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THE SETTLEMENT AFTEE THE 
WAE IN SOUTH APEICA. 






LONDON 1 
PRDTTXD BT WILLIAH CLOWK XND SONS, LnariD, 

gtAMTOlD fntm AID CHXIDra CBOM. 



TO 
JilT B£OTH£R LAWYEBS IN SOUTH AI'BICA, 

WHOBB LOtAL rStESDBHIF X EATB BAD BSASON 
to ATFBICX&'R, 



VIU 



CONTENTS 



OHAP. 

XIV. 



XV. 
XVI. 

xvn. 
xvm. 

XIX. 
XX. 

XXI. 

XXII. 

xxni. 

XXIV. 
XXV. 

XXVI. 



Th> UmjurpBB Imoictmbnt AaAimr Fbk- 
TOBU ...... 



The Bovb Reply to the Uitlandeb . 

Mt View or Boeb «. UiTLAirDEB 

Eboh the Raid to Afbikandes Rule in 
Fbetobia, 1896-1898 

The Afbieandkb Policy in the Boeb States, 
1898 



Afbicandeb Action against the Uitlandeb 
and the Ehpibb .... 



The Conference of Blokhfontein, June 
1899 



The Policy of the High Cohhissioneb 

My Last Remonstbance . 

Afbicandbb Negotiation : I^oh the Con 
febbnce of Bloemfontein to the Ulti 

MATUM ...... 



On which Side was the AggbbssionI 

The Pbinciples of the Sbttleuent: Mka 
8UBE8 Necessitated by the War . 



The Impebial Hold on South Afbica — 
Reorganisation of the Genbbal Govebn- 
mbnt 



xxvn. 

XXVm. In the Counterbalance : Videant Consules 



Policy of the General Gotebnubnt of South 
Afbica ...... 



PAGE 

117 
139 
161 

164 

17» 

179 

191 
199 
208 

212 
223 

230 

243 

253 

258 




APPENDICES. 

THE WAB Aim ITS ISSITEB : FROM VAEIOUS BTANDPODSTS. 

PAGE 
L FbOU the StaKDPOIKT of TH,K XiOS^Ai^ ClflZ£ltB 

OP DcTCH Descent 261 

A speech hy Advocate J* W. WesKBla on the Yoimg 
Afzikaader> 

U. E^H TEE STAJfPPOrST OF AN iNTSaSATIOS^ 

Lawtkb ....... 271 

The itocoEfltitutiou of South Africn : a letter to the 
Timeahy FroftaworJ. Westlake,of the University 
of C&mbridga, aud uf the luetituto of Internatlooal 

'm. Peom the Standpoint op tee CHTmoHBs . 

The Nonconformist Clergy and tliti War — Au addreas 
to the High. CoimmBflioneratid llie reply^A lettter 
from a Congregation bI MiaiiiiLer— a letter Cram 
the Afcbbisliop of Caj* Town — The Roluati 
Catholic Churcii. 

XY< Fbou tre Btakdpoust op ab Iupebialist. 

A speeclli hy Sir Alfred lidner on Local Patriotiflm and 
CitizeDHhip of the Empirii. 

V, From the Standpoint of the Tkadkb 

Trade amd the Isaue of the War — Estmcta from nn 
article in the Bntieh and SQuth A/riran Export 
Oazette, 

VL Fbom thb Standpoint or a Peogbebsive Buhoheic 

OF THB Orange Free State . . . 301 

Mf. J. G. Frw&er and President Kruger — Extracts from 
a despatch to the T'l'mcs hy a Bl^eciul correapondient 
at Bloeiixfontein. 



CONTENTS 



PAOE 



yn. Fboh the Standpoint or the Irish Colonists 

IN South Atbica ..... 309 

Yin. From the STAKDPonra of a Minister or the 

Crown in Cape Colony . .314 

Speech by the Hon. T. Lynedoch Graham, Q.G., H.L.G., 
Colonial Secretary of Cape Colony. 

IX. Fboh the Standpoint or a Lotal Woman or 

South AnucA 319 

An open Letter by Hrs. T. Lynedoch GrahMO. 



C xi ) 



IKTRODUCnOK 



) 



rjj is now the greater part of four years since I first came to 
ith Africa with the intention of carefully studying at first 
hand its various problems — political, racial, economical and 
legal. I hftd determined on a year's travel, deciding on 
South AiHca instead of Australia or America on account of 
the fact that for many years past I have known as personal 
fiienda or acquaintances most South Africans of Britiah or 
Dutch descent who have studied law at the Inns of Court 
in London — a connection which I have found of the utmost 
value and interest in my travels^ as South Africa, whether 
Dutch or Britiahj has been for a long time, and seems likely 
to continue to he, nded largely by lawyers. 

My purpose wag to write an impartially worded etatement 
of the various burning questions, some of the developments 
of which have now fixed on South Africa the eyea of the 
civilised world — Boer and Uitlander in the Transvaal — 
Imperial or Republican factor, Dutch or British predomi- 
nance in all South Africa — black and white^miasionary and 
anti'missionary — Indian and anti-Indiaa — capitalist and 
labourer at the diamond fields of Kimberley and on the Gold 
Beef of the Witwatersrand — Komau'Dutoh and British law 
in all South Africa. 

"With such an object in view I have visited every State 
and Colony and territory south of the Zambesi River, and I 
have hEid the privilege of discussing most pending political 
questions^ — of so much greater magnitude since then than I 
quite realised at the beginning as possible — with nearly every 



3DI 



INTRODUCTION 



leading public maa in South A&ica, from the High Com- 

missioDer, and other imperial goyemors and administrators 
of British tenitoriea and British agents in the Transvaal, to 
the present and late Minist^M-s of the two Colonies of the | 
Cape and of Natal ; from the presidents and executives and 
Yolk^raads of the Kepublics of the Vaal and of the Orangt} 
Eiver to leaders of the Bond in Cape Town, to leaders of 
the Uitlanders of Johannesburg sud to Eeform ptiaoners in 
Pretoria jail. In this way I have steadily adhered to the 
method of inquiry which I mapped out before I reached 
South Africa, and which I atated in the first of a short series 
of lettera which I contributed to a leading Loudon journal, 
beginning in November, 1896. 

As I have stated, my inquiry was not confined to the 
purely political question of British or Dutch predominance 
in South Africa now engrossing all minds. In pursuance of 
niy original design, I collected their views on the exploitation 
of minerala from directors of " De Beers " in Kimberley, as 
well as from Socialists in Pretoria ; from Johannesburg 
milHonaires and from workmen in the gold mines. On laud 
tenure I l^ave conversed with Boer commandants holding 
cattle runs of twelve thousand acres as well as with the 
Bijwoner, living on an overlord's land with a less certaiu 
than the most precarious of feudal tenures. I have inqnired 
into the prospects of missionary enterprise, T-isiting the chief 
missions of all the Churches in Bosutoland (the greatest of 
the armed Kaffir reserves) and have compared, later on, the 
methods of civilising the iLaffir adopted by the SoctetA 
Evangelique de Paris in Morija with those followed at the 
monastery of the German Trappiats in Natal, 1 have noted _ 
the doubts as to native adoptability to Christianity presented.'™ 
to me by white trader and Kaf&r chief On the momentona 
problem for the European race of the right way to deal with 
the Kaffir— the orit/o malonim between British and Dutch — 
Kaffir reserve or Kaffir dispersion-- the land for the black or 
for the white — and generally the relation of the Kaffir to the 
dominant race, in the towns and on the veld, on the farm 
and in the mine, I have ascertained the theories of European 



INTRODUCTION 



xiii 



mine owners^ of Boer stock farmers, of British agricnltiiriBts ; 
of miasianaTies who champioa the Kaffir almost to the 
vei;ge of claiming for him social and political equality ; aa 
•well as of home-born and Colonial British who approve of 
the Kaffir's exclusion from the foot-patli in Jokajujesbui^. 
As far && possible I have controated with these theories what 
the Zulu and the Basuto, the Swazi and the Matabele have 
to say to one on those matters, and on the incomprehenBible 
ways of Boer and Briton and white men in general ; although 
the task of penetrating into the recesses of the Kaffir mind, 
I am assured, by life-long observers, is one which no European 
can ever feel even hopeful of having achieved. On the 
■Qtility of permitting or encouraging Indian immigration I 
hare be^n favoured with views so widely divergent as, in 
Ehotieaia, those of the Chamber of Commerce of Buluwayo, 
and in Durban, those of the Aaaociation of Indians (Moham- 
medan and Hindu) of Katal. 

The legal problems of South Africa — questions of legisla- 
tion and administration — I have had the privilege of dis- 
cussing with all the Chief Justices and most of the Judges of 
the High Courts, aa well as with past and present Attorneys- 
General and State Attorneys of the Cape, of Natal, of 
Bhodesia, of GriquaJand Weat^ of the IVanavaal and of the 
Orange Free State ; and also with the Eeaident of Basutoland 
with Native Commissioners, and other magistrates adminis- 
tering the law affecting natives in the Kaffir reserves and in 
temtory occupied by Europeans. No one in Europe who has 
not made a special study of this aspect of the South African 
public field can form an adequate conception of the number 
and comple-xity of these problems, dealing with such un- 
familiar topics as the degree to which legislation should 
admit natives to civil or political rights, similar to those 
possessed by Europeans; the recognition to be accorded to 
native usages ; the regulation of Asiatic immigration ; the 
effect of systems of land tennre, native and European, on the 
ffQpply of labour for apiculture, for the mines, for industries 
and generally on the economical progress of the country : the 
special, and, to European eyes, the anomalous laws enacted 



INTRODUCTION 



lo protect the productioD of diamoadfl and gold ; the restric- 
tion of the supply of alcohol to the uativoa ; the prohibitioQ 
of the supply to them uf arma. 

The yery titles of the&e eoactmetits and of the officials to 
enforce tlieiu> strike strangely on the ear ; the Curfew Laws. 
the Glen Grey Act, the Faction Fight Acts, tha Native Com- 
nudsionera, the Protector of IndUns. Above all, fruitful of 
endless and persistent and fierce controversy among lawysi« 
and Uymen alike, are the famous enactments styled tha 
I.D.B. Act«i whichj contrary to usual principles of junspru- 
dence« reverse the burden of proof for all persons, European 
or native, by making it incumbent on the posse&aor of rough 
diamonds to prove bis innocence. 

Legislative power has been veated in authorities of every 
kind, and promulgated in every form, from enactments by 
BritialL Colonial Parliaments of the Cape and Na^ to 
resolutions of a Chartered Company and of a Legialativ* 
Council in Ehodesia ; frona Volksraad bealuits in the Trans- 
vaal to proclamations of the High Commi^ioner in tho 
native reserves. 

In another book I hope to publish the result of these 
inquiries. Il is true that I have adhered to this method of 
investigation long past the period which I had originally 
believed would be sufficient This, however, was tho result 
of a discovery — made by other Europe-bom inquirers in 
South Africa — that, however admirable a method of induc- 
tion ia the collection of opinion on both aides of every oon- 
troveray, a year ia not a sufficient time in which bo test the 
value of opinions or the reliability of assurances. Within 
the firet year I carried out ray plan of travel almost in full. 
If, however> I had written my conclusions in November 1897 
I should now be compelled to very gravely modify them. 
For — ^to take the problem overshadowing South Africa even 
then, now so tra^cally solved — I had come to the conclusion 
that there would be no war between the British and Dutch. 
I had accepted the assurances given to me, from the Orange 
River to the Limpopo, by men in the highest station in tho 
Republics, that no war party and no war spirit existed ; and 



i 



INTRODUCTION 



zir 



t 



I had agreed with the view of Mr. Bryce, whose hook on 
South AMca I had followed with attention, that infinite 
patience and the slow touch of time woiUd heal. 

This view, indeed, was repeatedly expressed to me within 
the past twelve months — when I had long ceased to hold it 
— by public men of such political experience as past and 
present Mioiaters of the Crown in Cape Colony and Natal, 
and by men of snch opportunities of gauging the most sensi- 
tive barometer of peace and war as the Committee of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 

However, at the end of my appointed time, a pressure of 
professional work (chiefly reaching me as advisory counsel to 
the Transvaal Republic on the legal questions arising under 
the Conventions with the Imperial Government) decided me 
to prolong my stay in South Africa for another year. 

Since then, the increasing strain of the ever-darkening 
political scene, IJaught with such sequence of blood and 
tears to all who Uve in South Africa and to all citizens of 
the Empire — a situation which, so far ofi* as November, 1898, 
I saw and proclaimed conld have no ending but war — has. 
held me as a spectator, and, to some slight degree, a most 
unwilling actor in the drama, which I had come only to 
witness. 

That I have warned, with all the force I could command, 
the Governments of the two Republics against the fatal 
conrae into which they were led by counsellors of their own 
race, I have no reason to regret; although much, that my 
vaming was in vain. 



CAfE Tows, 
Juli/, ItHX). 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 
IN SOUTH AFRICA. 



CHAPTER r. 

METHOD OF DTVESTIGATION. 

Ix a diapatcli which I sent to a London journal from 
Johannesburg, dated the 2lst NovembeTj 189tJ, I wrote:— 

" To investigate the more important fa^ts of tlie political 
situation in the Transvaal and South Afrioa was the task 
which I set before me some months ago. Fuller information 
W to the reality of the relations between British and Dutch 
b South Africa is obviously a ticceaaity of the hour, in view 
of the influence exwuiaed Uy home opinion on European 
tiipftnaion in that quarter of the world. The plan of inquiry 
which, after a gt>od deal of cunsideration, seemed to me the 
most likely to be Ufleful, was to ascertain the opinions of 
leading pubhc men in the Transvaal, the Free State, and the 
Cape Colony on all those points relating to South African 
iKihtical affaira on which home opinion appeared sjteciaUy 
to reqiirre infonnation, and which at the same time are of 
the first importance. This information lias been freely given 
to me, and I shall in consequence be able, where controversy 
exists, to present the views of both sides, I decided also to 
*«e as far as poaaible all aspects of life in the Transvaal and 
South Africa — on the farms and in the veldt, aa weH aa at 
tbe mines and in the towns. It ia, of course, not to be for- 
gotten thai some controvejsies about South African itHairs 
eaimot be decided by any investigation into facta. Often 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the dispute is not about facta, but abaut general theories of 
life and action. Take, for inatanee, the question of tlie 
arming of natives, as the Basutos were armed with Enrop«an 
weapons with which they defeated a General of the Imperifll 
forces forty years ago, which they have refused to surrender 
to a colooid demand, and which they still retain. I>Lamebri- 
cally opposite conclusions will be reached by theoiists who 
think that the white man baa no right to be in South Africa, 
—a not altogether unheard-of section at home — and those 
who hold that European immigration stands in need of no 
apology. No investigation into facts caq alter this diver- 
gence of view. Similarly, on the question of vote or no vote 
for the natives, or on that of British or Dutch supremacy— 
if supremacy and not fusion there must be — or on that of 
Imperial expansion or Imperial abandonmeni of our depcii- 
Idencies, not so much, if at all, do the facta of the situation, 
as the political preferences or other prejudices of the dia- 
putant, determme his opinion and action. To save time and 
useless trouble, I therefore decided to take some things, 
fruitful enough of controversy^ as granted. I take it as 
granted that Europeans have a right to immigrate to South 
AMca or any other region of the earth in which they L-an 
live in health. I assume that the native races have certain 
rights, at least those of being treated with humanity and 
Justice, however far they may fall abort of fitness for equality 
of political pi-ivileges. I assumti that thu British and Dutch 
speaking stttlera are equally entitled t^ be here ; they tM 
manifestly destined to stay here. X shall not waste time in 
arguing for the proposition that the British Government has no 
occasion to apologise for its existence in South Africa, and ia 
justified in doing its best to develop territoiy in its posseasioo 
for the advantage of the citizens of the Empire and of civili- 
sation generally. Finally, I take it that a general agreement 
among South Africflus as to a particulajr policy or as to the 
existence of a particular state of things is more likely to 
be correct than conclusions arrived at by home-staying 
politicians or others who have never come into contact ydth 
the social conditions about which they theorise. 



METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 



" It may occur to some that this enumeration is un- 
neceasary, Eut if recent criticism of the conduct of South 
■ African affairs be scrutinised it will be seen that exactly 
contxary assumptions underlie mxich that baa been written. 
Tliifortuuately, too, the history of South Africa displays at 
large the grave and lasting conseq^ueaces of blunders of 
British policy^ due only partly to ignoraQC© of the actualities 
of the situation, but much more attributable to fixed theories 
of political ethics or professedly religious priDciple as to the 
rights of the Kaffir, the respective claims of the British and 
Butch, the right or duty of the Imperial Goveruiuent to 
abandon or remain in South Africa. And the holders of 
these» like most other thooriea, are practically proof against 
argument based on facta. Not, however, that theory, political, 
philanthropic or religious, ie alone to blame, The see-saw 
of party government — most unhappily allowed to affect 
Imperial policy as regards the Colonies, although supposed 
to be excluded from affectiog Imperial foreign policy — has 
enabled the incessant, veering of home opinion to shape the 
direction of Soulli African jjolitica. But it is nearly always 
aome fact, proof, theory or other (often, no doubt, ahielding 
itseK behind mdsrepreseatation of facts) which has periodically 
coDvulaed home opiDJon, and so contributed quite as much to 
direct Imperial action as the presence or absence of informa- 
tion as to the value of gold reefs, or the utility of Colonies 03 
feeders of trade, or the material advantages ur material douyera 
of now fields for emigration. 

" The first discovery to bo made by anyone who en- 
deavours to get at the outlines of the problem, is that the 
political situiitiou in the Transvaal cannot be separated from 
that in the Cape Colony, in the Oi-auge Free State, and in 
Natal. Politics in the Transvaal are so intimately inter- 
woven with those of the neighbouriug Eepublic and those of 
the old Colony — of which both the llepublics are histoiically 
off-shoola— that they i^e iucomprehenaible if takou scpiu-fitely. 
A mixed European population, starting from the old Colony 
^-originally Hollander^ French, Huguenot, and British — 
spreads over all these States. lu the towns, English ia 

B 2 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



spoken ; in the country — with the exception of the English- 
speaking Eastern province of the Cape — Dut<;h. But the 
population is practically bilingual, in the sense that nearly 
every one can speak the two languages, although Engliah is | 
for the town, and Dutch for the country and for speaking to ' 
tiie KaiEr. The two Eepuhlieg were severed from Eritiah 
dominion within living memory — the Ti-anavaal in 1852, and 
the Free State in 1854. The connection between the Re- 
publics and the Colonies is not coraparable to the case even 
of such close neighbours aa Switzerland and Italy. It can 
only be compared^and even then the comparison falls short 
of the reality — to the connections arising from the inter- 
change of population between the diderent sections of the 
United Kingdom. Family ties link together the whole 
population — Dutch speaking and English speaking— -from 
Table Mountain in the Cape to the Limpopo in the Trans- 
vaal. A common history and tradition, a common religiou^ ^ 
and a common use of the two languages, weld them into &f 
community. Even the persons who play on the public &ta^ 
in one section of the territory are borrowed fram another. The 
present President of the South African Republic was bom a 
British subject in the Cape Colony ; the Chief Justice ia an 
immigrant from the Colony, The President of the Orange 
Free State who held ofBce longest, bore a title conferred by 
the Queen. The present Chief Juatiee ia a brother of the 
Chief Justice of Cape Colony. The highest officials of both 
Eepublics have been repeatedly chosen from the Colony. 
Dingaan's Day- — the Transvaal public festival commemorated 
on the 16th December — celebrated the defeat by the Boer 
emigrants from the Cape of a Zulu chief ijt the now Eritish 
colony of Natal. Not one public act of importance can ba M 
done by the Transvaal Government or the Cape Government " 
without ita effect passing from one end to the other of this 
contiguous territory of the Republics nnd tlie Colonies, and 
affecting all this mixed European population. The diversion 
of Transvaal trade to Delagoa Bay touches immediately the 
Cape Boer. Aa showing the community of sentiment and 
interest which pervades this mixed population, out of many 



METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 



» 



iDstajic^Sj thosB of Majuba Hill and the Jameson Baid ftra 
sufficient. They affected and ware affected by the politics of 
the Cape Colony only one degree less immediately than thoso 
of ^e Republics. In fact, South Africa presents much of tho 
situation which New Amsterdam presented before the com- 
plete fusion of British and Dutch produced the New York of 
the War of Independence. 

" British and Dutch Eire here in South A&ica to stay, 
The self-governing Colonies and the British Government are 
as much in possession as are the Eepublica. In the Interest 
of European civilisation, harmonious co-operation between 
British and Dutch is plainly desirable ; the common interest 
of both seetiona (©t^aally concerned in the maintenance of 
internal peace and security, order and efficiency of adminis- 
tration) points in the same way. Some perception of this 
common interest is shown l*y the existence of a certain body 
of sentiment in favour of a confederation of the Colonies and 
of the Eepublics. The presence of a common danger is a 
permanent stimulus to that sentiment. The black man 
never fails to realise, and by bis action to suggest to the 
white mau, the underlying galidarity of interest, if not of 
aentiment of all Europeans. When Boer and Briton were 
enpposed to bo in conflict as a consequence of the Jameson 
Raid the Matabele nxarketl his sense of the occasion by rising 
m revolt at Bulawayo. The fact, however, tliat a political 
combination is desirable is unhappily no proof that rulers and 
people will cause it to be formed, Washington thought in 
1787 that disruption was more likely to result from the 
jealousies of the States than federation from their perception 
of a comraun interest. This, too, although among many Uuka 
of union between the States were to be counted the use of a 
oommon language, the existence of similar EepubUcan con- 
slitutLons, and the memory of common perils endured and 
victories gained. It is clear that there were forces making 
tat imlon in America not to be found in South AMca. But 
dus is not all. The alternatives before the American States 
vere those of federation on the one hand, and separate State 
ftxlsteiice on the other. The issue was a single oae. In 



6 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

South Afiica, the possibilities of the future are more 
numerous. Will the future bring confederation or sopanitti 
development ? If eoiLfeila ration, ia it to be undeT the shidd 
of the British Empire, or iis the union of a group of States 
independent of the Empire ? And, lastly, whether the Stat*s 
be confederated or isolated, subject to the British Empire, or 
mdependeEit, what section of the population, British or Dutch 
speaking, seems likely to predominate in political power and 
ui langui^e ? The mind of the people in South AMca mn&t 
largely furnish the ultimate determinant of ±e future. It 
will be a fata! error to suppose thnt so-called " pmctical " 
couaiderdtioDg (meaning those of immediate pecuniary gain) 
must neceasarily decide their future action. Of all facta, the 
most stubborn and creative aro the iugiuined beliefs and 
prejudices of a people — which are usually atlributahle to 
quite other causes than a regard for their material interests. 
A genemlisatiou which is correct enough when applied to 
openiLors on the Stock Exchange fails tu explain the action 
of a generation of Huguenots who lost all in fleeing from 
France. 

" On the other hand, the set of homo opinion must play 
large part. Bominatit British opinion was ctartaiuly beliini 
the King in his attempt to tax the American colonies. 

"In .South Africa* Imperialist and Republican, Bntish- 
bom and Boer, colonists of every nationality eeem to agree 
with impressive unanimity that one great cause — if not the 
greatest — of such cleavage of British and Dutch as exists ha* 
always been an apprehension of Imperial enforcement of 
mistaken policy as regards the natives. The Englishmaii 
homo who creates public opinion is understood to be liab' 
to be swayed by a section who proclaim the black man as 
brother and a citizen, capable of exerciaing and abaolutel; 
entitled to full political citizen's rights and entire social 
equality. Two centuries of experience have led the DutcliH 
speaking colonists to believe that tutelage, and not equality^ 
is the black man's portion of justice. His belief is that 
shared by Sir Theophilua Shepatone, and announced aa a rule 
for future British administration in the proclamatioa of 1877, 



4 



4 



METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 



whicli annexed th^ TnmsTAaL * Equal justice does not uid 
should not involve the granting of eqnal rights^ such aa the 
exercise of the right of voting, to aavagea, or their bGcomitig 
members of a legialativi* body, or their being entitled to 
other civil pri\'ileges which are incompatible with their 
uQcivilisecJ condition.' It is true that the institution of 
responsible govornment in the Colonies has lessened the 
prospect of Imperial interference in the matter, as the Cape 
Glen Grey Act shows. But there are in practico limits to 
the self -government of a self-governing dependency, and to 
the extent to wliich it can diarogard current British opinion. 
The creation of the coloured vote in Cape Colony has not 
reasanied the Boer. Thia subject, therefore, is one for careful 
inquiry, as immediately l>enring on the prospects between 
Briton and Boer, and of confederation between the States. 
It may be convenient if I mention here the other subjects on 
which I have aoiight information from men of all parties 
through South /Vfrica, 

"As far as bearing on present conditions and prospects, 
tbe history of the European in South Africa, and paiticularly 
of the circumstances which have formed the character of the 
Boer, must be considered. Tlie present condition of pttrtiea 
in the Tranavaal particularly, and in the Free State and 
CfiipO Colony; theii grounds of divergence, racial and 
religious, and their policies I have made the subject o^ 
apeoial inquiry ; as alao the policy of the Transvaal Govem- 
ment» internal and external, and the policy of foreign powers, 
including Gennany, aa regards the Eepublics and South 
AMca. The views of eminent lawyers, including the Chief 
Justices of the EepubUca, on the question of the existence or 
non-existence of the suzerainty over the Transvaal proclaimed 
by the Convention of Pretoria of 1831, will be of interest. 
Leading men on both sides of the internal controversy have 
given with considerable care their views aa to the validity of 
the claims of the Uitlanders, and on all the matters of 
legislation and administration raised on their behalf, The 
relation of all the coloured iftcea, including the immigrant 
Indians and Chinese, to the white population constitute, as 



t 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



haa already been stated, a matter of the gravest intereBt; 
and I have been favoured with the opinion of the arbitrator 
appointed by the British and Tranisviial Governnieiita to 
decide upon the claims of the Indiana to be admitted to the 
Transvaal. Tlie views of the various political parties as to 
the right policy for the British Government, the Colonies and 
the Republics respectively in South African aft'aira have also 
been a matter for inquirj'. In my following lett-ers I shall 
deal with these subjects. Wbei'e divergence of views exists 
I shall state as fairly as I can the case presented by the 
authorities on both sides. Finally, I shall state the eon- 
elusions at which I have anived." 

In an interview published in the Pretoria Press of the 
6 th December, 1896, I said : — 

" The last point to which I should wish to refer is the 
prospect of a lasting peace between the two divisions of the 
European race in South Africa, the English and the Dutch 
sections of the population. I do not wish to put forward my 
opinion aa a final canclualon, but I think that if there shonld 
be a frank recognition on either side, that the other side ia 
entitled to be here, and a spirit of reasonable compromiae^ 
there is uo reason why a modus vtvaidi should not be arrived 
at. Not perhaps in the present, but almost certainly in the 
future, the pressure of the Kaffir and the other non-European 
populations would be likely to lead to the coalition and the 
ultimate fusion of the white people. The fact that a certain 
course of auUon is a reasonable one and for the benefit of all 
parties is no proof, however, that it is going to be adopted," 

These last remarks have unfortunately proved prophetic, 
but this dtation from the interview will show the spirit in 
which I had entered into my inquiries and in wbiuh they 
were conducted to thi^ end. 



( 9 > 



CHAPTER 11. 



TUB NECfiSSITY Of FINALITY IS TtFE SETTLKMEKT, 

The one conclusion which 13 bonio in upon the uiiml of 
anyone of any Eumpeaa natioaality who liiis considered the 
complex problems of the South African situation is the 
necessity of a final aettlemeut, once tnr all, of the question^ 
In whose hatida is political power to be committed ? On the 
ioswej* to this question depends the who!e future of the raco 
in South Africa. This ia obvious ; but much more depends 
on the aolution. On it depend the saf^^Tiai-ding of the 
inC^i^ty of the British Empire and the fulfilment of its 
high missioii in the world. On the solutiou depends the 
preservation of all that tlie great Eaj means for all tho 
subject races of the wurld, for Kaffir, for Hindu, for Malay ; 
as well as for the Europeau coloniat who has liten so 
strangely impelled to annex within the biief period of a 
few generjitioDs the whole surface of the habitable globe. 
The object with which I write, therefore, 13 to show that, 
above and beyond the rights and wrongs of the particidar 
issue to whic!i Boer and Briton in South Africa are com- 
I mitted, fiurdity in the settlement should bo the dominating 
I thought iu tho minds of the statesmen wbo will have to 
decide when the cunnoa ia silent; Jinality imperatively 
refjnirod to further the mission in tho world of the European 
race, a mission ao strongly realised now in Euglaud and in 
Uje Empirfc! by those who, a few years ago^ would have 
upou the vision as an idle dream ; to promote the 
of the European race in South Africa in furtherance 
vf he higher misaioii of the race the world over ; to «iiaur9 



lo 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the elevation ultiniately, and in the present tlio just treat- 
ment of tlie subordmate races ; a burden not of the white 
man's selection. These are the objects to be borne in mind 
by those who ciiileavour to influeuce the final settlement of 
the prcsont struggle in South Africa for British Imperial _ 
or Boer Republican prodoraiDance, That the continued f 
existence of the Empire tmna on the inclusion or the 
exclusion of South Africa from ita sphore of influence any 
impartial student of the situatioti must feel convinced. But 
that nothing must be left to the settlement of time alone in 
this struggle between Imperial British and Republican Dutch 
supremacy, is the otie great political fact which I purpose to 
make clear. 

The integrity of the British Empire, it ia a truism to say, 
resta on ita moral as much as or even more than on i 
material foundation, It may be thought unnecessary — but 
it is not- — ^to recall a truth falling Lu the category of those so 
well known that people thinlc they may be safely neglected. 
Its moral foundation centres in its prestige. Ita matenal 
foundation in the extent of its territory, in its strength in 
armaments, in its numbers of men trained to arms, in ita 
possossion of gold, in the dimensions of its trade. 

Prestige h a word not ha very j^'ood repute in England ; _ 
a foreign word not perfectly accUmatised, Nevertheless, itfl 
deserves natuiulisation, for, dispassionately considered, it 
represents the reputation of the Empu-e and of its goveruiag 
clasaea within as well as without ita own borders for, 
primarily, military power iu men and munitions of war, in 
valour and in tactical skill ; but quite as much for sanity, 
for intelligence, for a sense of justice iu administration^ and 
for gratitude to its public servants. Maoaulay points out 
moat truly how the chief foundation in India of the per- 
manence of British rule is due to the eonviction in the mind 
of every Indian, of Rajput, of Sikh, of Gurkha^ of Bengali, of 
the absolute reliance which they can place on the plighted 
British word. Every aworder of John Company knew that 
hia daily ration of rice would be paid t<» him as his veteran^a 
pension aa safely aa the salary of the viceroy ; although the 



i 



FINALITV IN THE SETTLEMENT 



XX 



veterain warrior were lying helpless in the most foi^otton of 
lemete Tillages. Whereas, notwithstanding the promise cf 
mountains of gold from the native ruler, the certain fate of 
the Teteran warrior oo longer fit to irield his weapon was to 
be thrown out on the roadside to furnish a meal for the 
vnltTures. In the woi-d " prestige " must be included 
repatatioQ for qualities such as this, the Empire's gratitude 
&ad its BezLse of justice. 

The present war in South Africa and all the precetUng 
race strife between British and Dutch is attributable to the 
fact that the reputation of the Imperial Government, not 
alone with the Dutch, but with the British descended 
colonist, with the Kaffir and with the Indian iramigTant, has 
been precisely the reverse of its reputation in India. No 
firmness, no consistency; alternately negrophilist and anti- 
Kaffir; alternately expansionist and Manchester School. 
Nothing more fijted than the certainty of Imperii change ; 
onleas indeed it were the cruelty of Imperial ingratitude. 

How then will the reputation of the Imperial power for 
the qualities of good government be aJfected by any un- 
certainty in the final settlement 1 

It is to be remembered that not alone the peoples of 
Europe, but the people of the United States of America will 
be judges on the Imperial action in the acttSement of South 
Africa- And not alone these, but the self-governing people 
of Canada, of Auattalia and New Zealand, and the vast 
subject population of India and of the far East j above all, 
in this matter of the settlement, the British colonist in 
South Africa and those of Butch descent, who are hanging 
with aniious attention upon the Imperial decision, and are 
considering now, and will decide at the end, what estimate 
ttey should form of the likelihood of the Imperial sceptre 
leniaining in the hands of the composite nation, Celt and 
Teuton and Scandinavian, in the Islands of the Northern 



Let M& glance at the other, the material foundations of 
the Empire. How will they be affected by the prospect 
whether the settlement in South Africa is to be permanent 



12 




THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



I 



or temporary ; whether a chance is to remain of an alien and 
hostile powor ris'mg in arras and excluding the Empire from 
8outli African territory ? It is admitted that it is esBential 
to the maintenanctj of the British Empire in its integrity that 
the sea route to India and Australia should be kept open. 
If a hostile power were lo dominate South Africa the 
maintenance of that route would be clearly impossible. 
The sinking of a single ship in the Suez Canal would block 
thi3 road to Indxjt. If India and Australiu were severed 
from the Empire, the defection or the annexation of Canada 
would clearly ha a matter of a very ahc»rt time. A apeek on 
the map would represent British territory after such defec- 
tions ; after aueh an annihilation of the life-work of Clivo 
and Hastings, of Wolfe, of Pitt and Nelson and Wellington, 
of Ila^elock and Lawrence, and of the contemporary admin 
istnitora and generals who from Kandahar to Cairo, fram 
Simla to Cape Town, from Khartoum to Bloemfontein and 
Pretoria, have carried on the work of their predecessors aa 
servants of the Empire. I 

Looking at South Africa exclusively, the newer age would 
see the gold and the diamonds of the Witwaterarand and^ 
ICimberley, the most productive fields in the world, in th^| 
hands of a hostile power. The recent policy and action of 
the two Dutch -speaking Eepublics have given proof, if proof 
were wanted, that gold and diamonds are equivalent to the 
possession of CftUJion and rifles, and provisions and all muni- 
tion of war, and the services of veteran strategists and 
skilled artillerists. And even the moat home-looking of 
theoiists could not fail to aee that» in regard to trade, the 
loss oi South African pnidomiuance would metin the necessary 
downfall of the commercial prosperity of the British Isles. 
The trade i-oute to Centriil Africa, to preserve which so many 
British statesmen have striven (t^veu the Colonial Minister 
of Majuba Hill), would be lost for ever. The fruits of the 
annexation of Egypt and of the conquest of the Soudan would 
be destroyud. 

But the moral foundation of the Empire ia the most im- 
portant. Stronger than steel ia the &word of the spirit Th© 



I 



d 



FINALITY IN THE SETTLEMENT 



13 



Empire rules India by the mind rather than by the cannon. 
Whttt will be th© effect of Imperial vacillaiioti, wtint of 
inteliigence, want of appreciation of the facts of the external 
world, on the minds of the jieople of India ? and on the 
mlndB of the poople of Canada, Austi-alia and New Zealand ? 
and on the minda of the people of the Ameritan Common- 
vealth, tending now ao closely to friendly co-operation with 
the Empire in the common world work of the race ? 

Now ihe arguments used in England, in the controversy 
at present proceeding there aa to the aefctldmeat in South, 
Africa, mainly turn on the contention, raised by a soaall 
minority, that none of these important consequences bearing 
npon the integrity of the Empire depends ia the least on 
the solution of the South African crisis. It ia contended 
that the question of Dutch or British supremacy may be 
solved one way or the other without affecting the future of 
the Empire ; without impairing its prestige in India or in 
the Colonies, in Europe or in the American commonwealth ; 
without cutting off its sea route to India and Australia, pr 
H the over-land r^ute through Africa to the Soudan and Egypt 
^^^ To some minds, and I confess to mine, the most complete 
Hjprwer to this contention is to be found in the universal 
conviction of the British Colonies, not merely in Afiica, but 
in Australia, New Zealand and in Canada, that tlie issue of 
Dutch or British supremacy in South Africa means life or 
death to the Empire. To many it aeems worae than idle for 
a section in England, whose experience lias never reached 
tbe outlying territories of the Empire, to set up their opinion 
on a matter of this kind against tbe universal conaciousness 
of the people in the self-governing colonies, who are con- 
vinced, and who have sealed their conviction with their 
IbltXKl, that the whole future of the Empire, its material and 
moral foundation^ turns on the assertion and the firm estab- 
liahment ouce for all of Imperial supremacy in South Africa. 
Socurus judicat orbis terrarum. 

With this conviction I have been compelled by the logic 
of facts to agrees and my task in these pages is to show 
the reasona why X think thld conviction should be shared by 




I 



all citizens of the Empire. I propose first to consider the 

general outline of the history of British and Dutch relations 
in South Africa, and the conclusions as to the right Imperial 
policy now to he adopted to be deduced from that history* 
But before conaidering this port of the subject there are two 
considerations I wish to lay stress upon. 

The first i3> that the Empire ia exceedingly modem ; it 
has not lasted for ever; there ia no vast store of political 
experience, such as in popular imagination exists, to draw 
upon. What has existed only one hundred and fifty yeara 
need not last for ever. 

The restless activity of the island-born Elizabethan 
sailors, though fully a century later in their enterprises 
than the Poituguese under Prince Henry the Navigator, 
has caused in most British minds an illusion of greater 
antiquity in the Empire than history warrants. The Battle 
of Plassey in 1757 marks practically the beginning of our 
preaent world*wide dominion. The victories of Drake and m 
Raleigh, the colonisations of Penn and Baltimore, were I 
obliterated aa far as the Empire was concerned when, one 
hundred and twenty-five years ago, a mad king controlled 
the destinies of England, and hy an assertion of almost 
Euasian autocracy — *' Mettre le roi hora de page " — cut off 
the American colonies from the British community, whose 
laws and ItmguEige and religion and social forms they inherit ; 
a tie so much stroager than at one time was believed iho 
happier developments of later j'ears have shown. This, of 
course, is only true as to the material foundation and the 
extent of the territJ^ry of the Empire. The Empire is ex- 
ceedingly modern in the extent of its territory; nearly as 
modem as the United States of America. 

Now, strange though it may seem to home-sfca^'ing 
Britons, this modernness — with its suggestion of the Empire 
being merely temporary — is fully present to th« minds of 
many leading South Africans, more especially those oSM 
Dutch descent At a Queen's jubilee banquet in Johannes-' 
burg in June 1897, 1 heard an unquestionably loyal speaker 
of Dutch descent refer to the inevitable diasolution of thai 



I 



1 



FINALITY IN THE SETTLEMENT 



15 



! Empire ; t-o what he took to be the ine\'ital}le time when a 
separate aijd iudependeat South African nation would take 
its plo/de in the world. In a recent missive to the Govem- 
mezits of Europe an official of a Dutch Republic referred to 
the Empire as a Coloasus with feet of clay. A cornet, not a 
fiied st^ is the conception of our world-widu dominion^ 
cherished not alone by some of our good cousins on the 
Contiaent of Europe, but by Bome citizens of the Empire, 

This is a conception which most citizens of the Empire 
<io not share. Rather the drawing together of the English- 
flpeakiag peoples is their ideal goal. And to some of us^ 
who are students of the Law of Nations, rather the political 
incorporation of the wholo of the dominant race of Enrope is 
the event towards which we move, than any repetition of 
the sundering of the community of tho race ; which, begin- 
I ning in the disruption of the Empire of the C^sars, ended in 
I the disraption of the Empire of the Hapsburgs.* But it 
should never be left out of the mind of the stjitesiuen who 
direct immediate Imperial action— although happily not 
ultimate Imperial destiny — that their firmness, their sense 
of justice, thytr gratitude for service to the Empire^ their 
teuncity of purpose, their approximation to or receding from 
the Hapsburg grip, are being carefully scrutinised by millions 
the world over— some with anxiety lest they fall below 
eir Imperial station ; others with hope, nay, with a sure 
bef, that they will fall. 
The other consideration I wish to present is that the 
preservation of tho heritage of the British Empire — the 
most glorious instrument of justice the world has yet seen 
— is not the private property of individual British citizens 
to be accepted or abandoned as a " damnosa hereditas," at 



• Since these lmo& were written, and for the first tiinfi siaca the last 
CniMid*,, and more compleiety than in the Cni&fidee, thi Great Powers of 

i lh» European r&co stand united ki unus ngainst a DOD-Kurapean fo€. 

[ *ni« masiiacres in Cbiim have brou^bt nbout that united Europ^tn 
DiterventioD which Home obaervera have long for<3Becn ne inevitable. 
{In an Mticle on the United 8tat«i Chiueec Escluaion Act, published in 
the Ammcun Law Seeieio of October 1894, I r^orred to thifl prospect 
of genend Euiopean interveatioa.) 



i6 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the STiggestioD of their individual interests. It is a trust 
for the whole human race. 

I have referred to the hrief period of time within which 
the British Empire hfuj been built up ; but the process has 
been only a part, aUhouph a mijrhty part, of a much greater 
movement. It is difficult to realise how few of the European 
race have clearly conceived the brevity of the term within 
which the whole of the earth has fallen under the control 
of European ideas, of law, of limits of social conduct, to 
some degree of religion and everywhere of Eitropeaji military 
power. At the [iresent moment the supreme law in all that 
vast section of Africa which stretches from the Zambesi to 
Ihe Lion's Head takes as its highest authority — highest ' 
though not most immeiliate — the decrees of a Pretorian 
I'refect of the lioman Empire in York ; and yet here, least 
of all in the community of Christendom, is the solidarity of ] 
the European mce Ihe world over recognised. That ihu 
dispersion of the race over the whole globe and its being 
placed in a position of guidance over subject populations is 
an accident few can believe. But, apart from this, of the 
deepening of the perception of duty towards these races, 
of the spirit which, in regard to one Bcction of Europeans, £a 
called Imperialism, and the acceptance of the white man'ii 
burden, there can be no doubt. Hero, in South Africa, one 
is the more struck by the rude recrudescence of 16th centuiy 
nationalist particularism, an unfortunate result of the dis- 
i-uption almost completed in that age of the organised 
community of Europe — a disruption which has given rise 
to so many things besides the individualist form of the 
present Law of Nations. Now, to many minds, it is clear 
that this revolt of Dutch sentiment in South Africa against ' 
the dominant spirit of the European world furnishes the proof 
of its destiny of failiu^. But it is none the less essential 
that that strange perversion of thought among some English- 
men, which leads them to look on devotion to the inte^ity 
of the Empire as an exhibition of national selfishness, sliould 
be banished from the minds of those on whom the high 
function of directing Imperial action has fallen. 



IP 




C «7 ) 



CHAPTER lU. 



t 



HISTOBY OF THK BRITISH AND DUTCH DJ SO0tH AFRICA. 

The necessity of ^victualling the Dutch ships engaged io 
tluj East India ti-ade, and the adoption by Louia XIV. of a 
policy of religioufl conformity in Franca, were the cauaea of 
the complexion borne by the original white population in 
South Africa. Soldiers, sailors and farmers in the service of 
the Dutch Kast India Company, and French Huguenota, have 
combined, with a large German contingent, to form the Dutch- 
speakiug jiei>ple.* Strange to say, the territory of the Cape 
was, long before the Dutch oceupatiou of 1652, declared a 
British possession by certain English captains. But the 
annexation of 1620 was not confirmed by the Government of 
James 1., no more than the annexation of Spitzbergen by 
other bold mariners ; and when the Huguenots came to the 
Cape after the Kevocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, the 
Dutch Company held undisputed possession of the tiny 
colony at the Castle on the Peninsula. As was to be 
expected in such a smaU. commnnity, the Huguenot mind 
has played a greater part at the Cape than in Englaud, or 
Ireland, or Holland, whither the bulk of the refugees fled. 
The intensity of the Huguenots' convictiona, reaching to 
fanaticism, seems the true origin of the present religions 
fervour of the averse Boer. NotwithstandiDg a careful and 

• J Am reminded by Chief Jwlic* Kot«' of thft Traatvao] that, for 
toaut UEiexpluDed reason, writ«rH on South Afncs. ignore the very krg« 
Otniiazi vtruD in the Duteii-Fpeakiiig peopk ; although Qanses bo well 
kaown «■ that of President Kruger are obviouBly GenuAn. In IttOG, the 
tiiDO of the ficcoud Britiah occupatiODj about oue-third of tha namea were 
Osmui. 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



sjatematic exclusion of undesirable members from permane 
reaidencOj the other colonists of the Dutch Cotupany, how^ 
ever determined and valiant, ccumot have been characterised 
by an extraordinary depth of religioua conviction. In fact, 
the aefvaiits of the Company were largely recruited from 
desperate and broken men of every European nationality. 
But dominating, overabadowing^ affecting all that has hap- 
pened till this year of 19U0, was an event of 1658, before the 
Huguenots had come. A number of slaves, captured from 
Portuguese slave shipSj were handed over to the New Colony* 
being sold on credit to the farmers. All the same, let us not 
forget that philanthropy which abolished^ also establiahed^ 
negro slavery. The captive West AfricMi was bought by 
Christian missionaries to prevent his being eaten, or boat 
being floated in his blood. 

The British Empire's acquisition of a real footing in Ind 
in the second half of the 18th century, and the anti-re-' 
publican zeal of the last Stadtholder of the house of Orange- 
Nassau, determined the presence of the British section of 1 
population. Since the original temporary cession after 
French Bovolution — ^' les provisoires sont lea plus perraan-^ 
enta "—made by the eriled Stadtholder, writing from Kew, 
and more especially since the definite cession of the Cap© 
and Ceylon and Guiana from the Kingdom of Holland to the 
Imperial Crown in 1814, a cession based on payment of 
several niillions of British money, the stream^ of British 
immigration has been ateady. Except in one instance, It has 
not been of very great volume, or setting towards the country 
rather than the town. This exception was the State-aided 
immigration of 1820, when the eastern province of Cape 
Colony was colonised from England. As a result^ the , 
Eastern Province is the only district where the farming 
population speaks English. In the rest of the Colony, and 
generally tlirough South Africa, English is spoken in the 
towns and Dutch in the country. 

The characteristics of the present Boer population of the 
two Republics are mainly due to their Ufe in the Colony 
before the Great Trek of 1836. Their religion, their govern- 



BRITISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 



19 



ment^ their language, their military organisation, all formed 
part of tfaeir life in the Colony. Even the nomadic life of 
trekking had it-s origin there^ though their aubsecLuent flight 
from British rule, contLaued for over a generation, deepened 
the habit and gave it a political purpose. 

The languf^e is a simplified modification of the Hollander 
! ttmgae of the 17th century, French was forcibly auppresaed 
early in the I8th century ; otherwise it ia probable that, as 
ihi& Huguenots were the great religiona and intellectual fores 
in the little community, the language would now be French 
aa well aa so maoy of the family names. Their religion ia 
Calvinist, of the Butch variety; here, as elsewhere^ disciplin- 
ing the mind by the stress of fatalism, which moulded 
English Roxmdhead and Scottish Covenunier aa well as the 
Lowland Burgher who fuughfc with Alva, Their strength in 
fight is made tenfold by the conviction that the aword of the 
Lord smites for His saints. President Kruger's speech in 
Pretoria in December 1896, ascribing his burghers* victories 
to the direct interposition of Heaven, and warning his marka- 
mea not to boast of their skill with the riSe, and bis address 
in Kroonstad in March 1900, ascribing the reverse of the 
anniveisaTy of Majuba Day, and the capture of General 
(^nje> to their boastful celebrations of Majuba, give an 
ejtttome of the orthodox Boer's view of success in war. At 
the same time, a struggle for existence prolonged over genera- 
tions, against beasts and men, lions and leopards, Eushman's 
poaeoned arrow and Zulu's assegai, have developed courage, 
neource and self-reliance. More than this, military disd- 
pline, not to be acquired in isolat«l border combats, has been 
impressed on the farmer's mind by a system, reaching back 
for centuries, of imiveraal compulsory military service. 
Every male from eighteen to sixty is under the mihtary 
eomipand of the Field-Comet of his district. In times of 
extreme danger the age limit begins at sixteen, and has no 
fixed lime for ending. The steel-bow tenancy of the northern 
fermers on the Scottish borders is the nearest British 
paalleL 

But, notwithstanding his democratic church and demo- 

c a 



2Q 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



cratic military duties, and, imtil very recently, a general 

condition of equality in respect to economical position, what 
has been evolved is not a peasant egalitaire^ but a peasant 
aristocrat The subjection of the negro, whether by force or 
other inducement, and the relegation to an inferior and alien 
race of nearly all manual labour, have produced in the Boer a _ 
distaate for such labour — a distaste, no doubt, intensified hfm 
climatic influence — and hog contributed to form as well an ex- 
treme independence of demeanour, quite dissociated from any 
reUanc© on an abstract liberty of the citizen. His people ar 
the chosen race of the Bible, which is Ma guide ; and it iei 
part of the design of Providence that the black man shot; 
toil. 

Lastly, the Government of the Colony, both Dutch and' 
British, was conducted in many points in such an ill-judged 
manner, ha\ing regard to the bent of the popular mind, as to 
produce an ingrained hostility to Government interfaronce. 
In all things political, autocrat ; in all things commercial, 
monopolistic, such was the government of the Dutch Ea^tH 
India Company. Strong Government and military obedience 
the Boer was raady to support, and to enforce when urgent 
necessity plainly showed such to be unavoidable. But for 
ordinary purposes and every-day life as little of Government 
as possible. And to prevent military usurpation they came^ 
to prefer to elect by popular vote even their military com-B 
mauders, from Field-Comet t^5 C-ommandant- General. To' 
this impatience of anything they consider as unneoe-ssary 
official medciling, their heritage of revolt iu their blood and 
their memory largely contributed. Their anceatora — fugitive 
adventurers of evety European nationality, Hollanders who 
carved a Republic from the territory of Philip II., French 
who fled from their fair land sooner than obey their King ; 
the descendants, hereditary revolters, impatient of restraint, 
reUgJously fanatic and religiously war-like, peasant aristocrats 
by Divine decree^ Roundheads turned Virginia plant 
Frenchmen and Germans who apeak Dutch. 
Such was their character in the old Colony. 
Next coraes the event — the reeult of that character and i 



BRITISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 



21 



ihe circamstances of the time — the event which created one 
British Colony and two Boer Bepublica, tlie Great Trek. The 
Grettt Trek of 183& was a strange tight. 

'MsfiBfiB of tb$ people, iDcludicg eomd of the Tery "beet men in the 

I OdQ&lrj, abuidoDCKl or Bold Tor little or nothing some of the cllioIce«tt 

» in South Africa, and left the Colony avowedJy to get rid of EDglieh 

nilsi and lo form indepeodcnt communities aoywh^j-e and at ajiy dutanc^a 

In the iDUrior.'* 

What caused this flight ? The answer to' this question 
will set in a clear light many of the perils and difficnltiea of 
the present and past political situation in the Transvaal and 
South Africa, and will carry a lesson for guides of British 
public opinioru 

The remote causes are, of cotxrao, to be found deep in the 
psst life of Dutch and Huguenot and British. The imme- 
diate cause was the well-meaning but utterly misguided 
policy of the Imperial Government. Missionaries and party 
«e»-eaw divide the blame. This policy may be described as 
negrophile and anti-Boer as regEutls the relations of black 
and white, and as altetiiately rash and timid as regards terri- 
torial expansion. The British Government has frequently, 
and at one time invariably, assumed the truth of missionary 
allegations, and held that, in all quarrels between Boer and 
Kaffir, the Boer was always wrong ; going at one time to the 
fantastic and monstrous extreme of endeavouring to subject 
Datch-speaking white men to the coercive criminal juriadio- 
tiOQ of Griqua chiefs, The British Government, according to 
whether on Imperialist or Little Englancier party happened 
to be in power, has awunj; again and again with bewildering 
inooDflistency from a policy of extending the territory of 
the Empire at vast expenditure of blood and treasure, to 
a policy of abandoning territory vnth precipitation and 
vith an astonishing disregard of obligations to friends and 
a] ties. 

The manifesto of Pieter Eetief, oue of the Boer leaders, 
dated 22nd January, 1837^ sets forth the main causes of the 
Great Trek, The abolition by the British Governmeut of the 
apfo^eatice labour system — long applied to the blacks, and of 



33 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the Dutch system of compelliiig them to reside in definite 
locations— had flooded the Colony with wandering plundei^is 
— "turbulent and dishonest vagrants," as Ketdef caBa them. 
The mannor in which the Imperial abolition of slavery had 
been carried out had infiicted severe loss on the farmers. 
Only a fraction of the real value of the slaves was allotted by_ 
the Imperial ParUameut ; and this fraction was reduced to m^ 
nominid sum by the estraordinary coadition that payment 
would only be made in London, a condition which compelled 
the farmer to sell hiB claim for a trivial amount to an argent. 
The British policy of recognising the " independence " and 
" sovereignty " of Kaflfir savages on the Colonial Imrdera had 
rendered the farmers on the border districts liable to constant 
risk of pillage and murder, which the Britiah Government 
either could not or wouJd not check, while it actively inter- 
fered to prevent the fajmera avenging themselves. Thev 
missionary anti-Boer agitation in England and the predomin- 
ance of the London Miasionarj Society's agent (a Dr. Phillips), 
in the direction of British policy at Cape Town, had convinced 
the farmers that no fair play was to be expected from any 
British Grovernment. The revolutionary doctrine of the 
politick equality of white and black, denounced with entire 
accuracy by the first Britiah Governor of the Cape aa an 
invention of the French Revolution, and subsequently to be 
repudiated by the first British Goveruor of the TransvaalfV 
had been, on missionary instigation, adopted as a Christian 
theory of Government by the Imperial authorities. The 
Dutch-apeaking farmer, who had to live among the blacks so 
placed on political eijuallty, regarded thia poUcy as not only 
icreligioua and uusoriptural, but as deatriictive of order, and 
"proper relations between master and servant," and aa 
standing danger to life and property. 

On the border all these evils pressed most heavily ; 
from the border districts of Beaufort, Graaf Eeinet, Somerset 
Albany, and Uitenhage, set off this exodus of the chosen 
people, 98 per cent, of the whole coming fi-om those districts. 
The emi^^nt farmers with their wives, and children, andl 
servants, their house-waggons and long teams of oxen, and 



BRITISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 



23 



altove all, with their rifles and their Bibles^ set their faces tA 
ibe mLdemess. 

" We •olemnly dectnre that we leave Ihia country with a desire to 
enjoy » quieter life than we h&ve Litherto led. We will not moleet any 
people or dcpriTe them of tlio BQiEJlest property ; but, if attacked, we 
riuU couuder oonelvei fully juBlified in defending our perBona and 
eflecCe to the utmo«G of our Ability against every euemy. We complain 
of the unjustifiable odium which hftB been cast upon us by interested and 
difthonflst pervobH under the n&me of religiou, whoee te&timotiy is believed 
in Bngl&nd to the exclufian of all eTldence in our favour ; and we can flee, 
M ibe raniltB of this prejudice, nothing but the total ruin of the country. 
W« quit thi« Colony under the full asBurauce that the Engliah Govem- 
niADt hu nothing more to require of ua, and will allow us to govern 
oarMliv«a without its interferenco id future- We aie leaving the fruitful 
bmd of our birth, ia. which we have Buffered eoortnoua iDBsea and cod- 
tina&l vexatioD ; but we go with a firm reliance on an aii-Beeingi just, 
and merciful God, whom we ehall always fear and huoibly endeavour 
loobey." 

On a summer day in Pecember 1896, I have taken down 
Itoiq the lips of a " VtwrLrekfcer" of 1836 — at that time in 
Oraaf Beinet a boy of lO^aa enumeratian of the causes of 
die Great Trek identical with those iu the upanifoato of 
Betwf; although ha told me he had no recollQctien of that 
manifeato. But, as typical of the Boer even of to-day, 1 
append other reasons he assigned, and to which, in character- 
istic fashion, Mb wife assented. The first waa that the 
Colony was beconiiug too crowded. The next was that 
the trek fever had seized on the people, as in 1868 it drove 
the Boers over the Kalahari desert to escape from death to 
h subjection to a German mlHtary administration. The last 
was that the Great Trek was desij^Tied by Pruvidence, &o that 
savage places of the earth might be peopled by Christian men. 

The territorial reaiilta of this movement of a few tliousand 
Boers have already been roforreU to. But the effect on the 
mind of the Boer has been no leas marked. As a friiendly 
chronicler put it, " Having been on trek for 44 yeiira, the 
trek has oaten itself into their hearts. They are still on 
trek." * But it is not merely the trek fever — moving for 

• Mr. W. A. Aylward. 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



I 



moTing's sake. Ic has been consecrated by time and prored 
efGciency as & political remedy for oppresaion. And Bntwli 
territory now hems them in and prevents their trekking 
further. The love of isolation has matured in the heart of 
the Boer- he feels crowded if a single habitation can he 
seen anywhere within the sweep of the horizon. His hou3@» 
as he would wiah it to be, and as it still ia in most cas^ 
reminds one of a ship on the open sea ; with the blue arch 
of the sky above, and the green and grey ciicle of the veld 
around, brokeu by nothing but the slopea of the kopje, blua^ 
in the distance. ^ 

It is difficult within brief limits to trace even in outline 
the events which followed the Great Trek. Only those bearing 
immediately on present problems can be touched, and the 
fewest words must suffice. The emigrant farmers leaving 
the Colony came upon a coast region on the Eastern slope 
swept bare of inhabitants by the murderous legions of Tshaka, 
the Zulu chief, who had perfected a new military organisation. 
This land was a res iiullius^ Tshaka merely exterminated ; 
he did not occupy. The farmers first tried peaceful methods. 
The treacherous Zulu Dingaan» successor to Tshaka, beguiled 
their leaders with their words, and then massacred Ketief 
and his companions at his kraal at which they were hia 
guests. The farmers then tried war. and broke the poweifl 
of Dingaan on December 16th, hence the Transvaal Stato 
festival, and founded the Kepublio of Katal. Here they 
were met by Colonial proclamations calling them British 
subjects. A British enactment of 1836 assumed jurisdictioD 
for the Cape Courts over offencea by white persons in Africa, 
south of latitude 25*^, the latitude of Delagoa Bay. Finally, 
in 1845, after many ahiftings of policy* the Imperial Govern- 
ment authorised the annexation of Natal — after the Boers 
had attempted to form an alliance with Holland — an offiSf 
which the King of Holland repudiated. Fleeing again from 
British rule, the Boers retired to the interior beyond the 
Drakenaberg range, and again set up theb Bepublieaa 
Government and their Dutch-speaking Yolksread. Yet 
again pursued by prw^kmations of their British allegiaQi 



BRITISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 



3S 



fougbt and lost the battle of Boomplatz in 1348, and 
their territory from the Orange River ta the Vaal was annexed 
to the British Crown as the Orange River Sovereignty. All 
the Boera north of the Vaal Biver — the territory of the 
preeet^t Transvaal — were left nnsubdaed, but still were 
deaignated British subjects and rebels by proclamation, and 
a price was set on the head o£ their leader^ Pretoriua th@ 
elder. 

So far the advance movement against the Boera was in 
favonr, notwithstanding some waverings, with the Imperial 
Government. The pendulum now began to awing in the 
opposite direction. The reaction began as a countermove 
to the subtle aod ungrateful poUcy of Moshesh, the Basuto 
cliief, really a ci^ature of the previous negrophiUst policy 
of the British administration. Moahesh was a petty Baauto 
chief, who had taken advantage of the deatruction of his 
Zulu enetniea by the Boers and of Imperial negro plillist 
policy to gather around him in the mountains now called 
Baautoland the broken remnants of many clans. These, 
with British aanction, he armed with European weapons, 
and became a power in the land. To consolidate his power 
he proceeded to intrigue against the British who had created 
him^herein as ungrateful as any European prince or demo- 
cracy. He proposed an armed union with Pretorius and the 
pr08i;ribed emigrants beyond the Vaal River, and a forcible 
intervention in the Orange River Sovereignty. 

The Imperial pendulum swung. After having for six 
years (from 1846 to 1852) protested that the emigrant 
farmers were under indbsoluble allegiance to the British 
Crown, and would never be allowed to set up their Republican 
Volkaraad, a complete change of front followed the unmaak- 
ing of the Basuto. "The minutes of a meeting at Sand 
Eiver" — commonly called the Sand River Convention — 
signed by British delegates, originally appointed to assess a 
fine on the Basntos, and delegates of the Transvaal rebels in 
January 1852, guarantee in the fullest manner on the part 
of the British Government to the Boers north of the Vaal 
RiTer the right to manage their own aifairs and to govern 



a6 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



themsalves according to their own laws, without any inter- 
ference on tlie part of tJie British Government. 

Tbe ImpdTJal troops were then sent agaioBt the Baanto 
(Xhief, &nd were signally defeated at the battle of Berea, in 
December 1852 ; Moshesh, at the head of thirty thousand 
weH-armed Basutos, driving back the British General Cath- ^ 
cart. What followed ? A step, the eSects of which exist in ■ 
South Africa to-day, to the astonishment of British and 
Dutch alike ; an unconditional surrender by the Imperial _ 
Grovernment. I 

The war against the Basuto was abandoned. But much 
more than this. The home Government actually decided, 
under the influence of a cold fit of " non-eipanaion " and 
economy, accelerated by defeat in war, to follow up the 
release of the Boera in th« Trimsvaal, who aaked for the 
release, by the abajidonment of the Boera and others in ■ 
the Orange River Sovereignty, who protested against the 
desertion. Tli© abandonment took place in tottd disregard 
of the declared wishes of the Assembly. Delegates were ■ 
sent to England to protest. The Imperial Commissioner 
shook off these too loyal subjects, and agreed with the anti- 
British party to establish the Orange Free State. This 
decision of the Imperial Government is embodied in the Con- 
vention of Bloemfontein of February 1854. 

In the twenty years which elapsed from 1854 few events 
jieculiar to South Africa materially modified the situation. 
The world-wide extension of means of oommunication, the 
increasing perception of the importance of markets, had a 
certain influence on British Imperial policy^ but had not 
created European rivalry. New conditions, however, arose 
after this time. The discoveries in Central Africa came to 
theij' culmination in the work of the expedition under 
Sir Henry Stanley- The establishment of trading posts 
by the King of the Belgians on the suggestion of that 
explorer^after British authoriLiea of the Colonial Office had 
cautiously declined his offer — directed tlie minds of other 
European States to Africa — once again to supply " something 
new." "Ex Africa semper aliquid novi." The entry by 



BRITISH ,AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 



27 



Gcnnany into tho indostrial ajfena of the world markeU'-one 
of tlie results of its oonsolidation under Prusaian influence^ 
and the rivalry of France in tha same field, due to tlie 
wonderful recuperating power of its people, ended in a 
general European agreement on tlie subjugation of Africa^ 
embodied in the Act of the Berlin CongrflsS' The " Scratable 
for Africa " ensued ; ancient Portuguese claims were revived^ 
and, within a decade, every power of Western Europej except 
Austria, was to be found with territorial claims over some 
portion of the land inhabited by the black man. 

In Imperial policy expanaion became once more in the 
•scendant. Under the Colonial Secretaryship of Lord Car- 
narvon — guided by and inspired by Mr. Froude — a design of 
South African Confederation, rather than of direct Imperial 
authority, was formed in 1874. One new condition had 
meanwhile arisen in its favour. The grant of responsible 
Government and local autonomy to the Cape Colony promised 
conaiderably to restrain interference by home enthusiasts in 
the conduct of native aflairs. 

Meantime, since 1854, the history of the two syjarsely 
populated Eepublica was one of inceaaant atmggle with the 
Basuto, the Griqua, and the other Kaf&r powers which Im- 
perial policy had allowed to be set up on their borders. 
Internecine conflicts between the Boers themselves were not 
unknown. The Tranavaal waa for the time rent into separate 
republics ; and a forcible annexation of the Orange Free State 
was actually attempted by Pre&ident Pretorious (the younger) 
of the Transvaal— the same I*retoriua being subsequently 
elected President of the Free State. With the exception of 
the Kaffir troubles, the progress in prosperity of the two 
Republics was unmistakable, though few in Em-ope before 
1877 — outside of British circles — were interested either in 
the constitution or the geographical position of these minor 
experiments in Republican (jroverumeut. Much, however, 
might be said of the wise rule of Sir John Brand, President 
of the Free State for a quarter of a century, and of the 
ambitions dreams of President Bni^era of the Transvaal — the 
^Tst to invoke aid from the HoUandere in men and money. 



a8 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



For a long time prior to 1877 certain Colonial statesmen^ 
such as Sir George Grey and Sir Kichard Southey, looked on 
the ahandonmeat of the territory of the Republics as a 
colossal blimder of the Imperial GoTeminent. A vasb , 
South African dominion under the British flag, stretchiDg 
from Cape Town to the Zambesi^ was their ideaL They 
regarded the Boer system, aaye a friend of the Boers, aa 
embodying "atagnation; waste of public land, which they 
looked on as the true treasury of Colonial Empire, and a 
retardation of the only progress they had faith in, which to 
their minds vas of itself a crime." The accession to power 
of Lord Carnarvon, and the acceptance of the views of Mr. 
Fronde, gave the Grey poUcy a forward impulse ; and Sir ■ 
TheophiJus Shepstone'a annexation of the Tmnj^vwl in 1877 \ 
was one of the results. 

The inevitable swing of the Imperial pendulum was, of | 
course, to come. After Majuba Hill, when a British force 
was defeated by the Boers^ the Transvaal was retroceded. 
The Btory of the retrocession is sufficiently familiar to 
obviate the necessity of repetition. Two observations will 
be sufficient for the present. In the first place, the parallel 
to the Imperial retreat before the Kaf&r after the Basuto fl 
victory of Berea in 1852 is obvious. If the Transvaal was 
to be retroceded, it was uafortunate for British prestige that 
it was not surrendered before Majuba Hill. The South 
African deduction — for Boer and Basuto — was necessarily 
that the beat way to get good terms from the British Empire 
is to fight. Again, the Government of Mr. Gladstone appears 
to have been under the impression that the territory of the , 
Transvaal was too worthless to fight about. 

In 1884 the States of South Africa consisted of two < 
British Colonies (the Cape and Katal) ; two Boer Republics 
— the South African Kepublic and the Orange Free State ; 
and various native States under direct Imperial Government, ■ 
such as Basutoland, Griqualand West, and others. It is 
worth noting that Basutoland was not declared British until 
the Basutos had been defeated in war by the Free State, J 
when Sir Philip Wodehouse interfered; and that all these j 



BRITISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 



29 



nominaUy British territories are really Ka£B.r reserves. Also^ 
<|^ the propriety of the annexation of the Kimberley 
diamond fields was disputed by the Orange free State ; 
and that the operationa of the Chartered Company were 
to end in cutting off the Boers irom the interior. One of 
the ever-recumng fits of Imperial hesitation — the inner 
history of which will be interesting when it is published — 
allowed Germany to annex a vast tract of South-Weat 
Afrina ; all of which had been for years within the sphere 
of influence of the Capo Colony, and the <;hi©f, if not only 
port of whidi is atill British. The agreement of the Imperial 
Government to submit British claims in Delagoa Bay to the 
arWti»tion of a French President had removed the British 
flag from that harbour, while, however, a right of pre-emption 
vns retained. 

This brief survey brings ua down to the origin — -the im- 
mediate cause — of the recent political situation in the Trana- 
vaaL An absolutely new complexion was put upon nffam 
by the opening of the 'goldfields and the discovery of gold in 
the Transvaal in 1887. No other political event of magni- 
tude has since occurred ; other than the British annexation 
of Zululand and Amatongaland. 

The financial situation of the restored Republic is under- 
itood to have induced the throwing open of the p;oldfields> 
proapocting having been hitherto prohibited by the Volksraad 
of the farmer State. The inevitable inrush of British and 
other European gold-seekers changed the whole political 
conditions of the Transvaal — before that time every white 
man was welcome to be a burgher — -indeed was placed on the 
Field-Comet's list without application — and the introduction 
of many millions of European capital concentrated on its 
affairs the attention of the civilised world; an attention 
which political agitation from 1892 to the outbreak of the 
war had not caused to relax. The problem before the war 
obviously arose from the fact that the original Boer popula- 
tion retained all political power, having enacted new laws 
for that express purpose. The Boer leaders directed all the 
internal and external affairs of the mixed community, 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



IB 80 ftr M the BriKiA GowsMnfc rotwn^d a 
of SQp«rrisM)Q otisr treitMS vilJk lonigB StiUjes — 
L ngaktad hy tba LomAob Oanvvtfian of 1884. 
Tka QvfHBBfiBt of Ao l^aartvd BapBhtir is and was 
m the hands of about 15,000 Boer doc totB , i^msentang 
■bott 60^000 to 80JD0Q» faoph n tXl Thoe dseton choee 
tfao VnaAeot, tiM O«MMilart-0«Mnl. the YoUBiaad. 
The total white imr^htina thu balk «f whoa immigrated 
mUMm tha last twvNv ywi bai bsen fhwlalw! at from 
aOO.OOOto300.000.nd«diii«dMB(Mn. The Mtire popula- 
tkn B efltimatied aft aboat $50,000. The ana of t]w bnd — 
Ibrta^ and nek im Mihwaah in aboat tbit of the United 
fi^dkiaa. The gold oaApi* of £11.006^000 a 7«v before 
the war Ittd plaeed the IkwBvaiU OM if not aaooBd in the 
fist of gold^mdiMBK w ti i w ; and its rart alai«a of ooal 
•■d nOBVan ptMlMlf MJCiitbflil Iha States whicth in 
1877 Mt adBteof £aiS»OQO a hMv^ basdB (iHiich it bad 
■o iMBftfirta aaaitt «f p^yiin)^ vbs in paaMHaaB of a 
r^naia* «t BBUilf £<5OB^000l teBTB Bbaost bxbMM^ ftom , 
the gold iiUAesL 

Ib % lt»ar fcam fx— (ia m BiWBBbw 189^ I wrote : 
'Ttiu mihnldfsn nf thr Bnfr t^nxnsBMl Jlif^ T?ii ir innnh 
to ntaia power in ^eir bands oa tha groBBd that b^ tbia 
■MBa akna on Iha Baar^ mki^mmkmm «Bd his lig^to 
gBWB hb Baiaiblid hi hia ««« va^* ba a&aCnafy maa»- 
laiBBd : and that in thu war ab»» caa has ngbt ia the land 
aad IB aU ^aeh ift |iio<tBMH ba Made jaadiMiiiaatb as it 
jasUr shoaU ba. *A ««<- thqr «•!. '«f a dwmnimii 
swk^ MOBi^ has mat ha« ftaaa all faartaas of the globe. 
IhsgiidlhiV'iKtoact'BBahafi^iBaBrfaaaHBBB iB oar own 
lad, Mtaa thu^ qbml Wa bata aot iwpihiil tfadr 
aawB^ B«r tt ihb their abidog phna. Iherwill nc«BtD 
AavhBBMaalvv jeata; aad 4tnag«i an Mwar aU»a«d 
toitae iB teg^fmaaaat at thiir ^am^mmy ^m^i^a^ 
|liBa. Wa do act know what thry wdbU da with politiBal 
yaaarifwagiavaaKtothaBa; baftlajiadfafroMthifr acAaoaB 
iBltepaaaaad their jaaaat ilwiiiniiiiim Ihaf voaU vm 
ft to oaaa «■. of whose wars th^j ^"^ w* a i i yui a^ Wa «aa 



BRITISH AND DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA 



3r 



I 



the mftii who have fought for our freedom, and have wrested 
this countty from Moaelekatso ami his cruel Matabele hordes 
The Btraugers have fought no one; they came merely to 
reap where we have sown/ 

*' It will be mj task to set forth the claims of the 
Uitlanders, and the reply of the Boers over all the main 
points at issue. Meanwhile, one striking feature of the 
situation must be noted. The Boer himself stauds not where 
he was ; here, as everywhere, the old order changetb. The 
power of gold, caDed furth by the Boer Government, has 
done more than assemble the Uitlanders of Johannesburg ; it 
has created the Boer of Pretoria — the townsman Boer, a 
contradiction in terms. 

•* The main characteristics of the mind of the Boer, while 
still on his wide-spreading farm, away in the dreamy hills, 
vith his Bible and his riSe, remain unchanged. But in the 
towns it is different, and the town Boer governs while the 
oountry Boer reigns. 

" The old order changeth. The Boera have been divided 
into sooial classes ; and the mind of some of tho^ classes 
has sadly altered its outlook on the world. Gold was the 
great engine of both changes; education, altered purpose, 
&nd altered social functions following. The stopper of the 
trek ranks next ; land, in vast farms, is no longer to be had 
for the asking by any burgher. Settled peace, and its 
attendant ills, play a great part in the change. And, lastly, 
the shrinking of the world — the closing of the ranks of the 
Family of Nations through steam and the telegraph — has 
left, sure if slow traces, 

" Where formerly the Boers were a single cla.^, with like 
duties, equality i*f fortune, and a sentiment of equality, there 
■TO now politicians and administrators, lawyers, engineers, 
BpeculatoTB in the mines, shares, and land valuer, as well as 
formers. Even among the farmers a class havS arisen ominous 
M any — 'the landless rustic — the bijwoner, the bye-dweller." 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTEK THE WAK 



CHAPTER rV. 



n flUVTH 



MM ttfKiaStf of thA Tfpmal 
tt dn dmims a£ l^TJidaadea and 
of t^ GtanvBBtiaM vith tko S^nblics, 
■kin dneoUr ban tk^ aactaoB of the 
So«tli *fe***» pMM wfckk iq4aUft tktt TnpnliJirin propft* 
gndft. tkat AoB is aoBB fl^norngM^ iaboBifc or aoqiuied, 
im tlH Dalefa RiHiMint ow ^ iMtMcal GoreEUBent to 
<iihliiiii or aaAoo^ mSoaftk A6ka; aid aiaihriy Borne 
•■peber q^ in t^ Dotdb aod fhMck Hngwiwt aad 
Gtxmt^ Aiwyndwi iadmdBal ''■*>***^ OTcr dw Bdtish 
ilfTWiwIM or BuiMb -tiMB *i4^**^ Is kfaen azk y JbandatioB 
kmikmammmptioal 

In. ths iB e ia a diiig birtBcical ABUh 1 hftve atited, as biilj 
M I eoold, Ae umatwiuM sa oalaaaBed niliiij^ of Sonth 
Afitkaui liirtuij ia liketf to nftkB oa ooe in vo way hosdla 
to As Dutch amdMBBt «■• peopla. U dwrlnwwi a long 
haA of rrtft**Tit of Impezial polie^. Tb kkna I shall rofer 
apin. Bat doea it ^ihaU the Boer [wniagandMt aaBBmption 
tfaot then k aoue aqiaior right to Soitth Afiioan temtorj, 
uid lo the goTiozuBent of all or any poctian of its inbabltajitE. 
in the Bfyohhra xatber than in the iMpenal GoTexmneiiC ? 
Or dow it witahliflh the laoce stnkiDg aMomptiaa th^ 
cuihinitra bearing Datch, Gennazi, and Hogimot names 
hapfe any Ugber daim to liTe their tivea in Sooth Africa 
wtdm tm^amy dvilieed '*t'*^*»~*\ indndinf; the ooaiditio^ 
of political Hbertj, than choae of British deaoent f ■ 

t«t « fii«t ronsider the i%ht of the Inperial Goveni- 



BRITISH RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 



33 



ent TJj6 origin of its preseat title to the Cape reninsula, 

id to a further stretch towards the interior (about one-third 

of the present Cape Colony) h baaed oa a formal Treaty 

I of Cessioii of 1314, between the Kingdom of Holland and 
thd British Government, ceding the Cape Colony and other 
Dutch posseaaiona to the Imperial Crown for the sum of 
£6,000,000, On cession, thereforSj not conquest, the title 
rests. It is further to be noted that the original occupation 
of the Cape was undertaken in 1796 at the request and in 
the name of the last Stadtholder of the Honae of Orange, a 
fugitive in England. The annexation of 1806 was a warlike 

k operation against the Batavian Republic, an ally of France, 
which, together with France, had engaged in war againat the 
fiiitiah. Nev'ertheleaa, in the negotiations at the general 
settlement of Europe following the overthrow of the First 
Napoleon in 1S14, the British right to retain the possession 
&f the Cape and to the portion of Cape Colony already 
referred to, was not baaed on a military occupation already 
Eflfected. A purchase was negotiated, emboditkl in the Con- 
vention of 1314 with the Kingdom of Holland, then newly 
wtabliahed, the Stadtholder having been transformed into a 
King. The original title to the Peninsula, therefore, which 
sJiotdd clearly be borne in mind, is net cooqueat, but peaceful 
cession, on terms of mutual advantage to both the contracting 
Powers. The parallel which some Continental writers have 
found in the conquest and partition of Poland does not 
therefore seem very evident. The Peninsula, be it remem- 
bered, not the rest of the Cape Colony, which, with the 
exception of a small portion, bounded on the east by the Fish 
■ Biver, has never been under Dutch, but always under British 
■D^i-emment. 

I But there are other titles of the Imperial Government in 

Bonth Africa. Immense sums have been spent in Kaffir ware 

B— a long series from the hrst date of British occupation until 

a few years ago. Tlie wars of the Kei River created the Cape 

.Colony as it w now known. The crushing of the Zulu, at a 

.1 of £6,000,000, freed the Transvaal and the Orange Free 



34 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



State in 1879 from ever present danger. Similarly, the 
occupation of Beehuanaland, at a cost of £2,000,000 in 1884, 
the pacification and firm government of the Basnto— the Gun 
War alone of 1S83 coat £3,000.000— the rednction of th<^ 
Matabele and the Mashona, have left the population in the 
Dutch-apeaking States free from the Kaffir menace which 
threatened them for generatioofi. Indeed, it i3 only tcnfl 
BTident that the subduing of the Kaffir vnth a view to the 
maintenance of peace between the two sections of Europeans 
muflt he described as prematura. If it had not been effectec 
the military energies of the Boer must necessarily have beei 
occupied in defending his life against native risings, instead'^ 
of in the war on the British Colonies. The blood of British 
soldieis has been for a hundred years shed like rain in repress- 
ing these attacks, Gatka and Galeka, Pondo and Griqna, 
Baauto and Zulu, Swazi and Matabele, and Mashona, have all 
taken their toll of blood from the forces of the Imperial 
Power. 

Then, again, the peaceful subjugation and the restraininjgl 
from attack of the Kaffir tribes is to be considered. In the 
present war 60,000 armed Baautoe, thirsting for rovenge 
for the loss of Iheii land annexed to the Orange rree State, 
under the unequivocal designation of the *' Conquered 
Territory," have been restrained from interfering by an 
Imperial Administrator. The Imperial Governor of Natal 
keeps in check a horde of 100,000 armed Zulus, who have 
petitioned for his permission, as their Supreme Chief, 
to take part in the present war. At a signal from the 
Imperial representative in Bechnanaland tens of thousands 
of Bechuanas would swarm over the western border of the_ 
Transvaal, One word from the High Commissioner wot 
precipitate the Swazi on the eastern border, 

Tliese service,'* in outlay of gold, in expenditure of blood, 
in labour of administration now affect, and always have 
affected, the safety and the prosperity of every European 
community, Dutch or British, in the Colonies^ tbe Terri- 
tories, or the Republics in all South Africa. The Imperial 



BRITISH RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 



35 



Govemment haa, indeed, thought the maintenaiice of peace 
and the upholding of civilisation to be worth the bones of 
many a romeranian Grenadier. Every sovereign expended, 
ereiy soldier's life lost, has represented a direct gain to 
every European inhabitant, inside as well as outside, the 
Bepahlic^ of the Vaal and the Orange Eiver, 

A^in, the enormous British immigratioQ into South 
Airica during the Inrndred yeara of Britiah rule is to be 
remembered. The eastern province of Cape Colony ia the 
English province jjdr ey^Uence. It is the result of an 
orgazuBed immigration of Briti-gh farmers, brought abaut 
under the direct auspices of, and at an enormous cost to, 
the Imperial Government. In what respect is the title of 
these immigrants and their descendants to Hve in South 
Africa and hear their language spoken, less than the right 
qf descendants of subjects of the Dutch Crown, now living 
in territory transferred by treaty to the Empire ? There was 
fto Dutch -speaking or other European population in that 
region when the British went there. Similar considerations 
obviously apply to the British imniigi^tion to Natal, colonised 
by British stibjects in 1820, long before the Boers trekked 
to the Hinterland in 1836, And with as much force do they 
apply to the British colonisation of the vast territory north- 
ward to Rhodesia* Wlmt prior Boer title exists in these 
regions ? Where, then, ia the justification for the ideal of a 
Dutch -speaking Republic ruling South Africa from Bulawayo 
to Simonstovvn ? 

Greatest of the services to all South Africa are those 
rendered by the naval forces of the Imperial Power. It is 
indisputable that the peace of South Africa and tbe inde- 
pendence of its States are guarded by the Imperial navy. 
Without that protection no one believes that the territory 
of South Africa would be left free for a single year from 
annexation by a Great Power. The German annexation in 
: of the comparatively bairen tract of south-west Africa 
' a sufficient proof — if proof were wanted — that, in the 
European scramble for Africa, the richest portion of the 

D 2 



36 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



1 



whole coQtment iu diamonds and gold would not have been 
forgotteo. 

It is, therefore, nDderstatmg the ca^ to fiay that all 
this eipcnditure of treaaure, of livea^ of labour, for a hundred 
years, and with no prospect of cessation in the present or in 
the future, show how intolerable is the assumption that the 
Duteb-speaking Republics, aa States, have any superior right 
in the territory of South AMca over that of the Imperial 
Government, 

Let lis next consider the right of the British colonist aa 
an individual^ apart fixuu his necessary participfttion in the 
right of the Imperial Government. The suggestion constantly 
appears in the writings of our continental critics that the 
British colonist is, somehow, an intruder in South Africa j 
that he has no right to be there except on sufferance by the 
Dut<:h* He has no right to hear his language spoken or have 
it taught to his children ; he is. in fact, in every sense of 
the word, an alien. There is one snflBcient answer. What 
has been said as to the action of the Imperial Power proves 
the right of British citizens the world over to emigrate to 
Sonth Africa, and to live there on terms of equality with 
prior European immigrants. But the right of the British 
colonist in South Africa, derived from his partidpation in 
the right of the Empire of which he is a part, has been greatly 
increased by his own action during the century of British 
occupation. The blood of British colonists has been lavishly 
shed during the long series of Kaffir wars. The fighting 
has by no means been left to the professional soldier ; the 
colonifll-bom British have always been as used to amis as 
their Dutch fellow-colnnists, and their coui-age has been as 
undoubted. But no Dutch expenditure of capital or of 
labour can be mentioned aa even dbtantly approximating 
to the lavish expenditure of money, of skill in industry, in 
agriculture, all over the South African territory, in the 
Colonies as well aa the Kepublics. It is to attempt to prove 
the indisputable to argue as to what the capital and labour 
of British colonists have done, not alone in the Cape and 
Katal, and in Ehodesia, but in the territory of the Eepublics. 



I 



BRITISH RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 37 

Where would be the wealth of Johannesbuig, and where 
indeed the armaments of Pretoria, but for the capital and 
labour of British colonists ? * 

* A leading joamalist of Cape Town tellB me that when a BritJBh 
cokmial of South Africa reads what he describee a» my icy analysis^ 
hia fingna tingle to grip his rifie as hU charter of right. There is much 
in Uiis feeling of irrepressible indignation at the assumption of a Bupnior 
Boer title, with which every citizen of the Empire must sympathise; 
but I have intentionally refruned from importing heat into the considera- 
tion of this partioilar aspect of the mtuation in South Africa, as my aim 
is not to denounce, but to convince. 



3« 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTER V. 



THE BOKK CHARACTEE. 

la November 1896 I wrote from JohanneabtLrg, as quoted 1 
in a preceding chapter t- — 

"Of all fact*, the moBt stubborn and creative are the ingramed beliefi 
aitd prejudiceti uf a jieople^ which ate usually attributable to quite other 
cauBCfl than a reganl for Ibuir nuiteriaJ int^reata. A generalisatioD which 
is Correct enough, when apj^Iied to uiwnitors on the Stock Exchange^ fiuls 
to uxplaiu the actiua uf a gfmeratioa uf HugueuotA who last all in fleong 
from France." 



One of tlie reaults of my four years* investigation has 
been to confirm my belief in the proposition of the truth of 
which I was convinced at the beginning. 

The foundation cause of the whole antagonism between \ 
British and Dutch in South Africa, either in social or in 
political life ; the foundation cause of the opposition of the 
Eepublica to the Imperial Goveruroent ; the foundation cause 
of the present wai", is to be found in tJie mind of the Boer i 
people; and that mind is, and has been for geuerations,] 
maintained io an attitude uf profoundeat distrust of thej 
British GovcTument and of the British colonist. 

The immediate cause nf the present war i& a different 
matter, which I shall consider later. In the explosion of a 
mdne the immediate cause may be described as the finger 
which presses the button completing the electric connection ; 
but the wire must have been laid and the explosives placed 
before any explosion would have been possible. In South. ^ 
Africa the wires have been laid and the exploaives placed™ 
in poaition by the inherited Boer distrust of the British 



THE BOER CHARACTER 



39 



GoreiTiinent, of the British colonist, of all that was or is in 
their ovm pkraae, " Engelsch gezind " — " English minded." 

The Boer people's distrust of the British Government and 
of the British people in South Africa ia the result, partly of 
their character, whether original or acquired ; partly of their 
degree of information as to past and present facts of British 
power and British purpose ; and partly of the history of 
Boer dealings with the British. This distrust eiista, and, 
as a British Imperial representative told me in Pretoria, is 
to be felt, palpable as a stone wall. It ia accompanied by 
appi^heusion, rising on occasion to hatred ; and^ however 
disagreeable the contemplation of the fact may be to loyal 
citizens of the Empire, is accompanied also with contempt. 

The Boer chetracter ia that of the ordinaxy Hollander 
Dutch of the 16th century, stubborn and brave ; and of the 
French Huguenot of the same time, religious in the 
16th-ceniiiry sense of that term, with a not inconsiderable 
High Genuan straiQ superadded. There are additional 
characteristics; the I'esult of two centuries and a^half of 
their environment in South Africa. Boer ignorance of facts 
as to the power and purpose of the Empire^ which ignorance 
Deed not surpri,3e us so much when we luflect that ifc is 
shared by so many of our good cousins on the Continent of 
Europe, plays a great part. Not the least force to coutribute 
to the deepeniug and strengthemng of the rooted distrust in 
the Boer mind of British Government and British cglomat 
have been past Imperial mistakes of omission and commission, 

I have found a Boer leader, holding high office in the 
Orange Free State, who was not aware that the trek-ox and 
the ox -waggon were not an original iuvention of South Afiica, 
but were a tolerably accurate reproduction of a ahnilar 
feature in Hollander rural life. Similarly, I found educated 
Dutch South Africans who have not realised that the basic 
elements [of the Boer character in war or in peacts axe a 
tolerably faithful reproduction of ordinary Lowlander 
characteristics of the 16th century in Europe^ which have 
aujvived by isolation. That character above all is conserva- 
tive, resisting change. Stare super aniiq;uas vias, that is the 



40 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



most striking feature of the Boer mind. They are stubborn 
and brave, which is equivalent to saying that they descend 
from the Dutch who broke their dykes to let in the sea ; and 
who still remember oq the lat April their Bncol-Spanish 
persecutor, and irho still recall how 

" Op den eersten April 
Verloor Alva ayn Briel." 

And, too, that they are descended from the French 
Huguenots, who at Moncontour met the shock of the veteran 
soldiers of the League, and at Ivry followed to victory 
white plume of Navarre. Yet, again> that they descend! 
from the sturdy tandsknecht who followed the fortunes of 
Ulrich von Hutten, and from the rustic leveller in the 
Peasant Wars, who beat back with big pike the proudest 
of the German chivalry. Their character is intensely clanaiah ; 
there is no room for the stranger except as a transitory 
guest. Here, i^ain, the I6th century of Europe is reproduced. 
The equality fantasy of that century as regards the aon- < 
European races, the experience of 250 years in South Africa 
has induced them to discard; but, unfortunately, part of 
their 16th-century heritage is to be found in their repudiation 
of the right to equality of the European stranger. " He 
belouga to the other Commune^ — what is he doing here ? " 

Super-added to this 16th-century foundation are acquired 
characteristics^ the result of the life of Hollander and French 
Huguenot and German for the hundred years which lasted 
before the establishment of the Imperial rule. The Boer'a 
demeanour towards the Kaffir is precisely the reverse of that 
favoured by the amiable Ibeoriats who for so long a period 
directed the policy of Exeter Hall. Th& Boer's dislike of ( 
Government and of taxation appears, primarily, to be traceable 
to past misgovemment of the Dutch East India Company. 
"In all thinga political, pm^ly despotic; in all things 
commercial, purely monopolistic/' Old Testament texts ore 
also at hand to show that only the alien should be taxed. 
Isolation in the veldt, and the illusion of being free from all 
protection or direction^not realising that the sea was kept 



THE|BOER CHARACTER 



41 



hj the Great Sea Power — contributed to this intense dislike. 
l)r. Johnson's favourite definition of excise best repfesenta 
iJifl Boex's conception of ELssessmants for public purpustis. 
igain, among mudifyiag influences on tlieix uliaracter must, 
be oomited their ignomuce of facts of the world, especially 
of external political facta. Primanly this appears to be due 
to their isolation in the remote veldt in the first instance ; 
but, of late years, quite as mnch to misleading " Airikander," 
Hollander and German propagandists, who, consciously or 
TUnconsciously, transmitted to them, their mialtiading concep- 
tions of British purpose and British power. 

Of no immediate politick importance, more especially aa 
r^ar(k the present political problem, but stQl indirectly 
affecting it as bearing upon the judgment of Europe-born 
visitors, must be noted the fact that not alone the clanaliip 
but the hoapitality of the wandering Arab are closely 
paislleled in the ordinary life of the Boer of the veldt. This 
hospitality has sometimes misled the British inquirer into 
forgetting that its presence is perfectly compatible with the 
Arab's diplomacy. 



