THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
PROFESSOR JOHN ELOF BOODIN
MEMORIAL PHILOSOPHY
COLLECTION
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SELF-REALIZATION
AN OUTLINE OF ETHICS
BY
HENRY W. WRIGHT
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN LAKE FOREST COLLEGE
NETV YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
COPTBIOHT, 1913,
BY
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
TNt QUINH iOOEN CO. PftEM
RAHWAT, N. J.
To
PROFESSOR JAMES EDWIN CREIGHTON
through whose advice and encouragement this study
was begun.
1C 87161
PREFACE
The writer on Ethics at the present time is fortunate
in having at his disposal the valuable results of two im-
portant movements in the science which took place in
the nineteenth century. The one idealistic, originating in
Germany but culminating as far as Ethics is concerned
in Great Britain, formulated the clearest conception which
human thought has yet attained of the spiritual activities
that cooperate in personal development. The other natu-
ralistic, continuing the tradition of English Utilitarianism
under the illuminating influence of evolutionary science,
furnished us with the most complete description that we
possess of the actual conditions, natural and social, under
which morality has developed. Now while these two schools
are sharply opposed in standpoint and method, their con-
clusions, in so far as these are well-founded, do not contra-
dict but rather supplement one another. Hence the moralist
of to-day, if he wishes to profit by the results of previous
ethical reflection, must aim to make his theory a synthesis of
these two different bodies of truth. Such has been my aim
in the present volume. The form of the Moral Ideal I have
endeavored to ground in the essential nature of volition,
understood as the controlling agency in personal develop-
ment; its content I have sought to derive from the actual
conditions of human existence as these have been discovered
by empirical study. In carrying out this program I was
made to recognize anew my heavy obligations to the leaders
of the two schools above mentioned. Among idealists I
owe most to Hegel, particularly to the pregnant suggestions
in the Encyclopedia of a moral " dialectic " whereby the
vi PREFACE
individual through self-negation overcomes the limitations
of his finitude and realizes his greater self, to Green's
Prolegomena, and to the works of Edward Caird. The
representatives of the other school to whom my debt is
largest are, perhaps, Leslie Stephen, Herbert Spencer and
Darwin himself.
In the arrangement of my material I have without doubt
been influenced decisively by the example of a book very
well known and highly esteemed by me Professor James
Seth's Ethical Principles. To introduce the principle of
Self-realization by a preliminary study of the opposing
theories of Hedonism and Rationalism, in which the one-
sidedness and inadequacy of each is clearly shown, has
always seemed to me a logical procedure and one well
suited to the purposes of a text-book. I should be indeed
remiss if I failed to take the opportunity here presented
of expressing my deep gratitude -to the author of this book.
As my first instructor in Ethics, Professor Seth rendered
me that high service which is in the power of only the
greatest teachers to perform he produced in my mind a
conviction of the importance and dignity of his subject
and awakened in me an enthusiasm for its further study
which has never waned.
Of late a growing tendency is noticeable among writers
on Ethics to avoid the abstractly formal, the purely theo-
retical, and to make their expositions concrete and prac-
tical. The desire which thus finds expression, to keep ethical
principles in close and vitalizing contact with the facts of
actual morality, and thus to facilitate their application to
conduct, is in every way commendable and promises well
for the development of ethical science. But this desire,
in itself wholly praiseworthy, should not in my opinion
lead to such neglect of theory as to make the ethical
treatise merely a series of discussions of different moral
problems. Of course the question concerns mainly the
PREFACE vii
method of presentation; any scientific treatment is bound
to be systematic and in order to be systematic must have
a framework of theory. How prominent then should the
theoretical framework be made in a text-book of Ethics?
My belief is that it should be made sufficiently prominent
to organize the material presented into a well-articulated
body of doctrine which can be grasped in its unity and
whose parts are so related that one implies and thus leads
on to the others. Such formulation is justified, I think,
both on logical and pedagogical grounds. These considera-
tions apply particularly to the treatment accorded to the
several virtues. Classifications of the virtues have been
out of fashion for some time in ethical literature. The
reasons usually given for abandoning the attempt thus to
classify the fundamental forms of good conduct are that
no classification can hope to be final or help being schematic
and arbitrary. Now such objections seem to me altogether
inconclusive and whatever force they may possess is in
my opinion far outweighed by the advantages which promise
to follow from a systematic exposition of the leading virtues.
The system of the virtues, each clearly defined in its re-
lation to all the rest, may with truth be said to complete
the science of Ethics, since it exhibits principles and ideals
in their application to daily conduct and as yielding a
program for actual living.
In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to
friends in Lake Forest for helpful suggestion and criticism ;
especially I desire to thank Professor J. M. Clapp of Lake
Forest College for assistance in proof-reading, and my
wife whose loyal cooperation in all my endeavors has made
this work possible.
HENRY W. WRIGHT.
LAKE FOREST, ILL.,
March 10, 1913.
CONTENTS
PART ONE
ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
CHAPTEB I
THE SUBJECT-MATTEB OF ETHICS CONDUCT
PAGE
1. The Meaning of Conduct. 2. Essential Features of Voluntary
Action. 3. Voluntary Action Defined. 4. In Voluntary
Action an Object Is Conceived as End, 5. Is Distinguished
from Present Actuality, 6. And Chosen in Preference to
Other Ideal Possibilities, 7. Because of Its Appeal to the
Character of the Agent, 8. Which Gains Expression
Through Its Attainment. 9. Ethics Is Concerned with the
Whole of Human Conduct. 10. Objections to This View . 3
CHAPTEB II
THE METHOD OF ETHICS A PRACTICAL AND
NORMATIVE SCIENCE
1. Ethics as a Practical Science. 2. Ethics as a Normative
Science. 3. The Human Will the Ground of Moral Value.
4. Other Practical Sciences: (a) Technical, 5. (6) In-
tellectual, and 6. (c)' ^Esthetic. 7. Other Normative
Sciences. 8. Conclusion 16
CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS THE DISCOVERY OF THE
SUMMUM BONUM
1. How Determine What Is Good Conduct? 2. Many Ends
Actually Sought Are Good only as Means. 3. To Satisfy
the Will an Object Must Be an End in Itself. 4. The
Problem of the Summum Bonum. 5. The Summum Bonum
as the Moral Ideal. 6. The Formation of the Moral Ideal.
7. Characteristics of the Ideal. 8. Source of the Power
of the Ideal ...,.,,. 29
iz
x CONTENTS
CHAPTEB IV
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD, OB CONSCIENCE
PAGE
1. Conscience Not a Separate Faculty, but a Species of Judg-
ment. 2. Conscience as Judgment of Moral Value. 3. The
Ground of Moral Judgment Is Usually Emotional Rather
than Rational. 4. Intuitional and Empirical Theories of
the Origin of the Moral Sentiments. 5. Experience as the
Source of the Moral Sentiments. 6. The Idea of the High-
est Good as the Rational Ground of Moral Judgment.
7. Moral Enlightenment. 8. Importance of Conscience in
Human Life. 9. Remorse 38
CHAPTEB V
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD OB MOBAL OBLIGATION
1. Objects Appeal to the Will Through the Feelings They
Arouse. 2. Appeal of the Good as Inclination. 3. Appeal
of the Good as Obligation. 4. Conditions Under Which Feel-
ing of Moral Obligation Arises. 5. Significance of the
Feeling of Moral Obligation. 6. Kant's View of Moral
Obligation. 7. Goodness Not Always Different from In-
clination. 8. The Duties of Morality Command Not as
Categorical but as Teleological Imperatives. 9. The Sum-
mum Bonum Alone Has the Authority of a Categorical Im-
perative 58
CHAPTEB VI
THE MOTIVE OF GOOD CONDUCT
1. The Appeal of the Summum Bonum as the Motive of Good
Conduct. 2. Possible Discrepancy Between the Intention
and the Consequences of Conduct. 3. Good Intentions
When Accompanied by Adequate Knowledge Are Usually
Productive of Good Consequences. 4. Good Consequences
in Most Cases Indicate Corresponding Degree of Goodness
in Intention. 5. But Good Motive Does Not Absolutely
Insure Good Consequences Because of Inability of Reason
to Foresee Future Developments ,..72
CONTENTS xi
PART TWO
ffHE NATURE OF THE GOOD
CHAPTER I
THE NATUBE OF THE GOOD CONDUCT OB CHABACTEB
PAGE
1. The Supreme Importance of the Subject. 2. The Good as
Determined by Custom. 3. The Good as Discovered by
Reflection. 4. Socrates' View of the Good. 5. Merita of
the Socratic Conception of the Good. 6. Defects of the
Socratic Conception of the Good. 7. The Good as Action
or the End of Action. 8. The Good as Conduct or Char-
acter. 9. The Good as Duty or Virtue 83
CHAPTEB II
THEOBIES OF THE GOOD HEDONISM
1. Pleasure as the Good. 2. Cyrenaicism. 3. Element of
Truth in Cyrenaicism. 4. The Inadequacy of Cyrenaicism.
5. Epicureanism. 6. Value of the Epicurean Theory of
the Good. 7. Arguments in Support of Hedonism. 8.
Error of Psychological Hedonism. 9. Criticism of Ethical
Hedonism. 10. Transition to Rationalism .... 96
CHAPTEB III
THEOBIES OF THE GOOD RATIONALISM
1. The Standpoint of Rationalism. 2. Extreme and Moderate
Rationalism. 3. Cynicism. 4. Stoicism. 5. The Truth of
Rationalism: Reason (o) as a Distinctively Human Fac-
ulty, 6. (6) As Extending the View of Man to Include a
World of Objects and Events, 7. (c) As enlarging the
Experience of Man to Embrace the Lives and Personalities
of Others. 8. The Faults in Rationalism: (a) It En-
courages Injurious Asceticism, 9. (6) It Justies Extreme
Intellectualism. 10. (c) It Is Individualistic in Tendency . 112
CHAPTEB IV
VOLITION AS AN OBGANIZING AGENCY
1. Volition as an Organizing Agency. 2. Volition as the
Synthetic Activity Comprehensive of Feeling and Thought.
xii CONTENTS
PAOI
3. Development of Volition: Involuntary Action, 4.
Voluntary Action: (a) From Desire, 5. (6) From Pur-
pose, 6. (c) From Ideal. 7. Volition as Creative of Self-
Conscious Personality. 8. Volition Does Not Always
Effect Complete Organization, 9. But to That Extent Is
Not Fully Developed 132
CHAPTEB V
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION OB FREEDOM
1. The Good as Self-Realization. 2. Self-Realization Through
the Instrumentality of Volition: (a) The Present Self,
3. (6) The Natural Self, 1. (c) The Personal Self.
5. The Possibilities of Selfhood as Actualized by Volition.
6. Self-Realization Identical with Self-Determination.
7. Libertarianism. 8. Determinism. 9. Freedom as Self-
Determination. 10. Objections to This View . . . 151
CHAPTEB VI
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION IN HUMAN LIFE
Form and Content in Self-Realization. 2. The Incidental
and the Essential in Human Nature. 3. Man as a Natural
Being, 4. His Native Instincts. 5. Man as a Conscious
Self, 6. His Spiritual Capacities. 7. Necessary Stages
in Self-Realization: 8. (a) Individual, 9. (6) Social,
10. (c) Universal 169
PART THREE
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
CHAPTEB I
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION
1. The Relation of the Good to the Existing Human Individ-
ual. 2. The Good as External to the Individual. 3. The
Good as Identical with the Interest of the Individual.
4. These Two Aspects of Goodness Explained by the Prin-
ciple of Self-Realization. 5. Arnold's Contrast of Hebra-
ism with Hellenism. 6. Hebraism. 7. Hellenism. 8. Re-
lation of Christianity to Hebraism and Hellenism . . 193
CONTENTS xiii
CHAPTER II
SELF-REALIZATION AND THE STANDABD OF GOODNESS
MM
1. The Idea of the Good as Furnishing a Standard of Moral
Judgment. 2. Self-Realization Criticised as Failing to
Supply Such a Standard. 3. The Ideal of Self-Realization
as the Standard of Moral Judgment. 4. This Standard
When Applied to Human Life Yields Further Principles of
Moral Distinction. 5. The Principle of Individual Interest.
6. The Principle of Social Welfare. 7. Maxims of In-
dividual Interest: (a) Maxim of Prudence, 8. (6)
Maxim of Idealism. 9. Maxims of Social Welfare: (a)
Maxim of Altruism, 10. (6) Maxim of Humanitarianism 211
CHAPTEB III
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACBIFICE
1. The Problem of Self-Sacrifice. 2. Self-Sacrifice, if a Duty,
Must Be of Ultimate Benefit to the Individual. 3. Self-
Sacrifice, if Genuine, Must Involve Real Loss to the In-
dividual. 4. The Conception of Organization Furnishes
Solution of the Problem. 5. All Organization Involves the
Sacrifice of Part to the Whole. 6. Self -Mastery .7. Self-
Sacrifice. 8. Is Self-Sacrifice Due to Merely Temporary
Maladjustment? 9. On the Contrary, It Is a Necessary
Factor in Self-Organization. 10. Optimism and Pessimism.
11. Conclusion 237
CHAPTEB IV
SELF-REALIZATION AND THE MOTIVE OF GOODNESS
1. The Motive of Good Conduct. 2. The Egoistic Motive:
Self-Interest. 3. Inadequacy of the Egoistic Motive.
4. The Altruistic Motive: Sympathy. 5. Inadequacy of
the Altruistic Motive. 6. The Religious Motive. 7. Self-
Realization as the Motive of Good Conduct. 8. Self-
Respect. 9. Philanthropy. 10. Reverence. 11. Mixed
Motives 261
CHAPTER V
SELF-REALIZATION AND HAPPINESS
1. Pleasure as an Element in Self-Realization. 2. Self-Real-
ization Not Identical with the Greatest Sum of Pleasures,
3. But Rather with a Harmony of Pleasures, or Happi-
xiv CONTENTS
PAGE
ness. 4. Happiness Thus the Feeling That Accompanies the
Organization of Conduct. 5. Happiness Not to Be Ac-
cepted as the Good, Because It Is Unduly Subjective in Its
Reference. 6. And It Implies a State of Passive Enjoy-
ment. 7. Is the Pursuit of Goodness Certain to Result in
the Greatest Happiness? 8. It Is, on the Assumption
That Moral Purpose Is Supreme in the Universe, 9. And
That Man May Complete His Moral Development in a
Future Life 288
CHAPTEB VI
SELF-REALIZATION AND THE SYSTEM OF VIBTUES
1. Intuitional and Empirical Conceptions of Virtue. 2. Virtue
as Interpreted by Self-Realization. 3. The Classification of
the Virtues. 4. Historic Methods of Classifying the Vir-
tues. 5. Other Methods of Classifying the Virtues.
6. Defects of These Classifications Illustrated by Pre-
evolutionary Classification of Living Forms. 7. Classifi-
cation of Virtues as Stages in Self-Organization Illustrated
by Evolutionary Classification. 8. Classification of Virtues
in Accordance with Method of Self-Realization. 9. Ad-
vantages of Such Classification 305
PART FOUR
THE LIFE OF SELF-REALIZATION
CHAPTEB I
THE INDIVIDUAL VIBTUES
1. The Exercise of Volition as the Pre-supposition of All Moral
Development. 2. Temperance. 3. Prudence. 4. Courage.
5. Idealism . . . 321
CHAPTEB II
THE SOCIAL VIBTUES
1. The Social Adjustment. 2. Kindness. 3. Friendship.
4. Justice. 5. Benevolence 369
CHAPTEB III
THE RELIGIOUS VIRTUES .416
INDEX . 423
PAET ONE
ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD
CONDUCT
CHAPTER I
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS CONDUCT
1. The Meaning of Conduct. 2. Essential Features of Voluntary
Action. 3. Voluntary Action Denned. 4. In Voluntary Action
an Object Is Conceived as End, 5. Is Distinguished from Pres-
ent Actuality, 6. And Chosen in Preference to Other Ideal
Possibilities, 7. Because of Its Appeal to the Character of the
Agent, 8. Which Gains Expression Through Its Attainment.
9. Ethics Is Concerned with the Whole of Human Conduct.
10. Objections to This View.
1. The Meaning of Conduct. Ethics may be described
as the science of conduct, provided that conduct itself is
defined with sufficient strictness. It is natural to think of
the term " conduct " as synonymous with the word " ac-
tion." But action is defined by Psychology as movement
having conscious antecedents and concomitants, 1 and evi-
dently is possible with animals as well as men; while the
field of morality has always been limited by the common
reason of mankind to the sphere of human action. The
same difficulty arises if with Spencer 2 we define conduct
as the adjustment of acts to ends ; since when thus defined
it includes the action of all living creatures. If the word
is used to signify the subject-matter of Ethics, therefore,
conduct must be defined as voluntary action and thus lim-
ited to the human sphere. For only to such action does
responsibility attach and are the moral predicates properly
applicable. Ethics is then the science of conduct when by
conduct is understood voluntary action.
1 TrrcHETfEB : Outline of Psychology, 61.
* SPENCEB : Data of Ethics, Chap. I, 2.
8
4 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
2. Essential Features of Voluntary Action. It will
assist us in our present undertaking that of determining
the nature of voluntary action if we consider briefly some
of the essential features of this type of action before
attempting its formal definition.
In the first place, voluntary action always involves some
kind of activity or change. Usually it involves change of
position in space, or movement. So generally is this the
case as to suggest that movement is a universal and neces-
sary accompaniment of all volition. Yet such is not the
fact if visible movement is meant. For thinking the think-
ing of one who aims to reach a definite conclusion which
is certainly voluntary, and deserves to be classed as conduct,
may be unaccompanied by any visible movement. It is
true that even here many psychologists maintain that small
invisible movements occur within the body of the thinker,
and constitute an essential element in his activity. 3 How-
ever this may be, it is certain that activity of some sort,
a series of changes possessing a measure of continuity and
direction, characterizes all voluntary action.
. Now a stream which rushes down a hillside, turning
away to avoid large boulders, making a quiet pool here
and a rapid torrent there, exhibits this feature of activity ;
it passes through a series of changes which are continuous
and all directed towards one result. Yet no one would
think of regarding the activity of the stream as voluntary.
The reason most obvious is that the movement of the water
has no conscious conditions or accompaniments. We dis-
cover then a second feature which is essential to voluntary
action the presence of consciousness. Because they are
not conscious, all changes occurring in inanimate objects
1 " We sometimes think of such doing as purely mental. In reality,
however, movements are involved in all cases, and even were this
not true the general principle of habit so far as this stands for a
law governing the transmission of nervous currents would still be
valid." ANGELL: Psychology, p. 76.
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 5
(and in plants as well) are excluded from the sphere of
voluntary action.
Suppose, in the second place, that consciousness of a
comparatively simple form should be present and produce
activity. A bull, aroused by the sight of a scarlet jersey
worn by a man who is traversing the pasture, rushes upon
him, goring and trampling him. Here we have activity
with conscious conditions and concomitants. The percep-
tion of the red object " angered " the bull and prompted
him to attack the person displaying the obnoxious color.
Yet we should not call the action voluntary or hold the
animal morally responsible for it. If asked why not, we
should probably reply that the animal did not ' ' know what
it was doing," and our meaning would be that while the
act had its source in certain images and feelings in the
animal consciousness, still it was accompanied by no knowl-
edge which could foresee the suffering and death of the
man or understand any of its consequences. Evidently,
therefore, foreknowledge involving some ability to gen-
eralize upon the past and to anticipate the future is a
necessary feature of voluntary action. The addition of this
element of foreknowledge to volition rules out of the field
tff conduct all animal action except possibly occasional acts
of a few species of the higher animals such as the dog and
monkey, which some authorities believe to be capable of
an elementary form of judgment and hence able to act
with a limited degree of foreknowledge. 4
Finally we can imagine activity conditioned by con-
sciousness and accompanied by foreknowledge, which is
nevertheless not voluntary. Imagine a motorist turning
down the center of a road in the middle of which some
children are playing, expecting, if they do not run out
4 Hobhouse believes that certain of the higher vertebrates, such
as those mentioned, are capable of practical (as distinguished from
conceptual) judgment. ( HOBHOUSE: Mind in Evolution, Chaps. VI
and IX.)
6 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
of the road, to turn his machine to one side or bring it
to a stop. Suppose that the children do not move and
the driver, owing to some break in the machinery, is unable
at the last moment to stop or turn his car. The ensuing
action might with fairness be said to have its condition
in the consciousness of the driver, since he consciously gave
direction to the machine, and was accompanied by a second 's
clear foreknowledge of the results on his part. The same
situation would exist if we imagined a prisoner of war
having his finger pressed forcibly by his captors upon a
key which he knew would explode a mine and destroy
one of his own country's ships. We have in both of these
cases which, to be sure, make somewhat extravagant de-
mands upon the imagination but are quite possible acts
conditioned by consciousness and accompanied by fore-
knowledge. We should not dream of regarding them as
voluntary, however; because they are not intentional. A
fourth feature essential to voluntary action has been found.
Not merely must the act have its source in a conscious
process, and its results be in a measure foreseen, but the
act and its results must be intended, i.e. they must be
consciously chosen, be preferred and sought after as ends.
3. Voluntary Action Defined. At least four factors
then enter into voluntary action: (1) activity, (2) con-
sciousness, (3) knowledge, and (4) intention. In order to
be voluntary an action must have its source in conscious-
ness, its results must be in a measure foreknown, and also
intended. The fourth of these factors of course includes
the second and third; an act can be intended only if it
is conscious and its result is foreseen. When the outcome
of action is thus intended it becomes an end or aim and,
as chosen by the agent, determines the nature and course
of his activity. To the pursuit and attainment of this end
all his action is made a means. Gathering up in a single
statement these different characteristics, voluntary action
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 7
may be defined as action in pursuit of a consciously chosen
end. Let us consider in further detail this mode of activity,
distinguishing the steps which enter necessarily into its
regular procedure.
4. In Voluntary Action an Object Is Conceived as an
End. All voluntary action is determined by the idea of an
object conceived as an end. This end or aim by which the
will is directed in its activity is of necessity a product of
thought and imagination. Usually the object which is
sought is not present to the senses, and hence must be
imagined or thought of. But even when the object desired
is present in perception, if it is to act as an end it must
be related in an intelligible way to certain ideas. With the
object sought, whether perceived or imagined, must be asso-
ciated ideas of the means or movements necessary to secure
it, and some conception of the satisfaction which will result
from obtaining it. Ideas of the two classes last named serve
to relate the object to the agent himself, make it an object
for him, i.e. an end. Because the object has this connection
with the needs and capacities of the agent it interests and
attracts him. This attractive quality belonging to the end
is signified in the consciousness of the agent by a pleasant
feeling which suffuses and colors the whole complex of
ideas which we have been describing. An illustration will
make clearer the nature and relation of these different con-
stituents which go to make up the nd. Suppose that after
I have settled down to my evening's reading I discover
that I have not a needed book in my possession. At once
the idea of going to the library for the missing book occurs
to my mind. The book in the library thus comes to be
thought of as an end of action. The book itself as a specific
object is imagined the image may be reproductive and
I see in my fancy the back of the book as it appears on
the shelf or feel the roughness of its binding when in my
hand, or I may have a verbal image, seeing the words of
8 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
the title printed out or hearing them spoken. With the
idea of the book as thus imagined are associated ideas
more or less vague of the movements I must make to procure
the book motor images of the movements incidental upon
rising from my chair, leaving the room, walking across the
campus, and even of reaching up to take the book from
its accustomed place on the shelf. Finally there is added
an idea of the result of the action, of the opportunity which
the possession of the book will give me to complete success-
fully my evening's work. The thought of thus finishing
my work pleases me and its pleasantness spreads over the
whole combination of ideas which thus becomes interesting
and attractive to me. This complex of ideas with its
pleasant tone, which is formed in much less time than it
takes to describe it, may be accepted as a typical end.
5. Is Distinguished from Present Actuality. The end
as conceived or imagined belongs strictly to the ideal
sphere and thus is set in sharp opposition to objects which
actually exist or are in present possession. This opposition
of the end as ideal or imagined, to the present and actual,
is essential to its nature and office as end; for precisely
because it does not actually exist, while it does interest
and attract, the thought of the end arouses the agent to
action. The opposition between the ideal and the actual,
due to the thought of an end unattained, introduces strain
and tension into the consciousness of the agent. His present
condition is rendered unpleasant or even painful because
its continued existence precludes the attainment of the
object. He is made restless and uneasy in the actual by
the possibilities held forth by the ideal. Thus, in the illus-
tration of the book wanted from the library, the thought
of securing it makes me discontented with the facilities of
my own library, distracts my attention from other tasks
I might perform, and causes me genuine uneasiness and
discomfort.
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 9
6. And Chosen in Preference to Other Ideal Possibili-
ties. Voluntary action requires that the end be not merely
distinguished from actually existing objects but also be
chosen in preference to all other ideal possibilities. These
possibilities may take the form of several clearly imagined
alternatives to the end finally realized. Then deliberation
ensues over the desirability of these rival ends, with an
attempt to foresee the consequences involved in the various
possibilities of action, as when one debates between different
possibilities of route and destination in a coming holiday
excursion. Or the alternative possibilities may be present
only by implication. In many cases of voluntary action
there is no debate between conflicting objects; indeed it is
often true that only one possibility of action is consciously
considered. Yet in all action truly voluntary, the possibility
of not performing the action, of not seeking the end, enters
in some form into the consciousness of the agent. His
present condition, contrasted as actual with the idea of
the end, becomes, in the idea of its continuance into the
future, itself an ideal possibility. I am aware, with more
or less conscious clearness, of the possibility of continuing
to sit in my easy-chair before the study-fire as an alterna-
tive to going to the library in the rain for the needed book.
Consequent upon this feature of voluntary action, the
feelings which accompany it are further complicated.
"While the idea of procuring the needed book is itself
pleasant, the steps which must be taken to attain this end
those of leaving my comfortable chair and going out
on an inclement night are in thought highly unpleasant.
And while my present condition of need for the book is
unpleasant and irritating, the thought of remaining where
I am in contrast to going after the book is very pleasant.
Hence arises that baffling confusion of pleasant and un-
pleasant feeling which is attendant upon hesitation and
decision.
10 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
Besides being contrasted with other possibilities of action,
an end must be chosen or selected from among them if
it is to be voluntarily realized. This choice consists in fixa-
tion of the attention upon one end, to the exclusion of all
other alternatives. Thus to hold attention upon one end
requires effort, since it involves a resisting of the attrac-
tions of other objects which are often very powerful.
Modern psychology has taught us that the effort involved
in volition is effort of the attention in holding an idea
in the focus of consciousness despite all influences
working to crowd it out, and not effort exercised in ener-
gizing unwilling muscles and in moving laggard limbs
to carry out the fiat of consciousness. Let the idea be
attended to, the psychologist tells us, and it will work
itself out. This does not mean, however, that only effort
enough need be exerted to bring the idea of the end once
within the circle of clearest consciousness, thus forcing
out for the time being all other attractive possibilities. On
the contrary, protracted effort is often required to hold
the idea fast in the focus of attention while the steps
necessary for its realization are serially thought of and
taken else the idea of a conflicting aim will seize the
attention and interrupt the action in its performance.
Thus I may have to keep the idea of the desired book
in the forefront of my thoughts until well on the way
to the library, lest the thoughts of the comforts of chair
and fire be sufficient to turn me back before I have passed
the door.
7. Because of Its Appeal to the Character of the
Agent. Such choice of an end of action must itself have
some cause or ground. Selection can occur only where
there is some basis or criterion for comparing the different
alternatives. In voluntary action choice is determined by
the character of the agent, as this is reflected in his con-
sciousness at the time of decision. The conscious processes
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 11
which thus represent the character of the agent in de-
termining his choice vary greatly in the degree of their
complexity and of their adequacy to the character they
express. At the one extreme we have choice determined
by the simple memory-image of a past experience in which
the individual sought and gained a similar object with
pleasant results to himself, as a person might select and
purchase a certain kind of fruit because it had particularly
pleased his taste on a former occasion. The opposite ex-
treme is given in instances of selection based upon a large
purpose or comprehensive ideal which has been built up
as the result of years of thought and experience, and
whose bearing upon the present situation is discovered
after a period of deliberation. The decision of a man to
accept public office at a pecuniary sacrifice, because in his
ideal of life public service stands higher than private am-
bition, would be an illustration in point. The important
fact is that the nature of the agent determines his choices. '
Hence if action is really voluntary it is, as Aristotle recog-
nized, an expression of character of some comparatively
permanent disposition or attribute in the nature of the
individual who performs it. 5 This is the reason why we
are justified in holding individuals responsible for their
voluntary acts. If I decide to go to the library in search
of the missing book the ground of my choice must rest
in my own nature. It may be my interest in the subject
I am studying, or a habit I have formed of pursuing to
completion a task I have undertaken, or some other trait or
disposition which influences my choice, but in any case the
act, if voluntary, has its source in myself.
8. Which Gains Satisfaction Through Its Attain-
ment. When the end chosen is attained through action
the tension between ideal aim and actual condition is re-
ABISTOTLE: Nioomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Chap. Ill (Welldon's
trana., p. 42).
12 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
lieved and its unpleasantness allayed. The end which is
thought of and desired is made an actual possession of
the agent, and thus unity and equilibrium are restored to
his consciousness. This state of unity, regained through
the inclusion of an object desired and sought for, is itself
pleasant and is experienced by the agent as satisfaction
the pleasant consciousness of success in giving expression
to his character. With such feelings of satisfaction I
begin my work again after returning from the library with
the object of my quest, pleased that I have not allowed
an obstacle which could thus be removed to interfere with
the prosecution of my evening's labors.
Finally, it should be observed that the steps just de-
scribed are not in any sense separable or independent, nor
is voluntary action merely the sum or sequence of them thus
conceived. On the contrary, each voluntary act is a vital
unity within which the different steps or activities just
distinguished are joined in close organic interdependence.
Each voluntary act is a pulsation in the life of intelligence,
a moment in the expression of personality.
9. Ethics Is Concerned with the Whole of Human
Conduct. If conduct, thus understood as voluntary action,
is taken for the subject-matter of Ethics, then it is obvious
that this science will be limited in its scope to the field
of human action; for man alone among living species is
capable of acting in pursuit of a consciously chosen end.
Within the limits of human life, however, Ethics is con-
cerned, not with a part, but with the whole of conduct.
It is the comprehensive science of human practice, and,
since all intelligent life has its source in will, may be said
to be the science of human life itself. In a real sense, then,
conduct is not a fraction, but the whole of human life,
and all of the activity by which man's personality gains
expression falls within the field of Ethics. Necessarily,
Ethics is general in its treatment, leaving a detailed con-
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 13
sideration of special activities to subordinate sciences and
confining itself to the essential characteristics and funda-
mental principles of conduct.
10. Objections to This View. Objections of two dif-
ferent kinds may arise to this view of the subject-matter
of Ethics. According to the first we have made the field
of Ethics too narrow in thus limiting it to voluntary action.
For, it is urged, we hold men responsible for actions that
clearly are not voluntary. Acts done from fixed habit,
such as the striking of a blow or the utterance of an oath
when angry, might be cited as examples. Certainly such
acts are frequently without intention, and hence, when
considered in isolation, appear as involuntary. They are
not properly understood when thus isolated, however; but
must rather be conceived as the outcome of a series of
acts, the first of which were intended, and voluntary, and
for which the agent was responsible. The habit itself is
voluntarily initiated if not the single act, and we properly
hold the agent responsible for it and for all the action
it entails. Much the same can be said of acts recognized
as " accidental " but for which we hold the individual re-
sponsible and inflict censure or punishment. While the
act itself is strictly unintentional and involuntary, it results
from a lack of care and attention which has voluntary
origin and for which responsibility is justly incurred.
The second objection is of just the opposite character
and rests upon the opinion that not all voluntary action
has moral significance. Hence, it is claimed, we make the
field of Ethics too broad when we identify it with the
sphere of voluntary action. Herbert Spencer was of this
opinion, and his illustration of conduct which is ethically
indifferent has become classic.
" As already said, a large part of ordinary conduct is indifferent.
Shall I walk to the waterfall to-day? Or shall I ramble along
the seashore? Here the ends are ethically indifferent. If I go
14 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
to the waterfall, shall I go over the moor or take the path
through the wood? Here the means are ethically indifferent.
And from hour to hour most of the things we do are not to be
judged as either good or bad in respect of either end or means." 6
Professor Dewey agrees with Spencer on this point. 7
He believes that when one end is taken for granted and
out of its connection with other ends, the question of
the means employed in its realization is one of technique
rather than of morals. " It is a question of taste and of
skill of personal preference and of practical wisdom, or
of economy, expediency. ' ' Thus if the matter of the after-
noon walk stand alone and have no bearing upon, or con-
flict with, other aims or interests, then the choice of a path
to follow is an affair of individual taste or practical ex-
pediency and has no ethical significance. Only when the
value of the proposed end is felt to be incomoatible with
that of another, appealing to a different kind of interest
or tendency, do we have a truly moral situation in the view
of the latter writer. But, as a matter of fact, ends can
be thus considered out of relation to other ends, and to
their ultimate consequences, only by artifice and abstrac-
tion. All the ends consciously chosen by an individual,
along with the activities they call forth, belong together,
since they are expressions of a unitary personality and
are interwoven by threads of common interest and mean-
ing. Thus, in Spencer's illustration, the afternoon walk
gives mental diversion and physical exercise, and these in
their turn are necessary to the health of mind and body,
ends of high moral worth. As a means to this end the
walk itself possesses moral value and, since it is difficult
to imagine, that with a given person and at a certain time,
one path would not fulfil the purposes of the walk a little
better than any other, we have in the choice of route a
Data of Ethics, Chap. I, 2.
DEWEY AND TUFTS : Ethics, p. 206.
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF ETHICS 15
question of real, although not momentous, moral signifi-
cance. Whether I shall have my house painted white or
brown seems on first thought merely a matter of taste or
economy and to have no ethical bearing whatever. Yet
further reflection shows me that the painting of my house
contributes in an important way to the purposes, themselves
of undoubted moral value, which the house itself subserves,
and that the advantage gained by painting is measured
largely by my success in selecting the " right " color. As
the field of conduct is thus a unity, the different ends being
inter-related and the single acts connected in the chains
of their consequences with the most inclusive purposes,
it is impossible to draw a line within it which shall exclude
certain actions as morally indifferent. Of course, it is not
meant that ends are never considered out of relationship
with other ends nor that in every case of choice we should
raise the issues of eternity and try to determine the ulti-
mate bearing of our action. In many cases the bearing
of an action upon the attainment of other ends itself im-
portant enough is thoughtlessly overlooked when it should
be taken into consideration. But manifestly time. alone
forbids that the whole field of conduct should be surveyed
at every instance of choice. Hence, in selecting a tool or
choosing a method for our work, we follow approved techni-
cal procedure which, while it is now habitual with us, was
first adopted because representing what in the experience
of the race was the most effective way of securing the end
desired.
REFERENCES
SPENCEB, Data of Ethics, Chap. I.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. X.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. I, 1, 2.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book I, Chap. I.
ABISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, (Welldon's trans.), Book II,
Chap. III.
GBEEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book II, Chap. II.
CHAPTER II
THE METHOD OF ETHICS A PRACTICAL AND
NORMATIVE SCIENCE
1. Ethics as a Practical Science. 2. Ethics as a Normative Science.
3. The Human Will the Ground of Moral Value. 4. Other
Practical Sciences: (a) Technical, 5. (6) Intellectual, and
6. (c) ^Esthetic. 7. Other Normative Sciences. 8. Conclusion.
1. Ethics as a Practical Science. The method of
Ethics is consequent upon the character of its subject-
matter. As the science of conduct, Ethics is necessarily a
" practical " science. In order to make clear what is
meant by such a practical science we may contrast it in
aim and method with theoretical science, although as will
appear later the distinctions we make are only provisional.
A theoretical science is concerned with the knowledge of
objects as facts. It investigates the conditions under which
they exist, seeking to discover the other objects with which
they are necessarily connected. The aim of such science
is to ascertain in this way the nature and connection of
all existing objects, explaining the existence of each one
as a necessary consequence of the existence of another,
its antecedent or cause. Geology is a science of this kind.
It seeks to know the facts concerning the earth 's structure,
to discover the order of events in its history. It explains
the existence of objects at present observable, e.g. sedi-
mentary rocks, by connecting them with other objects and
agencies which preceded them in the past and stand as
their causes. A practical science, on the contrary, is con-
cerned primarily with the realization of objects as ends
of action. To be sure, purposive action is a fact, the con-
16
THE METHOD OF ETHICS 17
ditions of whose existence may be investigated according
to the method of theoretical science. The work of Ethics
is greatly aided by a knowledge of the history of the
different forms of conduct and of the natural agencies
that have influenced their existence and development. But
such knowledge is only prefatory to ethical science proper,
which is interested in conduct, not as a series of events
causally connected, but as a means intelligently employed
in the realization of chosen ends. As a practical science,
then, Ethics seeks to discover through what actions the ends
of human conduct may be realized. With the introduction
of objects as ends to be realized a new conception enters,
of great importance in all sciences of practice, i.e. value.
Value is possessed by objects, not in their mere exist-
ence", but in their relation to conscious intelligence. What-
ever is required to satisfy a need or fulfil a capacity ^of
an intelligent being has value. The fact that an object
is chosen for pursuit by a voluntary agent shows he is
unsatisfied without it, and that, in promising relief to his
want, the object has value. Objects whose realization is
sought by mankind in general may, therefore, be regarded as
necessary for the satisfaction of the human will and, hence,
possessed of value. This value is communicated to all
actions which are required as means to their attainment.
The work of Ethics as a practical science may then be
said to be the discovery of what conduct thus has value
or, more definitely (although the criterion of distinction
has not yet been supplied), moral value. Ethics is a prac-
tical science, therefore, whose aim is to discover what con-
duct has moral value.
2. Ethics as a Normative Science. Upon the distinc-
tion between existence and value hinges the difference in
method between the descriptive and the normative sciences.
Descriptive sciences are composed of judgments of fact or
existence. These judgments are so organized in each sci-
18 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
ence that the resulting body of knowledge correctly reflects
the nature and connection of objects existing in a certain
field of human experience. The " natural " sciences thus
aim at a complete description of the phenomena of nature,
each investigating the behavior of objects and the order of
events in a particular part of the world. Normative sci-
ences are composed of judgments of worth. Their aim is
to evaluate, to appreciate. They are concerned, not with
what is, but with what ought to be. They imply the pos-
sibility of a choice between objects differing in value, with
consequent obligation to choose the best. Now it is possible
to estimate the worth of objects or actions only when we
have some standard to which they should conform, by which
their value may be measured. Indeed, when the true stand-
ard of value in a field is once clearly defined its applica-
tion is comparatively easy. Hence the first and most im-
portant task of any normative science is to discover the
standard or norm by which worth may be estimated in
its field.
Ethics belongs in the group of normative sciences. It
has work of description to accomplish, to be sure, in de-
scribing existent practices and beliefs of human society
and explaining the manner of their evolution. But this
work is of minor importance as compared to the task of
evaluating conduct, which falls to the duty of Ethics.
When the normative method is thus accepted as proper to
Ethics, the question of the standard of value in the field
of conduct is immediately raised to the greatest promi-
nence. For conduct cannot be evaluated without some
standard or criterion by which the worth of different
actions may be tested. As that to which all actions should
conform, such a standard must itself be some form of
conduct, or end, realized in action. An end of action in
order thus to act as a standard must itself possess full
value, that is, completely satisfy the will which seeks it.
THE METHOD OF ETHICS 19
That end, which in its realization possesses full value, and
hence may be used as a standard for evaluating conduct,
is called the Ggod. To discover what action or end of
action may be accepted as the Good or standard of value
in the field of conduct, and then to apply this standard,
judging those actions which conform to the standard to
be good and those which do not to be bad, is the task of
Ethics as a normative science. In brief, it is the science
of good conduct. This conception of the task of Ethics
is essentially the same as that reached when we considered
it as a science of practice. It has been suggested that there
is a real difference between the two methods, inasmuch
as the normative science is occupied exclusively with dis-
covering the ideal or standard, while the practical science
is concerned only with the conditions of its realization.
But this difference is simply one of emphasis ; the two kinds
of inquiry cannot be separated. It is impossible to de-
termine how human conduct shall achieve its end unless
we have adequate knowledge of the end itself, and a com-
plete understanding of the end includes knowledge of the
actions involved in its realization.
3. The Human Will the Ground of Moral Value.
Ethics is a practical and normative science, and its business
is to determine what conduct satisfies the human will and
hence is good, and what conduct fails in this respect, and
is therefore bad. Moral value thus attaches to all vol-
untary action and is grounded in the will itself, the source
of all such action. It should be recognized, however, that
when in this way we base moral value upon the demands of
the human will we do not, as might appear, prejudge the
whole question of what conduct is good. Good action may
be action which promotes social welfare, or increases selfish
pleasure, or glorifies God, for all that is known at the
present stage of the investigation; the fact which we now
emphasize is the fundamental psychological one, that if
20 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
any of these objects is to become an end of action it must
appeal to the human will. All value, that is to say, in the
whole field of conduct refers back to that capacity of intelli-
gent volition of which conduct itself is the expression. Now
we have knowledge of this power of volition only as it is
manifested in our own human experience. Hence any scien-
tific investigation of moral value, all empirical study of
Ethics in fact, must be based upon an analysis of the needs
and capacities of the human will and of the conditions of
its expression in human life.
4. Other Practical Sciences: (a) Technical. In de-
scribing Ethics as a practical science we put it in the class
of such sciences as agriculture and medicine, generally
recognized as practical. It will throw further light upon
the task of Ethics if we consider its relation to these other
sciences which are more obviously practical, or even techni-
cal, in their method.
Since Ethics is concerned with the whole of human
conduct, it is evident that the other practical sciences must
have their fields within the inclusive domain of Ethics.
Such is the case, each of these sciences being occupied with
a certain department of human conduct and attempting to
determine what actions are necessary in order that the ends
peculiar to this department of life be realized. Indeed, the
fields of all the well-known practical sciences fall within
one large department of conduct that of " practice," in
the narrow meaning which excludes both the intellectual
and the emotional, or esthetic. It is in this sense that we
use the word when we speak of a person as eminently
" practical." We do not mean that such a person is
equally skilled in all departments of life, in the activities
of thought as well as outward performance. Our refer-
ence is rather to a particular kind of conduct to skill in
a certain mode of activity that of adapting means to
the ends of intelligence. It will prevent confusion to call
21
this mode of conduct the technical rather than the " prac-
tical." Technical activity consists, not in thinking of ends
or ideals, nor in enjoying them in contemplation, but in
devising methods, in inventing instruments, for their at-
tainment. It is exercised chiefly in the outer world in
adapting the objects and forces of nature to the uses of
human intelligence. The prominence of this kind of ac-
tivity in human life has been so great that it has seemed
to cover the whole field of conduct itself " action " and
" practice " being identified with outward performance,
visible execution. But even technical activity not to men-
tion conduct itself with its still greater scope cannot be
limited to the manipulation of material objects and physical
forces in the external world. It is exercised in the political
and social as well as the mechanical spheres. A plan for
workingmen's compensation or a system of life-insurance
is as much a product of intelligent technique as a steam
engine or a mining process.
There are many practical sciences concerned with the
use of technical skill in the different special fields of human
experience. These sciences aim to prescribe in detail the
rules which must be followed, the methods which must be
used, the agencies which must be employed, in one special
field or another, if the purpose appropriate to that field is
to be realized. Thus the science of bridge-building tells
of the material which must be employed and of the plan
which must be followed in construction, in order that a
bridge may be built adapted to the purposes of human
intercourse and commerce. Any plan or device required
as a means or instrument in a special field whether it be
a tool, or machine, a medicine, or a political institution
has, of course, technical value. As technique is a branch
of conduct, so technical value is a species of moral value.
In fact they are not distinguished in name, and we speak
of a good engine or a good remedy, that the cantilever,
22 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
say, is a good bridge for this situation, when we mean
that the device in question is an effective instrument for
accomplishing its end. It would contribute to clearness
if we adopted a term distinctive of technical value, such
as efficiency, and spoke of an efficient engine, remedy, law,
etc. The technical sciences fall into groups in accordance
with the fields to which they are applied. In the inorganic
sphere, the world of matter and motion, we find many
technical sciences, all concerned with the conquest of nature
and the employment of its forces in the service of man.
The science of mining prescribes the methods which must be
followed if ores are to be extracted from the earth most
efficiently. The science of agriculture tells how the soil
must be treated if it is to yield the largest returns. The
sciences of engineering are discovering how materials may
be utilized, and natural forces employed, for the increase
of man's convenience and comfort. Besides these, there
are others in the same group too numerous to mention,
such as carpentry, bridge-building, etc. Coming into the
organic or animate sphere we find the practical sciences
of animal husbandry, which tell how animals must be housed
and fed and bred if they are to be most serviceable to
man as sources of food, carriers of burdens, etc. In the
closely related field of human life are found the sciences,
of hygiene which prescribes the rules which man must
observe if he is to retain his health, and of medicine, which
indicates the remedies he must use to cure disease. Going
on to the still higher fields of society and politics, we find
still another group of technical sciences those of trade
and commerce, of the practice of law and government, of
education, etc.
5. (b) Intellectual. Another department of conduct is
that of thought, or intellectual activity. We so frequently
contrast the theoretical with the practical that it is difficult
THE METHOD OF ETHICS 23
to think of thought or theory as a branch of practice.
Yet, if by conduct is meant voluntary action, it is certainly
such; for ends are chosen and pursued in the field of
thought and imagination as well as in the field of technique.
The work of the scientific investigator, who spends years
of thought over a problem with the purpose of discovering
the truth about it, and thus adding to the sum of human
knowledge, is sufficient proof of this. The aim of intel-
lectual activity is to gain ideas which ' ' agree with reality, ' '
i.e. are true. The end of thinking is always the discovery
of truth. A practical science of thought is needed, there-
fore, which shall state the requirements to which think-
ing must conform if it is to reach true conclusions. We
have such a science in Logic, the science of correct thinking.
Moreover, all of the special sciences, commonly designated as
theoretical or descriptive, are in a sense practical, inasmuch
as each tells the conditions under which facts may be ex-
perienced in a particular field. Thus such a science as
Chemistry, which has been termed theoretical in contrast to
a practical science like Ethics, because its aim is to describe
existent objects rather than to tell how objects may be
realized as ends, may itself be regarded as a practical
science in so far as it seeks to discover the ways in which
material substances must be regarded in order to reveal the
facts of their constitution. There are, of course, as many of
such sciences as there are different parts of the experienced
world, each concerned with the discovery of truth in its
field. The distinction between theoretical and practical as
applied to the method of the sciences now appears neither
absolute nor final. Theory turns out to be a department of
practice, and the theoretical sciences to be themselves prac-
tical sciences concerned with the attainment of a distinctive
end Truth. The difference between_ Ethics and the theo-
retical sciences is not, consequently, that Ethics is con-
24 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
cerned with the realization of ends while these sciences are
not, but rather that Ethics is concerned with all the. ends
required to satisfy the will in every department of its
activity, while they are interested in the attainment of
one special end alone.
6. (c) ^Esthetic. A third department of conduct is
the aesthetic. The aim of aesthetic activity is the produc-
tion of a type of feeling not that pleasure which always
accompanies the attainment of desired objects, but pure
or disinterested pleasure. Such " disinterested " pleasure
and it is the only case where pure feeling is made an
end is produced through the contemplation of certain
objects which set the perceptive and imaginative faculties
in free and harmonious play. Perceptions and images
(mostly of sight and sound) able to effect this end and
produce the enjoyment in question are recognized as having
aesthetic value and are judged beautiful. In order that
aesthetic pleasure may be experienced it is necessary that
objects of a definite character be present and that their
presence be accompanied by such subjective conditions as
interest, attention, etc. The practical science of ^Esthetics
endeavors to determine the conditions, both objective and
subjective, which must be fulfilled if the " sense of beauty "
is to be awakened. Thus on the side of the object Esthetics
investigates, for example, what proportions figures must
have to please the eye, and how tones may be combined to
give pleasure to the ear; while on the subjective side
it studies the effect that psychic^ conditions, such as love
for the object and intimate knowledge of it, have upon
the aesthetic experience. Besides the general science of
Esthetics there are many particular sciences, which pre-
scribe the rules which must be followed if the effect of
beauty is to be produced in various special fields. Such
are the sciences of Drawing, of Music, of Architecture,
etc.
THE METHOD OF ETHICS
25
VOLITION
Ethics
Intellectual Logic
Technical
^Esthetic
Mathematics
Physics
Chemistry
Astronomy
Geology
Biology
Anthropology
Sociology
Psychology, etc.
Agriculture and Mining
Engineering and Manufacturing
Animal Husbandry
Hygiene and Medicine
Trade and Commerce
Law and Government
Education, etc.
{Architecture and Sculpture
Drawing and Painting
Music and Literature, etc.
