REESE LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
Deceived , igo .
Accession No. - 851 6 7 . Class No. ' . 1
, V . ,
1-1 .
The Second Boer War.
1899-1900.
BY
JOHN P. WISSER,
Captain, 7th United States Artillery,
Late Instructor in Tactics and Strategy, United States Artillery School, Fort
Monroe, Va. ; Author of "Practical Problems in Strategy and Tactics."
Kansas O*
HI ^.p ^|p PUBLISHING COMPANY.
1001.
d lOOu
Copyrighted, 1901, by
HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING COMPANY,
Kansas City, Mo.
PREFACE.
The account here given was derived from a careful study
of the following exchanges of the Journal U. 8. Artillery (to
which were added from time to time such original thoughts
on organization, tactics and strategy as suggested them
selves), viz.:
Internationale Revue,
United Service Gazette,
Revue du Cercle Militaire,
Militar-Wocheriblatt,
Army and Navy Gazette,
Deutsche Heeres-Zeitung,
Schweizeris'che Militdrische Blatter,
Allgemeine Schweizeris-che Militdrzeitung,
Armee et Marine,
Mittheilungen uber Gegenstdnde des Artillerie und Genie-
Wesens-,
Umschau,
New York Sun,
The Engineer (London),
Engineering (London),
Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift,
Proceedings Royal Artillery Institution,
Jahrbiicher fur die Deutsche Armee und Marine.
The author also desires to express his obligations to the
following works, which appeared during the progress of the
war, and which were freely used by him :
Briton and Boer, James Bryce and others,
Boer War, Lieut.-Col. H. M. E. Brunker,
6 PREFACE.
Der BuernJcrieg in Sudafrika, Maj. L. von Estorff, Gen.
Staff,
La Guerre au Transvaal: U offensive des Boers, Lieut.-Col.
Frocard and Capt. Painvin,
Der Krieg in Transvaal, von Tiedemann, Oberstleutnant,
The Siege of Ladysmith (64 Photographs), H. St. J. Tug-
man,
Four Months- Besieged, The "Daily News,"
Der Krieg in Sudafrika, Kunowski and Fetzdorff.
The best current accounts of the war were undoubtedly
those of the German and French military periodicals, espe-
cially those of the Militar-Wochenblatt and the Revue du Cercle
Militaire, but the prejudice against the English in nearly all
of our exchanges (other than British) was so evident that the
author had great difficulty in arriving at a fair and unpreju-
diced view, and in presenting an unbiased account of the
events his particular aim in writing this history. Other
difficulties presented themselves : in the early part of the war
the British official despatches were very meagre, and the
available maps very unsatisfactory, so that little information
could be gleaned from them; moreover, few British writers
took up the subject in its early stages, and the only material
at hand was the warped accounts in both British and for-
eign journals. It was not until Lord Roberts opened his
brilliant campaign that the foreign journals began to change
their tone, and the British journals and official despatches
began to assume an authoritative air and to offer reliable and
really useful information.
Little original material will be found in this work, but it
is believed that no other single account thus far published
presents the subject in a fairer light. This history has been
carefully compared with the recently published British,
French and German works above mentioned, and every effort
has been made to insure accuracy. One great difficulty in
PREFACE. 1
the way is the lack of all reliable information from the side of
the Boers, especially as regards losses in battle.
The lessons to be learned are brought out in the com-
ments, and while the thoughts expressed are those of the
author, the ideas at the foundation of these thoughts were
generally derived from the authorities consulted.
JOHN P. WISSER,
Captain 7th Artillery.
Fort Monroe, Va., October 9, 1900.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
INTRODUCTION.
The history of the South African Republic (formerly
called the Transvaal Republic) and the Orange Free State
begins with that of Cape Colony.
The Dutch East India Company, recognizing the im-
portance of the Cape of Good Hope as a station where their
vessels might take in water and provisions, formed a colony
there in 1652. The colonists gradually drove the natives
back, reduced them to slavery and introduced Malays and ne-
groes as slaves. The Dutch government harasssed the farm-
ers, demanding a large part of their produce, and thus in-
spired the colonists with their dislike to interference by the
home government, and a love of independence. In 1795 they
attempted to throw off the yoke of the Dutch, when the Brit-
ish sent a fleet to support the authority of the Prince of
Orange, and took possession of Cape Colony in his name; but
as Holland was not able to hold it, the British ruled there
until 1802, when, at the peace of Amiens, it was again re-
stored to Holland. In 1806 it was again taken by the British,
and was finally ceded to them in 1815.
The Boers ill-treated the natives to such an extent that
they were often in danger of extermination, and Great Brit-
ain had to protect them.
By a succession of wars with the natives, or Kaffirs, the
boundary was gradually extended. The first of these wars
took place in 1811-12, the second in 1819. In 1820 British
emigrants laid the foundation of the settlements around Port
1() THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Elizabeth, and in 1834 the slave-emancipation measure took
effect in Cape Colony, and this gave great offense to the Dutch
Boers, who were large slave-owners. In 1835 the third Kaf-
fir war took place, and not long after that the Boers resolved
to free themselves from the British government (which began
to enforce measures to protect the natives against Boer in-
justice) and removed beyond the Orange River, a portion also
crossing the Drakensberg Mountains into Natal establishing
in both places republican governments, which they main-
tained till 1842, when the British extended their authority
into Natal, and the ,Boer colony there passed again under Brit-
ish rule. The Boers had so incensed the natives that the
peace of the whole country was menaced, and interference
became necessary. The fourth Kaffir war occurred in 1846-8.
The Boers beyond the Orange River maintained their
independence till 1848, when, at the solicitation of the Boer
authorities (in consequence of the lawless state of the coun-
try), the British annexed the country under the name of the
Orange River Sovereignty. Not long after, the Boers of Natal
crossed the mountains, joined some of the disaffected Orange
Boers and raised the standard of rebellion. A detachment
of British troops met and defeated them, and a number re-
treated over the Vaal River and established a government of
their own, first called Trans-Vaal, which was afterwards rec-
ognized by the British in 1852, and then called the South
African Republic.
The fifth Kaffir war was conducted between 1850 and
1853, and by it British Kaffraria was formed into a separate
colony. In 1853-4 the Orange Free State was formed, with
the consent of England.
The discovery of diamonds in the districts north of the
Orange River in 1867 led in 1874 to the annexation by the
British of Griqualand West, in 1881 of Basutoland, and in
1885 of Bechuanaland. Later, Cecil Rhodes, manager of
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 11
the South African Chartered Company, succeeded in adding
Mashonaland, Matebeleland, and finally Barotseland.
In 1877, in consequence of Boer trouble with the natives,
an empty treasury, and general discouragement due to re-
peated reverses in the contests with the natives, England
intervened and annexed the Transvaal. In 1879 England
fought the Zulu war to protect the Transvaal and the Boers.
In 1881, after the revolt of the disaffected Boers and the
defeat of the English at Majuba Hill in 1880, the republic was
restored under the suzerainty of England, but this was so far
modified in 1884 as to render the South African Republic
practically independent.
The discovery of rich gold deposits in 1886 led to a great
influx of British subjects, and difficulties arose from the at-
tempts of the Boer government to enforce military service on
them, though they were debarred from franchise. The ten-
sion grew stronger as the number of foreign gold-seekers
(Uitlanders) increased, and the latter began to ally themselves
with Cecil Rhodes, with Chamberlain, the Colonial minister,
and with other influential Englishmen. This finally led, in
1896, to an attack by Dr. Jameson and 500 men of the Char-
tered Company on Mafeking, w r ith the intention of moving on
Johannesburg, but he was met at Krugersdorp and repulsed
by the Boers, under Cronje, who killed a number of his force
and sent the rest for trial to England.
In 1897 the Uitlanders amounted to 180,000, and pos-
sessed 63 per cent of the landed, and 90 per cent of the per-
sonal property of the country.
In April, 1899, a petition signed by 11,000 Englishmen
living in Johannesburg was transmitted to Greene, the Brit-
ish agent at Pretoria, to Sir Alfred Milner, Governor of Cape
Colony, and by him forwarded to the Queen. The petition
set forth the fact that they were debarred from franchise, and
complained of the dynamite monopoly. Krtiger promise^ re-
12 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
forms in the franchise, and fixed upon 9 years as the term of
residence required to obtain the right to vote, instead of 14,
previously established. The discontent, however, continued.
Steyn (the President of the Orange Free State) then proposed
the Bloemfontein conference. Milner demanded 5 years as
the term for naturalization, but Krtiger would only compro-
mise, and proposed 7, but without any retroactive effect.
Milner then broke off the conference. The Orange Free State
then intervened and persuaded the Volksraad in Pretoria to
grant also the retroactive effect of the 7-year naturalization
law, and to give four new seats in the lower house to the
Uitlanders.
Now, complaints about the police, the language taught in
the schools, and organization laws began to be made, and
Chamberlain began to make inquiries as to the suzerainty
of England and to express a desire for a mixed Commission
in Cape Colony, a proposal which was interpreted to aim at
the independence of the Republic.
Upon this Krtiger proposed to grant the 5-year naturali-
zation law, with retroactive effect, and 10 seats in the lower
house, provided England gave up all claim to suzerainty.
The British government would not consider the last point at
all, and on the 12th of September Chamberlain, through the
British representative in Pretoria, Conyngham Greene, sub-
mitted as a fundamental condition for the proposed confer-
ence: 5 years naturalization, one-quarter of the seats for the
Uitlanders, and equality of Boers and Englishmen in the
Yolksraad and in the election of President. On the 14th
both Volkraads decided on the 7-year naturalization law, and
demanded as a basis for the conference the convention of
1884.
The situation was critical. Early in September England
had ordered 5,000 troops in India and an equal number from
European stations to hold themselves in readiness to proceed
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 13
to Africa, and towards the end of September these troops
actually sailed from Calcutta and Bombay for Natal. The
two Boer States also began their war preparations, and by
the end of September there were 13,000 armed men on the
Natal frontier, 1,500 in Boshof near Kimberley, and 4,000
near Malmain, opposite Mafeking.
On the 9th of October, 1899, Mr. Conyngham Greene the
diplomatic representative of Great Britain at Pretoria, re-
ceived the ultimatum of the Transvaal Republic. It slated
that if in 48 hours the British troops did not retire from the
border, war existed, and demanded also that the reini or ce-
ments already landed, as well as those on the way, be sent
back. It reached the Colonial Office in London on the 10th.
and on the llth the British government replied that the con-
ditions imposed by the Transvaal were such that the British
government could no longer discuss the subject. On that day
Mr. Conyngham Greene left Pretoria, and at 5 p. m. the
Transvaal was declared in a state of war, and the offensive
movements of the Boers began. The Orange Free State.
bound by a treaty of alliance, joined the Transvaal.
THE THEATRE OF WAK.
South Africa is a wide plateau or table-land, which rises
to an average height of about 5,000 feet, very gradually in the
west, very rapidly in the east, from the sea towards the in-
terior. In the south and southeast there are three well-
marked terraces: the coast land, the karroos (between 3,000
and 4,000 feet elevation) and the plateau beyond the Orange
River (about 5,000 feet). Between the last two are the
Schneeberge on the south of the Orange Free State and the
Drakensberge on the east.
In Natal the end of the coast land is marked by Pieter
maritzburg (2,225 feet), after which the ground rises rapidly
14 TEE SECOND BOER WAR.
and the country becomes very difficult, Colenso having an
elevation of 3,156 feet, Glencoe 4,300 feet and Laings Nek
5,400 feet. The Drakensberge rise to over 11,000 feet in the
peaks, and from 5,500 to 7,500 feet in the passes.
In Cape Colony the karroo southwest of the Schneeberge
is about 70 miles wide from north to south ; southeast of the
Schneeberge, about 50 miles. Water in these regions is very
scarce.
Beyond the Schneeberge rises the Orange Free State pla-
teau, with comparatively low ranges. North of the Schnee-
berge and west of the Drakensberge the country for some dis-
tance is not level, but rolling and mountainous, with ranges
running parallel to the eastern border, till they are lost in the
plains of the western Orange River. The Transvaal near the
southern part is very hilly (from the foot-hills of the Drakens-
berge), and is intersected by several minor ranges as at Pre-
toria and a few other points. To the northwest the country
slopes away gradually.
Aside from the few intersecting chains rising above the
plateau, the broad, unbroken and treeless plains of the Boer
States present only isolated tables, which often serve as land-
marks for several days' march.
The principal stream of South Africa is the Orange River,
with its main branch, the Vaal.
The climate of South Africa is sub-tropical, the rainy
season, or summer, lasting from October to March, the dry
season, or winter, from April to September. During the
rainy season the nearly or quite dry streams suddenly become
filled and converted into impassable mountain torrents, while
the larger streams are all very high. In the dry season it is
difficult to find water, for not only do the smaller streams and
springs dry up entirely, but even the large streams are so low
as to become everywhere passable, and the entire country is
dry and parched.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 15
The country is very poorly settled (about 3 inhabitants
to the square mile); the roads are few and very poor, hard
roads being extremely rare. Only the ox-wagons, 12 to 20
team, can get over the country. In the rainy season the roads
quickly become almost impassable. The railroads are conse-
quently of more than ordinary importance, but, as these are
generally narrow-gauge, their carrying capacity is not over
one-fifth that of a good wide-gauge road.
The South African Republic (Transvaal) has a popula-
tion of about 288,750 whites, of whom 80,000 are Boers, capa-
ble of putting 30,000 men in the field. The Orange Free State
has about 77,716 whites, of whom 75,443 are Boers, with
30,000 capable of bearing arms.
The Transvaal is divided into 31 districts, each of which
is under the command of a commandant, or field cornet,
who has an assistant field cornet. In time of war there is
about one field cornet to every 200 men. The Orange Free
State was similarly organized.
The principal strategic points in the Transvaal are the
fortified capital, Pretoria, and the gold center, Johannesburg;
in the Orange Free State, the capital, Bloemf ontein ; in Cape
Colony, the sea-ports, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East
London, and the seat of the diamond-fields, Kimberley; in Na-
tal, the port, Durban, the capital, Pietermaritzburg, and the
depot and supply station for northern Natal, Ladysmith.
Among the minor strategic points may be mentioned
Sterkstrom and De Aar, important railroad centers, Coles-
berg, the point of assembly of the disaffected Cape Colony
Boers, Mafeking, with a garrison threatening Pretoria di-
rectly, and the bridges at Orange River Station, Norvals Pont
and Bethulie.
16 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
THE FORCES ENGAGED.
To understand the initial operations, it will first be nec-
essary to obtain a clear conception of the positions and
strengths of the respective armies at the opening of the
campaign.
THE ENGLISH TKOOPS.
The English forces for the Boer war are divided into
three groups; viz.: the troops in Natal, the troops in Cape
Colony and the newly mobilized army corps to be sent to
South Africa from England.
The Natal Force. The Natal force, commanded by
Symons, comprised
10 battalions of infantry 7650 men.
4 regiments of cavalry 1650 men.
6 field batteries and one mountain bat-
tery (42 guns) 1218 men.
4 companies of pioneers 600 men.
4 companies train 300 men.
Natal volunteers 760 men.
Natal Carabiniers 120 men.
Imperial Light Horse volunteers .... 500 men.
Durban volunteers. . 750 men.
Mounted Natal police (9 guns) 550 men.
Total. . . .51 guns, 14,098 men.
Reinforcements arriving (from India),
3 field batteries (18 guns) 530 men.
Total for the first act of the drama,
69 guns, 14,628 men.
The Cape Colony Force. The Cape Colony force, com-
manded by White, comprised
8 battalions of infantry 4090 men.
2 companies heavy artillery. .... 200 men.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 17
2 companies train 150 men.
Total 4440 men.
Reinforcements arriving (due Octo-
ber 29), 2 battalions infantry. . . 700 men.
Total for the first act 5140 men.
There was no cavalry or artillery with this force. The
strength of the volunteer forces on the western border of the
Boer States cannot be accurately determined, but they are
estimated at about 4,000 men. Besides these troops, the Eng-
lish squadron had also landed a naval brigade of about 1,000
men, which was to be sent to the western border of the Boer
States.
The Army Corps. The mobilized army corps, under Gen-
eral Sir Redvers Buller, was organized into 3 divisions (com-
manded respectively by Lord Methuen, Sir Clery and Sir
Gatacre) and a cavalry division under French.
Its total strength was about 40,000 men, with 114 guns.
On the eleventh of October the British had in Glencoe
camp (near Dundee) about 4,000 men, at Ladysmith about
9,000 men.
At Aliwal (on the southern border of Orange Free State)
there was only a half -regiment and 100 mounted infantry;
further south a small reserve. In Kimberley (on the western
border of Orange Freee State)
4 half-companies infantry 700 men.
Volunteers 1500 men.
Artillery 20 guns.
Mafeking (on the western border of the Transvaal Republic)
had only 600 volunteers under Colonel Baden-Powell. There
were also 400 volunteers opposite Tuli (on the northern bor-
der) under Colonel Plumer.
18 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
THE BOER TROOPS.
The Boers had about 35,500 men under arms in the
Transvaal (commanded by General Joubert), and about 14.000
regulars in the Orange Free State (under General Grobeler),
posted as follows:
At Sandspruit (main body), north
of the wedge of Natal, under
Joubert 12,000 men.
West of Majuba Hill, right col-
umn under Kock 3,000 men.
At Wakkerstroom, left column
under Erasmus 2,000 men.
Between Utrecht and Vryheid,
under Schalk Burger 4,500 men.
Outposts on the Buffalo River op-
posite Vryheid, under Lukas
Meyer
On the road to Dundee, under
Viljoen 1,000 meu.
In Zoutpansberg district (north-
ern border) 2,000 men.
At Komatiport (opposite Delagoa
Bay) 2,000 men.
Opposite Mafeking (on the western
border), under Piet Cronje . . . 6,000 men.
Reserve, in the interior 3,000 men.
At Albertina Station and Van
Reenens Pass (west of Lady-
smith), under Andries Cronje, 8,000 men.
From Botha Pass to Bezuiden-
houts (to watch the passes west
of Ladysmith) 3,000 men.
Opposite Kimberley (on the west-
ern border), under Prinsloo . . 3,000 men.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 19
THE STRATEGIC POSITION.
The wedge of Natal, projecting as it does into the Boer
country, would be advantageous were it properly occupied
by a sufficient force, because it would give the British the
great advantage of always operating on interior lines, but the
superior force of the Boers enabled them to overcome this
strategic advantage, and turn the British positions. The
weakness of the small British force on th^ western border
was an element of great danger, especially as it exposed the
important railroad from Cape Town to Buluwayo.
In occupying their too advanced position at Glencoe the
British were exposing their troops to disaster, for it is a
maxim of war that "when a commander endeavors to cover
too much he covers nothing." It would have been better to
have concentrated further back, as at Ladysmith, and util-
ized the advantages of interior lines by falling upon the sepa-
rate Boer columns i nturn before they could unite.
THE OPERATIONS.
Preliminary Operations on the Western Border.
The object of these operations on the part of the Boers
was to isolate the two important tow r ns of Kimberley and
Maf eking, and to prevent invasion of their- territory ; and on
the part of the British to gather supplies preparatory to siege,
and to check further advances of the Boers beyond the Orange
River.
On the 12th of October the Transvaal Boers, under
Cronje, advanced in two columns on Mafeking; one (4,000
strong) from the Lichtenburg district, crossing the border at
Maritsani, south of Mafeking 500 men of this column at-
tacked and captured, at the station of Kraaipan, an armored
train which was repairing the telegraph line north of Vry-
20 TEE SECOND BOER WAR.
burg and carrying ammunition to Maf eking; the other col-
umn from Zeerust and the Marico valley, threatening Mafe-
king from the north. On the 13th Cronje's troops destroyed
the railroad and the railroad bridge over the Molopo River,
8^ miles north of Mafeking. On the 14th all rolling material
and stores in the vicinity were sent to Kimberley. On the
14th the Boers occupied Ramathlabama, north of Mafeking.
Soon after, the railroad and bridge at Modder River Station
were destroyed by the Boers. On the 16th the Boers took
possession of the railroad north and south of Kimberley, and
a Boer commando from Bethulie moved towards Norvals
Pont and destroyed the railroad. On the same day another
Boer force occupied Taungs. On the 17th the Boers de-
stroyed the bridge over the Vaal at Fourteen Streams station.
On the same day the British destroyed the railroad bridge at
Hopetown. On the 18th the Boers destroyed the railroad
north and south of Kimberley. While these preparatory
measures were being taken on the western border, the prin-
cipal campaign was going on in the east, in Natal.
Operations in Natal.
On the night of October 11-12 the Boers advanced in sev-
eral columns: one from Sandstruit, on the road to Laings Nek,
occupying with artillery the defile of the railroad to New-
castle; ai.o her f rom Wakkerstroom ^outh through the Belebas
Hills to the Buffalo River, occupying its bridges; a third
marched from Utrecht on the road towards Glencoe; a fourth
from Doornberg to Rorkes Drift, occupying the cross-roads
leading to Xrlencoe and Ladysmith opposite Waschbank and
Wessels Nek stations; a fifth marched to the right of Majuba
Hill along the border to Botha Pass; a sixth from Vrede to
the Mtiller Pass; and the Orange Boers (with ox train and 11
guns) from Albertina and Harrismith in three columns to
Van Reenens Pass, Tintwa Pass and Bezuidenhout Pass.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
21
THE NATAL FRONTIER.
^^
>talute Miles ^
~t ' f: -\ < S^"*.T""~ ^^s.-
^/WAKKERSTP^OOM
\v
VOLKSEItST %
r^^J?S-
^h7^^^^^'4 ! 52|/SH^HaoGTe
By midnight of the 12th all the passes on the eastern,
and western borders of Natal were in the hands of the Boers,
and on the 13th the British abandoned this district to within
six miles of Glencoe and Dundee.
At 3 a. m., October 13th, General White (then command-
ing at Ladysmith) advanced on the road toward Acton Homes
to attack the Boers and prevent the junction of the columns
from the passes; he struck the column from the Tintwa Pass
(under Major Albrecht), and attacked it, but the attack was
repulsed, and General Grobeler from Van Beenens Pass
22 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
threatened to cut him off from Ladysmith. White was there-
fore compelled to retire. The Boers followed the retiring
British and occupied positions commanding Ladysmith, along
the line Acton Homes Blaauwbank Bester's Station.
In the north the columns united at Ingagane, near
Konigsberg, and pushed outposts out to Glencoe on the
evening of the 13th. They then set to work to intrench them-
selves, awaiting the advance of the left wing. The British
ordered the garrisons of Pietermaritzburg and Durban to
work night and day to put these points in a state of defense.
By October loth the Boers had 1,500 men in Newcastle,
with 10 light and 2 heavy guns; advance guard under Viljoen
at Ingagane. On the 16th the main body of the Boers was
at Ingagane, and on the 18th Joubert made his headquarters
at Dannhauser. On the 19th the latter marched towards the
Impati Hill, while Lukas Meyer, commanding the advance
guard of the column from Utrecht (1,000), was ordered to
attack from the east. During the night the latter succeeded
in getting 4 guns on Dundee (or Talaua) Hill, and at 5:30
a. m. opened the attack.
The advance of the Boers is open to the criticism that in
subdividing into so many columns they exposed themselves
to the danger of being separately attacked and destroyed be-
fore they could reunite, but in all probability the explanation
.of their action lies in the fact that this subdivision was forced
upon them by the nature of the country and the character of
the roads.
By October 20th the left wing of the Boers had arrive I
in position: their strategical movements were completed, and
the tactical operations began.
The Battle of Dundee or Glencoe.
The occupation of Dundee (or Talana) Hill (between
the Glencoe Newcastle railroad and the Glencoe Dundee
THE SECOND BOH It \VAIf.
BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF LADYSMITH
AND ENVIRONS.
24 TEE SECOND BOER WAR.
branch) by the Boers on the 20th led General Symons to at-
tempt to dislodge them with portions of two regiments sup-
ported by 20 rapid-fire guns, but he only succeeded in causing
the withdrawal of the Boer artillery (4 guns). General Sy-
mons tried again and again to strike the enemy in flank, but
failed, and at 9 a. m. he received the report that Dundee was
also threatened by a Boer column of 9,000 men and a battery,
under Joubert in person, coming from the direction of Hat-
ting Spruit to the east of Dundee Hill. The position in which
Glencoe would be placed by the advance of this column, unless
Dundee Hill were taken, decided General Symons to make
another advance in force. In this attack General Symons
fell, mortally wounded, and General Yule succeeded to the
command. At 1 p. m. the position was taken and the Boers
retired. The British lost 12 officers and 33 men killed, 21
officers and 163 men wounded. The Boer loss is not known,
but is given at 300 killed and wounded; their field hospital
and entire train was taken by the British. Such was the
battle of Dundee. A squadron of the 18th Hussars, sent in
pursuit of the Boers after the battle, lost 4 killed, 9 wounded
and 86 captured.
While General Symons with all his force was thus strug-
gling against the advance guard of the Boers, their main body
was quietly advancing in the rear, cutting communication
between Glencoe and Lady smith, and completing the environ-
ment of both these places. General Schalk Burgher, with
the column from Vryheid, closed in on Glencoe from the east,
his left flanking column occupying Waschbank; while Gener-
al Viljoen, passing Glencoe on the west, pushed his outposts
to the Impati Hill; and Joubert's right column under Jan
Kock occupied the Biggars Hill, his forces reaching around
to the right towards the Orange Boers, who were advancing
towards the Pietermaritzburg railroad.
This situation forced the British to act, but it was a ques-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 25
lion whether to strike in a northerly direction to prevent the
union of the column near Dundee with the main column far-
ther west, or in a southerly direction to prevent that of the
columns from east and west, now approaching each other at
Elandslaagte.
On the 21st Yule made a demonstia ion against Ih9 BO3ia
north of Glencoe and pushed them back, and in the night
began his retreat through Dundee on Beith. Dundee and
Glencoe were abandoned, and a position nearer Ladysmith
taken up.
Battle of Elandslaagte.
At the same time General White decided to reopen com-
munication with Glencoe by attacking the Boers at Elands-
laagte. General French was sent out by rail with the ad-
vance guard at 4 a. m., but the main body under White did
not arrive till 3 :30 p. m., when the battle opened.
The British forces were about 3,400 strong, comprising
1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment,
\ 2d Battalion Gordon Highlanders,
\ 2d Battalion Manchester Regiment,
5th Lancers,
5th Dragoons, 1 squadron,
Natal Carabiniers,
Imperial Light Horse,
2 field batteries,
Natal field battery.
The Boers (the advance guard of Kock's column) occu-
piel two kopjes, or heights, their principal camp being be-
tween these kopjes in the saddle, the artillery (2 guns) being
intrenched on the lower of the two heights. They were about
1,400 strong. At about 4 p. m. the British artillery opened
from a position 4,400 yards from the Boers and prepared the
attack for the infantry. This artillery preparation was
26 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
THE BATTLE OF ELANDSLAAGTE.
deemed sufficient in about half an hour, and General French
decided to make the infantry attack, the artillery moving up
to its second position at 2,250 yards from the Boers, finally
supporting the advance at 1,950 yards.
The Devonshire regiment attacked in front, advancing
over perfectly open ground. Three companies were deployed
in first line on a front of 380 to 500 ya ds, famishing their own
supports. The other four companies remained in reserve in
single-file columns at 50 paces interval, the latter being in-
creased when the Boer artillery opened on them.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 27
AVlieu the regiment arrived at about 1,200 yards from
I he enemy's position, Major Park, commanding the first line,
halted it and opened fire, the only protection for the men
being low ant-hills. The advance was continued, and, after
a few volleys executed at a halt, the line was reinforced by
the supports, and again advanced. In spite of the hail of bul-
lets, the line moved on without a break, unhesitatingly, to
within 750 yards of the enemy, and there remained lying
down for a full half-hour, exposed to artillery and infantry
fire, awaiting the signal for the final assault. Their khaki
uniforms and the approaching darkness probably saved
them from destruction.
Meanwhile a flank movement was executed by the Man-
chester regiment, which, after passing the guns, was joined
by a dismounted squadron of .Imperial Light Horse, the Gor-
don Highlanders following in support. The movement was
over the lowest of the chain of heights, turning the left flank
of the Boers. On arriving at the foot of the hill a heavy
storm broke forth, and w T hen it was over, the Gordon High-
landers found themselves among the rocks covering the crest
of the hill, and exposed to the enemy's fire. The supports
then entered the line, filling up the interval between the col-
umns. A small plateau was .then crossed, next a depres-
sion between the hills, and finally a* steep slope had to be
scaled, but in spite of the difficulties and losses the line stead-
ily advanced to within 600 yards of the enemy. The ground
was entirely open as regards trees, but covered Vith stones
and wire entanglements. The colonel, Dick Cunyngham, of
the Highlanders, had been twice wounded, and half the offi-
cers were laid low, when Colonel Hamlton ordered a trum-
peter to sound a charge, which was taken up by all the other
trumpeters, and drum-major Lawrence jumped to the front
and placed himself at the head of the line, playing the na-
tional air.
28 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
*
The entire line now advanced.
At 6:30 p. m. the Boers' position was taken, 2 of their
guns being captured. The 5th Lancers were sent in pursuit.
The Boers lost 100 killed, 108 wounded and 188 prisoners, in-
cluding General Kock and Colonel Schiel (commanding the
German volunteers); the British lost 6 officers and 49 men
killed, 29 officers and 178 men wounded, and 10 men missing.
This is called the battle of Elandslaagte.
The communication with Yule was reestablished, and the
latter on the 23d, started to join forces with White, con-
centrating at Ladysmith.
Action at Rietfontein.
On that day (23rd) Yule reached Beith by the Help-
makaar road, and at 9 :30 a. m. on the 24th was at Waschbank
Spruit ; the column followed the valley of the Waschbank and
on the morning of the 25th reached that of the Sundays, and
on the 26th entered Ladysmith.
General White, knowing of Yule's approach, moved out
to Kietfontein on the 24th to cover his flank from attack.
He had heard that a force of Orange Boers from Bester's
Station had taken up a stong position w r est of the road Glen-
coe Ladysmith. His force consisted of about 4,500 men:
5th Lancers, Natal Volunteer Oarabiniers,
19th Hussars, Border Mounted Rifles
Imperial Light Horse, Natal Mounted Rifles,
1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment,
1st Battalion Liverpool Regiment,
1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment,
2nd Battalion King's Royal Rifles.
42nd and 43rd field batteries, 10th mountain battery.
He met the Boers (about 1,500 men) at Rietfontein, the
advance guard of cavalry under French coming upon them
at 7 a. m., and held them in check until noon, when, learning
THE SECOND BOEl^W^R. . v< 29
that General Yule had passed through thedelTfesof the Big-
garsberg, he retired to Ladysmith. British loss 116, Boers
230.
The Boers closed in on Ladysmith and cut the Ladysmith
Pietermaritzburg railroad at Colenso. Their concentric
advance, in spite of the disadvantages they experienced after
crossing the mountains in so many columns, succeeded. The
Boers were forced to subdivide their forces by the difficult
country they passed through, but the same excuse cannot,
be applied to the British. The probable reasons for their
dividing into two forces (Glencoe Dundee and Ladysmith),
instead of concentrating at some point as at Ladysmith, were
the facts that Glencoe threatened a Boer advance on the main
road over Newcastle, that Dundee possessed important coal-
fields, and that Ladysmith covered the very important line
to Pietermaritz.
Meanwhile, another important movement took place. A
Boer column started from Fort Evelin (the southernmost
point of the Transvaal) and marched along the Ummula River
over Melmoth to the coast, evidently with a view to influ-
encing the Zulus to take an active part against the English.
Operations on Western and Southern Border.
In the west and south of the Boer Republics the strategic
deployment and advance progressed more slowly. At the
opening of the war there were about 2,000 Boers along the
Bechuana railroad, and by October 14th Cronje had 6,000
men opposite Mafeking, which was garrisoned by about 600
colonial troops under Colonel Baden-Powell. At Kimberley
there was a garrison of about 2,500 men, under Colonel
Kekewich, half of which were British troops, with a consider-
able number of guns. A detachment of 3,000 Orange Boers
under Prinsloo, had occupied Boshof, 36 miles northeast of
30 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Kimberley, and on October 15th moved against that place to
besiege it.
On October 15th took place an action near Maf eking, in
which the Boers were repulsed. The British lost two killed
and 15 wounded; the Boers 53 killed and many wounded.
On October 24th a small but important engagement took
place north of Kimberley, in which 500 British attacked. and
defeated 700 Boers. The British lost 3 killed and 21
wounded. A sharp skirmish also took place at Rhodes Drift,
near Tuli. On the same day the Boers occupied Klipdani
in Griqunlaml West, :m<l n tiio 25ih they occupied \\\ burg
and Barkly West. On the latter day the Boers made a de-
termined attack on Mafeking, but were repulsed with con-
siderable loss. Colonel Baden-Powell had a railroad track
laid encircling the town, and armored trains were placed in
operation on it and could be taken quickly to any threatened
point.
At the end of October the Boers drew from Mafeking to
Kimberley considerable portions of the besieging troops.
General Cronje himself went there, leaving Botha in
command.
The Boers were masters of the situation on the western
border, and the occupation of points like Tauiigs, 40 miles
south of Vryburg, had enabled them to isolate the English
at Mafeking and Kimberley. On the southern border they
had occupied Norvals Pont, Bethulie, Rjuxvill j , Aliwal No.th
and the bridge over the Orange River, with outposts at Buru
ersdorp, threatening the railroad junction at De Aaar.
They advanced southward in two columns: one over Nor-
vals Pont on Oolesberg and Arundel, the other crossing at
Bethulie and advancing on Burgersdorp, and later on Stor n-
berg. The weak British garrisons at Colesberg and Ali-
wal North had retired on Naauwpoort and Queensto\n,
respectively.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 81
Summary and Review.
Let us review briefly the progress of events up to the
end of October, which marks the end of the first act and the
beginning of the second.
At midnight on October 11-12 General Joubert directed
all the Transvaal and Orange Boers under his orders to break
camp, and by noon the next day their concentric march on
the British position, Dundee Glencoe Ladysmith, was wel"
under way. The plan of campaign of the Boers was strategic-
ally sound, and its practical execution in detail was tactically
correct in the main, all the circumstances being carefully
considered. Among the tactical measures, to ensure ^he
safety of the general movement, may be mentioned (1) the
sending out beforehand the advance guard of the Sandspruit
corps from Volksrust to Laings Nek and occupying this posi-
tion and the railroad defile to Newcastle before daybreak;
(2) the movement of the Wakkerstroom corps in the general
direction of Newcastle, and occupying the bridges over the
Buffalo River; (3) the Dornberg corps taking up a position at
Vants Drift opposite Rorkes Drift as early as the llth, so as
to be able to reach the cross-roads to Glencoe and Ladysmith
opposite Waschbank and Weasels Nek on the 12th; (4) the ad-
vance on the same day of the Utrecht an(i Vryheid commands
to De Jagers Drift on the Glencoe road.
The Orange Boers, in a similar manner, occupied the
Botha, Miiller, Bezuidenhouts and Tintwa passes before the
evening of the 12th.
The danger of subdividing into many small columns we
have already discussed. On the British side the Dundee
Glencoe Ladysmith position was not well selected, and the
coal-fields at Dundee are hardly a sufficient reason for a de-
termined resistance at the Dundee Glencoe line, and the ex-
cuse of political and moral reasons is too often advanced to
cover military mistakes. A concentrated position north of
32 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Ladysmith, with a right flank column at Glencoe, appears
to be the- most reasonable solution; but such a Glencoe force
should have considered itself part of the Ladysmith main
body, and should not, therefore, have allowed itself to be sur-
rounded, but should have retired slowly before superior forces
toward Ladysmith or Colenso.
General White had but 3,000 men available, as it was,
with which to attempt to prevent the union of the separate
Boer columns, each of which was his superior in numbers,
and the large and practically independent force at Glencoe
tied him to Ladysmith. With the above arrangement he
would have had at least 10,000 men available for the attack
on the separate Boer columns, and nothing to look out for
but his own communications. If, however, his attempts to
prevent union failed, then his only course should have been
to retire beyond the Tugela and occupy a strong position cov-
ering Pietermaritzburg and Durban.
The neglect of General Symons to occupy Dundee Hill r
which commanded the British camp, cost him a hard fight.
The battles of Glencoe, Dundee and Elandslaagte were really
fought to redeem a bad position, made so by imperfect tac-
tical dispositions. An energetic, combined struggle with one
of the Boer columns from a good position north of Ladysmith
would have been far ^better. As it was, the British frittered
away their forces in advance guard and outpost affairs which
had no effect on the advance of the Boer main columns.
General White's success at Elandslaagte was decisive,
but it only reestablished a communication which had been
unnecessarily lost, and it gave the Boer columns more time
to complete their strategic plans and concentric march. Con-
sidered by itself, however, it was a well-planned and splen-
didly executed action. General Yule's night march from
Glencoe, in presence of an enemy greatly superior in strength,
was a remarkable achievement, and, taken in connection
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 33
with General White's covering flank attack at Bietfontein,
constitutes an excellent tactical study.
The bravery of the British officers commands the respect
and admiration of the world. In these days of strong de-
fensive lines and the great power of weapons in warfare, it
is more difficult than ever to induce the soldier to come up to
the enemy's lines, to come in contact with the enemy by
which alone the tide of battle can be turned; consequently
the example set by the officer comes more than ever into play,
is more than ever a necessity, and certainly the British officers
left nothing to be desired in this respect. The British loss in
officers at Glencoe was 14^ per cent of the total losses: at
Spicheren the Germans lost in officers 4^ per cent of the total
losses. Whether or not the officers exposed themselves un-
necessarily is a very difficult question to decide: it is the
officer's duty to get his men forward, to keep them under con-
trol, and to economize their offensive power until the crisis
is over, and if he stops to consider his own safety he is liable
to miss his main duty; on the other hand, a high percentage
of officers killed or wounded is very demoralizing. Between
these limits he must choose, and the best course of action
left open to the officer appears to be to get his men forward
as well as he can without too much exposing himself; but if
it is necessary to advance farther, and there is danger of lag-
ging if this method is kept up, then he must expose himself.
The campaign in South Africa, the first to fully illustrate
the effect of the modern magazine rifle and of smokeless
powder, furnishes no new principles of strategy or tactics, but
substantiates the conclusions long ago reached by the bast
authorities from -a careful consideration of all the elements
of modern warfare.
The reason that the results have impressed the world as
unexpectedly great is that acts speak so much louder than
3-
34 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
treatises, even to professional men, and that the principles,
heretofore known only to the initiated, now suddenly become
the world's property.
The first great principle, long since established, which it
emphasizes, is the power of the offensive, strategically and tac-
tically, and the fact that this offensive alone, in spite of all
the new power of defense,, can furnish decisive results. In
this early stage of the campaign the offensive is largely with
the Boers, yet even here the limitations of their offensive
power, in failing to strike hard when they had the opportu-
nity, and more especially in neglecting that other essential
element of the offensive, pursuit, is but too apparent.
Another important principle of the art of war is the cor-
rect estimation of the enemy's preparedness and strength.
The one great cause of the early British disasters was their
entire underrating of their enemy's offensive and defensive
pow r er. But many another nation has made this mistake for
example, France in 1870 and Kussia in 1877; hence this is not
so surprising, especially when we consider the great distance
of the scene of action from the home country. Of course, this
error of judgment falls upon the supreme heads of the army
command and upon the diplomatic department, and does not
concern the troops in the field.
Any other nation, under similar circumstances, m'ght
have made the same mistake, and yet history teaches us that
wars against irregular troops, defending their country and
their homes, are always to be rated among the most difficult
undertakings. And when in addition the nation attacking
has to do so over a long line of communications, extending
across the ocean for thousands of miles, and against a nation
well led, and fully armed and prepared, the difficulties in-
crease a thousand-fold.
Another great principle of strategy that finds applica-
tion of this campaign is the danger of holding on to what
THE 8ECOND BOER WAR. 35
appear to be important points in the theatre of operations
with large portions of the army of operations. The lesson of
Metz, which caused France the loss not only of Bazaine's
army, but also of MacMahon's at Sedan, was not taken to
heart by the British authorities. White's decision to hold
Ladysmith, and the announced* intention to retain possession
of Mafeking and Kimberley, tied the hands of the British
leaders in the field, and increased the difficulties of the situa-
tion. The lesson to be drawn is that armies should never
allow themselves to be shut up in fortifications, except when
there is no other means left them to save themselves from
destruction.
Still, simple as the principle is, it is so different in prac-
tice from what it appears to be in theory, that criticism must
be passed with caution. If, as is stated, the fall of Ladysmith
and Kimberley would have been the signal for a general up-
rising of the Dutch Boers in Cape Colony, the entire question
at once assumes a different aspect, and cannot be answered
on purely military grounds.
The principal tactical principle that has been corrobo-
rated by the battles in South Africa is that the purely frontal
attack is no longer successful. It must be combined with
flank attacks; but, since the latter will generally be met by
counter-measures on the part of the enemy, converting them
again into frontal attacks, these counter-attacks must be con-
tinued and extended into far outflanking movements, requir-
ing much time for their execution, during which, between the
two original fronts, a contest for position is taking place.
These tedious maneuvers are rarely practiced in time of peace,
because they take up so much time, but they should be, to
make them second nature to the soldier. Moreover, many por-
tions of the line, even of an "army acting offensively, must
stand temporarily on the defensive. Such portions should re-
sort immediately to intrenchments; hence the necessity for
36 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
practice in this important branch. In consequence of the
growing importance of intrenching on the field, high author-
ities claim that the subject of temporary fortifications and
field intrenchment should be embodied directly in the drill
regulations.
In the way of organization the only striking feature in
this campaign is the great use made of mounted infantry',
which constitutes on the side of the Boers, indeed, the prin-
cipal force, but is also much used by the British. The advan-
tage of such a force is undoubted, especially for reconnoiter-
ing and holding points important for the deployment of the
main body. This suggests that the cavalry be trained to
regard its fire-arm not as its exceptional, but as its principal
weapon, and that it be trained to fight on foot even more
thoroughly than has been the custom in the past.
THE SEOOND BOER WAR. 37
II.
THE CAMPAIGN IN NATAL CONTINUED.
After the battles of Dundee, Glencoe and Elandslaagte,
the respective forces in Natal were probably about as follows:
British. Infantry 7,800, cavalry 1,050, artillery
45 guns, volunteers (Natal Volunteers
and Imperial Light Horse) 1,000.
Boers. 30,000 men, 40 guns (including six 40-
pounders).
The Boers under Meyer and Erasmus who pursued Yule's
column came into position on Isimbulwana Hill; the Orange
Boers (7,000) arrived at Matawans Hoek; while Joubert's
main body closed in from the north, extending from Lom-
bards Kop to the railroad to Harrismith.
The question naturally arises, Why did not White retire
toward Pietermaritzburg as soon as he found himself unable
to longer hold his advanced position without danger of being
cut off? The reasons probably are that he had orders to hold
out (for political reasons and moral effect) as long as possible ;
moreover, the worn-out troops of Yule undoubtedly needed
rest.
In case retreat had been attempted, there were three
roads open to White. First, the road running east from Lady-
smith and then branching to Weenen, or going on to Pomeroy
and thence to Grey town; secondly, over the open ground be-
tween the Isimbulwana Hill and the Klip River; thirdly, the
road south over Nelthorpe and Colenso. But the Boer guns
on Lombards Kop and Isimbulwana Hill commanded the first
and second, and the left bank of the Modder Spruit was occu-
38 THE 8ECOND BOER WAR.
pied in force by two Boer commandoes (Meyer and Eras-
mus). It appears, however, that White had decided to hold
Ladysmith.
The Battles of Farquhar's Farm and Nicholsons Nek.
On October 30 White decided to attack the Boer forces,
but the difficulties were very great, for he had to start under
artillery fire from the Isimbulwana Hill, and the Boer col-
umns were now united.
Colonel Carleton with the Irish Fusiliers, the Gloucester-
shire battalion and a mountain battery, constituting his left
wing, was sent to Nicholsons Nek to hold in check the Boers
on Lombards Kop, and to cover the left and rear. The center
or main column, under Hamilton, was composed of 4 batteries
and 4 infantry battalions, and advanced along the railroad.
The right, under Grimwood, composed of 2 batteries and 5
battalions, moved directly east, between Isimbulwana and
Lombards Kop. The cavalry, 3 regiments and mounted in-
fantry, under French, covered the extreme right. A naval
brigade with two heavy guns, just arrived, also took part in
the engagement.
The Boer outposts retired before the British center, and
the latter in advancing lost touch with the right. This right
soon found itself outflanked, was compelled to change front
under fire, and had to call back the center to assist it. Never-
theless, the right thus reinforced was driven back completely
routed, covered by the 23d battery. This is known as the
battle of Farquhar's Farm.
Meanwhile, the left column moved on unmolested to
Nicholsons Nek, except that as they arrived there two large
boulders were rolled down from the heights by a Boer patrol,
and at the same time there was a blast of artillery fire, and
this so frightened the mules that they ran, and the entire
mountain battery with all the wagons of reserve ammunition
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 39
were lost. The infantry held the position, however, and in-
trenched. But the Boers having been reinforced, and the
right and center having fallen back, this entire column was
finally captured. This is called the battle of Nicholsons Nek.
The British lost in these two engagements several hun-
dred killed and wounded, 5 guns, the entire train, the ammu-
nition column, and 1,500 mules.
The losses in detail were: 6 officers, 57 men killed; 10 offi-
cers, 221 men wounded; 38 officers, 977 men missing.
It is probable that White, in first making this attack, had
decided, if successful, to retire further south, but his failure
determined him to hold on to Ladysmith rather than abandon,
the great supply of stores there.
