letter
Mr. Morris. I suggest, maybe we put the whole letter in the
record, and ask the witness to read the pertinent sections.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3425
Senator McClellan. All right. The letter will be printed in the
record at this point.
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 426." A transla-
tion reads as follows:)
Exhibit No. 426
[Transcribed copy]
December 27, 1938.
Dear Lev Davidovich, I am a Jew who came from Russia. In my youth I
was close to the revolutionary movement (the Bund Party). Later I emigrated
to America where I have been living for many years.
I have close relatives in Russia. Among them there was one by the name of
Lushkov, Henry Samoilovich, a prominent Bolshevik and chief of the Cheka. It
is the same Lushkov, who, being afraid for his life, fled 8 months ago from
Khabarovsk (Russia) to Japan. That story was printed in all newspapers.
From there (Japan) he wrote to me in America, asking me to come to Japan and
help him. I went there and helped him as much as I could. I found for him a
lawyer to make sure that he is not extradited to the Soviets and gave him a little
money.
Why am I writing all this to you? — Because I have learned from Lushkov that
there is within your organization a dangerous agent provocateur. I am no longer
a revolutionary, but I am an honest man. And an honest man has a definite
attitude toward agent provocateurs. Here is what I learned from Lushkov:
All the work against the old Bolsheviks in Russia was concentrated in the
hands of Molchanov, chief of the secret department. He was in charge of the
preparation of the Moscow trial against Zinoviev. Lushkov was Molchanov's
assistant. After the arrest of Yagoda, Lushkov was transferred to Khabarovsk
and appointed chief of the political police and assistant to General Blukher.
Meantime, Molchanov and all other leading police officers, who had served under
Yagoda were executed on Stalin's orders. Lushkov understood that his turn was
near and escaped to Japan.
From my conversation with Lushkov it has become clear to me that he himself
had also taken part in the persecution of revolutionaries and the preparation of
the trial against Zinoviev. Lushkov is now an enemy of Stalin, but he declined
my suggestion that he take action to vindicate the revolutionaries imprisoned in
Russia, because he is afraid that if he did so the Russian Government would
insist on his extradition and might come to terms with Japan on that score.
But I think that that's not the point, and that the real reason for Lushkov's
reluctance lies in the fact that he himself, spurred on by promotions and love of
power, took an active part in the crimes committed against the revolutionaries.
When I returned to the United States I acquainted myself more closely with
the tragedy of the Russian revolutionaries and read the books Not Guilty and
The Case of Leon Trotsky.
Dear L. D., these books arouse indignation at the cruelties which are being
inflicted in Russia on people who gave their whole lives to the revolution. Under
the influence of these books I decided (a little late to my regret) to write to you
about the most important thing which I learned from Lushkov: about one impor-
tant and dangerous agent provocateur, who had been for a long time assistant to
your son, Sedov, in Paris.
Lushkov is categorically against publishing the things which are known to
him and does not intend to make any public revelations himself, but he does
not object to letting you know who the principal agent provocateur or the Stalin
Cheka in your party is.
Lushkov gave me detailed information about this agent provocateur with the
understanding that no one, even you yourself, should know that this informa-
tion came from him. In spite of the fact that Lushkov forgot the last name of
the provocateur, he supplied enough details to enable you to establish without
any error who that man is. This agent provocateur had for a long time assisted
your son L. Sedov in editing your Russian "BuUeting of Opposition," in Paris,
and collaborated with him until the very death of Sedov.
Lushkov is almost sure that the provocateur's name is '"Mark." He was lit-
erally the shadow of L. Sedov ; he informed the Cheka about every step of Sedov,
about his activities and personal correspondence with you which the provocateur
read with the knowledge of L. Sedov. This provocateur wormed himself into
the complete confidence of your son and knew as much about the activities of
93215— 57— pt. 51 2
3426 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
your organization as Sedov himself. Thanks to this provocateur several officers
of the Cheka have received decorations.
This provocateur worked till 1938 at the Archive or Institute of the well-known
Menshevik, Nikolayevsky, in Paris and, may be, still works there. It was this
Mark who stole a part of your archive (documents) from Nikolayevsky's establish-
ment (he did it twice if I am not mistaken). These documents were delivered to
Lushkov in Moscow and he read them.
This agent provocateur is about 32-85 years old. He is a Jew, originates from
the Russian part of Poland, writes well in Russian. Lushkov had seen his photo-
graph. This provocateur wears glasses. He is married and has a baby.
What surprises me more than anything else is the gullibility of your comrades.
This man had no revolutionary past whatsoever. In spite of the fact that he is a
Jew, he was about 4 years ago a member of the Society for Repatriation to Russia
(this is a society of former czarist officers, in Paris). According to Lushkov, this
was well known in Paris even to members of your organization. In that society
he acted already as a Bolshvist agent provocateur. After that the Cheka assigned
him to your organization, where for some reason, he was trusted. This provocateur
represented himself as a former Polish Communist, but it is very unlikely that this
was true.
Lushkov said that after the theft of your archive from Nikolayevsky's Institute,
they were almost sure in Moscow that you would discover who the provocateur
was, because only a few persons worked at the insitute and all of them with the
exception of the provocateur Mark, had some revolutionary past. When I asked
Lushkov whether this provocateur was in any way responsible for the death of
your son L. Sedov, he answered that this was not known to him, but that the
archive was definitely stolen by Mark.
Lushkov expressed apprehension that now the assassination of Trotsky was on
the agenda and that Moscow would try to plant assassins with the help of this agent
provocateur or through agent provocateurs froyn Spain under the guise of Spanish
Trotskyites.
Lushkov said that you knew this provocateur well from letters of L. Sedov,
but that you had never met him personally. Lushkov told me that the provocateur
has regular meetings with officers from the Soviet embassy in Paris and Lushkov
expressed surprise why your comrades have not discovered this, especially after
your documents had been stolen from Nikolayevsky's Institute.
Dear L. D., this is all that I can tell you now. I hope that in the future I will
succeed in learning from him a lot of things, which might be important for the
purpose of exposing the frameups of the Moscow political police and proving that
the executed revolutionaries were innocent.
I ask you not to tell anybody about my letter and, especially, that this letter
came from the United States. The Russian Cheka, no doubt, knows that I made
the trip to Lushkov, and if they learn in some way about this letter they will
understand that Lushkov supplied the information through me. And I have
close relatives in Russia to whom I send food parcels and they might be arrested
as a reprisal for this letter.
Do not tell also that you obtained this information from Lushkov. The best
thing, don't tell anybody about this letter. Ask your trusted comrades in Paris
to find out whether Mark belonged to the Union of Repatriation to the Home-
land, to check on his past and to see whom he meets. There is no doubt, that
before long your comrades will see him meet officers from the Soviet Embassy.
You have all the right in the world to check on members of your organization,
even when you have no information that they are traitors. And besides, you
are not obliged to believe me.
The main thing: be on your guard. Do not trust any person, man or woman,
who may come to you with recommendations from this provocateur.
I am not signing this letter and I am not giving my address, because I am
afraid that the Stalinists might intercept and read this letter at the post office in
Mexico. They might even confiscate the letter.
In order that I may know that you have received this letter I should like you
to publish a notice in the newspaper Socialist Appeal in New York that the
editorial office has received the letter from Stein; please, have the notice appear
in the newspaper for January and February.
To make it safer, I am sending 2 identical letters: one addressed to you and the
other to your wife, N. Sedov. I have learned your address from the book The
Case of L. T.
Respectfully, your friend,
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3427
Senator McClellan. Now you may comment upon certain quotes
from it.
Mr. Orlov. Yes. Here are the quotations, but before quoting
this, I would like to say that, while I was sending that letter, I was
aware that Trotsky's correspondence was being intercepted by
agents of the Russian police at the Mexican Post Office, and I laiew
they would read my letter, and thus find out where I was hiding in
the United States, and that would facilitate my assassination.
So I had to find some way of transmitting the true message to
Trotsky and, at the same time, disguise my identit}^. I was success-
ful in doing that, thanks to one incident that occurred a few months
earlier.
Senator McClellan. Go right ahead.
Mr. Orlov. There was another person abroad who knew about
the identity of that Soviet agent among the Trotskyites. That man
was General Lushkov, who had been, before that. Deputy to Marshal
Blucher. Blucher was in the far eastern maritime provinces of
Russia.
It happened that General Lushkov, who was one of Stalin's right-
hand men in the preparation of the trials against the old Bolsheviks,
became afraid for his own life and fled to Japan some time in Jime
1938.
So I decided to send that message to Trotsky in such a way that
he shoidd think that that information came from General Lushkov,
and I knew pretty well that the Russians would read that letter and
would then thmk that Lushkov, who made revelations in Japan before
newspapermen, was the man who exposed ALark Zborowsky.
So I devised a legend and wrote to Trotsky that I was an old
immigrant, a Russian immigrant in America, that my "nephew,"
General Lushkov, fled to Japan, that I had received a letter from, him
saying he needed help, and was afraid he would be extradited to
Russia. So I went to him and helped him with whatever I could,
and found a la\v\"er for him. This is what I learned from Lushkov,
I wrote in my letter to Trotsky that Lushkov was one of the organ-
izers of the famous trials for Stalin, one of the men who falsified the
testimony in those trials and who became afraid for his life because
Stalin got into a habit of Idlling everybody who knew his secrets and
his crimes.
So, I wrote, I learned from Lushkov about the dangerous agent
provocateur in their midst, who is close to Trotsky's son, and who
might become instrumental in the assassination of Trotsky.
And here are some of the extracts from that letter. I wrote the
letter as a Russian immigrant would write it. I tried that my lan-
guage should not be very good, not in very good Russian:
I decided to write to you that I learned about an important and dangerous
agent provocateur M'ho had been a long time the assistant of your son, Sedov,
in Paris. The name of this provocateur is Mark. He was literally the shadow
of Leon Sedov.
Those are little pieces, quotations from the letter.
This provocateur worked until 1938 for the archives of Nikolayevsky in Paris
and maybe works there now. It was this Mark who stole a part of your archives
from the Nikolayevsky Institute in Paris.
This agent provocateur is about 32 to 35 years old. He is a Jew, originates from
the Russian part of Poland, speaks good Russian. He wears glasses. He is
married and has one child, a baby.
3428 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
This provocateur has no revolutionary past whatsoever. In spite of the fact
that he is a Jew, he was about 4 years ago a member of the Society for the Re-
patriation to Russia. (This is a society of former Czarist officers.) He was already
a Bolshevist provocateur then.
Now the assassination of Trotsky is on the agenda and they will try to plant
assassins through this agent provocateur or through provocateurs from Spain
under the guise of Spanish Trotskyites.
This provocateur meets a Soviet agent from the Soviet Embassy regularly.
The main thing, be on your guard. Don't trust any person, man or woman,
who may come to you with recommendations from this provocateur. Ask your
trusted men to check on this man and find out whom he meets. There is no doubt
that before long they will see him with an officer from the Soviet Embassy.
Being afraid that that letter might be stolen altogether from the
post office, and I would never know whether Trotsky had received
the letter, I asked Trotsky to place an ad in his own newspaper in
New York, which was called Socialist Appeal, and address it to Stein.
This is the name with which I signed the letter, but I wrote in the
letter that that was not my real name.
Soon enough, a month later, I received his frantic ad:
I insist, Mr. Stein, I insist that you go immediately to the editorial offices of
the Socialist Appeal and talk to Comrade Martin.
I went there without disclosing my identity. I took just a side
look at that Martin, and he did not inspire too much confidence in me,
so that w^as all.
Mr. Morris. You say he did not inspire any confidence?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
After that I tried to call up Trotsky by phone. His secretary talked
to me. Trotsky did not want to come to the phone. He was afraid
I was a journalist who just wanted to exploit him, for my own pur-
poses. So that was all about it.
Now, I have been in hiding for 15 years, in complete hiding. In
1953, when I published my life articles, and cam.e out, if not into the
open, at least into sem.ihiding. I met som.e of the Old Russian Socialists
who had lived in exile in Fiance for many years and are now in the
United States. I asked them whether they knew such a m.an, because
I was interested in preventing his treacherous work, which he mioht
have been continuing somewhere else, betraying Socialists, devia-
tionists, and other people.
Within 6 months I have found out — which was a big surprise to
me- — that that man was here in the United States since 1941, that he
became an American citizen, that he enjoyed Government and social
grants, quite substantial ones.
I immediately suspected that he had been sent by the Russians to
America to conduct espionage and to betray people. I learned this
on Christmas night, 1954, and, as soon as the holiday was over, I
went to the assistant United States attorney, B. Atterbury, in New
York, and told him the story. He called in two FBI ro.en, and I
repeated the story before them.
As a result — only then have I learned that his real name here was
Zborowsky, because, if you may have noticed, I have never asked what
his last name was — this Zborowsky was called before the Internal
Security Subcommittee where he confirmed everything, in the minutest
detail, of what I had said about him.
I gave my information about him — about his activity until 1938 —
because I did not have any way of knowing what he did afterward.
1
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3429
But he confessed that he maintained connections with the Soviet
intelHgence service, through the Soviet Embassy here, until 1945.
I got then a suspicion that he decided to hmit his activities by 1945,
because then he would have enjoyed here the statute of limitation.
But I don't know, probabl}^ the investigative agencies of the Govern-
ment are talking or have been talking to him, and I think that he might
have told them much more than we have heard about him here in his
testimony in the Internal Security Subcommittee.
Mr. Morris. Senator McClellan, when Mr. Zborowsk}^ testified
here on February 29, 1956, he acknowledged that, when the FBI
first went to him after this disclosure by Mr. Orlov, he had first denied
that he had been working for the secret police, but then afterward,
in subsequent sessions, he did make confessions that he had indeed
been doing these things. Now
Senator McClellan. Where is he now?
Mr. Morris. Senator, we last heard, when he testified at that time,
that he was operating under this grant in the Veterans' Administra-
tion hospitals in New York. He was working among the patients, at
the veterans' hospitals, studying pain and the reaction of pain on the
part of the wounded soldiers, wounded service people.
I could not tell you whether he is still there now or not. We have
not pursued Zborowsky now, the subject of Zborowsky, now for some
time.
Now, is there anything more you would like to know about that
particular man, Senator, that Zaborowsky?
Senator McClellan. I think we would all like to know where he
is and what he is doing now.
Mr. Morris. We will fmd out whether he is still up there now.
Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you would tell us about yom* role in Spain.
You had to handle — you were in charge of the rather substantial gold
transfer from the Spanish Government to Moscow, were you not?
Mr. Orlov. Well, that was just an exceptional operation
Mr. Morris. An exceptional operation.
Mr. Orlov (contmumg). Because my basic work m Spam was
organizing for the Spanish Republican Government the counter-
mtelligenee and intelligence agamst Hitlerite Germany and against
General Franco's forces.
My second task was to organize guerrilla warfare behind the enemy
Imes.
But the gold operation was just a unique operation which had been
entrusted to me by Stalin personally.
Mr. Morris. In other words, you were personall^^ in charge of this
transfer of gold, and you were personall}^ deputized b}^ Stalin to
arrange that; is that right?
Mr. Orlov. That is true.
I wish to say that the secret of the shipment of the Spanish reserves
of gold to Russia had been known to a very few selected persons.
After Prime Minister of Spain Largo Caballero died, after the Presi-
dent of Spain, Azana, died, there remain now in the Western World
only 3 persons who know about that operation of gold, and after the
death of the Prime Minister Negrin, only 3 persons. One is Indalecio
Prieto, one of the biggest statesmen of Republican Spain, the former
Minister of Defense. The second person who knew about the opera-
3430 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
tion was the Chief of the Spanish Treasury, Senor Mendez Aspe, who
later became Finance Minister of Spain, and the third person is me.
Mr. Prieto is a very old man. We don't know how long he will
last. So, actually, 2 persons might still remain as witnesses, 1, this
Aspe, who is somewhere in Mexico, and me, Alexander Orlov, who
is now in the United States.
Until approximately November of last year, there was no proof of
any kind that that gold had been shipped to Russia, because the re-
ceipt which had been issued in Moscow after the gold had been
counted, was in safekeeping of the former Prime Minister Negrin,
who did not want the gold to go to Franco.
As I read in the newspapers. Franco's men succeeded in stealing or
otherwise obtaining, maybe with the consent of Negrin himself, of
that receipt, and that the receipt is now in the hands of the Franco
government. There is some suspicion that Negrin himself, feeling that
his end was approaching, decided that, after all, that huge hoard of
gold belongs to the Spanish people. Regimes come and go. The
Spanish people remain, and the Spanish nation is entitled to the gold
and there were expressed suspicions or conjectures that he, Negrin,
instructed his own son to turn over that receipt to the present Spanish
Government.
The story about the Spanish gold developed as follows
Mr. Morris. Ai-e you going to relate your own role in that particular
operation?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
On the 20th of October, when I was in Madrid, the situation at the
front was desperate. The enemy came to within 20 miles of Madrid.
People were leaving the city, and the opinion of the Government was
that Madrid could not be held and the Government was getting ready
to abandon Madrid.
At that time, 1 day my code clerk came into my office with a code
book under his arm, and with a telegram which he started to decipher.
He deciphered only a few words, after which there was an order that
I should myself decipher the rest of the telegram.
The telegram read:
I transmit to you the personal order of the boss —
Yezhov.
And there followed the telegram of Stalin:
Together with Ambassador Rosenberg, arrange with the head of the Spanish
Government, Caballero, for the shipment of the gold reserves of Spain to the
Soviet Union. Use for that purpose a Soviet steamer. This operation must be
carried out with the utmost secrecy.
If the Spaniards demand from you a receipt, for the cargo, refuse. I repeat,
refuse to sign anything, and say that a formal receipt will be issued in Moscow
by the State Bank.
I hold you personally responsible for this operation. Rosenberg has been
instructed accordingly.
Mr. Morris. Now, this is the secret instruction sent to you by
Yezhov. What was his title at that time?
Mr. Orlov. He was at that time Minister of the Interior, the head
of all the Soviet Intelligence Service, the Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Party and, above all, the righthand man of Staliii.
Mr, Morris. And you were being given instructions from Stalm
that you were to act with respect to the Spanish gold?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3431
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
Senator AIcClellan. Who was Rosenberg?
Mr. Orlov. He was the Soviet Ambassador.
Senator McClellan. In Spain?
Mr. Orlov. In Spain; in Madrid.
I immediately went with that telegram to Soviet Ambassador
Rosenberg and found him deciphering a similar telegram, with his
code clerk waiting m a I'emote corner, waitmg because maybe his
help would be needed. Probably the Ambassador had instructions
also that he should decipher that telegram himself.
The next day, or the day after, I had a conference with our Ambas-
sador Rosenberg and with the Spanish Finance Minister Negrin, who
eventually became Prime Mmister. Negrin asked me how many
men I would need in order to carry out that operation. I told him
that I would carry out the operation with my own men, and I had
m mind our tank soldiers who had recently arrived in Spain.
Mr. Morris. Soviet soldiers?
Mr. Orlov. Yes; Soviet soldiers.
From there we went to the Spanish — from our Embassy we went
to the Spanish Ministry of Finance, where Negi^m, the Fmance
Minister, introduced me to the Chief of the Spanish Treasury, Senor
Mendez Aspe.
Mr. Morris. Now, did Negrin understand what was going on here?
Mr. Orlov. Yes, Negrin understood, and only three men of the
Government knew about the operation. No one else of the Cabinet
knew it. Those were Prime Minister Caballero, Finance Minister
Negrin, and the President of the Republic, Azana.
Mr. Morris. May I break in there, Mr. Orlov?
Knowing from the Soviet outlook, was this gold bemg taken from
the Spanish Government for safekeeping or simply being taken away?
Air. Orlov. It was being sent for safekeeping.
Mr. Morris. Was that the Soviet mtention at that time?
Air. Orlov. Yes, that was the Soviet intention at that time, and I
must say that Ambassador Rosenberg and myself were flabbergasted
when we were told that the Spanish Government was willmg to trust
Stalin with all the savings of the Spanish nation — Stalin, who had been
already known to the world for what he was, a man who did not
actually deserve any confidence at all.
Senator AIcClellan. What was the value of the gold?
Air. Orlov. It is difficult to say. I think about — it was estimated
between $600 million and $700 million. I thmk it was about 600 tons.
I wish to stress that, at that time, the Spanish Government, which
was a coalition government that consisted of leaders of various parties,
was not in full control because there were many parties, many armies,
uncontrollables. Anarchists had their own army. I franldy told
Fmance Almister Negrm that if somebody got wmd of it, if the
anarchists intercepted my men, Russians, with truckloads of Spanish
gold, they would kill my men, and it would be a tremendous political
scandal all over the world, and it might even create an internal
revolution.
So my suggestion was, I asked him whether the Spanish Govern-
ment could issue to me credentials under some fictitious name, naming
me there, representing me there as a representative of the Bank of
England or of the Bank of America, because then, figuring as a repre-
3432 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
sentative of the Bank of England or of America, I would be able to
say tliat the gold was being taken for safekeeping to America, but it
would be dangerous to say that I was taking it to Russia because that
would really create a revolution.
Negrin did not object. He thought it was a fine idea. I spoke
more or less decent English, and I could pass for a foreigner.
So he issued to me credentials in the name of Blackstone, and I
became the representative of the Bank of America.
Mr. Morris. You had the credentials of a man named Blackstone,
of tlie Bank of America?
Mr. Orlov. Yes. Blackstone.
The order was that I should put that gold on a Russian steamer,
but I decided to spread the risk and to load it on as many ships as I
could lay my hands on. I commandeered four Soviet steamers who
were then in Spanish ports.
Senator McClellan. Four what?
Mr. Orlov. Foiu- Soviet steamers who had been there then, in
Spanish ports, after they had unloaded armaments and food. And I
left for Cartagena, the Spanish port where the gold was stored in a
huge cave, hewn out of a mountain.
I asked the Government to give me 60 Spanish sailors to do the
loading of the gold. The Spanish sailors were kept for 3 nights and
3 days in that cave. They understood pretty well what was in those
boxes, because there were huge sacks, plain sacks, filled with silver
coins, and they knew that that was their treasury. But they did not
know where the gold was being taken, maybe to another Spanish city.
For 3 nights the loading of the gold was done during the night,
and transported during the night in complete blackout, to the pier,
where it was loaded on Soviet ships. During the day the Spanish
sailors slept on those sacks of silver.
On the second or third day there was a tremendous bombardment,
and somebody mentioned that, if a bomb hit the neighboring cave
where thousands of pounds of dynamite were stored, we would be
blown up into bits. The health of Mendez Aspe was a very serious
thing. He was a nervous man. He told us we must discontinue load-
ing or we will perish. I told him we could not do it, because the Ger-
mans would continue to bombard the harbor and the ships will be
sunk, that we must go on with it.
So he fled and left just one assistant, a very nice Spanish fellow,
who did the counting of the gold for them.
The first day I saw that our count of the gold coincided, but after
Mendez Aspe fled and that lone officer did the counting, the figures
began to diverge.
When the loading was finished, the Chief of the Treasury, Mendez
Aspe, wished to compare the figures with mine. My figures were
7,900 crates. His figures were 7,800. The error was by 2 truckloads
because each truckload, according to my instruction, contained 50
boxes, to facilitate the count. Each box weighed about 125 pounds.
I was afraid to tell him my real count because if I told him that we
had 100 boxes of gold more than he thought we did and later his count
would prove to be correct, then I would have to be responsible for
100 boxes of gold. So I did not tell him anything, but I telegraphed to
Moscow and told them later about that difference.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE IHSTITED STATES 3433
Before the gold was loaded, I decided to ask the Spanish Govern-
ment for an order to spread Spanish warships along the route, the
Mediterranean, at certain intervals, with instructions to the skippers
of the ships that if they received a special SOS with a special signal,
which would mean that the Soviet steamer had been attacked or was
being abducted, then the ships should hurry immediately to the rescue
of that Soviet steamer.
That order was issued to the skippers of Spanish warships in sealed
envelopes; they did not know anything, they did not know anything
before that. But the instructions were that as soon as an S O S,
with a certain special signal, is intercepted, then the skippers were
supposed to tear the envelopes, to read the instructions, and the
instruction was a Soviet steamer with very valuable cargo is being
attacked; hurry to rescue and engage in battle.
I knew that such an order could not be issued without Prieto, the
Minister of Defense — ^at that time he was the Minister of the Navy —
who did not know anything about the whole plan of the gold operation.
So, I called up the Soviet Ambassador in Madrid, Rosenberg, and
asked him to take it up with Prime Minister Caballero and arrange
that the Navy Minister, Prieto, should issue orders to the Spanish
warships, to the skippers.
In a few days, the Spanish Finance Minister, Negrin, and the
Defense Minister, Prieto, came to Cartagena. The orders were
issued. After that, I was waiting for about 7 or 8 days on tenterhooks,
waiting and wondering whether the ships will pass safely through the
dangerous stretches of the Mediterranean, not far from Italy.
In about 8 days, when I saw that the ships had already passed, I
sent a cable to Yezhov saymg that, accordmg to my count, there were
7,900 crates, according to the Spanish count, 7,800 crates, and I
should like them to check on it.
Well, this is a mystery. When I see now in the newspapers that the
receipt issued by the Soviet State Bank was for 7,800 boxes, not for
7,900, I think that probably Stalm decided that he could use 100
boxes of gold, maybe for some Comintern work or for something else.
Several months after the shipment of the gold, when I was lying in a
surgical clinic of Professor Bergere, in Paris, the Chief of the Soviet
NKVD himself, Sloutsky, came to see me and he told me about the
gold, what a great event it was when it arrived in Moscow, and he
told me on good authority that that gold, according to Stalin, would
never be returned to Spain.
A few months later, there came to see me a close friend of mme who
was in Spain at that time with me, whom I considered liquidated until
now, but it has been established now through the Soviet press that
about a month ago he had been rehabilitated and his books are being
reprinted now in Russia — so I would not name his name, not to
embarrass him. He was a very close friend of Yezhov, a man who
used to report to Stalin personally. He came from Moscow, where
he spent about a month, to Spain and told me about the great event
of the gold when it arrived in Russia, and he asked me why didn't you
tell me about that gold?
But the most mteresting thing he told me was that Stalm said at a
banquet, at which members of the Politburo were present, and at
which the arrival of the gold was celebrated, that — here are Stalin's
words :
93215— 57— pt. 51 3
3434 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
"The Spaniards will never see their gold again, as they don't see
their own ears." This is a Russian proverb.
Now, since then, so many years have passed, the gold is still locked
up in the underground vaults of the Kremlin, and if nothing is done
about it, it probably will never be returned. That gold belongs to
the Spanish nation. Regimes come and go, but the gold belongs to the
people, and the Spanish nation has a right to it, and I think it would
be a good idea if the leaders of the Spanish political parties, irrespec-
tive of their political affiliations and ideas, would combine together
and demand that the gold should be returned or transferred to the
United Nations or to the World Bank, ui safekeepuig for the Spanish
nation.
Mr. Morris. Senator McClellan, I suggest that masmuch as this
is du-ect testimony here today and, therefore, evidence that this $600
million worth of gold actually belongs to the Spanish people, that we
transmit a copy of this testimony, through our Ambassador at the
United Nations, to the United Nations, so that they perhaps may
consider some steps in order to effectuate justice in this matter.
Senator McClellan. This is a public hearing. Of course, the
information will be news, will be in the press. They will get the
information.
I think, possibly to take official action of the committee to carry
out your suggestions, the Chair would not want to order it. The
Acting Chair would not want to order it. I think it is a matter that
addresses itself to the committee as a whole, and I assume that can
be arranged simply by sending around a notice or request and let
the majority of the members sign it.
Mr. Morris. That will be done, Senator.
Senator McClellan". All right.
(Certain newspaper articles bearing on the Spanish gold shipment
were ordered mto the record by Senator Arthm- V. Watkins, presiding,
at a hearing February 20, 1957, and appear below:)
[The New York Times, January 6, 1957]
Soviet Gold Issue Stirs Spain Anew
madrid reports recovery of receipt for reserves sent to moscow to foil
FRANCO
By Benjamin Welles — Special to The New York Times
Madrid, January 5. — A tale of several hundred tons of Spanish gold turned
over to the Soviet Union in 1936 has become headline news here.
A brief, cautiously worded announcement by the Foreign Ministry, December
29 has led to widespread comment in the controlled press and in official and
diplomatic circles.
The Ministry asserted that exhaustive eflforts carried out abroad over the last
year had resulted in the recovery of the official Soviet receipt for the nation's
gold reserves. These were shipped secretly to Moscow in September 1936, at
the start of the Spanish Civil War.
The Ministry paid tribute to the family and friends of the late Dr. Juan Negrin,
Republican Premier during most of the civil war, for the reported recovery of this
important document. The paper gives Spain a legal basis for demanding the
return of her treasure, the statement said.
The announcement is the latest — and perhaps the most important — step in the
Franco government's 20-year effort to recover the gold shipment.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3435
7,800 CRATES OF GOLD
Officials here prefer not to estimate the quantity of gold. One highly placed
source has set it privately at "between 600 and 700 tons." Others, quoting Span-
iards in exile, say that on November 6, 1936, 510 tons of gold bars and gold
pesetas totaling 1,734 million gold pesetas reached Moscovi^ in 7,800 crates.
Unofficiallv the value of such gold today is believed to be considerablv more than
$500 million."
[Present gold reserves in the Bank of Spain have been reported authoritativelv
at $200 million.]
It has been disclosed that the Soviet receipt for the gold shipment was pre-
served in the personal archives of Dr. Negrin, who lived in exile in Paris and
London until his death in the French capital on November 14. During the last
year officials of the Franco government began negotiating secretly with Dr.
Negrin for the return of the receipt. On his death it was handed to Spanish
officials by one of his sons.
The shipment was carried out in extraordinary secrecy when the Republican
government began seriously to fear that the gold might be captured by the rebels
under Gen. Francisco Franco.
DUAL PURPOSE OF MOVE
As pieced together from various accounts by Spanish and Communist sources,
the shipment was ordered by Dr. Negrin, then Minister of Finance, on September
13, 1936. It had a dual purpose: to safeguard the gold from the Franco forces
and to serve as securit}' for Soviet arms shipments to the Republican government.
Under the personal direction of Francisco Mendez Aspe, Director General of
the Treasury, the bars and coins were loaded into trucks. On September 15, a
special train left for Cartagena, on the Mediterranean coast. At Cartagena the
treasure was transferred to three Soviet vessels, which were guarded by Spanish
Navy units. The ships sailed to Odessa, and on arriving there the docks were
guarded by special Soviet security units while officials from Moscow helped load
the gold into a special train.
At this point the trail becomes obscure.
What steps the Spanish Government will now take to recover the gold from
the Soviet Union are not being officially disclosed here. It is pointed out that on
January 7, 1955, the Government warned many countries that Moscow might
seek to make gold payments out of the Spanish national treasure.
It is generally believed Spain will take up the case at the International Court
in The Hague and in the United Nations.
One Son Issues Denial
(Special to the New York Times)
Paris, January 5. — Romulo Negrin, 1 of the 3 sons of the late Dr. Juan Negrin,
denied today that he had handed over the receipt to the Franco regime on his
father's instructions.
Romulo Negrin, who lives in Mexico City and is in Paris on a visit, said he had
no knowledge of such a receipt.
ANOTHER denial ISSUED
A similar denial was made by Miguel Negrin, who said the only 1 of the 3
brothers in Paris when his father died was Romulo. Senor Miguel Negrin,
reached by telephone at his home at Sands Point, Long Island, said that whatever
was to be said on the subject was to be said by Romulo Negrin. It was conceded,
however, that the late Dr. Juan Negrin might have handed over the paper at some
time other than at his deathbed, but Miguel Negrin cautioned that "this would be
speculation."
The third brother, Dr. Juan Negrin, was reported out of town and could not be
reached.
3436 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
[The New York Times, January 10, 1957]
Two Spanish Envoys Arrive in Soviet
TRIP LINKED TO EXILES' RETURN AND TO BIG GOLD RESERVE CLAIMED BY MADRID
By Benjamin Welles — Special to the New York Times
Madrid, January 9. — Two Spanish envoys were reported today to have arrived
in Moscow.
They are Dr. Luis de la Serna, a high official of the Spanish Red Cross, and
Salvador Vallina, a reporter of Arriba, newspaper of the Falange.
Officially it is explained that Dr. De la Serna is visiting the Soviet capital in
connection with the repatriation of Spaniards in exile. About 1,500 have returned
so far, there may be 3,000 more in the Soviet Union. About 300 are due to sail
from Odessa for Spain in a few days.
Observers have noted that the visit coincides with the wide publicity given
in the Spanish press to the Spanish gold reserves. These were shipped to the
Soviet Union by the Spanish Republican Government at the start of the 1936 civil
war.
SOVIET OFFER REPORTED
According to informed sources, the Soviet Government suggested late in 1955
that there be Spanish-Soviet discussions covering the repatriation of Spaniards,
the renewal of diplomatic relations, and, inferentially, the return of the gold.
Talks were accordingly held between Soviet and Spanish diplomats, first in
Paris and later in Hamburg, although no final agreements were reached.
The treasure thought to be in Moscow is estimated at 510 metric tons of gold
(16 million troy ounces). This is worth $560 million at the United States Govern-
ment price of gold, which is $35 a troy ounce.
Details of the shipment of Spanish monetary reserves are given in documents
that have recently come into the possession of the Spanish Government.
DOCUMENTS ARE LISTED
These documents include the following:
A Spanish Repubhcan decree of September 13, 1936, which authorized the late
Juan Negrin, then Finance Minister, to export the monetary treasure "wherever
he considers safest." The decree is signed by Manuel Azana, President of the
Republic, and by Largo Caballero, Premier.
An eight-page document in French in four parts, which tabulates the gold
coin, ingot bars and nugget gold received in Moscow by Gokhran, the state depot
of precious metals in the Finance Commissariat. This document was signed
February 5, 1937, by Marcelino Pascua, Spanish Republican Ambassador to
Moscow, and by G. F. Grinko, People's Commissar for Finance, and N. N.
Krestinski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. It provides in
paragraph 2, section 4, that the Spanish Republican Government may reexport
or otherwise dispose of its deposits freely.
The documents here were obtained after a year's confidential negotiations in
Paris with Senor Negrin, who died there November 14, 1956. He had agreed
before his death to return them to the Spanish state, officials here say.
The documents had been held for many years in safekeeping in the United
States, but not in Paris or London as was originally reported. The death of Senor
Negrin before the transaction was completed caused serious concern in Govern-
ment circles here.
These circles feared that the important papers, which formed the Spanish
nation's legal basis for renewed international efforts to get the treasure back from
Moscow, might be destroyed or might pass otherwise into Soviet possession and so
disappear.
RETRIEVED FROM UNITED STATES
"Through the cooperation of one of Senor Negrin's sons, whom officials choose not
to identify, and of other members of his entourage, including his housekeeper,
the papers were retrieved from the United States and are now in the Madrid
government's hands.
These documents give the Spanish Government what is considers watertight
legal proof that the Soviet Government received the Spanish national gold
reserves. Hitherto, this claim has rested solely on the Spanish Government's
word. With the documentary proof available, IVIadrid is expected to submit its
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3437
claim for the return of this treasure both in the International Court of Justice in
The Hague and in the United Nations and through diplomatic channels.
The documents have been carefully perused. They show among other things
that the total gold shipment, which reached Odessa in 3 Russian vessels,
weighed precisely 510,079,524.3 grams, or about 510 metric tons.
New York Times, International Edition, January 21, 1957]
Foreign ^\ffairs
the hidalgo and the commissar warm the atmosphere between moscow
and madrid
(By C. L. Sulzberger)
Paris, January 20. — The most interesting diplomatic colloquy now being
carried on in Paris is between a Spanish grandee and a Communist professor of
history. The ultimate purpose of their drawn-out talks is to decide whether
formal relationships shall be established between the antipathetic regimes of
Franco Spain and Bolshevik Russia.
Each dialogist serves his Government as Ambassador to France, which has
been chosen as the arena for this curious engagement. Jose Rojas y Moreno,
count of Casa Rojas, representing Madrid, is a well-dressed Valencian gentleman
with pale face, white hair, and cultivated, conservative manner. Sergei Alexan-
drovitch Vinogradov, representing Moscow, is a heavy-set, muscular Russian
with metallic smile and considerable suavity of expression. He was once on the
faculty of Leningrad University.
Casa Rojas and Vinogradov were acutely aware of each other's existence
during World War II when they served simultaneously in Ankara. They did
not speak to each other at the awkward diplomatic receptions staged by neutral
Turkey. But, from a distance, they observed the maneuverings and activities
of their mutually hostile embassies.
When Casa Rojas and Vinogradov found themselves again together in Paris,
they maintained this atmosphere of frigidity. This continued until the autumn
of 1954.
That November President Coty, as is his custom, invited all ambassadors to
the annual bird shoot at Rambouillet where thousands of plump and not very
agile pheasants are driven into the diplomatic guns. Casa Rojas and Vinogradov
were there. And, to the surprise of the hidalgo, the Bolshevik professor was
effusively agreeable. He joked. When a Soviet ambassador jokes it is not
without instruction.
SIGNS OF A THAW
Soon the peculiarly tense situation existing between Madrid and Moscow began
to ease. Russian representatives attended various nongovernmental international
conferences in Spain. Informal conversations began at several neutral points
concerning Madrid's desire to repatriate Spanish emigres from the U. S. S. R.
Approximately 2,000 of these had asked Moscow for permission to go home.
They included prisoners of war from the blue division that fought with Hitler
on the eastern front and grown up children of Loyalists who had been evacuated
to Russia during the civil war.
The U. S. S. R. permitted the departure of 286 veterans. By autumn it also
granted exist permits to more than 1,300 refugees. The first Soviet ship to touch
at a Spanish port since 1938 arrived in Valencia last September. Another is now
en route.
By October, Spaniards were even contemplating the approach of diplomatic
recognition. "The U. S. S. R. refrained from vetoing Spain's entry to the U. N.
Madrid saw this as tantamount to de facto acceptance of the Franco government.
At this point, when Vinogradov began direct conversations with Casa Rojas,
the latter was instructed to raise the subject of Spanish gold. Ten years ago
Juan Negrin, then Finance Minister of the Republican government, arranged to
export the national reserve to Moscow in order to protect it from seizure by Franco .
SEEKS SPANISH GOLD
The treasure, amounting to 510 metric tons, is worth considerably more than
half a billion dollars. But when Franco sought to press its claim, Moscow argued
that he had no legal proof of ownership.
3438 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Last November 14 Negrin, an embittered Emigre, died in Paris. On his death-
bed the old Loyalist leader asked one of his sons to collect from their hiding place
the official receipts for the gold and to present them to Franco. These were
photostated. Seventeen days ago Casa Rojas called on Vinogradov and gave
him copies of these documents. He officially requested that the buUion be re-
turned. If Moscow does not now oblige, Madrid will push its claims in the Hague
World Court.
While Negrin lay dying, however, a new element was intruded into the situa-
tion. The revolt of the largely Catholic Hungarian people — and its brutal re-
pression— made it politically still more difficult for a devoutly religious Spanish
regime to recognize Communist Russia.
Moscow desires to exchange embassies with Madrid for highly pragmatic
reasons. A diplomatic mission in Spain could help coordinate clandestine prop-
aganda and direction of espionage against American military bases. It could
also promote expansion of hitherto indirect commercial relationships. The
Soviets wish access to Spanish mineral wealth.
Madrid certainly covets its treasure. The national finances are in desperate
condition. A half a billion dollars would aid immensely in putting the country on
its feet. The question therefore resolves itself quite simply. Does Spain want
the gold enough to give recognition? Does Russia want recognition enough to
give up gold?
There is no prospect of any swift resolution of this problem. But both coun-
tries involved in the discussion are noted for their qualities of patience and en-
durance. The word "tomorrow" and the words "soon it will be done" have equiv-
alent significance in Spanish and in Russian.
[Washington Post, AprU 6, 1957]
Gold of Spanish War Spent, Soviets Report
London, April 5 (UP). — Radio Moscow reported today that $420 million
worth of Spanish gold smuggled to Russia 20 years ago had been sent "to finance
the (Spanish) Republican cause."
The broadcast also said the Spanish Republicans never did repay $50 million
of $85 million lent them by Russia during their brief period in power.
[Informed sources in Madrid said Spain will continue to press for the return of
gold.]
The gold, taken from the Spanish treasury, was smuggled out of the country
by the Communist-supported Republican government. Spain has been trying
ever since to get it back.
Today's broadcast, quoting what it said was an editorial in the Communist
organ Pravda, said there was no gold left.
"Some foreign newspapers carry articles concerning the deposit of Spanish gold
in the U. S. S. R. 20 years ago, completely ignoring the expenditure incurred by
the Spanish Republican government * * *." it said.
"After the Spanish Republican government had deposited the money in Moscow,
it frequently asked the Soviet Central State Bank to make payments abroad from
it. The payments became so frequent that the money soon was all gone."
Mr. Morris. Is there anything more about that one particular
episode that you would like to know, Senator?
Senator McClellan. No, I don't think so.
Is there anything further that j'OU think of that you w^ould like
Mr. Orlov. No. I have no more suggestions.
Senator McClellan. In connection with that.
x4.ll right; proceed.
Mr. Morris. Did j^ou know, Mr. Orlov, about Stalin personally
undertaking to counterfeit United States currency?
Mr. Orlov. Oh, yes. That was a well-known affair in the circles
of the NKVD chiefs. It is a bizarre affair for a huge country to start
counterfeiting American dollars with the purpose of passing it in the
West.
It is true that at the time when it had been prepared and done, it
was 1929, and Stalin was in need of money for financing the industriali-
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3439
zation of the country. But everyone, and he himself, probably under-
stood that, no matter how good the forgeries, you cannot pass more
than $1 million because it will become known to the banks. The banks
would be warned about the serial numbers, and that would be the end
of it.
But in spite of that, Stalin did it. And how could we explain that?
My explanation is — and I am quite sure I am right — it stems from
the character of Stalin, who was 90 percent a criminal and 10 percent a
politician.
Senator AIcClellan. From whom? '
Mr. Orlo V. From Stalin ; from Stalin himself.
In this respect, I should like to have your permission to quote a
well-known Russian Socialist revolutionary, who spent 6 months with
Stalin in prison in 1908, under the Czar. The name of this man is
Simon Vereshchak. As a matter of fact, Stalin himself confirmed
that he knew Vereshchak, and, in 1927, Pravda published an article
concerning the memoirs of that man. Stalin liked something of what
Vereshchak said about him while they were both in prison, and
that is why a special article was published in Pravda.
• But here is what Vereshchak, that Socialist revolutionary, wrote in
his memoirs:
While the politicals —
that means the political prisoners —
tried not to mix with ordinary criminals and especially warned their younger
members against doing so, Koba- —
this is the revolutionary pseudonym of Stalin —
was always to be seen in the company of the murderers, blackmailers and robbers.
He was always impressed by men who had brought off an affair. He shared a
cell with two forgers of 500-ruble notes, Sakvarelidze, and his brother Niko.
That was written about events when they were both in prison in
1908.
Mr. Morris. Mt. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate at
this time if we excuse this witness from testifying for just a few
minutes. We have a Treasury- representative who has a sample of
some of these counterfeit bills that Mr. Orlov has just referred to,
and I think if he will testify for the record, Senator, we would know
in a concrete form what was involved in this particular testimony.
Senator jNIcClellan. All right.
Will the witness come around here?
Do 3'ou solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this
Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Grube. I do.
Senator McClellan. Counsel, you may interrogate.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT F. GRUBE, UNITED STATES SECRET
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Mr. Morris. Will vou give your name and address to the reporter?
Mr. Grube. Robert F. Grube.
Mr. Morris. And for whom do you work?
Mr. Grube. United States Secret Service.
3440 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Morris. Now, I might say, Mr. Grube, that there are no
photographers here, so you will have no problem about photographs
being taken of existing Government obligations.
Have 3"ou brought samples of certain counterfeit mone}^ here with
you today?
Mr. Grube. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Will you offer Ihem to the chairman?
Mr. Grube. Mr. Chairman, those are counterfeit $100 Federal
Reserve notes of the old issue, and thev oi'iginally appeared in the
United States, in Texas in 1928, and $100,000 worth of those notes
were involved in an operation in Chicago, and also we had information
relative to the circulatio]i of those notes more extensively in foreign
countries.
Mr. McClellak. How many millions of dollars were circulated?
Mr. Grube. That would be hard to say, because we did not have
the complete information from all the foreign countries. As far as
the United States was concerned, we only had the 1 case involving the
$100,000 in Chicago but, in addition to that, we received many, what
we called floaters, in other words, brought in from foreign sources in
small amounts either by tourists or people who brought them in
intentionally.
Senator McClellan. What is the total amount that has been
recovered?
Mr. Grube. The total amount by this country was the $100,000,
plus those passed in Chicago.
Now, the amount involved in Chicago, the $100,000, they were only
able to place $25,000 of that money in circulation. We recovered the
$75,000 before they had an opportunity to put them in.
Senator ]McClellan. Before curulation?
Mr. Grube. Yes, sir.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Counsel, do you want these made an
exhibit to the testimony?
Mr. Morris. I thiik not. Just let the records show we can't
reduplicate them.
Senator McClellan. Take the numbers that you present here.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I respectfully call attention to the fact that the
important thing about these is the difference in serial numbers and
Reserve banks, and other indicia on the notes. It is not just a smgle
note as a run-of-the-mme counterfeiter might make. This is a mass-
production operation, with many changes in the plates.
Mr. Grube. That is right.
Each one of these notes has different characteristics, as far as their
identifying features. Either a different Federal Reserve bank, a
different check letter, a different face plate number, or a different back
plate number, and normally, on a counterfeiting operation, we will
get one note which will represent the entire lot turned out by that
counterfeiter.
In other words, they will stick to the same Federal Reserve bank, the
same check letter, the same face plate number and back plate number,
but in this particular instance here are two, what we consider, varia-
tions from the same plant.
Mr. Morris. From a technical point of view, they are good duplica-
tions of our existing operation, are they not?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3441
Mr. Grube. These are extremely deceptive. They are perhaps
the most deceptive counterfeit samples of the old issue that have ever
been brought to our attention of the $100 issue.
Mr. Morris. Were you able to trace these to any Soviet source?
Mr. Grube. No, sir, we were not.
Mr. Morris. There was one man arrested, was there not?
Mr. Grube. Right.
Mr, Morris. What was his name?
Mr. Grube. Dr. Valentine Burtan.
Mr. Morris. I have no more questions of this witness.
Senator McClellan. All right. Thank you very much.
Now you may resume.
TESTIMONY^OF ALEXANDER ORLOV— Resumed
Mr. Morris. Mr. Orlov, tell us what you know about this particular
operation.
Mr. Orlov. I learned about this operation of counterfeiting $100
bills in 1930, and I have learned that that operation had been directed
by Stalin personally and was supervised by 2 men. The name of
one of them is Boki.
Mr. Morris. Who was Mr. Boki?
Mr. Orlov. Mr. Boki was an old Bolshevik, the chief of the special
department of the NKVD, a man who became famous in the party
because he was the secretary who transcribed the so-called April deci-
sion taken by Lenin and his associates in April 1917, to start, to pre-
pare for the revolution which occurred later, in October.
The other man was Berzin, the head of the Soviet Military Intel-
ligence Service.
I also learned that, in preparing for the passing of the money on
orders of Stalin, a bank, a German bank, had been acquired, bought,
in order to facilitate the distribution of the money.
Mr. Morris. You mean, the Soviets even bought a German bank?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
The Soviets bought a German bank, or a financial house in Berlin,
which was called Martini, and another word, Sacks or Sass. Maybe
Mr. Mandel will correct me.
Mr. Morris. Will you spell that?
Mr. Mandel. S-a-a-s — M-a-r-t-i-n-i.
Mr. Orlov. That bank had been acquu'ed by some Canadian
people, also under Communist direction, and finally was resold to a
German Communist by^thepame of Paul Roth.
Mr. Morris. Paul Roth?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. He was also a Communist?
Mr. Orlov. He was also a Communist, and the main distributor
of that money. The man who became the chief customer of the
bank was a man by the name of Franz Fischer.
Mr. Morris. I offer you some photographs. WiU you tell us if
that is the man you refer to?
Mr. Orlov. I have never seen Fischer, so I cannot recognize it.
Mr. Morris. Can you identify those, the picture of Franz Fischer,
or can Mr. McManus do that?
93215— 57— pt 51 i
3442 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. McManus, I wonder if you could identify those photographs
which I just offered to Mr. Orlov, of Franz Fischer.
Senator McClellan. Is he a witness or a member of the staff?
Mr. Morris. Mr. McManus is a member of the staff.
Senator McClellan. He can make the statement.
Mr. Orlov. Will you permit me to add that that money was well
fabricated, because it was made in the Russian Engraving and Printing
Offices, in the Government Offices which make Russian money, and
which have the greatest experts in the world, who were able to produce
the so-called Czarist, you know, bills, which were the most compli-
cated in all the world! So that it is no wonder that that money is
undistinguishable from American $100 bills.
But it was a bizarre, foolish operation, because, after all, nobody,
could distribute more than $1 million.
Mr. Morris. How much was involved here, do you know?
Mr. Orlov. The plan was for $10 million first. That is all I know.
Senator McClellan. How much did they actually — how much
were they actuallv able to place in circulation?
Mr. Orlov. I don't know. But one thing I know: In 1931 I met
in Berlin a man. I became curious to see this man, and it might also
be interesting for you to know that this operation was tied up with the
common underworld, with criminals.
When I was in Berlin, in 1931, I was told that a noted criminal, a
common criminal, arrived from Slianghai, China, that he had been
arrested there and extricated himself in spite of the fact that $100 bifis
had been found in his possession. He probably bribed the pofice.
So I wanted to see that man, to learn more about it.
I met him. I don't remember the name of that man. And he
told me how a number of his men were arrested and how he saved
himself, and that he got 50-50 from that operation, from all the
mone}'.
I was just curious to see a real common criminal for the first time
in my life.
Mr. Morris. Mr. McManus, wifi you tell us where 3-ou obtained
those photographs?
Mr. McManus. These are photographs that were made available
to me by the Secret Service, from the files on Valentine Burtan.
There were a number of pictm-es.
Mr. Morris. In other words, these photographs were taken from
the files concernmg the testimony regardmg these $100 bills which
have been identified, and there is in that file a picture of Franz Fischer?
Mr. McManus. These are from the file containmg pictures which
bore on their face the name of Franz Fischer.
Mr. Morris. This witness has testified that from his knowledge,
Franz Fischer was the Communist agent that was taking part m this
operation. I mention that by way of identifymg those two things.
Mr. Mandel has prepared some contemporaneous news cHppings,
which do tell us some more about this particular counterfeiting
operation.
Mr. Mandel. In the New York Times of February 24, 1933, on
page 1, is an article I would like to place in the record, which is headed
as fallows: ''Flood of fake bills is traced to Russia; agents investigate
report Dr. Burtan, held as one of ring, was a Soviet agent."
And secondly
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3443
Senator McClellan. That article may be printed in the record.
(The newspaper article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No.
427" and reads as follows:)
Exhibit No. 427
[The New York Times, New York, February 24, 1933]
Flood of Fake Bills Is Tkaced to Russia
agents investigate report dr. burtan, held as one of ring, was a soviet
agent he loses removal fight commissioner advises he be sent to
chicago for trial in $100,000 conspiracy
The origin of $100,000 in counterfeit $100 notes, many of which were success-
fully passed last month in Chicago, has been traced by Federal agents to Soviet
Russia, it was disclosed yesterday at the Federal Building.
The notes, which have turned up as far away as China, have been pronounced
by experts of the Treasury Department to be the most genuine-appearing counter-
feits ever uncovered. They are said to have been made 6 years ago.
The Government, it was disclosed, is investigating a report that Dr. V. Gregory
Burtan, New York physician, who was arrested on January 4 as the American
principal in the alleged international counterfeiting plot, is, or was, an agent of the
Soviet Government.
It is believed that foreign governments have been notified of the facts of the
conspiracy as they have been revealed in New York and Chicago, and that an
international effort is being made to learn the identity of those higher in the
scheme than Burtan is alleged to be.
REMOVAL TO CHICAGO URGED
While the inquiry was being carried on with secrecy on orders from Washington,
Francis A. O'Neill, United States Commissioner, handed down an opinion recom-
mending the removal of Dr. Burtan to Chicago, where he and "Count" Enrique
Dechow von Buelow, German aviator, have been indicted on a charge of possessing
and passing the notes.
Alvin McK. Sylvester, assistant United States attorney,, immediately arranged
to present the opinion to Federal Judge Alfred C. Coxe, who, it is expected, will
sign a removal order today and order Dr. Burtan, formerly an assistant physician
of the staff of Polvclinic Hospital, to surrender. Dr. Burtan is free in bail of
$15,000.
Von Buelow, who is said to have made a full confession of the part he played in
attempting to dispose of the counterfeits, is in Chicago awaiting trial.
Dr. Burtan has insisted ever since his arrest that he was connected in no way
with any counterfeiting plot. During the removal proceedings Frank H. Smiley,
a private detective of Chicago, testified that Von Buelow had introduced him to
Burtan. Smiley and two of his friends arranged to dispose of $100,000 in counter-
feit notes in the innocent belief, he said, that they were genuine bills which boot-
leggers sought to dispose of because they feared income tax investigation if they
themselves attempted to pass them.
BANK TELLERS DECEIVED
Louis Mead Treadwell, assistant United States attorney, said that Smiley
took some of the notes to banks in Chicago, suspecting that they might be counter-
feits, but tellers in five banks said they were genuine, and the detective accepted
Von Buelow's story as true.
Smiley told Commissioner O'Neill that the actual passers had been promised
30 percent of all profits in the scheme. Twenty percent was to be divided among
himself, Burtan, Von Buelow and two of Smiley's associates, while 50 percent
was to go to the "bootleggers."
In his opinion. Commissioner O'Neill wrote:
"The only question involving doubt in this case is one as to whether the de-
fendant knew that these bills were counterfeit. It has been established that they
were counterfeit and that the defendant offered to sell them."
Dr. Burtan, a heart specialist, is represented by Benjamin Hartstein. When
he was first arraigned on the counterfeiting charge he said that he would prove
that he had been innocently involved in the case through professional services to a
patient.
3444 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Mandel. From the New York Times of May 16, 1934, page 15:
Guilty in counterfeiting, New York man convicted in alleged $2 million ring.
This, again, deals with Dr. Valentine Burtan.
Senator McClellan. All right. That one may also be printed in
the record.
(The newspaper article above referred to was marked "Exhibit
No. 428" and reads as follows:)
Exhibit No. 428
[The New York Times, May 6, 1934]
Guilty in Counterfeiting
new york man convicted in alleged $2 million ring
Chicago, May 5 (AP). — Authorities claimed partial disintegration of a $2
million international counterfeiting ring with the conviction last night of Dr.
Valentine C. Burtan of New York.
The defendant, accused with others with disposing of some $100,000 in spurious
currency, was convicted by a jury which deliberated only 2 hours.
Prosecutors Hall and Sullivan asserted after the trial that the ring had for
several years been under the personal investigation of W. H. Moran, Chief of the
Secret Service. They said Mr. Moran rated the bills as the best ever circulated
in the United States.
Dr. Burtan, they asserted, was a prominent New York Communist, but that
since his arrest in this case he had been expelled from the Communist Party.
They said the ring had been formed chiefly to flood the United States and
several South American countries with spurious money, in an attempt to discredit
this Government.
Senator McClellan. Proceed.
Mr. Morris. Senator, this particular episode, together with the
details about the Spanish gold episode, should be related generally
in our record with the inquiry that this Internal Security Subcom-
mittee is now undertaking with respect to the theft by the Soviet
forces in Berlin of $350 million worth of German bonds.
In 1945 the Soviet occupation forces took from German bank vaults
an amount of bonds worth approximately $350 million. Those bonds,
we believe, are now appearing for validation here in the United
States. The German-American Validation Board recently rejected a
claim of validation for a particidar man applying for $245,000 worth
of these bonds, and they rejected this application because they
concluded that his particular $245,000 worth of bonds were, in fact,
in German vaidts when the Soviet occupation forces arrived in Berlin,
and I would like this related, in the record, with that particular Soviet
operation.
Senator McClellan. All right.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Orlov, in your experiences in Spain
Senator, may I offer these pictures of Franz Fischer for the record?
Senator McClellan. All right. They may be admitted in the
record.
(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 429" and
is reproduced below:)
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3445
Exhibit 429
AMei?!QUE (Etats-Unis d )
FISCHER, frmi.
3446 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Morris. When you were in Spain, Luigi Longo, an Italian
Communist, worked generally under you, did he not?
Mr. Orlov. No. Luigi Longo w^as an Italian who was one of the
chiefs of the Garibaldi Brigade which fought in Spain during the civil
war, between 1936 and 1939.
Now, Luigi Longo is the deputy of the Italian party boss, Palmiro
Togliatti. He is the secret director of the military forces of the party,
which consist of the former members of the Garibaldi Brigade that
fought in Spain, and I am quite confident that they have caches of
arms hidden all over Italy. That means the leftovers from the World
War, in case Moscow gives orders to stage a revolution there.
Palmiro Togliatti was also in Spain at that time with me, and he
had been a good friend of mine at that time. He directed the Spanish
Communist Party and the Spanish Communist military forces in
behalf of Moscow.
Mr. Morris. Now, could you tell us what you know about the
present Italian Communist Party? You mentioned Mr. Togliatti.
He is an Italian Communist, is he not?
Mr. Orlov. He is an Italian Communist.
As is well known, the Italian party is the biggest and strongest
party in the West after the Soviet Communist Party. They have 2
million members in the Communist Party in Italy, which is a tre-
mendous percentage, if you take into account that the whole
population of Italy is 48 million.
The power of the Communist Party in Italy has been underesti-
mated. They actually dominate the biggest trade union there, which
controls more than half of the Italian workers.
Now, if you consider all that, and the fact that at the head of the
Italian Communist Party stands the most able man in the Communist
movement — that means Palmiro Togliatti, who had tremendous ex-
perience in militar}^ conspiracies in the civil war in Spain — you rnight
realize how serious the danger is, that if Moscow orders an uprising
in Italy, it might easily succeed.
I should like also to mention that in Trieste, the port of Trieste,
which is in the northern part of Italy, very near to Yugoslavia, there
is a man by the name of Vidale who heads the Communist Party of
Trieste.
Mr. Morris. Do you know Vidale?
Mr. Orlov. Yes. I Imew him in Spain. He was one of the chiefs
of the genera] staff of the International Brigade. He passed also under
another name, Contreras.
Vidale was not accidentally placed at that strategic position in
Trieste, because, in my understanding, if Moscow orders an uprising
in Italy, Moscow will need badly the help of Marshal Tito of Yugo-
slavia, who holds in his hands the gates to northern Italy, and in that
case, if Marshal Tito woidd be amenable to Soviet conspiratorial de-
signs against Ital}^, he would bs able to let through volunteers and
surreptitiously supply the Italian rebels with arms. And I think that
was the chief reason why Russia last year has been wooing Tito to a
tremendous extent.
If you allow me. Senator, to elaborate for 5 minutes on that subject,
I will give you some data.
Senator McClellan. I will be glad to.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3447
In the course of your elaboration, 1 would like for you to comment
on what advantage you think we are getting by giving military aid to
Tito, under these cu-cumstances.
Mr. Orlov. I would like to refresh some pertinent facts.
In 1948 there was a break between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia.
The reason was that at that time Tito, who had become a Yugo-
slavian hero, the only head of a satellite state who really liberated his
own country without the help of the Red army, but with his own
partisans, demanded from Stalin at least a limited measure of inde-
pendence for Yugoslavia.
Stalin did not like that, and he wrote a letter to Tito, which was also
signed by Molotov, w^arning him against insubordination and con-
taining inambiguous threats or unequivocal threat. The letter read
as follows:
Dear Comrade: We warn you, Trotsky's —
this is verbatim —
case should be instructive to you.
By that time Trotsky was already 8 years dead, assassinated,
liquidated by Stalin in Mexico.
In spite of that, Tito did not acquiesce to Stalin's demand and was
expelled from the Cominform as a traitor. Tito did not have any-
thing else to do but to turn for help to the West. He turned for help
to the United States, which gave him help which amounted to $1
billion — $500 million in economic assistance, industrial, food, and
things like that; and more than $500 million in military tanks, fighter
jets, and things like that.
That made Tito a double traitor in the eyes of Russia.
Now, in 1950, Tito signed the so-called Balkan Pact, together with
Turkey and Greece, in defense against the Soviet Union. It should
be appreciated that Turkey had been a traditional enemy of Russia
for hundreds of years. That made Tito a triple traitor in the eyes
not onl}^ of the Russian Government but of the Russian people.
After Stalin's death, relations, dij^lomatic relations, have been
restored between Russia and Yugoslavia, and that was enough to take
care of the relations between both countries. But since 1955 the world
has seen something very unusual, an unusual wooing of Tito by the
Kremlin.
In 1955 no less important a person than Khi'ushchev and Bulganin
themselves went to Belgrade and officially apoligized for the break
that had occurred in 1948. In 1956, in June, the beginning of June,
Tito was invited to Russia. He had been accepted almost as a na-
tional hero. He had been feted as no other foreign visitor had ever
been.
Before he came to Moscow, the Cominform was disbanded in
deference to Tito, because the Cominform had expelled Tito from its
ranks in 1948.
A day before Tito arrived in Moscow, Molotov was fired as Foreign
Minister, also in deference to Tito, because Molotov's signature was
on the threatening letter that Stalin sent to Tito in 1948. And, as if
Molotov had not been humiliated enough, he was made to go to the
railway station and bow to Tito.
I will not enumerate all the honors which were bestowed on Tito
there. I asked myself at that time what was the reason. A traitor
3448 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
to Russia in the eyes of the Russians, a triple traitor, why had he been
wooed to such an extent, and I wish to say that that wooing went so
far that it was'done'^with undisguised obsequiousness.
In his report to the 20th party congress, Khrushchev had this to
say about Tito, and about Stahn. First of all, he blamed Stalin for
the break with Tito, and then he said:
Stalin boasted —
declared Khrushchev fit the 20th congress of the party—
I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito. He will fall.
But that did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how little Stalin
shook not only his little finger but everything else that he could shake, Tito did
not fall.