♦» 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTER VI. 



A CENTURY OF DaPEEIAL VACILLATION. 

A cektuet'b vacillation of the Imperial policy from 18CK) to' 
1900, and a century's illustration of apparent Imperial 
ingratitude, have left profound traces on the Boer mind. 
Few in England have realised how great that vacillation haa 
be«n, and how striking have been the instances of Imperial 
abandonment of their servants in high ofhce, and of subjects 
found to be too loyal. 

It is quite a commonplace of belief among British South 
Africans that the Empire must be a providential institution ; 
ajB otherwise, its existence would have become impossible^ 
long ago. I 

Let us consider some of the most striking instances of 
the swinging of the Imperial pendulum, A proclamation of 
the first British Governor of the Cape, who took possession 
in 1795 at the suggestion of the exiled Stadtholder, pro- 
claimed^ with great accuracy, that the doctrine of the 
political equality of the Black and "White races, of European 
and non-European, was an invention of the rashly experi- 
menting minds who controlled a French Eevolutionary 
Assembly. That an observer so near to the event should 
have folly appreciated the moment-ous nature of the decree 
of the French Constituent Assembly conferring the franchise 
on the blacks in the French islands of the West Indies, ia^ 
perhaps a matter for some surprise. One result is to be seen 
at the present day in the travesty of civilised government^ 
tbat alternately shocks and amxises the visitor to the so- J 
called Black Republic of Hayti, where the barbarous rites of 



A CENTURY OF IMPERIAL VACILLATION 



43 



Voodoo are defended by citation of pmelyiEuropean theories 
of rdigiona liberty, Mid interference with even camiibal 
sacrifice is protested against aa equal in atrocity to the 
nuasacra of St Bartholomew ; and where gratitude for their 
liberation from slavery takes shape in enactments pro- 
hibiting a white man from ownership of an inch of land in 
Hayti 

Thia is the first tiieory of the Imperial Government, 
What wa^ their next ? The humanitarian impulse directed by 
5Bch leaders in England as "Wilbeiforce had clothed, with a 
qviasi-t'eligious sanction, the Prench Kevolutionary doctrine 
of the political equality of the negro; a new attitude waa 
taken up by the Tmperml Government. An anti-Boer pro- 
native policy, directed by the Loudon Missionary Society of 
South Afiica and other missionary bodies, finally received 
Imperial sanction by the liberation of the slaves in 1833. 
But it did not end there. It gave political votes to the 
negroes in the Cape in 1870, and their vote now w a most 
appreciable factor in the election of Members to the Cape 
Parliament. Here, however, also there is no finality. I 
have already cited the Proclamation in 1877 of Sir Theo- 
philus Shepatone, annexing the Transvaal to British territory, 
aud repudiating any concession of political or social equality 
of savages. 

Let us take another instance of shiftlngs of the Imperial 
policy. At the suggestion of the agents of the Missionary 
Societies the Imperial Government adopted, some seventy 
years ago, an astounding policy, which was no less than that 
nf surrounding the Cape Colony with a ring of independent 
native States ; and actually pursued this perverse idea to the 
ejctent of attempting to enforce the subjection of Dutch 
Voortrekkera to the criminal jur^diction of a Griqua chief. 
What followed ? This insane idea was abandoned on Dutch 
resistance ; and, more than that, the whole poHcy of creating 
independent native States was abandoned as precipitately as 
it had been undertaken. 

Take again, the astounding aeries of changes of policy 
with regard to the Basutos and Basuto territory. For twenty 



H 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



yeara after 1830 the Imperial Administrators gave ei 
eacoumgement to the formation of an independent armed 
Kaffir community in the mount^ns naw called Basutoland, 
a State practically created between 1830 and 1870 by the 
skill of the Kaflir chiel' Moahe3h> aided by the diplomatic 
guidance «f the French nuasionaries of the Social e Eyan- 
gelique, of Pai'is, whose first leader^ it is inatmctive to learn, 
had fought in the barricadea in 1830, dnring the Three 
Glorious Days of July. In 1852 the Imperial Government 
thought that the armed Basutos would become a danger, and 
sent Geneitd Cathcart, with an army, to subdue and disarm 
them. Thti British General being defeated by Moshesh at 
the Battle of Berea, the Imperial Government abandoned 
their intention of subduing the Basutos. Indeed, they went 
further ; tinding the Eaauto War rather troublesome, they 
abandoned the whole Orange River Sovereignty iu 1854, 
notwithstanding the protest of the Legislative Assembly at 
Bloemfontein. More changes were still to come. Duriug 
the war between the BMUtoa and the Orange Free Stale thaj 
Imperial Governor, Sir Philip Wodehouae, actually stopped 
the transmission of ammunition through British territory to i 
the Free State, in violation of the Convention of Bloem-1 
fontein of 1854, and proclaimed his neutrality ia war. It is 
moat interesting to find that an Acting Military Grovemor of _ 
N&tal, though no lawyer, pointed out, with entire legal I 
accuracy, that, quite apart from the Convention of Bloem- 
fontein, a Proclamation of neutrality on war between 
Europeans and non-Europeans was a thing absolutely 
unknown to International law, which has no application to 
relations of peace or war, except among States of European 
desc^ent. Yet another set of alterations of policy. To induce 
the Basutos to supply labour for the conatruction of the 
Capo railways in 1870, riiles were given to them in payment 
by the British authorities. In 1882 the disaatrous so-called 
*' Gun War " was started, with the object of disarming them 
^a war memorable from the fact that General Gordon 
admitted that he owed his life to the generosity of the 
Bafiuto chiof^ Masuphn, whose people were attacked while ^ 



A CENTURY OF IMPERIAL VACILLATION 



45 



GcatJon was actually parleying with Maaupha in the ctiefa 
toad.* 

Hie Basutos having mode an unexpectedly firm r&ai&t- 
mce to the disarmament, this policy too waa abandoned, 
4ud the territory in 1S84 was handed back by the Cape 
Goveratdent to the Imperial authorities, by whom it is now 
administered as a Kaffir Reserve. 

Take again the alternate hot and cold fits with regard 
U) expansion and non-expansion of territory in South Africa. 
Look at the single instance of Natal. In 1344 the Impsnal 
Government eraphaticaUj refused to sanction the various 
British occupations in Katal dating from 1820. In 1845 
thid policy was abandoned, and previous specific orders were 
recalled. Whatever may have been the motive, whether or 
not fears were entertained of a Boer Kepublic of Natalia 
obtaining possession of a port on the Indian Ocean, in the 
Harbour of Durban, and forming an alliance with Holland, 
the fact remains another instance of Imperial change. 

Look again at the inconsistent attitnde of the Houio 
Government with reference to the recognition or nou-roco^- 
oition of the independence of the Boer emigrants from the 
Cape Colony. Before the Great Trek of 1836i an Attorney- 
General in the Cape sees no objection of the Boer fanners 
withdrawing themselves from British jurisdiction. Later 
on proclamations are issued denying the right of the Boer 
farmers to expatriate iheniselves^ or to get free from tbo 
jurisdiction of the British Crown. ^Not merely proclamations 
hut arms were used. Natal is annexed in 1845 ; the Boer 
leader, Pretoriua, is defeated in the Battle of Boomplaats in 
1849 by Sir Harry Smith ; a price is set on the head of 
Pretoriua, who tied north of the Vaal Eiver. Then this 
design of preventing Boer independence is abandoned. The 
Sand Eiver Convention of 1852 promis^^s indepundence to 

* In December 1896 1 rode from Masem to Thaba Boeigo, the MounUin 
of DftrkneH, to vmt Masupha, and spoke to him about Grordoc's tIajc. 
The v«l«raB warrior had been rain-making, hnving oliersatfliy appeAled to 
the ahodetl of hifl ancestors c»n tke sea-Band covfereri top uf the Mtjimt. yf 
Dv kneos, and at the French MiAeionary Church at the fuot of kus kraal %o 
the higher powen of the other nu;e. 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the TranavaaL The Convention of Bloemfont^in foToea 
independence on the unwilling Assembly of the Orange 
Kiver Sovereignty. But the end is by no means here. 
Within a few years the Imperial Governor, Sir Croorge Grey, 
threatens the cancellation of the Conventiona of Bloemfon- 
tein and of the Sand River if union between the two I 
Republics be attempted. In 1866 Governor Sir Philip 
Wodehouae officially suggests the cancellation of the CJon- 
ventiona. In 1868 he takes the Baautoa under his profcec- 1 
lion after they had been defeated by tlie Boera of the Free 
State. In 1677 Sir Theophilua Shepstone annexes the 
TranSTaal. In 1881, after the defeat of Majuba Hill. 
Mr. Gladstone retrocedes the Transvaal. 

From 1845 to 1854, with some waverings and intervals^] 
the non-ex panaionist theory is emphatically asserted by the] 
Imperial Government. In 1822 it is definitely abandoDed, 
of course with the inevitable wavering; as, for instance, in^ 
1884, with reference to the territory now called Germeafl 
South-West Africa, annexed by Prince Bismarck, after the 
British Colouial Office had neglected to occupy it in reaponso 
to his inquiry. But still, since then, we have generally 
had nothing but annexations; No Man's Land, Bechuana-j 
land, Zulu and Maahonaland, Matabeleland, and Ilhodesia 
Amafcongaland on the eastern coast. 

Britiah rights in 1870 was emphatically asserted with 
regard to Delagoa Bay. To save a few thousand pounds, for 
which Portugal was willing to sell at that time Delagoa 
Bay, the British Colonial Office preferred to abandon tha 
claim for arbitration, which experience might have told 
them was sure to be unfavourable to any Britiah claim; andfl 
accordingly in 1874 the award of Marshal MoMahon, 
President of the French Eepublic, assigned the bay and 
territory to the Portuguese. What wonder then that the 
conviction remains in the Boer mind that nothing ia fixed 
but Imperial change ? Most striking of all^ most deeply 
permanent in its result, has been their remembrance of ft 
contrast between Gkivemor Wolseley'a speech in the Trans- 
vaal during the British occttpation and Prime Minister. 



A CENTURY OF IMPERIAL VACILLATION 



47 



Gladstone's retrocession. "As long as the sun shines in 
tiie he&TeDS the Transvaal will remain British territory." 
"You may as well expect the Vaal Kiver to run back to ita 
source as the act of annexation, to be reversed. '* Such waa 
General Wolseley'a confident declaration. 

It would take too long to give, in anything like sufficient 
detail, the instances of apparent Imperial ingratitude in the 
trcatment by the Imperial GJovemment of their own high 
officials and of their Colonial supporters. With the aban- 
donment of Sir George Grey^ the recall and the cancellation 
of the policy of Sir Bartle Frere, both Goveraore and High 
Commissioners ; the aupercesaion of Sir Theophilus Shep- 
stone, the Imperial Commisaioner who annexed the Trans- 
Taal; a supercession occurring long before the retroceding 
of the country, all these steps have left a deep impression 
on the Boer mind And, as regards the body of the loyal 
ooloniats, it is a commonplace to hear that it does not pay 
to be loyal. British colonistSj who settled on the Orange 
Kiver Sovereignty while it waa British territory, were 
abandoned in 1854, contrary to the declared wishes, contrary 
to the protest of the Legislative Assembly at Bloemfontein, 
contrary to the arguments and entreaties of the deputation 
of the Assembly sent to Westminster to protest The 
Imperial Governor, who carried ont the expulsion of the 
temtory from the Empire, even went the length of des- 
cribing the too loyal protestors as disaffected peraons ; in the 
Transvaal, British colonists who had settled during British 
occupation, investing all their capital in reliance on General 
Wolaeley's declaration of the permanence of British rule, 
found tJiemselves abandoned after the defeat of Majaba 
HilL 



48 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTER VTI. 

BOEH DISTRUST OF BMTISa 

Distrust, apprehension, depreciation ; these, I have said, 
oonatitute tlie resultant preaent attitude aad frame of mind 
of Boers to British. As it is now, and as it has been for 
generations past, Aa I have shown, their distrust is duo 
partly to memory of Imperial vacillation, partly to memory M 
of Imperial iTjgratitnde to faithful servants and loyal sub- 
jects. It ia due^ however, to other causea as well; cldef 
among these must be reckoned the long association of the 
Boer with Kaf&r wilea. Nowhere more than with the Kaffir 
chiefs of South Africa ia appreciated the conoeption ot 
language as an instrument given to man to conceal hia 
thoughts. Again, the distrust is baaed partly on ignorance 
of the Imperial Government's real motives. 

The Boer apprehension of injury from the Imperial 
power at times culminates in hatred. Again, a multitude of 
causes have called thia feeling into being. The memory 
of past injuries, or of deeds which Boers regard aa injuries, 
plays a great part. For there were some real injuries, 
although others are fictitious. The Boer dislike of Govern- 
ment and of taxation has already been referred to, and tli© 
Boer dialike of being intetfered with in treatment of the 
Kaffir, and the Boer dislike of being crowded out by 
strangers. The total result is an ever-present apprehen- 
sion of injury from the action of the Imperial power. 

Of past injuries some, aa I have aaid, were real. For 
instance, the method of carrying out tlie abolition of slavery 
in South Africa at the order of the Imperial Government in 



BOER DISTRUST OF BRITISH 



49 



1834, an order issued without the slightest regard to South 
African feeling under the influence of the Wilberforce agita- 
tion, this method left much to he desired. Au absurdly 
I inadequate sum of about a million and a half was allocated 

■ to South African slave-owners, and the payment of this aitm 
" ^ffoa rendered a simple farce by the preposterous condition 

which required the payment to be made iu London alone; 

the results of this condition being neeeaaarily that the task 

of receiving payment had to be assigned to speculative 

, ^enta, with the result that the greater part of the compen- 

■ sation did not reach the owners despoiled^ and even in aome 
^upses that their claim for compensation was abandoned. 
^^^ Then, again, among other real grievances, must be men- 
tioned the persistent negrophiliat interference of the Imperial 

I Government between Boer and Kaffir in the border wars. 
As the manifesto of Piet Eetief recites, no protucuun was 
givea to border farmers against the inroads of marauding 
savflg^. When the Boer farmer betook him to rifle and 
horse and repelled these iiivasione, the Imperial Government, 
under the impulse of an uninstructed public opinion in 
England, and of negrophilist nussionaries in South Africa, 
interfered and prevented the farmer from reaping tlie fruits 

■ of his victory, replacing the bhimelesg Kaffir in the statue 
^uo arUe helium. 

Hien, again, it must be admitted that tlie failure of the 
Imperial Government to carry out its promise given, through 
Sir Theophilus Shepstone, to grant Home Rule to the 
Transvaal, did constitute a real grievance. 
I But of the past injuries which rankle most in the Boer 

mind, and which have been seen to have real foundation, must 
be reckoned the extraordinary demeanour of various military 
Governors ruling in the name of the Empire. For instance, 
the demeanour of Sir Owen Lanyon, Governor of the Trans- 
vaal, is still daily recalled by the Boer ; a man who refused 
to shake hands with members of the Volksraad — an intoler- 
able insult to proud peasants who regarded themselves aa 
of the Lord's Klect. 

Among injuries in the past inflicted on the Boer by 



so 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Imperial action are some which ranklfl greatly as grievancea, 
but which any partial observer can only conclude, in yiew 
of the spirit of hostility which the present war and all the 
preparation for it have revealed, to be only apparent. The 
action of the Imperial Govcroment was really justifiable. 
First among these was the annexation of Baautoland by Sir 
Philip Wodehouse inten-ening to prevent the Orange Free 
State from annexing Ba^utoland, after fourteen years' desul* 
tory warfare with the Rasuto, to whose fury the Orange 
Biver Sovereignty hEid been abandoned by an ecoaomical 
Manchester School Ministiy in Westminster. Keally justi- 
fiable Sir Philip Wodehouae's intervention appears to have 
lieen, in the light of later facta and of the present war. At 
that time the strip of territory- between the Basutoland 
mountains, the range of the Molutis and the Drakensberg, 
stretched No Man's I^nd to the sea. One hears still in 
Basutoland of dreams in the early aixties of French annex- 
ation by Napoleon the Third, from the Caledon Kiver to the 
coast. The French missionaries, who were first to enter 
that loveliest of the lands of South Africa, and whose worq 
of exploration hag left ench permanent traces as the name of 
Mont aiix Sources, which they give to the highest snow-clai 
peak, of nearly 12,000 feet, in the whole sub-continent, coi 
not have viewed with other than satisfaction such an exien-' 
aion of the Empire which was peace. But one is told that 
the "Entente Cordiale" prevented the realisation of the 
dream.* 

Seeing that the occupation of Basutoland by the Orangft 
Free Street would most probably have entailed as a conae^ 
quence Boer occupation of the sea-coast from the slopes ol^ 
the Drakensberg, and in view of the war spirit now so 
imliappily evidenced among Boer peoples, Sir Philip Wode- 
liouse's policy of intervention and annexation, to protect the 
integrity of the Erapii'C, has been amply justified by time. 

A German attempt to annes the same coast — ^under title 
of concessions by a Kaffir chief of much later date (in 



only 



• Hitling tliruugh UaKuioiand one can bXHI fitnl a trudtjr who can BiteaX 
Y French and Sttmto, aa 1 did one day in January 1697. 



BOER DISTRUST OF BRITISH 



51 



I 



1SS4}, I am reminded by a leading member of the Cape 
Parliament — was defeated by the actiou of the late Cape 
idinistry. 

The aimeiation of the Biamond Fields of Kimberley 
figures as another and the greatest item in the Boer 
accusations of lupacity and bad faith against the Imperial 
Government It is said that on titles granted by Griqua 
chiefs, 8Bbsec[uently held invalid by a British High Court, 
the diamond fields of Kimberley were declared a British 
possession. TUs argument was one with which, at one 
time, I was considerably impressed; but the case on the 
other side has now proved to be much stronger than at one 
time it seemed, when it was based merely on the cession of 
the Diamond Fields, negotiated with Sir John Brand, the 
President of the Orange Free State, and the payment to the 
Orange Free State of a sura in compensation of £90,000. 
When we have witnessed the use to which the possession 
and control of the Gold Fields of the Witwatersrand has 
been put by the Boer BepubUca — how gold has been 
transmuted into artillery and rifles and the services of 
skUled generals from AlgierSj such as the late Comte de 
Villebois-Mareuil — one caunot say that the solo justification 
of the Imperial annexing of the Diamond Fields is to he 
^nd in the difficulties which a small pastoral stato would 
find in policing the cosmopolitan population of Du 
Toit's Fan. 

Among the purely fictitious injuries of the past in the 
relations of the Boer and Imperiid Governments must be 
counted the famoas executions of Slachter's Nek in 1815. 
Certain farmers, who had resisted arrest, and fired on and 
killed ofticers of the law, were tried for murder and 
rebellion, and were executed under a combination of 
singularly cruel and pathetic circumstances, incluiling that 
of ropes breaking at the first attempt at their execution. 
One could hardly admit that even real harahness attributable 
to the Imperial British authorities of such a far-off time, if 
folly establislied, could militate against or outweigh the 
aocumulation of British rights in South Africa for the last 

E 2 




52 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



oentmy. Not bo long before in Newgate, in London, 
English womac, whose husband was seized by the presa-^ 
of the Naval authorities, and who» to save herself froD 
starvation, stole a loaf of bread, was hanged, an 
denounced in the House of Commons as a foul judici^' 
murder. Such were the matmers of the age; and not in 
British territory alone, as Victor Hugo's story of Jean 
Valjean sufBcieatly shows. But the utter injustice of 
citing the execution of Slachter'a Nek a& a proof of British 
cruelty or of British tyranny over the Dutch, ia rendered 
manifest by the single consideration that the trial was held^ 
the sentence delivered and the sentence executed by I>utch 
officials — judge, jury» and executive officials being all 
Dutch. Many more examples of high-handed adminis- 
tration could be cited from the records of ths Dutch 
Administration of the Cape during the hundred and fifty 
years of Dutch rule in tha Peninsula. Hevolt of Dutch 
farmers and trek into the wilderness were by no means 
unknown during the rule of the Dutch East India Company, 
nor yet appeal and remonstrance to the States-General 
the Hague. 



( S3 ) 



CHAPTER VIII, 



BOKB DEPRECIATION 07 BRITiaH CHARACTER AKD POWER. 

The Boer deprmatum of British character as exhibited by 
both the Imperial Government and the British coloukt 
dprioga from quite a combination of causes, some of which 
have already been referred to. For Imperial indecision in 
the past nothing but contempt ia felt by the stubborn 
Hollander and Huguen&t race, which Vnowa its own mind. 
Anything but respect has been the result of the spectacles 
they witnessed of Imperial ingratitude to public Bervants, 
and to British and Dutch loyalists in tbe Orange Edvei 
Sovereignty in 1854, and in the Transvaal Province 
in 1885.' 

The Boers, people and Government, well remember that 
the Imperial Government threw over Sir George Grey, 
recalled Sir Bartle Frere, and diamisaed Sir Theophilua 
Sbepstone. There is nothing very astonishing, therefore, in 
the fact that they expected that the British Parliament 
would also abandon Sir Alfred Milner. 

The effect on the Boer mind of the plentiful lack of 
information on the part of the British Government of facts 
of life and of the world, palpable to all who have lived in 
South Africa, for instance, that the position to which KafBrs 
are entitled in justice is not one of equality, has not raised 
their estimate of British intelligence. Ignorance of fact 

• In January 1897 I had an interesting conTereatioD at hia farm in 

' the CoitquGred Territory, a district of the Free State^ with n bob cf the last 

Britiih randent of BtomnfoDtein vlio hftd settled down fan 9. burgher of 

the Orange Free State, and w^o had beooms iu ev«r^ res^t a typical 



54 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



they interpret as lack of inteUectnal acnmeiL The hTunani- 
tarian irave of sentiment, which for the last hundred years 
has BO dominated British home opinion, they do mot share 
m the least, no more than the English of the eighteentli 
or of the seventeenth or the sixteenth centuiy. In fact, 
counsellors are not wanted to tell them that the spirit, which 
dates from the French Encyclopffidists and from Eentham 
and Wilberforce and McKenzie in England at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, is only affectation of superior 
virtue at the expense of other people; and that, like the 
Cromwellian Puritan's interference with bear-baiting, which 
was prompted by the desire not t^ save pain to the bear, but 
to prevent the man being amuaed, so British interference 
with the domeatic diacipHne of the Kaffir was intended 
rather, under the pretext of virtue, to annoy the Boer and 
weaken his power in the land. 

Again, the non-eipansionist theories affected by Taiiov 
parties in succession in England, prompting Imi 
Governments in one generation after another to declare the 
unalterable resolve not to move further into the interior," 
have not greatly impressed the Boer with respect for British 
intelligence and consistency — theories expounded first by 
missionaries, who tried to build up independent Kaffir 
" sovereignties," later on by Manchester School economiata,,^ 
who had not yet realised that trade follows the flag] anc^jH 
last of all, by the so-called Little Englanders, whoso theory 
that the Empire must always be wrong no Boer thinks of 
reciprocating by a contention that the Eepublics must 
always be in error. The Boer, however, is fumighed with 
various explanations of these theories, all of them very _ 
unflattering to British intelligence. A high Imperisdi 
administrator was the first to point out to me that the Boers 
regard the missionary's interference as due to the missionary's 
perception of his private pecuniary interest Where the 
Kaffir tribe was left; imdiaturbed, and the Kaffir chief mled 
as king, the missionary sat by his side, sharing his authority 
and emoluments as mayor of the palace. The Manchester 
School economist they regarded as an example of the painful 



ER DEPRECIATION OF BRITISH CHARACTER 55 



t 



efibcts of want of mteUigence and of rash dealing with 
&eta 6,000 miles away, beyond the ken of the distant 
eitperiiDeiiter. Little Eoglanderwrn they regard as either 
lack of patriotism — for every Boer believes himself bound to 
take the side of his own people — or ela© fear of expense and 
mcrea^e of taxation ; or «bo party interest seeking a high- 
mmded excuse to turn the other political party out of office ; 
or els© what our Continental cousins believe to he our 
national weakness — the affectation of superior virtue. 

Much has been said in South Africa, of recent years^ of 
the advantoges and of the dangers of magnanimity. The 
High ComTnisaioner in a recent speech in Capoto-mi has 
Tindicated the wisdom and tbe statcsmanahip of exhibiting, 
during and after the war, the British quality of magnanimity. 
That cjuality is genuine as we know, The British are one 
of the very few peoples who do not personally hate their 
enemies in war or their rivals in commerce. They have 
adopted and fully exercise the precept of their greatest 
predecessors in the political organisation of the European 
raoe. No Koman administrator has more fully acted on the 
precept — Parccre sTihJcctig, et dchdlara supcrbos. Now, the 
Boer way of regarding actions of the Imperial Government 
claimed as exhibitions of magnanimity is very instructive. 
It ia q^uite untrue that they do not appreciate magnanimity. 
But, as lawyera aaj, they join issue on the facts. What has 
been represented as magnanimity they do not regard as 
magnanimity at all. For instance^ take the retrocesaion of 
the Transvaal after the British defeat at Majuba Hill. They 
regarded it, and still regard it, aa Loi-d Bandolph Churchill 
held in his book on South Afric^i, as a measure adopted after 
full consideration of political and economical advantages, 
They remind you that no gold reefs had been discovered in 
the Tt^Jisvaal at that time ; that Frinie Minister Gladstone 
bad cited the official description twenty-six years previously 
of the British Commissioner who negotiated the Sand Kiver 
Convention, that the Transvaal was a howUng wilderness. 
The Imperial Government knew that President Brand had 
intimated that he would be unable to restrain his burghers 



56 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



of the Orange Free State from siding with the Transvaal, if 
the war wero prolonged; and the Imperial Govemmemt did' 
not care to spend tens of thousands of lives of British 
Boldiera, and tens of millions of British money, in reducisg 
to subjection a howling wildenteas of barren and wortMess 
and wind-swept veldt. A Republican Chief Justice pointed 
out to me how absurd on this account it was for the Imperial 
Government to expect abject protestations of gratitude fpT^ 
this exhibition of magnanimity — magnanimity merely in 
pretence. The pretence was an aggravation of the origina 
crime of annexing the Transvaal. Now, Lard Kiinbcrley'a 
recent speech shows that this Boor contention all along (that 
the intimation of Sir John Brand, Preeident of the Orangti 
Free State, ag to the action of hia burghers really did we 
with at least one of the members of the Gladstona Cabinet 
and that one the Colonial Minister, in deciding on the' 
retrocession of Uie Transvaal without avenging Majuba Hill)^ 
was not without foundation. 

Then, again, one phase of British public life, which wfl 
see is really due to the spirit of justice which animalos oui 
people at home, presents itself in a totally difierent light to 
the Boer in South Airica, The Opposition in the House of 
Commona or in the House of Lords criticise the conduct of 
the war as carried out by the Government in power. This 
the Boera do not regard as unpatriotic, although they regard 
the publication of the debate as unpatriotic. But that any 
citizen of the British Empire should take sides against the 
Imperial Government diiring that war does not appear to the 
Boer to constitute any giwmd for admiring the British 
character, "Whatever their party differences, war unites the 
Boers and sUences faction. Above all things, howeverj the 
chief grounds of the Boer depreciation of the Imperial 
Government, and of the British people at home and in South 
Africa, is to be found in their estimate of the military 
capacity both of the Imperial troops and of the British 
civilian population. fl 

The ftclxial defeats of British forces for the last half™ 
century by Kaffir and by Boer have never been forgotten. 



BOER DEPRECIATION OF BRITISH CHARACTER 57 



and are every day recalled. The battle of Berea in 1852; 
the defeat of Majiibii Hill in 1881 ; tlie series of defeats 
which made up the Basutoland Gun War from 1882 to lm5 ; 
the surrender of Doornkop in 1896 of troops commimded by 
officers of the Imperial army, had quite prepared the Boera 
for their initial victories in the present war, and they were 
not in the least surprised to have driven back again and 
s^in seven generals of the Imperial forces. Magersfonteui, 
and Stormberg, and Colenso, and Spionkop, seemed to them 
the only natural sequence of their past expcriencea^ unbroken, 
save by Elaiidalaagte, imtil the tide of war turned on the 
anniversary of the " winter day that withered hope and 
pride ; " the anniversary, on tlie 27th February, 1900, of 
Majuha Hill, whose meuiory now is erased by Paardeberg. 

Let me sum up the Boer estimate of the Imperial 

British army ; for Colonial troops they have always had a 

different estimate. The Boera regard the rank and file of 

L the Imperial army as brave but unintelligent. Their 

■ Young Afrikander counsellors have read French as well 

" as English literature, and quote Kapoleon's description of 

the British army and people, " A nation of Bona led by 

jackasses." 

K The officers of thw Imperial army have never stood high 

I in their estimation. They do not understand why^ owing to 

I absurdly inadequate pay and a prepoaterous scale of mess 

^und amusements expenditure, the poa.se-ssion of wealth and 

^HKoial position is practically essential, with the posaible 

K exception of one in a hundred thonaand cases, to rank in the 

army and to command in the field ; and they do not think 

I that this method of organising an army is either fair to the 
average citizen or to the rank and file considered individually, 
and above all is unpatriotic, as jeopardising the safety of the 
State itself. They cannot understand how the British people 
or Parliament are insane enough to tolerate such a method 
of national suicide. Were such a system attempted among 
the Boera there would bo a general rebellion, and the 
Government would bo overturned in a day. Although 
not part of their Huguenot heritage, the Botrs act in the 



5« 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



organisation of their military forces strictly on the Frei 
prindplo of Napoleon — " La carribre ouverte aui talenta." 
General Joubert's explanation to Sir Evelyn Wood in > 
BfigOtiations after Majuba of the Boers' reasons for pick 
off the British ofiBcers — not merely that they were the e; 
o4 their corps, but that they were wealthy ariatocrs 
professional soldiers, whereas with the British rank and 
the Boer had no grievancc^ — is sufluciently instructive. 
regards the undoubted courage of British officers, the Be 
regard its exhibition as not truly patriotic, being a m 
ueekiog of personal distinction ; and they do not chink t 
a deaire to gain a cross or other marks of bravery is in 
least a justification for a servant of the State expoe 
himself to unnecessary danger, more especially when 
death may involve that of the troops under hia comma 
Boer criticism is often directed to the refaaal of Impe 
officers to take colonial advice ; they ascribe this refusal 
professional pride, to silly ideas of superiority over colon 
on social grounds, and to professional jealousy of volnnl 
soldiers. They tell nne many stories of what they regarr 
singular int'fficieucy, walking ioto traps which would dec* 
no Boer. At the same time, the Boers greatly resent w 
they describe as the overbearing demeanour of Impe 
officers to the common British soldier, with whom, on 
other hand, the Boer^ from commandant to the yonnj 
recruit on commando, is inclined to fraternise. In fact 
some of our candid though friendly critics from the 
army have pointed out to us, they hold the theory 
German critics, that officers of the Imperial army do" 
appear to take up the army as a serious profession, 
laUier as an appanage of their social rank, or as a so 
distinction; that they ere more interested in display 
gorgeous miiforms on parade, or in figuring as carpet-sold 
in drawing-rooms than in studying tactics ; and that ti 
are much more interested in polo than in Kri^spiel. E 
leaders have frequently commented also on what they desc] 
as nepotism in the appointments to the British War Oi 
and in the Imperial army, and, indeed, in the Bntish Fore 



BOER DEPRECIATION OF BRITISH CHARACTER 59 



Office and Colonial Office as well. It h quite true that 
there is no nepotiam in their military appointments. These 
go by merit alone. 

Their low estimate of the military capacity of the British 
civilian population la equally marked. The rawest Boer boy 
from the veldt smiles at the ignorance of rifles and horses 
^own by wandering British visitors and toiiriats, and ahown 
too by the Uitlanders on the Witwatersrand. The Boera have 
not the wider vision to see that this ttiilitary incapacity of 
the British civilian population ia the result of industrialism, 
of the division of labour; and very largely too of Britiah 
reliance on the Navy ; and most of all of the fact that, for 
generations, the ordinary British civilian has had no occasion 
to draw the sword on Britiah soil. In England, especially^ 
no battle has been foaght since the march of the Young 
Pretender to Derby in 1745. 

It is needless to say that I am not to be taken as 
approving of every detail of the Boer indictment of the 
British Army organisation^ as it exiata at present ; although, 
apparently, to judge by the criticism of our Continental 
friends, and more especially by similar criticism made by 
Colonial troops from South Africa, there is foundation of fact 
jnatiiying their view. What I am concerned with is the 
mental attitude of the Boer people in ita relation to causing 
the war. Therefore, I would point out, what, most of all, has 
caused the Boer depreciation of Imperial military power ia 
their false estimate, shared by many of our Continental friends, 
of the reserire force, of the real military strength, of the 
Empire when its existence is seen by its citizens to be in danger. 

Until the present war, and the striking exhibition of 
patriotism which it has evoked from the people of the United 
Kingdom, and nntil that heart- stirring rally of the Colonies, 
which ha3 impressed the world, the Boers, both people and 
Governments, really thought that the little red Army List 
enumerated the whole force of the Empire.* 

* Eren Ro eiiligjiteoed a man and so t;allant a Moltiier as Gonerat 
Joubert apparently thought flo, aa letters of hi» putlishtti in the French 
And Oemufi preui sit the Datbreak of the war eeem to show^ The highest 



6o 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



The Boers, Govemtnenta and people, genuinely beliered 
that Mammon-worsMp had killed patriotism in England. 
They too haatilj took the formula — ''A nation of shop- 
keepers " — as an accurate guide to the likely action of the 
BiitiBh people at home, " Shopkeepers intent on nothing 
but money," Many members of both the Governments of 
the Republics have been educated in London, and judged 
the people of England and of the United Kingdom from 
the denizens of the East End ; and even these they mis- 
judged. 

Again, too, they agreed with such a high authority as 
Mr. John Morley, that in any great war Canada or Australia, 
so far from ralljTug to the help of the Empire, ■would " cut 
the painter." JVIr. Gold win Smith's prophecies of the 
annexation of Canada by the United States of America were 
quite familiar to them. They believed that the hold of the 
Empire on India was of the most precarious kind, and that 
the 300,000,000 of people were merely waiting for an 
opportunity of revolt, Hollander, German, French, all their 
Continental friends really believed theae theories ; and 
impressed them on the mind of the Boer in the Yolkaraads 
and on the veldt. Above and beyond all things, they were 
certain that the courage of tlie Imperial Government itself 
was gone ; that they were afraid of liuasia in India, afraid of 
Dutch rebellion in the Cape, afraid of French- Canadian 
aeceasion ; afi-aid of French intervention in Egypt — one even 
spoke to me of a fancied French annexation of the Channel 
Islands, whose inhabitants, as loyal as any in the whole 
sweep of the Empire, describei themselves as having conquered 
England and beaten France — afraid of every Power in the 
civilised world; even of Italy taking Malta and Spain 
seizing Gibraltar. 

The Boers have had a rude awakening. 



ofScials of the Govemmenta at Pretoria and Bloemfontan listened to you 
with pdlite and patient iDcredultty when you endeavoured to show bow 
mifitaken "was thig theory, ond upon what sn immense reserve fund of 
patriotism and determiuatioQ, m the highest and in the lowwt social 
rwikB, in ttie cfuti« sb v^ii w xr thti almu^ th« Empire tou|d drftWr 



BOER DEPRECIATION OF BRITISH CHARACTER 6i 

Note. — What the views of the educated Boer — the youQg 
Afrikander — were is fairly paralleled by those ascribed to 
many French people, in the following; extmct from an article 
by Baron Piexte de Coubertin, in the Forinighilif Review for 
May 1900. 

Referring to the might of the Empire, and the average 
Frenchman's estimate of it, the writer states : — 

" TLere in botLiiig m the world ho hard to bring hoiati to a Fr'etichTiiaD'a 
nuBii u the nature of that power. He persists va Jud^ug An^lu-Saxon 
swiety by hU owil 'NapoleDDic' and ' centraUBing ' ideas. Ue ca.nnut !« 
nuide to Bw that all theee countries scattered over the «urface of the glohe 
cu form A whole; he itt always cxpectuig a hicak up, and U fimily 
penniftded that the ftmolIeBt; event mi^ht serve to bring^ it about. He 
IielieTM, on the authority of a fi^w worthy globe-trotl^rtt, who, io the 
wurds oftbe Psalmist, have eyes hut they tiee uut^ that the uatlvo {lopulii- 
llons of the different Esglifh Colonies are oppreKAenl niid long^n^ '^) revult, 
AhcAily hi« prophotio viHioa seeu Ireland, iTi'lia, Buniiah, JimLAica, 
Auetralia, New Zealand, tho Cat*, Egy|it, Canada, in-oclabnin^ their 
indtpet^dervc^ aa if that magic word expTes¥«d the highest holies of all 
thete oouDlricft Tou cannot get it into hia head that they are all luyal 
to ^England,, beCauHe they are happy under h^r rule and because there i^ 
mnBthmg quite woaderfuliu her {K>wer of organisatiun Aod admin iutratioA-" 



63 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTEK IX. 



THK POLICY OF PBE^tDENT KRUOKE. 

In the tistorical sketch which I hsve given of the relatioDS 
betwe^i the British and the Dutch in South Africa, I have 
eodeavouredj aa I have already stated, to place a view of the 
political position a3 it would etrike any citizen of the 
Empire, who catne tg the conaideration gf the problem with- 
out any bias a;^;iingt the aspirations, or the pa^t history, of i 
the l>utcb-Bpeaking people. 

"Meaaurea, not men" — that waa, and ia» aod always I 
shall he a favourite popular fallacy. Let me quote from a 
great political philosopher : " With atnall men no great ^ 
things are done." The policy of President Kniger haal 
not been in the least the policy of a small man. But he has 
not attained to the \ision of the first Bonaparte. One 
cannot do everything oneself; the moat obsequious ingtru- 
ment is usually the most completely useless. 

The plight of the Pretorian English after the retrocession ] 
of the Transvaal was truly piteous. They had invested 
their all in the British territory of the Transvaal province^ 
relying on the declaration of the Imperial Governor : " Aa 
long as the sun shines, as long as rivers run, the TVaosvaal 
remains British territory," They saw how that protnise, 
without fault of the promiser, had been kept. They buried 
the British flag in Pretoria with the prophetic epitaph 
*' Itesurgam," Wherefore the appreciation by the Pretorian 
English of Imperial faith and honour and gratitude haa 
always been extreme. And as regai'ds the conquering Boer, it 
is enough to say that the Pretorian ^ to the Johannes burger 



THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 



63 



is 6S wine unto water, in their divergence from fratemiaa- 
tion wdtt anything that is Dutch. 

The Triumvirate of the jiBoers — Kruger, Pretorions, 
Joubert — were indeed triumphant. Immediately after the 
retroceasioQ the divergent policies of Krugev, elected Pre- 
sident, and of Joubert» elected Cymmandant-General, became 
erident. 
H In a preceding chapter I have endeavoured to explain 
™ the line« on which parties were divided. Exactly as among 
the 17th-century English, the lines ran on principles of 
Church government ; it would seem an ex^geration to say 
religious principle. The Doppers were the Roimdheada 
among the Boers of the day* They represent what Edmund 
Burke calls the disaidence of dissent, the ProC^^stantism of 
the Protestant religion. A Dop is a round cap ; the Dapper 
was the Eoundhead. The Doppor objects to music in the 
church ; and in the contest between the policies of Paul 
Kruger and Piet Joubert he made his co-sectary the 
victor. 
H No one who has met the old President Kruger can doubt 
H in the Least that he is a most striking historical character ; 
f one who will stand out for centuries to come, and will wield 
in legend and story a great power on the minds of men. 
One is in doubt whether to reflect on the historic parallel of 
that English commander of mercenaries, who, the great 
Aguto^ figures in the records of the Eepublic of Florence, 
and sleeps in his English "village home as Sir John Hawk- 
wood ; or on recent ingenious romaneea wherein a 19th- 
centnry humanitarian survival finds himself surrounded 
with new, undreamt of, and paralysing conditions, in a time 
and B generation which had for furgotten the influences, and 
passed from the conditions which hod determined his mental 

■ tlevelopment. 
For the President is a Lowland Hollander of the I7th 
century in mind, whatever may he on one side his High 
Uefman descent, Stuhborn, brave, stoical, he cut off his 
own thumb with a knife when it was shattered by a rifle 
bullet. He believes absolutely in the divine destiny of his 



fi* 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



I 



people, and transfers to them all the promises of tlie Lord of 
the Old Testament, who led His chosen people out of the 
wilderness. The sword of the Lord and of Gideon still . 
smitea for the chosen people ; and, if one in surprised to || 
find what a lack of sense of historic eontinnity is manifested 
in this hermit, crab-like assumption of an ancient and caAt- 
oflT tenement, let ns remember that our worthy Independents, 
who stood up against the Man of Blood, and smots him at 
Brentford and Naseby — that sergeant " Bind-their*kings-in- 
chains-and-their-uobles-in-Unks-of-iron " who plied his sword 
in Ireton'fl army — were afflicted by a similar lack of per- 
ception of historical perspective. The President really 
believes, and alwaya has believed, that the Boers are the 
choaen people of the Old Testament^ to whom the children 
of Ham should be servants, and that they are promised 
the annexing of the l*roiDised Land. Some, who doubt the 
President's sincerity, do not know the fact that he was one 
of the first Voortrekkers born in the Cape Colony ; one who, 
in 1836 as a boy of thirteen, followed in the steps and 
adhered to the Proclamation of Piet Eetief. 

President Kruger'a policy, in pursuance of the mission 
which his election imposed on bira — for all that power, 
whether th^it of President, or Landdrost, or Field-Comet, is 
from on high no Boer, at least no Boer of the President's 
generation, can doubt — was clearly, from the firat, to establish 
the power of the choaen race ; or, transmuting this phrase 
into language understood by English-speaking people of the 
Empire and of the United States of America, to establish a 
great Dutch-speaktng Afrikander Power — the United States 
of South Africa. 

The first necessity for the accomplishment of this policy 
was necessarily to secure the power of the President hixnself. 
With the keen vision of a Cardinal Richelieu {whom a 
Transvaal official recently reminded the Uitlanders of Johan- 
nesburg bore the name so familiar in South Africa as that of 
Ilu Plessis) ; with tiie relentless purpose of a Prince Bismarck, 
the President evidently made up Ids mind that, to accomplish 
this providential mission ^ certain steps were necessary; and 



I 



THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 



65 



ttiefle steps he took without hesitation, with firmaeea^ 
iaapired by hia 17th-century conception of patriotic ardour 
\ad religious purpo9e. 

The nesft step wfts to do everything which waa possible 
to eliminate Imperial control of the destinies of the Republic. 
The eipeUed Orange Jree State, expelled &om the Empire 
ugainst its wiU, had abBolnte power, under the Treaty of 
Bloemfontein of 1854, to conclude treaties with foreign 
Towers, without any Imperial sanction or possibility of veto. 
The President designed to secure similar freedom for the 
Republic north of the Vaal River. 

The next desirable thing which he clearly contemplated 
in the interests of his burghers, who always desired land for 
the occupation of their increasing population, was to secure 
the expansion of their territory to the nortli, and thereby 
to allow the trek to secure opportunities of limitless 
continuation, 

Next to this to secure a seaport. The nucleus of the 
United States of South Africa would be greatly assisted in 
obtaining world-wide recognition of its status as a sovereign 
if its warships shoiUd sail the sea*, and ita flag wb3 
Ihvi. seen from Hamburg to Marseilles^ and from Nap"l433 to 
Trieste. 

Most of allj however, and moat urgently was needed the 
^uisition of gold for the Treasury of the Republic. When 
the Imperial Ccmmiasioner annexed the Transvaal in 1877 
the treasury was empty. The Boer has an aversion to pay 
taxes 80 strong that it may be almost desciribed as uonatitu- 
tional. How was the gold to be procured ? 

Because, unless some weakness hardly to be hoped for 
even in the moat vacillating Government at Westminster, it 
could hardly be expected that the Imperial Government 
would peaceably submit to being driven into the sea, not 
to mention the colonial of British descent, whose knowledge 
of liia rights and determination to maintain them were but 
too well known. Without gold, no war preparations could 
be contemplated. 

It ifl quite easy to prepare for war if you have gold, with 



66 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



which to obtain cannoii and rifles, and ammumdon, and 
skilled strategists^ veterans in stricken fields and expert 
artillerists. There is no necessity, if tbitigs go well, of 
declaring war until the British Empire is at war with another ^ 
Oreftt Power. ■ 

In furtherance of this policy, too, the President's obvious 



duty was to seek the support of the sister Kepuhlic of the 
Orange Free State ; and, above all things, if diplomacy tit\ 
preferential trade advantages, or promises (no matter how ' 



Orange Free State ; and, above all things, if diplomacy '■rfl 

w " 

lavish) of poUtica! dominatiou could secure it, the support of 
one of the Gi-eat Powers of Europe. H 

This policy the President steadily cari-ied out, with 
tjualities of determination ami foresight which must wring 
an unwilling admiratiou from the most loyal citizen of the 
Empire. 

It wa^ a mei-e incident in the consolidation of his 
personal power, but still absolutely essential, that he should 
eliuunate any Trans vaalera whose power and authority in 
the llypublic rested on their own weight with th« bur^^hers, 
and not on their nomination by the President, and who were 
liki,dy to endeavour to carry out a policy of independent 
initiative, which possibly might conflict with the I'resideut'a 
desi^s. 

In pursuance of the policy of eliminating Imperia; 
control, a deputation was sent to England at the end of 1883 
witli the object of obtaining certain modifioations of the 
Convention of Pretoria of 1881, which embodied the result 
of the Majubft Hill negotiation. The Convention of Pretoria 
coutfiined many restrictions on the liberty of the Governmentfl 
of the Kepnblic, both aa regards their internal action with 
reference to the KafSr and the foreign nei^otiationa of the 
Kepuhlic with the Great Powers of Europe. The deputation,™ 
of which Presklent Kruger waa a member, succeeded in 
obtaining from Lord Derby, then Colonial Minister, many 
modifications of the Convention, in their direction of giving 
a freer hand to the Government of the Kepuhlic. I shall 
revert to thia subject at greater length later on in connection 
with the Suzerainty Controversy of October 181*7. Suffice 



I 



THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 



67 



it here to note that the deputation aacceeded in prccnring 
the abrogation of the right of the Imperial Government 
to move its troops through the territory of the Republic, and 
procored also llie practical abolition of the right of the British 
Agent to interfere on behalf of the natives, and removed 
from the hands of the Imperial Foreign Office the function of 
negotiating all agreements between the Republic and Foreign 
Powers. But the crowning triumph for the negotiators of 
the New Convention of London of 1884 was that the 
obnojdous word Suzerainty was omitted by Lord Derby 
trom the New Convention; and that the only control 
over the foreign affairs of the KepMblic retained was a veto 
on treaties which, to be valid, should be exercised within 
six months. 

Now, as regards the expansion of the territory of the 
Itepublic which the President regarded as necessary to its 
prosperity, it is to he noted that, while the Conventions of 
Pretoria and Loodon contained provisions prohibiting the 
conclusion of treaties between native chiefs on the east or 
tlio west of the Kepublic without the sanction of the 
Imperial power, no such restriction is imposed on the trek 
to the north. The motives of these restrictions are clear 
enough, when one considers the traditional policy of the 
Imperial Government with regard to the Boers obtaining a 
foothold on the Indian Ocean ; and, on the other hand, the 
perception by the Colonial Office (even under the secretary- 
ship of Lord Derby) of the desirability of maintaining the 
trade route to the interior of Africa. Still, expansion to the 
north was expressly permitted to the Republic. 

This right to the north continued until the policy of 
Mr. Cecil Rhodes, ending in the oc<_'upaLion of Maahona- 
land and Matabeleland, put an end to all prospect of 
the expansion of the President's territory north of the 
lirapopo. 

The Bechuanaland Expedition of 1S84, under Sir Charles 
■Warren, costing the Imperial Government some milliona, 
pnt an end to expansion on the west by suppressing the new 
Boer RepubUca of Stellalaud and Goshen, which President 

F 3 



fi8 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Kniger hud proposed to annex to tlie TransTael The im- 
portance of thia step, from the Imperial point of view, may 
be seen, when it is considered that such expansion would 
necessarily have ended in the joining of the Transvaal 
territory in the west to the eastern border of German South' 
West Africa; and, consequently, the cutting off of the 
Britiflh trade route to Central Africa, which even Lord 
Derby — whose interest in African affaire, I was told by a 
member of the Transvaal Deputation of 1883, could be 
expressed in the wonder why the African elephant was not 
domesticated — was desirous of maintaining. If such a 
junction had been effected, there could obvioualy have been 
no Cape to Cairo route. 

The p'^licy of Mr. Cecil Rhodes baviug completely 
hindei-ed any peaceable expansion of the Tiunavaal territory, 
and warlike expansion being out of the question for the 
time being, the Preaident made the next best bargain he 
could^that ia to say, he entered into negotiations with the 
Imperial Government to obtain their sanction to an outlet 
on the sea. Between the Transvaal aod the Indian Ocean, 
and between the Portuguese of Delagoa Bay and the British 
Colony of Natal, stretched a narrow strip of land called H 
Amatongaliind, in the occupation of aome Kaffir chiefs, and 
not yet annexed by any European Power. Now, the Con- , 
ventiona of both Pretoria and Loudon of 1881 and 1384 ■ 
expressly provide that no treaties could be made by the 
Ti-anavaal with native chiefs to the east or west of the 
Repulilic without the express consent of the Imperial ■ 
Government, In i-eturn, therefore, for bis promise to 
support the Britiah Chartered Company in their establishing 
of law and order in Ehodeaia, the President obtained the ■ 
consent of the Imperial Government, embodied in the Swazi- 
land Convention of ISflO, to his taking over, in full 
sovereignty, a strip of land reaching from the eastern border 
of the Transvaal to the Indian Ocean at Kosi Bay. The 
Convention stipulated that the strip of land waa for the 
conatrucLion of a railway, which had to be completed within 
three yeara. In 1894 a new Convention of Swaziland was 



THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT KRUGER. 69 

negoUflted, chiefly for tbe purpose of obtaining the aimeia- 
tion of Swaziland to the Transvaal ; but the President, with 
a strange lack of his usual foresight, omitted, to iiiclufie in 
its firo\iaioD3 a continuation of the a^eemeTit with the 
Impenal Government relative to the strip of land iu 
sovereignty and the railway to Kosi Bay. It is understood 
that he intended to have it embodied in a separate Conven- 
tion. Neverthelesa, the promise of the Eepublic to aid the 
British Chartered Company in Ehodesia was repeated in the 
Swaziland Convention of 1S94, Soon after this period, aa 
the term of three years had expiretl, the Imperial Govern- 
ment took a step, seemingly of very slight importance, 
consisting in the annexation to the Imperial Crown of thu 
worthless slip of territory of Amatongaland ; whereupon 
the two Dutch Eepublica were completely hemmed in by 
BritL^h territory, and the President's dream of his port on the 
ludian Ocean became no longer realisable by peaceable 
meuDS. 

It must be noted that the President had not a unanimous 
Vulksraad with him In this desire of his to acquire a sea- 
port. Several members and high offlcials held that the 
possession would be a weakness in case of war with any 
great Power.* 

The President, nevertheless, undoubtedly considered this 
loss of hia opportunity of constructing a harbour aa a great 
grievance, for which he held Mr. Ehodes chiefly reaponaible. 

* The progresB of the prei*ent war would wem to betir out the corroct- 
nesB of the latter view, one which «»« very forcibly mi[>refiBe(i ou me by 
Ibftt able (flwyer, Df. Ct*t«f, whose servira to the Republic h<i iiiui ailoiit*-!! 
<Qjisd it) hiH gallaiit death, leading a corps uf hi^ Uollnnder fulUiw- 
emifitryitien at Klandslaagte. In (.(ctober of last year nt Delagoa Iky 
I tioCii»d tlie Btrikiog wutiety of the officera of Uer Majesty*n wftrelii|ia 
th&t the rumours v{ an intention of a Hepublicai] commaudo u* peke 
Koa Bay should bo confirmed, an anxiety wlueh one ^^iillant. oHker of 
1LM.S. Phiiorntl expressed to me with couisidemhlo emphaMa. It Kectris 
indiaputahle that the yon»timoQ of I}elagoa Bay in the lianiln of & ueutmi 
power, and thereby the impofisihility of the British Jieet blixrkadinR ihe 
harbour, hu beeu of dietinct advant^e to tJie Dutch HepublicB in 
cnttbling them to keep up their supplies. If either Deia^Du Bay ur Kuni 
Buy htul been La Dutch handa, a rigorous blockade of the cusu^t would 
certainly liave been carried out, ami all Bhl[i(i currying HU{)pli(M for the 
Boer wtoi^ woutd hare been seized u prizes of war. 



70 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



The President's design of i-epleniahing hia Treasury was 
indeed, as all the world knows, completely successfiil. The 
earlier law of the Transvaal proMbited proapectlng for gold 
anywhere in the Eepublican territory ; as the burg^eta^ who 
set such store upon their isolation on the veldt, quite realised 
that an influx of tainers would put an end to their pastoral 
quiet, and their exclusive possession of land. For aimilar 
reasons, as the Imperial GovemineDt desires to matntoin 
Basutoland as a Kaffir reserve, prospecting for minerala ia 
prohibited there ; and apart from other risks from native 
hostility any prospector would be promptly deported across 
the Caledon River, During the presence in London, in 1683, 
of the deputation to Lord Derby for the negotiation of the 
New Convention of 1884, the President invited capitalists 
from all the world to develop the mineral resources of the 
Transvaal, promising them every protection — a promise 
reiterated in the most emphatic terms in an official letter 
from the Secretary of the Deputation, dated 13th December, 
lySS, published in the press at the time. 

Having obtained from Lord Derby the right of conducting 
diplomatic negotiations independently of the British Foreign 
Office, the President promptly proceeded to make use of his 
power. Immediately negotiations were entered into with 
Germany and Holland^ Prince Bismarck, who had previously 
declined any direct negotiations, immediately recognising the M 
altered international status of the Eepublic, To this branch ™ 
of the subject I shall refer again, in considering the policy 
of the German Imperial Government in South Africa 
generally. 

The President, in purauanee of his policy of obtalniiig the 
support of Foreign Powers, entered into the closest relation 
with Holland and the Hollander people. He appointed as 
his representative in Europe the Hollander Baron Beeliierts 
van Elokland, residing at the Hague, The President alsofl 
secured the services of the most able of all his public" 
servants, a member of the Bar of Holland, Dr. W. J. Le3'd3 
(at present the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Eepublic ia 
Europe), and many other Hollanders for every branch of the 



I 
I 




THE POLICY. OF PRESIDENT KRUGER 



71 



poMic service. la pursuance of the same policy a Nether- 
lands Company was, after years of negotiation, which ifi 
Bufficiently familiar in connection with the recently published 
&ward of the Berne Arbitrators, placed in possession and 
DOnLrol of the railways of the Transvaal leading to the 
Portuguese harbour of Delagoa Bay. Couaiderable dia- 
aatiafactioti was always expressed by those of Dutch South 
African descent at this exclusion of themselves from the 
public service ; but, as has already been pointed out, it was 
apparently necessary to enable the President to consolidate 
his oflpn power so iis to carry out hia wider political designs. 
Dutch Afrikanders, as were called those educated men from 
the Colonies of the Cape aud Natal, would stand moie on 
their own feet, aud would depend less an the President's 
nomination. Even the able Uiwyer above referred to, who 
acted as secretary of the London Deputation, and whose 
own standiug with the burghers was considerable, did not 
remain long in the President's confidence. Dr. Jorissen, 
State Attorney of the Eepublie, the negotiator of the Majuba 
Hill Oouveutioa, was dismissed while on leave of absence 
in England. Precisely ad Cardinal Bichelieu crushed the 
recalcitrant nobles, and preciaely as Loxiis XI. surrounded 
himi^elf with his corps of Scottish archers, or Louis XIV. 
with hifl Swiss guards, so did the Pi-eaident aurround luinsolf 
with an army of skilled officials, who could possibly have no 
leverage on the minds of his burghers with wliJcli to thwart 
^^ijs far-seeing policy* For this reason^ quite as much as 
^■om the fact that few of the burghers of the Transvaal 
^Bere aufhciently educated to discharge the duties of any 
^Bovemment uffice, must be ascribed the President's preference 
^Kr the service of immigrants from Holland. 
1^^ Before referring,' at greater length to the transmuting of 
the gold of the Rand — won from the Eeef by the capital and 
toil of the British and other European immigrants wlio hud 
flocked to the newly-cieated town of Johannesburg at the 
Ppeaidenl'a invitation — into cannoa and forts and expe- 
rienced aoldiers, it mil be necessary for me to direct 



n THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

attention to another portion of the political field in South 
AMca. For it must never be forgotten that, as I have 
stated in the first chapter, the whole of the political field 
in South Africa — from Cape Town to Kimberley, from 
Kimberlej to Durban, &om Bloemfontein to Pretoria — all 
constitutes one vast chess-board. No single move can be 
taken at any one point without the fortunes of the whole 
field being afiTected. 



C 73 > 



CHAPTER X. 

THE TOITNG AFRIKANDEK PROPAGANDA; 1881. 

" The winter day that withered hoiw and pride." 

(l.)Majnbo and the Foundation of Uib Bond: The Platform. — (2,) Mnjubo 
and the Dutch Juurnfils : The Tress. ^3.) Majuha and Stelleo- 
bosch: The ^hoiil. — {i.) Majuha and tlie Dutch Itefurtiied Church : 
The Pulpit, 

The vision of a separate Dutch-a peaking nationality, exclu- 
sively governed by Untcb hand?i, and conforniing itself to 
traUitioaal Dutch ntethoda, seems always to have been lixej 
in the minda of the Boer Vwortrekters in the Eepublica. 
Tim danger to the British Empire involved in any such 
eatablisliiug of an alien Power in South Africa, and the 
danger of leaving n nucleus of Lostility in the Eepublioa on 
the British borders, was distinctly foreseen and pointed out 
by such British Imi>erial Governors as Sir Geai^e Grey, Sir 
Philip Wodehouse, Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir Theophilua 
Shepatone. Their treatment at the hands of the Imperial 
Government has already been referred to. But, until the 
retrocession of the Transvaal, very little indeed had been 
done in furtherance of that ideal. President Burgers^ of the 
Tmnavaol, a Hollander immigrant, endeavoured in the early 
'seventies to take some steps towards the renlisattan of the 
ideaL He had great schemes for the making of Pretoria 
a centre for the creation of an all-embmcing South AJJican 
Republic in the future — schemes which extended so far as 
the formation of a railway to Delagoa Bay and the establish- 
ing of a great university in Pretoria. But liis support from 
the burghers waa rather lukewarm. Independence they 



74 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



liked very well, and iaoktian in the veldt, and do 
interfered with by the British ; but far-reacbiug schemes of 
railways ajad uulveirSLties and other euch gorgeous palace 
of fancy, which involved in the immediate present the 
payment of taxes by tax-hating burghers, seem not to have 
appealed to them. For other reasons also — chie3y his want 
of barmonj with their religious beliefs — Pi-esident Burgers 
fell into disfavour with the Boers, who even went the length 
of abandoning their President when, immediately before thej 
annexation of the Transvaal, he wa$ leading them in wa 
against Sekukuni, a Kaffir cliief. So Presi^kmt Burgers wasl 
deposed by Sir Tlieopbilus Shepstone, who found the treasury^ 
in Pretoria completely empty ; the teachers, with whose aid! 
President Burgers desired to found his university of Pretoria, 
took to other occupations; and the President's iron rails 
for his projected railway to Louren^o Marques lay rusting 
al Delagoa Bay, 

Then occurred that event which has shaped tlie whole 
movement of South African politics for the last twenty y^Lta 
— the retrocession of the Transvaal^ after the unavenged 
defeat of Majnba Hill. Perhaps, if the genius of President 
Kruger, his skill and resource, and his procuring the exploita- 
tion of the gold mines by European capitaliats and niin*ir^, 
had not been there to utilise it — tliat terrific shock to South , 
African confi^dence in the resolution, the good faith, the con* 
sistency, or even the sense of self-presen'atiun, to be expected! 
from an Imperial Government in Westminster — no such 
world-moving conBe(|,uence3 would have occurred. But Presi- 
dent Xruyer was there, and the gold lying liid in the Band 
was procured in many millions. 

Before referring to the birth of the so-called Young 
Afrikander Propagnnda, which spread over South Aliica 
immediately after the retrocession of the Transvaal, let me 
indicate the manner in which, I think, any fair*minded 
citizen of the Empire should view the formation of this idea 
of an independent AJrikander nation, and the steps taken tu 
realise it, I do not think I can express it belter than by a 
quotation from a letter addressed to me in Johannest 



THE YOUNG AFREKANDER PROPAGANDA: iSSi 7$ 

October 1896, by a leading resident in Jolianneaburg,* who^ 
like moat C(douista of Britiali descent, is a Btrong Imperialist. 
He says : — 

"To say one word tliat would interfere with the proBpecta of bannoniauH 
oo-operatiuQ between the British pnd thi* Dutch would be crimijial- The 
Omiw U> 'bring about aucb CD-operation are^ it eeems to me, to be achieved 
aaly by EngJuid nmkint^ Buch a «leniu[)Et ration of her detenMimttion to 
remain the ■uprtme uid ruling power m South Africa as wuuld itmkc any 
tiuoughtof attamptiiig to cuat her junBdietiun tiiu \tiimtABsn only o( the 
ligUt«il of feather-brftined pnUticiane, 

**ThcR% IB nui duubt that many of the Dutch population please them- 
wItm with thot^hts and ambitioDs of eiitabliBhing an independent 
Afrik&ttder njition. Tlds umbitioo is no doubt creditAhle fron^ their point 
of view, but it is absolutely inounaiatent with Britiisli iuterests, not ouly in 
Soiiih ACrica, but througbout the Contineat of Europe, aad, if I may 
Tenturg to say 90, with the due iuid orderly spread of dvillMtiou amougfit 
t!i« native tnbea." 

The policy of the Gladstone Cabinet, in its deciding to 
retrocede the Transvaal after the defeat of Majuba Hill, has 
practically dominated the whole of South African politics for 
the last twenty yeara. That policy was announoed by Mr. 
Gladstone as one of magnanimity ; and so it was imdoubtedly 
regarded by the people of the United Kingdom. So it waa 
not regarded by anyone, British or Dutch, in South Africa. 
I have already referred to the interpretation put on the retro- 
cession given to me by a Republican Chief Justice. When 
that is the view of the retrocession held by a man of the 
highest education, what must be the estimate of every Boer 
of the veldt 1 

Four great movements of a propaganda throiigh the Cape 
Colony and the Eepnblics began on the perception by the 
BoeiB, in the Colony and in the Republics, that the Imperial 
Government was prepareil to submit to defarit The plat- 
form, the presa^ the school, and the pulpit, all, by combined 
action, proceeded to impress on the public mind that, in view 
of the weakness and indecision of the Imperial Government, 
tt was not merely possible, hut certain, that a new Afrikander 

■ Mr. H. S. Cftldecott, now Chaiiman t?r (he Uitlaoder Comniittee of 
KatoL 



76 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



mUion, abaoltttely independent of the Imperial Crovnj could 
be created. fl 

Now, it does iu>t seem of Uie highest imporUnce, althoagfi 
much contzoTCr^ has tamed on this point, whether forcible 
expulsion of the Imperial power or pacific negotiation was 
looked upon ss the more feasible method. The goal, held 
steadily in view, was the establishing of an independent 
nation ruling all South Africa, from the Zambesi to the sea. 
Of cooise, the advantages of the defence of that independence 
to be obtained &oni the navy of the greatest sea-Power in 
the world were quite obvious ; therefore, it was always put 
forward, as part of the Afrikander policy, to grant the British 
Empire the possession of Sinionstown, in tiie Cape Peninsula, 
as a coaling station for warships for India and Australia. 
ludeed, a contribution to the Imperial navy was admitted by 
all jVfrikander prupo^ndisU to be only fair, in view of the 
services the Imperial navy would render in policing the coast 
and warding off foreign attack. Even in the Republics many 
wure iilways to be found to advo^te such a subvention in 
aid of the Imperial navy. ^ 

The origin of the Bond, as was called the political 
organisation formed in the British Colony of the Cape, formed 
recently the subject of an interesting correspondence, be^n- 
ning with a letter from Mr. Tbeophilus Schreiner, brother of 
the late Cape Trime Minister. This letter is of such interest 
that I reproduce it here ; — 



Mb. Rbttz's HAiimsTO. 
To tie Editor of the " Cape ?¥««.•* 

Sm, — Wy attentioTi haa only just now been drawn to the iiuuiifwta| 
of Mr. RedtR, State Secretary of the TnmHvajkl, to Uie Orange Free 
biirgbcrii, as published in the Cape Argui^ I'Jth iDst 

In tliin ttlmiueru] and shuDeleae document Sir Alfred Miluer, Mr, Chuu- 
berlun, the Britifth Cabinet, the Quoeo uf Knglajad, and the CrittBh nation 
are declared to be niurderera, robberSj breakers uf treaticB, and tb* 
rocpatifiibiility for tbi} priQscnt war between the I{e|>ublicfi and England is 
■ought to be laid on their fthouIderB in a wealtb of ficurriloua and 
mendticlouB statemeDt. 

I feel impelled to write the followbg liocs, not to dlscusa ma.tt«re 




THE VOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: 1881 77 



whicli have passed bsyond Use jah of argument, but to throw a. little 
jvcKHul hiGtoric light on the queation aa to who i? reepoQelble for the 
piBHtit war, which Eoay- Berre to show that not Eogland, nor England'v 
Quwn, nor Englftnd's Goverumont ftre the real origiafltora of the same. 

I met Mr. Rdtz, then a judge of the Orange Free State, in Bloem- 
faateizi between Bflvonte^D and dghteen years ago^, shortly aftor the 
rttraoeHioEi of the Tranevaal rmd when he wru hxiny fetablistilng the 
AMkaader Bond, It must be patent to every one that, at that time at 
«11 ffvente, England and its Government hod no intention of taking away 
ihe independence of the TraQEvaal, for she had just " magDanimouely " 
granted the Rame; no intention of making war oti the BepubUc«, for Hha 
had just made peace ; do intention to wize the Band gold-fiefdB, for they 
were not yet diBcovered, At tlmt tinie then I met Mr. Reitz, and he did 
hia best to get me to become a member of KIej Afrikander Bond, hut nfter 
sCndyiiig ita conetitutjon and programme, I refused to do »o, whereupon 
the Allowing colloquy m «uti«tabco took place, which has been indelibly 
imprinted on my mod ever aiuce. 

Betcz : ** Why do yoTi refueo ? Ik the object of getting the people to 
take an intereet in pohtical mattere not a gooti one ? " 

Htbelf : "Yee^ it ie; but I eeem to sod plninly hero, )x!(w«m tho 
liaec of this constitutioa, much more ultimately aimed at than that.'' 
Reite : " What ? " 

Mtbxlf: '* I see iiulte clearly that the uldmate object aimeci at is the 
ovBfthrow of the Britiiih power, and tJic expuliion of the DrilL&h flag from 
Houth Africa." 

Reitk (with his pleaa&nt conscious smile^ as of one whoae Bocret 
thought and purpose bod ^nxa discovered, and who wob not altogether 
dipHeneed that such won the case) : ** Well, v/hat if it is bo ? " 

MTSEif: "You don't sup|>.iso, do you, that that flag is goin^ to 
disappear from South Africa without a tremendoua stru^le and fight V *' 

Kktiz (with the tuime pleafimt, eelf-ttatttiQed, and y«t e«nu-a]Ktlugetw 
cmiEe): " Well, I (uppoee not ; but even ao» what of that ? " 

HraeLF ; "Only IhiSj that when that struggle takes placo you and I 
will be on opposite sides, and, what ie more^ the God who wae on the side 
of the Transvaal in the late war, because it had right on it& side, will be 
on thf fide of England, becaune He iim^t vie^v with abhorrence any 
plotting and scheming to overthrow her poner and poeitlon in South 
AMca, which have been ordained by Him." 
Reitz: " We'U see." 

Thus ihe foHvernation ended ; bnt during tho seventeen year? that 
have elajpeed I have watched the pro{>aganda for the overthrow of Britiiih 
power in 3outb Africa being ceaseleeBJy spread by every possiMe mcana-~- 
the prcsa, the pidpit. the platform, the Bchooln, the colleges, the legiBiatwre 
— until it had cuJminateii in the present war, of which Mr. Iteitz and his 
tio-wurkero are the ortgia uid the cauw. Believe me, sir, the day on 



7» 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



which F. W. RditE ut down to pan hk nhimakam to Grmt BriCAin 
wmi tb« poodort ukd hftppieit momcot of hk Bf^ aad oiw uhicb bad for 
I'OitS jnn b«a lookad forward to by bun witfa etger loopng amd 
expectation. 

He tixd hU CD-worken hAve Ibr y«m put ploltad, nrorkalt pr^uvd 
Tor this war, uid the onJy nuU«n in oannection -with it id which they w 
diuppointad a/a, finlly, thU thctf would rath^ the wu bad come eeveral 
yaan Utar, m that their uiti-Bntii&h propagaDda might more fuUy hive 
pBTTDeatod the country; Beooodly, that tbty would haT« liked to dedaK 
war againrt England at a tima wben obe abguld be involved in Bume gnat 
struggle with a fora^ Power imtad of ^ a time wh«D &be ia free to ^re 
all her attentkou to South Africa; aol, lastly, they are diaappcnnted at 
finding out that EngliBh soldier* can fight, 

It H txiw that an active factor in bringing abotlt this war has btjati the 
exiftenoe of the g^jld-lielila of the H&nil^ not^ however^ rb osserted, bAcSAiit 
Eb^and coTcta them and is tietennined to seize thein, but becauM the 
'tre&lth drained from them haa enabled the Rspublica to become military 
powera of a HtTcngth Tar out of proportion to their pc^iolation, and Ihtu 
haa led F. W. Rdu & Go. to t)unk that their dream of a Pan- Afrikander 
Republic and the oiuting of the Britiah flag may become a nmlily. Heoos 
their declaration of war againat England latbo' than gani just political 
Tighta to the inhahitant«t whom that oame wealth haa led to Httle down 
in the Tmnsvaat, and whose preaeaoe •md numben, however uteful to iha 
Dutch Rejiublicfr towarda the productioD of wealth to he uaed for tha 
aetttng forward of their poUiir^al aiiua, might, if they became poeeesBorB of 
the franchifte, jirove damaging lo the bucckm of the acheme of the great 
Fan-Afrikander H«pubhc. Although I have been ohliged, in thia mwnl 
of an historic reminiscencs, to mention the Afrlkandsr Bond, 1 do not 
wish to be Supposed to bn attacking ihat body as it exiBla in the Capv 
Colony at the present time» or to accuBe it of backing Mr. R^tz up in hi* 
declaration of war against the Britieh Empire. It» leadura claim that 
they Kod it are toyal to England. So be iu Hy object is to show that, 
not the British Government, but the RepubllcB, ted by KnigCTi Rcaczt 
Ste3rn, and their co-wofkere, have been tteadily maiching on bowanlft thta 
WAT* and coDsciotutly plottbg for it, evar iince the "nu^^M&unoua" 
retruceseion of the Trannvaal by £ng]uid« and eren before the Witwaten-^ 
rand Gold-fields were diucovered, 

I am, etc, 

Sivfrsdalf. (kUfbtr 31. [1899,] 

A pamphlet recently published in Cape Town, entitled 
"The Birth of the Bond," consisting in a reprint of ei 
pamphlet entitled " De Traasvaalsche Oorlog " (" The 
TraosYaal War*'), isaned, in 1881, by a X>utch paper Cftllwl 



TKE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: 1881 79 

De Patriot, contains the following statements among many 
others of a like kind. 

The Preface of the translation nina as follows ; — 

** This U a Iranatation of a. pamphlet published in Dutcb in the firnt 
ImIT of tb6 yra,r 1^2, f^bortly after the Hurreurler of tlie Tra&iiVA&l to ths 
Boen. The title of the original in * De TranHVaabclie Oorlop' (*Tho 
TnnrrBAl War''^ sni) its rflutoDt* liHve been faithfully repro(!u<?Cf1, 
excepting ihLt a jiortiun hii^ hoen (miittcxl to avoid repetition. 

**It consictfi of B Marios of leading hrticlee, originHlLy publiRhod in 
D» Patriot^ [liGU the niuBt vigorous of tlie Bund orpniip. It ib beUcvorl 
they have ntrver lefure lieen ir&tinlatod into Kbglisli, and cftHBequently 
they will pn^ve a revelation to liritieh coloniHts und to the Britiiih public 
at home nf Lbe batrorl, an bitter au it m-qh ungrateful, which at that time 
was cheTvhe«i hy Arrikan>r1ei> in thin Colony, m v>-ell ao in the Republics, 
agkCMit the Eh^llHh |ie[i])lc, niKJ ngaicirit vvufythuig English, and whic^h 
bM been vigorously fojnentetl ever t»inc« hy ihe mot-t shametcBa mia- 
itrpreKntAtioTifU 

■ Uer«, ttw, the reader timy view the Afritan^^cr Bond at its very 
be^auing, and mark the lineH uu which it wan projocted, and which hnvo 
h^en exactly fnl In-wed out in itA illHini£ne<l careor. We f>ee that it was 
flwi^ed to Iw a jireparati'tn for nn Afrikniider 'tifttion,* a c^nfodarJitinn 
totiUy indei*iidetit nf (IrRnt Miitain. With this key all the moves of (he 
lloxiil and of the Repuhlicn fall iutG their pltK'e^— the enmity prncd^Hid 
lowardfl J^nglish coionistfi, the dilit^eiit propagation of the Dutch lanf^uiige^ 
the undergToiiod war against. Iin]*ria] iafluoncft, the do[;ged refusal lo 
make conceasMmb to the Uitlandery* the iccumulatjon of wur material, the 
foalering of the manufacture vi esplnsives, the conBolidatJQn of the t-wij 
R^mbhcfw tlie nMumption of ab«oiute inde])endence, and the declaratiun 
«f war ai the eartieat moment it was thought qafe, 

** Fortunately the grand conspiracy has failed, but we eamestSy deHire 
that GUI' countritTieii Fhould realiae the danger from wlbich South Africa 
haa had a narrow eecape ; and there can he no better meajii to this end 
than the universal peni^al of the followjug pagea-'^ * 

TuK TiiANsVAAi- War, 

The xnonJ pre*siire waa too Btrong: Eu^lajnd wa* farced to give back 
the atoloi Traiuvaal. K the TransTaalere hod indeed stayed quiet, as 
luarly aU advised them to do, then England's injustice would have been 
fliccewful; ahe would have been confirmed in her rohljer}', and would aim 
' b*V0Abaofbed the Free State. Now all her tliievitig la over, and 



• The traDBlstioQ ia publiahed at the Jou-rnol OMce, GmhaiaBtown 
Cape Cokmy, and ia dated Febrtiary 1900. 



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-fi"= :■:■ i:?. beinj 

-:.■;.■ -z: :" :i* Br'nd not 

■•- -A'.: i-^r: as to the 

- ■ 11. -is^ - ■*■ :tat we see 

.- i:^ \^:zz iVrsied at the 



THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: tSSr 8i 

,Bfv AS to give piiwerful a-wiBtJince to tho Eiifjlinh merchants. If tbero 
mtist be » coiiBict between Eugliah bad Dutch here, then let the Dutch 
l»ke c«re that they are reiwiy for it" 

The Free Stnte jfiscpreH of 7th April last publUheB the draft of such a 
! Btrnd, Fimilftr to what we have Mveral timaR proptwai in The Patriot, but 
wark»j out more in detail by Bume fricD^U at BlueinfoDtein. Hero fulluws 
its constitution :- — 

The object of the Afrikftiiiler Bond in the eAtAbliKhmeiit of & S*iuth 
African nationality through the cuHivAtion of A trud love of thiis our 
tathcr\nm\. 

The Bond miwt ritow up out of the heart of the people; the rules can 
rome on after. Thin a now our time to es^tablLKli tfie Ducit), wbtle ci 
ttatitiua] cxiHciouNue^ ba-* Ixscn Awnkenetl thmu^U tho TrnutiviuL] war. 
Ami the Buml lUUHt lie uur preiiamtkni I'ur the future ttjnfiiidt!r!vii*rti of sill 
the SUitw and C"louxe» of South Africa. Th* EopIiBli Government keeiw 
tAlking of B Confetlerntion under the British f\&g. Tha.t will never imp^H'ri 
(iloor bom iiikH van nie). We can ni<Eiure them of that. We IjiUvq ofti^ti 
mtkl it; tlieie i» jui<t oue hitcdrnnre l<i Confftletfiitio'ii, and that in thr^ 
fiiigli»li fla:;. Let them Uke Ibat away, and within a year t)u! Coiifwlera- 

I UQiler the free Afrikander tia^; would tie establislied, 

But »o long RH the English tlap reinainH here, the Afrikander Boud 
niujtt be our Confederation. Ami the British will afMr a while realise 
thaX^ Froude'fl arlrica h tho IxMt for thcni:; they mut.t be L'ontont wirh 
StmonlB Bay an a nnval and nutitary utation od the road tu India ami 
pvo over ail the rtwt uf B*mth Africa to the Afrika-udere* 

If an En-^liBliiuwi i« willing tu become lui Afiikaudor and ackDuwIedge 
cur land and people and lan^iage, tbeD w« will acknowledge him a.-> uuf 
cuuptrynum and heartily fiup|wrt him, or oue uf auj' other natiunality on 
Ihe same tvrniH, 

The Asti-Bkitish Campmos— No Thadino with the Bnirifiji. 

We inu»t form trading asBotiationa with Euroi* and the United Statiw 
of Aiiwrica. Theie is now good opportunity for thin, ne there lum recently 
btieD Btarted a direct line of Bteaniers luetween Germany^ Holland, Belgium, 
aod South Africa, and it is said ibere is to he a seiifirate line to run from 
Btlpuni to the Cape. There is aI»o now iwj TTuich intereet in South Africa 
awakened in Eurojie, and nucb aympathy felt for our Hoer nationality, 
ttuU )t will be catty to establish the deeifcd trade connectiona. 
' The AmHterdam Handetsbiad (Joumai (rj Trade) remarks : — 
••The future uf Kngland lies in India, and iJie future of Holland m 
South Africa. When our capitnliiits vigorously develop this tmdo, and 
tor «xunple form a Byndicate to buy Delagim Bay from Portugal, then a 
nuiway from Ca|« Town to Bloemfontein, PotcbefHtTuom, Pretaria^ DeLagoa 
TWy will be A lucrative inveetment. And when in course of time the 
Dutch language Hlmll univcrhally prevail in tSouth Africa, thia mout 





Si 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Gitennve tenito^ will become a North Anaerica for HoUaDd uul eoiblsi 
UA to b&lAiic6 the Anglo-Saxob th/m.^* 

The B()cr Btorea which we must eetahliBh raiMt bo Dutch or Afrikjunler 
through and through, not any EBghah. No English nigii board, noi EaglUh 
advertieementfi in Eoghe^h iiDTTaj>aper«a no English bookkeepers; lus ftU 
Dutch or Afrikander. JuBi as Englieh Btorcs help to uphold K^glUh 
newEpaperfl, Eu^lieh Bchuol:ii, English iRocio] hfe in o. tuwu^ u> on tho 
coDtrary oui Boor Btoras muHt work u» prevent the Englieh elcmeat frnm 
proTailiDg^ and must uphold the Afrikiiader vpirit in the plnce, ae »g»ifift 
the Esglish spirit. 

YeUf Engkod is, as Bilderdyk, the Dutch poet, hu rightly caU«d hsff 
"a gaog of robbera," and those i«ln&ders live only by plunder; theu* abipi 
plunder on every shore; their vulturen fly over mountain and valley, and 
light upon every carcase; they gather and glean whatever they c*a; 
therefore it in tlmt they have bo mapy (xilunieB^ and thflrefore they raked 
m the TronavoaL And now we must endeavour* instead of thdr bong 
aljle to plunder more w our Land, to cut it off io that they shall haire Ich, 
and if pOBBible nothing to prey on in our land. And then we ahaU 
whether we are vutt quickly rid of these vultures. Where there it 
no carcase, there you Me do vulturea. The trade ie still trader 
the Englieh flag; thus England cannot hinder ub from starting such 
auociations in the Colony and Natal, and the Free State and Transvaal 
are of cuuree free to do so. But ttie English rob ub out only with theif 
Htures, but particularly with their banks- We give aa extract from thH:^| 
Amfiterdam Jlantithhlad of March 13th, from which anyone, and our^ 
Transvaal friends above all, may eee how an Engliah bank dared to eervQ 
ua, "■ The only bank in the Transvaal was in EngliBh haDde, It had 
advanced mooey on the Seccocoeni war. SuddetJy it demaoded payment, 
and rofused all further credit. That was the cause of the talk later oa 
(Rays Mr. Moodie) about the empty State cheetr and the few pence that 
the Queeu'p treasurer foxmd as a balance of re&dy money.** And how are 
we to inrevent such an evil ? Why, in the same manner as with the stores, 
by helping ourselves. 

Let U9 start a National Bank, witii brancbes in all towns and viJlogea 
of our land, 

PaEFAttATIONa FOB WaR. 

To Btart manafactureB of ih.t muBitiona of war is another lesson which 
wc must leom Crom the events of lost year^ particularly from the late wran 
in the Transvaal and Basutoland. And this, of course, specially copcerea ^ 
the two Republics. fl 

For tbia, two things are required; (1) to make their own ammimiUon, 
anid (2) to be well supplied with cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery 
to work with them. To begin with this last. In this we may pctiM 
President Bnmd. We believe that the Free Htate is fairly well provided 
with catmoti and with ammunitioii for nmuoa. Aad he has also had fot 



THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA t iftSi 83 



Ktof time past yotmg iDeti drilled in the fort at BloemfoDtein to work 
witb the caoDcrD. So that if the English troops were oitraiug over the 
DrikeiMberg by HarriBmith way, for examplep they would not be tbe 
Mly ODes to use field-guDB, but the Free Stateris from the Berg above 
irould bftTe kept them far enough off with th«ir cannon, and if the 
IVutBTftol bad bad just n couple of canann on L^ug^s Nek, with a Sost 
cl«rer guiiDers, there vrould ha7o been hUII leM chnnce for the Kiia;kiali 
ever to get over that way. Unfortunately, in the betrayal of the cpimtry, 
the caanon that tho Trauaraal had, &lso fell into the hands of tlie rabberti,, 
imd vera lused ng^iiiBt tht; Buers at Pretoria. BuE when once the Tranav&al 
geCB its independence back, the GoTemment of tlie Republic will hAve 
Inrned from the recent war a lesson as to what they must do for th? 
future. 

But the other jioint is of much tnote importance ; the Free Slate and 
the TrauBvaal mnst niake their own ammunition for themsekee. Xhifl ia 
tha mriLter by which the English have ilwaya harasseil them. Thiuk 
Iww Sir P. WodehouM was ready Ut Viand over the Boers bo the ill-wiU of 
the Bosutos, by stopping the aupply of ammiinitioo to the Free Slate. 
And wo niu9t ffe«ly express our H^toDtshmf^nt at Preeident Braod and the 
Volksraad that they did not Lave their eyes opened then, and be^in at 
ODoe to manufacture gunpowder. And, azain, in the Tr&DBvaal war, Iba 
oae hope of the soldiera wae that the Transvaaiers might run out of 
AznmumLiou. And Sphgg * lent himself as a tool to utop the supply of 
aiaimujiititin from the Colony to the Free State, so that the latter might 
not fluppiy the Traiwvaal, Now, however^ they have their eyea opened, 
aod let them pro&t by tbc lesaon< The Trausvaalera are beginning to 
make &U their owd ammimition. At Hoidelberg there are already 4000 
CAitridgea made daily. And a few skilful ArhkaDdcra have be^un to make 
«heUt too. That ia right; ao muat wb become a nation. When 
oppreAHd, we ^ow strong. Let na have just a little time, and we will 
detelop our nationality. 

And the Free State in also becoming vigilant. At ieiRt the ExpreB$ 
takes the matC>er up warmly. In its issue of 1-lth Aprd it say? :~- 

** Lest (uiyouB fihould Lldnk the propoeaJ we made some time R^ince to 
the lUad about establishing a gunjKiwder cianufaclory waa merely out nf 
ill-huinour caused by ihc «Uippiug of our supply from abroad, we return 
tu the subject now. Sulphur, aa is well known, is foimd in the couutry, 
and the evident proof thereof i& the ai>ecitnen exhibited in the Bloemfon- 
C«iQ Muaeum. All that is needed ia to deterniine the quantity* and 
Government would du well to iiiHtruct ita officials to make the necessary 
inquiriM, for we are assured that it is found in mora than one place in 
the Btat«,. Saltpetre ia found in many partft, and also the best charcoal 
for gunixjwder making, namely that from willow-wo«i, which i& pkntiful. 

• Sir Gonlon Sprigg, then lad now Prime Minister of Cape Colony, 

a2 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



With U) outUy^ of ny £$^000 a fictory can be started nufficient to prroniifl 
for our owti iH«d«t which is our ipeckl aim at {raeIl^ tbougli afterwudi 
it could be enlarged as tdmj be de«ir»d. We caimot endure to \» d^ 
pondaDt^ as wt an now, on ^e pleasure of LU-mannered and tU-tanpend 
raaoals wlio In a UxS^mk manner rater upon vild, extraragant eaterpriiea 
from which th«j hare to tvtrmX with shame and thea cover it with 
varioua Ipug eiatemeata agaujst tha Free State, on which thaj wiah to 
lay the blame of their own folly. Nor can wg stand idly looking on 
wbilfi amm and aminuEuticii ace sold wboluale to tbe naUve* anmnd oa, 
whik in the future decisiTe momeDt for Sonth Africa we shall find 
ouhkItbs unarmed. Apd agwn, who knows who may be Prime MiniBter 
In Englaod then, and what ttori of poticy will rule the Colony? We 
Mf'ihh for jieace, and are Tewlved to have xi. We lu.ve no glory to win by 
war. But we may lose that which U precious, namely, BufGdeat pr9par«- 
tktn of nuch meanK of defence ut to make uit independent of the favour, 
friendnhip, or hcmtility of the eueniy. I'huH we hope that one of the 
fruitii of th« Tranflvaal War will bo that the Bepublica Rhall make tlieir 
own wnrnuDltioT), that they uu longer suffer England to make a profit by 
theiii^ acd that they will morei^Ter erery year set apart £1,000, or rather 
allow tjj their OoTemmeni the amount of chargea for powder mado on 
tbelf acouunu*^ 

Ko Lamp to be Soid to thb British. 

And wbilD we are more specially dealing with the Elepublics we wtlll 
accordingly give the Boera there one more piece of advice : they must 

(tell li<j liuid to EngliBhmen, 

We specially say thin, to our TranBVaal brethren. In Miy national 
conflict it ia to the advantage of us Afrikandeni that we are the land- 
ownera. The great majority of the English ore only birds of passage 
(tretcvogele} that go away as soon as they have eaten carrion enough, or 
there in ho more carrion to he gut. Our Boers are really th^ nohility of 
Bouth Africa^ In England they have a very pervertetl idea of our Boent. 
Tlity think they are like the English fanuerB. Amuog the Eogliah tho 
poblex are the tauduwners and the "boera" are merely tenants — the 
RlaviiH^ tu fact, of t)ie uoUlity. Here it ie just the revenue. Thf» Booth 
are l]w laridDwoeni aud the proud little Engiishmen are dependent on the 
BiiorH. Tliey themwlven are now bcgijining to eee it, and therefore will 
they try to get our ground into (liBir tio»8e«sion. Watch against that. 
Free Btaiera, Tranavaalcni ; sell no laud to the Jingoes, even though they 
offer to jmy high prices. Think, if once they get a firm footing (or 
landed property) then you will never get rid of them again. If you have 
ground to part with that you do not need for your own children sell it to 
an Afrikiiuder frc>m the Colouy. Bere there are too many of ub, and 
Uierc are plenty who will go north if they can get land. Once more, thla 
ia a point uf great Uii|K>rtiuice — Wo staad upon our own ground. 



THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: i«8i 85 



Was agaihst thb Ensltbh Language. 

The £ngH«h and the Anglifiod scboolmAsters and, stUl more, ficbool- 
tBiBtTeBsee' tei^ch our duldren from earlj youth — 

(ft) Tbnt the EngUah laogunge \b ^e finest ^d brnt ; wheredi it is 
tadf a mtecellaneouB gibberish, without proper grammar or dicnoniry. 

(b) That Bnglisfa hlBtoiy is the iddhI interesting aod gloriouit ; 
wlwhtiw it ia DotltLiog more thaa a concateuAtloa of lies and mis- 
iBpressiitEtuttis. 

(c) That ihey rount give the chief place to Englieh geogrnplij ; 
vberou all Ea^lacd is uothing mora thttn on uland ia the North Hc:a. 

(d) Th»t they are educated as soon m ihey can giithly Englieh ; 
wbereu tbey aimply make theimselTM ridiciUous by it, in tho eycd of 
«rexy judicioaa person. 

(e) Thftt Eugliah books atid pcriodicaUare the Rntiat nod beitt to rcful ; 
Uu'ugh really they are tbe greatefltmAgsuf Dooaenao (with somu excopluniH) 
that joa cao Bod aDywhero ; iind finally^ in one wE>;d ; 

(0 That it ia aa hooour for everyoue to ape tho Englifib Id ovory- 
thingi sadf in fact, to became Eaiglish ; whercaB it is the c^oatest Hbaine 
afid dligr&fie for any people to belie their own Go^l-gi^cc iintiuiiiilily. 