The General Situation.
On the evening of the 30th there were 5 commandoes of
Boers south of the city, between the Klip and the Flagstone,
with a second line in rear occupying Nelthorpe and Pieter
stations; another commando intrenched on the Lombard Kop;
2 commandoes (Meyer and Erasmus), 2,000 strong, east of the
Bulwana Kopje; while on the north and northeast Joubert
had seven camps in a semicircle from Lombards Kop to the
road from Van Reenens Pass; and finally 2 Orange comman-
does coming from Dewdrop Spruit, joining hands with Jou-
bert west of the town.
On November 3 White once more attempted to push back
the Boer lines between the Klip Kiver and the Isimbulwana
Hill. The point, 3,000 men, under General Murray, including
a greater part of the cavalry and several batteries, managed
to push through the Boer lines and escaped to Estcourt; the
rest were forced back to Ladysmith.
Colonel Cooper, occupying Colenso with 600 volunteers,
with a detachment of the Dublin Fusiliers at Fort Wylie, re-
tired to Estcourt. The Boers occupied Colenso on the 3d.
40 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
General Joubert, after leaving the proper force to con-
tinue the siege of Lady smith (the garrison of which was now
reduced to 7,000), continued his strategic march in three col-
umns: one to strengthen the corps at Colenso and advance
west of the railroad, the second advancing over Weenen, the
third over Greytown. The detachment which had penetrated
into Zululand crossed the lower Tugela, and threatened the
communication between Pietermaritzburg and Durban, from
the vicinity of Stanger.
The further advance was thus to be a grand right wheel
of the Boer army, to be followed by a concentric advance on
Pietermaritzburg. But the arrival of the 2d Brigade, 1st
Division, of British reinforcements under General Hildyard
at Estcourt caused a temporary change. General Botha's
Boer corps (7,000) from Colenso came to a stand, the corps
originally at Colenso moving over Ulundi-Courton west of the
railroad took the British in the left flank, that moving over
Weenen took them on the right flank, while that sent over
Greytown was to take position at Bietermaritzburg.
Heavy guns were gradually brought from Pretoria and
Johannesburg to strengthen the Boer lines, which were drawn
closer and closer around Ladysmith.
General Buller, who arrived at Cape Town on October
31, remained there until November 16, when he started north,
and on the 26th was at Pietermaritzburg. Meanwhile 17
transports (with about 19,000 men) arrived at Cape Town, 10
being sent on to Durban, where the troops were landed to
operate towards Ladysmith, the troops from the others being
sent north by rail to Orange River Station, General Methuen
in command.
The besieged cities of Ladysmith and Kimberley evi-
dently determined the British plan. Part of the reinforce-
ments were sent to Sir Buller in Natal, another part from
Cape Colony to Orange River Station under Lord Methuen, a
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 41
third and fourth under Generals Gatacre and French; respect-
ively, to threaten the Orange Free State. The reinforcements
were too small to warrant such a subdivision into four widely
separated columns. It would have been better to have con-
centrated the entire force in Natal against the main Boer
army, or to have retained the Boer army there and invaded
the Orange Free State with a strong column in the center or
left.
In the composition of the units there are decided ele-
ments of weakness, for the force under Clery in Natal has
parts of three different divisions, the others being in one or
other of the other columns.
Action at Willow Grange.
General Clery assumed command of the forces south of
Ladysmith on the 18th. A Boer column reached Nottingham
road and moved over Ulundi to Highland Station(Mooi River)
on the 21st, cutting off Estcourt. The British forces, 2,000
each, one under Hildyard at Estcourt, the other under Barton
at Weston, were thus surrounded. The Boers had a splendid
opportunity for a tactical offensive, which should have led to
decisive results; but General Joubert, learning of the arrival
of the British reinforcements in Pietermaritzburg, decided to
retire and concentrate his forces in the strong position north
of the Tugela. On the 21st General Hildyard attacked the
Boers at Willow Grange and drove them back, restoring com-
munication with Weston. Hildyard's force consisted of 700
mounted men, the 7th and 66th field batteries, and three bat-
talions (East Surrey, West Surrey and West York). He lost
13 killed, 65 wounded, and 9 missing; the Boer loss is reported
as 30 killed, 100 wounded. The troops from Estcourt and
Weston then advanced to Frere, the Boers retiring to Colenso.
By the 22d of November, 33 troopships had arrived at the
Cape, carrying 34,516 officers and men.
42 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
A 'fortified camp was established at Chieveley, where the
reinforcements were concentrated.
Events in the Southern and Western Theatres.
On October 30th, a Boer attack on Mafeking was re-
pulsed with loss: British lost 2 officers and 4 men killed, and
5 men wounded.
On November 1st, a Boer force crossed the bridge at Nor-
valfontein and occupied Colesburg, and another (3,000 under
Commandant Dutoil) assembled at Bethulie bridge. On the
2d,a detachment (3,500) crossed the bridge at Bethulie, the
British force at Stormberg Junction retiring to Queenstown.
The Boers were operating at this time south of the
Orange River in three columns: the right (2,000) against
De Aar and the Cape railroad; the center (1,000) pushing out
on the Colesberg road; the left (3,000) against Queenstown
and Port Elizabeth; a reserve of 4,000 at Bethulie.
At Mafeking there was daily skirmishing. Colonel
Plumer from Tuli was on the way to relieve this town.
Lord Methuen arrived at Orange River Station on No-
vember 9th. General French, who had escaped from Lady-
smith on the last train out, November 2d, obtained command
of the troops pushed out to Naauwpoort.
The troops actually placed under Lord Methuen's com-
mand were the following:
1st Brigade (Guards), 1st Division (Colville).*
9th Brigade (Featherstonehaugh, later Pole-
Carew), comprising
1st Northumberland Fusiliers,
2d Northamptonshire,
2d Yorkshire Light Infantry,
^ 1st Loyal North Lancashire.
Mounted Infantry, 1 regiment.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 43
Naval Brigade and 4 navy guns.
Cavalry, 9th Lancers and New South Wales Lancers.
Artillery, 3 batteries.
Later there were added:
3d Brigade (Scotch Brigade),*
1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.!
General Gatacre was placed in command of the troops
of the Cape force already in position, receiving in addition
the 5th Brigade.* General French (who had escaped from
Ladysmith) was under his command.
On the 10th of November a British reconnoitering par-
ty, under Colonel Gough, composed of two squadrons of the
9th Lancers, 1^ companies mounted infantry and a field bat-
tery, struck a force of 700 Boers at a point about 3 miles west
of Belmont and had a sharp skirmish with them.
On November 19th a Boer commando, 500 strong, at-
tacked Kuruman, but was repulsed. On the 20th Cronje left
Mafeking for the South, the commandoes of Snyman and
Malan remaining to continue the siege.
Meanwhile, Lord Methuen developed his plan of opera-
tions in the West. After repairing the bridge at Orange
Kiver Station, he advanced with 6,000 men on the 21st of
November against Belmont.
Action at Belmont.
The country is flat, with only low ridges, 100 to 200 feet
high, crossing it, and two miles south of Belmont rises the
Kaffirs Kop, which is much higher. On the 21st he reached
Witteputs and on the 22d Devondale (about 5 miles south
of Kaffirs Kop). The Boer forces around Kimberley were
commanded by Cronje, the outposts at Belmont and Kaffirs
Kop by Delarey. On the 23d the attack began against the
first rise, which was quickly taken, followed by the storming
*See Appendix.
fFrom the Hi e of communications.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 45
the second rise, the cavalry acting on the left flank to turn
the Boer right. The third rise was carried with more diffi-
culty, but being most effectively supported by the artillery,
the Boers retiring to the Kaffirs Kop. The cavalry was too
much exhausted to pursue. This is known as the battle of
Belmont.
The British lost 4 officers and 20 men killed, 50 officers
and 218 men wounded, and 2 missing. Among the wounded
was General Featherstonehaugh, commanding the 9th brig-
ade, who was succeeded by General Pole-Carew.
The Boer position on the Kaffirs Kop proved too strong,
and Lord Methuen retired to Orange Kiver Station.
Action at Graspan.
On the following night (24th and 25th) Lord Methuen
again advanced. He moved over Schalk Farm, in order to
go around the Kaffirs Kop and Belmont, and was approaching
the railway station, Graspan, when the head of the column
ran into 2,500 Boers concealed in a depression of the ground,
near Enslin, while 500 Boers from the Kaffirs Kop attacked
the rear guard. Lord Methuen engaged them in front with
the naval brigade, and turned their flanks with the 9th brig-
ade, while the cavalry threatened their rear. The Boers re-
tired to the Modder River. The cavalry was too weak to pur-
sue. This is called the battle of Graspan or Enslin.
The British force under Lord Methuen in this action
comprised :
9th Lancers.
Billington's Scouts.
2 field batteries.
Guards Brigade (Colville).
9th Brigade (Featherstonehaugh).
Naval Brigade (Captain Prothero, from the Doris).
The Boers under Cronje, were about 3,000 strong, with
6 field guns and 2 machine guns.
46 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The British lost 4 officers and 20 men killed, 5 officers and
161 men wounded, 7 missing.
The Battle of Modder River.
Lord Methuen, after resting for a day, and reconnoitering
to the front, continued his advance in the night of the 26th.
Nothing had been seen of the enemy. The column halted
for the night at Klopfontein Farm. At 4 a. m. Methuen re-
sumed his march, the 2d battalion Northamptonshire regi-
ment as advance guard, the 2d battalion Yorkshire Light In-
fantry leading the main column. The total strength (includ-
ing reinforcements joining on the battlefield) was about 8,500
men, with 22 guns (including 4 naval guns). The Boers num-
bered about 8,000, with 10 guns, and were under Delarey and
Cronje, their artillery under Albrecht.
The village called Modder Kiver (see sketch) lies on the
north bank of the Riet, just west of the junction of the Mod-
der. The Boer position was in the shape of a crescent, its
center opposite the bridge, its right flank resting on a group
of houses north of the dam, its left flank at a farm beyond
the Free State border. The Eiet, although swollen at this
time, was fordable at several points, and both banks are cov-
ered with trees and thick brush. The railroad bridge had
been destroyed by the Boers, but a road bridge north of
Sevenfontein remained for communication. The islands
above the dam are covered with trees. The ground on the
right bank rises gradually to the north and fully commands
the south bank.
Although the principal Boer position was on the north
side, their advanced line was on the south. Both were in-
trenched, the revetments covered with bags of sand and gal-
vanized iron plates, and the approaches were obstructed
with wire entanglements. Behind the advanced line the
*
OF THE
UNIVERSITY
SECOND BOER WAR.
47
ground slopes down to the river, affording cover for horses
and wagons, and communication over the river was effected
by innumerable boats and rafts.
48 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The artillery was all on the north side, 5 guns at the cen-
ter, 2 on the right and 2 on the left flank; the Maxim gun
near the junction of the rivers, and a Hotchkiss gun moved
about as required.
Methuen, when at daybreak his patrols drew the enemy's
fire, concluded it was merely an advance guard fight that con-
fronted him. After the cavalry and mounted infantry came
in contact with the advanced line of the Boers, the artillery,
under Colonel Hall, at about 5:30 a. m., took position at
4,300 yards and bombarded the Boer left flank. The 9th Lan-
cers and the mounted infantry protected the right flank of
the artillery. The artillery duel lasted about two hours, then
the infantry advanced in dispersed order, the naval brigade
(1,000) and the artillery composing the center, the right
formed of the Guard (3,500) under Colville, the left of the
9th brigade (4,000) under Pole-Carew. The latter was rein-
forced on the field by the first battalion of the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, coming from the Orange River.
The line advanced to within 600 yards of the enemy's posi-
tion, but could make no farther progress and lay there all day.
On the right repeated attempts were made to turn the Boer
position. On the left, however, a part of the 9th brigade
succeeded in crossing at the dam, and in gaining a footing
on the north bank. The artillery was active all day. At 3
p. m. the 62d battery arrived by rail. During the night the
Boers evacuated their position. This is called the battle of
Modder River. %
The British lost in this battle 4 officers and 68 men
killed, 19 officers and 377 men wounded, 7 missing.
The total losses of these British columns of invasion up
to and including November 28th were about 3,000 killed and
wounded. General Methuen remained at the Modder River,
repairing the bridge there.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 49
General Situation.
After the disaster of Glencoe and the siege of Lady-
smith, England proceeded to raise another (the 5th) division,
and to organize a siege train. The later disasters decided
'England to raise still another (the 6th) division.
On the southern border of the Orange Free State the
British (under General French) reoccupied Naauwpoort, No-
vember 19tli, while the Boers from Aliwal North took pos-
session of Jamestown, and moved on Dordrecht. Gatacre
moved north from Queenstow r n and occupied Bushmans
Hoek, November 27th, and the Boers destroyed the Steyns-
burg bridge, between Queenstown and Naauwpoort.
The general situation at the end of November may be
summed up as follows:
In Natal the continuation of the siege of Ladysmith, and
the holding in check of General Clery's relief force by the
Boers on their strongly intrenched Tugela line. In the west
the continuation of the siege of Mafeking and Kimberley, and
the holding in check of the relief force under Lord Methuen
on the Kiet River. In the south the holding in check of Gat-
acre's division and French's brigade.
The strength of the. Boer forces in Natal was about
25,000 men, south of the Orange River about 10,000, and in
the west about 12,000, with about 1,000 on the northern bor-
der, and about 2,000 in the interior, giving a total of about
50,000. They had about 45 field guns and 20 Maxims.
General Buller (after the arrival of the first reinforce-
ments) had command of about 34,000 infantry, 6,800 cavalry,
200 field guns and 40 Maxims (after deducting garrisons, etc.).
By the middle of December the second reinforcements
brought his force up to 40,000 infantry, 7,650 cavalry, 206
field guns; and by the first of January (when the third rein-
-4
50
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
forcements arrived) to 46,000 infantry, 7,650 cavalry, 221)
field guns and howitzers, 50 Maxims.
Events South of the Orange River.
General Gatacre's troops were concentrated at Queens-
town to act in concert with French, in order to throw back
the invading Boer columns.
T
mm
^Z~ ...Ate <*~
KIMBERLEY.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 51
On the 18th of November he had the following troops:
2d battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
2d battalion Berkshire (part only).
These were reinforced later on by:
2d battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.
2d battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers.
And on December 5th by :
74th, 77th and 79th field batteries, and
12th company, field engineers.
He also had some Cape Police, Kaffrarian Rifles and
Brabant's Horse, all volunteers and irregulars.
His total force amounted to 3,500 men.
On November 22d he established his camp at Putters
Kraal, leaving about 1,000 men at Queenstown. He occu-
pied Sterkstroom with about 300 men, and Bushmans Hoek
with about 800, but early in December he combined the two
advanced posts at Molteno.
General French, with a detachment comprising the 2d
Berkshire Regiment, the 6th Guards Dragoon Regiment and
mounted Cape Colony organizations, was directed to secure
to line Port Elizabeth Colesberg. He assembled his forces
at Naauwpoort, reconnoitering to Arundel.
On December 8th the Boers were distributed as follows:
800 men at Dordrecht, 700 (with 6 guns) on the way to Dor-
drecht from Jamestown, 1,500 at Stormberg, 400 near Mol-
teno, and a small commando at Steynsburg. The Boers in
the vicinity of Stormberg were commanded by Olivier.
The Battle of Stormberg.
At the begining of December the Boers in the south
were moving on Dordrecht, Molteno and Indwe. Mean-
while, Gatacre's troops remained inactive until the first
week of December had passed. Then, to strengthen Lord
Methuen's position, an offensive movement was decided upon.
52
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
This was begun by a reconnoissance of General French in the
direction of Arundel. His efforts to get an insight into the
enemy's position failed, and on the 10th he was compelled to
retire.
To further prepare for his advance, General Gatacre, on
the 8th, sent Colonel Dalgetty with all his available cavalry
and a half-battery against Dordrecht, with a view to tak-
ing this town and threatening Stormberg (reported to be occu-
pied by only 2,000 men) on the left flank.
General Gatacre himself, on the 9th, went by rail, with
about 2,500 infantry, 200 cavalry and 2 batteries, to Molteno,
and marched thence on the night of the 9th towards Storm-
berg (8J miles), to surprise the Boer garrison. The column
was to march along the Molteno Steynsburg road for about
5 miles, then turn northeast directly towards Stormberg (at
A, sketch), but in the darkness the troops moved on too far
(B, sketch) and had to make a wide sweep (double the dis-
tance) to reach their objective, striking the latter on the
THEATRE OF OPERATIONS OF GENERALS FRENCH AND GATACRE.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
53
northwest side, where it was practically unassailable. On
arriving about three miles from Stormberg the head of col-
umn suddenly found itself under heavy fire in front and right
flank. The Royal Dublins, composing the advance, broke and
carried panic with them. A rally was effected behind a kopje,
and a new position taken up to the rear, while the mounted
infantry was sent against the right flank. Before the new
position was occupied a Boer Maxim battery opened on the
BATTLE OF STORMBERGK Rev. du Cercle.
rear of the British, and they again retired in still greater dis-
order, and it was only behind the British artillery that order
could be restored. The Boers never followed up the retire-
ment of Gatacre, except with long-range artillery fire, and
sniping at quite extravagant distances.
Gatacre continued his retreat to Molteno. The entire
action lasted from 4 to 7 a. m. The reserves of the com-
54 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
panies that assembled on the hills were many of them cap-
tured, but no prisoners were lost during the retreat. The
British lost 60 killed and wounded, about 700 prisoners and
3 guns. This is the battle of Stormberg.
The tactical mistakes in this advance are apparent.
General French's movement could have for its object only
one of two things it was either a feigned attack, with a
view to drawing away from Stormberg some of the forces
there, or else it was' a forced reconnoissance to get an insight
into the situation at Arundel. In either case it was an error.
In the first case it was absurd to hope to produce any effect
on the garrison of Stormberg by a movement on a Boer force
three days' march away. In the second case the object did
not justify the use of such a large force: a few officers' pa-
trols would have served the purpose.
Moreover, Gatacre's advance was not properly organized
tactically, for there were no real flanking columns to insure
against surprise, Colonel Dalgetty's raid not being such in a
true tactical sense. Finally, the whole expedition was made
by too great a force, over too great a distance, to give prom-
ise of surprise in a country friendly to the enemy.
This break in the center of the general British line en-
dangered further advance by Methuen or Clery, and French
was so weakened that he could hardly secure the railroad line
to De Aar.
Dalgetty took and held Dordrecht; but French failed in
his attempt to turn the Boer position at Arundel, and was
compelled to return to Naauwpoort.
The Campaign in the West.
On the western theatre of operations, at about the same
time, important events were transpiring. Lord Methuen was
forced to inactivity after the battles on the Modder and Riet
rivers, not only because his troops were exhausted, but also
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 55
because the Boers under General Cronje held the strong po-
sition of Spytfontein Magersfontein in his front, and threat-
ened his right flank from their position (under Prinsloo) at
Jacobsdal, and even his line of communications from the rear,
Orange Boers under Delarey as early as December 2d, hav-
ing turned up at Graspan, destroyed the railroad bridge there,
and then worked round to the westward to cut off Lord Meth
uen. Efforts to dislodge these forces in rear proved unsuc
cessf ul ; consequently Lord Methuen decided to proceed witn
his more immediate duty, the relief of Kimberley, and made
his preparations to force the Boer lines in his front.
Immediately after the battle of the Modder River a
bridge of boats was constructed over the Riet about 40 yards
to the west of the railroad bridge, and an iron bridge waa
commenced to the east of the latter, which was completed
by December 7, when the first train crossed.
Between the 3d and the 8th of December the following
reinforcements reached Lord Methuen:
12th Lancers.
Horse Battery G.
Siege Howitzer Battery (4 pieces, 5-inch).
The Highlander Brigade (Gen. Wauchope).
A Balloon Section.
The 4.7 R.F. gun "Joe Chamberlain,' 1 from the Doris-.
The Canadian and Australian contingents.
His entire command comprised 11-J battalions, 6 squad-
rons, 5 batteries, 1 battalion mounted infantry, 1 naval brig-
ade, 1 naval battery of 5 guns, and about 1,100 volunteers, or,
in all, about 13,000 men and 35 guns.
The Boer position was in the form of a semicircle, com-
pised of two ridges, Spytfontein in the western part, Magers-
fontein in the eastern, the railroad passing between them
and dividing the position into two nearly equal sections, that
on the east side being much more strongly occupied than that
56
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
on the west. The position was well intrenched, and at Ma
gersfontein the trenches were so arranged as to allow of fire
at different elevations at the same time. Cronje had about
6,000 men and 13 guns.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
57
The Boers were reinforced by a number of commandoes,
one of which occupied Reads Drift, about seven miles west
of the Modder River, and another Jacobsdal to the east.
On the 10th of December, Lord Methuen, after leaving a
flanking force to guard against a Boer advance from Jacobs-
dal, crossed the Modder River on the temporary bridge
which he had constructed and advanced against the left (or
stronger) flank of the Boer position.
The Battle at Magersfontein.
On the morning of the 9th of December the 12 cm. naval
gun moved out about a mile beyond the camp and fired some
15 shots at the Magersfontein heights, ten of them lyddite
shells ; the cavalry had a light skirmish on the right, and the
9th brigade moved out in support. At 2 p. m. on the 10th,
BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN.-J?ev. du Cercle.
58
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
after leaving the 9th brigade to guard the .train, Lord Me-
thuen's command broke camp and began the advance, the
artillery opening fire, from the position occupied on the pre-
ceding day by the naval gun, on the heights at Magersfon-
tein. For two hours the firing continued, but the Boers
made no reply. The artillery, the Highland Brigade and the
9th Lancers bivouacked on the field during the early part of
the night of the 10th, about 2 miles from Modder Kiver Sta-
tion, and the Guards moved up in support. At 1 a. m., in a
heavy rain, the advance was continued.
The station of Spytfontein is about 10 miles from Mod-
der River. The ground rises gradually to about 5 miles north
of the Riet, then it begins to be cut up by kopjes. These
A KOPJE.
lines of kopjes trend obliquely so that the open ground is
like a wedge with Spytfontein at the apex, and Jacobsdal
at one end of the base. The Magersfontein Kopjes consti-
tute this portion of the Boer line. They rise to a height of
150 feet.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 59
The Boer trenches ran along the foot of the heights they
occupied, to the right of the British advance, then over the
kopjes into the open country, so that a wide detour would
have been necessary to turn them. But there was no thought
of this, Lord Methuen's plan evidently being to surprise the
position and attack in front only, nor was it known to the
British that the Boer trenches lay along the foot of the hills;
otherwise the artillery fire would not have been directed on
the heights.
In the early dawn of December llth the Highland Bri-
gade, still in closed column, arrived within 500 yards of the
enemy's trenches, having just passed a wire entanglement
(at about 650 yards from the enemy) and reached a perfectly
open terrain. Just as the order to deploy for attack was
given, the enemy opened fire, and so murderously that the
Highlanders broke and fell back in disorder with fearful
loss. General Wauchope fell among the first. The brigade
was reassembled a few hundred yards to the rear, but its
spirit was broken.
The Guard Brigade was then deployed, but could make
no headway, and finally the whole of Lord Methuen's force
was engaged except a battalion of Gordon Highlanders
left in reserve and to take charge of the train the Guards
on the right, Carew's brigade and the artillery in the cen-
ter, the Highlander Brigade on the left. The howitzers on
the left fired lyddite shell at about 3,800 yards range, while
the three light batteries in the center advanced to within
1,700 yards of the Boer trenches, and the horse batteries
moved to the right of the light batteries. The Boers occu-
pied the road towards Jacobsdal as well as the trenches at
the foot of the heights.
The Highlanders not being available for another attack,
the reserve (Gordon Highlanders) was ordered up, and ar-
rived about 9 a. m., taking position in front of Wauchope's
60
THE SECOND BOUli WAR.
.\
BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN. Bev. du Cercte.
brigade, the two battalions of the Coldstream Guards
strengthened the right wing, and the Grenadier Guards were
detached to cover the extreme right flank. The howitzers
advanced about 1,000 yards nearer. The field batteries were
then about 1,200 yards, the howitzers 2,700 yards and the
horse battetries about 1,600 yards from the enemy. But noth-
ing availed. The Boers worked continually around towards
the British right.
The Yorkshire Light Infantry had ascended the Modder
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 61
during the night and occupied at daybreak a ford about 3
miles northeast of the bridge; after leaving 3 companies at
this ford, the 5 others were sent to Browns Drift, further
north. This force protected Methuen's exposed right flank
during the entire day, and foiled Cronje's attempts to take
the British lines in flank.
At about 2 p. m. the Highlanders were again demoral-
ized and fell back in disorder, but were assembled, and, sup-
ported by the Scots Guards, took up their position again near
the guns.
At about 5:30 p. m. the enemy's guns (which had re-
mained silent up to this time) opened fire on the ammunition
train and the cavalry. The Highlander Brigade again broke
and fell back to the field hospital. Another attack was there-
fore not to be thought of. The British forces bivouacked on
the field and in the morning began their retreat, falling back
again to the Modder River.
During the day the balloon section made several ascents,
remaining up each time about ten minutes.
General Methuen's advance was in reality a forced
reconnoissance, for nothing was known of the enemy's
strength or exact position. He made the great mistake of
allowing an interval of several hours to elapse between his
artillery combat and his infantry attack, and in the latter
he brought his forces into action successively, consequently
without definite result.
General Wauchope, commanding the Highland Brigade,
was killed, and General Hector Macdonald succeeded him.
Again we find that the British, in their anxiety to sur-
prise the Boers, neglected all measures for security and in-
formation, and were themselves surprised. Lord Methuen
lost about 1,000 men, or one-ninth of the forces actually
engaged.
The British lost 21 officers and 139 men killed, 48 offi-
62 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
cers and 624 men wounded, 3 officers and 121 men missing,
or a total of 956. The Boers lost 219.
The Highlanders lost about 25.4 per cent of their entire
force in ten minutes, and the brigade was placed Jiors- de
combat for the day. The Black Watch lost over 37 per cent.
It has been stated by several authorities that in the battles
of the future the losses of the army will probably not exceed
20 per cent, although, of course, particular units will be
subjected to severer losses.
The battle was really lost in those ten minutes in which
the Highlanders suffered their great losses, and it is clearly
evident that nothing but imperfect reconnoissance is to
blame for the British reverse in this case.
How General Methuen could decide to cross the Mod-
der Kiver and advance when he had left a Boer force on the
south bank of the Riet, in his flank and rear, is inexplicable.
Before the close of the year but few further movements
took place in the western and southern sections of the
theatre of war, and none of any importance. On December
13th General French with the 6th Dragoon Guards, the 10th
Hussars and 4 horse-artillery guns forced back a commando
of Boers, about 1,800 strong, north of Naauwpoort; and again
on the same day his mounted infantry drove back a column
of Boers from Zoutpans Drift, 10 miles east of Orange River.
On December 25th Dordrecht was occupied by Colonel Dal-
getty, and on the olst there was a small skirmish near this
place.
THE CAMPAIGN IN NATAL.
Tlie First Attempt to Relieve Ladysmith.
The Battle of Colenso.
General Buller remained inactive until the middle of
December. The Boers under General Schalk Burgher (since
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
BATTLE OF COLENSO. Rev. du Cercle.
Joubert's illness) had occupied with 12,000 men and strength-
ened the Tugela line at Colenso, sending out detachments to
close the lines leading to Ladysmith, situated on their flanks:
on the right flank the bridges over the Little Tugela at
Springfield, and on the left flank the bridge over the Bush-
mans River at Weenen, and the Tugela bridge in rear. In
rear of Springfield they occupied a strong position on
Zwarts Kop.
At Colenso the principal Boer position was north of the
river, but they had also occupied the southern bank east of
the railroad, resting their left flank on the Hlangwane Hill.
From this last position they could take an enemy crossing
at Colenso in rear, cut him off, and take him under cross-
fire. General Buller appears not to have been aware that
this hill was occupied.
The country between Colenso, Frere and Springfield is
without roads and very hilly, and that between Colenso,
Weenen and Estcourt is also without roads and has the
obstacle of the Blaauwkrass River besides. Moreover, to
move on either of the flanks of the Boer position necessi-
64
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
tated abandoning the railroad. Finally, such a movement
in either direction would subject the British to flank attack
from Colenso, and in addition the distance from Colenso to
Springfield or to the Tugela bridge north of Weenen is
shorter than the distance from Frere to either of these
objectives.
WRECK OF THE BRIDGS AT F BERE.- Engineer ing
The railroad bridge just north of Colenso had been de-
stroyed; the road bridge about 600 yards above remained,
but was mined; there was a ford between the tw r o bridges,
and one just above the road bridge. These were the only
points where the river could be crossed without con-
structing a bridge, and they were, of course, strongly de-
fended by the Boers. Moreover, just below Colenso, where
THE SECOND BOER \VAK. (35
the river. makes a sharp turn to the north, the Boers had
crossed to the south bank and occupied the Hlangwane Hill,
commanding the Coleiiso Weenen road, and threatening the
river crossings from the eastward; and on the west they
had continued their lines on the south bank, flanking the
upper ford and the space between the bridges; finally,
Colenso itself was occupied by the Boers.
General Buller had at Chieveley and Frere about 19,000
men and 52 guns. His plan was to have Barton's brigade
with 2 field batteries and 6 12-pounder navy guns occupy the
Hlangwane Berg, to support the advance of Hildyard and
Lyttleton on Colenso in the center, while Hart's brigade on
the left was to first force the B.ridle Drift (upper ford), and.
if successful, the troops crossed there would facilitate the
passage of the other columns -at the iron bridge. If unsuc-
cessful, the troops would hold the enemy in their immediate
front w r hile the right wing forced the passage of the iron
bridge.
On the evening of December 14th and the morning of
December 15th, General Buller prepared for his advance
from Chieveley Camp by bombarding the supposed Boer
positions by means of the naval guns and the howitzer bat-
teries. On the 15th the advance was begun, Hildyard's bri-
gade moving on the lower ford, Lyttleton's through Colenso
on the road bridge, Hart's brigade on the upper ford. At
4:45 a. in. the navy 4.7-inch guns opened on Fort Wylie, and
at 6 a. m. the 14th and 66th batteries advanced to the east
of the railroad and came into position at 750 yards from the
Tugela (about 1,200 yards in front of the infantry). The
battery of naval 12-pounders came up on the left and rear
of the field guns. The Boers opened on the field guns not
only with their artillery, but also with infantry fire from
the trenches at short range, and the field batteries, under
-5
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 67
cross-fire from the front and from Hlangwane Hill, were
soon destroyed and had to be abandoned.
Barton's brigade advanced against the western spurs of
the Hlangwane Berg and reached the foot of the slope, when
the Boers suddenly opened fire from front and flank, and
forced back the right.
Meanwhile the infantry attack began.
Lyttleton's brigade and part of Hildyard's were held in
check by the garrison of Colenso, while Hart's advanced
towards the upper ford. The troops of the latter were still
in column when they found themselves under a cross-fire
from the Boer trenches on the north and the south banks, as
well as under artillery fire, and although they continued to
advance and even succeeded in getting a few men to the
other side, they lost heavily and were compelled to fall back,
and joined the part of Hildyard's brigade, which had passed
the eastern edge of Colenso and was advancing on the lower
ford. But then they received the flank fire of the Boer
trenches on the north bank, and the artillery fire from the
Hlangwane Hill. Buller sent his entire cavalry and the
mounted infantry against Hlangwane Hill, but the British
artillery could take up no good position against the longer
range Boer guns, and the cavalry and mounted infantry
could make no progress. Finally, in consequence of the
loss of the artillery, the troops fell back in disorder to-
wards Frere.
This is known as the battle of Tugela liiver, or the battle
of Colenso.
The British lost about 900 killed and wounded, and 11
guns: 9 officers, 137 men killed; 42 officers and G99 men
wounded, 200 missing.
The Boers in the trenches in this locality were com-
manded by Botha, and numbered only about 2,000 men.
The causes of these reverses on the Tugela are but ton
TEE SECOND BOER WAR. 69
apparent. While BuJler was still at Frere Station, his ad-
vance guard was directed on December 12th to reconnoiter
as far as Chieveley, and the presence of Boer forces south
of the Tugela (between it and the Blaauwkrass River) was
then established. Notwithstanding this, Buller advanced on
the 15th to attack the Tugela line without making any
attempt to determine the strength and position of these
forces. It is not surprising, therefore, that he met with sur-
prises, flank attacks and cross-fires. Moreover, it is an estab-
lished principle that to cross a river in the face of a prepared
enemy, it is necessary first of all to obtain full possession of
the nearer bank, and Buller's neglect of this condition still
further explains the results.
It is remarkable that during the long period of inaction
Buller should have taken no measures to obtain, by careful
reconnoissance, a clear insight into the strategic situation.
Had he done so, he would have seen that an advance on Co-
lenso laid him open to being cut off by an advance of the
Boers at Springfield and Weenen against his lines of com-
munication, which would have put him into the same plight
as White at Ladysmith. But, after neglecting all proper
reconnoissance, that he should advance to the attack with-
out properly securing his flanks is simply incomprehensible.
The first condition for forcing the passage of the Tugela
was the capture of the Hlangwane Hill and the expulsion
of the Boers from the trenches on the south bank. But ap-
parently the British did not even know that these points
were occupied in force.
In the face of these disasters England ordered out all
her reserves, proceeded to mobilize the 8th division, and ap-
pointed Field Marshal Lord Roberts commander-in-chief in
South Africa, with General Lord Kitchener of Khartoum as
second in command. The total losses of the British up to
this time (not including deaths from disease) were 7,630.
70
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
TEMPORARY BRIDGE AT
Comments.
Let us review briefly the causes of the events up to the
present:
The main causes of the late disasters to the British arms
in South Africa are readily traceable to grave mistakes made
early in the campaign, and now difficult to remedy. Minor
errors have marked the course of the operations, but they
were due largely to haste and a natural desire to overcome
by extraordinary exertions the difficulties of a situation
which was rendered dangerous by the earlier and graver
errors in training, preparation, recruitment, material, organ-
ization, strategy and tactics.
First, as regards strategy. The wedge of Natal, project-
ing as it does into the Boer country, would appear at first
to offer the great advantage of enabling an army always
to operate on interior lines. With such a position a compar-
atively small force is able to fall on the fractions of the
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 71
enemy, as his separate columns cross the passes of the bor-
der, and destroy them in turn. But in order to do this, the
force in the wedge must be at least stronger than any one
of the enemy's columns. The only way the British could have
taken full advantage of their advantageous position would
have been by concentrating their forces at some one point
just north of Ladysmith; instead they divided them into two
forces, one at Glencoe Dundee, the other at Ladysmith. The
result was, when White moved out from Ladysmith to pre
vent the union of two of the Boer columns coming over the
mountains, he had but 3,000 men available, which was much
below the strength of either of the Boer columns. If the
troops had been concentrated in one place, he would have
had 10,000 men available, a number which would have been
far greater than either Boer column.
It is only fair to state that when Sir George White
arrived, he found the situation created for him, and that he
desired to withdraw from Glencoe to Ladysmith at once, but
for political reasons he had to hold on to it. Moreover, by
permitting Symons to occupy Glencoe, the occupation of
Ladysmith became a necessity.
In the defense of Dundee and Ladysmith the British
showed too great a tendency to be tied down to localities,
when the only proper course would have been to retire before
superior forces and try to hold the Pietermaritzburg Durban
railroad, so important as a line of atlvance. Their tenacity
and pluck in defending the places referred to are to be com-
mended as such, but, although inspired by quite a different
motive from that which induced Bazaine to hold on to Metz
in 1870, the ultimate effect on the general situation was sim-
ilar. The same may be said of the defense of Mafeking and
Kimberley. Instead of adding to the strength of the British
attacking forces, they weakened the strategic plan, because
there can be little doubt that Buller's subsequent movements
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 73
were greatly influenced by the desire to. relieve these besieged
garrisons; whereas, had they retired, they would now be
available to assist the advancing columns, instead of being
held in check.
Turning now to General Buller's plan of campaign, he
seems, at first sight, to have followed good strategic princi-
ples in dividing into two main columns, one over Durban
Estcourt, the other over Cape Town Orange River Station,
concentrating on the Boer country, with Pretoria as the ulti-
mate objective. But, if we examine more closely, we find
that the total strength of his command does not warrant any
division, because neither column is strong enough to cope
with the enemy immediately in its front or to keep up proper
communication between the far separated columns for effect-
ive mutual support or combined action. His entire force
should have been sent to Durban and concentrated on the
main Boer army in Natal, if rapid and decisive results were
expected. Of course, the desire to relieve the garrisons at
Kimberley and Mafeking had a great influence, and no doubt
the strength and ability of the Boers were greatly under-
rated, but judgment and decision on such points are factors
in generalship and constitute the elements of strategy.
Although these early battles prove the high quality of
the British soldier in battle, they also indicate a lack of mo-
bility, and a too great dependence on their base of supply,
especially the railroad.
Secondly, as regards training. The best training is, of
course, actual war, but the late wars of the British have not
been of a character to teach them what an active and well-
trained enemy is liable to do on the battlefield. Next to
actual war come field exercises or maneuvers, and it appears
from what the British officers themselves say that this kind
of peace training was inadequate: first, in that it did not
include on a sufficiently large scale flanking movements by
74 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
the troops representing the enemy; secondly, in that the
maneuvers were not conducted on a scale sufficiently exten-
sive to make the officers familiar with the handling of large
bodies of troops on the battlefield. The former explains why
the British are continually surprised by the flanking move-
ments of the Boer lines, and the latter may account for some
of the tactical errors about to be considered.
Thirdly, let us analyze the British tactics. In the early
part of the campaign they were very deficient in cavalry, but
light infantry, properly trained, especially as opposed to such
slow-moving and deliberate enemies as the Boers, should
have done excellent service on reconnoissance, notably in the
rough country in northern Natal, which is in reality more
favorable for infantry than for cavalry scouts. But even
later on, when French had an entire cavalry division at
Naauwpoort, Gatacre was surprised in his advance from
Queenstown. Of course the British are under the great dis-
advantage of operating in country where the natives sympa-
thize with the enemy, but this does not satisfactorily explain
all the deficiencies in reconnoissance work. For example,
even on the battlefield, patrol duty to keep up intercommu-
nication between the parts of a line seems to have been neg-
lected, as at Nicholsons Nek, where one column of a small
command was allowed to get so completely separated as to
be captured, never having been informed of the repulse of
the adjacent portions of the general line.
The cavalry failed entirely in its reconnoissance work,
and the brigade commanders did not take up the work, when
the cavalry retired from the front, by advancing their lines
of infantry to force the enemy to develop his position.
The defeat of General Buller's army at Colenso appears
to be another case in point. It is to-day considered to be no
dishonor to lose a battery on the battlefield, provided its sac-
rifice is demanded by the general situation ; but from the offi-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 75
cial report it appears that when Colonel Long "advanced
close to the river in his desire to be within effective range/'
it "proved to be full of the enemy." Now the artillery's duty
was to get within effective range, but it is someone else's
business to see that the bank of the river is not full of the
enemy before the artillery is ordered to the front. Again,
imperfect reconnoissance appears to be at the bottom of the
trouble.
However, there is another point that demands considera-
tion here. For some years the continental armies have been
training special artillery scouts that is, mounted men, se-
lected from the field artillery batteries, whose duty it is to
precede a battery, clear up the ground along the road of
advance, look up the enemy's position, note points of value
to the artillery commander, and report promptly whatever
demands reporting, but remain constantly in touch with the
enemy. These scouts are usually formed into patrols, under
particularly efficient officers or non-commissioned officers.
The British field artillery appears not to have put in prac-
tice this most effective means of protecting the artillery from
surprise.
Another tactical weakness seems to be the failure to
occupy positions properly. It is incomprehensible why Ta-
lana Hill (which cost so dear to retake after the Boers occu-
pied it) was not occupied in the first place.
Moreover, the tendency of the British to make simple
frontal attacks, is to be condemned as too great a waste of
life in these days of enormous strength of the defense. The
mistaken ideas of tactics, which induced the British to make
such purely frontal attacks, in great measure necessitated
that exposure of the officers and men which resulted in such
great losses. Wherever they tried pressure on the flanks (as
at Elandslaagte and Kiedfontein) they were successful.
76 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
It will suffice to pass in rapid review the other elements
of weakness.
As regards preparedness, it is only necessary to refer to
the weak garrisons at Kirnberley and Mafeking, guarding the
important railroad from Cape Colony to Buluwayo, to the
insignificant forces on the Orange River, covering the Port
Elizabeth railroad, and to the comparatively small force at.
the keystone in Natal at the outset of the campaign. At
home, the unreadiness of the Admiralty promptly to trans-
port the reinforcements was severely commented on, and the
length of time allowed for recruiting the army corps was
probably necessitated by the lack of a full supply of clothing
and equipment in the store-houses. The conditions in South
Africa demanded prompt relief, and every moment of delay
increased the gravity of the situation, as soon became fully
apparent.
The greater part of the cavalry division of the army
corps and the field artillery arrived after the infantry, which
was a great disadvantage.
The want of artillery material, both field and siege, in
sufficient quantity, made itself felt very early in the war.
But this was not due to an actual want of such material at
home, only to a deficient organization the lack of a chief of
artillery, who could demand that the proper artillery guns
be sent, and who could be held responsible for not having
them on hand in time. Another deficiency in organization
w as the mixing up of the units in the two main armies, by
which one brigade of a division would be in one army, an-
other in the other, so that Clery's column had parts of four
different divisions.
The English had known for years that a collision with
the Transvaal would occur sooner or later, but they closed
their eyes to the strategical facts of the situation, and the
military forces in South Africa were kept at an insufficient
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 77
strength. The 6,000 miles separating the latter from the
mother country seem never to have been considered.
Former governments and parties must, of course, take
their share of the blame. The Cape garrison had always
been weak, and originally it was probably sufficient to over-
awe the natives; but between 1881 and 1886, when there
was constant friction between England and the Transvaal,
some attempt to provide for the impending crisis should have
been made by reinforcing the garrisons, and this would have
been possible even up to 1896, but after that any such in-
crease would certainly have led to war.
The chief of all these elements of British weakness is,
of course, the strategy of the campaign-^the great superi-
ority of the Boers in strategic deployment and strategic
advance, due to their unity of plan and action being every-
where manifest. The original inferiority of the British in
numbers is also a prime cause; but each of the other ele-
ments has had its effect on the preliminary situation and the
subsequent events.
The early operations of the Boers are marked by good
strategy, and their tactical applications of their forces in
battle, especially on the defensive, by considerable skill, but
they lacked the spirit of the initiative and the power of the
tactical offensive. The attack of the several columns on Dun-
dee was not simultaneous; at Elandslaagte the advanced
force was not properly supported; after the battles of Dun-
dee and Elandslaagte their forces became too cautious in
their advance and so allowed Yule to escape; they failed to
push their advantage and to attack Ladysmith vigorously hi
the proper direction, before the British could have time to
strengthen their position, but preferred to occupy a strong
position to the north of the town; and finally, after the battle
of Colensc, they failed to pursue.
78 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
III.
The British defeats at Magersfontein, Stormberg and on
the Tugela closed the second epoch of the war. They were
followed by a period of comparative inaction.
The mistakes in strategy of the second epoch, in trying
to operate on three distinct lines, separated by from 150 to
300 miles one for the relief of Kimberley, another for the
direct offensive from Queenstown towards Bloemfontein, and
the third for the relief of Ladysmith and in splitting up the
reinforcements for all these widely separated columns, in-
stead of concentrating on one, brought their natural conse-
quences, and the situation for the British became a very
difficult one.
The tactical errors in applying an obsolete method of
attack, in failing to develop a proper system of reconnois-
sance, and in neglecting to support field artillery by infan-
try or cavalry, the inferiority of the British artillery mate-
rial at the opening of the campaign, the greater mobility of
the Boer troops, as well as the inexperience of the British
officers in exercising the higher commands, are the princi-
pal additional factors that have determined the events.
The obsolete method of attack consisted (on the Tugela,
for example) in not preparing for the attack by a proper
artillery bombardment from guns placed in well-covered
gun-pits; then following the artillery duel (insufficient in
every case thus far) either too soon (before proper prepara-
tion) by the infantry attack (as on the Tugela), or leaving
too long an interval (as at Magersfontein) ; finally, in deploy-
ing an insufficient number of skirmishers for the firing line,
in line, firing volleys, against an invisible, well-intrenched
-enemy, and making only frontal attacks on the position.
SECOND BOER WAR^ 79
Both sides were compelled to inaction for a long period:
the British for want of complete trains, for laying bridges
and to enable them to cut loose from the railroads; and the
Boers for lack of any further reinforcements, which com-
pelled them to economize their troops, and consequently
prevented them from taking Lady smith or Kimberley by
storm, or from advancing a*ny farther into the British
domain.
The total number of British troops in South Africa on
January 1, 1900, was about 103,400, of which 83,600 were
unmounted and 19,800 mounted. The position of the troops
was as follows:
Lord Methuen was in an intrenched position between
the Modder and Riet rivers, just east of their point of junc-
tion, and covering a bridge over the two rivers as well as
the railroad bridge. He had about 13,000 men. The Boers,
under Cronje, Delaray and Prinsloo, about 20,000 strong,
occupied a fortified position at Spytfontein Magersfontein,
both flanks resting on the Modder River, the left extending
across the river to Jacobsdal. They were gradually closing
in on Methuen, and stray parties threatened his line of com-
munications, so he made an effort to clear up the situation
to the southwest, and on the 1st of January sent General
Babington w r ith a part of the 1st cavalry brigade from the
main camp, and Colonel Pilcher with a small detachment
from Belmont, towards Douglas. Pilcher surprised a Beer
detachment at Sunnyside, and pushed on to Douglas, but
the approach of a commando (500) of Boers along the Riet
induced him to leave Douglas on the 3d and return to Bel-
mont. Babington also returned to the main camp without
accomplishing his object.
