Sea power and freedom; a historical study. With an introd. by Bradley Allen Fiske

U. &TJ.

U. S. Battleship " Arkansas "

SEA POWER AND
FREEDOM "

A HISTORICAL STUDY

BY

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

BRADLEY ALLEN FISKE

Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

Illustrated

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

NEW YORK AND LONDON

Cbe Ikntcfecrbocfecr press
1918

COPYRIGHT, 1918

BY

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

Ube fmicfcerbocfcer press, Hew Kork

FOREWORD

THE conquest of the sea is man's greatest triumph.
The stages of this triumph from the time when the
savage first took advantage of the floating properties
of the log, down through all the ages until the present
day, are shown in moving pictures by this book. Sea
Power and Freedom depicts mainly the career and
achievements of the British Navy; because the British
Navy is the greatest embodiment of sea power that has
ever been attained, and because it has accomplished more
than any other agency, to achieve the conquest of the
sea. The career and achievements of other navies and
of various merchant marines as well are picturesquely
shown ; and the scenes succeed each other in such rapid
but well-ordered fashion, that the story runs uninter-
rupted and harmonious from the first page to the last.

There is nothing a man fears more naturally and more
profoundly than the water. While the ordinary man
remains on land, though subjected to dangers of various
kinds, he has a feeling of being where he belongs; but
once in the water, or in a vessel floating on the water,
fear that his breathing will suddenly be stopped has to
be subdued by force of will; and it is only after familiar-
ity with the dajiger has been attained that the fear is
entirely overcome. If this feeling exists at the present
day, when people know that millions of men have sailed
over the seas during thousands of years, and that the

iii

iv FOREWORD

vessels now constructed are so strong that they can
defy even hurricanes and typhoons, what must it have
been in remote times and among savage tribes !

Man's long and often painful contest with the sea
is a story of adventure, labour, skill, courage, science,
and achievement, which has no parallel in any other
of man's endeavours. No other achievement has tri-
umphed over such great obstacles, no other achieve-
ment has brought about such great results. No forces
of Nature have assailed man with such success as have
storms at sea, no forces of Nature have been so bravely
faced and so successfully overcome. Courage was
needed to do this; but mere courage accomplished little,
till Engineering came to its assistance, and gradually
brought into being those giants of mechanism that now
cross the ocean with mathematical precision, alike in
calm and storm. These steamships represent the high-
est point attained in the contest of men with Nature;
and the highest development of the steamship is the
battleship. No other engineering product of equal size
is so delicate, so manageable, or so perfect; no watch
or chronometer, no wireless telegraph apparatus, no as-
tronomical instrument, is constructed with more scien-
tific accuracy, or fitted with more delicate care. And
a battleship is not merely a battleship in the sense that
it is a kind of ship; because, aside from being a ship, it
is an organism containing hundreds of mechanism of
different kinds, each ready to do its part in the work of
fighting battles. A like remark may be made of the
other types which make up a navy, such as destroyers,
battle-cruisers, cruisers of different kinds, and submar-
ines;— and now a new type of unit is being added, in
the shape of dirigible balloons, and seaplanes of many
kinds.

FOREWORD v

Sea Power and Freedom shows how the early efforts of
the seaman started near the shores of rivers and after-
wards of lakes and seas; how, as the seaman's art
progressed, and the mechanic arts as well, their craft
became stronger, and instruments of propulsion and
navigation were devised. Then the navigator slowly en-
larged the radius of his trips from shore, then cautiously
ventured out upon the ocean, and finally launched out
bravely into the unknown, leaving behind him the solid
safety of the land.

For the most part, the efforts of navigators were
directed then to navigating vessels which were built and
used for the purposes of trade ; and, for the most part,
the efforts of navigators are similarly directed now.
In those days, transportation over the water was under-
taken for the same reason as was transportation over the
land — for trade. This is the fact now, and the reason
is the same. In those days, the water separated por-
tions of the land from other portions, and dwellers in
one place could usually find in other places certain pro-
ducts of the soil or handiwork which they did not them-
selves possess but which they could obtain in exchange
for certain products of their own. This was sea com-
merce in the earliest days, and it is sea commerce now.
The main difference is in the number and quantity of
the things produced and traded for.

There was no supreme law upon the sea then, and
there is none now. No place upon the sea had a police
force which protected the lives and property of people
as is now done in cities; and so it came about that each
trading vessel carried with it the laws of its own country,
and carried weapons with which to protect itself. From
these armed vessels which carried commerce, there were
afterwards developed vessels which were armed, but

vi FOREWORD

did not carry commerce, their task being to protect
commerce-carrying vessels. One armed vessel, or
naval vessel, could protect many merchant vessels on
a voyage, convoying them from one port to another.
Thus was the convoy system started.

It was not until the late Admiral Mahan published
his epochal book, The Influence of Sea Power upon His-
tory, in 1890, that the truth was finally apprehended
that sea power has had any distinctive influence upon
history. Such an idea had occurred to many men and
had appeared sometimes in print; but the book of
Mahan was so attractive, so complete, and so convincing,
that it woke men suddenly to a perception of the truth,
and at the same time to a realisation of the fact that
this truth was of supreme importance to mankind.

That men should not have realised the importance to
any nation of having a large commerce on the sea, with
sufficient naval force to guard it, can easily be under-
stood ; because the sea is so far away from the lives and
experience of most people, that its very existence is hard
to realise; and it is so associated in some minds with
stories of suffering and danger, that it has seemed to
them an agency of evil only. Furthermore, to most
people, the battle of life is so strenuous, and the neces-
sity for earning the daily bread is so imperious, that they
are forced to concern themselves with the things which
they can see with their eyes at the moment, and hear
with their ears, and taste with their lips. Few people
can take a comprehensive view of any subject, so con-
cerned are they forced to be with its details. Few men
and women have a clear idea of even the main facts in
the government of their own cities !

In order to look at any subject as a whole, one must
get high enough above the subject to see all parts of it

FOREWORD vii

unobstructed by other parts; just as one must do, in
order to look at a city as a whole.

If one desires to look at sea power in this way, let
him take an atlas of the world and note how three-
quarters of the globe is covered with water, while only
one-quarter is covered with land; and let him also note
how small a part of even the land is possessed by people
who have very much to say about the government of
that land. Let him note how nearly one-quarter of all
the land in the globe is under the British Government,
and how most of the rest of it is under the governments
of France, Germany, Russia, and the United States.
Let him also note that, in many of the civilised coun-
tries such as Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium, the
most important work of the people is in manufacturing;
while in many countries, such as those in Africa, and in
most of those of Asia, Australia, and South America,
comparatively little manufacturing is done, while there
are millions of square miles of productive soil; and he
will realise that, while the sea separates countries, the
ships which sail upon it act like bridges over it, joining
the countries together, and permitting a world-wide
commerce.

But, in one way or another, men always have to pay
for what they get, and they pay for the benefits of
ocean commerce by the necessity of guarding that com-
merce, and by incurring the dangers which result from
any failure to guard it adequately. The benefits of
ocean commerce bring about competition among mari-
time nations to obtain the most they can; and in this
competition, as in all great competitions, the rewards
go to him who is the most diligent, the most wise, and
the most brave. The nation which has been the most
diligent, wise, and brave in carrying on commerce on the

viii FOREWORD

sea, has gotten the most commerce on the sea, and has
employed the most complete measures for its protection.
The sails of her ships and the smoke of her steamers'
funnels, in both merchant craft and men-of-war, rise
above all the waters that cover three-quarters of the
earth, and attest the omnipresence of her sea power.

Is this omnipresence of sea power an unimportant
matter? Imagine a city in which there were a hundred
business firms in competition with each other, but in
which there was no protection for the goods of any firm
in transportation through the city, except such protec-
tion as the employees of that firm could give. In such
a condition of affairs, the wagons of each firm would
probably carry armed employees; contests between the
employees of one firm with those of another firm would
be possible; and the advantage possessed by the firm
that had the most and the biggest wagons and the best
guards would be obvious. Now such a condition is
much like the condition on the sea, over which each
nation transports its goods, with no protection except
that given by its employees.

To a greater degree than any other nation, Great
Britain has carried on and has protected commerce on
all the oceans of the world. The power she has exerted
has been greater than any other nation ever exerted
before, and has been so obvious that in recent years it
has come almost to be accepted as a law. Great power
is a curse if it is misused, but a blessing if it is well used.
Fortunately for the world, her power has been exerted
in the main for the benefit of mankind. As this book
so clearly and beautifully shows, the sea power of Great
Britain has been exerted in the main to preserve the
freedom of the seas, in the sense that it has made the
sea free to travellers, and has assisted commerce by

FOREWORD ix

assuring safety to it, and by bringing about the removal
of narrow rules and needless and burdensome restric-
tions.

This does not mean that all the acts which have es-
tablished and maintained the sea power of Great Britain
have been unselfish; but it does mean that, even if the
British sea policy has been guided by self-interest, that
self-interest has been intelligent; and that, even if we
may justly find fault with some things, we must admit
that the far-sightedness and broad-mindedness shown
by Great Britain in the use of the unprecedented power
given her by her predominance at sea, has no parallel
in history.

Possibly, one explanation is that many of the selfish
acts of men, and perhaps nearly all their cruelties, have
been because of short-sightedness, a narrow view of life,
a tendency to exaggerate the importance of things near
in place or time, and a failure to realise how trivial and
how fleeting are many of the things men strive for. If
this be so, large undertakings, involving great bodies of
men, and extending over continents and seas, tend so to
broaden men's views and elevate their aims, as to re-
duce the temptation to gain small personal advantages,
or gratify petty spites.

Such an effect seems to be in the mind of the author of
this book; and for this reason, as well as others, his
narrative of events and the conclusions which he reaches
are of vital interest to the world at large, and especially
to the people of the countries that border on the sea.

BRADLEY A. FISKE.

NEW YORK, February 9, 1918.

PREFACE

IT was while revising the lectures of which this book
is chiefly composed, that the vital part played by the
maritime races in establishing and maintaining the
freedom of mankind was borne in upon my mind.
Hence the title of this volume, expressive, as I venture
to think, of much which is in our thoughts to-day, and
cheering withal.

I would ask my readers to remember that I did not
set out to write a treatise on the relation of Sea Power
to Freedom, but to prepare a set of lectures on the
Meaning and Function of Sea Power which should
interest an audience of Teachers, in whose hands rests
so great an opportunity for impressing on the minds of
those who are to follow us the lessons of duty and
devotion which the history of maritime nations affords.
The idea of the connection of Sea Power with Freedom
is only one strain of thought out of many. The stress
of the time did not admit of extensive revision and re-
writing. Therefore I hope I may be forgiven a certain
discursiveness of matter and colloquialism of style less
proper to the printed page than to the spoken word.

The history of the world marches in orderly sequence.
No study convinces one so clearly of this fact in the
case of our own country as the study of Sea Power.
Approached from this standpoint, the events of the
ages show one steady stream of development, rich with
purpose and promise. In the issue of to-day, Great

xii PREFACE

Britain, her children oversea, and the United States
could not have been but where they are, without being
false to their past and prodigal of their future. Nor
can they, without certain disaster, sheathe the sword
till all that for which they are fighting is fully won.
" Here stand we. We can no other. "

Those acquainted with the writings of Admiral
Mahan will be at no loss to trace their influence in the
following pages. I can hope for nothing better than
that this book may induce others at present unfamiliar
with those writings to study them at first hand, and
also the no less valuable works of Sir John Knox
Laughton, Sir Julian Corbet, and other British naval
writers of far deeper learning and greater author^
than I can pretend to. I must also acknowledge the
debt I owe to Mr. E. Hallam Moorhouse for his in-
valuable volume, Letters of the English Seamen; to Mr.
Archibald Kurd, most painstaking of naval writers,
and Mr. Henry Castle for the information supplied by
their German Sea Power : Its Rise, Progress, and Eco-
nomic Basis; to Miss Alethea Wiel's engrossing study of
The Navy of Venice, and to Mr. Ernest Law's England's
First Great War Minister, a book which casts light on
a period of English history much overlaid by prejudice.
For the early history of Sea Power, I derived great
help from The Historian's History of the World, published
by the Times.

GERARD FIENNES.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. — INTRODUCTORY i

II. — SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD . 19

III.— "AlPLACE WHERE Two SEAS MEET" . 42

IV. — THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 61

V. — THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES 85

VI. — THE AGE OF DISCOVERY . . . .108

VII. — THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN . . . 134

VIII.— PRIDE AND A FALL ..... 162

IX. — SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE . . .191

X. — THE RESTORER OF PATHS .... 220

XI. — THE CHALLENGE ..... 248

XII. — THE VALLEY OF DECISION .... 277

XIII. — THE MAIN FLEETS 309

XIV. — CONCLUSION 333

INDEX 357

ILLUSTRATIONS

U. S. BATTLESHIP "ARKANSAS"

. Frontispiece

THE HEREFORD MAP OF THE WORLD. . . .24

MAP OF THE MEDITERRANEAN IN ANCIENT TIMES . 26
STATUE OF ALFRED THE GREAT AT WINCHESTER . . 48
THE BALTIC FLEET LEAVING SPITHEAD ... 64
THE CAPTURE OF AN ALGERINE CORSAIR ... 68
"THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON" . . . .68

HENRY VIII. EMBARKING AT DOVER ... 82
THE MAN-OF-WAR " GREAT HARRY " ... 84
THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO . . . . .104

A CARAVEL OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY . .no
COLUMBUS'S CARAVELS . . . . .no

A GALLEON OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY . .118
A GALLEY OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY . .118

A GALLEY RUNNING BEFORE THE WIND ... .122

AN ADMIRAL'S GALLEY. . . . . .122

A GALLEASS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY . 126

A GALLEASS . 126

xvi ILLUSTRATIONS

PACK

THE DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMADA, 1588 . .128

EDWARD LORD HAWKE, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET . 146

ROBERT BLAKE, GENERAL AND ADMIRAL OF THE

PARLIAMENT FORCES ..... 146

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALGIERS . . . .148

ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH

FLEETS AT THE MOUTH OF THE THAMES, 1666 . 152

THE BATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1759 180

ADMIRAL DUNCAN'S VICTORY OVER THE DUTCH

FLEET ........ 194

THE BATTLE OF THE NILE ..... 200

NAVAL BATTLE WON BY THE KNIGHTS OF SAINT

JEAN ........ 232

THE BRITISH DESTROYER " FOAM ". . . . 272

A BRITISH "DREADNOUGHT". .... 272

U. S. BATTLESHIP "NEBRASKA" .... 300

SIR JOHN JELLICOE ...... 304

LORD FISHER 304

SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Sea Power and Freedom

CHAPTER i

INTRODUCTORY

As the Great War has taken its course, from August,
1914, when Great Britain and her Allies, aroused from
their dreams of peace, stood up all unprepared, against
the Central Empires which had made them ready for
battle, till the time when, at last, they are bringing
their full might to bear, it has become more and more
evident that the bed-rock on which the hope of victory
rests is sea power. The events of the years just past
have taught us more of the meaning of the word than
has been popularly understood, at least since Trafalgar.
We have seen — or rather we have not seen, save with
the eye of faith — the Grand Fleet standing ever on
guard in "the Northern mists," and we have realised,
more or less, that, so long as it retains what is known
as the "Command of the Sea," we cannot be invaded.
The war is being fought on other soil than that of
Great Britain by reason of the predominance of that
Grand Fleet. Great armies have been transported,
not only across the Channel, but from the uttermost
parts of the earth, with the loss of scarce a man or a

i

2 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

pound of stores, again because the Grand Fleet has
"banged, barred, and bolted" the gates of the world
against the Germans and their allies. We have
learned that the reason why we suffer — but not un-
bearably— from high prices is that the demands upon
our mercantile marine and the depredations of the "U "
boats have caused a scarcity of tonnage for the carry-
ing of trade. We have been taught, by the logic of
events, that, for us, security and prosperity rest upon
the power to use the sea.

Sea power means that, and it means nothing more
— save the corollary: the power to deny the use of the
sea to the enemy in time of war. This definition should
be kept clearly in mind. It is all-important to what
is to follow. The military navy is a necessary instru-
ment of sea power, since it is on the military navy that
a maritime State must rely to "impeach" the enemy,
as the Elizabethans said, in his use of the sea-routes.
But, in itself, it is only a part, though a most important
part of the whole. The sea has no owner. It has
been compared to a wide common, free to the use of
all mankind. The right of ownership only begins
within the curtilage of the house, so to speak : with the
carriage-drive, the estuaries of the rivers and the
harbours. Even within territorial waters — the much-
quoted three-mile limit — there is no right of possession
until low water-mark is reached. It follows, then, that
sea power is not the monopoly of any one nation. All
nations who have the requisite natural facilities may
possess it in measure. Conceivably, all nations might
possess it in an equal degree, so long as they remain
at peace with one another.

In effect, however, though the right of all be equal,
the possession of sea power is limited by natural con-

INTRODUCTORY 3

ditions. Switzerland has the same right as Britain
to use the sea, but she has no more the power than has
a paralysed man the power to cross the common. All
she needs from over-sea must be brought her in the
ships of other nations. The first condition of sea
power is, obviously, access to the sea: favourable
geographical position, an easily accessible coast, secure
and commodious harbours. Thus baldly stated, it
appears a mere platitude to enunciate this condition.
But there are many degrees of ability and disability,
ranging between Switzerland, cut off entirely from
access to the sea, and Britain or Japan, with the sea
surrounding them, and ports, always possible of access,
on all their coasts. There is Russia, for instance, with
her Baltic ports sealed for nearly half the year by ice,
and Rumania, whose only approach to the outer seas
is through the Dardanelles, the control of which is
destined for ever to rest in the hands of another Power.
Or, again, there is Belgium, with her great port of
Antwerp situated on a river, the mouths of which are
controlled by Holland. The gradations are endless;
but the instances given show that, in peace as well as
in war, geographical position, apart from actual exclu-
sion from the shore, is the first and most important
factor in the incidence of sea power.

Next in importance comes the need of the nation
for over-sea commerce. So far as geographical posi-
tion is concerned, France and Spain are but little less
favourably situated than Great Britain. Yet neither
of these countries has succeeded in maintaining a
really developed sea power. Why?

The answer is partly to be found in the condition
stated above. The first thing necessary to the life of
man is eatables. When a nation produces at home all,

4 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

or almost all, it requires in the way of eatables; when
its soil is the true mother of the people; when they
have, perhaps, a surplus of corn and wine and oil to
barter for manufactures, or for luxuries of other kinds,
they do not take that surplus in their own ships, seek-
ing a market among the hungry. Just as, when Egypt
was in plenty and there was scarcity outside the
borders, Joseph hoarded the produce of the fat years
and the patriarchs went down into Egypt to buy food
for the famine of their houses, so the nation similarly
situated nowadays will say, in effect, to the world:
1 ' If you wish to partake of our superfluity, come down
in your ships and fetch it, and bring with you your
goods in exchange." The importing country is not,
of course, necessarily a poor country, or short of re-
sources. That could not be said of Britain with her
coal and iron and immense industries, nor of Germany.
But it is true, all through history, that the nations
which have had to exchange their products for food-
stuffs have been the great Sea Powers. Phoenicia,
Greece, Venice, Holland, Britain stand on the one
hand; ancient Egypt, Babylonia, France, and the
United States stand on the other. The instance of
the United States is peculiarly instructive, for, until
she began to develop her natural resources in the great
lands of the West, she was a great Sea Power, with a
mercantile marine at one time only second to that of
Great Britain. Now she is one of the greatest export-
ing countries in the world, but, in comparison with
the bulk of her trade, her mercantile marine is insigni-
ficant. As regards this country, which, of course,
has a great agriculture, and, in early times, was at
least self-supporting, it is interesting to note that her
sea commerce was small, and that she relied on Vene-

INTRODUCTORY 5

tian and Hanseatic ships to bring her what she required
from abroad — chiefly articles of luxury — up to Tudor
times. Why was there then a change, and why did
she become a maritime State?

Partly, no doubt, the change was due to the fostering
care of her kings. Partly it was due to the discovery
of America and of the passage round the Cape, which,
in the long run, ruined Venice. But, in addition to
these political and external causes, it may be remem-
bered that during the fourteenth century the popula-
tion was reduced to one-half by the Black Death, the
whole system of villenage, on which agriculture de-
pended, was overthrown, and that large tracts of land
went out of cultivation, while, during almost the whole
of the fifteenth, the land was distracted and recovery
retarded by the troubles leading up to and ensuing
upon the Wars of the Roses. These events upset the
balance between town and country and compelled
the importation of necessaries. Much has been attri-
buted to the Black Death; but its possible effect upon
our sea power has been overlooked by historians.
Were the latter accustomed to pay much heed to
maritime matters, their silence might condemn the
conjecture as of little value. But it is an extraordinary
fact that, with the exception of the few who specialise
in the subject, our historians seem oblivious of the
immense effect which the sea and the use thereof have
had on the making of Britain and her history.

Next in order of the factors which go to building
up sea power must be placed the character and habits
of the people, a factor which depends, in part at least,
on the condition just discussed. The need of food
first drives men to seek the harvest of the sea, and,
thus, fisheries are invariably the nurseries of mariners.

6 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

But also it is to be noticed that the great seafaring
peoples have been a stiff-necked breed, little wont to
accept either foreign domination or tyrannical govern-
ment at home. The docile subjects of the Pharaohs,
the Chaldean and Persian kings, of Louis XIV., and the
Spanish monarchy were never imbued with the true
sea spirit, although, from time to time, some of them
have shone as soldiers at sea. The temperament
which endures personal rule is lacking in initiative
and self-reliance. It was widely different with the
Phoenicians, the Athenians, the Norsemen, the Vene-
tians, the Dutch, and the English. The restless mind,
the independent and individualistic spirit with its love
of adventure and desire for gain, have made of these
true seafaring peoples, when once it was fairly aroused.
True, the awakening may take centuries. It has been
noted that the English people of the Middle Ages
were of almost Oriental docility save for the turbulent
Normans among them. But, in those centuries,
their dwelling-place was wide enough for them, and
the conditions of life, for all but the villeins and serfs,
at any rate, easy. They had not yet begun to find
the incentive to use the sea. The French are a people
with many of the qualities which go to make a great
colonising and seafaring nation. But the true maritime
spirit has never yet come to life in the people as a
whole. No lands have offered them a fairer prospect
than sunny France. They have always had elbow-
room and plenty, and, to the detriment of the national
life, they take care that there are never too many
Frenchmen for the soil of France. They are a thrifty
and home-loving nation. They lack the incentive to
seek their fortunes over-seas, or, if they do, they look
back with yearning and a determination to return to

INTRODUCTORY 7

their native land. They have developed at least a
theoretical passion for political freedom, and, in these
latter years, seem to have acquired a practical
capacity for self-government. But the causes noted
above continue to operate to prevent the growth of
the maritime and colonising spirit.

It will be gathered that what is meant by sea power
is by no means confined to the military navy. The
division of the maritime strength of a country into
fighting and mercantile ships is, indeed, a plant of
comparatively recent growth. After fishing, the
earliest development of sea power was piracy. No
need to boggle at the word. Piracy and empiricism
have both the same derivation, though the pirate is
regarded as a bloodthirsty ruffian and the empiric,
at worst, as a harmless lunatic. They are both people
who try experiments, discoverers. In Elizabethan
times, pirates were known by the more endearing
name of merchant, or even gentlemen, adventurers.

Regard the Phoenicians who first fared forth with
their freights to Cyprus and, later, to Tarshish and
beyond, seeking copper and tin. They went armed,
for they knew not whom or what they might meet.
They were not perhaps too nice in their methods of
barter with the strangers they met in the lands they
sought. It has not infrequently happened since that
the simple savage has held views on the subject of the
comparative value of copra and beads which have
led to a difference of opinion between him and the
seafaring man, who has felt himself obliged to chastise
him for the benefit of his commercial morals.

But there was no law on the sea, or in the lands
beyond, to protect these early voyagers. Their safety
and their success depended on the arms they carried

8 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

and their ability to use them. When the Greeks in
turn sought the riches of Spain, the Phoenicians fought
the Greeks at sea, though here was no war between
Phoenicia and Hellas, but trading relations continued.
Merchants and merchantmen went armed for protec-
tion, but their object was not war but wealth. It
was the same with the "adventurers" of our own land,
though they had the added joy of striking a blow for
the Protestant cause by snapping their fingers at the
King of Spain and the Bull of Alexander VI. Mer-
chantmen went armed at least down to the Peace of
1815, and many are the instances in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries of combats and captures at
sea while peace still nominally reigned between the
home governments. That there was — perhaps still
is — no law on the sea save that of the States which
use it is shown by the fact that, until quite recently,
every crime committed on the high seas and cognisable
by the British Courts was deemed to have been com-
mitted "in the County of Middlesex," and was triable
at the Old Bailey alone.

That special types of ships fitted for war were early
evolved by the maritime nations does not alter the
case, nor that certain States which were not strictly
speaking maritime built navies for the special purpose
of war. It is in the main true that the military navy,
so far from constituting the substance of sea power,
is rather its accident, and that the need to possess the
military "command of the sea" is exactly proportioned
to the dependence of a State on sea communications
for its wealth and subsistence. To take the instance
nearest at hand: If Germany were at war with us
alone,ufehe could still draw her necessary supplies of food
from the sources whence she, in the main, draws them

INTRODUCTORY 9

in time of peace: wheat and rye from Russia and
Rumania, dairy produce and meat from Holland,
Denmark, France, Italy, Switzerland, and so forth.
She could draw raw materials for her industries from
all the ports of Europe. She would have lost nothing
but ,the power to carry these things in her own ships
— a severe economic loss, but not fatal. As it is,
she has, by her own act, turned herself into an island.
She has failed to gain the advantage of the sea power
for which she strove, and she has lost that of her con-
tinental position. "Bitter is the need," not only of
a strong German navy, but of one strong enough to
keep open her sea communications, and this all the
millions she has lavished have failed to provide. Her
sea power for the time being has vanished, for she has
lost the power to use the sea. With the impotence
of her battle-fleet, there has disappeared her great
mercantile marine.

The real separation between the functions of a
military navy and a merchant fleet came with the
introduction of cannon. The trader desired, of course,
to devote all the space he could to cargo-carrying. He
did not wish to carry a larger crew than was needed
to work the ship. But guns and ammunition are
bulky and heavy, and extra men are required to fight
the guns. So the State took over certain functions
necessary to trade by sea, both in peace and war.
The policing of the trade routes, exploration, charting,
lighting, the establishment of bases of supply and re-
freshment and their protection, were all essentials,
and were all made the function of the military navy.
Hence it comes about that, quite apart from the de-
fence of the shores from invasion and the necessity
to transport land forces by sea, which was the earliest

io SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

purpose served by the construction of special war-
vessels, the possession of a large mercantile marine
involves the establishment and the upkeep of a military
force. But the essence of sea power must still be looked
for in the use of the sea as a means of peaceful inter-
course and commerce between nations.

The earliest known civilisations established them-
selves on the seashore, or on the alluvial plains stretch-
ing along the course of mighty rivers. Behind lay
the hills or the desert; in front the sea. As popu-
lation and wealth increased, the place where they
dwelt became too strait for nomadic life. There
was strife between the herdsmen, as between those of
Abraham and Lot, for the most fertile and well-watered
stretches of pasture. The strongest ceased to wander
and settled themselves permanently on these. Man
took to agriculture, then to dwelling in cities, to arts
and crafts, to exchange and barter. But, directly you
reach that stage, means of transport and communica-
tion become all important. The further you go from
sea-level the more difficult does transport become.
There were no roads, nor wheeled vehicles. But the
rivers provided an inclined plane, up and down which
goods might easily be transported, once the principle
of buoyancy was understood. No doubt that elemen-
tary principle was mastered by our arboreal ancestors,
who floated down stream on a tree trunk, wet but safe.
From the trunk to the dug-out, or to the raft, made
by lashing several trunks together, was an easy step;
to fashion frames and knees and to cover them with
planks or hides, and thus to ^orm a hollow, cargo-
bearing ship was less elementary, but not beyond the
powers of rude races of mankind, as the records show.
When means of propulsion by pole, paddle, oar, and

INTRODUCTORY n

eventually sail, had been devised, an easy means to
transport large weights of merchandise on the broad
bosom of the Nile or the Tigris and Euphrates was at
the disposal of man. As a matter of fact, from very
early days the produce of Armenia was transported
to Babylon on rafts which floated down the Euphrates
and were sold at the end of the journey to save the
labour and expense of poling or towing them up stream
again. The same system prevails to-day.

It is, however, to the man in the coracle or dug-out
that we must look for the first adventurer who put to
sea from the mouth of the river where lay his fishing-
ground. " Perhaps he went to see what was round the
next promontory, and there found a fishing village
similar to his own /with the inhabitants of which he
entered into relations, if they did not obey the time-
honoured advice to " 'eave 'arf a brick" at the stranger.
Perhaps ahead of him he saw "summer isles of Eden,
lying in dark purple spheres of sea," as one sees St.
Honorat and St. Marguerite from Cannes, with the
snowy mountains of Corsica behind them. Greatly
daring, the voyager fared forth and crossed the strait,
to find himself the first colonist. So traffic, demand-
ing ever larger craft, would be established between
himself and those who followed him and their mother
city, and ever their eyes would turn to other islands
lying yet further beyond. Consider the early history
of Cyprus, and all that it has meant to the world.
Here East and West first came into contact. The
Phoenician, creeping along the coast of Syria to the
mouth of the Orontes, saw Cape Andrea lift above the
sea-rim and set his sail for it. The Greek, coasting
along the shores of the Levant, saw it also. There
they met, Aryan and Semite, and there they traded

12 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

copper, all important in the Bronze age. Thence
Cadmus carried letters to Greece and there Ashtoreth
of the Zidonians rose from the waves, Aphrodite
Anadyomene of the Hellenes.

Adventures by individuals apart, however, what
was it which first drove man to the sea? He had no
knowledge of the lands which lay beyond. His pro-
gress, creeping from point to point, was slow and
fraught with peril. Yet he dared the mysterious forces
of Nature, leaving security and, perchance, ease behind
him. First and foremost, no doubt, necessity, the res
angusta domi. Driven by the stronger, or the more
cunning, from the fat pastures, a tribe of refugees,
such as the Phoenicians or the Venetians, would take
refuge in some undesired spot, protected by the ranges
of Libanus and Anti-Libanus or by the swamps and
lagoons of Venetia, and would there learn the hardi-
hood and skill which, in process of time, enabled them
to outstrip the oppressor in wealth or in power or in
both. Or, again, the trouble might not be external,
but internal. There might be those who felt them-
selves evil intreated of tyrants; those to whom the
right of private judgment, so passionately claimed by
some races, our own among others, was denied. Or
the seafarers might themselves be fiery, turbulent
spirits who would not submit to the reign of law. For
law, be it remembered, is the compromise of individual
right which man has found to be necessary if he is to
live in a society. We still talk of the right of con-
quest as between nations. But it is obvious that, if
conquest is admitted as a right between individuals,
our lives would be one continual turmoil and strife.
Man is therefore called upon to abandon his in-
dividual right when it impinges upon the right of his

INTRODUCTORY 13

neighbour, and, if question arises, to submit the matter
to judgment.

Since all law needs force behind it, it has frequently
been found the most practicable plan to invest the
sole right of plunder in the strongest or shrewdest
member of the community, on condition that he allows
no one to plunder but himself. Or he, being the
stronger, has seized that power. Hence arose tyrants,
and hence arose the necessity for those who could
not, or would not, submit to betake themselves else-
where. Aut disce, aut discede. Manet sors tertia,
cadi.

There are two main refuges for the persecuted and
the lawless: the hills and the sea. The weaker breeds
have, as a rule, taken to the hills, where, in the hard
school of adversity, they have learned hardihood, and
in time have avenged themselves upon the more
prosperous and slothful dwellers of the plain. As the
poet sings:

" The mountain sheep are sweeter,
But the valley sheep are fatter.
We therefore deemed it meeter
To carry off the latter."

Those who took to the sea have been, for the most part,
the stronger, the fiercer, the more adventurous. For
the wrath of Nature is more terrible than the wrath of
man. They chose the better part. The way of the
sea leads to wealth as well as liberty; the way of the
hills, to liberty indeed, but seldom to wealth.

We shall see as we proceed that the motives which
have led man to take to the sea have had an immense
influence on the future of the races from which they
have sprung. The Phoenicians, the Venetians, and the

H SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Dutch are instances of peoples driven to seafaring and
colonisation by the narrow resources of the lands in
which they dwelt, and the pressure of stronger races
behind them. Although, in two cases out of three, the
possession of colonies eventually overtaxed the strength
of the mother State, and, in the case of Venice, the
colonists made themselves fiercely hated by the peoples
among whom they dwelt, yet, with all three, the exiled
branches remained faithful to the parent stem, and
trade, at any rate, did "follow the flag." The same
cannot be said of the colonies of the Hellenic States.
Lack of subsistence, it is true, drove many of the
colonists to seek distant homes, and they took Greek
customs, Greek art, and Greek culture with them. But
the causes of their departure were, in many cases,
political also, and the colonists were of little aid to
Hellas in her struggles with the barbarian invaders;
indeed, they were frequently themselves to be counted
among her enemies. No Greek city, with the possible
exception of Corinth, became a great mart of the world's
merchandise through the energies of its sons as did the
Phoenician cities through those of the Carthaginians
and the settlers in Spain. The Greeks were essen-
tially without sense of solidarity, factious and lacking
in national spirit, except under stress of overwhelming
danger and for short periods of time. Most of the
Ionian colonies of Asia Minor marched under the
banner of Xerxes to the conquest of Greece. Take
again the case of the Northmen, whether Saxons,
Danes, or Norse. They planted themselves in England
and in Normandy; they settled and became English
or Norman. But they cut themselves off completely
from Scandinavia. They ceased absolutely to belong
to the nations from which they sprang. Our own

INTRODUCTORY 15

case is particularly instructive, seeing that those who
left our shores to escape political or religious persecu-
tion in the long run broke away, while those who went
to distant lands to seek fortune, neglected, it may be,
but left free in conscience and in their civil rights,
protected by the long arm of British sea power without
money and without price, are loyal to the Crown and
Blood, as they are proving more magnificently than
our warmest hopes have whispered to us. The sea
has proved, not a barrier, but the strongest link of
union. And, as we have every reason to believe, the
best is yet to be. It is an idea of Empire quite new to
the world, this free bond between free peoples, in which
the Mother Country exacts no tribute and asks no
special privileges. It is the latest and completest
product of sea power in its widest sense: born of its
spirit, nurtured by its genius. It will, of course, be
one of the principal aims of this volume to inquire
how the Ocean Empire was made and what are the
conditions under which it exists. It is an almost
miraculous story, and not the least marvellous part
of it is that many of its chroniclers have almost seemed
to miss the chief force on which it depends, so silent
and invisible is it in its working.

The British boy, taught history in the schools, can
name five British victories on land to every three at
sea. Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt; Blenheim, Ramillies,
Oudenarde; Minden, Dettingen, Corunna, Vimiera,
Albuera, Badajoz, Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria,
Waterloo, Alma, Inkerman, Balaklava, and so on:
these are all household words. On the naval side, he
would perhaps name Sluys (probably knowing no more
about it than that the Court Fool of the King of France
announced it to his master by saying: "What cowards

16 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

these English are! They had not the courage to jump
overboard like the French!"), the defeat of the Ar-
mada, La Hogue, Quiberon Bay, The Saints, the
Glorious First of June, Camperdown, St. Vincent, The
Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. Nineteen victories
by land to eleven at sea. The proportion is a strange
one for the greatest Sea Power in the world's history.
But sea power has its perfect work in the slow and
silent pressure it brings to bear, by denying to the
enemy freedom of action while maintaining that
freedom for itself and its allies, rather than in the
actual clash of arms. It resembles in its working the
serpents which arose out of the sea at Tenedos and
wound themselves round the limbs of Laocoon and his
sons. The Germans know — most painfully — this im-
palpable, impermeable force which surrounds the war-
ring armies on the Continent and constrains them to
its will. Belgium was overrun, beaten, crushed; yet
Belgium lives. Her army has been refitted by the
Power which has been untouched by the invader and
has the resources of the world at its back. Its flank
is secured by the British Navy, which has the control
of the North Sea and has the dunes under its guns.
Or take the case of Serbia. A rabble of starved and
beaten men straggled down to the coast of the Adriatic
in the autumn of 1915. They were rescued by sea
power as the army of Sir John Moore was rescued
after the retreat to Corunna, and was brought back to
Salonika, equipped and reorganised, to aid in recovering
the freedom of their native land. Take the Russians
in France or at Salonika, brought all the way round
from Vladivostok. Take the marvellous odyssey of
the British armoured cars, which were landed at
Archangel, and fought on the frontiers of Persia.

INTRODUCTORY 17

These are but a few telling incidents. They do not
show a tenth part of what sea power is accomplishing
to derange the plans of the enemy, even in parts remote
from the sea. That will be dealt with in its proper
place. But they serve to illustrate the immediate
point: that it is not amid the roar of the guns of
Jutland Bank that the truest and most vital workings
of sea power are to be sought. It is, rather, in the
use of sea communications to succour and support
the weaker combatants and to force the enemy to turn
from his purpose and to strike his blows in the air.
An army which has the free use of the sea is ever an
elusive foe against whom it is almost impossible to seek
a decision, unless he himself is prepared to welcome
it. Besides which, there is always economic pressure
working inexorably to derange his military plans and
force him to adventures beyond his strength.

"He that commands the sea," said Bacon, "hath
great liberty to take as much or as little of the war as
he will." That is unquestionably true, and we shall
find instances, in the histories of Phoenicia, of Greece,
of Venice, and of Britain, in which full advantage has
been taken of this liberty. Indeedjapan is exercising
it now, in so far as she commands the sea in her own
region of the world. To our credit be it said that, in
the great struggle of to-day we are using our liberty
to take as much of the war as we can.

The history of sea power to the Briton is the history
of the evolution of the British nation and Empire.
Towards that culmination all else moves. But before
tracing the development of our race it is necessary to
show something of the general working of sea power in
the ancient world and of the gradual process by which
maritime ascendency crystallised round these islands.

i8 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

If the story is one rather of war than of peace, that is
no contradiction of the statement made above that
sea power is not primarily an affair of the military
navy. Just as the great sea battles are the events on
which the imagination seizes in war-time, rather than
upon the silent pressure of the Navy, which is of even
greater moment, but which cannot easily be described
in words, so war is the touchstone by which sea power
is brought to the test. The use of the sea being its
main end, the ability to use it depends on the ability
to keep the highway clear in times of crisis. But
let it never be forgotten that, since the British Navy
won first place in the world, it has saved more wars
than it has fought. It has been the instrument of
peace, of law, and of liberty, keeping open the highway
of the sea so that "the wayfaring men, though fools,
shall not err therein." In this, we claim, it plays its
destined part in promoting the welfare of mankind.

CHAPTER II

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

To the ancient Greeks, from whom, apart from the
Scriptures and the monuments of Egypt and Assyria,
our knowledge of antiquity is almost wholly derived,
the Mediterranean was the centre of the (Ecumene,
or habitable world. All the known races of mankind
dwelt round its shores or to the east of it, as far as
the Persian Gulf and the shores of the Black Sea and
the Caspian. The Balkans and the Alps formed its
northern boundary; the Pillars of Herakles, set, accord-
ing to the Phoenician legend, by Melkarth on either
side of the Straits of Gibraltar, the western. West
of these again, in the golden sea, which, struck by the
setting sun, gave forth the sound of a harp-string,
were the Islands of the Blest, the fabled Atlantis, the
land where Hesperides guarded their golden fruit.
To the south, the weary Titan upheld the roof of the
world. To the north dwelt the Cimmerians in outer
darkness, the Laestrygons in endless day, and the happy
Hyperboreans in the "dancing places of the dawn."
Outside all these, Okeanus flowed endlessly round
the disc of the world. Such was the conception of
geography and ethnography at the date of Homer.
But the bounds of the (Ecumene were ever being
pushed further from the centre as knowledge grew
with exploration.

19

20 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

It is then, among the races living round the Medi-
terranean that great and mighty empires developed,
advanced in many respects in civilisation to a degree
which man has hardly yet surpassed. How much of
their greatness did they owe to sea power? How much
did it contribute to their upbuilding; how much to
the fall of those which did not possess it, or, having
possessed it, lost it? The question is asked of the
history of Egypt, of Chaldea, of Phoenicia, Persia,
Greece, Carthage, and Rome, from about the year 2000
B.C. to the foundation of the Empire of the Caesars
at Actium.

The first two great Empires of the world were river-
ain: Chaldea, depending on the Euphrates and the
Tigris, and Egypt on the Nile. They were self-sup-
porting in the necessaries of life; their capitals were
situated on rich alluvial plains; the rivers afforded
convenient inclined planes for transport and supply.
Thus neither of them experienced the first and most
cogent impulse for the development of sea power, and,
in fact, neither of them developed it to any great extent;
the Chaldeans, so far as we can tell, not at all. There
are representations of galleys and even of naval en-
gagements to be found on the bas-reliefs; but the
ships are not Assyrian or Babylonian ships, but those
of some ally, hired for the purpose of fighting, or of
transporting Chaldean soldiers. The wares of Chaldea
were carried overland to the Mediterranean, or along
the great trade route by the oasis of Palmyra, thence
down through Syria, and thus to Egypt. The Midian-
ites to whom Joseph was sold were, perhaps, engaged
on such a journey. There was no reason to think that
Chaldean ships sailed the Red Sea or the Indian Ocean,
though, as we shall see, the Egyptians occasionally

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 21

made expeditions there, and the Phoenicians thought
it worth while to maintain fleets in the Gulf of Akaba,
in order to fetch the treasures of Ophir and Punt for
the magnificent Solomon, and may, perhaps, have
journeyed as far south as Taprobane, or Ceylon. It has
been conjectured that the failure of the Chaldeans
to use the sea was due to the lack of suitable woods for
ship-building. This, however, can hardly have been
the case, since they had the resources of Armenia
behind them and easy transport by water. The reason
must be looked for in the absence of necessity and the
richness of the more temperate part of their dominions,
which kept the people from seeking the seacoast. If
the Chaldeans had established a sea power based on
the Persian Gulf; if they had been the bold and hardy
sailors the Phoenicians were, the history of the world
might have been fundamentally different. They would
have sailed south and east, and have established inter-
course with the peoples of India, perhaps even of China.
The course of empire might well have taken its way
eastwards instead of westwards.

So also it might if the Egyptians had developed into
a maritime people. With fleets in the Mediterranean
and in the Red Sea, they would have brought the
eastern and the western world into contact many hun-
dreds of years before that contact actually occurred.
Without any doubt they would have constructed the
Suez Canal — mere child's play to the builders of the
Pyramids — and, securely seated on their two seas,
they must have been the rulers of the world, which
might never have had occasion to look elsewhere
for a master. But the Pharaohs developed no great
measure of sea power. From time to time, some ruler,
more ambitious or more far-seeing than the rest, main-

22 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

tained a fleet in the Mediterranean or the Red Sea,
but these were all comparatively small achievements
for a people so favourably situated for sea trade and
endowed with so high a measure of constructive skill.
The ancient Egyptians were never a seafaring people.
When the Phoenicians and the Greeks had developed
their civilisation sufficiently to engage in maritime
industry, the Egyptians resigned their pretensions to
sea power altogether and were content to make use
of foreign shipping for their trade. In this they fol-
lowed the universal rule already laid down, that the
peoples which have a surplus of the necessaries of life
to dispose of make those who want that surplus come
and fetch it, bringing with them the luxuries and super-
fluities which the favoured nation desires. Yet ancient
Egypt was destined to fall by sea power, and she has
ever since been the prize of that nation which had the
supremacy at sea. It is not going too far to say that
there is no people in history more blind to the things
which belonged to their peace and greatness than the
subjects of the Pharaohs in their neglect of the sea and
all it might have given them.

Mention must be made, however, of one or two
notable enterprises during the short periods when
some monarch arose who was alive to the opportunities
afforded. The earliest maritime expedition of which
we have any authentic record was fitted out by Sankh-
ka-Ra, the last Pharaoh of the Eleventh Dynasty.
It sailed to Punt, or Somaliland, about the year 2800
B.C. Eleven hundred years later, the enterprise was
repeated by Queen Hat-Shepsu. The expeditions were
undertaken, not to fetch articles of necessity, but
"resin of incense, ebony, ivory set in pure gold, scented
woods, paint for the eyes, with dog-headed apes, long-

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 23

tailed monkeys and greyhounds, with leopard skins,
and with natives of the country, together with their
children." All these for the luxury of Pharaoh and
energetic Queen Hat-Shepsu. One is reminded of
King Solomon's cargoes of almug trees, of ivory, apes,
and peacocks, fetched by the navy which was built
for him by King Hiram of Tyre. The earliest recorded
sea fight, however, was won by Rameses III. at Mygdol,
over the Colchians and Carians, about 1200 B.C.

For many hundreds of years Syria was the scene
of struggles, first between the mysterious Empire of
the Hittites and Egypt and Assyria in turn, and then
between the Egyptians and Chaldeans. Carchemish,
Megiddo, Lachish are names which are continually
recurring as the scenes of great battles, according as
one State or the other obtained a temporary mastery
and carried the war into or towards the territory of
another. None of these campaigns appear to have
been decisive, save that the Assyrians eventually
broke the power of the Hittites in pieces. Egypt
never subdued Chaldea, nor Chaldea Egypt, until the
time of the Medes and Persians arrived, and their
kings made tributary to them a confederation of small
States, which placed in their hands the weapon needful
for success, namely, sea power.

The Phoenicians were the first of the early peoples
to become great by sea. They were probably a Canaan-
itish race, driven by more powerful tribes from the
fertile plains of Palestine to the narrow strip of country
which is shut in between Libanus and Anti-Libanus
and the sea. This strip is some two hundred miles
long, nowhere more than forty miles in breadth. Here
they founded cities, Byblus, Berytus, Akko, Arvad, and,
above all, Sidon and Tyre. Sidon was the oldest of

24 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

them all. An interesting legend makes its founders
to come from the shores of Lake Gennesaret. The
name "Sidon" means "fishing," and it is said that,
even at this remote period, the Lake was famous for
its fish. But it is more probable that the name of the
city was derived from the earliest occupation of its
inhabitants, fishing being generally the first stage of
sea power. These communities were united in a loose
confederation; they were too weak and incoherent
to resist attack by land from their powerful neighbours,
and they fell, over and over again, into the position
of tributaries. But they always retained their
autonomy and their pre-eminence in trade, till their
final subjugation by Alexander the Great.

The history of Phoenicia bears striking resemblance
to that of Venice in the Middle Ages. Both alike
were the sea-mercenaries of great land Powers. Both
alike, from a constricted and unprofitable homeland,
planted great colonies, developed into the foremost
trading nations of their times, and owed their eventual
fall partly to the exhaustion caused by this very
colonisation, partly to the pressure of their military
neighbours, and partly to a diversion of the great
trade routes of the world. But the Phoenician colonies
were of greater importance than those of Venice, and,
on the whole, the influence of Phoenicia on the world
has been more widespread.

The history of Phoenician colonisation is, indeed,
a remarkable one. As early as 1950 B.C. the Phoeni-
cians had subdued at least a part of Cyprus. That
is in pre-Homeric times, before the history of Greece
had emerged from the realms of myth. From Cyprus
they spread to Rhodes; to Cythera, sacred, like Cyprus,
to Aphrodite, whence they obtained the mureux, from

The Hereford Map of the World

This Map was Executed about 1300 A.D.

At the top is a representation of the Last Judgment. The Earth is repre-
sented as round and is surrounded by the Ocean; the upper part is the East.
Rather more than half is taken up by the Continent of Asia. Europe is at
the left hand of the lower half, Africa at the right hand. By a singular error
the words Europa^and Africa are transposed on the Map, Europa being
placed on the continent of Africa, and vice versa.

For convenience of reference the Key Map is divided into squares marked
by Roman capitals, which represent approximately the following:
I. II. III.— South- Western Asia.
IV — Caspian Sea.
V. — Bokhara and Thrace.
VI. — Babylonia and part of Palestine.
VII. — Red Sea and Mount Sinai. _
VIII. — Monastery of St. Anthony in Ethiopia.
IX.— Scythia.

X. — Asia Minor with the Black Sea.
XL— The Holy Land.
XII.— Egypt with the Nile.
XIII.— Ethiopia.

XIV. — To the left is Norway, in the middle Russia; Scotland and part of
England are shown in the lower part, but the British Isles are de-
scribed in XIX.

XV. — Germany with part of Greece; Venice is shown on the right.
XVI. — Italy and a great part of the Mediterranean. About the centre is Rome.
XVII. — Part of Africa, including Carthage in the lower part to the left on a

promontory.
XVIII.— Part of Africa.
XIX. — On the left are the British Isles, on the right France.

XX. — The upper part is Provence, the lower Spain.
XXI. — At the top to the left is St. Augustine of Hippo.

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 25

which was made the far-famed Tyrian purple; and
to Thasos, where their gold workings were the marvel
of the Greeks. Their influence is seen in the ruins of
Tiryns and Mycenae; from their intercourse with the
Greeks sprang the first rude beginnings of a law of
nations, which did not, it is true, run on the sea, but
rendered the person and goods of the voyager who had
divided a potsherd with his host inviolate on shore.
The seafaring peoples had now come into contact,
and it was necessary to regularise their intercourse in
their common interest. From the Phoenicians, accord-
ing to common tradition, the Greeks learned letters,
numbers, a rudimentary banking system, and the art
of navigation by the stars.

By 1500 B.C., still before Agamemnon, Phoenician
traders had penetrated beyond the Pillars of Herakles
and had established their colonies of Gadeira (Gades,
or Cadiz) and Tarshish (Tartessus) in Spain. It is
possible, though not certain, that they penetrated
further and brought tin from the Cassiterides, which
some have identified with the Scilly Islands, but which
others think are the islands of Morbihan at the mouth
of the Vilaine. At any rate, tin was an essential com-
modity in the Bronze age, and the only known deposits
of it were in north-western Europe. It may, however,
have been brought by land to Mediterranean ports.

These Spanish colonies preceded those on the
shores of the Mediterranean, at Lixos and Utica in
northern Africa, in Sicily and the other islands, and, by
very many centuries, the great offshoot, Carthage. By
the time that Hiram, the friend of David and Solomon,
sat on the throne of Tyre, the Phoenician States had
arrived at a very high pitch of wealth and splendour.
They built navies on the shore of the Red Sea, and they

26 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

traded not only with the Greeks and the peoples of
the far West. Their argosies sought the wealth of
Punt and Ophir: that is to say, of Somaliland and
India. If Herodotus may be believed — and one is
inclined to give credence to a story so inconsistent
with the ideas of geography which a Greek of his
time would have held — they anticipated Bartholomew
Diaz by two thousand years and more by sailing round
the Cape of Good Hope and returning by the Pillars
of Herakles. They spent two years on the voyage,
going ashore in the autumn to sow their crops, and
putting to sea again when the harvest was reaped.

The magnificence of Tyre in her days of highest
glory is a continually recurring theme in the books
of the Prophets. The Phoenicians were not only the
"wagoners of the world," as were the Dutch in the
seventeenth century. They were also its greatest
manufacturers and its leaders in art as well. But
their sea power was peaceful. Not that the Phoeni-
cians were by any means unwarlike. They had sharp
conflicts with the Greek colonists of the Mediterranean
shores and islands. But their object was not conquest,
but trade. Sea power wins empire by taking the line
of least resistance. It does not seek the conquest of
nations in an equal state of development. It has
often been harsh in its dealings with inferior races.
But, on the whole, it has brought benefits to these,
and its empires tend to endure longer than those of
the great world-conquerors.

When the Phoenician cities passed under the con-
trol of foreign empires, in the sixth and fifth centuries
B.C., they became a potent factor in the struggle
between Europe and Asia. They were the carriers
in turn of the armies of the Persians and of Alexander

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 27

the Great. What they accomplished for their masters,
and what they refused or failed to accomplish, are
both equally significant.

In 525 B.C., or thereabouts, Cambyses invaded
Egypt, defeated Psammenitus at Pelusium, and added
the country of the Pharaohs to his empire. In this
enterprise, the navy of Phoenicia was used by the
conqueror, and Egypt fell as she had never fallen be-
neath the arms of the Chaldeans, even when divided
against herself by the hated Ethiopian rule. But
when Cambyses wished to extend his conquests further
and to attack Carthage, the Phoenicians refused their
aid, alleging the impiety of aiding in the downfall of
their own offspring. Cambyses was fain to make the
attempt unaided by the power of the sea, and his army
perished in the Libyan desert. It is very striking
that the Great King, lord of the armies which had
subdued Chaldea, and himself the conqueror of Egypt,
made no attempt to coerce the little maritime people
which defied him. He was not prepared to undertake
the arduous task of subduing the cities by force of
arms. Besides, he required the help of their navies
for other enterprises. So the Persian Empire did not
extend beyond the western border of Egypt, and
Carthage survived to give Hannibal to history and to
engage in her duel with the power of Rome.

The meaning of what happened to Cambyses is
illustrated by an episode in the career of Alexander the
Great, which, for the sake of clearness, shall be dealt
with here, though it occurred two hundred years later.
After the battle of Issus (333 B.C.), Darius was driven
beyond the Euphrates, and Alexander found himself
in almost undisputed possession of Syria. Sidon,
Aradus, and Byblus submitted to him; but Tyre held

28 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

out, faithful to the Persian rule. Alexander wished to
conquer Egypt, in order that he might have a free
hand to follow his great adversary in northern Asia;
but he dared not undertake an expedition to Egypt
while the Persians, through the power of the Phoenician
navy, held command of the sea. He therefore set
himself to reduce Tyre, a result which he accomplished
after a desperate and bloody siege of seven months.
These events of the remote past are highly instructive
as to the workings of sea power. Cambyses, aided by
the Phoenicians reduced Egypt. When they refused
their aid, he failed to carry his conquests further into
Africa, and to subdue Carthage. Alexander, one of
the greatest strategists of the world, recognized that
the attempt to conquer Egypt without such command
of the sea as would ensure his communications was a
hopeless task in the then condition of the world. Napo-
leon was destined to learn the same lesson regarding
an attempt to invade Asia Minor from Egypt. He
marched across the desert and over the plain of Pales-
tine, to find himself held up at Acre (the ancien Akko)
by a small garrison of Turks which had the support
of a squadron under Captain Sydney Smith. He could
not take Acre; he dared not leave it on his flank un-
taken; his own fleet had been destroyed by Nelson
at the battle of the Nile in the preceding year. So the
great conqueror killed his prisoners, poisoned his
wounded, and returned to Egypt a baffled man. Mehe-
met Ali, the Egyptian, was similarly held up at Acre
by Sir Edward Codrington and his fleet. Sea power
along the Syrian coast has always been the key to
Egypt, and the attempts of the Turks to take it from
us, with the command of the sea in our hands, have
been hopeless from the first.

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 29

The sea power of the Greeks differed from that of
Phoenicia both in its origin and in its workings. It was
more truly military in its nature. The Greeks re-
sembled the Phoenicians in that they were divided
into a number of quasi-independent communities
individually weak and still further weakened by inter-
nal dissensions; difficult to unite, save under the most
overpowering sense of danger. The restless, the
insubordinate, and the adventurous found the place
wherein they dwelt, too strait for them, and Greece,
like Phoenicia, threw off numerous swarms from the
parent hive which settled on the coasts and islands
of the Mediterranean, in Propontis and on the shores of
the Euxine. But there was a wide difference between
the Greek colonies and the Phoenician. The Greeks
went as settlers rather than as traders, seeking fertile
lands to till, determined to settle down under a govern-
ment suited to their own minds. Greece had no in-
dustries, such as glass-making and dyeing; in those
early days, no products for sale or barter. Phoenicia
set up "factories," or trading establishments; Greece,
"plantations," or agricultural communities. The
Greek colonies were seldom a support to their parent
States. Moreover, in the cases of the former, whether
the colony was planted by Tyre or Sidon, the settlers
were simply Phoenician. In the case of the Greeks,
they remained Athenian or Corinthian or Phocean;
Ionian or Dorian. They exacerbated the differences,
instead of supplying a cement of union.

How would it be with the British Empire if Canada
had been settled entirely by the Scots, Australia by
the English, and New Zealand by the Irish? Most
probably unity would have suffered, not only in the
over-sea dominions, but also at home. The growth

30 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

of separate English, Scottish, and Irish communities
across the seas would have accentuated the racial
differences in these islands. Certainly, what we know
of the strong Nationalist feeling of the over-sea Irish,
even when mixed with settlers of English and Scottish
descent, does not tend to the belief that the Imperial
tie with an Irish New Zealand would be a strong one.
It is no disparagement of the gifted Irish race to say so.
Fortunately, British colonisation was not widespread
until the organic union of the greater island, at any
rate, was complete. Among the Greek States, there
never was any organic union at all.

Greek colonisation began in the seventh century
B.C., and spread both east and west. To the east,
the chief settlements were on the coast of Asia Minor
and Thrace, on the shores of Propontis, or the Sea of
Marmora, in the islands of the Aegean and even on the
shores of the Euxine. To the west, the chief settle-
ments were, of course, those in the Ionian and Tyrrhe-
nian seas, on the coast of Italy and on the island of
Sicily. Greek colonies and Phoenician were inter-
mixed. While the Phoenicians held Sardinia, the
Phoceans were in possession of Corsica. The Greeks
founded a colony at Tartessus, in Spain, two hundred
years after the settlement of the Phoenicians at Gadeira.
The two peoples were dove-tailed in with one another
on Sicily, much as the French and the British were in
India in the eighteenth century. The Phoenicians
held Malta and Gozo ; the Greeks Capri and the Lipari
islands. Lastly, in the sixth century B.C., the Phoceans
founded the colony of Massalia, which is now Mar-
seilles. On the northern shore of Africa, the only Greek
settlement was in Cyrenaica, now part of the Italian
possessions. All the rest was held by the Phoenicians.

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 31

In this mosaic of civilisations was the germ of in-
evitable trouble, even had no other seafaring races,
such as the Etruscans, been involved. The Greek
colonies along the coast of Italy, the Phoenician in
northern Africa, important as both were in themselves,
became links in the chain of communications which
joined their parent States with the possessions in
Spain, or, in the case of the Phoceans, with Massalia.
The collision came in the sixth century B.C., when
the Phoenicians of northern Africa, joining with the
Etruscans, attacked the Phoceans in Corsica, with
the result that, despite a victory in a fleet action,
Massalia was isolated, and the Phoenicians possessed
themselves of the Greek colony of Tartessus. They
had Carthage to rely on as a base of sea power, nearer
than the bases of the Greeks. Oversea possessions
must always be a source of anxiety under such cir-
cumstances. Hence the nervousness of the Austral-
asian Dominions at the growing sea power of Japan.

The conflicts between the Phoenicians and Greek
colonists, however, were but preliminaries to the great
trial of strength which was to come when Darius and
jyprsfts attempted t^ ma^pi t.hp land po.nfl11f*r the sea.
The Persian monarchs were able to overrun, and to
join into one great Empire, all Asia Minor, Mesopo-
tamia, Syria, and Egypt. In doing so, they were helped
to no inconsiderable extent by Phoenician sea power.
But, so far, the armies of Asia had met with no opponent
who was formidable upon the water. It was left to
Greece, or rather to parts of Greece, weak, selfish, and
divided as were the Hellenic States, to pronounce "Thus
far, and no farther," on the schemes of the first aspir-
ants to the dominion of the world. That has been
the immemorial and the noblest function of sea power.

32 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

The first encounter took place by land. The Per-
sians sailed across the ^Egean unchecked by the Greeks,
and landed on the east coast of Attica. The Spartans,
the leading military people among the Greeks, were
late in coming to the assistance of the Athenians and
Plateans, who gave battle on the plain of Marathon,
between the mountains and the sea, where the Persian
cavalry had not room to act. The Persians were com-
pletely defeated in what has been described as one of
the decisive battles of the world. They took to their
ships, and, sailing round Cape Sunium to Phaleron,
hoped to storm Athens before the Greek army could
arrive for its defence. But Miltiades by a forced march
forestalled them, and the Persians sailed for home.

Ten years later, Xerxes renewed the attack with an
immense armament, gathered from all the nations of
his realm. The army marched by way of Thrace,
Macedonia, and Thessaly, the fleet sailing parallel
with it along the coast, as the fleet of Henry V. sailed
parallel to the army marching from Harfleur to Calais,
which fought at Agincourt. Mardonius, Xerxes'
general, was met with and withstood for a time by
Leonidas at the renowned Pass of Thermopylae. The
Greek and Persian fleets, meantime, lay in the straits
which separate the island of Eubcea from the main-
land, the Persians having the advantage of position
off the mainland itself. Two indecisive actions were
fought here, the Greeks bearing themselves well against
superior numbers. But on hearing of the fall of Ther-
mopylae, Themistocles resolved to retreat. He sailed
round Sunium to Salamis; the defence of Athens was
abandoned and the city stormed and taken by the
Persians.

So far, it would appear that Greece was more effec-

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 33

tually defended by land than by sea. In 490 B.C., the
Persians had command of the sea, but Miltiades beat
them by land at Marathon, and forestalled them when
they attempted an attack on Athens. Ten years
later, owing to the failure of the Greek resistance on
land, Mardonius advanced over the terrain where
Artaphernes had been successfully withstood, and
sacked Athens itself. Had the Persians made a proper
use of their superiority at sea on the former occasion,
however, the result might well have been different.
If Artaphernes had made use of a portion of the fleet
to threaten the coast of the Peloponnesus, he would
have broken up the Hellenic confederacy, and he could
have landed his army at some spot where his still
overwhelming superiority in numbers would have
enabled him to break down the resistance of the
Athenians. But the Persians did not understand the
use of sea power. All the same, Marathon has no title
to be described as a decisive battle. The Persians got
away practically unscathed. The land fight was a
portent, not a decision. The decisive battle was to
take place at sea.

When Themistocles arrived at Salamis, the separa-
tist tendencies of the Hellenes at once began to show
themselves. The Peloponnesians, under the leader-
ship of Sparta, gave no proper assistance to the
defence of Attica. They busied themselves with build-
ing a great wall across the Isthmus, and wished to
withdraw their ships to defend its flanks. If they
showed in this a realisation of the elementary principle
that it is the fleet and not the sea which defends, they
ignored the far greater maxim of naval strategy, that
the proper objective is the enemy's fleet. Themis-
tocles, with that mother-wit which is not incompatible

34 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

with baseness of character, anticipated Drake and
Nelson in his realisation of this. The Council, over-
borne by the Spartans, decided on retreat. Themis-
tocles adopted the doubtful expedient of sending
word to the enemy of this decision. Whether he was
actually in treasonable correspondence with Xerxes
is a much-debated point. It may be that, like Judas
Iscariot, he was a traitor with the firm belief that his
treason would bring gain to himself and no great harm
to the betrayed. He gained his purpose and brought
on a battle, in which the Persians were signally de-
feated. The light, well-handled ships of the Athe-
nians and ^ginetans dashed among the heavy craft
of the enemy, jammed together in a too-narrow space,
broke their oars and left them helpless upon the water.
The Greeks, like the English of Elizabeth's time, were
sailors, and had evolved a system of sea warfare. The
Persians, who had control of the fleet, though it was
mainly composed of Phoenician and Ionian ships, were
landsmen and fought as soldiers upon the water.
Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, who was fighting
in the Persian cause, rammed and sank an Ionian
trireme which stood in her way of escape. Xerxes,
watching from the "rocky brow" immortalised by
Byron, imagined the vessel sunk to be an enemy.
"My men have become women, my women men,"
he exclaimed, and loaded the indomitable queen with
honours. Herodotus says that the Greeks lost forty
ships and the Persians two hundred, exclusive of
those which were captured with all their crews. A
contingent of troops which had been landed on the
island of Psyttalia was also destroyed.

The sea battle of Salamis saved Greece and Europe.
Xerxes became nervous about his communications, fear-

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 35

ing that the Greeks would sail up the Hellespont and
destroy the bridge of boats, as, indeed, Themistocles
was anxious to do. The king therefore left Mar-
donius with three hundred thousand men, and retired
with the rest of his army and the remnant of his fleet.
Mardonius was defeated and slain at Platea, and,
on the same day, or a few days later, the Athenians
won another great naval victory at Mycale, which
detached the greater part of Ionia from the Persian
cause. Thus ended the attempt of Xerxes to add
Europe to his empire. Of the Persian fleet, one-fourth
was Phoenician, and one-third at least was contributed
by the Greek colonies. The defection of the latter
shows the moral effect of the Athenian victory.

The war left Athens — the one State which had
grasped the meaning and function of sea power — with
the hegemony of Hellas, which had previously belonged
to the Spartans. The League of Delos, which com-
prised most of the States of Central Greece outside
the Peloponnesus, and the Ionian States, was formed
immediately afterwards. In process of time, the
smaller members became mere tributaries of Athens,
which was thus able to build up a centralised and
homogeneous sea power. The mutterings of the storm
which was to burst in the Peloponnesian war hardly
disturbed the glories of the era of Pericles. It would
be too long a matter to follow in detail the events of
that protracted struggle in which Hellas, having saved
Europe, did her best to destroy herself. One fact
stands out pre-eminent: that Athens, surrounded as
she was on land by forces greatly superior to her own,
ill-supported by jealous allies and tributaries whom
her domineering conduct had alienated from her,
was yet able to sustain the unequal contest, and even

36 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

to emerge the victor in the first period which ended
with the peace of Nicias. She owed her escape from
destruction entirely to her sea power. She lost battles1
even by sea; the hoplites of Sparta ravaged the lands/
of Attica; her people fell by thousands before the
plague. But she surrounded the Peloponnesus witl
her fleet and naval stations, and the Spartan armies
fought with their heads ever turned over their shoul-
ders, never daring to be long away from their own soil.!
She cut off her foes from the granaries of Syracuse.
She suppressed the revolts in Mitylene and elsewhere]
with a high hand, preventing the succour which Sparta
would have sent from reaching the rebels. Her fleets
forbade co-operation between the Spartans and their
allies in the north, and at the time of her deepest
distress she was able, by her superiority at sea, to hold]
on tenaciously to the blockade of Potidea and to com- 1
pel the surrender of that stubborn town. It is interest-
ing to note the great name of Sophocles among those
who had the best grip of the vital importance of sea
power to Athens.

In the second phase of the war, the conditions com-
pletely altered. The baneful influence of Alcibiades
dragged the Athenians into a war of aggression, for
which sea power is ill-suited, and distant adventure.
With the Spartan at their gates, they were compelled
to use their fleets excentrically, and they underwent,
in consequence, the disasters of Syracuse and JEgos-
potami. After the ruin which fell upon their sea power
in consequence of the latter defeat, Athens itself was
taken, and the Athenians, having lost command of
the sea, had no means of repairing the disaster as pre-
viously they had done by the victory of Salamis. The
strategy which led to ^Egospotami, fought just above

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 37

the Narrows of the Dardanelles, was correct enough.
Alcibiades and Conon followed the main force of the
enemy to bring it to battle. They were defeated, not
because their plan was bad, but because its execution
was grossly faulty, owing to carelessness. The disaster
might still have been repaired, for Conon escaped
from the battle with his squadron "in being." The
position was not much worse than that of Britain
after Torrington's defeat off Beachy Head in 1690,
when the army of James II. in Ireland represented the
threat to Athens of the. land power of Sparta. But
James was defeated at the battle of the Boyne twelve
days later, while the army of Sparta remained intact,
and the Athenians had lost the power to harry the
coast of the Peloponnesus. So they were subjected
to the humiliation of digging down the Long Walls
which connected Athens and the Piraeus at the behest
of their enemies.

The walls were destined, however, to be rebuilt by
Conon, who, with the assistance of Evagoras, the so-
called "tyrant" of Cyprus and Pharnabazus, the
Persian satrap, won a great victory at sea over the
Spartans at Cnidus, with a mixed fleet of Athenians
and Phoenicians. Henceforward, the history of Greece,
to the foundation of the Empire of Alexander the Great,
is one long struggle of contending States , in turn sup-
ported by the Persian power, for the mastery of Hellas.
Of all these it may be said that the State which had
command of the sea was master. Inevitably; for,
by command of the sea alone could the Persian aid
|be enjoyed, .s*

In the meantime, the power of Carthage and of
Rome was ripening in the Western Mediterranean for
their decisive struggle. The common estimation that

38 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Carthage was a great sea power is somewhat unaccount-
able. It is true that the Carthaginians have consider-
able maritime achievements to their credit. They
spread colonies over northern Africa, and they overran
Spain to the Ebro. They certainly sailed to the North
and had trading relations with Britain, perhaps also
with Scandinavia. But the analogy, of which the
Germans are particularly fond, which compares Car-
thage with Britain, is superficial. The Carthaginians,
of the era of the Punic Wars, had ceased to be a maritime
nation. They deserved that title only so long as they
maintained their connection with the mother States
of Phoenicia, and these had by now been absorbed into
the Alexandrine Empire. It was said of the Cartha-
ginians— and it was meant as a compliment — that
"they chose to live in Libya and not in Phoenicia."
That is, they cut themselves off from the maritime con-
federation of their race, as the United States cut them-
selves off from ours. They fitted out great fleets, and
at the beginning of the Punic Wars, before the Romans
had developed their navy, they won several battles.
But that they should have been worsted on what was
supposed to be their own element by a people which
had to copy a wrecked trireme as a model for their
ships and taught their sailors to row on dry land,
proves that they had not the real "sea-sense." The
pure-blooded Carthaginian of this period, enervated
by riches and the command of mercenary armies of
this race, had ceased to learn war. In this Carthage
differed utterly from Venice, where, to the very end
of her period of power, • the commercial nobility took
their own part in the fighting by land and sea. Only
a few of the great Carthaginian houses, notably the
Barca family, gave personal service in the wars. Their

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 39

hired or impressed Libyans, Numidians, Spaniards,
when led by a Hannibal or a Hasdrubal, could be
formidable enough as soldiers, as the Romans learned.
But sea power rests securely only on the character
and sea sense of the race which is dominant in the
State, and on the personal service of its sons. Great
Britain has this indispensable qualification; Carthage
had not. The German analogy, built on the German
view that all volunteers are "mercenaries," is therefore
unsound. Great Britain is no more comparable to
Carthage than is modern Germany to republican
Rome.

The course of events had been such that, when Rome
and Carthage came into conflict, there was no great
sea power any longer existing. Alexander, for his
own ends, had broken the strength of Tyre, and the
tradition of the Macedonian Empire, as represented
by Pyrrhus of Epirus, was not naval. His alliance
with the Carthaginians brought them no effective aid.
Hellas, in the thrall of the Macedonians, had ceased
to count. In the country of the blind, therefore, the
one-eyed was king, and the one-eyed proved to be
Rome. Mahan has made the naval lessons of the
Punic Wars the starting-point of his most famous
work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History. He
points out that, although many people have held,
because there was cross-raiding, and the Carthaginians
occasionally won a battle at sea and sent supplies and
reinforcements to Hannibal, that the command of the
sea remained in doubt, this opinion is erroneous. No
navy, however superior, can reckon on being able
entirely to prevent occasional incursions by its enemy.
The crucial fact which shows the supremacy of Rome
is this: that the Carthaginians elected to use the long

40 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

and perilous land route into Italy by Spain and the
Alps instead of the direct sea route, making use of their
Sicilian bases, and that Scipio, grasping the supreme
importance of maritime communications, struck un-
hindered at the Carthaginian base in Spain by means
of an oversea expedition. Hannibal, one of the three
superlative military geniuses of the world's history,
lost two-thirds of his army on its march to Italy, and
his brother, Hasdrubal, made the toilsome journey
only to be cut to pieces at the Metaurus, owing to the
disorganisation and exhaustion of his troops. It is
impossible to believe that Hannibal did not grasp the
advantage of the shorter line of communications, and
would not have used it if he could have done so with
safety. The campaign of Zama, like that of Waterloo,
clinched a business which had been already settled by
sea power.