Amotig following beatlinga in tbia rtiiuarkablt: reprint 
are: — 

Dutch speaking m Parlinmeot. 
Duich iu the Cqurta, 
Dutch in public officBti. 
Uutch in tho churches. 
Dutch Id the arhoolfi. 
Disigrace to apeJik English, 
The English govcnjcHa s pcM.* 

The Cape Times of lOtli May of tins year contftins the 
following comment on tho pamphlet just mcntionocl : — 

The |«mph!et rallijd the " Birth of tho Bond " lijui drawti from the 
Chmrtnati of tlie South African CoaciUation Cetomittee (in Kntjknd) a 
defence of liiat orgiUiiBfttioD ia the columsa of the TimeSj whoac special 
ODmapondeDt in Capo Town hail npiM^aled to its evidence of the Afrikiuider 
coti»pirai::y to drive the Eajglish out of South Africa. Mr, Mackarness 
niDBt have some personal acqimmtancB with the cperationa of the Bond|{ 
for if we are nnt mLBtoken be was in Cape Town duriog the period of 



• Id 1882» an Act of the Cape Parliament provided that Dutch in tho 
filtUfe waa to be treated aa an official la&guage, and on an »qual foDtlnj^ 
with Eiwlifih in FarliATDent atid in Courts of Law. Prior to that ennct- 
meat, a British Order in Council of XQ'iS waa in force oiajting English tho 
■ale official lao^^age* 



86 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



8ir Hcn;u1es RobinHOD's * experience of Band muihii]&ljuti& ooDMRilag 
Bechuatuland. lie may possibly even remember that f&mom deapstch 
lb which the Governor kmented the faalure of Responsible GoremciiBiLti 
in a politic*! cosditioo uf Minialerial subjection to an irrespousibte power 
having no cmurtitutional etatua. We are not quoting Ebe actual wonle. 
Hir Herculei Robii9son''8 dtCiiiitlan o( tbe lituatioD wm neater than ob^ «□ 
eau givG wltbDut ruferenoQ to the text. Tt was during the vame period 
that Mr. Mernninn'st denuiiciation of the Bond, receDtlj nri?ed aa a 
" PfogniKHive " docuDieni, tickled the eara of the grmmdlings m an 
Kaatera Ciiy. Mr. Miickamt*?, however, the mellowing iofluence cf 
limo haviKg duubtloss affected his Colcmiftl memdriea, nowwritea: "Since 
the Bond Wcame a geouiue polilJciLlI power in the hands of responnbW 
knderB it bna noitbfr in its constitution, ita conduct, nor in the flpeedtea 
of it3 cliampiucifl» fumifihed OTidence for the ckiur);:?^ of disloyalitf so 
freely launclied Bigaiiuit if* The ghampioim of tiie Bond included the 
late Ur. Borckctibagftn J and the present Mr. l{ttlt«,| The former 
gentleman wu nut a Uritidh 8ubjn:t ; and, therefore, not nmenablo to any 
charge of diatoyalty for bis conait^tent hr«iiUty to the British influenee 
in Boutb Africa. Mr. Ficitz has given ample proof of the aort of loyalty 
ho waa likely to fuster in the organiaation at which thn avowed aim wai 
" the fonnation of a South AfricaD nationality," When inriled to become 
Prcaident of the Orange Free State in 1888, Mr. Reitz declared that it waa 
hifl fervent i^esire to aee the day vhtm. the United States of South Africa 
ahuuld have btcome an accomplisbed Cict. It woe a perfectly Ji^tltDftCe 
BfipiratLon for tice in his position; but H waj an aspiration excluding the 
British power from, any part or lot in it* accomplish niont. With Sir. P* 
Molteno | Mr. Reitz preferred Great Britain as a coast protector to any 
other European Fowor. At leaftt, in 1&88, he avowed that prcfereucthA 
This^ indeed, in hardly the position which loyal British subjects ean to^ 
contemplate as the future destiny of their ouuntry. The Bond^ however, 
must Iw judged by Mr. Reitz*a utteranceii. The langnage of Bondmen in 
the Colony wu more cautiutie. That was all. In aim aud aBpintion 
there was no difference. 

It is not enough to establish the Bond's tncoc^nco of disloyally. 
Mr. Mackamess goes on to H^nert a direct and c-onlinuoua prxnf of it«; 
active loynlty. " The Bond," he writo% *' baa actively utipportcd aJmoal 
every Britiah MinlHtry of recent ycarv, Ibua associating iteelf closslj 
vigorously with a distinctly Britit^h {Xilicy.'^ As accurately, might it 



• High Commissi Qjier, afterwards Created Lord Rosmead. 
t A Meml^r of the Bond Ministry St tbe Cape, 
j Tbii Editor of the Bloemfontein ETpre*t. 
§ Formerly President of the Orangt^ Free State, now Tranavaal Statl 
Secretary. 

H Autho! of a book entitled A FedenU South 4ff*^- 







THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: lS8l »? 

Aid, tliat an aboriginal cannibal aBecciateH htmBoU donely uid -ngorously 
mth the kboun of evuigellBation when ho h&s cAteD biH misaioniirir. 
Such credulity mlgLt be venial la a Courtney or a Uassingham, knowing 
nothing of South African political Affairs by persnnai obtiervatioD. 
Mr. Mftckftnuas, however, hud hi» opportunity of acquainting bimaetf 
ith the waye of politiciaDs while tlio Bond method wa« betnp dcTHon- 
Atcd with really TUibhi^hing candour. From the beginDing it was the 
rule of kbs Bond to refmin from ininiBtflrial affica The rale wnfi,to eomo 
extent, forced upon the members by tboir tranBparcnt incApactty to 
transact ^departmental buaineae; it was also a convenient nilc, inasmuch 
ft» it enabled the manBgwa of th« porty to engago tho Borvicffii of 
pr&ctjaed debators, to whom office waa preciouH, both for the personal 
importance it conferred, and for other cooBide rations that need not be 
■[iQcified. Mr. M^ickamePfl mebtiona a scries of Ministers who etijoyod 
ibe Bond support in its clrwe and Tigoroua afwociation with a liistinetly 
Britinh policy. That is hardly Ibo languat;* Sir Hercqlea Bobinson 
-woufd have uwd vt the time of Mr Mncknrness'K South African (tojoum. 
It certainly waa not the language Mr. Merriman used at the aanio time; 
nor wan it the language with which Mr. J. W. Leonard * electriBcd thn 
meeting of Cape^ Town citizens assembled to Support the distinctly 
Britiiih policy in deBance of the Bond and ttA auxiliaries. The cnno of 
South African politics, indeed, was the diabt^lical ingenuity of the Bond 
in getting its pur]x>s«« effected by the inatrunientaUty of politicians who 
had DO uatund Hyiniiatby with it. The adv&ntve was made cantiouBly, 
«tep by step, but with aeeured progress towards the determined goal. 
Firat the native Tote had to be dealt with. One eet of Miniitera began 
tiiis work; another set of UmiEtera completotl it. Thus fieat after 
teat was loet to the Party now catling it«eir Frogreeaive, and the 
balance of power in the House of ABBeiuhly tranaferred to the Party 
aiming at Afrikander, which, in truth, is nothing else but Republican^ 
domination. "Ae a matter of fact," Mr. Mackamess eaye^ "neither 
Mr. Rbo<l€s nor any other Beneible persoD had any doubt aa to the Bond's 
loyalty." What Mr. Rh«jde3 thought about the idtimate aim of the Bond, 
while be wa« relying on the Bond vote, we do not know; ho ie not ono 
who alwayft let* out the full contents of his mind. It sufficed for him 
that the Bond vote was neceasary to keep him in power; nor did he 
grudge the immediate prlco< Whether he waa aatisBcd within himself 
that the union of South Africa witliin the Empire, and in harmony with 
Britiah ii^eals, wtts the dfteiro and aim of the Bond, is atiather matter. 
We doubtj however, whether any " fleneible person," who had even 
a superfici^ knowledge of South African politica, gave the Bund credit 
fpi- nich an aspiration. 

The diitintit instanceB of Bond loyalty quotal by Mr. Mackamesa 



Late Attonacy-Oeneral of Cape Colony. 



88 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

ue pbuBible but but amTisciiig. "In 1894," be uyi, *^tbe Bcai< 
Biembera voted a. lar^ Addition to the salary of the High ConuiuBuoner, 
will JQ 18^5 Bupporteti tbo Imperial (iqv«mmeiit in forcjug Prefcident 
Kruger lo reopeo the Va*I DriftB.* In 18H6 certadn Bond memberB 
supported Mr. MerriniAn in petiticmi&g fur tbe eBtabHsbmeint of the British 
Governnwnt in Rhodenia. The eathuHtainic devotion of the Dutcb 
towtirdfi Ucr MAJesty In 1B^)7 haft been plAced on record in eloquent 
terma by Sir Alfred Milner. La 1898 the Bond Members usanlTnouiOy 
viited £30,000 a year to tli« Imperial Kavy &Dd gave the Brttlt^li 
Adioiralty a free hand iii HiTiion'H Bay," The Tote tc the Navy wu 
creditable to the Bond ( it would have been wva more eo if tJie Mciubcn 
of tha Putj bod given a courteous lieanu^ to th« arguments by which it 
was raconuuended. In the coatter of the Vaal DrifCd the Bofid offered no 
opinion. Wb*t was done wan done io Cahlnet Council ; and we belierfi 
that the leaka)^ whereby the deciBitm tif the Cabinet came to be generally 
known ti«ricu&ly di(<turbed the equaniDiity of Min»t«rB. They did good 
hy ptDalth, and blualied to find it fame. The deinoiiHt»ti<>n of loyalty in 
lH97 goes far to prove that the Bond policy, written large in Mi. R«iii:^s 
doclaratiuOf iA not the policy of all the Dutch-speaking people of South 
Africn; and ufKin thiK fouuidntion lh the hope built of a. happier condition 
after the |irej«eat troublei* have paeeed away. Mr. Mackaruesa, however, 
huldfi his brief for the tlefeEce of the Bond, not of the Dutch-speaking 
liopulatioD of Ca]« Colony, andf «o far as the Bond is concerned, he hw 
abaolutely do caae. 

The London Dai!}/ News of the 20th April of the present | 
year containa the following article on the origin of the J 
Bond :— 

Mr. Cronwrigbt-Schreiner ia not exactly the tnau lo whom one ^ 
look at present for a criticiain of the Bond^ and for evidence in aupfuri i 
the dw* thot the British imlicy of ei^ual rights and progresRive legielatiuu 
was in danger in Sf^^mUi Africa. Neither wtmld anybody think frum 
Mr. Schreiner'a and other Kpe&chefl on the name side that BntJH^h tiucccsti 
nicana greater prol«tion for the uativeg- The fact is, however, that no 
stronger aSBcrtion of the nuschief thai waa going on in South Africa, a4 j 
tho roflult of the Bond's princitilea and organisalion, couM be desired than i 
that which ia to be found in n paper of Mr. Cronwright-Schreincr's on ' 
" Political Ethics and Political Organisation/' read to the Cradock 
Farinefa* Association un Octobor Ttli, 1893, and reprinted in a paraplilet 
whivb we now have In our band?. It will be noted that the date is long 



I 



* The late Cape Premier^ Mr. Scbrfuner^ agreed to the Cape Ministry's 
nctive aajiiKtauce in uning armed fwce to compel the Transvaal to open 
the Drifta, 



THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: i88t 89 



interior to the JameBon Raid ; it is even before the commaadeerinsr dispute 
Uid Sir Henry L(K'1i^s significant questiDiin to the Transvaal Uitt^dBrB 
oUBcemiag their armament ; it itt a date wlien Mr. Hhod^ was in favoiu* 
with the Dutch. Wha,t at that date waa the E>olicy of the Bond in regard 
|p Iho Bricisb power in Africa? What were the character and political 
oima of the Bond ? What were itis ideas with re^rd to the treatinont of 
the natiTeg? Mr. CVonwriglit-Schreiiier (Mr. C. S. Crotiwright as he was) 
ah&ll HAf . 

" What is the Afrikander Bond? " eaid Mr. Cronwri^ht, in his oddreas 
to til© Cmdock FnrniorB* Aasociation. 

" It is," said he, in answer to his own quoatioti — "it ib anti-English in 
it« aini£; its aQicetn Aiid ha laiiji^g^ Am Dutch; and it in Btriving to 
gain ftuch power as alwohitely to cootryl the Cope Parliatnetit." 
*• Wliat surt of nitn were they ?" 

**'nie vast majority of Bondmen," we read, "are Dearly ilHt-erate, 
ignorant^ and govemtxl almont entirely by eniotioD instead uf by reaeon ; 
the wisdom of the Bond represents to a very great extent the iyourmice of 
the fanning population of the Culony. Reason and argument are of no 
araif with such men ; they are had, nim-prusr««ive farmerSf and their 
actionf!^ prompted hy ignoriince, are governed by unthinking prejudice " 

The Bund, jmid Mr. Cmuwright, wan coni[HJBed ehietly of a type of 
farmer whiuh he liad described in an early part of his jiajjer. Liookinp 
for this description, wn find it Ik gart of a <£enoral deacdption of the Rodal 
conditioii5 of the Colony, moat of wiiich we tmnecribe: — 

"The social conditioas of this Odony present q mo«t interesting 
problem ; Indeed they are alntoHt unique. There are three luaiti ekwents 
of the population in JLi^tapoaition auch nti are not found similarly placed 
la vaj part of the wurhL There in first a claew fairly repre*entatiro of 
preecnt-Hilay, uinuteenth -century nioraU religioun, aocial, and mental 
JKnlopment. Tliiti claas iu cDmpofled ^nirtly of people burn in other 
conntrieA, prinici^iHUy in Great Britain and Gennany, and of their 
«docated Colonial-l>orn descend an t-)^, and of the educated AfrikandoTH, 
descrcndantu of the old Hulliinden* aud Uuguetiut*, The great bulk of 
this cla£N is, of courue, of Eiiglifih dos^eent, and all speak and write 
English. Next is a cbiaa, a [^lecutiar people^ Mu^h m I believe are found 
nowhere aUe in the world. It h comjjosod almost entirely of Afrikandera 
engagod in fanuin;^, speaking; n ptttois of very Umitisd vocabuJary, called 
by cltein ' the Taal,' the great majority being unable to speak English. 
Th«3r are dewjendmUi of the old Dut-ch pionperw, and through haTing 
been for a lon^ time almost entirely cut off front communication with 
civiliBntjnn, us many of them are yet, they have not advanced ; their ieola- 
tioo and ilUteracy have pi-eveuted any intellectual progress; rather they 
hare deteriorated. Th« narrow CalvLuiunn of their ancestors has developed 
inio a gposH fataliam. lliey are alnio&t illiterale, very ignorant, and Buper- 
gtitioiis -y they are out of touch with the world, and out of sympathy with, 



90 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

and behind the spirit of the times; their notioiui are crude and primitiTe 
in the extreme, and their conduct is gorernad hy a Htasdard of njotnUty 
which hod little in eommoD with that which regaUtce the renuLlnder of the 
trhita population. Their reading \s practically i^nfitied to the Bihie, and 
they are the TictimR of an effete theology. A raoet capable writer in 
* The Cape niuslrated Maga^^in'O* for August remarks: * No ODe with 
eyes to aeci aod ears to bear, can avoid remarlciiic that we have in our 
midst A numerous section of the jsopulaticiD, niontly rural, coaient U 
stand npon the old motto, Quieta non movrre. This ia the MCtion that 
beliere that what 8uf!iced for their anceetore Trill &ufSce for them, and 
which honestly imaginfls that a patoit, like the Toal, is eveotually to 
preraU againet the onruiih of the Anglo-Saxon ton^e, the language c( 
the modem world. This is a class whoee antiquated piety would arrfict 
the locomotive lQ mid-Karoo at 12 o'clock on a Saturday night and allow 
Ihe kK^iiBtfl to feed uodieturbecl on their growiug crojie, becauM ooce \n 
the dawn of history the cbadowy form of a Hebrew faw-gtTor brought 
the puniahment of vf/^gajtgen to bew on the equally shadowy form of 
an Egyptian king.' " 

Here comes in a sentence or two of Mr. Cronwrighi 

regarding the attittide of the population towards the native 
which we reserve tili we come to that subject. Then Mr^ 
Gronwright-Schreiiier proceeds : — 

It is from the ranks of these people thnt the ** Poor Whites," the i 
depraved aection of the jxjpulation, are being daily augmeuled. The 
Bn Iszyi Blovcniy farmorH, with a rooted antipathy to honest, continuous 
hard work, aod they objttjt to be interfered with by law, wishiiiig to be 
abfiolute on their famie. Tbey resent any law which tends to protect 
their more progressivB neighbour* from their own dangerous mothode of 
farmiag, and they would selfishly and fooHshly oubserviato the int«reits 
of the whole Colony to their own benighted winhes. Tims we have no 
Compulsf'ry Scab Act, no Compulsory Destruction of Locusts Act» no 
compulsory eradicstioB of prickly pear^ or Xanthiuin. Spinosum, no Oom> 
puhtory Branda Rc^stration Act. 

"These men,''' said Mr. Cronwright, summing up, "constitute the 
strength uf the Bond; this is the section of the Dutch to whom our 
pitiable invertebrate {Kjiitklaua are bowing the knee and selling the 
country jbr a tnesa of |>ottage, to the utter d^radation of jxilitical tnoraltty 
and to the great detriment of the beat iaterests of the Colony.'' The tliird 
section referral to by Mr. Cronwright-Schreiuer were the notivea, about 
whose treatment flomething will presently he quoted. 

Mr. Cronwright found that the Bond's influonoe on the politics of C&pe 
Colony was " diMridedty pernicious," tlmt it dominated the Parliament, ww 
** absolutely powerful" in up-country districts, and that the fev of 



THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: %Ut 91 
offendiDg it bid (even then in 1&93) "too long larftlyeed our political 

It U said to^aj that the war haa rawed the race fooling. But in 1893 
Mr, CronnTight said, in criticism of Mr. Hafmpyer'a reputation as a great 
BUtleRTnoa : 

** We have had our Legislature dominfttcd by a race clique, that clique 
hdng compowd of men whu, beyond all others, know laiat of politics and 
are leait ahle to jud^ of what the real n^n of this coimtry are. And 
the leader of thiB |»irty» he who^ by liia clever inaaagement, perhtipe 
heeause he ia thi; only able man ninong them, haa given them thlB baneful 
power^ he ie called great 1 " 

In further cnticiem of the Bond, Mr. Cronwrigbt-Schreiner objected to 
the rule of "that nectbn of our people least cai^uble of legislating on 
Bound and progreMive principles." Again, we read : " Where the Bond 
mlea there ia no ])olitical freedom, for Ita memheni conBidor a dificroiit 
opinion from their own as a gmea innult^ and resent it accordingJy." 
Agun : "It" (the Bond) "simply exerciBes tern>riain where it is powerful 
enough to do so," On the race issue, which Hir Alfretl Mihier ia occiosiod 
of nuBing in 1890, see again what Mn Cronwright said six years before : — 

" It i* the Bond which, while voting by bfillot in its own deli lie rations, 
has prevented our voting by ballot for FarliatneDtarj repredonLntion, and 
yet prsTentA that system being adopted at the coming General Election. 
With all its power what Kave we got to thank it for? Comparatively 
notlting. Weighed in (he balance, it is fciuiid wnnting. It has directed 
all ita energiefl to riesiating the meftstires the ccnintry needs, to introducing 
tlie "Tftftl " into Parlifimentftnd the LawCourte, and to raising the franchiBO 
80 as lo give the Dutch Boer element more voting povver. In fact, the 
Bond has sncrificeii the toelfsre of the cxjuntry for years to the selfish 
attainment of one object, namely, the supremacy of the Dutch -speaking 
bbabqtaats of the Colony, regardieww of the right* of others ; the imagined 
good of no ignorant clique of the Dutch haa lieen preferred to the good of 
th* country. These men must not hnvo power; they arc anwholly unfit 
ta hare it Because it is euch a hotly, niiil strlvicig Aolcly for its own 
benighted ends, and is fpunded and conductei on race Hues, and because 
it cannot grapple with our proiileras, and not only does not and cannot 
introduce wise and progrcsfiive Icj^inlation, but also blucks the way 
whereby we might a^WaDco, I say it should not bavc the ptiwer it has, 
and that we should opptwe it instead of temporiBing with it." 

So much for the character of the Bond, itt) political capacity and ita 
potiUcd ainuj long before the Raid. Kow, as to its treatment of the 
batires. The triumph of the Bond is, of oouree, the aJtematiTo to the 
British establisbmeut of the policy of equal right*, and recently there hoa 
been an attempt to prejudice the Britiph «ue by rtfpresentations (to which 
the aignatures of many labour leaders haTc beon obtained) tbat the war 
it A deep dcAtgu of the capitalist daefl to ohtun cheap native labour 



93 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

for the Qunes, Od this queetioa Mr. Cronwright gave Lbis ojnnioD in 
1693:— 

" I fttiii pure the Bond policy ftrguld appil our labonr eupply." 

He also said : — 

'* The Bond is utterly unfit to denl with the utiTe proMera, It it 
beiught«d and dominAtcd hy violent and unthinking prejudice, Buch a 
body cannot be trusted Ut guid« the dcetiniee of our wi^Jter feilow-mortAlt. 
Its native policy ie fraught with the gravefit dunger to ihe Colony. Ai I 
have Mid, the Da.Uve quedtioD U our nni^ l»g problem ; it will never bo. 
settled on Bond IIuim. In the native we have an uimoat unique supply of 
laboiir, a perennial fount of wealth to the Colony. Treat him joftly, 
wisely and htunanoly, and we shall always, have a supply of good juid 
cheap labour; pufflue the Bond policy, nnd the country will be floodnl 
with a set of roving thievee, whu will Iwcutno utterly demoniliMd by 
oddin;^ to their own vjcea thosf! of the lower whites, and be a curae to the 
wontry; uud eiidleas trouble will be sToruJ up for the future.'* 

Here we recur to the omitted passage ftxim Mr, 
Cronwright*a description of the farmers dominating the 
Bond. It is said ; — 

They still retaiin tho iujjumtm and pritrdtive ideas with regard to thai 

native — bred of ignoraUi:e, and the days whmi " Zwftrt Hchopsol" wa4 
their slave. They are utterly unable to dincui^ft the nativo que»tioi] on ita 
merita ; they do uot consider that we liave any moral duty towanU the 
black from whom we took thu land, and who now contributce largely to 
tl]G revenue, imd iighlit for tho British Empire a» loyaUy u they them- 
Hulvew ilo. 

Towards the end of hie pajcr Mr. Crunwright, recurnng to this tojqc, 
said the class uf IJiitch which conHtitiitod the majority of the Bond had 
an utterly degraded view of the native^ ]ookin|>; upt^in him more na a 
higher ty\xi of animal ihau ab a human being, and their behaviour 
towards him waa regulated accordingly. If they had their way, they 
would never have " fair play," These are the viowa of Mr. Cmmwright- 
Schreiner before the Baid, and before hie marriage. 

It is set against tlm explanation of the establishing of 
the Bond that the leadei-s of the party under whose auspices 
the present Cape Ministry have been put in power htive 
persiatetitly, and till to-day, denied that there ever was any 
such design to oust the British inHueuce. British colonists, 
however, meet one'a inquiry ba to the degree of acceptance 
which thege professions deserve by reminding one that, in a 



THE YOUNG AFRIKAMDER PROPAGANDA: 1881 93 

oovnttyot diplomatifita, the ways of diplomacy are considered 
permisaibk in the furtherance of a raovement regarded as 
patriotic ; and by telling one that, precisely as every Boer 
in the field is a general, fully cognisant of the plan of 
campaign, so is every Boer in political life an ambasaador, 
considering himaelf entitled to exercise quite aa much 
reticence aa any Miniater Plenipotentiary from St. Peters- 
bnig, or Washir^on, or Berlin, or Puria, or Roma — or even 
from the Court of St. Jamea. 



The connection between the hopes revivified by Majubn 
Hill and the immediately started Dutch pre3.^ propaganda 
has been sufficiently indicated by the extract already given 
from the pamphlet on *'The Birth of the Bond," wliichj it la 
to be noted, ia a reprint from Dc Patriot, the leading Dutch 
newspaper of Cape Colony in 1882. 

The nature of that propagan<3a has been clearly describetl 
in the despatches of the present High Commiasioner. Tliere 
is uothutg in which the pages of De Putrioi surpasaed those 
of De Express, the Afrikander organ in Bloemfontein in 
the Orange Free State, The mot d'ordrc. for the whole press 
in the Cape— where Onu Laiul is now the principal Bond 
paper printed in Dutch, and the South African News the 
principal Bond paper appearing in English — ia clearly to 
eliminate British influence in every respect all over South 
Africa. The veiy title of the jom-oal published in a British 
colony, an integral portion of the Empire — Qns Laiid — 
aflserting that the land h ours in the Dutch tongue, sliows 
plainly the keynote. The British bom or descended citizen 
of the Empire ia merely, in the view of the press propa- 
gandist, a commorant foreigner, who may remain, and even 
may be naturalised, if he behaves hiit. ^If, 

D$ Srpfess of BloemfonteLn was conducted by a man of 
great ability and of striking peraonality, the late Mr. Carl 
Borckenhagen, Grerman by birth, he had adopted his new 
Afrikander nationality with thoroughness, and showed 
clearly that the dream of h\s life was the eatabliahing of a 
new non'British nationality. Whether it was that he loved 



w 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the Afrikander more or the Briton less is not quite so clear. 
Many of our German coueins seem to dislike us. But 
of the wonderful ability with which he conducted his 
journal, there can be no doubt at all, and none, too, of his 
astonishing cotninand of the English idiom in ite most telling 
vigour. 

In Pretoria the Vdkssfem, the " People's Voice/' was 
conducted on practically the some lines as the Bloemfontein 
Express. In Johannesburg the Band Post, published in 
Dutch, and the Standard aiid Diyycrs' News, published in 
English, practically adopted — with some waverings on the i 
part of the latter journal^the aame programme. 

It wotild he impossible, within any rua^auable compass, 
to give citracta illustrating the carrying out by thesa 
jom-uala of the original policy — " Eliminate all that ia 
British." It must suHice to say that the very latest, sa 
well bd the earliest of their isauea, will convince the most 
incredulous. 

As far as Lho journalists of the Eepublica are concerned, it 
is to be remembered that they were foreigners, and not 
citizens of the Empire ; and, however we may regret their 
narrower conception of patriotism, we cannot say that they 
acted outside their rights, incumbent though it may be on 
evoi-y citizen of the Empire to aid in dispelling for ever^ 
their pturticidarisl dreams. I 

Similarly, as rtgards the anti-British propaganda carried 
on by Ministers of the Dutch Keformed Church, it does not ^ 
seom expedient to argue over much on what ia palpable to A 
all in South Africa, and what is indeed plainly avowed, if 
not boasted of, Churchmen of other Churches may safely be 
left to frame indictments against these preachers of tha 
Prince of Peace.* Eeading theae indictments of the Dutch 
Eeformed Church by Anglican and Boman Calbolic, Scottish 
l^esbyterian and Wesleyan in South Africa, one historical 
parallel forced itself on my memory. The heaviest article in 
the indictment of the Venerable Bede, the Saxon monk and 



* Bw Appcudii. 



THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA: 1881 95 



chronicler, against tlig British native Christian Church — the 
inheritors of the instftutions of Constantine, finally driven to 
Wales — was tliat they pushed their hatred of the Saxon 
invader so far as to refuse to evacgelisB hlui, desiring bis 
pnniflhment in the next world to avenge h^ crimes of the 
present The Grond Wet of the Boer liepublic of the Vaal 
River declares that no equality of black and white, in 
Church or State, will be endured by the people. The 
misaionajy enterprise of the Dutch Eeformed Church among 
the Kaffirs is largely conspicuous by ita absence, 

Aa to their war spirit, yet another historical parallel. 
The Dutch Reformed Church is, like its people, of the IGth 
oentury— a church militant indeed. The utterances of 
many pnjdikants recall the King'a unanswerable query to 
the Pope's renionstance against the capture of a mail-clad 
, bishop : " Is this your son's coat ? " 

■ Let me pass to aspects of the propaganda on which I 

■ may speak more freely. On a May day of 1891 I wag in 
the garden of the Middle Temple when I first heard of— huC 
did not realise its terrible meaninjj — the Young Afrikander 

P ideal. A friend of mine was with me, and we were speaking 
on one aspect of the Law of Nations, on whicli I have 
always been interesttiJ — the race limits of International 
Law — the extent to which our rules of international conduct 
are applicable to savages and savage warfare, or to the 
peoples of Eastern civilisations — Indian or Chinese or 
Japanese. I hold that tiiey are quite inapplicable, being 
the refles of the eonsciousneas of the white race of Europe^ 
I referred to the manner in which the great groups of peoples 
were becoming greater — the eodsoUdation of France, from 
the warring provinces of Brittany and Burgundy and 
Gascony and the Isle de France ; of the almoflt completed 
consolidation of the German-speaking peoples ; of the vast 
sweep of the Eusaian autocracy ; of the wondrous stretch of 
the United States of America; and last, and not least, of 
our world-wide Empire, and of how closely we are approxi- 
toating to the political fusion of the dominant race of 
Europe, almost realised in the Homau Empire ; and how 
with each step towards that fusion tho inapplicability of 



90 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

oar laws of couduct, actional and iiitematioucil, outside oar 
own race, tends to become plainer, until at last it would 
become so plain that tio one would conceive these laws as 
even remotely to relate to European dealings with Kaffir or 
noQ-European, The pressure of the non-European must 
inevitably tend in the direction of cousolidation, and there- 
fore of the elimination of pnrticnlarist national or rather 
tribol ideaa, among tlio European race the world over. My 
friend, who is of un old Hugueuot name, and a Inwyer of th*i 
Temple, said: "You are apoaking of the Millenninm ; in 
South Africa we aliall drive tlie Briti.sh into thu mm." 

A% amon<4 other reasons, I had immediately before 1>eeTi 
instructed in the library by a mild Aryan brother of Benj^al 
how the liritish I'ulere of India wei-e to he inducc-d tti 
surrender their jKiwere of Government to the uducaU'd 
graduate of Calcutta Univcroity — their command of Sikb and 
Gurkha and Rajput to the men from th« platu — ^by tlif 
simple device of holding up a grey-coated bogey of a Iiussinn 
soldier on the borders of Haluohiatan, I confess T did uot 
dream that tragedy wag jogtUng comedy 8fv near* Tlu^ 
abftdow ou the old sundial, the slope of t\m lawn, and the 
trees under which I was sitting, seemed more dea«n-ing of 
attention. 

In the fierce glare of a Bloemfontein day of March 1897 
I met my friend ngaiu, holding high office in the Orango' 
Free State. Wu talked of many things, but one nf his fii-st 
questions was, " Do you still tlnnk of the Millennium, as in 
the gardens of the Temple ? We shall drive the British into 
tlie sea." I said, " They shall be as dead and gone as tlie 
red and white roses plucked In the Temple Gardens the 
hundred years ago, and as forgotten as the wars of York 
and Lancaster" "No, not quite al^ foi-gotten. They can 
keep Siraonstowu and the Bay." Tliis was the Confederation 
Week of March 1897, whicsh linked the Orange Free State fl 
to the fortunes of the Vaal Jiiver Eepublic. I had returned 
from attending the " Kwa^e Viouw " banquet, and a perfectly 
harmless phrase of the President Kruger waa being wildly 
telegraphed over the world. 

Tlie latest, although^ I hopo» not the last, time 1 met my. 






I 

I 



I 



I 



THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER PROPAGANDA; i8Si 97 

friend was in a Jobaniiefiburg club m September 1899, in 
the dark and gloomy days durLag the exodus of the Uitlanders. 
He saidt " Good-bye : we should have preferred this war 
twenty yeare later ; we may fail, but we shall do our best. 
You did not believe my prophecies years ago ; you believe 
them now." I said, " Of war, I did not believe them ; but 
of auccesa, you will be led to believe mine," 

Now my friend of theae three interviews, and of many 
others, was not one of the Afrikanders in power ; ho is one of 
the most favourable specimens of tlie results of South African 
educational training, and is a marked exception to the 
rank and file of the average young Afrikander trained iu 
Afhcan schools, obtaining degrees in English or Scottish 
universities, or becoming qualified as professional men — 
lawyerSj phyaiciaua, or engineers — in England. To the 
intellectually inferior members of the Young Afrikander 
party I shall refer again, when I come to consider the 
immediate cause of the war. 

What, however, any European who settles in South 
Africa cannot fail to see, from palpable evidence, is that 
South African educational institutions, judged by the fruits 
of their training the minds of their alumni, can only lie 
described as an anti-Biitiah forcing-house. The shibboleth, 
•' Drive the British into the sea," has clearly been impressed 
on their minds at the most susceptible period. 

Nothing is further from my design than to institute a 
polemic against iDdi\'iduals or individual institutions. So I 
do not propose to re-echo the naming of particular colleges 
or institutions incessantly reaching one's cara in South 
Africa from British residents, although details, if they were 
wanted, are easily available. For present purposes it is 
suflicioat tfl judge the schools by their fruits — the minds of 
those who have passed through their training. "Drive the 
British into the sea.'" 

* Bee Appeoiiix. 



B 



98 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTER XI. 

GERMAN COLONUL EXPANSION.^THB ALLBGED 
" ENTENTE OORDIALE," 

Oke of the most impressive speeches T ever heard was one 
delivered by Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister^ in tie 
early part of 1885, defending his policy towards G-ennan 
expansion in South Africa — adtlressini;; the House of Conimons 
and the foreign ainhaasadora. Tlie Prime Minister welcomed 
Germany to the field of colonisation^ and as a helper in the 
gresit task of sprnading l^uropean civilisation over Africa and 
the world, wi'^hed her "God speed/' 

That IVince Bismarck, then German Chancellor/ recipro- 
cated such fraternal feelings one may be permitted to doubt. 
German interests, and German interesta akme, quite le^ti- 
matoly from hid nationalist staodpoint absorbed hiB thonghls. 
Consolidated Germany had become industrial. Industries 
reqnii-e markets all over the world, and trade follows the fla^ 
— more especially when other nations' traders are exdndeil 
by hostile tariffs. The Scramble for Africa came rather latw 
for Germany; but Germany took possession of anj'tbiDg 
that was left. Among these annexations was that of Gennau 
South West Africft, surrounding the British poeseasion, ad- 
ministered by Cape Colnny^ of Walfisch Bay. 

A generation or two from this will be bettor able to judge — 
as then documents, now in the archives of Continental Foreign 
Offices, may he published — as to the reality of the anti- 
British policy freely ascribed to the German Chancellor by 
British Imperialists in Johannesburg and in Cape Town, I 
shall endeavotir t^ show wlmt their theory wan and is. Let 



GERMAN COLONIAL EXPANSION 



99 



ns console ourselves by thinking that in a hundred yt^ars the 
incredible may become commonplace. Few people in London 
at the end of the 18th century would believe that the 
Empress Catherine of Russia could stoop to send written 
directions to her ambassador in London to have English 
journalists who opposed her policy in their articles in the 
London press waylaid and bludgeoned. Yet the curious may 
read these directions in the collection of desijatches published 
a few years ago by order of the Tsar, edited by Professor de 
Martena of St. Petersburg, If these journalists had been 
warned, and had published their news, they would probably 
not have fiot a soul in England to believe them, 

British Imperialists in South Africa ascribe to Prince 
Bismarck, and to a less extent to his BUcceasors, a definite 
aaCi-British policy, so as to secure for Germany territory 
where possible, and, when tenitory was not attaiuablo^ trade. 
They allege that the following ascertaiaed facts are proofs of 

tthat policy. 
In the first place, the annexation of German South West 
Africa, always rnfj;arded as within the British sphere of 
intlueucie since lH3f>, being within latitude 25°; and moru 
than that, actually constituting the Hinterland of thi* British 

IlH>ssesstori of the town and harbour of Walfisch Bay. TJiere 
is. in fact> even now, no other harbour of the slightest iiu- 
]x>riance in the territory. Much bitterness is still felt by 
Cfll»e colonists on what they regard as an unwarrantable 
intrusion on their ground, and it is another of their j^rievunues 
agatciat a vacillating Colonial Office in London. They point 
out to you that a narrow strip of German territory has been 
prolonged to touch the Zambesi River. They suggest it was 
meant to facilitate a junction with Transvaal territtn-y, the 

I trek to the North being still expressly permitted to the 
Kepnblics by the London Convention of 1884; permilt-iid, 
indeed, until Mr. Cecil Rhodes, by occupying Maghonaland 
and Matabeleland, headed off the trekking Boer, 
In the next place, the subsidising of the German East 
African line of steamers, running from Hamburg to Delagoa 
Bay, and preferential trade advantages in the way of Pretoria 

R 2 



lOO 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Government orders to German traders* Connected with thia, 
the institution of the Government National Bank in Ptetom 
with German, instead of Hollander or Boer, directors in 1889. 

Again, the cloaing of the Drifts in 1895, an order of 
President Kruger, to prevent traffic being taken by road 
instead of rail from Cape Colony to the Tranflvaal. a measure 
intended for the benefit of the Hollander railway company 
primarily, hut secondly to divert trade to Delagoa Bay, where 
the railway ended and the German steamera plied. 

Yet again, the introducfcian of German officersj artillorist 
and engineers, to Pretoria and Blocmfontein ; and the con- 
struction, ordered in 1895, before the Jameson Haid, of forts 
in Johannesburg and Pretoria under the direction of German 
officers. 

The famous telegmm of January 1896 of the Gennanj 
Kaiser fipurea very largely indeed among their proofs of an. 
anti-Britiah Boer-Germau entente mrdifilt. British Sonlb 
Africans will not accept assurances, such as even a Socialist I 
member of the German Keicbstag gave me, that no political | 
significance attached to that telegram. ; that it was merely l 
the miUtary spirit of the Kaiser lendin": him to recognise 
Boer valour. They ask you, why then did the Germans ask 
permission from Portugal to land marines at Delagoa Bay to 
proceed to Pretoria to gnard German interests, on the out- 
break of the Jameson Raid ? ■ 

As regards President Kruger*8 desire to obtain Gernian 
support, or that of any other of the great Powers, there of 
course can be no doubt. His declaration of January 1896 fl 
to that effect is explicit ; but we are speaking here of German 
policy. 

Now, in subsequent chapters, I purpose to present both 
the Uitlander and the Boer version of the Transvaal situa- 
tion, in the language of their own leaders, directly cam-, 
municabed to me, and my own conclusion on their merit 
In this will appear plainly the Boer attitude towards th« 
German Government and German influence, and their desir 
to utilise both of those forces as buttresses of their 
dependence — as they conceived it. 



GERMAN COLONIAL EXPANSION 



101 



Here I only record the general sentiment of British South 
African Imperialists, on German policy, prior to the present 
war. if I can form no definite conclusion as to OermoQ 
Imperial policy from 18S4 to 1892, and from 1892 to 1899, 
no doubt the fact that the public of foreign countriea have 
no access to the records of the Foreign Oflice at Berlin will 
prove a aufficieat excuse. Of one thing one can feel perfectly 
convinced: that if the German Chancellor had conceived 
designs of ousting British influence in the Ti'ausvaal and the 
Cape and South Africa generally, it would not be for love of 
the heatuc ycax of Pretoria. 

As to an alleged '* Conspiracy " between the two Ke^ 
publican Governments, the German Chancellor^ and tho 
Bond party in Cape Town, to oust the British Empire one 
hears very much; but, except by inference and induction, 
one is shown no proofs ; en the contraiy, as I shall make 
clear later on, we have emphatic denials on the Suutlk 
AMcan side — both in the Republics and the Capa 

Even as to such a dcaigu, embodied in an alliance aa 
formal as may be. it must in faJxaes3 be remembered that 
there is no absolute wickedness in a German Chancellor 
desiring the predominance of Germany, in extent of territory 
or in trade^ in South Afiaca, or anywhere else ; and in 
availing himself of the absulute independence thruijt on one 
former British depeadoucy — the Omnge Free State — and the 
modified independence surrendered after defeat to miother 
Britiflti dependency. And similarly, that the object of 
creating a Dutch-speaking and Dutch-ruled South African 
Dominion through the Governments of Pretoria and Bloem- 
font^an is a ptrfectly intelligible ideal for Dutch -speaking 
folk, who have had ao many reaaoua not to admire thu 
British Colonial Oftice, to entertain. 

The caae of the Bond party in Capo Colony is quito 
diiferent. Such an alliance would constitute the crime of 
rebellion in a particularly aggravated form. It would 
indeed be monstrous, aa the present High Commissioner put 
it, if the Dutch-descended British colonists were not loyal. 
Absolute liberty, absolute equality, political power to tho 



n» 



THE SETTFEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



extent of nominating the Ministers of the Crown, is their lot 
in llitt Cape Colony — and in all Eritiah possessions no 
(Jtsftbilily reals on any European of non^British descent. 

1 vtinlure to submit to Britiah South African Imperialists 
& view of the policy of some of the Bond leaders — for the 
rank and file have sent thoiisands of armed rebels to tha 
lield. aud iudeed Bond Membera of the Cftjie Parliament have 
tiiktin up arms as well — which 1 have tentatively held, which, 
if oorreet. would harmonise their professions, public and 
l)rivatB, of loyalty to the Empire with their sympathy with ■ 
lh*iir kindred over the Omnge Eiver, aud thyir desije to sec " 
them maintain their sepamt*3 stjite existence. Li\-ing states- 
men who have sat iu the Imperial Cabinet, even at one time 
Loid Beacousfield, looked forwaid to the future of iJie 
Colonies as one of absolute Beverance from the Empire,] 
" Teriah India," ia a well-kno'iva phrase. The Colonial 
Miuister of Majuba Hill, his successor of the London Con- 
vention of 1884, and Prime Minister Gladstone cannot have 
beou inspired with thiit passionate devotion to the groat 
mission of the Empire and the mamtenance of its integrity 
which now thriUs through its citizens. These statesmen 
certainly considered themselves loyal; and, no doubt, even 
their opponents would not dispute their loyalty in intention, 
however they may denounce what they rej^J^ aa their 
unwisdom. I have recalled how, at the Queen's Julfilee 
banquet in Johannesburg of June 1807, I heard a Dutch ' 
loyalist — who has sacrificed home and friends for his loyaltyB 
— refer to what he Eissumed to be the inevitable dissolution" 
of the Empire. May it not be that the independenti 
Afrikander nation, contemplated by some of the Bod(^| 
leaders, was one to he evolved by this peaceful process ? " 

None the leas it is incumbent on citizens of the Empire 
to demonstrate the utter failure of that ideal to rise to the 
true conceptioQ of the destinies of the race. That they will 
resist it to the death on the field of battle they have &hown> 
But the task remains of convincing the minds of o^a Boer 
fellow-citi^ena, and of some among our allies of the United 
States, The work befure those suited for it in South Africa 




GERMAN COLONIAL EXPANSION 103 

ay is to convince all who have, for good or ill, thrown 
tieir lot with the future of South Africa, that the growth 
local patriotism and the cherishing of proud memories 
t bygone ancestry are no more incompatible with the 
tr patriotism of the Empire than the upholding of the 
ent nationality of Wales or of the newer nationalities of 
ida and Australia. 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTER Xn. 



THE EEMMINO Df OF THE REPUBLICS— TKK ACTION OV 
MR. CECIL RHODES. 

Oi" the policy of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, late Prime Mmister of 
Gape Colony, I have no first-liand information ; as, to mj 
regret, he is almost the only one of the leading men, living in 
South Africa of recent yeara, whom 1 have never had an 
opportunity of meeting. My conclusLons aa to his policy, 
therefore, have to do rather with its results m action than its 
intention. 

The annexation, by Mr. Khodes'a expedition in 1889, of 
Mashonalfind, on the nortii of the Transvaal, followed by tlmt 
of Matabeleland, completely cut off the expansion of the Boer 
Hepublica to the north. For tlie first time in tlie twu 
liundred and lifty years of Boer life in South Africa the 
trek was at an eud. This was a serious social factor in tho 
life of the Boer, whose sous hitherto had alwaya looked to 
the beacouing off of new farms for newly eatablisheti homC'- 
steads. This aspect of the end of the trek was seen cla^ly 
enough by the Transvaal Boers, and the so-called Ferreira 
Trek across the Limpopo was attempted in 1890; but tho 
expedition was met and turned back by the then Adminis- 
trator of the newly-named province of Rhodesia, Dr. Jameson^ 
afterwards to be the leader of the Raid. 

The funds for this latest of British annexations were, as 
Mr, Rhodes has explained, furnished by the famous diamond 
mines of the De Beers' Company ; and a charter was procured 
from the Imperial Government, vesting the administration of 
the new province in a company, &amed on the seventeenth- 



r 



THE HEMMING IN OF THE REPUBLICS 



it)5 



■eentoiy English model of the old East India Company. 
IMr. Ehodea'a party in the Cape ParliameDt was^ until 1896, 
"the dat« of the Jameson Raid, supported by the ot^amsatiQii 

_-«if tlie BonJ, 

P The social effects in the life of the Boer of the Transvaal 
of the cutting off of the trek were great; the political effects 
wexo greater. As I havu pointed out already, tho Conveutions 

P of PR^toria of 1881 and of London of 1884, expressly per- 
mitted to thti Transvaal Boers the right of expansiou to the 
north of the Umpupo, if they should chooae to exorcise it, 
m«raly stipulating that agreetnents with Kaffir chiefs to the 
citst or the "west of ilm KepubKc should ho subject to 
Imperial roviaion. The Imperial policy was to retain the 
trade route to the north, and to control any access to the 
sea which the Boer Itepublics might seek to establish. 
Now, the Boers had neglcct«?d to exL^reise the right of ex- 
pansion; and the Bhwlus annexation definitely closed the 
door. 

Aa I have explained in what 1 have said aa to the policy 
of President Kruger, a substitute, or, at least, some alight 
tiuni waa offered to President Kruger in the shape of a 
i^jort on the Indian Ocean at Koai Bay. Tliis in i^etum for 
tbtt promise of the Kepuhlic to assist tlie Ohartei-ed Company 
in the maintenance of order in Khudesia. But this right, 
too, under circumstancea already described, was allowed to 
lapae, and was not i-uncwed in the Convention of 1894, 
aauexinf; Swaziland to the Transvaal. 

The extreme importance to the Empire of the annexation 
of Kbodtisia has only lately been realised in the United 
Kingdom. It is not a ([ucstion of whether Chartered Ct>m- 
pauy (luvernment is good or not, or whether direct ImpeiiyJ 
rule would be preferable. It is that some form of British 
annexation was urgently i'eq\ured to maintain the trade njutu 
lo the interior of Africa. British Parliaments, unfortunately, 
until quite recently, have not taken wide viewa of foreign 
rtlations, or of the necessity of safej^iarihug Bnliah trade. 
Much more than that, a Treasury, with a truly superstitious 
reverence for keeping down expense— an economy that in 



lo6 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Delagoa Bay and the Trauavaal has cost untold millioos 
and thoiiBanda of lives — would never have conaented to 
move. 

The result, therefore, would have been the expanaiou of 
the Boer Republic to the Zambesi Riven and the junction of 
its territory with German South- West Africa, where it touches 
the Zambusij and Uie complete shutting oET of British tnule 
to the vast undeveloped interior. 

The policy attributed to Prince Biflmarck of ousting 
British influence in South Africa, and joining hands with 
the Transvaal in holding a steel rope from sea to sea, 
became, therefore, incapable of realisation without war wilh 
the British Government, and a general European war, which 
the holdera of Aiaace-Lorraine could not contemplate with a 
light heart. 

As 1 have already said, I have no mateiials, except those 
open to the whole world, on which to Judge as to Mr. Cecil 
Iihodes*s intention or methods. As to this service of his to 
the Empire there can, however, be no doubt or he^tatiun. 
Without bis control of the millions of De Btsara and his 
promptitude of action^ not waiting for the consent of a de- 
bating ParEament or an unteachable Treasury at Westminster, 
the British annexation of that vast territory would^ in human 
probability, not have been accomplished. In which case, the 
problem now before the Imperial Government would have 
been different indeed. 

The prevention of Boer expansion to the west effected by 
the Bechuanaland Expedition of 1884, under Sir Charles 
Warren, ehowed a similar regard for Imperial Interests in 
the maintenance of the trade route to the interior. But in 
the Bechuanaland Expedition the action was taken by the 
Imperial Government. In the annexation of the territory 
north of the Limpopo the action waa taken by an individual 
citizen of the Empire on his own initiative, and at l^e 
expense of resources of which he held the control. 

Of the political methods of the late Premier of Cape 
Colony, various estimates have been made. 

His opponents — and there are some among staunch 



THE HEMMING IN OF THE REPUBLICS 



107 



Imperialists — tell you that his alliimca with the Bond 
> etrengtbened its power for anti-Britiah purposya. 

But the paiiiliel of Prince Bismarck peraisted in pre' 
senting if^elf to my mind. One would like to huar what 
any survivor of forty years ago of the old National Liberal 
l*iirty of I*niS8ia could tell one flf their earlier relations with 
the Man of Blood and Iron. Even in Inter days ho is aaid 
to have kept iu hi* cigar-case a ventable olive leaf, to be 
tendered by the victarious leader of the .Tnnkei"s to the 
Xiiiiutial Libemla, 

i'aremio viriccs. As are the powers of nature, fio are 
princes and democracies. Lord Chancellor Bacon's demeanour 
t<)wanJs the cflnt«uiplible Prinet;, into whose hands the in- 
iwruuible designs of Providence had commitled th« lordship 
of Scothind and England and Ireland, would too haatilty he 
deemed mere opportunism. 

The stories of Mr, Cecil llhodes's reputed cominent on 
General Gordon's views of life and action — " Yom' ideas are 
admirable^ but they lack a gold basi^"; of Mr, Rhodes' a — 
agedn reputed — indignation at General Gordon's refusal to 
accept the contents in gold of the treasure chamber of the 
Cliiuese Emperor, grateful for the repression of Taepiug 
rebels, if, as ia to be hoped, they are true, would explain 
many adaptations of means to an end. 

In a speech delivered to the shareholders of Da Beers 
after the relief of Kimberleyj Mr. Ithodea referred to a 
conversatioD of his with the late Mr. Carl Borckenhagenj 
editor of the Young Afrikander Bloemfontein ^xpres^. 
In tliiB colloquy the late premier of the Cape Colony wa$, 
as he says, invited to throw in his lot with the party which 
designed to oust British, influence from. South Africa, and 
to form an Indepeadent Afrikander nation; a proposition 
declined, ae being incompatible either with the respect 
of the Dutch people, which, towards a deserter, would 
be inconsiderable, or with the duty of a citizen of the 
Empire. 

Singidarly enough, I have Mr. Carl Borckenhagen's 
version of that colloquy. The able journalist described the 



io8 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

attitade of the late premier as one of crass materialism. 
" Money, not the sword of the spirit," 

I ventured to tell him that, in all ages, one who aspires 
to act, and not merely to teach, most use the weapons of the 
time and generation. In one time muscle ; in another tactical 
skill in arms ; in another speech ; in another gold. And this 
is not, of necessity, materialism. 



( I09 



CHAPTER XIIL 



THE RErOHM MOVEMENT IN JOHASNESBUKG. 

Dealiso with the policy of President Kniger, T have referred 
to the varioua restrictions on the attiiinment of the franchise, 
imposed after the London Convention of 1884, with the 
object of retaining power in Boer hands, and excluding any 
poeaible participatinn in power of those who did not entertain 
the dream of an anti-British 1 Jutch dominion in South Africa, 
and eVea of those who were in any respect "Engelsch 
gezind" 

Nowj many writers and speakers have hlamed the 
IVesident — while, strangely enough, congratulating the 
Empire — for not seizing on the undouhted opportunity, 
presented to him by the influx of the new European popu- 
lation and his control of a revenue of raiUiona, to build up 
a great Republic on the model of the United States of 
America, consisting of all Europern natjonsUties. There 19 
not the faintest doubt that the President had this progpect ; 
had it especially after the Jameson Raid in 1896 ; and had 
it even up to a short time before the war of October 1809. 

Many, even of British descent in Sonlh Africa, perplexed 
and despairing of ever seeing any sane and consistent policy 
adopted by the Imperial Govemmeut, would most decidedly 
have thrown in their lot with the formation of auch a 
Kepublic, destined to ultimate independence, if th«y were 
treated by the Boers on terms of equahty, Some critica 
even ascribe to the baleful influence of State Secretary Leyda 
the Preeident^B not having adopted this line of policy. I 
fihall show later on that it was not the policy of State 



no 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Secretary Leyds that had the last word in precipitating war y 
but there is a much deeper objection to all those irrelev&Dt 
criticiBms, They remiDd me of the ingenious speculations 
as to what would happen if an impossible Taar were a 
Socialist, or an inconceivahle Pope a revolutionist The 
mind of President Kruger, and of all the dominant caste 
among the Boera, would revolt against such a conception of 
a Republic, By independence they meant Dutch indepeo- 
dencflj of a Dutch -speaking, Dutch-thinking, Dutch-ruling, 
Dutch-praying and Dutch-fighting folk, and not nineteenth- 
century new-fangled Hepublicaniam of a cosmopolitan herd 
of unwarlike European Outsiders, of a different religion and 
langu^e, whose participation in political power would bring 
the RepubUc into harmony with, instead of opfiosition to, the 
Empire. Aut Caesar, aut nidiiisi. 

As might, iiowever, have been anticipated, the Outsiders, 
more especially the British majority, did not take kindly In 
this archaic conception of their position — whether paralleled 
by that of Hel^rewa in Egypt, or of Helots in Sparta; and 
refused to be comfurted by any amount of plausible ex- 
planations as to the President's necessity of coDBulting the 
prejudices of the veldt Boer. Within five years of the dis- 
covery of the "VVitwatersrand, they started against the 
exclusiouLst legislation of the VolkBraad, an agitation ever 
increasing in volume and determination. 

For the first few years, in fact until 1894, tho Uitlaudere 
addressed their petitions and remonstrances to the Govern- 
ment snd Volksraad of the Transvaal. They formed a Nfltiomd 
Union to agitate for the removal of their grievances. When. 
Iiowever, after years of agitation, they found their petitions 
rejected \vith scorn^ and a speaker in the Volksiuad telling 
them that if they wanted rights they could take up rifles and 
light for them, and the President declaring that he would 
never yield and that the storm might hurst, they turned their 
eyes to the Imperial Power. Their appoal to Lord Loch, 
the High Commissioner in 1894, primarily induced by the 
refusal of the British Helots to take up miHtary servic 
against the Kaffir tribes, as long as they were refused 



THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JOHANNESBURG nt 

franchise, is one iSt«p in this alteration of their appeal. The 
agitation in preas and platform meanwhile continued. 

Into the various counts of the indictment brought by the 
Uitlanders against the Government of Pretoria, I do not 
purpose to enter here, but shall go into them fully later 
ion. Here I shall deal only with the accusation that the 
■agitation was not a genuine one, but was the outcome of a 
Capitalist Plot" to get the gold reefs more completely 
'into capitalist hands ; and secondly, with the disastrous 
Jameson Raid of December 1895. 

I came to South Africa ftilly prepared to give credence 
to the theory of a " Capitalist Plot," should I find avidence 
sustain it. President Lincoln's wsmLng to hie people of 
danger of capitalist domination — a warning given now 
•ly forty yeai*a ago — has always seemed to me to mark his 
irescience, and to point to a real danger ; to which, fortunately, 
piany American citizens are at last awakening. The exemption 
of Kimberley diamonds from taxation seemed to prove a 
BLmolar danger in South Africa. The patient investigation 
bf some years has convinced me that there was no such 
;ception to the Uitlander agitation. 
In real fact, the great ca])itali8tfl, if they looked merely 
dividenda, were in a much better position nith the 
overament of President Kruger. I do not here refer to 
iseibilitiefl of corruption being greater than under any 
nibable British regime. The gold law itaelf of the Trans- 
played most enormously into the hands of the great 
louses. In the first place, the amount of taxatinn levied 
m the gold product directly was not considered by the 
resident Uitlanders — whatever the gi-eat capitalists might 
^y — as really excessive. What the Eeformers objected to 
ras not the actual amount of taxation on gold, but improper 
txpc-nditure of the sums accruing, and improper of levj-ing 
customs tarifl's on necessaries of life, which affected the 
link and tile, and affected the millioniiirea not at all. If 
frxation pi-essing on the Uitlander residents were i-emoved, and 
the taxes on the Gold Mines were expended on legitimate 



113 



THE SETTLEMENT* AFTER THE WAR 



alveola of pnblic expenditure — roads, bridges^ la\^.jc*ranfl, 
■ohool0» and other auch purposes — and not. expended on 
wiDanientA aod secret service funds, tiie rank aad file of 
ibe Reformors would never have objected to the taxation 
OQ the ftold outptit B8 excessivB ; and, indeed, would not 
iufvobaMy Kave advocated its beitig iticrerised. 

In the aeoond place, one absurdity of the Transvaal Gold 
Law |illty«d directly into the hands of the great capitalists, 
luul icAed detrimentally to the ordinary rusidetit of moderate 
iMaaa. Gold olaim^ vhether worked or tiot, had to pay 
Um sum «mo«At of moftthly licences. The result wels. that 
In tiVMa of dapcessioii. fwfaich vrealthy ajx^cnlators corefoll^ 
w«it«d, poonar uea, perforce, irons obliged to allow their 
eUiiM bo lapM lo the GoTenueent^ v-hereupon, of cotirse, 
I)m «ealU|T ipMittiitot oould afforti to buy at the publi 
AWiton of the Upeed clainu, preecribed by law. In tfa 
Wty ItU WMXploMd oiuaa oC known value were for a lor 
liwi^ m4 en ttt tte p t u w i day, foiling steadily into tli 
iMMMli ofa few gnat mpitalist ^roeps. 

TW gmk eWMHL win nay be tinstcd to set^ to the 
yewimlMT teieraM. wan quite awaie of these two cardins 
i\<Mlt« 4^ Uw 1V«Bannel GoU Law; add for tbemthGrul 
ul l>MiM^ AwA a mmttf ftemuj point of view, 

1 .^ff Ml haw looked ewkaTWie at the Reform iziov< 

WHk^ NO' ^\>ftoNT«M» Bntiab-rUad oomnunity could ^uit 
m yrriX ; wikMea t^ Mflftk exuaple ot the Bririsb. 
' KkOM^t^ C^^Hm^ •'koM so per eent of the gold to 
(V«K nfcinrwi Ite fteatfee Xnesisry. 
K •. : npiMrt tMn. af etaasau is the bot that the 

^ i/^ ebaife fer draamittf exacted by the 

^Mflfend with ezpkiaatioa of mines 

'^aik % ■flteein aand aoi vaiiy abciut 

t ^ w«» Mr* «C g^Ama^ whan they became 



4MMm h^MV ' 



iun'»i'»»^ 



■ m afleijad by the rank 
the Bufi who are now 
> han taAaoad die gn«( 



THE RErORM MOVEMENT IN JOHANNESBURG u^ 

capitalists to hold very severely aloof from tlie Reform 
movement at first, 

later, when it gained volume and there seemed a possi- 
bility of Pretoria giving way and a British as well as Dutch* 
raled KepubUc being created, they decided to caat in their 
lot with the side which appai'eutly — although only appai-ently 
— was going to win tind to control^ if not "capture/' the 
movement. 

Now, I am not to be taken as saying that the capitalLsta 
of the Witwatersrand had no public motive in their later 
action in joining the Heform movement; I was not in the 
Transvaal at the time, and I have not sufficient data on 
which to judge. Indeed, we muat all hope that, in view of 
the pending settlement, some at le^t have been and will 
be actuated by views of higher statesmanship. But it ia nn 
Uialorical fn-ct that, for whatever reason, they held aloof fruui 
the Beform movement, and that, therefore, its origin cannot 
have been a " Capitalist Plot." 

The .Jameaon Haid of December 1895 altered the whole 
political arena. All the winning cards fell to President 
Kruger. 

tt is needless here to dwell on either the conception 
or the execution of the Raid fof the supposed aid of the 
Uithindei'S, carried out by I>f. Jameson, the Administrator 
of Khodesia, with about 500 of the Mounted Police under 
Lis command. Its violation of all the rules of iuteraational 
law is, of course, obvious. 

Put its result on the position of tlie Imperial Government 
and of the Uitlanders of Johannesburg was simply to cause 
paralysis. To the hands of President Kruger and his 
Government it committuJ a magical lever. Knorraous 
armaments might in the future be proceeded with openly, 
as welt aa secretly, since proof there was that armed invasion 
Of the territory of the Republic, without challenge or warning, 
hud happened, and might happen again^ 

Viewed in the light of the subsequent war, the failure of 
t!ie ill-omened liaid can only be described aa Providential. 
If that body of five hundred men bad reached the practically 



114 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



utiarmed city of Joliaunesborg, one ahud^ers to think of 
what would lia%'e been the fate of the hapleas citizena. The 
mighty and unknown power of the two Republics — for both 
had sprung to arms — the most formidable military force iaj 
South Africa, which has defied in war one of the greatest 
of the world Empires, would have crushed into pore andj 
ashes the whole European population of the gold reef.* 

'* Dit is do eerst-e gehoortadag van der Afrikander natie," 
"This ia the first birthdny of the Afrikander imtion" — 19 
said to bavo been the exclamation, on hearing that Khodesian 
troops had crossed the border, of the veteran judge who waa 
negotiator of the Convention of Majuba Hill As a bkiw 
turns into ice water below freezing-point, so did tlie shock of ■ 
the Eaid unite all the Boera in the land. The mare pro- 
gressive Boers of the Transvaal, the Boers of the Oran^ 1 
Free State, who always maintained a Liberal franchise, thafl 
Putch colonists of the Cape and Natal, many of whom, un- 
witting of the old President's deeper designs, bad sympathised 
with the Uitlanders in their grievances, became cryBtallised 
into a solid mass, heaceforth never to he moved but by the 
cannon of the Empire, 

On the steps immediately following during the year 1396 
T need not dwell, llie Imperial Government's handa were 
cruully hampered Ijy being iiiiide to appear iu tbu wrong in 
the eyea of the world by the action of a few troopers over 
whom they really had no control. The Uitlanders werei 
reflected on for their apparent lack of courage for not coming 
to the help of their rescuers ; never to have opportxinity to j 
show their quality until Elandslaagte. The President was 
enabled to display bis uiuguaniniity tn not shoaling " the ^ 
marauders," merely handing them over to the British ■ 
Govwmmont for trial; and as to the "rebels,*' by re- 
straining himself from the infliction of the death sentenc-e, 



* It ba» beeo objected to by some that tho krge cannon hbd not at 
ttiattinie Ik3gu prDcured by Pretiiria; iind that therefore the fiaid might 
have Bucceeded. But uot cimntm, by any means. Tiifles were and are the 
Ptreiiii;t.li of (he burgliera ; aad Mr. J. P. PitKpatriek'B book shows that «t 
the iCiid of 18S5 there were two riflea for every bufghier in ike land. 



THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JOHANNESBURG iiS 



contenting himself with enormous fines amounting to a 
quarter of a million sterling. His Govemmeot also waa 
enabled to optnly increase with feverish haste that pile of 
armameDta which later on astouished the world. 

The trial of the Kefomi prisoners in Pretoria I have bad 
deacribed to me from the lips of Keforra prisoners and their 
advocates, aa well as by their chief prosecutor. The trial of 
the late Administrator of Rhodesia and his companions of 
the Raid I have persoaally witnessed in the High Court of 
Justice in England, where they were duly sentenced and sent 
to prison. 

The only immediate matter to be borne in mind is that 
the Imperial Government, for its part, vindicated its non- 
participation in, and strong disapproval of, the ill-omenud 
expedition. 

It is true that the deeper cause of the Eaid was the 
existence of the helotry of the Ultlander, and that public 
attention was riveted on their position aa one result of the 
Kaid. This, however, is one of the compensationa inciJeat 
to nmny actions whose justice cannot be defended. The 
peaceful progress of the Reform movement would x)rolably 
have succeeded in obtaining Imperial intervention without 
three years' delay, three years' preparation of armaments on 
the Boer side, and th« cost and loss of lives of a devastating 
war.* 

During the foUowjng year of 1896 the three most stiiking 
aspects of the political situation were the colossal amiamenta 
b^ng prepared for the Pretorian Government in all the war 
factories of the world, the diplomatic intervention of the 
Imperial Government through the Colonial Stseretaryj and 
the growth of an Imperial political organisation through 
South Africa, called the South African League. 

This last can ied on the agitation of the Reform movement^ 
thoug'h under different leadership, the leaders of the kto 
Eeform movement having been sentenced by the Courts of 

" The present High Commiftaioner deacribea the Raid as " m con- 
spiracy of which the gruat body of Uitlaadam wau iiuJiOceiil, and wbacU 
^rveruid aud ruined thdr Gaiue." 

I 2 



ii6 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

Pretoria either to bojuahment, or, as a condition of the 
redaction of their imprisonment to fines, by the impositum 
of the penalty of abstention from pditacal agitation. 

Before taking up the thread of eTeztts in the order cS 
time, let me state in their own langoage the case of the 
XJitlander against the ruling Boer, as presented to me by 
leaders on both sides in the end of 1896 and the b^jnning 
of 1897. 



:»? ) 



CHATTEn XIV. 



THE UITLANDER INtMCTMENT AGAINST PRCTOUIA, 

The method of investigation of the public problems of South 
Africa which I had decided on before my arrival, I carried 
out, with particular care in regard to the Uitlanfler move- 
mtint in the Transvaal. I shall give, usually in their own 
words, the charges of the UitlaDders againat the Transvaal 
Govemmont, which I obtained in 1800 and 1807 from 
leaders among them ; and the defence, again usually in 
their own words, as stated to m& by loadera in the two 
Republics. 

Let me first say that I have never regarded the real issue 
as one of the treatment of the Uitlanders, simply regarded as 
oppressed individuals. The. real issue for the Empire and the 
world was, and is, the inaiatenance of tlie integrity and 
prestige of the Empire, struck at primarily by the relegation 
of certain of its citizens to an inferior sttitua iu the Transvaal : 
secondarily^ by the fostering of an ideal of a hostile Dutch 
Afrikander Dominion. 

The Uitlander might want the franchise in nrder to use 
it as a lever to redress his personal grievances. The Imperial 
Government's demand on his behalf was moved by a sense 
of self-preservation. 

What follows in this chapter was written in 1897. 

The grievances of the Transvaal Uitlanders are now a 
thrice-told tale : one, too, on which public opinion in 
England is largely made up. As evidencing the existence 
of the anti-British policy ascribed to the Government, 
reference has already been made to this long catalogue. 



Tl8 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Here T piirpo^e to enumerate the gnevaoces as atfttod \sj ^ 
the Uitlander leaders, taking fiist those eDdorsed bj Lord 
Eipon and Mr. Chftmberlain. 

The UiUandcr'a exclusion from the fmnchise^ and Uie 
Teaaone wliy the Uitlanders objeet to being placed in a posi- 
tdoQ of political inferiority, furnish ground for a sense of 
resentment which has largely been influenced by what may 
be generically described aa sentimental considerations. The 
practical residts of their exclusion from the feanchiae are not 
leas entitled to consideratioD. The preaest conditiotis under 
■which the franchise may be obtained are practically pro- 
hibitive. If the Uitlander deairea to be naturalised, he 
must firat reaide two years, and have been during those 
two yeara registered in the list of the Field-Cornet of his 
district. This regiBtnition subjects him to compulsory 
military service. At the end of the two years he may 
requeat to be naturalised. His request may be granted — if 
the State Attorney conaidera there is no legal objection, and 
if the Executive congidera there is no political objection. ■ 
The Uitlander who has been permitted to become naturalised 
must take an oath of allegiance, eipreasly renouncing bi3 
allegiance to his former State. What privileges does he H 
secure by this naturalisation ? He can vote in the election 
of the Field-Comet for his district, and of the district 
member for the Second Volkaraad. What is the Second 
Volksraad? An advisory body without legislative power. 
Membership of the Second Volksraad is open to Uitlanders 
who have been naturalised for two yeara, are over thirty 
years of age» are Protestants by religion, have immovable 
property, and are actually domiciled in the TranavaaL If 
the newly naturalised citizen has remained in possession of I 
these qualifications for ten years, he becomes eligible to be 
appointed a full burgher ; that is, if the First VoUcsraad, the 
body with legislative power, thinks fit to create him a full 
burgher by resolution. Seeing that the First Volksraad 
lias absolute legialative power^ the Franchise Law would 
seem to be unnecessary in this latter proviaion ; as the First 
'>lk3mad can appoint anyone to be a burgher, whether he 



. UITLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA mq 

lias fnlfilled tbo terms or not. Tbo contrast between the 
provisioDS r^ardins the Uitlauder and those applying to 
the Boer is evident from consideration of the fact that 
every Boer youtlt of sixteen yeara of age obtains the full 
political fi-anchiae, with light of voting in the Presidential 
election and to the Piist Volksi-aad, the supreme power in 
the land. 

The consequences of this exclusion from the franchise are 
alleged by ihe Uitlaaders to be those which may be expected 
to spring from the absence of control hy tlie tax-payer over 
those who have the spending of the money. Eveiy item 
in the impeachmeat of the Government put forwanl hy the 
UiLtanders they trace to the monopoly of political powiir 
enjoyed by the earlier imraitrrants. Over-taxation, peculn- 
tiou, mismanagement, favouritism towards Hollanders, defects 
of municipnl government, inefficient police, defective water 
supply, iueRicient educational institutions, imperfect organi- 
sation of the Law Courts^ aud retrogi-essive legislation 
affecting the liberty of the citizen — all are ascribed to the 
exclusion of the Uitlaader population from the exercise of 
political rights. 

The educational tmevance is next to be considered. 



•' The GoTemmetit of the Tranavaal," writes a londrng UitlaBtlar, " in the 
exorciBQ (ff it« preropntive fivil>onlinniei the edm^ation i<f chiWrtn pruwin;; 
up in (ho country to tlie patrinlic Impulse of compenili!; Qitm to arc43[it it 
through the medium of the Dutch Intigusge. The o.fnBei|uencc If, tliAt 
ImhI year, whilst £63,000 was nomiuaJly upcut on State-aidiiJ «:ht>nl8, only 
1*. lOrf. per head was dcvolwl to tho education of Uitlandor cliildriiu, 
i.e., English BcboolB; whilst over £8 per head waa spent upon tho hcIiimI- 
gQittj* riiilnirBn of Dutch-Bpeakinp parents. NotwithBtaDr!in^ the lariwh 
expcndimre Mpoa. the"Stflal* Oyninaaium" antl Dutch country whooln, 
the acale of education RUiongst Dutch uihAbitftnto i? of the lowest order- 
In JohaucAburg, I have &o liei<Ltj!itiou in sayiu^, thcro are thouHatidH o( 
ehildreDf botb Dutch aud EngliBh, growing up in igDura&ca and vice, 
and tlieir exleteoce in the Stato must ultimately prov$ a dagger ftod 

"Tho prejudice againBt Engliftli," writce a leadiug advocate, "Ib eure 
to injure tho rifliDg generation in the Htruggle for axiHtenco bare, for 
vrvtbout EngUHh it could cover aapiro to any position either in thq leamod 
[irofeuione or in conunercial life." 



lao 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Jfr. Chamberlain's remark that " Up to the present^ it 
&Bem9 to have been practically impossible for the children of 
Uitlandera to obtain effectual education in the State-aided 
BchoolB/' is as true as when it was made in February 1896. 
There is no adequate provision for the 7,000 children in the 
Johannesbarg district. As English-speakdng parents refuse 
to allow their children to be taught in schools where the 
instruction is carried on in the Dutch language, their only 
alternative is to send them to private schools. As l\iese 
English-speaking private schools receive no aBsiBtanoe &om 
t]ie State, the expense falls on the parents of the children. 
In the case of well-to-do parents, this means they have to 
pay twice over for the education of their cbUdren ; but in 
the case of the miners and the ixwrer population, it means 
that their children are without instruction, as they cannot 
aftord to pay the fees re4|uired by competent teachers in 
perivat« scbtwLs. The newer peneration of the |>oorer classes 
are growing up without education, to the material detriment 
of their own prospects, as compared with those of the 
educated immigrants from Exirope, and to the ultimate 
danger of the population of the Transvaal j ignorance being 
the seed-plot of crime. Recently the Volksraad passed I 
an l*klucEition Bill, to which Mr, Chaniberlain looked forward 
in his desi^tc-h of February 1896, What are tho provisions 
of that Bill 7 The medium of instruction under the new ■ 
Bill will be the home laiiguage of the chililreti (this being 
usually EnglLsb) only until they have reached the fifth 
standard, when the medium is to be Dutcb alone. 
Financial grievances nre next to be considered. 



tniB- I 



"It n HiatnUiuei" eays Mr, ChamberlaiD. '* that tlte finaDcea are 
managed, and thsl the exjieiiditur© wcapes pmper ctBitrol ami audita Ihal 
taxation is maintained beyond the needa of the adtainiBtfation ; that 
unfair diBCTimination ie shown in the coUection of perBonal laxee ; that the 
itnpoTt duties on the neceaBarien of life are not only a hardebip on the 
working clawies, l>ut no raise the co«t of the working of the mines aa 
actually to ha prohiMtive of the working of the poorer ones, which, if 
tlie taxation were better apportioned to the ability to bear it, might bo 
ni^ened up to the general Advai^tage," 



UITLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA ill 

Ab the Manifesto of the Txauavaal Kational Union puta 
it:— 

'* We fiml that taxation Ib unpoeed upon m without any repre«jrit4tion 
wliftterw* Thflt laxaiion is wholly inequitable: 

(a) Betaiue a much greater aiTiouct is leyiod from the people than ie 
nqtured for the noetlfl uf the GoTemnient ; 

(b) Bccaufie It ifi either cXom^ tAxntion, pure and simple ; or, by the 
Belection of subjects, thougli Dorainally univereal, it ih maalo to fall upon 
OUT ehoulderH; and 

(e) BecsuH the Detxeflariee of life are uudiJy bunleDod. 
I Kxpcnditun is not coDtroUcd by aDy public cfBi^ial independent of the 
GoveminoDt; vast aume are fquiinderBd ; wKde the Secret Service Fuad is 
a dark myetery to everybtidy." 

' Aft a result of want of control of the t-ax-payer over Ihasa 
Rpendiiig the taxea, taxation ia exceRsive; it presses with 
special weight on the working classes. It discximinatea 
between the Boer and tlie Uitlander. 

The finances iire mismanaged in expendltiufe as well as 
in the levyinj;. Enormous sums are wasted on war material, 
imnecessaiy for any legitimate purpose of aelf-defence. Vast 
appropriations are made on accoimt of secret service. The 
excess of taxation may be measured by the consideration 
of tiie fact that a State with the insignificant population 
of the Trjmsvaal raises £4,4ti2,193 in taxes. 

In efiect, the whole of this taxation rests upon the gold 
industry, which produces about JtiT.OOO.OOO worth of gold 
during the year, as there are practically no manufactures, 
and no taxation levied on agricultural produce grown in the 
country. The annual estimates issued last year show the 
income and expenditure as follows :— 

Income. 

Cuetoma . . , , . . .£1,200,000 

Gold ProspectiTig Licences , . , , 482,000 

Hut Tas and Native Poll Tax , . . 102,925 

Finee, Special 212,000 

FoBtal 110,000 

Telegraph. , BB.OOO 

iUUway 322,327 

Stamp Puw ...... 200,000 



122 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Tnnifer Dum . . , • 
Diggere' Lic«Dcoe , . . 
BtAud Licences .... 
Stste portion of Profit on Dynsmito 



ExpgBDinmB. 



War. 

Total Salaries . 

police . * . 

Telegraph DciTJirtmEot 

Pontal DepBrtTHDnt . 

Worka . 

HpGcial ExpciKlituni . 

Judicial Depftrttnent . 

AdminiHtrfltjon of justice 



£275,000 

54,200 
35.000 



£04:1.510 

«i8,0il 

242. 421 

80,U09 

44,374 

730,000 

5^6,350 

19,241 

38,850 



The war item of expenditure last year was tmder 
£200,000; this year it la £943.510, of which £:i73»000 is 
for the " purchase of fire-arme/' 

The estimated expenditure, which in 1894 was only 
£1,595,000, has now risea to more than tliree times that 
amount, while there is a public debt of nearly £10,000,000 
sterling. 

The taxes are levied so as to tax the Uitlander and leave 
the Boer free from taxation. 

"Tho policy of the Government," Fttyn the Manifntto, "in regard 
taintion niny be practically dwcrilwd na [-rotection without proiiuctio 
The most diRrmtrouR hnrcjjthipfi result to cnnBumern, and morchiuitA caa^ 
scarcely nay frotii day l-o day where they are. 

" Ib it not a grievatico thafc the townaraan Uaa to j»y a heavy tal oti 
almiwt DverythiDg: he mtes, while the couotr^'tnan pnya hardly anytlijiig 
on those articles which he luniself indulgeH la ? 

The policy of taxing food importiS to favour the Boer 
farmer — the exact reverse of the policy of the Frco Breakfast 
Table — renders the cost of living to the working classes 
enormously high, and makes their nominally high wages 
entirely illuaory. 

The effect of this policy of taxation on the mining 
industry will be considered later. I 

An Uitlander wTiting at the time of the Jameson Kaid 
described the situation as follows ;— 



UITLANDER TNDlCTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 123 



P 



*• The Bystem of taxalion ia bo orgamsod as to throw nearly the whola 
of the reveoue charges of the tajuntry on that portion af the population 
which ia powerlflBR to cttntrql cx|iei)ditm-e. The revenue a few yoare sgo, 
lidbre the Uitlonder population had liaeii to ttn prcesnt Dunibera or 
ilsTdliiped the mining mdnfltry to its prcfnent vftluo, averaged about 
£75,000 a. year. In IHW the revenue wkb £1,750,000; in 1895 there him 
been a very gnat fuftber increase, imd, Dotwithntanitiiig thin Hugnientation 
in the totiJ teoeipla, it hae been esiiinnteiij fvccording to nareftilly compiled 
retuma, that the share paid by the Boer population ie only £.5000 more 
titan it was ten yeani ago. To B\i&Lk, as is aometimea done, of the eharo 
which they contribute to the Exchequer an a tenth ia only a form uf words. 
In reftHty it IB mnL'h nearer to a twentieth. Tlio ayBtem is protective 
where there ia nothing to protect. The Boer couBuiiie« no in!iK>rtod 
produov, and the State does not supply more than a qunrter of the produce 
ooncumed on the Rand. The ciutoiriB tax^ thereforoi falls as a revenue 
tax upon the Uitlander. The Boer, unfortiinately, ia cultivating less tban 
before, and the nativca, who were good produrern, are K-ing diftpotsed (ind 
hftnieJ under the Plakkcra W'et, or SquatterH* Law, wliichj a» will be 
shown, ia enforced also chiefly againet the Uitlander landhoMerB. A few 
other «xampl» wiU serve to LIJnBtrate the direction of the incidence of 
taxation. The recei[it stamp law ie made more and more vortatioua and 
burdcDsoiiie, and the i>eDaltiea are exceaaivu. But oniy tra4le receipts are 
ftamped. The farmer who aella produce does not etamp recelptei^ and Uie 
Boer never engnpeH in trade. 

"Thifi tax falis, therefore, exciuaively on the alien. The newly 
irapoaed 1 per cent, tax on coal falls aleo oxclueively on the alien^ who 
aloue makes uae of this kind of fuel. Theee are relatively amall matteni. 
The transfer duty, which, uf cuuree^ fxlk wholly upon the induBtrial tfom- 
munity^ hafi lately lieen subjected by the llaaii to an increaac, which i« of 
the most diwwtroun iniporlnncD to the develupment of the niiniii;^ industry* 
Hitherto this duty haa been i per cent., jwiid either on the cash conaidera- 
tipii puaed in reapecC of claims, or g;round acquired by companiee, or on a 
raluJitioa made hy the toCal authorities uf the Vendom' fiharefi. llio Raad 
have now dfeGide<l that, the 4 jwr cent, fihall Iw payable on the nominal 
value of the ahares acd caeh. I'he tax under the old conditiona has given 
a very largo revenue to the St«t«. The propoaad eliange converta It into 
an absolutely coloflaaJ charge upon the mining industry, and will awell 
tlw alrewly cooaiderable BurpluB at the dinpodal of the Transvaal Govem- 
mctll With suJn« that Would otherwke have gone a lon^ Way to open up 
uid equip new minea. The duty haa to be paid on reconetructiona as well 
u on bondJidB tales, and the fact that the ownerahip really remains in the 
aame huida u not taken Into account." 



Mr. Chamberlain'^ despatch next refers to the exceptional 
restrictiona imposed by law on the right of public meeting. 



124 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

Mr. Chamberlain adds, however, that he feelB bound 
admit that, as far as the recent hislflry of Johannesbuiig if 
couc«rued, these rc^trictians do not seem to have been rerf^ 
strictly LDterpreted. The UitlaJiiJer resident of Johannea- 
burg does not consider the restriction to be merely norair 
Exactly as the effect of an iramigration law is not lo 
measured by the number of immigmnta turned back nttlrtl 
border, similarly the effect of a law repressing the right of 
public meeting cannot be gauged by simply considering tli« 
numbei" of mtjetinga which have b«en formally auppreaaed. 
People arc deterred from boldinp meeting?* when they know 
they are exposed to hostile Government action. It is also 
pointed out that the now Acts, the Alien Expulsion Act and 
the I*res8 Act, render — 

** The oxj>rn8Rion iif [lublk opinwn Iiiible to be vmteA by •erere puiiib* 
inutit. IL in li^ht tdm to i^HjJnt out tlint umlcr Ihc Fmii Law Iettani<if 
iirticltiH uf II jieraunal or jiiolitjcal nntura uiUHt l>ear tbe »i<;natUR' <ff ilio ' 
iiutlmr; it iisny have the ofTect of liolening the cxixwunr (if ftbiiKes in any ■ 
t-^-uto whore the wnter ha4 ptirfectly good renitoa to foel diaiitclukod to flifr- { 

The grievances of the Mining Industry next como nndcr 
review. The agitation for the removal of burdens on the 
industry has been reprcjsunted in England as a ^Toteaipifl 
wjmplaint on tbe part of the cosmopolitan Jew capiuliat^ 
thai he is not allowed to add to his already supei-fluouafl 
minions. Hut, it is Bald, there is more in the complaint" 
than the disappointment of the millionaire. The whoL 
pi-osperity of the country depends on the mines. If b; 
taxation mines of inferior grade are made incapable of hoi 
worked at a profit, not merely the cosmopolitan millionairg 
hut all the inhabitants of the Rand, and more particularly 
the working class, must suffer. Furthermore^ the European 
investor must suffer. £150,000,000 of European eapi 
bare been sunk ioi the Transvaal mines ; the return 
dividends to tbe European sharebolders has been slight, 
the Government do not wish to repress the growth of the 
industry then they must labour under the economic fallacy 
ascribed by Edmund Kurke to the GoYernraent of George III. 



UITLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 125 

They seem not to know that " T&xation ia not Revenue/' and 
not to reaUse the elemeatary economic proposition that by 
lowering an impost the Government may obtain an increased 
return to the treaatiry. Tiie chief burdens on the Mining 
Industry fall under the head of the Protective Tariff adopted 
by the Government to favour the agricultural prodncts of 
the Transvaal farmers, the policy of granting monopoliea, 
such as the dynamite concession and the railway conceasion, 
the policy of obstruction 'as regards railway facilities with 
the Cape Colony, the want of facilities for the employment of 
native labour, and minor obattuctiona to the canying out of 
the buainesa of the mines — such as the otficial oatracism of 
the English language. Generally, also, it is alleged that the 
exceeaive taxation, direct and indirect^ prevents the higher- 
grade mines giving adequate return for the capital invested 
in them, and prevents the lower-grade mines being worked 
at any profit at idh As to thd first point, it ia clear that 
tfludng food imports raiaea the cost of aubsiatence of the 
labourer, and neceaaarily the rate of remuneration which he 
nanat be paid by the mining companiea, although that in- 
creased rate is of no advantage to the labourer hut passes 
to the Qovcrnmcnt in the form of taxation. Aa regards 
State monopolies Mr. Chamberlain obaer\'ea — 

^ Tha policy of grtmUng Stale munupolieB m regftrde minbg requifiitea 
mid other im]witaDl artklea of commerce h«s s^ven rise ta injrh resBjit- 
nieoti wid on rejjank wjme uf Ihem, it h tlifliicult to aee liow even a 
jilntttible justiliciitlua cim be put furward foT tliera from the point of view 
of the LnlereatB uf tbe gCDtoral community." 



It is pointed out that the policy of granting monopoliea 
is one which is condemned by all economies, and ia contrary 
to the practice of the civUiscd world. On the one band, it 
may be looked upon, at the best, as a means of exacting 
excessive taxation ; and at the worst, as a scandalous misuso 
of the public revenue Uj enrich a few monopolists. Tu take 
the dynamite monopoly.. At the lowest eatimate this ia 

eto be efiuivaleut to a tax of £400,000 per annum 
iuatry. The Manifesto of the Reform Union put 



136 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

it at £600,000 per annum. The monopolists purcb^ise in 
Europe a 50'lb. case of dyDamit-e at a cost of 29x., payiag 
carriage from Europe to JokaDneaburg, amounting to lOs, at 
the utmoBt. Their chM^e ia 88«. per caae to the ininin j^ 
companies. Kven these fijjurea do not represent the whole 
of the possible toss to the industry. The companies cazmdt 
use other explosives which cost less and are more suitable 
for some descriptions of mining ; they are deprived of the 
benefit of any new chemical inventiona, as they are compelled 
to buy from monopolists whatever the monopolists choose to 
sell ; and as to the dynamite which they purchase, they have 
no guarantee that it Is of good quality, as the monop<^li3ta 
have no corapetitioa to fear. 
Mr. Chamberlain observes — 

" 1 cannot BuppoM th&t, looking to the li&rge intereflta vhich tha 
QoTemment of the Republic has m the financiBd aucosu uf iia railmyi, 
there can \m aoy h(!«itatiun id redressing proved grieTaiioeB„or in adopdni 
nteoKurea for the iuiproTeiueut pf (he jieraoDiiel or the traffic and otker 
ajraagecueatB uf the lineK.** 

Opinion in Johannesburg does not jtiBtify that confident 
expectation of Mr. Chamberlain, It is represented that the 
railway management ia not merely Incompetent in its 
personnel, and inefficient in its supply of railway material 
and rolling stock, but is directed by political motives which 
have no regard whatever to the commercial success of the 
mining iuduatry. It is alleged that the policy of the 
railway admitiigtratjon controlled by the Government k, iu 
the first place, to repress the growth of the indoBtry, the 
opening up of new mines or the profitable working of mines 
of lower grade ; and in the next pkce, to drive such trafHc as 
there ia over the Portuguese railway to Delagoa Bay insteud 
of the British railway to Cape Town. It ia points out, for i 
instance, that the railway refuses to supply sufficient truck^| 
for conveying coal to the mines; that companies have^ 
Buffered large losses oa account of insufficient supply of coal 
for their engines. On one occasion the traffic from the Uape 
was practically stopped at Vereeniging on the Vaal River by 
the refu4al of the railway to forward loaded trucks from the 




UITLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 127 

Cep«, on the pretext that the Transvaal Railway could not 
give more trucks for the Cape service than for Natal or 
Delagoa Bay. The coal supply ia similarly obstructed by 
the refusal of the railway company to faoilitale the construc- 
tion of sidings, and by their insisting on coal being loaded 
iut<» sacks, instead of iubo trucks with movable aides. Their 
refusal to run sufficient trains to the terminus of the Cape 
Government Railway is ascribed to a diatinct anti-Cape 
policy to drive traffic from the Cape route, Political motives, 
liowever, are aaid to be not the sole ones, inasmuch as goods 
coming by the Delagoa Bay route pass for a greater dialauce 
over the Transvaal line, and a larger share of the cost of 
carriage goes to the Transvaal Railway. The railway, in 
whose stock the Government is largely interested, arranges 
its tariff so as to be a huge tax on the Mining Industry. The 
ItAod train, a coal and passenger train running from Kntgers- 
dorp to Springs (about forty-two miles), is understood to earn 
eoough to pay interest on the whole mining capital of the 
i-whole line. The railway has its head of&ce in Amsterdam, 
where its books are kept, and its accounts are publishfMi in 
Dutc-li. Refusal to insure undelivered goods, refusal to take 
precautions against fire, the apiKJintment of Hollander clerks 
mho can understand neither the Tiial nor English, a be- 
[vihiering red-tape system imported from Holland, arbitrary 
'legulatiuns of tariff and traffic, and systematic insolence on 
the part of the officials, are said to be counted among the 
facilities aflordcd by the railway. 

In connection with the labour supply Mr. Chamberlain 
as similarly hoi>efuI. 