7. Other Normative Sciences. The fact that thought
and feeling are fields of conduct in which ends are chosen
and attained is witnessed by the classification of norma-
tive sciences which is generally adopted. Besides Ethics
two other normative sciences are recognized Logic and
./Esthetics Logic seeking to discover the requirements of
Truth as the intellectual ideal and to evaluate modes of
thinking by this standard ; and ^Esthetics in a like manner
attempting to define the ideal of Beauty and, with this
criterion, to pass judgment upon natural objects and artis-
tic products. This classification of normative sciences is
somewhat misleading, however, since it places Ethics upon
an equal footing with Logic and ^Esthetics, and makes the
ideal of Goodness coordinate with the ideals of Truth and
Beauty. Thus man, as an intelligent being, is said to
possess three capacities, those of Thought and Will and
Feeling; intellectual value or Truth belongs to those ideas
which satisfy him as a thinking being, moral value or
Capacity
Satisfied
Kind of
Value
Ideal or
Standard
THOUGHT
Intellectual
TRUTH
WILL
Moral
GOODNESS
FEELING
^Esthetic
BEAUTY
26 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
Goodness belongs to those actions which satisfy him as
a voluntary agent, aesthetic value or Beauty belongs to
those presentations which satisfy him as an emotional
being.
HUMAN j
PERSONALITY 1
Such a division of man's psychic capacities, while useful
for certain purposes, has unfortunate results when applied
in the present connection. It does not indicate the true
relation of the fields of Logic, Ethics, and Esthetics, nor
of the ideals that govern in each field. When will is thus
put on an equal footing with the other faculties it is
necessarily taken as exclusive of thought and feeling, and
hence made identical with action in the narrower sense.
The sphere of Ethics then becomes that of outward perform-
ance, of what we have called technical activity adjustment
and adaptation and, in consequence of this limitation,
its ideal of Goodness loses all authority over the intellectual
and aesthetic fields. Now the truth is that will is the
inclusive factor; value attaches to objects only as ends
of volition, and this applies in the spheres of thought
and feeling as well as that of " action." Hence all value
is primarily moral value or Goodness. But volition is
exercised in different departments of life, in the pursuit
of various classes of objects; there are, consequently, spe-
cial kinds of value, included within, and subordinated to,
moral value. In the intellectual sphere ideas are sought
which agree with reality and, to such ideas, intellectual
value or truth is attributed ; in the technical sphere agencies
are sought which subserve the purposes of intelligence and,
THE METHOD OF ETHICS 27
to such instruments, technical value or efficiency is at-
tributed; in the aesthetic sphere objects are sought which
in mere contemplation awaken the feeling of pleasure, and,
to such objects, aesthetic value or beauty is attributed.
But in each case the value is also, and primarily, moral
value because it attaches to the objects as ends chosen and
pursued by will. Goodness belongs to all objects which
as ends satisfy the capacity of volition; truth to those
ends which satisfy volition in its intellectual sphere, and
beauty to those ends which satisfy volition in its aesthetic
sphere.
HUMAN
PERSONALITY
Ethics as a normative science is not coordinate with
Logic and ^Esthetics, therefore, but comprehensive of them ;
and the ideal of Goodness not of equal authority with those
of Truth and Beauty, but supreme over both.
8. Conclusion. Our brief survey of the practical and
normative sciences other than Ethics has served to em-
phasize its inclusive and fundamental character. Special
practical sciences cover, as we have seen, nearly the whole
field of conduct in its three departments of thought and
feeling and action. The need and importance of Ethics is
not due to the fact that its subject-matter is new and un-
explored, therefore, but to the fact that to Ethics alone
belongs the task of investigating the field of conduct as a
whole, of discovering its governing principles, and making
clear the relation of its essential parts. Ethics is the com-
prehensive science of human life itself.
Capacity
Satisfied
VOLITION
Kind of
Value
MORAL
Ideal or
Standard
GOODNESS
f Thought
| Action
( Feeling
i Intellectual
Technical
^Esthetic
( Truth
J Efficiency
( Beauty
28 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. II.
WUNDT, Ethics (English trans.), Vol. I, Introduction.
MUIBHEAD, Elements of Ethics, Book I, Chaps. II, III.
PAULSEN, System of Ethics (English trans.), Introduction.
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chap. I.
SIDGWICK, Methods of Ethics, Book I, Chap. I.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Introduction, Chaps. I, II.
MEZES, Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory, Chap. I.
CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS THE DISCOVERY
OF THE SUMMUM BONUM
1. How Determine What Is Good Conduct? 2. Many Ends Actually
Sought Are Good only as Means. 3. To Satisfy the Will an
Object Must Be an End in Itself. 4. The Problem of the
Summurn Bonum. 5. The Summum Bonum as the Moral Ideal.
6. The Formation of the Moral Ideal. 7. Characteristics of
the Ideal. 8. Source of the Power of the Ideal.
1. How Determine What Is Good Conduct? The aim
of Ethics as a practical and normative science is to de-
termine what conduct is good or, as we now understand,
what conduct will completely satisfy the human will.
Through what line of inquiry may this aim be most effec-
tively achieved? At the outset it should be noticed that
ethical science is not compelled to invent or imagine forms
of conduct that may possibly meet the requirements of
goodness. Human experience presents many types of con-
duct or (since actions are distinguished by the ends they
seek) many ends of action, and it is the business of Ethics
to scrutinize these existing ideals and practices. Certain
ends have been pursued by men in all periods of human
history; others are characteristic of particular races and
times. Among these latter sharp rivalry has frequently
existed and one set of ideals has replaced another only
after a bitter struggle, as when the ideals of Christianity
replaced those of classical antiquity. But while Ethics
should thus draw its material from the facts of human
experience, it is by no means limited to a description and
classification of the various forms of conduct and ideals
29
30 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
of action that have figured in human history. Its work
is to criticise these different ends, and such criticism re-
quires some knowledge of the nature and demands of that
power of volition which is seeking satisfaction through
them requires the presence, at least implicitly, of some
standard of moral value. As it becomes more explicit, this
standard of Goodness will take shape as the end or ideal
which in its realization completely satisfies the human
will; and although the elements which enter into the con-
stitution of this ideal may all be drawn from existing
human conduct, they may be so combined as to acquire
a new meaning and a supreme importance.
2. Many Ends Actually Sought Are Good only as
Means. If we look out on human life we see men engaged
in the pursuit of ends which appear infinitely diverse. A
closer look will show, however, that of chief ends, of leading
purposes, a comparatively few, as Aristotle observed, hold
the attention of the majority of mankind. Such popular
ends are money and reputation and pleasure. Yet these
ends prove upon examination to have value not in them-
selves, but only as means to something else. Take mqney,
as an instance. It is good only for what it will buy, and
not in itself. This is apparent to every one except the
miser, to whom his gold seems an end in itself because
his thoughts have been perverted by ceaseless efforts at
money-getting. Nor is it otherwise with reputation, in
the sense of fame or popularity. To be widely known in
society, to be favorably spoken of by one's fellows, is good
only if it bring more real and substantial benefits. Other-
wise it is but a hollow sham, an empty mockery, as many
who attain it have testified. In the same class are most
of the objects which we behold men pursuing. Here a
man is bending all his energies to secure a home for
himself and family; there one is working early and late
to win professional success. But all such things are good
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS 31
only as means to other things and not at all in themselves.
Hence while ends of this class may well be a part of the
good, their attainment can never represent the whole of
goodness: they can of themselves never satisfy the human
will, because they ever point further on to other ends
more satisfactory than themselves.
3. To Satisfy the Will an Object Must Be an End in
Itself. In contrast to the ends just mentioned stands afl.-
other class of ^objects which, although not sought by a large
proportion of mankind, are nevertheless earnestly pursued
by a few. These objects do not appear as means to further
ends, but as endsjji_themselves or_if_they do serve as
instruments in the attainment of other objects, then these
latter turn out to be only fuller and more complete ex-
pressions of themselves. Examples of this class of ends
are the knowledge pursued by the scientific_Jnvestigator,
and the welfare of country as sought by the patriot. In
both these cases the end seems to possess value in itself;
it is difficult to imagine a further good which would de-
mand the subordination of truth or of the public welfare.
Where the interests of truth appear to be thus subordi-
nated, as in the telling of myths to children or the de-
ception of sick persons, it is really done for the sake of a
more complete truth. And a sacrifice of national welfare
is demanded only when necessary for the good of humanity
with which the larger interests of the nation are identified.
This contrast between different classes of ends brings to
light an important characteristic of the end which is
entirely good. It must be an end in itself, existing for
the sake of no other end, and so complete as to require
the addition of no other object. For only such an end
can in its realization afford full satisfaction to the human
will. All other ends, while they may afford a partial satis-
faction, direct the will on to the pursuit of other objects
to which they are merely instrumental.
32 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
4. The Problem of the Summum Bonum. This object,
which is an end in itself, and hence able to satisfy the
human will completely, is called, in distinction from all
lesser or lower goods, the Highest Good, or the summum
bonum. Now the discovery of the summum bonum may
be taken for the chief problem of Ethics. For only con-
duct which realizes this end is good conduct, and all conduct
which does realize it is entirely good. Moreover, a thorough
knowledge of this end must include a knowledge of the
means necessary for its realization ; since the supreme end,
like all other ends, is an end of action, and can exist only
as it is realized in conduct. Hence in discovering the
summum bonum we solve the problem of what conduct
is good, and thus fulfil the aim of Ethics. It is not
strange, therefore, that ethical inquiry should have centered
on this problem and that most discussions of morality
should, since the beginning of ethical reflection, have borne
more or less directly upon the question, " What is the
summum bonum f " The fact that the problem, not
finally solved after many centuries, is still discussed, testi-
fies both to its great import and many difficulties. For
besides other difficulties the problem of the Highest Good
has this one, peculiar to itself, that while the value of other
ends is proved by reference to the further ends to which
they contribute, the summum bonum is a means to no
further end and its value can be proved only by a reference
back to the will which is its source, and a demonstra-
tion of its power to satisfy completely this capacity of
intelligent volition.
5. The Summum Bonum as the Moral Ideal. Since
the summum bonum represents the maximum of human
attainment and thus the goal of moral development for
man, it has seldom if ever been realized in human ex-
perience. It is frequently realized in part, and hence one
may, by a study of the different achievements of many
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS 33
individuals, observe in actual existence a large number
of its constituent elements. It is also in process of realiza-
tion by a multitude of lives which, while they never attain
their end in the world of our experience, have discovered
the direction of the goal, besides traveling a long distance
towards it. The summum bonum in its completeness,
therefore, does not exist actually, but only in thought and
imagination is thus an ideal. An ideal is a conception
of what is most desirable in life. It is an end the thought '
of which arouses feeling and enthusiasm because promising
largest satisfaction. Now while there are ideals in every
department of human experience; yet supreme over them
all is the Moral Ideal, the idea of the summum bonum.
By the Moral Ideal we mean that type of conduct or
character which represents the highest attainment for man,
the most complete fulfilment of his nature, the fullest
satisfaction of his will. As such it is none other than
the Highest Good and identical with the standard of moral
value. Consequently ethical inquiry is often described as
a quest of the Moral Ideal.
6. The Formation of the Moral Ideal. Every end is,
as we know, a product of thought whose existence depends
upon the ability to judge and generalize. But many ends
chosen for pursuit are particular objects limited both in
time and in place to the present environment; hence they
call only for the most elementary activities of cognition,
such as those involved in perception and the perceptual
judgment. Ideals, on the contrary, are of a universal
or typical character, and are projected into the distant
future; their formation, therefore, requires a degree of
intellectual grasp and some constructive imagination. One
might expect that as a consequence of this fact ideals
would be restricted in their existence and influence to a com-
paratively small fraction of mankind, as alone possessing
the intellectual power requisite to their formation. Yet
34 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
such is not the case; it appears rather that the majority
of men possess at some time during their lives moral and
religious ideals forecasts of future attainment, visions
of excellence they hope to attain. Proof of this is fur-
nished by the method which revivalists_and mission-workers
among the submerged classes frequently adopt and find
effective as a means of moral betterment. They seek
by devices of rhetoric and music to awaken in the minds
of their auditors memories of old ideals boyhood dreams
of noble achievement, youthful aspirations for honor and
integrity. "With many, these " ideals " seem, to be sure,
scarcely more than passing fancies, fleeting visions. Yet
they indicate the presence in the normal human being,
particularly during the period of youth and early maturity,
of imaginative and intellectual ability sufficient to the
formation of ideals which can give direction to life and
conduct. Authorities in genetic psychology x tell us that the
period of adolescence is the time in human life when ideals
are most readily and frequently formed. It is at this time,
when the higher powers of intelligence at first develop,
that they play most freely and spontaneously that imagi-
nation wings its loftiest flight and thought makes its widest
sweep. At this period the individual first becomes con<
scious of the present in its relation to the past ever receding
behind, and the future stretching away before. Awaken-
ing also to a sense of his own selfhood in its connection
with other selves, he is led almost inevitably to project
into the future an idea of himself achieving what he most
desires, and thus attaining his Highest Good. Then it is
that the boy sees himself in possession of great wealth and
owning houses and lands, yachts and horses ; or as a states-
man influencing the policies of nations ; or as a physician,
alleviating the ills of thousands of his suffering fellow-
beings.
1 STANLEY HALL: Adolescence, Vol. II, Chaps. XI-XVI.
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS 35
7. Characteristics of the Ideal. An ideal in order to
be effective in moral development must be an expression
of what is latent in the character of the agent and within
the range of his possible attainment. It must appeal to
the individual as the legitimate outcome of his own nature,
the realization of the possibilities inherent in his own situa-
tion, the fulfilment of his own deepest desires. If these
conditions are not fulfilled, the ideal will either prove
unattainable and the agent in his discouragement will aban-
don all endeavor, or its attainment will fail to bring the
expected satisfaction and he will be rendered skeptical of
all moral values. For these reasons it is necessary that
each individual construct his own ideal. While he may
be assisted in this task by information given and influence
wisely exerted, yet when this influence extends so far as
to cause him to adopt as his own an ideal which is not
rooted in his own nature and capacities, it does far more
harm than good. The ideal should always represent the
unrealized possibilities of the actual. As Professor Dewey
says with truth: " To set up ideals of perfection which
are other than the serious recognition of the possibilities
of development resident in each concrete situation is in the
end to pay ourselves with sentimentalities, if not with
words, and meanwhile it is to direct thought and energy
away from the situations which need and which welcome
the perfecting care of attention and affection. ' ' 2
Although it is true that the ideal should be based upon
the actual abilities of the agent and be relative to the
existing circumstances of his life, it is equally true that
in order to awaken enthusiasm and inspire effort the ideal
must be raisfiiLfar above the_actual and represent a height
of attainment which appears impossible enough to all save
the enraptured idealist. It is this height of the ideal
above the actual with all its negations that invests it with
J DEWEY AND Tuns : Ethics, p. 422.
36 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
such fascination and glamor that makes the pursuit of it
a romantic adventure. It is indeed unfortunate when a
human being stakes his life upon the realization of an
ideal which is altogether beyond his capacity to attain
if he had a dozen lives to live ; for then a bitter disappoint-
ment, a crushing sense of failure, are the reward of his
life 's endeavor. But the fact never to be forgotten is that
we cannot predict what is possible or impossible with a
human individual before he actually tries it. The greatest
of human achievements have been due to the promptings
of ideals which sensible, practical people would have de-
nounced as visionary and absurd in their first adoption.
If man is really to attain, therefore, he must have the
courage to venture ; he cannot afford to wait until assured
of success before making his endeavor. Emerson 's familiar
maxim, " Hitch^your wagon to a star," is sound, both
psychologically and ethically. A lofty ideal, even when
accompanied by no knowledge of how it is to be realized,
may provoke enthusiasm and effort sufficient to devise new
methods, overcome old obstacles, and finally to place the
agent upon a level of attainment far higher than he would
have reached had he chosen a lower ideal, the road to whose
realization lay open before him.
8. Source of the Power of the Ideal. No intelligent
student of history can doubt the tremendous influence of
the Ideal upon human conduct. The ancient ideal of civic
virtue led large numbers of Greek and Koman citizens
to devote their lives wholly to their country's welfare.
The Christian ideal of service and self-sacrifice has inflamed
the hearts of later thousands with missionary ardor, caus-
ing them to dedicate themselves to a life of labor for
humanity's good. The modern ideal of loyalty to Truth
has prompted a multitude of men to pursue scientific
investigations with unflagging zeal, and in the face of
hardship and persecution, in order that, as the result
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS 37
of their efforts, man's store of available knowledge should
be increased. The secret of the power of the Moral Ideal
over the lives of men lies in its appeal to the larger
possibilities of man as a spiritual being ultimately, in
these higher psychic capacities themselves, which enlarge
man's horizon beyond the limits of his present situation
and organic needs and bring him into touch with Universal
Reality. The Ideal attracts and inspires because it rep-
resents the complete fulfilment of man's powers as a vol-
untary agent the attainment of the highest human good.
REFERENCES
ABISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics (Welldon's trans.), Book I.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book I, Chap. I.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. I, 3-7.
PALMER, The Nature of Goodness, Chaps. I, II.
GBEEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chap. I.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. II.
CHAPTER IV
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD, OR CONSCIENCE
1. Conscience Not a Separate Faculty but a Species of Judgment.
2. Conscience as Judgment of Moral Value. 3. The Ground of
Moral Judgment Is Usually Emotional Rather than Rational.
4. Intuitional and Empirical Theories of the Origin of the
Moral Sentiments. 5. Experience as the Source of the Moral
Sentiments. 6. The Idea of the Highest Good as the Rational
Ground of the Moral Judgment. 7. Moral Enlightenment. 8.
Importance of Conscience in Human Life. 9. Remorse.
If the Highest Good is to be realized in human conduct,
it must (1) be known as an object of thought, and (2)
appeal as an end of action, under which conditions it will
(3) constitute the motive of good conduct. We shall, there-
fore, consider in the three chapters following : first, knowl-
edge of the Good, or Conscience ; second, the appeal of the
Good, or Obligation ; and, third, the Motive of Goodness.
1. Conscience Not a Separate Faculty but a Species
of Judgment. Men were for long supposed to receive
knowledge of good and evil from a special faculty, Con-
science, implanted in human nature for this purpose. To
Conscience was assigned the supreme place among the cog-
nitive faculties of man, as the final arbiter in all matters
of conduct a kind of oracle, in fact, revealing the mind
of God upon all questions of right and wrong. Such a
view was possible only so long as mind was understood as
an assemblage of different faculties, and Psychology re-
mained a general account of the achievements of these
faculties. When, however, Psychology undertook a close,
detailed analysis and description of mental processes, no
evidence was found of the existence of conscience as a
88
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 39
separate faculty. Our thinking upon moral subjects in-
volves the same processes and follows the same laws as
does our thinking upon other matters. Conclusions which
pertain to questions of morality are subject to the same
requirements of consistency and proof as are imposed on
other conclusions. Indeed, moral judgment differs from
all other judgment only in referring to a particular subject '
which possesses distinctive qualities. By conscience we
mean, therefore, simply a species of judgment judgment
of moral value.
2. Conscience as Judgment of Moral Value. We have
now to study as carefully as possible the working of con-
science or moral judgment. Let us begin by analyzing a
concrete instance of moral judgment, or the action of
conscience.
Suppose that a person, sitting by a window facing the
street, sees a group of boys approach a corner fruit-stand
kept by an aged and decrepit woman. While one of the
party engages the attention of the woman with questions
concerning the price of the fruit, others put a number
of apples in their pockets, and then the whole party goes
off laughing and shouting. The observer at the window,
who has seen the performance, exclaims indignantly, ' ' How
wrong! " These words give expression to a moral judg-
ment. The subject of this judgment is the conduct of
the boys. Since moral value attaches only to voluntary
action, the subject of all moral judgments is conduct. It
is always upon the conduct of self or the conduct of others
that conscience delivers its verdict. The quality attributed
to the conduct of the boys in the above example that of
" wrongness " is a kind of moral value. Here again we
may generalize and note that the quality which as predicate
is affirmed of the subject (conduct) in moral judgment is
always a kind of moral value moral judgment thus being
an evaluation of conduct. Now moral value is of two
40 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
opposite kinds, and hence the words which signify it fall
into pairs of contraries, as good and bad, right and wrong,
etc. The deliverances of conscience thus take the form
of judgments in which the subject is conduct and the
predicate some quality drawn from the class of moral
values.
T> ,. , . Subject Copula Predicate
Particular I
Illustration f Conduct of b y s is wrong.
[ Conduct of self or others is ^ 1 d ' or bad "
Statement ) right, or wrong ; etc.
The moral judgment possesses the same characteristics
as other judgment. 1 When seriously affirmed moral judg-
ment will not admit itself to be mere individual opinion,
(but claims to be true, to hold universally. As in the case
of all other judgments, the universal validity claimed by
moral judgment appears as a consequence of its necessity
that the particular judgment made had to be thus and so,
and could not have been different, because certain other
facts (themselves expressed in judgments) compelled it to
take just this form. Thus in all our thinking our con-
clusions seem to be necessitated by antecedent facts or
conclusions whose truth has been accepted. Now these
antecedent facts or propositions upon which the truth of
a judgment appears to rest are known as its grounds.
Hence we are accustomed to challenge a judgment with the
question, " What are its grounds? Its reasons? " This
question is as legitimate with the moral judgment as with
any other, and conscience must be prepared to answer
satisfactorily, if its conclusions are to be accepted as true.
Imagine, then, that we asked the onlooker in our ex-
ample, who judged the behavior of the boys to be wrong,
1 In further explanation of the essential features of judgment,
cf . CBEIGHTON : Introduction, Logic, Chap. XXII. " Main Character-
istics of Judgment."
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 41
the question, Why? " Why do you think their conduct
wrong? " He would probably answer, " Because it is
stealing, of course." The ground of his judgment would
therefore be another judgment which, completely expressed,
would be, " All stealing is wrong." The instance is again
typical. The ground of a particular moral judgment is usu-
ally one of a set of judgments of a more general nature
whose truth is already accepted, and which assign moral
values to certain classes of actions. Of such nature are the
familiar judgments, " Stealing is wrong," " Murder is
wrong," " Kindness is right," etc. If it is true that the
moral values mentioned belong to these general classes of
action, then of course they will attach to all particular
actions that fall within the classes. Now a conclusion taken
in connection with the grounds on which it rests is known
as an inference. So moral judgment, becoming conscious
of the other judgments which constitute its ground, expands
into moral inference or reasoning. Referring again to our
example, and using James's well-known formula, 2 the be-
havior of the boys represents the subject-matter of thought,
S. From this behavior as a whole the onlooker singles
out one feature that appears to him essential and most
important the feature, that is, of stealing, M. Now this
feature enters into many forms of conduct and is recog-
nized to possess certain properties, among them that of
being wrong, P. Since P attaches to M and M belongs
to S, P is attributable to S. The feature of theft is thus
the connecting link or middle ground between the behavior
of the boys and the quality of wrongness.
S M P
This act is stealing and therefore wrong.
Or, putting the inference in the traditional form of the
syllogism.
1 JAMES : Psychology, Chap. XXII, " Reasoning."
42 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
M P
S M
S
All stealing is wrong.
This act is stealing.
(Therefore) This act is wrong.
3. The Ground of the Moral Judgment Is Usually
Emotional Rather than Rational. But the question of
the ground of moral judgment is by no means settled when
we explicitly refer the particular act to a class of actions
previously judged to be good or bad. This prior judgment
itself needs support and the question is quite legitimate,
on what ground do we hold general forms of conduct such as
lying, stealing, courage, or kindness to be right or wrong?
For these judgments if true must themselves be necessary
consequences of other facts or considerations. Suppose
now that we asked the observer at the window, who had
indignantly pronounced the conduct of the boys to be wrong
because it was stealing, the further question, " Why is
stealing wrong? " If he exemplified the average man he
would probably show signs of surprise and impatience
at the question, and reply, ' ' Why is stealing wrong ? Why
because it is wrong ! " or in some such words. That is,
the great majority of human beings do not carry their
reasoning on moral matters back further than the judgment
that certain forms of conduct, such as e.g. courage and
honesty and kindness, are right, and other forms, such as
stealing and lying and murder, are wrong. Actions be-
longing to these recognized classes excite strong feelings
of approval in the former group and disapproval in the
latter. Hence whenever an action is encountered which
falls within such familiar class, it is greeted immediately
by feelings of approval or the reverse, and thus its moral
value, whether good or bad, appears self-evident. The
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 43
binding force of conscience, Mill says, " consists in the
existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken through
in order to do what violates our standard of right, and
which, if we do nevertheless violate this standard, will
probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of
remorse. ' ' 3 These moral feelings seem to justify them-
selves and to require no further explanation. It is true,
therefore, that with the greater number of mankind the
ultimate ground of moral judgment is emotional rather
than rational* Of course this is not the case with the
moral judgment alone. The average man has reasons for
comparatively few of the conclusions he maintains. He
nevertheless regards them as true, since they awaken the
sentiment of belief in him. In this way the uneducated
man feels that the claim of his political party or the doc-
trines of his church are necessarily true, and resents the
challenge to furnish proof. Perhaps the facts with refer-
ence to the moral judgment are most concisely stated when
we say that in the minds of those who have never reflected
upon questions of morality and who make up of course
the great bulk of mankind, the ground of all moral judg-
ments is a set of moral sentiments. By a moral sentiment
is meant a judgment of moral value, accompanied by feel-
ings of pleasure if the conduct is judged good, and dis-
pleasure if found bad. 5 A group of such sentiments, ap-
proving of some forms of conduct and disapproving of
others, is present in the minds of most men, and constitutes
the basis of their moral judgments.
4. Intuitional and Empirical Theories of the Origin of
Moral Sentiments. The existence of moral sentiments
similar in character among civilized peoples, and hence
* MILL: Utilitarianism, Chap. III.
THILLY: Introductory Ethics, Chap. Ill, pp. 77-79.
1 For a good description of the various sentiments, intellectual,
moral, and religious, in their relation to other mental processes, cf.
TTTCHENEB: Primer of Psychology, Chap. XII.
44 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
familiar to us all, has now to be explained. Two conflicting
theories as to their origin have arisen in the course of
ethical reflection. The Intuitional theory regards these
sentiments as fundamental intuitions of mind. They are,
the Intuitionist maintains, a part of our innate mental
endowment a property essential to the mind itself. Some
Intuitionists have emphasized the intellectual factor in
moral sentiment, declaring that we have an inborn ability
to distinguish good from bad, whose deliverances bear the
mark of self-evident truth. Other Intuitionists have con-
sidered the emotional element as more important, and have
held that man possessed an innate " moral sense," a fac-
ulty which reacts with feelings of liking and approval to
certain forms of conduct, and with feelings of dislike and
disapproval to others. The Empirical theory, on the other
hand, explains existing moral sentiments as wholly the
product of experience. This experience is both racial and
individual. The results of the experience of the race in
discovering that certain kinds of action are advantageous
are inherited by the individual in the form of a sentiment
approving of this type of action. The experience of the
individual himself the circumstances of his life, the in-
fluences to which he has been subjected is also a cause
for the moral sentiments which he possesses, according to
the Empirical view.
Of these two positions the Intuitional is the more difficult
to maintain. The Intuitionist proposes an explanation of
the origin of the moral sentiments which is clearly in-
applicable to other sentiments of a similar character. For
of course it is not his moral judgments alone that the
ordinary man feels to be necessary, without adequate
reasons. The case is exactly the same with the most of
his judgments on social, political, and religious matters.
No one would think of asserting, however, that sentiments
on these subjects, no matter how widespread among the
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 45
inhabitants of a country, were fundamental intuitions of
the human mind. On the contrary, it is a commonplace
observation that most men derive their political opinions,
their religious belief, and their social outlook, from their
parentage and early training. The Intuitionist proposes
now to make an exception of the moral sentiments, and
because these possess a strength and authority which cannot
be justified on rational grounds, to assign to them a unique
origin, as innate properties of the mind itself. It is con-
sistent with this general standpoint to conceive of the
moral sentiments as " divinely implanted " in human na-
ture, after the same manner of thinking that regards con-
science as the voice of God in the human soul. In fact,
the theory that the moral sentiments are intuitions innate
in the mind of man is closely affiliated with the ' special
faculty ' view of conscience, both leaning toward a super-
natural explanation of morality.
Moreover, the Intuitional theory has an important im-
plication which we cannot at present accept. If the moral
sentiments are an essential part of the mental endowment
of man we should expect to find them present in the minds
of men of all races and times. Or even if we admit that
the higher sentiments are at first present potentially, and
only come to clear consciousness in the course of human
history and development, it is nevertheless a necessary im-
plication of the Intuitional view that the existing senti-
ments of mankind as they concern such fundamental forms
of conduct as murder and stealing and lying must agree.
Intuitionists soon recognized this implication and felt the
crucial importance of the point which it raised. Hence the
defense of Intuitionism has consisted largely of an attempt
on the part of its advocates to prove that there is an
agreement in the moral sentiments of mankind. Champions
of the opposing school summoned all the facts at their
command to show that not unanimity but radical disagree-
46 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
ment has prevailed among different peoples in matters of
morality. Thus the controversy continued. Now it is not
difficult to prove that there is a substantial agreement in
moral sentiment among men, if we confine ourselves to
civilized or comparatively civilized peoples of our own
time. As long, then, as continents containing savage or
barbarous races remained unexplored and there was little
or no knowledge of the early history of human society, the
Intuitionist was able to uphold his side of the controversy
with a fair degree of success. But since the world has been
thoroughly explored and its various peoples studied, and
in particular since the discovery of evolution has given such
an impetus to all ethnological and anthropological investi-
gation, a mass of facts relative to human morality has
been collected which makes the Intuitional view utterly
untenable. Such studies of the evolution of human moral-
ity as those recently made by Westermarck 6 and Hob-
house 7 show a disagreement in moral belief and practice
among different peoples and periods which cannot be recon-
ciled with the theory of moral intuitions. If there is a
duty that is fundamental it would seem to be that of re-
specting the life of fellow-man. Yet we find that in early
stages of human society no rights at all attach to the
human being as such. 8 The stranger may be killed or
tortured at pleasure, and the life of fellow-clansman is re-
spected not because he is recognized as possessing any rights
as a human individual, but because his interest is identified
with that of the agent. A moral sentiment which is wide-
spread and might seem to be universal is that disapproving
of stealing ; yet among some peoples theft is not regarded as
dishonorable, and among others is even admired as a clever
trick. 9 The disapproval of lying is sufficiently general to
WESTEBMABCK : Origin and Development of Moral Ideas.
T HoBHOUSE: Morals in Evolution.
HoBHOUSE: Op. cit., Vol. I. p. 240.
HOBHOUSE : Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 334.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 47
suggest that it is based upon an intuition inherent in the
human mind; yet in certain tribes, authorities inform
us, a successful lie is a matter of popular admiration. 10
In fact, we find diversity almost without limit in the moral
sentiments of mankind. To be sure, the same investiga-
tions which have revealed such widespread divergence in
the opinions and customs of men in matters of morality,
have also shown the presence in human conduct of a ten-
dency to develop of an evolution in morals, in fact, which
has a definite goal and is governed by universal principles. 11
But such tendency toward a consistent and regular de-
velopment indicates that human morality is the expression
of a single unitary power or capacity rather than that it
rests upon a set of ready-made intuitions.
5. Experience as the Source of Moral Sentiments.
We are forced by these facts to believe that the moral
sentiments of the vast majority of men have their origin
in experience, as the Empiricist has maintained. They
are in a true sense the product of conditions of life, of
influences of environment, as these have acted upon the
individual and the race. Of course the presence in man
of an ability to adapt himself to the conditions of social
existence, and that with constantly increasing intelligence,
must be presupposed. But the special beliefs and customs
called forth by the requirements of social life under human
conditions find their explanation in the particular cir-
cumstances that evoked them rather than in this general
capacity of voluntary intelligence. The fact that the moral
10 WESTEBMABCK : Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 72.
"Hobhouse believes that "Thus, amid all the variety of social
institutions and the ebb and flow of historical change, it is possible
in the end to detect a double movement marking the transition from
the lower to the higher levels of civilized law and custom." This
' double movement ' is that in which humanity both in the sense of
the whole human rare and of the human nature in each one of U8
is progressively realized. HOBHOUSE: Op. cit., Vol. I, Summary,
pp. 367-68.
48 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
sentiments which exist at any time are the result of the
experience of the race, or of a considerable fraction of it,
acquired during ages previous, is of great importance in
explaining the agreement of moral sentiment among differ-
ent members of human society and also the authority which
these sentiments possess over the individual. Indeed,
Spencer thinks that when we see our moral judgments, as
the result of the experience of remote ancestors transmitted
to their progeny by physical heredity, and thus become
part of our native endowment, we both recognize the large
amount of truth contained in the view of Intuitionism
that the moral sentiments are innate properties of mind,
and at the same time reconcile this view with that of Em-
piricism. 12 Spencer himself finds no difficulty in believing
that opinions and practices acquired by the human indi-
vidual during his life-time may be inherited by his de-
scendants and finally become ingrained in the stock or race
as fixed instincts. But since his time biologists have found
good reason for disbelieving that such acquisitions are ever
transmitted through the channels of natural inheritance.
Hence we cannot depend upon physical heredity to explain
the perpetuation of moral sentiments, nor is it legitimate
to consider them as instincts formerly acquired but now
inborn.
It is quite possible to account for the development and
conservation of the moral experience of the race through
the operation of another factor, however " social _hered-
ity. ' ' By social heredity is meant the transmission through
the instrumentality of language, imitation, and suggestion,
11 " For as the doctrine of innate forms of intellectual intuition
falls into harmony with the experiential doctrine when we recognize
the production of intellectual faculties by inheritance of effects
wrought by experience; so the doctrine of innate powers of moral
perception becomes congruous with the utilitarian doctrine when
it is seen that preferences and aversions are rendered organic by
inheritance of the effects of pleasurable and painful experiences in
progenitors." SPENCEB: Data of Ethics, 45.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 49
of the accumulated experience of the race to each suc-
cessive generation of individuals. Through this channel,
by means of instruction and training, the moral tradi-
tion of a society is communicated to its youthful members.
This explanation makes it evident that the individual's
own experience is the source of his social and religious
sentiments the home and the school existing as special
agencies for influencing him during his earliest and most
susceptible years, and producing in him those beliefs and
convictions, those habits and dispositions, which are ap-
proved by the society of which he is a member.
We are hence reduced to the individual's own experience
the circumstances of his early life, his home training,
his education at school, his associates and friends, and the
other numberless influences, social and economic, that have
acted upon him during his formative period as the main
source of his moral sentiments. This explanation may seem
utterly inadequate when we think of the absolute authority
claimed by the deliverances of conscience, of the peculiar
dignity and even sanctity they possess, of the sense of
reverence they awaken. Yet if we consider for a moment
the character of this experience, how well it is adapted to
produce just such results, it will not seem so insufficient
as a source of authoritative moral sentiment. The child
has the current moral distinctions brought home to him
at a very early age. Every device is used to impress his
sensitive feelings and imagination. 13 Parents and nurse
agree in regarding certain acts with frowns and looks of
horror, while others are greeted with smiles and expressions
of pleasure. Punishments begin to follow actions of the
former class with threats of penalties still more dire for
one who persists in striking or lying or stealing. The
growing love of the child is appealed to, he being told that
parents can continue to love and cherish only children
"TniLLY: Op. cit., Chap. Ill, 8, "Genesis of Conscience."
50 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
who are obedient, truthful, etc. Then the religious factor
is often introduced, and God is alluded to as a Mysterious
Being who is particularly interested in these matters of
right and wrong, and Who, having an eye which is all-
seeing, and a power which knows no limit, will finaHy
inflict dreadful penalties upon those who continue to do
wrong, and bestow corresponding rewards upon the go d
and obedient. The terrors of the law are frequently in-
voked, and the prison referred to as the place where the
dishonest, the untruthful, the violent, are confined. In
the school the boy or girl encounters another authority
able to enforce the same set of distinctions by sanctions
of its own. Finally he meets the all-powerful influence
of public opinion which visits social opprobrium and ostra-
cism upon the head of the individual who dares to dis-
regard conventional standards or transgress approved cus-
toms. Small wonder, then, that the moral sentiments tra-
ditional in a society acquire an almost hypnotic power over
its members such principles as " Stealing is wrong,"
" Lying is wrong," having acquired through early associa-
tions, vague memories, and a bias given in childhood to the
whole nature, a greater power over the attention than
objects which awaken the strongest natural desires.
6. The Idea of the Highest Good as the Rational
Ground of Moral Judgment. Are we to conclude, because
the moral sentiments of most human beings have their
source in experience and not in reflective reason, that,
therefore, the moral judgment can have no rational ground ?
By no means. The moral judgment can have as secure a
basis in reason as any other judgment and may lay claim
to the same objective validity. For the moral judgment
is essentially a judgment of value a particular kind of
value called moral. Now this value is possessed by all
objects capable of fulfilling the demands of volition. But
the summum bonum is by definition that end which is able
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 51
to satisfy completely the capacity of human volit : on.
Hence when the Highest Good is discovered it will furnish
the rational ground of moral judgment; since whatever
action can be shown to be a means to its attainment will
be proved to have positive moral value or goodness, while
every action which hinders its attainment will in a like
manner be proved bad. To be sure, the connection between
a particular act and the attainment of the Good is not
always apparent. At this point, then, deliberation must
enter; the consequences of the proposed action must be
followed out in imagination until its bearing upon the
attainment of the Good is ascertained. Thus a number of
considerations are introduced which serve to connect the
moral judgment finally rendered with its ultimate ground.
Keverting to our previous illustration and assuming for the
sake of argument that Social Welfare is the Good, moral
reflection might take the following course: " This act is
stealing; stealing violates the rights of private ownership;
the institution of private property is necessary to social
welfare; this act is thus opposed to social welfare, and
therefore wrong." In this way the reasons for any moral
judgment are exhibited in full and, granting that the
summum bonum is correctly understood, the argument ia
valid and the conclusion true for all persons.
Inasmuch as the summum bonum constitutes the ultimate
ground of moral judgment it may be said to furnish con-
science with a standard or criterion of moral value. It
stands for perfect goodness in human conduct, and by
reference to it, consequently, the pretensions of any act
to be good can be tested. We secure in this way no magic
oracle of right or wrong, however; for after the Good is
discovered its use as a standard of moral value will be
beset by many difficulties. Its relation to a particular
action may be very hard to make out, the situation calling
for most painstaking analysis and careful study. Suppose
52 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
that the act under consideration is that of telling a friend
of certain faults he possesses. In the present circumstances,
will it be right or wrong, my duty or not? Let us say
further that the Highest Good is, in our opinion, the
Weil-Being of Humanity. This, then, must constitute our
standard of moral value. Is it easily applied? Is it a
simple matter to ascertain the bearing of telling my friend
a disagreeable truth upon human welfare? Obviously
not, yet it is a task which reason must undertake and dis-
charge to the best of its powers. The possibility of wound-
ing my friend's feelings, destroying our friendship, and
thus perhaps lessening the social efficiency of us both, must
be considered. But, on the other hand, it must not be
forgotten that a word from me may lead him to overcome
his fault, with great increase of his own happiness and
his serviceability to his fellow-men. Then the effect of
candor in social relations generally might be considered,
and account taken of the help which an individual derives
from the frank and kindly criticism of his fellows. To
be sure, the same opportunity for slips and errors exists
here as in all other reasoning, and the individual who
thinks out moral problems for himself is liable to frequent
mistake. At least, however, he is determining his conduct
in a manner befitting the dignity of an intelligent being
freely, and in accordance with conclusions of his own
reason.
7. Moral Enlightenment. Thus to substitute rational
insight as the basis of moral judgment, for feelings pro-
duced by experience and training, is to enlighten con-
science and rationalize morality. It is, as we know, just
the aim of Ethics to evaluate conduct rationally, i.e. in
accordance with the demands of the Moral Ideal. The
necessity for constant exertion to secure means of sub-
sistence has left the vast majority of mankind up to the
present neither the time nor the strength for ethical
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 53
reflection. Doubtless, for a long period in the future as
well, most men will be compelled to receive their moral
sentiments ready made through various influences of cus-
tom and tradition. Yet an increasing number are gaining
the education and leisure requisite for systematic reflection
upon the problems of conduct. With such, the conven-
tional moral sentiments inculcated in childhood are sure
to lose their authority. The individual will challenge the
right of the accepted moral code to rule over him and
summon it to appear for examination before the bar of his
own reason. Then indeed is the crisis, when the tradi-
tional moral sentiments must justify themselves to reason
or suffer entire repudiation in favor of some plan of life
original with the individual. It is at this juncture that
Ethics may be especially useful in guiding the thought
of the individual when he endeavors for himself to
evaluate different forms of conduct and alternative
ends, and, the larger grow the numbers of individuals
undertaking to think for themselves upon matters of
morality, the more general will be the need of ethical
instruction.
Fortunately, however, moral enlightenment does not nec-
essarily, or even frequently, entail the wholesale abandon-
ment of conventional beliefs and practices. Nor should we
expect that it would, when we remember that conventional
morality expresses, in general at least, what the experience
of mankind has found to contribute most to the welfare
of human society. Moral enlightenment does not mean,
therefore, that all moral judgments previously accepted
should at present be abandoned, but rather that they should
now gain a new and higher authority the authority of
reason in place of that of custom and tradition. The
duties of current morality are seen to derive their authority
from their relation as means to some end of attested value,
and not to be ends in themselves, both arbitrary and
54 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
absolute. Thus in the case of telling my friend a dis-
agreeable truth about himself, conventional morality would
exact a rigid and mechanical obedience to the rule, Tell
the truth, with the result that the friend might become
estranged from me, while his fault remained uncorrected.
Rational morality, on the other hand, is more flexible and
can be adapted to the requirements of differing cases; it
would permit me to study the case of my friend and
would pronounce good that action which I concluded would
be for his best welfare and the promotion of the highest
human good. But while moral enlightenment thus re-
quires us to establish our morality upon a new foundation,
it by no means renders valueless the early training in
approved moral practices or the acquisition of the con-
ventional moral sentiments. For, after these beliefs and
practices have secured a new basis in reason, it is still of
incalculable benefit to have them already ingrained in the
nervous system in the form of fixed habits. It is this
tremendous boon that moral training confers upon the
individual, and that makes this training worth all the
efforts which parents and teachers can put into it. What
if moral enlightenment does lead the individual to re-
nounce one practice out of ten learned in early childhood?
Surely less effort is required to break this one habit than
to form the other nine entirely new.
8. Importance of Conscience in Human Life. Since
Conscience represents man's Highest Good, either as dis-
covered by him through reflection or expressed for him
in the customs of his race, it is not strange that it should
have been given an exalted position among human faculties.
Conscience is only a particular manifestation of the power
of human intelligence, to be sure ; 14 but it is human in-
14 In his System of Ethics, Eng. trans., pp. 363-68, Paulsen
protests eloquently and effectively against the idea that the adop-
tion of the historico-psychological in place of the supernatural
theory of conscience will destroy its authority and sanctity.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 55
telligence in the most important of its many fields of ex-
ercise, when it deals, not with this interest or that, but
with the satisfaction of the whole of man's will, latent as
well as actual the fulfilment of all his possibilities as a
voluntary agent. As Professor Royce says: " Your con-
science is simply that ideal of life which constitutes your
moral personality. In having your conscience you become
aware of your plan of being yourself and nobody else.
Your conscience presents to you this plan, however, in
so far as the plan or ideal in question is distinct from
the life in which you are trying to embody your plan.
Your life, as it is lived, your experiences, feelings, deeds,
these are the embodiments of your ideal plan, in so far
as your ideal plan for your own individual life as this self,
gets embodied at all." 15 If conscience is not the voice of
God in the mind of man it at least speaks for those powers
in human nature which raise him above the animals and
link him to what is highest in reality his comprehensive
intelligence, his free will.
The insight which we have gained into the function of
conscience in human life compels us now to qualify some-
what the statement formerly made that in most human
beings conscience is determined in its decisions by custom
and training and not by any real understanding of the
Good. While it is true that the moral sentiments which
direct the conduct of the majority must be referred to these
sources rather than to their own intelligent understanding
of the issues involved, it is also true that the operation
of these sentiments is accompanied by a consciousness,
more or less vague, that they stand for the larger good
of the self. Even when the particular moral judgments
of an individual are wholly determined by custom, the
compulsion which he feels to bring his acts under general
rubrics for purposes of moral evalution is itself a dim
18 ROYCE: Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 175.
56 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
recognition of the existence of a Good authoritative over
all actions because representing the satisfaction of man's
larger will. Then there are the suggestions of the Ideal,
confused but never forgotten, and hopes inarticulate but
ever-stirring, which, even in the least intelligent and aspir-
ing of men, connect themselves with the duties of con-
ventional morality and cause them to appear as means to
a higher personal good.
9. Remorse. After performing the action which con-
science pronounces right, particularly if it be in the face
of strong opposing inclination, a sense of profound satis-
faction is felt. For the wrong desire, expressing a merely
temporary need, has in retrospect lost its appeal, while
the relatively permanent good secured by conscience con-
tinues to give satisfaction. Contrariwise, when conscience
is thwarted for the sake of present desire, a feeling of
great dissatisfaction may arise. For the Good, as repre-
sented by Conscience, is enduring in its appeal, and thus
while momentary desire once gratified is destroyed, this
appeal of Goodness, disregarded and unrealized, continues,
and awakens in the consciousness of the wrongdoer an
overwhelming sense of guilt and misery. This feeling of
sorrow and distress, which frequently follows the doing
of evil, is called remorse. Darwin, who finds the beginning
of conscience in the phenomena of remorse, explains the
origin of this latter experience in biological terms.
" At the moment of action man will no doubt be apt to follow
the stronger impulse; and though this may occasionally prompt
him to the noblest deeds, it will more commonly lead him to
gratify his own desires at the expense of other men. But after
their gratification, when past and weaker impressions are judged
by the ever-enduring social instinct, and by his deep regard for
the good opinion of his fellows, retribution will surely come.
He will then feel remorse, repentance, regret, or shame; this
latter feeling, however, relates almost exclusively to the judgment
of others. He will consequently resolve more or less firmly to
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GOOD 57
act differently for the future; and this is conscience; for con-
science looks backward and serves as a guide for the future. " 18
"While the conception of instinct as here used by Darwin
to explain the beginnings of morality is clearly inadequate,
yet as far as the relation of the factors involved is con-
cerned, his explanation of remorse is fundamentally true.
Conscience has charge of man's larger social and personal
good, and one who violates its dictates in order to gratify
momentary desire or to further selfish interest, betrays
himself, is a traitor to the larger possibilities of his own
nature as a man. He sells his birthright as a rational
being for the pottage of present pleasure. Because wrong-
doing is thus a betrayal of the whole human self, an evil
deed, in itself appearing trivial, may awaken in the agent
a sense of degradation that seems to affect his whole nature.
Literature gives us many examples, imaginary but not ex-
aggerated, of such soul-rending remorse with its agony
over lost opportunities for good and its torment by evil
that cannot be undone suffering so great that the un-
fortunate individual is driven to sacrifice his life in an
attempt at expiation or to destroy himself in the depth
of his despair.
REFERENCES
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chaps. Ill, IV.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Part I, Chap. III.
ROYCE, Philosophy of Loyalty, Chap. IV.
MABTINEAU, Types of Ethical Theory, Part II, Book I, Chap. I.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. VIII.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chaps. V, VI.
16 DABWIN: Descent of Man, Chap. IV.
CHAPTER V
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD OR MORAL OBLIGATION
1. Objects Appeal to the Will Through the Feelings They Arouse.
2. Appeal of the Good as Inclination. 3. Appeal of the Good
as Obligation. 4. Conditions Under Which Feeling of Moral
Obligation Arises. 5. Significance of the Feeling of Moral
Obligation. 6. Kant's View of Moral Obligation. 7. Goodness
Not Always Different from Inclination. 8. The Duties of
Morality Command Not as Categorical but as Teleological Im-
peratives. 9. The Summum Bonum Alone has the Authority
of a Categorical Imperative.
1. Objects Appeal to the Will Through the Feelings
They Arouse. Knowledge that an end is good does not
insure its choice and pursuit. We may know that an
action is right and still not perform it. To be realized
as an end of action an object must make a certain appeal
to the self. It must engage and hold the attention i.e. be
attractive, possess interest. Now the interest or attractive-
ness of an object is measured by the feelings which it
arouses. These feelings color or tone the object when
thought of, and, as they endue it with life and influence,
are sometimes called its dynamic or motive-power. The
character of these feelings seems to vary considerably.
When very hungry, the idea of food which attracts me, as
an end to be sought, is altogether pleasant. The feeling
aroused is one of simple, although very intense, pleasure,
and I should describe my feeling as one of strong liking
or desire for food. The idea of having a tooth filled, which
as an end prompts me to go to the dentist's, is not thus
simply pleasant. Of course the idea of having the tooth
repaired and thus saved from further decay pleases me,
68
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD 59
else it would have no power over my attention, no attractive
influence. Yet there are closely associated with it other
ideas of the discomfort and pain of the filling process,
which are very unpleasant. These fears and apprehensions
will divert me from my original intention unless by con-
tinuous effort I hold my attention on the course decided
upon. Such effort involves strain, which is unpleasant.