The ruin of Carthage was quickly followed by the
Roman conquest of Hellas, and that, in turn, by the
overthrow of the Ptolemies. Rome was mistress of
the Mediterranean and its shores. The dominion of
the world was yet to be settled by sea power, but in a
fight between Roman and Roman. Octavianus beat
Anthony at Actium, almost on the scene of Lepanto
and Navarino, and but a short distance from Salamis,
the region where contests between East and West are
fated to be settled. Thus the Empire of the Caesars
came into being. But the Romans can hardly be
counted among the races which have been great at sea.
They depended rather upon the subjects over whom
their land power gave them dominion, the Liburnians,
Illyrians, and so forth, than upon themselves. The
ponderous galleys of the regular Roman fleet were
simply platforms from which soldiers were to fight, as

SEA POWER IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 41

were, much later, the galleys of the Venetians, the
ships of the Armada, and, indeed, the vessels of all
the navies designed primarily for service in the closed
waters of the Mediterranean. The Romans met the
Carthaginians when the latter had forgotten the
habit of the sea and were morally and politically de-
generate. That was the determining factor, and not
any special aptitude for sea-warfare on either side.
The methods which gave them victory were merely
extensions of the method of land warfare to the water.
They could not have prevailed against a foe of real
maritime instinct.

CHAPTER III

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET"

DESPITE what has been written above, as to the
decadence of Carthaginian sea power at the time of the
Punic Wars, it has to be recorded that this people
made a notable contribution to the knowledge of the
world beyond the bounds of the CEcumene, if their
early and scanty records are to be believed. We are
the more bound to notice this because it is from a
Carthaginian source that we obtain our first knowledge
of Britain. Accounts have come down to us through
Pliny and the late Roman writer Rufus Festus Avienus,
of two expeditions which the Carthaginians sent into
the Atlantic about the year 500 B.C. The one, under
a leader bearing the common Punic name of Hanno,
sailed south; the other, under Himilco, turned north-
wards. Hanno's expedition coasted along the east
of Africa, and reached the mouth of the Senegal, or
of the Gaboon. They saw many wonders on their
way, including mountains and rivers which streamed
with fire; and they reached an island "full of savage
people, the greater part of whom were women, whose
bodies were hairy, and whom our interpreters called
Gorillae." "Though we pursued the men," the story
continues, "we could not seize any of them; but all
fled from us, escaping over the precipices and defend-

42

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 43

ing themselves with stones. Three women were, how-
ever, taken; but they attacked their conductors with
their teeth and hands and could not be prevailed
upon to accompany us. Having killed them, we flayed
them, and brought their skins with us to Carthage."
One is less surprised at the reluctance of the hairy
ladies than at the abrupt methods of their captors.

Himilco sailed northwards, as has been said, and
reached a promontory which he called (Estrymnis,
near the tin-bearing isles known as the Cassiterides.
CEstrymnis was two days' sail from the Holy Island,
identified with lerne, or Ireland, "near which is the
large island of Albion." If this be really the genuine
account of Himilco and not a late gloss of Avienus, as
the name Albion leads one to suspect,' we have the
earliest certain mention of our islands. (Estrymnis
may be Point St. Matthieu, in Ushant, or it may be
Le Croisic. But the mention of lerne as being two
days' sail, and of the large island of Albion lying "near
it," is strange. For, if CEstrymnis be Ushant, Cornwall,
and not Ireland, would be the nearest landfall after
the Scillies, if we take the latter to be the Cassiterides.
But Himilco's mention of our islands is probably
from hearsay. It is unlikely that the Carthaginian
explorer trusted himself to the open sea. If he visited
Albion, it would probably have been after coasting
along the northern shore of France and reaching the
Straits of Dover. Himilco, however, seems to have
seen the coracles of the British and Irish, who, no
doubt, came over — hardy fellows! — to northern France
to trade, as they did five hundred years later in Julius
Caesar's time. It was probably from them that he
heard of the islands lying to the northwards, and
formed an extremely hazy idea of their geographical

44 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

position. It is rather strange that either Himilco or
his supposed informants should have known that
Albion and lerne were islands, and it must be confessed
that it looks as if the more recently acquired knowledge
of Pliny and Avienus has been interwoven with the
Carthaginian's tale. Be this as it may, we are, per-
haps, entitled to conclude that the Britons, penitus
toto divisos orbe, came into contact with the civilisation
of the Mediterranean as early as 500 B.C.

Himilco says that the sea through which he sailed
to reach GEstrymnis was sluggish, with the winds so
light that they would scarce drive the ship; that it
was full of weed, which held the vessel back, and shal-
low withal, so that the water sometimes barely covered
the land. Nevertheless, it abounded in sea monsters.
Some people have conjectured, from the mention of
the weed, that Himilco reached the Sargasso Sea.
But the rest of the description, and especially the
shallowness of the water, forbid this interpretation.
It must be remembered that, coming from the Mediter-
ranean, he was unacquainted with the phenomena of
the tides. His voyage was a coasting voyage, and,
therefore, at low water, he would be liable to find
himself aground, or almost aground, in the shallow
seas off the western coast of France. The sea monsters
were, no doubt, the whales of the Bay of Biscay.

With Himilco, the period of Phoenician exploration
closes, so far as our knowledge goes. The next
explorer is a much more important person, namely
Pytheas of Massalia, a Phocean, who undertook one
or more voyages to the North between 330 and 325
B.C. This was just before the defeat of the Greeks
by the Phoenicians off Corsica gave the latter control
of the communications between southern France and

"A PLACE WH^RE TWO SEAS MEET" 45

Spain. Pytheas was an astronomer of some repute,
and seems to have been the first who had the idea of
dividing the world into degrees of latitude. He left
an account of his adventures which, though doubted
by writers like Polybius and Strabo, is much better
authenticated than that of Himilco. He added no
little to the store of geographical knowledge. But
the first interesting point about his voyage is that he
appears first to have established intercourse with the
Northmen, through Britain.

He sailed round Cape St. Vincent and up the coast
of Iberia and Gaul. He circumnavigated Britain,
and gives a measurement of the circumference of the
island which, unfortunately, is just twice too great.
He discovered the Orkney Islands and passed thence to
a land still further to the north, which is identified
with the Thule of the Romans. Here he saw the mid-
night sun, and came upon the fringe of the arctic ice
in what he speaks of as "a sluggish and congealed
sea" (mare pigrum et concretum). He calls Britain
Brettanice, which seems to confirm the opinion that
he had first-hand dealings with the inhabitants.

Thule is generally identified with Iceland; but, for
many reasons, it is practically certain that Iceland was
not the country which Pytheas reached. It is more
plausibly identified with Norway. He places it "six
days' sail north of Brettanice." The Phoceans, like
the Phoenicians, were coastwise sailors, and it is very
unlikely that Pytheas would have launched out into
the unknown where, according to the geographical
ideas of his time, there was no land, unless he had some
positive evidence that land existed. It is therefore
concluded that, even at this remote date, there was
communication between the Scandinavian countries

46 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

and Britain. If this be so, there was already a race
of seafaring men in the North who used the sea at least
as boldly as the Phoenicians and the Greeks. More
boldly, in fact, for the voyage across the open and
stormy waters of the North Sea was more perilous
than a coasting voyage along the shores of the Mediter-
ranean. It may be asked how it came about, if this
were so, that the subjugation of the Britons by the
northern tribes did not take place many centuries
sooner than it did; for our woad-painted forerunners
could hardly have resisted the invaders in their coracles.
The only reply which can be given is that, so far as
we can gather from the accounts which have reached
us of the writings of Pytheas (it must be remembered
that his book, On the Ocean, is not extant), those
northern peoples had already reached the agricultural
stage of development. They were not yet pressed
by the more powerful tribes from the East, and they
perhaps found little to tempt them in forest-covered
Britain, especially as its inhabitants were not yet
enervated by Roman rule and protection. The pur-
pose for which the Northmen came can only be con-
jectured. But, as there was trade between the Britons
and the inhabitants of north-western France, it is
possible that the amber of the Baltic actually found
its way to the Mediterranean through Britain, which
was thus already an entrepot.

If we accept the evidence, such as it is — and it
cannot be given in detail here — for early intercourse
between Britain and the North, it was in these islands
that the sea power of the North and the Mediterranean
first met, in peace, not in war, engaged in exploration
and in trade. It was for Britain that they were de-
stined to contend, and it was to Britain that the sea

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 47

power of both was eventually to pass. The facts of
geography decided the matter. When once the race
fit to wield sea power was established and the incentive
to adventure was present, the supremacy of Great
Britain at sea was a natural growth, and not an artifi-
cial development fostered by policy. But, in the era
of Pytheas, the Viking age was yet a thousand years
distant, and the eagles had not yet flown over Britain.
The Romans, by nature and tradition, were an
agricultural and military, not a trading and maritime,
people. Their legions conquered the races round them
by« their incomparable soldierly spirit and discipline.
The provinces so acquired were held by garrisons to
whom grants of land were given, and who settled
down and intermarried with the subject peoples. Our
Allies, the Rumanians, for instance, boast themselves
descended from the coloni of Trajan. When, therefore,
Rome became mistress of the Mediterranean ; when the
engineering skill of the Romans had opened up the
highways of Europe, it is the coracles of Britain and
the ships of Frisia which bring the tin and amber to
the markets of the Continent, not the galleys of the
Greeks and Phoenicians which fetch it thence, as afore-
time. Rome is only in appearance an exception to the
rule that the peoples which have need of the neces-
saries of life send and fetch them. It is true that, in
the time of the Caesars, the city was fed by corn from
Egypt, brought in ships of Adramyttium. But these
all owned the sovereignty of Rome. They represented
the seafaring portions of her Empire. In the North
the rule worked. Long sea trade, by way of the Atlan-
tic, almost ceased from the beginning of the Roman
dominion, and was never really revived till the dis-
covery of the New World.

48 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Small claim as the Romans had to be considered
a great maritime people, our naval history opens with
a defeat at their hands. Julius Caesar, in his victorious
march through Gaul, in the first century B.C., reached
the western coast, and there came into contact with
the Veneti, a seafaring tribe which dwelt about the
mouth of the Loire. Caesar ordered that a fleet should
be built on the river, and, when it was completed,
marched his soldiers on board and attacked the Veneti
off the rocky coast, which, many hundreds of years
later, was to be the scene of Hawke's great victory of
Quiberon Bay. At this time, as for many centuries
later, the Mediterranean peoples relied on oars as the
prime means of propulsion; the Northerners rather
upon sails. The former remained soldiers on ship-
board; the latter were destined to evolve a system of
real naval war. In this action, however, fought in the
narrow waters at the mouth of the river, their reliance
on sails was the bane of the Veneti. They had two
hundred and twenty ships, of which a proportion were
British, probably small trading ships which happened
to be in the river, as was their wont, on "their lawful
occasions." The following is Caesar's own account
of the first recorded sea battle in which Britons took
part. He says:

About two hundred and twenty of the ships of the
Veneti, fully equipped and appointed with every kind of
naval implement, sailed forth from the harbour and drew
up opposite ours; nor did it appear clear to Brutus who
commanded the fleet, nor to the tribunes of the soldiers
and the centurions to whom the several ships were assigned,
what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they
knew that damage could not be done by their beaks; and
that though turrets were built on their decks, yet the height

Statue of Alfred the Great at Winchester, England

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 49

of the stems of the barbarian ships exceeded these, so that
the weapons could not be cast up from our lower posi-
tions with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls
fell more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our
men was of great service: namely, sharp hooks inserted
into and fastened upon poles. When the ropes which
fastened the sail-yards were caught by them and pulled,
and our vessels vigorously impelled by the oars, the ropes
were severed, and the yards necessarily fell down, so that,
as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended upon their
sails and rigging, the entire management of the ships
was taken from them at the same time.

Eventually, the Veneti turned to fly — such of them,
presumably, as retained their sails intact — but the
wind suddenly dropped and a flat calm prevailed, in
which the Romans annihilated their enemy. The
battle is an instructive contrast to that which was
fought when "Hawke came swooping from the West,"
taking "the foe for pilot and the cannon-glare for light."
If such conditions had prevailed, Caesar would have
got "the father and mother of a batin'." He won
by means of a landsman's device, comparable with the
use of the "corvi," or spiked gangplanks which enabled
the Romans to swarm on board the Carthaginian ships.
Hawke, on the other hand, dashed in from seaward
and annihilated the foe among the rocks. The stormy
wind and tempest, dreaded by soldiers on shipboard,
are ever the allies of the true seaman. Therefore,

"Thank him who isled us here and roughly set
His Briton in blown seas and storming showers."

Marching eastwards again, Caesar looked across the
Channel to the white cliffs of Dover, whence comes the

50 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

name of Albion. In 55 B.C., Gaul was sufficiently
settled for him to lead his legionaries across the Strait.
The Britons gathered in such numbers to resist him
that the attempt to land at Dover was abandoned,
and the transports sailed on to Deal, where the Roman
eagles for the first time were borne on British soil.
If the Veneti and their British allies had won in Quibe-
ron Bay, Caesar might never have crossed to Britain.
But the silver streak of stormy water was no protec-
tion in itself. Rather the contrary. Had the cliffs
of Dover guarded a Pass of Thermopylae, Caesar might
not have been able to turn the flank of the British
defence. As it was, it was easier for him to sail to
Deal than it was for the defenders to transfer their
army thither by land. He was ashore before their
levies could come up with his forces. "Far distant,
storm-beaten ships" are a defence, whether they lie
off Brest, off Toulon, or at Scapa Flow; stormy water
without the ships, is none. A second landing was
made the next year, but affairs recalled Caesar to the
East, and the conquest of Britain was left to Claudius,
a hundred years later. The Roman occupation of
Britain lasted three hundred years. Rome reached
her zenith and fell into decay during that period. But
Roman Britain never learned that her future lay upon
the water. The Norsemen were passing from Norway
and Denmark to Iceland, and then to Greenland, and,
eventually, to "Wineland the Good," indentified with
Labrador. The mysterious "Eruli," the pirate tribe
whose name is, perhaps, a Latinised form of Jarl, or
Earl, were sailing south and east, even as far as Lucca.
The Viking age, with all its consequences, was begin-
ning; but the Britons were content to be defended by
the legions of their Roman masters. The latter built

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 51

the great Wall of Hadrian, to keep out the Picts, and
they appointed a Count of the Saxon Shore, to keep
out the Northmen. But as, generally speaking, they
gave him no fleet to assist him in his task, the poor
gentleman must have had a sorry time of it. Perhaps,
however, they were wise in their generation, for, when
they set a thief to catch a thief, by appointing a noted
pirate, one Carausius, Count of the Saxon Shore, he
incontinently entered into a compact with the pirates
he was set to catch, shared their gains with them, and
used the money to invest himself with the Imperial
purple. He sacked Boulogne, and played havoc with
the Roman communications with Britain before he
was finally suppressed.

The disciplined legionaries of the Romans sufficed
to protect Britain from serious invasion, so long as they
remained. But when the number was far greater than
Rome could spare with the Visigoth thundering at the
gates of the city, the legions were withdrawn, and the
Britons, spoon-fed and unwarlike, left to their fate.
The Northmen attacked the flanks of the Wall from
east and west; the Picts broke through and marched
almost to London; the Britons were fain to call in
the Saxons and other marauders along their coasts to
defend them. They came; they chased the Painted
People home again — and they stayed. Hengist landed
at Ebbsfleet in 449 A.D., and for the next hundred and
fifty years there was a continual influx of Saxons,
Jutes, and Angles. The latter people migrated in a
body from their homes in Frisia and Schleswig, driven
out by the pressure of still stronger and fiercer races
behind them. All Britain east of Seven Sea and south
of the Forth became Saxon, Jute, or English, eventually
to be unified under Egbert. It seems difficult to ac-

52

count for the fact that these sea-wolves, as we have
been taught to consider them, had no sooner settled
in the conquered land than they drew up their long
keels on the beach and forgot the habit of the sea.
It is, however, the case, certainly so far as the Angles
are concerned, that they came as settlers, not as rovers,
while the other tribes, no doubt, found Britain a pleas-
anter, more sunny, and more fertile land than their
own, and were glad to put what they regarded as the
barrier of the sea between themselves and the warrior
peoples which were pressing upon them from the East.
They brought their own social customs and political
system with them; they were used to the life of a com-
munity. They were not Vikings like the Norse and
the Danes. They hoped to be able to pursue their
peaceful occupations of husbandry and herdsmanship
in the new land which they had made theirs. Only
Offa of Mercia seems to have maintained a navy, prior
to the days of Alfred.

If such were the hope of the Anglo-Saxons, it was
writ in water. Already, before the end of the reign of
Egbert, the Danes had harried the coast, landing not
only in East Anglia, but even at the mouth of the Dart,
and, finally, in Cornwall, where they were joined by
the revolted Britons. Egbert gained a decisive victory
at Hengist's Down in 836 A.D. But the Danes came
in ever-increasing numbers during the next three reigns,
and, though often defeated, made East Anglia a Dan-
ish kingdom, and penetrated into Wessex as far as
Reading. The history of the Danish incursions shows
us how hopeless is the defence of an island without a
navy superior to all possible assailants. The invaders
attacked at all points, from Bamborough in Northum-
bria to Cornwall, and the task of marching and counter-

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 53

marching an army to resist them wherever they might
land was a hopeless one. This was realised by one
alone of our Saxon kings, the great Alfred, who began
his glorious reign in 871 A.D. He has been called
"The father of the British Navy," and, so far as the
realisation of the meaning and function of sea power
is concerned, he has considerable title to the honour.
Five years after his accession, he built a small flotilla
of ships and fell upon the Danes on the coast of Dorset,
routing a squadron of seven ships and taking one. The
effect of this victory on a small scale was as remarkable
as that of Salamis on a large. The Danes became
nervous about their communications and swore a
peace with Alfred — which they immediately and
treacherously broke. Both fleets were reinforced, and
the Danes, landing at the mouth of the Exe, laid siege
to Exeter. They, in their turn, were blockaded by
Alfred's fleet in the river. A formidable Danish fleet
sailed from the mouth of the Thames to raise the block-
ade; but a storm scattered the ships and destroyed
half of them. The rest were met by Alfred's fleet and
utterly defeated. Guthrum, meanwhile, had taken
Exeter, and Alfred had invested him there. Hearing
of the destruction of his fleet, the Danish king capitu-
lated, and marched out of Wessex into Mercia. Since
the Danes had been allowed to settle in large numbers,
however, the war continued by land, terminating in
Alfred's great victory at Ethandune, and the Treaty
of Wedmore, which established the Danelagh and
brought Guthrum to Christianity.

The races with which we are now dealing, however,
were not traders or agriculturists. They had no idea,
as the Phoenicians had, of making the sea the great
pathway for commerce. They were out for plunder.

54 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

The sea was, for them, a broad line of military com-
munications by which one swarm succeeded another.
No treaty which Guthrum could make could keep
new-comers from pouring in and overrunning the
boundaries which had been allotted to the Danelagh,
though these were ample enough, the Danelagh,
extending well into the Midland shires and having
for its western limit a chain of forts built at Derby,
Leicester, Nottingham, and Stamford

Seven years later came the invasion of Hasting,
which overran the greater part of the country, and was
at last scotched, though not killed, by the ingenious
device of Alfred, who dug channels from the Lea, in
which Hasting's fleet was lying, to the Thames, and
so lowered the level of the water that the ships, left
high and dry, were captured by the rejoicing London-
ers, and were, doubtless, used in the ensuing years
in the encounters which took place with Northumbrian
pirates and the lawless Danes of the Danelagh. Alfred
died in 901 A.D. In the concluding years of his reign
the land had peace, and this was entirely due to his
grasp of the essential condition on which the defence
of his realm was founded. The Danes settled ashore
became helpless when cut off from succour by the way
of the sea. The peace lasted for nearly eighty years
after Alfred's death, thanks in part to Athelstan's
great victory of Brunanburh. But his successors
forgot the lesson of his reign, and allowed the sea power
of the country to decline. Now came Sweyn and Olaf
of Norway, and to the Danelagh was added the de-
grading burden of the Danegeld, or tribute paid to
the marauders. Ethelred the Unready did, indeed,
build a great fleet of eight hundred vessels, after he
had aroused the mortal anger of Sweyn by the mas-

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 55

sacre of the Danes on St. Brice's Day. But it was
destroyed by internal dissensions among its leaders.
Sweyn subdued the country, and England had Danish
kings for twenty-six years.

It was not only into Britain that the Northmen
poured. About the time that Alfred made his treaty
with Guthrum, Rolf Ganger and his men established
themselves in the north of France, in what, thence-
forward, became the Duchy of Normandy. The Franks,
like the Saxons, were unable to meet them at sea for
want of a navy, and found it impossible to drive them
from the land when they had the way of the sea open
behind them. So Charles the Simple made over the
Duchy of Normandy to Rolf Ganger, to hold as a fief
of the Frankish Crown.

Rolf, or Rollo, had taken part in the piratical forays
which sailed up the Seine and sacked Paris in the reign
of Charles the Fat. But the invasion which resulted
in the settlement of the Norsemen in Normandy was
no mere piratical raid. A whole population had
migrated from Norway under the leadership of Rolf,
to escape loss of liberty, when the whole of the North-
land was united under the rule of Harold Harfagar,
the Dane. The Norse, in particular, could not brook
this incursion into their tribal freedom, and, in this
exodus of Rolf Ganger and his followers, we have an-
other instance of one of the prime motives which lead
to sea power: the claim of men of independent spirit
to live their own lives. Probably Rolf's following con-
tained Danes as well as Norsemen, as the inhabitants
of the Danelagh contained Norsemen as well as Danes.
The names were somewhat indiscriminately used.
But, in contradistinction to their compeers, the Nor-
mans remained warriors and seamen. It is said that

56 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

they introduced into Brittany the Norse method of
catching whales with the harpoon, and thus set up a
lucrative trade on the Biscayan coast. Their sea
power took them to the Mediterranean, where they
founded the kingdom of Sicily, and were for centuries
a thorn in the flesh of Venice, and the stoutest of
Crusaders.

The influence of the Norman power on the history
of the West can hardly be over-estimated. For the
conquest of England by the Normans and the mastery
of the Channel demanded by the necessity to main-
tain communications between the kingdom and the
duchy led to a realisation of the function of sea power,
and to the welding of all the elements of the English
nation. If the claim of the Angevin kings to the crown
of France gave rise to centuries of warfare between the
French and the English, the fact that the Norman
families were for so long the leaders of political and
social life in this country is the main reason why
Teutonic Kultur has not altogether prevailed with us,
and why we are not, at this moment, members of a
•Germanic confederation for the enslavement of the
world, instead of being ranged with the peoples which
are fighting for its liberties. No wonder the Germans
furiously rage together at seeing their "cousins" the
backbone of the opposition to their ambitions.

On the other hand, supposing the Romans had
understood the meaning and functions of sea power,
and the Romano-British, after the withdrawal of the
legions, had been able to keep their island free from
the assaults of the Barbarians, there would have grown
up in these islands a Celto-Latin race which would
naturally have linked itself with Gaul, and, thrown
like a barrier across the path of the northern nations,

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 57

would certainly have barred the way of discovery and
expansion to the west. The contrast between Latin
America (so-called) and Anglo-Saxon America, with
all the limitations which must be made in the use of
such terms, will serve to indicate what the result might
have been on the history of the world.

Britain is fashioned by nature to be the seaman's
prize, and only in the hands of a race inured to the
habit of the sea could she have taken any considerable
part in the world's affairs. Had the invasion of Sax-
ons, Angles, and Jutes been postponed until there had
risen a great and highly organised kingdom in the
North, she would have been the mere annexe of that
kingdom. Had the Norman Conquest not been
achieved until the realm of the Capets was unified,
an event which would have happened much earlier,
save for the fact that the dukes of Normandy were
kings of England, she would have been an annexe of
France. We have reason, then, to be thankful for
the slowness of vision which prevented our Saxon
kings from recognising that sea power was the back-
bone of their strength. Had they done so, one or more
of the valuable elements which make up our nation
would have been wanting.

Britain is, indeed, the "place where two seas meet."
The early civilisation of the Mediterranean and the
rude barbarian of the North found in her, the one its
latest, the other its earliest goal. We have seen how
the floods of Romans, Saxons, Angles, Jutes, Danes,
and Normans poured in upon her. When the ingre-
dients of the English people were ready for the mixing,
the flood was stayed by the rise of sea power. When
mixed, they came forth, a peculiar people, to fulfil
their mission in the world, with an audacity, tenacity,

58 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

flexibility, and adaptiveness which are not found in the
same degree elsewhere. We English, of course, have
the defects of our qualities. The Continent sneers
at our "insularity," as if an island people could, or
ought, to avoid being "insular." But his insularity
does not prevent the Englishman from being first
without a second in the art of handling the less ad-
vanced races of mankind over which it is his destiny
to rule. Whatever he may be at home, in the dark
places of the earth he is, if insular, not narrow-minded,
but tolerant, inflexibly just, with a happy way of fitting
the means to the end. Moreover, when the ingre-
dients which make the English people were mixed,
there was added to them the gifted Celtic races which
fringe the land, in a union which, we trust, will soon
be rendered complete by the true reconciliation of
Ireland.

Of what elements is an Englishman really made?
The descendants of the Britons, we know, survive
among us in the inhabitants of Wales and Cornwall.
Danish blood there unquestionably is in the men of
the East Coast and almost throughout Lincolnshire.
In all probability, our great Nelson was of Danish
descent. It used to be held for gospel, however, that
the two ingredients of the English nation which so
entirely swamped all others as to make them negligible
were the Anglo-Saxon masses and the Norman aristo-
cracy. The idea that any strain of the old Roman
blood remained was laughed at. That opinion is no
longer dogmatically held, nor is it likely to be correct.
The Roman legions were here for three hundred and
fifty years. They were not changed every ten or fifteen
years, as are our regiments in India. One legion at
least remained in Britain for over two hundred years.

"A PLACE WHERE TWO SEAS MEET" 59

The legionaries were not all of Roman race, it is true.
Many were Iberians and Gauls, Dacians, and other
subject races of Rome. But, at any rate, there was a
large element which settled permanently in the land
and took wives of the daughters of the people. When
the Saxons came, they plundered and massacred as
the Romans never did. But, in the beginning, at
any rate, they were warriors who came without their
women, and they stayed and settled. The complete
subjugation of the country was a long business, spread
over a hundred and fifty years. In that time there
must have been intermarriage. That the idea was
familiar to both the Romano-Britons and the Saxons
is shown by the story of the marriage of Vortigern
to the daughter of Hengist. Moreover, the persistence
of Roman place-names in a Saxonised form seems to
show that the inhabitants of the country were neither
entirely exterminated nor driven out. Chester, Leices-
ter, Lancaster survive and, in other cases, the present
names, while of Latin derivation, differ from those
by which the cities were known in Roman times.
Camalodunum became Colchester at some period;
Venta Belgarum, Winchester; Calleva Atrebatum, Sil-
chester. These bear the appearance of folk-names,
bestowed by a Latinised people. But the question is,
How did the names survive at all, if those who gave
them were exterminated?

Then there is the survival of old tradition, and the
glorification of British heroes. At Silchester there
lingers to this day the legend of a certain giant, whom
the country folk call Onion. He threw a great stone
a mile from the city, and there it stands unto this day.
It is called the Imp-stone, from the letters I.M.P.
inscribed upon it, doubtless the first syllable of Im-

60 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

perator. But the interesting point is that, when the
exploration of Silchester was systematically undertaken,
an inscription was found which proved "Onion" to
have been a historical personage. He was an ancient
British king or chieftain. In accordance • with the
usual growth of myth, he has become a giant. But
who made him a giant? The Saxons would not have
extolled his prowess. There must have been a surviv-
ing population by whom the story, growing into legend,
was passed down. There is no question here of the
story having been carried to the hills of Scotland and
Wales and there cherished among an undoubtedly
British population, as the legend of Arthur may have
been. It grew and survives on the spot among the
country folk. It may be claimed, surely, that there
is evidence here that the Romano-British survived in
parts of the country other than Wales and Cornwall.
The events and the elements which have contributed
to the making of the nation which has wielded sea
power as no other nation has in history; which has
made of it a tempered and a balanced weapon with
which to carry out its destiny, cannot be otherwise
than germane to the study of sea power. We are the
heirs of all our past. If we owe our turbulent love of
liberty and adventure to the Saxons and the Danes,
our stubbornness of purpose to the Normans, may it
not be that the inflexible love of law and justice and
the practical aptitude which drives the road and bridges
the ford descend to us from that great people who were
the first conquerors of Britain, and left these same
marks as their most enduring monument in the world?

CHAPTER IV

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND

WE now reach the point at which the last of the
essential elements which went to the making of the
English nation was added to it; at which strong cen-
tral government was substituted for the chaos of Saxon
times, tempered in turn by the gradual growth of
civil and political liberties which were won by struggles
oft-repeated between king, Church, baronage, and
people. These forces were grouped in different ways,
from time to time, but were gradually welded and
fused by the fires of strife behind the closed door which
was guarded by sea power. It was but slowly that
the meaning of that vital bulwark began to dominate
the minds of monarchs and statesmen; still more
slowly those of the people. But the days of tribal
incursions are henceforward at an end. Progress in
freedom coincided with development of maritime
greatness. The two things are inseparable in the
British conception of the State.

Homer, we are told, sometimes nods. It is not
surprising that our great Shakespeare should occa-
sionally follow his example. The noble rhapsody of
John of Gaunt in Richard II. was written a very few
years after the defeat of the Armada. When Shake-
speare wrote of

6l

62 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

"This precious stone set in a silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands,"

he must have had the great deliverance in his mind.
He speaks of England "bound in with the triumphant
sea"; but there is not the faintest allusion to the men
and ships which secured her safety. Of course Shake-
speare was not writing a naval treatise. But the
description of the sea as "a moat defensive to a house"
is a very bad comparison save on the supposition that
the enemy has no ships in which to cross it. The bold,
bad baron who attacked his neighbour's moated keep
did not, as a rule, drag a flotilla with him, and an at-
tempt to swim the moat in casque and hauberk would
naturally lead to a visit to the freshwater equivalent
of Davy Jones's locker. With drawbridge up and port-
cullis down, the besieged could sleep as soundly in his
bed as did Sir Robert de Shurland when his stronghold
was attacked by the Posse Comitatus of Kent, though
counter-attack eventually became necessary in that
historic instance.

But the aggressor from over-sea is, ex hypothesi,
provided with a fleet. Being able to move in secret,
he can choose his point of attack. The total defending
force may be ten or twenty times that of the invaders,
but it cannot watch the whole coast at one and the
same time and hope to be able to concentrate in suffi-
cient force at the point where the attempt at landing
is to be actually made. We saw this when Julius
Caesar, finding a great concentration of Britons to
oppose his landing at Dover, moved his point of
attack to Deal, and got ashore there before the de-

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 63

fenders could bring up their forces. No frontier is so
unsafe as a sea frontier, unless the defender is in supe-
rior strength at sea, for almost all land frontiers have
natural or artificial strong places which can be held
with a minimum of force, while the invader is tied to
the roads or railroads for his line of advance. To prove
this, it is only necessary to look at the war map of
to-day, and to consider the effect of the Carpathians,
the Alps, the Pripet Marshes, the inundations of the
Yser, the Wilderness of Sin, and the floods of the
Tigris, alternating with the drought of Mesopotamia.
So many lines of advance are closed by natural obsta-
cles that the defenders can foresee the points of attack
and concentrate their forces accordingly. But the sea
has no natural obstacles. It is a broad, level highway,
and the army which can use the sea unopposed is free
from the great bane of all armies moving by land:
that they have to defend and maintain long trains of
transport. Even when it is placed on shore, an army
carried by sea can often shorten its lines of communi-
cation by judicious co-operation with the fleet.

But a defending navy does not best fulfil its function
by hugging the shore and waiting to be attacked. That
is a fallacy which has persisted since Salamis. It
has given rise to such monstrosities as coast-defence
ships, on which we, like other nations, have wasted
millions. Coast-defence ships are merely the Martello
tower idea, transferred from the land to' the water.
Drake pleaded in vain for leave to "impeach" the
Spaniards off their own ports. Nelson laid down
the golden rule that "our first line of defence is close
to the enemy's coast." But the delusion is not yet
dead. It cropped up after the German bombardment
of East Coast towns.

64 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

A third delusion is that defence can be secured with
an inferior navy. That, in some mysterious way, a
"fleet in being" which is not strong enough to fight
will keep the enemy away from the shore. Under
certain geographical conditions, it is true that an in-
ferior navy may exercise considerable influence. It
would be foolish, for instance, to ignore the influence
which the German fleet has exercised. The short
coast-line of Germany, and the possession of a back
door at Kiel, together with the difficulty of forcing an
entrance into the Baltic, make the position of our chief
enemy to resemble rather a land-position than the
broad and accessible path of the sea. The "wet
triangle" and the narrow passages of the Sound and
the Belts are comparable to river estuaries. The
value of the German fleet rests upon the possibility
that, under conceivable circumstances, it might obtain
a local and temporary superiority in one sea or the
other. Moreover, in estimating superiority or in-
feriority, it is unsafe to reckon numbers only. The
question cannot be determined until it has been put
to the test of war. Efficiency, the habit of the sea,
superior resources, may make up for lack of numbers.
The Japanese were inferior to the Russians in 1904,
by the book. Yet the Russian squadron in Port Arthur
was powerless to prevent them from landing both in
Korea and the Shan-tung Peninsula. But such modi-
fications as have been here noted do not affect the
general principle. If a nation elects, or is compelled,
to place its faith in sea power for its defence, then it
must see to it that its navy remains indisputably
supreme in all respects to any possible assailant or
probable combination of enemies.

If Harold, the son of Godwin, had grasped these

ho

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« w

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 65

points, the last great invasion of this country, nearly
nine hundred years ago, might never have taken place.
He had a fleet, and, at other times, made good use of it.
For instance, he beat back the first attempt of his re-
bellious brother, Tostig, on the sea. But when the
crisis came in 1066, his fleet kept its ports, thinking,
perhaps, to defend England off her own shores, instead
of "impeaching" the Norman Duke off his. Nor was
any attempt made to meet the armada of Harald
Hardrada and Tostig by sea. It is likely enough that
the Saxon fleet was not strong enough to fulfil the
double task. But it was employed on neither. The
army was made the first line of defence. Harold
marched north to give battle to Harald Hardrada and
Tostig, apparently in the hope that William would
remain weather-bound until his return. He accom-
plished his immediate purpose at the battle of Stam-
ford Bridge, where both the invaders were slain. But
ere he could reach London again the Normans were
ashore in Sussex. It must be remembered that Harold's
fleet was not a royal navy. The ships were furnished
by London and what were afterwards known as the
Cinque Ports. Their owners were not required to give
continuous service, but only for a certain number of
days in the year. Very possibly, these had expired
before William got a fair wind which brought him to
Pevensey and the field of Senlac.

Being now both King of England and Duke of Nor-
mandy, William learned of necessity something of
the function of sea power. The rebellion of his son,
Robert Curt-hose, and other disturbances in his Duchy
alternated with outbreaks both of the Saxons and of
his own barons in England. The constant passage of
large bodies of men between the two countries became
s

66 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

an imperative necessity, and so continued during the
reigns of all the Norman and Angevin kings. Sea
power, at first a matter of transport only, now became
a serious preoccupation to the rulers of England. The
use of the sea, however, was not all on one side. There
was much cross-raiding. Sometimes an English army
was conveyed to France; sometimes a French army was
landed in this country. But gradually, as the
true English nation was formed and became conscious
of itself, it tended to realise that its own shores might
be rendered inviolate by predominance at sea. The
Anglo-Normans began to regard the Channel as their
highway and the opposite coast as their frontier.

The centre of power soon shifted from Normandy
to England. It was on the island, not on the conti-
nent, that the descendants of William the Conqueror
consolidated their strength for the great struggle with
their Frankish suzerains. And thus they made a
nation. An English party arose, led by the Norman
barons themselves. Stephen Langton, the Church-
man, and Simon de Montfort, the Frenchman, stood
boldly for the rights of Englishmen against intrigues
to make of England a province of Rome or a satrapy
of France. The greatest of our early English kings
had to meet the opposition of his feudal vassals when he
wished to use English power to further his designs on
France without the consent of Englishmen. It has
never been the right of the Kings of England, said
Bigod, Earl of Norfolk, to force their vassals to serve
in Flanders. "By God, Sir Earl," exclaimed the King,
with a profane pun, "you shall either go or hang!"
"By God, Sir King," replied the Earl, "I will neither
go nor hang!" And he neither went nor was hanged.
Eventually the kings themselves came to rely on the

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 67

English bowmen rather than upon the Norman chivalry
for their armies, for the latter had kindred whom they
would not harm and estates on which they feared re-
prisals, among the king's enemies. It was the cloth-
yard shafts of the English which gave victory to Edward
III. and Henry V. The English kings, no longer dukes
of Normandy, thanks to the merciful incompetence of
John Lackland, yet held a bridgehead at Calais. The
long struggle was fought out upon the soil of France,
while the English nation consolidated itself behind the
fleets and the armies. In the end, fortunately for
our future, the hopeless attempt to subdue the French
nation failed. All France was lost save Calais, and
then Calais itself. But England was ready for her
mission in the world. She was ready to expand,
first into Great Britain, then into the British Empire.
But as yet her sea power was insecurely based. In
Norman and Plantagenet times, the sailor was scarcely
more than a ferryman. His function was to carry
armies, though his came to involve the corollary that
he should prevent the carriage of the enemy's armies.
The impulse of the nation, as a whole, was not yet
towards the sea. Nevertheless, a true conception of
naval strategy and tactics was beginning to emerge.
In 1215, Louis the Dauphin was in London, called there
by the barons who were in revolt against John. But
the arrogance of the French roused the spirit of the
English people, and associations were formed which
equipped ships and continually raided the communica-
tions of Louis in the Channel. John died in the fol-
lowing year, and, in 1217, Louis was utterly defeated
and his army destroyed under the walls of Lincoln.
An armament of eighty galleys was fitted out at Calais
for his relief, commanded by a noted pirate, named

68 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Eustace the Monk. Hubert de Burgh, the Justiciary,
collected forty ships of the Cinque Ports, with which
he gave battle. The English manoeuvred for the
"weather gauge," as it came to be called later: that
is to say, they got to windward. They then hurled
quicklime into the air and, thus blinding their enemies,
fell on board them with such good will that only fifteen
of their ships escaped. Eustace himself was found
hiding in the hold of his vessel, and his head was struck
off by Richard Fitzroy, a bastard son of John. This
fight is notable for the evidence it gives of the insight
of Hubert de Burgh. When he went afloat and took
command of the fleet, he was holding Dover Castle,
always looked upon as the postern gate of England.
So fully did he recognise the desperate chances against
him that he gave orders before he set forth that Dover
Castle was not to be surrendered even to save his life,
should he be taken prisoner. But nothing blinded
him to the fact that, if England was to be saved, the
foe must be met at sea. His was the policy of the
wooden walls as against that of the Martello towers,
and eternal honour crowns the name of Hubert de
Burgh for this reason, though not for this alone.
"This victory," it has been said, "settled for ever
the question how England could best be defended.
From this time forward we have produced no great
naval or military leader who has not placed his trust
in the navy as the first line of defence when invasion
threatened the country." Yet many of our historians
do not mention it at all.

Our two warrior kings, Edward III. and Henry V.,
both made full and correct use of sea power. In 1340,
Philip of France lay at the mouth of the Scheldt with a
great armament consisting of nineteen ships of unusual

The Capture of an Algerine Corsair

From an old woodcut

The Baltic Fleet in 1855, " The Duke of Wellington "

From a drawing by E. Weedon, in the Illustrated London News, 1855

THE MAKING OP ENGLAND 69

dimensions, two hundred other ships of war, and a host
of smaller vessels. His object was the invasion of
England. Hastily collecting all the ships he could
from the Cinque Ports and the south generally, Edward
sailed to "impeach " the enemy off his own port. Thus
early, the Scheldt had become a "pistol pointed at the
heart of England." The whole of his Council opposed
Edward in this matter. "You are all in a conspiracy
against me!" he exclaimed impatiently. "I shall go.
Those who are afraid may stay at home." The battle
was fought off Sluys, at the mouth of the river. The
French drew up their array across the passage. Ed-
ward at first put out to sea as if to decline an engage-
ment. He was, however, but manoeuvring to avoid
the sun, which shone full in the eyes of his men. His
purpose gained, he bore down on the French with wind
and tide in his favour. Every ship in the first division
of the enemy was captured, and, at this opportune
moment, Lord Morley arrived with a fleet from the
northern counties. Joining forces, the combined fleet
fell upon the second and third lines of Philip's ships.
The French were seized with panic and jumped over-
board. The fourth line, consisting of sixty ships,
made a brave resistance, but was overpowered. With
the exception of a few stragglers, the whole French
fleet remained in the hands of the victors. Edward
lost two ships which were sunk, and about four thousand
men. The French losses in men are said to have
amounted to nearly thirty thousand.

This great sea fight, of far more consequence to
England than Cr6cy or Poitiers, is usually dismissed
by historians in a few lines and treated merely as the
prelude of the land campaign. Nevertheless, Sluys
settled the question whether the war should be fought

70 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

on the soil of France or England. Edward grasped the
full significance of his victory and claimed the title
of "The King of the Sea," which none disputed with
him. He insisted that foreign ships in the Channel
should vail their topsails to his flag in acknowledgment
of his sovereignty. The custom prevailed for near
three hundred years, and, as we shall see, was the overt
cause of the first Dutch War. Sluys was not the only
sea battle in which Edward commanded his fleet. In
1348 he attacked a Spanish fleet from the Biscayan
coast which had joined the French and was harrying
his communications and the English trade in the
Channel. The battle, which was commonly known as
that of Espagnols-sur-Mer, was fought within sight
of the town of Winchelsea, and resulted in a complete
victory for the English, fourteen of the enemy vessels
being sunk.

The use made by Henry V. of his navy was strategical,
and led to no engagement of first-rate importance.
But it is, none the less, extremely interesting. The
army with which the King embarked at Southampton
on August 2, 1415, cannot have been fewer in number
than 20,000 men. In six weeks it had lost more than
half its number from wounds and disease under the
walls of Harfleur. With 9000 men Henry set out to
march from Harfleur, which had surrendered, to Calais.
It was a piece of bravado, for his intention was to re-
embark his weakened army at Calais and carry it home.
This extraordinary flank march through a hostile
country, in face of an enemy at least ten times his
strength, was made possible by the fact that his fleet
moved parallel with him along the coast and that he
was supplied from it. All went well until he was
strongly opposed at Abbeville at the mouth of the

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 71

Somme. He was then compelled to turn inland and
to follow the course of the river along its left bank until
he could find a ford. He crossed near Peronne, in the
heart of the great battlefield of 1916, and then, turning
northward again, he met and utterly defeated the
French at Agincourt on the Ternoise, where the Dau-
phin and the Constable of France attempted to bar
his way to Calais. His strategy may be compared
with that of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular
War, when, marching from Lisbon to the Pyrenees, he
shifted his base from the former port to San Sebastian.
Little British armies have often been made to go a
long way by the skilful use of sea communications.
Henry, of course, had complete command of the Chan-
nel, though, in the following year, the French disputed
it with him. They blockaded the mouth of the Seine
and nearly reduced the English garrison of Harfleur
by starvation. But they were defeated by the Duke
of Bedford and the siege was raised.

What was the Navy which stood Edward III. and
Harry of Monmouth in such good stead? The ques-
tion is not very easily answered. It has been asserted
that Henry V. was the first king to establish a war-
navy, which now became separated from the merchant
service. This is certainly not the case. The separation
from the merchant service did not take place till many
years later. England, indeed, had very little sea-borne
trade at this time. The carriers of the world were the
Hanseatic cities (of which later), the Venetians and
the Genoese. England was still in the agricultural
stage, feeding her own people, and using the surplus
and the products of her fisheries to purchase luxuries
from abroad. London was a great entrepdt, but the
entrepdt trade was carried on in foreign ships. The

72 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

establishment of the Staples and the grant of Charters,
such as the Charter of Merchants by Edward I. in 1303,
which were devices to enable the kings to get money
without appealing to the Estates, acted in restraint
of foreign trade. On the other hand, the navy was not
yet the King's Navy. At least, the kings maintained
no permanent fleet. The feudal idea prevailed that
the dwellers by the seashore should give service by sea,
as the tenants in capite, their sub-tenants and retainers
gave it by land. In return, those who provided ships
and men had certain privileges. The most famous of
these corporations was the Cinque Ports, originally
the five ports of Sandwich, Dover, Hythe, Romney,
and Hastings. Afterwards the number increased to
seven by addition of Rye and Winchelsea. The de-
fence of the realm by sea, and, more especially of the
communications with Normandy, thus centred in
the narrow gate of the Straits of Dover, a strategical
position which has maintained its importance ever
since. Whether the threat has come from the South
or the North, the fleet in the Downs has always been
one of the bulwarks of England.

The first Charter of the Cinque Ports was granted
by Edward I. Under it the five towns were bound to
furnish fifty-seven ships for fifteen days in the year,
and victualling for others. They received in exchange
their own civil and criminal jurisdiction, exemption
from taxation and tolls, and the right to assemble in
their own parliament, which sat at Shepway, near
Hythe. To this day the Corporation has its Courts
of Guestling and Brotherhood, though their functions
are ornamental. (In point of fact, however, the Cinque
Ports possessed special rights and owed special duties
long before the date of their first Charter. In Domes-

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 73

day Book the contingent of Dover is fixed at twenty
ships, and those of other towns in proportion. There
are even traces of their obligation to furnish a fleet
as far back as the reign of Edward the Confessor. By
the Charter of Edward I. the Warden of the Cinque
Ports was Admiral of the Coast from Dover to Cornwall.
This, however, was subsequently modified, and Ports-
mouth was made a separate command.

There were, besides, other Admiralties and other
obligations to furnish ships. London, for instance,
was required to furnish a contingent, known as "ships
of the Tower." This was the nearest approach to a
Royal Navy in existence in pre-Tudor times. The
Lord Mayor was Admiral of the Thames. One stout
fellow, Sir John Philpot, after whom Philpot Lane is
named, actually commanded at sea. A notable Scot-
tish pirate, one John Mercer, was ravaging the traffic
in the North Sea, and Richard II., who was busy with
his own none too prosperous affairs, made no attempt
to put an end to his depredations. Said sturdy Sir
John, "We must catch the wasp which stings us, and
do our best to smoke his kindred from their nest. The
nobles who should defend us are laggers and excuse-
makers. They do not feel the prick of this thorn as
we merchants do, and so they neglect to pull it out.
But, an they like it or not, the thorn shall out, and,
if they will not attempt it, why, we must." Despite
its confused metaphor, this eloquent passage puts the
interrelation of sea power and commerce in a nutshell.
Sir John collected a fleet of fourteen ships and manned
it with a thousand picked men. He found the pirate
cruising in the Channel with twenty-one ships; fought
him to a standstill; captured or destroyed sixteen
vessels, and brought three hundred prisoners, including

74 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Mercer himself, back to London. The King, however,
considered that Philpot had taken too much upon him-
self and placed him on his trial. He was honourably
acquitted; the King kept his prisoners, and eventually
pocketed their ransom. The King's sovereignty was
vindicated and his pockets filled; the merchants
traded in peace, and "Box and Cox were satisfied."
Sir John afterwards placed his fleet at the King's
disposal, as was his bounden duty and service.

Besides the Warden of the Cinque Ports and the
Lord Mayor, there were Admirals of the North and
the West. The functions of these officials appear to
have been less to command at sea than to exercise
the administrative and judicial functions which now
belong to the Admiralty. They had, however, to
furnish a contingent of ships to the King's service
as Lord Morley did at Sluys.

The idea of local defence runs strongly through all
these arrangements: an idea which is unsound accord-
ing to the more developed strategical theories of our
own times. But the enemy to be met was less often
a national enemy than one or other of the pirates which
then infested the seas. Moreover, the communication
of intelligence was slow and uncertain, and prompt
action often necessary. Nevertheless, we can see the
strong tendency towards centralisation and the firm
hold which our English kings kept over the abuses of
the feudal system in the repression of private war,
as evidenced in the case of Sir John Philpot. If the
ships were not the King's ships, he was, nevertheless,
as effectively the Overlord of their owners as he was of
the tenants in capite to whom he forbade the practice
of sub-infeudation.

The forces wielded by these subordinate Admiralties

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 75

no doubt consisted largely of small craft, manned by
the hardy fishermen of the coast. But the contingents
of ships furnished by the Cinque Ports must have
included bigger vessels, some engaged in trade with the
Continent in time of peace, and some laid up for the
King's use. There is, however, ground for the sus-
picion that they were occasionally used on enterprises
not easily distinguishable from piracy, which were
disguised under the specious name of "reprisals."
In such days as those of Henry III., Edward II., and
Richard II., when the central power was loosened,
"Pirates of Penzance" may have had an actual
existence.

The feudal obligations of the Cinque Ports, the
City of London, and the Admiralties of the North and
West do not, however, account for the whole of the
great armaments which our kings sometimes took to
sea. The numbers vary from the two hundred ships
with which Edward III. fought the Battle of Sluys to
the twelve hundred which he mustered in the Channel
four years later. The ships can hardly have been
men-of-war as we understand the term. They had
certain distinctive features, it is true, such as the fore-
castle from which the men-at-arms fought, of which
the name survives, though the thing itself has vanished,
and fighting-tops for archers on the masts. These
were fitted on ships hired for the purpose of war, and
often from abroad. But the ship herself only became
a real instrument of warfare when she became a float-
ing gun-carriage. Artillery was first used, so far as
our own waters were concerned, by the Spaniards in
an engagement fought by them and the French against
an inferior English force off La Rochelle in 1377. The
Venetians used it about the same time in the Mediter-

76 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

ranean. It was more easily adapted to oared galleys
than to sailing ships. It had not been generally adopted
by the English even in Henry V. 's time, and it was not
made the primary armament of warships till the Tudor
era. That, then, must be regarded as the epoch when
the Royal Navy really had birth.

At this point it is convenient to say something about
that famous institution the Hansa, or Hanseatic
League, through which the Germanic peoples made
their first bid for sea power. It has been mentioned
that Edward I. granted a Charter of Merchants in
1303. The Hansa was, at that date, already estab-
lished in London in the Steelyard, where Cannon
Street Station now stands. The Easterlings, as the
merchants were called, had begun to acquire those
privileges which eventually gave them an alderman
of their own and the right to follow immediately after
the Lord Mayor and Corporation in all civic processions.
They had establishments also in Boston and elsewhere.
They were fostered by the kings, to whom they lent
money or paid toll. Their trading system was similar
to that of the Phoenicians in earlier days and to that
of the English and the Dutch in the East Indies after-
wards. That is to say, they established what were
later called "factories" in England, in Flanders, and
in the Scandinavian countries. The parent cities
were scattered throughout the Germanic Empire,
and they were not all maritime, for Cologne and even.
Cracow, Dinant, and Gottingen were, at one time or
another, Hanse towns. But the majority were situated
on the shores of the North Sea and the Baltic, and of
these Lubeck and Hamburg were the most considerable.
Their prosperity was founded upon the herring. They
bought the greater part of the catch off our shores;

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 77

but the main part of their supply came from the Sound,
where herring swarmed during the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries so that at certain seasons, it is said,
"they raised boats out of the water." The Lubeck
merchants set up establishments for catching and
curing the fish at Skanor and Falsterbo, on the south-
ern tip of the Swedish Peninsula. They had another
important establishment at Wisby in the island of
Gothland.

So far, the Hansa were peaceful traders, collecting
the merchandise of northern Europe in exchange for
their catch of herring, and selling it in England, France,
Spain, and the Netherlands. But in 1248 the herring
involved the League in war. Lubeck, in retaliation
for some alleged infringement of fishing rights, attacked
Denmark and plundered Copenhagen. A century
later, the great conflict between the League as a whole
and the Danes under King Waldemar IV. occurred.
Wisby was sacked by the Danes, and a fleet of fifty-
two Hanseatic ships, incautiously denuded of their
men to take part in the siege of Helsingor (Elsinore)
was attacked by Waldemar and destroyed. However,
in 1367 the Hansa met in Cologne and agreed to raise
a new fleet and army. Making alliance with the
Swedes, they again seized Copenhagen and ravaged the
islands of Laaland, Moen, and Falster. Norway sup-
ported Denmark, but the superior sea power of the
Hansa enabled the Swedes to bring their military force
to bear, and the Danes were forced to sign the humili-
ating Peace of Stralsund in 1370. The Danish realm
consists in the main of islands, and we see once more
that islands can only be successfully defended by a
fleet strong enough to keep open sea-communications
and to deny their use to the enemy. For lack of this

78 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

power, the aid of the Norwegians was useless to Den-
mark, while that given by the Swedes to the Hansa
was decisive.

After the Peace of Stralsund, the Hansa took to
piracy. Bodies were formed, known as the "Victual-
ling Brothers" or the "Equal Sharers" (the Germans
have always been pastmasters of the art of finding
fair names for rank iniquity). These established
strongholds at Wisby and Emden, and plundered all
and sundry. Complications with England followed,
in which the whole League was involved. It was noted
that, in the negotiations, the League endeavoured "to
get everything and give nothing," the right of the
German to possess the earth being already a Teutonic
article of faith. Matters culminated in an actual
conflict in 1417, when the English seized a number of
Hanse ships returning from the Bay of Biscay. Again,
in 1451, a fleet fitted out by the East Coast ports took
one hundred and eight ships in the Channel. A long
and desultory conflict followed during the years when
the central Power in England was embarrassed by the
Wars of the Roses. It is hardly distinguishable from
piracy on either side. The Steelyard was stormed by
the Londoners; but the Hansa was too useful to the
kings to allow of the expulsion of the Easterlings for
the present. Their privileges were confirmed by
Edward IV. and Henry VII. However, in the reign of
Elizabeth, they filled up the cup of their iniquity by
trading with the enemy during the war of the Spanish
Armada. Drake and Norris seized sixty of their ships
in the Tagus. Philip of Spain retorted by obtaining
a decree from the Emperor expelling all Englishmen
from Germany, so the masterful Elizabeth bundled
the Easterlings out of London bag and baggage. But

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 79

a worse misfortune awaited the Hansa. About the
same time, the wayward herring, for some reason,
deserted the Sound for the waters of the English and
Dutch coasts. The foundation of Hanseatic prosperity
was cut away, and, in its place Amsterdam, as has
been said, was "founded upon the herring." It may
be noted, as bearing upon German complaints to-day,
that the Hansa, in the heyday of its power, insisted on
the principle that "hostile ships make hostile goods,
and hostile goods make hostile ships."

The first great naval Power of northern Europe,
subsequent to Viking times, was German. It was
built upon trade and it vanished with the chief source
of its trade, just when the maritime stars of England
and Holland were rising. But it had an instructive
history. Politically, the Hansa was a loose confedera-
tion of cities, united for trade and defence, though
separated from each other geographically. It was held
together by the sea, the power to use which was secured
by the maritime towns, supported by subsidies from
the rest. It dispensed with any rigid political bond,
though it had its own Parliament, where common
policy was discussed from time to time as necessity
arose. It was driven to fight for one reason, and for
one only: to maintain its sea-communications with the
lands with which it traded and its right to use the sea.
The Hansa navy was in no sense the arm of an organised
Power. Yet it obtained so complete an ascendency
in the Baltic and North Sea that Gustavus Vasa, the
great King of Sweden, declared that the three Scandi-
navian Crowns "remained small wares of the Hansa
up to the sixteenth century." Hanseatic sea power was
securely based on the interests of the citizens.

Perhaps the greatest, though undesigned, work of

8o SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

this remarkable Confederation was that it taught
England to become a Sea Power in a similar sense.
The shrewd, money-loving Henry VII. did not fail to
perceive that the Easterlings were absorbing two profits
— that for trading, and that for carrying. The discovery
of America opened men's eyes to the immense advant-
age of our geographical position, and the cessation of
civil strife set free the minds of rulers to consider the
affairs of peace. The economic position of the country
was greatly altered by the Black Death and the con-
sequent and gradual substitution of hired labour for
villeinage. The capture of Constantinople by the
Turks, and other causes which will be dealt with in the
next chapter, put an end to the monopoly of the Eastern
trade which Venice had so long enjoyed. The result
was that private adventurers became busy fitting out
argosies for trade, and the kings took in hand the
establishment of the fighting force by which that trade
was to be protected and its opportunities increased.
That, perhaps, was not their sole intention. Dynastic
considerations, usually the most powerful with more
or less absolute monarchs, compelled this course.
The baronage had been practically destroyed by the
Wars of the Roses and the proscriptions and attainders
which followed; the feudal system as an engine of
defence was at an end; there were pretenders abroad
who would not look in vain for assistance from enemies
or rivals of this country. So Henry VII. built him ships
of war. It was about the only thing, save architec-
ture, on which he could be induced to spend money.

But it is rather his greater son, Henry VIII. , who
deserves the title of "Father of the British Navy,"
claimed for so many. He put the hoards extorted
by Empson and Dudley to the best use ill-gotten

THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 81

wealth has ever been put to. Extravagant as he was
in his personal expenditure, he laid aside each year
a certain sum for the building and equipment of ships.
He was himself no mean navigator, and delighted to
go aboard his ships at Portsmouth with the whistle,
the badge, in those days, of admiral's rank, hung
round his neck. He appointed a Controller of the
Navy under the Lord High Admiral, thus separating
administration from command and initiating the Navy
Office or Board, which long co-existed with the Board
of Admiralty, after the office of Lord High Admiral
had been placed in commission. He also founded
Trinity House at Deptford, committing to the care of
"the Brethren of the Sacred Trinity" the supervision
of pilotage and the buoying and lighting of the coast.

Among the ships which King Henry built were the
Henri Grace-a-Dieu, or Great Harry, of 1500 tons, the
Trinity Sovereign and Henry Imperial, each of 1000 tons,
the Gabriel Royal of 800 tons, the Great Galley of 700
tons, and the Mary Rose of 600 tons. The fleet which
left Portsmouth in Holy Week of 1512 for the war with
France is said to have numbered eighty vessels and to
have carried over 20,000 men. It was well armed with
serpentines, cannon and demi-cannon, sakers, culverins,
murderers, and all the rest of the quaintly-named
ordnance of the day, some throwing shot as heavy as
were used at Trafalgar nearly three hundred years
afterwards. These ships were designed for a regular
sea-fight, although boarding, then and for many years
later, was contemplated as the decisive stage of the
action. They were no longer merely platforms for
men-at-arms to fight upon.

With this armament, Henry kept command of the
Channel. The French were driven into Brest after

82 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

a fight which was, tactically, indecisive. The Eng-
lish followed them through the Goulet Passage, and
then occurred a strange incident which has never been
satisfactorily explained, but which cost the life of the
Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edward Howard. He ap-
pears to have boarded the French flagship which was
lying inside the harbour, with the intention of cutting
her out. He was left on deck almost single-handed,
the French throwing off the grappling-chains before
his whole crew could get on board. Howard, seeing
himself doomed, threw his whistle, the badge of his
rank, overboard, and was shortly afterwards hurled
into the sea. His adversary, Pregent, or "Prior John,"
as the English called him, a notorious corsair, re-
covered the body, and salted the heart as a "souvenir."
His motive was not "frightfulness," as one would
hastily conclude. He honestly wished to honour a
doughty foe.

Henry VIII. had his ups and downs by sea. The
English coast was repeatedly raided, despite his general
ascendency. As Mahan has said, and as recent experi-
ence has proved, no superiority, however great, can
wholly prevent such enterprises. On one occasion the
fishing hamlet of Brighthelmstone, not yet become
"Doctor Brighton," was burned. In a later war, the
French sent a great fleet to the Isle of Wight, which
actually sailed into Spithead. Henry's fleet on the
spot was much inferior in numbers, and, to make mat-
ters worse, the Mary Rose the "beauty ship" of the
squadron, as was our lost Queen Mary, capsized and
sank. Loud was the laughter of the French. But a
sudden shift of wind prevented them from making
use of their advantage. Night came on, and, in the
morning, to the astonishment of the English, the French

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THE MAKING OF ENGLAND 83

fleet had disappeared. So impressed were the pious
minds of English churchmen that two suffrages were
embodied in the Liturgy to keep the event in remem-
brance:

"Give peace in our time, O Lord!"

"Because there is none other that fighteth for us:
But only Thou, O God."

It was to this fleet also that the password, "God
Save the King!" with the countersign, "Long to reign
over us!" was given. Herein is supposed to be the
germ of the National Anthem.

It is once more to be noticed that the chroniclers of
the time and later historians tell us very little of the
means by which the English obtained their mastery
at sea. The battle off Brest was an indecisive affair,
in which we lost the Regent, one of the most powerful
vessels of the fleet. But the French sought refuge in
their harbours, and, during the rest of the war of 1512-
13, only essayed "tip-and-run" raids. The moral
appears to be that the side which will not fight is
beaten, and that all the advantages go to that which
seeks battle, even without a struggle. In other words,
sea power is power over communications at sea.

With Henry VIII. 's reign began the real era of Eng-
land's maritime greatness. Kings and people had
learned their lesson as to the true basis of defence.
The introduction of cannon, the discoveries of new
lands and of new sea routes, the altered economic
condition of the country, the abolition of restraints on
trade, even the personal rule of the Tudors, all helped
to foster the growing disposition of the English people
to turn towards the sea. The use of sea power by the
earlier kings to maintain their communications with
France had accustomed the public mind to the idea of

84 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

a fighting navy. The real, solid foundation of sea
power was now supplied. The growth of commerce
went hand in hand with efficiency in naval war. Each
supported the other. The King's ships kept the Nar-
row Seas secure; but the merchantman went armed on
his great adventures beyond. Therefore, in time of
peril, he was a valuable auxiliary to the naval force.
The English became in greater and greater degree a
seafaring people. And there was soon to come a wave
of enthusiasm, partly born of religious antagonisms,
partly of intolerance of restraint, which lent weight
and vigour to these impulses. These things, and much
else, came to fruition in the Elizabethan age.

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CHAPTER V

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES

IT has been truly said that the shores of the Mediter-
ranean are strewn with the wreckage of Empire. The
Pharaohs, the Phoenicians, the Carthaginians, the
Greeks and Macedonians, the Romans, Vandals,
Saracens have in turn borne sway and vanished. The
Turks are in a fair way to vanish. Some have left
their monuments, some their literature and art, and
all have left abiding lessons to those who study the
meaning and the function of sea power. The period
we now have to trace is one in which ancient civilisa-
tions were impinged upon by Barbarism from the
North and from the East; in which religious zeal or
fanaticism moved the nations to almost continuous
war, and in which Christendon, divided against itself,
gave ground before the fierce onslaughts of Islam.
Thence emerged a new contest between East and West
which ended in the bounds of the East being set further
to the westward than in the last great incursion in the
days of Xerxes. Nevertheless, the tide was stemmed,
and stemmed mainly by sea power. The bounds of
the Turkish Empire in northern Africa were set where
the bounds of Cambyses' Empire were set, for Ottoman
control beyond the borders of Egypt was little more
than nominal. On the European side, however, the

85

86 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

sword of the Faithful bit deeper. It was only under
the walls of Vienna that the plague was stayed. The
failure of the Byzantine Empire and of the other States
which should have supported it in the task of holding
back the Turkish onslaught are at the root of the troubles
of to-day, for it is the heritage of the Turk, derived
by conquest from Byzantium, which has stirred most
deeply the cupidity of the Teutonic rulers.

The history of sea power in the Mediterranean
during the Middle Ages can best be understood by
following the long, tortuous, but withal glorious,
history of Venice. It is the story of perhaps the most
completely organized naval State the world has ever
seen. Everything in that paradise of merchant princes
gave way to trade. All policy was founded on the
acquisition of wealth, and had that for its end. And
the Venetians, in consequence, had both the virtues
and vices of traders. They were punctilious in keep-
ing the letter of a bargain, but not equally scrupulous
about its spirit. They indulged in little idealism. It
was impossible to sway them by sentiment. But,
being sea-traders, they were of high spirit and tena-
cious of their ends. At last, they lapsed into the
torpor of wealth, and allowed themselves to be undone
by circumstances which they would have overcome,
had they retained their early stiffness of purpose —
namely, the discovery of America and the route to
India round the Cape.

Venice was founded in the fifth century of our era
by a band of fugitives who fled from the Huns. They
were of the most stiff-necked breed of the Italian peoples,
and they found among the lagoons at the head of the
Adriatic an abode easily defensible and as easily
adapted to the acquisition of wealth and power. From

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 87

small beginnings, merely punting from island to island,
carrying fish and other produce ; then gradually extend-
ing their range to fetch corn and wine from Apulia;
afterwards, pushing their trade down the narrow waters
of the Adriatic, the people of Venice built up their
great navy, trusting their all to the sea, and living by
it alone. Protection was needed from the pirates of
Illyria and the northern coast of Africa, and thus arose
the war navy. It was the deliberate creation of the
State for the protection of its merchantmen. The
Venetians started at the right end. The first Doge,
Paolo Lucio Anafesta, little more than two hundred
years after the small beginnings of Venice, enforced
the building of merchant ships and provided for the
fortification of the shipyards, and Doge Orso Ipato,
in 726, definitely set himself to create a war navy
for use against the Lombards. Fourteen years later,
the Venetians won their first smashing victory, taking
Ravenna, crushing a serious rival, and thus winning
the supremacy of the Adriatic.

Venice became later the "Safeguard of the West."
But at this time she was fairly constantly on the side
of the Empire of the East. Charlemagne attempted
to win her over. His policy was brimstone and treacle.
He sent his son, Pepin, to sack the town. But Pepin
met with a great disaster — so great that the scene of
the battle was known as the Canale d'Orfani. Charle-
magne then tried propitiation, opening the doors of his
empire to Venetian trade. The Venetians took his gifts
and used them as a lever to secure similar concessions
from Alexius, Emperor of the East. Thus Venice be-
came the entrepdt of trade between East and West, a
position she was to maintain till the sixteenth century.
Her power and wealth grew by leaps and bounds.

88 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Attention has been often called to the configuration
of the Adriatic coasts during the war. On the Italian
Peninsula there are few good harbours, until the Gulf
of Taranto is reached. On the other side, there is
not only the Peninsula of Istria, with the three naval
ports of Trieste, Fiume, and Pola, but also a rugged
coast along Illyria, Dalmatia, and Epirus, fringed
with islands and provided with the ports of Cattaro,
^be-viK. Sebenico, Durazzo, 'Ragusa, San Giovanni di Medusa,
Prevesa, Valona, and others. To develop full sea
£: power in the eastern Mediterranean, the masters of
Italy must be masters also of the eastern coast of the
Adriatic. All these ports were, from time immemorial,
nests of pirates, and it was the first task of the Vene-
tians to clear them out. The first condition of the
profitable use of sea power is the establishment of law
and right at sea. Throughout the latter part of the
ninth and the early part of the tenth century, Venice
fought for her life against a combination or succession
of enemies — Saracens, Slavs, Huns, Narentines. Some-
times she received a half-hearted backing from the
Empire of Byzantium. But, on the whole, it was her
arm alone which, in the end, made her the mistress of
almost the whole of the eastern shore. Her very mis-
fortunes turned to her advantage, for, being defeated
in a naval battle at Taranto, which they fought in
alliance with the Greeks in 839, the Venetians were
unable to prevent the enemy from sacking Ancona.
A disaster thus befell a formidable commercial rival,
at which the Venetians did not show themselves
inconsolable.

So long as the Greeks in Constantinople were strong,
Venice clave to them and, through her friendship
and the maritime help she was able to afford, sucked

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 89

out no small advantage. Her eyes were always on
the commercial opportunities afforded by Constanti-
nople. She constrained successive emperors to reduce
the dues in her favour, so that, at last, she obtained
pretty nearly the monopoly of trade with the Levant.
She adopted the same policy as did the Phoenicians,
the Hansa, and, later, the English and Dutch, of
establishing settlements or factories in the ports with
which she traded, winning many valuable privileges,
political, commercial, and also ecclesiastical. One
of her first demands on any State to which she sold
her help was the site for a church — and the tithes
appurtenant thereto.

This policy of peaceful trade led her into almost
continuous war. For this there were several reasons.
In the first place, she had to purchase the continuance
and extension of favours from the effete Empire of
Byzantium by armed help. In the second place, she
had to contend with the jealousy of commercial rivals,
such as Genoa, that other great trading Republic of
Italy, which did not by any means consent to take
the supremacy of Venice "lying down." In the third
place, the Crusades led to a demand for her services
to carry the warriors of the Cross to the Holy Land,
and she inevitably got embroiled in the strifes between
the Christian Powers which throw such a dark shadow
across the picture of these pious undertakings. It was
the Crusades which finally detached Venice from the
East and made her "The Safeguard of the West."
But first, having made her position secure in the Asi-
atic and debouching into the Mediterranean, she was
destined to come into contact with the Normans,
who had established themselves in Sicily, Apulia, and
Calabria.

90 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

They came, a band of adventurers in the beginning
of the eleventh century under Tancred of Hauteville,
thus bringing the power of the Northman into the
Mediterranean. Tancred's son, Roger, drove the
Saracens out of the greater part of Sicily, which, as
in the days of the Carthaginians, had been an outpost
of northern Africa and the East, and established him-
self there. His brother, Robert Guiscard, completed
the subjugation of the southern states of Italy. By
the conquest of Salerno and Amalfi, Robert got a
footing in Constantinople itself, for Amalfi had rich
possessions there. He set himself to build up his sea
power, determined to make himself master of the East.
The resolve of the Normans to increase their commerce
and to assert their right of way into the Adriatic could
not fail to bring them into collision with the Venetians,
even if the jealousy and fears of the Greek Empire had
not called on the latter to intervene. Both Venetians
and Normans aimed at an uncontrolled and exclusive
right of way through the Adriatic; each people con-
sidered its right to supremacy at sea to be paramount;
each had interests to guard and further in the commerce
of the East. Venice was in possession. Therefore she
stood in alliance with Byzantium to secure to herself
the use of the sea routes and to forbid them to her
rival. The primary function of sea power could not
more plainly be brought out.

In 1078, Duke Robert espoused the cause of the
dethroned Emperor, Michael VII., against Alexius
Comnenus. The latter sought the aid of Venice,
which was granted on these terms: Alexius promised,
whether successful or not, to pay an annual tribute of
twenty pounds of gold to the church of St. Mark; to
compel the citizens of Amalfi to pay a yearly tax to

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 91

the said church; to make a free gift of a warehouse,
some houses, four landing-stages, and a bakehouse,
with its dues, to the Venetians resident in Constanti-
nople; to make a gift to them of the church of St.
Andrew in Durazzo with its tithes and to grant to the
Venetians absolute freedom of trade in all parts of the
Empire, except in Cyprus and Candia. In exchange
for this charming compound of piety and business,
the Venetians promised to arm every vessel in their
possession and to lend the Greeks further help by land.
They kept their promise.