This was humiliating not only to Stalin; this was humiliating to
the Russian state and to the Russian people itself.
Then, looking for an answer, for the reasons why Tito had been
wooed to such an extent, I came to the following conclusion: that the
answer to that strange wooing could be found, first, in the strategic
position which Yugoslavia occupies on the map of Europe, and,
secondly, that it was dictated by a change in Soviet strategy which
was caused by the emergence of, or the appearance of the H-bomb.
Before the H-bomb had been invented and before the appearance of
nuclear weapons had changed the military thmking in both opposing
camps, Russia was madly increasing its war potential, in the hope
that some day they will grab the Western World by direct assault.
But the threat of a nuclear war made this plan too dangerous, and
Khrushchev and the other leaders of the Soviet Union decided that
the retaliatory power of the United States is too strong to attempt
plans of open warfare against the West, and that it is time to change
their open warfare plans to sm-reptitious schemes of spreading the
power of the Kremlin over the globe by subversion and staging
revolutions from the inside.
Then, it is well known, and I think it has been already noted by other
analj^sts, that the target countries where the Russians entertain their
plans and ideas of staging an inside revolution are two countries,
Italy and France, because there the Communists are the strongest.
But for the success of staging a revolution in Italy, where everything
actually has been set and prepared, as I mentioned before, the Kremlin
needed the help of Tito because Tito is located at the very gates,
Yugoslavia is located at the very gates of Italy.
Was Tito amenable or receptive to Russian plans and conspiratorial
designs on Italy? Studying the speeches which had been made in
Moscow, at the Moscow Stadium, before some 70,000 members of the
Soviet elite, speeches made by Tito and by Khrushchev, and studying
also the announcement they made to the press, and even such a trifle
as the slogan, "Forever Together," which was spelled out by the
multicolored formation of the athletes at the stadium, and then the
speech by Marshal Zhukov, who said "from now on we and our Yugo-
slavian comrades, our armies, will march shoulder to shoulder to-
gether," showed me that Tito was quite receptive to such a plan.
What could be actually Tito's interest in such a plan? Well, as we
know, every dictator who has entrenched himself in power, begins to
dream about territorial aggrandizement. We also know that Tito
had been coveting the port of Trieste for a long time, and he knows
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3449
very well that his good friend, Palmiro Togliatti, who, at the age of 63,
can hardly wait to become the Italian dictator, would hardlv begrudge
him a cit}^ a port, or a little Italian territory.
There were also other instances which showed to me that a deal
was being consummated between Moscow and Tito in this respect:
Tito, who, for years, had been excluded from the Communist world,
has been allowed by Russia to interfere in the affairs of the satellite
people. He demanded that Rakosi, the party boss of Hungary, be
dismissed. Khrushchev and Bulganin defended Rakosi as the best
man, but the Kremlin had to bow to the demand of Tito.
Now, Tito protested against Chervenkov, the head of Bulgaria,
and again the Kremlin had to bow to the demands of Tito that
Chervenkov be dismissed, and another man by the name of Yugov
was appointed head of Bulgaria.
Then we remember, also from the press, another case that, after
the dismissal of Rakosi as head of Hungary, the Kremlin suggested
that another man by the name of Erno Gero, a Hungarian Communist,
be put at the head of Hungary instead of Rakosi. I knew him ver;y
well in Spain. He had been there as assistant of Palmiro Togliatti.
Tito at a conference with Khrushchev in the Crimea protested
against Gero, but Khrushchev succeeded, after long hours or days of
persuasion, to obtain Tito's consent to the appointment of Gero.
Now, another sign that Tito was consummating a deal with the
Kremlin and that the Kremlin, in order to woo him and to win him
over to their plan, had to make concessions to him, can be seen from
the fact that, if you remember, during last summer, on the order of
the Kremlin, all the heads, party heads of all the satellite states, made
actually a pilgrimage to Belgrade, where they had to bow to Tito.
In other words, the ambitions of Tito were not only territorial but
also to play the first fiddle in the party movement of all Communist
parties of all satellite states.
That is not a new ambition. That ambition was known to us from
the press. In 1948, in Pravda, was published an announcement
about the proposed so-called Federation of the Balkan States. At
that time the big Communist leader, George Dmitrov, entertained
ambitions of combining all the satellite states into a Balkan federation
and to head it. It was actualh^ discussed in the press, the Cominform
press and Pravda, and later Stalin decided that Dmitrov might
become too powerful, and he actually overruled this idea.
But now Tito, remembering the old ambitions of Dmitrov, and
seemg that he can put conditions to the Kremlin because he was so
needed to the Kremlin for the Italian affair, for the staging of sub-
versive revolutionary uprising in Italy, he put in the biggest demand
he could.
Now, as we know, the Hungarian revolution occurred approximately
at this time, and the Hungarian revolution, which produced a lot of
very interested consequences, has actually set back those plans, the
Italian plans of the Russians, for a time at least.
Mr. Morris. May I break in there, Mr. Orlov?
In other words, it is your testimony here that, based on your
knowledge of the principals involved, this Luigi Longo, Togliatti,
Gero, the Hungarian, Vidale, the Communist who is
Mr. Orlov. Leader in Trieste.
3450 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. MoRKis. On the basis of all of your knowledge of these people,
and your knowledge of Communist strategy, you believe that the
Soviets are planning some kind of a coup, using military forces, the
military forces involved in the Communist Party in Italy, and for
that reason thej^ are trying to court Tito.
And one of the things 3"ou believe they are offering Tito, by way of
inducing him to go along with that conquest, is the cit}" of Trieste, the
now internationalized city of Trieste?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. That is what it comes down to; right?
Mr. Orlov. This is my conjecture, and I wish to note that not only
the Hungarian revolution has upset the Soviet plans but, if you re-
member, approximately in September of last year, Tito, who had been
given by the Kremlin every sign that they want him to be a man of
great influence in the Balkans, suddenly discovered that the Kremlin
was double crossing him, that the Kremlin had sent out a secret circu-
lar letter to all the Communist satellite states not to take Tito too
seriously, saying that:
The Yugoslavian Party is not a true Marxist party in the real sense of the word,
and the Italian Party is tinted with social-democratic tendencies.
When he learned about that, he protested, and then you remember
how the Soviet Party boss, Khrushchev, made a dash by airplane to
Belgrade and then to the island, Brioni, Tito's retreat, where they were
wrangling and haggling for a couple of weeks, and then they flew to-
gether to Yalta, where they had conferences with the rest of the Soviet
leaders, who tried to allay Tito's suspicions, but the result, as I see,
was a failure, because now jou see a new rift between Tito and the
Kremlin.
My idea is that, having recovered from the Hungarian debacle, the
Russians might try to reactivate their Italian plan, because, if the
Kremlin succeeded in seizing Italy, then they would flank France,
which has also a tremendous, a very strong Communist Party, which
polled, if I am not mistaken, about 20 percent of the votes in France,
and that would be the end of Europe as we know it.
The Communist leaders very often quote Lenin, not believing either
in Lenin or anybody else, believing only in their own method of
spreading their power over the globe by the means which they see fit.
But they remember one precept of Lenin, who taught the Communist
Party that a revolutionary, so-called revolutionary situation ripens
very rarely, and to miss a revolutionary situation is tantamount to
death, or something like that, to complete failure.
So, seeing now that the Communist Party of Italy is losing followers
as a result of Hungarian events and of the ferment in all the Commu-
nist parties, the Kremlin might decide that, if they wait too long, they
may lose that golden opportunity forever, and that is why I would
not be surprised if Moscow would maybe — I don't know when, this
year or next year — revert to their plan, and if that happens, we
shall witness another vigorous attempt to woo Tito back into the
Communist fold, to share the spoils.
Mr. Morris. Senator, we have gone over with Mr. Orlov other
testimony, particularly as to how espionage abroad, that is, abroad
from the Soviet Union, is financed. We have gone into that. I know
there are time limitations here, but that is a whole subject in itself.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3451
So I suggest, if your time commitments are otherwise, that this might
be a good time for a break.
Senator McClellax. What are your plans for the afternoon?
This is off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator McGlellan. The committee will stand in recess until
tomorrow morning at 10:30.
Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 12 :35 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene
at 10:30 a. m., Friday, February 15, 1957.)
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1957
United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act
AND Other Internal Security Laws
of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:35 a. m., in room
424 Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan presiding.
Present : Senator McClellan.
Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate
counsel; William A. Rusher, associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel,
research director.
Senator McClellan. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Counsel, you may resume the hearing from which we adjourned
yesterday.
Proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER ORLOV— Resumed
Mr. Morris. Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you could tell us precisely
what your assignment was with the NKVD?
^ Mr. Orlov. I occupied a number of important posts in the system,
NKVD. I do not think I should enumerate all of them, but 1 may
mention that I was commander of the frontier troops of the NKVD ;
Deputy Chief of the Economic Department of the NKVD; Chief of
the Economic Department for the Supervision of the Soviet Foreign
Trade; and my last job was that of Soviet diplomat and adviser of
the Soviet Government to the Republican Government of Spain on
matters pertaining to intelligence, counterintelligence, and guerrilla
warfare behind enemv lines during the civil war in Spain from 1936
to 1938.
I also served as a member of the little council in the NKVD, of 6
people who were chosen to evaluate secret documents obtained by
NKVD rings from abroad, in order to advise the Soviet Foreign
Office on foreign operations and the intentions of foreign governments,
and to evaluate the documents also for the Politburo of the party.
Mr. Morris. You say you were 1 of a group of 6 people who were
evaluating foreign documents from abroad?
Mr. Orlov. Foreign documents, with the view of giving their
opinion about the intention of foreign governments, concerning the
Soviet Union.
And Stalin would also get it after that.
3453
3454 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
I was also the author of a textbook on mtelhgence and counter-
mtelhgence, which was accepted by the NKVD. It was called Tac-
tics and Strateg}^ of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. This work
was written by me at the beginning of 1936, was accepted by the
NKVD, and became the handbook for the NKVD schools preparing
Soviet intelligence officers for service abroad.
Mr. Morris. That was called Tactics and Strategy — of what?
Mr. Orlov. Of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
I also directed for a number of years, but this was a sideline, the
faculty, you might say, on intelligence and counterintelligence in the
Central Military School of the NKVD in Moscow, which was also
preparing not only commanding officers for troops but also officers
for the intelligence services. And I used to lecture there, but that
was just a sideline.
Mr. Morris. I see.
I wonder if you would tell us, Mr. Orlov, how Soviet intelligence
and counterintelligence is organized from the very top.
By the way, is your textbook still in use, to your knowledge, in the
Soviet Union?
Mr. Orlov. I do not know, but I am almost sure, because it created
quite a stir.
A number of people were assigned to wi'ite a book, and my book
was chosen for the purpose, and because, actually, it collected all the
cases, the most important cases, of counterintelligence and intelli-
gence work in NKVD, ^vith a view of warning operative officers
against mistakes which were committed by others and which brought
them to peril abroad, to arrest, and on the wa^^s, actually, of obtain-
ing documents, of engaging spies, of using them, of covering up if
they fell through — all those little things which are a must for every
intelligence officer.
And because that book actually accumulated all the operative ex-
perience of the NKVD, I do not think it could be changed in any way.
Mr. Morris. I wonder if you would tell us how Soviet intelligence
operates, with respect to the various foreign countries.
Mr. Orlov. I would mention first the lines or targets of Soviet
intelligence abroad.
Soviet intelligence is a manifold tiling. I must say that intelligence
and counterintelligence work in Russia has been turned into a science
and almost an art. And through the jeuTs the work of Soviet in-
telligence services have crystallized in a number of directions.
The first direction, the first target of the Soviet intelligence service,
is the so-called diplomatic intelligence. That means to find out for
the Politburo the intentions of the capitalist governments a.gainst
each other, and the main thing is to find out the intentions of the
capitalist governments against the Soviet Union. That has been
done through the years successfull}^.
And Stalin would receive, have on his desk, at least once a week, a
full report on the information obtained by the NKVD in this direction.
And verj^ often Stalin would get copies of the diplomatic notes which
the foreign offices of capitalist countries were preparing for him, long
before those notes were actually received by the Soviet Foreign Office.
The second line of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence is
military intelligence. The name itself explains what it is: to obtain
complete data on the military strength of the western and eastern
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UlSriTED STATES 3455
countries, and on militarj' inventions such as new armament, new
submarines, new bombs, and things hke that.
Then, the third hue of Soviet intelUgence occupied itself with so-
caUed industrial intelligence. Although intelligence service, as such,
has been known for hundreds of years, this was something new, which
was created by the Soviet intelligence services.
The purpose of that industrial intelligence was to obtain the secret
processes of western industries, mainly of American industries, of new
inventions. And for that purpose, the Soviet intelligence service
recruited a number of engineers, scientists, inventors, over the woi-ld,
and especially in America.
And if you remember, for instance, the engineer Gold, who pla^^ed
such a big role in the atomic thing, he used to supply the Soviet intel-
ligence service with matters of inventions in private industry.
But when the war came, all those engineers, like Gold, the most
talented of them were mobilized, as we know, for the war effort, and
thus the}" found themselves in the most secret departments of Ameri-
can defense, or British defense, and were able to supply Soviet Russia
with all the military inventions wliich were developed during the war.
The fourth line of Soviet intelligence is the so-called economic
intelligence. This economic intelligence has nothing to do with the
so-called industrial intelligence, and actually is a defensive operation
on the part of the Soviets. It is directed to defend the Soviet foreign
trade.
As you know, all the trade which Soviet Russia conducts with the
foreign world is monopolized, and the Soviet Government was inter-
ested to know whether that trade was being conducted by American
companies, or by western companies, on a level.
It has been found out, for instance, in 1931, that industrial trusts
of various countries in the West who traded with Russia used to
overcharge Russia up to 75 percent. And I must here confess that
it was I who, in 1930, discovered the existence of a so-called gentle-
men's agreement, or bloc, among the electric companies of the world,
and to my desk came documents stolen from, for instance, General
Electric in America. I remember a document signed by Vice President
Minor, a letter addressed to the German A. E. G. Co., also something
like General Electric, to Director Bleiman, and to Switzerland, to
another director of the Brown Boveri Co., an electric firm, with a
list of prices that ought to be charged the Soviet Union, ostensibly
because the Soviet Union's credit was no good.
And the prices were from 60 percent to 75 percent higher than the
normal prices at which other companies of the world were able to
buy the same electric motors, and things like that.
This cartel, or gentlemen's agreement, has been broken up by the
Soviet Government.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Orlov, I wonder if you could tell us how
intelligence in the United States operated
Mr. Orlov. If you would permit me just to finish these points?
Mr. Morris. I am sorry; yes; excuse me.
Mr. Orlov. The fifth line of intelligence work is the so-called mis-
information. The Soviet Government is not only interested in obtain-
ing the best information it can from abroad, secret information about
the activities of the foreign governments, but also to misinform, to
mislead foreign governments.
3456 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
For that purpose, there was a special department which forged
diplomatic documents which were sold and peddled around the world,
with the view, for instance, of arousing suspicion in Italy against
Germany, in Ital}" against France, or something like that. And that
was very successful at times.
The sixth line of Soviet intelligence was a very peculiar one, which
I would define as paving the way for the Soviet Foreign Office in
ticldish international manipulations. First of all, for instance, the
Soviet intelligence helped the Foreign Office and helped the central
committee of the party to pave the way for the recognition of the
Soviet Union by various countries.
Senator McClellan. For what?
Mr. Orlov. For obtaining recognition of the Soviet Union, diplo-
matic recognition, by various countries.
And I know of some people who used to go to the United States to
see whether the recognition of the Soviet Union could not be expedited.
I am speaking of operators of the NKVD.
That means the Soviet Foreign Office was interested in influencing
the policies of foreign governments by pitting one part of a govern-
ment, for instance in France, against the other. For that purpose,
members of the government had been bribed, bought. With influence
attained by other means, they would also keep the intrigues within
foreign governments alive.
For instance, I had an assignment, it was when I was in Spain, to
get in touch with former Foreign Minister of Rumania Titulesku,
who was out of power at that time and lived in Menton, on the border
of France and Italy, to see whether he would not help the Soviet
Union to unseat the Prime Minister of Rumania, Alaniu, and surely
the Soviet Union was ready to finance such manipulation.
I know of another case when, on personal instructions of Stalin,
the NKVD tried to bribe one of the most important members of
Mussolini's Cabinet, who was the Minister of Corporations. Well,
I do not know whether he is alive and I would not like to mention his
name right here. That was in the early thirties, and it had been
arranged through an NKVD representative in Italy that that Cabinet
Minister should come to Berlin to accept his bribe.
He came to the then head of the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin,
by the name of — excuse me, I ^vill recall the name, I forgot it —
and when the member of the Italian Cabinet came to the head of the
Soviet trade delegation, they had a talk, and the head of the trade
delegation had an envelope for him. There was $15,000 — yes; the
name is Lubimov.
Mr. Morris. He was the Soviet head of the trade delegation in
Berlin?
Mr. Orlov. In Berlin, in Germany.
Later that man, Lubimov, became the Soviet Commissar for Light
Industry in Russia.
Mr. Morris. So he gave this member of Mussolini's Cabinet
$15,000?
Mr. Orlov. Yes; $15,000.
And the aftermath of that story: When he saw that he had only
$15,000 in that envelope, he decided it was better to go and teU the
story to Mussolini. So he came and talked to Mussolini, and Musso-
lini protested about it, you know, in an unofficial conversation with
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3457
the Soviet Ambassador, and Stalin's directive was: Too little money,
you ought next time to try $50,000.
Mr. Morris. Now, could 3'ou tell us why he was being bribed?
Mr. Orlov. The idea was that that important member of the
Cabinet of Mussolini had a following, and there was a hope that if
the Soviet Union could obtain the services of that man and conduct
an intrigue within the Government, ma^^be they might succeed finally
in unseating Mussolini.
Mr. Morris. Just a minute, now, and see if I understand that.
You sa}^ the bribe of $15,000 was offered to a member of Mussolini's
Cabinet
Mr. Orlov. Cabinet, yes.
Mr. Morris (continuing). For the purpose of just getting his gen-
eral sympathies, because he had a followmg?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
He had a following, and with a view that in future developments
he might help, under Russian influence, to conduct political intrigues
within the Alussolini Government itself.
Mr. Morris. And when did this take place?
Mr. Orlov. This took place in 1932.
Mr. Morris. What was the name of the Cabinet member involved?
Mr. Orlov. He was the Minister of Corporations.
Mr. Morris. Of corporations?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
I forgot to add that he made a trip back to Berlin and returned the
$15,000.
Mr. Morris. Why did he return the $15,000?
Mr. Orlov. Because he had shown already to Mussolini, proved
his devotion to Mussolini by that, and Mussolini instructed him to go
back and return that money.
And that was the case when Stalin said: Too little, vou ought to
have given $50,000.
Senator McClellan. I thought it was Mussolini who said it was
too little.
Mr. Orlov. No, not Mussolini.
Senator McClellan. Maybe I misunderstood.
Mr. Orlov. Stalin said: 'Tt is too little, you ought to have given
$50,000."
And after that, he came to Berlin and returned the $15,000.
Now, the seventh line of the NKVD work was engaged in influencing
the decisions of a foreign government, not only in obtaining informa-
tion but influencing decisions through powerful agents placed in high
places in foreign councils.
You may remember even from the American experience that during
the past decade you had in the very high councils people who were
willing to help Russia in the Chinese direction, not only with informa-
tion but were influencing the policy of the American Government in
connection with Germany, and other countries.
Senator McClellan. Can you give us the names of anyone who
has not heretofore been exposed, who was engaged in that operation?
Mr. Orlov. Well, I do not know whether I should give the name
of the man.
Senator McClellan. Will you give them in executive session?
Mr. Olov. I might give them in executive session.
3458 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator McClellan. I suggest, Mr. Counsel, that at the proper
time we have an executive session and interrogate the witness on
that line.
Mr. Morris. We will do that as soon as possible.
Mr. Orlov. The eighth line of the NKVD work is guerrilla opera-
tions. The purpose of guerrilla operations, it is self-understood, is
sabotaging war installations, arsenals, warships, and things like that.
The NKVD has a number of schools which prepare very skillful
sabotage agents.
Wlien I was in Spain, I had there about six schools
Senator McClellax. Had what?
Mr. Orlov. Six. I organized six schools for saboteurs, which were
used for sabotaging enemy installations, behind enemy lines.
They were mostly recruited of Spaniards and of members of the
international brigades, mostly Commiuiists. Among them were a
number of Americans, Englishmen. I remember at one opening of
the school in Barcelona for about 600 students, during the inter-
mission I spotted a group of about 30 or 40 persons speaking English.
So I approached them, and we talked in English, they were mem-
ners of the international brigades, of the British International
Brigade
Senator McClellan. Do you know of any Americans attending
those schools?
Mr. Orlov. I do not know the Americans, but I have seen and
talked to those people, and they did a good job behind enemy lines.
Senator McClellan. Do you know where any of them are, now?
Mr. Orlov. I do not know where they are, now, but they are prob-
ably in the United States.
And what I want to say is that that guerrilla line of NKVD opera-
tions was developed during the second World War into a tremendous
business. At the head of that business stood a man by the name of
Etingon. His other name was Kotov. Defector Khokhlov, about
whom you read in the newspaper, and who I think testified somewhere
here, wi'ote that during his times in the Soviet Union, my former
assistant, Kotov — he called him General Kotov — from Spain directed
all those operations.
The guerrilla operations were so vast during the Second World War
that saboteurs were counted by the tens of thousands, and I would not
be surprised if Russia has here now on the territory of the United
States a few hundred saboteurs who will get active as soon as war
danger arises, or when the cold war becomes hot.
Senator McClellan. In that connection, could you give any advice
or counsel that would enable either the Congress, this committee, or
the FBI, or any other agency of the Government, to identify them and
take other proper action?
Mr. Orlov. My advice in that respect would be, first, to guard the
most sensitive and important installations. When I am speaking of
the most sensitive, those are the atomic, hydrogen, and nuclear
weapons, missiles, and things like that.
Because knowing well how guerrilla operations are conducted
by the Russians and their methods, I would not be surprised if a few
days before the war started, a pseudo-American battalion — that means
a battalion dressed in American uniforms, with English-speaking
officers — would march by a certain place, for instance, where atomic
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3459
bombs are stored, and if that place is guarded by an American platoon
or by an American company, and so on, nobodj^ would even suspect
that the approaching group of American soldiers stepping by is
an enemy outfit. And then, those would be 90 percent Russians
dressed in American uniforms, with 10 percent of American guerrilla
fighters who served in Spain, who can conduct themselves as officers,
and that suicide brigade would make an attack.
Similar attacks could be made anywhere else, where very important
things like, for instance, guided missiles are stored.
Mr. Morris. Air. Orlov, I wonder if I may break in there.
While you had these positions in the NKVD and while you were
running the sabotage schools, how did intelligence operate in the
United States, and how many rings were there in existence at the time
of your separation from that service?
Air. Orlov. I can judge by certain facts. In 1938, a country like
the United States, like France, like Britain, had one director resident.
That means a chief representative of the NKVD, with six assistants,
Russian assistants
Mr. Morris. Is this the situation that existed in the United States
when you broke away in 1938?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
And this is the picture which existed here: There was here a chief
director resident of the NKVD, by the name of Gusev, a man who had
been in the former years my assistant. Then Gusev had six assist-
ants. Each assistant had three American assistants, from the Com-
munist Party usually, who were the contact men with the spies in the
United States.
Each of the Russian assistants took care of at least three rings.
So you multiply 3 rings by 6 assistants, and that makes 18 rings,
18 spy rings.
Since then the picture has become even more ominous, because
since then, as jo\: know, a war followed when America and Russia
were allies, and Russia had the greatest ease of planting spies here, of
bringing their people here.
Not only that. Since the war, Russia has acquired a number of
countries which are called satellites: Those satellites have now
embassies and consulates in this country. Consulates and embassies
have always been covers for vSoviet espionage, and it stands to reason,
there is no doubt in my mind that the NKVD has in every embassy of
that kind also their own rings.
Then there is the United Nations, which did not exist before the
war, and it has been established that there were Soviet spies in the
United Nations.
Even if the number of rings which the NKVD possesses now in the
United States is not larger than it had been in 1938, then still, there
ought to be 18 rings. Two rings, as we know, two spy rings, have
been exposed, one a military ring from the Red army, by Whittaker
Chambers. The other ring was exposed by Elizabeth Bentle}^, whc
came and reported to the American authorities.
Now, nobody else from other rings came and volunteered informa-
tion. It stands to reason that at least 16 rings are at large and have
the free run of this country.
Mr. AIorris. Air. Orlov, these rings, to your knowledge, were
directed by Soviet intelligence operatives; were they not?
3460 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Orlov. Yes; they were directed by Soviet intelligence opera-
tors, and they comprise only the NKVD rings. I am not speaking
about the rings which are directed by the Fourth Department of the
Soviet Army.
Mr. Morris. That is the military inteUigence ring. That is
something separate; is it not?
Mr. Orlov. Something separate.
And I have read that a former Soviet defector by the name of Ege
gave an estimate of the number of those military rings in the United
States as approximately 20.
Mr. Morris. And Ege testified, Senator, before this committee,
and he said, to his knowledge, that the Soviet militar}" intelligence
had 20 rings in operation.
Senator McClellan. Who was that?
Mr. Morris. His name is Ege.
But the rings you are talking about were NKVD rings?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
Mr. Morris. These are rings that are directed by Soviet officials;
right?
Mr. Orlov. By Soviet officials.
Mr. Morris. But do 3'ou know below, when j^ou get into the work-
ing range, for the most part, who are the people who do the work?
Mr, Orlov. The people who do the work were Americans, or any
other foreigners who lived here, and at least from 40 to 60 percent of
them were usuall}* American Communists.
Mr. Morris. And the rest of them?
Mr. Orlov. The rest of them are non-Communists, working either
for money or for some other reasons.
And I should like to add, these rings w^iich I define here, although
they conduct themselves illegally and commit espionage, they are
called in Russia a legal network. Why is it called legal? Because it
is conducted from legal coverups from Soviet embassies, which are
legal, and directed by officers who have legal passports.
But besides those rings there is another set of NKVD rings in the
United States, which are called underground rings. They are called
so because the Soviet leaders of those rings do not serve in the embassy
or in the United Nations, but live under false passports as foreign
businessmen or as American citizens and conduct their espionage.
They have private lines of communication with Moscow, they never
use the diplomatic pouch. They are forbidden even to approach the
Soviet embassy.
Senator McClellan. They usually try to become American citi-
zens, do they not?
Mr. Orlov. Yes. They come with false passports
Senator McClellan. I know, but they usually try to seek American
citizenry?
Mr. Orlov. They tr}^ to become American citizens. If they are
not satisfied with their forged American passports, then they try to
obtain somebody's natm'alization papers and to get naturalized in the
usual way as American citizens.
Mr. Morris. I think the Senator was asking, was he not, that
generalh^ they draw an American citizen to do their work?
Senator McClellan. No. I had in mind that the leaders of those
rings ostensibly try to become American citizens, to further cover
up their identity and their purpose.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3461
Mr. Orlov. Yes, this is their main purpose. Because every one
of them is afraid of an outright forged passport, becuase if he is
arrested, then everything comes out. They would hke to adopt an
American identity on the basis of true documents, and some of them
succeed in immigrating here, obtaining immigration with somebodj^'s
help from Europe, and gradually become American citizens.
For instance, that man Zborowsky, whom I mentioned yesterday,
he was sent here by the NKVD under his own name in 1941, and in
1947 he was already an American citizen.
Mr. Morris. Now, how can we know, Mr. Orlov — In order to learn
the identity of these rings it is necessary, is it not, for us to get a defec-
tion from some one of the Soviet NKVD persons in the United States?
Isn't that the way we are going to solve the thing?
Mr. Orlov. There are many ways of solving that problem. And
I must say that Soviet intelligence services are the most skillful in the
world.
In this connection, I will ask permission to read a little quotation
here, because I would never be able to put it, to formulate it, better
than this man has formulated it. I do not know the name of this
man, but I have found this in the newspaper. International News
Service report, from Chicago, saying:
Dan T. Moore, of Cleveland, former counterintelligence officer in the Middle
East, says that never in history has spy warfare been so important as it is now, or
such vital secrets to lose or such important secrets to steal.
He added:
"Of all nations on earth during the last 200 years, the most skillful in spy
warfare are the Russians. The secrets we lose this year may cause us to lose a
war 2 years from now.
"No nation now would think of declaring war unless it is established, through
a spy system, that it is going to win."
I think no one could put better the state of affahs and the impor-
tance of espionage in our times as this man did. I do not know who
he is, but whoever he is, that man could contribute much to the
struggle against foreign espionage in behalf of America.
Now, I would like to mention the last, the ninth, line of NKVD
work. That is infiltration of security agencies of the United States
and of other countries.
They have done, I think, a good job on that. And here I jotted
down just three lines, a quotation from Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.
He said :
I believe the Communists are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated
practically every security agency of the Government.
I took it from a New York Times, September 30, 1953.
Now, concerning the ways and how to combat espionage. There
are many ways. The Russians are very skillful in espionage, but
they are not invincible, they are not supermen. If that science of
intelligence were raised in the western countries to a proper level,
why, Soviet spies or any other spies could be checkmated.
One of the ways of obtaming information about the spies, the most
direct way, is obtaining defectors.
Senator McClellan. Obtaining what?
Mr. Orlov. Soviet defectors.
3462 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
For instance, had a Soviet intelligence officer who conducted the
work here decided to defect, he could have exploded the whole network
in the same way, for instance, as the American, Elizabeth Bentley, did.
Senator McClellan. All right.
In view of your experience and background, what is the prospect of
getting those men to defect?
Mr. Orlov. That is a very good question, Senator.
I think nothing has been done in that direction until now. I know,
because I was one of them, and I know what every Soviet intelligence
officer feels. "
When they started their work, they honestly served their country —
they were good patriots. But through decades of assassination of
innocent people, of liquidations by Stalin of every NKVD officer who
knew his criminal secrets, through all those decades there has been
created an atmosphere, a psychological atmosphere, among the
NKVD chiefs and the intelligence officers of the Soviet Union, that
each of them, at one time or another, usually during periodical purges,
would be happy to quit and to start his life anew.
They say, for instance, that the life of pilots, aviators, is very short;
but the life span of NKVD officers is the shortest of all. In my
memory, there was the chief of the NKVD, Yagoda, his assistants,
chiefs of all the departments — I was one of them — and they were all
liquidated.
Then came a new prophet appointed by Stalin, Yezhov, who was
Stalin's right-hand man. Yezhov recruited new men from the central
committee, taught men, mobilized and created a new apparatus of
the NKVD, who started their work. Finally, it was unavoidable
that those people that worked closely with Stalin learned about his
crimes. Wishing to remain in history as the most pure, honest man
in the world, Stalin could not let them live either, because some of
them might have survived him and written their memoirs. So he
liquidated them.
Then came, finally, Beria, a man whom I knew very well because
we worked together when we were both young men. As a matter of
fact, in the Caucasus in 1926 I was his senior. Beria was a man
who seemed to be the best man and most guaranteed man from any
execution, because he was a Georgian, hke Stalin himself, and very
close to him. And finally we have seen that Beria, the new m.an
whom he brought in the NKVD, had been also executed, together
with all of them.
After that — -
Mr. Morris. The point is, Mr. Orlov, you say the life span of all
of them is very short and they do not last long?
Mr. Orlov. They do not last long.
Senator McClellan. Let me ask you:
It seems to me that normal human intelligence would at some time
perceive that anyone who went into that field of work, accepted such
responsibilities, in view of the past experience and the things that
have happened, would know that ultimately he would come to the
same fate.
Now, how is it that they are able to recruit them and get them to
assume such responsibilities?
Mr. Orlov. You see, the difference is, in the United States you
have to recruit a man, to invite him. Here the President calls up a
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3463
man whom he knows to be able and says, "I want to give you a very
miportant job," and he can say, "Well, I am devoted to my family,
to my business, and I cannot take it."
In Russia
Senator McClellan. Over there they are drafted^
Mr. Orlov. Yes; over there they are drafted.
Senator McClellan. Virtually drafted?
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
Senator McClellan. They dare not refuse. In other words, by
accepting it, they may prolong their life, although they may finally
come to the same fate; is that correct?
Mr. Orlov. That is absolutely correct.
Senator McClellan. In other words, you have probably 10 years
if you do what they tell you, but if you don't it is over now?
Mr. Orlov. That is it.
Senator McClellan. All right.
Mr. Orlov. Now, I remember the tune when I defected. When
all the chiefs of the NKVD had been executed, I saw my assistants
around me — Kotov, who was also liquidated with Beria — I saw how
they were shaking in their boots. But they did not defect
Senator McClellan. Did you tell them you were going to defect?
Mr. Orlov. No; I did not.
Senator McClellan. You said they were shaking in theu- boots.
I do not understand. I am not criticizing; I am just trying to un-
derstand.
Mr. Orlov. Yes, they were shaking in their boots, because we had
conversations with one another, and if they did not spell out so-and-
so much, you could alwa^'^s feel and know they were afraid to go to
Russia.
For instance, I received word to go back to Russia. I received, for
instance, an order to send my assistant to Russia, an assistant who was
decorated by Stalin personally, and who had carried out great feats.
He was invited to Russia to report to Stalin on the Spanish war. And
then
Senator McClellan. You never knew, when you got such an
invitation, whether it was for liquidation or for getting information?
Mr. Orlov. No; we understood that it was for liquidation.
Senator McClellan. Oh, you did?
Mr. Orlov. Because only 1 month passed, and we did not receive
a single letter from him.
Then my other assistants would converge and say that something
must have happened, and things like that. ''He was an honest
fellow — What do you think?" and things like that. And they were
gloomy, aU of them.
And when I received a telegram instructing me to go to Belgium
and to board a ship, ostensibly for a secret conference where a top
member of the party would be waiting for me, two of my assistants
talked to me privatel}^ One of them said, "I do not like that tele-
gram."
When I asked him, "'V\'Tiat do you think; what conference could there
be?" about this or that matter. He did not answer me, and looked
away. He was afraid to talk, but at the same time wanted me to
feel that — and he said, "Why didn't he come here to Spain to talk
to you?"
3464 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
You see, everyone felt danger, everyone actually was trembling.
Now, under such circumstances, every one of them would have
defected. Some of them did not, because their families were in
Russia. Some of them were afraid because, working abroad, they
used to pilfer secret documents from every ministry in the world, and
they were afraid that, after all, when they defect, they would be ar-
rested and made responsible for espionage work which they conducted
for the Soviet Union.
And the third point was, Stalin issued orders to assassinate defec-
tors abroad. I can name some of the men who were assassinated
durmg that time. One of them was Ignace Reiss. He was cornered
and assassinated in Switzerland in 1937. You remember another
man by the name of Krivitzky died mysteriously here in Washington.
Another man by the name of Agabekov had been cornered 8 years
after his defection and killed in Belgium.
In the beginning of 1938, one was killed in Rotterdam, an under-
ground agent.
Senator McClellan. Have there been any killed here in the United
States?
Mr. Orlov. I think that Krivitzky was, and another man by the
name of Markin, who was found killed here, too.
Now, another outstanding underground chief, a Soviet Party mem-
ber and a Soviet national, was Idlled under the following circumstances
in Rotterdam, Holland. He was called for an appointment to a cer-
tain cafeteria to meetfa^Soviet intelligence man from Moscow. He
came there. They sipped their coffee, had their talk, and then that
man from Moscow gave him a package which ostensibly contained 3
or 4 books. He walked out first from the cafe, the cafeteria, and
the underground Soviet agent remained at his table for about 15
minutes.
In 15 minutes he walked out, and when he was in the doorway the
bomb exploded. It was in the package, and he was killed.
Those things created a double terror, and no one laiew whether he
would survive if he defected.
Now, I was in hiding for 15 years, and it was really a miracle that I
survived. As a matter of fact, I met one of the Russian terrorists in
Cleveland. I mean, I have seen him; I did not talk to him. He was
trailing me. But probably they would not kill me outright, because
in my letter to Stalin I wrote that if I were killed, my lawyer Avould
publish all the documents. And they would have to trap me, get me
into some trap, and make me yield the documents first, before they
would kill me. 49|
Mr. Morris. Senator, one of the problems that the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee has been having thi'oughout the years has
been the acquisition of a defector along the lines that Mr. Orlov is
talking about, ^^
Now, in Canada there was the Gouzenko defector, and he really
exposed much of the espionage that went on there. Rastvorov
defected in Japan, and has been able to tell the country a great deal;
Mr. Petrov in Australia; and Mr. Ege in Turkey.
Now, we have never had such a thing in the United States, any
NKVD official defecting, and we continue to explore, Senator, whether
or not there is any kind of legislation that we might enact, something
we might do to give inducements to the people that Mr, Orlov teUs
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3465
US about from his own experience, who he beheves would actually like
to come to our side if there was some kind of an inducement or some-
thing to put aside their fear
Mr. Orlov. May I say something about that?
Air. Morris (continuing). And it is a grave problem, Senator, as
far as we are concerned.
Senator McClellan. Do you feel, though, there are those over
here engaged in spj-ing for Cominunists that would be glad to defect,
if they felt their life would be
Mr. Orlov. I am quite sure, because they know that although
there is some kind of, what you call a thaw, in Moscow, some kind
of liberalization, the time will come when the sacrifice will have to
be laid on the altar.
Senator AIcClellan. In other words, the thaw is only for a season?
Mr. Orlov. Temporary.
Senator McClellan. For a season only?
Mr. Orlov. Yes, for a season onl}^.
Then I must say that the success of the Soviet intelligence services
is, to a certain extent, explained not only by their brilliant training,
not only by the tremendous help which was given to them by the
Communist Party here in the United States, but also by the com-
placency of the Western governments, which do not combat Soviet
intelligence as it ought to have been done.
Let me give you an example
Senator McClellan. All right. Let me ask you a question:
What is your recommendation, what do you suggest now? As you
say, we do not combat it as we should, and we are interested, of course,
in getting any defections we can from these people. What would be
your recommendation, how to go about it, how can we induce them,
and what action can this Government take?
Mr. Orlov. My recommendation would be that if an important
representative of this Government, let's say the Attorney General
or a Senator, would make a declaration at a press conference or other-
w^ise, saying that those who quit Soviet conspiracies, those who want
to quit their espionage work, those who want to part, to break with
their past and go over to the free world, they will be helped to get an
immigration visa in this country, with permanent residence in this
country, and they will be offered immunity against their own respon-
sibility for the things they have done in this country.
Because, as you know, espionage laws have been corrected in a way
which excludes the statute of limitations for espionage. So a man
who has been here, for instance, 10 years ago and was sent here again
because he knows the English language and he knows the country,
he is afraid that he might be put in the dock and be responsible and
be sentenced to some 20 years in prison.
Now, why should he take such a chance? If he would be promised
complete immunity against whatever he did in this country, if a
certain promise would be given to him that he would be helped to
establish himself — offering any money to a man of that kind would
not be good because people who come to a decision, when they have
to break with their country, with their families, with their past which
they cherished for many years, their participation in the civil war,
in the party, and in the revolution, they will not be moved by money.
They would feel insulted. They do not want to feel that they are
3466 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
regarded as traitors, and they do not want to be traitors in their
own eyes.
Senator McClell-mv. Let me ask you another question:
It occurs to me that these agents that they assign over here from
Russia, espionage agents and so forth, they select them with some
care, do they not, with respect to their family back home, so that
they can always hold that as a threat over them?
Mr. Orlov. Yes; it is usually done so.
But you know, life takes its toil, and if you send a man and leave
his family there, he knows he is not trusted any more — he cannot
work.
They would be told in Moscow: "Well, you have children; we
want your children to get a Soviet education; let them stay in the
schools here," and so on.
But then in 1 year he writes he cannot work here, he wants to go
back, and his work slackens — and it is not the same thing. You
cannot send a man to risk his life and at the same time show him
that he is not trusted.
So finally, within 1 year, they sent him his wife and then they sent
him his children.
So, some of them who still have their families in Russia won't
exchange the safety and lives of the members of their family for a
doubtful future in the United States. They just continue, they
return to the NKVD in Moscow and just take a chance that some
time, somehow, not everyone is killed, not everyone is lic{uidated.
Mr. AloRRis. Mr. Orlov, did you know Vasili Zubelin? He was
the third secretary, and then second secretary to the Embassy here
during the war. Now, he has recently figured in the espionage case
in New York, Senator.
Now, can we talk about that particular individual? Did you know
him as an NKVD man?
Mr. Orlov. I know about whom you are talking. I knew him
under a different name. In Moscow he was, he lived under his real
name, Zarubin, Vasili Zarubin. He was one of the outstanding
operatives of the NKVD. I knew also his wife, Lisa Gozsky.
Mr. Morris. She was an intelligence operator in her own right,
was she not?
Mr. Orlov. She was an intelligence officer in her own right, and
she worked in my department.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about him and her, and what, gen-
erally, their assignments were and what their connections were with
intelligence in the United States, if they had any connection at that
time?
Mr. Orlov. I know that the most important work which he did
was before the war in Germany. That was a dangerous thing, to
work against Germany with an undergi'ound false passport.
His wife also lived in the underground there.
I do not know what he did in America. What I know is just
what I read here in the newspapers about him.
His wife was also a noted operative, and she caused the death of
another NKVD operator by the name of Blumkin.
Blumkin, on one of his trips abroad, went to Turkey and had a
conversation — it was in 1930 — with Trotsky, whose chief bodyguard
he was during the civil war. That had been found out, and the wife of
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3467
Zarubin was assigned in order to spy on him and to find out every-
thing.
As a result, Blumkin had been shot on orders of StaUn.
By the way, that Bhimkin was a famous fellow. When he was
only 17 years old, it was in the beginning of the revolution, he was a
Socialist revolutionary and adversary of the Communists, of the
Bolsheviks. He did not like the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which Lenin
signed with tlie Germans, yielding to German}' a part of Kussia, so
he called up the German Ambassador in Moscow and presented
himself as a "cheka" man, and said:
"We have information that you. Ambassador, are going to be
killed, and we want to inform you about it — there is a ring here which
wants to kill you — May I see you?".
He said :
"Come right away."
So he came to him, opened his briefcase, and said:
"Here are the papers."
He took out some papers and took out a pistol and shot him to death.
That was a famous affair.
The Politburo wanted to shoot him, but Trotsky became interested
in that fellow, 17 years old, and had a talk with him. Blumkin said:
"I know you will shoot me, but if you will spare my life 1 will serve
the revolution well."
And Trotsky liked him, defended him, and made him chief of his
bodyguard and of his military train
That was why later, in 1929, Blumkin, when he was abroad, went
to see Trotsky, which was his undoing.
Mr. Morris. Senator, before we get off Zarubin there, om- evidence
in the past has shown us that among the American Communists over
here, the American operatives, Zarubin himself was only known as
Peter, and his wife was known as Helen.
In fact, the Americans, when dealing with him, the American sub-
ordinates dealing with him, never knew his actual name as Zarubin.
Mr. Orlov, you feel, then, do you, that there is need at this time — at
least, it is your advice — for some kind of a public pronouncement by
someone, such as a Senator or Attorney General, backed up with
specific offers of immunity, permanent residence, avoiding the use of
money because that would strike the wrong note, and urging some
NKVD personnel in the United States to come forward to make full
disclosure?
Mr. Orlov. Definitely so.
Not only NKVD officers, but I should say any man who takes part
in the Soviet conspiracy against the free world. It might be a Soviet
diplomat who was not engaged in espionage, and who possesses informa-
tion which would help to establish the conspiratorial activities of the
Soviet camp.
I think the reluctance to defect can be explained also by the com-
placency which has been shown by the Western government to this
problem.
For instance, you remember the Gouzenko case in Canada, where he
broke open the atomic ring. Gouzenko, in 1945 or 1946, collected all
the documents which have shown there existed in Canada a tremend-
ous ring. He went to the Minister of Justice — he wanted to defect —
and showed him the documents.
3468 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The Minister of Justice showed it to Mackenzie King, Prime
Minister, and Mackenzie King said: "Tell him to go and put those
documents back."
But not only that, Mackenzie King, after that, when the documents
were examined and found to be of tremendous importance, connected
with the atomic spy ring, made a trip to the United States to see the
American President, and he went to Britain to see Prime Minister
Atlee,
Mackenzie King made a report to the House of Commons, and here
is what he said there. First of all, he said:
I told the man Gouzenko he should go back and put it into the Soviet files, that
we did not want it. And the reason I did it —
he said —
I did not want to complicate relations with Russia.
And he said he wanted to go to see Stalin. Here it is verbatin:
From what I have heard and know about Premier Stalin, I am confident that
the Russian leader would not countenance or condone such action in one of his
country's Embassies.
Well, seeing liow^ Gouzenko was treated, actually he could have
been killed, not having attained his goal of defection, he could have
been sent or extradited to Russia.
As a matter of fact, during the war many people were extradited
from America to Russia — defectors.
I have not read the latest book about the FBI, but leafing through,
I notice a thing there, described by the authorities themselves:
In 1943, a young sailor, a Russian sailor by the name of Egorov
defected. He jumped his ship. So the Soviets demanded of the
American authorities that he should be found and extradited. He
was found and had to be put on a Norwegian ship. But while he was
being put on the Norwegian ship, he fled and hid himself somewhere
on a chicken farm.
Then a year later, American police authorities noticed that four
men were dragging a fellow to a Russian ship. The American police
officers came up and said: "What are you doing?"
Then 1 of those 4 kidnapers introduced himself as Lomakin, as
Consul Lomakin, Soviet consul, and said that that man was a deserter,
and things like that. And in spite of the protest of the American
authorities, they put him aboard the Soviet ship.
Two days later American investigators came to that ship and
demanded that this man Egorov be called in for questioning. They
brought Egorov, who was blue and black from beating. Egorov
begged on his knees not to be sent to Russia because he would be
liquidated. But Lomakin, who was also present there, the Soviet
consul, said:
"No, you cannot free that man, I have only signed him up as a
member of the crew."
And in spite of that, the American authorities did nothing, and that
man was sent to Russia, where he sm-ely was shot.
The report of the American authorities on that case is in that book
of the FBI. And the authorities were at a loss as to what to do, and
the man who wrote the report said :
"That man Egorov will surely be shot dead."
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3469
Now, in view of things like tliat, you must be doubly courageous-
Senator McClellan. In other words, we are not offering them any
incentive whatsoever for defection?
Mr. Orlov. Not only incentive, but at times it was discom-aging.
Senator McClellan. We offered deterrents rather than incentives?
Mr. Orlov. That is true.
Senator McClellan. For the record, I think one thing should be
corrected here.
There has been some reference to the fact that if one Senator, that
is the implication of it, would make such a statement, that that would
carry the authority of Government. That is the implication of it.
I am sorry sometimes it does not, because I would like to say some
things with that effect. But I think it would take action by the
executive branch of the Government, probably some legislation by
Congress, to authorize it.
Mr. Orlov. I know, but what I had in mind. Senator, was that a
Senator might make an announcement and say:
"I will use m}^ offices, I will do whatever I can to persuade the
executive branch to give pohtical asylum to such a person."
Senator McClellan. In other words, what is meant is that it
should be the policy of the Government, from whatever source author-
ity is required, to establish such a pohcy.
All right; let's proceed.
Mr. AloRRis. Senator, I think in view of the time area we stake out
here — I have one more hue of questioning, and I think I can finish
that up very briefly.
Senator McClellan. All right.
Mr. Morris. Do you feel now that, for instance, the Soviet Union,
present leaders of the Soviet Union, have abandoned the rule of
Stahn and that they are now embarking on a new and different course,
which course is being reflected even by the American Communist
Party here in the United States?
That is two things: the Soviet policy abroad, and the Communist
policy here at home. That will be the last question I have.
Mr. Orlov. No, I do not think that they have actually changed.
It is just a temporary liberalization in Russia, which is limited to
some free speech only.
Actually, Khrushchev, whom I had known personally, and all the
others in Russian leadership, they are the same Stalinists as they
were. They have not changed anything, either in their own policy
in their own country — because, as we know, their economic policy
remains the same. That means stress on heavy industry for war
armaments and nothing for the consumer, no consumer goods, very
little food, and the shortages of food and goods and the hardship of
the Russian people continue.
In the aspect of foreign polic} , they continue the same policy of
Stalin, of striving to subjugate other countries and other peoples.
Senator McClellan. In that connection, what would be your
comment regarding the recent action of the American Communist
Party in its propaganda? It seems to me it possibly could be regarded
as just window-dressing for the purpose of deception, of trjang to
make it appear that they are not holding allegiance to Russia
Communist domination.
What is vour view about that?
3470 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Orlov. You expressed it better than I could ever do. This is
absolute deception, absolute lies. They are still a branch of the
Russian Communist Party.
Senator McClellan. They are still Communist revolutionaries,
international in scope
Mr. Orlov. Absolutely.
Senator McClellan (continuing). And have the same objective.
Mr. Orlov. And all their resolutions had been approved in the
Kremlin beforehand. And they are so disciplined that they carry out
to the minutest detail the performance of how to show that they are
not disciplined.
Senator McClellan. All right.
Mr. Orlov. And I should like to add also that in spite of the fact
that in his speech before the 20th congress of the party the Soviet
party boss, Khruslichev, has admitted that millions of people were
exiled, without any guilt, into concentration camps, he did not throw
open the concentration camps; they are still there.
In spite of the fact that Krushchev has so completely exposed the
technique of torture in obtaining false confessions, all those who were
tried in the famous Moscow trials have not been rehabilitated. All
the former teachers of the present leaders of the Kremlin have not been
rehabilitated, they still stand in the books as Hitlerite spies.
The leaders of the Red army, Tvlarshal Tukhachevsky and the rest,
who have been shot on the charge that they had been Hitlerite spies,
they still stand as Hitlerite spies and nobody has rehabilitated them.
And Khrushchev has shown that he is able to use the same methods
as Stalin. Let us recall the case of Beria. Beria was shot ostensibly
because he was an American spy, but America knows he was not an
American spy. And it is so ridiculous, because it was Beria who stole
the atomic bomb secrets. So he was not an American spy. But, in
spite of that, he and a number of persons were liquidated, ostensibly
because they were spies.
Mr. Morris. Could I ask you, very briefly, in a few words, how,
generally, is espionage financed? Just in a few words, because we
have to finish now.
Mr. Orlov. Yes.
This is very simple. The Soviet intelligence service is financed
direct from the Treasury. No shady deals, they are not allowed to
counterfeit money for that purpose, or to engage in any contraband
to supplement their budgets.
The budget of the Soviet intelligence service, NKVD, as in my time,
was $2,800,000 per month, a very little sum, if you compare it by the
sums spent by the Western intelligence services, and there was never
a Year at that time when they spent more than $2 million of that
appropriation of $2,800,000.
Senator McClellan. Per month?
Mr. Orlov. Per month — all over the world.
Senator McClellan. How do they get by so cheaply?
Mr. Orlov. They get by so cheaply, iu-st, because the Soviet
officers worked for the revolution and were satisfied to get very small
salaries.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE tJNITED STATES 3471
And the main thing is that about 60 percent of the most efficient
Soviet spies were Communists, and the Communists were supposed
to work for their spu'itual fatherland, for Russia, not for money.
Mr. Morris. Now, if the American Communists supplant the work
of the NKVD officials in the intelligence operation in the United
States, there is no money going from the Soviet Union to the American
Communists, is there?
Mr. Orlov. No.
You see, when you speak about the Communist Party, then I may
tell you that the Communist Party exists on Soviet mone}', on the
money which comes from the Soviet Treasury, from the Central
Committee of the Party. That is whj' they have to toe the line.
That is why, you see, when there is a split in the Communist Party
here, the faction which has split off and has denounced Moscow, goes
out of existence, because they are not subsidized. That is why a
deviationist group has no chance to exist, although they may have
all the arsenal of Leninism and of Karl ]Marx and Engels in their
possession. They have no mone3^ He is the boss who pays the
money, and the central committee of the party had a budget for
the Comintern which financed all those activities of the Communist
Party everywhere in the world.
But concerning the so-called Communist spies, those spies worked
without money, or they just took some little sums in order to defray
their expenses.
Mr. Morris. I have no more questions.
I would like to thank Mr. Orlov for coming here.
Senator AIcClellan. The Chair would like to ask him one or two
questions. He probably would prefer to answer them in executive
session and, if so, that is all right.
I would like to inciuire of you whether you know now of any
Communists in our Government, in any position in the Government?
Mr. Orlov. No; I do not.
Senator McClellan. All right. And the other is: Do you know
any Communists in this country now who may be engaged in
espionage that j^ou could identify?
Mr. Orlov. No, I do not.
Senator McClellan. That is all.
Any further testimony?
Mr. Morris. I have no questions. Senator.
Senator McClellan. Thank you very much, Mr. Orlov.
What is the further pleasure of the staff with respect to hearings?
Mr. Morris. There is a witness coming down today. Senator.
We will have to have a session with him some time, in executive
session, toda}^, and make an announcement later in the day about
when he is to appear.
Senator McClellan. All right.
The committee will stand adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 11 :50 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
(The following article from the U. S. News & World Report of
March 29, 1957, was ordered into the record during a hearing March
29, 1957, at which Senator Olin Johnston presided:)
3472 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Weapon of Gold
REDS USE IT to PUT SQUEEZE ON SPAIN
Paris. — What may be one of the biggest "shakedown" schemes in history is
being tried by Soviet Russia now in an effort to get a Communist foothold in
Spain.
The bait in this case is a half billion dollars' worth of Spanish Government gold,
taken by the Russians for "safekeeping" during the Spanish Civil War 2(J years ago.
The Franco Government is trying to get it iDack. But, from the waj^ things are
going, the price is going to be high. So far, the Russians don't even admit —
publicly, at least — that thej^ took the gold in the first place, even though Spain
now has documentary proof.
Instead, Moscow is using the gold to try to squeeze concessions out of Spain
through roundabout talks in Paris. What Russia wants is an exchange of ambas-
sadors, trade agreements, the right to station "news correspondents" in Spain and
to put into effect all the other devices Moscow has used in the past to get the
Communists established in new territory.
Delicate negotiations about the gold have been taking place off and on since
1954 between Spain and Russia, even though they don't recognize each other's
governments and don't exchange representatives.
LINK with united STATES BASES
The talks started just about the time United States military bases were getting
established in Spain. The Soviet Ambassador in Paris, Sergei Vinogradov,
quietly approached the Count of Casa Rojas, Spanish Ambassador to France, at
a big diplomatic party and suggested that relations between their two countries
be "normalized."
Since then, the two ambassadors have met privately half a dozen times, 3 times
in each other's embassies, for sessions lasting from 30 to 45 minutes each. Vino-
gradov, while pushing the idea of getting Soviet officials into Spain, has avoided
mentioning the United States bases. Nor has he made any nasty remarks about
Madrid's anti-Communist policies. Instead, he spends the time urging "coex-
istence" and emphasizing that countries with wide differences can maintain
"normal" relations.
Throughout the talks between the two ambassadors, the Spanish position has
been that nothing can be done until two things happen: First, all Spanish citizens
in Russia must be returned to their homeland. And, second, the half billion in
gold must be returned to its rightful owner, the Spanish Government.
Last year, the Russians finally agreed to send back the Spaniards, most of
whom had been in the Soviet Union since the 1930's when the Spanish Civil War
was going on. More than 2,000 Spaniards, mostly people who had been sent to
Russia as children during the civil war, have now come back. Many of those who
grew up in Russia married there and have brought along their wives and children — ■
all Soviet citizens. The presence of these persons gives the Russians a talking
point when they suggest setting up an embassy and consulates in Spain. The
interests of Soviet citizens, they say, must be pi'otected by the Russian
Government.
SPANISH PROOF
The Spanish gold was mentioned only vaguely in the first few talks between the
two ambassadors here in Paris because Madrid lacked legal proof that the Russians
had taken it. But now the Spanish Government has that proof in the form of an
8-page receipt in the French language signed by 2 high officials of Russia.
The evidence was obtained after more than a year of negotiation with Juan
Negrin, an exile who sent the gold to Moscow when he was Finance Minister in
the Spanish Republican Government.
For months Negrin refused to give up the papers relating to the gold deal.
But, just before his death, in Paris in November, Negrin told his housekeeper to
turn the papers over to the Franco government.
With proof in hand, the Spaniards approached the Russians again. They
presented photographic copies of the receipt. Ambassador Vinogradov promised
to forward the photographic copies to Moscow. That was nearly 3 months ago.
The Spaniards are still awaiting a reply.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3473
APPEAL TO V. N.
The Spanish Government is prepared for long negotiations with the Russians.
But if direct talks don't bring the gold back, Madrid probably will appeal to the
International Court or the United Nations to get action. Spain badly needs the
half billion dollars' worth of gold. Franco's government is hard up for cash right
now, and the gold would be a windfall equal to all the United States aid Spain
has received since World War II.
The Spaniards have told the Russians they will not make any deals to get their
gold. However, veteran diplomats wouldn't be surprised to see a Soviet embassy
in Madrid, once the gold is back in the Bank of Spain.
The Russians would like access to Spanish strategic materials. They would
like diplomatic cover for espionage against the United States bases. They want
to get into the country to launch underground anti-Franco propaganda at a time
when economic difficulties, strikes and student unrest are plaguing Spain and
political troubles about the succession to Franco are beginning to appear.
FOR Moscow: A WEAPON
In the Spanish gold it took for "safekeeping" 20 years ago, the Soviet Union
figures it holds a powerful weapon for prying its way into Madrid.
J
INDEX
Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization
in this index.