Hence the feeling aroused by the end in question is one
of mingled pleasantness and unpleasantness, which I de-
scribe as a feeling of compulsion, saying that I do not
like to go to the dentist's, but feel that I must. Again
when an audience at the close of an address is led to rise
and join in singing the national anthem it is impelled to
the deed by still another emotional complex of which the
feelings of " enthusiasm " and " reverence " are perhaps
the chief components. Since such variation exists in the
feelings which propel us to action it is next in order to
ask what constitutes the interest or appeal of good con-
duct.
2. Appeal of the Good as Inclination. First let us take
a simple case. A man who is thinking of how he shall
occupy several hours of leisure happens to remember a
friend who is ill and whom he has not seen for several
days. " It is only decent that I should go to see him and
cheer him up a bit on this holiday," he says to himself.
No reason why he should not go occurs to his mind, nor
does any contrary impulse arise. He thereupon takes hat
and coat and sets out for the friend 's house with a thorough-
going sense of spontaneity, of " doing just what he likes."
Evidently, then, conduct which conscience pronounces good
sometimes arouses simple feelings of pleasure and its appeal
is the appeal of inclination.
Besides action of this kind which proceeds from a moral
judgment, although of an abbreviated type, are others which
result from unreflecting impulse and seem to involve no
60 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
activity of conscience whatever. I might act thus in pur-
chasing a paper or magazine, the illustrated cover of which
catches my eye when passing a shop window. Many of
these acts of thoughtless inclination must be considered
as in their own slight way good. Often a moral judgment
is implied in a recognition, dim but present in the margin
of consciousness, that the conduct in question does not
fall within any of the prohibited classes of actions. The
agent if challenged would immediately state this fact and
then perhaps go on to show how the action contributed
to some approved end. Again, an inclination is followed
without thought because it has been so often followed in
the past its immunity from criticism or disapproval dur-
ing that time constituting a kind of moral validation.
Habit of course enters as an important factor here. It
causes actions, at first performed only after careful thought
f and long deliberation, to be done with the promptness and
simplicity of mere impulse. It even makes conduct, which
at first was exceedingly difficult and opposed by urgent
desire, as easy and effective as the expression of natural
inclination.
3. Appeal of the Good as Obligation. But such a case
as the first mentioned, where conscience and inclination
are in perfect agreement, impresses one as the exception
rather than the rule. More frequently the appeal of good-
ness is opposed as obligation to inclination, as what one
ought, in contrast to what one inclines, to do. To keep our
thought in close touch with the facts of moral experience,
let us take another commonplace illustration. Suppose that
a young man employed as a clerk is left for several weeks
in charge of his employer's business while the latter is
away from home. He promises his employer that he will
be faithful in his attendance at the office during the stated
hours. But on a warm summer's afternoon, when there
is no prospect of a client's appearing, he is urged by friends
61
to accompany them to see a ball game or boat race. Being
very fond of sport he is exceedingly anxious to go, but
is restrained by the thought that such action, in violating
a promise made to his employer, would be wrong. There
is no doubt in this instance, which certainly exemplifies
a large class, that inclination and conscience are in sharp
conflict. He inclines " with all his heart " to join in the
afternoon's sport, yet is deterred by a feeling still stronger
than his inclination which enforces the conduct judged
right by conscience. This is the feeling of obligation or
" oughtness," which stands contrasted to that of inclina-
tion as a feeling of constraint, of coercion. The individual
who feels moral obligation feels constrained to certain acts
by a power or authority external to himself. The Good
in this guise of authority over the inclinations of the in-
dividual is known as the Moral Law, a rule imposed upon
the actions of all individuals. But while obligation differs
thus widely from inclination on the one hand, it differs
as widely from real compulsion on the other. For since
the individual is always conscious of freedom to choose
or not to choose the right, he recognizes that in another
sense this is not an external authority, but one created by
himself. He describes his experience after this manner,
" I wanted to do thus, but my duty required me, my con-
science compelled me, to do otherwise. ' '
As far as its essential characteristics are concerned, the
feeling of moral obligation is the same whether the con-
duct to which it attaches is judged good on rational or on
emotional grounds. In conventional morality this feeling
is aroused by those forms of conduct which the individual
has learned through his training and experience to approve,
to the familiar " duties of life " in fact. The tendency
to feel the deliverances of conscience as the exactions of
a foreign power is increased by their association in cus-
tomary morality with the commands of authority divine,
62 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
civil, parental. The moral law is thought to have its source
in the highest of all authorities, the will of God. Yet
even here, a consciousness of freedom to obey or disobey,
leads men to distinguish the requirements made by con-
science from the actual compulsion exercised by the forces
of nature or the civil authorities. In rational morality the
feeling of obligation attaches primarily to the idea of the
Good itself, and secondarily to the actions believed to be
means to its attainment. It would perhaps appear that
Goodness must lose somewhat in authority through the en-
lightenment of conscience being dissociated from thoughts
of the Divine Omnipotence, and the Day of Judgment with
its rewards and penalties, and associated only with the
satisfaction of the human will. But while unenlightened
morality may, through its appeal to the instinct of self-
preservation, arouse the intenser emotions of fear and
dread, rational morality, through its appeal to higher in-
terests and capacities, awakens feelings of inspiration and
enthusiasm more permanent and reliable as the motive-
power of conduct. On this point Mackenzie says, with
true ethical insight: " The more we advance in the de-
velopment of the moral life, the less possible does it become
to point to any single rule that seems to carry its own
authority with it, to any law that stands above us and says
categorically, You must do this. What we find is, more
and more, only the general principle that says, You ought
to do what you find to be best. And what is best njay
vary very much in its external form, and even in its inner
nature, with changing conditions. But this does not in
any way destroy the absoluteness of the moral standard.
It remains as true as ever that we are bound to choose
the right ' in the scorn of consequence,' though it may
be more difficult for us to say at any given point what
precisely is right. The authority, indeed, must come home
to us with a far more absolute power, when we recognize
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD 63
that it is our own law, than when we regard it as an
alien force. ' ' 1
4. Conditions Under Which the Feeling of Moral
Obligation Arises. It is not difficult to explain why so
remarkable a feeling as that of moral obligation, which
is at once a feeling of coercion by an external authority
and of attraction by a dosired end, should arise in such
cases as we are now discussing. As far as present action
is concerned, the agent is faced by two alternatives, one
pleasant and attractive, the other unpleasant and hence
unattractive. The youth in our illustration is confronted
by the alternative possibilities of an afternoon of sport
and pleasure in the open-air or one of monotony and dis-
comfort in a hot and dusty office. Now had the two pos-
sible courses of action no further connections or conse-
quences in the conduct of the individual, he must perforce
choose that which in itself is pleasanter and more desirable.
Our clerk would not hesitate a moment to abandon the
routine of his employer's office for the freedom of the
water and the field. Yet he does hesitate, and finally
resolves to remain at his post. It is a fact of moral ex-
perience familiar to us all that we do often select the
unpleasant alternative, the hard and unattractive course
that we do select what we do not like or desire. Now
this undoubted fact that we choose the less pleasant course
shows paradoxical as it may sound that it is not the less
but the more pleasant after all. Since it does not possess
interest and attraction in its own right, it must derive
them from other sources. This is precisely what it does.
While the idea of being shut up within the four walls
of an office during a bright summer's afternoon is not
attractive, that of fulfilling the pledge to the employer, or
of rising in business or profession is so, and these future
ends, these more remote interests, transmit some of their
1 MACKENZIE: Manual of Ethics, Bk. II, Chap. VT, 8.
64 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
attractiveness to the action which is seen to be the present
means to their attainment, more than counter-balancing its
own unpleasantness. Thus constantly does the pleasure
which attaches to the thought of performing the recognized
duties of conventional morality, or attaining the Good dis-
covered by moral reflection, communicate itself to actions
in themselves unpleasant and make possible their per-
formance " contrary to inclination." But in such cases
the agent identifies himself with the object of present desire
and treats these larger ideal considerations enforced by
conscience as external influences, the exactions, in fact, of
a foreign authority which he must obey. When, therefore,
Goodness requires the pursuit of some larger end extending
tojthe future or including the welfare of others, and this
contrary to present inclination or selfish interest, its appeal
is that of obligation.
Our view must encompass still another case in which
moral obligation is felt before we can hope to reach any
generalization concerning its essential significance which
will apply universally. Again let us avail ourselves of
the help of an illustration. A man is giving his afternoons
to the systematic study of a certain subject with the in-
tention of writing a book about it eventually. He hears
of a series of concerts to be given two afternoons a week
in his town. He has no particular liking for music and
is disinclined to spare two afternoons a week from his
study. Yet he feels that he ought to cultivate his taste for
music and to develop a liking for it if possible. Hence,
led by a sense of duty, and with a consciousness of con-
trary desire, he purchases a ticket and attends the concerts.
Now in this case and there are many resembling it both
of the conflicting ends are in the future ; if there is any
difference the end of inclination (writing the book) is more
remote than the end of obligation (cultivating the musical
taste). How does it happen, then, that the latter appals
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD 65
as the command of an external power, the former as the
fulfilment of the agent's own nature? The answer to this
question reveals the fact that in last analysis the difference
between obligation and inclination hinges, not upon the
distinction of future from present, or of social from selfish,
ends, but in a difference in the relation of the end to the
human will itself. In the example used, the one end
of writing the book although its attainment might be
postponed to the far future, was already adopted, had been
for a time pursued, and was thus in a measure identified
with the will of the individual. The other end, on the
contrary, was entirely new and untried. It represented
new territory to him, a field unexplored. Hence its appeal,
in contrast to that of the end already tried and so far
found satisfactory, is that of an external authority which
commands the agent " against his will." And so in a
sense it does ; for his will, finding satisfaction in the pursuit
of an object already chosen, is disinclined at first to re-
linquish it in order to seek another object whose nature
is not well known and whose capacity to yield satisfaction
is untried.
5. Significance of the Feeling of Moral Obligation.
The feeling of obligation proves, therefore, to be a necessary
accompaniment of all activity of volition. The human will,
in order to gain the satisfaction it seeks, must go forward ,
from achievement to achievement. It cannot afford to re-
main content with any end already attained, but must ever
press on to the attainment of larger and more adequate
ends, until its own possibilities for achievement and satis-
faction are exhausted. When the pursuit of such new and
untried ends requires the sacrifice of objects able to yield
present satisfaction, the feeling of obligation arises. In
its essence this feeling is unique, unanalyzable, irreducible
an original and necessary factor in the process of voli-
tion. It is the call which the human will makes upon itself
66 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
to venture into new and unknown fields, at the expense of
satisfactions already achieved. It is the imperious com-
mand which intelligent volition lays upon its own nature
to seek a larger and more comprehensive good. And like
the appeal of the trackless ocean to the adventurous ex-
plorer, this feeling contains something of fascination in
the alluring prospects of achievement held forth, something
of fear in the hardships and perils suggested, and some-
thing of pain in the thought of the comfortable home left
behind.
6. Kant's View of Moral Obligation. Among moral-
ists Immanuel Kant has given the most illuminating in-
terpretation of the facts of moral obligation. We are now
in a position to understand his famous theory both to
appreciate the profundity of his thought and to detect
some of the errors which it contains.
In Kant's view the Good always presents itself in the
form of Duty. Duty is the obligation to act from reverence
to law. 2 That is, good action is action whose end is obedi-
ence to the Moral Law. But the Moral Law as an end
appeals to the human will through the feeling of reverence
which it awakens. In good conduct, therefore, the will is
determined objectively by the Moral Law itself and sub-
jectively by pure reverence for the law as a principle of
action. Now since conduct is good only when prompted
by pure reverence for the Moral Law it follows that action
done from natural inclination can have no moral value.
This Kant explicitly maintains. Even in the case of an
action which is in accordance with duty such as for in-
stance safeguarding one's life if it is not done for the
sake of duty, but from natural inclination, it has no moral
worth whatever. Duty is a principle which is not de-
pendent upon natural inclination, but overmasters it, or
1 The abstract of Kant's thought given in this paragraph is based
upon the Metaphysic of Morality, Sec. 1. Translation by Wataon.
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD 67
at least allows it to have no influence whatever in de-
termining the course of action.
The sense of obligation thus signifies the constraint ex-
ercised by the Moral Law over the human will in opposition
to, or regardless of, inclination. 3 This constraint appears
to thought as a command, a command which, when ex-
pressed in words, takes the form of an imperative* Hence
it follows that the duties of morality come to us as im-
peratives. " Now all imperatives command either hypo-
thetically or categorically. A hypothetical imperative states
that a thing must be done if something else which is willed
or at least might be willed, is to be attained. The cate-
gorical imperative declares that an act is in itself or
objectively necessary, without any reference to another
end." 5 All men by a natural necessity seek happiness.
Certain actions are generally recognized by human in-
telligence to be productive of happiness. To these actions,
then, when chosen as a means to happiness, a hypothetical
imperative attaches. They are valued for the sake of
the happiness they are expected to bring. But " there is
an imperative which directly commands an action, with-
out presupposing as its condition that some other end
is to be attained by means of that action. It has to do,
not with the matter of an action and the result expected
to follow from it, but simply with the form and principle
from which the action itself proceeds. The action is essen-
tially good if the motive of the agent is good, let the con-
sequences be what they may. This imperative may be
called the imperative of morality." 9 Here we have before
us Kant's celebrated doctrine of duty as the Categorical
* Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. I, Chap. Ill (Abbott's trans.,
p. 165).
* This account of Kant'a doctrine of the Categorical Imperative is
drawn from the Metaphysic of Morality, Sec. 2.
* Ibid.
Ibid.
68 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
Imperative. This imperative, which bids us obey without
any regard for consequences, attaches to the Moral Law.
Every duty as a categorical imperative is an end sufficient
in itself and never a means to anything else.
7. Goodness Not Always Different from Inclination.
Kant is certainly in error in believing that acts done from
inclination never possess moral value. It is indeed little
less than absurd to hold that the conduct of a person who,
gladly and from a sympathetic inclination, helps another
in distress, possesses no moral value, while the conduct
of one who renders the same assistance reluctantly and
from a hard sense of duty deserves to be called good. To
be sure there are acts done from thoughtless impulse which,
although productive of good, possess a minimum of moral
value, as when a man from kindly impulse tosses a coin
to a beggar who importunes him, without a thought as to
whether the recipient is deserving or undeserving, or
whether the money will go for food or intoxicant. But, on
the other hand, there are actions which, once performed
with a feeling of obligation and contrary to inclination,
have through long habit become a ' ' second nature, ' ' and are
now done gladly and from desire, as in the case of a public-
spirited citizen who in earlier years becomes so used to
subordinating private interest to public concern that in
later life he turns from the pursuit of his own ambition
to the service of his country gladly, and with no sense
of hardship. Such conduct, while it involves no conflict
with desire and hence is accompanied by no feeling of
obligation, is superior in moral value to that which is
prompted by the constraint of duty, because it represents
a higher level of attainment. The saint, from the stand-
point of morality, is the person who having, through long
years of painful self-denial and heroic struggle, subdued
the flesh and overcome the world, finds the pursuit of good-
ness his only desire.
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD 69
Nevertheless, the facts of the moral life justify in a
large measure the view of Kant. Obligation, not inclina-
tion, is the characteristic form in which the Good appeals
to the human will. Moral obligation is temporary in the
sense just explained that the regular performance of duty
creates a new disposition which in time makes the practice
easy and natural. But when this new interest is thus in-
corporated in the character of the agent, still further ends
arise which forbid him to remain satisfied with what he has
already achieved. Hence again the constraint of duty and
the suppression of inclination. As long as possibilities of
attainment open before man's will which require the sac-
rifice of present satisfaction, the pressure of obligation will
be felt by the human individual. And such possibilities
will be exhausted only when the Good itself is attained
and the goal of moral development reached.
8. The Duties of Morality Command Not as Categor-
ical but as Teleological Imperatives. It is also a mistake
to maintain that duty as we usually understand it has the
authority of a categorical imperative. The recognized
duties of morality, as important as they are, are not ends
in themselves. If they were, why then, to be sure, we
should tell the truth " if the heavens fall " or (what is
more likely) we needlessly wound the feelings of our ac-
quaintances and create continual irritation and discord ; we
should be honest even if the food and clothing which we
will not take without the owner's permission would restore
self and relieve suffering comrades; we should be brave
even if in entering the burning building injuries were to be
received that cause suffering and expense to self and family
far outweighing the value of the articles we were able to
save. But in truth these duties possess value only as means
to higher ends, to human happiness and well-being ulti-
mately to the full satisfaction of the human will. They
have no authority in their own right, but derive what they
70 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
possess from the summum bonum, the supreme and only
authority in the field of conduct. Only in conventional
morality does obedience to these approved modes of action
appear as an end in itself; reflection discovers it to be
instrumental to the attainment of further ends. The im-
perative of duty is therefore not a categorical, but a teleo-
logical, imperative.
9. The Summum Bonum Alone Has the Authority of
a Categorical Imperative. "When we turn to the summum
bonum itself, to the realization of which the duties of con-
ventional morality are but instruments, we find that which
in truth is an end in itself and a means to nothing else.
The value of the summum bonum does not depend upon
its ability to lead us to some further end, but resides in its
direct appeal to the human will itself its own compelling
attraction. The summum bonum, therefore, and that alone,
possesses absolute authority over human conduct. And
since the summum bonum must always be construed in
terms of the conduct required to realize it, the absolute
authority denied to the several duties in their independence
is extended to them so far as they prove necessary to the
attainment of the Good. In this way, the whole of the
moral life is invested with the dignity and sublimity which
aroused such noble enthusiasm in Kant.
"Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace
nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and
yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would
arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely boldest forth a
law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains
reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before
which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counter-
work it; what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be
found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all
kindred with the inclinations; a root to be derived from which
THE APPEAL OF THE GOOD 71
is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can
give themselves." 7
The Good is indeed worthy of all the reverence which
Kant claimed for it as an ideal it has drawn men upward
with promise of a larger life and a deeper satisfaction, as
an authority it has exacted obedience and sacrifice, as
possessed in part it has yielded the most perfect happiness
which man has experienced.
REFERENCES
KANT, Metaphysics of Morality (Abbott's trans.).
PAULSEN, System of Ethics, Book II, Chap. V.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. III.
SPENCEB, Data of Ethics, Chap. VII.
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chap. V.
MUIBHEAD, Elements of Ethics, Book II, Chap. II.
GBEEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chap. II.
MILL, Utilitarianism, Chap. III.
T KANT: Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. I, Chap. Ill (Abbott's
trans., p. 180).
CHAPTER VI
THE MOTIVE OF GOOD CONDUCT
1. The Appeal of the Bummum Bonum as the Motive of Good Con-
duct. 2. Possible Discrepancy Between the Intention and the
Consequences of Conduct. 3. Good Intentions When Accom-
panied by Adequate Knowledge Are Usually Productive of
Good Consequences. 4. Good Consequences in Most Cases In-
dicate Corresponding Degree of Goodness in Intention. 5. But
Good Motive Does Not Absolutely Insure Good Consequences
Because of Inability of Reason to Foresee Future Developments.
1. The Appeal of the Summum Bonum as the Motive
of Good Conduct. Motive, psychologically speaking, is
the conscious condition of action. The motive of voluntary
action with which alone Ethics is directly concerned is
the desire of an object as end. We may now go a step
further and return answer to the question: What is the
motive of good conduct? The motive of good conduct is
the idea of the Highest Good in its appeal to the will of
an intelligent being. In this motive we have distinguished
and considered separately two aspects, an intellectual and
an emotional. On the one hand there is the conception of
the object to be sought, the inducement of action; on the
other are the feelings of interest or obligation aroused by
thought of this object, the incentive to act. Both of these
factors are necessary as constituents of the motive ; only
through their cooperation is it able to discharge its office
in the determination of conduct. The motive of good con-
duct is then composed of thought and feeling joined in an
effective unity it is the idea of the Good become dynamic,
converted into a living force for the creating of conduct,
the constructing of character.
72
THE MOTIVE OF GOOD CONDUCT 73
The statement that all good conduct has for its motive
the attainment of the summum bonum does not imply that
every act which is truly good, results from conscious thought
of, and has explicit reference to, the summum bonum. This
need only from time to time be so attentively studied and
clearly understood by the agent that he is constantly aware
of the general principles which its progressive attainment
imposes on his daily conduct, and that its appeal to him
shall be so strong that a feeling of compelling obligation
is communicated to these principles of conduct. When
this is the case and such principles determine human con-
duct, either operating consciously as motives, or having
done so in the past and now governing through habit,
the conception of the summum bonum is in verity discharg-
ing its proper function as the motive of good conduct.
2. Possible Discrepancy Between Intention and Con-
sequences of Conduct. Thus far we have assumed that
an action which aims at the Highest Good will, within the
limits of its own field, result in its attainment. No account
has been taken of a possible discrepancy between intention
and performance, motive and consequences. The possibil-
ity of such disagreement has impressed many writers on
Ethics as so real and important that it has affected their
whole conception of goodness. They have felt obliged to
choose either intention or consequences, the one to the
exclusion of the other, as determining the moral value of an
act. Either it is only the intention that counts in morality
and the consequences do not matter, or it is the actual
consequences which make an act good or bad, without
regard for the motive of the agent. Kant is the leading
representative of the former extreme. He held that ' ' Noth-
ing in the whole world, or even outside of the world, can
possibly be regarded as good without limitation except a
good will. ... A man's will is good, not because the
consequences which flow from it are good, nor because it is
74 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
capable of attaining the end which it seeks, but it is good in
itself, or because it wills the good." x J. S. Mill and others
of the Utilitarian school take the opposite view, believing
that the consequences of an act, in increasing or diminish-
ing the sum total of human happiness, make it right or
wrong. 2 Thus Mill says : ' ' Utilitarian moralists have gone
beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has
nothing to do with the morality of an action, though much
with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow-
creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether
his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his
trouble : he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty
of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend
to whom he is under greater obligations. ' ' 3
Everyday human experience gives ample warrant, one
may think, for thus contrasting the intention with the
consequences of action. It is proverbial that good inten-
tions often go with poor performance. Persons who mean
well, but do ill are easily found in every community. We
are all acquainted with men and women who, although
working with best intention for others' welfare, neverthe-
less do harm and mischief among them through ignorance
of their needs, their abilities, and the conditions under
which they live. Such well-intentioned altruists are fre-
quently condemned as meddlesome busy-bodies. Con-
versely human life and history can show us many cases
of good consequences issuing from intentions either bad
or indifferent. Excellent laws laws that do much to ad-
vance human welfare are sometimes enacted through the
influence of political leaders who seek only party success
*KANT: Metaphysic of Morality, Sec. 1.
*MlLL: Utilitarianism, Chap. II.
* The distinction made by Mill and other Utilitarians between
intention and motive is ignored here as tending to produce needless
perplexity in the mind of the student. Intention is here con-
trasted, according to popular usage, with actual results, conse-
quences.
THE MOTIVE OF GOOD CONDUCT 75
and personal preferment. Many a war undertaken from
love of conquest and plunder has in its outcome increased
human liberty and happiness.
3. Good Intentions When Accompanied by Adequate
Knowledge Are Usually Productive of Good Conse-
quences. Does the logic of our view compel us to hold
that any act whose motive is the attainment of the Highest
Good is itself good, no matter what its consequences may
be? Before giving a final answer to this question let us
consider whether the possibility of a real discrepancy be-
tween the intention and the outcome of action is as great
as it has been made out to be whether it is possible for
the inner and outer aspects of conduct to enter into such
sharp conflict. 4 In the first place, good^jintentions which
result in evil do so usually because the agent is ignorant
of the conditions in which he acts, of the true character
of the situation. The ultimate end conceived, the final
object aimed at, is good, but there is almost complete igno-
rance of the means which must be employed in its attain-
ment. In such circumstances can the intention be said
to be altogether good? Scarcely. Conduct is good in in-
tention when it intends the attainment of the summum '
bonum. But the summum bonum is an object of action, to
be realized in conduct. Hence, if the agent is truly to
understand the Highest Good, he must see it in its bearing
upon his own situation, as the outcome of his own conduct,
the expression of his own will. In other words, for the
Good fully to determine an action as motive, it must be
known, notjibstractly as the faraway goal of endeavor, but
concretely in terms of the conduct required to attain it.
To make an intention good, then, it does not suffice that
it have goodness for its final end, that it aim at human
4 For further light upon the subjects discussed in the remainder
of this chapter, cf. Professor Dewey's able discussion (DEWEY Ain>
TUFTS: Ethics, pp. 246-54).
76 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
happiness or social welfare, it must also include a knowl-
edge of the means necessary for its realization. On the
other hand, when these conditions are fulfilled, and an
action has for its motive the realization of the Good,
accompanied by a knowledge of the means requisite to this
end, we may reasonably expect that its consequences will
be good also. Thus far, at least, do good motives guarantee
good consequences.
The objection must arise at this point that, in many
cases, a person is not responsible for his ignorance of means
and methods whereby to realize his ideals. Where it has not
been possible for the agent to gain the needed knowledge,
should his lack of it affect the moral value of his intention ?
Certainly, in judging of moral values, care should be ex-
ercised to distinguish between cases where opportunities
for acquiring the information in question have been neg-
lected and those in which no opportunity has apparently ex-
isted, and to make due allowance in cases of the latter sort.
Yet it is difficult to see how a motive can be regarded as
altogether good when not accompanied by as much knowl-
edge as human experience can furnish as to the ways and
means by which the ends of Goodness are realized. Cer-
tainly intelligent public opinion is growing more unwilling
to accept " good intentions " in the ordinary sense as an
excuse for ignorance of actual conditions that brings dis-
astrous consequences. We tend more and more to hold the
engineer responsible for his ignorance of the conditions
of his air-brakes which, failing to work, caused the accident
the physician responsible for his ignorance of the in-
jurious after-effects of the medicine he prescribes the
orator or publicist responsible for ignorance of the mis-
leading and inflammatory character of certain doc-
trines when accepted by unenlightened and prejudiced
minds.
THE MOTIVE OF GOOD CONDUCT 77
4. Good Consequences in Most Cases Indicate a Cor-
responding Degree of Goodness in Intention. Much less
frequently than is popularly supposed we find upon ex-
amination is there any wide difference in moral value be-
tween the intention and the consequences of action. Given
a good intention, accompanied by all available information
as to how it may be carried out, i.e. given an intention that
is altogether good, and good consequences may be expected
to follow. Moreover, when we move in the reverse direc-
tion, from consequence back to intention, we find agreement,
not discrepancy, the rule. In the vast majority of cases \
good consequences indicate good intentions. In order
properly to understand the situation here one must make
an allowance for a natural tendency to exaggerate the good-
ness of those results which do seem in any degree good,
when the intention behind them is believed to be bad.
Our surprise is so great to find goodness produced in
this way by an evil motive that we incline almost irre-
sistibly to heighten the contrast and thus exaggerate the
amount of resulting good. We tend, for instance, to over-
estimate the amount of good resulting to Europe from
Napoleon's campaigns of conquest, when once our atten-
tion is caught by the fact that good did result. Now
when we do make this allowance and reduce the con-
sequent good to its true proportions, we usually discover
that the intention is good in a corresponding degree. The
scheming politician secures the passage of good laws, say
you, in order that his party may remain in public favor
and he may retain office and influence? Yes, but since
he is clear-headed enough to understand that fame and
fortune will come to him only as he proves a loyal servant
of his party, and that his party can retain its power only
so long as it obeys the popular will and secures the general
welfare, is his motive altogether selfish ? He seeks his own
interest, to be sure, but is shrewd enough to see that it
78 ETHICS AS THE SCIENCE OF GOOD CONDUCT
is inseparably bound up with the success of party and the
welfare of country ; hence he seeks these also. The conduct
I of the man who gives to charity in order to advertise his
business is probably as good in intention as it is in result.
That also springs from an insight into the connection of
private interest with public welfare, which possesses moral
value in degree probably equal to the amount of actual
good which is likely to result from such forms of charity.
5. But Goodness of Motive Cannot Absolutely Insure
Good Consequences Because of Inability of Reason to
Foresee All Future Developments. Returning now to the
question whether the moral value of conduct is not de-
termined wholly by the motive, and not at all by conse-
quences, we see that its difficulties have been largely re-
moved. There is no possibility of such radical discrepancy
between intention and consequences as would compel us to
choose one and ignore the other in evaluating conduct.
The two are inseparably joined in the unitary process of
volition, where they reciprocally determine one another.
1 When the motive is good, therefore, it is entirely probable
that the consequences will be also.
Can we not go still farther and assert without reserva-
tion that where the motive is good the consequences must
be good? Suppose the motive were good in that complete
sense suggested above an excellence of motive not often
attained, it must be confessed. Imagine an individual seek-
ing the summum bonum with all the knowledge that human
experience has been able to gather as to means and methods
of pursuit, concerning conditions to be met, and contin-
gencies apt to arise. Would such a motive necessarily
and without the possibility of exception produce conse-
quences of the same degree of goodness ? Or might fate or
accident still intervene to frustrate expectation, set plans
at naught, and bring evil out of good ? The whole problem
' turns upon the ability of human knowledge, when as com-
THE MOTIVE OF GOOD CONDUCT 79
plete as possible, tq_ anticipate the future. Is a knowledge
even theoretically possible that will enable one to foresee
every contingency that may arise in prospective action?
It is true that knowledge enables us in an astonishing
manner to foresee and to predict. But this very knowledge,
now the possession and advantage of the race, was gained
through experiments of which no one knew the outcome
until it occurred. Action has not, then, followed a pro-
gram prescribed by thought; thought has rather recorded -
and systematized the results of action. Volition is the
primary, the original, capacity; intellect is secondary and
derived. Hence it is impossible that knowledge should
ever foresee in detail all the possibilities of achievement,
or anticipate every emergency which a voluntary agent
may have to meet. Entirely novel situations arise; the
totally unexpected happens. New discoveries are made,
fresh developments occur, which upset every human cal-
culation. The best of motives may, through such a novel
turn of events, have results in action which are not wholly
good. In such case the agent is only responsible for his
motive for aiming at the Good with the fullest informa-)
tion human experience can furnish. For the consequences,
so far as they are determined, not by his will, but by the
new and unexpected course of events, he is not responsible
except in future actions, when the new facts which at first
surprised him and upset all calculation can be foreseen
and provided for.
REFERENCES
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book I, Chap. II.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XII, 1, 2.
MILL, Utilitarianism, Chap. II.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. II.
ALEXANDEB, Moral Order and Progress, Book I, Chap. II, 1, 2, 3.
PART TWO
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF THE GOOD CONDUCT 05
CHARACTER
1. The Supreme Importance of the Subject. 2. The Good as De-
termined by Custom. 3. The Good as Discovered by Reflec-
tion. 4. Socrates' View of the Good. 5. Merits of the
Socratic Conception of the Good. 6. Defects of the Socratic
Conception of the Good. 7. The Good as Action or the End
of Action. 8. The Good as Conduct or Character. 9. The
Good as Duty or Virtue.
1. The Supreme Importance of the Subject. What is
the Good? This is the question which must now engage
our attention; for we have seen that all other questions
of Ethics lead up to this one, and upon its successful
solution depends the possibility of a rational morality.
By the Good is meant that form of life which is re-
quired to satisfy completely the human will. When the
Good is thus understood it is easy to see why the question
of its nature fundamental to all ethical inquiry is the
supremely important problem of human thought. Placed
beside it, all questions of business profit and loss, of social
order and adjustment sink into insignificance. Such ques-
tions as these latter may in themselves be important enough,
touching thousands of lives in a vital and essential man-
ner. But, after all, they concern only single departments
of human life, while the problem of the Good concerns
the whole nature of man as an active being. Hence a
question of economics or politics, of education or of art,
interests only a comparatively small number of persons,
while the moral problem has interest for all human beings
in virtue of their common humanity. And for this reason
88
84 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
because fundamental in character and universal in in-
terest the question of the Good is of greatest practical
moment, and its solution of highest practical value. Be-
fore an individual can practise an art or profession he must
learn its principles and be drilled in its methods. If he
is properly to determine his conduct as a free agent, must
he not then learn the principles of human nature and the
methods of obtaining satisfaction for it ? And if it is worth
while to spend four years in studying the principles and
methods of a profession, is it not more worth while to spend
a little time in studying the nature and requirements of
human life itself ? Ethics is the science of human life and
human conduct, and, as such, underlies all the practical
sciences. Compared with that of the highest human good,
all other concerns have small value indeed. " For what
shall it profit a man," said our greatest moral and re-
ligious teacher, "if he shall gain the whole world and
lose his own soul ? " x
2. The Good as Determined by Custom. So important
a problem is this of the highest good that in the earlier
stages of moral development its solution is not left to
the reason of the individual. Instead it is settled for
him by the customs of his race. 2 These customs are rules
of conduct which prescribe what a man must do if his
conduct is to meet with approval among his fellows. In
general they serve to impose such restraint upon the in-
stincts and appetites of the individual as is required to
make group-life possible and, as conditions of social ex-
'Mark viii, 36 (A. V.).
* The superiority of custom to reason as an agency for securing
actions demanded by s.ocial welfare is remarked upon by Lafcadio
Hearn in his letters bearing on Japanese life. He alludes to prac-
tices required for hygienic purposes or necessary to an orderly com-
munity life which have been easily enforced by tradition and super-
stition, but which would be very difficult to enforce on grounds of
reason except among the most highly civilized peoples. ("Japanese
Letters of Lafcadio Hearn," I, Atlantic Monthly, December, 1909,
p. 727.)
CONDUCT OR CHARACTER 85
istence, are handed down from generation to generation
in the form of a race tradition. All custom in the field
of morality has two^ aspects ; a subjective, in the belief that
actions of a certain kind are good, and, an objective, in
the practices which flow from this belief. Thus the cus-
toms of a people lay down the conditions which the indi-
vidual must fulfil if he is to deserve the title of " good
man " that, for instance, he must be a brave warrior, a
successful hunter, the father of several sons, a worshiper
of the tribal deities, etc.
The system of customs which constitutes the morality
of primitive man is not the result of his reflection upon
the question of the highest human good; these customs
owe their origin and perpetuation largely to forces and
agencies purely natural. No doubt chance or " luck "
plays a large part in the origin of custom. Some action
happens to precede or accompany a piece of great good
fortune to the tribe, such as unparalleled success in the
hunt or complete victory in warfare. This action is there-
fore regarded as lucky and is perpetuated as a custom long
after the original circumstances have been forgotten. 3
With the continued existence of customs the law of natural
selection, acting between societies, has much to do. Those
tribes whose customs are such as to make them more efficient
in hunting and warfare, survive in the struggle for life
and their customs are continued, while tribes whose cus-
toms tend in the opposite direction towards disintegration
and inefficiency are exterminated.
But while primitive morality owes its existence so largely
to causes that are non-rational, its customs are by no means
on a level with the set of instincts by which life is organ-
ized in an animal society, such as a community of ants or of
* For a brief statement of the factors which enter into the origin
of custom, and of the means whereby customs are enforced, consult
DEWET AND TUFTS: Ethics, Chap. IV.
86 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
bees. The operation of custom in the most primitive human
society calls for the exercise of intelligence and volition
on the part of the individuals concerned. 4 A man must
possess the power of thinking in general terms of con-
ceptual thought before he can understand the require-
ments of a custom. He must be able to conceive of general
modes of acting of marrying within or without the clan,
for instance if the custom concerns marriage. Then
the obligation that is felt to obey the custom implies the
power of choice and selection. The individual must be
able to represent to himself a certain form of conduct
say, marrying without the clan as a possibility of action,
and to contrast it with other modes of action. Thus only
can he feel an obligation to pursue one alternative in action,
an obligation which is neither the desire of a particular
object on the one hand, nor the sense of external compulsion
on the other. Nor can we doubt that the intelligence and
volition required for the understanding and obeying of
customs have in an increasing degree influenced their
origination and continuance. The necessity of teaching
the traditional customs of the race to the rising generation
would set men to thinking of their meaning and value.
Thus thoughts of possible changes and innovations would
naturally arise. In result a new feature would be occa-
sionally introduced into the tribal customs through the
influence of some powerful individual. These changes,
though slight enough in any one generation, would have
cumulative effect and, as moral evolution proceeded, serve
more and more to rationalize the existing morality.
3. The Good as Discovered by Reflection. But the
time comes in the history of the race, as of the indi-
vidual, when man is no longer willing to have the nature
A full and illuminating account of the psychological factors in-
volved in custom is contained in WUNDT'S Ethics, Eng. trans., Vol. I,
"The Facts of the Moral Life," pp. 127-34.
CONDUCT OR CHARACTER 87
of his good determined for him by the customs of his
race. He insists upon applying his own reason to the
solution of the problem. The resulting reflection may seem
at first productive of evil rather than good; for while
general enlightenment follows upon the exercise of thought
by individuals, it is generally accompanied also by skep-
ticism or doubt of the existence of any universal standards
of truth or goodness, and individualism or the further
conclusion that the good for every individual is identical
with his own advantage.
The most notable instance in history of such an over-
throw of customary morality occurred in Greece in the
fifth century B.C. This revolt against the morality of
custom and tradition among the Greeks is especially im-
portant because, in the systematic reflection which grew
out of it, we have the beginnings of ethical science among
European peoples. Victory in the Persian wars had in-
creased the wealth and the commerce of the Greek states.
Thus their citizens were given more leisure for study and
reflection, and an increasing acquaintance with the beliefs
and customs of other peoples. The rise of democracy gave
greater importance and scope to action and initiative on
the part of the individual, and the frequent changes in
government tended to weaken his respect for established
law and institution. "When we add to these influences the
fact that philosophic speculation during the century pre-
vious had practically destroyed the old mythology and
undermined the foundations of the national religion, it
is not surprising to find the moral customs and traditions
of the Greek people losing their authority and falling into
disrespect. 5 This spirit of revolt against authority in all
departments of life finds expression in the teachings of
1 For a description of the influences that cooperated to bring about
the Greek enlightenment, and an explanation of the main tenets
in the teachings of the Sophists, cf. WINDELBAND: History of Philos-
ophy, Eng. trans, by TTJFTS, pp. 66-70.
88 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
the Sophists. The Sophists came into prominence at this
time as itinerant teachers, first of rhetoric and public
speaking, and then, extending the scope of their instruction,
of the whole conduct of life. 6 The effect of their teaching
was to encourage the individual to disregard all accepted
standards and established authority in the pursuit of his
own interest. They denied that there were any absolute
standards of truth and goodness which could claim author-
ity "over all men. Hence they maintained that the in-
dividual's opinion was truth for him, and that his advan-
tage was his good. The Sophists were therefore skeptics
in the field of thought defenders of subjectivism, and in
the sphere of conduct advocates of individualism.
4. Socrates' View of the Good. The general accept-
ance of this individualistic doctrine meant the dissolution
of all moral standards among the Greek people and the
reduction of their social order to a chaos of contending
desires and ambitions. To prevent this disastrous result
there was need for a man to appear with a mind keen
enough to see more deeply into the problem than did
the Sophists, and a personality sufficiently vigorous to
impress his views upon the thought of his age. Such
a man was Socrates, who is justly esteemed as one of
the great ethical teachers and moral heroes of history. 7
Socrates sought to reestablish the authority of the old
standards of justice and courage and temperance, not
First and most prominent among the Sophists was Protagoras
of Abdera, born about 480 B.C. He taught for forty years through-
out Greece, and with great success. He is the leading figure in
the celebrated dialogue of Plato's bearing his name. Other Sophists
were Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias.
1 Socrates was born in 470 B.C. His father was Sophroniscus, a
sculptor. He was trained in his father's profession. This he aban-
doned in response to what he regarded as a divine call to his
peculiar mission. His mission he understood as the moral in-
struction of the Greek people. As a moral teacher he followed the
indirect method of question and answer. By skilful questioning he
CONDUCT OR CHARACTER 89
by appealing to the authority of tradition and the past,
however, but by carrying still further that reflection on
ethical subjects begun by the Sophists. He maintained
that if men would not be content with mere feeling and
opinion, but would take the trouble to think systematically
on the subject of human conduct, they would discover what
is man's true good and see that its attainment imposes
on all men certain fundamental obligations. He declared,
in fact, that virtue or goodness is knowledge. For by a
necessity of his nature every man seeks "his own interest.
If he does wrong, this shows that he is ignorant of what
his true interest is. Conversely, if he gains knowledge of
his true interest he cannot help pursuing it, and hence
must do right. This knowledge, which for man is identical
with virtue, is primarily a knowledge of himself, of the
needs and capacities of his human nature. It is also a
knowledge of the conditions under which the individual
can find self-satisfaction in human life and society. Such
knowledge, leading the individual to consider the future
as well as the present, and revealing the community of
interest among fellow-citizens, will convince him of the
necessity of discharging the commonly recognized duties
as conditions of his own happiness. Thus that true knowl-
edge which is identical with virtue is shown to be a means
to happiness. Socrates is able, therefore, by a change of
emphasis to define virtue as happiness the true happiness
attained through the control of action by reason.
forced his hearers into confusion and self-contradiction. Thus they
were made to convict themselves of ignorance, and the way was
opened for Socrates to suggest the truth. In his own life and
conduct Socrates was a pattern of piety, patriotism, and justice.
His frankness in exposing hypocrisy, his devotion to truth with an
utter disregard of popular opinion, made him many enemies. As
a result of a conspiracy of these he was tried, sentenced to death,
and forced to drink the hemlock in the year 399 B.C.
For an interesting character-study of Socrates, cf. C. M. BAKE-
WELL: "The Unique Case of Socrates," International Journal of
Ethics, October, 1909.
90 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
5. Merits of the Socratic Conception of the Good.
The value of Socrates' contribution to the science of
Ethics can scarcely be over-estimated. He was the first
to offer a positive solution for the ethical problem; since
he was the first to find ground in human nature for a
Good which was the same for all men and would conse-
quently unite them in the bonds of a common moral obliga-
tion. Although designed to refute the individualism of
the Sophists, Socrates' view has not the one-sidedness which
usually condemns a doctrine developed in the heat of con-
troversy. "While it upholds the authority of duty it pro-
vides for the satisfaction of the individual. In fact, Soc-
rates' conception of the Good is a synthesis of two ele-
ments which often appear in open conflict. It contains,
first, the rationalistic principle that sense-impulse and pres-
ent desire should be subjected to the conceptions and pur-
poses of reason. But we find, in the second place, the
hedonistic doctrine that the exercise of reason should in
its turn be a means to the satisfaction and happiness of
the individual. Virtue is knowledge, but knowledge is
happiness.
6. Defects of the Socratic Conception of the Good.
Just this synthetic character, which is the strength
of Socrates' view of the Good, is also the source of its
weakness. For it is a synthesis too easily achieved. If
knowledge of one's true interest necessarily involved action
in accordance with it, we should have here a final solution
of the moral problem. But such is not the case. " For
the good that I would, I do not ; but the evil which I would
not, that I do," says Paul, 8 and the facts of our moral
experience are in accord with the statement of the Chris-
tian apostle rather than the view of the Athenian sage.
Socrates' error seems to have arisen from an imperfect
understanding of the working of the human will. In the
Romans vii, 19 (A. V.).
CONDUCT OR CHARACTER 91
process of volition the idea which reason connects with
one's true interest does not automatically and inevitably
translate itself into action and accomplishment. I may
be thoroughly convinced that two hours' exercise in the
open air every afternoon is required for my own best
welfare, yet sit quiet in my office or study during every
afternoon of the week. Besides the thought of the object
and the feeling of satisfaction in its attainment, a third
factor enters into volition whose significance Socrates did
not appreciate. This is the effort, the activity, with which
volition proper is often identified. This effort is mental
that activity of attention required to keep an idea steadily
in mind despite distracting influences, while the steps nec-
essary to its realization are duly taken. Now the amount
of attention which any idea is able to command is not
determined by rational considerations solely. (The most
reasonable alternative is not always the most attractive
one.) Rather is it in a large measure the result of the
individual 's tendencies and habits tendencies which are in-
nate and habits which have been developed through past
action and experience. In the development of such habits
the " training " of the will consists. And in order that
an individual shall pursue his true interest it is necessary,
not only that his intellect be enlightened as to its character,
but also that his will be trained in its. performance. Not
only moral instruction, therefore, bu.t also moral training
is required if a' man is to act for his own good. For the
habituation in a course of action, which results from train-
ing in its performance, makes the idea of it attractive,
and powerful over the attention. These considerations lead
to a position the very opposite of that taken by Socrates
and one that sounds paradoxical enough when first stated
that one can know an idea fully only after he has acted
upon it. Without attempting at this point to clear up
the perplexities involved, we may acknowledge that this
92 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
last statement contains sufficient truth to disprove the
Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. It is un-
doubtedly true that in many cases one can learn that an
object is a part of his own good only by seeking and
attaining it. He must have sufficient courage to make the
trial, and then he will be convinced by the results of his
action that the object which he sought is part of his own
good. Thus it is only by pursuing another's good at the
expense of our own that we learn the extent of our own
interest that it includes the welfare of others.
7. The Good as Action or the End of Action.
The difficulties in the Socratic conception show clearly
that no theory of the Good can be accepted as final which
neglects the conditions under which it is realized in action.
The reason for this is plain. By definition the Good is
that which completely satisfies intelligent volition. Voli-
tion is action in pursuit of a chosen end. Thus whatever
else it may or may not be the Good must certainly be some
form, or end, of action. Mr. Alexander states this fact
with emphasis in his Moral Order and Progress: " Hence
the object of morality cannot be a passive state like pleasure
or the possession of knowledge. When these are the objects
of will, what is willed is not the feeling or the state by them-
selves, but their production. It would be infinitely tedious
to be obliged always to say so, but the condition is always
implied. " 9 To admit the truth of this is not by any
means to decide the question of the Good in favor of some
form of voluntarism. 10 The Good may still be a passive
state a condition of agreeable feeling or of complete knowl-
edge. Or it may be the extinction of all individual activity
as in the Buddhist Nirvana. But these conditions of
being or non-being will nevertheless be objects which are
Moral Order and Progress, ed. of 1889, p. 165.
10 The theory, that is, that the Good is found in the process or
activity of willing itself rather than in any object or end attained by
will.
CONDUCT OR CHARACTER 93
actively pursued. The happiness must be sought after,
the knowledge must be obtained, and even the Nirvana of
the Buddhist must be achieved by long and persistent effort.
In short the Good must be some form of conduct ; for only
in conduct can the will find expression.
8. The Good as Conduct or Character. Thus to con-
ceive of the Good as a form of conduct is not to identify
it with outward and visible action in contrast with inner
and essential nature. Such an antithesis of conduct and
character is possible only on a false view of the human
self. According to this view held by a Psychology now
antiquated the self or soul is an entity or ' ' thing ' ' which
possesses a nature permanent and in a large degree in-
dependent of outward act and condition. This view per-
mitted of a sharp distinction being made between character
as pertaining to this inner and unchanging principle of
human selfhood and conduct as belonging to the outward
world of visible and changing events. Modern Psychol-
ogy, however, is dynamic, not static; it understands the
self as a sum total, or better, an organized unity of
conscious activities. From this standpoint it is impossible
to make any hard and fast distinction between conduct
and character. For conduct does not consist of a series
of unrelated acts; these acts are acjs_ji_ will, and rep-
resent so many choices. A series of such choices tends
to produce a habit, and out of these habits are formed
those dispositions and capacities which constitute the char-
acter of a person. Character in its turn does not consist
of passive qualities which exist apart from the sphere of
action. Rather it is made up of the dispositions and atti-
tudes of the individual dispositions to act and attitudes
towards objects of action. But it is in just these modes
of activity that the individual's conduct consists. Thus
conduct and character resolve Jhemselves into two sides,
outer and inner, of a unitary subject, the active self or
94 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
personality. 11 What a man is is manifest in what he does,
and what he does is an expression of what he is. If it is
legitimate to define the Good as a form of conduct, it is
equally legitimate to describe it as a species of character.
9. The Good as Duty or Virtue. The relation is
identical when we consider whether the Good consists in
the performance of duty or the acquisition of virtue.
By duty we understand a mode of aption which is mor-
ally approved. A virtue, on the other hand, is an at-
tribute or disposition of character which is judged good.
Now the moral ideal may be formulated in terms of
either of these two conceptions. The Greeks preferred
the latter explaining goodness as the acquisition of cer-
tain virjtues. Thus the greatest Greek moralists, Plato
and Aristotle, discuss at length those virtues which are
requisite to goodness, the so-called cardinal^virtues of tem-
perance, courage, justice, etc. Christian Ethics has in the
main adopted the former conception, understanding right
living to consist in the performane-_of certain duties.