The events of the war need not be recorded in detail.
The Normans were heavily defeated in a sea battle
off Durazzo. Nevertheless, they took the town, and, in
their turn annihilated a weak Venetian fleet off Corfu.
But Robert Guiscard died, and the threat to Venice
and Constantinople was removed. The impotence
of Byzantium, which lacked sea power, despite the
foremost maritime position in the world, to defend its
possessions on the seaboard and on the islands against
a much smaller State which possessed an efficient navy,
enabled Venice to extort what terms she pleased for
her assistance.

Now, however, the time had come when Venice was
to abandon her close connection with the Empire of
the East and, speaking generally, to take her place as
"The Safeguard of the West." It was the era of the
Crusades. The hosts of the Cross, drawn from all the
Christian lands of the West, needed the services of
the maritime republics of Italy to furnish them with
transport, to carry provisions and munitions of war,
and to keep the coasts and the sea communications
against attack by the still-powerful fleet of the Saracens.
Genoa and Pisa were first in the field. The former sent

92 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

an expedition to the help of Boemond, the son of Robert
Guiscard, who was besieging Antioch in 1097, an^> in
reward, received valuable grants when the city fell.
Next year, the Pisans, attracted by the advantages
obtained by the Genoese, also sent their aid to Boe-
mond. This was too much for the Venetians. Genoa
and Pisa, up to now, had contented themselves with
trading with Sicily and the northern coast of Africa.
Their presence in the East threatened the monopoly
so carefully built up by Venice in that quarter. In
1099, Baldwin, the Prankish King of Jerusalem, ap-
plied to the Republic for assistance, and the Doge,
Vitale Michiel, pressed the project of the willing Vene-
tians. The expedition was got ready and sailed for
Rhodes, where it wintered. But the reality of the
crusading spirit which animated the Venetians was
shown by a bloody quarrel which broke out between
them and the Pisans who formed part of the armament.
The Venetians were victorious, but restored to their
foes all the ships and prisoners they had taken, on con-
dition that the Pisans bound themselves not to trade
with any places in the Levant. The dear allies then
sailed off amicably together and arrived off Jaffa in
June, lioo, in time for a conference with the dying
Godfrey de Bouillon, from whom the Doge extracted
an agreement, giving Venice the third part of every
city captured and other privileges as the price of her
assistance. In conjunction with Tancred the Norman,
the Venetians captured Haifa; but the victors fell out
over the spoil, and Vitale Michiel took his fleet home.

The events of the next two years are instructive as
showing the motives which swayed Venice, and the
sure grasp she had on the principle that command of
the Adriatic was a matter of life and death to her. She

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 93

made an alliance with the King of Hungary to curb
the Norman power on the Dalmatian coast. Brindisi
was sacked, and the object of the allies on the whole
obtained. Next, Boemond, now Prince of Antioch,
finding himself sore beset by the Turks, Greeks, and
Saracens who were besieging that town, escaped to
Europe and raised a new army with which, instead
of returning at once to the Holy Land, he besieged
Durazzo. Venice at once entered into a league with
Byzantium, harassed Boemond's communications, and
forced him to raise the siege. This done, they set out
for Palestine to the assistance of Baldwin of Jerusalem.
There they, indirectly, at any rate, assisted the Nor-
mans against the Greeks who had, a few months pre-
viously, obtained their aid against the Normans.
To complicate matters still further, Caloman of Hun-
gary deemed the moment favourable to break his
treaty with Venice and to possess himself of some towns
in Dalmatia. The Venetians applied for aid to the
Emperor Alexius; but their need of Byzantine help
by land did not prevent the fleet, which had been sent
to the Syrian coast and had taken part in the capture
of Sidon, from paying a visit to Constantinople and
showing its friendliness to the Greeks by carrying off
the body of St. Stephen from one of the basilicas.
Alliances and enmities alike sat lightly on the business
men of Venice.

In all this, however, there is a clear and definite line
of policy, though the rape of the saint's body was not
essential to it. The Venetians lived by the trade of
the sea, and they realised that, to enjoy that trade and
its fruits, they must be in undisputed command of the
sea communications, since, according to the economic
thought of that time and of long afterwards, successful

94 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

trade required monopoly. They were so placed geo-
graphically that they could act both as a barrier and a
channel of intercourse between East and West, so long
as they maintained their sea power. While the Nor-
mans, Genoese, Pisans, and Saracens were kept in a
state of comparative weakness, these communications
and, with them, their valuable monopolies, were secure.
Nay, more, they could be increased almost indefinitely
by the sale of Venetian aid, first to one claimant and
then to another. It was not very noble, but it paid.
And the patrician of Venice would have been the first
to tell you that "business is business."

Moreover, in justice to the Venetians, it must be
remembered that at this time there was no vestige of a
law which ran at sea, and also that their position was
not entirely insular. Situated as they were at the
head of a narrow sea, they were compelled by necessity
to keep control of the Dalmatian coast so far as they
could, and this necessity brought them into direct
contact with great Land Powers. A land frontier
with powerful States on the other side of it is always a
dire complication for a maritime State, rendering in-
complete the advantage of sea power. Holland is
another instance of the same embarrassment.

The position of Venice at the time of the Crusades
is thus summed up by Gibbon:

The policy of Venice was marked by the avarice of a
trading, and the insolence of a maritime, Power; yet her
ambition was prudent. Nor did she often forget that,
if armed galleys were the effect and safeguard, merchant
vessels were the cause and supply, of her greatness.

Venice had now entered upon the policy of planting
colonies or settlements abroad. The first was in

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 95

Sidon. Others were shortly to follow, both on the
coast of Syria and in the islands of the Levant. Her
colonies brought her wealth; but, as in the case of
Phoenicia of old, they taxed her strength both by the
demand for settlers and the need of providing for
their defence. Moreover, the Venetians had not the
art of ruling. They exploited their colonies for the
advantage of the Mother City. They were cordially
disliked by their subjects. Sea power easily permits
of the foundation of an oversea empire; but whether
that empire is to be a source of strength or weakness
to the Mother Country depends, first on geographical
position; secondly, and, perhaps, mainly, on the char-
acter of the race and its capacity for government.
Gibbon, in the passage quoted above, talks of the
"insolence" of a maritime Power. He probably
intended a back-handed cut at his own country in
so doing. But, although, from time to time in our
history, we have, without doubt, displayed arrogance
towards other nations and even to people of our own
flesh and blood, it is the absence of insolence and
the lare tolerance which Britain has displayed; her

rights and interests of others, which
have made theBritish Empire a source of strength to
ie~Motrier Country and not of weakness. We have

not exploited the lands over which, cayf flag fliftg; we

have not exacted tribute from any, at any rate for the
last century and a half. We have freely extended to
all the protection of the navy and have sought no
monopoly in return. Therefore, each Colony and
Dependency has developed normally, if slowly, under
the British flag, and the strain which was felt by
Phoenicia and Venice, as, later, by Spain and Portugal,
has been avoided. A vein of idealism and a strong

96 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

sense of justice and freedom are necessary, if sea power
is to lead to Empire. Enterprise and commercial
capacity are not in themselves enough.

The Fourth Crusade witnessed the final breach
between Venice and the Empire of the East and the
passing of Constantinople itself into the hands of the
Western Powers. Enrico Dandolo, one of the great-
est names in Venetian history, was elected Doge in
1192, at the age of eighty-four. In his youth he had
been taken prisoner to Byzantium and cruelly treated,
his eyes being held so close over white hot steel that
the sight was almost destroyed. To him came an
embassy ten years after his election from Louis Count
of Blois, Thibaud Count of Champagne, and Baldwin
Count of Flanders and Hainault, to negotiate for the
hire of transport ships for an expedition they proposed
to undertake against Egypt. Dandolo not only readily
agreed to hire them the ships, but proposed himself,
though ninety-four years of age and nearly blind, to
take the Cross, with a great host of Venetian nobles.
The terms were, of course, favourable to Venice. But
the extraordinary thing is that, in the document which
ratified the agreement, no destination is named for
the expedition. Dandolo, in haranguing the ambas-
sadors on its conclusion said: "All these conditions
which we have explained to you will last a year, dating
from the day when we leave the port of Venice to per-
form the service of God and Christianity in whatever
place it be."

The Venetians were soon ready, but the Knights of
the Cross tarried, nor could those who assembled
find sufficient money to pay the agreed sum to their
hosts. So Dandolo made a proposal. If the Crusaders
would help the Venetians to recover Zara, a possession

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 97

of Venice on the Dalmatian coast which was then in
revolt, the latter would consent to defer the payment
of the money to a more convenient season. The
Crusaders agreed reluctantly and Zara was reduced
in November, 1201. The Knights now expected to
push on to Egypt, but Dandolo explained that it was
too late in the year. Then came young Alexius, son
of Isaac II., Emperor of Byzantium, who had been
dethroned and blinded by his brother, another Alexius,
six years before. He implored the aid of the Crusaders,
promising, among other things, that, if his father were
restored, he would promote the reunion of the churches
of the East and the West. The bait took. The
Crusade became a crusade of the Western Church
against the Eastern, instead of one against the Infidel.
Constantinople fell ; Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault
became Emperor of the East. The triumph was com-
plete but short-lived. Baldwin fell in battle with the
Bulgarians, and old Dandolo died shortly afterwards
at the age of ninety-six, having set his country on her
highest pinnacle of greatness. He bequeathed to his
successors the title of "Master of a fourth and an
eighth of the whole Empire of Rome." But his success,
by destroying the power of the Empire of Byzantium,
was fatal to the cause of Christendom in the East.

The story of the Fourth Crusade marks an epoch
in the history of the Mediterranean. We now come
to the long struggles between Venice and Genoa for
the mastery of that sea, which had for its consequences,
first, the destruction of the Frankish Empire in Con-
stantinople; secondly, the restoration of the Greek
Empire in the house of the Palaeologi and the alliance
of the latter with the Genoese; thirdly, the delivery
of Venice from destruction by the heroism of Vettor

98 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Pisani, and, finally, the decay and overthrow of the
sea power of Genoa. There were intervals of peace;
but from first to last the war lasted nearly one hundred
and fifty years, from 1238 to the Peace of Turin in
1382. Venice was forced to cede the coast of Dalmatia
to the King of Hungary, to hand over Tenedos to the
Count of Savoy, and to give up Treviso to the House
of Carrara. Her sea power was hampered much by
attacks from the land side ; but, in the end, she emerged
not visibly weaker, since a powerful rival had been
destroyed. But the seeds of decay were sown. More-
over, Tyre, Sidon, and Acre were now lost to the Christ-
ian cause by the advance of the Turks, and the bulwark
of Christendom was weakened by the establishment
of several feeble States across the path of the Ottoman
instead of a single strong Power. Venice was the true
Safeguard of the West as long as she lent the support
of her sea power to the East, or was herself supreme in
the vital position of Constantinople. She was yet
to offer a splendid resistance to the oncoming Turk;
but neither her navy, nor the armies of Greek, Serb,
Hungarian, or Rumanian could now prevent him from
blighting the east of Europe with his presence for
five hundred years and more. Had the Turk not mas-
tered the European shore of the Dardanelles — and he
could not have done so had the Venetian sea power
been predominant in Greece and in the islands — he
would no more have established himself firmly in
Europe than Xerxes did.

The folly and blindness of the Venetian leaders
during the ensuing century are almost past belief.
With the threat of the Osmanli power to all Europe,
and to themselves in particular, growing greater and
greater every year, they forsook the sea, the only ele-

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 99

ment on which they could hope to resist it, allowed
their fleet to decay, and devoted themselves to con-
quest on the mainland of Italy. They possessed them-
selves of a great part of Lombardy and of Padua and
other places, by which means they drew down upon
themselves the hostility of the Florentines, who in-
trigued with the Turks incessantly, and finally banded
a great part of Europe against themselves in the
League of Cambrai. They lost their continental
possessions thereby, and also their pride of place as
the foremost bulwark of Europe against the Turk.
But long before this date they had lost much else. In
1453, Mahomet II. stormed Constantinople, a cata-
clysm which shook Europe to its foundations. The
Greek Empire crumbled to the dust, never to revive.
Venice attempted to make terms with the conqueror,
humbly congratulating him upon his success, and
accepting at his hands renewal of her commercial
privileges at the cost of her honour. The feeble efforts
of the King of Cyprus and the Knights of Rhodes
utterly failed to stay the progress of Mahomet. He
possessed himself of the Morea; yet the League of the
Powers of Europe, formed in 1493 at Peterwaradin,
which the Venetians joined, failed to act. The Pope and
Venice were left to face the Turks alone. The Pope
wrote to the Doge, Cristoforo Moro, urging him to
remember the example of Dandolo and to put himself
at the head of the Venetian armament. The poor
o?d man, however, though he had nigh reached Dan-
dolo's years, lacked everything of his spirit" He
pleaded his infirmities and his ignorance of nautical
matters. But the Senate was determined that the
head of the nation should lead the national forces.
"Serene Prince," said Vettor Capello, one of the ducal

ioo SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

counsellors, "if your Excellency will not go willingly,
you shall be made to go forcibly, for we hold the honour
of our country above any consideration for your person."
The Doge went accordingly, but by the time the expedi-
tion had reached Ancona Pius II. was dead, and the
Venetians faced the fury of the Turks alone.

The latter revealed themselves to an astonished
Europe as a great naval Power. Secure within the
Straits of the Dardanelles, they had built up their
strength, and the Ottoman Admiral confronted the
Venetian leader Antonio Canale, with an armada of
three hundred ships to which he could oppose but
sixty. Mahomet in person marched into Greece by
the old route of the Persians, while the Venetians lay
off Euboea, where they hesitated to try conclusions
with the Turks. Negropont was taken and sacked
with the most appalling horrors, and Canale was
brought back to Venice in irons and banished.

The two invasions of Greece which bear so remark-
able a likeness — that of Mahomet and that of Xerxes
— may be compared. Themistocles, like Canale, lay
oil Eubcea in inferior force. After the defeat of Leoni-
das at Thermopylae, the Persians, like the Turks,
marched into Greece. Themistocles, however, showed
fight, and, though the actions he fought were both
indecisive, they saved Euboea, and enabled him to
withdraw his fleet in safety to Salamis, where, in
victorious battle, he forced the withdrawal of Xerxes,
who became nervous about his communications.
Command of the sea saved Greece then ; now the Greeks
had no fleet of their own, and the succouring fleet of
Venice was inferior. Therefore, Greece, under pre-
cisely similar strategical circumstances, was lost.
Mahomet, holding both shores of the Dardanelles,

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 101

moreover, had no need to be anxious for his communica-
tions, had the event proved less favourable to him
than it actually was.

After Euboea, Scutari — the Albanian Scutari, for
which the Montenegrins fought so hard in 1912 — was
taken by the Turks, and, ere long, the burghers of
Venice could see the fires of destruction from their
city. Nothing remained for them but to make peace,
and the Queen of the Adriatic, crowned with shame,
paid tribute to the infidel. It is a ghastly lesson to
all those who, having the gift of the sea for their pro-
tection, misuse that gift through sloth or penury, or
indulge in ambitions of aggrandisement on another
element.

Now there begin to appear in the Mediterranean
European Powers which had not hitherto made their
weight felt there by sea. In 1499, Venice declared
war on the Ottoman Empire in alliance with King John
of France. This venture was no more prosperous than
the preceding one, chiefly owing to the supineness, if
not the cowardice, of the Venetian Commander,
Grimani. The Venetians lost Modon, Coron, Navarino,
and Nauplia, and had to put up with insults both
from French and Turks. "You Venetians are wise
in councils and abound in riches," said the French
King. "But so fearful are you of death that you have
neither spirit nor manliness in war." "You have
wedded the sea till now," said Mahomet's Grand
Vizier to a Venetian envoy. "For the future that
belongs to us who have more on it than you." Bitter
words for Venetian ears to hear !

After the French, the Spaniards put in an appear-
ance in 1509, but proved of little more avail. The
Venetians, however, under Benedetto Pesaro, gained

102 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

some victories, which enabled them to conclude a
peace by which Cephalonia and Nauplia were restored
to them. Soon, however, worse things befell them
than any which had gone before. War broke out
again in 1538, when Venice joined a new League pro-
moted by the Pope after the fall of Rhodes. The
League was utterly defeated at Prevesa by the Otto-
mans under the famous corsair, Hairredin Barbarossa,
whose name and fame were fitly perpetuated in one of
the battleships bought from Germany by the Turks
and sunk in 1915 by a British submarine in the Mar-
mora. Selim the Drunkard, who had succeeded
Solyman the Magnificent, himself the great-grandson
of the conqueror of Constantinople, made ready to
attack Cyprus. Plague broke out in Venice, and the
Arsenal was burned down. The Christian Powers
had their own preoccupations elsewhere, and would
render no aid. Venice was left to face the storm alone.
It did not break till 1570, when the great Turkish fleet,
with an army of 100,000 men, laid siege to Nicosia.
Christendom was at last aroused; but Philip II. of
Spain, of Armada fame, alone sent aid. Even he was
something less than half-hearted. The opportunity
was thrown away in futile debate; Nicosia was taken,
and then Famagosta. The whole of Cyprus fell into
the hands of the Turks, so to remain until Disraeli
drove his bargain in 1878 and placed it in British hands.
Next year there came the last brilliant flash of the
expiring glory of Venice, which also marked the definite
turn of the tide of Turkish conquest. Philip roused
himself in earnest. He got together a great armament
of Spanish, Neapolitan, Papal, and Venetian ships
under the command of his bastard brother, Don John
of Austria. Giannandrea Doria, the Genoese, was at

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 103

the head of the Spanish contingent, Sebastiano Veniero
in command of that of Venice. As usual, there were
dissensions among the allies. The Venetian ships
were not well found — a fact perhaps excusable, in view
of the recent destruction of the Arsenal — and there
was a long relay at Messina. Veniero and Don John,
moreover, were not on good terms. The Venetians,
fallen from their high estate at the head of the Powers
of the West, had to endure many insults. But the
leaders were at least united in their determination to
fight, and on Sunday, October 7, 1571, the Turks were
met off the rocky cluster of the Curzolari, north of the
Gulf of Lepanto. A Council of War was held on board
the flagship, and some of the commanders were for
retiring. But Don John was of a higher spirit. "De-
part, gentlemen," he said. "This is not the time for
counsel but for battle." The great flag of the League,
bearing the image of the Crucified Redeemer, was run
up to the masthead of the flagship. Don John, catch-
ing sight of Veniero on his quarter-deck, waved him a
friendly greeting which wiped out all soreness, and then,
to show his joy in battle, danced the "gagliarda" on
the poop of his ship in the sight of his whole fleet.
Thus encouraged, the Christian host fell on. The
galley of Don John lay aboard that of AH Pasha, the
Turkish Commander-in-Chief, and a desperate hand-
to-hand fight resulted in the capture of the Turk.
By nightfall the victory of the Christians was complete.
A hundred and seventeen galleys and twenty galleons
remained in their hands; fifty more were sunk; eighty
thousand Turks were slain and ten thousand more
taken prisoners. The losses of the allies were about
7500, of whom 2000 were Venetians. Pope Pius V.
eulogised the victor by quoting: "There was a man

104 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

sent from God, whose name was John." All Christen-
dom agreed.

Lepanto is justly included among the decisive battles
of the world. The Turks were yet to add Crete to
their possessions; but Don John, on that October day
in 1571, pronounced upon them the sentence: "Thus
far and no farther!" Off the indented coast of the
Morea, among the islands of the Greek Archipelago
and within a few miles of Salamis, Actium, and Nava-
rino, the question whether East or West should prevail
was again decided. It was too late to push the Turk
back from the position he had won. The control of
the Dardanelles, which he had acquired owing to the
jealousies and ineptitudes of the Christian Powers,
was too strong to be forced, though the Venetians
were, in the next hundred and twenty years, to win
four victories at the mouth of the Straits, thanks
largely to the genius of Francesco Morosini. But the
Ottoman advance in Europe was definitely stayed.
The victory of John Sobieski under the walls of Vienna
a century later followed Lepanto as Waterloo followed
Trafalgar. Yet the day of Venice was at an end.
At Lepanto, for the first time in all the long struggles
with the Turks, she had been second, not first, in the
armament of Christendom. It was significant. She
kept the shadow of her power but the substance had
departed. The Spaniards, the French, the Dutch,
and the English — all the maritime Powers — came into
the Eastern Mediterranean in the seventeenth cen-
tury. If the Venetians failed to seize the opportunity
afforded by the discovery of America and the Cape
of Good Hope to extend her commerce beyond the
pillars of Hercules, the Westerners did not miss theirs
to garner their share of the lucrative trade with Con-

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- ••

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 105

stantinople and the Levant, so long the monopoly of
Venice. Their warships followed their merchantmen,
principally to protect the latter from the forays of
those strange pirate States which grew out of the loosely
knit Turkish Empire in North Africa, which its sea
power, broken by Lepanto, could no longer control.
The last was not suppressed until Lord Exmouth
reduced Algiers in 1816. Henceforward, the history
of sea power in the Mediterranean is interwoven with
that of the seas beyond. By the end of the seven-
teenth century there were conflicts between the English
and the Dutch in its waters; in 1704 Gibraltar passed
into the hands of the English.

Venice was great at sea partly by reason of her
geographical position which, so long as the States which
lay behind her did not become too powerful, so long
as she did not cherish ambitions of continental con-
quest, and so long as she kept on friendly terms with
the Empire of the East, gave her freedom to develop
her oversea trade and the sea power which that trade
created. The reasons why she nervelessly dropped her
sceptre when the way round the Cape of Good Hope
was found are probably three: First, her nobles, grown
rich and luxurious, were in no mind for further adven-
ture, involving hardship. Secondly, she was led away
by ambition to increase her realm by land, and thus
abandoned in some degree the element which alone
had made her great. Thirdly, as a Mediterranean
Power, she relied on the oared galley, and her seamen
were probably less skilled than those whose coasts
fronted the ocean. This limitation is not absolute,
for the Venetians were in the habit of sending a galley
to Britain every year, and therefore had some experi-
ence in oceanic voyaging. But to hug the shores of

106 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

France and Spain, even to cross the Bay of Biscay,
was a different thing from turning the prow boldly
to the distant horizon and sailing forth into the un-
known. Three of the four great explorers of the com-
ing age were, of course, Mediterranean seamen —
Genoese, not Venetians — but they were all in the service
of foreign States and gained their experience outside
the Middle Sea. When the Venetians made an attempt
to contest the right of way to India with the Portu-
guese, with the help of the Turks, Egyptians, and
Arabs, they proved no match for the ocean-tried
seamen of Vasco da Gama.

Venice lingered independent till the end of the
eighteenth century, but she lingered inglorious. Then
Napoleon put an end to her career, until she resumed
it with brighter hopes as part of the kingdom of United
Italy.

Since the construction of the Suez Canal the Medi-
terranean has recovered the importance it formerly
held for any Power aspiring to the command of the
sea. Indeed, it never really lost it, for the Peninsula
of Italy, long divided between Hapsburg and Bourbon,
had always a great strategical value in the struggles
between those houses, and the Mediterranean was
always the shortest line of communication with the
vital military position of Central Europe on the middle
Danube. Moreover, Egypt remained the pivot of
the communications with the East, and was therefore
the desired prize of any ruler with oriental ambitions.
It is notable that, as will be seen later, almost the
whole of Nelson's career was bound up with Mediter-
ranean questions. We have always found a grasp of
the Mediterranean essential to our policy of thwarting
any attempt at the domination of the Continent by a

MEDITERRANEAN IN MIDDLE AGES 107

single Power. As it has been in the past, so it is still
to-day. The abandonment of the Mediterranean
has been frequently advocated, and by authorities of
deserved weight. It has never been found a possible
policy in practice.

CHAPTER VI

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY

As the Middle Ages end, we stand at the beginning
of that great era when learning ceased to be shackled,
when man's thought became free, and when the horizon
of his vision was extended by the discovery of new
lands and new routes across the ocean. The world,
nay, the universe, underwent a sudden expansion,
and not only the material world, but the world of the
mind and spirit also. A short table of dates will be
sufficient to show the magnitude and the suddenness
of the change:

Constantinople was taken by the Turks ... 1453
Ferdinand and Isabella succeeded to the thrones

of Aragon and Castile ... ... ... 1474

Caxton set up the first printing press in England 1476
Bartholomew Diaz sailed round the Cape of

Good Hope 1486

Columbus discovered the Bahamas ... ... 1492

Luther posted his Confessions at Wittenberg 1517

Henry VIII. broke with Rome ... ... 1529-36

Copernicus published his De Revolutionibus

Orbium 1543

In these events, the product of a single crowded
century of history, are included almost all that is

1 08

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY

109

essential in the great movements which we call the
Renascence and Reformation. There are two political
events among them: the taking of Constantinople by
the Turks, which filled western Europe with the treas-
ures of Greek learning, and the accession of Ferdinand
and Isabella, who promoted the enterprise of Columbus,
and thus, indirectly, at any rate, brought about the
Spanish claim to the empire of the New World, which,
being ratified by the Pope, brought religious antago-
nisms into play as a factor in the long strife for the
freedom of the sea. Furthermore, it was in the reign
of Ferdinand and Isabella that Spain was unified,
and under their famous grandson, the Emperor Charles
V., that Spain, Naples, and the Netherlands became one
realm, while his sons, again, were Philip, the husband
of Mary Tudor, and enemy of Elizabeth, and Don
John of Austria, the victor of Lepanto.

It seems the natural thing that the boundless develop-
ment of men's minds which followed upon the revival
of learning, the collapse of feudalism, and the spread
far and wide of the printed word should turn their
thoughts to the ocean and what lay beyond. We
have to think of a world enlarged by the whole of the
American Continent and the islands adjacent to the
Atlantic coast thereof; by the coast-belt of Africa
south of a line drawn, roughly, from the Atlas moun-
tains on the west to the entrance to the Gulf of Suez
on the east ; by the islands of the Eastern Archipelago,
Madagascar, the coasts of India, Siam, Cochin China,
Japan, and, very darkly and mistily, Australia. It is
not, of course, the case that all these lands, or even
half of them, were unknown by repute, or even that
they had not had intercourse overland with Europe
before. If we believe ancient legends, even North

I io SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

America and the Cape of Good Hope were known to the
Norsemen and Phoenicians respectively, and Marco
Polo had visited China. But the Mohammedan power
barred the way to all the East by land, so that effective
intercourse with the regions named did, in fact, origin-
ate in the wonderful century which began with the
fall of Constantinople and ended with the accession of
Elizabeth. Naturally, the effect on men's minds was
stupendous. Is it wonderful that the world was re-
born, or that the throes of the new birth were violent,
devastating to old beliefs and systems, fraught with
misery and wrong? They were all that. But, never-
theless, the age was irradiated with a splendour of
thought and achievement such as no other age in the
world's history has seen.

To the little kingdom of Portugal, rather than to
her greater neighbour, must be given the palm as the
pioneer of discovery. In the first place, whereas the
great explorers who gave the main part of South America
to Spain, Columbus and Amerigo Vespucci, were
Italians, the far longer list of Portuguese navigators
contains only the names of the native-born. Bar-
tholomew Diaz, Vasco da Gama, Tristan d'Acunha,
Cabral, and Magellan, though the last-named was
employed by the Spanish Government, were all pure
Portuguese. With the exception of Cabral, who
discovered Brazil, and added that rich country to the
empire of Portugal, and Magellan, who sailed round
Cape Horn in the service of Spain, the Portuguese
navigators undertook all their voyages to the south
and east. It is curious that the chief preoccupation of
King Manoel the Fortunate in sending first Diaz and
then Vasco da Gama to discover the passage round the
Cape of Good Hope, should have been to find the

A Caravel of the Fifteenth Century

Columbus's Caravels

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY in

mythical realm of Prester John. It is related that,
when the Portuguese reached Calicut, they worshipped
the image of the Hindoo goddess Gauri, under the
belief that it was a representation of the Virgin, and
that the natives were the Christian subjects of Prester
John. The Hindoos, for their part, worshipped the
images of the Virgin under the belief that they repre-
sented Gauri. The Portuguese were greatly disappointed
to discover eventually that Prester John could only
be identified with the half-savage monarch of Abyssinia.
They had much to console them, however. The
silken stuffs, precious stones, and spices of the East
aroused their cupidity. Expedition followed expedi-
tion, and what has been rather magniloquently called
the "conquest of India" took place. As a matter of
fact, the Portuguese did little more than possess them-
selves of a few places on the coast, of which Bombay,
Goa, Cochin, and Diu were the most important. They
had to engage in hard fighting, in the course of which
they stained their hands with much cruelty; but they
fought rather against the Turks, Egyptians, Venetians,
and Arabs, who were already established as traders
with the Indian Rajahs, than with the natives. One
of the Governors sent out by Manoel, Almeida, laid
down a policy which closely resembles that pursued later
by the British in their dealings with India, and which,
if it had been followed, might have done much to con-
solidate Portuguese power by making oversea expansion
a support to the home Government instead of a source
of weakness to it.

Let all our strength be on the sea [he says]. Let us re-
frain from appropriating the land. The old tradition of
conquest, the empire of such distant lands, is not desirable.

112 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Let us destroy these new races [the Arabs, Turks, etc.],
and reinstate the ancient races and natives of the coast.
Then we will go further. Let us secure with our fleets the
safety of the sea, and protect the natives, in whose name we
may practically reign over India. There would certainly
be no harm in our having a few fortresses along the coast,
but simply to protect the factories against surprise, for
their chief safety will lie in the friendship of the native
Rajahs, placed upon their thrones by us, and maintained
and defended by our fleets. What has been done so far is
but anarchy, scarcely an outline of government, a system
of murder, piracy, and disorder which it is necessary to
remedy.

If the idea of Almeida be compared with the practice
of Clive and Warren Hastings, the likeness is certainly
remarkable. His great contemporary, Albuquerque,
however, thought differently, and, in Ormuz, Goa, and
Malacca established the limits of the empire, which,
in Almeida's judgment, would have floated securely,
if somewhat vaguely, on the water.

The range of that empire was enormous. From
Macao, forty miles from Hong-Kong, in the east, and
the island of Timor in the south, it spread over the
Portuguese settlements in India itself to the East
Coast of Africa — Mozambique, Zanzibar, and Lou-
rengo Marques — and round to the west, embracing
Angola and Portuguese Guinea, and then across the
Atlantic to Brazil. The Portuguese nowhere spread
across a whole continent as did the Spaniards in South
America, but they had their settlements on the fringes
of many lands; they held dominion over countless
islands. Their imprint to-day is as strong upon the
Malayan race as is that of the Arabs.

The fleets of Portugal were never large; the riches

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 113

obtained by maritime trade were never great. Never-
theless this little country must be accounted one of
the real Sea Powers of the world, for its maritime
ascendancy was based on that love of adventure and
desire for achievement which is the true foundation
of all maritime enterprise. The Portuguese, during
the short period of their power, came into conflict
with no European foe, save the Venetians, in the
Indian Ocean. Their communications with their
oversea possessions were disputed by no other nation,
for the Dutch and the English were but in their in-
fancy as sea-faring, or, rather, ocean-faring peoples,
and the desires of the Spaniards were set in a different
direction. When causes of quarrel arose, which, how-
ever, were not maritime, Spain easily crushed her
smaller neighbour on the land side. Portugal possessed
a fatal disqualification for sea power. She was a
small continental State, with a powerful neighbour
behind her. She suffered this inconvenience in com-
mon with Holland and Venice, and, in her case, as in
theirs, it was instrumental in bringing about her fall.
In 1583, Portugal and all its foreign possessions, with
the exception of the Azores, passed into the hands of
Philip II. of Spain. Sixty years later independence
was recovered, and, with the help of Britain on most
critical occasions, has since been maintained. But
the power of Portugal was a thing of the past, and the
Dutch now succeeded to the position of the Portu-
guese mariners as the boldest of traders and explorers.
One by one, the Eastern possessions of Portugal, save
Macao, Timor, and a few towns in India, fell into their
hands. But the African Empire was maintained,
and remains to this day almost intact. Brazil remained
Portuguese until the nineteenth century.

114 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

At the present time the Empire of Portugal abroad
consists of Macao, a part of Timor, Goa and Diu, in
India, Mozambique, and Delagoa Bay, Portuguese
Guinea, Angola, San Thome, and Principe Islands,
the Azores, and Cape Verd Islands. It is still consider-
able, judged by area and even by population. But
the mercantile marine consists of no more than seventy-
five steamers and one hundred and eight sailing ships,
altogether just over 200,000 tons. The war-navy
consists of one old coast-defence ship, four light cruisers,
a few torpedo-boats, and one submarine. Quomodo
ceciderunt validi! The power to defend its sea com-
munications has long departed. The independence
and the Empire of Portugal rest on British defence.
Consequently, while the flag of Portugal still floats
over many of the possessions of our ancient Ally, the
profit which so great possessions might bring is to
others. The alliance between Great Britain and
Portugal is the oldest and least interrupted in the
world. Its true basis will be best explained hereafter.

The sea power of Spain was as suddenly created as
that of the Romans, and, like theirs, it was entirely
military. The caravels and carracks crossed the
Atlantic, not to trade, but to bring home booty. If
the Portuguese Empire in the east rested on pepper,
that of Spain in the west had the gold of Peru and the
silver of Potosi for foundation. And the foundation
proved rotten. Nevertheless, while it endured, the
dominion of Spain upon the ocean was remarkable
enough.

Until Ferdinand and Isabella joined the two Crowns
of Arragon and Castile, Spain was not. Navarre still
owned a separate sovereign, the South was in the hands
of the Moors. The taking of Granada in 1492 sealed

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 115

the unity of Spain. It was in the self-same year that
Columbus landed in the Bahamas. Next year, Pope
Alexander VI. granted the Bull by which the Atlantic
was magnificently divided by a line drawn down its
centre, all discoveries to the east being given to Por-
tugal, and all on the west to Spain, in the name of Holy
Church. Forty years later, Corteshad conqueredMexico,
and Pizarro was master of Peru. The Spanish system
was in full swing; the treasure galleys were bringing
the golden store of the Incas to the mother country.
At this date the Netherlands were a province of the
Spanish Crown, and Henry VIII. had not yet begun
that rupture of relations with Rome which was the
first step in the English Reformation. It is important
to bear these facts in mind, for they explain in part
why the Spaniards were able to establish their empire
in the New World unmolested. The Bull of Pope
Alexander VI. protected them against the restless spirit
which was growing up in England, as in other European
countries, thanks to the travellers' tales which were
passing from mouth to mouth.

It has been pointed out above that the great seamen
who served Spain in this epoch were not Spaniards,
but Italians and Portuguese. The great Spaniards
were not seamen, but soldiers. Their principle was the
very opposite of that recommended by the Portu-
guese, Almeida. They set up a vast empire on land,
and trusted to the monopoly given them by the Papal
Bull and the restrictive legislation of the motherland
to preserve to Spain the fruits of their endeavour.
No export, other than that of the precious metals, was
at first permitted from the new territories; the vine
and the olive were not to be cultivated in the New
World, lest they should interfere with the Spanish

n6 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

trade in oil and wine; commerce was confined to the
port of Cadiz, and might only be carried on in the
galleons specially appointed for the purpose. Spanish
America was made the personal appanage of the sover-
eign. Under such conditions, sea power could not
grow healthily. It is, of course, true that a large num-
ber of ships were employed; but, as Columbus said,
in the early days, when once the passage was made,
the course was so easy that every tailor sought a licence
to turn explorer. The Spaniards no more acquired
the true habit of the sea, necessary to meet the emer-
gencies soon to confront them, than do the stewards
of a transatlantic liner in our own days. So far as the
military navy of Spain was concerned, the soldiers
ruled it, and to the soldiers' conception of sea fighting
it had to conform.

It was essentially a Mediterranean, not an oceanic,
fleet. It won glory in that inland sea; little, if any,
outside it. But a new conception of sea warfare was
arising, which was destined to make it a thing apart
from land warfare. The English mariners, who now
began to fare forth, seeking the North-West Passage
to India, or braving other stormy seas which called
for skill, resolution, and resource, were, for the most
part, private adventurers. Their ships were small,
as had been the ships of Columbus and Bartholomew
Diaz, and they remained small, handy, and weatherly
when the Spaniards turned to building their huge sea
castles. When the break with Rome removed the
reverence inspired by Pope Alexander's Bull, and made
it a pious duty, as well as a profitable recreation, to
"singe the beard" of his Catholic Majesty, they neces-
sarily went into forbidden seas, and thus they came
to evolve a system of purely naval tactics. They had

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 117

no soldiers to carry, and, if they had possessed them
there was no room for them in their little ships, in
which all available space was needed for rich cargoes.
So the sailors themselves learned to work the guns
which the dangers of the sea compelled all traders to
carry. They fought their ships as well as sailed them.

Finally, in the years immediately preceding the
Armada, the Netherlands revolted against the Spanish
Crown. The religious quarrel was already acute, and
the English instinct, which sees in Antwerp a pistol
pointed at the heart of England, began to take alarm
at the presence of Spanish armaments in the Flemish
and Dutch ports. The "sea-beggars," as the naval
forces of the revolutionaries were called, did not lack
volunteers from England, nor even direct aid from the
cautious Elizabeth, before hostilities were actually de-
clared between the Island State and the great military
Power of the Continent.

Before entering upon the story of the Armada, it
may be well to describe briefly the part which England
played in the work of discovery and the growth of the
sea spirit among our people. It is noteworthy that
the two explorers who first brought fame to England
and laid the foundation of her oversea empire were
Italians, as were those who went forth for Spain.
John Cabot, a Genoese by birth, but a citizen of Venice,
was settled at Bristol at the end of the fifteenth century,
and had become a wealthy merchant. In 1497, having
heard of the exploits of Columbus, he sought and ob-
tained from Henry VII. the following remarkable licence :

Henry, by the Grace of God King of England and
France, Lord of Ireland, to our trusty and well-beloved
subjects, greeting:

ii8 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Be it known to all that We have given and granted,
and, by these presents, do give and grant, to Our well-
beloved John Cabot, citizen of Venice; to Lewis, Sebastian,
and Sanctius, sons of the said John, and to their heirs
and deputies, full and free authority, leave and power
to sail to all parts, countries, and seas of the East, of the
West, and of the North, under our banners and ensigns,
with five ships of whatsoever burthen and quality they
shall choose, and as many mariners and men as they will
take with them in the ships upon their own proper costs
and charges, to look out, find, and discover whatsoever
isles, countries, regions, or provinces of the Heathen or
Infidels, wheresoever they be, and in what part soever of
the world, which before this time hath not been known to
all Christians.

He proceeds to give the Cabots authority to occupy
and possess all cities and towns, subject to an obliga-
tion to pay him one-fifth of all their profits on their
return to Bristol, at which port only they were bound
to arrive, and he bids all his subjects give their aid to
furnish them forth.

This licence observes very strictly the Bull of Alex-
ander VI. Cabot may sail "East, West, or North."
He is not empowered to sail south, the only direction
in which he could interfere with either Spain or Por-
tugal, and his rights are limited to the lands inhabited
by heathen or infidels not hitherto known to Christians.
So had he discovered the North-West Passage, and
reached India by that route, he would still have been
debarred from poaching on the Portuguese preserve.
The conditions imposed bear a striking resemblance
to those imposed later on their subjects by the kings
of Spain. If British discovery had depended alto-
gether on voyages made by royal licence the British

A Galleon of the Fifteenth Century

(Jurien de la Graviere)

A Galley of the Sixteenth Century

(Jurien de la Graviere)

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 119

system would probably have prospered no better than
the Spanish.

Cabot sailed from Bristol in the Matthew in 1497,
and, on June 24th, discovered Newfoundland. He
then went on to St. John's and the continent of North
America. He returned, bringing with him three men
from Newfoundland, just as Columbus brought back
the Caribbean Indians. He was persuaded that the
land he had discovered was the dominion of the Cham
of Tartary, just as the followers of Vasco da Gama
imagined that they had fallen in with the subjects of
Prester John. Shakespeare, in whose plays the wit,
wonder, and audacity of the time so bubble forth,
makes Benedick profess his willingness "to bring you
the length of Prester John's foot : fetch you a hair from
the great Cham's beard," rather than hold three words'
conference with "my Lady Tongue." Shakespeare
knew how England had "suffered a sea change," and
he knew it direct from the men who sat round the tavern
fire at Wapping or Deptford. His large humanity
was not learned in the Temple. He lived nearer the
salt of the sea.

After Cabot's return, the traders of Bristol formed
the "Company of Merchant Adventurers," seeking
the North-West and North-East Passages to India.
Sir Hugh Willoughby, in 1553, essayed to find the
latter, but perished with seventy of his men in the ice.
The rest, headed by Richard Chancellor, reached
Archangel, and travelled thence to Moscow. This led
to the establishment of trade with Russia through the
English Muscovy Company.

Thus we come to the reign of Elizabeth, well called
"spacious." With the loss of Calais in Mary's reign
went the last physical link with the Continent, the

120 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

last pretension to the Kingdom of France, save for the
inscription which the kings retained on their coins,
in the same spirit as the Spaniards, to this day, de-
scribe Gibraltar as "in temporary occupation of the
English," and send an officer once a year to inspect the
fortress. Of all the old Duchy of Normandy, there
remained to the line of William the Conqueror only
the Channel Islands, the natural appanage of the race
which had prevailed at sea. The fleet was no longer a
ferry to the possessions of English sovereigns abroad,
but a weapon consciously maintained to defend the
shores of the kingdom and to protect its ever-growing
trade overseas. English fishermen swarmed to the
banks of Newfoundland, and, though inferior in num-
bers to the French, yet claimed the mastery and
graciously extended to the others their protection. Fro-
bisher voyaged twice to the north in search of the fabled
Eldorado, which, had he been able to sail across a frozen
continent, he might indeed have found on the Yukon.
Sir Humphrey Gilbert essayed the first settlement on
the shores of the North American Continent, only to
perish gallantly at sea. Finally, Hawkyns and Drake
now began their "brilliant filibustering career, to be
followed later by Raleigh. Gold was still the object
of their quest. But, unlike the Spaniards, they sought
it, not on the land, but by the sea, and from the Span-
iards themselves. "Sic vos, non vobis!" The Dons
laboured, and the English entered into the fruit of
their labour.

All this is a well-known story. Despite the start
which the Spaniards and Portuguese had obtained, it
was an Englishman who first circumnavigated the globe,
for although Magellan's ship, the Victoria, accom-
plished the voyage, Magellan himself did not live to

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 121

return. Drake's career of adventure began in 1567,
when he commanded the Judith in the expedition which
ended in Hawkyns's amazing exploit at Vera Cruz.
After harrying the Don in the Spanish Main, Hawkyns
cast anchor in the strongly defended harbour of that
port, and, under its very guns, demanded of the Span-
iards provisions and water. There were treasure ships
in the harbour, and of these Hawkyns determined to
possess himself. Thirteen Spanish ships of war ap-
proached, so the Englishman had to abandon his
project. But he sent word to the governor that "it
did not suit his purpose that the Spanish ships should
enter the harbour," and for three whole days the
Spanish Admiral remained outside. Then it was ar-
ranged that he should enter, and that Hawkyns should
hold the island against which his ships were moored.
The Spaniards, however, broke the agreement and
attacked the English ships while Hawkyns and most
of his men were ashore. After a fierce engagement
against odds, two English ships succeeded in putting
to sea, and Hawkyns and his surviving men rowed after
them. The other three vessels were destroyed. Half-
starved, Hawkyns, Drake, and a few followers at length
reached England.

Nothing could daunt Drake, however. Born in
Devon and nurtured in Kent, the seafaring blood of
Viking ancestors ran in his blood full tide. Two years
later, he had fitted out two small ships, the Dragon of
seventy tons, and the Swan of twenty-five. He shipped
seventy-three men and boys, with whom he set out to
harry the Don. He fell in with another ship of fifty
tons, whose crew raised his force to one hundred and
twenty. He reached the Isthmus of Darien, intend-
ing to attack Nombre de Dios. But information that

122 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

a train of mules laden with treasure was on its way to
the sea induced him to alter his intention. He am-
bushed the train, took the treasure, buried it, and then,
from the peak in Darien, he beheld the Pacific Ocean.
His soul was fired by the prospect thus presented. He
sought no more fighting, but returned to England and
fitted out a new expedition of five ships. The largest
was the Pelican, later called the Golden Hind, of 125
tons, which was Drake's flagship. He had one hun-
dred and sixty gentlemen adventurers with him. He
reached the Straits of Magellan on May 20, 1578,
got into fearful weather, and arrived at Valparaiso
with his own ship only. Outside the port he came upon
a great galleon, the crew of which, never dreaming
that an Englishman was in the neighbourhood, greeted
him with cheers. Drake ran alongside, and, hoisting
the English flag, sprang into the chains sword in hand.
The Spaniards recognised him. El Draque, the
incarnation of the Evil One, was upon them. They
screamed with terror and jumped overboard without
so much as drawing their swords. Drake took treasure
to the value of £80,000. But the comedy did not
end there. The escaped sailors spread the panic to
the city, and the English landed only to see the in-
habitants, headed by the governor, streaming away to
the mountains.

From Valparaiso, Drake sailed to Tarapaca. Here
the comedy became broad farce. The English found
piles of silver bars lying loose on the wharves, and
their guardians fast asleep. They removed the whole
lot without waking them, and then lay in ambush while
another mule convoy approached. The muleteers un-
loaded their burdens and lay down for a siesta. The
English had that lot too. Then the Golden Hind sailed

A Galley Running before the Wind

(Jurien de la Graviere)

An Admiral's Galley

(Furttenbach, Architecture Navalis, 1612)

THE AGE OP DISCOVERY 123

out of harbour and shaped her course for Lima. Here
there were twelve great galleons in harbour with their
crews ashore. But they were empty of treasure, so
Drake contented himself with cutting their cables and
sending them adrift while he started off after the
Cacafuegos, a galleon which had started two days be-
fore, "her ribs abulge with bullion for the King of
Spain's own treasury." Drake overhauled her, and
the Spanish captain, never suspecting the presence of
an Englishman in those waters, in which he felt lonely,
shortened sail in order that the Golden Hind might come
up with him. The galleon was taken almost without
a fight. With his very ballast replaced by gold and
silver, Drake sailed off across the Pacific in order to
avoid a squadron which was now lying in wait for him
near the Straits of Magellan. After a narrow escape
from shipwreck off the Philippines, he arrived at
Plymouth on September 25, 1580, with spoil worth
three millions sterling of our money. Mendoza, the
Ambassador of the King of Spain, protested vehemently
against Drake's insolence in daring to sail in the Span-
ish Main. Said Elizabeth in reply: "Tell your Royal
Master that a title to the ocean cannot belong to any
people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature
nor public use and custom permitteth any possession
thereof." Thus Gloriana asserted the principle of
the "Freedom of the Seas." The gauntlet was down.
Philip slowly, lethargically, timidly, began to make
him ready to take it up.

The voyage of the Golden Hind will stand out for
all time as a model of the "joyous venture." Accord-
ing to the ideas of our time, of course it was piracy,
naked and unabashed. But what Englishman is there
so free from original sin that he can read the recital

124 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

without glorying in the light-hearted daring of hia
countrymen? Besides, it must be remembered that,
at this time, and for long afterwards, it was quite a
common occurrence for two nations to be essentially
at war while, for political reasons, their governments
remained nominally at peace. Elizabeth herself was
aiding the rebellious subjects of the King of Spain in
the Low Countries. She had her reasons for main-
taining the pretence of peace, and Philip had his. But
the Spaniards were capturing and torturing English
seamen whenever they could, as a penalty for infring-
ing the monopoly granted by the Pope, and the wrath
of the English was rising to the boiling point. Drake
himself, God-fearing as he was dauntless, truest of
patriots, though not insensible (any more than was
Nelson) to the advantages of worldly gain, believed
himself to be engaged in a holy war, and we may fairly
adopt his view. The sensitive spot of the Spanish
Empire was the sea communications by which the
wealth on which Spain had come to depend reached
her shores. To capture that wealth in transit was the
surest means available to the English, who had no army
which could hope to contend with the famous Spanish
infantry, to cripple the resources of Philip, to ward
off the menace from their own land, and to aid the
people of the Low Countries who were struggling against
the greatest captain of the age, the Duke of Alva.
Elizabeth's real opinion is shown by the fact that she
knighted Drake and ordered the Golden Hind to be
preserved at Deptford as a memorial of the valour of
her seamen. That covetousness had small share in
prompting Drake's actions is shown by the fact that
he kept no more than £10,000 of the spoil for himself
and set aside a like sum for his crew. The rest was

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 125

kept in the Tower until matter were settled with Spain,
and eventually, no doubt, found its way into Elizabeth's
Treasury.

Adventures now poured thick and fast upon
"Frankie." Two or three years later he was off Vigo
with a fleet fitted out by the City of London to effect
the delivery of some British sailors who had been
treacherously made captive by the Spaniards. The
Queen told Drake that, if it suited her purpose, she
should disown him.

"As you will, Madam," he replied. "Let me have
a free hand, and it may be an affair of privateers, and
nothing to do with the Government of England. My
plan is to find the crews that were caught and set them
free — and get what else we can, Madam."

"I am supposed to know nothing about that," was
the Queen's cautious answer.

In the end, Drake did not succeed in rescuing the
crews, nor did he acquire much booty. But he sacked
San Domingo and burned the shipping there, adding
to the terror of his name. By 1587, there was sterner
work in hand. The news of the Armada had reached
England, and Drake set forth to discover how much
truth there was in it. He arrived off Cadiz, which was
crowded with ships. A great galleon was moored across
the entrance to the harbour, but he fired on her and
sank her. The crews of the Spanish ships leaped over-
board at the terror of his name. Drake sank no fewer
than thirty-five, or, according to some accounts, eighty
of Philip's ships of war. He was about to repeat the
exploit in the Tagus when imperative orders from the
Queen called him home.

Philip had at last made up his mind to war. A
stream of messengers from Rome urged him to action.

126 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

The crown of England was promised by the Pope to
him who would invade the country and crush the heretic
Queen. Philip, an eldest son of the Church, was un-
able to withstand the pressure. He relied on the aid
of a Roman Catholic rising in England, a hope which
was bitterly disappointed. The nation had been welded
into one, as we have seen, in the five hundred years
which had passed since the Norman Conquest. To
preserve his island home inviolate was the first care
of every Englishman. His sovereign, though her
descent derived from the Norman, had in her the blood
of Cedric and of Arthur; she was the daughter of
Henry, who had freed the realm from the usurped
authority of Rome in temporal matters, a thing welcome
even to those Englishmen who still looked upon the
Pope as the spiritual Head of Christendon. Histo-
rians may paint Elizabeth as an elderly coquette,
faithless, fickle, cruel, and miserly. But to her sub-
jects, she was Gloriana, worshipped in verse and prose,
appealing to their chivalry by her sex, and to their
manhood by her lion heart. She intrigued; she
starved her sailors both of food and ammunition. But
to one and all who served her she was the embodiment
of right and liberty, while Philip was the enemy of
mankind. They knew the gloomy tyrant. He had
been husband to an English Queen.

The Royal Navy was made ready for the fight. The
Lord High Admiral, Howard, had his flag in the Ark
Royal. Drake, as Vice-Admiral, had his in the Re-
venge. The first Dreadnought was in the fleet, and the
first Swiftsure, Triumph, Warspite, and Bonaventure;
the first Lion and the first Tiger. Elizabeth was fond
of coining strange names for her ships. Strangest of
all, the Elizabeth Jonas, so called because, said the

A Galleass of the Seventeenth Century

A Galleass

(Furttenbach, Architecture. Xavalis, 1629)

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 127

Queen, she trusted the Lord to deliver her out of her
present peril as He delivered Jonas from the belly of
the fish. There were, besides, a crowd of armed
merchantmen.

Philip's plan for the invasion of England, or, perhaps,
one should say the plan of Parma and Santa Cruz,
was, in all essentials, that of Napoleon in 1803. The
fleet, with six thousand sailors and seventeen thousand
soldiers on board, was to sail from sundry Spanish
ports and rendezvous off the Scilly Islands. Parma,
with an army of 36,000 men, awaited it at Dunkirk.
Could the Spaniards maintain the command of the
Channel for twenty-four hours, the doom of England
would be sealed. Parma, like Napoleon, waited.
But everything went wrong with the undertaking.
Santa Cruz died and the command was given to the
Duke of Medina Sidonia, a man so incapable that
even his wife laughed when she heard of his appoint-
ment, saying he would be better on a horse than in a
ship. Rascally contractors supplied the fleet with
stinking provisions and foul water; many men were
sick and died from this cause. Finally, when at last
the Armada put to sea, it was caught in a tempest and
driven into Corunna in a shattered condition.

What, meanwhile, were the English doing? Drake,
from a bold buccaneer, now revealed himself as a naval
strategist of the first order. His letters to the Queen
and Walsingham lay down the strategy on which
England has ever since relied for her safety. Writing
to the Lords of the Council on March 30, 1588, he says:

My very good lords, next under God's mighty protection,
the advantage and gain of time and place will be the only
and chief means to our good, wherein I must humbly be-

128 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

seech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun,
for that, with fifty sail of shipping, we shall do more good
upon their own coast than a great many more will do here
at home, and the sooner we are gone, the better we shall
be able to impeach them.

He wrote in a similar sense to the Queen.

Elizabeth and her counsellors, however, would have
none of it. Her Majesty was even incensed with
Drake because he wasted good powder at gun-practice.
She still professed that she did not wish to give offence
to the King of Spain. A great deal has been said and
written about the Queen's parsimony and about the
lack of provisions and powder. There is no doubt
that both were lamentably short. When the English
set out to chase the Armada up Channel, they had
only two days' supply of powder on board their ships.
But there is this much to be said for Gloriana. The
idea of making a long sojourn off the enemy's ports
was new, just as the whole theory of sea-fighting
evolved by Howard, Drake, and Hawkyns was new,
and born of their experiences when roving the Spanish
Main. This had been denied by good authorities,
who point out that, from the time of Hubert de Burgh,
it had been the wont of the English to go forth and meet
the enemy at sea, or attack him in his ports. Most
true. But these were military expeditions on ship-
board. The ships, were regarded as transports, or, at
most, as fields of battle on which soldiers fought
according to the rules of land-warfare. The cannon,
when cannon began to be used, were meant to mow
down the enemy's men-at-arms and to hew a way
through his defences — like the preparatory bombard-
ment of to-day — in order that the boarders might

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 129

bring the affair to an issue in a short and sharp tussle.
But that a fleet should keep the sea, beating on and off
the enemy's ports; waiting for him to come out in
order to destroy him by gun-fire at long bowls, was
something new in kind, and not merely an extension
of the old theory of warfare to more distant waters.
Our own record as to ammunition supply in the present
war is not beyond criticism, and the story goes that
a certain general, in apportioning the amount of shell
for a certain operation, was guided by the precedent
of Inkerman. We may, therefore, judge the mis-
calculation of Elizabeth and her advisers lightly. But
her seamen had no choice save to fight on the new
model. The little English ships would have stood no
chance against the mighty galleons of Spain, had it
come to boarding. They fought as experience of the
sea had taught them to fight, and against a lands-
man's navy, they proved themselves invincible,"despite
all the miscalculations and errors of the Queen's
Government.

The evening of the day at the end of July, 1588, on
which Drake boarded his flagship, after finishing the
famous game of bowls on Plymouth Hoe, saw the Eng-
lish victory secure. A Spanish flagship was captured;
two more great galleons were sunk. The English
had suffered hardly a scratch. All through the week
the Spaniards lumbered up the Channel with the
English hanging on to them, but never giving them a
chance to close. On the Sunday night following, the
Armada was in Dunkirk Roads, and Howard loosed
fireships against it. In terror, the Spaniards cut their
cables. Seventy ships of war went north and took
no further part in the fighting. The rest found them-
selves on the Goodwin Sands, where some went aground

130 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

and all were hotly attacked, lying in a huddled mass,
by the English fleet. They crashed together; they
fired into each other, and sank their own ships. They
were not seamen, and they did not understand the new
form of sea-fighting by which the artillery of the ships
decided the battle instead of merely preparing the way
for the assault of the men-at-arms. But they fought
to the bitter end, with a heroism worthy of the gallant
Spanish infantry, of which the ship's complements
were mainly composed. At last came dead silence
after the roar of the fray. Both sides had expended
their powder, and the shattered remnant of the Span-
ish fleet took the opportunity to follow their seventy
consorts to the northward. Sixty ships and ten
thousand starved and scurvy-stricken men were all
that found their way home north-about. The English
lost no single ship, while of men but sixty-eight were
killed or wounded. The victors gave the glory to
God. "Efflavit Deus, et dissipati sunt." The words
stand to-day on the base of Drake's statue on Ply-
mouth Hoe. It is the seaman's way. "These men
see the works of the Lord and His wonders in the deep :
For at His word the stormy wind ariseth which lifteth
up the waves thereof." That sense of dependence on
Providence is not the least of the sources of strength
which attend sea power.

The ruin of the Armada ended the direct threat to
England; but it by no means ended the war. The
further events and their consequences, however, will
be best dealt with hereafter. But there are a few points
which must be noticed here. First of all, it should be
realised that the fleet which won the victory was by
no means wholly, or even mainly, composed of the
Queen's ships. Elizabeth had increased her father's

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 131

navy by comparatively few vessels. Of the forty-nine
sail which followed Drake up Channel, only thirteen,
according to some authorities, were Queen's ships of
four hundred tons and above. Including cutters and
pinnaces, there were no more than thirty-eight ships
all told flying her ensign. The rest of the fleet con-
sisted of armed merchantmen and ships fitted out
by private adventurers. These were very sparsely
manned, some of them having no more than thirty men
all told. The seamen of Britain, therefore, were, of ne-
cessity, also the sea fighters. Good man as the English-
man was ashore, we had no standing army, no body of
trained and disciplined infantry like the Spaniards.
But our sailors had learned war on the Spanish Main.
In the latter stages of the war, soldiers were embarked
to make descents on the Spanish coast; but sea fight-
ing and land fighting were kept distinct. Later again,
in Cromwell's time, the New Model supplied soldiers
for service afloat. After that, it became the recognised
rule that sea fighting was the function of the "tar-
paulin." The surviving exception is the Royal Regi-
ment of Marines.

The absence of soldiers on shipboard dictated the
tactics of the running fight, for the seamen had to fight
the guns as well as to work the ship. No boarding
parties could be spared, nor men to repel boarders.
The handiness of the ships themselves contributed
to dictate the advantage of the running fight. The
Spanish formed their line in a crescent, in the hope
that the English would run in between the horns, which
would then envelop them and bring them to close
action. But Drake's fast and weatherly ships frus-
trated this plan. They ran under the stern to fire
and made off before the Spaniards could turn to bring

132 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

their broadsides to bear; sometimes coming so close
that the enemy could not depress his guns sufficiently
to hit them, sometimes "playing long bowls," which
their better gunnery enabled them to do with effect
and impunity.

When people talk grandiloquently about the English
loving to close and disdaining to fight at long range,
they ignore the whole trend of our naval history and
miss the point which marks the special aptitude of our
seamen: namely, that they have never for very long
allowed themselves to be enslaved by a theory. They
have adapted their means to their end. When Nelson
went into action, he was wont to make the signal,
"Engage the enemy more closely." Drake, every
whit as brave a man as he, played "long bowls." The
object of all fighting is decisive victory. Nelson,
whose ships were of equal or superior fighting weight
to those of his opponents but who was frequently
outnumbered, saw that decisive victory could best be
gained by doubling on a part of the enemy's line and
trusting to the superior discipline and gunnery-training
of his men. Drake, whose ships were of inferior fight-
ing force, saw that he could best utilise that superior
fighting skill, which was his as well as Nelson's, by
lying off and engaging at a distance. Of what service
would bull-dog bravery be, if the fleet on which the
safety of England depended was wiped out? Each of
these great seamen attained his end by adapting his
means thereto. That the end was obtained is the
only thing which matters. The lesson holds good
for to-day.

In speaking of the Elizabethan navy, one talks of
Drake as naturally as, two hundred years later, one
talks of Nelson. There were other famous seamen

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY 133

in the days of each, and neither, as it happened, ever
held the chief command. But their dazzling person-
alities eclipse all their worthy compeers. They had
little in common save devotion to their country,
courage and supreme insight and skill. But their
names stand out in the eyes of their countrymen above
the Howards, Rodneys, Howes, and St. Vincents, and
are only approached by those of Blake, Cromwell's
great general at sea, and Hawke, the victor of Quiberon
Bay.

Drake fully deserves all the fame which is his. He
was the type of that full-blooded, sunny, chivalrous
Elizabethan life, which, in other spheres, gave us Sir
Philip Sidney and Shakespeare and Spenser. There
were meanness and cruelty and chicanery in the age
as in every other; but the breath of the salt sea blew
through the musty dungeons of the Middle Ages;
eyes grown dim in the darkness rejoiced in the sunlight
of the open day, and cramped muscles stretched them-
selves in an enlarged world. The roll of Drake's drum
called England to her destiny.

CHAPTER VII

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN

AFTER the Armada had been hounded by Howard
and Drake through the Channel and scattered by the
breath of God in its voyage north-about, the war against
Philip changed its character. Elizabeth and her coun-
sellors had not yet learned the full meaning and advan-
tage of sea power. The conditions of defence were
known; those of attack had not yet been sufficiently
studied. The Queen was immersed in continental
politics and concerned for her position as the protector
of Protestantism. Before the Armada, she had already
sent an ill-equipped expedition under Leicester to the
Low Countries to assist the revolted subjects of Philip.
In 1589 she determined to give the Spanish King a
Roland for his Oliver by invading his home territories.
An expedition of two hundred sail and twenty-one
thousand men was quickly fitted out at Plymouth
under the command of Drake and Norris, and with it
went one Don Antonio, a Churchman, who aspired
to the crown of Portugal, and was expected to stir up
a revolt among the Portuguese. The expedition sacked
Corunna and then sailed for the Tagus, landing and
marching through Torres Vedras to Lisbon. It met
with some success in the fighting, but returned with
disastrous loss from disease to England.

Two years later occurred the heroic incident of the

134

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 135

Revenge: the fight of the "one and the fifty- three" off
the Azores. It was one of those mad episodes in our
history which, like the Balaklava charge, are "mag-
nificent, but not war." So long as we remember this
fact and do not expect all British commanders to
behave in a harebrained fashion under all circum-
stances, such incidents have a value which is worth the
gallant blood shed. They are a reminder to us and to
the world that, in the veins of the "nation of shopkeep-
ers," there runs not the cold blood of commerce alone,
but a tide of fiery courage which no so-called "military
nation" has ever surpassed.

Whether Sir Richard Grenville was merely insub-
ordinate to his commander-in-chief, or whether, as
Tennyson tells us, he stayed with the consent of the
latter to get his sick men on board and was then cut
off, his exploit and his end warmed the courage of the
men of his own day, and have warmed the courage of
British seamen ever since. A country cannot afford
to look coldly on such great fights against odds if it
would see the martial spirit of its sons maintained.
The fight of Drake's old flagship, however, was but an
episode in one of the usual raids on Spanish communi-
cations, and had little real military significance, so
far as the larger purposes of the war were concerned.

These raids continued for two years longer, when
Elizabeth's attention was diverted to a new enterprise.
She espoused the cause of Henry of Navarre, in her
character of Protestant champion. English troops
were sent to France and fought bravely, if without
decisive effect, against the Cardinal of Bourbon and
the Catholic League. Then, in 1593, Henry decided
that "Paris was worth a Mass," and Elizabeth lost
interest in him. Her main attention was once more

136 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

given to the Spanish War. In the security given to
her realm by her mastery of the sea, she could afford
to indulge her feminine temperament, varium et muta-
bile semper, as other female sovereigns, beset with
land frontiers — Maria Theresa for instance — could not.

In 1596, Hawkyns and Drake set out once more to
raid the Spanish Main. The expedition proved to be
the last undertaken by either famous seaman. They
were repulsed from Porto Rico, where Hawkyns died.
Drake pushed on to Nombre de Dios and landed men.
They were, however, harassed by the Spaniards. Drake
caught a fever which ended his glorious career. In
the same year, hearing that Philip was once more
assembling a fleet for the invasion of England, Eliza-
beth sent a powerful armament, consisting of a hundred
and twenty ships with seven thousand soldiers and
six thousand seamen, besides some Dutch auxiliaries,
against Cadiz. The army was commanded by the
Earl of Essex, the fleet by Lord Effingham, with Lord
Thomas Howard and Sir Walter Raleigh among his
subordinate commanders. Cadiz was captured and
the Spanish fleet destroyed. Next year, a similar
expedition was sent against Ferrol and Corunna, but
the attempt to capture these two places was abandoned,
the fleet proceeding to the Azores, where Raleigh
captured Fayal.

In these two last expeditions of Elizabeth's reign,
Drake's policy of "impeaching the enemy off his own
shores" is allowed to prevail. After his death, Eliza-
beth does of her own accord what he could seldom wring
consent from her to do. The true principle of the
naval defence of this country is established, never
again to be entirely dropped. And, with it, the seeds
of that system of amphibious strategy which, up to

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 137

the present, we'have employed in all our great wars,
are sown. That we have departed widely from it in
the present struggle is a fact which there are many
reasons to regret. The circumstances of August and
September, 1914, however, left us no choice in the
matter. Experience shows that our insular position
does not exclude us from the European system and that
we can never cut ourselves free entirely from Continen-
tal preoccupations which, from time to time, must
necessitate intervention on the scale of a Continental
Land Power. It must, however, always be a disad-
vantage for us to be so compelled.

Elizabeth left England supreme in war at sea. The
decrepitude of the navy of Spain had been fully ex-
posed; Spanish communications lay at the mercy of
the English seamen. Our country had now a race of
hardy sailors who had developed a method of fighting
which was bred of the sea itself, and a numerous marine
which made an end of the necessity to hire ships from
Genoa, Holland, or the Hansa, as had previously been
the custom with English monarchs. But for purposes
other than fighting, the sea power of England was yet
in its infancy. There was little trade, properly so
called, in the Atlantic, save the Newfoundland fisheries.
The blame must rest on the Spanish system, not on
the English; but the fact remains that the various
expeditions fitted out by the Merchant or Gentlemen
Adventurers had buccaneering for their object. Sea
trade was confined principally to Antwerp and the
north of Europe. The Turkey Company was founded
in 1581 and the East India Company in 1600. But it

»was only shortly before the latter date that English-
men made the voyage round the Cape of Good Hope
to India which the Portuguese had made a hundred

138 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

years before. Colonisation had proved, so far, a
failure. Sir Humphrey Gilbert had taken possession
of Newfoundland in the name of the Queen in 1583;
but the claim was disputed then and many years
later by the French. The attempt of his step-brother,
Raleigh, to colonise Virginia came to nought. The
sea spirit, however, had been aroused from top to
bottom of the nation. That was the great gain of
the Elizabethan age to English sea power. The full
fruits were to be garnered later.

The two following reigns saw a change of spirit from
that of the Tudors which was inimical to the growth
of English, or, as we ought now to call it, British, sea
power. James I., "the wisest fool in Christendom,"
as others called him, or "the Caledonian Solomon,"
which was the title preferred by himself, had no desire
but to be known as "The Peacemaker." The high
claims of kingship ever put forward by the Stuarts
made him seek more intimate relations with Continental
dynasties. He was completely under the thumb of
Gondomar, the astute ambassador of the Court of
Spain, who dangled before him hopes of a marriage
between "Baby Charles" and the Spanish Infanta.
Gondomar at any rate achieved his purpose of bringing
about a peace between England and Spain, which left
the hands of his master free to prosecute the long war
against the Dutch, to separate the maritime Powers
from one another, and to intervene in the affairs of the
German Empire with such effect that James's own
son-in-law, the Elector Palatine, was driven into exile.
Corruption crept into the administration of the navy
under James's pacifist rule, and the exertions of Henry,
Prince of Wales, seconded by the able ship-designer,
Phineas Pett, who began his career at this time, availed

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 139

little to check the abuses. Pirates swarmed round the
coast, many of them the stout English seamen of the
days of Elizabeth, who, finding neither employment
nor pay in their motherland, took service with the
Barbary States. James in vain offered pardon to all
who would return to their allegiance. "I have no
intention of obeying the orders of one king, when I am
in a way a king myself," said the haughty pirate, Eston.
James was fain to give leave to a Dutch squadron
under Lambert to visit Irish harbours and root out the
pirates who were sheltering there.

The sea-borne trade of the country not being as
yet upon a sure footing, the peace with Spain caused
mercantile shipping to languish. The Venetian Am-
bassador noted with astonishment that, at one juncture,
only twenty merchantmen were to be found in the Port
of London. The merchants suffered losses so heavy
when they imported goods in English ships which
received no protection that they actually welcomed
their arrival in Dutch bottoms. The Hollanders then
began to emulate the example of the Hansa and set
up 'mercantile houses of their own in London. Trade
languished because the Royal Navy was too weak to
defend it; the Royal Navy languished because it
lacked the seamen who were its lifeblood, and who
were driven to seek service elsewhere. So the whole
sea affair was moving in a vicious circle. But, at the
root of all the mischief were corruption, maladminis-
tration, and faulty policy. Neither James nor Charles
could ever man a fleet completely during the occasional
bursts of energy they displayed. Yet all the time
it was noted by envious foreigners that the British
warships were the best in the world, and that the mer-
chantmen were built big and strong like warships.

140 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

The seed was germinating; the leaven hid in the
measure of meal was slowly but surely leavening the
lump.

The early Stuarts, however, were not altogether
indifferent to the Navy. That miserable creature
James I., was, of course, intent upon nothing but his
disreputable pleasures and the pedantry which he
mistook for wisdom. But his son, Prince Henry, was
an enthusiastic "blue water" man, and Charles I.,
when he came to the throne, showed great if misguided
zeal in naval affairs. Buckingham, too, according to
his lights, and to serve his own ends, was not only a
zealous, but also an intelligent, supporter of the Navy.
The Grand Commission, appointed under James I.
and continued under his son, worked honestly, hard,
and successfully to reform abuses in the department of
construction. It reduced the expenses of the Navy
by one-half, while, at the same time, it increased both
its strength and its efficiency. At the end of February,
1627, the year of the disastrous expedition to the Isle
of Rh6, the Navy mustered seventy-five ships, besides
others under repair, while the infant navy of France,
which Richelieu was fostering, did not amount to more
than thirty vessels and that of Holland to about the
same. We had, in fact, the "Two Power Standard."
In the following year Denbigh commanded a hundred
and forty ships, many of them merchantmen, however,
in the attempt to relieve La Rochelle. The "Ship-
money" fleets were stronger still, and, thanks to the
genius of Phineas Pett, they were more powerful and
better armed than those of any rival navy.