" A* regJwdB the grievaacet which hove been jmt forward In coDueclbo 
villi the labour qu««liot] by the miDing iaduatry, I conttint luyself at 
time hy eiT'rctiauig the hupe tfa&t, if, b; the abntetnoDt of formaHtie« 
"^imd Deedleso restrictions, by promoting the weU-being uf the natives when 
going to, remaining nt, and returoiug from the mines, OiDd by forcing oa 
Ihma wife reatrictiona m regards drink and Auch mattery the labour 
mppl7 can be entarged, and the coudition of the labaiirGm improved, the 
Prcflitdent nod hi« Executive Council will not fail to give the qucHtioQ 
lUuar ai4«t evueet atteQlioo.^ 



I 



I 

I 



I2S 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



The tJitlandefS do not consider that Mr. Chambftrkin'4 
hope has been realised to any appreciable eitect A liquor 
Law has been passed restricting the supply of alcohol to th< 
natives ; but the worloDg of the native paas law, the arbitrary 
exactionfl inflicted on the natives working in the mines, the 
police arrest of any native appearing even accidentally 
without a badge in public, their prohibition to walk on tlu 
footway, the practical denial of redress if they are ill-used by 
white men — all these official practices* it is alleged, act aa a 
deterrent on the supply of native labour to the minea. Many 
minor obstacles are enumerated to the development of the 
mines of the liand which fall under the heed of charges of 
general maladnunistrBtion, to be considered later on. One, 
however, may be noted here, The ostracism of the English 
language (the recent law requiring all documeuts to bv 
written in Dutch) is said to constitute a gerious obetmction. | 
Surniiiiag up generally the charges against the policy of tho 
Government as regards the mines, it is averred that the 
action of the K^ecutive, direct and indirect, prevents thaj 
higher-grade mines from giving adequate return for ^e^l 
capital invested in them, and prevents lower-grade mmesT 
from being worked at a profit. The Government Commissioa 
recently appointed to consider the condition of tlie Tnining 
industry is expected to elicit facta bearing out the foregoingj 
contentions. 

Mr. Chamberlain's remarks as to the police service are^ 
said to be as applicable to present conditions as they werflj 
to those of last year :— 

" The oaty other matter of grlOTance on which I propose to touch now 
U the cundilion of the police force ; m to whicb, I inny reiuArk, thai ilie 
difficulties of the refurniing party in the Vulkaraail and tbw Eioi;utivB 
a.ppeat to arJHC from tlie Btruug ]irojuilice of the more conservative of tha 
burghers agftinst employing UitUnderB, wliich would not be unworthy 
of sympathy were it not fur the |flit*jnt fact that & population tike that 
of the bur^jhere cannot poMibly be expected to funusli adequate materiil 
from which to Mlect eaddidate* for Ais. Aepartment of public service ; 
ftud to make difTiculties about aj^poiDting foreiguerB amounts, under tb« 
circuiutiUuiceij ,, to a. denial to Ehe Uitlandtif couunumty of w hat are Among 



UlTLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 129 



primary rights whi&h the goTemed muy demanid of ttiose who 
kfi 10 goveru them." 

Tlje inunicipal government of the Rand is the last subject 
iferreU to in Mr. Chamberlain's dospatch. It is complained 

,t residenta have no control over the management of 
unicipal affaursi that the streets aie ill-kept and ill- 

hted ; that there is no efficient police—the police being 
Xy Hollanders appointed and paid by the Government^ 

d under no obligation to consult the wishes of the residents 
€ the town ; that the water supply iu the hands of con- 
Bssionaires is very imperfect, and the quality of the water 
applied ia daugerous to health ; that fever has become 
Ddemie, and that criiue, owing to the want of efficient police 
nd absence of lighting, ia rapidly increasing, and that it 
tas become dangerous to go out of doors in the suburbs 
ifter sunset. The municipality created by the law recently 

Rl by the Raad is said to be but a slight improvement 
e previous system under which such control aa Johan- 
aesburg had over ita municipal aftaiia woa exercised by the 
lonitory Board- The Burgomaater of the new municipality 
t a nominee of the Government, and acta of the municipality 
ire subject to the veto of the Government. 



'The muiucipal aSain of the town," writes a resident, " are cootrotEed 
by a Sanitarj Board, whose powera are limited, uid Bubject In nearly all 
^etul to the veto uf the GoTfirnmenL 

** The water-flupiily, whkh should be coxttroUed by the municipal 
ody, U ia the haada of couceBsionairea. It waa the same with the 
igfating i»f the town until receotly, when the Sanitary Board waa 
powered to acquire it. The sanitatioci of the towc is Bxtremely 
ifectire, greatly uwing to the Umiled powers of the Sanitary Buard. 

** A tnuiiicit»l law is under the conBideratioa of the Volk6taad^ but 
U unnlereUjod that the chief officer, namely, the Burgomaster or Mayor, 
riil he appoioted by the GoTemmeut from among the burghers of the 
'iiDlry. All tbeRB matters occobIoii iDcoDvemence and didcomfurt tu the 
ihrntutantfi." 

ilany other grievances, however, not touched upon by 
tr. Chamberlain are enumerated by the Uitlander. The 
itra«ism of the English language ia not confined to the 

K 



I30 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



State schools. The langoB^ of commerce is Bngliab all 
through South Africa ; yet policemen in the Btreets sib 
unable or unwiliing to reply in English^ and railway officials 
profess a similar inability. The discuaslons at the municipal 
Boaiti must be conducted in Dutch. It is prop^ised that aU 
way-billa and other commercial documents ahoiild be written 
in Dutch under a penalty of a fine for neglect. ** There 
haa been a deliberate attempt/' says the Manifesto of the 
National Union, " to Holianderiae the Eepublic, and to kill i 
the English language." fl 

"The um of Dutch," writee a Joharmes'burger, "as the official 
language in CourtB acd public depBrtTD«tiU bAttifaUy CftUieH expeiuK A&d 
iaoonremeiLce to the tradings m&Dof&cturujgi and miiuDg clfisses, wkoee 
only tongue ia ubu&Uj English, and in which all buedoeu InmaacUoiu m 
conducted." 

A leading advocate writes : — 

"The probibitioB of Eogli^ in Uie Gaurte makea lltlgntjcin twice «» 
expen&ive ond Dot noacly ao effective as It would be ir both loDguAgee ite 
used; for in cro&BroxamiiLiiig on Eoglieh witness who underBtands, but 
dou not speak, Dutch, the witneM baa maiiy points in hJa favour, uJ 
Clfott-flxuninatioii through an interpmter is uften a force. About 75 per 
cent, of the High Court cases are between Englwh-fipedtiog people ; about 
16 to 20 per cent, ore between an EngliRb litigant and some other putjE^— 
and from & to 10 per cent, are between noD-Englith liciganta." ^M 

Beligious disabilities, unknown in any civilised country, 
flourish in the Transvaal. 

" The Statute bookB," says the £f ationat Union Manifesto, 
dii»6gured widi enactmeuta itiiposing religioua disabilities.^^ 

*' So far SB I knoWr" writes a resident, *' these dieabilitiea are felt in^ 
this way. Ho grant in aid of Jewish acboola ia mado on tbe ground that 
if Buch grant were givon, Eoman Cetholiea would equally have a claim, 
and aa the State will only eupport the Proteatant rdigiou, Bomau 
Catholics are rigidly excluded.** 

This retrograde principle is embodied in a clause of 
Grond Wet. 

Another branch of the action of the Government consists 
in reatrictmg the right of the Uitlauder to carry arms^ con- 
sidered in all countries to be the efisentlal privilege of a fi^a . 



UlTLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 131 



Arms are heavily taxed on tha frontier. Besides the 
tax a special permit is required for the importation, a 
pemut which may be refused at the discretion of a Govera- 
^umt official. The purchase of ammunition, even by persons 
me already m possession of arms^ is hedged round with 
(me restrictions. In every single instance of pur- 
auuaunition, no matter how small the quantity, the 
ovemment permit must be obtained. The new law now 
afore the Volkaraad may be described as the Uitlander 
Isanuament Act, aa it provides that not msrely is im- 
Drtntion or purchase of nvais, but the possession of aiinSj 
t be subject to Government licence, refusable at discretion- 
ssisting tliis policy of disarmament is instituted what is 
scribed as a system of military terrorism. Powerful forts 
re bniJt at Pretoria and Johannesburg ; vast quantities of 
[axiros and military supplies are being daily imported, and 
H elaborate force of artillery is drilled and equipped ; mili- 
try parade is incessant, and everything ia done to impress 
18 Uitlanders with a sense of subjection to the armed forces 
f the Executive^ and of being governed by a power which is 
idependent of their opinion. Threats, it la said, are freely 
made to commandeer obnoxious Uitlanders in the event of 
jlsturbanc^s ; everywhere the Transvaal eagle, adopted as the 
bol of military authority, ia paraded in the face of the 
hannes burger. German officials assist in this organisation 
military forces, and so far from conditions ia this respect 
,g better, they are worse than at the time of the publica- 
m of the Manifesto. 



•• Wo have tiow openly the policy of force revealed to ua : £250,000 

I to be spent uikjh the completing of a. fort at Pretorin, £100^000 is to be 

ni upOD a fort to terrorise the inhabitants of JohanneftbLLrg ; large 

I an wst to Krupp'B for big guns, Maxims have been ordered^ and 

even told tbiit German uflicera aro coming cut to tlrill tbe 



This anticipation of the Manifesto has been more than 
rified. 
The exclusion of the Uitlandor from office in the Rft- 

K 2 



133 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

public, quite apart from tJie resultant roiagovemment at- 
tributed to it, is confiidered a serious grievance. Public 
office has always been regBrded among English-speaking 
people as a reward for public servioe, and as a atimulos W 
public spirit. The position under which the permanent 
reaideut is excluded from any hope of rendering a»y aervice 
to the commonwealth is regarded afi not merely implying a 
stigma of inferiority, but as depri\'ing the English-speaking 
population of a valued element in their social life, and a& 
invaluable stimulus to interest in public afTairs. This is 
particularly a grievance felt by Eritlah residents on tlie 
Band, accustomed to traditions of self-government and e<iual 
citizenship. The special grievance of the Afrikander Uit- 
landers consists in the preference shown to Hollanders BS 
opposed to Afiikauders in appointments in the public 
service. 

" Wh«D we remem'ber,'' doclareR tbe MAiiifsBiCi, " tti&t tiiase who bold 
power belong to a different racCt speak a different Ijmguage, land b&Tv 
different pursuits from ounelves, that they regard ub with suipicioD aad 
ev^n with hostility, that &s a nile they are nat educated meo, attd tliat 
tlieir [jaHEtoiiB ara i>layoti upon by uoftcrupuloufl adventurers, it aiusl be 
wlrcitteU that we ure in very ^eat danger. ... In th* most imponant 
de]»rtmeuts of State we are being controlled by the geatlemeD from the 
Low Countrj^ while the innocent Boer hugii to himself the deluaton that 
he )H preserving his iiidepetidence. They Control Ub politically through 
Dr. beyda, finaaciAlly tilirough the Ketherboda Railway, educAt^LtUAlly 
through Dr. MfinBvelt, aod in the department of justice through 
Coster." 

A Johannesburger writes to me : — 

**^The railway departmenta aa well as the educational depArtment 
manned almofit eicluNvely by Hollanders, and many of tlie inort 
res|>oiiBible poBt« Are Ukewi^ occupied by Hollanden. It ie undoretood 
t1ia.t a gotid many Oemians have within the ti:»t few years heeu iniported 
into the Stat«, and occupy poBitiona in the military and Tolunteer corjN- 
Pew Bngliahmen are einployt-d ip any office of tmijt by the Qovemineot, 
aiid the NetherEa.ndii Railway in, uf coitrBe, in CN^rm^n a.nd BoUftuder 
bonds, BLs aIbo is the dynamite Induatry, the mint, and the Nallunal 
Bank." 



Aa a proof that legal oppression of the Uitlaudera haa 



4 



UITLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 133 

iDcreased sinoe Mr. Chamberlain's remonstrance of February 
1896, attention is called to the recent legislation, suth as the 
Press Law, the Alien Expulsion Act, the Jadiciary Law, and 
tbe proposed Disarmament Act. The anticipation of the 
Manifesto has again heen confirmed. 

"The Vplkaraad htut by roaolutioti aBirni^ the principle of ftdTnmis- 
tratiTe expul^oB^ and has iDlit^u{^ted the Government to briag; in the Bill 
accordingly UBit sesBion. To-dny this power leBta juatly with tho Courts 
of Law, aod I can only uty that if this Bill becomes kw, the power of the 
Executtre G-DT^mraaDt of this country would be aa aboolute as the jwwer 
of ihe Csar of EuHsia. We abail haTo BaiU good-bye finally to the l«fit 
principle of liberty." 

A year later than the Manifesto the Bill passed the 
Volksraad. 

A lawyer writea to me : — 

**The AlJen £x.pul«ion Act ia flcandaloua and ao reptilaiTe to South 
AfricatL wa.ya of thinking that I doubt whether it will ever bo enforced. 
The Press Act ia in direct oppositioti to the Grqud Wet, is moBt 
oppreBure, and w atringent tliat it will produce a vaat amount of barm.*^ 

There is none of that security for liberty which springs 
from the existetice of a fixed constitution, whether written 
or unwritten. The First Volkaraad is legally supreme, and 
blindly adopts the suggestions of the Executive. 

" The LegiaUture in this country," sayft the MaBifesto, " ia the snpremo 
power, apparently uncontrolled by any fixed ounatitutioa. The chance 
will of th€ majority in the Legislature, elected by one-third of the people, 
is capabk of dominating ua in every ralatiDn of Ufa. 

**Cotoing to the ExBcntive Go^rnment, we find that there is no true 
reepoaieibility to the people. None of the great departments of State are 
I controlled by miniateri&l officers in the proper aenae ; the Preflident's will 
Is Tirtiially suproiDe, and he, with h\i uniquti iDfluetice over the legislators 
of this State^ oided by aQ able, if boatile,. State Secretary, has been the 
author of erery act directed againat the liberties of the people.** 

The recent dispute between the judges on the one band, 

, and the Legislature and the Executive on the other, is fresh 

I in the public mind. Tbe judges endeavoured to assert the 

overriding force of the constitution, the Grond Wet of 1858, 

as againat the temporary will of a trftnaitory majority in the 



134 



THE SETTLEMEST AFTER THE WAR 



Tolfanad. Ths VallnwH iiiMtiiil its wn» e m e powor, 

, flaoed in ths hnds of thd ExeeidiTQ the 
tfae jfldgM ukM the judges vgKOod to 
■ lo tfe i^ or "teBttng" YdlkaMii 
lirfiiVi bj di* Guild WoL Vov, m a jn^ge ramnked. th« 
TcAsnftd, faoag kgd^ tiifwp^ maj declare tlio Prendmt 
ft king by ft iitf C Miy of cai^ or wxj cede the tezTxtAdr^ ur 
G e iiMuj I7 ft fika naioritj. 

Sto admoiBkBliaB of JastiDe vsxt ooam vncr coooioQn- 
tkB. It is eo^lMBad tW ifaft jodgBB lure no ftUfacli^ of 
toBme, tfaftt th^ aie nofc sftfiriBHlty paid, that the Executive 
ftad tbfi Lqjsdfttsie iiftwlsftllj infterfive in iheix decmons ia 
li eu ifit cam, and bane aooted their joiiadicticm in many 
iiHiml— t paiticDlanL Hmr in«ecsre thdr tenure of ofiioe is 
laaj \m ihwiii fiiaa usaiiVitrMsi if lV nle fiv fotoxe pnetioe 
iTffftHAad by t^ iwa^ Vcftsnad imhmi on the coti- 
rtkntinnal gaeHiwi ▲ no* rasniarinii of the Yolkanad 
mMpawms tht A«didKBt to dbHOSi 4ie jn^gss, one or all, 
Mtiiwi* t^sv pfeOttasQ to ■ ! > * —<*■< aa olnoodoos oopfltitotiopal 
theuj. llMir ii w lii ii wt paj has matsf ntaiflBiraMe tttnlts. 
No oomplftDt is mt00 as to say want ef ^ri^itneoB o& the 
port of thi^ indiTMiixal judges iioir on the beoi^ but it is 
aaartad Aat thsir ■wdast nlaij of a fiaw thosaands a year 
ia not a safiaeBt attnactian to Becnre the best lawyers in the 
Bspaihlic, vho would be etaapelled to sacrifice a Luge portioD 
of Aeir iMoaastt hf aoa^ttng jadidal offios;. It is felt, also, 
to be aBQBsaloiia aad atKiwritahle that caoaes inTolving the 
owiMfship of toany milKrtfca thoold be oomiiiitted Co die 
dnniiiri of oficiala ao inadwisatriy ramDnsated. It is not 
■aHiium ttai tha jadges dhoaU in bet be opright ; they 
ifaoald be placed in such a positton of dignity and aaolmoeiLt 
■8 to nndsr the eomplaxBt of iftinariitfinil Htzgants in great 
caosea oawoothy of attwirina or aedODoe. The inter£exenoe 
with the disaetioQ of dte jn^gea in specific cases adopted hy 
the Votkaaad od mae than obo nnrarim has been the subject 
of wnmsatt instaDoea of whSA an to be fbond in the 
Maniftiata Srsn peoding eaaea an aaid to have been inte;^ 
faied with by YolkaMd kriMt 



rUlTLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 135 
The Mamfeato declaiea ; — 

*• The Hijgh Court of tliis country has, in the abecQace of repreaentaticm, 
the sole gmkrdiftn of our libertieB. Although it has on tiie whole done 
Tk ablj, affoirB are in a very miBatiafactory pogitioiii The Juilgas 
law been underfed, th«ir salaries have never been aecui^ the matt 
UBdjgnifiad treatmfitit hs» been meted out to them, and the BtatuB and 
Indi^MEnileiice of the Bench have on more than one occaifion been attftcked. 
A deHherate iittempt wan made two years ago by President Kruger and 
t^ ODYemment to reduce the Bench to a poBition eubordmate to the 
Ex«cuti%-e CfOTommpnt, and only recflntiy we bad in the Witfont^in 
matter the hut of the ca»eti m which the Legi&lature interfered with vested 
rights of action." 

The limitiog of the juxisdiction of the Courts ia pointed 
out as another ominous tendency, 

" In a law, introduced hy the [irefient GoverDinent^ the Government, 
iiurtead of the Courte, are conetituted the final judges in cbbcb of dieputed 
BlectdoDa. No election committeefl Ave allowod. This operatca agaisBt 
i^Ddidatu opposed to the Government, bccauee the Q^Temment has 
Tirtually a vaet atsBding army of committeemen and henchmen, ojficialu 
being allowed opetdy to ttike part in Bwaying elecHons ; and the Govern- 
moot ifl in a poaitioiL by the distribution of contracts, appointmemtfl, 
pttrdiaae cf conoesBionfi, the ex^ienditure of jeecret aeirice money, and 
Qtberwim to bring iaUi existence and maintain a large number of &up- 
porteTB who act as canvaaseri — always on the right aide in times of 
eleotion.*' 

Kob merely is the cognisance of election disputes removed 
fi-om the jurisdiction of the Courts, but the recent Alien 
Eipulaion Act similarly deprives the Uitlonder of this 
protection of his liberty. The orgtmiaation of the tribunals 
in other reapects is not favourable to the Uitlander. 

** The great bulwark of liberty, the right to tiial by jurymen, ffho are 
our peent, ia denied to us. Only the burgher or naturalised burgher is 
«iititl^ to be a juiyman, or, in other wordK, anyone of us is liable to be 
tfied upon the gravest charge pu&Hible by jurymen who are in no sense our 
peen, who belong to a different race, who r^ard us with a greatef or lesa 
degree of hoatilily, and whose passioiiB, if inflame<i, might prompt them, 
aa weak human creatureBj to inQicC the gravest injuaticeSf even to deprive 
men of their Hvee, Suppoaing, in the preeent teow condition of political 
feeling, anyone of us wer« tried before a Boer jury on any charge having a 




THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

poliUc^ Abtout about it, Bboald we bo ^«d b^ oar peoa, «ad should w»| 
have « chtiQce of receiTing cnreD-handed jufttiw ? 

"The High Court hardly ccsmtm tuider thU consuret aJthtm^r ^ * 
Eeoenl aenae, there is mdadminiiitraUoEi, firat^ in the imder-iwymeoi of 
the judgflB ; etcondf in the occaeiuDal pressure [mt u|)on the High Ctnirt , 
bf th« GDv«niQL>eiil ; third, in the^ ab«cnc€ of attj Court of Appeal, wlttcfaj 
latt«T defect m viewed 04 a gre^t hanlahip In a coimtiy in which mh 
of Ivige magnitude ara convtantlj the subject of litigadoti.*' 

The treatment of natives is not usually supposed to be an 
Uitlander grievancej and has not figured largely in their j 
indictment against the Goveroraent, nevertheleaa, it is to 
found in the Manifesto of the National Union. 

" The admlniBtration of NatiTe AfTalrB ia a groaa sandal and a hauu { 
of imiDCDBe lorn and daogtr to the community. Native conuniatioDBn 
have been ].«Tznitt«d to practise extortion, injuetice and cruelty upm tba 
baCtTea under thetr juriMlirtiiJii. The Government has allowed p0tij 
tlibea to be goaded into rebellioo. W>e hnve had to pay tlie Cutis id tha 
'wars' while the wretched victim* of thtnr pulicy liave had tbrar trib« 
broken up. 8ourc« of native labour have been dertrtiyod, and Urge , 
numbers of prieonera have been kept in gaol for «om<rt)ung like aghteea ■ 
moDtha without trial. It whs Htat«d in the uewapRpera that, out of sixty* * 
three men imiiriBoaed, thirty-one ha<i di«i iu that period, while the foat 
were hmguiflhing to dtatb for want of vegetabJe fooda. We have had 
revelatioQS of repulsive cruelty on the part of Fi&ld-Comete.'" 

On the question of the treatment of natives as the main 
cause of the diviaion between the Dutch and the British, a 
leading Johannc^burger writea to me : — 

" The question of the treatment of the nativee in the form c£ the I 
admiaeion or not of the coloured people to poUttctd and civU rights titill I 
coDBtitutes the main cftuse which tends to maintain the sepaTatlon of the 
Dutch and DritiBh. In the Republics, the coloured p&jplc are entirely 
excluded frotn political and paitiaUy excluded from civil rights- In the 
British ColoniBS, the principle of political equality, irretupective of colqur, 
is eBtabliBhed.*^ 

Hie programme of the Imperialist organiaation, the South 
African League, even in the *' Transvaal Province," includes 
a profession of faith in the political equality of black and 
white. 

The l&st item in the long indictment against the Boer 



I 




UITLANDER INDICTMENT AGAINST PRETORIA 137 

admiobtiution rvfers to tho general conduct fknd policy of 
the Government as distin^iiahed from inherent vice of 
origin. 

"In the ftdralDiBtrfttion,'' daclarcB the Manifesto of the National 
nuion, "^wf; find timt Ihete h the gn>i!B»t ektrava<;aJQc« ; that Kcrot 
service monejH am lujuojidered^ that votes are exooeilod, that the public 
Credit i« pletlged in a manner that in wholly inainaimtant with tiia 
intereeU of the public. Money ia eaid tu have beeu twnt out uf tho 
country for secret service jftirj)OBefl, ami the public ftuiilt BecniH a frtrce. 

" The R<liniiii8tratii:'D t^f the publii; eerviee in iii a ecamlAlous cuutiition ; 
t ribery an J comiptitin aro rampant; we have k-ul menibera of the Rud 
accepting presents ... A cluii of meo has eprung up who ure in cuhAtaut 
sttraidance upon the membera of the VolkeraAd, and whoH« special biutlneM 
Hcnu to bo the influent-L&g the&e tnembera one way or the other, 1 think 
thousanda of you are ti&tiiified of the venality of many of our public Bcr- 
Tabta. ] wialt u» piArd a^ioBt ih« afiBumption that ftll public serranta am 
corrupt; thank Qui there nremany who are able and honourable meu ; and 
it BJUBt be gall and womiwowl to these men to find the whole tooo of tlio 
■enice dntroyed, and to have tbcmaelveft mndo liable to be included m 
the genera] dcaunciatioD." 

"The general mJiniriistFaUon," writes a leading advocate, "is rotten to 
the core ; where there ia no comiption there is groes iRnorance ; and in no 
department are the bulk of the men up to their work." 

A resident in Johanneabuj^ writes to me : — 

*^ Haladminitjtratiud may cotne under two heailp, fir«t, official coirup' 
tioD, second, official iucomjietencyr Both forme of malAdministr&tton exiat 
Tery largely in ihe Trtuuivaal, It \b unnecessary to particulariHe, aa the 
facts are notoriDUE." 

Tlie indictment of Transvaal methods of administration 
put forward on behalf of the Uitlanders may therefore be 
summarised as follows : — 

The Government of the RepubSic is an arbitrary Govern- 
ment, and is elected by a minority of the population. It is 
retrograde and narrow-minded, and opposed to liberal 
principlea of Government. It is oppressive in taxation and 
insulting in demeanour. It affects the methods of a military 
autocracy under cover of the forma of BepubUcan administra* 
tiou. It is incompetent through ignorance in the head and 
ignorance in the hands. The administration is extravagant 
tmd it is corrupt. 



138 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

I have endeavoured in the foregoing to set forth in their 
own langaage the dainis of the Uitlanders of the TransTaal, 
and their interpretation of the policy of the GoTemment of 
the Bepublic 

It will be my task to set ont the other side of the question 
as it has been represented to me by leaders of both political 
sections of the Boer population. This reply wiU deal first 
with the great allegation of an active anti-British and anti- 
Uitlander policy on the part of the Government of the 
Bepublic, and next with the special items of individual 
grievance as formulated by the Uitlander leaders. 




HATE already set forth in their own language the claims of 
the Uitlanders of the Transvaal and their interpretation of the 
policy of the Government of the Republic. It la now my 
task to set out the other side of the question, as it has been 
represented to me by the leaders of both political sections of 
the Boer population. 

This reply will deal with the general allegation of an 
anti-British and anti-Uitlander pohcy of the Boet Govern- 
ment of the Hepubhc, and also with the special items 
of individual grievances as formulated by the Uitlander 
leadei^. 

The Boer denies that the action of the Government, or of 
either political section of the Boera^ is guided by a sentiment of 
active hostility towards British interesta or Britiah-bom inha- 
bitants. A rogard for their independence is the impelling 
motive which dictates their policy ; they deny that there ia 
any such design aa that aacribed to them by the Uitlander 
leaders, of desiring to supersede British influence in South 
Africa. Tbey point out that it is difficulty from their stand- 
point, to see any identity of interest between the Uitlander in 
the Transvaal and the Imperial Government in England, If 
the franchise were conceded to British residents, the effect 
wotald be to deprive the Imperial Government of so many 
aubjects ; and no State has hitherto regarded it as a matter 
of political advantage to be deprived of its snbjecta. 

The policy of the TransvaiaJ (a leading adTocate writes) is Bimply cme 
of inteniA] independence; thti QoTcrnment BJid the ruling burgLen wuit 



MD 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



■fffly to be faft aiam to dksps ^m own m&jo, to vakc tbeir own Uw«, 
topotoet tbvowB fciiM, ail ^Midlyto wwatoin odartw^od tfaar 
pifify livtodi ^ eoftomd fwai, wUeb b i iiiwtoiilly IhnatoMd ty 
fw w wfa l pvtito ia EBghBd. . . . Thm ^t^Cf m to citcna! leklaoa* h 
•inqilr (■■ dnetod to mcvb an* MJr libar iMMul iwWtm d m ea. 
Anj —mnlinB tint thnw ii ■ iliiiMiil pnBrr i» ttm lift nf thn TnnrrMl 
to tvmt biim with GvoHuy i* witiwat touadaAm. Tfae Bon wmld 
ptdtt tai^Bt tk nx to Impcrkl mki to thtx ot any odhK Paw; bok Uicy 
hftTi BO deoR to b« BDl^ca to mbj fcnipi Power whatvnr. 

As to the TiricKB points of eridenoe adduced to prone 
Uk exifttenoe of an active and-Brilash policy , they ate all 

capable of different inteipretaticnt. 

Coming nov to tht specific gnenxtcBi set forth as 
affectiDg the Citlander residents, a somewhat diff^ent 
reply is made by the FicogTeasive from that made by the 
Conservadve party among the buighen. 

The Progressives aie inclined to admit that there ate 
certain ^evances, but not such as to justify the violent 
attempt to overthrow the Government of the Republic which 
has been made by the Jameson Raid, or the Press propa- 
ganda which has been carried on to discredit the policy of 
the Government abroad. 

To take the question of the franchise fii^t A Progressive 
writes to me : — 

Inasmnch u compidswy mlJjtuy service i* co&Bdqtie&t oa nitanlin- 
tiWt i think the priTil^H of aatundiration not adeqajbto to what a 
itxpecXed fwm the nev burgher who cui only vute for the Sfloocid 
Tolksnad. 



A Conservative writes r — 

I do not Bee that the Uitlu)d«n h»VQ *ay grieranM u regards 
tnachiie. It is merely in Helf-derenee that tb*^ ue excluded ; and they 
ahoidd be excluded, as they would upset the Government if they obtained 
political power. In no country in tlic world vuuld nn overwhelming body 
of foreigDers be allowed to obtain the franchiee and swfvp the votes of the 
orj^al dwellers. Aft regards the contrast between the frtmehiM law in 
tl:d> Republic and the Free State, and the fact that the law was origmally 
icie^icfli, H is aufiicient *o My thst circiimfltancea hare altered in the 
South African Bepublic, srni they are no longer the same aa liioee of the 
*^r«e State. Thousands of iuimigranta arhve every mooth In the Tnoa- 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 



141 



▼a»l, but the Free State is afflicted with do gucH ftdditioas to its 
popuUtioB. 

An eminent Judicial authority • writes to me : — 

Aa regards tbe fraacSiiec questiotij 1 iinderatand it to be nieaot tliat it 
is felt SB a hardilup by ikllish subjocts that thej are not allowed, except 
under certAio etringeDt coaditioDi^> io cai^t oS tbeir iUJc<;iftnce and becoine 
burghore of the South Afri<;an Republic (aoy idea of dual alle^nce lA, of 
eoime, out of the queetioQ and iie&l not be disctisBed), and what 1 bare 
here said of Britieh subjects of wuTKe also refers to pereone uf other 
nationalities ; but aince no exception can be miido of one nationality more 
iban another thiA restriction applies to alieoB of all uationalitiee. A 
historical retrospect will, I tbink, tend to show tbat what Is regarded as a 
grievance is, on the other eide, regardoii simply ae a legitimate means of 
self-defence agftinst foreigu — one may say British — aggression, I believe 
I am correct Id eaying that before the Traneva&l aonexation no cunotry 
could haw been more liberal as regards graoting the rigiits of citizenship 
to newcomerfl than the South African Republic. If I am not miBtaken, a 
i«HideQce of wx mouths sufiicoil to <jntitle them to burgher rights. The 
Republics have been liberal in this respect — the Free State stili, inasmuch 
aa no aggresBton upon ita LodependencQ has tks yet rendered it oecetiKarj to 
be on ita guard against sets of that nature. When the Brst goldfieldB of 
the Tranivoul were discoverod a couHiderable number of atrangera 
(chiefly Briti(«h Hubjecta) gettle'l in tlie country, particularly at Pilgrini'ft 
Bnt. I beheve^ again, that I am correct in saying that two mfimberB were 
allowed t*> them as their repreBentativea in the Legislatiire. The conduct 
of those new reaidenta viu on the whole not such as would encourage 
any Government to allow them to have a say in the affairs of the country. 
They hampered, insulted, and miaEepreBented the Government in cv^'ry 
poHsible way^ and it aeetos to have been partly due to the intrigues of 
these men, as well as a number of Britisli reHidentH in the towns, that the 
country subsequeoUy lost its inde[>endence for a time. Wheu the South 
AiricaD Bepublic afterwards regained itti independence that occurrence 
creatfld tha bitterest resentment among the Euglish'^spoakiug |>ortion of 
the Transvaal community. Some of them burietl the Engliub dag and 
placed a graveatone on the site with the motto " Resurgam." Eighteoua- 
uess was with them nccounted for nought. gon;e of their organs expressed 
the utmcAi hostility and disloyalty to l^publican GovemmenL A ttimilar 
spirit has subi^uently been not infrequently shown by Britifth f<ubjecta: 
wibiess the manner Id which the head of tliE; State has been insultod when 
be visited Johannesburg^ and ako oik the occasion when Li.>rd Lik-Il 
Tisited Pretoria British oewepapers have b^n constantly reiterating 



Chief Justice Melius de Villiers of the Orange Free State. 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



that it would do! be long bofora^ wiUt the ooatinned Urge iofiux of 
EngUflh people, the TrantrwAl woolil igun be BnglJah territary, and 
thflu wen the vame newspftpen th^t denunded the ft&Dchise for the 
Bcituh UltluLdn. The Uitbradw vt wxtj other oMwinltiy, by the wajr, 
u hanilj ever coiuidered worthy of b^oitg tAkon into account Tlrt 
profevod UitUpdcr organa at JohamuBburg hare elways oxhiUted tJu 
mmt virulent hatrad of the Boer ; no irords of abuH have bem conadvad 
too bad fbf the laUar. One of them had the hardihood to aimouikea thit 
tha Boar ntut be cniahed. Mote than once tare I raul i-hapao£cd 
aooounti uf the enthusiutic manner in which in the TramnrBal ** God 
Bav6 the Queen " ha« been ntug om occasioDH when it h certainly qnitft 
out of phica. Can it he wondered at that after the Bntish GoTemmoDt 
retired from the TroaeviO&I meaBures were at once ta^en to Tna.in«Ain and 
preaerve tha Indfipeadaaoe of the wustry through th« reatnctioos cf the 
rranchiae? and can it be wondered at tliat the old-eetabliahed popuUtioa 
of the country, who lore and cberiiih their Independenoe, should be loth to 
roUx exiatiiLg rcetrictions so long aa the British Imperial Govemineot 
ramaliui a factor in South African B^aira ? Wliy fthouJd we, more than 
any other people^ relieh the idea uf being extln^dhai an an iodepeqdeut 
nation ? dngJish people wouid not wimIi that England should become 
aubjoct to Germany. Why Bhould Bubjectioo to foreign power be tbnuit 
opoD ua ? And surely ito own right of continued independent existence 
muitt by the Traneraal be regarded aa a matter that ia paramjount and 
that cannot be suhardinated to the alleged right of others to control Om 
deHtinieB of the country. Judging fnxn the press org&ns advocating the 
caiiea of the Britiah UiiUnder, it in nubjeetioit of the raw and of 
country to British supremacy that is sought. "The Boer aurt 
cruAhed,^ one of their organs haa said., If euth a spirit prevails, one may» 
with confideocc aa to the reply, ask an im parti uUy-miudeil man whether 
the old-estabtiithed population ia not jufitl6od in treating the matter of 
extension of the franchiee with the utruont caution. This matter (^nnot 
be settled in accordance with tb^ doctricaire thaorlee of what are alleged 
to be the principlea of Republican Govertimenl» but the nafety of the 
Btflto ia the supreme law which muwt serve &» a guide in the matter. 

And another EngllnJumaii admits that it is unreaaonahle to expect 
the Hoers to givo full political power to Englishmen, who would ha 
numerous enough to hand the ijonntry over to the Imperial Government 
or the Chfirtered Comfttiny. 

ABother observee— Onp Englinhmon haa written, " The Boer ia aa 
Jealoua of hia political indejiendenoe oa the Yankee or the Swiss." 

As regards the educational grievance a Progreasive leader 
wiitea to mc aa follows ; — 

As regania tb« language question in the BchoolB, I consider the 
^ioTUkoa really exiats ; I would put the two langut^es on on equal 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 



H3 



footing ; I distlnguiAh betw^etn the acfaoo]«, tha Latv CourtA, and the 
public departnuntB. Allowing EogllBh to be epokan in the l&t.t>er might 
facilitate humueea ; but [nlitical coD&ideraUoBit make it necasaary to 
loaiiitaia the language as a maik of the Boer character of tbo Republic 
bod an uaertion of their absolute Lndapendence. 

A Conservative on this question writes : — 

We give more pdrileges here to foreign languageB, Euch as BngH&h, 
tlum pn given to foreign laQgua^g^ in England or in any uthef country. 
In other countries, if foreigners wish their children to learn their 
language, they have to [my nli expenbes; but here the Qovermnent pays 
part. I ehould like to see the reception which the British rarlianienb 
would give to a request that the language in schools should be Gertcuic in 
the east end of London, and Yiddiab in other quarters. "Wtt admit that 
for commerce both language^ (should be known, but not that it should be 
mada eompulaory in the Bchooia. Teoa of thoueanda in Jobanue&burg 
are foreigD or fiussian Jews. Why do they Itot make the eaiae com- 
plaint? 

As regards the use of the language in the courts of law 
and public offices, both sections of burghers are agreed that 
the official use of the language is a defence of the inde- 
pendence of the countrj and a standing protest against 
any infiltration of anti-Republican ideas. A Conservative 
writes : — ' 

If the munigranta wish to speak SngUeh^ why have they come here? 
Ab regards the statement that the English'^iHaking are in the mBjority^ 
we deny it. They ace not in the tiiajorily, if you escept those who speak 
both lauguagie». If the Eiiglii^h-sfieaking are In the nmjority^ then we 
dispute the right of a. niajurity of intrudsFS, 

Aa regards tie invitation Argument (that the Uitlanders have been 
invited to immigrate*), it is aufficient to eay that the conditions of invita- 
tion have been carried out. No promiiM waa tuBde to them that the 
language of the Bepublic would be altered. TranagresHiunH of the law 
have been pa««od over such as would nut have been permitted elBBwhere. 
The iuvitatiou addreased to the immigranta was, to come, provided they 
obeyed the Uwa ; qne of the tawi Toqmring the ufie of the Dutch language. 
There is no polity en the pan of the Boer Govemmetit or burgber^ lo 
oufit Biitiah infiuence and British language from South Africa, and 
aubdtituta Dutch. Ab to their doure to preserve the Dutch longuagBf 



Letter of Secretary Ewald EeBelen. 13th December, 1883, 



iU 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



ihejr chief reuoo for doing bo is becatiM they cwiinder \t part of Umit 
inheritamce in the put^ and a bulwark of tiunx ittdepaadoico in the 
present. 

English policy, it may be said, aUows Dutch to b© apokea 
in the Cape Parliament; but the liberties and constitution 
of thu Hepublic do not rest upou eo secure a basis as to 
admit of a step which would neceasarily be the first towards 
diminiahing the influence of the bui^her. It is also pointe«i 
out that the Duteh- speaking p(>pulatiQn have always laid 
great stress on the right to use tiielr native tongue. And 
one of their grievances, still remembered, is that Sir Owen 
Lanyon failed to keep the promise of Sir Theopbilue 
Shepstone in his pro<damatioQ that both languages should be 
used. Sir Owen Lanyon appointed officials who refused to 
speak Dutch. 

As r^ards the language qiiegtkon (writes another correspondent), in 
a letter to the Ninetetinth'. Century, I referred to the tie&tmeDt of the 
Ihitch-Bpeakiog inhabitants uf tliu Cape Cobcy by the British Goveni- 
tiieat. There an alien Government stepped iu imd delitwratdy Buppr«a«4(l 
the eximtuig rif£cial language then in ubg by the vast bulk uf the inhabi- 
tants (seven-eighths, Rt leiLst), imptised various di&abilitiee upoD those 
naing that language, di^lowed ite use in Parliament,, Courts of Law, end 
KuhHiLliEted bcUooIij. This contiDued for over fiixty years, when first the 
Dulch-apeaking community were is a poRition to command a majority in 
rflrliameotf and to obtain some dq^ree of restitution. They bore their 
disabilitiea quietly and patiently, without talking of revolution or making 
the world resound with the sad tale of their woes. Yet merely it is a 
far greater grievance for a people to be deprived of their own country, of 
the privileges which tiiey have enjoyed, than for a new popxilation coming 
inlu a eountry not to obtain equal privileges with the old inhabitaiit£, 
eapeclally when they knew what they were coming bo. 

I have more than once beard it Baid in the Cspe Colony, " This IB n 
British Oolooy ; it '\b quite right that the official language and tlte 
language of education fthould be EDgheh. If a people do not know ii, 
ihey muKt learn iU" It would he cooHtdered a moDstroue things I have 
no doubt, to make a eSmllar remark, mutatis mutandis^ in tJie TransToal. 
In South Africa it BO aeldom occurh that '* what is sauce for the goose is 
aauee fur the gander" 1 do not myself see the '^ right" of any body of 
men coming into a country^ where a foreign language is Eiioken, to niake 
& grievance of the fact that »uch a language ia not wholly or partiaUy 
Burrendered in favour of their own ; I would, as a matter of grace, not 



t 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 14$ 

rights be in fsTour of giriDg the Englub language every priTllegs thai ii 
reiutoaable vA fair^ even At the public departmaLte, la answer to my 
letter to the Nineteenth Ctntvrjf it has been B&id, " At alt ereots, in 
the Cape Colony the Diitch-flpeating people have had the opportunity of 
maJdng their toIccr heard on the language quostion^ whereas in the 
TVausv&al the Engtish-speftking population have had none." To my 
mind there is no analogy between tlie two cases. 

The financial grievances enumerated by Mr. Chamberlain 
similarly do not receive a single reply from the Boer, 
opinion being divided as to the existence and extent of the 
grievances alleged and aa to the remedies applicable. The 
recent Report of the Industrial Commiasion is euf&cient 
evidence of the difference of opinion in thiA matter, therefore 
it does not need to be dwelt on at any length. 

"It is maintained^" Boye Mr. Chaml^erlata, "that tha financee »ra 
mikmanoged; that the expemliture i^capea proper control and audit, tha 
taxation u maintained bdyoiid the needs of adminifi^tration ; that unfair 
diacrimination ib general in the collection of personal taxes; that tb« 
import duti«s on the neoaBRaries of life are a hardship on the working- 
claaHeB^ and w xaim th« coet of workiiig the minea as to be effectually 
probibiUjiy to the working of the poorer onea. If the tftsatioD was 
apportioned to the ability to pay a large aumber might be open to Ui« 
general advantage." 

It is notable, however, that the amount of admiaaion 
made by the most advanced Progreaaivea is substantially no 
more than that taxation has been levied on a wrong baais^ 
that the production of the mines and the working of the low- 
grade mines has been unnecesfiarily interfered with. Both 
parties nnito in denying that the finances are roismaaaged or 
that the expenditure escapes proper control or audit, or 
that the taxation is maintained beyond the needs of tha 
administration. 

A Frogreatdva writes : " I do Dot believe the expenditure it dispropor- 
tionate to the population. Look at the expenditure in Hhodesia ; and as 
to the taxation being excenaive, conuder that Bhodeaia exacts fifty per 
cent, on proGts of miniag ventures. It Is a purely English idea that gold 
in the reefh belongs to a private person ; th« law of moat couDtriee p'ren 
the mining rights to the State, and it waa for the State, as representing 

h 



146 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the whole commmutf, to dicUte t«reas cm which prirftte peraoDS m 
allowed to benefii by tlie partidiiatioD in public property.'* " Them u no 
unfair discrimination" (writee a Conservative) *'iii the coUeettdti at 
pencmAl tun, aot in favour of ftrmern. The impoelA cm luiunea are 
lets than tboM impoud in the Aiaerie&n Eepublio. A tariff for tb« 
protectioD of the produce of tbp countty may, or may not, be a mjirtakeii 
policy ; but Eogliithnie^n shQuld reco^^iuae that it is at loast a policy 
adopted by moiBt of the world, aod which th« buif^botv are entitjod to 
adopt if they think Bt. Thero ij no grierranoe wfo^iixig on the Uiil«&d«r 
raidents u ihe tqsuIi of tbut tariff. It i« inipoadble to make a ring in 
«uth produce; Boer fannera have no such ideaa of comhininig, and tie 
fertility of the country is too greaU" 

As to the objection to expenditure on warlike pre- 
parations they are fiimply necessities^ forced on. the bm^faer 
by the revolutionary plots of discontented immigrants. If 
there were no Jameson Haid thera would be no such 
expenditure. | 

As regards the exceptional reBtrictiona imposed by the 
law on the right of public meetLng^ referred to by Mr. 
Chamberlain^ the Boer a position is that, as Mr. Chamberlain 
himself admits, those restrictions have not been strictly 
interpreted. The power is only held in reserve, and, as a 
matter of fact, has not been actually enforced. An adirocate 
writes to me: "The law of the Transvaal on the subject is 
framed on that of England ; show me a meeting that has yet 
been proclaimed." In any case, it is held that a& long as 
there ia in existence a discontented party consisting of 
foreigners desirous of overturning the Government, every 
Government, having the right of self-defence, is justified in 
retaining in its hands these extraordinary powers. 

As regards the grievances of the mining industry, next 
teferred to by Mr, Chamberlain, the Report of the Mining 
Commission and the discussion in the Volksraad show that 
opinion on the Boer aide on this matter is largely divided. 
The recommendations of the Commission represent the viewB 
of the Progressive section ; the opposition thereto^ that of the 
other party. Ab the Eeport of the Mining Commission is 
already before the world it is unnecessary that I should here 
reiterate theii reoommendationB : I will content myself 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UlTLANDER H? 

therefore by giving the argumonts of the eiti^me Con- 
servativea on this matter as they have been preBented to me. 

'*Aa r$gardEi tlto general policj of coDonnont!,'' writM oaa of my 
informanta, "if uone had Iwen ^vea at the itarting of the induatry none 
would be given now, hut it would be diehonoBt to hreak mir contfjuita with 
capitalista who have expenJod enonnouB Buma of money. The State w»a 
obliged to adopt this policy of concoaaioa at the time at which it wu 
Adopted. The country wan poor, them were no induBtriee* and when 
capitalists offered to bring money for inveHtment they expected reaaoDEthle 
aecurity for their return. Aa regarde the dynamite moaopoly — in all 
Europe there are only two dynamite companies. Nobel enjoye a practical 
monopoly in the North, England, and Germany, and another group of 
4»jritali8tH that of the South. Their joint action has. recently been illue- 
trated, and is additional proof of the danger to this country of being 
obliged to rely on foreign supplies. It is also to be remembered that not 
merely the gold induHtry, but, En case of war, the interoBte of the State 
would be affected unless the producttoQ of eiplomvea waa efitabliBhod in 
the country iteelf. Ae a meiwuro of military necessity powder miuet be 
manufactured in this oountcy, as in time of war the porte woidd bo cloaed, 
and this HepuhUc, being surrounded by Britiah territory, would not be to 
a pueition to obtain suppUes from abroad. 

"Aft r^arda the conMBBion to the Nothcrlande Railway, the aame 
ugnmonte apply; no ono else waa ready to construct the railway at the 
time the concoBBion was grantud, and, howeFer desirable it might have 
been to avoid the reaulting reetrictiona on the induetry due to the working 
of the railway, it is impoeaible to (^t rid of the coiutequeDcea of the paAt. 

" Aa regardf! the apirit conceesion* tt ia enough to aay that the policy 
of tasting ttauriesj such ae spirits lias been approved of by all countrioB, 
and the Go^renimeat in this coontrj- U entitled to adopt eimilarly euch a 
policy. The flome conBiderattona apply to the protective tariff adopted by 
the Government to favour the agricultural products of the Transvaal 
farma." 

Aa to the condition of the police service in Johaimosburg 
and the restriction of recruiting to burghers, who, accotdiag 
to Mr. Chamberlain, " cannot be expected to furnish adequate 
material from which to select candidates for this department 
of the public serrine," the reply is that it is not to be 
expected thut a population which showed itself ready to 
overturn the Govemtnent in armed revolt, and invited a 
foreign force to invade the country^ should lue armed, drilled, 

L 2 



ui 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



and disciplined &t the expense of the GoTenuneafc vbich 
they wished to overtuni. 

Aa regards the municipal gOTemment of the Band — the 
la&t SQbject Inferred to in Mr. Ch&mberlaiji's dedpAtcb— it 
has been pointed out that^ in the fiiBt plac«, there has for 
many years past been a body which constituted a mojiid- 
pality all but in name, the Suiit&iy Board having municipil 
powers with the right to levy rates and taxes, not being 
elected by the burghera, but by the inhabitants of Jobannes- 
burg rated at £20 a year, This Board contained only two 
members nominated by the OorerDmeut and fifteen or 
sixteen chosen by the people themaelvea. However, the 
new municipality just instituted, with largely increased 
powers, 19 represented as being as much as can be expected 
to be given to a town so recently establiahed and possessing 
a population so floating in character. If, in the fntoie, 
streets axe ill-kept and ill-lighted, if the water supply be 
imperfect, or if dis&aae or crime be prevalent, the people 
of Johannesburg, and not the Government of the Republic, 
will be responsible. Aa to the acts of the new mnnicipelity, 
like that of the former Sanitary Board, being subject to 
Government veto, it is enfficient to say the veto has never 
yet been exercised. 

Coming to the grievances not touched upon in Mr. 
Chamberlain's despatch, the first is the official oetraciam of 
English. Policemen, railway oflBciala, officials in the public 
ofBces, and in the law courts, are represented as being 
unwilling or unable to use the language of Che majority of 
the population. The Boer reply to this is practically that 
referred to on the use of English in the schools. The use of _ 
English being permitted in the Courts and public depart- I 
ments might facilitate business, but the necessity^ for public 
reasons, to retain the Dutch lauguarge 03 stamping the Boer 
character of the Republic, apply even here, though a COTtain 
amount of inconvenience may be the result. 

As regards religious di»abilities» I have not found any 
section of the Boer population prepared to support them in 
argument. They are universally represented as a historical 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 149 

survival, to bo understood only in the light of the traditions 
of religious peraecution, from which the Huguenot aneestora 
of the Boera suifered. 

" The provision that a]3 ofHcials must be ' Prolefltanta,' " writee a leading 
C(HisorvatiTe» '* we ackcowledge UDder present clrcunutancfB to be 
objectiDiiable. Jews and CathoUcaare excluded froiia office under the Grond 
Wet. fiiit I may explun that this h Oct merel; a Uitl&nder grievabca, 
but it aifectft all the inhabitanta, inqjudiag burgherH, The only reason 
for Buch a proviHJoa ib that the Hugaenota who ]eft Europe iindor 
penecQtJQn by tb« Cntbolk King of Fnmcc eBtablifihed here the fQUudation 
stone of the old coiiBtitutiuti, and, rightly or wrongly, coiLBidered it to be 
ft political iianger if Catholtcs wera admittad to power. The «xc[u3ion of 
the Jews appears to be an unforafleen result. At the eotne time I m»y 
pmot out that certain refofms have already been introduced. At the time 
of the foundation of the Grand Wet Rooaan Catholic churchee or wmceft 
were prohibited. Under President Biargera, who was a Freethinker, thia 
rofltriction was aboliBhed, It Ib H»ore than Ukely in the coming rerlBioa 
of the coDBtitulJun these restrictions will be removed." 

"At the aome tinje,'* writea a Progreasive, "it must be remembered 
that a grier&tica d thu kmd is not one p&rticularly affecting the wocking- 
claaau, bat ralbar m&x of considerable vealtL.^ 

The restriction on the right of the Uitlander to carry 
armsy the building of forts, the importation of military 
«nppUeSj bag been the next of the grievances enumerated by 
the Uitlander. As regards the military preparations, the 
answer of both sections of the Boers is that the safety of the 
State is the supreme law. " Defence, and not Defiance/' ia 
the policy of the Govomment, which is entitled to regard ita 
own eiiatence as legitimate ; and it has to provide against 
revolt as an imperative duty towards the burghers of the 
State. As regards the carrying of arms, a correspondent 
writes: — 

** The statement that Uitlanders are prevented from haviag arms la a 
mialeading statement. The law here Ib as to r^iatration, cuBtoma duty, 
uid liceosicg of arms U tbe Bame taw as that of the Cape Colony, Natal, 
and the Free Stat& Aa regards registration, it is neceasary to order to 
pTBTent anna from reaching natiTea. As regards the customs imposed, 
ihi^y are the mme as imposed during the English regime. As regarda 
liceoaing, the regulation^ are the same as under the BrttLsh Ooreninient 
of the Transvaal. As a matter of fact,, it ia not true that the UitLaiideni 
are unarmed ; or, if they are, it Is their own fault"* 



lyj 



THE SETTtEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



The exclurion of the Uitlander from office, felt 
grievance by British netddenta, is not admitted && beui^7 
grievance by the burgher. Under what circuniBtancos 
askj and in what coimtry, haa it ever been regarded 
light of foreign immigrants to assumo office. If Engl 
miners went to dig the gold of the Ural Mountains thej 
wonld certainly not be inducted into political o^ffioe bjr 
the Tear, 

As r^arda the alleged monopoly of public offices by 
HoUandere, '* by gentlemen from the Low Country/' as tbs 
Manifesto of the National Union terms it. the Boer has two 
replies. 

In the first place, they point out that the political 
independence of the country being threatened on the 
Britii^h side made every appoiutmfent to office of a British 
resident a matter of considerable risk from a political point 
of view. Again, the Tranavaol population did not till some 
yeajs ago, and to a very limited extent even now, supply o 
sufficient nmnber of men educated to fill posts in the 
administration. Educated Hollanders^ who could speak the 
language, and could not possibly be suspected of having any 
designs against the independence of the country, naturally 
were chosen, ss there were no others t-o choose. 

Hieir second reply is that there is no such monopoly by 
Hollanders. With a few exceptions all the high officials 
are Afrikanders. I have been handed a liat with the names 
and nationalities of all the chief officials, which appeared to 
bear out this statement 

The Under Secretary of State, the Surveyor-General, the 
Asaiatant Surveyor - General, the Treasurer- General, the 
Auditor-General, the Registrar of Deeds, the Ghief Justice, 
and one of the Judges, the High Sheriff, the Registrar of the 
High Court, the Taxing Master, the Postmaster-Geneml, the 
Civil CommisBioner, Judicial Commiaaionera, Magistrates, 
and all the five members of the Executive Council, the 
President, the Commandant-General, the Master of Mines, 
the Commissionei' of Railways are all Afrikanders. Of the 
higher ofBcials only the State Secretary and tho Under 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 



151 



Secretary of State for Foroign Affairs, the State Attorney, 
two of the Judgejg, and the Master of the H^h Court, are 
HoUiuide^, 

KeiUier are Engliahnieii absolutely excluded from of&ce : 
one of tho Judges and the Assiat^it Treasiu'er^Griineral are 
Englishmen. 

Coming next to the recent legislation which is quoted as 
proof of the hostile action of the Government towards British 
residents, the Press Law, the Alien Expulsion Act, and the 
Alien Immigration Act, the position of the Transvaal Grovem- 
ment and of the ruling fcurghera has been clearly indicated 
in the despatch of the Government of the Yth May of this 
year. It is needless to here recapitulate these arguments, 
but it may be sufficient to quote the remarks of the corre- 
spondent I have already quoted, whose idaa is that the 
Ti^nsvaal ia perfectly justified in passing a law to curb not 
the liberty, but the unbridled licence of the press. I do not 
believe that in any country existing, under circumstances 
simiUr to that under which the Transvaal existed and exists, 
would such open advocacy of sedition and revolution be 
tolerated as was tolerated there for some time past. If there 
is anything in the law recently passed that would tend to 
check the legitimate liberty of the press, it ought, so far as it 
has that tendency, to be amended. 

If there \b anything UDOon&titutloaal in ;t, it ought bIbo to he 
ftOMbded in that respect. Thu is a, point, hoi^erer, concerniag which no 
irretipoiuiible jouitiala hut the cavirte of the country wouM hano to decide. 

The law for the expuialoQ of alienB who make tbeiDselves dnngerouB 
to the safety of the Stat«, I do not think any renwnahle pereoti cuuld 
nbject Uij such aliens, of course, would object. If tiey did not wieb to 
coDae under the provisionft of tlie law, they nead ooly be quiet and law- 
abiding. Without going into details of thia law, audi measnres may be 
QflCtaury for the eecarity of tlie State, though it ahoiild not go beyond 
the nec«sutjes of the cose. 

A3 regards the Alien Immigration Act, it is pointed out 
that in compliance ^vith remonstrances as to the incon- 
venience occasioned by its operation it haa been repealed ; 
but that it3 principle was the same as that adopted by every 



n* 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



civilised country, with the exception of England, and its pro- 
vifliouB ware not nearly so severe as tbose existing in tlie 
United States of Anatmca. 

A lawyer writes, as regards the Alien Immigration Act, 
" I agree with it in principle ; this is not a No Man's Land." 
A ret nullius. 

Any order under the Alien Expnkion Act, or under the 
new Pre^ Act, is subject to an appeal to the Courts, as baa 
been illustrated in practice in the case of the Star, when the 
President's order was set aside by the decree of the Court. 
That is an amount of power left; in the hands of the Ckturt of 
the Republic such as none of the Courts oo the Continent 
of Europe possesses. The order for the expulsion of an alien 
in any European country, with the exception of England, is 
not subject to appeal to the law courts. As regards the 
alleged absence of security for liberty, which springs from 
the non-existence of a fix^ conatitutioti, or from the legal 
supremacy of the Votksraad, it is pointed out that Parlia- 
ment in England is legally supreme, and that no Court of 
Justice or other authority could question the validity of an 
Act of Parliament. The Manifesto of the National Union 
makes it a gnevance that the chance will of the majority in 
the Legislature can alter the law, but the same criticism 
would apply to English methods of legislation. At the same 
time, and as a result of the recent dispute between the Bench 
and the Executive, a Commission is sitting for the purpose 
of drafting a new Grand Wet, in wliich provision will be 
made against the possibility of hasty legislation, and provision 
made for the security of the independence of the judges. 

As regards the treatment of natives, it is denied tliat there 
has been any habitual cruelty in theii- treatment. 

The Boer position is, as has been already explained, that 
it is a political and social blunder of the first magnitude to 
attempt to put into force the British theory of equality of 
black and white. In any individual case of ill-treatment the 
aggrieved have full access to the Courts, and the Courts have 
no hesitation in giving them justice, but justice in their case 
does not mean equality. 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UlTLANDER 



'53 



finally, the last item in the long indictment against the 
Boer admmistration, a chiallenge of the general conduct and 
policy of the Government as distinguished from what is 
alleged to be its inhetent vice of origin, the teply on the 
side of the Boer ia an emphatic repudiation of the truth of 
the charges. 

'^ Jt is Mmplj fale« " writes & corr>Bspondeiit ; " it ia nimpl; false to aay 
ihat the Gorernment h iDcompetaat and corrupt Vogae choices of that 
load sre very easily made,, and a partiaaa press is only too ready to 
eotifgente the aUghtcat irregtilnrity aucb a» may u^cvir imdar any 
GoTsniiTiicDt; bat to eay that the adD^ioiBtratiun as a body can be w> 
described ii a fniaelliood circulated for political purposes." 

Another writes — " The general ftdminiatratioD ia not aa eornipt om 'm 
Englajid, certainly not aa corrupt aa ia the United Stjitea of America. 
CaMe of occnsiQDal ootruption are inevitabJe m any country." 

Another corwapondetit writes—" We await Mr. Cham berk! n'a with- 
drawal of the extraordLnary statements nttiibuted to him on this htiod." 

Another writes — " As to the corruption alleged to CKiet in th« 
adminiBtmUotit if it does exiiet, that would bt) a ead and pitiable fact. It 
must be remembered, however^ that ali over the world the experieace of 
the United Statea, of Canada Mid other countries ahow that where 
opportunities are given to men to make money on a exteaalTe scale by 
Ulegitimnte means such iceaDB will be adopted. Under Great Britain, 
where opportuniities for corruptioa are afforded, as in the cose of army 
uoQtracts and the Vike, cnrruptiDn exiatft ; and curtouB tales could be told 
as to what haa happened in South Africa outside of tho Republics. In a 
young: country iuch practices are perhapB roore difficult to be stopped; 
but 8top|ted they certainly ought to be as the administration bwomes 
tXitOiget. In oourae of time sach practices no doubt will cesae. Also it 
mqat not be forgotten that unfortunately it was the Uitlander who 
introduced such practices, and that in the opinion of eoiDe of them (vitU 
Lionel Philips's lettara, publiahed by the Tracsvaal OoTeroment), the 
administration was unfortunately not quite corrupt enough, WhethBi 
aucb comiptioQ really cxista to the eitent as has often been aa^rt«d 
■mil III! to rue doubtful, but loos« talk of the clubs proves nothing,, and half-- 
mm will Htrentiotialy deny what balf-a^ozea others will as 
nuonsly assert.'^ 

Pasaing now from the catalogue of the grievances of tho 
tfitlanders regarded merely in the light of hardships to 
themselves, we have next to oansider that portion of their 
indictment against the policy of the Transvaal Government, 
which I have already aaid must present the greatest share of 



"54 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



int^re^t to Eaglisbmen at home. Reference Itas been ma(ie 
to the various matters put forward as evidence of an active 
anti-Briti^b policy on the part of the Goveramont, anti- 
British in tlie sense of trying to depress the condition of 
British residents in the Transvaal, and anti-British in the 
wider sense of trying to minimise or expel the iuflaence of 
the Imperial Groverament in South Africa. First among 
the proofs of such a policy aa are enumerated in the alleged 
grievances of the Uitlanders, I have given the Boer reply to 
this indictment, and have shown that their position in defence 
of these matters of legislation and admimetration complained 
of ia that they are necessitated by their desire to safeguard 
the independence of the country. That where that has not 
been the impelling motive of the Government, economic 
necessities of the past have induced some of the present 
conditions complained of. A^ to the other matters of which 
it is admitted that legitimate complaint may be made, the 
answer ig that time is required to adjust methods to circum- 
stances. Briefly it may be said that the Boer Grovernmeat 
deny that any of the alleged mattei-s of legislation or 
administrative complaint are dictated by a policy in any 
respect anti-British. 

*' The policy of nil parties amonc; tlie burgbarB," writes a corrtspondeat, 
" the policy of the Preeident and of the Slate Secretary are simply to have 
the Republic left alone by any outside Power. There i* nothing dJetinctly 
lUiti-BntiHh, and never ha6 beett in the sense of hastility towards Gl«&t 
BrltDJn in |mrticular« on the ptirt of the Govermneot or the people of thu 
Hc]mbUc. Apparently the actiou of the Government hoe heeu auCi- 
DHUbIi, but the raaeoD hfts Mimply been l^eoiiui^ the nttack hoH b^n from 
the British aide. Dr. Jameson with Mftxiiuo, and the Jingo ptosis with 
their pens, ha^ve both Lftd a common object. But the bui^hers would be 
an ready to reBent attack from Gflnoim, from PortugiieBo, or any other 
ijuarter, as from Britiah." 

'* Neither President," writes anolher correspondeBt, "nor the biirghe™ 
have uiy esp^tation or wihh to Bee the Bridgh power eUmlnp£ed botn. 
South Afiictt- They are perfectly aware of the defence of the iutenud 
BBCurity of the white men in South Africa afforded by the preeeocA of 
Britiitb power on the Mia. No doubt many TranKvaalers, lite mmy 
AfrikanderB generally, believe that ultimatnly Souift Africa %ff%fl ftewrae 
an iwiependeiU natwn, but that i£ a far-off event towardu which thinga 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 



tSS 



w\y ehaping tbemsdiTea, and Buch an mdepeodoBi South Africa 
w6iD3d have ao reajion lor boliig hostile or Tor being in any other relAtion 
to the Bndfih Empire th^n that of the cLoBeBt allijiJic«." 

*' The bui^here," wntm anottier oorrwpoiideiit, *' have had reiaaoa (o 
believe thrtt the Englush {people are reli^Qiu and desirauB of dabg justice, 
but tiiey have also renaon to helleve that the Eogliah jwople ure under the 
contro! and direcUoti of ittnun« who on tiot rdigiouB and gumedmea hava 
little regafd for jiiirtice." 

As to the other matters adduced as evidence of auch a 
policy, negotiations with foreign Powers, confederation of 
the Free State, desire to acquire a port, their refusal to comply 
with Mr. Chamberlidn's suggestions of reform, general expres- 
sions of hoatility towards Englishmen, their reply is distinct. 

" There Is not the leaat intention," ■writes a correBpoTident, " on the 
part of the burghfit-H of tliie cMimtry to subject themwlvea to the power of 
Germany, or any other foreign Power. What German policy may be ir a 
different thing ; but what the policy of the burghers la, is to aafeguard their 
iniieiwndeiLce, If hj cultivating felatiouelii^ with Oerniany ob well aa 
other foreign Powers, this object cati be effected, Hiicb a line uf action is 
distiLf tly the duty of the Gfoveroment." 

" The Gtiveninient," writua another corrcepondoDt, " wiahea to um 
Qermuiy to protect the eountry, hut not to uae Germany to injure Greet 
Britoin." 

" The Transvaal^" writes another correBpondent, " would prefer subjec- 
tion to Englaml fco Bubjection to any other Power, bot would fight to the last 
before Bubmittin^ to any foreign force. If the Transvaal made application 
to Qemiimy or France at the time of the Raid, a fact not aa yet establiahed, 
auvh a course Wuuld be quite within iia rights, aft the id^i ill the Traubraal, 
and even among the offioera. of the expedirion itself, was that the Adminis- 
trator wa9 acting on behalf of the British GoverLinent> and that his armed 
Raid bad the Imperial sanction. 

"Gertuau poUcy towards the South African Republic need hardly, I 
tbink, he conf^ider^d seriously. The people of that State do not want to 
fume under German rule or influence, nor. if they did, would they go so 
far as to estrange the people of the Orange Free State, who would bitterly 
rcaent any assumption of power in South Africa by the (Serman 
OoTemnient," 

A leading representative of the Press obeerves : — * 

*'l am ^NAiitivo there ia no diplomatic pur}x>ae behind German action. 
The ocly Germait iJoYmy in bouth Africa i& ttiat Germany is anxious to 



* Mr. Carl Borckenhagen. 



rsft 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAK 



coltirtte good folatiau with the TtefwiHky nd w pnvre the Inda ^ 
H KlraHJy poHMM vith the RepnMk. 

*^ OiM mikj btuAj tftj dui Eo^khmn ue diitoutai teeuue thm » 
■a English polier in SouLh Africa^ uyl OnuaiB ire trusted becuue tiMPe 
ift tH> Gonnui poticy. The Omuuo EmporavV liitgiini mttBt ika hostility 
(0 England ; be telegnpha to crBfTbodj-, mo to the Oonnt of TuriQ. 
The Boers, tnndng out in font agiiiist the Jamcacn Bud wh«n %knj 
thou^ thai Ihe wh^ might oC P-ngUwHi wu unred e^aanst tiwia, 
appealed to the miJitary inaii&eu of the £aiBM'."' 

A leader of the I^ogressive party tells me— 

"Even the ConaerfatiTei are moch morv sgsimt Qtnoany 
«e^ikit England. AU partise an muted on thk poibL 

** Aa regardE the adhermoe to the Qeoera GoaraitioD, aod the other 
tiegotiatioDt wtUi foreign Powvt, wboee ooDdosioD has ben made a 
matter of complakit by Mr. ChamWrkiD in hie lecmt despatch, the 
deepatch of the TraiuTaiJ GoventDent of the 7th May shows that they 
were acting within their rights. The expressed (object at the ConTentiun 
of 1884p as tat out by Lord Derby io bis accompanying despatch to the 
deputation^ was to gire the Republic foil po'er of oondncting aegotiatiQlBe 
with foreign States, and that power the Kepuhlic baa done no man tbaa 
cxeniab There is no danger to British tntetecta in such action of the 
QoTonkment, as any treaty with a foreiga Power, other than the Oran^ 
Free State, is subject to the Teto of the Britii^ OoTenmwDt, efaouid it 
prove contrary to Britiiih intemta. 

" As repjds the confederation of the Free State, and the recent treaty 
gnutting BpeciaJ rights to burghen of the Free State, such step ia one not 
marety of the most natnnJ, of alUanoe belweeq two hindred peojJ^a, but 
one distinctly contemplated by the frameia of the GmTcntion of London 
of 183*4, Treaties with the Orange Free Sute are eipresaly uempted 
from the requirement or the sabction of the Britiah GoTemmeat, and are 
OfpTOiily exempted from veto. 

" A funner Britiah Govemor^ though* hb usual, his policy was revencd 
by his Euocessor, wss strongly iq favour of the fusion of tbe two Sutes i 
and that fuaon would have Laiceu pl&c« forty ytnrs ago but for the action 
of Sir Qeurge Qreyj the micoeMor In queetion. The mere suggestion that 
there is an anti-British deeigu on tbe pari of the two Republics, evidenoed 
by the tr>raty of alliaQce, is in itself a eufficient indicatiDn of the nature of 
the criticism to which erery action of the GoTemmeDt of the BepubUfi is 
subject. The two Statee of common race, history, and language and 
interests are naturally compelled to draw aa close as ponUe the bonds 
between them, when their independenc* is threatoned, as it has been by 
the action of a large section of iuuDigrantf within Eheir borders, backed 
by an aggteeoiTe power, the administf&tion of the Chartered Company in 
the Dortb. As regards the acqukitiou of the port, it is to be noted that 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 157 

ihsn ia a rar? nrJous diviaioD of opmiaa unoag the bnrgbera themMlve* 
M to thft advisability of «iich a Jtep.*^ 

On one side, we are told, the eadstence of the Republic 
is on established fact, and England muat be contented to 
recognise it as an estabUgbed fact. 

** Her wiseet course would b« to fultjvate the rHendship of the Republics. 
Let her renouuc« entirely all ihouglit of repreMioa. Let her policy be, 
where she cao, to aaaiat in strengthening the power of the Hepuhlics. If 
thfi TnjuTaal hungerg after a seaport of its own, Set the Tranavftal have 
ooe. If one la to ho h&d. To think that by hampering the TrBOBTaal in 
that direction a great advantage ie gBJced, ia a miatiike. tnitation ie 
produced, and no good is evolved. If the South Africaa lit^public is 
anxiaoB to have a fleet of mea-of-war of ita Dfra^ let it hftve its wny. 
The fleet will not be employed to bombard Loudon; it niay asBiBt iu the 
defence of Capo Town," 

The President and the State Secretary are known to 
favour the project, but differences of opinion on this matter 
do not run on party linea. For instance, a leader of the 
Progressive party tells me, " We regard the absence of a port 
as a grievance against England ; we think she is trying to 
STirroiind ua." On the other hand, a member of the opposite 
party teUb me — '* Many agree with me in preferring to be as 
we are* I do not think that the Republic requires a port. 
It would simply give greater facilities for attack ; just as 
the possession of Conataatinople might not ba such an 
advantage to Russia as seems to be assumed." 

Aa regards the refusal of the Government to adopt 
Mr. Chamberlain's su^estions of internal refonn, it ia pointed 
out that no independent Govemmentj whose power of internal 
management, of their own affairs ia conceded, could adopt 
any measarea of the suggestion, however friendly, of another 
Power ; such adoption would be taken as a precedent^ and 
would constitute only the first of a long long series of 
intermeddling with the internal affairs of the Republic 

As regards Mr. Chamberlain's declanition of the existence 
of ftQ anti-British policy, and the ofGcia) information which, 
it is assumed, is such as to warrant suoh a declaratioD^ one is 
told that there is no necessity for answering such vague 



tjS THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

decUratioiia until something more tangible than 'Mr. Chamber- 
lain's expreaaion of opinion is adduced by way of proof. And 
QuQ b aaked to compare Mr. Gbambeclain'e recent expressioQ 
of opinion as to the exiBtence of a snzeiaicty, the abolition 
of which was one of the objects of th© visit of tbe Transraal 
delegation to England — an abolition effected by the Conven- 
tion of London of 1884. 

Lastly, us regards tho loud-apoken expressions of intention 
to drive out Englishmen, attributed to certain IrFesponsible 
persona, one ia assured that no Government of any people 
can control the acte of hot-headed and injudicious individuals. 
If the policy of the Britieh Government and the Bridsh 
people were to be judgad by the declaration of oertAin 
sections of the Bhiish Press, repudiation of treaty obliga- 
tions and an armed conquest of a friendly State would be 
aaaumed to be the object on which the British GovemmeDt 
has set its heart. 

Summarising, then, the attitude of the Boer Gorernment 
in ^ard to the Uitlandera, it may be said that the PrcK 
gressive party admit the existence of certain grievanoei!, 
snch OA the exclusion from the frunchise, but do not admit 
that the existence of theae grievances justified an armed 
insurrection or a political propaganda for the purpose of 
generally diacreditiug the Boer Government. The Con- 
servative party's position is practically the same. 

On the question of the independence of the Republic and 
ita right to manage ita own internal affairs, &ee &om inter- 
f^ence on the part of the British Govenunent, both parties 
are agreed. 

The Conservative section — being that in power, and 
likely to remain in power — one is justified in taking their 
position as of more practical importance than that of the 
opposing section of the burghers. The position of the typical 
Conservative burgher may bo summed up as one which 
upholds the general policy of retaining power in the 
hands of the burghera, and of excluding, aa far as possible, 
British interference with internal matters of legi&lation 
administration :^ 



I 



IP 



THE BOER REPLY TO THE UITLANDER 1^9 

■* Wo hfiiTe been the fint in the country^ we have fought fof It, and we 
wv the DwnerB of the land, and we own all that it contalnB. It ts for ub 
to dictate tennB to the Btiungera who come l^ere for the purpoeo of nwiking 
a fortime. 

" Thfiy need not have come if they did not wiah ; they did not atipiilal* 
thflt tbej ahotild get the fraacUiflti. If they had atipulatod we ahould 
have replied^ * You ooaie for diridendB, and you sbnU not get p<diticol 
right*.* In no country have «traDgen ever claimed as a right politlcatl 






I 
I 



I 



As to the clflim of these strangers that they assisted u« 
in defeating the Zulus, the reply is easy. The Boer has 
been the pioneer of South Africa* and the burden of nearly 
aD the fighting has fallen on him. If the British Govern- 
ment adopted the policy of Sir Enrtte Frere and defeated the 
Zulus, they did that for Imperial purposes, and not for 
the purpose of flasisting the Boers :— 

"The retrocraaion to the Trausvaal, however creditable to an English 
OoTemment, ja, it maat be remembered, aimply raveremg an act of violent 
imd tinjuEt aggresaioai and we iMJinot foTg:et that the Engiiah Prime 
Miniflter who directed the retn>ce«8ion» thought tVie cxjuntry to he n 
liowllog wLUtemesa. Nor can wg either forget that the poUticed opposition 
oftho Be^ra in tbo Onpo played a gr^i part in detormining the policy of 
giving bock the land tt> its ownei^. We never have yet heard that 
g|!atitiid« is dne tu a brigand for restoring what is not his, more especially 
when the restoratluu is hampered by reBtriction on the su'baequent liberty 
of the aggrieved pArty. Nor can we forget that it suited the e^ige&oiea 
of the British (jarty ayslcm, which the Qovemment of tbe Republic 
perfectly ufidemtandfl, to retrocede the Tranavaal and to avoid an 
DD|xipuLiir and exiiensivfl war." 

" Need I du nioro^^ said a burgher, " than quot* thiit, what two English 
writers have said on the eubject of the magDaminity of the rctroceemioD of 
the Ttanevaal. Mr. Edward EHcey eays^ 'I for one am not going to 
cndurflC) the futile tbooTy thfit Great Britaib, having annexed the Transvaal, 
gave it back to the Boers out of & tjentinient of magnanimity. That sort 
of twaddle may have heon good enough to remove the cxuiipiwction uf 
Mr. Gkdntone and his followent in 1881, at having to coneeDt to a dls- 
creditable Hurrender on the morrow of a disgracofu] defeat, but it is not 
good enough to fuitiify the demauds of hiBtorical truth. England, at the 
infitigatton of the Government of the day, gave up tbe Tranavaal, because 
the rwatance of the Boera proved more formidable than we had aiitii'ii^ted, 
becaiue South African wars were unpopuJar at that period with the British 
public, and because the game of reconquering the Transvaal after Mftjuba 
waa oot thought to be worth the candle.' 



I«0 




THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



" Lord Huidnlph Cbtirdiill Baye : ' Had the Britiih Gk>Tenunfl&t ol ibl 
dtj taken advaDtAge of ita «troDg mQitary poeition aad ■nTirK.Ta***^^ ^ jt 
could owilj have doiiei» the Boer foroes, il would ao douU hare ganied tltf 
TratiKTaal, but it mif;ht have lott the Cape Colony, The Dutch arTntimM* 
in the CtOuuy bad It«eu bo exaepdrat«d bj what it ccouidflrod to be tb 
nnjuitv faithJcas, and arbitrary jwlicy pureued toward* the frw DatehmB 
of the Tmuvaal^ that the &aal iriuniph o( the BritiEh arma mMnlj hy 
brute force would have permauestly and hopeleaaly alienated it fiom 
Oreat BritAin.' 

" We cannot see how w« owe gratitude to the Imperial GoTenuDoit 
for giving nut kibsmm in the Cape potiticid priTilegefl. Ili^ mstttotioa of 
■elf-^VHiung Ct>loDiee i& [lart of the Bhtiah political systeni, which eipe- 
riflDOQ ban Uughv them conducot to grater effici«ticy, aod let ua dcA 
forgM ftlwi grenter economy. 

" 1'ho policy ot the Freaident is eiraply to maiDtain the independcoce 
of the country, and to «tabbeh, on a finn haui, the prosperity of the 
biir^nhorA. It i» not reaaonable for inunigraQtu, who have come to miie 
thuir furtuneB, who have do intention of fighting in defence of the tadft* 
pendenoe of the country, and who have no permanent dwelling.place ban» 
to aak the original InhabitanU to etep aside, and to give them t")ifeei 
domination. KmnchiHe to the Uidander roeauH foreign rul& If not 
aniwaaliou to Cbartorland or to the British dominion, at any rate it would 
mauk poiitical domination by co«mopalitan Jew capitjiliBta. The capitalist 
tl walconie to make his money, but he ahaU not have power over our 
ehUdnn or over our country. We do not wonihip Mamuion; wo aet a 
higher *tore on liberty. This may be an old-woHd prejudice, but it is the 
■|nrit which drove our anoeetors from France, and drove our fathen from 
the Oape. To tell ue that our policy dimiiuahfla Ibe output of the witm 
may he, in your mind, to uee the hoaviMt words of oondtiinDfttion, but we 
refuae to oonaider our jwUcy limply fitim the pdnt of view of ita effect 
upon the jiroduction of gold. ^M 

" Even if newly-enfranchised Uitlanden would not attempt to BuneQder | 
the territory to the BritiBb Government, we distrunt thedr Aboriginfle' ' 
Protection Society policy, which ban made Natal, a land wrested by ua 
from tln3 tyrant Chaka, a coolie reserve. We do not wiah to Bee another 
garden of South Africa made a hot^bed of heathendom, with the Britoh 
Government of India inHiatiug on the right of the brown men to take 
poen^Hion of the soil, fought for and won by white men. Wo are keejnng 
one aectioD^ at least, of South Africa free from the Eaffim wd the coolie.'* 



( I6l > 



CHAPTER XVT. 



MY VIEW OP BOKR V. Um.AKDEE> 

It will bo seen, from the foregoing, that it was not without 
hearing what both sides bad to say on the issue of Boer 
against XJitlander that 1 have been led to form my opinion 
on the first question, Was there reality in the claima made 
on behalf of the Uitlander ? and on the second. Was there a 
definite purpose behind the trea-tment of the Uitlanders and 
the military preparations of Pretoria and the Afrikander 
propaganda through South Africa of ousting the British 
power from the whole aub-contiDcnt ? 

That the indictment of the Uitlanders was, in the main, 
well founded, subsequent facts have made but too clear. 
Criticism of people with genuine grievances is easy to those 
■who have not suffered under them ; but, nevertheless^ it may 
not be without political use, if I point out the errors, some 
of them of mere political tactics, but others much deeper, 
threatening the future peace of South Africa in the conduct 
of the Beform movement and the Uitlander agitation 
generally. 

As to the deeper mistakes there seems to have been a 
complete failure to grasp the Imperial importance of the 
policy of repression of the outaider followed by the Pretoria 
Government, and a marvelloua uuder-eatimate of the 
fighting power, of the dogged tenacity, of the far-sighted 
policy, of the nest to superhuman secrecy of the leadera of 
the Boers, and an equally wonderful over-estimate of the 
Hollander influence — the Uitlanders failing to see that the 
old President had not the least objection to being supposed 

M 



l63 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



to be led by HoUanderB or " my Doppera," vhen he knew ■ 
well that he was leading in all the loain lines of policy. 
If contiiiiied in. these errors bode ill for fature peace and 
etability in South Africa.* 

" Huis toe" was athcoiy too familiar to all the XTitlander 
centres. It meant that, after the moat trivial reverse, the 
Boer commandoes would disperse to their fanns, crying their 
tsaJl, **Let us home." Again, the theory that the ruling 
caate in the two Eepublics had no really national, however 
perverse, ideal, and were simply intent on the spoils of 
office^ has litien refuted by events. Their nationaliat project 
was thought to be non-existent, partly becauae the British 
citizen saw that it would be desperate and dangermia to the 
Boers themselves, and partly bocanse a money-making 
community, like that of Johanneaburg, is apt to 
money-makiug motives to every action it does not 
stand. Nevertheless, it is dear enough now tJiat there 
a national purpose behind the exclusion of the Uitland 
from office and from the spoils of office. 

The unfortunate episodes attendant on the Jameson l?aid 
may be ascribed on the aide of the raiders and the Johannes- 
burgers largely to want of judgment. One section of public 
opinion in England was alienated from the raidarg far 
lawlessness, and another from the Johannesburgers for want 
of gratitude to the ratdera, displayed in not going to their 
assistance. The persistent putting forward of the grievances 
as if personal, and not as rese-^n^jrsU against the Empire, 
the aaldng for the franchise, and swearing allegiance to a 
flag stated by the petitioners to be foreign, puzzled and 
dienated people in England. " Why do people calling 
themselves British ask for the franchise ? Either they are 
coming away and so remain British, and ao have no right to 
it, or they are staying to swear allegiance to the Vifrkimr, 
and, if so, what claim have they to our sympathy ? " There 

* The old PrenUloDt nole-l this wrap of th? UitUnilerB with grim 
nmuBeinebt. After iSie J»iii«sun Raid ho ohBervol : "lam supposed hy 
Lh« UitLitiderft ti> be ajwaya jjimletl by stime one or other ; il uswd to be 
NeUiDApiub, aud then Dr. Lt^yda. NellmnpiUB i& now dead, aud Dc 
Leydij is ip Europe. Who is leading now ? *^ 



MY VIEW OF BOER v, UITLANDER 



i«3 



is much in this illogical, but tmdeiatandabld all the same. 
Lastly^ tho violent language and personal diatribes of some 
journals of the TJitlander press alienated British sympathy. 
It is true they were paralleled and surpassed by some of the 
Dutch joumala, but Dutch ia not read in "EIngland. Besides, 
such is not the tone of English controversy. The pjiblic 
taste is prejudiced against a course upheld by violent 
language and indulgence in personalities. The English 
public suspects it ia a case of abusing thy plaintiff's attorney. 
From what has been said, in dealing with the policy of 
President Kruger, it will be seen to what conclusion I have 
been led as to the anti-Britisii purpose really underlying 
his tj'eatuient of the Uttlanders, as well as the other portions 
of hia action to which they objected as primarily affecting 
their own lives. 

In tbe preceding chapter I have given a full statement of 
the reply of the Boer leaders to the Uitlanders' indictment 
It will be admitted that it shows considerable skill in 
dialectics. But most important, aa bearing on the present 
war, will be noted the repeated repudiation of anti-British 
purpose or policy. Independence is their aim in excluding 
the Uitknder from equality of vote or language. Defence ia 
the meaning of their armaments: no aggression on the 
Britiah power. Such are the protestations of Presidents and 
State Secretaries^ Judges and Advocates, Jourualista and 
Volkaraad Members, Commandanta and Field-Comets, and 
Conunanders of Artillery. 

There is a sense, of course, in winch these aaaurancea 
may be taken as being meant to represent the truth. Inde- 
pendence means Dutch independence, of a Dutch-ruled 
State, in which the resident foreigner cannot become a 
citizen. Defence means defence of the rule of a privileged 
race. N'o aggression on the British power means no present 
esaion; only aggression at a favourable opportunity. 



H 2 



164 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHA1*TER XVII. 

FKOM THE RAID TO AFIUKANDEE BULE Dff PRETORIA, 

1896-1898. 

Let us dow resume the thread of events after the TRmeson 
Raid. EaTty in 1996, the Refona prisoners — as tlie Memben 
of the Eeform Committee of the Kational Union of the] 
Uitlanders have come to be known — were placed on their 
trial in Pretoria charged with high treason, and were I 
sentenced, four of them to death (afterwards commuted to a I 
tine on each of £20,000) and the remainder to imprisonment, 
commuted to a fine of £2000 on each priaoner applying for 
release. Two of the latt«r refused to do 8o, and were not 
released until the Queen's Jubilee in June 1897.* 

The late Administrator of Rhodesia and the officers of his 
Expedition were handed over tg the British CJoverxHnent, 
and, after trial in the Queen's Bench in England, under the 
Foreign Enlistment Act, were sentenced to various terms of 
imprisonment in May 1896. 

The next event of importance was the triumph of the 
militant Afrikander Party in the Presidential Election of 
1896 in the Orange Free State, The former President 
afterwards State Secretary Heitz of the Transvaal, referred 
to in the already quoted letter of Mr. Theophilus Schttiner) 
had resigned owing to iU-health, and Judge Steyn, a member 
of the same party, was elected, defeating Mr, J, G. Fraser. 

• These two were MeenM. AVoolo 8a.H]]5»oQ nod W, D. DavisB, now 
CominBiiditig m the Imperial Light Hurse, a force composftl a]mo»i 
exclusively of Uitkcdent. The State Attorney, Dr. CoE^ber, had caD»uJ(ad 
me on thi» matter, aixi I bad recoiameDded their tmoO'iidit^Dal releue u 
ft compliment to the hen-d of th« Imperis.! GrovenimeDt. 



^ 



RAID TO AFRIKANDER RULE IN PRETORIA '96-93 165 



for some years Chairmaii of the Volksraad, Mr, Fraser'a 
policy was that of the President for twenty-five years, the 
late Sir John Brand, a policy which his opponents described 
as pro-British, but which waa in reality stateamanlLke in the 
highest degree, being a policy of fusing the Butch and 
British people, by according eqnal rights to all new residents 
and a liberal franchise ; and, above all, of working in 
harmony with the great Imperii Power which kept the seas 
and secured the safety and autonomy of his pastoral State. 
It was an evil day for South Africa when Sir John Brand's 
enlightened policy was defeated in the person of its standard- 
bearer. If it had not been so, Brand's favourite saying 
" Allea zal recht komen " would have been realised.* 

The increase of armaments in the Transvaal proceeded 
with feverish haste during 18&6 and the following yeara» 
Orders already issued before the Baid, as is recited in the 
National Union Manifesto of 1895, for forts and artillery, 
were executed Military experts. German and Hollander 
officere» were iutioduced from Europe to drill the younger 
Boer in the artillery ; a short service system, enabling a large 
number to pass through this training to constitute a reserve 
force. 

Meanwhile, an Imperial organisation was instituted, called 
the South African League, to take the place of the disbanded 
National Union and the Eeform Committee. It was not 
directed by the same leaders — part of the conditions of the 
release of the latter being three years' abstention from 
politics — and while advocating the redress of the Uitlander 
grievances, it was absolutely Imperialist in policy, placing in 
the forefront of its programme the maintenance of British 
supremacy ia South Africa. There was no question here of 
swearing allegiance to the Vicrkieur. Furthermore, by 

* I hsve memoraiida of dLHCUBsiaoB uf Sir Juhn Brani^'B policy with 
llie public men to whom I have jueC referred, with the Ute Mr. Carl 
BorckeaihageD and with Members of the Tree State Volkaraul. They 
w invbuctive, and in one tecae enconragLUg, by sbuwiDg that »ome At 
leutt smoDg the Dutch-^peakmg people could granp the truth that th« 
unity of the European [wojile is ibe only way uf aalvatioD in iSouth 
A^ciu 



t» . THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

advocating the rights of civiliaed oatiTes, it was eveu more 
at vanaoce with Boer sentiment than its pr^ecesaor. lAter 
on we shall hnd, in conaideting the last agitation in 
Johannesburg, in connectioii with the Edgar murder in 
Januaiy 1899, that the action of the League, coupled with 
the prosecuLit^n uf its leaders,* Bnally determined the lesolnte 
intervention of the Imperial Government on behalf of the 
ITillandera. 

The negotiations of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamber- 
Iain, dnring 1896^ need not be gone into in detail They 
may be summarised as followa : The Imperial Government 
repudiated all reeponsibility for the Jameson Eaid, and 
proeecuted the leaders to conviction^ and agreed, in principle, 
to the payment of comperisation, to be assessed on the 
Chartered Company of lihodesia, for the invasic*n. A system 
of Home Jtule for Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand 
was tentatively suggested and declined by the Government 
ofPreUiria; the grievances of the Uitlanders were championed, ^ 
aa set forth in a preceding chapter, and were dealt wilii fl 
primarily as breachee of the Convention of London.t 

ForthermoTe, various steps taken by the Transvaal 
Government in concluding agreements with the Netherlands, 
with Portugal, the signing of the Geneva Convention, and 
other matters, were dealt with by the Colonial Secretary 
as being breaches of the Convention of London^ whieh fl 
subjected agreements of the Transvaal vrith foreign Powers ~ 
to a veto of the Imperial Government 

Lastly, two steps of the highest import wereitalcen by I 



" 5tr, Clem Webb, now an officer in the Imperial Light Hone^ and 
Mr. IX^d. 

t Article XIV. "All perftons otbor thiui nativea coufonuing them- 
selvea to the laws of tbo South Africau Eepublic (b) will have full 
lilicrty, with their farniliaB, to enter, travel, ur reaiJe ia any jflrt of ih* 
8outb AfrJcivD Hepublic ; (b) they '<si\l be eatitled to hiro or poweu 
JiouBes, Tuauufoclories, bbupB, and pretnifteB; (c) they may cnrry flti their 
commerce either iti pereon or by any agenta whom thoy may tMnk &t to 
employ; (d) they will not be eubJEct, in rcBjwct of their pereoiu vr 
property, or in respect of thait conmierc© or ioflustry, to any t«x4i^ 
whether geoeral or local, other tiiaa those which are or may be Impottd 
upon cituG&na of the naLd BepubLic." 