A Page
A. E. G. Co., in Germany 3455
Agabekov 3464
Article in New York Times re Spanish gold: One Son Issues Denial 3435
Article from New York Times dated January 6, 1957, re Spanish gold:
Soviet Gold Issue Stirs Spain Anew 3434
Article from New York Times dated January 10, 1957, re Spanish Gold:
Two Spanish Envoys Arrive in Soviet 3436
Article from New York Times dated January 21, 1957, re Spanish gold:
The Hidalgo and the Commissar Warm the Atmosphere Between
Moscow and Madrid 1_ 3437
Article from U. S. News & World Report dated March 27, 1957 re Spanish
gold: Weapon of Gold 3472
Article from Washington Post dated April 6, 1957: Gold of Spanish War
Spent, Soviets Report 3438
Aspe, Senor Mendez, Chief of the Spanish Treasury 3430-3432, 3435
Atlee, Prime Minister I 3468
Atterburg, B 3428
Australia 3464
Azana, President of Spanish Republic 3429, 3431, 3436
B
Balkan Pack ._ 3447
Balkans .. . .. 3450
Bank of America 3431, 3432
Bank of England 3431, 3432
Bank of Spain 3435, 3473
Belgium 3464
Belgrade 3447, 3449, 3450
Bentley, Elizabeth 3459, 3462
Bergere, Professor 3433
Beria 3462, 3463, 3470
Berlin 3456, 3457
Berzin, head of Soviet Military Intelligence Service 3441
Bleiman 3455
Blucher, Marshal 3427
Blumkin 3466, 3467
Boki, Mr 3441
Bolsheviks 3427
Brest-Litovsk Treaty 3467
Brioni Island 3450
Britain 3459, 3468
British International Brigade 3458
Bronx 3423
Brown Voveri Co., in Switzerland 3455
Bulganin 3447, 3449
Bulgaria 3449
Burtan, Dr. V. Gregory 3441-3444
Caballero, Largo, Prime Minister of Spain 3429-3431, 3433, 3436
Canada 3422, 3467
II INDEX
Page
Case of L. T., the (Leon Trotsky) 3426
Chambers, Whittaker 3459
Chervenkov... 3449
Chicago 3440, 3443
Cominform 3447. 3449
Commtern 3433, 3471
Communists 3441, 3442, 3444, 3448, 3450, 3458, 3465, 3467, 3471, 3472
American 3460, 3467, 3471
Hungarian 3449
Italian 3446
Polish 3426
Communist Party 3444, 3450, 3459, 3465, 3471
American 3469
Italian 3446, 3450
Spanish 3446
Soviet 3446, 3470
Congress 3458
Counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve notes 3440, 3441, 3442, 3443
Coxe, Judge Alfred C 3443
D
Dmitrov, George 3449
E
Ege 3460, 3464
Egoro V, Russian defector 3468
Etingon (also Kotov) 3458, 3463
Exhibit No. 426. Letter to Trotsky from Orlov dated December 27, 1938,
warning Trotskv of assassin 3425-3426
Exhibit No. 427. ' Article from New York Times dated February 24, 1933,
Flood of Fake Bills Is Traced to Russia 3443
Exhibit No. 428. Article from New York Times dated May 6, 1934, re
Dr. Burtan guiltv in counterfeiting 3444
Exhibit No. 429. Photograph of Franz Fischer 3445
F
FBI 3428,3429,3458,3468
Fis-her, Franz 3441, 3442, 3444
France' 3424,3448,3450,3456,3459
Franco, General 3422, 3429, 3430, 3434, 3435, 3437
Franco government 3472, 3473
G
Garibaldi Brigade 3446
General Electric 3455
German- American Validation Board 3444
German bonds 3444
Germany 3456, 3457, 3466, 3467
Gero, Efno 3449
Gold (Harry) 3455
Gouzenko -. 3464, 3467, 3468
Gozskv, Lisa 3466
Greece 3447
Grinko, G. F 3436
Grube, Robert F. (testimony of), with United States Secret Service,
Department of Justice 3439-3441
Gusev 3459
H
Hague, The 3435, 3437
Hartstein, Benjamin 3443
Hungarian revolution 3450
Hungary 3449
INDEX III
I Page
International Brigade 3446
International Court 3435, 3473
International Court of Justice in The Hague 3437
Italy 3446, 3448, 3450, 3456
J
Japan 3464
K
Khokhlov 3458
Khrushchev 3447-3450, 3469, 3470
King, Mackenzie 3468
Kotov (also Etingon) 3458, 3463
Kremlin 3434, 3447-3450, 3470
Krestinski, N. N 3436
Krivitzky 3464
L
La Roche, guerrilla forces at 3442
Lenin 3441, 3450, 3467
Life magazine 3422, 3423
Lomakin, Soviet consul 3468
Longo, Luigi 3446, 3449
Lubimo V 3456
Lushkov (Henry Samoilovich) 3425, 3426, 3427
M
Madrid, Spain 3430, 3436, 3438, 3472, 3473
Mandel, Benjamin 3421, 3453
Maniu, Prime Minister of Rumania 3456
Markin 3464
Martin, Comrade 3428
Minor 3455
McClellan, Senator John L 3421, 3453
McManus, Robert 3421
Mexico 3424, 3430
Molehanov 3425
Molotov 3447
Moore, Dan T 3461
Moran, W. H 3444
Morris, Robert 3421, 3453
Moscow 3429, 3433-3438, 3446, 3448, 3449, 3460, 3464^3467, 3471, 3472
Moscow trials 3470
Mussolini 3456, 3457
Mussolini's Cabinet 3456
N
Negrin, Juan, Prime Minister 3429-3438, 3472
Negrin, Miguel 3435
Negrin, Romulo 3435
New York 3428, 3429
New York Times 3434-3437
Nikolavevsky, Boris 3424, 3426
Nikolayevsky's Institute ^ 3426, 3427
NKVD (Soviet Secret Police) 3421-3424, 3433,
3438, 3441, 3453, 3454, 3456-3464, 3466, 3467, 3470, 3471
rV INDEX
O Page
Odessa 3435-3437
O'Neill, Francis A 3443
Orlov, Alexander:
Testimony of 3421-3439, 3441-3471
Born in Russia 3421
In 12th Red Army during Spanish Civil War 3421
Chief of counterintelligence 3422
Assistant prosecutor of Soviet supreme court 3422
Deputy chief of economic department of NKVD 3422
Soviet diplomat to Spain in 1936 3422
Broke with Soviet Government in 1938 3422
Pascua, Marcelino, Spanish Republican Ambassador to Moscow 3436
Persia 3422
Petrov 3464
Politburo 3433, 3453, 3454, 3467
Pravda 3438, 3449
Prieto, Indalecio, former Spanish Minister of Defense 3429, 3433
R
Rakosi 3449
Rastvorov 3464
Reiss, Ignace 3464
Rio Rinto, guerrilla forces at 3422
Rojas, Casa (Jose Rojas y Moreno, Count of Casa Rojas) 3437, 3438, 3472
Rosenberg, Ambassador, Soviet Ambassador in Spain 3430, 3431, 3433
Roth, Paul, main distributor of counterfeit $100 notes 3441
Rotterdam, Holland 3464
Rusher, William A 3421, 3453
Russell Sage Foundation 3423
Russia 3421-3423, 3443, 3448, 3449, 3455, 3457, 3463, 3464, 3466-3469
Russian Engraving and Printing Offices 3442
Saas Martini (German bank) 3441
Second World War 3458, 3473
Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, by Orlov 3422
Secret Service, United States 3439
Sedov, Leon, son of Trotsky 3423-3427
Serna, Dr. Luis de la 3436
Sloutsky, Chief of Soviet NKVD 3433
Smiley, Frank H 3443
Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell 3461
Socialist Appeal, New York newspaper of Trotsky 3428
Sourwine, J. G 3421, 3453
Soviet Army, Fourth Department of the 3460
Soviet Embassy 3428, 3429
Soviet Foreign Office 3456
Soviet Government 3423, 3424, 3436, 3443, 3455
Soviet intelligence 3454, 3455, 3459-3462, 3465, 3470
Soviet receipt for gold 3435
Soviet steamers 3432, 3433
Soviet Union 3422, 3430, 3434, 3435,
3447, 3448, 3453-3455, 3457, 3458, 3462, 3464, 3469, 3471, 3473
Spain 3422, 3424, 3426, 3429,
3430, 3431, 3436, 3437, 3438, 3444, 3446, 3456, 3458, 3463, 3472
Spanish Civil War 3421, 3434, 3472
Spanish gold 3429, 3430, 3432-3434, 3436, 3437, 3444, 3472, 3473
Spanish Government 3429-3431, 3433, 3435, 3473
Spanish Republican Government 3422, 3436, 3453
Stalin 3423, 3427, 3429-3431, 3433, 3438, 3439, 3441,
3447-3449, 3453, 3454, 3456, 3457, 3462-3464, 3467-3470
State Bank of Moscow ' 3430, 3433
Sulzberger, C. L 3437
Sylvester, Alvin McK 3443
INDEX V
T
Page
Tactics and Strategy of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, bv Orlov__ 3454
Tito, Marshal _" '. 3446-3450
Titulesku, former Foreign Minister of Rumania 3456
Togliatti, Palmiro 3446, 3449
Treadwell, Louis Mead 3443
Treasury Department 3443
Trieste, "port of 3446, 3448, 3450
Trotsky, Leon 3423-3428, 3447, 3466, 3467
TrotskV Bulletin of the Opposition 3424, 3425
Turkey ,.. 3422, 3447, 3464, 3466
U
United Nations 3434, 3435, 3437, 3459, 3460, 3473
United States 3421-3424, 3428, 3430, 3436, 3438,
3440, 3444, 3447, 3448, 3456, 3458, 3459, 3462, 3465-3469, 3473
U. S. News & World Report 3471
V
Vallina, Salvador 3436
Vereshchak, Simon 3439
Vidale (Contreras), head of CP of Trieste 3446, 3449
Vinogradov 3438, 3472
Von Buelow, "Count" Enrique Dechow 3443
W
Washington Post 3438
Watkins, Senator Arthur V 3434
Welles, Benjamin 3434, 3436
World Bank 3434
Y
Yagoda 3425, 3462
Yalta _ _ __ _ 3450
Yezho V, once righ't-hand" man "of Stalin 11"". /-"-""/-"-"."_' _"_" 3423^ 34"30", '3"43"3, 3462
Yugoslavia 3446-3448
Yugov 3449
Z
Zarubin, Vasili (Zubelin) 3466
Zborowsky, Mark (pen name of Etienne) 3423, 3424, 3426-3429, 3461
Zhukov, Marshal 3448
Zinoviev 3425
Zubelin, Vasili (Zarubin) 3466
o
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
MARCH 1, 1957
PART 52
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93215 WASHINGTON : 1957
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
OCT 9 - 1957
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
■**^*'"'^" JAMES O. SA'Aj^^P,.MississippJ, Chairman
ESTES KEF AUVER, Tennessee ~" AlJE^'^^hfDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JK., Missouri WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SAM J. ERVIN, JE., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER. Maryland
SAM J. ERVIN, jE., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
ROBERT MOEEis, Chief Counsel
J. G. SouBwiNE, Associate Counsel
William A. Rdsher, Associate Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
CONTENTS
Testimony of — Page
Cooke, Adm. Charles N 3500
Dunlop, Albert M 3475
m
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 1957
United States Senate, Subcommittee To
Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws,
OF THE Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. G.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 35 o'clock a. m., in
room 155, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner pre-
siding.
_ Also present : Eobert Morris, chief counsel ; J, G. Sourwine, asso-
ciate counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Kobert C.
McManus, investigation analyst.
Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order.
Would you call the first witness.
Mr. Sourwine. Dr. Dunlop.
Senator Jenner. Doctor, do j^ou swear the testimony given in this
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothmg but the truth,
so help you God ?
Dr. Dunlop. I do.
Senator Jenner. Proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ALBERT M. DUNLOP, M. D., ALEXANDRIA, VA.
Mr. Sourwine. Will you give your full name and address.
Dr. Dunlop. Albert M. Dunlop, Rural Free Delivery 4, Box 493,
Alexandria, Va.
Mr. Sourwine. You were born in Savoy, 111. ?
Dr. Dunlop. In Savoy, 111., in 1884.
Mr. Sourwine. You took your A. B. at the University of Illinois
in 1908?
Dr. Dunlop. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And you took your M. D. from Harvard University
in 1910?
Dr. Dunlop. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You taught at Harvard Medical School in Shanghai
from 1911 to 1916?
Dr. Dunlop. That is right.
Mr. SouRAViNE. You taught at the Peking University Medical Col-
lege from 1918 to 1931 ?
Dr. Dunlop. 1918 to 1931 ; that is right.
Mr. Sourwine. You were in private practice in Shanghai, in the
private practice of medicine, from 1931 through 1933 ?
Dr. Dunlop. Yes, sir.
3475
3476 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were a professor at the University of Chicago
from 1943 to 1946?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You were in private practice in Shanghai from
1946 through 1952?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And you were a professor at the University of
Hong Kong from 1952 through 1953 ?
Dr. DuNLOP. That is right.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And during the time that you practiced medicine
in China you had a clientele which included all classes ; is that right ?
Dr. DuNLOP. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You had rich men and poor men, beggarmen and
thieves, I suppose?
Dr. DuNLOP. I expect, and including the Communists.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And including a number of high officials?
Dr. DuNLOP. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, I submit that this qualifies Dr.
Dunlop as a gentleman of rather unusual experience, and I think
that we may go forward.
Senator Jenner. I certainly think so. Proceed.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Dr. Dunlop, what can you tell us about the regi-
mentation of doctors in Communist China ?
Dr. Dunlop. The regimentation of doctors started very soon in
the Shanghai area — and I am speaking primarily for the Shanghai
area, although I know by hearsay of other parts — started in late
1949, when the Communists, in their endeavor to placate the people,
or to meet the people with their state medicine, required all organ-
izations, factories, and so forth, to have clinics. And for this pur-
pose, they went out and raked in all of the well -qualified men, and
some who weren't so well qualified, to service these places.
In some instances, they were more or less forced to give up their
practices and go in.
Well, this taking away of the patients from these private men
made their practices, of course, go down to virtually nothing at all.
And so, these men, many of them, had to go into the hospitals and
clinics in order to earn a living.
That has continued. And today I would say there are a very fcAv
medical men in private practice.
Wlien the Communists came into China and into the Yangtze
Valley, there were close to 3,500 well-trained, western-trained doc-
tors. I don't include the native physicians, I don't include those
who were trained in Japan. I include those men who had been to
foreign institutions, either in the United States, England, Germany,
or in institutions such as the Peking Medical College, in Peking,
which was established by the Rockefeller Foundation. In all, there
were something like 3,500.
Within a year, many of those men — I say many, upward of 600
or so — had slipped out of China, and were either in Formosa or
Hong Kong. So that a month before I came away, a Chinese col-
league told me that he thought at that time — and that was in late
1952, I came out in October 1952 — that there could not be more than
2,500 of that original group. And many of them who had not es-
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3477
caped had come down with recurrent tuberculosis, and high blood
pressurej which we did not ordinarily have in China — it wasn't due
necessarily to the rice diet, but the fact is that the Chinese, as a rule,
had not had high blood pressure.
Is that what you mean ?
Mr, SouRWiNE. Yes, sir, that is very much along the line.
As a result of this regimentation, how many independently prac-
ticing physicians, well-trained physicians, would you say, there are
in Hed China now ?
Dr. DuNLOP, How many are in all China ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Are there any physicians allowed independently
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes.
I would say that of those original 2,500, there undoubtedly remain
at least 2,000 of the well-trained ones.
I knew some of those who are no more.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Pardon the interruption.
The question is: Are those men practicing independently, or are
they regimented by the Chinese Communists ?
Dr. DuNLOP. They are regimented.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is the point.
There is no free and independent practice of medicine any more
in Bed China ?
Dr. DuNLOP. A man may do some after hours in his own office or
home, and many of the men had their offices in their homes, but out-
side of that ; no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The Communists fix fees ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Absolutely, yes.
And that is another thing which drove the men out of their prac-
tice and out of their private hospitals, into the hands of the Com-
munists.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have the Communists done anything to foster the
teaching or training of additional physicians ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes.
They started in the very early days what they called the 214-year
boys. Those were middle-school students who were brought into
these large classes, sometimes of a thousand each, in some of the
various old, established institutions. And then, there were some
that were established especially for the purpose of training these boys
who, after 21/^ years, could take on a certain amount of major work.
Now, when I say 2i/^ years, I mean they started from scratch. For
instance, all of my instruments were sold to a colleague who went
into Sian Fu. And he sent his nose, throat, and ear men — I am a
nose, throat, and ear man — down to take over my equipment, check
it before it went back. And as we were checking it over one day,
he said to me, "Our boys and girls are doing operations after 21/^
years of training."
I said, "So?"
"Yes," he said, "that is the present move, to utilize all of the men
they can get, as quickly as they can get them, to meet the great need."
Now, the Communists did try to control, after a time, these 2%-
year boys and girls by decreeing that no major procedure could be
done without consultation with a colleague, a man of some other
department of training, such as a gynecologist or obstetrician, if it
3478 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
was a woman patient, or an internist, if it was to be something that
had to do with the abdominal cavity. So that, they turned out a
tremendous number of such individuals.
Now, one other aspect of that business of getting enough doctors to
meet the need of a country going wild with public health was to
insist that all the oldtime native doctors be given modern training.
I mean, the old men who treated with herbs, or the men who used
acupuncture needles for inserting in different parts of the body, for
the purpose of treating the individual. All of these people were
required to take special training.
And, some of my colleagues were required to give them night
classes in modern medicine, diagnostic work, and especially how to
take advantage of the modern antibiotics.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you make a competent physician out of a herb
doctor, with a few months in any school. Doctor ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, they tried it for a time, and then they failed.
And what they did was to bring back into their medical schools and
back into practice the old, traditional medicine of China, or herb
and acupuncture practice.
The herb doctors — we have seen them in this country, and in China
they are all over. In Shanghai, for instance, there are 10,000 of these
traditional tonic men who got their training from their fathers or
grandfathers, and so on down.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Are there any good medical schools in China?
Dr. DuNLOP. Good medical schools? Well, you have got the Pe-
king Medical School, to which I was attached for a long time, the
Rockefeller Foundation Medical School.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are they under Communist control ?
Dr. DuNLOP. All under Communist control.
And today, it does not take any undergraduates, but confines itself
entirely to postgraduates. And incidentally, today it has a Chair of
Herb Medicine and Acupuncture, which is being carried on side by
side with modern medicine.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. For the record. Doctor, explain what acupuncture
is.
Dr. DuNLOP. Acupuncture is the use of a needle of varying size
and length, which is inserted into the body in various places, in order
to destroy a particular disease. The graduate is required to perfect
his knowledge of the different localities into which he can thrust this
needle. And then he takes his examination by being required to in-
sert that needle into a mannequin, a brass mannequin, the holes of
which have been pasted over with paper. So that if he shoots accu-
rately and gets into the hole, he can pass his examination, and then
he is an acupuncturist.
Now, they have used that a great deal. Latterly, in the Peking
Medical College they have been using it for the treatment of polio-
myelitis, believe it or not. And they say they have cured cases of
poliomyelitis by the use of acupuncture needles.
Now, in the old times there was no sterilization of their needle.
It might be wiped off through the hair of the operator, or anything
might happen.
Incidentally, if I might go just a step further in regard to the acu-
puncture, the acupuncture people became very proficient in abortions.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3479
They would take a 3 months' pregnant uterus, thrust a fairly long
needle through the abdominal cavity into the top of the fundus of the
womb, and frequently there was a fairly prompt abortion. It also
resulted in the withdrawal of that needle into the abdominal cavity,
and then a chain of events started which would either end in the
death of the individual or the interference of modern surgery for its
removal.
Our man in gynecology at PTJMC used to have case after case
where he was required to go in and remove this needle, which had
been drawn through the contraction of the uterus within the abdomi-
nal cavity.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You say now they have modernized that ancient
practice, now they are sterilizing the needle ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Now they are sterilizing the needle, that is the only
difference.
Mr. SouEWiNE. Doctor, there are some other evidences of progress
under the Soviets, are there not, such as the transplantation of tissues
to treat asthma and gastric ulcers ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes.
We did a lot of transplantation of tissues after it had been
started in Russia at one time. And I think there was a directive of
some sort sent down into China that they should put it on there.
Well, the tissue that was taken was merely tissue from some animal,
such as the lip of a cow — they even went so far as to take some of the
glands of the various animals. That was put into deep freeze or re-
frigerator, and brought down to a very low temperature for a period,
and then when it was to be used, it was brought out and put into an
autoclave, that is a steam sterilizing machine, for the purpose of com-
pletely sterilizing.
Then a small opening was made through the skin underneath the
ribs, preferably on the right side, and that was inserted, and then the
skin was sewn up. And that was that. It was supposed to cure all
sorts of things.
And so this colleague of mine said he thought it was started in
Russia, primarily because they didn't have enough medicines, they
had to do something.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It is the same principle as the old asafetida bag
around the neck, only they put this under the skin ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, they have some various reactions every now
and then, and whether or not they have had any cures remains to be
seen.
Mr, SouKWiKE. Doctor, I asked you a question, whether medical
schools were good or bad. In your book, you told how the students
in the Communist schools, in the medical schools, get the same grades,
whether they are good or bad students, they get lectures instead of
examination, and they all graduate, if their political thinking is right.
Are those what you call the earmarks of a good medical school?
Dr. DuNLOP. No.
And I don't think that practice had been followed in such places as
the Peking Medical School, because our own staff is there. But take
that institution which was started in the north of Shanghai.
The man who was in charge told me that those men were divided
up into cells. At the time he spoke to me, there was something like
a thousand in their freshman class. And they were, first of all, di-
93215— 57— pt. 52 2
3480 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE "UNITED STATES
vided into a hundred each, and then each hundred was divided into
10. And they all had captains. The man who led the group, the
smaller group, had to see to it that every man in his group knew what
was going on. And when it came to the so-called examination time,
they all got the same grade, regardless.
Of course, a man had to be politically sound in order to get through.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is a special effort made to indoctrinate doctors in
Ked China?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes.
I knew the foreign group, because there were 10 out of 12 in that
group that were my old students. They met, first of all, once a week
in the evening, and had a class which lasted from 8 until about mid-
night. And they were indoctrinated by a Communist.
I remember his telling me once that they were required to approve
what he told them every now and then. He would say, "Now, don't
you think that the Americans have been subversive m the medical
schools and these various things they have been doing in an educa-
tional way?" And he said, "We would all raise our hands and shout
'Yes.' " He said, "If Ave don't we are kept after the class, and we are
interrogated for 2, 3, 4 hours." He said, "It isn't worth while, and
what we agree among ourselves is this : We speak with our lips, but
not with our hearts."
I put that in this book, but that is the sense of what goes on with
that group.
I don't believe that they have been indoctrinated.
Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Would you say that that is a part of the Commu-
nist attack on independent thinking ?
Dr. DuNLOP. That is a part of it, yes.
And, of course, they started in Peking very early in the game for
all educational institutions. They started, first of all, to try to con-
trol all of their own people in their own groups. They started in
Manchuria in August of 1950.
And then, when they found tliat some of the educational groups
were getting out of hand, they switched that into the educational insti-
tutions, and they had a big meeting in Peking when Chou En-lai
instructed the staffs as to what they should aim for in the way of
indoctrination of the gi^oup.
And, in the end, it was the students who indoctrinated the staffs,
because they were more accessible to the Government.
Mr. SouRWiNB. Do the Chinese Reds recognize physicians as an
especially influential group, and attempt to use them for propaganda
or for other purposes ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I don't think they have done that to any degree.
They use the physicians primarily because they can use them in con-
nection with this great movement of public health that they put on
for the entire country. They can't do without them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. What can you tell us about individualism among
the Chinese? Does that persist in spite of Red Communist efforts
to suppress it ? And what can you tell us about those areas ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I think it does. I think individualism has existed
back through the years, and I think it will continue to exist.
I think there is a great attempt on the part of the Communists to
try to destroy it. First of all, they have tried to break down the
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3481
family unit. I can best illustrate that by the instance of my own
colleague, whose son informed on him.
This son, like all of the others among the youngsters, was indoctri-
nated to the point — they were informing on their own families. It
got to the point where, when I went to a Chinese house, if there were
any children around there was very little speaking of any sort.
Now, this colleague of mine, a doctor, and a nose-and-throat man,
and myself, were very nervous about the whole thing. He was very
anti-Communist. The Communists had required all the doctors to
tell them how much they had in the way of property, and this col-
league of mine withheld the sum of his property. And this young-
ster informed against him.
Senator Jenner. His son?
Dr. DuNLOP. His son informed against the father. And his father
went into his office one Saturday afternoon and filled himself with
morphine, and that is where they found him Monday morning — dead.
And that is only one of several incidents of this sort. It has been
that attempt, first of all, to break down the family unit, which has
led to a breaking down of the individualism, if you will, of the
Chinese people. I can't believe that it will succeed.
Mr. SouKWiNE. You do not believe it will succeed ?
Mr. DuNLOP. I do not.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Wliy not, Doctor ?
Dr. DuNLOP. People who have a culture that goes back almost
4,000 years may be dented with this thing, but I don't think that in
the end they will accomplish wliat they are setting out to do.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You are saying, then, that communism is alien to
the ancient culture of China ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Absolutely.
And the older Chinese, especially, look u])on the regime in Peking
as an alien government, not as a Chinese Government.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, some of those who favor the recognition
of Red China and the admission of Red China to the United Nations
tell us repeatedly that communism is very much in line with the an-
cient traditions of China, that China has always been a nation which
was governed from above, and that they have developed their own
kind of Marxism, and that is really indigenous to China, this Red
communism that they have now.
You say that is not so ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I can't believe that for a moment.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Doctor, to what extent has the sovietization of
China progressed, if you know ?
Dr. DuNLOP. To what extent? I didn't get the question.
Mr. SouRWiNE. To what extent has the sovietization of China
progressed ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I think they have insinuated themselves into
many aspects of Chinese life. I think there is a great deal of imi-
tation on the part of the Chinese.
Take the matter of banking and accounting. I had some friends
who were in the Bank of China. And at one time they told me that
all of the accounting, all of the banking, was being changed to the
Soviet method of banking, whatever that is.
The Soviets are behind the scenes, not out in front.
3482 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UlSriTED STATES
As an example of that, you rarely see Soviets walking around in
the streets. That was true in my time. What happens now, I
don't know, but I don't think there has been any change.
The officials who came over, the so-called — what do you call
them? — the people who came in to help direct were carted about in
the city in closed motorcars. They took an ordinary car and put
some green stuff around the back and the sides where the passengers
sit, and those cars were sent through the streets at something more
than the ordinary rate of speed, and you never saw these people out
in the open.
I don't know whether I have answered your question, or not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir.
Do you know the phrase "national deviation" ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I don't think I do.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, taking that phrase with its Communist mean-
ing to mean differences between the Communist Party of one nation
and the Communist Party of Russia, based on differences between that
nation and Russia — do you understand me ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I think I follow you.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say to what extent national deviation is
tolerated in China, or to what extent there is an effort and an objec-
tive on the part of the Communist leaders to make the Chinese Com-
munists just the same as the Russian Communists ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I think their greatest attempt is to fashion
themselves after the Soviet way of living or way of life.
I was very much interested, in sitting down in my apartment in
Shanghai, in reading some old articles that appeared in the Post and
various places with regard to what was happening in some of the
other places, like Rumania and Hungary. We were going through
exactly the same thing in Shanghai. There was no difference, as far
as I could see.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, you spoke of the changes in family life, such
as children informing on their parents. I assume there were other
changes in family life.
For instance, does social visiting continue under the Communists ?
Dr. DuNLOP. It is very much restricted. In fact, you saw very
little of it, excepting at the traditional Chinese New Year's time, when
it is almost compulsory for a man to go out and visit his friends. But
they don't go out and see each other much.
And as far as my visits were concerned, although the Chinese were
very friendly to me, I rarely went into a Chinese home just for a visit
unless I was pretty sure of the type of home, and knew something
about the servants in the home, whether they were Communists.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Well, did the Communists make a practice of ques-
tioning the servants, as well as the children, about what went on in
the home ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I think they had constant contact with the servants.
The cook, in many instances, was required to report on all gatherings
in the home over, I think it was, eight people.
Now, that was for another purpose as well, not only to keep tabs
on who was meeting in some of the places, but also in order to make
attacks on those who were giving the meal.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, in your book you mentioned consignment
stores. Wliat are consignment stores ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3483
Dr. DuNLOP. A consignment store — and they sprang up by the hun-
dreds in Shanghai — the people had no money, it had been taken away
from them in various ways, and so they began taking things out of
their houses, j)ictures, shoes, clothing, all sorts of things — and these
piled into the consignment stores, where the man in charge would put
on a little extra fee for the article, which he would then take as his
commission, and turn back to the man who brought in the article the
amount that the owner wanted to receive. There were 2 or 3 in every
block.
They weren't very much patronized. I used to go and do some
window shopping and see what people were getting out of their
houses — everything and anything.
Senator Jenner. I didn't quite understand that. They took their
property out of their homes to the consignment store to raise money ;
they were out of money ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Exactly.
Senator Jenner. Sort of like a pawnshop ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes, exactly; only it was on a different basis. We
have pawnshops in China, but it was the same idea.
Mr. SouRwiNE, Doctor, that is at one end of the scale. Now, at the
other end of the scale are those who are well off. How did Red China
treat capitalists ? Were capitalists wooed by the new order ?
Dr. DuNLOP. In the very beginning, you might say that they were.
It was for the purpose of getting in solid with the commercial city of
Shanghai. For a time they wooed the merchants.
And then, after they went into Korea, they needed a lot of money,
they weren't getting it by any other means, they made an attack on
the merchants, turned on the merchants and made a concerted drive
to get away from the merchants as much money as they could in the
way of fines.
A merchant might have done something that was a bit irregular, and
some of his staff, who were part of the interrogating groups under
the Communists, would come along, knowing full well what had taken
place, and interrogate him openly about it. And if they could prove
it, then the Communists would levy a fine on him.
Sometimes the fine was so severe that it took his entire business.
We had a big canning group there. Ma Ling, which was fashioned
after many of our factories at home. It was a modern, up and coming
factory. And the Communists, in their interrogation, accused this
firm of sending putrid canned meat to the volunteers in Korea, with
the result that a heavy fine was put on the manager, the entire property
was virtually confiscated, with the result that the manager and his
wife took poison — not an unusual thing.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mentioned in your book that the employees of
foreign firms were sometimes held as sort of hostages. Will you tell
us about that ?
^ Dr. DuNLOP. I think that was true of all the foreigners in connec-
tion with firms that had any outside-of-the-country holdings. Dur-
ing the entire period of the early days — you must remember that the
Communists came into Shanghai and into the port cities without very
much in the way of money, no solid currency.
^ I stood at my office window on the Bund in Shanghai and saw the
silver and gold go out of the Bank of China across to the river and out
of the city.
3484 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
I would also add, there were American banknotes, because we had a
great many American banknotes after our boys were in Shanghai.
Now, they had no money, really, so they made this drive on the mer-
chants, and that meant taking all of the money, really, out of the com-
munity, with the result that no one had any money. Therefore, they
brought their gold bars from their hiding places, they brought their
rings— and even the servants had gold rings, which was their way of
storing a little property.
They took their American banknotes and their gold dollars down
to the bank and turned them in for the currency of the regime, and
that is where the Comnumists were able to get a tremendous amount
of their foreign currency.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, if you know, what were the tax policies of
the Chinese Reds ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, from my own personal experience, I would say
that their policy was to tax all they could get, and ask for more.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We have equality of taxation in this country. Is
there any such thing in Red China ?
Dr. DuNLOP. No ; I would say not.
A lawyer friend of mine said that his property was taxed at such
a rate that if he took the current value of the property before the Com-
munists came in, the tax would overcome that in 2i/^ years.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is the policy, then, of all the traffic will bear, and
a little more ?
Dr. DuNLOp. Yes.
For instance, my first tax on my motor car was the equivalent of
$150 United States, for 3 months. I said to my secretary, "3 months?
I thought that was for a year."
"No," she said, "it is only 3 months."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were the Chinese Reds efficient tax collectors ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes.
They had an article on that tax bill, when it came in, that if you
didn't pay it at the time it was due, it accrued in interest at the rate
of 1 percent a day. I understand that has been dropped to one-half
of 1 percent a day.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, what can you tell us about food exports
from China to Russia ?
Dr. DuNLOP. In the summer of 1952 especially, I was in contact with
the man who was renting a motor to some Russians, who were process-
ing, or rather, inspecting, beef at the abattoir in Shanghai, before
this meat was loaded into refrigerator cars to be sent north.
He said that there were five men in that group that went out every
morning to the slaughterhouse and inspected meat which would be sent
out that day. The Communists had taken ordinary boxcars, had built
inner walls, and cut holes in the top of the roofs of the cars so that they
could load them with ice.
They would bring these cars into Shanghai, load them with ice for
24 hours, in order to cool them, and then they would fill them up with
meat and load more ice in and send them north over the ferry at
Nanking. They made fairly good progress north.
They were sending beef, pork, chicken, ducks, eggs. One man who
was in a golf tournament with me one day told me that his company
had just processed 500 pigs that day to be sent out on this trip north.
T said, "You mean 500 pigs, this day ?"
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3485
He said, "Yes, and every day."
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was this at a time when there was a surphis of food
in China ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Anything but. No, they were beginning to have a
great dearth of proteins — fish they could get, but not beef, very little
chicken — they could get pigs' feet, because pigs' feet don't ship very
easily. And you could see these fellows going through the streets all
the time with a pole and lots of pigs' feet in front and back.
Mr. SouRWiNE. They were, then, shipping food to Russia at a time
when their own people in China were starving ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, they shipped grain to India. Was there a
surplus of grain, or was that the same situation ?
Dr. DuNLOP. No; that was just a bit of face, or what have you — it
was nothing.
I was coming out of China at the time those ships were being
loaded in Shanghai, and the comments then were that China could
ill afford to send this grain anywhere, because they were trying to
import from all sources.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do the Communists engage in un-American propa-
ganda among the people of Red China ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Beginning with the attack in November of 1950 in
North Korea, they put on a very severe attack on Americans. There
were posters on all of the buildings, walls. One of the favorite places
was the pillars of the American Club, which were plastered over
with these scurrilous propaganda cartoons, for the most part.
The Chinese themselves didn't take to this readily. And many
of these posters were torn down at night, if they were in places that
were not protected.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You don't believe that all this anti-American propa-
ganda developed antagonism in the people toward individual Ameri-
cans?
Dr. DuNLOP. No, I don't.
And when we came out — it became known that we were getting
out — I was surprised at the number of Chinese friends who slipped
in before we came away, who were very anxious to have us say to
Americans, wherever we met them : "Please tell the Americans we do
not hate them" — almost in identical words.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, has America really lost China ? You have
heard the statement that America has lost China, meaning the Chinese
people are no longer friendly toward the United States. Is that true?
Dr. DuisTLOP. No, I would say not.
During the attacks in Korea and the germ warfare thing, the
Chinese would have none of it. They called it "this silly business."
They liked to label things like that "this silly business" — Oh, for
instance, the wedding business is "the red business" and the funeral
business is "the white business." So they call this "this silly business."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is there any organized resistance movement in
China against the Communists ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I think there is.
There were two former Communist generals who used to take lunch
with us in the club, the American Club, before the club was closed,
who undoubtedly were mixed up with some underground movement
3486 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
in China. They disappeared about a year after that, and I think went
to Hong Kong." But before they went, one of them told me that they
were having a meeting in Hong Kong with their agents from all
over China.
That is the last I have heard of that man. I know nothing further
about it. When I went to Hong Kong, I inquired about this man,
because he was a well-known man, the one who spoke to me, and no one
had seen him.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is there any evidence of anti-Communist guerrilla
action around Shanghai ?
Dr. DuNLOP. There was in the early days. That was very early
cleared away. But for a long time — in May 1949, when the Com-
munists came into Shanghai, we could hear sporadic firing in the
suburbs, and further out. But that ceased. Along toward the last,
we heard nothing.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, were you familiar with St. John's Uni-
versity ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I taught there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you at St. John's when it was taken over by
the Chinese Communists?
Dr. DuNLOP. I went out a few days later, and saw the smashed
windows and the bridge which had been exploded and knocked to
the ground.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Were you at St. John's or in Shanghai in early
October of 1950, when delegates of the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth came to Shanghai and visited the university ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I must have been, but I couldn't been allowed out in
that period.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know that there were Americans in that
delegation ?
Dr. DuNLOP. We heard there were ; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, I will show you a newspaper story in the
Shanghai News of Saturday, October 7. The story is headed '^WFDY
delegates invited to speak at universities." I will ask you if that
refreshes your recollection about what happened at that time.
Mr. DuNLOP. The Shanghai News was an English language Com-
munist sheet. You want specially this about St. John's University ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. We will put that in the record. Doctor. But the
question is whether that refreshes your recollection at all about what
took place at that time,
Mr. DuNLOP. I remember there was something of the sort. But
you must remember that the newspapers and communications in the
city at that time were rather poor, and many things went on that we
knew nothing about.
I knew of two men who were hand-in-hand with that group.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Who were they. Doctor?
Dr. DuNLOP. One was John Powell, son of the late Bill Powell, who
took over his father's Weekly Eeview, the China Weekly Review, and
went off the deep end with regard to communism, as did his wife, who
had been a former secretary of Mme. Sun Yat-sen.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And the other one?
Dr. DuNLOP. The other one was a man by the name of Berges. He
later went to St. John's and was an instructor there. But after the
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3487
first few weeks we didn't go out to St. John's at all, the whole thing
was closed, so no one went out there,
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr, Chairman, the doctor has opened up a couple
of lines of questioning, but to keep things in a row here, may I ask that
this Shanghai newspaper story go into the record at this point?
Senator Jenner, It may go into the record,
(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 429" and reads
as follows:)
Exhibit No. 429
[The Shanghai News, Shanghai, October 7, 1950]
WFDY Delegates Invited to Speak at Universities
AT revolutionary UNIVERSITY
A rally to welcome the WFDY delegates was held yesterday morning at 9 :30
o'clock by the students of the China Revolutionary University, including those
of the Russian Language Institute.
At the auditorium of the former Chi Nan University, the meeting proceeded in
a friendly atmosphere, and amidst a thunder of applause Chang Chun-fang, the
president of the Russian Language Institute made a welcome speech to the
delegates, which was rendered into excellent Russian by a student of the in-
stitute.
In his speech on educational activities in the Soviet Union, Valentine Vdovin,
the WFDY delegate and the acting editor of the Russian edition of the World
Youth, organ of WFDY, vividly described numerous significant achievements in
the Soviet educational and intellectual life. Owing to such achievements in
the fields of education and learning, rapid progress in the reconstruction of the
U. S. S. R. has been made possible. It was stressed that atomic energy is no
longer a secret in the Soviet Union, as it has been utilized by the people for im-
proving their standard of living. As this fact was being mentioned by the Soviet
delegate, the eager audience burst out into thunderous applause.
Following the stirring speech of the Soviet delegate, Hamou Kraba, General
Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of Algeria reported enthusiastically
to the young student fighters of China on the problems now faced by the people
of Algeria. He first gave a brief introduction of the history of his fatherland
and then dwelled on the colonial status of Algeria. He also told about the
liberation movement carried on by the people of Algeria.
The meeting concluded after student representatives had presented embroid-
ered banners to the WFDY delegates.
Twelve Soviet professors of the Russian Language Institute also attended the
welcome meeting.
At St. John's University
At 9 :30 a. m. yesterday, two WFDY delegates, Comrades Robert N. Ebbels of
Australia and Selma Weiss of the United States, were guest speakers at a meet-
ing sponsored by the students of St. John's University, Great China University,
and three high schools, at the Social Hall of St. John's University.
Present at the meeting were some 1,500 students and professors of these in-
stitutions.
The distinguished WFDY visitors were welcomed by rousing cheers from
the eagerly waiting audience.
Comrade Ebbels, who is a member of the Executive Committee of the Inter-
national Union of Students, delivered a short and interesting report on the suc-
cessful achievements of the Second World Students Conference which was held
in Prague last August. He particularly pointed out that the sole aim of the
second conference was to call for further unity among all students over the
world in defending world peace and in fighting for democratic education as well
as for a better future.
Miss Weiss made an inspiring speech, revealing the true facts concerning the
democratic youth of America who earnestly seek peace and have been fighting
for it, but who have been ruthlessly frustrated by their reactionary government.
She believes that with the valuable experiences drawn from the two great
revolutions of the U. S. S. R. and of China, the American people, especially the
youth, will soon win liberation.
93215— .57— pt 52 3
3488 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, I show you another clipping from the
Shanghai News of October 5, 1950. It shows the pictures of the
delegates to this so-called World Federation of Democratic Youth,
and I call your attention to two of the pictures which are underlined,
being Americans in both instances, Selma Weiss, who was Harvey
Matusow's girl friend, and David McCamis.
I would like to have you glance over these and tell us if there are
any of those pictures that you recognize.
Dr. DuNLOP. I am afraid not. They probably passed me on the
street in one of these swanky buses, and I probably turned up my
nose at them.
Mr. SouEwiNE. I ask that this go in the record — not the pictures,
but the caption.
Senator Jenner. It may go in.
(The caption for the pictures of the delegates referred to above
was marked "Exhibit No. 430" and reads as follows :)
Exhibit No. 430
WFDY delegates: From left to right, upper row: 1. Robert Noel Ebbels,
member of the Executive Committee of the lUS and representative of the
Australian Democratic Youth. 2. Vladimir Semitchastny, Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League. 3. Lidiya
Ilina, Director of the Young Pioneers Department of the Central Committee of
the Komsomal. 4. Valentine Vdovin, acting editor of the Russian version of
the World Youth, organ of WFDY and USSR delegate. 5. Chun Cheng Hwan,
delegate of Korean democratic youth. 6. Vu Xuan Vinh, representative of Viet-
Nam democratic youth. 7. Wladyslaw Goralski, Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Union of Polish Youth. 8. Alois Svoboda, editor of the Mlada
Fronta, organ of the Czechoslovakia Union of Youth. 9. Hartwig Helmut, Cen-
tral Committee member of the Free German Youth. 10. Pascu Stefanescu,
Central Committee and Political Bureau member of the Union of Working
Youth of Rumania. 11. Cornel Raducano, chief editor of Scanteia Tineretului,
organ of the Rumanian UOWY. 12. Jano Birmann, representing the Union of
Working Youth of Hungary. 13. George Vasilev Manafov, editor-in-chief of the
Noradna Mlodech of the Dimitrov's Union of the People's Youth of Bulgaria.
14. Quamil Buxheli, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Work-
ing Youth of Albania. 15. Natsogdorzh, Central Committee member of the
Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. 16. Sandag, Central Committee mem-
ber of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League.
Lower row : 17. Ishkhand, doctor from the Choilbasan University of Mon-
golia. 18. Rangit Guha, head of the WFDY Bureau for Youth fighting against
Colonialism and delegate of Indian democratic youth. 19. Roger Guibert, Exec-
utive Bureau member of the National Committee of the Union of Republican
Youth of France. 20. Lidie Maiorelli, Central Committee member of the Fed-
eration of Communist Youth of Italy. 21. Saverio Tutino, editor of Gioventu
Nuova, organ of Italian FOCY. 22. Selma Weiss, director of the Student's De-
partment of Labour Youth League of USA. 23. David Graham MacAnns (sic),
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Young Progressives of America.
24. Dick Nettleton, chief of the Organisation Department of the Young Com-
munist League of Great Britain. 25. Flavio Bravo, President of the Socialist
Youth of Cuba. 26. Hans Grumm, delegate from the Free Austrian Youth.
27. Hamou Kraba, General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of
Algeria. 28. Palle Voigt, chief editor of Framad (Forward), organ of Young
Communist League of Denmark. 29. Omar Walmsley, delegate of Canadian
democratic youth. 30. Unto Minttinen, delegate of Finnish democratic youth.
31. Jacob Wolff, Central Committee member of the Netherlands Youth League.
32. Mou Mouni Abdou, representative of the Rally of African Democratic Youth.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Doctor, what effect would a meeting like this World
Federation of Democratic Youth have on non-Conununist Americans
and Chinese, if you know ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3489
Dr. DuNLOP. I think it would have none. And I think we out
there felt that all of these peace movements, and all of these various
things that took place at that time, were merely window dressing.
They were like ships that pass in the night ; we paid little attention
to them.
Mr. SouEwiNE. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I ask that an-
other clipping from the Shanghai News of September 23, 1950, with
the headlines "World youth delegation given rousing welcome at
Peking," be put in the record at this point.
Senator Jenner. It may go in.
(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 431" and
reads as follows :)
Exhibit No. 431
[Shanghai News, September 23, 1950]
World Youth Delegation Given Rousing Welcome at Peking
Peking, Sept. 23. — (Hsinhua) — Delegates of the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth — 42 youth leaders representing 32 countries — arrived in Peking
this morning after spending 12 days visiting various cities in Manchuria.
The platform of Peking's railway station was packed with leaders of the gov-
ernment and popular organizations, the Mayor of Peking, members of the
diplomatic corps, heroes of the army and of labour, and representatives of
China's young people. As the delegates stepped off the train, they disappeared
under a mass of llowers showered on them by Young Pioneers and then ran a
gauntlet of handshakes as they left the station.
The delegates from Korea, Viet-Nam, and Africa especially were surrounded
by eager groups who wanted to shake hands, pat them on the back or find some
way of showing their affection for these frontline figbtei-s; for democracy.
KEVOLUTIONAKY GREIETINGS
Outside the station, the Chien Men Square was packed with thousands of
Peking's youth, gathered under crowded red silk banners and massed portraits
of democratic leaders of the world. On a plinth backed by flags of all nations,
Liao Cheng-chih, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth,
welcomed the visitors. He said, "We welcome with elation you young fighters
who are defending world peace. The banner of unity of all world's youth — borne
by the delegation of the World Federation of Democratic Youth is warmly
welcomed in China.
"On behalf of the youth of China, I bring revolutionary greetings to you and
the democratic youth of the world whom you represent. Your courageous fight
and industrious work are striking powerful blows in the cause of defending
world iieace and have always been an inspiration to Chinese youth who are
with you in that fight."
Amid long ovations he saluted the youth of the Soviet Union, of Korea, and
Viet-Nam, of the new democracies and colonial and capitalist countries — all
the youth fighting for freedom, peace, and democracy.
CELEBRATE NATIONAL DAY
Enrico Boceara, of Italy, leader of the delegation, said that the delegates
had been overwhelmed by the profound enthusiasm, fraternity, and strong dis-
play of international solidarity with which the youth and' whole people of
China had welcomed them.
"All young partisans of peace throughout the world," he said, "will be with
you with their whole heart to celebrate the great day of October 1, the anni-
versary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.
"We come to salute your great victories, your great successes in building up
the now China. We come to pay homage to your people, your youth, and your
great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung. We come to dip our flags in memory
of the heroes who have died for the birth of a free and democratic new China,
who have fallen in the cause of progressive mankind.
3490 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
"In the hard struggle against warmongers, the young partisans of peace
throughout the world will know on our return that they can rely on the Chinese
youth who are determined to bar the way to the imperialists and establish peace.
PEACE FORCE POWERFUL
"They will know that, through your victories, the peace forces will be ever
more powerful than the forces of war and that our ideal of truth and liberty
will triumph over lies and oppression."
Vladimir Semitchastny, leader of the Soviet delegation, thanked the govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people and their youth for
the welcome they had received, and said, "We have come to Peking on the
eve of celebrations marking the first anniversary of the establishment of the
People's Republic of China. All of the delegates are convinced of the remarkable
successes achieved by the people under the leadership of the Communist Party
of China and its leader Mao Tse-tung in all sections of administrative and cul-
tural life of the country.
"Victory of the Chinese people in its war of liberation, successes of the first
year in social, economic, political, and cultural reconstruction are a new blow
to the whole present-day imperialist system."
ADVANCED NATION
"Soviet youth follow with great attention the building up of the young People's
Republic of China. They greet with joy each success achieved by the Chinese
people and their youth.
"There is no doubt whatsoever that the two largest units of the World Feder-
ation of Democratic Youth — Soviet and Chinese youths — will in future do every-
thing to strengthen the camp of peace and democracy.
"We profoundly believe that the day is not far off when the whole of China's
territory will be united under the banner of the People's Republic of China.
The day is near when the Chinese people and its youth will overcome all diflS-
culties and under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and Comrade
Mao Tse-tung will reconstruct the country and make it into an advanced nation."
The following delegates have arrived in Peking :
LIST OF DELEGATES
Enrico Boccara, head of the delegation. General Secretary of the World Feder-
ation of Democratic Youth and representative of Italy.
Robert Noel Ebbels, member of the Executive Committee of the lUS and rep-
resentative of the Australian Democratic Youth.
Ekbatani, delegate from the lUS and representative of the Iranian democratic
youth.
Vladimir Semitchastny, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Lenin Young Communist League.
Lidiya Ilina, Director of the Young Pioneers Department of the Central Com-
mittee of the Komsomal.
Valentine Vdovin, acting editor of the Russian version of the World Youth,
organ of WFDY and USSR delegate.
Chun Cheng Hwan, delegate of Korean democratic youth.
Vu Xuan Vinh, representative of Viet-Nam democratic youth.
Wladyslaw Goralski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of
Polish Youth.
Alois Svoboda, editor of the Mlada Fronta, organ of the Czechoslovakia
Union of Youth.
Hartwig Helmut, Central Committee member of the Free German Youth.
Pascu Stefanescu, Central Committee and Political Bureau member of the
Union of Working Youth of Rumania.
Cornel Raducano, chief editor of Scanteia Tineretului, organ of the Rumanian
UOWY.
Jano Birmann, representing the Union of Working Youth of Hungary.
George Vasilev Manafov, editor-in-chief of the Noradna Mlodech of the Dimi-
trov's Union of the People's Youth of Bulgaria.
Quamil Buxheli, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Working
Youth of Albania.
Natsogdorzh, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary
Youth League.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3491
Sandag, Central Committee member of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth
League.
Ishkhand, doctor from the Choilbasan University of Mongolia.
Rangit Guha, head of the WFDY Bureau for Youth fighting against Colonial-
ism and delegate of Indian democratic youth.
Slamet, delegate of the Indonesian democratic youth.
Tha Hia, delegate of the Burmese democratic youth.
Roger Guibert, Executive Bureau member of the National Committee of
the Union of Republican Youth of France.
Lidie Maiorelli, Central Committee member of the Federation of Communist
Youth of Italy.
Saverio Tutino, editor of Gioventu Nuova, organ of Italian FOCY.
Selma Weiss, director of the Student's Department of Labour Youth League
of USA.
David Graham MacAnns (sic), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Young Progressives of America.
Dick Nettleton, chief of the Organisation Department of the Young Commu-
nist League of Great Britain.
Mese, representing the Federation of the United Socialist Youth of the Repub-
lic of Spain.
Jandro, representing the Spanish FOUSY.
Mitsos Kipouros, delegate of the Greek democratic youth.
Mansouri Kazem, delegate of the Iranian democratic youth.
Abdilkarim Mouhallami, delegate from the Union of People's Youth of Syria.
Flavio Bravo, President of the Socialist Youth of Cuba.
Hans Grumm, delegate from the Free Austrian Youth.
Hamou Kraba. General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Youth of Algeria.
Paile Voigt, chief editor of Framad (Forward), organ of Young Communist
League of Denmark.
Omar AValmsley, delegate of Canadian democratic youth.
Unto Minttinen, delegate of Finnish democratic youth.
Jacob Wolff, Central Committee member of the Netherlands Youth League.
Salvador Dias, delegate of the Democratic Youth of Brazil.
Mou Mouni Abdou, representative of the Rally of African Democratic Youth.
Mr. SouKwiNE. That clipping also reflects the presence of Amer-
icans.
And this clipping headed "WFDY Press Conference in Prague on
China Tour," showing that the Americans were still there as they
toured, I ask that this be put in the record.
Senator Jenner. That may go into the record.
(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 432" and
reads as follows:)
Exhibit No. 432
[Shanghai News, November 1950]
WFDY Press Conference in Prague on China Tour
Prague, November 14. — (Hsinhua) — The delegates of the World Federation of
Democratic Youth who have been visiting China have arrived here on their way
home. They attended the celebrations of first anniversary of the Chinese People's
Republic during their 42-day visit to China and participated in the celebration
of the 33d anniversary of October Revolution in Moscow. Among those who have
arrived here are the leaders of young progressives of Italy, Britain, United
States of America, Holland, Austria, Cuba, Brazil, Greece, Syria, French West
Africa, and Algeria.
This afternoon the delegates met some 30 Czechoslovak and other journalists
here in a press conference organized jointly by the Czechoslovak Ministry of In-
formation and Culture and the Union of Czechoslovak Youth.
UNBREAKABLE SOLIDARITY
Saverio Tutino, Italian delegate, controlling his emotion with some diificulty,
told the reporters of the unbreakable solidarity of Chinese youth with their
fighting Korean brothers. He said that the delegates were elated to learn,
3492 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES
while they were in Moscow, of the joint declaration of Chinese democratic
parties on Chinese volunteers to Korea.
Answering a question on the reception given by Chinese youth to American dele-
gates, David MacAnns (sic), American delegate, a Negro, replied that the Chinese
youth know full well the distinction between the American people and the
American imperialists who are threatening the world with a new war. He related
that a special meeting for Negro delegates was arranged by the Chinese youth
as a sign of deep concern felt by the Chinese youth with regard to world's
oppressed people.
Bert Williams, secretary of V^FDT, said that all the delegates, many of whom
have already returned to their respective countries, would certainly make best
use of their experience in China and pass it on to their fellow countrymen. At
the end of the conference, delegates all rose and sang in Chinese, Red in the East
to express their respect to the Chinese people and their great leader, Chairman
Mao Tse-tung.
Mr. SouKvviNE. Now, you mentioned a man named Berges and a man
named Powell. Is that William Berges ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I don't remember his first name, but I rather think
that is what it was.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know a Capt. Gerald Tannebaum ?
Dr. DuNLOP. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Walter Illsley, who was at one time
with UNRRA, and was fired ?
Dr. DuNLOP. No.
Mr. SouR^vINE. He signed anti- American letters in the China Re-
view.
Mr. DuNLOP. No, I wouldn't — we rarely read those things : we ob-
jected to them so much. And that name didn't strike a chord of any
sort.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I have one more clipping, Mr. Chairman, to offer
at this time. It is also from the Shanghai News of October 29. The
headline is "WFDY Delegates Tell Their Impression of China."
And the lead is an interview with David G. McCanns, who was a
United States citizen, who was present at this conference.
Senator Jenner. It may go m the record.
(The article above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 433" and
reads as follows:)
Exhibit No. 433
[The Shanghai News, Shanghai, October 29, 1950]
WFDY Delegates Tell Theik Impression of China
David G. MacAnns (sic) (USA), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Young Progressives of America
Premier Chou En-lai has announced to the world that the Chinese People's
Republic loves peace and desires peace ardently. At the same time, he has said
that the Chinese people shall stand firm against any imperialistic aggression
which threatens the soil of China.
A people's china
The Delegation of World Federation of Democratic Youth has spent more than
a month in the new China. We have traveled from the north border, touching
the Soviet Union, through Northeast China, to Dairen, around to Peking, and
south to Shanghai and Canton. We have had the honour to participate in the
historic celebration of the first birthday of the People's Republic of China. We
have visited your factories and schools. We have seen the historic sites from
north to south of the heroic struggle of the people of China for liberation from
the oppression of feudalism and imperialist domination ; from the despotic, cor-
rupt rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his willing assistants the United States impe-
rialists. Everywhere we have seen the determination of the youth and people of
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3493
China to build a new China, a people's China, which, in every way, serves the
interest of the common people of China, a China which stands as a mighty
fortress alongside the great Soviet Union, in the cause of a lasting peace for all
mankind.
BRIGHT FACES
This determination shows itself no less in the strong, bright faces of the young
men and women of the People's Liberation Army of China. Young men and
women, many of whom themselves participated in the glorious struggle of libera-
tion, and many more who follow in the footsteps of the victorious revolutionary
traditions of the People's Liberation Army. We have seen how these bright
faces glow brighter at the mention of the name of the Commander and Chief of
the People's Liberation Army, General Chu Teh, and chief of new China, Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung.
We have seen these faces from north to south, intent with listening to the
accounts of the struggles of democratic youth the world over ; the Soviet youth,
youth from People's Democracies, colonial and semicolonial youth, youth from
the capitalist countries. Time and time again we have seen the People's Libera-
tion Army men and women warmly and enthusiastically embrace the uniformed,
fighting youth of Korea and Vietnam.
INCREDIBLE IN U. S. A.
In Mukden I had the honor to talk, for some time, with a fighting hero, Yuan
Chu-mo. Yuan Chu-mo won his honor because in his company, for 3 whole years,
no man or woman committed an act against the regulations. To me, coming
from the United States and having spent 3 years in the U. S. Army, for one year
of which I was a commissioned officer, this achievement is incredible. This
could only have been possible because Yuan Chu-mo, himself, knew intimately
why he was a member of the People's Liberation Army, and why he carried a gun
and why he fought. He understood that he, as a member of the People's
Liberation Army, fought in the interest of the common people of China. He
knew that he fought against the worst enemies of the Chinese people, imperialism
and its lackey, Chiang Kai-shek. He knew that the gun was the only guarantee
of defeat over the enemy, who itself carried a gun against the people. He was
confident of victory for he knew he, together with his comrades, stood on the side
of righteousness and truth.
Only because he knew these things well, was he able to educate the troops of
his company to such an understanding of the principle of service to the people.
Only because he knew and understood the fondest hopes and aspirations of the
men of his company for a bright future, and their willingness to take up arms
against anyone who threatened those hopes and aspirations, could he have
gained such confidence and respect, realized such discipline from his troops.
PARTY AND CHAIRMAN MAO
And how did he come to understand these things? How was it that he was
able to impart this understanding to his troops? When I asked Yuan Chu-mo
the question, he answered me very simply, "It was because of the education I
received from the Communist Party," he said. "It was because of the correct
leadership of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung."
Let the imperialist warmongers of my country take notice. An army whose
men and women understand why they fight ; an army whose men and women are
united firmly with the people ; an army whose men and women are themselves
united under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's
Government, such an army is invincible. Such an arm.v stands in the frontlines
in defense of the People's Republic of China, against the provocations of
Imperialists. Such an army stands in defense of the desires of the working
people of China and of the whole world for a lasting peace and a bright future.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Wliat can you tell us about Berges, the gentleman
you mentioned ?
Dr. DuNLOP. It is all hearsay. I saw Berges on occasions at the
American Club with Jolin Powell at luncheontime. I don't think I
ever spoke to him. He was a taller man than John Powell, as I remem-
ber liim. And they never associated with any of the other Americans
in the club ; as a rule, they sat by themselves.
3494 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The only thing that I heard otherwise about Berges was that he
carried a flag in one of the parades which were so common in the first
few months of the Communist occupation of Shanghai.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know anything about his attendance at a
meeting of 2,000 professors in the Grand Theatre in Shanghai'^
Dr. DuNLOP. I have heard that there was such a meetmg, but that is
all I know.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you meet Mr. Berges ?
Dr. DuNLOP. No ; I wouldn't say that I met him. I saw him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Sidney Shapiro ?
Dr. DuNLOP. That is a familiar name, but I don't place him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know what part was played in the anti-
American activities in Shanghai by Mr. Berges?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I would say as — I won't be definite about this —
I felt he was with Powell in this Review, this Weekly Review.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is all j^ou can testify to ?
Dr. DuNLOP. That is all I know about it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I have two affidavits
signed by the Reverend Gerard McKernan, which I would like to offer
for the record.
If the committee desires to call this man as a witness, it can be done.
The first of these is an affidavit as follows :
I, Gerald M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen, do declare
and affirm :
That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954 —
I will pause at that point.
. Do you know Father McKernan ?
Dr. DuNLOP. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE (continuing the affidavit) :
That I personally know John Powell, formerly editor of the China Weekly
Review, and Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), associate of Mme. Sun Yat-sen in wel-
fare work :
That Mrs. Powell (nee Sylvia Campbell) was also associated with Mme. Sun
Yat-sen in welfare work ;
That I did actually see both John Powell and Gerald Tannenbaum on at least
two occasions riding in official Communist government cars in the streets of
Shanghai.
Senator Jenner. That may go in the record.
(The affidavit of Gerard M, McKernan, dated July 18, 1955, was
marked "Exhibit No. 433-A" and reads as follows :)
Exhibit No. 433-A
Affidavit of Gebard McKernan
Senator James O. Eastland,
Chairman, Internal Security Sul)comtnittee,
United States Senate. Washington, D. C.
I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen do declare
and affirm,
That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954;
That I personally know John Powell, formerly editor of the China Weekly
Review and Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), associate of Mme. Sun Yat-sen in welfare
work;
That Mrs. Powell (nee Sylvia Campbell) was also associated with Mme. Sun
Yat-sen in welfare work ;
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3495
That I did actually see both John Powell and Gerald Tannenbaum on at least
two occasions riding in official Communist government cars in the streets of
Shanghai.
(Signed) Gerard McKkrnan.
Date : July 18, 1955.
Signed before me at Ridgewood, N. J.
(Signed) Nataije F. Larsex, Notary Public.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The other affidavit, dated August 5, 1955, reads as
follows :
I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic Priest and Canadian citizen, do dechire
and affirm :
That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 19-54 ;
That Mr. William Berges held up the delivery of UNICEF supplies until
Communist attack on Shanghai was imminent, then turned over all supplies
to the SFER (Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief), the official Commu-
nist welfare group of Shanghai ;
That at a general meeting of all welfare groups called by Chou En-lai and
held in Peiping (spring of 1951), Chou En-lai stated at one of these sessions
that "the party must do something for Mr. Berges, because of the help that he —
]Mr. Berges —
"had given the Communist Party welfare efforts in Shanghai'' ;
That Mr. Berges' closest friends in Shanghai were Anna Huang (a Russian
married and separated from a Dr. Huang). Mrs. Huang was an admitted
Communist and worked with the China Welfare Fund (Mme. Sun Yat-sen's wel-
fare organization) —
I will pause there, Mr. Chairman, and ask the witness :
Did you know Anna Huang?
Dr. DuNLAP. No, I can't identify her.
Mr. SouRwiNE (continuing) :
Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), also an admitted Communist, with the China
Welfare Fund ; Mrs. John Powell and her husband, Mr. John Powell, who also
took part in Communist activities and organizations ;
That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum in an argument with me regarding his Com-
munist activities stated "You will never change my mind" ;
That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum gave frequently the "clenched fist salute"
at the "Down with America sessions" which occurred at the end of most welfare
meetings ;
That Mr. John Powell and Mr. Gerald Tannenbaum investigated a house (at
the time occupied by an American citizen, later arrested) to check on the house's
suitability as a Communist child center.
I ask that that may go in the record.
Senator Jenner. It may go in.
(The August 5, 1955, affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 434" and
reads as follows :)
Exhibit No. 434
Affidavit of Rev. Gerard M. McKernan
August 5, 1955.
Senator James O. Eastland,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. 6.:
I, Gerard M. McKernan, a Catholic priest and Canadian citizen, do declare and
affirm —
That I was a resident of Shanghai from 1949 until July 1954 ;
That Mr. William Berges held up delivery of UNICEF supplies until Com-
munist attack on Shanghai was imminent, then turned over all supplies to the
SFER (Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief), the official Communist
welfare group of Shanghai ;
That at a general meeting of all welfare groups called by Chou En-lai and held
in Peiping (spring of 1951), Chou En-lai stated at one of the sessions, "that
93215— 57— pt. 52 4
3496 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
the party must do something for Mr. Berges, because of the help he (Mr. Berges)
had given the Communist Party welfare efforts in Shanghai" ;
That Mr. Berges' closest friends in Shanghai were Anna Huang (a Russian
married and separated from a Dr. Huang). Mrs. Huang was an admitted Com-
munist and worked with the China Welfare Fund (Mme. Sun Yat-sen's welfare
organization) ; Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum (sic), also an admitted Communist
with the China Welfare Fund; Mrs. John Powell and her husband, Mr. John
Powell, who took part in Communist activities and organizations ;
That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum in an argument with me regarding his Com-
munist activities stated, "You will never change my mind" ;
That Capt. Gerald Tannenbaum gave frequently the "clenched fist salute"
and the "down with America sessions," which occurred at the end of most wel-
fare meetings ;
That Mr. John Povpell and Mr. Gerald Tannenbaum investigated a house (at the
time occupied by an American citizen, later arrested) to check on the house's
suitability as a Communist child center.
(Signed) Gerard M. McKernan
(Rev. Gerard M. McKernan).
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of August 1955, a notary public
in the District of Columbia.
(Signed) Margaret M. Zemo, Notary Public.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Doctor, was that a common occurrence, for Com-
munist teams to investigate homes occupied by private citizens, when
they wanted to use them for something, and then ousted the citizens
and took over?
Dr. DuNLOP. Well, I had that experience in one of my own moves,
we had to get out after they had investigated to see whether or not
it would meet their needs.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, having mentioned Mr. Berges, I
have here 3 clippings which bear on the subject — 2 clippings; 1 am
sorry — on the subject of his activities.
I ask that they may go in the record at this point.
Senator Jenner. They may become part of the official record of this
committee.
(The clippings referred to, were marked "Exhibits Nos. 434-A and
434-B" and read as follows:)
Exhibit No. 434-A
[Shanghai News, December 15, 1950]
Two Thousand Professors Here Hold Rally and Parade To Resist United
States, Aid Korea
A grand rally was held by 2,000 professors at the Grand Theater yesterday
morning to demonstrate their strong determination to resist Inited States ag-
gression and aid Korea in the interest of national security and defense.
The rally was followed by an orderly parade along Shanghai's busiest thorough-
fares with thousands of voices sht)uting such slogans as: "Down with American
iniperialisu)" and "Resist United States aggression," which resounded all the way
from the Grand Theater through Nanking Road and on to Honau Road, where
the paraders turned in the direction of Foochow Road. Vociferous cheers min-
gled with warm api»lause from students, who lined both sides of the roads,
greeted the professoi-s to express their common stand with their teachers.
The professors carried banners, pictures and cartoons depicting the mighty
strength of the peace-loving people of the world against the warmongers. The
procession was led by motorcycles to open the way for the militant marching
professors who came from 39 local colleges and institutions.
parade starts
A band compo.sed of police cadres struck up a march as the professors opened
the parade in front of the race course a little after 11 a. in. The parade pre-
sented the impression of a forest of portraits, placards, banners, etc. to show the
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3497
professors' resolute will to take part in the patriotic movement and to stir stu-
dents to defend their country in face of United States aggression.
AT THE RALLY
Earlier in the rally, Cheng Wangtao, who was the chairman, declared that
the professors will demonstrate their patriotism by firmly supporting and en-
couraging their students to translate their love for the country into action in
defense of the country.