A mixed force occupied Zoutpans Drift, about 20 miles
east of Orange River Station on January 6.
Griqualand West and British Bechuanaland have prac-
80 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
tically joined the Boers, and Kuruman, the capital of the
latter, surrendered on January 2, with 12 officers and 10$
men.
On the southern border of the Orange Free State, Gat-
acre had retired towards Sterkstroom, French was at Arun-
del and Rendsburg, and Naauwpoort and De Aar were occu-
pied by British reserves. On December 31, leaving in Rends-
burg a half-regiment and a section of 'horse artillery, French
advanced with 5 squadrons of cavalry, 80 men, mounted in-
fantry and 10 guns against Colesberg. He occupied a posi-
tion to the west of Colesberg and made a demonstration in
the direction of the railroad junction north of Colesberg.
The Boers (1,000) retired in the direction of Xorvals Pont>
but on the morning of the 3d of January, being reinforced,
they returned and forced French to retire. He took up a
position about 5 miles southeast of Colesberg. On the 6th
he sent out Colonel Watson with a half-battalion of the
Suffolk regiment, to occupy a small height about 2 miles
west of Colesberg, commanding the road to Philipstown.
Colonel Watson advanced in close column to the top of the
hill, and there, w T hile giving his orders for the occupation
of the position to the assembled officers, was surprised by
the Boers and lost one-third of his force. French remained
operating in the vicinity of Colesberg.
In Natal the situation remained practically unchanged.
Joubert, who had been absent. ill since December 6th, had
resumed command of the Boer forces north of the Tugela
on December 18th.
i
The Siege of Lady smith.
Before proceeding to consider Buller's third attempt to
relieve Ladysmith, let us interrupt the narrative of events
in the active armies and cast a glance at the military situa-
tion in and about this beleaguered city.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
81
,-v
RECEIVING STATION, WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY.
Ladysmith, on account of its natural advantages, its
position on the railroad and its situation (well to the north)
in Natal, was long ago selected as a depot of supply and
point of support for this colony. Had it been properly for-
tified and adequately supplied with supplies and material,
as well as with a strong infantry garrison, in addition to the
necessary artillery, it would probably never have been be-
sieged, or, if so, it could have held out indefinitely. As it
was, there were, at the outbreak of the war, only four
months' provisions on hand, and about three hundred rounds
of ammunition per piece. A few batteries of heavy guns on
the surrounding hills, with strong bridge heads on the
Tugela at Colenso and on the Bushmans and Mooi rivers,
would have protected the city as well as the line of commu-
nications. But the British underrated the power of the two
Eepublics, and so were loth to make the proper preparations.
Had the Boers been trained in siege operations, the place
would probably have fallen.
82 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The town lies in a valley, on both sides of the Klip
River, and is commanded on all sides by high hills, which,
on the north, run in a ridge close to the river, on the south
consist of more isolated hills, separated from Ladysmith by
a broad plain. Outside of this nearer chain of hills is an-
other line encircling them, but rising somewhat higher.
The position of White was on a ridge beginning at
Helpmakaar Hill east of the town (nearly half-way between
the town and Lombards Kop), and running in a horseshoe
bend to the north of it, bending in the west and around by
the southeast of the town, near the railroad bridge over the
Fouries Spruit. In front of this general ridge on the south
side, several other points were occupied: Maiden Castle,
Besters Hill and Waggon Hill. The British position encir-
cled Ladysmith on the east at about 1J miles, on the north
close against the town, on the west at over 2 miles, and on
the south at about a mile. The entire line measured about
13 miles, for the occupation of which White had originally
about 12,000 troops, but this strength rapidly diminished to
9,000.
Outside of White's lines there was no high ground nearer
than about 6,000 yards from the center of Ladysmith, which
was a great advantage for the British. The Boer lines occu-
pied the nearest chain of hills outside of the British lines,
and this was about 3 miles on the north of Ladysmith, and
5 miles on the west and south.
The 14 works composing the British line were occupied
as follows:
Helpmakaar . . . 1st battalion Devonshire Regiment.
Cemetery Hill )
rp , TT.,, f 1st battalion Liverpool Regiment.
Junction Hill 1st battalion Gloucestershire Reg't.
Gordon Hill . . , )
_. . _. V 1st battalion Leicestershire Reg't.
Leicester Hill . . . . f
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 83
Naval Brigade (Powerful).
5t 2d battalion Rifle Brigade.
King's Post King's Royal Rifles.
Range Post 2d battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
Red Hill 1st battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Highlandman's Post. ) -
Maiden Castle i 2d battalion Gordon Highlanders.
Caesar's Camp ) 1st battalion Manchester Regiment
Waggon Hill 2 squadrons Imperial Light Horse
The guns were distributed as follows :
Cove Redoubt (opposite Pepworth and Isimbulwana
Hills) One 4.7-in. navy gun.
Junction Hill One 4.7-in. navy gun.
Gordon Hill Three navy 13-pounders.
Lady smith c> field batteries (30 guns).
Several 3-pdr. Hotchldss guns.
Two mountain guns.
One machine gun for each infan-
try battalion and cavalry reg't.
The Boer lines were 24 miles in extent, and were occu-
pied by a force varying continually between 10,000 and
20,000 and by 22 guns:
Pepworth Hill "Long Tom" (15.5 cm. or 6 in.).
(4 m. north of the town) Two 12-pdr. field guns.
Two 37 mm. R. F. guns.
"Long Tom," rendered unserviceable by the British, was
replaced by another piece of the same kind.
Isimbulwana Hill "Slim Piet" (6-in. Creusot).
Valley bet. Pepworth Hill ) 2 British guns captured at Nich-
and Surprise Hill f olsons Nek.
Surprise Hill One 4.7-in. howitzer.
-.(Destroyed by the British.)
Lombards Kop One 4.7-in. howitzer.
Between Lombards Kop ) Three field guns,
and Isimbulwana Hill. . Two 75 mm. mountain guns.
84 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
( One 4.7-in. howitzer.
Beyond Caesar's Camp . . . ]
I One field gun.
Other guns were behind the kopjes west of the town,
and were moved about from point to point as required.
In reserve One 37 mm. R. F. "Pom-Poni."
Several Maxim guns.
The British had, therefore, but five guns which could
reach the Boer guns of position, and these were the navy
guns. Without them they would have been helpless.
Communication from Chieveley Camp with Ladysmith
was kept up by means of a heliograph station on Mount Um-
kolumba, near Weenen, under Captain Kayser. The latter
w T as in almost daily communication, and by the middle of
January had sent over 41,000 words. There were also sev-
eral balloons in Ladysmith, which did excellent service.
On January 6th the Boers made a strong attack on the
British lines, especially on the outlying heights of Waggon
Hill and Besters Hill. Some of the positions were taken
and retaken three times during the day, but the Boers were
repulsed. The British lost in this action 14 officers killed,
25 wounded; 135 men killed, 244 wounded.
The Boers lost (according to their own reports) 54 killed
(including 5 field cornets) and 96 wounded; total 150.
It is remarkable that Buller did not attack the enemy
with more energy at the same time that the latter attacked
White, for Buller and White still communicated by helio-
graph, but he contented himself with a demonstration
towards the Hlangwane Hill (east of Colenso),. consisting
merely in an artillery bombardment of the Boer position,
to which the Boers did not even reply. His only chance of
helping White effectively was by way of Springfield, for
White's attack was towards the south, and he would nat-
urally avoid the enemy's strong position at Colenso, in case
he broke through the lines in his front, and strike westward.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
85
This is the military situation at the beginning of the
third act of the war.
Two grand movements open the third act. In Natal,
General Buller decided on turning the right flank of the
enemy's position by an advance over Springfield, Potgieters
Drift and Trichards Drift on Acton Homes and Dewdrop;
and in the west General Koberts developed his plan to turn
the Boer position in his front.
THE CAMPAIGN IN NATAL.
The Second Attempt to Believe Lady smith.
Battles on the Upper Tugela.
The Boers occupied the plateau and rugged ridges con-
stituting the foot-hills of the Drakenberg Mountains, from
Acton Homes, over the Tabayama Hills and Spion Kop to
Grobelaars Kloof, and after the battle of Colenso had re-
mained behind the Tugela, merely sending out patrols
fcom the fortified Hlangwaneberg, and in the west over
Springfield.
For some time after the battle of Colenso, General Bul-
ler had devoted his time to drawing in his reinforcements,
TRACTION ENGINE AND TRAIN.-T/ie Engineer.
6 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
concentrating at his headquarters in Frere all available
forces, a large supply train, and a number of traction
engines for the transportation of his artillery. The coun-
try as far as Springfield was carefully reconnoitered. A
narrow-gauge road was also laid from Frere to Springfield.
The enemy was deceived by feints indicating a projected
advance around his left flank over Weenen.
General Buller's entire force comprised about 25,000
men.
Leaving only Barton's brigade (and several navy guns)
at Frere to hold the enemy in front, and cover his lines of
communication, he directed the rest of his command (about
20,000 men) westward towards the upper Tugela. The ad-
vance guard cavalry brigade of Dundonald and Warren's
division left Estcourt on January 10th, and the brigades of
Lyttleton and Hart (under General Clery) left Frere on the
llth, Hildyard's brigade following on the 12th. On account
of the long train of 400 wagons and 5,000 draught and pack
animals, and the precautions taken to insure safety, as
well as the bad condition of the roads from heavy rains,.
Buller did not reach Springfield till the 13th, where a day's
halt was ordered. Clery's Division was then sent on the
road to Potgieters Drift, Dundonald and Warren on the
western road to Trichards Drift, Buller's headquarters being
located at Spearman's camp, a farm on the southern slope
of the Zwarts Kop. His general plan was to hold the enemy
in front at Colenso by means of Barton's brigade, to attack
his right flank by Clery's Division in a northerly direction
over the road between the Arnot Kop and the Brakfontein
Kopjes or over the plateau to the east of Arnot Kop, pros-
ing forward towards Ladysmith, but first to turn the Boer
right flank by means of Dundonald's and Warren's columns,
roll it up, secure the roads to Oliviers Hoek and the Be-
zuidenhout Pass, and join Clery's division over Dewdrop.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
87
General Buller's operations, in spite of all the difficul-
ties in the way, were so well concealed that the enemy was
not aware of his real plan until he had crossed the Little
Tugela and occupied the Zwarts Kop, although the move-
88
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
ment of his columns had been noticed and in a general way
preparations to receive his attack were made.
At Springfield provisional magazines were established
for supplying the troops, and the enemy's position was care-
fully reconnoitered by means of anchored balloons.
TRACTION ENGINE WITH DYNAMO AND SEARCH-LIGHT.
The ford at Potgieters Drift was secured on the. llth,
and on the 16th half of Lyttleton's brigade and a howitzer
battery crossed the Tugela there. Six howitzers were
promptly placed on One Tree Hill and the latter occupied,
while the heavy guns were taken up Z warts Kop on the
south bank to cover the position on the north. Coke, with
part of his brigade, was placed below Zwarts Kop to ob-
serve Schiets Drift, the remainder of his brigade guarded
the train and lines of communication. The advanced posi-
tion of the Boers on the spurs of Brakfontein Kopjes, imme-
diately in front of Lyttleton, separated him completely from
General Warren, who, after constructing a ponton bridge
at Trichards Drift, crossed there on the 18th. Warren had
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 89
also part of the 2d and 3d divisions. Dundonald moved rap-
idly to the left and cleared the western side of Acton Homes,
but Warren decided that the position of the Boers was too
strong to turn, so he ordered Dundonald to fall back to
Trichards Drift on the 19th, and directed his attention to
the Spion Kop, which appeared to be the key to the position.
Action at Venter Spruit.
General Warren, on January 19th, had decided to mod-
ify his orders. Meanwhile, the Boers were making prepara-
tions to meet his attack. General Botha at Colenso received
orders on the 19th to repair to the Upper Tugela and assume
command. He rode all night and at 3 a. m. on the 20th
arrived in the camp of General Schalk Burgher. The posi-
tion was inspected and the disposition of the troops made.
On January 20th, General Warren placed two brigades
{Woodgate's and Hart's) and 6 field batteries under General
Clery to attack the Boer position. The latter was in the
form of a semicircle around an amphitheatre containing
Three Tree Hill. The Boers had not had time to construct
trenches, but they built up with stones rude ramparts on
their ^pies of defense.
The British advanced in two columns. One (compris-
ing the 1st battalion South Lancashire Regiment and the 2d
battalion Lancaster Regiment of Warren's brigade) deployed
and moved out against two kopjes Three Tree Hill and
another to the east of it. The other (comprising the rest of
Woodgate's brigade and all of Hart's) advanced to the west
of Three Tree Hill and remained massed under cover. Hild-
yard's brigade remained in reserve.
The ascent of the kopjes w r as very difficult, and it was
not until 7 a. m. that the artillery came into action on Three
Tree Hill, at about 2,500 yards from the Boer defenses. At
7:30 a. m. the hill to the east was occupied by the British,
90 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
when the Boers opened a heavy fire of musketry. At 11
a. m. the west column received orders to advance.
The Boer position was naturally very strong. The
ground was broken and covered wkn rocks for the first part
of the British advance, but for 1,000 yards from the Boer
lines there was an open, gentle slope down toward the Brit-
ish position. The artillery of the latter also had very little
effect against the Boer defenses.
At 3 p. m. the British artillery opened a rapid fire, and
then the entire line started to advance over this open
ground. The attacking troops, however, could make no
headway, and gradually turned into the valleys instead of
going up the slopes, and so the order to halt was given. At
7:30 p. m. fresh battalions from Hildyard's brigade were sent
in to relieve the Lancashires.
The artillery of the Boers replied only at intervals to
that of the British, constantly changing its position, and
rarely firing more than three shots from any one.
Meanwhile, Dundonald's mounted brigade was active
on the left of Hart's brigade, and took a hill about 1,700
yards to the west of the latter, holding it all night.
The troops bivouacked in their positions at nigh^ On
the extreme right Lyttleton made a demonstration in force
against the Boer position opposite Potgieters Drift, but
found the latter still strongly occupied. On the morning
of the 21st it was found that the Boers on the right of their
line had retired to a second line of crests defended like the
first. The British occupied the line abandoned by the
Boers.
The British artillery had great difficulty in coming into
action on this day, because the position on Three Tree Hill
was now out of range of the Boers, and there was no nearer
position (except on the plain) available. Two field batteries
were sent by Warren to strengthen the left, and four how-
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
91
itzers were sent by Duller to reinforce Warren. Nothing
was accomplished on the 21st. The two field batteries and
the howitzers were placed on the plain between the Venter
Spruit and the road to Acton Homes, and bombarded the
Boer lines during the 22d and 23d, but produced no effect.
The troops in Ladysmith made sorties on the 20th and
22d, but without result; and Barton, at Chieveley, made a
weak demonstration on Hlangwane Hill.
Action on the Spion Kop.
On the 23d, since the Boer lines appeared to be very
thin, an attack on Spion Kop was decided upon in order to
break through them.
THE BATTLE OF SPION KOP.
General Woodgate was designated to command the
forces, comprising the advance under Colonel Thornycroft
(6 companies mounted infantry, 194 men and 1 company
of engineers) and a reserve of two companies of the South
Lancashire and the Imperial Light Infantry.
<}2 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The height was scaled in the night of the 23d and 24th,
and at 3 a. m. the troops arrived at the summit, where they
surprised and drove off a small Boer outpost. They at once
intrenched, but a heavy fog prevented them from appreciat-
ing their real position. At 8 a. m. the fog raised, and they
found themselves enfiladed by IJie Boers.
The outpost of Boers, driven off by the British, had
given warning, and in the fog the Boers managed to bring
five guns to bear on the British position, as well as two
Maxini-Nordenfelts, and had sent up two strong columns to
retake the position, so that when the fog raised at 8 a. m.
they opened with artillery and musketry, on the British
trenches, and by 10 a. m. the British were driven to the
southern extremity of the plateau. General Woodgate fell
mortally wounded, and was succeeded by General Coke,
who arrived in the afternoon with reinforcements, but later
Colonel Thornycroft was assigned to the chief command.
The two battalions of Coke's brigade were sent as reinforce-
ments and arrived about noon.
The extreme right, under Lyttleton, continued its ef-
forts against Brakfontein, and also sent reinforcements to
Thornycroft: the Scottish Rifles and the 60th Rifles back
over Potgieters Drift, and up stream to a ford, where they
again crossed to the north side, then the former went up
Spion Kop by the same path as the original troops, while
the latter followed along the foot of the Spion Kop, then
up to the north salient of the east side.
The arrival of these reinforcements during the after-
noon (4:30) enabled the British to hold out till evening.
Preparations were being made to send up the 4th mountain
battery and two naval 12-pounders, and part of Hildyard's
brigade was assembled at the foot of Three Tree Hill, with
orders to attack Tabamyama in the morning, but Colonel
Thornycroft was not informed of these measures.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 93
The troops on the plateau on the Spion Kop had suf-
fered severely, and therefore Colonel Thornycroft decided to
abandon the position in the night, commencing his retreat
at 8:30 p. m.
On the 25th Buller arrived in person at Trichards Drift,
and gave orders to retire over the Tugela.
On the 27th, General Warren's troops were taken to the
south bank of the Tugela. The passage was accomplished
without accident or loss, and the command deserves high
praise for this feat, for, besides the troops and the guns (6
field batteries, 4 howitzers and the machine guns), there
were 489 wagons namely, 232 ox-wagons, 98 ten-mule
teams, 107 six-mule teams, 52 four-mule teams.
Lyttleton's brigade was also partly drawn to the south
bank, but the Zwarts Kop was held, as well as One Tree
Hill.
Buller's plan was evidently to begin the turning move-
ment at Acton Homes, but Warren, not being able to make
any progress on the extreme flank of the Boer position, and
recognizing the importance of Spion Kop, decided to fall
back and take that first, with a view to then advancing on
the Fair View T Rosalie road (branching to the right from
the Trichards Drift Acton Homes road). In other words,
he converted Buller's plan for a turning movement into
what practically became again a purely frontal attack. He
reported his decision at once to his superior, but the latter
was too far away to control his actions in time. In a sim-
ilar way, after Spion Kop was taken, it was abandoned,
without consulting General Warren, by the immediate com-
mander, Thornycroft (Woodgate having been wounded). In
both cases orders were given by subordinates entirely up-
setting the main plans of their superiors.
The forces at this time were distributed somewhat as
follows:
94 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The Boers had in all abowt 30,000 men 12,000 at Lady-
smith, 3,000 at Colenso, and about 15,000 on the heights of
the Tabamyama and Brakfontein.
The British had for the turning movement about 12,000
in all Lyttleton 3,000, Hart 2,000, Hildyard 3,000, Wood-
gate 4,000 and Dundorald 800.
The losses of the British in this turning movement were
216 killed, 671 wounded and 315 missing; that of the Boers
is reported at 1,200. Buller's total losses between the 17th
and 24th amounted to 87 officers and 1,652 men.
THE THIRD ATTEMPT TO BELIEVE LADYSMITH.
Battle of the Vaal Kranz.
On January 30th Dundonald's cavalry, in order to draw
the attention of the Boers to their western flank, made a
demonstration towards Hongers Port (11 miles above Wag-
gon Drift), still further destroying the bridge there.
On February 3d the British artillery on Z warts Kop and
Alice Hill opened a heavy fire on the Boer position north
of the Tugela. Buller's object was to prepare for his ad-
vance over Potgieters Drift and Mole Drift, just below, his
most direct route towards Ladysmith.
Opposite Potgieters Drift the first line of hills is that
of One Tree Hill, and beyond that rises another ridge (a spur
of the Brakfontein Kopjes) called the Vaal Kranz. To the
east of these hills, near the bend of the Tugela, rises the Mole
Spruit Kop and further north the Dornkloof Berg, the lat-
ter permitting of a flank fire on the Vaal Kranz, and being
itself flanked by the western spurs of the Onderbrook Pla-
teau (especially the Kranz Kloof).
The only position north of the Tugela held by the Brit-
ish after the retreat of Warren over Trichards Drift was
the One Tree Hill ridge, about 1J miles northeast of Pot-
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
95
gieters Drift, which Lyttleton's brigade had occupied. The
rest of General Buller's army was encamped between Spear-
man's Farm and Springfield.
On February 4th the British troops broke camp, Clery's
Division marching towards the valley behind the Zwarts
Kop, while Warren's moved towards Potgieters Drift.
Wynne's brigade (llth) and 6 field batteries crossed the
Drift on the evening of the 4th and relieved Lyttleton's
brigade.
BATTLE OF THE VAAL KRANZ. Rev. du Cercle.
The plan of attack w r as as follows:
Wynne's* brigade, with the field batteries, was to move
over One Tree Hill and demonstrate against the Brakfontein
Heights, while the main attack was to proceed over a sec-
ond ponton bridge (to be constructed farther east), directed
against the southern spur of the Vaal Kranz. The batteries
with Wynne w T ere to retire in echelon, and then support the
main attack. In support of the general movement a battery
*Wynne succeeded Woodgate, the latter having been wounded.
96 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
of six 4.7-inch guns had been established on Mount Alice,
and six navy 12-pounders and two field 15-pounders on the
Z warts Kop.
The 1st brigade of cavalry (13th and 14th Hussars and
a horse battery under Burn Murdock) was to attack the
Brakfontein Plateau on the right of Clery's division, while
the 2d brigade (volunteers with a battery of machine guns
under Dundonald) was to protect the right flank against a
Boer advance from the Doom Kloof; Coke l s brigade was
held in reserve. Buller had been reinforced by eight 6-inch
howitzers from the siege train, and three batteries of naval
guns.
On the morning of February 5th, about 7 o'clock, the
British field batteries (five) moved out and took position, in
front of One Tree Hill Ridge, and opened fire, together with
06.
BATTLE OF THE VAAL KRANZ. -Wochenblatt.
Legend.
Boer trenches.
L. T. Long Tom, arrived from Ladysmith on night of February 6.
M. K. Maxim and Krupp guns, brought from Spion Kop.
K. Krupp gun.
F. Schneider gun.
J., St., V. V., Z., A., D., Kr., Boer Laagers.
E 1.- British battery, entrenched.
E 2. British howitzer battery.
E 3. British field batteries (4).
E 4. British infantry advancing.
E 5. British infantry on evening of February 5.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 97
a howitzer battery farther in rear, and the six 4.7-inch guns
on Alice Hill.
Wynne's brigade advanced slowly in open order. At
1,600 yards from the enemy's position the advanced line
halted.
Meanwhile Lyttleton's brigade moved along the foot of
the Zwarts Kop, and the engineers laid the second ponton
bridge.
At 10 a. m. the first British battery limbered up and
proceeded along the Tugela to the first ponton bridge and
crossed over; the other batteries followed at intervals of
half an hour. As soon as the artillery began this movement,
the Boer artillery opened at about 5,000 yards. At 1 p. m.
Wynne's brigade received orders to retire.
The second ponton bridge was completed at 12 m.,
practically without any losses. The batteries took position
northeast of the Zwarts Kop, and, after felling trees to
mask their position, opened fire and continued the bombard-
ment for two hours, when the principal attack began.
Lyttleton's brigade crossed first and advanced against
the Vaal Kranz. Monger's Farm on the British right flank
was taken. Meanw T hile, the artillery (70 guns) concentrated
on the left flank, opened at 2,400 yards on the Vaal Kranz
Ridge. The Boers were taken completely by surprise and
the ridge was captured by the Durham battalion. But the
Boers promptly took measures to meet the British advance,
and guns were rapidly placed on the Brakfontein spurs.
The Boer infantry, rapidly concentrating at the northern
end of the Vaal Kranz, drove the British from the east side
of this ridge. By evening of February 5th, Lyttleton occu-
pied about 1,000 yards of the west side of the Vaal Kranz.
The tactical value of the Vaal Kranz had been greatly over-
rated, and it was now seen that, from their position on it, it
was impossible to take the Boers in flank.
-7-
96 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
At sunset Hildyard's brigade relieved Lyttleton's. An
attempt was made to capture the British position, but it was
repulsed. During the night the Boers placed a 6-inch Greusot
gun on the Doom Kloof, and on the morning of the 6th
opened on the British with musketry. and shell fire. The
position of the Boers was exceedingly strong, as the British
advance would have been practically through a defile be-
tween the Spion Kop on the west and the Doom Kloof on
the east, both almost impregnable. Buller, instead of out-
flanking the Boer position, found himself outflanked, and
since it became known through balloon reconnoissance that
the Boers had placed a 6-inch gun in position on the Doom
Kloof, and it was recognized that the latter must be taken
by a frontal attack to clear the road to Ladysmith, Buller
gave orders at 9 p. m. on February Tth for the retreat over
the Tugela to Spearman's camp. Two days later the main
part of the army was back in Chieveley.
The British lost 2 officers killed, 16 wounded; 24 men
killed, 280 wounded and 5 missing.
in consequence of Buller's defeat the Boers began a
number of demonstrations indicating a projected strategic
advance against the British lines of communication. Jou-
bert pushed out a considerable force over the Tugela to-
wards Chieveley, occupying Bloy's Farm and the Doom
Kop; other troops crossed at Bridle Ford (4J miles west of
Colenso) and at Kobinson's Ford (6 miles west of Colenso),
threatening Buller's line of communication. Cavalry skir-
mishes took place beyond the east and west flanks of the
British at Chieveley and Springfield.
In Zululand a Boer column of about 2,000 men pushed
on from Vryheid through Nqutuland and Ingogo, capturing
the police station at Nqutu, and early in February took the
Inkandhla magistracy, and threatened a move on Eshowe,
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 99
the capital, 30 miles distant. Colonial scouts from north
Zululand, however, occupied Eshowe.
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH AND WEST.
Preliminary Movements.
During the period from the 6th of January to the 12th
of February few movements of any importance took place in
the southern and western theatres, but reconnoitering was
carried on continually, and led to many minor engagements.
Colonel Pilcher stationed at Belmont, to secure the rail-
road there, was ordered to Sunnyside on January 1st to
prevent the reported assembly of hostile troops in that
vicinity. He surprised 200 Boers, taking 40 prisoners.
The rest retired on Douglas, followed by Pilcher, but on the
approach of Boer reinforcements down the Riet River, the
latter returned to Belmont.
General Babington, with the 12th Lancers, sent to sup-
port Pilcher on the 2d, also returned to the camp on the
Modder River on the 4th.
Lord Roberts arrived at Cape Town on January 10th,
but awaited there the arrival of the 6th and 7th divisions.
General French, near Colesberg, displayed the greatest
activity. His efforts were directed to taking Colesberg and
securing the crossings of the Orange River at Bothos .Drift
and Norvals Pont, but he only succeeded in establishing
himself on the heights south of Colesberg.
The British position at Colesberg was in the form of
a wide semicircle, south of the town, with the Coles Kop
(900 feet high) in the center, occupied by two 15-pounder
guns. About 1,000 yards southwest of the Coles Kop the
British held a small kopje, occupied by the Berkshire regi-
ment, and 2 miles southwest of Coles Kop they had Porters
Hill, occupied by two guns supported by a company of
100 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
mounted infantry, while 2 miles farther south was the Kens-
burg camp; and about 3 miles northwest of Coles Kop two
squadrons of Lancers were posted. The Boers at Colesberg
were commanded by De Wet. French's activity resulted in
causing 1,000 men to be drawn from the forces besieging
Ladysmith and 600 from Magersfontein under Delavey, to
strengthen De Wet.
On the 12th of February the Boers made an energetic
attack and drove the British back to Rensburg. On the 13th
the Boers continued the attack and forced the British (under
Clements) to Arundel. French was ordered to the Modder
River to command the newly formed cavalry division.
On the 26th of January the 6th division (Kelly-Kenny)
arrived, and was sent over Port Elizabeth to Steynsburg and
occupied Thebus, on the Rosmead (Middelburg) Storm-
berg line (about 40 miles west of Stormberg). The 7th
division (Tucker) arrived at Cape Town early in February,
and was sent towards the Modder River.
On January 30th, Prieska, on the Orange River, 100
miles west of Orange River Station, was occupied by a Brit-
ish force.
Colonel Plunier was encamped, early in February, at
Krokodil Pool (about 65 miles north of Mafeking), with a
strong Boer commando in his front, which held the kopjei*
commanding the road and river.
The Boers had abandoned their positions at Graspan
and Belmont, in rear of Methuen's army, but on February
4th General Macdonald was sent with the Highland Brigade,
the 9th Lancers and a field battery to Koodoos Drift, in
order to prevent at that point the union of two Boer com-
mandoes, which were advancing with a view to reoccupying
Belmont. Macdonald would probably have succeeded in his
attempt, but was recalled by Lord Roberts. He lost 3 offi-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 101
cers and 5 men killed, 4 officers and 35 men wounded. On
the 9th he was ordered back to the camp on Modder River.
LORD ROBERTS' CAMPAIGN.
The problem which Lord Roberts had to solve was by
no means a simple one, but, for several reasons, he adopted
the plan to take the Oth and the 7th division, as well as
French's, and move to the east over Klip Drift, around
Jacobsdal, on Bloemfontein, with a view to the speedy relief
of Kimberley.
In the first place, Kimberly had nearly reached the
limit of its powers of resistance, and although its garrison
held 6,000 Boers to the spot, and not available for the active
field army, still its loss would add this force to the Boer
Army and deprive the British Army of the garrison of 2,600
men and 78 guns, not to mention the necessity for saving
the valuable diamond-fields. In the next place, after the
failure of Buller's third effort to relieve Ladysmith, it
seemed useless to reinforce him and attempt any further
movements in that difficult country, whereas an advance
as projected in the western part of the Orange Free State
would be over ground which would be in every way advan-
tageous to the British. Moreover, such an advance would
probably soon draw Boer troops from in front of Ladysmith,
and at least improve the chances of Buller's breaking
through their lines.
The difficulties of the situation are traceable to the orig-
inal splitting up of the forces, in consequence of which the
British are now in four columns separated respectively by
240, 64 and 144 miles, or 448 miles between the extreme col-
umns, and they are tied to these lines on account of the
extreme difficulty of withdrawing the immense trains (2,000
transport animals and several hundred wagons per division)
102 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
as well as the magazines of supplies and materials estab-
lished on these lines. In addition, if an attempt were made
to withdraw on any one of these lines, the Boers would
promptly advance, and so threaten the communications on
the others.
Moreover, Lord Eoberts could not await the arrival of
the 8th division (expected about the end of March), in order
to build up an army of 50,000, and then advance into the
Orange Free State according to the original plan, but was
compelled to act promptly for the relief of the besieged
places and of the general situation, with what forces were
available for an advance viz., the 6th and 7th divisions and
Brabant's colonial troops, either against Cronje's army on
the Modder, or against the Boer forces at Colesberg (Arun-
del) or Sterkstroom, leaving Buller in Natal to hold as many
Boer troops as possible in front of him and away from the
decisive theatre in the west.
On the 10th of February Lord Koberts arrived on the
Modder River, and immediately proceeded to organize his
army, gathering in all available cavalry and placing it
under French, and filling up with volunteers and local
troops, to form of the 6th and 7th divisions, recently arrived,
together with the 1st division (Lord Methuen's) and the 9th
brigade, an army of about 50,000 "men, for an offensive ad-
vance for the relief of Kimberley against Cronje's army and
Bloemfontein.
General Roberts formed his army into four divisions:
1st, Lord Methuen's; 6th, Kelly-Kenny's; 7th, Tucker's; 9th,
Sir A. Colvill's (formerly commanding Guard Brigade) and
French's cavalry division, which had been ordered from
Colesberg, Clements relieving French there.
The Guard Brigade was placed under the command of
Pole-Carew (previously commanding the 9th brigade), while
Colonel Douglas was given the 9th brigade. The 18th bri-
104 TEE SECOND BOER WAR.
gade was formed of volunteers and colonial troops (under
Stephen son).
His train consisted of 700 wagons and 9,000 pack and
draught animals.
General Roberts' Army.
9th Division. 7th Division.
Colville. Tucker.
3d Brigade. 19th Brigade. 14th Brigade. 15th Brigade.
Macdonald. Smith-Dorrien. Chermside. Wavell.
6th Division. 1st Division.
Kelly-Kenny. Methuen.
13th Brigade. 18th Brigade. 1st Brigade. 9th Brigade.
Knox. Stephenson. Pole-Carew. Douglas.
Cavalry Division.
French.
3d Brigade. 2d Brigade. 1st Brigade.
Gordon. Broadwood. Porter.
His preparations were kept perfectly secret, and the
activity of Buller in Natal, the appearance of Brabant's
volunteers in front of Dordrecht, General Gatacre's move-
ments and General Clements' resistance at Colesberg, all
served to keep the enemy occupied, attracted his attention
to other points in the theatre of operations, and prevented
him from sending timely reinforcements to the Modder
Hiver.
The direction of Lord Roberts' attack was well consid-
ered. A front attack on Cronje's strongly fortified position
at Spytfontein Magersfontein was out of the question. A
flank movement around Cronje's right flank, while it might
relieve Kimberley, was tactically and strategically false:
first, because Macdonald's operations near Koodoos Drift
undoubtedly attracted the attention of the Boers in that
direction; and secondly, because, even if successful, it would
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 105
merely force Cronje back on his line of communications. An
attack on Cronje's left flank had first to be directed on Prins-
loo's strong position at Jacobsdal, then after that was
taken, Cronje's position would be flanked, but in the mean-
time the latter would have had plenty of time to change
front, so that Roberts would have been compelled to make
a frontal attack after all.
In view of these considerations, Roberts decided to go
around Cronje's left flank, and advance over Waterval and
De Kiel's drifts (on the Riet) arid Klip Drift (on the Modder)
over Olifantsfontein, a maneuver which was both tactically
and strategically sound, and promised great results. Tac-
tically, it took the British army over open ground, and gave
the relief column a direct and unoccupied route to Kimber-
ley, and strategically it cut Cronje's line of communications
with Bloemfontein.
Lord Roberts' plan was to leave Lord Methuen with the
Guards Brigade at the junction of the Riet and Modder riv-
ers in order to support the turning movement by a frontal
attack on Cronje's position, while he with the cavalry under
French, the Highland Brigade, the divisions of Kelly-Kenny
and Tucker, as well as the new division, passed around Cron-
je's left flank. This involved a division of his forces, and,
of course, gave the enemy an opportunity to attack the sep-
arated parts in detail, but his superior strength and the
great results promised warranted his taking the risk.
On the 12th of February, French, moving over Enslin,
Graspan and Ramdarn, crossed the Riet at Waterval and
De Kiels drifts, and after a march of 37 miles, the Modder
at Klip Drift on the 13th. On the 14th he had an action
with a Boer force at Roodekalkfontein, and, carefully recon-
noitering on the way, passed between Olifantsfontein and
Alexanderfontein into Kimberley on the 15th. The siege
of Kimberley had lasted 122 days (October 15, 1899, to Feb-
106
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 107
ruary 15, 1900). To cover his left flank, a detachment under
Colonel Gordon was sent over Rondevals Drift (west of
Klip Drift), which, after some slight engagements with Boer
detachments, turned to the left and reconnoitered in rear of
Oonje's position.
The 6th division, followed by the Highland Brigade,
crossed the Riet at Waterval Drift on the 14th, reaching
Klip Drift on the 15th. The other two divisions and Rob-
erts' headquarters also crossed the Riet on the 14th, but at
De Kiels Drift. A Boer commando of 2,000 men under De
Wet, coming from Colesberg to reinforce Cronje, advanced
from Koffeyfontein (9 miles below Waterval Drift) and cap-
tured a large British wagon train. Roberts, with his two
divisions, turned on Jacobsdal, but found it abandoned and
the Boers in retreat.
Cronje, it appears, was completely surprised by Rob-
erts' movement, and not until reports of French's fight north
of Klip Drift reached him did he have any clear idea of the
situation. He promptly gave orders to retire frqm the Ma-
gersfontein position and to raise the siege of Kimberley,
directing all the troops in this vicinity towards Bloemfon-
tein. The interval between French (at Kimberley) and
Kelly-Kenny (still south of the Modder River) enabled him
to slip through. On the 15th of February he assembled his
troops, and on the 16th commenced his retreat eastward.
His plan was first to move along the north shore of the Mod
der, and cross to the south at Paardeberg Drift. On the
16th Lord Kitchener (who was with the 6th division at Klip
Drift) saw at daybreak immense clouds of dust moving east-
ward and at once concluded it w r as Cronje's army in retreat,
and decided to pursue, sending the mounted infantry after
his train. The British scouts found his rear guard at Roode-
kalkfontein, and Kelly-Kenny (who had crossed the Modder)
hastened after him with Knox's brigade and captured a part
108 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
of his train. On the 17th, French's cavalry division started
from Dronfield to the Modder Kiver in pursuit of Cronje.
Stephenson's brigade was sent back over Klip Drift, along
the southern bank of the Modder River to cut off Cronje's
retreat in that direction. The two divisions with Lord
Roberts were ordered to move on Bloemfontein, French was
directed to hang on Cronje's rear, while Lord Methuen was
sent up to Kimberlev to restore the communications there.
Lord Roberts had in all about 53,000 men, but for his
offensive movement only 40,000; Cronje had in all about
35,000 men: 5,000, which were moving from Jacobsdal on
the southern road; 8,000, his main army, north of the Mod-
der at Koodoos Rand Drift; 6,000 at Stormberg, and 10,000
from Colesberg, at this time near Koffeyfontein, marching
against Roberts' right flank. About 6,000 had retired to the
north and northeast.
Cronje reached Driput on the 16th, halted to rest, and
continued his retreat in the night along the north bank of
the Modder to Wolvekraal Drift. He was followed by
Knox's brigade, which, joining Stephenson's on the 17th at
Klipkraal Drift, continued its advance thence along the
south bank, towards Paardeberg Drift.
Battle of Paardeberg.
Cronje halted at Wolvekraal Drift (half-way between
Paardeberg Drift and Koodoos Rand Drift), intending to
cross there on the morning of the 18th. On the north side
he was already cut off, as Broadwood's brigade and a horse
battery (from Kimberley) had reached Koodoos Rand Drift
on the evening of the 17th and occupied the heights there,
and French with his other two brigades struck Cronje's
wagon park at noon near Kameelfontein (north of Wolve-
kraal Drift).
Lord Kitchener, with the 6th division, accidentally
TEE SECOND BOER WAR. 109
passed Paardeberg Drift, and so reached the point (on the
south bank) just opposite Cronje's camp (on the north
bank). The 9th division (over Weydrai) reached Paardeberg
Drift in the night of the 17th, Smith-Dorrien's brigade cross-
ing there to the north bank, while Macdonald's joined the
6th division on the south bank.
The British attacked from the south bank on the 18th,
but could not take the Boer positions along the river bank,
which had been, intrenched during the night. On the 19th
the 7th division and the naval brigade arrived. Lord Rob-
erts decided to prepare for any further attacks by artillery
fire, and located his artillery, consisting of about 50 guns,
to shell the Boer laager, posting three field batteries and
two naval 12-pounders south of the Modder at 2,000 yards
from the laager; 1 howitzer battery and 8 4.7-inch naval
guns on the north bank, enfilading the river-bed, in which
was the laager, at 1,000 yards range. A concentric fire was
thus brought to bear on Cronje's camp, which was kept up
for several days, the infantry gradually drawing up closer
by trenches thrown up at night.
The balloons did good service in locating vulnerable
points not visible to the gunners. On the 24th they located
the Boer caissons, which were promptly blown up by the
artillery.
Several attempts were made by commandoes of Boers
(under Botha and others from Natal) to break through the
British lines, and reinforce Cronje, but they were all re-
pelled with heavy loss. French's cavalry division was
intrusted with the duty of warding off these attempts, and
took position on both banks, facing east, supported by a
part of the 7th division.
Cronje lost about one-fourth of his command during his
week of heroic resistance. On the 26th he made a desperate
effort to break through, but was repulsed, and on the morn-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. Ill
ing of the 27th (the anniversary of Majuba Hill, where
Oonje defeated the British) he surrendered.
The forces which capitulated amounted to 4,100 men,
with 4 Krupp guns, 2 Maxim guns and 9 1-pounders. Among
the officers who surrendered, besides Cronje and his bril-
liant chief of artillery, Major Albrecht, there were 10 com
mandants and 18 cornets.
The fruits of the victory were rapidly reaped in other
quarters. Barkly West on the Vaal was occupied by a
force detached from Methuen's command at Kimberley, and
the country around Kimberley was gradually taken under
British control again. Colonel Plumer received reinforce-
ments from Rhodesia, to enable him to attack the Boer posi-
tion at Crocodile Pools.
General Roberts moved his headquarters to Osfontein,
his main army facing eastward, on both banks of the Mod-
der River, while his cavalry under French scouted towards
Bloemfontein. The main Boer position was between Abra-
hams Kraal and Aasvogel Kop, behind the Kaal Spruit.
General Joubert came with the reinforcements from Natal
and had the supreme command. The advanced Boer line
was held by Lukas Meyer, extending over Petrusburg, Bosch-
kop and Wolvespruit.
THE SOUTHERN THEATRE OF WAR.
The effect of Cronje's surrender made itself felt at once
in the other theatres of operations, in spite of the great dis-
tances separating them. The central position of the Boers
gave them the advantage of interior lines, and enabled them
to transfer quickly troops from one part of the general the-
atre to another, where they were most needed at the time;
but the strategic advance of the Boers was too extended
for the forces at their disposal, and they tried to cover too
112 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
great an extent of country; consequently, when the British
gained the superiority in numbers, they could no longer
weaken any part to reinforce another temporarily, because
the distances were so great that they could not hope to
bring such troops back in time to meet a British advance
at the depleted point.
About the time that Roberts began his advance, the
Boers under Delarey, in the southern theatre, gained some
marked successes, forcing the British first from Colesberg
and then from Rensburg back to Arundel. But just as they
were ready to threaten Roberts' line of communications,
reinforcements had to be sent to Cronje: De Wet from
Colesberg, and others from Dordrecht, Molteno and Naauw-
poort. His entire force was about 10,000 strong, and after
leaving 2,000 at Arundel, he sent the rest to threaten Rob-
erts' right flank, and, if possible, reinforce Cronje.
On the 18th of February General Brabant entered Dor-
drecht, and the British forces advanced to the line Barkly
East Jamestown Colesberg. Lord Kitchener, after Cron-
je's surrender, come in person to this portion of the theatre
to direct the advance.
On February 27th General Clements reoccupied Rens-
burg and Colesberg, and on the 28th Colesberg Junction, the
enemy retreating on Norvals Pont.
On the 22d and 23d Gatacre reconnoitered towards
Stormberg and had a severe skirmish there.
THE SITUATION IN NATAL.
The Fourth Attempt to Relieve Lady smith.
In order to prevent the Boers in Natal from sending
reinforcements of the western theatre, and if possible to-
relieve Ladysmith, Buller began a new offensive movement
on the 17th of Februarv. This time his attack was directed
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 1 ] 3
on the Hlangwane Berg, east of Colenso, in order to gain
possession of the nearer bank before attempting to cross
the Tugela. As early as the 12th of February he had made
a reconnoissance of Hussar Hill, 6 miles northeast of Chieve-
ley, and finding the Boer lines marked by Colenso, Hlang-
wane Hill, Green Hill, Monte Christo and Cingolo, he deter-
mined to turn the left flank of this position; on the 14th he
had directed his troops on Hussar Hill, the irregular cav-
alry supported by two infantry battalions covering the left
flank, Dundonald's cavalry covering the front of advance.
The latter had taken Hussar Hill after a slight skirmish at
8 a. m. on the 14th, and by night the British troops were
intrenched in the position. The 15th was devoted to artil-
lery fire on the enemy's line.
On the 16th the real advance began. The 2d division
(Lyttleton, who had replaced Clery, the latter being ill) and
Wynne's brigade were to march eastward and make a grand
turn to the left, while Dundonald's cavalry brigade, cross-
ing the Blaauwkrass River, was to pass farther to the east-
ward and scale the hill of Cingolo ; Barton's brigade was to
remain with the artillery, and the latter (66 pieces) was to
prepare the advance by firing on Green Hill, where the
Boers had a heavy gun and two light ones. Hart's brigade
was to guard the railroad.
Cingolo was occupied by a Boer outpost only, and was
quickly taken by Hildyard's brigade. It became evident in
this attack that the Boers were still in force here; conse-
quently, on the 17th, three brigades were ordered to attack
the heights: Barton's on the left, to demonstrate; Hildyard's
on the right, to make the principal attack; the 4th brigade
(Norcott's) in reserve on its left rear; Dundonald covering
the right. The ascent was very difficult. The troops biv-
ouacked on the ground gained. On the 18th the attack was
resumed. The artillery opened at 8 a. m., and Hildyard's
-8-
114
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
SEARCH-LIGHT FROM H.' M. S. TERRIBLE.
brigade (with Xorcott's on its left) advanced against Monte
Christo, which was taken by 11 a. m. The Boers, being
taken in flank, were compelled to evacuate Green Hill and
Hlangwane Berg, which were occupied by Barton's brigade,
the artillery moving up.
Buller's troops gradually forced the Boers back, and on
the 20th the latter evacuated the south bank of the Tugela,
and a battalion of Hart's brigade (from Chieveley) occupied
Colenso. where they found the bridge destroyed.
Tlie Battle of Pieters Hill
On the 21st of February Buller threw a ponton bridge
over, below Colenso. The British troops crossed the Tugela
and attacked Grobelaars Kloof on the 21st of February, but
without much success. The British artillery, posted on
Green Hill and the Hlangwane Berg, supported the advance.