RAID TO AFRIKANDER RULE IN PRETORIA '96-98 167 



I 



the Imperial Govermnent. The first was the dispatch, at 
the end of 1396» of Mr. Conyngham Greene, an experienced 
diplomatist in the service of the Foreign Office, to the post 
of British Agent in Pretoria, His predecessor had been — 
with an interval during which an acting Agents Mr* Henry 
Cloete, had been appointed — Sir Jacobag de Wei, a British 
colonial of Cutch descent. The next and moat important 
wa$ the sending, in March 1897, of Sir Alired Milner aa 
High Coramiaaioner for South A&ica. 

Early in 1^97 two other events on the aide of the 
ItepubUca ooGurred of the most far-reaching consequence. 
In January 1897 the High Court of tlie Transvaal delivered 
a judgmeut in a case of a claim to mining rights against the 
State, deciding that a right of declaring a law or a resolution 
of the Volksraad illegal, if in conflict with the Grond Wet, or 
Constitution, rested with the judges. A similar right was 
possessed by the High Court of the Orange Free State, and, 
as is well known, by the Courts of the United States of 
America. I do not here propoaCj as it is not ueceasftry for 
present purposes, to enter into the merits of the controversy, 
although I discussed them fully at the time with Chief 
Justice KotaS of the Transvaal, who delivered the judgment, 
and with bis colleagues, all of whom supported Ms action, 
aa well aa the President of the Free State, Chief Justice 
Melius de ViUiera of the Free State, and Sir Henry de 
Villiers, Chief Jnstice of Cape Colony, and also with the 
State Attorneys of the two Eepublic9, However interesting 
to lawyers may be the legal questions involved, it ia tatbei 
the result of the subsequent action of the Transvaal Grovem- 
ment that told on the political world. 

The Transvaal Government procured the immediate 
passing of a law by the Volksraad giving power to the 
President to summarily dismiss any or all of the judges 
who did not give him satisfactory assurances that they 
would not exercise the so-called " testing right," and would 
hold as law every resolution of the Volksraad, whether 
in conflict with the Grond Wet or not. The fact that 
resolutions of the Volksraad mif^ht also be retractire and 



les 



THE* SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



4 
I 



ex post ftido, and so overturn in a moment vested righta 
of property, caused this acdon of the Government to create 
the greatest alarm and nureat in the whole Uitlander 
community. 

On a promise of a new Grond Wet. providing for the 
independence of the Courts, the judges gave the required 
imdertaking; but the Grond Wet was not passed two yeai9 
later. 

The neit great event occurred in March 1897 — the 
confederation of the two Boer States, TMs was the crowning 
atone of the poUcy of the niiHtant Afrikaiider in power in 
Bloemfontein since President Steyn's election in the pry vioua 
year. It was strongly opposed, but it was passed, Events 
have proved that it sealed the fate of the Free State." ■ 

The arming of the Orange Free State burghers, at the ™ 
expense of Pretoria^ is generally understood to have proceeded 
rapidly from this date, and continued for the two following 
years, in fact, until the ultimatam of the 9th October^ 1899, ^ 

The only other event of considerable Importance in the H 
same year, was the opening of the Ehodesian Railway from ~ 
Cape Town, inaugurated by the High Commissioner^ in. 
Bulawayo, in November 1897* This events bringing a great 
concourse of journalists and other viisitors from all parts at 
the world, fised still more on the South African problem the _ 
attention of the home-staying British public. H 

Notj indeed, that there was much Likelihood of relaxing ~ 
that attention, the grievances of the Uitlanders still being 
unredressed. The negotiations of tlie Colonial Secretary 
with the Transvaal still continued on the same lines ba 
those already indicated ; to secure remedy for the Uitlander 
disabilities, and to assert the claim of the Imperial power to H 
control the relations of the Transvaal with foreign States. " 

* It was during the featiritiea of what wu called *^CcinfederHtiDn 
Week,'* in March 1897, that the "Kwaije Vrouw " banquet look place, in 
which Preaident Kruger waa supposed by some jounuUi&la, owing to their 
imperfect knowledge of Dutcbj tu have mad# socae derogatory observa- 
tlooK with reference to the Queen. Any one who w»a there could aee 
that the term waa really meant to be complimentary, mamiiig "One 
who ioflLBts OD her rights.** 




RAID TO AFRIKANDER RULE !N PRETORIA '96-^ 

New legislation, such as the Alien Iroroigration Act 
(restricting iinmigration of aliens, repealed on remonstrance 
by the Imperial Government, reuiongtrance emphasised by 
sending warships to Delagoa Bay), the Alien Expulsion 
Law, the Press Law, were among the topics dealt with.* 

In October 1397, Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial Secre- 
tary, baaed the right of the Imperial Government to refuse 
to submit certain claims to arbitration on the ground that 
aozerainty, created in the preamble of the Convention 
of 1881, remained, through the survival of that preamble, 
although the Articles of 1884 were aubatituted for those 
of 1881, 

The chief political events of 1898 wei^ the dismissal of 
the Chief Justice of the Transvaal, by order of the President, 
in February 1898; the Suzerainty Controversy, beginning 
in April 1898 ; the accession to office and power in Pretoria, 
in July 1898, of the militant Afrikander party, led by Mr. 
ate S«ecretary Eeitz and State Attorney Smuts, a party in 

per in Bloemfontein since President Steyn's election in 
1896 ; the controversy between the Imperial Government 
and the new power in Pretoria over the Swaziland Con- 
vention, from June to October 1898 ; and the accession to 
office of a Bond miniatry in the Cape Parliament, with Mr. 
Schreiner as Premier, in October 1898. 

Of the accession to power in Cape Town of the Bond 
Minifiby little need be said, except that it certainly was not 
calculated to damp the ardour or lower the militant tone of 
the Afrikanders in Pretoria, into whoae hands had fallen the 
conduct of the negotiations with the Imperial Government. 

The dismissal of Chief Justice Kotz6 had lasting and 
widespread effects. The Chief Justice, considering that the 
non-introduction of the new Grond Wet, promised as a 
condition of his temporarily relinquishii^ the " testing 

* At thiB time I began to take coQBidcrnble iutereal in tlie9« queetions 
of tbe legal ititerpretation uf tho Couvtation-s^ haviug accepted ia May 
1897, from Dr. CnjsHert then State Attorney, a rulainer aa Advinory 
C-ounsel to ibe ReiJublic, after having cuDsultol the Chief Juatice, the 
Ifiaders of the Bar^ and the Britifih Ageot^ Sir Conynghaiu Greene, iiotie 
of whoni saw Any objection to tjaat course. 



I70 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



light/* released him from his agreement to that effect, wrote 
to the President that ha held that the agreement had Iftpeed. 
The aoswer was hia instant disnussal by order of the 
President. Among the British public at home^ al&na and 
distrust of the Pretoria Govenunent woa increased tenfold. 
Among the Uitlanders there was con3tematiDn» as the 
British relianca on the courts of hiw as Uia lost and sorest 
defence of life, liberty and property is inherited in the blood. 
The Suzerainty controverBy, brought forward by the 
reply of State Secretary Leyds, of the 16th April, 1898^ 
excited much interest, but does not seem to have been 
fittended by much political consequence. I have alwayi 
^reed with the position of State Secretary Leyds, that the 
Suzerainty — a most elastic term, conveying no specific 
meaning at the present day- — eatabliahed by the Pretoria 
Convention of 1881 was abolished by the London Conven- 
tion of 1884. Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary, in bis 
apeecb in the House of Lords of the I7tb March, 1885, says, 1 
''We have abstained from using the word," But to assertt 
as proving the existence of the Suzerainty, the per^stence of 
the preamble of the 1881 Convention (as the Colonial 
SecretAty had been advised to do in Mb despatch of the 
16th October, 1897), when Lord Derby's printed draft of the I 
1884 Convention encloses " witliin a black line " as " proposed 
to be omitted " this very preamble of 1881, i& as eztraordinaiy 
as it is imintelligible.* . 

* The matter is renlly ana more of interest to lnwyers than to the 
general public. It JB Worth nDlmg^ howevef, that eTery lawyer of 
emiatiDceif wbu has puhlished An opinioD on the subject, agrees that the 
Suzerainty and the pntu/nbU of the 1&81 CunventioD were ^boiLshed on 
the coQcIuaion of the ConTCntioD of 1884^ Professor Weatlake, in the 
Sevue de Droit International oi 1896, holds this vicw^ and expcmify 
refxiiea the preamble theory. M. Arthur Desjirdiiis and M. Awer, both 
leading mcmbora of the lostituto of InterDational Law, haVQ writien 
(timi lflr cpiDioDS. In England 8ir Edward Clarke, and in South Africa 
fmvi^ral leading lawyeri>, hava expfeeeed the frame opinion ; and none the 
contrary. Among these are Mr. W. F. Schreiner, QXj.^ the late Priiue 
MiniBtcT of Gape Ckilony, who published hia Dpinlon in the presa, and 
Mr. Advocate J. W- We^sel^, of the Pretoria Bar^ the defender of th« 
Eeform pd^onerii, who ga.v& me in 1396 hii^ opinion in writing that the 
giueraiiity had been abohahed. A roreign Charge d'AJTaires at Pretoria 
aaked ma why tha Colonial OMce had not eonsullted Profeasor Weatlake. 



RAID TO AFRIKANDER RULE IN PRETORIA '96-9S 171 



The most fateful event of the year was, however, one 
which excited little attention at the tiine, and any attentioa 
that was attracted was rather of a friendly kind. Tlua was 
the accession of the militant Afrikander party to office in 
Pretoria in June 1898. 

State Secretary Leyds having been appointed Minister 
of the Eepnblic to Europe, State Attorney van Leeuwen 
being promoted to the bench, and Foreign Sectretary van 
Boeschoten being aent to the newly-eatabliahed Legation in 
Bmsaels, their officea were filled by the election of State 
Secretary Eeitz (formerly President of the Orange Free State, 
and fonnder of the Afrikander Bond), State Attorney Smuts 
(a yoong man of no experience, nnderstood to have been 
appointed on the recommendation of Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr^ of 
Gape Town, leader of the Afrikander Bond), and Foreign 
Secretary Grohlor, a relative of the President, all three being 
members of the Afrikander party. Three Hollander were 
thus succeeded by three Afrikanders. Changes were also 
made in their respective offices j but what really made the 
alteration of the persomid important was that the conduct 
of the negotiations with the Imperial Government — and 
necessarily, therefore, the policy to be adopted towards the 
Uitlander cause in the hands of the Imperial Government — 
fell to the militant Afrikanders instead of to the trained 
Europeans who had preceded them. 

The mistaken rejoicing of Johannesburg is still recalled 
by many of the victims of the exptdsian of October 189&^ at 
the oi*der of Messrs. liaitz and Smuts. A very prevalent 
theory for yeara had been that the Hollander public servants, 
introduced by the President, were the cauae, instead of the 
effect, of the policy against which the Uitlanders strove in 
vain. 

In Pretoria, therefore, State Secretary Eeitz of the 
militant Alrikandeia was, at last, in a position to influence 
the action of President Kmger^ — not in policy, for in policy 
they were in absolute agreement — but in choosing of times 
and seasons. Educated in England, he was supposed to 
understand the Imperial strength and_ purpose. In Bloem- 



172 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

fontein, ExecutiTe Councillor JElsclier, in conjunction with 
President Steyn — also educated in England — at last coold 
join hands with Pretoria in a militant pau-Afiikander 
policy.* 

• Mr. J. P. Fitzpatrick, in Mb valuable work, * The Transvaal from 
Within,* an accurate record of the facts which fell under Mb immediate 
notice, reproduces the Johannesbui^er's error as to the real character and 
purpose of the Young Afrikander. Contrast his estimate of Messrs. Bats 
and Smuts with the letter of Mr. Theophilus Schreiner, already quoted, 
and with the view of Messrs. Scoble and Abercombie^ cited in the note to 
Chapter XXIII. Johannesburg realised its error in October 1899, and 
rated plausible professions at their real worth ; but the BritUh of Pretoria 
had understood long before. The speech of Mr. J. W. WeaselB, ^ven in 
the Appendix, shows that it was the Young Afrikander party that were 
the immediate cause of the resistance to the Imperial demands on behalf 
of the Uitlander, and, consequently, of the war. 



( 173 ) 



\ 



CHAPTEK XVIII. 

THE AFRrKANBER POUCT IN THE BOER STATES, 1898. 

In June 1898, at last ia the councils of Pretoria, tho 
A&ikander party kept steadily in view the Fan- Afrikander 
ftnti-British goal. To preserve the nucleus round whieh waa 
to group the Dutch domination from the Zambesi to tho 
Cape, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean* a most jealoua 
grasp was to be kept on political power, on the gold in the 
reef, on the command on rifles, fortg and armaments, on the 
exclusive use of the Dutch tongue. Just && two hundred 
years before the use of the French language was suppressed 
by force, so was English to be steadfastly ostracised. 

Towards the British Uitlander, vigorous exclusion from 
political power, while feeding him with fair words, lest ho 
might mould the I-tepublic in other than Dutch models. 
Towards the Imperial Power, a steady resistance to its 
interi'tirence to protect the Uitlander — such treatment of 
the Uitiander as he received being a purely internal affaii' — 
and equally endeavour to shake off the IiQ|>erial control of 
foreign relations. Evade or openly disregard the Convene 
tions; wearineaa and English party spirit, and all other 
well-known causes of Imperial vacillation in the past 
centuiy will do the rest. What has often been flouted, 
becomes obsolete at last. 

On the origin and history of Boer distrust and under- 
estimate of the power of the British people and the Imperial 
Government 1 have already written, and of the Afrikander 
propaganda which has created an Afrikander Separatist party. 
Bat in the case of the men in Pretoria and Bloemfontein, 



174 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

their edncation in England hia reaUj served to foT^ieF 
miftleod them. Their brief and fragnientaTy erpi^ieaoQ of 
Kngiiflh life, acquired during a professional education, has 
given them little or no opportunity of seeing the higher 
aspect of public Ufe in England. Bnt it has produced an. 
Olosion of knowledge^ the most dangerona form of want ofl 
knowledge. And their education has produced an illusion , 
of intellectiial superiority — aa regards the rest of the world, ' 
the British portion included — a superiority which is r eali 
only in contrast to the veldt Boer, 

*' Dons le pays ilee aveuglee, 1e borgne at roi.** 
*' In het land dor blinden, is eenoog koning."'* 

The reason why thia small body of men bad such weight ' 
with the action of President Kruger — for hia policy tiiey 
did not require to sway as it was identical with their own 
— both as regards the TJitlander and the Imperial Govern- ^ 
ment, is clear enough to all familiar with the typical Boer's f 
distrust of aU but his own people. The President and, with 
him, the Executives and Volksraads. had complete tmst in 
their support of his anti-British policy. But mach more 
than that, they were credited with special knowledge (which 
in reality they did not possess) of British politico and parties, 
and the probabilities of Imperial action. Of Boer blood 
themselves^ educated (at least as to their professions) to 
some extent in England, they were regarded by the older 
members of the ruling class as counsellers, whose residence 
in England had enabled them to master the intricacies of ■ 
British statesmanship and politics, and whoso duties in ™ 
Holland had inducted them into the mysteries of Continental 
policy — an assumption which, curiously enough, they would 
have seen to be absurd if applied to the politics of a Kaffir 
chiefs head kraal, and the casual stay of a European traveller. 
Lastly, until, at the Bloemfontein Conference of June 1S99, 
the present High Commission raised— what should have been 
raised long ago — the wider issue of the status of British 
citizens in the Transvaal, involving the majesty and there- 
* See Appendix. The Toung AfrikftDder. 



AFRIKANDER POLICY IN THE BOER STATES 175 



I 



fore the safety of the Empire itself — an issue having no 
relation to the terms of Conventions between the Transvaal 
and the Imperial Government — until this issue waa raised, 
all the questions between the Governments turned on the 
legal interpretation of stipulations of the Conventiona, And 
these separatist Afrikanders are all lawyers, and, -nith few 
exceptions, educated in the law schools of England. So, 
anti-British, skilled in British and foreign politics, skilled 
in law : this was the President's conception of " Le borgne 
dans le pays des aveugles" — "Eenoog in het land der 
blindeu." 

The new directors of the negotiations showed their hand 
when vejy early in office, and a long series of new departures, 
challenged by the Imperial Government as breaches of the 
Conventions, were taken under their direction.* 

The first matter of negotiation arose under the Swaziland 
Convention of 1894. By that Convention Swaziland had 
been placed under the protectorate of the Transvaal ; certain 
stipulations being made in favottr of the Swazis, including 
the preservation of their native usages, so far as they wore 
not in conflict with civilised laws and customs, special 
Mftervatioa being made as to cases between Swazi and Swazi 
to be decided, as previously, by their own custom, and to be 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the High Court of Swazi- 
land. The privileges of the principal chief of the Swazis 
were specially guarded, and by an express article it was 
stipulated that the Imperial Government retained the right 
of diplomatic remonstrance, in case the provisions of the 
Convention touching the reserved rights of the Swazis were 
not observed. 

By order of the principal chief, what the Swazia regarded 
as a political execution took place early in 1898. In 
previous deciaioaa, the High Court of Swaziland had held 
that cases of this kind fell within the category of those 
excluded &om ita jurisdiction^ by the Convention^ inasmuch 

• ThflM will be eueti onumerated m » meraonuiduni to the two 
; GoTerament* of Uie Republics, which. I iasuiK) during the BlDetnfontalci 
CotdeTence, 



176 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

as it was matter between Swazi and Swazi, and no EnropMS 
was involved.* 

The Govemment of the Tranavaal, on the advice of its 
new offidala was proceeding to arrest the principal chief, 
who was called Bann, when the High Commissioner inter- 
posed, and pointed out that, under the Convention, the SwRzi 
Tuages were maintained intact^ unless in conflict with civilised 
laws and customs, that the privileges of the principal chief 
were specially protected, and that the High Comrt had 
already decided that there was no jurisdiction. 

At the same time the Imperial Government were qnito 
prepared, by means of a new protocol, to enlarge the juris- 
diction of the High Court, and in every way to facilitate the 
maintenance of order and the gradtial introduction of Earo* 
pean civilisation. 

The Transvaal Government, on militant Afrikander ad- 
vice, refused to admit that the Imperial Govemment had 
any right to a voice in the interpretation of the Conventioo 
— a bilateral tnatrument to which it was one of the partie 
No remonstrance from the Imperial Govemment would ba 
entertained — ^although the right was expressly reoerved — 
imless there should be a breach of the C^^nvention ; of which, 
apparently, Pretoria alone was to be the sole judge. They 
moved Transvaal troops — drilled volunteers as well as burgher 
comraandoca — into Swaziland to seize the Swazi chief, who 
fled to British territory in August 1898* 

The High CommissioDer evidently saw that, behind the 
apparently minor dispute as to the interpretation of a con- 
vention there was a spirit and purpose to discredit con- 
ventional obligations, and to weaken the whole authority of 
the Imperial Power. Thrtiugh the Acting British Agent, 
Mr. Edmund Fraser, what was practically an ultimatum was 
presented to Pretoria ; and, a.g times were not then deemed 
ripe for war, the Transvaal troops were withdrawn from 
Swaziland ; an arrangement was made that the Chief Bunu 

• The tneriifi of tbia decision are immaterial; aa most lawyers will 
hgreo, that naulher Judge' mig^ht Very well have held that Buch a procaediiig 
wu ^' cgntriLry to civiluted Inwa &Dd customa," 



1- 



AFRIKANDER POLICY IN THE BOER STATES 177 

was merelj to be fined, and not hanged, as intended, and a 
new Prctocol was signed, in October 1898, extending the 
jurisdiction of the Hip;h Court of Swasdland to cover cases of 
violent crime, even where only Swazis are concerned. 

So within two months of succeeding to office in Pretoria^ 
the Yotmg Afrikanders had brought South Afiica and the 
Empire to the verge of a war, such as has now convulsed 
the world. 

This, of course, was quite undreamt of in England, where 
the declaration of the Colonial Secretary that five times 
within recent years war with the Transvaal was imminent, 
has hardly even yet been realised in ita literal correctness,* 

Aa it will explain much that followg, I may say that it 
waa at this point, in October 1898, after many doubts and 
long enquiry that I realised the real trend— notwithstanding 
the moat pEicific professions — of the Afrikander movement. 
It meant war. The question was one only of time. That 
the leaders were absolutely assured that actual fighting would 
be neceflsary is another matter. If the Empire were at war 
with another Great Power, possibly the Imperial Government 
would peaceably cede South Alrica to the Dutch-speaking 
dominion, and even accept a subsidy for policing the aea by 
ita fleet, nntil the new dominioD could spare time to create 
one of its own. 



• 1 entered ^ strong prcitest againfll thia mi'thod of inlerpfetiug Con- 
7entioas, which is utJy meant as a ]>oUtical device to evade public obliga- 
liozia, and finally to ieniJurQ their do&truction by desuetude. 

The poeition taken up by Stat* Secretary Itcitz and his colleague, 
State Attorney Smuts, and tijeir followers, waa obviously— apart from 
their political purjxxte — that there i,^ no real validity io atipuliitiont^ pledged 
DQ the public faith. In fact^ that Ibtertiationftl Law lias no real c^i^teuce* 
being "t&rgely a tnntCer tif opinion, inaRniuch as it has nu law courts to 
enforoe it-," to quote t^ecretary Keith's eagaduus phraEc. This riiuat be 
intereHting to English lawyers, being an insLructive survival of EngliBh 
legal education — the Aiistmian heresy. It would no doubt aurpriae that 
amUble theoriatf John Auatin, to find hi& hamilesa abstractions nelping to 
e£CU6e the eTaflion of treaties. 

The coTmnandeering of British ftubjecU in the Free State to fight 
arauuat their own people, and the expreae iaclaration of BxocutJTo Coun- 
ciUor Fischer and Presideot Steyn, " We don't recognise InteroAtional Law 
b«re," will iUuBtrate the same spirit (in the case of Dr. Dalglicsh, referred 
ti> in Sir Alfred Mllncr^a deepatch, btii DeoenabeT} 1S99, 

N 



178 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

My absolute conviction that tiiere would be war was 
induced by the fact that I had learned to know the mind of 
the young Afrikander, and well knew the mind of the British 
people. It was as if one were looking through a stereoscopah 
from two points of view at once. In England no one could 
believe in the combined ignorance and audacity of two petty 
States rashly challenging the world-wide Empire; and ao» 
no one dreamt of war. In the Transvaal and among the 
mass of half-educated Afrikanders, not to mention the veld 
Boer, although war was conceived as possible, their invincible 
ignorance of the extent of the resources, of the reserve 
military power, of the determination of the Imperial people 
was as great as British incredulity as to the magnitude of an 
audacity, the result of a hundred years of Imperial mistakes. 



175^ 



CHAPTER XIX. 



AFRIKiJsDEB ACTION AGAINST THE UITLANDEE AND THE 
EMPIRE, 

Leavtno Pretoria, in November 1898, I made a tour through 
the Portuguese territory, the town of Louren^o Marques on 
Delagoa Bay ; thence to Durban and other districts of Natal ; 
and, visiting on the way the Eastern Province at East London 
and Port Elizabeth, arrived in Cape Town in January, 1899, 
My return to the Transvaal took place in April following. 

Impressed aa I had been on leaving the Transvaal, with 
the pending certainty of war, I endeavoured, while pursuing 
my uther inquiries, to aacertain the views of leading men, of 
all political parties, in all these districts of South Africa on 
the possibilities of war. Among tho,ge who views I sought 
were the Governor of Natal, Sir Walter Hcly Hutchinson, 
and the Acting High Commisgioner^ Sir William Butler \ 
the leading membera of the past and the present Govern- 
ments, and of the legislative bodies ; as well as oi leading 
lawyers, of leading merchants and landowners in Natal, the 
Eastern Province and the Cape. With only two exceptions, 
I was a'isured that the prospects uf war between the two 
Boer States and the Empire, or between Dutch and Britwh 
in South Africa^ wei-e so remote that no sensible man would 
think about thera. There were only two exceptions who^ 
neither of them South Airicans, realised the menace of the 
situation ; one holding a high Imperial post ■ the other a 
&lend« whose position in the Diplomatic Service^ had given 

H 2 



i6o 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



him exceptional opportunities of understanding tlie South 
African problem .• 

The last Station of the Uitlanders of Johanneaburg took 
place in Janoary 1899, arising out of tJbe outrage known 
as the Edgar murder. A British resident, being involved in 
some street brawl, took refuge in his own house. The Boer 
police — British being excluded from the force — -broke in the 
door; and, although several in niLmber, one of them shot 
the fugitive dead, instead of arresting hito. The policeman 
wfi3 brought to trials and after a charge from the Boer judge, 
was unanimously acquitted by the Boer jury. The Uitlanders 
determined to protest and to appeal for Imperial protection. 
Under the auspices of the South African League they drew 
up a petition to the Queen, and traDsmitted it in February 
to the Acting High Commisaioner in Cape Town. It was 
returned on account of some informality in the presentation,, 
and the Acting High Commissioner expressed himself in 
terma somewhat unfavourable to the methods of the Lea^e, 
A new petition of the 28th March, 1899. bearing 21,684 
signatures was drawn up, and a deputation proceeded to the 
British Yice'Consid. of Johannesburg to request his forwarding 
it to the Queen. For tliis exercise of the elementary rights 
of a British citizen, tlie leaders of the demonstration, Messra* 
Wehh and Dodd, were prosecuted at the order of the 
Afrikander State Attorney, Smuts, for infringeroent of the J 
Transvaal law proliibiting public meetings. Incidentally to ] 
tliis proceedings an illegal subpcena to attend the trial was , 
served on the Vice-Conaul. who refused to obey it. 

At this point, the Uitlanders of Johannesburg began to ^ 
suspect the genuineness of the sympathy felt with their lot 
by the educated Afrikander- J 

* A member of the prcBent Cape Miniptry reminds me that* in 
Janufliy, 18^!), 1 told a party uf frieDdi at hi» house that war was iDevit«bl« 
during the year, and that a quarter of a millioii of Ijrn«ria] owoxm would 
be required ts cope with the Boer forceH. This, nO' one ppeseat c<mld be 
brought to helioT€; the thcury of "Hujs toe*'and under-cHtimate of the veld 
Boers, prevailed fttnoD^ Imjiorialista at the Cape as well as Joh*nneflburg; 
»nd, afl regnrdf* their leader*, the edupated Voung Afrikanders, no 
could reoliBe Ibnt tliej could bo *k> ignorant aad w audacious. 



AFRIKANDER ACTION AGAINST THE EMPIRE l8l 

The High Conmuflaioner's despatch to the Colomal Office 

of the 4th May, practically adopts the prayer of the Petition. 
As I have already pointed out, it takes the question away 
altogether froia the region of legal interpretation of the 
ConventioiiB. It raises diatinctlyj and for the first time, 
the issue, that not the grievances of the Uitlanderg, not the 
■woes of the capitalists, but the prestige and therefore the 
life of the Empire is &t 9ta^e ; if the continued oppression 
of British citi^etia is to be endured. The despatch makes 
cle^x the existence of a distinct policy of calumny gainst 
the Imperial Government, and of claims baaed on the 
ftssumtion on some superior right in Dutch over British^ 
all over South Africa ; and shows how the Dutch in British 
Colonies are becoming disaffected at the spectacle of the 
British in the Transvaal appealing vainly for protection to 
the Imperial Power. 

The despatch of the Colonial Secretary, dated 14th May, 
ia a confirmation of Sir Alfred MiLaer's endorsement of the 
Petition, and states the views of the Imperial Government : — 

•* It FESults from tliiB review of the facts and conditions on which the 
PfititioD is fouoded, as well as from information. d«riv^ from four des- 
patches »nd other sourcee^ that Britiah Hubjectfi amd tbo UUlnnders geuo- 
rally, in the South African Republic^ have EubBt*ntial groundB for thoir 
complaint of the treatment to which they are a-ubjocted. 

" Her Majieaty*B Govermnent, however, attach much less importanCfi to 
luianciial gnev^ancaft than to those v/hich pUce them m a condition of 
jxjlitical, educational, imd Bocial inferiority towards the Boer inhabi- 
tant* of the Transvaal, Mid oven endanger the Becurity of their llv^ and 
property. 

"Her Majoaty*ft Government eameatly desire the proBperity of the 
Sottth African Eeptiblic. They have hetrn miiiouH to avoid any loter- 
vention in lie internal concenui, and they may point out in this connection, 
that if they really entertained the design of deatroying ite mdepoDdeiice, 
■wiuch has been attributed to them, no policy could be better ctvlculated to 
defeat their object, than that whjcb, in all friendBhip and eiiicerityt they 
now ui^e upon the Goverament of the South Afiican Republic^ and which 
would reasove any pretext for iuterferenoe by relieving British eubjects of 
all juat cause of ootophuct." 

During the last Johaimesbnrg agitation, in January 1899 




THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



I had DO special Bgnrces of infonuatiozt. alihongh I folloired 
the proceedinga with attention ; but, iniiamuch as, during mj 
then r©c«Di tour through the various States, I fomid that ail 
the leading public men, and the press, without exception, 
ascribed the action of the Transvaal Goveruiaent, both ss 
regaxda the Impeml Government — a series of quite ddv 
breachea of the CtonventionB having begun under the later 
regime in Pretoria — and as regarUa the Uitlanders, to my 
advice aa a lawyer, interpreting the Conventions, I wrota 
a letter of remonsteance to State Secretary Heitz, dated 
Cape Tomi, 4th February, 1899, to which reference will be 
made in the summary of my memoraDdum to the Executive 
and Volkoraad. dated Pretoria, 1st May. To the Minister 
to Eurt^pe, Df. Leyds, with whom I had interviews in 
January and March in Cape Town, I repeated the same 
remonstrances. 

In April I attended— ^for, as it proved^ the last time — ^the 
opening of the Volfcsraad of the Orange Free State. I bad _ 
several interviews with the President> and with members of ■ 
the Executive and Members of the Volksraad, of both the " 
Progreasive and the Conservative sectiona. I endeavoured to 
iropreas on them the extreme gravity of the situation, the 
urgent necessity of inducing the Pretcria Government to 
listen to more modeiute counsels, and, if they "wished to 
retain their independence, to redress the grievances of tiie 
Uitlanders, The introduction of the Free State Franchise 
Law into the Transvaal would be the simplest solution. 
Above all, I endeavoured to convey to them my own con- 
viction of the imminent risk of war ; and that the calculation 
obviously being made by the militant Afrikander that» once 
again, the Imperial Government would waver and retreat, 
was due to absolute want of knowledge of the courage and 
resolution of the British people or Government, when once 
roused. Although at that time I had not had an opportunity 
of discussing the situation with the High Commissioner, T 
had formed a suf&ciently accnrate estimate, not so much of 
his policy, as of the result on the mind of the British people 
at home, of his presentation of the cose of the UitWders, 



AFRIKANDER ACTION AGAINST THE EMPIRE 183 



I 



and of the gravity of the crisis as affecting the stability of 
the Empire. I pointed out, too, the boundless wealth and 
the reserve military force of the Empire in case of the war, 
towards which militant Afrikander policy in Pretoria was 
impelling the iwo Republics. 

I found that, with the exception of certain progressive 
members of the Volksraad, including Mr. J. G. Fraaer, there 
was not the least confidence in the reaolutioa of the Imperial 
Government. And as to the chances of wai", that they 
inclined in favour of the Boer States ; more especially in 
view of the likelihood of foreign complications. 

For much of this 1 was prepared^ but I confess I was 
surprised to find the President holding^ — as l»o told me — 
that the presence of the Bond Ministry in office in the Cape 
would interfere with the Imperial troops m.aktng use of the 
lailways. I reminded him that the Molteuo Ministry was 
dismisaed by a word from Sir Bartle Frere, for endeavouring 
to control his military operations ; and that, at an order 
from Sir Alired Miliier» the Bond Ministry would cease to 
hold office. And also, that neither an Oliivier Ministry nor 
a Gambetta Government prevented the German army from 
using the French railways. 

I was impressed also to find that, in addition to the 
many historic reasons for doubting the resolution and firm- 
new of any Imperial Government^ they relied on a new one^ 
aa rendering improbable any British redress by arms of the 
Uitlandera' grievances. This was the Queen's well-known 
dislike to any war, and her desire that her long reign should 
close in peace. In Pretoria I found the same impression. 

Now, on© of the strange things in this most strange field 
of South African politics, is thatj almost untU their expul- 
sion, the Uitlanders of Johannesburg retained a certain 
confidence in the friendly intentions of the Free State 
Government in particular, and also in the militant Afri' 
canders in Pretoria; thinking that the execution of their 
oonciliatory designs was prevented by President Kruger 
and the Boers of the older school ; whereas the very reverse 
was the case, 




THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



From Bloomfontein I proceeded to Pretoria, arriving then 
on the 9th April. I there conferred with several memben 
of the Volksraad, including Mr. R. K. Loveday, the only 
English member of the First Volkaraad, and other Pro- 
gr^sive membere, and, at their suggestion, drew np a 
" Menjorandum on the Present Aspect of the Foreign Affnin 
of the South African Republic," dated Pretoria, 1st Msy 1899. 
This memorfldnm was translated into Dutch and circulated 
among the members of the Executive and of tb^ Firat and 
Second Volkfiraad^ and was also sent to the Execndve of Uw 
Orango Free State. 

The Memorandum woa read at a private meetmg ofj 
members of the First Volksraad, at which I waa p7Q9et]tt^| 
It is too long to reproduce here; but the foUowiug are the 
chief passages : — 

" Tn view of the grave aspect of the external aSaxn of the Republic, it 
has be(^n flupigeeted to me thnt it would be well if T were to place on 
record, for the iELformation of the Exocutive nnd tJie Volkemwl, mj 
opinioo on (hoie fsatum of the BituaiiOD which Be^nid to call for 8pe<nal 
Attention at their huiide. 

"^ Thti iuaiiit«tiABce of the indcpendenoe and cf the free tnitiatiTO in 
8outli Africn of tbiH Kepublicv and of the micT Repuhlic of the Free SUXe^ 
miwt Dece&B&rilj be the fint care of those cha^rgi^ with the GoTenuaent 
of tho State. Ab I have more than onro pointed out during the period io 
which I acted as adiriKng Coimsel on the foreign affoini of the RepublicA, 
the mamteniLiice of that independence by the Burghera is not alone now, 
as It bos always been^ a high object of tlieir immediate pereonal conceni, 
but a tnwt which committed to them by dcatioy, ehuuid be carried out for 
the benefit of the preeent and all future people of the Biiropeain mco in 
South Africa." 

Among the causes alleged aa threatening the independence 
of the State, I enumerated the three which appeared to weigh 
moat with them— the hostility of great capitalififcic groups, 
the discontent of the Uitlander population, and a " policy of 
aggression ascribed to the present British Colonial Secretory ** 
Aa to the last^ I painted ont that 

" It would be imwUe to BBBumo, without the ampleBt evidooee, that 
any Statceman in euch a poftitdon of reBpoUElbility to hia Empire and to 
other Stated would lightlf teek cause of war. The wiacot ooune evideiiUy 



I 

I 



AFRIKANDER ACTION AGAINST THE EMPIRE 185 



\ 



I 



is to ftToid, "by OTOiy ineAUB abort of the ftmrendflr of the mdependencQ of 
a Republic, ^ving occaaon for either pacific or aTm«d interveDtion." 

I then proceeded to point out the circumstanceg favgur- 
able to armed intervention and the rashness of chaUenging 
the unfettered power of the Empire. The friendly attitude 
of Germany, the distractions of FrJ.nco; the Imperialist 
tendencies of the leaders of the former Gladstone party ; 
the irritation of the ruling class in England at what they 
regard as ingratitude on the part of the Transvaal burghers ; 
the change of tone among the Liberal press in England, 
formerly in favour of the burghers. 

I then refer to the general opinion, which I had recently 
aBcartained in all the states of South Africa on the gravity 
of tha crisis, to the recent increase of Imperial troops on the 
border and to the 

"IMudvontoges and diuBtere flttendant on var* however Tictorioiu — 
the Ion of Uvea, of money^ the check to induBiry, the rocrudeacence of 
race diTuionft amo&g the rapidly funalgamatiDg white people of every 

I then combat a fallacy impressed on the Volksraad by 
tihe Afrikander party, and which lured the burghers to their 
destruction. " Forcible intervention 13 impossible under 
British Constitutional Government, and so may be dismissed 
from our consideration/' I show how fallacious it was to 
think that the capitalists, fearing the destruction of their 
mines could hold the hands of the Imperial Government; 
who, in the issues of peace and war, have only to commend 
themselves to the J udgmen t of the ruling claaa in the United 
Kingdom, whose characteristic ia their "strong sense of 
justice/* 

"The ruling cloae, however imfavourttbly impreflaed by the former 
policy of thin State, Would never BSDClion war, uhIcbb what in their eyes 
coBBtituteB a jiiBt and mifEcient cause ebouJd arise. Should, therefore, the 
Republic, by a utrici adherence to tte external cibligatlanB. make certain 
that it is in the right Ln it« foreign relatioUB^ cot only would it have tlie 
eectuity which Aprings from a Benso of having fulfilled the obligations of 
j-ustiioei, but it would bav« perceptibly dimmiBbod the choncea of foielgn 
intervention.^ 




THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE 

I tben proceed to consider the two a^pec^ of the sitOAtioD 
into which the Airikonder party has led the Govenmieiit of 
tha State. The &^t aspect, that of the n^otiatioDs with iHe 
ImperiaJ Goverament, the second, that of the position of tlie 
reeident Uitlandera. 

1 first referred to the negotjationa with th© Imporiil 
Government with leferenca to actions held by them as 
breaches of the Conventions^ which, " for a considerahla 
time were referred to me for advice; advice usually, though 
not invaribly. acted upon by the Executive,*' but which had 
become ext^raoidinarily numerooB during the preceding year, 
since the accession of the Africander patty to office. 

The enumeration of the pending questions included the 
Suzerainty Question and the Dynamite Concession and the 
Convention of 1S84; the proclaniations with reference to 
Dynamite in Swaziland, and the Swaziland Convention 
of 1894; the Extradition with Hhodcsia and the fiame Con- 
vention ; Indian Immigration and the Convention of London 
and an arbitral award to which the Imperial Govenunent 
had assented ; and the privileges of the British Yice-CkmauL 
1 also enumerated the previous questions already settled on 
which I had advised. 

Desiring the Volksraad to clearly understand my dissent 
from the method of interpreting conventions adopted by the 
Afrikander party— with the real object of evading them — 
and which I was surprised to find even members of tlt« 
Volksraad had ascribed to ray advice, I referred to the fact 
that my advice had not been followed on the last occaaion 
on which I had been consulted by the Executive — the 
Swa2iland proposed Protocol — until and ultimatum had been 
received from tbe High Commissioner. 

" Ab more fully explnaning what I conBider to be tlie just and pnii 
way i>f conBJdenng all queatlone umler the ConventionB, I may here quote 
from my letter wldreHBed to the prtweut State Secretary on the 4th of 
February, 1899, the Bubetaace of which I requeBted him to communirate 
to the Executive. 

** I am, fur niy ]:Art Htrongly of opinion thtit no imisience idiould tn 
uiy caae b« made eltli$f as to m^turti in wMch there ia nothing of rvni 



i 




^ 




AFRIKANDER ACTION AGAINST THE EMPIRE 187 

substance in diBpute^ or where there \b room for doubt as to the extent of 
the legal rights uf the Reimblic i or, above all, where an ineiBtfiDce on a 
tocbnically valid right would entail disjirgpottionato consequencoB of 
public danger.^ 

Lastly, I referred to the position of the TOsident Uit- 
landera as follows : — 

** I may be i^cnnitted to expre«B my eatufaction th&t thti Prenldent hu 
^ven pnwf of hie pcopoeali of adherence to the policy of Becuring the 
■tability of the nepiiblic, and removing the prospect of foreigu intervention 
by widening the electnrftl bafliH of the State. There can be do doulit that 
the VolksFEiad, relying on the advice of tho Prmdunt &nd the Executive 
ag their trusted C'JuucillorB, \i'ill duly weigh all the argumentB (0 he 
ivhluce<i in favour of hber&l fi^anchiee proposals." And, in concluBiont 
" [ trust I may expreaa the hope, tbnt, not withfltati ding the present grave 
outkiok, the Volharaad, by the eierciM of wisdom and prudence, both in 
eoforcing a Rcrupuloua adhurence to the public fiuth of the State, pledged 
in ita CoDveotions and Treaties, and in a wise antl timely concilliation of 
thuso rendienta from other Statea, who« fur good or ill, have thrown in their 
jot with the RepublicB, will bo guide the future of the people that the 
cause of the Hepubljc will bo that of juntice aod rigliU" 

This appeal to tbe Volksraad had an appreciable effect 
at tbe time ; and several members expressed agreement with 
its recommendations. But the reactionary forces of the 
Afrikander party were too strong ; with the result which was 
seen in the Bloemfontein Conference, 

It will be Been that the arguments I used were those 
most useful to convince the burgher members — ^being an 
appeal to their desire to preserve theix independence and to 
their sense of justice. It may be convenient here to state 
tny reasons for desiring to see that independence preserved, 

Lif such were at all compatible with the higher interests of the 
race and of civilisation in South Africa, t 



I bad aacertaineil that this letter bad not been communicated to the 
Executive in Pretoria, Boma of whom were — aa well at Executive Couu- 
ciilors in Bloemfontein, under au impraaion that I had adviaed the legal 
slepa taken in connection with the aggresaive jwlicy of MesHrB. Reita and 
Smuts. In the aame letter (4th February), 1 recorded my diseent from 
othw legal action which I had read of in the neWBpaperB. 

t The reasons had olready been set forth in a pamphlet stating the 
argumentB in the *' Suzeraiuty QueBtjon " in iBiJb. 



iS8 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



The reasons which have evidentlj inScenoed the Imperul 
GovemmeBt not meorely to support, but to ofiei to guaruitM 
the independence of the Boer Bepublics, if a policy of equal 
lighU for Euiopeau iuhabitants and joatioe for the nathe 
races were adopted, must influence any <me who dispassioD- 
ately considers the subject. 

The promotion of the gradual fusion of the European 
in South Africa must be the object of any statesman, Impeiul 
or local, who looks into the future. Dutch as well ^ £Hti^ 
are here in South Africa to stay. 

One obvious step in this direction would be gained bj 
conciliating, if it were possible, as some until the present 
war had hoped, Dutch feeling in favour of Republican forms; 
leaving their Eepubiica and local institutions intact. 

Again, still bearing in mind the ultimate object, the fiee 
initiative of the Republics in regard to the native problem 
would be more likely to conciliate Dutch feeling, than any 
hasty super-iiQposition of home-bom British methods, which 
have caused so much bitterness in the past. But, of course, 
this initiative to be m the bands of British as well as Dutch 
residents in the Republics ; and the object of retaining it 
would not be the stereotyping of present Transvaal and 
Orange River legislation, but to control the application of 
what is known in South Africa as Eixeter Hall methods. 

Yet again, for the good of all South Africa, a free initti' 
tive in the hands of the Eepublics in regard to the exploita- 
tion of minerals — for the public service, and not for tha 
multiplication of mHliouaires, would undoubtedly present 
fidvantagea. Here again, howeverj the control of this initia- 
tive to be in the hands of British as well as Dutch residents 
in the Bepublica ; who would be more likely to take the 
British law of the Klondyke Gold Fields as a model, or the 
present Orange Free State law, than the old Free SUte la«j 
under which titles are held the Kimberley Diamond Mines, ial 
which no rights are reserved to the State. 

Immcidiate harmony with the policy of the Empire, and 
ultimate fedemtion of all South Africa under the Imperial p 
tection, would be directly the result of a policy so marked oul 



AFRIKANDER ACTION AGAINST THE EMPIRE iS 



Not least of all, the danger of war a.iid race faiid, whicb. 
we are now experiencing would be dispelled ; and a newer 
generation would have fai^otten the particularist dreams of 
to-day, as a Breton haa forgotten that Ma country was once 
separate &om France. 

The young Afrikander idea of independence, we have all 
now discovered was veiy different from this ; although it is 
true, pacific protestations of goodwill (in Johannesburg more 
especially) made the diacovery much later in most cases than 
in mine. The real object of that party in power in Bloeni' 
fontein and Pretoria, the meaning which they attached to the 
" Independence of the Eepublica " was intolerant and moat 
jealous Dutch domination in South Africa. Their action was 
impelled by bitter envy and jealousy of the Uitlandera 
generally, and of the British in particular ; and by insane 
haib^ of the Imperial Power, whose away meant equal rights. 
They well knew that under any system baaed on equality of 
opportunities, they would be compelled to take an inferior 
position i and they were determined to hold to their factitious 
superiority arising from the military strength of the veld 
Boer, and their graap on the arms and the gold. Their anti- 
capitalist statements were a mere rhetorical device — ad cap- 
tandum vulgus — in England and elsewhere. Their plausible 
professions of friendship to the Uitlander, and their ascribing 
their inability to procure redress of tlieir grievancea to the 
Dopper and Hollander influence — to President Kruger and 
Minister Leyds — were a mere diploniatie ruse to blind the 
Philistines, at whose simplicity in believing them they were 
amused : witness their attempt to bring over the capitalists in 
Mareh 1897, by concessiona of mining facilities if they would 
abandon the Uitlandera' politiciJ claims.* 

It is not sufficiently appreciated that their opposition was 
not merely to the Empire and the British. Anti-British 
always, it is tniej but also anti-Hollander, anti-German, 
anti-French, anti- foreigner an, fond, Thoy have always 
r^nrded their Hollander public servants as mere instruments, 

• Fully deacribed by Mr, Fitzpatrict, 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



to be dispensed with at the earliest opportunity. No oonces- 
siqu of eq[iial rights to any foreigner was dreamt ot 

In my sketch of the policy of President Kruger, I have 
^inted out their misapprehension of this fact aa one of the 
mistakes of the Uitlauders of Johannesburg.* 

* Thia lil'iBtake wab partly reali^d by Johannesburg Dfi the DCCUrtCttO 
of the reeignfttiotij in July, 1897^ of SUU* Attorney Co6t*f, after SB 
unwoTthy aspersion on the courage of bis fellow Hollaodera, offered to hSm 
by PresideDt Kniger. Dr. Coster has since been killed, as I have already 
nientioDcd, Bghting gnltantly at ElanrlfilAagte ; while Preeident Kru^r, 
and MeBflra, Bail?, and HmutH and Fwchor, and the rest of the young 
Afnkanders have kejit well outahle thi; mnge of the British ^^nDB. 

Pmident Steyn uiadu no siccrei of hi» intention to dispense with the 
Berrice of hie Hollander oificialti,, aa fvocn as he could get educated " land'* 
flODB^to take their place; and oi^oly averred that^ neither in Pretoria 
nur Bloemfontein could they cauue the Afrikander policy to waver by a 
hairVbrcaJtb. 

An Oxford UniverHtty graduate, appointed to lecture at the Pretoria 
gymnaeiuni, told me id July of last year, that ho had beeu introducoii by 
the Afrikander SfAte Secretary Reit?, to a Ptranger, as holding hie chaii 
only until «ome " wnui-e A/rik-atuirr'" couM Ije ^ot coini^tent to take it. 

The young Afrikanders ha%'e been correctly deacribod as ihe Boer 
" BoxetTi 1 " and, uideed, reBCtnble in more wayu than iheif anti-forei^wa- 

Solicy, the ChineBo a-nti-foreipier party. Among theee resettiiblaaMat 
DW&ver, must not be included any iieducihle from a too flerrile buitatiuu 
of the Chineee fanatical courage. 

One very militant memljer of the imrty» a barrieter of the Templp. 
whom I have known for eonie yearJi,lBfliil tu mo in I'retoria, in April 18^, 
when 1 endBavouT€<i to convince him of the necoRflity of a conciliator)' 
pohcy: — "The time for diecuBsion has gone by. My horae and my rifle 
are reody," 

Durinor the war, the hoftfe P-nd the rjfle may have Iteen ready ; but they 
were not need. At imitci, the rtOe woe not ; cuncttivably becnuH tts UH 
Siiglit involve ^tttiuj^ the markHmao within range of other ridee, Tbs 
warrior in question served firtt on a lied Cro:-* Committee, and then in 
the ConLmiEj^sariat ; the latter an undoubtedly convenient department, with 
an oye to the utr&te^^ic difbculty of procuring supplie*. He at pr^eat 
repiwiw muler a prutection ev«u mure nucuro than that of the Red Croes — 
that of the shadow of the Ipiperial flag at Pretoria; as a burgher wliu 
has taken the oath of neutrality—while the fighting is going on. 



( 191 ) 



CHAPTER XX. 

THE CONFERENCE OF BLOEMFONTEIN, JUNE 1899. 

[DtTElNG the month gf JJay, in Pretoriaj I had interviewa 

I with moat of the memherg of the Transvaal Executive, and 

with nearly all the members of the Firat and Second Volks- 

, toad, and with many of the official heads of dQpartmenta. 

I As in Bloemfontein, I found a widespread disbelief ia the 

' firmness of purpose of the Imperial Government, and an idea 

that they were seeking to obtain control by peaceful meanft 

which they knew they were unable to get by the uae of 

force, thinking war too dangerous and expensive. 

As I have already mentioned^ I found in Pretoria, as in 
Bloemfontein^ the same singular reliance on the Queen's 
dislike to war, as a contributing cause, among all the 
well-known other causes, towards preventing the Imperial 
Government from ever, under any circumatauces, redressing 
the tlitlanders' grievances by force of arma. It waa useless 
to endeavour to explain — what tlie moat superficial acquaint- 
ance with home politics teUs any one — that, however great 
the influence on foreign negotiations the Queen's unique 
experience has naturally given her, and however inteUigible 
I and laudable her desire for peace, Her Majesty could not 
conceivably entertain the wish — even if she had the power 
— to prevent the adoption of measures^ military or other, 
recommended by responsible Ministers as essential to the 
dignity, and therefore the safety^ of the Empire and its 
citizens. The Afrikander, educated in English law schools, 
knew all about Royal policy^ as well as everything else poli- 
tical. A statement by the Afrikander State Secretary and a 



m 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



letter from General Joubert, published at the beginning of 
tbe war, showed their reliance on the Queen's influence, and 
their diaappointment at ita not having interfered with the 
firmness of the Imperial Government. 

Nevertheless, there was a small but well-informed sectioa, 
who eventually would have influenced the President and the 
Executive^ but for the Afrikander State Secretary, State 
Attorney, and others of the party, who ultimately decided 
the fate of the negotiations, Geceral Joubert was strongly 
oppoaed to a war policy, and advised redress of the Uitlander 
grievances and hanuotiioua co-operatian with the Imperiil 
Government ; he was alone in the Executive Council. 

Before the Conference I had interviews in Pretoria with 
members of the Pree State Executive, who, however, so £m 
from being more pacific, as Johanuesburgers imagined to the 
last, were far more warlike, following implicitly the lead of 
Councillor riacher. 

When I went to Bloemfoutein, therefore^ I felt assured 
that the Conference would be abortive. 

It is needless to go at length into the proceediags. VerV 
few words will explain them. The High Commisaionar, as 
a basis for discussion of nil differences between the two 
Governments, proposed that immediate and satisfactory 
representation in the Legislature should be secured to the 
Uitlandera ; and proposed, as the minimum concession which 
would secure this end, a five years* retrospective franchise 
law for all inhabitants^ and one-fouxth representation in the 
Volkaraad. When the Uitlanderg were thus put in a position 
to redress their own grievances without calling on the 
Imperial Government, the High Commissioner would be 
prepared to discuss the settling of questions of the legal 
interpretation of the Conventions by an arbitistion Com- 
mission — from which all foreigners were excluded — and to 
settle, by personal negotiation/matters which were neither 
Uitlander grievances nor questions of legal interpretation. 

President Kruger, relying on the aasurancea of the 
Afrikander party, led by Executive Councillor Fischer in 
Bloemfoutein (followed by President Steyn), and State Socre- 



CONFERENCE OF BLOEMFONTEIN, JUNE 1899 193 

tary Heitz in Pretoria^ iiiiscalciilated the Imperial policy. 
He thought the miniinum demand waa a maximum ; that a 
mere bargain waa being introduced ; that, if he held firtn, the 
Imperial GovemmeDt would retreat ; and never, under any 
dfcum stances, would resort to arms to redress the balance of 
power between Boer and TJitlaDder. 

The President, therefore, in regard to the franchise claim 
produced a most wonderfully-drafted franchise law — honey- 
combed with pitfall? — a product of the ingenuity of Executive 
CooociUor Fischer — six months' notices, and proofs of law- 
abidingness, and of right to franchise in country of origin, 
and continuous two years' registration, and income of £200 
a year ; and, after five years, the same proofs all over again. 
So, at the and of seven years and a half from 1899, if one had 
spent a large portion of one's life attending to the matter, the 
franchise would be attained. And then oflered this boon, 
only if Swaziland would first be annexed to the Traoavaal, 
and only if an agreement were made that all future contro- 
versie3 with the Imperial Government would be settled by 
arbitration. 

The High Commiasioner pointed out that this extraordi- 
nary scheme did not provide for the immediate, or even 
the speedy, attainment of the franchise by persona who had 
been for a long time in the Bepublic ; and on the 5th June 
declared the Conference altogether at an end. 

As will have been seen, I was not surprised at this result. 
NeverthelesHj I did my beat to avert it. On the 1st June, 
the first day of the Conference — after the preliminary meeting 
to settle hours and procedure, of Slst May — I issued the 
following memorandum which was printed at the Official 
Printing Pre^s, and circulated among the membera of the 
Executives and Volksraads of the two States : — 



SUPPLEMEJJTARY MEMOfiAKDfH ON TEE FoRETGN AfFAEBB OF THE 

SoDTH African Rkpublic. 

I. — Sinco the iBsue of my memonmdum of the Ist May, addreeied to 
the Eiecutive and the Volksraftd of the South African Bepublic, I hava 
Mcertained Beveral facts, Boioe unkDown nt tiie titne of writing &Dd Bome 
occurring Bioce, which neceflfiitote Bome furtb&r observalioai 



«94 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



1, I ban HoartahMd thai the Skjocitj, if Bot sU, of «li« memben ri 
Vottn^a of tha SooUi Afrku Bipobfic a^ Onnse Fra* Bum 
I beMntidMr aft impMAAi t^i tfa* Mbaa ef &• IbnMr R^fMhlk, « 
> the negotiatioM irith A« Briti* Otfiwi—il dnxac tha laatn 
^ M f gw kwwtj r, Ih* lf«a tekca ondhr nj ■driee. 
TWt oKtan -»"— ii i iiii iM ii ^ ri fa ny BiDanAdaB af 1st ICir, 
in ■ cooditiGa in wUek tbt prapv «ai« «m atUl ni» to 
diiciaMiBon, have been atiraocwd a ktop fortlicr (and ooapfieBlad) I? 
t«f]|iM mat to the British Oovefamaiit and oUur actioii. 

3. That ftuiher giwrtwM under tHe CDBTentioni with tha Britiik 
OorenimeDt bars been opeoad Igr acta of whidi I was imaware, 

H. — I, tlMn&re, find It nnrrifj lo ialdim the Execbtivaa and t^e 
Telkanadi of the two Republki that ihu impwion on the part <of th« 
Manbwa to whom I hAve fefefred is unfounded. 

M7 adTioe durmg no period has imm ^nB OD all nutten ralatiTv to 
the foreign afftiirs of the Soutli Afncao Repohllc, bat only oo nuttten 
vpecificaJy raferred to me. Tbew mattas I hare already enuntented ia 
my memomidiun of 1b1 May. 

For all action taken mnce October laat tha preeent legal adviatn d 
the Guvemment era iolely raqnoBUa. 

ILL — I decire to place «i record the foUawiiig facte. | 

L. I itrongly diiapprore of the course adopted in connection nith t^ 
Bwaziland protocol negotiation, in which the offer of the High Com- 
miKHioDBT to negotiate a new protocol extending the juriBdicttoD of thit 
Uigh Court la include Bunti wee, contrary to my wntien adTioe^ m the 
first jDAtuice rejected, and then, after ttrong remonitrance from the High 
Commissioner, accepted, after unneceaiary Metion had been created and 
a \>»m of dig^iity bad accrrued to the OoTerbinent of the Bepubtic (Hm 
fa«ta are more fully set out in tny laal nemoranduin.) 

2- I cobidder the action of iseqing a eubpcena to tJie BnUab ViM- 
CckHKiil of JohanneBbiirg highly inexpedieDt in view of the strained 
relations with the Impenal Gc'venunent, u well at being contrary to 
iDtcrnntinnal Law» in view of the special practioe oonceming oansuJs in 
Prutoria. ^ 

3. I coDstder It was exceedingly inadvisable, in view of pesdiiig ■ 
nnpotifttUinn with the British Gfovemment, to prowcute Meosn. Webb " 
and Ootid, of J^lbannfitihuTg, in connoctlon with tlieir prceenting a petition 

to l» forwarded to the Queen, 

4. I conaider the tone (I do not criticise the arguTnente) of the reply 
to the Dynamite Oonceefiion deapalch of the British Government exceed- 
ingly ili-ftdviBod; and moTV eepocially ill-<ulviaed the referonw to tn 
allcgcid BritLih opium monopoly^ a reference ctUcuIatad to have no effect 
tint that of arotiRini; ill-feeling in Great Britmn and Bouth Africa alikfl| 
and rj>nHei|Lient1y of aiding the efforta of tho» desirous of (ffec:ipitAitiig| 
a war. 



CONFERENCE OF BLOEMFQNTEIN, JUNE iSgg 195 



6, I diwent, aa I have nlretwly RtRted, from the publiiihed opiuton of 
the pment State Attorney, uEfarourahle to the power of the Govenunent 
of the South African Republic, to cancel the Dynamite Conceseion ; and 1 
ngfdd with 1I1& contrary opicionn of Mr. RchreinBr, Prime Minister of 
Capo Colony, Mr_ Ad^ocnte Curlewis^ and Chief Ju»!ice GrfstoroWBki, 
As the Britii-h GoveTtiment eJflim that the monopoly is a breftch of tho 
Convention of li^84, unless the IiBiiiblic has p>wer to canrei (he cfln* 
cefinon, a new cauhs of comlroverny, over n qiifit*tioii t>f no mftteriol 
interefit tD the Republic, arisei?.. 

G. I hold illegal, and a breoch of the Swiwiland Convention of 18M 
with the British Government, the proclnmAtions of the Government of tho 
South African liepublie of Otii March and ^yth April, 18&9, relativa to 
the importation of dynamite and firo-anofi into Swaziland, rendering 
practically usBless tbo exUting concesBiona. Here, agnili, a new contn>' 
Teray with the British Govorameul has been quite recently created, 
Thifl i* more gTBtuiiouB, as tlje Swaziland Convention of 1994 providoB for 
the expropmtion of any coticesaton by comiwiiRation to bo fixed by 
arbitration. 

7. I consider, from whnt I brivo leam&d of ita purport, the recent 
reply of the Government, of the South Afritian Republic to the last 
suzerainty deapakt of tho Brlrieh Govsrament has placed the claim of 
tho Repubilic to be free from «uKeraiaty on a wrong legal bftsit— a buiB 
UDwarranted by the fucts. (The original reply of April, 1898, wsh haHed 
oa my opiaioo of llLh Febniary, I8W8O 

8. I ftm of (ipinion that the legal advice on which tbo recent war tax 
<in Bftn-burghere waa imposed of highly doubtful validity, at the Ipaat^ 
but quite apart from that (jueBtion, of FinKuLir inopportuneneps- Here 
ftgain another cortroTersy with the British Government haw b^n need- 
lesfly occavioDcd. 

!►. I am Btroogly of opinion thnt the proposed elanw In the new 
Grondwet (and the legal adviee on which it was baaed) subjecting all 
foreign resident*, to military service in time of war, is a flagrant breach oF 
iittomatioiial law; one Rure to incur the reprobation of tho whole world, 
and to exclude the Kepublic from tbo category of civiliB&l Htatea, I 
adhere to the conclusions in the learned opinion of advocate J, W. Wesaela 
on this subject, publiwheil in the ProM. 

10. I conaider the legal advice on which was based the recent resolu- 
tion of the VolkRraad diafranchiBiDg those burghers on whom the fmncbiBo 
had been cojiferrod for defending the Republic during the Jftmoeoti Raid, 
not merely unfounded on legal principle — bolug ex jfost ftuito and 
rctroacUve iBgiHlation^-bul rnoRt inopportune and calcul!iit«d to hamper 
the negotiationa with tho Brititili Government at the ConfcrencB of 
Bloemfontein. Doubt baa thus been thrown nn the reality and tho 
punnaneQca of any grant of fraucbitie to reiiidcut Uitlandere as tho result 
of the Conference. 

o 2 



ETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



IV. Finally, I denire to place on record my rtrong diaeent frons 
u-holQ b)n« and temper of the negotifttaoDt with the British OorernmesU 
during the last eix moDtbi t-tid op to the date of the ConfereDCft «( 
Bloomfontein^ft CkmferOTioe the result of the mediation of the PnndsEi 
of the Orange Free State. 

If the object of thoM on whnae advice the Govemmeqt of Lbe ScuUk 
African Repuhlic acted on the legal quwtion* cfleciing the Britisii»l 
Oriverninenl and ite subject? had bften lo precifatato a war with the 
British Government, a more direct coorHO oould not have been taken. 

An I have exjilained in my previcpiia memorandum, the rery caoMB 
which would lead the educated nding cIam in England — which aSow 
influeDce* foreipra poSicy — to nanctiun war are preciwly those whicli (ouch 
their BenBe of jmiiic-e. Their fteni* of injured national pride haa already 
been Biiflideutly awakened by event* in South African history. A atrongi 
war party eiista in every (creat state — its nucleuB in it« *rmy and navy, 
To go out of the way to utrengtheD the hands of such a fvirty on the put 
of a nmnU ^^a.te 1iy cnrnmitiing actn of admin intralionf none of which were 
of the leaKt iiimiodUte urgaacy as to time, and eotae of which ware flllhlT 
illegal or of dciuhtful legality or diacourteDUA to a great power, is nmitif 
to incur ari unjuetitiahle risk of the lives and fortunes of the burghen of 
the Republicfl, and to commit th^m to a war in an unjuat cause. 

Wjint of knowletige of external politii-al conditiona, in England or 
tlHi)whoi"e, mny Iw an expliination of such a line of action, but it i» nu 
valid tixcLiBiB. 

V. It is true that the permanent danger to the independence of the 
8outh African Kepublit, and indeed to that of the Orange Free Stater ii 
the disoontfiiit of certain of the resident Uitlander*, nuwlly Kiibjocta of 
the Brilish Government in the former Kepiibhc with their poeiUon under 
the conatituiion, Thi», hoivever, ]a a matter to be oonaidered separately 
in ita bearing on the foreign a&irR of the two Republics 

The purport of thin memorandum ie that I wish to make it clear to 
Ihitpe Members nf the Ex^K;^llivea and of the Valksraade of the Republici 
with whom I have had the honour of conferring, and t».i their colleague*, ihat 
most of th& acutcneHs uf the prefwnt crisis, threatening the iadependenoe 
and welfare of the RepublicR, and the evils of war, hnve been due to 
meaFurefi (with the rewpoDsibility for which I have been mjiitakeBly 
credited), the unviiadom of which I truat I have eufiiciently demotutrat«d 
to all interefited in the fortuneB of either Htate. 

M. J. Faiihkli.t» lilfcD. 
Bio&m/mtein, lai Junt, 18d@. 



r 

I 
I 



I 



The only comment I need make on the memorandum — 
which explains itself— is oa the reference to ihe Suzerainty 
ckini. In q despatch of 9th May» 1899, State Secretary 






CONFERENCE OF BLGEMFONTEIN, JUNE 1S99 197 

EeiU makes the following extraordinary proposition. Iiiaa- 
tnuch as in the London Convention of 1884 tbero in no 
mention of — • 

** Helf-government bcloD^i^ to the Bepublic;, it fullowit of itAclf thuL the 
ttlt> OJEticg right of ftbgolute (lelf-govenimeut of ttiiB Republic is ikot 
denVttd from either the Convontioo of ItSHl or that of iHyl, hut simply 
autl Kildy fuUowH frum the iDberiiDt right uf tliiB Kepuhlic as a Sovereigu 
Iiitenmtiiuuftl SttiEe." 

This is obviously a very fHfferent thing from mere'ly 
saying that the Suzerainty Preamble of 1881 was abolished, 
and that the Transvaal was a Sovereign .State» the rights of 
which were defined in the 1884 Convention.* However, the 
legal aide of this argiunent I leave to the apprecifltion of 
lawyers. To prove that you have everything^ hecause the 
instrument which is the historical recoixl of your title grants 
you nothing, ia certainly Ln keeping with the ^w that 
" international law is only a matter of opinion, aa it has no 
law courts to enforce it " ; imder which circumstances you 
no doubt can evolve it as you go along. 

It is the political side which is truly startling. It ia a 
claim of the Sovereign State of Monaco against France. It 
ia no less than a claim to stand on i^e same plane with the 
Empiro — which had restored ita separate existence to the 
Republic and still held a veto on its foreign treaties : a claim 
that the Republic differed from the Empire only in degree 
of power and not in kind : and stood in the circle of com- 
intmities as an International State, equal in rights to any in 
the world. This, of course, was a direct challenge to the 
Imperial supremacy in South Africa, 

The High Commissioner ftilly appreciated the relative 
importance of an argument faiJty in law. and a claim 
dangerous in politics. In a despatch of the 14th June, 
1899, the State Secretary's proposition ia thus com- 
mented on : — 

"Mr. Reila'» contentlou ia that the ConventioQ of 1881 is complfltely 
gaoe, and that on it« disappeftraiice the TrauBVaal emerged oa a Sovereign 

• Thfl nigh Court of Justice of Englimd^ Chancery DiriBion, tleclsred 
the TraDiivoa] a Sovereigo Btale, (Tii'mea Law KeportB, 22nd April, lb98.) 



198 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

International State, not, however, by virtue at the new GknmitiaB, 
which, according to him, absolutely abn^ated that of 1881, but I^ ito 
inherent right to be something which, as a matter of fact, it had oeaaed to 
be wren yean previously. The way in which the State-Secrataiy jng^ 
with the Convention of 1884 is rather irritating to a plain man. 

** But the importance of the matter does not conust in his aiganieDti. 
It consists in the assertion that the South African Bepublic is a Sovereign 
Inteniational State. This ai>i]ear8 to be contradicting the position aat- 
sistently maintained by us, and is, in fact, iu the nature of a defiance o( 
Uer Mftjeety's Government" 

A detiance it was, and was meant to be. It is easy 
to defy or to juggle with a giant when you are qnite 
sure he will not hit back; and that mental position of 
the Afrikander in power is the key to the failuie of the 
Bloemfontein Conference.* 

• A brilliant reception was held in the Presidency of Bloemfcmtein — 
of late occupied by Lord Roberts — on the evening of Slst May, to meet 
Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger. As I looked round the room, I 
UM my friend, Commandant Perreira, of the Volksraad, afterwards 
Conuniuidnnt-Gcneral of tlie Orange B^ree State, since killed at Lady- 
smith, that I saw the handwriting on the walL 



( 199 ) 



CHAPTER XXI. 



THE POLICY Of THE lUGH. COMMISSIONER. 

The appomtment of the present High CorandBaioner for 
Soulli Airica (Sir Alfred Miliier) was viewed by Boer and 
Uitlander in the Transvaal, and Bondmen and Imperialieta 
in the Colonies with more than usual attention, largely 
mingled with apprahenslon. The general eonaensua of 
approval shown by both p<.ilitical pai-tieSj within as well as 
without the Imperial Parliament, while accepted aa tolerably 
reliable evidence of exceptional ability, did nut in the least 
tend to allay thia apprehension ; nor yet his monumental 
work on the British regeneration of Egj^t. To have an 
able adminiatrator. Imperialists argued, who fails to grasp 
the real facts of the situation, will only make matters worse 
for the Empire. An extreme Liberal in office (the new 
High Commissioner having been co-worker with Mr. John 
Morley on the then Radical Pall Mall Gazette) was a portent 
in many eyea, and men spoke of Majubs. On the other 
hand, the Boers in the Eepublica were equally apprehensive. 
The High Comtmssioner had been appointed by Mr. Chamber- 
lain, whom they loudly charged with complicity in the 
Jameson Eaid, and with designs of annexing their country. 
Even after the new Commissioner' a coming the famous 
Suzerainty controversy arose. 

In Johanneiburg the Liberalism — or Eadicalism — 
weighed most ; and the long silence of the High Commis- 
sioner while conducting Ms investigations, and the fact that 
ha was aceesslble to politicians of the Bond aa well as 
Progressives — ending in the alarming report that he waa 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



learning to speak Dutcli — induced an accusation of his being 
*• Pro-Boer/' the Johanneaburg analogue of " Engelache zind" 

After nearly two yeara of inquiry — an eminent writer 
baa been found who thinks sis. months anfficient — the High 
Commissioner apparently grasped the situation, that then 
was a distinct purpose to oust the Imperial Power from rule 
in South Africa, and to substitate a Dutch-speaking Afii- 
kander dominion, separated from the Empire. 

In the Swaziland Convention negotiation in 1898 it was 
impossible not to aee the purpose of the Young Aftikaoder 
Party — in power since July 1898 in Pretoria, as well as ill 
Bloemfontein since 1896. They denied the right of tha 
Imperial Government to a voice in the interpretation of a 
Convention to which it waa one of the parties. They hcU 
that unless there should be a brejtch of the ConventitfU 
— of which l^etoria was to be sole judge— the Imperial 
Government had no right to remonstrate. Their obvious 
purpose was gradually to eliminate any effectual Imperial 
control based on the Conventions in force. On this point. 
however, the High Commissioner was tirm, and the nego- 
tiation of a new Protocol, extending a disputed jurisdiction 
of the High Court, acknowledged tlie Imperial right. 

It was not, however, imtil the delivery of a speech at 
Graaff Reinet, in the Cape, when, at the end of 1897, ft 
Bond deputation who had protested their loyalty were told : 
'* Of course you are loyal ; it would be monstrous if you 
were not," that the apprehension of the Uitlanders were 
relieved as regards the policy of the Imperial representative, 

In a aeries of despatches, ending with the memorably 
message of 5tli May, 1899, shortly before the Bloemfontein 
Conference, tho High Commisaioner displayed a vivid pictii 
of the whole political scene. There are pointed out th^ 
intolerable assumption — in the press and in the pnlpit, ill^ 
the school and on the platform — of some inherent superior 
tight to the land of South Africa of Dutch-speaking people 
over those of British descent: the disloyal propaganda of 
calumny against the purpose and choiaeter of the Imj 
Power ; the anti-British and anti-Imperial purpose 



THE POLICY OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 20i 



depreasing the Uitlander of the Tranavaal to the rank of a 
helut. The destruction of Imperial power in South Africa 
is cleailj shown to he the intended and inevitable end of tho 
Afrikander policy. 

The most striking feature of the High Commiasioner's 
policy, however, consisted in his boldly removing the whole 
controversy between the Imperial Government and the 
Trausvaal from the arid and profitless groupd of academical 
discussion as to the legal interpretation of the Conventione 
lietween the two Governments, The basing of Imperial 
rights on the alleged persistence of the Preamble of the 
Convention of London of 1881, declaring a suzerainty — a 
contention held invalid by so many emineot lawyers that it 
ia ampriaing how the Colonial Office should have adopted 
it — was succeeded by a much more statesmanlike and 
indeed an incontestable ground for inttrvention — the right of 
self-preservation inherent in the Empire, The Imperial 
Power, holding the greatest extent of territory, wealth, and 
population in South Africa, and Its continual hold on South 
Africa being essential to its retention of the sea route to 
India and Australia and to its retention of all the Colonies, 
the Imperial Goverrunent could not, as a matter of right of 
self-preaervation, endure the maiutenance of its borders of 
a hostile military State, keeping in political subjection a 
majority of inhabitants of British descent. To endure this 
injustice was to destroy its prestige in the eyes of the world, 
with British subjects of both white racea in South Africa, 
inth the sabject native racea. 

The spectacle of British subjecta in the Transvaal 
appealing vainly for protection to the Imperial Power was 
leading into disaffection the Dutch-descended inhabitants in 
the Cape and Natal, and, in conjunction with the incessant 
Afrikander propaganda, was bringing them to turn their 
eyes to Pretoria as a Mecca^and indeed aa a Golconda and 
a Woolwich as well. 

Kot Conventions, but rights apart from contract alto- 
gether, formed the baae of the High Commiasioner'a policy. 
Froximus ardel Ucale^on. In fact, his action rested on the 



202 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



jtriuciple of Presideiit Burger's ftddresa to the Pl«tom 
Valksmad m 1877, in spuakmg of the Boer ill-tl-eatment of 
the natives :— > 

" If fou oak mo whnt tlic F.iic;li8h have to do will) it, I tell yon t1i«l m 
little as we caa nlluw barbujitLefl oniimg the KaffiiB on ciur burden, U 
little cab they nUiiw tliat \u ft SUkto cm their bordem auarchy tliavU 

prevail." 

Kof did the High Commissioner allow the Jameson Raid 
to he ftwccesafully used as a reason for putting the Uitlanden 
on t43i-i]ia of iutjquality^ referring in one of his despatches to 
the llaid as a " couspiracy of which the great btxly of 
UltLindura was lunaceut, and which perverted and mined 
their cause." 

The key to the solution, without war, of the sitnatioD, 
the only i^eaceful way of ending the menace to South Africa 
and to the Imperial Tower was to adopt some means by 
wliich the power, guided by the anti-Britiah bias dominating 
the wealthy military State of the Transvual, could be paci- 
fically brought to work in harmony with inatead of against 
the Empire. The franchise for tlie Uitlauder was the only 
conceivable means, if the majesty, and therefore the int^rity, 
of the Empire, as well as the autonomy of the Kepablics 
were to be preserved. At the negotiations of Majuba, 
President Kruger had promised the continuation of equal 
treatment of new-comers with burghers, and that this 
explicitly referred to the political francbiee was explained 
by Dr. Joriaaen, one of the Transvaal negotiators. In the 
Ck>uvention of Pretoria of 1881 the grant of self-government 
was to "all the inhabitants," not merely the Boer inhabitants 
of the TrauavaaL The letter of invitation of December 13tb, 
1883, by the Secretary of the Transvaal deputation to 
London, addreaaed to European inveatora and immigranLa, 
expressed indignation at being asked to fumiah assurancea 
of fair treatment ; but the High Commisaioner took his 
stand on none of these contractual rights over which lawyers 
might ai^e. The majeaty— the integrity — of the Empire, 
tha loyalty of its South African citizens were at atake^ and this 
yave rights to the Imperial Goveroment apart from contiacU 



J 



THE POLICY OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 203 



i 



Therefore, at the Conference at Bloemfontein, the demand 
of a real and not illuaory fraiichi3e> and subataatinl represen- 
tation in the kgiqlatioD of the Transvaal was put firat. As it 
■was not conceded, a thing of gins and pitfalls being proffered 
instead, it was also the laat. Nothing but this minimum 
demand could remove the menace to the Empire by egtah- 
lishing race equality and bringing the Kepublic into friendly 
co-opemtion with the Imperial Government. 

Now, many Im].>eriali3t3, including several Eeform pri^ 
soners, expressed to me after the Conference, and even quite 
recently, their satiafactiou that this miuiimim demand of 
Sir jUired Milner at Bloemfontein was net acceded to^ and 
that the Conference failed.* 

Tliese objectiona were put to me in this way : Either the 
Frauuldae Law wuuld be evaded in administration, or an 
omnipotent Vylkaraad, three-fourths Boer, would alter the 
hiw when Sir Alfred Ifilner, in the course of time, waa 
promoted to some other sphere of public service, and a more 
pliable High Commissioner took his place, or British subjects 
in the Transvaal, uDwilliug to forfeit their citizenship of the 
Empire, would decline to take the franchise, no matter how 
liberal or geuuiue, and so no Uttlander majority could he 
obtained in the election of President or Commandant- 
General ; and, therefore, the last state of the Uitlander 
would be wore than the first, as they would have exhausted 
the fore of their appeal to the Imperial Government and tiio 
British public, who would say to them: "Now you can 
work out yoti own salvation." 

A little consideration will show that these objections are 
not well founded. In the first place, guai-antees, embodied 
in a new Convention, providing that the franchise was 
genuine, and not subject to vamtion or repeal without the 
express consent of the Imperial Government, would necea- 
sarily be insisted upon. In the next place, an Imperial Act 



* Scnu« of my ImperloliBt fnendfl of the Im^rlal Liglit Hone, and of 
the Guided, were cho good eaougti to adil that thoy were gkd that the 
H«pubUcmu Govemmeots would not luten to my a^vi ce j jua, if adopted, it 
would hflve averttxl war* 



204 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



of Parliament could easily be framed, providing that BritUh 
subjects, naturalised iu the Transvaal, could regain theii 
British nationality hy going to British territory ; and also. 
of course, that a reciprocal franchise in British tenitoiy 
would be granted to Ti-ansvaal bm^hers who applied- A 
rather close precedent for such a law is provided by the 
Swaziland Conventions of 1890 and 1894, by which Britiah 
residents in Swaziland were granted political franchise in 
the Transvaal. 

The rcisult of theae combined provisions would obvioudy 
he that every Briliah resident in the Tranavaal would accept 
the fraucliise. And what would instantly follow, under tiiii 
law of the Transvaal 1 

In the first place, rifles i rifles supplied by the State at 
the public expense to all the new citizens. In the next, tlw 
power of electing the Commandant-General, which carried 
necessarily with it the control of the forts and of tho 
aitUlery iu Juhanneabui^ and Pretoria. Again, the jiower 
of electing the President, which also involved the control, 
and if necessary dismissal, of all ofliclals in the permaiit^ut 
public ser\'ice. And laat^ and not least, the complete control 
of the municipalities of Johannesburg and Barberton, and 
other mining centres, 

Of these rights^ clearly, the rifles — the immediate arming 
of the British inhabitants, would be the greatest. To ensure 
the control of the forts and artillery it would not be necea 
sary for the new voters to elect a new Commandant-Gener 
or, to control the officials, even a new Presideut, Gtjne 
Joubert was a very enlightened man ; President 
would be a changed man in the presence of 80,000 Briti 
rifles. In a word, all officials would have to play to the pit 
instead of the gallery, A Plantagenet might safely be 
trusted with privilej^es by an England in arms, privilege 
destructive of English rights when exercised by James L* ■ 

* Id the Teocnl occupation of Johannesburg, Lord Hoberbi re-appoiatod 
the B<ier Cominaiiilniit uf the Town, Aud hU aubordinnte officiabi. It is 
obvioufl that though tho [person remalDed, the mot tTordn wu changed; 
BrltUh bayoDeta beicg prevaleut. 



THE POLICY OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER log 



The change in the position of the British inhabitauta 
would be immediate; the change in the persimnel of the 
ofBcials need not be other than gradual. 

To my mind, one of the clearest proofs of the complete 
efficacy of the High Commissioner's proposed franchise was 
that the Young Afrikander advisers of the two Executives 
of Pretoria and Bloenafonteiu adviaed its prompt rejection. 
They saw that a real, and not an illusory, franchise would 
destroy the purely Boer domination in the Eepublic, and 
with it their nucleus in Pret<»ria, their control of arms ajid 
gold, wherewith to buUd up a Boer dominion over all 
South Africa. 

It remains for me to give here, aa fairly as I can, an 
appreciation of the High Commissioner's policy and method 
of carrying it out, as derived from a careful consideration, 
among other things, of his published doapatches, and from 
personal interviews in Bioemfonteinand Cape Town. I may 
eay that I came to the consideration of the subject with no 
predisposition whatever in its favour, rather the reverse, as 
the past history of Colonial Office appointments in South 
Africa has not been very encouraging ; and even the policy 
of the Colonial OfBce with reference to the Transvaal as, for 
instance, in the Suzerainty controversy^ before the present 
High Commissioner took a stand of hia own, left something 
to be desired. 

The High Commissioner deserves credit for being the 
first to see and to proclaim the great Imperial issues 
involved in the dispute with the Transvaal, both as to the 
Imperial control of its foreign relations, and to its treatment 
of the Uitlanders. Even the Uitlandera themselves had noi 
insisted on this, the all-important aspect of the situation. 

As to liis methods, of slow and patient inve.^tigntinn, of 
accessibility to all parties in the State, and taking every 
pains to ascertain Dutch as well as British Colonial views, 
I have shown that they even excited suspicion among 
Imperialists. They vpere methods the very reverse of those 
of the purely imaginary " prancing pro-consul " of Mr. 
Gladstone's burning periijds. 



5o6 



THE SETTLEME>rT AFTER THE WAR 



The objects aimed at by that policy, on which it hu 
chiefly been chaileDged, relate to war, and the independena 
of the two Dutch States. As regards the prospect* of inr, 
mere quietism and inaction would never have nTerted it] 
On the first international trouble in which the Empin ins 
involved, the dominant Young Afrikander Governments rf_ 
the RepnblJca would have moved. Unless, indeed, that ' 
anticipated by the disgusted British Colonials taking the Uw' 
luLo their own hands and marching to the relief of thai 
kinamen in die Transvaal, in which civil war the Imperitl 
Government would of couree be immediately involved. Fnr 
the threats of British Colonials throwing off the Imperial 
connection and making terms with the Boer, though 
doubt meant when uttered, I do not think more than 
petulance of just indignation at Imperial betrayal, though ; 
to this I am not certain. Bat if this were the third one of 
three couraes, one of which was inevitable, this again meatit 
war for the Empire* and one ten times more terrible than the 
present. The High Commissioner's policy was the sole out 
that made for peace. 

The indepondence of the Republic in the legitimate 
of that term, its freedom from external interference and its 
perlect autonomy, provided a regime of liberty and politicAl 
equality for all civilised men were established, has never 
been threatened by that policy. Of this I am conviacod. 
not alone by the High Commissioner's personal asflnranc^ t^l 
myself, but from a dispassionate consideration both of hifl 
methods and of what would be^ if it were attainable, the 
most advantageous course to the Empii*o, to Europeans in 
South Africa, and to their mission of civilisation. As I 
have already stated, as my reason for supporting the inde- 
pendence of the Republics — constituted on a basis of equal 
rights for civilised men — I had hoped that their maintenance 
would conciliate the Dutch historic preference for Republican 
forms, and so promote the gradual fusion of Europeans in 
South Africa, which must be the aim of European statesmen 
of wider views. In this way. the self-ruling people of the 
two Kepublics would no longer have cause for race divisio 



THE POLICY OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 207 



and would gradually fall into line with the world-wide 
Empire — a fusion towards which the first step would be the 
Confederation of all South African Sta.tea undor Imperial 
protection. It would not be the first time that the Empire 
eheltered a Republic within its bounds. The Seven Isled 
Eepubiic rested once under the Pizx Britannica, until that 
MinisteT, afterwards to live to be the Premier of Majuha 
Hill, ceded, as High Commissianer, the Ionian Islands to 
Oreeca 

I But, above all things, the conservation of that glorioua 
heritage of the past, the Imperial power, so lightly regarded 
even now by some of our fellow-citizen 3^ haa been shown, by 
the desperate war being waged, to have been jeopardised by 
the policy againat ^vhich was set the action challenged of the 
present Imperial representative. As I have shown, war was 
Bought to be averted by that action; but, if that action had 
not been taken, war would soon have come in a worse form." 

* This book dealfl with policieB and actioDS of persons rather than 
with approcifttion of peraona. Nevertheless, as it conveys a public moral, 
may 1 a«k my lOurjtTymen to refie<.t wbat reAnc-z, Lftd they to expect that 
any Imperial repreaeotative, in full night of a centiiry'a csampkd of 
Imperial vacillatiuii And ingrAtitude, irniild be fouud at a criuiB of the 
EthpirdV fftte tu rejt>ct ft. ftafe quietism for A path of duty HlmoRt certAtnly 
iBvolving loftB of foituDB fttid i'ft^oe ntid career? 

The pathetic figure of a Frere going to his grave in ohjoquy^ 
denouoced by a wizard of eloqueoce — obloquy now» intie&J, to be 
Temedled by the blow wisdom of a tardy butit — might well have berved 
to<let«r. 



20S 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTEK XXII. 



MT LAST HEMONSTRJLKCE. 

Almost immediately after the Conference of Bloemfonteiin, 
I returned to Pretoria. The failure of the Conference to end 
ae the Afrikander Party had Loped it woiild — in the High 
Commissioner's accepting an illusory scheme of franchise — 
had somewhat disconcerted their leaders. The High Com- 
missi oner^unlike some of his predecessors, as the old 
President ruefully recalled — had ahown most unexpected 
firmness and penetration in dealing witli the negotiators o4jl 
the simple pastoral State. Still, the Afrikanders persuaded 
the Volksraad that it was merely a splendid chess move in 
the detested British gaaie oE diplomacy. They proceeded 
try a long series of tedious and fatuous jngglings "with isaaeal 
8oon to become so terrible. I made one last effort to awalwenj 
their misled people to the realitiea so soon to be upon thei 
I converged with many members of the Volksraad. who wer 
very courteous and willing to hear, and evidently doubtful' 
whether, after all, as I had rightly foretold the Imperial 
policy before the Conference — (tad predicted the failure of 
the Conference, on the gcoitnd on which it failed — I might 
not now also be in the right as to the necessity of redressing 
without delay the Uitlander grievances, of unreservedly 
accepting the Bloemfontein minimum, and of working on the 
policy of Sir John Brand, in thorough accord with the 
Imperial power. h 

My views on the critical nature of the situation havingi 
become known — partly owing to an imperfect version of my 
memorandum of the Ist June having been published in a 



MY LAST REMONSTRANCE 



%09 



I Johannesburg journal — I was requtistcd by a representative 
I of the Pretoria Press* a Government organ, to explain my 
■ viewa to the general puhlic, already explained to the 

Executives and Volkaraads in memoranda, 
1 The Press of Pretoria of 13th June, 1899, accordingly 

' published a report of an interview between its repre- 
sentative and myself, from which the following extracts ore 
I appended ; — 



I 
I 



The aituation ii ot)« of extreme gravity. Therc' le a distinct cbager 
of war, a danger not fully r««UBed hy m&ny in both Bepublice, Ak tar 
aa I Can »e« I do not think ttiare la any parly in the R^pubtice deflirotia 
of pracipitatJDg actual (and immGdiate) war. But 1 am certaio that a 
watt of knowleiige of tht actual conditioDis of English jiolitaca and of the 
(^laracter and jxiwer of EngliBh atateamenj and of the preB«ut Btnte of 
Eoglish public opinion with refereuce to the Bcpublics and tho statufi of 
the Uitlander, hm led many men of iuHueoce in public afiairB here tu 
believe that war is tmpOBBiU&, and that cberufore extreme atHpa may Iw 
taken, either m the directiou of a deiiial of the rights claimed on behalf 
of the UitlaQdcT, or of a dern^aiiour townnls th^ Imjierial Govermnent 
which, iu my opinion, i» uuuitie, without incurring any flak of actual 
warfare. Mrtuy hure ftpj^feudy think, even yet, that the Imperial 
Governraeat h not in earnest in cbarnpioQiQg the claima of Ihv UitlandBni 
to political right*. Poseibly they will continue their diabaljof until an 
actual conceutratioD of trt>opd ud the border convincts theni too late, when 
a Bpaik may cA\ine an explosion. I do not think that any true friiiind of 
the Rcjmblios or of the burglmrci iihould keep tiiliince under auch 
circuiuHtancea. 

The High ComraiMioaer gave me hia views fully at Bluerafontein. I 
have nen nearly all the public men in all Statcti atid Oolutiles of South 
Afric&i and all appear to me t«i b^ much mora intpres^ed tlinn hvre in 
Pretoria with the gravity of the criairi and the neccftsity of the reilreaa of 
the grieTanccs of the UitUnders. It will be rea*Hiy agreeJ, 1 think, that 
the attitude of other coontriea endoraea this view. The attitude of 
Germanyr evideaced through the fuct of the Anglo-Gbrman Agreement 
with raferenoe to the Rhodesian railways aad telugrapha — the position of 
France with reference to the DreyfuK agitation prcduding ita taking part 
iu outside matters — and the recent rapprodieinant of the Uuitod HtAten 
and Great Britain, seem to luo to indicate a alreagtheniog of the position 
uf Great Britain. It muat also be remembered that only n amnll sectiuti 



* The luui^tant editor, Mr. WilUama, now aarving with (}«neral 
fiuller'B force in Natal. 



aio THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

of tbe British public exorcise an mSusocB on foreign aJfiirB, tuu, the 
educated uijj.ier and middle claas, from which the cfiioera of the Anay uid 
Navy aro drawu. While there is, of cotirsflj a warlike feeling atnoog t!ie 
greater part of thia aection, they have a strong sense of justice, and they 
wUl BBDCtii^D D.0 war except tQV what Becttia to tbfim a just cause. But it 
in not merely on the ground gf ihb [xissiibility of armed intervention, but 
of the necessity of doing justice, that stej* Bhould be takec to meet tlrt 
jUBi demands of the reaidcQC Uitlanders for equality of tre&troent «a to 
jKjlitical rights; atid the bufghers of iho RopuhUoB have always wfalud 
to have justice and right on their side. 

The present cJaim put forward on behalf of the Uitlanders by the 
Imperial Government is a purely polilical qtiebtioo, and avowedly is not 
ba^ed on any rights secured to the BriUah CruvemmoiLt or itti subjects 
under Conventiuns with the Republics. Therefore, DO question of the 
l^al interpretation of the etipulatiutii of those CuQVehtions cian arise at 
alL The Imperial OfovemDient claimB political rights for it4 subjecta 
resident in rhe Itepublic, not under the Convtotiona, but on accoupt of its 
predomiDAUt ictcreat tn th« peace of the whole of South Afacn, and ita 
concern for tlie wislfape of its subjactB resident in the territory of the 
Republic. There ia, evidently, no room here for lawyers' ftrpimienls. 