But the canker which ate the heart out of the Stuart
Navy was implicit in the Stuart system. James and
Charles were not more arbitrary and tyrannical than

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 141

Henry and Elizabeth. Yet, whereas the two former
could get from Parliament what supplies they pleased,
the latter were continually at variance with the House
of Commons, and the Navy was starved for lack of
funds. The Parliamentary watchword, "Grievances
precede supply," had its counterpart in the domain of
foreign politics. In the view of the Stuart kings, the
function of Parliament was simply to find the money
necessary to carry out the policy dictated by the will
of the monarch. The expenditure of the sums granted
was part of the executive function which belonged
exclusively to the Crown. The Tudor theory was
little different; but it is practice, not theory, which
counts in England, and their practice differed by the
whole width of the heavens. The Tudors, with their
true insight, with their reliance on statecraft as distinct
from the kingcraft of their successors, interpreted the
wishes of the nation: even its prejudices and passions.
They put themselves at its head, and they led it.
Hence their wars were what are called — a detestable
phrase — "popular" wars. They furthered the reli-
gious cause which the people had at heart; they grati-
fied their desire for wealth. The Stuarts demanded
money and ships for the furtherance of designs which
were hateful to the mass of the nation; or, where the
undertaking itself was popular, as, unquestionably,
the expedition to Cadiz, the attack at the Isle of Rh6,
and the attempted relief of La Rochelle undoubtedly
were, they entangled it with constitutional questions
or entrusted the execution to favourites whom the
nation, which had made Drake its darling, most justly
regarded with the utmost distrust. The fleet was
allowed to become the symbol of personal rule.
That the greatest revolt of the English people against

142 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

their sovereign which our annals have ever known
should have come to a head over the question of pro-
vision for the Navy is a peculiar irony of fate. There
was nothing outrageous or monstrous about Charles
I.'s demand for ship-money. The maritime counties
had always been liable to make contribution, in ships,
if not in money, for the protection of the coasts. Lon-
don, as we have seen, was subject to a similar liability.
It was only logical that this obligation should be ex-
tended to the inland shires at a time when the feudal
provision for the defence of the realm had passed into
desuetude and the episode of the Armada had opened
the eyes of the people to the fact that their safety de-
pended upon the fleet. Whether John Hampden had
fully grasped the significance of that fact when he,
the owner of many manors, went to prison rather than
contribute one pound eleven shillings and sixpence
to maintain the Navy, is a debatable point. But it
in no way touches his claim to be immortalised as a
type of disinterested patriotism. One pound eleven
and six was nothing to him. But that even the odd
sixpence should be arbitrarily exacted was a very great
matter indeed.

There is here a very important lesson as to the
foundation upon which a healthy sea power rests. It
cannot be made to serve the purposes of absolutism.
A war-navy, created and maintained to support the
policy of a monarch or of a military clique, though it
may be powerful for a time, will not continue to main-
tain its position unless it has behind it the conviction
of the people, of the trading and commercial classes in
particular, that its existence and power are necessary
to the furtherance of their prosperity and the main-
tenance of their security. The necessity for sea

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 143

power demands a good deal of imagination from the
people. In the reign of Elizabeth, when wealth was
pouring into the country as a consequence of the war
with Spain, and when the Armada was hourly ex-
pected in the Channel, the necessity was plain enough.
When the Navy was being used by the Stuarts to
further the personal policy of James I. or to gratify
the private animosities of Buckingham, while English
trade was cut to pieces by pirates, Dunkirkers, or Dutch-
men, the advantages of sea power in the abstract did
not appeal. That is to say, though the men of the
time may not have formulated the doctrine in words,
the function which the mass of the people looked to
the Navy to perform was to secure the communications
of the country and the free use of the sea.

There are not many tridents, but one. When, as
at the period we are considering, the hand which has
held it becomes nerveless or paralysed, or attempts its
misuse, a stronger hand will be found ready to grasp
it. The stronger hand, for the moment, was the
hand of Holland. The rise of Dutch sea power has
some peculiar features. It had its beginning in the
herring-fisheries. The saying that "Amsterdam was
built on the herring" has already been quoted. Its
prowess in war was learned in the struggles of the
"Beggars of the Sea" against Philip II. Almost
driven from the land by the Spanish soldiery, the
United Provinces maintained the struggle upon the sea,
where they 'hampered the communications of the
Spaniards and could reach the rather grudging hand
which Elizabeth stretched out to aid them. But the
Dutch people were, by nature, a nation of traders.
Secure among their inundations, the burghers of Hol-
land drew from the seas, not only the means to carry

144 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

on the bitter struggle for eighty years, but also to grow
rich beyond all precedent. This was achieved very
largely by carrying the wealth of the Indies to Spain
itself, at the very time when the Dutch were in revolt
against the sovereign of that country, who was also
their own. The Dutch established themselves as
traders in the Portuguese settlements in the East.
They brought back the pepper, the sandalwood, the
rich silks from India and the Moluccas. They took
the goods of Northern Europe to Spain and Portugal,
and they carried back in return the "pieces of eight,"
the product of the mines of Mexico, and the gold of
Peru. What the Elizabethan mariners acquired by
violence the Dutch secured by trade, in virtue of the
prerogative which was theirs as subjects of Philip,
though they were a rebellious people. Therefore their
sea power waxed while his waned, and thus they
found the sinews to carry on the war against him. In
such strange topsyturvydom did the economic and
political ideas of the sixteenth century land those who
held them.

As the Dutch came to feel their strength, however,
conquest supplemented trade. The Dutch East India
Company was formed in 1602. A year later, Amboyna,
the principal town in the Moluccas, fell to the Dutch,
to be followed a year later by Malacca. Java was
appropriated by the Company in 1610, and Ceylon
taken from the Portuguese in 1658. In 1614 New
Amsterdam, now New York, was founded, while be-
tween 1623 and 1630 the greater part of Brazil fell to
Holland. Furthermore, the names of Tasmania, or
Van Diemen's Land, and New Zealand, both of which
places were discovered in 1642, point to the growing
power of the Dutch upon the sea. But, extensive as

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 145

the oversea empire of Holland became in this short
space of time, the chief source of Dutch wealth is to
be found in their position as "the wagoners of the
world."

It is wonderful that a collision between the Dutch
and the English was delayed as long as it was. There
are complaints of the "insolence" of the Hollanders
throughout the reigns of the first two Stuart kings,
and the low esteem in which they held English sea power
is plainly enough shown by their frequent incursions
into English harbours to cut out Spanish ships or
"Dunkirkers" which had taken refuge there. But
the Dutch were shrewd enough to see that, until they
were able to contest the mastery of the sea on some-
thing like equal terms with the English, their commu-
nications with the sources of wealth were entirely at
the mercy of the latter. Until they had made an end
of Spanish hostility, and until they were assured of at
least the sympathetic neutrality of France, they had
everything to lose and nothing to gain by falling out
with the Protestant Power over the way.

The first clash came, not with the Stuart monarchy,
but with the Commonwealth, under the masterful
hand of Cromwell. There had been a festering sore
between the two nations for years on account of the
murder of the English factors at Amboyna, for which
no reparation had ever been made. The Dutch, on
their part, were irritated and perturbed by the passing
of the Navigation Act. But it is a matter of dispute
to this day upon whom the responsibility rests for the
actual outbreak. This is commonly the case with
"inevitable" wars: those, that is, which occur because
there is no room for both aspirants to walk side by side
along their chosen path. Tromp, in command of a

146 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

superior force, trailed his coat before Blake by refusing
the customary salute to the English flag. Blake fired
the first broadside. But it is evident that the Dutch
Government did not, at that moment, wish to fight.
They sought accommodation. Cromwell was anxious
lest Holland should afford asylum to the Stuarts, and
actually proposed a union between the two countries.
He also insisted that the Dutch should pay to the flag
of the Commonwealth the same respect which they
had always paid to the flag of the kings. There was
stubborn fighting in the Channel and the North Sea
between the fleets of the two nations, which were about
equal in numbers. Tromp won one success and drove
Blake up the Thames, after which he cruised in the
Narrow Seas with a broom at the masthead, a piece
of bravado out of keeping with his character and that
of his nation, and well calculated to provoke the English.
But the war, as a whole, was completely unfavourable
to the Dutch, who lost over twelve hundred warships
and merchantmen in the course of it. This was a
profound blow to them, since their position in the
world depended entirely on the preservation of their
character as safe "wagoners." The causes of the
Qonflicts between the British and the Dutch are, after
all, best summed up in the blunt, almost cynical speech
attributed to Monk in the ensuing reign of Charles II. :
"What matters this or that reason? What we want
is more of the trade which the Dutch now have!"
That depended on our success in securing the position
of waywarden of the highway of the nations, the sea.

The Cromwellian wars in which Blake commanded
are noteworthy for the fact that engagements were
fought in the Mediterranean against the Dutch, the
heralds of a long series of fights between European

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 147

nations in waters remote from their home bases; for
the successful bombardment of Algiers — the only one
until Lord Exmouth reduced the pirates' stronghold
in 1816; the taking of Jamaica and Barbados by Penn,
and the last great deed of Blake in the bombardment
of Santa Cruz and the sinking of the Spanish fleet in
harbour there in 1656. Blake died as his ship entered
Plymouth Harbour on his return frorn this voyage.
Although a soldier, bearing the rank of colonel, he had
restored to the British Navy all the prestige it had
possessed under Elizabeth and had lost in the years
between 1604 and 1650. There is a passage in a letter
addressed by him and Deane to the Speaker while they
were awaiting the Dutch fleet which brings out in a
noble light the spirit of duty animating the sailors of
the Commonwealth.

. "We dare not in this great business to promise any-
thing for or to ourselves," they say, "because it is God
alone who giveth courage and conduct with opportu-
nity and success in the day of His Salvations; only we
desire the Parliament to believe that we are deeply
sensible of the extraordinary importance of the present
service in hand, the high expectation raised of it, and
the obligation of the great trust reposed in us." Ex-
pressed in Puritan form, we have in these words the
abiding spirit of the Navy.

Whatever we may think of the ethic of the Crom-
wellian wars with the Dutch, they were, at any rate,
national. Cromwell had the people at his back. There
was no difficulty in getting ships, money, and men.
Blake summed up the Navy's point of view in a sen-
tence: "It is not our business to meddle in politics,"
he said, "but to keep the foreigner from fooling us."
The wars of the Restoration were different. Charles

148 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

II., like his father, was soon in conflict with his Parlia-
ments, though his rooted determination not to set out
upon his travels again prevented him from openly
flouting the representatives of his people. But money
and men were once more scarce, and corruption again
began to appear in the administration of the Navy.
Save for the good work of the estimable Mr. Pepys
and the sailor-like capacity of the Duke of York, the
safety of the country might have been worse en-
dangered than it was. Charles, however, though care-
less and pleasure-loving, had a very real idea of what
was involved in the command of the sea. When it was
suggested that the British fleet, fighting in alliance
with that of France, should be placed under the com-
mand of a French officer, he told the Ambassador
haughtily that "it was the custom of the English to
command at sea," adding that, if he were to yield,
his subjects would not obey him. Charles, in fact —
though no doubt one object which he had in mind was
to free himself from dependence on Parliament by
receiving French subsidies — was playing a game of
"diamond cut diamond" with Louis XIV. He used
the French to weaken the Dutch by sea. Louis, on
the other hand, sent his naval contingent with orders
to take no strenuous part in the fighting, in order that
the Dutch might weaken the English. But this is to
anticipate naval events. In the first war the English
engaged the Dutch alone, the French eventually join-
ing the latter. The three nations, in fact, now entered
upon the long contest for the mastery of the sea, in
which the Dutch were destined to be eliminated first,
while the struggle between the other two continued to
the end of the Napoleonic era before it was finally de-
cided in favour of Britain. The geographical position

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THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 149

of the countries concerned supplies the reason for the
conflict. Holland was the man in possession; the
other two fought for the pathway to her front door.
Unfortunately for Holland, she had a back door also,
and the way of it was overland. The English, having
obtained the mastery of her by sea, would have been
only too pleased to aid her in defending the back door
against the French. They tried to do so, with varying
success, during the next hundred and twenty years.
But in the upshot the Dutch were drawn into the
French orbit and were crushed, so far as their maritime
power went, between the hammer and the anvil.

On June 3, 1665, the English and Dutch fleets met
off Lowestoft. The Duke of York, who was in com-
mand of the English, put into practice his new system
of tactics — that of fighting in a close line. The result
was a magnificent victory. The French then joined
the Dutch, and Monk, now in command, committed
the blunder of dividing his fleet, with the consequence
that he was defeated in the four days' battle off the
North Foreland. There was no disgrace in the defeat,
however. The English seamen won the respect of
their foes. "You can kill these English; you cannot
beat them," said a Dutch captain. On July 2ist,
the reverse was retrieved off the mouth of the Thames,
where Monk gave de Ruyter a sound drubbing. Then
followed the days of shame. Charles argued that, as
the Dutch were dependent upon trade, there was no
need to keep an expensive fleet of ships-of-the-line
in commission. He laid up his fleet in ordinary, and
de Ruyter came and burned it where it lay at its
anchorage between Sheerness and Chatham.

The real importance of this episode has been much
exaggerated. It was of the nature of a "tip-and-run

150 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

raid." It had small effect on Britain's command of the
sea. But it shook her prestige to its foundations, and
it stands for all time a monument to the folly of think-
ing that naval warfare can be carried to a successful
issue by mere commerce-raiding against an enemy who
possesses a fleet of capital ships. The Peace of Breda
followed, by which three West Indian islands, taken
by Holland, were returned to Britain, Nova Scotia
was restored to France, and the Navigation Acts were
modified in favour of the Dutch.

That Act, which was one of the causes of the first
Cromwellian war with the Dutch, decreed that foreign
goods should only be brought to English ports in Eng-
lish ships, or ships of the country of their origin. It,
of course, struck a deadly blow at the "wagoner"
trade of the Dutch. The relief obtained by the Treaty
of Breda did not long avail them, for, in 1672, the new
Navigation Act of Charles II. imposed regulations more
stringent still, especially with regard to Colonial trade,
which had all to be brought to London, and, of course,
in British bottoms. The Navigation Acts were finally
repealed in 1842-9, in the sacred name of Free Trade,
although Adam Smith himself had defended them as
the one legitimate form of protective legislation, in
conformity with his principle that "defence is greater
than opulence."

In the war of 1672-4, to which reference has before
been made, in which Britain was allied with the French
against the Dutch, tactical victory rested with the
latter in all three of the pitched battles fought, namely
Solebay, Schoneveld, and The Texel. This was due in
part to the deficiencies of Prince Rupert as a naval
commander, and in part to the unwillingness of the
French to risk their ships. "You fools!" said a Dutch

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 151

commander to his men, when they expressed surprise
at the small part D'Estrees bore in the fight, "you
fools! The French have hired the English to fight
for them, and they are here to see that they earn their
wages!" It was a bitter sarcasm, the bitterer because
it was exactly true. But sarcasm could not help
Holland. She experienced in this war the weakness
of her position, for she was attacked on land as well
as by sea, and, though her sea power brought her
through on the whole the victor, the damage to her
trade was such that she never recovered it. The Dutch,
though in all the stout fighting of the last twenty-five
years they had never suffered a decisive defeat at sea,
had definitely lost the game. Britain withdrew from
the struggle in 1679, and, during the next four years,
reaped a rich harvest as a neutral, while the Dutch
suffered disaster in the Mediterranean. English ships
were, henceforward, preferred to Dutch, as they had
proved themselves the safer carriers.

Great Britain had now laid the foundations of her
oversea Empire. On the mainland of North America,
she held the New England States, the Carolinas, Mary-
land, Virginia, New York, and New Jersey. Jamaica,
Barbados, and other islands in the Caribbean were hers,
as well as Bermuda and Newfoundland, though her
claim to the latter was still disputed by the French.
In the East, Bombay had passed to Charles II. in right
of his wife, Catherine of Braganza. Supremacy at
sea, therefore, had become vital, not only for the de-
fence of the islands, but for safe intercourse between
the King's possessions. Victory was assured to the
English in the wars with the Dutch, not by any military
superiority, but by natural, or geographical causes.
If the English ships were slightly more powerful than

152 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the Dutch, the fighting capacity of the sailors was as
great on one side as on the other, and, on the whole,
it must be conceded that, in the later wars, at any rate,
the Dutch were the better led. Blake and Monk were
great commanders, and James was at least respectable.
But de Ruyter, the two Tromps, and Evertsen were
something more than equals of any but Blake. Under
Cromwell, the discipline of the English was the better;
but they lost this advantage under Charles II. The
Government of Holland lacked unity of direction;
that of Charles was corrupt. But Holland, liable to
attack on the land side, and with the British Islands
lying like a breakwater across her path to the ocean,
had no chance to maintain herself against a Sea Power,
her equal in might, stubborness, and almost in wealth,
unless she could seize a favourable opportunity to sub-
due it on land as well as on sea. Had she been able
to invade with a sufficient army when de Ruyter lay
at Sheerness, she might have altered the history of the
world. But, even had her land forces been sufficient,
the weakness of her land frontier and the presence of
jealous enemies on the Continent would have forbidden
the attempt. When the Dutch did invade, it was with
the consent of the great majority of the English people.
Dutch William came in peace. When he came, it was
to become, like William the Conqueror, rather King of
England than lord of his own continental dominions.
At the conclusion of the Dutch Wars, the first
struggle against the first modern aspirant to universal
sovereignty arose. Louis XIV. v/as now on the throne
of France, and great ministers, who saw better than he
did himself the way to achieve his end, were striving
to build up the sea power of France upon a solid basis.
Richelieu first made the French formidable upon the

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 153

water. But it is to Colbert that the credit must be
given for working out a complete plan by which not
only was the war-navy to be made strong enough to
dominate the sea, but the colonies and maritime trade
necessary to give sea power an assured foundation
were to be established and fostered. Two things lay
open — or seemed to lie open — to Louis at this time.
He might seize the mastery of Europe, with its welter
of discords, dynastic, religious, and political; or he
might aim at the dominion of the East and of the New
World. The way to the first lay across the Rhine,
the Meuse, and the Scheldt; the way to the second lay
across the Channel. If he achieved the second, what
stood in his way from, hereafter, seizing the first also?
Leibnitz counselled him to possess himself of Egypt.
France, he said, wanted peace in the West and war in
the East. The Turkish power was, in reality, feeble,
and he who possessed Egypt would possess also the
islands and coasts of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
It was Napoleon's policy a hundred years and more
before Napoleon's time. It could, at that juncture,
have been much more easily carried into effect, for
the position of France for achieving supremacy at
sea was, on the whole, more favourable than that of
England. The latter had, as yet, no foothold in the
Mediterranean, and was, moreover, not yet deeply
interested in India. France, on the contrary, looked
on to the Atlantic from Brest and Bordeaux, and on to
the Inland Sea from Toulon and Marseilles. By her
position in the Channel Ports, she could hold a great
part of the British Navy in home waters. She had,
in Nova Scotia, a foothold on the North American
Continent, while there was a good chance of the Span-
ish crown falling to Louis, with the whole of the Ameri-

154 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

can dominions of Spain, and the vitally important
Mediterranean positions of Gibraltar and the Balearic
Islands. To secure this goodly heritage, he needed
sea power, and this Colbert was ready to give him.
Colbert's plan, as described by himself, was as follows :

To organise producers and merchants as a powerful
army subjected to an active and intelligent guidance, so
as to secure an industrial victory for France by order and
unity of efforts, and to obtain the best products by imposing
on all workmen the processes recognised as best by com-
petent men. ... To organize seamen and distant com-
merce in large bodies like the manufactures and internal
commerce, and to give as support to the commercial
power of France a navy established on a firm basis and of
dimensions hitherto unknown.

It was an ambitious undertaking, and it almost
succeeded. Colbert's work in the dockyards was so
efficient that an English officer, prisoner at Brest, de-
clared that ships were got ready for sea in half the time
which was required in England. A ship of one hundred
guns had all her guns removed in five hours with the
greatest ease and with less hazard than in England
where the same work would have taken twenty-four
hours. Colbert enacted something like our Navigation
Laws; he caused great bonded warehouses to be built,
in the hope of thus securing the entrepot trade of the
world; he reorganised the finances of France, and, for
the purpose of interesting all classes of society in his
schemes, he obtained a decree from Louis that the
nobility might engage in oversea commerce without
loss of status, so long as they abstained from retail
trade. This was necessary because it was the ambition
of merchants to secure patents of nobility. When these

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 155

were obtained, they were compelled by the laws of their
order to retire from business.

Such, in bare outline, was Colbert's plan — a plan
which very nearly resembles that pursued in Germany
since the accession of William II., to which the world
owes those priceless possessions, the Ballins, the Helf-
ferichs, and their like. It had one weakness. It rested
on the capricious will of an absolute monarch. Louis
was offered a choice, and he chose wrongly. The war,
undertaken in 1672, in alliance with England against
the Dutch, ruined Colbert's plans and broke his heart.
In the six years' struggle, the equilibrium of the finances
so carefully established for the furtherance of the greater
aims was destroyed; the springs of commerce and of a
peaceful shipping were exhausted. The military navy
was maintained in efficiency for some years; then it
too began to dwindle. Like the seed sown in stony
places, "having no root in itself, it withered away."
Louis was committed to those continental plans which
brought his realm to the verge of ruin and established
Great Britain instead of France as the mistress of the
sea. Sea power is too slow in its operation for the
would-be master of the world; its instruments too far
removed from his hand. Its aims are the prosperity
of the many rather than the exaltation of the one.

Yet we may doubt whether Louis XIV. rather than
Colbert was not the true interpreter of the genius of
France. The sunny and pleasant land; the intense
love of home; the thrifty nature of the people which
rejects speculative enterprise in favour of the bas de
laine, lead to the conclusion that Colbert's magnificent
scheme would have been a plant of hothouse growth;
that the history of France as a world-empire might
not have differed greatly from that of Spain. But,

156 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the character of the people apart, and as a matter of
pure policy, it is easy to see that Louis took the wrong
course. The great struggle between Britain and France
began when James II. lost his throne and Dutch Wil-
liam succeeded. Louis supported the cause of the
exiled King. The defeat of Torrington off Beachy
Head, which took place twelve days before William's
victory at the Boyne, plunged England into consterna-
tion which was only allayed by the firmness of the
Queen and the favourable news from Ireland. The
old English spirit of the Armada time then once more
took fire. Russell, who succeeded Torrington in com-
mand of the Channel Guard, and who was known to
have Jacobite sympathies, declared roundly that pro-
fessional honour required him to fight as stoutly for
the king he hated as for the king he loved, and his
officers assented to this declaration. The hope that
the fleet might rally to its old commander was utterly
disappointed. Russell attacked Tourville off the Race
of Alderney with a superior force, routed him, and
chased him into the harbour of La Hogue, where the
British seamen in a boat attack destroyed a number of
French ships at anchor. James II. watched the fight
from the battlements, exclaiming eagerly, and in his
own despite, "They'll never beat my English."

The victory of La Hogue, secondary in importance
as a naval encounter, had the effect of shattering the
belief in the superiority of the French at sea, engendered
by Tourville's success off Beachy Head, not less in the
eyes of Louis himself than in the eyes of European
nations. Spain joined in the war on the side of the
allies, and the French King withdrew his grand fleets
from the sea, electing to depend on a war against com-
merce. He hired out ships to privateers, and lent his

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 157

best captains and crews. Jean Bart, Forbin, and
Duguay-Trouin, famous privateersmen, wrought enor-
mous havoc on British and Dutch shipping; but the
wealth of Britain and Holland was always increasing,
nevertheless, and kept the League of Augsburg on foot
until the Treaty of Ryswick closed the war. France,
on the other hand, despite her great internal resources,
became more and more exhausted. "Nations, like
men," says Mahan, "however strong, decay when cut
off from the external activities which at once draw
out and support their internal powers. A nation can-
not live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest way in
which it can communicate with other people and renew
its own strength is upon the sea." The moral for
to-day is obvious.

Six years after the Peace of Ryswick, the War of the
Spanish Succession broke out. The contest was be-
tween Philip, grandson of Le Roi Soleil, and Charles,
brother of the Emperor, for the crown of Spain. The
Sea Powers, Britain and Holland, were determined that
the House of Bourbon should not wield the resources
of the whole vast Empire of Spain in conjunction with
the might and vigour of France. The titular sovereignty
of decrepit Spain in the New World might be tolerated,
for the wealth of the Indies was carried in British and
Dutch bottoms, despite the nominal monopoly which the
kings of Spain still maintained. But such a foundation
for French sea power could not be tolerated. Portugal,
likewise, dreaded the nearness of France, and sought
the protection of her old ally England. The Empire,
Britain, and Holland were thus arrayed against Louis
and that part of Spain which favoured the cause of
Philip. William III., the strong ruler, and able com-
mander, in whose person the British and Dutch realms

158 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

had been united, was now dead, and Queen Anne sat
on the throne of Britain, herself ruled by the imperi-
ous Sarah, Duchess of Maryborough, whose husband,
fortunately a man of shining military genius, took
command of the British and Dutch forces upon the
Continent. The policy of subsidies which Britain
was to pursue for the next century was now adopted,
and the wealth which command of the sea gave was
poured into the coffers of the Germanic States to sup-
port the land war.

At sea, the allies at first contemplated action in the
West Indies. But, on the Emperor putting forward
Charles definitely as a candidate for the throne of
Spain, the plan was changed, and the naval forces were
employed chiefly in the Mediterranean and off the coast
of Portugal. Supported by British sea power, the
Portuguese Government permitted Charles to land at
Lisbon and undertake the conquest of Spain from that
base. The great and abiding feature of the sea cam-
paign was the capture of Gibraltar by Sir George Rooke.
That event came about almost by inadvertence. Rooke
had failed in an attempt on Cadiz, and, despite a bril-
liant affair in which he cut out the Spanish treasure
galleons in Vigo Bay, he was ill-content to go back to
England without more substantial success. The Brit-
ish Admiralty, then as ever afterwards, allowed a very
free hand to its commanders afloat, so Rooke deter-
mined to attack the mighty fortress, which he first
bombarded and then stormed with the boats of his fleet.
Never did place of such importance fall with such
ridiculous ease. The Count of Toulouse attempted to
retrieve its loss, attacking Rooke off Malaga on his
return. The battle was indecisive. But the British
retained Gibraltar, and have retained it ever since,

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 159

despite several attempts to induce Spain to receive it
back again. Next to the taking of Gibraltar, the most
important event at sea was the capture of Minorca,
with its harbour, Port Mahon, which the British held
for fifty years.

It is, however, the silent, unseen pressure exercised
by sea power, so hard to estimate in words, which
dominates the War of the Spanish Succession, as it
dominates other struggles, both before and since. It
contributed more to the final success of the allies than all
the victories of Marlborough and Eugene. Lifeblood
flowed into Holland and Germany through the ports
of Flanders; the breath of France was gradually
choked out of her by the strangle-hold which forbade
her intercourse with the rest of the world. In 1710,
Louis was ready to offer almost abject terms of peace.
The allies, at the instigation of Great Britain, rejected
them, thinking to achieve the complete overthrow of
the French. Then, with the death of the Emperor
and the accession of Charles to the Imperial Crown, the
situation changed. Britain was no more ready to
welcome an omnipotent Hapsburg than an omnipotent
Bourbon. England and Holland withdrew from the
war, and the Emperor had no choice but to make peace,
for the lifeblood of sea-borne wealth was cut off from
him. Historians who habitually omit the factor of
sea power from their appreciations are wont to con-
trast the terms which might have been imposed in 1710
with those, apparently less favourable, ultimately
accepted in 1713. They comment freely on the ter-
giversations and intrigues of Whig and Tory, on the
treachery of Marlborough and the displacement of his
spouse in the royal favour by Mrs. Abigail Masham.
But they obstinately miss the point that the terms of

160 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

1713 suited Britain, now the supreme Sea Power, far
better than those offered at the earlier date. Our
statesmen, whatever their demerits of wisdom and
character, had now begun to realise, consciously and
clearly, in which direction the destiny of the country
lay.

By the Treaty of Utrecht, Great Britain gained a
definite recognition of her claim to Newfoundland.
Nova Scotia and the Hudson Bay Territory were
ceded to her by France, Gibraltar and Minorca by
Spain. Her position on the great sea routes was thus
infinitely strengthened. Holland gained possession of
the Barrier Fortresses of Flanders with the exception of
Lille. The respective acquisitions of the two Powers
show the trend of events. The Dutch gained positions
requisite for their defence on land, the British, outposts
for their expansion by sea. After the Treaty of Utrecht,
the last pretension of Holland to rival her neighbour
at sea vanished.

But the advantages won by Britain are not to be
measured in terms of territory, important as these are.
To quote Mahan again :

The sea power of England was not merely in the great
navy with which we too commonly and exclusively asso-
ciate it; France had had such a navy in 1688, and it had
shrivelled like a dry leaf in the fire. Neither was it in a
prosperous commerce alone; a few years after the date at
which we have arrived, the commerce of France took on
fair proportions, but the first blast of war swept it off the
seas as the navy of Cromwell had once swept that of Hol-
land. It was in the union of the two, carefully fostered,
that England made the gain of sea power over and beyond
all other States; and this gain is distinctly associated with,
and dates from, the War of Spanish Succession. Before

THE MASTERY TO BRITAIN 161

that war, England was one of the Sea Powers; after it, she
was the Sea Power, without any second. This power also
she held alone, unshared by friend and unchecked by foe.
She alone was rich, and in her command of the sea and her
extensive shipping had the sources of wealth so much in
her hands that there was no present fear of a rival on the
ocean. Thus her gain of sea power and wealth were not
only great, but solid, being entirely in her own hands;
while the gains of other States were not merely inferior in
degree, but weaker in kind, in that they depended more
or less on the goodwill of other people.

Thus ended the first great struggle of Great Britain
to prevent a Colossus from striding over the globe.
What follows from the outbreak of the War of Jenkins's
Ear to Trafalgar forms, in its ultimate meaning, a
continuous story: the story of one long struggle be-
tween sea power and land power for ascendancy. The
maintenance of the balance of power on the Continent
of Europe henceforward is a conscious policy, and it
has been so ever since. The first victims of a Napo-
leon or a William II. are, necessarily, the small and
weak States which fringe the seaboard of the Continent.
To uphold the independence of these States, so that
no great military Power shall obtain the advantage of
their maritime position, is vital to British supremacy
at sea. Thus the War of the Spanish Succession, in
the logical sequence of events, led straight to the great
struggle of to-day.
it

CHAPTER VIII

PRIDE AND A FALL

THE Peace of Utrecht was shortly followed by two
events which had a profound influence on the history
of Europe for the next seventy years. Shakespeare
has told us, through the mouth of Caesar, that,

When beggars die there are no comets seen;

The heavens themselves blaze forth the death of princes.

But it must be confessed that, often enough, changes
in the occupancy of thrones is a matter of profound
unimportance. Kings run their course. They do that
which is right or evil in the sight of the Lord and sleep
with their fathers. According to the power and author-
ity of the individual, he leaves a greater or a less im-
print on the course of events. But the tide of history
sweeps on, and kings are more often corks on its bosom
than breakwaters controlling or diverting its course.

This could fairly be said of the life of Queen Anne,
though not of the event for which she is chiefly famous:
her death. It could not be said either of the life or
death of Le Roi Soleil, for both profoundly influenced
events. Anne passed from this world in August,
1714, and Louis almost exactly a year later, both at
a time when peace reigned between the nations over
which they had ruled. Louis was succeeded by his

162

PRIDE AND A FALL 163

grandson, a child of five, and the Regency was exer-
cised by the Due d'Orleans, who sacrificed the late
King's policy of a close family union with Spain to his
private enmity towards Philip V. Orleans sought and
obtained an English alliance, which he purchased with
concessions to England, the most important of which,
from the British point of view, was a guarantee of the
Hanoverian Succession. Holland joined the alliance,
and thus the peaceful occupancy of the throne of Great
Britain was confirmed to George I., so far as the Powers
of the Continent could guarantee it. Had the Jacobite
rising in 1715 been supported by the combined sea
power of France and Holland, the return of the Stuarts
might well have been accomplished.

George I. was, of course, a Stuart, upon the distaff
side. In all other respects he was just a dull German
boor. Such Stuart qualities as he had were akin to
those of James I., and not of the more engaging mem-
bers of the House. His accession is chiefly important,
so far as he, personally, is concerned, from the fact
that he was Elector of Hanover as well as King of
England, and that, unlike our previous royal importa-
tions, voluntary or constrained, he remained rather
Elector of Hanover than King of Great Britain. He
and his immediate successor, at any rate, strove to
make the foreign policy of this country Hanoverian
and Continental, rather than British and maritime.
The country was involved in dynastic struggles abroad
in which it must seem that it was but slightly con-
cerned. The War of the Spanish Succession was also
a dynastic struggle ; but the prospect of a close connec-
tion between the crowns of France and Spain, and the
possible union of the extended Spanish Empire with
the kingdom of France, was a matter which touched the

164 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

welfare of Britain far more nearly than the accession
of Maria Theresa to the Imperial Crown. The pos-
session of the Low Countries by France was a matter
of the first concern; that of Silesia by Frederick the
Great of no concern at all, unless the statesmen of the
time could project their vision into the yet far distant
future — in which case they would have no doubt
been less willing to serve the King of Prussia. It says
much for these same statesmen, whom, with a few excep-
tions, such as the great Chatham and Lord Hardwicke,
we do not hold in very high esteem, that, while spend-
ing British blood and British treasure, the former
sparingly, the latter lavishly, on the Continental neces-
sities of the House of Hanover, they kept the destiny
of this country as a Sea Power continually before their
eyes, and made the Continental wars and alliances to
subserve the true ends of British policy.

An example of this occurred two years after the
death of Queen Anne. Spain had recovered a consider-
able measure of her former power under the adminis-
tration of Cardinal Alberoni. But one of the fixed
objectives of British policy was that Spain should not
recover her former power. The end was justifiable
enough, seeing that the Spanish system was still main-
tained in the Spanish possessions abroad. For the
moment, the policy of Orleans kept the two branches
of the House of Bourbon apart; but the danger of the
union of the two Powers, which the War of the Spanish
Succession had been fought to prevent, might recur
at any time. It happened that, in pursuance of his
German policy, George I. was anxious to secure the
Island of Sicily for the Emperor, giving the House of
Savoy Sardinia in exchange and compensating Spain
in Parma and Tuscany. George went so far as to offer

PRIDE AND A FALL 165

to restore Gibraltar, but the offer was not accepted.
Alberoni would not consent to the arrangement upon
which George had set his heart, and tried to occupy
Sicily by force. Byng, afterwards Lord Torrington,
the father of the ill-fated admiral of that name, fell
upon the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro and completely
destroyed it. It was of this battle that an English
captain, Walton by name, wrote the oft-quoted despatch :
1 ' Sir, We have taken or destroyed all the Spanish ships
upon this coast, the number as per margin." The
morality of Torrington's attack need not be discussed.
The incident is quoted to show how affairs purely
continental in their origin were used to serve the mari-
time purposes of Britain, one of which was to stereo-
type the naval weakness of Spain. If defence be thought
necessary, it is to be found in the fact that the Law of
Nations did not yet run on the sea, and that encounters
on that element continued to be of frequent occurrence
while nations remained formally at peace with each
other.

The death of Alberoni shortly afterwards put an
end to the immediate prospect of a Spanish revival.
But, at the same time, the death of the Due d'Or!6ans
put an end to the friction between France and Spain.
The old gentleman with the scythe used his implement
with notable impartiality just then. France and
Spain must be regarded as standing, at this time, and,
indeed, up to the fall of Napoleon, in much the same
relation to one another as Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary do to each other to-day. That gives the key to
British policy during the next hundred years. For the
moment a troubled peace was preserved, which lasted
till 1739. Cardinal Fleury, a pacific old man, assumed
the conduct of affairs in France, while those of Britain

166 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

were in the hands of Robert Walpole, no less a lover of
peace than he.

Britain was now in possession of the thirteen colonies
in North America, which were to constitute the nucleus
of the United States; of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland,
Jamaica, and other West Indian Islands, while, in the
East, she already held Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.
In the Mediterranean, she had possession of the two
strongholds, of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. But, on
the route to India, she had, at present, no half-way
house, the Cape being in the hands of the Dutch.
Neither East nor West, however, was her position
undisputed. The French held the valley of the St.
Lawrence, with Cape Breton Island at the mouth of
the river, and they claimed all the back-country of
North America behind the thirteen colonies, down to
Louisiana, which was also in their possession. They
had Guadeloupe, Martinique, and half Hayti in the
West Indies. Spain had the other half of Hayti, and
Cuba and several other islands, besides Florida, Mexico,
and the whole of South America, except Brazil. In the
East, France had Chandernagore, Pondicherry, and
Mahe in India, besides the Isle of Bourbon and the
Isle of France; these last two even more important
than possessions on the mainland, as providing fleet
bases in the Indian Ocean. France was decidedly more
favourably situated for acquiring the Empire of
India than Great Britain. The great Dupleix on the
mainland and La Bourdonnais in the islands were
building up French power. Happily for our future,
neither they nor their methods agreed. La Bourdon-
nais saw that, if the French were to hold India, it must
be by sea power. His ideas were the counterpart of
those held by Almeida, the Portuguese, and, it may be

PRIDE AND A FALL 167

added, by the British also, who were to succeed even-
tually where he failed. Dupleix followed the policy
of land dominion favoured by Albuquerque. Sea
power was destined to thwart him in the end, and he
returned to France, to die impoverished and disgraced,
just as Clive was setting out upon his victorious career.
With three Powers competing for the dominion of
the West, and two for that of the East, there could be
no lasting peace, especially in face of the prevailing
ideas of the day on economics. Distant possessions
were regarded as monopolies of the Mother Country.
The attempt on the part of any other country to trade
with them was a violation of right. The sea routes
which linked the Mother Country to them must there-
fore be protected, both by armed vessels and ,by bases
where these could obtain shelter and refreshment.
Islands especially were sought for this purpose. In
the oversea possessions of the three nations there was
an almost incessant state of war, and this state of war
of necessity existed also on the routes leading thereto.
While, therefore, the object of all the countries in-
volved was the increase of commerce and the wealth
which commerce brings by developing the resources
of the new countries and turning them to their own
advantage; by increasing the number of ships and
seamen who were the wagoners of the ocean highway,
this spread of commerce and wealth brought not peace
to the earth but a sword. The tangible, intelligible
history of the world's expansion is the history of the
activities of its war navies. In a later chapter it will
be shown how, with the establishment of the undoubted
supremacy of Great Britain on the seas, the outlook
changed ; how the highway was made safe to all nations
alike, and how all, in the common interest, were invited

168 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

to have a share, in the good things offered by the earth
and the fulness thereof. Another chapter of history
is now being written. It is the chapter which tells of
the latest, and we hope the last, attempt to secure
monopoly of the earth's fulness by military power
and universal dominion. 'When the inevitable ' ' Finis ' '
is written to that chapter, mankind, in brotherhood,
may at last reap in the fruit of all the toils and perils
endured by seafaring men from the time of the Phoeni-
cians to the present.

A separate word must here be said about the posi-
tion of Great Britain in the Mediterranean at the period
of our history now reached. The struggle for a share
of the trade of the Spanish dominions in South America
and the Caribbean is easily intelligible, and so is the
ceaseless contest with the French on the mainland of
America and of India and the consequential activities
of the sea routes leading to either. But it is less evi-
dent why, before the Suez Canal was made, our states-
men, granting that they had a clear idea of the interests
of Great Britain as a maritime State, should have
shown such insistent concern to achieve and maintain
a predominant position in the Mediterranean. The
trade with the Levant, it is true, was large and valu-
able. But its protection was not the real reason why,
as in the instance recorded above, and more particu-
larly later in Nelson's time, we should have concerned
ourselves so deeply about the fate of Sicily, for instance.
Toulon could be watched from Gibraltar and Port
Mahon, both of which places were in our hands. Some
further reason is required to account for the deeply
rooted instinct which caused us to cling so tenaciously
to the Mediterranean position. The true answer
sounds almost paradoxical. It was in the Mediter-

PRIDE AND A FALL 169

ranean that we defended our age-long interest, the
freedom of the Low Countries. The vital spot of mid-
European strategy lies on the Middle Danube. It was
there that the contest between the House of Hapsburg
and the House of Bourbon must be fought out, and the
easiest route for the French thereto lay through Italy,
much of which at this time was a Bourbon possession.
But Italy is a peninsula, and the route could never be
safe for the French unless they possessed command of
the sea. It was, then, to prevent the French from
enjoying the command of the Mediterranean and thus
securing their communications with the Middle Danube,
that, almost at any cost, we held on to a position so
remote from our home bases. Here our objects were,
in the main, political. Here we used sea power to
thwart plans of universal domination. There have
been many suggestions since that time that we should
abandon the Mediterranean. With some naval writers,
the idea has been almost an obsession. But a sounder
instinct has always prevailed against their logic. In
later days, since we became the masters of India and
the importance of Egypt has been grasped, the reasons
for holding on in the inland sea have, of course, become
more obvious. The more credit to the statesmen of
a former date that they should have obeyed the instinct
at a time when it was little more than prophetic. Nor
must the fact be overlooked that the instinct of those
who have sought to grasp world dominion has always
led them to turn their eyes to the East. Egypt was
the prize of Cambyses, of Alexander, of Antony, and
Octavianus. Liebnitz urged Louis XIV. to seize it
with a view to becoming the master of India; Napo-
leon's grandiose schemes all turned on eastern empire,
and the pan-Germanic megalomania has led William

i;o SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

II. in the same direction. It has been a true instinct,
therefore, which has led the nation which depends on
sea power and which, by and for the sake of sea power,
has stubbornly resisted all attempts at world-dominion,
to keep firmly in its hands the control of the pivotal
region from which radiate the routes by which the
would-be conqueror must go.

To return to the narrative of events. A policy of
pin-pricks, pursued both by England and by Spain,
led to open war in 1739. The English had acquired
the right to send a ship a year to trade in Spanish-
America. They took full advantage of this privilege,
loading the ship with Spanish produce on one side and
unloading it into other ships on the other. This
peculiar method had the connivance of the Spanish
colonists themselves, as had the bold system of smug-
gling which was carried on. Only in this way could
they acquire the wealth denied to them by the narrow
and selfish policy of the Home Government. Spain,
too weak to make a national question of the mat-
ter, attempted to deal with these irregularities locally,
resorting to the capture of English ships by her garda-
costas, and, it is said, inflicting torture and mutilation
on her captured English crews. One Jenkins, a mer-
chant skipper, returned to England with a complaint
that his ear had been cut off, and that he was told to
take it to England and to tell his royal master that he
would be treated the same way if he dared to voyage to
the Spanish Main. An impudent, but perfectly safe
threat. One can as well imagine George I. in Elijah's
chariot as on the Spanish Main. Jenkins attended at
the bar of the House of Commons and showed the
members what was alleged to be his ear. It was said
afterwards that the ear was made of india-rubber.

PRIDE AND A FALL 171

Asked what he did in the unpleasant circumstances
which had overtaken him, he replied: "I commended
my soul to God and my cause to my country." The
words bear the stamp of an origin nearer Westminster
than the Spanish Main; but they set England on
fire. Walpole was unable to stand against the storm.
Knowing that France would join Spain, covertly, if
not openly, and that the Navy was in no condition
for war, he entertained the gloomiest forebodings.
When peals of joy rang out from the steeples of London,
he remarked: "They are ringing the bells now. Soon
they will be wringing their hands." Thus began the
War of Jenkins's Ear, soon to be merged into the
greater struggle of the Austrian Succession.

In its earlier stages, the war was carried on in waters
remote from Europe, in the Elizabethan spirit, but
without the success which attended the Elizabethans.
The Navy was ill-found and worse manned. The men
died like flies in the West Indies. The islands, now a
health resort, were then a veritable pest-house. At
one period, it is on record that a hundred thousand
British soldiers and sailors died of disease in a single
year. Combined naval and military operations which
were undertaken against the Spanish possessions met
with a failure which brought about the fall of Walpole,
who resigned office in 1742 and died three years later.
That the peace-loving minister had neglected the Navy,
there is no doubt. But the total number of British
ships available was respectable, and superior to that
of France and Spain combined. The lack of men was
very largely due to the fact that the majority of the
prime seamen, of whom Great Britain now possessed
large numbers, were absent on distant voyages. In
this respect, the very increase of trade which the

172 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Navy existed to protect militated against the power
of the Navy to carry out its primary duty. Another
remarkable feature of the war was the position of the
French, who remained at peace with Britain, but, under
treaty, supplied the Spaniards with a contingent of
ships. It was argued that the provision of this pledged
help did not involve a state of war, and did not even
justify the British in capturing French ships. French
writers complain bitterly about such captures.

Vernon — old Grogram, from whose nickname the
word "grog" is said to be derived — captured Porto
Bello by a daring assault; but he failed in conjoint
expeditions against Cartagena and Santiago de Cuba,
mainly owing to disagreements with the military
commander. The one notable feat of the war was the
voyage of Anson round the world in 1740, in the course
of which he captured the Acapulco galleon off Manila,
and returned with a million and a quarter of treasure.
The exploit, in very many respects, recalls that of
Drake. Like Drake, Anson lost all his ships but one,
the Centurion, his flagship. Unlike Drake, however,
who had picked a crew of gentlemen adventurers with
him, Anson's men were the sweepings of the gaols and
the hospitals, old, bad, and decrepit. His voyage was
thus a great feat, showing that the spirit of seaman-
ship was alive in the British Navy, despite the evil
influences of Court favouritism and corruption. It
awoke all the old terror of the English name in the
American and Eastern possessions of Spain.

In the year that Anson started on his voyage, the
Emperor Charles VI. died, and the War of the Austrian
Succession began, France supporting the claim of
the Elector of Bavaria against Maria Theresa, and
Frederick the Great fighting against the latter for his

PRIDE AND A FALL 173

own hand. The English supported the Empress with
contingents of troops, in order to secure the Low Coun-
tries, but issued no declaration of war against France.
The complicated welter of alliances and enmities is,
however, no part of our subject. It is enough to record
that the Spaniards made an attempt to support France
against the Empress in Italy, and that, the considera-
tion before referred to operating, the British Navy
was employed in the Mediterranean to thwart them,
and employed with success. The result was curious.
The Spanish fleet, inferior to the British, was shut up
for months in Toulon, still a neutral port, and was
then escorted thence by a French squadron under
Admiral de Court, which had orders not to fight un-
less it was attacked. In February, 1744, an indecisive
engagement was fought outside Toulon, France and
Britain being still nominally at peace, though the
French had signed a treaty binding themselves to
declare war a few months previously.

The action did not redound to the credit of any of
those engaged, with the solitary exception of Captain
Edward Hawke, destined to become famous as the
victor of Quiberon Bay. Matthews, the British
admiral, with twenty-nine ships-of-the-line, attacked
the French and Spanish fleet of twenty-seven. The
misconduct of his second in command and of most of
his captains robbed Matthews of victory. He was
tried and condemned by court-martial, on the curious
ground that he had broken his own line of battle, the
truth being that his captains had refused to follow his
course. The second in command, who was Matthews's
personal enemy, was also tried but acquitted, on the
grounds that Matthews's signals were contradictory.
Seeing that he had failed to come into action at all,

174 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

it is plain that there was yet a long way to travel
before we reach the spirit of Nelson's fighting instruc-
tions: "No captain can do very wrong who lays his
ships alongside an enemy."

This reprehensible failure was partly redeemed,
after the declaration of war by France, by two actions
fought by Anson and Hawke respectively in the
Atlantic. The latter officer won a decided victory,
taking six ships out of a squadron of nine commanded
by Admiral L'Entenduere, who sacrificed himself
in order to protect his convoy of two hundred and
fifty ships, with which he was bound for the West
Indies. Hawke was himself too much shattered to
attempt to capture the convoy, but he sent a fast sailing
sloop to give warning of its approach to the admiral
on the West Indies station, with the consequence that
it was dispersed and the greater number of the ships
taken. Thus the communications of the enemy, were
disturbed by sea, and the superiority of the British
sea power asserted. To present the other side of the
picture, the British Channel Guard foiled an attempt
by Marshal Saxe to invade the country from Dunkirk,
and, although the Young Pretender landed in Scotland
in 1745, he could bring but few men with him, and
owed such success as his adventure won to the sympathy
with his cause which was widespread in the northern
kingdom. Had he been accompanied by ten, or even
five thousand French veterans, the story might have
been differently written. If the War of the Austrian
Succession was not very glorious to Great Britain, her
sea power at any rate achieved the main object of its
existence. It maintained the use of the sea routes to
herself and denied it to her enemies. The war navies
of France and Spain were swept from the ocean, and

PRIDE AND A PALL 175

their sea-borne trade was shattered. It was, however,
due to the weakness of her enemies rather than to her
own strength that Great Britain came through un-
scathed. The Navy did not rise to the height of the
expectations formed of it. Jealousies between it and
the Army fettered its action. There was, however, a
very significant outcome of sea power which holds a
lesson for us to-day, and must now be mentioned.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which closed this war,
settled none of the questions for which it had been
fought. Especially, the western boundaries of the
French and English in North America were still left
indeterminate. The American Colonists, however,
had taken Louisburg in the mouth of the St. Lawrence,
and thus had got a sure lever for future pressure upon
the French in Canada. But the English had lost
Madras, and, in the Treaty, the American gain was
bartered for the return of the English loss. Little as
the Colonists liked the loss of their capture, they knew
that they could always retake it, so long as Britain
held command of the sea. On the other hand, the
shock to the prestige of Dupleix in India when the
natives saw his resounding victory rendered fruitless
was something from which it could not recover. Such
was the result of sea power acting on opposite sides of
the world, but still all one. Naturally, however, there
was discontent among the Colonists, and this is the
first instance of a difficulty which may be expected to
recur when those who share the fighting have no voice
in the policy which makes war or concludes peace.
It is a question of urgent and growing importance to
the Ocean Empire.

Besides the question of the North American boundary,
that of the right of search in South American waters,

176 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the very starting point of the war with Spain, was also
left unsettled. It is not, therefore, surprising to learn
that, while Europe was nominally at peace, an irregu-
lar war continued between France and Britain in more
remote parts of the world, or that Spain was ready to
join, as far as her weakness would permit. Despite
the recall of Dupleix, the struggle for primacy in India
continued by means of alliances with native princes
who were continually at war with one another in the
tottering Empire of the Great Mogul. The way of
the sea being barred to French reinforcements, it was
a matter of course that British power should wax and
theirs wane, though it was long yet before the struggle
was entirely abandoned. In the West, Boscawen
actually stopped a squadron, in May, 1755, which was
carrying reinforcements to the garrison of Canada,
and, in the same year, Sir Edward Hawke was sent
to cruise between Ushant and Finisterre, with orders
to seize any French ships, line-of -battleships, or other,
that he might come across. The French made osten-
tatious preparations for the invasion of this country;
but were all the while preparing a coup in the Mediter-
ranean. A force under the Due de Richelieu, supported
by a fleet under La Gallissoniere, suddenly made a
descent on Minorca, and laid siege to Port Mahon.

This led to the fatal engagement for which Admiral
John Byng was tried and shot. He had been hurried
from Portsmouth on the first news of the French move
with ten sail-of-the-line, and picked up another three
on the way. With this force he was about equal to
La Gallissoniere. The French were not seeking a deci-
sive engagement, and tried to avoid close action, while
damaging the British ships aloft as much as possible.
Byng could not get his whole force into action. It

PRIDE AND A FALL 177

seems that the unfortunate man was oppressed by the
sentence on Matthews for his action in the battle off
Toulon, mentioned above. It will be remembered
that he was condemned for breaking his own line of
battle. The rearmost ships of Byng's fleet being late
in coming into action, and two vessels, Louisa and
Trident, owing to damage to their spars being behind
him instead of ahead, he would not bear down alone
and delay the French ships in order to bring them
into action. "You see, Captain Gardiner," he said
to his flag captain, "that the signal for the line is out,
and that I am ahead of the ships Louisa and Trident.
You would not have me, as Admiral of the Fleet, run
down as if I were about to engage a single ship. It was
Mr. Matthews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not
carrying down his line together, which I shall endeavour
to avoid." He avoided Mr. Matthews's "error" at
the cost of his life. A Council of War decided not to
fight again, but to return to Gibraltar. Port Mahon
fell, and Byng was recalled to England, to be tried for
his life. He was acquitted of cowardice and active
misconduct, but was found guilty of not doing all he
might have done to secure success. The only penalty
decreed by the Articles of War for his offence was
death, and, accordingly, death was the sentence. A
particularly unscrupulous political intrigue was set on
foot to prevent the King from exercising his prerogative
of mercy, and Byng was shot, less "to encourage the
rest," as Voltaire remarked, than to gratify the spite
of his political enemies. Nevertheless the effect of
the execution was to give the officers of the Navy a
better perspective of their duty, and, if hard measure
was meted out to the man himself, it must be owned
that, after the discreditable affair of Matthews, stern

178 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

action was required to restore the spirit of the Navy.
War was declared by France three days after the action
off Minorca.

After this inauspicious beginning, the rest of the
war was almost wholly glorious to our arms. The year
1757 saw the victory of Plassey, and the foundation
of the British Empire in India. The ' ' wonderful year, ' '
1759, saw the taking of Quebec, the battle of Minden,
Boscawen's victory over De La Clue in Lagos Bay,
and, finally, Hawke's great triumph at Quiberon.
Clive's work in India was helped by the tenacity with
which Admiral Pocock clung to the French squadron
under Commodore d'Ache. Three desperate, though
indecisive, battles were fought, and then the general
superiority of British sea power told its tale. Despite
the possession of the Isles of France and Bourbon,
d'Ache could get no proper support or supplies for his
ships, and, eventually, naval aid was withdrawn from
the French, and the British were left to consolidate
their position unmolested, save by such forces as the
French had already in the Peninsula. Wolfe owed
his success at Quebec largely to the fleet which accom-
panied him up the St. Lawrence, and enabled him to
surprise the enemy at the Heights of Abraham, besides
preventing reinforcements from reaching Montcalm.
The land advance by way of Lake Champlain failed;
that up the St. Lawrence, assisted by the Navy, suc-
ceeded. The capture of Canada is, perhaps, the best
monument to the success of the peculiarly British
strategy of the conjoint use of naval and military forces.
On the Continent of Europe, where the French had
been led into war with Prussia in an unwonted alliance
with Austria, owing to the resentment of Madame de
Pompadour at the sneers of Frederick, the arms of

PRIDE AND A FALL 179

that monarch were sustained in his desperate struggle
against French, Austrians, and Russians by the sub-
sidies which flowed from the overwhelming sea-borne
wealth of Britain. Moreover, the strength of France
was eventually diverted from the mid-European
struggle to an attempt to invade this country through
desperation at the ruin which was coming upon her.
The two conflicts were rather parallel than identical.
The British share in the land conflict was, once more,
dictated by anxiety for the Low Countries. Louis
XV., like his grandfather, was in a cleft stick. He had
to make up his mind whether he would be a "wet-bob "
or a "dry-bob." He elected to be the, latter, and then
changed his mind, under pressure of circumstances,
too late. A great armament was assembled at the
mouth of the Loire, while fleets were collected at Brest
and Toulon, which were intended to make junction
and convoy the armies across — fifty thousand men for
England, twelve thousand for Scotland. It was an
earlier example of Napoleon's plan of 1803, and a late
copy of Santa Cruz's scheme for the Armada.

The British seamen met the threat in the same
manner as it was met at the later date. Hawke
watched the squadron in Brest, Boscawen that at
Toulon. It was not a "blockade," though it is often
so described. The object was, not to shut the French
in, but to bring them to action, if, or when, they should
come out. It was a defensive measure which had
offence for its ultimate object. And it was combined
with direct action which was purely offensive, having
for its object to force the hands of the French by con-
tinual irritation and to compel them to withdraw or
withhold forces from the campaign against Frederick.
The British waged a relentless war against French

l8o SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

trade, made descents with conjoint naval and military
forces on various points of the French coast, and, one
by one, wrenched the colonies of France from her.
The Toulon squadron attempted to get to sea while
Boscawen was at Gibraltar carrying out repairs. It
was driven into Lagos Bay and scattered or destroyed.
Five ships alone managed to escape into Cadiz. The
Brest fleet was ordered to put to sea and fight a fleet
action with Hawke, in order to clear the way for the
transports. Hawke was driven off his station into
Torbay by a heavy westerly gale, which kept the French
in port but enabled them to receive as reinforcement
a small squadron which was returning from the West
Indies. When the wind shifted to easterly, M. de
Conflans, who commanded the French, put to sea and
cruised to the southward. Hawke, released from Torbay,
crowded all sail, and came up with him on November
2Oth. A gale was again blowing from west-north-west,
and Conflans, who was in slightly inferior force, made
for Quiberon Bay, thinking that Hawke would not
dare to follow him on that iron-bound lee shore. He
mistook the mettle of the man. Hawke was a con-
summate seaman, and he knew the coast. He ordered
a general chase. The flying spray was seen dashing
over the rocks, which showed black in the winter
twilight through it. Hawke's master remonstrated
with him on the rashness of the attempt to follow the
French in. "You have done your duty in pointing
out the danger," replied Hawke. "Now lay me along-
side the enemy's flagship!" That could not be, for
M. de Conflans led the flight. Hawke's van dashed in,
hot on the track of the French rear. The thunder of
guns mingled with the roar of the surf, and the flashes
lit up the darkness which had by now fallen. The

pq

PRIDE AND A PALL 181

foam-covered rocks alone buoyed the fairway. A
French 74, pressed by superior force, opened her lower-
deck ports in order that she might reply more effec-
tively to the hostile fire. The sea poured in, and she
foundered. Two more struck their colours; several
were wrecked. Fifteen made for the mouth of the
Vilaine, got in over the bar, and were left there helpless
for fifteen months. The flagship Le Roi Soleil found
herself when morning broke in the middle of the
British fleet. She was run ashore, where Hawke
destroyed her. Five ships only succeeded in making
their way to Rochefort. The Navy of Louis XV.
was out of action for the remainder of the war.

Such was this great victory, for boldness and skill
perhaps greater even than Trafalgar, and matched only
by the Nile. Henceforth Britain wrought her will on
every sea. The threat of invasion was at an end.
Spain joined in the war shortly afterwards, only to
be rewarded by the loss of Havana, which was cap-
tured by Pocock, and of the Philippine Islands. Im-
mense sums in specie were also taken, and Spain soon
sued for a humiliating peace. The war was ended by
the Treaty of Fontainebleau, signed on February 3,
1763. By it, France ceded all claim to Nova Scotia
and Canada, the Valley of the Ohio, and all her terri-
tory on the eastern side of the Mississippi, except the
town of New Orleans. Spain surrendered Florida
in exchange for the return of Havana. She was
leniently dealt with otherwise, for she recovered the
Philippines. In the West Indies, the islands of Guade-
loupe and Martinique were returned to France, and
her claim to Santa Lucia was allowed, while Britain
kept St. Vincent, Tobago, Dominica, and Grenada in
the Lesser Antilles. The former possessions of the

182 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

French in India were restored to them; but the right
to fortify or keep troops in Bengal was surrendered.
Britain recovered Minorca.

The losses of British trade during the Seven Years'
War were great. The French took to privateering after
1759, and, in one year, captured fourteen hundred
merchantmen out of a total of about eight thousand.
The national debt had risen to the sum of £122,000,000
— an immense burden for that day, though one at
which we may well look with envy now. But the new
resources which India and the Colonies yielded amply
compensated, and the debt was really a source of
wealth rather than of embarrassment. It meant a
distribution of comfort among the middle-classes, and
a consequent plenitude of employment for those de-
pendent upon them. The military navy of France
lost nearly half its strength in the war, while that of
Britain was strengthened by the capture of fine ships
of a better model than she herself, at this time, con-
structed. Moreover, the superiority of the British
officers and seamen was enhanced by the policy of
watching the enemy's ports. Facing all weathers, they
became in an increasing degree hardy and resource-
ful, while the French, condemned to sojourn in port,
rapidly deteriorated in efficiency, though not in courage.
At no time in the world's history was the maritime
superiority of any Power so firmly established as was
that of Britain at the close of the Seven Years' War.
And, at the same time, the Continent was exhausted
by the terrific struggle to subdue Frederick the Great,
and fell into torpor, until the thunder-clap of the French
Revolution aroused it. On this fact the foundation
of our industrial prosperity was also laid.

It must be remembered that sea-borne trade at this

PRIDE AND A FALL 183

time did not involve the free coming and going of
merchant ships into foreign ports freely open to them,
as we understand it nowadays, when the right is subject
only to the payment of dues required by municipal
law. The mercantile system prevailed almost univer-
sally, and the privilege of entering foreign ports was
only conceded as the outcome of negotiations between
governments. Colonial trade, in particular, was very
closely preserved to the Mother Country. The pro-
ducts of the French Colonies might be conveyed only
to France, and only in French ships. The French,
however, being unable to carry on this trade themselves
during the Seven Years' War, owing to the pressure
of the British Navy, opened it to the Dutch. Great
Britain replied with "The Rule of 1756," which is the
basis of all our Orders in Council and Prize Court
regulations.

The British Government gave orders that all neutral
ships laden with cargoes from the Colonies of the enemy
should be captured and brought before the Prize Courts.
. . . This was done on the principle that during war the
commercial dealings of neutrals ought to be kept within
their accustomed limits, and that they have no right to
enjoy a trade which is closed to them in time of peace,
and thus help one belligerent by incorporating their mer-
chantmen with his, thus identifying themselves with his
interests (G. W. T. Omond, The Law of the Sea, A. C.
Black, Ltd., pp. 7, 8).

In essence, this meant that French colonial trade
went to enrich Britain, even if the Colonies did not
themselves fall to her. The grinding power of supre-
macy at sea is thus shown, and one of the reasons also
why trade flourished in war-time in the case of a mari-

184 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

time Power like Great Britain, which, with the mastery
of the sea, held control of the sea routes. She was,
moreover, in a position to exact conditions favourable
to her trade from neutrals. The Treaty with Portugal,
negotiated by Paul Methuen in 1703, which reduced
the duties on Portuguese wines to two-thirds in ex-
change for the free importation of English woollen
manufactures, and is thus, perhaps, responsible for
half the gout in the country, is a case in point. It
gave Great Britain a practical monopoly of the trade
in Portugal, and sent the gold of Brazil to London by
way of Lisbon. Politically, it made Portugal depen-
dent for her defence on England, and made the defence
of Portugal one of the first of British interests. Trade
acquired as the result of general maritime superiority
soon outbalanced all the damage done by enemy
cruisers and privateers.

Two years after the signature of the Treaty of Fon-
tainebleau, the North American Colonists began their
struggle for independence by resistance to the Stamp
Act. It is easy to be wise after the event, and to
condemn, as the Whigs by whom history was com-
monly written up to the time of Macaulay, have unan-
imously condemned, the King and his successive
ministers for crass folly. Experiment had not yet
shown, as it has, happily, since, that a commonwealth
of nations, each enjoying the most complete rights of
self-government, could yet remain a united if loosely
compacted empire. No better system of administer-
ing the government of Colonies had as yet been devised
than that which Britain pursued up to 1765. The
Colonists themselves made no move for greater liberty
until the threat involved in the French possession of
Canada and Louisiana and their claim to the country

PRIDE AND A FALL 185

west of the Alleghanies had been removed in the Seven
Years' War. Still, sapiens qui prospicit! There was
a lesson which had to be learned, and our statesmen
learned it too late. The European enemies of Great
Britain were not slow to seize the opportunity to rub
it in.

The fourteen years which elapsed between the Treaty
of Fontainebleau and the adhesion of France to the
cause of the revolted Colonists were spent by the French
in a resolute attempt to build up their navy and to
strengthen the family compact which united the Royal
Houses of France and Spain. The efforts of Choiseul,
the French Minister, were heartily backed by the
people, who furnished the King with ships by voluntary
subscription. A thorough scheme of training for
French naval officers was instituted, and the science
of naval warfare was diligently studied. Nor was the
British Navy allowed to decay at this time, as it had
so often been before in time of peace. A regular
standard of naval strength was maintained: namely,
equality to the combined navies of the House of
Bourbon. That standard prevailed, at least nominally,
at the outbreak of the war. Nevertheless, Great
Britain entered upon the struggle under circumstances
very unfavourable to her. The merchant shipping of
the North American Colonies amounted to very nearly
half her own, and the reservoir of trained seamen
which she had thus possessed was now cut off from her.
In addition, she was committed to a war far from her
own shores, while her principal enemies at sea were
close to them, and, in the distant sphere, had, more-
over, a great part of the resources of the Colonies to
rely on. The prosecution of the land war against
the revolted Colonists demanded the presence of great

186 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

fleets upon their coasts to secure the communications
of her armies. For the first time in her history she
fought at a serious disadvantage in geographical posi-
tion. As a further embarrassment, the Dutch, dis-
loyal to their ancient treaties, resisted the application
of the rule of 1756 to the point of declaring war. Ant-
werp and the Scheldt were at the disposal of the enemy.
And Russia, Sweden, and Denmark joined in the armed
neutrality, which aimed at asserting the right of neutrals
to trade with belligerents in all articles save contraband
of war, and denied the right of blockade. Since naval
stores then chiefly came from the Baltic, and these
were denied to Great Britain, the armed neutrality
scarcely differed from actual war.

Twice over great French and Spanish fleets were
in the Channel, while a large army of invasion lay on
the" opposite shore. Three times Gibraltar was on the
point of starvation when it was relieved, first by
Darby, secondly by Rodney, and lastly by Howe.
Two British armies were compelled to lay down their
arms in America, chiefly owing to the local and tem-
porary superiority of the enemy at sea. Yet, with it
all, when peace came in 1783, the sea power of Britain
was substantially unshaken. The American Colonies
were gone, and a couple of West Indian islands, and
Minorca. But all except the first could be recovered,
provided that the real command of the sea were main-
tained, and that was still not in doubt. The sea-sense
of the race was never better exemplified than in this
struggle, which ought to have seen the end of Britain's
greatness. The Royal Navy of France was never so
formidable. But it completely failed against the
inherited instinct which led men like Hood, Kempen-
feldt, and Rodney to do the right thing, even when in

PRIDE AND A FALL 187

inferior force. Even in the East Indies, where Hughes,
as a commander, was plainly overmatched by the
real genius of the Bailli de Suffren, the latter never
beat him decisively, and Britain retained her position,
despite the struggle which she was forced to carry on
at the same time against the formidable power of
Mysore, under Hyder Ali. The French Navy, as a
military implement, was in a high state of perfection,
and, if the principles of sea-fighting were the same as
those of land warfare, might have overmatched its
opponent. But it lacked the true instinct for the sea;
it was not backed by a strong maritime system, or a
people whose destiny really lay upon the water. It
failed to seize its opportunities, and, therefore, it failed
to inflict any permanent injury on its great rival. This
was seen plainly enough when the issue was next fought
out, for, by then, the Revolution had shattered the old
Royal Navy of France, and revolutionary ardour could
not replace discipline at sea as it did on shore.

The operations in the West Indies, which form the
main naval interest in the War of American Indepen-
dence, are anything but easy to follow. Hood and
Byron, d'Estaing and de Grasse checked and counter-
checked each other by strategic moves which rarely
resulted in actual, and never in decisive, action. It is
unnecessary to follow these in detail. So long as the
land war on the American continent continued, British
naval operations were hampered by the necessity of sup-
porting the land forces and maintaining the communi-
cations of the different detachments with one another.
But after the surrender of Cornwallis in Yorktown,
the cause of the United States was won, and the struggle
was between Great Britain on the one hand and the
allied Bourbon Powers on the other. The capture of

188 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

"sugar islands"; the re-establishment of France and
Spain in their predominating position in the West
Indies became the objective. De Grasse left the
Chesapeake to capture St. Kitts, followed by Hood with
inferior force. Rodney was expected from England
with reinforcements, and de Guichen from France.
Rodney duly arrived; but de Guichen was brought
to action by Kempenfeldt off Brest, and his fleet and
convoy were beaten and .dispersed. This was the
turning point. Hood foiled de Grasse by a brilliant
stroke of strategy, and, although he could not prevent
the capture of St. Kitts, he joined Rodney with his
fleet intact, and the combined force became superior
to that under de Grasse. Nevertheless, the latter
proceeded with his preparations for the reduction of
Jamaica, collecting a great convoy with twenty thou-
sand troops. The expected Spanish reinforcements,
however, did not arrive, and, on April 12, 1782, de
Grasse was brought to action off The Saints by Rodney,
and defeated, with the loss of five ships captured,
including his own flagship, the Ville de Paris, the gift
of the people of the French capital. Peace was signed
in the following January, and it left Great Britain still
supreme at sea. She lost a couple of West Indian
islands and Minorca. Spain regained Florida; but
this was of more consequence to the United States
than to Britain. Gibraltar was saved, and, in the East
Indies, her position was untouched.

The British Government of the day is censured by
Mahan for not concentrating its force on the decisive
point, namely, off the enemy's ports. The criticism
is, in the abstract, justified. But it omits to take
account of the fact that, before the intervention of
France and Spain — an intervention, however, which

PRIDE AND A FALL 189

was admittedly likely — Great Britain was committed
to a struggle with the Colonists which demanded the
support of a large fleet on the scene of action. Naval
co-operation on the further side of the Atlantic was
essential, and, indeed, the Colonies were mainly lost,
because, in one or two instances, it failed to be effective.
The division of the total naval strength of Britain was,
therefore, inevitable. Subject to this limitation, the
expedient of watching the enemy's ports was resorted
to as far as possible, and, indeed, with such success
that one-half of the French expedition detailed for the
assistance of the Americans was locked up in Brest till
the end of the war. This division of force compelled
the abandonment of the Mediterranean. Port Mahon,
left to itself, necessarily fell. But its voluntary
abandonment would have relieved the British of little
of their embarrassment. The obligation to relieve
Gibraltar would have remained. The additional troops
would have been useless for the defence, and would
only have meant so many more mouths to feed. Again,
it was imperative to maintain local naval forces in
the East Indies. It is fairer to say that Great Britain,
thrown by faulty policy into a false strategical position,
held on tenaciously to all essential points, and that
her unshaken grip upon the sea routes brought her
safely through, despite the numerical inferiority to
which she was reduced in almost every theatre of war.
The disadvantage of the strategical defensive forced
upon us was corrected by a tactical offensive whenever
possible. Keppel attacked the French fleet off Ushant
at the very beginning of the war. The action failed
of decisive result, owing to the misconduct of his cap-
tains, or some of them. Rodney twice attacked the
Spaniards, in one instance under conditions which

SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

recall Quiberon Bay, and, on both occasions, inflicted
a heavy defeat upon them. The victory of Kempen-
feldt, one of our very great seamen, whose premature
fate in the Royal George is better known than his meri-
torious services at sea, over de Guichen off Brest has
already been mentioned. Only two ships-of-the-line
out of seventeen and five merchantmen out of a hun-
dred and fifty reached the West Indies. The distant
issue was decided in European waters — a telling instance
of the working of sea power.

Great Britain emerged from a contest in which the
whole world was engaged, actively or passively, against
her, chastened but not killed. Everything which she
had lost, save only the North American Colonies, was
recoverable, as the not distant future was to show.
The war of 1778-83 was, of course, one of the most
momentous for the future of mankind that has ever
been fought. The thirteen colonies, now become
independent were freed from the restrictions of the
Colonial system. The enormous expansion which the
next hundred years were to witness in the United States
had a most powerful influence on the freedom of trade
and freedom of the seas which it was the work of Brit-
ain chiefly to foster after 1815. Nor is that all. By
the independence of the United States, the hegemony
of the New World passed to a nation speaking the
English tongue and imbued with the ideals of Anglo-
Saxon culture, freedom, and law. The pride of Great
Britain was rudely humbled; but the lesson taught her
by the successful revolt of her Colonists bore fruit.
And its fruit is nothing less than the Ocean Empire of
which she is now the head — not the mistress, but
prima inter pares.