Tremendous clapping followed the speeches of four professors, among them
Pan Cheng-liang of Chiaotung University, and Wu Chee-nan of Futan Univer-
sity, who told the rally in deep emotional tones that they have encouraged
their own sons and daughters to enlist for the nation's defense work.
The rally resolved to adopt the program of action previously outlined by
Shanghai's higher educational workers and pledged to carry out same. The
resolution was contained in a message to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
MESSAGE TO VOLUNTEE^.S
Another message was sent by the professors to the Chinese volunteers in
which, they declared, inter alia, that the victory in Pyongyang scored by the
KPA and the Chinese volunteers had smashed the so-called general offensive
which was intended as the final episode of the United States campaign before
the GI's invading Korea returned home for Christmas as MacArthur pompously
announced.
The message pledged to back the volunteers with concrete action both spirit-
ually and materially on the part of the professors in order to preserve world
peace.
The rally sent still another message of greetings to patriotic Chinese pro-
fessors in Christian universities in the city, calling on them to expose Amer-
ican aggression on the cultural front in China. The message greeted the mission
university professors for the bold stand which they made previously to resist
American aggression.
Finally the rally resolved to coordinate their classwork with the study of
international events to whip up further patriotic sentiments.
At the conclusion of the rally, 2,000 professors and thousands more of stu-
dents and people wbo thronged the streets joined in a final roar of righteous
indignation expressive of their grim determination to resist United States
aggression, amidst the explosion of firecrackers, the noise of cheering squads,
gongs, cymbals, etc.
Practically every window and balcony was packed with onlookers to watch
the procession, never witnessed before in Shanghai.
AMERICAN AND SOVIET PROFESSORS PARTICIPATE
Among the professors was William C. Berges of the American-missionary
founded St. John's L'niversity, who carried a placard urging Chinese students
to take up their national defense tasks.
Soviet professors from the Russian Commercial Institute of Shanghai were
also in the procession, carrying with them the national flag of People's China
and the famous hammer and sickle flag of U. S. S. R., symbolizing the solidarity
of the two nations.
Militant and patriotic songs signifying their readiness to face any eventuality
were sung by students. The marching professors, four abreast, smiled when
they recognized their own students from among the crowds that jammed the
sidewalks.
Cheers were especially loud and thrilling when the presidium of prominent
professors with garlands, were welcomed by students in the balcony at the
corner of Foochow Road, the "Street of Culture" known as the center of the
largest bookstores, and Honan Road.
PROFESSOR W. C. BERGES' STATEMENT
In an interview with a reporter of the Shanghai News, an American professor,
William C. Berges, of St. John's University, made the following statement:
"This meeting of the university professors of Shanghai, which I am honored
to attend, is a moving and powerful expression of a tine people, a determined
people to defend their democratic, peaceful life from American imperialist
aggression.
3498 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
"PEOGKESSIVE AMERICAN
"As one of the hundreds of thousands of progressive Americans, I fully sup-
port the Chinese people's mass movement to defend their own country from
aggression and to help the Korean people.
"This meeting has great meaning for all Americans, especially for the mothers
of America whose sons have been needlessly sacrificed in Korea.
"Unless American imperialist aggression is checked, thousands and millions
of mothers in America and elsewhere will weep for their sons.
"The extension of American aggression must and shall be stopped by the
people's might, however. The glorious victory of the Korean People's Army
and the Chinese people's volunteers, the Vietnamese people, etc. show clearly
that the final victory belongs to the people.
"The American people join with all peoples of the world in resolutely de-
fending peace and putting an end to Wall Street imperialist aggression."
Exhibit No. 434-B
[Shanghai News, December 15, 1950]
Nanking Student's Accusation Group Welcomed at St. John's Rally
Signifying the solidarity of the students of missionary schools in Nanking,
Shanghai, a warm welcome was extended to the representatives from Nanking's
Ginling College and Nanking University by the over 1,000 students, professors, and
^vorkers of St. John's University and 51 other schools yesterday afternoon at
the social hall of St. John's.
The group of 6 from Nanking, 3 representing Ginling College, and the others
Nanking University, reached Shanghai yesterday on a mission to lay before
the Shanghai students the accusation of the insults made against the Chinese
people by three Americans professors, H. Ferris of Ginling College, C. Riggs and
A. Roy of Nanking University.
anti-united states patriotic rally
The first appearance before the students of Shanghai's missionary schools was
at yesterday's anti-United States patriotic rally held by the professors, students,
and workers of St. John's University.
The gathering, \^hich started at 3 p. m. yesterday, first heard a speech by
Prof. Liu Ke-liu of the department of journalism. He was followed by two
professors of Kwanghau University, who were all former professors in St.
John's but had left the university in 192.5 for protesting against the insults of the
late Hav. ks Pott. They further aroused the indignation of the students against
imperialists by recounting their own experiences under the highhanded dis-
criminative measures of the American school authorities.
The gathering then heard of the accusations made by a Ginling girl student
named Chung Yu-cheng who, together with five other representatives from
Nanking, stepped onto the platform amidst thunderous applause and cheers. In
eloquent and forceful words, she told in detail the story of Helen Ferris' insults
against Chinese people and the indignation of Nanking students which won deep
sympathy and strong support from the audience.
AMERICAN PROFESSOR SUPPORT
The other speaker at the meeting was an American professor of St. John's
University, named William C. Berges.
As one of the peaceloving people, he pledged himself to support wholeheartedly
the protest of the Chinese students against Austin's shameless slanders. His
address earned the warmest applause from all those present at the rally.
Before the closing of the rally, a draft message for Wu Hsiu-chuan to be
forwarded to the U. N. in protest against Austin's slanders, which was written by
representatives of seven Christian colleges in Shanghai and Nanking, was read
and duly endorsed by the professors, students, and workers of St. John's
University.
The meeting came to a close at 5 : 30 after singing in unison the Chinese national
anthem and shouting numerous slogans.
Following is the full text of Mr. Berges' speech at the meeting :
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3499
BERGES SPEECH
"Students, faculty members, and workers: I take my stand as one of the
American people fully supporting your protest movement against Austin's hypo-
critical statement that the missionary colleges in China were an example of
America's "friendship" for China. By such arrogant nonsense Austin may
liope to fool some people in the West; but he cannot fool the Chinese people,
who no longer are forced to obey Austin nor his missionary teachers.
"Who is Austin? A tool of the American monopolists — the ruling clique that is
now responsible for the aggressive war against the Korean people. Before lib-
eration this same ruling clique used the missionary colleges in China as an im-
portant part of their attempt to put China and the Chinese people under their
control.
"What was the result of missionary education? Chinese students were led to
turn their backs upon their own country and their own people, and to look toward
American 'culture,' represented by cheap, sensational, and often harmful
Hollywood films, as their model.
"Shanghai especially was full of young people who envied the purely material
aspects of American life, and who tried to be as 'American' in their thoughts
and actions as possible. Now many of them realize the harm they have suf-
fered, and are acquiring a new outlook. In response to popular demand, the
theaters have stopped showing American films, and gradually the missionary uni-
versities will rid themselves of American educational methods and materials left
from the past, which are unsuitable for the new China.
"Again let me assure you of my wholehearted support in your exposui'e of
Austin's shameless lie and your condemnation of the insult he offered to the
Chinese people. I know that all progressive Americans, here and in the United
States support your movement, which is part of the larger one of defending your
country from imperialist aggression in any form. You have our sympathy and
our active cooperation, whenever you request it, in building a strong and inde-
pendent China, a people's China, a new China with a glorious future."
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, are there any points that we have not cov-
ered here concerning which you have information, that you think
would be of vahie to the committee ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I have just this one point that I would like to make.
There has been a great deal said about the so-called overseas Chinese
group and their attitude toward Communist China. I saw what might
be called the overseas group or the out-of -China group in Hong Kong.
In the beginning, that Hong Kong group was rather pro-Commu-
nist. And then after the attack on the merchants, they turned dia-
metrically against it. And when I was in Hong Kong there was great
antagonism toward the Communists.
For instance, the Communist flag was put up in only five places in
Hong Kong on October 1, which is the Communist national holiday,
on October 1 of 1952, whereas there had been hundreds of Communist
flags 3 years before.
Now, the point I want to call attention to is the question of whether
or not the overseas Chinese have been brought back to the point where
they are more in favor of the Communist group.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You are not questioning that the Communists are
making a determined effort to achieve that, you are questioning
whether they are successful in that territory ; is that right ?
Dr. DuNLOP. That is right.
I understand that they are trying to bring them back. From my
observation, I would say that, at the moment, especially when there is
a renewed effort on the part of the Communists to intimidate overseas
Chinese in respect to their own families in China — that was done a
number of years ago, it has been renewed — that now the overseas Chi-
nese are inclined not to say anything which would bring about reper-
cussions in China.
3500 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
I personally feel that it is important that the overseas Chinese do
not swing back to the Communists, because they are an important —
they have an important backing; to give the Nationalist group, and if
the Nationalist group were to lose them and they would go back, I
think tlsere would be a loss of morale which would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States in the Far East.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Doctor, if we should recognize Red China and they
should be admitted to the United Nations, what would be the effect
upon this group of Chinese outside of China whom you say are so
important ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I think there would be an inclination on their part to
swing back to Communist China. And I think that would be dis-
astrous.
Mr. SouR"\viNE. You think that would be disastrous ?
Dr. DuNLOP. I do.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jenner. I have no further questions. Doctor.
We certainly appreciate your appearing before our committee and
giving us this valuable information.
Mr. Sour WINE. We have another witness. Mr. Morris, the chief
counsel, will interrogate him.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, would you come forward, please '?
Senator Jenner. Admiral, do you swear the testimony given in this
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God ?
Admiral Cooke. I do.
Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris.
TESTIMONY OF ADM. CHARLES N. COOKE, ITNITED STATES NAVY,
RETIRED, SONOMA, CALIF.
Mr. Morris. Senator, while en route to Honolulu last year, I stopped
off to see Adiiiiral Cooke in California.
You are Aclm. Charles Cooke, and you reside in Sonoma, just north
of San Francisco?
Admiral Cooke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. While I was there I took some Q and A testimony
from Admiral Cooke, and there was no Senator present. While Ad-
miral Cooke is here in the East, I would like to ask him if he will,
in the presence of the Senator, state that the testimony that I took at
that time, as counsel for the committee, is accurate.
Admiral Cooke. Yes.
I have been furnished a copy of this transcript, and everything in
there is true — there is a slight correction as to the circumstances con-
nected with General Fortier coming to Formosa at the time, which
is corrected in a later issue — it doesn't make any difference.'
Senator Jenner. The corrections have been made ?
Admiral Cooke. I don't know whether it is in there or not ; I have
called it to the attention of the counsel.
Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, the subject of that particular hearing
was misinformation given out by our State Department officials, or
some of our State Department officials, which information proved to be
1 The testimony of Admiral Cooke on October 7, 1956, Is printed in pt. 36, beginning at
p. 2061.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3501
helpful to the Communist cause and detrimental to the cause of the
United States.
At the same time, I would like to offer for the record, Senator, an
exchange of correspondence, or memorandums, introduced by John
K. Emmerson. I think that Mr. McManus, who is here today, is fa-
miliar with that, and will be able to identify some of these particular
documents.
Now, there was delivered to me in the month of October of last year
from Mr. IFred Scribner, of the Treasury Department, the following
paper.
I would like to offer that to you, Senator, and I ask, if you will, that
that be made a part of the record.
Senator Jenner. I have read it. It may go into the record and be-
come a part of the official record of this hearing.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 435, 435-A
and 435-B." and read as follows:)
Exhibit No. 435
[Inter-Treasury memo — Secretary]
Treasury Department,
Division of Monetary Research,
December 8, 1944-
To : Mr. White.
From : Mr. Friedman.
I believe that you will be interested in reading the attached memorandums
entitled as follows :
1. Will the Communists take over China? ^
2. How red are the Chinese Communists?^
3. The Chinese Communists and the great powers.*
4. A statement on Japan.
5. Proposed projects against Japan.
The memorandums on the Chinese Communists were prepared by John Davies,
political adviser to General Stilwell, on his return from Yenan during the first
week of November.
The memorandums on Japan were prepared by John Emmerson, special ad-
viser to Stilwell on Japan affairs, who went to Yenan with John Davies and is
still there.
Copies of these memorandums have been sent by John Davies to Harry Hop-
kins, as well as to the State Department. They were given to me by John Davies
in Chungking.
12-9/Or. to Mr. White.
Exhibit No. 435-A
Department of State,
Washington, May IJf, 1956.
In reply refer to SY/P.
To : Mr. Clarence O. Tormoen, Personnel Security OflQcer, Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.
From : Dennis A. Flinn, Director, Ofiice of Security, Washington, D. O.
Subject: Morgenthau diary papers.
Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1956, transmitting another docu-
ment from the Morgenthau diary collection for review and declassification prior
to its release to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.
The attached document has been reviewed in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
and no objection exists to its release to the subcommittee. This document was
previously declassified and, therefore, its declassification at this time is not
necessary.
1 12-11 : Sent to Secretary.
3502 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE XJNITED STATES
It was the opinion of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs that discretion should
be used in the handling of this document by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security, and that undue publicity should be avoided to prevent giving unneces-
sary offense to the Japanese Government.
Attachment: Photostatic copy of "Proposed Projects Against Japan."
Exhibit No. 435-B
Proposed Projects Against Japan
My short study of the activities of Susumu Okano and the Japanese Peoples
Emancipation League in Communist China convinces me that we can utilize the
■experience and achievements of this group to advantage in the prosecution of the
war against Japan. Without going into the details of methods and materials, all
of which are being carefully investigated here, we can suggest the following
proposals :
(1) Effect the organization of an intei-national "free Japan" movement
The Japanese Peoples Emancipation League (Nihon Jinmin Kaiho Renmei) has
an estimated membership of 450 Japanese prisoners in north and central China.
Its declared principles are democratic. It is not identified with the Communist
Party. Upon completion of a course of indoctrination, the more able members
voluntarily prepare propaganda leaflets and engage in propaganda activities on
the frontlines. There is no doubt that most of them are sincere converts to the
antiwar principles of the league.
Intelligence shows that the league is well known to the Japanese Army, and
its influence is respected and feared.
Organization of chapters of this association, or a similar one, among Japanese
(prisoners, internees, and others) in the United States, India, Australia, and
other countries, should be carried out. The result would be widespread dissemi-
nation of democratic ideas, the creation of a powerful Japanese propaganda
organ (it is indisputable that propaganda from a Japanese source and written by
Japanese is more effective than that from enemy sources), and the stimulation of
a force useful at the time of invasion and in postwar Japan.
(2) Encourage the organization of cells within Japan to spread defeatism and
thereby I'educe resistance at the time of invasion
Preparations are now being made to send agents directly to Japan from this
(Yenan) area.
Simultaneous organization needs to be undertaken of underground cells within
Japan on the same principles as the free-Japan group on the outside. Such activ-
ities would necessarily be on a small scale, but ample evidence exists that there
are such elements which can be useful to us. Careful preparation is obviously
essential.
(5) Set up a radio transmitter in a Communist base area such as \8hantung
Province for broadcasts to Japan, Korea, and Manchuria
A transmitter on the Shantung promontory would be 400 miles nearer Japan
proper than Saipan and 600 miles nearer than the northern tip of Luzon.
The Japanese Peoples Emancipation League has a strong unit in Shantung
Province and is now establishing a school there. Consequently, trustworthy
Japanese personnel is already on the spot to operate such a station. Additional
trained personnel could be recruited from the school in Yenan and sent to any
designated spot.
Identification of the station with a "Free Japan" group would insure broad-
casts of immeasurably greater effect than those of stated American (enemy)
origin.
(4) Train units of Japanese for activity with American pacification operations
and n-ith military government officials during occupation
Eighth Route Army experience has clearly proved not only that Japanese pris-
oners can be converted, but that they can be satisfactorily and extremely effec-
tively used in propaganda operations on the frontlines. Approximately 350 are
now training and engaging in such activities on the north and central China
fronts.
Such Japanese personnel, with invaluable knowledge of particular areas and
of the language, could be extremely useful in assisting American Army officers'
in reestablishing order among the Japanese population.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTWITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3503
Recruitment of these persons can be made from the personnel of Japanese
Emancipation League chapters in China, already trained, and from prison camps
under American, Australian, or British jurisdiction. A course of training would
be necessary. Issei and nisei in the United States could serve as instructors.
Materials and the exiierience of the Eighth Route Army would be of inestimable
assistance in setting up such a project.
John K. Emmekson.
Yenan, China, November 7, 1944-
Mr. Morris. Mr. McManus, will you identify these papers, to the
extent that you know them ?
This first docmnent, Mr. McManus, is a memorandiun that you
encoimtered in the course of your committee work, is it not ?
Mr. McManus. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Where did you find that ?
Mr. McManus. In the Treasury Department, originally in room
2028, and it was later moved. There is a filing cabinet, a 4-drawer
filing cabinet, which was the original filing cabinet of Harry Dexter
IVhite.
The subcommittee was notified of the existence of this filing cabinet
about Octolber of 1955. And I was designated to study it. I found
this document in that cabinet.
Mr. Morris. And subsequently request was made for a declassifica-
tion of that document, so that it can be used for the purposes of the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee ?
Mr. McManus. Yes.
Mr. Morris. And, Senator, I call your attention to a memorandum
from Dennis Flinn, director, Office of Security, to Mr. Clarence O.
Tormoen, Personnel Security Officer, Treasury Department, Wash-
ington 25, D. C, dated May 14, 1956, in which the document was
declassified.
And, as I say, that, together with this top memorandum, which is a
memorandum from Mr. Friedman to Mr. White, the first and third
documents having been found by Mr. McManus — you found the first
one, too, did you not, Mr. McManus ?
Mr. McManus. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Where did you find that?
Mr. McManus. That was on the Emmerson memorandum.
Mr. Morris. It was pinned on it ?
Mr. McManus. Yes ; it was pinned on it ; it was a little yellow sheet.
Mr. SouRW^iNE. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question, just for the
record.
This was received by you from Mr. Scribner in October of last year,
that is, October of 1956 ?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This is material which the committee had requested
in the spring of 1956.
Mr. Morris. When was the request made, Mr. McManus?
Senator Jenner. May 14.
Mr. Morris. It was declassified on May 14.
Mr. McManus. I made several requests. The original requests
were verbal.
And may I explain the oiiginal circumstances of coming in contact
with this cabinet.
The subcommittee was informed about the existence of this cabinet,
and I was designated to contact, under restrictions — in other words.
3504 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
I am classified for the handling; I mean to say, I am qualified to
handle classified material, but I was only permitted to read the docu-
ments in this file, and not permitted to report to the subcommittee
what I foimd in them. I was only allowed to request documents of
the Treasury.
Now, originally, I asked for groups of documents. And as I re-
ported to Mr. Sourwine, it seemed to me that in this filing cabinet
there was a piece of string that tied all these other stories together
about Harry Dexter Wliite, and I wanted documents in bulk.
Well, I began bringing them in to Mr. Clarance Tormoen, who
was designated to work with me — I think he was a Special Assistant
to the Secretary, and he has since died. I made a request for this
document, I should say, in the winter of 1955-56. Nothing came of
our request.
And when Mr. Tormoen died, I was put in touch with Mr. Page
Nelson, another Treasury official, and I asked liim for the document,
about June 6.
Mr. Morris. And then it was ultimately declassified on May 14,
1956?
Mr. McMaistus. Well, it had been declassified, according to what
we later learned, by the time I asked for it on June 6
Mr. Morris. Of what year ?
Mr. McManus. 1956. And Mr. Nelson informed me that — I kept
asking for it, and it wasn't turning up — I made it clear to Mr. Nelson
that it was an important document, because it substantiated verbal
testimony that we had had, and it related to a person now in the
employ of the State Department in a sensitive area in the Middle
East, and it was — I don't want to characterize it — it characterizes
itself.
Mr. Morris. It speaks for itself ?
Mr. McManus. Yes.
But Mr. Nelson kept informing me that the State Department had
not cleared the document.
Now, it shows in this series of letters that it had been cleared before
I asked him for it the first time.
Senator Jenner. On May 14 ?
Mr. McManus. May 14, yes.
Senator Jenner. And you asked for it June 6 ?
Mr. McManus. That was the second or third time I asked for it;
I asked for it originally from Mr. Tormoen.
Nothing happened. And on approximately August 26, 1 found an-
other document, also written by John K. Emmerson, and asked for
clearance on that, and got it within 3 or 4 days.
I have made records of all these conversations.
So I then addressed a letter to Mr. Nelson, in which I asked, how
it was possible for the State Department to clear this document so
promptly in one instance, and so slowly in another? And I asked
for the name of the person in the State Department who is handling
tliis matter, so that I could approach him directly.
Well, he never answered that letter. But as the result of it, Mr.
Scribner brought the documents to Judge Morris.
Mr. Morris. Senator, the importance of the document is, just to
read two sentences from it, this is a memorandum that apparently
ultimately made its way to the very top of our Government at the
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATE 3 3505
time. It is just fraught with misinformation. It says here that the
Japanese People's Emancipation League was a non-Communist or-
ganization which was operating in China. It has since been charac-
terized by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as a Communist
organization, organized by Susumu Okano, who held many important
positions in the Japanese Communist Party.
I would like to put that whole thing in the record, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jenner, It may go into the record and become a part of
the official record.
Mr. Morris. The whole excerpt from the report of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs : "The Strategy and Tactics of World Com-
mmiism."
(The excerpt referred to above was marked exhibit No. 436 and
reads as follows :)
Exhibit No. 436
Supplement IV. Five Hundred Leading Communists
Nozaka Sanzo (alias Okano Susumu)
Member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee, chief of
Propaganda and Investigation Section, and director of party school, Japan Com-
munist Party.
Born March 30, 1892, in Tamaguchi prefecture; graduated from Kobe Com-
mercial College, Keio University, 1919 ; went to London to study the British
trade-union movement, 1920 ; joined British Communist Party and was deported
from England, 1921 ; went to Moscow, returned to Japan and joined the Japan
Communist Party, 1922 ; organized left-wing labor unions and parties in Japan,
1922-1931 ; imprisoned, 1928-1929 ; escaped to Moscow, 1931 ; elected member of
Executive Committee of Communist International (3rd), 1935; organized Japa-
nese People's Emancipation League (Nippon Jimmin Kaiho Remmei), a Com-
munist organization, at Yenan, China, 1943; returned to Japan, January 1946;
member of Political Bureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee of Japanese
Communist Party since 1946 : elected to the Japanese House of Representatives,
April 1946 : reelected April 1947.
Mr. Morris. The Emmerson memo goes on to say :
The Japanese People's Emancipation League has an estimated membership of
4.50 Japanese prisoners in north and central China. It declared principles are
democratic. It is not identified with the Communist Party.
And at the very same time, it was apparent that Mr. Susumu Okano,
who was the head of this particular league, was a Communist, and
known by Mr. Emmerson to be a Communist.
Now, the reason that is important. Senator, is that we have Admiral
Cooke's sworn testimony in the record to the effect that Mr. Kobert C.
Strong, who is now our counselor of Embassy at Damascus, Syria, was
dispensing erroneous information to the advantage of the Communists
and the disadvantage of us, and here we have Mr. John K. Emmerson,
who is now our counselor of Embassy at Beirut, Lebanon, both impor-
tant positions now in the Middle East.
I would also like to put in the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, the
testimony of Mr. Dooman about John K. Emmerson.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Morris, may I interrupt just for one question
on this document that you have previously put in the record.
This memorandum of May 14 from Mr. Tormoen to Mr. Flinn starts
out:
Reference is made to your letter dated May 2, 1956, transmitting another docu-
ment from the Morgenthau diary collection for review and declassification prior
to its release to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.
3506 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
This document is not, in fact, a Morgenthau diary document, is it?
Mr. Morris. Apparently not, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. Thank you.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman has testified on page 747, in volume 23,
in our Institute of Pacific Relations Report, about the fact that Mr.
Emmerson did take Japanese Communists back to the United States
for the purpose of indoctrinating prisoners captured by the United
States.
I would like also to have in the record at this time the testimony of
General Wedemeyer, who said that he had four political advisers in
China. I would like to read two excerpts from that. General Wede-
meyer said that he had four advisers, they were John Service, John
Davies, Raymond Ludden, and John K. Emmerson. And he went on
to say that their intelligence reports were inconsistent with American
policy at the time, that the reports strongly favored the Chinese Com-
munists and were detrimental to the Chinese Nationalists.
He went on also to say, by way of summarization of their reports^
that:
If we had followed their directives and their advice, China would have gone
Communist long before it actually did go Communist.
And, as I say, John K. Emmerson, the man I am talking about, was
1 of the 4 advisers.
Another one, Raymond Ludden, now holds a position in the State
Department in Washington.
Senator Jenner. On these previous documents, Mr. McManus, that
you have testified about, how long had these documents been kept in
this file, do you know?
Mr. McManus. Well, I was told by Mr. Nelson that this filing cabi-
net had been there for at least 5 years, and, to the best of his judg-
ment, it had been there probably since the death of Harry White.
I would like to point out. Senator, that when you were chairman, at
your instructions we began an inquiry into the policymaking activi-
ties of Harry AVliite. And I was sent to the Treasury on that mission,
with the support of other persons, and I was never informed at any
time of the existence of the file, with these terribly important papers
in it, by any of several persons with whom I conferred in the Treasury.
And I learned afterward that the FBI had never been informed about
the existence of this filing cabinet.
Senator Jenner. In other words, these important documents had
been covered up, so to speak ; the FBI had no information on them for
several years ?
Mr. McManus. Yes, sir.
I was told when I first went there that they considered it so im-
portant they had 10 men working on this cabinet; that was simultane-
ously with my original examination of it.
Senator Jenner. They considered it so important that they had 10
men working on it, and yet they didn't consider it important enough
to turn it over to the FBI or other officials ?
Mr. Mr>MANus. No.
The FBI, when they were told about this thing, thoiight it was
BO important that they sent 10 men up there.
Senator Jenner. I see.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3507
Mr. SouRWiNE. I will volunteer this : When I learned of the exist-
ence of that cabinet, with the authority of the chairman, I immedi-
ately informed the Bureau tliat the cabinet existed.
Senator Jenner. I see. I was chairman at that time ; wasn't I ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is right.
Senator Jenner. Anything further ?
Mr. Morris. We have Admiral Cooke, Senator.
Admiral, could you tell us the posture of the military situation as
it now exists in eastern Asia ?
Admiral Cooke. I would like to explain that to the chairman and
to the Senate, because it is very important to the United States, as
I see it.
I have had quite a great deal to do with saving Formosa for the
United States, and we now recognize it as important.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, you were the Chief of Staff to Admiral
King during the war ; weren't you ?
Admiral Cooke. I was Chief of Staff at the last part of the war, but
I was Chief Strategical Adviser throughout the war, from April of
1942 until the end of the war.
Mr. Morris. And you were also there as head of the 7th Fleet, which
was the China fleet ?
Admiral Cooke. And while I was on that duty, I had a meeting of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff and heads of the staffs of other govern-
ments around the world. Later, as Mr. Morris said, I became com-
mander of our 7tli Fleet, stationed in China in 1946. I was there
in 1946 and 1947, and the early part of 1948 I was in command of
that fleet before I retired.
And I, of course, had warned the Chiefs of Staff, my own Chief of
Staff, Admiral King, the head of the Navy, as to what was goin^ to
come into the China area after the war was over, the precarious situ-
ation, due to the defeat of Japan and the power of Russia.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time felt that we had to build up
the power of China, particularly restore its fleet, and restoration of
its fleet had to be the result of congressional legislation, which was
drafted at that time and later passed by the Congress.
When the war was over and I got out there in early January 1946,
I found a different policy was being carried on.
Well, to go back into the past history, which is very important,
because it is repetition, we gave up a part of our own fleet in 1922,
and gave up our right to build bases in the western Pacific, which
passed over the control of that area to the power of Japan and, of
course, the control of the sea routes in the western Pacific and along the
coasts of east Asia.
The people who wanted to expand Japan and establish the copros-
perity area all over Asia managed to get control of Japan, and they
began to move into China and move down the coast.
Now, they were free to do that, because there was nothing to stop
them, no power to stop them. And, they were hampered somewhat
by the war in China, for the Chinese had not surrendered, but having
control of the sea routes and the line of communications down south,
they had gotten as far as the south end of China before the Pearl Har-
bor attack brought us into the war.
3508 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
They got down to Thailand and north Indochina, and the people
began to get worried. They said they would not go any farther, but
they did go still farther, their objective being to establish a coprosper-
ity area there and get to the rice bowl of southeast Asia, and to reach
the oilfields and tin supplies, and so forth, in Indonesia and Malaya.
Now, when the Russians came into the war, there was a sort of a
repetition of that. They first took over China, and then their objec-
tives became the industrial capacity of Japan, and also the Hice Belt
and supplies of southeast Asia.
After taking over China, then the Korean attack took place ; that
was the first step. That was not, of course, completely successful,
and they were held back. And as soon as the consummation of the
cease-fire took place, then they moved on down to Indochina and took
north Indochina, which we forecast would happen.
Well, the situation now is that
Senator Jenner. When you say "we forecast," how do you mean,
Admiral ?
Admiral Cooke. Well, I am one of the forecasters. Actually, when
the cease-fire negotiations started in early July of 1951, I told one of
the press representatives out there that, if and when they did it, the
Chinese Communists would take north Indochina, and that seemed
to be clear to me.
It was finally consummated several years later, and then they
moved on in and took that.
Now, that was an objective.
Now, to carry out what is going on in all southeast Asia and Indo-
china and Malaya, it has been testified before your committee yester-
day— and I heard the testimony — about the subversion going on, par-
ticularly among the overseas Chinese in those areas, of which there are
about 10 or 12 million — in the papers, in the schools, in the banks, and
so on. And that is progressing very much for the Communists.
However, in my view- — and I think it is borne out in middle
Europe — there must be a posture of military power ready to back
these things up, as in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. And
the necessary connnunications are along the sea routes.
Well, the one thing that is an obstacle now, the biggest obstacle to
this, is the continued occupation of Formosa by the Nationalist Gov-
ernment in opposition to the Communists. This is very important to
them — if they had it, they wouldn't be in exactly a position similar
to Japan, because we still have Okinawa and the bases in the Philip-
pines, but the key to that whole thing is the possession of Formosa.
Now, the Chinese have a substantial force in Formosa. They have
got a very strong force in Quemoy, which is the gateway for the
attack against Formosa. And then they have got a substantial force
on Matsu.
Part of this thing that has to do here, which was illustrated some-
what in the testimony yesterday before this committee, is the prestige
of the free world among the overseas Chinese and, for that matter,
the other inhabitants of that area.
In 1949, 1950, and 1951 most of those overseas Chinese were pro-
Communist, or the majority. And then, as time went on
Mr. Morris. You say they were pro-Communist ?
Admiral Cooke. Pro- Communist.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3509
And, then, as time went on, and they began to learn what com-
munism was and what was going on on the mainland, then they
turned toward the free world, and particularly toward the National-
ist Govermnent.
I was in these areas in 1952, myself, and talked to the Chinese m
Hanoi and Saigon and Bangkok, and so on.
Well, after the cease-fire was consummated, and after the surrender
of Chusan, the feeling that they were going on began to get stronger
and stronger, and at the same time the Communists were getting their
people into the papers and the schools, the Chinese papers and the
Chinese schools, in these areas.
There are millions of Chinese in Indochina and Thailand, and in
Singapore. And so now it is uncertain. They send their students,
some to the expanded University of Taiwan, but they are also send-
ing quite a number now to Red China.
There was a noted change when the Chusan islands to the north
were surrendered, here a couple of years ago. If these islands, off-
shore islands, fall, there will be a tremendous increase in the change
of these overseas Chinese who control the business in the southeast
area, back toward communism.
Now, the Chinese have, as I said, a very strong force on Quemoy,
and a substantial force on the others. If the Communists decide
to attack, part of the attack on those islands will have to be by sea
route. And to succeed in doing it — they have moved quite a bit
further in a disputed control of the Formosa Strait; if they succeed,
a large part of the defenses of Formosa will be liquidated — I mean,
if they defeat them. The Nationalists are going to defend them;
whatever the United States does, they will defend them.
And, of course, a big j)art of the buildup of the Communists is in
airfields. They have built up many airfields near Quemoy and all
along there, so they can bring in bombers, and so forth.
They have a many times stronger air force, of course, than the
Nationalist Government, so we are building that up somewhat, and
in Formosa there is a very formidable bunch of airfields.
So, if they are attacked, and it succeeds, maybe because we don't
come to their aid soon enough or don't come at all, then the probability
of the posture — posture is the situation in regard to the strength and
attitude of the military forces that I am talking about — toward the
Communist occupation and control of all southeast Asia will increase
very much.
So right now the Communists are carrying out a sort of a mixture
of a peace offensive and a force — they are not bombarding Quemoy
at the present time as much as they were when I was out there about
2 years ago. They do carry out one once in a while, then they are
beaming radios to Formosa and saying that "We are going to take
you peacefully, and when we get you, everything will be all right and
nobody will be damaged, and nobody will be hurt," and so on. "But
if this doesn't succeed, why, we will use force."
In other words, they play it both ways, whether that is good tactics
or not, but they think of it as being good tactics, and that is what is
going on.
So that you will see a certain amount of bombardment doesn't do
much damage on Quemoy, but ties in with the Chinese on Formosa,
where there are about 10 million Chinese.
3510 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
So that they will try to build up weakness, and also try to convey
to the free world that maybe they are not as strong as the free world
would like to see them — I mean, those w^ho want to see Free China
hold on. So that is one of the tactics.
Another one is to have somebody come over who has had contacts
in Peking and try to make social contact with some of the people
representing China — like Japan, for instance.
So they can expand that and say, "Well, negotiations are going
on." They are not going on at all. But they want to create that
impression to the world, to accomplish their own objective of getting
it one way or the other, probably a combination of the two.
So I just wanted to bring to the attention of the committee that
even though they succeed — and they are succeeding — on the infiltra-
tion and subversion in these areas, this will add to the picture, and
probably turn it over, if they take that Formosa Strait.
Senator Jenner. Admiral, nothing remains the same — and let's
take the Formosan situation — let's assume that another 5 or 10 years
of these tactics go on — what happens to Formosa ?
In other words, the Army is getting older, and so forth and so on.
Wliat is your opinion on that? In other words, will the Chinese
Communists win by default on time alone ?
Admiral Cooke. If they take southeast Asia, maybe so. If they
don't take southeast Asia, I think it does not have to happen.
Now, the economy of Formosa— there are about 10 million people
now — is very good, it is the best governed country, as far as I have
been able to observe, and I believe most observers agree with that, in
all Asia. And the army is not getting old, there are new ones coming
in, being recruited right along.
Now, at first — I mean, we sent out a military advisory group of a
small size, which has since been expanded, we sent it out in the
summer of 1951, giving help. But at that time they weren't recruit-
ing, because they just couldn't afford to do it.
In other words, their whole armed forces is somewhat in the neigh-
borhood of 600,000.
Well, when you bring in recruits, you have got that additional
thing, and also the business of retiring those that are too old.
Now, since then, in recent years, the recruitment is going on. It
is now going on. They have got a bunch of reserve divisions in which
new ones are coming in all the time. And, in age, the business of
getting too old is being handled.
So far, the morale has held up. How long it will hold up in a status
quo is a very difficult question to forecast. But so far it is holding
up very well.
Now, we are giving them some help in the navy, and in the air
force, and we are giving it to them in the army, too. But it is essen-
tially a problem of control of the straits, of the water thing, for the
present; they may never ^o back to the mainland, and again, maybe
they will, because a situation such as occurred in Hungary is possible
any time, much of the majority of the mainland of the Chinese is
against the Communist regime — -I would say 80 percent, maybe more.
And the Chinese, as you probably heard before — I think Mr. Cald-
<vell said yesterday the Chinese, as an individual, the main thing to a
Chinese — and there are about five or six hundred million of them,
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3511
and most of them are in this category — is his rice bowl and his in-
dividual noninterference.
Well, now, of course, the Communist is 100 percent interference
with the individual. So that is a ferment that is there.
"Wlien and if it occurs, such as happened in Hungary, but to a
greater extent, will we of the free world be ready to cash in on it?
That is the important thing.
They cannot invade unless that situation exists, and unless the
United States supports them. The United States has got to decide
that they will support them before they can carry out invasions even
under these conditions.
But if the United States, because of driving into southeast Asia,
is drawn into that picture, then they need to get ready ahead to do
what they finally want to do at that time.
For instance, in 1945 the Russians decided to attack Korea, and
they decided to get ready to do it at the opportune time. They didn't
think they were ready ior 5 years, and they didn't think they were
ready until our troops were withdrawn.
And in 1950, they attacked.
Now, at the same time, we could have been getting some South
Koreans ready to repel them, giving them striking power, but we
denied it; we said, "You can't have any striking power because you
might attack."
Senator Jenner. We gave them some bailing wire; didn't we?
Admiral Cooke. Something like that.
Now, what we need — we have a SEATO treaty, which you know
has eight nations in it, going as far as Pakistan, Australia, New
Zealand, and the Philippines and Thailand, and so on — but the only
nation in this SEATO agreement that has any power is the United
States.
Of course, free China and free Korea are not in it. But if they
decided they want to be with us, they haven't any striking power.
Striking power is, if we box, I hit you and you hit me. Well, all
they can do is defend. We want to get up the military power to
oppose them, and they will protest all over the place if we build up
the striking power of South Korea and free China.
Senator Jenner. The Communists are building up their striking
power in North Korea, aren't they, in violation of the truce ?
Admiral Cooke. That is right.
Senator Jenner. What are we doing about it, if anything, do you
know?
Admiral Cooke. We are not changing — we are abiding by the
agreement, truce.
Senator Jenner. In other words, we just close our eyes to the
violations of the truce by the Communists ?
Admiral Cooke. In effect ; yes.
Now, they are building up the power in all China, the airpower,
they have got lots of Mig-15's and Mig-17's, and they have — I
don't know how many, the last figure I had, they have 1,200 planes —
and I know they must have more now, very modern planes.
And they have constructed jet airfields all over China, all the way
down to the Canton area now, and particularly opposite Quemoy —
they call Quemoy, Kinmen, and that is the island just off Amoy,
which is, next to Tsingtao, the best harbor they have in China.
3512 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
So, if they take Tsingtao, and if the Russians want to use that to
base submarines, they will have it. If they don't take it — -if the Com-
munists don't take Quemoy, then they won't have it.
Now, the Russians right now are reported to have about 400 sub-
marines. And I don't know the number that is supposed to be in
the Pacific, but I have heard the figure, they say it is about a hundred,
based in Vladivostok, and maybe some in Port Arthur, and some in
Tsingtao, which is North China.
Some operate just north of the Yangtze River in the Chusan
Archipelago, which is a very wonderful base, and the best base they
would have for a big navy in China, w^hich the Nationalists had to
evacuate in 1950 to keep from losing everything.
And then the next thing down here, controlling Western Pacific
sea routes, is Amoy. And that is what is in dispute here in the United
States, as to whether or not we let the Communists know tliat we
will do something with our Navy and Air, in the event that Quemoy
is attacked.
Those are just some of the aspects of this thing for the free world
side of it.
That is another potential base for the expanding Russian Navy in
the Western Pacific.
Now, of course, they could take Quemoy, and would not take For-
mosa necessarily right away, as long as the 7th Fleet is in the picture.
But the pressure in southeast Asia, Communist pressure against the
free world, or against the local controlled sovereignty there, would be
much increased.
I think that the United States, considering the SEATO thing, is so
strongly dedicated to the preservation of free independence in south-
east Asia that if they take it over and have to bring in armed forces to
support it, it will lead to war.
In other words, my view is that holding, assisting the free Chinese
to hold those offshore islands in question, is more apt to stop war
than bring war, very much more so. That is my conviction.
Senator Jenner. Thank you. Admiral.
Mr. Morris. Senator, I have one question, to finish this off.
Admiral Cooke, you told me in October that you had learned last
January — January 1956 — of the formation of a Presidential Commis-
sion, headed by the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Mr. Killian, and that you therefore wrote to the Navy mem-
ber of this Commission immediately and told him that you could bear
witness to some very serious failures in intelligence that had caused
great harm to the United States, and would like to appear before this
committee.
You made the offer in January. Wlien you testified before us in
October, that offer liad not been accepted ?
Admiral Cooke. That is right.
I wrote several letters, and finally, about June, I decided they
weren't interested. And after the Angus Ward testimony that took
place here and was published, I wrote to Mr. Morris and told him
I didn't think they wanted it, and if he wanted it I would be glad
to get it to him.
And so I testified, and it was released by Senator Eastland for
publication on November 12.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3513
A day or two after that I got a call from one of the members,
asking if I did not want to testify before them. And so I said, "Yes."
I gave them the transcript of what I had said, and invited questions.
And so I have, in answer to their invitation, come to Washington
at this time, and have appeared before them.
They gave me a hearing, and I particularly wanted to be before
them, not to repeat my testimony, which they have, but to set out in
concrete terms the remedial action to prevent any such thing happen-
ing in the future — which I have done, and I showed you a copy — I
haven't showed it to you.
Mr, Morris. Not yet.
Admiral Cooke. I have brought it to their attention, tliis action
that I think should be taken by the United States Government to
prevent these things from happening in the future.
And, I have brought it to the attention of the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, and to members of the State Department, and also to Congress-
man Judd, and I will probably give it to Senator Knowland.
So it is a rather comprehensive thing. I am glad to give a copy of
this to this committee. I will give it to you — it is only six pages —
because I said that concretely and briefly.
Mr. Morris. It will be very helpful to us, Admiral Cooke.
Senator Jenner. It will be very helpful.
Mr. Morris. May I put in the record now the biographical sketch
of Robert Campbell Strong and John Kenneth Emmerson, from the
State Department hearing?
Senator Jenner. They may become a part of our record.
(The biographical sketches above referred to were marked "Ex-
hibit No. 437 and 437-A" and read as follows :)
Exhibit No. 437
Strong, Robert Campbell, b. 111., Sept. 29, 1915 ; Beloit, Coll.. B. A. 1938 : U. of
Wis. 1938-39 ; app. FSO unclass. v. c. of career, and sec. in Diplo. Ser. Mar. 2,
1939 ; V. c. at Frankfort on the Main Mar. 20, 1939 ; at Prague June 20, 1939 ; For.
Ser. Sch. Jan. 3, 1940; v. c. at Durban June 5, 1940; at Lourenco Marques, temp.
May 6, 1941 ; at Durban May 28, 1941 : FSO 8, Nov. 16, 1943 ; FSO at Sofia to pro-
ceed via Naples for temp, detail in office of U. S. pol. advLser, staff of Supreme
Allied Comdr., Mediterranean theater, Oct. 23, 1944 ; FSO 7, May 16, 1945 ; v. c. at
Sofia July 27. 1945 ; FSO 6, May 19, 1946 : to Dept. June 27, 1946 ; detailed to Naval
War Coll. July 1, 1946 ; cons. Oct. 16, 1946 ; FSO 4, Nov. 13, 1946 ; cons, at Tsingtao
Aug. 4, 1947 ; 1st sec. at Canton June 16, 1949 ; at Chungking, temp. June 24, 1949 ;
cons, in addition to duties as 1st sec. at Taipei Dec. 31, 1949 : FSO 3, May 23,
1950 ; to Dept. Aug. 4, 1950 ; special asst. to dir. Office of Chinese Affairs, Mar.
13, 1951 ; mem., Policy Planning Staff, Jan. 4, 53 ; 1st sec. and cons. Damascus.
Aug. 2, 54; cons, of emb. Damascus, Aug. 3, 54; FSO 2, Mar. 24, 55; m.
Exhibit No. 437-A
Emmerson, John Kenneth; b. Colo. Mar. 17, 1908; Colo. Coll., A. B. 1929;
Sorbonne 1927-28 ; N. Y. U., A. M. 1930 ; Georgetown U. Sch. of For. Ser. 1931-33 ;
instr. in social sci. (sc), U. of Nebr. 1930-31; asst. dir. Berlitz School of Lan-
guages, Chicago, 1933-35 ; app. FSO unclass., v. c, and sec. in Diplo. Ser. Oct. 1,
1935 ; language officer, Tokyo, Nov. 12, 1935 ; v. c. at Osaka Oct. 25, 1937, at Tai-
hoku, temp. Apr. 12, 1939 ; at Osaka Dec. 6, 19.39 ; 3d sec. at Tokyo Apr. 3, 1940 ;
FSO 8, Aug. 1, 1940 ; to Dept. temp. Nov. 19, 1941 ; 3d sec. and v. c. at Lima Feb.
6, 1942; FSO 7, Oct. 20, 1942 ; 2d sec. at Lima in addition to duties as v. c. Feb.
5, 1943 ; 2d sec. at Chungking Aug. 10, 1943 ; FSO 6, July 16, 1944 ; to Dept. May
3514 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
15, 1945; For. Ser. officer, Headquarters of Comdr. in Chief, U. S. Fleet, temp.
Aug. 8, 1945; FSO 5, Aug. 13, 1945; FSO, office of act. U. S. pel. adviser to
Supreme Comdr., Allied Forces, Japan, Sept. 7, 1945 ; to Dept. Feb. 18, 1946 ; asst.
chief, Div. of Jap. Affairs, Mar. 15, 1946; special asst. to chief Oct. 28, 1946;
FSO 4, Nov. 13, 1946 ; 1st sec. at Moscow May 1, 1947 ; FSO 3, May 15, 1947 ; cons.
July 21, 1947 ; cons, at Moscow in addition to duties as 1st sec. Aug. 13, 1947 ; to
Dept. May 13, 1949 ; detailed to Nat. War Coll. August 29, 1949 ; FSO 2, May 23,
1950 ; planning adviser Bu. of Far Eastern Affairs, Aug. 15, 1950 ; conns. Karachi,
July 28, 52 ; meritorious ser. award 54 ; FSO 1, Mar. 24, 55 ; coims. Beirut, Apr. 4,
55. m.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do I understand that Mr. Emmerson is still in the
American service, and is stationed in Beirut, Mr. Morris?
Mr. Morris. As I say, Strong is our counselor of embassy at
Damascus, Syria, and Emmerson is counselor of embassy at Beirut.
Mr. SouRwiNE. They have both been sent from China to the Middle
East?
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Senator Jenner. Thank you very much. Admiral.
That will conclude the hearing.
(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
INDEX
Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to
the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization
in this index.
A
Page
Abdou, Mou Mouni 3488,3491
Affidavit of Gerard McKernan :
Exhibit No. 433-A 3494
Exhibit No. 434 3495
Algeria 3487
American banknotes 3484
American Club (in Shanghai) 3485,3493
"American imperialist aggression" 3498
Amoy 3511, 3512
Asia 3508,3511
Austin 3498,3499
Australia 3511
B
Bangkok 3509
Bank of China 3481,3483
Beirut, Lebanon 3505
Berges, William C 3486,3492-3498
Birmann, Jano 3488, 3490
Boccara, Enrico 3489, 3490
Bravo, Flavio 3488, 3491
Bund (in Shanghai) 3483
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 3501, 3502
Buxheli, Quamil 3488, 3490
C
Campbell, Svlvia (Mrs. John Powell) 3494
Canton 3492,3511
Chair of Herb Medicine and Acupuncture 3478
Chang Chun-fang (president of Russian Language Institute) 3487
Chen? Wangtao 3497
Chiang Kai-shek 3492, 3493
Chiaotung University 3497
Chief of Naval Operations 3513
Chien Men Square 3489
Chi Nan University 3487
China 3476, 3477
3479, 3481, 3483, 3485-3487, 3491-3493, 3497-3499, 3503, 3508, 3511, 3512
Free China 3509, 3511
Northeast China 3492
China Revolutionary University ; 3487
China Weekly Review 3486, 3492, 3494
China Welfare Fund 3495, 3496
Chinese 3485, 3488, 3498, 3508, 3509
Overseas Chinese 3499, 3500, 3508
Chinese democratic parties 3492
Chinese national anthem 3498
Chinese New Year 3482
Chinese People's Republic 3491
Chinese volunteers to Korea 3492, 3497, 3498
II INDEX
Page I
Chou En-lai 3480,3492,3495 i
Chu Teh, General 3493 '
Chun Cheng Hwan 3488, 3490 '
Chungking 3501 i
Chusan 3509, 3512 '
Archipelago 3502 1
Clipping from Shanghai News of October 5, 1950, exhibit No. 430 3488 |
Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, September 23, 1950, exhibit
No. 431 3489
Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, November 1950, exhibit No.
432 3491
Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, October 29, 1950, exhibit I
No. 433 3492 i
Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, December 15, 1950, exhibit I
No. 434-A 349e {
Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, December 15, 1950, exhibit \
No. 434-B 3498 ]
Communism 3509 i
Communist/s 3476-3483, 3485, 3486, 3494, 3495, 3499-3501, 3508-3510 I
Chinese Communists 3477, 3480, 3482, 3484, 3486, 3501, 3506, 3510-3512 j
Japanese Communists 3506 I
Russian Communists 3482 '
Communist China, Red China 3476, 3480, 3481, 3483, 3485, 3499, 3500, 3509
Communist Party 3482, 3490, 3493, 3495, 3502, 3505 '
Consignment stores 3482, 3483 j
Cooke, Adm. Charles N., United States Navy, retired, Sonoma, Calif., j
testimony of 3500-3514 i
Czechoslovak Ministry of Information and Culture 3491 '
Damascus, Syria 3505, 3514 <
Davies, John 3501
Davis, John 3506 ^
Dias, Salvatore 3491 |
Dooman, Mr 3505, 3506 \
"Down with America sessions" 3495
"Down with American imperialism" (slogan) 3496
Dunlop, Albert M., M. D., Rural Free Delivery 4, Box 493, Alexandria, Va.,
born in Savoy, 111., in 1884 ; bachelor of arts degree. University of Illi-
nois ; doctor of medicine degree. Harvard University ; taught at Harvard ':
Medical School in Shanghai, 1911-16 ; taught at Peking University Medi- ■
cal College, 1918-31 ; private practice in Shanghai, 1931-33 ; professor |
at University of Chicago, 1943-46; private practice in Shanghai, 1946- |
52 ; professor at University of Hong Kong, 1952-53 ; testimony of__ 3475-3500
E \
Eastland, Senator 3512
Ebbels, Robert Noel (of Australia) 3487, 3488, 3490 :
Eighth Route Army 3502,3503 ]
Ekbatani 3490 j
Emmerson, John K., data on, exhibit No. 437-A 3501, 3503-3506, 3513, 3514 J
Europe 3508
Executive committee of the International Union of Students 3487 i
Exhibit No. 429 — Newspaper story re WFDY, in Shanghai News of Satur-
day, October 7, 1950 3487 j
Exhibit No. 430— Clipping from Shanghai News of October 5, 1950 3488 j
Exhibit No. 431— Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, September 23, i
1950 3489 ■
Exhibit No. 432 — Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, November
1950 3491 ■
Exhibit No. 433— Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, October 29, '.
1950 3492
Exhibit No. 433-A— Affidavit of Gerard McKernan, July 18, 1955 3494
Exhibit No. 434— Affidavit of Gerard McKernan, August 5, 1955 3495 ;
Exhibit No. 434-A — Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDY, December
15, 1950 3496 ;
INDEX m
Page
Exhibit No. 434-B — Clipping from Shanghai News, re WFDT, December
15, 1950 3498
Exhibit No. 435 — Inter-Treasury memo — Secretary, December 8, 1944 ; to
Mr. White from Mr. Friedman 3501
Exhibit No. 435-A — State Department memo, May 14, 1956 ; to Mr. Clarence
O. Tormoen from Dennis A. Flinn ; subject : Morgenthau diary papers 350?
Exhibit No. 435-B — Proposed projects against Japan 3502
Exhibit No. 436 — Data on Sanzo, Nozaka (alias Okamo Susmu) 3505
Exhibit No. 437— Data on Robert Campbell Strong 3513
Exhibit No. 437-A — Data on John Kenneth Emmerson 3513
F
FBI. {See Federal Bureau of Investigation.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation 3506, 3507
Ferris, Helen 3498
Flinn, Dennis 3501, 3503, 3505
Foochow Road ("Street of Culture") 3496,3497
Formosa 3476, 3500, 3507-3509
Formosa Strait 3509
Fortier, General 3500
"Free Japan" group 3502
Friedman, Mr 3.503
Futan University 8497
G
Ginling College 3498
Goralski, Wladyslaw 3488, 3490
Grand Theatre in Shanghai 3494, 3496
Great China University 3487
Grumm, Hans 3488, 3491
Guha, Rangit 3488, 3491
Guibert, Roger 3488, 3491
H
Hanoi 3509
Helmut, Hartwig 3488, 3490
Honan Road 3496, 3497
Hong Kong 3476, 3486, 3499
Hopkins, Harry 3501
Hsinhua 3489,3491
Huang, Anna 3495, 3496
Huang, Dr 3495, 3496
Hungary 3508,3510
I
Ilina, Lidiya 3488, 3490
Illsley, Walter 3492
India 3485
Indochina 3509
Institute of Pacific Relations Report 3506
Inter-Treasury memo of December 8, 1944, to Mr. White from Mr. Fried-
man, exhibit No. 435 3501
Ishkhand 3488,3491
Issei in United States 3503
3
Jandro 3491
Japan 3501, 3502, 3507, 3508
Japanese Army 3502
Japanese Government 3502
Japanese People's Emancipation League in Communist China (Nihon Jin-
min Kaiho Renmei) 3502, 3503, 3505
Jenner, Senator William E 3475, 3500
Judd, Congressman 3513
IV INDEX
K ^'"'^
Kazem, Mansouri _ _ _ _ _ 3491
Kiiiian Mr_ ""I":::::".::::::: 3512
King, Admiral 3-QY
Kinmen (Quemoy) "__" ~ ~ ~_ ~ ^^-^-^
Kipouros, Mitsos ~ ~ ~ _"" " 349^
Korea 3483, 3489," 3492' 3493, 3497," 3498, ~3502, 3511
Korean attack 3508
Korean People'e Army ~__I_I_I__II 3498
KPA _ 3497
Kraba, Hamou I_"_I_" I___"3487r348"8, 3491
Kwanghan University 3493
L
Lebanon 3505
Liao Cheng-chih 3489
Liu Ke-lin, Prof 3493
Ludden, Raymond 35O6
Luzon !":::_::::::::::::::::: 3502
M
Maiorelli, Lidie 3488, 3491
Malaya 3508
Ma Ling (canning group) 3483
Manafov, George Vasilev 3488 3490 ■
Manchuria IIIII'Mm, 3489,' 3502
Mandel, Benjamin 3475
Mao Tse-tung ~ 3489, 3490," 3492' 3493, 3497
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3512
Matsu 3508
McCanns (MacAnns), David Graham 3488,3491,3492
McKernan, Rev. Gerard ' 3494I3496
Affidavit of July 18, 1955, exhibit No. 433-A 3494
Affidavit of August 5, 1955, exhibit No. 434 349.5
McManus, Robert C 3475 3500
Mese ' 3491
Middle East 3504 3544
Minttinen, Unto _"_ 3488, 3491
Morgenthau diary papers 35OI 3.503
Morris, Robert 3475', 3500
Moscow 3491^ 3492
Mouhallami, Abdilkarim 3494
Mukden ~ ~~ 3493
N
Nanking 3493
Nanking Road ~ 3495
Nanking University 3498
Nationalist Government (Chinese) 3508, 3509
Nationalist group (Chinese) ' 3500
Natsogdorzh :__:_" :_"3488, 3490
Nelson, Mr. Page 3504
Nettleton, Dick ^ 3488, 3491
New Zealand 35II
Nihon Jinmin Kaiho Renmei. (See Japanese People's Emancipation
League in Communist China.)
Nisei in United States 3503
North Korea 35II
O
October Revolution in Moscow 3491
Okano, Susumu, alias of Nozako Sanzo.
Overseas Chinese 3499, 3500, 3508
INDEX V
Page
P
Pakistan 3511
Pan Cheng-liang 3497
Pearl Harbor attack 3507
Pieping 3495
Peking 3476, 3480, 3489, 3490
Mayor of 3489, 3492
Peking University Medical College (PUMC) 3476,3477,3479
People's Democracies 3493
People's Liberation Army of China 3493
People's Republic of China 3489, 3490, 3492
Philippines 3508, 3511
Poland 3508
Port Arthur 3512
Pott, Hawks 3498
Powell, Bill 3486
Powell, John 3486, 3492-3495
Powell, Mrs. John (nee Sylvia Campbell) 3494
Prague 3487, 3491
Proposed projects against Japan, exhibit No. 435-B 3502
Pyongyang 3497
Q
Quemoy 3508, 3509, 3511, 3512
B
Radueano, Cornel 3488, 3490
Red China. {See Communist China.)
Red in the East, song 3492
Rice Belt 3508
Riggs, C 3498
Rockefeller Foundation 3476
Medical School 3478
Roy, A 3498
Rumania 3482
Russia (see also Soviet Union) 3479,3484,3485
Russian Language Institute 3487
Russian Navy 3512
Russians 3512
S
Saigon 3509
Saipan 3502
St. John's University (Shanghai) 3486,3487,3497,3598
Sandag 3488,3491
Sanzo, Nozaka (alias Okano Susumu), data on, exhibit No. 436 3505
Scribner, Fred 3501, 3503, 3504
SEATO 3511,3512
Second World Students Conference 3487
Semitchastny, Vladimir 3488, 3490
Seventh Fleet 3507
Shanghai 3476, 3479, 3483-3489, 3491, 3492, 3494, 3495, 3498, 3499
Shanghai Federation for Emergency Relief (SFER), official Communist
welfare group of Shanghai 3495
Shanghai News (English-language Communist sheet) 3486, 3487
Shantung Province 3502
Shapiro, Sidney 3494
Sian Fu 3477
Slamet 3491
Sourwine, J. G 3475
South Korea, South Koreans 3511
Soviets 3479, 3482
Soviet Union, U. S. S. R. (see also Russia) 3487, 3489, 3492, 3493
State Department 3500-3502, 3504, 3513
Officials 3500
VI INDEX
Page
State Department memo re Morgenthau diary papers, exhibit No. 435-A 3501
Stefanescu, Pascu 3488, 3490
Stilwell, General 3501
Strong, Robert O 3505, 3513
Data on, exhibit No. 437 3513
Sun Yat-sen, Mme 3486, 3494
Svoboda, Alois 3488, 3490
Syria 3505,3514
T
Tha Hia 3491
Tannebaum (Tannenbaum), Capt. Gerald 3492,3494,3495
Tax policies of the Chinese Reds 3484
Thailand 3508, 3509, 3511
Tormoen, Clarence O 3503-3505
Treasury Department 3501, 3503, 3504, 3506
Tsingtao 3511,3512
Tutino, Saverio 3488, 3491
U
UNICEF 3495
Union of Czechoslovak Youth 3491
United Nations 3481,3500 \
University of Taiwan 3509 ;
V i;
Vdovin, Valentine 3487, 3490
Vietnam 3489, 3493, 3498 i
Vladivostok 3512
Voigt, Paile 3488, 3491 i
Vu Xuan Vinh 3488, 3490 j
W i
"Wall Street Imperialist Aggression" 3498 I
Walmsley, Omar 3488, 3491
Ward, Angus 3512 !
Wedemeyer, General 3506 '
Weiss, Selma (Harvey Matusow's girl friend) 3487, 3488, 3491 |
WFDY. (See World Federation of Democratic Youth.) I
"WFDY delegates invited to speak at universities," nevrspaper story in
Shanghai News of Saturday, October 7, 1950, exhibit No. 429 3486, 3487 '
White, Harry Dexter 3501, 3503, 3504, 3506 J
Williams, Bert, secretary of WFDY 3492 |
Wolfe, Jacob 3488, 3491 >
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) 3486-3492
List of delegates 3490, 3491 '
World Youth (organ of WFDY) 3487 \
Wu Chee-nan 3497 '
Wu Hsiu-chuan 3498 <
\
Yangtze Valley 3476 1
Yenan 3501-3503 ]
Young Pioneers :. 3489 .
Young Progressives of Algeria, America, Austria, Brazil, Britain, Cuba, ,
French West Africa, Greece, Holland, Italy (all delegates to WFDY) _ 3488, 3491 ]
Yuan Chu-mo 3493 i
o
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS,.
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTEATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHEE INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OP THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAEY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
riRST SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 20 AND 21, 1957
PART 53
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93215 WASHINGTON : 1957
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
OCT 9 - 1957
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAilES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
BSTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SAM J. ERVIN, Je., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Inteknal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
Robert Morris, Chief Counsel
J. G. SoDRWiNB, Associate Counsel
William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
n
CONTENTS
Witness : ^^^e j
Beichman, Arnold 3515
Rachlin, Carl 3533 j
Appendix I -- 3549
Summary trials in Hungary 3549-3552 |
Annex A — Decree law on criminal procedure 3552 i
Annex B — Decree on summary jurisdiction 3552-3553 )
Annex C — Decree on martial law 3553-3554 ]
Annex D — Decree on detention for public security 3554 ;
Annex E — Sixth Congress of the International Association of •
Democratic Lawyers, Brussels, May 1956 3554-3555 "•
Appendix I-A 3555 \
The Hungarian situation in the light of the Geneva Conventions <
of 1949 3555-3559 ;
I. Obligations in an internal conflict 3556 i
II. Internal or international conflict? 3556-3557
III. Obligations in an "international conflict" 3557-3559 ;
Appendix II 3559-3561
The situation behind the Iron Curtain, statement by the executive ;
council, AFL-CIO 3559-3561
Article from AFLr-CIO News, February 16, 1957, by Arnold Beichman, ^
Labor No. 1 Target of United States Communists 3561-3562 :
Article from Las Vegas Sun, February 16, 1957, by Victor Riesel 3562-3563 ]
m '
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1957
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room
457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.
Present: Senators Jenner and Watkins.
Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher,
associate counsel.
Senator Jenner. The meeting will come to order.
Mr. Morris. The witness this morning is Mr. Rachlin. Will you
come forward, Mr. Rachlin ?
Senator Jenner. Will you please raise your right hand and be
sworn.
Do you swear the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Rachlin. I swear.