Hence Christian moralists have laid greatest stress upon
a code of duties which are conceived as laws prescribing
the conduct of the good man. The Ten Commandments
are often cited by these moralists as constituting the fun-
damental code of duty, proceeding directly from God, the
source of the moral law. These two conceptions of good-
ness as duty and as virtue have been frequently: contrasted
as if they were in essential opposition and exclusive of one
another. 12 The Greek__view of the Good as virtue has
been charged with making morality self-centered, while
the Christian__conception of goodness as duty has been
accused of making it external ajjcLiormal. Such a con-
trast is made possible only by that abstract and false
11 This point is briefly but clearly put by SETH: Ethical Prin-
ciples, ed, of 1908, p. 5.
12 Sidgwick emphasizes this point of difference between Greek and
Christian Ethics in his Outline of the History of Ethics, Chap. III.
CONDUCT OR CHARACTER 95
separation of conduct and character which has just been
condemned. As conduct and character are two sides, outer
and inner, of one unitary personality, so duty and virtue
are two aspects, outer and inner, of the expression of this
personality. Whether we conceive of goodness in terras
of one or of the other is altogether a matter of emphasis ;
for one cannot exist without the other. A man can acquire
or possess no quality of soul which does not manifest itself
in action, nor can he perform any intelligent action without
affecting and modifying his essential nature. The Good
may therefore be conceived, equally well, as the perform-
ance of duty or as the acquisition of virtue.
REFERENCES
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book I, Chap. II, 4, 5.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chaps. IV and XIII, 8 3, 4.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book I, Chap. Ill, and Book II,
Chap. I.
WUNDT, Ethics, Vol. I, Chap. III.
WINDELBAND, History of Philosophy (Eng. trans.), Part I, Chap. II,
7.
BAKEWELL, Source-book in Ancient Philosophy, Chaps. VIII, IX, X.
CHAPTER II
THEORIES OF THE GOOD HEDONISM
1. Pleasure as the Good. 2. Cyrenaicism. 3. Element of Truth in
Cyrenaicism. 4. The Inadequacy of Cyrenaicism. 5. Epicure-
anism. 6. Value of the Epicurean Theory of the Good. 7.
Arguments in Support of Hedonism. 8. Error of Psychological
Hedonism. 9. Criticism of Ethical Hedonism. 10. Transition
to Rationalism.
1. Pleasure as the Good. There is reason to believe
that all actions whose results are beneficial to animal life
are accompanied by pleasure, while harmful actions are
attended by pain. As human beings, we know that ac-
tions which tend to conserve health and physical well-
being are, generally speaking, pleasurable, while actions
whose effect is to diminish health and lessen bodily vigor
are usually painful. 1 Advancing from the biological to
the psychological sphere, we find it true that the unin-
terrupted and successful exercise of our mental faculties
is accompanied by a pleasant, affective glow, as in ob-
servation, thought, and imagination. Here, too, the re-
verse condition of frustrated thought and interrupted
imagination is essentially unpleasant, as in doubt, per-
plexity, and confusion. In fact, psychologists tell us that
1 " From the biological point of view, then, we see that the con-
nections between pleasure and beneficial action and between pain
and detrimental action, which arose when sentient existence began,
and have continued among animate creatures up to man, are gen-
erally displayed in him also throughout the lower and more com-
pletely organized part of his nature; and must be more and more
fully displayed throughout the higher part of his nature, as fast
as his adaptation to the conditions of social life increases."
SPENCEB-. Data of Ethics, Chap. VI, 35.
96
HEDONISM 97
success in attaining the end of action always brings pleasure
in result, and failure causes pain. 2 In view of these facts,
it is not surprising that in the sphere of morals the theory
of Hedonism, the view that the Good is Pleasure, has
appealed strongly to men 's minds. For is not pleasure the
unfailing index of our success in attaining those objects
which we as voluntary agents strive after? If we pursue
pleasure do we not therefore seek that satisfaction which
our natures demand, and, if we obtain the greatest possible
pleasure, do we not obtain the maximum of satisfaction for
that faculty of will which is the source of all our action?
2. Cyrenaicism. Early in the history of ethical reflec-
tion Hedonism was proposed as a theory of the Good. It
was first definitely enunciated by Aristippus, who had
been a disciple of Socrates and professed to derive this
view from the teachings of his master. Socrates' concep-
tion of the Good had, it will be remembered, two sides.
According to the one, the Good was happiness, and reason
was but a means to the highest human happiness. Aristip-
pus was deeply impressed with this aspect of Socrates'
teachings and developed it to an extreme, neglecting the
rationalistic element which offset it in his master's con-
ception, and thus destroying the balance and unity of the
latter. He taught that the Good is pleasure and, since
the past is gone and the future is uncertain, the pleasure
of the presejat_moment. Thus man achieves his Good when,
with skill and care, he extracts the greatest possible en-
joyment from each passing moment. This theory, that the
Good consists in the enjoyment of present pleasure, called
Cyrenaicism 3 is, of course, not merely a feature of the
history of Ethics. It is the view of all those in every
age who consciously prefer the enjoyment of present pleas-
ure because they regard the future as at best incalculable
2 STOUT: Manual of Psychology, Bk. Ill, Div. I, Chap. Ill, 3.
8 From Gyrene, the birthplace and home of Aristippus.
98 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
and uncertain believing it wise to " eat, drink, and be
merry, for to-morrow we die."
3. Element of Truth in Cyrenaicism. Cyrenaicism is
so obviously impossible as a final solution of the ethical
problem that it is easy to overlook the element of in-
dubitable truth which it contains. Even the animals go
beyond this standpoint, it may be said; since they forego
present pleasure to provide for future need as when food
is hoarded for the coming winter. It must not be for-
gotten, however, that animals are prompted to such action
by instinct an inherited nervous modification that makes
it pleasanter for the individual so to act in the present
as to conserve future welfare. Man himself possesses an in-
stinct of self-preservation which causes him to take present
precautions to avoid future pain, and the possession of this
instinct renders it easy and natural for him to resist the
pressure of momentary feeling. But, it may be asked,
has not man an overwhelming advantage in the possession
of his reason, which enables him to foresee the future
clearly, and plan for it? This is of course true, yet it is
also true that this very faculty reveals to man a fact of
which the animals are not cognizant that the future of
any living being is essentially uncertain and incalculable.
Or, to express the same truth in other words, reason has
decided limitations in its ability to foresee the future.
In an important sense reason is limited to the familiar,
is compelled to interpret the future in the light of past
experience. Life, on the contrary, presents what is essen-
tially new, is ever revealing novel and unexpected aspects.
In comparison, therefore, with a future which must remain
to a large degree uncertain, the present has actuality, and
this actuality gives it a genuine importance and rightful
claim for consideration. It is in t 1 is emphasis upon the
rights of the present moment as al ne Actual that the truth
of Cyrenaicism consists. After all, life is constituted of
HEDONISM 99
a succession of present moments, and always to sacrifice
the now present to the future is to rob it of attainment
and satisfaction all along its course.* American life has
been justly criticised because, intent upon the pursuit of
wealth or the fulfilment of ambition, it fails to find any
true joy or satisfaction along the way, and hence becomes
hard and barren and mechanical.
4. The Inadequacy of Cyrenaicism. While we thus
do justice to the truth in Cyrenaicism, its inadequacy as
a theory of the Good can be made clear in a very few
words. To assert that the human will finds satisfaction in
the enjoyment of present pleasure only, is to admit that
it has no scope beyond the confines of the present, no
extension beyond the limits of the single moment, and
is, in effect, to deny that human life has any real unity
or is more than a succession of unrelated moments. It
is, to be sure, a fact a deplorable fact that many human
lives fail to attain any unitary meaning or significance;
they remain but a succession of impulses which yield
pleasure or pain, according as they succeed or fail of
gratification. We think however that such lives miss the
dignity of the truly human, and resemble in character the
animal existence. In many cases this enslavement to pres-
ent desire is due to mental deficiency the individual be-
ing unable to imagine the future or think of its connection
with the present with sufficient clearness and coherence
to make it a determining factor in present action. An
extreme instance of such deficiency is seen in the case of
those constant offenders who fall repeatedly into the clutches
of the law because they seem unable to represent to them-
selves the consequences of their actions. Yet, as we have
seen, knowledge of the future does^ not insure adequate
provision for it in the present. Moreover, reason, although
* Hoffding brings out the point of the right of the present moment
to have its claims duly considered in his Ethik.
100 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
it may forecast the future cannot guarantee it. To ad-
just present action to the needs of the future requires,
therefore, the exercise of a faculty which transcends even
reason that is, faith faith in one's future and faith in
. one's self. It calls for the exercise of will, the will to
be a self, which includes many present moments and joins
them in a significant unity. That the will has this power
to transcend the limits of the present can only be learned
by the exercise of it : yet its exercise is absolutely necessary
if the will is to find adequate expression in human life
and conduct.
5. Epicureanism. When it is thus seen that in order
to derive the greatest pleasure from life we must take
into account the future as well as the present we adopt a
second form of Hedonism, Epicureanism. Of this version
of Hedonism the author is Epicurus, a Greek philosopher,
who lived and taught in AthenlTa century after the time
of Aristippus. He gathered about him a company of de-
voted disciples who perpetuated his teachings after his
death in a school which continued for six centuries, and
always held the name and writings of its founder in greatest
reverence. Epicurus remained true to the fundamental
tenet of Hedonism, that pleasure is the only absolute good
in human life. Differing from the Cyrenaics, however,
he held that it was not present enjoyment, but the happi-
ness of a life-time which is the summum bonum. Now
if man is to gain the greatest pleasure from his life as
a whole it is clear that he must often forego a present
pleasure in order to secure a greater pleasure in the future
or to avoid a pain which will more than outweigh the
present enjoyment. Epicurus saw the necessity for this
and urged his followers to exercise strict self-control in
all their enjoyments. He preached temperance particu-
larly in the case of the bodily pleasures ami, always, a
prudent regard for the future. He even went so far as
HEDONISM 101
to recommend that intellectual^ pleasures be preferred to
those arising from the gratification of physical appetites
and did so, on the strictly hedonistic ground, that the in-
tellectual enjoyments, although less intense, were more per-
manent and less exhausting. Epicurus also dwelt upon
the pleasures of friendship, and of friendly intercourse with
a circle of congenial acquaintances. In his own practice
he sought a life of quiet contentment, having few de-
sires, and satisfying these with strict temperance, and find-
ing solace chiefly in the intellectual enjoyment of philo-
sophic contemplation and friendly intercourse.
6. Value of the Epicurean Theory of the Good. As a
theory of the Good, Epicureanism cannot be dismissed as
easily as was Cyrenaicism. 5 No justification can be found
in its doctrine for a debauched or licentious life, for an
idle dallying with present pleasure at the cost of future
well-being. He who would obtain the maximum of pleasure
in life must vigilantly guard his health, and this alone,
the careful conservation of health and bodily vigor, re-
quires the strictest temperance. Nor does Epicurean-
ism excuse such absorption in the pleasures of sense as
will exclude the higher satisfactions which come from the
exercise of our spiritual capacities. Rather it enjoins us
not to look solely at the present intensity of a pleasure,
but also at the length of its endurance and its possibilities
as a source of future enjoyment. Such reckoning, if hon-
estly made, will usually lead the consistent Epicurean to
seek such " intellectual " pleasures as those given by read-
ing, music, or conversation, rather than the " physical '
enjoyments of eating, drinking, etc. Nor, again, does Epi-
cureanism recommend that the individual pursue his own
selfish pleasure with a ruthless disregard of others' rights
8 The good points in Hedonism are well stated by President Hyde
in his Five Great Philosophies of Life, Chap. II, " The Epicurean
Price of Happiness."
102 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
and happiness. On the contrary, a survey of human life
and the conditions of its maintenance teaches the individual
how largely his own happiness is dependent upon his rela-
tions to his fellows and their good-will towards him. More-
. over, one of the purest and most lasting pleasures of human
' existence is that arising from friendly intercourse and
companionship. Hence the true follower of Epicurus will
sedulously cultivate a circle of congenial friends, and take
pains to preserve a good reputation among a larger number
of pleasant acquaintances. When consistently carried out,
therefore, Epicureanism as a theory of the Good is by no
means to be despised. It produces an orderly life and one
yielding much genuine satisfaction. It develops a type
of character dignified by many virtues. The true Epicu-
rean will be temperate and law-abiding, industrious, saving,
and prudent, a man quite content with simple pleasures,
the enjoyment of which is enhanced by being shared with
congenial friends.
7. Arguments in Support of Hedonism. When we
come to criticise Epicureanism the larger question of the
truth in Hedonism is naturally suggested; for Epicurean-
ism may be taken as the standard form of Hedonism. 6
Considering the matter in this more general way we find
that arguments advanced in support of Hedonism fall into
two main classes. The first is psychological and consists in
the assertion that all men do pursue pleasure always,
whether aware of it or not. The nature of the human will
' In modern times another form of Hedonism has arisen called
Utilitarianism, which contends that the Good is not the happiness
of the Individual but the happiness of society, the " greatest happi-
ness of the greatest number." This extension of pleasure as the
Good, beyond the individual to society, is possible, as Sidgwick has
shown, only through an appeal to reason. Thus the Hedonistic
doctrine is complicated and obscured. Indeed, it is doubtful if
Utilitarianism is a true species of Hedonism, since Hedonism finds
the Good in a state of feeling, and feeling is essentially subjective
and individual, while the introduction of reason in Utilitarianism
gives it a predominantly objective and social reference.
HEDONISM 103
is such that man can seek but one object and this his own
pleasure. In fact, to " desire " and to seek pleasure are
identical. In the words of J. S. Mill we have a classic
statement of this view:
" It results from the preceding considerations that there is
in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is de-
sired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself and
ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness,
and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who
desire virtue for its own sake desire it either because the con-
sciousness of it is a pleasure or because the consciousness of
being without it is a pain or for both reasons united : as in truth
the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always
together, the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of
virtue attained and pain in not having attained more. If one
of these gave him no pleasure and the other no pain, he would
not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other
benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom
he cared for. We have now, then, an answer to the question
of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible.
If the opinion which I have now stated is psychologically true
if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which
is not either a part of happiness or a means to happiness
we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these
are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end
of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to
judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows
that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included
in the whole," 7
If it is true that all men do pursue pleasure, and if,
moreover, they do so because they must from a compulsion
of their nature, why of course the whole question is settled
and further debate concerning the summum bonum is un-
necessary and futile. The Good is pleasure ; for, since the
human will can seek nothing else, in this it must find
satisfaction. There remains for Ethics only the task of
T Mm. : Utilitarianism, Chap. VL
104
determining what forms of conduct yield the most pleasure.
The second_Jype of argument in support of Hedonism
while not claiming that the psychology of volition proves
Hedonism by making all other theories impossible, maintains
its position on strictly ethical grounds. Without holding
that all men do pursue pleasure he may assert for given
. reasons that all men ought to pursue pleasure. Various
reasons are given why happiness is the only end whose
attainment completely satisfies human nature. Perhaps the
most convincing are those suggested in the opening para-
graph of this chapter. Since pleasure results from all sue-
| cessful endeavor, it signifies the satisfaction of the will
1 which initiated the action. The ultimate end of human con-
duct cannot be objective in the sense of being external to
the conscious life of man. It must rather be subjective, a
state of human consciousness. Now the only state of con-
sciousness desirable for its own sake is that which is pleas-
ant, or pleasure. Therefore pleasure is the highest human
good.
8. Error of Psychological Hedonism. Whether or not
pleasure is the sole and necessary end of all intelligent
action is a question of fact which psychology must decide.
Psychology has given its decision and this is adverse to
the claims of Hedonism. Pleasure, the psychologist tells
us, is by no means the sole and only aim of voluntary
action. 8 To be sure, we frequently seek pleasure the idea
of the pleasure to be enjoyed being unmistakably the end
of our action. But we do not always do so. In fact, it
is not usual for us to act with any subjective state, pleasur-
able or painful, in mind as the end we seek to attain.
Rather do we ordinarily pursue objects. Of course, in
any case, the end of an action is an idea, but the point
is not usually the idea of a subjective state which we
wish to produce, but of an object which we seek to attain.
JAMES: Psychology, Vol. II, Chap. XXVI, pp. 556-57.
HEDONISM 105
Intelligent action normally has this objective reference a
reference beyond subjective states and individual feelings. 9
Thus the hungry man desires, not the pleasure of satiety,
but a beefsteak or some other article of food. Even the man
having a holiday is not intent upon producing the feeling of
zest or invigoration which comes from this or that exercise
or sport, but upon catching fish, or shooting ducks, or play-
ing golf. Indeed, so obvious do the facts appear that one
wonders why a view that contravenes them could gain so
wide an acceptance. This question may be answered by a
brief reference to one most important consideration which
explains why psychological Hedonism has won the assent
of so many minds.
The plausibility of the doctrine that pleasure is always
the end of action depends upon an ambiguity in the terms
which are usually employed in discussing the subject. Is
it true or false that man always seeks that which most
pleases him? It depends entirely upon what is meant by
these words. If one means that man always chooses and
pursues the object or action whose idea is pleasantest to
him most strongly suffused or colored by pleasant feeling
it is true. In this sense, the person about to have a
tooth extracted, the mother going to nurse a child sick
with some very dangerous and communicable disease, the
martyr going to the stake, are all of them doing what
pleases them most. But this tells nothing about the end,
the motive, of their action. To say that man in his con-
duct always follows the pleasantest course is merely to
recognize that the end chosen and pursued is the end most
interesting, most attractive, to the agent who chooses and
acts. In this first sense, therefore, the statement that man
*HOFFDING: Outlines of Psychology, p. 323: "Because the end
or object of the impulse is something that excites or seems to excite
pleasure, it need not necessarily be the feeling of pleasure itself.
The impulse is essentially determined by an idea, is a striving after
the content of this idea."
106 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
always seeks the object-which. jtnpst _pleas.e,s him is true, but
is entirely irrelevant to the question at issue, which con-
cerns only thejsfld of action. If, in the second place, this
statement is understood to mean that man always seeks
the object which promises to yield him the most pleasure,
it is quite false. The mother does not undertake to nurse
the sick child because she expects to derive pleasure from it,
but because the idea of the child in pain and danger fills
her mind, and then the further idea of relieving his pain
and preserving his life appeals to her with overwhelming
force. The martyr does not go to the stake moved by
the thought of the pleasure he expects to enjoy during
the experience or, later, in Heaven, but in order to uphold
the principles to which he has devoted himself, to defend
the cause to which he has consecrated his life. To maintain
in these cases that men act, not in order to realize objects
to save a stricken child or to defend an honored cause,
but to produce certain subjective states in themselves
is to do violence to the plainest facts of human experience.
Thus we see that the dictum on which the Hedonist relies
to prove his case is capable of two interpretations. Accord-
ing to the one, it is true, but irrelevant to the question;
according to the other, it is relevant, but untrue. Un-
doubtedly many have been convinced by the arguments of
Hedonism because they thought that such a statement in
the same sense in which it was true was also relevant.
9. Criticism of Ethical Hedonism. The argument that
all men ought to pursue pleasure is not as easy to disprove.
Many objections have been brought against it in the long
controversy over Hedonism ; but not all of these objections
have weight. For instance, the fact alluded to that the
will normally directs itself upon objects and objective con-
ditions rather than subjective states may be urged as an
objection to making any state of feeling the Good. While
it is true that single acts of will have normally this ob-
HEDONISM 107
jective reference it must be remembered, however, that the
Good is an end sought in no single act, but in all the ',
voluntary activity of the individual. In order that the
summum bonum may be thus universal and include all
particular goods, it may be helpful to conceive of it in
contradistinction to them as a subjective state. Thus we
secure a common denominator to which to reduce them
all, measuring their value and importance by the amount
of pleasure they yield. Again Hedonism is charged with
being impracticable because it involves the idea of a sum-
total of pleasure. Pleasures cannot be thus added, it is
said, nor the effect of doing or refraining from a certain
act, in increasing or lessening the sum-total of pleasure,
be calculated with strict mathematical precision. This is
true, but the Hedonist may answer that he is compelled
to make no such exact mathematical calculation. No theory
of the Good can furnish a standard whereby the worth
of each particular object or act may be determined with
absolute quantitative exactitude. On the other hand, to
endeavor to, increase the sum-total of pleasure in life is
as practicable as a guiding principle in our conduct as
to endeavor to increase the amount of intellectual activity
or aesthetic appreciation.
Nor does the fault of Hedonism lie in anything positive
which it leads the individual to do or accomplish. "We
have seen that, so far from recommending a life of excess
or profligacy, it enforces the very opposite. The man who
obtains the most pleasure from life must maintain himself
in health, comfort, and security. To do this he must ac-
cumulate property, win reputation, and provide exercise
for his natural impulses in family and social life. Thus
Hedonism secures for man many objects that are required
to satisfy his will and are thus good. But the fatal. ob-
jection to the theory is that it is limited to just these
objects and hence prevents the complete satisfaction of
108 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
human^yolition through the attainment of larger ends.
The consistent Hedonist is limited in his choice to those
objects which his experience, past or present, assures him
will add to his life's enjoyment. Hence Hedonism can
furnish no justification for real heroism or true self-sacri-
fice ; since heroism and self-sacrifice consist essentially in
surrendering objects known by the individual to promote
his happiness for the sake of other larger objects which
promise to make no equal return to him in comfort or
pleasure. But the moral experience of man demonstrates
that such sacrifice and heroism are necessary if those more
comprehensive objects, ideal and social, are to be attained
which are required to satisfy completely intelligent volition.
The fatal defect of Hedonism lies, therefore, in the limita-
tion which it imposes on man's will limiting him to a
circle of objects which his experience proves will add to
his comfort and happiness, and shutting him away forever
from those larger ends and loftier ideals whose pleasure
yielding capacity must remain uncertain until the indi-
vidual by effort and sacrifice has achieved them. 10 The
Hedonist may be industrious and frugal, saving his pennies
for a rainy day, but he can never sell all his goods and
feed the poor, even in order to save his soul. The Hedonist
may be honest and good-tempered, checking his ambition
and bridling his tongue, in order to preserve a good repu-
tation among his fellows, yet he could never invite death
by entering a plague-stricken locality, even to relieve suffer-
ing or perchance discover some saving remedy. The Hedon-
ist may be obliging and companionable, going to much
trouble to retain a friendship, yet he could never lay down
his life, even for the sake of a friend.
" Rogers makes the same criticism of Hedonism when, in dis-
cussing Epicureanism in his Student's History of Philosophy,
Chap. I, 14, 3, he describes it as essentially commonplace and
unheroic.
HEDONISM 109
10. Transition to Rationalism. If the human will is
to obtain complete satisfaction, therefore, man must tran-
scend the standpoint of Hedonism, subordinating the life
of sense and feeling to the ideals of reason and the imagi-
nation. It may seem inconsistent with statements already
made thus to base the distinction between Hedonism and
the more adequate theory upon an opposition of feeling
to thought. For, on the one hand, have we not seen that
thought plays an important part in all Hedonistic theories
that go beyond momentary feeling and consider the hap-
piness of a lifetime? And, on the other hand, was it not
shown that reason alone is incapable of justifying abso-
lutely the surrender of present pleasure for the sake of
future happiness, not to mention the greater sacrifice of
individual well-being to ideal or social purposes? Certain
it is, most assuredly, that the man who seeks as his good the
greatest pleasure in life must exercise his reason in con-
sidering the exigencies of the future and in forming those
general purposes whose realization in the course of a life-
time produce's the maximum of agreeable feeling. Yet such
an exercise of thought is limited in range and need not
extend far beyond the field of sense perception. The
Cyrenaic, of course, considers only the objects of present
perception and seeks to find in them gratification for the
impulse momentarily uppermost. He seeks now an article
of food, now a form of exercise, now a mode of com-
panionship, etc., etc. The Epicurean is not limited thus
to particular objects and actions. He generalizes upon his
experiences, substituting for particular wishes and impulses
general desires and purposes. He seeks, not specific ob-
jects, like an article of food or clothing, but more general
and comprehensive ones, such as food, better health, or
more property. Now these general purposes are the work
of thought, and as such are not limited to the present, but
extend into the future, and their successful realization in
no THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
the course of time requires the denial of present desire.
But while such ideas as health, wealth, etc., standing for
the natural goods of man, are concepts of thought they
nevertheless represent only classes of sense-objects. Hence
they do not rise far above the sphere of sense-perception
and leave as the distinguishing feature of Hedonism its
emphasis upon the natural feelings of the individual. Now
turning to the second difficulty, it is admittedly true that in
cases where individual happiness is sacrificed to larger ends
reason cannot demonstrate in advance of the act of sac-
rifice that the result will be a larger and fuller satisfaction.
Such satisfaction can come only after the character of the
individual has been transformed by the voluntary sacrifice,
and cannot be imagined previously, just because the trans-
formation has not taken place. If reason could assure the
individual of a larger satisfaction, of course there would
be no real sacrifice, no genuine heroism. The fact that the
human will has capacity for a fuller satisfaction than that
found in individual comfort and happiness can only be
proved by exercising this will in resisting the claims of
present desire and the appeal of purposes whose realization
past experience shows to be productive of pleasure, and
turning to larger objects whose significance extends beyond
the natural pleasure and well-being of any individual. But
and this is the point to be noticed such objects, objects
which promise fuller and more adequate expression to man 's
capacity of volition, are products of thought and imagina-
tion. They result, not from a mere generalizing upon the
facts of experience, but from the exercise of free-ranging
thought and constructive imagination, which take the
materials of past experience and combine them in new
and highly significant forms. Thus ideals of spiritual
achievement and social betterment come into existence.
Think of the case of a man who sacrifices his reputation
and standing in the community in order to prepare the
HEDONISM 111
way for some social reform which he sees coming in the
distant future. The objects which he sacrifices are such
as appeal to his senses and arouse his feelings the smiles
and compliments of acquaintances, social opportunities and
diversions, increase of wealth, etc. The object which he
seeks to further is, on the contrary, nowhere visible and
tangible it is a social arrangement which as yet exists
only in the imagination of its advocates, and can be brought
to pass only in the far future. When we thus come to
see the necessity for sacrificing the demands of sense and
feeling to the principles and conceptions of reason and
the imagination, we advance to the position of Rationalism.
REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. I.
HICKS, Stoic and Epicurean, Chaps. V, VI, VII.
ZELLEB, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (Eng. trans.), Part III.
WAKNEB FITE, Introductory Study of Ethics, Part I.
THILLT, Introduction to Ethics, Chaps. VI, VIII.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. IV.
SPENCER, Data of Ethics, Chap. III.
SIDQWICK, Methods of Ethics, Book II.
HYDE, Five Great Philosophies of Life, Chap. I.
CHAPTER III
THEORIES OF THE GOOD RATIONALISM
1. The Standpoint of Rationalism. 2. Extreme and Moderate Ra-
tionalism. 3. Cynicism. 4. Stoicism. 5. The Truth of Ra-
tionalism: Reason (a) as a Distinctively Human Faculty, 6.
(6) As Extending the View of Man to Include a World of
Objects and Events, 7. (c) As Enlarging the Experience of
Man to Embrace the Lives and Personalities of Others. 8. The
Faults in Rationalism: (a) It Encourages Injurious Asceti-
cism, 9. (b) It Justifies Extreme Intellectualism, 10. (c) It
Is Individualistic in Tendency.
1. The Standpoint of Rationalism. Rationalism finds
the Good in the exercise and development of Reason.
As an ethical theory it appears as the opponent of Hedon-
ism and its view of the Good as rational activity is denned
and accentuated by contrast with the Hedonistic view of
the Good as pleasant feeling. In fact, the two theories
are the great antagonists in the ethical field, and the his-
tory of Ethics is largely a record of the controversy be-
tween them. Affiliated, the one with the real and the other
with the ideal, the one with the natural and the other
with the spiritual, Hedonism and Rationalism are twp_
poles between which ethical speculation swings and with
an inclination almost irresistible towards one or the other.
But while they are thus contrary, and appear as mutually
exclusive alternatives, the relation between Hedonism and
Rationalism is not merely that of opposition. Rather does
Rationalism represent a further stage in the development
of ethical theory in which the standpoint of Hedonism is
transcended and its limitations overcome. It is a step
onward towards the final solution of the problem of
Ethics.
RATIONALISM 113
2. Extreme and Moderate Rationalism. Just because
Rationalism is an attempt to surpass and supersede Hedon-
ism, it must retain as essential to its own position an atti-
tude of protest against the Hedonistic doctrine. When
the Rationalist recommends thejife of reason as the highest
human good he inevitably thinks of this intellectual activity
as superior to feeling and sensation. He is bound to insist,
therefore, that the demands of feeling and sense be strictly
subordinated to the requirements of reason. The extent
of this antagonism to the emotional side of man's nature
varies with the different types of Rationalism and affords
a convenient basis for classifying them. Theories of
Rationalism may be called extreme when holding that a free
exercise of reason, in which the highest human good con- .
sists, requires the complete suppression of all those desires
and impulses through which man naturally seeks pleasure.
Such theories demand the practical annihilation of the
feeling and emotional life of man. In moderate Ration-
alism, on the other hand, the Good is found, not in the com-
plete suppression, but in the regulation and control, of sense
and feeling by reason. Thus feelings and emotions are per-
mitted to enter the good life, but only in a subordinate role.
3. Cynicism. The theory of Rationalism, like that of
Hedonism, was originally derived from the teachings of
Socrates. Indeed, its relation to the spirit of Socrates'
doctrine is much closer than that of its rival. Of the two
sides of Socrates' teaching the rationalistic was certainly
the more prominent. He proposed that individual impulse
and opinion be submitted to the rule of reason, because
reason is the one faculty in human nature whose dictates
are authoritative for all individuals. Soon after Socrates'
death this element in his teaching was appropriated by a
school of thinkers called Cynics and was developed by them
into an extreme form of Rationalism. The founder of the
Cynic school, Antisthenes, was particularly impressed by
114 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
Socrates' independence of character, his courage in time of
danger, and his self-possession in every emergency. These
qualities constituting, in the opinion of Antisthenes, the
very highest type of virtue, are developed, he believed, only
( when a man suppresses his natural desires and appetites en-
tirely and devotes himself to intellectual pursuits. For our
natural desires and appetites require objects to gratify
them, such as food, drink, clothing, houses, furniture, etc.
He who seeks pleasure in such gratifications is dependent
upon the possession of these objects and hence becomes a
slave of external conditions of every circumstance that
may threaten his possessions or destroy them altogether,
leaving him destitute and miserable. The exercise of reason,
on the contrary, is in no such way dependent upon external
conditions and influences. The man who finds satisfaction
in intellectual activity has resources within himself and he
is freed entirely from control by such circumstances as
unpopularity, poverty, sickness, slavery. These are evils
only if we allow them to be such. If we root out the
desires for wealth, health, reputation, and the like, we shall
no longer suffer from the lack of their objects. In such
freedom is the highest type of virtue and the dignity of a
life truly human. The Cynics carried their hostility to
the life of feeling and the pursuit of pleasure to the farthest
extreme, Antisthenes declaring that he would rather be
mad than pleased. They attacked, not merely the enervat-
ing luxury and extravagance of their time, but all con-
ventions and institutions of civilization as useless para-
phernalia which encumbered man and hindered him from
attaining the freedom of a rational being.
4. Stoicism. Rationalism was amplified and developed
in ancient times by a second school, the Stoic, which was
contemporary with the Epicurean. 1 Stoicism may be re-
1 The founder of Stoicism was Zeno, born about 342 B.C. in a
Greek city of Cyprus having a considerable Phoenician population.
RATIONALISM 115
garded as the typical Rationalism and, as such, it confronts .
the typical Hedonism of Epicurus. In Stoicism, as with
the Cynics, the Good is found in the exercise of reason,
or knowledge. The Stoics especially in the beginning
relaxed little of the rigor and severity of the earlier school
in their attitude towards the life of sense and feeling. They
condemned all feeling and emotion as producing intellectual
confusion and leading to a slavish dependence on external
conditions. Such unselfish emotions as sympathy and pity
were included in this condemnation, and the destruction
of all feeling was therefore urged. The ideal state was
declared to be that of apathy or non-reeling, the state most
favorable to the exercise of reason. Now while the Stoics
thus agreed with the Cynics in identifying the Good with
the exercise of reason and the suppression of feeling, they
were able to give a new interpretation to the " life accord-
ing to reason, ' ' which in its turn communicated a new and
more positive meaning to their conception of freedom, and
finally served to soften and humanize their whole doctrine.
According to this new insight, man's reason is merely an
expression of the Universal Reason, that rational principle
which pervades the universe and determines the meaning
and purpose of everything within it. In obeying his
reason man is but conforming to the rational order of
the world: he is playing his part in the universal scheme
of things. Life according to reason thus means life accord-)
ing to nature. The freedom that man gains through the
exercise of reason is not merely negative, a relief from
domination by external objects and forces, it is positive
freedom, the freedom of self-expression and self-develop-
ment. For as much reality as a man possesses he derives
Zeno had Phoenician blood, which is thought by some historians to
account partially for the ascetic tendency in his philosophy. He went
to Athens at the age of twenty-two and became a pupil of the Cynic,
Crates. Later on he founded a school of his own, which, because
of its meeting-place, the Stoa Pcecile, was called the Stoic School.
116 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
from the universe. Hence in the degree to which the
human individual discharges the part assigned to him in the
Universal Purpose he achieves reality himself and furthers
his own development. Thus the Stoics were led to believe
that every person has a duty to perform in the world, and
this belief tended to counteract the self-centered and ex-
clusive character of their intellectualism. Moreover, if all
men are expressions of the Universal Reason they are in
an important sense equal in worth and dignity. This was
recognized particularly in later Stoicism, where we have
the principle of human brotherhood, if not explicitly real-
ized, at least clearly suggested, in the lofty conception of
a city of God which should unite all humanity in the bonds
of a common citizenship. This increasing humanitarianism
served to soften the earlier harshness and severity of the
school, developing a sense of justice and toleration, and
producing in its later development such upright and noble
characters as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. While often
the Stoic's " city of humanity " was to him but a vision,
to be realized if ever only in some world to come, yet
this vision did not fail to influence his conduct in the
present world. Hence Stoicism was the most potent force
working for moral and social improvement in the Roman
Empire, and it aided in effecting many important reforms,
particularly in ameliorating the condition of classes that
were oppressed, such as slaves and subject-peoples.
5. The Truth of Rationalism: Reason (a) As a Dis-
tinctively Human Faculty. The question now arises con-
cerning the truth in Rationalism; for as a theory of the
Good it must be subjected to the same critical scrutiny
as was Hedonism. Such a critical study will justify the
conclusion that Rationalism, if not the whole truth re-
garding the sum/mum bonum, is at least a large part of it.
In the first place, it creates a presumption in favor of
Rationalism that it finds man's good in the exercise and
RATIONALISM 117
development of a faculty distinctively human. The animals
possess the same senses that man does and they have, we
believe, similar sensations. The animals also experience
the fundamental feelings and emotions, seeking to prolong
those which are pleasant and to avoid the painful. But
man alone among living species possesses the faculty of
reason, the power of self-conscious intelligence, with the
ability to judge and to generalize, to imagine and to infer.
The possession of this rational faculty has been rightly
regarded as a distinguishing mark of the human species.
Is it not reasonable then to conclude that the Good which
must completely satisfy human nature will consist primarily
of the exercise and development of this faculty ? Certainly
the argument of Aristotle on this point has lost none
of its force. Man's^Gfbod, he maintains, must reside in
the exercise of his proper function as man. What is the
proper function of man? It cannot be mere life, involving
the processes of nutrition and reproduction; since these
activities are shared by plants as well as animals, and
man 's proper function must be peculiar to himself. Neither
can it lie in sensation; for the life of sense and feeling
is shared with the animal. It must therefore reside in
the exercise of that capacity which man alone possesses,
his Reason. " The function of man then is an activity
of soul in accordance with reason, ' ' 2 and his Good is a
life that is virtuous because controlled by reason.
Aristotle 's reasoning here is wholly sound and a sufficient
refutation of views at present widespread which find in
the fact of evolution a justification for Naturalism and
Hedonism in Ethics. Because man is the result of a long
evolution from the lower forms of life and has the same
origin as they so the argument runs the part of his
nature which he shares in common with the other animal
1 Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, trans, by Wclldon, Bk. I, Chap.
VI, p. 16.
118 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
species is the essential part. His Good will then consist
in the satisfaction of these primary instincts which express
his fundamental organic needs, for food, drink, shelter,
clothing, offspring, etc. This reasoning is fallacious from
the standpoint of evolution itself. For how does a species
evolve through the accentuation of what is common to
it and other lower species from which it has sprung, or
of what is peculiar to it and serves to distinguish it from
these lower forms? Certainly the latter; and as it is in
evolution universally, so it is with man. If he is to
continue his evolution, to progress still farther on the
upward road that has already elevated him above all
living species, it must be by the exercise and development
of those powers of intellect and will peculiar to himself.
In this connection it is curious to observe persons interested
in the doctrine of socialism attempting to find a scientific
basis for the ideal of human brotherhood in the biological
fact that all men are the outcome of the same evolutionary
process and have in common the same fundamental in-
stincts and impulses. Such thinkers seem to forget that
as a creature of instinct man, like the other natural species,
is subject to the law of natural selection, and his evolution
is accomplished through ruthless competition and the sur-
vival of the fittest. Furthermore, it is only through the
increasing power and efficacy of his reason that man is
- able to substitute for the blind action of natural selection
with its tremendous waste the intelligent action of social
selection which has for its conscious aim the highest human
welfare. Human evolution, both social and moral, demands
that we
"Arise and fly
The reeling faun, the sensual feast,
Move upward, working out the beast
And let the ape and tiger die." 3
* TENNYSON : In Memoriam, CXVIII.
RATIONALISM 119
6. (b) As Extending the View of Man to Include a
World of Objects and Events. Keason is thus important
in human life because it extends the view of man beyond
the present, to embrace both past and future within a
unified experience. "While the animal is, we suppose, con-
fined almost exclusively to the sensation of the moment,
man may survey his life as a whole, seeing the present
as the outcome of the past, and the future as the result
of them both. We may therefore count it as the second
point in favor of Rationalism that it is man's intellect
which introduces him into a new and larger world of per-
manent objects in fixed and necessary relationships. For
man's view is extended to past and future only through
his capacity to revive by-gone events and experiences in
the form of ideas, seeing these in their connection with
each other and with the present situation. Our thought
is not content, moreover, to accept every connection of
events as it happens to be given, but seeks to discover what
connections are fixed and necessary. Thus we gain an
insight into the causes of things which holds for the future
as well as for the past and present, enabling us to predict
with much certainty what the future has in store, and to
act accordingly. Through the work of thought the con-
scious life of man gains a totally new significance. His
present experience and surroundings are seen as part of
an orderly world of objects and events, of persons and
forces, which are interacting and interdependent. To the
animal a famine means only certain present sensations,
such as hunger and weakness. But man through his power
of thought sees it in the light of past experience and pre-
vious knowledge as an event in a complex system, the
result of drouth, perhaps, whose more frequent occurrence
is due to the denudation of watersheds, which in its turn
is a result of careless or corrupt administration and so
on through a net-work of causes which has no end, but
120 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
which if followed far enough would include all the forces
and factors in the universe.
Now it cannot be doubted that if we as voluntary agents
are to gain any true satisfaction from life, we must culti-
vate and develop that power of intelligence within us which
shows us our position as permanent individuals in an
orderly universe, and our relations to other individuals
and objects included within the system. Thus only can
we hope to achieve our aims, choosing those objects as
means which are bound in the nature of things to produce
the ends we desire. Spencer, himself a Hedonist of the
evolutionary school, shows appreciation of the importance
of reason in this capacity of guide to action when he
says that the evolution of conduct has been throughout
I accompanied by an increasing control of " presentative "
(by " representative " feelings. " Throughout the ascent
from low creatures up to man, and from the lowest types
of man up to the highest, self-preservation has been in-
creased by the subordination of simple excitations to com-
pound excitations the subjection of immediate sensations
to the ideas of sensations to come the overruling of pre-
sentative feelings by representative feelings, and of repre-
sentative by re-representative feelings. As life has ad-
vanced the accompanying sentiency has become increas-
ingly ideal; and among feelings produced by the com-
pounding of ideas, the. highest, and those which have evolved
latest, are the re-compjmjndecL. -Q.? .-doubly ideal. Hence it
follows that as guides the feelings have authorities pro-
portionate to the degrees in which they are removed by
their complexity and their ideality from simple sensations
and appetites." 4
But reason, in its work of organizing human experience,
is not limited to tracing the necessary sequence of events,
and thus to the discovery of causes and effects. It also
4 SPENCEB: Data of Ethics, Chap. VII, 42.
RATIONALISM 121
takes cognizance of the likenesses and differences of things,
and classifies them on this basis. This work of catalogu-
ing objects on ground of their qualitative similarity is
in general of great importance to conduct; for thereby we
systematize our world and are able to deal effectively with
the endless diversity of things which it contains. One of
its applications has, however, a peculiar and far-reaching
significance for Ethics. In this case, man himself becomes
the subject of classification. Through his own thought man
sees himself as a member of the class of human beings, as
one human individual among many. Thus he is enabled
to view himself objectively, impartially. When he passes
judgment on himself so considered, as merely a human
person, an individual man, this judgment will apply equally
to all other human beings, it will be valid universally.
Now if we are to make the most of our given human
capacities in a world of fixed conditions and definite facts,
clearly we must often take the impartial and objective
attitude towards ourselves, and reach conclusions concern-
ing our conduct which are universally true. But such ob-
jectivity and universality can only be attained if we sub-
stitute for the warmth of feeling and the color of sense
the " dry, white light of reason " if we quiet the clamor
of impulse, while we seek in the clarity of thought to view
our case " steadily and view it whole." It was this fact,
that only through reason do we reach precepts and prin-
ciples that are valid universally, which profoundly im-
pressed Immanuel Kant, the leading Rationalist of modern
times. Inclination and desire he regarded as essentially
subjective, since their objects are sought as means to indi-
vidual happiness. The Good, on the contrary, consists in
the conformity: of the human will to the law of reason
which, in contrast to inclination, is valid universally and is
always an end in itself, never a means to anything
else.
122 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
7. (c) As Enlarging the Experience of Man to Em-
brace the Lives and Personalities of Others. Reason
performs another valuable service which deserves mention
as a third consideration in favor of the theory which finds
man's chief good in intellectual activity. Reason enables
the individual to interpret the action and expression of
others, and thus to gain an insight into their personal
characteristics theirs aims, motives, and abilities. We
often overlook the part played by reason and imagination
in all altruistic action. The sole requisite for such action
we are apt to think is the proper state of " will " and
feeling, the willingness to lend a helping hand, and the
feeling of sympathy and fellowship. As for the needs
and abilrtws4j others, can we not observe them clearly
and easily ? Yet this is precisely what we cannot do. We
cannot observe directly the conscious life or personality
of another human being besides ourselves. The actions,
words, and facial expressions of others may be thus ob-
served, but not their motives, ambitions, or sentiments. The
individual must interpret what he sees others do, and hears
them say, in terms of his own conscious experience, and thus
arrive at an understanding of their personal attributes and
abilities. This work of interpreting the inner and unseen
from its outward and visible manifestation can be done only
by reason and imagination. Such interpretation is neces-
sary, however, if there is to be any genuine cooperation
or real helpfulness among men in society. For how is one
man to serve another unless he knows his needs, and how
cooperate with him unless he understands his nature?
Failure to recognize this necessity that of understand-
ing the thoughts and feelings of others has caused many a
well-meant act of kindness to go astray and do harm rather
than good. Persons whose intentions are of the best are
often condemned as meddlesome and officious because, hav-
ing no knowledge of others' desires and sentiments, they
RATIONALISM 123
ride rough-shod over them. If one is to do as he would
be done by, he must make the intellectual effort to put him-
self in another's place. This requires thought to under-
stand the otter's conditions and surroundings and imagi-
nation, to represent what his thoughts and feelings are in
these circumstances. And not only is it necessary that we
in this way project ourselves into others ' lives, interpreting
them in terms of our own conscious experience, but it is
equally necessary that we make due allowance for differ-
ences between ourselves and them. This puts a still greater
tax upon our powers of intelligence. Sufficient regard must
be paid to the essential identity between self and others as
fellow- workers or fellow-citizens, or even like human beings,
and at the same time recognition must be made of differ-
ences of race, age, sex, and finally, most critical of all, of
individuality. The non-observance of these differences of
personal character and standpoint is a frequent source of
misunderstanding and discord in social relations. This is
particularly noticeable in domestic relations, where the hus-
band, notwithstanding kindness of intention and genuine
affection, offends and alienates the wife through failure to
recognize that her sex gives her a standpoint fundamen-
tally different from his own, and the parent becomes es-
tranged from the child because of a failure to remember
that youth has its own thoughts and desires, its own code
of honor and attitude toward the world. Merely to under-
stand one's friends and acquaintances with their varying
characteristics sets a severe task for the rational and imagi-
native faculty. But only reason can accomplish it, and
hence should be trained for the task. A recent writer
urges that such training be made a part of the moral
instruction of youth. He says: "It is of highest im-
portance to recognize the place filled by imagination in
moral development. Although no doubt this power may
be used as an instrument of self-interest, it is in its nature
124 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
antagonistic to egoism. We cannot easily look forward
without letting our vision stray on one side or the other
of the track of our own immediate personality. While
selfish desires may be pursued with a minimum of pre-
vision, even the rudiments of sympathetic feelings are im-
possible without a considerable measure of representative
activity. The first task of the moral instructor, then, is
clearly to feed the springs of imaginative sympathy to
enable the child to put himself in the place of all those
whom his actions may affect." 6
8. The Faults of Rationalism: (a) It Encourages In-
jurious Asceticism. Since reason is the faculty which
raises man above the lower orders by revealing to him his
place as a conscious individual in a world of inter-related
objects and events, and by giving him an insight into the
lives and characters of his fellow-men, it is not surprising
that many moralists have found the summum bonum in
its exercise and development. Just because so much may
be said in favor of Rationalism, however, our criticism must
be particularly searching and severe that its many merits
may not blind us to its possible shortcomings.
We have already seen that in the logic of ethical de-
velopment Rationalism arises as a protest against the con-
tinued domination of feeling and sense over human con-
duct. Hence the Rationalist thinks of intellectual activity
as essentially opposed to the life of pleasure and sensuous
gratification. Now no one can deny that the suppression
of unruly passion and the regulation of wayward impulse
is the indispensable condition of all moral attainment.
Natural appetites and animal desire are strong within us,
and there is no hope for the development of spiritual
capacities unless these are curbed and controlled. Moral
development is achieved through struggle, and he has but
JAMES OLJPHAKT: "Moral Instruction," International Journal
of Ethics, July, 1906, p. 408.
RATIONALISM 125
a superficial understanding of its nature who would min-
imize the importance in it of self-development and self-
denial. The strictest control or even complete suppression
of natural impulse is justified if required to give intelli-
gence a hearing. Even when there is no such special need
it may be wise to practise self-denial and to discipline our
natural appetites so that our control over them may be
greater in case of emergency. In this sense of spiritual
exercise, of moral athletics, asceticism is to be highly com-
mended. Thus Professor James, in an oft-quoted passage,
advises us to keep the faculty effort alive in us by a
little gratuitous exercise every day. 6
But when an ethical theory makes such opposition to
man's natural desires and appetites its absorbing interest,
and treats the suppression of feeling, not as a means, but
as an end, the situation alters. Rationalism has shown a
constant tendency to go to this length to condemn all the
pleasures of sense and to concentrate itself upon the de-
struction of natural feeling and emotion. Thus, in spite
of its many merits which one should not fail to recognize, it
has been primarily negative, not positive, in its attitude,
being characterized, not by what it enjoined men to do, but
to refrain from doing. Now, no theory whose recommenda-
tions are mainly negative can be accepted as the final solu-
tion of the ethical problem. It is necessarily limited by its
negation being driven by its opposition, to a view nearly as
extreme and untenable as that of its opponent. It is not
unfair to say that there is inherent in Rationalism the ten-
dency toward such an extreme an extreme of asceticism
which condemns all the natural desires and gratifications
of human life as unworthy and evil, and which, when fully
developed as in the Middle Ages is as false in theory
and as injurious in practice as any form of Hedonism
could be. It is this kind of asceticism which Spencer
JAMZS: Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 126.
126 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
attacks, calling it a product of devil-worship of the wor-
ship of deities who are thought to take pleasure in human
privation and suffering. 7
The fact that such injurious asceticism is recommended
by Rationalism of the extreme type and encouraged by its
moderate forms must count as a serious charge against
the theory. The mind of the present rightfully disapproves
of the hostility to nature, the contempt for the flesh, that
is implied in this asceticism. An attitude of this kind
can be justified only by a philosophy which holds matter
and the material to be essentially evil. But such a view
is impossible to the thought of to-day which has accepted
the evolutionary interpretation of the universe. From this
standpoint all of human nature is the product of the evolu-
tionary process. Some of man's faculties he received al-
ready developed from animal progenitors: others existed
only in germ in the lower forms, their development being
peculiar to man. But this fact furnishes no ground for
making an absolute separation between the two, condemning
the former as material and exalting the latter as spiritual.