CHAPTER IX

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE

IN supporting the revolted Colonists, the House of
Bourbon fought for their own hand, and sealed their
own doom. The young and brilliant Lafayette, who,
at the age of twenty, placed his sword at the service of
the Americans, lived to propose to the National As-
sembly a Declaration of the Rights of Man founded
upon the Declaration of Independence, and to com-
mand the National Guard in the Revolution of 1830.
Great Britain was a reluctant opponent of the Revolu-
tion, with the principles, but not the excesses, of which
a large number of British people were in sympathy.
But when the revolutionists offered assistance to any
nation desirous of freeing itself from monarchial rule,
and proceeded to fit the Cap of Liberty on to the re-
luctant heads of the Dutch, then the old concern for
the Low Countries and the mouths of the Scheldt
was reawakened. The murder of Louis XVI. and Marie
Antoinette perhaps shocked the Court more than the
people, though the godlessness and blasphemy of the
Jacobins roused a sense of horror in the masses. The
British people had liberty, but liberty of their own
brand. They were not prepared to exchange it for
that of revolutionary France. So Britain, the first
Sea Power and the representative of constitutional

191

192 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

freedom, made common cause with Hapsburgs and
Hohenzollerns. War was declared in 1793; the sword
of Britain was not sheathed again, save for two short
intervals, till Waterloo delivered "the Spoiler" into
her hands in 1815.

The war divides itself naturally into three parts.
The first, which may be called the Revolutionary period,
is that in which Napoleon established and consolidated
his power in France and on the Continent. This
lasted from 1793 to the Peace of Amiens in 1801.
The second period is that of the duel between France
and Great Britain, from 1803 to the victory of Trafal-
gar, on October 21, 1805. The third, from Trafalgar
to Waterloo, is the period which covers the military
effort of Great Britain in the Peninsula and Flanders,
and the economic struggle consequent on the establish-
ment of Napoleon's "Continental System." A direct
consequence of this was the War of 1812 with the
United States. Many volumes have been written
concerning this titanic period in the world's history,
and to follow its infinite ramifications in a chapter
would be an impossible task. No more can be at-
tempted than to indicate the working of sea power and
to show its decisive influence on the great conflict,
exercised often most strongly when defeat seemed
most certain. Napoleon, the soldier, had command
of the whole resources of France. It has been said of
him, with truth, that he lacked "le sentiment exact des
difficult es de la marine.'" This was shown most clearly
in the period between 1803 and 1805, after which he
abandoned his hopes of maritime supremacy, and
devoted himself to the effort to "make the land con-
quer the sea." In that he failed utterly, as every other
conqueror has failed; and he not only failed but he

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 193

was drawn into false strategical moves by land which
eventually sapped the strength of France and caused
his own downfall. Two names stand out predominantly
during this period: those of Nelson and Napoleon.
The record of the sailor is emblazoned with three great
fights, in the third of which he fell: the Nile, Copen-
hagen, and Trafalgar. On the colours of the soldier
shine the names of Rivoli, Lodi, Arcola, Marengo,
Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Ulm, Wagram, to name
only the most famous of his triumphs. But each of
Nelson's battles was a deadly thrust, involving the
failure of one of Napoleon's grandiose plans. The
soldier's triumphs, despite the military glory ensuing,
were but ropes of sand.

In the first period of the war, the tasks which the
Navy of Great Britain had to perform were, briefly,
as follows: To protect the country from invasion,
always, and necessarily, the first preoccupation. This
involved, not only the time-honoured watch on the
French ports, especially Brest and Toulon, but also
the no less customary measures to render a threat from
the Low Countries harmless. We had the Dutch as
allies at the beginning of the war. But the French
overran the Austrian Netherlands, defeated a British
army which was laying siege to Dunkirk, and overthrew
the House of Orange, which was favourable to Britain.
Thus the Dutch were thrown into the arms of the Revo-
lution, and, without much stomach for it, joined the
ranks of our enemies. The Dutch fleet was immedi-
ately blockaded in the Texel by Admiral Duncan, who
brought it to action and completely defeated it, with
the loss of nine ships-of-the-line out of sixteen, on
October II, 1797. An invading force intended for
Ireland lay behind the shelter of the Dutch warships.
13

194 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

But, after the disaster of Camperdown, the project was
abandoned. Hoche's unsuccessful attempt had occurred
the year before, and Humbert's followed the year after.
The latter succeeded in landing a small body of troops,
which was quickly forced to surrender. An attempt
to send reinforcements to Humbert failed ignomini-
ously, the flagship, Hoche, and three frigates being
taken, and Wolfe Tone, the leader of the disaffected
Irish, taken with them. The direct threat to the se-
curity of the British islands was thus, for the time be-
ing, brought to an end before the close of the century.
The French continued to control the Dutch ports
throughout the war. But Dutch sea power rose no
more after Camperdown. The oversea possessions of
Holland fell one by one into the hands of the British,
though most of them were restored at the end of the
war, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Demerara
being the most important of those retained.

In the conditions under which the war opened,
assistance to the elements in France which resisted or
revolted against the Revolution was obviously indicated
as the second duty of the possessors of sea power. Such
attempts were duly made, in La Vendel, in Provence,
and in the West Indies, where Hayti, in particular,
under the leadership of the negro, Toussaint L'Ouver-
ture, was in revolt. Little came of these endeavours,
however, and the only one possessing any interest is
the occupation of Toulon, where the Mediterranean
fleet, under Lord Hood, supported the inhabitants who
had raised the White Flag of the Bourbons. The shore
works were seized and manned ; but the counter-revolu-
tion failed at Marseilles and Lyons, and Toulon was
besieged by the Revolutionary forces, whose artillery
was directed by Napoleon Bonaparte, then a captain.

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SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 195

The works proved untenable, and Hood retired, burn-
ing some and taking others of the French warships in
the port. Thus early the future Emperor came into
contact with sea power, and his first encounter ended
favourably for him.

If, however, he imbibed any hopes from this inci-
dent in his later reflections, knowledge of the fate of
France at this time should have checked them. The
"stranglehold" of the British Navy, combined with
the effects of internal disorder, was already telling.
The wheat cargoes from Sicily and the Barbary States
were cut off. The French were already in need of
bread. It was to secure the safe arrival of a great con-
voy from America that the Admiral commanding at
Brest, Villaret-Joyeuse, was ordered to sea, and thus
the first great naval engagement of the war was brought
on, namely, the battle which is known as The Glorious
First of June. The fleets were in contact four days
before the issue was finally joined, and each suffered
some losses in the earlier encounters. Those of the
French were made good by the joining of a detached
squadron under Nielly. On the morning of the First,
Howe, the British commander, had twenty-five of the
line against twenty-six French. Four prizes were
taken and several more ships were disabled. But
Howe's fleet was too severely damaged to renew the
action, and Villaret-Joyeuse drew off the rest of his
fleet to Brest, where he met the convoy which his action
had saved. But the battle proved the superiority of
the British at sea. The escape of the convoy was, more
or less, a fluke, and the grip of superior sea power was
confirmed, not weakened, by the event. Our own com-
munications, both with the Mediterranean and America,
were better assured after the defeat of Villaret-Joyeuse.

196 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

The consequence is clearly seen in the inability of
the French to re-equip their fleet. Naval stores from the
Baltic could not be obtained. The British also com-
manded the resources of the Mediterranean. When
the French commander put to sea for a winter cruise
early in 1795, he had to take with him ships whose
masts and spars had been wounded in the First of June,
there being no material to replace them. The cruise
cost the French five ships-of-the-line, though they never
fell in with the British fleet. Nevertheless, owing to
the policy of the Admiralty and of Lord Bridport,
whojhad succeeded Howe in command of the Channel
Fleet, which kept the British force in the harbours
of the South Coast and left the French unwatched, a
detachment was able to slip through to Toulon, which,
for the time being, left the British fleet under Hotham
in a position of inferiority. A small action off the He
Croix, in which Bridport took three French ships and
let nine escape him, was the only incident worth noting
in the Atlantic during the year 1795.

In the West Indies, meanwhile, islands had been
changing and re-changing hands, with the result that,
for all essential purposes, the two sides were practically
as they were at the beginning of the war, the French
retaining Martinique and Guadeloupe, strategically the
most important. The position had greatly changed
to the disadvantage of Great Britain, since the United
States became independent and were, therefore, no
longer subject to her Colonial system. The French
islands became not only nests of privateers, as they
had always been, but great centres of trade, to which
American produce was brought for shipment to France
under convoy. The trade, being carried on in a num-
ber of small vessels, was not easily stopped. It was

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 197

not till after Trafalgar, when the main fleets of France
no longer kept the sea, that the islands fell into British
hands and this source of support for the French was put
an end to.

The first act of the great sea drama, however, was
played out, for the most part, in the Mediterranean.
Great Britain, as usual, was supporting the Land Pow-
ers with subsidies and the aid of her fleet wherever diffi-
culties could be raised for the French on or in proximity
to blue water. We have seen how she supported
the insurrectionary party of Toulon. Hood retired
from there to the Salins d'Hyeres, where he kept watch
on the French fleet and did his best to harry the enemy's
communications with Italy and the Barbary States,
whence the South of France was mainly supplied with
corn. A base, however, was needed. Gibraltar was
too far off, and Port Mahon had been lost in the last
war. The disaffection of the Corsicans with French
rule offered the opportunity, and the British seized
San Fiorenzo, Bastia, and Calvi. Nelson's name first
becomes prominent in these operations. So based, the
British were in a position to interfere with the com-
munications of the French army in Italy along the
Corniche Road, and to influence the small States of
Italy, Naples, Genoa, and the rest in favour of Austria
and the Alliance. The French were once more aiming
at the control of the Middle Danube through Italy, for
which purpose they required secure communications
by sea. The joint enterprise, however, did not prosper,
partly owing to the supineness of the Austrian generals,
and partly to the brilliant campaign of Napoleon, who
entered Northern Italy by way of the Alps. Partly,
also, it must be owned, owing to the incapacity of
Hotham, who detached Nelson to the aid of the Aus-

198 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

trians, but with insufficient force. Napoleon compelled
the submission of Genoa, Parma, Tuscany, Naples, and
the Papal States. It looked as if the Land had won the
first round in the contest for mastery with the Sea.

Spain joined the French in 1796, with the result that
the British Government ordered the evacuation of
Corsica and Elba, which had been seized later, and the
British fleet evacuated the Mediterranean, a course
imposed on it by the disobedience to orders of Admiral
Mann, who, on being driven from before Cadiz by the
junction of the Spanish fleet with a French squadron
which he was watching in that port, sailed for home
instead of joining Sir John Jervis, who was now com-
mander-in-chief. The disappearance of the British
flag, however, was not for long, for on the I4th of the
following February Jervis won the great victory of St.
Vincent. Nelson's share in the triumph is well-known.
He there showed for the first time in a fleet action that
swift tactical insight in which he excelled all other
naval commanders of his own, or perhaps of any other
time. His action in leaving the line without orders
— the very fault for which Matthews had been con-
demned— was commented upon by Calder on board the
flagship afterwards. "He certainly disobeyed orders, "
Jervis replied, "and if ever you are guilty of a like dis-
obedience, I will forgive you, too. " No one less likely
than Calder to sin by too great initiative could possibly
be imagined. The battle of St. Vincent showed the
worthlessness of the Spanish navy, of which, however,
Nelson was fully convinced beforehand. When he
heard that the King of Spain had given five fine three-
deckers to the French, "Not with their crews, I presume,
for that would be the surest way to lose them again, "
was his pungent comment.

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 199

In the next year Nelson was back again in the Medi-
terranean. Bonaparte was evidently planning some
great enterprise, the nature of which was carefully con-
cealed, even from his own people. All the signs pointed
to an attempt to invade England or Ireland. But the
British Government were not wholly misled, and, when
the preparations could no longer be concealed, St. Vin-
cent was ordered to send ten of the line, under the
officer whom he should select, to observe and follow
the movements of the expedition. He selected Nelson,
who had just rejoined his fleet after recovery from the
wound by which he lost his arm at the unsuccessful
attempt on Vera Cruz. Napoleon seized Malta, and
then sailed for Egypt, where he landed with thirty
thousand men. The French were already in possession
of Corfu, Cerigo, and Cephalonia, which they had
acquired at the expense of Venice by the Treaty of
Campo Formio. The Porte, for the present, made no
attempt to defend its possession of Egypt, fearing the
sea power of France, which then seemed predominant
in the Mediterranean. Nelson chased to Alexandria,
but got there before the French. In a fever of anxiety,
he returned to Sicily, but could get no information of
their whereabouts. Still convinced in his own mind
that their destination was Egypt, he started off again,
and discovered the French at anchor in Aboukir Bay.
Nelson's fleet now consisted of thirteen ships, twelve of
the line, and one of fifty guns, while the French had
the same number under Admiral Brueys, with his flag
in L'Orient. Two of Nelson's ships had, however, been
away reconnoitring, thanks to his lack of frigates, and
were late in getting into action. A third, the Culloden,
under Troubridge, ran aground. The attack, therefore,
opened with ten ships against the thirteen of the enemy.

200 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

The French, however, were at anchor, and so badly
were they placed that they were open to attack on
both sides at once. Nelson observed that they lay at a
single anchor, and his acute mind at once seized upon
the opportunity offered. "Where there is room for a
Frenchman to swing, " he exclaimed, "there is room for
an Englishman to anchor, " and he ordered, or allowed,
Foley, in the Goliath, to lead into action on the inshore
side. The British, in turn, anchored by the stern oppo-
site the French van, and, having disposed of their
immediate opponents, passed on to the centre and rear.
The action raged furiously all night, the damage done
being great on both sides, but far greater on that of the
French. Towards midnight the flagship, L'Orient,
blew up with a fearful explosion, the awe of which
caused a suspension of the firing for nearly ten minutes.
In the end, the French fleet was destroyed more thor-
oughly than any fleet in history has been before or since,
with the single exception of the Russian at Tsu-shima.
Two ships only, Genereux and Guillaume Tell, escaped,
and both were captured in the following year.

The sea communications of Napoleon's army were
thus destroyed. Napoleon himself met the disaster
with characteristic spirit. "Seas which we do not
command," he said, "separate us from home; but no
seas divide us from Africa and Asia. We will found
here an Empire." Events proved him wrong. Sea
power commanded the only practicable route to Asia.
The Porte, encouraged by the destruction of the French
fleet, determined upon resistance. Following the old
historic road of invasion, Napoleon reached Acre.
There the British met him once more, in the shape of the
seamen from Sir Sidney Smith's squadron. He could
not take the place, with sea power at its back. Slaugh-

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 201

tering his prisoners and poisoning his own wounded,
he fell back to Egypt. Next year, in a daring manner,
he made his escape to France. But the misfortunes of
the army he left behind him were not at an end. A
British expedition under Sir Ralph Abercrombie landed
at Aboukir, defeated the French under General Menou,
and forced a capitulation, under the terms of which
the French army was allowed to re-embark for France.
Malta was blockaded and fell on September 5, 1800.

Sea power had won the second round handsomely.
A French writer, Jurien de la Gravi&re, says of the
Battle of the Nile:

Our navy never recovered from this terrible blow to its
consideration and its power. This was the combat which
for two years delivered the Mediterranean to the English
and called thither the squadrons of Russia; which shut up
our army in the midst of a rebellious population, and decided
the Porte to declare against us ; which put India out of the
reach of our enterprise, and brought France within a hair's
breadth of her ruin ; for it rekindled the scarcely extinct war
with Austria, and brought Suvarof and the Austro-Russians
to our very frontiers.

The trade of Britain advanced by leaps and bounds.
The total of exports and imports, which had been
£44,500,000 in 1792, rose to £73,000,000 in 1800.
Such a result of seven years of war might well be
described by Pitt as "a spectacle at once paradoxical,
inexplicable, and astonishing." By her command of
the sea, Great Britain centred the trade, finance, and
industry of the world upon her own shores. The seas
were free to her alone, and to such neutrals as she chose
to extend the freedom. The wealth of the tropical

202 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

world and the great granaries from which the nations
drew their supplies were hers also.

The military genius of Napoleon and the selfishness
and short-sightedness of the monarchs of Central and
Eastern Europe were, however, to postpone the golden
dreams of a victorious peace for many years yet. The
great captain, returned from Egypt, restored the affairs
of France in the campaign of Marengo. The Northern
States became restive under the British restrictions on
trade. Prussia, as usual, pursued a selfish, treacherous,
though short-sighted, policy. The half-mad Tsar,
Paul, incensed by what he considered to be the faith-
lessness of Austria, listened to the machinations of
Napoleon. The consequence was that Austria was
forced to accept the disastrous Treaty of Luneville, and
that a fresh armed neutrality was formed in Northern
Europe, by means of which Napoleon hoped to dispute
once more the command of the sea with the help of
the united navies of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden.
Nelson was once more the stumbling-block in his path.
There are few incidents in the history of their country
on which the British people look back with more sincere
regret than the Battle of Copenhagen. But regret
springs solely from the sentiments of friendship and
admiration they feel for the gallant Danes and from no
doubts as to the justice or expediency of the course taken
by the British Government. If Europe was to be saved
from the threatened dominion of Napoleon, the smaller
maritime States had to be taken out of his hand. How-
ever justified intrinsically the complaints of the Danes
might have been, the greater issues at stake demanded
that they should be laid on one side, forcibly if need
be.

Copenhagen was considered by Nelson to be the

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 203

greatest feat of his life, and, if we regard not only the
skill and boldness of the attack, but also the generous
and adroit diplomacy with which he won peace out of
strife, there is little reason to dispute his conclusion.
The incidents of the battle are so well known that they
need no re-telling. The Danes, to this day, claim that
they repulsed the attack, and we may be content
to leave it at that, for we grudge such brave foemen
nothing which may cause their honour to shine more
brightly. The glory of the furious onslaught on ships
and batteries is sufficient for our arms. Moreover,
the result of the battle, and of the ensuing death of Tsar
Paul, was to break up the northern coalition. Our
object was attained. The danger passed away. If the
Continent lay at Napoleon's feet, and seemed destined
to be the appanage of the Imperial Crown he was now
about to assume, the dominion of the seas and the tri-
bute of the world beyond was now confirmed to Great
Britain. So affairs stood when the short and troubled
Peace of Amiens closed for a period the doors of the
Temple of Janus.

That short peace was broken on May 16, 1801,
when Great Britain declared war in consequence of the
dispute about Malta. At once began that "sustained
watch," of which Mahan speaks in his most famous
passage. On the ryth, Cornwallis left Plymouth with
ten sail-of-the-line to resume the watch over Brest; on
the 1 8th, Nelson hoisted his flag in the Victory, and
sailed to take command of the Mediterranean fleet.

Napoleon came to the water's edge wherever it was
possible to him. He occupied Hanover, and also Cux-
haven on the Elbe. Great Britain replied by blockad-
ing the mouths of that river. If the ports of the
Continent, so far as the First Consul controlled them,

204 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

were closed to British trade, Great Britain replied
by re-imposing in its most rigorous form the Order of
1756. As yet no one could foresee the end. The
Continent remained at peace. Napoleon himself be-
lieved Great Britain to be incapable of waging war single-
handed against him. Although the outbreak of war
had come sooner than he desired, and before he had had
time to rehabilitate his navy, yet the golden opportunity
presented itself to crush his most relentless enemy.
Audacious schemes formed themselves in his brain;
yet not more audacious than the invasion of Egypt.
Could he command the Channel for twenty-four hours,
the hundred and thirty thousand men he had assembled
at Boulogne, Ambleteuse, Wimereux, and Etaples and
trained with the minutest care might embark in their
thousand flat-bottomed boats — and then, Plus d'Angle-
terre! To bring about the desired state of affairs, he
made elaborate preparations for a renewed expedition to
the East. Latouche Treville, at that time in command
of the Toulon fleet, was to feint to the eastward and then
slip out through the Straits. Ganteaume, with twenty
ships and five and twenty thousand troops, was to pre-
pare ostentatiously for an attempt on Ireland, in order
to keep Cornwallis close up to Brest. The Rochefort
squadron was to join Latouche Treville off Cadiz, and
the combined fleet of sixteen of the line was to bear
up for the Channel. This plan was afterwards modi-
fied, owing to the death of Latouche Treville and the
succession of Villeneuve, whom Napoleon, with reason,
distrusted, to the command.

British seamen never had a fear that the plan would
succeed, whatever apprehensions may have been excited
among the populace ashore. "As to the possibility of
the enemy being able to pass through our blockading and

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protecting squadron, with all the secrecy and dexterity,
and by those hidden means which some worthy people
expect," said Pellew, afterwards Lord" Exmouth, "I
really, from anything I have seen in the course of my
professional experience, am not much disposed to con-
cur in it." The squadrons of Britain took the old
central position, watching closely every port where
the enemy had a detachment of his force : Brest, Roche-
fort, and Toulon at first, and, when Spain joined France
in 1804, Ferrol and Cadiz as well. Should any of the
French get to sea, then the squadron watching the port
from which they emerged fell back on the next on the
way to Brest, or, if necessary, on the squadron watching
Brest itself. Thus, whatever concentration Napoleon
might achieve, his fleets must always be confronted with
an equal concentration of the British. Moreover, there
was kept a fleet in the North Sea, watching the Dutch
and the Flemish ports, a squadron under Lord Keith in
the Downs, and a reserve of five ships, fully manned, at
Spithead. Blow east, blow west, a British fleet could
get at the enemy and delay his plans until the larger
detachments could arrive. The hardships and trials of
two years' watch, keeping the sea in all weathers, in
accordance with the ideas of tough old St. Vincent, were
enormous. "Admirals need not be made of iron, " said
Collingwood. But the fleets of Britain were never more
perfectly manned than by the toughened and experi-
enced seamen of this time. The French, for the most
part confined to port, steadily deteriorated. Moreover,
while both fleets were inactive, so far as fighting was
concerned, all the advantages of command of the sea
flowed to Britain. If the French battle fleets could not
get out without fighting, neither could traders get in.
France was cut off from the world across the seas.

206 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Even her coasters enjoyed no immunity. The world
was behind Britain.

So complete was the confidence of the British Govern-
ment in their command of the sea that they did not hesi-
tate to send a military expedition to the Mediterranean
behind the watching squadrons, to join the Russians
in an attempt to drive the French from Southern Italy.
It has even been asserted that this expedition, rather
than the threat of invasion, prompted the elaborate
strategical distribution of their squadrons. It was cer-
tainly an essential part of the gigantic European com-
bination which Pitt designed and supported with money.
Its departure almost coincided with Villeneuve's
evasion of Nelson and voyage to the West Indies; its
safe arrival in Sicily even more closely coincided with
his return, and with the abandonment of Napoleon's
plan of invasion in favour of an attack on Austria.
Sea power in. this way made itself felt on Continental
politics, and a small body of British troops, disposed
in the right place through its agency, once more exer-
cised an influence altogether out of proportion to their
numbers.

The culminating point of the great battle of wits was
reached early in 1805, when Napoleon ordered Missiessy,
with five sail-of-the-line from Rochefort,and Villeneuve,
with ten from Toulon, to rendezvous in the West Indies,
in the hope of drawing after them such a British force
that Ganteaume might break the blockade off Brest.
Missiessy duly got away, followed by Cochrane and six
of the line. But Villeneuve failed owing to boisterous
weather, after having thrown Nelson, whose mind
was obsessed with the vision of a renewed attack on
Egypt, off the scent. The Emperor then modified his
plan, and, in March, ordered a concentration of the

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 207

fleets of Ganteaume, Villeneuve, and Missiessy at
Martinique. Ganteaume, Villeneuve, and Missiessy
sailed in the following month, just as Missiessy, having
waited in vain, started homewards. Nelson, at first
deceived once more, got positive news that Villeneuve
had passed the Straits of Gibraltar, and at once made
preparation to fall back on Cornwallis, in pursuance of
the general plan of campaign. But, receiving authori-
tative news that his enemy had been seen heading
across the Atlantic, he immediately set out in pursuit,
though the latter had thirty days' start of him. After
a fruitless search among the islands, he learned that his
opponent had sailed for Europe on June 9th. On
receiving this news three days later, he at once sent off
Captain Bettesworth in the brig Curieux to convey tid-
ings to England, ordering him to keep a certain course
which his instinct told him would bring him within
sight of Villeneuve. He himself set out for the Straits
on June I3th, and he actually arrived in European
waters before the French squadron.

Bettesworth reached Plymouth on July 7th, and, by
the i ith, the orders issued by Lord Barham, the wonder-
ful veteran of eighty who was now First Lord of the
Admiralty, had reached Cornwallis. The blockade
of Rochefort was raised, and the five ships composing
the squadron were sent to join Calder off Ferrol. The
latter, now with fifteen ships under his command, was
ordered to cruise one hundred miles west of Finisterre
to intercept Villeneuve. The fleets met on the after-
noon of July 22nd, and Calder captured two Spanish
ships-of-the-line, but did not press home his advantage,
for which fault he was tried by court-martial, and sen-
tenced to be severely reprimanded for the same fault
as that for which Byng was shot. But the court-martial

208 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

did not take place until Trafalgar had relieved the
country from all anxiety. The check received, and the
evidence that the British were ready for any emergency,
were, however, sufficient to cause Villeneuve, never very
firm of purpose, to abandon the intention of joining
Ganteaume, and to drive him into Ferrol. He oscillated
between that port and Cadiz, until Napoleon's angry
order, and the news that Rosily was on his way to super-
sede him, drove him out to meet disaster on October
2 1st at Trafalgar. Napoleon recognised that the game
was up, and issued the orders which led to Ulm and
Austerlitz.

The story of Trafalgar, so often told, need not be
repeated here. Victory and a glorious death were the
rewards which God gave to Nelson for a life devoted to
duty and the service of his country. Had he not fought
and fallen, the chaplet of immortal fame with which he
is crowned in the eyes of his countrymen might never
have been his. The human frailty which does but
throw his glory into brighter relief might, when the
stimulus of action had gone, have prevailed to bring
his life to a sordid close. He passed from life to become
the pattern and inspiration of every British boy who
has in his veins the sea spirit by which Britain lives.
The cockpit of the Victory became the holiest shrine of
our race. But, great as were, materially and spiritually,
the fruits of Trafalgar, every serious student of naval
history now realises that the Great Deliverance was
wrought before the guns spoke. And the fame of Nel-
son should not be allowed to eclipse, though it rightly
overshadows, the merit of others who shared that weary
and tenacious watch from 1803 to 1805. Cornwallis,
Collingwood, Cochrane, Calder, and Pellew all deserve
their share, nor must the skill and energy with which

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 209

Lord Barham met the crisis be left out of the account.
Blunders there were inevitably, and an occasional fail-
ure, as in Calder's case, to make the most of opportunity.
But the Trafalgar campaign, to include the whole period
in that convenient description, shows that the whole
Navy was permeated by a correct understanding of
strategical conditions. The seamen never lost their
grip of the essential point that the main force of the
enemy was their true objective, and that, whatever
combinations he might make, it was their business to
meet him with superior force at the decisive point.
All the dispositions of the Admiralty and the Admirals
were directed towards that end, and, though, counting
by numbers, the end was not attained, numbers were by
no means all that mattered. Napoleon himself did not
regard the French as equal to the British, ship for
ship, and his admirals showed again and again that
they were of his opinion. The Spanish were greatly
inferior to the French: so greatly that the Emperor,
in making his calculations, invariably reckoned two
Spaniards as one French.

The oft-quoted "Nelson touch" had for its purpose
no more than the common aim of all commanders to
isolate a portion of the enemy's fleet so that it could
be dealt with before the rest could come to its assistance.
This result was generally achieved by manoeuvring for
the weather gage, which, if secured, gave choice of the
point of attack. But so much time was frequently lost
in these manoeuvres that the longest day did not suffice
for a decisive action. Where Nelson improved upon
the tactics of his predecessors was in making his order
of sailing his order of battle. The equinox was well
past ; light airs prevailed. If he had first waited to form
the line when he sighted the enemy at daybreak, Tra-
14

210 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

falgar might have proved one of the ordinary in-
decisive battles. But Nelson had it firmly in his mind
that what his country required was not an ordinary
battle, with four or five of the enemy taken, but the com-
plete annihilation of the combined fleet as a fighting
force. It was therefore his plan to go down to the
enemy in the ordinary cruising formation of double
column of line ahead, to break their formation in two
places, to leave Collingwood to deal with their rear,
thus isolated, while he held his own division free to
manoeuvre against any attempt of the van to come to
its assistance. The plan involved the exposure of
the leading ships of his columns to a concentrated fire
without support — a fire to which, being head-on to the
enemy, they could not effectively reply for a long time.
Collingwood's flagship, the Royal Sovereign, was, indeed,
for half an hour under the fire of five ships before her
next astern got into action. She was, however, greatly
ahead of station, having been freshly coppered, and
therefore able to outsail her consorts. The plan was
audacious to the point of rashness. But Nelson
knew the enemy he was fighting. He knew the ineffi-
ciency of the Spanish contingent, and he took the risk
in order to obtain a more complete victory. In the
result, twenty-two of the enemy were taken or destroyed
out of thirty-three, and all but two of the remainder
surrendered in Cadiz harbour three years later. The
annihilation which Nelson sought was gained.

It is worth noting, perhaps, that Nelson reserved for
himself at Trafalgar, on a larger scale, the part which he
had played in the first fleet action in which he took
part, that of St. Vincent. As he then flung himself
across the path of the Spanish weather division in order
to prevent it bearing down to the relief of the detached

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 211

lee division, so at Trafalgar he purposed to engage
the allied van to prevent it coming to the assistance of
the threatened rear. To do this, he had to break
through the enemy's centre, cutting off four ships
between himself and Collingwood as he did so. The
accident of the Redoubtable getting across his bows
as he went through prevented the completion of the
movement and brought about his death. But his pur-
pose was achieved by the other ships of his division.
The effect of his death on his fleet is quaintly told by a
bluejacket of the Royal Sovereign, who wrote to his
father after the action:

Our dear Admiral Nelson is killed, so we have paid
pretty sharply for licking 'em. I never set eyes on him, for
which I am both glad and sorry; for, to be sure, I should
have liked to have seen him — but then all the men in our
ship who have seen him are such soft toads, they have done
nothing but blast their eyes and cry ever since he was killed.
God bless you! Chaps that fought like the devil sit down
and cry like a wench.

What manner of man must he have been whose
death so affected the rough tarpaulins of 1805?

So ended the second act of the great drama of sea
power. How much had been accomplished towards the
final victory, not even Ministers themselves in Britain
realised. The land campaign had already opened dis-
astrously for the Austrians. Mack with twenty thou-
sand men surrendered at Ulm on the day before
Trafalgar was fought. The Austrians and Russians were
overthrown at Austerlitz on December 5th following.
The news, it is said, killed Pitt. But Austerlitz was,
none the less, the first-fruits of Trafalgar. France, her
trade cut off, was in dire misery, which could only be

212 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

relieved by victories on the Continent and the spoils of
conquered nations. Napoleon was to know no respite
during which he might consolidate his power. The
European nations, besides the plentiful financial help
which victorious and wealthy Britain could, and did,
afford them with lavish hand, always found a fulcrum
of resistance to the universal tyrant in her might upon
the element where his genius for war could not rule.
If the land was to conquer the sea, land and sea forces
must touch at some point. Since Napoleon could make
no effective effort on the sea itself, that point must be
on the coast — in the ports. Hence he was compelled to
dissipate his strength in excentric efforts. He endeav-
oured to exclude British trade from the Continent by the
decrees of Berlin and Milan. Yet British goods poured
into the ports of Northern Europe, and Great Britain,
retaliating with the Orders in Council, took toll of every-
thing which went to feed and clothe the people of
France, and the very armies of Napoleon himself.
He tried to revive the project of 1801, and to combine
the navies of the smaller Powers with the remnants of
his own and that of Spain. Great Britain seized the
Danish fleet in 1807. Portugal resisted the peremptory
demands made upon her, both to lend the use of her
fleet and to prohibit British trade. Napoleon sent
Junot with an army corps to bring pressure upon her,
and this was the first irritation which set up the ' ' Spanish
ulcer."

To grapple with the resistance of the little State, the
staunch and age-long Ally of Great Britain, it was neces-
sary to Napoleon to have secure communications.
These could not be had by sea, but only through Spain.
If he could not control the sea, he was determined to
control the coasts, which, apparently, he thought

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 213

amounted to the same thing. He occupied Madrid,
and, taking advantage of a quarrel between the King of
Spain and his eldest son, he set his brother Joseph on the
throne. The Portuguese Court fled to Brazil. But
the British were now, since the danger of invasion had
passed away, prepared to play a stronger part in the
land campaign. An expedition was sent to Lisbon
under Sir Arthur Wellesley, which defeated Junot's
army at Vimiero. Just previously, the Spanish gueril-
leros had compelled the surrender of a French army
corps at Baylen, and, in the upshot, the whole French
army in Portugal was forced to capitulate, and was sent
back to France in British transports under the Conven-
tion of Cintra.

It was the worst blow the Emperor had ever suffered.
The Power of the Sea had foiled him once more. The
arm of Great Britain was stretched out to aid the
Spanish irregulars in fighting against his despotism
when none other but she could aid. The ally which
had been subservient to him when under the Bourbon
dynasty was now in revolt against his own brother.
Sea power was once more exercised on behalf of liberty.
Napoleon readily appreciated what this uprising of a
minor State against his authority might mean. He
recalled his first-line army from Germany, took com-
mand of it himself, reoccupied Madrid, and crushed
the Spanish rising almost completely for the time.
Then Sir John Moore, with some twenty thousand
British troops, made an audacious movement against
his communications with France. The Emperor's plans
were entirely dislocated, and he himself never caring to be
associated with failure, returned to Paris under the plea
of the threatening condition of affairs in mid-Europe.
Soult marched against Moore, and cut him off from

214 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Lisbon, which was easy for him to do. But he could
not cut him off from the sea. Moore retreated north-
wards to Corunna, where, in a battle fought to cover
the embarkation of his army, he lost his life. But the
army escaped to fight again. The mighty Emperor's
power ended at high-water mark.

Corunna was fought on January 9, 1809. It was
the year of Eckmuhl, Essling, and Wagram. In less
than twelve months more, Napoleon was to humiliate
the proud Hapsburg by taking his daughter to his bed.
But Essling was the most definite defeat he had yet
experienced, Wagram was a pyrrhic victory, and the
troops employed in the campaign were less the veterans
of France than the levies of Saxony, Bavaria, and Poland.
The legions of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland were, for
the most part, in Spain, where they were exhausting
their energies against the Spanish guerilleros, supported
by thirty thousand elusive Britons. Nor was this all,
or, perhaps, the worst. The national spirit was rising
all over Europe, stimulated by the example of Spain.
Schill, in North Germany, and Andreas Hofer, in the
Tyrol, were in arms against the would-be tyrant of
the world. North and south he was forced to excentric
movement ; wherever the resistance to him touched the
sea it was sure of support from the ships of Britain. It
is interesting to note that Heligoland came into our
hands in 1807 as a depot whence trade with the Elbe
could be carried on in defiance of Napoleon's Berlin
Decree.

Napoleon's career had now certainly passed its high-
water mark, whatever date may be properly assigned
to that epoch. Perhaps he reached the pinnacle of his
fame on the raft at Tilsit, where the young and impulsive
Tsar, Alexander I . , vowed friendship to him and Frederick

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 215

William of Prussia was his dog? Austerlitz, Jena, and
Friedland lay immediately behind him — but so did
Trafalgar. No, Tilsit was not his real zenith. It was
the first glory of the after-glow. The sun of Austerlitz
had set before its rising. He had the Continent at his
feet before the Peace of Amiens. A just and equitable
use of his military triumph could then have established
the peace of Europe upon a firm foundation. Peace
at home might have set him upon the throne of an
unexhausted and contented realm. But while the sea
power remained unsubdued to his arms, peace was to
him but gall and wormwood. His dreams of empire
were unfulfilled. "Capax imperil, nisi imperasset" is
more true of Napoleon than of the Caesar against whom
the crushing irony was first launched. To many that
verdict may seem a paradox. But it is just.

Great Britain was now committed to Continental war
with an army inadequate in numbers, but of tougher
material than any other army in the field, a general of
capacity only second to that of Napoleon himself,
officers who were then to prove, for the first time in
Europe, their power of training and leading brave men
of another race, and the sea, her own undisputed high-
way, at the back of all her effort. Napoleon learned,
as Philip II. and Philip V. had learned, each in turn,
that Lisbon was nearer to London than to Madrid.
Heavy as was the blow struck by Nelson at Trafalgar,
there could be no greater mistake than to suppose
that the navy of France was absolutely destroyed.
The greatest of her fleets, that of Ganteaume in Brest,
remained untouched. British seamen were still com-
pelled, all through the ensuing years, to spend them-
selves in maintaining a sleepless watch on French ports.
Actions between single ships, and even small squadrons,

216 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

were frequent. Yet all this time communications were
maintained between the Mother Country and the
Peninsular army, a thousand miles distant along a line
which passed by each of the enemy's chief military
ports in turn. The safe withdrawal of Sir John Moore's
army from Corunna was the first instance of the
advantage conferred on a small land force by the adroit
use of sea power. The years following show to those
who have eyes to see that on the same basis the whole
of Wellington's success in the Peninsula was built.
His impregnable fortress of Torres Vedras was flanked
by the sea and supplied from the sea. The French army,
with its communications stretched over the element its
master was supposed to command, starved. Welling-
ton's army lacked for nothing save that which the
ineptitude of the authorities at home failed to supply.
He advanced or he retreated, according to the effort
which the Emperor was able, or was compelled, to put
forth to check him. But whether he advanced or
retreated, his army was always secure against disaster,
and the drain of the "Spanish ulcer" upon his oppo-
nent's resources became greater and greater. At last,
when the hour of final victory struck and he was able to
move forward from the field of Vittoria to the Pyrenees,
he let go his hold on Lisbon, shortened his line of com-
munications by establishing his base at San Sebastian,
and moved his small army forward to Toulouse and
Bordeaux. It took six hundred thousand Continental
soldiers to wrest victory from Napoleon in the "Battle
of the Nations" at Leipsic. Even that mighty effort
might have been unsuccessful but for the handful with
which Wellington was supporting the resistance of the
Spanish nation and forcing his way up to southern
France.

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 217

Sea power triumphant exerted its influence from the
Vistula to the Douro; from the Elbe to the Bosporus.
Alexander I., sated with the acquisition of Finland, and
exasperated by the rigours of the Continental system,
became, first a lukewarm friend, and then, in 1812, an
open foe. The elaborate plan of Napoleon to keep
Turkey as "a mask" to cover his right flank failed,
owing to the predominance of British influence in
Constantinople. This influence predominated, partly
owing to the impression made by Sir Sidney Smith's
assistance in the defence of Acre, and partly owing to
that made by Duckworth's passage of the Dardanelles
in 1807. The huge disaster of the Russian campaign
completed what the "Spanish ulcer" had begun, and it
was the march of Tchitschakoff, released from the
Turkish campaign, on Minsk which turned the retreat
of the Grand Army into a debdcle. Germany rose
in arms from end to end. The position of Marie Louise
as Empress was insufficient deterrent to keep Austria
from joining the new coalition. The defection of the
Bavarians at Lobau completed the desertion of the
falling Emperor by his vassals and allies. He became
for the first time the prisoner of Great Britain, and was
sent to rule the island of Elba, guarded by the force
which alone he had failed to overcome. After the
Hundred Days, he returned to that captivity from
which he was to escape no more:

How far is St. Helena from the Capes of Trafalgar?

A longish way — a longish way — with ten year more to run.
It's south across the water underneath a setting star.

(What you cannot finish you must leave undone!)

There we may leave Napoleon. Sea power, reso-
lutely and unflinchingly used, had fulfilled its task,

2i 8 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

though not without much harm being wrought to the
nation which wielded it. For all her command of the
sea, Great Britain was at one period brought to scarcity
by the operation of the Continental system,t and that
although she was still to a great extent self-supporting,
so far as the necessaries of life were concerned. Worst
of all, the methods she was compelled to adopt led to
war with the great offshoot of her race across the
Atlantic, and kept the sore created by the War of
Independence open for many years. It is, perhaps,
only within the last few happy months that Great Brit-
ain and the United States have at last been able to
realise their common destiny in the service of the liberty
of mankind. It is difficult for an Englishman to find
justification for the action of the American Government
in making a casus belli of commercial grievances at a
time when every nerve was strained to grapple with
the enemy of all liberty. But the dead may now bury
its dead. It is a common belief that the British Navy
showed some deterioration from the standard . of
Trafalgar days- when the issue was joined with the
Americans. There is some truth, but not much, in the
belief. Between 1805 and 1812, there was much weary
watching and but little fighting. Seamanship was
more studied because, for the moment, more important
than gunnery. If the enemy was met at all he was an
enemy vastly deteriorated in efficiency. But the loss of
frigates to the well-found and highly trained American
ships really proves very little. The British Navy
was still undergoing a most anxious time in European
waters, with the communications of Wellington's army
in its charge, and the great blockade to maintain.
The ships and captains who could be spared were, for
the most part, not among the best in the service.

SEA POWER SAVES EUROPE 219

Losses were, in such circumstances, inevitable. But,
despite the showy successes gained by the American
frigates, the United States were strangled by the sea
power of Britain, which upheld all the objects for which
she fought. British statesmen had no desire to push
matters with the United States to extremities, and an
easy peace was concluded at Ghent.

The attempt to make the land conquer the sea failed
utterly, even in the strong, hands of Napoleon. It has
never yet succeeded in history, and it is permissible to
believe that it never will. Great Britain emerged from
the struggle with Jier great Imperial future before her.
How she used her opportunity it will be the purpose of
the next chapter to outline.

CHAPTER X

THE RESTORER OF PATHS

THE Peace of 1815 left Great Britain with the fol-
lowing places in her hands, besides those she possessed
before : In Europe, Malta, the Ionian Islands, and Heli-
goland; in Asia, Mauritius, and Ceylon; in Africa, the
Cape of Good Hope; and in the New World, the islands
of Trinidad, Tobago, and Santa Lucia, with the old
Dutch colony of Demerara. She had, moreover, defi-
nitely made good her claim to Australia and had begun
to settle it; she had "blazed the trail" across the North
American Continent to Vancouver. Her territorial
gains, therefore, were not small, and were even more
important by reason of their position than of their ex-
tent. Almost absent-mindedly (though the statement is
a rash one, in view of the highly developed sea-sense of
which the statesmanship of Britain had given evidence),
the British came to possess those "gates of the world, "
which were to acquire such great consequence in the
coming age of steam. For the sake of clearness, the
enumeration of the naval positions acquired between
the close of the war against Napoleon and that against
William II. will be here continued.

New Zealand, which had been incorporated in the
State of New South Wales in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, was formally annexed to the British Crown by

220

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 221

the Treaty of Waingari in 1840. The island of Singa-
pore was acquired by purchase from the Sultan of
Johore in 1824, and this was followed, little by little,
by the development of the Straits Settlements and the
Federated Malay States. In 1839, a dispute with the
Arab Sultan of Aden, who had taken prisoner and mal-
treated some British sailors, resulted in the annexation
of that renowned "cinder heap," one of the most
powerful naval fortresses in the world. Two years
later, as the result of the first Chinese War, we took and
held Hong -Kong. The Mediterranean position of the
Empire was strengthened by the occupation of Cyprus
in 1878 and of Egypt in 1882. Towards the end of the
century, the Soudan was recovered from barbarism,
giving us the port of Suakim on the Red Sea, and large
acquisitions were made in East Africa. In South
Africa, Natal was made a British possession in 1843,
while the enclave of Walfisch Bay was secured in 1878.
To continue the list would be tedious. The develop-
ment of submarine telegraphy, in which we naturally
led the world, necessitated the acquisition of islands in
every sea: places in themselves of little account, such as
Easter Island. Strategical value, or the fear that they
might pass into the hands of rivals, compelled us to
"peg out a claim" to other places of actual or potential
strength, such as Perim, Socotra, Wei-hai-wei, and
Koweit, on the Persian Gulf. Thus we have acquired
"the gates of the world," with the single exception of
Constantinople, the eventual possession of which is at
present in doubt. We have given the Ionian Islands to
Greece, and Heligoland to Germany, graceful conces-
sions for which it seems unlikely that we shall receive
any mundane reward.
With Gibraltar and Egypt in our hands, reinforced

222 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

by Malta as a central pivot, we control the passage of
the Mediterranean. Aden and Perim lock the door of
the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, from the south and north
respectively; Singapore controls the Straits of Malacca
and the road to the Far East. The Cape of Good
Hope is the "nodal point" on the long sea route both to
India and to Australasia. The Falkland Islands watch
the passage round the Horn, while Jamaica is as well
placed as Cuba for controlling the exit of the Panama
Canal. Finally, in the Straits of Dover we hold the
key to the Channel, and from Scapa Flow, control the
passage north-about. The British Islands lie like a
breakwater off the mainland of Central Europe. The
hard facts of geography, and not British jealousy or
ill-will, forbid the development of an oversea Empire
of Germany, unless Great Britain can first be subdued.
If the Germans cherished such ambitions, war was,
from the first, inevitable. We could not clear our-
selves out of the way, even if we would.

Strictly speaking, of course, a fortress or a naval
station no more "controls " a sea route than the stations
on the Tube "go" east or west, as the placards quaintly
announce. It is the fleet based on such places, or draw-
ing its supplies from them, which controls the route;
the fleet or the ships which at once guard the station
and are sheltered or succoured by it. If such bases
are to be adequate to their purpose, however, they
must be sufficiently strong, in a military sense, to
defend themselves against attack in the absence of the
fleet on its lawful occasions; otherwise the fleet becomes
a mere defence of the fortress and suffers all the dis-
abilities of an army in having to guard its own lines of
communications. Apart from the great military sta-
tions like Gibraltar, Aden, Simon's Bay, Colombo,

THE RESTORER OP PATHS 223

Singapore, and Hong-Kong — and sometimes combined
with them — we have acquired an unsurpassed chain of
coaling stations and commercial ports all over the world,
so that the world's traffic, with the exception of that of
the United States and South American ports, mainly
passes over routes in which all the stations are British.
Hence it follows that the things requisite for ocean
travel — coal, supplies, repairing yards, an$ so forth —
are mostly to be found in British ports. We have the
largest mercantile marine as well as the strongest war-
navy in the world, and, as we now know, in the age of
steam as in the age of sail, our mercantile strength in
time of peace has given our Navy strength in time of
war. This has been largely due to the wise policy which
has thrown open our ports to all and sundry to trade in
and to use, for thereby other nations have been relieved
of the necessity of developing resources of their own
overseas, and the time of crisis found all the important
links in the chain of communications in our hands.

In 1815, we were at the parting of the ways. We
had emerged from a great struggle more powerful than
any nation upon earth — more powerful, that is, in the
wider politics of the world. It would have been an evil
thing for humanity in general, and not least for our-
selves if, having a giant's strength, we had used it as a
giant. A Briton is entitled to say, without cant or
hypocrisy, and with full acknowledgment of the blun-
ders, failings, and sins of this nation and its rulers, that,
on the whole, this power has been used for the benefit
of mankind, and in a large and unselfish spirit. A
historian says of Britain in the years immediately
following the downfall of Napoleon :

Never before had the whole moral of the nation been
.:o modified in so short a space of time. . . . Nine years

224 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

spent in waging a war of opinions and ideas, and twelve
years more spent in fighting for existence and empire, had
made Great Britain wary, resolute, and far-sighted as she
had never been before. . . . Faction had died down in
a way which would have seemed incredible to an eight-
eenth century politician. . . . The improvement in politics
was only a symptom of the general moral improvement of
the nation. The war had sobered Britain. . . . If it taught
the nation that civic virtue and conscientious will to work
must be demanded from the leaders, it also required a better
general level of life and duty from every man. This was
strengthened by a strong religious revival. . . . For the
first time since the old Parliamentary wars, men armed
with a crusading spirit against a spiritual enemy, and the
cry "For God and the King" had a real meaning.

The words might have been written of this our day,
when the old spirit has so miraculously revived, showing
that, after a hundred years of ease and prosperity un-
known before, the nation has bred true to type : as prone
as ever to resist "spiritual wickedness in high places."
Sea power is a force potent to promote right, if it be
rightly used. After 1815 it was in our hands without a
question. Was it rightly used? Has it contributed to
the spread of freedom in the world and to the general
good of mankind? There is abundant evidence that it
has, and the best is the fact that despite the spread
of commercialism, with its inherent selfishness, our old
national ideals rang true as in the eighteenth century
when they were challenged.

Let us put the matter to the test. Europe had
exhausted itself in a war of ideas which had become a
war of ambitions. Outside, the world was still full of
violence and cruel habitations. The European, con-
fident of superiority, and impelled by greed, used all

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 225

other races as pawns in his game, or counters in his mart.
No law ran on the sea but the law of the strongest.
One of the clauses in the Treaty of Utrecht, the most
profitable, in a material sense, and the most shameful in
a moral, was the famous Assiento, which transferred
to Great Britain the monopoly of the slave trade
between Africa and the New World. The British
people first showed their moral title to the sovereignty
of the seas by the almost instantaneous revolt of the
national conscience against the advantages so gained.
Not that the profits were immediately foregone. Far
from it. But, as early as 1772, Lord Mansfield gave a
judgment in the case of the negro, Somerset, which
practically decided that no man could be a slave on
the soil of Great Britain herself. It was not, however,
till 1807 that the slave trade was made illegal, thanks
to the work of Clarkson, the elder Wilberforce, and
Zachary Macaulay. The British people, moreover,
were not content with abolishing it, so far as regarded
their own ships and possessions. The whole force of
the British Navy was used to put it down, after the
consent of other European Powers had been obtained
to the declaration of illegality. Finally, slavery itself
was abolished in all British possessions. Up to quite
recently we expended thousands of pounds and many
lives in suppressing the traffic in the Indian Ocean
and the Persian Gulf, at not a little risk to our political
position there, in the face of German rivalry.

To cleanse the sea of piracy was a task which went
hand in hand with the extirpation of the slaver. Piracy
still abounded, not only in the distant seas, but in the
Mediterranean, when Napoleon fell. There is nothing
stranger in Nelson's career than his relations with the
piratical States of Barbary, with the Bey of Tunis and
is

226 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the Dey of Algiers, with whom he treated almost on
the footing of an equal, cajoling and coercing them to
refrain from giving aid and comfort to the French.
After 1815, the hour speedily struck which brought
about the end of these nefarious monuments of Turkish
misgovernment and weakness. In 1816, Great Britain
demanded reparation from the Barbary States for
injuries wrought on British subjects. All Christian
slaves were to be given up, and guarantees given
that no more would be taken. Tunis and Tripoli,
conscious of weakness, yielded at once. But the
Dey of Algiers was recalcitrant. The place was
immensely strong, and the British Government were
aghast when stout old Lord Exmouth, Pellew of the
blockade of Cadiz, undertook to reduce it with five sail-
of-the-line. He was joined by some Dutch frigates,
and sailed into the harbour on October 2Oth. The
Dey returned no answer to his demand for restitution,
and next day — the anniversary of Trafalgar — he
opened fire. The action was a bloody one, costing
considerable loss to the British; but the fortifications
were shattered, the fleet destroyed, and the Dey
conceded all Exmouth's terms. That Great Britain
had no rapacious design is shown by the fact that the
place was left in the hands of the native ruler, and so
continued until the French took it in 1830.

Thirty years later, the British undertook the same
work on behalf of humanity in the Eastern seas. An
Englishman, James Brooke, had become the Rajah of
the State of Sarawak, in North-West Borneo. The
seas around the coast were infested with Malay and
Dyak pirates. Brooke was not strong enough by him-
self to subdue them, so Sir Harry Keppel was sent with
the Dido and Meander to his assistance. The pirates of

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 227

the Saribus and Sekaran, who were sea Dyaks led by
Malays, and the Sooloo and Lanun Malays, made a
stout resistance, but were overpowered. Piracy was
wiped out in those seas as an institution, though it
persisted sporadically among the Chinese for many
years longer, and even still shows itself from time to
time. The examples given are merely instances of the
work the British Navy did to make the seas safe for
traders of all nations, as a matter of course, simply
because we were the first Sea Power and acknowledged
the obligation which lay upon us. Of necessity, we
served our own ends first. But we shared the advan-
tage gained with every nation whose flag appeared at sea.

Contrast the state of affairs which has prevailed at
sea since 1815 with that which prevailed during all the
preceding centuries. The sea was the possession of
none; therefore no man gave the law. Private war was
freely levied; trade was carried on only with the high
hand, in the teeth of the. attempts of one country
or another to maintain a monopoly. Colonies were
always regarded as the strict preserve of their Mother
Country, and organised smuggling led to constant
encounters between the smugglers and the preventive
forces of the nation whose rights were assailed. There
was always war on the seas, and the greater number
of merchantmen either sailed armed or under convoy.
Great Britain arose as the Restorer of the Path. Only
a Power dominant as she had become could have done
the work which she did. Only a Power imbued with
big ideals would have used the power as she used it.
The Freedom of the Seas, before the days of Great
Britain's control, meant the freedom of the malefactor.

To use the term Free Trade is, unfortunately, to
raise visions of political controversy. But, in its

228 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

essence, Free Trade means much more than the imposi-
tion of customs duties of a greater or less amount on
imported goods. That is a matter of expediency. It
is a policy which may be followed by one generation and
revoked by the next without in the least disturbing the
principle. Customs duties on cargoes may differentiate
between the goods of one country and another, or
between different kinds of goods. But while the ships
of all countries are free to use the ports of all countries
on equal terms, there is, in essence, free trade. That
was the principle established by Great Britain, the
owner of far the largest mercantile marine in the world.
On it the maritime prosperity of the smaller countries
such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Greece, is
founded. By virtue of it, even more than by the reten-
tion of her East Indian possessions, some remnant of
the maritime greatness of Holland remains. Indirectly,
we have taxed ourselves to afford naval protection under
which these countries have flourished and grown rich.
This is not altruism. The policy suited us, and it
remains, as ever, our interest to see that the border-
States of Europe remain free and prosperous. But,
after 1815, we threw over completely every principle
on which the mercantile system was founded, and sub-
stituted for it a freedom which made the sea the true
highway of the nations.

The theory on which this policy was founded has,
doubtless, been carried too far. We saw the world
pouring into our ports and marts, its riches from every
clime in the ships of all nations. Wherever a com-
modity could be produced best and cheapest, there we
sought it; whatever ship could convey it most cheaply,
that we employed to convey it. In return, we secured,
for a time, at least, cheap production in our mining and

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 229

manufactures, and we held the markets of the world.
Although other nations were ahead of us in the develop-
ment of the marine steam engine, yet our skill in ship-
building and the proximity of coal arid iron to our ports
and estuaries kept us well ahead in the race for primacy
when iron and steel ships supplanted wooden. We
turned out tonnage, not only for ourselves, but for our
competitors. This is not the place to argue as to
economic soundness of this policy. But it is permissible
to point out that it was essentially a peace policy; that
it took no account of efforts deliberately made to
destroy our maritime supremacy by the adoption of
plans similar to those of Colbert, nor did it allow for
the fact, still more serious, that we might find ourselves
involved in war with a Power capable of dealing severe
blows at our commerce, while we were dependent on
imports from abroad for the necessaries of life. There
have been numerous attempts since 1815 to draw up an
international code to regulate the rights and duties of
belligerents and neutrals during a period of sea warfare.
In every one, the instructions of the British delegates
have been framed on the assumption that we should
be neutral, not belligerent. As the greatest oversea
traders, we stood to lose most from the operations
of belligerent Powers, if we were neutral, and sea warfare
was not restricted. As the greatest Sea Power, in a
naval sense, we stood to lose most if it were, supposing
us to be belligerent. The result of letting our agri-
culture decay, of becoming dependent on foreign ore,
instead of working our own iron deposits, and of suffer-
ing bounty-fed sugar to kill the industry of our West
India Islands, is now seen to have been disastrous in a
national sense, however profitable it may have been in
the economic sense to buy in the cheapest market.

23o SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

None the less, the maritime policy of Great Britain
during the last hundred years is one of which we may
legitimately be proud, and which has won results
unknown before in the history of the world. She did
more, indeed, than open her ports and the ports of the
Empire oversea; more, even, than suppress piracy in the
interests of mankind and the slave trade in the name
of humanity and the Gospel of Christ. Her ships of
war, once the cannon was silent, were sent into every
sea, exploring, sounding, surveying, charting, marking
the spot for a lighthouse here and a beacon there. It is
enough to mention two of these expeditions: That of
the Beagle in 1831, as a consequence of which Charles
Darwin revolutionised, if he did not create, the science
of biology, and that of the Challenger, in 1872-6, with
the valuable knowledge gained of deep-sea soundings.
Both the Arctic and the Antarctic regions were explored,
and, though it did not fall to the lot of a Briton to
discover either the North or the South Pole, yet such
men as Franklin, Ross, McClintock, Nares, Scott,
and Shackleton were the pioneers who made the
successes of Peary and Amundsen possible.

Britain went to war with Revolutionary France in
1792 on account of the Proclamation of the French
rulers that the forces of the Revolution would be used
to assist any nation which wished to free itself from
monarchical government. The consequence of that
policy was that France herself first passed under the
military despotism of Napoleon, and that, when that
despotism was destroyed, the greater part of the Con-
tinent of Europe found its neck beneath the yoke of the
Holy Alliance, while, of the remainder, a large propor-
tion remained enslaved to the Turk. It was left for sea
power to be instrumental in the work of liberation.

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 231

Most people are now prepared to admit, with Lord
Salisbury, that we "backed the wrong horse" when we
supported the Turk against the Russians in 1854 and
again in 1877-8. We were moved by concern for the
route to India, and by suspicion of the designs of
Russia, founded in part on the so-called "Will of Peter
the Great, " and in part of the real aggressiveness of her
action in Central Asia. Moreover, so long as Egypt
remained in fact a part of the dominions of the Sultan,
the passing of Constantinople into the hands of the
Power which controlled the Black Sea was a very real
danger. British interests, therefore, seemed to demand
that the Empire of the Turk should be maintained, while
British instinct cried out for the redemption of his
persecuted subjects. These cross-currents are apparent
all through the history of our foreign relations from 1828
onwards, and they found their culmination in the great
duel between Disraeli and Gladstone in 1877-80. In
the upshot, we fell between two stools, preserving the
Turk as a malevolent force in Europe, while earning
his ill-will by intervention, covenanted or otherwise,
on behalf of his subjects. Brimstone and treacle,
while admirable as a domestic medicine, is rarely service-
able in business or politics.

Our first essay in liberation is full of interest to us
to-day. In 1821 the Greeks rose in rebellion against
their Turkish masters. The horrible cruelties of the
Ottoman troops aroused the indignation of all Europe.
The imagination of the British was especially stirred by
the presence of Lord Byron as a volunteer, fighting in the
Greek ranks. An international squadron of British,
French, and Russian ships was sent to Greek waters. It
consisted of twenty-four vessels, of which seven were
British ships-of-the-line. The Turks and Egyptians

232 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

had over forty vessels of war, besides transports. The
Allied fleet had not intended action, but, when a shot
was fired at the French flagship, the wrath of the sailors
at the atrocities committed by the Turks and the bad
faith shown could not be restrained. A four-hours'
engagement resulted in the destruction of the combined
Turkish and Egyptian fleets. The Independence of
Greece was recognised, and Great Britain, France, and
Russia thus gained the title to be the protectors of that
country, on. which their action of to-day is based. The
Battle of Navarino was fought almost on the same spot
as Salamis and Lepanto. Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehe-
met AH, Pasha of Egypt, remained in the Morea a year
longer, when he was forced to retire by a French force
under General Maison. But the lesson of Navarino is
practically that of Salamis: that no power can hold
Helas which has lost command of the sea.

The power of Great Britain was destined to clash
with Ibrahim Pasha again twelve years later, when the
Egyptian forces advanced through Syria to the con-
quest of the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor. It is
possible that the ambitious Albanian — for such was the
race of Mehemet AH — might have seized the Imperial
Throne of Constantinople and the Khalifate. But a
combined squadron of British, Turkish, and Austrian
ships, under Sir R. Stopford, bombarded St. Jean d'
Acre, and stayed the course of the Egyptians on the
very spot where Sidney Smith had made Napoleon
"miss his destiny. " Since that time, British sea power
has intervened in the affairs of Eastern Europe on many
occasions, in Egypt, in Crete, and at other places, in a
vain endeavour to save the Turk from himself. Success-
ful or unsuccessful, the dispatch of a fleet has always
been the readiest way of bringing pressure to bear, and

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 233

Lord Salisbury,' who never seemed thoroughly to
understand the principles of sea power, took far too nar-
row a view of the possibilities when, in defending him-
self against the charge of inaction in the cause of the
Armenians, he dismissed the matter with the remark
that "You cannot send ironclads up Mount Ararat."

The campaign against Arabi Pasha and the revolted
Egyptian army was remarkable from a naval point of
view in several ways. In the first place, it afforded
another instance of the commander of an army making
use of the command of the sea to shift his base. Sir
Garnet Wolseley thus avoided a difficult flank march in
face of the lines of Kafr Dowar, and, by re-embarking
his army and landing it on the bank of the Suez Canal
at Ismailia, forced Arabi to evacuate his position and
change front at Tel-el-Kebir. Sir Garnet now had the
use of the Sweet Water Canal, and was able, after a
night march, to attack the Egyptian lines at dawn.
That evening, Drury Lowe's cavalry were in Cairo.

Apart from the military interest, the Egyptian affair,
with its aftermath, the campaigns in the Soudan, are
notable from the fact that they formed a part of the
bloodless struggle between British and French sea
power which continued from the overthrow of Napoleon
till it was happily terminated by the establishment of
the Entente Cordiale and the growing evidence of Ger-
man ambition. The departure of the French fleet
before the bombardment of Alexandria, which placed
the administration of Egypt solely in the hands of
Great Britain, and the Fashoda incident are recalled
only to bring home the fact that superior sea power was
able to work its will without the necessity for hostilities,
but none the less decisively. Another instance is to be
found in the story of the Italian struggle for freedom.

234 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Napoleon III., in 1859, made war against Austria,
promising that he would not sheath his sword till
Italy was free from the Alps to the Adriatic. After
the two victories of Solferino and Magenta, however,
the threatening attitude of Prussia and the North
German Confederation, as well as the unwillingness
of Roman Catholic France to countenance measures
against the Papal States, impelled him to sign the
Treaty of Villafranca. By this instrument he not only
failed to redeem the promises he had made, but he
spoiled Italy of Savoy and Nice, which were to have
been his only if he fulfilled his promise. Had it not
been for the backing which the British Ministry gave
to the Italian claims, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and a
part of the States of the Church would have been lost to
the kingdom of Piedmont. The Italians recognised
that they owed more to the moral support of British sea
power than they did to the material aid of France. Nor
was that all they were to owe. When Garibaldi, having
made himself master of Sicily, crossed to the mainland
and drove the King of Naples into Gaeta, Napoleon III.
sent the French fleet thither to protect the latter.
Lord John Russell protested effectually against the
action of the French, and Garibaldi was left to continue
his operations without interference. Here the Land
Power, France, was stopped by a threat to its frontiers.
The Sea Power, unfettered by any such fear, was suc-
cessful without firing a shot.

In other directions also Great Britain was instru-
mental during this period in foiling the effort of the
sovereigns of the Continent to rivet the principles of
the Holy Alliance on the necks of European peoples.
The independence and neutrality of Belgium were
secured by treaty — so far as a "scrap of paper" could

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 235

secure tjiem; the independence of the Spanish settle-
ments in South America, won in part by the efforts of
Cochrane and other British sailors and soldiers, was
secured against a movement on the part of Spain and
France by the joint action of Great Britain and the
United States. The national government of Spain
herself was likewise supported against French aggres-
sion. It may be said, though with some caution, that
the fruits of the French Revolution during this period
were consolidated against reaction behind the aegis
of the British Navy. The subject is too wide to follow
out in detail here. But, from 1815 to 1871, the French
nation was struggling uneasily against various forms of
autocracy, whether imposed by the Legitimist mon-
archy of Louis XVIII. and Charles X., by the Liberal
monarchy of Louis Philippe, or the Caesarism of Napo-
leon III. The French people were true to their ideals
of liberty, but French wars were mainly dynastic, and
the martial nation was easily roused by the cry, "La
Patrie en danger. " France had yet to find herself — the
France that we know to-day — and, in the meantime,
the defence of the smaller nations, of the principle of
national unity and of liberty of thought and life, was
left to the silent influence of the British Navy. The his-
tory of Europe, and, indeed, of the world, for the past
hundred years, can only be read rightly in the light of
events from 1914 onwards.

In one direction, Great Britain was false to her
ideals and her mission in the world. She allowed the
Austro-Prussian attack on Denmark in 1864, and the
annexation of the Duchies of Schleswig and Hoi-
stein to Prussia. This error gave Kiel to Germany,
and laid the foundation on which the German Navy
has been built. It was the direct outcome of the Ger-

236 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

manism which had been allowed to pervade the Courts
of Europe.

The use of sea power during the Civil War in the
United States is full of interest, but must be briefly
touched on. The superiority of the North at sea
brought about the exhaustion of the Confederacy by
the stringency of the blockade, while the direct naval
action of Farragut at Mobile and elsewhere practically
cut the South in two. The blockade was only main-
tained by measures which strained the doctrines of
international law, as then laid down, to the uttermost,
and which caused serious friction between the Federal
Government and this country. The United States
which had gone to war with us in 1812 owing to the
high-handedness of our restrictions on trade, bettered
our model in their own hour of necessity. We, on our
part, have occasion to be grateful to them now for
the precedents then created, severe as was the distress
caused to this country by their application at the time.
In particular, if the American Courts had not then
evolved the doctrine of Continuous Voyage, which lays
it down that a ship attempting to run a blockade is
capturable, whatever her immediate destination, if it
can be proved that her cargo is ultimately consigned
to the enemy, we could exercise no control whatever
over goods going to Germany by way of the Dutch or
Scandinavian ports. There were many reasons for the
sympathy, now almost inexplicable, which was widely felt
for the South among the British people. But, on the
whole, the cause of the North was felt to be that which
embodied British ideals and British traditions, and
Lancashire starved without a murmur in order that that
cause might prevail. In this was the first glimmering of
the dawn which now shines in the union of the English-

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 237

speaking peoples to maintain the principles for which
their common forefathers fought.

The latent sympathy came more fully to light when
war broke out in 1898 between the United States and
Spain, on account of the barbarities practised by the
latter against the Cuban insurgents, the embarrass-
ments caused to American trade by the long-drawn-out
revolution in that island, and, above all, by the sinking
of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbour. The
na'val incidents of that war supply useful comment on
the true understanding of sea power. The Spaniards
possessed a small squadron of three armoured cruisers
and a couple of destroyers, available for service on the
other side of the Atlantic. The American fleet was at
least three or four times as strong, and included several
first-class battleships. Yet the whole East Coast was
thrown into a state of panic by the approach of Cer-
vera's little force, and the naval dispositions of the
authorities were seriously hampered by the popular
outcry for local protection. Serious uneasiness pre-
vailed concerning the fate of the battleship, Oregon,
which was on the Pacific Coast at the outbreak of war,
and which had to make the long voyage round the Horn
unattended. The Spaniards were, of course, in posses-
sion of the harbours, not only of Cuba, but also of Porto
Rico, and there was, consequently, a real uncertainty
as to the destination of the squadron. The Americans,
having no bases on the European side of the Atlantic,
could not watch it before it set out, according to the
British method. But, even so, it is quite obvious
that concentration, not dissipation, of force was the
sound strategy. Instead of ships being kept to do
"sentry-go" off the American coast, the Spanish har-
bours should have been closely watched by the light

238 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

forces, while the main fleet was kept concentrated at a
central spot, ready to fall in force on the enemy when he
appeared. As it was, the land expedition was kept
waiting for weeks before embarkation, until Cervera
was safely "bottled up" in the harbour of Santiago de
Cuba. An advance against the land defences of the
port at length drove him out on to the guns of Admiral
Sampson's fleet, and his little squadron perished gal-
lantly. A few months before, Admiral Dewey had
destroyed a small squadron of antiquated ships in
Manila Bay, and the Philippine Islands passed finally
from Spain. Thus ended the once mighty oversea Em-
pire of the Dons. The futility of trying to hold distant
possessions without the power to protect the communi-
cations with them was demonstrated once again.

The Spanish-American War, however, was chiefly
noticeable as an example of the silent but far-reaching
force of British sea power. Continental Europe, with a
fellow feeling for a sister in distress, and always resentful
of the Monroe Doctrine, which, in truth, the Americans
themselves violated by the seizure of the Spanish posses-
sions, was of a mind to interfere. But the necessary
condition of intervention was the adhesion of Great
Britain to the Continental scheme. With British sea
power hostile, or even doubtful, the military nations
were powerless. Great Britain made no sign of acquies-
cence, and the whole design fell to the ground. Nothing
was done, or even said, overtly. But there was a sig-
nificant incident in Manila Bay. A German squadron,
which had followed Dewey from China, threatened to
interfere with his operations. Sir Edward Chichester,
who was in command of the British force on the spot,
quietly anchored his ships between the Germans and
the Americans. The hint was sufficient.

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 239

In the following year sea power asserted its noiseless
influence even more decisively. When the Boer War
broke out, European sympathy, for reasons we can
understand and, for the most part, respect, was very
strongly on the side of the little peoples. Negotiations
took place between certain Powers for active interfer-
ence on behalf of the Boers. But there were then no
three fleets in Europe capable of meeting the British, and
'the negotiations broke down. We carried our armies
and all their stores and munitions over 6000 miles of
sea, as if it had been along the highroads of our own
country, and not all the ill-will in Europe could interfere
with us. The German Emperor has taken credit for
having personally vetoed a coalition against us. His
claim may be justified. He was not ready. Nor did
he want others to share the spoil. But he improved the
occasion afforded by the capture of the Bundesrat, a Ger-
man vessel conveying arms to the Boers, by uttering the
first of his famous trilogy of sayings, "We are in bitter
need of a strong Germany navy. " Of this more hereafter.