1 am in favour of the wiJeet poEBJble ex.teneiun of the franchise 
coiiK)»teut with t)>e retecLtion of a couiddeT&hle majority in the Yolkaraad 
for thu prtisecit burglierH.* 

Tbe reiiident UitUtiderii e^hould have' a strong minority represebtatloD. 
A qualifying term of reHidence of five years, dating from the acUial 
©jmmiincBinent uf the r^esidence, seems reaflonable, "With a settled acheme 
of redistribution there can be no proapeat of overwhelming the power of 
the old burghers-t 

X hnve no hesiitAtion in sayini; that I have always muntained that to 
apply a wide and liberal int^rijretation to the provigion« of the Conven- 
tLonn with the Dritieh Government ia the right course to follow ; and 
that controversiea on trivial luattorH, and on any tnattera m far as 
tMmjiiblo, should bo avoided. I hold that it it unaound to interjirot litter^ 
Datioual Dgreementa of this kind in any me-rely technical wny, audi as 
rmght be defyudod in reference to a comraerdiU contract diown up by a 
Bolicitor. Gritica may cooBider this as applying ethics or pohtics to the 
InCcrpretatioQ of GouvcutJouEi. I consider it merely the application of 
comtituiL BBuifc. And I alao hold that a courteous and fri<jndly reception 
should invariably be accorded to any protioaiiii'D as to the interpretation 
of tlhe ConvcDtiuHB jmt forward on behalf of the Imperial Government. 
It is unJii^uiHtid on the pari of a sm^ State; it ia dangcroUB, inasmuch 



• The Bloemfontein Minimum. 

t Tku w&B LxjUited uut by tko High CommisaioneE at the Coafercuce. 



MY LAST REMONSTRANCE 



211 



as It. ptft^B into the hands of the war party whicli dxiftts in every great 
Stat^ kdA it is unjust to the great Power which guards tiie se&a uid 
preserves the pcfww of South Africa to adopt auy line of controverBy 
4»pfible of being regarded a& diuourteous. 

With regard to the ckim for equal political rights, advanced by the 
British Goverrnneaton behalf the UitliuadiirB, this claim by the Iin]ieria) 
Goverameat marks a perfectiy new pojot of departure. lu view uf the 
predominaot ititareat of the British Empire jjt tha peoca sod order of 
South Africa ntid the welfare of the iinuuodl&te subjects of tha EmpLre, 
thk m«aeiun might eauily bavo been foreseen as Datura] and inevitable. 
It is evident from the proceedrnga of the Blociufonteia Coafereuco that 
the Imperial GoverDmetit, aB represented by the High CommiBBioDSr, 
have no desire to set aside the icdependeuce of the Bepublicsi- Their 
claim iSf aubBtautially, to secure for British resideuta in tha Republic 
treaCioent eouie;vhat omklagous to the treatnieDt accorded to citisteus 
of tte RepublicH in Britiah tarritorii^. The law of tbe Orange Free 
Btjiite i» more iiberal than the claim now made on behalf of the Birltiah 
rettideuts in the South Africaa Republic, 

The maintenance of the independence of the Republic iiuiBt necee- 
saHty be the fimt care of the Volksraatl. All Europeaufl, aveu those wbo 
are nut African by birth, can sympathise with this desire. Apart from 
being a matter of the iuitnediate jjer»onal concem uf the burghens, all 
wbo coneidcr the future of South Africa must regard it in thti higher 
light of ft truBt which is committed to the Republics, to be carri&d out for 
the benefit of the present and future people of the European race in South 

What the Hepublica now iihould realiHe is that to preserpe that iode- 
pentknce, which is a heritage for the beaefit of all South Africa, the 
atrauger within the gate must be coDaidered. And* again, quite apart 
frout uny consideration of the deBirability of maintaiuiag the indejwu- 
dence of the Republics, the claltii uf the UitloJider to pLirtid[iate In 
poliUcal privilegea is gna fuunded on conaldemtloDS of juBtice, ti^juity, and 
ibternational usage. 

These were my last words to tlie Govermiieiite and the 
burghers of the Boer Itepublica. 



P 2 



tli 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHAPTEE XXIII. 

ATBIKANDER NEGOTIATION: FROM THE COKFEOENCE Of 
BLOEMFONTEIN TO THE ULTIMATUM. 

The Afrikander party, still believing that forte would never 
be resorted to by tho Imperial Government, and knowing 
British unprepureilnesa for wai', and atili resolute on refusing 
any franchise that was other than a pretence, tried, aa regards 
the Imperial Government, a policy of iUusory offers and 
wcaryijig delay ; towards the Uitlandera one of " Divide et i 
impera** ■ 

Negotiations had been opened with the capitalists in the 
preceding March to endeavour to detach them from the 
Uitlander cause by the ofTer to grant them greater facilities I 
for workiag the mines, by redueiup the price of dynainitej 
and other such cuucessions. When it was found that it waa I 
impossible to separate them from the rest of the Uitlandera I 
in their demand fnr political reform, the proposed conoessions 
were promptly withdrawal by the State Secretary, after an 
acrimonious correspondence. Similar attempts were now 
made to detach the Jews by promising to relieve tibem of 
thoir political disabilities under the Grond Wet — a promiae, 
it is needless to say, never kept. 

The negotiations with the Imperial Government extendi 
from Uie 9th June, the date of a despatch of State Secretary j 
Reitz, to the 22nd September, the date of the reply of tha 
Colonial Secretary — that he deemed it useltissi to continue' 
the discussion, and that the Imperial Government would, 
proceed to formulate its own proposals. 

It may be divided into two sections as to time, one veryl 



AFRIKANDER NEGOTIATION 



213 



long, from tho 9Lh of Juue to 10th September ; the other 
from the 10th September until the 22Dd. 

In the first stage of three months, the Afrikander part/a 
idea waa that the Imperial Government were not really in 
earnest. They would never fight, however they might 
bluster. They were known to be unprepared- 
Finding, after three months, the Imperial Government 
unexpectedly firm, and a body of about 5O00 British traopa 
from India ha^^ng been sent to Natal, the Afrikander State 
Secretary at Pretariii and the Executive Councillor at 
Bloemfoutein docided that a still bolder front would surely 
cause the Imperial Government to withtlraw from the 
position for which they were not really going to fight. 
So, without knowings the young Afrikander party made 
a fatal move. It meant irrevocably war. About the 
10th September the burgher commandoes were ordered to 
the Natal border. 

In three weeks, precisely as I had predicted in the 
interview in the Pretoria Prrss of the 13th June, a apark 
on the border caused the explosion. It was not from a 
concentration of Imperial troopa but of burgher levies that 
the occasion arose. The veldt Boer on the border was in- 
tended to frighten the Imperial Government out of ita 
supposed policy of pretence and bluster. The Imperial 
Government, never having been pretending or blustering in 
its demand for equality for the Uitlander, was not deterred 
in the least by the apparition of commandoes on the 
border. 

On the receipt of the Colonial Secretary's reply of the 
22nd Septembftr, closing the discussion, the Afrikander party, 
at long laat, saw that they had fatally miscalculated the 
spirit and purpose of the Imperial Government, and that the 
clock had struck for war. Even then they might have tried 
more delay, waiting for foreign complications, if delay were 
open to them. 

But the monster evoked by the Pretoria Frankenstein 
was not to be laid. The veldt Boer, absolutely certain as to 
his guperiority in arms to the despised red-coat, got out of 



St4 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER TttE WAR 



hand, and rasisted on seizing the formidable stntegical 
poeitioDS on Ihe borders of Natai. 

The insolent ultimatum of th^ 9th October «B8 nfit 
iDti^iided, in tiie least as a diplomatic document ; UiA 
deciding on war had already passed out of the hands of 
State Secretary Beitz and Executive Councillor fischer. It 
was the partizig inault of a player at a desperate game, vho 
sees he has under-estimated his adversary's intelllgencv and 
courage and skill, and knows that nothing has been left him 
by the ckances of £ate and fortune but a mad appeal U> 
force. 

Understanding, bo well as I do» the senes of evasions 
and devices the kaleidoBcopic succession of supposed offeia 
of franciiise really were, 1 could not find patience to attempt 
to summanse them, but that it ia alleged even by eome 
people in England that the faulty diplomacy of the Imperial 
Government cau;^d the war, Ther@ was no faulty diplomacy 
on the British side after the Conference at Bloemfontein ;; at 
least, in the direction of being peremptory. If Emything. ifrfl 
was too patient. ^ 

As I have showrij war was forced on the Aftikande; 
leaders by the veldt Boer, But it was they who sent the 
veldt Boer to the border ; and there would have been no war 
if they had agreed to treat the Uitlander as a political 
equal 

But even if, with their eyes wide open, they had believedl 
what I had told them — that the Imperial Government wm 
in earnest, and would fight to the death sooner than see 
the Empire shattered as a result of the degradation of its 
citizens in the Tranavaal— even if they had believed that 
aaauranee, I am convinced that, sooner than give up the 
political power, which all their lives they have dreamt of aa ^ 
the lever with which to build up a Dutch Afrikander Bam-f 
inion, they would have deliberately gone to war; hoping for 
chancea of foreign complications, of British party see-saw, of 
all the forces that for a hundred years have sprung up to 
unnerve the Imperial arm. They knew not how the spirit 
of the Empire, within one short generation, eicpanding with 



AFRIKANDER NEGOTIATION 



«s 



Its evGT-widening dominion, liaa entered into the souls of ita 
citi;iena,* 

It 13 ft tedious task, but let me endeavour to state briefly 
the course of the pontspondence. 

On the Sth of June State Secretary Keitz addresses a 
note to the British A^ent in Pretoria, containing a proposal 
for arbitration "on differences arising out of the varying 
inte^retationa, approved by the parties, of the terms of the 
London Convention of 1884." 

In his despatch of the 14th June the High Comnnsgionor 
observes : — 

" The whole iKiint and gist of my contcntiori " {at Bloom fontcin) " wna 
i.haC rctircjia of Uitlaiidor grievauccn mufii coiue tirat. . . . My imipuwils 
for Q selLkmtMit uf t.lie UitLaDrler griovnucos uti the LaaiH ij{ a mwluraU) 
mewsure of eufrRUchisemeut haviui; tieen rejectwl by the FrcsUleDt, aud 
a tottilly iniiilequato aclieme put forwnrd in their plnce, he now comes 
forward with an arbitratioD propoaaL. » . . I canoct see the smnlloBt 
reason why Her Majesty's Govemmeat should not at unce reject tiiia 
particular propusal.'* 

In ft telegram of the 19th July the High Cominis&ioner 
intimates that the Volksraad hnve passed a seven years' 
retrospective franchise, with multitudinous conditions. 

In a despatch of the 27th July the Colonial Secretary 
suggests a Joint Int[uiry by nominees of b<.ith Governments 
to ascertain and report on the practical reality and permanence 
of the franchise recently enacted. If such Joint Inquiry 
should reaidt in a favourable report, then a new conference 
should be hehl to discuss the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration. 

The Afrikander party know very well that their recent 
seven years' retrospective franchise law is quite illusory; 
they do not like any Joint Intj^uiry. So, in the first place, 



• I fiiiil that Sir WilK:nn Ptmn, M.P., for Foverttl years Conaul- 
Geuoral of ilio Orange Free Stat^ iu LotiJiuii, haa come to a like: con- 
cluBioti. In a spooch delivered ld Scoilnnd ou the 6tk June« he states: 
"While the llatd undoubtwUy hasteuud the autbriiak uf hostilities, tho 
Dutch had, long befure that idate, been doing all that chey cuidii to 
undermine Briliish aupiemacy in South Africa, and wore aimjily biding 
their time until they aaw their way clear to striking an effcotive blow." 



3i6 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



( 



their State Attorney olfers a simpliiied seven years' franchise, 
on condition that there Bhoulti be no inquiry.* 

The British Agent waa unwilling to accept less than the 
Bloemfontem Minimum of five years' retrospective ^-anclu^e-t 

" High Commifflioner'a despRtch, 15th Aa^uat. 

t ImmediAtely preceding the illusory offer of a five yeiro' ntnh 
SpdCttva friLtichisA, the negotistions &t Pretoria were being conductfld 
through the medium of interviews between the British Agent, Qa 
Conyngham Greene, and Mr. Smuts, the Transvaal State Attorney. 

Mr. Smuts BubFequcntly had the hardiiiood to accuse Her Hajesty^ 
AgeDt of ''trickiiig" and " decoying" him^ by nuHleadiaz promiaes «if 
ftocepting his condUioDfl, into making ut offer of a five yean^ retrospeotiTe 
fnu]chi»0. ThiH accusation startled and shocked th« British publSc at 
liotoe, and helped la give them »0m6 alight inkli&g of the Calibre aod 
character of the young Afrikander negotiatora. 

As I told the British .Agent at the timet if he had known Young 
Afrikander methods and penuuB s» weU m I dld^ he would probably have 
preferred to conduct hi§ negotiatiotiB through the medium of writing, 
infltead of penionaj interview. Sir Conyngham Greane'a diplomatic 
experience in dviliMd lands, such as Ilotland and Greece — and Persia. — 
ha^l miB.le«l him as to what be was rra^mahly justified in expecting. A 
veneer t>l European civilisation is at times diRcoDcerting, 

The deceit of the typical Young Afrikander in scathingly denlt with h^ 
Advocate J. W. WesselB in hiH 6f«ech which appears in the Appendix. I 
have no comment to make on that sijcech, except that I think aiy friend 
Mr. Weesela UEder-eatitnate*— or at least does not insist upon — one of the 
greabeet caueea of Young Afrikander depreciation of Bntudt character and 
power. It is tho ilLuBJon of half knowledge and deGcient ioaight. The 
saying "No man is a hero to his valet" is ofXea quoted as if it were 
depredation of thu man, instead of criticism of the valet. To appreciate 
a great i^amting one need not be a painter, but one must have some stigfat 
degree of nrtiE^tic feeling. To appreciate r high character or a high 
int#Uect, one must have some maight «iiniising from tiie presence, 
although it may be^ in a lowor degree, of the q ualities to be appreciated ; 
whereas the valet can only 8ee the exterior, and — this is the irony of it — 
he thinks he knows everything about bia master. A man who cȣi 099 
nothing but the foibles of some of the officers of our Imperial arcay ia 
really worse oB towards correctly estimatiug British militiary cfliciency 
than if he had never met a British soldier in hiH life. ^ 

In an ipterenting work by Messrs, John Scoble (an old resident off 
Pretoria) and H. It. Abercrombie, 'The Rise and Fall of Krugerimn,* tha 
following instructive passage^ illuBtrative of educated Young Afri^oder 
diplomacy, occurs;^ 

" Towards the middle of last year, and just after ite termination of 
the Bloemfontein Conference, a "bald attempt was tnoda to inculnta 
certain persons alleged to b6 officers holding Her Majesty's comtnu^OQ 
in tlie army as cunspiratora against the State. Some half-^ozeb persona 
were arrested during one night and tak&n to Pretoria, whore they were 
incarcerated in the common gaol u|,x]n a charge of high treason. For 
sometime ibese persunK were kept in prison^ and strenuoun effortA were 
TOfMle by ofGci^s and one or two of Che persons armtad to induce thfl 



AFRIKANDER NEGOTIATION 



217 



Kext, wo have State Secretary Reitz'a despatch of the 
22nd of Augiist offering a. five years' retroflpective franchise, 



I 



» 



\ 



princip&Js to wake a comfesaioD of i^ttiilt or guilty knowlodge of a plotting 
to overthruw the Guvemment of the Repiiblk. With great difficulty the 

SrincipalB mati»geii tu commuEiiciite wjth Mf. ConyngJiam Groene, Hor 
[ajesty's ai^nt at Fretonft, and Ua took the cecoHaAry steps to bring the 
matter to ui iBBue. Tho Stute Attorney, Mr. Bmuts, approached Mr. 
Greene, and offered to withdraw from the proaecntion n\,oa tbe ground 
that he feJt reluctant to pnxeed agaiDUt men holding commiaiiione in the 
British army, Mr. Qreene, huwevtir, knew whAC thi^ cunoiog isugg^tiou 
meaoti and after coDflulting the Coloninl Sticfetary, Mr. OhRmberlain, 
mformed the State Atturnoy that tlio Bfitish Govermneat inniated upon 
the matter being eiUtid tti thu bottom, and that an advocate was to bo 
aptpointed to defoud the accused. Fct this purpose Mr. Greene procured 
the nervier of Meaars. Taticred & Liinnon as attorneys for the defance, 
and they appointed Mr. Advocftte Dusbury an cqudm:!. The Government 
was in cooMquence forced to proceed "nith the investigation, acd prc- 
liminaiy exEiniiiiftticmE exteudintj over ecverni dayH took place. It then 
appeared that Bome of the necret agents of the Quvemnient had been 
imprtBoued intentioiiftKy, with the object oF onabliog them to gain 
inc rim milting evidence, bmA of bet^oniing State wiCneflues at the trial' 
Mr. Dtixbury Subjected these geotcy to such a severe crces-eiauiioatian 
a« to fully exioM tho intention of the plut, which was to identify the 
Imperial Goi'eraineDt, through the agency of BritiBb military officers, 
with a revolutionary propagoDda in the Transvaal, and thereby justify 
the hofitite attitude which the TraJisvaal Lutendeil to adopt. Through 
the able efTorta of the cotm^el engnged for the defence the charge broke 
down completely, and evtintually, the Government deciding not to 
proceed with the cnae, the accueed were released from custody. At thia 
time the authorities of the Republic shrank from no means to further 
their end, and the cajw ic question Heema to uh one very nearly 
approachibg to the crime of subornation of perjury. The secret sgentn, 
having their iiijitructiona from the head of the depiirtmeat, were oirdered 
to make the necesBary anidavits agam^^t those British eubjecta bo av to 
set the criminal law in motion i and these panie wretches were 8et on the 
watch to entrap peraons who allowed themeelvra to audibly condemn the 
actions of the Government, 

"The auggestioTi mndo by the State Attorney, that he would abandon 
proceedings if desired by the Britieh GovemmentT iPcasentiallyKrugeriMi. 
If Mr. Greene or Mr. Chamberlain hiul fallen into the tra.p, the Transvaal 
Goveroiuent would have claimed that the clmrpe wan so absolutely true 
that the British Govenmieut wan afraid of thecircuTtistaaceB being dragged 
into the bght of day, and it would have been u^ed aa a reason for the 
earlier declaration of war. As it is, there can he little doubt that the mass 
of the people believed that it was only by the vigilance of the Goveminent 
that a serious conspiracy ngalnBt the tndei'keQilenoe of the Itepublic waa 
brought to light, and the fact of the State Attumcy declining to protiecuie 
was solely in deference to the wish of the British Government, and, there- 
fore, a tnagnanimouH forbearance on the part of the TransTttal. The report 
on (iie proceedings at the preliminary examinntiun has been publiBhm in 



3l8 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



providmg the Imperial Govenunent comply with tbe foUowiD 
singularly reasonable conditiona :^ — 

First, — The Joint Inquijy to be waired. 



ft. recent Blae Book, and it shows dearly the quality of fho roettu 
by the GuvemmcBt in order to gala the lierared end. 

"The rircuiDKtacices relative to th« illicit jiorelinMR of gcdd osdir At 
authority of the (jovernmeBt have oft«n been dwelt on, but Ibe chmrg^al 
purchiuing gold unAlgam brooght agunst ft certaia Count <)o tWigny/and 
the Stat4 AttomeyV lEteiforence, i« xwrhapn low generally known. Tbo 
■cciued waA diHcharged before evidence could be adducoi]» mmiply becuuH 
it Would have tbYolverl the Ooveroment iq the ficaDdalouft airkir. Suffi- 
cient, however^ lenkcd out Ut show that a «yatein of [Kinuit* w&s iiwtituMd 
by which oettnJi) ferwns were heU free of uunage in chk of lidng < 
in purchfl^Dg gold. The oft^neible reuan for the institutiim of i 
permits waji U> aacertain how and by whcm the thefta of gold were : 
from the liattepjfH nf the jnluiTR coruiianWit. That wae a^uffident 
fur th& aduptiuD of extraonlrniiry m^aiift in ohler Ui ensure ibe dettractkn' 
uf ft Hysttini uf pilfering which had gruwD up on the Rftnd gpld fi«idi. 
But it lA a remarkable fact thnt nut a single amalgam thin has bein 
discovered through thin agepcy, white there is reasi^n to beliere that the 
gold bought under dpeclAl pernui ha« not been \v^ than £750^000 ia 
value. It ift difficult to trace gold obtained by theft or by the authoriNed 
robbery couDtenaoced by the GoTernment; but it ia pretty certain thai a 
coDt^iderable amount o( the etolen ^1d found itc way to agents etiitioDcd 
at De]}Lgr>ft Bay, where the price of amalgamated and cyanide ^old it 
opojiiy quottful." 

The metlioda and tbe civili^ied relets of the Young Afrikacder an 
well expreaeed in the following extract from a de«}ntch ap[«artiig in tha 
Londun Thne>^ duted, Pretoria, May 22:— 

** To-day 1 have had converstatinQB on the preacnt fiituation with Prea^ 
dent Kruguraud Mr. Smut*, the State Attorney, In di8cus*iitig the pr(^ 
BpectAof B|io«d,v jjeafeMr. Kru^erttaid, with great ampbasiHr^Uncunditioodl 
surrender on our part is absolutely out of the quotion. The Tnuisvaal 
will tight on until the greater |>art of her burghera are doad ; but jilsnty 
of life remaiuB to her jet.' 

" Mr. fi^mubfi declared that the Transvaal hod no choice but to fight to 
the bitter end. The Republics were How well aware of their uitiniiita fate, 
but, for all that, the war would not be coueluded for a long tituo yet, 
8p«kiiig of the proposed deatmctioin of the JohanneBbui^ tniaea, Mr. 
Smuts said that he greatly regretted that Johannesburg eh^juld auOer, but 
that the Govemmeot had no choice in the matter^ as the popular pmntra 
ujwn them was too great to be refliated." 

Mr. Smiitft' regrets were spared^ and the fiendish project of wrecking 
the DLineH ATjd plunging into hop^les^i mittery for yeara teoB of tbousanda 
of innocent raen, women and children — to which he wae ctimpcUed by 
popular preseuro to uaaept — was prevented from being Hccoinplish«d by the 
action of Dr. Krauae, the Boer Acting-Commandant of Johannesburg, 
who amwl«d the leador of the wrcckoru^ aent by Mr. 8niutB, the day 
before tbe Burr^digr to Lord Eioborts. 



AFRIKANDER NEGOTIATION 



»I9 



I 

i 



Second, — ^A definite promise of no more int^ffcrenco on 
"behalf of the Uitlander. 

Thirtl, — ^An abandonment of the Suzerainty Claim. 

Fourth, — An agreement to refer all future questions to 
Arbitration, 

The object of these aingulaj stipulationa — if they were 
really expected to be accepted — is of course clear. If the 
Imperial Government promised never to interfere again, an 
omnipotent Volksraad could soon dispose of the five yeara' — 
or a five months' — retrospective franchise—if, indeed, it 
were not illusory from the first, in the stipulated abBence of 
inciuiry. So the Uitlander would still be repressed. If an 
agreement were made to submit all future dispntea to arbitra- 
tion, the Imperial Government's power of intorferiiig in the 
foreign relations of the Republic would be reduced to a very 
small compass. 

The stipulation that the Imperiftl Government is to a^e 
not to " further iiiaist on the assertion of the Suzerainty " is 
even more subtle and dangerous, taking the circumstances 
of the time into con ai deration. Let us, therefore, consider 
this at more length. 

In his despatch of the 9th of May, the Afrikander State 
Secretiiry had quit© shifted from its orijrinal position the 
dL=icussion on the relaUouship between the Govemmenta. 
The original contention of State Secretary Leyds in the 
despatch of the IGth of April, 1898, was that the Suzerainty 
preamble of the 18S1 Convention was abolished^ and that 
the 18S4 Convention was the instrument defining the 
relationship. But State Secretary lieitz, on the 9th of May, 
1899, took the strikingly ori^dnal ground, that the Transvaal 
■was a " Sovereign International State," whose rights did not 
spring from any Convention. 

Now, seeing that the Imperial Government, in their 
despatch of the 13th July. 1899, had declared that " they had 
no intention of continuing to discuss this question," that was, 
for all practical purposes, all that a reasonable Transvaal 
Government could want. Tlioy would have heard no more 
of the Suzerainty. 



330 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



What, then, was the political meaning of State SecreUin 
Eeitz'a introducing the Bobject again, instead of letting it 
^rop?* 

In the first place, we extort from the Imperial Govern- 
ment a formal promise not to reassert the Suzerainty. Now^ 
the assertion of the Suzeiutnty, as most lawyers hold, was 
aimply an error made in good faith, and was due solely to 
the fact that the Colonial OflSee relied on incoirect legal 
advice. (Why they did not procure competent advice, and 
why our War Office also made not very dissimilM mistakes, 
is another matter, not undeserving of the attention of the 
British people.) But a fonnal renunciation would be reprd- 
sented as an admission that the Imperial Goverument had 
been wilfully, instead of mistakenly, in the wrong, and had 
attempted an unjustifiable aggression. This sort of easily 
misrepresen table step no Great Power can afford to take. 

In the next place, such a renunciation would instantly 
be represented to tbe Foreign Powers and to the veldt Boer 
as an admission of State Secretary Eeitz's theory that the 
Transvaal was a Sovereign International State, whose right 
of self-government did not spring from the abandoned » 
Suzerainty preamble or from any Convention. fl 

It seems hardly likely, however, that the Afrikander" 
party thought that those terms would be accepted. 

The Colonial Secretary's despatch of the 26th of August 
intimates that tbe Imperial Government are willing to agtea 
to a Unilateral Inquiry instituted by the British Agent, 
but cannot renounce the Imperial Government's right to 
interfere j can make no normal renunciation of the Suzerainty 
Claim ; are willing to discuss Arbitmtion ; and suggest a 
further Conference. fl 

State Secretary Keitz in a despfttch of the 2nd of Septem-" 
her withdraws his offer of a five years' franchise as his i 
remarkable conditions will not be accepted, and falls backl 
on the already enacted seven years' franchise — pitfiJla 
included. 

* There wer« other than political meaningB, but they are vxaxa* 
jjortivnt. 



AFRIKANDER NEGOTIATION 



221 



P 



The Colonial Secretary's despatch of the 8th September 
refuses to go back to the seven years* franchiae proposal, as 
the Imperial Goverament are satisfieil it is insufficient ; but 
is willing still to accept the lately proposed five years' 
£ranchiae ; assumes that the English language is to be 
used by the new Volksraad members ; and suggests a new 
Conference to discuss the Arbitration and other outstanding 
questions. 

Now we reach the fatal despatch of State Secretary 
Eeitz of the 16th September, after the commandoes had 
be^Q ordered out and sent to the Natal border. Pretoria 
will not agree to a five years' franoMae unless on the con- 
ditions already imposed, and refui^es the use of the English 
langimge in the Volkaroad, but will now agree to a Joint 
Inqxiiry, 

The reading of this remarkable diplomatic corruspondence 
at this point should be accompanied by a war map. The 
explanation has already been given. It was the effect on 
the Imperial Government of the presence of commandoes 
on the Natal border that was awaited, more than the tenor 
of this deapatch, 

The reply of the Colonial Secretary of the 22nd Septem- 
ber closes the discussion, and announces the intention of the 
Imperial Government to " formulate its own proposals for 
a final settlement of the issues which have been cruated in 
South Africa by the policy constantly foEowed for many 
years by the Government of the South African Uepublic." 

Last comes that most insolent document, flushed with 
insane arrt^uce^the Ultimatum. It is, as has already been 
stated, not a diplomatic document at atl. The Afrikander 
leaders saw that war had come upon them through the 
impatience of the veldt Boer ; and now was their last chance 
of a parting greeting to the foe they hod so fatuously con- 
temned. Its modest demands deserve enumeration : — 



Fint. — Ail matteiB of difference to be Betded by Arbitration- 
Second, — British troopB ou the burdeni to '' be luBtanUy withdrawn." 
r/«rd^— " All reinforoemente of troops which have WTived in Sguth 



t22 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Africa BiDce Uie let of June^ 1899> ah&U be remured (ram South 
Africa." 

^owih. — ** liar Majesty's tnw|is wliich ore now od Uie High Sou 
sliall not be bmdod in any part u( South Africa." 

"An immediate and aEUrmatiTe tuiawer'* is requeeted '"be- 
fore or ujwn WodaewJuy, llth Octoberj 1899, not Ui«r thta 
5 o'clock t.M." 

Failure to accept these terma before 5 o^clock P.U. a to 
regarded as a. decUratioo of war. 

Any further movement qf Britiah troops ia alao to be i 
as a declaration of var. 

These terms would hftvo been rejected with scorn 
Montenegro. The Imperial Government b calmly roquested 
to evacuate British territory and to recall Britisb troops on 
the high sana. J 

SU11» with all this insolence, even to the last is to be 
perceived the note of non-European sabtleness, Thii 
arrogant Ultimatum attempts to lay the responsibility ftff 
a declaration of war on the Imperial Government, because, 
indeed,, they will not evacunte British territory and will not 
prevent British troopa from landing at British ports. h 

But, as has been seen, it was intended as nothing bat" 
a parting insult to the Imperial people and Government, 
whom the aepaiatist Aitikander had foolishly despised aince 
Majuba Hill, And so, once again, is the Chancellor Oiea- 
aliema justified of his saying — -'* Vides, mi Jlii, inianiilUt 
sapienlia homines rct/antur,** 



( 223 ) 



CHAPTEE XXIV. 

'wUICn SIDE WAB TUB AGGRESSIOK ? 

Ben seen of the methods and objects of the 
Afrikander in powtsr in Pretoria and Blofimfontem, it will h& 
clear that the aggregaion and the making war was not on the 
side of tho Imperial Government 

There waii no a^grcasioQ or undue or unwarrantable 
inturfcrance in the Imperial interposition to put an end, as 
a measure of aelf-defence. to an intolerable menace to the 
p<iacB of South Africa iLiid to the very existence of the 
Empire, involved in the presence of a formidable and hostile 
military Power on the border, ever ready to attack at a 
moment when the Empire should become involved in foreign 
complications, U was no agression to intervene for the 
protection of the oppi-eaaed Uitlandera ; it was an Imperial 
dnty to citizens of the Empire and of friendly Powers ; it 
wafl self-defence to prevent the growing disaliectioD of the 
Colonial Dutch, 

This is the real juatification of the Imperial position ; 
the eitnation was ao menacing and intolerable that it would 
have justified armed intervention and occupation of the Boer 
states. 

I profer to call attention tu this — the real inwardness of 
the situation — rather than to the phitform question, " Who 
struck the first blow ? " 

As a matter of fact, the militant Afrikander led hia 
mi&guided people into striking the first blow, by seizing, 
aunoxing, and renaming British towua and territory in Natal 
and Cape ColoBy; aad by looting and destroying houaoa and 



224 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

property of British citizems ; and by croeUy expelling and 
maltreating the majority of the European inhabitants of tha 
Transvaal.* 

But, we are told, although it is admitted that the Boen 
Btruck the first blow, seized British territory and expelled 
and maltreated British citizens, still their action was only 
technically aggressive. BeUeving they were goiiig to be 
attacked, they, in their simple way, took up defensive poei- 
tionfl on alien soil. Aa Mr. Leonard Courtney put it, they, 
in entire innocenoe, took the Colonial Secretary's intimation 
that discussion waa useless, and that the Imperial Govero- 

* As It ifl act my mtention to writs in this book a history of th« 
iuipTec«dQat«d bcodcs of the Exodiui froiD the Transvaal, or of the pro 
gre«a of the wivr, I, therefore, deal with thut unpflralleled coitrmge on 
CiTJliBqtion* hj order of the AfrikoJideni in power in Pretoria, in eounecti'fxi 
with the queetioii of the rQsponS'iUlity f»r tlie wm-, I resided imr 
Joha&ntiebucg duriug must of the ].>oriod, Aud had abundant ]iiuof of the 
miaery wrought at the inataace of th* AfrikaDder office-holderd, Secretary 
ReitK and State Attorney Smute, who, as lawyers, odTi^ed the Pretoria 
Governmetit to taki^ thie gut^. Jubaimi^burg at ta&t appreciated thio 
educatfMl Young Afrikatidur. 

It )R, of couire«, true that, under tntcmatioua] Law, e Stato at ww is 
entitled to order the withdriLw&l of Bubjectt! uf tho other hcJligQi«nt. Bi 
here, if eTcr, muHt be applied the exceptiun, '* SuTiimum jus, «umn 
injuria.'" The geoeraS rule, taken from the cufltom uf Wtatas in Eurc 
applied to far different liirmirnfitaQCCH. Nowhere io tliu hletory of 
civiliaad world has the majority uf the iDhabitantfi of a terriU>ry, tneOf . 
wotuen, arid children, been driven from their homes in wliich thuy bare 
lived for yaarH b; an armed mluurity. There wan nu JuatLficaiioD in 
military uweamty, or otherwise, for advifiing the expukioD of these poor 
people. 

1'he crueTcy of tho mnnneT of the expulsion eurpitased the jiijqt(tic« « 
the Afriknndor order Not even tol&rahlo provision was mada by Mi'ssrsA 
licitz and t^uiuts for tlie tniu>>[Kirt of the 0xi>e]lod refugeea. I ha¥« seeVj 
wotDQii and children huddled in open cattle trucks asd coal vaggcouy' 
DXpii^ud to the rain and tlit^ ui^llt, while tbt; rough Boer^ ROCIIfltcniittl to 
pluep in the opiti veldt, wii£ sent by Afrikander order tu Srat^laiB oairiAgw. 
CuTue leuet lojtiunlur ; i/t-feniet stUni^ 

In one political move, tho Young Afrikander signally failed. A long, 
list of prBscriptlon hod besu coin[i^ll&d, containing the namea of the BefonnJ 
pnsiJDeri], uf the Itiadiars of the ^uuth African League, uod of oiben, Biich| 
as editors and stalTa of the nitlander journals, who bad made UienaMlve* 
ohuoxiouh to the Afrikatulor leadera. Wanants of Statd Attorney SmuU 
for the arrest of these UitlAodera aa hoBtagaB, undec a hetiCiuu» cha^e of 
treaaon, were prevented from being csecutBd by the timely flight of Uioh 
proscribed, maoy of whom have dincu uiarvhed into Pretoria in tha 
Uitlander corps. 



ON WHICH SIDE WAS THE AGGRESSION? 



ment would formulate iU own proposals to end an inLolemble 
position^ 83 meaning, " Wait until I get my pistol and I 
shall renew the discussion.'* 

Herej again, I prefer not to rely on a minor, though 
perfectly legitimate, answer, that re-naming of towns hardly 
is consistent with taking up more defensive positions on 
alien territory — even by a pastoral peasant. But the true 
reply ia, that if their Afrikander leailers had fulfilled the 

» obligations of justice, and the pledged faith of theh- people, 
to give fair treatment to the Uitlanders, and had abandoned 
their project of ousting British power from South AfricSj 

t there would have been no prospect of their being attacked. 
In one sense, of course, more especially since the tids of 
war has turned, the Boers have waged a war of defence. 
But, looking through mere phrases to the reality beyond, the 
defence they carried on was not of their independence, in 
the sense of autonomy, on the basis of justice, equality and 
. liberty to civilised inhabitants, but of the right to dominate, 
P as a privileged oligarchy. In that sense, the war waged 
by the Confederate States of America was a merely defensive 
war — to retain the right to keep negroes in slavery. 

In any case it was, with the Afrikander leaders, only a 
tfuestion of time and season. There is too vast bji accumula- 
tion of proofs — apart from those supplied by the annexations 
and rebdlions which have marked the course of the war — 
that active aggression on British territory at a favourable 
moment has long been designed. 

Dominating every thought and action of the militant 
Afrikander party was one idea — that the Boer had an in- 
herent superior right to the land of South Africa, in the Cape, 
in the Transvaal, everywhere, " Ona Land." The intolei-able 
injustice of this assumption has already boen pointed out, 
A plain deduction is that the assertion of their right was only 
a question of finding a favourable moment, when the Etapire 
was at war with another great Power. This, in that world, 
the most formative of action, that of ideas. What of deeds 
and declarations ? 

Colossal armaments — a world's wonder — ^have bwn re- 



336 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Eaid , 
annM 

pur" 



veded to the aatonished Empire. These were ordered^ be it 
remembered, before tlie fortanate excuse, the Jameson Eaid 
of 1895, occarrod. When have such enormoiiB stores of 
been collected with no intention to use them ? What iiur- 
pOBOS of legitimate defence would require an accnmuiadon of 
rifles^ estimated to number five for every burgher of the two 
Boer States ? For what purpose could tbey have been pro- 
cured — riflG9> however expensive, become obsolete in a few 
years — except for distribution among the Cape Dutch ? And 
laatly, og a writer in Switzerland inquires, What can a small 
State of 250,000 iiiUabitanta want with a Secret Service Fuiid 
of £300,000 a year ? * The Imperial Government h^s not oni>- 
fourth of that siLm. 

An anti-British campaign for twenty years — the Press, 
the Platform, the Pulpit, the School — took care that the ideal 
of Dutch domination and British exclusion should not grow 
dim. Was this to last for ever ? Would words never be 
transmuted into deeds ? 

Let thia war answer. It has presented us the spectacle 
of 15,000 rebels in arms against the authority of the Kmpire, 
led by members of the Cape Assembly who had taken the 
oath of allegiance. 

These, indeed, are proofs that all the world now can see. 
But no one who knew the mind of the separatist Afrikander 
could holp seeing it before the war, through all the veils of 
diplomacy. 

So far, I have considered the Boer sidy. What of the 
British ? There is one all-sufficient proof that the Imperial 
Government at the outbreak of the war had not abandoned 
the hope of peaceful remonstrance yet being safficient, and 
that war, if it could be avoided, was not designed. It wag 
pointed out some time ago in a speech by the Prime Minister 
of Canada, Sir Wilfred Laurier. The Empii-e was unprepared : 
only a handful of troops were in South AMca, 

This conai deration leada one to understand why, althougb 
the Afrikander leaders in Pretoria and Bloemfontein wotUd 

• FfofoBaor Edouard NavtUe, of tlie QeneTa Umreraity, * The Tran*- 



ON WHICH SIDE WAS THE AGGRESSION? 327 

have preferred postponing the war until the Empire was 
involved in complications, yet tbey diatinctly — though to 
their tuinds not to any great extent — incurred the risk of 
precipitating the war by sending the Boer commandoes to the 
Natal border. 

In the fust place, they believed that the Imperial Govern- 
ment would give way, and that the risk of war was no 
appreciable. But, if the improbable were to occm*, they 
calculated that they had a fair chancse, either of eomplote 
triumph or of substantial gain. 

At the best, should foreign complicatiana, through Hussian 
action in China or India, or French intorferemie in Egypt, 
cause war with the Empire^ triumph would ensue, and the 
name of the South African Eepublic would become a literally . 
correct description — the territory being expanded to include 
all South Africa. 

State Secretary lieitz reveaU his hopes in an interview 
publUhoJ in a Fruach newypaper, the EcJto da I'ttris. 

" At preaeat, Great Britain is most gloriously iaolated, and the Brltiali 
Empire it«elf runa contiidorable mk of boiDg vaQqiuahod. France mid 
BuBBia bnvo DBVer had a finer chance to gel rid of & troubIe»umc >eiiumy. 
Doea France mean to allow thia opportunlty^tLe last ehe will ever havt, 
perhapft— 'to ^laaa vritLuut taking Ler revetiga on the BriCiah V No I I ain 
Hure you will not, fur euch cunduct wuuld be naCbiDg Ititt^ than cnminol. 
It would mean your deetruclioa. Make a bold attempt fur Egypt then, 
and extend your |KJRfiOBflioua in Triimli. Fight, I soy, even at the very 
im|>rol>alj]e risk of being beaten. Fgllow our example. A» for Uuasia, 
auyune con aee that it ia to her interest to incite India to rebellion." 

And, at the worstf what would happen? Substantial 
improvement in the position of the Boer Stotea in the 
direction of shaking off Imperial control. The fact diat the 
British were unprepared, and had only a handful of troops, 
was thoroughly well-kuowu. Also, too, the " neutrality " of 
Bond membera — of the loyal section ; and the active assist- 
ance of thousands of rebels in the Cape and N"atal — of the 
militant section. Their gigantic secret armaments were well 
known to themselves i and also that they were quite com- 
I petent to U3e the lai'ge canuou— a fact of which the British 

Q2 



laB 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



War Office apparently was not aware, although they tnew of 
the e]dst«nce of the guns. 

The Afrikander leaders, therefore, quite correctly ood 
upon a aeries of initial British reverses, and, with 
reliance on the Colonial Office and British party pr 
of the past, expected that the Imperial Government, to 
farther loss of blood and treosuie, would aasent to a weak 
compromise, granting the Boer States a fireer hand — with 
which to prepare for a ftitnre war of extermination — and the 
abolition of Imperial control over TianaTaal foreign relations. 

Fortunately for the Empire, the Afrikander leadera* 
reliance on the paralysing of the Imperial arm, through 
British party spirit, British humanitarianism, British altniisin 
.{of the vicajions variety), and on the supposed want of 
patriotism of British shopkeeper and workman, has failed 
them for onoe, and the long ta]e of Imperial vacillatioii has 
ended.* » 

From the purely military point of view, it is now ^reed 
on all Bides that the Boer forcea did not make the best of 
their opportunities of immediate success, which were vastly 
greater than even now is generally appreciated. Military 
men are agreed that if the Boer forces had moved on the 
11th September instead of the 11th October, their army of 
40,000 men could have swept through all Natal to the sea, 
and occupied Durban, as the Indian reinforcements had not 
arrived, and there were only a few thousand troops in all 
Natal. Or, even when they began the war, in October, t if 



* An inBtarice of Yoiing A.fri]uLDder hopes which fell within ay 
pernonaJ eiperieoce will iilufltrafce. In Johannesburg, aoon befuru lb« 
Exodus of the Uildaiiden, a member, though k not very convinced one, of 
the Hparatiftt Afriluuider pvty, who is a jui^e of the Transr^, czkme tu 
He me about a legal question. lie expressed his regret that my pACifio 
couDHels bud not been adopted — the war party being too powerfuJ, and 
Dot having, until then, realised that it wm mere "bluff" on the eidaof 
the Imperial Qovorament. ** Howerer," he said, " we cannot help it 
now; w« shall win at the begintiing and for & long time, and then the 
British will get m liretl of the losa of lives and flKpense, that we shall get 
b&ua terme and a now Convention." I replied, " Tou wiU get no Cots- 
Tention, and you will have no Ilepublit,'* 

t But for th& foresight of the Freoiifir, Cbloa^ Eime, the Indiu 
nttnforcementa would not have been sent. 



ON WHICH SIDE WAS THE AGGRESSION? 329 

they had neglected Ladysmith and Kimberley — leaving a 
comparatiTely small force at the passes of Natal and at the 
diamond fields (where there were only 500 troops) — they 
could have seized the Hex Kiver Mountain passes, and 
marched straight to Gape Town. There would have been 
from 50,000 to 100,000 rebels in arms in the Cape Colony — 
as it was there were 15,000 — and there were no British troops 
to stop them. 

The ultimate end, of course, would be the same, as the 
Imperial Government would have to reconquer the Cape, 
or the Empire would perish. But the magnitude of the 
task — the amount of time and lives and money — would 
dwarf to insignificance the present war, heavy though the 
burthen has been. 



A*^ 



fj, («]«*( V% WW" 



230 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



CHArTER XXV. 

THE PBINCIPLE8 OF THE SETTLEMENT : MEAStJRES 
NECBSSTTATED BY THE WAiL 

It may be seen that, while the title of thia book relates to 
the aettlement after the war, liitherto I have dealt with the 
hifltOTy of n^er and Briton in South Africa for the last 
century, the attitude of the Boer towards the Briton, the 
separatist Afrikander propaganda since Majuba Hill^ and ita 
fatal sequence in the action of the separatist Afrikander, 
lately in power in the Boer States. 

My reason for approaching the subject of the re-settle- 
ment of South Africa in this manner is that it presented the 
only way of showing the crucial determinant of the immo- ■ 
diate course of aettlement necessitated by the war. I ha%*e 
endmvoured to present the mind of the Boer people, led and 
leaders, one, and the greatestj of the factors which most 
dotermiDe. The mind of our own people we know ; aa Id 
that of the Kaffirs and other subject races we may form 
coujecturas. 

That the result of the present war will, if not at once, in 
the early future, modify the attitude of the Boer and lessen 
hia depreciation of the Briton, we have reason to hope. But 
one campaign^ however victorious, canuot obliterate a 
century's mistakes. 

For some yeEirs to come^ therefore^ we must take as 
constant factoid all those disruptive tendencies^ in vehU 
Buer and separatist Afrikander, which I have described at 
length. ■ The immediate and necessary conclusion, therefore^ 
is that no separate existence outaide the Empire can be left 



i 

I 



THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SETTLEMENT 231 

I to the Boer States, f Like causes would produce like effects 
in the future as in the present. Annexation of the 
territories must be absolute. 

The same spirit eiists in the Boer leaders — the militant 
Afrikanders, who even now ascribe their defeat to /<wm 
majeure hostility to the Imperial Government ; dislike aod 
envy and jealousy of the unwarlike British-bom colonist.* 
The same spirit still exists in the veldt Boer ; their present 
defeats are only chastisings by the Lord, who will remember 
Hia people in good time and set them in strength again. 
They still are a slow and stubborn and patient people. 

The recent annexation of the territory, lately the Free 
State, aa the Orange Eiver Colony may seem to some to 
render these reflections needless, in fiEtce of the/ai^ accompli; 
but that is not. so. IJnleaa the principles which direct 
annexation are clearly apprehended, there is danger, not so 
much of the annexation being reversed— although that 
occurred before in the Orange River Territory — but of hopes 
being entertained of a reversal ; and, mora Berioua still, of 
the internal reorganiaation of the territories of the Boer 
States being conducted on lines which ignore the basic fae6 
— the condition of the mind of the Boer people. 

Intercourse, commerce, intermarriage, education, but, 
above all, timo, must he waited for — nntil the growth of a 
local South African patriotism^ common to all, of British or 
Dutch descent, and aa loyal to the Empire as Australian or 
Canadian national feelings has dispelled in ita light the dark 
shadow of aixbeenth-century tribal exclusiveness, which hafi 
wrought such evil in our day. 

It ia to be remembered also that, in view of the mental 



• Mr. J. A. Hobson, in hie hook, 'TLe War in South Africa,', writton 
frnm the etandpoiat *>f otie favourahly incliued towardB the Boer side, 
Btales: ** The able young judge jmt thin iK'int moBt hiipreagively to 
me. , . . ' But conquered aiid Immbled by Grcnt Britain^ our respect mil 
turn tfl rancour i we shall submit only liecaUBe we inustt ancl fo long as 
we must J the Rpirit of freedom will not die, and tlie Ileimblice, which 
might have been in friendly alliance -ftiLh Gttat Briidn^ will remain 
pcreoftnent centreB 0t disaffection, waiting an opportmiily to etriko 
a blow.' " 



332 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



attitude of the colonista of Britisb descent in South A£ict, 
Imperi*! stateemen cuisot afford to maka any moie 
mistakes; enough hv been made in the past to stnin 
loyalty almost to breaking points And never should it be 
forgotten what a menace would be the disaffection and scom 
of the Bubject native races, consequent on anj failure of 
their British rulers to see the facts of the hour which 
thxeaten the stability of the Imperial ruleL 

For the maintenance of that Imperial rule^ charged with 
its share of the destined mission of the European race in the 
world ; for the fusion of the European race in South A&ica, 
a necessary means towards that end ; for the good of Kaffir 
in Africa and India in our Eastern dominion; for the 
upholding of the confederation of the Empire, the most 
glorious instrument of justice which the world has seen — the 
menace to its heart> inherent in any persistence of an alien 
power, animated by racial Mitagonism in the midst of our 
South African dominion, must bo removed ; and not merely 
be reiDOved, but must never be auffered to recur — oover 
again, ■ 

Therefore must there be absolute and permanent annexa- V 
tioQ of these territories to the Empire ; and obliteration ot 
artificial barriers between nices and territories marked out by 
the deeds of the past and the physical facts of the present, to 
be one. M 

The war has reaped a heavy harvest of the patriot dead, 
who flocked from lands of the snow and the sun, and laid down 
their lives for the Empire, and for the spread of justice, and 
liberty, and happiness to their fellow-men which the Empire 
means. The survivors, and tlie Government of the Empire, 
are trustees to posterity of the fruits of their heroic deeds. 
Canada, and Australia and New Zealand, as well as the Home 
Country, have paid their share of the toll. And South 
Africans as well : from the Helot of the Transvaal, who with 
the people of Natal — numbering in all less than an English 
town — bore the fiercest shock of invasion ; to the British 
colonist in the Cape, distracted with doubts of once again 
being abandoued by the Imperial Power; to the loyaliata 



THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SETTLEMENT 



233 



I 



of Dutch descent, who have undergone the bitterest test 
ofalL 

The two aspects of the problem of the settlement after 
the war relate, on the one hand, to what is palpably neces-' 
saiy — the territorial and constitutional settlement of the 
annexed territories ; and, on the other, to the reorganisatioti 
of the Imperial machinery of government, with a view to 
preventing those errors in the past which have bome such 
evil fruits ; a reorganisation, the necessity of which is not so 
palpable and inevitable, but yet is most urgently required, 
lest worse come. 

As regartls the settlement of the territory of the Boer 
States, the priuciplea should first be clearly fixed on our minds. 

The first is the conservation of the integrity of the 
Empire, and of the Imperial hold on South Africa, For this 
end other things and places will urgently require considera- 
tion ; but the question now is as regards the Boer territories. 

To promote the fusion of the Dutch and British people, 
and to prevent the prospects of future war between British 
and Dutch, furnishes again a necessary principle. 

And, again, the conciliation of Dutch sentiment towards 
the Imperial Government, aa far as compatible wilh Imperial 
supremacy, must inevitably find its place. And, not at all 
to be forgotten, the conciliation of British sentiment in these 
territories. 

Lastly, the promotion of the federation of South Africa — 
for the good of South Africa and of the Empire as weU — to 
counteract and extinguiah the separatist tendency. 

Bearing those principles in mind, it becomes clear in the 
light of past and present dangers — of Boer and Afrikander 
sentiment and the danger of leaving it to be esploited by 
enemies of the Empire — the institution of Crown Colony 
govermneot for some years to come is plainly inevitable. 
Any immediate institution of representative government, in 
which the Boer inhabitants were admitted to the suffrage, 
would mean transferring the fight from the kopjes to the 
baUot-box. An electoral system in which the Boer had no 
TOte would mean erecting an Uitlander oligarchy ; and there 



] 



t 



3. 



134 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



^ 



is reason to fear an ideal Hnd of government would not be 
the result, besides the inevitable consequence of perpetuating 
race feeling. 

It has been suggested that it might be well to consider 
the advisftbility of fixing a period within which Crown Colony 
government would come to an end. In this way two dangers 
would be avoided. Crown Colony govermneut, like all kinds 
I of government, including a Pretoria oligarchy^ tends to 
perpetuate itself. Vested interests, family and personal 
influences, would rapidly cluster around it ; and no one ever 
heard of the most mimite, however patriotic, of German 
priadpalities consenting to be mediatised. If perpetuated, it 
would create an atmosphere alien to the freedom which is 
the breath of the Empire. It would ixltimately diminiah the 
strength of the territory as an integral portion of the Empire; 
and it would deter the most desirable class of British citi- 
zena, who have "reverence for the laws themselves have 
made," from imtmgrating. The second danger, which the 
fixing a period to Crown Colony government would avert, is 
that of premature agitation. If it ia known at what perind 
representation in a legislative assembly would be granted to 
the inhabitants of t!ie new Colonies — aesuming they are two, 
instead of one — then there would be no motive, utxleas 
intermediate period were too long for agitation. But this 
a matter calling for prolonged and careful inve3tigation_ 
the local conditions,* 



* Ah well as the tvosoda bascKl on the atnaggia between BritiRli ana 
BwTf Qecl3s^jtatt^g the puat[^ion{!meDt of the iutroauctioa of repreaeiitativ 
JDatituLLons, there are cohere ariaing from tbe character aad oontpMitia 
of the pffpulation of the WjtwatCTflrand. 

In the firf^t place, a Tery coDsidtrable section are noD-Britiah, ajid 
these tlie majority come from a country like Ruaaia, wherein there are do' 
reiireiwatalive inatitutiouit, and, therefore, no experience of the priitd[jee 
on which they niiisL h« worked to be efftjctivo ift |>roducing goad 
gOTemment. 

In the next place, the feverish race for wealth has produced, even 
among the BritiBh to an appreciftble extent, a type u( character in England 
cotifincd to the le«8 repuLahle side of Stock Esfhaiige busineM, veiwd m 
the circulation of unfounded runioure to bull and bear stock, nndi, by an 
easy traoHitioQf to injure iDconvcmeDt husiueBS or profeasicmal riTaU. 
Able altd uikHcrupuloua intrigue O'f thia kind ttpplied to electoral iSBtitu-' 



MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE WAR 23S 

As to the objection that the Iraperial Govertunent, after 
lengthy negotiation and inaistence on the franchise being 
conferred on the Uitlander, then proceeds to give the 
franchise to no one, and institutes a Government consisting — 
as a Crown Colony Government does — of a Governor 
norainated by the Crown, and a Council also nominated^ 
and so display inconsiatency, there is a quite sufGcient reply. 
What was aimed at by the demand for the franctise, as far 
as the Uitlander personally was affected, was simply a means 



tiouR could o-qIj effect & regreltaHe reproductiou of tbo less useful kind of 
AiuiencfU] pijUfica. 

The following eitract from Mr. J. A. HoTwud'h liookj already referred 
U.>f is uot without bcnritig on thifi nfii}et:t of tliu matter : — 

" Mr. WinBton Churchiil'a deficription of Soutli Africa as a ' Land of 
Lies ' is Dot quite the reckleBs geoeralitutiDD it enonda. Whtitber it ho a 
pubtle jwyehical reaction of cortain deceptive qualities of the country, iln 
illtiaivft difltauces, mirages, the incalcnlihl*; tricks of nature in tliia ' land 
of surprises,' or contact mth 'the treacherouH Kaffir,' or whothur it Iw A 
* natural ^ioction * leading to ihb Aurviral of mendacity for use in epoculn- 
tive bueinesft, I arn unable Ui docide. 

" But about the fntt there can be no doubt. There are liam and 
creduloua folk in every laud ; but for niLnute dot&ilwi niendiidty and the 
wanUin acreptaoce of the same. South Africa etandii pre-oiuinaiit. It Unik. 
nic jioine rbne to adjust iriy luaxjiorienceil mind to tl:ia focug. For smne 
time I was dit^jHj^ed to accejit readily the circunnKtaiitial Btateniente made* 
apjiarentiy in all good faith, by ftober Lntielligeut busineBs and prufesBionftL 
men. But I Htou learned the need uf eevere scc^itkifiui. In the art at 
which I iii«Jik it is s-cnrculy iiecoHsary tt> a(|d that ixiliticiiins were the 
gr>oatet<t adapts, nod when ihi) business man becomi|}8 politician, lie brings 
his bueinfer* talent for detail into |X)llticfl with marvellous results," 

I will only fiay that it took me very much longer to adjust my tuiod 
to that focus. ! but I have done it now. 

Lastly, tltere reniaiuB a reaA>n for avoiillng undue hatite in the 
introduction of eltictivti govtrnniont— one which linimta the iiund of the 
rank and 6k of the Jo hauDBA burgers like an evil dream — the daoger that 
any elective government would consieit of nomineea of the great capitaliat 
houBes. 

On this point the writer luui some anpopite ref]wrtionH» pointing to a real 
danger ; but one which, I hnj.ie, Imparial Statesmen will Iw able to overt, 

*' The practical paraumuntcy esercised by Unanciers, the r©ci.i^niMed 
leaders of whom are foreign Jews, over the economic intereata of the 
Transvaal, extenda alno to the flocial nud the recreative (tide of JohanncA- 
burg life. Many of the recognieed leaders of Bociety are Jewish. The 
newspapers of the 13th Sejit-emlwr contiuned the announcemeat: "There 
will be no [reirformaiico at the Empire (MuKic-Hall) to-day, by roaaon of 
the Jewieh Day of AtoDement." The Stock EichaEgo was also closed 
upon that day. 



THE SETTLEirETr AFTER THE WAR 

Gof wi i iwwt rtM> mij turn powible m 

it viAntt ««c SbDetiwn&e 

Ike frwnflmft ■ aa Iumjuji DecaieBij-; 

. kas wiNWiiihffi the ^ WMfiii i Mw of good gn ii i w ^ 

1 wpqld nov aoCbe fiuthaul faj tlia fianduoe ; andlw 
hai wtaMwhwi tkat ImpeoU japw aa cy i^kh ini, 
latMl n— !■! fia iliiwimlii^ llii friadiiaA. 
Mt wmatl powoa of Igpnlitioo and *^"*''*'T4n i ti n ii. 
1^ woald wt in the new Ouwn Odonj Goi 



p«p«f^i 



It maj Ik 



I daft VCR watii In 



fan or<^, tkk fanKB I 

IlkiB for * iOB^ Hoii of <" 



«ldi7 sf s J«iirMk naaopaly of 



Bota 



Kt^ 



I Jots all 



'ir^ 



ttei 



a««m 



itfaai 



inhw 



thit «^[B» Kkai dan oT fiisaiiden bn , 
6«m artiTc mrtionlioti tk 



pofiOci^ tk«7 win HB Bofitia b Iha t^umoL Tbcj uve fcwBd Ute 
ttMd for w*—"*^ pwiai waA hpditkM by faribary aai otiwr pnuuTe 
aftiUA«to; ttesBBeBBediadHeva cdatinl^latam. FoBtio* to 
tfaaa wOl nok »ntr ■■■& frae tad* lod ipmi adiaia iit ra tkiB ttf jwt 
bvh Ihaaanal iuiliHlij, i—t*^*— ^ Ae aiang aditetiy, re q uir — tlw 
uju a —i aod i i B|H i f I * mi of Uw 8w«. Tba toMoI of a laise^ cJwHfk 
tvgukr, — TwiiOTK tKg/^j td lalKnr, tk* cfcirf ttmar-AOBa of pcnfitaUi 
buMBcat. vil ba a oonaUat iBnatire to acqaira pJilical oootrol ; lailwij 
nta% cartiMM Inai^ and the all-inpartm; uaaa cA^ng tp mminl 
r^^itf, wOt fcte* tk«n iua peiitk% md iluy vill affly to tluaa tW mom 
itmlirifa wUefc hara auda than m nKMHfol in ifccalafctTa tadgggy. 
u a wcrd, thw wiQ nmp^ and tHrnteUy add to their othor barinMwi 
tba iwnifi !!■■ ofpcfitKa. Th« paiticular ionn of govaoiBMnt which staj 
ha adapted vOI not matter vorj BNeh. OffvoraaHnft fivn DinniiBg 
Stiat* i&ar, pH^a^ b«mp«r UMb a lilli* looia tbaa th« fbtaa of popakr 
iu|wiMilalii> gufaiiiiuttii ; but the jndkiuaa eoaitnl of tha pfm, an) 
tba — irtance of *»*'*■'*** frieodc in high idacet^ wUl coaUe thflcn to 
artatliah u>d maintain a hdaaUf riMB|ilcte form of hgaa-nxlre in South 
Afiica. 

A ODDudaalioa of thew poiMe tbrMn a dbar B^lt upon the Bator* <rf 
the flunflict in South Africa. W« ara fightiiig ia otdcr to plaee m aaall 
inlanialaaiui a&gardij of mina-owBan aad apaadklaatm m powar at 
ftat a tia. &)|rintaiD«D will nmfy do ««Q to reoopiin tkd tha Towifftiff 
and poKtical dcati&ia gf South Afiica *i^ and ap«m Ckdy to mnuB, in 
tba hand* «f mu, iiM«t of whom ara fdnogDerc by od^, wbow tode it 
finaoce, aod whose trade interefta ve not uiledy Brituh. 



MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE WAR 257 



[Above all thingg, iq the control of the Imperial Governor, 
oJl arm^ forts, and military equipment 

In the nomination of the Colonial Council to aaaist the 
Grovemor of the new colony of the TransvaAl — and, of 
course, of the Orange Kiver — special care should be taken to 
make it representative of all classes of the community- In 
view of popular interests— and prejudices as wdl— it should 
1>e made specially clear that there was no undue capitalist 
representation.* 

In the appointing of officials the greatest care should be 
taken to avoid any appearance, not merely of undue weight 
"being attached to the recommendations of the great capitalists, 
"but to any appearance of race domination by the victorious 
British- It is to be remembered that thousands of loyalists 
of Dutch names and descent fought on the side of the 
Empire. In the late admjmstrtLtionj especially in the Orange 
Free State, many useful officials can be found.f 

On one point there should be no uncertainty. English 
should be the of&cial language in every department of the 
adminiatration, in the public offices and the Law Courts. It 
is not in the present crisis merely a question of permitting 
Dutch for the sake of convenience in the transaction of 
business. As a matter of fact, business is» and always haa 
been transacted, even in Pretoria, in English, The fact is 
that the use of the Dutch language has been turned into a 
Beparatist propaganda. Its being permitted in the Cape 
Parliament in 1882 was openly declared oa '* the thin end 

Those who know JobaaneBbiirg do not require to be told that this 
■^^Tieof fear of beiog '* Kimberleyisad," as they term it— Elista 
_,'efy conaiderable aection, many of whom have lived in Kimborley 
„ ,„^flr yoarg. It was expreBsed to me quite recently by meiDbers of 
the Imijerial Light Horafr— aa Uitlaijder corpfl— returned from boiug 
Ited^ed in Ladyemitb. In Kinibarley, one sreat cortwration, that of Db 
Bwrt, not merely haa a practical nionoixjiy of the production of diamond*, 
but, by mea&H of what is known as tbe " comiMmnd eyatem," haa the 
monopoly of the supply of goods to the natives working in th« mines (the 
smiiwB- are ooufined to barracks, called "compounds") with th$ reault, uf 
course, that there is no room for the ordinary trader, 

t This fact has evidently been reoogniaed and Mted upon by I^ord 
Rc-bartB in the Orange RiTer Colony. 




( I 



^1 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



^' 



of the wedge " towards ousting British rule ; and its pnUk 
use in the Transvaal and tho OraD^* Rivtt Teititory would 
be laid hold of as atx incBSBOnt temiudev uf tJie iutoleiable 
claim to prior aud snpenoi right to tho hind in the Boen 
who fought the Matabebi over the British who subdued the 
Zulu.' 

It is cloar tliat au iuquiry as to tha measures BBcessarr 
to he taken for the re -establishment of order and civil life 
will be reiiuireJ without delay. Possibly a General Com- 
mission, with subordinate sections, would present some 
advmitagea : as a co-onlinatioii of reaulta in some case* 
would be called for, Thg first and most noqessary Cam- 
miBsion of Inq^uiry would bo to investigatti the cUums f(| 
compensation for losses suflered by the loyal TJitlanders : 
the Trauavaal and the Orange lliver Territory as a result of 
their lawless eipulaion and their being robbed of their 
property, under the guise of " oommandeering," or e^'en 
without show uf form, A Finance Comuiissitin, to arrange 
for the completion of a State loan to moat these losses, and 
to contribute a reasonable share of the coat of the war to til 
Imperial Treasury, would obviously be rec|uu"ed- 

The assessment of the burthen of the necessary taxes for 
this purpose will be no easy task. Quite different considera- 
tions apply to the assessment uf a war Lax on the minea ; on_ 
the property of the burghers in arms; on the property 
tlieir loadera — who^ and not the burghers, are responsible fa 
the beginning and the conduct of the war ; on the propertj 
of burghers of British descent who abandoned their proper 
ralhur than fight against the Empire; on the Eriti 
Uitlanders: on the Uitlaiidera, subjects of neutral Powers. 

A Commission of Inquiry on Law, and more especially, 
on Law lleform, b most urgently required. The present law 
must be taken as the basis uf property rights until it is duly 
altered. The first step should be to appoint a competent 
body to select such laws as ought to be confirmed - but much 
juuro important is the selection of laws to be promptly 



* See Chapter X — ** Tho Toimg Afrikander Pro|agaiida,'* 



MEASURES NECESSITATED BV THE WAR 339 



t 



tepealed or modified. The Gold Laws, especially, require 
immediate modifications. As they already stand, tliey unduly 
tend to throw all the gold claims into the hands of the great 
capitalistB, by requiring monthly licensing claims to be paid, 
whether the claima are being worked or not. The result is 
that, in times of depreasiou, the amaller holders have to 
relinqiiiah their claim 8^ which are, of oourae, then taken up 
by the wealthy men * Farther, no new claima should be 
allowed to he taken up for a considerable time, for the same 

ion. Again, the Transvaal GJoverament parted with 
many rights, which legitimately should have been retained 
by the State, under the guise of " Cortcesaiona." Special 
inquiry, at the moat impartial hands not intereated in any of 
the concessions, should bo made as to the validity and real 
value of these claims. 

Other matters of intiuiry as to what, if any, modifications 
should be made in the existing law of the two territories 
r«late to such difficult questions as the Kaffir laws : ruj^ula- 
tioos as to Kaffirs being obliged to carry passes ; to remain 
indoors after dark — the Curfew Lawj not to walk on the 
footpath ; to pay a special tax ; and those relatiug to Aaiado 
immigration, which is totally prohibited in the Orange lUver 
Territory, and only permitted, under restrictions, in the 
Ti-anavaal ; the Licensing Laws, dealing with the supply of 
aleoliol to the natives, present questions of great difficulty, 
both of lai,Tslation and administration. 

In addition to this work of inquiry, for which of course 
only temporary commLssiona will be required, all the branches 
already existing of the public service will require to be 
organised, and iu some cases to be entirely i^constituted. 
Such are the deportments of Justice, of the Railways, of the 
Treasury, of the Post Office, of the Mines, of the Land 
Eegistry, of the Surveyor- General, and of the Police. 

The police, more especially, will require complete recon- 
stnuition. Urban police will be required for Johannesburg, 
Pretoria, and other towns, and in the mining centres in 

* Thift proceaSj I mi ioformed bj JokLonc^burgors,, ia called " freozing 
ottt.'* 



»4o THE SETTLEMEKT AFTEK THE WAR 

ei^eoU, in very l&ige nomben. In the coontzy ssroog 
patrols of mounted police will be required for nuLDj ye«o 
to come. 

One new department should certainly be created, ud 
lirgG fund^ placed at iU disposal in both territoriea — « 
Oolonisatioii Department. The State-aided immigration of 
1820 produced the only completely British diatiict in the 
Capo Colony, the eastern province. Tlie poUti<^ effects of 
anch immigratLou need not be dwelt upon. In the Transvaal 
especially, and also in the Ortuige River Territory, a veiT 
oonaiderable proportion of l&nd is still in the hands of the 
State, and would be lEQiuediately available. In addition to 
this, very large tracts are in the hands of various land 
companies, with which the new Government could directly 
deal. The New Zealand Land Acts would fnruisb osefol 
precedents as to legislation, and their working a guide in 
carrying out the Acts. Agriculture, not cattle runs, would 
change the face of the two territories. Stat© irrigation works 
are, however, an absolute necessity for agriculture as much 
as in India. No private individual could afford the enormous 
expense of adequate works ; and no merely commercial 
oompaay, regarding dividends only, would expend its capital 
on what would bring in otJy a nominal return. To the 
State, on the contrary, and to the community, the return for 
irrigation works is not merely the actual interest paid yearly 
for the expenditure, but the total increased produce of the 
country ; an increase, which in some coses la India after 
returning yearly 74 per cent, on the capital, is equivalent 
in one year to the total capital expended.* Parts of the 
Transvaal and the Orange Hiver Territory are exceedingly 
fertile, and only require water to be converted into agri- 
cultural fanos. In the Transvaal esjiecially, a Forest 
Department would have a moat favourable field. Trees of 
all kinds grow with wonderful rapidity.f 

• Lord Curzou'8 speech at Lyftllpar. October 1&09. 

t North of JoliamieHburg is an Bitauaivo wood, mflea ia drciut» called 
the Sachsenwald, which looka an ideal public park far iho city, anti 
which iB only eight or nine ywra okL la England the eama growtli is 
Kud to requira aWut Ibifty jear^^ 



i 

I 



MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE WAR ni 



Natal and the Cape Colony willy of courae, be the scene 
of other measures necessitated immediately aa the result of 
the war. A Nat^l Commission to investigate the los&ea of 
loyal coloniste has been appointed for some time, A claim 
19 also made for the cession to Natal of the remaining 
portion of Zululand, now annexed to the Transvaal^ and for 
the annexation of Swaziland, now under the protectorate 
of the Transvaal. In the Cape, and Natal also, besides the 
question of compensation to loyalists* that of the punish- 
ment to be awarded to rebels is being considered, and of 
measures to be taken against seditious publicationB.* 

It may be well here U> notice much wider projects of 
readjustment of boundaries of the new territoriea published 
from time to time in the press. Suggestions have been 
m&dd of the annexation of the Orange Kiver territory to 
Natal, of Johannesburg and the Witwaterarand to Natal, of 
Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand lo Bechnanaland, to 
form a new province, with the Gold Reef city as its capital. 

The grounds on which these partitions are advocated are 
chiefly that they would obliterate the former lines of 
division, and with them the tradition of corporate unity. 
Aa to this I do not think there is much probability of 
the end in view being attained by such means, even 
supposing the course could be recommended on other 
grounds. The sentiment of unity among the Boers seems to 
rest on language and religion, and not territorial circtim- 
seriptian, the bouods of which— the late rebellion is a 
proof— race sentiment transcended. Another advantage 
claimed is that it would facilitate the restoration of civil 
government by putting a British majority in power. This 
also seems unfounded. It reata upon the aasumption that 
an electoral body is going to be entrusted %vith legislative 
power, which, aa I have pointed out, would be a rash 
experiment for several years. Again, the North-eastern 
Transvaal, almost completely inhabited by Boers, cut off by 

• Aft 1 write, m>wB has just been publiabed of the reKignatfon of the 
BoDcl Miniotry, it ia underBtood, owlug to a party division over the Jirtst- 
n&mcd mtitlert mid the ftanexatioQ of the Republics, 



343 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

any snoh operatioii as the last two-named, wonld beocme a 
focns of Afrikander propaganda. And, poesibly, a gold raef 
may yet be found there, to be transmuted into rifles and 
cannon. But the greatest disadvantages of all are the dsiiaj 
and paralysis of industry, awaiting tSe return of dvil lifo 
and law and order, pending the necessary inquiries as to 
population and boundaries, and, most of all, that it would 
be a complete leap in the dark as to the character and 
tendencies of any of the newly-formed communities. 




To retain the hold of the Empire on South Africa — a. hold 

essential to the continued existence of the Empire the world 
over — reoi^niaation of the whole political fabric in South 
Africa ia essential. 

The present crisis in the fate of the Empire, the presont 
war, with all its terrible consaqnences to victors and 
vaat^nished alike, are dii'ectly traceable to t!iB effect on the 
mind of a. stubborn people of Imperial errors of a hundred 
years. 

To strike at the root of the evil, profiting by the teaching 
of this war. we fthull have to destroy and to create. 

Destroy the causes of vacQlatiou and ignorance of fact, 
which have characterised the Imperial Government at home; 
destroy the causes of demoi-alisation «nd timidity of 
Imperial representatives in South Africa. 

Create conditions of information with the Govomment at 
home ; create conditions of confidence and independence 
with the Imperial representative in South A&ica. 

The method recommended and endorsed by experience is 
plainly that of our most successful Grovemment of India. 
There no attempt has boen mad© since thii Mutiny to shirk 
tlie Imperial burthen. Here, as Grey and Frer© have in 
vain preached to a people who would not heed, all the 
trouble has arisen by a series of vain endeavoiii*s to thrust 
the burthen of the Imperial people, now to a Griqua chief, 
now to a troublesome colony, now to rebels in arms, 

B 2 



244 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



The parallel betweon India and South A&ica 13 not. It l« 
true, V617 close. Here, aa in India, there is a lai^e suhjed 
population of non-European race. In Tndia^ however, tht 
European papulation are loyal citizens of the Empire. In 
South Africa there ia not merely the difficulty of a eabjecl 
non-European people, but there ia the difficulty, onkiiowa 
in India, of a Bectton of the Eui'opean population, set fct a 
generation past on ouating Imperial rule from the territory. 

A little reflection will show that the aaalogiea are gieater 
than the discrepancies. In neither India nor Africa cm 
mere counting of heads be sufficient to sufRce for a rale of 
GoveromeuL The possession of the Cape is so all essential 
to the maintenance of the Empire that it is impossible to 
allow its inhabitants, of whatever race, to do aa they please 
without regard to the higher interests and duties of thfl 
Empire as a whole. No more than the Orkneys — to which 
our original title ia traceable to a pledge from Denmark as A 
security for a loan from Scotland four hundred years ago— 
no more than the Orkneys can he permitted to demand 
reunion to the Danish Crown, can Dutch-apealcing citiiene 
in South Africa be permitted to weaken or exclude tlie 
Imperial Power. 

To follow the principle of our successful Government in 
India does not neoessarOy involve a servile copying of 
details. The creation of a Governor-General of South Africa, 
with an Advisory CouDcil, the creation of an Under-Secre- 
tary in the Colonial Office at home, with an Advisoty 
Council of South African experience, would reproduce the 
essential features characteristic of the Indian system. Of 
this last— the reorganisation of the South African section 
of the Colonial Office — no more need be said, as there are 
few difficulties in the way, except in the selection of persona. 
Let us first consider the present system of Govemmejit 
in South Africa, which is chaos, ajid see what, on the Indiaxi 
principles, should be substituted in its place. Evils, the 
immediate result of the present system, which ia no system, 
we have had to repletion. If there had not been such chaos, 
a band of rash officers of a British territory would not have 




THE IMPERIAL HOLD ON SOUTH AFRICA 245 

by a raid on a State with wMch we were at peace discredited 
the ImperiaJ Governineiit in the eyea of the world and tied 
ita bands in negotiating for the redress of British grievances. 
Nor, agaifij would an attack by the most formidable Power 
in South Africa have found the Imperial forces utteriy 
unprepared. 

J3ritish experience in organising and administering 
dependencies and colonies in every part of the world has 
been as unique as it ia renowned. In South Africa, never- 
thelesSj there is no trace of any foresight in the organisation 
of the various territories, Everything has been left to 
hazard, to the accidental creation of a moment, to a temporary 
« expedient to tide over a sudden difficulty. It ifl true, of 
P coTiTBe, that the constitution of the United Kingdom baa 
grown, and not been carried out on a pre-arranged plan. 
There the parallel ends. In the United Kingdom the move- 
ment has been from diversity to unity, from waning pro- 
vinces to a central Government, from thu mid-Saxon folk' 
moot to the Imperial Parliament. In South Africa the 
ftver-recuning desire on the part of the home Guvernment 
to evade Imperial reaponsibility— really insepamble from 
the necessary retention of the Cape — instead of, as in India, 
in 1857, boldly facing it, has ended in a perfect mosaic of 
constitutions, heterogeneous in origin, jarring in action. 

The constitution of Cape Colony is modelled on the 
ordinaiy type of the Britiah Colony in Auatmlia or Canada. 
It is self-governingj having a Governor nominated by the 
Imperial Crown, an Upper House of Paxliamentj the Legia- 
lative Council, and a Lower Hou^e, the Legislative As.^embly, 
both elected ; " responsible Govtjmmynl," that is to say, 
Government by Ministers responsible to the local Parlia- 
ment, was introduced some years ago. 

In Natal a similar system prevails. The Governor i3 
appointed by the Crown. A Lower House is elected, but 
the Upper House, the Legislative CouucU, is nominated by 
the Governor in CouneiL Here, too, i3 *' responaible Govern- 
ment." The Governor is also "Supreme Chief of the Native 
Tribes," Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's forces and 




M 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Vioe-AdminL Kow, befora proceeding In the oeoond tnd 
thiid ^pes of wttbodt; m thia vtuulafiil l&nd of expen- 
inait^ I nuj point oat tb«t the oondUiona which word m 
fiivotUAfale far tbe working of local autooomj, and " respoii- 
Bible Goremmtnt *' in Australia, «nd almost to the aaae 
degide in f^^naAt. were cot, and aie DOt» present in Sootk 
/ Africa. In both Australia and Oboada there is a solyect 
naitivQ moa^ but it is relati^elf animportant in nombers, and 
I doea noi aeem to iiuaeas^ In South Africa the number of 
the natiTe race south of the 7Minhem jg variooalj estimi^ed ; 
bat all agiee tbat it cannot be leas tluin six to one of the 
white i^ — six millions to less than one miUioiEL — and, more 
IwiBidable stilL it ift rapidly increa&ing, owing, appu<an&l]r, 
to tfa«ir ovn cnstom of potygamj, and to the peace which ia 
BdtUk Im penal interasta aie, therefore^ affected, and 
Impedal duties toiratds those races cannot be handed ova 
I to mereiy local govenunontB. 

Again, another differenoe, and equally importantp at least 
far our time and genenttion. In Aostralia the population it 
homogeneooSp and all are intensely British in spirit, all 
speaking ^English, In Canada, although there is a Freach- 
Bpeaking province, the loyalty to the Empire of the Frenclifl 
Ganadians is as undoubted and as proved as that of the^ 
IVench-spe&king folk of Guernsey and Jersey and the nsx 
of the group of idands in the Gulf Stream. In South 
Africa the disaffection of a considerable section of the 
Putch-spe&king people has scajrod deep traces in the history 
of the past ceDtnjy, joid, while I write, b being proclaimed 
by the tbnnder of cannon on Bridah soil. 

Under snch conditions it is not too much to sey that the 
experiment of " responsible government " waa aomewhot 
rash. 

The next form of authority we find is that of *' the High 
Commissioner for South Africa and Protector of Native 
Tribea," Commander-in-Chief of Her Miiyeaty^s Foreea, and 
Vioe-Adminl of the C^pe of Good Hope. TLeie appears to 
be no precise deftnitlon of his powers, and no military foice 
at his immediate [disposal to ^orce them, whatever they 



THE IMPERIAL HOLD ON SOUTH AFRICA H7 



are. The High Commissioner eommimicatea by despatch 
vitb the Colonial Secretary iu London, but — apart from a 
fludden etuergency, which haa only once occurred, when in 
1857 Sir George Grey despatched to quell the Indiaa 
Mutiny Imperial troops ordered elsewhere — he can only 
await iustniclioaa. As CommandBr-ia-Chief he has under 
his orders only such portions of the Imperial troops as 
happen to be iu Cape Colony — unti] the present war only 
a few thousand men. The Cotouial troops are under the 
control of "responsible" Ministers. He has no authority 
over even the Imperial troops in the Colony of Natal, where 
the local Grovernor ia Comniander-in-CIiief. 

In tlie Native Reserves of Casutolaad and Bechuanaland 
the Hi^h Commissioner holds the legislative power, his 
proclamations tteing law. The Resident of Basutoland and 
other officials represent liis authority. From these territories 
white immigration is excluded. 

Lastly, we come to Ehodesla. Here all the functions of 
State are partitioned. Originally, at the first occupation in 
181*0, all le^nalative and adminiatrative power was vested 
in the British South Ai'rica Compauy, Since the Jameson 
Raid the remainder of administrative power is still in the 
Company's hands, but the administration of justice and 
the control of the Mounted Police, the armed force, ia in the 
hands of the Imperial authority, reproaented by a Deputy 
High Commissioner. Bec^ntly the legislative authority ifl 
Bhared with a newly-created Legislative Council. 

Tliis survey shows that it would surpass the wit of man 
to devise a more confusing maze of conaicting, overlappingj 
and clashing authority. And this hi face of the fact that 
the whole white population from the Zambesi to Table 
Mountain, British and Dutch, are one community^ inextric- 
ably interwoven by family and business relationships, and 
that the geographical conformation of the country makes the 
whole population, Dutch and British, dependent, up to the 
present, for their trade, import and export, on a few har- 
bours, all, with one exception, in British hands. 

To save trouble to the Home Government, an absurd 



3+8 



THE SETTLEM£MT AFTER THE WAR 



attempt b&a been made to constitute and deal with these ' 
territories, as if they were different countries ; hence not so ' 
much needless multiplicatiaa of authorities — for varktioo 
of local authority to meet local needs can only be usefol- 
but tlie absence of any general scheme of government 1 
applying to the whole of South Africa, or indeed of any] 
reasoned scheme at all. If it wished to be consistent in its i 
inconaifttency, why did not the Imperial Government ePBCfrJ 
chains of fortresses all along the borders of these vario 
British territories, so as to imitate as closely as possible the 
particidariat Germany of opera bouff'e ? 

Prom the point of view of Imperial welfare the fatal omift-^ 
aion has been to provide a means and method of co-ordination. 
Imperial Soutli Africa baa been condemned to ataxia, ■ 

Both in war and in pence Llie hands of the Imperial 
representative are tied. If, as ws have seen, war be 
threatened, the High Commisaioner is liable to be impeded 
at every turn by the self-guverning power of Cape Colony, 
of which he is Governor, in which he resides, and tbrotigh 
whose Ministers responsible to a local parliament be must 
act. To Tiae the Colonial forces, he must secure their 
consent, consent which, one is told in South Africa^ cannot , 
always be safely reckoned on. If Imperial troops use the m 
Colonial railways he may read of supporters in Parliament, ■ 
of the Ministry in power, murmuriug at " Our Colonial 
railways " being made use of by Imperial troops going to 
kill " our kinsmen/* Of course he can dismiss the Ministry, 
and plunge a country at waj- into a general election, as Sir 
Bartl© Frere was intrepid enough to do, although that was 
only war with natives, not with Dutch, and be proclaimed a 
" prancing pro-Consul " by an eloquent Prime Minister in 
England. 

In peace, equally serious difficultiea may arise. The 
Protector of Natives may deem it expedient and just to 
institute measures, within the self-governing Colony as well 
as beyond its borders, which may not harmonise with the 
beliefs or prejudices which regard "Zwart Schepsel' 
bdngs without rights. 



i» 



ITHE IMPERIAL HOLD ON SOUTH AFRICA 349 



I 

I 

I 



I 



I 



In a word, co-ordination of the action of all South 
African States, when the safety of tlie whole Erapire is 
concernedf umat be provided for. Unlesa the necessity 
fihould become urgent, on account of developments which 
have not yet happened, it will not be necessary to suspend 
the experiuietit of self-government, already in operation in _ 
two of the Colonies. It will be quite sutiicient to introduce 
certain modifications of the powers of the self-governmg 
jlonies, which will give the Imperial representative in 
South Africa a free hand^ in everything aftecting Imperial 
welfare. The problem is too complex, the Issues are too 
dangerous to be left altogether in local hands. The 
commumty, torn by racial Dutch and British diascnaions, 
confronted everj'where by an overwhelming majority of 
Kaffir tribes; distracted by an anti-Brilish, propagandftj 
striving to expel the Imperial power; the centre^ too> of 
opefations of world finance, turning round the vaat Suuth 
African product of gold and diamonds, which, for the safety 
of the Empim, must not be alluwed to come completely 
under the control of cosmopolitan capitalists ; a community 
such as this la not one in which the welfare of the Empire 
can be with safety entrusted to local hands without Imperial 
guidance. A commuuity, too, the protection of wliose coasts 
the integrity of whose territory has lately been effected, once 
again^ at the expenditure of tens of millions of Imperial 
treasure, and thousands of lives of Imperial soldiers. 

To establish firmly the Imperial hold on South Africa, a 
complete re-organisation is therefore neceasarj' of the office of 
High Commissioner, and such minor modifications of the 
local constitutions aa may be required. Following the course 
marked out by our Indian experience the High Commissioner 
should become Governor-General of South Afiica, with all 
powers needful folTlEhe protecfionr"of the integrity of the 
Empire, and the safety of South Africa as a whole ; and for 
the discharge of duties incumbent on the Imperial Power 
towards the other great divisiona of the Empire, which may 
not be delegated to local authority. The authority of the 
Governor-Genei-al should spring dii*ectly from the Imperial 



25° 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



ll 





Parliament, delegating to him power to annuJ acta o£ the 
Vrovineial admiaiatmtioiis. In India the Govemor-Geiwnl 
in Council is charged " with the superinteBdence, direction 
and contrtil of the whole civil and militajy government" 

A Crmncil, as la India, would be clearly neceasary. la 
India, however, the appointment rests with the Gtowh, ia 
South Africa, the precedent need not be so closely foUowaL 
Seeing that, unlike in India, there is a considerable Europeaa 
population endowed with self-guvernment, a preferahle 
method of appointing a certain proportion of memben of 
the Council might well be from lists of alternative namea, 
submitted by the local Ad mm ist rations ; the nomination lo 
be by the Governor for tlie time being. In this way tlie 
Governor- Gene ml would be kept in touch with local viewi 
and experience ; and at the same time the selection of the 
names of candidates would be luss likaly to degeneiute into 
a party contest ; while thu power of selecting from dilferent 
namea submitted would facilitat6 the presence of members 
more likely to work in hannony with the particular Imperial 
representative in office. The remainder of the members of 
the Council coiJd be appointed by direct nomination by the 
Governor-General from leading rosidentg in South Africa, 
whether in or out of Parliament, The Commander-in-Chief 
of the Imperial troops in South Africa should be a member of 
the Council to advise oQ military affairs. 

-^ As in India the Council should be an adN-iaory body, 
having no right to direct by their vote the action, legistatdve 

I or administrative, of the Govemor-General^ bnt they flhonld 
have the right of being consulted ; and if the Governor- 
General decided to disregard the advice of the majority, it 
should be his duty to place his reaaona on record. The 

-T Council should have the right of placing their opinioua on 

record when they differed from those of the Governor, and of 

having their dissenting minutes forwarded to the Imperial 

I Government. 

, The legislative powers of the Governor- General in 

' Council should be defined. It would be found on Investiga- 
Hon that they need not be unduly restrictive of local adf- 



I 



I 




THE IMPERIAL HOLD ON SOUTH AFRICA 251 



govemmenl. Nor would they be likely to be ptit to very 
extensive use, or even to lead to any material conflict with ^ 
local legislation. The presence of these powers would 
iuevitahjj tend to prevent local tegislaturtjia or admiiiistni- 
tions from taking any steps inimicaj to the interests df 
olEer proviTicea in South Africa, or of South Africa as a 
whole^ or to the Imperial welfare. A general power of veto ' 
over local legislation or siots of administration in any of 
the three cases juat enumerated^ would probably be found 
sufficient, in conjunction with the power to legislate by 
ordinance— an extension of the present power of the High 
Commissioner to legislate by proclamation — with regard to 
military steps necessary for the safety of the Empire, the 
internal order of South Africa, the repression of rebellion, 
or of native risinga ; with regard to the native policy to 
be adopted by the Governor-General in his capacity of 
" Protector of Natives " ; and with regard to matters affect- 
ing other Colonies or divisions of the Empire^ such as the 
immigration of Indians. 

A apecial Imperial force levied and equipped in South 
Africa — for which the present irregular corps would form 
an admirable nucleus — should, in addition to the ordinary 
Imperial troopSj he under the direct command of the High 
Commissioner, to be despatched to any district of all South 
Africa. 

In India, general control and supervision of finance ia 
Tested in the Grovcmor-General in Council. In South Africa 
this power seems hardly required. Exception might be ' 
made, however, as regards a contribution to the military 
expenditure and to the navy expenditure of the Empire. A 
power to legislate by ordinance, as to the maintenance, by 
contributions from all the provinces of the whole organisa- 
tion of the Governor-General's staff, of the Legislative Council, 
and of the special Imperial force, would be plainly desirable ; 
the expense could be most conveniently assessed on the 
Customs duties. It would be highly inexpedient to leave 
the voting of such contributions to local authority. Further 
control over finance would hardly be necessary, as, in the 



253 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



only eveatuality that might seem to require it — a tariff wai 
between two &r more provincea — the interposition of the ve-t-o 
of the Governor-General would prove a fluffideut protdction 
to general South African interests. 

One wordj in addition, as to the alight curtailment of the 
local authority of the sylf-goveming colonies. It has been 
shown that it need not be considerable, urgently though it 
he required ; it has been shown that the view« of each pro- 
vince would be sure of representation at the Council of the 
GuverDor-Geuenih The justice, however, of the Empire's m 
claim, and tJiat the claim is not a matter of favour, is cle-ar fl 
when are considered the enormous loss and coat to the 
Empire of the present war^lhe direct result of the aheence 
of a central authority to adequately repreaent the Imperial 
power in South Africa. And, again, when we oonaitler that 
aU the colonies and provinces rest immediately on tlie sea 
power for the protection of the coast, and immediately, too, 
on the Imperial troops, for defence against domestic rebellions 
and Kaffir attack. ™ 

These arguments, however, are hardly necessary. Tho 
loyalty of the loyal colonists of Natal and the Cape, which 
has stood the stress of battle. Trill not exaggerate the minor 
surrender of local privileges which the present war has 
shown the Empire to require. No such surrender of power 
and privilege is expected or is requisite as that which took 
place in India, when, after the Mutiny of 1857, the authority 
of the great company waa transferred to the Imperial Crown. 




CHAPTER XXVIL 



POLICY OF THE GENEBAL GOVERNMENT OF SOOTH ATRtCA. 

The policy of the general Government of South Africa, 
carried out by its own immediate agency^ or imtnedUtely 
through the local Government of the Provinces, should be 
initiated on clearly fixed principles, to ensure permanence in 
results and stability in purpose, although individuals may 
change. The melancholy record of South African history 
shows how the absence of any fixed scheme of Government, 
of any tenable or permanent ideal of policy, together with 
the absence of any real freedom of initiative or other than a 
merely precarious tenure of oifice in Imperial representation, 
have coloured the whole life and development of the 
composite people of European descent. 