Instead we must regard all as alike natural and their differ-
ence one of degree only. Now as natural, man's sensuous
.impulses and " fleshly " desires may rightfully claim a
share of his attention and a measure of gratification. The
desire for food and drink and play, the impulse of sex
and parenthood all these are part of normal human
nature. Hence the attainment of their objects is a neces-
sary part of the satisfaction of man 's will ; and without it
human volition will go unsatisfied. Moreover, certain of
these sensuous impulses constitute the roots from which
spring some of the most esteemed " spiritual " gifts. Thus
the instincts of sex and sympathy are the source of altruis-
tic qualities that distinguish the finest character. The in-
stinct of combat is the source of those tendencies to rivalry
T SPENCEB: Data of Ethics, 14, 38.
RATIONALISM 127
and emulation which in their higher forms make the most
effective spurs to personal achievement. One who, in mis-
taken moral zeal, exterminates any of these impulses does
a double wrong to his human nature he mutilates it by
depriving it of one of its natural means of expression, and
also stunts its future growth by destroying forces germinal
to further development. Finally it is worth noting that
such asceticism usually fails of its aim to remove from
the mind all sensuous desire. The very effort to " crucify
the body, " to ' ' mortify the flesh, ' ' results in over-attention
to the pleasures of sense not the normal and wholesome
desire that is present at times and then gives place to other
interests but a morbid and unwholesome lingering of the
mind upon the details of joys at once repugnant and fas-
cinating. One of the most unpleasant chapters in the
literature of monasticism is that telling of the visions of
carnal pleasure and sensuous delight which were constantly
tantalizing monk and hermit when alone in the cell to
which they had fled to secure relief from the distractions
of the world and opportunity for uninterrupted prayer
and meditation.
9. (b) It Justifies Extreme Intellectualism. Rational-
ism maintains that man finds his highest good in withdraw-
ing his attention from those objects of sense that give him
present pleasure and directing it upon the principles and
conceptions of reason. Now these ideals of reason and
imagination pertain to the future and the larger world of
persons and principles. Hence they are different from the
objects of sense and feeling which are confined to the pres-
ent state or past experience of the individual. The Ration-
alist accentuates this difference by opposing the freedom
and range of thought to the strict limitations of feeling.
But the objects of sense and feeling, if limited in their
scope, at least possess actuality. And here also the con-
trast which the Rationalist makes between feeling and
128 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
thought holds in all its severity. The principles and con-
ceptions of thought, although their range may be as wide
as the universe, do not possess this actuality. They may
represent a condition better and more satisfactory than
the actual but, as thoughts and ideas, they merely repre-
sent it, they do not realize it. Thought and imagination
soar free from the limitations of the present and the actual,
but the penalty they pay is that the world they inhabit
is unactual and, in a sense, unreal. Thus the man who
finds his Good simply in thinking about the ideal, in reason-
ing out plans for his own betterment, is justly criticised
as a mere idealist, or even condemned as a visionary. He
is dwelling in a world of his own thought and imagination
and failing to give his nature the satisfaction it demands
in actual experience. Moreover, when this absorption in in-
tellectual activity is carried beyond a certain point it seems
definitely hostile to any actual attainment ; for it seeks, as
the condition most favorable to its own existence, seclusion
from the world of practical affairs and human intercourse.
Thus the individual finds his Good in the life of secluded
contemplation. That Rationalism encourages absorption in
thought at the expense of actual attainment must be reck-
oned a grave fault. And there can be no question but
that the logic of the theory leads towards such a barren
intellectualism. The historical development of Rationalism
in ancient and mediaeval times abundantly proves it. Plato,
with his artist's soul and dislike of extremes, despite a
feeling for the beauty of a harmonious and symmetrical
development of human nature, was impelled by his rational-
istic premises to praise most highly the life of the philoso-
pher who, removed from the distractions of the world, pur-
sues without interruption his philosophic meditations. The
same premise, that man's Good lies in the supremacy of
reason in his life, leads Aristotle, notwithstanding his nota-
ble good sense and sagacity in dealing with all matters
RATIONALISM 129
of practical morality, to esteem most worthy the speculative
life. The greatest defect in Stoicism was that it encouraged
aloofness from the world ancTself-absorption. The monas-
ticism of the Middle Ages found justification in a rational-
istic philosophy which condemned the material world and
the desires of the flesh as evil and sought salvation in medi-
tation and prayer, rather than in the teachings of Jesus. It
is this tendency of Rationalism the tendency to oppose to
the doctrine which finds the Good in the pleasure of present
attainment, another doctrine equally abstract and one-sided
which asserts that the Good lies in thinking about larger
ends and aims to be achieved in the future, which Hegel
roundly condemns in his Logic. The larger ends and ideals
of reason constitute " that ought-to-be on the strength
of which reflection is vain enough to treat the actual pres-
ent with scorn and to point to a scene beyond a scene
which is assumed to have place and being only in the
understanding of those who talk of it. " 8 The Rationalistic
position is a striking example of the false infinite which
exists as merely the negative of the finite, and hence is
always limited by it. Rationalism is limited by its opposi-
tion to Empiricism or Hedonism. Against it the latter
may always maintain " the great principle that whatever
is true must be in the actual world and present to sensa-
tion." " Yet what may be called the laziness of thought,
when dealing with this Supreme Idea, finds a too easy
mode of evasion in the ought-to-be; instead of the actual
realization of the ultimate end it clings hard to the dis-
junction of the notion from reality." 9
10. (c) It Is Individualistic in Tendency. Rational-
ism, as has been seen, recommends an asceticism which
cuts the individual off from social relationships and human
intercourse. It also encourages an intellectualism which
HEGEL: Shorter Logic, 38 (Wallace's trans., pp. 77-78).
Op. tit., 55, p. 112.
130 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
causes him to seek the seclusion favorable to continued
thought and study. The result of these two tendencies is
to encourage a self-centered life which feels no social re-
sponsibility and discharges no political obligation. Thus
Rationalism is as individualistic as selfish, if you please
in its final implications as is Hedonism. We are all familiar
with a certain type of intellectual culture which shrinks
from the ordinary human relationships as if fearing con-
tamination, and avoids the performance of social duty, lest
its own refinement should be diminished thereby. Such a
type of character is the legitimate offspring of Rationalism ;
for when we make intellectual activity man's chief good,
then it becomes right for him to seek the most favorable
conditions for its exercise. These conditions will not lie
in the busy walks of life, in the adjustments and readjust-
ments of the family relation, in the wear and tear of social
intercourse, but in the quiet of some secluded and com-
fortable retreat from which the world may be viewed as a
passing show.
Thus in conclusion it is interesting to behold the theories
of Hedonism and Rationalism, extreme opposites though
they are, brought by their equal one-sidedness into a kind
of identity. Hedonism recommends a well-planned and
prudent life in which mainly intellectual pleasures are
sought because they endure the longer and have less pain
in after-effect. Rationalism advises the exercise of reason
in a life freed from the pressure of social obligations in
order to afford the most favorable conditions for intellectual
activity and culture. The Rationalist will be more austere
and less sympathetic, the Hedonist more amiable but less
resolute, while the lives of both will incline to be equally
narrow and self -centered.
REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. II.
HICKS, Stoic and Epicurean, Chaps. I, II, III, IV.
RATIONALISM 131
ZELLEB, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, Part II.
FITE, Introductory Study of Ethics, Part II.
SIDOWICK, History of Ethics, Chap. II, 13-20.
BAKEWELL, Source-book in Ancient Philosophy, Chaps. XVII, XX,
XXI.
SIDQWICK, Methods of Ethics, Book III.
HYDE, Five Great Philosophies of Life, Chap. II.
CHAPTER IV
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY
1. Volition as an Organizing Agency. 2. Volition as the Synthetic
Activity Comprehensive of Feeling and Thought. 3. Develop-
ment of Volition: Involuntary Action, 4. Voluntary Action:
(a) From Desire, 5. (6) From Purpose, 6. (c) From Ideal.
7. Volition as Creative of Self-conscious Personality. 8. Vo-
lition Does Not Always Effect Complete Organization, 9. But
to That Extent Is Not Fully Developed.
1. Volition as an Organizing Agency. The leading
ethical theories, Hedonism and Rationalism, have now been
reviewed and the problem of the Good is still unsolved.
Neither theory when followed out provides for the com-
plete satisfaction of the human will. Only one way is open
to us, therefore, that of approaching our problem directly,
seeking first to discover the essential character of volition
and then to infer from its character as thus disclosed what
is required for its complete satisfaction. 1
When we approach the problem in this way our study
of Hedonism and Rationalism proves to have been far from
fruitless. Both of these theories throw light upon the
character of volition, for both reflect essential aspects
of this activity. Hedonism expresses its demand for suc-
cess in present attainment, but would secure such success
at the cost of limiting strictly the objects which it seeks
to attain. Rationalism voices its demand for a larger range
of objects to pursue, but at the expense of making these
objects mere thoughts and leaving them unrealized. How
can these two demands be met without the corresponding
disadvantages? How can the will be assured of enjoying
1 Compare Part I, Chap. II, 3.
132
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY 133
the success of present achievement without restricting itself
to objects which present perception or past experience
guarantee will furnish such satisfaction? And how can
the will overcome this restriction and direct itself upon the
larger objects of thought and imagination without aban-
doning the actual world for the realm of the ideal and
merely possible? Clearly, only when it takes a third step
and endeavors to convert the ideal into actuality. This
is accomplished by making the present act a means to the
realization of the principles and conceptions of reason. The
realization may be distant and the present act contribute
but little toward it, yet the two, actual present and ideal
future, are joined in a close and vital connection. This,
the third aspect of voluntary activity, is therefore a syn-
thesis of the other two, which transcends and at the same
time unites them. Present achievement is rendered more
satisfactory because it is no longer restricted in its range
as to object, but extends to the most inclusive and far-
reaching ends. On the other hand, our knowledge of these
larger aims and ideals is increased and made more definite
by our experience in progressively realizing them. The
two aspects of will which at first appeared to conflict, its
demand for present attainment, and its demand for the
greatest range of choice among objects, now prove to be
complementary and inter-dependent. All this is evidence
that we now behold volition with its nature fully expressed.
As thus viewed, it reveals itself as an activity of adjust-
ment, by which the various activities of the individual
are adjusted, or correlated, with one another or, bet-
ter, an organizing agency, whereby the successive acts
of the self are related as means to deliberately chosen
ends.
2. Volition as the Synthetic Activity Comprehensive
of Feeling and Thought. Let us consider a little further
this organizing activity of will, with particular reference
134 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
to the part played in it by feeling and thought. An ordi-
nary instance of volition will illustrate clearly how its or-
ganizing work is carried on. Suppose that a young man
is intending to devote an evening to amusement in such
company as he knows will furnish good-fellowship and
pleasure. He happens to think, however, of a leading pur-
pose of life, to prepare himself for a certain profession in
which he hopes to win distinction, and, as he thinks, he
begins to wonder uneasily if he is making his evenings
contribute as they might to the realization of his purpose.
In this connection there occurs to his mind the notice he
has seen of a lecture to be given this very evening upon
a subject relating to his proposed profession. He recog-
nizes that attendance upon this lecture would further his
life-purpose, and hence, contrary to inclination, he gives
his attention wholly to the idea of it, goes, and remains
an interested listener. The consequence of his thus acting
in accordance with his larger purpose is that he gains new
knowledge which makes this purpose clearer and more
effective in his life, besides the encouragement which results
from having taken a step in its actual realization. We
see, then, that the young man and the case is of course
typical of all volition through the exercise of will takes
his evening's action out of its isolation and makes it a
means to the attainment of a larger end which he has
chosen to pursue. To adjust actions as means to larger
'ends, in this way, is to organize conduct. The particular
act is given meaning through its subordination to the ruling
purpose, while the purpose is made real through the instru-
mentality of the particular act.
When volition is thus conceived as an organizing agency,
it appears as the all-comprehensive activity of intelligent
life, including within its unity both feeling and thought,
and assigning to each its proper place. Feeling is subjec-
tive and expresses the actual state of the self, a state of
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY 135
pleasure when in possession of sought-for objects. 2 Thought
is objective and represents the ideal conditions of a larger
life in the conception of objects as yet unattained. These
two factors come into conflict and opposition. Thought, by
representing new and greater possibilities of achievement,
destroys the unity and equilibrium signified by pleasant
feeling. Then, through action, the new objects thought of
are attained and the unity of the self is felt to be restored
and increased by the possession of a greater variety of
objects. Volition is the synthetic activity which includes
within its scope all these lesser activities of feeling, thought,
and action. These minor factors exist only in so far as
they contribute to the main work of organization. Hence
we see that it is absurd to regard volition as subordinate
either to feeling or to thought. Volition is not the servant
of feeling, limited to seeking those objects whose possession
is sure to increase pleasure. For the circle of such objects
is small, and, to obtain satisfaction, volition must go beyond
it in pursuit of objects whose pleasure-yielding capacity is
doubtful and uncertain. Neither is volition the servant of
thought, limited to the idea of larger achievement, or to
the mechanical reproduction of a program of action pre-
viously thought out in every detail. For thought, as
thought, does not communicate actuality to its objects, nor
can it anticipate with exactness the actual future. But
volition demands actual achievement and must therefore
advance on its' own initiative to grapple with a future
uncertain both as to feeling and fact. Volition is essentially
a venture a venture into the unknown. To a degree reason
1 " Hence in the case of happiness the subject takes the first place,
in the case of truth the object; there we have a vigorous con-
centration, here an unlimited expansion, there an expression, here
a repression of vital emotion. From the point of view of the desire
for happiness the struggle for truth may easily appear cold and life-
less, while from the point of view of the latter the former may appear
narrow and selfish. EucKEN: Philosophy of Spirit, Eng. trans.,
1909, p. 276.
136 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
may direct, and feeling impel, but never to the extent
of absolutely pre-determining what shall come to pass.
The individual must surrender objects which assure him
satisfaction in order to seek other more remote and far-
reaching ends. It is true that these ends when achieved
may afford a fuller satisfaction than those sacrificed to
them, but this can be ascertained only by making the sac-
rifice by taking the venture. An element of uncertainty
is bound to remain, and from this fact it follows that, not
pure reason, but rational faith, an effort of will guided
by intelligence but transcending the limits of proof or
demonstrable certainty, is the primary requisite of intelli-
gent life and action. Every act of will brings an ex-
perience that is entirely fresh and unique and yields some
results that possess absolute novelty. The occurrence of
what is absolutely new, and hence cannot be anticipated is
a distinguishing characteristic of all life. From it springs
the necessity for faith in one's self and the courage to
venture, and upon it rests the possibility of real spiritual
growth and achievement through such exercise of volition.
3. Development of Volition Involuntary Action, In-
stinctive and Impulsive. If further evidence is needed
to prove that volition is essentially an organizing agency,
it is furnished by a survey of the different forms which
this activity takes in the course of human development.
The earliest actions of the human individual are not
voluntary if we understand action to be voluntary which
is directed towards a consciously chosen end. 3 They have
not even a conscious motive. Man is born with certain
instincts modifications of his nervous system which cause
him to react in a definite manner to specific stimuli. Some
* For the account given of the development of volition in this
and the following sections the writer is indebted to the standard
psychologies of James, Titchener, and Stout, but is under special
obligations to HOFFDING: Outline of Psychology, and BALDWIN:
Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development.
object or influence of the outer world is usually the stimulus
to which the instinct is keyed, and the action by which
the organism responds to such stimulation is called in-
stinctive. When a pencil or the handle of a rattle is laid
in the hand of a very young infant, and the tiny fingers
move and close around the object, we have an example of
such instinctive action. The infant does not perceive the
pencil or rattle, much less act with the intention of grasp-
ing it. Instinctive action is then originally without con-
scious motive. But with its repetition and as the result
of it comes a growing consciousness of the object. The
numerous pressures and strains that accompany the in-
stinctive movement, and the pleasure or pain which is
consequent upon it, associate themselves with the group
of sensations set up by the original stimulus, cause them
to be distinguished from the confused contents of conscious-
ness, and finally to be given meaning as a definite object.
Thus the babe comes to perceive the rattle or colored pencil
and, when he puts out his hand for it, his movement is
prompted by an idea of the object. His action now has
a conscious impulse.
Action which is thus initiated by the perce_2tifln_jaiLJunage
of an object may be called impulsive. The number of
objects which are thus perceived and may become motives
of action rapidly increases in the early period of mental
development. Each of the instincts dominant at this time
leads to the perception of a class of articles constituting
its objective stimuli. Thus the different kinds of food, a
variety of playthings, etc., are consciously recognized and
induce action. Then besides these instincts which are
directed upon objects of a specific nature, there is the in-
stinct of imitation, whose stimulus is any movement of any
object, but particularly the movements of other individuals.
Through the operation of this instinct the child learns to
distinguish different people by their characteristic behavior
138 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
which he has imitated, and from this imitation comes also to
know something of his own strength and capacity. More-
over, in addition to an increasing knowledge of the nature of
objects, we find at this period as Baldwin points out an
increasing sense of their worth. The pleasure or pain which
results from seeking an object attaches to the idea of this
object and determines its power as an incentive to action.
Objects are sought in the degree to which their suggestions
are pleasurable, and avoided to the extent in which they
have painful associations.
While impulsive action has a conscious motive, it is
nevertheless not truly voluntary. It is action in pursuit
of a consciously-perceived object. But it is not action in
pursuit of a consciously chosen end. In true volition the
object is not merely known, but known as the end of action.
This is not the case with impulsive action. The impulse
is only the instinct raised to clear consciousness, and is still
dominated by the object. As Baldwin remarks concerning
this type of action in the child, 4 " The object before him
fills up his consciousness; he thinks nothing about it, he
simply thinks it. His action goes out in channels of in-
herited tendency, directly upon the object. " 5 In order
that an object be a " chosen end," as in voluntary action,
it must, in contrast to this, first be distinguished as ideal
and future from what is actual and present, and, second,
be distinguished from other ideal possibilities as the one
required to satisfy the self. 6 Green says, speaking of
desire, to him the typical form of volition, " The common
characteristic of every such desire is its direction to an
object consciously presented as not yet real and of which
the realization would satisfy, i.e. extinguish the desire." 7
BALDWIN: Mental Development: Social and Ethical Interpreta-
tions, p. 369.
Op. of*., p. 366.
*HOFFDING: Outline of Psychology, Eng. trans., p. 322.
GREEN: Prolegomena to Ethics, 131.
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY 139
Before volition can arise, therefore, there must be ability
to distinguish between the present and actual, on the one
hand, and the ideal and merely possible, on the other. In
contrast to the world of actual objects present to percep-
tion with nature and relations fixed, there must exist an
ideal order, a world of free ideas in which the thought of
the individual can range at will. This world of ideas, as
it develops, represents the experience, abilities, and inter-
ests of the individual himself as distinguished from all
objective conditions. Its development means the growth
of self-consciousness and selfhood. With its appearance
comes the possibility of acting to realize an end an ideal
chosen from among other ideal possibilities because the
most satisfactory to the self and thus of rising to the
dignity of a voluntary agent.
The distinction between ideal and actual is, like all men-
tal achievements, the result of a gradual process of growth.
Ideal elements enter very soon into the experience of the
individual in the form of memory-images. These images
may constitute impulses to action just as do perceptions.
Thus the clinking of spoon and glass calls up an image
of the nursing bottle to the infant consciousness and
prompts the same actions that the actual sight of the bottle
would. If the prompting of an idea inwardly aroused
(in distinction from a perception) sufficed to make an act
voluntary, we should have volition very early in mental
development. Animals are frequently moved to action by
images rather than by perceptions, as when the dog which
has been fed two mornings from the step behind the
house begins to leap and bark when he sees the door
opened on the third morning. But it is requisite to volition
that the idea be recognized as in its ideality different
from the perception, and at first this does not occur;
the images simply fuse with the perceptions. As devel-
opment proceeds, however, this fusion becomes less close
140 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
and complete at least in the experience of the human in-
dividual. 8 The image when revived brings with it numer-
ous associated images which, continuing for an interval of
time, serve to interrupt and dislocate the regular order
and sequence of perceptions from the outer world. Thus
the two series, inner and outer, ideal and actual, each hav-
ing its own order and relation, tend to break apart and
run separately. But, as Hoffding believes, probably the dis-
tinction between idea and actuality is fUst consciously made
as the result of the unpleasant experience of finding that
an idea, when acted upon as always in the past, does not
have the same result in the present, owing to change in
actual conditions. Thus the child seeing the whiteness of
the snow has an image of sugar called up, and, acting upon
it, fills his mouth with the cold substance. Such experi-
ences, with their unpleasantness, teach him effectually the
distinction between ideas or memories and actual objects
and conditions. Thus " the first basis is laid of the con-
trast between possibility and actuality. Then only the free
ideas enter into a relation of definite contrast to sensation
and percept."
With this distinction once made the individual becomes
capable of voluntary action, i.e. action in pursuit of a
consciously chosen end. When the implications of volition
are thus drawn out and stated, it may seem to be an in-
volved and complicated activity. Yet in its actual exercise
it is direct and simple enough. The three-year-old, who
leaves his play out of doors, enters the house, and, disre-
garding everything else, goes to his mother and says, " I
want an apple to eat," fulfils in his behavior all the re-
quirements of true volition. The object of his action, the
apple, he distinguishes as ideal from all actual objects
* Hoffding gives a full and illuminating account of the growth
of the distinction between ideal and actual in his Outline of Psy-
chology, Eng. trans., pp. 122-33.
HOFFDING: Op. oit., p. 133.
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY 141
present to his perception, and he disregards them for it.
He also distinguishes this idea and prefers it as an end
to all other ideal possibilities it is the apple he desires,
not bread, or sweet-meats, or any other eatable. In the
formation of this ideal order which the individual learns
to distinguish from the actual world and to identify with
himself, two factors deserve especial mention. The first
is that of imitation. Through imitating others the indi-
vidual acquires, in addition to his ideas of objects that
give pleasure, conceptions of various activities which yield
him satisfaction. 10 The second is language. The human
individual is able in the manner indicated to construct
an ideal order which has permanence and unity largely
because of the faculty of language which he possesses.
Through the use of words he gives body and definition to
ideas which otherwise would be too tenuous to persist in
memory and too shifting to enter into any permanent re-
lationships.
4. Voluntary Action: (a) From Desire. The first
stage in the development of volition is that of desire.
Action from desire has for its end the present attainment
of some single object. 11 An idea of the object in question
has been produced by past experience in the mind of the
individual. That idea has acquired interest and value be-
cause in the past its object has given satisfaction to some
need or capacity. That idea now becomes an end of action
which the individual consciously seeks to realize. The
object of desire, although single, may vary greatly in its
meaning and importance. The apple sought by the child
in the simple illustration just used and the rare book or
picture sought by the art collector, the flower by the road-
side, and the great mansion are, equally, in their way, ob-
jects of desire. Action from desire differs from instinctive
18 BALDWIN: Op. cit., p. 34.
"BALDWIN: Op. tit., p. 372, and HOFFDING: Op. tit., p. 323.
142 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
or impulsive action not so much in the nature of the object
as in the relation of the object to the self. Previous to
the appearance of desire, the action of the individual is
determined by the objects and forces of the environment,
as they play upon his different instincts and impulses.
Not the individual is acting, but the forces of nature are
acting through him. 12 But in desire, the first form of
voluntary action, all this is changed. The individual seeks
an object thought of as an end to be realized, and, conse-
quently set in sharp opposition to the world of objects,
actually existing. 13 He resists the appeal of externally
existent objects to his instincts in order to pursue this end,
which, of all the ideal possibilities of the situation, appeals
most to himself. Through effort he overcomes the opposi-
tion between ideal and actual, by making the ideal actual,
by realizing his end. 1 * Thus actual objects and conditions
are determined by the self and not vice versa. The effect
of desire is to release the actions of the human individual
from their subservience to various external objects and to
make them means to ends chosen by himself. Thus the
different acts are all made instrumental to self-expression,
and the first step is taken in the organization of conduct.
5. (b) Action from Purpose. "With the growth of in-
telligence single objects are grouped, according to their
affinities, into more or less comprehensive classes; general
ideas or concepts are formed which include a number of
particuTa~r~pefceptions. 15 Volition, in the next stage of its
"GBEEN: Op. tit., 91. "Ibid., 131.
14 Alexander in his account of desire emphasizes the conflict
which it involves between ideal and actual, ideal end and actual
conditions. He describes desire as consisting in " a feeling of ten-
sion which may be described as a sense of disparity between the
ideal object and the actual state of the agent." ( ALEXANDER:
Moral Order and Progress, Bk. I, Chap. I, 3, p. 22.)
IB As Alexander says, while each desire is a single particular
in mental history, in content it includes many qualities which as
universals serve to connect it with the content of other desires.
(Op. tit., p. 65, also p. 100.)
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY 143
development, has for its end the attainment of such classes
of objects, the realization that is of these general ideas.
For the sake of clearness in distinction, desire has been
defined as action whose end is the attainment of a single
object. As a matter of fact, however, no hard and fast
distinction can be made between actions whose object is
particular and those whose object is general. Since it is a
case of development the difference is always one of degree.
The child who desires " something to eat " or " something
to play with " is well on his way to the formation of gen-
eral purposes. Such purposes appear, clearly conceived,
as soon as infancy is passed and childhood fairly entered.
The resolves of the boy to stand well in school, to gather
bird's-eggs or stamps, or to learn to throw curves with a
ball, are examples of such purposes. The boy who adopts
one, seeks not a particular object to be attained in the
present, but a group or series of objects whose attainment
is prolonged into the future. Indeed, the object of present
desire, in its relation to such a comprehensive group or
series, becomes but one of many particulars. Like all par-
ticulars it is reduced to a subordinate position within the in-
clusive whole. Thus the eventual attainment of the larger
end may mean the denial or limitation of present desire.
This influence of the general over the particulars is soon
manifest for instance, in the case of the purpose to avoid
punishment which, when once taken, imposes a strict limit
on the gratification of present desire.
The second stage in the development of volition we may
thus call purposive action. It is action in pursuit of a
group of objects to be realized in the course of future time,
rather than in pursuit of a single object to be realized now.
The object in purposive action is always general, but may
vary greatly in the range of its generality, the extent of its
inclusiveness. One purpose, such as to do one's morning's
work well, may embrace a comparatively few acts and
144 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
extend over a little time; another such as to preserve
one's health may extend over the whole of a lifetime
and include thousands of acts. The purpose to secure wealth
is representative. Its end is a general idea standing for
a large group of objects money, land, houses, clothing,
jewels, etc. Its attainment usually occupies a period of
time often a lifetime. It requires the individual to re-
strict many of his particular desires for food, drink, cloth-
ing, amusement, and the like, the attainment of the gen-
eral purpose necessitating the strict subordination of all
the particular acts. What, then, is the procedure of voli-
tion in purposive action? It is first to check the action
of present desire and to turn the attention of the individual
from the particular object he now craves to the more
general object he purposes in the future to attain. The
bearing of this larger purpose upon the present action is
next considered, and finally the original desire is allowed
just that degree of gratification which is consistent with
the realization of the ruling purpose. Thus, through pur-
pose, the second form of volition, the successive acts of the
individual are taken out of their isolation as expressive of
a variety of particular desires, and are related as means
to the attainment of several general purposes, the second
step being thereupon taken in the organization of human
conduct.
6. (c) Action from Ideal. But thought can go beyond
the ideation that yields the object of desire and the gen-
eralization that furnishes the object of purpose. It can
take the material of experience, analyze it into its elements,
and then by synthesis construct from it a new and sig-
nificant conception. It is this constructive activity of
thought, more or less freely exercised, that produces the
Ideal, which constitutes the object of the next and highest
form of volition. Through free ranging thought and imagi-
nation an end is created more comprehensive than the
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY 145
particular object of desire or the general object of purpose.
This end extends in its scope beyond the limits of the
individual's life, and involves the effort and cooperation of
many individuals. It is a cause to which the individual
devotes himself rather than an object which he desires or
a purpose which he pursues. It serves to identify him
with his fellows and to make his very existence itself a
means to the realization of universal ends. The discovery
of truth is an example of such a cause or ideal to which
many men in modern times have devoted themselves. Natu-
rally these ideals appear later in mental development than
do desire and purpose; for while their growth may be en-
couraged by teaching, they can become effective as ends
of action only after the individual is able to interpret them
in terms of his own experience and apply them to his own
life. Hence they are only anticipated in early years
perhaps in the boy's passing fancy of himself as doing
some noble work as President or Premier. The subsequent
period of youth and adolescence is the great flowering time
of ideals, when the young man sees himself serving human-
ity as patriot or explorer, artist or inventor, physician,
lawyer, or teacher.
Through the adoption of an ideal as the ultimate end
of action, volition completes the organization of conduct.
Since the ideal is all-comprehensive and includes the in-
dividual himself, it also embraces all his life-purposes.
These purposes are adjusted as means to the realization
of the supreme ideal, just as previously the various desires
were made means to the attainment of these larger pur-
poses. Indeed, such a supreme end is needed as the final
court of appeal between the conflicting claims of different
purposes. In the specific instance the attainment of one
ruling purpose might require the denial of a desire, the
attainment of another its gratification, and what is to decide
between the two unless a still larger end exists to which
146 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
the purposes themselves are subordinated? When this is
done, and the particular act performed with a view not
merely to the attainment of a life-purpose of the individual,
but also to the realization of his supreme ideal, we have
volition in its fullest development. Here choice is pre-
ceded by full deliberation in which the consequences of
alternative lines of action are carefully traced out and
thus their bearing upon leading purposes of the individual
is ascertained. The relation of these ruling purposes to
the supreme ideal is next considered ; and finally, returning
from the universal to the particular, that act is chosen
which promises to further the purpose most in harmony
with the ideal.
7. Volition as Creative of Self-conscious Person-
ality. Volition proves to be, then, the formative and sus-
taining activity of conscious selfhood, or personality.
Thinkers of to-day are agreed that the self is not a spiritual
substance or entity which has permanent existence apart
from the succession of mental states. Rather it is just
the unity of these conscious states, the inter-relation of
our different experiences, which gives to them unity and
coherence as a whole. 16 Now it is volition that originates
this unity among the contents of consciousness and main-
tains it through the appropriation and assimilation of new
objects. In the initial period of mental development the
materials of personality are accumulated in the form of
memory-images of objects and activities. But these mem-
ories do not constitute a self until they are distinguished
as ideal from the actual world, and, through the exercise
of will, are made actual possessions of the self; for it is
only through the realizing of its different ideas that the
self becomes real. Then these various objects of desire
are connected and inter-connected as means to ends, being
thus subordinated to more comprehensive purposes. Finally
li BALDWIN: Op. cit., pp. 8, 374.
VOLITION AS AN ORGANIZING AGENCY 147
all the contents of consciousness are woven into one organ-
ized system when these purposes are made themselves in-
strumental to the realization of a supreme and all-inclusive
ideal.
Thus the process through which the self develops is that
followed by all life in its growth evolution. Like all gen-
uine evolutions, this organization of personality by volition
has two aspects, differentiation and integration. When an
object is chosen as an end of action, difference is intro-
duced into the life of the self. Inasmuch as the object is
an end for the self it exists within the unity of self-con-
sciousness; but in so far as it is unattained it is at the
same time external and opposed to the self in actual exist-
ence. Hence tension arises in the self and even pain, the
pain of unsatisfied desire. This tension is relieved and the
pain changed into pleasure when, through action and effort,
the object is attained. In integration, the coordinate
aspect, the difference is overcome and the object is appro-
priated by the self. Thus the unity of the self is restored,
but with a richer and more varied content. In this way
the development of the self proceeds through the agency of
volition ever expanding its boundaries to receive new ob-
jects, and by this very process strengthening and perfect-
ing its own unity.
8. Volition Does Not Always Effect Complete Or-
ganization. To the statement that volition is essentially
an organizing agency the objection may be made that it
does not in all cases actually manifest itself as such. In
the conduct of the majority of men, volition fails signally
to effect complete organization. The action of many never
passes the first stage of unregulated desire, while compara-
tively few ever reach the final stage, where all action is
governed by a few controlling purposes which are them-
selves subordinated to a supreme ideal. If volition does
not inevitably and of necessity pass through these successive
148 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
stages, what right have we to assert that a law inherent in
its nature causes it to follow this development, effecting
a more and more complete organization of conduct? To
this objection the reply may be made that there can be
no doubt of the fact that in actual life volition often
fails to organize action completely. The only question is:
How serious a difficulty does this fact constitute for the
view that volition is in its essential nature an organizing
activity? The difficulty, such as it is, is really but a par-
ticular aspect of a more general problem upon which Paul-
sen 17 remarks, as confronting all theories which identify the
Highest Good with the full expression of the human will.
If the normal human will finds complete and natural ex-
pression in the thoughtful and well-regulated action which
we usually call good, how does it happen that the actual
will of man seems usually to rebel against such action?
Can organization and adjustment be regarded as the truest
manifestations of will when it appears most nourishing and
vigorous in the demand for unlimited power and unre-
stricted gratification?
9. But to That Extent Is Not Fully Developed. The
difficulty is not great in the present case, however. If we
are seeking to discover the essential nature of volition,
surely we must base our conclusions upon its fully de-
veloped form, and not upon phases of incomplete develop-
ment. For only in its completed development shall we find
the true character of volition revealed. In earlier stages of
growth this remains largely latent and concealed. Now
such is just the case when, in the lives of men, conduct
remains unorganized. In that degree their wills fail of
their normal development. To that extent, in fact, volition
is absent from their lives. Such individuals, we correctly
say, fail to " exercise their wills." And not being exer-
cised their wills fail to display the larger possibilities they
1T Cf. System of Ethics, Bk. II, Chap. I
possess. Such cases of arrested development are sometimes
due to external causes, but oftener to the individuals them-
selves. VoliiioiL,ds_att -activity, .self-initiated and self-con-
trolled. Its exercise and development require effort, the
effort of close attention, studious thought, and discriminat-
ing selection. Whether or not this effort is made depends
for the most part on the self. Of course the individual's
capacity for such effort may itself be referred back to his
will, his ' ' will-power. ' ' But not in such a way as to make
the lack of organization in his life fairly chargeable to the
inherent nature of his will and not to himself. For the
whole point of the matter is that the individual's capacity
for " effort," his " will-power," is not fixed, having its
amount pre-determined by his heredity or some other cause
outside his control. Rather is his exercise of the power
of volition, and the increase in this power which follows
upon its exercise, determined by himself alone. It is, in
fact, identical with the power-to-be-a-self which, once pres-
ent in germ, can, like all vital principles, be maintained
and strengthened only from within. But upon the actual
effort put forth depends the development of volition into
the fullness of its capacity as an organizing agency, and
upon this hangs the moral destiny of the human individual.
As Professor James says in a celebrated passage: " Thus
not only our morality, but our religion, so far as the latter
is deliberate, depend upon the effort we can make. ' Will
you or won't you have it sof ' is the most probing question
we are ever asked ; we are asked it every hour of the day,
and about the largest as well as the smallest, the most
theoretical as well as the most practical things. We answer
by consents or non-consents and not by words. What
wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest
organs of communication with the nature of things ! What
wonder if the effort demanded by them be the measure
of our worth as men! What wonder if the amount we
150 THE NATUEE OF THE GOOD
accord of it be the one strictly original contribution which
we make to the world! " 18
REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Introduction, Chap. III.
HOFFDING, Outlines of Psychology (Eng. trans.), Chap. VII.
BALDWIN, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development,
Chap. IX.
JUDO, Psychology, Chap. XIII.
STOUT, Manual of Psychology, Chap. X.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book II, Chap. II.
11 JAMES: Psychology, Vol. II, p. 579.
CHAPTER V
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION OB FREEDOM
1. The Good aa Self-Realization. 2. Self-Realization Through the
Instrumentality of Volition: (a) The Present Self, 3. (6)
The Natural Self, 4. (c) The Personal Self. 5. The Possi-
bilities of Selfhood as Actualized by Volition. 6. Self-Realiza-
tion Identical with Self-Determination. 7. Libertarianism. 8.
Determinism. 9. Freedom as Self-Determination. 10. Objec-
tions to This View.
1. The Good as Self-Realization. The nature of voli-
tion has been investigated with the hope that knowledge
of this subject would furnish a key to the fundamental
ethical problem of the Good; for insight into the true
character of volition should enable us to answer the further
question as to the form of conduct required for its complete
satisfaction. Volition has upon investigation proved itself
to be in essential nature an organizing agency. Can we
not infer from this fact what is man 's highest Good ? This
query receives at once an affirmative reply; for the truth
lies open before us, as a moment's examination of what is
implied in the idea of organization, will show.
"What is the work of an organizing agency? What is
meant by organization ? Clearly, to organize is to establish
a_relation of inter-dependence and cooperation among the
parts within any whole. This inter-dependence is the most
thorough, this cooperation is the closest, that is possible.
So thorough is the inter-dependence that every part has its
nature altogether constituted by its connection with the
other parts of the system, and ceases to exist in independ-
ence of it. So close is the cooperation that every part has
J51
152 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
its life altogether determined by the office it discharges
within the system, and ceases to act independently. Organ-
ization means, therefore, such a relation within a system
that the whole finds expression in every part, and to organ-
ize is to establish this relation. Thus it is with the living
body which, because such a relation obtains among its
parts, is called an organism. The members are so related
that each has its nature wholly determined by its function
within the whole. This is what social organization means,
too, such cooperation among the different individuals that
each finds expression for his own individuality in the dis-
charge of his specific office in society. To organize a busi-
ness or industry involves such a distribution and adjust-
ment of its various activities that each department shall
work with maximum efficiency in the interest of the whole.
Nor is it otherwise hi the organization of human conduct
through the instrumentality of volition, to organize is to
relate the different activities of the individual so that each
may promote most effectively the exercise of all and or-
ganization means that the sum-total of the individual's
tendencies and capacities shall find conscious expression
in each single act. Now the sum-total- of the individual's
active tendencies and capacities, expressed in their conscious
\unity, constitute, as we have seen, his selfhood or per-
sonality. Consequently, the complete organization of con-
duct, the goal which volition strives to attain, and which is
required to satisfy it fully, is identical with complete self-
expj^ession or, in the more familiar phrase, self-realization.
Self-realization is therefore the summum bonum, the highest
human good, which we have been seeking to discover. It
is that form of conduct wherein each single act is made
contributory to the welfare of the whole self and, con-
versely, the whole self is given expression in every
act.
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 153
2. Self-Realization Through the Instrumentality of
Volition : (a) The Present Self .The Good is Self-realiza-
tion, because volition is an organizing agency, and complete
self-organization is identical with complete self-realization.
This is the conclusion to which the argument as thus far
pursued has led us. Volition, whose demands for satis-
faction are expressed in the Moral Ideal, now appears as
the faculty through whose instrumentality the self is real-
ized. How this result is accomplished through the exercise
of will becomes clearer if we glance back at the successive
stages in the development of volition and see what is the
effect of each upon the existence and nature of the self.
A person or a, self is, as Royce remarks, a life lived
according to a plan. 1 Now such purposiveness or aim is
introduced into human consciousness through the work of
volition in its earliest and simplest form that of desire.
In action from desire a number of experiences are united
as means to an end, the attainment of an object. The
consciousness of the child who desires a toy, and hence
goes in search of it, acquires a unity which it did not
possess when he acted from instinct or impulse. In instinc-
tive or impulsive action his successive experiences might
be united by the fact that they were all adapted to produce
a single result, but he would not be conscious of this unity,
and it is hi a consciousness of the unity of different ex-
periences that selfhood or personality consists. Since
through desire unity is first brought to the individual's
consciousness from within, this first form of volition may
be said to establish the existence of the self. Of course the
unity introduced is not extensive or thorough-going. A
desire does not embrace a class of objects and hence unite
the experiences of the individual over any considerable
span of time. Instead it is directed upon a single object
and the measures which must be taken for its present attain-
1 ROYCE: Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 168.
154 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
ment. Hence the self that is realized in desire is not the
whole self, nor even a large part of the self it is the self
in form most limited and circumscribed, the self of the
present moment.
This present self is realized, then, through the pursuit
and attainment of the object of momentary desire. Its
character, even at the moment of its inception, is, to be
sure, largely the outcome of past experience. The idea
of the object, now the end of conscious desire, has been
produced by past experience, when the same object
prompted to instinctive and impulsive action. Even when
the desire is for an object of present perception it is not
for the object merely as perceived, but for the perceived
object thought of as an end of action, i.e. a means of
self-satisfaction, and the perceived object could be thus
regarded only as the result of previous experience with
it. Thus it might be said that in desire, not the self of
the present simply, but that of the past as well, is realized.
While this is to an extent true, desire does not allow of
any conscious reflecting or generalizing upon past experi-
ence with a view to determining present conduct. For such
use of the past involves the subordination to it of the
present as of a particular instance to a general class, and
this is action from purpose and not from desire.
3. (b) The Natural Self. Through action from pur-
pose a more inclusive unity is established within the in-
dividual consciousness. Objects of like nature, desired and
sought in many different moments, are now grouped to-
gether and pursued as a class. Such purposes show by
their generality that they are not confined in their scope
to the present. Including many particulars, they arise only
out of the accumulated experiences of the past when these
particular objects have been singly desired, and can be
fulfilled only in the course of future time, when these same
specific objects are serially attained as parts of an inclusive
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 155
end. Thus purposive action unites experiences past, pres-
ent, and future, relating a succession of acts as means
to the attainment of an end embracing them all. By its
instrumentality the boundaries of the self are therefore
extended beyond the limits of the present moment to in-
clude past and future. A larger self is realized how large
depending upon the scope of the purpose. Some purposes
are restricted to a particular period, or place, or under-
taking, as the purposes of youth or of old age, or the
purpose of a man starting upon a journey. But the typical
purpjpse extends in its scope over the natural lifetime of
the individual the period of his physical existence. An
instance would be the purpose to win favorable recogni-
tion from, to be " liked by," one's fellows. Formed as the
result of many agreeable experiences of pleasing others,
this purpose is pursued throughout the remainder of life
and runs like a binding thread to the very end, tying
together diverse actions which would otherwise appear iso-
lated and discrepant. Since the typical purpose extends
over the natural lifetime, we may call the self which is )
realized through purposive action the natural self. It is
the self as natural individual whose existence covers a
definite period of years and is cut short by death.
4. (c) The Personal Self, Individual and Social. By
the third and highest form of volition, action from ideal, a
unity is produced which transcends even the limits of ?
natural individuality and physical existence. The ends
sought, the ideals of Truth and Honor, of Justice and
Beauty, are such as involve the cooperation of many per-
sons in a community of intelligence and endeavor. Hence
they include the natural self with its purposes, reduced
now to the rank of means to a more comprehensive end.
The self which is realized through the attainment of these
ideals is therefore not the natural self, the particular
individual external to, and exclusive of, others, but rather
156 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
the self in its universal aspect, the human person as
such. In this the culminating stage of self-realization the
existence and action of the natural individual are made
instrumental to the expression of the powers and capacities
of human personality. This largest self may, therefore,
be called the personal self. The development of the per-
sonal self through voluntary action follows two lines, which
may be clearly distinguished, although they are in close
and constant connection. It may be achieved through the
pursuit of such ideals as the discovery of truth or the
conquest of some department of nature ideals which, while
they implicate and refer to other persons, still concern
primarily the individual person and his relation to ob-
jective reality. Or it may be achieved through the pursuit
of such ideals as those of patriotism and humanitarianism,
in which the welfare of other selves is sought directly and
explicitly. In this way the social person is developed. The
two modes of personal expression, individual and social,
although distinguishable in direction, are really two aspects
of a unitary development, and hence are complementary
and inter-dependent.
5. The Possibilities of Selfhood as Actualized by
Volition. Through the exercise of volition in its succes-
sive stages, therefore, the self is created, developed, and
brought to full realization. The effect of the organizing
activity of will is to extend the limits of the self over a
larger and larger field. In action from desire the unity
of selfhood is manifested only in a grasp of the possibilities
of the present situation. Through purposive action this
unity is expanded to include events past and future and
finally to include within its scope the whole of a natural
lifetime. Action from ideal pushes the boundaries of per-
sonality out still farther until the lives of others and the
whole of the real universe are brought within its unity.
Thus voluntary action, when continued, discloses the pos-
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 157
sibilities of that selfhood which we all possess. Our self-
hood or personality is an ideal unity, capable of infinite
expansion, from a mere point in the present back into the
pastTand out into the future until the period of natural
existence is covered, and then in a wider sweep embracing
the lives of fellow-men, the epochs of human history, and
finally comprehending the vast process of universal evolu-
tion. Each self is capable of becoming an epitome of the
universe in truth, a microcosm. That these potencies shall
be made actual, that the possibilities of selfhood shall be
fulfilled, requires only that volition be exercised in the
fullness of its powers. Absolutely correct, then, was the
statement that the goal of volition as an organizing agency
is full self-realization. Equally true is it, also, that only
in such complete self-realization can volition find complete
satisfaction, and that herein, consequently, lies the highest
good for man.
6. Self-Realization Identical with Self-Determina-
tion. The process of self-realization, which now becomes
a subject of especial study, is equivalent to an increasing
control by the self of its own action in other words, to
growing power of self-determination. The power of self-
determination, the ability of the individual to direct and
control his own conduct in accordance with his own wishes,
is a faculty peculiar to man. It is not possessed in any
degree by the lower animals, whose action results from the
interplay of forces of the environment, with certain fixed
instincts present in the individual as part of his race in-
heritance for example, the actions of birds in nest-building
are due to the influence of external conditions connected
with season, locality, etc., which stimulate a highly devel-
oped and powerful instinct. The action of the animal can-
not then be said to be in any true sense self-determining or
spontaneous; the individual remains a part of the great
system of nature, acting out its laws and expressing its
158 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
forces. With man, the first actions are, like those of the
animals, instinctive; the actions of the individual are not
directed by himself but, instead, only register the effect
of external objects upon his nervous mechanism. \Vith the
entrance of volition all this is changed, however, and self-
determination begins. Action from desire is not elicited
by an external object which stimulates a fixed instinct;
it is prompted by an ideal object which the individual
takes for his own good. Such action may be properly re-
garded as an expression of the individual himself. But
while the act expresses what the individual now desires
his present self, that is its performance may serve to
prevent the gratification of a desire equally strong in the
future. In this case, the act does not express the future
self, but goes counter to it. It is not determined by the
entire self, therefore ; it is not wholly self-controlled. How
can the control of the self over such acts of desire be in-
creased? Clearly not by the absolute denial of desire or
cessation from action. Rather by relating the different
objects of desire and comprehending them within more
extensive ends which represent the good of the self in the
future as well as the present. This work of relating single
actions to larger aims and more general purposes is carried
forward by volition in its higher stages until, finally, pres-
ent conduct is made instrumental to the attainment of
that ideal end expressing the good of the whole self, present
and future, natural and personal, individual and social.
Then, and then only, action becomes entirely self-deter-
mined expressing the self, the whole nature of the self,
pnd nothing else. Now this process of self-determination
is of course the identical process of self-organization or
jelf-realization that we have been discussing. But it is
.important to notice their identity; for self-determination
i in its turn identical with true freedom. The correctness
ci this last statement will appear if we compare this con-
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 159
ception of freedom with the opposing views which have
long and vainly contended for supremacy in the field. We
shall see that the progressive self-realization, which we have
agreed is man's highest good, is equally the attainment
of absolute freedom.
7. Libertarianism. As one extreme among possible
views of human freedom is Libertarianism. According to
the Libertarian view man's will is free in the sense that
it is wn-determined, that it acts without a cause. Of course
the Libertarian does not deny that our will is, in a way,
influenced by our motives and tendencies. The field of
choice is limited by the knowledge and experience of the
individual and the possibilities of action that they suggest
to him. But when it comes to actually choosing between
courses of action open, the Libertarian believes that the
human will is uncontrolled by any influence whatsoever.
In this crisis no one motive is stronger in its influence upon
the will than any other. All motives are reduced to a
common level, in fact, since all are equally powerless to
control the will. Hence, as far as the ability to choose is
concerned, it is a matter of absolute indifference to the
will which of the possible courses shall be taken. Any
possibility may with equal readiness be chosen or rejected.
In the course of the long controversy upon the subject,
many considerations have been advanced in favor of this
and the opposing view. The leading arguments on both
sides may perhaps be summarized under three heads. The
Libertarian, with whose argument we are now concerned,
claims that his view is supported by facts of the following
classes. (1) Psychological. Men are generally conscious
of freedom in the sense just explained. They are conscious
before acting of the ability to choose with equal ease any
one of the alternatives offered, and, after acting, of the
fact that they might have chosen otherwise than they did.
(2) Ethical. Only if men's wills are undetermined can
160 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
we justly hold them responsible for their actions. For
if the human will is strictly determined no man can prevent
his conduct's being what it is. He should not be punished
for what he cannot help. (3) Metaphysical. Only if man's
will is thus uncaused is he freed from the chain of natural
causation and given power and dignity as a spiritual being.