TESTIMONY OP CARL RACHLIN
Mr. Morris. Would you like to sit at that end of the table, Mr.
Rachlin?
Senator, before beginning the hearing today, Mr. Rachlin has
agreed to come here to testify on the nature of the Communist Party
convention that was recently held in New York.
I would like to note for the record that Mr. Ludwig Rajchman was
subpenaed by the subcommittee. The subpena was issued on Monday
of this week. It was served on him last night at the Westbury Hotel
on 69th Street and Madison Avenue, New York City, at 7 : 31 p. m.,
by a member of the subcommittee staff. Rajchman threw the sub-
pena to the floor of the hotel rather than accept service.
Immediately thereafter the chairman of the subcommittee. Senator
Eastland, sent a telegram, asking that it be personally delivered upon
him, notifying him that the subpena which had been served on him
and which he had thrown to the floor was indeed a directive for him
to appear at room 319, Senate Office Building, at 10 a. m., this morning.
Senator, I left room 319 between 25 minutes after 10 and 10 : 30
this morning, and Mr. Rajchman had not yet appeared. I bring
that to your attention, Senator, in the event you want to pass it on to
the subcommittee, whether Mr. Rajchman is in contempt of the
Senate.
3515
3516 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator Jenner. Thank you very much.
Mr. Morris. I also would like to mention that Mr. Rajcliman is
being subpenaed because his name has frequently turned up in the
course of the inquiries conducted by the subcommittee into the nature
and extent of the Soviet activity in the United States. He figured
in the Harry Dexter White case, in the Alger Hiss case, and the white
papers. The fact that he left his position here as financial adviser to
the National Chinese delegation and became a Polish delegate gives
the committee reason to believe he may have been one of the Soviet
superiors of the ring that was operating in Washington.
[To the witness :] I wonder if you would give your name?
Mr. Kachlin. My name is Carl Rachlin and I reside at 187 Brown
Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., and I maintain my office for the practice of
law at 11 West 48th Street, New York City, N. Y.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell the subcommittee whether or not you
were an unofficial delegate to the recent Communist Party convention
that was held in New York ?
Mr. Rachlin. If I may, I was an unofficial observer. I was in no
way a delegate.
Mr. MoREis. Would you tell us exactly what your role was ?
Mr. Eachlin. The New York Civil Liberties Union, of which I
am on the board of directors, was asked if it wished to have anv ob-
server present at this convention held only last week. I was called
by the director of the New York Civil Liberties Union and asked
whether I would like to go. I immediately talked it over with my
partner, Lester Migdol, and we thought it would be a good idea if
both of us went to this convention for reasons which I would be
happy to explain. That is, in addition to the usual feeling that all
Americans have about the Communist Party, we had a special interest,
because among our clients are several trade unions and one of them,
particularly, is in a field which had formerly been under the control
of the Communists, and when it had been under the control of the
Communists it had been expelled from the CIO, back in 1948.
The old United Office and Professional Workers was one of the
unions expelled for Communist activity by the CIO. One of the suc-
cessor groups of that, which had later been chartered by the CIO, was
the Communities and Social Agencies Employees Union and that
union is our client. Prior to the expulsion of the Communist leader-
ship, I had been consulted by the people who are now the leaders
of that union. And they had consulted with me to help them finally
kick out the Commmiist leadership so that I became deeply personally
involved in the activities of Communists in order to assist my clients
in preventing a resurgence of Communist activity in that field. Be-
cause it was commonly talked about that the field of Communities and
Social Agencies was one of the areas in which Communists had a
particular interest.
In view of the fact further that my partner who was general counsel
of the American Veterans Committee and was one of those instru-
mental in expelling the Communists from the AMVETS back some 5
or 6 years ago and particularly John Gates, who was one of the leaders
of the Communist Party, we had this special interest.
Mr. Morris. Now what was it ? Was it a closed convention to every-
body else?
SCOPE OP SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3517
Mr. Rachlin. Except for the special observers it was closed to
everyone else. There may have been a few visitors, but they were
obviously associated with the Communist movement. It was obvious
that these people in the rear as visitors were associated with the Com-
munist movement. The press was excluded.
Mr. Morris. How many observers were there ?
Mr. Rachlin. To the best of my recollection, 6 or 8. There was a
Rev. J. A. Muste, who was a fairly well-known pacifist in New York
City, a man introduced to me as Stringfellow Barr, who I understood
either is or was the president of St. Johns College of Maryland ; there
was a man whom I had met before, Bayard Russin, who again was
identified with some of the pacifist movements in New York.
There was a man I had met previously by the name of Roy Fitch
whom I knew to be a pacifist. One or two others whose names escape
me now whom I had not met before and have not seen since.
Mr. Morris. And you did attend all the sessions of the convention?
Mr. Rachlin. I was there every day but not every session. Unfor-
tunately, I had some family duties with my children that required my
being home part of the time. So I did not see all the sessions all the
time.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we feel, in view of the experience that
Mr. Rachlin had, he is qualified to give us some testimony about this
Communist Party convention. And the Internal Security Subcom-
mittee is interested in this particular convention because of the bear-
ing on events, in the months ahead and the years ahead, of decisions
and policies adopted at that convention. Those decisions thus have
a direct bearing on the work of the Senate Internal Security subcom-
mittee.
Mr. Rachlin, I wonder whether you could tell us your general ob-
servations, your analysis, and your general interpretation of what hap-
pened while you were attending the Communist Party convention.
Mr. Rachlin. I would be pleased to, Mr. Morris.
The convention was held in a building known as Chateau Gardens
in New York, which formerly was a church and is now used as a ban-
quet hall or reception hall.
The press was excluded from the convention so that the pretention
of the convention being an open convention, of course, was immediately
dissipated by the fact that members of the press were kept outside in
an anteroom and could not see or hear any of the proceedings that took
place.
I, myself, went into the pressroom on 1 or 2 occasions for the pur-
pose of finding out whether it was possible at least to hear and it was
not possible to hear from this room.
Mr. Morris. Did the Communists give any reason for excluding the
press ?
Mr. Rachlin. The reason given by Simon Gerson, I understand,
who is the propaganda head of the Communist Party, was that if
the press were present they might identify delegates from areas where,
if it were known that these people were Communists, they would be
seriously handicapped in their daily activities.
This was an absurd statement because the press was all around the
building and movie cameras were around the building photographing
everybody who went in and out of the building.
3518 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
So the reason was absurd and I am quite sure was merely a reason
and now the true basis for excluding the press is apparent.
Now, there are some overall observations that may be of some
interest. This, I think, should be pleasing to most people. There
were very few young people present. I took particular notice of that.
Even though I could not see the faces of many of the people — we
were at a little table in the left of this hall so most of the delegates
facing the front of the room had their backs toward us so it was not
always possible to see the general appearance of all the people but
it was quite clear that there were relatively few young people. Many
less than perhaps might have been the case back 20 years ago when
student activities were much more vigorous than they are at the
present time.
Another observation which may possibly be of some interest is that
I would estimate that approximately 50 percent of the delegates were
women. I am not qiiite certain of the significance of it.
Senator Jenner.How many delegates would you estimate were
there?
Mr. Kachlin. Approximately 300, Senator. I am quite certain that
figure is relatively accurate. How many people they represented is
not clear because they are given in relative terms and one cannot be
sure.
However, I made a rough estimate based on the culling together of
statistics from various sources. At one point during the convention,
the Communist Party announced that they were going to have approxi-
mately 40 district representatives to the national committee of whom
II would be from the State of New York, which was roughly the
percentage of Communist Party members in New York to the whole
United States.
They indicated that New York actually had a higher percentage
than the 11 would indicate. However, going through the list, say
California would have 5 and Illinois 4, and so on. At the end of the
reading a person got up and asked, "Well how about Missouri ? There
doesn't seem to be any delegates from Missouri." The interesting
answer was that "we gave representation on the basis of at least 100
members," and apparently the inference was there were not 100
members of the Communist Party in the State of Missouri.
But using that — and the general figures that were talked about —
the figure of 100 in that area seemed to be the basis of representation —
so, figuring 40 delegates to the national convention, using their own
figures, I think there probably is about 2,000 members in the State
of New York, and perhaps 7,000 or 7,500 in the United States.
Now, I have no special way of knowing that. That is an estimate I
made trying to cull together statistics.
Senator Jenner. Any Indiana delegate ?
Mr. Raghlin. I will be able to tell you that in a moment. I took
fairly copious notes.
Senator Jenner. All right, sir.
Mr. Morris. If you have representation of the various States
Mr. Raghlin. I would be glad to read them into the record.
Senator Jenner. That would be good.
Mr. Raghlin. First of all, there were to be 20 delegates at large to
the National Committee of the Communist Party under its new setup.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3519
And then there were to be 40 from the various districts as follows:
New York, 11; California, 5; Illinois, 4; New Jersey, 2; eastern
Pennsylvania, 2; Ohio, 2; the entire southern region of the United
States, 2 ; New England, 1 ; western Pennsylvania, 1 ; Maryland, 1 ;
Indiana, 1 ; Wisconsin, 1 ; Minnesota and the 2 Dakotas, 1 ; the Rocky
Mountain region, 1 ; Oregon, 1 ; Washington and Idaho combined, 1 ;
and this totals up to 40 and, together with the 20 at large, makes a
total of 60 which will be the new national committee. The 40 from
the districts, as of the closing of the convention, had not been selected
partly because. I think, there is a good deal of internal jockeying in the
Communist Party as to who is going to come out as topmost.
Mr. Morris, Now, Mr. Rachlin, in connection with the numbers,
your estimated number of 7,500, that is on the basis of just the broad
representation ?
Mr. Rachlin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover has made the statement that there
are now between twenty and twenty-five thousand Communists in the
United States.
Mr. Rachlin. He would have much better sources of information
than I. This was a rough estimate that I made without having any
special knowledge.
Mr. Morris. For instance, based on your observation, there was no
one from Missouri ?
Mr. Rachlin. That is right — I am sorry, there was no one from
Missouri, and the entire southern region had only two. Using a few
little figures, a few little things like that, I made the estimate which
could be inaccurate.
Mr. Morris. If Missouri had less than 100 and was not represented
then whatever the number, if they were less than 100, were presumably
unrepresented ?
Mr. Rachlin. If I understand what they did, they were somehow
included in the southern region. I am not sure of that.
Mr. Morris. That is right. We appreciate the difficulty.
Mr. Rachlin. Now, I mentioned previously that approximately 50
percent were women. Another observation that most of the delegates
were elderly or getting along in years. There were very few young
people. Among the limited number of spectators who obviously were
attached, as I said, to the Communist movement in one form or an-
other, the average age was even older. This, I took as a rather
heartening sign that the Communist Party seems to be making no
impression or very limited impression on the younger people in the
country and I was particularly aware of that and my partner and I
discussed that observation.
Now, it was quite clear that the main concern of the Communist
Party at the present time and one which should be of great interest
to all Americans, is that they have felt and feel particularly their
isolation from the rest of the United States. No matter what the
political representation might be. Liberal, Conservative, Republican,
Democratic, they feel they are completely out of touch with the United
States and this convention was desig-ned to create the atmosphere and
the machinery to return them to the main stream of American life.
This was expressed in two generally different attitudes, though hav-
ing the same overall purpose, in my estimation.
93215— 57— pt. 53-
3520 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
One might be called the attitude of the unregenerate Stalinized
position led by William Z. Foster who, of course, has been the leader
of the Communist Party in the United States perhaps since its very
beginning, I guess. Foster is an elderly man — of some 75 years of
age — whose introductory speech was read to the convention by Ben
Davis, who had been some years ago a city councilman in the city of
New York.
The other position which follows some of the more deviating posi-
tions of the Communist Party is led by John Gates. John Gates is
the editor of the Daily Worker, and his general attitude, and of his
followers, is that the Communist Party must create a kind of inde-
pendence from the Soviet Government. It must appear to make de-
cisions on its own and based on what they consider the merits rather
than the position given to it by the Soviet Government.
Senator Jenner. Did the words "national Communist" appear ?
Mr. Rachlin. That term, itself, did not appear as such but Foster
in his introductory statement to the convention the first day. Senator,
came very close to suggesting or using those terms, because he com-
pared Gates and his followers and the whole group that circulates in
and through the Daily Worker to being modern Browderists, and
modern Lovestoneites, the term meaning, as he explained the term, \
Lovestone being the Communist Party secretary who preceded ]
Browder and was an exponent of the idea of American exceptionalism, !
which was the term used. America was supposed to be the exception
to the general Marxist-Leninist principles of revolution and Foster ^
accused Gates of following that position and also accused Gates of |
following the position of Browder who used the term "20th century ,
Americanism," again trying to create a kind of Communist within the :
framework of American life and Gates, in his position, is supposed to |
be following that kind of thing because Gates does want to abolish the |
Communist Party as a political party and keep it up as a kind of \
political association. ;
It is something less than a party, and Foster uses the old Stalinist j
terms in referring to his own opponents. The terms they used which '
were mildly amusing, Gates is a rightwinger or opportunist and also i
he is a liquidationist. This apparently a new term of abuse which the |
Communist Party uses to refer to the people who wish to do what .
Gates does, that is, abolish the Communist Party and create this '
Communist political association which, by the way, had been done for \
a brief time in the middle forties during the last years of Browder's '.
term as a general secretary to the Communist Party.
But, when Browder was expelled after the famous letter from |
Jacques Duclos, the leader of the French Communists back in the
middle forties, the Communist Party re-created itself from the political '
association. j
Interestingly enough, there was another Jacques Duclos letter read
to the convention, which was a similarly hard letter, urging the Ameri-
can Communist Party to take a hard line favorable — undeviatingly
favorable — to the Soviet Government, and Foster, in his introductory
speech which I said was read to the convention by this Ben Davis, '
urged support of the Duclos letter and, in other words, wanted all-out
support of the Soviet Government, and, of course, it is well known i
that the French Communist Party is among the most Stalinist of all '
the Communist parties throughout the world.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3521
Now, interestingly enough, Dennis — who was the national secretary
of the Communist Party and I see, according to the daily press today,
is due to testify here Monday— said, "We listen to Mr. Duclos' letter
but we reject it."
Now, this again is undoubtedly part of the general tactic of trying
to bring the American Communist Party back into the mainstream of
American life. And so Dennis took the position in his remarks that
they should reject the Duclos letter, they should create internal Com-
munist Party democracy and permit dissents from Communist Party
positions.
On that point, however, I would like to show the inherent contra-
diction and how these words are really tactical rather than basic in
belief. There was a resolution passed on "democratic centralism" and
"monolithic unity." These are words that are Communist words; no-
body else that I know of uses these terms. But it is interesting to see
from the last paragraph of this resolution that it is quite clear that
their desire to have internal democracy in the party is merely tactical
and for the purpose of fooling the public. I would like to read this
short statement referring to "monolithic unity." The Communists gen-
erally mean by "monolithic unity" a unified position that all follow
undeviatingh\ And here is what this says in the resolution :
As to "monolithic unity," originally this term meant simply a common ideology
or outlook as opposed to a Marxist ideology. In practice it came to mean a rigid
conformity of views on all matters of theory, policy, and tactics. The concept of
a common ideology must be retained as essential to a Marxist party.
Here is the sentence that is the key to how tactical this is rather than
basic : "But the term should be dropped because of the harmful prac-
tices and connotations that have groAvn around it."
In other words, they are going to have monolithic unity but they
are going to call it spinach or something else in the hopes that we
will be taken in by this change.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Eachlin, may I break in at this point? Where
you are talking about differences between various groups — Mr. Chair-
man, we have a source of information from among the Communists
themselves who has been reporting to the subcommittee on these events
and, as you may know, he himself will testify before this subcommittee,
but I think it probably will be restricted to executive session.
I would like to read to you his analysis which we have just received
from him, this man who is going to testify and to ask you for your
comments on his particular statement :
Because of certain facts which came to my attention, it was possible for me
to submit in my recent statement to the committee a forecast of the character
and the tone as well as the suggested analysis of specific decisions, public and
private announcements, of the recent Communist Party, United States of Amer-
ica convention several months before it took place. The convention itself con-
firms my previous statement that the controversies and final decisions to break
with Moscow were all deliberately prearranged and, what is even more sinister,
all of it was done under the direct guidance of and with the approval of the
Kremlin.
To accomplish this result, the Kremlin played upon real convictions and differ-
ences of opinion on the part of leaders and rank and file of the American party
over an 11-month period and achieved their final desired result in the recent unit
convention. It is unimportant that certain principal participants in the con-
vention did not and still do not know they were pawns in the Kremlin-controlled
farce. The purpose of the so-called break with Moscow and the avowed aban-
donment of force and violence along with one's party dictatorship, etc., is the
3522 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
path to a "Socialist America" by democratic means, is to secure legality of the
American arm of the Kremlin in order to build a large mass party out of the
present decimated organization within the next 2 years.
I wonder whether you would comment on this man's observation.
Mr. Rachlin. I would be glad to. There is little doubt in my mind,
I would agree basically with the comments made by your informant.
There is no doubt, the positions taken by the three different groups,
the group led by Foster, the group led by Eugene Dennis, and the
group led by John Gates, while they have the appearance to differ they
are not essentially different, and the differences are tactical rather
than philosophic.
Furthermore, all three of these people are longtime Communist
Party leaders. This is no new blood coming to the fore for asserting
new principles. These are the people who have led the Communist
Party for the last generation, and I find it difficult to believe that these
differences are more than how to get back into the good graces of the
American people, and not symptomatic of a real basic difference of
philosoph}^
I think, if there were a real basic difference of philosophy among
the 3 or any one of the 3, that person would not be long for the Com-
munist Party. I think the thing to do, however, before any of us here,
this committee or any American who watches this thing carefully, we
ought to at least — I won't say just suspend judgment — we ought to
watch carefully for the purposes of seeing how far Gates is going to
go in his so-called position toward greater democracy. I, for example,
will try to watch it as closely as I can. As I even told one of the peo-
ple who was the so-called host of this delegation, a national committee-
man by the name of Blumberg, this was only a tactical question ; that
I could not see any serious change in the Communist Party at all.
What I told him at the time was —
it is all well and good for you people to go through the pretense of creating
criticism of the Soviet Union of acts that happened several years ago, but I do
not see any criticism of any current activity. For example, all Americans, no
matter what their personal political views of a unified position on Hungary, we,
all of us, dread the Soviet intervention in Hungary. We all recognize it as
interference in the affairs of a small state trying to come out from the Communist
control. And yet you people have not criticized the Soviet Government for what
is obvious —
using your words — "Soviet imperialism."
When I see that, maybe I will take a new look but until that time, I am con-
vinced that your actions are just tactical differences and not basic.
Therefore, in general, while I do not know anything about the plans
of the Soviet Union with regard to this convention. I would basically
agree with the conclusions that you read to me in that statement.
Mr. Morris. Was there, in fact, any resolution on Hungary?
]Mr. Rachlin. None whatsoever on Hungary and, interestingly
enough, there was a minor undercurrent among some of the unimpor-
tant people there
Senator Jenner. Didn't you hear anything discussed at all ?
Mr. Rachlin. There were things discussed. For example, the
things that were discussed were really technical points like how they
should use the term "Marxism-Leninism."
The Gates crowd wanted to soften the use of the term so it would
not appear they were following Marxist-Leninist dogma. "Wliereas,
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3523
Foster was insisting that there be undeviating wholehearted and com-
plete unswerving support of the term "Marxism-Leninism." However,
there were a few of the delegates who got up on the floor and actually
made statements which
Senator Jenner. I want to interrupt to state that you may go ahead.
I have to attend another meeting. Senator AVatkins will be here to
relieve me.
Mr. Rachlin. Shall I continue ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, continue, Mr. Rachlin.
Mr. Rachlin. For example, there w^as a delegate who got up and
said that Foster advocated a converted aspect of Soviet policy. This
antagonized everybody. He said under Foster the Communist Party
waited for the Soviet Union to support peace before the United States
Communist Party did.
And this delegate went on to add that the United States Conununist
Party must see the contradictions in the Soviet Communist Party and
not wait to receive the line from the Soviet Government.
This was just an miimportant delegate. He said, for example, that
Pravda, the Soviet daily paper, does not print any stories about the
United States Communist resolutions which were at all critical in
any way of the Soviet Government except Dennis', and Dennis' state-
ments were excised. Then he made a vigorous attack on Foster as
being one who was just following undeviatingly the Soviet line.
I am just trying to show here that while the leaders of the party
are going in one direction, there is some kind of midercurrent among
some of the people, a few of them seemed generally disturbed. For
example, a young woman from California, whose name I do not know,
got up and said, "It is not enough to say we did not know what was
going on," that is referring to the Stalinist murders and things of
that sort — she w^ent on to say, "Oiu- policy" — meaning the Communist
Party policy — "in the United States was complete subservience to
Stalinism."
Oddly enough, there was a fair rippling of applause at the finishing
of this statement. I thinlv this is a good sign. It means there are
some people in the Communist Party who may be preparing to ac-
tually break from the Communist Party. There was one girl who
got up and criticized the leadership of the Communist Party. She
said, "You taught us to know more about Russian history than about
American history. This influence is not going to carry the party by
even the remotest possibility. The party is still in the hands of the
professionals and will be for a long time.
"But I hope that some day some of us will be able to develop ways
of encouraging these people to refuse the Communist Party and rejoin
the rest of the United States."
Mr. Morris. On that point, the subcommittee is very desirous of
trying to determine if there are defectors and who the defectors are,
because naturally they are prime sources of evidence. We are very
eagerly looking for someone who is a defector and someone who would
testify about the work of the Communist Party.
Did you learn of any particular defectors?
Mr. Rachlin. No, except this : Several of the newspapermen had
received a story from somebody inside the convention, and the rumor
was going around to the effect that, at the end of the convention, some-
body was going to get up and severely criticize all the leaders : Foster
3524 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
for being no different from what he always has been, and Gates for
selling out a liberal position on these issues, and the rumor was that
he was going to get up and say there was no resolution on Hungary,
there was no resolution on the Soviet anti-Semitism. But, as far as
I know, this event never took place and who this person was, I do
not know. But there is no doubt there were rumors going around
that this was going to happen.
Mr. Morris. You say there was no resolution on Soviet anti-
Semitism ?
Mr. Rachlin. No resolution on it; no, sir. This was obviously a
cause of undercurrent because this had been publicized throughout
the press of the United States, I guess tliroughout the press of tlie
world. This was one of the issues that was completely avoided.
And nothing was said at all.
Now, there are 1 or 2 other points that I miglit indicate. Of the
20 people who were elected to the national committee of the Com-
munist Party as delegates at large, I have their names — I was saying
of the 20 people who were elected to the Communist national com-
mittee at large, I tried to estimate from the information that I heard
how they divided it among the 3 groups. And the way that I have
it of those 20, I would have 6 or 7 among the Gates group, approxi-
mately 6 among the Dennis group, and 7 among the Foster group.
There obviously is some fight for power going on, because no new
national chairman or new general secretary was chosen. I think the
conclusion from that was that they could not agree among them-
selves who was goin^ to hold the seat of power on this score.
I made a rough estimate of the people in the different groups. They
read off the people who were elected. While one could not be sure
who was in what group, there was some evidence of who belonged
to whom. As I indicated, they were fairly equally divided.
Now tliere are 1 or 2 things that we might watch for in the future.
For example, a term we are going to hear with great frequency from
now on, which is going to be a Communist slogan, will be the anti-
monopoly coalition. This term was used by all sides and it indicates,
following up your point, that differences may have been more appar-
ent than real. Everybody, whether it was forced or real, used the
term "antimonopoly coalition." And we can rest assured that that
term is one we are going to hear at great length.
Another thing that they made quite clear at the convention and
which, in a way, was disturbing, is that the Communist Party is
going to make an extra special effort to infiltrate into Negro mass
organizations. I read in tlie press later that Roy Wilkins, who is
the head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, publicly repudiated them, but there is no doubt from the
nature of the national committee elected — approximately 5 or 6 of the
20 were Negroes — that the Communist Party is going to make an
extremely special effort to infiltrate and take over control of Negro
groups. I trust this will not happen and it is one we will all have to
watch carefully.
Mr. Morris. Tell me this, Mr. Rachlin : Would it be your opinion
that, at the present time, the Communist Party as a mass organization
is not successful now, and one of the purposes of this convention
was to try to arrange a framework wliereby they could get back in
operation as a mass organization ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3525
Mr. Eachlin, That statement, Judge, is absolutely correct. There
is no doubt they are not a mass organization. They are, fortunately,
completely isolated from all general activities in the American life.
I have the feeling, from the comments that were made, that this is
true not only of their political life but also their social life. Their
social life, as a result of their being isolated by all Americans, is only
with themselves. They have no contact with people except in the most
casual way, except Communist Party members.
Mr. Morris. Now we are talking about the Communists as Com-
munists ?
Mr. Eachun. Yes.
Mr. Morris. If there is — and the subcommittee is constantly en-
countering it — evidence of covert activity, miderground activity, of
secret Communist Party members who do not operate as Communists,
therefore do not participate in the so-called Communist mass move-
ment ; who even have instructions, not to associate with Communists,
then when we talk about the diminution of the Communist forces we
are talking about the Communist organization and not the under-
ground ?
Mr. Eachlin. That is right. In view of the fact they had some
outside observers like myself present, there was no evidence whatso-
ever of any underground or covert activity. Everybody there, except
the observers, was an open member of the Communist Party.
Mr. Morris. Senator Watkins, may I mention this is Mr. Carl
Eachlin, a New York attorney who has attended the recent Commu-
nist Party Convention in New York as an unofficial observer. He
represented the New York Chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union. He has attended virtually all the sessions of the convention.
He is a trained political observer. He represents many trade unions
which have a Communist problem within them, and he has consented,
at our request, to come here to give us his firsthand observations and
analysis of the recent Commmiist Party convention. As you know,
Senator Jenner had to leave to attend another session.
Senator Watkins. Let me ask you this question : Was this a closed
convention ?
Mr. Eachlin". Senator, it was closed with the exception of a few
observers like myself. It was closed to the press. There were some
guests there, but they were obviously in one way or another identified
with the Communist Party. The press was not admitted.
As a matter of fact, because of that, the press would grab hold of
me to give them some details, and I was in a sense responsible for some
of the stories appearing in the public press. The New York Times
and the New York Herald-Tribune in fact quoted me on some of the
things that took place because they could not get any reliable informa-
tion from within the convention itself, except the handouts of the
propaganda office of the Communist Party.
Mr. Morris. In that comiection, were the handouts given by Gates
a fair representation of what was going on inside ?
Mr. Eachlin. Gerson was handling all the press releases for the
Communist Party. They were merely the briefest summaries, one
might say. There were no details as to what took place. They would
not give information on who said what, except in the case of a man
like Dennis or Foster.
3526 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Every effort was made to cover up any real discussion that might
have taken place. All that was given out was just the vote, and the
resolution was such-and-such, and a copy of the resolution that was
passed; but there were no efforts made as to any discussion that might
have taken place.
Mr. Morris. There was an effort made, at least some few delegates
would like to have a resolution on Hungary and Soviet anti-Semitism ?
Mr. Rachlin. That is right, it was quite clear that some of the
delegates wanted those resolutions, and the press knew it. Appar-
ently they had some representatives in the Communist Party that
advised them.
Mr. Morris. Did you see any evidence that the Communists were
adapting and regulating the machinery of their party in such a way
that they had an eye on the Smith Act prosecutions ?
Mr. Rachlin. From my observations, there is no doubt that that
was one of their objectives. And they had a special resolution on the
Smith Act which I have in front of me. And the whole tenor of the
convention was to create the appearance of separating themselves
from the international Communist conspiracy, with the idea they
could then defend under the Smith Act and that they were not part
of the Communist conspiracy and they might defend in other areas
of government security or industrial security where there would be
the question of being part of the apparatus of Communist conspiracy.
There is no doubt their terminology is geared to create the appear-
ance of separation so they can take a stronger position in court.
Mr. Morris. In other words, if they passed a formal resolution and
tho resolution purported to be the official position of the American
Communist Party which is in real variance with the organization, by
promulgating those official positions, they feel they can possibly con-
fuse the courts and confuse the Government?
Mr. Rachlin. I am sure that is what they hope to do. There is no
doubt that they hope to create that illusion.
But that was just part of the whole atmosphere, Judge Morris.
That is part of it, but they are trying to create the impression that
they are good Americans and maybe their views are different from
yours or mine, but that they are really good Americans and that their
main interest is the United States.
That is the impression they are going to try to create. And they are
going to use the term — they are going to try to aline themselves with
all kinds of groups, even refer to the fact they want to aline them-
selves with conservative groups who might be interested in opposing
what they call the coalition of large corporations into monopolies.
And that is going to be one of their big slogans, the antimonopoly co-
alition and that is one of the things we will have to watch for.
Mr. Morris. Thank you, Mr. Rachlin.
Senator, do you have any questions ?
Senator Watkins. You may proceed.
Mr. Morris. One other thing, you are acquainted with the term
"Aesopian language" ?
Mr. Rachlin. I have read about it, I am familiar with the term.
Mr. Morris. Can you comment whether or not there was any Aeso-
pian language used in connection with the convention ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3527
Mr. Eachlin. Well, there is no doubt — for example, that para-
graph I read from their resolution on democratic centralism and
monolithic unity is a use of the Aesopian language. And they are
very blunt about stating that they are going to try to give the ap-
pearance of one thing so as to make people believe they mean some-
thing else.
In other words, they are going to use a term which will have a spe-
cific meaning to them, which they hope will confuse you and me and
the American public. All three positions of the Communist Party
when they criticize the Soviet Government or any activity of any Com-
munist Party throughout the world is a kind of use of Aesopian lan-
guage, because it is done with a view to creating an illusion which
most of them — almost all — do not reallj^ believe.
Some of the members of the Communist Party undoubtedly do be-
lieve the criticism of the Soviet Union that the Communist Party
passes out. But among the leadership, there is little belief it is more
than a tactical question with them.
Just perhaps a few more observations I might make : Some of the
leading well-known Communists were not reelected to the national
committee. Betty Gannett, who has been the subject of prosecutions
under the Smith iVct and been a well-known Communist for many
years, was apparently badly beaten in her efforts to be elected to the
national committee.
Simon Gerson was defeated for the national committee. I referred
to him before as the one in charge of propaganda. Blumberg, who
had been a member of the committee for a long time, was likewise
beaten for election. How the ballots were comited, of course, I do not
know but there were actually, from the appearance, half the number
of people running who were defeated. That was interesting and it
may be because — even if there are no real differences in ideology, there
is a difference in the efforts to obtain power, and I am sure that the
efforts to elect people to the national committee was an effort to create
a power situation whereby one or the other of the three groups could
assert enough power. On the question of continuing the Commmiist
Party as a political organization, the group led by Dennis supported!
the group led by Foster.
Dennis wants to continue the Conununist Party as a political organ-
ization as opposed to Gates, who openly stated that he wants to termi-
nate the Coimnunist Party as a party, but does want to continue it
as a political association.
On the other hand, on resolutions that had anything to do with
the program, the Dennis group by and large supported Gates group
against Foster. For example, the draft resolution, which was the
subject of all their programmatic material which indicates the efforts
that the Communist Party has gone to to create the appearance of
rejoining the American people, was supported by Dennis and rather
severely criticized by Foster. Foster, for exainple, was for all-out
support of the Soviet Government in its activities in Hungary, and
so forth, whereas Dennis and the others play around with words that
all add up to nothing on the subject.
So that, I think the thing perhaps that we can do in the future is
to watch the power fight. Because the fact that they could not elect
a national chairman and a general secretary indicates to me that they
are in a power fight. It may be of use to all of us— because, if it
93215— 57— pt. 53 3
3528 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
becomes a real power fight and people are expelled or leave, obviously
such people can be the sources of great information to all of us.
If I may utter one word of caution: This is the thing that might
be of help to all of us: One of the things I have learned over the
years in having to watch the Communist Party because of the situa-
tion mentioned earlier by me, was that the Communist Party, unlike
any other political group in the United States — I do not care whether
they be Republican, Democratic, or Socialist- — is the whole life to
the people who are its members. It is not merely something you do
once in a while on maj-be regular occasions, or argue about with your
friends while listening to the radio, it is everything. The Communist
Party member does nothing which, in his own mind, is not in some
way identifying him as a Communist Party member, whether it is his
job or social life or politics or as a member of a trade union. And the
word of caution I want to utter — and I do not want to sound like a psy-
chologist because I am not, even though in one of the trade unions
I deal with I deal with a lot of social workers — it is not like the
ordinary American who disagrees with his political party. It in-
volves an emotional upheaval. In encouraging the people to break
with the Communist Party, I think one of the things we have not
recognized strong enough is this difficulty they face.
I was speaking to the reporter who interviewed Howard Fast, when
he broke with the Communist Party just a few weeks ago. You
know Howard Fast was a moderately popular novelist and was asso-
ciated with the Communist Party a long time. He broke with the
Communist Party a month or so ago. And the reporter indicated
very clearly that this had been on Fast's mind for many, many months
but it involved a great effort on his part to come to the final break.
So this is a thing we perhaps ought to try to understand a little more.
And we ought to encourage them. The first thing they do is — of
course they all react almost unanimously in the same way, that their
emotional break is different, and they are not going to become a public
spectacle and discuss internal affairs of the Communist Party. I
think the thing that we have learned about such people is that all of
them eventually will discuss these matters publicly and disclose what
information they have. Many of them find it difficult at first. And
the only word of caution that I want to urge — if I may be so pre-
sumptions— is to say that we should try to recognize this difficulty
among some of these people who have this emotional difficulty ana.
encourage them and perhaps play along with it for a while, because
our experience has shown that every one of the people who have broken
with the Communist Party at one point or another, in a matter of
months or maybe a year or more have come forward and disclosed
information which has been of great value to all of us.
So this is the thing that I have watched over the years, and I recog-
nize the difficulty because it is important for all of us to have the
information.
At the same time, if we are overzealous, we may create a kind of
blocking which would prevent the person from disclosing the necessary
information.
Mr. Morris. I might mention that the subcommittee has found that
to be very true. We had recent dealings with somebody who has
defected recently and he has indicated that he would be willing to
talk, but did not want to be subpenaed and go on the record.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3529
Now, if we want to be strictly formal about it, the Senate com-
mittee should not deal with anyone who has broken with the Com-
munist Party unless he is under oath. But we realize he is emotionally
involved and by applying strict attitudes toward him, we may freeze
him in a certain position. And we have found it takes at least 3 years
for a man who is a Communist to become completely detached so he
can be in a position to see the world situation clearly enough and his
own situation clearly enough that he can begin to give testimony and
evidence against the conspiracy.
Mr. Rachlix. I have found that to be the fact and I am very happy
to hear Avhat you have said, Judge, because we are all anxious to get
this information. The reason I mention that specifically now is
there is an undercurrent — they are not among the top leaders, because
they are too hardened and too dedicated to break away, but I feel,
because of the Hungarian situation, because of the revelations of
Stalinism and the revelations of Soviet anti-Semitism, there are going
to be public breaks in the not too distant future. And we ought to
encourage this. The circumstances of events over the past few years
have made it difficult for the Communist Party.
If I may make this further one last comment : In the thirties it was
possible, for various reasons, for the Communist Party to work with
other groups as they did. One of tlie reasons was that the great pub-
lic enemy at that time was not Russia but Xazi Germany. jSIost of us
were concerned with Nazi Germany, Russia only as a secondary force.
Second, none of us had tlie ex])erience in the thirties that we have now
as to what Connnunists are, actually, what they are like.
But at the ])resent time quite certainly the efforts of the Commu-
nists to come back to the main stream of American life- — because all
Americans and most people throughout the world recognize the Soviet
Union as the great hungry power trying to alisorb free peoples and
destroy democratic government.
So their efforts — they will not haA^e the same friendly atmosphere
they might have experienced in the 1930-s, and Avhile we should watch
carefully, I do not think we ought to be too frightened that they are
trying to come back into American life, I do not see any serious pos-
sibilitv of it becoming a strono- influence.
Senator Watkins. You do not think for a moment the American
people are frightened about the possibilities ?
Mr. Rachlin. Not even remotely, Senator.
Senator Watkins. You used the word "frightened."
Mr, Rachlin. I misused the term. What I meant is — I am trying
to think what I did actually use.
Senator Watkins. We can be vigilant but not frightened.
Mr. Rachlin. That is right: there is nothing to be afraid of at all.
The American people have had a lot of education on this subject,
through all the legislative activity, through good public groups, and
what not. There is not much danger that the Communists will gain
any influence in any of the mass organizations in the United States.
Senator Watkixs. Maybe you have already expressed just lu-w you
came to cover this convention— did you take notes?
Mr. Rachlin. I took rather detailed notes which I have in front
of me.
Mr. Morris. Senator Watkins, he has been reading from the notes
he actually took at the time.
3530 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. RACHLiisr. I have on several occasions referred to my notes.
Senator Watkins. Did you make direct quotes ?
Mr. Rachlin. In 1 or 2 cases I actually made direct quotes.
Senator Watkins. From what? In other words, what you have
been giving us is a summary ?
Mr. Rachlin. Yes ; based on my recollection and my notes.
Senator Watkins. How long did this convention last ?
Mr. Rachlin. It ran over a period of 4 days, beginning on the Sat-
urday, a week ago, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, and the
convention closed last Tuesday evening a week ago.
Senator Watkins. Did you attend all sessions ?
Mr. Rachlin. The sessions were all day long — I am sorry, Senator.
I attended all the sessions but not all parts of all sessions. There
were times that I had duties at my office which unhappily took me
away. And, also, family duties — playing with the children took part
of my time, too.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Rachlin, on behalf of — Senator Jenner asked me
to thank the witness for him before he left — on behalf of Senator
Jenner and the chairman of the committee and myself, I want to
express our appreciation to you for arranging your business so that
you could come here and tell us about this convention.
Mr. Rachlin. I was happy to be here.
Senator Watkins. I join with my colleague. Senator Jenner, and
also Judge Morris in thanking you.
Mr. Morris. Senator, the witness tomorrow will be Mr. Beichman,
who was the reporter for Christian Science Monitor who covered
every one of the sessions at this convention. However, he was not
at the vantage point of Mr. Raclilin. But he is scheduled to be a
witness tomorrow. And we may have one other witness.
Mr. Rusher. With your approval we would like to place in the
public record of the subcommittee certain documents submitted to
us by Mr. Nicholas who testified before the subcommittee on May 10,
1956; records of the Communist Party and travel agency which
arranged transportation for the Communist Party.
(The above material appears as an appendix to pt. 23: Scope of
Soviet Activity in the United States.)
Mr. Rusher. Secondly, a continuation of the testimony of Dr.
Andriy ve who testified before this committee last year, a f oiTiier Soviet
citizen who defected to the West and who has made a careful analysis
of the meaning of de-Stalinization.
(The above material appears in pt. 45: Scope of Soviet Activity.)
Mr. Rusher. Thirdly, a memorandiun prepared by the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists on the Hungarian situation m the light
of the Geneva Convention of 1949.
(The above memorandum appears as appendix I following the testi-
mony in this volmne.)
Mr. Rusher. Fourthly, three articles with regard to recent subject
matter before the committee on the question of Spanish gold now held
by the Soviet Union. These articles appear in the New York Times
on Sunday, January 6, Thui-sday, January 10, on Monday, January 21.
Senator Watkins. Of this year?
Mr. Rusher. Of this year.
(The articles above referred to appear in pt. 51 : Scope of Soviet
Activity. )
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3531
Mr, Rusher. Lastly, a statement by the executive council of the
AFL-CIO dated February 4, 1957, entitled "The Situation Behind
the Iron Curtain."
With your consent, we would like these placed in the public record.
Senator Watkins. They may be placed in the public record.
(The AFL-CIO statement referred to above appears as appendix II
following the testimony in this volume.)
Mr. Morris. May we stand adjourned until 11 o'clock tomorrow
morning ?
Senator Watkins. The committee will be in recess until tomorrow
morning at 11 o'clock.
(At 11 : 45 a. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 11 a. m.,
Thursday, February 21, 1957.)
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1957
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the
commiitee on the judiciary,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 : 10 a. m., in room
457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.
Present : Senators Jenner and Hruska.
Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel ; and "William A. Rusher,
associate counsel.
Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order.
Proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, before beginning the session today, I
would like to put into our public record a statement in connection with
the subpena that was issued for Ludwig Rajchman. We have here a
confirmation from the Western Union that the telegram that Senator
Eastland sent after Mr. Rajchman had rejected our subpena and threAv
it on the floor, the subpena that served notice on him that he was due
down here, that the telegram was delivered at 7 : 30 a. m. yesterday at
the Hotel Westbury in New York.
I would like to make that statement part of the record.
Senator Jenner. It may become part of the record.
Mr. Morris. The witness is Arnold Beichman.
Will you stand and be sworn ?
Senator Jenner. Do you swear that the testimony given in this hear-
ing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD BEICHMAN, NEW YORK, N. Y.
Senator Jenner. Will you give your name and address for the rec-
ord, please?
Mr. Beichman. Arnold Beichman, 20 West 84th Street, New York.
Senator Jenner. What is your occupation ?
Mr. Beichman. I am a newspaperman.
Senator Jenner. For what newspaper ?
Mr. Beichman. I am a contributor to the Christian Science Moni-
tor and the AFTv-CIO News, and the New Leader.
Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. You also have some other positions ?
3533
3534 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Beichman. I am cliairman of the board of directors of the
American Committee for Cultural Freedom, which consists of several
hundred cultural figures and scientific personnel who are opposed to
commmiism and have been fighting it for several years.
The chairman of that national committee is Prof. Sidney Hook, of
the New York University Department of Philosophy.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Beichman, in connection with that particular expe-
rience, the experience that you have set forth, you drew on that partic-
ular background, did you not, in connection with the assignment that
you had last week of covering the New York Communist Party con-
vention ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Now, you appeared at the convention in what
capacity ?
Mr. Beichman. As a reporter for the AFL-CIO News, and for
the Christian Science Monitor.
Mr. Morris. Did you cover every session of the convention ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir — that is, you couldn't cover the sessions,
because thej^ wouldn't let you in. AVe were the pariahs. And we had
to wait in a little anteroom which was called the press room. So, to
that extent, we covered the sessions.
Senator Jenner. In other words, it was a closed session, to all
intents and purposes ?
Mr. Beichman. It certainly was. Senator.
Senator Jenner. And all you got was handouts ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir — well, we got oral comments, but it was
impossible to follow through with any questions, because the spokes-
anen would simply say, "I don't know." And when we would ask,
could we talk to, say, Foster, or Dennis, or Gates, they would say,
"Well, we will see," so that what we got were self-serving declara-
tions, but without any opportunity to cross-examine the responsible
leaders of the Communist Party as to what they meant.
For example, they said in one statement they gave us that there
have been mistakes made in the Soviet Union, but some of these mis-
takes are bemg corrected — I am paraphrasing. I asked the spokes-
man, "What mistakes are you referring to, and which mistakes have
been corrected?"
"The statement speaks for itself."
I asked, could we interview any of the leaders.
"We will try."
We never got any satisfaction. At one point we signed a petition,
three of us, three reporters, which we submitted to Simon Gerson,
who was the deputy spokesman, three reporters, one from the Herald
Tribune, one from the New York Times, and myself, saying we
wanted to see Jolin Gates. Apparently this had some influence.
Gates came out and said he couldn't talk, because there was a gentle-
men's agreement not to give any private interviews.
That was the extent of our contact with the leadership.
Senator Jenner. Proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Beichman, the first report that proceeded from
the convention, the first reportorial report that proceeded from the
convention, indicated pretty generally — it is hard to generalize — I
have here now the newspaper articles of three established east-coast
newspapers. The headline on one is: "Reds in U. S. Vote to Cast
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3535
Off Moscow." The second is: "U. S. Reds Vote End Control by
Soviet." Third: "U. S. Reds Quit Foster and Kremlin." They are
the headlines in the newspapers of February 13, the day after the
final session.
Now, the subcommittee has been looking into this, and we find
pretty generally that Gerson, Si Gerson, as public-relations official,
was in fact giving out handouts as to what happened at tlie conven-
tion, whereas what actually happened there was at variance with
what he gave out.
Now, I wonder if you could generally state whether or not, on the
basis of your having access to whatever you — you tell us about that —
whether, in fact, the Reds in the United States have voted to cast off
Moscow, whether they have voted to end control by the Soviet,
whether they have quit Foster and the Kremlin.
Mr. Beichman. Judge Morris, the only way the Communist Party
of America can be independent of Moscow is to be anti-Moscow. There
is no way it can be anything else but that.
If I may analogize for a moment, supposing we think to 1938,
when we had a Nazi bund in America, and supposing the Nazi bund
had a convention and, "We are going to be independent of Nazi
Germany ; from here on in we are going to interpret Mein Kampf the
way we think, according to American conditions. However, we still
believe in nazism, we still think that Hitler is a great fellow."
Would anybody for a moment say that the Nazi bund had become
inde])endent of Nazi Germany ?
I think the analogy would hold here, because the Communist Party
today, is in what the agencies on Madison Avenue call the soft sell
phase. They are not pushing quite as hard. We used to say there
was a hard sell in advertising, and there is a soft sell. And the
Communist Party on the propaganda level is in the soft sell stage;
it has to be.
There have been some very serious ideological problems in the
Comminiist world. They have had an uprising in East Germany in
1953. You liad a Poznan uprising. You had a Hungarian uprising.
You have had an uprising even in Tiflis, in the heart of Soviet Georgia.
These have revealed an ideological bankruptcy. In the days of
Stalin when Russia suffered defeats, as, for example, under Hitler,
under Mussolini, under Franco, those were external defeats which
they could weather, because this showed they were resisting the so-
called march of Fascism. To the Communist movement, internal
defeats of this kind where the masses behind the Iron Curtain refused
to acce])t Soviet dictation, and thereby demonstrate the bankruptcy
of Soviet ideology, this becomes a much mure t,erious problem within
the Communist Party throughout the world, particularly in Western
Europe, where you have seen some defection, in France, or in Italy,
among intellectuals, and among some of the trade unions.
Because of that I think the Communist Party in America has had
to go into its soft sell phase. It did that once before — as a matter of
fact, it did it twice before — in the midthirties, with its popular fronts,
and during World War II under the aegis of Earl Browder, when they
suddenly came out and said they were willing to accept the united
front with anybody who believed in winning the war, including the
National Association of Manufacturers.
93215 — 57 — pt. 53 4
3536 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNTITED STATES
That is a quotation from Earl Browder. I don't think the NAM
went for it.
However, at the present time the Communist Party is probably
in one of its strongest positions that it has been in, despite its defeats,
because tests demonstrated quite clearly that it has shucked off a lot
of its weak links, so-called, and what they are down to is the hard core.
For example, out of the 20 members elected to the national com-
mittee, 14 are men who have either been in jail or are under indict-
ment under the Smith Act, or for harboring fugitives — 14 out of
the 20 under indictment for harboring are in jail — that is a hard
core, because those are people who are willing to give up their freedom.
For what? They know perfectly well there is no chance of estab-
lishing communism in the near future. It is to protect and to nurture
and to strengthen Soviet foreign policy.
In other words, what you have seen at this convention is, they have
seen perhaps the errors of their tactics, but not the errors of their
ambitions.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Beichman, if I may, to get back to the first
question I asked you, were you able to draw any conclusion on the
basis of your analysis of the resolutions that ultimately came to you,
and your general understanding of what went on there, as to whether
or not the Communists in the United States did vote to cut off
Moscow ?
Mr. Beichman. No, sir. And I think it is easily provable.
Mr. Morris. Wliat is easily provable?
Mr. Beichman. That they have not voted to cut themselves off from
Moscow. They can't.
Mr. Morris. Well, I wonder if you would address yourself to
whether as a matter of fact they did on did not?
Mr. Beichman. They did not.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us why you make that statement?
Mr. Beichman. For examj^le, cutting itself off from Moscow would
entail certain specific acts. For example, they held out the hand of
friendship in one of their resolutions to the American Socialists, or
what they called Social Democrats. But they didn't talk about free-
ing the Socialists behind the Iron Curtain, democratic Socialists who
have been imprisoned by the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain.
They didn't ask for the freedom of political prisoners, let alone
ask for a fair trial. They didn't ask for an end to the one-party system.
They didn't ask for a withdrawal of Soviet troops in Hungary. They
haven't asked for freedom of the press or opinion. They haven't
even asked in an area in which many Communists in America are
interested, the issue of anti-semitism — they didn't even dare raise
that at the Communist Party convention.
And in one specific act, the case of Alter and Ehrlich, two Polish
Jewish Socialists who were executed by Stalin, allegedly because
they were allied with the Fascists, despite the admissions of some
Polish Communist newspapers that those were frameup trials, never-
theless the Communist Party here avoided taking any issue with that.
Now, to say you have broken with something without showing
where and how is purely, as I say, a self-serving declaration. They
have not broken — if I mav 20 back now — because they cannot break — ■
because the day they break with Moscow there will be a new Commu-
nist Party in America which will have the label "Communist Party,"
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3537
and then those who broke become just a little sect on the level with
the Trotskyites, or the Greenback Party, or the Vegetarian Party,
with as much significance.
They exist because they are the arm of the Soviet Union in America.
So when they break here they are no longer the arm. Where have
they broken ?
Senator Jenner. What about Titoism in America?
Mr. Beichman. I don't think it is of any major consequence.
Senator Jenner. Could they go that far 2
IMr. Beichman. No, sir.
Senator Jenner. You say they can't break, but can they have a title
break ?
Mr. Beiciiman. They have not, because — it is very interesting — in
Foster's speech at this convention he particularly attacked a so-called
pro-Tito movement in the party.
There has been no talk in tlie Daily Worker about Tito for months
now. In fact, throughout the Communist world today there is now
a developing anti-Tito movement all over agam — not that Tito is any
less of a Communist than he was.
Senator Jenner. I was interested in your ideas on that. In other
words, how do you tell the ditference between communism, interna-
tional communism, and national communism ?
Mr. Beichman. Words, because when it gets down to cases, where
do they stand ? The issue has been acceptance of the primacy of the
Soviet Communist Party. Jacques Duclos, in his greetings to this
Communist Party convention, made it very clear that you have to
accept the primacy of the Soviet Communist Party, because they are
the experienced fighters, and so on. And it is important to note that
the Kremlin, in two of its major ideological organs in January, came
out for a full support of the Foster leadership of the Communist
Party.
Despite the fact that, for several months before the convention,
the Daily Worker and its editor, John Gates, did criticize the Soviet
Union, when it came to a showdown, when the chips were down, they
went completely with the Foster move.
For example, the magazine Party Life^ — I am now reading from an
article in the Baltimore Sun by Howard Naughton, Moscow corre-
spondent, January 5 :
"Party Life is the chief ideological organ of the Soviet Union." It
denounced Gates, it said "it comes out against the dicatorship of the
proletariat, against the party of the Leninist type," and so on.
On February 4 in the New York Times there was a story that the
Soviet — that the magazine called Soviet Russia, has come out against
the Gates group and for Foster.
The greetings by Jacques Duclos to the Communist Party conven-
tion denounces the revisionists, as they called them, who want to
change the Communist Party.
And then we come to the Foster speech. Foster says :
We must not change the Communist Party in any way.
The Gates faction had said :
We want to change the Communist Party and make it a Communist political
association,
and Foster won hands down on that.
3538 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The next one was to endorse Foster — Foster called for the endorse-
ment of the theoretical base of the Communist movement under its
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. There was going to be a great
quarrel, because Marxism-Leninism, the Gates group said, could not
always apply it quite the same way to American's different conditions,
different customs.
The Gates group accepted the Foster evaluation without change.
They said they would be opposed to democratic centralism and mono-
lithic units, it is called, which means one-party dictatorship.
When it came to a showdown they accepted it, the Gates group,
always in the interest of unity in the party.
Foster, on the Hungarian question, where the Communist Daily
Worker had said :
We stand with the masses of Hungary —
where they said —
We do not condone the Soviet policies in Hungary or those of the Hungarian
Communist Party —
when it came to a showdown the resolution that was passed by this
convention says :
The imperialists intervened in the Hungarian tragedy —
a complete reversal, accepted in the name of party unity.
Throughout everything that Foster demanded in his speech they
came — the Gates group accepted it, always in the interest of national
unity, of party unity.
Now, of course, there were debates, there were votes, but I think
that was purely to pull the wool over the eyes of the innocents. They
had never had debates before, they had never had votes, now they
could say, "Look, we had a vote, and it has carried with so many people
voting against." But it was, I think, the great hoax of our time, to pull
the wool over the eyes of innocents and dupes. And we met some of
them who were observers at this Communist Party convention.
I asked one of the observers, whose name I would rather not men-
tion, "Do you think there is now democracy in the Communist Party
in America?"
And the answer was, "Sure look at the debates, look at the votes; I
think there is more democracy" — note, "more democracy" — the impli-
cation being that previously there had been some democracy.
I think that this has been an example, gentlemen, of one of the great
fakes of our time, one which we have gone through before. I think
the Communist Party is in a spot and has to come out of it. And I
think they have succeeded very well, because a lot of people who
might have left the Communist Party can now say, "Well, look, here is
Gates, he was opposed to a lot of the stuff, but he is staying in the
party in the interest of unity, he will fight it out in the party, there-
fore we can stay in while Gates is there."
That there have been no defections is to me the most interesting
thing.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Beichman, would you say that that is a
parallel or counterpart of the situation that prevails in the Soviet
Union, the fact that you have a faction that, when the political climate
seems to be in one direction, that particular faction, or the person
identified with the particular faction within the framework of the
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3539
party, is trotted out, as the case may be, in this case general secretary — •
do you iind there is a parallel in that ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir. Until Stalin consolidated his power you
did not have differences in the Communist Party in this country. You
have had different factions. When Stalin consolidated his power he
ran the Communist Party in America, as he ran the Communist
Parties of any other part of the world.
Today you have an obvious internal struggle with Khrushchev as
the No. 1 and the so-called collective leadership. This immediately
reflects itself in the Communist Party here, as it has in other parties,
notably that of Great Britain. But they always come back^ — -these are
temporary, minor, and relatively insignificant phenomena.
Mr. Morris. We had a witness yesterday, Mr. Beichman, Carl
Rachlin, who was an official observer, and he said that these differ-
ences are tactical differences, he used the expression 4 or 5 times.
Mr. Beichman. Exactly.
Mr, Morris. What would you say to that ?
Mr. Beichman. Purely tactical difference, and like that famous
saying of Earl Browder in 1936, that "Communism is 20th-century
Americanism," it has about as much significance as that.
Senator Hruska. Mr, Beichman, we have some testimony available
to the committee from a witness who indicated that in his judgment
and opinion the so-called final decision to "break with Moscow" was
deliberately prearranged, and all of it was done under the direct
guidance — as a matter of fact, under Moscow — and that the purpose
of the so-called break was to secure a sort of legality and an atmos-
phere of respectability for this American arm of the Kremlin, but
everything else has just stayed put, just as it has always been. What
comment would you have on that thought?
Mr. Beichman, Senator, I couldn't say, because I don't know if
it was prearranged — 1 have got no evidence, and I have no information
one way or the other.
Senator Hruska, Wliat would you say as to its plausibility ?
Mr, Beichman, There is a certain amount of plausibility to that.
I would still say, however, that undoubtedly there have been differ-
ences within the Communist Party, using your words "tactical differ-
ences," In other words, "We are losing an election, we are losing
a union, we are losing organizations, we are doing it the wrong way,
let's try it a different way, maybe if we say we are against what they
are doing in Hungary we can attract more people. Maybe if we
criticize Khrushchev for being anti-Semitic we can save some of our
members who want to leave. Maybe if we are more emphatic on the
Negro question we will keep people together in the party more close,"
and so on. It may be that there were some differences in the Commu-
nist Party.
Senator Hruska. Would you say that they are superficial, and the
underlying basis and the fundamental basis still remains, and that
the alliances with the international Communist organizations are still
the same?
Mr. Beichman. Absolutely. Their resolutions show this committee
that they intend to maintain the closest fraternal relationship, as they
say, with Communist Parties throughout the world, despite the disso-
lution of the Comintern and the Cominform.
3540 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator Hruska. Can you specifically point to some of those reso-
lutions and give us your comments on tliis^
Mr. Beiciiman. Yes, sir.
For example — this is Resolutions Committee No. 5, it doesn't say it
is in the Communist Party, it is a mimeographed sheet of paper. But
I was handed this by Mr. Gerson, the Communist Party spokesman,
at the convention.
Senator Hruska. What did he say it was ?
Mr. Beiciiman. He said this was a resolution on relations — I am
now quoting:
* * * on relations with other Marxist parties —
et cetera, and that resolution, which was passed by the convention,
says :
Serious mistakes and shortcomings in relations between the U. S. S. R. and
other Socialist states, as in the examples of Poland and Hungary, have been
revealed, and some have been corrected.
It was at that point we tried to ask him, what were the corrections,
but we couldn't get any information.
Membership in the national working class or party includes the right and
the responsibility to make friendly criticism of brother parties or the actions of
Socialist governments. At the same time, it requires that such criticism shall be
within the framework of recognition, that the fundamental conflict of all peoples
is with the forces of imperialism—
which means us, which means democracies, imperialism being the
-Aesopian word that they use.
Now, what that means to me is that there will be certain criticisms
made — I don't think significant criticisms — certainly in the future, but
that the enemy is still democracy, still freedom.
Senator Hruska. How many resolutions of that kind were handed
to you ?
Mr. Beichman. Senator, I haven't counted them, but if you have
ever covered a Communist Party convention, you have been drowned
in the sea of paper that they hand out.
Senator Hruska. Would you care to estimate how many ?
Mr. Beichman. Infinity. "
Senator Hruska. You weren't there long enough to have gotten
any ■
Mr. Beichman. I have got a suitcase full of nonsecret documents —
I would say probably 50, plus draft resolutions and amendments to
the draft resolutions, and amendments to the amendments — that goes
on and on, if I may, ad nauseam.
Senator Hruska. And you have indicated already that nowhere in
those resolutions or anywhere else has there been a stand taken which
would be in opposition to the so-called Moscow or Kremlin line of
communism ?
Mr. Beichman. Nowhere.
Senator Hruska. Nowhere any opposition ?
Mr. Beichman. Not only that, but they have reemphasized their
position, so that there is no misunderstanding — they have reem-
phasized their position on things like the class struggle, for example.
Now, there had been some talk in the Dailv Worker that there is no
real class struggle, perhaps, in the United States, so maybe we have
to use a different approach. But Foster told them off. He talked
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3541
about the sharpening- class struggle in the United States, and they
accepted it in his formulation.
One of the cute things is that the Daily Worker has been saying
that "we are not for violent revolutions, we believe in the constitutional
road to socialism."
Mr. Morris. Now, is there a general secretary of the party ?
Mr, Beichman. No. Technically there are no officers, they are
all acting.
Mr. Morris. How can you account for that ?
Mr. Beichman, I think perhaps a lawyer who knows the Smith
Act could account for it, better than I can. Technically, they are
in no position to elect, because they only elect at their convention 20
members of their national committee. They have to elect 40 more by
States — in other words, to make a total of 60 — and presumably, when
they elect those 60, they would elect the officers.
Senator Jenister. May I ask, were you permitted to see who came
and went to the convention? You were off in an anteroom, you
say?
Mr. Beichman. Yes. In fact, we had a rather amusing incident.
We were off in a press room about half the size of this one, with
perhaps 30 to 40 photographers and reporters — it was even smaller
than this one — and half of that was closed off by a screen about 6
feet high, behind which there were typists — we could hear typing
going on. And we were never allowed back there.
At one point, I got very curious to see what was behind those
screens. So I got up on a chair and stood up. And I could see that
it led into a little hallway. And I figured that that hallway led into
the meeting room on my left. As I stood up there, I saw Eugene
Dennis, whom I recognized, standing probably about 25 feet away.
And I turned to one of the reporters who was standing on the floor,
and I said : "Gee, there is Eugene Dennis standing there."
So he got up on the chair and said, "Where ?"
And I pointed, "There is Dennis in the hallway."
There was a Communist watchdog standing by the screen to prevent
us from going through, and he saw us standing on the chairs, and he
heard me say, "There is Dennis," and he quickly ran up to the cor-
ridor and closed the drapes. And somebody said, "There goes the
Iron Curtain."
Senator Jexner. Did you see Mr. Foster ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes ; just once.
Senator Jenner. How close were you to him ?
Mr. Beichman. He came out of the meeting room — in the street.
Senator Jenner. To your knowledge, was he there at the conven-
tion every day ?
Mr. BEicHMAisr. Every day, I don't know.
Senator Jenner. He was at the convention ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir.
Senator Jenner. Would you say that he was so ill that he wasn't
able to stand a trial, yet he could conduct a Communist meeting in
New York?
Mr. Beichman. I think doctors can answer that question far bet-
ter— he looked to me like he was breathing, and the body was warm —
I don't mean to be flippant
3542 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator Jenner. For several years he has been too sick to stand
trial, but he is not too sick to conduct a Communist meeting in New
York.
Mr. Beichman. I didn't mean to be flippant with you, Senator, but
that was a question that occurred to us in New York, but we had no
means of judging, since we weren't actually present at the meeting.
We were told many times that he was so tired that he wasn't in the
meeting room himself, we were told it by Mr. Gerson, and now I
have passed the message.
Mr. Morris. One of these headlines that I read to you at the begin-
ning of the hearing was that the United States Reds had quit Foster
and the Kremlin. Now, had the United States Reds quit Foster ?
Mr. Beichman. No. Foster is, I think, the major power in the
Communist Party — there may be people who are secret operators, I
don't know, but Foster's speech today is the Communist Party line,
and it hadn't changed
Mr. Morris. Why do you say that ?
Mr. Beichman. Because the resolutions adopted by the convention
are based on Foster's speech. And I think his speech is the answer
to what happened.
Mr. Morris. You say that the speech that Foster made was the basis
of the resolutions that were finally adopted ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Could you give us some examples?
Mr. Beichman. Foster said :
We must reaffirm the continued existence of the Communist Party. It is the
main single thing the convention must accomplisli.
The first day of the convention the Communist Party passed a res-
olution which said — I am now quoting from the resolution adopted at
the morning session of February 10 —
1. That this convention go on record to affirm the continuation of the Com-
munist Party of the United States. Our chief task is to strengthen, rebuild, and
consolidate the Communist Party and overcome its isolation.