Vigour, initiative, security of power in the Imperial 
representative, having been rendered possible by the changes 
just now indicated, part of that necesaary reorganisation 
must bo the adoption as a fixed rule by the Colonial Office — 
the rule of the Council of the Secretary of State for India — 
to interefere as little as possible with the Governor- General 
in Council of South Africa, 

The principles to be set steadily in view by the new 
general Government should be those which the mistakes of 
the past and the dangers of the present and future equally 
point out. 

First must be a consistent repudiation of that unhappy 
ideal of tfibal exclusiven ess— that fatal heritage of isolation 
in the wilds — which has been the chief cause of the present 
war. The solidarity of the European race in South Africa 



i$4 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



must Qeyer be lost sight of, with its principles of jostue^ 
equality and liberty, sad though it may be, that lb 
recognitioii of such an elemeDtei? truth ^ould hare to be 
enforced by the sword m the twentieth centaiy. Eqtnl 
righta for civilised men in South Africa, eqtud w&tccmie fix 
all» British or Dutch, CaoadiHiis, Austiftlians or Amenottti^ 
coming to South A&ica to make it their home. To promirts 
the growth of a new South African nationality. erobrnciBg 
all of European descout, and in active loyalty to the Emjore 
of which it is a constituent pait, must be the highest goal of 
Imperial statesmanship, while in any way consislent with 
the higher duty of preserving the inte^ty of tht* Empire, 
every consideration should be given to the sentiroeat of those 
citizens who are descendants ficom the earlier Colonists ; and 
care should be taken to show that the supremacy of the 
Kmpire does not mean the eatabliahing of a racial olin:ar€hy 
of any section of its citizens. 

Another principle which past dissensions and present 
eiperieuce equally warn ue ia necessary, is that recognition 
shonid constantly be accorded to the truth, that not equality, 
social or political, but tutelage is the position which justice 
accords to the uncivilised natives of South Africa. 

The principle should bo recognised that, while the rega- 
tion of immigration from India and our other possessions is 
a matter of Imperial concern, thei-e is a prior and superior 
claim of the Europeans— who in tropical lands can only 
exist as exotica^to irami<,TatG and occupy temperate landsi 
such as South Africa, and that this right exists apart 
the consideration that not Oiientals, but Europeans, 
colonised and ciyilised this land. 

The measures iieceBsary to be taken by the General 
Government for the establishing of secure prosperity for all 
inhabitants group themselves imder various divisions. In 
some, the measures can only be taken — consistently with 
safety and efficiency — by tlie General Government. lu 
others, while by instituting inquiry and affording guidance, 
the General Government may greatly ctrntribnta to the 
successful action of the subordinate governments, the actual 




POLICY OF THE GENET 



CL" GOVERNMENT 255 



carrying out of the measures may be left to local adminia- 

trlTltiOZl. 

First, among the tneasurea which can be efficiently 
cajiied out by the General Government alone, muat be 
counted the placing of the whole European community in 
South Africa on a sound inilitaTy basis. The foiTnation of a 
force of military police for the whole dominion is one of the 
first necessities of the hour. Fortunately* m the war shows, 
there ia no lack of matenal. 

A sound economic basis is also essential, and some of 
the necessary meaaurea Gould only, from their vastness, be 
adequately undertaken by the General Government. A 
well organised scheme of irrigation works, carried out by the 
State would change the whole face of the country. In view 
of its also changing the political complexion of large districts, 
by inducing greater British immigration of colonists, coming 
»s agriculturi.'^ta and not as cattle- I'an chars, it is obviously 
B matter for the General Goveramenfc.* 

Land tenure is a matter with which, in view of the 
enormous tracts which are still Crown lands, the General 
tioveTnnsent should deal on a wide basis and with fixed 
principles. A Commission to investigate and report on the 
H'ew Zealand, Australian, and United States systems of 
opening up new lands would afford useful guidance^ as 
the problems there ai'e somewhat similar. The growth of 
the class styled "Bijwoners" (tenants-at-will on another's 
farm) deserves speedy attention, as the class is rnpldly 
developing into the moat dangerous element in any society 
frith a subject native race— the " Poor Whites." With their 
recent military occupation taken from them, they will become 
an even greater menace. Their origin seems largely to have 
arisen from the absence of enactments, like the United States 
Homestead Exemption Acts, to prevent farmers being quite 
expropriated for debt ; and partly from the subdivision of 
inheritances. 

* One is Msureii ob all Bides (hat a steady oppoBition to nny measurcH 
tendiuc W favour British immigration Ljir been purfiued for years by 
hoM dfifiirouB of makiiig South Africa all Dutch. 



i$6 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



la other ways the General Goveramenb might deal 
the question of improTed land tenure. To abolish the 
of " bye-dwellers," experiment might be made with 
oommuQal tenure — from which expropriation is impoaabb- 
instead of allotmests. The prosperity of the Mir 
be due to this characteristic rather than to the quality of 
Eusaian villagers.* 

To prevent the gi-owth of a destitute class in the cii 
and a furtlier addition bo the political danger of "poor 
Whites," the United States Acts — such as those of Petm- 
sylvania, restricting legal process against poor debton- 
should he adopted ; and similar protection should be giva 
to workmen's earnings. 

The General Government should regard the exp]oitati':in 
of minerals as primarily a fund for State purposes— the ooo- 
Btruction of State works, roads, railways, bridges, irrigatioi, 
harbours, schoola ; and not for the creation of miUioniirea 
The British legislation of the Klondyke Gold Fieldg seems 19 
present a useful model for legislation. 

The construction of means for comraumcation ihroo^ 
the length and breadth of South Africa is eminently a matter 
of Imperial concern, and should be in the hands of the 
general Government, from its political importance, quite as 
much aa its relation to aj,^ricuHural and trade. In tbe 
Lenitory of the late Republics there are practically no roadi 
or bridges^ except in the suburbs of a few towns. Xew 
railways should belong to the general Government instead 
of local adminislrations. 

Inriiislrial education is also required as part of the 
means for furtbcrinp the economical development of the 
country. 

Education of the onKnary type, and the difFnsion 
information, are also matters of Imperial and politii 
coDceTU, It would have been impossible for any propaganda 



the 



♦ It is not improbftble thnt ont^ for th.e action of a rMhly-einprL 
niiBntiiiji British Governor, Sir John Cradocfc^ in 1812, noatly all tlie land 
lo 84>iirh AfncA would have cuDtiuuod to belong to the State, &s luidecj 
Butch-KBBb loditt Company rule. 



POLICY OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT 257 

to have created such widespread distrust of Imperial policy 
and of British people if there were not a seed-plot of 
ignorance for tares of calumny to grow. Not, indeed, that 
wondei^ can be worked even by years of education, but it 
would help other agencies for dispelling race-hatred- 
Legal administration would also be an appropriate subject 
for the concern of the general government The eBtabliahing 
of a general Court of Appeal for South Africa, and the 
making uEiiform the conditions of admission to the practice 
of the law, are matters of great moment to the whole 
community. The necessary appeal to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council will be a new link binding South Africa 
to the Empire. 

This enumeration of meaaores which, in pursuance of fixed 
general principles of administration, would naturally fall to 
be dealt with, by way of enquiry or eiecution^ by the general 
Government, 13 not meant to bo exhaustive. It is only 
intended to show that many matters which, at first aight^ 
might be looked upon as of merely local concern, are, in a 
vast undeveloped countryj beset with complex problems of 
Imperial moment. 



ajR 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 




CHAPTER X5VIII. 

IN THE COtTKTEKBALAKCE : TTDEAyT COHSdUUi 

In thu couQterbalaace to the griefe and losses of Uua faiM. 
war arc many things to chaer all those who. in the darkest 
hour, never dtjapaired of the Empire. That ottr people tf 
home, ui tho Utiited Kingdom, have Bhown their ancaant 
spirit, and shown that mammon -worship has tiot killed 
patriotismj as eo many had told uj$, is consolatiou indeed ; 
that all the people havt* become conscious of the mighty 
heritsigo of the Empire, charged with the lot of bearing 
justioti and happiness to so many hundred milliona of the 
humaT) race, is something to cheer the heart AIL men nosi 
can SBC that the march of the Empire is no lon^r the atep 
of the half-conscious giant, but follows clear purpose and 
steadfast resolve. The might of chaotic confusion, of crime, 
and misery, that fled from the aword of the Empire in India, 
is not U> return ; nor arc the fires of triumphaot barb&ri&m 
tliat made Africa a hell in an earthly paradise, to flame 
anew, with the hoped-for failing of the Imperial people to 
realise their destiny and their duty. 

The moving rally of our citizens from beyond the seaa— 
from snowland and aunland, from Canada, from Australia 
and New Zealand — has set a seal to the unity of the Empire 
such as no parchments of confederation could bring. The 
world knows now, and the Chancelleries of Europe kjoow, 
that the islands of the Northern Sea stand at the head of 
a world fedemtiou, iu war as in peace. Not least has been 
gained by the dawning, slow but clear, over the mind of the 
people of that land of sorrow and renown, which has seni j 



IN THE COUNTERBALANCE: VIDEANT CONSULES 159 



I victorioua commander to lead tke Empire's army of the Bun 
of their Imperial Juty, of thetr duty as co-heirs and joint 
nilerg of the Empire which their valour in arms and theii 
skill in administration have so greatly helped to create. 

In South Africa, too, there is something to encourage, 
however dark be the immediate outlook. The valour of the 
despised helot of the Transvaal, the loyalty of the loyal 
Dutch, the tenacity and stubborn courage of the Boer in tlie 
field, the thrice-tried fidelity of the British Colonial in arms, 
the historic intrepidity of the Imperial troops, bring hope of 
common rbspect, which must lead, in later days, to that 
fusion which ia the only way of salvation for the newer 
nationality now to grow up under the ahield of the Empire. 

For the Government of the Empire in South Africa there 
ia something to be counted, in the new-bom respect of the 
defeated foe — fliacarding the beliefs of a hundred years — for 
unlooked-for strength in arms and inflexibility of purpose. 
The hour came, and, all unexpectedly, the man. 

Yet much remains to be done^ that is worth the doing, 
and therein Ues a field for the highest statesmanship, for 
men who lift up their hearts. 

Videant Consider. Respect for Imperial strength and 
resolution is something; but much more is respect for 
justice, for liberty, for humanity ; for all of which, in truth, 
the Empire stands. 



(261 > 



APPENDICES. 



THE WAB AND ITS ISSUES: FROM YABIOUS 
STANDPOINTS. 



APPENDIX I. 



I 



PROM THE STANDPOINT OP THE LOYAL CITIZEN OF 
DUTCH DESCENT. 

The Yocrso Afhicastdee. 

The foHowing w b rei«rt of a speech, delivered on the 6th Juno, 1900, 
Bt a meeiing at the Pnarl, Cape Colony* of tho Guild of Loyal Wunmn 
of South Africs, by Mr, Advcxiaie WesBels, one of the leaders at tli^ bar 
of Pfetoria, who defended the Kefurm pritsoDere at the trial in Pretoria 
in 1896. 

8ir Pinter Fnur^ (lat« Miniflter for Agrieulture) iotfuducedi Mr. J. 
Weasels, him&elf an Africnuder, and well acquainted with Tramivaal 
affairs. 

Tbo Mayor alflo introduced Mr. Wesaels, paying a lugh tributei to that 
gentleman's post efTorte in the Traoavaal for South Africans welfare. 

Mr. WesBelfl said : — 

I liardly thought when as. a schoolboy I fipent my holidays in your 
beautiful town I would one day be aibed to addiewi you on the Bubj^wt of 
loyalty to the Crown. In those days tbere wan little. If any, race hatred. 
One never heard of those ^iHionariee who epeak of an independent South 
Africa free from aSI British control. Id thoBe days everytUiug wag peace 
and happineBa Without peace there could be no happinesit, and without 
bappinees life was not worth Imng in any country. If I should be 
somewhat aerioua this momtng, I feel sure the ladies will forgive me. 
The subject Ls such that it will not permit of any but serioua treatment. 
[ know that seriotunesK m a apeoker La by many regarded aa a great bore, 



263 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



bat the 8ub]«ot wiU not bear much lerity. Aa I undentand th6 QtOi. 
it wa« tlie intentioQ of those that fouaded it UuA whan the wooks tf 
South AM« ahouLd influence their diUiiren in mch « my that thai 
would (irmly undersUnd that It wu »a hoDour and advantage to fat t 
citisea of the British Empire (Applause.) When I ask you to oaoAh 
it an honour to helong to the British Empire, i would tiut for ono mooHl 
suggst that it is a difgrace to 1)« an Africander. On the csiabmrj, I 
woidd afik you tc be proud of the fact ttut joa are Africa-udwit, vaA on* 
to attempt to pose aa Knglifth women, for when we Africiuidera aUmpi 
this we only make' ourBelTOi ccintmiiptible. (Bear, faear.^ There an twi 
cardinal precepts that I would have you bear coDstaatly io toiu" niiada 
The first is that an Africander is every whit as good as an 
and the Rccubd m that an Engli^liiiiiEin le every whit aa good u u 
Africander. (Applause.) I am an Africnnder, and I am proud o( it I 
em ppotid of the fact that I have Dutcli^ Frcncli, and G«nnaD Wood bi 
my VBiuA. TbiK ia just the vary renBol} why I respect the Eaglishnua'i 
pride of birth. Wa hare every right to be n^ proud of our acDenton M 
the English have to be proud of theink. (flcar, bear.) There is^ howerer, 
one bad quality which haa become very prevalent amongst ua Africander, 
and that is the quality of coucoit. It ia especially notioeable in Ihe 
ridog' g^ueration of Africanders. J would not have you thiuk for eoo 
moment that the Engliihman ifl void of this vice, but I think that thv 
jouu<,' Africander is oggreaRive-ly conceited where he bos but littlo rcawo 
to be j«). The young Africnnder reminds me of the fable of tho frog that 
felt HO confideiit that it could rival the bull in size, that it blew itself oat 
until it burst. The young Africander etatee have tried to rival Great 
Britain aa a military power, and Like the old Greek^s ttcg they hare alw 
buraL (Lax^hter and nppUufto.) Tba young AfricfLnders in the 
TranBToal and Free State gradually came to believe that they knew 
everytbinj,' better anil could di> everything better than any Englishman. 
They thou^iht that because they, or rather their fathers, could hit a lottle 
at 200 yardfl there vi&a no lionit to their capacitiee, Straight shtwUug 
became to thorn the be-all and cud-atl vf virtue. (Laughter.) Educ^tjoa, 
culture, industry, eumm^rce and skill in good g:ovemln4&t Were as nothing 
compared with skiO in hitting the bottle. (Benewed Inugiiter.) T9 
suggfiBt tc the youDg Africander that he was not omniscient and omtu]iu-j 
tent was to be a traitor to one'e race. To tell the Kruger oligarchy 
Pretoria that it wag quito Jmpoasibla to prevent the active and inteUigvot 
Tnajority of the community fro]n obLiining a voico in the future gowrn- 
Uient of the State, wab enough to be Jeered at and calli^ a foci The/^ 
were strong enough to control thatjand "om die Engelecbe uil di* lauifl 
te schiet.*' To tell them that it wtm quite impossible for them to with- 
stand the might of the Empire if Ehej provok^ the Britiab ao as to o&m 
to blowB^ was Bufficieut to show yourself a ooward. To oriticiae thO 






APPENDIX I. 



rf3 



A/ricaDdef And cihow him that his inflated ideoE were foolish wm a DAtural 
offence. Vet tbat Bame claaa of Africacder would listen with mpturoua 
delight if Mr. Emeat Hargrove paiatcd hia own people as blood-thirety 
tyraDrd. To hear an ElDglijhRum deny hie countrymen and say tlmt the 
Empire was going to ruin becauae it would not listen to the Bond, met 
with violent applauso; hut for an Africander, one of thflmBelTeB, to point 
Qut their folly and to caukioa tbeia that if they persisted in their foolish 
course, ruin would stare them in the face, was a »m that m^rit^ the 
contempt of every AMcander. This cooceil had brought ruin to mimy a 
TraiLsraa], Free State and Colonial home. I beg aud pray cf you to teach 
joiir children to be proud of their race and teach them that they Eire quite 
aa good as others, but do not teach them that they are better. Conceit is 
bom of ignorance, and ignorance id the beat and surest guide to utter 
perdition. Widen the TsugCL of your children's knowledge and ttiach tha 
young Africanders to took beyond the Liiapupo to the broad world, where 
Auglo-Saxontt, Germans Frenchmen and Russians are ia constant rivalry 
to civiliBe nianbind- When he begins to realuo what goca an in tha wide 
world he will feci proud that he ib a British flubjoct^— a subject of perhapH 
th« greatent Eui])ire the world has ever seen. (Hear, htjar.) He will hcq 
that, go where he will, bo may meet with the aoowl of jealouay, the glare 
of hatred, but never witli the abrug of oc»ntempt., (Loud applauae.) Why 
ia that ? The iiumplole answer ta lutereatiMg but t^xtrciuely complex. 
ThU great fact he will, however, qiuckJy notice. Millions of Britleh 
Bubjects are ruled tn divers parta of the world with an army which com- 
pared with those of €Ton the smaller Euro]>caD States ia inBignificant. If 
he be wise hb will ask himaelf how ia this hugt; Empirt) able to maint&iii 
it«elf with Bu amall an army? How i» it tbat over tbeso large and 
pupulous tracts of country the Empire requires &o Hinall an anuy to 
ni^ntain the Fax Britannica ? In Gennany and the other great States of 
Europe there are miUiona of Boldiers to maintain the socia] order, and 
ccoBequentlj militariHm is rampant. In the British lales and wherever 
Uiere ia British rule the t^ocial order ia matutaln&l by ao almost insi^ifi- 
cant aLTiuy. The BriUah Empire ia thus not rulod by force, but by Hume- 
ihimgelae. What Is that wimcthing else? There can be no doubt that 
this »mething else is the BritJHh love of fraedom. (Applause.) Where- 
over the British flag floated there we find equality and tolerance. (Hear, 
bear.) No part of tlie Empire feels the goad of tyranny ; there ia therefore 
DO mdiicement to break away ; hence no large army is required to compel 
obedience and maiutaio the integrity of the Empire- On the contrary, ao 
jealous lit each StaUj of the national honour, aod .so koen to g«cure tus 
safety and integrity of ihe Empire, that directly one member ia rhrisaLen d 
weeeothe whole world in commotion, and we aee citizens rualdo^ to ita 
aid from the icy regions of Canada to the Bunny plains of Australia. The 
British Empire differs from the Empires of old and froui thoae of tiwiay 



364 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



In that it has been buiJt up not so much by cooquest u by a peaceful, 
itiduBtriaJ and commercial fiipan^on. No Akxander, do Cffisar, no 
Nap^wn fouuded the British Empire. France, Spain, and HoUa&d 
poHMsed Dot veiy loog ago £n)pire« nearl7 an great, ir oot a£ great, u 
tbe present British Empire. Where are lb«ir Empires dOw ? H*:jw *•* 
it that Great Britam had maintained her Empire wbU«t the other batioBS 
had luat dearly all their viut extra-Europeao poaannoiiB. The chkf 
reaBOD is bec&u^A the British Emjjife had oever been exploited for Ha 
benefit of a certaiD dwu or clique in Great Britain, but fgr the benefit of 
all. If tCKday the Dobleet and wealthiest peer of the realm were to land 
in Table Bay, (torn the luoment be set foot on Colonial soil be had do 
greater ngbt» in thin Colouy tbau you or I. (Applause.) Each state or 
colosj of the British Empire ruled itdelf, and waa master of its ovn 
dwtimea within its ovm ephere. A CaoadisQ hod do right to interfere in 
the affairs of Australia; au AuHtralian luui notbing to say is the Cape 
Colony, and the Cape Colonist had the right to control the affairs c^ tha ■ 
Cape ColoQy. Beyond the borders of the Cape Colony he bad no right of I 
coDtroUloe the policy of the whole Empire. (Hear, hear.) Within tba j 
limits of this Colotiy the voice of the majority in tha L^alaiure ia the ' 
Toice of the people for the time beiiLg. The Bond, for instauce, ia at 
preaent the ruling party in this Colony, Unfortunately, the Bond it not 
Batialied with having supreme power in this Colony, it deurei to rule tbe 
whole of Suuth A^ica. Such is ita concMt and ambition, tiiat it deama 
this insulBci&Dt aiid awks to rule not only South Africa, but the wbole 
Empire. It ia to my ULiod a ouriouB phenomsaon to hear tbe Bund 
shoutiDg that the whole British Emjue is going to ruin because EngUsb- 
men, Scotchmen, Irisbiuen, Canadiana, Indiana, AustralifLDs and the larger 
part of South Africa do uob agree with their wild halLuci nations. (Hear, 
hear.) Excuse this digression. I tbiiik you wiU agtw with me that the 
British Empire ie sui generis, that it does not hsug together by fOTt4^ thM 
its watchword is Political Equality, Freedom of thought and Freedom of 
speech, and that under its wide shield eT^ry man is the master of bii 
own deatiny. 

There is one other important fact. It is a fact very often overlooked 
but it is, neverthdleas, to my mind^ very importMit. The British Empin 
is composed of men of all nationalities. It is a Cosmopolitan Rmian. 
Ueu of Frenub, Dutch, English, Scotch, Iriab, and Asiatic descent are afl 
en^braced within its wide folds. Being, therefore, an agglomerate of 
nations and races there is do reason for any one to feel that his natjooal 
pride is Ijeing trampled on. Everyone's language is respected and no qua 
is interfered with in Mb reli^un, wbilbt every member haa a voice in 
public affairs. (Applause.) Take Germany, Bussia or any large Bum* 
pean power, and what do we find? The Germans had conquered tad 
partitiDned Polaud, they had annexed Scbleswig'Holstein, and wrested 



APPENDIX L 



s65 



from France Al«ac« and Lorimne. In all these conquered lerritotios the 
inliftbitaDta were coin|.)e]!led by order of the Kaiaer to thmk aad «peak in 
Qenaan. You could not erea dare to Bell on the marlcet a pound of 
butter in the Daniab language, German alooe la the language of the 
Parliament, the public o£Qcgb, and the BchooU. 

Moat people w&tited aome ma.t«rial advaq1«ge for their loyaltj. The 
aubjecta of the Britifih Empire have the advantage of a ready protfictltm 
wheresoever they might be. No region ■was so remote tbftt the ami of 
the Empire could not reach it^ Great Britain has &o great a navy that 
fthe cau always see that law and order is maintained and that no foreign 
zmtion dare trample od the nghta of her vubjecta. On* Land has thia 
mormng come out boldly with its policy. It want* the complete iude- 
pendeace of ^uth Africa. Th6 Eritieh flag shall no longer protect its 
eborea. or at the moBt it may obtain tha vuluntary concession of a right to 
protect. But do these people realize what the poRitioa ol" the Cape would 
be if it were not a portion of the British Empire? Do they know that it 
would be exposed to (be first naval power that came along, and that it ia 
not imposeible to couceive that the shrieking members of the Bond might 
beexime the aubjectti of aome AeiAtic sea power Like Japan. (Laughter 
and applauEe,) It wait tbert;foi:e not only an honour, it waa ud advantage 
to be a member of the British Empire, Can you uDderBtand huw anycjoe 
could wish to Gxchauge hia right of British citii^enfihip for the privilege of 
being ruled over by Preaidant Knigar and his family ? AdvisLMlly I add 
hia family, for cmyone intimate with political life in tb« Trati£<vaai would 
know tbat the family of Paul Kruger had a greater ioQuence there than 
the grandaons of the Queen have in the territoiies of tb& British Empire. 
To many there is a fascination in the word " Republic." They think you 
have but to baptiae any form of government with the name ^' Repubhc,'* 
and then Freedom immediately setB her throne there. Unwise men ! K 
they will make themselves acquainted with the history of Veuic* and the 
Italian Republics they will soon tind that the word " republic " does not 
always apcii freedom. If by republic we mean political equality, freedom 
of thought^ and freedom of language and religion, then the Britkh Eiuplro 
ia verily the greatest Republic in the world, and ita Sovereign it* 
[ferm&neut president. (Applaujie.) But, ladies, if by RepubUc we mean 
a narrow and selBsh oligarchy, then heaven defend us from Republics. 

J do not wish to vex you with proHcnt-4&y politics, but one cannot help 
referring, though cursorily, to the controvurBial jwiiUca of the day. Had 
it not been for the conceit of the young Transvaaler and the young Free 
Stater— their ignorancet bliudoeas, and obatinacy — we should cot have 
seen South Africa bathed in blood, and we ihould not have aeeu two 
RepuhUcs eeaae to exitnt. You have heard how the members of the Bond 
Congreflfl at Graaff-Reinet regret the war, I do aot believe that they 
can regret the war more thau I do. 1 did all in my ixiwer tg persuade 



366 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the oligarchy at Fntom to o«ue to be a family party and to allaw tht 

UiLl&Dder, who contributed bo much to the State and whom they had Id 
thuik for Lhetr welfare, to ha>ve som6 voioe in the gorcniiaeDt of t^ 
H«puhlic, Ao that the Transvaal might ceaBe to be an oligarchy tnd 
become a Kepuhlic in deed as weU a< in word. I h«ggod tbem to girt 
th>e Ditlander an hoDefit and Batisfaclor; fire-jear fnnchiae^ and ao to 
aatiit^r tho Uitlander'fl sense of justice. What was their reply? Tb«; 
calM lue a traitor to my race— a man whom hiD relations would not owil 
Tbaiik Oot), tlus part of their prediction bat Dot hnea fultUled. I uied to 
penuade them that war with Great Britain was suicidal, aad th»t wba 
ibe first shot «B« fired the indopendence of both Republica wvuJd bo jgopa. 
The Votkut^m^ tlie GoTenuuent organ, told me that I was a fool, utd 
that t knew nothing of the might of these young liepublics. It was not 
only the Boat of the 'back country that thought the Africander mrinclWa 
A moflt intelligent man, a friend of mine, wrote to me from ttie Boer canp 
that they were suro' of victory* and that many of them had vowed not to 
wa&h until tliey reached the Indian Ocean. Nay, he would eveu viidt me 
in Capo Town. The worst feature of A.lt thifl is that they really bdievad 
that thtir hopes would be ruJlilled, Shortly before I left tbere wai a 
feeling rampant in youQg TranBTaal that they wouM sweep the Briti^ 
into the Ha and compel the ofEciaU at Cape Town to &peak Cape Dutch. 
Every young Africander was pcUshlng bis Bfauser and openly boaatfaig 
" dat hij gaat Enge^he achi^t ." Ho thought that aa he could ehoot 
straight — thuu!?h many cannot oven do this — he would aoon be In 0^ 
Town. (Laughter.) Waa not the god of the TnmsvaaJ greater than tlw 
god of the British Emjiire ? I have &onne relalii;'B« and many fricDJi 
fighting on the aide o( the Transvaal, I am sorry that their conceit asd 
ignorance led them to take iip arms, hut I feel that they were nuibd 
by Knigor and that arch-^hend Leyde. (Qear^ bear.) After the Tictoiy ai 
Amajuba (he young TranBTaaler came to regard himBelf a for better mao 
than an Knglifthman. The Hollander Liejda pemuaded them that throngb 
hi» skill and clevcrneDB aa a diplomat the Trauevaal had become the moat 
important spot on the face of the globe. The Germao. and French oas' 
i^MdonarieB were never weary of imprcsdug upon the membera of the 
Raad that England was an effete Power, and that they loved tbe Trans- 
vaal with more than brotherly love. All Europe would niah to the 
aasiBtance of the young Bepubltc directly it resolved to tbmw off the 
British yoke. They smiled ab the unfurtunate Boer and said, " aap wal ii 
jy esn mcoia jongeu.*^ And yet when the war came what do "wq km 
The German Emperor hastens to congratulate the Queen and tell her thatl 
bis heart was always with the British Army. (Apidause.) The paopto 
who in their conceit and ignorance thought they could shake the found*- 
taons of the British Empire, make it totter and fall, only suoomd to 
overthrowing the independence of two Repablica. The Bond re^ta ^ 



^1 



Yarn of the Republics^ mdepecdeuc>B. I, who IWed m tho TransTaaJ and 
knew it well, regret that loss far mora than they. I k&ow wh&t happy, 
coRlemedf and prosperoua countries those two Republics eouid iiave been 
pudd uoder « Oovernment with wiJe vii:wH imbued with a, true feeliiig 
for frvedom; usder a Qoveriiment tbat did noi intrigue agaiDOt British 
iiitenvts with Germanf, Fi&nce, and UollAndt under a Govemmeiit that 
honestly endenvotired to axrry out the obligationji of the Coarentiou, and 
that did not try at every turn to clrcumTant Britieb htatE>ameQ; under & 
Qovenunent that sought the friendship and did not do eTorything in its 
pDW6f to fouse the enntity of the Britii^h oatioD. Qh, what a country it 
might have bti«n under a Preaident like the lat« John Brand ! Had the 
Tnwsvaal rccogni!ied the fact that an Africander is as. good as on Enghsh* 
man, but no better, then the Utter race hatred would have diBappcared, 
and tbe Bepublics would still haTehad their indepeudence. This wretched 
idea that the Transraat was a Sret class Fowor because they shot eirught 
at Amnjuba had spread even to the Capo Colooy. Did not a member of 
jouT Parliament consider that 50,000 Britiflh Eoldiers were but a breakfast 
lor the yoUDg giant. And because this filing spread Caiie ColoDlBts were 
aku anxiuua to take [lart in the ontilaught againBt the totterin.; Empire, 
I Nliw, laiiies, though 1 regret the ignorance, blindness, aad tihatinacy that 
I led the TrariBvoaler and Free Stater to dtselare war on Great Britain, I can 
I understand aud appreciate hi» aspiration to acquire for hJa country by bla 
^^^«wii right hand complete and full independence. I feel profoundly the 
^^KDiMry that has been caua«d alike to South African and Biiglieh mi^theie. 
^^Tet when I think of the battles that have been fought, though 1 feel 
bitterly soiry that ever a sbot wa« fired, 1 feel proud that my countrymen 
an DO cowardfi. (Applauae.) Aa I r^jwct the ^DgtlRhman, so wotdd 1 
that th« Eoglishnian should respect the Africander. (Apptauae.) When, 
however, I come to think of tho rebels in tliie Colony,, I cannot under* 
eland how their loadetEi cuuU have been guilty of such wrong and of auoh 
foUy as to take up arinn against the rest of 9outh Africa. I ffie] indignant 
that (hede men could havti led their iniaguided brothers into such luinery. 
I feel uo vindictive u ess against the bulk of the rebelB* for they w«ro but 
the sheep that followed the goats. The viotorioua Transvaal wouid drive 
the Engliith to tbe sea, and they too would join in the procesBion. Though 
they were guilty of a foolish crizDQ, th'ey at any rate came out boldly Into 
tiie Open light of day, risked their lives and took the conaequonce«. But, 
ladies, when I oome to thiuk of that other crowd of Africanders, who 
akulk in tho twilight and whow cours^e is mere inaolence, men who, 
secure in person and in property, sit behind the BritiBh lines of defence, 
and from there urge on the poor Transvaolere, Free Stator^^ and iuaurgentd 
to ccntinue the struggle for their own porsoual benefit, then words fail me 
to exprew my loathing and contempt. (ApphkU£e.) Their newspapers 
axaggeratd British losses^ sneer at British anna, cast grave doubta a& 



26S 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



British flucceateA is order to buoy up the B«public*Q bppee ; they exigge- 
rate the spread of the fl&mds of rebetlion, and promiie moral support wiili 
an emptj word. But would these men mk their hvoa? No. (ApplAiUt) 
At the moBt they will Mod a few scaa across the bordeirs aod n*k tiie 
Uvea of I few childran. (to taatth juur childrCD to bewail tmd rwpect 
thoi^ Africaudere who fouj^ht and died for a hopeless cause, but to de^iM 
and coudeEMi those othera who, aecuTe under the aegii of Britiib 
protectioD^ urged od thtitr tniaguided bmthers to die in the last ditch, J 
(Applauae.) Why were theiie leaden so anxiouB to join the Re]jniblicaii| 
cauoe? BecauM they thought it would benefit them. If aU Soatil 
AfhcA were one Dutch Kepublic, think of all the available govenimtnt 
billctn. The gkmour of the wealth and power of the Fre>tona Qligarch;' 
had crushed out thetr better reaaoD. 

Much as 1 dieilike exteuhion of empire by conquost or annexation, I feet | 
that the matter has gone »o far thnt Grltiflli Betitinieat could not be ' 
ap]K!a.Hed by anything short of anqexation. MoftnVer, it Reema to TOA 
tltat the peace of South AfricA would be in co&stAnt danger if tbe 
ItepubUcB were allowed to carry on their former hostile exi«tenca The 
lloiid at Graatf-[!einet Aays if yuu do annex there wiU also be evil. Ij^i 
tlien, this evil must and will prevail whether there i» iinuesatiou or tio*' 
thuii Hurely the better policy i» t*> i'hooss timt evtl which caa ui*.wt eaailj' 
be held under coDtruI— And that itndoubt.edly meana anuexation. If Sir 
Alfred Milner should wUh ti> jui^lify hits pflicj, be nwd but point ta 
Uie rebel di»triela and thi: Uraaff'Kuioet Ccnj^ceas.. The. speecheii ihsn 
dehveri'd will furDiHh Lord 8idi«biiry witli ampU) proof of the dnngar wjlh 
which the RepublicH threateueil South Africa, The »pee>cLei of Iha 
roeioberH of Parliftinewt st that Coogr»*9 transcended thoB« of liwir 
humbler brotliera in idiocy, and offer tbe atrongeat powible pica for 
annexatiou. TheK people nay, if you annex the Republica, tbe wbcle vt 
South Africa will bate you ; but they forget to say that they w«re all 
atanding on the tip-toe of expectatiuu that the KepubUca wuuJd la 
succesbful, and then they would have shouted Hepublicanism as loudly u j 
they now shriek out their fear that atmexatiun spella ruin to the Empiro, 
They dispiay a solicitude for the Bafaty of the Empire one would nerer 1 
aavQ givQu th^ni credit for. (Ijiiighter.) Did these men waru ihtf 
U^pubtlcs after tlie moeinfoutein ConfereDce thai if they did not give the 
fire yeara' franchJue tlie Kepublics might wicrifice their indep^juilencs ? 1 
never heard of that voice of warning. It was the old alory of watching 
tlie proverbial cat jump. Uofurtunately the animal jumped on the wn^ug 
aide, and that ia the reason fur all this bluster and threat^ing ami 
gnashing of t«eth. 

Ladies, I will conclude by again aaking you to teach your chUdnm to 
be proud of their race, proud of their country, and proud iif the fact that 
they are memljent of the British Empire ; but I will alH> aak you to teach 



APPENDIX L 



369 



I 



your cliildreQ bo toathe and degpise those who sow the saods of seditioD, 
ihoim who fan the flames of race hatred and who, bo satiHfy their envy 
and TiDdlctireneK), their liatred aad ambitioDr would wish to mnke of this 
f«r country a Toritabto hell on earth. (Loud ap]>]auBO.) 

In an introduction to the foregoing apeoch, which has been repuhliflhed 
as a jiamphlet, Mr. WdM«k writes n>( foUoWv ; — 

The Africanders in South Africa may be roughly divided into three 
political cI»8»eH — 1, The AFricundorB <te«ceDded from English ancestonu 
Tbeae have a strong attachment to the Empire and no desire tu break 
away from it. 2. AfricanJera doncended from Dutch or Huguenot 
aaccstors, who, like the Etlt;li»h Africanders, are abxioua that Houill 
Africa should form part of the Empire. These may he shortly designated 
an loyal Dutth Africandurs. 3, AfricftnderB springing from Dutch and 
Huguenot forefathers, wlio are aniloua to eatabllah a United Simth Africa 
entirely free froni Britifih rule. Many jieople identify the Bond party 
with this c^aaa, though I think this too aweeping a fltatemeiit. Tb is 
difficult to form an accurate estimate of the esact number of haade under 
each claiws though I think tliatthe combination of the EDglleh Africander 
and the Dutch loysl Africander considerably exceeds the disloyal portion. 
The disloyal portiuu clearly show through their newRpapers that the 
liberty of the individual ia do concern of theirs, and most assuredly no 
plaak ia their platform. They hate with a bitter hatred everybody who 
is not of their way of thinking, and they would impose their rule upon 
their fellows, not by perBuaflion, hut by brute force. To them the Mannar 
IB a holy flymbol. They have no desire to see South Africa a country 
peopled by free men. Their aepirationii are to pull down the Britiflh fJag, 
to impose the Dutch language on all, and to estabJieh a reign of barbaric 
terror. They prate loudly of the liberty of the Press, hutj judging by the 
|ia*t, they would suppress every anti-revolutionary pa|Hjr. They deprecate 
forcfi, but rely for argument and conciliation on tho Mauser and the Krupp 
gun. They howl at the idea of British annexation, but would have freely 

»»mi6Xed without a qualm of conricience any British territory that they 
■were strong enough to hold. They wail over the bloodshed which they 
ihamnelveB have caiused^ but openly gloat over the number of British 
poldiers they have slaiiL and the number of South AfricAU homes they 
bave made desolate. They feed aud batten on race hatred. Tliolr 
Christian Charity does not extend beyond their own narrow clique. T&ey 
Abuse the liberty of English rule and make of that Liberty a hcence. We 
ue therefore face to face with this problem. Are we going to allow these 
people to prevail'/ Are we going to allow them, to cut ub adrift from the 
Empire and expoBe South Africa to the attack of ^me other Fower with 
which these people would readily conclude an aliiance if it were only to 
wreak their vengeance against the British ? 

If we are goicg to allow this then we may bid Freedom farowelL 



370 THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

When ona hears wnne <rf then peof^ talk ftboat thcdr f<»e£ithen, ooa 
would imagine that the EngUah took away their Freedtno. They forget 
that the rule of the Dutch East India Company was a tyranny of no msaa 
order and they forget that the Gape waa handed over to Greftt Britain by 
solemn treaty. 

It is high time, therefore, that Engliah Africanders and Loyal Dutch 
Afrioandere etand together and oppose in solid phalanx the onslaught 
of those of our countiTmen who long to eetaUish oTer us a rule of Red 
Terror. 

It was with the object of voicing Uie views ci those Dutch Africanden 
who fear the threatened tyranny tiiat I delivered the following address. 

J. W. WnsEU. 



(a?! ) 



APPENDIX IL 



I 



FBOM THE STANDPOINT OP AN INTERNATIONAL LAWYEE. 

The Rbconstitution of Sdots Araitu. 

The London Times publishes the foUowing letter of the 10^ MRrch, 
1900, from Profeasof Westlftke of the UniverBity of Cambridge and of the 
InstitntA of InteruatLonal Law. 

To the Editor. 

Sk, — The niition ft]j]jaare to be practically agreed that the torritorios of I 
the two Dutch Republics miif^t become a part of thti Brttish Dommlonn, 
iu)d that their InhabitdDta muiit enjoy the free mstitutiODH which h&ve 
been found the bent Becurity for the loyalty of nil races under the British ^ 
flag. Whether those ioBtitutions eiiali be given to them aa provinces of 
the (Mtne areas with the Republics, or there i^hall bo a re-arrangemetit of 
areas in South Africa, whether they ahall be enjoyed by each province 
aepar&tely or in federatlou with othore, and what nrrangementa may be 
oecessary ia order that any part of the cost of the war may fall on the 
province* on which it ought to fall — these are questions which it may not 
be premature to discuas, but which I do not propose to discuM to-day. I 
wifib to draw attention to a prellzmnarj point of which the importance 
may easily be uyerlookad,— namely, the neocGsity of ending the war, whipn 
it eomeB to be ended, in auch a manner m to leave no doubt that the 
RepublicH will have ceaaed to ox.ist. To aay that " their jjast system, 
which InToIved a large measure of pclltical and military indepeudeneoi 
will, of couree, be materially modified as a result of the war ** is probably 
to go u far as, at the present stage of the tmlitary operatlonis, it would 
become the Govemmeiit to go ; but the public ought already to accuatom 
iteelf to perceiving that„ when the thiug comes to be done, that Will not 
be enough. If tha Bepublics are left standing with a modified system 
they will continue to be eeiiarate States under reatrictiona extending^ no 
dnubt, to the franchise and to anuamente, acid, therefore, much more 
important than any to which they are not Ruhject, but which, whateviar 
they may be, must leave the eituatbn open to the difGculty which 
unifonnly du^ the attempt to maintain restrictione on any State acknow- 
ledged to be one. The right of Russia to eioaDcipatiDo from the Black 
Sea Clauuas uf the Treaty of Paria waa put by many on the ground that 
restrictioM on what a State may do to ita own territory are contrary to 



27* 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 






nsture, a cotitrailictiun in logic, &uJ tlierdfom u^ver to be jufllified i 
for a tempor^Ty purpose. Tho&a who remembor 1818 will call to Buad 
how, when toaricg up the tr»tie« of lJ^15, the fatufactioQ of the Vnack 
Id prockiming tliwoAdTes free to fortify [Juningtio luwmitd, at leaat« equal 
to that which they fi^lf. from clniniing kld incrpa^Meri liherty of actioti i^| 
Europe, So W6 may be sure that if the Republics cootinue to cxiM, nl 
will not be long before they^ with the nupjurt of thdr sympatluaen in all 
partB of the world, will Dot otily tiy, but will cturn &a of right, to s: 
qS aU fetters to wiiich they may be Buhjected, And they will hare 
further Hiipfiort of thoa^ whO| whiles unable to deny the attempts w! 
the Tr«QA^*aal hi» made from 1361, to shake off the ftucce^vc Couvea 
EioQR, justify them oa the ground that the independfince t^ken from them 
in 1877 ought to have beeu fully restored. Tittte are ncT^r waqtiug 
thoM who contend that a Stale ia not prevented by ita Bignatur« from 
re-opening the question whether the conditions which it signed were juit^ 
and their argunmnts will be backed by the fallacy that no permaseu 
restrictiona on a State can be just. 

It may be said that it ie forung an open door to inusi on ita being 
made plain th^t the two territarieH are to b^ taken audcr the Bridsh flagi 
In answer, ] would {Mint to the bungUng phases through which Franca, a 
country in which form is much more $tt«nd&d to than in England, uriTed 
at her goal after her war in MAda};)i3car ; the treaty of the let October, 
IS^St the unilateral declaration of the Queen of Madogaacar on tbe 
iSth January, 1S9&^ and the equally imilaieral French law of the 6th to 
8th August, 189G. In the words of the Ilwue QenknU ds Droit 
JniBmaiionaZ ruHic, a very able periodio&l certainly not disposed to fiu] 
Fratmw in the wruug^ *' the«e diflerent documents gave me to the m«st 
lively and confused controversies about the meaning of the words pru- 
tectorate, annoxatlou, soTereignty, and the cons^ucnr^^e of the annexation 
of ttinTi tones." If England, which has to face a widely-spread dispoaitJoiL 
to find her in the wrong, cannot ariivo at her goal more simply than this, 
wti Hhall not only incur the usual imputations of had faith, but shall leave 
a real doubt to cloud the future. And our statasmen are^ in auch a 
matter, under the peculiar liability of being misled by our Indian 
experience. For reniwuH of policy, the reality of which I am far fitim 
disputing, we have built up in the Pemnsula a eystem of our own, (^ 
which the result is that the relations between the United Kingdom and 
the Dative States cannot be expressed without contradiclion in the tenus 
or European iuteruatioual law. That does not matter^ for there is tu> 
neighbour to take advantage of the circumstance^ and it has been officially 
notified in the Indian Goveinment Gazdie of the 2l&t August, 1891, 
that "the principles of intamational law have do besjing upon the 
relations between the Government of India as representing the Queen- 
Empress on the one hand;^ and the native States, under the suzerainty of 



I 

! 



APPENDIX ir. 



373 



I 



Her Majesty^ on the other." But iu South Africa we dare aut follow 
such precedents. If the svidant miqd of the ji»tioq is to te carried out it 
muet be made clear to Chose who take their stand od European iator- 
national law, that the Dutch States have ceased to exist, eveu as 
dependeDt odos. 

This beiDg ho, it will be weU that the public should begin tu reflect on 
the way in which its intention of bringing ftU South Africa under the 
Britiah fiag can be fullilled. A State may cede a part of its territory, but 
when the whole State disap|>earb there oan be no legal cession, became no 
oocatitution provides for such « celso. Neither the Legiatature, the 
Executive, nor any general has a commlsiiioD to put an end U> the State'a 
existence. A general may conclude) a. military convention as to thd 
t^rniA in which be and his troop8 will lay down their Anae, but there la 
this difficulty about inserting any political promises or holding out any 
political hopeft m such a convention, that at that gtAge reconBtmction 
cannot be for adpanoed, if indeed it haa commenced^ and in ita progress it 
may he found impossible to carry out such promiaes or give effect to such 
hopes. The Treaty of LimBrick ia an instructive example of the difli- 
cultlea which may follow from trpng (o make a military convention 
serve a political purpose. A moral »anctian to the eitini^tion of a State 
m»y be obtained from a popular vote, or from the resotution of an 
awembly fipeciftlly elected to decide on Uie matter; and, nince eutih 
isDction cannot in any case be a leg^i on^, the voters aummoned n^ not 
be only those who enjoyed the franchiie before. The oli^chy hitherio 
governing haa no moral claim to represent the South African Republic. 
But, BB agftinsit third Powers with which a question may arise aa to what 
hss become of the rights and obligaiionH of th» annexed ^itAe, the only 
legal title which the annexing State can claim under international usage 
iv the will of itself aa conqueror eanctioned hy time. And perhaps the 
annexing State will take the wisest course if it announcefi that wili in the 
t^iiopleKt way, by proclamatiob. For the moral jufiti&catign which we all 
desire and expect, we muet look to the CD~operatiou, in working the 
system which we aet u]^ of assemblies elected on ft liberal franchise. 

I will <?onclude with twowamiDgs. First, in auy reconstruction let the 
name " State " be avoided, even if the territories of the two RepuhUcs should 
bo adopted without alteration of boundariea as oolonies or provinces. In the 
case of the United Stat«B there was an original justificatioD for the word, 
because the colonies became States by declaring and achieviug their 
independence. But if» when they formed a true union, they had dropped 
tbat word with its misleading assoclationB, it could not have been argued 
so plausibly that entrance into the union did nob preclude eventual 
secession iVom it The power of names is great, and not eveo Eaglaad 
can afibrd to neglect accuracy in their uho, and to rival Carlyle'a " Emperor 
&Lgismund super grammaticam." 



274 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Beooodly, let the Ibbbob of 1877 teach \a the dADger of delay in intrcK I 

duciog the free ioetHutioDs which we iatend for these territories if &iid 
when CQnq^uered. Tliere ib do agrariao queHtion and no r^ligiouB queatioa j 
to fear. Since the Dutch language i^ sure to be ttdmitted ou «qiml tenne 
vith the Engliab, bb iii the Capo Colony and NaUl, and the exclufiioQ of ' 
EngUsih cannot be agaiD attempted without big guns, there will not even 
be a langUBge questioa. Some persoQJi talk of guerillan, but there am he 
no guerilla* without a sytjipathising popdilatioD from which to draw their 
8uppU«B, and the small body of Boora cannot be at onc« guerilias in the 
mountiinB and farmers to supply them. And the Don-Dutch voXe will 
have the majority in the TTax^vaal* and our garriBOD will, fur a ootuuder- 
able timo, be large. If the new mstitutionn are quickly got to wcrk, we 
may rely^ with Lord Loch, on the practical Teutonic minds of the Boera 
for settling down. The danger will be in the disafTectioiii which delay in 
getting the new iaatitutions to work may caiue to spread from the Boen 
to those who are now TTitlaodcrs. 
> ToufB obediently, 

J. Wkstlakb. 
Chelsea, lOth March. 



The TVmes commonta ae follows on the preceding letter :— 
"Lord 3ti.liBhury refuse to be led into a diecu£a)Dii of the highly^ 
contentiouti aaa^rtions made by the two Preaidenta. They move ua aa 
little ae their pathetic reference to conBiderations which ougbt to hsTe 
been prenent to their minda and to have held their handa when they 
prepared for a&d precipitated war and boasted that they would drive the 
English into the aea. The burden of blood aud tears and of moral and 
economic ruin of which they talk ia heavy, but jl is on their shouldoni 
and not on omn that the load muet rest. It is enough for ua that they 
dehbcrately made preparationa for this contest for years on an enormous 
scale, and thnt when they thought they were ready they made war upon 
ii« and seduced uumbera of our Dutch fellow-subjecta from their allegiance^ 
That is proof enough of the conspiracy, the existence of which ia Bom«> 
times denied by their friende. It muat be our huBineM to abolish, as far 
as pOBaible, any centre arouud which a flimilar conspiracy might hereaj^r 
re-form. FrofeaBor Westlake, who hod some doubts about our legal 
position while the Convetitions existed, writoe ufi a weighty letter this 
morning on the situation which followa their abrogation by the war. He 
insists on the abaolute neceaaity of doing in the most effectual way what 
the Government have now declared they mean to do. There must b? no 
loophole for a doubt hereafter thai the Bepublics have ceased to exiat. 
To leavs room for doubta ia to leave room for aapirations and for ijitriguea 
which must be extinguished for erer if the peace and the security of 
South A^CB are at Lset to be laid upon a solid and enduring foundatioiL" 



( 37S ) 



APPENDIX III. 



I 



FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE CHUROHEa 

TBB NONCONFOBKIST ClEBOT AND THE WaB. — T&S COHFlDEHOB OP 

THE CarjacBBB m Sm Ajjkbd Milheb, 

From *' Cape Titju-^," Wth June, 1900. 

Yeeterday, at noon, a large and influential body of NonconformiBt 
clergy waited upon Sir Alfred Milner at Government Houm to present to 
Bis ExcaUency an addrcas conTeying the aupport of all the raligiouA 
bodies ra Cape Town and district ia the Imperial xwlicy towards the two 
Bepublica, a&d of confidence in His Excellency M the exponent of that 
^x>Ucy. The deputation met the Cfovemor in the drawing-room, where 
there were praaent: The Reva. J. J. HeClure (coDTener), A. H. Hodges, 
H, Cottoc, Ezra NuttMll, J. H. Gothercole, J. G. Locke, J, R. Saunders, 
B, E. EJderkin^ W. 8. Cnldecott, R. Juikin, Geo. Holwan, Wealejans; 
D. W. Drew, A. Pitt, Jaa. HicIisrdHon, J. S, MofFatt, A, Vine Hall, and 
H. C. Kowell, Congregation alistn ; W. E. Robertgou, Dlivid BussoU, and 
W. McIntoBh, PreabyterianH ; A. E. Saihy and E. Baker, naptiala; and 
J. Tom Brown, London Missionary Society. Tha following miniBtera 
were unable for varioua reftsoon to attend : KevB. H. Tindall,^ J. le PI*, 
Jas. Fifih, and W. Edwards. 

The Addbxss. ' 

On His Excellency entering tba rooro^ 

The Rev. J. J. McClure uid : Tour Excellency, the address whicK 1 
hare the honour to present, with my brethren^ to you this morning repre- 
sents not only tho re«pect and eeteom in which you are held by the 
ministers of the Erang&lical Churchett uf Cape Town and district, which 
are represented here, and also tboee who a^e not represauted, but aho a 
deep feeling of personal affection, W« are here lo-day to presenl this 
addreK to you convinced that the policy which you reprewnt, and of 
which you have been such a distinguiBhEid exponent, has within It peace, 
prosperity, and abiding happinefla for all th* States and coloniea of South 

T 2 



376 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



AMca. (Hear, hear.) 
thae terzns: 



Ut. HoClura then read the iddioB, whidi wub 



To Sir Alfred MUnw, G.aSLa^ eta 



^ 



Itay it ple&B6 ^otir ExceUencj, — We, the undenign^ BUButert of 
religion rosideot in Capo Towa and the vicinity, feel impeUod by a sai*« 
of duty to 6ipr«fiA our coDvictlone on two or tlii«e tmportsDt poisu 
mvolvod ID the preaeDt situaUon id South Africa. 

1. We desire to express our eDtixe coafideDce in Tour ExceUaacT^ 
psraonal judgmeat, evidenced by the eminent faimsBa, juiAice and prmiffioe 
you have displAjed in the &dmiiiiBtr&tio& of South African &Skir« (lore 
you Assumed th« office of Ktgb ConamieeioDcr. 

3, Wo emphaticftlly approve of the geooral policy of which Your 
Excellency ha^ beeD the exponent, and which you have uDfaltenu^); 
&Dd pationtly pursued. Id the face of much inierepreeentatiun iuni 
anta^nism. 

3> We rery distinctly hold tho beUef that the well-bdng of tha whole 
of South Africa Ia de^^ident upon the tndisputahle establishmant »d 
Britieh Bupromacy aad eover^gnty, and we do not heaitate to affim that 
when the end \s accomplished aod the ueighbounng temtories are plaoeil 
under a pure and wiae govemtnont^ in occordanoe with the policy that 
prevaiU in other provinoea of tho Bridah Empire^ diaafiectioD will ceaw 
and the whole [upulation, witiiout distinction of nee or language will bi 
welded into a. pcacofuj BJid loyal community. — 'We are, Tour EjiceUeocT't 
mofit obedient servantft, (signed) Jaa. Is Pla, A. Pitt, D. W. Diva, 
H. C. W. Newdl, J. Moffatt, J. RichardBOn, A. V. Hall, Ben Erva. 
J. Leipold, E. Baker, A. E. Saiby, J. RuMeli, J, R. Saundera, E. Nuuafl. 
Wm. Flint, Hy. Ootton^ A. IL Hodges, B. B. Elderkio, E. Mdoloml% 
J. E. Locke, B. Jenkin, W. Hewitt^ Q. Roberteon, J. H. GathereoK 
Jftfi. Pish, Henry Tindall, W, Edwards, J. W. Bams, W. J. Caldaooo, 
W. E, Robertson, J. J. McClura, David Russall, S. J. Hwmlttw, C E 
Gre^nfieid, W, Mclotuah, J. M. Rus86ll» J. M. Zahn, Hy. IMndali, Wni. 
Edwards, J. McMilkn, H. a G. K^ef^ T, Weber, J. Kath, a Klins. 



TbB WsKLETUfd. 

The RaT. Ezra Nuttall said they counted it a very lilgh hoGOur tiiai 
they had heea permitted to attend aod present this addren to Hi5 
ExcelloDcy, who had many arduous and distracting duties to oocopy Iti* 
time. But they wished to say what was in their heartc WeK ih" 
matter under discussion one of mare parochial intcreat they would D'^t 
have ventured to aak auch an honour, but thi* Impedai and oolowil 
question waa very dear to them and to tha Churches they repnaeDlefi' 



APPENDIX ni. 



377 



They had come to Apwk m ministers of the Churcii, not ao much in tbo 
name of the membors of their churches, who hud nlre^dy had au o|ipor- 
tuaity of in/onning Hia EsceUency aft to their general vifiWH^ but bo 
might say for hia brethrea that they were in iwrfect accord wrjih th* 
reaolatioiii that had. already been passed at no many meetinga. It had 
gireu them paui, when ao often Hit: Bxcelloncy's naiiie and reputatioa 
had beea attacked, and they recogclRed that the difGcultiea of \um uxaltod 
poeitioD actually dlebarred him from anawering, as ha might w e^'ily du, 
BQch sophistries h« need not any ftlanders. (Applauw.) Would Hiii 
EsceUency accept from them this expression of their kindly feelingn, rory 
deep respect and esteem, and their eipree^on of tnut that tuiilur Ood hia 
adminiHtiatioQ might be carried to a Bucceeaful iBHue. (Ap[>lautH;.) 



TAE Coi4Gft£4A-[<ft}NALlBT6. 

Bar. X S. Moffatt, speaking an behalf of his own denomination, 
Mdd they perfectly understood each other. fHeor, hear.) They had come 
witli a profound conviction, one shared by every man there, tliat they 
could do a great deal for HIb Excellency and for the Empire, uf which 
they were proud to be the aubjecta, iu one way. There were mora thinj(M 
wTotight in heaven and earth than nLaa knew of by the power of prayer, 
and Hia EiceOwicy might rest Muured there wwe prayeri going up, 
earnest prayers, day by day, that he might be Bupporled in hii preitent 
reapoDBible and heavy work, and in the end attain the objects let forth id 
that [Mutition. They wished fervently that Hia Excellency might cum* 
Buccewfully out of thia criHiB, such a gne as had bOrer before (>ci;urred in 
thia country. (Applauiie.) 

The Prehbytbkiami^ 

The Rev. W. HctntoRh eaid he wae a Freebyterian, and until tecenlly ft 
Tranjivaal uitlander, and he had come to eay that they, the uitlnnduni, fult 
confidence and H^trength when Hi» ExceHency took up thin niat,(«r tu 
recently. They felt tliut now the power of the King wait going to ba 
made n:tanifefit in thiH laad. And, being here, he t'dH that he could du uo 
1«88 than stand forward and expreea thti feeling they hud towards llin 
E}[c«ll«Qcy. (Hear, liear.) The men who were bred utider the baniter uf 
the Queen should be with His Excellency in tbvse trying time*. (Uear* 
hear.) They had come aa Christiaa men to say that they bulievDd the 
Kbgdom uf OUT Lord waa a Kingdom of righteousnesf*. and that thai 
Kingdom would be advanced whan liberty which was not licence reigned 
throughout thte land. They foU that His EicelieDcy'B policy waa on the 
linea of that great ProvidBuoe in which they believud, nud so thoy caiiio 
to-day to give what little courage and conhdciDce and streQ^sh Uii 
Excellaocy might get from their eupport. (Applause.) 



378 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Tbe BAi-nsT8, 

Tb? Bev. E. Biiiker eaud his cliurcli unfortuiutely had ncit had m 
opportunity ot giving expreBBiun to its opinion on the great ta'b^ect, 
although thbt was not duo to any w&nt of ccpovictdoti, but he hoped to 
forward to HiB EiceUeacy their reaolution la a few days. He was odyj 
too gkd to he there to aaaiet in giv^iag a wider echo to the chonu if^ 
approval that bad come to His Eioelleocy that momlTi^, and which he 
hoped would ^treatheo Hifi Excellemcy's hands. He had alao pleo&ure in 
testifying to the statesmanahip His Eicelleucy bad diopkyed dutijag ihe 
tioubloiu months through which we were paasing. (Applause.) 



Sot A. MiLKEB^a Keflt^ 

His Eicellencyj after accepting the address, eaid: I thpjik you for 
coming here t<Miay to present me with this addieea. Emulating aa it 
does from a body of men so reprGsentative, acd whoee deUberate opinion 
on a quefition of the higheflt publiq importance is entitled to so much 
weight, I cannot but feel it is an event of tinuiiiual importance. Ton 
represent, I think, all tbti great NoncoDformiflt religious bodiea of this 
town and neighbourhood. Your altitude in typical of the unequalled 
unanimity and Btrecgtb of oonriction wbich exists among tbe ^uu- 
coDformiBts of South Africa with regard to the great struggle at present 
coDTulaing this country. The men whom I see here to-day, and their 
fellow mtniiitBra throughout South Africa^ ar« not in the habtt of 
obtruding their opuuona on political questions. (Hear, bear.) It is a 
unique crieiB which has brought them into th« areni, and the exceptional 
character of their interveotion leads additional weight to the temperate, 
but strong and clear, Htat«meat of their poeitioQ which has just beNi 
phu«d befoi-c me, 

A VicTW or Mbkhactty. ^| 

As regards myself pereooaUy, I cannot but feel it is a great source of 
strength at a trying time to be aBsurthl of the c^mfidence and approval of 
tba men I 860 before roe, and of ail whom tbey represent. You refer to 
my having to engounttiT mi^representatioQ and antagonism. I do not 
wish to make too much of thaL I have no doubt been exposed to much , 
Criticism and Bome abuse. There baa* I eometimw think, been M^f 
exceptional display of mendacity at my ex^KtiHe. (Laughter.) Bat thUi^^ 
is the late of every public man who ia forced by circumetances into a 
somewhat prominent position in a great criBiti. And after all praise and 
blame have a wonderful way of balancing one another if you only give 
them time. 



APPENDIX III. 



379 



Bix-urcofa Eulogy asd Abitee. 

when I left Bnglasd for South Africa three years ago, it 
f A chorus of eulogy so exc^&eive that it made me fee] thoroughly 
uncomfartabte. (Laughter.) To prutest would have been uBeless; it 
would only have looked lilte affectatioo. 80 I jaat pkced the aurplua 
piwe to my cre<iit, so to speak (laughter) as something to live on in 
the days which I surdy knew muatr come sooaer or later, if I did Tuy 
duty, when I would meet wjtlj Undeserved [^enBu^e. And certflialy I 
have had to draw on that account rather heavily during the last nine 
roonthiii. (Laughter.) But there is still a balance on the right Bide 
whichf tbanka to you aad •'jtherfi, la uow once uoreiacreaning. (Applau&e.) 
So I cannot pose aa a martyr, and what is more im|H)rtaDt> I caouot 
COmpUta of any want of support. No cmn, placed as 1 have been in a 
poaitioa of aingular embarraaaaient, exposed to bitter attacks to which he 
could not r$t>lyi aiid unable to explain his conduct even to his owu friends 
(hear, hear) has ever had more compeusatioD to be thankful for tlian 
[ have had in the cunstant^ devoted^ forbearing support and conhdencs of 
all thoee South AfricauH, whether in thla colooy, in Natal, or in the 
Republics, whose sympathy is with the British Empire, (Applause.) 

A Sbttlkmbht or "Never Aqaih" 

la the Co&cluding pars^rapb of your addrea^ you refer iu W&iglity Jmd 
well-COliBidered language to the conditions which yoia deem necesBary for 
the future peace and prowperity of South Africa, and for the ultimate 
hannuDj and fuaion of its white races, t can uoly say tliat. I entirely 
agree with the views expressed in that paragraphs The longer the 
struggle lai<ta, the greater the sacrifices which it involv&H, the stronger 
muKt surely be the dctercuinatLon of all of us to achieve a i>ettleineDt 
which wiil render the repetition of this terrible acourge impos^ibte, 
(Applause.) "Never again" must be the motto of all thltikiiiig;, of all 
humane men. It is for that reason, not from any lust of conquest, nut 
from auy d8Sire to trample on a gallant, if misguided, em^my, that we 
de«ir« that the ttettlement shall be 

No Patchwokk anb ko CoHFUCUHii^f: ^ 

that it shall leave no room for misunderotanding, no opportunity for 
iotrigue, for the revival of impuiiible aubitioos, or the accumulatiOQ of 
eaonnous armameatB. (Applause.) Fresideut Kruger had said that he 
waQte DO more ConveutiunB, and 1 eotirely agree with bim. (Laughter.) 
A c-ompromi&o of that bort iu unfair to everybody. If there is one thlnig 
of which, after recent eKp^rienceo, I am abiolutely convinced, it ie that 



3Se 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



tk« vit4l iDtareBts of ftU tboee who lire m South jyric*, of out prweot 
eiumiei as much as of t^oce frho an on our side, denumd tbat then 
should not be two diiRimUHr and antagooistic political Bystem^ in XhA 
which nature and hiRtory have iirevocAbt^' decided tnujt ba one oountrf. 
(Applauaa.) To agree to a comproniise which would leave hay amln^'tj 
on tbat point would Dot be magnaaimUy, U would be weaicnen, iograti- 
tude, and cruelty j ingratitude to the heroic dead, and cruelty vo tlia ^ 
unborn gQDeratlona. 

The TatiK MAONASiiimr. 

But when I say that, do not think thut I wi»h to join in the oub 
fprtsent so prtvnleat, agaiuat th« fine old virtue of magnaaiimty. 
belitive in it aa timch as ever I did^ and there ia plenty of room for It i 
the South Africa of to^&y. We can Hhow It bj a fianJE recognitioii 
what iM great aiad admirable in the char^ter of our enemiea; by ik4| 
Tnali^itig them m a htnly because of the sina of th« few, or perhaps areoj 
of many indiriduBln. We can show it by not crowing ezHeeirely ovetj 
our victorieii, and by not thiotiug evil of overyoue who, for one rvaaon or 
another, ja unable to join in our legitimate rejoicioga. We can elww i(^ 
by striving to take care that our ueatmeot uf tboae who have been goUtyl 
of reballiou, while characterised by a just neverity towards the really i 
guilty partiGfli Bhould be devoid of any spirit of viudictiveneBB, ot of nat- 
prejudice. (Hear, liear.) We can ahow it, abov^ all^ when thia dire 
mrugjgla i8 over, by proT.ing by ouj »ct» that they libelled ua who said 
that We fought fur gold or any iriateri^l advantage, and that the rights 
and privileges which we have resolutely claimed for ourBelTra we are 
prepared freely to extend to utheiK, even to tho&e who have fought agMDit 
ua, whei^ever they are prepared loyally to accept them. (Applause.) 

Hill Excellency conversed for a while with the members of thAj 
deputaticiti, who, with an eSpreRsivn of thauka for the interview, theo 
rotired. 

Despatch Bt a Conobkoatiosal MLNiffres. 

The Rav. E* J. Campbell has been writing a aeries of letters to 
Da^y News OD the subject of the war, its causes and its probable efleats^l 
The most recent of these letters appears in the issue of ILth Hay ; a fe« 
extractii are apjended. 

In a form&r commuuicatioo I endeavoured to show that in the judgment' 
of many C-olonials whose experience given them a right to sfeak. the 
present war is a conflict of forces rather than of individuais and that Its 
principal causes lie much further back thau the Conventiuus of 18B1 or 
IB84, much leas the Jameson Raid or Uitlander grievances. Kevertheleaa, 
it goes without saying that the course uf South African history wcmld 
have been altogether different but for the 1B77-B1 policies; and tba 



APPENDIX III. 



381 



I 



I 



in wUch WQ are dow engaged would have taken snotbe'r form, 
^dded another result than uaw eoeine likely tu be the coae, but for 
the Eaid and the Kruger policy towards Cha UiUajid^rH, 

By the working out of the effects of the 1877 to 18B1 ptiljciw in tbo 
Transvaal, asafited by the Krugerita and the Bond propognuda, iiuit^ 
auother situation arDM, which it ii instructi'vc Ui trace^ 

The ftret eSect was the impreaaion created of the bad faith, incon- 
sisteltcyf and weaknesa of the Briliah G-oTernmenc. Had the Be&consG&ld 
Cabinet kfipt its promie^ of the grant of free inatitutiotis to the Trana^raal, 
and avoided the blunder of eettiog up a military GoTommont instead, it is 
possible, though by no means oertain, that the Boera would hare given up 
their aspirationti after independence. Upon this do one can ipeak 
poaitively,aa the event would have depended upon ao many contingenci^; 
but when it is taken into account that Mt. Kruger blmitelf hold a poet 
under the Britiub Govemmeut, and only resigoed becau&e ho was refused 
an increaae of salary, it ie at least reaaunable to nsBuma that given velf- 
govemment and a fair measure of proaperity, the Boera wuuld apeedily 
have acquiesced in BritiBk aacandency, and that the insurrection would 
never have takeo place. But once it did take place the Gladstone policy, 
A policy in which Mr, Chamberlain had a voicfi, was certain to lead to 
further eomplicatiune, und aveu ItH initnediate effectB Were felt throughout 
tliB whole of South Afrioo, It not only injured Britifih prestige \solh. with 
whites and natives, but inflicted hBAvy damage upon Briti&h interesls of a 
material kind. 

Previous to the war of independence the race feeling did not exist, or, 
if BQ^ wa* very far from being a political danger. The retroceasion woke 
it iato activity. The Enghahnian sani a step; the Dutch Africander 
rose. In Cape Colony appeared tlie Bond, whoae political objecta have 
grai]ually become more clearly defineil, but whose attitude from the fimt 
was auti-British. Africanderiam became a force with a centrifugal 
tendency. In the mouth of a Dutchman the word was Siieuciated with 
the achievements of his brethren in the Tran&vftal, and the thought began 
to ahape itAelf that the victory of the Boer farmers might be the prelude 
td a greater consummation, whea Anglo-Sa::on ahould be BKchanged for 
Dutch supremacy in the Cape itself. There ih plenty of evidence that this 
aipiration waa not ill-founded, as those who read the words of the Eev. S. J. 
du Tuit, written nearly twenty years ago, and now traualaCed, may 
discover for tliBUn selves. 

In Paul Kruger Dutch Afriqanderism has found its focus, partly by 
force of circumetanceB, but chiefly by the character and abiHty of the man. 
The Preaident of the South African Republic i& a typical Boer, the 
embodiment and exponent of all that ia moat characteristic of Ms tace^ 
Narrow, Iguonrnt,, forceful, uiiBcrupuIoua and cunning, in hie own way 
religious, and perfectly fearless in carrying out bin aimSt he is the head 



2Si 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



and cenln of the South African problem. So £u- not another nun liu 
shown a tithe of bii ability, and tittle aft it might suit (.he mora lefinid 
Africauder palidcaL milcoDteDU of Ope Colony to eee such a nun at tfat 
head of alfun, in the eveut <^f a IhorQugb-goiag federal suco^u thej otmU 
usrer have dupensed with htiiL Boer ^ympathisere in England ult«riv 
mist^e Paul Krug«r. For twenty yean he hu ooneietently work«d 
lowardi one idaftl, a United States of South Africa, an Afncander 
Bepuhtic with himMlf a.9 Q«iigt Waihiugtoii. It ii not su absiird u it 
aeciEiB, aud ossuredlj not bo imposnhle u we far-off inlanders in ooi 
complacent self-coDGdeDoe bave ims^ned. Every act of his career sioce 
Majuba Day Qts in with the suppoettlon that hii objectiTe wu Cajv 
Town, though bis policy was such that tf the larger acheme failed the 
mialier might «acc«ed, and Pretoria become the capital of a aoveretgo 
LnterQatioBal State, which should abaorb ita anialler neighbour on the South, 
and force itti way to the aea on the East 

Tbe President ia a tuillionaire, thanks to the BritUh, and enonnous 
KUmH have been paid to consolidate and reiidar &ubB«rrieE)t th« Krugei 
party ia the State. Nor was thie Kniger [»rty condned to the TraniiTaal. 
Vast BumH found their way acrow the border. At the last Goutil 
Election the Bond party defeated Sir Gordon Spri^ with Transvaal goR 
Trannvaal emiasaries found their way to erery part of South Africa 
stirriog^ up dJwffectioo and race feehng. Why was this dooa ? or, at any 
rale» why wb« the money spent ? The only reasonable eiplanjition is that 
Hr. Eniger's policy was not ainiply defenniye, but offeiusive. ^M 

Once only did it seem to strain Africandei Bestiitient too far^ and that H 
was whan the closing of the Vaaldrift* waa attempted. But bete the 
policy waH not really ciianged. Dutch Africander hofie« were oentrad 
upon the power and importance of tbe official clique in the TransTaalf and 
it was worth risking something to further that end, which inthis Inctanoe^ 
happened to be served by the Bucoes4 of the Netherlands Railway 
Oonipaoy. 

The whute thing haa been worlced with marvellous cleveniesa. No ons 
can prove a "conspiracy" to oust British authority; Mr. Kruger and th« 
Bond have been too wary for that. But if for "conspiracy" we read 
'* understanding/' th«D we can vilely iiGQrm that AfnisnderiBm. has long 
known ttM own mind. Tu the world it louka (ka tbuugh the two Republics 
armed for their own defence. At the worst the Federate beUeved that 
Kuropean intervtiDtiuti would save them from extinction, while at tha 
best, well, the Powers might have to recognise a de facto sovereignty, tha 
result of a spontaneous Africander uprising from the Zambesi to Ca\» 
Town, All tbe afore- pa entiuQBd measurea have been meam to an end^ 
the very name Soutli African Republic instead of as formerly TraasTaMl 
Stale is uot without significance, as i^ aiiio the annexation of British 
territory at Che cuiameiuKiaeDt of the wv. It luay be that this fiwt fau 



I 




APPENDIX rn. 



^ 



been overlooked by philo- Boers at home, but CobDmlfl are utider do mis* 
apprehetiswD bb to ita meaning. It is a portion of the price thnt England 
haH had to pay for *' acquieecing in the EJtJBt«nce of the two K^pitUicB." 
That the price has not been greater ie due, first and foremost, to Sir 
Alfred MUner, and after him to the splendid loyalty of the Colonial 
Voiutiteere, 

It waa Dot the Tranacaal but the Emli}i^ which was mcDaced at the 
commeacemetit of the pr^ent ^Lruggb. If ChiH be an unrightaoua war the 
respofifiibility for it does not rest at the door of the British C^ovemment. 
EusLuhI did not moke it; Africaadoriam made it, aud inlendod to 
tD&ke it| though not eo aoon as has actually been the case. To the esd 
of time no doubt it will be denied that a couapiracy against British power 
ever existed at a^l. Good bard lymg haa alwayti been part of it, and it 
takea a goad deal to open the eyes of the British pubhc to the fact. 
Ferha]ia when the pacification eoines BuITicieDt black and white evidence 
will be forthcoming to eatabliah beyond all doubt the fact which every 
hyjdX British subject here well knows— that we have ha«i a very narrow 
escape. Will the Nonconformist irreconcilable^ at home poader the 
evideiK* that h forthcoming even now ? I cannot be surpriHed that they 
should be sliiw in believing it, but \vt them do juMiee to Colonial testi- 
mony, and Uiey will exactly reverBe their preacDt notion that the war ie 
on our part ooe of aggreesion^ and on the part of the Boers one of dereQC«. 
It is not flo. We are the attacked, and if our {Xilicy of self-defence 
inrolv^ the annexation of the defeated aggresKora it cannot ha beljied. 

One cannot but be eorry for the Boer rank and file. The untutored 
fojEDLT of the veldt has been the duf* of a cUque, which has naver 
perhspe numbered more than a hundred individuals. If it can be prored 
up to the hilt that this clique had some of ita representabivai in Cape 
Town as well as Pretoria and lUoemfontelti, sharp punishment ehould he 
meted aut It \a no light thiog u> juggle with men's lives. The Boers, 
as well as we, are paying in blood for the ambitiuus schennw of President 
Kiogw fU)d bis famiUajB, Perhaps they may aome day discover, if 
prejudice wUl let tbem, that they have been niieled. We must Hee to it 
that British victory shall mean for them the very liberty they love, and 
for the sake of which tbey are found willing to die. 

When the reckoning comets let the lovalista have their due. There is a 
Hurprising uneasiness abroul in regard to the pOHsible action of the British 
Ooremment. At Brst I found it difficult to understand, but now I am 
getting used to it. When one B}waks of tbe &rmnes6 and determination 
of Ministers and the Britiwh j^eopJe genarajly that this Ume the netttement 
Bhall be thorough, and of sucb n nature thpt the work will never need to 
be done over again. Colonials laugh. '* We have heard all that before," 
they say. " We know the sort of firmnesa to expect from the Britiflh 
Gorerament." This is rather humiliating', but true. Nor is it all. 



284 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Tliere is a grimmer note KUDded. The loysl inbabitaDtt of Cape GoSony 
lUid Nat&l are determliud that uiH<n the policy to be pursued hy Oicit^ 
Briulii in the furthcomiBg setUeroent they wili iwijuiit their own futan 
attitude to the MotherlaQii. ** BarriDg sentimeftt," ihey declare, " wh*t 
have we to gain by incluedQii in the DiitiBh Empire? We cannot ertazid 
anutlier twenty yeara like the last. E^ithor tiiere mu^t be a real eecUe-- j 
ment, or we sbJl make tenna for oiuvclres and cut Che cable." TUit] 
kind of loyalty favours of disloyalty, but iit ia not really eo : it is MutiiiMiit ' 
overooDie by iiidignatioii. Are our atAtpeiceti ali^e to the ilffliiseF ? 

t ought here to remark that it ia well understood both in Ckpe Oolooy 
and NatfLJ that in any eveot lh« Fr^ State wu biiund to loae lodepMb 
deoce, Part of the declared piir|joia« of Minie of the TruisTaalerE waa iha ] 
early abeorption of theic smaller neighbour. There are, of coune^ tota* | 
even amongtt GoloniiJs of British origin who r^et the posicton of the i 
Free State much more than that of the Tranerv^aal- Among«t euob BttJ 
men liku Mr, Henry B&anl^ one of the most reBpected citiseos of i 
Town, and a member of the Legiaktira Assembly. Mr. Beard ia one of* 
the few who refuse to believe in the reality uf an Africander cousiriracy 
to drive the Knglifth into the sea. Id imrticular he regrets the fate of tha | 
Orange Fr«e State, concemiug which be ha» held an o]]iiuon approxi- 1 
matiDg lo that of Mr. Bryca. Ue ist dubbed pro-Boer, aa so many | 
moderate men am juat now, both h^r^ and at home. Yet it were vetl] 
if suiib B8 he were listened to. While diflbelieving in the inervit&bloien of 
the preeent war> he regardn nuneiaUon an the only possible settlement ia 
the Btate of public feeling. Indeed, I understood him to say that Ijd 
regarded it as the beet policy under the circum^tancfis, btit pleads that U 
should be of such a nature that the Free Stale burgliera should scarcely 
know of Ui« change. Autonomy without independence seems the cleer 
line for the future. Thti, otie is glad to bay^ h alw the course appron^ 
of by Sir Alfred Mibflr, who »hnred Mr, Beard'e Bymjatby with the Prw 
Htatv. Sir Gordon Sprigg'a recoiiimendatioa, that self-government should, 
nnly be conceded when the Home Government ia salisfied that a oiajerityl 
of the burgliera ftre viilling U* accept British Bupferoacy, is tuure dnulifi| 
than proliftbly Sir Alfreii would recommend. Besides, i* it EiigHi<1ii?J 
The vanquished must not be crushed. If we have fought for equal rigblaj 
let UB cGncede tlioni an soon as law and order cau be renored in thai 
coji^uei-ed territories. 

The Rev. W. Teua, Preabytenan Miniator in Durbwi, furnished i» with' 
a surprising piece of first-hioid evidence uf the Africander conppiracy. In 
his congregation there \n, or was, a geuLleinui who wao formerly Attorney- , 
Qetieral in the Free State, and who ia of avowed pro-Boer pTO)cbvitiet.| 
When the war broke out, and the Boor Buccess made it seem profaab 
that Natal wou]d be overrun, this gentlemati mad^ no pretence 
couoealing bis saliafactioa. Mr. Teee,. in conversation with himf roftfTod 



APPENDIX III. 



285 



to the genei-al ccmstenkatiati At the thorough prepaLredneaB of the HepuhlioB 
for the Btrnggle. '* Yes," wm thfl culm rejoinder, " Great Britain has been 
oompietoly takcD by surprise. Bir, this has been prepariDg saDCS IBS*."* 

"In both States ?" "Yea, in both, iwid in the OiloEy al&o. Tho 
Transraal has been tJio Arsenal, but those in the know in the Free Stfttd 
atid the Colony have worked in unison with Kruger.'* 

"And the object was to oust the Britiflh from South Africa?^ 
" Precjfiely, but it was not Lntanded to do it all at once. Tho first «tep 
WAS the consolidation of the two Republics an a eovoroiign inbomationjj 
8ta.t£, and Inter on an Africander rising at tho right moment." 

"Then do you mean to aay that when President Kruger attended the 
Bloemfontein Conferonco he knew perfectly well that the proceedings 
were a farc«, and that he really raoant to fight? " " Yea," 

''And Freaident Steyn'a annauncement that the Free State had nevor 
tluHight of war was made in the full knowledge that war had lung bMd 
prepftredfor?" "Yen." 

"But, sir, tliat wae moat blasphomouj lying, for he called upon the 
name of (rod at the timo ho made tho fltatoment." 

** Weil, I supjKJSfl it was — diplomatic lying, diplomatic lying, you know." 

Thin kind of thing \a »low]y coming to light. Englinhmeti find it 
difficult to undereitand the deliberate falsehood, and long-BTiHtained 
inElncerity of the Africander policy in thie land of lioB, as Mr. Winston 
Churchill onUs it^ 

One thing I cMinot omit to montion — the Rplendid, touching loyalty 
to the Queen which is shown ou every hand. At home we take such 
loyalty for granted; hore it moans perhaps a Uttle more, because it 
cannot be taken for granted. Just think of it I Seven thousand miles 
from Old England in a territory which Her Majeety has never visited, and 
tho maJQiity of 'whoee inhabitants have nsver &een hor, tho sound of her 
nante ie gr&et.eil with a reverenct^ affection, and enthueiasm that I have 
rarely heard uqunlled. I naw men to Greenmarket-equare^ at Cape Town 
BJng the National Anthem with a solemn feeling and emotional earnestness 
that were IrrBsistible^ It stirred the fibres of the most stolid. 



TiO Chuboh of EnaLAMi). 

The following is the copy of a letter addressed by the Archbishop of 
Cape Town on the 31at April, 1900, to the High CkimmiBsioaer : — 

Sir, — 1 feel that the abaence of any official eipreaaion of opinion on the 
[)»rt of members of the English Church during the present crisis, at a 
time when other religious bodies have oombiued in addressiiig Your 
Excellancy, is likely to lead to an erroneous inference && to that Church'e 
attitude in reepect of the futtire of South Africa. I therefore hope that 
I may b« permitted to expreea to Your Excellency my firm conviction 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



thftt no onduriDg pciacfl can b« ucured ta this country so loog as thl 
Northern RcipuhlioB are allowed to ret&in thoir izidepeiideDce and 
rEtmuD outside the Urnitu of the Queon'H aoveTeignty. I believe thu. th«| 
c&tuei of freedonir rigbteousQesa, &iiA progr««, a& well u of justice to 1 
nrntive races dependB uimn the eet*blielimeat of Britiah rule throD 
Bouth Africa. 

Id paying thia I feel no doubt wbaterer that I am fixprwsing the 
d«biidod aod deliberate riews of an overwheliuiDg uajoHty of tbow ovcrfl 
whom I have the honoui to prerade as Motropolitaa, and that Hiey^ lile ^ 
myself^ entertain the futleit oontideiiM in Tour Exoellency'B prudence 
Trisdom, and courage m dealing with the monientous iKKaea now at atake. 

1 remain, sir, your faithful and obedient Bervant, 

(Sign^) W. W. CiPrroWK. 

The Rohan Catholic Chtbch. 

The Kdv, Dr. McCarthy, whose speech Iq eupport of the High Coro- 
misuoner'B policy, appear* in Ihe report of the meeting of Iriab Colonista, 
writes: — 

Tbe Roman Ca^olic clergy at the Cape are ^moit unanimouB in thdr 
nupportof Bir Alfred Milner'B policy; but their abstentioD from public | 
utteranceH may bave left a false impreBsioii. One of tbem. Dr. Kolb^ of 
Colonial birth and editor of the South J/ncan Caiholie Magaxinf^ wu 
atrangly oppoeed to it; and ihe omphaiiB of his eipre&sioD tnav bave 
caused »3me to think that he^ voiced the opinion of hie f^llowa in the faith. 
ThiB was Bo far from being the c««e that public opinion compelled hiia to 
redgn the editorship of the magitcino- Witb tbe tolersticni cbametarutic 
of the Boer advocates he, after montha of undiatuibed monopoly in 
exproseing his viewi^ complained that he was denied liberty of «|^eecb; 
merely because hia Bi»bop bad att^ded a meeting opposed to the Boer 
policy. 

Thk Dptch BitroBMED ConitcH aih) THit Kaptih, 
The Rev. J, 6, Moffalt writes:— 

One of the most remarkable etatements that haa appeared is in the 
manifesto signed by a body of the moet influential miniBtera and theo- 
logical profasiora of the Dutch Keformod Church, They contend not 
only that there is a better understanding between Boer and Black Han 
than tbene is between Black and British, but that the Dutch RefonDsd 
has alwaye been a miE^ionary church in South Africa, a&d is 90 at the 
present time in a greater degree than any other. It is out of tbe question 
to attribute to theBO Reverend Fatbers any wilful tnCentioQ to mislead by 
saying the thing that is not, tbe only other suppoeition possible is, that 
tbey are profoundly ignorant of the past history of South Afri^ and of 
diiogs as they are at the present moment. 



APPENDIX III. 



I 



I 



I 



Tftke a case In point — the relatire position of the natives in the Capo 
Golony^, and Id the Transvaal, The B^Terend Cfaarleg Phillipft, formerly 
of Or&aff-'Roiaet, bow A refugee from Joha-ODCsburg, has stated the caae 
AD coBcisaly and yet ao clearly that I make no apology for taking oTer 
the whole paasoge. "Tc^ come to the funiiame&toS [xtitcy of the two 
GoTernmentB, th« BBaentiat principles aa embodied in their Ibwt^^ which 
regulate their relations to tHeir coloured Hubjects, uo one dare affirm that 
the natiT^ ara not treated worse in the TransTaal than in Cape Ooloby. 
The differeoce baginti with the 'Grondwet,' or Conatitutjou itself: — 

"In it« ninth article it is afilnned that there shall bi? absolutely 'uo 
equality, either in Church or State, between white and coloured,' The 
natires are the *awaTt goed,' black goods or property, the achepsels, mere 
creaturea, the Gibeonites, to be used aa the * hewers of wood and drawers 
of water* for the white people. 

**Till two years ago there nerer was such a thing as a legal marri^e 
among coloured people. When it wag graiit^, lest it should be thought 
that there was the ehade of equality at the hymeneal altar» the preamble 
introduces the Sth Article of the Grondwet, quoted abova It then 
ioeisted uj^iuu a fee of £3 to the Qovemment, and bo hedged it round with 
Oth«r r«Btrictions as to put a premium on immorality, LDBomuch that alt 
branches of the CSinstiao Church sect deputations to Pretoria, and worked 
despentely for its abolition, preferring the old condition of things." 

The reverend autborB of the nrnnlfeRto toll ub that the Dutch Eeformed 
Church ifl not, and never haa been, unwiUing to give the Ooapel to the 
black man. Te^ and Kt) ! Certainly not eo far ae these particular 
miniftera are pei^onally concemal. They have given an honourable 
exajnple Htmggling successfully as they have done to toiiM in their own 
church missionary zeal. They have worked hard and well^ and they 
have dote good work. No one will grudge them that teBtitnony who is a 
well-wisher to the native. But it would seem aa if while absorbed in 
this effort, and in the joy of its Buccess within the range of their own 
obserration, they had quite forgotten what ie the rea! attitude of the vast 
majority of the adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church. That can 
only be understood by those Id such regions as the Transvaal and its 
Ibordors, who in their ratasionary efforts havB found their path crcseed, 
their labours retarded, their euccesBes crushed by the undying hoatitity 
of the Boer. There are many Boors, good Christian men, who are zeatouB 
and willing to give their native dependants a sort of Chrietian teaching, 
but it is doubtful whethei gven the^e would ailow that teaching to take a 
direction which would giv& progressive advancement to tlie nativA in 
atatuB and educadoD. Yet theae are some of the results without which 
the miseionary'B work reimains incomplete. 

We need not go beyond the Cape Colony to know how bitterly the 
Boar resenta the education of ih« black man. It was oidj lately and 



SETTLEMENT AFTER 



WAR 




wiUuD Hgbt of Tablft Xouttttin IbHt I Hiteaed to » Dutch lady who Ii 
down witk almost vebemont oooTiction ihs foUoving expomtioo of lur 
▼iewa : " EducatioD of the coloured people was no uae, it onlj apoUtd 
lliem. There ought to be a law made, that dvwj coloured penoa siiotild 
be cowpAlled to Apprentice his children for titre^ ymx^ to the service of 
HHue wlute man. That is what they were made for " Tet this Tm&j 
belongs to the mner circle of reTired reUgioQ iu the Dutch Hefonued 
Church. Id another hotua I had to nt in meeikiie«a under a wild tempest 
of wordB ID wMcb were set forth the iujUBtiot uf a QoTemmeut wUdk 
■Miated the black man to &iiiic«t« hie children, whilst the white peoph 
oould Dot afford to upare theirs from the work of tb* fann to go to Khool ; 
yet t.he»e ^teople were landowneTa ou the northeni slope of the Paart 
cnoimtaia who drctv« in to c)mreb evtiry Sunday with a w^ eel-op 
equipage aod a pur of &|]«iikiQg boreea, Trarelliog tbrough the kanuo 
by trftin seme years ago, I was ftppFOftcbed by a Dutch KefGriDed miiuster, 
who ^tb ui incredulous yet deeply serious air, inquired if I really 
believ^ that tbo«e bkck people had any reoeptire fiuutty for dii-ine 
things, aitd whether it wen «.ny use preaching the Gospel to them, t 
answered hitn lu tbo spirit of geDtleneBS, foi I saw that he oieuit no 
hnfin, and that he was a sincere seeker after truth. 

To gu back to the TntntTAal — that there are many miseiooary ststioni 
Lbere is true onougb. The misffiotiRjy Is tolemted aod lof^ked down upon 
u belonging to an icferior order of clerics. He must be discreet— ha 
must teach bis Hock to be submisaive to their superiors and coutenied 
with that state of life iu wlucb it has pleased Providence to plaoe ihecu. 

Reftnlutions supporting the policy of the Imperial QovercmiKit^ decLuing 
that the pnseni war is the result of a long prepared design to drive out 
the British Government from South Africa, and to substitute a Duicb- 
spoftking dominion a* tho reault of a war of aggresKiun and conquest; 
and afl^miiny; their coufi^leace ia the High Conimissiouer ha£ also been 
|iasHtid by — 

1. The Baptist Cburcb of South Africa, 

2. The Cape Town and District Congregational Aesodatioii. 

3. The Gon^gational Union of Natal 

4. The Durban Cbuteh Conncil. 

5. The Maritzburg Church Coundl. 

6. The Evaugelical Church Council of Port EUzabeth. 

7. The Evangelical Ministers of Kimberley. 

8. The Loyedale Mi^ijiobary Itistitution uf the Ftm Chorch of 
Scotland. 

9. The Cape Town Presbytery of the Pre*byterian Church, 

10, The King William's Town Presbytery of lie Prwbyterian Church- 

11. The Natal Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church. 
12* The Adelaide Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church, 



APPENDIX III. 389 

13. 'J'he Kaflfrwian Presbytery of the Free Church of Scotland. 