8. Determinism. The other extreme in the free-will
controversy is occupied by the Determinists. They hold
that volition is strictly determined in its activity. Every
choice is the result of a conflict of motives or tenden-
cies in which the strongest always wins. Being thus
the necessary resultant of certain fixed forces no choice
could be other than it is. Hence the act of will so far
from being arbitrary or uncertain is, like all other events,
the inevitable effect of definite causes. In defense of his
position the Determinist has on his side many arguments.
The most important are the following, grouped under the
three heads used above. (1) Psychological. Study of the
psychology of choice shows us that the strongest motive
does win. The idea is acted upon which succeeds better
than all others in holding the attention. Now, in this
struggle of ideas for command of the attention, the victory
is bound to go to the one which is inherently most_attrac-
trye, i.e. most pleasant to the individual with his character
and disposition such as they are. (2) Ethical. Only if
action is the necessary outcome of the character of the agent
can we hold him responsible for it. If, in the final choice,
the will acts in entire independence of all the motives and
tendencies of the agent, the act cannot fairly be regarded as
his, nor can he with justice be punished for it. (3) Meta-
physical. Nowhere in the world of our experience do we
find action without a cause. Science has proved that
the uniformity of law and the necessary sequence of cause
and effect, prevail throughout nature. To suppose that the
human will acts without a cause is to introduce an arbitrary
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 161
and lawless factor into the system of nature and thus to
contradict the fundamental principle of science.
9. Freedom as Self-Determination. The conception of
freedom as self-determination goes to neither of these ex-
tremes, but in a sense stands between them, and thus in-
cludes the truth in each. This conception makes freedom,
as Paulsen says, a " real, positive property of human na-
ture." 2 It is the ability to seek an object chosen by one's
self; hence the power to direct one's own conduct. So
understood, the animals do not possess freedom; for they
act as they are compelled to act by instinct or impulse.
Freedom is exhibited, however, by all men who act volun-
tarily, i.e. in pursuit of a consciously chosen end. In this
sense, it is sometimes called psychological freedom, since
it is a property of developed intelligence and is possessed
by all men of normal mental faculties. It is sufficient for
responsibility, moreover ; because, even though the act pro-
ceed from momentary desire, it is nevertheless an expression
of the self. But in action from momentary desire we have
not an expression of the whole self, but only a part, a
fractional part, the self of the present moment. Hence
the act is not wholly self-determined. Neither is it entirely
free. This fact is recognized when, for instance, we con-
demn a man for being a " slave to his desire," as in the
case of the drunkard or the glutton. The drunkard is free,
when he returns to the drink, inasmuch as his act expresses
himself. But since he acts from momentary desire and
in spite of good resolutions to the contrary, he is not free
inasmuch as the strength of present appetite thwarts and
prevents the expression of his permanent self. Action is
entirely free, therefore, only when it is determined by the
whole self. This requires such a complete organization of
conduct that each single act shall be an expression of the
total self. Freedom in this meaning, often termed moral
* PAULSEX : System of Ethics, p. 476.
162 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
freedom, is not a natural possession of man, but is a con-
dition to be attained. Its attainment is equivalent to reach-
ing the goal of moral development, full self-realization.
For only he who realizes in his conduct all the possibilities
of his nature is entirely free.
If we understand that the true meaning of freedom is
self-determination we are able to perceive how far both
Libertarianism and Determinism are right, and, at the
same time, to detect the errors in each. Our consciousness
of freedom, emphasized by the Libertarian, is no illusion.
Man is free in the sense that he is subject to no external
compulsion in his conduct, but can direct his own action.
Moreover, since it is the individual himself who decides
in any instance of choice, it may with truth be said that
all the alternatives remain open until he himself makes
up his mind. But this does not imply that in the final
ichoice the will acts in equal independence of all the ten-
dencies and characteristics of the individual that have been
in play, or that, with the aspect of the self that was upper-
most at the culminating moment, the decision could have
been other than it was. Determinism is, therefore, right
in maintaining that the strongest motive always wins. But
it is wrong in treating the motives as if they were forces
separate from the self and acting upon it from without.
Instead they are all expressions of the self, and to say that
the strongest wins is simply to say that the dominant aspect
of the self determines the action. Again the Libertarian
is right in asserting that the individual cannot be held
responsible if his act is the necessary resultant of forces
within him which he cannot control. But he is wrong
in his further conclusion that responsibility attaches only
to those choices in which the will acts in independence
of disposition and character. Rather is the view of the
Determinist correct that a man is responsible only for
those actions which are an expression of his character.
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 163
Only we must not think of character in this connection
as a factor given, fixed, or ready-made, but rather as sub-
ject to constant direction and development at the initiative
of the self. Finally, we agree with the Libertarian that
man can claim the dignity of independent personality only
in so far as he is relieved from the constraint of mechanical
necessity and left to be master of his own destiny. But
this does not require us to exalt to the supreme place in
his nature a perfectly arbitrary and lawless will. It only
requires that the laws by which this will acts should be
grounded deep in the nature of the self. 3
10. Objections to This View. It is not supposed that
the foregoing paragraphs remove every difficulty connected
with the vexed problem of free-will; but only that they
indicate the general direction in which present thought
is moving toward a solution of this problem. Many diffi-
culties remain. For instance, the Libertarian may object
that the view just advanced provides for no genuine free-
dom. Action is said to be always the necessary expression
of character, while character is admitted to be, at the time
of action, fixed, itself the necessary result of past actions
and influences. "Why speak as if the individual had any
real freedom of choice when, in every case, the very bent
of his will i.e. its power and direction is fixed and de-
terminate as a part of his character? In answer to this
objection two things should be said. In the first place,
it is a mistake to think of a man's character as something
distinct from himself which acts upon him from without,
and, as an external force, constrains him to behave thus
and so. This is a false abstraction. Rather is his char-
acter just himself, and, when it determines his action, He
is determining it. In the second place, it is wrong to
conceive of the character of the individual as if it were
once for all fixed and defined by agencies quite beyond
GBEEN: Op. tit., 98, 105.
164 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
his control. The fact is that his character, and particularly
his tendencies and dispositions of will, are subject to con-
stant modification and development. And this modifica-
tion and development is largely under the control of the
individual himself, so that he is responsible for the present
state of his character. The amount of ' ' will-power ' ' which
he possesses in the present emergency is in a great measure
the result of efforts which he has made to exercise his
will in the past. Man may thus, if he chooses, train and
form his own will, building up such habits as he judges
will be beneficial, taking thought to avoid situations that
will serve to awaken a desire that is excessive, or reducing
the strength of such a desire by more drastic measures of
repression and denial.
But, it may be urged, this is merely to push the difficulty
a little further back and not to remove it. For is not the
individual's ability thus to develop his own character, to
train his own will, the necessary resultant of causes which
lie altogether beyond his own choice or control of his
heredity, that is, and the influences of his environment?
Eace, sex, and family stock all combine to produce in the
individual through heredity certain definite characteristics
and capacities. Age, country, and local habitation have
an inevitable effect upon his nature. One man inherits a
taste for liquor, another is endowed with marked inventive
ability. The spirit of one age leads men in great numbers
to enter upon religious crusades, that of another makes
the pursuit of art equally popular. Is not, then, the
individual's ability to form and develop that character,
which in any particular case determines his action, itself
the result of forces outside his own will ? In the last analy-
sis, therefore, is not the human will determined by external
influences ?
At this point it will be necessary to inquire how these
influences, particularly heredity and environment, operate
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 165
in determining the will. Obviously, what they do is to
determine the comparative attractiveness of different ob-
jects to different individuals. Thus from hereditary ten-
dency one man is attracted to wealth, pursues it, and be-
comes a millionaire ; another man is attracted to machinery,
studies it, and becomes a great engineer. But in what
lies the attractiveness given to these objects by heredity
and surroundings ? Is it that in consequence of hereditary
constitution more pleasure results from the pursuit and
attainment of these objects than any others? In this case
human freedom is not destroyed; for we have seen that
the will is not determined by a necessity of its nature
always to seek the greatest pleasure. Does not the influ-
ence of heredity and environment consist rather in deter-
mining for the individual how pleasant, how interesting
certain objects shall be when they are represented as ends
of action? Now there is no doubt that these factors do
wield a momentous influence over the will in just this
way; since the pleasantness of any object is the measure
of its command over the attention, and hence its power
over the will. The fact that a certain desire is by heredity
especially strong in a man means that its object is much
pleasanter to him than to most other men, and that, con-
sequently, an unusually strong purpose will be required t
to overrule it and reduce it to proper submission. The
idea of being a prosperous and useful citizen must be
especially attractive and appealing if it is to hold the
attention and be pursued as a purpose by a man with an
inherited craving for liquor. We must admit, therefore,
that heredity, and environment too, do influence the will
in its expression and development, by determining the
natural or inherent attractiveness of different objects for
it. And if the will were merely a faculty whereby par-
ticular objects are sought and obtained, its acts would
simply reflect the varying attractiveness of these different
166 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
objects and thus be determined exclusively by the two fac-
tors above mentioned. But will is more than this: it has
a positive nature of its own. 4 In essential_character will is
an organizing agency, and this fact means that whenever
it is exercised and to the extent in which it is exercised, the
pleasantness of the larger and more inclusive object is in-
creased. Hence it is always possible for man by an effort
of will to overcome the strength of hereditary tendency and
environmental influence and act in accordance with his
own larger good. And this exertion of the will is de-
pendent on nothing but the will itself. In the exercise of its
own peculiar power, therefore, it is an independent and orig-
in^L source of spiritual energy. Thus while heredity and
environment often influence the action of the will, in some
cases setting practical limits to its expression by making
some desire so strong that its subjection requires a dispropor-
tionate and exhausting effort, it is inconceivable that the will
should be completely controlled by these external factors.
The Determinist may now, in his turn, accuse us of re-
instating the idea of will as an " uncaused cause," 5 as the
4 The ultimate question in this matter of human freedom appears
to be this, Is the individual an original source of spiritual power
the amount of which is undetermined and hence may. by effort, be
self-augmented? This question must receive an affirmative answer,
it seems, if there is to be any genuine self-determination. Paulsen,
in his System of Ethics, asserts that freedom as the power of self-
determination is a positive property of human nature. The actions
of the human individual are determined by his tendencies and pre-
dispositions, he holds, and these, constituting his character, are deter-
mined by the various influences, natural and social, that affect him
(p. 457). But, he further maintains, man may, by the exercise of
thought and the discipline of impulse, form his character, educate
his will (p. 469). Yet he admits, still further, that he cannot do
this unless the formative principle in sufficient strength is native
within him (p. 470). And if this power exists in an amount fixed
by hereditary endowment in the individual it is difficult to attach
much positive meaning to his capacity for self-determination. Does
not true freedom imply, as James suggests, the presence in human
nature of a power not fixed in amount but an " independent variable,
among the fixed data of the case, our motives, character, etc."?
* GBEEN : Op. cit., p. 100.
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION 167
one faculty of man which acts in absolute independence
of other tendencies in human nature and of the forces in
the outer world. This conception of will, he may say, has
been already discarded, as false to the facts of psychology,
and without any ethical value. In answering this charge
it is perhaps sufficient to say that the phrase, " uncaused
cause," does not in the least apply to the self-determining
will as it has been described in the previous paragraphs.
This will is not conceived as the one member of a group of
forces that is out of relation to all the rest, the single
event in a causal series that is itself undetermined. We
have seen that it is volition as an organizing agency which
establishes the unity of human experience and assigns place
to every object and interest therein. It is therefore the
source of the self and all its acts or, better, it is the self
acting in its unity. Every act and every tendency of the
self is an expression of will, for will is just the power of
the self in all its acts. How is it possible, then, to suppose
that will is determined and limited by one of these dis-
positions or tendencies which are but minor expressions
of itself? As easily suppose that the power and potency
of life is limited and defined by the various species which
it has already produced. And the independence and ini-
tiative which we thus ascribe to will is only a^fuller mani-
festation of that power to originate new forms and initiate /
new activities which is admitted to belong to all life and
which is the condition of all development and evolution.
The explanation of freedom is self-determination, the ex-
planation of self-determination is development the reali-
zation of the latent and often unknown possibilities of
human nature.
REFERENCES
STOUT, Manual of Psychology, Book TV. Chap. VTT.
BALDWIN, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development,
Chap. VII.
168 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
GBEEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book II, Chap. I.
PAULSEN, System of Ethics, Book II, Chap. IX.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part III, Chap. I.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. VII, 2.
ROGERS, The Religious Conception of the World, "The Problem of
Freedom."
JAMES, Psychology, Chap. XXVI.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. V.
SIDQWICK, Methods of Ethics, Book I, Chap. V.
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION IN
HUMAN LIFE
1. Form and Content in Self-Realization. 2. The Incidental and the
Essential in Human Nature. 3. Man as a Natural Being, 4.
His Native Instincts. 5. Man as a Conscious Self, 6. His
Spiritual Capacities. 7. Necessary Stages in Self-Realization:
8. (a) Individual, 9. (6) Social, 10. (c) Universal.
1. Form and Content in Self-Realization. The Good
is now defined as the... full realization of the human self.
This conception of self-realization is of supreme import-
ance in the science of Ethics. But its establishment does
not mark the complete solution of the ethical problem;
it only provides a necessary basis for further inquiry.
Highly significant as it is, the conception of self-realization
as thus far developed is an abstract principle of little value
in solving the practical problems of conduct. To be genu-
inely helpful and illuminating it must be made concrete.
We must know something of the actual nature of the
human self whose realization is the summum bonum of
what capacities it is constituted, through what activities
it is expressed. Only through such knowledge can the
principle of self-realization furnish guidance and direction
to human conduct.
Or, to put the matter in other words, our study up
to the present point has revealed to us the form of the
Good. An analysis of the activity of volition has proved
that conduct, in order to satisfy this faculty of will and
hence deserve to be called " good," must be completely
organizejd in form, that is, realize the whole self. But
170 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
the student of Ethics cannot be content with a principle
that is merely formal. He must know the content of the
Good as well as its form. What are the activities that go
to make up a completely organized life? "What are the
qualities and characteristics of the self whose nature is
completely realized ? If mere organization is the Good, will
not every life in which the different acts are all strictly
subordinated to a ruling purpose even though, as in the
case of the criminal, this purpose is a cruel and sinister
one be morally approved ? Suppose a boy is reared in the
belief that it is his chief duty to avenge the death of a
murdered father. As he grows to manhood such vengeance
becomes his ruling purpose, perhaps connecting itself with
an ideal of personal honor. In finally gaining his revenge
he himself meets death. Is not his life completely organ-
ized? Does he not or does he fully realize himself?
Such an example shows the necessity of going beyond the
formal principle of organization and discovering what defi-
nite^ characteristics and capacities are displayed by all nor-
mal human beings in the course of their development.
2. The Incidental and the Essential in Human Na-
ture. The task now before us is to ascertain what are the
fundamental characteristics of the human self and to see
how these are expressed in the process of self-realization.
Now while the form of the Good was discovered by an in-
vestigation of the faculty of volition, which is the source
of all conduct, this, the content, can be determined only
by a study of the facts of human nature and human ex-
perience. The effects of such a study especially a first
general survey are discouraging. The facts are many
and complicated, and the variations of character between
men of different races and ages are apparently endless and
certainly bewildering. It seems that all men possess in
common only the bare faculties of thought and action, while
the many ideas and beliefs which spring from the one, and
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 171
the varied tendencies and dispositions which pertain to the
other, are different in each individual case. What charac-
teristics have the Norse viking, the medieval recluse, and
the modern man of business in common? To what extent
will the course of self-realization for the Kaffir, the Es-
quimo, and the European be identical? Or even within
a modern civilized state, how many activities are shared
equally by street-sweeper, stock-broker, and charities-
worker ?
The activities involved in self-realization must neces-
sarily differ with the time, race, sex, and occupation of
the self. In fact, self-realization is bound to have a differ-
entjneaning for each separate individual; since each pos-
sesses certain attributes and abilities peculiar to himself,
which enter into his self-realization. Despite this infinite
diversity among men there are, nevertheless, certain char-
acteristics which are essential to human nature as~such.
They are consequently possessed by all normal human in-
dividuals, and serve to direct the course of self-realization
in each. In fact, these essential characteristics determine
the activities which all men must put forth as conditions
of their self-realization. They may hence be said to pre-
scribe the laws of self-realization, valid universally within
the field of human conduct. Before we proceed to a con-
sideration of those essential characteristics of human nature
which constitute the universal and necessary conditions of
self-realization in the life of man, a question must be an-
swered which will naturally arise at this point. To what
extent can such a process as self-realization which, as we
have seen, is the expression of the free agency of volition,
an original and spontaneous power, have its course pre-
determined by any influence whatever?
The mere idea that it is possible by reflection to discover
conditions of moral development which hold for all men,
and hence pre-determine the course of self-realization in
172 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
human life, may seem in direct contradiction to the pre-
vious assertion that the future must always contain for
the voluntary agent an element of uncertainty which
reason can never eliminate, and that consequently human
conduct must ever remain a venture in which the surprising
and unexpected are constantly encountered. If this latter
assertion be true, it will be urged, it is manifestly im-
possible that the course of self-realization should be pre-
determined or its successive stages prescribed. If the
future course of moral development is thus determined,
the power of human volition is limited, the will is not truly
free. Conversely, if we are to have true freedom in human
conduct and real evolution in human life, the possibilities
of change and difference must be unlimited. Indeed, the,
logic of the situation may appear to require from__us the
admission that not even the goal of moral development is
fixed, but that it is subject to indefinite change and varia-
tion in response to new and different conditions which may
arise in the future. This view that the logic of develop-
ment forbids us to attribute to development any definite
goal or ultimate end is repugnant alike to reason and to
s common-sense; it warns us against the over-emphasis of
one aspect of the truth, itself of great importance, to the
exclusion of the other aspects which in real experience
offset and balance it. Now the indubitable truth which
finds expression in the view we are considering is that
no genuine development realizes an end set for it by some
.' external agency; it, so to speak, unfolds its result out of
its own nature. The moral ideal of self-realization is rooted
in the nature of volition itself. For development, To be
development, must be the development of something, not
of nothing. The thing in this case is will, and we learn
from experiencing its activity that it is essentially an
agency of adjustment and organization. It is incpjaceiv-
able, therefore, that the goal of its development should be
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 173
other than the completed organization, perfected adjust-
ment. Further than this, reflection upon the achievements
of volition in human life shows that it works under certain
fundamental conditions, conditions fixed by the character-
istics of human nature, or by the character of the real
world. The existence of these conditions, revealed by the
results of past action, makes it reasonable to conclude as
we shall presently see that self-realization in the case of
all men must involve an^ integration of impulses in the
individual and an adjustment of interests in society. But
in addition to these necessary implications, which are of
a very general nature, the process of self-realization holds
forth enough uncertainty to test the courage of the most
adventuresome soul. The methods whereby self -organiza-
tion can be achieved in the individual and social spheres
can be ascertained only by trial and experiment. Guided
of course by the results of previous experience, man must
ever advance to meet new situations ; in meeting these situ-
ations he must have the strength of will, the courage of
conviction, sufficient to risk happiness already attained in
putting to the test new and more promising solutions. All
that ethical reflection can do is to make such generalizations
from the moral experience of humanity as will afford us
most effective guidance in solving the problems of future
conduct.
What, then, are the essential characteristics of human
nature which constitute the universal and necessary con-
ditions of human self-realization?
3. Man as a Natural Being. Man is primarily a a>
ural^bfiing, a member .of the highest of the animal species.
He is the outcome of the same natural evolution that has
produced the other living forms, and is, therefore, related
to them by descent. His genealogy may be traced down
through a succession of species to the earliest and simplest
forms of life. As a result of this, his natural origin and
174 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
development, man possesses certain qualities which must
be reckoned as fundamental to his character. Most im-
portant in their influence upon conduct are the instincts
which all men thus possess. These instincts are a part of
man 's natural inheritance, and hence are shared in common
with the lower animals. They are modifications of the
nervous system originally developed in our animal ances-
tors by natural selection because giving an advantage in
the struggle for existence. Originating in this way they
have been transmitted by physical heredity and made a
permanent part of man's physical structure.
4. His Native Instincts. Hence the first of the char-
acteristics fundamental to human nature is the possession
by all men of a set of natural instincts. These instincts
have an important bearing upon man's conduct, since they
cause him at first to react involuntarily to certain kinds
of objects and then consciously to desire and voluntarily
to seek them. It is difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate
and classify the various instincts of man. This is not
because their existence is in the least doubtful; but in
many cases the objects and movements involved in a group
of instinctive reactions are so related that it seems an
arbitrary matter whether we attribute the whole group
to one instinct or divide it among several. Are the in-
stincts, so-called, of defense, combat, and rivalry three sep-
arate instincts, or just varied manifestations of one instinct ?
Who shall decide? Still it is possible to make a rough
catalogue of the more important human instincts, which
will be sufficient to our needs; since, for ethical pur-
poses, we do not require a complete classification of every
variety of instinctive reaction in man. For purposes of
the present discussion, then, man's instinctive reactions
may be divided into three classes, in accordance with the
nature of the object upon which they are directed, whether
it be the individual himself, an inanimate object, or another
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 175
living individual. Under the first head comes the instinct
of self-preservation, which causes man to seek his own
health and pleasure, and equally to avoid conditions of
harm and pain. Under the second head we may note the
instincts of food, drink, shelter, and acquisition. Thirdly,
come the social instincts, among which are those of sex
and parenthood, of speech and sympathy, of resentment
and emulation. We may add as another to these three
classes, certain instincts whose object may be either an
inanimate thing or another living individual that is, the
instincts of imitation, curiosity, beauty, and play.
Originating as conditions of survival with the lower forms
of life, these instincts serve through the actions they
prompt to maintain the existence of the human organism
in the natural world. Thus they relate man as individual
to the objects of nature, giving value to material things
according as these minister to human needs. The world
of the human individual is consequently not a world of
objects that merely exist as facts, but a world of objects
which appeal as possible ends of action because supplying
food, shelter, clothing, amusement, etc. In the same way
man's native instincts relate him to other members of his
own species. Other individuals acquire interest for him
because furnishing companionship, arousing resentment, or
appealing to sexual or parental emotions. Through his
various natural instincts, therefore, man is set in certain
definite relationships to objects of the material world and
to other men as natural individuals.
5. Man as a Conscious Self. But man is more than a
natural individual: he is a conscious self. As a self or
person, he is not a material thing with boundaries to
separate it from other things in space, he is a spiritual
being to whom no such limitations can be assigned. Man's
selfhood or personality resides in the conscious unity of
his experience. " To have a conception of one's own self,"
176 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
says Hobhouse, " one must be aware of a certain identity
running through the mass of past experiences^ ~and in-
f erentially prolonged into the future. ' ' * Now man 's con-
sciousness of the unity of his experience, in which his self-
hood consists, depends upon his ability to weave together
the facts of his experience into a connected system. He
must do more than associate experiences in the order of
their occurrence; for this the animals do and yet have no
selfhood or personality. He must be able to establish per-
manent relations among the objects of his consciousness
" upon the basis of their affinities and the more remote
connections that follow therefrom." 2 Now this work of
the organization of experience, which is the condition of
conscious selfhood, proceeds ultimately from volition, the
spiritual force in man which builds out of the materials of
animal life a self-conscious personality. We already know
how volition in its first and simplest form begins this work.
In discovering the means which must be used to attain the
end of desire the individual is made aware of relationships
among objects that are permanent and necessary. Imita-
tion and language are, as we have noted, also important
factors in the development of the self. The social charac-
ter of selfhood is therefore marked from the first; since
self-development in its earliest stages is dependent upon
the influence of other selves and the possibility of com-
municating with them.
With the appearance of volition, then, in the third or
fourth year of human life, the growth of the self begins and
it continues through childhood. But full self -consciousness
does not arise until the power of free thought and imagina-
tion is developed in the later period of adolescence. This
power enables the individual to deal with his experience
in its larger masses and more comprehensive relationships.
1 HOBHOUSE: Mind in Evolution, p. 301.
1 HOBHOUSE: Op. cit., p. 300.
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 177
He may behold himself as a physical being, a denizen of
a planet in a great solar system and an insignificant atom
in a vast universe of suns and stars, or in his social nature
as one among the many millions of souls now existing in
the world. He may view his present in its connection
with the past which is fading in memory, and with the long
future which stretches out before, filled with unknown pos-
sibilities. In such consciousness of self the existence of
other selves is necessarily implied. The very relationships
by which the experience of the self is organized are as-
sumed to hold for other selves as well. The real universe in
which the self finds its home is assumed to exist for other
selves also. In fact, consciousness of self-existence involves
constant appeal to the existence of others. From his nature
as such, the self-conscious person must identify himself
with, and yet at the same time distinguish himself from,
other persons. He must recognize that all have the same
world, yet each occupies therein his own point of view.
6. His Spiritual Capacities. As a conscious self man
has certain spiritual capacities the possession of which may
rank as the second ofJJie fundamejaiaL characteristics of
human nature. And as his natural instincts serve to sus-
tain and strengthen his physical existence, so his spiritual
capacities maintain, and enrich his conscious personality.
These capacities are all expressions of the basal activity of
volition which, through its work of organization, builds up
the unity of selfhood. But in the discharge of its office
volition manifests itself in three highly specialized forms
which it is permissible to distinguish as different capacities.
These spiritual capacities in man are: first, the Intellectual, ~J^
the power of thought, the ability to acquire knowledge;
second, the Technical, the ability to contrive, to construct, ._
to invent what is serviceable ; third, the ^Esthetic, the ability
to perceive and enjoy what is beautiful. Now the effect of
the operation of all three of these capacities is to extend and
178 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
to enrich the unity of the self. The intellectual capacity
does this by introducing within the unity of self-conscious-
ness the objects and fixed connections of the real universe.
The scientist, with his telescope or microscope, is continu-
ally enriching human experience by bringing into it new
facts. In a like manner also does every individual enlarge
the content of his own personality, who by serious thought
discovers a new factor or hidden cause within the ken of his
own experience. The technical capacity of man extends the
unity of his own selfhood by subjecting the agencies of the
environment, natural and social, to the ends of intelligence.
This the inventor does when he devises a machine by which
the forces of nature are compelled to fulfil the purposes
of man; the educator, too, when he devises a new method
for communicating knowledge for teaching spelling or
arithmetic or grammar. The same ability is exercised by
all individuals who, through skill and contrivance, adapt
external surroundings to the uses of their own personal
intelligence. The cesthetic capacity in its way also enriches
the content of the unitary self; through exercise of the
imagination and perceptive faculties such form and arrange-
ment are given to experiences of color and sound as to
create in them new suggestions of meaning, and thus to
provide the agent with new sources of satisfaction. This
ability is of course displayed primarily in the work of the
artist; but in a less degree by all those who enjoy beauty
in any of its forms.
Since these activities spring from the nature of the self
and all contribute to its extension and development, we
should expect that the objects which they seek to realize
would be ideal or spiritual. Such is indeed the case ; the
objects of the three spiritual capacities mentioned are
ideal in character and possess none of the limitations of
material things. Of course any object which becomes an
x end of action is of necessity ideal. This is just as true
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 179
of the material object which instinct causes us to desire
as it is of the best considered purpose or most comprehensive
ideal. But the material ^object which becomes an end of
natural desire is particular in character and limited in time
and place ; hence it cannot be pursued by all men, but only
by a few individuals. Through the power of intelligence,
generalizing upon experiences of achievement by race and
individual, however, objects of much greater range are
furnished as ends for volition in its three-fold capacity
objects extending in their scope to all places and all times
and being possible of pursuit by all individuals. In this
way simple curiosity about a particular object becomes a
wish to know about a whole class of objects, then a number
of classes of objects, and at last develops into the craving
for knowledge of all possible objects i.e. for Truth. In-
terest in the steps which must be taken to secure a par-
ticular object grows into a desire to discover the best
means or methods for attaining all objects of the same
sort: agencies and methods are standardized, technique is
developed, and finally Power or Efficiency is adopted as
an end to be sought by all individuals. Liking for a special
object which, when seen or heard, gives a peculiar kind
of delight develops into an interest in all objects which
produce aesthetic pleasure, in their relation to one another,
and the conditions of their existence; out of this interest
grows the yearning to produce in every sphere the con-
ditions necessary to this species of enjoyment and thus
realize Beauty universally, fc-j *Jtt-} 'v^V^.
Truth, Power, and Beauty, the three ideals sought by
man~as a spiritual being, are therefore ideal in the sense
of being universal, and thus having a scope and compre-
hensiveness that natural objects do not possess. In proof
of this, compare the ideal of Truth, the object sought in
all intellectual activity, with the object of a natural in-
stinct say, food. Food is material, hence is perishable
180 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
in character and strictly limited in amount, so that what
one individual gains the rest must necessarily lose. Truth,
on the contrary, being ideal, survives even the limits of
man's natural lifetime, enduring and increasing as the
successive generations of men are born and die. It is not
restricted in quantity ; it cannot be ' ' cornered ' ' by any
individual. Rather does the individual, in the measure of
his success in obtaining it, increase the possessions of all
the rest; for truth requires for its pursuit and discovery
the cooperation of many individuals in a community of
intelligence. Nor is it otherwise with Power or Efficiency,
the end sought in technical activity. The engineer who
designs a new type of bridge, and the agricultural expert
who devises an improved method of farming are not seek-
ing material things with their narrow limits combinations
of stone and steel, bushels of grain, or tons of hay. Instead
their object is ideal the control of the forces of nature
by the power of intelligence. The same may be said of
efforts made in the social and political spheres to devise
methods and instruments whereby the aims of intelligence
may be attained in commerce and government. The pur-
poses which direct these undertakings, because intelligent
are universal, and hence the object of the inventor or
engineer, the master of industry or the statesman, when
attained, is of benefit to all humanity. Thus the originator
of the suspension bridge and steam engine pursued and
attained ideal objects which, as such, had permanence
and universality; for the inventions survived the natural
life of the inventor and became the common possession of
humanity. Likewise Beauty, which we in our aesthetic
capacity seek to create and enjoy, is identical with no block
of chiseled marble or piece of painted canvas which can
be bought and sold. It is ideal, consisting of the pleasant
harmony of imaginative faculties induced by certain aspects
of nature and works of art. In seeking it, then, we seek,
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 181
not a particular object which can be possessed by but
one individual, we seek an ideal quality which resides in
this object for all persons of cultivated imagination, and
thus may be seized on and enjoyed by them all.
Each of the three " spiritual " activities of man has
its distinctive end. These three ends constitute the three
ruling^ ideals of self-conscious personality, Truth, Po.wer,
and Beauty. In a sense they are coordinate and inde-
pendent ideals, each having its own distinctive sphere and
rightfully demanding supremacy within it. Sometimes,
however, the ideal of Goodness is given equal standing with
these three or with the first and last, Truth and Beauty.
Herein a serious mistake is made ; for the ideal of Goodness
represents the demands of the agency of volition, of which
intellectual, aesthetic, and technical activities are but sub-
ordinate expressions. Ultimately, then, the three ideals we
have been discussing must all be measured in terms of good-
ness, and all are subject to the requirements which the
complete satisfaction of the power of will imposes on human
conduct. By true ideas we mean, in last analysis, ideas
that can be realized as ends of action, by efficient agencies
or methods the ones that will produce the desired results,
and by beautiful presentations those in which the ends
of intelligence are immediately apprehended. Thus do in-
tellectual, technical, and aesthetic activities contribute to
the satisfaction of volition in its work of organizing and
enriching personal life.
7. Necessary Stages in Self-Realization. Two chaiv
acteristics, we find, must be regarded as fundamental to
the human self. They are consequences of the fact that
man is at once a natural being and a conscious self. The
first is the possession by him of a number of natural
instincts which relate him to the material objects of his
environment and to other individuals of the human species.
The second is the development in the human self of certain
182 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
spiritualjjapacities which serve to relate it both to other
selves and to universal reality. These conditions, funda-
mental to human nature, determine the course of self-
realization for all men. They prescribe what activities must
have place in the conduct of every human individual who
would realize himself. Hence we are now prepared to learn
of the content of self-realization, as well as the form, to
ask what course self-realization must take in human beings
thus characterized.
It will be convenient to recognize in advance three lead-
ing aspects of self-realization in man, which are consequent
upon the above-noted relations in which he stands, as natu-
ral being, and conscious self.
Full Self-realization, or the complete organization of
human conduct, requires the realization of :
(1) The Individual Self. Through such adjustment of
the activities in man that all are made means to the j>ro-
.^_ ti i r*/
motion of individual interest. w -Sl^Tc. \ ^'^u?[
(2) The Social Self. Through such adjustment of the
interest of the human individual to the interests of others
that his activity is made a means to the furtherance of
social welfare.
(3) The Universal Self. Through the adjustment of
human welfare to the Universal Purpose.
Thus an outline is furnished which may be regarded as
provisional until it is filled in and verified in subsequent
discussion. Let us now ascertain in further detail what
activities are essential to self-realization under the condi-
tions set by the nature of man. Or, since self-realization
is achieved by voluntary action, through the pursuit of
what succession of ends the self is fully realized.
8. (a) The Individual Self. Self-realization within the
individual sphere means that the total interest of the
individual shall be realized by all of his acts. Now, as
we know, the human individual possesses both natural in-
C\ ,. ~* + Jfufr^t^+Jr* *-*J^ATr^ J v- .- >^ ^*t*-' V^-VK^W
JS^^^SST^^ u!5CH^^^?^^u
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 183
stincts and spiritual capacities. In virtue of these charac-
teristics of his nature, certain objects appeal to him and
prompt him to act. In order that his conduct shall
express himself, it is first necessary that the objects of
instinct become the ends of conscious desire. "When this
is accomplished, he seeks in each succeeding act for the
thing which he at the moment desires be it food, play,-
companionship, or what-not. But the total interest of the
individual is not attained in this way; for these desires
often conflict, and to satisfy one to-day may prevent the
satisfaction of another to-morrow, or even for days to come.
Self-organization, then, requires such adjustment and cor-
relation of these varied and opposing desires that each
may receive a measure of fulfilment consistent with the I
due and proportionate satisfaction of those remaining. This
adjustment is not merely a compromise, however, in which
all the desires are treated as independent units and thus
admitted to have equal rights. Certain desires are given
a preference, but consistent with the principle of Self-
realization upon one ground only, that is, their greater
comprehensiveness. The measure of fulfilment which self-
realization permits to one of the particular desires or pur-
poses of the self is determined entirely by the comprehen-
siveness of the object concerned, the degree to which it in-
cludes other objects sought-for, and hence is expressive of
the whole self. As illustrative of difference in this regard,
compare the objects of two natural instincts; for example
those of food and of resentment or anger. The first is
much more comprehensive than the second. Upon the ob-
tainment of a sufficient quantity of the proper food de-
pends the effective exercise of the most of the other activ-
ities of the human individual. The other desire has a very
narrow range since the attainment of its object, retalia-
tion, in any but the most restricted form and unusual cir-
cumstances, acts as a hindrance to the attainment of other
184 THE NATTJRE OF THE GOOD
objects desired. Of all the objects which man seeks through
natural instinct, the most comprehensive is self -preservation.
This instinct leads the individual to desire those pleasant
conscious states which are indicative of physical well-being,
and equally to shun that consciousness of pain which sig-
nifies bodily disorder. Generalizing upon particular ex-
periences of pleasure and pain, he is further led to form
the purpose to secure in life the greatest enjoyment, or,
in other words, gain the maximum of pleasure. Now
pleasure, in the sense of agreeable consciousness, is the most
comprehensive of the objects which man is led by instinct
to pursue, and therefore the purpose to pursue it deserves
to be made supreme over all other desires and purposes
having a like source. For the greatest amount of pleasure
in the case of the human individual is generally an accom-
paniment of the highest degree of health, security, and
comfort in natural existence. And, since all other instincts
which man possesses have been developed to maintain and
promote his natural existence, the different objects which
they cause him to desire wealth, amusement, reputation,
etc. fall into subjection as means to the inclusive end of
Pleasure, or natural well-being. Thus Pleasure emerges
as the first of the ends which, in the process of self-realiza-
tion, represent the whole self in contrast to any of its
parts ; and we make due recognition of the truth contained
in the Hedonistic conception of the Good.
We have already seen, however, that the ideal objects
of man's spiritual capacities Truth, Power, and Beauty
are larger and more comprehensive, not merely than any
particular thing which he naturally desires, but even than
his natural existence and well-being itself. Self-organiza-
tion in the individual life requires, therefore, that the end
lately made supreme over all natural desires and purposes
now be subordinated as a means to the realization of these
spiritual capacities. The individual, that is, must make
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 185
his natural well-being and pleasure a means to the exercise
of his intellectual, technical, and aesthetic activities. The
ends of these higher activities of the human self taken
together may be expressed by the word Culture. Culture
thus appears as the ideal which transcends all other ends in
the conduct of the individual, because representing his larg-
est interest and embracing all lesser goods. To its attain-
ment, the natural existence and well-being of the individual
must be made subordinate, including of course such lesser
purposes as those to gain wealth, amusement, fame, etc.
These have now to be realigned and made instrumental, not
to the gaining of Pleasure, but to the attainment of Culture.
In thus making Culture supreme among the ends pursued
by the individual we provide for the truth in Rationalism,
which finds man's Good in spiritual activity rather than
natural pleasure. The ideal of Culture on which we dwell,
as representing the highest interest of the self as individual,
is practically identical with the Highest Good as conceived
by Plato * and Aristotle.* According to Plato Justice, the
supreme and all-inclusive virtue, consists in a strict~clivision
of labor and harmonious cooperation between the three
principles in the nature of man it being understood that
it is the function of reason to control. Aristotle, in his
doctrine of the Mean, would allow to each desire that
measure of gratification consistent with the realization of
the Supreme End which is the fulfilment of all man's
capacities under the direction of reason.
9. (b) The Social Self. Man is related as a natural
being to other members of the human species, and, as a
conscious self, to other selves in a community of intelli-
gence. Self-realization requires that his interest as indi-
vidual be adjusted to the interests of others in society.
The human individual becomes aware of the existence
PLATO: Republic, 443. C.
* AKISTOTLE : Nicomachean Ethics, 1106, B.
186 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
of others as soon as he becomes conscious of existing himself.
One of his leading instincts, moreover, that of sympathy,
makes him desirous of increasing others' pleasure and
lessening their pain. The formation of a general purpose
to promote the happiness or well-being of others usually
waits upon the development of a definite self-interest in
the individual himself. At first the sympathetic impulse
is correlated with other natural tendencies of the Individual
and made a means to the promotion of his own interest,
and it is only after a comparatively clear consciousness
of self and self-interest arises that there comes also a
recognition of the interest of others. This conception of
another's interest becomes fuller and more adequate as the
development of self-interest proceeds, growing from the
idea of another's comfort and happiness merely, to the
cultivation of his higher personal capacities. The impulse
of sympathy, attaching to such an idea of another's good,
makes it attractive as an end of action. Thus a well-defined
aim to seek the interests of other individuals appears and
exists along with the ideal of self-interest. These varied
interests often conflict, so that it seems possible to gain one 's
own ends as an individual only by thwarting the ambitions
of others, and, conversely, others ' good can often be realized
only at the expense of one 's private ambition. Self -organi-
zation makes necessary the adjustment of these warring
interests. As always, it insists that the less inclusive shall
be subordinated to the more inclusive end. Consequently
the realization of the self requires the adoption of the
ideal of Altruism on the part of the individual the de-
termination to seek the interests of others with whom he
comes into contact as well as his own. This means that
he shall surrender his own desire or partial interest
when it is opposed to the total well-being of another. In
cases where ego and alter seem to have equal interests at
stake, Self-realization enforces the doctrine of self-sacrifice,
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 187
since allowance must be made for the influence of a strong
and persistent tendency to over-estimate the interest of
self and under-estimate that of others, due to the fact
that one's own interest is keenly felt, while that of others
is only thought or imagined. There are limits, to be sure,
to the extent of self-sacrifice which self-realization requires.
It would not, for instance, require the individual to sac-
rifice his own well-being to the passing whim of another.
For here the interest of the self is the more comprehensive
end.
Self-realization in the social sphere is not completed when
the individual adjusts his own interest to the interests of
others of his acquaintance. For the selfhood of which man
is conscious is a universal principle present in all human
beings and uniting them in a community of intelligence
and personality. For full self-realization, therefore, it is
not sufficient that man pursue his own highest interest as
an individual, or that of other individuals with whom he
comes into contact ; he must go further and seek the good of
human personality, of conscious selfhood, whenever and !
wherever found. Thus a new end appears, more compre-
hensive than Altruism, which may be called Humanitarian-
ism. It means the development of humanity the full, free,
harmonious exercise of all the capacities of human person-
ality. To this ideal, Self-organization requires that the in-
dividual subordinate his own interest and the interests of all
other particular individuals. The conflict at this point be-
tween culture and humanitarianism between the interest
of the individual or a privileged group or class of indi-
viduals and the welfare of humanity while less obvious
may be as acute and persistent as that betwjeen egoism and
altruism. It cannot be doubted, however, that the fullest
expression of the self is found in pursuit of the more com-
prehensive end, and the highest culture can mean nothing ,
less than the fullest self-development. The artist or the
-"'
188 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
scientist may regard it as a hindrance to be obliged to rec-
ognize a social responsibility in their specialized activities.
Yet the very capacities, intellectual and aesthetic, which they
are exercising are implicitly universal, involving the union
of many persons in a common knowledge and appreciation.
Can one of these spiritual capacities of man be exercised
most effectively, then, unless it contribute to the highest
personal development of humanity?
10. (c) The Universal Self. Finally, man is related
through his spiritual capacities to Universal Reality. His
thought discovers the necessary connections of things and
shows how all natural objects are part of an inter-related
system. Through constructive activity he learns how the
objects and forces of nature are adapted as means to the
purposes of intelligence. Through his sesthetic faculty he
feels the order and harmony of nature. Self-realization
in its third and culminating phase requires the adjustment
of human interests to this all-comprehensive Reality. Now
it is plain that the character of this adjustment will vary
in accordance with the degree of development which self-
interest has undergone whether it is still mainly individual
or has been broadened to include the welfare of humanity.
But since in all cases of incomplete development the ad-
justment is only provisional we may safely neglect them
and consider only the interest of the self when thoroughly
socialized. The question is, therefore, that of the adjust-
ment of human welfare to the Real Universe. It must not
be thought, however, that here we go outside the boundaries
of the self and inquire concerning its relation to an ex-
ternal reality. On the contrary, just because the real uni-
verse is a necessary factor in self-consciousness, it must
be reckoned with in the process of self-realization. The
problem of the relation of man to the universe is of course
the problem of religion, and, as such, is an essential aspect
of self-realization.
THE CONDITIONS OF SELF-REALIZATION 189
The difficulty of the adjustment in question is that the
ultimate character of the All-encompassing Reality is un-
known. It cannot be directly observed or logically demon-
strated. Hence man can only speculate, and such adjust-
ment as he is able to effect will rest upon an assumption.
But speculation upon this subject need not be without
rational grounds. In fact, it is man's own moral develop-
ment that is most illuminating at this point. For, in the
process of self-realization, natural objects are sacrificed
to spiritual activities because the latter prove to be more
comprehensive. Is it not reasonable to assume, therefore,
that Universal Reality, which is by nature all-comprehen-
sive, is spiritual that it is the expression of a Universal
Self within which all our human interests may be included
and harmonized? Of course the existence of such a Uni-
versal or Divine self is in last analysis a matter of faith
rather than knowledge; but we have seen that faith is
called for along the whole course of moral development.
The very existence of the self is rooted in an act of will,
and each step forward in its realization is a venture, the
abandonment of one good which, although restricted, is
assured, for the sake of another which, although it promises
a larger satisfaction, is uncertain and largely unknown.
Religious belief is simply the last of these acts of faith,
the final venture, in which man commits his welfare into
the hands of the Universe, believing that since Spirit is
Universal no natural agency, in life or in death, can
lessen or destroy the reality which has been attained by a
conscious self.
Man thus subordinates his interest to the Universal or
Divine Purpose, adopting the latter, so far as it can be
known, as his own good. To describe in detail the character
and conditions of this adjustment is the task of religion
rather than of Ethics. It involves, for the ordinary man,
not a number of specific activities in addition to those pre-
190 THE NATURE OF THE GOOD
scribed by individual and social duty, but rather, a personal
attitude of resignation to the divine will, and trust in the
divine wisdom. The end now pursued is of all the most
comprehensive the realization of the Universal Purpose,
the Cause of Universal Progress.
Thus we see that with human nature characterized as
it is, the process of self-realization for man is definite in
its direction and specific in its requirements. In its three
aspects it involves the attainment of a progression of ends,
each of which includes and supersedes the one before,
until the supreme and all-comprehensive ideal is reached.
In tabulation these ends appear in the following order:
Self-Realization
Agency Organizing Activity of Volition.
Material Natural Instincts and Spiritual Capacities of Man.
Aspects Ends
Individual ........ \
(
Culture
Social . Altruism
( Humanitarianism
Universal . . . . . . . Universal Progress
REFERENCES
BALDWIN, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development,
Chaps. VI, IX, XII.
JAMES, Psychology, Chap. XXIV.
PILLSBUBY, Essentials of Psychology, Chap. X.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chap. VI.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. II.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XX.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book III, Chap. I.
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. III.
PART THREE
THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION
1. The Relation of the Good to the Existing Human Individual.
2. The Good as External to the Individual. 3. The Good as
Identical with the Interest of the Individual .4. These Two
Aspects of Goodness Explained by the Principle of Self-Realiza-
tion. 5. Arnold's Contrast of Hebraism with Hellenism. 6.
Hebraism. 7. Hellenism. 8. Relation of Christianity to Hebra-
ism and Hellenism.
1. The Relation of the Good to the Existing Human
Individual. In the preceding part the nature of the Good
was considered and the conclusion reached that the summum
bonum is Self-realization. Concerning the Good another
question may be asked which, although closely related to
that of its nature, is nevertheless distinct from it. This
question refers to the relation of the Good to the human
individual in actual life. How does the Good stand re-
lated to the normal man is it connected intimately and
essentially with himself, expressing his own deepest desires
and highest hopes, or is it only_ partially an expression of
his nature, representing his social impulses only and at
variance with other tendencies, or does it present itself
altogether as an authority from "without, a command of
God or a law of the universe to which he must conform or
perish? Upon this question two conflicting views have
arisen in the course of ethical reflection. The jme holds
that the Good is identical with the interest of the individual
and stands for the complete fulfilment of all his desires.
The other regards the Good as external to the individual
198
194 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
and usually opposed to his actual inclinations. 1 The line of
division between these two views does not correspond to,
or even parallel, that between Hedonism and Rationalism.
Rather it cuts across this, although obliquely. Thus one
may hold the view first-named, that the Good is identical
with man's actual interest, and be either a Hedonist or
Rationalist, according as he finds this interest in the enjoy-
ment of pleasure or the exercise of reason. Doubtless, this
first view has closer relationship logically with Hedonism;
feeling is the subjective factor, expressing in its warmth and
immediacy the present state of the self. Yet as a matter
of historic fact it has frequently appeared in union with
Rationalism, as in the case of Greek Ethics, which at once
identifies the Good with the nature of the individual and
believes it to consist in the supremacy of reason in his life.
On the other hand, the second view, that the^ Good is
external to the individual, may be maintained by one who
is either a Rationalist or a Hedonist. But here the leaning
is still more marked toward one of these rival theories, in
this case that of Rationalism; since reason is the objective
factor in human nature and its requirements, possessing
universal validity, seem frequently to have the force_of
external authority. If the Good is pleasure and still ex-
ternal to the individual it must be the pleasure of other
men or of God. But we already know that Hedonism as
a historic doctrine has relied chiefly on the psychological
argument that every man must, from a compulsion of his
1 Such a view of the Good may appear to be a contradiction in
terms, since the Good has been defined as that form of conduct
which satisfies the human will completely. The fact of the depend-
ence of the Good upon the demands of human volition has frequently
been obscured, however, by the features of moral experience described
in the following section, and the whole subject has been complicated
by the belief, more or less prevalent, that man's will, although
originally directed upon the Good, has been perverted by the sins
of our first parents and thus turned altogether to the pursuit of
selfish pleasure.
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 195
nature, seek his own pleasure. Hence a view which finds
the good of the individual in the pleasure of some other
person or persons does not appear as a true or consistent
Hedonism.
2. The Good as External to the Individual. Both of
these_jnews of the relation of the Good to the human in-
dividual are supported by facts whose importance cannot
be gainsaid. The view, second-named, of the externality
of the Good, is in accord with the apparent facts of moral
experience. In the experience of the majority of persons
the requirements of goodness are oppjosed, more frequently
than not, to natural inclination and present desire. Con-
formity to these requirements is possible, therefore, only
when inclination is thwarted and desire is repressed. The
moral life is correctly described as a struggle a struggle
with rebellious tendencies and a recalcitrant nature. We
must be ever watchful, always on our guard, not against
the principalities and powers of the outer world, but against
our own wayward impulses, the frowardness of our own
hearts. Moral development is not the unconscious matur-
ing, the spontaneous blossoming forth, of our nature.