The Boer war revealed the existence of a new organic
force in the world. Colonisation has always been an
intrinsic part of sea power. But the colonies of other
nations have been either subject and tributary to the
Mother Country, or they have soon broken away from
all connection with her. Many instances have been
given in earlier chapters. Great Britain had a bitter
experience of the consequences to be expected from
straining the allegiance of a great offshoot to the break-
ing point when the American settlers threw off her
allegiance in the latter part of the eighteenth century.
Many troubles were hers afterwards in Canada, in
Australasia, and particularly in South Africa. The
impossibility of controlling distant communities of her

240 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

own race and ideas, without a share in those repre-
sentative institutions so dear to the British heart;
the equal impossibility of retaining them within the
Empire if they should wish to sever themselves from it,
were impressed upon British statesmen of the Victorian
era. It was rather in weariness than with a true vision
of the future that the white communities of Greater
Britain were endowed with the rights of responsible
government. The way was paved for their separation
when they were strong enough to stand alone. They
were made free to develop along their own lines. No-
thing but "the golden link of the Crown" remained,
to outward observance, to preserve their unity with the
Mother Country. It was an experiment which no
conscious Empire builder would have dared to try. But
the invisible forces were to prove stronger than the
visible. Common thought, common speech, common
history and traditions are the first of these. Others are,
credit and the Navy. To call a fleet of battleships
an "invisible force" seems, at first sight, absurd.
But, in the literal sense, the Navy, except for a few
ships, generally of inferior force, has been invisible to
the peoples of the Dominions. It has acted from far
away, and it unquestionably took the Canadian, Aus-
tralian, and New Zealander a long time to realise that,
if the merchant ships coming into his ports, in a huge
majority, wore the Red Ensign of Britain; if he was free
to develop the riches of his land without keeping sword
and buckler, as it were, at the end of the furrow, it was
due to "those far-distant, storm-beaten ships," on
which he never looked, and for which he was not asked
to pay a single penny. The kings of the earth take
tribute from their subjects; but his Motherland gives
and does not take.

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 241

That the Imperial idea first awoke in the White
Empire oversea through sea power admits of no doubt.
In the early eighties of last century, the Australasian
Dominions first agreed to make a voluntary contribu-
tion to the cost of the Navy in return for the permanent
retention of some light cruisers upon the station. As a
result of the enthusiasm stirred by the two Jubilees of
Queen Victoria, the Cape presented the armoured
cruiser Good Hope to the Navy, on the motion of a
Dutchman, Jan Hofmeyr, while Natal made an annual
gift of coal, and Newfoundland raised a Naval Reserve
from among her fishermen. With the growth of the
German menace and the rise of the navy of Japan, the
movement took on wider dimensions. New Zealand
gave a battle cruiser to the Navy, while the Common-
wealth of Australia laid the foundations of a naval
unit of its own. Canada proved her desire to join in
the union for defence, but action was postponed owing
to internal difficulties. Her Prime Minister, Sir Robert
Borden, however, was the first to utter a demand for
closer political union with the Mother Country and
the Sister Dominions. "Call us to your councils" are
words which will be heard more insistently when the
struggle in which the Dominions have borne so noble a
part has come to an end.

Military aid was first given in a British campaign by
the New South Wales contingent, a small body of cav-
alry which joined the British force at Suakim in 1885.
When the war with the Boer Republics broke out,
offers of aid came, and were accepted, from all the White
Dominions. What, to the monarchies of Europe,
presented itself as a war of aggression and oppression
was seen by the citizens of the free communities of our
family to be a war for freedom. Their sons came

16

242

forward with an enthusiasm which no temporary
reverses could check. The sea power of Britain
collected them from all the ends of the earth. Nor was
that all. The echo of the last shot had hardly died
away before the South African peoples themselves
were first entrusted with the rights of self-government,
and were then united into one State in which Boer
and Briton shared equal rights, the Dutch majority,
under the leadership of the general who had led the
Boer armies against us, wielding the government
of the country behind the shield of the British
Navy. Free development of their national life, a
free share in all the benefits which the mighty mari-
time resources of Great Britain could give them, and
free protection from all outside aggression were bene-
fits apparent to the naturally shrewd mind of the
Boer. On the other hand, all the experiences of our
history and all the forces of the national character have
gone to build up the Union of South Africa, and to bring
about the almost miraculous result that two generals
who, in 1900, were waging a not unsuccessful war
against the British Empire, between 1914 and 1916
commanded British armies in two victorious campaigns.
Outside the White Dominions, the possessions of
the Honourable East India Company grew into the
Empire of India. What Alexander and all succeeding
conquerors failed to do by way of the land, Great Brit-
ain accomplished by way of the sea. Our title to India
has never been disputed since Napoleon fell; no Power
has ever shaken our position. Foreign rival and native
malcontent has learned alike that England is nearer to
India than Petrograd or Berlin; even than Merv, or,
to employ a paradox, Delhi itself. The foreign policy
of Britain for the last hundred years has been based

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 243

almost entirely upon considerations which touched the
road to India. The benefits of our rule there to our-
selves have often been questioned by the materialistic
school of thought ; the benefits of our rule to the native
population have never been seriously called in question
by any one whose opinion counted. India has repaid
the debt by the aid given by her fine regiments on
the battlefields of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The place
of this great empire within the Empire, possessing, as it
does, a civilisation and a culture of its own — perhaps one
should rather say several varieties of civilisation and
culture — and with a history extending beyond that of
any of the Powers of Europe, is a question which will
have to be settled after the war, and which may afford
the most crucial test which the British race has ever
undergone of that capacity for leadership which it has
hitherto so strikingly exhibited.

With the peoples of India may be ranked the Malays,
and such of the Arab and Chinese races as are under our
rule. The gift of the battleship Malaya by the Rajas of
the Federated Malay States proved that this maritime
race of the East has a grasp of the essential meaning of
sea power. These peoples are not to be ranked with
"the heathen in his blindness. " Of the so-called "sav-
age" races of mankind, the Ocean Empire has many
under its flag, the blacks of Africa, the Dyaks of Bor-
neo, the Papuans, and the inhabitants of countless
islands. Starting with trading stations on the coasts, in
the great majority of cases, and with a history of early
contact of which we have little reason to be proud,
all the good which is in the British nature has asserted
itself in its further dealings with native races, and has
exerted itself mainly by means of the long arm of the
Navy. The overthrow of dark and bloody tyrannies

244 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

like those of the Khalifa in the Soudan and King
Prempeh in West Africa, and the substitution of a just
rule for theirs, were works which we can fearlessly bring
to the test of their fruits, without heeding the charges of
rapacity and hypocrisy hurled at us by people whose
record in dealing with the backward races of the world
will not bear a similar test. It may be confidently
asserted that, in all such cases, we have applied unflinch-
ingly, so far as they are applicable, the principles on
which our own laws and government are founded, even
to the hurt of our own material interests.

Here, too, great questions face us in the future,
especially in the lands where white settlers live in
contact with native races. They are questions which
will only be solved if we keep within us a very real and
high sense of a Divine mission, laid upon the race by
"Him Who set His Briton in blown seas and storming
showers." This line of thought has been indicated
before, but here it must be developed in greater detail, if
the reader is to grasp the point of view from which
the writer regards the Empire and the history which has
gone to its making: if the high purpose for which sea
power and the heritage it has brought has been entrusted
to us by Him who sitteth above the water-floods is to
be fully grasped. Romans, Saxons, Danes, Normans
flowed into our islands ere the keepers of the gates came
to understand the principles on which an island is
made safe from conquest. Then the gates were shut,
and, with many a struggle, the various races fused and
became one people, with very definite characteristics,
contributed by each of the elements. They fought
among themselves for principles of liberty and law,
and they evolved an ordered freedom, foundations of
equity and justice, and a temperate polity which, if it is

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 245

no more perfect than any other human contrivance, is
yet far in advance of anything existing in the world,
save that which is borrowed from itself. In the sphere
of religion, no less than in that of law and politics,
the Church of England, at once national and catholic,
peculiar to ourselves, is an instrument unmatched for
spreading an ordered Christianity among the peoples
who dwell under the flag of Britain. While the British
temperament guarantees freedom for all forms of wor-
ship, the Church of England is ready with the organi-
sation which supplies the ordinances of Christianity
wherever Britons settle, or those who dwell in the
shadow of death, fast-bound in misery and iron, crave
for the light of the Gospel. All this was forged and
formed behind the shield of sea power, and, by sea
power, has been carried to the ends of the earth. The
United States, no less than the Dominions of the
British Crown, stand on the foundation of Magna
Carta and the Petition of Right. Rudyard Kipling
has summed up in four lines the ideal on which the
Empire rests :

Keep ye the Law! Be swift to all obedience,

Cleanse the land from evil, drive the road and bridge the

ford.
Render safe to each his own, that he reap where he hath

sown.
By the peace among our peoples, let men know we serve the

Lord!

Such an ideal of empire can never contemplate keep-
ing any body of its subjects in a condition of permanent
inferiority. We loosed the slave, and, thereby, we
endowed the coloured skin with the same rights of
humanity as the white. There is no need to press

246 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

theory to its extreme. The love of logical symmetry,
so destructive of success in the task of governing
and humanising the backward peoples among other
nations, has never been a distinguishing fault of the
British character. Rough-and-ready solutions become
the habit of those who occupy their business in great
waters, and are the pioneers in strange lands: the
adaptation of means to ends. But there are native
races under our rule which are attaining to a high degree
of education and a European standard of life. Already
we open the doors of the arts and sciences freely to
individuals among these. In process of time it
must become a question of granting to whole races
equal rights of citizenship. How is that question to be
faced? The attitude of the white inhabitants of the
Dominions towards the Indians before the war was a
matter of grave disquiet to those who thought seriously
on Imperial questions. The events of the past three
years have probably paved the way for a solution of
that question. But how are we to prepare for the day
when Basuto, Kaffir, and Zulu shall claim what the
Maori already possesses, the full rights of British
citizenship?

The answer depends on the view we take of the
Empire. On the "hen-and-chicken" theory, no solu-
tion can be found. But if the advice of Sir Robert
Borden be followed and the Dominions be called to our
councils; if the inhabitants of Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa come to regard themselves
as parts of an organic whole, sharing with us the responsi-
bility for the dark lands of the Empire; if, in short, the
whole meaning of the Ocean Empire become plain,
then a way may be found for the application of the
British ideal, suitably modified, to the whole family of

THE RESTORER OF PATHS 247

nations which dwells under the British flag. The
solution is not to be looked for in a crude equality of
conditions promiscuously applied. The white people
of the Dominions have ample justification, social and
economic, for their objections to unrestricted immi-
gration. The mistakes of the French in dealing with
Hayti and of the United States in dealing with the
emancipated slaves must be avoided in the interest of
white and coloured alike. No general solution of the
thousand varying questions involved will be even
suggested here. But it is strongly urged that the first
step toward a solution is to be found in the conception of
an organic realm, knit together by sea power, in which
the blood-brotherhood of Britons shoulder a joint
responsibility for the welfare of the coloured races
which sea power has committed to their charge.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHALLENGE

THE introduction of steam and steel shipbuilding
gave all nations a fair start in a renewed struggle for sea
power. But the advantages, natural or acquired, of
Great Britain soon enabled her to distance her com-
petitors more signally than ever. These advantages
consisted (i) in geographical position, (2) in the char-
acter of her people, (3) in the colonies and possessions
she had acquired abroad, with their commodious ports,
(4) the possession of the best kind of coal for maritime
purposes, and the proximity of coal and iron deposits to
her rivers and estuaries, and (5) her supremacy in
manufactures, combined with the necessity of fetching
both food and raw material from abroad for her indus-
trial population, in exchange for the products of her
looms and workshops. The Continent, beaten down
by war, had to depend on her both as provider and
carrier. The United States alone might have chal-
lenged her position successfully; but the United States
was as yet undeveloped, and was compelled to be for
many years a borrowing nation. The Civil War
destroyed the American mercantile marine, and the
great spurt of development which followed constrained
the Americans to pay the interest of their loans to a

large extent in the freights earned by British ships.

248

THE CHALLENGE 249

By a wise, if undesigned, policy, moreover, Great
Britain, so far from being jealous of the maritime expan-
sion of other nations, showed herself ready to build both
warships and merchantmen to their order. Thus, for
years, she alone developed the new industry of steel
shipbuilding and was able to turn out tonnage at a
figure which no other country approached for cheapness.
On the Clyde, the Tyne, the Mersey, the Thames, and
in many other places, great shipbuilding establishments
appeared, which for sixty years at least no other nation
attempted to rival. The craze for excessive cheapness
brought drawbacks in maritime affairs as well as in
others. The mercantile seamen were ill-paid and ill-
fed, and an undue number of foreigners, both European
and Lascar, were employed. There were serious fears,
which the war has, happily, expelled to a large extent,
that the old breed of seamen which had given to the
British their supremacy at sea might become extinct.
On the other hand, no nation gave more heed to the
safety of its sailors at sea, and, wherever the benefits of
sea power are recognised the name of Samuel Plimsoll
must be had in honour.

It was not, perhaps, unnatural that a service which
had won so high a position by the efficiency of its
personnel under the conditions of masts and sails should
prove itself reluctant, as did the Royal Navy of Britain,
to change its motive power for steam. Long after the
maritime engine had superseded the wind as prime
mover in all ships of war, masts and sails were retained
in British ships lest the British bluejacket should lose
his seamanlike qualities. Only within the last ten years
has the engineer been accorded his rightful place among
the officers of the ship. During the preceding period,
the Navy was organised with little regard for strategical

250 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

considerations. Its dispositions were, in the main,
based upon the old rivalry with France, and its later
duty of supplying the world's police of the seas. How a
change was brought about, and the Navy made ready
and disposed to meet a new challenge will be told
hereafter. One great and beneficial change, at any
rate, marked the transition period. The men were
enlisted for continuous service, and the calling of a
man-of-warsman at last became a regular profession.
The change was rendered necessary by the much greater
specialisation required and the increasing difference
between men-of-war and merchantmen. Despite the
lack of organisation and training in the Navy as an
engine of war, however, sea power, in the wider mean-
ing of the term, was never more, completely exercised
by any country than by Great Britain during the years
of maritime peace and commercial expansion.

The steam-driven, armour-clad ship, with her turret
guns and ram, owed her origin to the genius of the
French, and, afterwards, of the Americans. The ar-
moured batteries employed against Kinburn led to the
construction of La Gloire, a wooden frigate with four-
inch iron plates on her sides, designed by Dupuy de
Lome. We followed quickly with the Warrior, which
was built of iron and plated. Then the deeds of the
Confederate ram, Merrimac, and the Federal turret-
ship, Monitor, in the American Civil War turned naval
thought in a new direction as to tactics, or, rather,
revived a very old school of tactics. Steam and the
ram, it was argued, had restored the conditions of the
oared galley. The tactics of Salamis, the ^Egatian
Islands, and Lepanto were once more studied. When
the Italian flagship, Re d'ltalia, was sunk at the battle
of Lissa by the impact of a wooden ship of greatly

THE CHALLENGE 251

inferior force, these theories were greatly strengthened.
The day of the line and of broadside fighting, it seemed,
was at an end. Line abreast, and a melee in which the
ram would decide the issue, after the enemy ship had
been more or less wrecked by a heavy bow-fire, became
the conception of a naval fight. Most nations set to
work to build ships which should be as unlike ships as
possible.

Had this view finally triumphed, the day of the
soldier on shipboard might have returned, and the
priceless heritage which we possess in our stored sea-
sense might have been rendered of no avail. But the
British Navy, though it, to some extent, bowed to the
prevailing opinion, never entirely surrendered itself to
it. The loss of the Captain was the first rude shock. It
was realised that the British must be a sea-keeping
Nsfvy, and that weatherliness was of primary impor-
tance. Then the coming of the automobile torpedo and
the swift torpedo-boat showed that the defence of big
ships against such attacks could not be entrusted en-
tirely to the heavy guns. Finally, the catastrophe to
the Victoria and, especially, the fact that the Camper-
down, which rammed her, nearly shared her fate, proved
that the ram is a two-edged weapon on which supreme
reliance could not be placed. The pendulum swung
in the other direction, and action in close formed
line-ahead, with a tremendous volume of quick-fire to
shatter the enemy's upper- works and destroy or demoral-
ise his men, became the accepted theory of those who
held to the battleship as the arbiter of battle.

At the same time, another school of thought, which
described itself as thejeune ecole, was gaining weight in
France, under the leadership of Admiral Aube. Accord-
ing to its adherents, the battleship had seen her day.

252 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Swarms of torpedo-boats would forbid the use of the
sea to her, and a multitude of fast commerce-destroyers
would cut the communications of the Power which
rashly trusted to the command of the sea for its safety.
The stored naval wisdom of the British Admiralty
forbade assent to such views, plausible as they might
seem. The development of the torpedo-boat destroyer
showed the first hope to be illusory, while the second
could only be realised if the ports were left clear of
watching squadrons. Besides, whatever success might
be achieved in denying the use of the sea to the enemy,
the theory of thejeune ecole gave no promise of securing
the use of the sea for itself. The British Admiralty
only led the opinion of the world, holding that the
strategy which had been proved and consecrated by
naval history from the earliest times remained unaltered
by mere mechanical developments. The French Navy
alone, with its flair for new ideas and mechanical
invention, was caught by the new conception, greatly
to its temporary disadvantage. The effect produced
by the development of the submarine will be best
discussed in another place.

Such, in brief, were the changes wrought on the
fighting navies of the world upon the technical side by
the introduction of steam propulsion, steel shipbuilding,
armour plating, the shell gun, the automobile torpedo,
and other like developments. In maritime affairs
generally, the effect of the changes was to render vessels
independent of the winds, but dependent on fuel supply
and on the ports where fuel could be obtained. The
ocean routes became shorter, but at the same time,
speaking generally, narrower. The carrying capacity
of ships also increased enormously. Thus there came
about, and especially since the introduction of wireless

THE CHALLENGE 253

telegraphy, a greater concentration of traffic, which
made ocean travel and conveyance more secure, at any
rate in time of peace. Merchant ships came to be
divided into "liners," or ships which voyage between
fixed points, and "tramps" which roam the world, pick-
ing up cargo where it is to be found, or are hired on
charter by merchants for particular purposes. Liners,
of course, are the descendants of the old East Indiamen,
and of the "English galleon" which sailed once a
year from Venice.

Up to 1890, the world was content to increase its
merchant traffic on the ocean without giving much heed
to the foundations on which sea power rests, or the
principles by which it • is defended. The ancient
rivalry between France and Britain prompted the
maintenance of naval competition, mainly in types
and theories, between the two countries. There were
periodical "scares" in this country, notably at the
time of the Penjeh crisis in 1885, which led to the series
of articles called "The Truth about the Navy," pro-
moted by Captain Fisher, now Lord Fisher of Kilver-
stone, and published in the Pall Mall Gazette, by Mr.
W. T. Stead, which led to the Naval Defence Act of
1889. Italy laid the foundations of her navy, but on
principles which offered no serious prospect of the
adequate defence of her peninsular position and ex-
tentfed coast-line. The United States began to build
battleships, after a period of complete paralysis, but, in
the main, rather because the American Government had
money to spare than on any intelligible theory of
defence. Minor states, such as the South American
republics, China and Japan (not yet a first-class
Power), ordered ships, Elswick cruisers for the most
part, which afforded the world almost the earliest

254 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

examples of sea fighting in the days of steam and the
torpedo. The failure of the French Navy to accomplish
anything visible to the naked eye in 1870 and of the
Turks to contest the command of the Black Sea with
Russia in 1877 caused sea power to be held in light
estimation in comparison with land power, and the
pervading influence of the British Navy in the Mediter-
ranean during this period was missed, so far as the
general public was concerned. To have a navy was
regarded, one might say, rather as a sign of substance,
like keeping a carriage. But as to the use to which that
navy should be put, the prevailing ideas were of the
mistiest.

In 1890, however, an event occurred which had the
most powerful influence on the course of events. It was
no more than the publication of a book, and a book,
moreover, which contained little which was absolutely
new. Captain A. T. Mahan, an officer of the American
Navy, and professor at the Naval College of Annapolis,
published the results of his reflections while he was
preparing his lectures under the title of The Influence
of Sea Power upon History. He owed much of the
germ of his argument to two English writers, Sir John
Knox Laughton and Admiral Colomb. But the facts
were so freshly and powerfully presented that he seemed
the prophet of a new school. He showed that sea
power consists not alone in the military navy, .but
in the whole maritime industries and aptitudes of a
nation, based on geographical position, internal eco-
nomic conditions, the national character, and the nature
of the government. He went on to prove, by a wealth
of example that sea power is silent and far-reaching in its
operation, affecting the national well-being in peace and
the national strength for war in many directions which

THE CHALLENGE 255

do not appear from superficial study. His keen and
penetrating analysis showed the action of this force
in ways unsuspected by the reader of history as it is
commonly written, from the Punic Wars down to the
outbreak of the French Revolution. This book was
followed by The Influence of Sea Power upon the French
Revolution and Empire, The Influence of Sea Power upon
the War of 1812, The Life of Nelson: the Embodiment of
British Sea Power, and several others. Mahan died
in the early part of 1915, just when his theories were
being put to the sharp test of a well-nigh universal
war, and before his own country had taken the step
which he, of all men, would most heartily have approved,
of lending her might to maintain the Freedom of the
Seas. His work had an effect which he himself can
hardly have foreseen.

Mahan's first object was to stir up public opinion in
his own country to an effort to recover the maritime
position which had been lost in consequence of the
Civil War and the great internal development of the
United States. So far as the war navy was concerned,
he was successful. The war with Spain in 1898
emphasised and reinforced his teachings. But no
eloquence of writing and argument could fight against
the conditions which he himself laid down as essential,
to maritime, as opposed to merely naval, expansion,
and, until the great war gave the United States the
opportunity to recover that which they lost in war, he
fought in vain against economic forces. How matters
will be hereafter, it is too early to foresee.

How far Mahan was prophet and how far only
herald is hard to determine. With the increasing
contraction of the world, the appropriation of its waste
space, the growth of its population, and the entry of

256 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

new peoples into the comity of nations, it is probable
that the wind was already blowing in the direction of
maritime expansion and new naval rivalries. In the
case of Japan, for instance, an island state, the develop-
ment of sea power was inevitable, once her self-imposed
isolation came to an end. It is hardly likely that
the Japanese were consciously moved by the teachings
of Mahan. Indeed, their maritime expansion began
before his day. But, in another direction, and that,
for the moment, the most important of all, his influence
was direct. Among the warmest admirers of his writ-
ings is the German Emperor, who found his vague
aspirations crystallised on his pages. Wilhelm II.
came to the imperial throne two years before The
Influence of Sea Power upon History appeared. As the
grandson of Queen Victoria, he had paid many visits
during his boyhood's years to England, and had spent
considerable time in Portsmouth Dockyard and on
board British ships. These early impressions left
their mark upon him. He became an ardent admirer
of the British Navy and a worshipper of Nelson. He
worshipped also the deeds of his ancestor, Frederick the
Great, and of his grandfather, the old Kaiser of the
Franco-German War. The opportunity to expand
his realm on the Continent was exhausted. He looked
east and he looked west. His Germans had left
their country by the hundred thousand, and were settled
under foreign flags. The growing manufactures, the
product of German skill, science, and industry, were
carried in foreign ships. Germany appeared to be what
List had called her, "the step-child of Providence."
Reflecting on all this, the teaching of Mahan came to
him as a gospel newly revealed, and the second word
of his trilogy was spoken, "Our future lies upon the

THE CHALLENGE 257

water. " But the British Islands are an immovable
barrier across the only path. While Britain remained
supreme at sea, any empire which Germany could found
across the ocean must be held in fee of her. Very well,
then, "The trident must be in our fist. " Here was the
new vision of world power, ever present to the mind of
the imperial dreamer, whether he were preaching his
strange mixed doctrine of despotism and mystic religion
in Hamburg or Kiel, or seeing visions on the Mount of
Olives, wrapped in the cloak of a Crusader. Perhaps
he himself had no hatred for the people of his mother's
land. But he and his school imbued his people with the
latent hatred which has flamed up so fiercely. The
overthrow of Great Britain became the goal of pan-
Germanism. It was the only possible goal for which
it was worth while to strive.

German maritime expansion was carried out on the
lines laid down by Colbert in the France of the late
seventeenth century, but much more persistently and
scientifically applied. Bismarck started the Colonial
Empire of Germany, with his tongue in his cheek.
Wilhelm II. made that rather unprofitable asset the
starting point of his naval aims. Somewhat before
his time, Germany having acquired a considerable grip
on the commerce of the East, liners of the Nord-
deutscher Lloyd, resplendent with much gold and plate
glass, were plying to China: subsidised vessels which
attracted a certain amount of custom from English
people anxious to get out or home more cheaply than
was possible by P. and O. Those who preferred to com-
bine more comfort and less glitter with a cheap fare,
however, preferred the Messageries Maritimes. The
Kaiser expanded the movement, with the aid of German
shipowners and financiers, among whom the most
17

258 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

conspicuous was the Jew, Herr Ballin, and soon great
vessels of the Hamburg-Amerika line were steaming
into Southampton Water, with their bands blaring
" Deutschland, Deutschland uber Alles." A sensation
was caused in Britain when one of these obtained the
"blue riband of the Atlantic," and a rather senseless
competition in speed, size, and luxury ensued, which
was chiefly useful as an advertisement of the German
shipbuilding yards. A more serious matter, really, for
our maritime position was the institution of subsidised
lines running to East Africa and Australia. By 1914,
Germany owned the second largest mercantile marine
in the world, though her steam tonnage was still only
a fourth of that owned by the British Empire. What
was formidable about German competition was the
direction of all the resources of the State, both at home
and abroad, to the one end. The ownership of the
railways by the State, and the admirable system of
internal waterways were powerful aids. Hamburg
outstripped London and became the greatest entrepdt
in the world. Moreover, with all the efforts made to
strengthen the maritime position of Germany, agri-
culture was never allowed to languish, and the German
people went into the war almost self-supporting, so far
as foodstuffs are concerned.

A military navy was obviously necessary to support
and defend this growing volume of sea-borne trade: at
least, so the German people were told, when it was
desired to obtain credits for naval expansion. They
were not told, however, that a military navy could only
protect trade adequately if it were supreme. The
unthinking were easily caught and cozened into lending
themselves to the ambitious schemes of the Emperor
and his pan-German clique. The Deutsche Flatten-

THE CHALLENGE 259

verein, established on the lines of the English Navy
League, and enjoying Royal and Imperial patronage,
soon mimbered millions of members. Whatever was
intended, there was only one end possible. Prior to
1888, the German Navy hardly had an existence. Ten
years more passed before the country and the Reichstag
could be brought to the proper frame of mind to con-
template naval expansion. But, in January, 1897,
Admiral Tirpitz succeeded Admiral von Hollman as
Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office. He proved
himself a statesman as well as a remarkably able sailor.
He adopted the usual German methods of Press-
manipulation and cajoled the Reichstag into resigning
all real power over the details of navy expenditure. In
1898, he was able to obtain the first of the famous
German Navy Acts, that known as the Sexennate,
which provided for the creation of a fleet of certain
fixed proportions within a period of six years. Battle-
ships were to be automatically replaced at the end of
twenty-five years from the voting of the first instal-
ment for their construction, and large cruisers at the
end of twenty years. These periods were reduced
by a subsequent Act to twenty and fifteen years re-
spectively. By this means it became possible to re-
place a miserable little coast-defence vessel, like the
Siegfried, of about 4000 tons, by a great Dreadnought
of 22,000 tons, and a 3ooo-ton light cruiser by a
battle-cruiser like the Hindenburg. Even before the
Act of 1898 came into full operation, it was replaced
by the Act of 1900, which nearly doubled the proposed
number of ships. The Bundesrat incident, mentioned
above, was made the occasion for obtaining this ex-
tension. The famous preamble to the Statute of 1898
runs as follows:

260 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

To protect Germany's sea-trade and colonies, in the
existing circumstances there is only one means: Germany
must have a battle-fleet so strong that, even for the adver-
sary with the greatest sea power, a war against it would
involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the
world.

For this purpose, it is not absolutely necessary that
the German battle-fleet should be as strong as that of
the greatest naval Power, because a great naval Power
will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all his
striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed
in meeting us with considerable superiority, the defeat of
a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the
enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained,
his own position in the world would no longer be secured
by an adequate fleet.

The reasoning is identical with that of Nelson when
he wrote, ' ' I am no conjurer, but this I ventured with-
out any fear, that, if Calder (with eighteen ships) got
fairly alongside their twenty-eight sail, by the time the
enemy had beaten our fleet soundly, they would do us
no harm this year. " The argument is a perfectly sound
one, as Nelson applied it; but von Tirpitz made the
radical mistake of supposing that the nation which has
always realised the supreme importance of defeating
decisively the immediate enemy could be diverted from
that policy by the fear of ulterior consequences else-
where. In the German view, the world is composed of
nations who are always on the look-out to pounce on
the weak, regardless of right or wrong, as opportunity
offers, as wolves will tear to pieces a wounded member
of the pack.

That there should be no mistake as to the meaning
of this preamble, despite the almost decent restraint of

THE CHALLENGE 261

its language, it was interpreted for the German people
by Admiral von der Goltz. This officer frankly dis-
'cussed the chance of a war with Great Britain, ending
with the declaration that, with the additions proposed,
the German fleet would be in a position to measure its
strength with the ordinary British forces in home
waters, and adding :

It should not be forgotten that the question of numbers
is far less important on sea than on land. Numerical inferi-
ority can be compensated by efficiency, by excellency
of material, by the efficiency and discipline of the men.
Careful preparation, permitting rapid mobilisation, can
ensure a momentary superiority.

These words have a most important bearing on the
sequel. The hope was no vain one, as matters stood in
1900.

The Reichstag compelled the dropping of five large
and five small cruisers from von Tirpitz's programme of
1900, but these were restored in 1906. Two years later
a further Act was passed, shortening the statutory age
of ships, and, in 1912, the final Act, providing for three
additional battleships, and increasing largely the force
to be kept in permanent commission, in accordance with
von der Goltz 's demand for speedy mobilisation. In
fourteen years, Germany sprang from the position of
an insignificant naval Power, superior only to Austria-
Hungary among the greater nations of Europe, to the
second place in the world. Instead of a squadron of
four coast defence vessels, incapable of keeping the sea
for many days, she disposed of four squadrons of eight
battleships each, two of them composed of Dread-
noughts, with four older battleships in reserve; eight
large armoured cruisers, of which five were battle-

262 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

cruisers, with two in reserve, and the nucleus of a strong
squadron of cruisers for foreign service, of which the
most noteworthy were the Goeben, Scharnhorst, and
Gneisenau. Nor does the number of ships of which
she disposed in 1914 give the full measure of her increase
in naval strength. After many years' toil, the works at
Wilhelmshaven, acquired from Oldenburg by Prussia in
1852, were completed, and her short-cut from the Baltic
to the North Sea secured by the widening and deepening
of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, necessitated by the open-
ing of the Dreadnought era. The Kaiser and his
Ministers are, at least, entitled to this credit : that they
have spared neither toil nor treasure in their attempt
to secure the mastery of the world by land and sea.

During the years of German naval expansion, events
of equal significance were taking place on the other side
of the globe. The growth of the Japanese Navy, as has
been pointed out, is a perfectly natural one. The
Japanese people have all the qualities, and their native
land all the advantages and needs which make for sea
power. Lying off the mainland of Asia, as the British
Islands lie off the mainland of Europe, the geographical
position of the Japanese Islands confers the same sort of
control over the Pacific and Indian Oceans, so far as
the mainland is concerned, as we exercise over the
communications of Germany, Holland, Scandinavia, and
Northern Russia with the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
There is, however, this important difference; that
whereas the Continent of Europe is occupied by power-
ful organised States, standing, roughly, on the same
level of civilisation and enterprise as we, Japan is con-
fronted with the inchoate mass of China, the prey of
European ambitions, and with the lower races of Korea
and Manchuria. Under no circumstances should we

THE CHALLENGE 263

seek possessions on the Continent of Europe. The
need to keep the conquering white race out of Eastern
Asia, so far as she may, has compelled Japan to seek
territory on the mainland. Japan emerged from a
state of feudal isolation during the sixties of last cen-
tury. The necessity for a navy was apparent to her
statesmen, and she called upon Great Britain for aid.
The late Sir Archibald Douglas was appointed head of
the Naval Mission to Japan, and he was the father of
the navy which fought the battles of the Yalu and Tsu-
shima, while Admiral Togo, the victor in the latter
engagement, received his education on board the Wor-
cester, the training ship for cadets for the British mer-
cantile marine.

The war with China, in 1894, was» essentially a war
of prestige. China claimed a suzerainty over Korea
which Japan would not admit. An attempt to send
reinforcements by sea was met by the sinking of the
transport conveying them by a torpedo fired from the
Naniwa, under the command of Captain Togo, as he
then was. A naval engagement was fought off the
mouth of the Yalu River in Korea, in which the fast
Japanese cruisers utterly defeated a Chinese force which
included two battleships. The Chinese land forces in
the Peninsula were no less decisively defeated at Ping-
yang, and the Japanese then set themselves to reduce
the two great naval strongholds of China, Port Arthur,
and Wei-hai-wei. Their efforts were successful, and
the remnant of the Chinese Navy fell into their hands,
but the intervention of Germany, France, and Russia
compelled them to restore Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei,
the former of which was leased to Russia two years
later. About the same time, Germany compelled the
Chinese to lease them the settlement of Kiao-chau, in

264 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the Shan-tung Peninsula. It must be added that
Great Britain acquired Wei-hai-wei as an offset to these
concessions. But no attempt has ever been made to
turn the place into a great naval fortress, as did the
Russians at Port Arthur and the Germans at Kiao-
chau.

Although the Chinese were defeated, Japan suffered
a blow to her prestige by the European intervention
which followed her victory, which she could not endure
patiently. Europe was treating China as an artichoke
to be eaten leaf by leaf. Besides the naval stations of
Hong-Kong and Wei-hai-wei, held by Great Britain,
Port Arthur held by Russia, and Kiao-chau held by
Germany, there were settlements and concessions at
Shanghai, Hankow, and other places, while Europeans
were under the extra-territorial jurisdiction of their
Consular Courts. That would not have mattered had
the Japanese had a similar standing; but not only had
they no such standing, but Europeans in Japan itself
enjoyed a similar right. The Japanese were thus
placed in the category of uncivilised, or semi-civilised
nations, along with China and Turkey. They owed
their release from this humiliating position to the
friendly sympathy of the Sea Power of the West,
which elevated their Legation to the dignity of an
Embassy, abandoned its Consular Courts, and eventu-
ally entered into formal alliance. Other nations were
compelled to follow the example of Great Britain, so far
as the first two matters were concerned, and Japan
entered fully into the comity of Powers.

She had, none the less, to struggle for breathing-
space, with the naval Powers of Europe hemming her in,
if she was to attain to the position to which she aspired,
and the Russian threat to Korea brought matters to a

THE CHALLENGE 265

crisis. The war which followed presents many features
of interest to the student of sea power. Japan pos-
sessed six first-class battleships, and as many armoured
cruisers of a good type, which were reinforced at the
beginning of the war by the Kasuga and Nisshin, vessels
which had been built in Italy for the Argentine Republic.
Russia had six battleships of approximately equal force
to those of Japan in Port Arthur, with one armoured
cruiser, while three armoured cruisers were at Vladi-
vostok. The two. Powers were about equal in light
cruisers, and the Japanese superior in torpedo craft.
But, whereas the force enumerated composed the whole
of Japan's naval strength, the Russians had four good
battleships in the Baltic completed and another com-
pleting, as well as a considerable force of older
battleships. They had been for some time drafting
more ships to the Far East, and it was possible to
foretell almost to a day when war would break out by
watching the movements of Russian ships. In point of
fact, when the seventh Russian battleship reached the
Suez Canal, the Japanese opened hostilities by a sur-
prise torpedo attack on Port Arthur. The Kasuga
and Nisshin, at the same time, were just out of reach
of molestation.

Russia depended on the long single line of the Trans-
Siberian Railway for her communications. The Japan-
ese had a short and rapid line by sea. Moreover, they
held the central position, between the two parts of the
Russian fleet in Port Arthur and Vladivostok. They
sealed the former port in order to get their armies
ashore, the one in Korea, the other on the neck of the
Liao-tung Peninsula, at the head of which Port Arthur
stands. They watched the Vladivostok ships with a
division of armoured cruisers. Thus, secure on the sea,

266 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

they threw themselves across the Russian communi-
cations with Port Arthur, and soon had the place
besieged on the land side as well as blockaded by sea.
They suffered some damage from the Vladivostok
cruisers, which contrived to slip out in a fog, and sink
the vessel which was carrying the siege-train for Port
Arthur. But, except for this, the communications of
the Japanese were not interfered with. But the Rus-
sians made the fatal mistake of treating their squad-
ron as a part of the armament of the fortress. They
lost one battleship by a mine explosion, but the Japan-
ese lost two, and the latter had nothing in reserve,
while the Russians had the whole Baltic Fleet. If their
admirals had remembered the saying of Nelson recorded
above, and had engaged their enemy resolutely in a fleet
action, it is more than likely that the Baltic Fleet would
have restored the local command of the sea to Russia,
and that Port Arthur would have been saved. As it
was, after one feeble effort to escape to Vladivostok on
August 10, 1904, in which they lost their battleship, the
Tsessarevitch, which was interned at Shanghai for the
rest of the war, the Russian fleet tamely awaited de-
struction in the harbour, and, when the place was
surrendered early in January, 1905, fell into the hands
of the Japanese.

By that time the Baltic Fleet, under Admiral Rojdest-
vensky, was on its way out. But the purpose of
its mission was gone. It was the laughing-stock of the
world; but the laughter was ill-timed. Rojdestvensky,
a good officer, really performed a remarkable feat in
getting his heterogeneous, ill-found, ill-manned fleet
to the end of its long voyage in any sort of fighting
trim. He had not a single base on the way, and had to
coal in ill-protected roadsteads. Every place he passed

THE CHALLENGE 267

sent news of his passing ; the French, although in alliance
with Russia, had "paired" with Great Britain, the Ally
of Japan, to substitute benevolent neutrality for active
participation in the struggle, and Rojdestvensky got
sympathy, but little assistance, from the French posses-
sions he passed on his way. Japanese cruisers shadowed
him from Madagascar onwards, but the main fleet of
his enemy awaited him in the Straits of Tsu-shima, in
confidence that, from that central position, it would be
able to intercept him, whether he took the direct route
or attempted to reach Vladivostok by way of the Tsu-
garu Strait between Nippon and Yezo. His ships,
having left their auxiliaries off the Chinese coast, were
weighed down by deck loads of coal and supplies till
the upper edges of their armour belts were submerged.
No fleet was ever in a worse condition to face a decisive
action.

Togo, on the other hand, had only four battleships
to oppose to an equal number of first-class vessels and
several of more ancient date possessed by his enemy.
Moreover, his guns were worn with his ceaseless service
off Port Arthur, and he had no time to change them.
But his war-hardened crews and his nearness to his
bases of supply gave him an immense advantage over his
enemy. On the morning of May 28th, he received in-
formation of the approach of his enemy. In probably
conscious imitation of Nelson's immortal signal before
Trafalgar, he encouraged his men with the words,
"The fate of the Empire depends on this day's event.
Do your duty, every one of you. " The sea was en-
veloped in a patchy fog, out of which the Japanese ships
suddenly loomed across the bows of their enemy, before
the latter could form his line of battle. Togo engaged
the head of the enemy's line with his battleship division,

268 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

to which the armoured cruisers Kasuga andNisshin
were attached, while Kamimura, with the rest of the
armoured cruisers, attacked the rear. The Russian
battleship Oslyobia was sunk almost at the first salvoes.
The rest of the fleet succeeded in forming some sort of
line-ahead, but their formation was almost immediately
broken up, and the rest of the battle, which lasted for
the best part of two days, was a melee, in which the
Japanese torpedo-flotillas played a deadly part. Togo
was forced to close action by the inefficiency of his worn
guns. He relied on the devastating effect of twelve-
inch shells, charged with high explosive, on the crews
and upper works of his opponents. He could not pierce
the armour-belts of the Russian battleships. Those
which were sunk by gun-fire owed their fate to their
overloaded condition. The water pouring in above the
protective deck caused them to capsize. The older
ships proved themselves utterly incapable of resisting
attack. In the end, one modern battleship, the Orel,
was captured, together with two small coast-defence
vessels, while the Suvarof, Rojdestvensky's flagship,
Borodino, Alexander III., and Oslyabia were sunk,
besides all the rest of the older battleships, the armoured
cruisers, and all the protected cruisers but two. Rojdest-
vensky himself, wounded in the head and senseless, was
removed from his doomed flagship on board a destroyer,
and captured by the Japanese on the second day. Tsu-
shima was the most complete "wipe out" in the annals
of fleet warfare, more complete even than the Nile. No
Japanese ship was sunk, or even seriously injured, and
the loss of the victors in men was astonishingly small.
British opinion was highly incensed at the time
against the Russians on account of the stupid affair
of the Dogger Bank, when British fishing boats were

THE CHALLENGE 269

fired upon and sunk by the inexperienced and "jumpy"
Russians, in the absurd belief that there was a Japanese
torpedo-boat lurking among them in disguise. But
the infinite pathos of Rojdestvensky's attempt and
the high qualities of courage and endurance displayed
by the Russians may now be better appreciated and
acknowledged. Rojdestvensky saved the honour of
the Russian flag at a tremendous cost. There was
nothing else he could do. Had he made Vladivostok in
safety there was no service to his country he could
hope to perform. Port Arthur had fallen; the battle
of Mukden had been fought and lost. The strength
of Japan was unequal to the total overthrow of Russia;
but the Court intriguers who had brought the war
about had thrown and lost. Their blunders were
irretrievable. Success or failure turned on the com-
mand of the sea, and sea power once again refused to lend
itself to the purposes of dynastic and military aggres-
sion. Its use misunderstood and its elements mis-
handled, the navy of Russia, greatly superior by the
book, was brought to ruin by the lesser, but efficiently
handled, navy of Japan. The campaign, admirably
conceived by the Japanese General Staff, naval and
military, is a model of that type of "limited war" to
which sea power so readily adapts itself. The objects
of Japan were attained without her being constrained
to the hopeless task of attempting to crush her giant
adversary, and this happy result was due to her com-
mand of the sea.

Much friction arose between Great Britain and
Russia, not only on account of the Dogger Bank inci-
dent, but also on account of the conduct of the Russian
auxiliary cruisers in capturing and searching British ves-
sels. How far the Russians exceeded belligerent rights, as

270 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

we should be inclined to claim them to-day, when we our-
selves are belligerents, it would take too long to argue.
Vessels were seized and searched for contraband far out-
side the zone of hostilities, with an entire absence of proof
that any part of their cargo had an enemy destination,
and to this our Government took a strong and successful
objection. The Russians also set the fatal precedent
of sinking ships on the plea of "military necessity" —
that necessity consisting of inability to bring them into
port — which was afterwards admitted by the Hague
Conference, and thus gave the Germans a handle for
their submarine campaign.

Small as was the effect of the Russian cruiser opera-
tionsjn the war with Japan, those operations gave clear
evidence of the ability of marauding vessels to keep the
sea for many weeks together, lost to the ken of humanity
and subsisting on coal taken either from captured ships
or from colliers chartered for the purpose. Two vessels
of the Russian Volunteer Fleet from the Black Sea,
named for war purposes Dneister and Rion, were thus
lost to sight for a long period. Meanwhile, the British
protest against their action was allowed by the Russian
Government, which sent orders for their recall. It was
one thing, however, to send orders, and another thing to
communicate with the ships. For this purpose, the
Russian Government had to appeal for the good offices
of the British, and the ships were eventually found,
and their orders conveyed to them by British cruisers
on the Cape Station. The reality of the British con-
trol of the seas could hardly have received plainer
demonstration.

The Russo-Japanese War has been dealt with at
some length because it is, in many respects, a turning-
point in the history of sea power. The Russian Navy

THE CHALLENGE 271

was annihilated. The growing German Navy, by no
direct act of its own, now had command of the Baltic.
German ambition, encouraged also by the apparent
collapse of Russian military power on land, had now, as
it considered, a free hand to deal with France. A
period of provocation at once began, in Morocco and
elsewhere, in the course of which France was subjected
to dire humiliation. The balance was redressed by the
formation of the Entente Cordiale between this country
and her gallant neighbour, to which, by slow degrees,
Russia became a partner. The grain of mustard seed
had, indeed, been sown by the wise diplomacy of King
Edward VII. some years earlier; but the plant came to
maturity between 1905 and 1911. The^ consequences
on our naval policy were immediate. On the very day
when the Russian fleet sank the fishing boats on the
Dogger Bank, Admiral Sir John Fisher became First
Sea Lord, with practically a free hand to carry out
a gigantic programme of reform, which was to prepare
the Navy for the great conflict with its new enemy.
The period of tension which followed the Dogger
Bank incident showed how faulty our naval dispositions
were to meet a threat from the North Sea. Our princi-
pal fleet was in the Mediterranean; the Channel Fleet
was at Gibraltar, and the defence of home waters rested
upon the Home Fleet, a collection of antique vessels,
used for port- and coast-guard ships, generally known
irreverently as the ' ' gobby fleet. ' ' If hostile action had
been taken against Rojdestvensky before he passed
Ushant, and had the French joined their allies, the
British Navy would have been liable to be attacked in
detail. The lesson was reinforced a few years later, when
Germany suddenly presented to France what was
almost an ultimatum, demanding the dismissal of M.

272 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Delcasse from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
Channel Fleet was, once more, at Gibraltar, with the
newly formed Atlantic Fleet. Both were ordered to
stand fast, for fear the diplomatic situation should be
unfavourably affected by a concentration in home
waters. The Home Fleet was then, perhaps, suffi-
ciently strong to deal with the existing German Navy.
But if these things were done in the green tree, what
might not be done in the dry?

Sir John Fisher's schemes were based, in his own
words, on the necessity for securing "the fighting effi-
ciency of the Fleet, and its instant readiness for war."
He recalled the six battleships from China, where, after
the disappearance of Russian sea power, they were
no longer needed for the time; he reduced the Mediter-
ranean Fleet and the Channel Fleet each to six ships,
and he utilised the vessels thus obtained to create the
Atlantic Fleet, of six battleships, and to strengthen the
Home Fleet with comparatively modern vessels. These
latter were kept at the three great naval ports, manned
with nucleus crews, and organised in divisions under the
officers who would command them in war. The neces-
sary men were obtained by recalling the small cruisers,
sloops, and gunboats kept on foreign stations, ships of
little or no fighting power, which nevertheless absorbed
about ten thousand seamen. This reform was hotly
contested, on the ground that the number of battleships
kept in full commission was somewhat reduced thereby.
But, in point of fact, the nucleus crews provided were
so large that, since they included all the skilled ratings,
and were continually practised at sea, they were fit to
fight even without their "balance crews, " which, more-
over, consisted of the men who were going through the
schools, or were otherwise employed in their home ports.

Underwood & Underwood.

British Destroyer " Foam "

A British " Dreadnought "

THE CHALLENGE 273

The net result was to render nugatory von Tirpitz's
hope of being able to mobilise the German Navy more
rapidly than the British could be mobilised.

Sir John was, in reality, silently and adroitly, swing-
ing round the British battle-front from south to east.
The Dreadnought, the first of the all-big-gun class
of battleship, was ordered in 1905 and pushed to com-
pletion in a year. The nation was astonished when
instead of being placed in full commission in one of the
sea-going fleets, she was attached to a new nucleus crew
unit, called the Nore Division of the Home Fleet. The
new class of battle-cruisers, Invincible, Indomitable, and
Inflexible, followed her there, and then, when the time
was ripe, the Nore Division and the Channel and Atlan-
tic Fleets became one fully commissioned force, the
Home Fleet. This force was further strengthened as
ships came to hand. The remaining battleships were
withdrawn from the Mediterranean, the French under-
taking the guardianship of our mutual interests in that
sea, and, eventually, one single organisation of our
battleship force emerged, known as the First and Second
Fleets, each consisting of four complete squadrons
of eight ships each, the first four in full commission,
the second with nucleus crews of greater or less size.
Each squadron had its attached cruiser squadron, the
First consisting of battle-cruisers, and each its flotilla
of torpedo-boat destroyers, with light cruisers as flotilla
leaders. Besides this, the surplus torpedo-craft and
the large submarine flotilla were organised under an
Admiral of Patrol, to undertake the guardianship of
the coast and thus leave the fleets a free hand. The
gunnery of the fleet was revolutionised according to
the methods of Admiral Sir Percy Scott, while, by a new
system of common entry and training, it was sought to

18

274 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

amalgamate the officers of the military and engineering
branches. A War Staff was appointed at the Admiralty,
and a War College established at Portsmouth, for the
study of naval strategy and tactics. For the first
time since 1815 we had a scientifically thought-out sys-
tem of naval defence, based on the occupation of a
central position in home waters over against the anti-
cipated foe, but spreading into all the seas of the world.
All the advantages of recent growth were taken into
account : wireless telegraphy, the turbine, oil fuel. Ships
were designed according to the strategical and tactical
theories of their use which were worked out. Moreover,
the war-navy and the mercantile marine were brought
into closer relation with each other, mainly through the
instrumentality of Lord Charles Beresford. A step
which has proved fruitful of good in the time of testing.
The underlying principle of strategy in all these
reforms was the old one: that the main force of Great
Britain should face the main force of the enemy in over-
whelming strength from a position which would give it
the best chance of forcing an action should opportunity
present itself. Behind this "sure shield, " the activities
of the country, whether military or commercial, could
go on unchecked. A military force was postulated
for home defence, capable of dealing with a raid of
seventy thousand men, or, in the formula adopted, of
such strength as to ensure that, if the enemy come, he
must come in such force that he could not come at all.
An Expeditionary Force of one hundred and sixty
thousand men was provided for, which the naval people
hoped would be used in conjunction with the fleet, to
threaten descents on the enemy's coast, and thus to
immobilise a number of his troops out of all proportion
to its own strength. The magnitude of the effort

THE CHALLENGE 275

which Great Britain has been compelled to make by
land, and which has upset all the considered strategy
on which our plans were based, could not have been fore-
seen. But the Navy was prepared to guarantee the safe
passage of the Expeditionary Force to the Continent of
Europe, even before the fleet of the Power next to our-
selves in strength had been met and defeated, and to
maintain its communications. It has fully made good
its word.

Sir John Fisher did not remain in office long enough
to see his schemes come to full fruition. He reached the
retirement age of an Admiral of the fleet in 1910, and
was raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Fisher of
Kilverstone. In the words of Lord Brassey, he had done
"the day's work of a giant. " Naturally, some parts of
his schemes raised bitter opposition; but they gave us
the Navy with which we have successfully faced the
German onslaught. That, however, is a subject which
must be reserved for the next chapter.

In 1911 the Germans attempted to establish them-
selves on the western coast of Morocco, in a position
which would have been eminently favourable for attacks
upon our commerce. The gunboat Panther suddenly
appeared off Agadir, and was later replaced by the light
cruiser Berlin. The ensuing period was full of danger.
But the firm attitude of Great Britain, whose interests
were directly menaced, encouraged the French, on this
occasion, to stand firm. The matter ended by a com-
promise, the French yielding a part of the French Congo
in return for an abandonment of German pretensions
in Morocco. It was a piece of successful blackmail on
the part of the Germans ; but the event showed that the
Entente Powers were no longer in a mood to allow
the bully of Europe to have his way, and the reorganised

276 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

sea power of Great Britain forbade him to hope that
he could reach the object of his desires. In the autumn
of the same year the Italians attacked the Turkish
possessions in Tripoli, while in 1912 the war between
Turkey and the Balkan States took place. These
events do not strictly belong to our subject, but they
were each of them incidents which led directly to the
great struggle which was to follow. The year 1913 was
devoted by Germany to the increase of her land arma-
ments, a threat to which the French immediately re-
sponded. Internal troubles both in France and Great
Britain during the following year made the Germans
believe that they saw their chance. The time was ripe
for the blow in other ways also.

CHAPTER XII

THE VALLEY OF DECISION

WHENEVER a tyrant has come into conflict with
sea power it has broken him. It is a force which tyrants
have attempted to wield, but have consistently failed.
It was so with Xerxes, with Philip II., with Louis XIV.,
with Napoleon. Xerxes chastising the Hellespont is an
allegory, the meaning of which is revealed in the history
of mankind. The issue was raised afresh in 1914 by
Wilhelm II. of Germany and his ally of Austria. The
arrogant revival of the doctrines of the Holy Alliance
which was witnessed after Sadowa and Sedan had
placed Prussia in a dominating military position was a
gauntlet thrown down to the free nations of the world.
A whole logic of tyranny, based on an insane pride of
race, a lust for domination, a worship of armed might,
and a theory of the Divine Right of Kings was worked
out by soldiers and professors and presented to the
mystic dreamer who sat upon the Imperial Throne.
The descendants of Luther took Nietzsche for their
prophet. Christianity became, for them, a "slave
religion"; its tenets of mercy and justice were deemed
unworthy of a race of super-men; a reincarnation of
Wotan was installed in the Eternal Throne as "the good
old God" of the German tribes. Not consciously, of
course. But the attributes of the God the Germans

277

278 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

came to worship were those of Wotan rather than of
the God of Love revealed in Jesus Christ.

The whole machinery of the State moved to one end.
There is no denying the energy, capacity, and mental
power the Germans put into their task of national and
Imperial organisation from 1871 onwards. There is
this much to be said for them: their Empire was no
natural growth, but a piece of elaborate and skilful
cabinet-making. By the sword it was won; by the
sword alone it could be kept. Moreover, it was born
late into the family of nations. The vacant spaces of
the world were already allotted. Only the sword could
carve a way to world-power, and to the sword must be
added the trident, if Great Britain, which lay like a
breakwater across the path to oversea empire, was to
be removed out of the way. To many nations the
task might have seemed too great. They would have
been content with the material fruits of their industry,
and, armed for defence, would have abstained from
provocation of their neighbours. But that was not the
tradition which the Hohenzollerns had inherited from
Frederick the Great. It was not the logical outcome
of the teaching of Bismarck — who, be it said, was too
great to be logical. A frenzied conceit, spread through
all classes of the drilled and docile nation by the pro-
fessors and school teachers, taught that the world
needed, for its happiness, to be brought under the sway
of German Kultur. Thus, while other peoples stood
dismayed at German tastelessness and vulgarity, this
besotted folk regarded itself as the guide predestined
to lead the world in sweetness and light. The smaller
nations had no right to a separate existence. For
their own good it was requisite that they should come
direct under the benevolent tyranny of Hohenzollern

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 279

or Hapsburg, or should submit to the rule of a Teutonic
princelet placed upon the throne and upheld by an
army trained by German officers on the German model.
Happily for European liberty, one poison counter-
acted another. Pan-Germanism, on the one hand, and
Pan-Slavism on the other, prevented that League of
Monarchs which would in very truth have riveted the
principles of the Holy Alliance on the necks of all
Continental peoples. We are so accustomed to think
of Germany, Austria, and Italy as composing the Triple
Alliance, that we forget the days of the Drei-Kaiser-
bund which threatened a revival of the "leagued oppres-
sion" which destroyed Polish independence. The work
of the Imperial meeting at Skiernevice in the early
eighties of last century never came to fruition, owing
to the irreconcilable antagonism between the ambitions
of the Slavs and the Germanic peoples in relation to
Turkey and the Near East. Italy was forced into
an unnatural alliance with the Tedeschi, whom, of
all people, the Italians most heartily abhor, by the pres-
sure on her northern frontiers. The advantage to
Germany and Austria of her adhesion to the Central
League consisted in the reinforcement which her navy
gave to their sea power in the Mediterranean, and the
route into Eastern France, turning the flank of the
French positions, which the use of her territory would
give. But the adhesion of Italy to the Central League
in the event of war depended on one thing, as we shall
see : on the attitude of Great Britain. With the excep-
tion of the future of Albania and Epirus, it is difficult
to see a single point where the interests or sentiments
of the Italian people were identical with those of the
Germans and Austrians, and even in the excepted case,
the identity was negative, not positive. The Italians

280 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

desired that the Serbians should be kept out of Durazzo
and San Giovanni di Medua, the Greeks out of Avlona.
They certainly did not desire to see these ports pass to
Austria.

In 1914, the German Navy had risen to the position
of second in the world. It was far from being in a posi-
tion to challenge single-handed the naval might of
Great Britain, for our strength in heavy ships was nearly
two to one numerically, and probably a very great deal
more than two to one in the other elements which make
sea power. But, as we saw from the Preamble to the
German Navy Act of 1900, the German Admiralty
held the opinion that "it is not absolutely necessary
that the German battle-fleet should be as strong as that
of the greatest naval Power, because a great naval
Power will not be able, as a rule, to concentrate all its
striking forces against us." The diplomacy of King
Edward and the naval policy of Lord Fisher had rend-
ered the hope underlying this sentence nugatory. Our
battle-front had been swung round to face eastward,
and our rear had been rendered safe by the new and
friendly relations into which we had entered with
France and, subsequently, with Russia. There re-
mained two hopes for the Germans : First, that we should
argue as they did, that the defeat of a strong German
Navy would so substantially weaken us that our own
position in the world would no longer be secured by an
adequate fleet, and that, therefore, we should hesitate
to join in the struggle; and, secondly, that their antici-
pated superiority in training, in material, and, above
all, in speed of mobilisation, might avail to give them
an initial advantage which would counteract their total
inferiority in strength. Both hopes were doomed to
disappointment.

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 281

The first assumption is a characteristic manifestation
of that cynical philosophy known to the school of Bis-
marck as "Realpolitik. " That nothing ought to
count in national policy except advantage; that truth,
honour, faith, loyalty have no place in international
relations; that the plighted word of king or people
should hold good just so long as convenience prescribes
and may be broken when circumstances alter: such
are the principles underlying German statecraft, and
such are the principles on which the Wilhelmstrasse
seems to have believed, quite sincerely, that we should
act. The bond we had signed and sealed, along
with Prussia, to protect the neutrality of Belgium; our
amity with France and Russia, were not expected to
weigh with us against the chance which would come of
fishing in troubled waters if .we kept our sea power intact.
The earth and everything in it would belong to us and
Germany if we held aloof — until the time came for Ger-
many to swallow our share as well as her own. Such
was the thought underlying the dishonouring conditions
of neutrality offered by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg
to our Government. Such was the ethical outlook
from which sprang his cry of mortification and anger
that all this should be thrown away for the sake of "a
scrap of paper." The British and the German minds;
the point of view of militarism and sea power are, as
the mathematicians say, asymptotic. If it be true that
a gentleman is one who "sweareth unto his neighbour
and disappointeth him not, though it be to his own
hindrance," then, in that memorable interview with
Sir Edward Goschen, Bethmann-Hollweg wrote himself
down a cad. And he spoke in the name of his nation.

Lest the charge of unctuous rectitude which some
of our own countrymen level at us when our obligation

282 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

to Belgium is put forward as our ground for war be
brought against the foregoing passage, let it be frankly
acknowledged that our interest jumped with our
honour. Otherwise our pledge to Belgium would never
have been given. We were about to fight once more
the age-long issue which had brought us into the field
every time it has been raised, from the Spanish Armada
to the defeat of Napoleon. To maintain the independ-
ence of the small nations which fringe the coastline
of Europe, and to prevent, so far as lies in our power,
any one of the great military monarchies of the Con-
tinent from enlarging its access to blue water are ob-
jects for us no less vital than to preserve the balance of
power and to check all attempts at universal dominion.
Indeed, the three things all hang together. For this
reason, we have always fought for the independence of
the Low Countries. For this reason we have been the
steadfast ally of Portugal. For this reason we, for
years, as Lord Salisbury said, "backed the wrong
horse" by defending the Turks against the Russians.
Once we failed to be true to our policy, and our failure
gave Kiel to Germany.

Only when the secrets of all hearts are revealed will
the cross-currents which swayed the minds of men in the
eventful days between the murder of the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand on June 28th, and the outbreak of war
be fully understood. Nothing is yet clear, save the
dignified determination of France to stand by Russia,
the heroic resolve of King Albert and his Belgians to
resist aggression, and the calm resolution with which
Great Britain stood to her word. The motives of the
Russian people are clear enough in the light of subse-
quent events ; but those of the Tsardom are less easy
to unravel. As to Germany and Austria, arrogance,

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 283

ambition, and panic seem to have borne about equal
parts. By the morning of August 4th, Germany knew
that, if she persisted in her intention to attack France
and to violate the neutrality of Belgium in order to do
so, the sea power of Britain would be ranged against her.
The German Higher Command could hardly be so
obtuse as not to realise, at least partially, what that
meant. But they still hoped to neutralise their dis-
advantage by rapid mobilisation and a dashing "hussar
stroke" at the outset. They had seized an opportunity
which presented itself at a favourable moment. The
German Navy is a conscript force. It has, for back-
bone, a large number of petty officers and leading hands
who volunteer for continuous service and make a life
profession of the navy. But of the rest one-third is
changed every year, the change taking place in the
early autumn. In the month of August, therefore,
the German Navy reaches its highest point of efficiency,
the youngest members of its crews having had about
a year's training, while the three-year men are still on
board. In August, 1914, the High Sea Fleet had just
returned from manoeuvres when war broke out. The
manoeuvres themselves had followed immediately upon
the junketings at Kiel to celebrate the re-opening of
the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal after the widening and deep-
ening necessitated by the coming of the Dreadnought
type of ship. Admiral Sir George Warrender and a
division of the First Battle Squadron had been present,
and the Kaiser had gone out of his way to show excep-
tional courtesy to him and to his accomplished wife.

As it happened, the circumstances were hardly less
fortunate for the British Navy, since a test mobilisation
of the Second, or nucleus crew, Fleet, which had been
ordered months previously when there was no hint of

284 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

trouble in the air, had just been brought to a successful
conclusion. The events of the latter half of July will
long live in the memory of those who took part in them.
On the eighteenth, the long lines of ships, stretching
from the entrance to Portsmouth Harbour across to the
Island, lay in sunlight, with a stiff breeze which stretched
the ensigns and admirals' flags as stiff as boards. The
picket boats and pinnaces raced to and fro, tumbling
and tossing over the gleaming waves, bringing parties
of guests to the various ships. For the King was com-
ing to inspect his fleets. In the interval of waiting,
Shamrock III. danced down the lines like some frail
butterfly, on her way to challenge for the America Cup,
and in tow of the Erin, destined to finish her journey,
not in New York Harbour, but in the Adriatic. Over
this world of light and gaiety came the first shadow of
the storm. The King's visit was cancelled.' He was
engaged with the Party leaders in a last effort to avert
civil war in Ireland. That even graver matters lay
behind, few guessed.

Two days later he came. It was a grey, wet morn-
ing as the harbour tugs detailed to convey the spectators
took up their position beyond the Horse Fort. The
ships weighed anchor, and were led by the King in the
Victoria and Albert out to sea. The yacht anchored
hard by, and the guns of the great ships pealed forth
their A ve Ccesar! as they steamed by. First battleships,
Dreadnoughts, and pre- Dreadnoughts ; then battle-
cruisers, armoured cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers; the
destroyer flotillas: in endless stretch of pageantry they
went by while the seaplanes wheeled and circled and
dipped overhead. The mightiest fleet ever assembled
steamed out past the Nab on its last errand of peace.
And there were in that array ships which should return

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 285

no more at all. The war-cloud was, by then, bigger
than a man's hand, and in the minds of the spectators
the thought was present that things might be as it
proved they were destined to be.

On July 24th, after four days' exercise in the Channel,
the First Fleet returned to Portland, and the squadrons
of the Second Fleet to their home ports, where the
reservists were dismissed to their homes. The First
Fleet was to have given manoeuvre leave to the crews
by watches. But on July 26th the order was flashed
down to it, "Stand fast!" The ships of the Second
Fleet were ordered to remain in close proximity to their
"balance crews, " that is, to the men in the schools and
harbour establishments detailed to bring them up to
full complement. On July 29th the First Fleet moved
from Portland, the bands playing The Red, White, and
Blue; Britons, Strike Home; Hearts of Oak; and such like^
stirring airs of Eighteen Hundred and War-time. The
movement was quite unexpected, and only a small
crowd had assembled on Portland Breakwater to cheer
them as they put to sea. They "faded like a cloud in
the silent summer heaven, " and no one, the Germans
least of all, knew their destination. But when that
fleet steamed out of Portland, the chance of a sudden
blow on which the hope of Germany at sea was based,
vanished. On August 2nd, Mr. Churchill took the step
which, whatever view is taken of his subsequent actions,
earned him the undying gratitude of his country. He is-
sued the order to mobilise the whole of our naval forces.
The response bettered expectation. On the evening of
August 3rd the Admiralty were able to announce that,

the mobilisation of the British Navy was completed in
all respects at four o'clock this morning. This is due to

286 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the measures taken, and to the voluntary response of the
reserve men in the absence of a Royal Proclamation,
which has now been issued. The entire Navy is now on
a war footing.

The force so mobilised comprised the whole of the
effective warships in the Navy List, and the trawler
reserve, which had been organised for mine-sweeping.
Mercantile auxiliaries were taken up, and their guns
mounted with extraordinary rapidity. Necessarily,
many men of the Royal Naval Reserve, which consists
of merchant seamen, were out of the country at the
start. But the Fleet Reservists and the Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve showed up in full numbers from the
start. That the English had not lost the habit of the
sea was soon apparent.

War was declared at n P.M. on August 4th. At
9 A.M. on August 5th, less than twelve hours later, the
German mine-layer, Konigin Luise, was sunk when
laying mines off the coast of Suffolk. Numbers had
already been laid, with the object of catching the British
fleet on its way to its war stations. But the British
fleet was already there. Other schemes of the Ger-
mans to hamper our mobilisation and to destroy our
communications were nipped in the bud by the prompti-
tude of the measures taken by the Admiralty. The
faith of Admiral von der Goltz in German superiority
of mobilisation was thus brought to nought. The
mines laid by the Konigin Luise unhappily caught the
Amphion, the leader of the flotilla which sank the mine-
layer; but they effected nothing else, beyond demon-
strating to the world that Germany only signed the
Article of the Hague Convention dealing with the
laying of mines in order that she might snatch an

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 287

advantage by disregarding it. The cruisers which had
been built to prey upon our commerce were forced to
remain in their home ports, save such as were already in
distant waters. The ships of the German mercantile
marine which were in Hamburg and Bremen were laid
up where they were. Those which were in neutral
ports dared not put to sea, but interned themselves
at once. Those already on the high seas scuttled like
rabbits for the nearest neutral ports, among others the
great liner Kronprinzessin Cecilie, which was on voyage
home from the United States with a precious cargo of
bullion. Within forty-eight hours the sea-borne trade v/
of Germany had ceased to be. In all our successful
naval wars, we had never asserted our mastery of the
ocean routes so speedily or so completely. The first
half of the function of sea power was successfully car-
ried out. We denied the use of the sea to the enemy,
save by neutral ships. The second part was also carried
out, though less completely. We secured the use of the
sea to ourselves.

The immediate results of the entry of Great Britain
into the war must now be discussed at some length.
The more obvious effects are, of course, easily apparent.
The way was made safe for the passage of the Expedi-
tionary Force to France, and its immediate dispatch
was permitted by the inviolability secured to our shores
by the "instant readiness for war" of the fleet. The
seas were kept open for trade both to the French and
ourselves, and the resources of the neutral world were
thus made available to correct the initial unreadiness
of the free Powers. The French were enabled to bring
their oversea armies for service in the Western battle-
fields. Moreover, we ourselves brought four good
divisions of Regulars, the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th,

288 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

back from distant parts of the Empire, replacing them
and the Indian Army, which was imperatively needed
to strengthen the thin line in France and Flanders,
with Territorial troops. And, in due course, Canadians,
Australians, and New Zealanders, the gallant volunteers
of the marches of the Empire, were brought to stand side
by side with the sons of the Mother Country. At the
same time, many thousands of Germans and Austrians
of military age were prevented from joining the armies
of our foes. Excluding altogether the army in France,
which, of course, is there entirely owing to sea power,
it would probably be within the mark to say that
the same force has been worth not less than two million
soldiers to the Allies. Nor is the total number of men
furnished to our own armies and denied to those of our
enemies the only thing to be considered. It is neces-
sary not only to have soldiers, but to have them where
they are wanted. Whether the strategy which directed
the Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Salonika, and Egyptian
campaigns was sound or not, at any rate the armies
required were conveyed to the chosen spots by virtue
of sea power, and, by the same agency, have hitherto
been maintained where they were required, or have
been transferred to another battlefield and redistributed
according to need. Egypt, as always in history, has
furnished a striking instance of the superiority of sea
communications over land communications. We used
it as a central base, not only for the army defending
the Canal or designated for offensive operations in
Palestine, but for troops whose eventual destination
was France, Gallipoli, Salonika, or Mesopotamia. The
Turks, on the other hand, despite the ardent desire of
their German masters to strike at what they term the
backbone of the British Emnire, have never been able

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 289

to muster a force sufficiently large to cause us the small-
est uneasiness. The sea-borne troops have numbered
hundreds of thousands, the land-borne troops, tens of
thousands.

Two other episodes may also be mentioned by way
of illustration. The Serbian Army, scattered, weary,
ragged, and starving, straggled down to the coast
through the Albanian mountains in the autumn of 1915.
There they were met by French transports, were
snatched away out of reach of their pursuing enemies,
fed, re-equipped, and re-organised in Corfu, and were
then conveyed to Salonika where they have rescued
Monastir from the hands of their inveterate foes. This
was a feat in every way comparable with the rescue of
Sir John Moore's army at Corunna. Again, thanks to
the assistance of the Japanese, forty thousand Russian
troops were brought round from Vladivostok to fight
in France. The number seems insignificant in relation
to the mighty hosts engaged on the Western Front.
But it is almost as great as Wellington's Peninsular
army, greater than the number of British troops which
fought at Waterloo, and not much less than the original
force which Sir Redvers Buller took to South Africa in
1899. It was thought an astonishing feat, of which
the British Empire alone was capable, to convey that
army six thousand miles. The Japanese conveyed
the Russian force more than double that distance,
covered, of course, by the British Navy, and, in parti-
cular, by the Grand Fleet, "hidden in the Northern
mists." These things have been going on all through
the war, unseen and in silence. But they are merely
the more commonplace workings of sea power.

If we look a little deeper, the results are even more
momentous. Without the aid of Britain, the navies of

19

290 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

France and Russia would have been outnumbered by
those of Germany and Austria about two to one. At
the beginning of the war, Russia had not a single Dread-
nought ship in commission, the French but four. Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary opposed to them no fewer
than twenty-four battleships and battle-cruisers of the
Dreadnought type. It is evident that the control of
the Baltic would have been completely in the hands of
the Germans, but for the fact that the presence of the
Grand Fleet of Britain in the North Sea forbade them
to concentrate their strength to the North. Had
they been able to do so, a swift blow at Petrograd by
sea might have settled the event in the Eastern theatre
within a few months. Moreover, the coasts of North-
ern France would have lain open to attack by sea, and
the French must have kept a large number of men of
the fighting line to watch them. With Great Britain
on her side, not only has France been able to concen-
trate the whole of her fighting strength against the
German armies, but the Germans have felt themselves
compelled to keep a large number of troops in the North
to guard against a sudden descent upon their coasts.
But there is more than this. The position of Italy in
the Triple Alliance has already been discussed. If the
shores of Italy had not been secured by a force more
powerful than anything the Austro-Germans could
bring against the combined naval strength of France
and Italy, it would have been impossible for the Italians
to have resisted the pressure of the Teutons. They
would have been forced into the war on the side of
the Central Powers. That would have meant a way
open for the invasion of France through Savoy, and the
French positions on their eastern frontier taken in
reverse. Mutatis mutandis, the situation of 1796-8

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 291

would have been very nearly reproduced, with still
greater advantage on the side of the invader. But this
time, the role of invader and invaded would have been
reversed.