1 16 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The mounted infantry occupied the hills north of Colenso,
and at noon the 5th division crossed the ponton bridge, fol-
lowed by Hart's brigade, while a battalion of the 10th brig-
ade (Coke's) advanced against Grobelaar's Kloof. The Boers,
however, forced back the attack. On the 22d the struggle
was renewed. This time the attack was directed on Pieters
Hill, but again without success. The whole of Buller's army
was now over the Tugela near Fort Wylie, the Boer position
in a semicircle before it. On the 23d another effort was
made to take Pieters Hill, but this also failed. Buller in-
trenched his infantry, and on the 24th moved with his artil-
lery back over the Tugela, followed by the infantry; he de-
stroyed this ponton bridge, and in the night threw another
ponton bridge over the Tugela nearer Pieters Station at the
mouth of the Langverwacht Spruit. On the morning of the
27th, Barton's brigade crossed the bridge and stormed Pieters
Hill. Meanwhile, Warren (with the 4th and llth brigades) at-
tacked the western heights, and Dundonald, with four squad-
rons of cavalry, moved on to Ladysmith, which he entered on
the 28th, thus relieving this city after 120 days' investment.
The Boers retired from their positions in the vicinity of
the town towards the mountain passes, and Buller moved on
Nelthorpe on the 28th. The Boer forces had been greatly
weakened by reinforcements sent to the western theatre.
Buller's losses between February 16th and 27th amount-
ed to 1,859: 252 killed, 1,512 wounded and 95 missing.
The total casualties in Ladysmith during its investment
were 24 officers and 235 men killed, 70 officers, 520 men
wounded, 6 officers and 340 men died of disease.
On February 27th Hart was placed in command )f the
2d Division, Clery having been injured; Colonel Kitchener
(a brother to Lord Kitchener) received the llth brigade,
Wynne having been wounded; and Colonel Norcott the 5th
brigade in place of Hart, promoted.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 117
Buller moved his troops up to Nelthorpe on the 28th of
February.
Comments.
In this campaign the great principles of strategy and
tactics appeared in some cases to be violated at the outset,
but closer inspection and further developments invariably
showed the fallacy of such a conclusion. One of these great
principles is the old-established maxim that, in spite of all the
boasted defensive power of modern intrenchments and the
immensely increased effect of modern fire-arms, only the
offensive (strategical and tactical) can lead to decisive results.
With the British the spirit of the strategical and tac-
tical offensive was innate, and the 'reason it did not make
itself felt in the earlier stages of the campaign was due to
several causes. In the first place, their entire system, both
as regards organization and practical field training, was some-
what imperfect. Their field maneuvers were inadequate to
teach practically either the proper tactical employment of the
separate arms, or that of the three arms combined, to impart
a knowledge of correct estimation of their own or the enemy's
fire-effect, or to impress the troop leaders with the necessity
for flank attacks in proper form in modern battle tactics.
This accounts for the fact that the offensive of the Brit-
ish was strategically unsound, in that the forces were too much
subdivided, too greatly scattered, and not applied with the
best effect; and in that the enemy was greatly underrated
and the general situation very imperfectly known. More-
over, tactically the execution was poor, in spite of great brav-
ery on the part of the officers and men, on account of anti-
quated battle formations and tactics.
The service of reconnoissance and the mobility of the
troops were no doubt affected by the climate and the terrain,,
and the difficulties of the former were greatly increased by
118 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
the character of the ground, the lack of good maps, the use
of smokeless powder and the manner of fighting of the Boers,
and these causes also interfered with the best use of the artil-
lery; nevertheless, as will appear later, the well-planned and
prepared offensive advance (that of General Roberts), exe-
cuted with rapidity and energy, promptly compelled the
Boers to give up their fastness at Magersfontein, so that it
was evidently previous mistakes in strategy and tactics that
caused the failure of so many efforts, not the climate or the
terrain, much as they may have increased the difficulties.
The Boers, on the other hand, in spite of their original
offensive advance with its brilliant results, do not really pos-
sess the spirit of the offensive strategically, and are not capa-
ble of executing the offensive tactically, as shown by the sub-
sequent events. On a small scale there were, on the part of
the Boers, occasional offensive attacks and pursuits, as in
some of the actions in Cape Colony, but never with large bod-
ies of troops. For cohesive attack they lack the necessary
leaders, training, discipline and tactical organization, and for
energetic and prompt pursuit they lack cavalry, for al-
though every Boer is mounted, he is not in a true sense a
cavalryman.
The Defensive and the Offensive.
At first sight it would appear that the plainest lesson
taught by the Boer war is the apparent impossibility of at-
tacking successfully in front a fortified position in other
w r ords, the impossibility of so silencing even a weak artillery
on the defensive, and so demoralizing a good infantry line
on the defensive, as to enable the attacking infantry, with-
out too great loss, to move to the attack over open ground.
Both at Magersfontein and af Colenso the English artil-
lery was superior to that of the Boers, and especially was
this the case in the later actions on the upper Tugela and
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 119
oil the Vaal Kranz. In all these cases the British artillery
could not dominate that of the Boers, and in the first two
actions referred to the British greatly overrated the effect
of their artillery. At the last mentioned action the infantry
advance was indeed prevented by the Boer artillery alone.
Many authorities conclude, therefore, that our ideas on
this point of tactics must be modified accordingly. It is at
present stated in all tactics that the first duty of the attack-
ing army is to silence by means of its artillery that of the
enemy; then to concentrate its artillery fire on the enemy 's.
infantry at the point of principal attack. But fiom the above
it appears that the artillery of the defense may withdraw tem-
porarily (be apparently silenced) and then turn up in full
power at the moment of the decisive infantry attack. But
these conclusions must not be arrived at hastily. There are
many considerations that must first be settled before we can
determine whether the English artillery actually followed
modern tactics in its employment of this arm. It appears,
on the contrary, that the batteries were brought into action
separately, and seldom really attained concerted fire-action
on the decisive point of attack ; moreover, they had at first no
pieces for curved fire (recognized everywhere as essential
nowadays in the attack on intrenchments) ; and finally, the
difficulties of the ground were such as to exclude anything ap-
proaching ideal action as a general rule. Consequently, it is
better to wait till more complete data are available, before
laying too great stress on the power and advantages of the
defensive.
In fact, if there is one lesson that does stand out promi-
nently and definitely, throughout the Boer war, it is the ne-
cessity for adopting the offensive in order to secure decisive
results. In other words, the exact opposite of the conclusion
above suggested, which would give the preference to the
defensive.
120 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The indecisive results even of the Boer victories can only
be attributed to their lack of offensive power, either in attack-
ing the British in intrenched positions (as at Ladysmith), or,
after defeating the British attack (as at Dundee, Colenso
and Magersfontein), in taking up a proper offensive counter-
attack, thereby making their victory complete. An active
and energetic offensive at Ladysmith and on the Tugela
would have led to results very different from the passive de-
fensive actually adopted, and the Boers could have met the
advance of Roberts with very different forces from those
which they were actually enabled to assemble. Moreover, a
more energetic offensive south of the Orange River would
have made it possible to penetrate farther into the British do-
main, and would have afforded a better chance of encouraging
the Dutch inhabitants to rise and join their Boer countrymen.
The old principle of strategy, therefore, still holds true;
viz.: that the best mode of action for decisive results is the
strategical and tactical offensive. The resorting to mere
frontal attacks and the remaining on the tactical defensive
and indulging in mere position actions are signs of mediocre
ability. If the enemy adopts the tactical defensive, the ad-
vantages of his mode of action must be overcome by proper
strategic deployment and advance and by increased mobility,
to force him from his positions, to obtain the superiority in
numbers, not at all points of the line, but at the decisive
points, and to keep him moving, thus preventing him from
occupying continually strong positions. All this requires
a well-trained cavalry for reconnoissance, an artillery with
proper material as well as one trained in the correct tactical
employment of this arm 'and in hitting, and, finally, an in-
fantry instructed to shoot accurately and move rapidly.
Railways.
One of the characteristic features of modern warfare is
the part played by railroads. The power of effecting rapid
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 121
concentration which they confer causes their direction and
location to determine the lines of advance of the main armies,
and their points of crossing or branching fix the strategical
points in the theatre of war where the great battles must be
fought. The side that possesses or commands the main lines
at the opening of a campaign has an immense advantage,
and this advantage in the present war was with the Boers.
Pretoria, the Transvaal capital, has radiating from it
three main lines : one to Lorenzo-Marques, one to Durban, and
one to Port Elizabeth; the latter with a branch from north of
the Orange River to East London; a fourth main line runs
west of the two Republics from Buluwayo to Cape Town.
There are also two minor lines, one from Pretoria northward
to Pietersburg, and one from Johannesburg southwestward
to Klerksdorp.
The Boers, of course, made full use of these lines fn
their strategic deployment on the border, and in their subse-
quent advance, but the original disposition of their troops
resulted mainly from the British forces at Dundee, Lady-
smith, Mafeking and Kimberley; hence they concentrated
the bulk of their armies on the Natal and the western frontier,
neglecting the important points on the Orange River border.
Had the British been able to conduct their campaign on pure-
ly military principles, untrammeled by political reasons for
relieving these isolated points (Ladysmith, Kimberley and
Mafeking), this neglect might have been at once fatal to the
Boer strategy, for the military plan was, it is stated, to ad-
vance from the south directly on Bloemfontein and Pretoria
over the Orange River.
The holding on to the isolated points above mentioned,
had the same crippling effect on the Boers, therefore, that it
had on the British movements, for it prevented the former
also from carrying out their original plan of invading Cape
Colony, concentrating in Natal at Pietermaritzburg, and
122 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
forcing the point of main attack in the West far south of
Kimberley. Had they carried out this plan, the problem
for the British would have been a far more difficult one.
The Strategy of Butter's Campaign.
General Buller's plan to turn the Boer right flank over
the upper Tugela is based on a correct strategical principle,
but its success must depend on the forces available, for this
was not a mere tactical meneuver, but a strategic operation
on a large scale, involving an extension of the British base
from Frere over Springfield to Trichards Drift, about 20
miles, before the actual turning maneuver can begin.
The Boer position was, moreover, naturally very strong
and was occupied in force. Ultimate success in the turning
movement depended on the rapidity of its execution, and this,
ia the face of all the difficulties of the situation, was practi-
cally impossible.
However, the left flank was the critical point of the
British line, and there, north of Trichards was Buller's place,
and not at Spearman's camp. The tactical value of that part
of the Spion Kop which was the object of the attack was
greatly overrated, on account of imperfect reconnoissance and
poor maps, and, had Buller been originally with Warren's
force, he probably would not have permitted the assault on
this point.
The Boers, x after Warren's failure, again neglected a
splendid opportunity to reap the rewards of success in not
pursuing. Even admitting that they were economizing their
men, it is plain that an energetic pursuit might have almost
annihilated Warren's command, in which case the Boers
would have been spared the battles of the 5th and 7th of
February, which also involved considerable losses to them.
As it was, Buller's plan failed, but his strength was not bro-
ken, and he immediately proceeded to make and execute
other plans for breaking through the Boer lines.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 123
The Tactics of Butter's Campaign.
General Buller's third attempt to relieve Ladysmith
was justified by the circumstances, for it promised success,
and even if it failed, it held a certain number of Boers in
Natal, and therefore away from Roberts' front. Nevertheless,
there are several points in the plan and its execution which
are subject to criticism.
Once more imperfect reconnoissance led to overrating
the tactical value of the Vaal Kranz, and consequently it was
not known until after it was taken that it could not be held.
The two key points to the Boer position on the upper
Tugela were the Bpion Kop and the Doom Kloof, and yet in
the two separate attacks on these points Buller did not put
in all his available forces, nor did he act with the requisite
energy in pushing the attack. In both cases the Boers were
at first surprised, but the inadequacy of the forces employed
prevented a rapid advance and gave them time to reorganize
their lines, and repel the attack.
Buller's attack, moreover, does not appear to have been
supported in the least by any demonstration on the part of
Barton in front of Colenso.
This appears to have been the fault with all of Buller's
battles. When he attacked the key point of a position he
made no general attack along the entire line to prevent the
enemy from reinforcing the threatened point in fact, he al-
lowed them every opportunity to do so at their leisure Spion
Kop, at the Vaal Kranz, at Pieters Hill. An energetic at-
tack along the entire line would have prevented that con-
stant shifting of forces by the Boers which enabled them to
make such good use of their small force and their interior
lines.
The Boers took no measures to reap the rewards of their
victory. They neither pursued Buller's army over the Tugela.
124 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
nor made any effort to defeat Barton and so cut off Buller's
line of retreat.
The Strategy and Tactics of Roberts' Campaign.
General Roberts could have divided the reinforcements
he received in the 6th and 7th divisions, but it would have
been another case of splitting up the forces, so he decided to
add them all to the left column.
The new troops amounted to 30,000 men and 9 batteries.
Had one division only been added to Lord Methuen's army,
he w r ould have had 25,600 men and 78 guns; and had the
other division been assigned to French's command, and Gat-
acre's also added, this column would have had 24,000 men
and 60 guns; Brabant's division would have been available
to reinforce either column. The total of the British field
forces in this theatre would have been about 60,000 men and
138 guns.
The Boers had about 20,000 at Magersfontein, 15,000 at
Oolesberg, and 6,000 at Stormberg, or a total of 41,000.
Evidently, Roberts could have advanced on both lines,
but by combining all his reinforcements on one the results
were more decisive and also more rapid.
General Buller on the Tugela was compelled to inaction.
It was very difficult for Roberts to leave this army of 30,000
men and 78 guns inactive, but had Ladysmith fallen, the be-
siegers, 20,000 in number, would have been at once available
in other theatres and the British would have lost the chance
of having the garrison of 8,000 added to their ranks in case of
a successful sortie. Therefore, there was nothing else to do
but let Buller detain as many of the enemy as possible in his
front.
The results of Lord Roberts' victory stand out in marked
contrast with the early successes of the Boers on the Modder,
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 125
at Colenso and at Stormberg: whereas the latter were iso-
lated successes, with no decisive effect on the general situa-
tion, the former entailed the retreat of the Boers along their
entire line of defense as far east as Natal. The cause is not
far to seek, and illustrates on the one hand the weakness of
the purely defensive, and on the other the power of the strate-
gical and tactic offensive combined with a definite plan of
action.
The Strategy and Tactics of the Boers.
The strategic deployment of the Boers and their advance
over such widely separated lines (Natal, Cape Colony and the
West) was in accordance with sound principles of strat-
egy. The advance into Natal \vas demanded because of the
presence there of the main British force and the short-
ness of their line of communications; that into Cape Colony
and the West was necessitated by the immense importance
of gaining possession of the railroad net-work, which was so
essential for the rapid advance of the British, and also the
desire to gain reinforcements from the Afrikander population
in these districts. Nevertheless, the three lines should have
been treated differently in- a tactical sense, for, while a tac-
tical, as well as strategical, offensive was quite in place in
Natal, the southern and western theatres warranted (and in
view of the limited Boer force, commanded) the tactical
defensive, provided the strategic measures were sufficient.
But the latter was hardly the case, for the Boer efforts
against the line De Aar Kimberley were not on a scale
corresponding to its vast importance to the British. In the
early stages of the campaign this line was occupied by such
weak British forces that it would have been very easy to
have destroyed considerable stretches of it; moreover, even in
the later stages there were many points vulnerable to such
attacks. An effective destruction of this road, requiring con-
126 T HE SECOND BOER WAR.
siderable time to repair, might have fatally delayed Roberts'
advance, or caused him to alter his plan. In addition, con-
stant attempts to interfere with this all-important line would
have revealed to the Boers the plan of the British, and prob-
ably prevented Cronje's surprise.
However, the fact that in general the tactical defensive
was the proper role for the Boer troops in the West, should
not have prevented them from taking up the tactical offensive
after the defeats of Lord Methuen on the Modder River.
Such an offensive after the battle of Magersfontein, when
Lord Methuen still had the river in his rear, promised deci-
sive results, and his further defeat would have prevented
Lord Roberts from assembling his army in Cronje's imme-
diate front, and would consequently have prevented him",
from surprising Oronje by his flank movement.
The great weakness of the Boers, however, was the lack
of the tactical offensive in Natal, where it was more partic-
ularly in place. This lack of the tactical offensive neutral-
ized all the advantages of their strategical offensive advance,
and enabled the British to transfer the decisive theatre to the
West. Had the Boers followed up their strategic deployment
and advance in Natal with an energetic tactical offensive, the
British would have been forced to accept Natal as the decisive
theatre, and all the advantage of topography and situation
of the troops would have been with the Boers ; or, in case the
Boers won a decisive victory there, sufficient Boer forces
might have been liberated to turn the tide in the West.
This tendency of the Boers to avoid the tactical offensive
is apparent even in the selection of their defensive positions,
which rarely admit of easy advance toward the front, and is
further emphasized by their neglect of proper pursuit after
victory.
The offensive requires a far higher capacity in the troop
leaders than the defensive, and the Boer commanders were
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 127
evidently not sufficiently trained in the art of war to meet
these requirements. The defensive may be the stronger
form, but the offensive is, nevertheless, the most effective.
So long as the Boer defensive remained intact at all points
of their line it succeeded, but the moment the British offens-
ive broke that line at a single point the entire line was
broken.
The Artillery Tactics of tlie Boers.
It is a principle, definitely established long before, but
especially emphasized by the experiences of the Franco-
Prussian war, that artillery fire, to be effective, must be
concentrated.
The Boers seem at first sight to have upset this principle.
They were able to select their ground, conceal their guns,
and prepare their positions, and this, combined with the use
of smokeless powder, which assisted the concealment, and
the longer range of their guns, gave them such an advantage
that military men began to think that isolated guns in well-
concealed positions were better than masses of artillery,
But, in reality, the old principle is still true, and it is only a
question of modifying the application. The Boers, although
adepts in hiding their artillery, never succeeded in concen-
trating its fire, and this is one of the secrets of their want of
success.
128 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
IV.
The third act iu the drama has closed, the decisive bat-
tle of the war has been fought, but there are still many ele-
ments of strife to be subdued, and finally the contending
elements must be harmonized to restore peace and quiet
permanently.
The third act closed with the defeat of Cronje, the
advance of the British into the Orange Free State from the
west, the relief of Kimberley, the retreat of the Boers from
Cape Colony and in Natal, and the relief of Ladysmith.
The weakening of the Boer forces in Natal was very
poor policy, for it failed to help Cronje on the one hand f
and left the road to Ladysmith open on the other ; moreover,
it indicates a weakness in the leadership of the troops, for
the proper course was undoubtedly to fall upon General Bui-
ler with all available forces, and to strike a blow there to
counteract the disastrous events in the West. This separa-
tion of the forces was a serious mistake in strategy, but may
have been called forth by the fact that the coalition between
the Transvaal and Orange Free State was none too strong,
and the discipline of the Boers comparatively weak, so that
the Orange Boers preferred to protect their own land rather
than help the Transvaal Boers to finish the campaign for
both.
The forces at the opening of the fourth act (about the
beginning of March) were distributed as follows:
In the Western Theatre.
Lord Roberts, after Cronje's capitulation, took up a
position fronting to the east, on both sides of the Modder
River, his headquarters at Osfontein (about 5 miles east of
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 129
Paardeberg), the 6th division (Kelly-Kenny) on the right
holding all kopjes to a distance 5 miles south of the Mod-
der, the 7th division (Tucker) at the center close to the
river, the 9th division (Colville) on the north bank, the cav-
alry (French) on the extreme left, and the mounted infant-
ry (Colonel Kidley-Martyr) on the right. The troops were
given a rest of several days, with a view to supplying them
with full rations once more, reestablishing the communica-
tions and preparing for the advance on Bloemfontein.
The reconnoissance of the cavalry had developed the
fact that the Boers were intrenching themselves on a series
of kopjes about 8 miles east of Roberts' position, their posi-
tion extending several miles north and south of the Modder.
These troops were under the command of Delarey and De
Wet, and numbered about 14,000. Other Boer columns
were reported coming from the northwest of Kimberley
and from the southeast towards Petrusburg.
Lord Methuen, from Kimberley, had occupied Boshof
on the road to Bloemfontein, and had sent a column to re-
lieve Mafeking.
In the Southern Theatre.
In Cape Colony the Boers (8,000) retreated towards the
Orange River, followed by the columns of Generals Bra-
bant, Gatacre and Clements. The forces confronting Rob-
erts were partly these troops from the south. West of the
De Aar Hopetown line and in Griqualand West a serious
uprising of the inhabitants took place, but Lord Kitchener,
who was in charge of the lines of communication, with head-
quarters at De Aar, readily suppressed it.
In the Eastern Theatre.
In Natal, General Buller rested and reorganized his
troops in Ladysmith camp, assembling a large force near
9-
130 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Helpmakaar with a view to resuming the offensive at an
early date, as soon as White's division would be ready for
service again. The Boers under Joubert (20,000) occupied a
position on the Biggarsberg, north of Ladysmith, their left
near Dundee, with detachments in the passes of the Drakens-
berg as far south as Bezuidenhout Pass. This was still
the main Boer army.
Such w r as the general situation at the opening of the
fourth act. The country between Osfontein and Bloemfon-
tein is not especially favorable for the Boer tactics, but
their purpose probably was to delay Roberts as much as
possible along this route, thus giving time for the main
army to reorganize and establish itself on more favorable
ground north of Bloemfontein, where the country is more
hilly and broken, the crests often rising to a height of 8,000
feet above the sea.
For the British the campaign thus far had been a very
severe one, especially on the horses of the cavalry, and some
time was needed for their recuperation; moreover, the sup-
plies had been short, owing to the loss of a considerable
part of their train as well as the natural consequences of
such strenuous efforts as the army recently made in the way
of marching and fighting, and time was required to bring
the supply of food and forage to the normal state again.
The country was very poor in water and the army was
therefore tied to the vicinity of the river.
The natural consequence of the British invasion of the
Orange Free State was that many of the burghers left the
Army to defend their own houses, and thus the Boer Army
was greatly reduced in a comparatively short time, and the
resistance to Roberts' advance was gradually weakened.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 131
GENERAL ROBERTS' CAMPAIGN.
Battle of Poplar Grove.
On March 7th General Roberts continued his advance.
French's division, composed of 3 brigades of cavalry, 2 of
mounted infantry and 7 batteries, started at 1 a, m. in a
southeasterly direction, followed by Kelly-Kenny's division,
and at daybreak struck the left of the Boer lines, posted on
a group of seven hills, near Poplar Grove. French attempted
to turn the left flank of the Boers by means of Porter's bri-
gade and several guns. The British guns soon silenced
those of the Boers, and Porter continued his advance, but
came upon a second Boer position, farther to the rear, from
which he received heavy musketry fire. He sent cavalry
and mounted infantry against this position, but ne had the
enemy on two sides of him and so found himself in a diffi-
cult situation. However, the howitzers and guns of Kelly-
Kenny's division came into play soon after this and forced
the enemy in the advanced position to retire from the* hills
in a northerly direction, thus freeing Porter.
The artillery of Kelly-Kenny advanced and attacked
the second or actual Boer position, while the cavalry worked
on the flanks. The Boers were gradually driven back, and,
finally, when the cavalry threatened their line of retreat,
they fled in confusion towards the north and east, pursued
by the cavalry.
The British lost 1 officer killed and 4 wounded, 3 men
killed, 46 wounded and 1 missing.
The British horse artillery did excellent service, and the
fighting was practically confined to the cavalry, which was
very nearly exhausted. The British captured 1 gun and
great quantities of forage, stores, tentage, etc.
Roberts moved his headquarters to Poplar Grove.
The infantry on the north of the Modder River crossed
132
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
to the south at Poplar Drift (opposite Poplar Grove), and
General Roberts' further advance was continued along the
south bank. The 7th division (Tucker) on the right, moving
on the Petrusburg, road towards Aasvogel Kop; the left of
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 133
the Boer position covering Bloeinfontein. The 6th division
(Kelly-Kenny) in the center, over the open country. The
cavalry division (French) on the left, close to the river, fol-
lowed by the rest of the troops.
The Battle of Driefontein.
On the morning of March 10th Broadwood's brigade of
French's division came in contact with the Boers at Drie-
fontein, 8 miles south of Abrahams Kraal, and drove their
outposts back, attempting then to outflank the position.
The Boers kept up a heavy artillery fire. About 1 p. m.
Kelly-Kenny's division arrived before the center and left
of the Boers, and then Broadwood took his brigade to his
left, made a wide detour and came upon the rear of the
enemy before nightfall. Meanwhile, Kelly-Kenny's division
attacked at the center and worked around the enemy's right
flank. By 2 p. m. the horse batteries cleared the way for
the infantry, which advanced to the attack. Finally, they
stormed the kopjes at the charge, and took the heights at
the point of the bayonet, but not until after a hard fight,
lasting six hours.
The Boers were commanded by Delarey, and were
mainly those from Colesberg. They had no time to intrench,
although the heights afforded good natural positions, and
scattered rocks gave some shelter.
The British lost 7 officers killed and 16 wounded, 66 men
killed and 313 wounded. The Boers left 173 dead on the
field and 20 prisoners.
The strength of the British forces was about 45,000;
that of the Boers about 12,000.
Lord Roberts reported to the Presidents of the two Re-
publics that their troops had abused the privilege of the white
flag, and of the signal of holding up the hands in token of
surrender; and also that he had captured large quantities
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
of explosive bullets, which are being used by the Boers.
Lord Koberts reported to the War Office that the wounds,
as a rule, are more serious than usual, ow r ing to expanding
bullets having been freely used by the Boers.
The Occupation of Bloemfontein.
After the battle Brief ontein, Lord Roberts, instead of
following the retreating Boers, turned to the southeast,
along the Kaal Spruit, in the direction of Bloemfontein, the
capital of the Orange Free State. On the llth he reached
Aasvogel Kop, and on the 12th Venters Vallei, 18 miles
southwest of the capital, and about 10 miles west of the
railroad. The cavalry division was ordered to push on and
seize the railroad station and its rolling material. French
struck the railroad six miles below Bloemfontein in the
morning, and by evening succeeded in taking two hills close
to the station, which commanded the town. On the morn-
ing of the 13th, the 3d cavalry brigade and mounted infantry
from the 7th division were sent to support French, and the
town was called upon to surrender, on pain of being bom-
barded; the white flag was raised at noon, and a few hours
afterwards Lord Roberts entered and took possession.
The President, Mr. Steyn, and the officials fled to
Kroonstad, which was proclaimed as the new capital.
The British captured 8 locomotives and much rolling
stock.
Lord Roberts set to work at once to reestablish the
government of the district south of the Modder River. Gen-
eral Pretyman was designated as military governor. The
civil affairs were turned over to Mr. Fraser, a member of
the former government, but a friend of the English. Many
of the former officials who remained were retained, and the
burghers were allowed to retire peaceably to their homes.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 135
on condition that they would not take up arms again in the
present struggle.
The result of this tolerance was that the Boer line on
the Orange River broke down at once. Of course, the fact
that Lord Roberts had penetrated to the rear of this line had
its natural effect, but its immediate collapse was due to the
fact that many of the burghers preferred to accept Lord
Roberts' conditions.
The moral effect of the occupation of Bloemfontein was
of course very great, not only on the Boers of the Orange
Free State as well as the Transvaal, but also on the native
uprisings in western and northern Cape Colony; but the
strategic effect was far greater, as it gave the British con-
trol of the important nay, indispensable railroad line
from Colesberg to Bloemfontein, a line not only necessary
to supply the army in its present position, but absolutely
required for any further advance northward. Besides,
Bloemfontein, with its natural advantages and its gener-
ous water supply, formed an excellent base of supply for
the subsequent movements of the army.
Lord Roberts had another problem to solve before he
could advance; viz.: to transfer his base at Modder River
Station and his overland line of communications to the rail-
road. The Boers had destroyed the bridge at Norvals Pont,
but as the British had previously prepared the necessary
parts for repairing it and held them all ready to ship to that
point, this work would not require over two weeks. Mean-
while, 2,000 Kaffirs had been ordered there to effect the
transportation of supplies and material over the Orange
River.
The security of the lines of communications was left to
Lord Kitchener, a master in that art. Lord Roberts also rec-
ognized the danger of the uprising in the Southwest, and on
March 19th sent Lord Kitchener to the Prieska and Carnar-
136 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
von districts to suppress it. General Settle was sent to
Prieska (85 miles west of Hopetown, on the Orange River)
with a force of mounted infantry, and Sir Parsons to Van
Wyks Vlei (215 miles west of Colesberg).
Another care of General Roberts was to insure his
junction with Generals Brabant, Gatacre and Clements,
coming ifp from Cape Colony, to facilitate which he sent
General Pole-Carew with a brigade by rail to Springfontein,
the junction of the railroads from Norvals Pont and from
Bethulie, where the advancing British troops could be sup
ported against any Boer resistance on the Orange Kiver by
threatening the rear of the enemy.
The troops were greatly in need of rest and reorganiza-
tion, especially the arm in which the British Army excelled,
and which had increased in importance as the army ad-
vanced viz., the cavalry; moreover, the supply trains, on
account of the great loss of pack animals en route from Mod-
der River Station, were not in condition for any farther
advance, and so, for all these reasons, it became imperative
to give the troops a long rest, in spite of the fact that such
a delay would also afford the Boers time to gather their
forces at some advantageous point and prepare a strong
defensive position. The raid to Kimberley broke down
nearly 20 per cent of the British horses, and over 1,700
horses were disabled. On the w r ay from Kimberley to
Bloemfontein, over the hot plain, a large number were foun-
dered or died, so that in all the cavalry was short about
10,000 horses, and remounts had to be awaited.
EVENTS IN THE SOUTHERN THEATRE.
At the beginning of March Generals Brabant, Gatacre
and Clements, meeting with no resistance in their front,
began to advance from Jamestown, Molteno and Colesberg
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 137
behind the retiring Boers. They moved slowly in order to
take on the way the measures necessary for quieting the
inhabitants of the districts through which they passed.
General Brabant moved from Dordrecht on the 3d, with
about 1,800 men, on the 4th took possession of the Boer
position at Labuschagnes Nek, about 6 miles north of Dor-
drecht. On the 5th he attacked the Boers north of this posi-
tion, and, after an all-day fight, defeated them. The British
lost about 30 killed and wounded, and captured wagons,
rifles and cattle in large quantities.
General Gatacre reoccupied Stormberg on the 5th of
March, and thus came in railway communication with Gen-
eral Clements at Colesberg; on the 7th he occupied Bur-
ghersdorp, while Brabant reached Jamestown, and Clements
advanced to Norvals Pont, on the south bank of the Orange
River. At the last-mentioned place the enemy, after retir-
ing over the river on the 6th, blew up the bridge.
On March 12th, Brabant was at Aliwal North, Gatacre
at Bethulie bridge and Clements at Norvals Pont. When
Gatacre reached the Orange Eiver, the railway bridge had
been destroyed, and the enemy were preparing to demolish
the road bridge, but were driven off before they could accom-
plish their purpose. On the 15th he occupied Bethulie. Pa-
trols of Clements' force effected a juncture with Gatacr^'s
troops near Burghersdorp, and a patrol from Bethulie
bridge effected a union with Brabant's column.
On March 4th, on which day Brabant defeated the rear
guard of the Boer column from Dordrecht at Aliwal North,
the three columns were practically in touch with one an-
other. It appears that the Boers in their retreat had become
demoralized, failed to take proper measures to insure the
service of security and information, and were consequently
completely surprised by the rapid advance of the British.
As a result, they were unable to make a firm and concerted
138 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
stand on the Orange River. On the 16th the three British
columns crossed the river without opposition.
The Boer column retiring over Aliwal North, com-
manded by Grobeler, assembled at Smithfield; that over
Bethulie, under Olivier, joined them at Smithfield, thus
combining to a force of about 5,000 men and 16 guns. The
combined columns, under Olivier, then moved over Wepener
on Winburg, to join the Boer forces there. The column
over Norvals Pont (600), under Van der Post, assembled at
Fauresmith.
On the 18th, Clements was advancing on Philippolis and
Fauresmith; Gatacre was established at Springfontein, with
a detachment at Springfield and the Scots Guards holding
the railway at Edensburg; and Brabant occupied Rouxville,
preparing to move along the Basutoland border.
EVENTS IN THE WESTERN THEATRE.
Lord Kitchener remained in the Prieska and Carnarvon
districts, southwest of Orange River Station, pacifying the
uprisings kindled by roaming bodies of Boers, until March
27th, when he returned to De Aar. About 200 rebels made
their submission, and others retired over the Orange River.
Cronje left Modder River Station on March 4th for
Cape Town. He was to be held a prisoner at St. Helena till
the close of the war.
The Transvaal Boers, augmented in number since the
relief of Kimberley, reoccupied Griquatown. Bodies of
rebels w r ere reported at various points, commandeering and
looting. A body of 800 Boers with 4 guns held the north
bank of the Vaal at Fourteen Streams, and attacked the
British at Warrenton, but without success. Lord Methuen,
who had gone to Barkly West to restore order, returned to
Ivimberlev on the 27th.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
139
General Snyman was still investing Haf eking in the
month of March. Colonel Plumer's force was checked at
Lobatsi by an offensive advance of the Boers on March 16th;
whereupon he made a raid to within 12 miles of Zeerust
against the line of communications of Snyman's force, and
returned to Ramathlabama, only six miles from Mafeking.
The Boers, however, drove him back with heavy loss to
Gaberones.
EVENTS IN NATAL.
The relieving force under Sir Bedvers Buller marched
through Ladysmith on March 3d. On the 9th the naval bri-
gade of the Powerful returned from Ladysmith to Durban.
The line between Colenso and Ladysmith was clear, but
the Boers began entrenching on the Biggarsberg, as proven
by a reconnoissance to Pomeroy on the road to Helpmakaar,
by Bethune's Horse.
The British army occupied a line extending from Acton
Homes and Dewdrop in the west to Elandslaagte and Sun-
ARMQRED TRACTION TRAIN Engineering.
140
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
ARMORED TRACTION TRAIN. -Engineering.
ARMORED TRACTION TRAIN. Engineering.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 141
days River in the east, with outposts along a line from Van
Reeuens Pass to Helpmakaar. The Boers occupied the
Biggarsberg with about 14,000 men and 20 guns, and had
strong detachments in De Beers, Tintwa and Van Reenens
passes. The cavalry of Dundonald reconnoitered continu-
ally on the left flank, while Bethune's Horse guarded the
right, and felt its way forward.
Pomeroy, on the Zululand border road, was burned by
the Boers on March 23d.
LORD ROBERTS' CAMPAIGN.
Pacification of Conquered Territory.
As soon as the army had rested and sufficiently recu-
perated, and the system of supply was in normal working
order again, Lord Roberts directed his attention more par-
ticularly to pacifying the conquered territory the south-
ern part of the Orange Free State and to secure his lines
of communication.
His first move was to intercept, if possible, the retreat-
ing Boer columns from Cape Colony, the principal of which
was that under Olivier (5,000 men with 16 guns) retreating
over Smithfield and Wepener towards Winburg. For this
purpose Lord Roberts sent General French with his division
to cut Olivier off on the Thaba 'Nchu Ladybrand road. A
brigade of cavalry had been sent to Thaba 'Nchu as early as
March 18th, to quiet the inhabitants, but on the 26th Gen-
eral French's division advanced towards Ladybrand, which
his advance guard occupied. He was too late, however, as
Olivier had already passed that point on his way north,
gathering to his standard many of the Boers who had re-
turned to their homes.
The rejection of the peace propositions of Presidents
Kriiger and Steyn by the British government was followed
142 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
by flaming proclamations by both these rulers calling upon
the Boers to continue the struggle to the end. In conse-
quence of this, many returned to the army.
French's movement was observed by a Boer outpost
near Brandfort, and a commando under Crowther was
promptly sent to Ladybrand to hold the road open for Oli-
vier. Crowther drove French's advance guard back and
compelled him to give up his mission, as he had no infantry
with which to dispute the ground. French left Broad-
wood's brigade at Thaba 'Nehu, and returned with the rest
to Bloemfontein.
The Boer force at Fauresmith, under Van der Post,
slipped through to the north at Petrusberg and Poplar
Grove, reaching the Boer lines at Bultfontein.
The British columns from Cape Colony, after uniting
with Pole-Carew's brigade, moved northward on a broad
front, taking all necessary measures to pacify the inhab
itants and to restore peace and order. One of the great
objects of Lord Roberts the junction of his main army
with the scattered columns in Cape Colony had thus been
accomplished.
Clements entered Fauresmith and Jiigersfontein on the
27th, and, leaving a garrison at the latter place, reached
Bloemfontein on the 8th of April; Gatacre made his head-
quarters at Springfontein, and Brabant remained at Aliwal
North. Gatacre and Brabant were required to preserve
order in this portion of the captured district, and to secure
the lines of communication.
Preparations for Advance.
Depressing as were the consequences of Cronje's sur-
render for the Boers, there were many indications at this
time that their spirit was not yet broken, and that Lord
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 143
Roberts had still a numerous and active enemy to contend
with.
The first element was the Afrikander uprising, which
was still going on in the rear of Roberts' army, and along
his long lines of communication. In the next place, the
success of Olivier in eluding the British, combined with
President Steyn's determination to stand by the treaty of
alliance with the Transvaal, and President Krtiger's to
carry on the war to the end, had given the Boers new cour
age and inspired them with a new enthusiasm. Their num-
bers, due to the return of many on the call of the Presidents,
had risen considerably, and but few of the reinforcements
Lord Roberts received had been available at the front. As
regards war supplies, arms and ammunition, the Boers were
well prepared and had enough for a long war. In losing
Joubert and Cronje, on the other hand, they suffered most,
for they had no leaders to fully replace them, although
Botha and De Wet, for the kind of warfare they decided to
wage, >were remarkably well fitted. Finally, their tendency
to assume the tactical offensive in small bodies seemed always
to have been greater than on a large scale; consequently
their new mode of warfare benefited thereby.
Before resuming his advance, therefore, it was not only
necessary to reorganize the troops, remount the cavalry, and
secure the lines of communication, but also to quell disturb-
ances in and to pacify the conquered districts, to clear the
country of the numerous smaller bodies of Boers, or at least
to locate them and determine their strength, with a view
to leaving behind detachments to watch them, and to coun-
teract the effects of Krtiger's and Steyn's proclamations by
such measures of leniency or severity as might be found most
effective.
Evidences of this new energy of the Boers were felt in
all directions. Some of these have already been referred to ;
144 TEE SECOND BOER WAR.
namely, the repulse of Methuen at Fourteen Streams, and of
Plumer at Lobatsi, the attack on French's advance guard
and its expulsion from Ladybrand, and, in Natal, the burn-
ing of Pomeroy. Other evidences made themselves felt, and
gradually on a larger and larger scale.
On March 20th the two railroad bridges north of Bloem-
fontein (over the Modder and the Vet rivers, respectively)
were destroyed by the Boers.
Roberts' army near Bloemfontein was posted as fol-
lows: 7th division, 1st and 3d cavalry brigades, at Glen,
near the Modder River; 6th division in Bloemfontein; 2d
cavalry brigade at Thaba 'Nchu; 9th division in Bloemfon-
tein; 1st and 2d brigades mounted infantry near Karree Sid-
ing, with portions at Thaba 'Nchu and other points.
On March 25th the British reconnoitering towards
Brandfort had a small skirmish with the Boers.
Action at Karree Siding.
On the 31st General Roberts found it necessary, in con-
sequence of the activity of the Boers, under General Smets,
in his immediate front, to drive them from some kopjes
they occupied near Karree Siding Station, a few miles south
of Brandfort. The operation was conducted by the 7th
division, assisted by the 1st and 3d cavalry brigades under
French, and Le Gallais' regiment of mounted infantry.
The group of isolated hills at Karree Siding trends east
and west, extending over about 5 miles of ground. The line
was occupied by about 3,000 Boers.
Tucker's division was sent to Glen. French, with his
cavalry division, was sent to the west to turn the Boer posi-
tion, while Le Gallais, with the mounted infantry and 3
guns (37 mm.), was to do the same by the east. Tucker
was to attack in front after the turning movements were
completed.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 145
At 10 a. m. French sent a heliograph message that he
was in position in rear of the hills, and Tucker advanced to
the attack.
The infantry pushed the Boers back gradually, but they
resisted with some energy till about 4 p. m., when French's
artillery opened on them from the rear. The Boers then
retired precipitately. The mounted infantry did not reach
their rear in time to cut them off.
The British took the kopjes after a six-hour fight and
held them. They lost 2 officers killed, 7 wounded; and about
100 men killed, wounded and missing.
The success of the British was due to the enveloping
attack {around both flanks) made by the cavalry, but the
fact that no pursuit was attempted indicates that the lat-
ter was not yet in proper condition for active operations.
Action Near Bloemfontein Waterworks, on the Koorn Spruit.
On March 30th, Broadwood, who had been left at
Thaba 'Nchu, 38 miles east of Bloemfontein, having received
information that two strong forces from the north and east
were approaching his position, retired to the waterworks,
which were 17 miles nearer Bloemfontein, and where he had
a detachment of two companies of mounted infantry for the
protection of the \vorks, near Sauna's Post. General Bob-
erts sent the 9th division to his support.
Broadwood's force consisted of the Household Cavalry,,
the 10th Hussars, Q and U batteries horse artillery, and
Pilcher's battalion mounted infantry, in all about 1,400 men..
De Wet, hearing on the 30th that Broadwood had re-
tired from Thaba 'Nchu. decided to intercept him, and by a,
forced night march, with a force of about 8,000 men, reached
the British camp before daybreak, and made his dispositions,
for attack.
At dawn Broadwood found himself attacked on three-
-10-
146 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
sides. He immediatetly despatched his two horse-artillery
batteries and his baggage towards Bloemfontein, covering
them with his mounted troops. At the point where the road
crosses the Koorn Spruit about 2 miles from the water-
works, a Boer force was so well concealed that the scouts
had not discovered them, but as the artillery and the train
entered the drift, the Boers opened fire at short range, shoot-
ing down drivers and horses. Such as were able galloped
away, covered by Roberts' Horse. Meanwhile, another pas
sage was found where the remainder of Broad wood's forcx-
crossed and re-formed. The horse-artillery guns that got
out formed at Klip Kraal, a group of ten houses over the
Koorn Spruit, and opened on the Boers, but they were soon
driven back by cross-fire. The 9th division, after a magnifi-
cent march, arrived on the scene of action at about 2 p. m.
French with 2 brigades had also been ordered up, but did
not arrive in time to take part in the action.
The Boers retired towards Ladybrand, leaving 20
wounded officers and 70 wounded men. Broadwood lost 7
guns and all his baggage, about 150 killed and wounded, and
200 missing.
Action at Pietfontein, Near Boshof.
The column of Boers under Van der Post, which slipped
through the British lines from Fauresmith north, remained
in that vicinity and sent out detachments from Koodoos
Rand, in the direction of Poplar Grove, to disturb the Brit-
ish communications between Modder River Station and
Bloemfontein. One of his outposts, to protect his rear in
the direction of Kiinberley, 70 men strong, was surrounded
by Methuen's troops from Boshof on April 5th and captured,
the French colonel of engineers, Villebois, being among
those who fell in the attack. The British lost 1 officer and
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 147
1 man killed, 10 men wounded. The Boers lost 8 killed, 8
wounded and 54 prisoners.
Action at Reddersburg.
The Boer columns under De Wet and Olivier again took
up their offensive movement southward early in April. On
the 3d De Wet reached Reddersburg, where he fell upon a
small British force and captured it.
This force, composed of 3 companies 2d Royal Irish
Rifles and 2 companies 9th Regiment Mounted Infantry, had
been sent to Dewetsdorp, 40 miles east of the railway, to
receive arms of the burghers, and on the way back to Beth-
any it found its way intercepted a few miles east of Red-
dersburg by a large force with guns. The British detach-
ment rushed to a kopje near by, and held it for 18 hours,
when, all hope of reinforcement being abandoned, they sur-
rendered. The battle opened in the afternoon of the 3d,
and the English, without artillery, defended themselves till
2 a. m. on the 4th, at which time all their ammunition was
expended. At daybreak, therefore, they were compelled to
surrender.
Gatacre, at Springfield, in spite of the thunder of the
Boer artillery all the afternoon, was not informed of the
battle until late in the evening, when he received an order
from Lord Roberts to send reinforcements. The latter he
took by rail to Bethany, and then marched across country,
but did not reach the field till noon of the 4th too late to
be of any use. He therefore retired to Bethanie.
In consequence of this mishap, General Gatacre was
relieved from command on the 9th and ordered home. Gen-
eral Pole-Carew was placed in command of his troops.
The British lost 2 officers killed, 4 wounded and 9 cap-
tured; 10 men killed, 33 wounded and about 400 captured.
148 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
THE GENERAL SITUATION.
Before discussing the movements of Olivier's column,
which began at the same time as those of De Wet's against
Reddersburg, and which resulted in the siege of Wepener,
a glance at the general situation will enable us to obtain a
clearer understanding of Lord Roberts' preliminary move-
ments and his resumption of the advance.
The Boers were distributed somewhat as follows: around
Ladybrand, 10,000; on the Vaal, from Fourteen Streams to
Christiana, 6,000; at Brandfort, about 6,000; near Boetsap
(Barkly West), 400; near Witrand (Barkly West), 700; about
Kroonstad, 5,000; and in the eastern theatre (Natal), about
14,000.
The general plan of the Boers was evidently to attack
Roberts at the center near Brandfort, and at the same time
to make a raid around his right flank over Wepener against
his communications in rear, and another against his left
flank over Paardeberg, and to threaten the extreme left at
Kimberley by an advance from Barkly West and Fourteen
Streams.
The British had nearly completed their reorganization
and remounts, the bridges at Bethulie and Norvals Pont had
been repaired, and the uprisings in Cape Colony subdued.