That this convention opposes the transformation of the party into a political
or educational association.
And then, since there had been some opposition from the so-called
Gates faction, they said that this, the first two points, should not close
the door to all constructive exploration and discussion of the subjects
as may be, repeat, as may be organized by the incoming national
committee.
Now, when you deal with the Communist movement you have to play
games with words, too, because they never quite mean what they say,
and you have to interpret what they say. I thinlv there isn't going to
be very much debate in the Communist Party from here on in as to
whether there should be a Communist political association, or chang-
ing the name, or anything else.
This is just a sop that was thrown in to satisfy some of the opposi-
tion. The party is still the party, still the party.
Mr. Morris. Now, wasn't there a speech made by William Z. Foster
on November 26 that forecast many of the things that took place ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Tell us about that.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3543
Mr. Beichman. Foster was very critical about the Gates faction,
and spoke in very harsh terms about the attempt to transform the
Communist Party into what he called— here is what he said :
The Communist Partv of the United States cannot be some vague "Marxist"—
[in quotation] "Marxist"— party without a real theoretical basis. It must be
founded solidly upon the general principles of Marxism-Leninism skillfully
adopted to the American scene.
That is what happened, no change.
The New York State Communist Party, which probably has half the
membership, and probably half the deleo^ates to the convention, had
called as late as January 3 of this year for changing the Communist
Party name and turning it into a nonparty political action association.
That was thrown out the window. But they could have debated it,
mavbe. . • , i, i i.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Beichman, yesterday, in connection with the last
statement you made, Mr. Rachlin who was there as a nonofficial rep-
resentative, said that of the 40 delegates there were 11 from New York.
How many delegates were there altogether?
Mr. Beichman. 298, or 300— let's say roughly 300, it varied, and
298 was the figure they finally used.
Mr. Morris. They had a large group, did they not, of 40 that were
formally elected to be the delegates?
Mr. Beichman. No, they elected 20 and 40 are to be elected in com-
ing months by the State Communist Party. So it will be a total of
60 when they have elected their full roster of central committee
members.
Mr. Morris. Were their indentities known, the 40 to be elected?^
How about the delegates who attended from the various States in
the Union ?
Mr. Beichman. They didn't give any names.
Mr. Morris. They didn't give any names ?
Mr. Beichman. Just the people you saw that you knew — Steve
Nelson, Foster, Dennis, Gerson, et cetera — the people that were open
Communists that you knew, you could recognize. Claude Lightfoot
was there, I recognized him, Fred Fine, Sid Stein, and others, whom
you could recognize from photographs in the Daily Worker, and so on.
Senator Hruska. Were you given the names of the 20 who were
elected to this committee?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir, they were made public in the newspaper,
you have the clipping.
Senator Hruska. You were not given the names of those who gen-
erally attended the convention {
Mr. Beichman. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I alluded to the information
that was being supplied to the subcommittee by a man whom we
described as someone who was moving among the Communists and
was accepted by them. He came in yesterday afternoon, and he was
sworn, and testified to, and affirmed some of the information he had
given us as true facts.
One thing in particular, the thing that Senator Hruska mentioned
today, I think I would like to read into the record in its total. But
I would like to point out that he bases this not on any word that he
received from Moscow — that is the point you said you didn't know
3544 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
about — but on the basis of his own observation from talking to some
of the Communist leaders who accepted it. I would like to read this
into the record.
Senator Jenner. Proceed.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
Because of certain facts which came to my attention, it was possible for me to
submit in my recent statement to the committee a forecast
By the way, Senator, he told us that there were going to be no
officers elected at this convention in December, and he has given us an
estimate as to who the men were who were going to be elected — and who
was going to be elected secretary-general — but I think I had better not
put that into the record at this time —
My recent statement to the committee was a forecast of tlie character and tone,
as well as a suggested analysis of specific decisions, public and private pronounce-
ments of the recent CPUSA convention several months before it took place. The
convention itself confirms my previous statement that the controversies and
final decisions to "break with Moscow" were all deliberately prearranged, and
what is even more sinister, all of it was done under the direct guidance of and
with the approval of the Kremlin. To accomplish this result the Kremlin
played upon real convictions and differences of opinion on the part of leaders
and rank and file in the American party over an 11-month period and achieved
their final desired result in the recent "unity" convention. It is unimportant
that certain principal participants in the convention did not and still do not
know that they were pawns in a Kremlin-controlled farce. The purpose of the
so-called break with Moscow and the avowed abandonment of force and violence,
along with one-party dictatorship, et cetera, as a path to a "socialist America."
by democratic means, is to secure legality for the American arm of the Kremlin
in order to build a large mass party out of the present decimated organization
within the next 2 years.
Mr. Beichman, have you noticed any deterioration of hard-core
Communist power in the labor unions that you are conversant with?
Mr. Beichman. I think the answer to that question is yes that they
are trying to get into the trade-union movement in America — well,
that is history, it goes back to 1920, when Lenin said in his book Left
Wing Communism, and ] quote :
We must resort to all stratagems, maneuvers, illegal methods, evasions, and
subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to
carry on Communist work within them at all costs.
There is no question that this is their intent. Their draft resolu-
tion on trade unionism made it very clear that they intend to be more
active, more skillfully active, if you will, than they had been before.
Their resolution, about 7,000 words, is a confession of complete
defeat. They were mistaken in this and they were mistaken in that.
But now they are going to do it more intelligently.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the background of
the particular question I asked Mr. Beichman, the subcommittee in
its analysis of the Communist strength in labor unions during the
last year, as you know, will be reflected in the forthcoming annual
report, when you look at specific reserves of power that the Commu-
nists had control over the last few years, you will see that there was no
break in their actual power, even though the overall prestige that you
refer to, Mr. Beichman, is on the decline because of the international
situation and the breaks within their own organization.
Mr. Beichman. Yes.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3545
Mr. Morris. Now, as some one who is following the labor movement
on a day-to-day basis, as you have stated, have you noticed that there is
any break in Communist power as opposed to Communist prestige
in\he labor movement in the last 2 or 3 years? I don't know about
before that, the situation was very different.
Mr. Beichman. You mean — let's say in the midforties and up to
say, 1948, 1949, and 1950, of course they did have a very major role,
because they had officers, and they controlled unions. At one point
they had probably 10 unions in which their officers. Communists,
avowed Communist Party members, were in charge. That obviously is
not tlie case. There isn't a Communist in the AFL-CIO executive
council out of 29 men. Out of those 29 men I would say you have
29 good, solid, tough, knowledgeable anti-Communists, from George
Meany down, men who have gone through the battle with the Com-
munist movement, and have licked it in their unions.
On a local level, certainly, you have Communists who have pene-
trated. But I think they are being watched very carefully.
Mr. Morris. I am sorry, Mr. Beichman, I didn't mean in the AFL-
CIO trade union, I don't mean that, but in the unions that the Com-
munists controlled, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the Inter-
national Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union, the United Elec-
trical, Radio and Machine Workers.
Mr. Beichman. Harry Bridges, the Mining and Smelter Workers,
the Electrical workers, yes.
Mr. Morris. In all those unions that the Communists do control as
a result of the developments of the last 2 or 3 years, have there been any
defections ?
Mr. Beichman. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Because we are searching out defections, and we have
those particular three unions under careful study before the sub-
committee.
Mr. Beichman. There has been no defection.
Mr. Morris. And we can find no diminution of their power, and, in
fact, in many cases they are extending that power.
Mr. Beichman. Exactly.
Mr. Morris. I wonder if, as an official observer, you could tell us
something about that?
INIr. Beichman. I think in the three unions that I have referred to,
their power is just as great as it ever was. And I think that industry
must bear some burden of responsibility in this area, if I may intrude
a comment.
I think what is important is what they are going to do now about
the trade union movement. And I refer you to the Daily Worker of
Januarj' 20, where George Morris, its labor writer, said:
Only very recently has there been stronger and more consistent effort on the
part of progressives —
I interpolate here that "progressives" means Communists and fellow
travelers in Daily Worker parlance
progressives to establish their rights and make their contributions vpithin the
conservatively led unions. It can be expected that, following the convention of
the Communist Party, and revival of their influence and activity, the worker
progressives in the labor movement will reach a still higher level.
1
3546 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
They are not going to give up, because tlie trade union movement is
the major base that they must have. Without control of the trade
union movement they cannot seize power. In Czechoslovakia they ^
first had to suborn the trade union movement, and then they came to
power. I
Senator Hruska. As a matter of fact, they made that evident in
Hungary, too.
Mr. Beichman. Exactly that, I was going to say that; it was the
trade unions in Hungary and the workers who rose up on October 23.
And one of the first actions they took was to announce that they were
going to withdraw from the Communist World Federation of Trade
Unions, and they would seek to join the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions. That was the first thing.
In a sense, it is a revelation of the bankruptcy of the Communist
ideology that the revolution in Hungarj^ came from the workers and
the intellectuals — 10 years of Communist propaganda, 10 years of
brainwashing, had no effect, they rose up.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think that as far as the session that
we have had previous to this with Mr. Beichman is concerned, I have
pretty generally covered the field that he has indicated he is prepared
to talk about.
Is that light, Mr. Beichman ?
Mr. Beichman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. And I am speaking for myself, knowing Mr. Beichman
and asking him to come down here, we arranged the schedule for him |
to come, and I want to thank him for coming. i
Do you have any more questions, Senator? t
Senator Hruska. No more, except to join in the expression of |
appreciation to you for your coming here at this time and giving us i
this very valuable information. j
Mr. Beichman. Thank you, sir. I
Mr. Morris. What was done in connection with the coming hearings, j
we have asked Mr. Eugene Dennis to testify — in fact, he has been sub- ,
penaed to testify — I have arranged so that he will be here at 1 : 45 for \
an executive session on Monday afternoon, and we will have an open j
session at approximately 2 : 15. And after that — now, one thing we
have been straining to do. Senator, I would like to have the record |
show — is to find a defector from the Communist Party who would be !
willing to testify. And we find it is very difficult. i
We have one man who broke — I can't think of the date— in 1949 or i
1950, and who hasn't testified before a congressional committee before, '
although he has testified before the SACB, and he said that he will ,
testify on the basis of his interpretation of the Communist Party con- i
vention and what it means. !
The reason we want someone who has been in the party is that by j
virtue of that fact he is qualified to testify. _ ]
Mr, Beichman. I wanted to enter in again for just a moment to i
try to clean this up. '
I hold here two clippings, one an A. P. Dispatch, and one a U. P. !
Dispatch, both from Moscow. The A. P. Dispatch is headed "U. S. ,
Keds' Stand Hailed by Pravda." And the U. P. Dispatch says,
"Pravda Hails U. S. Reds." And Pravda says, it hailed the Commu-
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3547
nist Party in the United States for remaining loyal to the principles
of Marxism-Leninism.
I think that about closes that question of whether they are inde-
pendent of Moscow or not.
Mr. Morris. In other words, the fact that Pravda applauded the
stand that they took
Mr. Beichman. In a very friendly way, no criticisms, "Bless you
and go and do your good work."
Senator Hruska. If that is all, the meeting is adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.
(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the
call of the Chair.)
APPENDIXES
Appendix I
INTERNATIOXAL COM MISSION OF JUKISTS,
The Hague, Netherlands, January J), 1951.
Dear Sir : The enclosed paper on legal aspects of summary trial procedure in
Hungary supplements the information given and views expressed in the luipers
published by the Commissicm oh November 16 and December 7. The Commis-
sion considers that it is important to appreciate the extent of the poAvers given
to the Kadar regime under the decrees discussed in this paper and the threat
which they must present to established conceptions of justice recognized by all
natictns with developed legal systems.
The Commission does not however claim to have full information on the extent
to which these powers have been exercised ; the object of this paper is to make
clear that the passing of these dec-rees constitutes a breach of a treaty and of
conventions to which Hungary and the Soviet Union were parties. Although
there are some indications that in its very grave economic situation the Kadar
regime has hesitated to use tlie powers of summary trial to the fullest extent,
nevertheless it is in the view of the Commission imixvrtant to establish as fully
as possible the legal background against which the historic events in Hungary
have developed.
This paper may be reprinted in whole or in part or used as the basis of com-
ment without further reference to the Commission but it would be appreciated
if the name of the Commission was given in connection with any use made of
this summary and a copy of the relevant article or news item sent to the
Commission.
Yours truly,
A. J. M. VAX Dal.
Vice President, International Conmiission of Jurists.
Summary Trials in Hungary
1. Recent decrees and laws passed by the Kadar regime in Hungary must
be profoundly disturbing to members of the legal profession throughout the
world, who are concerned to ensure that accused persons in criminal trials
are accorded the safeguards recognized in all developed systems of law. Fur-
thermore, it would appear that in certain aspects these decrees and laws con-
stitute a violation both of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947,' and of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were ratified by the Hungarian Peoples
Republic" and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
'2. The relevant decrees and laws are set out in full in an annex to this
paper. They may be summarized as follows :
A. Decree-Law of November 10, 1956 (hereinafter called Decree A)." This
authorizes the Procurator's department to present a prosecution before the
court In a wide range of offenses : *
{ i ) without submitting a bill of indictment.
(ii) without the issue of summons or fixing of a day for hearing by
tlie court.
1 This Treaty was concluded b.v U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, U. S. A., Australia, the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, New Zealand, the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia with Hungary
at Paris on February 10, 1947.
'English text: Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne,
vol. I.
3 Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, November 10, 1956, 14.00 hrs (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, psirt II B. No. 777, November 15, 1956, pp. 8-9).
* These include "mui-der, wilful! manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, any kind of crime
committed by the unlawful use of firearms, including the attempt to commit the aforesaid
crimes."
3549
3550 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
These powers are limited not only to cases where the accused was caught
flagrante delicto but also extend to any case where "the Procurator's department
can submit immediately the necessary evidence to the Court." The Prosecutor's
department is specifically authorized to rely merely on a verbal presentation
of the charge at the trial. It would appear that under this procedure the
accused may have no foreknowledge of the offense with which he is charged
and can have no adequate opportunity to prepare his defense.
B. Decree-Law of December 9, 1956, amended December 12, 1956 (hereinafter
called Decree B).^ This empowers Military Courts to try the offenses listed
in Decree A and adds to the list certain other offenses, notably the failure to
report knowledge of the possession of firearms by third parties, other than
next of kin. The appointment of other courts of summary jurisdiction by
the Presidential Council of the Republic is also authorized by this Decree.
The amendment of December 12 provides a mandatory death sentence for offenses
specified in Decree A and B. Thus, a person tried in accordance with the pro-
cedure laid down under Decree A stands in peril of his life with virtually no
provision for his defense.
C. Decree of December 15, 1956 (hereinafter called Decree C)." This reg-
ulates in greater detail the composition and powers of Military Courts. This
Decree exempts certain categories of accused (persons who are suffering from
serious illness or who are insane, as well as pregnant women) from the jurisdic-
tion of Military Courts and limits the sentence on those under 20 to imprisonment.
It also envisages the substitution of imprisonment for the death sentence "if
the reestablishment of peace and order no longer requires the imposition of
the death penalty." But this Decree provides that there shall be no appeal
except by way of revision ^ and a petition for clemency can only be made by a
unanimous decision of the court; failing such leave the death sentence has
to be carried out within two hours. In view of the latter provision it is not
unfair to suggest that no serious miscarriage of justice, should it occur, could
be rectified, except posthumously.
D. Decree-Law of December 20 (hereinafter called Decree D). This in
effect, reintroduced the system, abolished by Imre Nagy in 1953," whereby
the Procurator's department on the recommendation of the police can order
detention without trial for a period not exceeding six months.
3. The situation created by the above Decrees is not the exclusive concern
of the Hungarian government but must be considered in the light of inter-
national conventions and treaties binding on Hungary.
A. The Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947. Part II, section 1, article 2,
provides inter alia that "Hungary shall take all measures necessary to secure
all persons under Hungarian jurisdiction * * * the enjoyment of human rights
and of the fundamental freedoms."
Although the precise meaning to be given to this article is a matter of
interpretation, it clearly constitutes a legal obligation, which is to be inferred
from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the In-
terpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Roumania." In
interpreting this article it is not possible directly to rely so far as criminal
justice is concerned, on the provisions of Articles 9-11 of the Universal Declara-
"Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, December 9 and 12, 1956 (BBC Summary,
loe. cit. No. 785, December 13, 1956, p. 4 and No. 786, December 18, 1956. p. 2).
« Radio Budapest, December 15, 1956 ; German translation in Neue Zflrclier Zeitung,
December 17, 1956, p. 1.
■^ Article 10 ; the appeal by way of revision is a characteristic of the countries which
followed the Soviet system. In Hungary the revision can only be initiated by the Procu-
rator or the President of the Supreme Court and is heard by the Supreme Court (Sec. 225
of the Hunsrarian Code of Criminal Procedure 1951 : III tv. amended under Law 1954
V tv. 8). Cf. Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe, Washing-
ton, D. C, November 1956, p. .360.
8 Resolution No. 1034/1953 (VII.26) Mt. h. published in Torv^nvek 4s Renedeletek
Hivatalos Gyiijtemenye, 1953, p. 193 (also in Nepszava, July 26, 1953) English transla-
tion : Highlights, loc. cit., October 1953, No. 5, p. 10.
8 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania (Second
Phase) ; Advisory Opinion of July 18, 1950, p. 228. In this Opinion the Court held that
although the Governments of those countries were legally bound to carry out the provisions
of the Peace Treaties relating to settlement of disputes, including the appointment of
their representatives to the Commissions provided for by the treaties, the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations was not authorized to make such appointments after the parties
refused to do so. Judges Read and Azevodo dissenting. Judge Krylov concurred with
the opinion but was unable to concur with the reasons dealing with the problem of
international responsibility as these in his opinion went beyond the scope of his request
for opinion.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3551
tion of Human Rights, 1948,'° or on Articles 5-6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights."' Nevertheless it is well established in interpreting treaties
that reference may be made to "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations" a source of law specifically recognized by Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is difficult to conceive that
these principles would be held not to include: Freedom from arbitrary arrest
or detention; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 9; European
Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(1).
The right of the accused to be informed of any criminal charge preferred
(European Convention on Human Rights, Articles 5 (2), 6 (3) (a)).
The right of the accused to have adequate time and facilities for the prepa-
ration of his defense (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 11, 1;
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6(3) (b) ) .
It is significant that the International Association of Democratic Lawyers
(lADL), which has been consistently supported by the U. S. S. R. and by other
Eastern European countries, in the findings of its Committee on Penal Pro-
cedure (Brussels Conference, May 1956), attended among others by leading
Soviet and Hungarian lawyers, include inter alia the above-mentioned rights
among the elements necessary "in a system of criminal procedure to preserve
the rights of the individual." (The text of the findings is set out in the annex
to this paper. ) Indeed in some respects the Committee goes further in requiring :
From the moment of arrest every accused must have the right to con-
sult with his legal advisers without surveillance (Report of Committee on
Penal Procedure, Article 5 (c) ) .
There must be at least one appeal in all criminal proceedings (ibid.,
article?).
No state of emergency abrogating these principles shall be permitted in
time of peace (ibid., article 9) .
It is therefore submitted :
1. that the words "the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental
freedoms" in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947, must be interpreted as
including the above-mentioned rights of accused persons in criminal trials.
2. that the decrees and laws of the Hungarian Government particularized
above are in breach of section 1, article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary,
1947.
B. Geneva Conventions of 1949. The views of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists on the application of these Conventions to the present situation
in Hungary were fully discussed in the paper entitled "The Hungarian Situation
in the Light of the Geneva Conventions of 1949" published on December 7th, 1956.
This Commission considered that certain provisions of the Conventions were
applicable to the Hungarian situation whether the conflict were to be regarded
as ■•internal" or "international."
(i) If it is regarded as "internal" then "the passing of sentences and the
carryinging out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, afl;orded all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" is prohibited (Art. 3,
Convention IV).
For the reasons above given and from the explicit wording of Decrees
A, B, C, and D above cited, it is evident in the view of the International
Commission of Jurists that they do not afford such guarantees and there-
fore, that the Kadar regime is in breach of the Convention.
(ii) If, on the other hand, it is regarded as an "international conflict"
it is firstly relevant to note the provisions of Article 47 of Convention IV :
"Protected persons" * * * shall not be deprived, in any case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention * * * by any
agreement between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occu-
pying Power * * *". It must follow that, if the Government of the Occu-
pied Power, introduces measures at the instance of the Occupying Power,
such measures are subject to the provisions of the Conventions dealing with
the administration of justice by the Occupying Power.
^"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was proclaimed by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is neither a treaty nor an interna-
tional agreement and is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal
obligation. (See Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights. 1950, p. 399.)
11 The European Convention on Human Rights was signed on November 4, 1950, by the
members of the Council of Europe, and came into force in 1953 after ratification by 10
countries. Neither Hungary nor the U. S. S. R. are parties to this Convention.
3552 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
These provisions deal separately with the protection of civilian persons and
with members of the armed forces.
(a) As far as civilian persons are concerned, it is sufficient to mention articles
71-73 of Convention IV which provide for "regular trial" and give the accused
person the riglits of defence and of appeal.
(b) As far as membei's of the armed forces are concerned, a term which in-
cludes both members of organized resistence movements and inhabitants who
carry arms openly to resist the invading forces (Article 4A of Convention III)
the following provisions of Convention III protect those who fall into the hands
of the enemy : —
Detained persons are entitled to be tried by independent and impartial courts
the procedure of which affords the accused the rights of defence and appeal
(Articles 84, 99, 105 and 106 of Convention III).
The fact that the Decrees of the Kadar regime do not afford accused per.sons
such rights as are provided under the Conventions both to civilian persons and
members of the armed forces has been sufficiently demonstrated In paragraph 2
of this paper.
Annex A
Decbee-Law on CniMiNAL Procedure ^
(November 14, 1956)
Article 1. (i) In cases of murder, wilful manslaughter, arson, robbery, loot-
ing, and any kind of crime committed l)y the unlawful use of firearms, including
the attempt to commit the aforesaid crimes, the Prosecutor's Office may take
the perpetrator to court, without submitting a Bill of Indictment, if the perpe-
trator has been caught in the act, or if the Prosecutor's Office can submit imme-
diately the necessary evidence to the court.
(ii) Under (i) above the Court will not fix a date for the hearing nor issue
summonses. The Prosecutor's Office will present the indictment verbally dur-
ing the trial. It is the duty of the Prosecutor's Office to see that witnesses
and experts appear in court, and that other evidence is submitted to it.
Article 2. This Decree-Law becomes effective on the day of its promulgation.
ISTVAN DOBI,
President of the Presidential Conncil.
ISTVAN Kbistof,
Secretary to the Presidential Covnml.
Annew B
Decree on Summary Jueisdictiox "
(December 9, 1956)
Article 1. The Presidential Council of the People's Republic proclaims Sum-
mary Jurisdiction over the whole territory of the country, starting at 18.00 hours
[local time] on 11th December, as regards the following crimes : murder, wilful
manslaughter, arson, robbery, looting, crimes committeed by wilfully damaging
enterprises of public interest or enterprises producing vital supplies for the popu-
lation, attempts to commit any of these crimes, and the possession without license
of firearms, ammunition and explosives.
Article 2. Those who have in their possession firearms, ammunition, explosives
etc. without license must hand them over to one of the oj-gans of the armed forces
of public order by 18.00 hours on 11th December 1956. Those who hand over
their arms etc. between the promulgati<m of this Decree-Law and the date fixed
for the handing over cannot be punished for hiding arms.
Articles, (i) Conspiracy with the object of committing the crimes mentioned
in Article 1, and orgauisatory steps taken to connuit such crimes are subject to
summary judicial procedure.
(ii) Those who obtain credible knowledge of other persons possessing fire-
arms, ammunition etc. without license, and do not report this [two words indis-
tinct] to the authorities, commit a crime and are subject to summary jurisdic-
tion. This decree is not applicable to their next-of-kin.
1= Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest. November 3 0, 1956, 14.00 hrs (BBC Summarv
of World Broadcasts, Part II B, No. 777, November 15, 1956, p. .8-9).
"Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest. December 9 and 12, 1956 (BBC Summarv of
World Broadcasts, No. 785, December 13. 1956, p, 4).
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3553
Article Jf. The Government will take steps to promulgate this Decree-Law.
The promulgation can be made also through the Press, radio and posters. The
procedure under summary jurisdiction comes under the competence of the Mili-
tary Courts, but the Presidential Council of the Republic may take steps to
appoint other courts of summary jurisdiction also. The Presidential Council of
the Republic authorises the Government to define the rules of summary juris-
diction in detail.
Article 5. This Decree-Law enters into force on the day of its promulgation.
ISTVAN DOBI,
President of the Presidential Council.
IsTVAN KRISTOF,
Secretary to the Presidential Council.
AMENDMENT TO DECREE ON SUMMARY JURISDICTION "
(December 12, 1956)
The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic is amending
its Decree-Law concerning Summary .Jurisdiction as follows :
The third paragraph of the basic Decree ends with the following clause : If the
accused is declared guilty by the summary court of justice on any of the charges
falling within the categories of summary process, the verdict at the same time
involves the imposition of the death sentence. The amendment comes into force
at the time of its promulgation.
ISTVAN DOBI,
Chairman of the Presidential Council.
ISTVAN KKISTOF,
Secretary of the Presidential Coimoil.
Annex C
Decree on Martial Law "
(December 15, 1956)
Article 1. The application of this law belongs to the competency of th^ aiilitary
courts, but the Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic reserves the right
to itself, to designate also other courts.
Article 2. The court-martial shall be composed of one professional judge and
two people's assessors.
Article 3. Every person who is to be tried by a court-martial has to be taken
into custody.
Article 4. Only those accused who were found in flagranti or whose guilt can
be proved before the court may be referred to a court-martial.
Article 5. Persons who are insane or seriously ill as well as pregnant women
must in no event be referred to a court-martial.
Article 6. The duration of the trial may in no case exceed three times 24
hours. If the appointed time cannot be observed, the case has to be transferred
to an ordinary court.
Article 7. The court-mai'tial proclaims the death sentence in case it is con-
vinced that the accused committed the crime on account of which he has to
appear before the court-martial.
Article 8. The court-martial may impose imprisonment for from six to fifteen
years, if the re-establishment of peace and order does no longer require the
Impo^tion of the death penalty.
Article 9. The accused can by no means be sentenced to death in case he is
less than 20 years old. In such a case a sentence to imprisonment for from
10 to 15 years shall be pronounced, and if the accused is under 18 years of age,
imprisonment for from 5 to 10 years shall be imposed.
Article 10. Persons sentenced by a court-martial are entitled to lodge an appeal
only in case the trial is revised.
Article 11. After the sentence is pronounced the court has to decide imme-
diately on the filing of a petition for clemency. Such a decision can only be taken
unanimously.
^^ Text as broadcast by Radio Budapest, December 9 and 12, 1936 (BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts. No. 786, December 18, 1936, p. 2).
^ Radio Budapest, December 15, 1956: German translation in Neiie Ziircher Zeitung,
December 17. 1956, p. 1.
3554 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Article 12. In case the court-martial refuses to file a petition for clemency,
capital punishment has to be executed within two hours.
Annex D
Decree on Detention fob Public Security ^*
(December 20, 1056)
A decree issued by the Presidential Council said that "persons whose activity
or behaviour endanger public order, especially production, can be placed under
detention for public security. On suggestion of police authorities the State
Prosecutor can order detention which will be carried out by the police."
The Chief Prosecutor must investigate the case of the detained person within
30 days and internment can last a maximum of six months. The decree is valid
for one year.
The decree did not mention internment, but used instead the expression "de-
tention for public security." It was not published in the government press
which is on sale to the population, but only in the official gazette which has a
very limited circulation.
Armfix E
Sixth Congeess of the Inteenational Association of Democratic Lawyers,
Brussels, May 1956
report of committee on penal procedure
On the basis of the discussion there was general agreement on the elements
requiring to be present in a system of criminal procedure to preserve the rights
of the individual. This agreement was reached by lawyers from different
countries and different social systems. These elements and the suggestions
agreed by the Committee to them are set out below :
1. Nullum crimen sine lege
We have observed with regret many infringements of this principle in which
we re-affirm our belief. We consider that the doctrine of analogy ought not to
form part of any procedure and that offences should be clearly stated. In
particular, we reject the conception of collective punishment.
2. The need for the accused to he brought to trial speedily
(a) The period from time of arrest to appearance before a magistrate or
judicial functionary should not exceed 48 hours.
(b) To ensure this there must be effective legal sanction, civil or criminal and
unjustified detention should give a right to an action for damages.
(c) During the preliminary investigation the accused must not be kept in
detention more than three months without the permission of the Court after
public hearing of the parties.
3. Fair trial
{a) It is desirable that Courts of first instance should contain a lay element
appointed on democratic principles.
(&) No punishment involving deprivation of liberty to be imposed except by
a judicial tribunal.
4. No discrimination against the accused
There shall be no discrimination in the forms of penal procedure or punish-
ment for reasons of race, religion, class, or any other cause. This point arises
because in some legal systems, particularly in colonial countries, sections of its
population are tried by a procedure which provides less guarantees than those
afi!orded by the procedure to which other members of its population are subject.
5. Right of defense
(a) An accused without means shall be entitled to effective legal aid and
representation by a qualified lawyer of his own choice before all tribunals with-
out exception.
(&) That the accused and his Counsel shall have the same rights at the hearing
as has the prosecution.
^* As reported by Associated Prt-ss, Budapest, December 20, 1956.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3555
(c) From the moment of arrest every accused must have the right to consult
with his legal advisers without surveillance.
(d) That in countries where the preliminary investigation is in private de-
fending counsel should be entitled to be present with the accused at all stages
of the preliminary investigation and to have access to the prosecution dossier
before the examination or confrontation of the accused.
(e) Lawyers should not be subjected to prosecution or pressure because of
their professional status on behalf of their clients.
6. Proof
(a) A confession particularly made to the police must be corroborated by
independent evidence before it can be the basis of a conviction. Evidence of an
accomplice also requires corroboration by independent evidence.
(&) Conviction must be based only on facts proved in evidence.
(c) No arrested person shall be subject to any physical pressure, threats, or
promises calculated to produce a statement.
7. Appeal
There must be at least one appeal in all criminal proceedings.
S. Punishment
(a) Corporal punishment should be abolished.
(&) The death penalty should be abolished in time of peace.
9. State of emergency
No state of emergency abrogating these principles shall be permitted in time
of peace.
We consider that one of the strongest guarantees of the application of these
principles is to assure full and fair publicity for all criminal proceedings with
the exception of those involving state secrets or matters of serious indecency.
We put forward these proposals as minimum suggestions only in the belief
that their adoption would involve significant advances in nearly every criminal
procedure throughout the world. We urge all lawyers to do whatever they
can to secure their implementation in their own countries.
Appendix I -A
Inteenational Commission of Jurists,
The Hague, Netherlands, December 7, 1956.
For immediate use
Dear Sir : The enclosed paper on "The Hungarian Situation in the Light of
Geneva Conventions of 1949," summarizes the international law governing
the actions of Soviet forces and the Hungarian Govex-nment in Hungary. It
supplements the paper on "Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression"
published by the Commission on November 16, 1956.
It may be reprinted in whole or in part or used as the basis of comment
without further reference to the Commission, but it would be appreciated if
the name of the Commission was given in connection with any use made of
this summary and a copy of the relevant article or news item sent to the
Commission.
Yours truly,
Norman S. Marsh,
Secretary-General, International Commission of Jurists.
The Hungarian Situation in the Light of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
The reports from Hungary about mass arrests, summary trial," deportations,"
and other measures which are alleged to have infringed the Rule of Law have
attracted worldwide attention.
^■^Cf. Decree on criminal procedure of November 10, 1956 (Radio Budapest, November
10, 1956, 14.00 hours, as monitored in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part II B, No.
777/1956/, pp. 8-9, with text of Decree).
MCf. Report of Radio Budapest, November 14, 1956, 15.00 hours (BBC, The Monitoring
Report, No. 5, 200/November 15, 1956/, p. 1), as well as the case of Imre Nagy and his
group. According to several testimonials of Hungarian refugees, camps of deportees exist
in Soviet Carpatho-Ukraine,
3556 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The present Government of Hungary contends that the national uprising sup-
pressed by Soviet armed forces is an internal affair of Hungary. The Soviet
Union holds the same view.
It is, however, to be remembered that there are rules of international law
which apply even if the conflict in question is merely a civil war. These rules
are laid down in the Geneva Conventions for the protection of the victims
of war,"* concluded in 1949 and ratified among others by the Soviet Union.^"
and by the Hungarian People's Republic.^^
The obligations entered into by the signatories of the Convention depend on the
character of the conflict, and are more speciflc if it is an international conflict
and less detailed if it is an internal one.
I. OBLIGATIONS IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT
If it is assumed that the conflict is an internal one, the parties are bound
to apply among others the following provisions at least :
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities shall be treated humanely. The
following acts in particular are prohibited :
"(c) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment, and torture ;
" ( & ) taking of hostages ;
"(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment ;
"((i) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guaranties which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples" (Art. 3, Convention IV).
During the negotiations the Soviet Union supported ^' a draft approved by the
XVIIth International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in August 1948 ^ which
served as a basis for discussion at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in 1949.
This text reads :
"In all cases of armed conflict not of an international character * * * the
Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present
Convention [i. e., as a whole, not only Art. 3 mentioned above], subject to the
adverse party likewise acting in obedience thereto."
When this text met with opposition on the part of a number of government
delegates, the Soviet Union introduced the following version of the provision :
"* * * The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions
of the present Convention which guarantee : humane treatment of the civilian
population ; prohibition within the territory occupied * * * of reprisals against
the civilian population, the taking of hostages, * * * damage to property * * *
prohibition of any discriminatory treatment of the civilian population * * *." "
The delegate from Hungary also favoured as wide as possible an application
of the Convention to civil wars :
"The essential aim of the Conference was to extend the fleld of action of the
Convention as much as possible for the protection of the victims of conflict." *°
ir. INTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT ?
The view that events in Hungary represent merely an internal conflict has
no basis in international or Hungarian law. It is the considered view of the
19 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (hereafter called Convention I).
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (hereafter called Convention II).
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter called Convention
III).
Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereafter called
Convention IV).
^ The Belorussian and Ukrainian Republics are also signatories of the Conventions.
21 English text : Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Berne
(hereafter cited Record), Vol. I; Franch text: Actes de la Conft'rence diplomatique de
GenSve de 1949, Berne, Tome I ; Russian text : Zhenevskie konventsii o zashchite zherty
volny, Izdanie Vedomostei Verehovnogo Soveta SSSR (publication of Gazette of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR), Moscove, 1954, 219 pp.; German text: Bundesgesetzblatt,
Bonn, Teil II, S. 781 ff. ; Die Genfer Abkommen zum Schutz der Krlegsopfer vom 12
August 1949 hrsg. vom Deutschen Roten Kreuz, 2 Aufl., Bonn 1953.
=2 Cf. Record, Vol. IIB, pp. 13-14, 34. 37, 42, 44, 47, 76, 93, 325-327.
23 Art. 2. par. 4, of the Draft. Text : Record. Vol. I, p. 113.
2* Amendment of the Soviet Union, July 21, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex Nr. 15, p. 28).
Corresponding amendments for the other Conventions.
25 Joint Committee, First meeting, April 26, 1949 (Record, Vol. IIB, p. 11),
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3557
International Commission of Jurists that the events in Hungary amount to an
international conflict with two adverse parties — the Hungarian nation on the
one side and the Soviet Union on the other side. The reasons for this view
are as follows :
1. The suppression of the national uprising in Hungary constitutes an aggres-
sion in the sense of the Soviet definition of aggression proposed to the United
Nations in 1953 (cf. the paper "Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression,"
released by the International Commission of Jurists, November 16, 1956).
2. The overthrow of the Nagy government and the setting up of the Kadar
regime was effected with the help of Soviet armed forces and constitute an "in-
direct aggression" in the sense of the Definition just mentioned.
3. The request for military assistance made by the Kadar government was
therefore not valid under international law.
4. The request was also invalid in Hungarian constitutional law. The armed
attack began before the Kadar regime was in power. Five days later — on No-
vember 9 — a constitutional amendment was enacted to legalize subsequently the
existence and the acts of the Kadar government.^
5. The request, even if validly made, could have had no legal effect on the
application of the Convention, since Art. 47 of Convention IV stipulates:
"Protected persons * * * shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner
whatsoever, of the benefits of the present convention * * * by any agreement be-
tween the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power. * * *"
The Soviet and Hungarian Governments are therefore under a legal duty to
carry out those obligations which the Geneva Conventions provide for cases of
an international conflict.
in. OBLIGATIONS IN AN
The obligations apply to all cases of armed conflict between two or more of
the Parties as well as "to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance" (Art. 2/2/2/2)."
The obligations of the signatory states in such cases include among others :
A. With respect to all Victims of War
The provisions mentioned under this heading "cover the whole of the popula-
tions of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based in par-
ticular on * * * political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings
caused by the war" (Art. 13).^'
1. Particular protection of the wounded and children (Art. 16-22, 24).
2. Allowing free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores
and, if intended for children and mothers, also of essential foodstuffs, clothing,
and tonics (Art. 23).'°
3. Allowing family correspondence and facilitating enquiries made by members
of dispersed families (Art. 25, 26).
B. With respect to Civilian Persons
The provisions mentioned under this heading cover all persons who are na-
tionals of a State bound by the Convention and flnd themselves in the hands of
an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. The protection extends
to all persons who are not covered by one of the other three Conventions (see
note 3) (Art. 4). The protection lasts for the duration of the occupation (Art.
6). If a protected person is suspected or engaged in activities hostile to the
security of the Occupying Power he forfeits certain rights under Convention IV,
but retains at least the right of fair and regular trial (cf. infra under 10) (Art. 5) .
4. Human treatment, respect for the person, honor, family rights, religious
convictions, customs. Equal treatment, "without any adverse distinction based,
in particular, on * * * political opinion" (Art. 27).
5. No exercise of physical or moral coercion (Art. 31). Prohibition of any
measures causing physical suffering or extermination of protected persons,
including e. g. torture, or any other measure of brutality (Art. 32).^°
2" Decree of November 10, 1956. Text broadcast by Racllo Budapest, November 9, 1956,
19.00 hours (BBC Summary, Part IIB, No. 777 (1956), p. 7).
^ Article common to all four Conventions.
^ This and the following article refer to Convention IV.
28 Cf. Text proposed bv the Soviet Union (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 222, p. 114).
=»Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 231,
p. 116), supported bv Hungary in the 13th meeting of Committee III, June 15, 1949
(Record, Vol. IIA, p. 717).
3558 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
6. Prohibition of collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terri- j
torism (Art. 33)." Prohibition of taking hostages (Art. 34). \
7. Prohibition of "individual or mass forcible transfers,'- as well as deporta- i
tions of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupy-
ing Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, * * * regardless
of their motive." (Art. 49, cf. also Art. 52, 76-77.)
The phrase "into the territory of the Occupying Power or the territory of |
any other country" was incorporated on the suggestion of the Soviet Union.'^
8. No sanctions or any measures of coercion against public oflBcials or judges,
should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience
(Art. 54).
9. Duty to ensure food and medical supplies to the population (Art. 55) "
as well as hospital establishments and services (Art. 56). Duty to allow and
facilitate relief schemes for the population if inadequately supplied (Art.. 59-62).
Red Cross Societies shall be able to pursue their activities (Art. 63).^
10. Respect for existing criminal legislation (Art. 64). Duty not to enact
retroactive criminal laws (Art. 65). Courts of the Occupying Power shall apply
only those provisions of law which are in accordance with general principles
of law (Art. 67). The penalty shall be in proportion to the offense (Art. 67-68).
There shall be no prosecution for acts committed or for opinions expressed
before the occupation (Art. 70). No sentence shall be pronounced by the compe-
tent courts of the Occupying Power except after a regular trial (Art. 71). An
accused person shall have the right of defense (Art. 72) and a convicted person
the right of appeal (Art. 73). They shall be detained and serve their sentences
in the occupied territory (Art. 76) .
C. With respect to prisoners of war
The Convention also protects apart from the traditional category of "members
of the armed forces of a Party" the following persons among others :
(a) members of organized resistance movements, if they are commanded
by a person responsible for his subordinates, if they carry arms openly and
respect the laws and customs of war.
(6) members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a govern-
ment or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(c) Inhabitants who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading forces, if they carry arms openly and respect
the laws and customs of war (Art. 4 A).^®
The Convention applies to these persons from the time they fall into the
power of the enemy until their final release (Art. 5) .
The inclusion of the persons mentioned under a-c was considered imperative
considering the experience of Nazi occupation of Denmark and other countries
which were invaded without resistance on the part of the armed forces. The
innovation was supported by the Soviet delegate who declared :
"Civilians who took up arms in defense of the liberty of their country should
be entitled to the same protection as members of armed forces." "
He spoke also in favour of protection of members of resistance movements
(partisans).'^ The Hungarian delegate supported the Soviet Union in both
cases.'°
The individual obligations of the Detaining Power include among others :
11. Duty to treat prisoners of war humanely (Art. 13).** Respect for their
person and honour (Art. 14). Equal treatment "without any adverse distinction
based on political opinions" (Art. 16) .
31 Cf. Text presented by the Soviet Union, June 7, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 234,
p. 117).
32 The words "individual or mass" are missing from the Russian text, as reproduced In
the source quoted, supra, note 5. The English and French texts are, however, authentic
(Art. 55/54/133/150K
33 Amendment of the Soviet Union, May 12, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 45,
p. 130).
3*Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 28, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 282,
p. 136).
35 Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, June 28, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 292,
p. 139).
3" This and the following articles refer to Convention III.
37 Committee II, Fifth meeting. May 16, 1949 (Record, Vol. II A, p. 426).
38 Loc. cit, p. 429.
39 Source as in notes 21 and 22.
*" Cf. Amendment of the Soviet Union, May 4, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex No. 99,
p. 64).
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3559
12. Duty to allow prisoners of war to send and receive letters and cards
(Art. 71).
13. Duty not to bring a prisoner of war before a court unless it offers the
essential guaranty of independence and impartiality as generally recognized
and in particular, a procedure which affords the accused the rights of defence
(Art. 84, 105) and of appeal (Art. 106).
14. No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not for-
bidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at
the time the said act was committed. No moral or physical coercion may be ex-
erted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit his guilt. No prisoner
of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his de-
fence and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel (Art. 99).
15. Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after
the cessation of active hostilities (Art. 118).
D. Provisions for enforcing these oMigations
The following provisions are incorporated into all four Geneva Conventions in
order to assure their strict performance.
1. The Parties "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con-
vention in all circumstances" (Art. 1/1/1/1) ."■
2. The protected persons "may in no circumstances renounce in part or in
entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention" (Art. 7/7/7/8).
3. The Convention "shall be applied with the cooperation and under the
scrutiny of the Protecting Powers" (Art. 8/8/8/9). The Parties may agree to
entrust to an impartial organisation the duties incumbent on the Protecting
Powers (Art. 10/10/10/11).'^
4. The Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering to be committed, any grave
breaches of the Conventions (Art. 49/50/129/146 and Art. 50/51/130/147).'^
The Hungarian delegate stated that the Hungarian Military Penal Code, in
force since February 1, 1949, stipulates severe penalties for violations of the
Convention."
5. An enquiry shall be instituted concerning any alleged violation of the Con-
vention (Art. 52/53/132/149).
IV.
In publishing this paper the International Commission of Jurists hopes to act
in the interests of the signatories of the Geneva Conventions, including the Soviet
Union and Hungary, since Articles 47/48/127/144 of the Conventions provide :
"The High Contracting Parties undertake * * * to disseminate the text of
the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, * * *
so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population."
December 7, 1956, International Commission of Jurists, Buitenhof 47, The
Hague.
Appendix II
The Situation Behind the Iron Cuktain
Statement by the Executive Council, AFL-CIO, Monday, February 4, 1957
The growing revolt for national independence behind the Iron Curtain Is a
development of the greatest historic significance. Its outcome will be a decisive
factor in determining whether mankind will be able to insure peace, whether
human freedom or Communist despotism will prevail.
The satellites are in the throes of an economic crisis aggravated by years of
ruthless Soviet exploitation and looting. Moscow sought their resources for
speedily building its own gigantic war machine, for developing the Chinese
Communist war potential. Years of Communist oppression have generated
bitter resentment and deep-going unrest, mass strikes and open revolt. At first,
the Kremlin sought to dispel the mounting discontent by softening certain
^^ This and the following articles are common to all four conventions.
*-Ct. an amendment by the Soviet Union, July 20. 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex 26,
p. 34), and the reservation of the Soviet Union and Hungary to Art. 10/10/10/11.
^Qt. Amendments of the Soviet Union of July 20 and 21, 1949 (Record, Vol. Ill, Annex
Nr. 53 and 53 A, pp. 44).
« Record, Vol. II B, p. 32.
3560 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
features of its dictatorship, by introducing some so-called liberal reforms. After
the 20th Soviet Communist Party congress and the Khrushchev indictment of
Stalin as a mass murderer, the forces of revolt— particularly among the workers,
students and intellectuals— began to assert openly their demand for democratic
rights, better conditions of life and labor, and national independence. This
historic development reaches its highest point to date in the inspiring Hungarian
democratic revolution. This heroic revolt has intensified political unrest
throughout the Iron Curtain domain.
By resorting to brute force, Moscow has for the moment slowed down the
trend toward disintegration, but it has not overcome the crisis. Whether the
Kremlin reverts to the method of Stalinist massive suppression by armed force,
as in Hungary, or accepts the more subtle technique of national communism, as
in Poland, its fundamental aims are the same— to prevent freedom and genuine
national independence. Soviet savagery in crushing the Hungarian revolt has
aroused the conscience and moral indignation of the civilized world as no other
event has done in many years. The international Communist movement and
Soviet prestige have been seriously weakened in the free world. Communism
is now detested most by the very people whom it has pretended to serve most.
Hastening to stem the tide of doubt and disintegration in the camp of world
communism, the Soviet ruling clique has vigorously reasserted its primacy
in international communism. This primacy was promptly acknowledged by
Chou En-lai and Gomulka in their support of Russia's barbarous suppression
of the democratic revolution in Hungary.
In this situation, the free world must guard against perilous pitfalls and the
continuation of errors in policy, such as: (a) lack of unity, passivity and inade-
quate military strength; (&) timidity of policy in the face of Soviet threats and
appeasement measures which can only help bail Moscow and its satellites out
of their serious difficulties ; (c) hesitation and refusal to break with colonialism
(Algeria, Cyprus) ; (d) failure to assist adequately the promotion of economic
development and improved living standards in the industrially underdeveloped
countries committed to the building of democracy; (e) slowness in eliminating
shortcomings in the social, economic, and political fabric and institutions of
the free nations.
Toward helping the democracies to utilize the crisis behind the Iron Curtain
in the interest of peace and freedom, we urge our Government to :
(1) Reassure the captive countries that America will: (a) oppose all policies
for an agreement with Moscow based on delineated spheres of control (mutual
acceptance of old and new colonialism) and will not accept as final their present
status; (6) not allow these lands to serve as spheres of exploitation or areas
from which to launch invasions of other countries; (c) repudiate all efforts and
elements seeking to replace the present despotic regimes with other reactionary
governments or to impose on them any particular economic, political or social
system; (d) seek U. N. supervised free elections to enable them to establish
democratic governments fully sovereign in their foreign as well as domestic
relations.
(2) Place the problem of the captive countries and German reunification be-
fore the U. N. which should call upon Russia to abide by the Yalta agreement
providing for free elections in the satellites and to comply with its promises
regarding German reunification in freedom.
(3) Urge the U. N. to appeal to the free governments of Asia, especially India,
to declare their solidarity with and pledge support of the Hungarian freedom
fighters in their courageous passive resistance to Soviet colonial oppression and
exploitation.
(4) Provide the victims of Soviet tyranny in Hungary with free food — via the
International Red Cross or an especially designated agency — and desist from
aiding the quisling Kadar regime through selling it consumers' goods and
industrial products.
(5) Condemn the puppet Kadar regime for executing the leaders of the
workers councils and seek to have the ILO expel it for its flagrant violation of
all human rights.
(6) Sever diplomatic relations with the Kadar regime and seek its unseating,
as a foreign-imposed government, from the U. N.
(7) Demand that the Rumanian puppet government should free Hungary's
legitimate Premier Imre Nagy, upon pain of expulsion from the U. N.
(8) Seek to have the U. N. invoke economic sanctions against Russia for
its persistent refusal to heed the U. N. decision that it withdraw its invasion
army from Hungary.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3561
(9) Urge all free governments to join in giving full support to the Hungarian
National Government representation (Kethly, Kiraly, Koevago) as rallying
center of Hungarian freedom fighters seeking full national independence and
freedom.
(10) Cancel all plans to have the Communist dictator Tito and the Falangist
dictator Franco visit the United States. Such visits would serve no useful
purpose for the democratic forces in their worldwide struggle against totali-
tarians of every hue and stripe and would be an affront and injury to the
peoples of Yugoslavia and Spain now increasingly demanding human rights
and democracy.
The following newspaper articles were ordered into the record at
a subsequent hearing of the subcommittee :
[AFL-CIO News, Washington, D. C, February 16, 1957, p. 13]
Labor No. 1 Target of United States Communists
By Arnold Beichman
New York. — The Communist Party of the U. S. A. has concluded its first
convention in 7 years with a decision to attempt to penetrate the AFL-CIO.
It was also announced to the world that henceforth the Communist Party is
going to be "independent" of Moscow. It formulated its new program at a 4-
day convention from which the press was barred. Whatever the newspapers
printed about the convention came from "official spokesmen" who were obviously
under orders to answer no questions on anything discussing the American trade-
union movement.
they just "confess"
Nowhere in the 7,500-word statement on trade unionism did the Communists
ask why they had been defeated by the labor movement. They just "confessed"
and having done so, denied with fiery indignation that it is "Communist policy"
to interfere with, "bore from within," or to seek to capture or control the trade
unions.
The Communist Party bemoaned the fact that "what is dominant in the AFL-
CIO leadership is a trend bitterly hostile to the Soviet Union and other 'Socialist'
countries."
"This dominant trend," said the Communist Party resolution, "equates negotia-
tions with 'appeasement,' keeps an iron curtain between workers of our country
and workers of Socialist lands and rejects the possibility of peacefvil coexistence."
STRESS "changes"
The task of the convention was primarily to persuade Americans that Com-
munists have changed, that they don't follow Moscow orders. Here's what they
did:
They charged that "the imperialists intervened in the Hungarian tragedy"
although a few months ago the Daily Worker conceded that the Hungarian up-
rising was not Fascist-inspired.
They said they would love to work with Socialists in America but they forgot
to call for the liberation of Socialists in iron curtain prisons.
They dumped a proposal to dissolve the Communist Party, and to change its
name.
So far as is known, they said nothing in any resolutions which was critical of
Soviet anti-Semitism.
A few weeks ago the Daily Worker wrote that over the last decade Com-
munists have been "shrinking away from the association with great masses of
workers * * * only very recently has there been stronger, and more consistent
effort on the part of progressives (Communists and fellow travelers) to establish
their rights and make their contributions within the conservatively led imions
* * * it can be expected that following the convention of the Communist Party and
revival of its influence and activity, the work of progressives in the labor move-
ment will reach a still higher level."
3562 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
VOW COMEBACK
From its position of unparalleled weakness the Communist Party is de-
termined to make a comeback. It is moving its national headquarters to Chicago
from New York City to be closer as the Communist Party said, to the industrial
and agricultural heartland of America.
Years of declining membership and party purges have left the Communist
Party with a powerful "hard-core" group of dedicated revolutionaries. Its
national committee of 20 numbers 14 Communist leaders who have gone to jail
or have been indicted and are awaiting trial.
The latest Communist Party convention disclosed what everybody knows — no
matter how much its leaders may mumble unhappily about Khrushchev or Stalin
or some single Soviet policy or other, when the chips are down, Communist
Partyers here as in other countries of the free world, will toe the Kremlin
mark or else.
Yet is should also be remembered that the Communist Party has emerged
from this convention stronger than it entered. There will be differences and dis-
putes within its ranks — but it will be over power, who is to be top dog — not
whether the Soviet Union is right or wrong.
A stronger Communist Party, no matter how tiny numerically, represents a
threat to American democracy, and, esi)ecially, to the American labor movement.
[Las Vegas Sun, February 16, 1957, p. 16]
Victor Riesel — Inside Labor
New York. — Though it met those past 4 days just around the corner from
the Bowery, the Communist Party was far from hitting the skids. When
its national leaders quietly slipped out of the city, their party was still a
noticeable item in Moscow's cold war budget.
Couriers from the Kremlin had brought word that the Party's press would be
heavily subsidized in America once again. The national headquarters would be
refinanced. Funds for agitation-propaganda would be available once more.
There would be stronger backing for the Party's labor friends — some of whom
were in town from as far off as the west coast. There would be money for good
lawyers and undercover organizers to help re-infiltrate the AFL--CIO.
The American Communist Party had agreed to behave itself and not to "Tito."
Moscow was selling gold in London and Brussels. Some of the money would be
funneled into the United States. Moscow had wanted to keep its American
mouthpiece from fading out.
This was no convention ; this was a conspiracy. And it would have been a
mistake to cover the drones as we cover the national major party parleys. Among
the chairmen, and dispersed through the 300 delegates and 110 visitors, were
men awaiting jail on charges of teaching the violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment. There were several Soviet secret police officials.
And, of course, the fellow who led the fight to free the electrocuted atomic
spies.
The press was barred so that we, and perhaps some undercover men who
might slip in with us, would not recognize the so-called delegates. But not
because the delegates feared they'd lose their jobs— as the indicted Steve Nelson
told several of us out on the sidewalk. The press was barred because the four-
hundred-odd men inside were the top Communist functionaries in the United
States — and among them were the men taking direct orders from Moscow via
London.
These 400 were older people. They were the hard core. They made up — not a
convention — but the first full gathering of the party's operatives throughout the
United States. They were mostly from New York, California, Pennsylvania,
Michigan and Illinois. They run the apparat in 34 States. They're tough. They
are the ones the party can count on to walk through the street near the Chateau
Gardens and scurry into the old hall — even after the blood bath of Budapest and
the Soviet's ties with the Nazified Nasser.
There was talk of this as a convention. You know, three delegates representing
every hundred members, caucuses, etc.
They took the pains to vote and count. But what did they count? The alleged
"delegates," by the party's own total, would have spoken for slightly under 7,000
registered Communists. But this is like a wrestling referee's count. The party
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3563
has almost 20,000 registered members. That's positive. It has several thousand
secret members who take orders from a tricky cell-like chain of command.
Furthermore, the party still operates on the 10 to 1 formula. Its leaders boast
that they have 10 persons ready to work for them for every one of their official
members.
That puts their count way up. So what you had at the Communist Party's
16th National Convention was a gathering of the top 300-man committee. These
were not really delegates but regional chiefs being briefed by men who had taken
their orders by courier from abroad.
Not all of them, however, were ready to take direction unquestioningly. So
they were permitted to sound off about the new road to American socialism. Or
about the yoke of "democratic centralism" which, translated, means "You have
5 minutes to talk Comrade, and then sit down, shut up or take orders." They
had their hopes raised that they might be men again after the depurification of
Stalin. But over the past weekend they were told that they must go along with
the Kremlin, or their Moscow gold will be cut off.
The convention's press officer. Si Gerson, worked hard at giving us a fairly
good facsimile of what a capitalist public relations man would be — with just one
twist. Somebody asked for a drink and Gerson said, "Why don't you fellows send
in a case of Scotch?"
INDEX
Note. — The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organi-
zation in this index.
A
Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the interpreta- Page
tion of peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania 3550
"Aesopian language" 3526, 3527
AFI^CIO 3561,3562
AFL-CIO executive council 3545, 3559-3561
AFL^CIO News 3533, 3534, 3561
Alter (Polish Socialist) 3536
American Civil Liberties Union, New York chapter 3525
American Committee for Cultural Freedom 3534
American Communist Party (see also Communist Party) 3521,
3523, 3526, 3535, 3539, 3544
American Veterans Committee 3516
AMVETS 3516
"Antimonopoly coalition" 3524
Asia 3560
B
Baltimore Sun 3537
Barr, Stringfellow 3517
Beichman, Arnold 3533-3547, 3561
20 West 84th Street, New York 3533
Testimony of 3533-3547
Newspaperman 3533
Chairman, board of directors, American Committee for Cultural
Freedom 3534
Contributor to AFI^CIO News 3533
Contributor to New Leader 3533
Contributor to Christian Science Monitor 3533
Blumberg 3522, 3527
Bridges, Harry 3545
Brooklyn, N. Y 3516
Browder, Earl 3520, 3535, 3536, 3539
Browderists 3520
Brown Street, 187 (Brooklyn) 3516
Brussels 3554, 3555, 3562
Brussels Conference, May 1956 3551
Budapest 3562
Bulgaria 3550
C
Chateau Gardens 3517
Chinese Nationals 3516
Chou En-lai 3560
Christian Science Monitor 3533, 3534
CIO 3516
Civil Liberties Union, New York 3516
Cominform 3539
Comintern 3539
Committee on Penal Procedure 3551, 3554
n INDEX
Page
Communist/s 3516, 3517, 3519-
3521, 3524-3526, 3529, 3536-3539, 3541, 3542, 3544-3546, 3559-8562
Communist Chinese 3559
Communist Party 3518-
3529, 3534-3537, 3539, 3540, 3542, 3543, 3545-3547, 3561, 3562
Communist Party convention 3516,3517,3525,3538
Communist Party delegates to 3518, 3519, 3523, 3543, 3562
California 3518, 3519, 3523, 3562 'I
Dakotas 3519 'i
Idaho 3519 \
Illinois 3518, 3519, 3562 '|
Indiana 3518, 3519
Maryland 3519 i
Michigan 3562 ';
Minnesota 3519 ,i
New Jersey 3519 ■
New York State 3518, 3519, 3543, 3562 '
Oregon 3519 i
Pennsylvania 3519, 3562
Washington 3519 \
Wisconsin 3519 \
Commimist Party, National Committee of 3518
Communist Party, 16th National Convention of the 3563
Commimist World Federation of Trade Unions 3546
Communities and Social Agencies Employees Union 3516
Czechoslovakia 3546
D
Daily Worker 3520, 3537, 3538, 3540, 3541, 3543, 3545, 3561
Davis, Ben 3520
"Democratic centralism" 3521, 3527, 3538
Denmark 3558
Dennis, Eugene 3521, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3527, 3534, 3541, 3543, 3546
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, 1949 3556
Dobi, Istvan 3552, 3553
Duclos, Jacques 3520, 3521, 3537
E
East Germany 3535
Ehrlich (Polish Socialist) 3536
Eighty-fourth Street, 20 West 3533
European Convention on Human Rights 3551
F
Fast, Howard 3528
Fine, Fred 3543
Fitch, Roy 3517
Foster, William Z 3520,3522-3225,3534,3535,3537,3538,3540-3543
France 3535
Franco 3535,3561
French Communists 3520
French Communist Party , 3520
G
Gannett, Betty 3527
Gates, John 3516, 3520, 3522, 3524, 3525, 3527, 3534, 3537, 3538, 3542, 3543
Geneva Conventions of 1949 3549, 3551, 3556, 3557, 3559
German 3560 j
Gerson, Simon 3517, 3525, 3527, 3534, 3535, 3540, 3542, 3543, 3563 1
Gomulka 3560 i
Great Britain 3539 !
i
H I
Hague, The 3549, 3555, 3559
Hiss, Alger 3516 ,
INDEX in
Page
Hitler 3535
Hook, Prof. Sidney 3534
Hoover, J. Edgar 3519
Hruska, Senator Roman L 3533
Hungarian 3529, 3588, 3558, 3559
Hungarian Communist Party 3538
Hungarian Government 3550, 3551, 3555-3557
Hungarian Military Penal Code 3559
Hungarian National Government 3561
Hungarian People's Republic 3549, 3556
"Hungarian Situation in the Light of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
the" 3551, 3555
Hungary 3522,
3524, 3526, 3527, 3536, 3538-3540, 3546, 3549, 3550, 3557, 3559, 3560
"Hungary and the Soviet Definition of Aggression" 3555, 3557
I
ILO 3560
India 3560
International Association of Democratic Lawyers 3551, 3554
International Commission of Jurists 3549, 3551, 3555, 3557, 3559
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 3546
International Court of Justice 355I
International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union 3545
International Red Cross 3560
International Red Cross Conference, 17th (Stockholm) 3556
Iron Curtain 3535, 3536, 3541, 3559, 3560
Italy 3535
J
Jenner, Senator William E 3515, 3533
K
Kadar regime 3549, 3551, 3552, 3557, 3560
Kethly 3561
Khrushchev 3539, 3560, 3562
Kiraly 3561
Koevago 3561
Kremlin 3521. 3522, 3535, 3537, 3539, 3540, 3542, 3544, 3559, 3560, 3562, 3563
Kristof, Istvan 3552, 3553
"Labor No. 1 Target of United States Communists," by Arnold Beichman__ 3561
Las Vegas Sun 35g2
Left Wing Communism, by Lenin ~~ 3544
Lenin " 3544
Lightfoot, Claude 3543
London ~_ ~_~_ 3552
Lovestone 3520
Lovestoneites ~~ 3520
M
Marsh, Norman S 3555
Marxist 3521 3543
Marxist-Leninist 3520, 3522, 3523,~3538, 3543', 3547
Meany, George 3545
Mein Kampf ~~~ I_~_I_ 3535
Migdol, Lester II_~IIII 35I6
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers _ _Z" _~ ~~_ 3545
^^««'^",^i-- — TV i~"::::i5i8, 3519
"Monolithic unity" 3521, 3527, 3538
Morns, George 3545
Morris, Robert II~~I~3515 3533
Moscow 3521, 3535-3537, 3539, 3540, 3543,1544, 3546, 3547, 355^568
IV INDEX
Page
Mussolini 3535
Muste, Rev. J. A 3517
N
Nagy government, 3557
Nagy, Imre 3540, 3560
Nasser 3562
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 3524
National Association of Manufacturers 3535, 3536
Naughton, Howard 3537
Nazi 3558
Nazi Germany 3529
Nelson, Steve 3543
Netherlands 3549, 3555
New Leader 3533
New York 3515, 3516, 3517, 3533, 3541, 3542, 3561, 3562
New York Communist Party 3534, 3543
New York Herald Tribune 3525, 3534
New York Times 3525, 3534, 3537
New York University, department of philosophy : 3534
P
Party Life (magazine) 3537
Poland 3540, 3560
Polish 3516
Poznan 3535
Pravda 3523, 3546, 3547
Presidential Council of the People's Republic : 3552, 3553, 3554
B
Rachlin, Carl 3515-3530, 3539, 3543
187 Brown Street, Brooklyn, N. Y 3516
Testimony of 3515-3530
Lawyer (11 West 48th Street, New York City) 3516
Board of directors, New York Civil Liberties Union 3516
Unofficial observer to Communist Party Convention, New York 3516
Rajchman, Ludwig 3515, 3533
Riesel, Victor 3562
Rumania 3550
Rumanian puppet government 3560
Rusher, William A 3515, 3533
Russia 3529, 3535, 3540
Russian 3523, 3560
Russin, Bayard 3517
S
SACB 3546
Smith Act 3526, 3527, 3536, 3541
Soviet anti-Semitism 3524, 3526, 3529
Soviet Communist Party 3523, 3537
Soviet Communist Party Congress, 20th 3560
Soviet Georgia 3535
Soviet Government 3520, 3522, 3523, 3527, 3557
"Soviet imperialism" 3522
Soviet Russia (magazine) 3537
Soviet Union__ 3522, 3523, 3527, 3529, 3534, 3536-3538, 3549, 3556-3559, 3561, 3562
Spain 3561
Stalin 3535, 3536, 3539, 3562, 3563
Stalinism 3529
Stalinist 3520, 3523
Stein, Sid 3543
St. Johns College of Maryland 3517
Summary Trials in Hungary 3549
INDEX V
T
Page
Tiflis 3535
Tito 3537, 3561
Treaty of Peace With Hungary, 1947 3549-3551
Trotskyites 3537
"20tli Century Americanism" 3520
U
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers 3545
United Nations 3557, 3560
United Office and Professional Workers 3516
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 3550, 3551
V
van Dal, A. J. M 3549
W
Watkins, Senator Arthur V 3515
Westbury Hotel (New York City) 3515, 3533
Western Union 3533
White, Harry Dexter 3516
Wilkins, Roy 3524
World War II 3535
Y
Yalta agreement 3560
Yugoslavia 3561
o
DEPOSITORV
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY 25 AND 26, 1957
PART 54
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
93215 WASHINGTON : 1957
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
OCT 9 - 1957
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
StXBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
Act AND Other Internal Security Laws
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
MATTHEW M. NEELY, West Virginia ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
ROBERT Morris, Chief Counsel
J. G. SODRWiNE, Associate Counsel
William A. Rusher, Associate Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
II
CONTENTS
Witness : Page
Dennis, Eugene 3566
Meyer, Frank S 3577
m
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1957
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
or the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 : 15 p. m., in room
318, Senate Office Buildin<r, Senator Roman L. Hruska presiding.
Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine and
William A. Rusher, associate counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director
of research.
Senator Hruska. The committee will come to order.
There was recently held in New York City a convention of the Com-
munist Party of the United States of America. I believe the last day
of the session was February 12, 1957.
This committee has had several witnesses appear before it in connec-
tion with reporting some of the things which transpired at that con-
vention. Carl Rachlin was here. He was an unofficial observer at
the sessions of the convention, as I understand it.
And Arnold Beichman was a reporter who covered as best he could
the proceedings of that convention.
This committee, in connection with the inquiries in this general
field of the activities of the Communist Party here in this country,
would like to continue its inquiry into this situation.
And we have, therefore, invited Mr. Eugene Dennis to appear
before this committee.^
^ See the following letter :
United States Department of Justice,
United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York,
New York, N. Y., Fehruary 18, 1957.
Re Eugene Dennis.
Robert Morris, Esq.,
Chief Counsel,
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Bob : Enclosed herewith is copy of letter to attorney for the above-named subject
which is self-explanatory.
Sincerely,
tom bolan.
February 18, 1957.
Re United States versus Eugene Dennis.
.TOHN J. Abt, Esq.,
320 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Dear Sir : Confirming telephone conversation with my assistant, Thomas A. Bolan, this
afternoon, please be advised that the United States attorney's office has no objection to
the above-named defendant's traveling to Washington, D. C., on February 25, 1957, to
answer a subpena issued by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, or on any day
to which his appearance may be adjourned by said subcommittee.
Very truly yours,
Paul W. Williams,
United States Attorney.
By Thomas A. Bolan,
Assistant United States Attorney.
3565
3566 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
I presume at this time it would be well to swear the witness.
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Senator Hjiuska. Will you please rise ?
You solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth in the testimony which you are about to give ?
Mr. Dennis. I do.
Senator Hruska. So help you God ?
Mr. Dennis. Yes.
Senator Hruska. I might say by way of preliminary that the Daily
Worker, a well-known newspaper in this field, in commenting on the
subpena issued to the witness here, Mr. Dennis, made a statement which
included this language :
Far from being a cellar conspiracy, our convention was held in the glare of
white-hot publicity.
And it was our thought that perhaps, inasmuch as it was that,
maybe you would sliare with us some of the things that transpired
there, and also some of the parts which you assumed in that connection.
Judge Morris, would you like to proceed at this time to interrogate
the witness, or do you want to do otherwise ?
TESTIMONY OF EUGENE DENNIS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER,
ATTORNEY, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Morris. I will proceed.
What is your name and address, please ?
Mr. Dennis. My name is Eugene Dennis. I reside at 628 West
151st Street, New York City.
Mr. Morris, "\'\^iere were you born, Mr. Dennis ?
Mr. Dennis. At this point, counsel and Senator, I would like to
read a very brief statement. It is extremely short but it sets forth
my legal and political position on these hearings.
Senator Hruska. Suppose we dispose of the preliminary questions
first, Mr. Dennis, and then you may at a later time read that statement.
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Morris. Wliere were you born ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I am going to decline to answer that question, Mr.
Morris, first, invoking my rights under the first amendment, which
precludes the Congress or any of its committees prying into my opin-
ions, political beliefs, or associations.
Secondly, on the grounds of my conscience, because I consider this
a lawless coimnittee, headed by a chairman who is a notorious racist
and
Senator Hruska. Mr. Dennis, you may make a short statement,
but this coimnittee will not tolerate any aspersions of that kind upon
a member of this committee. They are not necessary for any state-
ment which you have in this connection, and we would respectfully
request that you desist from any further remarks of that kind.
Mr. Dennis. May I complete the grounds on which I am declining!
Senator Hruska. Not if they include any further reference to any
member of this committee, a fact which is not necessary in order to
make your position clear in respect to your legal rights, Mr. Dennis.
Mr. Dennis. And the further gromids on wliich I decline to answer
this and other questions that I may so refuse to answer, is that I claim
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3567
my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against
myself.
Senator Hruska. The Chair will overrule all of those objections,
all of those grounds except that of the fifth amendment at this time.
Mr. Dennis. May the record show that I am still standing on the
grounds which I have stated ?
Senator Hrusk.4. The record so shows.
Judge Morris, will you proceed ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dennis, to reframe the question, you were born in
Seattle, Wash., were you not?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to ansAver on the grounds previously stated.
Mr. Morris. Were you born in Seattle, Wash., under the name of
Frank Waldron ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as stated before.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Chairman, I assume we have the same ruling?
Senator Hruska. The record will show that the same ruling will
apply to all of the same assertions of refusal to answer.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Dennis, you had your training, did you not, in
the Lenin Institute in Moscow; that is, your Commmiist Party
training ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer that question under the grounds as
previously stated.
Mr. Morris. Have you ever been to the Lenin Institute in Moscow ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer the question on these same
grounds
Mr. Forer. Pardon me.
Mr. Dennis. As stated previously.
Mr. FoRER. Have you gotten beyond the preliminary question, so
the witness' request to read his statement may again be renewed ?
Senator Hruska. Yes, I think so; subject, however, to that limita-
tion which I placed on it, if that statement contains any reference
which casts those kind of aspersions as were made a little bit ago
upon the chairman of this subcommittee, we respectfully ask that they
be withheld and not given.
Mr. Morris. Might I also add that there is a subcommittee rule
with which I think counsel is acquainted that before statements are
going to be read or presented to the committee, that the committee
rule requires that they be filed 24 hours in advance.
Now, Mr. Chairman, we had an executive session, as you know, just
a short time ago and there was no reference whatever made at that
time to the filing or the reading of any statement here in this open
session.
Mr. FoRER. It is only a procedural rule which I am sure you can
bypass.
Senator Hruska. It will depend.
Mr. Dennis. May I state, Mr. Senator
Senator Hruska. The Chair at this time requests that a copy of
that statement be submitted in advance so we may consider whether
or not we want to waive the committee rules to which reference has
just been made.
Mr. Dennis. I might say at this point, Senator, that contrary to —
being the remark that you must have made inadvertently — I was not
invited here. I was subpenaed. And, therefore, I think after being
3568 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
brought here that I should be entitled to read a very brief statement
which is pertinent.
Senator PIruska. The record will stand corrected, insofar as it was
a subpena which brought you here as opposed to an invitation.
However, the committee rules have not yet been waived and I do
not know that they will. Your ability to make that statement will
be governed by the decision of the Chair, which will be made in just
a little bit.
In the meantime, may we proceed to other questions while that
statement is being analyzed by the staff?
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Dennis, you have been the general secretary
of the Communist Party of the United States of America, have you
not?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer the question on tlie grounds pre-
viously stated.
Mr. Morris. Well now, did you attend the recent Communist Party
convention in New York City ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer the question for reasons stated
previously.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Dennis, as the chairman read just a short time
ago at the time that you were served with a subpena, the Communist
Party, the national committee of the Communist Party issued the
statement in connection with your very appearance here, that —
far from this being a cellar conspiracy our convention was held in a glare of
white-hot pubUeity.
Do you, even after that statement was issued, refuse now to tell us
whether or not you were even present at the convention ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I repeat, I refuse to answer the question on the basis
of the gromids as previously stated.
Mr. Morris. Do you know that Irving Potash surre[)titiously ent-
ered the United States in the closing days of 1956 ?
( Consultation between witness and attorney. )
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the basis of the grounds pre-
viously given.
Mr. Morris. Well now, to your knowledge did Irving Potash secret-
ly meet with leaders of the American Commmiist Party at that time ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. That is absurd, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Wliat is absurd, that he met — that he met with lead-
ers of the Communist Party ?
Mr. Dennis. My answer to your question is that is absurd. Be-
yond that I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons previously
given.
Mr. Morris. Well now, let me ask this, did you meet with Mr.
Potash?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse, sir, on the basis of reasons as previously
stated.
Mr. Morris. To your knowledge did Potash meet with any leader of
the Communist Party known to you?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for the reasons as previously
given.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3569
Mr. Morris. Wlien you say — when you give^ — when you gave your
preceding answer, "it is absurd," did you mean that it is absurd that
I should ask you that, Mr. Dennis ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I meant by that the implications contained in the
question were absurd, fantastic, preposterous.
Mr. Morris. Well, did he meet with you ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as previously given.
Senator Hruska. Do you know Mr. Potash, Mr. Dennis ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer, sir, on the basis of the reasons
as I have stated before.
Senator Hruska. Do you know who he is ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons as given previously.
Mr. Morris. Well now, Mr. Dennis, the New York Herald Tribune
of January 9, 1957, contained an article, which said that Ii-\^ing Pot-
ash has illegally entered this countiy carrying secret orders from the
Kremlin to leaders of the Communist Party in the United States.
Now, did you know that Potash was in the United States at any
time that he was in the United States ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the basis of the grounds as pre-
viously stated.
Mr. Morris. Do you have any knowledge that he was secretly meet-
ing with leaders of the Communist Party of the United States?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the basis of the reasons as I
have given them before.
Mr. Morris. Did he, to your knowledge, bear any instructions to
members of the Communist Party in the United States ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. Would you kindly repeat the question ?
Mr. Morris. Eead it.
(Question read.)
Mr. Dennis. I certainly did not receive anything or act upon any-
thing that I regarded as a directive or an instruction.
Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, did he have any advice or instruc-
tions for any member at the top of the Communist Party — did he — to
your knowledge, did you know that he was imparting instructions
or orders to any leader of the Communist Party ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. That is preposterous, Mr. Morris. I am sure, to the
best of my knowledge, nothing was received that anyone in his right
mind could regard as directives.
Mr. Morris. How about advice?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons I stated
previously.
Mr. Morris. You will not enter a denial with respect to the term
"advice"?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds I have just given.
Mr. Morris. Would you be willing to tell us the purpose of Mr.
Potash's trip to the United States ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as previously given.
Mr. Morris. "W^ien did you first learn that Potash was in the United
States?
93215— 57— pt. 54 2
3570 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons as stated before.
Mr. Morris. Do you know a man named John Williamson who was
previously one of the leaders of the American Communist Party?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for the reasons as previously given.
Mr. Morris. AVould you tell us, Mr. Dennis — would you tell us
Vvdien you last had a communication from John Williamson?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for reasons I have stated before.
Mr. Morris. Have you received instructions from Jolin Williamson ?
Mr. Forer. Just a moment, do you have in mind any particular
time?
Mr. Morris. Within the last 6 months, did you receive a letter or any
communication of any kind
Mr. Dennis. I decline to
Mr. Morris. With recommendations or advice from John Wil-
liamson?
Mr. Forer. Let us get it straight. Your first question was instruc-
tions. Now it has become a letter. Which question do you want
him to answer.
Mr. Morris. Have you received any letters from John Williamson ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for grounds previously given.
Mr. IMoRRis. Would you be willing to turn over to the committee
any letters that you have received from John Williamson in the last
6 months ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons as stated before.
Mr. Morris. Have you received any written instructions from
John Williamson in the last 6 months ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I repeat, Mr. Morris, that is preposterous, absurd.
I am sure to the best of my knowledge nothing was received that
anyone in his right mind could regard as directives.
Mr. Morris. Did you receive any letter— a letter or any other
communication from Mr. Williamson which gave you any advice as
to how the Communist Partj^ of the United States should be run?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for reasons as stated before.
Mr. Morris. Again, you will make the distinction between "in-
structions" and "advice"?
Mr. Forer. There is a distinction, you know.
Mr. Morris. Again you are making the distinction in your answer
between "instructions" and "advice" ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer for the grounds previously stated.
Mr. Morris. Did you know, Mr. Dennis, that John Williamson
went from London, where, to my knowledge, he now is, to Moscow,
during the fall of 1956?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons I have stated
before.
Mr. Morris. Isn't it so, Mr. Dennis, that after he returned from
Moscow, he commenced to write you and to give you instructions and
advice with respect to how the Communist Party of the United States
should be run ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as stated before.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Dennis, did you receive, or did you or any
other leader of tlie Communist Party receive any letters or instruc-
tions or bits of advice from a French Communist named Duclos?
( Consultation between witness and attorney. )
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE "UNITED STATES 3571
Mr. Dennis. Mr. Morris, that is a very compounded question. I
would appreciate it if you would break it down into its particulars.
Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, Mr. Dennis, did Mr. Khrushchev
in addressing the 20th party convention of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, on March 7, 1956, state :
There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries violent overthrow
of the dictatorship of the bourgeois and the aggravation of the class struggle
connected with this are inevitable.
Is that so, to your knowledge ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as previously
given.
Mr. Morris. Now, to your knowledge was the declaration made by
a leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that peaceful
transition is possible only in countries where there is voting socialism,
but that there must be a revolutionary transition where the particular
country concerned has an entrenched capitalist society?
To your knowledge was that statement made ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the basis of the reasons given
before.
Mr. Morris. Was the decision made in connection with any policy
decision of the Communist Party of the United States that the United
States was such a country where there is an entrenched capitalist
society ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as previously stated.
Mr. Morris. When did you last hear from Mr. Duclos ?
Mr. Dennis. I decline to answer on the grounds as stated previously.
Mr. ISIoRRis. And will you not tell us about any instructions and/or
advice that the Communist Party of the United States received from
Mr. Duclos ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I would appreciate, Mr. Morris, if you would break
that question up.
Mr. Morris. Well, I mean that has come up several times before,
Mr. Chairman. The witness has stated that he has entered a denial
with respect to any instructions that have been imparted to the Com-
munist Party of the United States but has claimed privilege on the
same question when the noun used is "advice."
Now, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that the witness is draw-
ing a distinction here that we should take cognizance of. On the basis
of his denials of having received any instructions, I think, Mr. Chair-
man, that we can pursue this further and make recommendations and
expect answers with respect to any communication where instruction
is involved.
Senator Hruska. The witness will answer.
Mr. Forer. We don't know the question.
Mr. Morris. Did you receive any communication from Mr. Duclos
which contained an instruction to the leaders of the Communist Party
of the United States?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. FoRER. Are you talking — as of what time are you talking about?
Mr. Morris. At any time within the last 6 months.
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
3572 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Denxis. I wish to repeat, as I have stated earlier to a similar
Question, Mr. Morris, that is preposterous. I am sure, to the best of
my knowledge, that iiothino; was received by anyone in his right
mind— which anybody in his right mind could regard as directives
or instructions.
Mr. Morris. Is that the end of the answer ?
Mr. FoRER. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Would you deny that Duclos sent any instructions to
the United States?
Mr. FoRER. He could only answer to the best of his knowledge which
he already did.
Mr. Morris. What is the best of his knowledge ?
Mr. FoRER. He just told you, he had no such knowledge.
Mr. Morris. No knowledge of any communications from Mr.
Duclos ?
Mr. FoRER. That was not the question. You asked if there had
been any instructions, not if there had been any communications.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us, on the basis of that answer, what
instructions that you know of that have been received by the American
Communist Party from Mr. Duclos?
Mr. Forer. You are talking in the last 6 months?
:Mr. :Morrts. In the last 6 months ?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. FoRER. He said he didn't know of any. How can you ask him
what they were?
]\f r. Morris. Did he Imow of any communication of any kind ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the
grounds as previously stated.
Mr. Sourwine. May I inquire ?
Senator Hruska. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I believe I quote you correctly, sir. You said :
I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard
as directives.
You stated that in response to questions about communications from
Mr. Potash.
You stated it again in regard to communications from Mr. Wil-
liamson.
You stated it again in regard to communications from Mr. Duclos.
On the latter occasion you added the words "or instructions."
It appeared to me that you were reading that statement and that is
how ;^ou repeated it precisely.
I will ask you if that is true, were you reading that statement ?
Mr. FoRER. That is a pertinent question, Mr. Chairman. Isn't the
witness entitled to use his notes ?
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I intend to inquire here for the
purpose of testing the witness' credibility in connection with the
positive statement he has made to the committee, and for the purpose
of pursuing, so far as the committee has a right to pursue it, the
implications of that question.
Senator Hruska. The Chair rules that the question is proper.
Mr. FoRER. The question is whether he was reading his answer ?
Senator Hruska. That is right.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3573
Mr. SouRwiNE. No implication that he does not have the right to
read it.
Mr. FoRER. Then I do not understand why you ask the question.
All right, then.
Mr. Dennis. "Wliat is your
Mr. SouRWiNE. The question is, When you stated on several occa-
sions these words :
I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard
as directives —
were you reading that phrasing ?
Mr. Dennis. I have various notes here Avhich I refer to from time
to time.
Mr. Sotjrwine. Do you have in front of you a note which carries
these words :
I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard
as directives.
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Forer. Give him time while he looks over his notes.
You are talking about those precise words ?
Senator Hruska. The record will show that the witness has been
given opportunity to scan the notes in front of him.
Mr. Dennis. Not the notes — the notes are not in those precise words.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Then let me ask you this question : When you said :
I am sure nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would regard
as directives.
were you saying precisely what you intended to say ?
Mr. Forer. I clon't get this.
Mr. Dennis. I don't understand the question.
Mr. Sourwine. You made an answer three times here. It seems
quite obvious that is what you intended to answer, that you had
made up your mind that that was what you were going to say to a
particular kind of question. When that question came up you then
did say it.
Is that what happened ?
Mr. Dennis. As you know, I was brought here under subpena
against my will and in violation of the first amendment. And I am
offering testimony under oath and that testimony is mine.
And I don't w\ant anybody to put any words into my mouth.
Mr. Sourwine. Fine, fine.
Now, you have stated that you are sure— and I speak now with re-
gard to your answer to the question which was asked as to Mr. Pot-
ash— you have stated that you are sure that nothing was received
that anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.
I will now ask you. Do you have any knowledge whatsoever which
will serve as a basis for your judgment as expressed in those words?
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I rest on my previous answer to reply to that ques-
tion just formulated, I decline to answer on the grounds as previously
stated.
Mr. Sourwine. I ask that the Chair direct that this question be
answered. The witness has made a voluntary statement and we are
not to put anything in his mouth. He made the statement. I ask
that he be ordered and directed to answer that question.
3574 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The committee is entitled to find, out the basis on which he gives the
committee his opinion with regard to this matter.
Senator Hruska. The witness is directed by the Chair to answer
the question.
Mr. FoRER. I would like the record to show, Mr. Chairman, that I
am here as Mr. Dennis' counsel and that I am the one advising him
on his legal rights, not Mr. Sourwine, and that in my opinion it is
perfectly clear that the witness was entitled to claim his privilege to
that question.
And I am advising the witness now that he is entitled, if he so
desires, to persist in his refusal to answer for the reasons he gave
before.
Senator Hruska. The record will show what the counsel has just
stated and the Chair further directs the witness at this time, not-
withstanding that advice and the words of counsel, to answer the ques-
tion.
Mr. Dennis. Mr. Chairman, I will abide by my refusal on the
grounds and reason as previously stated.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, Mr. Dennis, you have stated that you are
sure that nothing was received that anyone in his right mind would
regard as directives.
I will ask you : Unless you know everything which was received how
can you make that statement ?
(Consultation between witnesses and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I don't understand the question.
Mr. Sourwine. You have stated that notliing was received which
fell in a certain category — notliing was received from Mr. Potash
which fell in a certain category. That is the category of things which
anyone in his right mind would regard as directives.
Now, if you do not know what was received from Mr. Potash, how
can you make that statement ?
Mr. Forer. That is not a question — that is an argument. Keally,
Mr. Chairman, in temis of time, I am going to object to this line of
questions because Mr. Sourwine is arguing with the witness. He is
not asking him questions of information.
Mr. Morris. Isn't it apparent to you what Mr. Sourwine has just
done was made very clear ?
Mr. FoRER. If he wants to make something clear he can do it — say
whatever he has to say without asking the witness argumentative
questions.
I mean if he wants to state what his position is, that is one thing.
But that does not mean he has to do it in the form of questions to
Mr. Dennis.
I think it is really just a waste of time.
Senator Hruska. It will be necessary for the committee to recess
very shortly to resume this hearing in the morning. Before we do
that, however, I should like to make a comment on the statement which
was submitted by the witness, preceded by a couple of additional state-
ments by Judge Morris here.
Mr. Morris. I have two questions that I would like to ask.
Senator Hruska. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Do you have a son now in Moscow, Mr. Dennis ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3575
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer the question on the grounds as
previously stated.
Mr. Morris. Your son, Timothy, is now in Moscow ?
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer for the reasons just given.
Mr. Morris. I have here an article that appeared in the New Leader
of February 25, 1957. This reads :
In fact, the main issues at the Communist convention were hammered out in a
secret session which began 3 days before the convention, held on the 6th and 7th
floors of the National Theater Building in a special room and nearby hall.
Is it true that there were secret sessions preceding the convention of
the Communist Party held in the second week of February 'I
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis. I refuse to answer on the grounds as stated before.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
Senator Hruska. Very well.
With reference to the statement which was submitted by you, Mr.
Dennis, the Chair will rule that there will be a conditional acceptance
of a part of it. You are free, if you choose, to read the first page
thereof, but the Chair holds that it would be improper for you to
I ead the second part thereof at this time.
So if you want to accept that and read the first page you may do so.
JVir. Dennis. Mr. Chairman, I shall read the first page of the state-
ment according to the ruling of the Chair, and under protest, I shall
not read the latter part, but I assume the statement in its entirety will
be entered into the record.
Senator Hruska. Before you start, on the inquiry as to the in-
clusion of the entire statement into the record, we will let you read
the first part, and the second part will not be read at this time nor
will it be included in the record which is being made.
It will, however, constitute a part of the files of this committee.
(Consultation between witness and attorney.)
Mr. Dennis (reading). I hold to the basic constitutional doctrine
embodied in the first amendment of our Bill of Rights — Congress
shall make no law denying the freedom of speech and assembly.
It follows that congressional committees may not investigate these
areas, since they are not empowered to legislate in them.
I will, therefore, answer no questions involuntarily which relate
directly or indirectly to my political beliefs or associations.
In so doing, I will invoke all constitutional guaranties available
to all Americans — the first amendment, the fifth amendment, and all
other guaranties of my rights.
Whatever political discussion I shall carry on, it will be in the
market place of public opinion, and not under the gun of a congres-
sional subpena and witchhunt.
Let me make clear, however, that whatever the legalities, I place
special emphasis on the first amendment. I hold firmly that neither
this committee nor any other congressional body may constitutionally
investigate peaceful assembly — whether exercised by conventions of
Republicans, Democrats, Socialists, Communists, ADAers, or trade
unionists.
I contend that this is so, even though this committee may endeavor
to camouflage its unconstitutional invasion of the first-amendment
■i.
3576 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
area mider the pretext of investigating alleged "directives from
abroad," or some other equally preposterous accusation.
Senator Heuska. The Chair would like to observe that such a state-
ment as this witness has just read is a far cry from the words of Daily
Worker of February 20, 1957, commenting upon that convention in
New York, ending on February 12, which reads as follows :
Far from being a cellar conspiracy, our convention was held in the glare
of white-hot publicity.
There are other observations and other questions which will be
followed up a little later and we will recess until 10 tomorrow morn- 1
ing in a room to be determined, and notice of same will be given in
due time. ^
We are recessed until that time. t
Mr. FoRER. You do not mean that you want Mr. Dennis back? \
Senator Hruska. Yes; we want Mr. Dennis back. i
(Whereupon, at 3 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene ;
Tuesday, February 26, 1957.) i
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1957
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF THE Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. G,
The subcominittee met. pursuant to notice, at 2 p. m., in room 457,
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.
Present : Senators Jenner and Hruska.
Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel, and William A. Rusher,
associate counsel.
Senator Jenner. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Meyer, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about
to give to this Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Meyer. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the hearing today is a continuance of
(he present series of hearings being held by the Internal Security Sub-
committee, by way of determining the nature of the purported or pro-
fessed changes of the Communist pai'ty line. We have heard Carl
Rachlin and ]\Ir. Beichman. Yesterday we had Mr. Dennis, and now
we have ]Mr. Frank Meyer.
We are going to do everything we can in order to get people who
are competent to testify on Communist party policy, to testify in these
hearings.
TESTIMONY OF FRANK S. MEYER, WOODSTOCK, N. Y.
]Mr. Morris. Will you give your name and address to the reporter,
please ?
Mi-. Meyer. Frank S. Meyer, Woodstock, N. Y.
Mr. Morris. And what is your business or occupation, Mr. Meyer?
Mr. Meyer. I am a writer.
Mr. Morris. And what do you write, for instance?
Mr. Meyer. I am working on the finishing up of one book, and in
the middle of another, and I have been doing a good deal of writing
also, of a free-lance magazine character.
My first book, which is approaching the stage of production, publi-
cation, is a stud}^ of the molding of Communists, the training and
making of Communists.
93215— 57— pt. 54 3 3577
3578 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
My second one is a study in American political theoi-y. Most of my
free-lance work recently lias been for National Review, of which I am
associate editor.
Mr. Morris. And do you do any other writin_2:s ?
Mr. Meyer. I have done a good deal of free-lanc-e writing here and
there, but recently that is the main thing I have been working on, the
two books, and the National Review work.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Meyer, where were you born ?
Mr. Meyer. Newark, N. J.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what your education has been?
INIr, Meyer. I went to school at Newark Academy, Newark, N. J.;
then to Princeton, N. J., where I spent a couple of years, and then I
went abroad to England where, after studying privately for a year,
1 went to Oxford, Balliol College, Oxford.
Mr. Morris. How is that spelled ?
Mr. JNIeyer. B-a-l-l-i-o-1.
I took a bachelor-of-arts degree there, which later was trans-
formed to a master of arts from Oxford University, and later did
graduate work, though I never took a degree, a couple of years at
the London School of Economics, and several years at the University
of Chicago.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Meyer, you joined the Communist Party
as you went along the line, did you not ?
Mr. Meyer. 1931.
Mr. Morris. Where were you at that time ?
Mr. Meyer. Oxford.
Mr. Morris. "Wliat was your first introduction to the Communist
Party organization?
Mr. Meyer. I was rather active in the Labor Party organization,
and a group of us became dissatisfied with what we thought was the
slowness of affairs, reformism of the Labor Party.
We founded a small group at Oxford and made our own connec-
tions with the Communist Party. That is, we went up to London
and saw the Communist Party and said we wanted to found a Com-
munist Party group at Oxford University.
We then founded a public group called the October Club, which is
a small group. Communist-controlled, and which became a small
group in the University, along with the Labor Club and the Con-
servatives.
That actually was founded, I think, about December 31, just before
the vacation.
Mr. INfoRRis. And tell us, generally, the nature of your Communist
activity while you were still in England.
Mr. Meyer. 'After I left Oxford in the spring of 1932, June 1932,
I went as a graduate student to the London School of Economics, and
at this point I became the secretary of the student bureau of the Com-
munist Party of Great Britain, That is, I was responsible for and
the head of the students' activity.
Mr. Morris. You were secretary of what group ?
Mr. Meyer. The Students' Bureau of the Communist Party of
Great Britain.
Mr. Morris. Secretary of the Students' Bureau of the Communist
Party of Great Britain. How extensive an organization was the Stu-
dents' Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3579
Mr. Meyer. By the time I left England, about 1934, I would say
that we had from 400 to 500 Communist Party members, disciplined
Communist Party members, in the British universities, which is a
more significant figure, perhaps, than in America, because there are
only about 50,000 or 60,000 university students altogether.
Mr. Morris. So, of the 50,000 or 60,000 university students, there
were 400 disciplined Communists ?
Mr. Meyer. 400 to 500. At Oxford, I remember distinctly, there
was a disciplined university group of TO, and at Cambridge of ap-
proximately 100.
Mr. Morris. How many at the London School of Economics ?
Mr. Meyer. At the London School of Economics, I would say, the
group ranged somewhere around 45 or 50, from memory.
Senator Jenner. Let the record show Senator Hruska is now in
attendance.
Mr. Morris. Senator Hruska, I will bring you up to date with what
the witness has said today, thus far.
Mr. Frank Meyer is the witness. He has testified that he was born
in New Jersey, attended Princeton University and Oxford. While
he was in Oxford, he became a Communist ; that he then rose to posi-
tion of secretary of the student bureau of the Communist Party of
Great Britain, and, as such, was in charge of or head of a disciplined
group of between 400 and 500 Communists, of which 70 were at
Oxford and 100 at Cambridge. And how many
Mr. Meyer. About 45 or 50 in the London School of Economics.
Something like 150 or more at London University, as a whole, of
which the London School of Economics is one school.
Mr. Morris. Were there any Communists from the other units of
the British Empire in London at that time?
Mr. Meyer. The situation in that regard is rather an interesting
one. I was in constant commmiication, through the British Central
Committee, in a conspiratorial manner, with both the Chinese Com-
mmiist Party unit and the unit of the Communist Party of India.
That is to say^ I never met, as such, any member of either the In-
dian or the Chinese group, but we had constant communications
through a third source ; that is, through the central committee of the
Communist Party. I was, as a matter of fact, at this point a member
of the central committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain,
and had specific contacts for this purpose, and my guess is — it has to
be something of a guess
Mr. Morris. A guess or an estimate ?
Mr. Meyer. My estimate. But first — this is not an estimate — there
was a powerful unit of the Indian group of the Communist Party in
the London School of Economics, so far as I was informed by the
party, and observing their result. That is to say, we coordinated our
activities and one could see, when certain things were to be done,
that the basic mass of the Indian student body could be swung by
our Communist unit, when we wished to have them so swung.
I have no real estimate as to how many that group would be, but
my general idea is that there must have been 25 to 30 members of the
Commmiist Party of India in the school, in addition to our own
group, judging by their results, and judging by my general memory
of what sort of a group it was.
3580 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN IHE UNITED STATES
As a matter of fact, I was elected president of the student govern-
ing body of the London School of Economics, as a known Commu-
nist, on a United Front ticket. That is to say, we were supported by
some elements of the left Labor Party, as well as our own following,
and many scattered students, and, specifically, by an almost solid
support of the organized Indian students.
Now, that organized Lidian student group were nationalists. They
were not Communists, as such, but it was very clear to me from the
results we could achieve, that the decisive force within the Indian
national group, the nationalist group, was the Communist Party unit.
And they were our main allies in every campaign we carried on dur-
ing that period.
It may be of interest that
Mr. Morris. Who was the leader of that Indian group ?
Mr. Meyer. The public leader of the Indian students and the
Indian nationalists at the London School of Economics in the union
debates was Mr. Krishna Menon.
Mr. Morris. Did Krishna Menon support you, for instance, when
you were in these various activities you were carrying on ?
Mr. Meyer. Very definitely; because in terms of any negotiations
made with the Indian student grouping, where one met with 2 or ?>
of them to decide on policy, he was the outstanding spokesman of the
Indian students.
As a matter of fact, there is a rather odd story. I was a candidate
for the president of the London School of Economics Student Union.
It was a very hard- fought election.
JNIr. Morris. Running as a known Communist ?
Mr. Meyer, United Front candidate, but as a known Communist,
and I was defeated by, I think, 8 or 10 votes, whereupon Krishna
Menon discovered there had been fraud in the election. It did turn
out that the fraud was somebody on our side, but at least it was fraud,
and the election was canceled at his demand and after constitutional
discussions in the union the election was held again, and this time I
was elected by 35 votes. So that, in this case, the Indian students and
their leader played a rather big part in my election, in the election
of the Communist candidate.
Mr. Morris. And you Icnew there was a hard core operating there,
but you did not know precisely which was a Communist ?
Mr. Meyer. Precisely. I l^new there was a hard core operating
within the Indian national group. I knew some of the leaders were
Communists, but I did not know which were which.
Mr. Morris. "Wliat are some of the other Communist assignments
you had while you were in England ? You left in 1934, did you not ?
Mr. Meyer. Yes.
I joined the party, as it were, in 1931 to 1932. I have to make it
general because this group attached itself and it was sort of infor-
mally associated with the party vmtil we consolidated ourselves in
early 1932.
Then, after I left Oxford, my main assignment was secretary of the
student bureau of the Party. I was a member of the central committee
of the party, and of the Young Communist League. I was
Mr. Morris. Member of the national committee of the Communist
Party of Great Britain ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3581
Mr. Meyer. That is right.
And I was, at a couple of specific times, occupied in the leadership
of youth and student delegations, both, to international antiwar and
3nti-Fascist congresses, which were held in Paris and in Amsterdam
during those years.
The first of these, the Amsterdam one, was the international con-
gress from which the American League Against War and Fascism
proceeded. The others were secondary followup congresses of the
same kind.
I was at the European Workers — I think it was called — the Euro-
pean Workers Anti-Fascist Congress, which was often referred to as
the Pleyel Congress, and also at an international youth congress in
Paris a few months later.
Now, these congresses, in addition to being publicly what they were,
were also utilized for international student fraction meetings under
the aegis of the Communist International, where international stu-
dent policy was worked out, international youth fraction meetings,
and so on.
Furthermore, during the time I was in England, I had other scat-
tered assignments. I worked at one point for the central committee
with the leading fraction of the London Busmen, and at another point
with an important rail unit. But basically, my work was student work
and, in general, united front work of the antiwar and anti-Fascist
kind.
Mr. Morris. Generally, Mr. Meyer, as a general point of interest,
would some of these students who are subordinates of yours in the
Communist program work at Cambridge, Oxford, and the London
School of Economics, have they gone on to be well-known personalities
in some cases in Great Britain?
JNIr. Meyer. I think so ; in many cases. I have noticed names from
time to time — writers, editors, political people in the Labor Party,
scientists; yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Well, now, when you came to the United States, did
you recognize there was any link, organizational link, between the
Communist Party of Great Britain and the Communist Party of the
United States?
Mr. INIeyer. ]My movement, as it were, from the Communist Party
of Great Britain to the Communist Party of the United States was "a
transfer between one section of the Communist International and an-
other section of the same world party, the Communist International.
And it was so handled officially. That is, I was transferred, as I might
have been transferred from Chicago to New York, I was transferred
from England to the United States.
Mr. Morris. Was there any effort to maintain a fiction that the
Communist Party of Great Britain was wholly independent and some-
thing separate from the Communist Party of the United States ?
Mr. Meyer. In those years there wasn't even an effort at that fiction.
In those years it was openly accepted that each section of it, each
national party was a section of the Communist International, with the
same relationships to the executive committee of the Communist Inter-
national that, say, the Chicago district of the American party would
have to the national committee of the American party.
And far from being concealed at that point, it was taught, boasted
of.
3582 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
For example, in France, in ordinary newspaper talk they very
often — the newspapers did not say "Communist Party of France."
They said the "S. F. I. C," Section Francaise Internationale Com-
mimiste — French section of the Communist International, and very
often in England or America during those years the party was simply
referred to as the American section of the Communist International
or the British section.
Mr. Morris, Well, now, what was your assignment in the Com-
munist Party in- the United States, your first assignment in 1934?
Mr. Meyer. When I arrived in the United States in 1934, the stu-
dent work in England had been Communist Party work. In the
United States it was directly under the control of the Young Com-
munist League, which at that period was simply a youth section of
the Communist Party, and I was transferred, so far as my effective
work was concerned, from the party to the Young Communist League,
and some weeks, perhaps some months, passed before it was decided
exactly what I would do.
During that time I participated in the preliminary discussions
which led to the capture of the American Youth Congress by the
Communists.
I did other odds and ends of work around New York. I went up to
Canada to attend the founding congress of the Canadian Students
League and Antiwar Congress there, and attended a convention of the
Young Communist League of Canada at the same time.
And finally, it was agreed that I would go to Chicago, continue as
a graduate student at the University of Chicago, and work with the
district bureau of the Young Communist League in Chicago, and
with the American League Against War and Fascism, as the party
force in the youth section of the American League Against War and
Fascism in Chicago.
And my student and YCL work in Chicago lasted about a year and a
half, as my main assignment, after which I transferred over to party
work, though I still had connections with the university, some respon-
sibilities for it.
Shall I continue with that ?
Mr. Morris. When you attended this meeting in Canada, what was
the nature of the Communist Party of Canada that you observed at
that time ?
Mr. Meyer. Well, at that point the Communist Pai'ty of Canada
v.'as more or less underground. It was — it considered itself an under-
ground party. There was an anti-Communist law. The Young Com-
munist League did not fully come under that statute, so it met half
conspiratorially, half open, and half closed, as it were.
Mr. Morris. And again, the relationship that existed between the
Canadian Communist Party and the American Communist Party was
the same as you have described as existing between the American
Communist Party and the English party ?
Mr. Meyer. Very definitely.
There was a delegation from New York, consisting of Gil Green, who
was then national secretary of the YCL, I believe, and Max Weiss,
who was then educational director of the Young Communist League,
and a man named Max. I cannot give him a last name because I
never heard one. He was a representative of the Young Communist
International from Moscow.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3583
Mr.MoREis. Was he Eussian ?
Mr. JSIeyer. I have no idea what he was. He was obviously, by his
accent, of some SLavic hmguage originally. And I would gather from
the authority he showed in Canada, that he was not only the repre-
sentative to the Young Communist League of the United States,
which I knew, but that Canada was, so to speak, secondary and under
the leadership of him and the American Young Communist League.
At least, both he and Gil Green spoke with great authority in the
Canadian Young Communist League inner meetings.
As a matter of fact, the Canadians suggested that perhaps I should
work in Canada for a period, but that was vetoed.
Mr. Morris. In describing the general nature of your work, Mr.
Meyer, how far have you gone by way of point of time, from 1934
until
Mr. Meyer. I got to Chicago in the fall of 1934, and I would say
about a year and a half or so m the student movement, and some time
in late 1935, early 1936.
Mr. Morris. And now, what did you do after 1936 ?
Mr. Meyer. My first serious party assignment after I left the stu-
dent movement was in the South Side section in Chicago, which is the
Negro area of Chicago, like Harlem in New York, also including the
university area of Hyde Park. And I was the educational director of
that section, which was considered a ]3retty important section by the
party, since the section organizer was a member of the political bureau,
actually still a member of the political bureau assigned to work there.
Mr. Morris. Who was he ?
Mr. Meyer. Harry Haywood.
Mr. Morris. How long did you carry on work there ?
Mr. Meyer. I would say about, again, roughly a year and half. I
can date the time I went into full-time district work, which was 1938,
but during this period I was still attempting to do some graduate
student work at the university, as well as being pretty active on the
South Side section committee.
Mr. Morris. Now, what positions did you subsequently attain in the
Communist Party of the United States ?
Mr. Meyer. Beginning in 1938, I became a full-time functionary
in charge of the education work in the Illinois-Indiana district, whose
center was Chicago, which included the whole of the State of Illinois
and the State of Indiana. And at one point or another bits of Mis-
souri and bits of Wisconsin, but most of this period it was Illinois and
Indiana.
And I was, simultaneously, the director of the Chicago Workers
School, which was an open party school, similar to and part of the same
chain as the New York Workers ScJiool.
But as educational director of the party, I was responsible for all
inner education, agitation, and propaganda, public meetings, printed
matter, shop papers, everything that used to be called by the Commu-
nists agit-prop, but more politely in America called educational di-
rector at that point. And also as a district leader, I had from time to
time all sorts of other general responsibilities.
I would be responsible for this section for a period of time, then for
that one, for special campaigns, and so on. But my main work was
educational director.
3584 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Morris. Now, was there any — did the direction of all this Com-
munist Party activity come from above — from a Communist organiza-
tion above — or was it democratically decided among the various func-
tionaries carrying on this work ?
Mr. Meyer. I would like to put it this way :
At every level — in this case we will take the district level — a great
many problems of execution were decided on the spot, but basic line
came from above.
For example, in the position I held in charge of a department, it
came in from two directions. One, from the district bureau and the
district organizer himself of Illinois-Indiana who, in turn, had his
directives from New York, from the central committee, and also di-
rectly to me from the educational apparatus in New York itself.
I would say that at each level in my experience the basic policies
are laid down from on top, even to the degree of important personnel
decisions being made from on top. But the execution of policies is
your responsibility at the level you are at, and the same thing applies
in your relations with the lower level.
Mr. Morris. Now, how long did you remain a Communist Party
functionary, Mr. Meyer?
Mr. Meyer. I became — incidentally, I did not finish the actual posts
I held. The last year or so of my activity, that is, beginning in the
spring of 1941, 1 went from educational work into organizational work,
so that I was involved in the organizational commission for about a
year, until the summer of 1942, at which time I entered the Army as
a volunteer officer candidate.
I would say that my active work continued until about a month
or two before I was accepted as a volunteer officer candidate in, I
imagine, August or so. I was actually inducted in the Army in
October of 1942.
Mr. Morris. Wliat happened when you were inducted into the
Army, Mr. Meyer ?
Mr. Meyer. Well, as a functionary, and since as I was not im-
mediately draftable, there was considerable opposition from the
party leadership to my volunteering, and it took several months of
argument to get the O. K. to do so.
Wlien I was actually inducted into the Army, as was the case
generally, a formal breaking of formal membership in the party
was the normal case. That is to say, as of that moment you were
not a party member until you came out again, and became a party
member again.
Mr. Morris. In other words, if you were asked under oath, were
you, during the period you were in service, a member of the Com-
munist Party, could you, without fear of incriminating yourself,
honestly deny that you were a party member ?
Mr. Meyer. If you are a good casuist and a good Communist, you
could.
Mr. Morris. There is no doubt about the fact, even though you
were in that reserve status, you were a dedicated Communist?
Mr. Meyer. Of course ; of course.
Mr. Morris. How long did you serve in the Army ?
Mr. Meyer. I went in as a volunteer officer candidate in 1942, in
October, and went through basic training, and so on, and was washed
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3585
out for lack of sufficient physical agility at Fort Benning in late
February.
Mr. Morris. A few months later ?
Mr. Meyer. Seven months later, six months. I dont know-
five months, actually ; late February, early March— I am not sure of
Wliereupon, under the VOC situation, you were discharged hon-
orably and reverted to draft status. But my feet had broken down
completely in the Army, and I had to follow that up with a couple
of operations, which kept me immobilized for about a year and a
half.
Mr. Morris. Then, after you left the service, you did some work
in Washington, did you not ?
Mr. Meyer. No. I had in mind the possibility of getting a job m
Washington, in order to be able to do something, and also I was a
Communist, and thinking in terms of where I could be most effective
in that period.
The point of the matter is this : that having been m the Army and
still being draftable, and having these medical problems, the party
felt that it was not worthwhile my going back into an organiza-
tional job that I might either, for medical or draft reasons, have to
leave in a few months, and I was a member at large, living in and
near New York, and at 2 points in 1943, and again in 19-±5, before
and after the operations, I thought in terms of getting a job of some
sort where my attitudes would be useful, and so on, in Washington.
And I made some efforts in 1943.
Then it became absolutely necessary to have the operations, and
then in 1945 I made efforts again.
Mr. Morris. Senator Jenner, while you were chairman of this sub-
committee, the subcommittee made an extensive inquiry into how
Communists were able to get into Government and move around in
Government. I wonder if we might ask Mr. Meyer how he, as a
member at large at that time, went about his efforts to get Govern-
ment employment.
Senator Jenner. Proceed.
Mr. Meyer. Actually, the person with whom I made contact, and
it was done as so many things in the party are done in these circum-
stances, without specifically saying "he is a party member, you are a
party member, you ought to work together," but by a series of recom-
mendations, the details of which I don't even remember, I was intro-
duced to a man named David Wahl, who seemed to me to be function-
ing as a sort of informal employment bureau for the party in Wash-
ington, because I know of one or two other cases where he was helping
people in this way.
Mr. Morris. I might say David Wahl has been a witness before the
subcommittee, at least in executive session here, connected with this
particular aspect of his experiences.
Proceed, Mr. Meyer.
Mr. Meyer. Various possibilities arose. I unfortunately do not re-
member at this point exactly whom I saw. I was introduced to a
number of people in Washington, where nothing happened to work
out or come through.
The one I remember most distinctly, because it appealed to me very
strongly at the time, was a proposal made by a friend of Mr. Wahl's
93215— 57— pt. 54 4
3586 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
who was then Mr. Seller. I think it is Dick Seller. He had been, I
believe, in a newspaper strike in Chicago, and was then secretai*y to
Congressman Hugh JDe Lacy of Washington or Oregon. Washing-
ton, I believe.
Mr. Morris. Now, was Seller a Communist, to your knowledge ?
Mr. Meyer. To the same degree that I would say I talked and acted
with Dave Wahl, as though he was a Communist, I talked and acted
with Seller as though he were a Communist.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony that Congress-
man Hugh De Lacy was a Communist during this period.
Will you proceed, Mr. Meyer ?
Mr. Meyer. The scheme or the proposal that Dave Wahl and Seller
worked up was to get me a job as secretary to Congressman Helen
Gahagan Douglas, who, so far as I know, was not aware of the cir-
cumstances by which this thing was being done. She apparently re-
lied on Mr. Seller to a considerable degree for advice and general
knowing the way around, and he was working to find her a person as a
speech writer. I don't know which specific assistant to a Congress-
man or secretaryship it was but, as the job was discussed, it would have
consisted of speech writing, general activity, and so on. I think this
was before the period of the Congressional Reorganization Act any-
way, was it not, and I don't know exactly what the specific post was.
Mr. Morris. Wliat year was this, Mr. Meyer ?
Mr. Meyer. This was 1945.
Mr. Morris. Well, our records show, Mr. Chairman, that from
January 3, 1945, to January 2, 1947, a person named H. Richard Seller
was on the House Disbursing Office rolls, employed by Congressman
Hugh De Lacy, at a salary of $6,219. This is the House disbursing
record. Senator.^
The fact of the matter is you did not get the job, did you ?
Mr. Meyer. No. The fact of the matter is I didn't. I don't even
remember who did, except I knew he said there were other people he
had in mmd, and it did not work out.
I perhaps should go back a year or so to explain what I was, in gen-
eral, doing at that point, and finish up this biography.
I was, as I say, a member-at-large. I had been very much out of
activity because of the two operations and the recoveiy that occupied
a lot of time, and I was in a wheelchair. I was in the country doing
a certain amount of writing, and when I was in New York, in com-
munication, personal conversations, with a number of national com-
mittee members — about the same time as I considered and looked into
the Washington thing again for a few weeks, I was also discussing
with the national committee what they had in mind for me to do
from a party point of view.
' A study of the payroll records in the House'disburslng office showed'employment in DeLacy's office
of the following individuals, their highest salary per annum, and their duration of tenure in his office.
Name
Tenure
Salary
H. Richard Seller . . .
Jan. 3, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947
$6. 219. 84
Isabella Saverv
Jan. 3, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947
3.461.04
Barbara Z. Richardson
Jan. 13, 1945, to Jan. 2, 1947
3,461.04
Gladvs Castle
Jan. 3, 1945, to Oct. 31, 1945
488.40
Suzanne S. Blumenkranz »..
Nov. 1, 1945, to Aug. 31, 1946, and Nov. 1, 1946, to Jan.;2, 1947.
1, 145. 00
' Blumenkranz is not listed on the roUs for the months of September and October 1946.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE TJNITED STATES 3587
I should say that I think tliat, at that time, my mind was moving
a little in the direction it later took. That is, I was critical of the
party position. I was thinking in terms of very much what became
the Browder position. I had drafted a memorandum to Browder
just before he opened up the broad, so-called Teheran position of the
Communist Party.
I was a little unsettled already, let us say, and perhaps might have
moved still further away from the party during that long exile, had
it not been that the Browder position seemed to me to be just what
[ wanted, and I remained in for a couple of more years, and became
rather enthusiastic about it, moving in the direction of making it
more that way.
Mr. Morris. And some time within a year after Browder's expul-
sion from the Communist Party you, too, lost your interest in the
Communist Party?
Mr. JNIeter. What actually happened is this :
During this period of 1945 or so, I finally, after discussions with
John Williamson and Gil Green, it was agreed that I should write
and teach for a year or so before taking on further organizational
responsibilities, and I taught at the Jefferson School, wrote for the
New Masses, and I had previously, incidentally, written a number
of articles for the theoretical journal of the party, the Communist,
later Political Affairs.
I don't believe my articles appeared when it was Political Affairs.
I think they appeared in the earlier prints. And I actually broke with
all or most inner party connections, or was broken with most inner
party connections, almost identically at the time of the Duclos article
and the big Browder removal from the position of power.
Mr, Morris. Did you know Browder well?
Mr. Meter. I knew Browder extremely well right at that time, and
somewhat later, during those first few months after he was removed
from power. I knew him somewhat before.
Mr. Morris. Were you acquainted with a woman who was closely
associated with Mr. Browder, Josephine Truslow Adams?
Mr. Meter. Yes.
As a matter of fact, it was through her that I first personally met
Browder ; otherwise, in a very informal official capacity.
Mr. Morris. Who was Josephine Truslow Adams?
Mr. Meter. Miss Adams is a woman, formerly a teacher at Swarth-
more, who became involved in the United Front and Communist Party
activities, in the first place, on campaigns on questions of so-called
civil liberties, Spanish Civil War, and so on and, at the time I knew
her, was teaching at the Jefferson School in New York.
Mr. Morris. You were a teacher, or she was a teacher?
Mr. Meter. Both of us were teaching, as a matter of fact. I met
her when we were both teaching there.
Mr. Morris. You say you both were in the general Communist
framework ?
Mr. Meter. That is right.
I was introduced to her by Howard Selsam, as a matter of fact, who
was the director of the Jefferson School.
Mr. Morris. And a Communist ?
Mr. Meter. iVnd a Communist.
3588 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
At the time I met her, we got to know each other quite well through
a series of accidental circumstances, and she was a very close friend
of Browder's and had become a very close friend of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, of the President.
During the year or so I knew her, she was in constant communication
with both of them, and insofar as my discussions with her were con-
cerned, we acted, talked, and generally acted and talked as Communists
together, in the perfectly normal way that Communists would act
together.
In the circumstances in which I knew her, she talked to me at very
great length through tliose years, had many long conversations, and
from it I got a very detailed idea of what was going on in the course
of her visits between New York and Washington, or between New
York and Hyde Park.
So far as I can deduce from it, deduce from — I won't say deduce.
My memory of what she told me from day to day and week to week
was that these were not simply the carrying of messages, as it were,
but a continuing political conversation devoted toward attempting to
show Franklin Roosevelt the similarity of aims of the Communists
and of liis, and persuading him, or attempting to persuade him, with
much receptivity on his part, that the United States and the American
Communist Party, the United States and the Soviet Union were and
should be moving in the same direction, toward a democratic socialism,
as it was put.
That is to say, Franklin Roosevelt was, I believe, from the conver-
sations I had with Miss Adams, convinced that the Soviet Union would
move from its lack of civil liberties toward civil liberties M'hile the
United States moved from its constitutional and free enterprise situ-
ation to socialism, and both would end at the same point, and that, as it
were, he and Browder were very close political friends, though they
never met personally, working toward the same goal from somewhat
different positions.
This was the general framework of the conversations I had with
Miss Adams.
Many detailed points could be raised in connection with it. I don't
know to what degree you want me to go into the problem. Many ques-
tions were discussed concretely from time to time.
Mr. Morris. Well, now Mr. Meyer, is it so, then, that Miss Adams
was seeing both the President and Earl Browder, who was at that
time the head of the Communist Party ?
Mr. IMeter. Right.
Mr. Morris. Now, did you learn from what she told you about these
conversations, as she would meet these two people involved — she would
come back and tell you about it ; is that the situation ?
Mr. Meter. Yes.
She would talk to me — it so happened during that period I was
teaching once a week at the Jefferson School in New York, and spent
1 day a week in New York, living out in the country, and the people
with whom I stayed at the time, Miss Adams also lived with. Both
she and I were people who liked to stay up late at night and talk and
talk, and she would tell me a very great deal of what occurred the daj
before, the week before, what occurred a week before.
Mr. Morris. Browder trying to influence Mr. Roosevelt, or Roose-
velt trying to influence Mr. Browder ?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3589
Mr. Meyer. Mr. Browder was trying to influence Mr. Eoosevelt
specifically, and Miss Adams was acting as an influence from Mr.
Browder on Mr. Roosevelt.
Senator Jenner. Did she tell you how she got into that position?
Mr. Meter. Yes. It is quite a long, complicated story.
It began when, after leaving Swarthmore, I believe, she had some
difficulties because of her political activities. After leaving Swarth-
more and being active in Philadelphia in this kind of general activity,
she became involved with — I don't know if she was an official member
of it, but she became involved with the Free Browder Committee.
Earl Browder had been sent to jail on a passport charge, and Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn and others were running a committee to bring pressure
to bear to free him.
She was working with that, and she had previously had personal
relationships through old friends of hers with Mrs. Roosevelt.
It was suggested to her that she should do what she could to utilize
that relationship to help the work of the Free Browder Committee.
She wrote many letters about the matter through Mrs. Roosevelt to
the President, to Mrs. Roosevelt, and finally she was invited to Hyde
Park to an art exhibit of some kind.
Miss Adams is a painter, incidentally, and some art exhibit was
going on, of some WPA painter, or something of the kind, and she
was invited there, along with a lot of other painters, and was quietly
ushered into the President's office, study, whatnot.
He said a word or two about the exhibit to her, and then, as I re-
member her story, he turned to her and said, "Wliat would happen if
I freed Earl Browder tomorrow ? What do you think would happen ?
How would the country react?" And she gave him the pitch of what
the Free Browder Committee would want, argued with him a bit, and
said things would be good, it would help national unity, that sort of
thing. And they talked about it.
Now, I am not clear, I cannot remember distinctly one interview
she had with Roosevelt from another.
Either at that one or at one fairly shortly thereafter, Roosevelt, in
talking to her about her claim that there were a large number of peo-
ple who — there was sufficient mass pressure to support him if he freed
Browder, sort of half jokingly and half seriously said, "There is a
meeting going on in Philadelphia at which, I believe, ^Vlieeler and
Nye and Lindbergh were speaking, and — well, if you know people and
have people that can get mass pressure, it might be a good idea ; maybe
you might be able to do somethino; about that meeting."
It was half jokingly done, half seriously done, rather sparringly
done.
Miss Adams went down to Philadelphia, had all her connections
through her friends around the party and near the party and, pre-
sumably, in the party. I don't know exactly what she did, and a
rather spectacular countermeeting was held, which stole the headlines,
or at least equaled the headlines of the Wheeler-Nye meeting. They
got big caricatures of Wheeler and Nye.
I believe Mr. Cudahy was chairman of the meeting, and connected
with the meeting, and he made some remark about Roosevelt which
3590 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
was regarded as odd. It was misinterpreted. I don't know exactly
the circumstances. They got big slogans.
To make a long story short, they got enough counterpublicity so i
that the anti-Wheeler- Nye-Lindbergh meeting got as much publicity ]
as the original meeting.
Mr. Morris. ISIr. Chairman, at this point may I break in to say in
connection with the story now being told us by this witness, we have
made some kind of an inquiry. For instance, on January 17 of this |
year Miss Josephine Adams did testify in executive session before the
subcommittee. i
She, in substance, tells very much the same story about that and
about her own role as the person who would see Mr. Roosevelt and Mr.
Browder, and bear messages from one to the other. She has estimated |
that she acted in this capacity from 38 to 40 times and. Senator, as you
know, we circulated this resolution yesterday, which reads :
Resolved ty the Internal Security Committee of the Senate Committee on the j
Judiciary, That the executive testimony of Josephine Truslow Adams, talien i
before the committee on January 16, 1957, be hereby released from the injunction j
of secrecy and made public ; be it further
Resolved, That certain parts of said testimony may be used in public hearings
from time to time. I
Five Senators signed that yesterday. Senator. ^ . . \
I ask at this time, and in support of the testimony just being given \
here by this particular witness, that the excerpts selected by the sub-
committee from this testimony of Miss Adams go into the public :
record. j
Senator Jenner. It may go into the record and become a part of the j
offici al records of this committee.
(The material referred to was marked exhibit No. 438 and reads as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 438
Excerpt From Josephine Truslow Adams' Testimony, January 16, 1957 ,
Mr. Morris. Why don't you tell us how the arrangement first had its origin. ,
Miss Adams. It started this way, in a very informal way. He saw me on other j
things. Then he asked me what I thought of the situation, what people in gen-
eral— what was the impression from different sorts of groups. He knew I knew
a good many different kinds of people — about the Browder situation. I mean,
how the labor people felt, how the clergy felt, how the conservative people felt, {
what would happen if he should pardon him, and so forth, what would be the
reaction in the papers. He knew I was one individual, but he evidently was
saying this to a lot of people. I don't consider I am so important. But I think
he thought — what he was practically saying to me is how many signatures can ^
the Communists get in every city of people that are not just Communists, you ,
know — what I did, practically, because I knew enough people to do it. And the
person extremely uncooperative was Darcy of Philadelphia. He was diflScult, '
because apparently his enmity to Browder had apparently been seething. I got
details from Boston and New York and so on about that, and also about the
clergymen, and so on. j
Then there was — the first definite appointment that had anything to do with j
talking to him about Browder that was really on that point was when some of
the people in New York told me that it would be a wonderful thing if I could get i
to Hyde Park to see him on that subject. i
Mr. Morris. Who were the people in New York? j
Miss Adams. Now, those were the people on the committee to free Browder — i
I mean like Elizabeth Flynn and Weinstock.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3591
Mr. MoBKis. Louis Weinstock?
Miss Adams. Yes. I think what they did was invite me down someplace or
other, Hotel Alba — it was mostly — it was really run by Louis Weinstock.
*******
Miss Adams. * * * And as soon as he [the President] had given me directions
on that, he turned around suddenly and began talking about the Browder case
and asked me — he said suddenly, "What do you think would happen if I should
pardon Earl Browder tomorrow?" Just like that. "How would the newspapers
take it?" And I told him to the best of my ability what I thought would happen
at that time.
Mr. MoKKis. And what was that. Miss Adams?
Miss Adams. Well, I felt that there would be a considerable protest from
certain papers, but a general feeling of support and sympathy, because of the
war situation — I think there was a strong support from labor and liberal groups,
and even from the upper middle-class groups — on the point that he was there on a
technicality, and that the war situation warranted it. And he pretty much
agreed with me as to the basis of his being in prison. I think he was a little
ashamed of the way he had been put in. He didn't like Browder at that particu-
lar point. He thought there had been a technical frameup himself. He had
been convinced of that. But he was embarrassed as to how to do it and what
would happen, what kind of a reaction there might be, particularly because of
the war situation. He didn't want to cause any confusion. And it was a long
time after that interview he did pardon Browder. But I saw him several times
in between — because it was at that point he hinted also about wanting to find
out what people thought about it as much as possible.
And after that I wrote to him a good many times, on other points, things that
came up, anything that I thought might be useful. I think I have a list of
some of those letters somewhere. And I always got some kind of an acknowledg-
ment, very often from Mrs. Roosevelt instead of him, that the letter had been
received. If it was important, he would send for me, and I would see him —
if it was something of real importance to him.
Mr. MoRpas. Now, on how many occasions did you see the President?
Miss Adams. Altogether?
Mr. MoEBis. Yes.
Miss Adams. I couldn't say that under oath, because I might be wrong.
Mr. MoRKis. Well, just approximately.
Miss Adams. Oh, I should say approximately 38 or 40 times, in the whole time
this existed. It was at Hyde Park as often as in the White House.
Mr, Morris. Now, what was your relationship to Earl Browder at this time,
at the time of your visits to the President?
Miss Adams. Well, I didn't know him at all at the time when he came out
of prison, and did not see him for some time after. But the first time that I
ever had occasion to see him was the time when I heard the story that Roose-
velt— I heard from him, in other words — when I was ill in the hospital, St.