Nor is this all, important as the considerations just
stated are. Turkey hesitated long before throwing in
her lot with Germany and Austria. But for the unfortu-
nate affair of the Goeben, she might have hesitated till
the end. Bereft of sea power, the chances of war
offered few attractions for her. The safe arrival of the
Goeben at Constantinople, however, gave her a tempor-
ary command of the Black Sea, for the Russian Dread-
noughts were not ready. Had Great Britain not joined
the Allies, there can be no sort of doubt that the chance
of striking down Russia, her secular foe, would have
brought her into the arena at once. Bulgaria, without
any question, would immediately have followed her
example. These things were all included in the calcu-
lations of the Central Powers. Russia has always
found it a sufficiently difficult task to fight the Turks
single-handed. With Austria and a part of the German
armies on her hands, and with the Ottoman forces
supplied by Germany and led by German officers, she
must have been overwhelmed. Then, with Serbia
crushed, Rumania, like Italy, forced to abide by the
engagements into which she had entered, and Greece,
under her ineffable King, siding enthusiastically with
the strongest, the whole of the Teuton ambitions in the
Near and Middle East would have been realised.
Events have shown us plainly enough that the Central
Powers had nothing to fear from the war on two fronts
unless the trident of Britain were thrown into the scale.

But the British declaration of war reversed the
situation. Instead of being two-fold stronger at sea,

292 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the Central Powers were now almost exactly two-fold
weaker, so far as numbers were concerned. How much
weaker in all other elements, it is impossible to compute.
This gave the forces of liberty the precious gift of time
to organise their resources, they being, in the very
nature of the case, less prepared for the struggle than
the forces of tyranny. In all history it has been so,
and in all history it is fortunate for the cause of right
and freedom that sea power does not flourish under
systems which make for aggression and oppression.
The Germans have come nearer to success than any
such people have before. If the trident had been in
their fist in 1914, or they could have succeeded in
grasping it, the world would by now have been at their
feet, despite all the armies of the Allies. The recent
history of Turkey is illuminative on this point. The
Ottoman Navy once ranked third in the world. It was
still formidable as lately as 1877. But Abdul Hamid
feared the fleet, and he deliberately let it sink into decay.
The very engines of the warships were sold by the
Minister of Marine for his private profit. So Turkey,
with the most magnificent naval position in Europe
in her hands, entered the final struggle for existence
(which we may date from the Italian attack on Tripoli
in 1911) without a navy. Had she been more powerful
at sea than the Greeks in 1912, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that Salonika and Dedeagatch would still have
been in her possession, along with the islands of the
^Egean, and that the Gallipoli expedition could never
have taken place.

That famous adventure failed to attain its ultimate
purpose, and has, in consequence, been somewhat
hastily written down a disastrous failure. But, having
regard to the circumstances and needs of the moment

THE VALLEY OP DECISION 293

at which it was launched, that view is far too shallow.
Had the Turks been able to bring their whole power
to bear against the Russians at the time of Mackensen's
famous "drive" through Galicia, especially had the
accession of Bulgaria to the Central League then
permitted the use of Turkish and Bulgarian troops
against the Serbians and thus against the Russian
flank, it is difficult to see how the Allies could have
avoided signing a calamitous peace. That the greater
positive ends were not attained is lamentable. Had
they been, it is probable that peace would also have
come long before, and that it would have been equally
calamitous to the Central Powers. Russian man-
power and food-power would have been fully combined
with Western munition-power, and the result must
have been overwhelming. It is, of course, possible
that some other and more practicable way might have
been found of obtaining the same end. Alternative
schemes were proposed; but, as one and all depended on
the use of sea power, there is no need to discuss them
in detail here.

A consequence of sea power, subtle and easy to be
missed, must now be discussed. As time went on, the
huge armies placed in the field by both sides extended
in fortified lines the whole length of their natural
frontiers. Thus the line on the Western Front extended
from the Belgian coast to the borders of Switzerland;
that on the Eastern Front from the Baltic, at first
to the Rumanian frontier, and now to the Black Sea.
The Italians extended from the Swiss Alps to the head
of the Adriatic. In Asia, the Turkish line extended
from the Black Sea down to well into Persia, with its
right flank refused to cover Mesopotamia from a
British advance. By land, therefore, the opportunity

294 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

of a flank attack was everywhere denied to the com-
batants. All that any of them could hope to achieve
was to create a flank by breaking through the enemy's
lines by frontal attack. But command of the sea
confers on its possessor the power of reaching round the
flank of the enemy's line and thus turning it. If the
Germans could acquire such command, they could
turn the northern end of the Russian positions beyond
Riga. A successful landing on the Belgian coast or in
Schleswig would place the British in a similar position.
But, apart from such obvious strokes as these, the
apprehension of which has an abiding influence on the
course of the war, there are more distant opportunities
which have had consequences, the full effect of which
will only be seen when its complete history is written.
Success in Gallipoli would have turned the flank of the
Central Powers to some purpose. When its approach-
ing failure became apparent, the Bulgarians were
cajoled or bribed into the war, and, for the moment, the
danger was averted. But the concentration of German
aims was none the less dissipated, and the Franco-
British force at Salonika occupied something of the
same position that Wellington's army did in the lines
of Torres Vedras. The actual turning-movement,
however, was wider still. It began with the driving in
of the Turkish right flank at Kut and Baghdad, aided
by the British movement on Palestine. The end of
these things is not yet; the military effect is not fully
apparent. But this much can be said: that however
valuable Turkish and Bulgarian aid may have been to
the Germans, they would gladly have dispensed with it,
if the dangers against which it was intended to guard
could have been removed at the same time. The
existence of these dangers was the result of the superior-

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 295

ity at sea which we and our Allies possessed. Sea
power has shown its old ability to force its energy
into excentric movements, with consequent dissipa-
tion of his energy and resources. Turkey and Bul-
garia have no resources of their own for the manufacture
of guns and munitions. Germany and Austria must
supply them. If, then, the superiority in artillery with
which the Germans began the war on the Western
Front had passed to the other side when the campaign
of 1917 opened, the fact may be attributed, in part at
least, to the fact that the brooding threat of sea power
compelled the enemy to seek allies whose dependence
on him for the equipment of war weakened his own
power to compete with the output of material which the
French and British could obtain from all parts of the
world.

The events of the war at sea may now be briefly
recorded. As we have seen, the first function of sea
power was speedily fulfilled. The Germans lost the
use of the sea. If the Germans wished to regain it,
there was only one way in which they could so do.
Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty told them so as
plainly as acts could speak. The Grand Fleet swept
the North Sea, offering battle. When this had no
effect, Sir David trailed his coat inside the Bight of
Heligoland. Thus was brought on the dashing action
of August 28, 1914, in which the German cruisers
Mainz, Koln and Ariadne, with several torpedo-boats,
were sunk and the power of the battle-cruiser first
demonstrated. The German heavy ships refused action
and hid themselves in the mist. Germany, then and
there, surrendered the command of the sea on the
positive side. The natural consequence was that she
was cut off, in a degree more or less complete, from

296 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

oversea supplies. Great Britain established what, for
want of a better word, is called a blockade, which she
tightened at will, the only restraint being consideration
for the interests of .neutrals. Measures were not form-
ally adopted until the Germans announced their inten-
tion of sinking merchantmen approaching the shores of
Great Britain by submarines, and until the German
Government had assumed the control of the whole
food supply of Germany. There is a distinction
between the British blockade of Germany and the
measures taken by Order in Council against Napoleon
which has been generally overlooked. Napoleon's
expressed intention was to ruin Great Britain by shut-
ting her goods out from the whole Continent. The
British Government, on the other hand, was willing
that not only British, but also neutral, goods should
reach the Continent, provided they paid toll to Great
Britain first. Thus the financial ability of the country
to continue the war was maintained. But the Contin-
ent was made to feel the smart by exorbitant prices.
As against Germany and her allies, the intention has
been, on the other hand, to cut off all possible sources of
supply. The difference in method is explained by the
difference in the character of the two wars. In the
former, it was an affair of governments and armies;
in the latter, it has been an affair of whole nations,
of the efforts of every man and every woman, in the
fighting line or behind it. The quickest possible
decision was, therefore, imperative.

The "strangle-hold" on Germany, however, took
effect much more slowly than many people had be-
lieved would be the case. For this there are two
main reasons. In the first place, Germany before the
war was, to a very large extent, a self-supporting and

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 297

exporting country, both in regard to food and to many
raw materials, especially those which were required
for the production of munitions of war. With her
export trade cut off, the whole of the stocks of these
raw materials was available for home consumption.
As regards food supplies, with the exception of the
cereals, previously imported in the main from Russia,
the greater part of the imports were from Holland,
Denmark, Switzerland: neutral countries lying along
the German frontier. The circumstances were, in an-
other respect, different from those which obtained
during the Napoleonic Wars. Then, almost the whole
of the Continent lay at the feet of the Emperor, and it
was easy to treat goods going to any European port
under his domination as enemy goods. But Holland
and the Scandinavian countries were in every way
entitled to the rights of neutrals. To interfere with
the high hand with their right to trade with other
neutral countries, especially with the United States, was
a proceeding, not only at variance with all the principles
for theisake of which Great Britain drew the sword, but
also one fraught with the gravest peril to us. Gently
as we dealt with neutrals, the sympathy of the smaller
countries was not so universally with us as the mer-
its of the quarrel and their own deadly peril from a Ger-
man success appeared to make it probable that they
would be.

It cannot be denied that the experiences of the war
have shown that the economic advantages of sea
power had been exploited by this country to a degree
which carried with it a grave political danger. This
was particularly apparent after the Germans adopted
"unrestricted submarine warfare" in February,
1917. Flagitious as was their defiance of all the laws

298 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

of nations and of humanity, the British had only them-
selves to thank for it that, in the many years of peace,
they had deliberately shut their eyes to the dangers of
war. The years of peace may be many and those of
war, mercifully, few. But a week of unsuccessful war
may destroy for ever all the benefits accruing from
generations of peace. Sea power is essentially pacific
in its aims and workings. But behind those peaceful
workings must always stand the ability to keep the
paths of the sea open against any foe, whatever weap-
ons he may use, and sufficient means of endurance to
hold out until the effects of a temporary reverse or
a delayed decision can be overcome. Otherwise the
whole country is in the position of a maritime fortress,
meant to support and succour the fleet, which, like
Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, keeps the fleet
tethered to itself and incapable of that offensive action
which is its true function. Great Britain, suffering
scarcity and fearing starvation while her fleet sealed
the Germans into their ports, and while one-fifth of
the. globe, including many of its most fertile portions,
was included within the British Empire, will stand for a
warning to all time that, in the last analysis, man lives
by Mother Earth, and that no cheapness of imported
commodities can compensate for the ruin of a country's
agriculture.

The Germans knew from the start that, while they
themselves were not absolutely dependent on imported
goods, at any rate for many months, the British were
dependent at once on sea-borne trade for the very neces-
saries of life. While, therefore, they surrendered
somewhat tamely their own use of the sea, they made a
determined and well-organised effort to stop its use by us.
They operated in home waters by scattering mines

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 299

freely, and without warning to neutrals, in the paths
of shipping, and, in a growing degree, by the use of sub-
marines. In the distant seas they let loose a number of
cruisers. The Goeben, battle-cruiser, and Breslau, light
cruiser, were in the Mediterranean, while outside Euro-
pean waters were the two powerful armoured cruisers,
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and several light cruisers,
the most famous of which were the Emden, Karlsruhe,
Leipsic, Dresden, Konigsberg, and Niirriberg. In addi-
tion, there were three or four armed auxiliaries, which,
in defiance of all agreements, transformed themselves
into warships on the high seas. The supply of these
ships was skilfully arranged for by means which are not
yet known in detail, at any rate outside the Intelligence
Department of the Admiralty. If war against com-
merce, most carefully organised in advance, could give
the command of the seas, the Germans would have
won it in August and September, 1914. The success
of their plan was frustrated by their inability to get a
sufficient number of cruisers out upon the trade routes,
and that failure was due to the prompt mobilisation
of the Grand Fleet and the impotence of the Germans
to contest the major issue with it.

To deal first with the Goeben. The object of her
presence in the Mediterranean was undoubtedly, in part
at least, to interfere with the transport of the French
African army to France. In that she and her lighter
consort, the Breslau, should have had the assistance of
the Austrian Fleet. But war between France and
Austria was not declared till August loth, nor between
Great Britain and Austria till August I2th. The
German ships bombarded Algiers and Boma during the
first week of the war, and then betook themselves into
the neutral port of Messina, which they were, of course,

300 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

bound to leave at the expiration of twenty-four hours in
accordance with the Neutrality Declaration of Italy.
The British had four battle-cruisers in the Mediterran-
ean, as well as some armoured cruisers and light cruisers.
For some accountable reason the battle-cruiser squad-
ron was not concentrated against the Germans, but was
kept watching the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic.
The task of watching the Goeben and Breslau was
entrusted to the Defence and Gloucester, . the f ormer_of
which was greatly inferior in force to the Goeben, while
the Gloucester was slightly superior to the Breslau.
Wireless messages failed to bring the battle-cruisers to
the assistance of the Defence in time; the Admiral whose
flag was flying in that vessel had positive orders not to
fight if in inferior force, and, after a plucky attempt to
engage on the part of the little Gloucester, the two
German ships escaped into the Dardanelles and up to
Constantinople, carrying a whole bag of troubles with
them. Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne, the Commander-in-
Chief , came home, the chief command in the Mediter-
ranean being handed over to the French Admiral,
Boue de Lapeyrere, and the Admiralty "approved the
measures taken by him in all respects." His second
in command, Rear-Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge, was
recalled for an inquiry to be made, was tried by court-
martial, and was acquitted. As my Lords are in sole
possession of all the facts of the case, it is impossible to
dispute the ground on which their "satisfaction" with
the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief was based.
But the failure to make an end of the Goeben and
Breslau was a costly one for this country and her Allies.
Equally unfortunate was the escape of the Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau from Tsing-tao without being
watched and followed by a superior force. These

THE VALLEY OF DECISION

301

powerful ships vanished almost completely from sight
for over two months, and the British light cruisers,
engaged in hunting down the commerce raiders, ran a
continual risk of fetching up against them. Hunting
commerce raiders entails dissipation of force, and it
was not the least able part of the German dispositions
that they provided this strong, concentrated force to
act as a perpetual menace to the scattered ships of the
Allies. Squadrons were formed as rapidly as possible
for the purpose of putting an end to the menace,
but unfortunately, as events were to prove, one at least
of these squadrons was itself insufficiently powerful for
the task. The one British battle-cruiser on the station,
H.M.A.S. Australia, was for some time engaged in sub-
duing German islands in the Pacific, for which task there
was doubtless a sound political reason. The navy of
Japan, which had declared war in September, joined in
the hue-and-cry; but it was only in December that the
two vessels were finally run to earth, and then only after
they had inflicted a reverse on the British Navy of a
particularly galling kind.

One of the squadrons organised to deal with the
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau consisted of the Good Hope,
flying the flag of Rear- Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock,
Monmouih, Glasgow, and Otranto, an auxiliary cruiser.
The Admiralty, aware of the inferiority of this force to
the Germans, sent out the old battleship Canopus to
support Cradock, sending him instructions that he was
not to fight unless she was in company, which was
equivalent to an order not to fight at all. On November
1st, Cradock encountered the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
which formed the German squadron under Admiral
Graf von Spee, off Coronel, a port of Chili. The Ger-
mans were superior in gun-power, disposing of twelve

302

SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

8.2-inch guns upon the broadside and six 6-inch, against
two 9.2-inch in the Good Hope and seventeen 6-inch for
the two British vessels combined. But the main-deck
6-inch of the Good Hope could not be fought in a sea-
way, and there was a heavy swell running. The Ger-
man ships, moreover, were homogeneous, while the
British were diverse. In speed the British had a small
nominal advantage. This might have enabled Cradock
to avoid action if that had been his mind. But it was
insufficient to force action on the enemy until the
conditions of light favoured him. When the British
ships were silhouetted against the afterglow, and he
himself had become almost invisible against the land,
von Spee accepted battle at twelve thousand yards.
The action was quickly at an end. Both British ships
caught fire after a few salvoes from the Germans, and
just before eight o'clock, the Good Hope blew up. The
Monmouth continued the hopeless fight for a while
longer, badly down by the bows, and then the Glasgow,
which had parted company in face of the overwhelming
odds, saw a number of flashes, which were doubtless
the final attack iupon the Monmouth. The rest is
silence. Not a man of Cradock's gallant ships survived
to tell the tale.

There has been much difference of opinion over the
conduct of the British Admiral in accepting battle.
That he disobeyed a direct order of the Admiralty is
clear. That he was outmanoeuvred in the engagement
is equally clear. But what was the alternative? Von
Spee might very well have escaped from observation in
the night and have gone off to wreak mischief, perhaps,
on the coast of British Columbia, which would have
raised an outcry throughout the whole Empire. Cra-
dock was where he was for the express purpose of

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 303

stopping von Spec's career. It was practically certain
that, wherever and whenever he fought him, he would
have to do so without the aid of the Canopus. The
sending of that ship to support fast cruisers was little
better than a farce. To fall in with an enemy so nearly
of equal strength and to part without an action would
have been to fly in the face of British naval tradition.
Cradock may very well have called to mind Nelson's
words, and reasoned that by the time von Spee had
beaten him soundly he would do us no more mischief
that year. That, in the event, he failed to put the
German squadron out of action was due to a tactical
miscalculation. The words from the Book of Macca-
bees, inscribed upon his cenotaph, embody the verdict
of his comrades upon this gallant and unfortunate sea-
man: "God forbid that I should do this thing and flee
away from them; if our time be come, let us die manfully
for our brethren, and let us not stain our honour."
It was a consideration, no doubt present to Cradock' s
mind, that if von Spee were only injured comparatively
lightly he had no port within many thousands of miles
to which he could go for repairs. He could coal and
receive supplies at a secret rendezvous; but if he had to
seek dockyard repairs he could receive no assistance
from neutrals. Even if his own ships' companies
could do the work, his whereabouts in port would be
immediately known. It was even an object worth
considerable risk to compel him to empty his maga-
zines. The British squadron, on the other hand, could
rely on ports under its own flag in which it could obtain
the necessary succour. In the sequel, the force brought
to bear on von Spee was so superior that it is difficult to
say that Cradock's action had any bearing on the result.
But it is noteworthy that Admiral Sturdee's despatch

304 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

speaks of the ammunition of the Gneisenau being
exhausted before the end of the Battle of the Falkland
Islands.

Lord Fisher returned to office as First Sea Lord the
day before the action off Coronel was fought. Not a
moment was lost by the vigorous old seaman, when the
news came, in making his dispositions to avenge and
repair the disaster. The parent of the battle-cruiser
had the weapon ready to his hand, now to be used for
the purpose he had designed her for. The Invincible
and the Inflexible were ordered to the Pacific immedi-
ately, Admiral Sturdee being appointed to the com-
mand. To all representations as to the need for a refit
the answer was returned, "Go, and go quickly." The
squadron donned the cap of darkness and the shoes of
swiftness. As it went the still, small voice of the wire-
less called to it all the ships which were cruising in the
South Atlantic and Pacific. Kent, Carnarvon, Cornwall,
Glasgow, and Bristol flocked from all quarters to the
flag, with the Canopus and auxiliary cruiser Macedonia.
The Australia raced across the Pacific along with the
Japanese; but they were too late for a share in the grand
event. On December yth, Admiral Sturdee arrived at
the Falkland Islands and there assembled his squadron.

Admiral Graf von Spee had taken similar action.
He had called to him the Number g, Dresden, and Leipsic,
together with some colliers. It is thought that his
destination was South Africa, where the German colon-
ists were resisting Botha, and where there had lately
been an outbreak of rebellion among the unreconciled
element of the Dutch population. Had he arrived in
those waters the mischief he would have done might
have been incalculable. But his lucky star had set.
He decided on his way to look in at the Falkland Islands

1MBHBBI

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 305

and destroy the wireless station. On the morning of
December 8th the Gneisenau and Nurnberg approached
to reconnoitre. They found the Canopus, which opened
fire upon them at 11,000 yards, and the Kent lying at
the entrance to Port William as guard-ship. They
stood in to engage, expecting, probably, an easy repeti-
tion of the Coronel victory. Then they saw the masts
of the Invincible and Inflexible, recognised the trap
into which they had fallen, and retreated at full speed
to warn their consorts. The British fleet got under
way, and a stern chase followed. The Germans scat-
tered, but the Kent, Cornwall, and Glasgow accounted
for the Nurnberg and Leipsic, while the battle-cruisers
and Carnarvon went after the armoured ships. The
Dresden alone of the German squadron escaped, to meet
her fate a few months later off the Island of St. Juan
Fernandez. The fight between the battle-cruisers
and the armoured cruisers was a long-drawn-out
business, for the former made no attempt to close, but
made use of their superiority in gun-power and speed to
destroy their opponents at a range at which they ran
little risk of incurring severe injuries themselves. The
tactical theory on which they were designed was bril-
liantly vindicated on this occasion. But it must be
remembered that neither succour nor escape was
possible to the Germans. Admiral Sturdee always
retained the power to close if there was the smallest
indication of a change of weather, or if visibility should
deteriorate from any cause. At 4.17 the Scharnhorst
sank with all hands, the gallant von Spee, who had
shown himself throughout an honourable enemy, going
down with her. At six o'clock the Gneisenau followed
her, having fought a single-handed battle for nearly
two hours. Less than two hundred officers and men

306

SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

were saved. Two transports or colliers were destroyed
by the Bristol and Macedonia.

The operations which ended in the destruction of
Admiral von Spec's squadron remain the most brilliant
and decisive of the war at sea. Full credit must be
given to those who hunted the German squadron out of
the seas where it would have found most opportunities
of mischief, both by direct action and by forming a
point d'appui for the light cruisers of the enemy. But
above all else stands out the sureness of touch with
which the veteran seaman, Lord Fisher, solved the
problem of being in superior force at the decisive point.
The actual meeting at the Falkland Islands has the
dramatic touch about it which, according to disposition,
we may call fortuitous or Providential But the uner-
ring reading of von Spee's mind, the instant decision and
the sure adjustment of means to the end all lend to the
British strategy a touch of genius. Sturdee's ships,
dependent on coal supply for their motive power, were
lost to sight for a month as completely as were Nelson's
in the chase after Villeneuve. But whereas the Admir-
alty were as much in ignorance of the whereabouts
of the latter as were the public, the secret, noiseless
whispers of the wireless not only kept Whitehall fully
informed of all that was passing, but also summoned all
the British ships within the area to the fateful rendez-
vous. The Battle of the Falkland Islands put an end
at once to all hope of German support which the
disaffected within the Empire might have cherished,
and set free the British Navy outside the Grand Fleet
for any work it might be called upon to do. There
was soon plenty ready to its hand.

The havoc wrought by German light cruisers on
British shipping in the first phase of the war was by no

THE VALLEY OF DECISION 307

means negligible. The Emden, in particular, boldly and
skilfully handled, not only sank seventeen vessels worth
over two millions sterling, but even bombarded a part of
Madras, and sank a small Russian cruiser and a French
destroyer at Penang. On November 9th, however, she
was caught by the Australian cruiser, Sydney, off Cocos
Keeling Island and destroyed. The Sydney, with other
light cruisers, was engaged in convoying Australasian
troops — a touch-and-go business under the circum-
stances. The destruction of the famous raider was a
very decided relief, especially as, about the same time,
the Konigsberg, which had sunk the small cruiser Pegasus
off Zanzibar, was driven into the Rufigi River, and there
held a captive till she was destroyed some months later
in a curious action in which a monitor and a seaplane
bore part. The Karlsruhe, operating in the Atlantic,
also destroyed seventeen ships, valued at a million and
a half, before she met with a mysterious end. The
Number g, Dresden, and Leipsic were less successful,
the chief feat of the first-named being the cutting of
the submarine cable at Fanning Island. Two auxiliary
cruisers, however, the Kronprinz Wilhelm and Prinz Ei-
tel Friedrich, sank between them twenty-four ships,
worth about a million and three-quarters. They both
interned themselves when they had exhausted their
means of obtaining supplies. But another, the Kaiser
Wilhelm der Grosse, was sunk in action by the Highflyer
off the coast of Morocco, and the Cap Trafalgar was
destroyed by the auxiliary cruiser, Carmania, after a
spirited and well-fought action in which the victor very
nearly shared the fate of her victim.

Since the Dresden was destroyed, the efforts of the
Germans in the outer seas, so far as above-water craft
are concerned, have been confined to raids by disguised

308 SEA "POWER AND FREEDOM

vessels of uncertain type, one (or two) of which have
been known by the name of Mowe. This vessel (or
these vessels), most ably commanded by Count von
und zu Dohna-Schlodien, did heavy damage, and.
succeeded in getting at least one prize back into a
German port. Another ship, the Grief, was discovered
and sunk before she could get out to the trade routes.
She succeeded in torpedoing her assailant, the auxiliary
cruiser, Alcantara, before she succumbed. A sailing
ship, to which the name Seeadler has been given,
has also caused considerable havoc, chiefly by means of
mines, as far east as Colombo. The deeds of all these
vessels put together, however, by no means approach
the loss we suffered from cruisers and privateers during
our most victorious wars in the past, and even after our
greatest successes. Further discussion on the war
against commerce must, however, be postponed till a
later chapter.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MAIN FLEETS

THE activities of British cruisers in all parts of the
world were thus efficacious in clearing the seas of enemy
surface-craft, in permitting the safe transport of many
hundred thousands of troops, and in clearing the way for
offensive operations both by land and sea. Their
success in this depended on the soundness of tha dis-
positions which held the main fleets in a clamp of steel
and denied ingress and egress to and from the enemy's
ports to vessels of all kinds. This was the root principle
of the strategy inherited by us from the past : the mod-
ern application of Drake's plan of "impeaching"
the enemy off his own ports. To observe the enemy
fleet from a central position, whence any threatened
point could be speedily reached and the foe be brought
to action if he should expose himself, was once again the
plan adopted by the Admiralty. Togo's strategy in the
Russo-Japanese War had shown how that plan needed
to be modified in the face of modern material. In the
days of Cornwallis the heavy ships had nothing to fear
but a lee shore and the land batteries of the defenders.
They could only be attacked by their like, which was ex-
actly the contingency which they hoped to bring about.
They could, therefore, lie in as close proximity to the
port they were appointed to watch as facilities for

309

310 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

getting the requisite supplies permitted and the cunning
of the Admiral's brain dictated.

The addition of the torpedo, carried in a swarm of
light and fast craft operating on the surface, or in vessels
moving invisible beneath the waters, and the fact that a
consumable store like coal or oil has taken the place of
the wind, which is Nature's gift, compelled a modi-
fication of this simple plan. Togo kept his fleet at "a
certain place" some sixty miles away from Port Arthur,
keeping the fortress under observation by his light craft.
The British Admiralty adopted a similar plan. The
problem before them must now be briefly stated.

The British battle-fleet was confronted by a force
numerically a little more than half as strong as itself in
ships of the first line. But these were a well-organised
fleet, provided with all the necessary subsidiary craft in
adequate numbers, and aided by the possession of a
means of aerial reconnaissance which the British were
without, namely, the famous Zeppelin airships. More-
over, the base of the German fleet was that expanse of
intricate water, aptly described as the "wet triangle,"
over which the Island of Heligoland stands sentinel.
The strategical importance of the island has, perhaps,
been over-estimated ; but it has a value as an advanced
torpedo-base, and also as a rallying point for skirmishing
craft, as was proved by the "Battle of the Bight," and
for heavy ships driven back after an unsuccessful
engagement. The mouths of the Elbe and Weser, with
Jahde Bay, not only contain the strongly fortified naval
ports of Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Brunsbuttel,
but also the entrance to the passage connecting the
front door with the back, the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal,
which joins the North Sea ports to the great Baltic
port and dockyard at Kiel.

THE MAIN FLEETS 311

The British fleet, then, had to watch two exits : that
from the "wet triangle" and that from the Baltic
through the Skager Rak. It had also to face the
possibility that, utilising its back-door, the German
fleet might go east to attack the Russians, whose naval
force at the outbreak of war was in no wise equal to
a single-handed contest with the Germans. Events
might at any time have rendered it imperative for the
British to enter the Baltic at all costs and go to the
succour of the Russians, threatened with a land and sea
attack which, if successful, would bring the Germans
within easy striking distance of Petrograd. Its own
problems were, roughly, twofold. It had to cover the
coast of Britain and the vast stretch of sea from the
north of the British Islands to the edge of the Arctic
Circle. The North Sea may be compared to a pyramid
standing on its apex. The distance from Wilhelmshaven
to Flamborough Head being about 300 sea-miles, and
that from Dover to Calais 22 miles. If the Germans
were to be prevented from enjoying the use of the sea, it
is obvious that a position had to be found as a base
for the British fleet which would cover the route
north-about. This would necessarily leave the Ger-
mans nearer to the mouth of the Thames (to treat
that as the vital spot) than the British fleet. On the
other hand, the journey to and from the English coast
would be longer than that from the British base to the
entrance to the "wet triangle. " There was, therefore,
a reasonable certainty that if the Germans undertook
any serious enterprise to the southward they would be
met and fought before they could return. The worst
danger to be feared was that they would carry out
what have come to be known, from a phrase of Admiral
Jellicoe's, as "tip-and-run raids." A well-organised

312 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

system of flotilla defence would minimise that danger.
The place selected was a land-locked basin in the Ork-
neys, known as Scapa Flow. It is something over 500
miles from Wilhelmshaven and about 400 from the
Skager Rak. It is, therefore, well out of range of a
night attack by torpedo-boats, and it covers the passage
north-about. The battle-cruiser fleet was stationed
in the Firth of Forth, being thus a hundred miles
nearer the German bases and 150 miles nearer the
mouth of the Thames. Translating distance into
hours, and allowing for the superior speed of the battle-
cruisers, it may be said to have been nine hours nearer to
the former, and ten and a half nearer to the latter.

Regard the North Sea as the Channel, the stretch of
water from the Orkneys to the Arctic Circle as the
Atlantic, and the Baltic as the Mediterranean, and the
watch off the "wet triangle" does not differ fundamen-
tally from the watch off Brest. We had, however, no
base inside the Baltic from which to watch Kiel and
prevent the enemy fleet from acting to the eastward as
Nelson watched Toulon. The German fleet, besides,
was concentrated instead of being divided between sev-
eral different ports with no communication with each
other except by way of the open sea, and it had the
power to strike either east or west without our having
immediate knowledge of its intentions. But the principle
is the same. It was the enemy fleet which was watched,
and not the coast which was guarded.

The choice of Scapa Flow for the base of the battle-
fleet has been much criticised ; but, on the wider outlook,
it was probably sound. At first sight, perhaps, it seems
an inversion of common sense to put the fastest and
least powerful ships in the closest proximity to the
enemy ports, while retaining the slower and more

THE MAIN FLEETS 313

powerful to deal with a possible attempt to break out
to the north. But the fastest ships were best qualified
to deal with the kind of raids which the Germans
actually undertook, and they were best qualified also if
the enemy should come out in force to the southward
to overtake him and fight a delaying action until the
battle-fleet could come up. On the other hand, if
the Germans designed to get their cruisers out on to the
high seas, they would probably employ their battleship
strength in order to force a passage for them. Some
such design seems to have, in fact, brought on the Battle
of Jutland Bank.

Having failed in their first endeavour to reduce the
British fleet by "attrition," the Germans next at-
tempted to disarrange our plans and to force us to dissi-
pate our strength by a series of raids against our coast.
The first of these, undertaken against Yarmouth, was a
ludicrous failure. Five cruisers took part, but, so far
as is known, the battle-cruisers were not out on this
occasion. They attacked the little gunboat Halcyon,
which signalled to the nearest base, "Am engaging
five German cruisers. Enemy retiring." They then
opened a furious cannonade in the direction of Yar-
mouth. Most of their shells fell a mile short. In the
faint light of dawn they were that much out in their
reckoning. British forces were approaching, and they
fled incontinently. On their way the rearmost cruiser
dropped mines, which destroyed submarine D 5. But
that loss was more than offset by the destruction of the
armoured cruiser Yorck, which hit a mine and foundered
just as she was entering Jahde Bay.

On December i6th a similar attempt was made
against Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepools,
which resulted in the death of over a hundred civilians,

314 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

men, women, and children. Apparently the whole
battle-cruiser force of the Germans took part in this.
They were engaged by a flotilla of destroyers, which
they blundered into in the mist, and also by a light
battery at Hartlepool. Whether they suffered any
material damage or not is not known, but a careful
study of the German casualty lists revealed the fact
that they had over two hundred killed and wounded.
So the "baby-killers," as Mr. Churchill promptly
dubbed them, had by no means the best of the deal.
Only a thick fog which, unhappily, intervened saved
them from the hand of Sir David Beatty and his "Cat"
squadron. The German and British squadrons were
actually within gunshot of each other. The occasion
was marked by the publication of a clear and strong
statement by the Admiralty, warning the population
that coast towns could not be guaranteed immunity
from such attacks; that their inhabitants must bear in
mind that they had no military results; and that, while
the Admiralty regretted the circumstances, they must
not be allowed to modify the general naval policy which
was being pursued. It is said that the sava indignatio
roused by this wanton destruction of defenceless life
was worth an army corps to the New Armies. At any
rate, the spirit displayed by the sufferers was beyond
praise.

Sir David Beatty was compensated for his disap-
pointment on. January 24th, when the Germans, intent,
presumably, on a similar exploit, were met by the
British battle-cruiser squadron near the Dogger Bank.
The enemy force consisted of three battle-cruisers,
Derfflinger, Seydlitz, and Moltke, and the armoured
cruiser Blucher, a ship of an inferior type, built by
the Germans as a reply to the Invincible class, under a

THE MAIN FLEETS 315

misapprehension of what their design was to be. She
carried only 8.2-inch guns, and was a drag on the squad-
ron. What had become of the fourth German battle-
cruiser, Von der Tann, has never been revealed. It is
thought that she was severely injured, probably by
collision, on the occasion of the Christmas Day air raid
on Cuxhaven. There is good reason for thinking
that she took part in the Battle of Jutland Bank.

Beatty followed the enemy in general chase, his
flagship, Lion, leading. Deliberate fire was opened at
eighteen thousand yards, and the official report says,
"We began hitting at seventeen thousand yards. " The
Blucher, which was the last of the German line, received
the fire of each ship as she passed, was reduced to a
sinking condition by gunfire, and eventually torpedoed
by the Arethusa. The Derfflinger and Seydlitz also re-
ceived severe damage, and were seen to be heavily on
fire. But an unlucky shot disabled the Lion, which had
to sheer out of line. Submarines were about and the
position of the vessel was dangerous, but she was well
screened by the destroyers, and escaped further injury.
Beatty shifted his flag first to a destroyer and then to
the Princess Royal. But the battle had gone roaring to
the east, and before the resolute young Admiral could
again take command the action had been broken off.
The Germans claimed a victory ; but as their claim was
dependent on the utterly false assertion that they had
sunk the Lion and Tiger, its baselessness was easily
exposed.

The battle was one of the most picturesque in all
naval history. The battle-cruisers flew through the
water at twenty-eight or twenty-nine knots, and the
destroyers dashed hither and thither at even greater
speed. A general chase under such circumstances

316 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

needs the most exceptional quickness of mind on the
part of the Admiral in command and of every captain in
the fleet. Action was, apparently, broken off seventy
miles from Heligoland, and it is not therefore surprising
that many people should hold that a little more deter-
mination and readiness to take risks on the part of the
second in command when Beatty was temporarily out
of action would have brought about a more decisive
result. Only those who are in possession of the secret
information held by the Admiralty can express an
opinion on that point. The battle-cruiser, at any rate,
justified her existence, and the theories of those who
insisted on the value of the heaviest guns and of superior
speed were justified.

The heavy ships of the Germans made one more
attempt to raid the coast, attacking Lowestoft and,
again, Yarmouth at Easter, 1916. Little damage was
done, but the battle-cruiser squadron failed to come up
with them, and, under the Board of Admiralty which
succeeded Mr. Winston Churchill and Lord Fisher,
there was an unfortunate appearance of yielding some-
thing to this kind of terrorism. Certain alterations
were made in the disposition of the fleet. But this was
not, in itself, so serious as the admission in a letter from
the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, to the mayors of the two
towns that the Admiralty could now be brought to con-
sider the question of local protection apart from the
general strategy of the war at sea. On the other hand,
there was some evidence that "tip-and-run raids" were
not improving the morale of the German Navy. A
German prisoner captured about this time is said to
have replied to some comments on the poor shooting
of the German battle-cruisers by naively remarking,
"How can you expect us to shoot well when we may

THE MAIN FLEETS 317

have the British fleet upon us at any moment?"
Whatever truth there may be in the story, it is certain
that on more than one occasion the German gunners
have shown a tendency to go to pieces after the first
few salvoes when the British return fire became hot.
To fire on defenceless places and to turn tail directly
there is a chance of meeting a foe who can hit back
never can conduce to a high military spirit. The same
inefficiency has been noticed in the U-boats when they
meet an armed antagonist.

On May 31, 1916, the main fleets met for the first
time. The German battle-cruisers had steamed north
up the coast of Jutland to the neighbourhood of the
Skager Rak. They chased off some of our light cruisers
which were watching the exit from the Baltic, and these
were followed by the light and battle-cruisers to the
eastward. The British battle-fleet, with a battle-
cruiser squadron under Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood,
consisting of the Inflexible, Indomitable, and Invincible
(flag), and an armoured cruiser squadron, consisting of
the Defence (flag), Black Prince, Warrior, and Duke of
Edinburgh, under Sir Robert Arbuthnot, was to the
north. Eastward was Sir David Beatty, having un-
der his command the battle-cruiser fleet, consisting
of the Lion (flag) Tiger, Princess Mary, Princess
Royal (flag), New Zealand (flag), and Indefatigable.
He had also with him four ships of the Queen Eliza-
beth class, with some divisions of light cruisers and
destroyers. The Queen Elizabeth herself and the Aus-
tralia were absent.

The German battle-cruisers, chasing'our light cruisers,
found themselves in the presence of Beatty's force,
and turned to run for it with the object of drawing
him down on to the German battle-fleet, which was

318 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

following in support from the southward. A running
action ensued, in which the destroyers played a dashing
part, attacking the big ships in broad daylight and fight-
ing miniature fleet actions among themselves. Towards
the middle of the afternoon the light cruisers, scout-
ing ahead of the battle-cruisers, came within range of
the German battle-fleet. The British sustained severe
loss in the first part of the action, the Queen Mary and
Indefatigable being sunk. The Queen Elizabeths could
not get near enough to play a decisive part. Now,
both fleets went about, Beatty, in his turn, trying to
draw the Germans on to the British battle-fleet, the
approach of which had been signalled. The running
fight between the battle-cruisers continued, while the
Queen Elizabeths engaged the battleships at long range.
The weather conditions, unfortunately, now became
unfavourable, with patches of fog and low visibility.
On ascertaining the approach of Admiral Jellicoe the
Germans sheered off to the eastward, with the obvious
intention of evading battle and returning home along
the Danish coast. The movement was frustrated by a
splendid act of self-sacrifice on the part of Admiral
Hood. His battle-cruisers, steaming south-south-west,
had come on ahead of the battle-fleet and appeared on
the scene just as Beatty, on the outer edge of the circle,
was losing his position abeam of the German battle-
cruisers. Hood threw himself across the head of the
enemy's line by a movement which recalls that of Nel-
son at St. Vincent, and endured in his flagship the concen-
trated fire of the battle-cruiser squadron and the leading
German battleships. The fire of the Invincible was
noticeably effective, but the odds were too heavy for
her, and she blew up and foundered, carrying with her
a heroic seaman who, in this one short fight, outshone

THE MAIN FLEETS 319

the deeds of the famous sailors from whom he was
descended. Only the commander escaped.

The Invincible did not perish in vain. Time was
gained; Beatty enveloped the head of the enemy line,
and Jellicoe, now able to solve the difficulties of the situ-
ation and to form his line, bore down upon them. The
British, however, had still to suffer severe loss before
darkness closed in. Sir Robert Arbuthnot, a hard-
bitten sailor of impetuous temperament, either by acci-
dent or design, thrust his squadron of armoured
cruisers between the British and German battle-fleets at
close range to the latter. His flagship, the Defence,
was instantly sunk, and he went down with her.
The Warrior sank in tow shortly afterward, and the
Black Prince was badly crippled, forced to leave the
line, and torpedoed during the night. The Marl-
borough, a Dreadnought battleship, was also torpe-
doed, but it was brought safely into port under her
own steam.

By now, however, the Germans were a beaten fleet.
All semblance of formation was lost. The ships scat-
tered and made for their home ports as best they could,
furiously assailed all through the night by the British
light cruisers and destroyers. It is further evidence of
the German tendency to go to pieces when the odds turn
against them that, after Hood's attack had foiled their
plan of escape, our light cruisers never hesitated to
attack their battleships, and that they did so with
impunity. The pursuit only ended with the morning,
when the British found themselves in the neighbourhood
of the German mine-fields, behind which the battered
enemy had withdrawn. Jellicoe remained at hand,
searching for stragglers all day, and then returned to his
base, whence he reported himself again ready for action

320 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

thirty-six hours later. It took the enemy months to
repair the damage, so far as it was reparable.

The losses on the British side, which were chiefly
incurred in the holding attacks necessary to bring the
German main fleet to action, were three battle-cruisers,
three armoured cruisers, and eight destroyers sunk.
The Germans only admitted the loss of a pre-
Dreadnought battleship of the Deutschland class, one
battle-cruiser (Lutzow), three light cruisers, and a few
torpedo-boats or destroyers. The British claim to have
sunk two battleships of the Kaiser class (Dreadnoughts),
one of the Deutschland class, one battle-cruiser, five
light cruisers, six torpedo-boats, and a submarine. Sir
John Jellicoe's despatch adds that one Dreadnought
battleship, one battle-cruiser, and three torpedo-boats
were so badly damaged that it is doubtful if they could
reach port. One of these was presumably the battle-
cruiser Seydlitz, which was put ashore by the Germans
in the Bight of Heligoland, but eventually salved and
towed into Wilhelmshaven in a plight which makes it
doubtful if she will see any more service. The British
figure of German losses may fairly be taken as a mini-
mum. As a rule, a routed fleet suffers more heavily in
its flight than in the earlier part of the action, and, as the
Germans were relentlessly pursued and attacked all
through the night, it is hardly likely that they escaped
further losses. But the darkness prevented the British
from ascertaining these, and gave the Germans an
opportunity to conceal them.

Take any test you please, and the Battle of Jutland
Bank stands declared a British victory. Take losses of
ships, the test which the public most readily applies.
The Germans lost two Dreadnought battleships, the
British none. A German squadron was spoiled thereby,

THE MAIN FLEETS 321

and the huge preponderance possessed by the British
increased. The Germans lost one battle-cruiser out of
five, and the British three out of ten — no account is
taken of ships completed since the outbreak of war — so
that, while the margin of superiority is infinitesimally
reduced, it is still sufficient. If the Seydlitz be really
an irreparable wreck, the British preponderance — which
stood at two to one before the battle — is actually
increased. In light cruisers the Germans lost five,
against which we may set the three armoured cruisers
lost by the British, for these vessels are really of little
more consequence. Only in destroyers was the British
loss a serious matter from a military point of view. But
destroyers must be sacrificed if destroyer work is to be
done effectually, and there can be no question that the
work of the flotillas, both offensive and defensive, more
than repaid the loss they suffered.

Or take the objects for which the battle was fought.
The ultimate object of any encounter between the fleets
must be, for the Germans, to regain the free use of the
sea in order to relieve their necessities at home and to
enable them to deliver a blow at our heart; for the
British, to prevent the Germans from gaining that use
of the sea. Decisive victory for either side means the
destruction of the enemy fleet. Short of that, victory
rests with the British if they prevent their enemy from
regaining the use of the sea. In the actual event the
Germans probably had a more limited purpose. They
may have desired to break a way for some of their
cruisers to get out and harry the trade routes, or they
may have meant to compass the destruction of Admiral
Beatty's battle-cruisers by drawing them on to the
battle-fleet. They have never revealed what the "en-
terprise to the northward" was on which they professed

322 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

to be engaged. But, whatever their purpose was, they
indubitably failed to achieve it. No cruisers appeared
on the high seas; the battle-cruiser fleet was not de-
stroyed. And the Germans, whatever their object, cer-
tainly did not mean to return weaker than they set out.

From another point of view the British victory is
equally clear. The British remained in possession of the
field of battle; the German formation was broken up,
and their morale, at least temporarily, destroyed. That,
perhaps, is the most important point of all. The case
may be summed up in homely analogy. If a little boy
engaged in robbing an orchard be chased thence by the
owner with a big stick, the owner may remain in posses-
sion of the orchard, but the little boy may have the
apples. The barren fact of victory rests with one side,
the fruit with the other. But if the boy is compelled to
leave the orchard without the apples, he can hardly claim
victory on the ground that he is still able to sit down
without undue discomfort. The German claim to vic-
tory in the Battle of Jutland can only be maintained on
such a posteriori grounds.

On the other hand, the British victory was not so
decisive as a people nourished on the traditions of the
Nile and Trafalgar were inclined to expect. A con-
siderable amount of criticism has arisen from that fact,
and rather loose comparisons have been made with the
victories of Hawke and Nelson. In point of fact, these
comparisons are misleading. At Quiberon Bay, Con-
flans did not retreat to his base at Brest, where he
would have been under the shelter of [the shore guns.
He fled pell-mell into an undefended roadstead where
the only dangers encountered in following him were
the dangers of a lee shore, the darkness and the gale.
Hawke, a consummate seaman, knew the coast as well

THE MAIN FLEETS 323

as Conflans. He "took the foe for pilot" because the
dangers were inanimate dangers, and at fixed points.
The chances were equal for the two sides. To follow
the Germans into their protected area was a very
different matter. Moreover, magnificent as was the
victory of Quiberon Bay, the loss of the enemy in action
was actually small. Their fleet was annihilated because
half the surviving vessels was mewed up in the Vilaine,
where it had no facilities for repair or supplies. The
German fleet, after its return to the Bight of Heligoland,
had all the German bases at its back.

At the Nile the French fleet was, to all practical
purposes, destroyed. But Nelson had full opportunity
to weigh the position before he attacked, and he acted
upon one of those brilliant intuitions of genius which
show when safety lies in taking apparent risks. Brueys
delivered himself into the hands of the British in a way
which can only be called imbecile. The Germans acted
throughout on a considered plan, the ultimate object
of which was to draw Sir John Jellicoe on to do just
that which he refused to do, and is blamed in some
quarters for not doing. It is to be remembered, more-
over, that, after the confused night action, he had no
certain knowledge of the dispositions of the enemy fleet.
The circumstances of Trafalgar were even more dis-
similar. It is sufficient to point out that, in that
case, Villeneuve was driven to sea by the express orders
of Napoleon and by despair at the news that he had
been relieved of his command for hesitation to obey.
He came out with the purpose of fighting a decisive
action, and he fought it stubbornly to the point
of annihilation. The Germans, as their movements
showed, had no intention of fighting the entire Grand
Fleet to a finish.

324 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

If we turn from these three crushing victories to
others of fame in our annals, we shall find that the result
of Jutland Bank compares very favourably with them,
if we allow for certain facts. Wooden ships were rarely
sunk in action. On the other hand, fighting at short
range and even yard-arm to yard-arm, the slaughter
was often so great as to demoralise the crews and bring
about the surrender of the ship. In a modern action,
fought at long range, with the crews in armoured
positions, damage to material, causing fire and explo-
sion which, possibly, end in the destruction of the ship, is
the more frequent'result. That the fighting spirit of a
ship's company should be so demoralised by the fire
of an opponent ten thousand yards away that she should
surrender, unless cut off and surrounded, with her
motive power disabled, is almost unthinkable. Even
under the latter circumstances, the commanding officer
would probably order the destruction of the ship. The
whole standard, therefore, by which we judge actio'ns
like The Saints, or the Glorious First of June is altered.
The criterion of surrender, which was the best evidence
of the moral superiority established by the British
in these actions is absent from Jutland Bank. The
evidence of demoralisation is of a different kind, but it
is clear enough, and it may be said, without any fear of
exaggeration, that the victory won by Sir John Jellicoe
and Sir David Beatty was at least as complete as though
won by Rodney and Howe, or gained in many another
battle which resulted in two or three prizes being taken,
but, in many cases had important strategical results —
e. g., Saumarez's action with Linois off Algeciras in 1801.

Let it be granted, as everyone must grant, that the
complete destruction of the enemy fleet is the best and
surest way to gain control of the sea. Let it be granted

THE MAIN FLEETS

325

also that, until the enemy fleet is destroyed, it is not
strictly correct to speak of either combatant having
" command of the sea." Does that make the destruc-
tion of the enemy fleet an object to be pursued at any
risk? With due deference to some distinguished naval
officers who appear to think that it does, it is sub-
mitted that such was not the practice of the great
masters of naval war. In May, 1805, Ganteaume, by
Napoleon's instructions, left the inner anchorage of
Brest and anchored outside the Goulet Passage under
the protection of batteries mounting 150 heavy guns
which had been erected for the purpose. Neither
Cornwallis nor Gardner, who was in command during
the absence of the former through illness, made any
attempt to attack until August, when, hearing that
Villeneuve was at sea, Ganteaume weighed and stood
out as if to engage. When Cornwallis took up the
challenge, he thought better of it and returned. Corn-
wallis followed him and engaged his rear, but, coming
under the fire of the shore batteries, desisted from the
attack. For batteries read minefields and submarines,
and the policy pursued by Sir John Jellicoe is clearly
identical with that of Cornwallis, a hard-fighting old
seaman whom no one has ever accused of undue caution.
Nelson's conduct off Toulon was precisely of the same
cautious kind. The story of the game of bluff played
by him and Admiral Latouche - Treville in 1804
makes amusing reading, but it is quite conclusive as
to the principles which guided him. "My friend,
M. Latouche, sometimes plays bo-peep in and out of
Toulon, like a mouse at the edge of her hole," he
writes, and, again: "Yesterday a rear-admiral and
seven sail, including frigates, put their nose outside the
harbour. If they go on playing this game, some day we

326 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

shall lay salt upon their tails, and so end the campaign. "
He put Bickerton, with five sail, close to the harbour to
draw the French out, a "method to make M. Latouche
angry " ; but he himself kept twenty leagues away. And
he clinches the matter in the following passage:

I think their fleet will be ordered out to fight close to
Toulon, that they may get their crippled ships in again,
and that we must then quit the coast to repair our damages
and thus leave the coast clear ; but my mind is fixed not to
fight them, unless with a westerly wind outside the Hyeres and
with an easterly wind to the westward of Sicie.

Finally, M. Latouche did something characteristic-
ally German. He came out with his whole force as if
to offer battle, but retired under the guns of Toulon on
Nelson's approach. He then made a report that Nelson
had run away from him, adding that he pursued till
nightfall, and, next morning, could not see the enemy.
Nelson's wrath knew no bounds. "You will have seen
M. Latouche's letter, of how he chased me and I ran,"
he writes. "I keep it; and, by God, if I take him, he
shall eat it ! " But M. Latouche died shortly afterwards
from another cause.

Minefields, destroyers, and submarines are more for-
midable to a battle-fleet than shore batteries. Yet we
see that Cornwallis and Nelson steadfastly refused to be
drawn into action under the shore guns, while Hawke
readily accepted it when and where there were no
batteries to be feared. To hold that battle is in itself
the end at which a commander should aim is as unsound
as to hold that war can be made without taking risks.
Those who accuse Sir John Jellicoe of thinking of the
safety of the fleet rather than of victory are not only
doing an injustice to an officer whose qualities of courage

THE MAIN FLEETS 327

and resolution have been of ttimes tested, but are guilty
of very shallow criticism. If the enemy's whole fleet
consist of ten vessels, it is worth while to lose twenty in
destroying the ten. But if there is a strong probability
that a part at least of his force will escape, while the
attacking fleet will lose so heavily that it will be left
inferior to the survivors, then an attack shows not
courage, but criminal folly. That such would be the
result of engaging the Germans d, entrance under condi-
tions chosen by themselves is most probable. "That
they may get their crippled ships in again, and that we
must then quit the coast to repair our damages and
thus leave the coast clear," was as plainly the object
of the Germans in offering battle in proximity to their
ports as it was the object of M. Latouche. The pros-
pect is not made more seductive by the fact that, under
modern conditions, there might be no ships to repair.

The truth is that the. critics think in the terms of
time and space which belong to Nelson's day, not to our
own. Nelson's position at twenty leagues from Toulon
in his day, when all information had to be conveyed by
frigate, and he was dependent on the wind to bear him
to the decisive spot, was not so very far different from
that of the Grand Fleet in relation to the German bases
to-day, while his determination not to fight unless he
could catch the enemy at a distance of ten to fifteen
miles from Toulon is certainly not extravagantly
translated into an intention not to begin an action
within, let us say, a hundred to a hundred and fifty
miles off the Bight of Heligoland.

Nelson's principle was only to fight under conditions
which gave him an assurance of decisive victory. That
is plain no less from the tactics of Trafalgar, where he
did fight, than from those employed off Toulon, where

328 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

he did not. The whole of the order of attack at Trafal-
gar was based on the idea of going down to the enemy
in order of sailing, so as not to waste time in forming
the line in light airs lest the day should prove too short
for a decision. Nelson certainly never held the doctrine
that a battle was an end in itself. On the return voyage
from the West Indies, he was accustomed to say to his
captains, speaking of the French fleet :

If we meet them, we shall find them not less than eigh-
teen, I rather think twenty, sail of the line, and therefore
do not be surprised if I do not fall on them immediately;
we won't part without a battle. I will let them alone until
we approach the shores of Europe, or they give me an
advantage too tempting to be resisted.

He was in inferior force, and he would not fight at a dis-
advantage, until all chance of reinforcements reaching
him before the enemy made his own ports had vanished.
Then he would attack, and sacrifice his fleet, if neces-
sary, because, by so doing, he would reduce the strength
of the enemy relatively to the British. His was not the
fleet upon which the all of his country depended. He
relied on his fleet taking heavier' toll than it paid, and
knew that, by so much he would relieve his comrades-
in-arms. He kept the ulterior objects steadily in view.
But he avoided the mistake, which is what Mahan
really criticises in the French school of naval strategy,
of forgetting that all ulterior objects are best served by
the destruction of the enemy's fleet, if an opportunity
offers sufficiently advantageous to give a reasonable
certainty of success. Until it is proved that such an
opportunity of destroying the German fleet has been
offered and refused, one is justified in maintaining
that the strategy of the Admiralty and of Sir John

THE MAIN FLEETS 329

Jellicoe has been in accordance with the best doctrines
of naval war as taught by its greatest professors.

After the Battle of Jutland Bank the Germans made
no further attempt to meet the British fleet in force,
though, in an excursion, the details of which have never
been made known, they succeeded in destroying two of
our light cruisers by submarine attack. As, however, a
Dreadnought battleship of theirs was twice torpedoed
by one of our submarines, they suffered more heavily
than they gained. On a later occasion also British sub-
marines got Jtorpedoes home on German battleships.

The High Sea Fleet, however, remains a menace, and
is the chief reason why we are unable to take completely
effective measures to prevent German submarines from
reaching the trade routes. The weapon employed for
commerce destruction is new, and the method of its
employment is an offence against God and man. But
the old lessons which naval history has taught remain
true: that the power to use the sea in war-time and
the power to restrict the use of the sea alike depend on
the existence of a fleet capable of fighting for suprem-
acy. These matters, however, will be more fully dis-
cussed in the next chapter. It remains to refer briefly
to events in other seas in which fleets of heavy ships are
employed.

Both the French and the Russians have very largely
increased their number of capital ships since the war be-
gan. In the Black Sea the latter possess an undoubted
supremacy of which it cannot be said they have made
full use. Along the coast of Asia Minor their military
operations were assisted by the fleet up to the fall of
Trebizond, and it appeared likely that an adroit use of
the tactics there employed might bring them to the head
of the Bosporus. This hope has not been fulfilled, and,

330 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

furthermore, the Russians failed to make use of their
maritime superiority to frustrate the German and
Bulgarian crossings of the Danube near its mouth and
the consequent outflanking of the Rumanian armies.
It was a severe disappointment to every believer in sea
power to notice the absolute neglect of the means of
defence afforded by the waterway of the Danube.
The Russian Revolution and the light it has thrown
on the chaotic internal condition of the country,
however, go far to explain the reason. It emphasises
once more the fact that the sea will not serve a tyrant.
This is no mere rhetorical phrase. Since the Goeben
was disabled and one or more of their own battle-
cruisers were finished, the Russians have had no main
fleet to face in the Black Sea, yet their own greatly
superior navy has remained impotent.

In the Baltic, as has been pointed out before, the
situation is a curious one. By virtue of their back-
door the Germans can, in theory, bring a vastly superior
force to bear against the Russians. But the latter are,
more or less, secure in the Gulf of Finland, and the
Germans have not at present dared to risk decisive
operations for fear of weakening their position in the
North Sea. The Grand Fleet defends the gate of
Petrograd. The Germans burned their fingers badly
when they attempted conjoint operations against
Riga in the summer of 1915, and, indeed, up to now,
have met with nothing but misfortune in anything they
have attempted in the only sea which they can claim to
control. On the other hand, the Russians have made
no use of their opportunities for offensive action, if only
on a small scale. Once again, the cause must be
assigned to the internal condition of the country and
the hostility and suspicions of Sweden which have

THE MAIN FLEETS 331

hampered the Russian use of the sea from the first. It
is perfectly true that the Russian battle-fleet in the
Baltic, like the German in the North Sea is precluded
from taking heavy risks for fear of "leaving the coast
clear"; but our Ally is strong in torpedo-craft, and is
better situated than any other member of the Alliance
for forcing action on the Germans. The political
consequences of successful activities would be such
that a considerable amount of risk would be justified.

In the Adriatic, the only other important scene of
naval activity, the French and Italians have been
content to blockade the Austrian fleet, suffering consider-
able losses by submarine attack in the narrow waters.
The attempt upon Cattaro in the earlier part of the
war was feeble and irresolute, and the opportunity for
more decisive action passed when the Montenegrins lost
Mount Lovtcha, which commands the harbour. The
geographical features of this sea have been explained in
the chapter on the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages.
Now, as then, the Italians, for this purpose the succes-
sors of the Venetians, are eager to obtain a foothold on
its eastern shore. They have one, temporarily, at any
rate, in Avlona, but political and national jealousies
dominate the situation. If Trieste be taken, and the
Istrian Peninsula fall into the hands of our Ally, the
question of the Austrian fleet will be speedily solved. A
successful advance of the Allies through Serbia, or the
elimination of Bulgaria from the war, might also render
the naval positions of the Austrians untenable.

The naval events of the war, in fact, have reinforced
the lesson learned from the fate of Cervera's squadron
in Santiago de Cuba and of the Russian fleet in Port
Arthur, that a naval force which is unwilling to fight can
only be compelled to do so — or perish il it does not —

332 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

by the conjoint use of sea and land forces. It is no new
fact, but one which, in early history, is obscured because
the line of distinction between land and sea forces is
narrow, and because, before the days of long-range
weapons, actions were often fought within the harbours
themselves. Salamis was brought about thus, and so
was the Siege of Sebastopol. In our great wars with the
French we should have done the same thing had we
possessed the necessary land force. As it was, our fleets
had to wait and watch until other conditions, operating,
perhaps, at a great distance, compelled the enemy to
sea. The development of aerial warfare may, perhaps,
bring about a change. But that has not yet gone far
enough, and the hopes which some built on the sub-
marine and its possible use as a ferret have not, up to
the present, been justified. The main fleets, therefore,
act by a process of silent constriction which is elusive,
though all pervading. This influence, however, is not
confined to the stronger. The weaker fleets also exer-
cise it in their degree, and, in considering what is to
follow, it is ' important to recognise the difference
between a fleet which will not and a fleet which can
not fight.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

THE use of the submarine by the Germans has raised
questions, moral, military, and economic, to which vary-
ing answers have been, and will, for a long time, be
given. Up to the summer of 1914 the underwater boat
was going through a process of evolution as a military
weapon which followed pretty closely that of the
torpedo-boat and destroyer. Beginning as a mere
engine of harbour defence, the weapon of the weaker
Power, the submarine, thanks to engineering improve-
ments, chiefly the perfecting of the heavy-oil engine, to
optical science, and, above all, to the daring and skill
of the young officers trained to use her, had become
a sea- and even an ocean-going vessel of almost
unlimited possibilities for offence and observation.
British submarines, before and after the begin-
ning of the war, made voyages to China, from
Australia, and across the Atlantic. Within three hours
after the beginning of hostilities they were, as Mr.
Churchill informed the House of Commons, inside
the Bight of Heligoland, watching the movements of
the German fleet, and they were used to guard the
passage of the Army to France. The feat of Com-
mander Holbrook, V.C., in diving under the Turkish
minefield in the Dardanelles and torpedoing the battle-

333

334 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

ship Messudyeh, the actions of Commander Nasmyth
in the Sea of Marmora, and many like exploits, seemed
to confirm the hopes of those who believed that, in
the submarine, we possessed a weapon which might
be effectively used to drive a reluctant fleet out of
harbour to battle. On the other hand, the Germans
taught us lessons of caution. A single submarine, as
the Germans claimed, destroyed the three armoured
cruisers, Cressy, Hogue, and Aboukir, by the use of a
decoy; the Pathfinder and Hermes fell victims to the
same agency, and the Formidable (battleship) was
torpedoed and sunk by an attack at night, when it
was believed that the submarine must be too blind
to be effective.

On the other hand, the German harbours had proved
impregnable to attack, and many attempts on our fleets
at their bases were unsuccessful. Moreover, the main
fleets, manoeuvring at high speed and well screened by
destroyers, moved about the seas with impunity, while
the underwater craft proved more vulnerable to the
assaults of light cruisers than their more enthusiastic
advocates had foreseen. As a military weapon, in
fact, they proved effective, but not decisive. An armed
and organised fleet had little to fear from them.

But the successful attacks on the three cruisers and
on the Formidable showed that, under certain condi-
tions, they might be used with deadly effect in a war on
commerce. Admiral Sir Percy Scott, writing to the
Times a month or two before the war, pointed out the
possibilities, and, though experience proved his theories
wrong in many respects, especially as to the submarine
compelling the withdrawal of the battle-squadrons from
the seas, in others he proved an accurate seer of the
things which were to come. The Germans were late

CONCLUSION 335

beginners with the weapon which they afterwards
claimed as particularly their own. It is one of the
ironies of war that Admiral von Tirpitz, the father of
submarine piracy — a term which will be justified pres-
ently— persistently deprecated the military value of
the submarine until a comparatively short time before
war broke out, with the consequence that Germany had
only thirty completed boats in August, 1914.

The various attempts at codifying the law, or, rather,
the practice, of war at sea had left matters in a state
of royal confusion. Without attempting a complete
analysis, it may be said that enemy ships were liable to
capture and neutral ships were not, save under condi-
tions shortly to be named. Under the Declaration of
Paris, to which this country was a party, free ships made
free goods — that is to say, enemy goods, except contra-
band of war could not be captured in neutral ships —
neutral goods in enemy ships were not liable to capture;
privateering was abolished; blockade, to be binding up-
on neutrals, must be effective — that is to say, a ship
attempting to enter a blockaded port must be in real
danger of capture, and must not be made prize as a
punitive measure subsequent to the running of her cargo.
Moreover, it was agreed by sundry of the Hague Con-
ventions that ships seized by vessels of war must be
brought into the Prize Court for adjudication, and
might only be sunk in the case of urgent military neces-
sity, in which case their papers must be preserved and
every provision made for the safety of their passen-
gers and crews. If these conditions could not be com-
plied with, the ships must be released.

The flaws in this rough-and-ready code of rules are
easily apparent. One or two only, which are relevant
to the purpose of this chapter, need be mentioned. The

336 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

definition of "contraband" was left to the discretion of
the belligerent Powers, with the exception that certain
articles ancipitis usus, of which the chief are foodstuffs,
were declared contraband conditionally on their being
consigned to the government of a belligerent for use by
the armed forces. Again, no definition of "military
necessity" was attempted, nor were any rules laid down
as to what constituted adequate provision for the safety
of passengers and crews in the case of ships destroyed.
Furthermore, the definition of "effective blockade"
was too loosely framed to cover the conditions which
arose with the use of the submarine for this purpose.

The Germans hypocritically pretended that they
resorted to submarine war against merchantmen as a
reprisal for the alleged illegal and inhuman action of
Great Britain in cutting off imports of food, and thus,
so it was alleged, starving German women and children.
In point of fact — it is worth remembering — the Ger-
mans by their own act in declaring war on Russia cut
themselves off from the main source of their imports of
breadstuff s, and, by forcing Turkey into the war, cut us
also off from the same source of supply. Their demand,
therefore, was that we should allow them free access
to markets of which they made a comparatively small
use in time of peace, there to compete with us, who used
them largely and whose need was the greater on account
of the closing of the Dardanelles. However, that point
need not be laboured. It is enough to recall that, while
the German cruisers were still at large, they deliberately
sank all the vessels laden with foodstuffs destined
for this country which they could capture, includ-
ing the William P. Frye, an American sailing ship
bound from Seattle to Liverpool with a cargo of wheat.
Moreover, our Order in Council was not issued until

CONCLUSION 337

after the first submarine campaign had begun, and
until the German Government had taken over the whole
wheat supply of the country, thus acquiring the power
to allot any proportion it thought good to the armies.

The first submarine campaign began in February,
1915. It was ostensibly aimed only at British ships
approaching or leaving the shores of this country.
Neutrals were warned that accidents might occur, and
"accidents" did. The war was conducted with abso-
lute ruthlessness, ships being torpedoed without warn-
ing, and the crews, in some instances, being shelled
as they were leaving their vessels in their boats. The
sinking of the Lusitania, with the consequent loss of
noo lives, and of the cross-Channel steamer, Sussex,
were the incidents which made the greatest impression
on the world, but they were, in fact, no more atrocious
than many other acts done by the Germans. The
campaign in this form, however, was a total failure.
The boats used for the purpose were small and designed
for military purposes; they were extremely vulnerable;
the restrictions imposed to avoid offence to neutrals,
and, especially to the United States, hampered their
use, and the British counter-measures rapidly became
effective. By the late summer or early autumn of
1915, the war on merchantmen had ceased to be a
matter of serious concern.

The sense of victory and security engendered in the
British people, and, unfortunately, in the British
Admiralty, was, however, entirely illusory. The Ger-
mans were following a deep-laid plan. While Count
von Reventlow and others were abusing Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg for laying aside the sharpest
weapon of Germany; while von Tirpitz was forced into
retirement, and while the Chancellor, on his side, was

338 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

protesting that lack of success and not lack of will had
forced the termination of the U-boat warfare, the
Germans were building boats by the score of a newer,
bigger, and stronger type, training crews, laying plans,
experimenting, preparing the ground for the playing
of their highest trump — the knave. At the end of
1916, after much preliminary blowing of trumpets, a
so-called "peace-offer" was issued. It amounted
to no more than an invitation to a conference, at which
Germany would .state her terms. It was preluded
by an offensive claim to victory. The Allies, wisely or
unwisely — it depends on the point of view — replied by
a statement of their aims. Immediately the prepared
outcry arose in Germany and the countries of her
Allies. "England" had spurned the hand offered to
her and had proclaimed her intention to destroy Ger-
many. On her head, then, rested the guilt of the con-
tinued bloodshed ; Germany would now use her sharpest
weapons. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, with a cyni-
cism worthy of his "scrap of paper" outburst and his
admission of the wrong done to Belgium when the
German armies set themselves to "hack their way
through" her territories, declared that he had only
been waiting for a favourable opportunity to open
"unrestricted U-boat warfare." The time had now
come; Germany was ready, both with men and material;
the food-supply of the whole world was short, and, if
the United States saw fit to resent German measures,
their intervention would come too late to affect the issue.
The prophets of Germany declared that the U-boats
were in a position to sink a million tons of shipping a
month, and that Great Britain would be forced to sue
for peace in three.

The measures proclaimed were a challenge to the

CONCLUSION 339

whole world. Every ship of whatever nationality
which approached a cordon drawn round practically
the whole of Europe would be sunk at sight. Hospital
ships were included among the intended victims, on the
flimsy pretence that the British employed them for
the conveyance of troops and stores. The proclama-
tion was attended by every sort of insult to neutrals,
such as the insolent permission given to the Dutch to
send a weekly paddle-steamer to Southwold and to the
Americans to send one ship a week, painted in a pre-
scribed and ridiculous way, to Falmouth. Moreover,
the Chancellor, 'having protested up to the last that the
Germans meant to adhere to their agreement with the
United States, arrived at after the sinking of the Sussex,
that they would not destroy passenger steamers without
warning, told the American Ambassador only six hours
before the "unrestricted warfare" was to be put into
effect of the intentions of Germany, with the calm
intimation that the German word held good just so
long as it suited Germany, and no longer. The result
was an immediate material success for the Germans,
and a crushing moral defeat. Ships went down like
leaves in autumn. Hospital ships, Belgian relief ships,
under German safe conduct, anything and everything.
Neutrals hesitated to sail. The whole trade of the
world was thrown out of gear. But the United States
ranged themselves on the side of the Allies, and, from
China to Peru, the neutral States showed their detest-
ation of the crime either by declaring war or by break-
ing off relations with the German Government. Only
the little sea-bordered States of Northern Europe, too
near to Germany and too weak to resent her iniquity,
bowed the head and suffered. The immediate addition
to the forces of the Alliance in the field was not great.

340 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

So far, the German calculation was correct. But the
addition to the unseen forces which work silently
through sea power was enormous. Every embarrass-
ment felt by Great Britain in her blockade policy was
swept away. She became to the whole world what she
had never been before in all her wars, the champion of
its rights instead of the tyrant of the seas. For it
has always been the weakness of Britain that, while
she was fighting for liberty against land-tyranny, she
has always been compelled by her war-measures to
appear as the antagonist of neutral right, or, at any rate,
of neutral interest.

After a first gasp of surprise the British people
steadied themselves to meet the new situation. Never
did they prove more gloriously their right to be con-
sidered the first maritime nation in the world. Not a
merchant seaman flinched from his duty. Not a British
ship the less sailed from or to her ports. Neutrals might
hesitate, and justifiably. The mercantile marine of
Britain carried on. The Admiralty, newly formed
just before the unrestricted warfare began, with Sir
Edward Carson as First Lord and Sir John Jellicoe,
recalled for the purpose from the command of the
Grand Fleet, as First Sea Lord, were placed in the
most embarrassing position. Their predecessors had
failed to foresee the German plan. The advice of the
Navy had not been sought in forming the general war-
plans of the Allies, and the nation was committed to
distant enterprises, demanding the protection of long
lines of communications which could not be secured
without complete command of the sea. The sinking
of hospital ships and raids from Zeebrugge on the coast
of Kent caused a continual demand for protection which
threatened to denude the Grand Fleet of its necessary

CONCLUSION 341

complement of destroyers and light craft, and, perhaps,
to render it impotent. A clatter of interested criticism
arose; but the nation, as a whole, would have none of it.
It quickly recognised that no magical device was to be
expected which would finish the submarine at a blow,
and it made up its mind that "it's dogged that does it. "
By the end of May, four months after the unrestricted
U-boat warfare had begun, and a month after the date
at which, according to the German calculation, we were
to have been on our knees, the Prime Minister was able
to inform the House of Commons that our resources
were sufficient to pull us through. By September it
was confidently announced that the U-boat campaign
was defeated.