General Clements had reached Bloemfontein, while Gener-
als Gatacre and Brabant were moving gradually on Lady-
brand to secure Roberts' right flank.
In Natal, Botha held his intrenched position in the Big-
garsberg with about 12,000 men, his main body north of
Helpmakaar, with strong detachments at Glencoe and One
Tree Hill (Road Junction Pass), while 2,000 Orange Boers
held the Drakensberg passes.
General Buller, with 40,000 men, occupied a position
north of Elandslaagte and on the Sundays River. His ad-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 149
vanced position was of great importance, as it was geo-
graphically 60 miles farther north than Bloemfontein.
In the north of the Transvaal a new movement was
being planned. With the consent of Portugal, the Rhode-
sian Feld Force, under General Sir F. Carrington, 5,000
strong, composed of Colonial Horse, mostly Australian
bushmen, was to land at Beira and be transported by rail
to Rhodesia.
The army was entirely reorganized, both the divisions
under General Roberts and those in Natal (see Appendix);
and Hart's brigade was sent from Natal to reinforce Bra
bant in the Orange Free State, while Barton's was sent to
the extreme west at Kimberley a little later.
Lord Roberts' original plan appears to have been to
advance from Bloemfontein with the main army against the
left flank of the enemy at Kroonstad, uniting on the way
with a part of Buller's army, opening a way from Natal
through the Drakerisberg passes, while Methuen was to
advance over Boshof and Hoopstad on Kroonstad, thus mak
ing a concentric march in three columns. But the enemy's
dispositions showed that a very small force was concen-
trated at Kroonstad, whereas the right flank of the British
was seriously threatened, and in Natal, as soon as they
learned of the transfer of a part of the 10th division (Hart's
brigade) to the western theatre, the Boers, on the 10th of
April, attacked Buller, and took Clery's camp, on the south
side of Sundays River, completely by surprise, only the arri-
val of reinforcements saving the situation, but not until
after a three-days struggle.
Methuen's force, it is true, advanced on its route to-
wards Hoopstad, and reached Zwartskopjefontein. His
march was opposed by a detachment of 2,000 under Delarey.
On the 20th Lord Methuen retired, followed by Delarey, a
150 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
serious skirmish taking place between the latter and Me-
thuen's rear guard.
Evidently, then, Lord Roberts could not count on a
junction with Buller from Natal, and even Lord Methuen
would have difficulty in taking part in the march northward.
Moreover, the main force of the Boers, now east of Bloem-
fontein, demanded attention before any march north could
be made.
The total British forces in South Africa numbered at
this time about 200,000 men, distributed over a front of 300
miles, and guarding nearly 1,800 miles of railway. Lord
Roberts' army at the center was posted in and around
Bloemfontein, occupying also other strategic points, and
numbered about 60,000 combatants with 216 guns and how-
itzers (3J guns per 1,000 men). The army of Natal numbered
about 36,000 combatants, with 96 field guns and howitzers
(2} pieces per 1,000 men), besides a number of naval guns.
Lord Methuen, in the extreme west, had about 14,000
combatants. The railways arid towns of Cape Colony and
Natal were protected by about 35,000 combatants. The
other fighting forces were those of General Brabant in
southern Orange Free State, Colonel Plumer at Gaberones,
the garrison of Mafeking, Colonel Parsons at Carnarvon in
western Cape Colony, and the new force under Carrington
landing at Beira.
Tlie Siege and Relief of Wepener.
At the same time that De Wet fell upon Reddersburg
(April 4th), Olivier with his column arrived before Wepener.
The latter had been occupied by a detachment of Brabant's
force under Dalgetty, composed of a company of Scotch
mounted infantry, the Cape Mounted Scouts, the 1st and 2d
Kaffrarian Scouts about 2,000 men in all, with 7 guns.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 151
The success of De Wet at Keddersburg should naturally
have led to an attempt on Roberts' communications on the-
Springfield Bloemfontein railroad, but the appearance of
small detachments from Brabant's force, and the approach
of the new 3d division under Pole-Carew, induced the Boers
to turn eastward.
Olivier, finding Wepener already occupied, left a de-
tachment in front of it, which was joined by two other com-
mandoes retiring from Rouxville and Smithfield, respect-
ively. With the rest of his force Olivier moved southward,,
and on the 6th of April attacked a detachment of Brabant's
troops, composed of 4 companies Irish Fusiliers, 2 companies
volunteers and 2 squadrons border scouts, between Bush-
mans Kop and the Caledon River, the Witte Spruit and the
Basutoland border, opposite Mafeteng, and forced them
back on Aliwal North, reoccupying Smithfleld with a detach-
ment of his force. On the 9th the Boers besieging Wepener
began the attack on that place, the British force occupying
the town and the Jammerberg Drift. On the 10th the lat-
ter made a spirited sortie, inflicting severe loss on the Boers^
The attack of the Boers was continued, however, and was.
covered by Olivier at Rouxville and Smithfield against Bra-
bant at Aliwal North, and by De W T et, who concentrated his
force at Dewetsdorp after the action at Reddersburg, against
a British approach from the northw r est.
Meanwhile, for the relief of Wepener, Roberts ordered*
Rundle's 8th division by rail to Bethanie, thence due east
over Reddersburg, by way of Rosendal and Vorlogspoort, oni
Dewetsdorp; while Brabant, recently reinforced by Hart's^
brigade from Natal, was directed over Rouxville on Boes-
mans Kop to force back Olivier's troops. To cover Run-
die's left flank, Chermside's division (stationed between*
Bloemfontein and Bethanie) was concentrated at Redders-
burg and ordered to Marshoutfontein (17 miles east of the
152 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
railroad), Knox's brigade holding the railroad in rear, in
support.
Bundle left Bethanie on the 13th of April, and Redders-
burg on the 16th, but heavy rains made the roads almost
impassable, so that he did not reach Wakkerstroom till the
19th, and only come in contact with the Boers (4 miles south
of Dewetsdorp) on the morning of the 20th. Chermside oc-
cupied Marshoutfontein on the 14th. Brabant reoccupied
Rouxville on the 15th.
The vicinity of Dewetsdorp is comparatively high
ground, containing the sources of the Modder, the Kaffir,
the Koorn Spruit and of several branches of the Caledon
emptying into the Orange River. It is much cut up, very
difficult for cavalry, favoring the defense and offering many
obstacles for the attack. The Boers recognized the fact that
it covered their line of retreat to Thaba 'Nchu and Lady-
ftrand, and consequently fortified it with great care. The
right of their position was protected against an attack from
Bloemfontein by the Leeuw Kop (16 miles southeast of
Bloemfontein), which was occupied by the left flank of the
Boer forces encircling Bloemfontein on the east. The front
of their position at Dewetsdorp faced southwest. The total
Boer forces at Wepener and Dewetsdorp amounted to 8,000
men, with 15 guns.
Rundle, deciding that the position was too strong to
attack in front, deployed the mounted infantry and yeo-
manry in front, and sent Brabazon with the cavalry to out-
flank the left of the Boer position. The Boers retired their
left wing, but took up a new defensive position, while Run-
die entrenched on the ground gained.
Meanwhile, Brabant reached the enemy's position at
Bushmans Kop, 18 miles south of Wepener, on the even-
ing of the 21st.
De Wet's force at Dewetsdorp resisted Bundle's ad-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 153
vanee; consequently Roberts despatched Pole-Carew's divi-
sion from Bloemfontein on the 22d, and two brigades of cav-
alry under French, to relieve the situation. They reached
Leeuw Kop (near Bloemfontein) the same day, the latter
being abandoned by the Boers on their approach, and con-
tinued to Tweede Geluk (24 miles northwest of Dewetsdorp).
Brabant turned the flank of the Boers at Bushmans
Kop and pushed on to within 8 miles of Wepener.
At this time (23d) General Roberts instituted a general
movement against the Boer position to the east of Bloem-
fontein, sending the mounted infantry under Hamilton
against the waterworks and Thaba 'Nchu, supported by
Smith-Dorrien's brigade.
To occupy the enemy in front and to prepare for his
advance toward Kroonstad, Maxwell's brigade of the 7th
division at Karree Siding moved eastward and took posses-
sion of the hills commanding the wagon bridge over the
Modder River at Kranz Kraal, 8 miles east of the railway,
on the 23d of April.
On the 24th Hamilton occupied the waterworks at
Sanna's Post, Smith-Dorrien's brigade 10 miles in rear, the
rest of the 9th division in Bloemfontein ready to march east-
ward, the object being to cut off the line of retreat of the
Boers in the south. Brabant made little progress, the Boers
holding their own against him and renewing the attack on
Dalgetty. Pole-Carew reached Roode Kop, 14 miles from
Dewetsdorp, on the 24th, French pushing on to the east as
far as Grootfontein, in order next day to sieze the Boer line
of retreat on Thaba 'Nchu at Vaalbank, 9 miles northeast
of Dewetsdorp. Bundle's scouts also came in touch with
Brabant's outposts on the Caledon.
The Boers, on the night of the 24th, however, abandoned
their positions at Dewetsdorp and Wepener and retired on
Thaba 'Nchu and Ladybrand, respectively. Brabant pur-
154 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
sued along the Basutoland border, while French and Bun-
dle followed along the Dewetsdorp Thaba 'Nchu road. Pole-
Carew returned to Bloemfontein, as reserve. On the 27th
French reached Thaba 'Nchu, joining there the forces of
Hamilton and Sniith-Dorrien, Bundle also arriving later in
the day. The Boers, however, made good their escape and
joined their forces near Ladybrand.
The pursuit of the Boers was continued during the 26th
and 27th of April. The district of Moroka, through which the
Thaba 'Nchu Ladybrand road passes, is mountainous coun-
try in the form of a bastion with its base and higher ground
near Ladybrand, its point and lower ground towards Bloem-
fontein. East of Thaba 'Nchu the ground changes from its
comparatively low hilly character to the westward to
broader and higher reaches to the eastward, the latter form-
ing excellent defensive positions, very difficult for cavalry.
In the latter the Boers (under De Wet), retiring from Thaba
'Nchu, took up a strong position. French, with his usual en-
ergy, attacked, but was compelled, after a fruitless engage-
ment, to retire on Thaba 'Nchu. On the 28th and 29th the
advance was continued, but this frontal attack was effect-
ively resisted by the Boers. The British attempted to turn
the Boer left flank, but the right flank of the latter was sa
active that little headway could be made, until the British
decided to make a wide detour and attempted to strike
through the Houtnek Pass, about 12 miles north of f Thaba
'Nchu, which was held by a Boer force under Botha. This
was accomplished by Hamilton with the mounted infantry,
supported by Broadwood's brigade, and Bruce Hamilton's*
infantry brigade (21st), on the 2d of May, and the Boers
retired towards Winburg. In this action the Boers lost 12
killed, 40 wounded and 26 prisoners. Hamilton rested at
Jacobsrust by Lord Roberts' orders, as he had been fighting
for seven days out of the past ten.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 155
Meanwhile Roberts resumed the general advance on
Kroonstad, and these troops joined his right flank. The
Boers, on the 3d and 4th, retired over the Leeuw River (east
of Thaba 'Nchu), followed by Rundle and Brabazon to that
stream, when the latter came in touch with Brabant. The
parts of the 3d division left at Thaba 'Nchu returned to take
charge of the line of communications.
LORD ROBERTS' CAMPAIGN.
The Advance on Kroonstad.
The country between Bloemfontein and the Vaal River
is a rolling plain, with low ridges crossing in the northern
portion, showing occasionally the characteristic South Afri-
can table mountain.
The railroad runs in a northeastern direction for 125
miles without a curve, over nearly level country, which is
treeless, with streams only in the rainy season, and only
grass and low bushes visible over the broad plain. Few
houses, and these only isolated dwellings and kraals, are
met with, and the country furnishes nothing for the support
of troops.
But, while the British army will have to depend entirely
on the supplies it carries along, the advance offers no diffi-
culties, since the railroad, wherever it has been destroyed
(as at the low bridges over the Modder, Vet and Zand rivers),
is easily repaired. There are no places for defensive posi-
tions except at Brandfort, Winburg and Ventersburg, where
there are considerable elevations; but all these can be
turned, especially since the entire country is practicable for
cavalry or mounted infantry. The innumerable spruits are
far more troublesome to an army than the kopjes, because
in the rainy season they swell so suddenly, and are rarely
156 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
bridged, while in the dry season they form excellent defens-
ive positions for the Boers.
The total number of British troops in South Africa on
the 21st of April amounted to about 210,759, including offi-
cers, but after deducting the non-combatants (13,000), the
troops on the lines of communications (40,000) and the sick
(about 23,670), the total fighting strength was about 134,000,
stationed as follows:
Under Roberts, directly in Orange Free State
(including garrisons) 66,000
Under Methuen and Hunter, at Kimberley,
Boshof and Fourteen Streams 20,000
Under Parsons, in western Cape Colony 10,000
Under Plumer, north of Maf eking 2,000
Under Baden-Powell, in Mafeking 1,000
Under Carrington, in Rhodesia 5,000
Under Buller, in Natal 30,000
The total Boer forces in the field amounted to about
50,000 men, distributed as follows :
Southeast of Bloemf ontein 8,000
At Smaldeel 3,000
At Brandfort and Karree Siding 5,000
Ladybrand 1,500
East of Bloemf ontein Springf ontein R. R. . . 2,000
Between Kroonstad and Winburg 5,000
24,000
The rest at Fourteen Streams (6,000), in Natal (14,000),
in Barkly West and in reserve.
Roberts' immediate army was posted as follows, previ-
ous to the resumption of the advance from Bloemf ontein :
7th Division, 14th Brigade (Maxwell) at Modder River
bridge, beyond Glen.
15th Brigade (C. E. Knox) between the
Modder River and Karree Siding.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 157
6th Division, 12th Brigade (Clements) on outpost duty.
13th Brigade (Wavell) north of Modder
River, south of Karree Siding.
llth Division, in Bloemfontein.
21st Brigade (newly formed), at Glen.
The position of the cavalry and mounted infantry
changed constantly.
The Boers were known to be in force at Karree Siding
and on three kopjes southeast of that point, guarding the
road to Winburg.
On April 30th Maxwell's brigade, assisted by Broad-
wood's cavalry brigdae, then at Holzhuisfontein, was or-
dered to take these kopjes, which was accomplished before
nightfall.
Broadwood's brigade was then directed to move out well
to the east, while Button was sent to the west, to outflank
the Boer position at Brandfort The 6th and llth divisions
and the 21st brigade were ordered to advance, following the
general direction of the railroad, and to attack the enemy
at Brandfort.
On May 2d Broadwood reached Isabelfontein, 16 miles
east of Brandfort, and the Boers retired. The British occu-
pied the position on the 3d.
The 9th division, Hamilton's mounted infantry and
French's cavalry, which had moved on Houtnek Pass and
compelled the Boer forces there to retire on Winburg, hav-
ing accomplished their purpose, joined the movement of ad-
vance of Roberts' main army. Hamilton reached Welcome
(12 miles south of Winburg) on May 4th, and had a skirmish
with a retiring Boer column there; on the 5th he crossed the
Little Vet and took Winburg.
Meanwhile, Roberts had engaged the Boers at the rail-
road crossing of the Little Vet, south of Winburg. Pole-
Carew's division (llth) was deployed for the attack, the
158 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Boers (under Delarey) on the right bank opposing its ad-
yance, bringing several guns in position. The British devel-
oped a superior artillery fire, bringing 2 batteries of field
guns, 4 navy guns and 2 siege guns into action, and soon
silenced the Boer artillery, but kept up the fire all the after-
noon (May 5th). Eoberts again turned the enemy's flank,
without making a strong frontal infantry attack, by send-
ing Hutton with his mounted infantry and some cavalry
and artillery down stream to a ford. The latter was held
by a small Boer force with 2 field guns, a howitzer and a
Maxim gun, but their artillery was silenced by the British
guns, and the Boers retired, losing their Maxim gun and a
number of prisoners.
Hamilton reached Winburg about the same time as
Broadwood (who advanced along the Bloemfontein Win-
burg road). The Boers united their forces, however, and in
the night, with the aid of the railroad, effected their retreat.
On the morning of the 6th of May Button's patrols destroyed
the railroad at Smaldeel, but his force was too late to cut off
the Boers, although it secured some rolling material for
Roberts' further advance.
At Smaldeel the British were compelled to halt for a
short period, in order to repair the bridge over the Little
Vet, to rearrange the strategic front and the columns of
march, and to await supplies. Hamilton with one brigade
of mounted infantry, Broadwood's cavalry brigade and the
9th division constituted the right wing and moved over the
Winburg Kroonstad road; the 7th and llth divisions and
the 21st brigade formed the center along the railroad; and
Button's brigade of mounted infantry and the other three
cavalry brigades under French, the left, west of the railroad.
On May 7th Roberts had the entire country to the Zand
River cleared up by his cavalry and mounted infantry, and
found the Boers strongly intrenched on the north bank of
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
159
160 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
the Zand; but indications of retreat induced Button to
attack with his artillery at Virginia, near the railroad, south
of the river, and established the fact that the Boers were
abandoning the position.
On May 9th the general advance was resumed by Rob-
erts' army, and on the 10th the Zand was crossed, the troops
advancing that day to Ventersburg. On the llth the army
reached the Bloem Spruit, and on the 12th Kroonstad. The
Boers retired over the Vaal. President Steyn moved the
seat of government to Heilbron.
EVENTS IN THE SOUTH.
The 8th division (Bundle's), it will be remembered, fol-
lowed the retiring Boers east of Thaba 'Nchu as far as the
Little Leeuw Spruit. On the 9th of May, not being able
to penetrate to Ladybrand eastward, Bundle turned north
along the Leeuw, and after a number of minor affairs with
stray Boer commandoes, reached Mequathings Nek (18 miles
northwest of Ladybrand) on the 16th, and Clocolan (20 miles
northeast of Ladybrand) on the 17th. After these points
were taken, Brabazon with the yeomanry was able to push
forward to Ladybrand.
EVENTS IN NATAL.
Buller also resumed the offensive on the 9th, and ad-
vanced against the Boer position in the Biggarsberg. The
2d division and Dundonald's cavalry marched towards Help-
makaar, while Bethune's mounted force was sent in the
direction of Greytown to mislead the enemy. On the 12th,
the 5th division moved eastward from Elandslaagte and
occupied Indoda Mountain, 11 miles away, to cover and sup-
port Buller's movement, while Bethune, turning northward,
made for Pomerov.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 161
The enemy's position was a few miles southwest of Help-
makaar. On the 13th the British infantry attacked it in
front, the cavalry turning the right flank, and Bethune's force
operating on the left and rear.
The Boers (now about 7,000 strong) retired over Helpma-
kaar, firing the dry grass as they went. Dundonald's cavalry
pursued, and the army occupied Dundee and Glencoe on the
15th; on the 17th it reached Dannhauser, with its advanced
patrols at Newcastle. The Boers fell back over Laings Nek
and De Jagers Drift on the Buffalo Kiver. They destroyed
the waterworks at Newcastle, and the bridge over the Ingogo,
and blew up the tunnel at Laings Nek. Buller sent Clery
and Dundonald as advance guard towards Laings Nek (Clery
detaching Hildyard's brigade towards Utrecht), and ordered
Lyttleton towards Vryheid to turn the Boer left flank.
EVENTS IN THE EXTREME WEST.
Towards the end of April Douglas' brigade, which had
advanced as far as Zwartskopjefontein had been forced to
return to Boshof by Delarey, and Paget's brigade was still
striving to force a passage over the Vaal near Fourteen
Streams. Meanwhile, a detachment of mounted troops, about
1,500 strong, under Colonel Mahon, attempted to cross the
Vaal below Barkly West, in order to turn the Boer west flank
and thus reach Maf eking by forced marches; this force
reached Taungs on May 7th, and Vryburg on the 9th.
Colonel Mahon's force consisted of picked cavalry and
included a detachment of Queenslanders and Canadians
drawn from Carrington's Buslimen at Beira. This detach-
ment left Beira on May 5th, went by rail to Salisbury and by
coach to Buluwayo, where it arrived May 8th, then by train
to Oatsi, arriving May llth, then marched for twenty-two
hours to join the main column on the 12th.
-11-
162 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Early in April Hunter's division (10th) was taken from
Natal and transferred to the western theatre, Hart's brigade
sent to reinforce Brabant at Aliwal North, while Barton and
the artillery were sent to Kimberley, where they were joined
by Hart after the relief of Wepener. The object of thus rein-
forcing Methuen was to enable him to cross the Vaal and
relieve Mafeking.
While Paget made a demonstration at Warrenton r
Hunter endeavored to cross the Vaal farther west, at Wind-
sorton, about 27 miles below Fourteen Streams, then to turn
on Fourteen Streams and roll up the Boer position. On the
5th of May he effected a crossing, and on the 9th he attacked
the right flank of the Boer position at Fourteen Streams,
while Paget advanced against its front at Warrenton. The
Boers were forced to retire. Hunter sent Barton's brigade
towards Mafeking, while he with the other brigade moved
towards Bloemhof, and at the same time Methuen advanced
in the direction of Hoopstad. Delarey from Zwartskopje-
fontein moved north towards Mafeking, while the Boers from
Fourteen Streams retired on Klerksdorp. Hunter occupied
Christiana on the 13th of May.
The Relief of Mafelcing.
Meanwhile, the column under Mahon advanced by forced
marches to the relief of Mafeking. After passing Vryburg,
the column made a detour to the west to avoid a Boer force
at Pudimoe Siding, 10 miles north of Taungs, and again on
the 13th, at Setlacoli, a similar detour was made to avoid
a column from Maritsani Station, which was that of Delarey,
who had moved north to cover the siege. At Kraiipan the
British column was heavily attacked, but the Boers were
finally repulsed. On the 15th Mahon joined Plumer at Jan-
masibi, 20 miles west of Mafeking, and on the 16th they at-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 163
tacked a Boer force of 1,500, 9 miles west of the investing
lines. The Boers were defeated and retreated eastward, and
on the 17th Mahon entered Mafeking. The Boers had made a
last attack on Mafeking on the 12th, in which they were com-
pletely defeated, El off, the commander, and 120 men being
taken prisoners.
The siege of Mafeking had lasted 217 days.
On the same day, May 17th, Methuen entered Hoopstad,
and Hunter left Christiana for Bloemhof.
LORD ROBERTS' CAMPAIGN.
The Advance on Pretoria.
At Kroonstad the army of invasion rested in order to
secure its lines of communication, first, as regards their or-
ganization ; secondly, as regards their protection, since a num-
ber of commandoes still hovered about the flanks of the
British front as well as their line of advance.
In the movements instituted for the protection of the
flanks, Hutton on the left succeeded in capturing a small
Boer detachment at the mouth of the Olter Spruit, on the
Vaal, while Broadwood on the right occupied Lindley on the
17th. These mounted troops on the extreme flanks pushed
out detachments toward the Rhenoster River, and found the
Boers on its north bank. Hamilton and Broadwood moved
out from Lindley on the 9th and had a series of engagements
with a Boer force under De Wet retiring before them, reach-
ing Heilbron on the 22d. French and Hutton on the left
reached Borman on the Rhenoster on the same day, and Pros-
pect, 5 miles north of the river, on the 23d.
At the same time Hunter in the West advanced to Vry-
burg, w r hich he reached on the 23d.
The general advance was resumed on the 22d, the army
1(54 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
reaching Honing Spruit Station, 20 miles north of Kroonstad,
on that day, and continuing the advance on the 23d. The
Boers, threatened on both flanks, retired, after destroying the
Ehenoster bridge and the railroad.
After passing the Rhenoster, Lord Roberts decided to
concentrate his army more, and to put all the cavalry on the
left flank. The interval between the two flanking columns
(nearly 50 miles) had proven too great for concerted action, so
that, although the Boers were easily maneuvered out of their
positions, they were always enabled to retire with all their
artillery and baggage. Hamilton and Broadwood were di-
rected to join French and Hutton on the left wing, the right
being covered by Colonel Henry's mounted infantry only.
French and Hutton reached Parys on the 24th, and part
of their forces crossed the Vaal there; Hamilton and Broad-
wood stood at Wolvehoek north of Heilbron Station, and
Roberts was close up to Wolvehoek. On the 25th the main
part of the forces of French and Hutton crossed at Linde-
quees Drift, 10 miles west of Vereeniging, Broadwood crossed
at Wonder Water Drift north of Boschbank (8 miles west of
Vereeniging), while Hamilton stood at Boschbank; Roberts
swung away from the railroad, moving on Boschbank.
Broadwood's brigade secured Wonder Water Drift, 3 miles
above Lindequees Drift, and there covered the passage of
Hamilton's column on the 26th.
Colonel Henry, constituting the advance guard, seized
Viljoens Drift (south of Vereeniging), but one span of the
railway bridge was blown up by the Boers, here commanded
by Lemmer. On the 27th Roberts' army crossed the Vaal
there, the 3d cavalry brigade (Gordon)/ which had crossed
at Engelbrecht Drift the day before, covering the right flank.
The extent of the front of Roberts' army by these move-
ments was reduced to 25 miles.
Immediately after passing the Vaal, and entering the
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 165
Transvaal or South African Republic. Lord Roberts an-
nounced the annexation by Great Britain of the Orange Free
State under the name of the Orange River Colony.
On the 27th French and Hamilton, operating to the west-
ward, reached Vanwyksrust, 30 miles southwest of Johan-
nesburg, while Roberts' main army on the 28th advanced to
Klip River, 15 miles from Johannesburg, continuing on the
29th to Germiston, 10 miles east of Johannesburg. There
Roberts secured possession of the junction of the road to Na-
tal over Heidelberg, and that of the Johannesburg Klerks-
dorp road.
Colonel Henry with his mounted infantry, supported on
the right by the 3d cavalry brigade, had orders to seize Natal
Spruit and Ekmdsfontein at all cost. Pole-Car ew and Tucker
advanced along the railroad. Natal Spruit was first taken,
then Elandsfoutein, thus turning the Boer right.
Roberts here detached the 9th division for seivice in
guarding the communications, retaining only the llth and
7th divisions.
On the 30th Lord Roberts' army surrounded the city:
the 7th division and Gordon's cavalry on the north, Hamilton
on the west at Florida, French on the northeast, the llth
division and the heavy 'artillery remaining in Germiston.
On the 31st the city surrendered, Roberts having agreed to
allow its complete evacuation by the armed burghers. The
Boers had left much rolling material and even a train-
load of coal in their hasty retreat, and the mines were found
undisturbed.
The British army had covered the distance between
Kroonstad and Germiston, nearly 160 miles, in 8 days, at the
rate of nearly 20 miles a day, repairing roads, railroads and
bridges as they went, a remarkable performance.
In Pretoria Lord Roberts' victorious advance created con-
sternation. President Kriiger and the principal officials fled
166 TR E SECOND BOER WAlt.
on the 29th of May to Machadodorp, a station on the rail-
road to Lorenzo-Marques. General Botha, however, was in
Pretoria on the 31st, encouraging the Boers and endeavoring
to incite them to further resistance, but with poor success.
Roberts, therefore, hastened his advance in order to take
advantage of the confusion and to prevent the Boers from
forming and executing new plans of resistance. His army
rested on June 1st, and on the 2d, leaving the 14th brigade
(Wavell's) in Johannesburg, he resumed his advance, the
left flank covered by Hamilton, the extreme left guarded by
French and Hutton pushed out towards Schoewan.
On June 4th the British came in contact with the Boers
at Six Mile Spruit (Hennops River), just south of Pretoria.
The mounted infantry and yeomanry dislodged the Boers
from their first position, but, after pursuing them for nearly
a mile, came upon their real position, protected by guns. The
British heavy guns, which had been placed well to the front
for that purpose, came into action, supported by Stephenson's
brigade, and drove the Boers out of their position.
The latter then attempted to turn the British left flank,
but were resisted by the mounted infantry and yeomanry
and Maxwell's brigade, and finally Roberts directed Hamil-
ton, 3 miles to the west at that time, to turn into the gap
between the two columns. The Boers were driven back to
Pretoria. Roberts bivoucked on the field, 4 miles from Pre-
toria. French, with the 3d and 4th cavalry brigades and
Huttou's mounted infantry, was north of Pretoria, Broad-
wood between French and Hamilton, and Gordon was watch-
ing the right, near the railway bridge at Irene Station, which
had been destroyed by the Boers.
The strength of the latter at Six Mile Spruit was still
about 10,000.
Hamilton pursued the Boers on the evening of the 4th
to within 2,000 yards of the town, through which they re-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 167
treated. In the morning the town was surrendered. The
Boer forces, under Louis Botha, taking their guns with them,
had retired to the eastward and northward. Most of the
English prisoners (4,500) were left by them at Waterval.
The surrender of the Transvaal capital closes the fourth
act of the drama.
EVENTS IN THE SOUTH.
The guarding of the railway south of the Vaal was con-
ducted by Bundle, Brabant, Clements and Methuen, holding
a chain of posts from Heilbron to Ficksburg, 110 miles.
Kelly-Kenny remained at Bloemfontein.
Bundle and Brabant continued maneuvering against the
Boer commandoes between Ficksburg and Bethlehem. On
May 24th, Colville standing at Winburg, they reached Trom-
mel, and on the 28th they had a sharp engagement with a
Boer force at Senekal. On the 29th Rundle advanced south-
east from Senekal to draw the Boer forces from Lindley,
where a force of yeomanry was hard pressed. Lindley was oc-
cupied by the British, but on the 31st of May the 13th bat-
talion yeomanry under Colonel Spragge was surrounded and
captured by a superior Boer force. Methuen from Kroonstad
had been ordered to the rescue and marched 44 miles in 25
hours, but arrived too late. He attacked the Boers, however,
and routed them.
EVENTS IN THE EXTEEME WEST.
In Griqualand West a revival of the rebellion so recently
stamped out took place. Warren, with 700 men, was sur-
rounded at night on May 29th, surprised and attacked by
1,000 rebels, while encamped at Faber Spruit, 12 miles from
Douglas. The. Boers were finally repulsed, but with heavy
loss to the British.
168 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Hunter was occupied in repairing the railway to Mafe-
king. On May 24th Hart was at Fourteen Streams on the
Vaal, Barton at Taungs, Hunter at Vryburg, Baden-Powell
at Mafeking, and Carrington at Marandellas. On May 28th
Plumer occupied Zeerust, and on the 30th Hunter was at
Khunwana, 40 miles south of Mafeking, and early in June
was marching unopposed over Ventersdorp on Pretoria.
EVENTS IN NATAL.
Buller was detained at Newcastle repairing the railroad.
On May 18th a squadron of Bethune's horse (500 men)
was detached to march from Dundee by Vantis Drift, show-
ing their force in Nqutu, then to rejoin the main body at
Newcastle. On their return they were ambushed by the
Boers and lost 27 killed and 11 prisoners.
On May 19th Clery's division encamped at Ingogo, 12
miles north of Newcastle, while Dundonald reconnoitered to
Laings Nek. On the 21st Buller's scouts crossed the Buffalo
into the Transvaal.
Hildyard's (5th) division joined Buller at Newcastle on
the 27th of May, and was at once sent out to seize Utrecht,
while Lyttleton was ordered to move on Doornberg and Vry-
heid. The object of these movements was to turn the strong
Boer position beyond Laings Nek.
The defile at Laings Nek was opened and the tunnel
there repaired.
One June 2d Hildyard joined the main force from
Utrecht. Lyttleton was at Coetzees Drift, protecting the
right flank.
The Boers, under Christian Botha, still numbered 10,000
men, and successfully opposed Buller's advance.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 169
COMMENTS.
The Advance on Bloemfontein.
The battles of the war thus far, not including that of
Paardeberg, fall into three groups of four each.
The first group embraced the actions in Natal at Glencoe,
Elandslaagte, Rietfontein and Nicholsons Nek three tac-
tical successes culminating in a grave disaster. The second
included the encounters in the West, of Belmont, Graspan,
Modder Eiver and Magersfontein again three victories fol-
lowed by a serious repulse. The third group comprised the
battles on the Tugela, Colenso, Spion Kop, Vaal Kranz and
Pieters Hill three desperate repulses, succeeded by a final
victory.
The invasion of the Free State by Lord Roberts rendered
possible the forcing of the Boer lines on the Tugela, by draw-
ing off a portion of Joubert's army, but the capture of Pieters
Hill decided the campaign in Natal. In tactics this battle
also illustrates the best modern ideas on the subject namely,
the combined frontal and flank attack, and is a perfect ex-
ample of the proper execution of such a movement and action.
After Cronje's defeat the Boer Army should either have
struck a decisive blow in Natal to counteract Lord Roberts'
victory at Paardeberg, or, if they had to give up the siege of
Ladysmith, their only chance for any decisive results was to
concentrate all their available forces as rapidly as possible
at Brandfort and Winburg in order to strike a decisive blow
against the victorious army of Lord Roberts.
The occupation of Bloemfontein turning aside from the
direct route against the enemy's army by Lord Roberts was
a sound movement strategically, in which the moral effect
of occupying the enemy's capital played but a secondary part.
His strategic purpose was to get in communication with the
columns of Brabant, Gatacre and Clements, to secure a strong
170 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
base and the railroad as a line of supply and communication,
and to reestablish on a normal footing the system of relays
and intercommunication of the parts of his army. Moreover,
by taking the southerly direction along the Kraal Spruit any
further intrenched positions of the enemy would be turned by
the mere advance of the army.
Knowing the state of French's cavalry, it is difficult to
criticise the tactics of the advance on Bloemfontein. Their
deeds, considering the circumstances, are rather the subject
for praise and wonder. Nevertheless, it was a mistake in re-
connoissance to allow Porter's brigade at Poplar Grove to fall
into the zone of a Boer position which had not been properly
reconnoitered. Moreover, as another result, his turning
movement was not at first sufficiently extended to strike the
actual rear of the Boer flanks in the first place, so that Rob-
erts' success was not complete, and the Boers were ready to
oppose him again on the 10th.
Again, at Driefontein, the British came upon the Boer
position unexpectedly, and were forced at first to make a
frontal attack. They failed again to cut off the Boers, or to
gain a decisive victory. One great cause of the British diffi-
culties in reconnoissance, aside from the worn-out condition
of the cavalry, is the lack of good maps, those of the Intelli-
gence Division being remarkably poor; but the greatest ele-
ment in their failure to bring about decisive actions is the re-
markable mobility of the Boer troops, w T hich they made full
use of at this time in the tactics which they adopted namely,
to stand and fight till the tide begins to turn against them,
and then rapidly to retire beyond reach. The forced march
of the division of Kelly-Kenny across the hot plains, followed
by six hours of hard fighting, was a performance deserving
to rank among the finest of this kind.
After the fall of Bloemfontein there were three positions
available for the Boer forces to make a defensive stand: at
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 171
Brandfort, about 35 miles north of Bloemf ontein ; near Win-
burg, about 30 miles farther north; and at Ventersburg,
about 30 miles still farther.
On the east these positions rest on considerable heights,
but on the west they can all be turned, for which purpose
the numerical superiority of the British would, of course, be
taken advantage of. The first position (at Brandfort) could
have been occupied immediately after Cronje's defeat, but
after the fall of Bloemfontein it was no longer possible to
concentrate the Boer army from Natal there, but it was still
practicable to assemble it at Ventersburg or Kroonstad,
holding the passes of the Drakensberg by a few thousand
men. Moreover, after the occupation of Bloemfontein, the
flanks of the position at Brandfort could readily have been
threatened from Boshof, which Roberts had previously or-
dered occupied.
It is evident that, unless a decisive blow could be struck
at once in Natal, it was useless for the Boers to hold on there,
because the advance of Lord Roberts north from Bloemfon-
tein would at once render the position of the Boer army on
the Biggarsberg untenable, and force the latter to retreat
over Laings Nek into the Transvaal domain. No doubt, the
desire to hold the British beyond their own borders as long
as possible influenced the Transvaal Boers to keep their main
army in front of Buller, and to attempt to delay Roberts by
means of a small but active force in the West.
The Strategy of the Boers.
The Boers, however, contrary to all expectation, adopted
a more daring plan than that of concentrating at Kroonstad.
They occupied the difficult hill country to the east and south-
east of Bloemfontein, not over 40 or 50 miles from that capi-
tal. This was a bold step to take, but it promised results,
for it placed on Lord Roberts' flank a force which would
172 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
either compel him to give up his advance and turn against it
towards Ladybrand, or, if he persists in advancing, to leave
his long line of communications exposed to a flank attack.
The moral effect of occupying a position so near to the Brit-
ish army was also very great, and restored the courage of
the Orange Free State Boers.
By the death of Joubert the Boers lost their ablest gen-
eral, and, coming as it did just after the capture of Cronje, the
blow fell doubly hard. But the new generals, Botha, Olivier,
De Wet and others, appeared to fill their places remarkably
well, as shown by the actions immediately after Joubert's
death and forborne time thereafter; indeed, the fact that they
were younger men in general probably was an advantage in
itself, considering the new and more active mode of warfare
demanded by the circumstances and adopted by the Boers.
This new strategy of the Boers led to innumerable minor
engagements, but finally, early in April, they began a move-
ment on a larger scale. While part of their forces made an
attack at Brandfort against the center of Lord Roberts' line y
a large force undertook a raid around his right flank towards
Wepener, with a view to striking the British communica-
tions in rear and to gather up as many of the burghers as pos-
sible to swell the ranks of their army, while at the same time
another force was gathering in the west at Paardeberg to
move against Roberts' left flank. Moreover, farther west still,
at Barkly West, Fourteen Streams, and along the north bank
of the Vaal, the Boers were threatening an advance on Kim-
berley. Another great object of this movement to the rich
country of southern Orange Free State was to gather in
supplies, especially the harvest for which the district is noted.
While the spirit of this movement w r as strategically
offensive, even to actual contact with the enemy (as at Red-
dersburg and Smithfield), its tactical execution failed entirely,
for, instead of taking up the tactical offensive and' attacking
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 173
the British with determination, they split up their forces
and engaged in a number of minor affairs which had no real
connection with the original object of their strategical ad-
vance. Again did their tendency to a tactical defensive
prevent them from reaping the rewards of their strategic
offensive.
The Actions Around Bloemfontein.
The escape of Van der Post's column through the British
lines at Poplar Grove, and that of Olivier's and Grobeler's
along the Basutoland border must be attributed, first, to the
fact that Roberts' cavalry was used up and the necessary re-
mounts had not yet arrived, and, secondly, to the necessity of
slow movement of the British columns following them from
Cape Colony, this slowness being demanded in order to pacify
the country passed over. The British columns were thus
prevented from keeping in touch with the Boer columns,
which enabled the latter to escape.
In the action at Karree Siding the condition of the cav*
;alry evidently prevented a more complete victory.
The surprise of Broadwood's train at Koorn Spruit and
his command at the waterworks* is another example of neg-
lect of outpost and reconnoissance duty, at least of an effect-
ive kind. Broadwood knew that the enemy was in the vicin-
ity in force, for he had himself reported the fact to .General
Roberts and had acted on the information by retiring from
Thaba 'Nchu.
The capture of the command at Reddersburg was due
to insufficient equipment at the outset, since no artillery was
assigned to this column, and for this neglect General Gatacre
was properly held responsible. Moreover, it would seem
that with a proper system of transmitting information Gen-
eral Gatacre should have known of the action going on within
8 miles of one of his permanent posts (at Bethanie) long be-
174 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
fore he received his order from General Roberts; and after
he received that order, since he had the railroad available to
Bethanie, and only 8 miles to march, it would seem that the
relief force should also have arrived earlier. In addition,
however, there was again the usual neglect of proper outpost
duty; otherwise so complete a surprise would have been
impossible.
The Relief of Wepener.
The measures taken by Lord Roberts for the relief of
Dewetsdorp and Wepener were finally effective so far as to
cause the retreat of the Boers as soon as their line of retreat
was threatened, but failed in effecting their capture. This
was mainly due to the condition of the British troops, and it
is to be noted that other indications point in the same direc-
tion. A careful analysis of the events will make this clear.
In the first place, the ordering of Brabant, Hart and
Rundle against Wepener and Dewetsdorp was not dictated
by strategical considerations, but merely to relieve the Brit-
ish force at the former of these two points, and to support it
against great odds. The reinforcement of Rundle's troops by
Pole-Carew and French was originally of a similar character.
In the next place, the movement finally made against
the Boer lines of retreat (by Hamilton's command) was made
by an entirely inadequate force and too late to be effective in
capturing the agile Boers. It is evident that Roberts simply
did not have his troops ready any sooner for taking the field,
and this view is supported by the fact that the troops first
selected were those which had not participated in the hard
march to Bloemfontein, and also by the fact that as soon as
possible Pole-Carew was sent back as a reserve to Bloemfon-
tein to be available for any possible movement of the Boers
from the northeast or northwest, or to meet any emergency
in the east or southeast.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 175
Finally, the pursuit by the British after the Boers aban-
doned Dewetsdorp and Wepener was too slow to insure suc-
cess, and this again must be attributed to the condition of
the troops, more especially as to supplies.
The explanation of this state of affairs after so long a
rest in the case of the troops at Bloemfontein is to be sought
not only in the effects of the hard marches from Modder River
to Bloemfontein, but more especially (and this applies also
to the new reinforcements recently arrived) to the fact that
the British rolling material for the narrow-gauge road of sup-
ply had all to be prepared before the system of supply could
be fully organized.
Nevertheless, some share of the blame must fall on the
apparent lack of good training of the new troops in modern
war movements.
The Advance on Kroonstad.
The decision of Lord Roberts to advance again after the
capture of the kopjes southeast of Brandfort on the 4th of
May was good judgment and fine strategy. The movements
of his entire army were thus combined on a singly object, and
no time was lost in forming a new front, but the parts came
up into line as they moved forward on their natural routes,
and in such a way as to embody a turning movement at the
same time.
But in turning the enemy's position at Vet River with
cavalry (or mounted troops) on both his flanks it does not ap
pear clear why Hamilton or Hutton did not strike the rear
of the enemy and break up the railroad to prevent his retir-
ing. In all probability Hamilton was not sufficiently in-
formed on reaching Winburg of the position in front of Rob-
erts, and so could not know how effective such a measure
might be, and Hutton evidently obeyed his orders too liter-'
176 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
ally, and did not take advantage of the opportunity ottered
till too late.
At Smaldeel the question naturally arose as to the pro
priety of attacking in rear the Boer detachments occupying
the Drakensberg passes, because Winburg, on account of the
connections and communications, was the nearest point alon^
the railway from which to accomplish this. To have done
this, however, would have necessitated leaving the railway
again, and, besides, would have offered the Boers an opportu>
nity to attack the British in flank. In view of these facts,
then, and the additional one that Buller was holding a large
Boer force idle in front of him, the strategy of Lord Roberts
in continuing his advance along the railroad must be regard-
ed as sound.
Of course, the latter movement still presented some dif
ficulties, because the Boers retiring from the Moroka district
might effect, in the vicinity of Bethlehem, a junction with
those opposing Roberts' advance directly, and then compel
the British to fight with their front to a flank. But the char-
acter of the opposition thus far met with did not indicate
such mobility, determination or strategic ability on the part
of the Boers. It was with a view to preventing such action
on the part of the latter that Roberts, on May 7th, had such
an extended reconnoissance made by his cavalry and mounted
infantry to make sure that the Boers were retiring northward
beyond the Zand River.
The prompt advance of Lord Roberts beyond Smaldeel
was masterful strategy. The moral effect was in itself very
great : most of the Orange Boers returned to their farms, and
the Transvaal Boers declined to fight any longer in the
Orange Free State. But the strategic results were greater
still, because it gave Roberts practically control of the lines
Durban Bethlehem, and Durban Johannesburg. The ad-
vance, moreover, put these three theatres in actual strate-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 177
gical relation with one another, for Buller in Natal, and Hun-
ter and Methuen in the vicinity of Kimberley, moved out at
the same time, and Roberts' short halt in Kroonstad was
mainly to adjust the parts of this line.
The Advance on Pretoria.
The advance of Roberts from Kroonstad to Johannes-
burg was conducted at first on a broad front (about 50 miles),
but it soon became evident that, while such an extent of front
facilitated the turning of the Boer positions strategically,
it did not fulfil the tactical conditions necessary for capturing
the Boers or for forcing them to stand and fight a decisive
action, because concerted action between the turning wings
was impossible. Consequently, after passing the Rhenoster,
the width of front was reduced to 25 miles, and all the cavalry
was put on the left flank. The Boers then could escape only
by giving up practically all resistance.
This march to Johannesburg, considering its distance,
the character of the country, the size of the army and the
destroyed bridges, railroads and roads, was a splendid achieve-
ment, and illustrates the grand qualities of the British in
marching capacity in their ability to repair bridges, railroads
and wagon roads, in their utter contempt for the danger of
an enemy hovering on their lines of communication in rear,
and in their determination to reach their objective.
The turn to the west before crossing the Vaal was sound
strategy, for the Vaal, unlike other rivers in this section in
the dry season, is not fordable except at a few points, and
the position at Vereeniging was a very strong one to force,
and required passage over the bridge there.
The strategy of Roberts' campaign was brilliant and
effective, and the opening of Laings Nek by Buller and the
advance of Hunter over Ventersdorp on Pretoria promised to
-12-
178 TEE SECOND BOER WAR.
furnish him the necessary reinforcements. Nevertheless, the
escape of the Boers at Johannesburg and again at Pretoria
give to the results an element of incompleteness, especially
as the enemy retired to the difficult mountain country the
Lyndenburg District.
Roberts' turning movement in both these cases was by
his left; had he turned to the east, he would have forced them
to fight at both places. However, it must be remembered
that Roberts counted on Buller's advance from Natal, which
the latter was unable to effect; moreover, his main object was
to keep the Boers moving by the rapidity of his strokes, and
at both the above mentioned places the turning of the
western flank was far the easier, hence the more quickly
accomplished.