Rather is moral progress a slow and painful ascent in
which each step upward is hard-won and costs pain and
privation. We develop morally by subjecting ourselves to
a law which our natures resist because of its apparent
rigor and severity. Hence even when we have come to
recognize fully the authority of the Good over us and to
acquiesce in its dictates, we never regard it with the affec-
tion and familiarity that we do our private plans and
ambitions. Fear and dislike of the Good may turn to
admiration and reverence, but our attitude towards it never
loses something of that awe which we feel in the presence
of a power greatly superior to ourselves. In spite, then,
of moral development and an increasing conformity to the
demands of the Ideal, duty always retains a suggestion of
196 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
that stern and inflexible authority expressed in the lines
of Wordsworth:
" Stern Daughter of the Voice of God,
Duty, if that name thou love
Who art a light to guide, a rod
To check the erring and reprove;
Thou, who art victory and law
When empty terrors overawe;
From vain temptations dost set free;
And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity ! "
3. The Good as Identical with the Interest of the In-
dividual. When the facts of the moral life are made the
subject of conscious reflection the identity of Goodness
with the nature and interest of the individual assumes
greater prominence than any semblance of opposition be-
tween them. It is true that the voice of duty never loses
the note of authority when it demands the subjection of
present desire or natural impulse. Yet it is not an author-
ity external to the human individual constraining him
against his will. So far from this, the distinguishing char-
acteristic of duty or moral obligation is its utter difference
from such external compulsion. When the individual
recognizes a moral obligation, he feels that he owes the
act in question, not to any person or power outside him,
but to himself. To his conscience, he may say it is, but his
conscience is an integral part of his own nature. The
authority of conscience is therefore an authority self-con-
stituted, and the law of duty is a law which we impose
on ourselves. Neither can be understood except as an
expression of the will of the agent a different will from
that which flames out in momentary desire, but as the very
contrast suggests, a steadier and larger will. There is no
disputing that the demands of goodness express the nature
of the individual and are identical with his true interest.
This identity of the Good with the highest interests of
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 197
man cannot be doubted even in the most extreme cases
of opposition between the requirements of duty and the
apparent interest of the individual. Duty may demand
that he give up comfort and possessions, health, and even
life, in the discharge of some service to the state whose
importance is not recognized or appreciated. Is not the
Good opposed to the interest of the individual in this case ?
No, the fact that he felt this political or social obligation
shows that there was a side of his nature which could not
be satisfied with wealth, comfort, or pleasure, but which
required for its expression some positive contribution to
social welfare. Even though the action is one which a
fuller understanding of the matter will show to be actually
at variance with the true interest of the individual or his
fellow-men, the simple fact that the agent feels an obliga-
tion to perform it proves that for him in ignorance, for
him with his limitations and prejudices, it is a genuine
expression of himself and hence represents at the time his
highest interest. It has been truly said in the case often
cited of the zealous Puritan, who was willing to be damned
if it would increase God's glory, that for this particular
man as he was, possessed of the peculiar theological con-
ceptions and intense religious convictions of his sect, such
a fate for himself, with the resulting augmentation of
the divine glory, might represent the fullest satisfaction
of his nature. Such discrepancies between the form and
the content of goodness are fortunately rare and destined
to become rarer as moral enlightenment proceeds. One
of the greatest services of ethical reflection has been to
make perfectly clear this dependence of the Good, or
the Moral Ideal, upon the nature~of man. A better under-
standing of this fact by people at large will make it
less easy in the future than it has been in the past for
politicians and ecclesiastics to work upon the consciences
of men through the agencies of school and church, arousing
198 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
in them a reverence for laws and institutions actually
opposed to the highest human welfare, on the plea that
they express the commands of Deity for mankind.
4. These Two Aspects of Goodness Explained by the
Principle of Self- Realization. These two aspects of the
relation of the Good to the human individual, neither of
which can be denied, yet which seem to contradict one
another absolutely, are explained and adjusted when we
view the Good as Self-realization. From this standpoint
the Good is interpreted as the realization of the whole self.
But the whole self, it must be remembered, is actual only
at the end of the process. This, the goal of moral evolution,
is seldom if ever reached in the present world, and exists
it must be confessed rather as an ideal limit than as
an actual state. In all stages of incomplete moral develop-
ment, which is the condition of all human individuals,
only a part and not the whole of the self is actual.
Hence the Good, whichjs always identical with the demands
of ,the larger total self, is partially external to, and may be
sharply at variance with, the desires of the actual self.
The existence of the larger self, as yet latent and unrealized,
is demonstrated, however, by the obligation felt to tran-
scend the narrow boundaries of the actual nature and
enter a larger life. Thus a solution is reached of the
chief antinomy of the moral life that the Good is identical
with the interest of human nature and at the same time
opposed to it. The Good is identical with the interest
of the whole self, which exists during the course of moral
evolution only in potentia, and opposed to the interest
of the part self, which is alone actual.
Of course, the character of the self is continually chang-
ing as moral development proceeds, and consequently the
battle-ground between its actual nature and latent possi-
bilities is constantly shifting. There are, however, certain
points in the pathway of moral progress where the conflict
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 199
between the actual and the ideal seems especially severe.
These assume the proportions of crises in moral experience ;
for upon the issue of the battle here waged depends the
further progress of the individual. Perhaps the most im-
portant of these conflicts are those between the sentient
or " natural " self aryl the personal or " spiritual ." self,
ajad between the individual or egoistic and the social or
altruistic self. In the first case we find that the regulation
and adjustment of animal impulse, which is the first step in
self-realization, has apparently increased rather than dimin-
ished the desire for sentient satisfaction. For such regula-
tion is productive of fuller health and a higher degree of
physical energy. Hence the craving for pleasure to be
obtained from the due gratification of all sensuous desires
becomes stronger and it is accompanied by an increasing
consciousness of power to gain such gratification. To the
demands for a larger spiritual attainment the nature of in-
dividuals, thus dominated by a desire for sentient satisfac-
tion, interpose the most stubborn resistance. A striking
instance of such conflict is afforded in the case of young
men who, in the full tide of youthful vitality, are confronted
by the necessity of submitting to a long period of prepara-
tory^discipline as the condition of successful achievement in
some professional sphere. To oppose the insistent clamor
of fully awakened senses for their appropriate satisfaction
is indeed to battle against nature. Yet such a conquest
of nature is the sine qua non of all further attainment
and many a promising career has been ruined through
failure to achieve it.
In an analogous way, the second conflict arises when
as the result of the organization olT~all the desires and
capacities of the individual into a unitary system, a well-
defined self-interest appears. This self-interest, when it
first emerges from the confusion of opposing tendencies,
stands for the individual in his individuality as a single
200 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
unit among many, and thus is of a markedly exclusive
character. The individual is sharply conscious of himself
as possessing plans and purposes in short, an interest
which is entirely his own and quite different from the
interest of every other human being. Hence one prominent
part of his true good is external to the nature of the in-
dividual at this stage. The welfare of others, which con-
stitutes an important element in the Good when completely
realized, is largely absent from the interest of the self when
this is first defined in moral evolution. The ...cost jof in-
creasing coherence is at first increasing narrowness of
character; the immediate result of concentration may be
accentuated selfishness. When a man, by the ordering
of his various impulses, first awakens to the existence of
his own individuality his attention is naturally centered
upon himself and upon his hopes and plans as a separate
individual. He finds that his ambition often conflicts with
the purposes of others. The whole tendency of his awak-
ened self-consciousness is to fulfil this ambition of his,
to satisfy his own desire at any cost, regardless of the
welfare of others and the suffering he may cause among
his fellow-men. If, notwithstanding his natural inclina-
tions, he feels obliged to promote another's interest at the
expense of his own, he regards the Good which he realizes
as entirely external to himself. Duty appears to him
as a foreign authority coercing him against his will
and compelling him to give up his own Good. Yet
here also it is necessary for the individual to surrender
his private plans and his actual ambitions if he is to par-
ticipate in the fuller life of social interchange and com-
munity.
It must not be forgotten, when we dwell thus upon the
conflict of the ideal with the actual nature of the individual,
that the feeling of obligation, the recognition of a duty, to
overcome the limitations of this narrow, actual self, proves
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 201
clearly that a larger nature exists latent and undeveloped.
No matter how reluctant the admission, no matter how
grudging the assent, still the fact that the duty is admitted,
the obligation assented to, shows that the larger self is there
waiting to be developed. And the development follows, by
the necessity of psychological law, when the obligation is
met and the duty performed. Led by a sense of duty, and
with great unwillingness, a man may engage in the politics
of his own city. He may not at first feel the slightest inter-
est in the matter in fact, may have a strong repugnance
for the associations and activities which it involves. But
after repeatedly acting as civic duty demands in caucus and
election, he begins to form new habits which make these
activities easier and more natural. Direct participation
in political affairs gives him first-hand knowledge and
more intimate acquaintance with them. This in turn
arouses interest, and before many years the newly-formed
habits pass into a permanent disposition or trait of char-
acter which seeks expression and finds pleasure in the
discharge of those offices which formerly were performed
with dread and disgust. Thus the actual nature of an
individual is extended and enlarged, with its boundaries
approaching ever more nearly those of his total self, the
universal self, that is, present implicitly in all human
individuals. This larger self which is developed through
effort and struggle is often called the ' ' second nature ' ' to
contrast it with the first nature which is partially the
result of heredity and early training. Speaking in the
same fashion, Hegel says: " The harmoniousness of child-
hood is a gift from the hand of nature : the second harmony
must spring from the labor and culture of the Spirit." 2
When the Good thus becomes a second nature it is no
longer in any sense external to the self, but becomes the
spontaneous expression of a character which has been so
1 HEGEL: Logic (Wallace trans., p. 55).
202 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
broadened as to include the interests of others and so
organized as to realize all of the capacities of intelligent
personality.
5. Arnold's Contrast of Hebraism with Hellenism
These two aspects of the Good which we have been con-
sidering are connected by Matthew Arnold, in his famous
essay, Hebraism and Hellenism, with two great historic
forces at work in human society. The final aim of these
two spiritual forces, he asserts, is the same, man's perfec-
tion or salvation ; but they pursue their aim by very differ-
ent courses. The one_eniphasizes^ction. Its leading idea is
conduct and obedience obedience to the divine law, in
strict conformity to the demands of conscience. Only thus
can man conquer the sinful tendency in his own nature and
realize in himself the perfection of the divine. The em-
phasis of tfre.jjt.her is upon intelligence. It seeks to know
human life and the world of human experience as they are.
And to such insight the Good appears as a reasonable
and beautiful thing the condition of human happiness,
to be pursued spontaneously and joyously. " And these
two forces we regard as in some sense rivals rivals not
by a necessity of their own nature, but as exhibited in man
and his history. And to give these forces names from the
two races of men who have supplied the most signal and
splendid manifestations of them, we may call them, re-
spectively, the forces of Hebraism and Hellenism. Hebra-
ism and Hellenism between these two points of influence
moves our world. At one time it feels more powerfully
the attraction of one of them, at another time of the other ;
and it ought to be, though it never is, evenly and happily
balanced between them." Christianity, according to
Arnold, is but a modification of Hebraism. " Christianity
changed nothing in the essential bent of Hebraism to set
doing above knowing. Self-conquest, self-devotion, the fol-
lowing, not our own individual will, but the will of God,
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 203
obedience, is the fundamental idea of this form, also, of
the discipline to which we have attached the general name
of Hebraism." Hellenism was re-born at the beginning
of the modern era, in the Renaissance with its desire for
knowledge of the material world and its appreciation of
the beauty in nature and human art. It persists in the
ideal of culture which aims at a perfection of man 's natural
qualities. It was met, however, by a new_form_of Hebra-
isno, the product of the Reformation. Protestantism called
upon men to find their chief good in obedience to the
divine will as revealed in the Scriptures. This, the Puritan
ideal, which makes duty or conscience supreme in human
life, is still the strongest moral force in the world. Neither
of these two great spiritual disciplines which have for so
long opposed one another and still offer to humanity sharply
conflicting ideals is to be looked upon as furnishing the
law of human development. " They are, each of them,
contributions to human development, august contributions,
invaluable contributions; and each showing itself to us
more august, more invaluable, more preponderant over the
other, according to the moment in which we take them
and the relation in which we stand to them."
6. Hebraism. It will be illuminating to dwell a little
longer upon these two tendencies in the spiritual develop-
ment of humanity which Arnold contrasts so effectively;
for here, as in many other cases, history gives vitality and
concreteness to a distinction which of itself might seem
abstract and theoretical. Let us therefore compare the
two conflicting doctrines upon important points, and then
inquire if there has not arisen in history a third view
which may be taken as a synthesis of the other two. We
derive our knowledge of Hebraism chiefly from the litera-
ture of the Old Testament. There man's good is repre-
sented as existing, entirely outside his own nature, in the
204 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
will of God. 3 Man is, in fact, believed to be entirely sin-
ful and incapable of knowing his own good. The primary
and essential condition of goodness for him is obedience
to the divine will. The commands of God are not dis-
covered by the exercise of human reason : they are revealed,
in the form of a divine law, by inspired law-givers and
prophets. The revelation of this divine law to a particular
people is based upon a covenant in which God as Law-giver
agrees, in reward of their obedience to this law, to make
of them a favored race and to continue them under His
protection and guidance. The result of obedience, if given,
will not be goodness or perfection in man like to that of
God. But man will attain, through obedience unto right-
eousness, a state of conformity to the divine will. The
sphere in which this righteousness is exercised is to be not a
political state, but a theocratic kingdom, a divinely estab-
lished order to be set up in Israel. The people of God's
choice may live righteously, ruled by God Himself. This
ethico-religious system under which the Hebrew people lived
had the great merit of holding before men a lofty ideal
raised above the level of individual interest because believed
to proceed from the Creator and Sovereign Power of all the
world. Thus the requirements of morality were given
the dignity and majesty of a law with a superhuman source
and supernatural sanctions. But this very separation of
the Good from the nature and interest of man had evil
consequences which in time seemed to outweigh the merits
of the system. Since the Good found expression in a law
imposed upon men from without, it was inevitable that
they should pay more and more attention to outward con-
formity and less and less to inward motive and disposition.
Great care was expended in learning with literal exactness
the requirements of the law and in practising with formal
*Cf. BRUCE: Ethics of the Old Testament, Chap. I, (2) "Funda-
mental Principles of Old Testament Ethics."
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 205
precision the observances which it required. Thus Hebra-
ism degenerated into that arid legalism and barren formal-
ism which permitted an exact outward compliance with
the law a mere husk of righteousness to exist along with
injustice and cruelty and avarice, a condition denounced
by the later prophets and still more strongly reprobated
by Jesus himself.
7. Hellenism. In all essential points the Ethics of
Hellenism is the antithesis of the Hebrew doctrine. For
the Greek thinker it was a truth self-evident that the Good
was based upon the nature of man and identical with his
true happiness. 4 Not that all the Greek moralists were
Hedonists, but it was an assumption common to all their
theories that, whatever^ the Qood was, it would be such as
tojiring. man that happiness which results from the fulfil-
ment of his nature. Even the Cynics, who recommended
the renunciation of all natural pleasure, did so because they
believed that only through such asceticism could the human
soul gain peace and the opportunity to exercise freely and
uninterruptedly its own capacities. With regard to the
primary and essential factor in goodness, practically all
the Greek moralists agree that this is the exercise,.^
reason. Wisdom, the distinctively human capacity, is the
one sterling coin for which all the virtues may be ex-
changed, 5 and constitutes the foundation of every good
life. Reason when exercised gives man an insight into his
own nature and into his relations with his fellow-men: it
enables him to foresee the consequences of his conduct and
to act with a view to his future happiness. The effect of
thus applying reason to the conduct of human life is to
produce order and harmony. The several activities of
man's nature are so regulated and adjusted that their
expression is harmonious and proportionate. Such balance
4 ARISTOTLE: Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Chap. V.
PLATO: Phaedo, 69.
206 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
and proportion in the play of its different activities are
equivalent to the health of the soul, which is identical with
virtue or goodness. 6 The sphere in which this rationally
ordered life is attained is the body-politic, the city-state;
since man is a social animal, and complete satisfaction is
possible to his nature only when, through the discharge
of his duties as citizen, he is brought into varied and in-
timate associations with his fellows. For its effort thus
to connect the Good with man's nature Greek Ethics is
deserving of highest praise. Represented as the perfection
of human nature, the Ideal is made to appear in its de-
mands both reasonable and beautiful. Morality, instead of
being an unwilling obedience to a law exacting and in-
flexible, is the spontaneous expression of a soul enlightened
by reason. But this identification of the Good with the cul-
ture and perfection of man's faculties had unfortunate re-
sults in Greek thought. For an imperfect understanding of
human nature led to an inadequate conception of the Good.
Reason was made supreme, and thus the Good limited to
what could be reasonably expected to increase the satisfac-
tion of the human individual. Hence no sufficient basis was
provided, after all, for social obligation. It was possible to
show that the citizens of a Greek city had mutual interests,
and, for that reason, were bound in duty to assist and
serve one another. But that such a community of interest
extended to barbarians and slaves could not be demon-
strated, and consequently no social obligation was admitted
which extended beyond the limits of the Greek nation to
humanity in general. And when the Greek states lost
their independence and their citizens were brought into
more direct contact with other nationalities and classes,
this individualism in their ethical thought was further
accentuated until, in the later theories, the chief function
of reason in human conduct was to give the individual a
PLATO: Republic, 443.
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 207
means of satisfaction within himself which should free
him from the need of all social activities and relation-
ships.
8. Relation of Christianity to Hebraism and Hellen-
ism. In the opinion of Arnold, as we have seen, Chris-
tianity is only a modification of Hebraism, sharing its one-
sidedness and inadequacy. Such criticism may be justly
applied to the interpretation of Christianity which regards
it as a continuation of the Hebrew cult, in which an in-
tellectual assent to the divinity of the Founder is offered
as a substitute for that perfect conformity to the divine
law which God demands and man is unable to achieve.
But we find in the teachings of Jesus another and a higher
view in all important respects identical with that of " self-
realization " which raises Christianity far above the lim-
itations of both Hebraism and Hellenism and makes of
it a comprehensive synthesis of the profound and enduring
truths contained in these two historic doctrines. Jesus
based the Good neither upon a divine will external to man,
nor upon the actual nature of the human individual. He
always taught that goodness consisted in inward disposi-
tion and not in outward conformity : it must be rooted deep
in the soul of man and develop as a true expression of
his nature. " Have salt in yourselves " (Mark 9: 50), he
admonishes his disciples, and always sought to arouse and
strengthen the better part of their natures. Of all the
laws of the old Hebrew dispensation, none was more dis-
tinctive or held in greater reverence than that concerning
Sabbath observance. Yet Jesus did not hesitate to break
this law when human welfare could be benefited thereby,
and to his critics he replied, " The Sabbath was made for
man, and not man for the Sabbath." (Mark 2 : 27.) Nor,
on the other hand, did he identify the Good with the actual
interest of man. Rather did he insist that its attainment
was an arduous task, involving struggle and submission.
208 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
The individual must prepare to see his own nature
thwarted and his own desires suppressed if he proposes
to pursue the Ideal. The sacrifice of private aim and
ambition was said to be the condition of achieving the
higher good. He who would find his life must be willing
first to lose it. As the death of the seed is the condition
of the growth of the plant, so the death of the old self is
the condition of the development of the new life of virtue
and goodness. Not, then, in a law imposed upon man from
without, nor in desires existing within him, does Jesus find
the ground and source of goodness, but in a larger self
latent in human nature. This larger self pertains neither
to God nor man exclusively, but is common to both and
testifies to the union of the human and the divine. It is,
in fact, the divine principle in man, and in its realization
man shares the divine life, while God is expressed in human
nature. Through the submission of his actual nature the
individual realizes his larger self, and this perfecting of
his own nature brings him into harmony with his fellow-
men and with God.
In further evidence of its synthetic character Christianity
finds the prime condition of goodness neither in wisdom nor
obedience, but in a union of thought and action i.e. faith.
It does not exalt as the essence of righteousness in man
an unquestioning obedience to a will external to him and
a law arbitrarily imposed upon his conduct. Instead Jesus
based his injunctions upon a well-defined and consistent
view of man and the universe. According to this, the
Christian view of the world, man is not what he seems,
a merely natural being whose Good lies in the satisfaction
of his material wants. He is in his deepest nature spiritual
and the child of the Divine Spirit, who is the source of
all reality. Hence the larger life for man, the more real
existence, is a spiritual life in which those ends are sought
which have universal value. But in the teachings of Jesus
THE CONCEPTION OF SELF-REALIZATION 209
no attempt is made to prove or demonstrate the truth of
these views. Since they concern the possibilities of human
development they lie beyond the region of direct proof
or demonstration. The only proof which the individual
can have of their truth comes from acting upon them.
He must be willing to make the venture before he can
experience the satisfaction of the larger life. This venture
involves the surrender of objects known to have value for
the sake of others which are untried, in actual experience
unknown. Faith in the Christian conception is therefore
an act of will enlightened by reason, but not prescribed
or pre-determined by reason. The will in this action only
expresses the larger self, voicing the latent possibilities in
the human individual of a more comprehensive and com-
pletely organized life.
The larger self, which is the basis of Christian Ethics,
furnishes also a new social bond among human beings.
Since all men possess this divine principle latent in their
natures they are all united by ties of spiritual kinship.
A recognition of this kinship awakens in the individual
a love for his fellow-men. This love is different from a
natural sympathy for a limited number of friends and ac-
quaintances; it is an enthusiastic devotion to the ideal
possibilities which are present in every human individual
and give to each an infinite value. This love, when it is
awakened, constitutes the only motive sufficient to impel
men to unlimited social service. To such motive Chris-
tianity appeals, and arouses the individual to effort in
behalf of all mankind. Its sphere is therefore not that
of the political state, or an ecclesiastical organization, but
of the whole human race, and its social ideal, that of the
Kingdom of God, is a universal society in which the divine
spirit of justice and benevolence prevails and each indi-
vidual is given an opportunity for the fullest personal
development.
210 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
REFERENCES
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. Ill, 1-6.
JAMES, Psychology, Chap. X.
DEWEY AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XVIII, 4.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book II, Chap. V.
ALEXANDEB, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. I.
GBEEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chaps. I, II.
ABNOLD, Culture and Anarchy, Chaps. IV, V.
CAIBD, Evolution of Religion, Vol. II, Lecture VI.
CHAPTER II
SELF-REALIZATION AND THE STANDARD OF
GOODNESS
1. The Idea of the Good as Furnishing a Standard of Moral Judg-
ment. 2. Self-Realization Criticised as Failing to Supply Such
a Standard. 3. The Ideal of Self-Realization as the Standard of
Moral Judgment. 4. This Standard When Applied to Human
Life Yields Further Principles of Moral Distinction. 5. The
Principle of Individual Interest. 6. The Principle of Social
Welfare. 7. Maxims of Individual Interest: (a) Maxim of
Prudence, 8. (6) Maxim of Idealism. 9. Maxims of Social
Welfare: (a) Maxim of Altruism, 10. (6) Maxim of Humani-
tarianism.
1. The Idea of the Good as Furnishing a Standard of
Moral Judgment. One of the reasons why it is worth our
while to inquire at length into the nature of the summum
bonum is that the_j2onception of the Good when attained
should provide us with a satisfactory standard of moral
judgment. Indeed it seems that this is the chief reason
for such a study as we have undertaken ; since the^leading
aim of ^Ethics is tp_j*ationalize human conduct, and this is
accomplished only by_substituting a rational basis_|or_the
authority of custom and tradition, in all judgments of
moral value. Now, as previous discussion has shown, the
idea of the Good ought to furnish just this rational basis
for the deciding of all questions of good and evil, and
hence for the practical guidance of life. We have a right
to expect, therefore, that Self-realization, if a true view
of the Good, will fully meet this requirement. To the
question of whether the theory of Self-realization actually
furnishes such a standard of moral judgment we now ad-
dress ourselves.
211
212 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
2. Self-Realization Criticised as Failing to Furnish
Such a Standard. Unfortunately, difficulties are en-
countered at the very beginning in the form of charges
recently made that Self-realization fails in just this matter
of supplying an adequate criterion of right and wrong.
It is asserted, in the flrsJL. place, that Self-realization gives
no_ground_for discriminating between different acts of
the individual, since afl are equally expressions of the
self and hence good. Professor W. R. Sorley has thus
criticised " self-realization " because it affords no standard
for estimating the moral value of the different actions of
the individual. " In every action whatever of a conscious
being," he says, " self-realization may be said to be the
end: some capacity is being developed, satisfaction is being
sought for some desire. A man may develop his capacities,
seek, and to some extent attain self-satisfaction, in a man-
ner realize himself not only in devotion to a scientific
or artistic ideal or in labors for a common good, but jilso
in the selfish pursuit of power, or even in sensual enjoy-
ment. So far as the word ' self-realization ' can be made
to cover such different activities, it is vo|d^ of moral content
and cannot express the nature of the moral ideal. ' ' 1
In the segojid place, it is charged that Self-realization
doesjnot permit us tojnake distinctions of moral worth,
as, between t^e^c^djiet_of_different individuals. For are
not all individuals equally selves, and in so far as the
activities of each express his own nature, are not all upon
the same plane of goodness ? In this connection, Professor
Boodin, for instance, criticises Self-realization and charges
it with failure to furnish a standard for the evaluation of
conduct. " There are many types of selves, and each type
desires its own fulfilment. If self-realization is to be the
criterion of life, what self is to be realized, the baboon
self, the pig self, or what sort of self? If all but human
1 W. R. SOBLET: Recent Tendencies in Ethioe, p. 90.
.
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 213
selves are to be excluded, what sort of human self? Not
the criminal or the insane self, surely? Only a normal
self could be the standard. As Plato says, it must be a
very wise man who is to be the measure. But what is
normal? " 2
These critics strike at a vital point in the Self-realization
theory. The defect dwelt upon is not an unimportant or
external feature which can be easily removed. Instead it
appears to be inseparably connected with the fundamental
principle of Self-realization. For it is the peculiar merit
as well as the distinguishing characteristic of this view that
it finds the Good not in the exercise of any one part or
faculty of human nature, but in the harmonious develop-
mejit__oJLthe wholejself. But does not this fact, which is
the boast of the Self-realizationist that his theory recog-
nizes as equally ...legitimate and worthy all the tendencies
and powers of conscious personality prove a stumbling-
block when the attempt is made to use the theory as a
basis of moral judgment? For ho wjdjscriminate__ between
acts, approving some as good and condemning others as
bad^ when all are equally necessary expressions of the self?
And how impose the same standard upon different selves,
when they vary in character and ability, and the ideal
demands that each should realize his own capacities?
Because they exalt one side of human nature at the
expense of the rest, the time-honored doctrines of IJedon-
ism_and Rationalism have been discarded. BUJL by, virtue
of this very quality one-sidedness, we consider it they
succeed, where Self-realization seems to fail, in furnishing
a definite standard of moral judgment. Take Hedonism,
for instance ; pleasant feeling is declared to be the ^ood.
Hence all acts that bring pleasure now or in the future
are morally good; all acts that bring pain are morally
* " The Ought and Eeality," International Journal of EtMcs, July,
1907, p. 457.
214 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
bad; all other acts are morally indifferent. The case is
the_sa.me with Rationalism, if the exercise of reason be
substituted for the feeling of pleasure. If we take either
of these two doctrines as the rule of life, we can contrast
acts which satisfy the chosen part of the self with acts that
satisfy other parts, draw a sharp line of distinction be-
tween them, and judge the former actions to be good and
the latter to be bad. Thus we gajn_ a T serviceable, principle
for the ordering of our lives, which is certainly better tkan
nojprinciple _at_all, and perhaps^ better than a principle
which presents an attractive ideal but supplies no guidance
for the conduct of daily life.
3. The Ideal of Self-Realization as the Standard of
Moral Judgment. Self-realization need rest under no
such condemnation, however ; since such criticisms as those
just mentioned result from a misunderstanding of the
theory. It is a mistake to think that because Self-realiza-
tion identifies the Good with the expression of no one part
of the self to the exclusion of the remainder, it therefore
approves of all activities of the self as good. True it is,
that our view finds the Good in the exercise of no one
faculty of human nature, but this does not mean that it
is consequently deprived of any criterion by which right
action can be distinguished from wrong. On the contrary,
it furnishes a very definite__criterion. For, according to
Self-realization, the Good lies in the realization of ihejyhole
self in distinction from any part or division of the self.
From this ideal we secure a clear and decisive standard
of moral judgment. The line_pf distinction is drawn be-
tween ^actions which^cpntribute_J;o the satisfaction of^all
thejcapjacities of the human self anjl thpse_jyhich serve
to gratify only single^ones. The former are judged good:
the latter are pronounced bad. So far from making only
vague and ambiguous recommendation, Self-realization
issues the mostdefinite ajid peremptory commands. All
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 215
acts which hinder or frustrate the fulfilment of man 's entire
self it condemns as utterly wrong, and it demands their
absolute suppression. Thus we gain a secure and adequate
basis for all judgments of moral value.
The Ideal of Self-realization furnishes no infallible touch-
stone of good and evil, to be sure, deciding ojf-hand the
moral value of every particular act. It is an ideal of a
very general-character. Its application to specific questions
of right and wrong is often not apparent, and can be
made out only_by protracted and careful thought. This
does not lessen the value of Self-realization as the Ideal,
however; for, in order to fulfil this office, a conception .must
be sufficiently general to comprehend within its scope all
practical considerations whatsoever, and to be_junversally
applicable throughout the entire field of conduct. Hence
whjjje in the regulation o_f_daily life we may_find_that prin-
ciples, more definite in meaning and limited in range, are
usually of greater jissistance, still on critical occasions when
these principles themselves are called into question such
an ideal is indispensable as a jina! jjourt of appeal. The
Ideal may be likened to the polar star which, far removed
from the affairs of our planet, gives to the surveyor of
the earth's surface his ultimate direction of reference.
He does not take it into consideration every time he meas-
ures a distance or computes an area. Yet since it furnishes
the direction upon which all other directions are based,
there is a tacit reference to it in every calculation of the
surveyor, and, in all cases of serious doubt, it is the final
court ofjmpeal.
Whenever we are driven^hack to firsJLpremises we have
need of such a standard as the Ideal of Self-realization
supplies. This mayjiccur in the case of__acts that are
comparatively^ unimportant. An action which in itself is
trivial, like playing a game of cards or calling upon an
acquaintance, may take on the significance of a test case
216 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
and involve all the issues of morality. Or^yiarily, how-
ever, we have recourse to an ultimatj^ standard only when
considering such broa^jyid_iiiLdjamnta.l problems of human
life and relationships as call in question otherwise accepted
principles of conduct. This is the case when we are re-
quired to pass judgment upon existing, pfllitical aadjsocial
institutions. Then the value of such a standard as Self-
realization is most clearly manifest. Suppose that it is a
form of government which we are critically considering;
for instance, democracy or_ aristocracy. Then it is illumi-
nating and even necessary to know that the final aim of
government is neither to promote the interest of a special
class nor to register the will of a majority, but to further
the development of hugiaB_DjersQn_ality in all_individuals,
to^expressjhe^ * ' genemLwill. * * Or if it is a social insti-
tution, like monogamous_jnarriage, of which we are seeking
to ascertain the value then we must recognize that the
worth of such an institution depends, not upon the extent
to which it fulfils a supposed divine command or continues
a historic development, but rather upon the degree to which
it contributesjp the self-realization of the persons involved.
Or, better stated perhaps, the pretensions of any social
or political arrangement to be of divine origin or in the
line of moral development may be rejected as false when
this arrangement does not minister to the personaj,_welfare
of humanity.
iT'This Standard When Applied to Human Life
Yields Further Principles of Moral Distinction. Still it
must be Admitted that if Self-realization were limited to
enjoining every individual to realize his entire self, there
would be sufficient justification for the second Criticism
noted above, that the theory provides no definite principles
of conduct which are binding upon all individuals. For
since indiviflnajs jljffpj in character and in capacities the
expression of the entire nature will involve quite different
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 217
forms of conduct for each one. Self-realization, as thus
far considered, an ideal which recommends the realization
of the whole as distinct from the part self, leaves undecided
t.hp. guest ion of what kind of a self is to be fully realized,
normal or abnormal, primitive or civilized, masculine or
feminine, intellectual, emotional, or practical. But this
objection also disappears after further reflection. When
the Ideal of Self-realization, which we have accepted as
the standard of moral judgment, is applied_io_acJtuaL human
nature, it yields^ certain definite_jp_rinciples of action which
hold, jfor all men equally and constitute in themselves an
adequate answer to the objection. For while human
nature varies almost without limit there are, as has been
shown, fundamentaLchaxaeteristics which all men possess
in common. In the first place, all men have the same natu-
raMnstincts, which relate them to a world of objects and
to other members of the human species. Secondly, men
are all alike in the possession of certain spiritual .capacities, j
which relate them to fellow-men in a community of in-
telligence and to the real universe as an orderly system.
In consequence of this essential identity of human nature,
the realization of the whole self requires from all of us
the same modes of action. It is possible, therefore, to
derive from the Ideal of Self-realization, when applied to
the actual nature of man, a set of principles and maxims
which enable us to distinguish between good and evil in
our daily experience. Of course, the whole self is not .
realized in a single act or all at once. Rather is it gradu-
ally unfolded or developed in a number of spheres and
through a succession of stages. What^ we wish to know v
is what^form of conduct expresses the whole self, and Jience
deserves^ to be called good in each important spjhere and
at e very ^ nee essary_ stage.
The twQ_jaost important jspheres or__aspeci;s of the life
of the self are the individual and the social. In the sphere
218 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
first-joamed, the self is mani|eljis an individual, gaining
expression through a system of objects. In the second, the
self^ appears as_ united with other individuals in a__socjal
community. In the firsj__s,phere the whole self is repre*
sented by the total_interest of the individual or the satisfac-
tion of all his desires and cap_acities in their organized unity,
injgontrast to hjs_partial interest or the satisfaction of one
or more desires at the expense of the rest. In the second
sphere the whole_self is represented, by the welfare ofjociety
or jhe_ social jself , in contrast to the interest of any in-
dividual or limited number of individuals. When applied
to both of these spheres the Ideal of Self-realization thus
yields two principles of moral judgment, each of which
may be briefly considered.
5. The Principle of Individual Interest. The principle
which Self-realization furnishes to guide moral judgment
in the individual sphere is that the total interest of the
individual is to be preferred to any partial interest what-
soever. And since this total interest is the result of the
adjustment of various activities and tendencies of the in-
-,dividual into an organized system, its attainment will in-
^ volve the proportionate expression of all these activities
and that in contrast to the gratification of any single desire
or group of desires. Some moralists do not admit the
existence of such an adjustment within the life of the in-
dividual in distinction from the adjustment of the indi-
vidual to society. For example, Mr. Alexander, in his
Moral Order and Progress, 3 tells us that Goodness may be
understood either as (1) an adjustment of activities in the
individual or as (2) an adjustment of individuals in
society. These adjustments are idejitical in process and
. result. Hence the individual who gives harmonious ex-
pression to all his impulses at the same time discharges
" in full his obligation to society. The same writer endeavors
ALEXANDER: Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. II.
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 219
to show how all the virtues usually regarded as solely
individual have also a social reference. Now it is assuredly
true that the individual and the social spheres cannot be
separated, and that they imply one another at every point.
Such a virtue as temperance, ordinarily thought of as
individual, has a decided social bearing. But nevertheless
to deny the existence of a sphere at least relatively distinct
from the social, in which the individual is concerned only
with his own interest, is to overlook certain of the most
salient features of morality. It is to neglect the import-
ance of the development of individuality in the moral life,
both in itself and as a condition of the further adjustment
of the individual to society.
The need for recognizing a distinctly individual sphere
of action is apparent when we think of the principles which
should determine the individual's choice of a profession
or occupation. While it is important for the individual
to take account of social conditions and demands, it is
still more important for him to consider his own abilities
and limitations, and select that line of work in which the
one shall receive the fullest expression and the other offer
the least hindrance. For genuine ability in a man when
honestly exercised may always be socially useful, while
a work undertaken for social benefit will fail of its purpose
if the individual is unfitted to perform it. "When social
influences or economic pressure interfere, therefore, to pre-
vent the individual from consulting his own aptitudes and
preferences in thife matter of a life-work, the result is '
morally injurious. In European countries young men have
been drawn in large numbers into the clergy a|jd the army,
not because of any particular fitness for these professions,
but because social convention has set an artificial premium
upon activity in these lines and thus put at a comparative
disadvantage other professions. In America accepted so-
cial standards tend, in like manner, to infringe upon the
220 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
liberty of the individual by setting a premium upon busi-
ness and political success, and reflecting corresponding dis-
credit upon scholarly and artistic achievement. As Pro-
fessor Miinsterberg says : ' ' If we are sincere we ought not
to overlook the fact that the scholar, as such, has no position
in public opinion which corresponds to the true value of
his achievement. The foreigner feels at once this difference
between the Americans and the Europeans. . . . The finest
men go into business and industry, into law and medicine ;
and those who turn to the graduate schools of the country
are, in the majority, men without initiative and ambition,
and without promise for the highest kind of work. ' ' * And
what is here said applies, not merely to professions and
" callings," but to every trade and occupation which men
pursue. The establishment of vocation bureaus in some
of our large cities, through which individuals are relieved
of economic pressure for a short time, during which they
are assisted in finding the occupation for which their na-
tures have fitted them, shows how far the rights of in-
dividuality in this respect have been violated under present
social conditions. The man, who as carpenter or brick-layer
leads a dissatisfied and unregulated life, may as sign-
painter become a happy and useful citizen, because, in the
latter case, his native ability is finding free expression
and not being thwarted and stifled.
After the life-work is once chosen the individual may
rightfully claim a large liberty in methods of preparation
and accomplishment. He should follow the principle which
governs action in the individual sphere selecting those
means which promise, in his case and with his nature, the
most effectually to further his supreme aim. Of course
human experience has discovered, in the case of the leading
occupations, what is in general the best preparatory train-
4 HUGO MTTNSTERBEBG : "The Standing of Scholarship in
Atlantic Monthly, October, 1900, p. 455.
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 221
ing, and the individual greatly economizes his own time
and strength who submits willingly to such preparation
and appropriates as much as possible of its benefit. But
when accepted methods of preparation and practice in
any trade or profession become so rigid and exacting as
to cramp his originality and destroy his initiative, they
lessen the individual's power of achievement, and he is
justified in rebelling against them and asserting the right
of his individuality to seek its own methods of accomplish-
ment.
In other details of his conduct not related to his specific
life-work, but intimately connected with himself, such as
dress, amusements, and daily routine, the individual should
have in a large measure the freedom to determine his
action in accordance with what he believes to be his highest
interest. These are not matters of great moment, but they
are ways in which individuality naturally seeks expression.
Hence they may assume a critical importance when an
unwarranted interference in them is attempted by society,
and such interference, if successful, reacts most unfavorably
upon the character of the individual. In this way sumptu-
ary and " blue " laws, such as those enacted by our
Puritan ancestors, do great harm. Unfortunately, some
traces of this aspect of Puritanism are still seen among
us, especially in our smaller communities, where a person's
attitude towards " worldly amusements " is deemed more
significant of his character than his acts of justice or of
mercy. The right which many Protestant communities
arrogate to themselves of censoring their minister's con-
duct, even in the minutiae of clothing and amusements and
domestic economy, has undoubtedly lessened the efficiency
of many members of the Protestant ministry, thwarting
their individuality and destroying their independence, thus
causing them to appear negative and colorless in their
virtue.
222 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
6. The Principle of Social Welfare. In the social
sphere Self-realization requires that the welfare of society
be preferred to the interest of any individual. The human
individual is thus forbidden in all his relations with his
fellows to utilize other individuals as means or instruments
to the attainment of his own interest, but is rather enjoined
to seek the interests of others as his own. This sub9rdina-
tion of individual interest to social welfare is not in any
sense a violation of the true welfare of the self. Instead
-- --
it signifies the realization of the social self, and this social
self is larger and more complete than the individual for
the very reason that it does not center around a single
individual interest, but comprehends in an organized sys-
tem a vast number of interests each one of which is an
end in itself. The social self is a kingdom of ends the
content and value of each of which is increased by its
relation to all the rest ; humanjsociety is an organic^system
in which all the members stand in functional relation to
the whole.
The principle of social welfare applies to all human
action that concerns more than one individual. Of course
every action of a normal human being has its reference
to other individuals, but, as we have just recognized, this
reference is often only indirect and implied. On the other
hand, there are actions of the individual that are primarily
social in their character. Such are, for instance, the activi-
ties of citizenship. In a democracy the most important of
these activities is the exercise of the franchise. In his vot-
ing the individual citizen should be governed altogether
by the principle just enunciated. Not the promotion of
individual interest in any of its forms, but the furtherance
of public welfare should be the aim of every ballot cast.
This moral issue which is involved in every election is
frequently confused where popular government is secured
through the party system. In that case the individual
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 223
cannot vote directly upon measures and policies, but only
for party candidates who are pledged to enact certain
laws and follow certain policies. Now it is unlikely that
a man who thinks seriously about public welfare will agree
entirely with the platform of any party. Yet, if his vote
and influence are not to be entirely ineifective, he must
join one of the leading parties and support it loyally.
Hence election time finds the good citizen aiming directly
at party success rather than public welfare. This necessity
for choosing some party as best on the whole, and then of
loyally supporting it, despite objectionable features in pol-
icies or personnel, does not mean, however, that the citizen
shall cease to think for himself on all matters of public
concern or shall hesitate to abandon his party on the in-
stant that he is convinced that the policies of another party
are more in accord with the general welfare. Unfortu-
nately, this is just what it does mean with many citizens
who substitute a blind loyalty to party for an intelligent
devotion to social welfare, thus seeking the good of a group
within the state rather than that of the state itself.
The same situation is reproduced on a larger scale when
we think of the relation of the human individual to other
individuals of different nationality to human beings over
all the world. The citizen of a modern state can exert
very little direct influence for good or for ill upon the
citizens of other states. The rise of the nationalistic idea
in modern times seems in many ways to have increased the
barriers between civilized states. But the rise of the
nationalistic idea has been accompanied by the inception
and growth of internationalism the belief that the single
state has an office to discharge in the family of nations.
Hence while the individual citizen can do little directly
to affect the destinies of the millions of human beings living
outside his own state, he can have a share in determining
the policies of his own nation, which, acting in its national
224 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
capacity, may affect profoundly the welfare of humanity
over all the world. The principle of social welfare, applied
here, shows it to be the duty of the citizen to favor those
measures which promise to further, not the well-being of
his own nation merely, but of all the nations, of mankind
universally. There is no reason to doubt that such inter-
nationalism will be as effective in benefiting humanity
as would a humanitarianism which leveled all national
barriers. For, in acting at a distance and in a large way,
the organized agencies of government are more adequate
and efficient than the effort of single individuals or asso-
ciations of individuals. At the time of the earthquake of
1908, in Italy, much valuable assistance was rendered
through individual initiative and cooperative enterprise;
but none so prompt and effective as that of the govern-
ment, which diverted a loaded naval supply-ship to the
relief of the starving sufferers.
7. Maxims of Individual Interest : (a) Maxim of Pru-
dence. But the idea of Self-realization when interpreted
in the light of human experience is capable of supplying
more explicit and detailed criteria of right and wrong,
whose bearing upon the questions of daily conduct is direct
and obvious. Let the two principles just explained, those
of individual interest and social welfare, be applied within
their respective spheres, and the result is in each case
two corollaries or maxims. These maxims express the re-
quirements of Self-realization in successive stages, and each
constitutes within its own province the determining prin-
ciple of moral judgment.
In the individual life Self-realization calls first for the
regulation and adjustment of those sentient impulses which
are the common heritage of mankind. Now of all the
natural instincts of man that which, when raised to the level
of conscious aim, is most comprehensive in its scope, is the
instinct of self-preservation. At first merely a desire for
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 225
present security and well-being, it develops, with the growth
of intelligence, into the purpose to have comfort and
pleasure throughout the natural lifetime. Its object, the
individual in his physical existence, endures throughout
a period of years, and is permanent compared with multi-
tudinous objects of natural desire which are varying and
transitory. Within this inclusive purpose, then, fall the
objects of the other natural instincts which have been de-
veloped as means to individual survival, like those of food,
acquisition, resentment, etc. Being thus inclusive of all
such objects in the degree to which they contribute to
man's comfort and well-being, this purpose represents the
system of natural goods, and, within its own province, the
Ideal of Self-realization. Hence the first maxim in the in-
dividual sphere is that survival and future pleasure should ,
be preferred to the gratification of any desire or desires.
There is slight reason, it may appear, to enjoin human
beings to seek their own comfort and pleasure. Prudence
is easily learned, and the burden of ethical teaching must
be to recommend the subordination of prudential con-
siderations to the larger personal and social ends. Yet as
limited and circumscribed as is its cause prudence con-
stitutes an end much larger and more significant than
many of the ends to which it is often subordinated. Such
objects are, for example, wealth and reputation, when these
are sought for themselves, and not as part of some far-
reaching plan. To be sure, a certain amount of property
and a good reputation are important aids in the attain-
ment of comfort and security, and, in so far as they are
thus sought, their pursuit is justified. But from being
at first sought as means they become, in many cases, ends
in themselves sought for their own sake and to which the
comfort and pleasure of living are ruthlessly sacrificed.
This is particularly true in a country like our own, where
the individual's sphere of activity and social standing are
226 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
not pre-determined by his birth and early surroundings.
The appearance of unlimited opportunity begets a spirit
of restlessness and dissatisfaction with present conditions
which leads the individual to seek wealth and reputation,
not from any appreciation of the larger possibilities of
life which they may open, but simply from a desire to
" get on." To this desire, eager and consuming, all the
simpler joys of living are sacrificed the comfort of the
fireside on winters' evenings in company with interesting
books or truly congenial friends, the enjoyment of the
summer's holiday out-of-doors, the pleasures of unimpaired
digestion, and the solace of refreshing sleep. Spencer re-
marks upon the folly of the husband and father who, in
order to increase the income of his family, applies himself
so unremittingly to his business that his health is broken
down or his life shortened. 5 How much more foolish is the
individual who brings these results upon himself not be-
cause of devotion to his family but merely from a desire
to surpass his acquaintances in wealth or rise above his
parents in social position!
8. (b) Maxim of Idealism. In addition to his natural
instincts the human individual possesses, as we well know,
certain spiritual capacities which require for their satis-
faction the attainment of ideal objects, such as Truth and
Power and Beauty. To realize himself fully it follows,
then, that the individual must seek and attain not only
material well-being but also personal_culture. Now these
ideal ends which man in his spiritual capacity pursues
are, as has been previously shown, more comprehensive and
far-reaching than any of the objects of natural instinct,
even that of the instinct of self-preservation itself ; because
such ideals as Truth and Beauty are not limited in their
scope to the period of the individual's natural lifetime but
include the existence and activity of many generations
SPEJfCEB: Data of Ethics, 72.
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 227
of men. Hence the individual who devotes himself to a
realization of these ideals identifies himself with the cause
of spiritual progress which unites men of all ages as loyal
adherents ahdTellow- workers. We may therefore set down
as the second maxim of Self-realization in the individual
sphere that the attainment of the ideal ^objects of intelli-
gence and personality should be preferred to the promotion
of material well-being and the gratification of natural
desires.
The grounds for this maxim should be made perfectly
clear. The one and only reason why from the standpoint
of Self-realization the exercise of man 's spiritual capacities
is better than the gratification of his natural desires is that
such spiritual activity results in a larger and more com-
prehensive life. Thus the attainment of ideal ends, in-
tellectual, practical, and aesthetic, represents the realization
of the whole self, in contrast to which the material comfort
and pleasure stand for the interest of the partial self.
The life of spiritual attainment and personal culture is to be
preferred morally because it is a larger and a fuller life
than that of physical gratification and well-being. This is
easy to see when we contrast the life of the cultivated
man of affairs with his broad outlook and lasting achieve-
ments to that of the unlettered peasant with his narrow
horizon and rude pleasures. But it is not so easy to see
when the life of the successful man of the world and that
of the struggling artist or obscure scholar are compared.