War in itself is an exhibition by man of the elemental
instincts which belong to the animal in him. The profes-
sion of arms is noble only because man, by his reason,
realises the dangers to which war exposes him, and faces
them with a steadfast mind at the call of faith or justice
or freedom. It is an offering of self for a cause. The
cause may be a bad one, but that is not for the sailor or
soldier to judge. The motives on which he acts are
loyalty, faithfulness, duty. It is for others to bear the
responsibility of the rights and wrongs of the quarrel.
Thence comes the paradox that war, in itself bestial,
calls forth the highest qualities of which man is capable.
But the glory is in dying, not in killing. The warrior
who kills the unresisting is on a level with the cutthroat.
Progressive consciousness of this has led to the gradual
evolution of a whole code of restraints, wholly illogical
it may be, but firmly rooted in the better nature of man,
by which the naked horrors of war have been mitigated.

342 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

Those who cease to resist are spared ; the aged and the
young are unmolested; women are inviolate. Even
private property is respected. Nay, more; restraint is
placed even upon the weapons which may be used
against the armed forces of the enemy. At least, all
these things were regarded as established until the
German tribes arose to make war on a world devoted
to peace at the bidding of a knot of half -crazy soldiers
and statesmen surrounding a potentate drunk with
flattery. Then the astonished world learned that
logic and science could bring men back to the worst
and most brutal savagery of their primeval instincts,
unchecked, unsoftened, and unsweetened either by
the boasted progress of humanity or the revelation of
Divine Love which the Germans nominally accept as
their religious creed.

Necessity, we know, has been described as "the
tyrant's plea. " The tyrants of Potsdam have used it
to the full. Could they have pleaded truthfully, as
they have pleaded mendaciously, "We are righting for
the life of our country against a world banded against us
in a monstrous act of aggression," some justification of
their violent infractions of international right might
have been admitted. But the German faith is that
whoever resists the ambitions of Germany, no matter to
what degree these conflict with the rights and interests
of her neighbours, is thereby guilty of an "attack"
upon her. Preventive war is then a "necessity."
The violation of her neighbour's territory is also a
"necessity," in order that the preventive war may
be carried to a successful conclusion. The ruthless
shooting of those who resist and the laying waste of
their cities is also a "necessity." And all is tricked
out in the garb of mercy. We are assured that "fright-

CONCLUSION 343

fulness" is reluctantly adopted as a means of shortening
the war and bringing the blessings of German Kultur to
the nations of the earth. It is egotism exalted to the
seventh heaven. It is also the deliberate denial of right
to all nations but the German. Not even the allies of
Germany are excepted, for the reward offered to them
for their comradeship in arms is, in the case of victory,
to live under the German yoke, and, in the case of
defeat, to pay the price thereof: "Oesterreich mussen
blut."

Now this is the very antithesis of all that sea power
stands for. These chapters have been written in vain if
it has not been made clear that, from Xerxes to Napo-
leon, the breed of men who have used the sea have
stubbornly upheld the right of men and nations to live
their lives as they chose, to worship God according to
their consciences, to enjoy intellectual freedom under
the form of government best suited to themselves.
No gifts which the best and wisest despot could bring, of
material prosperity, of ordered and sheltered existence,
could compensate for the loss of freedom of soul, the
unfettered choice of paths which alone forms character.
God Himself damned Germanism when He gave free
will to man.

Secure in their island, when once the secret of sea
power had been learned, the British people have fought
out the matter of freedom among themselves. They
have curbed the power of kings and priests and nobles.
They have learned that each in turn may become a
barrier against the tyranny of the other; that all, in
their ordered degree, are a bulwark against the hasty
passions of the mob, as the groynes on the coast against
the violence of the storm. They learned, slowly per- ,
haps, the lesson of tolerance, the worth of compromise,

344 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the worthlessness of logic divorced from actuality.
To live and let live became their ideal. And with the
widening of the world, the opening of the sea, they
spread that ideal over the globe. Did tyranny, political,
ecclesiastical, or economic, at any time threaten to
prevail in Britain, there were lands beyond the seas
to which those Britons who would not suffer it could
pass. There they widened the bounds of their liberty,
and thence the tide flowed back again, bringing new
freshness to the Motherland. Others went but for a
time, as sailors, as merchants, as administrators. But
all alike have contributed to keep the national life sane.
" Insular" we may be. No man is more prone to poke
fun at the foreigner than is the Briton, or to pity him
for the misfortune of his birth. But the Briton does not
display the irritation of the German when, for instance,
an Englishman takes off his coat to play lawn-tennis. He
has a salt of humour which forbids him to believe that
all races of mankind would be the better if they could
be melted down and cast into a mould of his pattern.

Contrast the history of Germany. Divided, dis-
tracted, desolated by war, foreign and civil, the German
tribes have slowly crystallised round the military
kingdom of Prussia. The threat from without has
always checked political development within. Security
had demanded unquestioning submission to the will
of the ruler and the classes around him. That all
Germans should be cast in one mould and obedient to a
single mind has appeared the first condition of existence.
Generations of weakness and enslavement to petty
potentates or prelates paved the way for the
domination of Prussia over the lesser States. More-
over, having no national life of her own, Germany
for centuries supplied the mercenaries of Europe, from

CONCLUSION 345

the Lanz-knechts of the Middle Ages to the Hessians
and Hanoverians who left so evil a reputation in Amer-
ica and Ireland. Recollection of this, perhaps, accounts
for the abhorrence in which the term "mercenary" is
regarded in Germany to-day. Whether derived from
them or not, the brutality of German militarism is
worthy of their traditions. From all this there was no
escape for the German oversea. If he left his native
shore it was in a foreign ship, to dwell among foreigners,
to listen to a foreign tongue, to live under foreign laws
and amid foreign customs and habits of thought. He
could contribute nothing to the evolution of ideas which
were essentially German, as could the Briton who dwelt
in the United States, Canada, or Australia, to ideas
which are essentially British. He could not get out of
the reach of the long arm of the tyranny under which
he lived at home save by forfeiting much of that which
made him German. Se soumettre ou se demettre was his
painful choice. Intoxication with victory completed
the work of turning the German people into an instrur
ment ready to the hand of the megalomaniacs who
dreamed of world-dominion. Victory, be it said, not
only on the field of battle, but in science, in commerce,
and in organisation. "We Germans are the salt of
the earth" was a phrase quite natural on the lips of the
monarch of this self-centred people.

Only such a people could be brought to submit to
the long years of grinding discipline and sacrifice which
had to be lived while their leaders were maturing their
plans of conquest. The Briton, with no bitter memo-
ries of an invaded and ravaged land, with his belief,
tested by centuries of immunity, in the security of his
island home with the seas and all that lies beyond open
to him, would never for an instant have endured what

346 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

the German has endured for forty-five years in the belief
that what was prepared for aggression was necessary
for defence. The application is not particular, but
general. It shows why a Sea Power is incapable of
planning and attempting the subjugation of other
nations; why freedom does indeed flourish behind the
trident and not the. sword.

This analysis brings us to the underlying factors of
the submarine war. It lays bare the deeply-hidden
springs of the conflict between Britain and Germany,
between the "elephant and the whale," to quote Bis-
marck. The submarine war is the attempt on the part
of the Prussians to bring military tyranny to bear upon
the seas and to carry it to the uttermost parts of the
earth where sea power has planted freedom. Napo-
leon failed at the water's edge. Prussia is making a
desperate attempt to succeed in the dark places under
the waters. This makes the defeat of the Prussian
plan a question not only between Great Britain and her
present foe, but between freedom and tyranny in all
parts of the world. For a German success means
that the whole world is to bow the head to the German
plea of "necessity," which means submission to the
arbitrary will of Germany on pain of the complete
destruction of all intercourse between nations, of all
freedom to conduct the ordinary affairs of men, but by
the Prussian leave.

The Germans claim that they are fighting for the
Freedom of the Seas. It is an effective phrase. It has
already been shown that Great Britain, as the fruit
of her maritime triumphs down to 1815, and by the
work of her Navy in the years of peace that followed,
secured that freedom for all the nations of the world.
The Germans, however, attach a different meaning to

CONCLUSION 347

the phrase. They design to overthrow the barrier
which sea power has placed between tyranny and
freedom. When Mendoza complained to Elizabeth
of the insolence of Drake in daring to sail in the Spanish
Main, that high-spirited Princess replied, "Tell your
royal Master that a title to the ocean cannot belong
to any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither
nature nor public use and custom permitteth any
possession thereof." Philip claimed the monopoly of
the Spanish Main as a way by which the long arm of his
tyranny could reach his subjects in Spanish America.
The German claim is really identical. They do not
claim possession of the ocean, it is true, though their
contention that the Baltic should be regarded as mare
clausum shows that they do not, in their hearts, accept
Elizabeth's repudiation of private possession. But
they claim that, in time of war, the sea should be
altogether ruled out of the theatre of operations. They
claim not only that merchantmen, belligerent and neu-
tral alike, should be allowed to come and go freely,
but that the same immunity should be permitted to
transports. Hostilities are not to begin until the
enemy's coast is reached. We and every nation in the
world are to be compelled to lay aside our shield of naval
defence. The arm of military autocracy is to be
extended so that it can reach to the further side of the
Atlantic, into the Pacific, to the Antipodes, or anywhere
it will. Against this outrageous demand, Great Britain
stands, the one firm rock. The German reply, to the
whole world, is, "Very well. So long as 'England'
resists our demand, we will sink your ships, murder
your people, destroy your property." It is "neces-
sary" to Germany to have freedom of the seas in her
sense of the word. It is "necessary," in order to

348 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

obtain it, to break "England's " sea power. To do so, it
is "necessary" to use the submarine weapon, and,
since "England's" supremacy above the surface
prevents the Germans bringing ships into port, it is
' ' necessary ' ' to sink them. Moreover, as ' ' England's ' '
patrol craft swarm on the seas and her merchantmen are
armed, it is "necessary" for the U-boats to remain be-
low the surface and to use the torpedo without warning
or an attempt to secure the safety of those on board
the ships attacked. Thus the plea of necessity is turned
into a doctrine of devils.

It is surely clear that we have reached the ultimate
issue between sea power as the instrument of freedom
and land power as that of military tyranny. Let us see
what will happen if, in the upshot, the submarine is not
rendered innocuous by force of arms. It is idle, in that
case, to suppose that any international agreement will
avail to stop its use as the Germans have used it. Ex
hypothesi, the naval force of the whole world would be
impotent. Mankind would be thrown back on a choice
of these alternatives : either the German doctrine of the
Freedom of the Seas must be accepted, in which case
every country in the world will lie at the mercy of
military power unless it lives armed to the teeth, or
else the intercourse between nations separated by the
sea must remain for ever subject to sudden and violent
interruption by any Power which has an ambition to
serve and which deems the time ripe for its fulfilment,
provided it has sufficient military force to resist invasion
and fortified ports from which its submarines can issue.
We shall be thrown back upon the naked rule of force,
and the counter check which sea power has always
placed upon the misuse of land power and vice versa will
be a thing of the past.

CONCLUSION 349

To those who hold Free Trade as an article of faith
the prospect created by the methods of the German sub-
marine attack upon merchantmen and the consequences
which would flow from its success must be regarded as
particularly serious. No country will dare, in future,
to rely on supplies of necessaries from abroad if it values
its national life. Home production even of the things
which the country is least fitted to produce must be
maintained, or the national security will be imperilled.
International trade will receive a severe check, and, with
it, the peaceful intercourse between nations. The world
will be thrown back on the old conception of trade as a
form of hostilities, in which the nation which attempts
to thrust its goods into the markets of its neighbours
is striking a blow at their national life. That view will
be the better justified in the light of our past experiences
of Germany's trade methods and aims.

To the British Empire the state of things here fore-
cast would be particularly disastrous. We look to the
future development of the dominions and dependencies
as our great source for the supply of foodstuffs and raw
materials. But that can only be if the way of the sea
can be kept reasonably safe in war as well as in peace.
Take sugar, for instance. We are never likely to repeat
the costly mistake by which we became dependent on
foreign bounty-fed sugar, especially from Germany.
But sugar is an essential food, and the alternatives
before us are to set up and foster the cultivation of
beet in this country, or to develop the supply of cane-
sugar within the Empire, which contains many areas
particularly fitted for its production. If the submarine
is allowed to continue a standing menace to the world,
it is on the first and not the second alternative that we
must rely. The same remarks apply to other commodi-

350 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

ties, though, perhaps, not so forcibly. The submarine
menace, in fact, cuts at the very basis on which the
Ocean Empire is founded. While all the world is
interested, and profoundly interested, in its suppression
to us it is a matter of life or death.

It is essential, then, that we should have a clear
understanding of a development which touches the
future of the British Commonwealth so nearly. The
"U-boat warfare" of the Germans, in its eventual
development, was a surprise sprung upon the world
because it was the use of a weapon, new and not fully
understood, in a way which set at defiance all the usages
of the civilised world. It is quite justifiably described
as piracy. Piracy in its strict sense is, of course, private
war levied on the world for the sake of gain. But there
have been States to which piracy was a policy, and the
action of Germany does not differ from theirs except
that direct robbery was not resorted to except in small
and insignificant instances. But that Germany has
levied war upon the whole world for her own ultimate
gain, and that she is, in the words of the old jurists,
hostis humani generis, is a matter which admits of
no dispute. It is a rather singular instance of uncon-
scious prophecy that, in 1849, when a German fleet,
flying the colours of the empire which was not then in
existence, had a skirmish with the Danes off Heligoland,
Palmerston gave great offence to the Germans by declar-
ing that any vessel committing acts of belligerency
under the black-red-and-gold flag would render them-
selves liable to be treated as pirates. The black-red-
and-white which has succeeded the black-red-and-gold
has made good its claim to the inheritance of the "Jolly
Roger."

It must, however, be borne in mind that the sub-

CONCLUSION 351

marine is an engine of destruction merely. It may
hamper and harass sea power. It might conceivably
banish it from the earth by closing the seas altogether
to the use of mankind. It can never confer sea power
on any nation. The theory was advanced in the open-
ing chapter of the book that the natural plane of man's
existence is sea level. Above and below it he is involved
in a ceaseless struggle with the law of gravity. Even in
surface ships cranes are needed to extract cargo from
holds below the water-line. This fact seems to secure
the permanence of the surface ship as the ultimate
factor in sea power, using the term in its broadest
sense. Despite the boasted voyages of the Deutschland,
submarine cargo-ships are never likely, for very many
reasons, to replace surface vessels for trade purposes.
If that be so, it follows that the Power which is inferior
in force on the surface and relies on submarine attack,
while it may forbid to its opponent the use of the
sea, can never acquire it for itself. The "fundamental
basis of sea power, which has existed since Syracuse,"
is not therefore "shaken by this new development of
submarine cruisers," as was somewhat absurdly asserted
when the "unrestricted U-boat warfare" was at its
height. No mere mechanical invention can effect
that. The fundamental basis of sea power will still
remain, and must always remain, the force which pro-
tects the use of the sea, and the ships and men which use
it. The submarine menace does not differ in essence
from the varying dangers which have threatened sea-
borne commerce in the past. The instrument has the
added power of becoming invisible at will, and the
German method of its use involves a disregard of human
life and human right which belongs to the centuries
before the reign of law was extended to the sea ; that is,

352 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

before peaceful intercourse between nations was estab-
lished. The sea sense of a maritime nation may be
trusted to prevail eventually over the particular advan-
tage secured by invisibility. Merchantmen, as of old,
will be compelled to go armed, and their crews will have
to be included in the category of combatants. This
will involve a revision of the rules which forbid the use
of neutral ports to armed vessels, except for limited
periods which are too short for the loading and unloading
of cargo. It will make the preservation of neutrality
far harder than it has hitherto been, and will pro-
bably extend the area of war, as, indeed, it has done in
the present instance. But in the end the old qualities
and aptitudes will prevail to give command of the sea
to the nation fitted by character and natural advantages
to possess it.

On the other hand, the disappearance of the reign
of law from the sea in war-time will greatly modify inter-
national relationships, not only in war but in peace,
unless law can be re-established on some sure basis.
It has been pointed out that nations must become more
self-contained and self-supporting. It may be added
that the great maritime Powers, and Britain first and
foremost, will be compelled to rely more exclusively on
their own ships, which they can protect and arm, and
that in all probability it will be necessary to build a
greater number of smaller ships, with a consequent
increase in the cost of ocean travel and of freight. The
eggs will have to be distributed in as many baskets as
possible. This may involve a return to something
like the Navigation Laws, and will be bad for the
maritime prospects of such countries as Holland, Den-
mark, Norway, and Greece. But here a consideration
of the first importance intrudes itself. After their first

CONCLUSION 353

failure the Germans were quick to recognise that a sub-
marine campaign against commerce offered no chance
of success unless all merchantmen, neutral as well as
belligerent, were subjected to attack. The reason is
partly economic, and obvious, and partly military. To
lie concealed and shoot at sight without exposing them-
selves to make inquiry was the only method by which
the U-boats could obtain comparative immunity. If in
future wars neutral nations choose to submit to such an
assault on their rights ; if they will not even resent it to
the extent of closing their harbours and territorial
waters to the pirate boats, but extend to them the privi-
leges of warships ; if they tamely submit to a haughty
summons to stay at home or take the consequences,
then this menace to the world's safety will never be
removed. It will be bound to spread, for, once openly
or tacitly admitted to be within the limits of lawful
warfare, no nation will be able to abstain from its use
any more than we and the French and the Russians
could abstain from the use of poison gas, abhorrent as
it was to our consciences.

No conventions in themselves will be binding.
Deeds alone will avail to free the world from this assault
on its rights. Only if every nation which uses the sea
determines and declares that submarines used for the
indiscriminate destruction of sea-borne trade shall be
treated as outlaws, refused all rights, and destroyed at
sight whenever opportunity offers; only if every State
which possesses warships will assist in hunting them
out will the plague be abated. There need be no
Declaration of War. Indeed, there should be none.
They should be treated with exactly the consideration
extended to sharks.

354 SEA POWER AND FREEDOM

In the Heavenly Jerusalem, as seen by St. John in
the Apocalypse, "there was no more sea." But there
right and justice, love and the liberty of the sons of God
prevailed. To man on earth, so far as the sea has been,
and is, a divider, it has been a barrier which he can
place between himself and oppression and wrong. To
overleap that barrier has ever been the aim of tyranny.
The tyrant loathes the thought that any man should
be out of reach of his arm. Benevolent or harsh, he
demands the tribute of the souls, no less than the bodies,
of men. The tyrant may be a man or a system — even a
democratic system. In either case, blue water is his
bane. To the sons of freedom, on the other hand, the
sea is a pathway which unites. Are freedom and
tyranny empty words? Recent events have shown us
that they are not, though they are terms easily misused.
Let us hold fast our heritage. Though there is much
yet to gain, something has been lost through the
circumstances which have compelled us to abandon our
historical policy and turn ourselves into a Land Power
on a European scale. So long as we are mindful that
our past, our present, and our future lie on the water,
we shall refuse the temptation which might possibly
breed the will to enter into an era of conquests.

We had better avoid illusions. There is no security
that this war will end war. Human passions remain
what they ever were, and, when the sick-headache has
passed, it is only too probable that Europe will return
to its wallowing in the mire of jealousies and ambitions.
The hope of the world's peace rests on the free nations
sprung from the loins of Britain, the offspring of sea
power. On these united, the freedom-loving races of
Europe can rest. To them can be entrusted the main-
tenance of a true freedom of the seas. The small

CONCLUSION 355

nations, deemed by the Germans unfit for separate
existence, will look to them with confidence to guarantee
them equal rights with the greater Powers. There
are, perhaps, internal struggles ahead of us, not less
severe than the great struggle with the Powers of Dark-
ness which we have been waging since 1914. Man will
still seek to build the New Jerusalem on earth by social
and political changes, oblivious of the truth that the
Kingdom of God is within him. And greed and selfish-
ness will resist his efforts. If we are to come through
in safety, we shall need to be taken out of ourselves
by remembrance of the duty laid upon us to all nations
of mankind in return for the infinite blessings which
sea power has brought us.

Where Britain's flag flies wide unfurled,

All tyrant wrong repelling,
God make the world a better world

For man's brief earthly dwelling!

INDEX

Abbeville, Henry V. turned inland

at, 70

Abdul Hamid, 292
Aboukir, expedition under Aber-

crombie at, 201
Bay, action off, 199, 200
Aboukir, the, 334
Acre, 28

defence of, 217

lost to Christian cause, 98

Napoleon at, 200

Sidney Smith's resistance at,

217

Actium, 40, 104; Empire of
Caesars founded at, 20,
40

Aden, annexation, 222; impor-
tance of, 221, 222
Admiralty, 73, 286, 328, 309-

335
appointment of War Staff at,

274

Board of, 316
Intelligence Department of,

299
Adriatic, Austrian fleet blockaded

in, 33i
coast of, 16, 90; importance of,

to Italy, 87, 88
Italians at head of (1914), 293
operations in, 331
^Egean Islands, Greek colonisa-
tion in, 30; ships of, 34
^Egean Sea, Persians cross the, 32;

292

Aerial reconnaissance, 310
Africa, 42, 109, 113

British possessions in, after

Peace of 1815, 220
collision of races in, 31
German subsidised line to, 257
Greek settlement in, 30

Phoenician settlement in, 31, 86,

90, 105, 112

Agadir, 275
Agincourt, 15, 32, 71
Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 175
Albania, future of, 279
Albanian Mountains, Serbian

Army in, 289
Alberoni, Cardinal, 164, 165
Albert, King of the Belgians, 282
Albion, first mention of, 43
Albuera, 15
Albuquerque, 112, 167
Alcantara, the, 308
Alcibiades, 37
Alexander I., vowed friendship to

Napoleon, 214; rupture

with Napoleon, 217
Alexander III., the, sunk, 268
Alexander VI., Bull of 8, 115,

116, 118
Alexander the Great, 24, 26, 28,

37,39

armies of, 26
conqueror of Egypt, 169
Alexandria, bombardment of, 233 ;

Nelson at, 198
Alexandrine Empire, 38
Alfred the Great, blockaded Dan-
ish fleet, 53; grasped
meaning and function of
sea power, 53; nation's
debt to, 54; treaty of
Wedmore, 53
Algeciras, 324

Algiers, bombardment of, 147;
British attack on, 226;
reduced, 105

Ali Pasha, capture of, 103
Allies, aims of, 338
armies of, 288

dependent on support of

navies of, 292
joined by Great Britain, 291

357

358

INDEX

Allies, reply to German "peace

offer," 338

unpreparedness for war, i
Alma, 15

Almeida, in, 112, 115, 166
Alps, Italians at Swiss (1914),

293

Amboyna, fell to Dutch, 144;
English factors murdered
at, 145

America, Britain's holdings in,
151, 160, 162

Cabot reaches, 119

contrast between Latin and
Anglo-Saxon, 57

discovery of, 5

effect of discovery of, 80, 86

English trade rights, 170

first settlement in, 119-122

France's foothold in, 153, 166

German impertinence to, 239

hegemony of, 161

South, 113

Spanish claim to, 109, no, 116

struggle for trade in, 168
American Ambassador flouted by
Germany, 339

fleet, strength of, in Cuban
War, 238

Government made commercial
grievances a casus belli,
218

mercantile marine destroyed by
Civil War, 248

Navy, 253

ships, successes of, 219
American War of Independence,
adhesion of France to
Revolutionaries, 185;
American Colonies and
two West Indian Islands
lost, 1 86; begun by re-
sistance to Stamp Act,
184; British criticised by
Mahan, 188; British con-
duct of, 189; British sur-
renders in America, 186;
cause of British defeat,
1 88; conditions unfa-
vourable to Great Brit-
ain, 185; Great Britain
embarrassed by Dutch
declaration of war, and
by "armed neutrality,"
1 86; operations in West

Indies, main naval inter-
est in, 187; sea power of
Britain unshaken, 186;
surrender at Yorktown,
187

Amiens, Peace of, 192

Amphion, the, 286':

Amundsen, 230

Ancient world, Empires of, 19, 20

Anne, Queen, 158, 162

Anson, 172, 174

Antony, 40, 169

Antwerp, 3, 186

Arabi Pasha, campaign against,

233

Arabs, 93, in, 112
Aragon, throne of , 108, 114
Arbuthnot, Admiral Sir Robert,

317-319

Arethusa, the, 315

Ariadne, the, 295

Ark Royal, the, 126

Armada, the, 117; effect of defeat
of, 134; English victory
over, 128-131; news of,
reached England, 125

Armenia, n

Armour-plating, changes wrought
by introduction of, 250-

253
Artillery, first used at sea by

Spaniards, 75
Asia, armies, of, 31, 231; struggle

between, and Europe,

26,27
Asia Minor, 28; Greek colonisation

in, 30; under Persian

monarchs, 31
Assyria, 19, 23

Athens, sack of, 32; vital impor-
tance of sea power to,

36
Atlantic routes, our control of,

262

Fleet, 271-274
Aube, Admiral, 251
Augsburg, League of, 157
Austerlitz, 208, 211, 214
Australia, 29; Britain's claim to,

established, 220
Australia, the, 301, 304, 317
Austria, 197, 282; Napoleon makes

war on, 234
Austria- Hungary, 165; army of,

291 ; navy of, 290

INDEX

359

Austrian fleet, 300, 331

Succession, War of, 171-174
Automobile torpedo, changes

wrought by introduction

of, 250-253
Avlona, 280, 331
Azores, 113, 114, 135, 136

B

Babylonia, as a Sea Power, 4;

transports to, n
Bacon, on command of sea

(quoted), 17
Badajoz, 15
Balaklava, 15, 135
Balance of power, 161
Baldwin of Flanders, Emperor of

East, 97; fell in battle,

97

Baldwin of Jerusalem, 93

Balearic Islands, 154

Balfour, Mr., letters to Mayors,
3i6

Balkan States, war with Turkey,
276

Balkans, 19

Ballin, Herr, 155, 258

Baltic, control of, 290, 317; curi-
ous situation in, 330;
German command of,
271 ; Germany's difficulty
of entrance, 64; naval
stores from, 186, 196;
operations in the, 310,
330; Russian battleships
in, 265, 266, 331

Baltic ports ice-sealed, 3

Barbados, taken by Penn, 147;
secure to Britain, 151

Barbarians, assaults of, on Britain,
56

Barbarossa, Hairredin, 102

Barbary States, 139, 195, 197, 225

Barca, Carthaginian house of,
38

Barham, Lord, 207, 209

Baronage destroyed by Wars of
the Roses, 80

Bart, Jean, 157

Bastia, seized, 197

Basuto, future of, 246

Battle of Jutland Bank (see Jut-
land)

Battle of Navarino (see Navarino)

"Battle of the Bight," 310

Battle of the Falkland Islands,
304

Battleships sunk by German sub-
marines, 334

Bavaria, Elector of, against Maria
Theresa, 172

Bavarian levies of Napoleon,
214

Bavarians, defection of, at Lobau,
217

Bay of Biscay, 44, 56, 70, 78

Baylen, French corps surrendered
at, 213

Beachy Head, Battle of, 37, 156

Beagle, the, 230

Beatty, Sir David, at Dogger
Bank, 314; Battle of
Jutland, 315, 316, 317,
319, 322; "Cat" squad-
ron, 318; victory of, 323;
offered German fleet
battle, 195

Bedford, Duke of, victorious at
Harfleur, 71

Belgium, army refitted, 16; chief
river, 3; great port of, 3;
invaded, 16; independ-
ence of, 234, 282; King
of, 282; neutrality of,
234, 281, 282; pledge to,
of England, 282; resolve
of, 282 ; situation of, 3

Beresford, Lord (Charles), brought
navy and mercantile
marine into closer re-
lation, 274

Berlin, Decree of, 214; Napoleon's
Decree of, 212

Berlin, the, 275

Bermuda, secure to Britain, 151

Berytus, Phoenicians founded, 23

Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr von,
281, 337

Bettesworth sent to England by
Nelson, 207

Bickerton at Toulon, 326

Bight of Heligoland, the 320,

327, 333
Bigod, Earl, 66
Bismarck, 257, 278, 281, 346
Black Death, 5; effect on econo-
mic position of England,
80; effect on sea power,
5

360

INDEX

Black Prince, the, 317, 319

Black Sea, 19; Germany's tempo-
rary command of, 291;
Russian volunteer fleet,
270; Russia's supremacy
ifl» 33°; temporary com-
mand of, by Turkey, 291

Blake, Admiral, 133, 146, 147

Blenheim, 15

Blockades, 179, 186, 207, 236,
296, 336

Blucher, 315

Boemond, 92, 93

Boer War, the 239, 241, 242

Bombay, in, 151, 166

Bonaventure, the, 126

Bordeaux, 153

Borden, Sir Robert, 241, 246

Border States of Europe, Eng-
land's policy towards, 228

Borneo, Dyaks of, under British
rule, 243

Boscawen, 179

Boulogne, 204

Bourbons, the, 106, 157, 169, 191

Boyne,James II. defeated at battle
of, William's victory at,
156

Braganza, Catherine of, 151

Brazil, no, 113, 144, 166, 213

Breda, Peace of, 150

Bremen, 287

Breslau, the, 299, 300

Brest, 81, 83, 153, 179, 189, 190,
193, 195, 203, 322, 325

Bridport, Lord, 195

Brighthelmstone(Brighton) burned
by French, 82

Brindisi sacked, 93

Bristol, Cabot sailed from, 119;
Company of Merchant
Adventurers formed, 1 19

Bristol, the, 304, 306

Britain (also see Great Britain,
England, etc.), advan-
tages gained by, after
Utrecht, 160, 161; allied
with France, 148, 150,
163; defended by Roman
legionaries, 51; invaded
by Danes, 52, 53, 55~57;
invaded by French, 68,
69; invaded by Normans,
65; struggles with France,
156, 176, 184

British Channel Guard, 174

British cruisers, 309

British explorers, 230

British fleet, base for, 311

British foreign policy, in relation
to India, 242; under
George I., 163, 165

British mercantile marine, 223
nation, sea power, evolution of,

17

Navy, 18; mobilisation of, 284,

285

sea communications, 220-223
submarines, evolution of, 333;

feats of, 333
Brittany, harpooning introduced,

56

Bronze Age, 12, 25
Brooke, Sir James, Rajah, 226,
Brueys, French commander at

the Nile, 323
Brunsbuttel, 310
Buckingham, Duke of, 143
Bulgaria, crossing of the Danube,
330; effect of possible
elimination of, from war,
331; induced into war to
avert Germany's danger,
297; influenced by Tur-
key, 291, 293; resource-
lessness of, 295
Bulgarians in Crusades, 97
Bull of Alexander VI., 8, 115, 116,

118, 124

Buller, Sir Redvers, 289
Bundesrat incident, 239, 259
Byblus, Phoenicians founded, 23;
submitted to Alexander,

27

Byng, afterwards Lord Torring-

ton, destroyed Spanish

fleet, 165
Byng, John, fatal engagement, 176,

177; recalled, 177; tried,

1 77; shot, 177
Byron, Lord, in Greek ranks,

231
Byzantine Empire, 86, 88, 90, 91,

93,97

Cabot, John, 117, 119
Cabral, no
Cacafttegos, the, 123

INDEX

Cadiz, 208, 210

Cadmus, 12

Caesar, Julius, 43; in Gaul, 48;
first recorded British bat-
tle, 48; sees England,

49

Calais, loss of , 119

Cambrai, League of, 99

Cambyses 169; army of, perished,
27; invaded Egypt, 27

Camperdown, battle of, 194

Camperdown, the, 251

Campo Formio, Treaty of, 199

Canale, Antonio, confronted by
Ottomans, 100; banished,
100; sack of Negropont,
loo

Canopus, the, 301-305

Cap Trafalgar, the, 307

Cape Breton Island, 166

Cape Horn, no

Cape of Good Hope, 137, 194,
220

Cape St. Vincent, 45

Cape Sunium, 32

Carmania, the, 307

Carnarvon, the, 304, 305

Carson, Sir E., 340

Carthage, 20, 25, 27; as a Sea
Power, 37, 39; base of
Phoenician sea power; 31 ;
ruin of, 40

Carthaginians, 14; alliance with
Alexander, 39; as colo-
nists, 38

defeat of, by the Romans, 41
expeditions into Atlantic, 42

Cassiterides, 25, 43

Catholic League, 135

Cattaro, 331

Caxton, 1 08

Central Empires, I

Central League, 293; advantage
to Germany and Austria
of Italy's adhesion to,
279; sea power of, in
Mediterranean, 279

Central Powers, strength of, 290,
291, 294

Cervera, Admiral, 236

Ceylon, 144, 220

Chaldean Empire, 20
Kings, 6
people not a seafaring race, 21

Challenger, the, 230

Channel Fleet, 271-273

Charles L, 138, 140; demanded

ship money, 142
Charles II., Navy under, 148,

149; relations with Louis

XIV., 148
Charter of Merchants, 1303, 72,

76

Cinque Ports, 72
China, war with Japan, 263
Choiseul, 185
Churchill, Mr. Winston, 314,

316
Cinque Ports, 65, 68, 69, 72;

charter of, 72; feudal

obligations of, 75
Civil War, the, destroys American

mercantile marine, 248
Claudius, conquest of Britain, 50
Cliye, 112, 167
Cnidus, 37
Colbert, 153, 154; policy of, for

development of France,

154

Collingwood, 208, 210
Colonies, British, in North Amer-
ica, 1 66; in the East,
1 66; in the Mediterran-
ean, 166
contribute to British Navy,

241, 243
French, in North America, 166;

in the East, 166
government of, 184
military aid given by, 241
North American, 161
Spanish, 165
Colonisation, an intrinsic part of

sea power, 239, 241
Colonists, early, n, 14
Greek, 14, 29, 30
Phoenician, 24, 29
Venetian, 13
Columbus, Christopher, 108, 109,

no, 115, 116
Command of the sea, I, 8
Commonwealth, clash with Dutch,

146

Comnenus, Alexius, 90
Company of Merchant Adventur-
ers, 119
Conon, 37
Constantinople, 80, 88, 90, 91, 93,

96, 97, 98, 99, 108, 109
Contraband of war, 336

362

INDEX

Convention of Cintra, 213
Copenhagen, 16, 77, 202
Corinth, 14; colonies of, 29
Cornwall, 43, 52, 58, 304, 305
Cornwallis, 203, 207, 208, 309,

, 325,326

Coron lost to Venice, 101
Corsica, n, 30, 44, 197, 198
Cortes conquered Mexico, 115
Corunna, 16, 127, 134, 136, 214
Cradock Rear-Admiral Sir Chris-
topher, 301-303
Crecy, 15, 69
Cressy, the, 334
Crime on high seas, 8
Cromwell, Oliver, clash with
Dutch under 145; sol-
diers, 131, 1 33; wars with
Dutch, I45-H7

Cromwellian wars, Blake in, 146;
bombardment of Algiers,
147; heralded long series
of fights, 147; sinking of
Spanish fleet, 147; tak-
ing of Jamaica and Bar-
bados, 147; were na-
tional, 147

Cruisers, British, 309; sunk by
German submarines, 334
Crusades, 89, 91 94, 96, 97
Cuba, 166

Cuban War, 237, 238
Cuxhaven, 310, 315
Cyprus, 7, n, 24, 37, 91, 102,

221

Cyrenaica, 30
Cythera, 24

D

d'Ache, Commodore, 178

Dandolo, Doge of Venice, re-
lations with Crusaders,
96

Danelagh, the, 53~56

Danish invasion of Britain, 52-57

Danube, Middle, importance of,
169, 197; waterway of
the, 330

Dardanelles, the 3, 37, 98, 100,
104, 217; closing of, 336

Darius, 27, 31

Deal, Julius Caesar lands at,
50

De Burgh, Hubert, 58, 128

Declaration of Paris, 335
of Independence, 191
of the Rights of Man, 191

Defence, the, 300, 317-319

Defending navy, value of, 63

De Grasse, operations of, 187

De Guichen, operations of, 188,
190

Delcasse, M., 272

Delos, League of, 35

Demerara, 194, 220

Derfflinger, the German battle-
cruiser, 315

d'Estaing, operations of, 187

Deutsche Flottenverein (German
Navy League), 258

Deutschland class, the, 320

Deutschland, the, 351

Diaz, Bartholomew, 26, 108

Dido, the, in action, 226

Dogger Bank, battle of the, 314;
incident, 268, 271

Dragon, the, 121

Drake, Sir Francis, expeditions of,
120-25, 135; as a naval
strategist, 128, 136; pol-
icy of, 309

Drake's ships, 122, 123, 126

Dreadnought class, 259, 261, 273;
the first, 126

Dresden, the, German light cruiser,

299, 304, 307

Duke of Edinburgh, the, British
armoured cruiser, 317

Duncan, Admiral, 193

Dunkirk, 193

Dupleix, exploits of, 166, 175, 176

Dutch, 14; as traders, 143; colon-
ies, 144; conflict with
English 148-151; East
India Company, 144;
fleet blockaded in Texel,
193; navy, comparison
of, with English, 151;
mastery of the sea, de-
cline of, 148-152; rise of
sea power of 142-144;
wars against Cromwell,
145, H7

E

East India Company, foundation
of, 137; nucleus of Em-
pire of India, 242

INDEX

363

East Indies, British position in,
187, 188

Easter Island, 221

Eastern Front, extent of, 293

Edward VII., diplomacy of, 271,
280

Edward III., 67, 68, 69, 70

Effective blockade, 335

Effingham, Lord, 136

Egbert, 51, 52

Egypt, 20; ancient, fall of, caused
by sea power, 22, 28; as
a central base, 288; as
a Sea Power, 4; adminis-
tration of, in hands of
British, 233 ;. attempted
invasion of, by Napoleon,
204; invasion of, 27;
importance of position
of, 153, 169; occupied by
the British, 221

Egyptians, ancient, not a sea-
faring people, 22

Elba, 198

Elbe, mouth of the, 203, 310

Elector Palatine, the, 138

Elizabeth, Queen of England, 123-
133 ; as protector of Prot-
estantism, 134; naval
policy of, 136

Elizabethan Navy, the, 130, 131,
132, 141

Emden, the, 299, 307

Empire, bond of 15; foundation
of British, in India, 178;
foundations of Britain's
oversea, 151; in relation
to Mother Country, 95;
Ocean, 15, 161, 175

Empires of ancient world, 20

England, conflict with Spain, 124,
125; conflict with Hol-
land, 146-152; invasion
of, by Spain, 127; peace
with Spain, 139; mari-
time greatness of, begin-
ning -of, 83 (see also under
Britain and Great Brit-
ain)

English nation, effect of tribal in-
cursions on, 58-60; racial
elements of, 58

Entente Cordiak, the, 233, 271,

275
Erin, the, 284

Espagnols-sur-Mer, battle of, 70
Ethelred the Unready, 54
Euphrates, the, n, 20
Expeditionary Force, 274; passage

to France, 286
Explorers, British, 230

Falkland Islands, 222; battle of,
304-306

Farragut, 236

Federated Malay States, develop-
ment of, 221

Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain,
108-109, JI4

Finland, Gulf of, 330

Firth of Forth, 312

Fisher, Admiral Lord, 253, 271-
272, 275, 280, 304, 306,
316

Fleets, First and Second, composi-
tion of, 273

Fleury, Cardinal, 165

Florida regained by Spain, 188

Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 181,
184, 185

Formidable, the, 334

France, 3, 9; as a Sea Power, 4;
alliance with Britain,
163; alliance with Spain,
198; allied with Britain
against the Dutch, 148,
150; development of, by
Colbert, 154-155; failure
of English attempt to
subdue, 67; invasion of,
in 1415, 70; invasion of,
by Northmen, 55-57 ; po-
sition of, in relation to
Egypt, 153; war with
Britain, 156, 176, 184,
230; under Louis XIV.,

152, I55_

Franco-Prussian War, 192
Franz-Ferdinand, Archduke, mur-
der of, 282-283
Frederick the Great, 182, 278
Free Trade, 227; effect of sub-
marine warfare on, 349
Freedom of the seas, 346
French, attempted invasion of
Britain in, 1340, 70; as a
sea-faring people, 6; fleet,
329; fleet defeated, 195;

364

INDEX

French — Continued

invasion of Britain in
1217, 67; Navy, 186;
Navy under Richelieu,
140; relations with Spain,
163, 165; Revolution in
1830, 191; struggle
against autocracy, 235;
superiority at sea shat-
tered, 156; trade stopped
by Britain, 196-197; war
against commerce, 156

Frobisher, voyages of, 120

Gallipoli, 288, 292, 294

Ganteaume, Admiral, 204, 207,
208, 215, 325

Garibaldi, 234

Genoa, struggle with Venice for
mastery of sea, 97

George I. of England, 163; foreign
policy of, 163-165

German — ambitions, antagonism
with Slav, 279; Empire,
growth of, 278; fleet, 310,
311-313; value of, 64,
65; High Sea Fleet, 283;
Higher Command, 283;
Kultur, 278; light cruis-
ers, actions of, 299-
308 ; maritime competi-
tion with Britain, 258,
259 ; maritime expan-
sion, 257; military navy,
necessity of, 258; na-
tional and imperial or-
ganisation, 278; naval ex-
pansion, 254-261; Navy
Act of 1900, 280; Navy
in 1914, 280-283; need
of strong navy, 8; raids
on seacoast towns, 313-
314, 316; sources of food
supply, 9; statecraft,
principles underlying,
281 ; first submarine cam-
paign, failure of, 337,

338, 353

Germany, 4; as a self-support-
ing country, 296, 298;
Colonial Empire of, 78;
first great naval power of
Europe, 79

Ghent, Peace of, 219

Gibraltar, 105, 165, 186; captured
by Sir George Rooke,
158

Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 120, 138

Glasgow, the, in action, 301

Gloucester, the, in action, 300

Gneisenau, the, in action, 299, 300,
301, 304, 305

Gceben, the, 262, 291, 299, 300,
330

Golden Hind, the, 122-124

Goliath, the, in action, 200

Goltz, Admiral von der, 261, 286

Gondemar, 138

Good Hope, the, in action, 301,
302

Goschen, Sir Edward, interview
with Bethmann-Hollweg,
281

Grand Fleet, I, 295

Great Britain, 4, 17; advantages
of, in struggle for sea
power, 248 ; alliance with
Japan, 264; alliance of,
with Portugal, 113; effect
of entry into the war, 287
-291 ; growth of, as a mar-
itime State, 4; not a self-
supporting country, 298;
position of, in Mediter-
ranean, 1 68, 169; posses-
sions in hands of, at the
Peace of- 1815, 220

Greece, 4, 17; independence of,
recognised, 232; invaded
by Mahomet II., 100

Greek colonists, 14, 29, 30, 32;
Empire, fall of, 99; fleet,
action with Persian, 33,

Grenville, Sir Richard, 135

H

Hadrian, 51

Hague Conference, 270; Conven-
tions, 286, 335

Halcyon, the, British gunboat, 313

Hampden, John, refusal to con-
tribute to maintenance
of Navy, 142

Hannibal, 27, 39, 40

Hanno, expedition of, 42

Hanoverian succession secured to
England, 163

INDEX

365

Hansa, see Hanseatic League

Hanseatic League, 76-79, 137;
conflict with Danes, 77;
conflict with English,
78; effect of, on British
sea power, 80; expulsion
from England, 78; politi-
cal constitution of, 80;
towns of the, 76

Hapsburgs, the, 279; alliance with
Britain, 192

Hartlepools, German raid on the,

313

Hasdrubal, 39, 40
Hawke, Admiral Lord, 48, 49,

133, 326

Hawke, 174, 176, 179, 181
Hawkyns, Admiral, expeditions of ,

120, 128, 136
Heligoland, Bight of, 295, 310,

320, 323, 327, 333, 350;

island of, 214, 310,

316; possessed by Great

Britain, 220
Hellenes, separatist tendencies of,

29, 3i, 33
Henry V., 67, 68; invasion of

France by (1415), 70
Henry VII., Navy under, 80
Henry VIII., broke with Rome,

1 08, 115; Navy under,

80-84, 141

Hermes, the, in action, 334
Highflyer, the, in action, 307
Himilco, expeditions led by, 42,

43. 45

Hindenburg, the, German battle-
cruiser, 259

Hittites, power of, broken by
Assyrians, 23

Hague, the, in action, 334

Hohenzollerns, the, 278; alliance
with Britain, 192

Holbrook, Commander, V.C., tor-
pedoing of Messitdyeh,

333'

Holland, 3, 9; as a Sea Power, 4,
143, 144; in alliance with
England and France,
163 : in conflict with Eng-
land, I45~I52
Hollman, Admiral von, 259
Holy Alliance, 230, 234, 277-279
Holy Island, lerne or Ireland* 43
Home Fleet, 271-273

Hong-Kong taken and held by
Great Britain, 221

Hood, Admiral Lord, 186, 187,
194

Hood, Admiral the Hon. Horace,

317-319

Hospital ships, 339
Hotham, British fleet under, 196,

197
Howard, Lord Thomas, 126-129,

, !3> 136

Howard, Sir Edward, 82
Howe, 324; commanding British

fleet, 196

Ibrahim Pasha, 232

Indefatigable, British battle-cruis-
er, 318

India, France's possessions in,
1 66; foundation of Brit-
ish Empire in, 178; in
relation to British foreign
policy, 242; Portuguese
expedition to, 1 1 1 ; search
for N.-W. and N.-E.
passages to, 118, 119

Indomitable, the, British battle-
cruiser, 273, 317

Inflexible, the British battle-
cruiser, 273, 304, 305, 317

Intelligence Department of the
Admiralty, 299

Invincible, the British battle-crui-
ser, 273, 304, 305, 314,

3i7,3i8

Ionian Islands, 220
Italian Front, extent of, 293
Italy, as German food source,
9; alliance with the Te-
deschi, 279; in relation to
the Central League, 279;
neutrality, Declaration
of, 300; Peninsula of,
106, 169

Jamaica, geographical position of,

222

James I., King of England, 138,
139; decline of trade
under, 139; Navy under,
139

366

INDEX

Japan, 3, 31; alliance with Great
Britain, 264; naval mis-
sion to, 263; war with
China, 263; war with
Russia, 264, 265

Japanese, naval strength against
Russians, 264-267; Navy,
growth of, 262; Navy
transports Russian
troops, 289, 290

Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, 295,
318, 323, 324, 326, 329,
34O

Judith, the, one of Drake's ships,

121

Julius Caesar, defeats the Britains,
48, 49; lands in Britain,
50

Jutland Bank, Battle of, 313, 315,
317-322, 324, 329

K

Kaiser class, 320

Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, 262, 283,
310

Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, Ger-
man auxiliary cruiser,

307

Kamimura, Admiral, 268
Karlsruhe, the, German light

cruiser, 299, 307
Kasuga, the, Japanese armoured

cruiser, 265, 268
Kempenfeldt, Admiral, 186, 188,

190
Kent, German raids on coast of,

340

Kent, the, in action, 304, 305
Keppel attacks French fleet, 189
Kiao-chau leased by China to

Germany, 265
Kiel, 64, 235, 282, 283, 310,

312

Koln, the, German cruiser, 295
Konigin Luise, the, German mine-
layer, 286
Konigsberg, German light cruiser,

299, 307
Koweit, possession of, by British,

221

Kronprinz Wilhelm, German auxili-
ary cruiser, 307

Kronprinzessin Cecilie, German
liner, 287

Kultur, German, 278
Kut, Turkish flank turned at,
294

Lafayette proposed a Declaration
of the Rights of Man,
commanded the National
Guard, 191

La Gallissoniere, 176

La Gloire, 250

La Hogue, victory of, 156

La Rochelle, attempt to relieve,
140-141 ; Battle of, 75

Latouche-TreVille, Admiral, off
Cadiz, 204; off Toulon,

325-327
Law of Nations, the first, 25,

165

Le Roi Soleil, 157, 162
Leipsic, "Battle of the Nations"

at, 216
Leipsic, German light cruiser,

299, 304, 307

Lepanto, battle of, 103-104
Levant, 1 1 ; trade with, 168
Libanus, ranges of, 12, 23
Lion, battle-cruiser, 315, 317; the

first, 126

Lisbon, expedition against, 214
Lissa, battle of, 250
L'Orient, French flagship, 197-

200
Louis XIV. of France, 6, 152, 162,

277; France under, 152-

J56, 159; relations with

Charles II., 147
Louis XV. of France, navy under,

179-181
Louis XVI. of France, murder of,

191

Louis the Dauphin, 67-68
Low Countries, independence of,

I9Ir J93F 282 (see also

Netherlands)
Lowestoft, German naval raid on,

316
Lubeck, town of the Hanseatic

League, 76, 77
Luneville, Treaty of, 202
Lusitania, sinking of the, 337
Lutzow, German battle-cruiser,

320

INDEX

36?

M

Macedonia, the, 304, 306

Macedonian Empire, 39

Madrid, occupation of, by Napo-
leon, 213

Magellan, no, 120; Straits of,
122-123

Mahan, Capt. A. T., importance
of works of, 254-256 £j

Mahomet II. , conquests of, 99,
100

Mainz, German cruiser, 295

Malay States, Federated, develop-
ment of, 221

Malta, 220; blockade and fall of,

2OI

Manila Bay, 238

Marathon, battle of, 32, 33

Marco Polo, no

Mardonius, 32, 33, 35

Marengo, campaign 6f , 202

Marie Antoinette, murder of, 191

Marines, Royal Regiment of, 131

Maritime expedition, earliest re-
corded, 22

Marlborough, Duke of, 158-159

Marmora, Sea of, 334

Matthews, Admiral, 173

Mauritius, 220

Meander, the, 226

Medina Sidonia, Duke of, 127

Mediterranean, as centre of the
Ancient World, 19; en-
gagements fought in,
146; evacuation of, 198;
importance of, to Great
Britain, 168; importance
of, in relation to sea
power, 1 06; position of
Great Britain in, 168;
races, first contact with
Britons, 44

Mediterranean fleet, 271-272

Merchant fleet, functions of, 9

Merrimac, the, 250

Mesopotamia, 288

Messudyeh torpeoed, 334

Military navy, 2, 7, 8, 18; func-
tions of, 9; German neces-
sity of, 258

Minorca, 186, 188

Missiessy, Admiral, 207

Mobilisation of the British Navy,
285

Moltke, the, 314

Monastir, 289

Monmouth, British cruiser, 301-302

Monroe Doctrine, 238

Montenegrins, loss of Mount
Lovtcha, 331

Moore, Sir John, 213

Morocco, 271, 275

Mount Lovtcha lost by Montene-
grins, 331

Mowe, 308

Mukden, Battle of, 269

Mycale, Greek victory at, 35

N

Naniwa, the, 263

Napoleon, attempt to invade Asia
Minor, 28; campaigns,
1.99, 213, 217; "con-
tinental system, " 192,
218; first contact with
sea power, 194; Order in
Council against, 296;
sea communications de-
stroyed, 200; strategies,
192; victories, 192, 198

Nasmyth, Commander, 334

Natal made a British possession,

221

National Debt, 182

Naval Defence Act, 253

Naval defence, British system of,

2O5» 273; principles of,

136
warfare, early methods of, 49;

policy of Elizabethan,

136-138
rino, Bj

Navarino, Battle of, 232
Navarre, Henry of, 135
Navigation Acts, 145, 150, 154

Laws, 352

Navy Acts, German, 259, 261;
Dutch compared with
English, 151; Elizabeth-
an, 130-132

Navy, first Controller of, 81
Importance of, as first line of

defence, 68
League, 259
neglect of, under George I.,

171
under Henry VII. and Henry

VIII., 80-84
under the Stuarts, 139-141

368

INDEX

Navy Office, German, 259; initi-
ation of, 8 1

Nelson, Lord, 28, 130, 197, 199,
322, 325-328; tactics of,
209; victories of, 193

Netherlands, revolt of, against
Spain, 117, 134, 169, 173,
179

Neutrals, German proclamation
to, 339; rights of, 295-
297; sinking, 337

Newfoundland, British claim to,
151, 1 60; discovery of,
119; fisheries, 138

New South Wales formally an-
nexed to the British
Crown, 220

New Zealand, 317; formally an-
nexed to the British
Crown, 220

Nicias, 36

Nile, 1 1 ; Battle of the, 200-202

Nisshin, the, 265, 268

Norman power and influence in
the West, 56

Normans in conflict with Vene-
tians, 90

North Sea, 312, 330, 331

Northmen, the, 51-56

Nitrnberg, German light cruiser,
299, 304-307

O

CEstrymnis, 43-44

Orange, overthrow of House of,

193

Orkney Islands, 312
Orleans, Duke of, 163-165
Otranto, 301
Ottoman Navy, 292

Pan-Germanism, overthrow of
Great Britain the goal
of, 257-259, 279
Pan-Slavism, 279
Panther, German gunboat, 275
Paris, Declaration of, 335
Parma, Duke of, 127
Passaro, Cape, Battle of, 165
Pathfinder sunk by German sub-
marine, 334
Peace of 1815, 220

Pegasus, British cruiser, sunk off

Zanzibar, 307

Pelican, Drake's flagship, 122
Peloponnesian War, 35
Peloponnesus under leadership

of Sparta, 33
Peloponnesus, coast of, 33, 35,

37
Peninsula of Italy, strategical

importance of, 106
Peninsular War, 192-216
Penjeh crisis, 253
Penn captures Jamaica and Bar-
bados, 147
Perim, 222

Persian Empire, conflict with Hel-
lenic States, 31
fleet, action with Greek fleet, 33 ;

defeat of, 33
Gulf, 19; sea power, 33
Petrograd defended by the Grand

Fleet, 330
Pett, Phineas, ship designer, 138,

140

Pharaohs, the, 6, 21-23
Philip II. of Spain, 240 (see also

Spain)
Philippine Islands pass finally

from Spain, 238
Philpot, Sir John, 73-74
Phoceans, the, 29, 31, 45
Phoenicia, 4, 8, 17, 20; cause of

fall of, 24
Phoenician colonisation, 24, 29;

conflicts with Greece,

31; trade, 26
Phoenicians as a seafaring people,

6, 8, n, 13; the first Sea

Power, 23
Picts, march on London, 51; Wall

of Hadrian built to keep

out the, 51
Pillars of Herakles, 19, 25, 26,

104

Piracy, suppression of, 225-227
Plassey, Battle of, 178
Pocock, Admiral, capture of

Havana, 178-181
Polish independence destroyed,

279
Port Arthur, 263-274, 310, 331;

fall of, 269

Port Mahon, 176, 189, 197
Port of London, 139
Port William, 305

INDEX

369

Portsmouth, War College estab-
lished at, 274

Portugal, Britain as the ally of,
114, 157, 282; as a Sea
Power, 112; fall of, 112-
114; pioneer of discovery,
1 10-1 12; treaty with, 184

Portuguese Empire, range of, 1 10-

112

mercantile marine, 114
trade with Great Britain, 1 14
War Navy, 114

Power, Balance of, 282

Princess Mary, British battle-
cruiser, 317

Princess Royal, British battle-
cruiser, 315, 317

Prim Eitel Friedrich, German
auxiliary cruiser, 307

Protestantism, Queen Ehzabeth
as protector of, 134

Prussia, domination of, in Ger-
many, 344

Ptolemies, overthrow of, 40

Punic Wars, 38, 42

Pytheas, explorations of, 44-46

Q

Quebec taken by Wolfe, 178
Queen Elizabeth class, 317-318
Queen Elizabeth of England (see

Elizabeth)
Quiberon Bay, Hawke's victory

in, 48, 133, 173, 180,

323 ; the Veneti and their

allies in, 50

R

Raids, German naval, on British
sea coast towns, 3i3~3i4»
316

Raleigh, Sir Walter, expedition
against Cadiz, 136; at-
tempt to colonise Vir-
ginia, 138

Ram, the, in naval warfare, 250-

251

Re d'ltalia, Italian flagship, 250
Redoubtable, French ship of the

line, 211
Reformation, the, 109; rupture of

relations with Rome, 115

Reichstag, and German naval
expenditure, 259, 261

Renascence, the, 109

Restoration, Wars of the, 147

Revenge, Drake's flagship, 126, 135

Reventlow, Count von, on sub-
marine warfare, 337

Rh^, Isle of, expedition to, 140-
141

Richelieu, Cardinal, and the
French Navy, 140

Richelieu, Due de, expedition
against Port Mahon, 176

Riga, German operations against,

294, 330

Right of Conquest, 12

Rodney, Admiral, 324; attack
against the Spanish, 189;
expedition against St.
Kitts, 1 88; relief of
Gibraltar, 186

Rojdestvensky, Admiral, com-
mand of the Baltic Fleet
against Japan, 266-269,
271

Rollo, or Rolf Ganger, invasion of
France and settlement in
Normandy, 55-56

Roman conquest of Hellas, 40;
occupation of Britain,

50

names, survival of, in Britain,

59

Romano-British, survival of, 59-
60

Romans, the, as an agricultural
and military people, 47;
defeat Britons .by sea,
48-49

Rome, conflict with Carthage,
39; supremacy of, 39

Roumania, approach to, through
the Dardanelles, 3; as a
source of supply to Ger-
many, 8

Royal Naval Reserve, 286

Royal Navy, existence in pre-
Tudor times, 73; in the
time of Queen Elizabeth,
126; decline of, after
peace with Spain, 139;
introduction of steam
power into, 249

Royal Sovereign, CoUingwood's
flagship, 210, 211

370

INDEX

" Rule of 1756, " basis of Orders in
Council and Prize Court
Regulations, 183; re-im-
posed by Great Britain,
204; resisted by the
Dutch, 1 86

Russia, as a source of supply to
Germany, 8, 336; friction
with, as result of Dogger
Bank incident, 269; sea
power of, in relation to
geographical conditions,

3

Russian fleet, 311, 312; and the
Baltic, 329-331; com-
pared with Japanese fleet,
64, 264-267
Revolution, 330

troops transported by Japan-
ese Navy, 289

Russo-Japanese War, 265-267 ; Ad-
miral Togo's strategy in,

309
Ruyter, Admiral de, as a great

commander, 152; leads

the Dutch fleet against

England, 149
Ryswick, Peace of, 157

Sadowa, 277

St. Jean d'Acre, bombardment of,

232

St. Vincent, Battle of, 198
Salamis, 332; sea battle of, 34,

36

Salisbury, Lord, 282
Salonika, 288, 294
Santa Cruz, 127
Santa Lucia in British possession,

220

Sarawak, State of, 226
Saumarez, action off Algeciras,

324

Saxons, invade Britain, 51, 57

Scapa Flow, 222, 312

Scarborough, German naval raid
on, 313

Scharnhorst, the, German cruiser,
262, 299, 300, 301, 305

Scheldt, 1 86, 191

Schleswig and Holstein, annexa-
tion of, to Prussia, 235

Scipio, 40

Scott, Sir Percy, gunnery of fleet
revolutionised by, 273 ;
on submarine warfare,

334

Scutari taken by Turks, 101
Sea communications, 8, 17; im-
portance of, to Venice,

93,95
Seafaring peoples, 5; early, 8; of

the North, 45; the Veneti

as, 47, 49
Sea fight, earliest recorded, 22 ; in

which Britons took part,

48,49

Sea frontiers, vulnerability of, 63

Sea power, advantages of Great
Britain in struggle for,
248; beginnings of Eng-
lish, 67; conditions of,
2, 3; definition of, 2;
economic advantages of,
297; effect of Hanseatic
League on British, 79;
effect of, on War of
Spanish Succession, 159;
essentials for effective,
143; during Civil War in
United States, 236; fac-
tors of, 2, 5, 254; in
relation to continental
nations, 16; of ancient
world, 20-22 ; of Greeks,
29; of Persians, 32; of
Phoenicians, 23 ; supreme,
held by England, 161;
the basis of freedpm,
346-347; the key to
Egypt, 28; under Eliza-
beth, 135; value of, for
transportation of troops,
287, 288

Sea Powers, great, 4

Sea routes, control of, 222

Sebastopol, siege of, 332

Sedan, 277

Seeadler, the, havoc caused by,
308

Serbia, rescue of, by sea power,
16

Serbian Army, beaten and re-
equipped, 289

Seven Years' War, 182, 183

Sexennate, the, 259

Seydlitz, German battle-cruiser,
315, 320, 321

INDEX

37i

Shamrock III., the, 284

Shell gun, changes wrought by
introduction of, 250-253

Ship-money fleets, 140; instituted
by Charles I., 142

Sidon, meaning of name, 24

Siegfried, the, German coast-
defence vessel, 259

Singapore purchased by the Brit-
ish, 221

Skager Rak, 311, 312, 317

Skiernevice, Imperial meeting at,
279

Slav ambitions, antagonism with
German, 279

Slave trade, 225, 246

Sluys, Battle of, 69

Smith, Sir Sidney, exploits of,
200, 217

Socotra, British possession of, 221

Somaliland, earliest recorded mari-
time expedition to, 22

Soudan, 233, 244; recovery from
barbarism, 221

South Africa, Union of, 242

Spain, alliance with France, 163,
165; conflict between
England and, 125; Fer-
dinand and Isabella of,

1 08, 109; geographical
position of, 3; overrun
by Carthaginians, 38-40;
Philip II.of,lO2, 124-127,
136; peace with England,
138; relations of, with
France, 163, 165; revival
of, 8, 16; sea power of,
114, 115; unification of,

109, 115; war with
United States (1898),

237

Spanish — colonies of Phoenicia,
25; Main, 121-123, 128,
131, 136, 137; monarchy,
subjects of, 6; Succession,
War of the, 157, 159,
160, 163; leads to present
struggle, 161

Spee, Admiral von, commands
German squadron, 301-
306

Stamp Act, resistance to, 184
Staples, establishment of, 72
Steam power, introduction of,
into Royal Navy, 250

Steel shipbuilding, changes
wrought by introduction
of, 250-253; development
of, 249

Straits of Gibraltar, ancient boun-
dary of habitable world,
J9

Straits Settlements, development
of, 221

Stralsund, Peace of, 78

Strategic principles, of Lord Nel-
son, 327-328; naval of
Great Britain, 275

Sturdee, Admiral Sir John, action
off Falkland Islands, 304
-305

Suakim, possession of, by British,
221

Submarine — campaign, failure of
first German, 336, 338;
evolution of the, 333 ; the,
in relation to sea power,
351 ; telegraphy, develop-
ment of, 221; uses of,
333, 335; warfare, al-
leged German reprisal,
337; underlying factors

of, 346-349

Suez Canal, position of, 168
Sugar supply, stopped by sub-
marine campaign, 349
Sussex, sinking of the, 337
Swan, the, one of Drake's ships,

121

Swiftsure, the first, 126
Sydney, the, Australian cruiser, 307
Syracuse, 36

Syria, n, 23; conquered by Alex-
ander, 27

Tarshish, 25

Telegraphy, submarine, develop-
ment of, 221

Tel-el-Kebir, 233

Territorial troops replace Regular
Army, 286; waters, 2

Themistocles, 33, 35, 100

Tiger, the, 315, 317; the first, 126

Tigris, ii, 20

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 259, 260;
in submarine warfare,
335, 337; programme for
ship-building, 261

372

INDEX

Tobago, 220

Togo, Admiral, 263, 267, 309,
310

Torpedo, addition of, to vessels,
309 ; automobile, 252 ;
base, Heligoland as a, 310

Torpedo-boat destroyer, develop-
ment of, 252

Torres Vedras, 216

Torrington defeated off Beachy

Head, 156
Lord, 165

Toulon, 173, 194, 325-328

Trade, advance of British, during
Napoleonic wars, 201,
21 1 ; British, with Spain,
170; colonial, in relation
to Mother Country, 183;
decline of, under James I.,
140; England struggles
to enlarge her, 168;
French, 183; loss of Brit-
ish, during Seven Years'
War, 182, 183; militates
against power of Navy
under George I., 171

Trafalgar, 92, 322, 327; Battle of
208-21 1 ; effect of battle
of, 211

Transport, early methods of, 1 1 ;
importance of, 10; of
troops, 309

Trans-Siberian Railway, 265

Trebizond, fall of, 329

Trinidad, 220

Trinity House, foundation of, 81

Triple Alliance, 279

Tripoli, Turkish possessions in,
attacked by Italy, 276

Triumph, the first, 126

Tromp, Admiral, exploits of,

145, 152

Troops, safe transport of, 309
Tsessaremtch, the, interned at

Shanghai, 266
Tsu-shima, Battle of, 267
Tudors, the Navy under the, 141
Turin, Peace of (1382), 98
Turkey, alliance with Germany

and Austria, 291; war

with Balkan States, 279
Company, 137
Turkish Empire in Middle Ages,

85, 86; front, extent of,

293; navy, 292

Turks, advance of, in Europe,
98, 103; allied campaign
against (1821), 231; as
a great naval Power, 100;
defeat of, by Venetians
and Spanish, 104; in
conflict with Venetians,

99

Two Power Standard, 140
Tyre, 23, 25, 26, 39, 98; fall of,
28; King Hiram of, 23

U

U-boat warfare, 317, 338, 339,
348-351 ; unrestricted,

297, 339, 341
Ulm, 208, 211
Union of South Africa, 242
United States, 161 ; as a Sea Power,
4; restrictions on sub-
marine warfare, 337-339;
war with Spain (1898),

237
Utrecht, Treaty of, 160, 162, 225

V

Vasco da Gama, 106, no

Venice, 4, 17; as a naval State,
87; as safeguard of the
West, 87, 91, 98; attacked
by Charlemagne, 87 ;
breach with Empire of
the East, 96; cause of
fall of, 24; decline of,
98, 1 02, 1 06; foundation
of, 86; in alliance with
other European Powers,
101, 102; sea power of,
causes of decline of, 105-
107; struggles of, with
Genoa, for mastery of
the sea, 98

Veneti, Julius Caesar defeats, the,
48-50

Venetian alliance with Hungary
against Normans, 93,
94; colonists, 14, 94;
conquests on land, 97 ;
navy and the Crusades,
89; trade, development
of, 88

INDEX

373

Venetians in conflict with Nor-
mans, 89; with Turks,
98-101; war-navy estab-
lished by, 87

Vera Cruz, 199

Vespucci, Amerigo, no

Victoria, the, 120, 251

Victoria and Albert, the, 284

Victory, the, 203

Viking Age, the, 50

Villafranca, Treaty of, 234

Villaret-Joyeuse, Admiral, 195

Vitte de Paris, the, 188

Villeneuve, 204, 208, 323

Vladivostok, 267, 289

Von der Tann, the, 315

W .

Wagram, Battle of, 193, 214
Waingari, Treaty of, 221
Waldemar IV., King, conflict with

Hanseatic League, 77
Wales, descendants of Britons in,

58,60

Walfisch Bay, 221
Wall of Hadrian, 51
Walpole, Robert, 166, 171; fall of,

171
Walsingham, letters from Drake,

127

Walton, Captain, 165
Wapping, 119

War, declaration of, 286; of Jen-
kins's Ear, 161, 170-171;

of 1812, 192

College at Portsmouth estab-
lished, 274
navy established by Henry V.,

71; in Venice, 87
staff appointed by Admiralty,

274
Warrender, Admiral Sir George,

at reopening of Kiel

Canal, 283

Warrior, cruiser, 31 7; sinks, 319
Wars of the Roses, 5, 80
War spite, the, 126
Waterloo, 15, 104, 192
Wedmore, Treaty of, 53
Wei-hai-wei, 221; acquired by

Britain, 264
Wellesley, Sir Arthur, expedition

against Lisbon, 213

Wellington, Duke of, his strategy,

71; success in Peninsula,

216, 218, 294
Weser, 310
West Africa, 244
West Indies, islands, 150, 158,

166, 171, 174, 180, 181,

186, 187-190, 194, 196,

206, 229

Western Front, extent of, 293 '
Western Mediterranean, 37
Western Powers, Constantinople

in hands of, 96; Vene-
tians fall from headship

of, 103

Westminster, 171
Whitby, German naval raid on,

313

White Empire, oversea, 241
Wilberforce, the elder, abolition of

slavery, 225
Wilhelm II.,accession to throne of

Germany, 256-259, 262
Wilhelmshaven, completion of

works, 262, 310; distance

from FlamboroughHead,

312, 320
William, Frederick, of Prussia,

214
William of Normandy, invasion of

England, 65, 66; becomes

King, 65 ; descendants,

66; growth of sea power

under, 65; remnant of

Duchy, 1 20, 152
William P. Frye, American sailing

ship, 336

William, Port, 305
Willoughby, Sir Hugh, search for

N.-E. Passage to India,

119

Wimereux, 204
Winchelsea, 70; one of Cinque

Ports, 72

Winchester, Venta Belgarum, 59
"Wineland the Good," identified

with Labrador, 50
Wisby, 78

Wolfe, taking of Quebec, 178
Wolseley, Sir Garnet, 233
World, New — cultivation in, 153;

Spanish sovereignty, 157 ;

English-speaking nation,

220, 225
Wotan, German worship of, 277

374

INDEX

Xerxes, 14, 31, 34, 85, 98, 277,
343

Yalu River, 263

Yarmouth, German naval raid,

313, 3i6
Yezo, 267
Yorck, 313

Yorktown, surrender of Corn-

wallis in, 187
Young Pretender, 174
Yser, inundations, 63
Yukon, 120

Zama, campaign of, 40
Zanzibar, 307
Zeebrugge, 340
Zeppelin airships, 310

A Selection from the
Catalogue of

C. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

Complete Catalogues
on application

Belgium:

Neutral and Loyal

The War of 1914

By

Emile Waxweiler

Director of the Solvay Institute of Sociology at Brussels,

Member of the Academic Royale of Belgium

12° . $1.25 net. By mail, $1.35

In order to clarify opinion and to correct
wrong judgment, the author has not deemed it
superfluous to weigh in the balance all the im-
putations that have been made against Belgium,
even to the inclusion of those that do violence to
common sense. There are five chapters, with
the following titles: "Up to 7 P.M. of August
2d," " To Be or Not To Be," " Belgian Neutral-
ity," "Imputations against the Loyalty of
Belgium," " German Rules of Waging War and
their Application to Belgium."

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York London

Belgium

and

The Great Powers

By
Emile Waxweiler

12°, $I.OO net. By mail, $1.10

The eminent scholar, Emile Waxweiler,
Director of the Solvay Institute of Sociology
at Brussels, presents a thesis which it will be
difficult for his opponents to disprove.

With calm, dispassionate judgment, he up-
holds Belgium's right to oppose the violation
of her territory by Germany, citing with tell-
ing force the Treaty of 1839, and subsequent
events of international importance, such as
Lord Palmerston's action at the time of
threatened French aggression in 1848.

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York London

Brave Belgians

By
Baron C. Buf fin

Preface by

Baron de Broqueville

Belgian Minister of War
Translated by

Alys Mallard
12°. $130 net, By mail, $1,65

This volume of accounts, collected
so patiently by Baron Buffin, well de-
served the award of the Audiffred
Prize by the French Academy of
Moral and Political Science. They
make us live over again the whole
campaign, from the heroic resistance
at Liege down to the hard moments
through which the Belgian army passed
in its victorious defense of the Yser.

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York London

034170049

.IAN 9.9, 1992