Strategically, then, his march marked the great command-
er who takes a comprehensive view of the entire situation,
and retains his object, in spite of mishaps in isolated parts
of the theatre. Tactically he could not reap the full harvest
of his strategy because of Buller's difficult advance from
Natal and the disturbances around Lindley threatening his
line of communications in rear: the necessity for rapidity of
action was greater than that for perfection in tactical
disposition.
THE SECOND BOER WAlf. 179
V 7 .
The fourth act in the South African war closed with
the brilliant campaign of Roberts, ending with the occupa-
tion of Pretoria, the Transvaal capital.
Pretoria had been well fortified with seven strong forts,
but only five of these had their armament. Fort Signal,
about 5^ miles south of Pretoria, commanded the railroad
to Johannesburg, and was well armed, and at the outbreak
of hostilities fully garrisoned; and Fort Wonder-boom, about
5 miles south of the capital, was one of the best of modern
forts. The garrisons, however, had been sent into the field,
and were never replaced. Moreover, the entire line of de-
fense was too extended for the 10,000 men left to hold it.
For these reasons the Boers gave up this important point,
and retired to Middelburg on the railroad, leaving a strong
rear guard at Hatherley, 12 miles east of Pretoria.
They had decided to defend the mountain district of
Lydenburg, and had for some time been sending daily from
Pretoria 50 trains with supplies into this region. Neverthe-
less, they had not yet made up their minds to limit them-
selves to guerrilla warfare, but proposed to make a stand at
any good available defensive positions, such as Hatherley,
Middelburg and Yolksrust.
In the northern part of the Orange Free State their re-
sistance was not yet subdued, but there guerrilla warfare was
exclusively adopted, and proved effective.
Events in Orange River Colony.
Lord Roberts reached the end of his march with about
25,000 men 10,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, so that he
still had enough to cope with Botha, and had reason to hope
that Buller and Hunter could advance to Pretoria. But the
180 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
great danger was that threatening his lines of communica-
tion, especially as Buller's advance was too slow to enable
him to count on a line through Natal in time, and to dispense
entirely with the line through Kroonstad.
Roberts took with him into the Transvaal about 46,000
men. Hunter, Mahon and Plumer had about 11,500. In
Orange River Colony there were about 41,500.
His immediate army comprised Pole-Carew's (llth)
division, Smith-Dorrien's brigade of Colville's division, and
Maxwell's of Tucker's division; also French's cavalry, and
Hamilton's mounted infantry.
The following troops had been assigned to the protection
of the lines of communication in rear of Roberts' army, viz.:
1st division, Lord Methuen, on the Rhenoster (Paget's
Brigade at Lindley).
3d division, Chermside, near Senekal.
6th division (J), Kelly-Kenny, at Bloemfontein.
8th division, Rundle, at Hammonia.
8th division, Colville, at Heilbron.
Colonial division, Brabant, at Ficksburg.
West of Johannesburg the detachments of Hunter and
Colonel Mahon had joined forces at Ventersdorp. Troops
from Cape Colony and half of Kelly-Kenny's division (Max-
well's brigade from Johannesburg) had been sent to Kroon-
stad to strengthen the line of communications.
Buller in Natal had Clery's, Lyttleton's and Warren's
divisions, as well as three Natal cavalry brigades.
The Boers were still about 27,000 strong: 10,000 at
Hatherley Middelburg (east of Pretoria), 8,000 under
Stein at Heilbron Bethlehem Harrismith Ficksburg
Vreede, 9,000 at Laings Nek.
De Wet, who had retired into the Elandsberge, between
Lindley and Frankfort, soon began to display great activity.
Utilizing the difficult mountain district as his base, he made
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 181
constant forays against the railroad between Kroonstad and
Vereeniging. In the early art of June he succeeded in de-
stroying the telegraph line and the railroad, near Eoodeval
and American Station, for a distance of 20 miles.
The advance of Methuen from Lindley towards Heil-
bron, and of the troops of the lines of communication under
Lord Kitchener from Vereeniging, prevented their gaining
a permanent foothold, but constant forays were made
against this long line of railroad. Lord Kitchener joined
torces with Methuen at Heilbron, and the united forces
marched to the Ehenoster Eiver, where they completely
defeated De Wet, and then marched to Kroonstad. During
the repair of the road between Roodeval and American Sta-
tion the Boers captured a number of workmen, detachments
of troops, convoys, and in one case even an entire battalion
the 4th of the Derbyshire Militia Regiment. The Boers
were especially active against Honing Spruit Station.
Whenever successful they retired to their fortresses in the
Elandsberge.
On June 19th, De Wet with 5,000 men attacked Meth-
uen's force, escorting a transport train to Heilbron, but was
defeated. Nevertheless, on the 23d, he cut off a British de-
tachment on the Kroonstad Honing Spruit Section, at-
tacked the camp of the Shropshire Regiment and the
Canadian Contingent, captured a train going south, tore up
the track for some distance, and only retired before superior
forces coming from Kroonstad.
In the vicinity of Ficksburg, where General Brabant
had remained, and at Hammonia, whither Rundle was has-
tening in support, the Boers under De Villiers were also act-
ive. In the middle of June, Brabant disarmed a Boer com-
mando of 1,500 men near Ficksburg, but the Boers received
considerable reinforcements from the northern part of the
Orange River Colony. President Stein had moved his seat
182 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
of government to Bethlehem, so as to be between De Wet
and De Villiers, in order to incite both to desperate and con-
stant resistance.
These engagements have no effect on the general situa-
tion, and the fact remains that a large part of the inhabit-
ants of the Orange River Colony have retired to their farms,
leaving the forces in the field too weak to accomplish any-
thing decisive.
Events in Natal.
The advance of Buller in Natal against the extremely
strong position of the Boers had been necessarily slow, so
that he was not able to take part in the proposed concentric
advance on Johannesburg. His efforts were directed to
turning the Boer position, and in this he showed that he had
learned well the lesson of the Tugela.
His attempt to turn the Boer left flank, by detaching
Lyttleton to Vryheid and Hildyard to Utrecht, failed. His
next step was to secure favorable artillery positions to com-
mand Majuba Hill and Laings Nek, operating against the
right flank of the Boer position.
The advance of Lord Roberts to Johannesburg had had
its effect on the Boer troops, and their forces, previously
given at 10,000, were considerably reduced. Their leader,
Christian Botha, had asked for a three-days cessation of hos-
tilities, but Buller's demand for unconditional surrender
ended the correspondence.
Oh June 3d, Buller resumed his advance, his plan being
to hold the Boer front and to roll up the flanks. For this
purpose he made a reconnoissance over Bothas Pass towards
Gansvlei Spruit, a branch of the Klip River, and then assem-
bled his forces behind his left wing for a decisive attack.
Meanwhile, Lord StrathconaV Horse (from Canada) was
sent out to the north to threaten the rear of Botha's force
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 183
and his railway communications with Delagoa Bay o\ r ( j r
Komatipoort.
General Coke, with the 10th brigade and the South
African Light Horse, took the Van Wyk Berg, a spur of
Mount Prospect, with little loss; and in the night of the 7th r
the Van Wyk Berg and the southwestern spurs of the Ink-
welo Berg were occupied by artillery. Under the protection
of the fire of the latter, General Hildyard on the 8th attacked
the heights between the Inkwelo and Bothas Pass and car-
ried them in excellent form, winning thereby his promotion
to lieutenant-general. Almonds Nek, the last pass before
Charlestown, was taken, and the road to the enemy's rear
was opened.
On the 9th Buller resumed the offensive, moving in the
direction of the Gansvlei valley, pushing along the Transvaal
and Natal border in a northeastern direction, to turn Laings
Nek. The Boers in his front retired towards Paarde Kop,
and on the llth of June, after the 'further advance of the
British on Volksrust, the Boers (3,000), occupying Laings
Nek and Majuba Hill, abandoned this strong position, re-
tiring on \Yakkerstroom. They were thus separated into
two parts, but in spite of the success of Buller's strategical
maneuvers, the Boers were enabled to retire without loss,
taking their artillery and train with them.
On June 12th Buller, on account of the scarcity of water,
retired from Volksrust to Charlestown, where he joined
Clery, who had come from Ingogo.
The interruption of the railroad at Laings Nek was soon
repaired, and by the 17th of June the first train was running
through this point.
On the 19th Lord Strathcona's Horse (sent out about
the 9th) destroyed a railway bridge near Komatipoort, cut-
ting Botha's communications in that direction.
184 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
EVENTS IN THE TRANSVAAL.
First Campaign Against Louis Botha.
Reconnoissances from Roberts' main army at Pretoria
had established the fact that Louis Botha's army was at
Eerste Fabrieken (Hatherley and Donkerholk), about 16 miles
east of Pretoria, on both sides of the Middelburg road. The
position was a strong one, but too extended for the troops
occupying it about 12,000.
In spite of the fact that everything was quiet and peace-
ful in Pretoria and Johannesburg, the close proximity of so
strong a Boer army was a constant menace, and Roberts de-
cided to attack it. Reinforcements could not be expected
for some time, as Buller was still at Laings Nek, Hunter at
Potchef stroom, Baden-Powell at Rustenburg, and no troops
could be spared from the line of communications. He there-
fore decided to make the attack with what troops he had in
hand.
The Battle of Diamond Hill
Botha had concentrated his forces on the flanks of his
position, leaving the center comparatively weak. Roberts,
following his usual course, advanced on the llth of June
with a broad front, intending to enclose the Boers with both
flanks; French's cavalry division on the left to turn the Boer
right flank; Hamilton, with the mounted infantry and Broad-
wood's brigade on the right, to turn the Boer left; while Pole-
Carew, with some mounted infantry, under Colonel Henry,
held the enemy at the center. Roberts, however, soon found
Botha's flanks too strong, and directed his efforts on the
center, ordering Hamilton to attack Diamond Hill, which
was accomplished with little loss on the 12th by the aid of
Pole-Carew's division, the Boers retiring towards Middel-
burg. The British troops did not pursue, but returned to
Pretoria.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 185
Roberts decided to await the arrival of reinforcements
before inaugurating a definite campaign against the forces
in northern Orange River Colony, threatening his line of com-
munications. With this object in view, he drew in the Natal
army along the Laings Nek Johannesburg railroad, to sep-
arate completely the Transvaal and Orange Boers. Buller
reached Standerton on the 17th, and Hunter turned off at
Kriigersdorp (west of Johannesburg) towards Frankfort.
Baden-Powell reached Pretoria on the 18th. On the 21st
Buller reached Paarde Kop; Hamilton's column from Pre-
toria reaching Springs on the same day, ready to join hands
with Buller at Heidelberg on the 24th of June, but Buller
was forced to halt at Standerton, which he reached on
the 23d, because the Boers had destroyed the bridge there,
and their forces to the eastward threatened his line of
communications.
EVENTS IN ORANGE RIVER COLONY.*
Roberts, towards the end of June, directed his attention
to the Boers under Steyn and De Wet, threatening his line
of communications. The enveloping movement already be-
gun was gradually completed.
A glance at the general situation at this time will aid
materially in comprehending the movements about to follow :
Baden-Powell, Hutton and Plumer held Rustenburg;
Pole-Carew, Tucker and French formed the garrisons of Pre-
toria and Johannesburg; Smith-Dorrien was at Vredefort
(southwest of Johannesburg), to guard the west of the rail-
road; Methuen, Knox, Kelly-Kenny, Clements, Paget, and
*In Cape Colony, on June 23d, De Villier's commando, 200 men,
280 horses, 18 wagons, 260 rifles, and over 100,000 rounds of ammu-
nition, arrived at Blikfontein and surrendered to Sir Charles Warren.
De Villiers in person escaped eastward.
186 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Colville were stationed at Rhenoster, Kroonstad, Bloemfon-
tein, Senekal, Lindley and Heilbron, respectively, to guard
the railroad on the east; Bundle and Brabant completed the
cordon along the northwest border of Basutoland, at Ham-
monia and Ficksburg, respectively; Hamilton and Hunter
occupied Heidelberg; and Buller had reached Standerton.
The Boers, still numbering 20,000, had about two-thirds
of their forces south of the Vaal, divided into four com-
mandoes, under Piet and Christian De Wet, Limmer and
Olivier.
Buller, after occupying Standerton, sent mounted troops
forward to Greylingstad. Vilj eon's commando, which had
held the place, retired towards Middelburg. Buller had left a
strong detachment under Hildyard at Volksrust and Laings
Xek to guard the pass and railroad against any efforts of the
Boers who had retired from that point on Wakkerstroom.
During his advance his outposts had met numerous small
bodies of Boers, indicating the presence of the latter on all
sides. A Boer force of 1,000 from Wakkerstroom took up a
strong position at Gras Kop, northwest of Volksrust, and fif-
teen miles from Sand Spruit Station, threatening the railway
line.
On June 29th General Coke, sent on a reconnoissance
with the 10th brigade to Amersfoort (12 miles north of the
railroad), discovered a force of 2,000 Boers with guns in a
strong position there, which he did not attack. In view of
these facts, Buller strengthened his outpost at Greylingstad
with a brigade on July 3d, and early in July pushed out
Clery to the vicinity of Heidelberg, where he joined Hart's
brigade on the 4th. Thus it is evident that nearly all of
Buller's troops were needed to guard the railroad. How-
ever, on July Tth, he reported that the railroad was service-
able as far as Pretoria.
Buller's portion along the railroad completed the sepa-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 187
ration of the Orange from the Transvaal Boers and brought
his forces in contact with those of Roberts.
The Campaign Against De Wet.
As soon as Roberts had organized his cordon around the
Orange Boers, and had completed their separation from the
Transvaal Boers, he proceeded to institute a decisive cam-
paign against De Wet, ensconced in the Elandsberge.
whence he had made numerous successful sorties against the
troops guarding the lines of communication.
The general movements were inaugurated on July 1st
by sending Hunter (exclusive of Hart's brigade, which w r as
left at Heidelberg), as well as Broadwood's and Little's cav-
alry brigades, to Frankfort.
As soon as these troops were in position, the following
changes in organization and command were instituted :
Colville's division (!>th) was broken up, and its comman-
der relieved; Macdonald's (Highlander) brigade being as-
signed to Hunter's (10th) division, in place of Hart's, joining
Hunter on July 3d in Frankfort; Smith-Dorrien's being trans-
ferred to Methuen's (1st) division, then at Paarde Kraal, north
of Kroonstad, the latter sending Paget's brigade to operate
against De Wet. Broadwood's and Little's brigades, first
attached to Hunter's division, were now attached to Paget's
brigade, which was to constitute Hunter's advance guard.
The mounted infantry, which had been sent from Roberts'
immediate command, reached Heilbron on the 8th of July,
but was afterwards called back to relieve Methuen on the
lines of communication, when the latter was sent on July
llth to the relief of Rustenburg.
The general plan was a concentric advance of Hunter
from Frankfort, Paget from Kroonstad, and Clements from
Winburg, against De Wet, in order to surround and capture
him in the mountains near Lindlev.
188 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Paget moved rapidly, reached Pleiserfontein, east of
Lindley, on July 3d, and had an engagement with the Boers
there. The latter were defeated and followed by Paget on
the 4th to a point half way between Lindley and Bethlehem
(the temporary seat of the Orange Boer government, which
was now moved to Reitz). De Wet had taken up a strong
position at Bethlehem, consequently Paget hesitated to at-
tack him, and decided to await the arrival of Clements. On
the 7th their combined forces continued the advance, and
compelled the Boers to retire into the mountains south of
Bethlehem.
Meanwhile Broadwood and Little arrived at Bethlehem,
while Hunter was still on the march from the north, some
distance away. The original concentric advance of three
columns had thus become the simple advance of a single
column.
De Wet, after retiring into the Roode Berge south of
Bethlehem, found himself between the forces at Bethlehem
and the Basutoland border, threatened in his left flank by
Brabant and Bundle, and cut off in the west.
Meanwhile, Bundle and Brabant continued their ad-
vance, reaching Rooikrans (northwest of Ficksburg), where
they drove off a small Boer detachment, and establishing the
fact that a strong Boer force was posted east of that place.
On July 16th, meeting with little resistance, De Wet
was enabled to break through the left flank of Rundle's line,
with 1,500 men and 5 guns, marching on Lindley.
Broadwood and Little (from Bethlehem, where Bruce
Hamilton had now arrived) followed in pursuit, and struck
De Wet on the 19th at Palmietfontein, just west of Lindley,
and defeated him. But on the 22d he turned up at Serfon-
tein, just north of Honing Spruit, took a transport train
with its guard (1 officer, 100 men), continuing his march to
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 189
Vredefort, where he halted on the 23d and prepared his posi-
tion for defence.
The Boers again displayed considerable activity at other
points. A reconnoitering party with a battery, sent out from
Bethlehem by Hunter on July 21st, came upon a strong posi-
tion 'held by Boers about 20 miles west of Bethlehem, and
was forced back. On the 22 minor engagements took place
with Boer forces south of Bethlehem, and on the 23d Hunter
moved out with stronger forces, but failed to carry the Boer
position on that day. On the 24th, however, he succeeded
in turning the Boer flanks, the latter retiring before him.
He moved south in pursuit, reaching Fouriesburg on the
27th.
Meanwhile Rundle continued his advance, pushing the
retiring Boers in his front before him towards the same point.
He occupied Kommando Nek, and the two forces of Boers
found themselves between Hunter and Eundle. The result
was that Prinsloo with about 4,140 men surrendered on July
30th. - Among the captured were commandants Villiers and
Crowther, and three other commandants of less note. Gen-
eral Olivier, with his commando and five guns, however, suc-
ceeded in breaking through in the direction of Harrismith.
EVENTS IN THE TRANSVAAL.
The renewed activity of the Boers was made evident not
only along Roberts' line of communications, but also on his
immediate front and flanks. The flanks of the British army
at Pretoria are covered by detachments at Rustenburg (50
miles west of the capital), near Bronkhorst Spruit (35 miles
east) and at Springs (the terminus of the branch line from
Johannesburg), and at all these points, as well as at others,
the Boers made more or less energetic attacks, besides that
already referred to at Greylingstad.
190 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Actions at Rustenburg and Olifants Nek.
On July 8th Lemmer with a commando of Boers sud-
denly appeared before Rustenburg, occupied the heights com-
manding the town, and demanded its surrender. Major
Tracy, in command there, refused, and' opened an attack on
the Boers. Part of Carrington's force from Zeerust arrived
in time to take part in the action, and Lemmer was forced to
give up the siege and retire. A few days later, however,
after this relief force moved on to join Lord Roberts, the Boer-
leader Delarey appeared before Rustenburg and resumed the
\siege. The garrison was too weak to resist him for any
length of time, so Roberts, to relieve his threatened left flank
and restore communication with Mafeking, was forced to
draw Methuen from Paarde Kraal (north of Kroonstad) to
Rustenburg. The latter reached on the 21st the vicinity of
Rustenburg over Kriigersdorp, struck the Boers at Olifants
Nek, and dispersed them.
Lord Roberts had at this time decided on a grand right
wheel of his army, advancing on Middelburg, and Methuen
was left at Rustenburg to cover his rear. But on the 25th he
was ordered to march over Potchef stroom tow r ards the Vaal,
to join Broadwood and Little against De Wet, who had in-
trenched himself at Vredefort.
In Roberts' immediate front the army of Louis Botha had
again grown to a strength of 15,000 men, and had taken up
its position at Bronkhorst Spruit, 35 miles east of Pretoria.
Action at Springs.
Colonel Mahon had occupied w r ith his own troops and
portions of Hamilton's mounted infantry, which had been
left in the Transvaal, the important end station, Springs, on
the Johannesburg branch. He was the first to feel the pres-
sure of this strong Boer army in such close proximity to
Roberts' front. On July 6th, about 3,000 Boers attacked his
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 191
position, and could only be forced back over the Bronkhorst
Spruit after a hard fight on the 7th. But this attack Avas evi-
dently merely a diversion to cover a more determined ad-
vance of the Boers by the north and west of Pretoria to act
on the flank of Roberts' line and gain touch with the Boers
around Rustenburg.
Action at Uitvals Nek.
In anticipation of such a movement Roberts had sent five
companies of the Lincolnshire Regiment, and a squadron of
Scots Greys, with several guns, to occupy Uitvals (Massili-
katz) Nek, a pass about 18 miles west of Pretoria, to cover
his left flank. These troops reached their destination on
July 10th, and occupied a position directly covering the pass
with three companies, the other tw r o being left on the plain.
On the llth, at dawn, Boers to the north of the pass opened
fire on the British outposts, and at the same time a heavy
fire was opened by Boers from kopjes to the east of the pass,
or in rear of the British. These Boers were part of Dela-
rey's force. The fight lasted all day, and although reinforce-
ments were sent, they arrived too late, the three companies
in the pass having been surrounded and captured. The Brit-
ish lost 00 prisoners, besides the killed and wounded. The
latter amounted to 1 officer and 15 men killed; 3 officers and
51 men wounded.
Action at Derdepoort.
On the same day, July llth, Roberts' outpost at Derde-
poort (5 miles northeast of Pretoria) was surprised and at-
tacked by the Boers under Delarey, resulting in the retreat
of the British with considerable loss, viz.: 1 officer and two
men killed; 2 officers and 4 men wounded; and 19 men
missing.
Another Boer subdivision occupied a ridge running east
.and west, about 10 miles north of Pretoria, but retired before
192 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
a strong detachment * sent out by Roberts on July 16th, since
it had accomplished its object of drawing British troops in
that direction, in order to prepare the way for a direct attack
on Roberts' front.
The latter was directed on Pole-Carew's left flank and
the left wing, commanded by Hutton, but the excellent han-
dling of the British artillery resulted in the defeat of the
Boers. An attack on Springs, at the same time, was re-
pelled by the fire of the Royal Irish Regiment.
Numerous sallies were also made against the British
detachments at Krtigersdorp.
All these operations of the Boers indicated their pres-
ence on all sides of Roberts' army, and demanded some de-
cided action at once.
CAMPAIGN OF MIDDELBURG.
Second Campaign Against Louis Botha.
Roberts determined to move against the strongest and
most active of the Boer armies namely, that of General
Louis Botha, in the direction of Middelburg.
On July 19th the movement began. The British line
was formed just east of Pretoria, facing eastward: French on
the right at Treneestate, Pole-Carew in the center, Button's
mounted infantry on the left, including Hamilton's mounted
infantry and Mahon's brigade, which had been sent to-
Springs.
The British forces numbered about 22,000; the Boers had
about 12,000 men in position.
He first moved along the railroad to Bronkhorst Spruit;
*A new brigade under Colonel Cunningham was formed, com-
prising 1st battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st battalion
Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1st battalion Argyll and Sutherland High-
landers. Hickman's mounted infantry (1,800) was attached.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 193
during the advance Button was sent to reinforce French's
right wing, while Hamilton's and Mahon's mounted infantry
moved to the left flank behind Pole-Carew's division.
On July 22d the right wing was south of Prinsloo, on the
Bronkhorst Spruit, its center at the station ; the left flank at
Russf ontein (6 miles north of the station) ; giving Pole-Carew
a very advantageous position at the center. On the 23d,
when the general advance began, the Boers retired eastward.
French reached the eastern shore of Wilge River, 7 miles
south of Balmoral Station (5 miles east of Wilge River Sta-
tion), on the afternoon of the 24th; the leading brigade (Ste-
phenson's) of Pole-Carew's division arrived at the Elands
River station (30 miles east of Pretoria); while Hamilton re-
mained about 8 miles in rear, as a left flank guard. The
Boers had offered no resistance at any point.
On the eastern shore of the Wilge River, however,
French found a Boer commando of 2,000 Boers ready to resist
his advance. Part of Button's mounted infantry attacked
the right flank of the position, while French endeavored to
pass around the left flank. The Boers retired, and French
and Hutton pursued, but failed to get any material results.
On the 25th the center reached Balmoral Station, 10
miles east of Elands River. French and Hutton continued
the pursuit over the Steenkoot River, where the condition of
their horses compelled them to halt. A few detachments
crossed the Olifant River, and reported strong columns of
Boers in full retreat on Middelburg. The weather was very
inclement, the rain falling in torrents, and a cold east wind
blowing. This, together with the condition of the horses,
prevented Roberts from taking advantage of the situation.
Roberts in person, and the troops of Hamilton and Ma-
hon, returned to Pretoria, which they reached on the 30th.
French and Pole-Carew (their forces amounting to about
15,000 men) continued the pursuit as far as Middelburg, where
-13-
194 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
they arrived on the 29th. Louis Botha withdrew into the
hills of Wonderfontein with his main army, leaving a con-
siderable force on the Bothas Berge, north of Middelburg,
threatening the left flank of any further advance eastward
on the part of the British.
Meanwhile Buller (who had previously moved from
Standerton back to Paarde Kop, to be nearer Hildyard, who
was constantly threatened by the forces under Christian
Botha near Volksrust) sent Lyttleton and two cavalry brig-
ades to threaten the Boer left flank east of Middelburg, these
troops reaching Amersfoort (25 miles north of Volksrust)
on the 5th of August. Clery was left to guard the rail-
road between Standerton and Heidelberg; Hildyard near
Volksrust.
Botha at first retired before Buller, but finally made a
stand on a ridge north of Amersfoort.
On August 6th the British attacked the position: Dun-
donald on the west side, the infantry on the east; the latter,
with the King's Royal Fusiliers on the right, and the Gordon
Highlanders on the left, continued the attack, in spite of the
heavy artillery fire, till 5 p. m., when the Boers retired. The
roads were so bad that the train was so far to the rear; conse-
quently Buller was compelled to remain in Amersfoort on
the 7th.
On the 8th he continued his advance, reaching Rood (on
the Vaal) on the 9th, and on the 12th Ermelo, in rear of the
forces of Christian Botha, who were retiring on Carolina.
On the 15th he reached Twyfelaar, near Carolina, Mean-
while French's reconnoitering parties from Middleburg over
Wonderfontein had established communication with Buller.
The Boers made several attempts on Buller's line of com-
munications. In the vicinity of Ingogo, south of Laings Nek,
they brought a heavy gun into position with a view to destroy
the iron railroad bridge there; near Lady smith they made
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 195
several efforts to break up the railroad; and finally, on Aug-
ust 21st, a Boer detachment destroyed the bridge 9 miles
north of Newcastle, and broke up the railroad south of that
point. West of Standerton also there were constant skir-
mishes with Boer detachments.
These interruptions caused Buller to delay his further
advance.
The Chase After De Wet.
De Wet had intrenched himself in the vicinity of Vrede-
fort, whither he had been pursued by Broadwood and Little.
Methuen had been ordered down from Rustenburg over Pot-
chef stroom, to take part in the pursuit of De Wet.
This Boer leader with his small column, with which was
also President Steyn, was considered of such importance
that Lord Kitchener w r as ordered to take the troops from
Springs, reinforce Broadwood and Little, and conduct the
operations, but Methuen was not placed under his orders,
the latter retaining independent command of his own column
from the northwest.
De Wet remained inactive from the 23d of July to the 7th
of August, awaiting the approach of Methuen from Potchef-
stroom, and Kitchener, operating south of the Vaal. On
that day, however, he marched his main column to Linde-
quees Drift, 20 miles up stream from Vredefort, and pro-
tected himself against Kitchener, sending a flank column
over the Vaal at Venterskroon, 7 miles northwest of Vrede-
fort, to cover his position against a flank attack by Methuen,
which might impede his passage of the river. This flank
column, on the morning of August 7th, had an action with
Methuen's advanced troops, but retired in good order, reach-
ing Buffelshoek, 7 miles northeast of Venterskroon, on Aug-
ust 9th (the day on which Lord Kitchener reached Linde-
quees Drift, and had a slight engagement with De Wet's
rear guard), and was attacked again by Methuen. Neither
196 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
British commander knew of the near presence of the other
until the fighting at Lindequees Drift on the one hand, and
Buffelshoek on the other, informed them ; otherwise Methuen
would have moved by his right, joined hands with Kitchener,
and then rolled up De Wet's flank. De Wet drew his forces
on the 9th from the two rear-guard actions, combined his
forces, and retired on Welverdiend, 18 miles northeast of
Potchefstroom, whereas Kitchener and Methuen did not join
forces till the 10th, north of Buffelshoek.
At Welverdiend, however, De Wet found Smith-Dorrien,
whom Lord Methuen had left behind to guard the railroad,
and who now blocked his way northward. He had little
difficulty, however, in slipping by these troops, following
the Mooi River towards Rustenburg.
Kitchener and Methuen, moving in two separate col-
umns, overtook De Wet again on the 13th of August east of
Ventersdorp, Methuen succeeding in capturing one gun. On
the- night of the 13th, De Wet liberated his 60 British pris-
oners, blew up three ammunition wagons and abandoned
30 worn-out horses, and escaped from his pursuers.
On August 17th De Wet reached Kommando Nek in the
Magalies Hills, between Pretoria and Rustenburg, and came
here upon Baden-Powell, who happened to have withdrawn
to this point, for reasons which will be at once explained.
The British had posted three detachments to guard the
line from Mafeking towards Pretoria, viz. : Carrington (who
had come through Rhodesia and taken part in the first relief
of Rustenburg) at Zeerust; Lieutenant-Colonel Hore, with
400 men at Elands River, 40 miles west of Rustenburg, and
Baden-Powell, with 4,000 men, at the latter place, where he
had been twice besieged and relieved, and was still constant-
ly threatened by Delarey (who had recently been reinforced
by Grobeler's commando).
As soon as Methuen left to operate against De Wet,.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 197
Eustenburg was besieged for the third time, and this ex-
plains why Lord Roberts brought Hamilton's and Mahon's
mounted infantry back from the campaign against Middel-
burg. Hamilton left Pretoria on his way to relieve Eusten-
burg on August 2d, and succeeded in joining Baden-Powell,
Delarey retiring without resisting. Hamilton brought
Baden-Powell to Komando Nek, where the latter intrenched
himself, and himself started southward to take part in the
chase after De Wet, reaching Blaauwbank on August 13th.
No sooner was Eustenburg abandoned than Delarey
turned on the weak garrison of Elands Eiver and besieged it.
Carrington, with 900 men and several guns, started out from
Zeerust on August 3d to relieve Ho re, but on the 5th, as he
was approaching Hore's camp, he found his way impeded by
a strong Boer force with artillery. He was forced to retire,
under heavy cross fire, and reached Zeerust, after consider-
able loss in men and material on the 7th ; but at once decided
to retire still farther. On his way to Maf eking he met
another force of Boers at Ottoshoop and Malmain on the
KJth of August, and had a skirmish with them, but drove
them off. ,
Hore was thus entirely isolated after August 6th. On
the 10th a messenger from Hore came through the Boer lines
and reported the garrison still resisting. Eoberts received
this message on the 13th, and at once ordered Carrington
and Hamilton to return to the relief of Hore. Meanwhile
Kitchener, who saw the uselessness of further pursuit of De
Wet, and hearing of Hore's dilemma, also started to his re-
lief, reaching Elands Eiver on August 16th, the Boers retir-
ing northward. Methuen, giving up the pursuit of De Wet
in the vicinity of Eustenburg, started westward to the region
about Zeerust, Mafeking and Lichtenburg, to restore order
at points threatened by the Boers.
When Hamilton on the 17th approached Eustenburg he
198 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
learned of the relief of Elands River, and also of the near
presence of De Wet, who, after calling upon Baden-Powell
at Kommando Nek to surrender, had continued his march
on the 18th towards the Sterk Stroom north of Rensburg.
Hamilton had reached Olifants Nek, south of Rustenburg, on
the 17th, and Mahon, his advance guard, came in touch with
De Wet. Hamilton decided to continue the pursuit; mean-
while Baden-Powell, moving towards Rensburg on the Pre-
toria Rustenburg road, attempted to strike De Wet's flank.
On the 19th, while Baden-Powell continued his turning move-
ment, Mahon succeeded in engaging De Wet's rear guard in
an action on the Crocodile River; but the latter escaped, and
on the 20th camped near Hebron, 20 miles northwest of
Pretoria.
It looked as if De Wet was aiming to cross the railroad
north of Pretoria and join Louis Botha's forces.
Roberts meanwhile had sent Paget on the 18th of Aug-
ost along the Pretoria Pietersburg road northward, and
the latter, after forcing small Boer detachments out of the
Homes Nek (10 miles northwest of Pretoria), had taken up
a position near Hammans Kraal (27 miles from Pretoria). On
the 20th, Roberts also sent Clements northward to take part
in the pursuit of De Wet. Baden-Powell, turning out of the
Pretoria Rustenburg road, completed the line around
De Wet.
On the 2()th Paget allowed himself to be drawn into a
fight by a detachment of De Wet's, and was held fast all day ;
and on the 21st Baden-Powell struggled all day against the
rear guard of Grobeler (part of whose forces had joined De
Wet). Meanwhile De Wet accomplished the main object
of his long and dangerous march, viz.: to enable President
Steyn (with a strong detachment) to escape eastward over
the Pienaars River to join Kr tiger in Machadodorp through
the unoccupied region over the Bothas Berge. De Wet him-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 199
self, with a small force, turned back over the Magalies Berge
to regain the Orange River Colony.
The force under Methuen remained in western Trans-
vaal, while Paget and Baden-Powell took charge of the Pre-
toria Pietersburg railroad.
Hamilton's division was taken by Lord Roberts on the
new campaign against Botha.
THE SITUATION IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY.
The capitulation of Prinsloo at Fouriesburg, the escape
of De Wet northward, and that of Olivier eastward, were
the events that marked the end of July in this region. Mac-
donald, who was pursuing Olivier, reached Harrismith^
which yielded without resistance; Hunter remained at Beth-
lehem, while Rundle also advanced to Harri smith, to secure
the Ladysmith Bethlehem railroad, which was now placed
in operation.
Small Boer commandoes still infested the district, how-
ever, and as early as August 2d one attacked the line at Rhe-
noster Spruit, compelling Knox to move out against it from
Kroonstad ; while another derailed a train at Honing Spruit
(south of Kroonstad). These disturbances were all the more
difficult to control as the British forces had been greatly
reduced by the removal of Broadwood, Little, Paget and
Clements, who had gone in pursuit of De Wet.
Towards the middle of August, Olivier suddenly ap-
peared south of Heilbron. Hunter moved out against him
from Bethlehem and was joined by Macdonald. They at-
tacked Olivier on August 15th, but failed to capture him, or.
prevent his escape, and lost touch with him in the pursuit.
Soon after, Olivier fell upon a British post at Ventersburg,
inflicting a loss on the British of 2 killed and 5 officers
and 24 men captured. On August 25th he attacked Win-
200 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
burg from three sides, but was defeated by Bruce Hamilton,
and, with three of his sons, was made prisoner.
Soon after, a Boer commando appeared before Lady-
brand and threatened the town.
These disturbances, evidently intended to keep the
British forces divided, decided Roberts once more to insti-
tute a decisive stroke against the main Boer army east of
Middelburg.
THE THIRD CAMPAIGN AGAINST LOUIS BOTHA.
Lord Roberts moved his headquarters to Wonderfontein
Station (25 miles east of Middelburg) on the 26th of August,
preparatory to resuming the offensive against Botha.
Buller had moved out from Twyfelaar (near Carolina)
in a northerly direction on the 23d of August, French's cav-
alry clearing up his front and left flank. The latter met with
considerable resistance, but the advance of Buller's division
(especially the artillery) compelled the Boers to give way.
In this action (near Geluk) in consequence of a misun-
derstanding, two British companies advanced about 1,500
yards into a hollow, out of sight of the main firing-line, sepa-
rated from the main body, and were surrounded by the Boers.
They lost 1 officer and 12 men killed, 57 men wounded and
33 prisoners.
On the 24th and 25th of August, Buller and French met
with increased resistance, and it became evident that the
Boers were preparing to make a stand in the hills west of
Machadodorp. Pole-Carew had occupied Belfast on the
25th, and came in contact with the main Boer army at Dal-
manutha. The British line extended from near Belfast back
along the railroad some 30 miles, and the Boer front facing
it was evidently strong and of considerable extent, and its
artillery fire was well sustained. To form this line the Boer
forces in the Bothas Berge, northeast of Middelburg, had to
be considerably reduced, which explains the unopposed ad-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 201
vance of Pole-Carew to Belfast, the Boer plan being to make
an offensive advance with their left flank.
French, who had the duty of keeping up communication
between Buller and Pole-Carew, by the concentric advance
of the latter necessarily came up with his cavalry between
these two divisions, thus bringing the cavalry in the center
of the front of operations. Measures were therefore taken
to concentrate the British troops and at the same time get
the cavalry on the flank again.
On August 26th the battle raged all along the line.
Buller, with Lyttleton's division and two cavalry brigades,
attempted to force his way north from the southwest of Dal-
manutha, working around the Boer left flank. French took
his two cavalry brigades behind Pole-Carew's division to
the left flank.
The reasons for putting the cavalry division on the left
flank were: to keep the Boers out of the malarious and diffi-
cult country of the Lydenburg district, and to force them
along the railroad into the Portuguese colony.
French forced a part of the Boers towards Lekenvley
(on the Belfast Lydenburg road, 5 miles north of Belfast),
but the difficult country (hilly, broken and covered with
dense brush) prevented his further advance and favored the
Boer defence to such an extent that Pole-Carew had to move
out in support. The advance met with stubborn resistance,
the Boer positions being generally supported by guns of
heavy caliber. But the Boer forces were not directed in such
a way as to bring their tactics to bear with full effect, their
resistance consisting in separate engagements, and was not
based on any general plan. Consequently, in spite of the dif-
ficulties, the British made some headway, Buller forcing his
way to Bergendal, while Pole-Carew broke the Boer resist-
ance at Lekenvley.
On the 27th French, on the left flank, moved out over
202 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Lekenvley on the Lydenburg road as far as the Schwartz
Kopjes (10 miles north of Machadodorp), and then cleared up
the ground in front of Pole-Carew's division.
The Battle of Bergendal.
Buller, however, met with strong resistance at Bergen-
dal (between Belfast and Dalmanutha), a town lying at the
foot of two kopjes commanding the approach, which led over
an open plain, about a mile broad. The attack was con-
ducted with excellent skill and judgment. Buller opened
with a heavy artillery fire which was remarkably effective,
utterly demoralizing the supports of the Boer front, and then
advanced the Inniskilling Fusiliers, w r ho took the town with-
out a halt, and also occupied one of the neighboring hills,
thus forcing the Boers to retire precipitately.
Buller lost 1 officer and 13 men killed, 7 officers and 57
men wounded; the Boers left 20 killed and 19 prisoners on
the field. The Boers, retiring on Dalmanutha, disputed the
advance foot by foot till dark.
Buller's advance on the 28th, however, met with little
resistance, and before noon his advance guard reached Ma-
chadodorp. The Boers retired northward, pursued by Dun-
donald to Helvetia (7 miles north of Machadodorp), where
the country became too difficult and dangerous for cavalry
alone.
French advanced to Elandsfontein (9 miles west of Hel-
vetia), establishing signal communication with Machado-
dorp. Pole-Carew followed French to the Schwartz Kopjes
(10 miles north of Machadodorp).
Presidents Kriiger and Steyn fled to Nel Spruit, near the
Portuguese border.
Buller continued his advance on Lydenburg on August
31st, over Helvetia, crossing the Crocodile Kiver on the 1st
of September, meeting with little resistance from Botha's
UNIVERSITY
THE SECOND BOER W/ *
rear guard. On the 2d, however, he found the Boers (3,000)
in a strong position in the hills commanding Lydenburg.
French and Pole-Carew, having received orders to make
a demonstration eastward, did not join Buller's column.
An inversion thus resulted, the original right flank now be-
coming the left, due to the fact that Buller had started on the
pursuit of Botha from Machadodorp, while Pole-Carew was
still far to the rear, and*French found the country too diffi-
cult for a large force of cavalry.
Buller reconnoitered Botha's position, and tried to turn
its right flank, but found it too strong, and his artillery was
unable to silence that of the Boers.
On September 3d Roberts sent Hamilton from north of
Belfast to reinforce Buller. Hamilton, whom Brocklehurst's
cavalry brigade had joined, moved against the right flank of
the Boer position, passing Dulstroom (27 miles southwest of
Lydenburg) on the 4th, there coming in signal communica-
tion with Buller, who was at the time engaged in turning
the Boer left flank.
This pressure on both flanks caused Botha to alter his
position, withdrawing his right flank in a northeastern di-
rection towards the Mauch Berg, while a strong detachment
on his left flank occupied the Spitz Kop, 25 miles to the east-
ward of Lydenburg. By this change he avoided the out-
flanking movement against his left flank, and also withdrew
his line out of reach of Hamilton's move against his right
flank. Lydenburg was thus given up by the Boers, and was
occupied on the 6th by Dundonald's cavalry (of Buller's di-
vision) and Brocklehurst's (of Hamilton's column).
Hamilton joined Buller on September 7th, and Buller
prepared to attack the new position. A flank attack was
impossible, consequently a frontal attack had to be resorted
to ; but as it was well supported by artillery fire, the British
took the position with little loss.
204 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The Boers had sent their artillery on to Kruger's Post
(about 25 miles north of Lydenburg) and fought a delaying
action only, finally retreating northward, pursued by Buller
over the Mauch Berg.
Hamilton was sent back to Machadodorp to take part in
Pole-Carew's advance, while Botha, with about 3,000 men,
retired to Pietersburg, joining there Commandant Vorster.
Buller crossed the Mauch Bei^ 10 miles east of Lyden-
burg on September 18th, entering very difficult country, and,
driving the Boers before him, arrived at the junction of roads
from east and south near Spitz Kop on the 10th. He cap-
tured many wagons of food and ammunition, and divided
the Boers, some retiring to Nel Spruit and others across the
Sabie Drift. On the 12th he occupied Spitz Kop, and found
there immense quantities of Boer supplies. He remained
there till the 23d, replenishing his supplies, and then moved
towards Sabie Drift against Viljoen's force north of the
river. He met with little resistance and advanced to Macmac
River and Burghers Pass. On October 2d Buller returned
to Lydenburg, after a circuitous march through the country
from Spitz Kop via Pilgrim's Rest and Kruger's Post.
Meanwhile, Roberts continued his offensive advance
eastward, with Pole-Carew and French, the former moving
along the railroad, the latter covering his right flank; and
later with Hamilton on the left flank. French reached Caro-
lina on September 7th, and moved on Barberton, but met
with considerable resistance before he reached the upper
Buffels Spruit. However, he forced the Boers out of a num-
ber of consecutive positions.
At the same time the advance of Pole-Carew and French
compelled the Presidents to leave Nel Spruit and retire on
Komatipoort.
Kruger, leaving Schalk Burgher in charge of the gov-
ernment, left for Lorenzo Marques, on his way to Europe, to
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 205
ask for foreign intercession. Steyn, taking command of all
the Boer forces which retired eastward from Machadodorp,
organized his forces for further resistance.
French occupied Barberton on September 13th, and
made large captures, among them the great park of railroad
rolling stock, including 43 locomotives. At the same time
Pole-Carew occupied Kaapsche Hoop, to the northwest of
Barberton. The further advance of the British to the Portu-
guese frontier was practically unopposed. On the 18th of
September 700 Boers crossed the border at Komatipoort
and were disarmed; and a similar fate befell most of those
who were forced over the Kaap Berge. But Viljoen, with
a small force, succeeded in escaping northward, and marched
over the hills of the Lydenburg district, to join Botha at
Pietersburg.
Pole-Carew occupied the border station, Komatipoort,
on September 24th, and made large captures of rolling
material.
This ended the campaign, and practically ended all
larger operations of the war.
GENERAL SITUATION.
On September 2d Lord Roberts announced the annexa-
tion of the Transvaal. It is to be called, it is stated, the
Vaal River Colony.
Raids against the railroads stil|l took place in all parts
of the two colonies, bridges were destroyed, and (due to care-
lessness in outpost duty) detachments were attacked and
captured. Indeed, scarcely a day passed without some such
incident.
A Boer commando under Erasmus, for example, made
several energetic attacks on the British troops guarding the
Pretoria Pietersburg line, near Pretoria, in the month of
206 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
September. South of Pretoria, portions of De Wet's and
Theron's troops made attempts to destroy the waterworks
of Johannesburg, and succeeded in liberating 500 prisoners
from the jail at Klip River. Along the Ladysmith Johan-
nesburg road, especially near Standerton and Utrecht, small
Boer detachments threatened road and trains continually.
On the Johannesburg Klerksdorp road the Boers held Pot-
chefstroom for a time. Even Methuen and Carrington, in the
West, were kept constantly on the alert, and the little garri-
son town of Mamusa was surrounded by the Boers, and al-
most taken, before it could be relieved.
The most successful raids, however, were conducted in
the Orange River Colony by Fouries, Grobeler and Lemmer,
later also by De Wet. A Boer force of 3,000 suddenly ap-
peared before Ladybrand and took it, but the approach of
Hunter caused it to be evacuated again. At the beginning of
September a Boer commando attacked Bruce Hamilton at
Thaba 'Nchu, but was defeated.
The British were compelled to vacate Vrede, Bethlehem,
Fouriesburg and Senekal, in order to concentrate their forces
more effectually; Harrismith alone remained occupied.
In the vicinity of Kroonstad, and even just south of
Bloemfontein, the railroad was occasionally destroyed.
On September 13th Macdonald at Winburg heard of a
Boer raid on the railroad at Brandfort, and immediately set
out in pursuit, crossing to the south bank of the Vet River,
near Tafel Kop. He came upon them eight miles west of
that place, drove them over the Vet River, and pursued them
north of the Winburg Smaldeel railway, utterly defeating
them, and capturing a number of prisoners, wagons, oxen,
ammunition and food supplies.