14. The KafTrarian Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of South 
Africa. 

15. The Gape of Qood Hope Synod of the Wealeyan Uetfaodiet Church 
of South Africa. 

16. The Clarkebury Synod (Native) of the Wesleyan Methodist Church 
of South Africa. 

17. The Queenstown Synod (Native) of the Wealeyan Methodist Church 
of South Africa. 

18. The Conference of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa. 



U 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



APPEITDIX IT. 



FROM THE STANDPOINT OF AN IMPEBIALIST, 

Sm Alfbcd MiLtTKK on Looa^l Patbiotibii axd CrriSKxxHip or 

Tho follgwing flpeeeh hy Sir Alfred Mjlner, High CominwQaoBr for 
South Africa, wqa delivered to a deputation of the QuUd of Loyal Womsk 
of Bouth Africa, attendiuj; to present an addresa to the Queen. Th« 
report is taken from the Capt Arffus of S5th April, 1900. 

It U hardly uecedgary for me to aasure you thai it will give me gntt 
plsftBure to aend home thia address for HubuuBsioti to Her Majesty. 1 
venture lo tbink, thuugh pefhape I go beyond tny provibce in saying bo^ 
that among the ionumerable demooatTatlonB of loyalty and affectjao, of 
which ihe ia the recipient, this addreu will poBsesa a peculiar intereit 
and value, because it cotneB from South A^ca,. because it oomea from 
the women of South Africa, and because it epringe diractly out of the 
great crisis through which South Africa iit at pre»«Dt pa^alug. I have 
been Joaking back to see when it waa that 1 first heard of the mDvomsQt 
which has resulted in th« fonciation of tkjs Guild, oud t Bnd it waa jurt 
before Lord Robert* left Cape Town, before the operations which led to 
the relief of Kimberley and Ladyemtth, at the moment when 

Tax TrDK of Rebeluon 

in this Colony had reached high wat«r mark, and the hopeA of tbe enemy 
were at th«ir highenl. They are dm fair weather friendfi, the Loyal 
Women of 8- luth Africa (uheeta), neither are they, [ fancy, iu the ordinary 
couraej much of pohticion*. But there are crises iu the history of every 
State when tlie Latent regervefi of strength in thow sectiuna af society 
which are uHually the least political, naturally and rightly show excep- 
tional Botivity. It in euch an impulse, a generous and s)>oDtaneous 
impulse, which haa led you, women of South Africa* iu one of the graveot 
criaee which has ever thr«itened Her Majesty'^ Throne and Empire, to 

RaLLT BolTND TOOB SoVEKEIflN, 

herself a womun. the most auguit and venerable figure on the world's 
stage. But when I say that, do not suppose that I think that your move- 
ment bepnn and ends with an enpresfiion of personal dcToticm, however 
deep. WhAt I H|)ecinlly welcome about the BtAtement of pH^ciplee 



APPENDIX IV. 



291 



I 



ccmtajued id your address ia its wide outlook, its appreciation of wliat is 
msuit by citizenship of the Britlah Ecopira. That ia wkftt we lUl Dned 
■0 greatl^f qot only in t\w Cape ColoQy, or in the Colom«& geaerallft but 
qait« ^ muob in Great Britam itaelf. 

Do not think it is iccoDnstent with locaJ patriotism. Quite the rerers^. 
The latest political red herring is an attempt to coqfuse the mioda of 
men about the real i^sue at the bottom of the present Etruggle, which is 
aimplj whether this country sball be inside or outside the British Empire, 
by repreaenting it as & struggle between those who think first of the good 
of South Africa, and those whose intereBts and sjmpathies He outside. 
In future we are told that we are only to have two parti&s here — South 
Africans and UitUndera (laughter), but the difficulty of this ingenious 
idea ia, that it takes twa Xo make a fight Before you can get two bodies 
uf men to engage in CDnibat> they muet both euft, and, as it happens, 
there is no such thing ia exiBtence, either here or in Great Britain, as an 
UitUnder Party, if that meanB a party which wiehea to see South Africans 
gOTsnied in any other interest but it« own (cheerB.). I am, I believt, 
Hupposad to be a typical Imperiahat (bear, hear). Speaking o& an 
ImperialiBt, I can only say that it Is no^t only conBiHtent with ray political 
creed, but it is an esBential part of it, that South Africans should be 
goremed in the interest, and by the agency, of the people whoeo lives 
are bound in it (cheers), who feel for it, and who work for it, as their 
home. Bat the 

Spirit of Local PATRioiiaM, 

which I for one de'sire to se6 etrengthened, not weakened, is liable to two 
ftbeiratioDa. It is a mistake to think that such patriotism can only be 
found, or only eiiat in full measure, ia bom South Afritiana. Nothing 
can be more unwise in a young country than to make distiuctiona 
between those who are bom in it, and thofie who have come from outside 
provided they are equally attached to it^ equally preiNured to serre it as 
their home (cheeni). And it ia eTe<n a greater atid more vital mistake to 
ngard a d^TotioD to South Africa as iDConsietcnt with, much more «s 
antagonistic to a devotion lo the Brilbh Empire. If there is utie thing 
O'f which I am abflolutely convincftl, it is that the highest iuieresta of 
South Africa itself make for its inclusion in that great aasociation of free 
and self-governing cnnimimitiea which h known aa the British Empire — 
(chears)— -and the existence of which as a unit of invincible power, ii 
eawntial to the maintenance of the political tdeala which these eom- 
munitiea have in common, and which mean bo much for the whole future 
of humanity. It ia jis htgheftt marit In my eyes that the boiJy, whose 
muDbers I am addxeeaing, recognisfl that fact, and that their object is to 



1 

I 
I 



393 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



vprmA itc recog^itioIU And t^ Ivtd* me to makt one remuk mSi 
ngud to your cntinL I do Dot refer to hostile cntia whan ittacfa M 
n haDOur and ibDotd be fiDcocragemcnt— {bnghtflr Mod chei) kt 
critici of your own Ijousebold vilO tA beart sr? at ooe with you, Klkd «itb 
whom joa would wish to af^iSd wn the iikiuiow of a mivuDdentsadlig. 
I can sympBittuH with Hime wfaou loyaltr to tfa« Throcw and Bat|af» it 
quite uodoubled, ssd who nj: "WbU need u ibere that w afaoiiU 
pror«fl our loyalty* or form an auociatiDD to dei&oiisCrate it?" Ani. 
certaiQly no ana would dream of prenuig thfrne who han thftt fading, 
to join in any public moTemeot if that method of oontdbuting tikeir quou 
to the rtock of cotnnion effort is uscD&genial to tbcm- But I fancy they 
somewhat miscoDceive th« object of those who &re pfeeetit here umIst. 
That object is not to demonstrate their own loyalty^ which ift qiUtii 
umiecesMtry, but to help to ipread aad itrengthen thraugbout the oddi- 
TTiuDity a acDH of what loyalty in ila true wnt>e really means (cheer*). 
Can any one say that in this country^ at thia time^ tbat ie a work of 
■ujK-ren^atiou? That ia ime criticiem. But tben there is anothert and 
agun froiD friendly quarters. I h«ar there are »ome who think that ynu 
are not iu£&ciently exclufiive, that this CriuJd is drawiog u> iteelf adbereota ] 
from among thoae wbo do not feel, or have not at all timee felt, as strtjogly 
aa Home of us do, the honour and privilege of cituenahip of the Britiib 
Empire^ or wbo do not agree in elII reK|^ecte with every aspect of Imperial 
policy. But if that is true, it Kems to me to be a rtwoa for Mlisfadioa 
rather thui the contrary, and shova that 

Thb Gdild 

it plready dcnng gowi work, by uniting thoee who, despite mmor, ami 
peTbaps Berioui differeccee, ftre prepared to take their Btand on one 
broad j^iUtfonn of Imperial jietnotimi. 1 don't care what the differences 
laay be in other reepecta. If any one ift able to HuhBcribe heartily to the 
pfincipleH laid down in your prograram*, it is good enough for me. la 
ooncluoion, I wieh to my one word i-n a personal matter, though I am 
iorry to introduce the peraonal note at all on an occaflLon of thii kind. It 
is one of the principles of thia guild to loyally strengtheD the bauds of 
the Imperial Government and of Her Majesty'K repreftentative in tbia I 
land, and in handing me your iiddre»H you have been kind enough tal 
H]ieak in very Htiong terms — in terms which 1 feel to be too ittrong. thoughl 
I Bill grateful for the kind feeling which prompted them — of the action 
and services of Her MajeRt-y^fi prepent repreiwntative in this Colony. 
Now, I see a very great ditference between the cordial support of Her ■ 
Majesty's repreaentativo au bet- representative — eapecially at a time offl 
great itational danger, aod when he haa hh hand? fuU» and more than full^ 
in upholding her lawful authority in this country (cb«ere)t and the approval 
of the particular methods and acta by which he maty BtrivOf however con- 




■cientaouBlir, (a fulfil that duty, Ceituuly he may clum that great 
allow&DDe flhould be made for him, that his actiona ahoulil be judged 
geDeroualy and aa a whole. But God forbid that he should clEum tu bg 
eiempt from criticiam, even at a time Uk« this. It ia a favourite allega- 
tion of th« eoemy that people are li&ble to be accti&ed of being disloyal 
because they critici^ the action of the Ooveruar. I do not believe that 
this 13 ac, bat if it were do, it wuuLd, franUy epeaking, be absurd. I 
deprecate auy attempt to invest the Governor with a aacrosauct character, 
as I deprecate the iDtoleraut spirit, the moniii of siispiciout ^t preBGot 
abroad in warn quarters, which would even oBtraciBe people whoBo 
essentia] loyalty la Qot open to queetiuD, becauee on thitt, that, or the 
othwr point of a widely involved contraverey, they may not agree with tho 
opinion of the majiirlty of loyediHta. From that auspicioua, that, ictoleraDt 
Bpirit, I believe tho Guild of the Loyal Women of South Africa to be 
cctirely ftee (cheeni), and that is one of the many reasons why I welcome 
it and look forward hopefully to Lt« future. Faithful to the SoTereign^ 
faithful bo South Afrii^a, and faithful to the Empire, ita membera havti 



I 



I 



A Osur Woas 

before them Ln tho coming daya,, not only the reinAining daya of what is 
BtiU a critical struggle} during which all our energiea must he centered on 
enauring the triumph of our cause (cheers), but in tho Bubeaquont period 
uf reconstruction and development on new and broader lines. For that 
v^ indeed require the etrenuoua, the uniwlliBh, the patient efforts of all 
loyal men and women^ working iu a spirit of generoeity and compr^ 
hen«iiveDess in order Co place thla country for ever beyond tho danger of a 
renewal of intestine strife, uj make it a strength, aad not a weaknee«, to 
the Emptra, and a happier placa to Uro in» for those of every race, than It 
u been in the immediate i 




294 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



APPENDIX V. 



FROM THE STANDPOIXT OF THE TRADER. 
Trade asd ths lastm ok trb Wa*. 

A Ic&ding trade journbl— tJbe BrittMh an4 Boi^ Afriema Export 
{ToMiMft—cootaiaBi in & recent Dumber an able arUd?^ from which an 
extracted Ihe followiqg uwful reflectioan dd the ieaue of tlie war in Its . 
bearing on the c-omiDorciiJ intereBtt of the world ; and on the ■ettlemeat j 
after the war from the eame point of view. 

The Kbw '* Progrem ahd Potbrttt," 

The particft in the fteld repreficnt the opposing forces of progresA i 
and reaction. Tbooe who fight under the bminer of " Afiica for thel 
Afrikauders" are Sghling to make South Africa a dose pveerre fori 
thenuelvea and their deaceDdanta. Thoy are deaf to all appeals for 
enligbteiiBd advance ; they care nothing about utilising the resouroea of 
IhD ooontry ao long aa they can Uvt; in tb&ir traditJoDal aioth, Thoy 
simply desire not to be bothered 'nith agriculturai iuiproTemeats nor 
comiTiercial activities. The busybody fiom Europe would have no pUoe 
in their commonwealth ex,cept as the helot to work mineral de^x»U for 
their benefit, or develop other nutive induBtri^a on a percentage to the 
State. The Afrikander Republic would be a Republic of prohibitive 
import dues, of eiisJaved natiTO lalxiur, of cppreseiwe land tenure, of cheap 
brandy and dear bread, of few railwayB, of a scanty white pojiulation liruij; 
in patriarchal ease u^xin a tributary working conimuiuCy, white and black. 
The twentieth century, which is being weJcoraed by the rest of the world, 
would never enter South Africa if by any ixtfwihility the Boers should 
prove victorious in the present campaign;. For it must not be forgotten 
that chough wa are only fighting the burgHera of the two Republics, the 
ideas which animate tbem are held just as ardently by the Dutch popula- 
tion of the Cape Colony and Nata!. The fight is to settle whether South 
Africa IB to be made a aeeond China or to be thrown open to the capital j 
and enterprise of the world, 

A PoLicT Of Oten Mabsets. 

The Britiah spirit in South Africa, as opposed to the Dutchf ib for tha 
fullest and freest powihlo exjmTiBiou tif the »ul>-Cuntiiient'a resources, for 
udliaing the free labour of the black, for aboUsbing all t«m that hamper 



APPENDIX V. 



ns 



iradd aiid induKtr/. Tbe«e etrs aU objeotft which beftr ittitnfidiBtd relation 
to oommerce^ and cotmnerce in South AfriCA Accordingly h&e had to play 
the part of a vigomus political combataDt, To read the reaalutioDigi of the 
South African Chambers of CommerM, and compare thorn with the pro- 
oeediugfi of the DuU^h political organisatious, would make one helieve 
that both pronouncements were equally the issues of s vigorouB party 
pTDpagauda. But commerce baa fought in Tam for most of the reformn 
she has asked for. The Dutch have been the predommant power, and 
they have set thamMlveB with the most uniDtelligent doggedoBBH to reeist 
any propoaal which might interfere with their narrow conceptioD of their 
own inLerostB, 

A New Tbade Kfooh. 

Now, however^ at the dreadful coAt of a detiperate war, comnierce is to 
gain a Voice of authority. The task of reconstituting the shattered fabric 
of South African poUtics will devolve upon Great Britain, and we can feel 
the utmost confidence that her object will be to easure the fullest freedom 
iae the ecoaoniic dovelopment of the country. The ■converaion of the two 
Boer iUpublica into Britinh territories will moan an enormoua change In 
the political tendBDCieB of the Cape Cblotjiy. The iwcret Pan-Afrikander 
amhitioDs of the patil inw years will have to be abandoned, and the con- 
tinued malntenaace of many ahtise^ whiuh recently ueemed impregnable 
will have ceased to be within the limitH of practical politics. Then Natal, 
wtuch IB refreshingly Britinh and vigorously commercial, willl be given a 
Btrongur position in the making of Bouth Africa than it has hitherto 
anjoyed. No doubt the winmng of tbe war an^i the pacidcation of the 
two Republics are tolerably arduous preliminarieB to the general recouBti- 
tutioD of government. But the subject is of such vast importance and 
intricacy that one cannot very well be pn-mature in ditscusaing it. 

The "DoiHNtoN op South Afbida.*' 

There i» a great deal to be aaid, for example, for and agunut the I 
projected Dominion of South Africa. Whether the war will leave the ^ 
country in such a condition that the fr^nente of old inatitutionB can be 
pieced into thia whole of political fedcrstioa h a quoBtion which only a 
bold man wjll attempt to answer. But, whatever the progpectB of (wlitical I 
unity may boi the conditionA are already prepared for commercial unity. [ 
It will be for the trading intereets of the country to &m that both in tka 
remodelling of tkn Boer G-ovemments and }n the formulation of the larger 
Bcbeme of South African adn^initstration ae a whole, every nieana are 
adopted to relieve commerce of the many absurd and injurious reHtrictiona 
which at present retard her progress. Id the 8ucces]i)ful construction of a 
new commercial Hystcm everything depends upon a clear recognition of 
the force and eQ'ect of existing convicting tendcnci^ and Interttfita- It 



20 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Beenui to us, therefora, worth wbilo to point out, eveo during the 
of tho great struggle between BriLon aiA Boer^ the i^buBea which am 
pr«tene (»mpluDed of in the commerci&l cunditionfi uf th« country ud 
lh« remedieB which are moBt likely to prove suoceuful lu deaUiog with. 
ihexxi. Eritiiih maitufacturen know haw enormous hu boec the raccat 
ftdrknce in the value uf Soutli African tnde de^pitQ thase ahuM^i. Whu 
cui plAce Any limit to itii growth if thaw ahuBes wen removed and Iha 
magnifioeDt reeourcw of the Bub-ContineDt w«re thrown open to the 
onterpriBf md capita] of the outside world ? 

Free Trade Txaeus pBOTBonax. 

To snmo ext«nt the economic pompon of South Africa resembles thai of 
Gtreat Dritain at the time of the great Com Law agitation^ The fiecaj 
eyBlem h&H 1>eeii detiignod tmtirely in the intoreita of the producer as 
agaioBt those of the couBumer. That the import tariff has not been oon- 
Htrticted on a. fraokly prohibitive hasis !« due to the fact that the producer 
IB Bo poor a haud nt production as to b«i of sheer DeceBsity A h«Avy con- 
flumer loo. But the spirit of the country's fincal policy is unequivocally 
Mpoecd, beyond any dispute, by the chtppiug on of extra duties to meat 
and breadAtuffB when these oonmiodidet hegan to be largely imported 
from Auatralia and America. Where the poaition in South Africa differ* 
from that in Kngland in the ihirtiw and fortl&» in in the fact that no party 
in the State is quite prepBred to advocate unadulterated Free Trad*. 
Thiii, of courfle, ia exjiliinod by the fact that there is no huge induBtrlai 
p4:>pii1ntioa in South Africa, bh there was in England, to whom cheap food 
meabB thiQ potwihility of a tolerable csuBttiLioe. Beaidea, it is generally 
roct^nised in South Africa that the development of the soil ii realty a 
prime necoBBity of & prosperoue development, and the conHumiog portion 
of the community h quite ready to make some reasonable eocrifioes in 
order to stimulate the growth of floeks and herd?. But even amotgat the 
town populations in the Capo Colony and Natal, and far more strongly 
amongBt the mining communities of the Tranevaal and KhodeBJa, there is 
spreading the hittercBt indiguation against a policy which impose froah 
duties on ovcrnea food 8.up]ilies while thfs native prodaction u far below 
even lbs preaont proportiono of a continually growing detnand. 

Commercial Union. 

It follows from these facts thai commercial union for British South 
Africa cannot come, aa it has been hoped in the patit it would come, froni 
the universal adoption of the Customs Union tariff, although with the 
abolition of th« Bpocial tariff of the Transvaal it will be the only tiscal 
scheme in bcIuhI op«ratioci. It is true that Natal hA« lately Bubscribed 
»>Bent to that very aqomaEouB tari^n Bnt she entered the UoioQ 



APPENDIX V. 



397 



I 



grudj^ngly, obA ma.iiily becauBe ahe vtiu aaxlouji to avoiii any cut^tKroat 
coibpQtitbti for tlie rraiiavAal trade. An to Rhodesia, the a{;ceptan<:& of 
the Cap« Colony tariff is one of the keenest grievancea of the jieople agninat 
their jwiministr-iti 'D. lodeed, on© «:aiiifiJt aspect it (o stMid ii« a por- 
muueDt principle of tixiitioa thnt miners in uim cnuniry ohould pay 
iinnecessarily dearly for their foud and drink in order Ui iupjvrt tlie 
farmcnt Aiid distillerB in anotlior. Bo» ff^r m Britinh innuuractiirem Arc 
concerned, they have hardly anything to ctnniilaiti of in the Ciiutoins 
UlniMti tariff, beyond A few anDinaliea and i(tii|iiditia!i such <*■» are to ba 
fotind in (dl tariffs. The de)d-8«L of th6 '^ciulh-Afric la jiroiecticnist is 
not ag^nst imiDfACt tires but agaJiiBt foodstuffK. If, however, the war is ta 
FQtmh in any scheme of li&ual federntion for tho aiib-Cotilinetit, rlio 
Imperial anthocitieB who have made such a measuro possiblo will certtiinly 
bftve a right to dfimuid that it shall be made a lueasuro of aMiatancQ lu 
Imperial trade. 

FntCAL FKDEftATION OP TUE EhPIBE, 

The idea of special favouring taritls within the Empire has mado huge 
progress ninco the days when Mi. Khodas was e^tiuhbed for a tetitativo 
attempt to put it into practice. The new tariff of a United South Africa 
might very well give Britieh (or, Tather, Imperial) gooda au advantage 
over Contiuental and other foreign merchaodise. The country is a large 
importer from AuAtralaaia ruid India as well aa from Great Britain, and it 
hfti practically nc trade intereiita that are Worth coDKerving with any 
foreign Power. The onij objection winch can b© rajj!*! to this proitoiml 
la ita effect upon revonue, but it ie probable that any diminution inouetoiub 
rec^pts would be more than oompenaatad for by an all-round eipausioa 
uf trade. 

IsTKft-SonTH Apeicau Taks Tbads. 

The *' free mterchflngs of South African produota " is the one prineiple 
of the Ouatorufl Union which the reorganisers of the fiecal aysioiin, lo 
include the Transvaal, icould roogt heartily and oniphaticalty eodorBe. 
The atupid and vindictive policy of the Tranavaa! — which has ebut out 
Cape tobacco wbllo it haa let in Delagoa Bay iBpirit — has undoubtedly 
proved a severe handicap u{>on the producing induatries of South Africa- 
With the old barriers removed, and with the freah influx of capital and 
enterprise which will follow upon British control^ there uught to be an 
cstraordinary growth in the farming,, fruit-growiDj^, and viticultural 
activitiea. The ol deists fas liii.iDed Dutch landowner wiU have to recognise 
that he U face to face with new conditioiia after the war, and the eoil of 
South Africa wiU cease to be an example of bow it la poseible to make 
nothing of the gifta of nature. There will no lon;:er be that arti6cia 
inflatloB of produce prices which iu the poAt baa ao largely reduced the 
Xi$fxseity for agricidtiira) ex^rtioo. And in tlie Traof^^^aal the distreaaetl 



age THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

hmxj^ui will act longer be able to draw m mbtvaXMiin frma ti>« puUie faab 
WcMin he has do mind to cuUi'nle bii (krxa. 



Railvat RxroBic 

WUb a iui<v«r«U im\<i}rl UmS^ and with the aboli^on of wurtdtt 
dntui oa linport«d ToodatuJft. the principal e^iU of which Uw SaaOil 
Afrkao trader hai bad to c»m[dain woold he ranched. Such matten m 
poatal and telej^ph aDomaliet are onlj nutUcrt of detuL There remaiim 
however, ibe grtat qowtion (»f the railw^ji, la tb« paat, unfortunatelXK 
the railwajra have heen much too lar^lj used as jioUtical jnatrumiota. 
The British Colonie* caoiict be held guiltleBs of exploidtig the rveouitM of 
the i&tflrior for fche benefit of reTeaiu^ dot of making oae branch of trafBc 
hear tb« bwdeD of oihers leas profitable. In the Cape Coloay there h» 
been followed a cheese-pan itg policy of building local lines ocit of ibrtmgli 
traffic e&nimgi^ when at once the bold and the wise coiine wotild ion 
becHi to float a now rvlway loan and to enter upon a Ing Kch^me of extcn- 
Bon. The« heresies are notbini, however, to the petty luaievolmca with 
which ihe Netherkndfl Railway Company of the Tnnsraal has boca 
employed by the Transvaal Ouvtrnmcat to furward iw pet #ch#nw n( 
crnibitiv out Brili-h cunirai-rciaJ supremacy within ita territoriia. Whfu 
the ImjieriaL autbori(Je» take over tti« functiuna "f Mr. Kruger's Gorcra- 
tnent, they will, of coune, &Mume its obligationri tawdnlB the railway 
com[<anieB. Thty may be depeode:) u]ion to estAblish a more equitable 
ayiteni uf through ratca fnim the jiorts, ab&indoniu^ tiic fuoUah policy of 
placing ubataclev in the way of tiade^i development aliam the line of IcMt 
rMislanca. It will not be long, probably, before the TransTaal railway 
■ystflrn becomL-n tlie property of the Stati'. It will then only be reaaonablD 
to expect that the traDBport of gc-d* for the np-couotry mintng iudiutries 
will, for the first time, be pkced upon a thoroughly wmnd economic baaia. 
There are, Uxi, many detaLla in the loca? working of the NetherlandB 
Elailway, of which both the mines and the roerchanta have the ittronge«t 
reaaon to complain. One of the griovanoea of impottEm ii the frequent 
jmpoesibility of putting the rc&punaibiiity for loss and dAoiflgc in transit 
up»n any one of the aeveral railway authoiitlea, and the freighter's coriae- 
quent inabitity to obtain any redrena. There is no doubt that the general 
ftdjustnient of ratee mifht be made on the Netherlaoda Byntem with »ory 
great advaotage to freighlcra. The «mftl! inHtahnfifflit of reforms which 
was granted a couple of yeat^ ago by no meuiB exhaoated ibe capabilitici 
of conceaston in this direction. 

THANSVAAL MeBCHANTB' GRffl-^AtfCM. 

The quoftUoDB of tariifa and of railways are qneiCions in which under 
the promised federatioD the whoW of South Africa will be dealt with. 



APPENDIX V. 



»99 



Bttt before federation is considerfld fcbe Imperial autHorities will haye to 
curj out the important and difficult preliminftry of reorgftDJBing the 
ftdminiBtrtitioQ of the two HepubltCB. There are no commercial prohlmnft 
in porticulttr to be dealt with in the Orango Free State, but almont ttie 
whole body of the UiUandera' grievsuceft in the Transvaal la made up of 
oppreBfiioDB and exactions upon trade. It ih Deedleea to point out htiw 
intimat^^ly th« intereiitft of merchants and Btoreteepors are b<.'UEid up witb 
the profl]iorlty of the mineB, and with the wideapread movement in mining 
enterprinc which in certain to follow upon the eitabliabraont of Britifih 
control. But it may lie pointed out that the wholesale evaaion of tljo 
native Liquor Law ha^ meant an enormuus drain upon the native detimud 
for all other commodities, Th«n there is tbij quwtion of the treatment of 
AriatioBt Mr. Hjuger'e proposal was to inaist upon the confinemeDt of 
Adatici, both for Crading and residence, in locatians. Agaioflt ihia pro 
poaal thd Imperial Government proteaC^d on the ground that it was a 
breach of the Convention. Probably the majority of wholeaale Iraders in 
the Transvaal would prefer the luitintenance of the present freedom for 
Afliatic-8, with a strict&r enforcement of aaaitary regulationfl, and they 
would certainty object to any kgisbition which would favour ihelr further 
increase. Anuibf^r matter of ulinost et^ual couR^u^nce to bulti mining 
and qommBrce Is the quealion of native labour BXfpply. Something lite 
free trade should be eatabiyicd in this traffic in place of the ill-adviiied 
pan regulationti wliich havB served only iis eiiCourag>ementa to tlie flagrant 
dishonesty of Boer f-iflicials. It ie not tc« much to say that a native 
labour BUpply at once plentiful and Bobcr would mean the beginning of a 
new industrial era in South Africa. The eflfect upon the community's 
conauining power of lower import dues and railway ratea need not be 
dwelt upon. Nor i» it Decennary to di^cuBQ such minor matterR as trading 
licennea, jxilice protection, and munici[>ai administration. It may bo 
worth (wintiug out, however, that the theory of Transvaal juriBpniilance, 
as eatabliahed by the autocrat Kruger, gave positively no security of title 
to property ; and it will be readily underitood what sort of an influence 
thia fact ex.ertedi upon commercial euteri^nrise in the last days of the 
Rdpublic. It ia )mp<>e8ible ta my what the aggregate benefit to British 
maoufacturcrH of a healthy coudition of things in the TrnuEvaal would Ira. 
Probably it woutd amount to several millions of additional purchaHce 
annually.^ But what is certain Ik tbat after this war, Johanneaburg will 
foUow in itA old courses and once more *' beggar exfnctaCion." 



The Kcosomio Ideal. 

It ia perfectly obvious, therefore, that cnmmerce baa a very substantial 
concern in the lamentable strugglie now pri>ceeding in South Africa, and 
tbat it will have much to say in the reorganiBation of affairs which will 
fcUow upon the conclusion of hoBtilitieB. In many of hi cotitentiotia 



300 THE SETTLEllENT AFTER THE WAR 

tnde will nm counter to the Tiews of <Ahja interasta, thoogh «e bdicn 
th»t the policy we here fonnulated would be found to benefit in the long 
run every dau of the community. It is well, therefore, that the rcfn- 
•entatiTes of conunerce ihould determine upon the mttitode they will 
adopt, and that they should be prepared to prerent any perpetuatico d 
the anachronisms and anomalies which have hindered the ecxnonuc 
development of South Africa. It would be a thooaand pities if ths 
effusion of blood and the sacrifice of life which the settlement of pending 
questions by war has involved should leave unaltered any of these abutei. 
Many of them are local in their working and must be left to the gradual 
operation of local opinion. But the whole trmd and tme of ojHnion in 
South Africa will depend uptm the wisdom and breadth of view of the meo 
who are entrusted with the task of setting up a new scheme of adminis- 
tration in the conquered Republics, and with the greater task of federating 
the several territories into one free, [vospenMU and progressive common- 
wealth. 



APPENDIX VI. 



301 



APPENDIX VI. 



I 

I 



PBOM THE STANDPOINT OF A PROGRESSIVE BUROHER 
OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 

THB OhASQB FrKB StATB AITD PbEBIDKST KRBOEa'S POLICT. 

Tlie Special CurreBpotidetlt of th^ LobdoA Time* at Blo^mfotitflill Hods 
an iDtereBting deHjatch, ■datwl 25th April, lOOO, from which the following 
extracts are tfiten. They contain the views of a Progreseiye burgher of 
the Free State, the jiarty lately led hy Mr. J. G. Fraser, who, to tho loM 
of all South Africa, vrns defeated in the PreBldeDtial glectioD of 1896. 

Few chapters in the hietory of Ilie JeveloproeDt of Hiat anti-Britiab 
movement which finally culmiuaterl tn tho preaent war in South Africa 
could be more Interesting th&B that dealing with the jiolitical relations. 
betwuti the Oraugo Free State and the TranBvaal. 

Both Republics had their origin in the Great Trek, But, though both 
fipraog from thnt movemeut of discoDtant with Britjah nile, budJi bb it 
was in the tbirtiesi, there was a great difierence in the degree of the 
diaccmteot. A large flection of the emigrant fannerH waa composed of 
men of adTecturous Domadic habits^ impatient of all control, and bitterly 
liOBtUe to all those elements of modem civiliBatian which British influonce 
re[ffeBent«d. It, waa these who, when in 164@ <3irect sovereignty over tho 
country between the Orange and Va&l fiven wa» resumed by Sir Harry 
Bmith^ decided to cross over into the tben almost unknown regionA 
beyond the latter river^ and founded various turbulent little States carved 
out of territorieR cojujueretl from the natives. These ultitnately coalcRced 
into a. eingle republic, which assumed to itself the ambitioua title of the 
South African Hepublic. Tho^ oa the other hand, whose grievancen 
had been largely temporary and local, and who realined the odvaQtages of 
some form of ntahle govemment,^ remained in the fertile country Aouth 
of the Vaal, and, being joined hy many immigrants, Dutch, English, and 
Oermau» became the fathers of the Free Staters of the preaent generation. 
Thus there was from the very 6rst a great difference of character between 
tlie two Republics, and for many yeare after the retroceosion of the Free 
State intercourse between it and Cape Colony vha umch closer than 
between it and the Transvaal. There grew up in South Africa during the 
sixties and scTeaties a Dutch natioualiRt aepiration, aiming at the ulti- 
mate creation of an united Dutch South Africa from which English rule 
should be eliminated. This aspiration was chiefly fostered by foreign 



yn 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



ImmLgnajits, Ilolkuden vidi G^rmana, who came to eeek tiieir (otwntt in 
LhB Republics, *iid bj some of the more educated VDoag the Cupv Dtttch 
who had studied m Euiope, &ad there imbibed the rievrs ftbout Dalwoil- 
ism vhich were in £ubioa wiUi the geaeration th&t followed ike b^" 
imtionaliat, half-Libem] moTeniA&t of 1848. Oobapicuoua mlDOttg then 
were men lik0 C&rl Borckdohageii^ a. t^entadt ajnbitious and tmscnipukMB 
Oermao, who, thn^ugh the medlam of hia jounul, Lhe Bioem/onUm 
Sapnta, and Btill more through theenormouE. Hccret inSuence he exmami 
over Frfwideot Reitz aod his aucceeeor Stepi, devoted aU hie powen to ^ 
the propegation of the natioiuiliit idea of hatred of Englaiui ; F. W..fl 
RdtK, a riiiiDg advocate in Cape Colonfr who afterwards roov to beootnt-^ 
Ohief Justice and Pr^idenl of the Free State, and is now State SecreCaj)' 
of the Tratisvaal ; the Rev. & J. du Toit, editor of the Pntrict—natx 
OODVertad to a souoder appiecialJOD of what the future welfare of Soutli 
Africa deraanda. It was these three men who. in 1882, founded tha 
Arrikander Buod. In President Burgera, too, with hie magnificeui pLiiu 
for the future developmect of the Sou:^ African Republic, theae ratwi 
found a typical represeotatiTe. 

It was tha revolt of 1881, Lhe serie* of defeats inSicted on Britub 
regularn by a handful of Afrikacder fanneni, and the ahort-eighted and 
unexpected suirenJer of Mr. (jladstoDe^ tioTenunent, that gave Hie 
natioiialiftt odpiration a chaiiter in hiatory, a new hope, aod^in Paul 
Kruger — a leader. 

During the war of 1381 large numbers of Free Staters and ooUmiak 
Backed to the Transvaal to join their hioafulk. In the Free StAte manj 
petitions were aigued and addr^sed to PceeLdeDt Brand expressing sym- 
pathy with the Boera and aekiog the President'a interveotion. On 
7th February, 1881, Eniger gent from Hdddberg a long appeal for 
intervention or assistance to Fredideot Brand, eliding with a pawage 
which may well be quoted as eummiag up the object of KnigeA poUoj 
ffoiii that day to thiij : " Freedom ahall ri&e in South Africa, aa the flUb 
ffoni the uioming clouds, as freedom rose in the United SiAteaof America. 
Then shall it be, from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay. Africa fi>r the 
Afrikander.*^ Brood offered his mediatiun, which the British Govera- 
ment, glad to get out of the i^crape as beet it couldt eagerly accepted. At 
the Newcastle coaference Braud practically dictated ike tertna to which 
both parties were to tiubiiut. But, though Brandos sympatluea inoli&ed 
towards the revolted burghers of the Tmn»TBaJ!f he still remained a friend 
to Great Britain. He was far loo sagacioiM to be led astray by the 
nationalist delinum whkh the war awakened an^ong the Dutch all over 
South Africa. He did all in his power to diHCOun tenancy the Bond 
advocated by Borck cubage □ and Reitz as only calculated tt> cau^e future 
miachief. His aaae, far-seeing ixilicy w&a guided by a itincere patriotiflm 
which looked not only to the Orange Prw State, but to the whola of 



APPENDIX VI. 



303 



'South Africa. Ee looked od the British power u a friaodly fAclcr— a 
Jactor esaeutial to the developmeat t>{ ihofe portiona of South Africa 
which it hai retaiued imder its coatrol. Brand's eoraiJaratively early 
doa^ iu 1888 was one of the greatest niisfottUDes that «T«r bef^l! South 
Alrica, u it left the field ckar for Paul Kruger. From the very firat 
Krugei WAB daCanmDed not to refit content with the eettlemeot secured 
for the TransTaal by President Brand. Through the weakness of Lord 
I>erbj he secured ite modificatioa by peaceful means in 1884. But the 
reaction which followed in England Boiii which led to the despatch of the 
Wftiren expedition in the following year convinced Mm that he hod now 
got as much out of Great Britain as he was ever likely to get by peaceful 
request, and that henL-efurward he must took to political intrigue abd 
physical force to help bim in bis further plana. For a time the [w^rty 
of the country, internal dieAeasionR, and the task of maintaining himself 
in power — an object which in bia eyea baa always ranked above all else, 
above even the destruction of the British power in South Africa — kept 
him quiet. Id 1886 cuine the diecovery of the Witwaterdrand with ite 
promiu of immeasufable wealth, to be used not only to keep the President 
in office, but also to Carry otit by the practical instruiaents of armed force 
and lavish intrigue the vague ambitious once cherished by Presideet 
Butgent. The Delagoa Bay railway scheme initiated by Burgers was 
now taken in hand by Kniger with charftcteristic detorroinatioD add 
uuscrupiilotisneesi, and s.b an essential preliminary the Portuguese Govern- 
ment was driven into breaking ita faith with the English company which 
hfld got the concession for the railway to the Tronavaal border. The 
objects Kruger kept before his eyen in those years were Iwofuld. On the 
one hand, hl& aim wa8 to connect the Tran&vaal with the «ea, not only 
through Dehgoa Bay> but by the actual extenvjlou of ita territory to the 
const through Zululand or AmatongaJaud, (to that it should have ita own 
harbour and become economically fre« both of Portugal and the Britinh 
C'lloniets and be able to enter into more direct relatiniiK with European 
Powers which might xup^iort it agaiui^t England ; and, on the other hand, 
to arra hi* own hurghers and render the Free State economically and 
jjolifcically so corapletfily deiwndent on the Transvaal that, when the time 
fthoiiM come either for throwing off the London Convention or for ancer- 
lug some piece of disputed territory necessary for his echenies, he tihould 
have at Lis back a military Power with which nu British Government^ such 
as lintiab Govenimentft then were, would dare to try the issue of war. 

In 1887 two secret conferences took place between the Transvanl and 
the Orange Free State^ dealing with various ecouDmicnl and political 
questiouM, Nothing could give a clearer idea of Kruger's policy towardu 
the Free State than atime brief account of these meeiitigB. The first 
conference took place in President Kruger'a house at Pretoria on 31st May 
and the next two days. There were present on the one side FreBiden 



304 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Kruger with hu SUio Secratarr uid Sule Attorwj, MetiBn. Bok uA 
T^jdc, and ft comniiiBuuti of tlii« TrMivTuJ Vu^jvaad DonntcDg of Uaan 
K. Wolmarft&Hf Kt<'iii«r, TulJAord, LoinlAard, a&d S|««^ and od Uieocbar 
tide * deputoiiOD from Uie Free State Volker^ad «HDpD«ad of Haiinu 
FrMer, KlynvelcL, anil Myliurgh. The TraLUSTul repreaentatiTei anvay 
typiti*!. Above Itwm aU ftand* out the Freeident, who pmctaomy Iwi* 
the whole conference; IcnDwing exactly whftt he wactts, i[idifr«re&t i" 
RTgament, returniag R^aio and a^in ta the ume puibt, hoirerer ofi«n 
refutAi ; incapable of coDvidion, though reAdy »s a. Ust reeort to Wmrr 
his deniandit eUp by step anai claim that he ha« mA(l« b great oonceMK-n 
^Ihc same Kruger m twelve years Uter at BloerofonUna, aaXj here i 
ua the defBnBivB agunet a HUperior intellect and a wfll H vtroilg wt '. 
own, but active,, peraufipdve^ impaBuonod, Bpeaking among men 
capable of subtnitUcg to his influence. At bift side is the smooth ptautihltf 1 
young HcIlfiDder Leydi, t&king do part in the debate, but making hi* 
influence diHcertiible in slnicwt every argument. The mnuiiiedou rF|Tr- 
aeciU Kniger'a BtaJwarta in the Volkaraad, the meo choseD for their 
unqueetiooiiig fidelity to the hand that bae fed them and kept them 
their places, fof their narrow religioiiB and political prejudices aod (^4 
their genuine hatred of £Dgland. Just as the Tr&nsTAal representataT 
tor most i)ur|)08CR mean President Kru^r, so the Free Staien 
Mr. J. Q, Fraaer, Son of utia of those Scotch Freflbytemn cle 
wlio came out lo 8<iLiib Africa in the middle of the century to aup 
iatellectuai detid^iticie? uf the Dutch Kefonned Church, Mr. 
entered the Free State aa a you^ man, and threw in hisrloi u&reienreillji 
witli the country of his odoptiDn, rapidly attracting President Brand 
Altentioti and becoming hie right-hand man, hia political aiUr ego, 
wiiicb cajmcity ho came on thin occasion to Pretoria. After Brand") 
daith Mr. Fra»er resolutely continued the tradition of Brandos pulicy,* 
Wt unfurtiinfltely, tn year by year the induence of the nolaer vnt 
extreiner party led by Reitz and Borckenhagan, and afterwarda by Steytb 
prevailed, hh own hold grew Meaker. In vain Mr. Fraaer for 
prophesied the inevitable result of following the miechievouB jKilicy 
I ho Tranavaal. The mass of the burghecBj ewayed by Bentiment aii^ 
deluded by their belief in Eiiglaud'K weakneao, refused to heed his want-l 
ings. And now Mr. Fraaer hat) lived lo see the little 8tate with whkb ' 
he has m long been identlHed, and which owes bq much to him ^ throw 
nwny its iudependence in defence of hh unworthy and hopeless cause. 

Tlie object with which the Free State deputicB had come was a aingli 
i^ud straightforward one — to arrange for b geneml treaty of amity ou 
commerce which i^hould bring the two kindred titatee closer toother, andl 
more eapeci&Uy to come to eome agreement with n^nrd to the ecbenie t 
building a railway acmaa the Free State from Cape Colony to join on lo i 
proposed Tmnsvaal railway &om tht Vaal to the Wiiwaterarand. 



APPENDIX Vr. 



3P% 



rretori^. Another suggeatioD the deputation hftd came to urge upon the 
Tmnn-aal wa* that of joining a general South Africao CuetomB Union. 
Uiith these Buggeaiions met with Kruger's Btrongwt diflapproval. They 
lueaot bringing Suuth Africa together, linking Ibe Free State in tlytier 
cotumercial, a.x:ial, MiU jtoliticft] relaiiouflhip with the BritiBh poflaenflions, 
iuBteul of bringiug it intu cutnploter '<Je[)eadt!iice on the Triiuiivaal. More 
than that, it n^eont EDirEiah commerce and English immigration on the 
Hand, and threatened tu Hwnni]) hiH carefully -fostered HcliciiieB fur the 
Uelagua R&ilway a.nd fur Oemmn and HoUander iiumigratloa. Through- 
out tlie whuk BoreH uf dlscuBaions at the conference the cantraat betwcGu 
the uttitude of Kruger and the Free State I^eputi^ ia very utrikiug, The 
latter hare come to diHCusa in a straightforward matter of fact way certain 
[ eoonomiral mattcrB of vital intoreat to both IteptibUcs. For Kruger and 
hta comnuHfitonera these ar« all queaticQS of high poUtLCS, to be judgftl 
according as they tit in, or clash with, a ctirtaio inyateriouH Aecrct policy 
to which allusiunFi are constantly dropped. In fact, while the Fr«u 
StaterK talk like business p>:iliticia)ifi, the Tran^iivaalem talk like Htnga 
consptrator*. On the railway quefltion Kruger insifits that the Free Sfate 
ahall not construct, or even Banction, iti railway, or, at any rate, the pkrt 
connecting Bloenifoiitein with Cape Colony, before the Delagoa Riulway id 
completed. Deln^oa Bay iniu<t bo the {wrf. for the Free Stftte^ and not 
an Kngliah port which would let in English trade and bring EagUnh 
influenceH into the land. For in Kruger's eyes Engliflh trade ia the worst 
form of ruin. It muflt bo kept out of the UepubUcH at all oostB. To 
quote his own metapJiorical language : — '* For tlie little iiheep my iloor la 
open; but the wolf I mean to keep out," Or, ae another member of his 
comtoiasioti puts it ■ — " What need have we of the Colony and ita importa- 
tion V The traile they represent to ub as life and prosperity is our death. 
We KepublicB are atroog enough ; let us go together." Agfltaat such 
argmnentK it in uaeleaa for the Free Stately to pleail that (he line i^ an 
urgent necerisity for them, and that there it; no sign of the Delagoa 
Railway being complpted for yearB to coma, or to twk whether the 
Tnmflvaal is quite indifferent Ic Free Sfate intaresta, as long as it can get 
the Free State under its contnil. Krn;i;;c;r entreata them to wait, vow* 
fhat railwayfi ara a dtilufliiin and a t^nara, that for the present the Fret 
State is much better without nne, that to jrpin with Cape Colony now will 
ruin Iha Delagoa Railway or any railway he niay wiith to bnild to a 
harbour yet to be aoqiilred. In time, he promiees them, they shall have 
a great milway Rystem radiating all over South Africa from Pretoria, but 
tiot before the Transvaal ha» made itself abaolufcely independnit of 
English political inflience and ErLfrliah trade. 

Deiagoa 18 a life and death question for us. Help «8l If you hook on 
to the colony you cut our throat. .... Kow can our Bute exhit without 
the Delagofl Radway ? * . . . Keep free I We Bhall help you, fiveu with 



jo6 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



ft eobtributiati if ntotmuj. I wiih to «lur« «itb you, but if yon ttf^m, 
gvt Wo tiiaii baild» if it t&km of toi y«aiiL The Lord n6t»t If 
the Fth Stata will not work with ub, wb BhaU nuika our own huimr 
on cmr own borden. .... If joq Iwild joor line i will not lift it joii 
mine. 

Aa for the Costoma Union, Kroger decUres that the Tnavrul eudd 
&«v«r enter il unle« it had ita own hftrfaaur slqiI wsm free of Ua d ii eadwce 
VD the cPDTentkUk As thing* &re th« Eogliah wiU only q»e Uunr poriliaB 
to pwiodle the Tnnrrul of ita prpper ahair in the ntmpa. Ha entfOM 
the Free State to keep clear of audi a muon. 

No Oialmni union 1 Cuafconu uiuoni are nude bet weea equal Slaltf 
with «qiul acctiaa to harboare, but where om ih mAsiar and the other 
<lepen:dent there can be no union. We are striTiaj^ to aetUe the quflBtaa 
of our own harboar peacefully. 

If r. Fraser Kcptically remarks tluit a harbout requifei forta a&d 
and eoldiera and ftailoiti to man theni, or else It would be at the mercy t 
the &nt pasfiing gunboat. Kruger, «omewhat uetUed, T«plka that» i 
the TraneiTBal hiu a harbour, for^gn Powe» can mtervesie ia ita afiim ' 
The Trans^^ mu&t get into touch with fondgti Fo woit in tiiw of 
eventualitiee. 

The itrength of our poBition lies in our making the Britiah Gorenkmnt 
underetiind that the Hepoblica hold tc^ether. Then we cfia be eore that 
we will he taken into account. .... Let ub Bpesik fr^kiy. \V« are not 
going to be dcpepdeot on England, Take no railway umon — Kouin 
without a rai! way. That ia batter than to take thdr money. Tb« fotoie 
will provide greater bleesingi if you work with ua. Le^t thao keep thdr 
money. t>et them not bind you. The Lord retgnt) — ^none other 
deliverance is near at hand. 

So, too, Mr, F. WolmaranB : — 

We muat look at the matter from the political st^ndpouit of crar 
independeace. We have had much expcrieuce of Uer MnjeBty^a Oovam- 
ment, and we will and miiet fhake our«6lvea free abd become indei«udcDt. 
We are atill in sufficiently prepared {ongtrmt). We wieh to get lo lh« 
sea, more eapecially with an eye to future compUcatiunB. Let us tirat get 
to the flea and Rchi(;v-« our indepeEtdence. Wait a few yean. Why an 
we lo-day worried at DelagoaV Englii^h inSuenoel They wish t<i ke 
UB in bondB and dependence ; that in what we Btruggle agamet. . 
You know uur secret pwlicy. We cnnnot treat the colony a& we wouklj 
treat you. The tsolony would dentrfty us. It ia not the Dutch there thai 
vre are hghtlng nf^aiuat. Time nbiUl i^how what we mean to do with 
Ihem; for the preeent we must keep them oif. 

'J'hese extraeta give some idea of the ho|tee and fcara that *D imatf^ 
President Krug&r and bis fullowers in 1^^7. I'bey hardly miggeat th« 
theory so cotnmon among thoee whose knonl&lgeof ^uth African Aflaifi 



APPENDIX VL 



30? 



I 



I 



li^pns mth New Year'a Day, 18&6, that Kmger bore no ill-will to 
EitgliiDti or the Ebglifih, before the bitter (ttBilluHiomneat of lhu@ Juomod 
rud. 

The FMuU of ibe coDfercnce wu tbat Kruger retiTGd beaLen, Brand 
haTing made it qiaite clear Umt lie would not let the Froe St»to bo draped 
into Kruger'E policy or ^ve up hh jiower of mdepeudeat action as regards 
either the miln^ay or a cuBtomti union. 

In the foUowing year Brand died, and ^as auccseded hy 'Rtn.lx. For a 
while Bmnd'tt influenca Lq tlia Volkn-aad was strong onougb tv act aa a 
cbeck im RuitzV desire to subonlinnte Free State iatereets to TrauBvaal 
ambttioii». Traa^vaa! mAtivlminI»tratioD and the exclusive policy adopted 
towarda iho UitlaDden*, many of whom were Froe StaterH, offended a largo 
KCtion among the more thoughtful (icople m the Free Stnt^. N«Ter- 
dielosH, in 1880 Beits e^uoceeded in concluding a conditioQal defensive 
allianc* with Kruger at Potchefstroora ; and as Brand's influence died 
away the doctrines of Pan-Afnkaaderdom, as expounded by the new 
I^resident imd etill more clcquentty cnntinDed by the growiug wealth and 
]>owcr of the Tran-ivaal, found ready acceptaitco. How far thie change of 
sentiment ba<.i gone by the autumn of 1895, when Reltz reaignod owing 
to mental breakdown, la flliown by the fact that in the prelimlQary 
flfllectioa in the VolkBioad of candidates for the Presidency only nineteen 
Tot« were given to Mr. Frawr as against forty-one given to Mr, Steyn, 
an out-and-out follower of the extreme Afrikander doctrine as preachod 
by Reitz and Bort:kenhagen. In the iDterral betwe^^n tbia fielectlou and 
the actual election came the Jam<isou raid, Fraaer, who had for years 
coudemned Kruger^s policy Upwards the Uitlandera, and could not, there- 
fore, euter into the denunciation of the raid with Lbe same trnqualidod 
fervour of invective at. Steyn, was diaiiBtroualy beaten. Tnnavaal money 
i& believed to have played no Amell \uTt in the ezpebsea of that election. 
Immediateiy after the raid the Free State Volkqraad poMad a reaoEuUoa 
setting aside the FotohefKtroooi treaty and declaring that tho Free State 
burghere ahould be at t!ie dieposal of the Trantivaal if its indeiMudenc* 
were endangered from without or within. In the following year Steyn 
w^nt to Fretoria, where he waft received witb tremendous catbusiasm 
and welcomed »$ the destined PrBeident of the United Eopublics, A 
definite treaty of offeaBivc and defennive alliam^ wan now concluded — the 
treaty under the terras of which the Free State declared war upon Great 
Britain two years later. It wae in vain that the moderate fiarty, headed 
by Prarier, proteebed and declared that there could Ite only one outcome 
of a policy who^e whult: object waa to Htrengthen the TmnsToal in its 
rwolve to Huppreaa tho Uitlanders and defy the Britieh Government— 
nwnelyp war and the deHtruction of the Republics, In a apeecb to Mb 
eonaiituents od 17th March, iH9H, Mr. Fraaer condemned in the strongeBt 
language the misrule and corruption in the Transvoalf and, reviewing th» 

X 2 




3o3 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



whole hi»tor7 of the relatiouii between Ihe two Republice* deoouBcod 
PraeidoDt Btejn for ha.vimg sBcrilicad to d «puriouft seatiment the pnrad 
and indepeodent po^itiuo wot) for the Free St^u bj President Bnnd, ud 
Tor Laving reduc«ct the Free BtAte to be ft vasaal of the South Africu 
Republic, enjoying the extreme privil^e of figb^ng ite euamies tmd pQlicinj 
iti citbseiu without having a voice tn its offaira. The &3Ji&»c6 w&« a shui 
which wu deBtlned to ruin both States. 

Ur. Fhmt'b j)roteflt« fell on deaf ears. PreBident Kroger and hi* 
agents at Bloenifontein had completely pereuaded the people of Uie Pn> 
State that no British Qovernment would dare to challenge the combined 
forces of the two Kepublica to the issue of war, and that beyond diplomatic 
[jrotceu therft wouJd b& HO int^rfercqcH with Kruger*s policy aa long as the 
Republics held closely together. 

The Bloomfontein confereuce Hhade some pretonco at reviving the old 
mediating pohcy of PreBidont Brand. But it w&s only a pretcncm. 
There was no attempt at impartiality; dtill lees could the Free State, 
bound band and foot as it was by treaty^ bring any real pressure to bear 
on il*s ally. Mr. Abrabajn Fischer, a plauitihle, ambiLioos lawyer, 
attended the sittings of tbo conferenoe professedly &r intecpreter, really in 
order to mialead the Free State Volkaraad aa to what poMod. It waa upon 
Lia account of the proceedmgs that the Volhsraad voted ito reiolutioa 
eipretfliag ite complete aatiafaction at Kruger'a fiiBt propoeal*. In the 
HubBijquant negotiatiouB FiBcbeij while actively engaged on peace mEaeioni, 
did no little to make peace impossible. It was be who, in Auguat^ went 
to Pretoria and urged Kruger to refuse the proposal for a joint commiarion 
aa an unwarrantable interference with his independence. Undoubtedly 
it wa» the attitude of MeBttrH. Kleyn and Fi»cher, and of the Volksraad 
which they swayed, that more than anything else Ktreagtbened Prwident 
Kruger in hh reHolve to r«HiBt the Britifih dauiands. The history of the 
last few inoiitbu, the secret scBsioa of the Free State Voiksraad^ where 
President Steyn oj^)enly aijcuaed the British agent at Pretoria of hailing 
deceived and mieWl Mr. Smuts, the correHpondeuce with ^5i^ A. Milaer 
ordering him to withdraw British troops fpjm the Iteisublican fruntiert^ 
the wholesale amiexation of Bntish territory and commandeering 
Britieh Bubjecta to tight againai tlieir allegiain^e are too recent and ' 
known to rcq^viire fuller treatmeob. Newr in biiitory bna the iodep 
dence of a amall, pToa{)eroiiH, and well-governed State been mftre wantunly 
and Ught'-hcartedly thrown away by its rulers than in the caBe of the 
Orange t'reti State. 



APPENDIX VII. 



309 



APPENDIX VIL 



FROM THE BTANDPOINT OF IRtSH COLONISTS IK 
SOUTH AFRICA. 

From the Cope Timee of the 16tb Man^h, 1900. 

IliELAND FOR EVER. 

EsTHUBiASTic Mektino — The Natiosal SESTisncHT— Ibibh 
Reqiweht of Gxjard8 — HiB EicelIjEncy's Policy. 

A represeutAlIve meeting of Imhmeii residenL ia Cape Town was held 
ftt the Inlemationft] Hotel la^t night, under the jiresidency of the Deputj- 
Maygr (Mr. T. J. O^Reilly). Thetre wa« a large atteudauce, induding tlie 
Rev. Dr. McCarthy, tlie Rtiv. Father Moran, the Rev. Father O'Reilly, the 
K«v. J. J. McClure, Dr. Parrelly, MesBrH. J. C. O'Riley, F. L, St. Leger, 
Burke, Ford, Wallace, J. Gabriel, Chfljclwick, W. Black, Ryan, J. E, Wood^ 
and many othere, the hall being well filled^ and the proceedinga throughout 
of on eDthofliaBtic character. 

The Chiilrxaan, m ofienlng the pruceedibge, gald that the present was a 
meet opportune time for tlie Irishmen to come tugcther and pass resoluUouB 
of the nature which would be eubinitted to theia thut night, specially 
considering the unount of vnluur which hiul been shown by the Irish 
troops cow in thift country (cheers). Probably such another occaBton 
Would never come a^^n during their yiotime, and It would be seen from 
the r^oJutiocB that ibe Irifibm^] of the army and navy were to be allowed 
to wear the national embleni, the ebsnirock, on Si Fatrick^'fi day (cheers). 
And further, the valour of the Iriih troopi was going to be marked by 
the formation of an Iriab regiment of Guards, and when they had heard 
the reaolutionB which would be epoken ta he hod no doubt that they 
would be caxried unanimouely (cheers^ 

St. PATKicK'ft Day and the SHAMancE, 

Dr. FarreUy moved the first resolution in the following terms: "That 
we Iiuhmen, m public meeting aGsenibled, reoogniie that our couctrTmou 
in Her Majesty's eervice have added freah laurels to the national honour 
and thank Her Majeiity for acknowledging thisir merit by her order to w^r 
the shamrock on St. Patrick^e Day, her intentioD of fomiing an truh 
raiment of G'Uarde, and of paying a visit to our country, where a loyal 
and enthufllaatic welcoiue awaits her. And that this resolution be banded 
by the chainu&a to HIb Excellency @ir Alfrad Mjluer for tranunjaaion to 




3»o 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



Her MaJMty.* Speaknig to the wwthitino. Dr. Furellx Mad that tbc 
pnMDt oeeaikn mulnd tlw hmpmm^ of lufiidBr timn «Uefa wo* in 
■ton fef than. Ha Ihougbt that after many eaotmiw w>'g**"»'"***, Itii^ 

mm, SooAcfaman, and Wridtawp had larnt to aifnetate oba uMilTin^ 
qiulitiea, Tfa« Qwa'a aciwb a n^ird to t|i« t ha mrocfc, aTw jiJii a ■■( 
admil to be a moat graosfoli wpognition of the tia*iiMal wmtimtgait, a naa^ 
nitiDD of tbe Iciah ■• » csonatitaBBt fixcc, and ml aa ■ d i w a p U yg damt 
ai the Empire wbieb ruled the greater pert cf the drfliaed world, tt atnlal 
the aniaa of (he acattend unil* «f the Esi|vc^ and lended greatly to heil 
thoae mnmdt infiieted hy dead and gone diaannni — (dbecrs>— ^ df 
things of long a^. That thoae vere not altogether ended, of couxea the; 
all kiiew, wtd it oerUinly marked an cTeoit wlucb couM bave only cw 
rcBoltr and th»t wae to lead Iriahmen to nEK^vtand not toanAf tfav 
jtatkm^ bat their Imperial iwptnualnltty. Tb* fornifttjoa of the InA 
n^maat of Qiurda waa alao a atep taken bj n«i Majtcty which mul 
conmumd itaelf to Iruhmen. It wu a moat fitting recognition of llw 
TsJour of their countrymen in the field, uA of the akill of lAwh g«Qttib 
(cbeere). Her Hajeaty'fl Tist to Ireluid «ia alfio a mark of a cJeanr 
aadervtaDding among tbe oanetitoent peoples of the United KingdoD. 
They bad not made thcar own deiitioy ; it had been imposed on tbeoit and 
they were linked together for ever^ ElnghAh^ IciBh, Scotch* ood Welsh, aad 
be thought it wu a moat fartucate omen for tbe future of the Brnpie, 
which they al:] had to adinmidt«r, that Her Majoaty ehoutd huve 
to pay a viiit to Ireland. 

He had noUced n T?ry corioue misapprehenfiiod of the attitude of the ! 
towards the Empire od the part of the foreiga critics. There were 
fiubjecte of diftppute &nA misunderfiUnding between Ecghsh and Ir 
very few of tbe foreign writera hod noiiceil that their attitude waa 
dieputante in a family quarrel Tbey were prepared to diflcuaa, even with 
unneceeeary faeat at tiiD(!«, their r««|^iecltve sidea of the quarrel, btit on the 
■nterrention of one wboni they conti^iTgd to he outside the circle of tbfi 
Empire, their attitude changed. That wna one of the greatest leaaoCM 
which tbe preuDt slate of affain ia South Africa impresGed upon tham« 
and tbe effect itneir waa emphaaieed by Her Hajeety's recciDt action' 
Anotlier thing which their foreign critioi hbl failed to aee waa the position 
of ih« Gn^liAh towards the Iri^h themHlves. One could not have lived 
for maay years Id Eogland without {leroeiviDg the extreme good-nature 
the abBolutc abeence of jealotuy, and tbe readiiiew to appreciate pnUte 
^rrico on the part of the Eoglish towardd the Irish, and most fordgneii 
absolutely failed to ^riiEp that fact. H« thought there lay a heavy burdeD 
on tbcm not to be behind in reciprocating thai feeliDg, and %o recogniee 
that however much they might dispute on minor iflnuea^ on the greato 







APPENDIX VII. 



[cBDGft which Affected the Bsfety of the Empire they were one with their 
En.glijih frieDdfl (loud cheere). The Imf»eriftl aeaitimcnt amfingBt the IriBh 
waa ufloally dewribed ty continenta] critics m nan-eiiatents but bethought 
that was a eoteiplet* ftulure to appreciate the facta, for they must remember 
that at all great criseB of the Empire'e fnte — from Waterioo to Delhi, from 
Kandahiir to AJeiandria^ from Khartoum to PaaMehprg, Irish ekill and 
Irish vflJour in the field had helped to create the Empire. In the more 
pmoetaS. fieid of the law, of adimniHtrutioDp and of diplomacy, Iriah wrvic* 
had ooiiBtitiited our people co-heirs of a great inhcrltaDce {loud cheers). 

Mr. Wood, in swconding the motion, aaid that DBver would ao order haTO 
baeq so gladly ohfiyiid a& the order for the wearing of the whamrMk on 
Su Patrick's Day, and he was «ure that Her Majeely would have no moro 
loyal and devoted Guard&men than the Iriah Guards (cheers). 

The reeolution was carried by floolunadon. 

LOBD B0BEBT& 

Dr. MoriuB WileoD moved the second Teflolution as follow* ; " That this 
meeting of IriBhmen wishes to convey to Lord Rolwrto their high appre- 
ciation of tho great aerricea he haa rendered to the British Empire, and, aa 
brother Irishmen^ to congratulate him and the troops under his commaod 
on the great succeBaes vrhich they have achieved. They hope and trust 
that the great work which he has still in hand may be br.iught ere long to 
a Hucceseful iseue, so that the BritiBh flag may triumphifujtly fly from Capo 
Point to the Zambesi. As Irishmen we drink your health and our 
brother countrymen's on this Bt. Patrick*B Day." He observed that Lord 
Boberta had come ovX to take the command of the forces in South Africa 
at a time when he was mourning the death of a son who had Iwd down 
hia lifo in the serrica of hia country, and Bin(»e his lordahip had been out 
here he had carried matters on in a way they all liked fhear, hear). For 
years p*Bt everj-one had looked forward to a United South Africa; the 
only difference in the point of view i^as that one section of the corajnunlty 
want&d it under ona flag, whilst they wanted it under the flag under which 
they were bom, (liad under which they lived (cheers). 

Mr. J. C, O'Riky seconded the resolution, and said that for the laat fifty 
years he had been a reeident of thia CoJony, and he had witnessed the 
arrival of every general since tho days of Sir Harry Smith Ln 1851- He 
also mentioned that ho had bpttM through the Kaffir War of 1851* *t a 
time when he waB scarcely bigger than the gun bo carried (cheers). 

The motion wa» passed with unanimous enthusiasm and hetfty 
cheering. 

A Scandal to CiviLtflATiOS. 

The Rev. Dr. McCarthy than moved tho next resolution, which read as 
follow! : " That this meeting of Iriah coloniata records its profound convtc- 



I 



3» 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



tioa tlut m the preftent mr the Empire ie Bgbting tor jtutice and p««oi, j 
UiA tendcri lo the High ComminioQer its absolute confidence and roBpaotftil ! 
•jmpathy in his grave anxietn." He said thtX, psvosoJlj he beld th&t 
the war wan juat umplj because it was imnTcddabte, and he took it ih^t 
the Enipir« was quite juniifiad in forcinz the TnuiBraal to remoTe the etate 
of oppression which existed, evep by the emiiloyment of force. Both 
l^aliy and luorally Great Britain was fuUj justified in taking such atepi 
aii should reiDore what bad b«>eD for a lon^ t>nie a scaodal to c'lvHicaiioo 
and in in«ult to their brethren, which they all felt (hear, hear). He mJ^ht 
also pumt out the tteCfiMtnly bad efTcct which the TraosTaal had upon 
the Dutch in the Cape Oc^y. He had lived lo th« country too long lu 
«ay that the Dut^h were disloyal. There wore disloyal Dutch no doubt, | 
but the tendency of things wa& audi that the prevalence of the Africander ' 
idea) in the Traasvaal meant a war for the ttxistence of the British flag, or 
else the reduction of all men except the burghen to the level of the popu- 
l^ion of Johannesburg. So he was firmly convinced that the Empire «aa 
fighting for justice and for peace, becaube if they had hesitated now they 
would have had to fight later on. It wa* not the Empire that had brokeai 
the peace; it wna thoae men wbo» by their irrwoodlable attitude^ had 
BhowD that their anxiety was to govem the whole of South Africa. 



Tex Htos CoumsstOHXs, 

He would ask them to recollect, moreover, if they bad ever hurd of a 
nation piling up arma which they did not intend lo uee; and while they 
piled up arms in the Transvaal, the Tranevaal emiuariefl had inraded the 
Colony, and while be was perfectly ready to acquit the majority of the 
Dutehmen or the Colony cf disloyalty, he waa perfectly eure that there 
was a conspiracy to oeduce them, and that it had succeeded only too well. 
In oonciusion, it only renmioHd for him to a«k them to tender fco Hit 
Excellency Sir Alfred Milner their absolute confidence (loud cheers). He 
regretted greatly to learn that under the recent strain Hia Excellency*! 
health had sufTered during the fiaat few weeks, but he would have th« 
sympathy of all honest Irishmen — (cheers) — and when hia tenn of office 
expired they would show him bow much they admired the courage and 
wiadom which Hia Excellency had shown in spite of domestic treason, 
iisault, and conttunely (renewed cheers). 

The Rev. J. J. McCIure, in Becoudiog the resolution, {aid aa eloquent 
tribute to the manner in which Sir Alfred Miber had conducted the euffairs 
of the Empire in South Africa, and observed thnt th^y must all feel proud 
of the part which their country had played in thia great struggle. 

The resolution waa carried with much enthnaiamn. 

On the motion of the Rev, Father O'Heilly, a vote of thanks wai p 
to Lady Roberta for the great work fthe haa done in aiding the familiee of I 



APPENDIX VII. 313 

Iriih loIdiflrBi and the prooeedicgs came to a cloae with the ringmg of (he 
National Anthem. 

The Queen's Iteply to the resolution moved by Dr. Farrelly addressed 
to Her Hajesty was transmitted by cable and forwarded through the 
hands of the H^;fa GommisHioner. 

Copy of message dated London, 17th March, l^X): — ^"The Queen 
sincerely thanks the Inshmen in Cape Town for their loyal message) 
unanimously agreed upon at a public meeting and transmitted through 
the High Commissioner. The sentiments which it expressed have greatly 
touched Her Majesty. The Queen has always felt confident that the 
same spirit of courage and allegiance which has distinguished her Irish 
soldiers in the face of the enemy would be shared by their brethren in 
the Colony in support of the authority of Her GoTemment." 

(Cape Timet, 19th March, 1900.) 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



ArrENDix vm. 



PROM THE STANDPOINT OF A MINISTER OP THE CBOWN 
IN CAPE COLONY. 

A Spkkgr dy the Hon. T. Lvkedoch Obibav« Q^C^ M.L.C., bov 
CoLoirUL Skcbkta&v iv TBI Fbieb^nt Cabutbt. 

The speoch yraa delivered at & mMtiog in mippnrt of the poUey of iht 
Imperial Qovernn^ent, held at Clarennoat, Cape Town, oa 30lh M<fch, 
l9<X)t 9^^ IB rapurted in the Gaj» TYttmi of Slat Marcb. 

"A OoVKBNOa WITH A BACiBONB.'* 

The Hod. T. L. Orahftm, Q.C., M.L.C., who waa received with luud asd] 
prolonged cheers, inoveHl : "Thai ihU meeting dwireg to piace ou reoonl 
its high Appreciation uf the conduct ttt H<ir Majesty's High CominiiiSiOIW 
throughout his tenure of oAice, and its comptete oon&deDce in the policy 
of Hor MajottiyV tTi'veroineut, fm ibiiiuDLfltered by hioL" (Lfjud ch(<en.) 
Hr, Gmh&ti) aaid, *^ I fibd mme dldiculty iu fulcquattily expregaiog my» 
in moving the resolution, because 1 (ael that fnw^ if Hny, of the dintiiwl 
guiahed indlvidmJei who bavo occupied the oneroua and raepoDsible 
poBitioD of High ComuiiftBioner of this Colony su mpidly gained the 
lasticg alfcctiun of the loyal irLhabiiontg uf ihla country as; Bir AMni 
Milner — (loud cheen) — aad thi» in spite of the fact that to the vwA 
majority of the iohahitiiats of South Africa wh«n Sir Alfred Uilnor 
HDcept«d that reaponsible position hin fi^re wua an unfamiliar one. W«J 
knew him ilh nn nble iifiholar. We kuew ham a» a brilluiQt trritvr, buti 
we hod. yet v> learn of those high qualities of stateBmaaship and aduiinis- 
tiatiDQ which we have now l«aTned by penioTiftl espenence, (Cheers, 
and a Voice : He's too sharp for Kniger.) I well remember wheat the 
question of a 9uccp«8or to Lord Ropmead won first mooted bow eagerly 
we icanned the cables frcnn England to fwe who wafl coming cmi as liigb 
Commisaionep. 1 wbU remember ihe crilicil iJeri<nl of His Bxcullency'a 
Kp^wintineiit. I recoUlect e^rly in February, laborlly after Sir Alfnd'i 
appointineot was pjumu^ateil^ an article had been pubUshed m the DaOy 
ChroRieU of London, then under its old riSgime, and edited by a nun 
whoRo Bjnjpathion were strongly pto^Buer, and in that article It waa 
pointed (mt that Sir Alfred Milner was coming to the Capo nt orie of the 
moflt critical perioda of its hiatoiyf and the writer wound up hie article, 



APPENDIX VIIL 



315 



I 



wbioh cre&fcod & t^ongide^&ble B^oaatioa At tha tAme, bj pointitig out th^t 
th« time would bo coiiaidared even more critical were it not for the full 
trast and confidence roposed ia Sir Alfred Milner's fairaesa arid honour. 
And the editor of tlio Chronids woe net the oulj person who hiid been 
prepared to eulogiw cur dov High Commi&sioDer, because we fouud at a 
public ftmction men of almost every ehadfi uf ptnlltlcal opmion uuited in 
vaihtng our High GommiARioner God-apMd, atid in coagratuia.titig the 
GoTerameat upon the excelleuc^ of their npiKiintment. We fuucd meu 
like Sir WUIiAm Harcourt, John Mcirlej, Lord Rofiebery, combinitig with 
Mr. Aaqiuth, Ur. Balfuur, and Mr. Goschen id iheir congratulatioDS, and 
we waited expectantly, and we have not been diBappointed. (Cheors.) 
We, huwever, soon found that in Sir Alfred Milner we had a man ol jrou 
will — (cheers)— and fearle«s courage — (renewed cheerB) — aod what was 
morOf a man who intended to do what he considered was b^t in the 
interests of tho Empire, entirely regardless of the conaequencea. (Gheeta.) 
I remember wtill haviEig a convenatioti with your mesaber (Mr. lunra), 
who&e Blo(][uent, and int«reBbin;g speech we have heard with such pleasure 
to-night, very shortly after Sic Alfred Milner'a arrival in thi& colony, 
Ferhape Mr. Innce^ will not mind my meiiUnaLng it. We were di&cuMint;- 
u everybody was at the time^ the High Cummisaioner, axiA I asked Mr. 
Innee what bin opmion was of the new High Commiesiioner. Mr. hmm 
Mid — I shall never forget liin worda — " Well, of oce thing I am perfectly 
certein. He lia« got a backbone ]ik« a lightning conductor." (Loud and 
prolongad cheers.) And if there was one thing that South Africa wantal 
at that tinifl it wae a man with a backbone, and within a very abort timo 
we have all been only too eager and onxioua to join in the ehoruH of 
praifie with which Sir Alfred Milner bad left the shores of Bngtand. 
(Hear, hear.) 

The Attacks on Sir Alfred Milseh. 

Now in what I have said I have been specially referring to the circum- 
maBcea ourfounding Hie. EscellencyV early appointment, for this reaeon, 
becauae lately we have eeen political parties in this eountry and in 
lnglftnd~('V^"ice: "Rebcle," and cheera) — people perhaps who eagerly 
and by all kinds of means, underhand and otherwifle, endeavouring to 
prove that Sir Alfred Milner wan a firebrand, Bent out here by Mr, 
Chamberlaia witli the deliborale object of phinging Great Britain into 
an unjuBt war \wth the Tranflvaal. (Criee of "Shame.") We know that 
that was abeolutely untrue. (Loud cheers.) We know that when Sir 
Alfred Milner arrived here his aympalhy with the Dutch wan a matter 
of regaril. In June, shortly after hU arrival, with the cheers of the 
Jubilee tttill ringing in hit, e&n, ho wrote a despatch to Mr Chamberlain 
in which be stated that iiotwithBtanding racial d]fticu]tie« in South Africa, 
BO far OB he could obflcrvBt they had no effeet on the loyalty of any sectiuti 
of the inhabitaat». (Chaers.) What waa it that made him changa his 



316 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



mizid? It waa the ioexonble logic of facu. It wu tfa&t that lud 
ehuiged hU mlml, and now we find Kim attacked by thoee penoue whom 
ha hvH referred to, and X imve been (;iideavotiriiig to aH»ftaJn on wfast 
grDucdft \hey based E.li«ir Attacks. First of all, m> fkr u I can leftm, the; 
»ud that Sir Alfred MUiier h&d rushed this DtRmtr; into ui unjust war. 
(" No.") Well, I would say, let them refer to the dwipfttches ; l*t tham 
refer to tho prolooged negotiattODS which preceded the ultimatum tiuA 
wjia tuyat by the TraoBvikal Republic, and 1 would uk, could any negotia- 
tioQB have baeo carried oa with mare patience, and with, greater tact 
than thoB6 conducted by Sir Alfred Milner? (Loud cheera.) When one 
came to read thoM deipatchc* aod follow the train of CTcotfi that led iqt 
to the wnr^ it was clear that if there was one tiling that the Bridsh 
GoTemmoDt desired it wa£ peace, and if there was one thing thAt the 
Britieh (iuvemmeDt desired to aruid it ww war, at aU axta, eaTiDg the 
leea of Britieh Bupremacy in South Africa. (Loud cbeere.) And thea 
another charge that has been hurled against Sir Alfred Milner wis that 
he made re6«ctioDe upon the lo'yolty of a. certain aectjon of the itdiabi- 
tonts. It was a charge which wa« seriauety advanced in the columns of 
certain papers appearing both here and in Engluid^ It certsinly did 
«ound comical in the light of events, when ws see a large socman of the 
inhabitants of this Colony who have broken out Into open rabelUoa. We 
have got to look not only at the rank and El«. We have beyond the 
more rank and file professional men, ficld-cometR, justices of the pnm 
galore, (Laughter and cheers.) We liave ministers af religion alod 
members of Pariiament (Loud groanp*) 

TBA.rro&s ik Pahuamskt. 

Tea, we have memfaerfi of Parliament^ and I will give them one or two 
little ]Jarticu]Brs with regard tc thesti latter gentry. (Cheers.) First of 
all, let us take the case of Vryburg. If you will take the map you will 
find that in every district into which a Boer commando entered the 
inhabitants of Dutch descent have risen with open arms to rocelTe them, 
not all of them, but the vaat majority who took Vryburg. Seventy-five 
per cent, of the inhabitant* were now either squatting round Mafeking, 
aidflftvouring to Bubdue tb* indamitable Badan-Powell — (loud and pro- 
longed {^heeni) — or else ibey were engaged in the more congenial oocupa- 
Uou of looting loyalists' farms. And, as I have said before, it was not 
only the rank and Sic, but we have a fair sprinkling of members of 
Parliament. What happened at Burghersdorp ? There was a patriotic 
gontleiuaQ, named Juubert. (Laughter,) He is at present, I believe, 
member for the district of Albert. When the Boer commandu entered 
Burghersdorp, of course this gentleman was there. One of the very first 
things done waa to raise a commando of rebels* and a couaiderable force 
was got together, which was captained by a well-known fieldHxraet, also 



I 
I 

r' 

f 

I 



APPENDIX VIII. 



317 



a Justicfl of the Peace — (laughter) — and a rebel commando eonMBtiog 
almoat eBtirely of Dutch Coloai-stB, Wha.t did thia patriotic geDtleman, 
Mr. Jouhert, do ? On tlie tnarket square at Burghersdorp he presented 
the gallant commatidAnt with a Free State flag, beaudfully embroidered, 
and eipreBsed the pious hope that ho would carry it with the force with 
honour and glory to victory. (Loud groaua and cries of " Traitor " aud 
** Uaog him.") That patriotic g«DtI«nian is Btill at Urge. And then 
there is another gantieman, well known to all memberB of Parlinment, 
whose speeches were read by all with tho very greatest attention. That 
gootleman i9 Mr. Van der Walt. (Groans and laughter.) t believe Mr. 
Van der Walt has been a meinher of Parliament Bioce the year 1884, or 
even longer. What has thiB gentleman done? He ir one of the most 
loquaelouB membetB in the House- Ho makes lengthy stfleehes on alnioet 
eTery coDceivable subject; hut never was ho bo eloquent as when ho was 
protesting the loyalty of the Dntch-Bpeaking inhabitants of thia cumitry. 
(Lotid laughter and che^rji,) Now, what haa Mr. Van der Walt done? 
When the oomniaudo arrived at Goleaberg he had welcomed tliam, and 
had made a speech, TJmt was not surprising, (Laughter,) And he 
told them, that m an old member of the Cape Parliament, the time had 
arrive*! when every Afrikander should work Bhoulder to shoulder. That 
gentleman is also i)til| at large. Then cliey came to a sumewlmt painful 
subject That is, the colleague of the TreMurer-Geoeral. I will not Bay 
anythm^ about him^ — (A Voice i " Do ") — becauee he waa ia durance vile, 
(Laughter.) Last, and perliapn not lea;st, we have that reverend pAtdot, 
Mr. Schroder, of UiJiugtori. Until very recently he waa the Landdrost 
of Upington, and at the Baine time he never kneiv when he might be 
Cfidled upon to take hia seat in the Cape Parliament, lu the face of all 
thiu, can we not e&j that 8ir Alfred Milner waa perfectly right i:i making 
aap«THioua u[>on tho loyalty of certain mhabitanta of thia colony ? And 
we have only to look clo^e at band and read the speechua which many of 
the membera who attend these so-tailed Christian meetingB make, aud we 
will find violent treason in a very large number of tliem. (Hear, hear.) 



k 



The Gratitt of the SrroATtos. 



It 19 ft Bignifieant fact that the military authorities hail found it ncces- 
Bary to place tenn of thouBand.^ of men ou the HneH of conmiuniuation 
between this and BloiiilfouteiD, (Cheers.) I will go farther, and say 
that it waa Sir Alfred Milner's duty to draw the attention of the English 
people to the state of affaira which osisted in this colony. FortUQutely, 
not only the people of Great Britain, but the people of Greater Britain 
over the aea, had recognised the gravity of the dtuation, and had made 
up their minda that such a state of affairs ahould never esist again in 




3i« THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 

Seuth Africa {Loud eh«en,) Tbej ant mrm of Uieir \>eKt men, muj 
of urimn had pra op cbeir Iitm figbiitig for the old flag. In the wonU 
of on* oT their moit •loqamt ooionul Premien, ** Etecj buUet thai ftndi 
tt« WAj to the be«Tt of our cotoaul »oldi«r8 u sjt imeaBtAdB rivet ia tb 
links of that ch^n which wejds together th« difiereDt [«rt« of the Britufa 
&njHre." (Lotid cheers.) I will just brudSr refer to un^er ceriei of 
charges BguuBt Hn Eicellency. It has been mid thi.t Sir Alfred Uibar 
bad diarcgardedi tli« adTlee of his oootfituttotiAl tninislers. (Laughter 
aoA a Voice: All rebels.) Well, he eeruinly dedioed to jettUoa the 
UitJaoder. He cerUiiilj put lut foot dowD when Ivge quaotitieB of 
ammunition were being sent orer our nilwajra to the Free State at the 
tiiiM when thoee extnordina^ eiEpnesioiia of Deutr&lity wrre being made 
bj the Pmnc MiDister of this odIddj; the doctrine thnt an integral pvt 
of the British Empire coul<i retnfiin neutral m the stniggla I think yen 
will agree with me that Hifl F.xceUeDcy waa right. (Loud cheers.) 

SLA.in>KIII2IQ THE HiGB (^mCESSlOSEA. 

But I can hardlj beliere that theno ch&rgea were lerelled against tael 
head of the High CotamiASwner and the Governor of thi^ colony. 1/ it ie ' 
true that the Gofemor had a Bcrjoita diM^reement with hie nimistere, thejr 
hA<i ft roDetittttii^tial course o].ie[i to them, which perliapn they might baTe 
Bilu|/t&i, Of course tbii remedy inYolred retlremeot; but I do not think 
that the representativee of a pvty who had the monopol; of that 
"rightwumesB which exalteth a ttation** would eobaid^ auch a questiun 
on such a vitAl point. (Laughter.) Thef had their qoiiRtitutioiuJ remedy, , 
They had not choecn to t&ke it^ but had remained in office. I thit^ ' 
that was the i^n^eat ar-^umeDt in favour of the luggestion that then 
could not be any very Iarg« amount of disagreement betwecEo theGovenHir 
and his coniititutioDal BAi^isers. (Hear, hear.) It has been said by my 
friaod Mf. Innes that, after all, was tiiere any neGMBity at the preeent 
moment to raise any agitation, wheq the bulk of thinking people io 
Epglaod weTtt with UA, when the hulk of the Wlouiw were with at, was 
there any reanon why we should not sit abeolutely quiet and allow 
nmttera to take their course? I feel that in 1881 and 1882, if the truth 
had been kni^iwn to tlio Etnpire, than war mig;ht never haf^ been rained. 
(Hear, hear.) ConReqiiently, I would echo the wish that hoa been 
BxpreHBed by the lant B{«eaker, aod urge u{>jd you to roll up at the 
mee)ing which haa beeu organised by the Vigilance Conunittee» and I 
will go one step farther^ and ask you to put your i^amos down on the 
Vigilance Committee. Itn sole object is to carry out the mocicui which 
you have juBt enthuBiostically passed. (Loud cheers.) 



APPENDIX IX. 



319 



APPENDIX IX. 



FROM THE STANDPOINT OP A LOYAL WOMAK IN SOUTH 

AFRICA. 

Ah Opeh Lbtter pkoh Mrs. T. Ltnedoch Orabas. 
The Cape Timu of 12lh July contaiaa the ftjllowiDg upen iBttor : — 

To Mra. CroDwriglit'Sohremer. 

Wynberg HUl, July 10. 

Sir» — Can you fiod Bjiace in your paper for tluB open letter to Mm. 
CroBWright-Schreinflr ?— 1 am, etc., 

A. Gbah^m. 



July 10, 1900. 

Dear Mrs, &cbreiaer, — Ab only Bympathiaere with the view* rjf your 
own party were iiivited to the meeting in Cftpe Town yeetenlay aftemooo, 
I could not, of course, be present, but your Fijeech in reported m this 
taoming'B paper, ho thougk we might not hear there ig evideutly no 
abjection to our reading It, koA I should like to moke a few retoarkB 
upon it, 

Uu fortunately we wotnei) on the other side haTe do Olive S^bmnw to 
Toice our aentimenta on public pUtformn, ao mosB meetings are cot muoh 
in our hne. Bui do not imagiDe that because we are silent, we do not 
tixiflt, or that bocauKe we make no noise we are in the minority. The 
women of South Africa who bdEieve in the juHtice of the British cause are 
in A great majontyp aud their feelings on the rights &nd witynga of the wiir 
are deep if eilenL 

You say you have received letters from Canada, AuetralLa^ New 
Zealiknd, and other English colonies, coodenming the war luid the propoflal 
to umex the RepuhhcB, DouhtletM you have. Thi^re are cranks in every 
commuuity. But gliall I tell you. what we huve recuved ? Not letters, 
hut men^ iJien whif have flock©] tu the, Tinperinl stimdard and gladly 
given their blood to fight for tlie caune that they beliei'e to be jUBt, Men 
in hundreiiB have voluntarily come frum all those very pUces from which 
it IB your boant to eay that you have received kttere. The cause for 
which men will die is more likely to be fundamentally eight than the one 
for which they will only write letters. 

Tou dare to accuse ub of a " Hideoua crime a<;aiuBt juatice and 
humanity j," the "ludeouB crime agdust juEtice and humanity'^ Ilea at 




520 



THE SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WAR 



the ituir uf th« R«iiuhUc!A. The wu wu none of otur malo&g. ThtJ 
nutle iuDg uul careful prepuBlioiiSa they spent niitUons un amumenti ; 
Ihej Uubched the ultlniatutn, thfiy l&TAded our teniCurin, ftnd ^kdin; vb 
iiDpre[-n.red» Id the first dark days of the wv, they »lcv the flower of our 
manhood by bundred^ To pleotl in joBdCcatlovi ihit ther did all lhi» ta 
•df-defeno^ on accoust of Qmt BritamV threoteDmg a^Httidt\ i« q poor 
■i^mffDt. I wonder how much «zouk your friends woiUd find for me if 
I tnet you Kottie day and killed you, bttaujae I fancied you looked fervcion* j 
and might be meaning EQurder ? Over and ov«r again we have given bJood | 
and treasure to aare these same Boer* froiD extinction by the native tribal | 
that awana around them ; we iguored the ih&mefu] defeat of Hajufaa, 
ulthough our troops, roady to wipe it out* were actually in Table Bay; 
and thie« 1>ec&iiBe the conacience of the Britiah people thought the Boen 
had some right on thtar bide. And what was the return we got ? Hardly 
were Olir lMck» ttimal than pome o( the p«o;)le of this colony, thinking 
they scented weakjiess in our treatment of the Trnnevaa],, b^an to 
conepire to turn vm out of South Africa altogether. As far back as 1882 
{which was before the Jameson Raid, you knaw) this dream of a United 
South Africa for the Afrikanderv, under a Dutch flag, was fitst dreamt of 
and ]i]titteil for; and tliia Miheming and plotting has never ceaaed since. 
Read the artictee uniler the title '* De TraQsVaalBcbe Oorlog^ which 
appeared in De {'atnot in I8b2, and deny it if you can. 

Voui- par&llel of a eurgioai oiteration h px^S, but it IHts us better than it 
does you. We all know a Hrious surgical operation w not undertaken 
for fan, neither in a great war undertaken for the benefit of a few 
ca^talicta^ as you pretend to think. We tried a Surgical operation in ' 
1H81, and We wBr6 both Btupid and careless — we left some of the iDstrxi- I 
ment« uf discord in the wound ; we gave the Tranrraal a badly-worded I 
Convention &nd the right to arm itself to the teeth, although erery child 
knew the only Fou'er thoRc guniiE mid cannon were to be used against waa 
Great Britain. We have e.uH'ered long, and now we aie going through 
anothflr Burgicnl operation. This time, please God, we will be cjore 
Careful, and Iwve do instrument* inside tu cnuse a festering aore in the 
future. We should be fools indeed if we did not proiit by experience ; if i 
we left the Transvaal and the Free State the independence they have so 
grOafily ftbuHiH, R) that they might again liave the Bat iRfaCtion uf mv^adiiig 
our territoriee and opprcf»ing our HubjectB or soon a^ tbe khaki hack« of 
our aoldiere were turned. Tbe Re]mblicf! have made a bid for Kmpire^ and 
played im for a great intake, and in a fair Jigbt they have been beaten ; if 
the peace you talk bo much about is dear to your heart, now is the time 
to show it. Bid thenv i>ay their stakea like honourable men, then bury 
the hachet and shake hands; that \i tbe only way to promote peace:. 
What would you Bay of* man, who having loat hia game, went whimper- 
ing round to hie frienda asking them to try and get bim let off paying his 



APPENDIX IX. 331 

stakes — his debts of honour ? Tou would say he was a mean, dishcmour- 
able cur, that no decent man would speak to. What is dishonourable in 
an individual is dishonourable in a nation. 

You talk glibly of the " loftiest traditions of English morality " ; would 
you not be serving your country better if yoa tried to inculcate some of 
this lofty morality into your own countrymen and country-women, instead 
of insisting that there shall be no peace, because your wish is father to 
your thought, and you have not got your own way about the war ? 

My dear lady, under all that political Inas and personal bittemeos, I 
think your heart ia really tender. Think a little sometimes of our 
desolate homes and the dear ones we, too, have lost, and give up eggji^ 
on an unfortunate people to shed more blood in a lost cause. The game 
has been played, and lost and won; to go on killing now is surely 
murder in the sight of Qod. It is His decree that the British arms should 
be victorious, and after all is said and done, there might certunly be a 
worse fate than to become citizens of the greatest Empire the world has 
ever seen. — I am, etc., 

A. Gbaram. 



LOITDOS : 

PRCtTBD BT WILLIAM CLOWES AXD SONS, LDIITrp, 

■tAXrOBD STBIRT AXI» rRAKIKO ntOSB.