Particularly is this true at present when improved facilities
of transportation and communication, and the development
of the arts of printing and photographic reproduction, have
made it possible for a man possessed of good health and
riches to travel over the entire world and to possess what
books and works of art he pleases. It is difficult indeed
to believe that the career of such a man, widely traveled
and surrounded by all the fruits of culture, is not larger
228 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
and fuller than that of the artist or investigator who has
never been able to travel outside his own country and can
scarcely supply himself with the books and appliances which
his work necessitates. Now the advantages of travel and
the possession of books and pictures in stimulating even
a belated growth of intelligence and taste are not to be
overlooked on the one hand, nor is the limitation which
the lack of these things imposes upon the most fruitful
and promising spiritual activity to be neglected on the
other. Yet the law inexorably holds that the breadth and
1 fullness of human life is directly proportionate to the
amount of spiritual activity exercised in it. The uncul-
tivated man may travel to every quarter of the globe and
all that his travel will yield him is a succession of un-
related impressions which soon become vague memories or
are forgotten altogether. He cannot make the objects he
see his own because his mind furnishes him with no back-
ground of historic associations or value judgments with
which to connect them. His varied and interesting ex-
periences do not become a permanent addition to his life,
for he has built up by his own thought and study no system
of ideas within which the new experiences can be given a
fixed and definite place. Such a person may buy books
by the ton and pictures by the gross, but these will remain
simply material objects without a trace of profound mean-
ing or subtle suggestion. The scholar, artist, or investiga-
tor, on the contrary, although he possess few or compara-
tively none of these advantages, has through the exercise
of his intellectual powers, creative ability, or artistic skill,
so correlated his ideas and organized his experience that his
life is extended in space and time far beyond the limits
of his geographical location or natural existence, under-
standing the past in its relation to the present, viewing
other worlds than his own, and penetrating to the deeper
and essential meanings of things which do not appear on
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 229
the surface but reveal themselves to rational insight and
aesthetic intuition. The career of the philosopher Im-
manuel Kant is instructive in proving that the breadth
and fullness of a human life is determined rather by cul-
tivation of spirit than by any external advantages or pos-
sessions whatsoever. During the whole period of his
maturity Kant was occupied with the methodical discharge
of the routine duties of a university professor. He seldom
left the university town of Koenigsberg and never went
outside his native province in Germany. Yet he possessed
such an inquiring mind and so comprehensive an intelli-
gence that his reading and thought extended far beyond
the subject of his special interest, philosophy, to all ques-
tions pertaining to the earth and its inhabitants. Hence
in addition to his epoch-making work in philosophy he wrote
treatises on the history of the earth, upon the origin of
the different living forms, and upon the relations of the
various races of men. These latter rank among the most
important contributions of the eighteenth century to our
knowledge of the natural world and anticipate in a re-
markable way the evolutionary conception of the succeed-
ing century. Thus Kant, secluded throughout life in an
insignificant German town, and hampered by the exactions
of an academic routine, attained a fuller knowledge of
the natural world, its facts and its forces, than many a
contemporary who, blessed with rank and fortune, was
able to travel over Europe at will, viewing its most in-
teresting localities and interviewing its most illustrious
personages.
9. Maxims of Social Welfare: (a) Maxim of Altru-
ism. In the social sphere the primary adjustment is be-
tween single individuals or persons. The individual comes
into contact with other persons like himself before he en-
ters into conscious relations with the larger social groups
such as the community, the " public," the nation, or
230 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
humanity. In all the stages of individual development the
self is of course associated with others. Material comfort
and pleasure are obtained by the individual only by asso-
ciation with other individuals in procuring the means of
subsistence and maintaining the conditions necessary for
human existence. In this case, however, the social rela-
tionship enters as a means to the survival and material
well-being of the individual. To a still greater degree
does the achievement of the aims of intelligence and per-
sonality involve the cooperation of many individuals in
the fields of art and science and invention. But here the
individual is brought into contact not with the lives of
others in their entirety, but only with such parts as are
connected by the bond of a common interest with his own.
Thus a man can achieve professional success only through
cooperation with his professional colleagues: but he is in-
terested in them not as men, but as physicians or lawyers
or engineers. It is this fact to which Mr. Chesterton
refers in his picturesque and forcible way when he asserts
that the social life of the large community like our modern
city is much narrower and more limited than that of a
small community. For in the large city we come into
association only with those who have aims and interests
identical with our own, while in the small community we
are forced to come to terms with individuals in the totali-
ties of their natures, which are always different from and,
at some points, antagonistic to our own.
" We make our friends, we make our enemies ; but God makes our
next-door neighbor. Hence he comes to us clad in all the careless
terrors of nature ; he is as strange as the stars, as reckless and in-
different as the rain. He is Man, the most terrible of beasts. That
is why the old religions and the old scriptural language showed so
sharp a wisdom when they spoke, not of one's duty towards
humanity but of one's duty towards one's neighbor. The duty
towards humanity may often take the form of a choice which is
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 231
personal and even pleasurable. That duty may be a hobby; it may
even be a dissipation. . . . The most monstrous martyrdom,
the most repulsive experience may be the result of a choice or
a kind of taste. . . . But we have to love our neighbor
because he is there a much more alarming reason for a much
more serious operation. He is the sample of humanity which is
actually given us. Precisely because he may be anybody he is
everybody. He is a symbol because he is an accident." 6
The maxim which the principle of social welfare (and
ultimately the Ideal of Self-realization) supplies for the
directing of conduct in this adjustment of differing in-
dividualities is that the individual should prefer the interest
of another to his own interest. Now it has been previously
made clear that for a man possessed of the instinct of sym-
pathy and of an intelligence to which his own personality
is revealed as a universal principle present equally in the
lives of all other self-conscious persons, the interest of
every other human individual is an end of equal value
with his own. Hence the individual does wrong when he
treats another individual as a means to his own ends, sub-
ordinating the interest of another to his own. The reason
for this is apparent when in case of conflict the interest
of the alter is greater than that of the ego; for when, in
such emergency, we prefer another's interest to our own
we are attaining a greater good, realizing our own larger
selves. Perplexity may arise, however, when the conflict-
ing interests of ego and alter are, as far as honest thought
can decide, equal in amount and importance. Why, it
may be asked, when ego and alter have equal interests at
stake, is it attaining a larger good to sacrifice my interest
to that of another than to sacrifice his interest to mine?
Only one interest can be attained : the other must be
thwarted. It is asserted that both have equal value, and
CHESTEBTON : Heretics, " On the Institution of the Family,"
p. 185.
232 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
the same right to attainment. Let this be granted, and
readily why then should not mine be the one that is
attained and the other's the one that is thwarted? There
is genuine difficulty in such cases, but it is not insuperable.
From the standpoint of Self-realization a form of conduct
is preferred as better only as through it the self attains a
larger and more inclusive end. When in the circumstances
above described the individual subordinates his interest to
that of another, his own interest is not entirely thwarted.
It may be in so far as the attainment originally sought for
is concerned. But when voluntarily sacrificed to another's
good the interest of the ego is converted into a means to
the promotion of the alter's interest and lives again in
its complete and successful attainment. The same is not
true in the contrary case where another's interest is made
subordinate to one's own. The interest of the alter may
be forcibly subordinated to the interest of the ego, but it
not voluntarily sacrificed to it. No individual has the power
to cause the aims and interests of others to sacrifice them-
selves voluntarily to his own interests and ambitions. Hence
in the first case the conflicting interests merge, the one
entering into and completing the other; in the second the
one is attained at the expense, and to the exclusion, of the
other. Manifestly it is in the former alternative that the
self attains the larger and more inclusive end, and it is
this course only which it is right for the individual to take.
Instances in which the opposing interests are exactly
equal are extremely rare, however; and the difficulty just
considered is more one of theory, perhaps, than of practice.
Usually it is amply sufficient if the individual recognize
that the interests of others have equal value with his own
and then, in particular cases where the interests of ego
and alter come into conflict, try earnestly to discover which
is the larger good. If study of the situation shows that
he has himself much more at stake than his fellow, the
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 233
individual is justified in preferring his own interest. In
all other circumstances he is morally bound to seek the
other's good. But this obligation of the individual to in-
terest himself in desires and ambitions which are frequently
unattractive or even distasteful does not, as would at first
appear, act as a check to his own development, thwarting
his aims and impoverishing his life. It has just the oppo-
site effect, by opening to the individual new sources of
interest and capacities for action. When we seek the in-
terests of others they, by virtue of being different from
and antagonistic to our own, communicate to our lives a
fuller and more varied content. The fullness or variety
of any individual's life is measured largely by the degree
to which he has, in domestic and social life, interested
himself in the hopes and plans of others, participating in
their efforts and sharing their successes. To seek the in-
terests of others, therefore, so far from hampering or im-
poverishing the life of the self, is the most effective means
to broaden and deepen it. 7
10. (b) Maxim of Humanitarianism. The social re-
lationship is not limited to the association of individuals
who come into direct contact with one another. For to
the human individual as an intelligent person all conscious
personality has the same absolute worth. Hence the wel-
fare of humanity in the larger social groups of the com-
munity and the state and the world becomes an object to
be sought for, although here a personal contact of all the
individuals involved is manifestly impossible. And since
T Theodore Roosevelt brings out most forcibly the interest and
value which attaches to each individual among the mass of our
fellow-citizens if we take the trouble to investigate it. In his article,
" The Coal Miner at Home," he says : " I think that those who
preach to the educated man to the graduate of a particular school
or college about his duty to the country often tend to lay the em-
phasis on the wrong side. If he remains aloof from his fellow-
citizens, the damage done is really not as much to them as to him,
and he is the man who suffers most." Cf. Outlook, December 24,
1910, pp. 900-904.
234 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
all persons are alike ends whose interest is to be pursued,
the most inclusive object is that which embraces in its
realization the welfare of the largest number of persons.
Most comprehensive of all objects in the social sphere is,
therefore, humanity, the welfare of human personality uni-
versally. It follows then that the second maxim in the
social sphere is that the welfare of humanity shouldjbe
preferred to the interest of any lesser number of indi-
viduals.
The first duty of the individual in the social sphere
is to seek the good of other individuals with whom he is
L -i ' _ ...
acquainted. This means that he shall strive incessantly
to extend that personal development and cultivation which
he seeks for himself to the members of his family, his circle
^ t of friends, and those with whom he is professionally asso*
ciated. Such effort has frequently been successful ii*
[..inhuman history, and small groups or classes have arisen
which, through cooperative activity and mutual encourage-
ment, have attained a high level of personal culture in the
various fields of spiritual achievement such as art, science,
literature, etc. But the culture of these small groups has
usually been at the expense, rather than for the benefit,
of existing humanity. A much larger number of their
fellow-men have been condemned to lives of ceaseless and
spirit-killing toil in order that a selected few should have
the needed leisure and appropriate surroundings for the
exercise of the higher psychic powers of human nature.
It was thus in ancientjGrreece where the labor of thousands
of slaves provided a small number of citizens with the
means of subsistence and thus made possible their in-
comparable intellectual and artistic achievement. The
same condition has existed, though to a less extent, in
many modern states in which the presence of a hereditary
aristocracy has led to a restriction of culture, as a privilege
of the select few born into this class. Up to the time of
SELF-REALIZATION AND STANDARD OF GOODNESS 235
the French Revolution the great mass of toilers with few
exceptions bore this arrangement uncomplainingly, being
led by social tradition and religious superstition to believe
that the lot to which God had ordained them was to labor
unremittingly that a few of their fellows might enjoy the
better things of life. But during the past century the
proletariat has been awakening, its attitude has entirely
changed, and it will no longer submit willingly to a
regime that restricts the benefits of culture to a chosen
few. As Eucken says: " Hitherto spiritual conflict has
usually been confined to the limited arena of cultivated
society, and the general mass of mankind has not been much
affected. Now, however, the people are pressing forward;
they not only demand a voice in the settlement of ultimate
questions, but require that the whole structure of society
shall be regulated with reference to their opinions and
interests. They are very liable moreover to that harsh
intolerance which always characterizes big mass move-
ments. " 8 It is plain then that the work of extending to
all^ humanity the opportunity for real cultivation of spirit
to each man according to his capacity must be under-
taken more vigorously and on a larger scale than ever here-
tofore. For the days of privilege are numbered, and the
sort of spiritual expansion which is possible in a few only
at the cost of a corresponding limitation in the many, will
not be permitted to exist much longer on the earth. Cul-
ture must now, if ever, be justified of her children, and
those of her exponents do her indeed a poor service who
assert that she is essentially selective and opposed to the
spirit of democracy. For if culture is identified with priv-
ilege she is destined to be swept away by that movement
for human brotherhood and social equality which is slowly
beginning and gathering momentum, but which when it
gains its full force shall sweep all else before it. Far
EUCKEN : The Problem of Human Life, Eng. trans., p. 566.
236 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
truer and more consistent with ethical principles is it to
identify culture with that united effort on the part of all
mankind to develop the highest powers of human person-
ality, which is itself identical with human brotherhood.
REFERENCES
ALEXANDEB, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. II.
GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Book III, Chaps. Ill, IV.
MACKENZIE, Manual of Ethics, Book III, Chaps. I, II, III.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. Ill, 6-9.
DEWET AND TUFTS, Ethics, Chap. XX.
KANT, Metaphysic of Morals, Second Section (Abbott's trans.).
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chap. IX.
CHAPTER III
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE
1. The Problem of Self-Sacrifice. 2. Self-Sacrifice, if a Duty, Must
Be of Ultimate Benefit to the Individual. 3. Self-Sacrifice, if
Genuine, Must Involve Real Loss to the Individual. 4. The
Conception of Organization Furnishes Solution of the Problem.
5. All Organization Involves the Sacrifice of Part to the Whole.
6. Self-Mastery. 7. Self-Sacrifice. 8. Is Self-Sacrifice Due to
Merely Temporary Maladjustment? 9. On the Contrary, It Is
a Necessary Factor in Self-Organization. 10. Optimism and
Pessimism. 11. Conclusion.
1. The Problem of Self-Sacrifice. The subject of self-
sacrifice has always been one of special difficulty for the
student of morality. Indeed, there is reason for regarding
it as the gravest problem in the field of Ethics, since ethical
reflection itself originated in the urgent necessity of solving
it. As long as the conduct of men was determined by
customs which conserved the well-being of group and com-
munity, no question arose of a possible discrepancy between
the obligations of morality and the good of the individual.
But when individuality was so far developed as to produce
in man a consciousness of aims and interests belonging to
him as an individual which clashed with the desires and
ambitions of other individuals and the interest of the
community, it was inevitable that he should ask the ques-
tion: " Why should I abandon my own plans, surrender
my own ambitions, in order that the plans and ambitions
of others may be f ulfilled ? ' ' This crisis in moral develop-
ment occurred with the Greeks in the fifth century B.C.
The Sophists cut the Gordian knot by asserting that no
obligation existed for the individual to sacrifice his in-
887
238 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
terest to the welfare of his fellows that every man's in-
terest was his good and the law of the state represented
the interest of the strongest individuals. The illustrious
contributions of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, to ethical
theory were prompted by a desire to find rational grounds
for a social obligation supreme over all considerations of
individual interest. But while the insight of these great
thinkers was more illuminating and profound than the
shallow and dogmatic pronouncements of the Sophists, still
they were only partially successful in solving the problem.
They agree in basing social obligation on the faculty of
reason common to all men holding that if men would
take the trouble to think clearly concerning human life
and conduct they would be convinced that the interests of
all individuals in the state are identical and hence that any
individual who serves community or nation is thereby at-
taining his own private interest. They were able to demon-
strate that such a community of interest existed, however,
among a comparatively small number of fellow-citizens,
only; much larger classes such as women, slaves, and bar-
barians, being left partly or wholly out of account. Hence
the problem of the larger social obligation extending_ta
all fellow-humans was left unsolved. It remained for
Christianity to enforce this obligation in its fullest ex-
tension, making self-sacrifice the .keynote of its teaching
and communicating to mediaeval and modern morality a
negative and ascetic tone which contrasts sharply with the
freedom and spontaneity of Greek life. In justification
of thus enjoining the individual to sacrifice his interest to
the good of humanity there is clearly suggested in the
Christian gospel ~a view of human nature and human life
much more adequate and profound than that of Greek
philosophy. But this has been so often confused by ex-
ponents of Christianity with merely a supernatural sanc-
tion of morality which recompenses the individual in a
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 239
future life for the pain and privation undergone in the
discharge of duty here, that the whole problem must be
considered afresh by present-day Ethics and, if possible, a
solution found which will agree with modern conceptions
of man, his social relations, and his place in the world.
2. Self-Sacrifice, if a Duty, Must Be of Ultimate
Benefit to the Individual. The problem of self-sacrifice
arises from the presence in man's moral experience of
two_ sets of facts neither of which can be disputed, but
which seem to "contradict and even to exclude one another.
The first of these facts is, that whatever it be that conscience
requires of man, it^is for his real benefit to recognize and
fulfil this obligation. This identity of the Good with the
highest interest of man has been sufficiently emphasized
in previous pages. In the case of self-sacrifice it seems
an indubitable fact, therefore, that no matter how extreme
the sacrifice if it is a duty, then it is the fulfilment of
the. individual's own good. Even the extreme^ of self-sac-
rific^recommended by Christianity must thus be regarded
as a method of self-realization just_as much as the ob-
servance of the jnean, or the attainment of a harmony, in
conduct, was to the Greek moralist. In this connection
Green says with his usual discernment:
" It is not because it involves the renunciation of so much
pleasure that we deem the life of larger seIF-"3enial which the
Christian conscience calls for, a higher life than was conceived
by the Greek philosophers; but because it implies a fuller reali-
zation of the human soul. It is not the xenunciati^n as such
but the spiritual staje which it represents that constitutes the
value of a life spent in self-devoted service to mankind; and it
represents, we must remember, not merely a certain system of
desires and interests, on the part of the persons who make the
renunciation, but certain social development in consequence of
which those desires and interests are called into play." x
: Prolegomena to Ethics, 273, p. 332.
240 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
3. Self-Sacrifice, if Genuine, Must Involve Real Loss
to the Individual. A second group of facts which are
equally important seem to show that moral value attaches
only to such " self-sacrifice " as entails real loss. When
this aspect of the subject comes home to us in full force,
it becomes impossible to treat self-sacrifice as an incident,
merely, in self-realization. Moral experience teaches us
that self-sacrifice is a real surrender of personal interest
involving the pain of irretrievable loss and calling for
genuine heroism. Shall we understand it then as a tem-
porary discomfort due to the denial of present desire for
the sake of future well-being? This is to make self-
sacrifice a part of enlightened prudence. Such an in-
terpretation appears to contravene the plain teaching of
moral experience and to rob this vitally important feature
of morality of its true meaning. It was this aspect of the
subject which impressed Leslie Stephen, who believed that
morality has been developed as a means for securing social
as distinct from individual survival, and that the obligation
to altruism can never be reconciled with individual interest.
Certainly his remarks upon this subject contain much
shrewd sense:
"When we listen to the careful demonstrations of the reality
of benevolence, when we are told again and again that a man
may, and in fact does, sacrifice his own happiness to the good
of his fellows, we are edified and convinced. But we receive
something of a shock when the edifying moralist suddenly turns
round and tells us that the sacrifice is only temporary, that is to
say, that it is after all unreal. It is still more surprising when
this is presented, and precisely by the moralists who profess
to take the loftiest theory, not merely as expressing the fact,
but as an a priori truth deducible from the very nature of things.
For what can this be but to fall back upon the purely egoistic
doctrine." *
* STEPHEN: Science of Ethics, ed. of 1882, p. 430.
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 241
4. The Conception of Organization Furnishes the
Solution of the Problem. How shall we interpret self-
sacrifice so as to harmonize these discordant facts ? The con-
ception of moral development as a progressive self-organiza-
tion through the instrumentality of volition gives us thejsey
to the puzzle. For all organization, not only in the de-
velopment of conscious intelligence, but also in the evolu-
tion of all living matter, involves two opposite and com-
plementary aspects. On the one hand there is differentia-
tion or the division of the whole which is being organized
into disparate parts. Thus the evolution of the organism
is accompanied by a multiplication of cells and structures,
the development of consciousness by a diversification of
ideas and experiences. On the other hand and equally
prominent is integration, in which the independence of
these parts is canceled and they are adjusted within a
comprehensive whole. Thus organic evolution is accompa-
nied by an increasing inter-dependence of tissues and
organs, aijd personal development by a more and more
perfect correlation of the contents of consciousness. These
two aspects of differentiation and integration characterize
evolution universally and may be accepted as essential
features of all growth, conscious and unconscious. And
in this fact that all growth, as an organizing process, en-
courages the development of parts in independence of one
another and of the whole to which they belong, while it
also destroys this independence and subordinates the parts
to the good of the whole, we have a possible explanation
of the presence and importance of self-sacrifice in moral
development.
5. All Organization Involves the Sacrifice of the Part
to the Whole. Such sacrifice of parts to the whole pre-
vails throughout the field of organic evolution. The single
organism is a colony of cells and tissues crowding one
another for place and competing with one another for
242 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
food. Yet the health of the organism and the proper bal-
ance of its functions necessitate that the activities of these
constituent parts be strictly limited and that they be pre-
vented from attaining their maximum of size and strength.
Frequently in the life-history of organisms structures are
developed to completeness and maturity simply as a means
to the inception and growth of other structures more im-
portant to the existence of individual or species. 3 Then,
when these latter are produced, the former like a tem-
porary scaffolding are destroyed. Striking instances of
such sacrifice of one part or member of a living organism
to the welfare of another or of the whole have been observed.
Evidently the familiar statement has more than a figurative
meaning which compares the act of self-sacrifice to the
dying of the seed that the young plant may live and grow.
Turning from ontogeny to phylogeny we find that the
evolution of the species is accomplished by a process of
struggle and selection in which the individual is sacrificed
to the welfare of his race or species. Individuals are born
in much greater numbers than the environment can support
and then a large majority of these are exterminated, often
suffering painful deaths, in order that only the individuals
possessing the best natural equipment shall survive and
reproduce their kind. An analogous process of competition
and resulting selection goes on among the species in their
turn, many living forms suffering extinction in order that
a more perfect adaptation of the existing forms of life
to the resources of the environment shall be secured. Many
species seem to be developed simply as bridges from the
parent form to the one still more divergent and then to
' A beautiful case is that of the " nurse-cells " which in some
insect and other forms surround the young egg-cell and nourish it.
The egg-cell grows rapidly at the expense of the nurse-cells, which,
being steadily depleted, become mere rudiments attached to the egg-
cell and then finally disappear. ( WILSON: The Cell in Development
and Heredity, p. 151.)
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 243
be eliminated in competition with these two. Thus we see
that throughout the entire field of Jljfe evolution as a
progressiveorganization involves the complementary^jjroc-
esses ofjffi^entiation and integration, in^_vvhich_^paj^ are
developed^ in distinction f rpm the whole and, at^the^same
time, thisjndependpnp.fi jp gannplprl jn_a subordination of
alT parts to the good of the whole. In all these cases~"bf
the sacrifice of parts or members to the welfare of the
whole undergoing development, it is worth noting that the
benefit of the whole to which the sacrifice of the 4>arts is ;
instruin^n^ar^accrues only a/fer__the__part has been sup-
pressed .orjdestroyed^.
6. Self- Mastery. The evolution of intelligent con-
sciousness is achieved by volition which is itself an organ-
izing agency. The " work of volition displays those two
features of organization just mentioned more strongly
emphasized, however, and set in sharper and clearer relief.
Self -organization begins with a differentiation or diversi-
fication of conscious life. Volition first expresses itself in
differentiating out of a mass of instinctive tendencies a
number of separate desires, each having a distinct object
and employing special methods in its pursuit. The differ-
entiation of these desires is the first step in self-organiza-
tion and the pre-requisite of all further moral development.
For the individual to be conscious of certain definite needs,
for him to desire certain special objects as ends, and also
to have knowledge of the ways of gratifying these desires,
of availing himself of the resources of the objective world
this ability, while it occupies the very lowest place in
the scale of moral excellence, is still the absolutely indis-
pensable foundation upon which the higher development
rests. The individual who is too dull to have any definite
desires, too listless to make any special demands upon the
world, and too incapable to secure the few objects he
does desire is, morally speaking, the one absolutely hopeless
244 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
case. It is necessary to Self -realization, then, that a num-
ber of different desires and purposes be developed within
the consciousness of the individual, and that each of these
desires should acquire a certain strength and independence.
But organization requires that this process be supple-
mented by a complementary activity of correlation and
adjustment in which tKese different desires are subordi-
nated as means to larger ends. It is a natural, an in-
evitable, consequence of raising a desire to clearest con-
sciousness and adding to this consciousness a knowledge
of the most expeditious method of gratification, that the
desire in question should insist upon its own gratification
regardless of any other considerations whatever. The re-
sult of the primary differentiating of desires within the
individual is thus to put him at the mercy of a number
of eager and aggressive impulses, each of which is clamor-
ing for its own satisfaction to the exclusion of the others.
Hence volition is compelled to undertake the work of sup-
pressing these desires in their independence and isolation
only permitting them to exist as they are made con-
formable to the total interest of the individual. This re-
pression which, from the standpoint of the single desire,
may be injurious and destructive, is strongly resisted. Vo-
lition is compelled to overcome this resistance and forcibly
to restrain the rebellious desire or purpose. Such forcible
restraint causes distress and pain to the individual; since
the desire which is subjugated after struggle is a part
of himself and he suffers both the distress of a nature
divided against itself and the pain of a consciousness de-
prived of its usual gratification. This form of self-sacrifice
which arises from the necessity of integrating all single
desires and purposes within the unity of the individual
life may be called self-mastery, to distinguish it from self-
sacrifice proper, which will be later discussed. Pla,io treats
of this subject of self-mastery in a well-known passage of
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 245
the Republic. Socrates is made to remark upon the para-
dox involved in the expression " master of himself."
" For the man who is master of himself will, also, I pre-
sume, be the slave of himself, and the slave will be the
master. For the subject of all these phrases is the same
person. ' ' * The use of such an expression is due in the
opinion of Socrates to the presence in human nature of
two principles, a good and a bad, and a man is said to be
master of himself when the good principle is master of the
bad. He further maintains that, of these two principles
which are in constant conflict, the good is the rational
and the bad the sentient or irrational part of our nature;
and this is generally true because the ends of reason, being
concepts, are larger and more inclusive than the particular
objects of sensuous desire.
Self-mastery does not usually consist, as we might sup-
pose, in a certain amount of compulsory restraint placed
upon all desires equally, in the interest of individual well-
being. The fact is that in most cases the great majority
of desires submit without much resistance to subordination
and control, and the rebellion is concentrated in a few de-
sires (or perhaps just a single one) especially strong and
insistent in the particular individual his " besetting " sin
or sins, as the expression is. With such desires man must
fight, and over them he must triumph, if he is to realize
himself as an individual. Of course, any desire may prove
thus difficult to control, but there are certain impulses and
appetites which seem particularly liable to make trouble
with all human beings. Such is the appetite for stimulants
and narcotics which because uncontrolled has ruined the
life of many an individual. Our literature contains many
descriptions of the agonizing experiences of individuals who
have fought desperately with the craving for alcoholic drink
9,nd finally have conquered it and mastered themselves.
* Republic, 431 A.
246 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
The passion for gaming and the desire for sexual grati-
fication belong to the same class of appetites which often
possess exceptional strength and which, unless closely re-
strained, will escape from control. Nor is the total interest
of the individual to which all the single desires are made
subservient, always represented by the demands of all his
desires and purposes in their organized unity. Just as
the resistance of the different parts, to such an adjustment,
may be concentrated in a single desire, so the good of the
individual as a whole may be represented by a single pur-
pose or desire. Thus the part and the whole confront one
another in the guise of two conflicting desires, and self-
mastery consists in the victory of the one over the other.
To take a concrete instance chosen almost at random from
a large and important class, the total interest of an in-
dividual may be represented by a comprehensive purpose
to achieve success as an artist, thus realizing marked crea-
tive ability and gratifying a strong love of beauty. The
chief obstacle to the realization of this purpose in a youth
or young man may reside in the presence of strong sexual
and social impulses which conflict with the larger purpose
because they resist that postponement of marriage and
domestic life which a long period of preparatory study
and travel, would entail. Here self-mastery, the attainment
of the more comprehensive good, demands that the desire
for immediate marriage and a home, be subordinated and
its gratification postponed, in order that the larger end
be pursued which, if realized, will provide for a more
permanent and adequate satisfaction of these desires as
well.
Self-mastery self-denial prove then to be instrumen-
tal to self-development. In these experiences, painful as
they are, the individual gains and not loses. Yet it must
not be forgotten that he does not experience the gain when
he suffers the loss. The attainment of the larger interest
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 247
does not occur simultaneously with the loss of the desired
object. If it did, the pain of deprivation might be can-
celed and overcome by the satisfaction of a larger attain-
ment. But the condition of achieving the greater goods
is that the lesser goods shall first be surrendered. The pain
of denial and deprivation must be endured before the satis-
faction of a full and harmonious expression of individuality
can be experienced. Moreover, the satisfaction of fulfilling
the larger aims of his entire nature cannot even be imagined
adequately by the individual, because this is a satisfaction,
not of his nature as it is at present but of his present
nature after it has been changed by just such painful
adjustments as he now is making. Moral development re-
quires the sacrifice of objects proved in experience to be
good, on behalf of others which might not at present be
satisfactory even though successfully achieved. The anv
bitious boy abandons amusements which give him keenest
delight in order to acquire information and training in a
field of activity whose significance he does not clearly un-
derstand and whose value he does not fully appreciate.
But thus it is with all growth, spiritual as well as natural,
the interest of an assured present is sacrificed to a larger
future which is yet to be.
7. Self-Sacrifice. The very process of integration which
we have been describing of activities within the life of
the individual is itself a differentiation. For it is through
such an adjustment of different desires and impulses that
the nature of the individual is organized and his abilities
all directed towards the attainment of some supreme aim
or life-purpose. Knowledge of such overmastering interests
in himself makes the individual conscious of the dominance
of similiar aims and ambitions over the lives of other in-
dividuals. The respective interests of self and others soon
show themselves to be discordant. Self-organization, or
Goodness, then necessitates another process of integration,
248 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
this time upon a larger scale, the adjustments of these
warring interests within the unity of an organized social
system. "When, in the course of moral development, the
necessity thus arises for the individual to subordinate that
interest which he has come to identify with himself, to
the welfare of others, then self-sacrifice proper first enters
the moral life. Previous to the emergence of individuality
through the coordination of the various desires, true self-
sacrifice is impossible, for the self-in-its-unity has not yet
attained to conscious expression. Hence neither the child
nor the savage is capable of self-sacrifice in the full meaning
of the word, since the individuality of neither has come
to conscious existence through the adoption of plans and
purposes which he recognizes as his own and distinct from
all others. This awakening of individuality to conscious-
ness of itself comes in the history of the race when, owing
to a developing intelligence and easier conditions of life,
men refuse to be bound longer in their conduct by tradition
and custom, but assert their rights as individuals to choose,
each of them, the manner of life which appeals to his in-
telligence and suits his taste. It occurs in the development
of the individual when, at the period of adolescence, the
youth is unwilling to be dominated longer by the practices
and potnt-of-view of his family, and considers plans and
adopts purposes which he proposes to pursue as an inde-
pendent individual.
Just as much as the total interest of the individual is,
through its greater complexity and superior organization,
stronger and more compelling than any one of his single
desires, so much the greater is the power of resistance it
shows when attacked. Hence the subordination or suppres-
sion of self-interest is a greater task, calling for more effort
and persistence than that of self-mastery, and it is accom-
panied by struggle and suffering correspondingly more in-
tense. The individual who feels the obligation to sacrifice
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 249
his interest his most cherished hopes and plans for the
good of another faces the gravest crisis of the moral life.
His soul is the scene of a mighty conflict upon the issue of
which may hang his moral salvation. Our recognition of
the high moral worth of self-sacrifice, as well as our appre-
ciation of its almost insurmountable difficulty, is witnessed
by the spontaneous, burst of approval and admiration that
greets every notable instance of it which is brought to
public attention. Indeed the public praise and eulogy
in newspaper, pulpit, and periodical of those who have
under unusual circumstances sacrificed property or health
or life for the sake of others ' welfare, may lead us to think
of self-sacrifice as something which occurs only under
extraordinary conditions and in a dramatic setting as
when the engineer dies at the throttle in saving the train,
or a miner risks his life in returning to a burning mine
in order to rescue his injured comrade, or the sailor insists
that his shipmates go first in life-boat or breeches-buoy
and is left to freeze or drown. But self-sacrifice, in order
to be genuine, requires no dramatic setting, no wide public-
ity it need in fact be known to no one except the in-
dividual who is undergoing it. Such self-sacrifice is con-
stantly occurring with no blare of trumpets or bursts of
applause, but just as a part of recognized duty hard,
but cheerfully or stoically endured. Thus there are par-
ents working to the breaking-point and foregoing nearly
every rightful pleasure, in order that children may be
educated; there are sons and daughters giving up plans
and ambitions which seem to mean more than life itself
to them, in order to care for an aged or infirm parent;
there are physicians wearing themselves out in the relief
of pain and the curing of disease among their fellows;
there are ministers and teachers expending their intelli-
gence and energy without stint in ministering to the souls
which have been committed to their charge. What Pro-
250 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
fessor Royce says about loyalty in this connection is also
true of self-sacrifice which is an essential part of all true
loyalty.
"My own mind also chooses some of the plainest and ob-
scurest people whom I chance to know, the most straightforward
(and simple-minded of folk, whose loyalty is even all the more sure
to me because I can certainly affirm that they at least cannot be
making any mere display of loyalty in order that they should
be seen of men. Nobody knows of their loyalty except those
that are in more or less direct touch with them ; and these usually
appreciate this loyalty too little. You all of you similarly know
plain and wholly obscure men and women of whom the world has
not heard and is not worthy, but who have possessed and who have
proved in the presence of you who have chanced to observe them a
loyalty to their chosen causes which was not indeed expressed
in martial deeds but which was quite as genuine a loyalty as
that of a Samurai or as that of Arnold von Winkelried when
he rushed on the Austrian spears. As for ordinary expressions
of loyalty, not at critical moments and in the heroic instants that
come to the plainest lives, but in daily business, we are all aware
how the letter-carrier and the house-maid may live, and often
do live when they choose, as complete a daily life of steadfast
loyalty as could any knight or king." 5
With these facts before our minds we condemn as the
veriest .sophistry any view which does not admit that the
sacrifices exacted by duty are real, or attempts to explain
them as part of a larger prudence or as the gratification
of sympathetic or social impulses. Such interpretations of
self-sacrifice do not explain it: they explain it away. Self-
sacrifice is a means to Self-realization ? Yes, assuredly !
But it is not the sacrificed self w T hich is finally realized.
It is not the surrendered interest the unfulfilled ambi-
tions, the thwarted aims, the lost hopes which are tri-
umphantly attained. No, it is the self whose character
has been transformed through the ordeal of suffering and
5 ROYCE: Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 112-13.
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 251
sacrifice that is finally realized: it is an interest which
has been altered and enlarged by denial and deprivation
that is triumphantly attained. Self-sacrifice is then a real
" dying to self " in which the pangs of dissolution under-
gone by the old nature are the birth-pains of the new.
' ' The higher or personal self can be realized only through
the death of the lower or individual self, as lower and
merely individual." 6 "The individual must die to an
isolated life i.e. a life for and in himself, a life in which
the immediate satisfaction of desire, as his desire, is an
end in itself in order that he may live the spiritual life,
the universal life which really belongs to him as a spiritual
or self-conscious being." 7 It is necessary that the limita-
tions of a narrow and exclusive individuality shall be over-
come if man is to realize the larger possibilities of his
nature. But such individuality maintains its independence
and isolation with utmost stubbornness. It must be crushed
and broken, therefore; for thus only can it be rendered
pliant and adaptable capable of adjustment along with the
differing interests of other individuals within a comprehen-
sive system of social ends and activities. As long as Self-
realization compels man to make this adjustment, it will re-
main a severe ordeal fraught with spiritual struggle and
soul agony. Self-sacrifice cannot be expelled from human
life, then; but seems destined to remain one of the most
profound and searching as well as the most characteristic
experiences in man's moral life.
8. Is Self-Sacrifice Due to Merely Temporary Mal-
adjustment? While the social adjustment of individuals
whose desires and ambitions are at variance with the good
of society is difficult and exceedingly painful, is it not
sure to become much easier and less painful as moral
development proceeds? In the course of social evolution
are not man's social instincts and impulses certain to
SETH: Ethical Principles, p. 207. T CAIBD: Hegel, p. 213.
252 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
be so far strengthened, and his understanding of the ad-
vantages of cooperation so much increased, that he will
seek others' interests as naturally and spontaneously as
his own ? HerberJ jSpencer looked forward to such a state
of human society in the far distant future, in which there
would be no more need of self-sacrifice, and the conflicting
claims of egoism and altruism would be completely recon-
ciled. In his own words:
"From the laws of life it must be concluded that unceasing
social discipline will so mold human nature that eventually sym-
pathetic pleasures will be spontaneously pursued to the fullest
extent advantageous to each and all. The scope for altruistic
activities will not exceed the desire for altruistic satisfactions." 8
Confining ourselves just now to the trend of social de-
velopment and the direction of civilization as we can ob-
serve them and not asking whether the laws which govern
moral development as a progressive self-organization permit
of the elimination of self-sacrifice we find slight reason
for expecting that such a condition of ready-prepared
social adjustment and harmony will come in the near or
distant future. It is true that man becomes more social-
ized as civilization advances. We are less confident than
Spencer was that his experience of the benefits of social
life and his acquisition of habits socially useful are modi-
fying his native instincts and impulses in any decided or
revolutionary fashion. There is no doubt, however, that
as he becomes further civilized man gains a more adequate
knowledge of his community of interest with his fellows
and a more intelligent appreciation of the importance and
value of social organization and social service. Such knowl-
edge of social relations, being transmitted through train-
ing and education from one generation to the next, steadily
SPENCEB: Data of Ethics, 95, p. 294.
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 253
accumulates and must, it might appear, make altruistic
action easier and the social adjustment more natural and
spontaneous. Hence we should expect to find the citizen
of a highly civilized state more willing to serve his nation
at the expense of private interest than the member of a
society not so highly civilized. Unfortunately the facts
are otherwise or partially so owing to the operation of
other factors which have a contrary influence. For the
mental development which accompanies advance in civiliza-
tion not only leads to an increased sense of social obliga-
tion but it also makes clearer and more acute the conscious-
ness of individual interest. The stimulation of intellectual
and imaginative faculties in an advanced civilization gives
to the individual a much more vivid and realizing sense
of his own interest present and future. His imagination
enables him to enjoy in anticipation the pleasures of ful-
filling his ambitions and equally to suffer in apprehen-
sion of the failure of his plans and the frustration of his
purposes. An increased sensitivity to pain seems to be an
accompaniment of civilization, due both to added power
of imagining it beforehand and to a more delicate sensi-
bility which has resulted from easier conditions of life.
Hence the citizen of a half-civilized state might, and prob-
ably would, respond more readily to the call to take up
arms and suffer danger, pain, and possible death, for
his country, than would the educated man of modern
society. And this would not be because he had a clearer
or more intelligent conception of his duty as a citizen
but because he had less ability to imagine the hardships
and sufferings he would have to undergo on the one hand,
and the satisfactions and successes he might be compelled
to forego, on the other. 9 Yet the outcome is that he can
'Compare this statement of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.
Ill, Chap. XII) : "If then the case in regard to courage is similar
to this, death and wounds will be painful to the courageous man and
involuntary ; but he will endure them because endurance is honorable
254 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
be depended upon to sacrifice himself as an individual,
more willingly, suffering peril and death in his country's
cause with less hesitation, than his civilized descendant.
These facts have caused it to be alleged as a penalty of
civilization that nations lose their " fighting edge." The
intensifying of self-consciousness, the training of imagina-
tion, and the refinement of sensibility in the individual all
tend to make him less ready to place himself at the disposal
of his country as a weapon or instrument to be used in its
defense. Hence, it is predicted, nations in which civiliza-
tion has progressed thus far will be at a decided disad-
vantage in time of war and will perhaps be defeated and
finally superseded by other peoples, in whom mental devel-
opment has not proceeded so far as to interfere with the
action of instinctive loyalty and unthinking courage. How-
ever this may be and many other facts would have to be
considered before assent were given to such a conclusion
the significance of the whole matter as it bears upon the
present argument is that an increasing knowledge of the
character and importance of the social relation among the
individuals that compose a society does not of necessity
make the sacrifice of private interests to the public good
any easier for these individuals. For the same growth
of intelligence that enlightens the individual concerning
his social relationships gives him also a clearer conception
and avoidance disgraceful. Nay, in proportion as he possesses virtue
in its fullness and is happy, will be his pain at the prospect of
death; for to such an one life is preeminently valuable, and he will
be consciously deprived at death of the greatest blessings. But,
painful as such deprivation is, he is none the less courageous, nay
, perhaps he is even more courageous, as he willingly sacrifices
these blessings for noble conduct on the field of battle. It is
not the case, then, that all virtues imply a pleasurable activity,
except in so far as one attains to the end. Still, it is true perhaps,
after all, that people who enjoy a happy life are not such good
soldiers as people who are less courageous but have nothing to lose,
as these last are ready to face any danger, and will sell their lives
for a small sum of money" (Welldon's trans., p. 89).
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 255
of his interests as an individual and an added power of
imagining his own successes and failures. Thus self-
sacrifice becomes no easier, and may even be rendered more
difficult and painful.
9. On the Contrary It Is a Necessary Factor in Self-
Organization. Self-sacrifice has been interpreted as the
surrender of the narrower purposes and ambitions with
which individuality has identified itself in order that the
larger ends of the social self may be realized. Such an
interpretation should satisfy all persons who believe in the
reality of self-sacrifice except, to be sure, those who, like
Leslie Stephen, believe that self-sacrifice, in order to be
real, must involve final and irretrievable loss to the self.
From this extreme standpoint, if self-sacrifice is regarded
as instrumental in self-realization, its meaning is entirely
destroyed and it is degraded into a form of self-interest.
Thus if one who sacrifices his plans and purposes for an-
other's benefit is aiming at his own self-realization his
sacrifice is not genuine and his conduct is merely prudent.
And moral enlightenment is all that is necessary to remove
as groundless from the experience of man any feeling of
pain or sorrow in the subordination of private interest to
social welfare and to create instead the pleasant conscious-
ness of securing his own good. This position would be
justified if our actions were in every case inevitably de-
termined as Socrates, for example, believed by what we,
upon solely intellectual grounds, thought was for our high-
est interest. Then certainly virtue would be knowledge
and our pursuit of the largest good would be simply an
affair of intellectual enlightenment. But the fajcts are
nearly the reverse. Man's action is not necessarily de-
termined by what he believes to be true from the exercise
of his reason, and in independence of action. Rather is
his knowledge determined by his action, his conception of
truth dependent upon his conduct with its experiences of
256 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
success and failure. The true idea is the idea that can
be realized, i.e. that satisfies volition in increasing the
fullness and variety of self-conscious life. Hence the
largesj; knowledge at the command of any human individual
the body of accepted truths in any generation but sums
up the results of human achievement in the past. The
science of Ethics is thus a systematic reflection upon the
experience of man in organizing his life and thus fulfilling
the power of self-development resident in his own will.
Now the individual must act with the fullest knowledge
available if his action is to build upon his own experience
and the experience of his fellow-men. But to new situa-
tions in which the individual finds himself this knowledge
is never adequate; since it can receive conclusive verifica-
tion only in his own experience and the prospect of further
development open before every human being involves the
possibility of entirely new and unexpected experiences.
Hence at each successive step in his moral development
man is compelled to abandon objects which his experience
has shown to be satisfactory for the sake of others whose
reality and value await their final verification in the results
of the action which he is then undertaking. Such acts
are primarily ventures of will and not expressions of
knowledge ; and they are of necessity painful, because they
call for the negation of objects through which the self
itself has found expression thus putting its very existence
in jeopardy in order that other and larger objects may
be sought and, if possible, attained. Self-sacrifice is the
greatest as well as the most painful of these ventures,
requiring the surrender of objects on which the existence
and integrity of individuality itself seem to depend, as
the condition of pursuing social ends which are untried
and hence in character and value uncertain. Thus self-
sacrifice is revealed as a necessary consequence of the
fundamental fact of morality, that moral development is
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 257
an organization of conduct achieved by volition and not
an organization of ideas accomplished by thought and
reproduced in action.
10. Optimism and Pessimism. Self-sacrifice appears
as one and perhaps the most important of the adjustments
of parts to the whole which are effected by volition in
the course of its organizing activity. Viewed from this
standpoint, but with a slight change of angle, it may be
regarded as a consequence of the maladjustment which
actually exists within the nature of man and throughout
the world of human experience. The existence of such
maladjustment, deep-seated and thorough-going, cannot be
disputed. The presence of moral evil, springing from the
opposing interests of individuals in society and the con-
flicting tendencies within these individuals themselves, tes-
tifies to its presence in the nature of the human indi-
vidual and in human society. The existence of physical
evil likewise, the indescribable suffering and painful deaths
inflicted upon countless thousands of innocent human be-
ings by the forces of nature in fire and famine, flood and
storm, earthquake and volcanic eruption, proves that the
natural universe is not adjusted to the needs and pur-
poses of man. It is this maladjustment with which in-
telligently directed will is contending in the evolution of
human life and conduct, and which it has been able in
a measure to overcome. This process is necessarily painful.
But suffering cannot be escaped in any event; it must
follow from the lack of adjustment and harmony in the
actual nature of things. In the organization of life through
the instrumentality of volition, we see this pain and suffer-
ing made a means to a larger satisfaction, however, the
extent and fullness of intelligent life being increased by
the number and variety of originally conflicting elements
that have been adjusted within it. Such an understanding
of moral development leads us to a view of the world of
258 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
human experience that is between the extremes of optimism
and pessimism. Extreme optimism would deny that there
is any disorder or maladjustment inherent in the nature
of the world. What seems to be such must be, from this
point of view, purely temporary and presently to be done
away with, or only apparent, i.e. due to our failure to
understand the world completely, and sure to disappear
when we gain a fuller knowledge. Extreme pessimism
sees only disorder and conflict in the world of human
experience and believes it to be impossible for man to
introduce into it any real consistency or derive from it any
genuine satisfaction. Now the true view lies between these
two extremes, in a qualified optimism. It is difficult to
see how any one not superficial in his thought or else
wilfully blind, can deny that evil, due to radical maladjust-
ment, is inherent in the actual world. The insight recently
gained by science into the causes operative in organic evo-
lution adds to the evidence already more than sufficient
which human experience has furnished on this point. In
the process of natural selection the evolution of species is
secured at the expense of the individuals which compose
it, the majority of those born in each generation suffering
death and often cruel death before reaching maturity in
order that only the minority who are best adapted to the
conditions of life shall be allowed to breed and thus de-
termine the character of the species. Yet there is another
side which is equally prominent and equally worthy oTem-
phasis. Our increased knowledge of organic evolution and
of the history of human morality of universal evolution,
n fact sets in stronger relief than ever the fact that this
maladjustment is being overcome, that harmony and order
are being won through pain and struggle. The discovery of
natural selection was not needed to teach us that warfare
is incessant and cruelty prevalent in the organic world,
that the law of the jungle is the law of tooth and claw,
SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE 259
that nature on its face so peaceful and " bright with
gladness " is the scene of constant turmoil and destruc-
tion. 10 But we are indebted to science for the knowledge
that this suffering is not useless and not meaningless, but
through its instrumentality adaptation is being secured and
evolution is proceeding. In the sphere of intelligence and
personality likewise a survey of moral development shows
us how in the process of self-organization man, by suppress-
ing his single desires in their independence, gains control
over his entire nature, all of whose different resources are
thus put at his command; by sacrificing his interest as
an individual he gains entrance into a larger life which
provides a wider and more varied field for the exercise
of his own powers; and by seeking to understand, and
adapt himself to, the laws and forces of the universe, he
allies himself with the process of universal evolution and
the cause of world progress.
11. Conclusion. In the only world we human beings
know the cost of progress is pain, and suffering is an accom-
paniment of evolution. Moreover, mental development in
man has for its penalty an increase of this suffering
present pain being more acute and highly focalized in his
consciousness, while that of the past is preserved in memory,
and that of the future anticipated in imagination. Yet
for this, his superior intelligence more than recompenses
him by revealing with increasing fullness the stupendous
results which are being achieved through the toil and travail
of the world reproducing in his conscious life the main
stages of universal evolution, and awakening within his
soul some appreciation of the significance and value of the
ends that are being realized therein.
19 Of. DABWIN: Origin of Species, Chap. HI.
260 THE GOOD AS SELF-REALIZATION
REFERENCES
LESLIE STEPHEN, Science of Ethics, Chap. X, 4.
ALEXANDER, Moral Order and Progress, Book II, Chap. IV.
SETH, Ethical Principles, Part I, Chap. Ill, 10.
CAIBD, Evolution of Religion, Vol. II, Lecture VII.
THILLY, Introduction to Ethics, Chap. X.
RASHDALI,, Theories of Good and Evil. Book II, Chap. III.
CHAPTER IV
SELF-REALIZATION AND THE MOTIVE OF GOODNESS
1. The Motive of Good Conduct. 2. The Egoistic Motive: Self-
interest. 3. Inadequacy of the Egoistic Motive. 4. The Altru-
istic Motive: Sympathy. 5. Inadequacy of the Altruistic Mo-
tive. 6. The Religious Motive. 7. Self-Realization as the Mo-
tive of Good Conduct. 8. Self -Respect. 9. Philanthropy. 10.
Reverence. 11. Mixed Motives.
1. The Motive of Good Conduct. The motive of con-
duct has been defined as that idea which as an end attracts
the self to action in its pursuit. The motive of good con-
duct is, of course, the idea of the Good. The Good is now
understood to be Self-realization. 