In spite of all these disturbances, however, the main
military operations were ended.
Lord Roberts returned to Pretoria on September 22d,
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 207
and was appointed Commander-in-chief of the British Army,
to succeed Lord Wolseley (retired), on October 1. On Octo-
ber 16th General Buller relinquished command of the Natal
forces, to return home; Lyttleton was left in command of his
troops.
The resistance of the Boers, headed by Botha, Steyn and
De Wet, continued throughout the month of October and to
near the end of November.
During these months Hildyard operated in the south-
eastern Transvaal, Clery in the vicinity of Standerton, Clem-
ents in central Transvaal near Rustenburg and Krtigers-
dorp, Hart southwest of Kriigersdorp, Methuen in western
Transvaal, while Paget and Plumer held the northern posts.
Bundle was in the vicinity of Bethlehem, Knox at Kroon-
stad, Barton near Kriigersdorp, Bradley near Heidelberg,
Hunter near Mequathings Nek, Macdonald near Winburg
and Senekal, Brabant at Heilbron and Lindley, Kelly-Kenny
at Bloemfontein.
Guerrilla warfare continued at all these points, and de-
tachments up to a strength of 1,500 or 2,000 occasionally
assembled, although most of the raids were made by much
smaller bodies.
One of the latest and most important of the combats
with the Boer raiders was that of Bothaville (northwest of
Kroonstad, south of Klerksdorp), where Colonel Le Gallais
met a Boer force of 1,000 men (among them Steyn and De
Wet) and completely defeated them. He captured six field
guns, two machine guns, and 100 prisoners, the Boers leaving
25 dead and 30 wounded on the field. The British lost 3
officers and 8 men killed, 7 officers and 26 men wounded.
This guerrilla warfare gradually subsided towards the
end of November, and the war virtually ended. Great Brit-
ain added two extensive colonies, rich in gold, diamonds and
cattle, to her domains, and sustained a total loss in officers
and men of about 12,800.
208 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
COMMENTS.
At the opening of the fifth act in this war drama the
main Boer army in the west was at Middelburg and Hath-
erley, east of Pretoria, and the question for Lord Roberts to
decide was, whether he should attack this army and dis-
perse it, or send a strong detachment by rail to Volksrust, to
assist Buller in his attempts to turn the Boer position at
Laings Nek, and hasten the retreat of Christian Botha north-
ward. After the performance of both these tasks he would
be prepared to begin operations against the Boer troops
waging a guerrilla war in the Lydenburg district, where the
latter were strongly ensconsed in the mountains, and well
provided with supplies from Lorenzo Marques.
The effect of Roberts' advance to Pretoria undoubtedly
made itself felt on the resistance of the Boers at Laings Nek,
but Buller deserves great credit for the masterly way in
which he maneuvered the latter out of their extremely strong
position with little loss, and succeeded in cutting them
in two.
Tactically, however, he failed to reap the full reward of
his strategical measures, since the Boers escaped without
loss in men or material. This may have been due to the fact
that, having learned the futility of purely frontal attacks,
he went to the other extreme, and laid too much stress on
outflanking movements, which are never very successful
tactically; unless the frontal attack is pressed hard at the
same time, in order to hold the enemy while the flanking col-
umns roll them up.
Buller's movement had another great advantage in that
it separated the Transvaal from the Orange Boers, occupying
the Drakensberge and assembling to the southwest under
President Steyn, and prevented the former from joining the
latter. Had he turned their position by the east (his first
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 209
plan), the strategic situation would have been far less ad-
vantageous.
R would appear at first sight that Buller's proper
course after reaching Volksrust was to hasten northward to
join Robert^ in a combined attack on the Boers near Middel-
burg. But the reconnoissances from Roberts' army had de-
termined the position of the latter, under Louis Botha, east
of Pretoria, to be in a strong, although very extended line.
Moreover, although Pretoria and Johannesburg were per-
fectly quiet, he feared the effect of such close proximity of a
strong Boer army, and decided to attack it without awaiting
the arrival either of Buller or Hunter.
Roberts' prompt decision to attack the center of Botha's
position, as soon as he found it impracticable to turn the
flanks according to his previous tactics, thus far uniformly
successful, marks the general, ready at all times to suit his
methods of warfare to the existing circumstances. His fail-
ure to pursue, however, after the battle, and determine def-
initely the whereabouts of the enemy, is open to criticism.
His comparatively small force, the danger threatening
his line of communications, and the ravages of disease in the
army (which were great in the months of May and June), no
doubt determined him to risk no further engagement with
Botha, but this does not excuse the neglect of reconnoissance
of the enemy during the retreat of the latter. *
The splendid strategic campaign of Lord Roberts ended,
the weaknesses of the British army and their neglect of
proper reconnoissance a.nd the service of security and infor-
mation once more come into prominence. To subdue the
scattered forces of the Boers it became necessary to subdi-
vide the army, thus throwing the responsibility for the minor
tactical operations on the subordinate commanders; conse-
quently surprises and captures of detachments became al-
most daily events. No doubt much of the neglect of outpost
-14-
210 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
duty was due to the poor state of the cavalry horses, but
most of the failure must be ascribed to the lack of proper
training of the troops in such service.
Buller, after entering the Transvaal, had two courses
open to him: on the one hand, he could have operated
against the Boers retreating on Ermelo, and seized the Loren-
zo Marques railway, cutting off Botha from his source of sup-
ply at the latter point, and thus ending the campaign in this
region; on the other hand, he could move along the railway
line to Johannesburg and complete the cordon around the
Orange Boers, at the same time opening a new line of supply
for Roberts' army.
The first plan would have compelled him to leave the
railroad and organize a large train, which was well-nigh im-
practicable. Roberts, therefore, decided on the second plan,
which would also bring Buller's force in contact with his
own.
Turning now to the campaign against De Wet near
Bethlehem, we find again one of the deficiencies of the Brit-
ish officer coming into prominence, viz.: the lack of proper
service of security and information. The entire strategic
plan of Roberts the concentric advance on De Wet's posi :
tion was virtually defeated by the want of definite informa-
tion of the exact position of the latter, and the slow advance
of Hunter, the too dispersed order of march of Rundle, and
finally the .precipitate dash of Paget, who became involved
in a position where he had to await reinforcements, and
changed the proposed concentric advance into a mere for-
ward movement of a single body.
Again, after Rundle discovered the Boers in strong force
east of Rooikrans, which should have indicated to him that
De Wet had selected this point for the breaking through, he
made no special arrangements to resist his efforts, and al-
lowed him to escape with ease, preserving his too extended
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 211
order of advance even after the motives of De Wet were
evident.
The capture of Prinsloo's force, on the other hand, was
effected with skill and judgment.
It is a question, however, if De Wet would not have been
wiser to have broken through to the eastward, over the Dra-
kensberg passes, and joined the remains of the Boer army
northeast of Laings Nek.
The surprise of the British garrison at Kustenburg by
Lemmer must be ascribed once more to imperfect outpost
service; and to this same weakness of the British troops the
surprises at Uitvals Nek and Derdepoort must be attributed.
Campaign of Middelburg.
In the organization and execution of the advance, four
points at once strike the military student, viz. : first, the plac-
ing of Hamilton's mounted infantry on the left, and French's
much more mobile cavalry division on the right; secondly, the
broad front of the advance, and the distance of the flanking
columns from the main column ; thirdly, the small force which
Roberts selected for this service; fourthly, why Buller was
allowed to remain practically inactive, when he might have
brought fatal pressure to bear on the Boer left and rear.
In the first place, Hamilton's troops had to go a longer
distance to reach the left flank than they would have had to
take the right ; and in the next place, both were familiar with
the country (from their advance against Eerste Fabrieken)
on the opposite flanks from those now assigned to them.
Moreover, as Roberts' plan evidently involved preventing the
Boers from retiring into the hills of the Lydenburg District,
French's advance north of the railroad would have been far
more in place. His flanking movements south of the rail-
road merely forced the Boers back on their line of retreat.
The broad front of Roberts' advance, and the far out-
212 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
flanking movements of French, prevented concerted action
of the various parts on account of the distances to be covered.
On this account, after French's scouts crossed Olifants River,
and found the Boers in full retreat, it was impossible for
Roberts to take advantage of the situation, because the cen-
ter and left was still far in rear. A flanking movement can
only be successful when the flank column reaches the enemy
in good condition, and can count on the assistance of the rest
of the army.
The force assigned to this service by Roberts had a
strength of about 22,000 men, and was destined to attack a
skillful enemy, well entrenched in positions of his own selec-
tion, about 12,000 strong. Decisive results could hardly be
expected under such circumstances, and when Pole-Carew
and French, with 15,000, were left alone to continue the
pursuit, it is not surprising that they did not- go beyond
Middelburg.
Buller's advance against Middelburg would have pro-
tected the northern side of the railroad much better than
quietly guarding it, and would have threatened the Boers in
front of Roberts besides. Moreover, at that time there was
little danger of Boer raids south of the railroad.
After it was found that Pole-Carew and French could
not advance with safety beyond Middelburg, then at last
was done what should have been done when the advance
against Middelburg began viz., Buller w r as directed against
the Boer left flank and rear.
The Chase of De Wet.
One of the first points that strikes the military student
in this pursuit of De Wet is the fact that the separate Brit-
ish columns acted perfectly independently, with no single
controlling power to direct the movements on the field in-
telligently towards the common end. Kitchener and Meth-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 213
lien were independent, and when they struck^ De Wet neither
knew the exact situation.
Smith-Dorrien, when he tried to block De Wet's way
near Welverdiend, had only troops which had been worn out
by constant marching to and fro, due to conflicting orders
and the lack of a directing head, and so failed to stop the
Boer leader.
And finally, Paget and Baden-Powell, by getting them-
selves involved in combats with small detachments at a
critical moment, allowed De Wet to escape when he was
practically surrounded: again, the independence of the indi-
vidual leader caused the failure of the strategic measures.
Another point that strikes the military student is the
fact that the British failed to distinguish between the im-
portant or essential and the unimportant or trivial. When
Roberts had carried his campaign against the main Boer
army, under Louis Botha, nearly to Middelburg, he returned
with the mounted infantry of Hamilton and Mahon, giving
up a serious campaign at a critical moment, to secure a sub-
ordinate (unessential) object viz., the line to Maf eking,
where he had 15,000 troops already posted in western Trans-
vaal. Again, Methuen was taken away from this line to act
against a paltry 1500 under De Wet. Finally, Hamilton, after
being sent to the relief of Rustenburg, the object of which
was evidently to secure the line to Mafeking, brought Baden-
Powell away from that point and left him at Kommando
Nek, and himself joined in the pursuit of De Wet.
The last prominent characteristic of these movements
is the fact that some of the British subordinate commanders
did not prove equal to the tactical and strategical situation,
and that they failed in intelligent, combined action. Car-
rington's dicision, after having been ordered to relieve Hore,
to retire not only to Zeerust, but even farther, does not seem
warranted by the circumstances, and more concerted action
214 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
by the other subordinate commanders should have brought
better results.
The Third Campaign against Botha.
The third campaign against Botha, beyond Middelburg,
was conducted in Roberts' true manner, and his measures
substantiate our views on the second campaign in two lead-
ing particulars viz., the fact that the place for the cavalry
was on the left, and the necessity for Buller's advance in
flank at the same time. Nevertheless, the transfer of the
cavalry to the left flank at so late a stage failed to prevent
Louis Botha from escaping into the Lydenburg district, as it
would have done had it been on that flank originally; more-
over, Buller's participation came too late for decisive effect
in capturing the Boers, or in forcing them to fight a decisive
action. *
The latter part of this campaign was a splendid achieve-
ment and illustrates the effect of properly applying a suffi-
cient number of troops to a definite purpose, and pursuing
this purpose with single-minded determination to the end.
The Boers, on the other hand, had split up their forces,
scattered them over a wide area, had no concerted action
under single leadership, and failed to concentrate for any
definite purpose; consequently their resistance was rapidly
destroyed.
TACTICAL DEDUCTIONS FROM THE WAR.*
In drawing lessons from the war in South Africa the
first point to be taken into consideration is the general char-
acter of the armies opposed to each other. On the one hand,
there is a crude militia, insufficiently organized and trained
*The author is indebted for much of his information and many
of his ideas to an anonymous article in Internationale Revue, Beiheft
14; and to the United Sw^vice Magazine.
THE SECOND BOER 1VJ.A'. 215
iii time of peace, but composed of excellent though undis-
ciplined material, untrained in tactics, hence incapable of
the tactical offensive, so indispensable for decisive results.
On the other hand, a European army, composed of a large
nucleus of regular troops, disciplined and trained, but its
greater part militia and volunteers of variable quality,
generally only partially trained, with all the technical and
scientific means of carrying on war at its disposal.
Fire effect serves as a basis for all tactical deductions.
The Lee-Metford and the Mauser gun, in spite of certain ad-
vantages of the latter over the former, must be regarded
as practically equal in the field. But the possession of a
bayonet gave the British a decided advantage over the Boera
(who were without one), not because hand-to-hand conflicts
are liable to be very common in modern war, but because
the moral effect of its possession confers tenacity on the
defense and confidence and esprit on the attack.
As marksmen the Boers had the advantage, for they
were all trained to this accomplishment from their youth,
and kept up their practice by their mode of life. They
surpassed probably, in this respect, all European armies.
The Artillery Arm.
The field artillery material used by the two armies is an
interesting study, but in judging of the relative degree of
preparedness, the circumstances must be carefully consid-
ered. The Transvaal had been arming since 1896, purchas-
ing the best material procurable, and it so happened that
at this time the field artillery of Europe was in a transition
stage, but on the Continent rearmament had commenced,
consequently the Boers had their choice of the latest designs.
England, however, had been slow to adopt the changes
effected on the Continent, and had merely modified its ex-
isting carriages, while the guns remained the same. The
216 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
result was that the Boers were possessed of the latest quick-
firers, with fixed ammunition, and the ranges exceeded that
of the British field gun by several thousand yards.
Small as these differences were, they soon proved great
in effect, because it was this little difference that enabled
the Boers with single guns to put a number of shell into a
British battery before the latter could reply, and the only
reason they failed to accomplish more than they did was
because they had but a small number of guns and did not
know the value of cencentrating their fire; moreover, they
were afraid to risk a stand-up fight.
It has been urged that field guns are not intended to
engage siege guns; but the British guns frequently failed to
reach even the Boer field guns when the latter could reach
them. The 5-inch field howitzer had a range of only 4,900
yards, and frequently failed to be of use on that account. At
Venters Spruit something might have been done to assist
the British troops on top of Spion Kop if only their guns
had had a little longer range: some forty British guns were
forced to remain idle, while a few Boer guns shelled the
crest of the hill. In the demonstration against Brakfontein
heights, preceding the attack on the Vaal Kranz, six field
batteries were so effectually outranged that they had to
stand still, to be shot at ; and a few days later the single Boer
gun on the Doornkloof defied all the British guns in the plain
or on the Schwartz Kop. In this last case a howitzer of
sufficient range was all that was needed.
That it is possible to combine in the field gun increased
range with mobility is proven by the fact that Boers accom-
lished it, and that Captain Scott constructed temporary car-
riages for the 12-pdr. guns of the Naval Brigade, which
weighed (with gun, complete) approximately only two-thirds
as much as the field equipment, while the guns were sighted
up to 8,000 yards, and could be fired at even greater ranges.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 217
The other advantages of long range in field pieces are
that the enemy's advancing infantry can be brought under
shell fire earlier, or a larger extent of front of his defensive
position can be swept by the artillery without changing posi-
tion; moreover, the artillery can be kept farther in rear and
still be effective, a great advantage under modern infantry
fire. On the contrary, short-range field guns can only come
up behind infantry, and must be correspondingly slow in
getting up.
In view of this great importance of range, it is evidently
better to sacrifice some degree of mobility, if it be necessary
to sacrifice anything, in order to secure a good heavy long-
range field gun, provided only it can keep up with the
infantry.
The effects of earthworks and their extensive use have
merely substantiated what was predicted by the best authori-
ties. They have demonstrated the necessity for a howitzer
to search trenches, since ordinary field guns can only serve,
by a constant storm of shell, to keep the enemy in them, but
cannot reach him there.
The advantage of quick-firing guns was illustrated at
Brakfontein, on February 5th, where three Boer guns easily
maintained a rate of fire and a storm of shell on six British
field batteries (unable to reply because outranged) such as a
battery of six British guns could not have produced by using
its most rapid rate of fire. Another advantage of quick-
firing guns is that the number of guns to a battery can be
reduced to four, and hence the target presented by a battery
be made much smaller, and cover can be more easily secured.
Quick-fire guns also offer the great advantage of quickly
engaging a moving target and following it up readily: at
Brakfontein the slow rate of fire of the British and their sys-
tem of fire discipline allowed a Boer gun to retire and a pom-
pom to be brought into action before a shot from a field gun
could be fired.
218 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
The experiences in South Africa seem to point to the
following as the proper equipment of an army as regards
artillery:
1. A quick-fire gun, perhaps a little more mobile than
the present field gun, capable of accompanying mounted
troops on the march.
2. A heavier gun (including the howitzer) of long range,
capable of moving with infantry.
3. A light mountain gun in country where only pack-
animal transportation is to be had.
The small actual effect of the pom-poms of the Boers, in
spite of their great moral effect and their mobility (which
enabled them to follow readily in pursuit), confirmed pre-
vious experience. Their high rate of fire (10 shots a minute)
could not make up for the low weight of projectile, and the
consequent limited action in depth of troops struck. The
campaign shows that the use of guns of smaller caliber than
75 mm. is only permissible in mountain or barbarian warfare,
or against torpedo boats.
The Physiological Effects of the Infantry Arm.
All authorities agree that the wounds from the small-
arm bullets are more humane than those from the old large-
caliber projectiles. According to the eminent English sur-
geon, Sir William MacCormac, the human body can in many
cases be perforated by the bullets without fatal results.
About 96 per cent of the wounded at the base of operations
in South Africa recovered, and a large percentage returned
to the front. Most of the wounds leave a very small open-
ing at the points of entrance and of exit. Most of them stop
bleeding themselves, and heal very rapidly. Prens, in the
British Medical Journal, asserts that at ranges of from 1,500
to 2,000 yards the Mauser bullet goes through bones like a
needle, and only at close ranges (up to 500 yards) does it shat-
THE 8ECOND BOER WAR.
ter the larger bones, while breast wounds heal readily. Am-
putations are rarely necessary.
Losses in Battle.
One of the most interesting features connected with im-
provements in fire-arms is the fact that the losses in battle
constantly grow smaller. The following table will illustrate
this:
Percentage Percentage
of killed and of the killed
wounded. in the total
looses.
Oifen- Defen-
sive, sive.
Wars of Frederick the Great 15 19 25
Wars of Napoleon 13 10 21
Crimean War 12 17 29
Campaign of 1859 8 9 19
Campaign of 1866 8 9 24
Campaign of 1870-1 9 9 24
Battle of Ladysmith (10,000 British 3
Battle of Ladysmith (10,000 British) .... 3
Battle of Stormberg (2,500 British) 3.6
Battle of Magersfontein (10,000 British) . . 9
Battle of Colenso (17,000 British) 5.3
Battle of Spion Kop (20,000 British) 7
The percentage of losses in officers is remarkably high. At
Magersfontein, for example, it reached 25 per cent, cj" 1
officer for every 14 men killed, wounded and missing.
Relation between Losses in Battle and Losses by Disease.
As a general rule, losses by disease in long-continued
wars far exceed losses in battle: the only known exception
is the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. Another fact worth
noticing is that the losses in battle grow smaller as war pro-
gresses, while those from disease grow greater, and the latter
in a higher ratio for the men than for the officers.
The British losses at short intervals are given in the Ap-
220 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
pendix, but the number of sick is not clearly stated in the
official reports.
The following table gives some idea of the relative num-
bers of those who were killed (or mortally wounded) in battle
and those who died of disease (or accidents) at various
intervals :
Killed. Died of Disease.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
Up to February 24 198 1748 20 722
Up to May 26 285 2672 95 3127
Up to July 30 324 3013 126 4270
Up to September 8 368 3462 152 5573
Up to October 21 391 3795 162 6350
Transportation of Horses ~by Sea.
Between the 30th of September and the 24th of March
about 24,333 horses were transported on some 70 vessels,
with a loss of 5.5 per cent, not considering the Ismore, which
stranded with 315 horses on board, and the Rapidan, which
did not proceed farther than the Irish Sea. In some cases
the percentage was very low: in 9 ships, for example, it
ranged between J and 2 per cent. In others, on the contrary,
it ran very high: on the America, for example, as high as.
24.3 per cent.
Lessons for the Defense.
The operations of the Boers illustrate fully whatever
advantages attach to the strategical defensive. The reasons
for their adopting this form were probobly three: the pecul-
iar characteristics and nature of the Boer, his lack of mili-
tary obedience and discipline, and the difficulty of replacing
losses in battle by new levies.
In Natal they combined the strategical offensive with
the tactical defensive, and, as ever, they were defeated in
the end.
Their positions were always well selected, and intrench-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 221
merits in two tiers (one over the other) were very common.
Fire was first opened from the upper tier, that of the lower
being reserved for close quarters. The Boers also con-
structed dummy intrenchments, from which they fired with
smoky powder. Perfect use of the configuration of the
ground was generally made, and at Paardeberg a special
form of trench widened at bottom (as shown elsewhere in the
text) was made use of in the firm ground found there.
Wire entanglements were placed in front of positions,
which not only delayed the attack, but also enabled the
Boers to guard the ground in front with weak detachments,
the noise of passing through the obstacle giving sufficient
warning. Such was.the case at Magersfontein, for example.
The occupation of advanced positions (in front of the gen-
eral line) by the Boers is contrary to the accepted ideas of
tacticians. But their success in the war was due to the fact
that the British generally resorted to purely frontal attacks,
and thus enabled the Boers to make the very best use of
them. Moreover, the Boers were usually mounted, and their
horses (owing to the terrain) could be kept close at hand, so
that, when it came to the short ranges, they could quickly
retire.
The question of when to open infantry fire is compara-
tively simple for the attack, as it is determined by the fire-
action of the enemy's arm, the object being to get as near
as possible to the inner limit of the medium battle ranges be-
fore opening fire. But for the defense the problem is more
difficult, because the opening of fire at once discovers to the
enemy our positions, and offers targets for their artillery.
Most European nations would now open fire at about 1,000
yards, to prevent the enemy from ever reaching the close
range (600 yards) at which the defenders' heads begin to be
visible targets.
But the Boers wisely did otherwise, and allowed the
enemy to come to close range before opening on him. This
222 TEE SECOND BOER WAR.
action is entirely justified because of the great superiority of
the British in artillery, because at close ranges the latter can
no longer take part. Moreover, the moral effect of a sudden,
overwhelming infantry fire is enormous even on the best of
troops, and in South Africa the withholding of the fire was
particularly justified because the British often approached
close to the Boer positions in closed masses, and in utter
ignorance of the exact position of the enemy. Examples of
these points will be found in the battles of Modder River,
Magersfontein and Stormberg. In the first the losses of the
subdivisions in front were considerable; in the second the
actual losses were slight, but the demoralized battalions
could not be assembled again until the following day; and
in the last the losses in killed and wounded were only 34
per cent, but in prisoners it amounted to 25.3 per cent.
These examples illustrate the necessity of accurately
locating the enemy's subdivisions in his position, and deter-
mining that position from a distance.
Whenever the Boers did open fire at longer ranges the
British advance was generally stopped at 900 yards.
Lessons for the Attack.
The British mode of attack is characterized, at the open-
ing of campaign, by its purely frontal form,, and by the
insufficient numbers placed on the line; by taking up the
formation for attack at too late an hour; and by laying too
little stress on gaining superiority of fire.
At Magersfontein, for example, the artillery opened fire
on the Boer position, while the infantry remained in rear
and gave no assistance. The result was that the Boers lay
quietly in their trenches. The infantry of the attack must
move up and support the artillery fire by its fire action, in
order to compel the enemy to occupy his positions and thus
offer targets for the artillery. The two arms must work to-
THE 8ECOND BOER WAR. 223
gether: artillery and infantry preparation for attack are not
two successive phases of a battle, but must be simultaneous.
Night marches and night battles found considerable appli-
cation in this war. On the Tugela, at Spion Kop, at Storm-
berg and at Magersfontein examples are found. In several
of these cases the great objection to night marches namely,
the danger of a panic, is decidedly in evidence. The only
remedy, acknowledging the necessity for such operations,
is for the officers to use all their power to prevent a panic,
or to keep it in bounds. The great trouble with the British
in these night attacks was the fact that they advanced with-
out outposts; this may be risked by a singe company, but
never by a column of all arms, 2,000 strong.
The examples prove that night battles on a large scale
are impossible. Th.e taking of the Spion Kop at night was
a proper measure, as also would be an approach by night
over open ground to an enemy's position, but all these re-
quire careful previous reconnoissance of the ground to be
passed over. Moreover, the men should be fully impressed
with the idea that night fire is not dangerous, and as soon as
the enemy opens it all the troops must charge with all their
energy.
These are a few of the lessons to be learned from the
Boer War, but perhaps the most impressive lesson of all is
the high significance, true for all time to come, of the tactical
and strategical offensive.
224 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
APPRNDIX.
Distances Between Important Points.
BY SEA.
Nautical Miles.
Southampton to Cape Town 5,978
_Cape Town to Port Elizabeth 428
Port Elizabeth to East London 131
East London to Durban *. 253
Durban to Lorenzo Marques 300
Lorenzo Marques to Beira 488
BY RAILROAD.
Miles. Hours,
Cape Town to De Aar 500 27
De Aar to Naauwpoort 69 3
De Aar to Orange River 70 4
Orange River to Modder River 52% . .
Modder River to Spytf ontein 11
Spytfontein to Kimberley 14
Kimberley to Warrenton 44% ..'
Kimberley to Fourteen Streams 47% . .
Kimberley to Taungs 84
Taungs to Vryburg 43 .i
Vryburg to Mafeking 96% . .
Fourteen Streams to Mafeking 176% ..
Mafeking to Ramathlabama 15% . ,
Mafeking to Lobatsi 47
Mafeking to Crocodile Pools 83% .'.
Mafeking to Gaberones 92%
Mafeking to Buluwayo 389% . .
Port Elizabeth to Rosmead Junction (Route 1) 243
Port Elizabeth to Rosmead Junction (Route 2) 283 18%
Rosmead Junction to Naauwpoort 26% 1%
Rosmead Junction to Stormberg Junction 83% 7
Rosmead Junction to Thebus 37 ' , , . -
Naauwpoort to Arundel 18% . .
Arundel to Rensburg 8% . .
Rensburg to Colesberg Junction 9
Colesberg Junction to Norvals Pont 24% ..
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 225
Miles. Hours.
Norvals Pont to Spriiigfontein 32^ . .
Rosmead Junction to Springfontein 93 5
East London to Queenstown 154^ . .
Queenstown to Sterkstroom Junction 35
Queenstown to Stormberg Junction 67
Sterkstroom to Dordrecht 41
Dordrecht to Indwe 25
Sterkstroom to Indwe 66 6
Stormberg Junction to Thebus 46* . .
Stormberg Junction to Burghersdorp 22
Burghersdorp to Bethulie Bridge 42^ . .
Bethulie Bridge to Springfontein 28
Stormberg Junction to Springfontein 92*4 8
Stormberg Junction to Albert Junction 25^
Albert Junction to Aliwal North 29
Springfontein to Bethany SO 1 /^ . .
Bethany to Bloemf ontein 36^ . .
Springfontein to Bloemf ontein 88 4
Bloemf ontein to Karree 21
Bloemf ontein to Brandf ort 35
Bloemfontein to Vet River 56
Vet River to Smaldeel (Winburg railroad station) 6% ..
Smaldeel (Winburg railroad station) to Kroonstad 70
Kroonstad to Pretoria 160
Springfontein to Vil joens Drift 317 13
Bloemfontein to Viljoens Drift 230 9
Viljoens Drift to Klip River...: 22
Klip River to Elandsf ontein . 20
Elandsfontein to Pretoria 36
Viljoens Drift to Pretoria 78 5
Elandsfontein to Johannesburg 10
Johannesburg to Krugersdorp 19
Krugersdorp to Potchefstroom 67
Potchefstroom to Klerksdorp 30
Elandsfontein to Charlestown (Natal) 170 9
Pretoria to Waterval 15
Pretoria to Nylstroom 81
Pretoria to Belfast 136
Belfast to Komatipoort 155
Komatipoort to Lorenzo Marques 51
15-
226 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Miles. Hours.
Durban to Mooi River 541^ . .
Mooi River to Estcourt 21
Bstcourt to Colenso 27
Colenso to Ladysmith 16^ - .
Ladysmith to Glencoe "41^ . .
Glencoe to Newcastle 37
Newcastle to Charlestown 36
Ladysmith to Besters 15% . .
Besters to Van Reenan 21 1 / . .
Van Reenan to Harrismith 23^ . .
Durban to Ladysmith 188% 12
Ladysmith to Harrismith 60^ 5
Ladysmith to Charlestown 114^ 6
Beira to Umtali 203
Umtali to Marandellas 130
Marandellas to Salisbury 40
BY ROAD.
De Aar to Prieska 110
Belmont to Douglas 52
Modder River Bridge to Jacobsdal 10
Kimberley to Barkly West 22
Kimberley to Boshof 36
Colesberg to Norvals Pont 25
Norvals Pont to Bethulie 30
Norvals Pont to Springfontein : 31
Bethulie to Springtontein 23
Bethulie to Smithfield 40
Dordrecht to Jamestown 24
Jamestown to Aliwal North 33
Aliwal North to Rouxville 20
Aliwal North to Bushmans Kop 60
Aliwal North to Wepener 77
Smithfield to Dewetsdorp 52
Wepener to Dewetsdorp 23
Dewetsdorp to Bloemf ontein 40
Dewetsdorp to Reddersburg 38
Dewetsdorp to Thaba 'Nchu 27
Kimberley to Boshof 36
Jacobsdal to Koffyf ontein 24
Klip Drift to Paardeberg 11
Paardeberg Drift to Osfontein 8
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 221
Miles. Hours.
Osfontein to Poplar Grove 10
Poplar Grove to Abrahams Kraal 17
Poplar Grove to Driefontein 1
Poplar Grove to Aasvogel Kop 10
Aasvogel Kop to Venters Vlei 18
Venters Vlei to Bloemfontein 18
Oolesberg to Fauresmith 85
Fauresmith to Jacobsdal 60
Boshof to Bulfontein 60
Boshof to Hoopstad 70
Bloemfontein to Sanna's Post 18
Bloemf ontein to Thaba 'Nchu 38
Bloemfontein to Ladybrand 72
Bloemfontein to Winburg 68
Bloemfontein to Dewetsdorp 40
Thaba 'Nchu to Dewetsdorp 27
Pietermaritzburg to Dundee (over Greytown) 126
Frere to Potgieters Drift 23
Ladysmith to Acton Homes 26
Ladysmith to Bezuidenhouts Pass 46
Ladysmith to Colenso 16
Ladysmith to Pietermaritzburg 100
Ladysmith to Dundee 48
Ladysmith to Helpmakaar 45
Maf eking to Johannesburg 160
Pretoria to Tuli 360
The strength and composition of the British forces in South
Africa at the outbreak of the war was as follows:
THE NATAL FORCE.
The Natal force was part of the Cape Colony force up to the mid-
dle of October, and Major-General Symons was in command of it.
Afterwards General White, who had been in command of the Cape
Colony forces, was sent to take command of the Natal force.
Infantry -
1st battalion Liverpool Regiment (originally in Cape Colony, sent
to Ladysmith September 25) 750
1st battalion Leicestershire Regiment (originally in Ladysmith,
sent to Glencoe September 25) 800
2d battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers (originally in Ladysmith,
sent to Glencoe September 25) 750
1st battalion King's Royal Rifles (at Glencoe) 750
228 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
2d battalion King's Royal Rifles (at Ladysmith, embarked at Cal-
cutta and Bombay September 29) 750
1st battalion Devonshire Regiment (at Ladysmith, embarked at
Calcutta and Bombay September 29) 800
1st battalion Manchester Regiment (at Ladysmith, arrived at
Durban September 15) 750
2d battalion Gordon Highlanders (at Ladysmith, embarked at
Calcutta and Bombay September 29) 80&
1st battalion Gloucestershire Regiment (at Ladysmith, embarked
at Calcutta and Bombay September 29) 800
1st battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers (at Glencoe, sent from Cairo) 700
7,650
Cavalry.
5th Lancers (originally in Pietermaritzburg, sent to Ladysmith
September 25) 400-
5th Dragoon Guards (at Ladysmith) 400
18th Hussars (originally in Ladysmith, sent to Glencoe Septem-
ber 25) 450
19th Hussars.. 400
% 1,650
Artillery.
Field Batteries Nos. 13, 21, 42, 53, 67 and 69 and the 10th Moun-
tain Battery (42 guns in all) 1,218
Field Batteries Nos. 18, 62 and 75 (18 guns in all) expected shortly
from Aldershot.. . 530
1,748
Three of the batteries were originally in Ladysmith, sent to
Glencoe September 25; 3 batteries (21, 42, 53) came from India.
Engineers (Pioneers).
Field Companies Nos. 7, 8 and 23 and the 29th Garrison Company 600
Train.
Companies 9, 15, 31 and 41 300
Volunteers.
Natal Volunteers 760
Natal Carabiniers 120
Imperial Light Horse 500
Durban Volunteers 750-
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 229
Mounted Police of Natal (with 9 guns) 550
2,680
14,628
Total, 69 guns and 14,628 men.
THE CAPE FORCE.
Infantry.
1st battalion Northumberland Fusiliers (sent from Aldershot) . . . 770
1st battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers (arrived at Cape Town
September 15) 750
1st battalion North Lancashire Regiment 800
2d battalion Berkshire Regiment 750
% 2d battalion Yorkshire Light Infantry 320
1st battalion Border Regiment (sent from Malta) ' 700
4,090
To arrive October 29th:
2d battalion Rifle Brigade (sent from Crete) 700
2 companies Garrison Artillery, Nos. 14 and 23 200
5th and 22d Companies Train 150
5,140
On the Western Border.
Estimated (mostly volunteers) 4,000
Naval Brigade, landed from the fleet at Cape Town (4 guns) 1,000
Total 10,140
Field Batteries Nos. 18, 62 and 75. 9th Lancers.
Grand total, 24,768 men and 69 guns.
The Mobilized Army Corps.
General Sir Redvers Buller.
First Division.
Lieutenant-General Lord P. Methuen.
1st Brigade (Guards): Major-General Colville.
3d battalion Grenadier Guards (from Gibraltar).
1st battalion Coldstream Guards (from Gibraltar).
2d battalion Coldstream Guards.
1st battalion Scots Guards.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 19).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 18.
Field Ambulance No. 18.
230 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
2d Brigade (English Brigade): Major-General Hildyard.
2d battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment.
2d battalion Devonshire Regiment.
2d battalion West Yorkshire Regiment.
2d battalion East Surrey Regiment.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 26).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 2.
Depot Field Ambulance.
1 squadron 14th Hussars.
Field Batteries Nos. 7, 14 and 66 (6 guns each).
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
Field Engineer Co. No. 17.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 20).
Field Ambulance No. 19.
Second Division.
Major-General Sir C. F. Clery.
3d Brigade (Scotch Bridgade): Major-General Wauchope.*
2d battalion Royal Highlanders (Black Watch).
1st battalion Highland Light Infantry.
2d battalion Seaforth Highlanders.
1st battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 14).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 1.
Field Ambulance No. 14.
4th Brigade (Light Infantry): Major-General Lyttleton.
_2d battalion Scottish Rifles (Cameronians).
3d battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps.
1st battalion Durham Light Infantry.
1st battalion 1st Rifle Brigade.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 16).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 14.
Field Ambulance No. 14.
1 squadron 14th Hussars.
Field Batteries Nos. 63, 64 and 73 (6 guns each).
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
Field Engineer Co. No. 11.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 24).
Field Ambulance No. 3.
Third Division.
Major-General Sir W. F. Gatacre.
5th Brigade (Irish Brigade): Major-General Hart.
1st battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
*Killed at Magersfontein ; succeeded by General Hector Macdonald.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 231
2d battalion Royal Irish Rifles.
1st battalion Connaught Rangers.
1st battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 30).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 16.
Field Ambulance No. 10.
6th Brigade (Fusilier Brigade) : Major-General Barton.
2d battalion Royal Fusiliers.
2d battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers.
1st battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
2d battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 36).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 17.
Field Ambulance No. 11.
1 squadron 14th Hussars.
Field Batteries Nos. 74, 77 and 79 (6 guns each).
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
Field Engineer Co. No. 12.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 33).
Field Ambulance No. 7.
Cavalry Division.
Lieutenant-General J. D. P. French.
1st Brigade: Major-General Babington.
6th Dragoon Guards.
10th Hussars.
12th Lancers.
Horse Battery R (6 guns).
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
Field Engineer Troop.
1st battalion Mounted Infantry.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 13).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 9.
Field Ambulance No. 9.
2d Brigade: Major-General Brabazon.
1st Dragoons.
2d Dragoons.
6th Dragoons.
Horse Battery O (6 guns).
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
2d battalion Mounted Infantry.
. Supply column (Train Co. No. 11).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 12.
Field Ambulance No. 6.
232 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Corps Headquarters and Reserve.
1st battalion Royal Scots.
Staff of the 14th Hussars.
13th Hussars.
Field Artillery Regimental Staff.
Field Artillery Battalion Staff.
Horse Artillery Battalion Staff.
Horse Batteries G and P.
Field Batteries Nos. 4, 38 and 78 (6 guns each).
Howitzer Battalion Staff.
Howitzer Batteries Nos. 37, 61 and 65 (6 guns each).
Engineer Regimental Staff.
Pontoneers Section.
1st Section Telegraphists.
Field Engineer Co. No. 26.
1st Engineer Field Park.
1st and 2d Balloon Section.
10th Railroad Co.
Ammunition Park.
Supply column (Train Co. No. 21).
Field Bakery No. 40 (Train).
Field Ambulance No. 5.
Supply Park (Train Cos. No. 4, 29 and 42).
Troops for Lines of Communication.
Lieutenant-General Sir Forestier-Walker.
2d battalion Northumberland Fusiliers.
2d battalion Somersetshire Light Infantry.
2d battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
1st battalion Welsh Regiment.
2d battalion Northamptonshire Regiment.
2d battalion Shropshire Light Infantry.
1st battalion Gordon Highlanders.
1 Balloon Field Equipage.
4 Train Companies (6, 8, 28 and 35).
4 Stationary Field Hospitals.
4 General Field Hospitals.
2 Principal Depots for Medical Supplies.
3 Advance Depots for Medical Supplies.
4 Hospital Sections.
2 Hospital Ships.
4 Companies Army Ordnance Corps (1, 2, 3 and 4).
1 Corps Pay Station.
1 Infantry Depot.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 233
1 General Depot.
2 Remount Depots.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH FORCES AT THE END OF
NOVEMBER, 1899.
Ladysmith.
General White.
10,000 men, 44 (36 field, 8 navy) guns, 12 machine guns.
Natal.
General Clery.
15,500 men, 24 field guns, 16 machine guns.
Modder River.
General Lord Methuen.
9,400 men, 22 field guns, 12 machine guns.
Kimberley.
Colonel Kekewich.
2,400 men, 12 field guns, 4 machine guns.
Mafeking.
Colonel Baden-Powell.
1,000 men, 6 field guns, 4 machine guns.
Naauwpoort and De Aar.
General French.
4,900 men, 6 field guns, 6 machine guns.
Queenstown.
General Gatacre.
4,300 men, 5 machine guns.
Rhodesia.
1,000 men, 6 field guns, 4 machine guns.
Gape Town.
3,500 men, 35 field guns, 2 machine guns.
The strength of the forces in South Africa after the arrival of
the mobile army corps was as follows:
Officers and Mon. Horses. Mules.
6 Infantry Brigades .-25,674 408 5,244
3 Divisional Troops... 3,579 2,289 1,119
2 Cavalry Brigades 5,370 4,894 2,282
Corps Troops 5,124 2,584 1,938
Cavalry Division Staff 42 38 33
Field Engineer Troops with the Cavalry.. 122 88 51
Total of Mobile Army Corps 39,911 10,301 10,667
Troops for Lines of Communication 9,387 885 2,683
234 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Officers and Men. Horses. Mules.
Natal Force 14,628
Cape Force 5,140
Naval Brigade 1,000
70,066 11,186 13,350
The actual strength of the mobile army corps in line troops, ex-
clusive of the Staffs, was:
Infantry 25,475
Mounted Infantry 1,172
Cavalry 4,252
Artillery . 3,435
Total 34,334 and 114 guns.
The Infantry arm is the Lee-Metford rifle of 0.3-inch caliber,
the Cavalry arm is the Lee-Metford carbine of the same caliber, the
field batteries have 15-pounder guns, the horse batteries 12-pounders,
the mountain batteries 7-pounder guns and the howitzer batteries
5-inch guns.
The transports landed their first troops on November 12 at Cape
Town, part being sent on to Durban. The following were sent on to
Natal:
1st Brigade.
2d Coldstream Guards.
2d Brigade: Major-General Hildyard.
2d West Surrey Regiment.
2d West Yorkshire Regiment.
2d East Surrey Regiment.
6th Brigade.
1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
2d Irish Fusiliers.
Also parts of the 2d Division and 3 field batteries. Major-Gen-
eral Clery (commanding 2d Division) was sent as commander-in-chief
in Natal.
Lord Methuen (commanding 1st Division) was sent to Orange
River Station with the following:
3d Grenadier Guards.
1st Coldstream Guards.
1st Scots Guards.
1st Northumberland Fusiliers.
1st Royal Munster Fusiliers.
l / 2 1st Royal North Lancashire Regiment.
9th Lancers (embarked at Calcutta and Bombay, September 29>.
Field Artillery.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 235
The rest of the mobilized army corps (1st, 2d and 3d Divisions)
embarked in the first and second weeks of November, and arrived
early in December. White's troops at Ladysmith constitute the 4th
Division.
New Oryanuzations.
The 5th Division was ordered mobilized on November 8th and
has the following composition:
Fifth Division.
General Sir C. Warren.
10th Brigade: Major-General Coke.
2d battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1st battalion Yorkshire Regiment.
2d battalion Dorsetshire Regiment.
2d battalion Middlesex Regiment.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 32).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 10.
Field Ambulance No. 11.
llth Brigade: Colonel Woodgate.
2d battalion Royal Lancaster Regiment.
2d battalion Lancashire Fusiliers.
1st battalion South Lancashire Regiment.
1st battalion York and Lancaster Regiment.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 25).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 6.
1 Field Ambulance.
1 squadron 14th Hussars.
19th, 20th and 28th Field Battery.
Ammunition column.
Field Engineer Co. No. 37.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 12).
Field Ambulance No. 15.
Total strength 11,000 men, 1,263 horses, 18 field guns, 9 machine
guns. Embarkation the end of November on fast steamers.
Not Yet Brigaded:
1st King's (Liverpool).
2d King's Royal Rifle Corps.
2d Rifle Brigade.
1st Border Regiment.
In addition to the 5th Division the following troops were or-
dered to proceed to South Africa:
Three infantry battalions, the 1st Suffolk (from Dover), 1st Essex
(from Warley), 1st Sherwood Foresters (from Malta) and 1st Derby-
23(5 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
shire battalions were ordered to replace the Gloucester and Irish Fu-
silier battalions captured at Ladysmith.
The 4th mountain battery to replace the captured 10th.
A regiment of Household Cavalry.
A siege train of 30 howitzers (14 six-inch and 8 five -inch and
8 four-inch) and 1,000 men.
On December 3d the mobilization of the 6th Division was ordered,
beginning on the 4th and ending on the llth of December. On the
16th the transportation to South Africa was begun, and the first troops
would reach Cape Town about January 8th, pr Durban about January
12th.
Sixth Division.
Major-General T. Kelly-Kenny.
12th Brigade: Colonel Clements.
2d battalion Bedfordshire Regiment.
1st battalion Royal Irish Regiment.
2d battalion Worcestershire Regiment.
2d battalion Wiltshire Regiment.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 7).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 8.
Field Ambulance No. 4.
13th Brigade: Colonel Knox.
2d battalion East Kent Regiment (Buffs).
2d battalion Gloucestershire Regiment.
1st battalion West Riding Regiment.
1st battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry Regiment.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 10).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 7.
Field Ambulance No. 18.
76th, 81st and 82d Field Battery.
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
Field Engineer Co. No. 38.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 23).
Field Ambulance No. 6.
Total strength: 9,601 men, 744 horses and 2,405 mules.
On December 14th the mobilization of the 7th Division was or-
dered. Its embarkation took place between the 4th and 10th of Jan-
uary, and it reached the Cape about the end of January.
Seventh Division.
Major-General C. Tucker.
14th Brigade: Major-General Chermside.
2d battalion Norfolk Regiment.
2d battalion Lincolnshire Regiment.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 237
1st battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers.
2d battalion Hampshire Regiment.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 31).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 19.
Field Hospital No. 13.
15th Brigade: Major-General Wavell.*
2d battalion Cheshire Regiment.
1st battalion East Lancashire Regiment.
2d battalion South Wales Borderers.
2d battalion North Staffordshire Regiment.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 12).
Field Ambulance No. 13.
83d, 84th and 85th Field Batteries.
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
Field Engineer Co. No. 9.
Army Service Corps Co. No. 17.
Field Hospital No. 13.
No cavalry is assigned to this division; hereafter volunteer
mounted infantry is to be attached about 880 men to a division.