Lukes, I had an operation, flowers were sent to me by Bill and by Mr. and
Mrs. Browder, because people told him I had worked on his release, but I
didn't see him. And then I finally did go to one meeting that was held as a
sort of celebration of his coming out, in which a number of people. Communists
and non-Communists working on his release— of course, there were really lots
of Communists — were supposed to be. I think that was on the Fourth of July
in the year he came out in May. The first time I ever looked at him or saw
him in person was on the Fourth of July, and I was introduced to him by Sam
Darcy, who was sitting on the platform in front of me. And he shook hands
with me, and that was all, said a word or two, and I think was scarcely aware
at that point of who I was or of what I had done in the case. I think Carol King,
his wife, told him.
And then I heard from Roosevelt and people that knew Roosevelt approached
me on the subject that they would like to get word around that they did not
want a third party in the 1944 election, outside of New York State, except for
the ALP. And I gathered that he would like this word to get to Earl Browder.
And I didn't even know at the time where Earl Browder was, where he lived.
But someone that I knew knew where his brother lived. So I went to see his
brother And his brother told me he was up at Monroe, in New York State.
3592 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
So I took a bus to Monroe and went to see him, and told him the story of the
no third party beyond New York State, and was interested to see that in those
days he had a good deal of influence, because within a few days there were
things in the papers all over the country about the fact that there would be no
third party outside of the ALP in New York State — not just in the Communist
papers, but all over. And Benson of the former labor group was approached
and had an interview with Earl in New York, and of course Gil Greene, of later
fame, wrote an article in the Daily Worker itself on that subject, and the Times
came out with an article that there would be — understood there would be no
third party beyond New York State in the 1944 election.
Mr. Morris. AYhy was New York excepted from that?
Miss Adams. Because the ALP was valuable to the election. In the other
place it might cause splits, but there the support would be unanimous and they
were sure of it. That was obvious. But that was the most amazing piece of
political engineering, of course — the first I had witnessed of how fast things
could go if they were well organized. In other words, that it really worked.
And at that time he was at his peak of influence. Browder had a great deal of
influence outside of the party at that time, although he was so shortly out of
prison, because there was a very widespread and immediate reaction that I
sensed. To me it was almost frightening, although I was completely in sup-
port of Roosevelt.
Mr. MoRuis. Almost what, you say?
Miss Adams. Frightening.
Mr. Morris. Do you mean the speed with which an order
Miss Adams. Yes ; I was surprised. I was in sympathy with the project and
completely aware of the fact that it would probably be a good thing from my
point of view. But I was a little amazed, overwhelmed, to see something
work.
But during that interview, he asked me for the first time — of course it was
the first time I really had any personal conversation with him — he told me that
he was worried about Irene's status — this went on for years afterward, conver-
sations about Irene's status — that was his wife. But he was worried and fol-
lowed me down the steps in Monroe to speak about it — told me also to warn
Roosevelt that the Puerto Ricans who were then in Atlanta were a dangerous
setup as long as they were in this country. And he had a suggestion what
should be done with Campos. He had gotten to know them in Atlanta. He
thought they were pitiable, but unreliable figures. And he suggested that some
relative of Campos in Peru would, you know, take him, because he had this bad
heart and he was on parole in the Columbia Hospital down here in New York.
And, of coui'se, as soon as he was out of Atlanta and was in that hospital, all the
Puerto Ricans in New York came to see him, and they were plotting all the time.
And I went down a couple of times myself. I got to know him through Earl. And
every time I went down to the hospital, I gathered more and more that this
was going on. I wrote to Roosevelt continually on that point. But, of course,
the thing was he could not, as I found out afterwards, just order a thing like
that, because being a Puerto Rican, Campos was a citizen in a way, you know.
I mean it wasn't a matter of deportiiug him where you wanted to. It was a
difficult thing to arrange. But Earl realized the danger in Campos. That was
not a party affair — it was just a personal thing to Roosevelt. Because Campos —
you couldn't say what Campos was. He was with the Jesuits one day, the Com-
munists the next. He would take anybody's help to help Puerto Rico to be free,
as lie thought, because he was a completely fanatical revolutionary.
Mr. Morris. Miss Adams, you say that Earl mentioned to you, on the steps, of
his wife's deportation, Irene's deportation case.
Miss Adams. Yes. At that time it was not a question of deporting her. It
was not as definite as that. He was not sure of the status. It had not yet been
brought up in that sense. They had not mentioned deporting her. The last de-
velopments had not happened at that point. But he was afraid that something
of the sort would happen because of her uncertain status. And he wanted me
to talk to Roosevelt if I could possibly get his ear on what could be done about
Irene. And he assured me, as I found to be probably true through knowing
other alien Communists, or alien members of Communist parties and so on, that
she was not a member of the party officially, because they did not permit aliens
to hold party cards. They considered it too dangerous. In the early days of the
party I think most of them were aliens it was made up of. But at that point
it was considered unwise, and I know she was not.
Mr. Morris. But that was a mere technicality.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3593
Miss Adams. Of course, it was a technicality. But I think she was so wrapped
up in her children — in all the period I knew her she was not involved with party
people, she didn't get along with party people — Elizabeth Gurley Flynn couldn't
stand her.
Mr. NoRRis. And then did you relate that message suggested by Eai-1 Browder
back to the President?
Miss Adams. I didn't tell him that in person. I went home and wrote a letter
about it. I wrote a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt that was sent to him. I often, in
those days, wrote to her things that I wanted to reach him. And sometimes
letters that I addressed to him I put inside of an envelope to her, because they
got there faster. He had a bigger mail than she had even. If the things were
earmarked for him they went very quickly from her office to him, I discovered.
Her secretary knew enough to get them to him fast. Whereas if I sent it directly
to him sometimes it took quite a while.
Mr. Morris. Now, did Mr. Browder initiate any of these meetings? Did he
suggest to you to go down and see the President and tell him this or take him
that?
Miss Adams. I don't remember that it was ever said that way. If he thought
there was something very important that had come up, that he wanted him to
know about, he would say, "You had better get word to him such and such."
And if I had a chance to see him. I did. If I didn't, I wrote letters. I wrote
endless letters all the time. In fact, people that knew me then — Bella was sur-
prised to find out I was a mural painter, because my political activities were so
strong, they never even knew I was an artist.
Mr. Morris. For instance, may I just take this one document.
Miss Adams. That is later ; yes.
Mr. Morris. This is a paper that I had photostated, which I have taken from
your file. Do you recognize this paper?
Miss Adams. Yes, I do.
Mr. Morris. What is it?
Miss Adams. It was a paper that Earl Browder gave me in relation to the
activities of the Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek toward the Chinese in the north,
using materials and troops that were supposed to be used in fighting the Japa-
nese, but were used in fighting the civil war instead. And it was a summary of
the exact statistics, as much as they could get on that, to bring home to Roose-
velt, which he probably may have known from other quarters, what the situation
was in China.
Mr. Morris. Where did Mr. Browder get this; do you know?
Miss AoAiis. I am not positive where he got that. He handed it to me. I
think that it came along with that other slip about the sabotage of the — no, it
didn't — the sabotage of the airfield in Kweilin was a little later. I think he gave
me that one separately, and it came from a suitcase that had come in from
Burma, some place in the East. Because I saw him take some papers out of the
lining of a suitcase somebody had brought him. It had come by plane. Some-
body that had some connection with the Bast.
Browder was on very good terms at that time with Mao Tse-tung. He had
been interested in China in the past. And, of course, I may say for Browder the
first rebellion against Stalin started with him. Tito came later. It was really
instigated by Browder and went around the world. That I know, because I
watched it happen. He was way ahead of the others. He had insight enough
to know. I am bringing this in — it is extraneous, but I believe it has a con-
nection here. Because he thought Mao Tse-tung was going to be the kind of
Communist that Tito became, and he was very interested in him. In other
words, he thought he would work out some kind of national movement in China
that was not as much associated with the Soviet Union. And he was watching
him with great interest for that reason. He seemed to have been on good terms
with him. And I imagine some of the material he had came through people
that he knew through Mao Tse-tung.
Mr. Morris. It came from the Far East?
Miss Adams. Undoubtedly. But the actual person that brought it I could not
tell.
Mr. MoRBis. Browder gave it to you?
Miss Adams. Browder gave it to me because he thought I could reach Roose-
velt, either by mail or if I happened to be going down.
Mr. Morris. In other words, he wanted you to give this to the President?
Miss Adams. Yes, as quickly as possible.
Mr. Morris. Did he convey any message with it?
3594 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Miss Adams. No, simply he thought it would be of great interest to him, and
it would be a good idea to let somebody go out there and see what was really
going on. Of course, such statements were reinforced by people like Stilwell
and so on. There were other people out there.
Mr. Morris. This reads that "as of February 20, 1944, Chungking troops en-
tirely engaged in blockading Eighth Route Army under Gen. Hu Shung Nan,
23d Army Corps of three divisions each." This will appear in the record.
"As of February 20, 1944, Chungking troops entirely engaged in blockading
Eighth Route Army, under Gen. Hu Chung-nan, 23d Army Corps of 3 divisions
each ; 30 divisions of central troops ; 39 divisions of local troops. Under Gen.
Kao Hsang-chen, south of Suyuan : Armies Nos. 1, 3, 16, 36, 8. 9, 91, 57, 22 ; and
third cavalry army. Under Ten Pao-hsan, new 26th division, in Tu Ling-fu
up north. Under the Ma lirothers (mosleras) ; Ninghsia 11th Army, 81st Army;
and mechanized regiment of 70 tanks.
"Between October 1943 and February 1944, 4,000 tons of munitions sent from
Chengtu and Chungking to area of Paochi and Sian, where can only be used
against 8th Route Array. This was not directly lend-lease material, but was
diverted from Kunming stores when replaced by lend-lease. Also vast stores of
foodstuffs accompanied.
"On January 14, 1944, a military conference at Sian formed an anti-Communist
training class,' at same time sealed the radios operating at Sian and Chungking
offices of 8th Route Army ; also sent 2 squadrons of planes with Chinese pilots
(from 18 to 24 units) for participation in attack on border region. Exposure
and protests in foreign press caused withdrawal of marching orders. Economic
situation becoming worse."
Miss Adams. I remember I did take it to the lens plant. I had seen Browder
in the evening. I remember that I took it down instead of mailing it, because
it was one of the times when I went from the factory where I was working, the
lens plant, on 56th Street. I carried it to the factory, and, you know, had it
on my desk there while I was working there.
Mr. Morris. Now, then, you did physically turn that over to the President?
Miss Adams. Yes. I had two copies. The reason I have that — they were on
onionskin. And I think I kept one and sent the other to him or gave the other
to hiro.
Mr. Morris. Did he return it to you later on?
Miss Adams. No. The copy I have is a second copy.
Mr. Morris. Now, what happened after you showed this to the President?
Miss Adams. I believe he sent Wallace out there following that. Yes, he sent
Wallace out. And Earl himself had some memory of that, because when I made
the Ford recording, he came in at that point and mentioned things that hap-
pened that seemed to be a direct result partly of this and, of course, other mate-
rial that the President had on the same subject. But he did send Wallace
out there.
Mr. Morris. That was as a result, you think, of this — Browder having sent
that letter down?
Miss Adams. Partly.
Mr. Morris. And was there anything that Browder said to you on this other
occasion that you just referred to, at the time of the recording, that would be
of interest in connection with this episode, Miss Adams?
Miss Adams. I think he said several things that would be of interest, but I
could not be sure. No — I could add to this record — he promised me a copy of
the record, you know, for myself. I could listen to it and then pick that up,
send it in to you.
Mr. Morris. And you can supplement the record.
Miss Adams. Supplement it, yes.
Mr. Morris. Now, did the President say anything to you?
Miss Adams. My bringing this thing up, in other words, reminded Earl of
things he said that he had almost forgotten and started him off. And several
times he intervened with his voice on the record, adding things on this subject
that came back to him as we talked. Anything the President said on that?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Miss Adams. Yes. He was very interested in the Far East situation, and very
bewildered by it, because he did not want a Communist China, if I may say
plainly. He did not want that at all. But he realized, as I think a great many
people had, that the leadership was very poor — that the south — that the eventual
collapse might come for that reason, because they were not powerful or enough
trusted — but that the Chinese would fall very fast for the Communists there —
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3595
because his contacts with Chiang and Madam Chiang were not too happy. He
didn't like them or trust them particularly. He told me the story about some —
Chiang appealing for gold, because he was short, and that he had sent things
out that could be turned into gold, and then he sent it off, and he used it in some
way himself, instead of fighting the Japanese war, he had thought. And that
it was the best thing he could deal with, in other words, but he worried about
him as a leader of a caliber — that he didn't feel that they had anything like,
say, England and France had, as allies.
Mr. Morris. Now, do you think the President
Miss Adams. I think he was not at all — I think it would be going to great
extremes and very unfair to think that Roosevelt ever wanted China to become
Communist. It was far from that idea.
Mr. Morris. Now, I think you mentioned to me an episode about a Polish
Government-in-exile agent.
Miss Adams. Oh, yes. I think I have that piece of paper in another folder.
It isn't in there. I was given a cable to get to Roosevelt that was sent by a
Polish Government in exile, in London, an agent of same — was sent by him in
London as a sort of survey of the situation here of elements that he considered
were fast falling to the bottom — that was the word— he was sorry to say that
these were the elements that were supporting him, the only elements. And he
listed a great many different types of things — organizations in Detroit, Polish
organizations, church organizations, different political groups and individuals,
among them Whittaker Chambers, incidentally. And none of these groups were
identified too much. They were just described in a very vague way. And
Browder went over them with me, and to the best of my ability, we marked in
red ink on the side what we thought they were. For instance, Whittaker
Chambers was mentioned as the editor of a popular magazine.
Mr. Morris. Time.
Miss Adams. Yes; Time. But they did not say Time. So then we figured
out it was Whittaker Chambers and it was Time. At that time I never heard
of Whittaker Chambers, but Earl told me. So I labeled the different things
and said those were his guesses as to what they were.
Mr. Morris. Let me see if I understand this. This was a letter
Miss Adams. It was really a cable.
Mr. Morris. Written by
Miss Adams. Roosevelt could have had access to it. In other words, it was
brought to his attention this way. Roosevelt had the right to read that cable
if he wanted to, but he didn't know it existed.
Mr. Morris. How did Browder know?
Miss Adams. Because somebody who must have worked in the office where
this went through or something brought it to Browder. That is the only way I
can figure. And so he thought the material might interest Roosevelt. It was
simply a survey of what even the Polish people themselves thought were the
groups that were supporting them. And he mentioned at the end that these were
fast sinking to the bottom. In other words, in the political atmosphere of that
day, they were very unpopular groups.
Mr. Morris. Let's see if I can understand this. This was a cable that Earl
Browder showed to you.
Miss Adams. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You do not know where he got it.
Miss Adams. No.
Mr. Morris. Obviously, however, it did not come from the sender
Miss Adams. No — somebody who had access to it gave it to him.
Mr. Morris. What did Browder say? Did he ask you to call it to the Presi-
dent's attention?
Miss Adams. He never put it that way. He said he thought that was very
interesting material. He knew I would be likely to send it if it was. And he
thought it would be interesting to the President to see it. This was when the
Polish border question was beginning to loom large, the whole question of
Poland. It was just before Roosevelt's death.
I have a briefcase somewhere that incidentally was given to me by Roosevelt,
it was something, some mineworkers in Mexico or something, some fancy thing
they had given to him as a present, that he gave to me because I carried so
many papers back and forth. In it was the Polish cable. That is in my home in
Suffern, but I can send it to you.
3596 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Morris. The effect of that would be to cause the President to lose con-
fidence in the Polish Government-in-exile, wouldn't it?
Miss Adams. Well, I don't think one cable would be powerful enough for
that. But of course that was the object of it, I think — to make him realize that
it was not a much-respected force, like a good many of the governments-in-exile.
Mr. Morris. Now, did you take that to the President?
Miss Adams. Yes. That I believe I mailed him. I mailed him that.
Mr. Morris. And you do not remember any conversation on his part, any
reaction to his reception of that.
Miss Adams. Yes — because when I did go to see him, he went over with some
interest — he went over what these different things meant. And I can remem-
ber then that was the first time that [the name of] Whittaker Chambers ever
crossed my lips, I didn't know anything about him. Earl had given me a slight
history of him at that moment.
Mr. Morris. What did Browder say of Chambers?
Miss Adams. Well, he said he had been a party member at one time and now
was an editor of Time. And he sort of shook his head over him at that moment.
And then — no mention of the later story. But he never went In for that kind
of thing about people. But he did think that — he was apparently very anxious
for Roosevelt to see it, and I gave it to him. And I do remember that Roosevelt
went over the meaning of these different little red-ink marks. That is the docu-
ment he later wrote "Dr. Johnson" on and was later found by Truman after
Roosevelt died, and he was bewildered. It was in a dossier on Poland.
Mr. Morris. This is the cable that Browder had acquired and you had sent it
to the President.
Miss Adams. Yes. And that was the only way that my name ever came up.
Mr. Morris. It was marked "Dr. Johnson," you say?
Miss Adams. I think all this Madam X story must have come out of that.
Mr. Morris. What was the reference to Dr. Johnson ?
Miss Adams. He had just written on the top "Dr. Johnson," meaning me.
Mr. Morris. Why did he call you that?
Miss Adams. Because I had to talk to him so much. I was a conversationalist
rather than anything else. In other words, you know, Sam Johnson had to
talk — I mean he was better known as a conversationalist than a writer. And
there were many things that were the kind of things — they were not conspira-
torial or anything like that, but you didn't want to go through the hands of a
million secretaries and so on. that I tried to get to him by taking them down.
And he was amused by my tearing down from the factory with a white shawl
over my head, and coming back. So he used to call me Dr. Johnson to tease me.
Mr. Morris. There was no Boswell involved.
Miss Adams. No.
Mr. Morris. Now, what specifically did he say about this cable later on, when
you did speak to him?
Miss Adams. Well, he told me that he thought that the Government, the
Polish Government-in-exile, was at pretty low ebb himself. He had gotten that
report from many quarters — much like the experience he had had with the
Finnish Ambassador and so on. He had had that feeling, that you had to deal
with them because — he wasn't in sympathy with the things particularly that
were going on in the country, but he felt, I think that that was not a completely
representative thing, the government-in-exile. I suppose he would have labeled
it Fascist, much as Earl would ; at that time — probably it was, partly, according
to the definitions in those days. I don't know. I couldn't say, in fairness.
* * * * , * * *
Mr. Morris. Now, how often did you see him, say, in Hyde Park and how often
in Washington?
Miss Adams. Well, I would really hesitate to give a number, because it became
a routine almost. And I was so interested in what was going on, and I never
thought this was something to be made a record of, and I just could not say.
Certain occasions stand out very vividly in my mind, but I could not give an
exact count. I can just figure the space of time and the number of times that
I — how far apart the visits were spaced. If it was over 2 years that I saw him
once a month, you have 24 months there, you see. And it was really 3 years. I
think, of this kind of thing.
Mr. Morris. Now, did you ever stay overnight in the White House?
Miss Adams. No ; not in the White House. I stayed overnight in Hyde Park,
a couple of times — more than once — several times. I went to the White House
at night, but I usually went back, because I had the job. It was usually not on
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3597
a weekend. I took sleepers back and walked into the factory. I had to be there
at 8 in the morning. And one of the things that I was looking up for him at that
time was sabotage in the lens plant, which was reported in New York.
*******
Mr. Morris. Did you discuss the Teheran Conference with the President and
with Mr. Browder?
Miss Adams. Yes.
Mr. Morris. I wonder if you could develop that for us.
Miss Adams. Well, of course, I did not — Roosevelt didn't tell anybody before
he went.
Mr. Morris. He didn't go to Teheran, did he? That was Hull. He went to
Yalta.
Miss Adams. Wait a minute. He went to both — oh, yes. There were pictures
of him at both. Yes, he did — because it was after the Teheran Conference, I
remember, that was the first time that all of them got together. There had been
some of them in North Africa, but without Stalin. There had been the DeGaulle
meetings. There was a lot of amusing stuff — you know all that stuff — between
Churchill and Roosevelt on the sub.iect of DeGaulle, the way they used to speak
of DeGaulle as the bride, his cable name. They had so much trouble with him as
being a prima donna, that they always spoke of him as the bride.
But it seems to me that it was after the Teheran meeting that Browder said to
me, "Well, my work is done." He seemed to think that — and that is when he
wrote the book that of course got him out of the party. He seemed to have an
instinct the way that things would march forward then, from that time on, in
the party here, would broaden out into such a thing that he would no longer
function as he had been functioning. He seemed to realize it very early. He
didn't know just what pattern it would take.
Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Browder try to influence the President during this period
with his ideas about Teheran? Did he make any recommendations to the
President, in other words?
Miss Adams. I don't think he ever assumed that he would consider that too
much — he never put it to me that way. In other words, he would have the hope
that if he heard something from me, as he heard it from other people, that he
would listen. But he had never been told that the President valued — only by
action could he tell how much he did. The only time that he ever gave him a
word, it was just once in a great while, sometimes indirectly, by thanking me,
saying the thing I had done was important. Or the time that he did send word
to Browder that he had put his country before the Daily V/orker. And I remem-
ber there was one occasion on which he said, Roosevelt said to me, "If this is
really put over, in a strange way you will have done as much as some of your
ancestors for the country." I have that in some kind of notation. It com-
pletely overwhelmed me. and of course I didn't believe it. But it had something
to do with Browder, because I went back to Browder with it. It may have been
when the party was turned into the political association. But I don't think it
was that. There was something else. And I have some note on that, too. I
would hesitate to give it to you as a fact until I look it up again, but I have.
And you see, I think that Browder — I felt that where there had been any shrewd
contribution, that it was not a matter — I did not take credit to myself, that it
was my brain — where there had been a shrewd analysis that might help him in
the war situation, it was very often Browder's. So that I felt, in a way, when
he said something to me that it was a tribute to Browder.
Mr. Morris. And was there any discussion between Browder and you on that,
and then a resultant discussion between yourself and the President about
Teheran ?
Miss Adams. Yes, there were.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about those?
Miss Adams. It is very hard for me to look back at the moment and sift out
Teheran and Yalta, although they were quite different. But I do remember that
when the decisions at Teheran came out, they were in line with many discussions
that I had with the President that were the outcome of things I had said to
Browder. Not that I take credit for myself or Browder for being big enough to
have influenced him. There must have been many, many things that influenced
him. But I think that he had come to know by that time that Browder knew, or
as representative of a certain group, that he was giving him what he thought, as
far as he could. He was certainly not in contact with the Soviet Union at that
time, but he had been in the past. I suppose he was giving him to the best of
his ability a picture of what he thought would go on as a result of certain things.
3598 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Morris. You say he was not in contact with the Soviet Union at that time.
Miss Adams. No; not during the war. He had very, very little contact. I
know this by the fact that they were always puzzling and fighting on what was
really going on there and what they really wanted. I heard that enough inside
to know there were very few contacts during the war period, that it was guess-
work from over here, if they were trying to follow out the policy of the Soviet
Union from reading things — they were able to get hold of certain things.
They saw certain publications, certain action, and were able to interpret them
according to what they had known before. But you see, whatever representatives
they had here were here and stranded. In other words, they did not have con-
tact with home too much, either.
Mr. Morris. And you say now that
Miss Adams. And I think that is what made such a prolonged quarrel over
Browder's dismissal. They had no direct contact.
Mr. Morris, Now, Miss Adams, can you tell us now specifically, give us a
couple of concrete instances of a convei'sation on Teheran that you would have
had with Browder and a subsequent one with the President?
Miss Adams. I remember that he believed that the opportunity for him to get
together and talk things over would make a longtime program for possible peace
in the world ; that it would be of great benefit ; and he thought it was the begin-
ning of a possible wartime program of peaceful coexistence between the Socialist
and the capitalist nations ; that it would be of great advantage in the working
out of the war itself, the winning of the war. And he laid great stress on the
fact that if they had some common meeting ground, that something would be
worked out. Of terms or advantages to the Soviet Union or the United .States,
specific terms, I didn't hear anything beforehand, because Browder did not know
beforehand that the meeting was going to be. We didn't know that, had no way
of knowing that. I could sense sometimes — I mean I have a sixth sense about
these things. I had the feeling, say, that it was coming. I very often had, you
know, on these trips. But nothing specific was told me about it. With Yalta,
there was a more specific talk beforehand — if there were such a meeting — about
terms, not on the part of Roosevelt, but on the part of Browder. I remember his
saying that he hoped this or that would happen if they got together. For in-
stance, this business of the Japanese, that if they did go to war with the Japanese,
what could be done about waterways with the Soviet Union and so on. But
nothing specific that was handed to Roosevelt, say a request. I do remember that
other people tried to pump me as to whether or not Roosevelt had — I don't know
how they ever got word of it; it wasn't through Browder; it wasn't through me;
but I think it was at that time through Mai-y Jane Keeney. By the way, she came
down on the train with me. She was standing behind me on the train. She must
have been sort of watching to see whether I was testifying, because she knows
I would have traveled coach ordinarily. She said, "I see you are going parlor
car." She said, "I'm going in the smoker, so I don't suppose I'll see you again,
but I'm glad to have seen you." She was right behind me at the gate. But I
hadn't seen her in years. But I think Mary Jane must have been the person. I
have a reason for knowing she knew I was down here.
One time when I did come down to stay overnight in Washington, but not at
the White House, and saw the President, I stayed several days and saw him 2 or
3 times, and Mary Jane knew I was around, because she saw me at that time.
And she did some rather foolish boasting, which I warned them about, boasting
that she knew the people in the Embassy, and she got material
Mr. Morris. The .Soviet Embassy?
Miss Adams. Well, everybody went to embassy receptions. But as though
she were rather important. She boasted.
Mr. Morris. About having gotten material.
Miss Adams. Yes. And I knew Kouvnikoff, just because he wandered around
New York with his boxer dog and turned up everywhere.
Mr. Morris. Serge Kouvnikoff?
Miss Adams. Yes. ' She seemed to have direct relationships with Serge,
seen him every so often and let him know what was going on. And I got the
feeling, strangely enough, although she is a twittery little thing, of all the
people I met around, aside from Ted Baer, that she had more direct connections
with Embassy things, with Russian people, than other people that I knew. Most
of the party people didn't. They were just guessing.
Mr. MoREis. Now, Kouvnikoff; was he a Russian national?
Miss Adams. Oh, yes.
Mr. MoBBis. He wrote for the Daily Worker, did he not?
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3599
Miss Adams. He wrote for the Daily Worker. He had been a White Russian,
and then he turned revolutionary. He was a fine horseman.
Mr. MoKRis. He wrote a column called The Veteran Commander.
Miss Adams. Yes. Ted Baer used to invite me down there. And I wrote to
Roosevelt on this score, and I told Browder. Browder said : "Just always know
nothing or give him something wrong." And I got the same word from Roose-
velt. Because they began pumping me as to points about what Roosevelt
thought. I mean, in the first place, it was a very daring assumption that
Roosevelt would ever have told me anything of a military nature, or terms
in any specific way before they came out, because that would be too dangerous
a thing to do. But they thought I might have sensed something like that, or
felt something was going on. So that, every once in a while, Ted Baer would
try to snare me into his house, and the minute I got there, Kouvnikoff would
walk in with the dog, as though this were just a little exercise. And then he
antagonized me by always attacking our military as being so stupid, the cam-
paigns in Italy
Mr. Morris. Where was this?
Miss Adams. Ted Baer's house. He would attack the military, our own,
as being stupid, because he was so conceited about his knowledge of military
affairs — particularly on the Italian campaign. What he would do, he would
come in with a riding crop in his hand, or the dog, sit there, and in a very arro-
gant fashion, just as though it were offhand and he could trap me — but I was
wise to this thing — he would say, "What do you think they will do, the Rus-
sians, if they do go into the Japanese war?" It was veiT obvious. And I
think if Roosevelt wanted anybody like that to know it, he had his own way
of letting him know. In other words, I wrote to Roosevelt and told him ex-
actly what had taken place, but I never said anything there.
Mr. Morris. Tell me this. Did Kouvnikoff have access to the Soviet Embassy?
Miss Adams. Oh, yes. I think without a doubt. I think there was a link —
in fact, Keeney practically told me that once — between Keeney, Kouvnikoff, and
the Embassy.
Mr. Morris. Well, there was a link that we were talking about, that the
Communist Party would have a link to the Soviet Union.
Miss Adams. Well, it would be only such^because they always felt, and I
know, with the discussions that came over, whether the Soviet Union approved
or did not approve of Earl's dismissal business, that there were terrific rows
about what the Soviet Union thought. So if they had anything — of course,
finally — what is the name of that old fellow that was in charge of the Inter-
national Publishing House?
Mr. Morris. Trachtenberg.
Miss Adams. Trachtenberg finally laid down the law — where he got it from —
that he knew what was right and what they wanted. That is the way he got
Gurley Flynn into line. He professed to speak for the Soviet Union; that he
knew. In fact he came to the Jefferson School. They had all voted the other
way. He said the vote had to he made over — "You just have to change it."
Which is what made Frank Meyer fall downstairs. That was the end of Frank.
Frank got up and fought on that occasion. I didn't have any right to speak,
but I was terribly knocked down by Stachel. I started to say something.
Stachel said, "Oh, comrades, this is a very sad occasion. I am afraid Earl
Browder is not going to see the light. He doesn't want to. We will never
straighten this thing out." He wanted it to be this way, you know. He was
looking for power.
Mr. Morris. Now, Senator, in addition, in trying to be sure that a
story like this is accurate, I went to New York 2 weeks ago to see Earl
Browder, and I asked Mr. Browder about this story. He said, yes,
he knew about it. I told him the nature, the general nature, of Jose-
phine Adams' testimony, and he corroborated it. He said : "Yes, it
is true. She did act as an intermediary between me and the Presi-
dent."
I said that she had estimated between 38 and 40 times. He said,
"Yes, that would be about right," and I asked him if he would testify,
and he now is, I believe. Senator, under indictment, and he said that
he would not like to testify in public, in public testimony before a
3600 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
congressional committee on this subject, but authorized me, in the
presence of his attorney, to state for our public record
Senator Jenner. Who was his attorney ?
Mr. Morris. O. John Rogge. He authorized me to say that the
information, as I related it to him about the testimony of Miss Adams,
was an accurate story, and he would generally corroborate it, and he
said I may say so for the public.
Senator Jenner. Had he previously denied this story, or had he not
been asked about it ?
Mr. Morris. This had come up before. Mr. Meyer, you did testify
to this once before, before the Subversive Activities Control Board?
Mr. ]Meter. Very briefly, and simply, as to the existence of the rela-
tionship. It came up in the Jefferson School case before the Subver-
sive Activities Control Board, and Miss Adams and Mr. Browcler
entered denials before the press, not under oath at the time.
Mr. Morris. It was not denied ; the substance of the thing. They
took some particular aspects.
Mr. Meyer. They twisted around the matter ; yes.
Mr. Morris. Senator, this testimony, which is now in the public
record, is an acknowledgment on the part of Miss Adams that she so
testified under oath, that these things did in fact occur, much the
same as Mr. Meyer's testimony.
Senator Jenner. And Mr. Browder has substantiated this story, in
the presence of his attorne}-, with you in New York as recently as
Mr. Morris. Two weeks ago, but not under oath.
Senator Jenner. Not under oath. All right.
Mr. Morris. Now, is there anything else now about your qualifica-
tions to testify here in connection with the meeting of the recent Com-
munist Party Convention and that j^ou think we should have in the
record, by way of qualifying you as an expert in these particular
hearings ?
Mr. Meyer. Only, I suppose, that in the intervening years I have
kept myself acquainted with Communist developments. Communist
literature. I have worked for a year or two on a book which required
that I make a rather special study of some aspects of it, and have
followed the press, both American and world press. I think I remain
acquainted from month to month with the developments in the Com-
munist world.
Mr. Morris. Well, now, 3^011 never formally resigned from the Com-
munist Party, did you, Mr. Meyer ?
Mr. ]\Ieye'r. I drifted out of it, as it were, after the Browder break,
but the drift, so far as the Communist Party was concerned, was very
quick, in the sense that, while I continued to teach at the Jefferson
School a few months longer, I had no official connections with the
party, as such. And I did not make an issue at the Jefferson School,
and they did not. They waited until my last scheduled class was out
of the way, and then we just let it go.
Mr. Morris. And what was the year of that?
Mr. Meyer. The break, as it were, with the part}^ officially was at
the point of the Duclos letter, and a few weeks after, which is May to
June 1945. The last course I taught at the Jefferson School ended
in December 1945, so, let us say 1945.
Mr. Morris. December 1945 ?
Mr. Meyer. Yes.
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3601
Mr. Morris. Well, now, how long after that — what was the transi-
tional period which was necessary to set in, in your own case, before
you, for instance, would say you would testify before a congressional
committee about the details, about your own experiences in the Com-
munist Party? Was there a transitional period in your case, Mr.
Meyer?
Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that that is very important
for us, because, as you know, the Communist Control Act of 1954
indicates that, before action can be taken against a Communist-con-
trolled union, you have to show Communist membership within a
period of 2 or 3 years.
Now, we have been laboring at great length to establish that that is
a very unreal provision in the law, Senator, because we find that it
takes, ordinarily, many years before a witness, after he has disas-
sociated himself from the Communist Party, sees the world issues
clearly enough that he will come forward and testify against them.
That is why, Senator, in each case where we have somebody who
did break away from the Communist Party and testifies here, we
advert to this one particular aspect of his testimony.
Senator Jenxer. Proceed, Mr. Meyer.
Mr. INIeyer. In my case, it might be recognized that for 2 years
there had been a certain process going on inside of me, even before I
left the Communist Party. But starting with 1945 as a year, it was,
I believe, 1947 or 1948 — ^I am not quite sure — before I talked to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and it w^as 1949 before I testified
in the Smith Act case, the Dennis case.
Now, it so happened that I have not testified before a committee
before, and I would say it probably would have been much more
difficult to convince me to testify before a committee in 1949, on a
subpena, in a judicial case. I would estimate that had there been
any reason and had I been asked to testify before a committee, I
might have done so as early as 1951, somewhere along there. Five
or six years' minimum.
Mr. Morris. And the reason for that; I wonder if you could just
generally tell us the reason for that, Mr. Meyer.
Mr. Meter. The problem involved is this :
When one first breaks with only the abuses, one feels either the
Soviet Union or Stalinism is bad, or this or that aspect is bad.
As my wife and I used to put it, we are not anti-Communist, we
are just non-Communist, and then, even after you get from the non-
Communist phase to becoming rather an anti- Communist, large
remnants of prejudices that have been instilled all your life against
investigating agencies remain.
One feels that, well, this is not the way to fight them, and one thinks
it can be fought only in the labor movement, or only by intellectual
methods. It is necessary to break first from a rejection of Stalinism,
then of Leninism, then of Marxism.
It is a long process of philosophical breaking, and in many cases
that I know of it never completes itself, but I feel that somewhere
along that line — and it differs from person to person — when certain
problems are really finally satisfied in one's mind and one realizes
this is totally evil — the Communist movement — then one is prepared
to testify, and it might take anyAvhere from a year or so, to 7 and 8
years.
3602 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
I personally know cases of ex-Communists who are perfectly sound
people today, but who still have years to go before I think they will
be willing to testify.
Mr. Morris. Meanwhile, the secrets that they have remain locked
up and inaccessible to the various agencies of the United States Gov-
ernment ?
Mr. Meyer. And they get rather stale in the course of that time, too.
Meanwhile, new things have developed which will take another
7 years to get hold of.
Mr. Morris. Now, Mr. Meyer, you have been following the Com-
munist Party activities on the international level and national level,
have you not, with great care ?
Mr. JNIeyer. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Have you read thoroughly the 20th congress reports,
the 20th congress of the Communist Party reports, from Moscow?
Mr. Meyer. I have seen a good deal of the material, and I have
particularly studied both Khrushchev speeches, not merely the sensa-
tional secret speech, which was finally released by our Department
of State, on Stalin, but the main report made to that convention
which laid down the line of that convention, that congress, and was
adopted as the line of that congress.
The main address of Khrushchev to the 20th party convention,
which I believe is the central document for Communist Party ideol-
ogy, policy, during this period
Mr. Morris. Now, did that represent a retreat on the part of the
Communists from their heretofore aggressive position?
Mr. Meyer. It is my opinion that the line of the 20th congress, far
from being stategically a retreat or far from being a strategic admis-
sion of weakness in the need of retreating, is the most forward and
aggressive strategic statement that has ever been made by the Com-
munist international movement in all of the years of its existence.
Senator Jenner. Why do you say that, Mr, Meyer?
Mr. Meyer. For this reason. Previously, through all the years
since the revolution, and up until — for a century up until this state-
ment, or just before it, one doctrine of the Communist movement has
been that we live, speaking for them, as it were, that we live in a
world of capitalist encirclement. We have a Socialist island here,
and the capitalist world could constantly encircle it. We are, as it
were, on the strategic defensive. The main thing to do is hold on, to
gradually strengthen ourselves, to wait for tlie day when new possi-
bilities exist outside of the Socialist island.
With the 20th congress, for the first time — let's put it this way :
With the 20th congress, and with certain documents that appeared
a few months or a year or so before it, for the first time in all the
years of the existence of the Communist movement, the basic strategic
point was reversed, and the constant talk was about 900 million
people, the general tone was that of a period in which not socialism
is encircled but capitalism is encircled, the free world is encircled.
And the conclusions drawn from that are extremely positive, hope-
ful, and just because, if I may be a little complicated about this, just
because it is a strategically offensive situation when, from the Soviet
point of view, time is on their side, everything is moving their way, it
is possible to think much more than before in terms of tactics that are
comparatively gentle, because at this point, with everything moving
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY EST THE UNITED STATES 3603
in their direction, the only thing that would possibly stop them would
be a really hard, desperate understanding of the situation and resist-
ance. Soft tactics are far and away the best way to present such a
resistance.
Hence, while the Geneva Congress line, and the Geneva agreement,
Summit meeting line, and the 20th Congress line, which are the same —
I am sorry.
Hence, while they are tactically soft, they are based on a hard
strategy which is, as it were, thinking of itself as entering the last lap,
of having passed over to the last big struggle and moving forward on
that, w4th considerable hopefulness.
I have, as a matter of fact, Khrushchev's report, photostated here,
and I think that there are a couple of aspects, a paragraph or two, if
you would like that, that might be worthwhile reading in this respect,
because this has to do — let me say one word more before I read, because
these paragraphs affect several points relative to the recent convention.
It is clear from Communist strategy and Communist principles that
the stronger you are in a given area or situation, the less need there is
for violent revolution. The weaker the enemy is, the less need — I
won't say for violent— yes, for violent revolution in the immediate
sense of uprising. The stronger you are, the more the country con-
cerned is surrounded with Ked tanks, terrorized with Eed rocket fleets,
infiltrated from the inside with a strong Communist Party, with a
leadership that is weak and vacillating and doesn't know where it is
coming, the easier it is to pull a victory for communism, like Czecho-
slovakia where, without any actual civil war, the whole structure of
the constitution was overthrown.
The passages I am interested in here connect both with the problem
of their strategical concept and with the true meaning of all the talk
that has come out, both internationally and in the United States, about
how violent overthrow isn't necessary ; world war is no longer neces-
sary ; which I think these few paragraphs may enlighten a bit.
Senator Hruska. Mr. Meyer, will you state for the record the docu-
ment from which you are reading?
Mr. Meyer. This is the Keport of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union to its 20th Party Congress,
delivered by N. S. Khrushchev.
Senator Hruska. What date ?
Mr. Meyer. This comes from the organ, the organ of the Cominf orm,
"For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy," that is the name of
the journal, dated February 17, 1956. And it is the full text of the
report delivered by Khrushchev there.
Mr. Morris. There was some portion you wanted to read ?
Mr. Meyer. Yes, which I think may be of interest on these two
points :
Our enemies like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence, always and
everywhere. True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation
of capitalist society into a Socialist society.
That is to say, the recognition of a need for a revolutionary trans-
formation.
It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists —
which in this language means Communists —
from the reformists, the opportunists.
3604 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries, the violent over-
throw of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie —
that is to say, of constitutional government of a non-Communist
kind —
There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent over-
throw of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class
struggle connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution
vary. It is not true —
says he —
that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society.
Then, and this is relevant to the first question that was asked here :
Leninism teaches us that the ruling classes will not surrender their power
voluntarily. And the greater or lesser degree of intensity which the struggle
may assume, the use or the nonuse of violence in the transition to socialism,
depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiting class
itself resorts to violence, rather than on the proletariat.
In other words, "if you will hand over your money without being
shot, we won't shoot you," or "if you will hand over your freedom
w^ithout being shot, we won't shoot you." It is a question of the rob-
ber saying, "Your money or your life" ; in this case, "your freedom,
your Constitution, your way of living, or your life," and "if you
won't fight, we won't fight, either."
Later in this passage he says, and this is relevant to the problem
of their greater strength from their own point of view at this time,
their feeling of Socialist encirclement :
The historical situation has undergone radical changes which make possible
a new approach to the question. The forces of socialism and democracy —
that is, of the Soviet Union and its satellites —
have grown immeasurably throughout the world, and capitalism has become
much weaker. The mighty camp of socialism, with its population of over 900
million, is growing and gaining in strength.
And so on. He develops this at considerable length.
Therefore, under these circumstances —
skipping a bit —
in these circumstances the working class is in a position to defeat the reac-
tionary forces opposed to the popular interest —
that is, the Communist Party to gain power —
to capture a stable majority in Parliament, and transform the latter from an
organ of bourgeoisie democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will.
That is to say, a transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The point — and it is a little complexly placed here — but the essen-
tial point, the conclusions I draw from this are :
First, and this is absolutely unchanged Leninistic doctrine in all the
years that I have been a Communist, studied communism: 1. Our
goal is the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of a
Communist society.
2. We will do this in any manner and by any means which is use-
ful, efficient, and successful.
3. That inchides violence where necessary.
4. Under the circumstances of the past period where the Communist
camp has become stronger, where, rather than being an encircled
island, we can almost begin to think in terms of encircling the free
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UlSnTED STATES 3605
world, there will be many more places in which we won't have to carry
through an armed civil war, but can simply penetrate parliaments,
penetrate the government offices, stir up threats abroad and at home,
and carry through a victory, as we did in Czechoslovakia.
However, and I think this is vitally necessary in the present situa-
tion and considering the kind of headlines we have had about coin-
munism a great deal later, the one sentence here which is absolutely
guiding and still remains is the section which says :
There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent over-
throw of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class
struggle connected with this are inevitable.
Now, he did not name any names as to the number of countries,
but clearly he means the ones where communism is weakest at this
point, which are strongest in their economy and in their free system,
and I think the initials of the one he really means are U. S. A.
I think that is about all the quotes from this.
Mr. Morris. Well, now, Mr. Meyer, the Communist Party had a
convention here on February 12, and, as you know, the committee has
been holding hearings on this one particular series of hearings.
Now, the first news headlines that came out from this convention,
and I will mention them, are : "Reds in U. S. Vote To Cast Off Mos-
cow." "U. S. Reds Vote End to Control by Soviet." "U. S. Reds Quit
Foster, Kremlin." And it goes on.
We have been hearing quite a bit of testimony to the effect that that
is just not the case, that the opposite is so. There was a tactical
change, and a tactical representation is made that there was a break
from Moscow, but witnesses have indicated that their lines are still
holding fast.
I have been wondering if you have made a study of the reports
of the recent Communist Party convention, the resolutions as such.
In fact, you have studied every part of the convention, have you not?
Mr. Meyer. I have seen a large mass of material, read everything
that I could find in the papers, both the Daily Worker and several
other papers, and I think I have a pretty good idea. I have also
read some of the testimony of witnesses you have had already here, in
the press, and summaries of their testimony, who were actually at
the convention.
I think I have as good an idea of what went on as anybody who
wasn't there could have, in terms of the material issued, and I think
I can make an interpretation that is fairly valid, on the basis of that
material.
Mr. Morris. Would you tell us what your own interpretation of this
Communist convention was based on, your studies and your own
experience as a Communist, as you have described it?
Mr. Meyer. I would like to actually pick up for a moment on the
international Communist situation, because I don't think it is possible
to understand even the details of any Communist Party in a given
country without seeing it against the background of the movement,
of which it is an integral part.
And I have already stated my belief as to what the character of
the main line of the* 20th party congress was, in the Soviet Union
which is a line for the whole Communist movement, the line of strategic
offensive.
3606 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UlSriTED STATES
I want to make one more point about the 20th Congress and the
period since.
I think it is undoubtedly true that, in the whole international Com-
munist movement, and first of all in the Soviet Union itself, a factional
struggle has been going on since Stalin's death. But I also want to
emphasize that that factional struggle is not a new idea or new pos-
sibility in Communist ranks, that there have been a number before,
and that this factional struggle, whether in Russia, internationally,
or in the United States, is far and away less violent an inner struggle
than others, and in particular than the stniggle that went on hardly
without cessation from 1925 or so to 1929 or 1930, at which time also
our papers were hourly predicting the end of communism as a serious
threat or saying that Stalin was fighting with Zinovieff and Trotsky,
Russia is going to mind its own business, or this, that or the other.
That is to say, I think that there are many examples of more severe
factional struggles in the past than this.
Secondly, I do not find in all the reading I have been able to do, and
despite certain new aspects of this struggle that I will mention in a
moment, any very profound difference between the factions and serious
theoretical factors, not as severe as between Stalin and Trotsky, or
Stalin and Bukharin in the struggle between 1925 and 1930.
They were arguing and disagreeing and fighting for power, with
considerable differences of opinion. It was basically a power struggle,
but it was also a theoretical struggle.
So far as I can see at this point, in the general terms of Communist
theory, there is not anything like the severity in that difference in the
three major groupings that seem to me to turn up again and again in
international communism in the last year or so. And those three
groupings I would characterize as unreconstructed Stalinists on the
one hand, a rather smaller group which seems to think in terms, for
tactical reasons, of a certain liberalizatiou, for example, of more em-
phasis in Russia on consumer goods to pacify the population, in-
ternally a little gentler hand with the satellites.
Let us call it, for the moment, a liberalizing on the other hand ; and,
tlie third faction, and apparently at this point the dominant one, which
I believe Khrushchev represents, a center faction which is essentially
holding them all together in a little bit, a considerable amount of
internecine squabbling, but in which the line moves pretty much along,
first, making a little concession to this group, and then making a con-
cession to that group.
I raise this only because I do not think that it is possible to under-
stand what went on at the convention of the Communist Party of the
United States without this background.
One other thing: The 20th Congress and the general Soviet at-
titude since, have allowed, have encouraged, have, one might say, di-
rected that such differences should be allowed to occur openly to a
certain degree instead of being concealed as they were in the past in
committees and bureaus.
Hence, as I hope to show in a moment, the United States — the
Communist Party of the United States convention will not merely
reflect in content the same kind of divisions as occurred in the 20th
Congress and have since occurred in the Communist International,
but actually the very fact that these things are being fought out
in the open to a certain degree, being argued out in the open, com-
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3607
promises arrived at in the open, the very fact that they are doing it
in the open, the very fact they are talking about how independent
they are of Moscow in the open, is precisely a carrying out of the
directive of the 20th Congress to say in the open, "We are inde-
pendent of Moscow" — in the open.
Mr. Morris. Do you see any sign that there is any independence
of Moscow ?
Mr. Meter. To make this point, I think it would be necessary to
analyze, it would be necessar;^ to put it this way. Let me just go
a bit further on the three groupings, as far as I am concerned.
The Stalinists are unreconstructed Stalin groups that seem to be
headed by Foster.
The liberal group by Gates, and the center seems to have been most
of the old solid leaders of the party, not the best ones, but the good
solid leadership of years' duration.
So far as I can see, on the question of relationship to Mos-
cow and the relationship to international communism, the resolu-
tions as adopted to the degree that we know them, and the draft
resolutions where they have not yet published them, are all funda-
mental defeats for any effort whatever to take a substantially non-
Moscow-dominated stand.
Basically, on the Hungarian situation where one small group,
rather to the liberal side, wanted the adoption of a resolution being
quite critical of the use of Soviet troops in Hungary — this was
smashed, and a double-talking resolution on the surface passed on
the motion of the Illinois State committee, which essentially accepts
the Foster position, with a little window dressing, criticizes by im-
plication the Gates position, and ends with this sentence:
While international working-class solidarity includes the right to friendly
criticism of the party or of the actions of Socialist governments, at the same
time —
And this is the key sentence —
at the same time it requires that such criticism shall be within the frame-
work of recognition that the fundamental conflict is with the forces of im-
perialism.
And as a directive to the party, this is a statement on the Hun-
garian situation, that the Soviet Union acted correctly. It is against
the forces of the rebels in Hungary, who are categorized as Fascists
and imperialist agents, that we must direct ourselves. We must
hold our criticism, to the degree we have any criticism at all, to a
minor level and fundamentally support the Soviet Union in this
situation.
As a matter of fact, somewhere in the material, someone's speech,
in an appeal to be a little more liberalish, a little more surfacely
critical, someone said — I cannot remember who it was offhand, but
one of the speakers said :
Look, I agree perfectly. We must not overdo the criticism of Stalin, overdo
the criticism of the Soviet Union but, after all, it is all right for the Chinese
party, who already have power, to say "Let's take a balanced view of this in
our public statements," but recognizing, as we do, of course, that Stalin only
made surface errors, certainly in a country with civil liberties, can't we be
allowed a little more criticism of the Soviet Union than, say, the Chinese party
would be?
Practically in those words — not those exact words.
3608 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES |
Generally speaking, to summarize the answer to your question,
I feel, from the evidence of the material and the resolutions passed,
that all basic questions that were argued rather vigorously in the
party during the months beforehand were solved before the Congress
opened.
The convention did three things. It made a show of unity, as the
Daily Worker and all the last speakers said. Foster did not win,
Gates did not win, Dennis did not win. The party won.
The first thing it did was that.
Secondly, it developed a working agreement between the factions
by essentially splitting all committees that were so far elected just
about equally between them, with the center on top.
Thirdly, it made a record for the courts, or attempted to make a
record for the courts, in terms of verbiage but not of fundamentals on
its relationship to the American free constitutional process.
And fourthly, on all important questions of program, with 1 or 2
exceptions, it passed on to the new national committee the task of
making a program, only 1 or 2 questions on which I think this con-
vention took concrete action in terms of its immediate program, in
looking at it. Most were passed over to the new national committee.
There was a point on the agenda, party program, which was totally
passed over.
But on one question the stand of the convention is extremely clear
in all its resolutions, and that is that the main campaign of the Com-
mimist Party at this point must be, to use their verbiage, the exten-
sion of democratization in the South. That is to say, the main point
made by the convention in terms of an immediate program fits in
very well with an old line of Communist attitude toward constitu-
tional processes in America.
It goes back, to my knowledge, 15 years or so when I was rather
deeply involved in some theoretical work in connection with the so-
called Negro question, and it is this : To the Communist Party efforts
to utilize mass democratic mob criterion approaches rather than con-
stitutional ones, to attempt to turn elections into plebiscites, and the
main obstacle is the structure, the constitutional checks and balances
structure.
And they have recognized for 15 years, and clearly now recognize,
that that point in the country at which this structure of checks and
balances has its greatest support is in the Senate of the United States,
and specifically in the State rights structure of the Southern States,
which bring it about that the Democratic Party cannot be looked at
by them as a totally people's party in their terms, totally a laborish
kind of party, but split it up.
Hence, the major drive in the sense of putting themselves at the
head, or attempting to put themselves at the head, to penetrate the
movement of the Negro people in the various forms it has been taking
in recent years and previously, has nothing whatever to do with any
interest in the aims and desires of the Negro people, but is a reali-
zation by the Communist Party that that movement can be used as
the most important and strongest cutting edge against the constitu-
tional structure of the United States, by trying to develop a removal
of division of power guaranties in the South, and, secondarily, by
the fact that they believe, as it is clear from the resolutions, that at
this time in a prosperous country this is the only place in which
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3609
serious trouble can possibly be stirred up, in which there are serious
possibilities of developing what they call mass struggles, of building
up extra-constitutional and extra-legal actions, and so on.
I do want to emphasize, however, that this is not in any sense a
humanitarian position. It has nothing whatever to do with any sym-
pathy for the needs of the Negro peoples themselves. But it has to
do w^ith a feeling on their part that this is the point of breakthrough
in the country at this time.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Meyer, both Senators have advised me that they
have 3 : 30 appointments. I wonder if we might break in at this
time.
Senator, I don't know whether we will be able to work out finally
complete testimony of Mr. Meyer, but if we can, we will do it, and
I will so notify the subcommittee.
Senator Jenner. Well, on behalf of the committee, Mr. Meyer, I
want to thank you. I think you have contributed a great deal to
the work of this committee.
I am only sorry that every Member of the Congress couldn't have
heard you. I am only sorry that every person in the United States
couldn't have heard you.
We certainly want to thank you for j^our forthright, courageous
presentation of this very important subject here today.
Senator Hruska. I just want to say, Mr. Meyer, I think in many
respects so many of tlie points about which many of us have been
thinking have been corroborated by your testimony here this after-
noon.
That is specifically true of your observations concerning the con-
vention held in New York City. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Meyer. Thank you, sir.
(Wliereupon, at 3 : 30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
The following newspaper article was ordered into the record at a
subsequent meeting of the subcommittee :
[From the New York Times, March 5, 1957]
Soviet Attache Leaves — Russian Ousted by Denmark on Espionage Charge
Copenhagen, Denmark, March 4. — Capt. Mikhail Roudichev, assistant naval
attache in the Soviet Embassy here, who was ordered to leave Denmark last
week, left Copenhagen by plane today for Moscow.
Captain Roudichev was charged with having tried to obtain secret military
information, particularly that concerning the new coastal defenses on Denmark's
Baltic coast.
In January Lt. Col. Anatol Rogov, assistant military attache at the Soviet
Embassy here, was expelled on similar charges.
INDEX
Note. — Tlie Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance
to tlie mere fact of tlie appearance of tlie names of an inrtiyidual or an organ-
ization in tliis index.
A Page
ADAers 3575
Adams, Josephine Truslow, excerpts of testimony 3587, 35SS, 3590-3600
American League Against War and Fascism 3581, 3582
American Youth Congress 3582
Amsterdam 3581
Antiwar and anti-Fascist congresses 35S1
Antiwar Congress (of Canada) 3582
Article from New York Times dated March 5, 1957, Soviet Attache
Leaves — ^Russian Ousted by Demark on Espionage Charges 3609
B
Baer, Ted 3598, 3599
Beichman, Arnold 3565
Benson 3592
Bill of Rights 3575
Browder, Earl 3587-3600
Bukharin 3603
C
Cambridge 3579, 3581
Campos 3592
Canada 3582, 3583
Canadian Students League 3582
Chambers, Whittaker 3595, 3596
Chiang, Kai-shek 3593, 3595
Chiang, Madam 3595
Chicago 3582,3583
South Side section 3583
Chicago Workers School 3583
China 3593,3595
Communist 3594
Chungking troops 3594
Churchill 3597
Cominform 3603
Communist/s 3575, 3577, 3579, 3580, 3582, 3586-3588, 3591, 3592, 3600, 3603
French 3570
Communist Control Act of 1954 3601
Communist International 3581, 3606
Communist Party 3565-
3569, 3578-3580, 3582, 3584, 3587, 3588, 3599, 3601-3604, 3608
American (of United States) 3568, 3570-3572, 3581-3583, 3606
Chinese 3579
of Canada 3582
of India 3579
of Great Britain 3579-3581
British Central Committee of 3579
Central Committee of 3603
Communist Party Convention in New York City 3568, 3600, 3605
Congressional Reorganization Act 3586
Cudahy, Mr 8589
Czechoslovakia 3603, 3605
II INDEX
D
Page
Daily Worker 3566, 3576, 3592, 3597-3599, 3605, 3608
Darcy, Sam 3590, 3591
De Gaulle meetings 3597
De Lacy, Congressman Hugh 3586
Democratic Party 3608
Democrats 3575
Dennis, Eugene 3601, 3608
Testimony of 3566-3576
Joseph Forer, attorney 3566
628 West 151st Street, New York City 3566
Born under name of Frank Waldron 3567
Fifth amendment if got Communist Party training at Lenin Insti-
tute in Moscow 3567
Fifth amendment if general secretary of CPUSA 3568
Fifth amendment if son Timothy now in Moscow 3575
Department of State 3602
Douglas, Congresswoman Helen Gahagan 3586
Duclos 3570-3572, 3587, 3600
E
Eighth Route Army 3594
England 3578-3580, 3582
European Workers Anti-Fascist Congress (Pleyel Congress) 3581
Exhibit No. 438 — Excerpt from Josephine Truslow Adams' testimony, Jan-
uary 16, 1957 3590-3599
F
Federal Bureau of Investigation 3601
Fifth amendment 3567, 3575
First amendment 3566, 3573, 3575
Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley 3589, 3590, 3593, 3599
"For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy" 3603
Fort Benning 3558
Foster 3607, 3608
France 3582
Free Browder Committee 3589
G
Gates 3607, 3608
Geneva Congress 3603
Great Britain 3581
Green, Gil 3582, 3583, 3587, 3592
H
Harlem in New York 3583
Haywood, Harry 3583
Hruska, Senator Roman L 3565, 3577
Hu, Gen. Shung Nan 3594
Hyde Park 3583, 3588-3591, 3596
I
Illinois 3583, 3584
Indiana 3583,3584
International Publishing House 3599
Italy 3599
J
Japanese 3598
Jefferson School in New York 3587, 3588, 3599, 3600
Jenner, Senator William E 3577
"Johnson, Dr." document 3996
INDEX III
K Page
Kao, Gen. Hsang-chen 3594
Keeney, Mary Jane 3598, 3599
Khrushchev 3571, 3602, 3603
King, Carol (wife of Sam Darcy) 3591
Kouvnikoff, Serge 3598, 3599
Kremlin 3569
Kweilin 3593
L
Labor Club 3578
Labor Party 3578, 3580
Lenin Institute in Moscow 3567
Leninism 3601
Leninistic doctrine 3604
Letter to John J. Abt, Esq., from Paul Williams, United States attorney,
re Eugene Dennis, February 18, 1957 3565
Letter to Bob Morris from Department of Justice re Eugene Dennis,
February 18, 1957 3565
Lindbergh 3589,3590
London 3578
London Busmen 3581
London School of Economics 3579-3581
M
Mandel, Benjamin 3565
Mao, Tse-tung 3593
Marxism 3601
Menon, Krishna 3580
Meyer, Frank S. (testimony of) 3577-3609
Woodstock, N. Y 3577
Free-lance writer 3577
Born Newark, N. J 3578
Newark Academy, Newark, N. J. ; Princeton, N. J. ; Balliol College,
Oxford ; Oxford University ; London School of Economics ; Univer-
sity of Chicago 3578
Joined Communist Party in 1931 at Oxford 3578
Broke with party in December 1945 3600
Missouri 3583
Monroe, N. Y 3591, 3592
Morris, Robert 3565, 3577
Moscow 3574, 3575, 3582, 3602, 3606, 3609
N
National Review : 3578
National Theatre Building (New York) 3575
Negro people 3608, 3609
New Leader (publication) 3575
New Masses 3587
New York 3568, 3582, 3584, 3586, 3588, 3597, 3609
New York Herald Tribune 3569
New York Times 3609
New York Workers School 3583
Nye 3589,3590
October Club 3578
Oxford 3578-3581
P
Paris 3581
Philadelphia 3589, 3590
Poland 3595
Polish Government-in-exile 3596
Political Affairs 3587
Potash. Irving 3568, 3569, 3572, 3573
Puerto Ricans 3592
IV INDEX ;
R Page j
"Reds in U. S. Vote To Cast OfE Moscow" 3605 i
Report of Central Committee of Communist Party of Soviet Union to its ;
20th Party Congress, delivered by Krushchev 3603 j
Republicans 3575 i
Rogge, O. John 3600 i
Rogov, Lt. Col. Anatol, expelled assistant military attache at Soviet Em- 1
bassy, Denmark 3609 '
Roosevelt, Mrs 3589, 3591, 3593 i
Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano 3588-3598 :
Roudichev, Capt. Mikhail, expelled assistant naval attach^ in Soviet Em- \
bassy, Denmark 3609 '
Rusher, William A 3565, 3577 )
Russia ^ 3603 '
i
S
Seller, Dick, former secretary to Congressman DeLacy 3586 ■
Selsam, Howard, director of Jefferson School 3587 i
S. P. I. C. (Section Francaise Internationle Commimiste) 3582 '
Smith Act 3601 1
Socialists 3575 !
Sourwine, J. G 3565 \
Southern States 3608 -,
Soviet Embassy 3598, 3599, 3609 '
Soviet Union 3588, 3597-3599, 3604-3607 I
Spanish Civil War 3587 j
Stachel 3599 \
Stalin 3593, 3597, 3602, 3606 |
Stalinism 3601 |
State rights structure 3608 1
Stilwell 3594
Students' Bureau of the Communist Party of Great Britain 3578
Subversive Activities Control Board 3600
Swarthmore 3587, 3588
T
Teheran 3587. 3597, 3598
Ten Pao-hsan 3594
Time magazine 3595, 3596
Tito 3593
Trachtenberg 3599
Trotsky 3606
20th party convention of Communist Party of Soviet Union, March 7,
1956 3571, 3602, 3603, 3606, 3607
U
United Front 3580, 3587 j
United States 3569, 3572, 3582, 3588, 3598, 3603, 3606, 3608 \
University of Chicago 3582 j
"U. S. Reds Quit Foster, Kremlin" 3605
"U. S. Reds Vote End to Control by Soviet" 3605 j
W '
Wahl, David 3585, 3586 :
Wallace 3594 ,
Washington 3558, 3586, 3588, 3596, 3598 :
Weinstock, Louis 3590, 3591 ,
Weiss, Max 3582 ]
Wheeler 3589, 3590 <
Williamson, John 3570, 3572, 3587 ■
Wisconsin 3583 1
WPA 3589 i
T !
Yalta 3597, 3598
Young Communist International 3582
Young Communist League 3580, 3582, 3583
Z
ZinoviefE 3603 J
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