On December 17th Field Marshal Lord Roberts was appointed
commander-in-chief in South Africa, with Lord Kitchener of Khar-
toum as his chief of staff.
The Government, about the middle of December, ordered the
organization of the following for service in South Africa:
1. Imperial Yeomanry, 3,000 men (selected Yeomanry as mount-
ed infantry); the companies to have a strength of 5 officers and 110
men.
2. Volunteer Mounted Infantry, 76 selected companies, one for
each battalion to be sent out in future, 8,664 in all. A second selected
company to be made up in the regimental district of each regiment.
3. A battalion of volunteers from the metropolis:
City of London Imperial Volunteers, 1,400 men.
8 companies Infantry.
2 companies Mounted Infantry.
1 battery Field Artillery (4 Q. F. guns).
4. The 16th Lancers and 2,000 reserve horses from India.
5. 700 men of the Naval Brigade landed.
6. A field howitzer battalion of 3 batteries of 6 guns each:
43d, 86th and 87th Batteries.
The 8th Division was ordered mobilized towards the end of
December.
*General Prior first assigned, died at Aldershot.
238 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Eighth Division.
Major-General Sir H. Rundle.
16th Brigade: Major-General B. B. D. Campbell.
2d battalion Grenadier Guards.
2d battalion Scots Guards.
2d battalion East Yorkshire.
1st battalion Leinster (Royal Canadians), from Halifax.
Army Service Corps.
Litter Bearer Co. No. 21.
Field Hospital No. 21.
17th Brigade: Major-General J. E. Boyes.
1st battalion Worcester.
1st battalion Royal West Kent, from Cairo.
1st battalion South Stafford, from Gibraltar.
2d battalion Manchester.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 37).
Litter Bearer Co. No. 22.
Field Hospital No. 22.
89th, 90th and 91st Field Batteries.
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
Field Engineer Co. No. 5.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 39).
Field Hospital No. 23.
Each battalion has a strength of 1,019, in which is included for
each a mounted company.
A cavalry brigade was ordered mobilized at the same time with
the 8th Division.
Cavalry Brigade.
Major-General J. B. B. Dickson.
7th Dragoon Guards.
8th Hussars.
17th Lancers.
Horse Battery M.
Ammunition column (1 reserve gun).
2 companies Mounted Infantry.
Army Service Corps (Co. No. 3).
1 Company Bearers.
1 Field Hospital.
Total strength: 2,518 men, 2,160 horses, 7 field guns and 2 ma-
chine guns.
An artillery corps was ordered to mobilize at the same time as
the 8th Division.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 239
Artillery Corps.
12th howitzer battalion: 43d, 86th and 87th Batteries.
13th battalion: 2d, 8th and 44th Field Batteries.
14th battalion: 39th, 68th and 88th Field Batteries.
15th battalion: 5th, 9th aid 17th Field Batteries.
Total strength 2,630 men, 2,134 horses. Each howitzer battery
has 199 men, 162 horses; each field battery 175 men, 137 horses.
The following separate organizations have been ordered to South
Africa:
1st battalion Cameron Highlanders (from Cairo).
1st battalion Sussex (from Malta).
2 battalions from Gibraltar.
16th Lancers from India (sailed January 8).
Horse Batteries A and J from India.
Ninth Brigade.
1st Northumberland Fusiliers.*
1st Loyal North Lancashire* (part).
2d Yorkshire Light Infantry.*
2d Northamptonshire, f
COLONIAL FORCES.
Rhodesia.
Rhodesia Horse (one squadron in Natal).
Protectorate Regiment (under Colonel Baden-Powell).
Mounted Infantry (under Colonel Plumer).
Kimbcrlcy.
Diamond Fields Artillery.
Kimberley Light Horse.
Kimberley Rifles.
Cape Colony.
South African Light Horse (under Col. Byng and Capt. Villiers).
Imperial Corps of Guides.
Brabant's Horse.
Warren's Horse.
De Montmorency's Scouts.
Railway Engineer Corps.
Mounted Volunteers (Colonel Cole).
Prince Albert Cape Artillery.
Cape Garrison Artillery.
Victoria Rifles.
*Originally in Cape Colony Force.
tOriginally on Line of Communications.
240 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Cape Town Highlanders.
Prince Albert Guard of Port Elizabeth.
Kaffrarian Rifles of East London.
Grahamstown Volunteers.
Queenstown Rifle Volunteers.
British South African Police (Colonel Walford).
Cape Mounted Rifles Police (Colonel Dalgetty).
Natal.
Amounted to 4,500 men in November, 1899.
Imperial Light Horse.
Uitlander Regiment.
Imperial Infantry.
Bethune's Horse.
Natal Carabineers.
Natal Field Artillery.
Natal Mounted Rifles.
Border Mounted Rifles.
Umvoti Mounted Rifles.
Corps of Colonial Scouts.
Corps of Guides.
Natal Mounted Police.
Canada.
Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry.
Canadian Mounted Rifles (2 battalions).
Royal Canadian Artillery. Batteries C, D, E (12-pounder B. L.).
Australia.
New South Wales Lancers Squadron 80
New South Wales Infantry 120
New South Wales Mounted Rifles 75
Queensland Mounted Infantry 264
Victoria Mounted Infantry 250
South Australia Mounted Infantry 125
West Australia Mounted Infantry 125
Tasmania Mounted Infantry 80
1,119
New Zealand.
Mounted Infantry... 213
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
241
-T9-
242 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
GENERAL BULLER'S COMMAND.
December 14, 1899.
2d Brigade: General Hildyard.
2d battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment.
2d battalion Devonshire Regiment.
2d battalion West Yorkshire Regiment.
2d battalion East Surrey Regiment.
4th Brigade: General Lyttleton.
1st battalion Rifle Brigade.
3d battalion King's Royal Rifles.
6th Brigade: General Barton.
2d battalion Royal Fusiliers.
2d battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers.
1st battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
2d battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Mixed Brigade: General Hart.
2d battalion Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).
1st battalion Durham Light Infantry.
1st battalion Highland Light Infantry.
2d battalion Somerset Light Infantry.
2 field batteries and 6 naval guns.
Maf eking.
Colonel Baden-Powell.
Cavalry.
Cape Mounted Police.
Infantry.
Protectorate Regiment.
Volunteers.
B. S. A. Companies, Motfnted Police.
Tuli.
Colonel Plumer.
Kitnberley.
Cavalry.
Cape Police.
Diamond Field Horse (part).
Kimberley Light Horse (part).
Infantry.
2d Royal Highlanders (detachment).
1st Loyal North Lancashire (4 companies).
Local Volunteer Corps.
Townsmen.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
243
BRITISH FIELD GUN WITH CLARKE RECOIL BRAKE.
Artillery.
Field Batteries.
Garrison Artillery.
Diamond Fields Artillery.
Engineers.
1 Detachment.
R. A. M. C.
Hospital.
British Artillery.
At the end of the year 1899 the British had in South Africa (omit-
ting those lost in battle) the following artillery material:
4 batteries (G, O, P, R) Royal Horse Artillery, 6 guns each,
12-pounder, 3-inch, breech-loaders 24
24 batteries (Nos. 4, 7, 13, 14, 18. 19, 20, 21, 36, 42, 49, 53, 62,
64, 66, 67, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 92) Royal Field Artillery,
6 guns each, 15-pounder, 3-inch, breech-loaders 144
3 batteries (Nos, 37, 61, 65) Royal Field Artillery, 6 guns each,
5-inch field howitzers, firing shrapnel, canister and lyddite
shell 18
1 mountain battery (No. 4), 6 guns, 2.5-inch, muzzle-loaders.... 6
192
244
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
4.7-t.V. Q. F. NAVY GUM, ON 6-IN. HOWITZER CARRIAGE.
The Artillery of the Transvaal Boers.
Old Guns.
8 cm. field guns, Krupp, old 40
6 cm. mountain guns, Krupp, old 40
80
7-pounder R. P. Maxim-Nordenfeldt (captured in Jameson Raid) 1
3-inch R. F. Maxim-Nordenfeldt (captured in Jameson Raid) 1
New Guns.
7.5 cm. R. F. Krupp field guns, new 8
7.5 cm. R. F. Schneider-Canet field guns, new 16
8 cm. R. F. Maxim-Nordenfeldt field guns, new 5
3.7 cm. Automatic Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns, new 24
12 cm. field howitzers, Krupp, new 4
12 cm. field howitzers, Schneider-Canet, new 4
3.7 cm. R. F. mountain guns, Krupp, new 4
Dynamite gun (like Simms- Dudley), new 1
15.5 cm. long siege guns, Schneider-Canet, new 4
72
BRITISH 4.7-IN. NAVY GUN ON 40-PDR. CARRIAGE.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
245
Machine Guns.
0.45-inch Maxim guns 30
0.30-inch Maxim guns 20
50
The Artillery of the Orange Boers.
7.5 cm. field guns, Krupp 12
3.7 cm. field guns 1
Field guns 13
Maxim machine guns 6
Guns captured by the Boers 26
Small-Arms in the War.
British: Lee-Metford gun. Boers: Mauser gun, M. 93, 95 and 98.
Henry-Martini gun.
The small-arms used in the Boer War are of especial interest
to the military world because in this war small-caliber magazine
rifles are used on a large scale for the first time in history.
The arms of the two opposed nations are contrasted in the fol-
lowing table:
Wt. of rifle alone (mag. empty)
Wt. of rifle and bayonet(mag. full)
British.
Boer.
Lee-Metford,
89, Mil.
Henry-
Martini,95
Mauser,
93-95.
Henry-
Martini (old)
9.2 Ibs.
10.9 Ibs.
4 ft. \y z in.
5
0.303 in.
5
Bolt.
14 grams.
f 2.2 grams.
\ cordite.
28.3 grams.
21.49f. s.
1900 yds.
38 in.
115
0.303 in.
5
14 grams.
2.2 grams,
cordite.
28.3
8.4 Ibs.
9.6 Ibs.
4 ft. Y 2 in.
5
0.276 in.
Bolt.
11.2 grams.
2.2 grams.
24.8 grams.
2389 f . s.
4380 yds.
55 in.
0.45 in.
31.2 grams.
5.5 grams,
bl'k powder.
Number of cartridges in magazine.
Caliber of bore
Number of grooves
Mechanism
Weight of bullet
Charge
Total weight of round
Velocity (muzzle)
Extreme range
Sight graduated to
Penetration in deal at 12 m
Rounds carried by soldier .
The British Army is armed principally with the Lee-Metford
rifle 89 M. II., but in 1895 the old Henry-Martini guns were altered at
Enfield and furnished with a bore of the same dimensions as the
Lee-Metford, and firing the same projectile. These guns were issued
to the volunteers at that time, and it is probable that some of them
are now in use in South Africa.
The Boer Army has mostly the Mauser gun; the Transvaal
Boers the model 93-95, the Orange Boers the latest model (98); but
the latter use in part the old 0.45-inch Henry-Martini, a number of
which they purchased from England in 1894.
246
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
LEE-METFORD GUN. Kriegatech. 3.
MAUSER RIFLE. Kriegstech.
Results of Firing of Mauser Rifle.
Height of trajectory at 500 m 3 feet 5 inches.
550 m 4 feet 3 inches.
" " 600 m 5 feet 4 inches.
Deviation (mean) at 200 m. vertical 6 inches.
horizontal . . 5 inches.
1200
vertical .............. 4 feet 5y 2 inches.
horizontal ........... 3 feet
1500 vertical ............. 10 feet
horizontal ........... 5 feet
2000 vertical ............. 20 feet
horizontal ........... 5 feet.
Space completely swept for Infantry, 1969 feet.
" Cavalry, 2297 feet.
ADDITIONAL COLONIAL CONTINGENTS.
Canada.
1,247 men.
4 squadrons Mounted Infantry.
3 Field Batteries.
% inch.
11 inches.
10 inches.
7 inches.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
247
HENRY-MAR flNI.Kriegstech. 3-
Australia.
Infantry. 1,250 men.
1 Field Battery.
New Zealand.
200 men, 4 Hotchkiss guns.
I ml ia.
i
250 mounted men.
Ceylon*
125 mounted men.
ADDITIONAL TROOPS ORDERED.
The 8th Division sailed from England in the latter part of March
and arrived at Port Elizabeth and East London about the middle of
April.
The 1st battalion Leinster Regiment came from Halifax, Nova
Scotia, to England to be mobilized and did not embark there for South
Africa till April 18th. The three batteries first assigned to tfie division
were left behind, but after the loss of 7 guns at Koorn Spruit (March
31, 1900), two other batteries for this division were ordered mobilized
at Aldershot.
Of the Militia 29 battalions have been (up to the end of April) sent
to South Africa, 4 to Malta, 1 to Cairo and 1 to St. Helena (to replace
other troops and, at the last mentioned place, to guard prisoners).
Of the Imperial Yeomanry 79 companies were organized into 20
battalions, besides a battalion of Sharpshooters, one of Rough Riders,
and one called Paget's Corps. They began to arrive in South Africa
on the 9th of February, and on the 21st of April there were 58 com-
panies in South Africa, 12 at sea, and 9 still at home.
248 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
TROOPS IN SOUTH AFRICA.
At the opening of Lord Roberts' campaign, about the middle of
February, England had the following troops in South Africa:
Army of operations at the front 110,000 men, 216 guns.
In Ladysmith 8,000 " 46
In Kimberley 2,600 " 76
In Mafeking 1,000 " 16
Reserves, and on Line of Communications:
In Natal 4,000 " )
In the Center and West 8,500 " (.32 "
In Cape Town 5,500 " I
In Rhodesia 2,000 " 6
Non-combatants 22,400
Losses in killed, wounded and pris-
oners 10,000
Sick 5,000 "
Total in South Africa 179,000 392
On the way to Cape Town 17,150 men, 172 guns.
Embarked: 4th Cavalry Brigade.
Mobilizing 17,150 men, 24 guns.
Ordered mobilized: 9th Division.
The Boers had about 65,000 men, 110 guns.
Up to the end of February the total number of troops sent from
England amounted to 141,165 men, 24,103 horses and 379 guns.
TOTAL BRITISH FORCES IN SOUTH AFRICA, INCLUDING
COLONIALS.
Unmownted. Mounted. Total.
(includ. artillery.)
February 15,* 15,142,800 37,800 180,600
BOER LOSSES.
Up to the middle of January.
Mafeking 500
Belmont 400
Graspan 250
Modder River 400
Magersf ontein 700
Kuruman 100
Douglas 75
Against Gen. French 300
*Not including 8th Division or 4th Cavalry Brigade.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 249
Against Gen. Gatacre 100
Glencoe 300
Elandslaagte 600
Ladysmith 2,000
Sundry 400
Total 6,125
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES (OFFICIAL)
Up to February 24th.
161 officers and 1,490 men killed.
194 officers and 5,795 men wounded.
133 officers and 2,669 men prisoners and missing.
Total, 488 officers and 9,954 men.
CHANGES IN COMMAND.
Feb. 10, General Colville to command 9th Division, newly
formed.
Feb. 10, Colonel Douglas to command 9th Brigade, vice Colville,
promoted.
Feb. 27, General Hart to 2d Division, vice Clery, injured.
Feb. 27, Colonel Norcott to 5th Brigade, vice Hart, promoted.
Feb. 27, Colonel Kitchener to llth Brigade, vice Wynne, wounded.
THE NAVAL BRIGADE.
The Terrible arrived at Simons Bay on October 14th, and while
getting ready to land the small-arms and field guns, the captain
(Percy Scott) concluded that heavier guns would be needed at the
front, and therefore commenced to mount the navy guns on carriages
for field use and on platforms, carrying on the work first on board and
then in the dockyard. The Powerful arrived on the same day and
took up the same work. On the 26th the latter was ordered to Durban,
and on the day of arrival Captain Lambton took to Ladysmith two
4.7-in. guns, three long 12-pounders and one short 12-pounder, some
Maxims, 300 rounds per gun, and 286 officers and men. On November
2d the Terrible received orders for Durban, arriving November 6th,
and at once landed the heavy guns:
One 4.7-inch Q.F., on wheeled mounting.
Sixteen long 12-pounders, on special mountings.
Two short 12-pounders, on field mountings.
Two Maxims, on field mountings.
300 rounds for each piece.
250 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
21 officers and 250 men were also landed, all for the defense of
Durban.
Four 12-pounders were soon taken to Pietermaritzburg, to replace
two long 12-pounders which had been landed by the Powerful, these
having been ordered forward to the Mooi River.
On November 23d two more were sent from Durban, the four
previously sent having also been sent forward to Mooi River and Est-
court. The guns sent forward were manned by men of the Tartar,
Philomel and Forte. On November 26th two 4.7-inch guns and four
more 12-pounders were ordered forward manned by the Terrible.
On December 1st Capt. Scott (Terrible) mounted a search-light on
a railway car. On December 8th eight more guns were ordered to the
front. The two 4.7-inch and six of the 12-pounders were in action at
Chievely on December 12.
THE NATIVE VOLUNTEER BODIES.
Bethune's Mounted Infantry.
Border Horse.
Brabant's Horse.
British South Africa Police.
Cape Garrison Artillery.
Cape Medical Staff Corps.
Cape Mounted Rifles.
Cape Town Highlanders.
Cape Town City Volunteers.
Duke of Edinburgh's Own Rifle Volunteers.
French's Scouts.
Frontier Mounted Rifles.
Imperial Light Horse.
Imperial Light Infantry.
Kaffrarian Rifles.
Kaffrarian Mounted Infantry.
Kitchener's Horse.
Montmorency's Scouts.
Prince Alfred's Own Cape Artillery.
Prince Alfred's Volunteer Guard.
Protectorate Regiment.
Oueenstown Rifle Volunteers.
Rhodesia Regiment.
Rimington Imperial Guides.
Roberts' Horse.
South African Light Horse.
Thornycroft's Mounted Infantry.
TEE SECOND BOER WAR. 251
COLONIAL CONTINGENTS.
Australia.
New South Wales Lancers.
1st Australian Horse.
Mounted Rifles.
A Battery.
Queensland Mounted Infantry.
South Australian Infantry.
Tasmanian Contingent.
Victorian Contingent.
Mounted Infantry.
West Australian Contingent.
New Zealand Mounted Rifles.
Canada.
1st and 2d battalions Canadian Mounted Rifles.
2d battalion Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry.
C, D and B batteries Royal Canadian Artillery.
Ceylon.
Ceylon Contingent.
THE ARTILLERY MATERIAL.
BRITISH ARTILLERY.
Strength and Distribution, February 15, 1900.
Field Gwns.
Roberts' Army 156
Buller's Army 60
Gatacre's Army 18
At Arundel and Naauwpoort 26
Cities and lines of communication. . . .100
360
Field Howitzers.
Methuen's Corps 12
Buller's Army 6
18
Navy Gutns.
Buller's Army 12
In Ladysmith 8
Roberts' Army 12
Elsewhere .26
58
252 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Additional: March 15, 1900.
Field guns 72
Field howitzers 18
4.7-inch Armstrong guns 6
Mobilizing: Field guns 24
The Field Gwn
The field gun is called a 15-pounder, M. 95; it is of 3-inch caliber,
firing only shrapnel (besides canister), initial velocity 1,574 feet,
weight 14 pounds; maximum range (15 elevation) 5,468 yards, but can
fire 2,000 yards farther. Its mean dispersion (double the mean devi-
ation) in range at 5,468 yards (for percussion shell) is 155 yards, while
that of the German gun is only 54 yards. It is sighted up to 5,500
yards, but the shrapnel is timed only to 4,000 yards. It was not orig-
inally a quick-firer, but with the Clarke brake it is now practically
such.
The City of London Volunteers were supplied with a battery of
3-inch Vickers guns. These guns are wire guns, firing a 12.5 pound
shrapnel with a muzzle velocity of 1,575 feet. It is sighted up to 5,000
yards, and carries shrapnel and shell. It is mountd on an improved
Darmancier carriage.
The City of Elswick Volunteers were supplied with a battery of
3-inch quick-firing Armstrong guns.
The Horse Artillery Gu>n
The horse artillery gun is a wire gun of 3-inch caliber, 12-pounder.
The Mountain Guto*.
A 7-pounder muzzle-loader.
The Field Howitzer.
The field howitzer is 5-inch caliber, firing lyddite shrapnel weigh-
ing 50 pounds, with time fuse graduated to 3,390 yards, maximum
range 4,900 yards. The guns of the siege train sent over from England
on December 9th comprised mainly 6-inch, but partly also 4.7-inch and
4-inch howitzers, firing lyddite and other shell.
Navy Guns.
These are 6-inch, 4.7-inch and 3-inch.
The 4.7-inch navy guns with Methuen's column were mounted on
40-pounder carriages.
Those at Ladysmith on 6-inch howitzer carriages, the recoil gear
for fixed platform removed.
This gun fires a 50-pound shell, with a muzzle velocity of 1,750
foot-seconds, and great range.
The Machine Gun.
Maxim gun firing small-arm ammunition.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
253
BOER ARTILLERY.
44 quick-fire modern field guns, 7.5 cm. or 3-inch (Krupp ?
Schneider-Creusot and Maxim-Nordenfeldt).
254 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
These guns fire (besides canister) shell and shrapnel, with from
1,475 to 1,510 feet muzzle velocity.
6 older 7.85 cm. (3.1-inch) guns.
4 old 6 cm. (2.4-inch) guns
4 new 3.7 cm. (1.46-inch) Krupp mountain guns.
24 3.7 cm. (1.46-inch) Maxim-Nordenfeldt
50 Maxim machine guns firing either the ammunition of the old
Henry-Martini gun, or that of the Mauser gun.
8 12 cm. (4.7-inch) field howitzers (Krupp or Schneider-Creusot).
These fire shell, shrapnel and torpedo shell, and are much
more mobile than the British howitzers.
6 long Creusot or Krupp 15.5 cm. (6-inch) siege guns (including
the Long Tom at Ladysmith), firing an 88-pound projectile with
a muzzle velocity of 1,574 feet.
The British cannot utilize the maximum range of their field guns
(about 7,500 yards), because their sight is not graduated beyond 5,500
yards, and their tables are not worked out beyond this range; whereas
the Boers, by burying the trail and by firing as they generally do from
above downward, can attain the extreme range of 7,500 yards.
Moreover, the Boer (Krupp) fuse is graduated to 4,200 meters (or
550 meters farther than the British), so that they can fire with shrap-
nel farther than the British. The British have, however, fired their
shrapnel (on account of the great range of the Mauser rifle) at too
great ranges ranges over 3,600 meters where the shrapnel bullets
have too low a velocity to be effective. Hence, the great advantage
of the Boers in possessing also shell, in addition to shrapnel, by means
of which they can fire effectively at ranges beyond the maximum
effective range of the British shrapnel. The British have nothing in
the way of a field piece to oppose to the Boer shell fire of over 5,000
meters, or even over 4,000 yards (the limit of the British time fuse).
The Boers have no real idea of tactics in their use of artillery,
for we never hear of batteries in the various engagements that have
taken place, but always of single guns, and after the second Upper
Tugela fight a single gun only pursued the British.
The British, having only shrapnel, were practically without any
effect on the Boer infantry in its S-shaped trenches, even when they
had a flank fire on them. Such trenches could only be reached by
high angle fire, but the maximum range of the British field howitzer
is only 4,900 yards, and good ranging with this piece requires well-
trained cannoneers, specially when the enemy is as expert in mask-
ing its trenches as the Boers were. Moreover, the British artillery
lacked tactical handling, in that the superior artillery officers were
generally detached, and the work was left mainly to the battery com-
manders: there was no concentration of groups of batteries, no fire
THE
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 255
control of the entire artillery; indeed, the great lesson of the war of
1870-71, the use of masses of artillery, seems to have been forgotten.
In an attack the artillery preceded the infantry, but did not always
accompany it in its advance, so that the latter really met unshaken
infantry in the assault. There is no question of the excellent and
fearless handling of the separate batteries in advance or in covering a
retreat, but no great tactical result has been accomplished by a large
mass of artillery on any of the fields, although the two groups in the
battles of the 5th to the 8th of February seem to hae worked in uni-
son, and in surrounding Cronje, Roberts undoubtedly attained an
artillery mass fire.
BRITISH CASUALTIES OF THE WAR TO MARCH 9.
Officers. Men.
Killed 132 1,583
Died of wounds 38 309
Missing and prisoners 138 3,191
Died of disease 32 793
Died of accidents 2 20
Sent home as invalids.. 83* 2,428*
Total 8,739
CHANGES IN COMMAND.
General Joubert died in Pretoria March 27th.
General Louis Botha succeeded to the command of the Trans-
vaal Boers, while President Kriiger assumed the command-in-chief
of the Boer troops.
General Clery returned to the 2d Division March 30th.
General White left Ladysmith on March 9th, to return to Eng-
land for rest and recuperation. General Lyttleton took command of
the Ladysmith garrison, with Howard and Knox in command of the
brigades.
The 10th Division was placed under General Hunter. It com-
prised the 5th and 6th Brigades.
April 15th Gatacre was recalled to England, and Pole-Carew suc-
ceeded him. Colonel Inigo Jones received the Guards Brigade.
ORGANIZATION OF LORD ROBERTS' ARMY.
Before the Advance on Bloemfantein.
1st Division. 6th Division.
Methuen. Kelly-Kenny.
^Includes some of the wounded.
256
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
1st Brigade. 9th Brigade.
Pole-Carew. Douglas.
7th Division.
Tucker.
14th Brigade. 15th Brigade.
Chermside. Wavell.
13th Brigade. 18th Brigade.
Knox. Stephenson.
9th Division.
Colville.
3d Brigade. 19th Brigade.
Colville. Macdonald.
Artillery.
11 field batteries, 2 howitzer batteries, 4 navy 4.7" guns, 4 navy
12-pounders, 3 Vickers-Maxim automatic guns (37 mm.).
Mounted Troops.
Cavalry Division.
Mounted Infantry
Division.
1st Brigade. 2d Brigade.
Hannah. Ridley.
French.
1st Brigade. 2d Brigade. 3d Brigade.
Porter. Broadwood. Gordon.
7 horse batteries.
1 balloon section.
6 companies Engineers.
The 8th Division (Rundle) landed at East London March 30th,
and was sent to the front at once, reaching Springfontein April 12th.
B&fore the Advance from Bloemfontchi.
1st Division.
Methuen.
1st Brigade. 2d Brigade.
Douglas. Paget.
6th Division.
Kelly-Kenny.
12th Brigade. 13th Brigade.
Clements. Wavell.
8th Division.
Sir Leslie Rundle.
16th Brigade. 17th Brigade.
Campbell, Boyes.
3d Division.
Pole-Carew.*
22d Brigade. 23d Brigade.
R. E. Allen. W. G. Knox.
7th Division.
Tucker.
14th Brigade. 15th Brigade.
J. G. Maxwell. C. E. Knox.
9th Division.
Colville.
3d Brigade. 19th Brigade.
MacDonald. Smith-Dorrien.
(Highlanders.)
llth Division.
(Vacancy.)
Guards Brigade. 18th Brigade.
I. R. Jones. Stephenson.
21st Brigade.
(Newly formed.)
Bruce-Hamilton.
:: '-Pole-Carew was later transferred to the new llth Division, Chermside
receiving the 3d.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
257
1st Brigade.
Porter.
Cavalry Division.
French.
2d Brigade.
Broadwood.
Independent.
4th Brigade.
Mounted Infantry.
Hamilton.
3d Brigade.
Gordon.
1st Brigade.
Hutton.
2d Brigade.
Ridley.
THE NATAL ARMY,
April 15th.
2d Division.
Clery.
2d Brigade. 4th Brigade.
Hildyard. Cooper.
5th Division.
Warren, t
10th Brigade. llth Brigade.
Coke. Wynne.
4th Division.
Lyttleton.
7th Brigade. 8th Brigade.
W. F. Kitchener. Howard.
10th Division.*
Sir A. Hunter.
5th Brigade. 6th Brigade.
Hart. Barton.
1st Brigade.
Burn-Murdock.
Cavalry Division.
2d Brigade.
Brocklehurst.
3d Brigade.
Dundonald.
BRITISH CASUALTIES OF THE WAR TO APRIL 7.
Officers. Mf)n.
Killed 211 1,960
Died of wounds 48 465
Died of disease 47 1,485
Died of accidents 3 34
Sent home as invalids J 29 1,828
Missing and prisoners 168 3,722
Wounded .627 9,883
Total
20,510
"Early in April Hart's Brigade was transferred to the western theatre to
join Brabant. Barton's followed and was sent to Kimberley.
fRelieved on account of his failure at Spion Kop, and sent to the western the-
atre on duty other than that at the front. Hildyard placed in command May 1st.
tNot including the wounded.
-17-
258 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO APRIL
Officers.
Killed. . 218 2,062
Died of wounds 53 492
Died of disease 64 2,028
Died of accidents 48
Sent home as invalids (not wounded) 29 3,101
Wounded 764 9,225
Missing and prisoners 171 3,925
Total (not including invalids) .... 22,180
CHANGES IN COMMAND.
May 1st Hildyard received command of the 5th division, vice
Sir Charles Warren.
BRITISH CASUALTIES TO MAY 19.
Officers. Men.
Killed 224 2,131
Died of wounds 58 517
Died of disease 84 2,719
Died of accidents 54
Died in captivity 1 49
Sent home as invalids* 525 9,893
Wounded 697 9,522
Missing and prisoners 171 4,304
Total (not including invalids) 20,680
*Including some of the wounded.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
OFFICIAL TABLE OF CASUALTIES.
June 19, 1900.
Casualties in Action.
Killed.
Wound-
ed.
Died of
wounds in
S. Africa
(included
in wound-
ed).
Missing
and
prisoners.
Total killed,
wounded,
missing,
and
prisoners.
Officers.
03 r '
a
73 '
Officers.
O d
O>o
Officers.
N. C. O.'s
and men.
QJ
0-0
fc'ol
Officers
N. C. O.
and me
Officers
o!
~
Uelmont, Nov. 23
Colenso Dec 15
3
7
5
8
5
8
6
8
1
22
23
1
4
17
2
2
1
3
27
14
6
2
5
66
235
50
128
58
40
50
13
57
20
20
11
241
148
13
66
238
23
10
11
16
245
32
11
167
63
36
63
453
2283
25
43
19
11
3*1
6
9
84
9
6
90
45
8
20
74
18
2
6
16
53
7
1
88
3ti
15
10
215
841
220
719
342
84
169
163
244
129
152
101
1530
646
180
393
1135
326
33
08
118
1050
51
66
284
280
H8
147
1786
10564
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
3
3
6
1
2
6
4
3
25
21
20
18
6
3
10
6
11
1
75
35
3
31
65
8
1
4
7
39
1
2
25
29
4
6
120
551
28
71
24
44
35
9
58
42
10
6
113
68
9
24
98
20
12
7
37
87
20
2
47
42
18
16
329
1276
270
1054
402
430
223
185
1226
187
172
119
1782
902
197
461
1436
354
440
111
541
1646
702
85
453
355
157
250
3265
17405
21
25
43
5
1
7
8
18
7
13
1
1
1
19
200
207
2
306
4
9
925
38
Driefoniein, March 10
Dundee, Oci ober 20
Elandslaagte, October 21..
Enslin (Graspan) Nov. 25...
Farqu bar's Farm and
Nicholsons Nek, Oct. 30. .
Johannesburg & Pretoria
Karee, near Brandfort,
March 29 ...
Klip Kraal Feb 16 ...
7
11
108
4
2
63
5
397
2
407
351
619
8
2
12
3
40
1026
4558
Lady smith, Relief of,
Feb. 19 to 27
Magersfontein, Dec.il
Monte Christo (Colenso),
etc.. Feb. 15-18
Modder River, Nov. 28....
Paardeberg, Feb. 1627
Potgeiters Drift, Feb. 5
to 7 ....
Reddersburg, April 3 4
Reiifontein, Oct. 24
Sanna? Post, March 31
bpion Kop, etc., Jan. 17
to 24
Stormberg Dec 10
Willow Grange, Nov. 23
At Ladysmith during in-
vestment-
Battle of January 6
Other casualties
At Kimberley during in-
vestment
At Maf eking
Other casualties ....
Total casualties in ac- )
lion reported up to V
June9 )
260 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
CHANGES IN COMMAND.
Juno. Colonel Carew, 7th Hussars, appointed brigadier general
commanding 1st Brigade Rhodesia Field Force, comprising 1st and
2d Bushmen's regiments. Colonel Grey commanding 2d Brigade.
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO JUNE 16.
Officers. Men.
Killed 243 2,353
Died of wounds 64 558
Died of disease 123 3,782
Died of accidents 60
Sent home as invalids 724 15,039
Missing and prisoners* 41 1,469
Totaly 24,456
CHANGES IN COMMAND.
July 1. The 9th division broke up, General Colville relieved,
Macdonald's (Highlander) brigade assigned to Hunter's (10th) divis-
ion, Smith-Dorrien's to Methuen's 1st division.
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO JUNE 23.
Officers. Men.
Killed ,...250i (2,384
Died of wounds 68 589
Died of disease 125 3,985
Died of accidents 66
Sent home as invalids 784 16,358
Missing and prisoners* 37 1,650
Totalf 26.296
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO JUNE 30.
Officers. Men.
Killed 254 2.403
Died of wounds 70 610
Died of disease 133 4,204
Died of accidents 66
Sent home as invalids 844 18,433
Missing and prisoners* 65 2,624
Totalt 29,706
""Excluding those who have been recovered.
fExcluding sick and wounded now in British hospitals in South Africa.
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 261
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO JULY 13.
Officers. Men.
Killed 255 2,411
Died of wounds 70 625
Died of disease 137 4,398
Died of accidents 68
Died in captivity 1 84
Sent home as invalids 916 19,742
Missing and prisoners* 59 1,927
Totalf 30,963
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO JULY 27.
Officers. Men.
Killed 271 2,502
Died of wounds 73 681
Died of disease 141 4,836
Died of accidents 1 72
Died in captivity 1 85
Sent home as invalids 1,044 24,058
Missing and prisoners* 76 2,718
Totalf 36,559
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO AUGUST 4.
Officers. Men.
Killed 272 2,534
Died of wounds 74 696
Died of disease 145 4,937
Died of accidents 1 77
Died in captivity 1 85
Sent home as invalids 1,105 25,049
Missing and prisoners* 59 2,740
Totalf 37,775
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO AUGUST 11.
Officers. .1/Vw.
Killed 272 2,549
Died of wounds 77 712
Died of disease 146 5,036
Died of accidents 1 81
^Excluding those who have been recovered.
tExcluding sick and wounded now in British hospitals in South Africa.
262 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Officers. Men.
Died in captivity 1 85
Sent home as invalids 1,151 26,123
Missing and prisoners* 55 2,768
Totalf 39,057
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO AUGUST 18.
Officers. Men.
Killed 275 2,560
Died of wounds 78 724
Died of disease 147 5,130
Died of accidents 1 86
Died in captivity 1 85
Sent home as invalids 1,151 26,123
Missing and prisoners* 54 2,751
Totalf 39,166
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO AUGUST 25.
Officers. Men.
Killed 281 2,599
Died of wounds 79 732
Died in captivity . . . 1 85
Died of disease 148 5,215
Died of accidents 1 90
Sent home as invalids 1,188 27,309
Missing and prisoners* 55 2,778
Totalf 40,561
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO SEPTEMBER 1.
Officers. Men.
Killed 283 2,655
Died of wounds 83 758
Died in captivity 1 85
Died of disease 148 5,332
Died of accidents 3 95
Sent home as invalids 1,213 27,937
Missing and prisoners* 45 1,007
Totalf 39,645
*Excluding those who have been recovered.
tExcluding sick and wounded now in British hospitals in South Africa.
THE SECOND BOER WAR.
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO SEPTEMBER 8.
Officers. Men.
Killed 283 2,683
Died of wounds 85 791
Died in captivity. 3 86
Died of disease.. 149 5,472
Died of accidents 3 101
Sent home as invalids 1,219 27,937
Missing and prisoners* 40 945
Totalf 39,785
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO SEPTEMBER 17.
Officers. Mew*
Killed 285 2,718
Died of wounds r. ...... 86 797
Died in captivity 3 86
Died of disease 149 5,582
Died of accidents 3 107
Sent home as invalids 1,239 28,199
Missing and prisoners* 12 809
Totalf 40,075
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO SEPTEMBER 22.
Officers. Hem*
Killed 287 2,738
Died of wounds 86 813
Died of disease 149 5,653
Died of accidents 3 108
Died in captivity 3 88
Sent home as invalids 1,279 29,957
Missing and prisoners* 9 799
Totalf 41,972$
TOTAL REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES THROUGH THE WAR.
Officers. Man*
Deaths in South Africa 528 9,400
Missing and prisoners 9 799
Invalids who died in England 4 183
Invalids discharged for disability 814
Total.. ll,737t
*Excluding: those who have been recovered.
FRxcludiner sick and wounded now in British hosmtals in South Africa.
|The great majority of those invalided home had recovered and rejoined.
264 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO SEPTEMBER 29
Officers. Men,.
Killed 287 2,750
Died of wounds 86 825
Died of disease 150 5,753
Died of accidents 3 114
Died in captivity 3 89
Sent home as invalids 1,326 30,300
Missing and prisoners* 7 812
Totalf 42,505$
TOTAL REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES THROUGH THE WAR.
Officers. Men.
Deaths in South Africa 529 9,531
Missing and prisoners 7 812
Invalids who died in England 4 193
Invalids discharged for disability 873
Total 11,949$
TOTAL BRITISH CASUALTIES TO OCTOBER 31
Officers. Men.
Killed 302 2,902
Died of wounds 89 893
Died of disease 155 6,115
Died of accidents 4 145
Died in captivity 3 90
Sent home as invalids 1,422 33,077
Missing and prisoners* 7 822
Totalf 46,026 J:
TOTAL REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES THROUGH THE WAR.
Officers. Men.
Deaths in South Africa 553 10,145
Missing and prisoners 7 822
Invalids who died in England 4 208
Invalids discharged for disability 1,030
Totalf.... 12,769$
-Excluding those who have recovered.
tExcluding those in South African hospitals.
$The great majority of those invalided home had recovered and rejoined.
TEE SECOND BOER WAR. 265
OFFICIAL TABLE OF CASUALTIES.
(Principal actions only.)
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
C o - o
S
SB O
Sunday River. April 10
1
14
1
Wepener. April 9-18
... 6 17
17
105
Zwartkopjesfontein. April 19-20 ,
3
16
26
Dewetsdorp. April 20
1
9
Wepener. April 17-24 ,
8
36
Wakkerstroom. April 21, 25
3
19
Karrefontein. April 22
3
2
26
3
Grootefontein. April 24
3
35
Thaba 'Nchu. April 28-30
3
3
46
13
Gen. Ian Hamilton's force. April 30
.... 1 3
10
6 1
9
Jacobsrust. April 30-May 3
5
2
35
10
Brandfort. May 2-5
3
48
8
Wellow. May 4
.... 2
1
6
Boordam. May 4
8
2
35
1
Kroonstad. May 10-11
3
1
37
3
Wepener. May 10
. . . . 3 27
14
109
1
Zand River. May 10
.... 1 15
5
31
1
Maritsani. May 13
5
1
22
3
Vryheid (ambuscade). May 20
.... 3
2
1
Winburg. May 25-26
3
16 1
1
Kheis. May 28
.... 1 4
5
17
Roodepoort. May 28
1
2
31
Hammonia. May 28-29
3
1
4 2
38
Senekal. May 29
. . . . 1 41
11
129
11
Florida. May 26
. . . . 1 19
11
112
Douglas. May 30
18
2
36
Lindley. June 1
. . . . 1 18
9
43
13
Bothas Pass. June 6-8
8
2
34
Swalkranz. June 4
1
53
Roodeval. June 7
6
1
21
4
Hoilbron. June 7
2
1
2 1
6
Vredef ort. June 7
1
17
Roodeval. June 11
1
1
17
Diamond Hill. June 11
.... 6 6
10
119 1
3
Almonds Nek. June 11
17
116
266 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
03 03 CO
sfi 5
o a o s o a
Diamond Hill. June 13 ...................... 1 21 1 81 2
Leuwspruit. June 14 ........................ 1 4 4 60
Vredef ort. June 17 .......................... 1 18 11
Rhenoster. June 17 .......................... 1 3 2 51
Honingspruit. June 22 ...................... 1 4 2 18
Amersfoot. June 29 ......................... 2 7
Machadodorp. July 3 ........................ 25
Lindley. July 3 .............................. 1 2 3 10 8
Reitzf ontein. July 7 ........................ 2 4 1 28
Bethlehem. July 6-8 ......................... 10 6 111
Rustenburg. July 7 ......................... 2 1 4
Derdepoort. July 11 ......................... 1 2 2 5 18
Uitvals Nek. July 11 ........................ 1 16 3 50 183
Krugersdorp. July 11 ................... .... 1 2 33
Potchefstroom. July 19-22 ................... 3 23
Bank (captured in derailed train). July 19... 31
Palmeitfontein. July 19 ..................... 4 4 18 3
Oliphants Nek. July 20 ...................... 2 1 5
Koster River. July 21 ....................... 5 6 20 6
Spitz Kop. July 21-22 ....................... 4 2 20
Stafferts Nek. July 23 ...................... 1 8 3 28
Retiefs Nek. July 23-24 ..................... 9 6 77
Rooi Koppies. July 24 ...................... 2 1 21
Stinkhoutboom. July 24 ..................... 4 8 24
Slaapkrans. July 28 ........................ 3 3 27
Stepannskraal. July 29 ...................... 1 1 21
Frederikstad R. R. accident. July 30 ....... 18 1 43
Zelekats Nek. August 1 ..................... 2 2 41
Elands River. August 4-6 .................. 1 4 1 32 1 9
Elands River (Carrington's force). August 4-6. 1 2 1 10 1
Amersf oort. August 7 ....................... 22
Venterskroon. August 7 .................. 1 6 13
Greylingstad. August 13-14 .................. 2 5 8
Wilport. August 14 ......................... 4 1 41
Buffels Hoek. August 19 .... ................. 6 9
Klipfontein. August 19 ...................... 5 21
Hammans Kraal. August 20 ............... 1 1 1 11
Van Wyks. August 21 ...................... 7 2 22 5
Geluk. August 23-26 ........................ 19 2 97 2 51
Belfast. August 24-26 ........................ 3 2 45 3
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 26*7
Killed. Wounded. Missing.
2 2 S
8Q> 05
jS & JB
55 S SB
O S O S O 2
Doomoek. August 26 1 10 6
Bergendal. August 29 1 12 9 95
Jachtfontein. August 29 116 1
Kwaggasfontein. August 31 5 6 11 2
Badfontein. September 1-4 1 17 7
Mauchberg. September 9 1 6
Lydenburg. September 4-10 3 34 2
Rochf ontein. September 11 2 1 14
Ventersburg. October 10 1 11
Jagersfontein. October 13-16 11 1 13
Carolina. October 13-14 6 21
Carolina to Bethel. October 15-19 1 5 3 21 3
Frederickstad. October 19-25 1 22 4 89 3
Jacobsdal. October 25 11 16
Bethlehem. October 26 3 1 16
12 miles south of Belfast. November 2 1 1 2 12 1
Bothaville. November 6 . . 26724
268 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
CONTENTS.
Preface 5
Introduction 9
The Theatre of War 13
The Forces Engaged 16
The English Troops 16
The Boer Troops 18
The Strategic Position , 19
The Operations 19
II.
The Campaign in Natal 37
The Campaign in Natal (continued) 62
III.
The Campaign in Natal 85
The Third Attempt to Relieve Ladysmith 94
The Campaign in the South and West 99
Lord Roberts' Campaign 101
The Southern Theatre of War Ill
The Situation in Natal 112
IV.
General Roberts' Campaign 131
Events in the Southern Theatre 136
Events in the Western Theatre 138
Events in Natal -139
Lord Roberts' Campaign 141
The General Situation 148
Lord Roberts' Campaign 155
Events in the South 160
Events in Natal 16
Events in the Extreme West 161
Lord Roberts' Campaign 163
Events in the South 167
Events in the Extreme West 167
Events in Natal 168
Comments 169
THE SECOND BOER WAR. 269
V.
Events in the Orange River Colony 185
Events in the Transvaal 189
Campaign of Middelburg 192
The Situation in the Orange River Colony 199
The Third Campaign against Louis Botha 200
General Situation 205
Comments 208
Tactical Deductions from the War 214
Appendix 224
270 THE SECOND BOER WAR.
IJST OF MAPS.
Sheet 1. The General Theatre of War.
Sheet 2. Sketch Map of Natal.
Sheet 3. Sketch Map of Ladysmith and Vicinity.
Sheet 4. The Theatre of War in Natal.
Sheet 5. The Siege of Ladysmith.
Sheet 6. Jacobsdal to Paardeberg.
Sheet 7. Paardeberg to Bloemfontein.
Sheet 8. Bloemfontein to Wepener.
Sheet 9. Bloemfontein to Winburg.
Sheet 10. Winburg to Kroonstad.
Sheet 11. Kimberley to Fourteen Streams.
Sheet 12. Fourteen Streams to Vryburg.
Sheet 13. Vryburg to Mafeking.
Sheet 14. Kroonstad to Wolvehoek.
Sheet 15. Wolvehoek to Johannesburg.
Sheet 16. Johannesburg to Pretoria.
Sheet 17. Newcastle to Volksrust.
Sheet 18. Lindley to Bethlehem, Fouriesburg.
Sheet 19. Rustenburg and Vicinity.
Sheet 20. Pretoria to Lorenzo Marquez.
Sheet 21. Belfast, Lydenburg, Nelspruit.
Sheet 22. Vredefort to W^elverdiend.
Sheet 23. Vicinity of Colesberg.
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